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*Maritime Average and Seaborne Trade in Early
Modern Genoa, 1590-1700*

Submitted by Antonio Iodice to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History and to the University of Genoa as a thesis for the degree of Doctor in Economics in July 2021.

Signature:

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Abstract

English

This thesis examines Average procedures in Genoa during the seventeenth century (1590-1700). Genoa was the capital of an oligarchic Republic, ruled by an elite of patricians actively involved in maritime trade, shipping, international finance and credit. Average, in particular General Average (GA), is a procedure to redistribute among all parties involved – shipowners and merchants – unexpected costs arising during the course of a maritime expedition, due to damages or other expenses. This is one of the oldest surviving maritime rules, whose origins predate Roman law.

The port of Genoa constitutes a privileged observation point in the early modern Mediterranean. Allied to the Spanish Empire, the Republic adopted a policy of political neutrality in order to survive the great changes that characterized the international scenario. Thanks to the administrative and economic policies adopted, the port was one of the main redistributive emporium in the Mediterranean, acting also as a fundamental hub for the economy of the region.

This dissertation develops around two well-defined layers. On the one hand, I investigate the Genoese regulations governing Average and its development from the medieval to the early modern period. I discuss, for example, the parallelisms, mutual influences and divergences with respect to other Mediterranean regulations. On the second layer, Average procedures drawn up in Genoa have been processed and inserted in the *AveTransRisk* database in order to elaborate statistical series. These series, structured around intervals of years selected on a sample basis, allowed reconstructing the trends of maritime trade calling at the port of Genoa. The sources analysed, unpublished and particularly rich in information, have also allowed further observations regarding the structure of early modern international maritime trade, Mediterranean cabotage trade and the management of maritime risk by the actors involved.

Italian

Questa tesi esamina le procedure di ‘avaria’ marittima a Genova nel corso del diciassettesimo secolo (1590-1700). Genova fu la capitale di una repubblica oligarchica, retta da una élite di patrizi attivamente coinvolti nel commercio marittimo, nell’armamento e in operazioni di finanza e credito internazionale. L’avaria marittima, e in particolare l’avaria generale (GA), è invece una procedura volta a ridistribuire i costi imprevisi che sorgono nel corso di una spedizione marittima, dovuti a danni o a spese di altra natura, tra le parti interessate: armatori e mercanti. Si tratta di una delle più antiche consuetudini del diritto marittimo, le cui radici risalgono al diritto romano.

Il porto di Genova costituisce un punto di osservazione privilegiato nel Mediterraneo di età moderna. Alleata dell’impero spagnolo, la repubblica adottò una sempre più marcata politica di neutralità che le permise di sopravvivere ai grandi mutamenti che caratterizzarono lo scenario internazionale. Grazie alle politiche amministrative ed economiche adottate, nella prima età moderna il porto si impose come uno dei principali empori nel Mediterraneo, fungendo anche da fondamentale punto focale per l’economia della regione.

La tesi si sviluppa su due piani ben precisi. Da un lato si indaga la normativa genovese che regola le Avarie e i suoi sviluppi dall’età medievale alla età moderna. Si riprendono, ad esempio, i parallelismi, le influenze reciproche e le divergenze rispetto alle altre normative mediterranee. Sul secondo piano, le informazioni tratte dalle procedure di avaria redatte a Genova sono state elaborate e inserite nel database *AveTransRisk* per elaborare delle serie statistiche. Tali serie, strutturate intorno a intervalli selezionati a campione, hanno permesso di ricostruire i trend del commercio marittimo facente capo al porto di Genova. La documentazione consultata, inedita e particolarmente ricca di informazioni, ha inoltre permesso di formulare ulteriori osservazioni in merito alle strutture del commercio marittimo internazionale in età moderna, al commercio di cabotaggio mediterraneo e alla gestione del rischio di mare da parte degli attori coinvolti.

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A particularly big thank you goes to my sister, Giulia, who has read and checked my first draft chapters, and to Maria Francesca, who can show an almost convincing interest when I talk to her about my research.

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COVID-19 Impact Statement

In this preliminary statement, I would like to outline the impact that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic had on the dissertation I submit to the University of Exeter and the University of Genoa, entitled *Maritime Average and Seaborne Trade in Early Modern Genoa, 1590-1700*.

Recognising that the pandemic has had an impact on us all, with differential effects, the disruption to my thesis has been minimal. Fortunately, I was well along the duration of the ongoing pandemic. Archival research was mostly done during 2018 and 2019, so limited access to the archives did not have an excessive impact. Digital publications obtained through libraries in Exeter and Genoa allowed me to make up, where possible, for library closures during the first half of 2020. Some of the archival work was not completed until September and October 2020. The archives staff allowed me to make digital reproductions of the documentation needed to complete this dissertation.

As a doctoral student in a bilateral agreement with the University of Genoa, I received a first dose of COVID-19 vaccine in March 2021. This has allowed me, in recent months, to work on the dissertation in the Department of Economics at the University of Genoa. I have been regularly in touch with one of my supervisors, Maria Fusaro. I could also rely on the presence in Genoa of my other supervisor, Luisa Piccinno.

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Measures and Currencies Conversion Rates

The currency and measurement provided in this section are based on information found in metrology handbooks. Where possible, this data has been cross-referenced with Average sources, in which exchange rates are often included.

Throughout the dissertation, reference is made to the vessels' tonnage. The term 'tonnage' is used here in the meaning of maximum net load that can be stowed below deck, which is the one in which it was consistently used in the Genoese sources of the time. It corresponds to the freight tonnage or *tonnellata di nolo* or *tonneau d'affrètement*.¹

Weight measures²:

1 *cantaro* = kg. 47.64.

1 *mina* = kg. 90.985.

1 *lasto* or *lastro* = 25 *mine* = kg. 2,274.6.³

1 Genoese *salma* = 4 *cantari* = kg. 190.56.

1 Sicilian *salma* = 2.36 *mine* = kg. 214.72.

Liquid measures:

1 wine barrel = lt. 79.5.⁴

1 *mezzarola* = lt. 158.04.

Currencies:

The main currencies found in Average sources are Genoese *lire*, which are generally used in calculations from 1590 to around the third quarter of the century, and Spanish silver pieces of eight, which is the currency for those Average calculations drafted at the end of the century. This latter coin was equivalent to the Spanish *real* or dollar and became widely used in international

¹ F.C. Lane, 'Tonnages, Medieval and Modern', *The Economic History Review* 17/2, 1964, 213-233, 216.

² G. Giacchero, *Il Seicento e le compere di San Giorgio*, Genoa, 1979, 695-696.

³ For the sake of simplicity, this value has been calculated as equivalent to 25 *mine*. The exchange rate in the sources examined varied between 25 and 27 *mine*. Giacchero quotes Finetto Oberto, who valued the Polish and Danzig *lasto* equal to 25 *mine*, the Hamburg *lasto* to 27 *mine* and the Amsterdam *lasto* to 25.5 *mine*.

⁴ For the sake of simplicity I have chosen the value used at the end of the seventeenth century. In 1606, for example, a wine barrel measured 78.36 lt.

trade. Genoese *lire* were subdivided into *soldi* (of which there were twenty to a piece) and *denari* (of which there were twelve to a *soldo*). Prices are expressed in the sources using a point to separate each unit of value, for instance, 5.17.10.

1 Genoese *lira* = 20 *soldi* = 12 *denari*.

1 Sicilian *scudo* (1699) = 5.10 Genoese *lire*.⁵

Genoese <i>lira</i> /silver conversion rate ⁶	
1594-1596	8.362 gr.
1597-1629	8.176 gr.
1630-1631	6.512 gr.
1632-1642	6.236 gr.
1643-1646	6.132 gr.
1647-1653	5.661 gr.
1654-1659	5.411 gr.
1660-1670	5.256 gr.
1671-1674	4.972 gr.
1675-1740	4.841 gr.

Genoese <i>lire</i> per 1 Spanish piece of eight ⁷	
1594	2.19.6 <i>lire</i>
1600 ^{GA}	3.2 <i>lire</i>
1601/1601 ^{GA}	3.1 <i>lire</i> /3.3 <i>lire</i>
1632	4 <i>lire</i>
1638 ^{GA}	4.2 <i>lire</i>
1639 ^{GA}	4.2 <i>lire</i>
1643	4.2 <i>lire</i>
1647	4.8 <i>lire</i>
1653	4.12 <i>lire</i>
1656	4.14 <i>lire</i>
1659	4.16 <i>lire</i>
1669 ^{GA}	4.16 <i>lire</i>
1671	5 <i>lire</i>

⁵ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50367.

⁶ G. Felloni, G. Pesce, *Le monete genovesi. Storia, arte ed economia nelle monete di Genova dal 1139 al 1814*, Genoa, 1975, 210.

⁷ This table is based on the one in Giacchero, *Il Seicento*, 694. To the values reported by Giacchero I added the conversion rates found in the *AveTransRisk* online db. These are available through the 'advanced search' function on <http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/avetransrisk/search/advanced/>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

1675	5.2 <i>lire</i>
1695 ^{GA}	5 <i>lire</i>
1696 ^{GA}	5 <i>lire</i>
1698 ^{GA}	5 <i>lire</i>
1699 ^{GA}	5 <i>lire</i>
1700 ^{GA}	5 <i>lire</i>
1702 ^{GA}	5 <i>lire</i>
GA = Based on GA sources	

Genoese <i>lire</i> per 1 Genoese silver <i>scudo</i> ⁸	
1591 ^{GA}	3.4 <i>lire</i>
1592 ^{GA}	4.7-4.8 <i>lire</i>
1593-1604/1598-1599 ^{GA}	4.10 <i>lire</i>
1605-1607	4.12 <i>lire</i>
1608	4.14 <i>lire</i>
1609-1610	4.14-4.16 <i>lire</i>
1611	5-5.2 <i>lire</i>
1612-1615	4.10 <i>lire</i>
1616	4.18-5 <i>lire</i>
1617-1619	5-5.4 <i>lire</i>
1620-1622	5.4 <i>lire</i>
1623-1626	5.7-5.10 <i>lire</i>
1627	5.11 <i>lire</i>
1628-30	5.12-5.14 <i>lire</i>
1631	5.15-5.18 <i>lire</i>
1632-1637	5.18-5.19 <i>lire</i>
1638	5.19-6 <i>lire</i>
1639-1642/1640 ^{GA}	6/5 <i>lire</i>
1643-1645	6.2 <i>lire</i>
1646-1648	6.8-6.10 <i>lire</i>
1649-1655	6.12-6.16 <i>lire</i>
1656	6.18 <i>lire</i>
1657-1660	7 <i>lire</i>
1661-1668	7.4 <i>lire</i>
1669	7.6 <i>lire</i>
1670-1672	7.8 <i>lire</i>
1675	7.12 <i>lire</i>
GA = Based on GA sources	

⁸ This table is based on the one in Giacchero, *Il Seicento*, 694. To the values reported by Giacchero I added the conversion rates found in the *AveTRansRisk* online dd. These are available through the 'advanced search' function on <http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/avetransrisk/search/advanced/>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

Further readings:

F. Oberti, *Aggiustamento universale ovvero corrispondenza che hanno i pesi e le misure di tutte le cose l'una con l'altra...*, Genoa, 1672.

P. Rocca, *Pesi e misure antiche di Genova e del Genovesato*, Genoa, 1871.

A. Martini, *Manuale di metrologia ossia misure, pesi e monete in uso attualmente e anticamente presso tutti i popoli*, Turin, 1883.

M. Giagnacovo, *Appunti di metrologia mercantile genovese. Un contributo dalla documentazione aziendale Datini*, Florence, 2014.

Terminology

There was no standardised spelling in the seventeenth century. The notaries and officials who wrote the documents examined in the following pages translated foreign names of both people and vessels into seventeenth-century local vernacular Italian. Juan Sanchez, for instance, becomes Giovanni Sances, and so on with other foreign names. The vessel *Merchant of Dover* becomes *Il mercante di Dover*. There is no correct spelling and we cannot always be sure of the original name or pronunciation. I have therefore adopted the names given by the sources throughout this dissertation.

Regarding the roles on board a vessel, I employed the original terminology whenever possible. The main exception is the use of the Italian word '*capitano*'. This has been translated with the word 'shipmaster' throughout. I left the term *patrone* when the sources used it. What was known as *patrone* in early modern Genoa could be both the 'master' and the 'owner' of a vessel.¹ In Genoa in the fifteenth century, the most influential *patroni* were the owners of large vessels who negotiated with the government to obtain broader control and intervention powers in everything related to maritime shipbuilding.² Luciana Gatti, a scholar of early modern Mediterranean maritime history, pointed out how the *patrone* was usually both master and owner of a small vessel.³ In the case of larger vessels, the expression *patronus in terra* was used to indicate the main owner of the vessel, who was in charge of the maritime business. The *patronus in maris* was often a secondary owner who was in charge of navigation. Carats (*carati*) were the shares of ownership in which a vessel was divided in Genoa among the *caratisti*, the shareholders. In the seventeenth century, the term *patrone* began to be used exclusively for masters and owners of small vessels. The nautical dictionary of Simone Stratico, published in 1813, defines him as indifferently captain or master of a merchant vessel. In particular, captain or master of a small tonnage vessel. Stratico compared him to the English 'master'

¹ See the definition of *Patrone* in 'Roles on board merchant ships during the seventeenth century', available on <https://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/history/research/centres/maritime/resources/sailingintomodernity/roles/>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

² M. Calegari, 'Patroni di nave e magistrature marittime: i *Conservatores Navium*', *Miscellanea Storica Ligure* II/1, 1970, 57-91, 59-60.

³ L. Gatti, *Navi e cantieri della repubblica di Genova (secoli XVI-XVIII)*, Genoa, 1999, 413.

or 'commander'.⁴ Subsequent nautical dictionaries, and this is particularly evident in that edited by Francesco Corazzini, take up Stratico's definition and sanction the erroneous equivalence between *patrone* and captain.⁵ More details on the different roles on board and their translation in the main European languages can be found in the table of roles compiled by the ERC project, *Sailing into Modernity*.⁶

Regarding vessel types, I stuck to the original terminology used in the sources. The characteristics of the vessels listed in the table below could vary significantly depending on the period, the site of construction or their use.

Vessel type	Tonnage (tons)	N. of masts	N. of decks	Crew	Notes
Nave/Navi	95-595	3	2	23-70	Big armed vessel. Sails.
Orca/Orche	around 667				Northern vessel. Sails.
Galeotta/ Galeotte		2	1	37-140	Small galley. Rows and sails.
Galeone/ Galeoni	476-1,190	2-4			Armed vessel, often used in convoys. Sails.
Brigantino/ Brigantini	10-24	2	1	15+rowers	Light Mediterranean vessel. Rows and sails.
Feluca/ Feluche		1-2	1	6-12	Light Mediterranean vessel. Rows and sails.
Fregata/ Fregate	4-7	1-2	1	6-15	Light Mediterranean vessel. Rows and sails.
Barca/Cimba Barche/Cimbe	20-200	2-3	2	18	Mediterranean armed vessel. Rows and sails.
Leudo/Liuto Leudi/Liuti	4-29	1-2	1	3-10	Light Mediterranean vessel. Rows and/or sails.
Pinco/Pinchi	27-230	3	1	12-26	Light Genoese vessel.
Polacca/ Polacche	76-280	2	1	10-20	Light Mediterranean vessel.
Tartana/ Tartane	19-43	1-2	1	10	Light Mediterranean vessel.
Petacchio/ Petacchi	167-334			9	Mediterranean vessel.

⁴ See the definition of *Padrone*, in S. Stratico, *Vocabolario di Marina in tre lingue*, I, Milan, 1813, 327.

⁵ See the definition of *Padrone* in F. Corazzini, *Vocabolario Nautico Italiano*, V, Bologna, 1906, 233-235.

⁶

The table is based on data provided by Luciana Gatti.⁷ Preference was given to data from sources from the second half of the sixteenth to the seventeenth century. The word '*nave*' in seventeenth century Italian could also refer to a generic vessel. For this reason, I did not employ the vessel type '*nave*' in the dissertation, unless I had information on the vessel's tonnage.

The first document that makes up an Average procedure is the shipmaster's report. In the sources, this document, despite the theoretical distinctions, is indifferently referred to as *consolato*, *testimoniale*, *manifesto* or otherwise. I minimise the use of these terms and, where present, they refer to the terminology used in a specific document, not to its drafting criteria. For this reason, I have decided to use the term 'report' throughout.

With regards to places, I have always adopted that name which will be most familiar to a non-specialist Anglophone reader. I have thus used the common English names of major Italian cities (Venice, Naples, and so on) rather than their Italian names. I have used [?] after place names that could not be identified.

Shipmasters in the examined sources usually employed the expression *Merci diverse* ('miscellaneous goods') to refer to mixed cargoes loaded in boxes, barrels, bales, crates, packages, bundles, etc. This expression has been translated throughout the text with the current formula of 'General Cargo'.⁸

All dates here have been given according to our modern calendar, which is the Gregorian calendar beginning on 1 January. Genoa adopted the Gregorian calendar immediately after the publication of the Papal bull *Inter gravissimas* in 1582.⁹

I have kept the names of magistracies in their original language. This is to avoid a proliferation of different translations being adopted in Anglophone scholarship on Genoa.

All citations have been translated. When needed, I inserted the original text in the footnote. All translations are my own unless otherwise stated. I have expanded abbreviations in order to aid legibility.

⁷ Gatti, *Navi e cantieri*, 145-245.

⁸ On the definition of General Cargo, see 'General Cargo', in *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 2005. Available on <https://www.thefreedictionary.com/general+cargo>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

⁹ On the different timing with which European countries adopted the Gregorian calendar, see A. Cappelli, *Cronologia, cronografia e calendario perpetuo. Dal principio dell'era cristiana ai nostri giorni*, Milan, 1930.

Finally, I have capitalised the words General Average (GA), Particular Average (PA) and Average (meaning GA and PA with no particular distinction) throughout where the words refer to a maritime Average. When referring to a mathematical average, I have used lower case.

Abbreviations used:

ed. = editor/edition

eds. = editors

r. = recto

v. = verso

cc. = carte

chap. = chapter

par. = paragraph

n. = number

doc. = document

Archival References and Abbreviations

The documents in the Archivio di Stato di Genova examined in this dissertation are usually bound in *filze*. Each *filza* contains several hundred documents (mostly loose sheets and files) held together by a string through a central hole and protected at the ends by two covers of equal dimensions.¹ Each *filza* is numbered, but the sheets inside it are usually not. Within each *filza*, the cases are generally usually arranged in chronological order. That is why I referred to documents in a *filza* either by specifying the date in which they were drafted, or by specifying their corresponding ‘id number’ in the *AveTransRisk* database.²

The archival references follow the format: archive – *archival series* – subseries – case number (when available) – date of drafting.

Abbreviations pertaining to archival references are as follows:

Archivio di Stato di Genova = ASG

Conservatori del Mare = CdM

Notai Giudiziari = NG

Notai Antichi = NA

Archivio Segreto = AS

Biblioteca = Bibl.

Manoscritti = ms.

San Giorgio = SG

Archivio Storico del Comune di Genova = ASCG

Magistrato dell’Abbondanza = MA

Manoscritti = ms.

Padri del Comune = PdC

Biblioteca Civica Berio = BCB

Centro di studi e documentazione di Storia economica “Archivio Doria” = ADG

Biblioteca Universitaria di Genova = BUG

Manoscritti = ms.

¹ See P. Carucci, *Le fonti archivistiche: ordinamento e conservazione*, Rome, 1998.

² References will be given directly in the online database, according to the following formula: the voyage has been recorded in the *AveTransRisk* online db with the id 50xxx. The voyages are numbered from 50000 to 50895. The database is available on <http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/avetransrisk>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

Noi partimmo da Iolco una mattina come questa, ed eravamo tutti giovani e
avevamo gli dèi dalla nostra. Era bello varcare, senza pensare all'indomani. Poi
cominciarono i prodigi.

Era un mondo più giovane, Méliata, i giorni come chiare mattine, le notti di
tenebra spessa – dove tutto poteva succedere. Di volta in volta i prodigi erano
fonti, erano mostri, eran uomini o rupi. Di noi ne scomparvero, qualcuno morì.
Ogni approdo era un lutto.

Ogni mattina il mare era più bello, più vergine. La giornata passava nell'attesa.
Poi vennero piogge, vennero nebbie e schiume nere. [...] Non era il mare il
rischio. Noi s'era capito, d'approdo in approdo, che quel lungo cammino ci
aveva cresciuti.

C. Pavese, 'Gli Argonauti', in *Dialoghi con Leucò*, Milan, 2021 (1st ed. 1947),
166-167.

Introduction

In the past decades, maritime history enjoyed a revival and entered the mainstream of historical research. This led to a series of methodological problems, also in connection with its relation to global history.¹ According to many historians, the bond between maritime and global history emerged since the age of geographical discoveries: in fact, maritime travel became the medium that allowed the emergence of networks of global communications and exchange.² Maritime history, however, has been tightly linked also to European imperialism, as the control of maritime routes was often a necessary requirement before beginning military and political expansion on land. This is true, especially, if we consider maritime studies on the British Empire.³ The new challenge of contemporary 'imperial' history, according to Maria Fusaro, is, therefore, to avoid making them 'imperialistic'.⁴

The presence of small Republican states in early modern Europe, often looked at as alternative and 'secondary' political systems compared to the main monarchic kingdoms, can help to overcome the 'imperialist' perspective.⁵ Small states usually did not have the political and military power to control maritime routes: they had to overcome this problem in some other way. One possible solution, for example, was the adoption of neutrality policies that allowed the development of emporia. It is for this reason that Genoa was selected as an observation point for the Mediterranean world at a time of swift changes. Although its role might appear as secondary compared to the main European nation-states, we must keep in mind, on the one hand, the role of its patrician class in international finance, and on the other hand, the importance of the traffic calling at the port of Genoa. This dissertation aims at analysing its main trade dynamics using an unpublished and almost unknown source: the Average

¹ M. Fusaro, A. Polonia eds., *Maritime History as Global History*, St. John's, 2011.

² M. Fusaro, 'Maritime history as global history? The methodological challenges and a future research agenda', in Fusaro, Polonia eds., *Maritime History*, 267-282, 274.

³ G. O'Hara, 'The Sea is swinging into view': modern British maritime history in a globalised world', *The English Historical Review* CXXIV/510, 2009, 1109–1134.

⁴ Fusaro, 'Maritime history', 276. See, as an example of a new kind of imperial, global and maritime history, S. Strootman, F. van den Eijnde, R. van Wijk eds., *Empires of the sea. Maritime power networks in world history*, Leiden-Boston, 2020.

⁵ A. Holenstein, T. Maissen, M. Prak eds., *The Republican Alternative. The Netherlands and Switzerland compared*, Amsterdam, 2008.

procedures.⁶ At the same time, I study the influence of normative rules and of Genoese jurists' texts in the legal evolution of this institution within an international perspective.

Genoa is located at the Northern edge of the Tyrrhenian Gulf, surrounded by growing rival centres, like Livorno, Marseille, and Nice. During the early modern period, this small Republic, traditionally perceived as a 'weak' state, managed to survive and maintain its independence in the political and military struggles that ravaged across Europe.⁷ From 1528, it was a close ally of the Spanish Empire.⁸ The Genoese granted loans (the so-called *Asientos*) to the Spanish monarchy and, in return, they obtained formal and informal privileges that allowed them to get profitably involved into trade and finance operations in the "Empire on which the sun never sets". The Republic's independence and 'free trade' also rested on this alliance. Because of the reforms carried out in that year, later modified in 1576, the Republic adopted an oligarchic system: the main patrician families, who often also owned fiefs inland and had multiple commercial and financial interests, shared among them all political power. The ruling class coincided with the state's economic elite.⁹ Following changes in the European economy, the interests of the Genoese patricians gradually expanded from trade to finance, although they managed to maintain a balance between shipping, trade, manufacturing and finance. Some historians refer to the years between the sixteenth and the seventeenth century as the "age of the Genoese".¹⁰

The port's administration and functioning played a fundamental role in the economic policies of the patriciate. Even today, the region's economy still

⁶ This dissertation, as will be explained later, is part of the research on Average fostered by the ERC *AveTransRisk* project. Alongside the present research, there are also other Ph.D. candidates working in this field from different perspectives. See G.P. Dreijer, *The power and pains of polysemy: General Average, maritime trade and normative practice in the Southern Low Countries (fifteenth-sixteenth centuries)*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter/Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2021; J.A. Dyble, *General Average in the free port of Livorno, 1600-1700*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter/University of Pisa, 2021; L.M. Wade, *Privilege at a premium: insurance, maritime law and political economy in early modern France, 1664-c. 1710*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter, 2021.

⁷ M. Fusaro, *Political economies of empire in the early modern Mediterranean. The decline of Venice and the rise of England, 1450-1700*, Cambridge, 2015, 92.

⁸ A. Pacini, "Poiché gli stati non sono portatili...": geopolitica e strategia nei rapporti tra Genova e Spagna nel Cinquecento', in M. Herrero Sanchez, Y. Rocio Ben Yessef Garcia, C. Bitossi, D. Puncuh eds., *Génova y la Monarquía Hispánica (1528-1713)*, II, Genoa, 2011, 443-456.

⁹ See C. Bitossi, *Il governo dei magnifici. Patriziato e politica a Genova fra Cinque e Seicento*, Genoa, 1990.

¹⁰ F. Braudel, *Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century*, III, *The perspective of the world*, London, 1984 (1st ed. 1979), 157.

revolves mainly around the port of Genoa.¹¹ The availability of money, the speculative attitude and, above all, the need to rely on maritime trade, for example to import foodstuffs for the population's consumption and raw materials for the manufacturing sector, made the shipping sector vital. The ruling class, because of its direct interest in activities related to maritime trade, carefully looked after port management, the maintenance and the expansion of its infrastructures. These is evidence of a long-run Genoese investment strategy on maritime trade. About 30% of the total tonnage of merchant vessels in the Mediterranean stopped in the port of Genoa in the first half of the sixteenth century.¹²

Data from Average sources in the State Archives in Genoa allows the analysis of the routes calling at the port. In order to understand its complexity and potentiality, it is necessary to provide some further information. GA is a legal instrument, with ancient origins probably predating Roman law, and nowadays still applied, to share risks in a maritime voyage between all the participants: shipmaster, ship-owners, and cargo owners.¹³ The Average institution is one of the most important, but also one of the most complicated topics in maritime law. According to Bill Yancey, former president of the US Average Adjusters Association, this institution is characterised by "the most esoteric obscurities".¹⁴

The GA principle relates to the common proportional liability of all participants in the sea venture to contribute to the loss of one or a few of them, incurred to save the vessel otherwise in distress (such as throwing cargo overboard to keep a vessel afloat until rescued). It is a spreading risk technique: it redistributes amongst all stakeholders unforeseen expenses that can occur to

¹¹ The port of Genoa is the second largest Italian port for cargo handled. The cargo terminal has a maximum annual capacity of 550,000 TEU (Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit), see <https://www.portsofgenoa.com/it/porto-di-genova.html>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

¹² C. Costantini, *La repubblica di Genova nell'età moderna*, Turin, 1978, 164.

¹³ As Andrew Chamberlain pointed out at the 2018 Lloyd's seminar on general average, this legal tool is enjoying a new life in recent years. The main reason is due to the financial crash of 2008. In a general average procedure occurred before this year, the vessel's value was the main contributing element, covering 80 or 90% of the damage. After the financial crisis, the cargo became the main contributor, which is one of the many similarities with old general average procedures. See <https://maritime.knect365.com/general-Average/>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

¹⁴ L.J. Buglass, *General Average and the York/Antwerp rules, 1974, American Law and Practice*, Baltimore, 1974, ix. See also G.N. Hudson, 'The York-Antwerp Rules: Background to the Changes of 1994', *Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce* 27/3, 1996, 469. The York Antwerp rules of 2016 are available for consultation on the website of the Comité Maritime. See [http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Work%20Product/York-Antwerp%20Rules%202016%20\(Final\).pdf](http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Work%20Product/York-Antwerp%20Rules%202016%20(Final).pdf), accessed on 29/06/2021.

ship or cargo from the loading to the unloading. For this reason, we could refer to GA as a form of mutual protection. Particular average (PA), on the other hand, refers to damages that befall only the owner of the damaged goods or ship as the damage was due to unforeseen circumstances, it was not a voluntary sacrifice and did not produce a common benefit.

In the expression 'General Average', the word 'Average' is equal to 'loss' or 'damage'. Since the medieval period, chroniclers and notaries used this word to describe any kind of damage, not necessarily related to sea voyages.¹⁵ The term itself (German *Haverei*; Dutch *averij*; French *avarie*; Italian *avaria*) derived probably from the Arabian *awaria*, meaning 'damaged goods'.¹⁶ 'General' refers to 'common to everyone'. The word average is the English transliteration of the Italian word *avere* or *averia*.¹⁷ In some of the modern languages in use in countries with a strong shipping tradition, GA is referred to as *avarie commune* in French, *averia gruesa* in Spanish, *averij grosse* in Dutch, *havarie-grosse* in German, *avaria generale* or *comune* in Italian. They all serve better to convey the real meaning of the institution than the English translation, because of the ambiguity that the term 'Average' implies, compared to its everyday use¹⁸. Lawrence Duckworth, in 1905, still pointed out that: "The expression 'Average', as used in maritime law, is a foreign word [...]. It has been regarded for nearly eighteen centuries as an unintelligible, or doubtful, symbol".¹⁹

The need to compare the formal rules with the daily practice in order to highlight any divergence led to a research structured along two axes. The first one is the legal and jurisprudential analysis, as I shall investigate the evolution of Genoese rules concerning the management of Average procedures alongside the functioning, more generally, of the main magistracies involved in

¹⁵ Even in Genoa, we can easily find this word meaning 'damaged'.

¹⁶ This is one of the more recent theories, but it is not the only one. See A. Addobbati, 'Principles and rules on general average: notes on legislation and case-law between Middle and Modern Ages', in M. Fusaro, A. Addobbati, L. Piccinno eds., *Sharing risk: general average and European maritime business (VI-XVIII centuries)*, London, forthcoming.

¹⁷ In the city states of Italy (Venice, Pisa and Genoa) and in Valencia the term *avaria* was already used from the second half of the thirteenth century. It appears in Dutch and Hanseatic legal sources in the sixteenth century. In the 1551 Ordinance of Emperor Charles V for the Netherlands (art. 28, 41 and 42) and in the Hanseatic Sea Law of 1614 (VIII; XII, art. 2) a distinction between general and particular Average was already made. See E. Frankot, *Of Laws of Ships and Shipmen. Medieval maritime law and its practice in urban Northern Europe*, Cambridge, 2013, 31. First use in medieval Italy is in the *Constitutum Usus* of the City of Pisa, dated around A.D 1160. The Italian word *avaria* still means 'damage'. It was used with the same meaning in some Genoese codes dated around twelfth century, see M. Curtellazzo, P. Zolli, *Dizionario etimologico della Lingua Italiana*, 1/A-C, Bologna, 1998, 94-95.

¹⁸ An etymological overview is in M. Hopkins, *A handbook of Average*, London, 1884, 1-13.

¹⁹ L. Duckworth, *The Law affecting General and Particular Average*, London, 1905, 1.

port activities. Genoese lawmakers adopted a combination of elements from Roman law, their customary laws and the *Consolat de Mar* written in Barcelona in the fifteenth century. The analysis considers the corpus of laws produced by the Republic's lawmakers and the related opinions provided by jurists. Whenever possible, the normative texts and the jurists' legal opinions will be studied keeping in mind what emerges from the daily practice of managing Average procedures in Genoa. This analysis also allows to test the credibility of the *Lex Maritima* and *Lex Mercatoria* theories, which will be discussed in the conclusion.

The second axis of the research, the quantitative one, consists in the identification and reconstruction of specific trends concerning maritime trade calling at the port of Genoa. This analysis takes into account, where possible, the wide, albeit fragmentary, historiography on Genoese maritime trade in the early modern period, and aims to be part of the broader scenario of the historiographic framework relating to seventeenth century Mediterranean trade. Traditional Genoese historiography is mainly based on fiscal sources (anchorage taxes, taxes on cargo, etc.), my research uses instead Average reports, grouped into files concerning individual voyages. In fact, the shipmasters themselves requested the competent authorities to start the procedure, just as it was the merchants or their insurers who took the initiative in the appeal procedures against any 'unequal' decision. For this reason, these sources have a wealth and breadth of information that fiscal sources do not. Moreover, since GA is a mutual institution, the documents do not present the systematic underestimates of the values of ships and cargoes that affect fiscal sources.²⁰ The data from single voyages allows both micro- and macro-economic analysis. Each voyage, when compared with others with similar characteristics (port of departure, port of arrival, type of vessel, type of incident, etc.), can be analysed and classified as an exemplary or exceptional case. The incorporation and processing of data extracted from these documents into statistical series can also shed light on the specific characteristics of international commercial shipping in the early modern period.

As mentioned, this dissertation intends also to contribute to the studies carried out so far on the maritime history of the Republic of Genoa. The Genoese Republic, to use an expression of Count Giuseppe Gorani (1740-

²⁰ As it will be seen, expenses related to GA procedures were usually low.

1819), a Milanese writer and diplomat in the service of the Austrian monarchy, was “the most envied, the most denigrated and the least known” among all the maritime republics.²¹ Studies on Venice, for example, are far more.²² This ‘diversity’ caused a relative isolation of the historical researches on Genoa.²³ A rich tradition of local Genoese historians exists, though, and some of their researches are of very high quality.²⁴ Yet such researches often suffer from the weaknesses of the ‘local history’ genre: a strictly regional scope. Nevertheless, the publications of foreign scholars on the Republic of Genoa during the second half of the twentieth century partly reinvigorated this field. It was an English scholar, Frank C. Spooner, that invented the already cited expression “age of the Genoese” when referring to the history of the Republic between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and, in particular, to that of its businessmen’s relations with the Spanish monarchy.²⁵ According to Fernand Braudel:

For three-quarters of a century, ‘the Genoese experience’ enabled the merchant-bankers of Genoa, through their handling of capital and credit, to call the tune of European payments and transactions. This is worth studying in itself, for it must surely have been the most extraordinary example of convergence and concentration the European world-economy had yet witnessed, as it re-oriented itself around an almost invisible focus. For the focal point of the whole system was not even the city of Genoa itself, but a handful of banker-financiers. And this is only one of the paradoxes surrounding the strange city of Genoa which, thought apparently so cursed by date, tended both before and after its ‘age of glory’ to gravitate towards

²¹ Quotation in G. Assereto, ‘Dall’amministrazione patrizia all’amministrazione moderna: Genova’, in *L’amministrazione nella storia moderna*, I, Milan, 1985, 95-159, 95.

²² T.A. Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea. Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559-1684*, Baltimore, 2005, IX.

²³ G. Felloni, *Dall’Italia all’Europa: il primato della finanza italiana dal Medioevo alla prima Età moderna*, in A. Cova, S. La Francesca eds., *Storia d’Italia. Annali*, 23, *La Banca*, Turin, 2008, 93-149.

²⁴ Regarding Genoese history, see, for example, L. Bulferetti, C. Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria nell’età del Risorgimento (1700-1861)*, Milan, 1966; Costantini, *La Repubblica di Genova*; G. Giacchero, *Origini e sviluppi del porto franco genovese: 11 agosto 1590-9 ottobre 1778*, Genoa, 1972; G. Giacchero, *Economia e società del Settecento genovese*, Genova, 1981; E. Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia moderna della Repubblica di Genova*, Genova, 1976; E. Grendi, ‘Problemi e studi di storia economica genovese (secoli XVI-XVIII)’, *Rivista storica italiana* LXXXIV, 1972, 1022-1059; G. Doria, P. Massa eds., *Il sistema portuale della Repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1988. The Ligurian region has a wealth tradition of ‘micro histories’ which, focusing on social and institutional aspects, have shed light in an original way onto more ‘economic’ mechanics. In particular, see E. Grendi, *Il Cervo e la Repubblica. Il modello ligure di antico regime*, Turin, 1993; O. Raggio, *Faide e parentele. Lo Stato Genovese visto dalla Fontanabuona*, Turin, 1990.

²⁵ This expression, commonly referred to Braudel, was actually invented in French by Frank C. Spooner, cited by Felipe Ruiz Martin, an historian of Spanish finances during early modern period, and finally revived by Braudel in 1984.

the summit of world business. To me Genoa seems always to have been, in every age, the capitalist city par excellence.²⁶

The renewed interest on Genoese history touched only marginally maritime trade topics, although the same patricians involved in financial activities, or their closest relatives, were also active in this field. As stated by Giuseppe Galasso, far more missing elements than presences mark maritime history in Italy.²⁷ Genoa still lacks an organic research on its seaborne trade in relation with the strategies adopted by its mercantile class.²⁸ According to Maria Fusaro there is a real “historiographical schizophrenia regarding Genoa, on the one hand hailed as the cradle of global financial capitalism, and on the other described as a ‘failed state’”.²⁹ Edoardo Grendi, one of the foremost historians on Genoa in the early modern period and one of the founders of Italian microhistory, meaningfully employed the expression an “historiography without masters” to describe the literature on Genoa. The *Annales* described him as “the best expert on the least popular – and most difficult to understand – of Italian trading cities”.³⁰

As already mentioned, Genoese historiography made extensive use of fiscal sources to reconstruct maritime traffic trends, as the serial reconstructions carried out between the 1960s and the 1980s by Giorgio Doria and Edoardo Grendi.³¹ The latter, in particular, pointed to the need for specific studies on Genoese maritime trade. According to Grendi, such studies would only be possible through in-depth studies of archival sources. He referred in particular to the potential offered by the Genoese notarial archives. The State Archives of Genoa preserves the oldest and one of the largest notarial collections in the world.³² The abundance of the sources and the lack of indexing of the folders in which the documents are kept, however, make this type of research very

²⁶ Braudel, *Civilization and capitalism*, 157.

²⁷ G. Galasso, ‘Il Mezzogiorno e il mare’, in A. Fratta ed., *La fabbrica delle navi. Storia della cantieristica nel Mezzogiorno d'Italia*, Naples, 1990, 11.

²⁸ P. Calcagno, ‘Uno dei “Tirreni” di Braudel: scambi commerciali nell’area marittima ligure-provenzale tra XVII e XVIII secolo’, *Mediterranea, ricerche storiche* 33, 2015, 79-106, 82-83.

²⁹ Fusaro, *Political economies*, 92 and bibliography quoted therein.

³⁰ “meilleur connaisseur de la plus mal connue - et la plus difficile à comprendre - des villes marchandes italiennes”, in ‘Le choix des Annales’, in *Annales*, 43/1, 1988, unnumbered page.

³¹ G. Doria, ‘La gestione del porto di Genova dal 1550 al 1797’, in Doria, Massa eds., *Il sistema portuale*, 135-197; E. Grendi, ‘Il traffico portuale di Genova (1500-1700)’, in E. Grendi ed., *La repubblica aristocratica dei Genovesi: politica, carità e commercio fra Cinque e Seicento*, Genoa, 1987, 307-364; E. Grendi, ‘I nordici e il traffico del porto di Genova: 1590-1666’, *Rivista Storica Italiana* LXXXIII/1, 1971, 23-71.

³² A. Assini, *Inventario del fondo notai antichi*, available on

complex. Carlo Bitossi, a scholar of the political history of the Republic, referred to the Genoese archival sources as a “complicated abundance”.³³

Giuseppe Felloni, working in roughly the same years as Grendi, was one of the few to perceive the potential of a synthesis operation starting from the serial processing of judicial and notarial Average sources. He published an article based on the Genoese evidence for the years 1599, 1600 and 1601.³⁴ This research, therefore, follows in the footsteps of Felloni and followed over the years by other Italian scholars such as Marcello Berti in the 1970s, and, more recently, Luisa Piccinno.³⁵

As far as the juridical-normative side of the present research is concerned, the main historiographical references were, inevitably, the studies of Rodolfo Savelli and Vito Piergiovanni. Savelli, in particular, published numerous works on the statutes of Genoa and of its territories, also editing the critical edition of these sources.³⁶ In addition to his studies on the laws enacted by the Genoese Republic, Piergiovanni worked extensively on the treatises of the main Italian jurists of the medieval and early modern period, in particular Giuseppe Casaregi, who worked in Genoa before moving to Florence in the early eighteenth century as a judge of the local *Rota*.³⁷ The conceptual normative frameworks that emerge through the work of Savelli and Piergiovanni, and the direct reference to the normative sources, have been assessed in the light of recent institutionalist studies. In particular, Sheilagh Ogilvie has criticised the assumption that *Ancien Régime* institutions arised and survived because they were economically efficient.³⁸ There is a tendency to believe that if a particular

³³ Bitossi, *Il governo dei magnifici*, 22.

³⁴ G. Felloni, ‘Una fonte inesplorata per la storia dell’economia marittima in età moderna: i calcoli di avaria’, in *Wirtschaftskräfte in der europäischen Expansion*, 2, Stuttgart, 1978, 37-57.

³⁵ Berti, in particular, seems to operate autonomously and at the same time as Felloni, exploiting the Average sources in Tuscany to analyse the danger of the main sea routes leading to the port of Livorno. See M. Berti, ‘I rischi nella circolazione marittima tra Europa nordica ed Europa mediterranea nel primo trentennio del Seicento ed il caso della seconda guerra anglo-olandese (1665-67)’, in S. Cavaciocchi ed., *Ricchezza del mare ricchezza dal mare: secc.13-18. Atti della trentasettesima Settimana di studi, 11-15 aprile 2005*, Bagno a Ripoli, 2006, 809-839; M. Berti, ‘Il “rischio” nella navigazione commerciale mediterranea nel Seicento: aspetti tecnici e aspetti economici’, in S. Di Bella, S. ed., *La rivolta di Messina 1674-78 e il mondo mediterraneo nella seconda metà del Seicento: atti*, Cosenza, 1979, 271-332. On this see topic, see also L. Piccinno, ‘Rischi di viaggio nel commercio marittimo del XVIII secolo’, in M. Cini ed., *Traffici commerciali, sicurezza marittima, guerra di corsa. Il Mediterraneo e l’Ordine di Santo Stefano*, Pisa, 2011, 159-179.

³⁶ R. Savelli, *Repertorio degli statuti della Liguria (secc. XII-XVIII)*, Genoa, 2003.

³⁷ V. Piergiovanni ed., *Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica tra Genova e l’Occidente medievale e moderno*, I-II, Genoa, 2012.

³⁸ S. Ogilvie, ‘Whatever is, is right’? Economic institutions in pre-industrial Europe’, *The Economic History Review* 60/4, 2007, 649-684.

economic institution has endured for centuries, as might be the case with the GA institution, it must have been 'efficient'.³⁹ Such beliefs often overlook the fact that not necessarily what is rational is also efficient, or the presence of external factors that lead to compromise solutions that could benefit only a part of the society. The evolution of Average regulations in Genoa, from this perspective, is a demonstration of how difficult it is to draw a progressive line and to make assessments regarding the bureaucratic-administrative efficiency of *Ancien Régime* institutions.

This research on Genoese Average procedures is based on normative and notarial sources. As regards the former, the essential reference is represented by the *Statuti Civili* of the Republic enacted in 1589.⁴⁰ These ruled, among other things, on the operational application of Average and established a new magistracy, the *calcolatori*. The statutes continued to be reprinted without change until the early eighteenth century.⁴¹ They were in force, therefore, for the entire period considered in this thesis. The text of the *Statuti Civili* will be analysed in detail with regard to Average procedures and compared with the *Consolat de Mar*, the main Mediterranean body of rules of the time in this field, in order to assess similarities, differences and mutual influences. I also investigated the origins of some GA rules through the analysis of the older statutes of the Genoese colony of Pera on the Black Sea, controlled by the Republic from 1155 to 1453. I then integrated this with the analysis of jurists' treatises. The main points of reference were the works of Carlo Targa and Giuseppe Maria Casaregi.⁴² Their treatises explicitly refer to Chapters from the *Statuti Civili* and often also cite legal judgments of which the authors had direct experience. However, these also provide summaries and reflexions derived from the authors' experiences: these were not works of pure erudition, but rather handbooks for administrative legal personnel and maritime traders, who needed clear and practical rules to follow, not the precise genealogy of legal sources, or the presentation of the contradictory ways in which they were applied and conceived.

³⁹ Ogilvie, 'Whatever is, is right?', 652.

⁴⁰ BUG, *ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis*, Genoa, 1589. See the transcription in [Appendix I](#).

⁴¹ BUG, *Laura gg.II.27, Statutorum Civilium Serenissimae Reipublicae Januensis*, 1707.

⁴² G.M. Casaregi, *Discursos Legales de Commercio*, I-II-III, Venice, 1740; C. Targa, *Ponderationi sopra la contrattatione marittima*, Genoa, 1692.

This brings us to notarial and administrative sources.⁴³ At its core, this dissertation draws from the *Atti dei Calcolatori* and the *Atti Civili* folders in the Genoa State Archives, in the collections of, respectively, the *Notai Giudiziari* and the *Conservatori del Mare*. In spite of the different archival location, which, as will be seen below, corresponds to different competent magistracies (the *calcolatori* and the *Conservatori del Mare*), the sources are consistent and follow a very similar structure throughout the period under examination.

The *Atti dei Calcolatori* are part of the notarial documentation, and preserve the Average procedures (both PA and GA) drawn up by the *calcolatori*. In Genoa private notaries frequently acted as chancellors and secretaries of the magistrates' courts.⁴⁴ This explains the particular archival location of these folders, kept among the notaries' documents and labelled as *Atti dei Calcolatori*. The following notaries working for the *calcolatori* have been identified: Orazio Fazio (1590-1608), Giovanni Agostino Gritta (1606-1616), Giovanni Benedetto Gritta (1636-1663).⁴⁵

A reform, examined in the third chapter, partially changed the procedure from the second half of the seventeenth century: the *Conservatori del Mare* extended their jurisdiction over Averages. The archival evidence is filed differently from that of the *Atti dei Calcolatori*: alongside Average procedures, for example, there are court cases between shipmasters and crews or merchants, or sea loan contracts. However, the documentation does not seem to have any significant gap for the second half of the seventeenth century: *Atti Civili* (1654-1697, 1699-1700).

Although the sources apparently cover the whole of the second half of the seventeenth century, part of the documentation is missing. In order to complete the long-term analysis and to gather further information, I used also the files of the *Testimonialli all'estero segreti* (1635-1796). These contain the reports of shipmasters requesting the initiation of an Average procedure, which the competent magistracies, due to inherent vice or substantial errors, did not validate.⁴⁶ The use of a variety of archival collections has allowed me to follow the evolution of the procedural process beyond the simplistic reconstructions

⁴³ Further information on the archival locations of the sources mentioned in these pages can be found in the bibliography.

⁴⁴ See V. Piergiovanni, 'Il notaio nella storia giuridica genovese', in V. Piergiovanni ed., *Per una storia del notariato nella civiltà europea*, II, Milan, 1994, 73-89.

⁴⁵ Although it has not been possible to identify the name(s) of the notaries in the period from 1617 to 1635, there are hundreds of procedures for each available year.

⁴⁶ Further information and theories on these sources are in par. 5.5.

offered by legislation and jurists. At the same time, the hundreds of procedures thus available allow to assess the divergence between rule and practice in this area of maritime law. This divergence is one of the peculiarities of maritime trade over the *longue durée*, and a most interesting analytical element which is usually mentioned in the literature, but not properly investigated.

The large amount of the archival documentation led me to select specific samples. This selection was based on several elements: the availability of primary evidence; the significance of the periods examined; and the possibility of comparing the data with existing or ongoing studies on Genoese – or Mediterranean – maritime trade and/or on Average sources. More precisely, I decided to concentrate on the following periods, better contextualised in the Fourth Chapter:

- 1599-1601. During these years, following the most acute phase of the Northern Invasion, Genoese trade partially returned to its traditional routes, i.e. Sicily and Mediterranean Spain. Intra-Mediterranean trade and grain from Sicily and raw wool from Spain dominated as cargoes.
- 1639-1641. This interval is situated within the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), a conflict that eroded Spanish hegemony over Europe and the Mediterranean. Genoa maintained its neutrality and its merchants made ample use of Northern ships to carry their cargoes, even on the most traditional routes.
- 1668-1670. This was a period of relative trade stagnation, and this is confirmed by Averages' evidence. Local Mediterranean shipping dominated, involving smaller vessels and capitals. The role of Genoa as a redistributive emporium for colonial goods, in particular from Portugal and Cadiz, became more evident.
- 1698-1700. The main feature of this period was the 'forced' reapproach with France, following the 1684 French attack. Most of the cargoes came from Sicily and Spain, and were carried by French ships. Northern shipping remained of vital importance for extra-Mediterranean trade.

The documentation and notes left by Felloni to the Department of Economics of the University of Genoa greatly helped the identification and investigation of the archival documentation. He created a paper card format to collect the main

information concerning Average reports and calculations. The cards he filled in, which are preserved at the Centro di studi e documentazione di Storia economica "Archivio Doria", cover almost all the documentation from the *Atti dei Calcolatori*.⁴⁷ Consultation of the paper cards, compared with the original sources to supplement missing information, provided an initial guideline of vital importance.⁴⁸

All data obtained from Average procedures in the archives from the years mentioned above has been uploaded and is freely available in the *AveTransRisk* database.⁴⁹ This database was created within the framework of the European project *Average-Transaction Costs and Risk Management during the First Globalization (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)* (grant agreement n. 724544), led by Maria Fusaro. This project involved the collaboration of scholars working in different countries - Italy, Spain, England, France, Malta, Belgium and the Netherlands - and in different fields of historical studies - economic history, legal history, maritime history, etc. The project aims to offer a historical analysis of the Average institution and its impact on economic development through a comparative investigation of procedures between different European countries. In this perspective, the Genoese sources I analysed and recorded into the database has actively supported it.

The database to date contains information on 858 sea voyages based on Genoese sources. The starting model for the entry form, developed using Office Microsoft Access Database software (.accdb), was the paper form made by Felloni for his study during the 1970s, already mentioned. The Access template

⁴⁷ ADG, *Felloni* 1, 3-8, 10-11, 1589-171e. Felloni's recording continued with a sample analysis of documents from the eighteenth century, when the *Magistrato d'Avaria*, a sub-office of the *Conservatori del Mare*, began operating. Felloni choose a sample of the documents in the *Conservatori del Mare* collection and, in particular, from the folders *Esibite in Avarie*, 1695-1714; *Testimoniali fatti a Genova*, 1709-1796; and *Calcoli d'Avaria*, 1714-1777. It is likely that the eighteenth-century samples were used simply to assess the consistency of the sources and their comparability with those from the previous centuries. His pioneering research, however, came to a halt when Felloni moved on to reorganise the archives of the *Casa di San Giorgio*, a project that took him until 2012 to be completed (<http://www.lacasadisangiorgio.eu/>, accessed on 29/06/2021.). Felloni's cards do not mention the *Atti Civili*. It is probable that he did not notice the presence of Average procedures there.

⁴⁸ Felloni, for instance, often did not record the more 'narrative' information in the documentation. He was mainly interested in the 'accounting' part of the procedure.

⁴⁹ As already stated, references will be given to consult a source directly in the online database, according to the following formula: the voyage has been recorded in the *AveTransRisk* online db with the id 50xxx. The voyages are numbered from 50000 to 50895.

is an evolution of the paper card initially conceived by Felloni, modified to include also the data he ignored.⁵⁰

A standard Average procedure consists of a report and a damage apportionment calculation. The report is a transcription, often through the use of formulae and expressions whose use has been consolidated over time, of the events that occurred during navigation leading to the Average act. It is narrated by the shipmaster before the authorities in the first port in which he stopped after the accident. The report contains all the elements relating to the maritime voyage, often with an abundance of details concerning the accident – or accidents – that occurred during navigation.

The calculation, although quickly referring to the information contained in the previous report, is an estimate of the value of the vessel, the cargo and, if certain conditions were met, the freights. These values are complemented by the calculation of damage to the vessel or to the cargo, and that of all administrative and unforeseen expenses. The total of damages is divided by the total of contributing values to derive the percentage of contribution on each individual asset. The sources therefore have a 'narrative' and often social component – the report – which help to reconstruct some of the dynamics of maritime trade in the early modern period, and an 'accounting' and economic component – the calculation – which provide information about the capital involved in the sea voyage, and the incidence of damage and unforeseen expenses in sea transport. Often these documents contain the names of the merchants involved and other documents which help to shed further light on the dynamics of individual sea voyages. An Average procedure may consist of a single sheet containing only the shipmaster's report, or of a rich dossier containing several documents, court cases and petitions produced by the various parties involved.

Although the sources maintain a high level of uniformity and comparability throughout the seventeenth century, the formulation and refinement of the data entry template has presented numerous challenges from a conceptual, as well as technological, point. The main features of the Access template are presented

⁵⁰ The main changes to the Access template reflect the need to add transcriptions of the original documents and records of the events that occurred in navigation. Interaction with Ian Wellaway, the project's IT technician, was crucial to the changes to the Access tabs. He further modified the interface from time to time to better suit the needs of this research.

below to give an idea of the criteria followed and the potential for research.⁵¹ In addition to an initial 'summary' box, it has been decided to create a series of tabs relating to the different areas into which the information from an Average procedure can be divided. The information in the summary box follows this order: type of cargo; port of departure; any intermediate stop; port of destination; fortuitous event and Average act. The tabs are categorised as follows:

- Vessels. This tab contains all information about the vessel, the shipmaster and the crew. In particular, the most frequently used fields for Genoese sources are those relating to the name of the vessel, its type, its tonnage, the name of the shipmaster and his origin, whether a city or a country.
- Legs. This tab contains a list of all stops made by the vessel. For each port, is indicated the date of arrival and departure. For each port, the reason for the stop (load cargo, unload cargo, pick up supplies, etc.) and the type of stop (origin, scheduled stop, forced stop, destination, unknown) is also specified. Ports are geo-localised at the moment of entry, thus allowing the rapid creation of maps over intervals of years and for specific types of stops.
- Risk-corpo/Risk-noli/Risk-carico/Risk-equipaggio/Risk-total. Several assets contribute to the apportionment of an Average damage: the vessel, the freight, the cargo and, in rare cases, the crew's goods. Each type of asset is recorded in a separate table. The values are almost always given in Genoese *lire*. Even when other currencies are used, the exchange rate with the *lira* is always given in the 'from source' section for each cargo item or in the 'further information' section. In the case of freights and vessels, part of the value could be 'non-contributing', as will be seen later. This information is also given in the template. The risk-total table shows the total risk and the sums of the tables described above.
- Reports. This tab contains all the information related to the shipmaster's report. Apart from the space for the date and the type of report, this section is divided into three subsections. The first one contains the summary of the report and a space for the transcription. The second one contains the data of

⁵¹ I have chosen to follow the structure of the Access template and not the one in the *AveTransRisk* online database as the latter, although accessible online, is still being refined and its structure may vary.

the witnesses called to validate the shipmaster's statements, their age, their role (as they are often part of the crew) and their city of origin. The third subtab contains data on the unforeseen events that occurred during the voyage. For each event, in addition to the summary and the transcript, a series of key words are given that allow it to be classified in particular categories (storm, strong wind, shipwreck, hostile encounter, etc.). This facilitates research on a large scale.

- Averages. This tab records the data related to the calculation. The first items in this tab show the type of Average, GA or PA (General Average or Particular Average). There is also a table that automatically calculates the number of days required to complete the procedure from the time the report is deposited in Genoa until the calculation is approved by the relevant magistracy. The list of damages follows. For each item of damage, the amount of expenditure and any explanatory notes are reported. The total awarded table below shows the total damages and/or expenses incurred. The descriptive box shows the contribution rate transcribed, when present, directly from the calculation. The calculation section contains further information about the timeframe for approval of the calculation. Following the drafting of the calculation, in fact, a few days passed before it was approved by the competent authority.

- Documents. This miscellaneous section contains the informations related to any type of document attached to the procedure other than the report or the calculation. Supplements to previously issued testimonies, legal cases and memoranda, bills of lading and more can be found in this tab. For each additional document, the date of drafting is indicated, alongside with the name of the document. There is also a space for a summary and a transcript.

- Sources. The last tab contains the archival references to trace the original document within the Genoa State Archives. Documents in Genoa are collected in *filze* made of separate sheets, not in registers, so it can sometimes be difficult to locate a document. Fortunately, the individual procedures are often numbered in pencil and, in any case, having the database with all the Average procedures in a single *filza*, it is easy to go back to the specific document.

In addition to the tabs listed so far, there is a section devoted to metrological equivalences. This section contains all the equivalences of the various units of measurement or foreign currencies, converted by the Genoese notaries themselves into local units of measurement and currency. This information, for example, was essential for the elaboration of the conversion table for Genoese *lire* and pieces of eight shown in the 'Measures and currencies' section, or for the statistics on Sicilian wheat prices in [Grap 4.8](#). Most of the data in the *AveTransRisk* database, as noted, is placed in special cells to facilitate indexing and processing for statistical purposes. The online database has a convenient advanced search function that allows customised searches on any type of parameter entered in the database. The results of advanced searches can also be downloaded in Excel or other formats to facilitate further processing by scholars.

The structure of this work reflects the need to provide an overall picture of the early modern maritime trade of the Genoese Republic, and to investigate specific peculiarities from a micro perspective. To this end, and with the aim of providing the essential elements to frame the cases under examination, the First Chapter analyses the process of formation and strengthening of the Republic from the medieval period to the seventeenth century, a period characterised by frequent civil wars and attempted coups. The reforms of 1528 and 1576 then brought a period of relative political stability. Understanding the mechanisms underlying the economic policies of the Republic, with particular reference to maritime trade, allows to understand the role of Genoa in the European political arena.

The port itself, both its organisation in terms of infrastructure and its administrative and financial features, are analysed in the Second Chapter, highlighting the specialisation of the Genoese magistracies involved in its management. It will discuss the importance of the *Casa di San Giorgio*, a particularly complex institution involved in the activities and financing of the port complex in parallel and in symbiosis with other authorities. As I will show in detail, the *Conservatori del Mare* were the main governmental body for the management of Average procedures. They traditionally held jurisdiction over all procedures, problems and disputes concerning vessels entering and docking in the port. There was no lack of jurisdictional conflicts and tensions between the interests of the main families who had the monopoly of this magistracy and, for

example, those of the shipmasters who arrived in Genoa to unload cargoes and declare their Average report, or those of the other merchants involved.

The Third Chapter focuses on the analysis of the credit and risk management tools available to maritime trade operators in Genoa. This overview is necessary both to contextualise the role of Average practices as a maritime risk management tool and to better understand the evolution of the regulatory framework and the application of the rules themselves. This is followed by an observation of the strategies of control and protection deployed by the magistracy of the *Conservatori del Mare*. Its members also acted as judges in case of litigation. I will analyze their efforts, during the seventeenth century, to limit the fraudulent practices linked to the Average reports.

Average procedures constitute a very interesting lens through which I investigated maritime trade calling at the port of Genoa. The processing of the data in the database, sorted into the four sample periods already mentioned (1599-1601; 1639-1641; 1668-1670; 1698-1700) allows to reconstruct the main trends in maritime trade to or from the port of Genoa during the seventeenth century. The research criteria used and the results were integrated and compared with the studies of Felloni, Grendi and Doria. An attempt was made to clarify the visualisation of the main traffic flows which, in each period under examination, connected the port of Genoa to the main ports of call in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe. The total number of voyages recorded in the database, as will be seen, constitutes a sufficiently reliable sample compared to the total traffic. It is also possible to make observations on the cabotage navigation carried out by small Ligurian and Mediterranean vessels, a type of navigation which usually escapes the analysis of historians.⁵² Paragraph 4.5 contains a quantitative analysis of several macrotrends based on Average sources, like the presence of foreign shipmasters, the structure of Genoese grain trade or the main maritime risks faced by vessels in the Mediterranean.

⁵² This term, possibly deriving from the Spanish *cabo*, cape, refers to the navigation carried out mainly along the coast by small vessels in search of advantageous freight contracts. For a more exhaustive definition see A. Lefebvre D'Ovidio, G. Pescatore, *Manuale di diritto della navigazione*, VII ed., Rome, 1990. Some historians, such as Ricardo Benavent, use more differentiated categories, such as "cabotaje corto" and "cabotaje largo", but it would be difficult to find precise distinctions between the different types of navigation. See R. Franch Benavent, 'El comercio en Mediterráneo español durante la edad moderna: del estudio del tráfico a su vinculación con la realidad productiva y el contexto social', *Obradoiro de Historia Moderna* 17, 2008, 77-112, 81.

The last Chapter, finally, is based on a selection of cases studies which, due to their complexity, lie on the borderline of the regulations examined in the Third Chapter and provide an example of a qualitative analysis on early modern maritime shipping. In spite of the statutory provisions and the interpretations of the jurists of the time, some cases elude an immediate attempt to classify them in the main categories of Average events. I divided them in two main types (shipwreck or piracy) and I analysed them by taking into account all possible hypotheses to explain why they were considered as Average documents. Although they are not particularly numerous in comparison with the total number of cases recorded, they allow us to capture a variety of original and atypical situations that can foster future researches. The observation of these cases, perhaps even better than the study of legal texts, allows to observe the boundary between what was considered an Average and what was not. Finally, the last section will focus on frauds and rejected Average reports. In particular, I will show some of the strategies that merchants and shipmasters could use in relation to the Average institution. These particular cases also offer some examples of those macrotrends observed in the Fourth Chapter.

The analysis carried out for the seventeenth century sources also aims to trace a new path of investigation in the field of Genoese maritime history for the following century and which, it is hoped, can be further enriched by comparison with analyses relating to other ports or new documentation. The relative homogeneity and wealth of the documentation for the eighteenth century will allow in the future to complete the Genoese regulatory framework, to work on new data on international maritime trade and to observe the regulatory evolution of *Ancien Régime* Europe. The eighteenth century, especially with regard to the history of Genoa, is an under-studied period of swift changes. The documentation preserved in the Genoese state archives seems to survive even the French domination and the first years of the Restoration (1796-1817). Obviously, a more in-depth investigation or the selection of subsequent intervals may also reinforce or, in some cases, challenge the hypotheses suggested in the following pages.

1. Genoa in the Mediterranean World: the Republic's Political Consolidation

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1. Genoa in the Mediterranean World: the Republic's Political Consolidation

1.1 A Fragile Stability: Internal Politics and Public Order in Genoa

The Republic of Genoa in the early modern period was a small state surrounded by expanding monarchies. It was a financial centre with its own merchant marine and an élite of powerful patricians engaged in all sorts of businesses, while also being in charge of the Republic's political administration.¹ The institutional development of Genoa reflected the specific characteristics of Genoese maritime economy.² GAs are rich and multifaceted sources which, in synergy with existing studies on the Republic of Genoa, can help scholars investigate maritime trade, both on a micro and macro-economic level. Proximity between public power and private interests affected the strategies underlying what we might call proto-economic policies. In particular, the Genoese oligarchy managed the port with efficiency and autonomy, while appointing different magistrates for the administration of specific sectors. The same is true for disputes in civil, maritime and merchant justice that were quickly resolved. Extra-judicial dispute resolution was also very common.³ However, the slow growth of the oligarchic class that ruled the Republic between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century and the functioning of the state itself, in terms of institutions and foreign policy, were the result of a series of choices and circumstances dating back to previous centuries.

Therefore, this preliminary Chapter is a necessary excursus that deals with the role of Genoa on the international scene during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, alongside with its institutional development from consular municipality in the medieval period to oligarchic Republic following the 1528 reforms. I will highlight the main developments that determined the features of the Republic of

¹ G. Felloni, 'Il ceto dirigente a Genova nel secolo XVII: governanti o uomini d'affari?', in *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, vol. 38, 1998, 1323-1340; Bitossi, *Il governo dei magnifici*. For a comparison with the medieval period, see Q. Van Doosselaere, *Commercial agreements and social dynamics in Medieval Genoa*, New York, 2009; E. Basso, *Strutture insediative ed espansione commerciale. La rete portuale Genovese nel bacino del Mediterraneo*, Cherasco, 2011.

² A. Zanini, 'La Superba: its institutions and fortunes', in J. Bober, P. Boccardo, F. Boggero eds., *A superb baroque. Art in Genoa, 1600-1750*, Washington, 2020, 5-21.

³ V. Piergiovanni, 'Dottrina e prassi nella formazione del diritto portuale: il modello genovese', in Doria, Massa eds., *Il sistema portuale*, 9-36.

Genoa in the seventeenth century. This is essential in order to clarify the context structure and peculiarities, before dealing with the functioning of the average institution in the Third Chapter.

With the progressive extension of the Municipality of Genoa into the *Riviere* (the neighbouring coastal regions), borders were established that remained more or less unchanged for most of Genoa's history.⁴ Its dominion extended along the coast from Monaco to the West, bordering with Savoy and France, to Lerici to the East, next to Tuscany. The hinterland is squeezed between the sea and the Apennines, with only a small area extending beyond them, the *Oltregiogo*. This was a strategic region for land trade routes towards Lombardy and Northern Italy.⁵ The overall land extent of mostly hilly or mountainous areas, was minimal, only 4,000 square kilometres. The development of manufacturing activity in the region was also affected by the lack of raw materials that had to be imported via maritime routes.⁶ These are the reasons why, from its gulf on the Ligurian Sea, Genoa has always linked its existence to maritime trade and territorial expansion. Moreover, numerous other institutional entities would coexist in this narrow land, including episcopal cities, private fiefdoms, and lordships of some families or other states, as can be seen in [Map 1.1](#).⁷

During the medieval period, the Genoese state would not only experience a great commercial development, but would also build an overseas colonial dominion in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.⁸ At the beginning of the sixteenth century, because of Ottoman expansion and the wars with other

⁴ M. Schnettger, C. Taviani eds., *Libertà e Dominio. Il sistema politico genovese: le relazioni esterne e il controllo del territorio*, Rome, 2011; G. Assereto, 'Porti e scali minori della Repubblica di Genova in Età moderna', in Doria, Massa eds., *Il sistema portuale*, 221-258.

⁵ V. Polonio, 'Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul mare. Un lento itinerario tra V e XIII secolo', in G. Assereto, M. Doria eds., *Storia della Liguria*, Rome-Bari, 2007, 28-36; P. Guglielmotti, 'Genoa and Liguria', in C.A. Benes, ed., *A Companion to Medieval Genoa*, Leiden, 2018 49-61. See also R. Pavoni, *Liguria medievale. Da provincia romana a stato regionale*, Genoa, 1992.


⁶ P. Massa, *Lineamenti di organizzazione economica in uno stato preindustriale. La repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1995, 12.

⁷ See Costantini, *La repubblica di Genova*, 195-198; Polonio, 'Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul mare', 28-36.

⁸ C. Taviani criticized the use of the term 'colony' to define these territories. Such term was never used in the sources and it implies an administrative difference that does not seem to have been taken into consideration by the legislators. See C. Taviani, 'The Genoese Casa di San Giorgio as a micro-economic and territorial nodal system', in W. Blockmans, M. Krom, J. Wubs-Mrozewicz eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Maritime Trade around Europe 1300-1600: Commercial Networks and Urban Autonomy*, London-New York, 2017, 177-191, 185.

states, this dominion had shrunk to the islands of Capraia and Corsica.⁹ Moreover, because of its weak army and navy, made up mostly of mercenaries or militias, Genoa had to stipulate agreements or alliances with its neighbours, especially with France or Spain. And yet, Genoa always tried to preserve its political independence, even though only in the eighteenth century did it slowly develop a more articulated neutrality policy.¹⁰ Throughout the early modern period, the Republic of Genoa tried to improve and control every administrative and political tool likely to guarantee a constant and vital chain of supplies and commodities to the capital. Policies enacted by the Genoese elites could be seen as efforts to keep a certain margin of independence as well as the city's role in international trade flows, in which it would often play a relevant role.¹¹

Map 1.1 *Genoese territory in the second half of the fifteenth century*



Source: C. Costantini, *La repubblica di Genova nell'età moderna*, Turin, 1978, 8

According to the research conducted by Steven Epstein, in Genoa between 1338 and 1538, there were fourteen peasant revolts, eleven revolts

⁹ L. Piccinno, 'A city with a Port or a Port City?', in Blockmans, Krom, Wubs-Mrozewicz eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Maritime Trade around Europe, 1300-1600*, London, 2017, 159-176, 161-163.

¹⁰ The French bombing of Genoa in 1684 and the Spanish war of succession (1700-1714) marked the failure of the alliance with Spain, see C. Bitossi, *La repubblica sfida il re Sole*, Bari, 2011. On the neutrality policies see also L. Garibbo, *La neutralità della repubblica di Genova. Saggio sulla condizione dei piccoli stati nell'Europa del Settecento*, Milano, 1972; A. Alimento ed., *War, trade and neutrality. Europe and the Mediterranean in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*, Milan, 2011.

¹¹ Costantini, *La Repubblica di Genova*, 323-325.

spearheaded by the nobility, seven joint revolts (peasant and nobility), six riots led by the Fregoso family, and one civil war.¹² Genoese political authority was quite weak, compared to other republics, such as Venice, for example, and its history is characterised by constant struggles for internal hegemony, thus preventing any long-term faction's rule. Yet, the government and the ruling elites remained more or less the same. Throughout its history, this is evidence of the exceptional ability of the political establishment to adjust to leadership changes. According to Guglielmo Assereto, the belief that the Genoese state was highly unstable should be considered as a historiographical cliché.¹³ Genoese rulers followed needs and strategies that were different from those of 'territorial' states, more heavily based on agriculture. As a matter of fact, Arturo Pacini wrote that the different idea of state developed by the Genoese is due to Liguria's unique geography features.¹⁴

One of the reasons for frequent government changes lies in the complex Genoese ruling class and their idea of state. These men managed to preserve their power from the origin of the *Comune* in the twelfth century until the end of the eighteenth century. The different groups and factions would change shape, structure and name according to political circumstances. Between the fourteenth and the seventeenth century, from time to time they would split into Guelphs and Ghibellines, Black and White, *nobiles* and *populares*, Old and New nobles.¹⁵ The 1528 reform tried to bring to an end conflicts through the creation of the *Alberghi*, which, however, failed to reach this objective, and were abolished in 1576. All these steps led to the celebrated 'union', a concept constantly championed and recalled by annalists and historians during the sixteenth century and beyond.¹⁶ Thanks to this union, a fragile socio-political balance managed to last from 1576 to 1797.

Family groups who monopolistically held public, often inherited offices, made up the Genoa nobility. This process began in the twelfth century, during the

¹² See S. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528*, Chapel Hill, 1996.

¹³ Assereto, 'Dall'amministrazione patrizia, 95-159'; Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia moderna*, 214.

¹⁴ A. Pacini, *I presupposti politici del "secolo dei genovesi". La riforma del 1528*, Genoa, 1990, 84-85.

¹⁵ Black and Whites were respectively equivalent for Ghibelline and Guelph. This division was a Genoese peculiarity, as in other parts of Italy only the Guelph themselves were divided in Black and Whites. See Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 29-30.

¹⁶ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 16-19.

development of the Commune, which replaced the ancient episcopal rule.¹⁷ The ruling class was initially made up of lower-rank nobility, who had moved to town following the economic and political decline of feudal governments. Officers belonging to the bishop-count circle would complement it. As administration and taxation experts, they were most suitable to run the government.¹⁸ Genoese elites had been the protagonists of the city's political life since its dawn, leading its merchant trade and the city's expansion on the mainland and on international trade routes, especially towards the East, the so-called *Levante*. Because of its mountainous and hilly geography, Liguria's hinterland was not much fertile, hence city merchants would rarely invest their money in crops.

Still, as we can see from [Map 1.1](#), noble families had their fiefs and owned property and land in the hinterland.¹⁹ Due to personal interest and political and military weakness, the Republic kept within itself the different above-mentioned small states and fiefs. It would also face frequent opposition from leading European powers that were interested in controlling the area.²⁰ For all these reasons, relations between Genoa (the 'Dominant') and the Dominion were quite complex.²¹ Additionally, Genoese families constantly aimed at establishing good relations with families in the *Riviera*, through patronage or alliances, in order to exploit the land surrounding the city during frequent clashes for power. The Commune had only two major land-related concerns: protecting the Apennine passes to guarantee safe access to Po-valley region, and maintaining control over the cities in the *Riviera*, in particular over Savona.²²

¹⁷ On the figure of the Count-Bishop, see A. Gamberini, 'Vescovo e conte: la fortuna di un titolo nell'Italia centro-settentrionale (secoli XI-XV)', *Quaderni Storici* 46/138, 2011, 671-695.

¹⁸ A. Lercari, 'La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria dal Comune consolare alla repubblica aristocratica', in M. Fracanzani, I. Quadrio, M. Zorzi eds., *Le aristocrazie cittadine. Evoluzione dei ceti dirigenti urbani nei secoli XV-XVIII. Atti del Convegno (Venezia, 20 ottobre 2007)*, Venice, 2009, 227-362, 234. See also Polonio, 'Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul mare', 26-38.

¹⁹ A. Zanini, 'Strategie politiche ed economia feudale ai confini della Repubblica di Genova (secoli XVI-XVIII). Un buon negotio con qualche contrarietà', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* 45, 2005, 5-238.

²⁰ See V. Piergiovanni, 'Il sistema europeo e le istituzioni repubblicane di Genova nel Quattrocento', in Piergiovanni ed., *Norme, scienza e pratica*, 3-10.

²¹ The Spanish ownership of Finale is a clear example of foreign interference in the Genoese consolidation of its territorial state. I will discuss it in the next Chapters. See P. Calcagno, 'Una schermaglia di antico regime: la "partita" del Finale fra Genova, Milano e Madrid', in M.H. Sánchez, Y. Ben Yessef Garfia, C. Bitossi, D. Puncuh eds., *Génova y la Monarquía Hispánica (1528-1713)*, II, Genoa, 2011, 459-494; Zanini, 'Strategie politiche ed economia feudale', 5-238; G. Assereto, 'Porti e scali minori della Repubblica di Genova', 221-258.

²² On the strategical value of Savona, see P. Calcagno, *Savona, porto di Piemonte. L'economia della città e del suo territorio dal Quattrocento alla grande guerra*, Novi Ligure, 2013; G. Assereto, *La città fedelissima. Savona e il governo genovese fra XVI e XVIII secolo*, Savona, 2007.

During the thirteenth century, Genoa's political and economic success on the international scene went hand in hand with fiercer rivalries between the city factions of the Guelphs, also known as *Rampini*, and the Ghibellines, also known as *Mascherati*. These factions were struggling for power in most Italian cities. Theoretically, they were supporting either the Papacy or the Empire.²³ However, this distinction overlapped the division between *nobiles* – descendants of the consuls who had governed the city in the communal phase –, and *populares* – partly corresponding to merchants, artisans, shopkeepers, etc. In turn, the *populares* were divided into *artifex* (artisans) and *mercatores* (merchants).²⁴ *Nobiles vs. populares* is undoubtedly the longest lasting conflict affecting the life of the Republic of Genoa. In part, it even survived the sixteenth century reforms.

Each faction aimed to influence access to public offices, in order to fashion the composition of the city administration's ranks to its own advantage.²⁵ However, the divisions within the Genoese elites were not so clear-cut, as they may seem from the outside, for they would not represent clearly separated groups. Members of a faction could be active within the Genoese community for some matters and concurrently (or subsequently) take sides with a different group. As pointed out by Edoardo Grendi, some members of the ruling class changed faction during their political careers, often just for political or economic

²³ M. Ascheri, *Le città-Stato*, Bologna, 2006; C. Capra, G. Chittolini, F. Della Peruta, *Corso di storia*, I, *Storia Medievale*, Florence, 1995; H. Pirenne, *Medieval cities: their origins and the revival of trade*, Princeton, 2014 (1ed. 1925).

²⁴ Pacini, *I presupposti*, 22-23.

²⁵ On the conflicts between *nobiles* and *populares*, see G. Petti Balbi, 'Genesi e composizione di un ceto dirigente, i "populares" a Genova nei secoli XIII e XIV', in G. Rossetti ed., *Spazio, società, potere nell'Italia dei Comuni*, Naples, 1986, 85-103; E. Grendi, 'Un esempio di arcaismo politico: le conventicole nobiliari a Genova e la riforma del 1528', *Rivista storica italiana* LXXVIII/4, 1966, 948-968; E. Grendi, 'Capitazioni e nobiltà genovese in età moderna', *Quaderni storici* IX/26, 1974, 403-444; E. Grendi, 'Profilo storico degli alberghi genovesi', *Mélanges de l'Ecole Française de Rome* LXXXVII/1, 1975, 241-302; E. Grendi, 'Problemi di storia degli alberghi genovesi', in *La storia dei genovesi*, I, *Atti del convegno di studi sui ceti dirigenti nelle istituzioni della Repubblica di Genova (Genova, 7-9 novembre 1980)*, Genoa, 1981, 183-197; G. Forcheri, 'Dalla Compagna al Popolo', in *La storia dei genovesi*, I, 73-89; A. Agosto, 'Nobili e popolari: l'origine del dogato', in *La storia dei genovesi*, I, 91-120; G. Barni, 'La divisione del potere nelle costituzioni Adorno del 1363 e del 1413 (Nobili e Popolari)', in *La storia dei genovesi*, I, 121-158; C. Cattaneo Mallone, 'La nobiltà genovese dal Boccanegra alla riforma di Andrea Doria', in *La Storia dei genovesi*, IV, *Atti del convegno di studi sui ceti dirigenti nelle istituzioni della Repubblica di Genova (Genova, 28-30 aprile 1983)*, Genoa, 1984, 97-137; G. Forcheri, 'Dalle Regulae costituzionali del 1413 alla Riforma del 1528', in *La Storia dei genovesi*, IV, 7-29. See also G. Balbi, 'Boccanegra Simone', in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, IX, Rome, 1968, 37-40; V. Piergiovanni, 'Il senato della Repubblica di Genova nella riforma di Andrea Doria', *Annali della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza* IV/1, Genoa, 1965, 230-275; A. Petracchi, 'Norma e prassi costituzionale nella serenissima Repubblica di Genova: La riforma del 1528', *Nuova rivista storica* LXIV, 1980, 43-80; M. Nicora, 'La nobiltà genovese dal 1528 al 1700', *Miscellanea storica ligure*, II, Milan, 1961, 217-310.

convenience.²⁶ Francesco Guicciardini summarised this complex pattern as follows:

And all these divisions are so confused that often those who are of the same side, against the opposing party, are also among themselves divided into various parties, and, on the contrary, they join with those who follow another side.²⁷

In 1257, there was a breakthrough. That year, due to the political supremacy of burghers over the recently urbanized nobility, the *Podestà*, formerly the political leader of the commune, was abolished and replaced by the *capitano del popolo*. Guglielmo Boccanegra, the first *capitano del popolo*, supported by the populace, expelled the nobles from the city.²⁸ His rule, however, was short. Following Boccanegra's fall, in 1262, the nobles came back and took over the role of *capitano del popolo*, which became their own prerogative.²⁹ Ghibelline and Guelph exponents of the nobility would hold it alternatively: the Doria and Spinola ruled for the Ghibellines, the Fieschi and Grimaldi for the Guelphs. An abbot flanked the noble *capitano del popolo* as a guardian of *populares'* interests.

Long-lasting political instability, with actually no prevailing faction, and strongly fragmented main parties, would let new international players enter the fray. Since the fourteenth century, the main factions were increasingly relying on the strength and support of foreign powers, particularly interested in Genoa's international alignment. Thus in 1311, after conflicts between the various parties, the Genoese placed themselves under the rule of the Holy Roman

²⁶ Grendi, 'Profilo storico degli Alberghi', 24. The vicissitudes of Adamo Centurione are a clear example: he was a wealthy merchant who accumulated a fortune in trading and finance with Spain. He was a prominent element of a predominantly White *Albergo*. He was registered as a White in an undated list from early sixteenth century; he changed faction before 1521, the year in which he was among the councillors of *San Giorgio*. In the following years, he appeared among the *Boni viri de tabula* as a Black noble. ASG, ms. 87, *Consigli delle classi*, cc. 61r.-71t. Centurione sits among the *Consiglieri di San Giorgio* in 1521, as reported in ASCG, ms. 443, 1521, 295.

²⁷ "E si confondono in modo tutte queste divisioni che spesso quegli che sono d'una medesima parte, contro alla parte opposita, sono eziandio tra se medesimi divisi in varie parti, e per contrario congiunti in una parte con quegli che seguitano un'altra parte", F. Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia*, II, Turin, 1971 (1ed. 1537-1540), 655.

²⁸ R. Sabatino Lopez, 'Boccanegra, Guglielmo', in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, 11, 1969; A.M. Boldorini, 'Guglielmo Boccanegra, Carlo d'Angiò e i conti di Ventimiglia (1257-1262)', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, nuova serie* III/1, 1963, 139-199.

²⁹ The *podestà* played the role of moderator between factions, as he had to be a foreigner and not in any relation with the city clans. The *capitano del popolo*, and later the *doge*, on the other hand, were the expression of a specific clan or faction within urban society. See G. Cama, 'Banco di San Giorgio e sistema politico genovese: un'analisi teorica', in G. Felloni ed., *La Casa di San Giorgio: il potere del credito*, Genoa, 2006, 109-120, 114.

Emperor Henry VII. He tried to broker an agreement between the factions in town.³⁰ Subsequently, the Guelphs, allies to the King of France and opposed to the Emperor's authority, expelled the Ghibellines. In 1318, they yielded to the rule of Pope John XXII and Robert of Anjou, king of Naples and count of Provence. These new rulers abolished the *capitano del popolo*, leaving only the abbot who supported a vicar appointed by the King. In 1331, the city officially surrendered to the king of Naples. Robert of Anjou, as requested by a mixed delegation of Genoese Guelphs and Ghibellines, managed to mediate a truce between them. The Ghibelline Doria and Spinola families were allowed back in town.³¹ Already in 1335, these families returned to power with a new *capitano del popolo*. However, any attempt to re-establish this old arrangement failed.

On 23 September 1339, the election of a new abbot turned into the popular acclamation of the first *doge*, Simone Boccanegra, Guglielmo's nephew, who was opposed to the nobles.³² The *doge's* mandate was supposed to last for life but, in Genoa, factions would always be against a long-lasting rule by a single individual.³³ In addition, Boccanegra's election had resulted from a riot aimed at excluding the nobility from power. As a result, nobles could no longer hold any of the city main offices.³⁴ The noble families, however, opposed Boccanegra with the help of populations from the *Riviera* and the duchy of Milan. In 1353, this coalition succeeded in driving out the *doge* and imposing a Milanese rule. The principle of equal distribution of public offices among families was slowly brought back again. In any case, the control of the *populares* over the *doge* appointment lasted until 1528.

Boccanegra managed to return to Genoa in 1356 when he ousted the Milanese with the support of Ghibelline troops from Tuscany. Following his death, few *populares* families – the Guarco, the Montaldo, the Fregoso and the Adorno – would take part in the struggle for the dogeship. Progressively, it became a prerogative of the members of the Adorno and Fregoso families alone. They were called *cappellazzi*, mere aggregators of factions scarcely

³⁰ M. Jones, *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, VI, c. 1300-c. 1415, Cambridge, 2000, 534. See also G. Petti Balbi, 'Uno dei fallimenti di Enrico VII: la signoria di Genova (1311-1313)', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, nuova serie* LIV/2, 2014, 5-36.

³¹ G. Petti Balbi, 'L'assedio di Genova degli anni 1317-1331: maligna et durans discordia inter gibellinos et guelfos de lanua', *Reti Medievali Rivista* VIII, 2007, see <https://doi.org/10.6092/1593-2214/129>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

³² Petti Balbi, 'Boccanegra Simone', 37-40.

³³ Polonio, 'Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul mare', 33.

³⁴ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 25.

characterized by common social purposes.³⁵ The Adorno were the leaders of the Ghibelline faction, while the Fregoso led the Guelphs. Noble families would side with either of them, for reasons that often escape historical reconstruction. The Fieschi and the Grimaldi – Guelph nobles – together with the Spinola – Ghibelline nobles – supported the Adorno. The Doria – popular Ghibellines – supported the Fregoso – popular Guelphs.³⁶ The *nobiles* never lost their influence on the city's political life.³⁷

In 1363, Gabriele Adorno, former vicar of Boccanegra and *doge* after him, promulgated the *Regulae Communis Januae*. According to these rules, twelve all-popular *Anziani* were to be appointed, six from the *mercatores* and six from the *artifex*. During their four-month term, they had to support the *doge*, as I will show later.³⁸ The *Regulae* remained in force until 1528, when they were replaced by the so-called 'Dorian' reforms. Under these *Regulae*, the division between *Nobiles* and *Populares* was formalised. The names of the members of the two factions were recorded in a book periodically updated by the two *vicedoge*, chosen among the *populares*. In order to be elected to public offices one had to be listed in this book.³⁹

Between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Genoa's political life was deeply troubled by bitter disputes between factions that could result in the arrival of foreign rulers. During most of the fifteenth century, the members of the Adorno and Fregoso families would take turns in ruling the city, with short intervals of foreign rulers supported by the Milanese and the French. During this whole period, the ancient nobility – except for the Fieschi, Doria and Spinola, faction leaders in the *Riviera* – were sitting on the fence.⁴⁰ Giorgio Adorno (1413-1415) during his dogeship, in order to ease social tensions, enacted the *Reguale Reipublicae Genuensis*: the seats in the Council of the *Anziani* and in the other magistracies were to be equally distributed among *nobiles* and

³⁵ R. Musso, 'La tirannia dei cappellazzi. La Liguria tra XIV e XVI secolo', in Assereto, Doria eds., *Storia della Liguria* 39-50.

³⁶ F. Casoni, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova del secolo decimo sesto*, I, Genoa, 1799, 21-22 (1ed.1708). See also H. Sieveking, 'Studio sulle finanze genovesi nel medioevo e in particolare sulla casa di S. Giorgio', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* XXXV, 1905-1906, 1-261, 20-21, 155-159.

³⁷ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 28.

³⁸ According to Vitale, there was an equal division of the offices between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, see V. Vitale, *Breviario della storia di Genova: lineamenti storici ed orientamenti bibliografici*, Genoa, 1955, 140.

³⁹ C. Cattaneo Mallone, *I "politici" del medioevo genovese: (ricerche d'archivio). Il Liber civilitatis del 1528*, Genoa, 1987, 109; Lercari, 'La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria', 238.

⁴⁰ Lercari, 'La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria', 237.

populares. The division between Guelphs and Ghibellines overlapped this criterion; however, these labels were progressively losing their original meaning. The terms *Bianchi* (White) and *Neri* (Black), slowly replaced those of Ghibellines and Guelphs.

1.2 “*Franza o Spagna, Purché se Magna*”⁴¹: Comparing Models

During the Italian Wars (1494-1559), Genoa became strategically more important for the main parties involved. This process is evident in the different policies adopted by France and Spain regarding the Republic of Genoa.⁴² Most probably, the type of rule imposed over Genoa and its territories by these two monarchies affected all subsequent alliances of the Genoese. The ruling class was perfectly aware of their key role: the city was the gateway to the Italian peninsula for France, as well as an access to the sea for Milan. As a frontier region, it had to be adequately supported and defended. As to Spain, the Republic was unrivalled in what Parker called “the way to Flanders”.⁴³ From 1499, Genoa was under the rule of France, following the annexation of the Duchy of Milan to the dominion of Louis XII. Despite popular uprisings in 1506-1507 and the brief dogeship of Paolo da Novi, the French government lasted until 1512. At least at the beginning, it enjoyed the favour of the nobility, as privileged interlocutors of the King.⁴⁴

Louis XII resorted to feudal investitures in order to win over the great noble families in Liguria and Lombardy, thus displeasing the *populares*. He managed the territory of Genoa as the rest of his Kingdom. Therefore, he used the same strategies he adopted in France to rule over the country and dominate local politics, without paying much attention to any specific local circumstances. In particular, Louis XII granted fiefdoms to reward the members of the nobility who were loyal to him. The Fieschi family for example, owners of a vast territorial

⁴¹ This is an Italian proverb, literally meaning “France or Spain, until we eat”. It was perhaps Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) who invented this proverb. First, he was Florence's ambassador in Spain and then, back home, he supported the 1526 Cognac Agreement and the alliance with France to weaken Charles V's hegemony over Italy. This proverb applies well to Genoese internal conflicts for power in early modern period.

⁴² M. Mallett, C. Shaw, *The Italian Wars: 1494–1559*, Harlow, 2012; J. Black, *European Warfare, 1494–1660. Warfare and History*, London, 2002.

⁴³ G. Parker, *The army of Flanders and the Spanish road 1567-1659*, Cambridge, 1972. See also W. Brulez, ‘L'exportation des Pays-Bas vers l'Italie par voie de terre, au milieu du XVIe siècle’, *Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations* 3, 1959, 461-491.

⁴⁴ Lercari, ‘La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria’, 240. On the Doge Paolo da Novi, see Costantini, *La repubblica di Genova*, 11-13.

domain in the *Levante* and defined by Jacque Heers as “un état montagnard”, were the King’s privileged interlocutors.⁴⁵ In 1499, Gian Luigi Fieschi was appointed governor of the *Riviera di Levante*, which means the territories belonging to the republic East of Genoa.⁴⁶ Repeated concessions to the requests made by Savona, in the Western *Riviera*, and attempts to change the local political-institutional system, added up to the conflict.⁴⁷ The nobles, therefore, sided with the King. During the uprisings in 1506, the French, driven out from Genoa, reorganised their forces from Savona to conquer back the capital and restore the French rule. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for the *populares* to prevail over the nobility.

However, interferences by the king's representatives in the most disparate matters, particularly in civil justice, slowly drove even the nobles to side against the king. The governor chosen by the king, for example, had the right to appoint all major judicial bodies. Moreover, in June 1509, Louis XII began to autonomously appoint officers and magistrates even in the Ligurian *Riviera*, with increasing concern among the citizens. In 1510, the Genoese managed to obtain a higher degree of autonomy. Venice and the Papacy organised an anti-French offensive, laying siege to Genoa. The anti-French forces hoped for a popular uprising.⁴⁸ However, the city sided with the king and rejected the invading armies. This success earned the favour of the king. Louis XII decided to recall his commissioners from Genoa. The king had never specified their mission, which had worried Genoese authorities. In general, during this period of French rule, the division between *nobiles* and *populares* was clearly exacerbated. The new fiefs had tipped off Genoa’s territorial balance, while the city judicial bodies were under continuous attacks from the French authorities.

Although the French were ousted in 1512, the Adorno and Fieschi remained tied to France. The new *doge*, Ottaviano Fregoso, came to power in 1513 with Spanish support and the consent of Leo X.⁴⁹ According to Oberto Foglietta, a contemporary historian, who was an opponent of the Doria and sided with the

⁴⁵ J. Heers, *Gènes au XVe siècle. Activité économique et problèmes sociaux*, Paris, 1961, 599.

⁴⁶ V. Vitale, ‘Fieschi, Gian Luigi, il Vecchio’, in *Enciclopedia Italiana*, 15, Rome, 1932.

⁴⁷ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 52; E. Pandiani, ‘Controversie tra Genova e Savona durante il pontificato di Giulio II’, in *Savona nella storia e nell’arte*, Genoa, 1928, 167-202; C. Russo, ‘L’arbitrato di Giulio II nella secolare lotta tra Genova e Savona’, *Atti della Regia Deputazione di Storia Patria per la Liguria, sezione di Savona XXIV*, 1942, 4-130.

⁴⁸ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 74-75.

⁴⁹ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 58; G. Brunelli, ‘Fregoso, Ottaviano’, in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, 50, Rome, 1998.

populares, the direction of Genoese politics and the need for a 'unitary' reform were already clear since Ottaviano Fregoso's dogeship.⁵⁰ The *doge* wanted to reunite the various factions and the Republic's territories. For this reason, for example, he forced Savona – which under the French rule had enjoyed some degree of autonomy – to comply with the old agreements. Fregoso's government distinguished itself for massive recourse to large assemblies of citizens, looking for broad consensus to overcome factionary fights.⁵¹ On the initiative of the *doge*, however, during an offensive led by the French sovereign Francis I in 1515, Genoa left the Hispanic-pontifical alliance and sided again with France. Ottaviano Fregoso gave up the *doge* title to become Governor of Genoa on behalf of the King of France, upon payment of a loan of 80,000 *scudi* to the King. The French rule lasted until 1522. However, the heterogeneous composition of the Fregoso faction, in which not everyone supported this sudden change of front, and the voluntary nature of this alliance, prevented Francis I from carrying on the pro-noble policy of Louis XII. However, there were new sources of conflict. The Genoese conquest of Gavi and Ovada domains, for example, previously owned by the noble Trotti and Guaschi families, broke all relations with France. The disagreement concerned borderland and key strategic positions for trade and defence. The Genoese army occupied these areas, but France demanded the government to leave them again to the Trotti and Guaschi.⁵² Actually, the pressing need of the Genoese state was to guarantee its land integrity. Thus, its willingness to accept the French rule depended also on this. The Grand Council of France, however, reached an agreement with the Trotti and Guaschi. Furthermore, already in 1519, Francis I asked Genoa for more money, arguing that this was a tribute rightfully owed to the king by his subjects. The requests intensified after the death of Emperor Maximilian I, when the French ruler sought to acquire the imperial title for himself. However, many bankers from Genoa, second only to the Fugger, are known to have sponsored the election of the future Charles V.⁵³

⁵⁰ O. Foglietta, *La Repubblica di Genova*, Bologna, 1997 (1ed. 1559). On Foglietta see C. Bitossi, 'Foglietta, Oberto', in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 48, 1997.

⁵¹ E. Pandiani, *Genova ed Andrea Doria nel primo quarto del Cinquecento*, Genoa, 1949, 160.

⁵² Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 80-84.

⁵³ R. Ehrenberg, *Le siècle des Fugger*, Paris, 1955, 44. See also R. Ehrenberg, *Capital and finance in the age of the Renaissance: a study of the Fuggers and their connections*, Fairfield, 1985. Francis I requested money to the Republic in the spring 1519, see ASG, AS, Lettere principi alla repubblica di Genova 2780, 1519.

According to Arturo Pacini and Claudio Costantini, the alliance with the Empire and Spain, formalized in 1528, was the political result of an economic decision made in the early 1520s.⁵⁴ Following the Turkish advance in the Eastern Mediterranean, the interests of Ligurian merchants had largely shifted westward, particularly to Spain and Portugal.⁵⁵ The financial businesses of the wealthiest Genoese families, for example, were often intertwined with political and military events of the utmost importance. The Sauli financed the descent of Charles VIII to Italy in 1494, while the Grimaldi, Fornari and Vivaldi were among the financiers of Charles V against Francis I, as already discussed, even while Francis I was ruling in Genoa.

Following the defeat of Francis I in the imperial election, obstacles to the alliance with France became even more evident. The political and commercial isolation that the Genoese merchants encountered in the territories subject to Charles V became unsustainable. The latter had also gained control over the duchy of Milan and the Kingdom of Naples, effectively hindering Genoese trade throughout the peninsula.⁵⁶ Moreover, when examining Genoese foreign policy, provisioning was a constant concern. Being a city totally committed to commerce, industry and finance, and without a suitable hinterland for large cereal crops, Genoa depended on other Mediterranean areas to feed its population. In particular, safeguarding the supplies of Provençal (French) and Sicilian (Spanish/Imperial) grain was paramount. The revived conflict between the main European powers jeopardized access to those markets, thus the need for grain markets played an important role in strategic decisions at the international level. Ottaviano Fregoso himself, addressing Francis I, reported how the wealth of the city strictly depended on this trade: “not getting fruit from the earth at all, except only for the industry that induces traffic and trade”.⁵⁷ In March 1522, for example, Genoa sent two ships under Commissioner Tommaso Italiano to seize all the vessels loaded with grain that he would encounter.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, Spanish troops besieged the city. The Genoese defended themselves by buying time and hoping for French support.

⁵⁴ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 15; Costantini, *La repubblica di Genova*, 19.

⁵⁵ See Heers, *Gènes au XVe siècle*.

⁵⁶ T. Dandeleit, J. Marino eds., *Spain in Italy. Politics, Society and Religion 1500-1700*, Leiden, 2006.

⁵⁷ “non uscendo da alcuni fructi de la terra, salvo solamente de la industria che induce el traffico et tratta mercantile”, in Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 120.

⁵⁸ K. Brandi, *Carlo V*, Turin, 1967, 102-106; P. Pieri, *Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana*, Turin, 1970, 537; Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 87.

The choice between France and Spain was clearly a difficult one, which would obviously lead to the exclusion from either market. However, there was the imperial assurance to restore the Republic and appoint a trusted Genoese citizen as the new *doge*, probably Girolamo Adorno, who was travelling together with the Spanish troops. The French, on the other hand, would continue to leave their own governor in Genoa. Agostino Giustiniani wrote that Charles V acted wisely because he knew and respected the proverb according to which only the Genoese would be able to run Genoa:

[...] and he knew very well, His Majesty, the truth of the proverb, which said that if Genoa does not take Genoa the whole world would not take Genoa, and therefore [he] resolved to make use of the Adorno faction.⁵⁹

A direct French rule and the Spanish (or imperial) 'protection' alternated depending on which of the two main factions – the Adorno's or the Fregoso's – was prevailing. The fact that the two great powers had different institutional models played an important role. Under the French rule, the magistrates made their important decisions in the presence of the royal governor; they were subject to his supervision. Under the Spanish rule, on the other hand, an ambassador represented the king in the city. His control capacity, however, depended on the presence of trusted people in the state's establishment.⁶⁰ In practice, the Spanish protection offered better guarantees of independence and room for manoeuvre than the more direct French rule, which was a true governorate.⁶¹

The way in which the Genoese conducted the negotiations during the 1522 Spanish siege, with the exclusive intention of buying time and waiting for the French army, was perhaps at the origin of the subsequent sack of the city on the 30 and 31 of May 1522. Following the sack, pro-Spain Antoniotto Adorno (1522-1527) became the new *doge*. Already at this time when the imperial alliance was being put to test, Genoa had to deal with a more respectful

⁵⁹ “[...] e sapeva benissimo Sua Maestà la verità del proverbio, che si sol dire, che se Genoa non piglia Genoa tutto il mondo non piglierebbe Genoa, e perciò si volse servire della fattion Adorna”, in A. Giustiniani, *Castigatissimi annali con la loro copiosa tavola della Eccelsa et Illustrissima Repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, Genoa, 1537, CCLXXV, in Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 86.

⁶⁰ See E. Grendi, *I Balbi. Una famiglia genovese fra Spagna e Impero*, Turin, 1997; M.H. Sánchez, M. Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, ‘La aristocracia genovesa al servicio de la Monarquía Católica: el caso del III marqués de Los Balbases (1630-1699)’, in Sánchez, Ben Yessef Garfia, Bitossi, Puncuh eds., *Génova y la Monarquía Hispánica*, I, 331-366.

⁶¹ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 51-145.

interlocutor to discuss its needs. The debt of over 40,000 *scudi* incurred by the Adorno with their supporters forced them to beg for the emperor's benevolence. They sought to obtain an official backing from him. Charles V granted it with patent letter dated 20 December 1523.⁶² The sack, the blockage of trade with Lombardy, and unsafe sea routes, had weakened the city's economy while tax revenues had dropped. During the Spanish attack in Provence in 1524, Adamo Centurione, consul, banker, and later Andrea Doria's 'finance minister', pleaded the emperor to let Genoa get free access to the grain in Provence in exchange for its support in war.⁶³ This would have allowed Genoa to preserve both its key supply centres. The attack, however, failed because of Marseille's resistance.⁶⁴

Conflicts of jurisdiction and administration still remained: the compulsory draft to the anti-French league of July-August 1523; the methodical exploitation of Genoese financial resources and of the city's strategic position; some secret negotiations between Charles V and France in May 1524 concerning Genoese territory; the pressures during the Morone conspiracy,⁶⁵ the emperor's resistance in accepting Genoa's demands for free traffic in Spanish territories. For all these reasons, the government was poorly tolerated in the city.⁶⁶ After the expulsion of Antoniotto Adorno, the troops of Cesare Fregoso and Andrea Doria, supported by the French, gave birth to the last foreign government, by the French governor Teodoro Trivulzio. Under his rule, the reform began, later to be completed by Andrea Doria.

However, the French government proved to be highly unpopular: Francis I failed to bring Savona back under the Republic's rule and refused to push through a reform of Genoa's political bodies.⁶⁷ Upon expiry of the agreement between Doria and Francis I, and after a few months of negotiations followed with apprehension in all European courts, the admiral went under the service of

⁶² Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 117-118, 123-124.

⁶³ G. Nuti, 'Centurione, Adamo', in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 23, 1979.

⁶⁴ Letter written on the 15/03/1524, in ASG, AS, Relazioni dei ministri genovesi presso le corti estere 2718, *Libro de recolecta di tutti li progressi et actione de Martino Centurione et de quello che ha negociato in la sua ambassaria de la excelsa comunita de Genova a la Cesarea et Catholica Maestà in Spagna*, 37 r. See also the report written by Centurione on the 31/03/1524 and the letter to Lannoy on the 08/04/1524, 26 v., 29 r.

⁶⁵ See F. Cazzamini Musso, *La congiura di Gerolamo Morone*, Como, 1945.

⁶⁶ G. Oreste, 'Adorno, Antoniotto', in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 1, 1960.

⁶⁷ After the conquest of Savona, Francis I kept separate administrations. He replaced Savona under Genoese jurisdiction only in June 1528. In Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea*, 19.

Charles V. In September 1528, Doria entered Genoa.⁶⁸ The city, weakened by the plague and the recent war, opposed almost no resistance and went again under Spanish rule. The contribution from Doria's and Genoa's galleys, new emperor's allies, was fundamental to continue his fight for supremacy in Italy.

This turnaround, not unusual in Genoese foreign policy in previous decades, also had obvious economic reasons. As early as 1519, a fundamental agreement had been finalised between Genoa and Spain. This document – originally a simple addition to the 1493 peace treaty between the Republic and the Iberian monarchy – sought to smooth out any economic divergences: i.e., managing mercantile disputes, ruling on possible reprisals, etc.⁶⁹ The king's subjects would fall under the jurisdiction of Genoese law *etiam tam mari quam terra, in omnibus locis subditis iurisdictioni ianuensi*, and viceversa.⁷⁰ Thus the courts of the place where the law had been breached would have been the appropriate judiciary courts. Maritime legislation in Genoa was already strictly linked to Iberian customs, as we can see from the circulation, in Genoa, of the *Consolat de Mar* drafted in Barcelona in the thirteenth century.⁷¹ It probably succeeded the French rules known as the *Roles d'Oleron*.⁷² The *Consolat de Mar* was a key reference, as I will show in the Third Chapter, even in Genoese Average procedures. Genoese jurists cited and used it until the eighteenth century.⁷³

There were common interests well beyond the 1528 reform. Ideological, strategic, political and economic reasons contributed to bringing Genoa into the Spanish sphere of influence, even though the recent plunder was still a vivid memory. During the French rule, the Genoese had to waive their formal

⁶⁸ For the complex and multifaceted relations between Genoa and the Spanish crown see Sánchez, Ben Yessef Garfia, Bitossi, Puncuh eds., *Génova y la Monarquía Hispánica (1528-1713)*, 2 voll., Genoa, 2011.

⁶⁹ P. Lisciandrelli, *Trattati e negoziazioni politiche della repubblica di Genova (958-1797)*, Genoa, 1960, 185-187.

⁷⁰ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 102.

⁷¹ The first Italian edition of the *Consolat de Mer* dated back to 1584, see A. Lozzi, *Codici e consuetudini nella storia del commercio marittimo. Dagli statuti delle città italiane ai Codici del Regno d'Italia*, Milan, 2010; S. Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare. La tradizione giuridico-marittimo del Mediterraneo attraverso un'edizione italiana del 1584 del testo originale del 1484*, Rome, 2005; G. Calafat, *Une mer jalousee. Contribution à l'histoire de la souveraineté (Méditerranée, XVIIe siècle)*, Paris, 2019; O. Remie Constable, 'The problem of jettison in Medieval Mediterranean maritime law', *Journal of Medieval History* 20/3, 1994, 207-220.

⁷² E. Maccioni, 'Il ruolo del Consolato del Mare di Barcellona nella guerra catalano-aragonese contro i giudici d'Arborea', in O. Schena, S. Tognetti eds., *Commercio, finanza e guerra nella Sardegna tardomedievale*, Rome, 2017, 167-196.

⁷³ There are many famous editions of the *Consolat* especially in the eighteenth century. See G.M. Casaregi, *Il Consolato del Mare*, Venezia, 1732; A. Capmany, *Codigo de las costumbres maritimas de Barcelona*, Madrid, 1791.

freedom by accepting a governor appointed by France. Conversely, by remaining under the Spanish/imperial orbit, the State could maintain its republican structure. This basic difference affected the way power was wielded and might have been one of the main reasons for siding with Spain. For example, according to Pacini, France and Spain adopted different ways of exploiting Genoa's resources and reflected the way they looked upon Genoa. Francis I asked for contributions as if the Republic of Genoa were part of his own Kingdom.⁷⁴ Conversely, Charles V, since 1524, did not collect any taxes with his own officers, but rather resorted to loans from Genoese bankers, which would bring him great financial benefits.⁷⁵ Still, we cannot underestimate the benefits of trade with France and the 'opportunity cost' of this choice for Genoa.⁷⁶

The Republic of Genoa did its best to avoid the duties involved in political alliances. It did not want to be subjected to Spanish foreign policies and tried to keep a minimum margin of manoeuvrability.⁷⁷ This alliance was an expression of mercantile opportunism, made 'honourable' and justified by republican pride. The forces underlying Genoa's political survival in European mercantile and financial markets and the survival, on a smaller scale, of its internal social and political balance, were difficult to govern.

1.3 *The Creation of an Oligarchic Republic*

Between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the city was either a subject of the French king or an ally of the Iberian Catholic kings and then of the Holy Roman Emperor. Keeping their formal independence was a constant concern of the Genoese elites. Traditionally, most historiography about Genoa identifies the date of 1528, the stable alliance with Spain and the Dorian reforms as the reasons for the end of the bitter conflicts that had characterized Genoa's government. Genoa thus entered a new foreign policy phase: Andrea Doria

⁷⁴ See F. Levy, 'Gênes ville de France? Aspects juridiques de la domination française à Gênes', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* XLVII/1, 2007, 329-356.

⁷⁵ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 144.

⁷⁶ D. Giofrè, *Gênes et les foires de change. De Lyon à Besançon*, Paris, 1960.

⁷⁷ A. Ceccarelli, 'Tra sovranità e imperialità. Genova nell'età delle congiure popolari barocche (1623-1637)', *Perspectivia.net* 93, 2013, 251-282; M. Schnettger, 'Libertà e imperialità. La repubblica di Genova e il Sacro Romano Impero nel tardo Cinquecento', in Schnettger, Taviani eds., *Libertà e dominio*, 129-144. The Republic's government operated a strict control over the political texts that put discredit on its decisions, see C. Costantini, *Dibattito politico e problemi di governo a Genova nella prima metà del Seicento*, Florence, 1970.

became the guarantor of both the newly enacted reform and the new political alliance.⁷⁸

The issue of Genoa's positioning on the European stage and the need for an institutional structure and system of unitary power had distant origins: not even the 1528 reorganization could provide a lasting solution. The drafting of the *Libro di Pace e Concordia* (date unknown, after 19 July 1506) was a first attempt at creating the 'union' as an outcome of popular uprising.⁷⁹ It derived from the oath made to each other by some Genoese citizens: they undertook to reject the logic of factions, as soon as the 'law of two thirds' was to be approved. According to this law, which was immediately repealed upon the reinstatement of the French rule, magistracy offices had to be equally distributed not only between *nobiles* and *populares*, but also between the three orders of *nobiles*, *populares*, and craftsmen. The *populares* tried to overcome their factional division in order to increase their representative power. Until then, a greater unity of the nobility, as we have seen, was otherwise sufficient to guarantee their *de facto* dominance. The *populares* were far too divided among themselves.

To safeguard their power, the nobles aimed to further strengthen internal divisions: the Adorno and Fregoso were the ideal tools to maintain the *status quo*. The Genoese nobility conceived society as an opposition between nobles and all other citizens, and the noble class in Genoa were merchants just like other citizens. Even some of the great *populares* families like, for example, the De Franchi, De Fornari, Promontorio, Sauli and Giustiniani would act like nobles, although they would be formally categorised as merchants and bankers.⁸⁰ Challenging the superiority of the noble class was tantamount to attesting to a homogeneous ruling class of citizens involved in commercial and production activities. Despite alternating events, this homogeneous social structure could be established only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁸¹

According to a manuscript by Giovanni Battista Cicala, another reform attempt took place in 1525.⁸² The Republic's government appointed twelve

⁷⁸ On how Spain looked at the alliance with Genoa see R. Ciasca, *Istruzioni e relazioni degli ambasciatori genovesi*, I, *Spagna (1494-1617)*, Rome, 1951, 103-108.

⁷⁹ ASG, ms. 137, *Decreta pro reformatione officiorum*, 1506. See C. Taviani, *Superba discordia. Guerra, rivolta e pacificazione nella Genova di primo Cinquecento*, Rome, 2008.

⁸⁰ See G. Doria ed., *Nobiltà e investimenti a Genova in età moderna*, Genoa, 1995.

⁸¹ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 181.

⁸² M. Cavanna Ciappina, 'Cicala Zoagli, Giovanni Battista', in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 25, 1981.

citizens – six *nobiles* and six *populares* – with the specific task of reforming the government.⁸³ The circumstances looked propitious. Spain had just suffered a military defeat at Varazze and its authority was weakened, allowing the Genoese to aim at long overdue reforms. The promise of a long-awaited union with the *populares* was a political move. It was also useful to overcome political-military difficulties and keep citizens united during a new offensive by the French who were leading the siege by sea and by land.⁸⁴ The union was supposed to put an end to Adorno-Fregoso's alternating rule pattern, and let the Republic take a neutral position between Spain and France. At the same time, the approval of any government system reform had to be obtained from Charles V. However, the unexpected imperial victory in the battle of Pavia, (10 March 1525), and the capture of King Francis seriously weakened the position of reform advocates.⁸⁵ Suddenly, it was no more urgent for the emperor to find an alternative to the proven loyalty of Antoniotto Adorno and his dogeship. Despite further attempts to demand reforms, especially from the Genoese ambassador Adamo Centurione, Madrid's attitude became cautious and evasive.⁸⁶ In the previous months, a reformers' committee had worked successfully and enforced some likely new measures: already between February and March 1525, there was news of a list of twenty-eight *Alberghi* to which Genoa's families were to be assigned, similarly to the system that would be adopted later in the 1528 'Dorian' reforms.⁸⁷

The cumbersome presence of the Adorno and Fregoso families and their catalyst role in factionary struggles were still the main obstacles, in addition to the lack of imperial support. Any reform would have to address their monopoly on the dogeship. In order to separate the fate of Genoa from the wars in Italy and from external powers, the institutional system of the Republic itself had to be reformed and the role of the lifetime *doge* done away with or in any case diminished. In 1527-1528, the reform plans, briefly taken up again during the

⁸³ White *nobiles*: Agostino quondam Pietro Pallavicino, Battista quondam Tommaso Spinola, Girolamo quondam Agostino Doria. Black *nobiles*: Franco Fieschi, Ansaldo Grimaldi, Battista quondam Stefano Lomellino. White *mercator*: Raffaele de Fornari, Stefano Giustiniani. Black *mercator*: Francesco quondam Paolo Sauli. White *artifex*: Bartolomeo Sofia, Giovanni Ballano. Black *artifex*: Battista Botto. In ASCG, ms. 443, 1525, 345.

⁸⁴ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 216-217.

⁸⁵ ASG, AS, Relazioni dei ministri genovesi presso le corti estere 2718, *Libro de recoleta*, 70 r.-71 r. See Brandi, *Carlo V*, 209-212.

⁸⁶ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 228-229.

⁸⁷ ASG, *Manoscritti di Parigi*, I, 243 r. - 244 r.

end of the French rule, were handed out practically unchanged to the pro-Habsburg Andrea Doria.

While there are no doubts about the importance of this decisive choice, the role of *artifex* attributed to Andrea Doria, often deemed as the sole mastermind and promoter of the Republic's new structure, is disputable.⁸⁸ After the already mentioned coup by Doria, on 12 September 1528, the aristocratic Republic of Genoa was established. The Genoese ruling class was perfectly aware of local political instability. In the next two centuries, the city would be governed by a sovereign aristocracy, mostly made up of the members of those families that for different reasons had participated in Genoa's public life in previous centuries.

Between 1527 and 1528, the magistracies appointed to draw up the new 'constitutional' laws of the Genoese state pursued two goals: reorganizing the institutional framework and putting an end to factional clashes, in the name of an ideal concept of 'unity'. The already cited magistracy of twelve reformers – six *nobiles* and six *populares* – was entrusted with reorganizing the law. However, already in October 1528, two nobles, Simone Centurione and Filippo Cattaneo, succeeded in replacing two *populares* members of this magistracy. While the reasons for this change in the board's composition are unclear, they hint at a prevalingly *nobiles* imprint to future reforms.⁸⁹

To bring order into Genoa's ruling class, those entitled to participate in the government were divided into twenty-eight *Alberghi* through a formal process of *ascrizione* (enrolment) in the *Liber Civitatis*. This ledger reported every member's name; candidates were selected or randomly chosen from this book.⁹⁰

What are these *Alberghi*? Edoardo Grendi defined an *Albergo* as a "demotopographic" institution. On the one hand, it aggregated families by surname; on the other hand, urban spaces were shaped by it, according to socio-political and cultural principles.⁹¹ They were in place even prior to the 1528 reform. They were partly the result of faction changes, but also of the

⁸⁸ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 17; E. Petit, *Andrea Doria. Un ammiraglio condottiere au XVI^e siècle, 1466-1560*, Paris, 1887; E. Celesia, *La congiura del conte G. L. Fieschi*, Genoa, 1865. Grendi was the first to adopt a critical approach in E. Grendi 'Andrea Doria, uomo del Rinascimento', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* XIX/1, 1979, 91-121.

⁸⁹ Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 325.

⁹⁰ The Doge's election, for example, followed a complex and codified procedure that consisted in both a first random selection and a vote on the extracted candidates. On the criteria followed in appointing the members of each magistracy, see G. Forcheri, *Doge, Governatori, Procuratori, Consigli e Magistrati della Repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1968.

⁹¹ Grendi, 'Profilo storico degli alberghi genovesi', 248.

establishment of multi-family groups without the obligation to take side with any particular faction. An *Albergo* could be established after a power sharing agreement or to certify the management of common goods.⁹² This peculiar procedure of family structure consolidation in a horizontal sense was perhaps the legacy of Genoese feudal system. Indeed, in Liguria, even before the establishment of the Commune, all male sons of a feudal lord would inherit their father's estate. Parcelling out of power was the inevitable result of this process. The *Albergo*, therefore, was most probably designed to offset an excessive dispersal of power between groups: small families were absorbed by a larger one, taking on its surname and coat of arms or, in some cases, small families could join together and take on a new common surname.⁹³

Some of the main *nobiles* families originated in this way: the Cattaneos, for example, were born from the union between the Ghibelline Della Volta and the Guelph Mallone. The Imperiales were born out of a group of Ghibelline families after Emperor Henry VII conquered Genoa in 1311.⁹⁴ Even some *populares* followed this model, as in the case of the remarkable *Alberghi* of the De Franchi and Giustiniani. The members of the same *Albergo* were required to live in the same neighbourhood. Here, they had their main residence, the *loggia*, warehouses and often a private church.⁹⁵ The area of residence in the city impacted on the *Alberghi*: there were the Spinola of Lucca and the Spinola of San Luca, the Di Negro of Banchi and the Di Negro of San Lorenzo, etc. When recorded in the *Liber*, each member would get a double surname: for example, Silvestro Invrea, belonging to a family aggregated to the *Albergo* Doria, would be named Silvestro Invrea Doria.⁹⁶

The institutionalization of the *Alberghi* was an original experiment, not without drawbacks: some important families, such as the Serra and De Mari, failed to meet the requirements for the creation of an *Albergo* and had to join an existing one. In particular, they did not have the six houses in the city, or the six

⁹² Grendi, 'Profilo storico degli alberghi genovesi', 241-302; G. Petti Balbi, 'Strutture familiari nella Liguria medioevale', *I liguri dall'Arno all'Ebro*, "Rivista di studi liguri" L, 1985, 68-91; J. Heers, 'Consorterie e alberghi a Gênes: la ville et la campagne', in G. Ferro ed., *La Storia dei Genovesi*, IX, *Atti del Convegno di studi sui ceti dirigenti nelle istituzioni della Repubblica di Genova (Genova, 7-10 giugno 1988)*, Genoa, 1989, 45-63; C. Cattaneo Mallone, 'La famiglia medioevale a Genova e in Liguria', in *La Storia dei Genovesi*, X, *Atti del Convegno di studi sui ceti dirigenti nelle istituzioni della Repubblica di Genova (Genova, 23-26 maggio 1989)*, Genoa, 1990, 459-475.

⁹³ Lercari, 'La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria', 232.

⁹⁴ See N. Battilana, *Genealogia delle famiglie nobili di Genova*, 3 voll., Genoa, 1825-1833.

⁹⁵ Lercari, 'La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria', 231-233.

⁹⁶ C. Bitossi, 'L'età di Andrea Doria', in Assereto, Doria eds., *Storia della Liguria*, 61-78, 53.

branches of the same family, required for establishing an *Albergo*. In addition, often, the eponym families would not recognize the aggregates as their equal. This system would also feature some important exceptions. The Adorno and Fregoso, for example, were banned from giving their name to an *Albergo*, to avoid the conflicts experienced in the past. The important Cybo family, on the other hand, could establish an *Albergo* even if they failed to meet the requirements. This was a unique concession granted to them because one Cybo family member was at the time archbishop of Genoa.⁹⁷


The 28 *Alberghi* were ranked according to size, lineage, and members. The aggregation criteria are not quite clear. In many cases, the relationship with the *Albergo*'s eponym families or residence contiguity had priority. In many other cases, the associations were completely at random. The *Alberghi* and families did not coincide with Black and White divisions. In some *Alberghi* consisting of former *nobiles* (Salvago, Cattaneo, Pinelli, Gentile) and *populares* families (Costa, Levanto, Oneto), there were both White and Black individuals. Conversely, there was no mixing between *nobiles* and *populares*.

The patrician Agostino Franzoni, a member of the New Nobles (former *populares*), in his book published in 1636, visually represented this new order, with all the coats of arms of the families constituting the twenty-eight *Alberghi* and those recorded in the period following the 1576 reform, which, as we shall see, abolished the *Alberghi*.⁹⁸ His work was a careful historical investigation, even if the drawings are not complemented by any written text. In every table related to each of the twenty-eight *Alberghi*, like the Doria here below, the coats of arms are arranged according to a well defined hierarchy: the coat of arms (or its two or three versions) of the *eponym* family of the *Albergo* is in the centre. It is sided by the coats of arms of the families associated before 1528. Further, away from the central coat-of-arm, there are those of the families that joined the *Albergo* after the constitutional reform.

⁹⁷ Bitossi, 'L'età di Andrea Doria', 54.

⁹⁸ A. Franzoni, *Nobiltà di Genova*, Genoa, 1636. In Lercari, 'La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria', 255.

Image 1.1 *Coats of arms of the Genoese patriciate*



Source: A. Franzoni, *Nobiltà di Genova*, Genoa, 1636

Divisions between factions, however, were not to disappear quickly. Following this new grouping, the members of the nobility reintroduced a careful division between former *nobiles* and former *populares* for access to the main political offices. While any name evoking past divisions was officially banned, the terms of New Nobles and Old Nobles became the official substitutes for *populares* and *nobiles*. The New Nobles were more numerous, but they only had four *Alberghi* out of twenty-eight. Each time a magistrate was elected following the principle of alternation between *Alberghi*, they were clearly at a disadvantage.⁹⁹

Table 1.1 *The Twenty-eight Alberghi created by the 1528 Reform*

Calvi	Di Negro	Grimaldi	Pinelli
Cattaneo	Doria	Imperiale	Promontorio ^p
Centurione	Fieschi	Interiano	Salvago
Cibo	Fornari ^p	Lercaro	Sauli ^p
Cigala	Gentile	Lomellini	Spinola
De Franchi	Giustiniani ^p	Negrone	Usodimare
De Marini	Grillo	Pallavicino	Vivaldi

Source: Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea*, 25. ^p = All-*populares* grouping

Table 1.2 *Family composing the 'Old Nobility'*

Bernissone	Da Passano	Imperiale	Ponte
Biassa	De Gradi	Interiano	Raggio
Bracelli	Della Rovere	Lecavela	Ravaschiero
Caldi	De Mari	Lengueglia	Re
Camilla	De Marini	Lercaro	Ricci
Carmendino	Di Negro	Lomellini	Salvago
Cattaneo	Doria	Malocello	Serra
Cebá	Fieschi	Mottino	Spinola
Centurione	Galiani	Negrone	Squarciafico
Cibo	Gentile	Pallavicino	Usodimare
Cigala	Ghisolfi	Pansani	Vento
Clavesana	Grillo	Piccamiglio	Vivaldi
Cogno	Grimaldi	Pichenotti	
Corso	Gualterio	Pinelli	

Source: Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea*, 25

After 1528, therefore, the traditional internal divisions reappeared with the labels of Old Nobles and New Nobles, taking up Genoa's political life for the next half-

⁹⁹ Forcheri, *Doge, Governatori, Procuratori*, 19-28.

century.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, the terms of 'portico di San Luca' and 'portico di San Pietro' also became popular as synonyms of 'Old' and 'New'. They were named after the meeting places of the two factions at the opposite sides of *piazza Banchi*. Both Old and New Nobles looked upon 'aggregates' – those enrolled after the reform – with contempt and considered them almost as a separate class.¹⁰¹

Only those recorded in the *Liber Civilitatis* were entitled to take part in the government. However, they were not allowed to engage in mechanical arts. When the *Liber* was first drafted, there were around 1,500 registered individuals: eight hundred *populares* and seven hundred *nobiles*.¹⁰² Under applicable inheritance rules, political power was to be handed down to legitimate male children, who also had to be enrolled in the *Liber*.¹⁰³ Each year, seven non-registered citizens could apply to be added to the official list. Among these, until 1546, there were also entitled individuals who had failed to be recorded in 1528. Applicants had to be approved by the *Maggior Consiglio*.¹⁰⁴ They had to be born of a legitimate marriage, could not engage in mechanical arts, never been charged with heresy, sedition or shameful sins, and were required to lead an upright life within their family compound.¹⁰⁵

At the end of the sixteenth century, Genoa's noble class consisted of about 200 families. They were only 135 at the end of the eighteenth century, even if many new families had achieved noble status during that time.¹⁰⁶ During these centuries, some of the oldest families died out, while there was a relative stability in the total number of new families, with frequent replacements. Furthermore, we know that in the *Liber Civilitatis*, which later became *Liber Nobilitatis*, over six hundred and forty families were recorded between 1528 and 1797.¹⁰⁷ Many of them were entitled to rule, but the implicit condition was that

¹⁰⁰ See A. Greif, 'Political Organizations, Social Structure, and Institutional Success: Reflections from Genoa and Venice during the Commercial Revolution', *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 151/4, 1995, 734-740.

¹⁰¹ Lercari, 'La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria', 257.

¹⁰² Bitossi, 'L'età di Andrea Doria', 56.

¹⁰³ Felloni, 'Il ceto dirigente a Genova', 1324.

¹⁰⁴ For the enrolment procedures of the New Nobles and the derived issues see Lercari, 'La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria', 266-276.

¹⁰⁵ R. Savelli, *La repubblica oligarchica. Legislazione, istituzioni e ceti a Genova nel Cinquecento*, Milan, 1981, 216-217.

¹⁰⁶ C. Bitossi, 'Il governo della Repubblica e della Casa di San Giorgio: i ceti dirigenti dopo la riforma costituzionale del 1576', in Felloni ed., *La Casa di San Giorgio*, 91-108, 98. C. Bitossi, "La Repubblica è vecchia". *Patriziato e governo a Genova nel secondo Settecento*, Rome, 1995.

¹⁰⁷ Lercari, 'La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria', 228.

only few should actually be appointed. Carlo Bitossi observed that in the history of the Genoese oligarchic Republic, we constantly find the same families. Moreover, only few of the New Nobles managed to get to the highest offices. In particular, there are recurrent names in the main magistracies: six among the New Nobles (Balbi, Brignole, De Franchi, Durazzo, Invrea, Sauli) and seven among the Old Nobles (Cattaneo, Doria, Gentile, Grimaldi, Lomellini, Negrone, Spinola).¹⁰⁸

This oligarchy ruled the state, but they were also actively involved in commerce, finance and navigation.¹⁰⁹ While Bitossi identified a core of unchanged noble families ruling the Republic, Grendi and other scholars claimed that there was a distinction between the New Nobles, who were mostly merchants, and the Old Nobles, who were increasingly becoming financiers. During the seventeenth century, the capitalistic oligarchy that owned nine-tenths of the city's wealth managed its own capital, and benefited from a wide range of opportunities and networks, while also being in charge of the Republic's treasury.¹¹⁰ Government bonds, operations at the Fairs of Bisenzio,¹¹¹ real estates, etc. were the most common types of investment. They would also heavily invest in international trade, shipping companies, manufacturing, insurance, etc.¹¹² The names of important Genoese families are constantly found among those merchants involved in Averages analysed in the next Chapters.¹¹³ Genoa's nobility continued to be an active and enterprising class both as passive investors and as entrepreneurs. Private enterprise had paved the way to the financial expansion between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, supported by the Republic's government and its institutions.¹¹⁴ An

¹⁰⁸ Bitossi, 'Il governo della Repubblica', 100.

¹⁰⁹ See Grendi, 'Il traffico portuale', 332; T.A. Kirk, 'The apogee of the hispano-Genoese bond, 1576-1627', *Hispania* LXV/1 219, 2005, 45-65, 48; G. Doria, *Un quadriennio critico- 1575-1578 - contrasti e nuovi orientamenti nella società genovese nel quadro della crisi finanziaria spagnola*, Bologna, 1976; E. Neri, *Uomini d'affari e di governo tra Genova e Madrid (secoli XVI e XVII)*, Milan, 1989, 54-55.

¹¹⁰ Felloni, 'Il ceto dirigente a Genova', 1338.

¹¹¹ J.I. Martinez Ruiz, 'Mercato creditizio e profitti del cambio per lettera. Le operazioni di cambio con patto di ricorso tra Siviglia e le fiere internazionali di Bisenzio(1589-1621)', *Storia Economica* 5/2, 2002, 106-132. L. Pezzolo, G. Tattara, "'Una fiera senza luogo': Was Bisenzio an international capital market in sixteenth-century Italy?', *The Journal of Economic History* 68/4, 2008, 1098-1122; R. Romano, J. Gentil Da Silva, 'L'histoire des changes: Les foires de «Bisenzio» de 1600 à 1650', *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 17/4, 1962, 715-721.

¹¹² Giacchero, *Il Seicento*, 372-405.

¹¹³ For example, in 1640 there are vessels loaded with goods by Northern merchants alongside the main patrician families like the De Ferrari, Balbi, Imperiale, Spinola, Odescalchi, Grillo, in ASG, NG 2084, n. 124.

¹¹⁴ See Felloni, 'Il ceto dirigente a Genova nel secolo XVII', 1323-1340.

extensive credit network controlled by the Old Nobles, for example, managed funds related to *asientos* at the Spanish court.¹¹⁵ Some leading families of the New Nobles – such as the Airolo, Balbi, Brignole-Sale, Durazzo, Invrea, Moneglia and Saluzzo families – joined them in their lucrative businesses.¹¹⁶ They worked in strict interdependence with the Spanish crown: this strategy pushed the Genoese economy toward high finance.¹¹⁷ Fernand Braudel recalled the expression “Age of the Genoese” to describe the period from 1557 to 1627, “[...] of a rule that was so discreet and sophisticated that historians for a long time failed to notice it”.¹¹⁸ According to Bitossi, recent works on Genoese history are now expected to further ‘stretch’ the age of the Genoese towards the first half of the sixteenth century and the mid-seventeenth century.¹¹⁹

In addition to financial activities, the frequent presence of Genoa’s noble names in Average documents and the capitals they employed implies that maritime commercial activities remained important. Although I do not have enough data yet to state this with absolute certainty, throughout this dissertation I have provided a re-evaluation of the Genoese noble class’ role within the maritime sector. Claudio Marsilio highlighted the importance of Genoese involvement in the Spanish silver trade, with businessmen carrying silver from the main Spanish Mediterranean ports (Barcelona, Cartagena, Denia, and Alicante) to Genoa. From here, they re-routed the cases of silver towards England, the Netherlands, and beyond.¹²⁰ Genoese patricians had their own galleys and, when these were not enough or were not available, they hired the Republic’s galleys or others from Spanish squadrons. Between 1528 and 1716, when the private galley squadron was disbanded, numerous *asentistas*

¹¹⁵ Kirk, ‘The apogee of the hispano-Genoese bond’, 49. The *asentista* received a considerable interest, around 15%. Moreover, by signing the *asiento*, he obtained the possibility of exporting wheat from Spanish possessions at reduced prices and, above all, the authorisation to get gold and silver out of Spain. See L. Lo Basso, ‘Economie e culture del mare: armamento, navigazione, commerci’, in Assereto, Doria eds., *Storia della Liguria*, 76-86, 81.

¹¹⁶ For example, the pope himself suggested, in the aftermath of the *pace di Casale*, that the New Nobles were more involved in the financial business with Spain. Doria, ‘Nobiltà e investimenti’: 17. The most evident expression of this equality is the building of the *Strada dei Balbi* and in private palaces of the New Nobles, see Lercari, ‘La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria’, 264.

¹¹⁷ See R.S. Lopez, ‘Market expansion: the case of Genoa’, *Journal of Economic History* 24, 1964, 445-464; C. Dauverd, *Imperial ambition in the early modern Mediterranean. Genoese Merchants and the Spanish Crown*, Cambridge, 2015; C. Brilli, *Genoese Trade and Migration in the Spanish Atlantic, 1700–1830*, Cambridge, 2016; Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 135-197.

¹¹⁸ Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, III, 157.

¹¹⁹ Bitossi, ‘L’età di Andrea Doria’, 57.

¹²⁰ C. Marsilio, ‘The Genoese and Portuguese financial operators’ control of the Spanish Silver Market (1627-1657)’, *Journal of European Economic History* 3, 2012, 69-89, 77-78.

belonging to the Genoese nobility replaced it: Centurione, Cicala, De Mari, De Marini, Doria d'Angri, Doria di Melfi, Grillo, Grimaldi, Imperiale, Lomellini, Negrone, Sauli, Serra and Spinola.¹²¹ Moreover, if we consider Genoese financial brokers (Durazzo, Pallavicini, Spinola, Invrea, Pichenotti, Moneglia and Balbi) and the abovementioned Spanish ports involved, there are many similarities with the information on Genoese trade found in GAs. The management of the Tunisian island of Tabarka is another example. Thanks to an *asiento* signed in 1543 with the Spanish crown, the Lomellini family were in charge of lucrative coral fishing in the waters around the island, as well as its subsequent shipping.¹²²

1.4 *The Evolution of the Oligarchic Republic*

Doria defined the period from 1528 to 1576 as the phase when “the noble class tried to get unified”.¹²³ Indeed, the changes introduced by the Dorian reforms were not sufficient to guarantee the desired union, even if they had reorganised the functioning of the Republic itself. The 1528 reforms, for example, imposed a two-year limit on the *Doge's* term.¹²⁴ Although the *doge* could run for a second term, Giacomo Maria Brignole was the only re-elected *doge* and during his dogeship, in 1797, the Republic collapsed.¹²⁵ The two year-limit would guarantee a frequent turnover in the Republic's top administration offices, while preventing monopoly by any faction. The *doge*, together with the *Collegi* – the Senate and the Chamber – held what today is referred to as the executive function. The Senate managed most of the government business.¹²⁶ It consisted of eight members, called senators or governors, increased to 12 after the 1576 reform. Senators remained in charge for two years and, at the end of their term, they became procurators for the next two years in the other *Collegio*, the

¹²¹ Lo Basso, ‘Economie e culture del mare’, 81.

¹²² See L. Piccinno, ‘Alleanze, conflittualità e diplomazia tra Genova e la Spagna: i contratti di *asiento* per la gestione di Tabarca (1542-1695)’, in M. Doria et al. eds., *Le vocazioni di un territorio. Saggi di Storia economica per Paola Massa*, Genoa, 2019, 15-42; L. Piccinno, *Un'impresa fra terra e mare. Giacomo Filippo Durazzo e soci a Tabarca, (1719-1729)*, Milan, 2008.

¹²³ G. Doria, ‘«Cittadini di governo a Genova»: ricchezza e potere tra Cinque e Seicento’ in Doria, *Nobiltà e investimenti*, 11-89, 11.

¹²⁴ Forcheri, *Doge, governatori, procuratori*, 29-34.

¹²⁵ See S. Bonadonna, M. Marcenaro, *Rosso Doge. I Dogi della Repubblica di Genova dal 1399 al 1797*, Genoa, 2000.

¹²⁶ Forcheri, *Doge, governatori, procuratori*, 67-74.

Chamber.¹²⁷ Therefore, eight procurators would sit in the Chamber: they were in charge of public finances, voted new laws and acted as a court of appeal. The *doge*, together with the *Collegi*, formed the *Signoria*, the body jointly responsible for government's decisions. Former *dogi* would also sit in the Chamber as lifetime procurators, after their previous activities had been checked by an important constitutional and accounting supervising authority, namely the five *Supremi Sindacatori*.¹²⁸ Andrea Doria was one of them. He designed the office on himself: he would be a lifetime *Sindacatore* and held the primacy in the council as its Prior. As a personal recognition, also Sinibaldo Fieschi was granted the unique privilege of becoming *Supremo Sindacatore* for life. Finally, the outgoing members of the *Collegi*, also called *togati*, formed the three permanent *Giunta*: *Giunta dei Confini*, *Giunta di Giurisdizione*, *Giunta di Marina*. They would deal with foreign policy issues, relations with the Church and trade, with frequently overlapping tasks and powers.¹²⁹ One quarter of the *Collegi*, Senate and Chamber, was renewed every semester, choosing the new members out of a selection of 120 individuals, called *Seminario*, then decreased to 90. The *Minor Consiglio* would compile and filled up the *Seminario* list every year. Since it was possible to be listed back in the *Seminario*, the most influential patricians were repeatedly listed. They were called *gentiluomini del Seminario*: they formed the inner circle of the oligarchy, monopolizing the top government circles. The *gentiluomini di attendenza* were much more numerous. These were patricians trying to get a job in one of the various magistrates and other Republic's offices.¹³⁰

Then there were the *Consigli*. The two *Consigli* shared legislative power. They worked together with the *Collegi* in the approval phase: 400 people formed the *Maggior Consiglio*, while the *Minor Consiglio* was made up of 100 members. After 1652, its number increased to 200.¹³¹ The *Consigli* elected the *doge* and chose the 30 electors who each year would replace part of their members. They had the power to amend constitutional laws and appoint the

¹²⁷ Forcheri, *Doge, governatori, procuratori*, 75-80.

¹²⁸ Andrea Doria reserved for himself the charge of *Sindacatore perpetuo*. In this way, he kept a discreet margin of intervention into the Republic's political and decisional processes. See Forcheri, *Doge, Governatori, Procuratori, Consigli*: 14-15.

¹²⁹ C. Bitossi, 'La repubblica di Genova: politica e istituzioni', in Assereto, Doria eds., *Storia della Liguria*, 63.

¹³⁰ Bitossi, 'La repubblica di Genova', 66.

¹³¹ Forcheri, *Doge, governatori, procuratori*, 41-55.

chiefs of the main magistracies.¹³² The *Maggior Consiglio*, formed by 400 members chosen from the *Liber Civitatis*, elected the eight senators from a list previously made by 28 councillors, one for each *Albergo*.

Different magistracies were in charge of the remaining political and administrative functions. Each of them had limited powers and responsibilities linked to their scope, as I will show in the next Chapter. Depending on the institution, its members could be elected, directly appointed, or randomly chosen from a list. In order to make sure that the new entries would always be supported by more experienced people, a partial turnover was maintained in each administrative body.¹³³ According to an estimate carried out by Felloni, in Liguria and Corsica together, the Republic employed 800-900 nobles in public offices lasting up to 2 years.¹³⁴ Because of this great need for public officers working in the state's bureaucracy, fines and penalties had to be introduced in case of desertion from duty. Over time, pragmatically, even non-listed citizens could also apply for minor offices.

Following the 1528 organisation implemented by Andrea Doria, the *nobiles* could once again aspire to the position of *doge*. On the other hand, the status of *populares* was officially equated to the *nobiles*, without any formal distinction. The institutional solution followed a precise rationale: increasing the representative structures (*Consigli*) with elective, consultative and even decision-making functions; distribution of the *doge's* power, who became almost equal to the senators – heirs to the old *Collegio degli Anziani* – with the support from the procurators (the *Collegi*); establishment of a supervisory authority, the *Supremi Sindacatori*, whose activity was in turn checked by the *Minor Consiglio*.¹³⁵ Alongside with the *Supremi Sindacatori*, there were the *Sindacatori Ordinari*, in charge of supervising less important offices.¹³⁶ Another feature of Genoa's political system was the frequent use of 'temporary' laws, which had to be renewed after a few years. While allowing some flexibility and easy strategy

¹³² L. Piccinno, *Economia marittima e operatività portuale. Genova, secc. XVII-XIX*, Genoa, 2000, 68.

¹³³ G. Felloni, 'Stato genovese, finanza pubblica e ricchezza privata: un profilo storico', in I. Zilli ed., *Fra spazio e tempo. Studi in onore di Luigi de Rosa*, I, Naples, 1995, 381-404, 384-385; Bitossi, 'La repubblica di Genova', 79-84.

¹³⁴ Felloni, 'Il ceto dirigente a Genova', 1326.

¹³⁵ Grendi, *Doria uomo del Rinascimento*, 103.

¹³⁶ Forcheri, *Doge, governatori, procuratori*, 127-130.

adjustments in response to changing scenarios, it would also prevent the development of long-term strategies in the most varied fields.¹³⁷

Even if the 1528 reforms and the division into *Alberghi* can in part help us understand and explain Genoese political life, many elements remain unknown, especially in the following decades. *Nobiles* and *populares*, Guelphs and Ghibellines, the Adorno and Fregoso, they all reflected a highly mobile, almost inconsistent political organisation. This very feature has hindered research on general Genoese history, usually forcing historians to focus on well-determined periods and aspects. Factions, coup attempts, and other important political system distortions remained even after the 1528 reform, recognised by many historians as a final pacification. For this reason, it is also difficult to retrace the various groups' ability to coagulate, break up, and re-assemble with new features. Understanding the reasons why individuals would behave in a certain way is complicated, while departing from applying the same labels used so far to investigate their economic and private decisions is difficult. Yet, a sufficiently reliable interpretation is possible only by studying their actual actions. Indeed, within the new system there were further divisions: different degrees of wealth, a different distribution of the rich and poor between New and Old Nobles; quantitative inequalities between the Old and New Nobles are all parameters of instability. A report on Genoa, dated to 1597 by Giorgio Doria, clearly described this situation:

In this city, the ones who rule are not always those who ought to, as reason and the law dictate, but rather the richest [...]. I say that, as much as in appearance she is governed by the *ottimati* [the aristocracy], with regard to the factions the New [Nobles] have, by chance, the superiority [...], in effect [...] it is all the rich who really rule.¹³⁸

Judging by this report, the Republic of Genoa looked more like a plutocracy than an aristocracy. The connections between political power, finance and trade are hard to retrace. Historians have for a long time referred to a “turn to finance” in the strategies of the Genoese elites. Yet, their involvement in maritime trade

¹³⁷ See for example the frequent modifications in the free port's edicts in Giacchero, *Origini e sviluppi*.

¹³⁸ “In questa città non governano tutti quelli egualmente che dalle leggi sono ammessi, e che per ragione dovrebbero governare, ma tutti i più ricchi [...]. Dico che quanto alla apparenza ella è governata dalli ottimati, quanto alle fattioni i nuovi ne hanno per accidente la maggior parte [...] quanto all'effetto [...] tutti i ricchi sono quelli che veramente comandano”. In ASG, Bibl. 166, *Dialoghi sopra la repubblica di Genova ...*, seventeenth century, 2v. See Doria, ‘«Cittadini di governo a Genova»’, 33.

lasted at least until the end of the seventeenth century.¹³⁹ For this reason, the study of Average sheds light on the businessmen, their constant involvement in maritime trade and their investments. For example, GAs provide data on the merchants involved in shipping headed to Genoa, on the freights and carried goods. The main Genoese families were involved in trade with Spain or Southern Italy, together with foreigners residing in the city, thus forming a diffuse network of shared interests.¹⁴⁰ The nobles entertained business relationships with the Spanish ambassadors sent to Genoa, with the Spanish viceroys in Southern Italy, and had a network of agents and brokers spread all across Europe.¹⁴¹ At the same time, during the seventeenth century, there were massive investments in port infrastructures and policies were enforced to strengthen the role of Genoa.¹⁴² All these elements will be taken into account in the next Chapters.

The riots following the division into *Alberghi* led to sweeping institutional changes. The 1547 laws, called the *garibetto*, and the *Leggi di Casale* in 1576 – the outcome of anti-loyal movements in the previous year – were fundamental steps confirming contrasts between citizens.¹⁴³

The *garibetto* was the political response to the failed Fieschi's conspiracy. Following the pacification of inner borders, the political weight of the Fieschi family – owners of numerous fiefdoms in the *Levante* hinterland – had decreased. Parallel to the relative decline experienced by the feudal nobility, the nobles involved in the main mercantile and financial circuits got richer, above all those that had businesses with Spain, like Adamo Centurione, the Grimaldi, Doria, Spinola, De Mari, and Pallavicini.¹⁴⁴ Thus, the Spanish alliance could be seen as a proto-political and economic strategy closely interconnected with the

¹³⁹ Kirk, for example, focuses on the naval policies discussed or applied between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, in Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea*.

¹⁴⁰ L. Piccinno, A. Zanini, 'Genoa: Colonizing and Colonized City? The Port City as a Pole of Attraction for Foreign Merchants (16th-18th centuries)', in G. Nigro ed., *Reti marittime come fattori dell'integrazione europea*, Florence, 2019, 281-296.

¹⁴¹ The alliance, for example, with the Spanish ambassador Gomez Suarez de Figueroa, contributed to the consolidation of the Genoese exploitation of the Spanish possession of Tabarka, see Piccinno, 'Alleanze, conflittualità e diplomazia tra Genova e la Spagna', 19-24. On the Genoese networks, see G. Doria, 'Conoscenza del mercato e Sistema informativo: il know-how dei mercanti-finanzieri genovesi nei secoli XVI e XVII', in Doria, *Nobiltà e investimenti*, 91-156; Dauverd, *Imperial ambition*.

¹⁴² See Doria, Massa eds., *Il sistema portuale*.

¹⁴³ Andrea Doria himself employed the term *garibetto*, which literally means 'gracefully', to indicate the minor adjustment made to the 1528 rules. The reform aimed at replace entirely or partly the random election of the *Consigli* and the *Senato* with a selective election. See Bitossi, 'L'età di Andrea Doria', 58.

¹⁴⁴ Bitossi, 'L'età di Andrea Doria', 57.

measures adopted in the seventeenth century, as I will show in the Second Chapter.

Therefore, with the support of the papacy and France, Gian Luigi Fieschi attempted a coup in 1547. His goal was to bring the Republic back under French rule. The conspiracy was a failure, although the Fieschi succeeded in getting rid of Giannettino Doria, commander of Andrea Doria's squadron of galleys. In the aftermath of the uprising, the Republic, the Duke of Parma, Andrea Doria himself and the emperor partitioned Fieschi's properties. However, to avoid Charles V installing a garrison under the pretext of the city's defence in case of new riots, Doria and his circle proposed an amendment to the 1528 laws, the *garibetto*, implemented in November 1547.¹⁴⁵ According to this measure, an electoral body made up of *Collegi*, *Banco di San Giorgio*, *Sindacati Ordinari* and *Sindacati Straordinari* was in charge of electing one hundred members of the *Maggior Consiglio* and the entire *Minor Consiglio*. This process would centralize power as desired by the New Nobles. In this way, they hoped they could compensate for the random factor implied in the drawing system applicable to the *Alberghi*, where the Old Nobles had the majority.¹⁴⁶ This solution did not eliminate all contrasts. Subsequent governments worked on other measures to avoid violent factional clashes; in 1569, for example, *doge* Paolo Moneglia announced that he intended to update the *garibetto*.¹⁴⁷

The subsequent Corsica War – a particularly long and costly conflict waged between 1553 and 1559 and between 1562 and 1569 – contributed to unifying the Genoese ruling class in the aftermath of the *garibetto*. On the other hand, the war and recurrent famines aggravated relations with Spain and increased social tensions.¹⁴⁸ Philip II had even a secret plan to buy Corsica from the Genoese, exploiting the weakness of the Republic.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, the Spanish crown was reluctant to repay the loans they had frequently taken from the Genoese. In 1557, the crown decided to suspend repayment of the royal debt

¹⁴⁵ See Bitossi, 'L'età di Andrea Doria', 58. The only specific research on the *garibetto* is in A. Pelacchi, 'Norma e prassi «costituzionale» nella Serenissima Repubblica di Genova. II: Modifiche al sistema: «Garibetto» e «Leges Novae»', *Nuova Rivista Storica* LXIV, 1980, 524-564.

¹⁴⁶ Savelli, *La repubblica oligarchica*, 46.

¹⁴⁷ Savelli, *La repubblica oligarchica*, 48.

¹⁴⁸ F. Pomponi, 'La politique agraire de la République de Gênes en Corse (1570-1730)', in *Atti del Congresso Interregionale di studi storici, Rapporti Genova-Mediterraneo-Atlantico nell'età moderna*, Genoa, 1983, 82-111; R. Russo, 'La politica agraria dell'ufficio di San Giorgio in Corsica (1490-1553)', *Rivista Storica Italiana* 4, 1934, 421-468; R. Russo, 'La politica agraria dell'ufficio di San Giorgio in Corsica (1490-1553)', *Rivista Storica Italiana* 5, 1935, 1-48.

¹⁴⁹ A. Pacini, "Poiché gli stati non sono portatili...", 443-456.

and to renegotiate the loan in a process called *Quiebra*.¹⁵⁰ This event – usually wrongly defined as bankruptcy, when technically it was a debt renegotiation – undermined the creditors’ trust and triggered a liquidity crisis.¹⁵¹ The Spanish alliance allowed privileged interest rates to be applied, which, as we have seen, was justified by several political and economic reasons. In the following century, this issue would strongly emerge as a source of problems and obstacles, as I will show in the next Chapters.

The war led to higher taxes, for example with the levy of a wine tax, and worsened living conditions for the population. Andrea Doria himself suggested to the Spanish king Philip II, son of Charles V, to take over the Republic of Genoa as a guarantor of its stability.¹⁵² After the war-related crisis, many wanted to go back to the 1528 regime, blaming the *garibetto* for the current economic situation. Oberto Foglietta, for example, in his 1559 *Dialogo delle Cose della Repubblica di Genova*, suggested a reform of the electoral system purely based on census – obviously more favourable to the New Nobles – to which he belonged.¹⁵³ Further, with the death of Andrea Doria in 1560, the government lost an authoritative mediator. Following his death, the clashes between factions that had marked the previous decades resumed once again.

To mark their distance from the New Nobles, the Old Nobles wanted to reinstate the old divisions between social classes. On the other hand, the New Nobles believed that the current system was too much in favour of the Old Nobles, headed by Matteo Senarega, the former Secretary of the Senate, and wanted to reform the Republic’s system.¹⁵⁴ Among the New Nobles, there were still the same internal differences that had characterized the *populares* faction: families and groups had different standards of living and interests. In addition, many wealthy citizens complained that they could not be enrolled in the *Liber* and achieve noble status. Even a slow integration process contributed to

¹⁵⁰ Marsilio, ‘The Genoese and Portuguese financial operators’, 69.

¹⁵¹ On this procedure see C. Álvarez-Nogal, C. Chamley, ‘Refinancing short-term debt with a fixed monthly interest rate into funded *juros* under Philip II: an *asiento* with the Maluenda brothers’, *The Economic History Review* 71/4, 2018, 1100-1117; M. Drelichman, H.J. Voth, ‘Risk sharing with the monarch: contingent debt and excusable defaults in the age of Philip II, 1556–1598’, *Cliometrica* 9/1, 2015, 49-75; C. Álvarez-Nogal, C. Chamley, ‘Debt policy under constraints: Philip II, the Cortes, and Genoese bankers’, *The Economic History Review* 67/1, 2014, 192-213.

¹⁵² Archivio General de Simancas, *Estado*, 1388: ff. 95-98, 1559, in E. Grendi, ‘Genova alla metà del Cinquecento: una politica del grano?’, *Quaderni Storici* 13, 1970, 106-160, 107.

¹⁵³ Foglietta, *La Repubblica di Genova*.

¹⁵⁴ For a detailed analysis of the reasons that led to the *Leges Novae* see Doria, ‘«Cittadini di governo a Genova»’, 11-84.

generating tensions. Between 1573 and 1575, more turmoil blocked government activities. In March 1575, the New Nobles, under pressure from the armed people on the streets, imposed the abolition of the *garibetto* and the enrolling of 300 nobles in the *Liber*.¹⁵⁵ The Old Nobles fled the city, waiting for the support of the king of Spain. They started preparing a counteroffensive from the marquisate of Finale.

For a whole year in Genoa there was only a moderate government made up of New Nobles, while the King of Spain not only failed to support the Old Nobles but, in 1575, he even imposed a 'credit freeze'.¹⁵⁶ The group in power that controlled Genoa was a line-up representing about 60% of the entire nobility, equivalent to 1,800-2,000 male individuals.¹⁵⁷ Faced with this stalemate, the opposite factions accepted the mediation by a committee composed of one representative of the king of Spain, the Emperor, and the Pope each. The refounding of the political system, quickly accepted by both parties, started on the 12 March 1576. The last Genoese civil war ended with the return of the Old Nobles and the acceptance of about 90 new members into the *Liber*.

The laws promulgated in 1576 are known as the *Leges Novae* or *Leggi di Casale*, from the place where negotiations had taken place. The new laws dismantled the *Alberghi*, together with the union of surnames, the division into *Portici*, and the *garibetto*. They ignored the Old Nobles' claims of superiority. The number of new annual enrolments was raised to ten, of which seven from the city and three from the *Riviera*. Through a periodic strengthening of the ruling class, the rise of any homogeneous class antagonistic to the state would be prevented. Moreover, in the seventeenth century, applicants could also be enrolled in the *Liber* following a generous donation to the state's treasury.¹⁵⁸ However, according to a 1670 survey, a full century after the enforcement of the *Leges Novae*, half of the marriages of the former Old Nobles were still with other Old Nobles, and only a quarter with the New Nobles.¹⁵⁹ Following these negotiations, no new figure as Andrea Doria could emerge. All main members of the city elite made all decisions, confirming patrician class' cohesion.

¹⁵⁵ Lercari, 'La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria', 260.

¹⁵⁶ See C. Álvarez-Nogal, C. Chamley, 'Philip II against the Cortes and the credit freeze of 1575-1577', *Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History* 34/3, 2016, 351-382; A.W. Lovett, 'The Castilian bankruptcy of 1575', *The Historical Journal* 23/4, 1980, 899-911.

¹⁵⁷ Doria, '«Cittadini di governo a Genova»', 12.

¹⁵⁸ Bitossi, 'La repubblica di Genova', 65.

¹⁵⁹ Bitossi, 'L'età di Andrea Doria', 63.

The first issue to be faced was to clearly define noble's status.¹⁶⁰ Under the 1576 laws, 'noble' status was compatible with ship-owning and banking activities, tax collection and industrial and commercial enterprises, provided that the noble did not personally work in the shop. If he was a notary, the nobleman could draw up documents in his own house or in the hospitals, but he could not have a private office nor a desk in public spaces. Mechanical arts (related to the handling of raw materials or goods) were still incompatible. Under the *Leges Novae*, those who exercised mechanical arts were required to stop within the next two years.¹⁶¹ However, the nobles involved in mechanical arts managed to have exceptions approved one after another, until 1603: a sign of the heterogeneous composition of the noble class and of its multiple interests.¹⁶²

Therefore, only the sixteenth century structural reforms did allow a gradual building of a real 'sovereign patriciate', by those who had acquired the right to run the Republic.¹⁶³ Doria defined the period following the 1576 reform as the "final unification".¹⁶⁴ From this moment on, all families recorded in the *Liber Civitatis* were deemed equal and eligible to public offices; they were also the only ones with the power to elect the main magistracies of the Republic. Unification had been slow but effective, aimed at joining the various sectors of the Genoese aristocracy together into a single body.¹⁶⁵ The political stabilization necessary for the functioning of the Republic in the early modern period, as we have seen, required a profound reorganization of the city's ruling class. The concept of civil nobility prevailed: being noble meant participating in government activities. This participation in no way excluded the exercise of banking, commercial or financial professions. The high level of conflict between the ruling factions and individuals remained a constant feature of the Genoese administration, influenced by both internal and external factors. Still, a fragile stability lasted until the end of the eighteenth century.

Finally, in 1579, the stabilization process was completed. After four years of financial clashes, the Genoese took control of all leading international financial

¹⁶⁰ On the definition of noblemen, see C. Donati, *L'idea di Nobiltà in Italia*, Bari, 1998. See also G. Huppert, *Il Borghese Gentiluomo: saggio sulla definizione di élite nella Francia del Rinascimento*, Bologna, 1978; J.P. Labatut, *Le Nobiltà Europee*, Bologna, 1978; N. Elias, *La civiltà delle buone maniere*, Bologna, 2009; N. Elias, *La società di corte*, Bologna, 2010.

¹⁶¹ Savelli, *La repubblica oligarchica*, 215-217.

¹⁶² ASG, *Collegii Diversorum* 25, doc. 8-20, --/01/1603.

¹⁶³ Lercari, 'La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria', 227.

¹⁶⁴ Doria, '«Cittadini di governo a Genova»', 11.

¹⁶⁵ Costantini, *La Repubblica di Genova*, 75-170.

exchange fairs – the so-called *fiere di Bisenzone* - by moving them to neighbouring and friendly Piacenza. In this way, they also managed to redefine financial services provided to the Spanish crown under more favourable conditions for them.¹⁶⁶ Finally, most notably, the *Collegi's* decree dated 16 November 1581 officially established a unified honorary title for all the nobility, namely the title of *magnifico* to designate all those citizens registered in the *Liber*.¹⁶⁷ This is the reason why Genoa could finally be formally defined as an aristocratic and oligarchic Republic.¹⁶⁸

1.5 *The Republic throughout the Seventeenth Century*

Following the 1576 reforms, Genoese internal political balance remained substantially unchanged until the end of the eighteenth century. With these, the oligarchy in power agreed to preserve the balance which had been achieved after much political struggle, but this was not without criticism.

While the distinction between Old and New Nobles had officially been dissolved, it survived, albeit implicitly, in the separation and rivalry between the former members of the two groups.¹⁶⁹ This two-party process was still scrupulously adhered to during the decade of 1680, in the election of the *doge* as well as in the selection of the 30 voters and members of the *Minor Consiglio*.¹⁷⁰ According to Bitossi, the use of partition mechanisms ensured control of the government to a compact group of individuals from different lineages to include Old Nobles alongside leaders of the New Nobles faction.¹⁷¹ This criterion ensured cohesion among those families who had traditionally been in power, as well as the presence of a group of 'recent' ascension who was determined to maintain its own power.¹⁷² In the successive two centuries,

¹⁶⁶ See M.T. Boyer-Xambeau, G. Deleplace, L. Gillard, 'La crise du système de change Lyonnais a la fin du XVIe siècle', *Revue Internationale d'Histoire de la Banque* 32–33, 1986, 145–65; Romano, Gentil Da Silva, 'L'histoire des changes', 715–721. Martinez Ruiz, 'Mercato creditizio e profitti del cambio per lettera', 106–132.

¹⁶⁷ ASG, *Collegii Diversorum* 25, doc. 8-20, 16/11/1581.

¹⁶⁸ Forcheri, *Doge, Governatori, Procuratori, Consigli*, 22-23.

¹⁶⁹ Bitossi, *Il governo dei magnifici*, 79. The ancient division between Old and New Nobles seems to remain as a specific connotation of every patrician which they carried solely due their belonging to a said family, ASG, Bibl. 166, *Dialoghi sopra la repubblica di Genova ...*, seventeenth century, 2v.

¹⁷⁰ For a list of elected *doge* in these year and for information on their political sympathies, see Bonadonna, Marcenaro, *Rosso Doge*.

¹⁷¹ See Bitossi, *Il governo dei magnifici*.

¹⁷² Bitossi, *Il governo dei magnifici*, 136-137.

only a few institutional changes were made. Among these, as it will be seen, there was the promulgation of the *Statuti Civili* of 1589.¹⁷³

Much criticism from within the government regarded the Genoese Republic's privileged relationship with the Spanish Empire, which Andrea Doria had inaugurated in 1528. The main issues included: institutional balance in light of Spanish interferences made by their representatives in town; the economic model to be followed, as it was feared that the decline of Genoese trade was due to excessive concentration of capital on the financial market of the Iberian *asientos*; as well as diplomatic and military strategies, as foreign policy appeared too closely linked to Spain.¹⁷⁴ Spain, for example, prohibited the establishment of foreign diplomatic delegations in Genoa.¹⁷⁵ As a solution to the latter, some patricians proposed strengthening the Republic's fleet to gain full jurisdiction over the Ligurian Sea: this project, as it will be seen, would lead to the *Nuovo Armamento* policies.¹⁷⁶

After the coronation of Henry IV of Bourbon and the end of the Wars of Religion in France (1589), encouraged by the difficulties of Spain, the pro-French factions and parties reignited attempts to gain control over Genoa.¹⁷⁷ The beginning of the seventeenth century also saw the medieval idea of Empire lose ground due to growing distrust towards Habsburg authority.¹⁷⁸ Progressive growth of the autonomist debate and the strengthening of an anti-Spanish and 'republican' independent faction in Genoa characterized these years.¹⁷⁹ Between 1610 and 1620, for example, Ansaldo Cebà and Andrea Spinola, among the main supporters of political reformism, looked to Venice as a

¹⁷³ On the evolution of Genoese statutes see Savelli, *Repertorio degli statuti*.

¹⁷⁴ B. Maréchaux, 'Cultiver l'alternative au système philo-hispanique. Attraction, diffusion et appropriation du modèle vénitien dans la pensée républicaniste génoise du premier XVIIIe siècle', in Herrero Sanchez, Rocio Ben Yessef Garcia, Bitossi, Puncuh eds., *Génova y la Monarquía Hispanica*, 657-694, 660.

¹⁷⁵ M. Herrero Sanchez, 'La finanza genovese e il sistema imperiale spagnolo', in B.J. García, A. Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño eds., *La monarquía de las naciones: patria, nación y naturaleza en la Monarquía de España*, Madrid, 2004, 27-60, 31.

¹⁷⁶ Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea*, 84-117.

¹⁷⁷ See Costantini, *Dibattito politico e problemi*.

¹⁷⁸ M. Schmettger, 'Libertà e imperialità', 129-144. Regarding relations with the Holy Roman Empire during the early modern period, see M. Schmettger, *Principe sovrano oder civitas imperialis? Die Republik Genua und das Alte Reich in der Frühen Neuzeit (1556-1797)*, Mainz, 2006.

¹⁷⁹ In 1633, the Spanish ambassador Francisco de Melo, resident in Genova, drew up a list in which he ordered Genoese patricians on the basis of different parameters, one of which was their orientation towards the Spanish crown. Such orientation ranged from *bien afectos al servicio de su Magestad* to *republicuistas*, or to *zelos de la libertad de la Republica*. See Bitossi, *Il governo dei magnifici*, 217-229; Piccinno, 'Alleanze, conflittualità e diplomazia', 28-29.

possible model to imitate as a “strong and independent” Republic, not reliant on foreign monarchies.¹⁸⁰

Meanwhile, loans to the Spanish crown, which had reached their apex in the first few years of the seventeenth century, decreased in volume over time because of the difficulties of the Spanish treasury, especially after 1606.¹⁸¹ This led to a gradual rebalancing of investments in favour of maritime trade as Genoese patricians considered both sectors to be of paramount importance. Moreover, maritime trade and naval forces were an essential part of the ‘Spanish’ connection: according to Arturo Pacini, they were the most effective remedy to face the scattering of Spanish territories in the Italian peninsula, thus also providing business opportunities for Genoese *patroni* and merchants.¹⁸² In fact, the routes between Genoa, the Iberian Peninsula and the Italian domains of the Spanish monarchy were the main axis of Genoese short- and medium-distance trade, as Average documentation clearly demonstrates.¹⁸³ Many historians have used the metaphor of the gold chain – a strong and profitable bond, but still a bound – to illustrate the complex relationship between the Genoese Republic and the Spanish crown: a situation which was convenient to both allies in many ways.¹⁸⁴ The routes of the Western Mediterranean survived, despite logistical and political-diplomatic challenges. The Genoa-Barcelona route, for example, mostly ran along the coasts of a rival power, the Bourbons of France, whilst the Gulf of Lion, with its unpredictable winds and its strong mistral, was one of the most dangerous and uncertain areas for Mediterranean navigation.¹⁸⁵ Another route which Genoese vessels followed, along the Tyrrhenian Sea, also had areas, such as the Tuscan archipelago, which were particularly dangerous for navigation. The Lazio coast, instead, lacked in

¹⁸⁰ G. Assereto, ‘Lo sguardo di Genova su Venezia. Odio, ammirazione, imitazione’, in U. Israel ed., *La diversa visuale. Il fenomeno Venezia osservato dagli altri*, Rome, 2008, 89-114; Maréchaux, ‘Cultiver l’alternative’, 660. 1628 saw the creation of three *Inquisitori di Stato*, an institutional charge modelled after the same Venetian magistracy. See R. Canosa, *Alle origini delle polizie politiche. Gli inquisitori di Stato a Venezia e a Genova*, Milan, 1989. For comparison between the two institutional models, see A. Greif, ‘Political organizations, social structure, and institutional success: reflections from Genoa and Venice during the Commercial Revolution’, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 151/4, 1995, 734-740.

¹⁸¹ Felloni, ‘Il ceto dirigente’, 1338.

¹⁸² Pacini, “Poiché gli stati non sono portatili”, 414.

¹⁸³ See chap. 4.

¹⁸⁴ See Pacini, “Poiché gli stati non sono portatili”, 416-417, footnote 8. In particular, see R. Savelli, ‘Tra Machiavelli e S. Giorgio. Cultura giuspolitica e dibattito istituzionale a Genova nel Cinque-Seicento’, in A. De Maddalena, H. Kellenbenz eds., *Finanze e ragion di Stato in Italia e in Germania nella prima età moderna*, Bologna, 1984.

¹⁸⁵ On this topic, see Berti, ‘Il rischio nella navigazione’, 271-332; Berti, ‘I rischi nella circolazione marittima’, 809-839.

landings on the coast up to Civitavecchia and both these areas were hunting grounds for Barbary and Christian piracy.¹⁸⁶

The *quiebra* of 1627, which left the Genoese financiers in credit of six million ducats, together with the war of Candia between Venice and the Ottoman Empire (1645-1669) were contributing factors that pushed Genoese capital investment towards naval forces and maritime trade.¹⁸⁷ The 1627 *quiebra*, in particular, represented one of the most challenging times for the Genoa-Madrid axis. Historians often indicate it as the event that determined the end of the 'Genoese century'.¹⁸⁸ Even in this case, however, the financial crisis that followed did not lead to a long-term political or diplomatic shift.¹⁸⁹ Genoese loans were converted into *juros*, which were public debt bonds of long-term maturity, although their market value was lower than their nominal value.¹⁹⁰ A great deal of Genoese capital was also reinvested in other sectors, such as Venetian, Roman, or other European state bonds.¹⁹¹

Despite the internationally established networks, based more on commercial than diplomatic relations, the Genoese Republic was not safe from its long rivalry with the neighbouring Duchy of Savoy. On the pretext of Franco-Spanish hostility, in fact, it faced invasion by Franco-Savoyard troops in 1625.¹⁹² Duke Carlo Emanuele I, following the Genoese acquisition of the marquisate of Zuccarello in 1623 by Marquis Ottaviano del Carretto, had ordered the attack.¹⁹³ Zuccarello was an imperial fief in the hinterland of Albenga and a strategic territory for the control of the west Ligurian coast. Divergences between the

¹⁸⁶ Pacini, "Poiché gli stati non sono portatili", 415.

¹⁸⁷ Herrero Sanchez, 'La finanza genovese', 27-60.

¹⁸⁸ Many historians have reconsidered this date to be important. The very same Braudel, one of the most noted users of the expression "century of the Genoese", hypothesised a wider period which could expand to 1640 or 1650, see F. Braudel, *Civiltà materiale, economia, capitalismo (secoli XV-XVIII)*, III, *I tempi del mondo*, Turin, 1982, 151.

¹⁸⁹ In an analogue situation following the *quiebra* of 1647, it is worth noting that the Spanish chose to guarantee the investments of a few amongst the most important families in the market of loans (Spinola, Centurione, Invrea, Pallavicini) in the reconversion into *juros*. See D. Pizzorno, 'La repubblica di Genova nella prima metà del Seicento: una complessa piattaforma negoziale all'ombra della protezione politico-diplomatica spagnola', working paper in *Attraverso la Storia*, IV, Bologna, 2016, 1-18, 13.

¹⁹⁰ Giaccherio, *Il Seicento*, 366.

¹⁹¹ See C. Marsilio, "Cumplir con cuidado". Il mercato del credito genovese negli anni 1630-1640. Vecchi protagonisti e nuove strategie operative', in Herrero Sanchez, Rocio Ben Yessef Garcia, Bitossi, Puncuh eds., *Genova y la monarquía*, II, 801-819. Between 1675 and 1693 Genoese speculators began to operate regularly in other financial markets. See G. Felloni, *Gli investimenti finanziari genovesi in Europa tra il Seicento e la Restaurazione*, Milan, 1971.

¹⁹² F. Ieva, 'Il principe di Piemonte nella guerra lampo del 1625', in G. Assereto, C. Bitossi, P. Merlin eds., *Genova e Torino. Quattro secoli di incontri e scontri*, Genoa, 2015, 81-97; G. Casanova, *La Liguria centro-occidentale e l'invasione franco-piemontese del 1625*, Genoa, 1983.

¹⁹³ Ceccarelli, 'Tra sovranità e imperialità', 253.

orders from Paris and the Duke's strategy, however, gave the Spanish troops enough time to help Genoa put stop to the invasion and the conflict ended with a return to the previous *status quo*. Without consulting its ally, however, Spain signed an armistice with France and left the duchy and the Republic to face each other in low intensity conflict in the years following.¹⁹⁴ This resulted in a two-year period of turmoil supported by the Savoy (1627-1629) and a further attempt of aggression in 1672.¹⁹⁵ Once again, there were no significant territorial consequences; this time, thanks to French mediation.¹⁹⁶ Attempts of military expansion in the west of Liguria and the creation of a new free port in Villefranche (1612) were the marks of the growing importance of the Savoy state during the seventeenth century and the economic and military threat that it entailed for the Genoese.¹⁹⁷

The opponent's growing audacity coincided with the weakening of the main ally of the Republic. The crisis of the Spanish imperial system in the fourth decade of the century – marked by the uprising of Catalonia (1640-1652) and the Portuguese war of secession (1640-1668), consequences of the impressive waste of men and resources in the Thirty Years' War and the hostility of France – benefited Genoese republican and anti-Spanish patricians.¹⁹⁸ Some members of this faction even obtained key positions within the state administration. One example of this is the *doge* Agostino Pallavicini (1637-1639), who was the first *doge* to be symbolically awarded the royal crown.¹⁹⁹ In 1637, there had been

¹⁹⁴ In 1628, Spain signed an alliance with Carlo Emanuele I in the war of succession of Mantova. Filippo IV even tried to impose peace to Genoa with the Savoia, see T.A. Kirk, 'La crisi del 1654 come indicatore del nuovo equilibrio mediterraneo', in Herrero Sanchez, Rocio Ben Yessef Garfia, Bitossi, Puncuh eds., *Génova y la monarquía*, II, 527-538, 532.

¹⁹⁵ The Savoia had a specific social group on which they could lean: exponents of the lower classes who aspired to become nobles. Propagandistic activity passed from manuscripts to leaflets, see Doria, Savelli, '«Cittadini di governo a Genova»', 43-44. Some viewed Spanish ministers with suspicion as they were accused of complicity with the Piedimontese in the Ansaldi-Vachero and Ligalupo conspiracies (1627-1629), see Ceccarelli, 'Tra sovranità e imperialità', 267.

¹⁹⁶ On the role of France see G. Ferretti, 'Conquérir et conserver. Gênes et Turin dans la politique de la France su XVII siècle', in Assereto, Bitossi, Merlin eds., *Genova e Torino*, 143-162.

¹⁹⁷ On this rivalry, see Assereto, Bitossi, Merlin eds., *Genova e Torino*. On the spread of the *porto franco* in the Mediterranean area, see A. Iodice, 'L'istituzione del porto franco in un Mediterraneo senza frontiere', *Politics. Rivista di studi politici* 5/1, 2016, 19-33, 23-24.

¹⁹⁸ See, for example, the attempted coup of Giovanni Paolo Balbi, with initial support of Cardinal Mazarino, in E. Grendi, 'L'ascesa dei Balbi genovesi e la congiura di Gio. Paolo', *Quaderni Storici* 28, 1993, 775-814.

¹⁹⁹ Agostino Pallavicini, despite sympathy for France, revealed little hostility towards Spain's interests. Relations with Spanish authorities were in the hand of a few nobles who were involved in the financial service with the sovereign, such as Stefano Balbi and Cornelio Spinola. See C. Bitossi, 'Il granello di sabbia e i piatti della bilancia. Note sulla politica genovese nella

the proclamation of the *Madonna* as 'Queen' of the Republic, an element that should have placed the state at the same level as the other European monarchies, though this was only theoretical; not even after the official endorsement obtained by the emperor in exchange for a donation in 1641, would this claim royal status be taken seriously by the other monarchies.²⁰⁰ In February 1641, secret negotiations to establish a French embassy in the city were uncovered.²⁰¹

From a symbolic point of view, which was also a result of the decreased reliability of the Spanish partner and the military protection that this could guarantee, the Genoese sought to obtain the title of *Serenissima* from Venice and the royal dignity for their Republic from the papal court.²⁰² The war of Candia (1645-1669) between Venetians and Ottomans which had broken out after the invasion of the island by the latter, seemed to offer a possible solution to this dilemma. Helping the island would have allowed the Genoese to obtain recognition, as a crowned head, of their equality with the Venetians and favoured, hopefully, possible expansion in the Levantine markets.²⁰³ However, negotiations with the Venetians did not lead to the desired outcome and the Republic of St. Mark lost its most important surviving possession in the Levant.²⁰⁴

In addition to the need for visibility on the international stage, there was a growing fear of Spanish interference in the maritime trade headed to Genoa. On several occasions, Genoese claims for sovereignty over the Ligurian Sea were made to protect the vessels of all nationalities passing between Corsica and Liguria and in particular, Dutch ones loaded with cereals.²⁰⁵ In 1638, the

crisi del sistema imperiale ispano-asburgico, 1640-1660', in Herrero Sanchez, Rocio Ben Yessef Garcia, Bitossi, Puncuh eds., *Génova y la monarquía*, II, 495-526, 496, 511.

²⁰⁰ The Sun King was especially against this operation, see M. Fusaro, A. Addobbati, 'The Grand Tour of Mercantilism: Lord Fauconberg and his Italian mission (1669-1671)', *The English Historical Review*, forthcoming. Among the ancient Italian states of the time, only Venice had the same privilege. See R. Ciasca, 'Affermazioni di sovranità della Repubblica di Genova nel secolo XVII', *Giornale storico e letterario della Liguria* XIV, 1938, 81-91, 161-181.

²⁰¹ Pizzorno, 'La repubblica di Genova', 5. See also G. Ferretti, 'La ricerca di un'alleanza: l'istituzione del consolato francese a Genova', in M.G. Palumbo ed., *Genova e Francia al crocevia dell'Europa (1624-1642)*, Genoa, 1989, 101-147.

²⁰² Maréchaux, 'Cultiver l'alternative', 690.

²⁰³ O. Pastine, 'La politica di Genova nella lotta veneto-turca dalla guerra di Candia alla pace di Passarowitz', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* LXVII, 1938, 1-153.

²⁰⁴ See S. McKee, *Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity*, Philadelphia, 2000; G. Ortalli ed., *Venezia e Creta: atti del convegno internazionale di studi* (Iraklio and Chanià, 30 September to 5 October 1997), Venice, 1998.

²⁰⁵ Kirk, *Genoa and the sea*, 118-127. Worthy to note is the black market sale of precious metals which took place on board Genoese vessels, including galleys. See Kirk, 'La crisi del 1654', 534-535.

government approved strengthening the state's fleet by experiment of the *galee di libertà*, a move which was badly received by the Spanish.²⁰⁶ Strengthening of the fleet was a double-edged sword: on the one hand it reduced the need for Spanish protection, on the other hand it damaged the interests of the Genoese *asentistas de galeras*, including the descendants of Andrea Doria, who employed Genoese labour and capital.²⁰⁷

In the end, the origins of the policies of free port and neutrality lie, in part, in the decline of Spain.²⁰⁸ Free port, the genesis of which will be seen in the next Chapter, was conceived in 1590 to bring grain shipments on foreign vessels to Genoa, and Northern vessels, in particular.²⁰⁹ Over time, it evolved to perform different functions, particularly as an emporium for the transit and re-export of goods, in close competition with the nearby free port of Livorno.²¹⁰ Following another crisis with Spain in 1654, the Genoese modified free port policy to support the arrival of foreign merchants to the city, with an imitation of the Livorno model.²¹¹

Other reasons for disagreement with Spain came from diplomatic and territorial clashes. Philip IV and, in his name, the Duke of Olivares, were trying to curb the role of the Genoese *hombres de negocio* in Madrid and to reaffirm the role of Spain as guarantor of international politics.²¹² They even tried to prevent the creation of a strong Genoese dominion in Liguria. In 1646, for example, the Republic bought Pontremoli, on the border with Tuscany, thanks to an agreement reached with the governor of Milan in exchange for 200,000 pieces of eight. However, the Spanish crown cancelled the purchase and sold this fief to the Grand Duke of Tuscany for only 625 pieces of eight.²¹³ Spain did not want to damage relations with Tuscany by excessively favouring Genoa by

²⁰⁶ On the use of galleys with paid voluntary crew instead of the customary use of slaves, see Bitossi, 'Il granello di sabbia', 497.

²⁰⁷ See B. Maréchaux, *Instituciones navales y finanzas internacionales en el Mediterráneo de la época moderna. Los asentistas de galeras genoveses al servicio de la Monarquía Hispánica (1500-1650)*, unpublished PhD thesis, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2017.

²⁰⁸ Regarding the evolution of free port policies, see Chapter Two.

²⁰⁹ ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 11/08/1590.

²¹⁰ On the free port of Livorno, see C.S. Tazzara, *The free port of Livorno and the transformation of the Mediterranean world*, Oxford, 2017.

²¹¹ Piccinno, Zanini, 'Genoa: colonizing and colonized city?', 290; T.A. Kirk, 'Genoa and Livorno: Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century Commercial Rivalry as a Stimulus to Policy Development', *History* 86/281, 2001, 3-17, 13-14.

²¹² This strategy also included inviting Portuguese bankers to operate at the court of Madrid in place of the Genoese, see J.C. Boyajian, *Portuguese bankers at the court of Spain, 1626-1650*, New Brunswick, 1983.

²¹³ See M. Giuliani, 'La contesa tra Genova e Firenze per l'acquisto di Pontremoli (1647-1650)', *Bollettino Ligustico per la Storia e la Cultura Regionale*, X/1-2, 1958, 163-171.

granting Pontremoli, which, on the contrary, did not represent a territory of strategic importance for the Grand Duke. Negotiations for Finale, on the other hand, a Spanish enclave in west Liguria and a constant source of concern for the Ligurian trade and for salt smuggling, led to nothing despite a Genoese offer of 800,000 pieces of eight.²¹⁴ The crisis that followed failed negotiations ended in 1655 with the restitution of Genoese assets and interests that the Spanish had seized in Milan and Naples. In addition, the Spanish crown officially recognized the Genoese right to tax the salt brought to Finale: neither country was ready to give up the advantages offered by their alliance.²¹⁵ Genoa obtained the marquisate of Finale only in 1713. Therefore, in spite of efforts to strengthen its territorial state, the Republic struggled to impose its dominion.²¹⁶

By the middle of the seventeenth century some form of precarious balance had been achieved. The state managed to suppress the popular uprising; there was peace with the Duchy of Savoy; Genoa had obtained the royal title; and the Habsburgs renegotiated their agreements with the Genoese businessmen after the *quiebra* of 1647. The republican party lost most of its influence.²¹⁷ In 1659, the Republic recovered from the plague epidemic that had weakened it between 1656 and 1657. Moreover, the peace of the Pyrenees between France and Spain allowed Genoese patricians once again to work in symbiosis with the Hispanic-Habsburg imperial system.²¹⁸ A short period of dynamism began, characterized by the adoption of *Nuovo Armamento* policies, which were aimed at strengthening the Republic's maritime forces. The *Magnifici* decreed an increase in the number of public galleys and established, in 1655, a special *Nuovo Armamento* Magistrate who was in charge of organizing convoys to protect vessels on the route between Cadiz and Genoa.²¹⁹ From 1665 onwards,

²¹⁴ Amongst reasons for concern, there was the fear of a new Finale-Livorno axis with the participation of non-noble Genoese, see Bitossi, 'Il granello di sabbia', 502. On relations between Spain and Finale see P. Calcagno, 'Lo sviluppo del commercio finalese sotto la Spagna: danno e minaccia per la Casa di San Giorgio', in A. Peano Cavasola ed., *Finale, porto di Fiandra, briglia di Genova*, Finale Ligure, 2007, 207-234; P. Calcagno, '«Al pregiudizio de la giurisdizione si aggiunge il danno pecuniario». Genova e la «piaga del Finale» nel XVII secolo', *Società e storia* XXXI, 2008, 499-535; L. Lo Basso, 'Finale porto corsaro spagnolo tra Genova e la Francia alla fine del Seicento', in P. Calcagno ed., *Finale fra le potenze di antico regime. Il ruolo del marchesato sulla scena internazionale (secoli XVI-XVIII)*, Savona, 2009, 137-155.

²¹⁵ Kirk, 'La crisi del 1654', 537-538.

²¹⁶ Ceccarelli, 'Tra sovranità e imperialità', 280.

²¹⁷ Maréchaux, 'Cultiver l'alternative', 692. The activities of some politicians such as Giambattista Raggio, Raffaele Della Torre or Gio Bernardo Veneroso are noteworthy. They are examined in Bitossi, 'Il granello di sabbia', 504-510.

²¹⁸ See C. Bitossi, 'Un lungo addio. Il tramonto del partito spagnolo nella Genova del '600', in *La storia dei genovesi*, VIII, Genoa, 1988, 119-135.

²¹⁹ Lo Basso, 'Economie e culture del mare', 82.

Genoese diplomacy succeeded in obtaining the reopening of links with the Levant and Izmir, extending the navigation conveyed to the Levant. This new route, however, had a short life.²²⁰ Only the smaller, privately operated convoys continued to trade following a new break down in relations with the Ottoman court a decade later.²²¹ The *Magnifici* also started plans to establish new trade routes beyond the Mediterranean Sea.²²² Already in 1647, it emerges that an attempt was made to create a shipping company for commerce with the Far East, while the commercial relations of some patricians with Rio de la Plata or New Spain at that time are well known.²²³

After the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), Genoa had to face the growing importance of other players on the international market, like the growing United Provinces.²²⁴ In addition to this and following a new attack by the Savoy in 1672, the Catholic king officially ceased to present himself as the “protector de la libertad de la República”.²²⁵ It was a matter of time before France, which had been trying to take Spain’s place since 1528, resumed diplomatic-military pressures. The apex of this strategy was the bombing of Genoa on order of the sovereign Louis XIV in 1684.²²⁶ This action was part of a wider French operation to impose its authority on the Mediterranean and decisive strengthening of the Royal Navy allowed for such a strategy. The French Navy fleet was increased from about twenty vessels in 1661 to 121 units in 1684, marking the beginning of a campaign of international ‘terrorism’, thanks to the use of modern bombing *galeotte*.²²⁷ In 1679 Sanremo and Sampierdarena, villages on the outskirts of Genoa, were bombed in reprisal for the missed greetings reserved to the French ships from the Genoese fortresses. In 1682-83, it was the turn of Algiers, as punishment for the operations of the corsairs based in this port. After Genoa, in 1685, Tripoli was bombed, too.²²⁸

²²⁰ See O. Pastine, *Genova e l'impero ottomano nel secolo XVII*, Genoa, 1952.

²²¹ Lo Basso, ‘Economie e culture del mare’, 83.

²²² Bitossi, ‘Il granello di sabbia’, 498. Amongst the projects of expansion, there was also the long presiding idea of opening routes for oceanic navigation under the protection of the Portuguese.

²²³ Felloni, ‘Il ceto dirigente’, 1339.

²²⁴ M. Herrero Sánchez, ‘La quiebra del sistema hispano-genovés (1627-1700)’, *Hispania* LXV, 2005, 115-152.

²²⁵ Herrero Sánchez, ‘La quiebra del sistema’, 146.

²²⁶ See Bitossi, 1684. *La Repubblica sfida il Re Sole*.

²²⁷ See J. Peter, *Les barbaresques sous Louis XIV. Le duel entre Alger et la Marine du Roi (1681-1698)*, Paris, 1997.

²²⁸ Bitossi, 1684, par. 1. On this see also N. Matar, ‘Bombardment of Tripoli, Libya, by the French fleet, in Ahmad ibn Khaled al-Nasiri, in N. Matar ed., *Europe through Arab eyes, 1578-1727*, Columbia, 2009, 210-212.

The requests of the French king were: disarmament of the new Genoese galleys, brought from 6 to 10 units thanks to the policy of the *Nuovo Armamento*; the opening of a salt warehouse in Savona for the supply of the French troops stationed in Casale Monferrato, in Piedmont; as well as the sending of a delegation to Paris to apologize for the alleged discourtesy to the French ambassador in Genoa, who had been a presence there since 1682.²²⁹

Although the bombing damaged a large part of the city, the local militia and the Spanish troops sent from Milan repelled any attempt by French troops to land. Having survived these battles, the Republic sent its galleys, supported by a Spanish squadron, to plunder the French vessels between the Ligurian Sea and the Gulf of Lion. However, the hesitation of Spain, which signed a separate truce with France on August 10 and the French corsairs, forced the Genoese to sue for peace. The *doge* himself, Francesco Maria Imperiale Lercari, together with senators Marcello Durazzo, Giannettino Garibaldi, Agostino Lomellini and Paris Maria Salvago, met Louis XIV in Versailles on May 15, 1685 to apologize to the sovereign and accept his requests.²³⁰

The subsequent election of *doge* Pietro Durazzo, an oligarch who was close to France, in 1685 can be seen as a political message of reconciliation.²³¹ This event marked the beginning of separation from Spain. The only viable solution seemed to be a strict neutrality policy, which would also be useful in dealing with increasing competition from England and the United Provinces.²³² Neutrality during the war of the Augsburg League (1688-1697) demonstrated all the benefits of this policy.²³³ Neutrality could guarantee profitable opportunities, as long as it did not antagonize the belligerent states that saw every action to be an aid to one of the involved factions.

The anti-Spaniards, therefore, did not succeed in overturning the axis of Genoese politics, which, if anything, moved towards a more marked policy of neutrality that was fully achieved in the eighteenth century. This, together with the strengthening of the free port, made Genoa an international emporium and, according to Diego Pizzorno's definition, a 'diplomatic-informative

²²⁹ Bitossi, *1684*, par. 1.

²³⁰ Bitossi, *1684*, par. 6-7.

²³¹ Costantini, *La Repubblica di Genova*, 392.

²³² Assereto, 'La guerra di Successione spagnola dal punto di vista genovese', in Herrero Sanchez, Rocio Ben Yessef Garcia, Bitossi, Puncuh eds., *Génova y la monarquía*, II, 539-584, 543.

²³³ C. Bitossi, 'L'antico regime genovese, 1576-1797', in D. Puncuh ed., *Storia di Genova*, Genoa, 2003, 391-508, 467-468.

portofranco'.²³⁴ The 'republican' party were unsuccessful in creating a compact and opposing group of interests, nor in proposing solutions that did not clash with consolidated and transversal interests of the ruling class of the Republic. The French bombardment of 1684 and the disintegration of the Hispanic-Habsburg imperial system during the Spanish War of Succession (1701-1714), as well as the acquisition of Finale in 1713, gave the Republic some ephemeral margins of manoeuvre, in a rapidly changing Europe.²³⁵ This situation, according to Carlo Bitossi, lasted at least until the 1730s, when support for France finally prevailed.²³⁶

The neutrality policy focused on the importance of the capital's port, its proper administration and the improvement of its infrastructure. Both before and after the weakening of the ties with Spain, the port played a key role in guaranteeing not only the survival but also the very independence of the Republic, because of the interests of several countries it sheltered.

²³⁴ Pizzorno, 'La repubblica di Genova', 3. It is interesting to observe the adoption of a neutrality policy already back in the seventeenth century, during the War of Castro (1641/1649), see D. Pizzorno, 'Genova e Roma nella crisi di Castro', *Studi Storici* 2, 2015, 377-402. For the politics of neutrality of the Republic in the eighteenth century, see Garibbo, *La neutralità della repubblica*.

²³⁵ The purchase of Finale was eventually possible thanks to intense diplomatic activity, the availability of money from the *Casa di San Giorgio* and, above all, diffidence of the new emperor Carlo VI towards Vittorio Amedeo II, see G. Assereto, G. Bongiovanni, «*Sotto il felice e dolce dominio della Serenissima Repubblica*». *L'acquisto del Finale da parte di Genova e la Distinta relazione di Filippo Cattaneo De Marini*, Savona, 2003.

²³⁶ Bitossi, *1684*, par. 8.

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2. The Port's Administrative and Maritime Policies during the Seventeenth Century

2.1 Genoa Strategic Function for the Economy of the Republic

A port was a fundamental *res publica*: all commercial operators who benefited from its infrastructures, even foreigners, theoretically became temporary subjects of the state and their goods were subject to specific local laws.¹ Between the medieval and early modern period, ports' development in Europe became increasingly complex from an urban, programmatic and financial point of view.² Special institutions were needed that could manage the growing traffic flows and build new infrastructures. These interventions resulted in the creation of specialized technical and administrative offices, as in the case of the *Padri del Comune* of Genoa, examined in the pages to follow.

GA administration in Genoa, despite the references to Mediterranean shared customs and legal traditions, was closely linked to local institutional strategies and contingencies, at the centre of which was the port.³ A port is a shelter for vessels, a provider of facilities and services for trade, and a source of tax revenue for its state.⁴ The port reflected the city status in the international trade and allowed it to dominate the Republic's subjected territories in Liguria and overseas. Since the medieval period, the port has been distinguished by its liveliness and dynamism, it had never been a military harbour, as the fleet of the Republic was always very limited in number, nor a port of call:⁵ despite the presence of an *arsenale* and two *darsena*, shipbuilding was a collateral activity,

¹ Piergiovanni, 'Dottrina e prassi', 15.

² See E. Poleggi, 'La costruzione della città portuale, un nuovo tema di storia', in E. Poleggi E., *Città portuali del Mediterraneo: storia e archeologia*, Genoa, 1985, 7-10. Between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, Genoa began to play a new role: namely, not only as an importer of supplies, but also as a major centre of re-exportation. See L. Piccinno, 'Genoa. A city with a port or a port city?', in W. Blockmans, M. Krom, J. Wubs-Mrozewicz eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Maritime Trade around Europe 1300-1600: Commercial Networks and Urban Autonomy*, London-New York, 2017, 159-176, 159-176, 165.

³ Piergiovanni, 'Dottrina e prassi', 11.

⁴ See S. Cavaciocchi, *I porti come impresa economica: atti della diciannovesima Settimana di studi*, Bagno a Ripoli, 1988; M. Sirago, 'Il sistema portuale italiano in età moderna', in D. Romero, A. Guimera eds., *Puertos y sistemas portuarios (siglos XVI-XX) actas del Coloquio internacional: El sistema portuario español*, Madrid, 1996, 53-76.

⁵ See G. Benvenuti, *Le repubbliche marinare. Amalfi, Pisa, Genova e Venezia*, Rome, 1989.

which was instead widespread in the *Riviera*.⁶ The port, however, was in an undoubtedly favourable position for unloading goods headed to the Po Valley or, for example, for the importation of cereals and raw materials from southern Italy, such as raw silk.⁷ Excluding galleys, which were mainly destined for military use, it is estimated that about 30% of the total tonnage of vessels sailing in the Mediterranean Sea stopped in the port of Genoa in the first half of the sixteenth century.⁸ The importance of the maritime trade that stopped in the port was the result of the oligarchy's care and strategies.⁹

As already noted, the rival or allied powers of Genoa recognized its function as a centre of transit and redistribution of goods as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These foreign powers exploited the port's potential as a commercial hub, as did Spain, or sought to seize it and/or encourage the creation of competing emporia, as did France, Savoy and Tuscany.¹⁰ At the same time, between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Genoese businessmen expanded their business ventures through operations that guaranteed them the monopoly of alum from the mines of Mazarrón and Tolfa, a role in the slave trade with the American colonies, participation in Levantine trade with the Ottoman Empire or North Africa, a predominant role in foreign exchange fairs or a role as intermediaries and agents in the exchanges that took place in the Asian Spanish colonies, where they sold American silver in exchange for Chinese products.¹¹

⁶ Gatti, *Navi e cantieri*, 19-40; L. Gatti, *L'Arsenale e le galee. Pratiche di costruzione e linguaggio tecnico a Genova tra Medioevo ed età moderna*, Genoa, 1990, 78-81.

⁷ On silk manufacturing in Liguria see Massa, *Lineamenti di organizzazione*, 45-53.

⁸ Costantini, *La repubblica di Genova*, 164.

⁹ Massa, 'Fattori tecnici ed economici', 89.

¹⁰ See par. 1.5.

¹¹ Lopez, 'Market expansion', 445-464. Sauli and Di Negro families also managed Mazarrón mines, while the Grimaldi, Sauli, Di Negro and Pallavicino acquired temporary mining rights on Tolfa mines, see J. Delumeau, *L'alun de Rome, XVe-XIX siècle*, Paris, 1962, 38, 92-100, 106-118, 169, 208-241. Grillo and Lomellini families obtained the *asiento* of American slave trade between 1663 and 1674, see M. Vega Franco, *El tráfico de esclavos con America (asientos de Grilo y Lomelin, 1663-1674)*, Seville, 1984. Genoese nobleman Gio. Agostino Durazzo managed to reopen trade with the Ottoman Empire, with the help of the Greek *dragomanno* Panaioti Nicolosio, whom was married to a Genoese noblewoman from the Calvo family, see Pastine, *Genova e l'Impero ottomano*. Since 1542, the Lomellini family bought from Spain the *asiento* of the red coral from Tabarka, a small island near Tunisian coast. From 1719, they shared their *asiento* with other members of Genoese aristocracy, see Piccinno, *Un'impresa fra terra e mare*. The Centurione, Cicala, De Mari, De Marini, Doria d'Angri, Doria di Melfi, Grillo, Grimaldi, Imperiale, Lomellini, Negrone, Sauli, Serra and Spinola gained the *asiento* for the transport of silver arriving from Spanish colonies that they re-exported to Europe and Flanders, see Marsilio, 'The Genoese and Portuguese', 77-78. The Genoese presence in the Philippines has never been studied, so we are unable to assess their relative importance. However, it is worth mentioning how, in the 1760s, the General of the Philippine galleys was Sebastián Rayo Doria [Raggio Doria], married to Ana Pestaño de la Cueva, daughter of Marcos, one of the most

The commercial success of the port of Genoa and the numerous Ligurian ships of all sorts that sailed the Mediterranean coincided with a total absence of other Ligurian ports.¹² Andrea Spinola, patrician and future *doge* of the Republic (1629-1631), confirmed this when reviewing the main Ligurian ports and harbours in the early seventeenth century.¹³ In the western *Riviera* there were only insecure moorings in the bay of Alassio, towards Gallinara island, where vessels could find some shelter from strong winds,¹⁴ or in the bay of Vado and in Savona. Between Savona and Genoa, for about 50 km, Spinola did not identify other landings or beaches.¹⁵ To the eastern *Riviera*, the situation was no better: only Portofino offered some shelter and, perhaps because of its proximity to Genoa and the fact that it administratively depended from the Genoese *Padri del Comune*, it was among the few operating and functional ports of call in the area.¹⁶ Almost at the border with Tuscany, to the East, there was the gulf of La Spezia. Ports in this gulf enjoyed a relative margin of autonomy: Genoa had subjugated these communities often through conventions that had granted them a partial autonomy.¹⁷ However, their activities were limited to cabotage because of the lack of adequate infrastructures and a configuration of the territory that did not favour a coastal expansion.¹⁸ There was also a multitude of small moorings for the use of fishermen and, with a few exceptions, for small-scale trade.

important merchants in Manila at that time, see L. Lo Basso, 'Diaspora e armamento marittimo nelle strategie economiche dei genovesi nella seconda metà del XVII secolo: una storia globale', *Studi storici*, 1, 2015, 138; on Manila see J. Gil, *Los chinos en Manila (siglos XVI y XVII)*, Lisboa, 2011, 65-70.

¹² See 'Introduzione', in Doria, Massa, Piergiorgio eds., *Il sistema portuale*, 6.

¹³ ASCG, *ms. Brignole Sale* 106 C 4, Andrea Spinola, *Ricordi Politici*, sixteenth century, 76-78, in Assereto, 'Porti e scali minori', 223-224. On Andrea Spinola see S. Buonadonna, M. Marcenaro, *Rosso doge. I dogi della repubblica di Genova dal 1339 al 1797*, Genoa, 2000, 123; C. Bitossi ed., *Andrea Spinola, Scritti scelti*, Genoa, 1981.

¹⁴ Vessels sheltering at anchor behind this rock could also give rise to multiple collisions, as happened in 1698 to the *lembo* of the *patrone* Jo Baptista Bozanus, see ASG, *CdM*, Testimoniali segreti redatti all'estero 285, 10/10/1698. For more details on this voyage see also par. 5.5.

¹⁵ Assereto, 'Porti e scali minori', 223.

¹⁶ Perhaps it is also for these reasons that shipmasters made a large number of Average declarations in Portofino, in greater numbers than in the other ports of the Republic, see *AveTransRisk* Online Database.

¹⁷ Assereto, 'Porti e scali minori'.

¹⁸ Again, Average reports show a constellation of small ports and landings that were used in time of emergencies, such as Lèvanto, Sestri Levante, Santa Margherita, Lerici, Albissola Marina, etc., see *AveTransRisk* Online Database.

Sailors, shipwrights, cartographers and masters lived in Genoa, Savona and the towns along the *Riviera*, serving an economy based on the sea.¹⁹ The Ligurian *patroni*, shipowners and sailors, in particular, worked in cabotage trade with small and fast boats, guaranteeing traffic between the ports of the *Riviera* but also with part of the North-Western Mediterranean.²⁰ The government of the *Magnifici*, however, deliberately neglected a state policy of support for smaller ports.²¹ The pre-eminence of the Genoese port determined the drainage of a consistent quota of the Republic's manpower and investments towards the capital.²² Many regulations date back to the medieval period, when Genoa gradually eliminated or 'limited' the few existing ports of call along the *Riviera* for military, fiscal or commercial reasons.²³ For example, a 1440 decree stated that all communities subjected to Genoa were required to have their own goods to pass through customs formalities in Genoa.²⁴ This requirement also aimed to consolidate the regional political and economic system through the concentration of business in the capital, in parallel with other measures such as internal co-optation within the ruling and merchant classes and a better organization of import, export and redistribution mechanisms.²⁵ The decree, encouraging direct trade with the port of Genoa, was reconfirmed in 1519 and 1526, causing the end of trade for ports such as Ventimiglia and Albenga. Savona was an exemplary case. It was the main alternative port of call in the region and, since the late medieval period, it was resentful of the capital's authority. Already in 1504, Genoa implemented an embargo of the city, accused of an alliance with the French sovereign in exchange for independence.²⁶ Between 1525 and 1528, Genoa narrowed its harbour to just the *darsena* as a punishment for its alliance with France and as a marker of the settlement's

¹⁹ On the concept of 'sea economy' and the 'maritime regions dynamics', see M. Ciotti, *Economie del mare: costruzioni navali, commercio, navigazione e pesca nella Marca meridionale in età moderna*, Ancona, 2005, 17-41.

²⁰ L. Lo Basso, 'Economie e culture del mare: armamento, navigazione, commerci', in G. Assereto, M. Doria eds., *Storia della Liguria*, Bari, 2014, 76-86, 76.

²¹ On a definition of 'small port' see G. Assereto, 'Porti e scali minori della Repubblica di Genova in età moderna', in Doria, Massa, Piergiovanni eds., *Il sistema portuale*, 223.

²² See L. Piccinno, 'Il commercio marittimo e lo sviluppo del porto di Genova tra Medioevo ed età Moderna', *Università dell'Insubria, Facoltà di Economia*, 12, 2004.

²³ V. Polonio, 'Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul mare. Un lento itinerario tra V e XIII secolo', in G. Assereto, M. Doria eds., *Storia della Liguria*, Rome-Bari, 2007, 28-36.

²⁴ C. Costantini, *La Repubblica di Genova nell'età moderna*, Turin, 1991, 326.

²⁵ L. Giusto, 'Genova, i genovesi e i grani siciliani. Dinamiche sociali ed economiche; produzione, stoccaggio e commercio', essay for the class on *Documenti e Tecnologia*, Bologna, 2011, 1-29, 11.

²⁶ Assereto, *La città fedelissima*, 41.

complete submission.²⁷ Still in 1571, the *Magnifici* feared that small ports such as Varigotti could compete with the capital city.²⁸ Only harbours with beaches or single docks (as in Sanremo) survived.²⁹

The patricians concentrated all available resources on Genoa, according to what Guglielmo Assereto called the “logic of the city state”.³⁰ The conception underlying this policy, as reflected in the words of the Genoese *Padri del Comune*, was based on the complete subjection of the minor ports of call, which were treated as:

[...] muscles of the body, and also to the body it is more necessary to defend the head, on which the vital spirit of the whole body depends, than it is necessary to defend a member, without which he can still hold his head.³¹

Strategic-military concerns motivated this policy. The political instability of the Republic, which the neighbouring powers tried to exploit on several occasions, led to the fear that enemies could seize a port in the *Riviera* to use it as a base for military operations or as a port of call for commercial competition: keeping the peripheric ports dependent on the capital would have discouraged these attempts.³² The fragmentary nature of the Ligurian territory, and the presence of enclaves under the control of foreign authorities such as Nice, Villefranche and Oneglia controlled by Savoy, or Finale in the hands of Spain, are examples of the vulnerability of the Republic.³³ In the sixteenth century, in addition to the embankment of the port of Savona, the Genoese state also ordered the construction of a fortress to guard the Savona basin. Further fortifications were built in Vado and in the Gulf of La Spezia.³⁴

²⁷ The raging of the Franco-Spanish conflict delayed the execution of the 1523 Genoese decree for the dismantling of the port, see N. Cerisola, *Storia del porto di Savona*, Savona, 1968, 21-77.

²⁸ E. Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale, naviglio mercantile e consolati genovesi nel Cinquecento’, *Rivista Storica Italiana*, LXXX/3, 1968, 593-638, 621.

²⁹ Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia*, 26. On Sanremo see N. Calvini, C. Gentili, *La storia del porto di Sanremo*, Sanremo, 1986.

³⁰ Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori’, 254.

³¹ “[...] muscoli del corpo, et pure al corpo è più necessario diffendere il capo, dal quale dipende il spirito vittale di tutto il corpo, che non è necessario di diffendere uno membro, senza il quale ancora può regersi il capo”, ASCG, *PdC* 316, 1638, in Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori’, 241.

³² Andrea Spinola, for example, feared that the creation of a new port would have posed a serious threat to the Republic: “correr non di meno pericolo di perder lo stato e la libertà”, in ASCG, *Manoscritti Brignole Sale*, 106 C 4, Andrea Spinola, *Ricordi Politici*, 76-77.

³³ On Finale see Calcagno, ‘Lo sviluppo del commercio finalese’, 207-234.

³⁴ See P. Calcagno, ‘Privateers and military mobile defense of the coasts: the Genoese case in the second half of the 17th century’, *Studi storici*, 4, 2014, 937-964; E. Beri, ‘Genova e la sua frontiera marittima fra XVI e XVIII secolo: difesa e controllo’, paper discussed in *Frontiere*.

The Senate of the Republic sent an administrator to each peripheral settlement and imposed restrictive taxation.³⁵ The latter, whether he was a *podestà*, a captain, a *sindaco* or a governor, was responsible for the supervision of local finance and public works: he controlled and, if necessary, blocked any intervention on the port that went beyond the ordinary administration.³⁶ Moreover, Genoese authorities forcibly requisitioned the port equipment of the above-mentioned localities in order to carry out extraordinary maintenance work in the port of the capital.³⁷ The local elites, on the other hand, often consisted of rentiers and landowners, who had little interest in investing the large sums required for the implementation and maintenance of an efficient port structure, especially considering the risks of interference from the capital.³⁸

However, as Genoese supremacy over the Ligurian territory strengthened between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, some of the monopolistic regulations were broken through the granting of *ad hoc* agreements with the villages of the *Riviera*.³⁹

These villages constituted an indispensable resource to ensure connectivity through the region, given the difficulty of traveling overland.⁴⁰ In every Ligurian community an intense shipbuilding, shipowning and seafaring activity developed, of which we find evidence in Average sources.⁴¹ In addition to moving goods according to the victualling of the territory of the Republic and its capital, in some cases the local *patroni* were able to carry out some commission trade.⁴² One such example is the voyage of Captain Andrea Bianchi di Bartolomeo from Lavagna, a village on the eastern *Riviera*. Bianchi di

Rappresentazioni, integrazioni e conflitti tra Europa ed America (secc. XVI-XX), University of Roma Tre, Rome, 20-22/06/2013.

³⁵ Assereto, 'Porti e scali minori', 227.

³⁶ See Assereto, 'Dall'amministrazione patrizia', 59-159.

³⁷ As happened in 1590 and 1638, when Genoa forced Savona to lend its pontoon, a wooden float used to dredge the dock, see Assereto, *La città fedelissima*, 165.

³⁸ See, for example, the ruling class of Savona between seventeenth and eighteenth century, Assereto, *La città fedelissima*, 167-168.

³⁹ The Republic, for example, allowed Savona to collect an anchorage fee for the maintenance of the port, on an exceptional basis and with occasional renewals, in 1550, 1630, 1634 e 1699, see Assereto, 'Porti e scali minori', 235.

⁴⁰ Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia*, 15-40.

⁴¹ See chap. 4. Average reports in the following Chapters will reveal the role of shipmasters and sailors from the *Riviera* in the Republic's trade, as well as the importance of family and proximity ties among the crews. See for example the *felucca* of the *patrone* Santino Fugone of Sestri Levante. The crew was composed entirely of sailors from Sestri Levante, and during the course of the voyage, the patron met other vessels and captains all from this town. See ASG, NG 2084, 21/03/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id50238. The transcript of the report made by this *patrone* is in the [Appendix VII](#).

⁴² Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia*, 118.

Bartolomeo left Lavagna in August 1697 with an empty hold to load wheat in Cagliari. Finding no return cargo, he sailed from Cagliari to Palermo and Trapani, where he loaded salt for Genoa. The bad weather forced him to stop in Naples, where the general of the galleys of Spain ordered him to load oars destined for Sicily. Finally, driven by contrary winds, Bianchi di Bartolomeo shipwrecked in Calabria near Scalea.⁴³

The Genoese patricians did not cease to ensure that long-distance traffic, or the possible construction of infrastructures in smaller ports did not affect the interests of the capital. In 1661 a report read to the *Collegi* by a deputation of the *Casa di San Giorgio*, a semi-private body with multiple interests in the administration of the Republic, officially questioned the system of restrictions and privileges with the coastal centres developed as a result of the already noted decree of 1440.⁴⁴ The salt monopoly, for example, managed directly by *San Giorgio*, was preserved through the control of the *stapole* in the coastal settlements.⁴⁵ In the two-year period 1662-1663, the *Collegi* replied with a temporary revocation of all special agreements with the minor communities.⁴⁶ The monopolistic ambitions of the Genoese emporium, however, were not able to completely contrast the initiative of the villages of the *Riviera*. They obtained more operational space during the eighteenth century, when the Ligurian cabotage trade came to control the traffic of most of the Tyrrhenian basin.⁴⁷

⁴³ ASG, *CdM*, Testimoniali segreti redatti all'estero 285, 15/04/1698, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id50428.

⁴⁴ Costantini, *La repubblica di Genova*, 364.

⁴⁵ The monopoly on salt was one of the most important sources of income for the *Casa di San Giorgio*. The defence of this privilege was constant throughout the early modern period, see Calcagno, '«Al pregiudizio de la giurisdizione si aggiunge il danno pecuniario»', 499-535. The *stapole* were the places where salt was stored and sold under the monopoly regime, see Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia*, 118. The annual consumption of salt in Genoa was on average 4.6 tons and increased from the middle of the seventeenth century. The salt was also re-exported from the city to the hinterland, see Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 153.

⁴⁶ Costantini, *La repubblica di Genova*, 364-371. *San Giorgio*, recognizing the failure of this strategy and the fall in revenue due to illegal trade, reached an agreement with the various coastal communities: it established the payment of an annual fixed sum that slightly reduced the total revenue expected, see G. Felloni, 'Organizzazione portuale, navigazione e traffici a Genova: un sondaggio tra le fonti per l'età moderna', in D. Puncuh ed., *Studi in memoria di Giorgio Costamagna*, Genoa, 2003, 337-364, 350.

⁴⁷ Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia*, 118. See also B. Salvemini, 'Negli spazi mediterranei della decadenza. Note su istituzioni, etiche e pratiche mercantili della tarda età moderna', *Storica*, 51, 2011, 7-51, 24.

2.2 The Customs Regime and the Free Port Policy

Taxation was an important tool to reinforce the pre-eminence of the capital's port. In general terms, during the period under analysis taxation of vessels entering and leaving Genoa was relatively light.⁴⁸ On the basis of an analysis of the operating costs for the maintenance of the port, however, it is evident that the charges imposed on the carriers using the port never provided adequate revenue for its needs.⁴⁹

The *Padri del Comune*, the magistracy in charge for the port's administration, directly collected most of the taxes, while some of them were farmed out to private individuals or consortia in exchange for lump sums of money estimated on the basis of expected revenues.⁵⁰ Many taxes had ancient origins and experienced some continuity between the medieval and early modern period. The oldest known is the *fanali*, levied from 1340 onwards in exchange for the service offered by the two lighthouses at the port's entrance. The amount varied in proportion to the crew of each ship.⁵¹ From 1451, the *Padri del Comune* obtained the direct management of this tax, which in 1487 was raised to 18 *denari* for each crew member.⁵² At least from the middle of the fifteenth century, there was a tax paid only by 'small' ships for the right to moor in the port, the *gabella dello schifato*, which was regularly farmed out.⁵³ There was also a tax on anchorage, the *iactus navium*, for larger vessels.⁵⁴ It amounted to 20 *soldi* for every 1,000 *cantari* (47,640 tons) of capacity.⁵⁵

In addition to the fee for mooring within the port, the *Padri del Comune* collected a tax for those that left, called *Exitus navium*, whose rates were

⁴⁸ Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 174-176.

⁴⁹ P. Massa, 'Fattori tecnici ed economici dello sviluppo del porto di Genova tra medioevo ed età moderna (1340-1548)', in Doria, Massa, Piergiovanni eds., *Il sistema portuale*, 37-134, 79.

⁵⁰ Massa, 'Fattori tecnici ed economici', 79; L. Piccinno, *Economia marittima e operatività portuale. Genova, secc. XVII-XIX*, Genoa, 2000, 92-93. On the system of contracts see G. Felloni, 'Accumulazione capitalistica ed investimenti a Genova nei secc. XVI-XVII: uno sguardo d'insieme', in G. Felloni ed., *Scritti di Storia Economica*, I, Genoa, 1998, 653-667.

⁵¹ C. Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune della repubblica genovese*, Genoa, 1865, 22-23.

⁵² Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 120-122. See also Grendi, 'Il traffico portuale', 310-311.

⁵³ Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 251-252.

⁵⁴ The distinction between small and large vessels is unclear: initially, it was based on the presence of the *castello di poppa*. However, following the practice of removing this structure before entering the port, a decree of 1548 extended the anchorage tax to all vessels with a capacity of more than 1,500 *cantari* (71,460 kg.). See Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 251-252.

⁵⁵ Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 51-53.

stabilized from the end of the fourteenth century.⁵⁶ From 1487, it was fixed at 1.15 *lire* for single-deck vessels and 3.5 *lire* for all others. Other occasional charges were: the *Introitus siverni Darsine*, paid by the ships stopping in the *Darsena* for protection during the winter months;⁵⁷ the tax on rigging, which affected the importation of rigging from Capo Corvo to Monaco, the boundaries of the coastal line of the Republic, with a tax of 4 *soldi* per *cantaro* (47.64 kg.); the *molagium*, introduced in 1487 and levied on all vessels entering the port of Genoa for the first time, with a tax of 25 *soldi* per 1,000 *cantari* (47,640 tons) of capacity.⁵⁸ With taxes came tax collectors, who patrolled in boats up to two miles out to sea to prevent fraud.⁵⁹

Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, despite the new tax increases, charges on vessels entering the port of Genoa did not exceed 1,500/2,000 *lire* annually.⁶⁰ Not even the increase of the *iactus navium* to 2 *lire* every 1,000 *cantari* (47,640 tons) in 1586, and the introduction of the payment of an annual tax for vessels of lesser capacity led to the financial balance.⁶¹ As already mentioned, these impositions were not sufficient to cover the costs of maintenance and expansion of the port.⁶² However, the Republic drained funds for the port from other sectors: extra-port revenues helped to balance the budget, keeping taxes on shipping carriers at a stable and relatively low level. The constant deficit and the habitual recourse to loans and levies on other assets suggests that the modest taxation responded to a precise strategy to channel Mediterranean traffic towards Genoa.⁶³

The value of goods imported annually by sea, and therefore their relative taxation, grew over time. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the value of incoming goods amounted to a total of about 8-10 million Genoese *lire*.⁶⁴ Port traffic generated income that flowed between *San Giorgio* to which, as we shall

⁵⁶ Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 22-23, 120-122.

⁵⁷ Massa, 'Fattori tecnici ed economici', 82-83.

⁵⁸ Grendi, 'Il traffico portuale', 312.

⁵⁹ Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 17, 115, 131. From 1533 the *Padri del Comune* handed this tax to the *Casa di San Giorgio*, following a formal agreement. See Desimoni, *Statuti Padri del Comune*, 211-214.

⁶⁰ Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 97.

⁶¹ Grendi, 'Il traffico portuale', 596-597.

⁶² Accounting records from 1412 are in ASCG, *Padri del Comune, scritture contabili* (262 registers, 1412-1812). See L. Saginati, *L'archivio storico del Comune di Genova*, Genoa, 1974, 5-53.

⁶³ See, for example, the resources available to the *Padri del Comune*, described in the following pages.

⁶⁴ Felloni 'Una fonte inesplorata', 49,52.

see, were entrusted various taxes, and the Republic, estimated at 600-800 thousand *lire* per year between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁶⁵

The system of taxation was substantially modified by the introduction of free port policies at the end of the sixteenth century. According to one of the best-known definitions given in an eighteenth-century dictionary, this term referred to:

a port where it is free to all merchants of any Nation to unload their goods, and to reload them when they have not been able to sell them, without paying any entry or exit fees [...].⁶⁶

The free port, although it was born to face contingent needs, was also a significant economic policy tool specially designed to turn the port into a trading centre for the redistribution of goods throughout the Mediterranean. The rules governing its activities were rather confused, and mostly driven by the need to respond to the policies implemented by other competing ports.⁶⁷ The Genoese government favoured above all the storage of goods in the port. Tax reductions were applied to specific types of goods, unlike other free ports such as the Livornese one, created to attract foreign merchants.⁶⁸

The stimulus to create the franchise in Genoa arose during the famine that affected much of the Mediterranean between 1590 and 1592.⁶⁹ The Republic, as previously observed, lacked suitable areas to guarantee a sufficient production of cereals and survived only thanks to abundant imports from Sicily, Provence and other areas of the Mediterranean.⁷⁰ According to the words of a

⁶⁵ Giaccherio, *Il Seicento*, 671-675

⁶⁶ “[...] un port où il est libre à tous marchands, de quelque Nation qu’ils soient, de décharger leurs marchandises, et de les en retirer lorsqu’ils ne les ont pu vendre, sans payer aucun droit d’entrée ni de sortie [...]”, P.L. Savary De Brûlons, J. Savary De Brûlons, *Dictionnaire Universel du Commerce*, III, Geneva, 1750 (1ed.1741), 309.

⁶⁷ L. Piccinno, A. Zanini, ‘Genoa: colonizing and colonized city? The port city as a pole of attraction for foreign merchants (16th-18th centuries)’, in G. Nigro ed., *Maritime networks as a factor in European integration*, Florence, 2019, 290. On the spread of the free port institution and its various functions, see A. Iodice, *Il porto franco, diffusione di un modello economico: politiche, attori, ideologie, mito. Due realtà a confronto: Genova e Marsiglia (1590-1817)*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Naples Federico II and University of Aix-Marseille, 2017; Iodice, ‘L’istituzione del porto franco’, 19-33.

⁶⁸ See Tazzara, *The free port of Livorno*; S. Fettah, *Les limites de la cite. Espace, pouvoir et société à Livourne au temps du port franc (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle)*, Rome, 2017.

⁶⁹ On the importance of the cereal trade and the increasing polarization of some regions of Europe, see S. Pelizzon, ‘Grain Flour, 1590-1790’, *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, 23/1, 2000, 87-195.

⁷⁰ According to an estimate by E. Grendi, out of 500,000 tons of grain necessary to feed the Republic with its 270,000 inhabitants in the middle of the sixteenth century, at least 350,000

memorial presented by some senators in 1606, already in 1568 and 1573 there had been “such a shortage of wheat that everyone was lost”.⁷¹ Supplies arrived in extremis, once from the Genoese possession of the Lomellini family of Tabarka, and once from Lombardy, allowed to avoid the famine.⁷² Another remedy was to temporarily decrease taxes on cereals arriving in the port.⁷³

The famine of the late sixteenth century was generalised across all the Mediterranean. With a decree of 11 August 1590, therefore, the *Collegi* issued a *portofranco delle vettovaglie* in the hope of attracting vessels loaded with cereals from all over Europe.⁷⁴ The decree promised a “portus immunis” to Christians and infidels for the supply of the city. Any vessel loaded for at least two thirds of cereals would have benefited of a general safe-conduct of the duration of one year:⁷⁵

On behalf of the Most Serene Doge and Most Excellent Lords Governors of the Most Serene Republic of Genoa, every person is hereby notified that the two Most Serene Colleges have, by their decrees of the 11 of August of the last past year and of the 28 of January of the present year, granted free port in the present City and in the entire Dominion to any ships and other vessels of Christians and Infidels of whatever quality which, within one year from the 11 of August, will bring into the present City and Dominion the said provisions. Provided that they have the two thirds of the entire load in wheat.⁷⁶

This legislation, rather than alleviating taxation on incoming ships, aimed to ensure the safety of shipmasters and merchants on board, while decreasing

tons were imported from abroad. See E. Grendi, ‘Il traffico portuale di Genova (1500-1700)’, in Grendi ed., *La Repubblica aristocratica*, 307-364.

⁷¹ “[...] in tanta penuria di grani che ognuno era smarrito”, Giacchero, *Origini e sviluppi*, 27-28.

⁷² On the ‘colonization’ of Tabarka between seventeenth and eighteenth century see Piccinno, *Un’ impresa fra terra e mare*; S. Boubaker, ‘Les génois de Tabarka et la Régence de Tunis au XVIIème siècle et au XVIIIème siècle’, in R. Belvederi ed., *Rapporti Genova-Mediterraneo-Atlantico nell’Età Moderna*, VII, Genoa, 1989, 275-295; A. Riggio, ‘Genovesi e tabarchini in Tunisia settecentesca’, *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, LXXI, 1948, 1-7.

⁷³ Kirk, *Genoa and the sea*, 6.

⁷⁴ ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 11/08/1590.

⁷⁵ This document was influenced by the customs reform issued in Livorno in 1566, see B. Mannini, ‘La riforma della dogana di Livorno del 1566’, *Studi livornesi*, 1, 1992, 65-107.

⁷⁶ “Per parte del Ser.mo Duce et Ecc.mi Sig.ri Governatori della Ser.ma Repubblica di Genova si notifica ad ogni persona qualmente i dua Ser.mi Collegi hanno per loro decreti fatti agli 11 di Agosto ultimamente passo et a 28 di Gennaro del presente anno, concesso porto franco così nella presente Città come in tutto il Dominio a qual si vogliano navi et altri navigli così de Cristiani come de Infedeli, et siano di che qualità si vogliano, che per lo spatio di un anno avvenire dopo il detto giorno 11 di Agosto condurranno nella presente Città e Dominio delle dette vettovaglie purché di abbiano le due terze parti di tutto il carrico loro rispettivamente [...]”. This text belongs to a decree of 1591 which summarized the first decree, in Latin, published on 11 August 1590. The 28 January 1591 decree extended the free port to the *Riviera*. See ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 12/02/1591.

taxes on landed cereals and exempting from taxation the unsold cereals re-exported by sea.⁷⁷

At the same time, diplomats were sent and agents and merchants were contacted abroad to privately negotiate the purchase of wheat to send to the Republic: the network of contacts of the Genoese diaspora allowed to mobilize resources on several fronts.⁷⁸ For example, the Senate sent Bartolomeo Cornaro to Provence and Languedoc to buy cereals. Once arrived, he collaborated with a Genoese merchant living there, Gio. Angelo Scorza.⁷⁹ Moreover, the Senate instructed Guglielmo Assereto in Florence and to Gio Batta Franchi in Naples to buy more cereals.⁸⁰ Even in the main Flemish marketplaces, in particular Antwerp and Hamburg, where many Genoese commercial and financial operators resided, they were asked to find the necessary provisions and to commit themselves to spreading the news of the free port.⁸¹ Other agents, such as Pier Battista Cattaneo in Madrid and the courtier Orazio Pallavicino in London, succeeded in obtaining from the monarchs of these countries the safe passage of vessels bound for Genoa with cereals.⁸²

The first free port decree of 1590 granted a one-year import duty exemption to vessels arriving in Genoa loaded with cereals in the capital, to facilitate re-exportation to the *Riviera*.⁸³ On 28 January 1591, however, the *sindaco* of La Spezia addressed the Senate asking for the free port to be granted to his city as

⁷⁷ The free port decree of 1595 was the first to officially establish customs exemptions on cereals: “Et così abbiamo risoluto concedere per cinque anni d’avvenire porto franco a tutti coloro che con navigli di maggior portata di mine trecento condurranno nel presente porto vettovaglie obbligate alla gabella del grano. In maniera che sia lecito a coloro ai quali spetteranno dettovaglie, o a cui d’esse havrà cura, stare in porto quanto gli accomoderà, et esse vettovaglie, o tutte o parte a piacer suo sbarcare in terra, e poi esse tutte, o scaricate o non scaricate portar per via di mare quanto più loro gusterà [...]”, in ASG, AS, *Propositionum* 1028, 09/04/1595. This model was followed in the subsequent decrees, as well.

⁷⁸ Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia*, 91. See also C. Brillì, M. Herrero Sanchez eds., *Italian merchants in the early-modern Spanish Monarchy: business relations, identities and political resources*, London/New York, 2017. Lo Basso, ‘Diaspora e armamento marittimo’, 137-155.

⁷⁹ Their mission failed due to the meddling of the Duke of Savoy Charles Emmanuel I, see Giacchero, *Origini e sviluppi*, 38-39.

⁸⁰ Giacchero, *Origini e sviluppi*, 54.

⁸¹ See D.H. Andersen, P. Pourchasse, ‘La navigation des flottes de l’Europe du nord vers la Méditerranée (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle)’, *Revue d’Histoire Maritime*, 13, 2011, 21-44.

⁸² On Cattaneo’s instructions see ASG, AS, Lettere ministri Spagna 2419, 12/09/1591. See V. Vitale, *Diplomatici e consoli della Repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1934, 83, 109, 166. On Pallavicino’s instructions, see ASG, AS, Litterarum ad principes et viros illustres 1868, 12/10/1591. See also L. Stone, *An Elizabethan. Sir Orazio Pallavicino*, Oxford, 1976.

⁸³ “[...] fuit portus immunis quibuscumque navibus et aliis navigis conducentibus et seu que condixerint durante anno praeterito victualia ad dictam Civitatem [...]”, ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 11/08/1590.

well: the same request came from the village of Arcola.⁸⁴ In the following days other centres such as Sarzana, Sestri Levante and Savona asked to trade freely with Livorno and Tuscany to quickly stock up on cereals. When the *Collegi* realized that the situation would not improve, on the 28 January 1591 they issued a decree, later reconfirmed on the 12 February.⁸⁵ The free port was granted to all the Republic's territories.⁸⁶ In order to spread the news, on the 28 January the Senate ordered captain Gio Delmar to patrol between La Spezia and Viareggio with a stock of printed bills promulgating the free port and licenses for access to the port. He was explicitly asked to approach those cereal vessels coming from the Netherlands, Hamburg, Danzig and other Northern ports, bound for Livorno or elsewhere, in order to persuade them to divert their precious cargoes to Genoa:

Our noble beloved, since we know that many ships from Holland, Hamburg, Danzig and the Low Countries loaded with provisions are destined for Italy and many for Livorno [...] we thought of sending you to search for them as we do [...].⁸⁷

The free port modified the fluxes of incoming and outgoing goods, introducing reductions and partial exemptions through decrees renewable from quinquennium to quinquennium or from decade to decade.⁸⁸ There was no exemption from the anchorage tax, paid at the time of landing. The exemptions concerned mainly the taxation of goods that remained on board. If they were landed and stored in warehouses, the foreign merchant could leave without paying anything for unsold goods. In the same decree there was a general safe-conduct towards *patroni*, sailors, merchants and other possible agents from “civil and criminal cases and public debts, with the exception only of the crime of

⁸⁴ ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 1591. The *sindaco* of La Spezia was probably subordinate to the *Podestà* in charge of the control of the city according to the laws of 1576, see Forcheri, *Doge e governatori*, 187.

⁸⁵ ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 12/02/1591.

⁸⁶ “[...] concesso porto franco così nella presente città come in tutto il dominio [...]”, in ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 12/02/1591.

⁸⁷ “Nobile diletto nostro, poi che sappiamo che molte navi di Olanda, Amburgh et di Anzich et paesi bassi cariche di vettovaglie sono destinate per l'Italia et molte con divisa destinate a Livorno [...] habbiamo pensato di mandarvi in busca a esse si como facciamo [...]”, in ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 09/02/1591.

⁸⁸ Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia*, 146.

offence to human or divine majesty”.⁸⁹ On the 2 August 1591, however, a new edict limited the benefits of the free port to the capital alone.⁹⁰

The results of this policy for the supply of wheat were evident: in just a few months in 1592 about two hundred ships arrived in the city, many of which from Danzig and Lübeck, with a cargo of about 36,000 tons of cereals.⁹¹ In 1593 limits of origin were introduced for vessels, beyond which the facilities of the free port would be granted. Only vessels coming from beyond the Strait of Gibraltar, for example, would be admitted free of charge and on the condition to have at least half of their hold full of cereals. Due to the difficulty of operating efficient controls on smaller vessels, the exemption was also limited to those with a capacity of more than 300 *mine* (27.3 tons).⁹² Towards vessels arriving from the East, the limits were more variable: to contrast the competition from Livorno, the renewals of the edicts moved the limits to Liguria, Lazio or Sicily.⁹³ With frequent variations with regard to the geographical limits, this system characterized the Genoese free port throughout its existence.⁹⁴

It was only in 1609 that the Senate ordered the creation of a general free port, extending the existing measures to almost all goods that transited through Genoa, with the exception of those coming from other ports of the Republic.⁹⁵ The debates to define the free port as an ordinary administrative and commercial tool had already begun in 1607, when the cereal shortage eased. The suspension of payments by the Spanish crown and the desire to enter new

⁸⁹ ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 12/02/1591.

⁹⁰ ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 02/08/1591.

⁹¹ See A. Roccatagliata, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova dall'anno 1581 all'anno 1607*, Genoa, 1873, 158.

⁹² Giacchero, *Economia e società*, 17.

⁹³ The words West (*Ponente*) and East (*Levante*) are often employed when referring to Genoese territories West or East of Genoa. Even the Livorno customs reform of 1566, which had laid the foundations of the future Tuscan free port, had indicated the limits of origin of the goods in order to exclude the port of Genoa: “Tutte le mercanzie et robe ché sopra mare fuori delle cento miglia verranno in detto porto di Livorno, et in quello si scaricheranno, et che per ponente da Genova et per mezzodi da Corsica, et da indi in là, non havendo tocco da detti luoghi al porto di Livorno altro porto che di Livorno [...]. Si possino in detta terra di Livorno et porto tenere un anno [...] si possino per i detti padroni rinavicar fuori de' supradetti termini delle cento miglia senza pagamento d'alcuna gabella [...]”, see M. Baruchello, *Livorno e il suo porto. Origini, caratteristiche e vicende dei traffici livornesi*, Livorno, 1932, 124-125. In the Genoese decree of 1592 Gibraltar was the western limit. The eastern limits were more variable. The edict of 1609, for example, excluded the territories between Liguria and Rome, see ASG, AS, Propositionum 1030, 03/06/1609.

⁹⁴ The dismantling of the *Banco di San Giorgio* in 1799 led to the closure of the free port and the sale of the warehouses to repay creditors. It was reopened in 1805 when the Napoleonic Empire conquered Genoa and closed again after the fall of Napoleon. It resumed regular operations only from 2 May 1814 when the Savoy Kingdom annexed the Republic, see A. Brusa, *Dal portofranco della Repubblica genovese al deposito franco dei giorni nostri*, Milan, 1953, 152-162.

⁹⁵ ASG, AS, Propositionum 1030, 12/02/1613.

supply circuits also played an important role in the configuration of the new rules. The general free port was born, therefore, also as an instrument to ensure a commercial alternative to the ties with the Iberian monarchy, as well as for contingent circumstances. It gradually evolved into long-term state economic policy.

Shipmasters were required to deliver the bill of lading of their goods in order to enjoy the exemption and access to the warehouses. Moreover, they had to pay a *sigurtà* - a 'security' - of 2,000 *scudi* to discourage re-exports to Livorno: in case the shipmaster had re-embarked all the goods and had brought them to Livorno, in fact, he would have lost his *sigurtà*. If a shipmaster, however, had gone to Livorno and then returned to Genoa and resumed his business without having sold the cargo in Tuscany, he could regain his *sigurtà* regularly.⁹⁶ The free port for cereals survived separately from the general one, with its own regulations and geographical limits. Goods could be transhipped from ship to ship by paying a 1% tax as opposed to the ordinary 7%. On land, they could be stored for six months by paying 3%, while the remaining 4% would be paid only in case of sale for domestic consumption.⁹⁷

From 1618 the *Casa di San Giorgio*, whose functioning will be illustrated later, obtained the management of the free port in agreement with the government. The *Casa di San Giorgio* was a semi-private body made up of Genoese patricians to which the Republic turned to when it needed capital, entrusting in return the collection of specific taxes and duties.⁹⁸ For this reason, *San Giorgio* had an interest in almost every aspect of the state's fiscal policies. The interests of *San Giorgio* and of the businessman to whom the collection of taxes was sold almost coincided: the *gabellieri* were assured compensation for lost revenue due to facilitation or exemption of payments. The *Casa di San Giorgio*, on the other hand, dealt with the drafting of decrees and the application of rules, with wide decision-making power.⁹⁹

The regulation of 1618 attempted to formulate simpler and more liberal rules than the previous ones. For example, if a vessel had arrived in Genoa after a

⁹⁶ Giaccherio, *Origini e sviluppi*, 95-96.

⁹⁷ There were specific treatments based on the origin of the ships or the operations undergone by the goods (disembarkation, transfer, etc.); prices and tariffs varied from one decree to the next; direct navigation to the port of Genoa was favoured without intermediate stops; privileges were extended under different conditions to both vessels and people. See Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 228-229.

⁹⁸ See G. Felloni ed., *La Casa di San Giorgio: il potere del credito*, Genoa, 2006.

⁹⁹ Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 227. See also Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea*, 168.

stop in a port excluded from the franchise, it could still sell the goods originally loaded in the regions beyond the territorial limits.¹⁰⁰ Goods could be unloaded and stored for 18 months without paying any other fees, except for storage. In case of sale, they would have been subject to a 2% fee. If, as a result of a transaction, they were taken out of the Republic, they would have paid a 6% toll, only half of the tax on goods leaving the country by land. These facilitations tended, therefore, to favour the stay in the port of Genoa and its role as a redistributive emporium.

In the renewal of 1623, there was a more organic regulation and a true declaration of '*Portofranco libero, generale e generalissimo*', with the elimination of the *sigurtà* and the unification of the two free ports.¹⁰¹ Only a few categories of goods were subject to an absolute ban on duty-free entry, such as easily inflammable goods like tobacco or greasy wool.¹⁰²

The number of foreign vessels which ensured most of the exchanges, also with nearby Livorno, increased considerably starting from the first decade of the seventeenth century. According to Claudio Costantini, this increase was symptomatic of the widespread smuggling carried out by small cabotage vessels: it led to new requests for abolition of the privileges of the minor ports.¹⁰³ The free port, if on the one hand did nothing but further strengthen the hegemony of Genoa on the region, on the other hand it also tried to foster an integrated exchange structure with other centres in the Republic. For example, starting from 1653 the *Collegi* launched a policy of lowering customs taxes in Savona, the objective of which was to strengthen re-export towards the *Riviera*. Goods arriving to Savona by sea could continue overland towards Piedmont and Monferrat.¹⁰⁴ These attempts were frequent throughout the seventeenth

¹⁰⁰ ASG, AS, Propositionum 1032, 29/01/1618. For the results of these new rules, see ASG, SG, ms. 75, 1618-1619.

¹⁰¹ The spatial limits within which the goods were excluded from the exemption remained in force, Antibes in the West and Viareggio in the East. In each decree the expiry date remained ten years. The renewals were decided within these periods. The two free port would be separated again in the free port of 1653, see Giacchero, *Origini e sviluppi*, 119.

¹⁰² ASG, SG, ms. 82, 11/02/1623. Greasy wools are wools that have not yet been washed or otherwise cleaned. These goods had to be unloaded in the warehouses of the *Molo*, except for 'Brazil' tobacco, which could be brought into the free port. On this type of tobacco see U. Rossi, *I tabacchi greggi italiani*, Milan, 1937. Other excluded goods were olive oil, which had to be deposited in special warehouses in Sampierdarena; spirits; rum; liqueurs, destined for the *gabelle* warehouses or the one in Sampierdarena; books and prints, which could only enter the free port in special warehouses.

¹⁰³ Costantini, *La repubblica di Genova*, 326.

¹⁰⁴ See the report presented by Francesco Maria Sauli and Niccolò De Mari on 26 June 1686, transcribed in Assereto, 'Porti e scali minori', 245, note 62. Savona obtained a minor concession in the free port edict of 1646. This edict allowed to receive freely the vessels inferior to 1,200

century and beyond. In addition, also because of the rivalry with Livorno, from the second half of the seventeenth century there were projects for a free port in La Spezia which could compete with the Tuscan port and work in synergy with the one in Genoa.¹⁰⁵ Fear of stimulating new competition, however, led the *Collegi* to slow down and eventually abandon this project.¹⁰⁶

Alongside the development of the free port and the debates on the management of maritime trade, the state's financial commitment to the management of the port increased during the seventeenth century. This phenomenon can be observed not only in the massive works of modernization and expansion of port facilities, but also in the increase of taxes on shipping, in line with what was happening in other Italian ports.¹⁰⁷ In 1638, in particular, a reform of the taxation system was passed which simplified the taxation criteria and remained in force until the fall of the Republic.¹⁰⁸ This reform unified the taxes imposed on vessels, grouping them into a single anchorage tax, diversified on the basis of their capacity.¹⁰⁹ This reform, as will be seen in the next Chapter, also made changes in Average procedures. As of this year, shipmasters suddenly ceased to declare the capacity of their vessels.¹¹⁰ The average annual revenue increased from 3,876.6 *lire* in the 1628-1637 period, to 20,954.3.11 *lire* in the following decade.¹¹¹ The revenue from the aforementioned tax on smaller vessels, although managed under contract, passed in the same period from 575.12.6 *lire* to 1,182.19.8 *lire*. In the same way, the recourse of the *Padri del Comune* to external loans decreased: the most relevant and constant loan, until that moment, had been the ordinary contribution paid by the *Casa di San Giorgio* annually, which began to decrease

cantari (57,168 kg.) of capacity and with goods coming from beyond the limits of the free port coming from Livorno or Marseille, see BCB, *Portofranco, misc. Genovese*, 1646.

¹⁰⁵ Giaccherio, *Origini e sviluppi*, 59-71. The first project, however, dated back to 1592, see ASG, AS, Propositionum 1028, 20/02/1592, 27/02/1592.

¹⁰⁶ The vote on this project in 1703 ended in the second round with 10 votes in favour and 12 against, see ASG, AS, Portofranco 1011, 27/06/1703.

¹⁰⁷ The port of Venice, for example, had increased anchorage fees by almost 50% as early as 1581 and they were further doubled by the end of the seventeenth century, see F.C. Lane, *Le navi di Venezia fra i secoli XIII e XVI*, Turin, 1983, 29, 39-40.

¹⁰⁸ See Grendi, 'I nordici e il traffico', 48-49.

¹⁰⁹ The tax was calculated on the basis of the tonnage of the vessels: only 4 *lire* per year for vessels with a capacity of less than 50 Genoese *salme* (9.5 tons); 8 *denari* per *salma* on vessels with a capacity between 50 and 800 Genoese *salme* (9.5-152.4 tons); 1 *soldo* and 6 *denari* per *salma* on vessels with a capacity of more than 800 Genoese *salme* (152.4 tons).

¹¹⁰ See ASG, NG 2084, 1640.

¹¹¹ This tribute increased from 16,000 annual *lire* in the period 1623-1644 to 8,937.10 *lire* in the period 1645-1656. See Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 178.

from 1645.¹¹² For the first time in two centuries, there was a sharp increase in revenue.¹¹³

However, the virtuous cycle was short-lived. From 1669, the anchorage fee was also farmed out, leading to a reduction in its revenue. The withdrawal of *San Giorgio* from the contribution to port expenses since 1682, following the increased autonomous funding and the plague epidemic that had decreased traffic and therefore the income of the *Padri del Comune*, led to abandon the policy of modernization and expansion of infrastructure and to concentrate only on modest works of extension and restoration of existing structures.¹¹⁴ Finally, the French bombardment of 1684 damaged port facilities and reduced traffic, so that between the end of the seventeenth century and 1751 there was a return to a chronic situation of budget deficit.¹¹⁵

2.3 Management and Organization of the Port Area

Port maintenance and expansion are closely related to the financial availability of the state and, therefore, to the related taxation policies. The complex articulation of a port's infrastructure is the result of the needs of economic operators and actors whose interests depended on its efficiency. Docks, lighthouses and warehouses are as important as the institutions and operating rules that made the loading, unloading and entry of ships as quick and efficient as possible.¹¹⁶ In Genoa, the available space in the port area became an increasingly valuable resource, especially after the establishment of the free port, to the point that, according to Ennio Poleggi, it was “a life-or-death motive that forces the ruling classes to perform actual urban planning acrobatics, as well as rapid programmatic and financial choices”.¹¹⁷

¹¹² Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 178.

¹¹³ 18 balance sheets closed with a deficit and 26 with a surplus between 1638 and 1681. See Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 178-179.

¹¹⁴ From this phase on, the investments and expanses would fall only on the *Padri del Comune*. They concentrated their resources on the maintenance of the port apparatus.

¹¹⁵ Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 101; Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 180.

¹¹⁶ See A. Polónia, ‘European seaports in the Early Modern Age: concepts, methodology and models of analysis’, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 80, 2010, 17-39.

¹¹⁷ “Una ragione di vita o di morte che costringe i ceti di governo a vere e proprie acrobazie urbanistiche, oltre che a rapide scelte programmatiche e finanziarie”, Poleggi, ‘La costruzione della città’, 8.

In the first half of the seventeenth century, the port hosted about 1,500 vessels per year, with a capacity between 12 and 71.5 tons.¹¹⁸ The port could accommodate at the same time about 130 vessels, according to its administrators, although there were accidents due to overcrowding or to the winds, especially the *libeccio* (SW) wind.¹¹⁹ In the first two-thirds of the seventeenth century, an average of 5 vessels over 71.5 tons and 34 smaller vessels arrived weekly, without significant seasonal variations. The port entrance was large and sufficiently safe even during storms or night time:

The port of Genoa is state of the art and very good for vessels, [...]. The entrance of this port is very large, being between the edges of a pier and the other the distance of a small Italian mile. He who wishes to enter this port by day may do so freely, paying attention to what he sees. And if he enters at night, he will have to orient himself by means of the above-mentioned light, which he will leave on his left a musket shot. And if, by bad luck, he enters during a storm, and you are discovered during the day, then you will have a fire to guide you above the edge of the *Molo Vecchio* [on the right], so that by navigating between the light and the fire you will be able to enter happily without collisions.¹²⁰

Between loading and unloading operations, frequent *stallie*,¹²¹ or simply slow commercial negotiations, the time spent in port could vary widely.¹²² In the harbour there were dozens of small boats that were responsible for transshipping and unloading ashore the cargoes of the ships that remained at anchor when there were no free docks or sufficient draught: at the end of the seventeenth

¹¹⁸ Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 20.

¹¹⁹ ASCG, ms. 58, Miscellanea di memorie genovesi, 1678-1679, 152 v, in Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 152.

¹²⁰ "Il porto di Genova è fatto dall'arte et è buonissimo per navi, [...]. L'entrata di questo porto è molto ampia, essendo fra le punte di un molo e l'altro di distanza di uno picciolo miglio italiano. Colui che vorrà entrare di giorno in questo porto potrà farlo liberamente, guardandosi da quello che vede. E se di notte, doverà governarsi con il fanale sudetto, il quale lascerà alla sinistra un tiro di moschetto. E se per mala sorte venisse con un tempo fortunale, e che di giorno vi habbiano discoperto, all'hora haverete per guida un fuoco sopra la punta del molo vecchio, acciò che voi navigando fra il fanale et il fuoco sudetto possiate felicemente entrare in meta di questi senza incontrare", G.B. Della Rovere, *Prima parte dello specchio del mare*, Genoa, 1664, 63.

¹²¹ *Stallia* is a nautical term that refers to the amount of days spent in port to carry out loading or unloading. According to Carlo Targa's definition, "Stallia, dico non esser altro, che un termine di dimora, così denominato à stando o volontaria o forzosa, che può commettere tanto il Padron di Vascello in ricevere il carico quanto il Noleggiatore in darglielo in pregiudizio o dell'uno o dell'altro rispettivamente", see Targa, *Ponderationi*, 165. For the current definition of this term, see P. Todd, *Contracts for the carriage of Goods by Sea*, Oxford, 1988, 88.

¹²² If the unloading and loading of goods could take a 'short' time, between five/six and ten days, unforeseen events or obstacles could extend the stops by months. Examples of the extra costs incurred in these cases result from the analysis of Average reports.

century these service boats were about 120-130 units.¹²³ A labour force of around 1,000 to 1,300 people between the mid-sixteenth and mid-eighteenth centuries worked between the docks and the warehouses. These men represented about 10% of the urban total workforce.¹²⁴ About 300-400 men were employed only for the warehouses of the *Annona* (provisions) and those of the free port. The high level of trade and the large number of individuals involved determined logistical, administrative and financial needs that fostered the need for an accurate port administration.

In Genoa all roads, instead of going towards the cathedral or the government palace, are oriented towards the port or the docks.¹²⁵ The characteristic shape of the port was formed from the fourteenth century and did not undergo significant changes during the fifteenth century.¹²⁶ Between 1550 and the first half of the seventeenth century, on the other hand, Genoa underwent not only a profound restructuring from an administrative/institutional point of view, but also the modernization or enlargement of the entire port area.¹²⁷ The port, with all the loading and docking docks arranged in a radial pattern, was surrounded by a line of buildings called *ripa* that stretched for almost a kilometre, from the Piazza del Molo to the gate of Santa Fede (see [Map 2.1](#)).¹²⁸ This line physically separated the space of the port from that of the activities connected to it and from the great patrician palaces behind. In the buildings arranged along the *ripa* were the stores of coopers, oar-makers, sailmakers, merchants and cartographers. Behind the *ripa* were the three public markets of the city: San Giorgio, San Pietro della Porta or Banchi, and Soziglia.¹²⁹

¹²³ Other individuals not registered in the *Arti* of the 'minolli', 'nocchieri' or 'marinai' could work with these vessels, see Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 141. On the assistance to vessels during disembarkation see also Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 134-178.

¹²⁴ Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia*, 88,95.

¹²⁵ Massa, *Lineamenti di Storia economica*, 101.

¹²⁶ Massa, 'Fattori tecnici ed economici', 41-42.

¹²⁷ For example, the warehouse system underwent a vigorous expansion between 1550 and 1650. The three *darsene* were also completely renovated between 1573 and 1648, see F. Podestà, *Il porto di Genova*, Genoa, 1913, 95, 98, 254-259.

¹²⁸ Poleggi, 'La costruzione della città portuale', 9.

¹²⁹ Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 19.

Image 2.1 the city of Genoa



Source: T. Salmon, *La città di Genova, capitale del genovesato in Italia*, 1751

In the same area were located the main lodges of merchants, foreigners and not.¹³⁰ Until the beginning of the sixteenth century, the main maintenance interventions were aimed at the rebuilding in stone of the main docks.¹³¹

The main dock, called *Molo Vecchio*, delimited the basin on the eastern side and offered partial protection from *libeccio* wind.¹³² In the western part of the basin was a promontory called Capo di Faro.¹³³ On it stood (and still stands) the lighthouse tower, used for signalling to vessels, in which burned an oil lamp, and iconic structure in all illustrations and descriptions of the port of Genoa known as 'La Lanterna'.¹³⁴ As reported by the annalist Agostino Giustiniani, who described the port in 1535, six docks branched off from the bank, whose names derived from the patrician families who lived near each of them or from the function that they covered: the first one, near the *Molo Vecchio*, was called *Piazzalunga*, later called *Cattanei*; the second one, *Coltellieri* or *Vino* dock, later called *Chiavari*; the third one, the *Legne* dock, later called *Mercanzia* dock; the fourth one was the *Pedaggio* dock, located next to the Customs building, near the Mint; finally, there were the *Spinola* and *Calvi* docks, the latter also called

¹³⁰ E. Pandiani, 'Le arti intorno al porto nell'età di Andrea Doria', in G. Barni, F. Ruffini eds, *Il porto di Genova nella mostra di palazzo San Giorgio*, Milan, 1953, 21-214.

¹³¹ See A. Boato, 'Dalle cave ai cantieri: il mercato dei materiali lapidei a Genova in età medievale e moderna alla luce delle fonti d'archivio', *Archeologia Postmedievale*, 17, 2013, 21-32.

¹³² Massa, 'Fattori tecnici ed economici', 56.

¹³³ See D. Roscelli, *La Lanterna di Genova: le torri del mare*, Genoa, 1991.

¹³⁴ On the iconic role of the lighthouse tower, see G. Giubbini ed., *Genova nelle vecchie stampe*, Genoa, 1970; E. Poggi, *Iconografia di Genova e delle riviere*, Genoa, 1976.

Calcina dock.¹³⁵ Each dock had its own station for the tax collectors. The toponymy of the docks recalled once again the importance of maritime trade for the main patrician families of the city and their interests in this traffic. These same families were often among the recipients of the goods, as can be seen from the bills of lading present also in the Average documentation.¹³⁶

Following the rebuilding in masonry of the main docks and the erection of the fortified port walls, completed between 1633 and 1635, a masonry quay was built along the coast which, creating a continuous road system, connected the two ends of the port to facilitate the transit of goods.¹³⁷

Some spaces within the basin were used for occasional drydocking and minor repairs, such as the area of Boccadebò, *macello del Molo*, San Marco, Marina di Sarzano and San Pier d'Arena, outside the urban area.¹³⁸ There were also two *darsene* for the protection of vessels in case of bad weather: the *darsena delle barche*, or *del vino*, used for vessels dedicated to cabotage, and the *darsena delle galere*. The latter was used as a refuge for merchant vessels and warships.¹³⁹ Finally, there was an *arsenale* for the construction and repair of galleys. It is good to remember, however, that the Republic in naval conflicts used mainly fleets made with vessels rented from private shipowners, while the shipbuilding activity was distributed along the *Riviera*.¹⁴⁰

The public warehouses were among the most important structures. Over the period, they were the object of significant works of enlargement and maintenance. Between some of the docks and the *ripa* there were public warehouses for the conservation of foodstuffs (called *rebe* or *clape*). From the name itself it is possible to deduce the goods that were intended, as for the

¹³⁵ A. Giustiniani, *Castigatissimi annali*, 14r-14v. See Massa, 'Fattori tecnici ed economici', 56.

¹³⁶ An interesting example concerns the GA of the ship *Il mercante di Dover* and his shipmaster, the Englishman Guglielmo Segent. Although there were several merchants involved, the main interested party in the ship's cargo was the Genoese patrician Francesco Spinola. He was the owner of a batch of sugar for which he appealed against the procedure. See ASG, NG 2084, 1640. Recorded in the *AveTransRisk* database as the id50272.

¹³⁷ The first 500 metres of the port road were built between 1583 and 1601, while the remaining 180 metres were completed between 1633 and 1640. These works were followed by a further enlargement, financed by *San Giorgio*, between 1641 and 1643, see Podestà, *Il porto di Genova*, 136-140.

¹³⁸ Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 22.

¹³⁹ G.A. Nanni, 'La Darsena del Comune', in Barni, Ruffini eds., *Il porto di Genova*, 107-119.

¹⁴⁰ See E. Poleggi, 'L'arsenale della Repubblica di Genova', in E. Concina ed., *Arsenali e città nell'Occidente europeo*, Rome, 1987, 83-96. Since 1503 it would have been sold to private shipowners in exchange for an annual fee. Part of the structure collapsed in 1590 and it was totally rebuilt in the following years. See Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 168; Poleggi, 'L'arsenale della repubblica', 83-84.

legumes *raiba*, the oil *clapa*, the fish *clapa* and the wheat *raiba*.¹⁴¹ There were twenty-two warehouses in 1550 only for salt, to which others were added in the course of the following century. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the *Casa di San Giorgio* owned 33 warehouses in the port area, including the free port warehouses, an overall increase of 69.3% of their volume compared to a century earlier.¹⁴² For wine, initially stored in cellars or in small warehouses rented by private individuals near the homonymous dock, four big public warehouses were reserved in the half of the seventeenth century.¹⁴³ Also for oil, between the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century, new warehouses were reserved inside the Ducal Palace, which reached in 1626 a capacity of more than 9,000 hectolitres.¹⁴⁴ No less important was the expansion of the wheat warehouses, in particular as a result of free port regulations and the need to redistribute the provisions that arrived in Genoa to supply the territories of the Spanish crown. Between 1565 and 1633, the warehouses could store more than 9,000 tons of wheat.¹⁴⁵

The management of the free port forced a revision of the criteria with which the warehouses for the most valuable goods in *colli* were located in the city. From simple storage rooms while waiting for the completion of customs formalities, these spaces had to become buildings capable of hosting a large quantity of goods for significantly longer periods of time. Moreover, in order to avoid smuggling, spaces needed to be well separated from the urban areas and easy to monitor. From 1609 the old granary warehouses near the *San Giorgio* palace were used, but these had to be expanded a few years later.¹⁴⁶ During the seventeenth century, these spaces formed an enclosed complex consisting of 211 warehouses, permanently rented to private individuals or 'public', all managed by *San Giorgio*.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹ The word *reba* or *rayba* indicated a public warehouse with a square generally situated in front of a market; the term *clapa* or *chiappa* indicated instead the place where the fish or oil market was situated, see Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 20-21.

¹⁴² Podestà, *Il porto di Genova*, 62, 149.

¹⁴³ Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 155-156.


¹⁴⁴ Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 157.

¹⁴⁵ G. Costamagna, 'I magazzini del magistrato del sale e del magistrato dell'abbondanza nel porto', in Barni, Ruffini eds., *Il porto di Genova*, 167.

¹⁴⁶ The area grew from 1,700 square metres in 1609 to 3,700 in 1651 and 6,000 in 1675, see Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 157.

¹⁴⁷ See A. Brusa, *Il portofranco della repubblica Genovese. Basi storiche e geografiche*, Genoa, 1948. On the rents paid for the warehouses in the free port see Piccinno, Zanini, 'Genoa: colonizing and colonized city?', 281-296.

Map 2.1 Genoa and its port in the seventeenth century



Source: my elaboration based on a map by P. Barberi, *Genova antica e dintorni*, Milan, 1974

There were two doors of entry and exit, one towards the sea and one towards the city. The goods were unloaded near the *Mercanzia* dock or the *Mandraccio*, in order to be transported from the porters in the free warehouses or in other

buildings in case of lack of space.¹⁴⁸ Between 1644 and 1645, another warehouse was added to these spaces in the western part of the port, where before stood the ancient hospital of *San Lazzaro*.¹⁴⁹

Beyond the proper use of infrastructure, one of the main concerns regarding the management of the Genoese port complex in the early modern period was the depth of the seabed. The increase in vessels' capacity, and therefore in the draught, from the middle of the sixteenth century had made this an urgent problem.¹⁵⁰ Ensuring a sufficient draught in all areas of the harbour would have allowed to speed up docking operations and to avoid accidents and collisions between ships stationed in the port. However, the techniques for dredging the seabed used in Genoa were antiquated, so that the work of digging and maintaining the minimum depth was constant between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹⁵¹ On the 23 July 1601 *Doge* Agostino Doria intervened with an ordinance which ordered, without success, to keep the seabed at a depth of 4.96 metres.¹⁵² In 1680, for example, the depth between *Molo Vecchio* and *Mandraccio* in some points decreased from 5.5 to 2.6 metres.¹⁵³ In the central area of the port, there was a crest called *cavallo* which posed a constant threat to the larger ships that waited in the port bay during unloading.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 226. The *Mandraccio* was the area between the *Molo Vecchio* and the *ripa*, an area that enclosed the entire port in the early medieval period.

¹⁴⁹ Brusa, *Dal portofranco della Repubblica*, 145. The enlargement of the free port warehouses would have been the most important enterprise carried out during the eighteenth century in the port area.

¹⁵⁰ Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 143-144. The increase in the capacity of vessels in this period was a common phenomenon in the main Mediterranean ports and not only, see G.F. Bass, *A history of seafaring based on underwater technology*, London, 1972. F.C. Lane, for example, confirmed this trend for Venice, see F.C. Lane, *Le navi di Venezia*, 1983, 16, 20, 224, 287, 295, 304, 306. In the seventeenth century the port of Marseille was also visited by vessels with a draft of 5 metres or more, compared to 3.5/4 of the galleys and smaller vessels used in previous centuries. See L. Bergasse, G. Rambert, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille*, IV, de 1599 à 1799, Paris, 1954.

¹⁵¹ In the comparative examination of the dredging systems used in Livorno, Venice, Corfu and Genoa made by B. Crescenzo, Genoa is in last place. In Genoa, small flat-bottomed boats were used on which the materials removed were piled up using hoes, while workers had to dive each time to remove the stones from the seabed. See B. Crescenzo, *Nautica mediterranea*, Rome, 1607, 543-544. Only in the second half of the seventeenth century was there a shift to mechanical devices like the *bette*, see Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 164.

¹⁵² Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 145. Even this depth was insufficient if one considers that in the major European ports, in order to allow the docking of the largest vessels, it was estimated that the depths should be between 8.93 and 10.42 metres, see Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 163.

¹⁵³ W. Borghesi, *Il Mediterraneo tra due rivoluzioni nautiche (secoli XIV-XVII)*, Florence, 1976, 51.

¹⁵⁴ On 15 February 1670, for example, the patron Gio Battista Torello of Sestri Levante moored his vessel in the harbour. The waves during the night made the vessel hit the seabed several times, until it broke its keel, causing it to partially sink. See ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 86, 19/02/1670, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the ID50719.

Finally, another pressing problem was the safety of the basin with respect to the Northern Tyrrhenian Sea's winds and currents. In particular, storms could give rise to dangerous accidents in the port itself of which we find traces in Average documents. A significant accident occurred in the port on Easter Sunday 1640 to the English vessel *Il Mercante di Dover*, coming from Cartagena. As can be seen from the declaration of shipmaster William Segent, in the course of 4 hours a *libeccio* storm tore the moorings of several vessels in the bay and at the docks. They ended up colliding with each other, with much damage and the consequent filing of multiple GAs:

[...] after having arrived in the present port, Sunday past 8 of the present morning, a storm of south-westerly wind arose, and a very heavy sea that lasted four hours in its greatest fury. It caused four ships that were moored in said port to tear their shore moorings. So they went away from their moorings, and with a great force on my ropes, which were underneath, they sawed off two of them. Then another Flemish ship moored on the right side of my ship named *Il Romano*, and another Flemish ship named *Il Sole*, moored on the left side, having also torn off part of their anchorages by the force of the wind and the sea, were pushed on me, hitting my ship for a long time with great damage. Having ripped two ropes, broken in pieces a small anchor, damaged the major anchor to the point that it will cost more than 200 *soldi* to redo it, being in weight 22 *cantari* [1,048 kg.], and with the continuous beatings of said ships I have broken 2 hatches of the artillery, bypassed the artillery and broken the stairs, broken the stern gallery and all this has cost the ship and has greatly damaged beyond the damage caused to me in the rigging. And if I had not prevented this disaster by having hung out of my ship many woollen sacks, with which I resisted with less damage to the blows of said two ships, it can be doubted that my ship together with all the goods and merchandise would have been shipwrecked, for the salvation of which I also had to cut the cable that I had at the prow since the sea continually pushed it against me at the ropes. And if I had not done so, he would have sawn them off, showing that of all the said damage he claims, emendation and reparation, as well as of the expenses made for the said account, et hoc est [...].¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ “[...] dopo esser giunto nel presente porto, domenica passata 8 del presente alla mattina, si levò una tempesta di vento lebechio, et mare grossissimo che durò quattro hore incirca nella sua maggior furia, che causò che quattro navi che erano in detto porto ormeggiate strappassero gli ormeggi di terra. Con che si allontanarono dal loro posto e facendo gran forza alle mie gumine che li erano sotto ne segarono due. Poi un'altra nave fiamminga ormeggiata dalla banda dritta della mia nave nominata *Il Romano*, et un'altra pur fiamminga nominata *Il Sole*, ormeggiata dalla banda sinistra, havendo strappato anch'esse parte delli loro ormeggi dalla forza del vento e del mare si furono spente addosso, urtando in detta mia nave per buon spazio di tempo con grandissimo danno di essa. Havendomi fatto strappare due gumine, rotto in pezzi un'ancora piccola, guasto l'ancora maggiore a segno che costerà il rifarla più di soldi 200 essendo in peso cantara 22, e con le continue percosse di dette navi mi hanno rotto 2 portelli della artiglieria, scavalcato l'artiglieria e rotto li scaloni rotto la galleria di poppa e tutto il costato detta nave e grandemente dannificato oltre il danno causatomi nella sartia. E se non avessi prevenuto questo disastro con far appendere fuori dalla detta mia nave molti sacchi di lana, con le quali si resisteva con minor danno alle percosse di dette due navi, si può dubitare che la mia

The most important structural intervention to avoid these accidents was the realization of the *Molo Nuovo*. It was initially conceived as a breakwater for the protection of the port from the *libeccio* winds.¹⁵⁶ The work, carried out according to the project of Ansaldo de Mari with the contribution of the Republic, *San Giorgio* and private subscribers, was almost entirely completed between 1638 and 1643 with an initial financing of 2 million Genoese *lire*.¹⁵⁷ The intervention significantly increased the port's functionality, bringing it to have about 3,000 linear metres of docks suitable for mooring, a larger area than, for example, the competing ports of Livorno and Marseille.¹⁵⁸ Even sixteenth century's *portolani* reported how the construction of the *Molo Nuovo* significantly improved the safety of the port of Genoa for the moored vessels:

If you come to moor at the port of Genoa in a *libeccio* storm, or if bad weather threatens you from that direction, do it this way: come close to the distance of a ship's hull, and after you have passed it, being ready to set the *mezzana* sail, follow the wind, coasting along the *Molo Nuovo* at a distance of half a barrel, and less than that, while you don't have any vessels at the bow to hinder you. When you get almost to the middle of the *Molo*, drop an anchor from the left side of the bow and then from the right side, with a winch. Lay out your moorings on the *Molo*, securing yourselves against the columns with good ropes, so that you will be in a better position than at the *Molo Vecchio*, since there is not so much backwash.¹⁵⁹

insieme con tutte le robe e merci havesse naufragato, per salvezza delle quali mi convenne anco tagliar il cavo ad una piatta che avevo per prora per quanto che il mare me la spingeva continuamente addosso alle gumine. E se non havessi ciò fatto me le avrebbe segate, manifestando che di tutto detto danno ne pretende, emenda e refacimento, come anco delle spese fatte per detto conto, et hoc est [...]", ASG, NG 2084, 09/04/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* database as the id50272.

¹⁵⁶ It is famous, for example, the painting of the *libeccciata* of 11 November 1613, which damaged or sank most of the vessels in the western part of the harbour, the one most exposed to the south-westerly winds. See J. Furtenbach, *Newes Itinerarium Italiae*, Hildesheim, 1627, 203.

¹⁵⁷ It is the main investment in the port in the early modern period. The *Molo Nuovo* was a 446.4-meter-long breakwater resting on an artificial reef, at a height of 7.4 metres above sea level, see Podestà, *Il porto di Genova*, 292-294.

¹⁵⁸ That square meterage was divided between 1,290 metres for the piers and the *Molo Vecchio*, 870 metres for the docks along the coast and 840 metres for the docks within the three *darsene*, see Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 150-151. Livorno's and Marseille's meterage were respectively lower of 33% (2,000 m) and of 43% (1,700 m), see D. Matteoni, *Livorno*, Bari, 1985, 43,56; Bergasse, Rambert, *Histoire de Marseille*, 414.

¹⁵⁹ "Se con libeccio fortunale veniste a prender porto in Genova, o vero il tempo vi minacciasse da quella parte di fortuna, fate in questa maniera: venite ad accostarvi bene alla distanza di un corpo di vascello e, montata che l'haverete, essendo pronto a far vela della mezzana, orseggiate costeggiando il molo nuovo in distanza di mezzo fusto, e meno anchora, mentre non habbiate vascelli per prora che v'impedischino. E giunto che sarete quasi alla metà di esso, lasciate [p. 64] cadere un'ancora dall'occhio sinistro di prora e poi dal destro, con un'andarivello. Stendete i vostri ormeggi sopra il molo, facendovi forte alle colonnate con buone

However, the *Molo Nuovo* did not offer complete protection from storms, as demonstrated by the accidents that continued to occur even after its construction. In 1641 the frigate of the patron Gio Grosso, for example, coming from Albissola, sank while it was moored between the *Molo Nuovo* and the *Molo Vecchio* because of a storm with a *tramontana* wind (N):

[...] He left with his *frigata* loaded with iron, vessels, coal, musket barrels, and other goods, and his seamen from the place of Arbissola and a sack of money, always navigated with good weather until they arrived between the *Nuovo* and *Vecchio Molo*. There came such a cruel north wind fury that it sank the vessel, where it was still at the time of the present *consolato*, which [the vessel] then had to be recovered and in it was found to be lacking the goods that will be described below [...].¹⁶⁰

To further protect the basin, it was necessary to extend the *Molo Vecchio*.¹⁶¹ From 1649 and in the following 40 years, a new construction joined the *Molo Nuovo* to the mainland of Capo di Faro, on the western side of the bay. The strength of the currents, however, made it necessary to reinforce almost annually the *Molo* outer reef.¹⁶²

This century and a half of investments in the area, while greatly increasing the availability of warehouses and docks, did not result in a significant reduction in the risk factors. Of the 1,400,000 square metres available, only 200,000 metres (14% of the total), were safely usable for commercial operations.¹⁶³ However, the efforts made by the *Magnifici* and the administrators of *San Giorgio* highlight the centrality of the port in the economic system of the Republic.

gomene, che così sarete in miglior posta che al molo vecchio, non vi essendo tanta risacca o tirannia”, Della Rovere, *Prima parte*, 63-64.

¹⁶⁰ “[...] partito con detta sua fregata carica di ferro, vascellami, carbone, canni per moschetti, et altre robbe, e suoi marinari dal luogo di Arbissola et un sachetto di denari, navigorno sempre con buon tempo sino di arrivati tra il Molo Nuovo e Vecchio. Venne furia di vento tramontana così crudele che fece affondare il vascello, ove ancora si ritrovava al tempo che fece il presente Consolato, quale poi ha fatto ricoverare et in esso ha trovato mancare le robbe che dirà in appresso [...]”, ASG, *NG2085*, 26/02/1641, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* database as the id50300.

¹⁶¹ Podestà, *Il porto di Genova*, 216-218.

¹⁶² Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 167.

¹⁶³ Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 169; D. Presotto, ‘Aspetti dell’economia ligure nell’età napoleonica: i lavori pubblici’, *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, VII, 1967, 147-186, 156.

2.4 *The Magistracies Involved and the Regulation of Trade*

The port of Genoa was characterized not only by a relatively complex organization of infrastructures and a low level of taxation, but also by the presence of a well-defined administrative structure. The *Padri del Comune* were in charge of the management of the port and its infrastructures, while the *Conservatori del Mare* had jurisdiction over the vessels in port and navigation in general. Other magistracies depended on the port traffic: these were the *Magistrato dell'Abbondanza*, in charge of the supply of cereals for the city and the *Riviera*, and the *Conservatori di Sanità*, in charge of public health and quarantine vessels that could spread contagious diseases.

2.4.1 *Padri del Comune*

In Genoa, most of the magistracies were collegial. Perhaps because of the need to maintain an efficient and tested institutional apparatus, there was continuity between the medieval and early modern periods.

The *Padri del Comune* was the main port magistracy, as well as one of the oldest of the Republic.¹⁶⁴ Their first mention, with the name of *Sabarbarii portus et moduli*, dates back to 1281.¹⁶⁵ They had both surveillance and judicial jurisdiction over the port. The rules in their own statutes compensated for the paucity of information concerning port organization in the civil and criminal statutes of the Republic.¹⁶⁶

The activity of the *Padri del Comune* was formally regulated only in 1340, during the reorganization of the state wanted by *doge* Simon Boccanegra.¹⁶⁷ In 1363 *doge* Gabriele Adorno promulgated the *Leges* that, among other things, better developed this first nucleus of the legislation.¹⁶⁸ Only after the reform of the French governor Boucicault (1403-1406), the name of the magistracy became that of *Patres Communis Salvatores Portus et Moduli*.¹⁶⁹ The

¹⁶⁴ Forcheri, *Doge e governatori*, 90.

¹⁶⁵ Podestà, *Il porto di Genova*, 18-19.

¹⁶⁶ V. Piergiovanni even theorizes the presence of two 'legislative paths', see Piergiovanni, 'L'organizzazione di una città portuale', 430.

¹⁶⁷ Polonio, *L'amministrazione della Res Publica*, 43.

¹⁶⁸ These laws were mentioned in the previous Chapter, see C. Desimoni, A.T. Belgrano eds., *Historiae Patriae Monumenta. Leges genuenses*, Turin, 1901, 333-337.

¹⁶⁹ Desimoni, Belgrano eds., *Historiae Patriae Monumenta*, 963-976.

vernacular abbreviation of *Padri del Comune* supplanted the older Latin formula within fifty years.

The port-management and extra-port responsibilities of the *Padri* were numerous. For example, it promulgated regulations prohibiting the careening of vessels in port or the entry of overloaded vessels, due to the risk of sinking,¹⁷⁰ and checked that the docks were not cluttered with overly bulky goods or that material used as ballast was not discharged into the harbour basin.¹⁷¹ In addition, it had to check whether incoming vessels were of good quality and able to dock safely,¹⁷² and could prohibit the departure of a ship if they suspected any irregularity.¹⁷³ The *Padri del Comune* issued summary judgments against those who hampered the operativity of the port.¹⁷⁴ The professional corporations involved in the various operations in the port area were formally under their control and had to abide by their rules.¹⁷⁵ In addition to this, the *Padri* took care of everything that gravitated around the port, both as spaces and as taxes, such as the management of the sewage, the aqueduct or the issue of fishing licenses in the basin.¹⁷⁶ Over time, the extra-port duties of the magistracy grew to the point that the *Magnifici*, in 1588, divided it into two separate bodies on the basis of their responsibilities, each composed of five units: *Padri del Comune Conservatori del Porto e del Molo* and *Padri del Comune Conservatori del Patrimonio*.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁰ Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 244, 317.

¹⁷¹ The statutes have several Chapters on rules to prevent the silting up of the port, as well as norms aimed at controlling the corporation of the *minolli*, those who took care of the transport of ballast, sand and debris outside the port, see Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 489-490.

¹⁷² Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 70-71.

¹⁷³ The *Padri del Comune* were agents at the service of the Republic, so they enjoyed numerous privileges that strengthened their control. For example, their judgments were unappealable, they had precedence over other creditors against debtors, they could carry out forced expropriations, they did not have to comply with prescriptions, etc., see Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 24, 44, 47, 88, 91, 135, 319, 425.

¹⁷⁴ Piergiovanni, 'Dottrina e prassi', 23. They could, for example, prevent overloaded vessels from entering the dock for fear that they would sink, or watch over ballast transports out of the dock to ensure that material used as ballast was disposed of properly. See Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 70-71.

¹⁷⁵ See Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 134-178, 208-221, 230-246, 287-342. On guilds and corporations in Italy during early modern period see A. Guenzi, P. Massa, A. Moiola eds., *Corporazioni e gruppi professionali nell'Italia moderna*, Milan, 1999.

¹⁷⁶ Desimoni, Belgrano eds., *Historiae Patriae Monumenta*, 967.

¹⁷⁷ This new organizational structure would last for the next two centuries. The *Conservatori del Patrimonio* supervised the *Arti* (the guilds), managed the road network, the aqueduct, and urban cleaning. The *Conservatori del Porto* were in charge of port infrastructure, the granting of anchorage permits and authorizations for ship repairs on land. The two sections maintained a common office, unified accounting and equal work obligations. See Piccinno, 'A city with a Port', 171; Felloni, 'Organizzazione portuale', 337-364.

The members of the *Padri del Comune Conservatori del Porto e del Molo* had an 18-month term and were organized as follows: two deputies for the “scrittura e condotto” and three for “altre faccende”.¹⁷⁸ One of the five component magistrates of the office was also the *Deputato al Porto*.¹⁷⁹ Personally liable in case of irregularities, the latter employed the *sotto sindaco di mare*, the *architetto di camera*, the *custode dell’ordigno* and the *custode del porto*.¹⁸⁰ The 1576 reforms established that the *Minor Consiglio* would handle their appointment.¹⁸¹ Technical management was coordinated by a small number of officials ranging from 4 to 8 units.¹⁸²

The statutes of the sixteenth century offer a detailed picture of the income of the *Padri*. They handled: a tax on legacies for pious deeds;¹⁸³ the tax on the activity of the city's *postriboli*; the *exitum navium* and the *molagium*; the anchorage tax; the *iactus*; the right to take part of the arriving cargoes of wheat for the city’s provision, that the office could sell directly; the tax on fishing licenses and the *cabella fanalium* for the lighthouse on Capo di Faro.¹⁸⁴ In addition to these taxes, the *Padri del Comune* collected part of the registration fees paid by aspiring members of the guilds involved in port activities.¹⁸⁵ They collected rents on numerous warehouses, stores, houses and lands in the port area and outside the walls. All the other city magistrates, moreover, paid to the *Padri del Comune* part of the pecuniary sanctions that they ordered.¹⁸⁶

Another source of income was the revenue from certain *luoghi* held in the *Casa di San Giorgio*. The *luoghi*, as will be seen in more detail below, were the shares with which St. George lent capital to the state. Each *luogo* provided a

¹⁷⁸ Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 70.

¹⁷⁹ Although the earliest records of such a charge date back to 1715, it can be assumed that a similar figure was already operating in earlier centuries, see Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 82.

¹⁸⁰ Detailed instructions for these various charges are preserved in a 1715 register kept in ASCG, *PdC* 755, 1715.

¹⁸¹ A minimum of 3/5ths of affirmative votes was required for the election of a member of the *Padri del Comune*, see ASG, ms. 675, *Magistrati coi quali si governa al presente la città*.

¹⁸² A group of 2-4 people supervised the operations, controlled the collection of taxes, and kept the accounts. The *Guardiano della Lanterna* was responsible for the lighthouse and signalling to vessels. The *Custode del Pontone*, with his helper, directed the dredging operations and those that required the boats of the *Padri del Comune*. Other officials or technicians (divers, architects, accountants, etc.) could be hired on a temporary basis for specific jobs, see Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 171-172.

¹⁸³ V. Polonio, *L’amministrazione della Res Publica genovese fra Tre e Quattrocento*, Genoa, 1977, 41.

¹⁸⁴ Vedi Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici’, 55-72.

¹⁸⁵ Several *Arti* took part in port activities, whose members handled a wide range of tasks, like driving vessels to entering port, disembarking, packing, etc. On the *Arti* involved in the functioning of the port, see Piccinno, *Economia marittima*.

¹⁸⁶ Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 23.

variable interest to its owner. In the event of an emergency, they could be resold or transferred to quickly obtain the capital.¹⁸⁷

Non-port revenues, i.e., not related to marine traffic, were higher than port revenues.¹⁸⁸ This imbalance probably responded, as mentioned, to a precise policy of the Genoese authorities. It could be said that the entire city contributed to the financing of the port, thus allowing them to keep the charges on the maritime operators relatively low.

The maintenance costs, on the other hand, could be mainly grouped into three categories: maintaining the seabed depth, care of the *Molo Vecchio* and the other docks, and the functioning of lights.¹⁸⁹ These fell for the most part on the budget of the *Padri del Comune*.

2.4.2 *Conservatori del Mare*

The *Padri del Comune* were complemented by other magistracies linked to the maritime sector, among which the most important was that of the *Conservatori del Mare*. These had tasks related to the control of trade and navigation, inherited from magistracies operating in previous centuries such as the *Ufficio di Mercanzia e Robaria*¹⁹⁰ and the *Officium Gazariae*.¹⁹¹ There was strong continuity between the medieval and early modern period.

The origin of the *Conservatori del Mare* dated back to the creation of the *Officium Maris* on 15 October 1490 and the *Conservatori delle Navi* on 24 July 1490.¹⁹² These two magistracies were the results of the requests from the

¹⁸⁷ Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 123 and following. See also G. Felloni ed., *Amministrazione ed etica nella Casa di San Giorgio (1407-1805). Lo statuto del 1568*, Florence, 2014. On *San Giorgio* see par. 2.5.

¹⁸⁸ Of all these revenues, the tax on legacies, as mentioned above, was the oldest and consisted of a tenth of each bequest for pious purposes. Later on, this levy would have been extended to all legacies and would have been applied both in the city and the *Riviera*, see chap. XXXIII, *De deceno legatorum*, in Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 44. In the 1470s this source of revenue would be replaced by 36 *luoghi* of *San Giorgio*, the functioning of which will be explained in the following pages, see Doria, 'La gestione portuale', 128. Another important income was the *Introitus Casteleti*, the tribute collected on the *postribolo* of Monte Albano from the middle of the fourteenth century, see cap. XXIV, *Capitula postribuli*, in Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 27-35. For a long time these two source of revenues represented the main income for the magistracy, far surpassing the income from the taxes collected in the port area such as the *iactus navium* or the anchorage tax.

¹⁸⁹ Massa, 'Fattori tecnici ed economici', 59.

¹⁹⁰ V. Piergiovanni, *Lezioni di storia giuridica genovese: il Medioevo*, Genoa, 1983, 89-91.

¹⁹¹ Piergiovanni, *Lezioni di storia*, 85.

¹⁹² Calegari, 'Patroni di nave', 57-91; Forcheri, *Doge, governatori, procuratori*, 147-148. Magistracies composed of merchants and shipowners were common in cities with a strong mercantile vocation, such as Barcelona in this same period. See M.E. Soldani, 'Arbitrati e

Genoese shipmasters and shipowners who demanded greater power of control and organization over the corporations engaged in the construction, repair and naval supplies, as well as the behaviour of crews and port discipline more generally.¹⁹³ The *Officium Maris* inherited part of the judicial powers of the *Gazaria*, the Genoese maritime court with jurisdiction *super factis et negotiis navigandi*.¹⁹⁴ Its judges were not legal professionals but merchants and trade experts. Precisely because they belonged to the same category as the merchants whose cases they were often called upon to judge, the functioning of this tribunal responded effectively to the needs of rapidity and fairness of trade, escaping the juridical and bureaucratic subtleties of the ordinary legal apparatus of the Republic.¹⁹⁵ The *Conservatori delle Navi* were elected from among the major shipowners in the city and their delegates. It was, that is, the sanction of hegemony by the shipowning sector over all other interest groups involved in the shipping industry, such as shipwrights, caulkers, coopers, ironmongers and other minor corporations.¹⁹⁶ The *Conservatori delle Navi* controlled the construction and careening of ships, their provisions, riggings, ropes and weapons, the behaviour of crews in port, safety regulations and harbour rescue.¹⁹⁷ The only formal limitation was the principle of non-contradiction with the norms and prerogatives of the *Officium Gazariae*, which, as noted, were partially absorbed by the *Officium Maris*.¹⁹⁸ This partial duality in the division of power in the maritime sphere was resolved following the 1528 structural reforms. All the competences of the *Officium Maris* and of the *Gazaria*, in fact, were transferred to the *Conservatori delle Navi*, later called *Conservatori del Mare* from 1573.¹⁹⁹

processi consolari tra Barcellona e l'oltremare nel tardo Medioevo', in E. Maccioni, S. Tognetti eds., *Tribunali di mercanti e giustizia mercantile nel tardo Medioevo*, Florence, 2016, 83-105.

¹⁹³ Calegari, 'Patroni di nave', 59.

¹⁹⁴ One of the collections of laws concerning this magistracy was promulgated in 1441. The name *Gazaria* was a reference to the lost Genoese colony inhabited by Gazarians in the Crimea. See Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, XLV; Calegari, 'Patroni di nave', 60. See G. Forcheri, *Navi e navigazione a Genova nel Trecento. Il «Liber Gazarie»*, Genoa, 1974.

¹⁹⁵ V. Piergiovanni, 'Celesterio di Negro', in Piergiovanni ed., *Norme, scienza e pratica*, I, 229-224, 222. On this same topic, see B. Maréchaux, '«Non andare mai alla giustizia». Conflictividad marítima, medjacion y normas jurídicas comunes entre Venecia y el imperio otomano (1600-1630)', in M.H. Sanchez ed., *Republicas y Republicanismo en la Europa moderna (siglos XVI-XVIII)*, Madrid, 2017, 205-228.

¹⁹⁶ Calegari, 'Patroni di nave', 61.

¹⁹⁷ Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 75.

¹⁹⁸ Calegari, 'Patroni di nave', 61-62.

¹⁹⁹ Calegari, 'Patroni di nave', 62-63; Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, XLV; Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 75-76. According to V. Vitale, however, the *Officium Maris* was abolished at the end of the fifteenth century, see V. Vitale, *Le fonti del diritto marittimo ligure*, Genoa,

This magistracy functioned as a civil and criminal maritime court. Specifically, in the seventeenth century it was responsible for: settling disputes regarding freight, wages and delivery of goods, punishing officers, pilots and sailors who did not respect the contract of engagement, taking care of the maintenance of the barges for the storage and unloading of goods, keeping ropes and anchors available for vessels and avoiding accidents in case of bad weather.²⁰⁰ In the reform of 18 March 1602, the *Conservatori* also obtained complete criminal jurisdiction with respect to violations of police and safety regulations. This authority had been entrusted to the *Rota Criminale* since 1576.²⁰¹ Among the powers obtained since 1602 were, for example:

- Questioning witnesses and, if they refuse or make false statements, have them imprisoned and proceed against them with the same authority as the *Rota Criminale*;
- Judging and meeting without regard to vacations and suspensions of activities for holidays;
- Taking legal action against all individuals who were responsible for unloading and loading boats in the port, such as “i patroni delle chiatte, i camalli e altri”.²⁰²

The intention of the *Collegi* was probably to rationalize the administrative and legal system concerning navigation, by concentrating the judicial power in the hands of a single magistracy. In this perspective the *Conservatori* – discussed in greater detail below – inherited the competence for the registration and approval of Averages from the *Officium Gazariae*. They, moreover, also had superior authority in port in case of bad weather, when it was essential to act

1951, 31. On the uncertainties surrounding the name of this magistracy until 1573 see ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 1, 1575-1578.

²⁰⁰ See Forcheri, *Doge, governatori*, 147-150. BUG, 716.C.V.15, *Magistrati antichi e moderni, Consigli, Presidenze dal principio della repubblica*, manuscript of the eighteenth century, 65v-66r.

²⁰¹ However, in the case of corporal punishment or banishment of more than three years, they were to meet together with the praetor of the *Rota Criminale*. See G. Forcheri, ‘Il ritorno allo stato di polizia dopo la costituzione del 1576’, *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, LXXXIII/I, 1969, 53-67.

²⁰² ASG, ms. 41, *Leggi perpetue*, 1576-1639, 17/03/1607, 119r, 127r. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the crisis of the Rota led to the resumption of previous institutional practices such as the use of merchant courts, formed by members of the city's elite, also because of a deep-rooted distrust against the jurists, see R. Savelli, *Politiche del diritto ed istituzioni a Genova tra Medioevo ed età moderna*, Genoa, 2017, 1-3.

promptly for the safety of the infrastructure and vessels in port.²⁰³ For example, the entire office had to move to the base of the docks in order to quickly give the necessary orders to avoid accidents. The *Conservatori* had their own warehouse at the *Molo Vecchio* where they stored anchors, shrouds and other equipment to lend to the vessels in case of need.²⁰⁴ They ordered the compulsory loan of this equipment, pledging gold or silver in any currency if there was time, where vessels in port needed it.²⁰⁵

If, by chance, you find yourself during a storm at the *Molo Vecchio*, and you (God forbid) lack some mooring, or if in doubt you wish to protect yourself, you can, by firing a shot, ask for help, even at night, which will be provided to you with both ropes and anchors, with such punctuality as you will not find anywhere else in the world, paying only the rope at the fair price that it costs to the public, and an honest wage to the men who carries it. And in the year 1655, on the 26 and 27 of December, during a storm, 22 ropes and 15 anchors were taken out in one day and one night, a service that you will not find in any other part of Europe.²⁰⁶

The magistracy consisted of three members. The shipmasters and shipowners present in Genoa, or their delegates, directly elected them. Following the reform of 18 March 1602, originally lasting five years, but made perpetual in 1607, the number of magistrates was increased to five and their appointment passed under the responsibility of the *Serenissimi Collegi*. The *Collegi*, in agreement with the *Minor Consiglio*, chose five nobles for a 20 months term. One member

²⁰³ Traces of this function can also be found in Average calculations, which will be explained in detail in par. 3.4.

²⁰⁴ “[...] vien data facultà al detto magistrato di poter prestare, o sia commodare, le agumene, et anchora à quelli vascelli che in porto per fortuna di mare o altro non havessero bisogno [...]”, see ASG, ms. 41, *Leggi perpetue*, 1576-1639, 24/07/1605, 125v.

²⁰⁵ Otherwise, the damage caused by the failure to return the equipment was suffered by the entire magistracy. With a law of 1556, if the magistrate did not have the pledge delivered, he himself was obliged to pay in case of failure to return it. The reform of 1602 recognized that in case of danger this penalty did not apply, “[...] non essendo ragionevole che ne i tempi di fortuna si lascino perire quei vascelli che non havessero comodità di pagare à dar castigo per detto costo perciò s’annullino e si aboliscano detti ordini [...]”, see ASG, ms. 41, *Leggi perpetue*, 1576-1639, 24/07/1605, 126r. For an example of the application of this procedure see ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 85, 04/04/1669, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50672.

²⁰⁶ “Se per sorte vi trovaste con fortuna al molo vecchio, e vi venisse (che Dio non voglia) a mancare qualche ormeggio, o dubbitandone voleste accautelarvi, potrete sparando un tiro addimandare aiuto, ancor che di notte, che vi sarà somministrato così di gomene come d’ancore, con tanta puntualità che nulla più in nessuna parte del mondo, pagando solo la gomena il giusto prezzo che costa al publico, et una honesta mercede a gli huomini che la conducono. E l’anno 1655 alli 26 e 27 di decembre si diedere fuori in tempo di fortuna 22 gomene e 15 ancore in un giorno et una notte, assistenza che non troverete maggiore in nessuna parte di Europa”, Della Rovere, *Prima parte*, 64.

was elected every four months, in rotation.²⁰⁷ The *Conservatori* had a permanent staff made of a notary, an agent and a *tragetta* (a servant).²⁰⁸ While we do not have specifics on the *tragetta*'s assignments, we do know that the agent patrolled the harbor with a small boat for routine surveillance and aided vessels in case of need.²⁰⁹ One of the five magistrates also acted as a *sindaco*:²¹⁰ elected for a three-year term, he was entrusted with the collection of a tax of 6 *soldi* for every 100 Genoese *salme* (19.05 tons) on departing ships, as well as a tax of one *soldo* per *balla* of hemp “when intervening with the measuring officials to verify whether it is enough to be used to work [for the weaving process] or not”.²¹¹

The magistracy relied on the following revenues: the contracting of the *gabella* on *Piatte, Liuti and Sacchi*, the collection of a tax of six *soldi* for every 100 Genoese *salme* (19.05 tons) on the ships leaving the port and the proceeds from the sentences that they inflicted.²¹² One-third of the pecuniary sentences were collected by the *sindaco*, who was charged with conducting shipboard inspections and authorizing all vessels leaving the port.²¹³ The law of 10 December 1609 prescribed that the *sindaco* would also be responsible for visiting vessels arriving in port, examining bills of lading, crews, and any other relevant element:

[...] and to know where they come from, where they are going, what they are loaded with, to know the number of seamen as well as of passengers and of every other thing completely and every morning he is obliged [the *Sindaco*] to

²⁰⁷ The 1602 reform was the culmination of a series of minor changes that occurred in 1569, 1573, and 1576, see Calegari, ‘Patroni di nave’, 65-66. With a further reform in 1605, in order to guarantee the rapidity of procedures in the maritime field, in which any delay could lead to further expenses and damages, they were authorized to proceed at any time, i.e. ignoring the normal office days indicated in the *Statuti Civili*, see ASG, ms. 41, *Leggi perpetue*, 1576-1639, 27/05/1605, 104r.

²⁰⁸ ASG, ms. 41, *Leggi perpetue*, 1576-1639, 24/07/1605, 126r. The *tragetta*, in Genoese dialect, was the servant of a magistracy. See the definition of ‘Tragetta’ in G. Olivieri, *Dizionario Genovese-Italiano*, Genoa, 1851, 514.

²⁰⁹ He had to make sure, for example, that boatmen did not circulate around moored ships during the night, from 1 am until the Hail Mary of dawn, see ASG, ms. 41, *Leggi perpetue*, 1576-1639, 24/07/1605, 126r-126v.

²¹⁰ Forcheri, *Doge, governatori*, 150.

²¹¹ “[...] quando interveniva con li tareggiatori a riconoscer se sono sufficienti da mettere in lavoro e non altrimenti”. In ASG, ms. 41, *Leggi perpetue*, 1576-1639, 24/07/1605, 125v.

²¹² ASG, AS, Gride e proclami 1017/3, 11/02/1602, chap. 26.

²¹³ This role, lasting three years, was also entrusted with the collection of a tax of six *soldi* for every hundred Genoese *salme* (1.9 tons) of capacity on ships departing, see Forcheri, *Doge, governatori*, 150. He could also collect a *soldo* per bale on hemp “quando interveniva con li tareggiatori a riconoscer se sono sufficienti da mettere in lavoro e non altrimenti”, see ASG, ms. 41, *Leggi perpetue*, 1576-1639, 24/07/1605, 125v.

come and make report to the Most Serene *Doge* and Most Illustrious of the Palace.²¹⁴

Many Average cases report on these visits, following which the *sindaco* provided an estimate of the value of the vessel.²¹⁵

It is reasonable to assume that there was a significant degree of overlap between the competences of the *Conservatori* and those of the *Padri del Comune*. There are no reports, however, of serious conflicts of jurisdiction between the two magistracies, which suggests a relatively peaceful coexistence. This emerged, for example, in the occasional collaboration in matters of common interest.²¹⁶

2.4.3 Other Magistracies

Another magistracy involved in port activities, as well as occasionally in Average procedures, was the Office of *Annona*, also called *Magistrato dell'Abbondanza*. It was established in 1564 as an evolution of the previous *Officium victualium*.²¹⁷ Its main task was to keep a reserve of 15,000 *mine* (1,364.77 tons) of wheat and 15,000 *mine* of millets ready at all times.²¹⁸ Following the creation of the first public ovens in the Ducal Palace during the famine of 1590-1592, moreover, the office obtained control over the mechanisms of production and sale of bread throughout the Republic's territories.²¹⁹ All cereals had to be contracted with the office, which decided to distribute them directly to millers, bakers, etc. and set production targets.²²⁰

²¹⁴ “[...] et sapere d’onde vengano, dove vanno, di cosa sono carichi, informarsi del numero così de’ marinari come de’ passeggeri e d’ogni altra cosa compiutamente et ogni mattina sia obbligato [the *Sindaco*] a venire fare relatione al Serenissimo Duce e Illustrissimi di Palazzo”, Forcheri, *Doge, governatori*, 150.

²¹⁵ See, for example, a payment of 6 *lire* to the *sindaco* of the *Conservatori*, Stefano Garibaldi, for the estimate of the vessel *Santa Maria e San Placito* of the Genoese *patrone* Giovanni Assereto in 1600, in ASG, NG 636, 07/04/1600. Recorded in the *AveTransRisk* database as the id50213.

²¹⁶ As observed in Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 78.

²¹⁷ See S. Origone, ‘L’*Officium Victualium* a Caffa nella prima metà del secolo XV’, in V. Giuzelev ed., *Bulgaria Pontica Media Aevii*, 2, Sofia, 1988, 398-426.

²¹⁸ See Giaccherò, *Origini e sviluppi*, 19. Many of the towns in the Republic had their own *Ufficio dell'Abbondanza*. Between the late sixteenth century and 1640-1650 there were more than 40 of them, see E. Grendi, ‘L’approvvigionamento dei grani nella Liguria del Seicento: libera pratica e annona’, *Miscellanea Storica Ligure*, XVIII/2, 1986, 1031.

²¹⁹ In 1645 the *Maggior Consiglio* agreed to the building of new public ovens between the *Chiavari* and the *Cattanei* docks, see Giaccherò, *Economia e società*, 355.

²²⁰ P. Calcagno, ‘Il dominio genovese e il grano in antico regime: un sistema federale sotto la sorveglianza dello stato’, *Storia Urbana*, 134, 2012, 75-94, 78.

The magistracy was headed by five “keen citizens” with non-renewable annual terms. Four of them came from the nobility, while the magistracy was presided over by a member of the *Camera*. The *Collegi* with the *Minor Consiglio* appointed them: once installed, the magistrates charged a deputation for the purchase of cereals, composed of two employees with a two-month mandate and a commissioner of warehouses to weigh the lots of cereals and supervise the work of the *camalli*, the local porters. They also employed minor officers for different and not always specified activities: a commissioner for the public ovens, a *scritturale*, a cashier, a sub-chancellor and a *sindaco*.²²¹ The role of the *sindaco* was probably not very different from that of the *sindaco* of the *Conservatori*: he controlled all the cereals landings in the port and checked the vessels’ origins, the quantity of wheat on board, the selling prices, etc. He also supervised over the warehousemen and collected money for the magistrates. In addition, he was in charge of checking that no one bought wheat to resell it in a speculative way, i.e., that no one privately purchased more than 120 *mine* (10.92 tons) of wheat.²²²

Constant cereal shortages in the Republic forced stocks to always be purchased on the market, and a significant portion of imported wheat arrived through the port. From an analysis of GA's practices, cereals bound for Genoa represented the vast majority of the cargoes that flowed to the capital.²²³ This magistracy therefore was an attempt by the state to guarantee a regular influx of supplies to the population. The *Abbondanza* did not have state revenues or taxes: it acted as a single large company specialized in wheat trade.²²⁴ Extreme diversification of markets, for example, was the strategy followed throughout the seventeenth century to cope with variations in price and availability.²²⁵ The magistracy, however, could count on the full support of the state, which adopted protective mechanisms such as the imposition of prices or diplomatic

²²¹ Calcagno, ‘Il dominio genovese e il grano’, 79.

²²² Calcagno, ‘Il dominio genovese e il grano’, 79-80.

²²³ See <http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/avetransrisk>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

²²⁴ ASG, *Senato*, miscellanea 1092, 1591.

²²⁵ The markets could experience significant price fluctuations depending on several factors such as privateers along the routes or wars that broke out in the countries where loads came from. Diversification strategies allowed to resort from time to time to the market that offered the product at the most convenient price. See, for example, the activity of the Raynolt firm for the purchase of grain in Genoa in M.C. Lamberti, ‘Mercanti tedeschi a Genova nel XVII secolo: l’attività della compagnia Raynolt negli anni 1619-1620’, *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, nuova serie*, XII/1, 1972, 71-121.

pressures.²²⁶ In times of good harvests there were few who bought public bread, because many produced it themselves at home buying flour from suppliers or had other sources available to buy it at lower prices.²²⁷ There was, in fact, a fair amount of illegal production and sale of cereals outside the *Annona* circuits. According to Paolo Calcagno, illegal commerce was decisive in compensating for the shortcomings of state centralism, which was not able to effectively cover the entire territory, especially the inland areas.²²⁸

Finally, another vital element was the sanitary supervision over arriving vessels. In Genoa, this task was entrusted to the *Conservatori di Sanità*.²²⁹ Their first mention dates back to the fifteenth century, although their role was outlined precisely only between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century.²³⁰ The *Conservatori* checked the health conditions of arriving crews and goods and issued licenses attesting the good health of departing vessels.²³¹ Since 1532, the magistracy managed the *lazaretto* at the mouth of the Bisagno River, where men and goods suspicious of being infected were obliged to undergo quarantine.²³² It had civil and criminal jurisdiction over the entire territory of the Republic and had agents or guards in every community with a landing space.²³³

The development of the free port and the greater volume of goods in the city increased the likelihood of contagion, making it necessary to better structure

²²⁶ There is no trace, however, of public rewards for navigation and trade, as was in use in Venice and Tuscany, see Grendi, 'Genova alla metà del Cinquecento', 147.

²²⁷ Calcagno, 'Il dominio genovese e il grano', 81.

²²⁸ See Calcagno, 'Il dominio genovese e il grano'.

²²⁹ For a detailed analysis of the Genovese sanitary polices, see G. Assereto, «*Per la comune salvezza dal morbo contagioso*». *I controlli di sanità nella Repubblica di Genova*, Novi Ligure, 2011. Similar institutions existed in all major European ports. See for example, for Italy, C.M. Cipolla, *Il pestifero e contagioso morbo. Combattere la peste nell'Italia del Seicento*, Bologna, 2012.

²³⁰ The earliest records are from 1429 and 1463; however, this was a provisional magistracy that remained in place for the duration of the emergency, see G. Assereto, 'Polizia sanitaria e sviluppo delle istituzioni statali nella repubblica di Genova', in L. Antonielli, S. Levati eds., *Controllare il territorio. Norme, corpi e conflitti tra medioevo e prima guerra mondiale*, Rubbettino, 2013, 167-187, 167.

²³¹ According to the jurist Scipione Bussetti, on 2 February 1676 the office of the *Conservatori di Sanità* "[...] impedisce l'ingresso nelle città, scaccia gli abitanti dalle proprie case, incendia vascelli, abbruggia robbe infette, spiana le case e procede di fatto nell'irrogare le pene, così portando il pubblico beneficio [...]"; see ASG, ms. 988, *Istruzioni dell'illustrissimi signori ufficiali del Magistrato della Sanità e loro ministri*, 1501-1796, 02/02/1676.

²³² T.O. De Negri, *Storia di Genova*, Milan, 1974, 651-652.

²³³ In 1628 the sanitary police of the minor communities is reorganized, with the specification of the election structure, the powers and the relationships of each peripheral office with the central authority, see Assereto, 'Polizia sanitaria e sviluppo', 171-172. Similar general regulations can also be found for Livorno (1648), Marseille (1689) and Venice (1692), see D. Panzac, *Quarantaines et lazarets. L'Europe et la peste d'Orient (XVIIe-XXe siècles)*, Aix-en-Provence, 1986, 32.

this magistracy, which was born as temporary.²³⁴ Initially, the magistrate was composed of four noble citizens, to whom a senator would be added as president from 1623. Their number was increased to five with the addition of a non-noble citizen from 1664.²³⁵ The *Collegi* and the *Minor Consiglio* appointed them.²³⁶

The *Conservatori* had a permanent staff consisting of a *sindaco*, responsible for checking ships, verifying licenses, supervising goods and interrogating captains; a guard officer, at the *sindaco's* service on the Spinola dock, with the task of recognizing arriving ships and crews and receiving health licenses to be returned upon departure; a chancellor and a sub-chancellor who worked with the *sindaco* to verify the licenses; a sub-chancellor who kept the accounts of the office; a *tragetta*; a *commissario*; and a chaplain for the *lazaretto*.²³⁷ The magistracy collected any fine for the violation of health regulations.²³⁸ In addition, the *Conservatori* collected a fee for the granting of health certificates and received fees for the hostel in the *lazaretto*.²³⁹

In Genoa, the ruling class kept the port administration in its own hands: its members, moreover, were in turn usually integrated into the city's mercantile and financial environment.²⁴⁰ All the magistracies examined thus far contributed to the management, both ordinarily and extraordinarily, of the port complex. Despite some overlapping of jurisdictions, it is possible to observe an increasing specialization of competences. In particular, significant improvements and expansions of port infrastructures were carried out in the period between the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century. All of this would not have been possible without the support of the State and its willingness to incur debt to meet the needs of the port.²⁴¹ As a counterpart to the continuous indebtedness, the fiscal income of the port in modern times, as reconstructed by Paola Massa and Giorgio Doria, grew considerably over time,

²³⁴ In 1609 the free port was extended to all goods, while in 1623 it became the "Portofranco libero, generale e generalissimo", see Giaccherio, *Origine e sviluppi*, 119.

²³⁵ The addition of a senator as president would date back to an act of 11 August 1623, while the number of members was increased to five by decree of the Senate on 10 December 1664, see Assereto, *Per la comune salvezza*, 20.

²³⁶ Assereto, *Per la comune salvezza*, 19.

²³⁷ Assereto, *Per la comune salvezza*, 41-42.

²³⁸ S. Olivieri, 'La normativa della Magistratura di Sanità di Genova (1500-1750)', *La Berio* 1, 1999, 7.

²³⁹ Felloni, 'Organizzazione portuale, navigazione', 340.

²⁴⁰ L. Lo Basso, 'Il finanziamento dell'armamento marittimo tra società e istituzioni: il caso ligure (secc. XVII-XVIII)', *Archivio Storico Italiano* 174/1, 2016, 81-106, 101.

²⁴¹ See Massa, 'Fattori tecnici ed economici'; Doria, 'La gestione portuale'.

going from a thousand *lira* a year in the fifteenth century to about 2,000 *lira* in the sixteenth century and up to 50,000 *lira* in the late eighteenth century. However, as it has emerged from the documentation, these revenues were very often inadequate to the growing needs of one of the main Mediterranean and European ports. Contributors outside the port played a key role, especially the *Casa di San Giorgio*.

2.5 An Increasingly Influential Partner: the Casa di San Giorgio

Although the magistracies previously examined enjoyed their own tax revenues, the collection of most taxes throughout the Republic fell to another extra-state authority, whose role has so far been only hinted at. This was the *Casa di San Giorgio*, the consortium of public creditors that managed the state's public debt in exchange for fiscal, judicial, finance, coinage, and co-participation in the sovereignty of the Republic.²⁴²

The *Officium procuratorum Sanctii Georgii super diminutione debitorum* was born between 1407 and 1408 during the French domination. Marshal Boucicault, governor of the city between 1401 and 1409, made an agreement for its implementation with the *Consiglio degli Anziani* and the *Officium Provisionum*, a kind of ministry of the treasury.²⁴³ The French administration needed capital for the planned reforms and for the control of the state apparatus. In 1417 it granted to *San Giorgio* civil jurisdiction, extended in 1469 following the concession of the administration of territories previously belonging to the Republic; in 1445 it was entrusted with the direction of the state Mint and, in 1447, the *Officium* obtained its first territorial domain with full sovereignty on the city of Famagosta (Cyprus).²⁴⁴ The *Casa* obtained in 1408 the authorization

²⁴² Vedi Cama, 'Banco di San Giorgio', 112.

²⁴³ On the reforms during the governorship of Boucicault see V. Piergiovanni, *Gli statuti civili e criminali di Genova nel Medioevo. La tradizione manoscritta e le edizioni*, Genoa, 1980. It was common practice in Genoa to resort to private financing through the creation of *compere* or *maone* formed by patricians who obtained assets and tax revenues in exchange for the capital paid in. An example is, in 1350, the formation of the *Compera magna Venetorum* with an interest of 10% in exchange for a loan of 300,000 Genoese *lire* in the war against Venice, see D. Gioffré, 'Il debito pubblico genovese. Inventario delle compere anteriori a San Giorgio o non consolidate nel Banco (sec.XIV-XIX)', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* VI, 1966, 172-173.

²⁴⁴ Cama, 'Banco di San Giorgio', 112.

to exercise banking activities with the creation of the *Banco di San Giorgio*.²⁴⁵ In 1444 this was suspended, and only in 1586 the *Banco di San Giorgio* resumed its banking activities on behalf of private individuals issuing, in exchange for deposits, special transferable bonds considered precursors of banknotes. The *Banco* was suppressed in 1816.²⁴⁶

The name of the institution became *Casa delle compere e dei banchi di San Giorgio*. The term *Compere*, with which the *Casa di San Giorgio* was often referred to, indicated a particular type of public debt widespread in Genoa: a company of private investors lent the State a certain sum of money for an agreed period and, on the basis of the capital sold, obtained the right to collect for its own benefit and until the loan was repaid, a tax already in force or specially instituted. The profits collected each year on the taxes temporarily granted by the state represented the interest on the debt: the uncertain nature of tax revenues made the interest variable and thus allowed to escape the condemnations of the Church against fixed interest rates.²⁴⁷ The creation of the *Casa di San Giorgio* represented an operation of debt consolidation through the reunification of the different pre-existing *Compere* into a single institution.²⁴⁸ The seat of the *Casa* was located in the building once known as *Palazzo a Mare* since 1408: ancient residence of the *Capitano del Popolo*, it was later briefly used as a customs house.²⁴⁹

The administrative direction of the *Casa* followed strict requirements: protect the creditors, minimize conflict of interests, and maintain independence from government.²⁵⁰ The state granted the *Casa* non-interference in the management of its accounts, a commitment sanctioned annually through a

²⁴⁵ The only exception was the period between 1445 and 1530, when banking was restricted to the state, shareholders, tax collectors, and taxpayers, see G. Felloni, *Inventario dell'archivio del Banco di San Giorgio (1407-1805)*, III/1, Rome, 1990, 77-82.

²⁴⁶ See *Il Banco di San Giorgio: fonti e cimeli. Mostra a cura del Banco di Roma, Genova, Palazzo S. Giorgio, 16-28 maggio 1970*, Genova, 1970.

²⁴⁷ Only in 1569 did Pius V approve the *censo costitutivo*, a type of loan that recalled the functioning of the Genoese *compere*. See P. Vismara, *Oltre l'usura. La chiesa moderna e il prestito a interesse*, Soveria Mannelli, 2004.

²⁴⁸ In Genoa, the processes of consolidation and unification of debts began in 1274 and were renewed in 1303, 1332, 1340 and, finally, 1407. G. Felloni's studies have long focused on the functioning of this powerful institution. In particolare, see G. Felloni, 'I primi banchi pubblici della Casa di San Giorgio', in G. Felloni ed., *Scritti di storia economica*, 1, Genova, 1998, 603-622. On this theme, see <http://www.lacasadisangiorgio.eu/main.php?do=bibliografia>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

²⁴⁹ This building is currently known as *Palazzo San Giorgio* and it is the siege of the Port Authority. See D. Cabona, *Palazzo San Giorgio*, Genova, 1991.

²⁵⁰ G. Giacchero, 'Il contributo della Casa di San Giorgio alla difesa della repubblica', in *La storia dei genovesi*, III, Genova, 1983, 173.

mutual oath: *San Giorgio* swore to protect the state financially, while the latter guaranteed the autonomy of the institution. Many observers have differentiated, when not opposed, the management of *San Giorgio* from that of the Republic. Niccolò Machiavelli himself was among the first authors to compare the chaos and factional conflicts that characterized the Republic political life with the order and efficiency of *San Giorgio*.²⁵¹ This contrast is however misleading, as shown also by the observations of some Genoese politicians of the time such as Matteo Senarega or Andrea Spinola.²⁵² Although formally separated, the same elites governed *San Giorgio* and the Republic, and it would be unthinkable to believe that their political agendas diverged significantly. However, scholars often refer to two 'separate states' in reference to the two entities.²⁵³ This is, however, an exaggeration. Even after the declaration of incompatibility between the charges of *San Giorgio* and those in the government of the Republic, which took place in 1528, the *Casa di San Giorgio* was continually called upon by the *Magnifici* of the Ducal Palace to provide the economic means necessary for the Senate, the *Camera* and the magistrates in their institutional duties. A further example of the correlation between *San Giorgio* and the state, as mentioned above, can also be observed in the entrusting to the first of the free port policies.

In line with developments with the main institutions of the Republic, all the supreme positions of the *Casa di San Giorgio* were reserved for patricians listed in the *Liber Nobilitatis*. Not infrequently, among the offices of government and of *San Giorgio* there were people linked by close kinship or successive generations of the same family branch. Also in this case, moreover, the criterion of the alternation between *Vecchi* and *Nuovi Nobili*, applied since the formation of the *Casa*, was preserved.²⁵⁴ In 1568, a general statute was promulgated in order to create an organic structure, harmonizing all the decrees and orders issued in previous years.²⁵⁵ Leading the management of *Casa di San Giorgio*

²⁵¹ C. Vivanti ed., N. Machiavelli, *Istorie fiorentine*, VIII, Turin, 2005 (1 ed. 1532), 28.

²⁵² BCB, m.r. XIV, 1, 4, A. Spinola, *Ricordi*, 129-131. BUG, *Manoscritto* B-III-8, M. Senarega, *Relatione compitissima della Repubblica di Genova*, 1597. On Senarega see Cattaneo Mallone, *I "politici" del Medioevo genovese*, 205, 251, 321, 328, 360. On the internal debates on *San Giorgio* during the sixteenth century see Savelli, 'Tra Machiavelli e San Giorgio', 249-322.

²⁵³ Cama, 'Banco di San Giorgio', 110.

²⁵⁴ In particular, we can find recurrent names of some of the families of the Old Nobles such as De Franchi, Sauli, Invrea, while among the New ones the most frequent were Balbi, Brignole and Durazzo. See Bitossi, 'Il governo della Repubblica', 97-100.

²⁵⁵ The patricians Simone Spinola quondam Gio. Battista (*protettore* in 1529), Nicolò Doria quondam Giacomo (*protettore* in 1556), Nicolò Cibo quondam Giuliano (*protettore* in 1560) and

was a select committee of eight individuals (*Protettori*).²⁵⁶ The charge lasted two years with a renewal of two members per semester, as a result centralizing almost all the decision-making power. The elder among the *Protettori* was the *Priore*, who presided over the meetings and kept the keys of the palace. At the end of their term of office, the outgoing *Protettori* would enter the office of the *Precedenti*, where they would hold a one-year term charge to complete any remaining task.²⁵⁷ In the case of relevant issues, the *Protettori* had to obtain the approval of the general assembly, the *Gran Consiglio delle Compere*. The *Gran Consiglio*, which had representative and consultative functions, initially consisted of fifty-two councillors, but their number increased to 480 following the 1568 statute.²⁵⁸ It also appointed four *Sindacatori* to review the activities of the *Casa* during the previous year.²⁵⁹ The *Gran Consiglio* would meet at least once a year to deliberate on major issues and internal rules.

Since individuals belonging to the same families and the same social class as those who ran the Republic lead the *Casa*, it is likely that the formal separation served to minimize the side effects of the continuous struggle for power that characterized Genoa between the fifteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The privacy of its public accounts sheltered *San Giorgio* from the constant shocks that occurred at the political-administrative level.²⁶⁰ Some scholars such as Giampiero Cama refer to it as a kind of:

A sui generis Senate, a clearinghouse that cushioned the bitterness of city rivalries that risked, without the presence of this brake, to drag the Republic

Ottaviano Sauli quondam Antonio (*protettore* in 1565-1566) formed the deputation in charge of drafting the new rules of the *Casa delle Compere*. On this process see Felloni ed., *Amministrazione ed etica*, 9-10.

²⁵⁶ Giacchero, 'Il contributo della Casa', 167. The *protettori*, in turn, formed sub-commissions for ordinary administration, one of which was responsible for the *affari del mattino*, the taxes, and the other for the *cura della scrittura*, the accounting. To these permanent commissions were added others for criminal authority, the franchises of the clergy, unsold taxes, salt contracts, free port, etc.

²⁵⁷ After the year had passed, the *precedenti* handed over to the *protettori* the writings for which they were responsible, and the *protettori* had another five years and one month to complete any outstanding issue. Beyond this term every writing was transferred to a special office in charge of the liquidation of the residuals, called *Ufficio del 1444* to commemorate the year of its foundation. See G. Felloni, *1407. La fondazione del Banco di San Giorgio*, Bari, 2011, ebook.

²⁵⁸ Of these 480 individuals, 460 were chosen from among the owners of at least 10 *luoghi*, chosen half by random draw and half by vote, and the remaining 20 were the *protettori*, *precedenti* and *sindacatori*. The Council met formally with the presence of at least 300 members. See Felloni ed., *Amministrazione ed etica*, 11.

²⁵⁹ Cama, 'Banco di San Giorgio', 111.

²⁶⁰ Giacchero, 'Il contributo della Casa', 170.

towards a destiny of disorder and turbulence detrimental to its very survival.²⁶¹

San Giorgio represented an economic and political security mechanism at the service of the city's oligarchy.²⁶² Initially, the *Protettori* alone decided the granting of credit to the state. Because of the increasingly pressing financial demands of the Republic, however, the statute of 1568 introduced the need to obtain the approval of the *Gran Consiglio delle Compere*.²⁶³

The institutional function of the *Casa* was to administer the taxes that the state had transferred to creditors. It collected tax revenues at variable interest until the state repaid the loan. The sum loaned constituted the capital of the *Compera* and, to facilitate the collection and counting of subscriptions, it was divided into shares called *luoghi*. The *luoghi* had a nominal value of 100 *lire* each, were seizable by the tax authorities in case of insolvency, were mortgageable and could be transferred: all these elements favoured the birth of a dynamic market. The *luoghi* yielded a variable interest each year, called *paga*, to their owners, called *luogatari*. Investments in *luoghi* were not highly remunerative. However, they were safe investments guaranteed by the state.²⁶⁴ The *paghe* were proportional to the active balance of *San Giorgio*, that is, to the difference between the sale of the tax revenues managed under contract and the expenses for ordinary administration and ordinary and extraordinary contributions to the Republic.²⁶⁵ Initially, the interest on the *luoghi* was fixed at 7% and was paid regularly every year. In the course of the fifteenth century and, in particular, as a result of the large expenses for the administration of those eastern colonies that the Republic had granted to the *Casa di San Giorgio* since

²⁶¹ "Senato sui generis, una camera di compensazione che attutiva le asprezze di quelle rivalità cittadine che rischiavano, senza la presenza di questo freno, di trascinare la repubblica verso un destino di disordini e turbolenze nefaste per la sua stessa sopravvivenza", in Cama, 'Banco di San Giorgio', 116. C. Bitossi also suggests an approach to the study of *San Giorgio* that considers this institution as a fundamental component of Genoese politics, see Bitossi, 'Il governo della Repubblica', 107.

²⁶² From 1539 the state debt and the taxes entrusted to *San Giorgio* were declared perpetual.

²⁶³ BCB, B.S.XVI.C.55-88, *Leggi delle compere di San Giorgio*, 1568, 30.

²⁶⁴ This type of public debt guaranteed the creditors from risk, also giving them greater bargaining power with the government. The public debt in the Kingdom of Naples, for example, offered a much higher interest rate on average during the sixteenth century, but this difference was also the result of the different risk rate, see A. Calabria, *The cost of empire: the finances of the kingdom of Naples in the time of the spanish rule*, Cambridge, 1991. This same mechanism was still applied in 1980s Europe by entities such as the British central bank or some European central banks, see D. North, B. Weingast, 'Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England', *Journal of Economic History* 49, 1989, 803-832.

²⁶⁵ Felloni, 'Organizzazione portuale', 347.

1446, it was necessary to opt for a variable and usually lower profit margin.²⁶⁶ After 1440, *paghe* collection became variable, and *luogatari* waited from a few months to several years, depending on the economic situation, for payments.²⁶⁷

The *Casa di San Giorgio* had full authority over the administration of its taxes and revenues.²⁶⁸ This institution managed the taxes that the Republic entrusted to it, in return for its loans, through contract sales to private operators who offered the highest price, for periods ranging from one to five years.²⁶⁹ The taxes were auctioned off in the first months of the year, so that between May and June the *Casa* could calculate the income from the contracts and the related expenses. After deducting the expenses from the profits, it established how much interest would be left for the *luogatari*.²⁷⁰

Overall, the budget of the *Casa* far exceeded the revenues and expenditures pertaining to the state: a body managed by the main creditor families of the government administered more resources than were managed by the government itself. This element corroborates the hypothesis of a system of mutual collaboration with the Republic. With the accumulated capital, the *Casa* made public investments and financed activities of public utility, for example through fixed or extraordinary contributions and occasional debt cancellations.²⁷¹ Ordinary contributions amounted to 33,000 *lire* in 1490 and they increased to 50,000 in 1539. In the same year, a debt worth 350,000 Genoese *lire* was also forgiven.²⁷² The contributions, as noted above, also allowed for the maintenance of low taxation in the port area.

²⁶⁶ From 1420 the bond became variable. In 1457, for example, it was of 3.45% per year, see M. Balard, 'Il Banco di San Giorgio e le colonie d'Oltremare', in G. Felloni ed., *La Casa di San Giorgio: il potere del credito*, Genoa, 2006, 63-73, 73.

²⁶⁷ *San Giorgio* required the purchasers of the tax collection rights to pay the price in *paghe* of the same year, contributing to the liveliness of the securities market through the purchase and sale of credits collectible forward and exchanged for cash at a rate below the nominal value. In 1631 it also instituted an office with a monopoly in the trade of *paghe*, but this office was suppressed in 1662 because of the impossibility of regulating the market. See G. Felloni, 'Il credito all'erario e ai privati: forme ed evoluzione', in G. Felloni ed., *La Casa di San Giorgio: il potere del credito*, Genoa, 2006, 155-163, 156-157.

²⁶⁸ It also dealt with tax evasion, see Heers, *Gênes au XVe siècle*, 129-130.

²⁶⁹ Felloni, 'Il credito all'erario', 155.

²⁷⁰ The income provided by the *luoghi* seems to double, going from 250 *lire* in 1450 to 500 *lire* annually during the first half of the sixteenth century. See Massa, 'Fattori tecnici ed economici', 132. The quotation of the *luoghi* of *San Giorgio* on the market went from 64.10 Genoese *lire* in 1575 to 130.15 *lire* in 1600 to 278 *lire* in 1621. Their value dropped again to 151.5 *lire* in 1632. See C. Cuneo, *Memorie sopra l'antico debito pubblico, mutui, compere e banca di S. Giorgio in Genova*, Genoa, 1842, 309.

²⁷¹ Giaccherio, *Il Seicento*, 131.

²⁷² Giaccherio, *Il Seicento*, 54.

The establishment of new taxes by the government was subject to approval by the *Casa di San Giorgio*, whose duty it was to protect the interests of creditors.²⁷³ Since the majority of goods and commodities arrived by sea, moreover, the *Casa di San Giorgio* was interested in the port administration. Throughout the early modern period, 40% of Genoa's tax revenue came from trade impositions. Of this amount, about 33% came from the taxation of fundamental supplies (wine, wheat, meat, oil and salt).²⁷⁴ About 75% of *San Giorgio's* revenues came from goods transiting through the port, mainly foodstuffs.²⁷⁵ The maritime policy of the Genoese state, which for centuries had centralized trade in the capital, guaranteed *San Giorgio* control over commercial flows and the corresponding revenues.²⁷⁶ It is no coincidence that at the palace of *San Giorgio* were declared also the Average reports relating to the ships that arrived in Genoa with loads of salt or oil, whose taxes were due to *San Giorgio*.²⁷⁷

San Giorgio often replaced the state, or reinforced its action, in the port investments. The *carati maris* tax initially linked *San Giorgio* with maritime trade and determined its interest in the port area. It unified this tax from 1445 and regularly contracted it out. It affected goods landed in Genoa or in the *Riviera* coming from abroad or from the Republic, as well as those leaving, with a levy of between 5 and 7%.²⁷⁸ The 1576-1637 period, the most prosperous in investments in infrastructure, coincided with the phase in which the port of Genoa was most protected by the *Casa*. Between the mid-sixteenth century and the seventeenth century, the financial contribution of *San Giorgio* for the port represented 49.6% of the total invested in this sector.²⁷⁹ It provided funds that,

²⁷³ For these reasons, scholars' opinions on the activity of this institution are often divergent. Admirers of this institution, in later centuries, were for example Cuneo, *Memorie sopra l'antico debito*; A. Wiszniewski, *Histoire de la banque de Saint-George de Gênes, la plus ancienne banque de l'Europe*, Paris, 1865; E. Marengo, 'L'antico debito pubblico genovese e la Casa di San Giorgio', in E. Marengo, C. Manfroni, G. Pessagno eds., *Il Banco di San Giorgio*, Genoa, 1911; Heers, *Gênes au XVe siècle*.

²⁷⁴ Felloni, 'Organizzazione portuale', 340. G. Felloni, basing his analysis on the sums collected by *San Giorgio*, suggested a number of hypotheses regarding the flow of goods which will be examined in chap. 4.

²⁷⁵ Felloni, 'Organizzazione portuale', 347.

²⁷⁶ Felloni, 'Organizzazione portuale', 349.

²⁷⁷ These reports are found occasionally, but with a certain regularity, throughout the early modern period. See some examples in ASG, SG, Affari Generali 2796, 1501-1506; ASG, SG, Altro, 39578, 19/08/1678-27/98/1680. *San Giorgio*, as will be seen in the next Chapter, was also involved in the collection of administrative fees related to Average procedures.

²⁷⁸ See A. Pacini, *Desde Rosas a Gaeta. La costruzione della rotta spagnola nel Mediterraneo occidentale nel secolo XVI*, Milan, 2013, 319.

²⁷⁹ *San Giorgio* contributed for the 18,7% in the realization of the warehouses and for the 30,9% in the construction of the *Molo Nuovo*, vedi Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 159.

depending on the year, could exceed seven or eight times the total amount of ordinary port revenues.²⁸⁰ As early as 1545 the *Padri del Comune*, who benefited from a fixed contribution from *San Giorgio*, were forced to ask for a loan of 28,000 *lire* in 310 *luoghi*, to be repaid in ten years.²⁸¹ They used this money, among other things, for seabed excavation.²⁸² In exchange, *San Giorgio* obtained the collection of a tax of 4 *denari* for every *mezzarola* (158.04 lt.) of wine discharged in the *Darsena*.²⁸³

San Giorgio was directly interested in an increase of port traffic and infrastructures. The construction of new warehouses, for example, allowed to increase customs revenues through warehousing costs and to attract more businessmen to use the Genoese port facilities. Following the already observed increase in taxes on vessels in 1638 *San Giorgio's* financial aid to the port decreased.²⁸⁴ The annual contribution dropped from 16,000 *lire* per year in the period 1623-1644 to an average of 8937.10 *lire* in the years 1645-1656 and to a complete cessation in the period 1657-1661.²⁸⁵

The end of its financial involvement did not mean the end of *San Giorgio's* complex relationship with the port space and the goods in transit, nor the end of the port's primary role in the Republic's economy. On the contrary, this relationship intensified with the growth of the free port and the building of new warehouses. The contribution of a financial and banking institution proved to be decisive in the evolution and functioning of the complex apparatus analysed in the preceding paragraphs. *San Giorgio* lived in a symbiotic relationship with the state's institutions, a symbiosis that belies the alterity or divergence of interests with respect to the government, who actually needed *San Giorgio's* financial power and authority.

²⁸⁰ Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 173, 175.

²⁸¹ In addition to this, they received a fixed contribution from *San Giorgio* in *lire di paghe*. Extraordinary contributions for the excavation of the seabed were also frequent, vedi Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 97.

²⁸² Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 97.

²⁸³ Massa, 'Fattori tecnici', 110-111.

²⁸⁴ Grendi, 'I nordici e il traffico', 48-49.

²⁸⁵ The plague epidemic that struck the city between 1656 and 1657 must be taken into account, see Giaccherò, *Il Seicento*, 430-434. The final suspension of tributes, as already noted, did not occur until 1682.

3. Maritime Trade: Business Strategies and Risks

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3. Maritime Trade: Business Strategies and Risks

3.1 Financing Maritime Business in Genoa between the Medieval and Early Modern Period

The information flow, the voyage organization, the voyage's financing, and the option of either reducing or shifting the voyage's business risk to third parties all played a crucial role in the development of maritime trade. The efficiency in managing the port of Genoa and the tax system applied by the Republic, together with the free port policy previously examined, are not enough to explain the volume of maritime trade that, whether as a final destination or as a port of call, concerned Genoa. Genoa has been a privileged observation point due to both its importance as a port and the resourcefulness of the businessmen who resided there. The latter used cutting-edge financial instruments, which were popular in the main European market squares.¹ The businessmen could rely either on institutions with ancient roots, such as the GA, or on more modern financial instruments, such as maritime exchange loans or premium insurance.²

Even before shipowners faced the risk factors linked to ship management, shipowning and trading activities, their very first endeavour was the raising of capital to finance travel. Maritime expeditions only pay off upon arrival at their destination, providing earnings through freights or by selling their cargo. Before the voyage, however, the shipowners or the shipmasters had to bear preventive costs to supply the onboard provisions, to buy goods or to hire the crew.³ The capital could be obtained by using funds from previous profits, using the accumulated stocks following previous earnings or by entering into debt.⁴ This

¹ See G. Felloni, *Genova e la storia della finanza: una serie di primati*, Genoa, 2005.

² While maritime loans, *commenda* and all the tools examined in these pages were typical market instruments, GA was not; see M. Fusaro, 'Introduction: sharing risks, on averages and why they matter', in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., *Sharing risk*, forthcoming. On the development of risk management, see M. Billings, 'A historical perspective on risk management', in M. Woods, P. Linsley ed., *The Routledge Companion to Accounting and Risk*, Abingdon-New York, 2017, 5-14.

³ A shipowner, for example, would acquire some shares in a vessel in order to pay only part of the construction costs and spread the risk of shipwreck over several vessels. This practice was used in Genoa since the fifteenth century, see Heers, *Gênes au XVe siècle*, 288-291.

⁴ Excessive debt, however, could undermine the stability of the business or wipe out its profit margins. See B. Supple, 'The Nature of Enterprise', in E.E. Rich, C.H. Wilson eds., *The*

last strategy was more often common practice, as it allowed the shipowners to shift part of the business risk onto the creditor.

As in the main Italian marketplaces, in Genoa, the credit instruments that developed between the Middle Ages and the modern age to meet the needs of shipowners or merchants belonged to two main categories: contracts of association and credit agreements.⁵ Contracts of association allowed splitting the profits and risks between the investors of the capital and the shipmasters/shipowner; even GA made the relationship between shipowners and merchants similar to a society. Credit agreements, on the other hand, according to local customs and the debtors' needs, provided funds on terms different from those available under the market conjuncture.

Contracts of association complied with the principle of finance equity: since the return to equity investors was a pro rata share of the profits, they also bore a pro rata share of all the risks to which the business was exposed.⁶ The most common contracts of this kind were the sea *commenda* — also known as *accomendatio* in Genoa and *collegantia* in Venice — and the *implicita*.⁷ Such contracts were temporary arrangements, limited in time or for a single investment.⁸ The *commenda* was a contract of association for capital and work and allowed the contract partner to buy goods to sell elsewhere, usually overseas, and then to split the earnings amongst the business partners.⁹ These contracts in Genoa usually stated the route and the first port of call. Other than

Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 5, *The Economic Organization of Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge, 1977, 393-461.

⁵ See A. Zanini, 'Financing and risk sharing in Genoa's maritime trade: strategies and practices (Eighteenth Century)', in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., *Sharing risk*, forthcoming.

⁶ M. Kohn, 'Risk instruments in the medieval and early modern economy', Dartmouth College, *Department of Economics working paper*, 99/07, 1999, 1, 2, available on https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=151871, accessed on 29/06/2021. A similar principle, as mentioned, underlies the very concept of GA.

⁷ The origin of this institution is uncertain. According to some theories it derives from the Roman *societas* or from medieval legal doctrines, see J.H. Pryor, 'The origins of the commenda contract', *Speculum* 51/1, 1977, 5-37. Jewish and Arabic origins have also been suggested. See A. Udovitch, 'At the origins of the western commenda', *Speculum* 37/2, 1962, 198-207; A. Sacerdoti, 'Le colleganze nella pratica degli affari e nella legislazione veneta', in *Atti del R. Istituto di Scienze, Letteratura ed Arti* VIII, II/2, 1899-1900, 1-45.

⁸ Jurists have pointed out that the *commenda* and the *implicita* were not partnership contracts, see Targa, *Ponderationi*, 150.

⁹ The *commenda* appeared for the first time in Islamic Arabia. Islamic jurists in the eighth and ninth centuries called it *qirad* or *mudarabah*. *Commenda* contracts arrived in Italy only between the eleventh and twelfth centuries, see R. Harris, 'General average and all the rest: the law and economics of early modern maritime risk mitigation', in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., *Sharing risk*, forthcoming. See also G. Astuti, *Origine e svolgimento storico della Commenda fino al sec. XII*, Turin, 1933.

that, the shipmaster was given much leeway.¹⁰ The most common practice was for the partner who remained ashore (*socius stans*, or *commendante*) to handle the full sum of the capital and to in turn receive $\frac{3}{4}$ of the revenues, whereas the partner who did the voyage (*socius tractans*, *commendatario*) received the remaining $\frac{1}{4}$. In Genoa, to better safeguard the *tractans*, the allocation of profits deriving from the *commenda* was given priority over other types of contracts and credit obligations.¹¹ In the *impietta*, also known as the *implicita*, the *tractans* received a fixed percentage of the profits rather than a proportional share.¹² The statutes of the Republic, as it can be seen, displayed both the *commenda* and the *impietta*.¹³

We declare that the *accomenda* is to be understood as the money to be sent for the purchase of goods and the goods to be sent for the sale and that all the proceeds are to be used for other goods and not for those things in which the person who brings them or administers them has a share. However, we declare that the *impietta* is a purchase of goods ordered by the commissioners, in which the person who administers or executes the goods has no part but only takes his commission, provided that no company or other reason has been imposed in the aforesaid *accomende* and *impiette*. The *accomendatario* is the one who takes care of the execution of the *accomende* or *impiette*, but the *accomendatore* is the one who orders to anyone who participates in the *accomende* or *impiette*.¹⁴

The *societas maris*, also called bilateral *commenda*, particularly common during the twelfth century, was similar to the abovementioned contracts. The capital in the *societas maris* was provided by both parties, who then split $\frac{3}{4}$ of the profits for the *stans* shareholder in proportion to the given values. The *tractans*

¹⁰ F. Ciccaglione, 'Il contratto di commenda nella storia del Diritto italiano', *Il Filangieri*, XI/1, 1886, 322-338, 383-406, 389-390.

¹¹ As the most 'vulnerable' party, he would receive his share of the profits first in order to face any unforeseen expenses related to commercial shipping.

¹² Targa, *Ponderationi*, 151. When it came to practice, however, such distinction was not as clear-cut. See Targa, *Ponderationi*, 150-158. M.S. Rollandi, 'Mimetismo di bandiera nel Mediterraneo del secondo Settecento. Il caso del Giorgio inglese', *Società e Storia* 130, 2010, 721-742.

¹³ ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, *Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1613, IV, chap. XIII, 'Delle accomende et impiette', 128.

¹⁴ "Dichiariamo che l'accomenda s'intenda de denari da mandarsi per compra de merci e di merci da mandarsi, accioché siano vendute; tutto il proceduto s'impieghi in altre merci o non s'impieghi in quelle cose nelle quali colui che le porta, o ne ha l'amministrazione, è partecipe. Ma dichiariamo l'impietta compra de merci ordinata per i committenti, nelle quali colui che amministra o essequisce non ha parte, ma solamente piglia la sua provigione, pur che nelle predette accomende et impiette non sia stata imposta alcuna compagnia o ragione. L'accomendatario è quello che ha cura di essequire l'accomende, o impiette; ma l'accomendatore è quello che ordina a qualsivoglia che è partecipe nell'accomende o impiette". See ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, *Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1613, IV, chap. XIII, 'Delle accomende et impiette', 130.

shareholder kept the remaining $\frac{1}{4}$ of the profits as compensation for their work.¹⁵ In the event of shipwreck, jettison, robbery, etc., these bilateral contracts also specified how the payment for these damages was to be shared based on the capital invested in the enterprise.¹⁶ Last, there was the *colonna* contract, namely, the *societas navis*, which is probably less common in the early modern period but of which it is still possible to find occasional traces in Average documentation presented in Genoa until the middle of the seventeenth century.¹⁷ This contract included the financier, who put in the capital, the shipmaster or shipowners, who contributed the ship, and the sailors, who provided the work.¹⁸ All of the profits were divided by three, while any possible damage was shared only between the financiers and the shipmaster/shipowners. The sailors did not contribute ever, not even in the case of jettisons or shipwrecks.¹⁹

The main issue with finance equity and the use of such instruments was that they exposed the investors to all maritime risks.²⁰ For this reason, investors often needed to employ more money, thus increasing transaction costs. According to Douglass North's definition, transaction costs are the costs of specifying and enforcing the contracts that underlie exchange and therefore

¹⁵ The limited capitals and financial resources of commercial operators led to the initial success of the bilateral *commenda*, which offered more guarantees to the *stans* partner. From the thirteenth century onwards, greater security on the seas and greater financial availability led to a preference for the unilateral *commenda*, which was more favourable to both investors and merchants, who were better protected against risks. See Astuti, *Origin and Development*, 38. The increase in capital was also facilitated by the statutory rules that permitted the investment of minor assets in the *commenda* contracts. For Genoa see V. Promis ed., *Statuti della colonia genovese di Pera*, Genoa, 1870, ch. CVIII, 'de pecunia minorum collocanda', 663; ch. CXX, 'de tutore et curatore potestatem non habentibus mittendi per mare pecuniam minorum', 669. In the medieval period the main Genoese families, such as the Spinola, frequently invested their capital in *commenda* and *societas maris* contracts. See M. Weber, *The history of commercial partnership in the Middle Ages*, Lanham, 2002 (1st ed. 1889), 74. This contract, unlike a traditional partnership contract, hindered the contribution of shares of different amounts which had to be separated in further unilateral *commenda* contracts, see D. Puncuh, 'Il documento commerciale in area mediterranea', in D. Puncuh ed. *Cinquant'anni tra archivi e biblioteche: 1956-2006*, Genoa, 2006, 785-882, 834-835.

¹⁶ Astuti, *Origine e svolgimento*, 31.

¹⁷ An example is the voyage of shipmaster Geronimo Trani's vessel of Sestri Ponente, bound from Naples to Genoa in 1640 with a cargo of raw materials for making paper and wine. The wine was intended for "coloro che li avevano dato li denari per comprarlo in colonna", see ASG, NG 2084/136, 09/04/1640.

¹⁸ Weber, *The history*, 74-77. See also A. Carrino, B. Salvemini, 'Come si costruisce uno spazio mercantile: il Tirreno nel Settecento', *Studi storici* 1, 2012, 47-73.

¹⁹ This was both in compliance with chap. 245 of the *Consolat de Mar*, and because sailors lost their wages in case of damages, see Targa, *Ponderationi*, 160-161.

²⁰ Such contracts, for instance, were not very attractive to investors who had liquidity but were unfamiliar with the maritime sector. On this aspect see G. Rossi, 'Barratry of the shipmaster in early modern law: polysemy and *mos italicum*', *The Legal History Review* 87, 2019, 65-85.

comprise all the costs of political and economic organization.²¹ For example, the contracts could require the sending of a trusted subordinate on board or at the port of loading to verify the shipmaster's behaviour and competence.

However, operators involved in the maritime trade could still rely on other tools that could protect them at least partially from maritime risks. *Cambio* and *mutuo* developed in Genoa from the middle of the twelfth century and represented important innovations from which new types of contracts, such as letters of credit and sea loans, would derive.²² One of the first new instruments to allow access to credit was the stipulation of *mutui*, known in Genoa by the formula *habuisse et recepisse mutuo*.²³ These loans could be unconditional, i.e., intended for use in the purchase of goods through a deferred payment, or aleatory, that is, the payment is contingent upon the safe arrival of what had been exposed to the risk. Except for Venice, where a customary interest of 20% was applied, in other marketplaces, commercial operators masked the interest with the formula *gratis et amore Dei*.²⁴ At the urging of a Genoese archbishop—Siro II or maybe Ugo dalla Volta—between 1159 and 1181, Pope Alexander III vouched against this type of contract, pointing out that “venditores peccatum incurunt”. However, merchants continued using them in the following centuries.²⁵ The other most widely used loan in medieval times was the maritime loan, derived by the Roman *foenus nauticum* and regulated in the Justinian *Digesto*.²⁶ Expressed in money or goods, the maritime loan was specifically intended for maritime traffic, which travelled at the risk of the lender to whom the trafficked goods had been pledged.²⁷ Maritime loan agreements became more sophisticated in time by specifying the type of vessel, the itinerary, the length of the journey and the expected port of calls, as well as the

²¹ See D. North, ‘Transaction costs, institutions and economic history’, *Journal of institutional and theoretical economics* 140, 1984, 7-17, 7.

²² Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 850.

²³ Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 801.

²⁴ Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 802.

²⁵ Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 803.

²⁶ Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 791. The sea loan was known to the Byzantine Empire, it was not accepted by Islamic law and remerged in the Latin West with the revival of trade in Italy, see R. Harris, *Going the Distance: Eurasian Trade and the Rise of the Business Corporation, 1400-1700*, Princeton, 2020.

²⁷ Unless specific conditions were met, the debtor was entitled to the profits of the expedition and had to repay the creditor and keep the rest. In the event of losses, the creditor could claim against the entire assets of the debtor. See G. Bonolis, *Il diritto marittimo medievale dell'Adriatico*, Pisa, 1921, 456.

interest, which was usually higher than that of ordinary loans.²⁸ These loans were always linked to the safe outcome of the expeditions.²⁹

The most common loan instrument in modern age was the *cambium maritimum*, namely, the sea loan.³⁰ It was the direct evolution of maritime loans and a variant of the well-known bill of exchange.³¹ Known simply as *cambio* in Italy during the early modern period, this was a high-risk and high profit loan, which became one of the cornerstones of European maritime commerce.³² The investor lent the capital to the operator involved in maritime trade for a specific journey or amount of time. At the end of the contract, the investor obtained, exclusively at the investor's own risk, both the return of the initial capital and the interests accrued. At the time of drafting of the document, the latter was specified in a different currency.³³ The recipient of the loan could mortgage as warranty the vessel and freights and/or the potential goods that had been loaded. As happened with maritime loans, the contracts specified the main elements related to the voyage. In this contract, the debtor was free from any obligation in the event that the mortgaged goods were lost.³⁴

According to the Genoese jurist Carlo Targa, the maritime carrier would rather resort to the sea loans, as this allowed him to immediately have at his disposal an amount of money that he could use to resolve any possible

²⁸ Interest was also referred to as *pretium periculi*, see J.M. Pardessus, *Collection des lois maritimes antérieures au XVIIIe siècle*, I, Paris, 1828, 47. It was usually also followed by the opt-out of the *privilegium fori*, see Puncuh, 'Il documento commerciale', 809.

²⁹ G. Astuti, 'recensione a U.E. Paoli, Studi sul processo attico', *Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica* XI, 1933, 261. Zanini, 'Financing and risk sharing'.

³⁰ On the application of this contract in Genoa see Lo Basso, 'Il finanziamento dell'armamento marittimo', 81-106; L. Lo Basso, 'The Maritime Loan as a Form of Small Shipping Credit (17th-18th centuries): The Case of Liguria', in A. Giuffrida, R. Rossi, G. Sabatini eds., *Informal Credit in the Mediterranean Area (XVI-XIX Centuries)*, Palermo, 2016, 145-173. In France it was called *prêt à la grosse aventure*, while in the Anglo-Saxon area a distinction was made between 'bottomry loan', guaranteed by the ship, and 'respondentia loan', guaranteed by the goods on board. See A. Baldasseroni, *Dizionario ragionato di giurisprudenza marittima, e di commercio*, 2, 1810, 357-358; A. Annesley, *A Compendium of the Law of Marine Insurance, Bottomry, Insurance on Lives and Insurance against Fire in which the Mode of Calculating Averages is Defined and Illustrated by Examples*, New York, 1808, 173-174.

³¹ See Hoover, 'The Sea Loan', 495-529. This credit instrument was derived from the maritime loan or *foenus nauticum*, a contract of Roman origin which was abandoned following Pope Gregory IX's condemnation of usury in 1236. See L. Piccinno, 'Genoa 1340-1620: early development of marine insurance', in A. Leonard ed., *Marine insurance. Origins and institutions, 1300-1850*, London, 2016, 25-46, 29.

³² A.M. Bernal, *La financiación de la Carrera de Indias (1492-1824). Dinero y credito en el comercio colonial español con America*, Madrid, 1993, 27.

³³ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 73; Lo Basso, 'Il finanziamento dell'armamento', 82.

³⁴ This practice was also used, from about the middle of the seventeenth century, in the shipping sector, in the ransom of slaves and in fishing, see Lo Basso, 'Il Finanziamento dell'armamento', 93-96.

inconvenience and to take care of the voyage expenses.³⁵ The insurance practice, the most common alternative in the early modern period, would have allowed him to obtain the money only after the damage was done and following irregular timing.³⁶ Moreover, the shipowner, or the shipmaster, was not required to return the capital invested in case of accident; therefore, the entire casualty risk fell onto the lender. To legitimize this contract and to avoid incurring the accusation of usury, it was drawn up as a summary of three separate and artificial contracts, all of which were morally lawful and well familiar to the jurists.³⁷

The first contract was a loan for a sum of money in return for a share in the profits that would have been yielded by a certain capital. For example, a loan with a warranty on goods was negotiated based on the profits expected to be gained by selling those goods in the port of destination. The second contract was an implicit sale, drawn up between the seller and the buyer through the assignment of capital of which the seller required a percentage of the profits, quite like the maritime loans already examined. Finally, the third contract was a promise, made by the lender, to be accountable for risks *maris, piratarum et ignis*, as if it were an insurance contract.³⁸

In early modern period, interest in this type of loan was highly variable and depended on routes, seasons, vessels, and market conjuncture. The interest would range from 6% to 50%. The interest was hidden by using two different currencies, namely, the one used in the port of departure and the one in the port of arrival, for the return of the capital.³⁹ From the seventeenth century onward, Genoese businessman abandoned the practice of using different currencies, explicitly stating in the contract the compensation to the creditor, calculated as a percentage of the lent sum.⁴⁰ The lender could add specific clauses to limit his liability and reduce the interest rate. These included the possibility of excluding GA contributions, whose specific operation will be discussed in the next pages. In the ordinary drafting, the subject interested in the preservation of the

³⁵ On Targa's life and works see M.G. Merello Altea, *Carlo Targa giurista genovese del secolo XVII*, I, *La Vita e le opere*, Milan, 1967.

³⁶ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 72.

³⁷ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 74; Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, LXI, 220.

³⁸ Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, LXI, 224.

³⁹ Lo Basso, 'Il Finanziamento dell'armamento', 84. See also L. Freire Costa, 'Privateering and Insurance: Transaction Costs in Seventeenth-Century European Colonial Flows', in S. Cavaciocchi ed., *Ricchezza del mare, ricchezza dal mare. Secc. XIII-XVIII, Atti della "Trentasettesima Settimana di Studi"*, 11-15 aprile 2005, II, Florence, 2006, 703-726.

⁴⁰ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 136-137; Lo Basso, 'Il finanziamento dell'armamento', 88.

mortgaged assets was the creditor — also called the *cambista* — upon whom would fall any potential obligation linked to damage repartition or compensation.⁴¹ The contracting parties could agree to exclude this situation, leaving the borrower to repay the loan in full with — lower — interest.⁴²

Sea loans were exposed to different risks or fraud: the debtor could ask for multiple loans by continuing to mortgage the same assets; the value of the mortgaged assets could be overestimated and not be sufficient enough to repay the creditor in the event of insolvency; and with the help of the crew, the shipmaster could deliberately cause a shipwreck, avoiding thus the repayment of the credit.⁴³ Various measures were adopted in Genoa to limit frauds. First, the legislation imposed that it would not be possible to request sea loans for sums that exceeded two-thirds of the mortgaged assets;⁴⁴ sea loan debts would expire after thirty years.⁴⁵ Furthermore, according to a decree issued on 20 May 1644, all sea loans and *commenda* contracts had to be entered in a register kept by the chancellor of the *Conservatori del Mare*, which was also the court in charge in case of fraud.⁴⁶ In 1654, however, the *Conservatori* were still asking the *Collegi* for authorization to compile the register, a clear sign of the difficulty in applying this measure.⁴⁷ The *Senato* granted a new special law in 1668 ordering the register's redaction. Between 1698 and 1707, to identify contracts and contractors, the *Conservatori* still recalled the need for the correct compilation of the register with all the relevant annotations, and they asked to register contracts that had been drawn up abroad.⁴⁸ Note that the *Conservatori del Mare*, which was responsible for both Average proceures and the register of

⁴¹ Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, LXI, 229.

⁴² Targa, *Ponderationi*, 137, 140.

⁴³ See ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 20/05/1644; Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, LXI, 222. The creditor in these cases could claim against the assets of the shipmaster/receiver, see Puncuh, 'The Commercial Document', 806. Other frauds could take place in the currency used for the exchange, as in the fraud perpetrated by the Genoese against the Ottoman Empire in the 1660s. They passed off a French coin, the *luigino*, by adulterating it with less silver than its nominal value. The system involved making sea loans in Genoa or in Livorno in *luigini*, to be repaid on return in pieces of eight. The profit derived both from the sea loan and from the different intrinsic value between bad and good money, see Cipolla, C.M., *Tre storie extra vaganti*, Bologna, 1994.

⁴⁴ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 148.

⁴⁵ Gatti, *Navi e Cantieri*, 108.

⁴⁶ Documentation on the legislative process of this decree is in ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 20/05/1644. The documents concerning the second half of the eighteenth century, the only systematically preserved records for the early modern period, are in ASG, *CdM*, Cambi 378-386, 1782-1798.

⁴⁷ "[...] Primieramente, che si debba formare quel libro che sin l'anno 1644 a 20 di maggio fu ordinato da serenissimi collegi in tutto come si contiene nella relatione che fece in quel tempo il prestantissimo magistrato [...]", in ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 21/10/1654.

⁴⁸ ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 24/11/1707.

sea loans and criminal proceedings involving both of these institutes, drafted legislations in conjunction with the two issues during the seventeenth century, as I will show in the following pages.

Scholars have defined the sea loan as the imperfect ancestor of insurance due to its obvious similarities with this type of contract.⁴⁹ It is significant, however, that in the eighteenth century, Genoese merchants still resorted to sea loan rather than the newer consolidated insurance contract.⁵⁰ In fact, in the event of an accident, it could take a long time before insurers settled claims, and this would entail an expense for shipmasters, shipowners or merchants, who in the meantime had to resort to invest more capital, reduce their capital investments, or even temporarily suspend their activity. With sea loans, without further consequences for the debtor, the occurrence of damage immediately nullified the obligation to repay the loan.⁵¹ In Genoa, there was also a fiscal motivation: while sea loan contracts were exempt from taxes, insurance contracts were charged a half percent on the insured capital, therefore increasing the obligations borne by the contractor.⁵² Sea loans and insurance contracts were not mutually exclusive. A mortgaged asset in a sea loan contract could be insured:⁵³ for example, in the event of a shipwreck, the exchange agent/debtor could ask the creditor for an insurance premium or for a sum for the insurance established within the sea loan.⁵⁴ In the event of shipwreck, depending on what was specified in the contract, either the exchange agent, the insurer, or the owner of the asset him- or herself could pitch in. The profound interconnection amongst the instruments analysed in these pages is therefore undeniable.

⁴⁹ Zanini, 'Financing and risk sharing'; C. Kingston, 'Governance and Institutional Change in Marine Insurance, 1350–1850', *European Review of Economic History* 18/1, 2014, 1-18, 2.

⁵⁰ Zanini, 'Financing and risk sharing.'

⁵¹ Procrastination in payment was a frequent occurrence, despite repeated regulations aimed at preventing it. According to the Barcelona *Ordenanzas*, for example, the maximum time limit before proceeding to payment was 2 months for voyages to Spain or the Balearics, 3 months for those to southern Italy or North Africa, 4 months for voyages beyond these limits and 6 months if there was no more news of the vessel. See Corrieri, *Il consolato del mare*, 551.

⁵² G. Giaccherio, *Storia delle assicurazioni marittime. L'esperienza genovese dal Medioevo all'Età contemporanea*, Genoa, 1984, 119-128.

⁵³ However, limitations could be applied to avoid fraud. In the *Ordenanzas* of Barcelona, for example, the mortgage for maritime exchange could not exceed the value of the sum insured, see Pardessus, *Collection des lois*, 5, 496.

⁵⁴ Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, LXVI, 229.

3.2 *Managing Risk: Insurance Between Law and Practice*⁵⁵

Alongside the practices for obtaining credit, the ability to share and transfer maritime risks is a key element of commercial activities.⁵⁶ The risks are divided into two main categories: casualty risks and market risks.⁵⁷ Casualty risks are accidents, such as the jettison of goods or equipment, shipwrecks, encountering pirates, and unexpected delays, that occur during navigation. Market risk, on the other hand, refers to the possible losses due to adverse conditions of the money market or the commercial market, and that might occur upon the arrival of the cargo at its destination. As a matter of fact, the high costs of transportation and transaction resulted in national and international markets becoming fragmented and vulnerable; this meant that prices could undergo sudden and significant changes even during a single journey. The main strategies for dealing with casualty risk consisted of finding new routes, travelling in convoys, improving the fitting out of ships, or dividing the load on several different vessels. Market risk, on the other hand, could be addressed by improving intelligence gathering and by diversifying activities across multiple assets and markets.⁵⁸

According to Douglass North, the development of insurance practices and the diversification of profitable investments were important institutional innovations that facilitated risk management and by doing so, reduced transaction costs.⁵⁹ Insurance practice separated casualty risks from credit risks. Casualty risk was a variable influenced by the chosen route, the period of the year or the political situation. All these elements were evaluated and analysed by the insurer. The latter, based on the information available to him, established the premium that the insured had to pay and could share insurance coverage with other policyholders. In a competitive insurance market, the insurer had to be able to price a risk premium that was sufficiently accurate and

⁵⁵ This paragraph is partly the re-elaboration of the section I wrote for an article written with Luisa Piccinno: 'Shifting and sharing risk: average and insurance between law and practice', in P. Hellwege, G. Rossi eds., *Maritime risk management. Essays on the history of marine insurance, general average and sea loan*, Berlin, 2021, 83-110.

⁵⁶ Piccinno, 'Genoa, 1340-1620', 27.

⁵⁷ Kohn, 'Risk instruments', 1.

⁵⁸ See Doria, 'Conoscenza del mercato', 91-156. On the English scenario, see R. Davis, *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, New York, 1962.

⁵⁹ D. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge, 1990, 126-127.

competitive.⁶⁰ The insurance contract, an original creation by medieval Italian merchants and developed between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, largely derived its structure from that of other contracts that have been previously examined, such as the *mutuo*.⁶¹ Policies in the late medieval period usually had to be registered in front of a notary and took the form of a 'contingent loan', the opposite of a sea loan.⁶² The insurer promised to pay a specific sum unless the ship or cargo arrived safely in port. This sum also included the return of the premium paid before the voyage.⁶³ To avoid accusations of usury, the distinction between investment and speculation was fundamental. Within the community, concepts, such as credibility and trust, were essential in the insurance practice, whose proceeds were usually modest.⁶⁴ Between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, although still often accused of being *culpabilis and execrabilis*, some jurists, such as Saint Bernardino of Siena, justified the practice because of the social utility elicited in the commercial field.⁶⁵

In medieval Genoese documents, insurance was hidden in the form of a mortgage, in which the insurer appeared as the borrower and was required to reimburse a fictitiously paid sum only if the ship had not arrived safely at its destination.⁶⁶ Gradually, jurists recognized that the risk could be remunerated according to the potential loss of earnings with respect to the direct

⁶⁰ G. Ceccarelli, 'The price for risk-taking: marine insurance and probability calculus in the late Middle Ages', *Journal Électronique d'Histoire des Probabilités et de la Statistique* 3/1, 2007, 1-26.

⁶¹ G. Cassandro, 'Note storiche sul contratto di assicurazione', *Assicurazioni* XXVI/1, 1959, 16-57. See also Piccinno, 'Genoa, 1340-1620'.

⁶² For a distinction between maritime loan, *foenus nauticum*, sea loan and insurance loan see F.E. De Roover, 'Early examples of marine insurance', *The journal of Economic History* 5/2, 1945, 172-200; E. Spagnesi, 'Aspetti dell'assicurazione medievale', in E. Spagnesi, G.S. Pene Vidari, B. Caizzi eds. *L'Assicurazione in Italia fino all'unità: saggi storici in onore di Eugenio Artom*, Milan, 1975, 1-187, 38.

⁶³ The premium consisted of the difference between the sum borrowed and the sum declared. See Puncuh, 'Il documento commerciale', 868. In the late medieval period the contract became a conditional purchase. The insurer agreed to buy the vessel or the cargo from the insured only if it did not arrive in port. Between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, came the principle of *emptio-venditio periculi*, recognised by jurists Pietro Santerna, Benvenuto Stracca, Sigismondo Scaccia and Carlo Targa. See E.C. Pia, "'From heaven to earth": developments in insurance', *Reti Medievali Rivista* 19/1, 2018, 177-187, 185.

⁶⁴ Pia, '«Dal cielo alla terra»', 177-187.

⁶⁵ Spagnesi, 'Aspetti dell'assicurazione', 82. On the concept of 'social utility', better theorised in the eighteenth century, see K. Stapelbroek, 'La libertà del commercio. Problemi politici, istituzionali e costituzionali dello stato commerciale del '700', in D. Andreozzi ed., *Attraverso i conflitti. Neutralità e commercio fra età moderna ed età contemporanea*, Trieste, 2017, 13-27; G. Ceccarelli, 'Quando rischiare è lecito. Il credito finalizzato al commercio marittimo nella riflessione scolastica tardomedievale', in Cavaciocchi ed., *Ricchezza del mare*, 1187-1199.

⁶⁶ Puncuh, 'Il documento commerciale', 872-873.

management of the borrowed money.⁶⁷ The lawfulness of the operation was accompanied by a rise in resorting to intermediaries connecting shipmasters/shipowners with private investors: *sensali*.⁶⁸ Community networks, in which operators often shared risks by acting at the same time as insurers for the operations of others and as the insured for their own operation, partially responded to the uncertainty in shipping.⁶⁹ In Genoa, it was common practice for patrician families who had sufficient financial liquidity to participate in multiple insurance contracts. Repeated voyages to the same destinations, a higher frequency of voyages, thicker trade networks, and larger commercial and financial family firms gradually lead to the accumulation of sufficient information about the *a priori* probabilities.⁷⁰

From a regulatory point of view, Genoa was one of the most active and avant-garde actors in this sector.⁷¹ The first insurance policy known to date was stipulated in the city on 18 March 1343 by the notary Tommaso Casanova, although it included a prior agreement drawn up in Pisa previously on 20 February.⁷² Dating back to 1369, the first rule aimed at regulating the sector was a decree of *doge* Gabriele Adorno, who tried to limit disputes in the context

⁶⁷ M. Bukala, *Risk and medieval negotium. Studies of the Attitude towards Entrepreneurship: from Peter the Chanter to Clarus Florentinus*, Spoleto, 2014, 119.

⁶⁸ Policy underwriting was not a sector for specialists. The operators were often merchants, shipowners, bankers, see Kohn, 'Risk instruments', 6.

⁶⁹ G. Ceccarelli, 'Tra solvibilità economica e status politico: mercato delle assicurazioni marittime a Firenze (secc. XIV-XV)', in B. Molina, G. Scarcia eds., *Politiche del credito. Investimento consumo solidarietà, Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Asti, 20-22 marzo 2003)*, Asti, 2004, 191-221; see also G. Ceccarelli, *Un mercato del rischio. Assicurare e farsi assicurare nella Firenze rinascimentale*, Venice, 2012.

⁷⁰ Scholars do not agree on the role of insurance in the shipping business. According to Frank Knight, insurance was the outcome of the conversion of uncertainty into risk. Douglass North further specified this, taking a position that is not mutually exclusive with Knight's theories: he wrote that insurance was a solution reached through a gradual and continuous institutional development. See F.H. Knight, *Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit*, Boston, 1921; North, *Institutions, institutional change*.

⁷¹ See V. Piergiovanni, 'Le assicurazioni marittime', in Piergiovanni ed., *Norme, scienza e pratica*, II, 869-882; V. Piergiovanni, 'L'Italia e le assicurazioni nel secolo XIX', in Piergiovanni ed., *Norme, scienza e pratica*, 827-868. See also E. Bensa, *Il contratto di assicurazione nel medioevo*, Genoa, 1884; L.A. Boiteux, *La fortune de mer, le besoin de sécurité et les débuts de l'assurance maritime*, Paris, 1968. On the economic evaluation of the insurance contract see F. Melis, *Origini e sviluppo dell'assicurazione in Italia (secoli XIV-XVI)*, I, *Le fonti*, Rome, 1975.

⁷² Giaccherò, *Storia delle assicurazioni*, 23, 215. The insurance practice is also mentioned in a provision of the *Breve portus Kallaritani* of 1318, although opinions differ on the term *securare*. See Bensa, *Il contratto di assicurazione*, 49-50; Lattes A., 'L'assicurazione e la voce "securare" in documenti genovesi del 1191 e 1192', *Rivista del Diritto commerciale e del Diritto generale delle obbligazioni* XXV, 1927, 64-73. Other historians attributed a more ancient tradition to Florentine rules. See F. Melis, *L'economia fiorentina del Rinascimento*, Florence, 1984, 121-126; J. Heers, *Genova nel Quattrocento*, Milan, 1983, 141; G. Valeri, 'I primordi dell'assicurazione attraverso il documento del 1329', *Rivista del Diritto commerciale e del Diritto generale delle obbligazioni* XXVI, 1928, 601-641.

of sea loans, *mutui* and insurance contracts.⁷³ These disputes were generally caused by those who exploited the lack of clarity of the clauses necessary to avoid the canonical prescriptions of usury, to evade payment obligations or to implement fraudulent or speculative practices. For example, this provision forbade the policies stipulated after the accident and those relating to foreign ships, on which it was more difficult to collect information quickly.⁷⁴

At the regulatory level, this institution developed along two axes.⁷⁵ On the one hand, the sector was progressively regulated because of the transposition of rules from the *Ordenanzas de seguros marítimos de Barcelona*, issued between 1435 and 1484, and inserted as an appendix to *the Libro del Consolat de Mar*.⁷⁶ The *Ordenanzas* governed the contract, focusing on the merits of its practical drafting and also establishing precise procedures for resolving disputes.⁷⁷ According to the Genoese jurist Casaregi, the *Ordenanzas* were not universally recognized 'laws' but general 'rules', which were more or less applicable according to local customs.⁷⁸ However, in an effort to prevent abusive practices, the *Ordenanzas* of 1484 imposed constraints and controls

⁷³ 'Contra allegantes quod cambia et assecuramenta facta quovicumque coum scriptura, vel sine, sint illicita et usuraia', issued on the 22 October 1369. This document is reproduced in Bensa, *Il contratto di assicurazione*, 149-151. This rule was draft to legitimise insurance and speed up contracts. It was, however, a special law that did not represent an attempt at comprehensive codification, as happened with the *Barcelona Ordenanzas* in the following century. See F. Mansutti, 'La più antica disciplina del contratto di assicurazione: le Ordinanze sulle sicurtà marittime', *Assicurazioni, rivista di diritto, economia e finanza delle assicurazioni private* LXXIV/4, 2008, 683-693. According to Melis, the first real Italian legislation was made in Florence in 1523. See Melis, *Origini e sviluppo*, 166. According to others, the first one was the *Codice per la veneta mercantile marina* of 1786. See G. Cassandro, *Saggi di storia del diritto commerciale*, Naples, 1982, 251.

⁷⁴ Piccinno, 'Genoa, 1340-1620', 33-34.

⁷⁵ D. Gioffré, *Mostra storica del documento assicurativo del XIV-XVI secolo: Palazzo S. Giorgio, 29 aprile-10 maggio 1969*, Genoa, 1969, 19-20. Between the last decades of the sixteenth century and the 1620s, Genoa was one of the most active centres in the insurance market. Its slow decline began only after the military aggression of the Savoy in 1626-1627. It continued in the following decades due to both the slowdown in merchant activities resulting from the general crisis in the Italian economy and the increasing competition from Livorno. This decline can also be seen in the lower income of the *gabella di sicurtà*, which dropped from more than 88,000 *lire* in 1627 to around 52,000 *lire* in 1629. It then settled at a lower level, between 20 and 30,000 *lire*, in the following years. See Giacchero, *Storia delle assicurazioni*, 125. On the rise of Livorno as a thriving commercial and insurance business centre, see A. Addobbati, 'Italy 1500-1800: cooperation and competition', in Leonard ed., *Marine insurance*, 46-77, 63.

⁷⁶ The *Ordenanzas* are published in Catalan and French in Pardessus, *Collection des lois maritimes*, vol. 5, 493-543.

⁷⁷ These include, for example, the possibility of insuring foreign vessels and goods, unless they were departing from beyond the Strait of Gibraltar, the insured's ownership of the interest covered, the advance payment of the premium. See Addobbati, 'Italy 1500-1800', 49.

⁷⁸ "[...] leges particulares civitatis Barchinoniensis non sunt attendendae in aliis mundi emporiis, nis eas de consuetudine receptas fuisse probatum fuerit [...]", in Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, 27. Of Genoese origin, Casaregi practised law in his city before moving to Tuscany as a judge of the *Rota* in Siena and then in Florence. See V. Piergiovanni, 'Giuseppe Lorenzo Maria Casaregi', in Piergiovanni ed., *Norme, scienza e pratica*, I, 57-63.

that were often considered excessive.⁷⁹ Perhaps for these reasons, to cope with the expansion of traffic and the growth in demand for insurance coverage, Genoese rulers chose to liberalize the sector, responding to the requests of shipowners, merchants and brokers. For example, on January 1408, more than thirty years earlier than in Florence, the *Magnifici* abolished the ban on insuring foreign boats and merchandise, while the ban on vessels bound for the Strait of Gibraltar and beyond remained in force.⁸⁰ The latter fell only a few years later, presumably around approximately 1420.⁸¹ Towards the middle of the fifteenth century, and later with respect to Florence, notaries began to redact policies in an explicit form in Genoa, and the recourse to brokers and *apodisie* increased. The latter was a private agreement by private or verbal writing, although the employment of notaries persisted.⁸² A law enacted in 1434 specified that brokers were directly responsible for the registration of the contracts in the public register, and for the payment of the 0.5% tax on the insured values required by the beneficiary of the policy. This tax increased over time, reaching 1.5% in 1490. From the sixteenth century, tax collectors began to calculate it based on the premium paid.⁸³

As far as the risks covered by the policies are concerned, it was common practice to insert the *ad florentinam* clause to indicate the maximum possible extension of coverage, including *risicum maris*, such as storms or shipwrecks, and *risicum gentium*, such as the capture by pirates or privateers.⁸⁴ The clauses often also included the risks derived from the unseaworthiness of the ship following harmful events during the voyage.⁸⁵ In this period, however, the rules

⁷⁹ For example, all insurance policies had to be stipulated by public deed; the whole regulation was mandatory and had to be mentioned in the policy; in case of a dispute, the parties had to address themselves compulsorily to the *Consolat de Mar* of Barcelona with renunciation of recourse to other magistracies; insurers had to swear an oath on the truthfulness of the agreements made; transgressors had to pay heavy fines. See Mansutti, 'La più antica disciplina', 5-6.

⁸⁰ Bonolis contested the Genoese precedence over Florence. He stated that the amendments to the Florentine Statutes of Mercanzia in 1405 and 1407 laid down exceptions that allowed the prohibition to be circumvented. See G. Bonolis, 'Contributo alla storia delle assicurazioni in Firenze', *Archivio Storico Italiano* V/22, 1898, 312-321, 315-316.

⁸¹ However, this ban did not seem to have a protectionist aim as it protected Genoese businessmen from the risks linked to information asymmetries with the Mediterranean basin, see Melis, *Origini e sviluppi*, I., 166; Giacchero, *Storia dell'assicurazione*, 33-34, 218-219.

⁸² D. Gioffré, 'Note sull'assicurazione e sugli assicuratori genovesi tra Medioevo ed età moderna', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* 9/1, 1969, 27-51, 32.

⁸³ Giacchero, *Storia dell'assicurazione*, 119-120.

⁸⁴ Giacchero, *Storia dell'assicurazione*, 33-34.

⁸⁵ To invalidate the policy, the insured had to be aware of a damage or loss to the insured asset prior to the conclusion of the contract, while it was irrelevant that the contract was drawn up after the loss if the loss was still unknown. In such cases the policy included the clause "a

did not mention coverage for damage caused by GA acts, and the documentation found to date does not allow us to shed full light on the matter.⁸⁶ If we consider the legislative production of the following century, it is reasonable to assume that policyholders could choose whether to include GA damages in the list of risks excluded from the policy.

The wide discretion left to the contractors and the lack of precise discipline led to some disputes in the middle of the sixteenth century. The *De Mercatura* treaty, published in 1553,⁸⁷ report some judgements of the *Rota Civile* of Genoa, the competent court in all civil cases worth more than one hundred *lire*. One of the judgements concerned the acceptance of the appeal filed by the insurers Agostino Lomellino and Stefano Pinelli and associates against the shipmaster Lorenzo Riccio and concerning throwing into the sea some insured goods, a harmful event that fell within the GA cases (*Decisio CXXIX*). The judges expressly stated that in the event of a jettison, the insurers were not held responsible for damage to the ship's equipment, the crew's property or the goods loaded. They were required to pay for any type of damage except *iactu & avaria*. This ruling was not aligned with those issued by the *Rota* in previous years, which it clearly overturned. This tribunal was more concerned with good faith and merchant customs than with the technical or legal aspects of the cases.⁸⁸

It is obvious that because of ambiguous regulations on this issue, judges were allowed a wide margin of discretion.⁸⁹ During the sixteenth century, legal

buona o cattivo nuova". See A. Brunetti, 'Svolgimento storico del diritto marittimo e le fonti', *Diritto marittimo privato italiano* 3/1, Turin, 1935, 218. This principle took into account the difficulty of the circulation of information at the time, so much so that an arbitrary travel speed was established which was judged sufficient to get the news across: according to the *Ordenanzas* this travel speed was one *lega* per hour, while according to the Genoese statutes it was two miles per hour, see Bensa, *Il contratto di assicurazione*, 107; BUG, *ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis*, Genoa, 1589, 159.

⁸⁶ Even the *Ordenanzas* do not mention this subject, see Pardessus, *Collection des lois maritimes*, 5, 493-543. On the links between Average and insurance practice see also par. 5.3.

⁸⁷ *De mercatura decisiones et tractatus varii*, Colonia, 1622.

⁸⁸ Piccinno, 'Genoa 1340-1620', 43.

⁸⁹ The first point in this judgement's argumentation declares that "Ad remotionem antecedentis sequitur remotio subsequentu", in *De mercatura*, 245. This judgement is also included in the collection of decisions of the *Rota* published in 1582, *Decisio CXXVIII. Assecurator non obligatus ad iactum teneturramen ad naula rerum iactarum*, in *Decisiones Rotae Genuae De Mercatura et Pertinentibus ad eam*, Venice, 1582, 104r-104v. On the decisive role played by the judgements of the courts of the states of *Ancien Régime* as a primary source of regulation of legal disputes, see G. Gorla, *Civilian judicial decisions: an historical account of Italian style*, New Orleans, 1970; M. Sbriccoli, A. Bettoni eds., *Grandi tribunali e rote nell'Italia dell'Antico Regime*, Milan, 1993; C.M. Moschetti, *Caso fortuito, trasporto marittimo e assicurazione nella giurisprudenza napoletana del Seicento*, Naples, 1994; I. Birocchi, *Alla ricerca dell'ordine: fonti e cultura giuridica nell'età moderna*, Turin, 2002; A. Monti, *Iudicare tamquam deus: I modi della*

doctrine played a relevant role, providing opinions and interpretations, helping to outline a unitary vision of the principles and rules on insurance. For example, the practice of limiting the insurance of an asset to only a fraction of its estimated value became widespread to reduce risky capital.⁹⁰

Genoese rules regarding insurance were for the most part an organic collection of laws previously enacted. They adopted a structure similar to that of the Florentine Statutes of *Sigurtà* of 1524,⁹¹ with which they also shared some fundamental principles.⁹² The latter, although they did not introduce any particular innovation, represented the first organic corpus of laws enacted on the subject. For this reason, they became a model upon which the normative productions of the main European commercial centres were based. Policy holders were bound to adopt a legal policy standard, which included specific sections for the variable elements of the contract, namely: the name of the insured, the indications for the identification and estimate of the value of the property exposed to danger, the journey to be made, and the name of the ship and shipmaster. Insurers could insert the clause in *quovis*,⁹³ which allowed the name of the ship or the exact composition of the insured cargo to be not specified.⁹⁴ Regarding the extension of insurance coverage, the 1524 Florentine Statutes asserted that the list of events provided the right to compensation, abandoning the use of the aforementioned permissive *ad florentinam* clause; the cover was valid until the completion of the unloading of the goods on land.⁹⁵ In the event of an accident, the insurer was required to pay within two months of

giustizia senatoria nel ducato di Milano tra Cinque e Seicento, Milan, 2003; A. Wijffels, R. van Rhee eds., *European supreme courts: a portrait through history*, Tempe, 2013.

⁹⁰ This practice was taken up by the Barcelona *Ordenanzas*, which stipulated that an 'overdraft' of 12.5% on the value of the insured goods was compulsory. This figure was doubled in the case of goods of an enemy nationality voyaging to and from Barcelona. See Pardessus, *Collection des lois maritimes*, 5, 525. This prohibition, however, does not appear in the *Consolat* Italian editions. See Mansutti, 'La più antica disciplina', 7.

⁹¹ In 1515, the Florentine *Rota* referred to the rules in the *Ordenanzas* for the resolution of disputes: "dove non n'è statuto, né leggie, che s'à a richorrere im quelli luoghi dove sono: che ssono quelli di Barzalona; e all'uso mercantile, che è questo statuto di Barzalona", in Melis, *Origine e sviluppi*, 168-170.

⁹² The text of the Florentine Statutes are partially published in A. Baldasseroni, *Trattato delle assicurazioni marittime*, III, Florence, 1786, 500-515. See also A. Baldasseroni, *Collezione delle leggi costituzioni ed usi delle principali piazze di commercio d'Europa per il regolamento delle assicurazioni cambi ed avarie raccolte dal cavaliere Ascanio Baldasseroni per servire di supplemento al Trattato delle assicurazioni marittime*, V, Livorno, 1804, 238-248.

⁹³ On this clause, in use from the beginning of the sixteenth century, see G.S. Pene Vidari, *Il contratto d'assicurazione nell'età moderna*, Milan, 1975, 255-257.

⁹⁴ However, not reporting particularly risky goods as perishable or of high unit value was a sufficient reason to invalidate the contract. See Pardessus, *Collection des lois maritimes*, IV, 602-603; Addobbati, 'Italy 1500-1800', 54.

⁹⁵ Baldasseroni, *Trattato delle assicurazioni*, IV, 240.

receiving a notification of the event, or after six months had passed without having received any news on the outcome of the voyage. This was, in fact, the principle of the provisional enforceability of the contract, a concept developed according to the *solve et repete* formula and introduced to avoid the delays and obstacles posed by insurers to avoid payments.⁹⁶

In Genoa, following the administrative and institutional reorganization culminated in the *Reformationes novae* of 1528 and the *Leges novae* of 1576, the long preparatory phase of the new *Statuti Civili* began. This phase started in 1551 and ended only in December 1588, with the promulgation decree and its subsequent publication and implementation in June of the following year.⁹⁷ The new statutes, as well as their subsequent editions translated into the vernacular and published without significant changes in the following two centuries, focused also on Average and insurance.⁹⁸ Although they make multiple references to the sixteenth century reforms that had preceded them, on maritime and commercial topics, the new *Statuti* evoked much older rules still dating back to the *Statuti* of 1413.⁹⁹ Perhaps the *Magnifici* wanted to guarantee the long-term continuity of a subject traditionally at the centre of the economic interests of the Genoese ruling class.

Chapter XVII of volume IV focuses exclusively on insurance. This Chapter follows the one on jettisons and GA, confirming the close relationship that existed and that still exists today between these two institutes.¹⁰⁰ Chapter XVII specified first how policies should always report the name of the insured and the insured object, whether it was “in goods, or in ships, or in all other things insured with or without mediation, mainly or indirectly”.¹⁰¹ The activity of brokers was freely permitted. The insurance premium corresponded to the cost of the

⁹⁶ Addobbati, 'Italy 1500-1800': 52; Bensa, *Il contratto di assicurazione*, 80.

⁹⁷ BUG, *ms. C. III. 13*, Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis, Genoa, 1589.

⁹⁸ As Rodolfo Savelli pointed out, “a Genova si stampavano e si ristampavano gli Statuti mentre sembra esservi stata una minore attenzione per le leggi”. Except for minor changes, the *Statuti Civili* remained substantially unchanged until the end of the 18th century. The last edition was published in 1787; see Savelli ed., *Repertorio degli statuti*, 145, 150.

⁹⁹ Attached to these statutes were also the *Liber Gazariae*, one of the few collections of laws preceding the 16th century statutes; see R. Savelli, 'Statuti e amministrazione della giustizia a Genova nel Cinquecento', *Quaderni Storici*, 37/110, 2002, 347-377, 362-363.

¹⁰⁰ BUG, *ms. C. III. 13*, Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis, Genoa, 1589, IV, chap. XVII. *De Securitatibus*, 158-160.

¹⁰¹ “Il rischio, o in merci, o né navigli, ovvero in tutte le altre cose assicurate mediatamente o immediatamente, principalmente o indirettamente”, in ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, *Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1613, IV, chap. XVII, 'Delle segortà', 141.

sigurtà.¹⁰² If the policy did not specify the value of the goods, and the damage had occurred in the first half of the voyage, then it would have been valued at the purchase price; if the accident had occurred in the second half of the voyage, it would have been considered the sales price inclusive of freight charges and taxes.¹⁰³ In the event of fraud involving multiple insurances on the same property, all policies after the first one would be null. The insurance stipulated after the *caso sinistro* (the accident) was not valid. This expression was also linked to the concept of Average and is defined in the Chapter itself:

It is not a *caso sinistro* unless the insured vessel, on which the goods or other things have been insured, has been reduced by accident to such a state that it cannot be repaired by human providence.¹⁰⁴

After the accident, the insured party had two options: he could terminate the contract of *sigurtà* and leave the *impietta* up to the insurers, making them become owners of the insured assets, or he could request the calculation of damages and compensation, as often happened after a GA.¹⁰⁵ In the same way, if the damage to the insured property exceeded 50% of its value, the insurer could choose to pay the compensation and acquire the object of the policy.¹⁰⁶

As previously stated, the practice of using predefined forms for the stipulation of insurance contracts was in use in Genoa. However, neither the *Statuti Civili* of 1589, nor the subsequent edition of 1613, included this model.¹⁰⁷ The

¹⁰² “Escluso il costo delle sigortà, il quale non s’intenda compreso in essa sigortà”, in ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, *Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1613, IV, chap. XVII, ‘Delle segortà’, 142.

¹⁰³ ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, *Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1613, IV, chap. XVII, ‘Delle segortà’, 142.

¹⁰⁴ “Non s’intenda caso sinistro, salvo se il naviglio assicurato, sopra il quale le merci o le altre cose saranno state assicurate, sarà stato ridotto per caso fortuito in tale stato che dalla provvidenza humana non possa esser riparato”. In these cases the shipmaster had to obtain within one month a declaration of the Genoese consul or, in his absence, of a local magistrate.

¹⁰⁵ “L’assicurato, in qualsivoglia caso sinistro, possa scodere le sigortà in tutto se vorrà, e le cose assicurate, o come si dice volgarmente lascia l’impietta agli assicuratori, a quali in tal caso spettino. O possa se vorrà far fare il calcolo sopra il danno secondo la forma de capitoli”, in ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, *Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1613, IV, chap. XVII, ‘Delle segortà’, 142.

¹⁰⁶ “E quando fosse stato dichiarato ascender il danno a cinquanta per cento, sia lecito a gli assicuratori pagare la somma intera assicurata e tener per se le cose assicurate, o pagar il danno dichiarato e lasciar la cosa assicurata all’assicurato”, in ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, *Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1613, IV, chap. XVII, ‘Delle segortà’, 142.

¹⁰⁷ In his commented edition of the *Statuti Civili* of the Republic of 1610, Baldasseroni reported a model of a *Polizza di Sicurtà marittima in Genova*. This model, however, refers to rules of 1780, which therefore excludes a previous chronological origin. See Baldasseroni, *Trattato delle assicurazioni*, IV, 309.

Genoese statutes, moreover, did not specify the list of risks covered, but they focused on other items, for example, the specific case of damages deriving from the GA. In this regard, Chapter XVII decreed the following:

If the insurers and the insured have not made any legal agreement with each other regarding the above, they shall be held to pay for the jettison which has been made and proved in accordance with the statutes, and they shall also be held to pay for the average [GA], which is all the damage which results from an accidental event, whether it occurs to the ship, to the inventory, or to the insured goods, as well as the expenses which may be incurred even if the damage does not occur; so far that one can say that the accident involves everything; and this is true for the apportionment of the jettison, or of the average which is due by the insured thing.¹⁰⁸

Therefore, insurers were formally required to pay for Average damages. Entirely similar in content but more detailed in form is the statutory Chapter reported by Baldasseroni, who probably erroneously linked it back to a 1610 edition:

If the insurers do not come to an agreement with the insured, in accordance with the agreed practice, they will be obliged to pay, according to the Statutes, for the jettison which has been made, and which can be proved, as well as the average [GA] (in which are included all the damages deriving from any accident to the ship, its belongings, or to the insured merchandise), in addition to the expenses, which will be caused by such accident, if it can be proved that they concerned the whole vessel, in proportion to the insured goods, whether of jettison, or average.¹⁰⁹

For the first time in Genoa, the rules explicitly established that unless otherwise agreed, the insurance covered damages and expenses deriving from Average events, and the insurer was required to indemnify the insured for the share pertaining to him. The *Conservatori del Mare* ordered the execution of the

¹⁰⁸ “Se gli assicuratori con l’assicurato, sopra l’infrascritte cose, non havranno fatto alcun patto lecito, siano tenuti del getto fatto, e provato secondo la forma degli statuti, ancora siano tenuti per l’avaria, la qual è tutto il danno, il quale segue per caso fortuito, ò accade nel naviglio, con l’inventario, ò nelle cose assicurate, oltre le spese, che possono occorrere ancorché egli non segua; talmente, che si possa dire di caso sinistro esser seguito sopra il tutto; e ciò per la rata, ò del getto, o dell’avaria che spetta alla cosa assicurata”. ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, *Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, IV, chap. XVII, ‘Delle segortà’, 142-143.

¹⁰⁹ “Se gli assicuratori non vengono ad un accomodamento con gli assicurati, conforme alla pratica accordata, saranno obbligati a bonificare a seconda degli Statuti, il getto che è stato fatto, e che può provarsi, come anche l’avaria (nella quale sono inclusi tutti i danni provenienti da qualunque sinistro, che accada al bastimento, sue appartenenze, o alle mercanzie assicurate) oltre le spese, che appariranno cagionate da tale sinistro, se può dimostrarsi che le medesime furono sopra l’intero in generale, qual proporzione che cade sulla parte delle robe assicurate, sia di getto di mare, o di avaria”. Baldasseroni, *Trattato delle assicurazioni*, IV, 307. No trace of this edition of the *Statuti Civili* actually appears in the repertoires, perhaps because of a dating error made by Baldasseroni or because it has been lost in the course of time. See Savelli, *Repertorio degli statuti*, 304-305.

calculation of damages only in the event that the jettison followed current regulations.¹¹⁰ The same was true for any other damage or expense arising from the shipmaster's actions aimed at pursuing the salvation of the shipment. This mixture between insurance and Average perhaps explains the high number of complaints filed in Genoa that certified damages without the practice leading to a calculation: it was probably an expedient tolerated by the authorities and that enabled the obtaining of a certificate to be enforced by the insurer to receive compensation for the losses suffered.¹¹¹

The *Statuti Civili* of the Republic therefore sanctioned the definitive integration between insurance institution and Average procedures as complementary business risk management tools in maritime trade.¹¹²

For example, consider again the journey of the ship the *Mercante di Dover* and its English shipmaster William Segent.¹¹³ The vessel carried a cargo of sugar, wool, and soda from Cartagena to Genoa in 1640. A storm near Mallorca damaged the cargo, especially the sugar, which partially melted when it came in contact with sea water, prompting the crew to perform emergency repair at sea. Following the declaration of GA, the calculation, whose detailed operation will be explained in the next pages, declared the contributory amount for each batch of cargo on board. However, as noted by the statutes and as recalled in the ruling of the *Rota Civile* at the bottom of the calculation, the owners of the assets could retaliate against their insurers:

Having made the due apportionment, we find that there is damage to the amount of 1.4.0.1/12 *lire* for every 100 *lire*, and we say that this amount should be accepted, reasoned, calculated, and paid among the merchandise, that is the merchants, and their insurers, and others who have, and may have, an interest in this calculation, freeing, as we do, the said captain William from the said damage suffered as a result of the said fortune [...].¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ BUG, *ms. C. III. 13*, Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis, Genoa, 1589, 159.

¹¹¹ Some documents only report the values of the vessel and its equipment, which was not sufficient information for a GA calculation, but may have been sufficient for shipmasters and shipowners to address their insurers. As an example, see the calculation in ASG, *NG 636*, 24/01/1601. Numerous other examples are in the *AveTransRisk* database, available on <http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/AveTransRisk>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

¹¹² Also in some Average procedures drawn up in Genoa, Genoese shipmasters and merchants specified how they wanted to submit to Genoese legislation. Perhaps this was for the benefit of insurers, who were thus obliged to pay for the GA contribution, see ASG, *NG 636*, 13/04/1600.

¹¹³ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50272.

¹¹⁴ "Fatto il dovuto ripartimento troviamo esservi di danno a ragione di lire 1.4.0.1/12 per ogni lire 100, e tanto alla detta ragione diciamo doverci accettare, ragionare, calcolare, e pagare tra le mercanzie, ossia mercanti, e suoi assicuratori, e altri che nel presente calcolo habbino, e possino avere interesse, liberando, come liberiamo, il detto capitano Guglielmo dal detto danno seguito per la detta fortuna patita [...]". ASG, *NG 2084*, 23/04/1640.

For example, the merchant Francesco Spinola had to contribute by paying approximately 1.25% of the value of his sugar. The notary who performed the calculation, Gio. Benedetto Gritta, drew up another copy of Segent's *testimoniale* at Spinola's request. Spinola asked for the document so he could deliver it to his insurers to avoid complications in the payment of the compensation:

[...] in the sugars received from the ship named the *Mercante di Dover*, some broken and wet bags have been found, which have been taken to the warehouse. One of the keys is with the *sindico* of the Most Serene Lords of the Commerce of *San Giorgio* and the other with the *magnifico* Francesco [Spinola], as he will testify. Therefore, he asks that they [the sugars] be visited and assessed for the damage they may have received so that they may be paid for by the insurers or others to whom it may pertain.¹¹⁵

Further protection in the event of an accident was provided by the fact that Genoese legislation, unlike what was established in other port cities, such as Livorno, authorized the stipulation of policies that included coverage for damages deriving from Average events.¹¹⁶ It was also because of the great dynamism of the local insurance sector, the relative elasticity of the rules that governed its functioning, and the use of Average institution that the port of Genoa maintained a primary role in Mediterranean trade, even in an era characterized by a progressive globalization of traffic and the rise of new players.

¹¹⁵ “[...] nelli zuccari ricevuti dalla nave nominata il *Mercante di Dover* se ne ha trovate alquante sporte di rotto e bagnate, quali sono deportati nel magazzino con una delle chiavi del quali è appresso il Sindico de Serenissimi Signori del Commercio di San Giorgio e l'altra appresso di essi magnifico Francesco come farà constare per testimonii. Perciò richiede che siano visitati, et taggiato il danno che possono haver ricevuto acciò se ne possa imbursare dalli assicuratori, o altri a quali spetti”. ASG, NG 2084, 02/05/1640.

¹¹⁶ For example, the PA calculation drawn up in Genoa for the shipment of grain to the brothers Raffaele, Andrea and Gio Batta Ferrari in 1640 also shows the bill of lading and the insurance contract drawn up in Naples. It is likely that the calculation and the report were drawn up in order to be sent to Naples where the insurers would then have been asked to reimburse their share in the damages following the GA act. See ASG, NG 2084, 12/08/1640. According to Jake Dyble the functions of GA damages' repartition and premium insurance in Livorno were complementary, while in Genoa they were overlapping, see Dyble, *General Average in the free port*.

3.3 The Evolution of Average Rules in the Mediterranean¹¹⁷

Unlike insurance, a GA procedure did not separate the risks by transferring them to a third party but rather created a temporary 'society' among all participants in the maritime voyage. The participants suffered an arguably precise or justifiable expense equally shared, as Casaregi reports:

It is well known that the *avaria grossa* [GA] is the proportional contribution of the things saved to restore the damage done by someone voluntarily on the sacrificed things of another, so that the saved things escaped an imminent danger.¹¹⁸

The GA standards recalled the Justinian *Corpus Iuris Civilis* and the so-called *Basilika*, legislative collections that acted as coagulating factors within the various regulations that had developed in the Mediterranean area between the medieval and early modern period.¹¹⁹ The concept of GA derived directly from the *Digest*, an anthology of 50 books that is part of the *Justinian's Corpus Iuris Civilis*, and in particular from book 4.2, significantly named *De Lege Rhodia de Jactu*.¹²⁰ The genesis and formulation of this rule has been defined as the "greatest problem in the history of maritime trade".¹²¹

At the core of this procedure was the idea that to ensure the safety of the vessel and its cargo, all participants in the expedition should equally share the damages that had voluntarily occurred to someone's property during a sea shipment.¹²² This strategy also resolved *a priori* any disputes related to the stowage of goods and the greater risks incurred by goods placed on the upper decks or the different weight/value ratios. Only upon arrival in port, merchants

¹¹⁷ This paragraph is partly a reworking of A. Iodice, 'General average in Genoa: rules and practices', in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., *Sharing risk*, forthcoming.

¹¹⁸ "Sciendum est itaque Avaria grossam esse contributionem pro portione rerum servatarum reficiendi causa damni voluntario alicujus facto alterius rebus illati, ut ab imminente periculo caetera evaderent". Casaregi, *Discursos*, II, 1.

¹¹⁹ On the evolution of Roman law in the Byzantine Empire, see D. Penna, 'General average in Byzantium', in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., *Sharing risk*, forthcoming. On the adoption of Rhodian law, see G. Tedeschi, *Il diritto marittimo dei romani comparato al diritto italiano*, Montefiascone, 1899; G.A. Palazzo, *La lex Rhodia de jactu nel diritto romano*, Parma, 1919.

¹²⁰ The jurists' texts collected in the corpus date as far back as the second and third centuries. Some scholars believe that a customary Rhodian maritime law existed as early as the seventh century BCE. Jettison is also mentioned in the Book of Jonah, see D. Bolanča, V. Pezelj, P. Amižić, 'General average an ancient institution of maritime law', *Ius Romanum* 2, 2017, 390-401; Remie Constable, 'The Problem of Jettison', 207-220.

¹²¹ J. Rougé, *Recherches sur l'organisation du commerce maritime en Méditerranée sous l'empire romain*, Paris, 1966, 398.

¹²² K.S. Selmer, *The survival of General Average: a necessity or an anachronism?*, Oslo, 1958, 42.

and shipowners, in proportion to the economic interests of each, shared the damages suffered by the cargo, the ship itself and its crew.¹²³

The text of the *Lex Rhodia* is quite old and presents a few interpolations. It is interesting to observe that it does not include the term 'average' but only that of 'contribution'.¹²⁴ According to Andrea Addobbati, despite the linguistic confusions, the theoretical distinction between GA, understood as voluntary damage, and PA, understood as fortuitous damage due to reasons of *force majeure*, remains fundamental. The latter only burdened the owner of the damaged property. The main legal figure in both cases was the *Magister*, that is, the shipmaster, who was often also the owner of the ship. In a GA event, he acted for the common good by addressing the actual event, but he was also the mediator in the subsequent apportionment of damages: he collected the money from those who had to contribute and offered it as partial compensation for those who had suffered damage. He also had the authority to seize the properties of those who refused to pay their share. On the other hand, the *Magister* was held solely responsible for any damage caused by inexperience or the erroneous assessment of the danger.¹²⁵

The *Nòmos Rhodion Nautikòs* introduced some changes. Scholars believe this work is a private collection of maritime principles applied in the Eastern Mediterranean in the eighth century. Aimed at forensic practice, it is a text in which for the first time the damages suffered in an attempt to escape from enemies or pirates, including shipwrecks, were admitted to the sharing.¹²⁶ The text is known as *Pseudo-Rhodian Law* to distinguish it from the original *Lex Rhodia de iactu*, inserted in the *Corpus Juris*.¹²⁷ The maritime matter is in Book 53, and in theory, it referred directly to the maritime custom reported in the *Corpus Juris*. The main difference with respect to the *Corpus* was the need for a favourable resolution by the majority of the merchants, before claiming voluntary damage. This novelty was perhaps due to the growing piracy in the

¹²³ Corrieri, *Il consolato del mare*, 267.

¹²⁴ See Addobbati, 'Principles and rules'.

¹²⁵ A. Lefebvre d'Ovidio, 'La contribuzione alle avarie comuni', *Rivista di Diritto della Navigazione* I, 1935, 36-140, 39-40.

¹²⁶ In the event of a shipwreck, the contribution rate was fixed and was only paid by any surviving property and if the vessel could be partially salvaged.

¹²⁷ The recall to the Rhodian law was just a way to give it a pretended authority and a legislative validity, Bogojevic-Gluscevic, 'The Law and Practice of Average', 28. See also W. Ashburner, *The Rhodian Sea Law*, Oxford, 1909. On the Pseudo-Rhodian law see also M. Pal ed., *Plenitudi legis, amor veritatis*, Rome, 2002, 134-135; Lefebvre d'Ovidio, 'La contribuzione alle avarie comuni', 62-70.

Mediterranean and to the practice of the owners of goods to travel on board with the goods. The new collection of rules survived until the twelfth century in Adriatic cities, especially those that were involved the most in trade with the Byzantine Empire. The first legal systems of Trani, Venice and Ancona partially adopted them.¹²⁸

Based on the adoption of the *Pseudo-Rhodian Law* or the *Digest*, which maintained its influence in the Western Mediterranean, two distinct legal traditions developed. However, there was no lack of mutual influences. For instance, the rules of Pisa, Genoa and Amalfi, as well as the *Usatges de la Ribera de Barcelona*, traditionally linked to the *Digest*, gradually accepted the *Pseudo-Rhodian Law*, which was more widespread in the Eastern Mediterranean.¹²⁹ The reference to slightly different norms amongst the various states led to a multitude of customs and usages that made it necessary to formulate codes and compendia of law or to resort to the opinions of jurists to provide practical indications for merchants, shipmasters, and institutions.¹³⁰ As in the Genoese case, to have a shared starting point and to be able to claim the necessary authority for their own indigenous rules, which often differed from those of neighbouring states, codes and statutes of various maritime realities explicitly referred to the authority of Roman law or to the generally accepted general customs.¹³¹ No social or institutional player was able to impose its own rules. This increased the transaction costs associated with risk management, as there were different administrative structures with which the agents of the sector had to deal.¹³²

¹²⁸ R. Di Tucci, 'Consuetudini marittime del Medio Evo italiano nella redazione del Libro del Consolato del Mare', in L.A. Senigallia ed., *Atti della mostra bibliografica e convegno internazionale di studi storici del Diritto marittimo medioevale*, Naples, 1934, 129-138, 130-131. According to Lefebvre D'Ovidio, the statutory provisions of these cities were simply more or less extensive derogations from the customary law of the *Nòmos*, see Lefebvre D'Ovidio, 'La contribuzione alle avarie comuni', 70.

¹²⁹ Corrieri, *Il consolato del mare*, 24-25. See also Benvenuti, *Le repubbliche marinare*.

¹³⁰ One of the recurring themes in today's quest for uniformity in maritime law is the argument that different states applied uniform rules in the past. The most enthusiastic supporters contend that the *lex mercatoria* is a universal and autonomous a-national legal system developed spontaneously by merchants, without regard to and independently of states. Opponents of the *lex mercatoria*, however, reject these claims by maintaining that detaching law from the state is little more than wishful thinking. The scholars' discussions regarding a hypothetical *lex mercatoria* are partially stimulated by the idea of 'international rules' such as those governing GAs. See V. Piergiovanni ed., *From lex mercatoria to commercial law*, Berlin, 2005; O. Toth, *The Lex Mercatoria in Theory and Practice*, Oxford, 2017.

¹³¹ This was the case in the Genoese statutes, according to Pardessus. See J.M. Pardessus, *Collection des lois maritimes antérieures au XVIII siècle*, IV, Paris, 1837, 521.

¹³² See D. North, 'A transaction cost theory of politics', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 2/4, 1990, 355-367.

Between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, frequent exchanges between the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Western Mediterranean favoured Genoa and Barcelona as ports of trading. This allowed Genoese and Catalan maritime law to play an aggregating role in the Western Mediterranean area.¹³³ At the same time, the slow increase in the volume of trade determined a broadening of the GA principles. For instance, in Barcelona and Genoa, the concept of GA, which according to the *Digesto* was closely linked to the act of jettison, expanded irregularly until it included administrative costs and many damages due to unforeseeable circumstances or *force majeure*.¹³⁴ Even a maritime exchange loan requested by the shipmaster to make emergency repairs and purchase supplies could be included in GA.¹³⁵ There was no lack of attempts to standardize and rearrange the rules. For example, this was the purpose of the *Costumbres de Valencia*.¹³⁶ According to this collection of rules, promulgated in 1250, damage apportionment would only take place in the case of a jettison, whereas to emphasize the voluntary nature of the act, the merchants had to throw their own goods overboard. To protect shipowners, who assumed the risk of the sea voyage, the ship contributed to the compensation of damages for half of its value.¹³⁷ In 1258, however, Barcelona responded to the legal systems of Valencia with the drafting of a new maritime code and with the establishment of a magistracy formed by local merchants for the resolution of disputes, namely, the *Consolat de Mar*.¹³⁸ Under the authority of the Crown of Aragon, this magistracy established itself as the defender and supporter of international trade, thus becoming a legislative model far beyond the Aragonese borders.¹³⁹

¹³³ Corrieri, *Il consolato del mare*, 14. The *Ordonnance touchant la Marine* issued in France in 1681 had the same aggregating function, but between Nordic and Mediterranean law. See O. Chaline, *La mer et la France: Quand les Bourbons voulaient dominer les océans*, Paris, 2016. The original document is digitally available on Gallica. See <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k95955s>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

¹³⁴ Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 266.

¹³⁵ An example is the loan of 1,184 Genoese *lire* requested by the Catalan *patrone* Giovanni Pol in 1600 to make a new lifeboat and buy food supplies. Only 10% of its value, however, was included in GA calculation. See ASG, NG 637, 04/04/1601, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50433.

¹³⁶ See D.S.H. Abulafia, D. Bates, *The Western Mediterranean kingdoms: the struggle for Dominion, 1200-1500*, London, 2014.

¹³⁷ *Costumbres de Valencia*, IX, chap. XVII, par. VII. Transcribed in Pardessus, *Collection des lois maritimes*, 5, 336.

¹³⁸ R.C. Cave, H.H. Coulson eds., *A Source Book for Medieval Economic History*, New York, 1965, 160-168. Following the development of maritime law and trade, Peter IV granted further legislative privileges in 1340, see Lefebvre d'Ovidio, 'La contribuzione alle avarie comuni', 104-105.

¹³⁹ See E. Maccioni, *Il Consolato del Mare di Barcellona. Tribunale e corporazione di mercanti (1394-1462)*, Rome, 2019. An important role is played also by arbitrators, required in

The volume of the judgements of the *Consolat de Mar*, resulting from its judicial activity, became the reference point for maritime laws and rules in the Mediterranean. It remained an essential model for Genoese jurists during the early modern period.¹⁴⁰ According to Raffaele di Tucci, the *Consolat* partially reflected the legal systems of the states of the Western Mediterranean in a 'practical' synthesis for resolving disputes.¹⁴¹ Perhaps the initial weakness of the normative and customary tradition facilitated the Barcelonian legislators in the editing of the *Consolat*, which was largely the outcome of the elaboration of different sources.¹⁴²

Tracing the events related to this text and analysing the rules therein allows us to reveal the circulation of the principles of maritime legislation in the Mediterranean. This is a necessary task to better understand the regulatory evolution of Average within the legal system of the Republic of Genoa. For instance, it is significant that scholars believed for a long time that the *Consolat* was an Italian work. At the beginning of the twentieth century, its authorship was still the subject of numerous debates and clashes amongst legal historians.¹⁴³ The succession of the *Consolat's* editions gave rise to this

commercial and maritime disputes by different legislations, especially in case of 'international accidents'. See M.E. Soldani, *I mercanti catalani e la corona d'Aragona in Sardegna: profitti e potere negli anni della conquista*, Rome, 2017.

¹⁴⁰ Although the oldest Italian printed edition dates back to 1519 (*Capitulj et ordinatione di mare et di mercantie*, Antonio de Bladi, Rome, 1519), the *editio princeps* was the second edition by G.B. Pedrezzano ed., *Libro di consolato novamente stampato et ricorretto, nel quale sono scritti capitoli & statuti & buone ordinationi, che li antichi ordinarono per li casi di mercantia & di mare & mercanti & marinari, & patroni di nauillii*, Venice, 1539. In 1549 a new edition was printed, in which the editor made direct reference to the Catalan edition by including all the original parts, like the Chapters on the customs of the consuls of Valencia and other Chapters omitted by the previous editions. See C. De Deo, 'Il consolato del mare: storia di un successo editoriale', in L. Guatri, C. De Deo, G. Guerzoni eds., *Il Consolato e il portolano del Mare*, Milan, 2007, XI-XXVIII, XXI-XXII. The reprints of the latter edition, published in 1564 and 1584, were the most widely known in Europe. The work of the Genoese jurist Casaregi, *Il Consolato del Mare*, was based on these editions.

¹⁴¹ Di Tucci, 'Consuetudini marittime', 133. A direct influence had, for example, the customs of Tortosa (1271), of Valencia (1272), the ordinances of the *Ribera* of Barcelona (1258), the *Curia Fumada* of Vic (1231), the consulate of Majorca (1336), the consulate of Barcelona (1348), see Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 43-45. On the influences for the redaction of the book of the *Consolat*, see G. Colon, A. Garcia, *Llibre del Consolat de Mar*, Barcelona, 2001; A. Iglesia-Ferreiros, 'La formacion de los libros de consulado de mar', *Initium*, 2, 1997, 1-372.

¹⁴² For example, some collections of Genoese laws such as the statutes of Pera and Gazaria, already mentioned, directly influenced the redaction of the *Consolat*. See Di Tucci, 'Consuetudini marittime', 134-136.

¹⁴³ See, for example, the debates around the publication of O. Sciolla ed., *Il Consolato del Mare*, Turin, 1911. Guillermo M. de Brocà, member of the *Real Academias de Buenas Letras* of Barcelona, replied to this book accusing the editor of wanting to "fight, through a primacy of editions, the Barcelona authorship to assign the Italian authorship to the consular collections", see O. Sciolla, 'Dell'edizione principe del Consolato del mare', in L.A. Senigallia ed., *Atti della mostra bibliografica e convegno internazionale di studi storici del Diritto marittimo medioevale*, Naples, 1934, 329-334.

misinterpretation. In fact, between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, 25 editions of the *Consolat* were published in Italian, while only 7 editions were printed in Castilian, English, Dutch, French, and German.¹⁴⁴ Most of the printed versions also enclosed a list that displayed the presumed date of the implementation of the book's rules in the various Mediterranean ports, the so-called *cronica de les promulgacions*.¹⁴⁵ This list backdated the writing of the book to the period immediately subsequent to the *Basilika*, that is, at the dawn of the eleventh century: in this way and by citing Rome as the first city that adopted it in 1075, a direct continuity with Roman law was communicated, giving strength and formal authority to the book. Some seventeenth- and eighteenth-century jurists, such as Carlo Targa and Giuseppe Lorenzo Maria Casaregi, reported this list presumably in good faith.¹⁴⁶ According to the *cronica*, Genoa adopted the *Consolat* in 1186. As Olivia Remie Constable proved, however, the rules which constitute the book of the *Consolat* mostly date back to the thirteenth century.¹⁴⁷

The Catalan *princeps* edition dates between 1482 and 1484.¹⁴⁸ The Italian editions consulted the most by Genoese magistrates and jurists until the eighteenth century were those of 1564 and 1584.¹⁴⁹ Casaregi, for instance, used a reprint of the 1564 edition for his *Spiegazione*.¹⁵⁰ All the Italian first

¹⁴⁴ Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 1. Among the earliest printed editions is the one in Barcelona, dating from around 1484. The second, revised by Francesch Celells, dates back to 1494. The immediately following editions, all printed in Barcelona, date from 1502 (by Johan Luschner), 1518 (by Johan Rosembach) and again 1518 (by Carles Amoros). The first Italian editions, all printed in Venice except the Roman edition of 1519, date from 1539, 1544, 1549, 1556, 1558, 1564, 1566, 1567, 1576 and 1584. See J.M. Edelstein, 'Some Early Editions of the "Consulate of the Sea"', *The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America* 51/2, 1957, 119-125, 120-122. The first French edition is F. Mayssoni ed., *Le livre du Consolat*, Aix-en-Provence, 1577. One of the best known and most faithful edition to the original text is the Spanish edition with Catalan text on the front, edited by Capmany, *Codigo de las costumbres*.

¹⁴⁵ The studies citing this list, however, do not specifically mention which editions contain it and which do not, with the exception of the edition commented on by Casaregi. See L. Tanzini, 'Le prime edizioni a stampa in italiano del Libro del Consolato del Mare', in R. Martorelli ed., *Itinerando. Senza confini dalla preistoria ad oggi. Studi in onore di Roberto Coroneo*, Perugia, 2015, 965-978, 967. Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 45-46.

¹⁴⁶ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 395. G.M. Casaregi, 'Il Consolato del Mare colla spiegazione di Giuseppe Maria Casaregi', in Casaregi, *Discursos*, III, 59. See also V. Piergiovanni, 'La Spiegazione del Consolato del mare di Giuseppe Lorenzo Maria Casaregi', in Piergiovanni ed., *Norme, scienza e pratica*, II, 1257-1271.

¹⁴⁷ Remie Constable, 'The problem of jettison', 215. On the dating of the *Consolat*, see also A. Garcia Sanz, 'El derecho marítimo preconsular', *Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura*, 36, 1960, 47-74; J.J. Chiner Gimeno, J.P. Galiana Cachón, 'Del «Consolat de mar» al «Libro llamado Consulado de mar»: aproximación histórica', in *Libro llamado Consulado de mar (Valencia, 1539)*, Valencia, 2003, 7-42.

¹⁴⁸ On the diffusion of the different editions, see Tanzini, 'Le prime edizioni a stampa', 966.

¹⁴⁹ Tanzini, 'Le prime edizioni a stampa', 975-976.

¹⁵⁰ Tanzini, 'Le prime edizioni a stampa', 975.

editions, with the exception of the Roman edition of 1519, were printed in Venice, one of the most important printing centres in Europe.¹⁵¹

The book had a section on the establishment and jurisdiction of the *Consoli del Mare di Valencia*, a corpus of customary norms known as “the good manners of the sea”, and a final section taken from normative definitions of the kings of Aragon or the city authorities of Barcelona.¹⁵² The rules resembled codes of conduct that became executive legal rules at the very moment of navigation. According to Roman law, law and customs have equal normative forces.¹⁵³ Therefore, in the laws of maritime navigation, as in the rest of commercial laws, the behaviours declared as ‘good rules’ were indeed mandatory in those given circumstances, in that environment and in those activities, as these rules met the established criteria of adequacy, fairness and justice.¹⁵⁴

The *Consolat* did not deal with questions of a technical-seafaring nature, except for a few exemplary cases.¹⁵⁵ The Chapters relating to jettison were very detailed and met the Roman law and Mediterranean customs’ guidelines at the time, such as the Genoese statutes of Pera, which will be discussed in the next pages.¹⁵⁶

An essential requirement for the validity of a GA act was the manifestation of the will of the weakest subjects, the ones most exposed to the prejudices that it involved, that is, the merchants. All responsibility for the prediction and assessment of the danger, as well as the actions necessary for the elimination or reduction of risks, converged on the *Dominus/Magister*. In the absence of

¹⁵¹ Tanzini, ‘Le prime edizioni a stampa’, 974; In the 1539 edition, the dedication by Giovan Battista Pedrezzano to the imperial consul of Venice Martino Zornoza suggests that the *Consolat* was also well known in Venice as a normative source, although its first mention in Venetian documents dates back to 1705. M. Fusaro, ‘Migrating Seamen, Migrating Laws? An Historiographical Genealogy of Seamen’s Employment and States’ Jurisdiction in the Early Modern Mediterranean’, in S. Gialdroni, A. Cordes, S. Dauchy, D. De ruyscher, H. Pihlajamäki eds., *Migrating Words, Migrating Merchants, Migrating Law*, Leiden, 2019, 54-83, 71-72.

¹⁵² Tanzini, ‘Le prime edizioni a stampa’, 966.

¹⁵³ According to the classical conception, the *populus* is the holder of all normative power and the emperor also took his power from it. The customary source had the same value as the written source, since both were essentially expressions of the same subject holding the power to legislate, see F. Gallo, *Interpretazione e formazione consuetudinaria del diritto: lezioni di diritto romano*, Turin, 1993, 55-56.

¹⁵⁴ Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 23.

¹⁵⁵ Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 195-196.

¹⁵⁶ The Chapter on jettison in the *Consulate* reflects the major influence of the *Corpus Juris*. The institute of *germinamento* on the other hand, of uncertain origin and analysed in Addobbati, ‘Principle and rules’, is influenced by the Pseudo-Rodhian law but is a contractual obligation, see Lefebvre d’Ovidio, ‘La contribuzione alle avarie comuni’, 113-115. For an analysis of the Chapters of the *Consolat* relating to the GA, see Iodice, ‘General average in Genoa’.

merchants, the shipmaster needed the consent of the officers and the *nocchiero* (boatswain).¹⁵⁷

The jettison procedure played a key role. It began with the shipmaster correctly assessing the threatening danger that he would have to report to the merchants in a speech. In this speech, partially transcribed in the *Consolat*, he would formally suggest the jettison as the only way to save the expedition.¹⁵⁸ Once the merchants had expressed their approval, the shipmaster could start the operation by letting one of the merchants ‘symbolically’ begin the jettison.¹⁵⁹ The ship's *scrivano* (purser)¹⁶⁰ wrote down the agreement. The shipmaster could jettison with the help of the boatswain and the *pennese*,¹⁶¹ keeping in mind that he had to achieve the maximum benefit with the minimum sacrifice. The shipmaster also had to have no scruples in sacrificing the goods, because “[...] it is worth more to throw a large amount of goods than to lose the people, the ship and all the goods [...]”.¹⁶²

The ship, the freights and the cargo contributed to the damage partition. Crew’s properties did not contribute as long as these were worth less than half the wage of each sailor and officer for the current voyage.¹⁶³ In the case of a “plain jettison”, in which the quantity of goods thrown was less than half of the total load, the ship contributed half of its value. In the event of an “irregular jettison”, also defined as “almost similar to shipwreck”, which occurred when there was no time to observe the necessary formalities and half the load or

¹⁵⁷ The ‘boatswain’ was in charge of the crew during navigation, see <https://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/history/research/centres/maritime/resources/sailingintomodernity/roles/>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

¹⁵⁸ On this ceremony and the reception of the *Consolat*, see also Addobbati, ‘Principle and rules’.

¹⁵⁹ This custom was abandoned over the following centuries, see Casaregi, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 87.

¹⁶⁰ In Genoa and Venice the ‘purser’ was in charge of the administrative and financial running of the ship. He took care of the books, and this is the only role that was given only to properly literate individuals. On Italian ships he acted as public notary on board. On English ships, there was no directly comparable office. See <https://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/history/research/centres/maritime/resources/sailingintomodernity/roles/>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

¹⁶¹ The *pennese* was in charge of the correct and safe loading of the cargo on board, see <https://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/history/research/centres/maritime/resources/sailingintomodernity/roles/>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

¹⁶² “[...] vale più gettar una quantità di robba che se perdessino le persone, la nave et tutta la robba [...]”. This practice was also confirmed by the jurist Casaregi in the eighteenth century, see Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, 162. According to Casaregi, for example, even the wounding of a sailor in case of successful defence against a pirate or enemy attack could give rise to a GA damage repartition, see Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, 163.

¹⁶³ These goods constituted the so-called *canterata* of the sailors. It was not even subject to the payment of freight, but the *canterata* had to be purchased with the money of the salary itself, see ch. 128 and 129. See also Lefebvre D’Ovidio, ‘La contribuzione alle avarie comuni’, 110.

more was involved, the ship contributed two-thirds of its value.¹⁶⁴ The freights contributed in their entirety, but only if the accident happened in the second half of the voyage. The *Consolat* extended the concept of GA damages to include any extraordinary and voluntary expenses necessary for the completion of the journey. An example was the application of the GA procedure for damages or loss of the *schifo* [the skiff],¹⁶⁵ the small boat used for the loading and unloading of goods and, if necessary, as a lifeboat, a frequent type of damage.¹⁶⁶ Following the approval of the judges, the procedure ended with the settlement phase.

The *Consolat*, unlike the Venetian and Ancona statutes, did not clearly regulate the assessment of damage and settlement. It also did not require the reconstruction of the events, but rather, it relied on the shipmaster/shipowner for the definition of the attribution criteria of the incurred expenses. The calculation took place in the port of loading of the goods if the shipmaster could go back on his route. The calculation of the value of the assets followed a procedure that Corrieri defines as “archaic and simple”, in which the shipmaster himself assumed the function of *calcolatore*, drawing up a list with the value of the goods involved.¹⁶⁷ The goods contributed according to either the purchase value if the Average had occurred in the first half of the journey, or the sales value in the port of destination if the damage had occurred in the second half of the journey.¹⁶⁸ As per Roman law, the shipmaster had the possibility of confiscating the goods while waiting for payment from the merchants: the shipmaster assumed a prominent role in the procedure.¹⁶⁹ Despite the rhetoric of fairness and trust, there could always be the suspicion that the shipmasters acted in their own interest, as shipmasters lacked real counterparts beyond their own crew. For these reasons, merchants could resort to the judgement of the arbitrators, who were chosen as “[...] two good seamen [...]”.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁴ In the event of sinking or abandonment, the loss was accounted over the cargo alone. See Casaregi, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 100.

¹⁶⁵ F. Corazzini, *Vocabolario Nautico Italiano*, VI, Bologna, 1906, 160. The term derives from the Longobard *Skiff* and is still used today to refer to vessels less than 10 metres long, see <https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/schifo2/>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

¹⁶⁶ Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 295-296.

¹⁶⁷ Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 300-301. As revealed by the Livorno documentation uploaded to the *AveTransRisk* database by Jake Dyble, it seems that this procedure was also followed in Tuscany.

¹⁶⁸ Casaregi, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 88-89.

¹⁶⁹ Casaregi, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 87-88.

¹⁷⁰ “[...] due buoni huomini di mare [...]”. Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 300-301.

Regarding the responsibility of the shipmaster and the criteria for attributing risk, the *Libro del Consolat* partly followed the same rules as those applied in the Genoese Republic at that time.¹⁷¹ In Catalonia, in fact, the need for written and shared maritime rules arose later than in Genoa, which by the late medieval period ruled over a territorial and maritime domain that extended from the Black Sea to North Africa.¹⁷²

3.4 *The Genoese Statutes from Pera to the 1589 Statuti Civili*

The overseas territorial expansion of the Republic and the general increase in maritime traffic in the late medieval period propelled the development of trade and determined the need for rules for the protection of the most distant routes. During this period, the Republic of Genoa sent copies of its statutes to the territories under its control for ordinary administration.¹⁷³ The statutes constituted the formal affirmation of its own legal system and allowed the preservation of the privileged and direct relationship of the distant territories with the motherland.¹⁷⁴ The statutes of the colony of Pera responded to these considerations. Pera (Galata) was a Genoese settlement on the *Corno d'Oro*, obtained in 1261 together with the free transit through the Dardanelles Strait and the Black Sea, following a treaty between the *Capitano del Popolo* Guglielmo Boccanegra and the Byzantine emperor Michele Paleologo.¹⁷⁵

The statutes of Pera (1316) ruled on various topics, including maritime trade. Based on the type of formulation, the regulations are assumed to date back to the years prior to the abolition of the *podestà*, which occurred in 1265, and thought to be a copy of the regulations promulgated in the capital.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 36.

¹⁷² See Polonio, 'Dalla marginalità alla potenza', 26-38. The Castile-Genoa axis also remained a determining factor for the economic development of Catalonia during the sixteenth century, when relations between these two regions were further favoured by the political alliance between Genoa and the Spanish Empire. See P. Vilar, *La Catalogne dans l'Espagne moderne*, 2 voll., Paris, 1962.

¹⁷³ These territories were considered part of the Republic and not colonies, a term never used in the sources. See Taviani, 'The Genoese Casa di San Giorgio', 185.

¹⁷⁴ See V. Piergiovanni, 'Lo statuto: lo specchio normativo delle identità cittadine', in Piergiovanni ed., *Norme, scienza e pratica*, I, 317-328, 327.

¹⁷⁵ Polonio, 'Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul mare', 33.

¹⁷⁶ Raffaele Di Tucci also hypothesised a reciprocal influence with respect to the *Constitutum Usus* of Pisa, the oldest core of which date back to 1212, see Di Tucci, 'Consuetudini marittime', 134.

These norms included the first known Genoese rules concerning Average and jettison.¹⁷⁷ A Chapter forbade loading goods on the upper deck of the ship, as this was the most dangerous area on board, while another one ordered the voyage to proceed with the throwing (*iactu*) of goods only in case of real danger and with the approval of the merchants on board.¹⁷⁸ The statutes regulated jettison, Average (the word 'Average' appears in the Chapter as a synonym for 'damage') and any further expense under the concept of risk sharing, hinting at the influence of these traditions pertaining to Roman law, the *Digesto* law and the Pseudo-Rhodian law. According to Pardessus, the Chapters were resumed and were influenced by the *Roles d'Oleron*, a well-known compilation of maritime law written in France in the twelfth century.¹⁷⁹

The Genoese judges of the *Officium Gazariae* applied these rules in Genoa in the following century. The *Officium Gazariae* was a maritime court based in Genoa and established in the fourteenth century, although the name refers to the lost colony inhabited by the *Gazari* in Crimea. The court dealt in maritime legislation, with specific reference to *super factis et negotiis navigandi*.¹⁸⁰ Its statutes were redrafted from time to time based on the need to update the rules or distribute new copies of the current laws such that their formulation became stratified throughout different editions. The volumes were intended to provide a manual for consultation; they did not, however, help clarify the genesis of the individual norms. In contrast, the new rules overruled the previous ones, and for this reason, the older, obsolete versions were discarded.¹⁸¹ The Chapters concerning jettison and Average copied the statutes of Pera without additions, both in the edition of 1403 and in that of 1441.¹⁸² The Chapter on jettison was

¹⁷⁷ This is the oldest normative text on this subject found to date, as far as the Genoese Republic is concerned. See Promis ed., 'Statuti della colonia genovese', 588-595. On these statutes, which contain the rules adopted in Genoa and Pera at the beginning of the fourteenth century, but which actually cover a period of time from 1195 to 1316, see Piergiovanni, *Gli statuti civili e criminali*; Piergiovanni, *Lezioni di storia giuridica*.

¹⁷⁸ See chap. CCXV *De Rebus Positis in Navi Super Cohpertam Emendandis*; chap. CCXXXI *De iactu emendando facto de voluntate maioris partis mercatorum*, in Promis, 'Statuti della Colonia', 752.

¹⁷⁹ The *Roles d'Oleron*, however, mention more specific cases such as, for example, the cutting of the mast. See Pardessus, *Collection des lois*, I, 328.

¹⁸⁰ Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, XLV; Calegari, 'Patroni di nave', 60. The fourteenth-century book of the *Imposicio Officii Gazariae*, consisting of 11 treatises and 153 paragraphs, does not mention the Chapter on jettison, which appeared in the fifteenth century editions, see 'Imposicio Officii Gazariae', in *Monumenta Historiae Patriae, Leges Municipales*, I, Turin, 1838, 303-430.

¹⁸¹ This is perhaps a Genoese peculiarity compared to other cities of the time, such as Venice. See Pardessus, *Collection des lois*, IV, 425.

¹⁸² Chap. VIII. *De non carrigando in deck, nisi ut supra*. According to Pardessus, the same Chapter was also in the statutes of Pera of 14 October 1317, thus confirming the origin of this

almost the same as the Chapter in the statutes of Pera, as was the content: however, the Chapter's title displayed the word *avariis*, intended as a synonym for damage, whereas the terms *avarias*, *expensas* and *jactum* were used in the text. The Chapter referred to the need for the approval of those on board, the proportional division of damages and the possibility of including into the repartition all the expenses incurred.¹⁸³

The Average legislative production in Genoa seems to stop after the statutes of *Gazaria*. Most likely, in the years until the promulgation of the *Statuti Civili* of 1589, the Republic followed the rules in the book of the *Consolat de Mar*. Despite the probable circulation and adoption of the *Consolat*, the presence of an anti-Spanish faction within the Republic, the vagueness of some customary rules, and the conflicts of jurisdiction in the stretch of sea between Liguria and Corsica were perhaps the basis of the subsequent will to affirm an autonomous jurisdiction.¹⁸⁴

The Republic reformed its statutes during the sixteenth century, and the long preparatory phase of the *Statuti Civili* began in 1551.¹⁸⁵ These statutes remained unchanged at least until the first decades of the eighteenth century. They represented an essential moment in the consolidation of the Genoese legal system. Although the new body of laws had multiple references to the *Dorian* 1528 reforms, in the maritime and commercial spheres it resumed regulations dating back to the *Liber Gazariae*.¹⁸⁶ The desire to convey an idea of long-term continuity is perfectly normal, as already observed about the book of the *Consolat* itself.¹⁸⁷ The latter, despite being informally integrated into

rule. See Pardessus, *Collection des lois*, IV, 463; chap. XCVIII. *De jactis et avariis factis de voluntate majoris partis mercatorum*. This Chapter appears in the 1403 edition, see Pardessus, *Collection des lois*, IV, Officium Gazarie (1441), chap. XCVIII, 521.

¹⁸³ Pardessus, *Collection des lois*, IV, Officium Gazarie (1441), chap. XCVIII, 521.

¹⁸⁴ According to the jurist Giulio Pace, the Genoese Republic, as weaker of the Spanish Empire, did not have legal control over the Ligurian Sea, see G. Pace, *De dominio maris Hadriatici*, Lyon, 1619, 70-71, in Calafat, *Une mer jalousee*, 155. In the *Additiones* to the capitulations with Spain in 1519 the Genoese were subject "ordinibus constitutionibus et decretis dicotrum locorum, tam mari quam terra" to Iberian legislation, while the Spanish had to submit to Genoese regulations in the territories of the Republic. See Pacini, *I presupposti politici*, 102.

¹⁸⁵ The consultations began in 1551 with the appointment of a first experts' committee and ended in December 1588 with the promulgation decree in June 1589. See BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis*, Genoa, 1589. BCB, F.Ant.Gen.C.110, *Degli Statuti civili della Serenissima Repubblica di Genova*, Genoa, 1613. The draft of these statutes is in ASG, ms. 197, *Statuti Civili*, 1588.

¹⁸⁶ Savelli, 'Statuti e amministrazione', 362-363.

¹⁸⁷ The political-institutional context, the policies of neutrality and the coincidence between the subjects governing the state and those involved in the main commercial networks determined a partial coincidence between public power and private interests in the economic policies. See L.

Genoese customs, was never explicitly mentioned in the *Statuti Civili*.¹⁸⁸ According to the authoritative opinion of Casaregi, who wrote in the eighteenth century, the *Consolat* prevailed over Roman law, yet the *Statuti Civili* did not mention the *Corpus* nor the *Consolat*. Plus, the *Statuti* introduced important innovations and clarifications at an institutional and procedural level.¹⁸⁹

Genoese legislators inserted Average rules into a rigid and apparently autonomous institutional framework. In their plans, the division of competences within different magistracies was assumed to ensure the reliability of the procedure and to discourage litigations, thus leading to a reduction of costs and timing. The rules involved a new office created *ad hoc*: the *calcolatori*. The Statutes, as well as the subsequent editions translated into vernacular and published in the following centuries, dedicated two Chapters to GA.¹⁹⁰ Genoese legislators chose to focus only on some crucial aspects: the jettison procedure, the contribution criteria, and the operations of the *calcolatori*. Their role was the main element of divergence from coevals and previous European rules. Jurists in the following centuries criticized the way in which the statutes described Average procedure: for example, according to Ascanio Baldasseroni, author of a well-known treatise on insurance written at the end of the eighteenth century, Genoese statutes included too many procedural details and too few rules.¹⁹¹

As far as jettison is concerned, procedure resembled the one described in the *Consolat*, although it differed from it in several respects and required a

Piccinno, 'Grandi porti e scali minori del Mediterraneo in età moderna: fattori competitivi e reti commerciali', in *lanuensis non nascitur, sed fit*, 3, 1045-1059, 1053.

¹⁸⁸ Still in 1592 it is possible to find shipmasters arriving in port and promising to respect the Average procedure according to the "customs of the sea": "[...] pagandomi [...] l'avaria secondo il Costume del mare [...]", in ASG, NG 630, 10/04/1592. Towards the end of the decade the promise to respect the Genoese *Statuti Civili* or, even, "juxta formam statuti de Calcolatoribus et eorum officio". See, for example, ASG, NG 636, 16/11/1599. The promise to respect the statutes of the *calcolatori* is also in ASG, NG 636, 07/01/1600. It is also quoted in Felloni, 'Una fonte inesplorata', 848. It is not easy to interpret it: it could refer to the Chapter on the *calcolatori* in the *Statuti Civili* or to other specific statutes of this magistracy, whose traces have been lost so far.

¹⁸⁹ Casaregi, *Discursos*, II, 2. The lack of clarity of the normative text on the hierarchy of legal sources and the desire to emphasise the authority of the statutes is reminiscent in some respects of the Venetian case illustrated in Fusaro, 'Migrating Seamen', 54-83.

¹⁹⁰ Vol. I, chap. XI. *De calculatoribus et eorum officio*, IV, chap. XVI. *De jactu, et forma in eo tenenda*. Except for minor changes, the *Statuti Civili* remained substantially unchanged until the end of the eighteenth century. The last edition was published in 1787, see Savelli ed., *Repertorio degli statuti*, 145, 150.

¹⁹¹ In his treatise, however, the Average rules are hazily depicted. Come accennato, Baldasseroni reports a model of the 'Polizza di Sicurtà marittima in Genova' sbagliando la data, See Baldasseroni, *Collezione*, 5 (n. 27), 309. This is not the only mistake reported in good faith by Baldasseroni. In the Chapter on jettison, for example, he attributed a quote from Targa to Casaregi, see Baldasseroni, *Trattato delle assicurazioni marittime*, 4, 60.

greater bureaucratic effort from the parties involved.¹⁹² According to Andrea Addobbati, the introduction of further formal requirements in Genoa, often impossible to carry out in practice and almost “ridiculous”, should be interpreted as a formal act against parties, who would eventually refuse jettison.¹⁹³ For example, the Statutes required merchants’ approval, although they did not travel anymore with their goods and according to Targa, GA reports that continued to mention this element were usually suspicious.¹⁹⁴

Similarly to the *Consolat*, even in the Genoese Statutes, the shipmaster assessed the danger, which could be represented by a storm or “any other reason”, and proposed the jettison. The statutes described a rather complex and articulated procedure, following the shipmaster’s speech, in which he explained the inevitability of imminent danger, crew and merchants had to vote for the GA act. In case of approval with a two-thirds majority, they appointed three consuls: two among the crews’ officers and one among the merchants.¹⁹⁵ It is not clear whether the criterion for establishing the two-thirds majority was based on a vote per head or by the “parties involved”, where the shipmaster, the crew and the merchants each made one party. In the absence of merchants on board, the shipmaster had still to seek the consent of his crew. The newly elected consuls held a temporary position of great responsibility: they chose what to throw into the sea; common salvation depended on them. The shipmaster was the one who proposed a solution to avert imminent danger. However, he did not direct the operations. The purser kept track of all the jettisoned goods, while the consuls signed his list after the danger.¹⁹⁶ The

¹⁹² BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 154-157. The scale and variety of the trade headed to Genoa, as well as legal reasons, according to Steven Epstein, led to a different conception of time and to the unusual mania of the Genoese mercantile and notarial class for the written documents. This behaviour led them to record and preserve a mass of documents rarely equalled in other ports, see S. Epstein, ‘Business cycles and the sense of Time in Medieval Genova’, *Business History Review* 62, 1988, 238-260, 244.

¹⁹³ See Addobbati, ‘Principle and rules’.

¹⁹⁴ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 253.

¹⁹⁵ “[...] facere consultam cum omnibus officialibus navigii et mercatoribus in eo existentibus, et si duae tertiae partes praedictorum concurrerint in faciendo iactu pro dicta salvatione, eligantur eo casu tres consules, quorum duo sint ex dictis officialibus et unus ex dictis mercatoribus [...]”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 154-155. In the event of the absence of merchants on board, the *Statuti* require the election of two consuls from among the “officers of the bow” and one from among the “officers of the stern”.

¹⁹⁶ “[...] quicquid de ordine dictorum consulum iactum fuerit, scribi et annotari debeat per scribam navigii in suo libro in praesentia dictorum consulum cum eorum subscriptionibus, si scribere scirent”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 155.

jettison had to have a positive outcome; otherwise, it would have resulted in a shipwreck, defined by Targa as a “total loss”.¹⁹⁷

Due to the jettison’s complexity, it is safe to assume that the procedure was largely theoretical. Taking into account that it was a response operation to sudden events, and that the speed of the measures adopted could make the difference between either the safety or the ruin of the expedition, all of these formalities could hardly all be implemented.¹⁹⁸ However, in a study on the Mediterranean between the medieval and early modern period, Wilma Borghesi reports a practical example of the application of this procedure dating back to 1504, well before the publication of the *Statuti Civili*. This is a testimony relating to the election of 3 consuls for a jettison carried out on 16 February 1504 on the Genoese ship of the *patrone* Agostino de Gropallo off the coast of Tortosa.¹⁹⁹ This document implies, prior to the 1589 *Statuti Civili*, a specific Genoese legislation on GA. This is not the only case of GA reported in Genoa before 1589 and cited by Genoese scholars in their researches on other topics.²⁰⁰

According to the 1589 *Statuti*, damages caused by jettison were distributed proportionally over the value of the ship, freights and everything else on board.²⁰¹ The Chapter on jettison was full of operational details. It specified how certain types of goods, for example gold, silver, jewels but also horses, other animals, and slaves, contributed to the repartition.²⁰² These goods, in return,

¹⁹⁷ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 256. This rule is also confirmed in Casaregi, *Discursos*, II, 2. According to Targa’s definition, the shipwreck is caused by the wrath of the sea, “procede da ira di mare”, and leads to the breaking of the ship. See Targa, *Ponderationi*, chap. 57, 247. On the concept of shipwreck in later Genoese legal doctrine see V. Piergiovanni, ‘Brevi note dottrinali e giurisprudenziali in tema di naufragio’, in Piergiovanni ed., *Norma, Scienza e pratica*, 1277-1282.

¹⁹⁸ No mention of the list drawn up during the storm or of the consuls’ election was found in the documentation consulted so far. Consultation certainly took place, in a more informal manner. Depending on the presence or absence of merchants on board, expressions like this were used: “fatto il debito consiglio [with the merchants and his crew]” or “d’accordo con li suoi ufficiali [with his crew only]”. See ASG, *NG 2084*, 18/04/1640; ASG, *CdM*, Esibite in avaria 377, 28/02/1696.

¹⁹⁹ The testimony of officers and passengers reported the appointment of two consuls chosen from among the passengers, Lodisio de Odone and Geronimo Grimaldi quondam Giorgio, and two councillors chosen from among the crew, the sub-boatswain Enrico de Ceva and the master *calafato* Jacopo de Columnis. See Borghesi, *Il Mediterraneo*, 74-77. Borghesi did not recognise the connection with the GA procedure, which is however evident by cross-referencing this source with the practice described in the *Statuti Civili*.

²⁰⁰ Edoardo Grendi found two GA calculations drawn up in 1552 and 1558, although he believed them to be insurance documents, see Grendi, ‘Genova alla metà del Cinquecento’, 136.

²⁰¹ “[...] dividi debeat secundum aes et libram inter navigium, naula, merces et omnes alia res existentes in dicto navigio tempore iactus [...]”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 155.

²⁰² “[...] compraehensis pecuniis, auro, argento, iocalibus, servis maribus et foeminus, quis et aliis animalibus existentibus in navigio de transitu”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 155. These same goods, according to the

could not be thrown overboard, even though they could obviously suffer damage in the event of a storm or any other situation.²⁰³ There are, however, a few rare examples that contradict this rule, such as the jettison of a horse made by the ship *Sant'Antonio Buonaventura* during a storm in the Ligurian Sea in 1601.²⁰⁴

Although the Statutes did not specify it, the calculation of the value of the goods and their freights appears to follow the custom of the *Consolat de Mar*.²⁰⁵ Each merchandise, both saved and thrown, was valued for the contribution based on the moment in which the jettison took place. If it took place in the first half of the voyage, the price was assessed according to the port of departure; if it took place in the second half, the price was assessed according to the port of destination, and the expressions “here at sea” or “here on land” were usually used to indicate this distinction.²⁰⁶ In case of doubt, as reported by both Targa and Casaregi, the value of the asset was calculated in the port of departure, it was added to by its value in the port of arrival, and the resulting average was the final sum to be considered.²⁰⁷ No mention of this procedure, however, was ever found in the sources. Freights, on the other hand, only contributed if the damage occurred in the second half of the trip, as only in this case were they considered “earned”.²⁰⁸ This principle was also depicted within individual cases:

We do not place in the present risk the freights of the aforementioned goods, because the accident [...] is occurred in the port of loading, and so they are not earned for not having made not only half of the journey, but [...] any part of it.²⁰⁹

legislations of other ports, such as Venice or Leghorn, were otherwise excluded from the repartition procedure.

²⁰³ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 324. This prohibition goes back to the *Digest*, see Constable, ‘The problem of jettison’, 211.

²⁰⁴ The horse was listed both as a contributing item and as jettisoned good, its value in both cases being 97.11 Genoese *lire*. See ASG, *NG 637*, 30/08/1601, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50473.

²⁰⁵ Also in the Genoese documentation, damage to goods loaded above deck is excluded from repartition. From some statements, it seems that the shipmasters tried to get repartitions on these goods anyway, see ASG, *NG 2085*, 19/10/1641, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50341.

²⁰⁶ Casaregi, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 88-89. In case of incidents in different parts of the route it could also happen to find the same goods valued in different ways, as in the case of the sugar cargo in ASG, *NG 637*, 16/12/1601, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50500.

²⁰⁷ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 323, Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, 164.

²⁰⁸ According to Targa, on the other hand, freights are registered into the calculation only at their net value, as per *Consolat* chap. 96. See Targa, *Ponderationi*, 326.

²⁰⁹ “Non ponendosi nel presente risico li noli delle soprascritte merci, perché il sinistro [...] è seguito nel caricatore, e così non per anche guadagnati per non aver fatto, non solo la metà del viaggio, ma [...] parte alcuna del medesimo”. ASG, *CdM*, Esibite in avaria 377, 20/08/1705.

However, the application of this principle seems to vary over time: in certain years, freights contributed to all GA calculations, regardless of where the accident took place, while in other years, they followed these customary rules, and there was usually an expression similar to the abovementioned quotation.²¹⁰

According to the *Statuti Civili*, the vessel contributed for the entirety of its value.²¹¹ This element favoured the merchants and their insurers against the shipowners: a high value of the vessel would have increased the “passive mass”, i.e. all those assets that survived the fortuitous event, reducing the relative individual rate to be paid by the cargo.²¹² According to Targa, however, the value of a vessel consisted of both its hull and its equipment: the latter accounted for approximately half of total value. For example, Average calculations drawn up between 1639 and 1641 report both values confirming this theory.²¹³ Each calculation reports the value of the body of the vessel and a list of the value of all its equipment (sails, ropes, etc.). The equipment almost exactly matches the value of the vessel itself. Targa explains that although the Statutes did not explicitly mention the *Consolat de Mar*, they did refer to it where they wrote “vessel” and not “vessel and accessories”, which would have indicated the total value. Targa considered this reasoning essential to avoid a procedural difference that could hinder international trade: “it is not possible, in one part of the world, to operate in one way with regard to maritime commerce and in another in a different way, because of the common interest that so many different people may have in the same fact”.²¹⁴ Calculations redacted at least

²¹⁰ Routes could vary significantly. See, for example, the voyage of the shipmaster Simone Sverze. He set sail from Amsterdam to Genoa. However, probably because of bad weather, he took the Northern route passing through the strait between Scotland and Ireland. See ASG, NG 630, 17/02/1592.

²¹¹ “[...] dividi debeat secundum aes et libram inter navigium, naula, merces et omnes alia res existentes in dicto navigio tempore iactus [...]”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 155.

²¹² Furthermore, in the cases of Average calculations presumably drawn up for the sole purpose of insurance on the body of the vessel, it would not have made sense to report only half of its value, as the insurance was calculated as a percentage of the total value. See for example, the value of the *orca* named *San Giovanni Battista*, mastered by Antonio Maria Germano of Sestri Ponente, in 1601, ASG, NG 636, 04/04/1601. Recorded in *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50275.

²¹³ ASG, NG 2084, 1639-1640, NG 2085, 1641.

²¹⁴ “Non potendosi, in una parte del mondo, circa la contrattazione maritima operare in un modo e in altra in diverso, per l'interesse comune che tanta gente diversa puonno haver in un istesso fatto”. Targa, *Ponderationi*, 323-324. Legal doctrine regulates the diversity factor introduced by the *Statuti Civili* by placing it in a Mediterranean, if not European, context, see V. Piergiovanni, ‘Il valore del documento alle origini della scienza del diritto commerciale: Sigismondo Scaccia giudice a Genova nel XVII secolo’, in *Ianuensis non nascitur, sed fit. Studi in onore di Dino Puncuh*, Genoa, 2019, 1061-1068. In Venice, for example, local statutes and, only later,

until the 1640s, however, did not explicitly report both the value of the vessel and of its equipment in every calculation; they considered them both for the repartition of the damages. This clearly contradicts Targa's interpretation.²¹⁵ According to his opinion, moreover, the vessel contributed two-thirds of its value in the event of an "irregular jettison", that is, when due to the need to act promptly and the necessary procedural formalities had been neglected. Based on the documentation examined thus far, however, I have not found any indication of an "irregular jettison".²¹⁶ Perhaps this was purely a theoretical distinction.²¹⁷ The sources do not allow for clarity in this area. However, it is reasonable to speculate that Targa's theory is applicable only to the ship damages drawn up in the second half of the seventeenth century, which were the years in which he worked as a *causidico* in Average trials at the *Conservatori del Mare*.²¹⁸ Targa was not a legal historian. He conceived his treatise to be a practical guide for merchants and shipowners. Seeing that the *Statuti Civili* explained a criterion that contradicted the daily practice of the courts of his time, he gave a plausible explanation without further research. This explanation, however, was taken up by later jurists and historians, leading to a 'flattening' of the development of a legislation that at least in Genoa was not as linear as had been imagined.²¹⁹ Average rules in the *Statuti Civili* are evidence

international conventions were given preeminence in the procedure to be followed during maritime trials. See Fusaro, 'Migrating seamen', 69. The need for the parties to agree on shared procedures and contractual forms is also the reason for the existence of the contemporary York-Antwerp Rules, see J. Kruit, *General average, legal basis and applicable law: the overrated significance of the York-Antwerp Rules*, Zurphen, 2017, 32-35.

²¹⁵ See, as an example, ASG, NG 2084, 20/03/1640.

²¹⁶ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 325.

²¹⁷ Targa also referred to other theoretical elements, such as the subdivision of Averages into the following categories: *Avaria Ordinaria*, i.e. for customary and foreseeable payments; *Avaria Straordinaria*, similar to shipwreck and due to accidents for which "human providence could not repair"; *Avaria Mista*, when there was an unforeseeable accident from which one could save oneself with a voluntary expenditure; *Avaria Straordinaria-Volontaria*, when two or more shipmasters met in a port of loading and agreed to share the cargo, freight and related maritime risks. Half the profit went to the shipmasters and his officers, half "to the people for their good service"; *Avaria Indiana* or *Portoghese*, which was added to the surplus on the freight to make a voluntary gift to the officers and the crew; *Avaria Inglese* or *Olandese*, which consisted of a gift of one Spanish *real* to the shipmaster for each lot of high-value goods; *Avaria Grossa*, when a vessel stayed in port voluntarily to avoid privateers or pirates. The expenses were distributed over the freight, the cargo and the vessel. See Targa, *Ponderationi*, 252. No trace of all these categories has been found in the documentation. Also Venetian laws, for example, contemplated such variants (except for the *Avaria Inglese* or *Olandese*), although they do not appear in the actual documentation.

²¹⁸ According to Targa, the main difference between a *causidico* and a lawyer lay in the fact that the *causidico* was interested and participated in the court case, while the lawyer was only interested in the final judgement. See Targa, *Ponderationi*, 418-419.

²¹⁹ Even Felloni did not notice this important procedural difference for calculations made between 1590s and the 1640s.

of how each country could rule independently even on a topic well known across Europe, such as GA. Calculations drawn up at the end of the seventeenth century, on the other hand, show the value of the vessel as a contributing element, specifying that it was half of the total value.²²⁰ Following the shifting of the procedure from the *calcolatori's* to the *Conservatori del Mare's* jurisdiction, a convergence probably occurred.

The *Statuti Civili* also described the conditions needed to continue the journey following the jettison. Loading a new cargo or modifying the route would have resulted in the request for new documents, casting doubt on the legality of those documents and on the legitimacy of the GA act. This meant that the shipmaster was forbidden to load goods other than the provisions necessary for the journey, passenger baggage or *merci sottili*, that is, goods with a high unit value, which for the most part were excluded from jettison.²²¹ The shipmaster had to unload the remaining cargo on board only at ports agreed upon and had to present the relevant bills of lading. For this reason, many bills of lading are included in Average documentation in Genoa. The unloading of the cargo had to take place during the day, and the shipmaster had to request a certificate from local customs officers; otherwise, the shipmaster would have had to pay the damages deriving from the jettison. Average calculations in Genoa often mention a payment due to the assistant and one to the *sindaco* of the *calcolatori*, who were responsible for assisting the unloading of goods.²²²

If at the behest of the owning merchant or due to other exceptional conditions, part of the cargo had been unloaded in any other port than the one envisaged, the so-called “consuls of the jettison”, in addition to the local Genoese consul or another magistrate, had to witness the unloading

²²⁰ See for example the explanation of this criterion in ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 124, 03/03/1699, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50590: “E prima si pone in risico detta tartana stata tutta dal Francesco Maria Burna sudetto perito eletto, estimata in pezzi sei cento cinquanta reali da otto, e così per metà pezzi trecento venticinque simili”.

²²¹ “[...] victualia pro usu et necessitate navigii, merce subtiles et capsias passageriorum [...]”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 155. The *merci sottili*, in the mercantile practice of the time, consisted of finished products, usually woollen cloths and linens, see A. Fiorentino, *Il commercio delle pelli lavorate nel Basso Medioevo. Risultati dall'Archivio Datini di Prato*, Florence, 2015, 38.

²²² The ‘assistant’ was also called “giovane dei calcolatori”, “assistente dei calcolatori”. Only sometimes was the name of the official given. From 1639 to 1641, for example, we know that Giacomo Varese was in charge of assisting the unloading of goods on behalf of the *calcolatori*. See, for example, ASG, *NG 2084*, 12/08/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50382.

operations.²²³ At the time of this unexpected unloading, the shipmaster had to demand the contribution from the owner of the unloaded goods. The contribution rate was calculated based on the economic interests involved and according to the *per soldo et per lira* formula.²²⁴ Since the calculation had not been done previously, however, the shipmaster could only make an estimate of the contribution rate: if, after the calculation, the rate turned out to be greater than what he had already collected, the difference would have had to be paid by the shipmaster himself.²²⁵ This rule was obviously a further incentive to make the calculation as soon as possible to avoid inaccuracies and quarrels with merchants.²²⁶ Only if the jettison had occurred *in* the loading port, it was possible to load on board again as many goods as those previously jettisoned.²²⁷ If the shipmaster had taken on a new load elsewhere, and another jettison had then occurred, the latter's damage would have been exclusively borne by the shipmaster.²²⁸ In this case, the shipowners would have had to pay one-third of the freight charges on the new cargo to the insurers of the jettisoned goods and two-thirds to the *Conservatori del Mare*.²²⁹

In the first port reached after the jettison, with the help of the purser and the consuls of the jettison, the shipmaster had to declare the accident and all the lost or damaged goods. The report — in the sources called indifferently *consolato*, *testimoniale*, or *manifesto* — had to be followed by the officers', merchants' or any passengers' testimonies, which were a necessary prerequisite to free the shipmaster from liability for all damages.²³⁰ The incipit of

²²³ BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 157.

²²⁴ This expression also appears in the statutes of Pera and Gazaria, and in the *editio princeps* of the *Consolat*: “per sou et per liura et per besant”, where the latter term refers to the currency of Byzantium. See Corrieri, *Il Consolato del Mare*, 298.

²²⁵ “[...] contributionem iuxta calculum fiendum cum damnis et interesse”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 156.

²²⁶ The inaccuracies seem to have been very rare. Although we do not know exactly where appeals were filed with the *Rota Civile*, if any, we do have some rare examples of appeals in the examined files. See for example the request for amendment in the shipmaster's report wanted by the merchant Francesco Spinola in 1640 for a miscalculated consignment of wheat. See ASG, NG 2084, 16/06/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50272.

²²⁷ This was the case, for example, with the *galeone* named *San Giorgio*, mastered by Delfino Vassallo in 1601. An accident in the port of Girgenti forced it to leave the port and to lose part of its cargo. Later, however, the *galeone* returned to port and loaded new cargo, see ASG, NG 637, 05/01/1601, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50417.

²²⁸ “[...] patronus [...] teneatur ad satisfaciendum omne damnum in casu novi iactus [...]”, BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 155.

²²⁹ For the links between these two institutions in Genoa see the essay by Iodice, Piccinno, ‘Shifting and sharing risk’.

²³⁰ BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 156-157. According to Targa, the three terms responded to a precise logic, not always

the reports followed a common pattern: first, the date was recorded, and then, the office of the authority in which the declaration was made; finally, the elements aimed at identifying the shipmaster and the vessel were recorded. Although the statutes did not require it, documents drawn up in Genoa in the first years following the promulgation of the new rules also frequently indicated the tonnage of the vessel.²³¹ The shipmaster usually arrived with the oldest members of the crew, the most important crew officers in navigation, or those best able to understand the followed route and to confirm the alleged 'inevitability' of the Average act, namely, the pilot or the boatswain.²³² Testimonies are usually attached to the reports.

The report often served other purposes as well. For example, it could be used to meet the requirements of the formulas *consolato di sigurtà*,²³³ which refers to the need of the shipmaster to obtain an official document to request reimbursement of damages to the insurers, also referred to as *consolato o germinamento*.²³⁴ The latter refers to the sharing of all damages between the vessel and goods by agreement between the shipmaster and the merchants.

followed in the documents examined: the *manifesto* referred to the shipmaster who 'manifested' his accident; the *consolato* to the fact that the document was drawn up in front of a Genoese consul; finally, the *testimoniale* referred to the presence of at least three supporting testimonies. See Targa, *Ponderationi*, 309. It is also possible to find other formulas such as *attestato pubblico*, present in ASG, *CdM*, Testimoniali segreti redatti all'estero 285, 26/09/1698, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50411. The Genoese economist and senator Girolamo Boccardo, in his nineteenth-century dictionary of economics and commerce, provided a broad interpretation of the term, which perhaps better suited the complexity of the Genoese case. According to him, the word *Consolato* referred generically to the shipmaster's report, an act containing the judicial deposition of maritime events, in particular the accident, suffered by the vessel. See G. Boccardo, *Dizionario universale di economia politica e di commercio*, I, Milan, 1875, 559. On Boccardo see G. Pavanelli, 'L'attività scientifica e le vicende politico-professionali di Gerolamo Boccardo', in M.M. Augello, G. Pavanelli eds., *Tra economia, politica e impegno civile*, Genoa, 2005, 20-71.

²³¹ Following the change in the taxation system in 1638, discussed above, this indication seems to disappear almost completely from the shipmaster's reports. Not being a detail specifically required by the legislation, shipmasters probably preferred to keep silent about an element that could lead to higher taxation. See L. Piccinno, 'The economic structure of maritime trade calling at the port of Genoa through the analysis of general average data (Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries)', in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno, *Sharing risk*, forthcoming.

²³² It could happen that, following the accident or for any other reason, the shipmaster was unable to file a report and to ask for the calculation to be drawn up. In these cases, the shipmaster could delegate this task to one of his officers. This was the case of the shipmaster Antonio de Andrea of Frontignano, in 1600. Honorato Cavo, his boatswain, requested the calculation. See ASG, *NG 636*, 26/02/1600, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50182.

²³³ ASG, *NG 637*, 05/01/1601, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50422.

²³⁴ ASG, *CdM*, Testimoniali segreti redatti all'estero 285, 17/11/1698, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50407.

This agreement could be taken on before the voyage as well as at the time of facing an impending danger, as stated in the *Consolat de Mar*.²³⁵

Either the consul of the Genoese nation or the local magistrate approved the report and delivered an authentic and sealed copy of it to the shipmaster for the continuation of the voyage to the port of destination. Here, the calculation procedure would start. In the rare cases where there was no public authority present at the place where the accident was reported, the shipmaster could walk to another larger settlement, or could be given a sworn statement by a notary or a local officer before continuing the journey.²³⁶

Once in Genoa, the vessel that had suffered an Average event had the right of way to unload its cargo.²³⁷ Perhaps this was meant to prevent any damaged goods from suffering even more damage while waiting. For example, a load of wet wheat had to be unloaded immediately, put in the air and ‘paddled’ to remove moisture.²³⁸ The offloading precedence also helped to prevent the parties involved from making private and (potentially fraudulent) agreements, thus avoiding pleas to the institutions in charge. Furthermore, this could have been a way to favour the rapid circulation of information on the presence of pirates or temporarily dangerous routes, as well as making sure that different testimonies relating to the same event would strengthen and confirm one

²³⁵ Although not a GA procedure, the affinity was evident. On the relationship between *germinamento* and jettison see Addobbati, ‘Principle and rules’; D’Ovidio, ‘La contribuzione alle avarie comuni’, 110-111.

²³⁶ The vessel *Maria Buonaventura*, mastered by the *patrone* Marco de Thomatis, is a clear example. Following a storm near Ansedonia, the vessel took refuge in Porto Ercole where the *patrone* asked for a *consolato*, but no notary was present. He therefore decided to set sail again by having a certificate issued by the local harbour master. This certificate was called *consolato e fede*, see ASG, NG 636, 08/04/1600, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50233. Another example is the behaviour of the *patrone* Joseph Rigliomaio. He arrived in Portofino in 1640 but was told that it would take some time to get a notary from Santa Margherita Ligure. He therefore walked to Genoa and filed his report in front of the *Abbondanza* magistrates. See ASG, NG 2084, 19/03/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50326.

²³⁷ The *Conservatori del Mare*, perhaps also for this reason and in order to avoid delays, could accept the shipmaster’s reports even on traditional holidays. It is also significant that sometimes the reports drawn up in Genoa were drawn up “in domus mei”, in the residence of the notary himself. See, for example, the report drawn up in the home of the notary of the *calcolatori* Gio. Benedetto Gritta in Piazza delle Erbe, ASG, NG 2084, 17/06/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50375. Notaries in Genoa could draw up documents in their own homes or in one of the involved parties’ home or in some conventional public space such as squares or markets, see Epstein, ‘Business cycles’, 238-260.

²³⁸ For example, see the cargo of wheat transported from Campomarino to Genoa on the vessel of the Flemish shipmaster Martino Boccehlins in 1640. Once landed, the rotten wheat was sold for a very low price, while the recovered wheat was *paleggiato*, i.e. shaken and turned to ventilate it, 8 times and sold at 5% of its value. See ASG, NG 2084, 05/10/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* database with the id 50403.

another.²³⁹ The shipmaster and his purser had to go either to the port magistrate responsible for unloading the vessel or to an ordinary judge and state the month, day, and time of the jettison, along with a list of damages. If the officers or the sailors broke these rules in any way, for example, by unloading their belongings or other goods sooner than permitted, they would lose their jobs and their possessions on board.²⁴⁰ The goods unloaded illegally in Genoa were seizable by the *Padri del Comune* or by the *Conservatori del Mare*.²⁴¹ If there was an accuser reporting the fraud, the latter was rewarded with a third of the involved assets and the promise of anonymity.

The Chapter on jettison ended with a significant clarification: the regulations were addressed to all *patroni* and shipmasters but also to any other legal figure managing the vessel.²⁴²

What emerges from this legislation is the attempt to delimit as much as possible the operational margins left to the shipmasters. If, on the one hand, in the event of irregularities, shipmasters were personally responsible for any damage with their personal belongings; on the other hand, they still had great decision-making power. The voluntary act of jettison presupposed a choice and a resolution that morally qualified that action. Because of this, the shipmaster stated how the damage had occurred “after due consultation with his people” or with other expressions aimed at stressing the collegiality of the decision.²⁴³ However, a ‘choice’ was and still is an inner act that at most can be deduced by way of circumstantial evidence, therefore leaving the shipmaster as the only

²³⁹ See a few significant examples: the vessels *Salamandra*, *Tobia il Giovane* and *Ettore Troiano* sailed from Sciacca to Genoa with a cargo of grain in 1639. All three encountered the same storm near Sardinia which caused damage to ships and cargoes. The fact that the *testimoniali* were written two days apart reinforced each other’s credibility, see ASG, NG 2084, 22/01/1639, 24/01/1639, 24/01/1639, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50186, id 50187, id 50188. In the event of a pirate attack, moreover, it was useful to know as soon as possible the sea area in which the pirates had been sighted. For example, the *patrone* Cristophorus Raynerius, whose *galeone* was plundered by pirates, reported a *testimoniale privato* in which he identified the assailant as Henrico Puppel from London on board of the English vessel *Le Charlé*. The *patrone* drew up a list of looted goods which, if recovered, would rightfully belong to the owner, the merchant Pompeo Vassallo of Genoa, see ASG, NG 637, 08/05/1601, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as id 50458.

²⁴⁰ “[...] amitta exonerata et privati remaneant officiis”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 157.

²⁴¹ “Si bona fuerint reperta exonerata contra formam praesentis statuti sint effecta patrum communis et conservatorum maris civitatus Genuae [...]”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 157.

²⁴² “[...] prefectus, magister seu praepositus navigii”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. IV, chap. XVI, *De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda*, 157.

²⁴³ Apart from this example, similar formulas are frequent in the sources, see ASG, NG 2084, 19/04/1640.

depository of the truth.²⁴⁴ In a period in which merchants rarely travelled with their goods, the shipmaster was almost the exclusive arbiter and ‘narrator’ of any event that took place during navigation.²⁴⁵ In this regard, the opinion of Targa on the presumed voluntariness of jettison, which he defined as a wilful act “violated” by danger, is significant: “the cause from which it [the jettison] originates is not free, but violent, and so it is a will violated by the accident of danger”.²⁴⁶

The complexity of these rules, although aimed at avoiding fraud and irregularities, made it difficult to effectively enforce their content.²⁴⁷ Targa himself confirmed this impression. He believed that those cases in which all the rules and complex theoretical indications provided by the Statutes were complied with were probably linked to the shipmasters' decision making or to other subjects involved in concealing much larger irregularities:

[...] when a great danger arises, little is remembered of the juridical actions; and in sixty years in which I have seen a great number of maritime practices I do not remember having seen more than four in five *consolati*, made for a jettison, legally noted in the prearranged form; and in every one of these there was some criticism for having seemed too premeditated.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁴ On this see Addobbati, ‘Principle and rules’, and par. 5.4, 5.5.

²⁴⁵ Even in this cases, although rare, there is no lack of requests for amendments to the shipmaster’s reports. For example, the ship *Santa Maria Bonaventura*, mastered by the *patrone* Battista Insula quondam Bernardi, sailed into a storm in front of Portovenere and the Insula ordered a jettison. An unspecified number of baggages were thrown overboard, whose cargo was unknown. On arrival in port, the merchant owners asked and obtained an amendment to have the contents of their baggages recorded, see ASG, *NG 2084*, 05/05/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50376.

²⁴⁶ “La causa da cui ha origine non è libera, ma violenta, e così è una volontà violentata dall’accidente del pericolo”. Targa, *Ponderationi*, 249.

²⁴⁷ However, the Genoese rules became internationally known and were also reported by jurists such as Sigismondo Scaccia: “Avaria secundum statuta Genua, et apud mercatores quid significet”, chap. 2 gloss. 5 n. 57-58-60, in S. Scaccia, *Tractatus de Commerciis et Cambio*, Rome, 1620, 340-341.

²⁴⁸ “[...] sopraggiungendo un grande pericolo, poco vengono a memoria li atti giuridici, et io in anni sessanta di pratiche maritime che n’havrò veduto gran quantità non mi ricordo haver veduto Consolati á pena quattro in cinque fatti per gettito notato giuridicamente alla forma prenarrata, et in ogn’un di questi vi è stato da criticare per esser parsi troppo premeditate”. Targa, *Ponderationi*, 253. The work was published in 1692, but Targa’s name was among the *causidici* present when the calculations were drawn up as early as 1640, see ASG, *NG 2084*, 21/05/1640. The same opinion can be found in Baldasseroni, *Trattato delle assicurazioni*, IV, 60. Even in the nineteenth century, Gerolamo Boccardo used almost the same expression to refer to the legislation on jettison of his time, a sign of the difficulty of ruling in this area and of the continuity of certain problems of the GA institution that are affect it today, see Boccardo, *Dizionario*, I, 221.

To date, the adjustment to an ever-changing reality is still a necessary prerogative of maritime law. Although rich in provisions and indications, formal rules will never be capable of contemplating every variable of a sea voyage.

3.5 *The Calcolatori and the Standardization of Average Procedure*

The estimates and calculations of the damages are still to date a reason for frequent disputes, in which the parties rely on external ‘experts’, trusting them in their competence and impartiality. From the end of the sixteenth century, through the legitimation of a new professional magistracy, Genoese rulemakers made a significant effort at an institutional level to limit arbitrariness. The establishment of the *calcolatori* represented an important innovation in the management of Average practices. According to the current extant research, such magistracy seems to have been a Genoese peculiarity.

Book I of the new *Statuti Civili* sanctioned the creation of the *Ufficio dei calcolatori*, exclusively intended to deal with Average (GA and PA).²⁴⁹ Before the *Statuti Civili* of 1589, the *Rota Civile* chose the judges and the *calcolatori* of each Average case in the presence of all interested parties. This process followed common practice, and those legal treatises which mentioned the *Lex Rhodia de jactu*.²⁵⁰ The *calcolatori* were transitory figures, appointed on the spot as experts *ad id specialiter deputata per habentem ad id autoritate*.²⁵¹ The faith in their role was based on custom. Between the involved parties, there was a type of fiduciary relationship that clearly distinguished the mutualistic nature of Average practice as external to the market logic. The *calcolatori* magistracy was composed of three *calcolatori* who remained in office for 18 months, signed all the calculations, and had their own specialized notary/chancellor with a renewable five-year mandate.²⁵² As previously mentioned, they also had a *traglietta*, an assistant whose position probably corresponded to that of the

²⁴⁹ See BUG, 716.C.V.15, *Magistrati antichi e moderni, Consigli, Presidenze dal principio della repubblica*, manuscript of the eighteenth century, 12r.

²⁵⁰ See, for example, the lawsuit by Niccolò Spinola against Vincenzo Giustiniani, transferee of a jettisoned cargo previously belonging to Cristoforo Giustiniani. Niccolò Spinola, probably a merchant involved in the sea venture, demanded that Vincenzo, the new owner of the cargo, pay his share of the GA contribution. See *De Mercatura*, 254 (decisio CXLI).

²⁵¹ See *De Mercatura*, 254 (decisio CXLI).

²⁵² The mandate was renewable, but with a 3-year break between one term and the next. There could be exceptions, including the extension of Gio Benedetto Gritta’s mandate for two consecutive five-year terms, see ASG, Bibl. Rari 8, *Statutorum Civilium Serenissimae Reipublicae lanuensis*, I, chap. XI, ‘De calculatoribus, et eorum officio’, 1688, 29.

giovane dei calcolatori mentioned in the sources, and a *sindaco* who was in charge of attending disembarkations.²⁵³ Therefore, the *calcolatori* were no longer experts appointed on the spot, and thus theoretically susceptible to creating conflicts between the parties, but were individuals formally selected by the *Senato*.²⁵⁴ The parties, however, could ask the *Conservatori del Mare* to appoint 'private' *calcolatori*. For example, in a 1667 case involving the merchant Antonio Grimaldi and the *patrone* Benedetto de Moro, this type of appointment occurred with the election of external *calcolatori*.²⁵⁵ This practice, however, does not appear in the Statutes and was probably linked only to exceptional situations. In a few cases, experts appointed by the parties could support the ordinary *calcolatori*. For example, in 1640 Francesco Spinola, Nicolao Scaglia and Ambrogio Digherio agreed with numerous other English and Genoese merchants for the appointment of Carolus Vulstatuis, Michael Belhomus and Hieronimus Pallavicinus as *calcolatori*. Michele Bonomo and Geronimo Pallavicino were two *calcolatori* whose names were present in almost all the calculations of those years. The appointment of a third one, probably Dutch, perhaps responded to a need for protection - maybe also for a translator - expressed by the Northern merchants involved. The notary of the *Conservatori del Mare*, Filippo Camere, approved their calculation.²⁵⁶

The Statutes also specified the remuneration due to this new office. The *calcolatori's* salary varied between a minimum of ten and a maximum of one hundred and fifty *lire* per calculation, probably depending on its complexity.²⁵⁷

²⁵³ These roles do not appear in the statutes, but are recorded in the documentation examined. See, for example, the calculation in ASG, NG 2084, 12/08/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50382.

²⁵⁴ As an example, see the appointing of the *calcolatore* Joannes Baptista Zerbinus in 1594, ASG, NG 631, Atti dei calcolatori, 11/07/1594. See the document transcribed in [Appendix IV](#). Such specialisation can be observed as well in the notarial folders of Orazio Fazio, Gio Agostino Gritta and Gio Benedetto Gritta, significantly marked on the back as 'Atti dei Calcolatori', see ASG, NG 629-637, 1643-1646, 2083-2088. For example, for 1640 the three *calcolatori* Carlo Ottaggio, Michele Bonomo and Geronimo Pallavicino always appear, see ASG, NG 2084, 1640.

²⁵⁵ However, if this agreement had not been reached quickly, the judges of the *Rota Civile* reassigned the case to the *calcolatori* 'ordinary'. More precisely, the foreign judges of the *Rota Civile* entrusted the practice to the *Senato* of the Republic, which transferred it under the jurisdiction of the *calcolatori*. The example, reported in [Appendix V](#), took place by private notary in the house of Antonio Grimaldi himself and in the presence of witnesses, see ASG, NA 8478, UGG 10, 11/05/1667. See also See BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. I, chap. XI, *De calculatoribus, et eorum officio*, 20.

²⁵⁶ ASG, NG 2084, 16/04/1640.

²⁵⁷ If there was unforeseen income, it was due to the *Padri del Comune* for the maintenance of the port: "[...] et alia dimidia solvatur conservatoribus maris eroganda in usus dicti officii et pro eo, quod dictis usibus supererit, dando patribus communis in impensas portus et moduli erogando", in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. I, chap. XI, *De calculatoribus, et eorum officio*, 19-20.

For example, the payment for a 'standard' calculation in the period between 1590 and 1641 was 10 *lire* for the *calcolatori* and 1.13.04 *lire* for their notary.²⁵⁸ The *Conservatori del Mare* seized half of the fee, as specified in the calculations:

[...] 5 *lire* half of 10 *lire* in which the said calculation has been taxed for the magnificent magistrate of the *Conservatori del Mare* [...]. The half of which, due to the said magnificent magistrate, has been paid credit by means of 5 *lire*.²⁵⁹

The *sindaco* of the *calcolatori* received 30 *denari* a day for supervising the unloading of vessels and the storage of the cargo.²⁶⁰ The payment of the *traglietta* was usually 2 *lire* in total, to which a variable amount could be added.²⁶¹

The Statutes did not just entrust to the *calcolatori* the drafting of the calculation. The *calcolatori* listened to parties (shipmaster, merchants, and any insurers) and their witnesses and then proceeded to validate or nullify the report presented.²⁶² At this stage, the parties could propose any claim regarding the report.²⁶³

Following the report approval, the *calcolatori* could order the unloading of the goods and impose the presence of guardians on the ship to prevent any

²⁵⁸ The sum of 11.13.04 *lire* was very frequent in the Average administrative costs reported in the calculations drawn up in these years. In case of complicated cases, however, the costs could rise to an exceptional calculation where the parties paid 175 *lire* for the salary of notary and *calcolatori*, see ASG, NG 636, 27/01/1600, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50164.

²⁵⁹ “[...] *lire* 5 metà de *lire* 10 in quali è stato tassato il detto calcolo per il magnifico magistrato de signori Conservatori del Mare [...]. La metà de quali spettante al detto magnifico magistrato è stata pagata in lo credito per mezzo che sono *lire* 5”. ASG, NG 2084, 04/05/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50376.

²⁶⁰ This criterion is explicitly illustrated in ASG, NG 2084, 30/01/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50584: “[...] che ha assistito al sbarco di detti grani per riponerli in magazzino, per farsi paleggiare, e farli consignare dopo la vendita che si sono consumati giorni ventotto a *denari* 30 il giorno”.

²⁶¹ In the period 1639-1641 the payment of a fee for the notary of *calcolatori* is also frequent, see for example the fee of 20 *lire* paid in ASG, NG 2084, 12/08/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as id 50382.

²⁶² “Quotiescumque patronus, magister seu prefectus navigii, aut alius ad quem de iure spectet, petierit fieri calculum de iacut seu avaria [...] Magistratus calculorum intelligat partes, examinari faciat testes [...]”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, *Statutorum civilium*, vol. I, chap. XI, *De calculatoribus, et eorum officio*, 19.

²⁶³ One example is the case of the *patrone* Antonino Risso from Messina. He filed a report promising to comply with the Genoese Average laws in order to discharge any liability for damage to the cargo of grain he had brought to Genoa. The grain had not only become wet but also deteriorated. Following the calculation of GA, a supplementary *consolato* was drawn up and two calculations were produced for two PAs, see ASG, NG 636, 01/03/1600, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50215.

fraud.²⁶⁴ Furthermore, the shipmaster had to swear that he had not unloaded anything in violation of the statutory rules and to be ready otherwise to pay a fine of twelve *scudi*. The *calcolatori* collected one-third of the fine, and the *Padri del Comune* collected the remaining two-thirds.²⁶⁵ A guilty shipmaster was fined one hundred *scudi* or the value of the Average itself. If an accuser had revealed the fraud, he would receive the third part of the fine as a reward.

Each calculation began with a brief summary of the report, including the information on the case and the events leading up to the GA. The calculation listed the values of the contributing elements, that is: vessel, freights, and cargo.²⁶⁶ The contributing assets referred to the situation prior to the jettison. All these elements were called *risico* (risk) in the document. The *calcolatori* also indicated the quantity, quality, and value of each loaded batch of cargo, often expressed in the units of measurement and in the currency of the place of loading, along with the relative equivalent values in Genoese measures. In addition, they often recorded the names of the seller and buyer merchants and those of any other intermediaries. If the goods were packed, they relied on the bill of lading without opening the crates.²⁶⁷

After the risk section, the calculation of the damage admitted during the partition followed, with a list developed of the value of the deteriorated and/or lost assets and of the administrative and unforeseen expenses incurred up to that moment.²⁶⁸ The contribution rate, which had to be borne by the individual merchants and by the shipowners or by their insurers, was formulated through the division of the total damages by the total risk. These calculations were quite complex at times, as reported by the notary in the notes attached to the

²⁶⁴ Documents often mention the presence of a “young man of the *calcolatori*” who attended the disembarkation of the ships and handed over a note listing the disembarked cargo, see ASG, NG 2084, 1640.

²⁶⁵ Forcheri, *Doge, governatori, procuratori*, 90.

²⁶⁶ Often, when referring to the ship's equipment, the quality of the lost objects was also specified. This was expressed in carats for keels, sails and anchors. For other parts such as a mast or a *schifo*, adjectives such as ‘new’, for example, were used to obtain the highest valuation. This system could lead to fraud. Evidence of this can be found in the lawsuits brought by insurers against shipmasters accused of making upward valuations of the ship's equipment in order to amortise the costs of renewal and maintenance by taking advantage of the GA event, see Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, 58.

²⁶⁷ ASG, NG 2084, n. 143, 27/04/1640.

²⁶⁸ The value of GA damages was generally low. For the period 1598-1600, for example, the average damage was 1,109 Genoese *lire*. It constituted only 4% of the average value of the contributing elements, see my elaboration based on the dataset of the *AveTransRisk* database, <http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/avetransrisk>, accessed on 29/06/2021. This was the subject of a paper presented at the EBHA international conference held in Ancona on 9 September 2018, *The firm and the sea: chains, flows and connections*.

procedure.²⁶⁹ The calculation was the most important and detailed document of the entire process, and was an essential knowledge source because of the wealth of information it provided on the loading of vessels arriving in the port of Genoa, the routes they followed and the dangers they faced. After this process, the *calcolatori* read the calculation in the presence of all the involved parties. The calculation was then passed to the *Rota Civile* of Genoa, which sanctioned its validity with a judgement.²⁷⁰

The approval of the *Rota Civile* appeared to be a mere bureaucratic formality, and required a variable period of time linked to the presence of disagreements. The approval usually took place on the same day or in the days immediately ensuing. This magistracy had full jurisdiction on any potential appeal against the calculation. According to what has emerged from the practices examined, these instances seem rather rare. The priority of the procedure was rapidity, and the few appeals in the sources are mainly concerned with an erroneous estimate of the cargo value, rather than with a refusal to pay for a share in a GA repartition.²⁷¹ A motto of the time, shared in European trading circles, recommended the merchant to “never go to justice” to avoid further raising his expenses.²⁷² The resolution of the case, from the presentation of the *scriptura* to the approval of the *Rota*, could end in a few days as well as in many months, and, in rare cases, after several years. The shipmasters presented their declarations asking for a generic damage repartition and a discharge from any responsibility, but it was up to the competent judiciary to assess whether the

²⁶⁹ ASG, *NG 2084*, n. 143, 27/04/1640.

²⁷⁰ This last operation is not specified in the *Statuti Civili*, but emerges with regularity in daily practice. The calculations regularly concluded with formulas such as “Diciamo doversi accettare, ragionare, e calcolare tra il mercanzie, o sia mercanti, e suoi assicuratori et altri che nel presente calcolo abbino o possano avere interesse, liberano come liberiamo il patrone [...] dal detto gettito seguito per colpa di detta fortuna patita, riservando siccome riserviamo le ragioni e azioni a cuiusvoglia contro qualunque persona che prima o poi del presente calcolo avesse o fossero obbligati tali quali li competano, o possono competere in giudizio ordinario e così in fero a magnifici Auditori della Rota Civile della serenissima repubblica doversi accettare, ragionare, calcolare e pagare”. See, for example, ASG, *NG 2084*, 19/02/1640. On the *Rota Civile* see V. Piergiovanni, ‘Genoese Civil Rota and mercantile customary law’, in Piergiovanni ed., *Norme scienza e pratica*, II, 1211-1229.

²⁷¹ Again, see the report declared by the *patrone* Antonino Riso in ASG, *NG 636*, 10/04/1600, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50215. A further problem with the valuation of cargoes arose from the jettison of a suitcase valued at 400 Genoese *lire*. Paolo Sommovigo, its owner, asked and obtained to suspend the GA procedure promising to bring new witnesses to prove that his suitcase was actually worth 800 *lire*. See ASG, *NG 2084*, 05/05/1640, voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50376.

²⁷² This advice was included in a petition by the dragoman Giovanni Antonio Grillo who attributed it to the *baillio* Giorgio Giustiniani during his embassy to Constantinople, see Maréchaux, ‘«Non andare mai alla giustizia»: conflictividad marítima, mediación y normas jurídicas comunes entre Venecia y el imperio otomano (1600-1630)’, in M.H. Sanchez ed., *Republica y Republicanismo en la Europa moderna (siglos XVI-XVIII)*, Madrid, 2017, 205-228.

conditions for GA existed.²⁷³ The practices of GA and PA from the moment of approval of the report to that of the calculation required on average 46 days for the former and 72 days for the latter, a relatively short time considering the multiplicity of interests and the courts involved.²⁷⁴

During the seventeenth century, Average procedures in Genoa underwent only slight changes, largely translatable into an increase in responsibilities, skills, and controls by the *Conservatori del Mare*. Although the 1589 statutes did not indicate a relationship between the *calcolatori* and the *Conservatori*, and indeed the former appeared as an independent office, with the passing of time the *Conservatori* gradually absorbed the *calcolatori*'s functions. The calculation procedure followed a progressive standardization, which limited the functions of the *calcolatori*.²⁷⁵ For example, the value of the ship and its equipment was increasingly provided by the *sindaco* of the *Conservatori del Mare*. The *sindaco*, as previously mentioned, was the officer in charge of the visit to the vessels arriving in the port.²⁷⁶ The authority of the *sindaco* probably allowed resolving or preventing any issues that could arise between the merchants and shipowners.²⁷⁷ The *calcolatori* simply copied the estimate into their calculation.²⁷⁸ Furthermore, the *calcolatori* lost their responsibility over the reception of the shipmasters who presented a report in Genoa. This formally

²⁷³ Felloni, 'I calcoli di avaria', 844.

²⁷⁴ Elaboration based on all Genoese archival sources uploaded in the *AveTransRisk* online database. The average value for GA procedures was calculated on 110 voyages. Seven voyages were excluded due to the number of days being significantly higher than the other 110 voyages (number of days > 250 days). The average value for PA procedures was calculated on 100 voyages. Two voyages were excluded due to the number of days being significantly higher than the other 100 voyages (number of days > 300 days). The difference between the average values is perhaps due to litigations of merchants with their insurers or to the fact that Genoese institutions considered the PA procedures less 'urgent' than those involving many merchants and shipowners.

²⁷⁵ For an example of the standardisation of *consulates*, see the form in Targa, *Ponderationi*, 326-328 and transcribed in par. 3.5.

²⁷⁶ See for example the estimate for the ship *San Giacomo* of the English shipmaster Andrea Rend, arrived in Genoa from London in March 1640: "Estimo fatto da me Gio. Batta Casanova Sindaco delli m. Ill. Conservatori del Mare, e con mio giuramento della nave nominata Santo Giacomo di portata di salme 2500 incirca, capitano Andrea Rend inglese, venuta d'Inghilterra con carico di merci diverse [...]", in ASG, NG 2084, 09/03/1640, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as id 50229.

²⁷⁷ A mercede to the *sindaco* of the *Conservatori*, usually 6 *lire*, generally appear in the calculations. See, for example, ASG, NG 2084, n. 143, 26/03/1640.

²⁷⁸ The person in charge of providing this assessment was the *sindaco* of the *Conservatori*. This role, already mentioned in par. 2.4.2, lasted three years. The *sindaco* was also entrusted with the inspection of vessels leaving the port, together with another ordinary member of the *Conservatori*, as well as the collection of a tax of six *soldi* for every hundred Genoese *salme* (1.9 tons) of departing ships, see Forcheri, *Doge, governatori, procuratori*, 150.

passed to the *Conservatori del Mare* from 1602 onwards.²⁷⁹ For example, consider the report of the *patrone* Giacomo S. Michele di Lavagna, the patron of the *liuto* called *San Antonio Bonaventura*.²⁸⁰ He brought his report, initially drawn up in Piombino, to Genoa, and he delivered it to the *Conservatori del Mare* on 25 October 1638. The *Conservatori* read it in the presence of the *patrone* and Stefano Marengo, the principal merchant interested. Marengo and the *patrone* asked the *Conservatori del Mare* Pantaleo Balbi, Geronimo de Marini and Alessandro Gentili, to proceed with the calculation on 29 October. The *Conservatori* approved the request but requested further witnesses. The declaration was then rewritten, followed by the testimony of three of the five crew members of the vessel. Finally, the *Conservatori* asked the *calcolatori* to proceed with the calculation. Only from this moment on did the *calcolatori* intervene in the procedure.

At the same time, the informal practice in which shipmasters declared an Average report in front of other city authorities became common practice.²⁸¹ In such cases, the report differed from those drawn up abroad due to its brevity. It was usually a single sheet divided into two columns. It had a small introduction with standard expressions aimed at declaring the proper loading of the cargo and the safety of the vessel.²⁸² It ended with formulas that released the vessel, the sailors, and the shipmaster from any responsibility.²⁸³ Perhaps, shipmasters asked to have these declarations written down simply so that the notary of the *calcolatori* could keep them to prove the shipmasters' innocence in case of possible litigation or claims by the merchants. The percentage can vary

²⁷⁹ As early as 1598 an isolated case of a declared consulate can be found at the chancellery of the *Conservatori del Mare*, see ASG, NG 635, Atti dei calcolatori, 31/12/1598. This practice, however, only became established during the first years of the following century.

²⁸⁰ ASG, NG 2084, 09/10/1638, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50512. Report partially transcribed in [Appendix VI](#).

²⁸¹ This happened in particular in front of the *Ufficio dell'Abbondanza* and the *Pammatone* hospital, near the gate of Acquasola. It is not clear what motivated this change in the daily practice of dealing with Average cases. Perhaps the large number of vessels arriving in the port led captains to declare the damage they faced en route to other magistracies so as to set sail again as soon as possible. For example, the *consolato* declared by the Flemish shipmaster Gio Giacomo Pellegrino in 1641 was drafted in the "cancelleria dei protettori dell'ospedale di Pammatone". See ASG, NG 2085, 04/04/1641; the shipmaster Jacob Passanus declared his *consolato* in 1640, on the other hand, in the "ufficio dell'Annona", see ASG, NG 2084, 03/02/1640.

²⁸² "Il detto carico era bene in ordine stagno fasciato e amainato et atto a venir qua con detto carico havendo per tutte le parti del mondo", see ASG, NG 636, n.14, 04/02/1600. Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50184.

²⁸³ "Il che tutto quelle che è seguito non è stato ne è per colpa di detto patrone, o sua marinari e gente ma per causa di detta fortuna però fa istanza esaminati li seguenti testimoni per valersene poi dove si faccia il bisogno et tutto in ogni miglior modo [...]", in ASG, NG 2084, 01/01/1640. Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50201.

significantly depending on the period examined, but in general, more than 50% of the total reports in the *calcolatori's* archival folders, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* database, do not have an attached calculation.

Moreover, the 1602 reforms granted to the *Conservatori* all criminal jurisdiction for control and safety of navigation. This jurisdiction had been theirs initially, but it had been entrusted to the *Rota Criminale* in 1576. A further reform in 1605 authorised the *Conservatori* to proceed at any time, ignoring for example public holidays or Sunday rest, in order to ensure the speedy execution of maritime cases as any delay could lead to further expense and financial damage.²⁸⁴ Part of the jurisdictional tasks, however, also seemed to belong to the *calcolatori*, as demonstrated in a complex overlapping of duties: a judgement of 23 March 1625, signed by the *Conservatore del Mare* Ottaviano Canevari, officially established that the *calcolatori* could not be judges in civil cases: all judicial authority belonged to the *Conservatori* alone.²⁸⁵ This judgement allows us to speculate an institutional conflict of which, unfortunately, no other evidence remains to date. Only following the potential approval of the report and the request for calculation by decree of the *Conservatori* would the procedure reach the *calcolatori*.²⁸⁶

At the end of the seventeenth century, the *calcolatori* seem to disappear from the sources, although the *Statuti Civili* were unchanged. The calculations began to be drawn up and signed by the notary of the *Conservatori*. For example, all the calculations found to date for the year 1699 display the name of the notary of the *Conservatori del Mare* Alessandro Alfonso, who functioned as both the chancellor and the designated *calcolatore*. The calculation also took place under the direction and guidance of one of the *Conservatori del Mare*, who in these cases was Filippo Spinola.²⁸⁷ Starting in 1720, the new magistracy of the *Magistrato di Avaria* replaced the notary of the *Conservatori*. This magistracy operated from 1720 to 1817.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁴ See ASG, ms. 41, *Leggi perpetue*, 1576-1639, 27/05/1605, 104r.

²⁸⁵ ASG, Bibl. Rari 8, *Statutorum Civilium Serenissimae Reipublicae Ianuensis*, 1688, 29.

²⁸⁶ ASG, Bibl. 9, *Legum* 1590-1608, 18/03/1602, 263.

²⁸⁷ ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 124, 19/05/1699. These documents were drawn up following legal disputes, in fact they are part of the folders of the *Atti Civili*. One of the values in the calculation was the payment of the lawyer who carried out the litigation. Further analyses on other sources could perhaps shed more light on these events.

²⁸⁸ ASG, *CdM* 451-453, Sessioni diverse del magistrato d'avaria ed altro, 1720-1817. A short review shows that these documents are essentially made up of drafts of sessions in which the date and names of the shipmasters involved are recorded. Since the end of the seventeenth century, all the Genoese documents on Average procedures are kept in the files of the

The strengthening and centralization of the procedure perhaps responded to a specific request from merchants and insurers or from shipowners. The complete management by the *Conservatori* would have possibly favoured a streamlining of the procedure and a greater standardization of practices, allowing merchants to save time and money by not having to pay administrative costs to the various judiciaries involved. For shipowners, the jurisdiction shift from the *calcolatori* to the *Conservatori* seems to have carried a change in the contributing criteria: the vessel started contributing for only half of its value. As stated by Douglass North, a significant part of the institutional changes in history were carried out by the same social actors who sought to interpret the world around them through ideologies, regulations, and values.²⁸⁹ This was even truer in Genoa, where the main merchants and businessmen were closely linked by business and family relations and belonged to the class of patricians ruling the state.²⁹⁰ From the management of Average practices, an effort of bureaucratic-administrative uniformization emerges in line with other Italian and European realities, considered by historians as more advancements toward the “creation of the modern state”.²⁹¹

Most likely due to the continuous standardization of the procedure and the variety of types of damage accepted as GA, during the second half of the seventeenth century, the *Conservatori del Mare* faced the growing problem of the unscrupulous use of reports by some shipmasters. The latter obtained counterfeit accident reports or exaggerated the extent of the damages to receive illicit repartitions, without the port authorities being able to do much to stop them. For this reason, in 1654, the *Conservatori* asked the *Senato* for authorization to issue new surveillance and punishment regulations.²⁹² The *Senato*, having heard the positive opinion of a deputation specially created to evaluate the matter, gave its authorization.²⁹³ On 27 November 1654, the

Conservatori del Mare. Future research will shed light on the functioning of Average practice in Genoa in the eighteenth century.

²⁸⁹ North, *Institutions, institutional change*, 36-45; see also J. Knight, D. North, ‘Explaining Economic Change: The Interplay Between Cognition and Institutions’, *Legal Theory* 3(3), 1997, 211-226.

²⁹⁰ Bitossi, ‘Il governo della Repubblica’, 91-107; Felloni, ‘Il ceto dirigente’, 1323-1340; Bitossi, *Il governo dei magnifici*.

²⁹¹ Lo Basso, ‘Il finanziamento dell’armamento’, 101.

²⁹² The *Conservatori* sent a request to draft new rules following the trial for the barratry of the shipmaster Franciscus Rubeum of Sestri Ponente, see ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 27/11/1654.

²⁹³ The deputation included the *magnifici* Andrea De Mari, Agostino Raggio and Gio. Batta Raggio quondam Francesco, see ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 15/03/1655.

Conservatori del Mare obtained the authority to take all necessary measures to limit the phenomenon of the false *consolati*, i.e., the false reports made by shipmasters, usually in collusion with their crews. According to the *Senato*, those countermeasures should above all protect foreign merchants who arrived in Genoa:

[...] we have esteemed that it is in the public interest to find and establish a way by which they can be deprived of the opportunity to commit so frequently fraud, theft, barratry [shipmaster's fraud] and similar crimes outside the dominion of the Most Serene Republic, to the detriment, not so much of the vassals and subjects of the Most Serene Republic, but of the foreign merchants [...].²⁹⁴

The common indebtedness of the shipmasters was considered the first reason behind the frauds. For this reason, the regularization of Average reports went hand in hand with the regularization of sea loans, one of the most commonly used tools for the rapid retrieval of credit. However, the establishment of a univocal method that limited the shipmasters' false reports remained problematic. The solutions adopted were limited to reinstating the need for witnesses to be present at the time of the drafting of the report and the presentation of the bill of lading. Documents that did not comply with these formal requirements would be considered null, and the *Conservatori* would have had the authority to proceed *ex officio* in suspicious cases. There would also be a reward for those who denounced fraud. This reward ranged from 50 to 500 *scudi*, depending on the crime. To avoid weighing on the *Conservatori's* budget, the reward was paid by the owners of the vessel whose shipmaster had been found guilty of barratry.²⁹⁵

These measures do not appear to have brought significant improvements, as the matter remained at the centre of the memoirs that the *Conservatori* sent to

²⁹⁴ “[...] abbiamo stimato che convenga al pubblico servizio di trovare, e stabilire forma per mezzo de cui si tolga in qualche maniera li occasione di poter commettere così frequentemente le frodi, furti, baratterie e delitti simili anche fuori di dominio della Serenissima Repubblica in pregiudizio non tanto de vassalli e sudditi della Serenissima Repubblica quanto de mercanti forastieri [...]”. ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 15/03/1655.

²⁹⁵ On the definition of ‘barratry’ see Boccoardo, *Dizionario*, I, 290-292. On this topic see G. Rossi, ‘Early modern maritime insurance between mercantile customs and *ius commune*: some remarks on the liability of the shipmaster’, in L. Brunori, S. Dauchy, O. Descamps and X. Prévost eds., *Le droit face à l'économie sans travail. Finance, investissement et spéculation de l'Antiquité à nos jours*, II, *L'approche internationale*, Paris, 2020, 241-263; G. Rossi, ‘The Barratry of the Shipmaster in Early Modern Law: The Approach of Italian and English Law Courts’, *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis*, 87(2), 2019, 504-574; M. Berti, ‘La “baratteria di padrone” nella circolazione marittima commerciale mediterranea’, in S.P.P. Scalfati, A. Veronese eds., *Studi di storia offerti a Michele Luzzati*, Pisa, 2008, 39-52.

the *Senato* throughout the second half of the seventeenth century. In Genoa, as deducible from the documentation examined, there was a rapid and almost standard drafting of the reports, which as previously specified, could also be declared before different magistracies of the Republic. This obviously increased the difficulty in recognizing mendacious statements.²⁹⁶ However, these factors could have contributed to pushing more shipmasters to declare their GA or PA report in Genoa; that is, the ease of declaring a report for a shipmaster was a congenital but “necessary” inconvenience to maritime trade. These problems were still present in the following centuries and are still a source of contrast today.²⁹⁷ The culmination of automatism in the drafting of the reports was the template reported by Targa in 1692. This is a summary of all the characteristics and requirements that the shipmaster’s reports had to observe and even included the usual references to the inevitability of damage and to the external danger:

1690. In ... at ... appeared before the... the *patrone* ... of nation ... *patrone* of the vessel named ... he with his oath registered from me, notary, and from himself taken, having touched the writings, denounces in all as hereinafter; that is, that coming with his said vessel, and men ... of his crew from ... from where he left with a cargo of ... to be taken to ... as per the freight contract made to ... on behalf of ... to go to ... and, being this night, or ... on high sea above this port miles ... and having been overtaken by a fierce storm of ... which caused him a very heavy damage, which he was unable to resist, after various attempts, in order not to get lost; he was forced to land in this port where he arrived at ... and he has moored, that for other things he did not have here to do anything, but it was mere violence, and he has not done, nor does he intend to do any landing, nor any embarkation, and he asks that of this report a public act is made, and that it is approved, when it is needed, by whoever is responsible for it, so that it may always be a record of the truth, and for his own indemnity, and that of all concerned in the said vessel, and in its cargo, and he requests that in confirmation of what has been said above, the examinations of the passengers and seamen be received in the usual form.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 15/03/1655.

²⁹⁷ Baldasseroni, for example, wrote that “[...] vi è sommo abuso, permettendo che i capitani facciano solamente una denuncia generica, che talvolta è fatta dai loro raccomandatarj senza loro saputa [...]”. See Baldasseroni, *Trattato sulle assicurazioni*, IV, 96.

²⁹⁸ “1690. À ... in ... à hore ... comparve dinanzi al ... il Patron ... di Nation ... patroneggiante come dice la Barca intitolata ... di portata di ... il quale con suo giuramento defertoli da me Nottaro, e da esso stato preso, toccate le scritture, denuncia in tutto come in appresso; cioè che venendo con detta sua Barca, & huomini ... di Marinaria da ... di dove si è partito ... con carico di ... da condursi a ... come per contratto di noleggio fatto à ... per conto di ... per andar a ... & essendo questa notte, ó ... in altura sopra questo porto miglia ... ó circa è stato sopragionto da una fierissima borasca di ... che gli hà causato una gravissima tormenta, alla quale non hauendo, doppo vari tentativi potuto resistere, per non perdersi; gli è stato forza di approdar in questo porto nel qual è gionto à hore ... & hà dato fondo, che per altro non havvea qui da far

The countermeasures enacted against the false reports resulted in an edict drawn up in 1698, approved and published in 1703, to prevent “large averages based on inconsistent calculations”.²⁹⁹ This edict, however, only reported the solutions discussed by the commission of 1654 and did not add any further restrictions. It was renewed without changes in the following years.

The standardisation of the procedure increased the simplicity with which a shipmaster could declare his Average report, thus leading to favouring a stop in the port of Genoa. In this sense, it is possible to assume that the lack of a more organic intervention on the drafting of the reports was part of the competition policy with nearby ports, especially Livorno but also Villefranche and Marseille.³⁰⁰ The letters written in 1671 by the English consul residing in Livorno, John Finch, seem to confirm this hypothesis.³⁰¹ For this reason, perhaps in the Genoese archives, there are numerous reports of shipmasters with cargoes destined for Livorno, especially wheat: they stopped in Genoa to declare their report and to request the calculation.³⁰² The standardisation of the procedure may also have reduced transaction costs compared to those applied in rival ports.³⁰³ Genoese authorities, moreover, constantly kept under surveillance the reports drafted in Livorno. They requested their consul in

cosa alcuna, ma è stata mera violenza, & non hà fatto, né intende fare sbarco, né imbarco alcuno, e domanda che di questa sua dinoncia, ne sia fatto atto publico, e che sia approvato, quando sia di bisogno, da chi spetta, quale sia, acciò sempre consti della verità, e per indennità sua, e d'ogni interessato in detta Barca, e nel carico di essa, e fa istanza che in confermatione di quanto ha detto sopra, sieno ricevuti li esami de passeggeri, e Marinari in forma solita”. Targa, *Ponderationi*, 300-301. The sources, however, did not follow this model and shows a significant syntactic variety even at the end of the seventeenth century. See, for example, the documents in ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 125, 1700.

²⁹⁹ ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 15/09/1698. The drafting process of the edict began on 20 November 1698 and ended on 26 September 1703.

³⁰⁰ Also the free port institution was a tool used in the commercial rivalry with Livorno. See Kirk, ‘Genoa and Livorno’.

³⁰¹ J. Dyble, ‘Foreign shipping and the Tuscan authorities’, in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., *Sharing risk*, forthcoming.

³⁰² An interesting example is the voyage of two Flemish shipmasters who set out from Malamocco, near Venice, with a cargo of grain for Livorno. Both vessels, Giovanni d'Armano's *San Giorgio* and Gherardo Shut's *Profeta Elia*, declared an Average due to bad weather en route. However, following the unloading of the goods in Livorno and the reports drawn up with the city governor, the two shipmasters took their declarations to Genoa. See ASG, *NG 2084*, 29/12/1639 e 29/12/1639, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50195 and id 50196.

³⁰³ This observation can only be tested following specific research on nearby ports. Following the analysis of two sample cases for GA calculations made in 1640 in Genoa and Livorno, for example, the administrative costs in Livorno are more than double those paid in Genoa. Administrative expenses in two GA calculations in Genoa in 1640: 114 *lire*; 93.5 *lire*. Administrative expenses in two GA calculations in Livorno in 1640: 280.5 *lire*; 218 *lire*. See the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the ids 50229, 50272, 10036 and 10042. The currency in Calculations drafted in Livorno in 1640 were the *scudo*. I followed the conversion rate of 1 florentine *scudo* = 7.5 *lire*, as indicated in Dyble, ‘General average’, 137.

Livorno to keep them informed about what was happening in Tuscany. The consul sent to Genoa a copy of the reports declared by Genoese shipmasters in front of the local governor.³⁰⁴

In Genoa and elsewhere, Average procedure responded to the primary function of mercantile justice: to provide judgements quickly and without excessive formalities and without wasting time in the economic cycle. These were the guidelines followed by Genoese businessmen and legislators in drafting the legislation, and these requirements precisely determined the continuous and detailed normative development in Genoa. The entrustment of the appeal function first to the *Rota Civile* and then to the *Conservatori*, the presence of the merchants at the time of approval of the report and of the calculation, and the speed in the procedure, as has emerged from the cases analysed thus far, were functional aspects in the mercantile environment and in the customary practices that prevailed in the field of maritime law.³⁰⁵ Vito Piergiovanni stated:

If the world of commerce moves in increasingly wide international spaces, it is unthinkable that law could become a brake, at least in realities, such as the Genoese one, which based its survival and then its fortunes on commerce.³⁰⁶

These are probably some of the reasons why the GA institution, in some ways based on empiricism and 'trust' between the parties, still survives today, albeit with mixed fortunes.

³⁰⁴ The reports drawn up in Livorno in front of the governor and sent to Genoa by the Genoese ambassador are numerous, see for instance the dispatches made by Consul Gio. Stefano Bocalandro during 1640 in ASG, *NG 2084*, 1640.

³⁰⁵ Other jurists of the time reported the Genoese rules on credit and insurance as exemplary measures, see Scaccia, *Tractatus de commercii*, 340-341.

³⁰⁶ "Se il mondo del commercio si muove su spazi internazionali sempre più ampi, non è pensabile che il diritto possa diventare un freno, almeno in realtà, come quella genovese, che sulla mercatura ha basato prima la propria sopravvivenza e poi le sue fortune". V. Piergiovanni, 'Il diritto del commercio internazionale e la tradizione genovese', in Piergiovanni ed., *Norme, scienza e pratica*, I, 417-425, 424.

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4. Ships Calling at the Port of Genoa Based on the *Avetransrisk* Db

Average reports are precious sources that can also be used to investigate the structure of maritime trade calling at Genoa. This analysis aims at proving how the economy of the Genoese Republic relied heavily on maritime trade, even in a period, such as the seventeenth century, in which historians mainly study the financial activities of Genoese businessmen.¹ The routes to and from the port of Genoa formed the heart of the Republic's economic system. The Republic, for example, depended yearly on the arrival of vessels loaded with grain to ensure the necessary food supplies.² Almost the entire manufacturing sector also depended on maritime trade for both the import of raw materials and the export of finished products.³ Even today, the region still revolves mainly around the port of Genoa.⁴

Genoa survived or prospered, therefore, thanks to the control of an area that transcended its territorial boundaries.⁵ The routes linking the capital and its territory guaranteed connections to Western- and Northern-European, or to more remote, markets. Genoa also acted as a redistributive emporium towards the coastal centres, according to a precise policy of centralisation.⁶ The smaller ports often lacked the necessary infrastructure to facilitate the stopover of vessels engaged in long-distance trade.

Genoa, therefore, was involved in trade exchanges extending from the Mediterranean to Northern Europe, with connections also to non-European regions such as the Russian Empire or the island of Newfoundland. The documentation examined in the following pages makes it possible to reconstruct the main characteristics of Genoese trade, particularly intra-Mediterranean, and provides some paradigmatic examples of an elusive and dynamic cabotage trade.⁷

¹ The urban economy, according to Edoardo Grendi, escaped from the 'continental' model to fit fully into a 'maritime-international' model. See Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia*, 115.

² See par. 2.2.

³ Massa, *Lineamenti di organizzazione*, 90.

⁴ The port of Genoa is today the second largest Italian port for cargo handled. The cargo terminal has a maximum annual capacity of 550,000 TEU (Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit). See <https://www.portsofgenoa.com/it/porto-di-genova.html>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

⁵ Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 593-638.

⁶ See par. 2.2.

⁷ On the definition of cabotage trade, see the Terminology.

Short-distance trade, often carried out by *patroni* from the *Riviera*, acting on their own behalf with crews of fellow countrymen, has long escaped the scrutiny of historians due to a lack of sources. Although the *patroni* of small vessels often did not ask for the calculation of Average damages compared to the shipmasters of large vessels in which the interests of several merchants were involved, they still presented reports before the Genoese magistracies, perhaps for different purposes.⁸ The *AveTransRisk* database, although it does not report information on the total number of voyages per year involving the port of Genoa, collects a significant amount of information on different types of voyage and provides a representative picture of general trends. Moreover, Average reports and calculations constitute a reliable and relatively consistent source that does not change significantly during the early modern period, thereby allowing a long-term analysis.

The history of maritime trade in the Republic of Genoa for the seventeenth century is significantly incomplete, and there are no comprehensive reconstructions. Felloni, in an essay devoted to maritime historiography on Genoa, observed how the reconstruction of Genoese maritime trade was still a work in progress.⁹ Grendi attempted to fill this relative historiographical and documentary gap through a series of essays that are still an indispensable reference point today. Edoardo Grendi systematically examined the proceeds of the *jactus navium*, the tax of 20 *soldi* per 1,000 *cantari* (47.64 tons) levied by the *Padri del Comune* on vessels over 1,500 *cantari* (71.46 tons).¹⁰ The registers of the collection of the *jactum* between 1590 and 1666 provided him with information on the destination of the vessels, without indicating their names; on the shipmasters, whose nationality is rarely specified; and on the tonnage, with the possibility of making subdivisions of vessels according to their tonnages.¹¹ The tonnages, as well as the number of arriving vessels, are significantly variable.¹² The data analysed by Grendi are useful in providing overall indications of trade, but do not specify the economic relations underlying individual voyages. Grendi himself, in fact, recalled the need to make in-depth studies to reconstruct the voyage records of individual vessels entering the port

⁸ Examples of possible alternative uses of shipmasters' Average reports are described in chap. 3.

⁹ G. Felloni, 'La storiografia marittima su Genova in età moderna', in Felloni ed., *Scritti di storia*, 861-880, 865.

¹⁰ See par. 2.2.

¹¹ Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 602.

¹² Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 607.

of Genoa, in order to correct any errors in the general trends assumed so far.¹³ His analysis shows, for example, the importance of the Sicilian market and the fundamental role of the routes involving the territories formally under the control of the Spanish crown.¹⁴ However, for example, the *jactum* excluded vessels with a capacity of less than 1,500 *cantari* (71.46 tons), which instead paid the *schifato*, a duty regularly contracted.¹⁵ In spite of the lack of precise measurements, Grendi hypothesised a direct correlation between major and minor traffic trends.

Also Giorgio Doria hypothesised the existence of this relationship. He used a different approach to attempt an analysis of the Genoese port movement in general terms. Doria analysed the annual revenue from *bollo* and anchorage duties collected by the *Padri del Comune* between 1550 and 1797. This analysis enabled him to identify the general trend of port traffic and to identify specific phases of growth, crisis or stagnation. These phases or cycles (1550-1575; 1576-1637; 1638-1681; 1682-1751; 1752-1797), will be considered in the analysis of the sample periods examined below through the use of data recorded in the *AveTransRisk* database.¹⁶ The main traffic trends indicated by Doria, as well as Grendi's data, are reflected, at least in part, in the number of vessels and the cargoes of the vessels whose shipmasters started Average procedures in Genoa. Being able to consider the sources for all types of vessels arriving in Genoa, as Average's documentation allows, makes it possible to verify the complementarity of trends or the presence of divergences between bigger and smaller vessels. Grendi's and Doria's analyses are inevitably Genoa-centric. Both scholars based their work on the analysis of certain taxes collected by the *Padri del Comune*, linked to the functioning of the port. Despite the exclusivity of the capital city for the management of Average practices and the role of the *Conservatori del Mare*, reports came from all the ports of the Republic and beyond, as the documents revolved around the ships, not a specific institution or port area. Although it is almost impossible to disregard the role of Genoa, this allows at least a partial observation of the activity of different Ligurian ports and *patroni*.

¹³ Grendi, 'I nordici', 23.

¹⁴ Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 603.

¹⁵ Galleys, vessels wrecked in the port area, those loaded with grain and those carrying ballast out of the port were also excluded, see Desimoni, *Statuto dei Padri del Comune*, 93-97.

¹⁶ See Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 135-198, 173-183.

The objective of the following analysis is to examine the structure and changes of maritime traffic in Genoa through the employment of Average data. It is based primarily on what emerges from the documents found in several archival series of the Genoa State Archives and registered in the *AveTransRisk* database to facilitate statistical and synthesis operations. The documentation presents bills of lading, estimates with values of vessels and damages, interrogations and statements of the witnesses involved and a whole series of judicial documents related to litigations, some of which come from abroad. These documents refer to the private initiative of the shipmasters and merchants involved in the maritime trade and help to build a complex and comprehensive idea of the trade headed to Genoa.

Regardless of Average rules and the purpose for which the reports are used by shipmasters or *patroni*, Average documents provide information relevant to the history of trade and navigation without excessive administrative manipulation. Within the reports, the identification of the vessel and shipmaster, the course of the vessel and its cargo, and the causes of the event leading to the alleged damage are regularly found. The calculations also include the value of the vessel, the description and amount of expenses and damages, the composition and specific value of the cargo, the amount of freight, the names of the merchants and/or insurers involved. The reports, as well as the calculations, were read in the presence of the parties involved and cases of dispute seem rare and mainly related to errors of assessment and exceptional circumstances, rather than to problems in the procedure itself.¹⁷

The most difficult task is to determine the exact degree of representativeness of the Average reports per year in relation to the total maritime traffic. Felloni, in his article on Average procedures between 1599 and 1601, considered that these data accounted for about 60% of the total voyages operated by large vessels (over 1,500 *cantari*, 71.46 tons).¹⁸ As regards the total value of goods reported in the calculations in this same interval, it would amount to about one fifth of all Genoese maritime imports: 5,804,078 Genoese *lire* in three years, compared to about 8-10 million *lire* per year in total.¹⁹ Piccinno found similar

¹⁷ On these aspects see Felloni, 'Una fonte inesplorata', 846.

¹⁸ Felloni, 'Una fonte inesplorata', 851. Felloni grounds this statement on the number of vessels above 1,500 *cantari* (71,460 kg.) that enter the port of Genoa annually paying the anchorage tax. The total number of vessels per year is analysed in Grendi, 'Traffico portuale' and is continuously available until 1666.

¹⁹ Felloni, 'Una fonte inesplorata', 854-855.

percentages for Average calculations drawn up in the years 1640-1641.²⁰ It is worth remembering that most of the cargoes of the vessels whose shipmasters declared an Average report were foodstuff cargoes and that valuable goods were excluded from the GA damage apportionment.²¹ On the basis of the documentation in the archives and the paper cards catalogued by Felloni, it is assumed that the sources maintained a sufficient level of representativeness in the following decades. This could be confirmed by further research on the eighteenth-century sources.

The available sources are abundant and unpublished. In the Genoese archives there are dozens, in some periods hundreds, of Average procedures per year. These may consist of only the report with the narration of the shipmaster and his witnesses, or they may have attached documents, forming 'dossiers' within the archival units. The inclusion of these documents in the *AveTransRisk* database aims to provide scholars with all the information that emerge from the original source. This is why, in addition to fields relating to the Average procedure itself, such as one for the report and the harmful event and one for the GA or PA, there are tables relating to the ports of call, the cargo on board, the vessel, the freight and the shipmaster. There is also a generic *documents* section to summarise the data related to other documents, not necessarily related to an Average procedure. Each piece of information in the database is often fully transcribed. Each record also contains the archival references for further verification. Due to the large number of procedures and the information they report, it has not been possible to date to include all the documents extants in the archive, which on the basis of some verifications go back at least as far as the eighteenth century. The documents come from multiple archival series: *Notai Giudiziari (Atti dei calcolatori)*, and *Conservatori del Mare (Atti Civili; Testimoniali segreti redatti all'estero; Esibite in avarie)*.

Three-year sample intervals were chosen from the documents recorded in the database, based on the availability of cases and their relevance. With the aim of covering the seventeenth century, the chosen intervals are 1599-1601, 1639-1641, 1668-1670, 1698-1700. These three-year samples are analysed in relation to their contemporary political-economic situation. This selection also makes it possible to compare the data with those available for Livorno, which

²⁰ L. Piccinno, 'The economic structure'.

²¹ See par. 3.4.

are also present in the database for the same years.²² The processed data allow a macroeconomic survey that, depending on the chosen time period, reveal new information or corroborate the hypotheses put forward so far by Grendi and Doria.

The first interval, 1599-1601, benefits from a significant homogeneity and abundance of documents, perhaps due to the recent establishment of the magistrate of the *calcolatori*, before the progressive loss of power of this office to the *Conservatori del Mare*.²³ It is situated after the most acute phase of the so-called 'Northern Invasion', which occurred in the early 1590s, but before the second wave identified by Grendi, which began around 1602.²⁴ It records the partial readjustment of Genoese trade with a return to traditional routes, alongside the inclusion of new players and routes. For this interval I have relied on the paper cards recorded and used by Felloni, which I have included in the database.

The second interval, relating to the years 1639-1641, is still based on the *Atti dei Calcolatori*, with the presence of estimates and documents drawn up by the *Conservatori del Mare*.²⁵ Since, for these cases, Felloni's paper cards did not capture all the data from these cases, I integrated them with direct recourse to the sources. This interval is situated at the height of the Thirty Years' War, following France's entry into the conflict. The Republic, as already noted, tried to maintain a position of neutrality to ensure the survival of its trade.

The third interval covers the years 1668-1670.²⁶ The trade in these years have been reconstructed relying exclusively on the documents preserved or drawn up by the *Conservatori del Mare* and kept in the archival series of the *Atti Civili*. For this reason, it is possible to find several litigations and explicit requests for repartition of GA damages, while the number of calculations seem to be proportionally lower than in the other chosen periods. This period,

²² These data were entered into the db by Jake Dyble, Ph.D. student within the *AveTransRisk* project.

²³ On this, see par. 3.5.

²⁴ Grendi, 'I nordici', 31. ASG, NG 635, *Atti dei Calcolatori*, 1599; NG 636, *Atti dei Calcolatori*, 1600, NG 637, *Atti dei Calcolatori*, 1601. The paper cards are in ADG, *Felloni 1*, 1589-1608. On the impact of the 'Northern Invasion' in Genoa, see par. 2.2.

²⁵ ASG, NG 2084, *Atti dei Calcolatori*, 1639-1640; NG 2085, *Atti dei Calcolatori*, 1641-1642. The paper cards are in ADG, *Felloni 6*, 1639-1640; ASG, *Felloni 7*, 1641-1642.

²⁶ ASG, *CdM*, *Atti Civili 84*, 1667-1668; *CdM*, *Atti Civili 85*, 1668-1669; *CdM*, *Atti Civili 86*, 1669-1670; *CdM*, *Atti Civili 87*, 1670-1671.

according to Doria, was one of stagnation of traffic, which only began to recover in 1670.²⁷

The fourth interval, finally, considers the last three years of the seventeenth century, 1698-1700.²⁸ This is perhaps the darkest period in Genoese maritime historiography, for which there are no hypotheses regarding the systematic arrival of vessels in port. Here too I have relied on the documents in the *Atti Civili*, which are more numerous and richer in calculations than in the previous interval, although there are gaps in the documentation, which I have tried to fill by using documents from different but homogeneous archival folders.²⁹ These are the years following the French bombardment of 1684 and were characterised by the definitive adoption of neutrality policies by the Republic. Frequent commercial interactions with France and the subsequent 'liberal' free port edict of 1708 are evidence of this policy.³⁰

Despite the fact that the documents come from different series, they follow the same structure. Terminology, units of measurement, currencies and dates are standardised and a report drawn up in 1590 is essentially identical to one produced a century later. The same applies to calculations. Although the calculations, for example, changed from using Genoese *lire* to using Spanish pieces of eight, they always show the conversion rates followed in Genoa in that particular year.³¹ Grendi himself points out the importance of referring directly to Genoese documents for conversion rates between different measures and currencies, beyond the usefulness of manuals such as that of Rocca.³²

A further example of continuity in the sources concerns the use of the term *patrone*.³³ The sources regularly employ it to refer to Ligurian and sometimes Provençal or Neapolitan shipmasters, while the term '*capitano*' recurs in all other cases. When he was not the sole owner, the Ligurian *patrone* was usually

²⁷ Felloni, 'Port Organisation', 345.

²⁸ ASG, *CdM*, Testimoniali segreti redatti all'estero 285, 1693-1698; *CdM*, Atti Civili 124, 1699; *CdM*, Atti Civili 125, 1699-1700.

²⁹ See par. 4.4.

³⁰ This edict allowed goods from Livorno into the free port warehouses, lowered tariffs for imports from the Levant and renewed the invitation to foreigners and Jews, see ASG, AS, Portofranco 1011, 1708. See also par. 1.4.

³¹ For an average of the year-by-year conversion rates calculated on the basis of the GA calculation, see the table of currencies.

³² Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia*, 123. See P. Rocca, *Pesi e misure antiche di Genova e del genovesato*, Genoa, 1871; A. Martini, *Manuale di metrologia, ossia misure, pesi e monete in uso attualmente e anticamente presso tutti i popoli*, Turin, 1883.

³³ On the term *patrone* see the introduction.

part of a shipowning group, in which he held a minority position.³⁴ The objective of this group was chartering. It is possible to assume, for the purposes of this analysis, that the nationalities of the *patroni* coincided with those of their vessels, a circumstance which occurred in most cases, but which is not specified in the documentation.³⁵ Generally speaking, Genoese merchants preferred to use foreign vessels which guaranteed better armament, lower freight rates and fewer stops in ports.³⁶ Although the nationality of the shipmaster was not always explicitly stated, it is possible to rely on their names and those of their vessels to observe the role of, for example, Northern vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.³⁷ From the voyages examined in each of the sample periods, it is possible to derive both a quantitative and a commodity analysis of the imports made by merchants in Genoa, both in general terms and for comparative purposes. There are also sporadic voyages from Genoa that allow observations on exports from the capital's port. Unfortunately, only a fraction of the total reports have an attached bill of lading, and often the sources use the expression '*merci diverse*' (General Cargo) to describe cargoes.³⁸ As far as vessel types are concerned, the sources specify them only with regard to the most common ones in the Mediterranean (*tartana*, *polacca*, *felucca*, *barca*, etc.). However, they do not distinguish between the different vessels from Northern Europe and, above all, between the use of the generic term '*nave*' (ship) and that of '*nave*' as a specific vessel type.³⁹ For this reason, there are a large number of 'vessels' registered in the database, within which the '*nave*' category also falls. The '*nave*' type has been specified only where the sources specified the tonnage.

In order to maintain a uniform structure and to facilitate comparisons, the statistical analysis of the sources for each period has a similar structure. Following the presentation of the political-economic context, the number of cases and the amount of calculations available per year, the main reference

³⁴ The election of the *patrone* was annual and the same *patrone* could be reconfirmed for several years. The charge could be passed on from father to son, see Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 608-609.

³⁵ Piccinno, 'The economic structure'; Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 598; Polonio, 'Devozioni marinare', 305.

³⁶ Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 608.

³⁷ This approach is also adopted, for example, in Grendi, 'I nordici', 34.

³⁸ The same problem affects Grendi's sources. See Grendi, 'I nordici', 42. *Merci diverse* literally means 'miscellaneous goods'. This expression has been translated, across the text, with the current formula of General Cargo.

³⁹ See Gatti, *Navi e Cantieri*, 145-154.

factor is the port of departure of the vessels. Through a classification of the origin's regions of the arriving vessels, it will be possible to identify the main traffic flows that emerge. I will present the main areas involved in trade with Genoa starting from Northern Europe and the Atlantic side of the Iberian Peninsula, before focusing on the Mediterranean by presenting the various areas from west to east. To this end, reference can be made to the order in which the different regions will be listed within the graphs in each paragraph. All places cited in this Chapter appear in the [Appendix XI](#) maps.

Average sources indicate ports of departure, possible scheduled stops, and ports of destination. Italian ports were the most involved in trade with Genoa, both for political-economic and geographical reasons. In order to escape the boundaries' changes between the various Old Regime states, as well as their different names, a hybrid localisation method has been chosen: reference has been made both to the political-administrative subdivisions of Europe in the seventeenth century and, for Italy in particular, to the contemporary administrative division into regions. The Kingdom of Naples, for example, can be treated as such or classified according to the current administrative division, i.e. Campania, Calabria, Apulia, Molise and Abruzzo.⁴⁰ The sources sometimes resort to a subdivision into geographical regions, albeit uncertain, which partly coincide with the current administrative boundaries. It is sufficient to refer to [Map 4.1](#) and [Map 4.2](#) below to contextualise the references within the text.

As noted by Paola Massa, although the economic and organisational resources deployed by the Genoese were not negligible, their ability to formulate precise strategic choices based on analyses of individual sectors, competition, the economic and social environment and other data was equally essential.⁴¹ Within each section, information related to the areas of origin, the various types of vessels, the cargoes, the nationalities of the shipmasters and the possible presence of merchants' names will be considered.

⁴⁰ There are no reports of vessels coming from the coasts of the current coastal region of Basilicata.

⁴¹ Massa, *Lineamenti di organizzazione*, 92. On the organizational skills of Genoese merchants and the circulation of information see Doria, 'Conoscenza del mercato', 91-156.

Map 4.1 *Italian early modern states, seventeenth century*



Source: my elaboration based on the maps in C. Grataloup, *Atlante storico mondiale. La storia dell'umanità in 500 mappe*, Milan, 2020

Map 4.2 Contemporary Italian regions



Source: my elaboration based on 'Regioni d'Italia' Wikipedia page, in https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regioni_d%27Italia, accessed on 29/06/2021.

For each sample period, differences and continuities will be highlighted. In contrast to Northern Europe, Mediterranean maritime traffic took place throughout the year without major seasonal differences, which at most influenced the availability of specific products.⁴² All analyses were conducted

⁴² A. Aragón Ruano, 'The Mediterranean connections of Basque ports (1700-1841): trade, trust and networks', *The Journal of European Economic History* 3, 2015, 51-90, 79.

using the ‘advanced search’ function of the *AveTransRisk* database. The common elements for each search were as follows:

Table 4.1 *Advanced search fields used in the AveTransRisk database*

Search fields:

Archival Source	=	Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG)	AND	Remove line
Reports: written date (Year: yyyy)	>=		AND	Remove line
Reports: written date (Year: yyyy)	<=		AND	Remove line

Add Choice Field Add Text Field

Number of results per page: All

Submit Reset Fields

Source: screenshot from the *AveTransRisk* db ‘advanced search

To these three main fields, in which the sample years of the various reference periods have been entered, further fields have been added from time to time to refine the search. These will be indicated in a footnote following each piece of data in the text from paragraph 4.1 to 4.4. In the absence of specific indications, the results presented in the text were obtained through a search using only these three fields.

4.1 1599-1601, the Traditional Routes in the Aftermath of the Northern Invasion

As mentioned, the analysis begins in the years following the so-called ‘first Northern Invasion’, which took place between 1591 and 1594.⁴³ During the following years, traditional routes reconsolidated before the second wave in 1602. The three years from 1599 to 1601 were part of the second phase of the port movement identified by Doria on the basis of the account books kept by the *Padri del Comune*.⁴⁴ It began in 1576, the year of the *Leggi di Casale* and the end of the Republic’s internal conflicts, and ended in 1637.⁴⁵ During this interval, as noted above, the *Padri del Comune* carried out the most important work of extension and maintenance of the port area. Between 1599 and 1601, according to Grendi, an average of 89 ships of more than 1,500 *cantari* (71.46 tons) entered the port of Genoa each year, plus 1,500-2,500 vessels of lesser

⁴³ Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 24.

⁴⁴ See par. 2.4.1.

⁴⁵ The *Leggi di Casale* of 1576 put an end to the last civil war within the Genoese oligarchic class, divided into Old and New Nobles, and reformed the political system of the Republic. See par. 1.4.

capacity, which escaped the measurements.⁴⁶ During most of the sixteenth century, vessels came from Spain, Sicily and, until 1560, from the Levant. Genoese and the Ragusan vessels (present day Dubrovnik) were the main carriers. Northern ships replaced them in the 1590s.⁴⁷ Most of the goods handled on the docks were cargoes of food supplies and wood.⁴⁸

The total number of voyages entered in the database from the *Atti dei calcolatori* between 1599 and 1601 is 171, respectively 50 cases for 1599, 60 for 1600 and 61 for 1601.⁴⁹ This period is homogeneous in terms of number and distribution of reports per month within each year. Perhaps it was this homogeneity that led Felloni to choose these years for his study. Similarly, there are no significant changes in the characteristics of voyages from one year to another. This makes it possible to bring the sample together for an overall analysis. Eighty-five voyages, about half of the total, have one or more GA or PA calculation attached.⁵⁰ The total value of cargoes in this three-year period amounts to 6,130,127.38 Genoese *lire*.⁵¹ This total value results in an annual average cargo value per vessel of 72,204 Genoese *lire*. The average annual value of vessels involved in the 48 GA amounts to 10,104 Genoese *lire*, approximately 14% of their average cargo.⁵² Finally, between GA and PA, the total damage suffered by cargoes and vessels in this three-year period amounts to 321,822.03 Genoese *lire*, for which the annual average per vessel is 3,790 *lire*, an amount equal to approximately 5% with respect to the capital involved (cargo plus vessel).⁵³ These values are reported in [Table 4.2](#).

⁴⁶ My elaboration, based on data in Grendi, 'I nordici', 65. Arrivals of the largest ships could range from 27 in 1580 to 263 in 1592, the year of the higher arrivals of the Northern vessels loaded with cereals.

⁴⁷ Felloni, 'Organizzazione portuale', 346.

⁴⁸ Wood could serve as construction material in shipyards but also as simple firewood. Other frequent goods were salt, wine, oil and some raw materials (iron, building materials, wool and silk). See Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 139-140. The quantity of goods in parcels increased progressively, especially during the eighteenth century. Parcels could contain textiles, metals, spices, manufactured goods, hides, foodstuffs, lye, pitch, saltpetre, alum and others.

⁴⁹ This is achieved by entering 1599 and 1601 in the second and third text fields of the 'advanced search' function above.

⁵⁰ Result obtained by adding the function 'Average type' 'is not empty'.


⁵¹ Result obtained by adding the function 'Total amount of risk for the cargo' '>1'.

⁵² Result obtained by adding the function 'Total amount of risk for the vessel' '>1'.

⁵³ Result obtained by adding the function 'Damages/expanses - total awarded' '>1'.

n. of voyages with GA or PA calculations	average vessel value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period	average cargo value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period	average damage value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period
85	10,104	-	72,204	-	3,790	-

Using the *AveTransRisk* database it was possible to separate each voyage according to its port of origin. Graph 4.1 below refers to the departure regions of vessels bound for Genoa between 1599 and 1601.



My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa (4) and those with Genoa as port of origin (5).

⁵⁴ I put empty Deltas in this tab to keep the same structure as the following Table 4.3, Table 4.4, and Table 4.5.


Origins concentrated between the Western Mediterranean and the Italian coasts. These data also highlight the focus of Genoese maritime import trade in this period on two specific routes: Sicily-Genoa and Mediterranean Spain-Genoa. These two areas accounted for more than 60% of the total voyages reported (104). Three main types of goods travelled on such routes: cereals, wool and money. The ports most involved in trade with Genoa emerge in [Map 4.3](#), realised through the mapping function of the *AveTransRisk* database. Each port, except Genoa, has its frequency cluster.

Each port is marked with different colours according to its function. Purple markers indicate ports of origin, blue markers indicate scheduled stops to load supplies or other goods, and yellow markers indicate ports of destination.⁵⁵ The same port could have multiple colours according to the different functions it had from one voyage to another. For example, Livorno could be a port of origin as well as a scheduled stop or an additional destination. The number of markers and the width of certain clusters make it possible to quickly identify the main areas of concentration of origins, confirming the observations made earlier and based on Doria's research. It is also interesting to observe the presence of a significant cluster around the port of Livorno. Livorno was a competing port of call which figures in many voyages as an additional or substitute destination to Genoa: often the goods on board were addressed to "Livorno and Genoa", or to "Livorno or Genoa".⁵⁶ Usually the shipmasters stated that their vessels were suitable to make any voyage, so it was not binding for them to indicate a specific destination.

⁵⁵ Markers in the centre of a country indicate that the shipmaster did not specify the specific port in his report. See, for example, in this sample period, the marker in the centre of 'Spain'.

⁵⁶ As shown by Dyble's Ph.D. thesis and by data from the State Archives of Pisa recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db, Livorno also kept numerous Average reports mentioning Genoa as an additional or substitute destination. See Dyble, *General Average*.






Map 4.3 Ports of departure and scheduled stops of vessels arriving in Genoa, 1599-1601



Showing ports visited by vessels:

From year: 1599 To year: 1601

From the source material: Repubblica de Genova For Underwriter(s):

Reason the vessel visited port:  Voyage origin:  Scheduled stop:  Forced stop due to an event:  Destination:  Unknown reason:
Use different coloured markers:

The map was constructed on the *AveTransRisk* db by selecting the sources in ASG in the interval 1599-1601 and excluding stops for unknown or unforeseen reasons. In addition, I removed the frequency cluster of Genoa as it is the destination port for almost all voyages.

The absence of a univocal port of destination is also indicative of the absence of a specific buyer for the goods, a sign that shipmasters moved easily from one port to another in search of buyers for their cargoes, perhaps on the instructions of the merchants who loaded the goods.

4.1.1 1599-1601, *Extra Mediterranean Routes*

Routes with Northern Europe, as already mentioned, had a limited weight in these years. They accounted for 4.6% of the total voyages (8).¹¹⁰ The shipmasters were mainly of Dutch origin (4), while only one of them was certainly English, Giacobbo Leill from London.¹¹¹ According to Grendi, there were misunderstandings, excessive taxes and the problem of return freight for those Northern shipmasters who stopped in Genoa.¹¹² The cargoes from Northern Europe consisted of wheat and rye from Danzig and Amsterdam; wood and iron from Texel;¹¹³ wheat, lead and General Cargo from London; and cod from an unidentified location, possibly in Normandy.¹¹⁴

As mentioned above, the reports in these years frequently show the tonnages of vessels arriving in the port of Genoa.¹¹⁵ This information is particularly useful with regard to Northern vessels. The difficulty in obtaining the tonnages of these vessels from traditional sources, in fact, led Grendi to

¹¹⁰ This information is also confirmed by Grendi's data. From 196 arrivals of vessels in 1592 and 105 in 1593 the average was about 18 arrivals between 1599 and 1601. My elaboration based on the data in Grendi, 'I nordici', 67.

¹¹¹ Numerous Flemish shipmasters arrived in Genoa, while the English preferred the port of Livorno. It was a Flemish merchant, Gio Buchentorp, who spread the news that he was the first to bring cargoes of Northern grain to Genoa. See Grendi, 'I nordici', 25. A sharp increase in English shipmasters only occurred from the 1660s onwards, see Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 343.

¹¹² Grendi, 'I nordici', 26.

¹¹³ Texel was the Dutch port where the largest vessels passed through to fill their holds with products for Genoa and the Mediterranean. Grendi, 'I nordici', 37.

¹¹⁴ The port of loading was "Habelegroscia di Ormandie", see the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50137.

¹¹⁵ See par. 3.4.

formulate hypotheses which can now be tested thanks to Average data.¹¹⁶ Grendi found unusually low tonnages for Northern vessels, based on those occasionally recorded in other sources, and questioned the criteria by which they were calculated. He ascribed these measurement problems to the large number of vessels, mostly of unknown types, that crowded into the port of Genoa within a few years at the end of the sixteenth century. There is also the fiscal element to consider, as the higher the tonnages, the higher the taxes which Northern shipmasters had to pay. The average value in the capacities of Northern vessels arriving in these years, based on Grendi's sources, was about 82 *lasti* (185,52 tons).¹¹⁷ The shipmasters' Average reports, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* database, allow to test this value's reliability. Northern shipmasters regularly reported their vessels' tonnages from 1590 until the 1630s.¹¹⁸ Reports from the late 1500s to the early 1600s show a stable value, which is probably closer to the actual vessels' tonnage.¹¹⁹ This value is 117.5 *lasti* (267.26 tons), i.e. about 30% more than the value found by Grendi.¹²⁰ In the early modern period, however, tonnage is an elusive concept.¹²¹ As already specified, I use this term in the meaning of the maximum net load that can be stowed below deck, which is the meaning used in the Genoese sources of the time; it therefore corresponds to the freight tonnage or *tonneau d'affrètement*.¹²²

Let us now resume the data analysis, following the order set by [Graph 4.1](#). Firstly, the Iberian Peninsula. Genoa was the main port of call for vessels departing from Spain, at least until the increasing role of Marseille during the seventeenth century.¹²³ Voyages from this area appear to be very regular in terms of cargo types and stops. The few vessels from the west coast of Spain

¹¹⁶ Here too, according to Grendi, the use of specific voyage dataset would have resolved the issue of underestimate vessels' tonnages. See Grendi, 'I nordici', 51.

¹¹⁷ Grendi, 'I nordici', 28.

¹¹⁸ This, as also assumed by Piccinno and stated in par. 3.4, was probably due to the introduction of a new tax from 1638 onwards.

¹¹⁹ The tonnages were identified using the advanced search function of the *AveTransRisk* db indicating 'Archivio di Stato di Genova' as the 'Archival Source'. The 'vessel tonnage' had to be 'IS NOT EMPTY' and the 'reports: written date' was '<= 1601'.

¹²⁰ The equivalence between Genoese *mine* and *lasti* in the sources varies between 25 and 27 *mine* per *lasto*, as can be seen in the conversion section.

¹²¹ See Lane, 'Tonnages, Medieval and Modern', 213-233; U. Di Tucci, 'Architettura navale veneziana: misure di vascelli della metà del Cinquecento', *Bollettino dell'atlante linguistico mediterraneo*, 5/6, 1963, 277-293.

¹²² Lane, 'Tonnages, Medieval and Modern', 216.

¹²³ M. Deyà, 'L'evolució del comerç exterior', in E. Belenguer ed., *Història de les Illes Balears*, Vol II, *L'època foral i la seva evolució (1230-1715)*, Barcelona, 2004, 440-447.

(4) carried hides and wool cargoes from Cadiz, including “Indian” hides.¹²⁴ Other colonial products came from Seville, such as ginger.¹²⁵

4.1.2 1599-1601, Western Mediterranean and Italian Routes

Thirty-four vessels arrived in Genoa from the Mediterranean Spain, i.e. 21% of the total. They departed from Cartagena and Alicante or from the Balearic archipelago. These routes, together with those from Sicily, constituted the main connections with the Spanish dominions in the Mediterranean, allowing Genoa to play a linking role which, according to Pacini, was one of the reasons for its alliance with Spain.¹²⁶

Voyages from Cartagena and Alicante (18) were the most frequent in the reports examined. They represent about 53% of the total number of voyages from Mediterranean Spain. These two ports were both ports of loading. Again, this was a traditional market, although the importance of these ports had grown in the later years of the sixteenth century. Wool was the main product traded by the Genoese in Spain from medieval times,¹²⁷ and Alicante was the first port for the export of Castilian wool during the early modern period.¹²⁸ This city took over Valencia's role in Spanish trade during the second half of the sixteenth century, due to privileges obtained from the kings of Spain, such as the authorisation by Philip II to Alicante to have a commercial court independent of the *Consulado* of Valencia.¹²⁹ Even trade routes from Cadiz stopped in Alicante before proceeding to Genoa or Livorno. Cartagena, usually the first scheduled stop on the Alicante-Genoa route for vessels from beyond Gibraltar,

¹²⁴ On leather working in the early modern period and the functioning of a tannery see S. Tognetti, ‘La conceria Serristori di Figline Valdarno nel primo Cinquecento’, in P. Pirillo, A. Zorzi eds., *Il castello, il borgo e la piazza*, Florence, 2012, 195-219.

¹²⁵ Seville housed the main institutions for governing overseas territories and was one of the most active Spanish ports during the early modern period. F. Morales Padrón, ‘The commercial world of Seville in early modern times’, *Journal of European Economic History* 2/2, 1973, 294-319.

¹²⁶ See Pacini, ‘Poichè gli stati’, 413-457.

¹²⁷ The wool was ‘washed’ and prepared mainly in inland towns and transported to the Mediterranean ports of Cartagena and Alicante for export. See C. Rahn Phillips, W.D. Phillips, *El toisón de oro español. Producción y comercio de lana en las épocas medieval y moderna*, Valladolid, 2005. Genoese companies, such as those of B. Spinola, B. Veneroso, B. Spinola, B. Veneroso and B. Veneroso, were also active in the internal movement and processing of wool (unfortunately the author does not specify the names of the members of these companies). See R.M. Girón Pascual, *Las indias de Génova. Mercaderes genoveses en el reino de Granada durante la edad moderna*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Granada, 2012, 153.

¹²⁸ Aragón Ruano, ‘The Mediterranean connections’, 67.

¹²⁹ F. Figueras Pacheco, *El Consulado marítimo y terrestre de Alicante y pueblos del Obispado de Orihuela*, Alicante, 1957, 51-57.

experienced its period of greatest splendour between 1540 and 1640, thanks to the settlement of many Genoese merchants attracted by the advantages of its fiscal policy, guaranteed by the sovereigns to encourage the colonisation of its territory.¹³⁰ The raw wool exported from Alicante and Cartagena, depending on the year, varied between 10 and 20% of the total value of goods imported annually to Genoa.¹³¹ There were also cargoes of raw silk, leather, sugar, linen, money and other goods.¹³² Occasional cargoes of wool or wheat were also sent from Catalonia or Valencia (3). Only galleys escape detection based on Average reports, and thus the data in the database, probably for two reasons: this type of vessel in the seventeenth century was often used as a warship, so galleys usually did not carry goods on board; plus, their holds had a limited capacity, this is why they carried high unit-value cargoes such as silver currency, thus excluded from GA contribution. An example are the galleys used for the transport of silver and money on the Barcelona-Genoa route.¹³³

Many cargoes from Spain departed from or stopped at the Balearic archipelago, particularly the island of Ibiza. These islands were both a frequent port of call and loading ports for specific goods. The Balearic Islands were known for the salt trade and the presence of large vessels.¹³⁴ It is also possible to find vessels loaded with oil or hides, the latter probably coming from mainland Spain.

As regards the shipmasters' nationality from this area in the three years examined, on the basis of the Average sources there were Genoese (10) and Ragusans (6), against a marginal presence of Provençals (3).¹³⁵

The data analysed in [Figure 4.1](#) also reveals what can be defined as the minor routes headed to Genoa, some of which experienced significant developments during the sixteenth century. Small vessels carried most of the traffic on these routes and their shipmasters seldom declared an Average

¹³⁰ Franch Benavent, 'El comercio en Mediterráneo', 89.

¹³¹ Piccinno, 'Il commercio marittimo', 8.

¹³² On the cash and silver trade see C. Marsilio, "Which way to turn?" The destinations of the Spanish silver (1621-1650). London, Lisbon, or Genoa?', *Gabinete de história económica e social* WP 54, 2015, 4-28.

¹³³ Franch Benavent, 'El comercio en Mediterráneo', 80.

¹³⁴ Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 605. The Raynolt, for example, a family of German merchants living in Genoa, also had a correspondent in Ibiza for salt purchases. See Lamberti, 'Mercanti tedeschi a Genova', 84.

¹³⁵ In the following years French shipping would establish itself on these routes. As reported, for example, by Franch Benavent, between 1603 and 1617 the total traffic from Cartagena carried out by French vessels alone accounted for 71.5% of the total. Franch Benavent, 'El comercio en Mediterráneo', 89.

report. Nevertheless, although the voyages from the routes listed below, like Corsica and Sardinia, may have been sporadic, they are representative of the reality of daily traffic and are in line with what is already known from other studies.¹³⁶ Eight vessels arrived from the Genoese Corsica, from Ajaccio (6) and Calvi (2) in particular. They brought wood, wine, wheat and other food supplies, or even passengers, to Genoa. Genoese considered Corsica as a poor suburb, they exploited mostly the north and north-east area of the island.¹³⁷ Forests were the main island resource. Agriculture and sheep-farming were the main human activities, with the exception of Cap Corse, a densely populated peninsula with small harbours from which the Genoese imported local wines.¹³⁸ The reports in the database, all declared by Ligurian *patroni* sailing on small vessels, reflect the structure of Genoese trade with this region. Other foodstuffs were imported from Sardinia (4), including cheese and salt. The presence on the island of a grain market system facilitated the concentration of goods for export in the ports of Cagliari, Sassari, Alghero and Oristano. In fact, three of the four voyages in this three-year period came from Cagliari, although the goods on board were mainly salt and cheese. Despite the fact that tax records show grain as the most important export product from Sardinia, this does not reflect the demographic and social weight of the sector linked to sheep farming activities and it is reflected in the cargoes of this three-year period.¹³⁹ Another cargo, consisting of *tonnine* (a low-value cured tuna meat), came from Porto Paglia, on the south-western side of the island. The voyages were operated by shipmasters of different nationalities including one from Catalonia, one from Saint-Tropez and one from Danzig.

Even Liguria would be a secondary region in terms of volume of trade if we look only at the cases in the database. On the contrary, it is known, as already mentioned, that most of the exchanges between the ports of the Republic and between them and the capital took place by sea. The two *patroni* in this interval,

¹³⁶ Grendi does not have data for this three-year period. However, looking at the data for the decade 1580-1589 it appears that arrivals of vessels over 71.5 tons from Corsica and Sardinia averaged 3.9 units per year. My elaboration based on data in Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 637.

¹³⁷ This was the most fertile and populous area, where the Genoese governor was also based. See P. Massa, 'Lo sviluppo economico della Corsica tra età moderna e contemporanea', in A.M. Macías Hernández ed., *Economía e insularidad (siglos XIV-XX)*, vol. II, La Laguna, 2007, 533-576, 12, 22.

¹³⁸ Massa, 'Lo sviluppo economico', 16-17.

¹³⁹ In the early seventeenth century in Sardinia, about 60% of the population was engaged in sheep farming, 30% in agriculture and the remaining 10% in other activities, such as handicrafts. See M. Brigaglia, A. Mastino, G.G. Ortu eds., *Storia della Sardegna*, vol. 1, *Dalle origini al Settecento*, Bari, 2006, 175-176.

one from Lerici on a *tartana* and one of unknown origin on a *fregata*, sailed from the ports of Portovenere and the estuary of the Magra River, near La Spezia. They carried an unspecified cargo and a cargo of grapes to Genoa.

Continuing with the Italian peninsula, from Tuscany (4) came Sicilian grain loaded in Livorno, Tuscan grain loaded in Montalto, and wood from the Torre di San Vincenzo. Ligurian *patroni* on small vessels, one from Arenzano, operated on this route (2).¹⁴⁰ Also the only voyage from Civitavecchia (1) (Lazio) concerns a *patrone* from Arenzano on his *barca*, a small Mediterranean vessel mainly used in cabotage trade. He carried a cargo of alum to Genoa. This cargo reflects the monopoly of this precious resource on the mines of the nearby Tolfa by some Genoese families.¹⁴¹

Vessels arriving from the Kingdom of Naples follow. There were two main areas of origin: the city of Naples (8), on the Tyrrhenian side of the Kingdom (Campania), and the ports of Apulia, on the Adriatic side (5). Vessels from Naples transported wine, raw materials for making paper, pitch, pasta and other goods. In some cases the vessels stopped at Livorno to unload part of their cargo.¹⁴² The privileged relations between the Genoese and the Spanish crown had favoured the establishment and growth of a flourishing diasporic Genoese community in Naples, which maintained contacts and trade with the homeland.¹⁴³ Ligurian *patroni*, from Sestri Ponente (3) or Lavagna (1), Neapolitan from Sorrento (1) or unspecified (1), and Tuscan from the Elba Island (1) sailed from Naples.

As far as trade with Apulia is concerned, from the cases in which the Average reports specified the cargo, it consisted only in wheat from the ports of Barletta and Manfredonia straight to Genoa.¹⁴⁴ Merchants in Apulia commonly hired Ragusan vessels (3), perhaps because of the proximity to the city of Ragusa and their vessels' large tonnage.¹⁴⁵ Two Ragusan vessels loaded with grain

¹⁴⁰ The only case involving a larger vessel, a *galeone*, concerns a voyage where an accident during loading in the port of Livorno caused an explosion on board. See the voyage in the *AveTransRisk* db recorded with the id 50129.

¹⁴¹ See Delumeau, *L'alun de Rome*, 92-100, 106-118, 169, 208-241.

¹⁴² Paper mills were located close to the minor centres of Ligurian maritime trade, and generally according to the availability of local rivers. These were concentrated around Pegli, Voltri, Cogoleto, Arenzano and Varazze, see Massa, *Lineamenti di organizzazione*, 48.

¹⁴³ See G. Brancaccio, "Nazione genovese". *Consoli e colonia nella Napoli moderna*, Naples, 2001.

¹⁴⁴ See G. Poli, *Città contadine. La Puglia dell'olio e del grano in età moderna*, Bari, 2004.

¹⁴⁵ Sergio Anselmi described Ragusa as a sort of Hong Kong of the Adriatic because of its lively trade and its role as a bridge between the Ottoman and European worlds. See S. Anselmi, 'Le

also arrived in Genoa from the Marche region, and in particular from Ancona, on the Adriatic side of the Papal States. The vessels of the Republic of Ragusa, after an initial shock due to the arrival of Northern vessels and the free port of Livorno's edict in the early 1590s, re-established their role on the main Mediterranean routes by the end of the century.¹⁴⁶ Ragusa experienced a period of relative stability even during the Austro-Turkish War (1593-1606).¹⁴⁷ The real decline came from the 1620s onwards, as the importance of the Adriatic and the role of the Dubrovnik shipmasters as intermediaries declined.¹⁴⁸ Over the next few years, however, the Apulian grain market established itself as a viable alternative to the Sicilian market, and Northern shipmasters took over from Ragusan shipmasters.

Trade with Venice (1) (Veneto) based on Average reports is almost non-existent. There was only one voyage from Venice to Livorno and Genoa with a cargo of *vallonea*, a type of leather, transported on the vessel of a Rotterdam shipmaster.

Voyages from Sicily were the most frequent. According to Orazio Cancila, Sicilian trade with Genoa during the sixteenth century ranked first both in terms of number of vessels and volume of goods.¹⁴⁹ The tonnage of ships from Sicily in favourable years between the sixteenth and mid-seventeenth century, according to Grendi's estimates, accounted for 42% of the total tonnage of vessels arriving in Genoa.¹⁵⁰ This phenomenon is easily understandable for a city, like Genoa, that survived thanks to the constant arrival of foodstuffs. The number of shipmasters reporting Average damages in Genoa, which accounted for more than 45% of all voyages, confirms Grendi's estimate. Trade between these regions dated back to medieval times, as does the presence of a strong Genoese minority established in the island's main cities and with ramifications in

relazioni economiche tra Ragusa e lo stato pontificio', *Nuova Rivista Storica* V-VI, 1976, 521-534.

¹⁴⁶ On the role of Livorno for the Ragusan merchant shipping see M. Berti, 'Navi e capitani ragusei sulle rotte per Livorno (fine secolo XVI- inizio secolo XVII)', in A. Di Vittorio ed., *Ragusa e il Mediterraneo. Ruolo e funzioni di una Repubblica marinara tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna*, Bari, 1990, 197-227. On Ragusan trade see D. Dell'Osa, 'Tra commercio e finanza: profitti commerciali e investimenti finanziari dei mercanti ragusei nella seconda metà del XVI secolo', *Storia Economica* XV/2, 2012, 343-375. Despite the partial recovery, the reduced size of the Ragusan fleet started as early as 1599, see A. Di Vittorio, *Tra mare e terra. Aspetti economici e finanziari della repubblica di Ragusa in età moderna*, Bari, 2001, 93.

¹⁴⁷ G. Castellani, *Storia del Balcani, XIV-XX secolo*, Lecce, 1996, 207.

¹⁴⁸ M. Moroni, *L'impero di san Biagio. Ragusa e i commerciali balcanici dopo la conquista turca (1521-1620)*, Bologna, 2011, 229-234.

¹⁴⁹ O. Cancila, *Impresa, redditi, mercato nella Sicilia moderna*, Rome-Bari, 1980, 249.

¹⁵⁰ Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 603.

the local government. The merchants in Genoa exploited their links with the Genoese community in Sicily.¹⁵¹ The habitual recourse to certain routes and the need to guarantee regular grain supplies, as noted, had been among the motivations for the alliance with Spain, endorsed by Andrea Doria in 1528, and the free port policies inaugurated at the end of the sixteenth century. Genoese financiers also entered the grain trade in exchange for loans granted to the Spanish crown.¹⁵² The economic ties favoured, at least in part, the specialisation of trade and commercial operators on this and other routes.¹⁵³

Regarding the shipmasters' nationalities on the Sicily-Genoa routes, no particular trend emerges, apart from the generic origin from Western Mediterranean, in particular from France. Probably, given the importance and frequency of trade with the island, Genoese merchants needed to find amenable freight rates quickly throughout the year, so there is no clear specialisation. The years between 1530 and 1596 marked, theoretically, a long process of crisis for the Genoese merchant fleet.¹⁵⁴ However, this crisis does not seem to have affected the Sicilian route, at least as far as Average reports are concerned: the authorities could not afford to lose provisions. If, during 1590s, based on Average reports examined by Piccinno (1589-1592, 1597-1599), Ligurian merchant marine accounted for between 31.75 and 20.54%, in the current sample period they still accounted for 21.73% of the total.¹⁵⁵ In particular, there were Ligurian shipmasters (15) from Genoa, Cogoleto, Arenzano, Sestri Levante and Savona; Provençal shipmasters (15), from Marseille, Six-Fours-Les-Plages, Toulon, Saint-Tropez, Frontignan, La Ciotat and Antibes; Catalan shipmasters (5); Sicilian shipmasters (8) from Messina and Catania; and Ragusan shipmasters (3).¹⁵⁶ Northern European shipping

¹⁵¹ On the structure of Genoese trade in Sicily in this period, see L. Piccinno, A. Iodice, 'Whatever the cost. Grain Trade and the Genoese dominating minority in Sicily and Tabarka', *Business History, special issue paper in minorities and grain trade in early modern Europe*, 2021, 1-19.

¹⁵² Consider, for example, the concession of exports licenses from the warehouses of Sciacca and Girgenti which in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries yielded 25,000 *ducati* annually each, see M. Aymard, 'Bilancio di una lunga crisi finanziaria', *Rivista Storica Italiana* LXXXIV/1, 1972, 988-1021, 996.

¹⁵³ It is no coincidence that many Genoese consulates scattered throughout Europe came into being precisely to protect Ligurian *patroni* abroad. According to Grendi it is possible to distinguish between merchant consulates, *patroni* consulates and mixed consulates, see Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 616.

¹⁵⁴ Grendi, 'Traffico portuale', 606.

¹⁵⁵ Piccinno, 'The economic structure'.

¹⁵⁶ Ragusan shipmasters constituted about 17% of the arriving shipmasters between the intervals 1589-1592 and 1597-1599, see Piccinno, 'The economic structure'. The Ragusan shipping had reached its peak in the Genoese port traffic around 1567, when it accounted for

seems to have been completely absent. Northern shipmasters were probably still linked to routes connecting Genoa with their home countries.

The cargoes from Sicily belong to two macro categories: foodstuffs and silk/textiles.

Wheat, in a city characterised by the need to import grain from abroad like Genoa, was the great protagonist of the exchanges, with no less than 56 voyages out of 70 with, at least in part, a load of grain (80%).¹⁵⁷ Among the most frequented Sicilian locations were Sciacca, Girgenti (present-day Agrigento), Castellammare del Golfo, Trapani, Termini Imerese, Siculiana and Terranova (present-day Gela). Other products such as sugar or legumes could accompany cereals.¹⁵⁸ In 16 out of 56 cases, wheat was unloaded also in the port of Livorno.¹⁵⁹ Wheat is a bulky product with a low unit value, the transport of which in freight contracts was paid for on the basis of weight in the port of loading.¹⁶⁰ It was convenient for shipmasters to fill their holds as much as possible in order to obtain higher freight rates.

In Sicily, there was a complex system of managing the export of grain, through the granting of special licenses called *tratte* managed as a monopoly by a *Maestro Portolano*, appointed by the king and resident in Palermo.¹⁶¹ The Genoese often requested the concession of these *tratte* as a guarantee for money loans made to the Spanish government in the Sicilian or European markets.¹⁶² Another strategy was to obtain the *Maestro Portolano* office, which was managed in almost monopoly by the Spinola family from the 1550s until 1608.¹⁶³ Average calculations related to voyages from Sicily often reported the names of the merchants involved. This allows us to observe how traffic was carried out by different branches of the same Genoese families active between

about 40% of the total tonnage, see Grendi, *Introduzione alla storia*, 110; Piccinno, 'Il Commercio marittimo', 3-4.

¹⁵⁷ See Grendi, 'Genova alla metà del Cinquecento', 106-160.

¹⁵⁸ In Palermo, for example, shipmasters from Genoa brought manufactured and luxury goods which were sorted into the inland. In the port, in return, they loaded sugar or made contracts to go and load grain in other ports of the island. See M. Aymard, 'Palermo and Messina', in M. Ganci, R. Romano eds. *L'impero spagnolo dal XV al XIX secolo*, Palermo, 1991, 143-164, 146.

¹⁵⁹ On grain trade in Livorno see Braudel, Romano, *Navires et marchandises*.

¹⁶⁰ A widespread fraudulent practice, for example, was to pour water on the grain in the hold to make it heavier and cover any shortcomings, see Targa, *Ponderationi*, 175-177.

¹⁶¹ On this export system see S. Laudani, 'Dai "magazzinieri" ai "contrascrittori": il sistema dei "caricatori" nella Sicilia d'età moderna tra mutamenti e continuità', *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée* 120/2, 2008, 477-490.

¹⁶² Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 257.

¹⁶³ The Spinola family took over as *Maestri Portolani* as early as the 1550s, see Soprintendenza Archivistica della Sicilia, Archivio di Stato di Palermo, *L'archivio del Maestro Portulano del Regno di Sicilia*, 8.

Genoa and Sicily and often based in Palermo: examples are the Spinola, Cigala, De Ferrari, Di Negro, Rogali, Roccatagliata, De Franchi, Interiano, Groppo, Squarciafico, Fieschi, Pallavicino, Mainardo, Cavanna or Brignone.¹⁶⁴

Another product imported from Sicily, the most important in terms of cargo value, was silk.¹⁶⁵ Silk, unlike wheat, was a high value product. It was an essential raw material for the manufactures of the Republic of Genoa, which imported significant quantities of it. It could be loaded together with wheat and was present in 8.5% of the cases examined in this period. This percentage, however, should be revised upwards, as part of the silk trade took place on board of Genoese galleys, vessels considered safer from pirate attacks than merchant vessels.¹⁶⁶ Galley shipmasters, however, did not use the Average procedure. The database can therefore only capture the percentage of traffic that occurred on other types of vessel.

Genoese silk manufacturing in the sixteenth century was probably the most important in Europe.¹⁶⁷ In 1565, for example, it has been calculated that about 250 merchant-entrepreneurs were active in Genoa, employing about 38,000 artisans and workers.¹⁶⁸ Sicilian exports were concentrated in the city of Messina, where all the cargoes identified so far came from and which was the main export port for this product until 1674.¹⁶⁹ In Messina itself, numerous *maestri setaiuoli* of Genoese origin were active.¹⁷⁰ Here too, Genoese merchants dominated the market in a quasi-monopoly regime: they often purchased raw silk from producers in advance, based on reliable estimates, thus managing to seize around 90% of the annual island production.¹⁷¹

Other products from Sicily were sugar and *tonnina*, produced mainly in Trapani, the city of tuna fisheries.¹⁷² Sugar had been traditionally produced since at least the fifteenth century, but the market slowly declined during the

¹⁶⁴ Piccinno, Iodice, 'Whatever the cost', 8.

¹⁶⁵ Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 261-262; Massa, *Lineamenti di organizzazione*, 49-50

¹⁶⁶ This common perception was also reflected in insurance policies, where galleys paid lower premiums compared to other vessels. See Piccinno, Iodice, 'Managing shipping risk', 103.

¹⁶⁷ S. Tognetti, 'I drappi di seta', in F. Franceschi, R.A. Goldthwaite, R.C. Mueller eds., *Commercio e cultura mercantile*, Vicenza, 2007, 86-170, 86. On silk industry in Genoa see P. Massa, 'Conseguenze socioeconomiche dei mutamenti di struttura nella tessitura serica ligure (secoli XVI-XIX)', in R. Allio ed., *Studi in memoria di Mario Abrate*, Turin, 1986, 601-620; P. Massa, *L'arte genovese della seta nella normativa del XV e del XVI secolo*, Genoa, 1970.

¹⁶⁸ G. Sivori, 'Il tramonto dell'industria serica genovese', *Rivista Storica Italiana* LXXXIV, 1972, 893-942, 895-897.

¹⁶⁹ M. Aymard, 'Commerce et production de la soie sicilienne', *Mélanges de l'école française de Rome* 77/2, 1965, 609-640, 622-631.

¹⁷⁰ Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 253.

¹⁷¹ G. Galasso, *Economia e società della Calabria del Cinquecento*, Naples, 1992, 209.

¹⁷² Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 274.

sixteenth century.¹⁷³ Venetian merchants largely handled the Sicilian sugar trade, but there was also a strong Livornese component, so the Genoese were unable to secure a monopoly in this sector.¹⁷⁴ The Sicilian sugar imports would disappear from Genoa during the seventeenth century, as did the Sicilian tuna imports, gradually replaced by Northern European and Newfoundland's herrings and stockfish.¹⁷⁵

4.1.3 1599-1601, *Eastern Mediterranean and North African Routes*

Finally, the Levantine routes are quite rare. Two cargoes of grain arrived from Greece, from the region generically called "the Archipelago", corresponding to the Aegean Islands. The voyages were made by a shipmaster's *orca* of unspecified origin and by a vessel of a *patrone* from Messina. The voyages from Alexandria (2) were also made by a shipmaster of unknown origin and a *patrone*. The latter was a Marseillaise living in Savona, travelling on his *galeone*. These voyages testify to the survival of a small Levantine market for spices, silk and luxury goods. The vessels followed a route via Messina and Genoa or via Messina, Livorno and Genoa. Finally, voyages from Tabarka, an estate run by the Lomellini family in North Africa along the Tunisian coast, still involved cargoes of grain. As early as the second half of the sixteenth century, the island of Tabarka began to establish itself as a purchasing and redistribution market for Maghreb wheat, a trade that complemented the lucrative red coral trade that had initially been the *raison d'être* of the settlement itself.¹⁷⁶

4.2 1639-1641, *Trade in Troubled Times and the Hegemony of Northern Shipping*

Let us now turn to the analysis of the second sample period, consisting of the documents in the *Atti dei calcolatori* from 1639 to 1641. Between the two periods analysed here, it is worth remembering the expansive phase of the city's economy in the years 1615-1620, observable in the influx of financial income from abroad, in the stability of silk production and in the constant

¹⁷³ Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 262.

¹⁷⁴ Braudel, Romano, *Navires et marchandises*, 32.

¹⁷⁵ Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 274.

¹⁷⁶ Piccinno, 'Alleanze, conflittualità', 29-30; Piccinno, *Un'impresa fra terra e mare*.

immigration from the periphery to the capital of the Republic. From the 1620s onwards there was a general decline in trade, probably because of the Thirty Years' War, which involved the main European states between 1618 and 1648. The decline phase is reflected in the increase in *rentiers*, the abandonment of productive investments in favour of private housing, the collapse of the silk industry, the halting of urban growth, and the transfer of industrial activities to the suburbs.¹⁷⁷ The collapse of business in the foreign exchange fairs, the war with the Savoy and the Spanish bankruptcy of 1627 further exacerbated the economic malaise.¹⁷⁸

In this three-year period, the average number of vessels with a capacity of over 1,500 *cantari* (71.46 tons) arriving in Genoa, as determined by Grendi's analyses, was of 298 units, while there were approximately 1,740 smaller vessels per year.¹⁷⁹ Urban supplies and the growing activity of the free port were the main port movement growth factors. Traffic grew almost separately from urban development, benefiting those engaged in international trade and those working on behalf of foreign correspondents.¹⁸⁰

The *AveTransRisk* database contains a total of 243 voyages recorded between 1639 and 1641. These cases are distributed as follows: 96 for 1639, 88 for 1640 and 59 for 1641.¹⁸¹ The decrease in the number of reports from one year to the next was probably influenced by the contraction of trade brought about by the escalation of the conflict and the entry of France into the conflict. The period 1629-1643 represented the crucial phase of the conflict, when war efforts on Spain's possessions in Italy (Sicily, Milan, Naples) were heaviest.¹⁸² In confirmation of this, Grendi identifies, on the basis of the traffic curve constructed from the income from the *jactum* tax, a regular downturn from 1625 until 1641, the point of maximum stagnation. The curve only began to rise again in 1642, reaching a short-lived peak in 1643 and then undergoing a new phase of decline.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁷ On the decline of the silk industry see Sivori, 'Il tramonto dell'industria', 893-943.

¹⁷⁸ Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 173-174.

¹⁷⁹ My elaboration of the data in Grendi, 'I nordici', 66.

¹⁸⁰ Compared to the first sample period, for example, voyages from/to Livorno appeared more and more frequently in these years, with Genoa acting as a transit port for the Tuscan free port. See Grendi, 'I nordici', tab. V, 70.

¹⁸¹ This is achieved by entering 1639 and 1641 in the second and third text fields of the 'advanced search' function.

¹⁸² Aymard, 'Bilancio di una lunga crisi', 988.

¹⁸³ Grendi, 'I nordici', 53.

Voyages took place regularly over the three years period and there is no particular change in the structure of the trades, other than a general contraction. Only 20 cases present a GA or PA calculation, confirming the increasing standardisation in reports, often done for precautionary purposes only.¹⁸⁴ The total value of the goods involved amounts to 1,617,421.48 Genoese *lire*.¹⁸⁵ The average annual value per voyage is 80,468.7 *lire*, a figure similar to that observed in the previous three-year period, and about 11% higher. The total value of the vessels involved in the 10 GA recorded is 162,676.5 Genoese *lire*.¹⁸⁶ The average annual value per vessel is approximately 16,432 *lire*, an increase of approximately 62% compared to the previous period due to the presence of Northern vessels whose hulls had a much higher value than that of *liuti*, *cimbe* and *fregate* usually employed in the Mediterranean Sea.¹⁸⁷ The total damages suffered by goods and vessels in the three-year period 1639-1641 amounted to 71,211.13 Genoese *lire*, resulting in an annual average of approximately 3,542.8 Genoese *lire*.¹⁸⁸

Table 4.3 *Statistical values 1639-1641*

n. of voyages with GA or PA calculations	average vessel value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period	average cargo value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period	average damage value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period
20	16,432	+62.63%	80,468.7	+11.45%	3,542.8	-6.98%

These data show that, although the number of calculations is lower than in the previous period and the value of vessels is higher due to the presence of vessels from Northern Europe, the values of the goods transported and the damages suffered do not vary significantly.

Tonnages, which, as has already been pointed out in recent years, are no longer recorded in the reports, emerge with irregularity from other types of sources, although they are probably methodically underestimated in order to

¹⁸⁴ Probably the parties involved made private arrangements for the drawing up of the calculations, using other notaries. See par. 3.5.

¹⁸⁵ Result obtained by adding the functions 'Total amount of risk for the cargo' '>1'.

¹⁸⁶ Result obtained by adding the functions 'Total amount of risk for the vessel' '>1'.

¹⁸⁷ In addition to eight vessels whose hulls alone are valued between 250 and 10,000 *lire*, there are two Northern vessels, *Il mercante di Dover* and *Juppiter*, each valued at 32,000 Genoese *lire*. See the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as id 50572 and 50245.

¹⁸⁸ Result obtained by adding the functions 'Damages/expanses - total awarded' '>1'.

pay less on the custom duties.¹⁸⁹ On the contrary, the voyage records obtained from the reports increasingly allow us to observe the nationality of the shipmasters and their city of origin. Starting from this period it is also possible to find often the names of Genoese and foreign merchants involved together in GA cases or in court litigations. Although the Republic did not follow a policy of opening up to foreigners similar to the Livorno model, a mercantile pragmatism dominated, allowing trade and investment to take place wherever conditions were advantageous.¹⁹⁰ Compared to the early seventeenth century, for example, when English merchants sent agents to Genoa temporarily to deal with their businesses, it is possible to observe from 1630 the stable presence of a slowly consolidating community.¹⁹¹

Names that sporadically emerge from Average sources can be cross-referenced with other studies on foreign merchant activities in Genoa in the same period. In a 1639 GA procedure, concerning a General Cargo from Isle of Wight to Alicante, Genoa and other destinations, for example, Genoese merchants such as Raffaele Ferrari, Carlo Odescalchi and Gio. Agostino Mussi had goods loaded on board together with English merchants such as Guglielmo Elam or Enrico Mulman.¹⁹² Grendi observed these English merchants' activities thanks to the analysis of the *dricus armamenti*.¹⁹³ Crosschecking sources shows that Mulman established in Genoa before 1591-1592, where he was active in grain trade. Guglielmo Elam, on the other hand, had been resident in Genoa since at least 1637, the year in which he was involved with a group of other English merchants in a dispute concerning an English shipmaster. Seventeenth-century Mediterranean had the same attraction, for the English, that India or North America would later have in the eighteenth century.¹⁹⁴ The second sample period (1639-1641), as it will be seen, allows observing the growing weight of Northern vessels in the trade circuits traditionally pertaining to Mediterranean shipping.

¹⁸⁹ Grendi, 'I nordici', 52.

¹⁹⁰ Grendi, 'I nordici', 45.

¹⁹¹ Grendi, 'I nordici', 46-47.

¹⁹² See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50354.

¹⁹³ Grendi, 'I nordici', 45-46.

¹⁹⁴ See Fusaro, *Political Economies of Empire*; L. Colley, *Captives Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850*, London, 2003; R. Rapp, 'The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution', *Journal of Economic History* 35/3, 1975, 499-525.

From the second decade of the seventeenth century, there was also an increase in the number of small vessels from the Republic's *Riviera*. At first, Grendi noted a prevalence of *patroni* from Arenzano and Cogoleto, also observed in the first three years period examined.¹⁹⁵ In these years, the origin of Ligurian *patroni*, when specified, is more diversified.¹⁹⁶

As regards the types of goods transported, wheat remained the primary product. Grendi cites two registers, one for the years 1629-1630 and one for the years 1644-1645, to note the proportions in the commodity compositions of vessels arriving above 300 *salms*.¹⁹⁷ He identified 145 and 243 vessels with grain on board in these two intervals. The prevalence of cereal cargoes over other categories is highest in the period between 1629 and 1631, when it reached 43% of the total number of vessels entering Genoa.¹⁹⁸ In the twenty-year period 1630-1650, based on Grendi's data, the average value of wheat landings in the port was 25-30% of the total arrivals. In the three-year period examined on the basis of the Average sources (1639-1641), there were 87 vessels with the hold at least partly loaded with grain, equal to 35% of the total. The Genoese, according to Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, who quotes the English consul in Livorno, were forced, due to the dependence of the Ligurian region on food supplies imports, to maintain a certain commercial movement in order to provide the incoming vessels with return cargoes.¹⁹⁹ In these same years, General Cargo shipments also increased, which passed, on the basis of Grendi's data, from 19% in 1629-1631 to 56% in 1640-1643.²⁰⁰ This phenomenon emerge, to a slightly lesser extent, in the Average reports as well: 61 vessels (25%), almost all from beyond the Strait of Gibraltar, declared only a General Cargo, compared to only four vessels in the previous three years.

Below you can see the distribution by region of the origin of the vessels arriving in Genoa and reporting an Average between 1639 and 1641.

¹⁹⁵ Grendi, 'I nordici', 36.

¹⁹⁶ They came from Genoa (5), Cogoleto (3), Sturla (3), Albissola (2), Chiavari (2), Lavagna (2), Sestri Levante (2), Sestri Ponente (2), Prà (2), Savona (2), Arenzano (1), Alassio (1), Sampierdarena (1), Voltri (1), Moneglia (1) and a generic "riviera di Genova" (1).


¹⁹⁷ Grendi, 'I nordici', 31.

¹⁹⁸ Piccinno, 'Il commercio marittimo', 8.

¹⁹⁹ G. Pagano de Divitiis, 'L'espansione commerciale inglese e l'Italia', *Studi Storici* 27/1, 1986, 109-148, 123.

²⁰⁰ Piccinno, 'Il commercio marittimo', 8.


Graph 4.2 *Regions of origin of vessels calling at the port of Genoa, 1639-1641*



My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa (15) and those with Genoa as port of origin (4).

Compared to Graph 4.1, for the years 1599-1601, the greater fragmentation of origins immediately stands out. This was the effect of a diversification of markets perhaps due to greater insecurity of the routes or the search for regular inflows of goods.

Map 4.4 Ports of departure and scheduled stops of vessels arriving in Genoa, 1639-1641



Showing ports visited by vessels:

From year: To year:

From the source material: For Underwriter(s):

Reason the vessel visited port: Voyage origin: Scheduled stop: Forced stop due to an event: Destination: Unknown reason:

Use different coloured markers:

The map was constructed on the *AveTransRisk* db by selecting the sources in ASG in the interval 1639-1641 and excluding stops for unknown or unforeseen reasons. In addition, I removed the frequency cluster of Genoa as it is the destination port for almost all voyages.

4.2.1 1639-1641, Extra Mediterranean Routes

From the sample examined in this three-year period, we can also see a marked increase in arrivals from Northern Europe. This region, with 43 arrivals, is the first area of import of cargoes arriving in Genoa.

The massive arrival of Northern ships into Genoa had already resumed vigorously in 1602, creating new types of traffic alongside the ordinary grain cargoes.¹⁴⁸ However, it is necessary to clarify this. The Northern market was divided into two distinct areas: the Dutch and the English area. The number of ports involved in the trade is very limited, but the polarisation is clear. From the reports it seems that navigation was direct or with undeclared stops.¹⁴⁹

As can be seen from the first three years examined, a large part of the traffic with Northern Europe between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries consisted of Dutch vessels which made their way between Amsterdam, Texel, Danzig and Lübeck to bring mainly grain to Genoa: the interception of this type of traffic was also the first spur for the creation of the free port. England was an almost obligatory passage area for vessels coming from the North Sea, and Genoese diplomats agreed to obtain free transit for cargoes destined for Genoa. Trade from this area, however, was much lower.¹⁵⁰ The situation changed dramatically in the following years. The use of General Cargo category in the three-year period under consideration makes it difficult to identify the precise currents of North European trade. However, where possible, hypotheses will be ventured. With the consolidation of relations within the Mediterranean, Northern shipmasters sought to transport, in addition to cereals, other products such as salted fish, metals, hides, and others.

¹⁴⁸ Grendi, 'I nordici', 31.

¹⁴⁹ In most cases the report was made in Genoa. According to the regulations, the shipmaster had to make his report in the first port he touched following the accident. Avoiding reporting other stops could help to prevent disputes when arriving at the landing destination.

¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the activity of some Genoese merchants on the English market in the preceding decades, such as the Pallavicino family, is significant. See Stone, *An Elizabethan*.

Eighteen out of forty-three voyages, or about 41% of the total, were General Cargo shipments from Amsterdam, Texel or Antwerp to Genoa (11), Genoa and Livorno (5), Genoa and Naples (1) or Genoa, Livorno and Venice (1). The shipmasters all seem to have come from the Flemish area, although nationalities were never specified and can at best be deduced from their names or those of their vessels.

Seventeen vessels left England, accounting for 39% of the total arrivals from Northern Europe. The main embarkation areas were Dunes (7), an unspecified location at the mouth of the Thames,¹⁵¹ London (6), Plymouth (2), the Isle of Wight (1) and Dover (1). From the mid-sixteenth century the connection between the Flemish area, particularly Antwerp, and London had given the capital a significant competitive advantage over other English ports.¹⁵² From the rare instances where the goods shipped are specified, it seems that cargoes of cloth and 'other goods' left London and the mouth of the Thames, while cargoes of *salacca*, salted fish, arrived mainly from Plymouth. Fernand Braudel and Ruggiero Romano stated that typical cargoes arriving from England consisted of tin, cloth, barrels of salted fish, leather or other goods loaded along the route. The shipmasters involved appear to be exclusively English, as confirmed in the cases where their origin was specified (5).¹⁵³

Alongside the main flows from Holland and England, there are other trade flows, notably from Hamburg (5), Arkhangelsk, Russia (3) and Newfoundland (2). Hamburg rose as a hub for international trade following Antwerp's sack in 1576 and Lübeck's century-long stagnation.¹⁵⁴ However, although its port was suitable for Northern trade, it proved unsuitable for handling the distribution of incoming goods from southern Europe.¹⁵⁵ From Hamburg cargoes departed for Genoa and Venice (3), Genoa (1) or Marseille and Genoa (1): the Livorno

¹⁵¹ In sources it is also called "caricatore di Londra" or "spiaggia di Londra". Such designations are frequent in the Mediterranean.

¹⁵² Pagano de Divitiis, 'L'espansione commerciale', 111. An example is also the decline of the colony of Italian merchants in Southampton, who moved to London and were absorbed into the English community in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, see G.D. Ramsay, 'The undoing of the Italian mercantile colony in sixteenth century London', in N. B. Harte, K. G. Ponting eds., *Textiles history and economic history: essays in honour of Miss Julia de Lacy Mann*, Manchester, 1973, 22-49.

¹⁵³ Braudel, Romano, *Navires et marchandises*, 49-50.

¹⁵⁴ In face of increasing competition from Dutch and English shipping, Lübeck chose to defend its home market by enforcing rules against foreigners. See R. Fagel, L. Alvarez Frances, B. Santiago Belmonte eds., *Early modern war narratives and the revolt in the Low Countries*, Manchester, 2020; E. Lindberg, 'The rise of Hamburg as a global marketplace in the seventeenth century: a comparative study of the rise of the city', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50/3, 2008, 641-662.

¹⁵⁵ Pagano de Divitiis, 'L'espansione commerciale', 113.

emporium seems curiously absent, as the Tuscan sources examined so far also show for comparison. From the two voyages in which the goods on board are specified, we know that Hamburg merchants sent lead, tin, wax and leather to the Mediterranean market.¹⁵⁶ Despite the importance of the English 'nation' in this city, the voyages seem to have been made by local shipmasters.¹⁵⁷ Little is known of the voyages from Arkhangelsk to Genoa (1) or Genoa and Livorno (2): shipmasters declared only General Cargoes and, on the basis of one of the three cases examined, it seems that they shipmasters followed a route north of Scotland, thus avoiding the English Channel and probably stopping at other ports in the area.¹⁵⁸ Typical imports from this area, which can also be seen from GA data recorded in Livorno, were caviar and hides.¹⁵⁹ On the Hamburg route there are local or unspecified shipmasters, while all voyages from Arkhangelsk are made by English shipmasters, probably employed by the *Muscovy Company*, on whose behalf regular shipments departed throughout the year.¹⁶⁰ The cod trade from Newfoundland also seems to have involved only English shipmasters.¹⁶¹ Two shipmasters departed from this area, probably travelling together, with cargoes of cod on their way to Genoa.¹⁶²

Trade to Genoa from the Atlantic side of the Iberian Peninsula also seems to be dominated by the Northerners and, in particular, the English. In this interval

¹⁵⁶ The only voyage examined to date with departure from Hamburg to Genoa and Livorno dates back to 1704, see ASLi, *Governor Auditore Vicario, Atti Civili 478*, 1220, 22/11/1704, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 13095.

¹⁵⁷ According to Michael North, Hamburg was "the continent's most English city", see M. North, *From the North Sea to the Baltic: Essays in Commercial, Monetary and Agrarian History*, London, 1996.

¹⁵⁸ Vessels from Amsterdam and Texel also chose to use this route when headwinds (mainly south-westerly) made it impossible to pass through the Channel. See, for example, the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50030 and 50031. Such a change of route could also be specified in freight contracts, see Berti, 'Il "rischio" nella navigazione', 292.

¹⁵⁹ Advanced search carried out by selecting 'Arkhangelsk' as 'port visited'. The records in the *AveTransRisk* db do not show any other specific type of goods being loaded in Arkhangelsk. Also Pagano de Divitiis' research shows that caviar was the main object of trade. See Pagano de Divitiis, 'The Commercial Expansion', 122.

¹⁶⁰ On the development of English trade in Russia see F.J. Stout, *Exploring Russia in the Elizabethan commonwealth: the Muscovy Company and Giles Fletcher, the Elder (1546-1611)*, Manchester, 2015.

¹⁶¹ It is possible that the English shipmasters came from the Devon area, see D. J. Starkey, 'Devonians and the Newfoundland Trade', in M. Duffy, S. Fisher, B. Greenhill, D.J. Starkey, J. Youings eds., *The New Maritime History of Devon*, I, *From Early Times to the Late Eighteenth Century*, London, 1992, 163-171, 164. On Newfoundland fish trade see C. Heywood, 'Beyond Braudel's 'Northern Invasion'? Aspects of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean fish trade in the early seventeenth century', *The International Journal of Maritime History* 26/2, 2014, 193-209; D. Abreu-Ferreira, 'The English mercantile community in seventeenth-century Porto: a case study of the early Newfoundland trade', *Newfoundland Studies* 19/1, 2003, 132-152.

¹⁶² The two reports were declared one day apart. This suggests that the voyage took place in convoy. See the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50577 and 50581.

there are 6 voyages from Portugal and 6 from western Spain. The vessels from Portugal all departed from Lisbon with 'colonial' products such as ginger, cinnamon, sugar or General Cargoes.¹⁶³ Amongst the damage reports from this period is a return cargo, a consignment of wheat from Livorno to Lisbon which stopped in Genoa due to bad weather. Shipmasters from Western Spain only reported General Cargo from Cadiz to Genoa (1), or Genoa and Venice (3). On one of the voyages from Cadiz, the shipmaster stopped to load other General Cargoes also in Motril and Cartagena.¹⁶⁴ The role of Cadiz will emerge more clearly in the analysis of the next three years. This city had an active Genoese colony with its own consul and institutions.¹⁶⁵ Cadiz, alongside Portuguese ports, specialised in the redistribution trade of colonial or Northern European products. This role had belonged in the sixteenth century to the city of Seville, where the largest community of Genoese merchants on the Iberian Peninsula initially resided.¹⁶⁶ In the course of the sixteenth century, however, Genoese merchants in Seville slowly moved their interests towards insurance business, trade with North America - in slaves but also in goods - and lending to the local nobility or crown.¹⁶⁷ Perhaps these reasons explain the low number of shipmasters coming from Seville in the Average reports. Only one cargo for Genoa arrived from Seville (1).

4.2.2 1639-1641, Western Mediterranean and Italian Routes

The area whose trade changed perhaps less in this three-year period than in the previous sample is Mediterranean Spain. In the database there are 30 voyages from this area, representing about 13% of the total. From 1630 onwards, trade in the area was characterised by a greater instability in the

¹⁶³ Although Lisbon was the main port of the Kingdom, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries other ports, such as Porto, specialised in particular sectors such as the Swedish steel trade. See M.C. Moreira, J. Eloranta, J. Ojala, L. Karvonen, 'Early modern trade flows between smaller states. The Portuguese-Swedish trade in the eighteenth century as an example', *Revue de l'OFCE* 4/140, 2015, 87-109, 101.

¹⁶⁴ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50520.

¹⁶⁵ The first special privileges for Genoese date back to the fifteenth century, see F. Morand, 'La nación nómada: los genoveses en Cádiz desde finales del XV hasta mediados del siglo XVII', in J.I. Ruiz Rodríguez, I. Sosa Mayor eds., *Construyendo identidades: del protonacionalismo a la nación*, Madrid, 2003, 9-37.

¹⁶⁶ R. Pike, 'The Genoese in Seville and the opening of the New World', *The Journal of Economic History* 22/3, 1962, 348-378, 349.

¹⁶⁷ Pike, 'The Genoese in Seville', 376-377.

number of vessels.¹⁶⁸ In addition, the Genoese settled on the Mediterranean coast of Spain had to cope with the growing weight of French merchants who were mainly based in the region of Valencia and Andalusia.¹⁶⁹ The voyages within the three years examined are concentrated in the area between Cartagena and Alicante or between Menorca and Majorca. The origins are as follows: Alicante (3), Cartagena (6), Alicante and Cartagena (6), Balearic Islands (11), Barcelona (2), Motril and Cartagena (1), and the salt flats of La Mata (1), a coastal location between Cartagena and Alicante. Compared to the previous period, Cartagena and Alicante began to be referred to separately. Cartagena had in fact entered a long phase of decline since the increase in taxation in 1630, which would slowly make Alicante the main export port in the area in the second half of the seventeenth century.¹⁷⁰ Wool, timber, sugar, soda ash and barley, a plant used to make soda, were sent from mainland Spain.¹⁷¹ Some of the sugar probably came from the Cadiz area, where it arrived from overseas waiting to be reloaded.¹⁷² Production was also widespread in the Granada area, where many Genoese companies operated.¹⁷³ According to Edoardo Grendi and Luisa Piccinno, between 10 and 20% of the raw silk shipped to Genoa came from Spain.¹⁷⁴ This merchandise, as mentioned, was transported mainly on board galleys and, for this reason, partly escapes analysis based on damage documents. The Spanish market, in return, bought paper produced in Liguria, iron and about two thirds of the textiles which arrived in Genoa.¹⁷⁵ From Menorca and Majorca, in addition to the products already listed, there were frequent shipments of oil and cheese.

An important new element in this three-year period is the increasing role of Northern shipping on specific routes, such as those from Sicily or the Adriatic area. Chartering was a way of obtaining valuable currency in pieces of eight *reales* in the Mediterranean, a market where the arrival of Spanish silver

¹⁶⁸ Franch Benavent, 'El comercio en Mediterráneo', 87.

¹⁶⁹ A. Alloza, *Europa en el mercado español. Mercaderes, represalias y contrabando en el siglo XVII*, Salamanca, 2006, 90.

¹⁷⁰ Franch Benavent, 'El comercio en Mediterráneo', 111.

¹⁷¹ W. Bowles, *Introduction to the Natural History and Physical Geography of Spain*, I, Parma, 1783, 139.

¹⁷² Franch Benavent, 'El comercio en Mediterráneo', 111.

¹⁷³ See A. Fábregas García, *Producción y comercio del azúcar en el Mediterráneo medieval. El ejemplo del reino de Granada*, Granada, 2000.

¹⁷⁴ Piccinno, 'Il commercio marittimo', 8; Grendi, 'Il traffico portuale', 324-330. On the silk trade in Spain see M. Garzón Pareja, *El industria sedera en España: el arte de la seda de Granada*, Granada, 1972. In the Sicilian market too, silk, at least between 1620 and 1670, replaced wheat as the first export product. See Aymard, 'Palermo and Messina', 158.

¹⁷⁵ Grendi, 'Il traffico portuale', 324-330.

allowed a wide circulation of money.¹⁷⁶ The appearance of the Northern shipmasters is evident: in addition to five Genoese shipmasters and one Majorcan, there are five Northerners, probably Flemish, and four English. The nationalities of the remaining shipmasters are not specified, but on the basis of their names it can be assumed that most of them came from the territories of the Republic.

On the basis of the data analysed, there are very few journeys coming from Provence (2) and Liguria (2), mostly operated by local shipmasters. Perhaps this is due to the small amount of capital involved in the individual voyages, which rarely led to a report or calculation, or perhaps the route connecting these two regions was generally safer.¹⁷⁷ Genoa's trade with the *Riviera* and the French Mediterranean coasts was mainly based on small-scale coastal shipping. From Provence there is information on two voyages, both made by Provençal *patroni* on small boats: in one case it is a Marseille *patron* leaving the islands of Marseille with his *cimba* and an unknown cargo for Genoa and Livorno; the second case, instead, concerns the events of a French *patron* carrying bales of fabric from Marseille to Genoa on his *tartana*. The correspondence of Genoese diplomats in Paris confirms this type of traffic: it shows that Genoese vessels, calling at Marseille and other ports or plundered by French pirates on the coasts of Provence, were mainly *boats (cimbe), feluccas, tartanes*, for which the coasts of western Liguria and Provence offered excellent landing places.¹⁷⁸ Another area of activity of the Ligurian *patroni*, as one would expect, was Corsica (7). Loads of grain, wine, timber and 'forks' destined for Genoa left from Ajaccio (3), Cap Corse (1) or other unspecified locations. The voyages were operated by *patroni* of the Ligurian *Riviera*, coming from Arenzano (1), Sturla (1) or Sampierdarena (1). From the Kingdom of Sardinia (9), on the other hand, Flemish (3), Ligurian (1), Tuscan (1) or other nationalities shipmasters arrived with probably larger vessels. The region continued to be an exporter of foodstuffs, especially cheese, but here too there is evidence of a vessel loaded with General Cargo.

The sources examined for this three-year period report only two voyages from Liguria, both carried out by Ligurian *patroni* on small vessels: one is a

¹⁷⁶ Pagano de Divitiis, 'L'espansione commerciale', 137.

¹⁷⁷ On the landings between Genoa and Marseille see A. Agosto, 'Portulans et Cartes nautiques génoises', in *Marseille au XVII siècle, numero spécial* 122, 1980, 30-32.

¹⁷⁸ P. Schiappacasse, 'Genova e Marsiglia nella seconda metà del XVII secolo', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, nuova serie*, XXII, 1982, 197-224, 203.

patrone from Albissola, a small town on the Western *Riviera*, transporting General Cargoes from Albissola to Genoa on his *fregata*; the second voyage involves a *patrone* transporting wine from La Spezia, on the Eastern *Riviera*, to the capital of the Republic on a *cimba*.

There are 14 voyages from Tuscany. Again, these are often made by Ligurian *patroni*, whose origin is specified in the sources: San Cipriano (1), Cogoleto (1), Sturla (1), Prà (1) Genoa (1), “riviera di Genova” (1), or even one from Corsica but living in Livorno (1). They travelled on small vessels such as *cimbe* (3), *barche* (3), *polacche* (3), *liuti* (2), *tartane* (1), *fregate* (1) or others not specified (1). From the nearby port of Livorno came wheat, wax, Roman saltpetre and General Cargoes. The trade with Tuscany also reveals the activity of minor ports specialised in specific exports such as Elba and Piombino, from which iron was exported, or Montalto and Corneto, from where cargoes of grain departed for Genoa. The cargoes of the two remaining voyages from Tuscany, which set sailed from Follonica and Cecina, are not specified.

The vessels departing from Lazio (8), the Tyrrhenian side of the Papal States, carried goods such as wheat, General Cargo, saltpetre, oil, wine, raw materials for paper or wood. The ports of loading were Rome (3), Civitavecchia (2), Rome and Civitavecchia (1), Foce Verde (1) or Porto Badino (1). Given perhaps the geographical proximity to Liguria, it seems that also in this case the trade was carried out mainly by *patroni* on Mediterranean vessels such as *liuti* (2), *lembi* (1), *tartane* (2), or *polacche* (2). The shipmasters are Genoese, e.g. from Savona (2), or of unspecified nationalities, plus a Provençal shipmaster from Martigues (1).

The routes linked to the Kingdom of Naples are in significant growth compared to the previous period. Heterogeneous cargoes departed from Naples and it is possible to find also luxury goods: besides products such as pitch, wine, raw materials for paper, almonds and General Cargoes, in fact, there are two porcelain shipments, one from Sorrento and one from Naples, both bound directly for Genoa. Grain and foodstuffs arrived from Calabria (8) and, in particular, from the port of Crotona, on the Ionian coast.¹⁷⁹ Trade with the Adriatic area - Apulia (21), Abruzzo (1) and Molise (1), constituting the Adriatic side of the Kingdom of Naples - also increased, as shown in [Graph 4.2](#).

¹⁷⁹ One of these vessels also stopped in Messina to load “altre merci”, see the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50371.

About 9.4% of the total vessels registered in this three years sample period arrived from these latter regions, all loaded with grain for Genoa. Apulia, as already mentioned, was an alternative market to Sicily. In purchasing Apulian grain, Genoese merchants theoretically faced competition from the Republic of Venice, which concentrated its food trade in this area.¹⁸⁰ However, the increasing number of voyages, the indication of Genoa as the only destination and the relative specialisation of some ports such as Barletta (6) and Fortore (6) suggest an increasing weight of Genoese merchants.¹⁸¹

As far as the nationality of the shipmasters is concerned, despite the few cases where this data was specified, it is possible to observe or hypothesise the presence of some trends.¹⁸² Trade from Naples seem to be managed by Genoese shipmasters where the nationality is indicated (3) or where it can be deduced (1). From Calabria, on the other hand, Flemish shipmasters (5) and one Genoese arrived in Genoa. On the Adriatic side, two thirds of the shipmasters (14) came from the Flemish area, while the others are not specified (7).

The Adriatic side of the Papal State, roughly comprising the present-day regions of Marche and Emilia-Romagna, also specialised in sending grain cargoes: these departed from Goro (2), Ravenna (1), and Ancona (3).¹⁸³ The shipmasters headed straight to Genoa. They were Flemish (5) or of unspecified nationality (1). A Flemish shipmaster travelling with a cargo of wheat, rice etc. from Venice and Ancona declared instead to be generically heading “westward”.¹⁸⁴

Northern shipmasters clearly established themselves in the cereal sector, also thanks to the competitive advantage of the larger average holds of their vessels. This specialisation is also confirmed by the voyages arriving from the

¹⁸⁰ M. Aymard, ‘Commerce et consommation des draps en Sicile et en Italie méridionale (XVe-XVIIIe siècles)’, *Settimana di Prato* 1970, 1970, 127-132, 130.

¹⁸¹ Unfortunately it is not possible to make a comparison with the vessels heading for Venice in the same period. It is safe to assume, however, that their presence in the area remained stable during the seventeenth century.

¹⁸² This data is also absent from Grendi's studies, which report vessel origins only for a limited sample of years (1558-1565). See Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 70.

¹⁸³ In the period 1630-1639, according to Grendi, 21% of the cargoes of grain purchased by the *Ufficio dell'Abbondanza* came from central Italy, while arrivals from Sicily remained stable between 45 and 49%, see Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 324. On the commercial development of Ancona during the early modern period see P. Earle, ‘The Commercial Development of Ancona, 1479-1551’, *The Economic History Review* 22/1, 1969, 28-44; M. Moroni, ‘Reti commerciali e spazi costieri: il caso di Ancona tra XVII e XVIII secolo’, in D. Andreozzi, L. Panariti, C. Zaccaria eds., *Acque, terre e spazi dei mercanti*, Trieste, 2009, 85-112.

¹⁸⁴ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50353.

territories of the Venetian Republic. The 9 cases recorded all concern cargoes of grain, in one case accompanied by a consignment of *uva passa* bound for Genoa (5) or Livorno (3). There is also a voyage with wheat and rice from Venice and Ancona destined generically “westward”.¹⁸⁵ With the exception of a French shipmaster living in Venice, all voyages are carried out by Flemish shipmasters (8).

Moving from the Italian peninsula to Sicily, it is evident that this region remained one of the main areas of origin for vessels bound for Genoa and involved in Average reports. Nevertheless, these were years of crisis for Sicilian exports. Cereal shipments in these years were mainly destined for Catalonia, to support the war effort: from 1642 to 1646, for example, 30,000 Sicilian *salme* (6,441.6 tons) of wheat and 20,000 Sicilian *salme* (4,294.4 tons) of barley were required each year for Tarragona.¹⁸⁶ After 1620, the volume of cereal sales from Sicily abroad had steadily decreased.¹⁸⁷ This can also be observed in the lower yield of the revenue from the sales of the *tratte*, the grain export permits abovementioned: they decreased from 8,000 *scudi* per grain in 1560 to 2,250 *scudi* per grain in 1640.¹⁸⁸ In 1640 in particular, according to Cancila, the long sixteenth century ended and a long seventeenth century of relative decline in Sicily began, lasting until the advent of the Bourbon dynasty (1734).¹⁸⁹

Within the cargoes arriving in Genoa from Sicily in the three-year period 1639-1640, wheat figured in 21 voyages. It was often the only commodity on board. The variety of ports of loading decreased considerably compared to the previous sample period and arrivals were concentrated in the island's main *caricatori*: Girgenti (11) and Sciacca (9). One voyage with a cargo of wheat also departed from Messina (1). Silk shipments are completely absent in Average reports and silk manufacturing experienced a period of decline in Genoa. Other goods such as oil from Milazzo (3), or pitch and wine (1), hemp (1), tonnine (1), *zibibbo* wine with raw materials for making paper (1) from Messina, Palermo or Lipari are also present to a lesser extent.

As many as 20 of the 30 total voyages from Sicily were carried out by shipmasters from the Flemish area, to which must be added the presence of an

¹⁸⁵ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50353.

¹⁸⁶ Aymard, 'Bilancio di una lunga crisi', 990.

¹⁸⁷ Aymard, 'Palermo and Messina', 158.

¹⁸⁸ Aymard, 'Bilancio di una lunga crisi', 992. O. Cancila, 'I dazi sull'esportazione dei cereali e il commercio dei grani nel regno di Sicilia', *Nuovi Quaderni del Meridione* 28, 1962, 12-17.

¹⁸⁹ Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 264.

English shipmaster, Thomas Spenser. There are only 3 shipmasters of Genoese origin and 5 of unknown origin: on the basis of their names and their status of *patrone*, however, it is possible to assume that most of them were Genoese. Compared to the previous period, therefore, the so-called 'Northern Invasion' was fully established, which led Northern European merchant navies to impose themselves on the Mediterranean routes, eroding the market shares of local navies thanks to their lower freight rates.¹⁹⁰ According to Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, this substitution had begun, painlessly, as early as the 1570s: only gradually it evolved into greater involvement of English and Dutch merchants who began to establish themselves directly in the main Mediterranean ports.¹⁹¹ The cargoes bounded for Genoa in this period, however, are mostly bought and sold by Genoese merchants: an example is the consignment of wheat loaded at Girgenti by order of Gio Batta Semino, resident in Palermo, and received in Genoa by Giulio Semino and Paolo Morinello in 1639, transported on the vessel of the Flemish shipmaster Antonio Jacopo Coes.¹⁹²

4.2.3 1639-1641, Eastern Mediterranean and North African Routes

Moving eastward, there are two voyages from Greece, one of which was made by a *patrone*, probably from Genoa, on board of his *tartana* with General Cargo from Zakynthos and Kefalonia to Genoa and Marseille. The second voyage, about which unfortunately we do not have many details, concerns the sending of a cargo on board a *galeone* from Corfu to Messina and Genoa.¹⁹³ Corfu, Zakynthos and Kefalonia were all part of the Venetian domains in the Ionian Sea. The *galeone* carried *uva passa*, oil, dyeing material, millet and stones used to polish mirrors.¹⁹⁴ The document was drawn up in front of the *Annona* office. The shipmaster feared that storms along the route had soaked the millet

¹⁹⁰ According to the research of F. Rigamonti, for example, the freight for a bale of cloth from Genoa to Palermo in 1619 on a large Dutch vessel was less than half that paid to a Mediterranean *fregata* or *felucca*. See F. Rigamonti, 'Dutch navigation in Sicily in the first half of the Seventeenth century', in Ö. Çaykent, L. Zavagno eds., *People and goods on the move. Merchants, networks and communication routes in the medieval and early modern Mediterranean*, Fisciano, 2016, 143-161, 146.

¹⁹¹ Pagano de Divitiis, 'L'espansione commerciale', 142.

¹⁹² See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50509.

¹⁹³ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50384.

¹⁹⁴ On the Venetian trade of *uva passa* and the presence of English and Dutch shipmasters in the Ionian Sea, see M. Fusaro, *Uva passa. Una Guerra commerciale tra Venezia e l'Inghilterra (1540-1640)*, Venice, 1996.

on board. The shipmaster appears to be Armenian or Persian, while the only sailor called to testify was a Ragusan.¹⁹⁵ Similarly to what has already been pointed out for the first sample period, the Levantine market remained secondary within the panorama of trade to Genoa. As the *Direttori per il commercio con il Levante* in Livorno in 1627 explained in a report, for example, eight times more Levantine vessels arrived yearly in Livorno than in Genoa.¹⁹⁶ There was no lack of plans to increase trade in the Levant, as shown by a report written by the *Giunta Marittima* in Genoa in 1638, which referred to a *Collegi's* decree of the previous year.¹⁹⁷ However, international opposition, particularly from France, to the entry of new competitors into the Levantine market made it difficult to implement these projects. Only one voyage from Acre on a Flemish shipmaster's vessel in 1639 with a cargo of grain, silk and other goods is recorded in the current three years sample.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, this cargo was bound for Livorno and only a copy of the report drawn up in Tuscany was sent to Genoa. This is perhaps an indication of the interest of unknown Genoese merchants in some of the goods carried to Livorno.

Finally, there are five vessels from Tabarka. All voyages are operated by Flemish shipmasters.¹⁹⁹ They carried to Genoa two cargoes of wheat and other goods, one of wheat, coral and other goods and one of unknown goods.

4.3 1668-1670, New Balance between Local and Foreign Players

The third three-year sample period is situated within a phase of relative decline in traffic. The years of the plague of 1656-1657 must be taken into account, for which about 45-55,000 people died in Genoa alone, equal to nearly half of its

¹⁹⁵ Following the promulgation of the *Livornine* between 1591 and 1592, a stable community of Armenian merchants established in Livorno, some of whom moved to Marseille following the free port edict of 1669. On the other hand, the presence of Armenian shipmasters, which was growing in Venice and the Eastern Mediterranean at the time, seems unusual for the Tyrrhenian area. On the *Livornine* see P. Castignoli, L. Frattarelli Fischer, *Bandi per il popolamento di Livorno. 1590-1603*, Livorno, 1988. On the Armenian community that moved to Marseille see S. Boghossian, *La communauté arménienne de Marseille*, Paris, 2009. For an example of the Armenian presence in Livorno in the *AveTransRisk* database see voyage id 10031.

¹⁹⁶ M.C. Engels, *Merchants, interlopers, seamen and corsairs: the Flemish community in Livorno and Genoa, 1615-1635*, Hilversum, 1997, 107.

¹⁹⁷ Pastine, *Genova e l'Impero Ottomano*, 8.

¹⁹⁸ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50194.

¹⁹⁹ The nationalities of the shipmasters are explicitly mentioned in two cases. They can be deduced from the names of their vessels (*La Speranza*, *La Barca Longa*, *Rosa di Fortuna*) in the remaining three cases.

inhabitants.²⁰⁰ The plague marked a collapse, preceded and followed by years of decline and stagnation.²⁰¹ Thereafter, trade recovered very slowly and this led to the gradual end of the policy of state support for port maintenance during the 1670s. It almost seems, according to Giorgio Doria, that the city's oligarchy between the 1640s and 1660s tried to swim against the tide through a vast programme of public works to revive activity and employment in the port area, but without achieving the aimed objectives.²⁰² Edoardo Grendi, too, confirmed the decline in traffic from the 1640s onwards and even more markedly in the 1660s.²⁰³ For the five-year period 1661-1665, among the last years considered in his research, he identifies 67 vessels with a capacity of over 300 Genoese *salme* (57.17 tons) arriving in the port of Genoa on average every year.

Compared to the previous period, there is an important change in the archival location of the Average procedures. As mentioned above, between the 1640s and the 1660s the drafting of the procedures progressively passed to the notary of the *Conservatori del Mare*.²⁰⁴ This led to an increasing number of cases being declared and registered at the *Conservatori's* chancellery. It was then the notary of the latter, also acting as a *calculator*, who drew up the calculation of the apportionment of damages. The total voyages in the *Atti Civili* of the *Conservatori del Mare* for the three-year period 1668-1670 are 168, respectively 38 for 1668, 58 for 1669 and 72 for 1670.²⁰⁵ The increasing quantity reflects both the progressive recovery of traffic compared to the previous years, and the growing importance of the notary of the *Conservatori*. However, it is still a consolidation phase from an administrative point of view and this is also reflected in the low number of calculations made in these years.²⁰⁶ Only seven voyages present one or more calculation, for five GA and four PA respectively.²⁰⁷ For some voyages, in fact, more than one calculation was

²⁰⁰ Plague epidemics broke out regularly in Genoa during the early modern period (1499-1506, 1527-1530, 1579-1580, 1598-1599, 1625-1626), but the plague of 1656-1657 was the most serious in terms of death toll. Costantini, *La repubblica di Genova*, 355-357.

²⁰¹ Grendi, 'I nordici', 53.

²⁰² Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 177. As early as 1645 the *Casa di San Giorgio* began to reduce its ordinary contribution, leading the *Padri del Comune* to rely increasingly on income from port traffic alone. See par. 2.4.

²⁰³ Grendi, 'I nordici', 55.

²⁰⁴ See par. 3.5.

²⁰⁵ This is achieved by entering '1668' and '1670' in the second and third text fields of the 'advanced search' function above.

²⁰⁶ It is probable that in the transition period of the procedure's jurisdiction from the *calculatori* to the *Conservatori* the shipmasters and, above all, the merchants involved preferred to use private agreements for the GA calculations, see par. 3.5.

²⁰⁷ Result obtained by adding the function 'Average type' 'is not empty'.

made. For example, there could be more than one GA calculation in the case of multiple accidents on the same voyage because of more than one harmful event. PA calculations, on the other hand, resulted when part of the cargo was damaged as a result of an accident and not as a result of an act of GA.²⁰⁸ The goods' average value per voyage in this period is 9,571 *lire*.²⁰⁹ The average value per vessel is approximately of 4,790 Genoese *lire*.²¹⁰ This figure represents approximately half or one third of the value of the vessels in the Average calculations examined in the first or second three-year period respectively. Finally, the average damage per voyage amounts to 3,597 Genoese *lire*.²¹¹ Although the average value of vessels and cargoes on board has declined significantly, the average amount of damage during the first three quarters of the seventeenth century remains substantially stable.

Table 4.4 Statistical values 1668-1670

n. of voyages with GA or PA calculations	average vessel value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period	average cargo value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period	average damage value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period
7	4,790	-243%	9,571	-740.7%	3,597	+1.5%

In spite of the small number of calculations, it was possible to trace the names of the merchants involved in 27 different voyages thanks to the information in the reports and the accompanying documentation, such as bills of lading or calling of the parties involved before the *Conservatori's* court. Compared to the previous sample period, there are not many names of foreign merchants and, in general, *patroni* or their sailors are often found among the owners of the goods loaded in the holds. The only exception is the presence in 1670 of the English merchant Guglielmo Elam, already mentioned in the calculations of 1639 and 1640. He was probably part of the small community of English merchants

²⁰⁸ This was the case when different incidents gave rise to multiple Averages or when, within the same event, the vessel and the goods suffered both GA and PA damages.

²⁰⁹ Result obtained by adding the function 'Total amount of risk for the cargo' '>1'. The total value is 201,948 Genoese *lire*.

²¹⁰ Result obtained by adding the functions 'Total amount of risk for the vessel' '>1'. The total value of the 5 vessels involved in GA procedures is about 35,923 Genoese *lire*. This figure has to be doubled as the value of the vessels in the GA contributes only half in this three-year period. On the different criteria followed for the calculation of the vessel's contributing value, see par. 3.3.

²¹¹ Result obtained by adding the function 'Damages/expenses - total awarded' '>1'. The total damage to goods and vessels between GA and PA calculations amounts to 75,544 Genoese *lire*.

permanently settled in Genoa. He was involved in a GA concerning a General Cargo from England to Genoa in 1670.²¹² On the other hand, there is no shortage of names from the Genoese aristocracy such as Spinola, Pallavicino, Assereto, Tagliafico, Rezzonico and others.

Graph 4.3 shows the distribution by region of the origin of vessels arriving in Genoa and declaring an Average report between 1668 and 1670.

Once again, wheat confirms its centrality among the types of cargo arriving in the port. It appears as the only product on board or, in rare cases, together with other goods, in 62 voyages, 36% of the total. This percentage is significantly almost identical to the one found in the previous sample period. There was a slight decrease in the number of vessels carrying a General Cargo: 36 vessels, or about 21% of the total, compared to the previous 25%. Although this expression refers mainly to cargoes coming from Northern Europe, it was sometimes also used to indicate goods coming from Mediterranean ports such as Naples and Marseille, or from Genoa itself.²¹³ On the other hand, fifteen voyages did not provide any indication of the region of origin and/or on the loaded goods.²¹⁴


The three main areas of origin are Northern Europe (21), Apulia (22) and Sicily (16). These three areas accounted for 59 cases, or 43% of the total. They are followed, at a short distance, by Mediterranean Spain with 11 voyages. This last route saw its importance reduced compared to the other flows and to the previous sample periods, decreasing from 19 to 12 to 8% of the total traffic. Apulia, on the other hand, seems to have acquired a leading importance in this interval, following a positive trend already observable in the previous sample periods. The absence of a clear predominance of a specific area in this interval is reflected in Map 4.5, where there is a great dispersion of ports of departure and scheduled stops along the Mediterranean coast.

²¹² All the voyages involving Guglielmo Elam are recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the ids 50354 (1639), 50272 (1640) and 50736 (1670).

²¹³ See, for example, a General Cargo from Genoa to Athens in ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 86, 27/09/1669, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50706.


²¹⁴ These cases also include 3 voyages where the region of origin could not be identified ("spiaggia di Lissinati"; "Gonda"), see the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50695, and 50733.

Graph 4.3 *Regions of origin of vessels calling at the port of Genoa, 1668-1670*



My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa (19) and those with Genoa as port of origin (10).

Map 4.5 Ports of departure and scheduled stops of vessels arriving in Genoa, 1668-1670



Showing ports visited by vessels:

Year range:

Drag the circles to adjust the years

Min: 1500

Max: 1900

From year: 1667

To year: 1670

From the source material: Repubblica de Genova

For Underwriter(s):

Reason the vessel visited port:



Voyage origin:



Scheduled stop:



Forced stop due to an event:



Destination:



Unknown reason:



Use different coloured markers:



The map was constructed on the *AveTransRisk* db by selecting the sources in ASG in the interval 1668-1670 and excluding stops for unknown or unforeseen reasons. In addition, I removed the frequency cluster of Genoa as it is the destination port for almost all voyages.

4.3.1 1668-1670, Extra Mediterranean Routes

Northern Europe is one of the main areas of origin of shipmasters. This region, as shown above, has a clear bipolarity between England and the Flemish area. There are no more arrivals from Arkhangelsk. The disappearance of Arkhangelsk with its English shipmasters from this area is also reflected in the Livorno sources. Only Flemish shipmasters sailed from Russia to Livorno in these years.²¹⁵

Fifteen vessels departed from Holland, accounting for 71% of the arrivals from Northern Europe and about 9% of the total voyages. The shipmasters, when specified, were Dutch (6). There is also one shipmaster specifically from Texel and one from Scotland. Texel appears to be the most used port, whereas in the previous sample period it was a port of call to complete the cargo after departure from nearby Amsterdam.²¹⁶ The origins are distributed as follows: Texel (11), Rotterdam (1), Amsterdam (1), unspecified (2). Two of these voyages are bounded to unspecified locations, probably Genoa. In one other case, the vessel, besides Genoa, was bounded also to Livorno, Naples and Messina.²¹⁷ In all cases, unfortunately, the composition of the cargo is not indicated or the sources report a General Cargo. Cadiz appears to be a common leg in these voyages (13), although shipmasters did not always specified whether they loaded a new cargo in Cadiz or they simply replenished food supplies and equipment necessary for the vessel and crew. Based on the two only cases where this information is given, we know that General Cargo

²¹⁵ Voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the ids 10020 and 10027.

²¹⁶ Considering that Texel is a small island in the delta where Amsterdam is located, it is likely that cargoes were brought there to save time. On Dutch maritime trade in these years see J. De Vrie, A. van der Woude, *The first modern economy. Success, failure and perseverance of the Dutch Republic, 1500-1815*, Cambridge, 1997.

²¹⁷ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50679.

and “money” were loaded. In Cadiz, Atlantic and Mediterranean trade routes and products converged.²¹⁸ Cadiz was also a port of call for Dutch convoys to regroup and form up before entering the Mediterranean. The Dutch vessels on this route, in fact, sometimes travelled in convoy and under the escort of warships, so it is frequent that on arrival in Genoa, in the event of accidents during the voyage, the Dutch shipmasters went together on the same day to declare their report at the chancellery of the *Conservatori del Mare*.²¹⁹ Other possible legs were the ports on the Mediterranean coast of Spain. There is, for example, a shipmaster coming from Amsterdam with a General Cargo who stopped in Alicante to load salt for Genoa.²²⁰

Six vessels set sailed from England, all with English shipmasters, when specified (4). From 1651, the Navigation Acts, which declared that only English ships would be allowed to bring goods into England, were in force. London maintained its centrality with respect to the other ports of the Kingdom, establishing itself even more clearly than in the previous sample periods. Apart from two cases where the port of origin is not indicated, the alternative to the English capital in these years was the port of Yarmouth, in Norfolk.²²¹ Unfortunately, General Cargo expression makes it difficult to get an idea of the types of cargo leaving England. The only voyage where this is specified is for a cargo of herring leaving Yarmouth for Genoa, with a scheduled stop at Cadiz.²²² On the basis of what emerges from Tuscan GA sources, it is possible to state that cargoes of woollen cloth, lead, tin, leather and spices such as pepper arrived mainly from England.²²³ All voyages are declared as headed directly to Genoa, which suggests that relations with England were being strengthened. In the previous sample periods Genoa had frequently been a destination in addition to or instead of the port of Livorno.

There was only one voyage from Newfoundland in this three-year period. This was a cargo of cod loaded onto an English vessel and bound for Genoa and Livorno.

²¹⁸ A. Bustos Rodríguez, *Cádiz en el sistema atlántico. La ciudad, sus comerciantes y la actividad mercantil (1650-1830)*, Madrid, 2005, 60-70, 364-372.

²¹⁹ See, for example, ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 84, doc. 306, 24/08/1668 and ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 84, doc. 307, 24/08/1668.

²²⁰ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50776.

²²¹ On the rise of Yarmouth as a trading centre see P. Gauci, *Politics and society in Great Yarmouth 1660-1722*, Oxford, 1996.

²²² See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50714.

²²³ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 10033.

Moving on to the western coasts of the Iberian Peninsula, we find the vessels departing from Portugal. The structure of the routes from Portugal to the Mediterranean Sea is very simple. The main port of loading was Lisbon (7) but some voyages also departed from Oporto (1) and Vila Nova de Milfontes (1). The goods were bound for Genoa (5), Genoa and Livorno (1) or, in 1 case, Livorno alone.²²⁴ In contrast to the Dutch dominance on the Cadiz-Genoa route, the vessels from Portugal are of different nationalities. When specified, French (2), English (1) and Genoese (1) shipmasters are found. What is striking is the regularity of the composition of the cargoes. Sugar is the main product of Portuguese exports, sometimes loaded with tobacco cargoes. Cargoes are distributed as follows: sugar and General Cargoes (5), sugar and tobacco (2) or just sugar (1). It is likely that the sugar came from Portuguese Brazil, which specialised in this type of export. Between 1650 and 1710, the production of Brazilian plantations increased from 4,000 to 25,000 tonnes of sugar per year.²²⁵ Much of the sugar arrived in Lisbon.²²⁶ From Lisbon, loads were re-exported to the Mediterranean or to Northern Europe. As can be seen from the documentation, and has been theorised by other scholars, the port of Genoa played an important redistribution function, thanks also to the contacts between Genoese merchants living in Lisbon and their partners in the homeland.²²⁷ Stephen Fisher, for example, has brought out how the importance of Lisbon as an emporium should not be underestimated by concentrating entirely on the

²²⁴ The vessel headed to Livorno stopped in Genoa only because of bad weather suffered along the route. See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50772.

²²⁵ The reduced importance of the Lisbon sugar circuit in the previous sample period was probably due to the temporary loss of Pernambuco (1630-1654) by Portugal in its wars with Holland. See N. Alessandrini, A. Viola, 'Genovesi e fiorentini in Portogallo: reti commerciali e strategie politico-diplomatiche(1650-1700)', in *Mediterranea. Ricerche storiche* 28, 2013, 295-322, 300. On Portugal in these years see L. Freire Costa, P. Lains, S. Munch Miranda, *An economic history of Portugal, 1143-2010*, Cambridge, 2016; D. Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation upon the Ocean Sea: Portugal's Atlantic Diaspora and the Crisis of the Spanish Empire, 1492-1640*, Oxford, 2007; C.A. Hanson, *Economy and Society in Baroque Portugal: 1668-1703*, Minneapolis, 1981.

²²⁶ P. Calcagno, 'Attraverso la porta di Lisbona: i generi coloniali volano del commercio lusogenovese tra XVII e XVIII secolo', in Nigro ed., *Reti marittime*, 519-532, 521. The increase in Brazilian sugar production averaged 2.4% per year in the two centuries between 1580 and 1780, see M. Fusaro, *Reti commerciali e traffici globali in età moderna*, Rome-Bari, 2008, 64.

²²⁷ The Genoese colony was the most important in Lisbon's socio-economic sector, see N. Alessandrini, 'La presenza genovese a Lisbona negli anni dell'unione delle Corone (1580-1640)', in Herrero Sánchez, Ben Yessef Garfia, Bitossi, Puncuh eds, *Génova y la Monarquía*, 73-98; Alessandrini, Viola, 'Genovesi e fiorentini'; L. Lo Basso, "'La porte d'Italie". Marchandises coloniales et transculturation dans le port de Gênes au XVIIIe siècle: l'exemple du tabac', in M. Figeac, C. Bouneau eds., *Circulation, métissage et culture matérielle (XVIe-XXe siècles)*, Paris, 2017, 145-160. A similar role in the re-export of sugar from Lisbon to Northern Europe was played by the French port of Nantes, see M. Villeret, *Le goût de l'or blanc. Le sucre en France au XVIII siècle*, Rennes, 2017.

fortunes of Livorno.²²⁸ This function became more evident in the following years. Re-exporting was also carried out from Livorno, often by Genoese and Livornese merchants together, with bills of lading specifying both ports as possible destinations.²²⁹

The growing role of Cadiz as a transit port for vessels from Northern Europe to the Mediterranean has already been mentioned. The western side of the Iberian Peninsula acted not only as a port of call for supplies and regrouping for Northern vessels before entering into the Mediterranean Sea, but also as a centre for the redistribution of colonial products arriving from overseas. Cadiz, in this sample period, is a port of loading for five vessels bound for Genoa. As in the case of the voyages previously examined, the shipmasters were Dutch (4) or from Hamburg (1). They used to travel in convoy (3). There is also evidence of a French vessel travelling from the Canary Islands to Alicante and Genoa with a General Cargo including, most probably, sugar.²³⁰ In these same years there were also convoys operating on the Cadiz-Genoa route loaded with precious metals.²³¹

4.3.2 1668-1670, Western Mediterranean and Italian Routes

As regards the Mediterranean side of the Iberian Peninsula, the situation shows little changes. For this sample period, information is available on eleven voyages, i.e. 6.5% of the total. The ports of departure were Alicante (4), Cartagena (3), the Balearic Islands (2), Mazarròn and Barcelona (1) or generally Spain (1). Apart from one journey to Genoa and Palermo (1), all cargoes were directed to Genoa (10). The cargoes loaded on board are the same of the previous periods, confirming the continuity of trading along the

²²⁸ S. Fisher, 'Lisbon, its English merchant community and the Mediterranean in the eighteenth century', in P.L. Cottrell, D.H. Aldcroft eds., *Shipping, Trade and Commerce: essays in memory of Ralph Davis*, Leicester, 1981, 23-44.

²²⁹ Calcagno, 'Attraverso la porta', 531. See also, for example, the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 10048. On this trade see Braudel, Romano, *Navires et marchandises*; J.P. Filippini, *Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814)*, I, Naples, 1998, I, 55-56.

²³⁰ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50715. Genoese merchants stimulated the establishment of a plantation society in the Canary Islands, see S. Greenfield, 'Plantations, Sugar Cane and Slavery', *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 6/1, 1979, 85-119. On the role of these islands for international trade see G. Santana Pérez, 'Los holandeses y la utilización de Canarias como puerta atlántica durante los siglos XVI-XVIII', in R. Vermeir, M. Ebben, R. Fagel eds., *Agentes e identidades en movimiento. España y los Países Bajos siglos XVI-XVIII*, Madrid, 2011, 329-349.

²³¹ Kirk, *Genoa and the sea*, 194.

'traditional' routes of the Republic which, apart from variations in quantitative terms, do not undergo significant changes. Soda, salt and *libani* ropes were exported from Alicante.²³² Soda was also exported from Cartagena alongside, occasionally, wool and pieces of eight.²³³ From Balearic Islands came money, hides, blankets, cheese and salt. Finally, a cargo of wheat left Mazzaròn, in Catalonia, to which the shipmaster added a General Cargo loaded in Barcelona. Grendi identifies, at least until 1666, the presence of an almost constant predominance of Flemish and Dutch shipmasters on the routes from Mediterranean Spain.²³⁴ On the basis of the data examined, however, there appear to be Genoese shipmasters from Sturla and Monterosso (2), on the Genoese *Riviera*, a Majorcan *patrone* (1) and only one shipmaster, probably English, in command of the vessel *La Fregata di Zante*.²³⁵ The proximity of Catalonia allowed the Ligurian *patroni* to trade in different goods, perhaps loaded along the route, according to what Arnaud Bartolomei has defined as the "great European coastal trade route".²³⁶ One example is the voyage of the *patrone* Sebastiano Bigetto from Voltri.²³⁷ In 1670 he transported a cargo of oil, rice, soap and candied fruit jam from Genoa to Mazzaròn, in Catalonia, on his *barca*. When he arrived in Mazzaròn, Bigetto decided to keep the soap and jam on board to sell them in Barcelona. During the stop in Barcelona and after the selling of his goods, the local merchant Hieronime Sivaro gave him some *cordelatti* - a type of woollen cloth - to take to Augustin Martin, possibly a French merchant living in Genoa. His *consolato* includes other goods loaded in Barcelona as, for example, 50 Spanish gold *pistole*, addressed to several merchants living in Genoa. Francois Turdant, another merchant in Barcelona, gave Bigetto some cloths to take to Alexis, a merchant in Finale. Finally, Bigetto returned to Mazzaròn from where he sailed to Genoa and Finale. Bad weather and a storm in the Gulf of Lion forced him to make several stops and he arrived in Genoa in roughly a month.

²³² *Liban* was a vegetable rope made of braided fibres, not twisted, used for various purposes in merchant marine or by fishermen. This rope is also used in mussel farming. See the definition of 'Liban', in G. Casaccia, *Vocabolario genovese-italiano*, Genoa, 1883, 273.

²³³ There is also an unidentified type of good, "strase di late", see the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50774.

²³⁴ Grendi, 'I nordici', 55.

²³⁵ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the voyage id 50816.

²³⁶ A. Bartolomei, 'Cadix et la Méditerranée à la fin du XVIIIe siècle', *Revue d'Histoire Maritime* 13, 2011, 173-210, 192.

²³⁷ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50745.

Voyages of this kind, which hardly emerges with such richness of detail in the archival sources, probably also characterised exchanges with southern France. In this period only 4 voyages are recorded. Two of them concern cargoes of different goods from Marseille to Genoa, while the other two are a transport of wine from Frontignan to Genoa and one of oats from an unidentified port known only as “Golfo Bianco” to Sestri Ponente. There is also a cargo of lemons, citrons and wheat from Bordighera to Marseille, where wine was to be loaded to take to Bordighera or “in other places in Italy”.²³⁸ The two voyages from Marseille, which took place in March 1669 by a *patrone* probably from Genoa and a shipmaster from Hamburg, took place between the end of the rebellion against King Louis XIV and the promulgation of the free port on 26 March 1669.²³⁹ We will therefore have to wait until the last sample period of the present analysis to assess the long-term effects of the opening of the free port in Marseille and the reinforced Genoese policy of neutrality on the exchanges between these two ports.²⁴⁰

Five vessels set sail from nearby Corsica, one headed to Bocca di Magra - and therefore not considered for this analysis - and the others directly to Genoa. The cargoes, as in the previous periods, were mainly wood (4), but also fish (1), tuna (1), cheese (1) or other goods. The ports of loading were mainly Saint-Florent (2) and Cap Corse (1). All voyages were carried out by, in the only two cases where it is specified, Corsican *patroni*. On the other hand, according to the Average reports, there are no voyages from Sardinia. The only two voyages recorded in this period concern cargoes of grain and foodstuffs bound from Sardinia to Spain, in which Genoese merchants or shipowners were probably involved. The sources, however, reveal some information on the routes from Liguria to Sardinia.²⁴¹ One *patrone* left from Sestri Levante with an empty hold to go to Sardinia to load goods to bring, later, to Genoa.²⁴² Another *patrone* left with a load of building materials such as planks of fir, “chiappelle per lastricar case” (floor tiles) made in Savona and glasses, but also other goods, to Cagliari

²³⁸ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50819.

²³⁹ See the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50669 and 50674. On Marseille in these years see J.T. Takeda, *Marseille between Crown and Commerce*, Baltimore, 2011, 20-49. G. Rambert ed., *Histoire du commerce de Marseille*, IV, de 1599 à 1660, and V, de 1660 à 1789: *Le Levant*, Paris, 1954, 1957.

²⁴⁰ On taxes and relations between Genoa and Marseille in the second half of the seventeenth century see Schiappacasse, ‘Genoa and Marseille’, 197-224.

²⁴¹ See the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50766 and 50801.

²⁴² See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50768.

and Alghero.²⁴³ Perhaps this voyage also would have continued with a cargo of Sardinian products back to the capital of the Republic, if the *patrone* had not suffered a shipwreck near Liguria.

In spite of the often complementary role of Livorno, contacts with Tuscany are scarce in the examined sources. In this interval there is only one cargo of wheat and two cargoes of “*merci varie*” bound for Genoa on board the vessels of three *patroni*, probably Ligurian. This does not mean that traffic between the two regions was absent, it was probably operated by small vessels of *patroni* from the *Riviera* which, as such, largely escape recording in archival sources. The sources allow the partial observation of some *patroni* operating between Ligurian and Tuscan ports. One example is the voyage of the *patrone* Bartolomeo Mucci from Lerici to Livorno on his *fregata*.²⁴⁴ He carried some bags of coins, white wine, a *fagotto* of towels, a *fagotto* of documents and books, and a *ferraiuolo* [?]. The coins were addressed to different groups of merchants, as stated in the bill of lading. Some of the merchants to whom they were addressed, such as Cornelius Loct, were probably of Flemish origin and lived in Livorno. The *patrone* also travelled with 40 pieces of eight, divided between “*moneta minuta*” and silver *scudi*. The boat sank off the coast of Viareggio, despite the fact that the *schifo* had been abandoned in order to increase manoeuvrability. Mucci managed to save himself by swimming ashore. These isolated examples are indicative of traffic networks, as already mentioned, that escape ‘traditional’ sources and show the operational autonomy of the Republic's merchant marine, whose vessels were always on the lookout for profitable opportunities without necessarily touching Ligurian ports. For example, the reports following a heavy storm in September 1670 reveal a series of connections between Livorno and Villefranche operated by Genoese *patroni* from Prà and Voltri. Between 18 and 23 September, three Genoese *patroni* sailing from the Elba Island with a cargo of iron presented a report at the chancellery of the *Conservatori del Mare* in Genoa.²⁴⁵ The Duke of Savoy Emmanuel I had granted Villefranche the benefit of the free port since 1612. Over the years, his successors tried to encourage the formation of a local

²⁴³ On the loading of this vessel see the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50756. On the definition of *chiappella* see ‘ciappa’ in Casaccia, *Vocabolario genovese-italiano*, 166.

²⁴⁴ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50641.

²⁴⁵ See the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the ids 50791, 50792 and 50793.

merchant marine that could compete with the neighbouring Ligurian ports.²⁴⁶ Witnessing the activity of the *patroni* of the Republic of Genoa operating undisturbed on the Livorno-Villefranche route is indicative of the flexibility of Mediterranean trade, even though it was operated by modest-sized vessels.²⁴⁷ Part of the trade from overseas also arrived in Livorno without stopping in Genoa. One example, as Grendi states, was the activity of English shipmasters, in command of large vessels.²⁴⁸

The activity of the Ligurian *patroni* is observable even in the exchanges with the Tyrrhenian side of the Papal States, roughly corresponding to present-day Lazio. In this three-year period there are two voyages to Genoa, one with wheat from Civitavecchia and one with “ferraccio” (low-quality iron) from Nettuno. Another vessel with a load of wheat sailed from Porto Badino to Villefranche. Small boats made these three voyages: a *tartana*, a *barca* and a *navicello*. Also the small boats of the Ligurian *patroni* were probably entrusted with part of the re-export trade from Genoa to Lazio. An example is the voyage from Genoa to Civitavecchia by the *frigate* called *San Giovanni Bonaventura* in 1668 with a cargo of sugar.²⁴⁹ The sugar presumably arrived in Genoa from Lisbon on one of the previously mentioned voyages.

From Campania, in particular from Mondragone and Castellammare di Stabia, departed two vessels with a cargo of wheat bound for Genoa: one *cimba* and one *tartana* of Mediterranean *patroni*, one of which from nearby Sorrento. Calabria, on the other hand, was the area of origin of eight voyages, seven of which with loads of wheat and one of *zibibbo* wine. The voyages were bound to Genoa (6) or to Livorno and Genoa (2). The departures were from Crotona (3), Collegiano [?] (1), Corigliano (1), Melissa (1), Belvedere Marittimo (1) and from Calabria in general (1). Only shipmasters from the Mediterranean area and, more specifically, from the Tyrrhenian area are found. There are in fact three shipmasters from Liguria, one from Sestri Ponente, and two from the Kingdom of Naples, both from the town of Vico Equense. The vessels used, when specified, were *cimbe* (3) and *tartane* (1).

In this third interval, as mentioned above, the importance of the Apulian cereal market grew significantly, bringing this region to the first place as an area

²⁴⁶ F. Hildesheimer, ‘Entre la Méditerranée et les Alpes: Nice et son port franc au XVIIe siècle’, *Provence Historique* 27/108, 1977, 197-212.

²⁴⁷ Fusaro, Addobbati, ‘The Grand Tour of Mercantilism’. See also bibliography therein quoted.

²⁴⁸ Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 55.

²⁴⁹ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50789.

of origin of the vessels arriving in Genoa: there are twenty-two voyages, equal to 16% of the total. The years 1640-1660 were characterised by a general contraction of voyages from Sicily and Apulia. The decline phase was overcome after 1661 in favour of Apulia.²⁵⁰ In the period 1658-1665, as Cancila reports, an average of about forty-seven vessels arrived in Genoa yearly from Apulia and Sicily.²⁵¹ The specialisation in wheat cargoes is very clear: twenty cargoes of wheat were bound to Genoa (17), Livorno or Genoa (1), Messina and Genoa (1), Genoa or Spain (1). Among the charterer merchants in Apulia there are also local public authorities, such as the Prince of San Nicandro.²⁵² The loading ports are Taranto (8), Barletta (5), Manfredonia (3), Brindisi (2), Gallipoli (1), Fortore (1), or Manfredonia and Otranto (1). In addition to wheat, there are one load of broad beans from Taranto and one load of oil from Ostuni. Compared to the previous three years there is a marked evolution in the nationality of the shipmasters and in the type of vessels used. There are no shipmasters from Northern Europe in the documentation examined. The employ of *patroni* in charge of vessels with a smaller tonnage than those from the Northern Europe is common. The vessels used are typical of the Mediterranean area: *cimba* (7), *tartana* (4), *petacchio* (1), *polacca* (1). The nationalities of the shipmasters are not specified, except for two *patroni* of the Kingdom of Naples, one from Positano and one from Castellammare di Stabia. It would therefore seem that the Mediterranean and, in particular, the Kingdom of Naples' merchant marine controlled these routes following a period of fierce competition with Northern European shipmasters. This rebalancing was perhaps also possible because of the reduced circulation of capital in the analysed period.

The North-Central Adriatic is one of the few areas where traces of Northern shipmasters involved in the grain trade can still be found. There are two shipmasters from Holland and possibly one from Northern France. It is also interesting to note the presence of three Ligurian *patroni* from Cogoleto, Arenzano and Finale. Cogoleto and Arenzano, in particular, are villages on the Ligurian *Riviera* which provided the Republic with shipmasters engaged on the grain routes through all the sample periods analysed so far.

In particular, vessels arrived from the ports of Ancona (3) and Senigallia (2) in the Marche region, to which can be added the ports of Rimini (3), Ravenna

²⁵⁰ Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 266.

²⁵¹ Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 266.

²⁵² See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50775.

(2) and Rimini (1) from the present Emilia-Romagna. The goods travelled almost exclusively straight to Genoa (8) with the exceptions of a cargo of wheat to Livorno or Genoa (1) and a voyage with wheat to Genoa and unspecified goods to Messina (1). Also another voyage to Genoa included a stop in Messina, to load a consignment of silk. Apart from these exceptions related to the stop in Messina, on all voyages from the Adriatic region wheat was the only cargo item on board. From the few reports in which Genoa is mentioned as a port of departure, it is also possible to know how the voyages to the Adriatic were carried out. The *barca* of the *patrone* Benedetto Moro, for example, left Genoa in the winter of 1668 with a cargo of codfish to be unloaded in Senigallia and Ancona.²⁵³ When he arrived in Senigallia, he took a new load of grain to Genoa for his return journey. The cargo was sent to Genoa by the same merchant who had received the codfish in Senigallia, Carlo Vianelli.

Exchanges with Venice in this three-year period are completely absent from the documentation examined. The only exception is a voyage from the Bocche di Cattaro (present-day Boka Kotorska), a Venetian possession in the eastern Adriatic, present-day Croatia.²⁵⁴ The shipmaster was a Venetian who departed from the Boka Kotorska Bay in 1670 with several bags of money obtained from sea loans guaranteed on the vessel, to go and load grain in Albania.²⁵⁵ After loading the grain and returning to the Boka Kotorska Bay to settle the sea loan contracts, the vessel continued its journey to unload the grain in Livorno or Genoa. Although this is an isolated example, this voyage illustrates the multiple tools available to shipmasters to find the capital for maritime trade.

From Sicily there are 16 voyages to Genoa, which is about 9.5% of the total. The database also contains data for 4 other voyages that did not have Genoa as destination port, but Livorno (2), Naples (1) or Ancona (1). In particular, the two voyages to Livorno regarded oil shipments, while those to Naples and Ancona were salt shipments. The presence of these Average reports in Genoa, a port not touched during these voyages, is perhaps linked to the nationality of the shipmasters, who were Genoese in three out of four cases, and/or to the presence of insurers or merchants in Genoa involved in such cargoes. With regard to the cargoes bound for Genoa, despite the presence of rare cargoes of salt (2), oil (1) or *zibibbo* wine (1), wheat continued to monopolise the trade from

²⁵³ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50691.

²⁵⁴ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50742.

²⁵⁵ For the function of sea loans, see par. 3.1.

Sicily (12). The destinations were Genoa alone (16), Genoa and Livorno (1) or Genoa and the coast of Spain (1). With the exception of Girgenti and Trapani for grain cargo, among the most used ports of loading also in the previous sample periods, there are no particular preferences among the Sicilian ports: Girgenti (5), Trapani (3), Milazzo (1), Termini (1), Siracusa (1), Palermo (1), Pozzallo (1), Lipari (1), Messina (1), and Sicily in general (1). The merchants involved are mainly Genoese. As expected, these routes also confirm the predominance of Mediterranean shipping, with the presence of shipmasters from Liguria (7), Provence (2) and Sicily (1). There seems to be no shipmaster from Northern Europe. Even for Sicily, in the few cases where the type of vessel used is indicated, small Mediterranean vessels prevail: *petacchio* (2), *barca* (1), *tartana* (1), *pinco* (1) and *polacca* (1). The reduced use of the Northern marine and the use of smaller vessels was one of the symptoms of the stagnation of trade, which led to less investment, so that the large Northern vessels could not be chartered to load heavy and low-value wheat cargoes.²⁵⁶

4.3.3 1668-1670, Eastern Mediterranean and North African Routes

The routes with the eastern and southern Mediterranean are still a clear minority among the routes headed to Genoa. In this interval there are only two voyages from Greece, two from Turkey and one from Algiers. From Greece, in particular from Athens and Porto Vitolo - today's Karavostasi in the Peloponnese - a cargo of wool and other goods left for Genoa and a cargo of pieces of eight, silk, *vallonia*²⁵⁷ and other goods left for Livorno. The first voyage was made by a French *patrone* from La Ciotat on board of his *polacca*, the second one by an unknown shipmaster on his *tartana*. There is also a shipmaster sailing from Genoa to Greece, Antonio Pavia. He sailed on 12 September 1669 with a cargo of pottery, salted fish and money to load *vallonia* and other goods in Athens, but his vessel sank off Cape Matapan in the Peloponnese.²⁵⁸ He was rescued by a French *tartan* carrying wine to Candia,

²⁵⁶According to Cancila, from 1650 Sicily entered a long phase of crisis that lasted until the advent of the Bourbon dynasty. Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 264.

²⁵⁷ *Valania* or *vallonia* is the fruit of the Valonia oak; the powder, obtained by grinding the acorn, was used, due to its high tannin content, for tanning hides. See G. Grotti, *Le Storie della Ranica. Il mulino della Nesa*, Ranica, 2017, 36.

²⁵⁸ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50706.

present-day Crete, which had recently come under Ottoman control following a long siege against the Venetians.²⁵⁹

Both vessels from the Ottoman Empire sailed from Izmir, on the Turkish Aegean coast. This town in the seventeenth century was one of the main points of the French network of *échelles* in the Ottoman Empire and a port with many Christian merchants.²⁶⁰ The two vessels loaded General Cargoes and there is no further record on them. Even most of the GA reports redacted in Livorno and concerning shipments from Izmir did not specify the loaded cargoes. However, according to the documentation in Pisa from 1671 in the *AveTranRisk* database, there are 2 voyages from Izmir to Livorno with loads of hides, cotton and General Cargo.²⁶¹ These cargoes could be representative of departures from Izmir in this period also to other ports, such as Genoa.

Finally, there is a single voyage from Algiers. This involved a vessel, possibly Northerner, with a cargo of sugar, wax and “*scocoso*” (cous cous) bound for Livorno, which stopped in Genoa because, due to bad weather, it suffered some damages in the Gulf of Lion. Other cases recorded in the database also indicate cargoes of sugar, hides and other goods from Algiers to Livorno.²⁶² Although small in scale, this was a continuous traffic during the seventeenth century. There are no departures from Tabarka, despite the fact that the island was gradually concentrating its efforts on the grain trade, often bound for Genoa, during these years.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ G. Ongaro, ‘The siege of Candia: population control, social dynamics and emergency management by the Venetian authorities in the face of the Ottoman advance (1645-1669)’, *Società e Storia* 157, 2017, 459-477; A. Anastasopoulos ed., *The Eastern Mediterranean under Ottoman rule: Crete, 1645-1840*, Rethymno, 2008.

²⁶⁰ On Izmir see M.H. van der Boogert ed., *Ottoman Izmir: studies in honour of Alexander H. de Groot*, Leiden, 2007; J. Barnai, ‘The Development of Community Organizational Structures: The Case of Izmir’, in A. Levy ed., *Jews, Turks, Ottomans: A Shared History, Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Century*, Syracuse, 2002, 35-51; E. Eldem, D. Goffman, B.A. Masters, *The Ottoman City Between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul*, Cambridge, 1999.

²⁶¹ Voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the ids 10007 and 10008.

²⁶² Voyage recorded in the *AveTranRisk* db as the id 10043.

²⁶³ Four voyages a year covered the essential trade between the island and the homeland, to which must be added the voyages operated by the so-called *venturieri* shipmasters who operated according to the availability of cargoes. Piccinno calculated that about 1 voyage per year resulted in an Average report. However, it is possible, as in this three year period, that given the few voyages, there could be no voyages at all declaring an Average report. See Iodice, Piccinno, ‘Whatever the cost’, 12.

4.4 1698-1700, the 'French Invasion' and a New Era for Genoese Shipping

The structure of the trade varies further during the last three years examined, comprising the Average reports written or presented in Genoa between 1698 and 1700. These years have been chosen both on the basis of the availability of the sources, and on the fact that this was a relatively 'peaceful' three-year period as it was situated between two international conflicts which influenced, despite the neutrality maintained by the Republic, the dynamics of international trade: the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714).²⁶⁴

The history of Genoese maritime trade in the last years of the seventeenth century is fragmentary and there are no systematic reconstruction of traffic trends.²⁶⁵ The sources on which Grendi based most of his statistical analysis on port traffic in Genoa stop at 1666 and there are no subsequent quantitative studies.

According to Giorgio Doria's research, based on the trend of the anchorage tax, maritime traffic in the port gradually declined in the last years of the seventeenth century, starting in 1684.²⁶⁶ The French bombardment in that year would have contributed decisively to a decrease in arrivals and the beginning of a new phase of stagnation. In 1682, plans to resume Levantine trade had also failed.²⁶⁷ It should be remembered that, in the long run, the political consequences of the 'forced' rapprochement with France would allow the implementation of stronger neutrality policies and the promotion of the port as a Mediterranean emporium.²⁶⁸ As early as 1693, for example, the Genoese ambassador to Madrid reported how the continuing European conflicts were

²⁶⁴ See J. Falkner, *The War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714*, Barnsley, 2015; K.A.J. McLay, 'Combined operations and the European theatre during the Nine Years' War, 1688-97', *Historical Research* 78/202, 2005, 506-539; J.A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV: 1667-1714*, London, 1999.

²⁶⁵ Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 10.

²⁶⁶ The revenue from the anchorage tax fell by 40.4% between 1682 and 1751, partly due to the devaluation of the Genoese *lira* and partly to the decline in traffic. See Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 179-180. According to a rather rough estimate, however, carried out by Luigi Bulferetti and Claudio Costantini and also based on the figures at which the anchorage tax was contracted out, it seems that the traffic trend of this period was not very different from the first seventy years of the seventeenth century. See Bulferetti, Costantini, *Industria e commercio*, 127.

²⁶⁷ Giacchero, *Economia e società*, 73-74.

²⁶⁸ Bitossi, *La repubblica sfida il Re Sole*, 20.

benefiting the ports and merchants of the Republic of Genoa with the arrival of English and Dutch vessels in the free port.²⁶⁹

With regard to the seriality of the data, there is a gap in the documentation that has made some cross-referencing and approximations necessary. In the series of *Atti Civili* of the last decade of the seventeenth century, the 1698 and the second half of 1700 archival folders are missing.²⁷⁰ In order to maintain the three-year structure and to take into account the years 1698-1700, in addition to the documents kept in the files of the *Atti Civili*, I employed the sources of the *Testimonialia segreti all'estero* registered in 1698 and the paper files referring to the folder *Esibite in avarie* between 1699 and 1700.²⁷¹ The latter file contains various calculations produced at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For these reasons there is a clear disparity in the distribution of cases by year. The total number of cases amounts to 148. They, however, are distributed as follows: 25 for 1698, 85 for 1699 and 38 for 1700. It is conceivable that the 38 cases for the year 1700 constitute approximately half of the total number of cases for this year.

The structure of the documents kept in these years in the *Atti Civili* is more standardised than in previous years, and it is possible to hypothesise a frequent use of declarations for precautionary purposes. Within the three-year period there is a greater number of calculations than in the previous sample period, perhaps a sign of the greater degree of reliability and control acknowledged to the *Conservatori del Mare*. For 1699 and 1700 there are in fact twenty-nine calculations, respectively relating to twenty-seven GA and two PA.²⁷² Similarly to what happened in Livorno, these calculations are drawn up in Spanish pieces of eight, although the notary/calculator reported each equivalence in Genoese *lire*. Due to the already highlighted discrepancy in the subdivision of the cases by year and the different funds used, all the calculations in this sample date back to 1699 or 1700. For this reason, the average values refer to these two

²⁶⁹ Giacchero, *Economia e Società*, 81-84.

²⁷⁰ Of the 26 archival folders preserving the Average reports written between 1690 and 1700, 13 are missing. The folders in ASG, *CdM* 124 and 125, corresponding to the years 1699 and 1699-1700, have been used. *CdM* 126, preserving documents produced in the second half of 1700, is missing.

²⁷¹ ASG, *CdM*, Testimonialia segreti redatti all'estero 285, 1693-1698. ASG, *CdM*, Esibite in avarie 377, 1696-1706. The paper cards were checked against the archival documentation on a sample basis to assess their reliability.

²⁷² The 2 PA, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the ids 50365 and 50820, refer to cases for which GA is already present. For this reason only the values of the goods will be taken into account in the calculation of GA, to avoid doubling the totals. The same applies to the voyage ids 50612 and 50617, for which there are 2 GA in each.

years and not to the whole three-year period. The goods' average value per voyage was approximately of 57,112 *lire*.²⁷³ The average value of the vessels in the 25 GA amounted to 11,754 *lire*.²⁷⁴ Finally, the average value of damages per voyage was approximately 2,867 *lire*.²⁷⁵

Table 4.5 *Statistical values 1698-1700*

n. of voyages with GA or PA calculations	average vessel value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period	average cargo value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period	average damage value (<i>lire</i>)	Δ with previous period
25	11,754	+145%	57,112	+496.7%	3,597	-25.5%

According to Doria's data, wood and foodstuffs prevailed among the goods unloaded in Genoa in these years: imports of the former amounted to 20-27,000 tonnes per year; wheat amounted to 12-16,000 tonnes; salt to 7-12,000 tonnes, and wine to around 79,000 hectolitres. There was a sharp increase in goods in boxes or packages, which reached and perhaps exceeded 10,000 tonnes towards the end of the century.²⁷⁶

An analysis of Average reports shows a clear predominance of bulky goods, which are often more at risk of deterioration or loss in adverse weather conditions.²⁷⁷ Wheat ranked first in importance. Wheat is found, alone or with other goods, in the holds of 57 vessels out of a total of 148, i.e. in approximately 38% of cases. This is followed by cargoes of oil (21) and salt (16). It is also interesting to note the presence of twenty General Cargoes, almost exclusively from Northern Europe or Cadiz.

Even in this interval, it is possible to find the presence of the main names of the Genoese aristocracy, such as the Assereto, Serra, Grimaldi, Rezzonico, De Mari and others. Within the calculations, these merchants are the recipients of consignments of goods on which are also embarked cargoes destined for Marseille merchants such as David and Bernardi and Jewish or Dutch

²⁷³ Result obtained by adding the function 'Total amount of risk for the cargo' '>1'. I excluded a calculation made in Naples in *ducati*, see voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50820.

²⁷⁴ Result obtained by adding the functions 'Total amount of risk for the vessel' '>1'. The value of the vessels was double the figure that would have resulted from the contributing values in the calculations. As explained within the same calculations, only half of the value of the vessel contributed to the damage apportionment in the calculations drawn up in this three-year period.

²⁷⁵ Result obtained by adding the function 'Damages/expanses - total awarded' '>1'.

²⁷⁶ Doria, 'La gestione del porto', 137-140.

²⁷⁷ As stated in par. 3.4, legal texts often specified how goods should be properly stowed below deck.

merchants living in Genoa, such as Pascal de Silva or Desmet Vanhouten. Among the 'senders' in the ports of loading there are also public authorities such as the governor of Porto Ferraio or of the Elba Island, in Tuscany. Once again, therefore, the potential of Average sources for cross-studies on the activities of merchants in Genoa emerges. Let us consider, for instance, the presence of French merchants in Genoa. The weakening of relations with the Spanish crown led the ruling class of the Republic to a radical change of strategy, the results of which, as mentioned, were to be seen in full during the eighteenth century.²⁷⁸ Despite a relative weakening of relations between Genoa and France after the death of the cardinal and minister Giulio Mazzarino (1691), political and commercial contacts between the two states gradually increased over the years.²⁷⁹ Average sources examined reveal the activity, for example, of the French merchants residing in Genoa Gio. and Guglielmo Boissier, in 1698. They sent a cargo of sugar from Lisbon to Genoa on the *barca* of Gio. Baptiste Olivier, a shipmaster from Marseille.²⁸⁰ Their names regularly appear in the rental registers of the free port warehouses, together with those of other members of the French 'nation' in the city, at least until the 1740s.²⁸¹ As for the presence of French shipmasters arriving in the port, the documents examined in this three-year period show a relevant increase. In the cases where the shipmasters' nationality was indicated, there are 26 out of 103 French shipmasters, about a quarter of the total. It is well known that, in the first decades of the eighteenth century, Genoese merchants increasingly used French shipmasters. This was not justified by lower freight rates or by the greater capacity of their vessels, but by the relative safety that French shipmasters enjoyed against North African piracy, particularly Algerian piracy.²⁸²

Graph 4.4 shows a partial return to the situation examined in the first sample period, relating to the years 1599-1601, while below is Map 4.6, showing ports of loading, unloading and scheduled stops of vessels in this sample period.

²⁷⁸ M. Herrero Sanchez, 'The business relations, identities and political resources of Italian merchants in the early-modern Spanish monarchy: some introductory remarks', in Brilli, Herrero Sanchez eds., *Italian merchants*, 1-12, 3


²⁷⁹ Schiappacasse, 'Genova e Marsiglia', 199.

²⁸⁰ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50627.

²⁸¹ ASG, *SG*, Magazzini del porto franco, 1739-1746, 3.00201.


²⁸² Piccinno, *Iodice*, 'Whatever the cost', 12.

Graph 4.4 *Regions of origin of vessels calling at the port of Genoa, 1698-1700*



My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa (11) and those with Genoa as port of origin (7).

Map 4.6 Ports of departure and scheduled stops of vessels arriving in Genoa, 1698-1700



Showing ports visited by vessels:

Year range:

Drag the circles to adjust the years

Min: 1500

Max: 1900

From year: 1698

To year: 1700

From the source material: Repubblica di Genova

For Underwriter(s):

Reason the vessel visited port: Voyage origin: Scheduled stop: Forced stop due to an event: Destination: Unknown reason:

Use different coloured markers:

The map was constructed on the *AveTransRisk* db by selecting the sources in ASG in the interval 1698-1700 and excluding stops for unknown or unforeseen reasons. In addition, I removed the frequency cluster of Genoa as it is the destination port for almost all voyages.

[Graph 4.4](#) and the clusters in [Map 4.6](#) clearly shows the renewed intensity of traffic on the routes linking Sicily to Genoa. In fact, there are forty-one voyages from Sicily (32%), a proportionally intermediate value compared to those recorded between the first (45%) and the second and third ranges (12-13%). Arrivals from Apulia, on the other hand, seem to be falling (3) in favour of a recovery, in relative terms, of routes from Calabria (10). Moreover, the role of the routes from Portugal as an emporium for overseas goods consolidated.

4.4.1 1698-1700, Extra Mediterranean Routes

There were twelve vessels coming from Northern Europe, divided between England and Holland, representing about 8% of the cases. Genoa was the only port of destination in one voyage only, with an intermediate stop in Cartagena to load other goods. On the other hand, a regular traffic circuit emerges, linking Northern Europe to the Western Mediterranean and Italy through a series of 'nodes' also observed in the years examined above. Two voyages are generally headed to "Italian cities" or "Italy", while others reports contain more or less long lists of destination ports: Alicante, Marseille, Genoa and Livorno (1), Cadiz, Cartagena, Alicante, Genoa and Livorno (1), Cadiz, Barcelona, Genoa and Livorno (1), 'coast of Spain', Genoa and Livorno (1), Cadiz, Marseille, Genoa and Livorno (1), Cadiz, Alicante, Genoa and Livorno (2), Cadiz, Alicante, Genoa, Livorno, Messina and Calderona [?] (1), Marseille and Genoa (1). As can easily be seen, Genoa and Livorno are regularly associated, while Cadiz is a frequent stop before passing through the Strait of Gibraltar.

The Dutch ports of embarkation reported by the sources, as in the previous periods examined, were Amsterdam (4), Amsterdam and Texel (3), Texel alone (2) or, in general, Holland (1). Only two voyages departed from England and in

both cases London was the port of loading. Unfortunately almost all cargoes on the routes from Northern Europe are indicated as “miscellaneous goods” (9) or are not indicated at all (2), thus not allowing a detailed analysis of their composition. The only exception is a voyage from Texel whose cargo consists mainly of a heavy and bulky commodity, iron rods, together with other high-value, low-volume goods such as pepper, carnations, nutmeg and others.²⁸³ There is even a basket of elephant’s teeth addressed to Livorno, worth 300 pieces of eight.²⁸⁴ This cargo, together with the cargoes of vessels bound for Livorno and recorded in the database, confirms the traditional role of the Northern ports as exporters of iron, hides and cloths, to which colonial products arriving from the main non-European routes should be added. The nationality of the shipmasters, where indicated, coincides with that of the ports of departure: English from London (2) and Dutch from Holland (3), plus the presence of a French shipmaster from Dunkirk on the Amsterdam-Cartagena-Genoa route mentioned above.²⁸⁵ It is worth remembering that the Navigation Acts in England were still in force, while Dutch commercial shipping had lost its primacy in Northern Europe.

Journeys from Northern Europe included a voyage from the port of Le Havre, Northern France.²⁸⁶ The port of Le Havre was, between 1664 and 1709, the seat of several French privileged companies trading with the African coast and the American colonies.²⁸⁷ A French shipmaster carried out this voyage. He was in Le Havre with a cargo of oil, perhaps already on board before this stop. At Le Havre his crew deserted and abandoned the vessel, so the shipmaster decided to go to Lisbon in search of new freights, perhaps with a new crew. He managed to load sugar and General Cargo to take to Genoa and Livorno. The exceptional circumstances and the fact that there is only one voyage from Northern France might imply that trade from this region was rare, given the interests of the *négociants* of ports such as Le Havre in overseas trade. The city of Marseille was also doing its utmost to maintain its monopoly on

²⁸³ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50842.

²⁸⁴ This term probably referred to the animal's tusks, made of ivory. This was a material used in the world of luxury arts and crafts of the time, and could have come from Africa or Asia. See E.G. Milner-Gulland, J.R. Beddington, 'The Exploitation of Elephants for the Ivory Trade: An Historical Perspective', *Proceedings: Biological Sciences* 252/1333, 1993, 29-37.

²⁸⁵ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50885.

²⁸⁶ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50622.

²⁸⁷ See P. Dardel, *Navires et marchandises dans les ports de Rouen et du Havre au XVIIIe siècle*, Rouen, 1966.

Mediterranean trade, particularly with the Levant, which partly explains this 'specialisation'.²⁸⁸ In this three-year period however, as already mentioned, shipmasters from the north of France appeared in the Mediterranean for the first time in Average records.

Apart from Northern Europe there are five voyages from Newfoundland. These, when specified, were made to bring codfish to Genoa (4) or Livorno (1).²⁸⁹ Although in the previous sample periods there were only English shipmasters involved on this route, here we find, in addition to the English (2), two Frenchmen and a *patrone* who was probably Italian, Leonardo Russo. Both French shipmasters came from Dunkirk and were bound for Genoa. One of the two English vessels was travelling under the escort of a warship, perhaps a sign of the dangerousness of the area even after the end of the conflict, or of the dangerousness of the route into the Mediterranean.

Moving southwards, there are 22 voyages from the Iberian Peninsula in this three-year period. Voyages from Portugal appear to be growing slightly and confirm the level of product specialisation already observed above. The database contains ten cases, departing respectively from Lisbon (7), Lisbon and Porto (1), Lisbon and "other ports" (1), or Porto (1). Links to networks of port cities from Portugal to Western Mediterranean emerge. Destinations were: Genoa (3), Genoa and Livorno (2), Alicante and Genoa (1), Marseille, Genoa and Livorno (1), Cadiz, Marseille, Genoa and Livorno (1) or unspecified (2). Sugar cargoes, loaded on board in six out of ten voyages, were often associated with tobacco cargoes (4), while only in four cases cargoes were made only of General Cargo (2) or unspecified (2). It was common for shipmasters on these routes to stop at other ports to load additional cargo. One French vessel from Lisbon stopped at Cadiz and Marseille to load General Cargo while another, also French and from Lisbon, stopped at Cadiz to load quinine - extracted from the chincona tree, it was the mainstay treatment for

²⁸⁸ See Takeda, *Between Crown and Commerce*. On the good and routes from Marseille see also Rambert, *Histoire du commerce*, IV, V. D. Panzac, *La Caravane maritime: Marins européens et marchands ottomans en Méditerranée (1680-1830)*, Paris, 2004. M. Fontenay, 'Le commerce des Occidentaux dans les Echelles du Levant vers la fin du XVIIe siècle', in B. Bannassar, R. Sauzet eds., *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance*, Paris, 1998, 337-370.

²⁸⁹ The voyage to Livorno, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the voyage id 50850, stopped in Genoa only because of bad weather. On this topic see M. D'Angelo, 'In the .English. Mediterranean (1511-1815)', *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* XII 2002, 271-285.

malaria for centuries²⁹⁰ - and at Alicante to load wool and salt.²⁹¹ As many as seven out of ten shipmasters were from France. Of these, two were from Marseille, one from La Ciotat and one from La Rochelle.

Moving southwards, there are only two shipmasters sailing from Cadiz. In both cases, they loaded General Cargoes. Another voyage concerns a cargo of iron and wool from Bilbao to Genoa and Livorno. Bilbao, on the Northwestern coasts of the Iberian Peninsula, specialised in the exportation of foreign woollens, linens, velvets, silks, laces, and metallurgical products.²⁹² Again, a French shipmaster carried out this voyage.

4.4.2 1698-1700, Western Mediterranean and Italian Routes

Nine vessels came from the Mediterranean coasts of Spain, accounting for about 6% of the total. Proportionally, the area was still among the most relevant for traffic to Genoa. As already observed, some ports in this area played the role of ports of call for loading or unloading goods coming from beyond Gibraltar. There is an increasing specialisation in cargoes: all the voyages started from the peninsula, in particular from Alicante (3), or from the Balearic Islands (6), in particular from Ibiza. Departures from Cartagena are completely absent from the documentation, probably due to the decline of this port after its peak in 1640.²⁹³ Salt and General Cargo departed from Alicante. In this respect, the analysis of the documentation of the voyage of John Marin Cadiz, a French shipmaster, reveals further information about the goods exchanged on the Alicante-Marseille-Genoa route.²⁹⁴ The bill of lading attached to the GA calculation shows the presence of cash, *barriglia* (soda), *campeccio* wood,²⁹⁵ silk and other goods, indicating a greater variety of goods than in the other sample periods. From the Balearic Islands, the cargoes remain essentially the same. The shipmasters embarked salt (6), salt and wine (1), or oil (1). The

²⁹⁰ J. Mann, 'Jesuits' powder', *Royal Society of Chemistry*, 2009, available online on <https://web.archive.org/web/20160923052751/http://www.rsc.org/education/eic/issues/2009Jan/Jesuit-quinine-cinchona-bark-perkin.asp>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

²⁹¹ Voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the ids 50634 and 50891.

²⁹² See S.J. Stein, B.H. Stein, *Silver, trade, and war: Spain and America in the making of early modern Europe*, Baltimore and London, 2000, 7.

²⁹³ Franch Benavent, 'El comercio en Mediterráneo', 89.

²⁹⁴ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50365.

²⁹⁵ Known as *Palo de Campeche* and *Palo de Brasil*, it is a plant used for dyeing. In the seventeenth century it was imported from Yucatán, Mexico, Santo Domingo or Cuba. See E. Lorenzo Sanz, *Comercio de España con América en la época de Felipe II*, Valladolid, 1986, 598-600.

nationalities of the shipmasters in this region once again show a majority of Frenchman (5). Of these, two were from Dunkirk. Genoese (3) and Majorcan (1) followed.

Looking at the departures from Mediterranean France, there are only two voyages, both from Marseille. The shipmasters were from Marseille itself and from Martigues, a village in Provence. There is no information on the cargo carried by the former, but it appears that the shipmaster of Martigues took wool, drapes, saffron (a plant used as a dye), salted eels and General Cargo to Finale, the Spanish enclave on the western border of the Republic, and to Genoa.²⁹⁶

Trade between Genoa and neighbouring regions such as Provence or Tuscany, or the islands of Corsica and Sardinia, relied largely, as already mentioned, on the activity of small vessels which, due to the small number of merchants and capital involved, are difficult to trace. It is also plausible that, given the relatively short duration of the voyages, the shipmasters set out in good weather conditions which did not change for the duration of the voyage, although weather in the Mediterranean could suddenly change. By sailing close to shore whenever possible, they could quickly take shelter from unforeseen events although, as Berti points out, entering and leaving ports was a major risk factor.²⁹⁷ Few shipmasters from Corsica declared an Average report upon their arrival in Genoa. Only three voyages were reported and one of them related to the internal trade of the island: it was a load of salt sent from Saint-Florent to Bonifacio.²⁹⁸ Salt in Corsica often arrived from Genoa, as shown by two voyages in the database concerning shippings of salt to Bastia and Calvi.²⁹⁹ The other two journeys, carried out on a *pinco* and a *barca* by two *patroni*, concern a load of timber and one of oil to Genoa. As in the three years examined above, timber is the main export commodity from Corsica. There is also a cargo of silver *scudi* loaded in Portofino to buy firewood in the gulf of Porti, on the central west coast of the island.³⁰⁰

There are five voyages departing from Sardinia. Again, this is a route, according to the Average sources, served by Ligurian *patroni* on small boats,

²⁹⁶ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50867. On Finale and the political tensions with Spain see chap. 1.

²⁹⁷ Berti, 'The "risk" in navigation', 280.

²⁹⁸ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50881. The report was probably sent to Genoa to notify the merchants involved.

²⁹⁹ See the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the ids 50882 and 50895.

³⁰⁰ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50633.

barche (3) or *cimbe* (2). All voyages involve the shipment of foodstuffs to Genoa (4) or Livorno and Genoa (1). These consisted of cargoes of wheat and chickpeas (2), wheat and cheese (1), wheat only (1) or wine, biscuit and cheese (1). There is also a report of a *patrone* in 1699, probably from Genoa, following a journey from Sardinia to Villefranche with a cargo of wheat, lard, anchovies and pasta.³⁰¹

From Liguria there is only one cargo of unspecified goods, transported from Finale to Genoa.³⁰² The voyages departing from Genoa, on the other hand, as noted, provide valuable information about the cargoes shipped from the port of the capital.

The trade with Tuscany, as mentioned, was also modest. There were five voyages, three of which were carried out by Genoese shipmasters, one by a Neapolitan shipmaster and one by a Dutch shipmaster.³⁰³ On the latter voyage, the vessel of the shipmaster Giusti di Egidio van de Brande sailed from Livorno in autumn 1700. Genoa was also the port of unloading for a further batch of General Cargo worth about 1,640 pieces of eight. General Cargo on board allow us to assume that the vessel came from outside the Mediterranean. A storm while the vessel was in the port of Genoa caused serious damage to the hull and caused the vessel to collide with other moored vessels.³⁰⁴ The other voyages involved a cargo of pitch from Porto Ercole, one of wheat from Montaldo, one of coal from Bolgheri and one of coal from San Vincenzo. The variety of ports of embarkation and the different types of goods involved on the routes between Tuscany and Genoa are indicative of the dense network of traffic between the two regions, of which the reports provide several examples. From the copies of the reports received by the *Conservatori del Mare* from the Genoese consuls in the main Italian cities, we also learn of further traffic involving Ligurian *patroni* operating in ports outside the Republic, including those in Tuscany. As far as Livorno is concerned, for example, there is a *consolato* relating to a voyage to load goods in Palermo and another relating to a cargo of iron from the Elba Island to Naples.³⁰⁵ In the latter voyage the

³⁰¹ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50823.

³⁰² Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50413.

³⁰³ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50368.

³⁰⁴ The total value of the vessel was 5,200 pieces of eight. The vessel sustained damage amounting to 465 pieces of eight. This represents 10% of the damage to the vessel, which is quite a high percentage compared to the average damage in other GA cases over the other sample periods.

³⁰⁵ Voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the ids 50593 and 50820.

patrone, originally from Taggia in Liguria, faced a storm which threatened to sink the vessel, but two *barche*, one belonging to a Genoese *patrone* from Sori and one to a Neapolitan *patrone* from Gaeta, came to the rescue. Although the traffic of small vessels largely escapes statistical analysis, the samples resulting from the Average procedures are nonetheless significant portraits of the variety and dynamism of Mediterranean trade in the early modern period.

In this three-year period there were no voyages from the Tyrrhenian side of the territories of the Papal State. The only vessel leaving Civitavecchia with wheat, hides and General Cargo was bound for Santa Margherita Ligure, the residence of the *patrone* involved. The vessel, however, was damaged, losing its cargo at the Arno estuary off the Tuscan coast.³⁰⁶

The quantity of vessels from the Kingdom of Naples is also clearly decreasing compared to the samples analysed in the previous periods. From Naples there are only two voyages. One was made by a *patrone* with his *barca* to take raw material for paper and “carnuccio” (hides) to Genoa. The second was a transport of *asperino* wine from Naples to Genoa on behalf of the *patrone* himself.³⁰⁷ In Genoa, he sold his cargo to Stefano and Pier Francesco Lomellini, who bought it and ordered him to send it to Tabarka. The *consolato* drawn up in the final port of destination, which will be examined in more detail in the next Chapter, therefore considers Genoa as a port of call in a wider circuit to supply the Tunisian island of Tabarka, the Spanish possession run by the Lomellini family of Genoa who had established a veritable ‘colony’ of Genoese there, for whom they were responsible for food supplies.³⁰⁸ Among the voyages leaving the port of Naples, there is also a load of wheat bound for Livorno and transported by a Genoese *patrone* from Prà.

Arrivals from Calabria are substantially stable compared to the sample analysed previously. There are ten voyages, carried out exclusively by Genoese or Neapolitan *patroni*, when specified, on Mediterranean vessels: *tartane* (5), *cimbe* (5) and a *felucone* (1). The ports of loading are scattered along the Tyrrhenian and Ionian coasts of the region, with no particular trends emerging: Crotona (3), Reggio Calabria (2), Cassano (1), Palanuda (1), Calopezzati (1), Rossano (1), Marina (1). The *patroni* involved did not always sail straight to Genoa. They had a range of possibilities. Apart from six voyages bound

³⁰⁶ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50603.

³⁰⁷ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50442.

³⁰⁸ See Iodice, Piccinno, ‘Whatever the cost’, 10.

explicitly to Genoa and one to Genoa and Livorno, the others present a list of alternative ports: Livorno or Genoa (1), Naples, Livorno or Genoa (1), or even Pietrasanta, Massa (both in Tuscany), Chiavari or Genoa (1).³⁰⁹ The main commodity traded on this route was again wheat, alone (6) or with other foodstuffs such as cheese and legumes (1). This was followed by two loads of oil and one of chestnuts.³¹⁰

One of the areas where the quantity of arrivals varies most significantly compared to the previous three years is, as already mentioned, Apulia. Only three shipmasters come from this region, which in the previous sample was the first area of origin of vessels. They are three *shipmasters*, probably from Liguria, of which two are sailing on their *cimbe*. Again all shipments from this area were composed only of grain, coming from Barletta (1), Brindisi (1) and Taranto (1).

The Adriatic side of the Papal States, present-day region of Marche, complete the voyages from the Italian peninsula. From this area there are six shipmasters. The route Marche-Genoa is characterised, as in the previous intervals, by the regularity of the types of goods and the ports involved. All the voyages concern exclusively cargoes of wheat embarked in Ancona (4), in Ancona, Monte Santo (present-day Potenza Picena) and Porto Recanati (1) or in Senigallia (1). There is also, among the voyages departing from Genoa, a cargo of goods loaded on the *tartana* of a Genoese *patrone* in the ports of Genoa, Livorno, Naples and Reggio. The goods were bound for Ancona, where wheat was to be loaded and brought back to Genoa on behalf of some Genoese merchants.³¹¹ Most of the outward cargo consisted of herring (200 barrels) and cod loaded in Livorno but there were also, for example, soap and sailing equipment loaded in Genoa, straw chairs loaded in Naples and lemons loaded in Reggio. Compared to previous intervals, Northern shipmasters are absent from this area. Genoese shipmasters and a Venetian *patrone* travelled on these routes. They employed three *cimbe*, one *pinco*, one *fregatone* [!] and an unspecified vessel.

This three-year period is characterised, as already mentioned, by the relative increase in the role of French commercial shipping and by the decline in the

³⁰⁹ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50828.

³¹⁰ Biagio Salvemini too, in his studies on trade from Marseille in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, points out the marked decrease in arrivals from Campania compared with an increase in exports from Sicily and Calabria, with cargoes being transported mainly by Genoese shipmasters from ports and settlements scattered along the coasts of these two regions. See Salvemini, Carrino, 'Porti di campagna', 223.

³¹¹ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50629.

number of vessels from the Adriatic area. Trade with the Venetian Republic and the Veneto region is absent, with the exception of two departures from the Venetian-controlled Ionian islands of Fanò (present-day Othoni) and Merlera (present-day Ereikoussa). Two *patroni* of unspecified nationality left from these two islands with, respectively, a cargo of wheat and one of oil to Genoa. Based on their names, it is safe to assume they were from Campania and Calabria respectively.³¹²

Sicily returns to first place as an area of origin in this three-year period with forty-one voyages, equal to 32% of the total. Wheat, alone (17) or with other goods (9), is still the main cargo, present in more than 60% of cases. During the seventeenth century in Sicily cereal production remained essentially stable, allowing the region to continue to play its redistribution role for the Mediterranean market. The theory of the Sicilian ‘crisis’ during the “long seventeenth century” would not seem to exist if one looked only at the quantitative data emerging from the Genoese Average sources.³¹³ This data must be contextualised and compared with other sources and with what we know from the historiography on this subject. In the second half of the seventeenth century, the internal consumption of the island’s population increased significantly and it became difficult to sell the grain that was brought to the ports of loading, among whom, in the sources examined, Girgenti (11) and Sciacca (6) still predominated. This led to a decrease in the quantity of grain sold abroad. Whereas in the sixteenth century, and occasionally in the early seventeenth century too, according to Cancila’s estimates, Sicily exported annually more than 200,000 Sicilian *salme* (42,944 tons) of wheat, between 1699 and 1700 the average was estimated to be 54,195 Sicilian *salme* (11,636.75 tons).³¹⁴ Based on the Average reports, other goods on the Sicily-Genoa route were oil, loaded alone (10) or with other goods (3), salt (2) and silk (2). The low tonnages of the vessels employed on this route, often mastered by Sicilian (9) or Genoese (6) *patroni*, was perhaps one of the reasons why there is a large number of vessels arriving in these years. There are thirty-five *patroni* mastering *cimbe* (15), *tartane* (14), *barche* (3) or other vessels (2), plus six

³¹² Their names are, respectively, Gavardella (from which the current Gambardella, widespread in Campania, derives) and Naucerra (from which the current Nucera, widespread in Calabria, derives), see the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the ids 50609 and 50630.

³¹³ On the chronological scanning of Sicilian trade divided into a long sixteenth century (1450-1650) and a long seventeenth century (1650-1740) see Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 264; Braudel, *Civiltà e imperi*, II, 950-951.

³¹⁴ Cancila, *Impresa, redditi*, 275.

shipmasters with unspecified vessels. Only one of them seems not to be from the Mediterranean area. From Sicily, there is also a Genoese shipmaster who transported a cargo of wheat from Trapani to Malaga, in Andalusia.³¹⁵

4.4.3 1698-1700, Eastern Mediterranean and North African Routes

Finally, three vessels sailed from the coasts of North Africa. Two of them concern the island of Tabarka. The *patron* and shipmaster involved carried, respectively, a cargo of wheat and broad beans and a cargo of wheat, coral and money to Genoa. These cargoes constitute an example of the main types of goods transported on the Tabarka-Genoa route.³¹⁶

The third voyage was from the port of Salé, on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. The *barca* of the *patrone* Antonio Maria Del Canto, from Sturla, left Salé with copper and General Cargo for an unspecified destination, presumably Genoa. This is one of the rare examples in which Average sources allow to follow the same shipmaster's activity over multiple voyages. Del Canto, although his name was spelled differently by the authorities who wrote his reports - the French consul in Salé and the *Conservatori del Mare* in Genoa - was involved in no less than three Average reports between 1697 and 1699.³¹⁷ His first known voyage was a shipment of marble from Genoa to Larache, some 160 km north of Salé, on behalf of English merchants living in Genoa: Jean Scadamoré, Jean and Giorgio Henstran fils and Carlo Compagni.³¹⁸ The latter was probably an Italian merchant. The cargo was bound for another English merchant living in Tetouan, called Expenses.³¹⁹ After unfortunate events along the route that gave rise to a GA report, Del Canto arrived at its destination on 15 August 1697. The *alcalde* of Larache, the local authority, obliged the *patrone* to go to Salé for his report. The *alcalde* of Salé, however, together with an unspecified "general of vessels" named Benache, ordered the *patrone* to transport his cargo of marble to La

³¹⁵ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50827.

³¹⁶ On the structures of these trades see Piccinno, *Un'impresa fra terra e mare*.

³¹⁷ See the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the ids 50598, 50999 and 50600. In these voyages the *patrone's* name is recorded in the following ways: Antonio Maria Del Canto (Genoa); Antonio Maria Goustou (Salé); Antonio Maria Coste (Salé). The vessel's name does not change significantly between the different voyages.

³¹⁸ Following the temporary occupation of Tangier (1662-1684), England aimed to control the traffic areas from North Africa, where competition from rival European powers was looser. See T. Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', in *The Historical Journal* 54, 2011, 985-1011.

³¹⁹ The shipmaster declared in his *consolato*, drawn up in front of the French consul in Salé, that the cargo on board was bound for "monsieur Expenses marchand anglois".

Mamora (probably Al-Ma'Mura, present-day Mehdyia), despite what had been agreed in the freight contract. Del Canto obtained formal permission to leave Morocco only on 29 October 1697, with a cargo of copper and “altre merci”. In 1699, he is among the *patroni* on the Sicily-Genoa route with a cargo of salt, perhaps following the decision to operate on more ‘crowded’ but also ‘safer’ routes.

4.5 1599-1700, *Old and New Balances*

The data examined in the four sample periods reveal the potential of Average practices to investigate and reconstruct the main trends of trade destined for and, to a lesser extent, transiting for the port of Genoa. The documentation allows further insights into the activity and operational strategies implemented by the shipmasters and the merchants involved.

The seventeenth century was a century of changes in the structure of maritime traffic around Genoa although, from a quantitative point of view, Mediterranean routes and food cargoes maintained their preponderance. Trade remained centred around Italy, Sicily in particular, and the Mediterranean side of the Iberian Peninsula. The latter kept its polarization between the Balearic Islands and the ports of Cartagena and Alicante, on one side, and the Atlantic coasts. However, it is possible to highlight several discontinuities that characterise the trends.

Two factors stand out: the degree of elasticity of the traditional structures of Genoese traffic with respect to the arrival of elements that ‘break’ the balance, and the role of foreign shipping. First, in order to make an analysis of long-term trends, I will briefly discuss the main elements emerging from the analysis of Average documents.

The first three-year period examined (1599-1601) is an ‘elastic’ response to an event of such significant importance as the first ‘Northern Invasion’ (1591-1592). Between the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, Average reports reveal the presence of a new, although secondary, market for cereals transported from Northern Europe by Northern shipmasters, especially Flemish. On the other hand, the Sicilian market seems to be dominant after the crisis of 1591, at least if we look at the number of vessels arriving in Genoa and declaring an Average report. Mainly Ligurian *patroni* and

French and Ragusan shipmasters operated on the Mediterranean routes leading to Genoa. By the second period (1639-1641), shipmasters from Northern Europe fully integrated into the main Mediterranean trade and this had important consequences. First, the goods arriving from Northern Europe began to diversify. Together with lesser and lesser cereal cargoes, other products arrived, such as salted fish, hides or metals (iron, lead). Among the Northern shipmasters, the English also tended to acquire importance. Furthest routes, such as those from Russia or Newfoundland, appeared alongside the voyages from Dutch, English or Hamburg ports: cargoes of salted fish from Newfoundland, in particular, were a constant during the second half of the century.³²⁰ Furthermore, in the period 1639-1641 it is evident that Northern shipmasters began to stay within the Mediterranean area in search of profitable freights.³²¹ They had first arrived carrying cereals, and it was on this type of cargo that they focused their subsequent activity as carriers, thanks to their large vessels with small crews. The Dutch, in particular, were specialised in unarmed, light but capacious merchant vessels.³²² They operated predominantly on all main Mediterranean routes, on which they carried cereals. The Genoese merchants, at the same time, responded to the uncertain situation of the Sicilian market, generated in particular by the 30 Years' War, which was devastating central Europe, through a greater diversification of routes. Previously 'secondary' markets such as Apulia began to gain importance. From the first sample period, moreover, it is possible to observe the grain shipping from the Lomellini possession of Tabarka, the island off the coast of Tunisia. With the depletion of the coral banks, the island became a small emporium for grain exports acquired directly in North Africa.³²³ In addition to the grain routes and products from Northern Europe, from the end of the 1630s onwards the importance of trade with the Atlantic side of the Iberian Peninsula and the role

³²⁰ Heywood, 'Beyond Braudel's'; G.T. Cell, *English Enterprise in Newfoundland, 1577-1660*, Toronto, 1969.

³²¹ M. Fusaro, 'The invasion of northern litigants: English and Dutch seaman in Mediterranean courts of law', in M. Fusaro, B. Allaire, R. Blackemore, T. Vanneste eds., *Law, labour and empire. Comparative perspective on seafarers, c. 1500-1800*, London, 2015, 21-42; R. Davis, 'England and the Mediterranean', in J.F. Fisher ed., *Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England in Honour of R.H. Tawney*, Cambridge, 1961, 117-137.

³²² M. van Gelder, 'Favouring foreign traders? The Venetian Republic and the accommodation of Netherlandish merchants in the late 16th and 17th centuries', in U. Bosma, G. Kessler, L. Lucassen eds., *Migration and membership regimes in global and historical perspective: an introduction*, Leiden-Boston, 2013, 141-166; J. Parry, 'Transport and Trade Routes', in E. Rich, C. Wilson eds., *Economic History of Europe*, Cambridge, 1967, 155-219, 190.

³²³ Piccinno, Iodice, 'Whatever the cost', 3.

of Genoa as an emporium for colonial products such as sugar, tobacco, cinnamon, etc. grew more and more. Even in the three-year period 1668-1670, which is situated within a time of crisis in maritime traffic, Average reports reveal an increase in the quantity of vessels coming from Portugal, usually from Lisbon and Oporto, with cargoes of sugar and tobacco. The period 1668-1670 also shows another 'elastic' reaction: the reduced circulation of capital led to an almost total disappearance of Northern shipmasters from Mediterranean routes. This also affected the average values of vessels and their cargoes, which were significantly lower. The grain trade remained of primary importance, but mainly small vessels commanded by Genoese, Neapolitan or French shipmasters handled it.


The last selected period (1698-1700) shows, at least partially, a return to the initial balance. On the one hand, the Sicilian market regained its leading role for the supply of cereals to Genoa. Cargoes of oil or other goods increased as well. Arrivals from Northern Europe, although they doubled compared to the beginning of the century, do not reach the values recorded in the second or third period. They remain, for example, at about the same level as traffic from Portugal, Mediterranean Spain or Calabria. On the other hand, in this phase there are shipmasters of different nationalities, with the Genoese and, even more clearly, the French prevailing. The French, in particular, were constantly present on all the main routes leading to Genoa in the years 1698-1700, without specialising on certain routes. They were not only from the Provence area, as one would expect for geographical reasons and as it was in the first period, but from the whole Kingdom.³²⁴ They, for example, mastered some of the vessels loaded with salted fish from Newfoundland as well as those loaded with sugar and tobacco from Portugal.

When processed and compared through graphs and tables, data resulting from the four periods examined allows a long-term analysis of seventeenth-century Genoese trade. And several macro-trends emerge. Graph 4.5 compares the data on different cargo types arriving in Genoa during each period.³²⁵

³²⁴ Evidence is the presence, for the first time, of shipmasters from Dunkirk.

³²⁵ In most cases, sources specify ports of unloading. Sometimes, however, Average reports employed vague expressions such as 'Ponente' or 'Levante', or 'Porti d'Italia'. I chose, in such cases, to assume that Genoa was a port of unloading.

Cargo types are grouped into four macro-categories. The first is 'cereals'. Being a basic commodity of which the Republic was in annual deficit, [Graph 4.5](#) confirms its relative importance: cereal imports never fall below 38% for those voyages which declared an Average procedure. Since cereals (wheat, rye, etc.) are bulky goods, these could easily occupy the entire hold of a vessel. In some cases, other foodstuffs (broad beans, pasta, chickpeas, etc.), and other raw materials or high-unit value goods could be loaded alongside them, albeit in a smaller quantity. For example, the vessel of the Genoese *patrone* Antonio Decotto with a tonnage of 1,373.5 *mine* (about 125 tons) sailed from Tabarka in 1696 carrying on board 1,300 *mine* of cereal (94.6% of the total tonnage) and small quantities of coral, broad beans, lentils, cous cous, dates and chalk.³²⁶



My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of *AveTransRisk* db. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa and those with Genoa as port of origin. Total number of voyages are between parentheses near each sample period.

The second macro-category is 'raw wool'. This category is relevant not only because of the importance of this trade, almost exclusively carried between Mediterranean Spain and Genoa, but also because wool, like cereals, was often

³²⁶ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50349.

the only merchandise on board.³²⁷ In Average calculations, magistracies distinguished between different types of 'wool' with different values, as shown in the bills of lading: "first quality wool", "second quality wool", "third quality wool", "reffina wool", "Barbary wool", "fioretto wool", "agnina wool", and so on. Looking at the data from a diachronic perspective, two elements emerge. On the one hand, as results from Graph 4.5, wool trade decreased significantly, in percentage, over the course of the seventeenth century. This probably happened because of the growing role of Genoa as an emporium. Free port policies were designed explicitly to attract cargoes into the free port warehouses described in the Third Chapter. Raw wool cargoes, used in manufacturing in Liguria as well as in Northern Italy, were replaced by other raw materials that could stay in the port's warehouses for a longer period of time, waiting to be re-exported. Voyages with wool cargoes at the end of the seventeenth century were almost a third of a century earlier. On the other hand, there was also a change in the places of origin of the wool arriving in Genoa. In the 1599-1601 period, more than 80% of wool shipments arrived from Mediterranean Spain. The same applies to the years 1639-1641. Things had changed by the end of the century, as in the interval 1698-1700 only one out of seven wool cargoes arrived from Mediterranean Spain, and the others arrived from from Amsterdam (2), Bilbao (1), Lisbon (1), Marseille (1) and Sardinia (1).

I separated the 'General Cargo' category. Unfortunately, as already mentioned, the sources do not reveal further details on the composition of these cargoes. Still, their changing flow emerges through the examined periods. General Cargoes were completely absent in first period (1599-1601), were abundant in the second period (1639-1641), while their quantity slowly diminished during the third and fourth periods (1668-1670, 1698-1700). Almost all came from Northern Europe, carried by Northern shipmasters. There were occasional loading of General Cargoes on Mediterranean shipmasters' vessels leaving Rome, Messina, Cartagena and other ports. Doria's research shows that between 1688-1690 and 1708-1712 this typology of cargo reached an annual average of 5,500 tons, while the average in the eighteenth century was 10,000 tons.³²⁸

³²⁷ On wool trade see Bulferetti, Costantini, *Industria e commercio*, 35, 97. Wool trade was in decline in Genoa during the seventeenth century. Registered wool weavers were 88 in 1630, 39 in the second half of the century. See Massa, *Lineamenti*, 64.

³²⁸ Doria, 'La gestione portuale', 140-141.

I grouped the cargoes that do not belong to the previous categories in the 'other goods, foodstuff and raw materials' field. As can be seen from [Graph 4.5](#), they were always a minority compared to cereals, yet their percentage is the only one showing a constant positive trend through all four periods (1599-1700). Such trend reflects, as already mentioned, the growing role of the port of Genoa as a commercial emporium, in parallel with the development of free port policies and expansion of port's warehouses. Wide diversification of 'Other goods, foodstuff and raw materials' category emerges in [Table 4.6](#). In order to show the frequency of the arrivals of these goods for each period, a cargo containing fish, foodstuff and hides, for example, will count as one in 'fish', one in 'foodstuff', and one in 'hides'.

Tab 4.6 Arrivals' frequency per cargo type, 1599-1700

	1599- 1601	1639- 1641	1668- 1670	1698- 1700
Chemicals ³²⁹	5	6	4	2
Fish	5	6	3	3
Foodstuff ³³⁰	12	13	3	2
Hides	7	2	1	1
Luxury goods ³³¹	7	3	-	2
Metals and coal		5	1	5
Money	1	2	4	-
Oil	2	14	3	17
Raw materials for paper	4	4	1	1
Salt	5	1	9	10
Spices	4	3	-	3
Sugar	2	2	6	6
Textiles	5	2	1	4
Tobacco	-	-	2	4
Tools	3	5	1	-
Wax	1	3	-	-
Wine	4	9	4	2
Wood	3	7	4	1
Unknown	6	15	14	9

My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of *AveTransRisk* db. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa and those with Genoa as port of origin. Total number of voyages per each sample period are, respectively, 39 (1599-1601), 59 (1639-1641), 35 (1668-1670), and 46 (1698-1700).

A few elements emerge if we look at specific goods. Totals in the 'fish' field, for example, do not vary significantly from the first to the last period. However,

³²⁹ Saltnitre, Soda, Sulphur, Alum, Pitch.

³³⁰ Legumes, Cheese, Fruits, Pasta.

³³¹ Silk, Silk shirts, Carpets, Books, Coral.

there was a shift in the type of fish from Sicilian tuna (the *tonnine*) to cod from Newfoundland or Northern Europe. The origin of sugar shipments also changed as the century progressed. Cane sugar from plantations outside Europe, probably coming from Brazil, replaced Sicilian sugar beet, which dominated during the first period.³³² Tobacco cargoes arrived from Brazil, usually travelling alongside sugar. Genoese merchants bought them in Lisbon to redistribute it from Genoa in the Mediterranean area.³³³ The growing importance of these products highlights the ability of merchants operating in Genoa to set up networks linking the Oceans with the Mediterranean, and to redistribute across Italy those type of products from extra-European colonies that would lead to the 'consumer revolution' in the eighteenth century.³³⁴ According to Paolo Calcagno the port of Genoa, rather than simply being an example of a decadent port in a decadent Mediterranean, can be more effectively described as a reliable example of the transformations engendered by trade globalisation in early modern period.³³⁵

4.5.1 Cereal Trade Long-Term Trends

What follows is a specific example of the Average documents potential for long-term analysis on maritime trade during the early modern period. The importance of Genoese cereal trade, and the abundance of data available, allow to study its


³³² See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50627. On Brazilian sugar trade, see M. Edel, 'The Brazilian Sugar Cycle of the Seventeenth Century and the Rise of the West Indian Competition', *Caribbean Studies* IX/1, 1969, 24-43.

³³³ All shipmasters in the *AveTransRisk* db who transported tobacco cargoes from Portugal to Genoa also carried sugar cargoes. For both sugar and tobacco, Average reports refer to "Brazilian weight". In the case of tobacco, a vessel bound for Livorno that made a forced stop in Genoa in 1667 carried a cargo of "Brazilian tobacco". See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db with the id 50645. On Brazilian tobacco trade, see M. Norton, *Sacred Gifts, Profane Pleasures: A History of Tobacco and Chocolate in the Atlantic World*, New York, 2008.

³³⁴ The consumer revolution is a theory formulated for the first time by Neil McKendrick in 1982 and then applied to early modern England. Scholars today argue on the real impact of this 'revolution'. See G. Klark, 'The Consumer Revolution: Turning Point in Human History, or Statistical Artifact?', SSRN, 2010, 1-21, available on https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1653155, accessed on 29/06/2021. M. Kwass, 'Ordering the World of Goods: Consumer Revolution and the Classification of Objects in Eighteenth-Century France', *Representations* 82/1, 2003, 87-116; M. Carmagnani, *Le isole del lusso. Prodotti esotici, nuovi consumi e cultura economica europea, 1650-1800*, Turin, 2010. On this topic in Italian historiography, see A. Clemente, 'Consumi e domanda tra XVIII e XIX secolo. Acquisizioni e tendenze della storiografia economica italiana', *Storia Economica* 2/3, 2004, 555-580.

³³⁵ Calcagno, 'La porta di Lisbona', 532.

long-term evolution in some detail.³³⁶ Origins of cereal shipments changed significantly over the course of the seventeenth century, as shown in Graph 4.6.



My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of *AveTransRisk* db. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa and those with Genoa as port of origin. Total number of voyages are between parentheses near each sample period.

Grain trade does not seem to have been much affected by the seasons, although the data examined show that departures were more concentrated between September and May. This was probably because harvest season started in June and shipments were ready from September. However, GA calculations often indicate that the wheat on board came «from the old harvest», so dependence on seasonal variables must have been negligible.³³⁷ On the other hand, concentrated arrivals of ships would have raised some problems, as, for example, was the case with the ships traveling in convoy from

³³⁶ See, for example, Piccinno, Iodice, 'Whatever the cost'.

³³⁷ The price paid for wheat of the old harvest was generally lower compared to the average price of the current harvest. ASG, *Notai Giudiziari* 637, 04/09/1601.

Northern Europe: i.e. price drops at the place of sale, due to supply surplus, and difficulties in finding return cargo due to increased traffic.³³⁸

Sicily retained a dominant role as place of origin for Genoese cereal imports: at the beginning of the century (1599-1601) on the island were loaded almost 80% of grain cargoes and, after a period of uncertainty, at the end of the century (1698-1700) still accounted for 50% of these. Shipmasters could also load their ships in more than one port. For example, in 1600, Antonio Maria Germano of Sestri Ponente loaded wheat at Girgenti and then, after a jettison during a storm, loaded more wheat in Trapani.³³⁹ Voyages could also include a call at Palermo or Messina to load other goods, such as silk, wine, or sugar.³⁴⁰

Shipments from Northern Europe, which had saved the Republic's population during the famine of 1591, disappeared during the seventeenth century. Four vessels loaded with Northern cereals arrived in the 1599-1601 period, not even one in the following ones (1639-1700).³⁴¹ That is why Graph 4.6 only considers Mediterranean cereals.

After the free port's edict (1590), the Republic became a redistribution hub for Mediterranean cereals. To the initial near-monopoly of Sicilian cereal shipments, the disruptions caused by the Thirty Years' War made supplies from Spanish territories difficult, and forced Genoese merchants to rely on different markets. This is also evident from the growth of 'Other' category in cereal shipping, which includes Tuscan ports (accounting for 8% of total voyages cases in the 1639-1641 three-year period) but also ports in Calabria, Greece, Tabarka, etc. Cereals from the Adriatic region and Apulia became particularly common. During the last period examined (1698-1700) there was a partial return to Sicilian grain, but the secondary markets maintained their importance.

Although cereals from Northern Europe may have almost disappeared, Northern shipmasters did not. Graph 4.7 shows, in percentage, the origins of shipmasters involved in cereal shipping.


³³⁸ These issues affected Genoa especially following increased trade with Northern Europe. The free port aimed at facilitating the arrival of different goods for return cargoes. Costantini, *La repubblica di Genova*, 170.

³³⁹ Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG), *Notai Giudiziari* 636, 23/08/1600.

³⁴⁰ On the silk industry, see Guenzi, Massa, Piola Caselli (eds.), *Guilds, Markets and Work Regulations*.

³⁴¹ This does not imply that no cereal cargoes at all arrived from Northern Europe. Its percentage remained significantly lower than the arrivals of Mediterranean cereals. For an example of arrivals and costs of Northern cereals, see Lamberti, 'Mercanti tedeschi a Genova'.

Graph 4.7 *Origin of shipmasters carrying cereals to Genoa, 1599-1700*



My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of *AveTransRisk* db. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa and those with Genoa as port of origin. Total number of voyages are between parentheses near each sample period.

Almost all shipmasters whose origin was not specified in the sources were probably from the Mediterranean, as those from Northern Europe are easily distinguishable by their or their vessels' names. 'Other Mediterranean Regions' here refers to those captains whose Mediterranean origins were clearly stated (John Doe from Naples, for example) as well as those whose origin can be deduced. Mainly French, Ligurian and other Mediterranean (like Catalans and Sicilian) shipmasters transported cereals to Genoa during the first period (1599-1601). There were also Dubrovnik shipmasters (8.11%), who later disappeared.³⁴² In the second interval, during the Thirty Years' War, the dominance of Northern shipping became evident. In the 1639-41 interval 86% of shipmasters were Northerners. This shift confirms the data reported by Carmelo Trasselli on Sicilian cereal exports. Between 1601 and 1635 most of the non Sicilian vessels calling at Sicilian ports were French (39%), followed by Dutch (9%), while in the 1640s there was an increase in the presence of Dutch (23%)

³⁴² They are into the 'Mediterranean' category.

and English (9%) vessels.³⁴³ Cross-referencing the proportion of Northern shipmasters from Average sources with the data from [Graph 4.6](#) provides evidence of these shipmasters' operations in several Mediterranean marketplaces. Maybe the growing insecurity of Mediterranean routes helped Northern shipmasters securing a key role in cereal shipments across the Mediterranean. Similar percentages apply to the presence of Northern shipmasters on Northern Europe routes, or in all those voyages involving General Cargoes. My findings confirm also Edoardo Grendi's arguing for a peak in Northern shipmasters' arrivals in Genoa in the 1640s.³⁴⁴ After the end of the Thirty Years' War, they almost completely disappeared from the grain trade. They were replaced by smaller vessels mastered by shipmasters of unspecified origins, probably Mediterranean, however they kept their dominance in the trade routes with Northern Europe.

The abundance of voyages involving Sicilian wheat allows us to compare the prices that Genoese merchants paid for it in Sicily, as Average calculations frequently reported this information. More studies on Average sources and crossreferences with different archives will allow to perform the same operation for different markets (Northern Europe, Ottoman Empire, other Italian regions, etc.) and on different goods.³⁴⁵ [Graph 4.8](#) shows the purchase price for one *mina* (90.985 kg.) of the main types of Sicilian wheat in Genoese *lire*.³⁴⁶ The tax on wheat paid in Genoa and the cost of freight amounted to about 2 *lire* and 1.5 *lire per mina*, respectively. As confirmed by Gertrude Macrì's studies, reliance on different types of wheat, like *rocella* or *carosella* (two types of durum wheat), was an effective risk reduction strategy, successfully adopted by Genoese merchants. Should there be a poor harvest of *rocella* wheat in a certain year, for example, they could purchase another type of wheat.³⁴⁷

³⁴³ C. Trasselli, 'Note sui ragusei in Sicilia', *Economia e Storia* I, 1965, 40–79.


³⁴⁴ Grendi, 'I nordici', 56.

³⁴⁵ For example, further studies on Average reports drafted in Livorno will allow a comparison of prices and administrative costs paid by merchants and shipmasters during the same periods.

³⁴⁶ This graph is also published in Piccinno, Iodice, 'Whatever the cost', 8.

³⁴⁷ G. Macrì, 'Il grano di Palermo fra '500 e '600: Prerogative e reti d'interesse', *Mediterranea, Ricerche Storiche* VII/18, 2010, 87–110, 93.

Graph 4.8 Purchase price for 1 *mina* of Sicilian wheat in Genoese *lire*, 1589-1703



My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of *AveTransRisk* db

In the first period, between approximately 1589 and early 1599, prices were sharply fluctuating. The price of *rocella* wheat in 1590, for example, was more than 30 Genoese *lire* per *mina*. This period coincided with the famine and the subsequent Northern Invasion³⁴⁸. Strong price fluctuations affected both Genoese and Sicilian markets, with similar trends.³⁴⁹ Based on the data provided by Felloni, the price of wheat in Genoa in 1591 almost doubled compared to the one of the previous year.³⁵⁰ Prices returned to pre-crisis levels only within four years, with a price of 16 Genoese *lire* per *mina*.³⁵¹ Further fluctuations, although less significant, marked the following years, with an average price of 18 *lire* per *mina*. In the second phase, starting from the end of 1599, prices in Sicily stabilized around an average of 16 *lire* until the beginning of the eighteenth century, when the trend began to show again marked fluctuations. Standard deviation in Graph 4.8, i.e. the statistical dispersion index, was about 1.8 *lire*. Hence, using average prices should be sufficiently reliable. It also confirms that the Genoese in Sicily could buy wheat at 'stable'

³⁴⁸ Grendi, 'Genova alla metà del Cinquecento', 117-120.

³⁴⁹ In 1591, for example, prices peaked in Genoa and Catania. See G. Felloni, 'Prezzi e popolazione in Italia nei secoli XVI-XIX', in Felloni ed., *Scritti di Storia Economica*, II, 1231-1288, 1239.


³⁵⁰ Northern Italy was among the area most affected by this famine. See G. Alfani, 'The Famine of the 1590s in Northern Italy. An Analysis of the Greatest "System Shock" of Sixteenth Century', *Histoire et Mesure* XXVI/1, 2011, 17-50.

³⁵¹ Felloni, Pesce, *Le monete genovesi*, 293.

prices. Prices in Genoa follow a regular trend: after a peak between 1640s and 1650s, they stabilized at 23 *lire* from 1670.³⁵²

4.5.2 Further Observations

Finally, Average sources allow the observation of further macro-trends. One of these is the arrival of French shipmasters' in Genoa (Graph 4.9). This graph has two columns. The first one is the percentage of French shipmasters carrying cargoes to Genoa, while the second one is the percentage of French pirates attacks' appearing in Averages' reports over the total Averages reporting pirates' encounters.³⁵³ The two columns are placed together to observe eventual correlations.



My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of *AveTransRisk* db. Total number of voyages are between parentheses near each sample period. Total number of voyages are between parentheses near each sample period. First number refers to total shipmasters involved in commercial shipping, second number to total Average reports with pirates' attacks or theft of goods.

In the first period (1599-1601), there was a considerable presence of French shipmasters, usually involved in the grain trade. They disappeared abruptly, albeit predictably, during the Thirty Years' War when France and Spain were at war. During this second period, French pirates were extremely active as

³⁵² Felloni, Pesce, *Le monete genovesi*, 293

³⁵³ On the differences between Average events and pirate's encounters/attacks, see par. 5.2.

declared by vessels presenting their Average reports in Genoa. The two percentages rebalanced in the following period (1668-1670), returning to a situation similar to the initial balance during last three-year period (1698-1700). This time, however, French shipmasters were no longer specifically involved in the grain trade. As reported in [Graph 4.7](#), French shipmasters carrying cereals to Genoa, which accounted for more than 25% of the total in the first period (1599-1601), disappeared by the end of the seventeenth century. In return, they operated on all routes to Genoa, whether from the Mediterranean or Northern Europe, including Newfoundland, and they arrived from Northern France's ports as well.

To sum it up, from Average's evidence we can clearly see a high concentration of French pirates during periods of active warfare, whereas at other times peaceful/everyday trade between neighbouring states seemed to predominate. Traditional historiography, in particular Giulio Giacchero's works, usually referred to trade between Genoa and neighbouring ports (Livorno and Marseille) in terms of conflict and rivalry, although there was certainly a degree of 'rivalry', everyday exchanges show a higher degree of collaboration.³⁵⁴

Another field that benefits from a quantitative elaboration of Average data is the historical analysis of environmental risk. Average reports highlight the most frequent dangers as they listed the routes and places where the events that determined an Average took place, with the date and a description of weather conditions. With these information I geo-localised about 87% of the places where maritime accidents occurred, corresponding to 833 out of 958 events.


[Graph 4.10](#) shows the macroareas in which accidents occurred. I grouped them by the name of the sea area in which they occurred (Ionian Sea, Ligurian Sea, etc.) or by the closest region (Provence, Corse, etc.). Gulf of Lion is the only area that follows the sources' terminology. However, Gulf of Lion in early modern period was considered much bigger than today: depending on the source, it could extend across the whole area between the Balearic Islands, Corsica, and Western part of Sardinia.³⁵⁵

Events occurring along the coasts and near islands and archipelagos – which often have unpredictable effects on currents and winds – accounted for a significant proportion of all Averages. According to Marcello Berti's statistical

³⁵⁴ Rivalry rhetoric is particularly evident in Giacchero, *Origine e sviluppi*.

³⁵⁵ Berti, 'Il «rischio» nella navigazione', 278.

analysis most accidents occurred along the coasts: depending on wind and sea conditions, every peninsula, every small island, every beach, could pose sudden and unpredictable hazards.³⁵⁶ In particular, the Tuscan archipelago (Central Tyrrhenian), the Ligurian Sea and the Sicilian coasts, together with the Gulf of Lion, were the most dangerous zones. Graph 4.10 confirm Berti's observations and, once again, is evidence of the potential for compared quantitative analysis between Average sources from different archives.



My elaboration based on the 'advanced search' function of the *AveTransRisk* database. Accidents in port (72) and unknown locations (125) are excluded.

³⁵⁶ Berti, 'Il «rischio» nella navigazione', 285.

It was not unusual for a shipmaster to declare multiple accidents in his report. During a single voyage, shipmaster Jo. Battista Rapallo, carrying a cereal cargo from Crotona (Calabria) to Genoa in 1670, faced separate incidents of bad weather and storms near Sicily, Naples, Livorno and La Spezia.³⁵⁷

Strong winds and sudden tides and currents pose unpredictable risks and hazards in the Mediterranean, perhaps even greater than those encountered during coastal navigation in the Atlantic Ocean to and from Northern Europe.³⁵⁸ Most vessels from beyond Gibraltar, for example, suffered accidents in the Mediterranean only. Only ten shipmasters from Northern Europe or Newfoundland declared an accident only outside the Mediterranean.

Storm winds in the Western Mediterranean were, irrespective of the season, the Mistral and, sometimes, the *Scirocco*, a south-westerly wind. Mistral, for example, can blow at more than 120 km per hour, is dry and is deemed to be a stormy wind, especially in Sardinia and Corsica. Originating from the Rhone valleys and the Gulf of Lion, the Mistral blows on the upper Tyrrhenian Sea, and the Ligurian Sea. Even Average claims relating to accidents in port (72) were primarily caused by extraordinary weather conditions.³⁵⁹ The situation is much more ambiguous in cases of pirate or enemy attacks, as will be seen in chap. 5.

The analysis carried out in these pages, based on relatively homogeneous three-year sample periods, has therefore allowed two important tasks: a long-term analysis for the whole of the seventeenth century, and the analysis on specific elements: value and composition of the cargoes, main maritime risks, etc. The latter elements, in particular, often escaped traditional studies and the results show the great wealth of information contained in Average sources.

The relative homogeneous documents' structure and data collection and processing through the *AveTransRisk* database are an incentive to extend this research to the eighteenth century and to strengthen the hypotheses related to the trends observed so far through the study of further years from seventeenth century.

³⁵⁷ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50796.

³⁵⁸ Berti, 'Il «rischio» nella navigazione', 285. On maritime risks see also R. Gluzman, 'Tracking Venice's Maritime Traffic in the First Age of Globalization: a Geospatial Analysis', in *Maritime networks as a factor in European integration: selection of essays*, Florence, 2019, 135-153.

³⁵⁹ These in turn could give rise to complex and multiple cases of damage between different ships, see *Casaregi*, vol. 1 (n. **Error! Bookmark not defined.**), 163.

5. The Twilight Zone. Limits and Illegal Practices

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5. The Twilight Zone. Limits and Illegal Practices

Navigation and trade inevitably contribute to determining the technical and economic frontiers within which entrepreneurial skills are employed and analysed, risk transfer and sharing tools are tested, and market tools coexist with mentalities based on apparently opposite concepts such as ethics, mutual trust, or religious faith.

¹ Thanks to Average sources, I analysed the main features of the maritime traffic flows headed to or stopping at the port of Genoa. Although the documentation was homogeneous enough to allow statistical analysis, there was no shortage of borderline cases or situations out of the ordinary. Fernand Braudel and Ruggiero Romano dedicated the conclusion of their brilliant essay on the analysis of Livorno's trade to what they called "aberrant cases", a fitting definition even for borderline cases resulting from Average sources.²

These cases are exemplary of the unpredictability and variety of situations that could arise during a sea voyage. In these peculiar circumstances, the law and daily practice had to provide solutions that the involved parties could accept. The authors of the reports that make up the following case studies placed themselves, knowingly or not, on the border between the Average acts and other types of claims, perhaps trying to obtain damage sharing that would have allowed them to better bear the unexpected expenses that arose in commercial navigation.³ All places cited in this Chapter can be found in the Appendix XI.

As mentioned in the previous pages, the fear of shipwreck or of pirate attacks were, in theory, the only reasons that could induce the shipmaster to jettison cargo or equipment, the 'standard' event at the root of Average.⁴ The GA acts, for example, had to avoid the supreme danger of a shipwreck to be able for the calculation to follow. The jurist Targa, in his treatise published in 1692, made this distinction clear:

¹ V. Piergiovanni, 'Il viaggio per mare. Spunti di diritto medievale e moderno', in Piergiovanni ed., *Norme, scienza e pratica*, II, 1307-1314, 1307-1308.

² Braudel, Romano, *Navires et marchandises*, 65-75.

³ On the 'polysemy' of the GA and PA concepts and their classification in Western Europe during the early modern period, see Dreijer, *The Power and Pains of Polysemy*, 119-126.

⁴ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 254.

If such an accident should occur, due to a serious storm, fire, combat or other unforeseen incident, that it reduces the ship to a state of unseaworthiness that cannot be brought back to the state of being able to navigate, as it is exposed above, then there are no longer the conditions for an average. It is a total loss.⁵

The difference between the positive outcome of a GA act, which allowed the partial salvage of the goods or the ship, and a total loss, was what, either in good or bad faith, most frequently eluded the shipmasters who asked to proceed with an Average procedure. The shipmaster's report, with subsequent questioning of witnesses or not, was an essential requirement to prove any type of event that had occurred at sea, regardless of the declarant's purposes. Shipmasters just needed a document to shift responsibility for the accident away from themselves. As previously stated, notaries in Genoa marked the reports indifferently as *consolato*, *testimoniale*, *manifesto*, etc. without distinctions based on the function or the formal structure of the document. In most cases, reports contained formulas to prove the truthfulness of the shipmasters, with expressions such as "and I mean all this to correspond to the truth", or "et hoc est".⁶ The shipmaster's report and Average procedure were therefore not necessarily equivalent concepts. Casaregi, for example, reported the case of a shipmaster whose request to proceed with the GA calculation was refused because in his report, drawn up in Cadiz, the shipmaster had not requested a calculation:

[...] in his consulate in Cadiz, he made no mention of the accident and he only intended to make a consulate so that the truth of the incident would be known forever, in order to free himself from the obligation to compensate for damage to someone's cargo [...].⁷

However, even in doubtful reports, it was sometime possible to go ahead with calculation. These uncertain procedures is evidence of a certain confusion and flexibility in the daily practice followed in Genoa. Furthermore, the fact that the

⁵ "Se poi seguisse tale infortunio, che o per tempesta grave, o per incendio, o per combattimento, o per altro incidente impensato si riducesse la nave a termini d'innavigabilità non riducibile allo stato da potersi più navigare come si è esposto al succapo all'hora non si è più ne termini d'Avaria, ma vien ad essere sinistro totale". Targa, *Ponderationi*, 256.

⁶ The same formulas are also within the sources in Livorno, as shown by the db *AveTransRisk*, see

<http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/AveTransRisk/search/>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

⁷ "[...] in eius consolatatu in emporio Cadicis factu, nullum de Avaria hac fecit verbum, et solum intendebat consolatum facere, ut semper veritas casus sinistri appareret, pro se liberando à refectione danni aliquarum mercium [...]". Casaregi, *Discursos legales*, 1, XIX, 57.

same archival folders preserve the documents pertaining to GA acts, as well as those related to other kinds of maritime events, raises further questions as to how much the authorities clearly distinguished between Average procedures and other maritime accidents, such as shipwrecks.⁸ The similarities in shipwrecks and Average reports perhaps determined a specialization of the courts and notaries in receiving and recording these documents.

5.1 *On the Border between GA and Shipwreck*

Shipwreck is part of the macrocategory defined by Targa as “fatal incidents”.⁹ The etymology of the word shipwreck in Italian, *naufragio*, derived from the Latin words *navis fractio*, breaking of the ship.¹⁰ Michele de Jorio, a Neapolitan jurist involved in the drafting of a Maritime Code in Naples in 1781, drew up an exhaustive definition of this concept:

Shipwreck, *navis fractio*, is the loss of the ship. It happens when the ship is sailing, whether laden with merchandise or not, [and it is] due to a sea fortune, or to being followed by enemy vessels, or for any cause of misfortune. It [the ship] will go ashore, and there it will break up in such a way that it will not be able to continue its journey. The same is true if the ship sinks. This is the real shipwreck.¹¹

Shipwreck is the sea risk *par excellence*, and it is the most common of the risks included in maritime insurance policies since the very beginning of insurance. The most frequent events that could cause a shipwreck, beyond storms, were the attacks by enemy vessels or shipmaster and crew's inexperience. In the latter case, however, the insurance policies did not usually compensate for the damages occurred. In case of doubts about the shipmaster's responsibility in

⁸ Only in PA cases it is possible to find the request to draw up a calculation by, usually, the merchants owning the damaged goods. The latter probably needed the calculation in order to resort to their insurers, see, e.g., the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50490.

⁹ Targa also includes in this category the “rovina improvvisa, l'incendio casuale, la tempesta, l'impeto di acque, la guerra e la peste ossia malattie, il furto, la forza dei superiori o dei nemici, la mortalità imprevista della gente a bordo o del bestiame, la carestia, le rivoluzioni di gente [ribellioni a bordo], la fuga degli schiavi o degli animali a bordo, l'ingiustizia commessa da un inesperto o troppo esperto [sic], e il disordine commesso per errore”, see Targa, *Ponderationi*, 242-243.

¹⁰ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 245.

¹¹ “Il naufragio, *navis fractio*, è la perdita della nave. Allora succede quando la nave sta navigando, tanto carica di mercanzie, quanto senza mercanzie, o per fortuna di mare, o per essere seguitata da vascelli nemici, o per qualsivoglia causa di sventura andrà a traverso a terra, ed ivi si romperà in maniera, che non potrà essere accomodata per seguire il suo viaggio. Lo stesso è se la nave va a fondo. Questo è il vero naufragio”. C.M. Moschetti ed., *Il Codice marittimo del 1781 di Michele de Jorio per il Regno di Napoli*, Naples, 1979 (1 ed. 1781), 1040.

the events leading to the shipwreck, the incident was presumed to be accidental.¹² If the shipwreck was not caused by a shipmaster's fault, the damages following a shipwreck were borne individually.¹³ Shipwrecks explicitly are not Average events. Nevertheless, shipwreck events are, although in a clear minority of cases, recorded among the reports preserved in the *calcolatori* and the *Conservatori del Mare* archival folders. To date, they make up approximately 3.73% of the total number of registered cases (32 voyages out of 858).¹⁴ The majority of the shipwrecks analysed thus far occurred inside the harbours. They were due to sudden and strong winds that caused the moored vessels to collide against one another or against the docks.¹⁵ Even if part of the goods had been recovered following the accident, this did not start an Average procedure. The shipmasters could still obtain the standard payment of the freights, and the insurers obtained the sum of the recovered goods if they had already paid for it.¹⁶ Targa reports as examples two shipwrecks that, coincidentally, occurred in the port of Genoa: the shipwreck of the vessel *Concettione* of the shipmaster Tommaso Calcagno, sunken in 1664 in the *mandraccio* of the port, and that of the vessel of a Corsica shipmaster, sunken near an unspecified pier.¹⁷

Some theoretical exceptions allowed shipwrecks to be eligible GA events. In case two vessels were about to shipwreck in the same storm, for example, and the sacrifice of one of them could save the other one, Targa stated that only the most important one was to be saved, that is the one "whose salvation is most useful for all". The two vessels would have shared damages and expenses as if they were a single entity from a legal point of view.¹⁸ He recalled the principle of the sacrifice of one part for the greater good, typical of GA, although in this case the 'part' was an entire vessel with its equipment and cargo. Casaregi also reported other exceptions; in the event of a fire in the port, with the flames spreading from ship to ship, thus burning all the moored vessels, it was possible

¹² Targa, *Ponderationi*, 246.

¹³ Casaregi, *Discursos*, XLVI, 161.

¹⁴ I selected the following search fields in the advanced search of *AveTransRisk* db: Archival type = Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG); Event type = Shipwreck.

¹⁵ See for example the voyage involving the *polacca* named *Santo Stefano e Domenico Buonaventura*, of the *patrone* Domenico Cantello. It sank in Civitavecchia. The entire cargo was lost. The corresponding report is in the *atti dei calcolatori*, but there was no Average calculation. See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50270.

¹⁶ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 246-247.

¹⁷ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 248.

¹⁸ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 247.

to voluntarily destroy the vessels closest to the flames to stop the spread and save the farthest ones.¹⁹ The ships voluntarily destroyed and those saved thanks to their sacrifice would have split the damages between them. These examples allowed to extend the concept of damage sharing even to situations other than standard GA acts such as jettisons. In both cases, the initial requirement after the accident was a detailed report.²⁰ Shipmasters had to declare their shipwreck as soon as possible in the nearest port.²¹

The aberrant cases analysed in the following pages differ from the jurists' theoretical formulations. They are apparently inexplicable. Let us consider, for example, the voyage of the *patrone* Gio Grosso of Albissola, with his *fregata*, the *San Carlo*.²² The *patrone* left Albissola, a village on Genoese *Riviera*, with a load of pottery, coal, gunmetal and other goods, to bring to Genoa. Once in Genoa, a sudden north wind arose while the vessel was moored between the *Molo Vecchio* and the *Molo Nuovo*, causing its rapid sinking. At first sight, it would appear to be an ordinary shipwreck, yet the *Conservatori del mare*, on 22 February 1641, ordered to proceed with a calculation. The vessel with its equipment contributed to the damage sharing, alongside the cargo and the freights. The list of damages was particularly long and included the administrative expenses necessary to recover the sunken vessel and the damages of both lost and recovered goods. The total damage was of 591.10.6 Genoese *lire*, while the contributing values were 3,804.16.6 Genoese *lire*. A shipwreck in port gave rise to a GA calculation in this peculiar case. The resulting contribution rate was 15.10.11 *lire* for every 100 *lire*. The source does not report any justification for this unusual case. Perhaps the possibility of recovering the vessel would have allowed to save the hull and part of the goods, which would then have contributed to the partial compensation for damages against what had been lost, hence the need to have a calculation of the contributing goods and of the total damages. In his report, the *patrone* specified that he hoped to recover the vessel and the goods.²³ Based on the

¹⁹ Casaregi, *Discursos*, XLVI, 163. This exception is statede also by the Spanish jurist Hevia y Bolaños, experts in the *Carrera de Indias*. He cited Casaregi, Targa and la *Lex Rhodia*, see *Ilustracion y Continuacion á la Curia Filípica*, vol. III, Madrid, 1790, 323-324.

²⁰ Casaregi, *Discursos*, XXVIII, 86.

²¹ Casaregi, *Discursos*, II, 11.

²² ASG, NG, Atti dei calcolatori 2085, 26/02/1641, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50300.

²³ ASG, NG, Atti dei calcolatori 2085, 14/02/1641, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50300.

documentation examined thus far, another similar situation concerns the 1703 shipwreck of the *Santo Bruno*, mastered by the Dutch *patrone* Pietro Coderch.²⁴ The ship sank in the port of Genoa while it was moored at the *Molo Vecchio*. The calculation included the costs for recovery as well as the interest of 1% on a sea loan, perhaps made to find the capital for the recovery operations. The unusual presence of a sea loan in the calculation, a credit instrument whose functioning has been previously discussed, testifies to the survival of this instrument during the eighteenth century, as recent studies also show.²⁵

Further uncertainties in the formal distinction between Average and shipwreck procedures stemmed from the fact that a shipmaster's report could describe both types of events in the same voyage. However, for the GA act to be valid, enough time would have to have passed between it and the shipwreck.²⁶ According to some authors, including, for example, Baldasseroni, a jettison could not be successful if, during the same storm, the vessel shipwrecked.²⁷ A case in point was the voyage of *patrone* Gregorio Graffigna of Chiavari with his *leudo*, the *San Cristoforo*, from Chiavari to Finale.²⁸ He left Chiavari, his hometown, on 17 April 1640 with a cargo of wine, flax, sausage, *mortadella* and salted meat, which belonged to himself, and with benches and trestles belonging to the *vicario* of Chiavari.²⁹ It was a typical voyage of a small cabotage vessel, with a low value cargo, headed for the Western *Riviera*. A fellow citizen of Graffigna would have received the cargo in Finale. On 18 April 1640, at 3 p.m., over the cape of Varazze, a sudden storm pressed the shipmaster to order a jettison. Despite this emergency measure, however, the waves submerged the *leudo*, which sank. The *patrone* with his sailors "came ashore naked", without being able to save anything. The cape of Varazze was and still is a stretch of sea subject to frequent storms and bad weather.³⁰ As soon as they reached the beach, the *patrone* and the sailors asked the local

²⁴ ASG, *CdM*, Esibite in avaria 377, 31/08/1703, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50362.

²⁵ On the functioning of *cambio marittimo* see par. 3.1. On its survival in the eighteenth century, see Zanini, 'Financing and risk sharing'.

²⁶ Casaregi, *Discursos*, XLVI, 163.

²⁷ Baldasseroni, *Trattato delle assicurazioni*, vol. 4, 49.

²⁸ Report partially transcribed in Appendix VIII. Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50324.

²⁹ In 1610, the archbishop of Genoa, Cardinal Orazio Spinola, instituted the charge of *vicario generale* with jurisdiction over all the parishes in the Chiavari district.

³⁰ In the db *AveTransRisk* there is also another voyage that ended up in a shipwreck in this area, the *liuto* named *Santa Maria*, sunken near Varazze around the 29 October 1600. See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50266.

inhabitants for help to recover the vessel, which had sunk half a mile from the coast. More sailors came to the rescue, and together with Graffigna's crew, they were able to tie up and pull the sunken vessel ashore, thus managing to recover part of the goods still on board. Afterwards, the *patrone* went to Varazze to draw up "the present *manifesto consolato* in order that it may be known to be true". During the same storm, the *patrone* had attempted a jettison, and then he lost his vessel. Although the document arrived at Genoa, where the *Annona* office approved it on 30 April 1640, there was no subsequent GA calculation. The shipwreck occurred immediately after the jettison, which clearly did not manage to avoid the sinking. The report only allowed the *patrone* to go to his insurer or could have been useful to him against the owner of the lost cargo.

The expenses for the drafting of the documents, as well as those for the recovery of the ship or the goods, triggered urgent payments that the shipmaster had to face in some way. The difficulty in finding the required capital for the expenses caused by a shipwreck, which presumably involved the loss of all valuables, was indeed not a negligible issue and may perhaps explain why the shipmasters tried to 'disguise' these incidents as GA events.

Another case of shipwreck that did not give rise to a calculation is the voyage of the *patrone* Lorenzo quondam Bartolomeo Cappello of Lavagna, a town on Eastern *Riviera*, with its *cimba* called *Nostra Signora del Rosario*.³¹ He left Salonika, the modern Thessaloniki, on 26 April 1698 with a load of wheat to take to Marseille. Unfavourable winds affected the whole journey, in particular a *scirocco* wind, which changed to a north wind and then back to a *scirocco* near Sicily, 60 miles from the island of Marettimo. At 100 miles from Montalto, a mountain in the Aspromonte chain, a strong *libeccio* wind forced them to move away from their route and make a jettison. That jettison was not enough since, after a few hours, they had to perform another one "of greater sum". The ship, however, was still at the mercy of the bad weather, to such an extent that it could not follow the set course. Bad weather and poor visibility forced the vessel to run ashore on the beach of Corneto, namely, Tarquinia, in Lazio, in a place called Castellania, perhaps the same as the fortress of Gravisca. The voluntary stranding could theoretically compel a sharing of the damages, if it took place after due consultation, because it meant sacrificing part of the hull to save the

³¹ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50441. Report partially transcribed in [Appendix X](#).

goods and the people on board.³² However, in this case, the stranding on the beach, probably without a 'free' choice on the part of the *patrone* due to the strength of the storm, destroyed the hull and resulted in a full-fledged shipwreck:

[...] and following the route as best we could, not being able to know the terrain because the mountains were obscured unless we were on land, we had to land in the Cornero beach in a place called Castellania. Seeing that we were completely lost and trying to save at least our lives if we could, as we were all out of hope, when the hull was broken we tried to recover what little we could [...].³³

The *patrone* immediately turned to a cardinal of Genoese origin and superintendent of Corneto in those years, Giorgio Spinola, for his report. Spinola ordered the recovered wheat to be resold to pay the costs of recovering the vessel and of the quarantine of the crew.³⁴ The repair costs in port due to bad weather, in fact, were theoretically borne by shipmasters and shipowners.³⁵ Other tools recovered from the destroyed vessel were immediately sold. The *patrone* requested the Genoese consul of the Papal State, Francesco Domenico Cicopevio, for a report to certify the accident and his correct behaviour. He submitted this document in Genoa on 3 July 1698. Although the jettisons had been made while still in sight of Montalto, that is approximately 200 miles from the place of the subsequent stranding, the *Conservatori del Mare* did not order to proceed with the calculation, and therefore, all the expenses remained the responsibility of the *patrone* and his partners.

It is interesting to note how, for the smaller vessels, and despite the progress in the field of nautical charts, in the seventeenth century, shipmasters still preferred to sail near the coast, relying on either the visual memory of the landmarks along the route or on the *portolani*. The latter were volumes providing the description of the bays, the ports of call and the coastal elements

³² Casaregi, *Discursos*, XLVI, 164.

³³ “[...] e seguitando il cammino alla meglio che potevamo, non potendo conoscere terreno per essere le montagne offuscate se non quando fossimo in terra, dove ci convenne investire nella spiaggia di Cornero in luogo detto la Castellania. Vedendoci affatto persi e seguendo salvare almeno la vita se potevamo, essendo tutti fuori di speranza, onde rotto che fu detto scafo si è procurato di ricuperare quel poco sia stato possibile [...]”. ASG, *CdM*, Testimoniali segreti redatti all'estero 285, 10/06/1698, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50441.

³⁴ The superintendent was in charge of the temporal affairs of the papal state in a specific region. On Giorgio Spinola see D.M. Cheney, 'Giorgio Spinola', in *Catholic Hierarchy*, see <http://cardinals.fiu.edu/bios1719.htm#Spinola>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

³⁵ Casaregi, *Discursos*, XLVI, 164.

(mountains, towers, etc.) with an indication on the correct manoeuvres to avoid dangers.³⁶ This type of navigation, however, forced face waves, shoals, maritime traffic, and easily variable currents. Let us take as example the voyage of *patrone* Giuseppe Palermo on his *tartana* called *Il Santissimo Sacramento e la Madonna della Lettera*. In an attempt to round the island of Capri, he found himself facing two different and consecutive storms, first with westerly and *libeccio* winds and then with southern winds, probably caused by the streams and natural obstacles that channelled the winds from the mainland.³⁷

Another reason for a shipmaster, as mentioned, to draft a report following a shipwreck was insurance purposes. In these cases, there was usually an explicit request for a PA calculation. The voyage of Shipmaster Giacomo di Negro, a naturalized French Genoese and citizen of Toulon, on his *Nave* called *Santa Maria di Misericordia*, is an example of this behaviour.³⁸ He left Genoa with a load of chestnuts, probably in April 1600, and stopped in Livorno to load wheat and other goods to take to Cadiz. Once in sight of the coasts of Catalonia, a storm broke out and forced his *Nave* to take refuge in the port of Salou. Although it was sheltered there, it went “sideways” and sank inside the harbour. The shipwrecks inside the ports, as noted, forced costly recovery operations to remove the vessels from the bottom of the sea and make the docking safe again. The shipmaster had to bear the unexpected and quite significant expenses; the vessel, for example, was taken to Barcelona for repairs. Once Giacomo di Negro arrived in the port of Tarragona, probably on foot, he declared his report with a list of expenses. Although he was a citizen of Toulon, he took the report to Genoa to request a PA calculation. Perhaps among the shipowners there were some Di Negro from Genoa related to the shipmasters, or perhaps the insurers were Genoese and drawing up the calculation procedure in their city would have sped up the payment of the compensation.³⁹ The report was submitted in November 1600, which is seven

³⁶ On the *portolani* most used in Genoa see ‘Catalogo di carte ed atlanti nautici di autori genovesi, ovvero fatti od esistenti in Genova’, *Giornale ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle arti*, II, 1875, 41-71. On this topic see also R. Unger, ‘Ships and Shipping Technology’, in C. Jowitt, C. Lambert, S. Mentz. eds., *The Routledge Companion to Marine and Maritime Worlds, 1400–1800*, Abingdon, 221-240, 230-231; T. Campbell, ‘Portolan Charts from the Late Thirteenth Century’, in J.B. Harley, D. Woodward eds., *A History of Cartography*, Chicago-London, 1987, 371-463.

³⁷ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50623.

³⁸ See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50276.

³⁹ The Di Negro were one of the leading families in the Genoese oligarchy. See A.M.G. Scorza, *Le famiglie nobili genovesi*, Trebaseleghe, 2009.

months after the declaration of the accident. It may be that this was the required time for the repairs to the ship or to draw up a complete estimate of the damages. Unfortunately, there are no notes on this. The calculation seems to be a PA for the shipowners, since it reports only the damages to the vessel. The value of the vessel 6,000 Genoese *lire*, and that of the freight collected by the shipmaster, 5,964 *lire*, constituted the *risico*. The calculation of the damages was much more complex. There were:

- 394.0.4 *lire* to bail out all the water that entered into the hold.
- 489.11.8 *lire* to take the vessel to Barcelona.
- 1,946.4.8 *lire* for repairs.
- 313.6.8 *lire* as compensation to the superintendent, originally paid in 800 pieces of eight.⁴⁰ The superintendent was probably the one who followed the ship to Barcelona and supervised the progress of the repair work.
- 45.8.8 *lire* for the travel expenses of Gio Micone, whose identity we know nothing else of, to go to Barcelona to recover the ship after the repairs had been completed. He was probably an agent charged with carrying the newly repaired ship to the next port of destination.
- 195.16.8 *lire* for the expenses of the attorney, another type of agent who acted on behalf of the shipmaster and the owners, also sent for the recovery of the ship in Barcelona.⁴¹
- 14.17.8 *lire* for copies of deeds made in Spain, such as the report drawn up in Tarragona.
- 1,250 *lire* for damage to the *Nave* after the accident, as resulting from the report of the appointed expert.
- 2,825.18 *lire* for lost freight rates, calculated per miles with respect to the uncompleted voyage.
- 34.10.4 *lire* for the submission of the report and the appraisals to the *calcolatori* in Genoa, as well as for the expenses to be paid to them and to their notary for the preparation of the calculation.

⁴⁰ According to the exchange rate reported by the *calcolatori*, 1 real was equal to 0.7.10 Genoese *lire*, see ASG, NG 637, 04/05/1601.

⁴¹ The 'procuratore' or 'procuratore' in the early modern period acted as a defender or accuser in a court case on behalf of others. See 'Procuratore, *Vocabolario degli accademici della Crusca*, 4th ed., vol. III, Florence, 1729-1738, 728.

The total damage amounted to 7,509.14.8 Genoese *lire*, a large figure compared to the 11,964 *lire* of *risico*, equal to approximately 63% of the total. Considering the difference between the total freight rates and the lost freight rates, since the total freights contribute to the *risico*, the damages in the freight rates amounted to 47%. If we look at the expenses for the recovery and repair of the vessel, instead, they amounted to 77% of the 6,000 *lire* of the *Nave*. The purely administrative costs for copying the records and drafting the various documents related to the calculation procedure amounted to approximately 50 *lire*, only 0.4% of the risk.

This was a significant loss. Only two reasons could have prompted the shipmaster to request such a precise calculation: the need to unload his responsibilities in front of the shipowners, to prove to them that the damage did not derive from inexperience or imprudence — but in such case, theoretically, the sea protest would have been enough — or the willingness to turn to the insurers for the reimbursement of at least part of the damages. According to Felloni's handwritten notes on some PA calculations recorded on paper cards relating to those same years but not yet supported by the sources, the calculations in these cases were drawn up for insurance purposes: they reported the values of freight and vessels, not including the goods on board.⁴² According to Casaregi, notarial writing was always necessary in cases where part of the insured property had survived to accurately assess the damage to be reimbursed.⁴³ In theory, however, chap. IV, book II of the *Statuti Civili, De Cause brevioribus*, clearly stated that in case of lawsuits between *patroni* and merchants, or other interested parties regarding Averages, freights, etc., it was necessary to proceed briefly, without the need to resort to administrative documents.⁴⁴ There was no need for any calculation unless, according to the Statutes, this request did not come from the insured person himself.⁴⁵ Average

⁴² See the paper card in ADG, *Felloni* 1, n. 100, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50276.

⁴³ “[...] quae fieri solet per assecuratos, in casu, quo mercies non perierunt in totum[...]”, in Casaregi, *Discursos*, LXX, 242.

⁴⁴ “[...] in exequendo summariae, et de plano, sine strepitu, et figura iudicii, sine libello in scriptis et sine scriptis omnibus, et quibuscumque solemnitatibus omissis et teneantur magistratus concedere licentiam expedita actori contra debitorem [...]”. BUG, *ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis*, Genoa, 1589, 50.

⁴⁵ Attached documents made to expedite summary judgements were very common, despite the legislative texts. This was especially true for maritime courts, see M. Fusaro, ‘Politics of justice/Politics of trade: foreign merchants and the administration of justice from the records of Venice’s Giudici del Forestier’, *Mélanges de l’École française de Rome - Italie et Méditerranée modernes et contemporaines*, 126-1, 2014,

and other procedures such as the shipwrecks, therefore, probably reached their highest degree of connection and interchangeability when they involved the insurers or, as I will state in the following pages, in the event of attacks by pirates or privateers.

5.2 On the Border between GA and Piracy

According to the list of “fatal incidents” identified by Targa, the second type was called *Corsaria ovvero piratica*. This referred to the plundering of a ship and/or of a ship’s cargo by privateers or pirates:

[...] a depredation which is forcefully done to one person of his goods, by means of privateering or piracy, which are the principal cases among the fortuitous ones; which is committed at sea, or in port, or on the beach, as distinct from the depredation which is done on land by means of plunder, or robbery [...].⁴⁶

The theft or seizure of the vessel and the goods by the enemies could occur in deep waters just as well as in a harbour or near a shoreline. It could take place because of a conflict between two warring nations, or without any legal justification, and it was perpetrated by a *ladro di mare*, a “sea thief”.⁴⁷ According to the formal distinction between pirate and privateer, a pirate was a thief who acted outside of legal regulations, while a privateer was an auxiliary of the state’s navy. A privateer was authorized by a letter of marque to plunder the vessels that his nation was at war with.⁴⁸ This distinction is not so clear in the legal sources; according to Targa, a pirate was someone who exercised the corsair activity with a regular licence and who, in addition to plundering the vessels that his lord was at war with, also attacked and plundered vessels of other nationalities.⁴⁹ According to the jurist Azuni, such behaviour was frequent:

<http://journals.openedition.org/mefrim/1665>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

⁴⁶ “[...] depredazione che vien fatta ad alcuno delli di lui effetti violentemente, per via di corsaria o piratica, caso principalissimo tra li fortuiti; la quale si commette in mare, o in porto, o in spiaggia, a distintione della depredazione che si fa in terra per via di bottini, ovvero di rapine [...]”. Targa, *Ponderationi*, 260.

⁴⁷ On the juridical and legal framework of piracy see G. Tellarini, *La pirateria marittima. Regime di repressione e misure di contrasto*, Rome, 2012.

⁴⁸ Catalonia rulers invented the letters of marque in the thirteenth century. The reference to the ‘lawful’ economic gain derived from the privateering activity is implicit in the etymology of the Catalan term itself, *Patent de Cors*. The Latin word *cursum* was in fact equivalent to *lucrum*, see C.M. Moschetti, ‘Pirateria (storia)’, in *Enciclopedia del Diritto italiano*, XXIII, Milan, 1983, 873.

⁴⁹ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 261.

“they always degenerated into real piracy; it is just a kind of general brigandage”.⁵⁰ For Casaregi, however, a pirate was someone who plundered vessels without a licence, acting on the basis of his own authority.⁵¹ He himself quoted Targa to clarify how those who acted with privateering licences were improperly called pirates, according to a widespread misinterpretation. Making a clear distinction, therefore, is a misleading operation.⁵² Even in Average practices, such a distinction does not seem to be relevant. For this reason, I will use the term *pirate* only.

Pirates stealing part of the cargo was an event that had close links with the practice of GA. After a shipwreck, with the subsequent loss of the vessel and its goods, there were not enough assets left to proceed with damage sharing calculations, as all or most of them were lost. The situation was more blurred in the event of a theft. Under these circumstances, the ship or part of the goods usually survived and, therefore, were liable to contribute to what had been lost, albeit under particular conditions.⁵³ According to Casaregi, who also specified that other jurisdictions adopted such practice, even the wounding of a sailor in the course of a successful defence against a hostile attack and the subsequent expenses for his food and medical treatment should have been considered as GA damage and, as such, shared amongst the contributing elements.⁵⁴

The reports examined to date in which thefts of goods, assault or encounters with hostile ships were reported are 58 out of 858. They represent almost 6.76% of the total number of cases registered to date.⁵⁵ In 19 of these cases, equal to approximately 32% of their total, the shipmaster obtained a GA or PA calculation. Where the pirates came from was not always specified (11): they

⁵⁰ “Ils dégénéraient toujours en vraies pirateries; elles n’étaient qu’une espèce de brigandage general”. D.A. Azuni, *System universel des armemens et des corsaires en tems de guerre*, Genoa, 1817, 13.

⁵¹ In a gloss Casaregi reported other legal-commercial dictionaries such as the *Dictionarium ad utriusque juris* of Alberico da Rosate, published in Bologna in 1481, as a confirmation of this distinction. See Casaregi, *Discursos*, LXIV, 228.

⁵² Primary sources frequently use both terms as synonyms, see L. Lo Basso, *In traccia de’ legni nemici. Corsari europei nel Mediterraneo del Settecento*, Ventimiglia, 2002, 17. Braudel himself, after clarifying the differences between privateer and pirate, resorted to both terms indiscriminately. See F. Braudel, *Civiltà e imperi del Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II*, Turin, 1986, 919-948.

⁵³ The only type of accident that did not allow for any GA reparation, according to Baldasseroni, who quoted the Dutch jurist Quintino Weitsen, was the shipwreck. In all other cases there was the possibility that something was lost for the common salvation. See Baldasseroni, *Trattato sulle assicurazioni*, vol. IV, 87.

⁵⁴ Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, 163.

⁵⁵ I selected the following search fields in the advanced search of *AveTransRisk* db: Archival type = Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG); (Event type = Hostile Encounter; OR Event type = Hostile attack; OR Event type = Theft of merchandise).

could be Turks (15), French (11), “Turks or French” (2), from the Barbary Coast (7), English (8), Majorcan (2), Dutch (1), Spanish (1) or even Genoese (1). These events took place on the busiest routes, near straits or archipelagos where it was easier to vanish without a trace, such as the area near Gibraltar or the triangle between Sardinia, Corsica and the islands of the Tuscan archipelago. In some cases, the assault declarations could even be useful to encourage the circulation of information and help each other by reporting dangerous areas or the presence of specific pirates. An example of this practice is represented by the *testimoniale privato* drawn up by the *patrone* Cristoforo Raynerius from Savona to report the theft of goods on board, destined for the Genoese merchant Pompeo Vassallo.⁵⁶ In his report, with an attached list of stolen goods, the shipmaster specified that he had been robbed by the English shipmaster named Henrico Puppel on his vessel *La Charlé*, from London.⁵⁷

The main discriminating factor that authorized the transfer of the report to the GA procedure was the intentionality in the actions of the declarant and his crew to avoid the accident or reduce the damage. In fact, a simple theft, as Baldasseroni also clarified, would not have resulted in a repartition of damages.⁵⁸ On the other hand, if, for example, the shipmaster had voluntarily given away a portion of the cargo to ransom the ship or any other good or to avoid imprisonment, kidnapping and indiscriminate looting, then the rest of the goods, freights and the ship itself would have contributed as in an ordinary GA act.⁵⁹ If the ship either shipwrecked or suffered another accident afterwards, the assets surrendered to the pirates would have been compensated based on the value of the goods and the ship at the time of the theft, without considering subsequent events. Even extraordinary expenses, for example those related to unexpected stops to avoid encounters with pirates, usually made in a port or under a fortress, those for changing and lengthening the route or those for tracking down a ship that was abandoned following the arrival of the pirates, were eligible for contributions regardless of the achievement of the successful

⁵⁶ ASG, *NG 637*, 08/05/1601, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50458.

⁵⁷ Another example is the report of the *patrone* from Sestri Levante Vincenzo Federico quondam Giacomo. He specified that the pirate Fransù Moreo from Tolone robbed and kidnapped him. See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50768.

⁵⁸ Baldasseroni, *Trattato sulle assicurazioni*, vol. IV, 90.

⁵⁹ Baldasseroni, *Trattato sulle assicurazioni*, vol. IV, 90.

result. The only condition was that the fear of encountering pirates was justified.⁶⁰

In practice, however, it was rare that reports submitted to Genoese magistracies concerning pirates led to GA calculations. Let us take as an example a claim that was tried to be passed off as a GA: the report of the journey of the *patrone* Santino Fugone of Sestri Levante, age 28, on board of his *felucca*.⁶¹ Fugone left on Thursday 15 March 1640 from Porto Torres on the northwestern coast of Sardinia, with a load of Sardinian cheese, probably delivered to Bastia, Corsica. Six sailors made up his crew, and they all testified as witnesses. The *felucca* left Porto Torres on Thursday around midnight, with two other *felucche* led by two *patroni* of Sestri Levante, Orlando Mulli and Domenico Severisio, probably acquaintances of Santino Fugone. Travelling in 'convoy', even if they were only small vessels in this case, discouraged potential enemy attacks and allowed them to help one another in case of bad weather. This measure demonstrated the *patrone's* cautiousness, an essential virtue at sea, to be displayed as much as possible when declaring an accident. The following day, the three *felucche* sailed together towards the Sponsaglia tower, a small fortification on the southeastern coast of Corsica. The *patroni* spoke with the tower guardian, who warned them of the presence of an unidentified vessel in that area that he feared might belong to pirates. Prudence prompted the three *patroni* to stop under the Sponsaglia tower from Friday to Sunday morning. However, receiving no further news, on Sunday, they set out in calm weather. On Monday evening, they decided to stop in Sari (Sari-Solenzara), in Corsica, to enquire about the presence of other ships between Solenzara and Bastia. Here, they found another *patrone* of Sestri Levante and two *felucche* from the same city, as well as a *felucca* from Bastia. These *felucche* confirmed to Fugone that the stretch of sea from Sari to Bastia was secure. Fugone set sail immediately, after only three hours of rest, with rowing and no wind. There is no further information on the other two *felucche* he travelled with, a sign that they probably separated after their stop in Sari-Solenzara.

The *felucca* had been travelling through the last stretch of its route alone on a windless night. There are 50 miles between Solenzara and Bastia. After

⁶⁰ Baldasseroni, *Trattato sulle assicurazioni*, vol. IV, 92.

⁶¹ Report partially transcribed in [Appendix VII](#). The *felucca* was a small Mediterranean ship with a single deck and approximately 10 m long, see Gatti, *Navi e cantieri*, 176-182. See the voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50238.

approximately 30 miles, near the Fiorentina tower, a small boat of French pirates suddenly appeared on the route to Bastia, rowing towards the *felucca*. They immediately began firing musket shots at the vessel and yelling at the *patrone* to stop. After a brief chase, when the *felucca* came to be at only “a stone's throw from the coast”, the French reached the vessel and jumped aboard armed with pistols and melee weapons. The *patrone's* first thought went to the bag of money he kept hidden under a rowing bench. He picked it up and tried to jump overboard to save it, but a French pirate pinned him from behind. Deprived of the escape route, the *patrone* threw the bag into the middle of the cargo of cheese, hoping it would go unnoticed. The very content of the bag, the personal wealth of this *patrone* of the Genoese *Riviera*, is an example of the dynamism of coastal trade in the Mediterranean in the early modern period. That bag, in fact, contained money in all kinds of currencies, valued at approximately 600 Genoese *lire*: seventy-seven *levantini*, thirty pieces of Spanish pieces of eight, two silver *ecus*, one *doppia* from Florence, a gold *ecu* from Naples and ten *lire* of Genoese currency.⁶²

The pirates proceeded methodically; they transferred four sailors onto the small boat and left the *patrone* with another sailor on the *felucca*, forcing them to sail until dawn, when they reached the main pirate vessel. They tortured the *patrone* and interrogated him by enquiring what he had on board and asking him to show them his documents. The pirate shipmaster accused the *patrone* of being a Neapolitan who departed from Naples. The Republic of Genoa maintained its neutrality during the Thirty Years' War; an attack on a Ligurian *patrone* would have been an act of open piracy. The French shipmaster, who probably had a letter of marque to plunder the vessels of the Viceroyalty of Naples, that France was at war with, tried in this way to justify the theft and avoid a possible trial for piracy upon returning home.⁶³ The interrogation subsequently focused on the money on board. Santino Fugone suspiciously quickly revealed the location of his bag, following the requests of the pirate shipmaster. Soon after that, in fact, one of the French pirates found the bag in the middle of the cheese cargo. Perhaps the *patrone* hoped that declaring that

⁶² On this topic see ‘Appendix 1: the coinages of Renaissance Europe, c.1500’, T.A. Brady, JR. Heiko, A. Oberman, J.D. Tracy eds., *Handbook of European history, 1400-1600: late Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation*, vol. 1, Leiden, 1994, 671-678; C.M. Cipolla, *Moneta e civiltà mediterranea*, Venice, 1957.

⁶³ Pirates were formally considered as “enemies of mankind” and were given the death penalty, see Azuni, *System universel*: 18.

he had voluntarily revealed the presence of the bag, taken by the pirates afterwards, could be seen as a voluntary sacrifice of the money to save their lives and the goods on board. The pirates took the bag, all the cheese, which was worth approximately 800 pieces of “Sardinian money”, the belongings and clothing of the crew for a value of approximately 50 *lire*, and returned to their vessel. On Monday evening, they discussed what to do with the captured crew, while the *patrone* begged them to let them go and return their belongings:

[...] And all the said day they detained us. Even at twenty one o'clock, having consulted between them yesterday about what to do with our people, the *patrone* begged for the love of God that they give him what was due to him and [that it did not belong] to any Neapolitan. And in the evening the [pirate] captain said that he should have hung me from a mast of the boat and that he did not want to give me anything [...].⁶⁴

The *patrone's* alleged prayers and insistence on specifying how they were Genoese and not Neapolitans were heard. The French pirates returned four rows of cheese and some of the money, along with sails and oars to reach the nearest port. It was in this way that the *felucca* of Santino Fugone arrived in Bastia at four in the morning of Tuesday 21 March 1640. Fugone immediately declared his report in front of the *Conservatori del Mare* of Bastia, a magistracy perhaps dependent on the *Conservatori del Mare* of Genoa.⁶⁵

Despite the estimates of the damage, the presence of witnesses and the transfer of the file amongst the *atti dei calcolatori* of Genoa, where it arrived on 24 March, no GA calculation was ordered. The abundance of details and the insistence on the good conduct of the shipmaster were probably not seen as sufficient elements for a GA, or perhaps the *patrone* needed this report only to privately contact his insurers. According to Casaregi, if a *patrone* had guided the pirates in taking part of the goods and leaving some other, the loss would have been comparable to a voluntary sacrifice.⁶⁶ In this case, however, the pirates took everything, and only later did they return part of the cargo to the

⁶⁴ “[...] e tutto detto giorno ci hanno trattenuti. Persino a ore venti una, havendo tra ieri consiglio circa quello dovevano fare delle nostre persone, a quale il *patrone* pregava per l'amor di Dio che mi dessero il fatto mio stante, che era mio proprio e non di napolitani, e da esso capitano ali sera fu detto, che meritava che mi appendesse a un pennone di detta barca, et che non mi voleva dare cosa alcuna [...]”. See [Appendix VII](#).

⁶⁵ There are no information on this magistracy in the *Statuti Civili* and *Statuti Criminali* of Corsica, published in G.C. Gregorii ed., *Statuti Civili e Criminali di Corsica*, 2 voll., Lyon, 1843.

⁶⁶ Casaregi, *Discursos*, I, 162.

patrone following his prayers, albeit at their discretion. This subtle distinction may have determined the outcome of this case.

In the most common cases, an encounter with pirates could simply be avoided by means of a jettison that would lighten the ship and favour an escape. As in the case of escaping a storm, these cases usually ended without problems in a GA calculation. Let us take, for example, the voyage of the English shipmaster John Clarveth on his vessel *Galera Jacob*.⁶⁷ This voyage brings together two common situations in a GA practice: a storm and an encounter with enemy vessels.

The vessel left Gravesham, Kent, on 24 November 1707 with a cargo of herring, pepper, and other goods to be delivered to Genoa. While the vessel was at anchor in Portsmouth, where it had stopped due to bad weather, a storm broke out and forced the shipmaster to order the cutting of the anchor cable to speed up departure. Later, between Lisbon and Cape Saint Vincent, the shipmaster and his crew encountered three enemy vessels with which they engaged in naval combat. Given the impossibility of winning, the shipmaster ordered to throw away part of the guns to lighten the ship and escape the battle. They arrived safely in the port of Genoa on 7 March 1708 and requested the calculation of all the damages suffered. The *Conservatori del Mare* approved the shipmaster's report and ordered the calculation to be carried out on 21 April 1708. Although the drawing up of the calculation underwent an unusual delay, perhaps possibly due to the slowness of communications with the merchants in England, all of the damages were admitted to the repartition procedure and brought together in a single GA calculation, completed on 10 January 1709. This calculation is in Spanish pieces of eight, a very widespread currency in the Mediterranean, used regularly in Genoese calculations from the second half of the seventeenth century but also in GA calculations made in other ports, such as Livorno.⁶⁸

Following the calculation of all the contributing elements, worthy of 7,476 pieces of eight between the goods and the vessel, the damages below were recorded:

⁶⁷ ASG, *CdM*, Esibite in avaria 377, 08/03/1708, recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50356.

⁶⁸ Dyble, *General Average in the free port*.

- 124.10 pieces of eight for cutting of the anchor's cable with its anchor in port and for subsequent recovery costs.
- 39 pieces of eight for the jettison of 2 Flemish 18-carat iron cannons to escape enemies.⁶⁹
- 110 pieces of eight per the cutting of an anchor's cable, worth "two third of its value" that took place during the escape, probably with its anchor still connected.
- 55 pieces of eight used for the consumption of the gunpowder used to fire 50 cannon shots and for other damages suffered by the vessel, the cordage and the water barrels during the conflict.
- 83.17 pieces of eight for the administrative expenses for the calculation and for all the necessary investigations.

The total 412.7 pieces of eight of damage concerned only the expenses pertaining to the vessel, as the goods had not suffered damage in either of the two incidents. However, thanks to the GA principle, they also contributed at an overall rate of 5.5%.⁷⁰

Another common example of GA following encounters and capture by enemy vessels, as already mentioned, consisted of the payment of a ransom. This could be done in cash or through the voluntary transfer of part of the cargo. Let us take as an example the case of the French *patrone* Lorenzo Dauffin, from Martigue, with his *tartana* named *San Pietro*.⁷¹

Dauffin left Cagliari on 1 May 1703 with a load of wheat, pasta, rags, cheeses, cash and other goods to be delivered to Genoa. Along the way, he encountered four Dutch vessels with square sails that captured him and his crew and demanded a payment of 600 Spanish pieces of eight, equal to approximately 3,000 Genoese *lire* at the exchange rate of that year. That was a huge amount if we consider that the value of the vessel alone in the calculation was 1,175 *lire*. The pirates hoped to gain much money from the ransoming of goods or perhaps from some wealthy passengers. Indeed, it was a merchant on board, a sailor and the purser who paid the ransom for the release of the ship.

⁶⁹ Calculators in Genoa often employed carats to describe the quality of lost or damaged goods, although it is not clear how many carats was worth each element in total.

⁷⁰ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50356.

⁷¹ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50358.

In addition, the *patrone* handed over a small part of the cargo of pasta to the Dutch pirates, perhaps as food supplies for their own ship.

The *tartana* arrived in Genoa on 16 May 1703, and the *patrone* made his report three days later. We do not know the date of the order of execution of the calculation, and hence how long it took and if there had been legal issues. The calculation was certainly completed before 20 July, the date of its approval. The damages were:

- 72 Genoese *lire* for the soaking of part of the wheat during the seizure of the *tartana*.
- 3,000 Genoese *lire* for the payment of the ransom, paid in advance by the purser, a sailor, and a merchant. The sum was reimbursed to them as soon as they arrived in Genoa.
- 170 Genoese *lire* for three crates of pasta given to the Dutch.
- 520 Genoese *lire* as a gift to the purser and the sailor for having paid in advance part of the ransom.
- 104.7 Genoese *lire* for various unspecified expenses.
- 241.2 Genoese *lire* for common expenses related to the procedure, such as the drafting of the report, the calculation and any other documents.

Considering the low value of the contributing elements, of only 9,639.2 Genoese *lire*, the participants in this voyage had to face a GA repartition of 4,107.9.8 Genoese *lire* of damages. The overall rate was approximately 42%.

As previously mentioned, another valid GA act in the case of pirate encounters was abandoning the vessel. The vessel had to be close to the coast or it had to have a sufficiently large *schifo*, and the crew had to be able to reach the coast before the arrival of the enemies. However, no such case is present in the documentation examined thus far. Even in the case that follows below, that of *Sant'Anna*, the *tartana* of the *patrone* of Alassio Giacomo Airaldi, the abandonment following the pirate attack did not result in a GA calculation.⁷²

The *patrone*, carrying various goods on the route from Alassio to Cagliari, encountered a vessel of “Moors” on 2 June 1698 near Cape Sferracavallo on the east coast of Sardinia. In the meantime, three other Christian vessels also

⁷² Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50429. Other similar examples are the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50263 and the id 50274.

arrived, including one of Neapolitans, and they all took refuge in the nearby Porto Cavallo to escape the pirates. The pirates managed to run ashore three boats, and they attacked and defeated the defenders of the port. Cornered, the crews of the Christian vessels fled, abandoning their ships, which were plundered by pirates. Afterwards, they went back on their ships and travelled to Cagliari to report the incident. Giacomo Airaldi's *testimoniale* was sent to Genoa but did not give rise to any GA calculation. Perhaps the *Conservatori del Mare* did not order to proceed because of the lack of freedom in choosing to abandon the vessel; the crew resorted to this solution only after taking refuge in the port and seeing the Moors defeat the defenders on the beach.

Finally, pirate encounters could also give rise to PA calculations that were suffered individually by the owner of the damaged cargo or vessel. This is the case for the voyage of the *liuto San Antonio Bonaventura*, belonging to the *patrone* Giacomo Sanmichele of Lavagna.⁷³ He left Civitavecchia on 1 October 1638 with a crew of five sailors and a load of hemp and rags bound for Genoa. The following day, at just three miles from the coast, between Cala di Forno and Castello Marino, a *brigantino* and a *tartana* of French pirates suddenly appeared near the coast. The distance between the vessels was too short, and his *liuto*, a small single mast vessel, had no way of escaping the assailants.⁷⁴ The shipmaster decided to flee with the *schifo* and take refuge on shore, while the pirates boarded the vessel to plunder it. The crew could do nothing but watch helplessly as the pirates plundered the vessel and then left the *liuto* adrift offshore. Only later they were able to go back on board and sail towards Piombino, the nearest port, to make a report.

The report was brought to Genoa and delivered to the *Conservatori del Mare* on 25 October 1638. It was opened and read in the presence of the *patrone* and of Stefano Marengo, the merchant who was the recipient of the hemp consignment taken by the pirates. This procedure is particularly rich in details regarding the bureaucratic process related to the calculation of the following PA. On 29 October, the *patrone* and Stefano Marengo requested a calculation in the presence of the *Conservatori del Mare* Pantaleo Balbi, Geronimo de Marini and Alessandro Gentili. The *Conservatori* approved the request on the condition that the crew members had to be questioned first. The document was formally a

⁷³ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50512.

⁷⁴ The word *liuto* could refer either to small service vessels used in ports or, as probably in this case, to a slightly larger vessel used to transport goods. See Gatti, *Navi e cantieri*, 201-211.

testimoniale. This was perhaps the reason why the *Conservatori* requested further evidence to complete it.⁷⁵

Three crew members were questioned, but the two remaining crew members were also required to sign the document. All of them were from Lavagna, just like the *patrone*. In his statement, the sailor Nicolao del Viola denounced the operations of the French pirates who infested the waters between Sardinia and Tuscany: “[...] who are everyday in these waters, robbing and persecuting the poor vessels that pass by”.⁷⁶ At the end of the document, following the additional testimonies, authorization appears to proceed with the calculation. The damages were:

- 712.10 Genoese *lire* for 28.5 *cantari* (1,357.74 kg.) of hemp stolen by pirates, compared to the 99 (4,713.36 kg.) initially on board.
- 16 Genoese *lire* for the *calcolatori*.
- 20 Genoese *lire* for the notary of the *calcolatori*.
- 2 Genoese *lire* for the *traglietta*, the *calcolatori*'s assistant, who had probably witnessed the unloading of the goods.

This damage was borne by the 99 *cantari* of hemp loaded in Civitavecchia, which were worth 2,475 Genoese *lire*. The damage, therefore, amounted to approximately 30% of the contribution values. In the calculation, the cargo of rags for Bartolomeo Caneri was not mentioned; neither the calculation specified if the pirates also took part of this cargo, nor was there another calculation related to it. However, this is an interesting example of collaboration between a *patrone* and a merchant, probably united by the possibility of transferring the damage fee to an insurer.

5.3 Disputed Cases: the Atti Civili

⁷⁵ According to Targa, a *testimoniale* needed three supporting testimonies to be recognized as such. See Targa, *Ponderationi*, 309.

⁷⁶ “[...] i quali giornalmente stanno per questi mari, a rubbare e perseguitare li poveri vascelli che passano”.

Reaching a peaceful agreement between the parties involved in a GA procedure was not always possible. The presence of litigations emerges from the analysis of the documentation preserved in the *Atti Civili* archival folders, containing the judicial decisions of the *Conservatori del Mare*, in particular concerning contracts relating to the construction of vessels, sea loans, or the relations between shipmasters and their crews. According to what has been possible to verify, as already mentioned above, the judicial activity of the *Conservatori* strengthened during the seventeenth century, in parallel with a decrease in the activity of the *calcolatori*.⁷⁷ This process is also accompanied by an administrative reorganization of the procedures related to the GA. If the latter were previously kept in the *atti dei calcolatori* folders, for which some notaries worked exclusively, starting from about the middle of the century, the practices shifted to the *Atti Civili* of the *Conservatori*.⁷⁸

It is reasonable to assume that the Average calculation procedure at the end of the seventeenth century had become a practice that took place at the request of the parties when they could not agree on the payment or the appointment of a *calcolatore*. Often, there are orders to proceed with the calculation without the presence of an attached calculation. It seems that this practice finally overtook the text of the *Statuti Civili* of Genoa, which continued to be reprinted without changes during the eighteenth century and to mention the presence of a magistrate, the *calcolatori*, who seemed to have lost all functions.⁷⁹ The usually low value of damages in Average calculations was perhaps one of the reasons explaining the low number of disputes: it was probably better for merchants or insurers to pay what shipmasters demanded, even in dubious cases, rather than engaging in long judicial cases, which would only increase transaction costs.

In Genoa, following what was stated also in the book of the *Consolat de Mar*, the *Conservatori del Mare* made summary judgements. They judged *de bono et aequo*, and *de sola facti veritate inspecta*, that is without excessive formalities

⁷⁷ See par. 3.5.

⁷⁸ Once Gio. Benedetto Gritta's activity as notary of the *calcolatori* had ended (1636 to 1663), it has not been possible thus far to identify other notaries specialized in Average practices. Moreover, the activity of Gritta seems to slow down at a steady pace: from 94 cases in 1640 he drafted only 44 Average documents in 1654, ending with 7 cases in 1663. See ASG, *NG 2084*, 1639-1640, *NG 2088*, 1651-1663. The amount of reports stored in the *Atti Civili*, on the other hand, increased significantly during the second half of the seventeenth century. See ASG, *CdM*, *Atti Civili* 84, 1667, *CdM*, *Atti Civili* 124, 1699.

⁷⁹ An edition of 1707 still reports the Chapter on the *calcolatori*, without changes. Vedi BUG, *Laura gg.II.27*, *Statutorum Civilium Serenissimae Reipublicae Januensis*, 1707.

and in the least possible number of days.⁸⁰ As soon as they had the necessary testimonies, they proceeded with the judgement. Furthermore, the judgements of the *Conservatori del Mare* were unappealable.⁸¹ In the documents from the *Atti Civili*, the shipmasters required the calculations and the appointment of experts to obtain compensation for damages either from the merchants who were receiving the goods or from their insurers. It is therefore legitimate to speculate that these procedures were mainly aimed at the protection of the *patroni*. The *Conservatori del Mare* were a specific judiciary linked to navigation; originally, the magistracy was made of local shipmasters and shipowners. Their role seemed linked not only to the resolution of any disputes but also to the need to favour commercial navigation by protecting shipmasters who entered the port. According to Targa, commercial shipping was a fundamental public good; for example, even in the case of a requisition of the assets of a shipmaster guilty of some crime, the authorities could not order the seizure of the vessel's equipment, as this would have created a 'public damage' to commercial shipping.⁸²

If a shipmaster was unable to appear before the *Conservatori* to request a judgement, it was the shipowners themselves who turned to them to seek justice against the merchants. Such was the case, for example, of the Neapolitan shipowners of the *pitacchio* called *Nostra Signora del Faro e San Francesco*. The *pitacchio* with its crew and its shipmaster was captured by "Turkish or French" pirates between Trapani and Marseille. The shipowners had their report drawn up in Trapani in January 1668 and sent to Genoa to request reimbursement from all the insurers involved.⁸³

Let us take, for instance, the litigation between the Sicilian *patrone* Jacobi Lolliandro, from Termini Imerese, and the merchants involved in the voyage of his *tartana* the *Immacolata Concettione e le Anime del Purgatorio*.⁸⁴ The *patrone* left Marsala to load 490 Sicilian *salme* (105.2 tons) of wheat in Girgenti on 22 February 1699. He arrived in the port the evening of that same day, along with two other *tartane*. He loaded wheat bought by Andrea Rangetti from the merchant Stefano Sacco in Genoa. On the afternoon of 23 February, the

⁸⁰ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 398.

⁸¹ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 400.

⁸² However, they could order the seizure of the vessel with all its equipment. See Targa, *Ponderationi*, 405.

⁸³ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50646. Report partially transcribed in [Appendix IX](#).

⁸⁴ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50617.

loading procedures began through four boats carrying wheat from the dock to the *tartana*. Two boats were tied to either side of the *tartana*, while the other two awaited their turn nearby. The wind began to strengthen, but the boats were unloading the wheat so that it was not possible for them to interrupt the operation. Part of the wheat ended up in the sea, while the vessels collided against one another. The *patrone* told his sailors to hurry loading the wheat, while one of the two boats on the flank managed to break free and leave. As the weather continued to worsen, the *tartana* pulled on the sails to move away from the coast, dragging the remaining boat with it. The *patrone* ordered to use all the ropes and cables available to reinforce the connection with the boat to avoid collisions. The ropes and cables, taken haphazardly from the *tartana*, were unable to withstand the strain for long and were torn. The crew, meanwhile, managed to complete the loading operations. One of the boats, a *caicco*,⁸⁵ breaking free from a rope attached to a *tartana* anchor, broke its hull and sank offshore. Lolliandro's vessel managed to set sail, but the *patrone* calculated the loss of approximately 25 Sicilian *salme* (5.37 tons) of wheat, in addition to damage to the sails and hull, due to the continuous hits and the strong wind. He went to Syracuse to declare his report in front of the royal *Viceportolano* and two officials of the city Senate, on 24 February. On 27 February, the *tartana* set sail for Genoa. After leaving Sicily, a series of storms hindered navigation and forced it to take refuge in Lipari first, then in Gaeta and finally in Porto Ferraiolo. Leaving Porto Ferraiolo on 3 May, the wind damaged the sails and broke the foremast and the main mast. The *tartana* had to stop in Livorno for repairs and arrived in Genoa only after 5 more days.

A few days after arriving in Genoa, on 11 May, the *patrone* Giacomo Lolliandro filed a lawsuit against Stefano Sacco, the merchant whom the wheat was destined for. The drafting of the numerous documents that led to the calculation was quite rapid. It is possible to speculate that the *patrone* had first turned to Stefano Sacco, showing him the report drawn up in Syracuse and asking for the payment of his share for the damages suffered. Sacco must have refused the payment or demanded further evidence. Unable to find an agreement 'quickly', Lolliandro had then turned to the *Conservatori del Mare*, where he had the report validated, and he requested an Average calculation.

⁸⁵ It was a small boat, although it was bigger than a schifo, used as a launch by bigger vessels. See Gatti, *Navi e cantieri*, 236.

New depositions were heard among the crew members before proceeding with what in the document was referred to as the “election of the *calcolatori*”. It was simply the appointment of the notary in charge, Alessandro Alfonso. On 16 May, the *sindaco* of the *Conservatori del Mare* compiled an estimate of the value of the vessel and of all damages. On the same day, the public measurers of the Republic, in charge of verifying the quantity of goods unloaded and its weight in the presence of witnesses, carried out the analysis to verify the condition of the wheat.⁸⁶ In addition to these documents, the *patrone* delivered to the notary/*calcolatore* a note with the prices paid for the purchase of the wheat and the bill of lading with the freight. The freight contract was drawn up in Palermo by the notary Ippolito di Miceli.⁸⁷

With all this documentation, the case quickly proceeded with the drafting of the calculation, completed and signed on 19 May. Since there were two different kinds of accidents, the calculation was divided into two sections with the respective contributing values and damages. In the first section, concerning the accident in Girgenti, the freight was not shown, and the batch of wheat was valued at the full price of 4,626 pieces of eight. In the second one, the freight costs were added, and the value of the wheat was reduced by almost 600 pieces of eight based on the damage suffered in Girgenti. The first contribution was 5,076 pieces of eight, and the second contribution was 4,972. In the first list of damages, there are 34.10 pieces of eight paid as administrative expenses, along with almost 250 pieces of eight for the damage. In the second calculation, drawn up in Genoa, the administrative costs were approximately 24 pieces of eight to be added to the damage to the vessel of 68 pieces of eight. The quantity of different administrative expenses makes the execution of these calculations on average more onerous than those examined in previous years. It is also interesting to note that, compared to the calculations drawn up by the *calcolatori*, those kept in the *Atti Civili* always reported the payment to the attorney or lawyer of one of the parties, “for the litigation in the present calculation”.⁸⁸ In all the calculations examined thus far for the year 1699, for example, there was a payment of 8 pieces of eight, half of which went to the lawyer and half was forfeited directly by the *Conservatori* as a tax on the

⁸⁶ On the *misuratori pubblici* see Piccinno, *Economia marittima*, 296, 343-351.

⁸⁷ Palermo was the privileged place of trading for the loads of grain purchased by the Genoese in Sicily. See Piccinno, Iodice, ‘Whatever the cost’, 4-6.

⁸⁸ ASG, *CdM*, *Atti Civili* 124, 19/05/1699.

procedure. The calculation of the two events was approved following the reading in the presence of the involved parties. Stefano Sacco was forced to pay at a rate of 5.5% for the first claim and 1.75% for the second. Perhaps the initial quarrel had arisen around the fact that both claims did not appear to be GA events but rather simple accidents.

On the same day, the merchant Stefano Sacco was involved in another lawsuit concerning a GA claim.⁸⁹ The lawsuit involved a cargo of *rocella* wheat⁹⁰ and one of durum wheat from Licata, Sicily, loaded onto the *tartana* of Francesco La Barbera, a *patrone* originally from Marsala. On 17 April 1699, a storm 60 miles from the island of Ponza in the Gulf of Gaeta prompted the *patrone* to return to Pozzuoli and jettison part of the load, including 80 Sicilian *salme* (17.18 tons) of wheat. Following the declaration issued in Pozzuoli and the arrival in Genoa, it is likely that the *patrone* turned to Stefano Sacco for a contribution to damages, obtaining a refusal. The *patrone* also loaded 80 Sicilian *salme* of wheat onto the vessel on his own account, and it seems that these coincided with the wheat thrown away. However, the report drawn up in Pozzuoli only mentioned a batch of *rocella* wheat and durum wheat loaded on behalf of “whom it belongs out of the Kingdom”.⁹¹ On 26 May 1699, La Barbera decided to take legal action at the court of the *Conservatori del Mare* through his *causidico* Bernardo Paganini.⁹² Unlike the previous case, Stefano Sacco himself asked that the *patrone*'s sailors be questioned about the jettison. The depositions, however, slightly differed from each other. According to some, it seemed that the 80 Sicilian *salme* of wheat thrown away were those owned by the *patrone*. According to the deposition of sailor Vincenzo, son of Filippo, however, the 80 Sicilian *salme* of the *patrone* were unloaded and sold in Livorno after the jettison before arriving in Genoa. It is therefore legitimate to hypothesize that La Barbera tried to request a repartition of damages without specifying, in his report, that he had loaded 80 Sicilian *salme* on his own and that these had been sold in Livorno. In the subsequent calculation ordered by the *Conservatori*, there is no mention of damage equal to 80 Sicilian *salme*, which would have been evaluated as at least 1,000 pieces of eight, depending

⁸⁹ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50624.

⁹⁰ *Rocella* wheat was a type of durum wheat widely used in the exportations from Sicily to Genoa, alongside other types such as *carosella* wheat and *frumento forte*. See Piccinno, Iodice, 'Whatever the cost', 7, and bibliography therein quoted.

⁹¹ ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 124, 18/04/1699.

⁹² On the definition of 'causidico', see par. 3.4.

on the type of wheat thrown away. The damage to Stefano Sacco wheat amounted to only 8 *mine* (727.88 kg.) of wheat and 4.5 *mine* (409.43 kg.) of wet and deteriorated wheat. With administrative expenses exceeding 50 pieces of eight, the total damage to the ship and cargo was approximately 283 pieces of eight. Even though the procedure seems to favour the shipmaster, it was possible for the merchants to request further evidence and statements and to contest the actions of the declarant who had initiated the case.

Finally, the shipmasters who turned to their insurers for the payment of damages from a *Average* event constituted another type of dispute in the *Atti Civili*. The compatibility between the *Average* and insurance policies, as already noted, has been formalized since the promulgation of the *Statuti Civili* of 1589.⁹³ However, attempts by insurers to escape from paying the contribution were going to be a frequent phenomenon, even a century later.

Let us take, for example, the voyage of the Marseille shipmaster Gio. Baptiste Olivier with the vessel called *Nostra Signora della Speranza*. Olivier left Lisbon on 16 October 1698 with a load of sugar, tobacco, and other goods, probably headed for Genoa.⁹⁴ The vessel stopped in Cartagena in November; it was probably a scheduled stop during which it loaded up some soda ash. Near Majorca, however, it had to face a storm with *Greco* and easterly winds, while the water level in the bilge began to rise. The entry of water into the hold, in the case of loose and 'vulnerable' cargo such as sugar or salt, was particularly feared, as it resulted in its melting. In a short time, the water in the bilge reached a depth of two feet, equal to approximately 60 cm. An attempt was made to reach the port of Majorca, but the northeasterly winds prevented it. The shipmaster therefore decided to moor in a gulf of the island to at least partly exploit the natural shelter that the inlet would offer. Three anchors that were connected to the strongest cables of the vessel were dropped. As soon as the weather improved, Olivier decided to set sail and resume the voyage, but one of the anchors was stuck on the seabed, and its cable broke in an attempt to retrieve it. The vessel continued its voyage to Marseille, the shipmaster's native city. Once before the court of the Admiralty of Marseille, Olivier drew up his report on 29 December 1698.⁹⁵ It is likely that Marseille was one of the ports of

⁹³ See par. 3.4.

⁹⁴ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50627.

⁹⁵ On the Admiralty of Marseille, see S. Law-Hang, 'La justice d'amirauté en Provence à la fin de l'Ancien Régime', *Revue Juridique de l'Océan Indien*, 11, 2010, 123-145.

unloading due to the relatively long time that it took for the *patrone* to bring the report to Genoa, where it arrived on approximately 19 February 1699, about a month and a half after arriving in Marseille.

It is possible that Genoa was another port of unloading, as frequently occurred in the other cases examined during these years. Genoa also played the important role of insurance centre, and it is here, indeed, that most of the insurers connected to this voyage were located. Perhaps the shipmaster, who in the Genoese documents was indicated as a *patrone*, turned to his insurers to ask for a reimbursement of the damage suffered and obtained a refusal. After only 6 days from the approval of the report by the *Conservatori del Mare*, in fact, his lawyer Giovanni Bianchi submitted a note with a request for reimbursement of the freight and the damage suffered.⁹⁶

The note provided must not have been sufficient, given that Giovanni Bianchi turned to the *Conservatori del Mare* to ask for the official convocation of the insurers. The convocation of the interested parties was aimed at giving 'public' news of the GA event or the accident that had occurred and formally requesting the sharing of damages.⁹⁷ In the document, the lawyer provided a list of the insurers involved and asked to call two deputies. The insurers were Gio. Battista Nicolò Maria Castri, David Bernard of Marseille, Guglielmo Gio. Buglier, probably of French descent, Alessio and Francesco Carrega, and Bartolomeo Seporino. Unlike the other Average procedures in the *AveTransRisk* database, in which the insurers involved belonged to the main Genoese patrician families, in this case, perhaps also due to the few capitals involved, the names of the Genoese and French insurers were not well known. The *Conservatori* chose to call as representatives the first two names on the list, Nicolò Maria Castri and David Bernard, a Genoese and a Frenchman.⁹⁸ In the presence of all interested parties or their representatives, on 6 June, the *Conservatore del Mare* Filippo Spinola recalled the approval of the report, and on 10 June, gave the order to proceed with the calculation. The case, however, proceeded slowly; the bill of lading was submitted only on 2 August. Notary Alessandro Alfonso completed and signed the calculation on 12 August. It was finally approved two days

⁹⁶ ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 124, 25/02/1669.

⁹⁷ The same procedure, for example, was followed in Venice to obtain reimbursements from insurers, see ASV, *Notarile atti 134C*, 11090, 181v-182r. I am grateful to Dr. Isabella Cecchini for this information.

⁹⁸ ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 124, 20/05/1699. It is interesting to note that a David Bernardi is a tenant of a warehouse in the free port in 1693, see ASG, *SG*, 235 sala 37, 01/01/1693. See Piccinno, Zanini, 'Genoa: colonizing and colonized city?'.

later.⁹⁹ The main consignment of goods on board turned out to be tobacco, with 137 *rolli* worth 6,120 pieces of eight and 10 *balle* worth 230 pieces of eight. The tobacco was followed by a batch of sugar worthy 1,200 pieces of eight, washed wool for 850 *pieces of eight*, and soda worthy 720 pieces of eight. In addition to the cargo, they also calculated the value of the vessel, 275 pieces of eight, and that of the freights, amounting to 429.6.8 pieces of eight. The damage was rather modest. The list consisted of:

- 39 pieces of eight for the anchor left in the harbour in Majorca.
- 47 pieces of eight for half of the cable that was tied to the anchor.
- 3.10 pieces of eight for the report drawn up in Marseille.
- 3 pieces of eight for the report drawn up in Genoa.
- Half a piece of eight for the translation of the report from the French language.
- 1.4 piece of eight for the decrees of the *Conservatori del Mare*, probably the convocation of the insurers and the order to proceed with the calculation.
- 8 pieces of eight for the *Conservatori*.
- 8 pieces of eight for the *calcolatore's* fee.
- 4 pieces of eight for the approval of the calculation.
- 4 pieces of eight for the lawyer, Giovanni Bianchi.
- 7 pieces of eight for the *sindaco* to estimate the vessel and the damages.
- 4 pieces of eight to the subchancellors of the *Conservatori*.
- 1 piece of eight for a copy of the calculation.
- 0.8 pieces of eight for the *traglietta* of the *Conservatori*.

It is significant that out of approximately 130 pieces of eight of damage, 44 amounted to procedural expenses related to the trial, a figure equal to approximately 33% of the total. The contribution rate was only 1.6.7 pieces of eight out of 100. The *patrone* obtained the recognition of his GA and the reimbursement of the requested amount.

5.4 False Reports and Frauds

⁹⁹ ASG, *CdM*, Atti Civili 124, 12/08/1669.

In addition to the problems that emerge from the *Atti Civili*, another phenomenon often denounced by the authorities was that of false reports. The constant concern of the *Conservatori del Mare* throughout the seventeenth century was how to correctly fill in the shipmasters' reports.¹⁰⁰ Strict compliance with the procedure would have allowed to avoid, or at least recognize, false reports more easily. Being able to prove the falsity or irregularity of a report, however, especially in a phase in which this type of document was undergoing increasing standardization and the shipmaster and his crew were increasingly the only men on board, was an arduous task and was probably doomed to failure. An unscrupulous shipmaster, with the complicity of his crew, could easily escape institutional control attempts. This was especially true in small-scale coastal shipping. The eighteenth-century economist Ferdinando Galiani, for example, considered fraud in this sector almost a "consubstantial" element associated with trading.¹⁰¹ This led merchants and businessmen involved in maritime trade to seek solutions independently even outside the boundaries of ordinary justice.

In 1654, the *Conservatori del Mare* wrote to the *Senato* of the Republic of Genoa to denounce how the drafting of the shipmasters' reports was but a mere formality that everyone could carry out to mask any type of accident, wilful theft or simple misfortune:

The making of *consolati* is now reduced to a simple formality, which encourages more quickly the committing of crimes of fraud in order to cover up those of barratry and theft, than to achieve the purpose for which it was introduced by the *Statuti Civili* in Chapter 16 of book 4, *de iactu et forma in eo tenenda*. The disposition of which statute being manifestly violated, it is necessary to mandate its observance by ordering that both here in Genoa and in the Dominion, as well as outside of it in those Kingdoms, Provinces, Cities, and places where there are consuls of the Genoese nation, the form of the said statute be observed by anyone.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ See par.3.5.

¹⁰¹ M. Gangemi, *Esportazioni calabresi nel XVIII secolo. Le tratte di «seccamenti, salumi, tavole, legnami ed altro»*, Naples, 1991, 83.

¹⁰² "Il far de Consolati è hoggidì ridotto ad una semplice formalità, la quale invita più presto a commettere delitti di falsità per coprir quelli delle baratterie e de furti, che a conseguire il fine per il quale n'è stato introdotto l'uso dallo Statuto Civile al libro 4 del cap. 16 de iactu et forma in eo tenenda, la disposizione del quale statuto essendo con manifesto abuso violata, è necessario incaricare l'osservanza con ordinare che tanto qui in Genova e nel Dominio, quanto fuori di esso in quelli Regni, Province, Città, e luoghi ove sono consoli della nazione genovese sia ad unquem osservata la forma di detto statuto". ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 27/11/1654.

This practice clearly emerges also from the analysis of the documentation examined thus far, especially when observing the high number of cases not accompanied by calculations or other supporting documents, the presence of declarations with unusual events that could not be proven in any way, or the numerous complaints filed in by the same *patrone*.

For example, a case of 'extraordinary' bad luck, to say the least, were the voyages of the *patrone* Prospero Schiaffino, author of four GA reports in one year, 1598.¹⁰³ Schiaffino was a Genoese citizen residing in Majorca, *patrone* of a vessel indifferently mentioned in the sources as *San Theramo* or *San Theramo Buonaventura*.¹⁰⁴ His first known voyage, which took place in April, was from Cadiz and Majorca to Genoa and Livorno, with a load of different goods, including sarsaparilla, a medicinal plant from the West Indies.¹⁰⁵ In the second half of the voyage, probably due to bad weather, the vessel took refuge at the promontory of Portofino, 15 nautical miles from Genoa, and declared a GA.¹⁰⁶ Although we do not have much information regarding the calculation, we know that the vessel suffered damage equal to 1,023.03.04 Genoese *lire*.¹⁰⁷ The ship was worth 5,000 Genoese *lire*, while the cargo of sarsaparilla and other goods, including probably other 'colonial' products that were re-exported from Cadiz throughout Europe, were worth 122,550.6.7 Genoese *lire*. The damages, therefore, amounted to only 0.8% of the value of the contributing elements, and the merchants involved probably paid for it without raising any issues, rather than investigating the accident or appealing to the *Conservatori*.

After a few months, probably in May of the same year, Schiaffino was back in Cadiz, from which he departed with another cargo of products from overseas to be delivered to Genoa and Livorno.¹⁰⁸ Again, he took refuge in Portofino before arriving in Genoa to declare a GA report. However, this time, the *Conservatori del Mare* ordered a PA calculation, in which the only contributing element was a cargo of leather from India worth 35,000 Genoese *lire*. The damages amounted

¹⁰³ These voyages are recorded in the *AveTransRisk* online db as the id 50075, id 50099, id 50115, and id 50125.

¹⁰⁴ The name *San Theramo* and its derivatives was widespread in medieval times. It is a deformation of St. Erasmus, saint of sailors. See V. Polonio, 'Devozioni marinare dall'osservatorio ligure (secoli XII-XVII)', *Quaderni di Storia Religiosa*, XV, 2008, 243-315, 252-254.

¹⁰⁵ On its functions and description, see Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia, "Monocotyledon", *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/plant/monocotyledon>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

¹⁰⁶ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50075.

¹⁰⁷ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50075.

¹⁰⁸ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50115.

to 2,597.4.8 Genoese *lire*, approximately 7.4% of the total.¹⁰⁹ It is possible that the voyage from Genoa to Cadiz before loading the cargo happened with an empty hold, especially considering the relatively short interval between the date of the previous calculation and that of the new one. The problem of finding advantageous return cargoes was common in maritime traffic headed to Genoa.¹¹⁰

For the next cargo, Schiaffino sailed to the eastern coast of Spain in the area between Tortosa, Ibiza and Ampola.¹¹¹ Among these ports, probably in October 1598, he loaded wool, apples, spices and salt to take to Genoa. Even in this case, we do not know the drafting date of the report, the nature of the accident, or the place where it was drafted, which could have been Portofino again. According to the GA calculation drawn up in November, the resulting damages were 491 Genoese *lire*, with a contributing value of 39,837.9 Genoese *lire*. Damage was equal to approximately 1.2% of the total.¹¹² It was an extremely low figure, which did not significantly affect the merchants' interests. Oddly, this time, the *calcolatori* in Genoa estimated the contributing value of the vessel at 7,000 Genoese *lire*, compared to the previous 5,000 *lire* made in April. The vessel had probably been more damaged, following the two accidents that had occurred in the meantime. This overestimate could be due to some new equipment acquired after the previous accidents, or it could be that the *calcolatori* decided to increase the percentage paid by the vessel, by almost 30%, to discourage the frequent GA claims made by Schiaffino.¹¹³

Schiaffino had yet another accident during 1598.¹¹⁴ The *patrone* left Genoa between November and December 1598 to go to Tabarka, with an unknown cargo. He arrived there in December.¹¹⁵ After the unloading and loading procedures, he left again on 31 December 1598 and finally arrived in Genoa on January 1599. There, he first submitted an Average report drawn up in Tabarka on 31 December 1598 to declare that he had faced a storm during the Genoa-

¹⁰⁹ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50115.

¹¹⁰ Grendi, 'Il traffico portuale', 309.

¹¹¹ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50099.

¹¹² Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50099.

¹¹³ It is unlikely that it was a different vessel, as the name would also have had to be changed, or at least the new name would have been added after the old one, as was the custom in Genoa, see Polonio, 'Devozioni marinare', 243-315.

¹¹⁴ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50125.

¹¹⁵ As already stated in previous Chapters, Tabarka was a small island belonging to the Spanish crown, managed under contract by the Genoese Lomellini family. It was known for the redistribution of coral and barbaric products, among which wheat. On the Genoese administration of Tabarka and its trade see Piccinno, *Un' impresa fra terra e mare*.

Tabarka route. Then, he had another report drafted because of another storm faced on the way back on the Tabarka-Genoa route.¹¹⁶ The declaration drawn up in Tabarka specified the vessel's tonnage, which turned out to be 1,500 Genoese *salme* (285.84 tons). This time, the Genoese authorities were suspicious of Schiaffino's reports: both reports were refused, and no calculation was ordered. This is the last voyage on which we have information, but it is proof of the high level of familiarity of the Genoese shipmasters and *patroni* with the instrument of Average reports. This tool, in Schiaffino's exceptional case, allows us to follow the routes and voyages of a *patrone* over the course of an entire year and over 5,000 nautical miles across the western and southern Mediterranean Sea.

Although there may truly be cases of particularly unlucky voyages and shipmasters such as Schiaffino, these situations also highlight the difficulty of the authorities in verifying the truthfulness of the claims of the shipmasters who came to Genoa to declare their reports. If the shipmaster travelled only with his crew, all of them his own countrymen or relatives, perhaps on a small vessel, it should not be difficult to agree among themselves to 'disguise' ordinary accidents and pass them off as GA events. The authorities were well aware of this situation, as were obviously the merchants who entrusted their goods to the seamen, but they did not always have the tools to discover false reports. Let us take, for example, the voyage of the *patrone* Curzius Priscopus with his *tartana* named *San Filippo Nero*.¹¹⁷ The vessel left Naples on 6 August 1640, with a load of wine to be brought to Genoa on behalf of the local *Provvisori del Vino*.¹¹⁸ When Priscopus arrived in Genoa, on 4 September of the same year, the *patrone* made his report in front of the *Annona* office. The vessel encountered a *tartana* of French pirates when in sight of Mount Sercelli, near the beach of Legola, a place of uncertain identification. The *patrone* and the crew quickly beached the vessel and left the place to save their lives. Suddenly, however, some unidentified musketeers came down the mountain overlooking the beach and chased away the pirates, who, in the meantime, had stolen a bag with two

¹¹⁶ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50125.

¹¹⁷ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50387.

¹¹⁸ This magistracy was born in 1588 with the purpose of ensuring and control the supply of wine to Genoa, see P. Calcagno, L. Lo Basso, 'I provvisori del vino della repubblica di Genova: una politica annonaria tra ricerca del profitto e finalità di controllo territoriale (sec. XVI-XVIII)', in A. Carassale, L. Lo Basso eds., *In terra vineata. La vite e il vino in Liguria e nelle Alpi Marittime dal Medioevo ai nostri giorni*, Ventimiglia, 2014, 243-259; Massa, *Lineamenti di organizzazione*, 79-81.

shirts, a new coat worth three *ecus* and had broken two barrels of wine (159 lt.) out of the seventy (5,565 lt.) which were loaded on board. According to what was stated in the report, the *patrone* decided to donate part of the remaining wine to the musketeers to thank them for the help received: “and for this reason the wine is almost all there, he took only enough to give it to the persons who came to save him”. It would have been impossible to confirm or deny the authenticity of this declaration, and nothing could guarantee that the crew had not simply consumed an extra ration of wine during the voyage, drawing from those very goods that they were supposed to deliver. Perhaps for this reason, no calculation followed.

A similar situation occurred during the voyage of the *patrone* Andrea Arseno de Milani of Lavagna on his *pinco* called *Nostra Signora del Rosario e San Giuseppe*.¹¹⁹ De Milani left Naples in 1697 with a cargo of wine to sell in Genoa. Once in the Ligurian port, he managed to sell the cargo to Stefano and Pier Francesco Lomellini, who asked him to take it to Tabarka. Bad weather, however, considerably slowed down what would have usually been a couple weeks long journey.¹²⁰ After leaving Genoa on 5 October 1697, the *patrone* stopped in Portofino the following 13 days, waiting for favourable winds. He arrived in Calvi, Corsica, on 22 October, where he had to stop again for another 11 days. Afterwards, he stopped again for 12 days on the island of Asinara, and eventually, he reached Portoscuso in Sardinia, where he had to take refuge once again due to bad weather. According to the declarations of the *patrone*, the stop in Portoscuso lasted four months and several days, during which they had tried three times to leave the port. The cargo reached Tabarka only on 13 March 1698, more than 5 months after the departure from Genoa.

Once in Tabarka, the *patrone* went to the governor of the island, Pier Battista Mainero, to declare his report. The governor administered the island on behalf of the Lomellini and was responsible, among other things, for the free distribution of wine and oil to the inhabitants.¹²¹ In addition to reporting the

¹¹⁹ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50442.

¹²⁰ For travel times, seasonality of routes, and flows of goods to and from Tabarka, see Piccinno, *Un'impresa fra terra e mare*. The documentation in the *AveTransRisk* database shows two Northern vessels that completed the Tabarka-Genoa route in just 7 and 8 days. See the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50227 and 50540. In two other cases of Mediterranean vessels, the voyage time was less than 25 days. See the voyages recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50009 and 50125.

¹²¹ The initial Genoese settlement was constituted by approximately 300 fishermen coming mostly from the area of Pegli. The population grew during the century to reach 1,200-1,300

reasons for the considerable delay and the drenching of part of the cargo, De Milani also reported the count of the barrels of wine unloaded in Tabarka. A total of 230 barrels (18,285 lt.) were duly delivered, while 89 (7,075.5 lt.) went missing after the damage suffered during the storms encountered along the way. Finally, the *patrone* declared that he and his crew had consumed 105 barrels (8,347.5 lt.) of wine, “for their own use”. All the information was recorded regularly in the declaration, to which they added the declarations of the crew members and of some of the representatives of Tabarka. It does not seem that there had been any further investigations, despite the crew having drunk on average more than half a barrel of wine (39.75 lt.) a day during the previous 5 months.¹²² The governor did not seem interested in the way in which the goods destined for the inhabitants of Tabarka had been used by the crew. Perhaps this ‘benevolence’ allowed to avoid formally resorting to legal action. The *patrone* could have theoretically asked for a refund for the unexpected stops he had suffered due to the bad weather. In that case, the matter ought to have been settled before a judge.¹²³ We do not know if De Milani asked for compensation from his insurers. The declaration ends merely with the signature of the governor. It was submitted in Genoa on 16 June 1698, where it was not followed by any calculation.

According to the *Conservatori del Mare*, the main problem linked to false reports was that the merchants often colluded with the shipmasters and did not report the frauds and unjustified calculations that followed. In a report of 1690 to the Senate, the *Conservatori* reported this behaviour, adducing as an example the events linked to the report of the *patrone* Filippo del Canto.¹²⁴ The latter loaded his vessel with goods, wheat perhaps, at the Cape of Goro, near Venice. It is unclear whether the goods travelled on behalf of some merchants or if they belonged to the shipmaster himself. Del Canto headed from Goro to Corfu, where he sold his cargo and resumed the journey to Messina. In the Gulf of Messina, he gave the order to sink the vessel, which was abandoned, while he and the crew headed to Messina with his *schifo* and asked to draw up a report

individuals at the beginning of the eighteenth century; the Lomellini family provided to the sustenance of the population. See Piccinno, ‘Alleanze, conflittualità e diplomazia’, 15-42.

¹²² The crew of a *pinco* depended on the size of the vessel. According to the research of Gatti it could vary between 12 and 26 men. See Gatti, *Navi e cantieri*, 215-216.

¹²³ Irregular *stallie*, i.e., not agreed in advance, were regulated by a judge who decreed the reimbursement due to the shipmaster. See Targa, *Ponderationi*, 165-166.

¹²⁴ ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 16/09/1690. See a transcription of this document in [Appendix II](#).

there. In the report, Del Canto declared that he had been attacked by Turkish pirates at the Cape of Milo, an unspecified location, probably near Sicily. A *patrone* who insured his vessel and then deliberately sank it was the typical case of maritime barratry.¹²⁵ Nothing could prove the report falsehood. The selling of the cargo in Corfu, if bought in good faith by the buyers, was valid and nonterminable.¹²⁶ The owner of the goods that had been loaded and resold by the *patrone* could not ask for a refund from the insurers, who did not cover the damage from barratry. He could have only bought back his own goods at the selling price from the new owner.¹²⁷

One of the sailors, however, thwarted Del Canto's fraud. Gio. Paolo Tarascone, to "ease his own conscience", reported the incident in front of the Genoese consul in Naples, Benedetto Valdetaro, where perhaps the crew had stopped after Messina.¹²⁸ Because of this, the *patrone* murdered his own sailor. This act was the focal point in the report drawn up by the *Conservatori* of Genoa. The *patrone* Filippo del Canto was judged *in absentia* for the murder of Gio. Paolo Tarascone. However, there was no condemnation for the fake report, and it was not possible to impose any criminal responsibility on him in this respect. The *Conservatori del Mare* asked for the possibility of proceeding *ex officio* and autonomously against *patroni* and shipmasters who issued false declarations without waiting for the merchants to denounce them. For the same reason, the *Conservatori* also asked that any informer would benefit from immunity, a prize and anonymity to avoid the repetition of similar events. As already noted, these frauds led to the enactment of the decree of 1698. The decree included the countermeasures proposed by the *Conservatori*, but did not put an end to a phenomenon that was difficult to control, although apparently

¹²⁵ Rossi, 'The barratry of the shipmaster', 80. These frauds usually occurred to cover up the deterioration of a vessel: the declaration proclaimed the good quality of a vessel that in reality would need maintenance or had reached the end of its useful life. On the widespread unscrupulousness behaviour of shipmasters, see the diary of S. Pepys published from Project Gutenberg, *The diary of Samuel Pepys, daily entries from the 17th century London diary*, 01/12/1663, available on <https://www.pepysdiary.com/diary/1663/12/01/>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

¹²⁶ Targa reports two similar judgments: one occurred in 1677 in the dispute between the *patrone* Giuseppe Barilaro and Giovan Battista Borrea, of Sanremo; the other one happened in 1685 in the dispute between the *patrone* Ambrogio Amoreto of Oneglia who bought 200 Sicilian *salme* (42.94 tons) of *rocella* wheat in Livorno from a *patrone* of Sturla. See Targa, *Ponderationi*, 307.

¹²⁷ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 307. On the definition of barratry as an abuse of authority by the shipmaster and its legal evolution, particularly as it relates to insurance practice, see Rossi, 'The barratry of the shipmaster', 65-85.

¹²⁸ "disgravio della propria coscienza". On the activity of Genoese consuls in Naples, see Brancaccio, "*Nazione genovese*".

rare. In a report of the same year, a request was made to explicitly extend the decree to the owners of *pinchi*, *leudi* and *tartane*, small vessels that had previously probably been excluded.¹²⁹

In 1705, however, the *Conservatori* still complained about the existence of strategies by merchants that made it difficult to eradicate this phenomenon.¹³⁰ The *Conservatori*, recalling the turmoil preceding the 1698 law and those that were still taking place, highlighted the low impact of an edict, which had cost almost fifty years of debates and memorials. The false reports led to GA calculations that were in good faith validated by Genoese magistracies, thus legitimizing the fraud. This unlawful practice caused damage mainly to the merchants and the insurers, yet often they did not take any legal action. According to the *Conservatori del Mare*, the reason for this was that the injured party preferred to keep the fraudulent shipmasters or *patroni* in debt, trusting that they would be able to reach an out-of-court settlement, rather than risk wasting more time and money in official litigation:

[...] the main obstacle, which existed before this law, was that it was not possible to proceed in the above cases except at the request of the offended party following the former's complaint, promise and signature, according to the Criminal Statutes of Genoa under the Chapter *quod accusans, vel denunciary caveat*. Most of the time, the offenders avoid doing it, in order to keep their debtors in the faith of some adjustment, with the aim of recouping some portions of the credit, and not to lose their own [money] entirely. Which is the main concern for the offended, more than whatever punishment the offenders of such abuses may suffer [...].¹³¹

From such reports there appears to be an 'informal' trust and credit system, of which no other traces have been found yet, but which might be applied to the procedure of the previous years too. This network hindered and circumvented the rules of the Republic and the institutional attempts to standardize the Average institution. The *Conservatori* once again insisted that the procedure be

¹²⁹ ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 16/12/1698. On these different types of vessels, see the table in the 'Terminology' section.

¹³⁰ ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 01/08/1705. For a full transcription, see [Appendix III](#).

¹³¹ "[...] l'impedimento principale, il quale ostava prima di sudetta legge, si riduceva al non potersi procedere ne casi premissi se non ad istanza dell'offeso con la precedente querela, promessa e sigortà, secondo la dispositione del Statuto Criminale di Genova sotto la rubrica *quod accusans, vel denunciary caveat*; ciò che il più delle volte li dannificati schivano di fare, per tenere li rei loro debitori nella fede di qualche aggiusto, con la mira di riccavare d'accordo qualche portione del credito, e non perdere il proprio del tutto premendo più questo a dannificati; che qualonque castigo, subire possano li rei di tali eccessi [...]" ASG, *CdM*, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 01/08/1705. For the full transcription, see [Appendix III](#).

strengthened by renewing the law. The latter was confirmed in 1707 for the following 10 years. Alongside this, they also granted the possibility of proceeding *ex officio*, that is, without a formal complaint by one of the parties, as well as the total control of the drafting and approval of the calculation and the inclusion of the death penalty for those guilty of mendacious statements.¹³² The *Conservatori* maintained their monopoly of maritime justice as the only competent judiciary on Average procedures for the whole Republic. All public authorities of the *Riviera* had to submit to their authority. These measures were still not sufficient to fully structure a practice that, in the end, was based on a criterion of mutual assistance and trust.

5.5 How Not to Write a Report: the *Testimonial* segreti

Finally, there are cases in which the shipmaster's report was openly rejected. Following its approval, the *consolato* or the *testimoniale* was formally “opened and published”. Within the archival folders of the *Conservatori del Mare*, there are two series that presumably reflect the approval or disapproval of the sea protest: *Testimonial* all'estero segreti and *Testimonial* all'estero palesi.¹³³ Most likely, for all those cases in which the conduct of the shipmaster was suspicious, or when the case was dismissed because it could not give rise to a repartition of damages or to an insurance refund, the practice would be classified as a secret report, from the Latin word *secretum*: set aside. The cases in these folders ranged from shipwrecks to much more complex events, often completely unrelated to the most common Average situations. Although these cases prove to be rather useless for the purposes of statistical surveys, due to their uniqueness and the total absence of calculations, they can still be a valuable source of information on navigation techniques, life on board, and the political situation in the context of commercial navigation, particularly that of Genoa during the seventeenth century.

Let us take, for example, the voyage of the 50-year-old *patrone* Jo. Battista Bozano with his *leudo* called *Nostra Signora di Misericordia*, with a capacity of

¹³² France, for example, already applied the death penalty for false reports. See the *consolato* drawn up at the Admiralty of Antibes by the shipmaster Giovanni Maria Cadiz from Marseille. Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50631.

¹³³ On the *Testimonial* all'estero segreti see ASG, *CdM Testimonial* all'estero segreti 277-301, 1709-1796. On the *Testimonial* all'estero palesi see ASG, *CdM, Testimonial* all'estero palesi 302-317, 1709-1796.

300 *mine* (27.3 tons).¹³⁴ The *patrone* was a native of Savona, and he travelled with his 29-year-old son Paolo Bozano and a 75-year-old Alessandro Bozano, who was probably his father, both of whom were sailors: three generations of the same family. The Bozano left Genoa on 25 September 1698 with a cargo of salt transported on behalf of the *Magistrato del Sale* of Genoa.¹³⁵ The cargo was directed to Ceriale, a village on the western coast near Albenga. The departure on that specific date, according to the declaration of the *patrone*, took place at the advice of the *Magistrato del Sale* himself. Shortly after leaving the port, however, the *leudo* found itself facing severe bad weather. The wind tore the sails at Albissola, just 17 nautical miles away from Genoa. The *patrone* therefore decided to stop for repairs in nearby Savona, his birthplace. The bad weather lasted several days, and the *leudo* could return at sea only on 8 October. The voyage continued towards Ceriale without any other accidents. The dock of Ceriale had no pier, so unloading took place near the beach facing the village, thanks to several boats that shuttled between the vessel and the coast. It was a rather slow and inefficient system but one that responded to a precise choice of the Genoese government to control traffic and possible competition from minor or peripheral coastal centres.¹³⁶ Part of the cargo, equal to 149.5 *mine* (13.6 tons) of salt, was unloaded and delivered to Pietro Paolo and Gio. Batta, contractors for the *Magistrato del Sale*. Suddenly, another storm broke out and forced the unloading operation to stop. The crew had to wait for better weather conditions while the vessel remained anchored in front of the beach. At ten in the evening, since the weather had not improved and the darkness would have made the unloading even more dangerous, the *patrone* decided to take shelter behind the nearby Gallinara island, a refuge still used today against the North and West winds.

While Bozano's vessel waited behind the island for the weather to improve, a *tartana* arrived at the mercy of the wind. Its *patrone* was probably seeking

¹³⁴ In the source, the *lembo* is also indicated as a *fregata*. Both were small vessels suitable for cabotage trade, with a capacity between 4 and 29 tons; see Gatti, *Navi e cantieri*, 183-189, 201-211. Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50410. The Bozano were an important family of Ligurian shipowners operating in the area of Varazze in the eighteenth century, see L. Gatti, «Un raggio di convenienza». *Navi mercantili, costruttori e proprietari in Liguria nella prima metà dell'Ottocento*, Genoa, 2008.

¹³⁵ The Casa di *San Giorgio* managed the collection of the tax on salt and its inflow in monopoly. According to the governor of Finale in 1614, the revenue that this magistracy earned was the most important in the Republic, see Calcagno, 'Al pregiudizio de la giurisdizione', 504.

¹³⁶ See par. 2.1. This strategy gave rise to a system of 'widespread portuality' similar to the one described by Carrino, Salvemini, 'porti di campagna', 209-254.

shelter in the same spot, but he had difficulties manoeuvring. This *tartana*, led by a *patrone* that Bozano could not recognize, collided with the *leudo* and tore the mooring cables out of two of the three anchors on the seabed. After evaluating the situation, Bozano decided to perform a very common action amongst the cases of GA — he ordered the cutting of the last anchor cable to avoid ending up on the rocks and let the *leudo* follow the wind without sails. Navigation *alla cappa*, which is without sails while trying to keep the bow or the *mascone* in front of the waves, is the safest way to face a stormy sea with a vessel.¹³⁷ However, the storm was such that it managed to inflate and tear the mainsail. At that point, Bozano decided to order a jettison to lighten the vessel. First, the crew throw the dead weight oversea. The dead weight was usually composed of sand and gravel bags placed on the bottom of the bilge to ensure the stability of the vessel and reduce rolling.¹³⁸ However, in the case of bad weather, the movements of the cargo in the hold could compromise the vessel's balance. Judging that the jettison was not enough, they also jettisoned 45 *mine* (4.09 tons) of salt that they had not been able to unload at Ceriale. Meanwhile, the force of the waves tore the bow ram, a particular type of bow stem, making the *leudo* much more vulnerable to the sea waves.¹³⁹ The *patrone* decided to head towards Savona to avoid a shipwreck. Above the cape of Noli, at 13 miles from the island of Gallinara and only 7.5 miles from Savona, the *schifo* moored at the stern was carried away by the waves, but the vessel still managed to reach the port during the night of 9 October. Once in Savona, the first thing the *patrone* and his sailors did, even before declaring the accident, was to go barefoot to the sanctuary of the *Madonna della Misericordia* in Savona, saint of the city. The men thanked who they deemed to be their saviour.¹⁴⁰ One of the sailors, Cesare Caralto, together with the *patrone's* son Paolo, was sent to collect information on the timings and costs to remake the anchors lost in the voyage. After the procession to the sanctuary, the *patrone*, together with his

¹³⁷ F. Guglielmi, *Guida al diporto nautico*, San Benedetto del Tronto, 2011, 54.

¹³⁸ For a definition of 'zavorra' (dead weight) in the early modern period see *Vocabolario degli accademici della Crusca*, 4th ed., V, Florence, 1729-1738, 356. On the concepts of flotation and ship stability, see Guglielmi, *Guida al diporto*, 16-17.

¹³⁹ The *dritto di prua* is the forward end of the keel, usually reinforced and bulged to reduce resistance to motion and curb pitching movements in a stormy sea, see Guglielmi, *Guida al diporto*, 14-15.

¹⁴⁰ The promise of a pilgrimage or of a donation to the Church was a common practice, on the eve of a casualty or upon safe arrival in port. For an overview of the devotional customs of Ligurian sailors see Polonio, 'Devozioni marinare', 243-315.

son, his father and another sailor, Giuseppe Laura, went to the court of the *vicario* Domenico Solimano to ask for an official report.¹⁴¹

The report is particularly rich in detail and concerns different fortuitous events; however, it is part of the *Testimonialiali all'estero segreti*. This means that the case was not “opened and published” by the *Conservatori del Mare* when it arrived in Genoa on 8 November 1698.¹⁴² Some of the events reported, such as the first tearing of the sails and the stop at Savona and even the clash with the *tartana* near the Gallinara island, certainly did not respond to the requisites of a GA event. The damage suffered should have been attributed to the unknown *tartana*, as it came up against a moored ship, but it had not been possible to recognize the ship or its *patrone*.¹⁴³ The cutting of the anchor’s cable, as well as the subsequent jettison, seemed rather to result in a GA calculation. However, it must be considered that part of the cargo, equal to half the capacity of the hold, had already been unloaded at the time of these accidents. According to Targa, if an accident were to occur when the ship had already begun unloading, the assets already ashore should not contribute in any way, so perhaps the remaining contributing mass was either very low or nonexistent.¹⁴⁴ We do not know the amount of salt left aboard. If there were any at all, it may have been damaged by the water that entered the vessel. Furthermore, since this was a voyage carried out on behalf of a single hirer, the *Magistrato del Sale*, perhaps there was no need for the approval of the report and the *patrone* only needed a declaration of the accident to exempt himself from any responsibility and to request either the payment of the freight rates or exemption from reimbursement for a missed delivery. Finally, another hypothesis is that the report, drafted in Savona, the *patrone*'s hometown, was made with the sole intent of seeking compensation from the *Magistrato del Sale* for the damages suffered by the vessel. Again, according to Targa, who also refers to Chapter 181 of the *Consolat de Mar*, if the hirer insisted that the vessel should go at any cost to a certain port to embark or disembark the goods, he would implicitly

¹⁴¹ Ceriale in medieval times was under the authority of the bishops of the diocese of Albenga. It is probable that even after the passage under the control of the Republic the main authority maintained the title of *vicario*. On the history of Ceriale see the contribution of the scholar Francesco Demichelis on

<https://www.comune.ceriale.sv.it/servizi/Menu/dinamica.aspx?idSezione=568&idArea=4191&idCat=4292&ID=4292&TipoElemento=categoria>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

¹⁴² ASG, *CdM*, *Testimonialiali all'estero segreti* 285, 08/11/1698.

¹⁴³ On damage resulting from collision between vessels see Targa, *Ponderationi*, 234-237. Targa also cites an unidentified treatise of Benvenuto Stracca (1509-1578).

¹⁴⁴ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 177.

assume the maritime risks: “which is to be understood by providing it with assistance, and provisions in other forms”.¹⁴⁵ It was for this reason, perhaps, that in his statement, the *patrone* mentioned the order to set sail in spite of the bad weather, issued by the *Magistrato del Sale* of Genoa.

Unfortunately, there are no other documents that might shed light on this matter, which in any case provides interesting insights. It highlights, as has already been mentioned several times before, the role played by small Ligurian vessels in supplying the coastal territories of the Republic, for which it was easier sending good by sea routes than on the few available roads. Further elements that depict the characteristics of coastal traffic in that area between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are the details on the crew members, with three generations of the same family on board, and the importance of the shipmaster's port of residence. The elements relating to the protection and ‘salvific’ role of local saints also reveal elements of the devotional practices of the Ligurian maritime communities. Turning to the protection of a saint, which could occur through pilgrimage, donations, onomastics of vessels, etc., was something that could attenuate the risks out at sea as much as any ‘modern’ instrument such as a partnership agreement, insurance, or other.¹⁴⁶

Another significant case found within the *Testimonialli all'estero segreti* is the travel of the Genoese *patrone* Aloisio Losardo on his *tartana* named *Nostre Domine dell'Acquasanta*.¹⁴⁷ The first part of his voyage was a typical example of cabotage trade. On 25 November 1697, the *patrone* was in Portopino [or Portospino], in the city of Palma on the island of Majorca, to load oil that would be transported to Genoa. He drew up his report on 13 January 1698 in front of the Genoese consul of Trapani, Giovanni Bernardo Desiderati. How was it possible that regular travel from Majorca to Genoa had taken so long and ended in Trapani, completely off course? The Spanish authorities, to which the Republic of Genoa was politically linked, were responsible for this complex voyage. While the *patrone* of the vessel was in the port waiting to load the oil, he was summoned by commander Gute of the royal galleys of Sicily, whose

¹⁴⁵ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 188.

¹⁴⁶ See Polonio, ‘Devozioni marinare’, 243-315. A. Cabantous, *Le Ciel dans la mer. Christianisme et civilisation maritime (XVIe-XIXe siècle)*, Paris, 1990.

¹⁴⁷ Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id 50445.

squadron was also moored in Majorca.¹⁴⁸ The latter asked Losardo to rent his *tartana* to carry the crew of two galleys to Palermo. The two galleys of Gute's squadron had sunk in the previous days, one in the seas of Lisa [Libya?], and the other near Majorca. The *patrone* tried to protest, explaining that he already had a freight contract for a load of oil to take to Genoa, but the Spanish commander told him that his request would have been a service for the Spanish Crown and that he could not refuse. He was right. As Targa states, in such situations, the Prince [that is, the higher authority] could break freight contracts made with private parties and force any individual to make his property available for the public good. These cases were known as "accident caused by the power of the Prince". Insurers could reimburse these kinds of damages.¹⁴⁹

The report of the Genoese *patrone* does not state the value of the lost freight on the oil shipment. Gute forced Losardo to accept a contract of 750 Sicilian *scudi* (4,125 Genoese *lire*) for the transport of the two crews to Palermo. From his report, it seems that this sum was not enough to compensate for the lost freight. The two crews of the galleys were loaded aboard the *tartana*, and Losardo remained in port awaiting further orders from Gute. We do not know how many men were loaded on the *tartana*. However, considering that the crew of a galley consisted of at least a hundred men to which space for provisions had to be added, it is likely that the vessel was at the limit of its carrying capacity.¹⁵⁰ After a month, however, it was still moored in Majorca. It seems that Gute forced Losardo to wait for two *tartane mozze* that had to deliver supplies for the passengers.¹⁵¹ Even after the two *tartane* arrived, however, Losardo was still forced to keep waiting. After a few more days, he formally raised a complaint to the commander of the galleys. Gute allowed the departure, but at the same time, he decided to modify the contract by reducing the hiring price to 650 Sicilian *scudi* (3,575 Genoese *lire*). The *patrone* obtained 200 Sicilian *scudi* (1,100 Genoese *lire*) as a deposit and promised to receive the rest of the money once he arrived in Palermo. The *tartana* left Majorca on 24 December 1697, on

¹⁴⁸ On the role of the general commander of Spanish galleys in the seventeenth century, see M. Lomas, *Governing the galleys: jurisdiction, justice and trade in the squadrons of the Hispanic monarchy (sixteenth-seventeenth centuries)*, Leiden-Boston, 2020, 22-25.

¹⁴⁹ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 103-114, 187-188.

¹⁵⁰ On the structure of galleys, see Gatti, *Navi e cantieri*: 157-162; V. Favaro, 'La *Escuadra de galeras* del Regno di Sicilia: costruzione, armamento, amministrazione (XVI secolo)', in R. Cancila ed., *Mediterraneo in armi (secc. XV-XVIII)*, Palermo, 2007, 289-314.

¹⁵¹ Food supplies represented the main expenses for the royal galleys, coming to exceed even 50% of the total. Favaro, 'La *Escuadra de galeras*', 300. No further information is available regarding the features of a *tartana mozza*.

“the eve of the nativity of Our Lord”, bound for Porto Colombo [Porto Colom], in Menorca. Here, it would have had to wait to rejoin the royal galleys before continuing to Sicily by sailing in convoy. Bad weather in the channel between the two islands, however, forced him to stop at Port Mahon. Commander Gute was supposed to arrive the following day, but after 14 days he had still not appeared. In the meantime, the supplies on board were running out, and due to the cold weather, the passengers began to fall sick. The *patrone* obtained authorization to leave from the castellan of Port Mahon, despite Gute's previous orders. The castellan drew up a special report in which he indicated the scarcity of supplies and the presence of sick men on board as reasons for immediate departure.¹⁵² On 7 January, the *tartana* finally sailed to Sardinia, its last stop before Palermo. However, their odyssey was not yet over; from the following day on, the weather got so bad that it made it impossible to keep following the original route, and so the vessel had to head towards North Africa, that is, southward. The wind tore the mainsail and the topsail. This set off the *patrone's* decision to proceed with a jettison of the superfluous equipment, water, wine, and other barrels of provisions of the passengers who were above deck, as well as part of the dead weight.

The *patrone* led the vessel back to Sardinia, but bad weather and poor visibility forced him to decide to steer directly towards Sicily, following the direction of the wind. On 11 January, the *tartana* arrived at approximately 20 miles from the island of Marettimo, west of Trapani. Once in sight of the coast, the vessel tried to make *forza di vele*, that is, it tried to exploit the strong wind at the cost of damaging the sails to reach Palermo. During the night, the wind changed again and forced them to move away from the mainland. Out of caution, Losardo decided to spend the night without sails and to try reaching Trapani the following day. When, at one a.m. on 12 January, the passengers of the galleys learned of the decision to wait for dawn of the following day before approaching the coast, they complained strongly, assuring the *patrone* that they had the necessary skills to navigate and make the landing even in the dark and “with their eyes closed”. When faced with Losardo's refusal, the galleys' sailors took possession of the *tartana* by force, promising to lead it to safety. That is how at three a.m. that morning, near the Sant'Antonio a mare tower, the *tartana*

¹⁵² Illnesses that affected the crew and deprived the vessel of the sailors, perhaps forcing the crew to abandon the vessel were, according to Targa, among the “fatal incidents”. See Targa, *Ponderationi*, 291-292.

ran aground on the rocks. As they could not see exactly how they were positioned, they lowered an anchor from the left side of the vessel to try to immobilize it.

The *patrone* managed to regain control of his *tartana* and ordered to fire a few shots to attract the attention of any nearby vessel. In the meantime, he decided to lighten the vessel further by jettisoning more equipment into the sea. The passengers, fearing that the *patrone* wanted to escape with his crew aboard the *schifo*, began to crowd into the small boat, despite the attempts of one of their officers to stop them by drawing his sword. Perhaps also due to the excessive weight, the *schifo* had to be loosened from the *tartana* and left to drift. It sank immediately, causing many of its occupants to drown and the others to return on board. After an hour and a half in this precarious situation, the only cable holding the *tartana* in place tore and, since because of the jettison they had nothing else to use to reinforce their mooring, the hull ended up smashing against the rocks. After another hour from the shipwreck, the *patrone* dived in from the wreck of the *tartana* “into the sea, naked and without anything, as his mother made him”. Due to an alleged miracle of the Holy Virgin of Trapani, a ship coming from Trapani immediately rescued him. This vessel had probably set sail at night to come to their aid after hearing the shots. Losardo, almost frozen to death, was taken to a larger vessel, given some dry clothes, and kept warm by a brazier. After that, he was transferred to the *tartana* of a Genoese *patrone*, Francesco Lupo. The following morning, Lupo helped him return to the wreck of *Nostra Domine dell’Acquasanta* to save the surviving crew and passengers, check the damage and recover the chest that held Losardo’s money and documents. His chest, however, had been forced open overnight, resulting in missing goods worth approximately 350 pieces of eight. Sailors Matteo Villa and Gio. Batta Lavaggi reported that they could only save a bag of 10 Sardinian *ecus*, possibly part of the payment received from the commander of the galleys. Similarly, the goods that the *patrone*, his pursue Francesco Russo and some other sailors had loaded had been lost or damaged. The shipwreck also caused the loss of the logbook and all the documents relating to the cargo, so it was difficult to quantify the amount of damage.

The statements of the seamen who were part of the crew accurately matched the declaration of their *patrone*. However, it was suspicious that even the moments when Losardo found himself alone were recounted by the sailors with

the same wealth of detail. This suggests that the crew had ‘agreed’ in advance to issue uniform declarations. The report also includes the declaration of Michael Honphrius Silvera, soldier of the royal galleys. This statement is interesting, as it represents a glimpse into the perception of the journey and the obstacles posed by a passenger. It is a short statement. The soldier claimed to have been partly above deck and partly below deck and recounted how his companions “wept” at the news of being headed for Barbary, probably fearing being captured by the local pirates. The sailors of the *tartana*, on the other hand, “wept” when they were forced to move away from the coast of Sicily after the first attempted approach. The *patrone*'s report clearly shows the intention to place the responsibility for the accident on the crews of the two galleys to free himself and his crew. Silvera himself said he had heard the *patrone* complaining about how it was their fault that they had been shipwrecked on the rocks.¹⁵³ Silvera’ story depicts a much more ‘empathetic’ narrative of what happened, with moments of shared despair of both the sailors and soldiers, all of them at the mercy of an unknown and unpredictable fate.

The dynamics of the facts and the statements mentioned lead us to wonder why this complaint is among the *Testimonialii segreti all'estero*. During this troubled voyage there were two jettisons. The first was made on 7 January to head towards Sardinia after the bad weather had forced the vessel to deviate towards Barbary. However, even after the jettison, the *patrone* could not follow the route, so the jettison had been unable to increase the manoeuvrability of the vessel. The next jettison had been made to free the vessel from the rocks, but that attempt still resulted in a shipwreck, so even in this case, the jettison had proved useless. In addition, it is good to remember the very same principle underlying an act of GA — it is necessary for common salvation, but its ultimate goal is the distribution of damages among all parties involved in the shipment. In this case, there were no goods belonging to different owners. All the goods loaded on board were the property of the *patrone* and his men. The provisions and the crew's assets, provided they did not exceed the value of each *canterata*, did not contribute in the event of a jettison. The two crews for which the freight had been paid could not be considered ‘cargo’. Moreover, the

¹⁵³ Spanish legislation explicitly protected soldiers in the galleys. In the military ordinance of 1632, an article specified that no magistrate could charge a soldier with any crime except robbery or treason. See Lomas, *Governing the galleys*, 50. Losardo was therefore in a condition of disadvantage.

passengers and their assets did not contribute to a GA calculation. The most likely reason why the *patrone* decided to declare his report, beyond simply reporting the news, could have been due to the need to go to Palermo to ask for the rest of the agreed freight or at least a percentage of it for the journey to Trapani. The freight was not due in the event of nondelivery of the goods, except in the case of either jettison or *germinamento*.¹⁵⁴ Perhaps by blaming the crews of the galleys, Losardo could free himself and his crew from any responsibility for the accident and seek compensation directly from Commander Gute. The revolt of the passengers on board was a classic case of a fatal accident, which usually occurred when there were soldiers on board, as in this case.¹⁵⁵ Targa himself was wary of such situations, as they were particularly difficult to keep under control. He mentioned the authority of the Gospel and of classical authors such as Ovid to encourage harmony among the passengers. Moreover, the abandonment of the *schifo* with the men on board and their subsequent death was a serious matter that probably had to be amply justified and documented. Even in this case, however, there are no further documents to shed light on the accident. On 5 June 1698, approximately 6 months later, the report had been submitted and kept in the *Testimonialiali all'estero segreti* folders.

The Average acts, as has already been remarked in the previous pages, are not limited to the jettison and voluntary sacrifice of equipment required to escape a storm, as the jurisprudential literature would suggest. Although the *Lex Rhodia* and its subsequent regulations, including the Genoese statutes, mainly focused on this aspect, the progressive expansion of this institution led to ever new and different situations. Furthermore, the relative simplicity and speed of the procedure allowed a certain margin of action to the shipmasters, who could exploit the legislation for different and rarely explicit purposes at the time of drafting their report. Those same authorities, as noted regarding the memoranda drawn up by the *Conservatori del Mare*, tried to favour the shipmaster's reporting at their chancellery to avoid extrajudicial agreements and possible fraud, but this inevitably resulted in simplifications to speed up the procedure.

While jurists could also provide partial justifications for the extension of the GA concept towards liminal practices such as shipwrecks and encounters with

¹⁵⁴ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 103.

¹⁵⁵ Targa, *Ponderationi*, 289-290.

pirates, the sources examined often seem to move in an autonomous direction and, in a certain sense, towards a more external 'front' than the legislation. The *Testimonialia all'estero segreti* go even further, situating themselves in a sort of no man's land, where each aberrant case was unique in terms of the variability of situations and the impossibility of applying a uniform procedure. The jurists, with their judgements, pursued different types of practices, specifying case by case the behaviours to follow when the content of the rules was not enough. However, they could not encompass the entire variety of situations that occurred during sea voyages. Despite this dynamism, moreover, the *Statuti Civili* and the many regulations of the judiciary remained unchanged. The laws underwent only slight and slow changes. They represented a most formal authority that was inevitably sliding towards a way of facing the current reality and whose role was increasingly a 'façade' — unmovable landmarks with different degrees of application in daily practices.

Conclusion

This dissertation offers preliminary insights into how an economic-quantitative approach to Average documentary evidence, can help to reconstruct the structure of European maritime traffic, providing insights into the links and relationships between the players involved in the shipping business. The analysis of more than eight hundred Average procedures, preserved in the State Archives of Genoa and drawn up between 1590 and 1700, allowed this in-depth study. Average procedures proved to be a sufficiently homogeneous and representative source: depending on the year chosen, they account for up to 60% of the total number of vessels over 1,500 *cantari*, (71.46 tons.) annually entering the port of Genoa.¹ The analysis on this source allows to formulate multiple hypothesis on hitherto hardly investigated aspects of the Genoese maritime trade, which underwent significant changes between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. It was possible as well to investigate in detail the 'asynchronous' configuration, compared to other European markets, of the Average procedure in Genoa and the way in which this procedure was applied and overseen by the institutions involved.

The analysis follows two research axes, the normative/procedural one and the historical-economic one, based on data analysis. I frequently compared the abundant data coming from Average procedures with the regulations adopted by the Republic of Genoa. The analysis of the normative sources allows also to contextualise procedures followed in Genoa into the wider European context. The application of the rules was evaluated for each of the cases examined, especially in the last Chapter, in order to assess their actual impact on daily practices. Relying on the wealth of information extrapolated from the procedures drawn up under the jurisdiction of the magistracies of the *calcolatori* or the *Conservatori del Mare*, and applying a methodology that allowed for both a quantitative long-term approach and a qualitative one, I analysed the maritime trade and routes headed to the Republic of Genoa in the seventeenth century. The choice of the Republic of Genoa as an observation point allowed the close examination of some phenomena such as the different importance of foreign shipping in the seventeenth century Mediterranean Sea, its evolution, or the sea risks connected to early modern shipping. In this context, the port of Genoa

¹ See chap. 4.

played a fundamental role, not only within the 'economic policies' of the Republic in the seventeenth century, as shown in Chapter Two, but also in the general economy of European trade, for which it played as an important regional role.

This analysis allowed a wider reflection on the question of the existence of shared rules within the Mediterranean. For a long time, historians have identified Average legislation in Europe as evidence of the existence of a *Lex Maritima*, universally adopted and shared by merchants, intended as the law and customs developed in seventeenth-century Europe to govern international commercial shipping.² William Tetley, in particular, presented GA procedure's history as a straightforward evolution of rules shared by most European countries.³ The *Lex Maritima* historiographical debate is part of the wider debate on *Lex Mercatoria*.⁴ The English writer Gerard de Malynes first popularised this idea in 1622.⁵ He opposed *Lex Mercatoria* to contemporary English common law. The contemporary supporters of *Lex Mercatoria* argue that non-institutional actors, when allowed to thrive, provided more efficient solutions to the problem of mercantile justice than state institutions.⁶ In this perspective, *Lex Mercatoria* and *Lex Maritima* are presented together as evidence of the historical existence of a natural solution for mercantile justice, without the interference of states. According to Emily Kadens, there is no historical evidence of such universal set of rules, but rather of "iura mercatorum, the laws of merchants: bundles of public privileges and private practices, public statutes and private customs".⁷

The state, however, played out a vital role in the Average rules process of formation and consolidation. The simple fact that the basic principles of the institution of GA survived with few changes from classical Greece to the contemporary period encouraged scholars between the nineteenth and the

² 'Lex maritima', in A.X. Fellmeth, M. Horwitz, *Guide to Latin in international law*, Oxford, 2009. See also A. Cordes, 'Lex Maritima? Local, Regional and Universal Maritime law in the Middle Ages', in Blockmans, Krom, Wubs-Mrowewicz eds., *The Routledge Handbook*, 69-85.

³ W. Tetley, 'The general maritime law: the lex maritima in arbitration law and the conflict of laws', *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce* 20, 1994, 105-45.

⁴ On this topic, see Cordes, 'Lex maritima?'; E Kadens., 'The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant', *Texas Law Review* 90, 2012, 1153-206. A. Cordes, 'The Search for a Medieval lex mercatoria', in Piergiovanni ed., *From lex mercatoria*, 53-67.

⁵ G. Malynes, *Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria: or, the Ancient Law-Merchant...*, London, 1629. On the conceptualization of the *Lex Mercatoria*, see D. De ruyscher, 'Conceptualising lex mercatoria: Malynes, Schmitthoff and Goldman Compared', *Maastricht Journal for European and Comparative Law*, forthcoming. A recent reconstruction of the debates linked to *Lex Maritima* and GA is in Dreijer, *The power and pains*, 37-41.

⁶ Kadens, 'The Myth', 1153-1154.

⁷ E. Kadens, 'Order within Law, Variety within Custom: The Character of the Medieval Law Merchant', *Chicago Journal of International Law* 139, 2004, 39-65, 42.

twentieth centuries to look at the set of Average rules enacted in the early modern period as a simple linear development. This evolution originates from the multiple law systems following the end of the Roman Empire and culminates in the 'neo-classical' return to a shared set of rules accepted by different countries following the adoption of the York-Antwerp Rules (YAR), established for the first time in 1890. The YAR, the international convention which still regulates the GA procedure today and which is subject to periodic revisions, perhaps resembles more the ancient *Lex Rhodia* than the various European regulations, which developed in the course of the early modern period.

The historical development of regulations in the Mediterranean area, often simplified by jurists and scholars by referring simply to the *Consolat de Mar* and the *Lex Rhodia*, was in actual practice a complex and original phenomenon. The *Consolat* imposed itself, without doubt, as an important point of reference for the European legal world and for subsequent normative elaborations. This did not imply, however, an a-critical acceptance by each legislating state of its rules. Moreover, as argued in Chapter Three, the *Consolat* itself was largely the result of influences coming from outside the Catalan city of Barcelona and, in relation to the Genoese case, from set of rules such as the statutes of the Genoese colony of Pera.⁸

The analysis of the legislation produced and adopted in Genoa, therefore, challenge the concept of the *Lex Maritima* defined above: the Genoese Average legislation reflects the peculiarities of the Republic of Genoa in the early modern period. Such peculiarities clearly emerge in the process of state formation of the Genoese Republic, examined in the First Chapter. The Republic of Genoa was an oligarchy of merchants, financiers and businessmen. The ruling elite legislated on the basis of their own political and economic interests.

In Genoa the *Statuti Civili*, the main corpus of laws of the Republic from 1589 to the eighteenth century, regulated Average and other institutions linked to shipping, such as insurance. These Statutes contain two Chapters on the Average procedure: one regarding the operations to follow in navigation in case of a GA event, in particular in the case of jettison, while the other regarding the institution of the *calcolatori* magistracy, in charge of drawing up the apportionment calculations for GA and PA procedures. This legislation did not

⁸ As stated in par. 3.3, it is believed that the statutes of Pera were a copy of the statutes adopted in the capital, Genoa. The influence on the *Consolat*, therefore, derived in part from the normative production of Genoa.

change in the following centuries. Genoese jurists at the end of the seventeenth and at the beginning of the eighteenth century, therefore, published legal treatises providing extensive interpretations of these rules in order to better frame Genoese practice in the context of 'international law'. For example, according to the jurists Casaregi and Targa, and despite what was written in the *Statuti Civili*, daily practice in Genoa followed the procedures of the *Consolat de Mar*. According to Casaregi, in addition to the *Consolat de Mar*, the Genoese magistracies also followed the *Lex Rhodia* as described in Justinian's *Digest*: a typical example of *Lex Maritima*. Everyday practice, however, belies these statements.

One of the most important elements of divergence between Genoese regulations and those of other Mediterranean countries can be found in the different contribution criteria for GA calculations in the first half of the seventeenth century. The analysis of the procedures preserved in the State Archives has shown that in Genoa an original system was used to calculate the contribution to the value of the ship: the vessel contributed for its entire value, and not for half or a third, as was the case in other ports such as Livorno. The contribution for the whole vessel value has two interconnected consequences: a higher contribution for shipowners and a wider redistribution of damages among all involved capitals for merchants.

In the course of the damage apportionment procedure in a GA calculation, all the involved parties formed a sort of temporary partnership. The same principle is evident across all European legal traditions, and also in Islamic regulations on Averages.⁹ However, from a technical jurisprudential perspective, the whole issue of whether GA was effectively supported by a 'tacit' partnership remains a contested matter.¹⁰

An evidence of this silent partnership could reside in the different criteria followed in the assets' estimate. In many ports, for example, the vessel only contributed for half of its value, determining lower transaction costs for the shipowners. It is possible that a sort of 'compensation' was given to the shipowner, who in the past often coincided with the shipmaster, because he

⁹ A.L. Udovitch, 'An Eleventh Century Islamic Treatise on the Law of the Sea', *Annales Islamologique* 27, 1993, 37-54, 51.

¹⁰ See Fusaro's and Addobbati's contributions in Addobbati, Fusaro, Piccinno eds., *Sharing risks*. For a contemporary analysis of GA as an 'implied contract' see also the considerations of G.M. Gauci, 'Of Piracy and General Average: Contribution in General Average for Ransom Payment Occasioned by Piratical Activity', *Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce* 50/2, 2019, 235-255.

physically took part in the voyage. The protection of the 'partner' who risked his own life during a sea voyage, for example, was established in other credit and risk management instruments such as the medieval *commenda*: in the *commenda* the *socius tractans* was better protected than those who invested goods and capitals without undertaking the voyage.¹¹ The equal treatment in Genoa, i.e. the absence of specific incentives for shipowners, probably reflects the atypical nature of the Genoese government. Although the aristocracy maintained an interest in the shipowning sector, the merchant marine experienced a decline in the second half of the sixteenth century. The 1589 *Statuti Civili* were drafted at the height of this downward phase in Genoese shipping. This factor may have influenced the application of a principle that seemed to benefit only merchants. In the years immediately following the promulgation of the *Statuti Civili* grain shortage had led to the 'Northern Invasion', which caused an increasing presence and availability of foreign vessels in the Mediterranean. No one argues anymore that the Northerners' arrival led inevitably and relatively quickly to their pre-eminence in Mediterranean maritime trade, and it is true that the Northerners had little impact on the structures of cabotage, but this process had important repercussions, particularly on the medium to long-distance trade, which the Northerners quickly came to dominate.¹² Perhaps it was the growth of trade and the growing role of the port as a neutral emporium, although the Republic remained formally an ally of the Spanish Empire, which prompted a review of this policy. Between the 1660s and the end of the century the value of vessels in GA calculations drawn up in Genoa began to contribute only for half. This procedural convergence, in line with what happened in other ports, aimed at requesting shipowners lower costs in the event of an Average calculation. Free port policies, which were more or less 'liberal' depending on the economic situation at the time, also reflected the same concerns: creating incentives for foreign shipmasters.

We have also observed another peculiarity in Genoese Average legislation: the existence of an official body of state sanctioned *calcolatori*. In Livorno, for

¹¹ See par. 3.1.

¹² M. Fusaro, 'After Braudel: a reassessment of Mediterranean history between the Northern invasion and the Caravane Maritime', in M. Fusaro et al. eds., *Trade and cultural exchange in the early modern maritime Mediterranean*, London, 2010, 1-23; M. Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion: the Mediterranean in the seventeenth Century', *Past and Present* 174, 2002, 42-71.

example, sometimes it was the shipmaster himself, autonomously or in agreement with the merchants, who proposed to the local magistracy of the *Consoli del Mare* the assessment of the goods and the damages in an Average calculation: it was then the magistracy, almost taking for granted the shipmaster's tendency to increase the value of the damages, who ordered an apportionment for a lowered sum.¹³ The creation of the *calcolatori* magistracy in Genoa, which on the basis of current studies is unique in the European legislative context of the sixteenth century, reflects the logic of the patricians ruling the Republic. A specialised magistracy would have guaranteed protection to the party who invested more capital in a sea venture: the merchants. In the seventeenth century the value of the vessels was generally lower than the total value of the cargo, and there was always the risk that one of the parties could contest an incorrect assessment of their goods, leading to litigations.

Merchants probably afforded a greater trustworthiness to a magistracy with specific jurisdiction over Average calculations. Each element, relating to the contributing mass or to the damages, was calculated and validated by the *calcolatori* – first a special magistrate, then a notary/*calcolatore* – before proceeding with the approval of the calculation and the contribution rate. Requests by merchants for the recalculation of the value of goods or damages are very rare in the documentation examined. Although the contribution of half or the entire vessel could have a more or less significant influence on the apportionment phase, the contributing value of the cargo was the key element in the procedure. Genoese legislators were aware of this and perhaps, precisely for this reason, they created a magistracy of experts that could provide fair and uniform valuations of the assets involved. With this in mind, it will be interesting to assess in subsequent research the evolution of Average rules and practices following the formation of a new specialised magistrate during the eighteenth century: the *Magistrato d'Avaria*.¹⁴

¹³ See Dyle, *General Average*. However, this is an issue that has not yet been fully investigated, as the procedure seems to vary significantly from case to case.

¹⁴ ASG, *CdM* 451-453, *Sessioni diverse del magistrato d'avaria ed altro, 1720-1817*. The eighteenth century is a period hardly studied by the historiography on Genoa, in particular as far as the maritime trade is concerned. Felloni's cards have already shown that it is possible to reconstruct the traffic headed to the port also regarding these years. Moreover, the archival documentation concerning the eighteenth century is wider and does not present significant gaps, unlike that of the previous century, for which it was necessary to cross-reference different archival collections.

In addition to an in-depth analysis of the legal framework of Average institutions and their evolution in the seventeenth century, this research allowed me to analyse the main characteristics of the traffic arriving in the port of Genoa. The vessels involved in Average declarations, about eight hundred cases distributed over four three-year intervals taken as a sample in the Fourth Chapter, came from the Tyrrhenian area as well as from more remote regions such as the island of Newfoundland, Russia or Egypt. The historiographical tradition concerning Genoese maritime trade during the seventeenth century generally refers to a decline in maritime trade in this period. This decline emerges both from the analysis of the data on the annual arrivals of vessels studied by Edoardo Grendi and from studies on the maritime-commercial policies implemented by the Republic in the seventeenth century. According to Thomas Kirk:

Two threads run intertwined through Genoese political discourse during the latter half of the sixteenth and the better part of the seventeenth century [...] relaunching Genoa as a maritime power (for many as a maritime military power), and creating an emporium market as a means of enhancing the city's importance as a commercial hub in the Western Mediterranean [...].¹⁵

Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Genoese patricians prospered thanks to their relationship with the Spanish crown and its global empire. The weakening of Spain and of its hegemony in the Western Mediterranean, as well as the increasingly recurrent Spanish financial crises, forced the Genoese to redefine their diplomatic and commercial strategies. The decline of Spanish hegemony and the rise of English and Dutch as a presence in the Mediterranean forced a transformation on the Genoese economy comparable with the one made in the fifteenth century, when they had lost the Levantine colonies and markets.¹⁶ During the seventeenth century, the Republic gradually and non-linearly developed a commercial policy that favoured Genoa's role as a maritime emporium, for example through the free port and projects for a return to the Levantine trade. It is also for this reason that the port continued to play a key role in seventeenth-century government policies, as we have seen in Chapter Two, allowing Genoa to maintain its independence.¹⁷

¹⁵ Kirk, *Genoa and the sea*, 186.

¹⁶ Kirk, *Genoa and the sea*, 198.

¹⁷ Kirk, *Genoa and the sea*, 202. The Republic was dependent on its port also for its annual food imports, of which it was structurally in deficit. See par. 2.2.

Giorgio Doria's studies showed the importance of the Genoese port system, moreover, the trend in port taxes he studied increased in the last decades of the seventeenth century, but further data are lacking to verify the extent and resilience of this.

The role of neutral port of call, particularly following the weakening of Spain and the consolidation of free port policies, represented one of the possible ways for a small state like Genoa, to survive in an increasingly imperialistic and mercantilist early modern Europe.¹⁸ It was convenient for a small state to become a hub for several other countries as this made them natural allies, as they would not want to see their maritime hub fall into the hands of an enemy power. This strategy is feasible if the small state in question, for example, occupies a strategic position for sea and land routes, specialises in the handling of particular types of goods or responds to the economic interests of several larger countries. All these characteristics apply well to the Genoese scenario, beyond its undoubted peculiarities.¹⁹

The analysis of Average procedures, and their degree of representativeness which has emerged with respect to total traffic, has allowed the detection of further factors which had so far escaped historical analysis. One of the most significant elements emerging from the macro analysis allows a better understanding of the modalities and dating of the arrival of Northern shipmasters in the port in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Although Grendi had already identified the presence of specific 'waves' of arrivals, the current analysis allowed to observe in detail the tonnages of Northern vessels, the different ports involved in sending goods to Genoa and the main routes followed. In the first three years examined, from 1599 to 1601, there were very few Northern vessels, probably arriving in the same quantity even before the well-known cereal crisis of 1591. On the other hand, analysing

¹⁸ The expression 'Mercantilism' refers to a debated theory that broadly focuses on the finite nature of the world's wealth and the ways Kingdoms and Empires in early modern Europe could seize the bigger share for themselves. See L. Magnusson, *The political economy of mercantilism*, London, 2015; S. Pincus. 'Rethinking Mercantilism: Political Economy, the British Empire, and the Atlantic World in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 69/1, 2012, 3–34. 'Imperialism' broadly refers to the complex of intentions and material forces which predispose states to an incursion into the sovereignty of other states. See C.A. Bayly, The first age of global imperialism, c. 1760–1830, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26/2, 1998, 28-47.

¹⁹ This role fully developed during the eighteenth century. See, for example, the role Genoa played for Switzerland merchants in L. Codignola, M.E. Tonizzi, 'The Swiss community in Genoa from the Old Regime to the late nineteenth century', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 13/2, 2008, 152-170.

their presence in the years 1639-1641, the trading network in which they operated emerges and, in particular, the cereal routes in which their vessels, with their capacious holds and relatively low freight rates, were most used.²⁰ The high number of shipmasters involved in cereal trade allows also to reconstruct the main flows directed to Genoa and their evolution over time, both in terms of markets and price trends.

A further element which emerges from the analysis of the data is the role of French merchant marine in the traffic directed to the port of Genoa. The growing presence of French shipmasters in the 1698-1700 sample period reflects, on the one hand, the political balance in the Mediterranean at the end of the seventeenth century and, on the other hand, the will/necessity of the Republic to act as a purely neutral emporium in competition with the nearby Livorno. Despite the free port policies, the number of French shipmasters arriving in Genoa and declaring Average was significantly lower in the previous sample years. From Genoa point of view, two factors are particularly noticeable during the seventeenth century: the already mentioned weakening of the Spanish ally and the constant French attempts to bring the Republic under its influence. The French bombardment of 1684 led to the disarmament of the new Genoese galleys, but the Republic maintained its independence and further strengthened its policy of neutrality. During the three-year period 1698-1700, however, French shipmasters in Average procedures rose to about a quarter of the total shipmasters calling at the port of Genoa. This figure is even more significant if we look at their precise origin: while in the first three quarters of the century they came from nearby Provence, especially Marseille, in the last years of the century they arrived from all ports in France, including those on the Northern coasts like Dunkirk or La Rochelle. This element is perhaps an indicator of greater integration of French 'national' shipping following the establishment of free port of Marseille in 1669, and the promulgation of the *Grande ordonnance de la marine* in 1681.²¹

²⁰ This confirms the classic literature on the Netherlandish in the Mediterranean. See Van Gelder, 'Favouring foreign traders?'; M. Van Gelder, *Trading Places: The Netherlandish Merchants in Early Modern Venice*, Leiden-Boston, 2009; P.C. Van Royen, 'The First Phase of the Dutch Straatvaart (1591–1605): Fact and Fiction', *International Journal of Maritime History* 2/2, 1990, 69-102. The GA calculations may reveal further information regarding transaction costs and damage sharing for Northern vessels in comparison to Mediterranean vessels. A specific study on this aspect is underway and will be published in collaboration with Luigi Oddo (University of Genoa).

²¹ See J. Horn, 'Marseille et la question du mercantilisme: privilège, liberté et économie politique en France, 1650-1750', *Histoire, économie et société* 2, 2011, 95-112 ; A. Smedley-Weill, 'la

Moreover, processing of data from sea voyages can be cross-referenced with the studies produced so far to investigate further elements, like the dangerousness of Mediterranean navigation. The case studies analysis in Chapter Five, moreover, allowed specific considerations on the concept of Average and on the way reports were written by shipmasters. The first cases examined showed that Genoese magistracies did not classify Average reports and did not always clearly distinguish different cases like Average acts (GA and PA), shipwrecks, pirate attacks. Legal ('learned') texts often were peremptory in their distinctions, and jurists constantly referred to them. In the face of the complexity of cases, however, law could at best offer a broad general frame of reference, leaving room for interpretation by the competent authorities when faced with the specificities of each case.

The analysis of the documents preserved within the *Atti Civili* of the *Conservatori del Mare* also allowed to identify and analyse in details some of the strategies available to shipmasters and merchants in the event of litigation. In par. 5.1 I detailed the voyages involving Stefano Sacco, a merchant in Genoa who received damaged goods and refused to pay his due share in the resulting GA calculation. The shipmasters carrying the goods addressed to him, Lolliandro and La Barbera, took months to reach the port of Genoa and the cargoes were seriously damaged by bad weather. Nevertheless, they turned to the *Conservatori del Mare* and succeeded in obtaining payment of Sacco's GA share. In the second case, however, Sacco's claims demonstrates the possibility for a merchant to request further evidence to support the GA procedure, *before* proceeding with the calculation. In fact, the *Conservatori* requested additional evidence following Sacco's request and perhaps the total damages were lower than those the shipmaster had initially asked for. Another example is the voyage of the shipmaster Gio. Baptiste Olivier, which shows the close interrelationship between Average and insurance. The *Conservatori del Mare* acted as a bridge between shipmasters, merchants and insurers: in the case of Olivier, for example, at his request the *Conservatori* summoned and ordered the payment of the contribution to the insurers involved. The relationship between Average and insurance, unlike in other port cities such as Venice, seems to have been complementary since the promulgation of the

gestion du commerce français au XVIIe siècle: impulsions gouvernementales et besoins des échanges', *Histoire, Économie et Société* 12/4, 1993, 473–486.

Statuti Civili in 1589 which put an end to the disputes mentioned in the judgments of the *Rota Civile* in the previous decades.²² In legal proceedings involving insured goods or vessels, it does not seem to have been difficult for a shipmaster to ask the *Conservatori del Mare* to summon the parties concerned and oversee the apportionment of damages, as Olivier successfully did.

Finally, the cases cited as 'false reports' and those preserved within the *Testimonialia Segreti* best capture the complexity of a sea voyage. Cases of barratry and false reports, such as that of the shipmaster Filippo Del Canto cited by the *Conservatori*, were probably a minority compared to the total procedures preserved in Genoa. Del Canto sold his cargo, sank his vessel and claimed to have been attacked by the Turks. He even went so far as to kill his crew member who decided to report the fraud. Borderline cases of this kind allow us to shed light on events outside the institutional narrative and put the legislation in a dynamic context. The voyage of the *patrone* Andrea Arsenio de Milani, who took months to travel the Genoa-Tabarka route that usually took one or two weeks, also leads to questions about the presence of informal practices that otherwise do not emerge from the legal sources. Real life business that historians and economic historians often ignore emerges from the informal agreements. It is possible that involved parties preferred to avoid legal disputes, as was probably the case in de Milani's voyage, in order to accommodate a business partner or for other reasons.

These decisions are also an indication of long-term business strategies that challenge the simplifying schemes with which scholars often explained actors' behaviour in pre-industrial period. Such schemes state that social actors act only on the basis of immediate profit maximisation, as an archetypical *homo oeconomicus*.²³ According to Walter Friedman and Geoffrey Jones:

Entrepreneurship is an area in which business historians have made an important contribution, but in which most of the recent conceptual work has been done by economists and management scholars. Their theories provide a more powerful set of tools for examining the history of entrepreneurship

²² K. Nehlsen-von Stryk, *L'assicurazione marittima a Venezia nel XV secolo*, Rome, 1988. In Florence integration started earlier, see Addobbati, 'Italy 1500–1800', 46-77.

²³ This archetype, first theorised by John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century, refers to a rational agent with consistent and stable preferences. He is entirely forward-looking, and pursues only his own self-interest. When given options he chooses the alternative with the highest expected utility for himself. See 'homo oeconomicus', in *Oxford Reference*, available on <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095943203>, accessed on 29/06/2021.

than any that were available to the pioneering business historians in the 1940s and 1950s. [...] Huge areas of uncertainty regarding the causal links between entrepreneurship, innovation and growth still call for explanation.²⁴

In this sense Average sources, linked to a mutualistic form of protection, offer a different perspective, thanks also to the rich available quantitative data. In their everyday businesses, merchants could choose to bear higher transaction costs in order to recover their credit at a later stage, also reinforcing the bond of business and trust with other merchants and shipmasters. The same can be said for institutions and their functioning. They are often seen simply in terms of immediate efficiency, whereas the behaviour of actors, whether institutions or individuals, must necessarily be contextualised in the historical moment in which it occurred.²⁵ Average procedures preserved in Genoa and analysed in this dissertation may well constitute the first step of further studies aimed at shedding light on the way of doing business and managing sea risk in an atypical *Ancien Régime* society such as the Republic of Genoa.

²⁴ W.A. Friedman, G. Jones, 'Business History: Time for Debate', *Business History Review* 85/1, 2011, 1–8, 5. See also C. Casson, M. Casson, 'The history of entrepreneurship: Medieval origins of a modern phenomenon', *Business History* 56/8, 2014, 1223-1242.

²⁵ Ogilvie, 'Whatever is, is right?'; an example of historical contextualisation for medieval Genoa is in Van Doosselaere, *Commercial Agreements*.

Appendix

Appendix I Genoese *Statuti Civili*, 1589

Source: BUG, *ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis*, Genoa, 1589.

[19]

Liber Primus. 19.

De calculatoribus et eorum officio. Cap. XI.

Quotiescumque patronus, magister, seu prefectus navigii, aut alius ad quem de iure spectet, petierit fieri calculum de iactu, seu avaria contra mercatores, seu dominus, bonorum in navi oneratorum, seu contra assecuratore, magistratus calculatorum intelligat partes, examinari faciat testes, et quicquid determinaverit, seu in calculo posuerit debeat comprobari per magistratus, ad quos spectat, et secundum illud procedi, salvi praetensionibus et actionibus tam dominis rerum quam assecuratoribus contra quosvis.

Possint dicti calculatores mandare que voluerint patrono, magistro seu praefecto navigii praetendenti fieri calculum, tam circa exonerationem mercium, seu bonorum, quam circa acceptandum custodes in navi usque ad perfectam exonerationem, sub poena scutorum centum pro qualibet vice, et interesse iactu, seu avarie secutae.

Et antequam patronus, magister seu praefectus, ut supra admittantur ad examinandum testes super iactu, seu avaria secutis, teneantur calculatore habere ab eis promissionem et idoneam fideiussionem de solvendo duodecim pro quolibet, quod exonerassent contra formam statuti de iactu. Et seu de quo fraudassent, seu fraudem commisissent, aut committerent ad praeiudicium calculi, que poena sit applicata pro tertiis calculatoribus et pro aliis duobus tertiis patribus communis, nisi fraus detecta esset medio alicuius, quia tunc tertia parte poenae debetur delatori etiam secreto.

Merces, seu stipendium faciendi calculum sit de libri decem, usque in libras centum quinquaginta pro quolibet, taxanda per conservatores maris et dimidia sit ipsorum calculatorum et alia dimidia solvatur conservatoribus maris eroganda in usus dicti officio et pro

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et pro eo, quod dictis usibus supererit, dando patribus communis in impensas portus et moduli erogando.

Si qui calculatores dandi, vel eligendi essent in aliqua causa, et in eorum election, seu nomination partes essent discordes, eligantur per magistratus, seu iudices causae, exclusis magistratibus forensibus, qui calculatore non eligant ; sed de huiusmodi magistratuum forensium mandato per notarium causae fia notitia in scriptis Senatui, de qualitate causae, et nominibus partium. Et electio fiat per Senatum citata parte et remotis removendis ; et calculatores teneantur procedere ad cognitionem causae, et relationem facere intra tempus statuendum.

[...]

[154]

Liber Quartus. 154.

De iactu et forma in eo tenenda. Cap. XVI.

Patronus, sive praefectus cuiusvis navigii, eligens ob adversam tempestatem, seu aliam iustam causam, facere iactum pro salvatione navigii, et eius inventarii, et hominum, et mercium, teneatur

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ante iactum alicuius rei facere consultam cum omnibus officialibus navigii, et mercatoribus in eo existentibus, et si duae tertiae partes praedictorum concurrerint in faciendo iactu pro dicta salvatione, eligantur eo casu tres consules, quorum duo sint ex dictis officialibus, et unus ex dictis mercatoribus, et non existentibus mercatoribus, duo sint ex officialibus prorae, et unus ex officialibus puppis, qui tre consules auctoritatem habeant proiciendi in mare quid eis necessarium videbitur pro residui salvatione.

Quicquid per consultam de qua supra deliberatum fuerit, et quicquid de ordine dictorum consulum iactum fuerit, scribi, et annotari debeat per scribam navigii, in suo libro in praesentia dictorum consulum cum eorum subscriptionibus, si scribere scirent.

Omnia iacta (servatis solennitatibus praedictis) seu eorundem iactorum valor cedat damno, dividiq; debeat secundum aes, et libram inter navigium, nauula, merces et omnes alias res existentes in dicto navigio tempore iactus, comprehensis pecuniis, auro, argento, localibus, servis maribus et foeminis, equis, et aliis animalibus existentibus in navigio de transitu.

Secuto iactu, non liceat patrono, seu praefecto navigii, nequem alicui pro eo onerare in dicto viagio aliquid in quovis loco (seu scala) nisi tantummodo victualia pro usu et necessitate navigii, merces subtiles et capsias passageriourum, nisi quando iactus factus fuisset antequam navigium recessisset ab oneratorio, seu a portu, in quo onerasset, quo casu liceat navigium in totum onerare, seu nisi navigium sive eundo, siuc redeundo deberet exonerare aliquas merces in aliquo loco ; quia tunc liceat in loco exonerationis onerare tantum, quantum fuerit exoneratum, non tamen possit onerare loco iactus facti, et si patronus oneraret, vel onerari faceret aliquid loco iactus facti, et si patronus oneraret, vel onerari faceret aliquid loco iactus, teneatur ad satisfaciendum omne damnum in casu novi iactus, et naula oneratorum ut supra spectent pro tertia parte assecuratoribus, et pro residuo conservatoribus maris.

Nullus patronus, sive praefectus secuto iactu possit in itinere exonerare aliquid nisi in locis, ad quae merces seu alia onerata fuissent destinata, cum appodisiis caricati, et in dictis locis non possint exonerare nisi de die, et nisi portatis mercibus, et aliis exoneratis in

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duganam, seu loca publica deputata secundum qualitates rerum; a quibus duganis seu daceriis portare debeant fidem authenticam de rebus exoneratic cum declaratione cui spectent: et patronus, seu praefectus, qui haec non observaverit, non possit fieri facere aliquem calculum pro damno, imo damnum iactus spectet ipsi patrono, seu praefecto.

Possit etiam idem patronus, seu praefectus exonerare in quocunque loco ad requisitionem supracarici, seu mercaoris, aut alterius, cui res spectarent, dummodo exoneret de die cum interventu consulum electorum tempore iactus, et cum interventu consulis nationis Genuensis existentis in dicto loco, et eo non existente, cum interventu magistratus dicti loci; a quo consule, seu magistratu portare debeat fidem ut supra, sub poena predicta, sine praeiudicio iurium mercatorum contra navim.

Si patronus, seu praefectus in aliquo ex dictis duobus casibus exonerasset aliquid plusquam contineretur in fide, cadat in eandem poenam.

Pro rebus vero sicut supra aliquo modo permissis exoneratis, teneatur patronus, seu praefectus ante exonerationem, et consignationem se cautelare de rata iactus, et damnorum obveniente dictis rebus exonerandis: et non possit

contra alios dominos rerum, nec contra alia bona, seu res, quae in navigio remansissent aliquid pretendere ratione dicti iactus, et damnorum; imo si quid esset contribuendum pro dictis rebus ut supra exonerati, tenatur ipse patronus, seu praefectus, et navigium, cum eius inventario erga alios, et quaemlibet eorum pro his, quibus facta fuisset consignatio ad refectioem, et contributionem iuxta calculum fiendum cum damnis et interesse.

Facto iactu patronus, seu praefectus cum appulerit in aliquem portum, seu alium locum commodum, tenatur diligenter inquirere quid iactum fuerit, seu proiectum in mare in praesentia dictorum consulum, et scribae navigii, a quo de praedictis fieri debeat diligens scriptura. Et praedicta iustificari, et probari debeant per testimonium officialium, et mercatorum seu existentium de transitu in navigio, non existentibus mercatoribus, et ipsis etiam non esistentibus per testimonius officialium; aliter iactus factu eo usque

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cedat damno patroni, seu praefecti, et dictae iustificationes fieri debeant coram consule nationis Genuensis, et eo non existente, coram magistratu loci, et patronus, seu praefectus teneatur portare secum copiam praedictorum authenticam, et sigillatam.

Navigia, quae iactum fecerint, appulsa ad locum destinatum exonerentur primo, et ante alia, etiam si alia prius appulissent, sine preiudicio solitorum allegiorum, si eo in loco aderit ordo exonerandi.

Patronus, seu praefectus, qui iactum fecerit, reversus cum navigio ad locum destinatum, antequam manum apponat exonerationi alicuius rei, tenatur notificare cum iuramento magistratui deputato ad praedicta in dicto loco, si aderit, aliteri iudici ordinario loci, mensem, diem, et horam iactus facti, et quantitates rerum, seu res iactas circum circa iudicio suo; et teneatur incontinenti mittere scribam, qui producat librum, in quo sit notata deliberatio iactus faciendi, et nota rerum iactarum; qui scriba dare debeat copiam praedictorum notario dicti magistratu, qui eam conservare debeat ad hoc, ut serviat in faciendo calculo, et in aliis, quae occurrerint.

Officiales, et nautae exonerantes sua, vel aliena bona, etiam pro eorum portatis, veld antes auxilium contra formam presentis capituli, amittant exonerata, et privati remaneant officiiis.

Si bona fuerint reperta exonerata contra formam praesentis statuti sint effecta patrum communis, et conservatorum maris civitatis Genuae aequaliter,

nisi si intervenisset accusator, seu qui contrafactionem denuntiasset, et in claris posuisset, quia tali casu tertia pars sit ipsius, et teneatur secretus.

Ultra poenas praedictas qui contrafecerint, subiaceant aliis poenis que viderentur Senatui.

Quod supradictum fuit de patronis navis, sit et intelligatur dictum de capitaneo, seu quocunque alio nomine vocetur prefectus magister, seu praepositus navigii.

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Liber Quartus. 158.

De securitatibus. Cap. XVII.

Non possint fieri assecurationes in appodisiis, quae non habeant clarum et expressum nomen illius, qui se assecurari faciet, et hoc antequam aliquis assecurator in ea se subscribat, nec possit dimitti spatium album pro ponendo nomine, alias appodisia non valeat, et assecuratio non teneat.

Securitates non possint fieri pro se, neque pro aliis, nisi extet risicum, vel in mercibus, vel in navigiis, vel rebus, quibus vis essecuratis medietem, vel immediatem, principaliter vel indirectem, et nisi pro quantitate, seu valore risici, sive valoris et aestimationis tantum, excluso consteo securitatum, quod non intelligatur in ipsa securitate comprehensum, nisi expressum fuisset.

Si inter partes non fuerit appositum pretium mercibus, vel aliis assecuratis, intelligatur pretium, si casus advenerit ante medietatem itineris confecti, consteum ipsarum cum expensis usquem ad earum onerationem: si vero ultra medietatem itineris confecti, casus occurrerit, intelligatur pretium illud, quo velerent in loco, ad quem fuissent destinatae.

Si factae fuerint securitates importantes plusquam sit risicum, vel quia factae fuissent in diversis proinciis, seu locis, vel quavis alia de causa, priores in tempore intelligantur cucurrisse, et currere risicum; pro reliquis vero consteum restituatur, et inter pare tempore quilibet teneatur pro rata summae assecuratae.

Casus sinister non intelligatur nisi navigium assecuratum, sive super quo merces, aut alia fuerint assecurata, redactum fuerit casu fortuito in eum statum, qui providentia humana reparari non possit, intra tempus declarandum per consulem nationis, si aderit in eo loco, ubi erit navigium et consule non existente, per magistratum loci, dummodo dictum tempus non excedat mesem unum, aliqua ratione, seu accidenti, vel nisi navigium iussu superioris loci, ubi

fuerit, esset interceptum, aut saxitum, vel ut dicitur de eo factum imbarcum ita et taliter, quo sit coactum capere aliud viagium et merces assecuratas exonerare.

Assecuratus in quocunquem casu sinistro, possit securitates in totum exigere [159]

si voluerit, et res assecuratas, seu ut vulgo dicitur, implicitam relinquere assecuratoribus, quibus tali spectent, vel possit, si voluerit, calculum fieri facere super damno iuxta formam capitulorum; et ubi damnum foret exclaratum ascendere ad quinquaginta pro centenario, liceat assecuratoribus integram summam assecuratam solvere et habere pro se res assecuratas, vel damnum declaratum solvere, et rem assecuratam assecurato dimittere in electione ipsorum assecuratorum, quam electionem habeat etiam in quocunque casu, in quo fieret calculus pro emendatione damni, quod praetenderetur ratione legitimi casus secuti, re assecurata existente in esse in totum, vel in parte.

Assecuratore, si cum assecurato super infrascriptis nullum licitum pactum fecissent, tenantur de iactu secundum formam statutorum facto, et probato, et etiam teneantur de avaria, quae est omne damnum quod casu fortuito sequitur, seu contingit in navigio cum inventario, et seu rebus assecuratis ultra expensas, quae contingere possunt, etiam si non sequatur, taliter quod possit dici casum sinistrum per toto secutum esse, et haec pro rata sive iactus, sive avariae spectantis rei assecuratae.

Securitates factae post casum sinistrum secutum tali tempore, quod de eo habita prius fuerit notitia saltem per formam legitime probatam vel tali tempore, quod notitia verosimiliter haberi potuerit, non valeant, nec teneant, et consteum restitui debeat, et intelligatur habitam verosimiliter fuisse notitiam, quando fuerit transactum spatium tanti temporis, quo a loco ubi secutus fuerit casus sinister, calculatis milliaribus duobus pro qualibet hora ad locum, in quo facta esset securitas, haberi potuisset: et si casus secutus esset in mare longinquo, adeo quod notitia deferenda esset per mare: antequam pervenire posset in terram firmam, calculetur tempus ad rationem predictam a loco, in quo primo venerit dicta notitia, seu novum.

Assecuratores non teneantur de barataria patroni navigii, nisi aliter factum fuisset.

Sine licentia Senatus, non possint fieri securitates, vadimonia, seu partita super vita pontificis, neque super vita Imperatoris, neque super vita regum, nec Cardinalium, neque Ducum, Principum,

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Episcoporum, nequem aliorum Dominorum, aut personarum ecclesiasticarum, seu secularium in dignitate constitutarum.

Non possint etiam fieri super acquisitione, amissione, seu mutatione Dominorum, statuum, regnorum, Pronvinciarum, Ducturum, civitatum, terrarum, seu locorum.

Non possint similiter fieri super felici, seu infelici successu exercituum, classium, seu expeditionum neque eorum adventu, neque recessu; neque super expugnatione, aut defensione aliqua.

Non possint pariter fieri super matrimoniis contrahendis, vel non contrahendis super uxoribus ducendis, aut non neque super partu mulierum neque navium aut aliorum appulsu aut recessu.

Non possint fieri super futura, vel non futura peste, aut bello, neque super electione Ducis, aut magistratum Republicae: et demum super aliis quibusvis habentibus speciem seu formam vadimonii, securitatis, seu partiti ; sed omnia intelligantur, et sint prohibita.

Contrafacientes alicui de praedictis cadant in poenam tantundem summae, pro quanta fuerit facta assecuratio, vadimonium, seu partitum pro qualibet vice, et censarii, qui in praedictis se immiscuerint tanquam contrafacientes cadant in eandem poenam.

De praedictis sic ut supra prohibitis, non possit ab aliquo reddi ius ; neque aliquis audiri sine licentia. Et si casu aliquo quicquam fuerit solutum, sit sempre ius salvum repetendi ; et nullus possit de eis instrumenta, seu scripturas conficere sub poena scutorum viginti quinque pro quolibet, et qualibet vice.

Non possint fieri loti sine licentia Senatus sub poena scutorum centum, et ammissione raubarum, seu rerum positarum ad lotum: et in eandem poenam cadant illi, in quorum domo erunt, etiam si fit corporis alicuius, et pro mulieribus teneantur mariti.

[...].

Appendix II Law against barratry and false reports, 1690

Source: ASG, *CdM* 444, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione, 16/09/1690.

Serenissimi Signori,

La frequenza de delitti che si commettono da capitani e patroni de legni, in pregiudizio del trafico, con l'uso de consolati falsi, da giusto motivo al prestantissimo magistrato dei Conservatori del Mare di procurare il riparo, mentre per le falsità che in essi si commettono rimangono il più delle volte i delinquenti impuniti per faltà di parte che ne faccia istanza, come ultimamente è seguito nel consolato fatto dal patrone Filippo del Canto, il quale dopo haver preso il carrico de grani con sua tartana a Capo di Goro si partì a Corfù, et ivi vendutigli se ne venne alla volta di Napoli e, gionto nel golfo di Messina, sfondò la tartana, e col caico andò in detta città di Messina dove fece testimoniale asserendo esser stata presa da turchi col carico sudetto sopra capo di Milo. E perché un tal Gio. Paolo Tarascone d'Alassio, che fu presente a detto fatto, per disgravio della propria coscienza, manifestò con giuramento avanti al magnifico Benedetto Valdetaro, console in Napoli, la vita di detto delitto, fu da lì a pochi giorni dal medesimo patrone ucciso. E quantunque detto homicidio habbia detto prestantissimo magistrato procedato in contumacia contro detto patrone, restono con tuttocio si esso patrone come li corsi per detta baratteria e falsità del consolato impuniti, mentre contro di essi non si può procedere se non ad istanza della parte.

Pertanto, il prescritto prestantissimo magistrato sottopone alla benigna censura delle vostre signorie serenissime, ogni volta che stimassero accertato, provvedere a simili inconvenienti per mezzo de Consigli della Serenissima Repubblica, se fosse bene di stabilire per nuova legge:

Che in l'avenire chi in sudetto genere commetterà tanto in Dominio come fuori di esso et in qualsivoglia parte del mondo, delitto di baratteria, o farà Consolato falso, resti soggetto, oltre alle pene statutarie, alla pena corporale che da il statuto, de Furibus, etiamdio dell'ultimo supplicio inclusive, e ciò secondo la qualità e gravezza per delitto ad arbitrio di detto prestantissimo magistrato quali si come secondo le regole in questi casi opera sempre con uno dei magnifici Auditori della Rota Criminale, tanto maggiormente si assicurerà di accertare, e che a tutto ciò possa procedere contro li rei tanto instante la parte quanto ex officio, acciò che il Fisco non resti pregiudicato.

Et perché la speranza del premio conduce molte volte li medemi delinquenti a scoprire li delitti commessi, perciò si stima anche sarebbe beneficio pubblico che restasse proposta, e deliberato, premio et impunità a chi si sia, marinaio, passeggero, sopracarrico, o mercante, purché non fusse l'autore principale, il quale rivelasse o mettesse in chiaro a giudizio di detto prestantissimo magistrato, li delitti commessi da capitani, patroni o marinari, o altri che sotto ogn'altro nome esercitasse la marinaria o navigatione de vascelli, tanto di falsità per consolati quanto de furti e baratterie, o altri delitti concernenti il traffico marittimo, e si costituissero nelle forze della Giustitia.

Il premio da darsi a chi rivelasse, e comparisse come sopra, potrebbe essere di scudi cinquanta sino in cinquecento, a giudizio di detto prestantissimo magistrato, regolato sopra il maggiore o minore pregiudicio di mercanti, da cacciarsi da beni di delinquenti oltre le pene corporali e pecuniarie alle quale per disposizione delle leggi della serenissima repubblica fussero soggetti.

Et se rispetto all'accennato di sopra delitto di baratteria e consolato falso stimassero accertato di conferire facultà di poter procedere et ca. senza istanza della parte, si sottomettono alla loro somma precedenza et questo exponi decretum serenissimi presentissimi SS. Conservatores Maris ad Calculos hac die 16 septembris 1690.

[handwritten signature of the *Conservatori's* notary]

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Serenissimi Signori

Li disordini preceduti alla legge fatta nel 1698, e che frequenti andavano seguendo, in danno del marittimo traffico del pubblico e privato bene, per i sinistri accadevano ne vascelli, et altri bastimenti, loro rispettivo scarico con dolo, lasta o lastissima colpa de loro capitani, patroni, ufficiali, marinari ed altri trafficanti ne medesimi con l'unico fine di causare grosse avarie, procurare baratarie, far danni e pregiudicii di non poco rilievo a terzi, fondati e stabiliti sopra testimoniali et altre studiate scritte ritrovate insusistenti, per forza de quali riccapiti conveniva si facessero li calcoli de pretesi accaduti danni, ne sinistri supposti, con quali venivano a paliarsi quasi legalmente le frodi commesse dalli di sopra nominati. O almeno la cooperazione loro a medesimi, con malitia e colpa pregiudicievoli all'interessati; perloche furono i Serenissimi Collegi obbligati nell'anno già detto 1698 ponere alla truttina delle considerationi loro precedentemente la sorte di quanto sopra per rinvenire le maniere più proprie, giuste da praticarsi, et efficaci per andar al riparo di tutti sudetti inconvenienti. Et avendo conosciuto che l'impedimento principale, il quale ostava prima di sudetta legge, si riduceva al non potersi procedere ne casi premessi se non ad istanza dell'offeso con la precedente querela, promessa e sigortà, secondo la dispositione del Statuto Criminale di Genova sotto la rubrica quod accusans, vel denunciarii caveat; ciò che il più delle volte li dannificati schivano di fare, per tenere li rei loro debitori nella fede di qualche aggiusto, con la mira di ricavare d'accordo qualche portione del credito, e non perdere il proprio del tutto premendo più questo a dannificati; che qualonque castigo subire possano li rei di tali eccessi; onde tali riflessi et altri più degni e prudentissimi che sovennero alla prudenza somma, et intelligenza de soggetti de Serenissimi Collegi, diedero a medemmi moltivo promulgare in 1698 la qui innestata legge, la quale (come spirata) di nuovo

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si soggetta alla Censura et applicazione loro, con qualche aggiunte considerate per essentialissime alla condotta di un ben regolato traffico; perché conosciuto dal finissimo intendimento di vostre signorie serenissime necessaria la proroga

di essa legge, con le addizioni delle quali nella medesima dell'infrascritto rispettivamente tenore possana farla o ristorarla, e prorogarla per quel tempo comanderanno, ò provvedere in quei modi e forme saranno conosciute più proprie dalla suprema loro intelligenza.

Che per l'avvenire in detti delitti si commettessero per i casi sinistri apprezzati, baratarie, testimoniali o consolati non susistenti, et altre qualsivogliano frodi seguissero e si commettessero da cuiusvoglia da oggi nell'avvenire con dolo, lasta e lastissima colpa, nello e per lo comercio marittimo, negotii della navigatione sopra qualsiasi vase navigabile dipendente da viaggi di marine, da fatti e negotii della navigatione, così da capitani, patroni, ufficiali che da marinari, soldati et altri chi che sia dell'equipaggio loro, et ogn'uno imbarcato sopra detto qualonque vase navigabile in pregiudicio tanto di ciasched'uno de medemmi rispettivamente vasi navigabili, di essi rispettivo carico mercisti, cambisti et interessati qualsiasi tanto nel corpo e noli, quanto nel carico e merci, quanto parimente di qualonque contratto quasi contratto di strazzo et interesse di qualsiasi sorte, o dipendenza dalle navigationi da farsi da medesimi rispettivi vasi navigabili si possa principiare, procedere, terminare, si principii, proceda e termini criminalmente, anche senza querela, istanza, denuncia o accusa dell'offeso, danneggiato et in altro modo pregiudicato a cagione de sudetti rispettivi delitti, et ogn'uno de medemmi, ma ex officio semplicemente del Sindico et agente per il fisco del magistrato prestantissimo de Conservatori del Mare per condannare lo reo, li rei, complici, fautori, ausiliatori, o in altro qualonque modo interessati ne delitti sudetti, annessi loro, connessi, dipendente, incidenti et emergenti in qualsivoglia

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pena corporale compresa la capitale di forca, o testa, come se fossero delitti di vero furto servate però nel procedere solamente le regole di esso magistrato prestantissimo. Che venire più facilmente in cognizione de suddetti rispettivi delitti possa lo stesso magistrato de Conservatori del mare concedere e far publicare impunità in forma solita per cuiusvoglia sarà il primo a volerne godere con palesarli entro del termine averà stimato proprio di prescrivere aciò nella concessione e publicatione sudetta, et indi porsi in chiaro a giudizio de serenissimi Collegi mentre detta impunità non sii lui lo reo principale, ne di già indiciato, processato ne carcerato per il delitto stesso, per il quale vorrà godere del beneficio dell'impunità, con oblatione a simil impunità d'un premio, quale

però eccedere non possa in ciasched'uno caso scudi ducento argento della stampa e corona di Genova, pagabili de denari della Camera di detto magistrato dopo la servita condanna del reo, et rei, et altri come sopra, che doverà prima restarne da beni del condannato e condannati reintegrata non altrimenti. Che li giusdicenti dell'una et altra Riviera, i quali non hanno veruna giurisdizione di procedere criminalmente ne di castigare per sudetti et altri delitti seguissero in mare, restando ella per dispositione delle leggi, statuto criminale e costituenti di detto magistrato unicamente all'istesso, appoggiata private quo ad alios in qualunque caso pervenisse a notizia loro extragiudicialmente o ricevendolo di essi cancelliere o sdottoro attuario denuncia, querela, o accusa o in altro modo ad haver per detti rispettivi delitti et ognuno de medemmi commesso o commessi per caosa di navigare, merci, denari, vasi navigabili, accessori loro fatti, e negotii della navigatione, e dipendenze di quella, et essi siino tenuti darne aviso di subito al magistrato sudetto con lettera e trasmissione in essa in autentica forma dell'atti perciò ricevuti di che se ne debba fare aggiunta nella di quelli instruttione

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per domandargliene conto nel sindacato.

Che se ne corso de processi quali accederà formarsi da detto magistrato accorgesse che alcuno reo, rei, complice o complici del delitto, o delitti et altri eccessi come sopra intieramente reintegrasse i dannificati, o interessati in qualunque modo per il caso sinistro o alcuna delle sopradette frodi, doli, laste o lastissime colpe commesse in tutto come avanti si è detto, debba in ogn'uno di questi casi et in tali termini solamente detto magistrato prestantissimo darne notitia a serenissimi collegi, quali prima di fatta la sentenza o contumaciale o diffinitiva, habbino facultà di ordinare che non più oltre si proceda quando così conoscano convenirsi al dovere sotto li modi e forme loro parerà.

Che i calcoli delle avarie ne sudetti e simili casi, come pure tutti li calcoli da farsi in qualsiasi altro caso, fare si debbano, e regolarsi, con direttione, decreti et altre provvigioni di detto magistrato prestantissimo, o suo diputato, sino alla di essi approvatione inclusivamente, altrimenti siino nulli non habbino alcuna fede ne esecuzione.

Che niuno possa essere riconosciuto per capitano di nave, pinco, polacca, altro bastimento de gabbia che non sii approvato prima per tale, conosciuta la sufficienza e fedeltà dal detto magistrato, e che nell'istesso tempo non facci

promessa e di cautione idonea della bona amministrazione, vendimento di conto, pagamento e sodisfattione del reliquatto a giudicio di quello, o suo diputando per la somma ben vista, qual caotione debbano prestare similmente li patroni tutti di qualonque altri vase navigabile del Dominio del serenissimo in arbitrio di detto magistrato, et a fine che quanto sopra possi avvere la dovuta esecutione, incarricare al magistrato prestantissimo della sanità lo ingiongere a suoi ministri tanto in Genova che nell'una et altra Riviera del Dominio Serenissimo perché nell'avvenire non diino la Patente di sanità ad alcuno de sudetti capitani e patroni de sudetti rispettivi vascelli,

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navi, bastimenti, et altri vasi navigabili si di terraferma che di tutto lo Regno di Corsica, che da medemmi rispettivamente et ogn'uno di loro non le sii prima e per una volta solo dalla publicatione della presente, presentata fede sottoscritta dal Prestantissimo diputato del mese pro tempore di detto magistrato prestantissimo de Conservatori del Mare, e dal di esso cancelliere, quale giustifichi avvere loro osservato quanto sopra in esecutione della presente legge et alla forma della medemma.

Che li capitani tutti, e rispettivamente singoli li patroni di qualsiasi vase navigabile di questo serenissimo genovese dominio, compresi quei tutti del regno di Corsica, minori per anco d'anni venticinque con padre, o senza padre vivente, et anche maggiori di detti anni venticinque ma per anco figli di famiglia, li quali concepiranno obligationi di cambii maritimi o altra qualsivoglia per causa di qualonque vase navigabile da medemmi rispettivamente comandato, suoi accessori, carico, et altro per la navigatione, quantonque la stipulatione segua illegittimamente e contro la dispositione delle leggi e statuti, particolarmente del civile di Genova sotto la rubrica de contract. Min. et mul. in maniera che restino tenuti legalmente non solo ne beni et agenda ma etiamdio nella persona vallidamente verso li di essi rispettivamente creditori veri, et altri nel di essi debito interessati, onde possano per tali loro contratti debiti et anche minori di età essere pignorati, dettenuti, carcerati, sequestrati, e costretti per giustizia in tutte le maniere al pagamento de da essi dovuto, come se fossero maggiori di anni venticinque che detto magistrato habbia carico d'invigliare a che li vascelli nazionali

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navighino ben corredati e provisti tanto di equipaggio che di ogni altra cosa, come richiederà la qualità di essi, a giudizio di detto magistrato o del deputato di mese pro tempore, con continuare a tal'effetto la visita si pratica di fare in essi vascelli da gabbia prima della loro partenza.

Che si continui lo già cominciato libro, nel quale tutti quelli, li quali nell'avvenire, prima però della partenza di qualunque vase navigabile, faranno notare di avere dato danari, robbe, merci, mercanzia, et altro a cambio marittimo di qualsivoglia sorte, o in participatione di qualunque vascello, bastimento o vase navigabile, colonna, implicita, accomenda, o in altro qualunque modo, a capitani, e rispettivamente patroni, che comanderanno li medesimi come sopra, o a chi avesse persona legittima per essi, constandone però per scritture pubbliche (esclusi però sempre li privilegiati dalle leggi) habbino sopra de medemmi rispettivamente et accessori loro, e merci essistenti caricate con obligo per detti creditori dal giorno che in esso sudetto libro sarà stata fatta detta nota, ipoteca per detto loro interesse anteriore a tutti gli altri interessati su li vascelli medemmi, accessori loro, il credito de quali non sarà notato in detto libro, o sarà notato posteriormente dichiarando a caotela che se si troveranno più crediti notati nel detto libro sotto lo stesso giorno in tertis habbino fra di loro uguale anteriorità, e così fra di loro haveranno pari anteriorità quelli che saranno notati sotto lo stesso giorno in vesperis, saranno però posteriori a quei notati sotto lo medesimo giorno in tertis.

Che nelle note quali si faranno in esso libro, come sopra, debba esprimersi la somma del credito et enonciarsi l'anno, giorno del rogito dell'instrumento, e nelli atti di qual notaro sii stato fatto, et i nomi de contraenti, per il quale instrumento consti del detto credito, e se non si

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troveranno poi vere dette espressioni et enonciazioni resterà detta nota invalida e come se fatta non fosse.

Che sia obligo ad ogn'uno di detti capitani e patroni rispettivamente quali averano preso danari, robbe, merci et altro a cambio marittimo di qualunque sorte, o in participatione di qualsivoglia vascello, bastimento, o vase navigabile, colonna, implicita, accomenda, o in qualunque altra maniera, et in tutto come sopra in debito, de quali saranno state in detto libro fatte le note di essi cambii marittimi, participationi, et altro come sopra, terminato da loro ogni viaggio, o passato il tempo del risico espresso ne medesimi contratti, all'arrivo qui in

Genova o nel dominio, dal viaggio, o almeno prima d'intraprenderne altro, di portare al cancelliere di detto magistrato le quittanze autentiche di essi, o l'instrumenti di detti cambii, per potergliene dare il credito al loro conto in detto libro.

Che tutti quelli i quali hanno o averanno dato in danaro nelle caose sudette dopo spirata la legge per ciò fatta nell'anno 1698 et in approssimo al giorno, che dall'uno et l'altro consiglio verrà la presente approvata e susseguita publicatione, non possano ne debbano rispettivamente ricevere pregiudicio alcuno nelli di loro respettivi crediti, ma restino le loro ragioni, et attioni illese, conforme ad essi competevano prima della comprobatione di questa legge, purché constino per instrumento publico e che rispetto a quelli che ne averanno polizza, o polizze private, non debba parimente ricevere pregiudicio alcuno ne detti loro crediti, con che però debbano far registrare in esso libro dette polizze dentro lo termine di mesi tre rispetto a quei che sono nel dominio, e di un'anno rispetto a quelli che sono fuori di detto dominio, quale termine di mesi tre e di un'anno habbi da cominciare dal giorno della publicatione della legge

[4v]

si farà sopra sudetti capitoli; e perché ben spesso succede che li capitani e patroni de vascelli et altri bastimenti prendono fuori di questo dominio denari per ultimo espedimento di essi, deliberare che in simili casi, e termini, siino tenuti essi capitani di vascelli e patroni di qualsivogliano altri bastimenti, far notare dentro lo termine di giorni quindici dal giorno dell'arrivo in questo porto, et altra qualonque parte di questo dominio, e che avveranno avuto pratica, nel detto libro, le somme de denari presi come sopra, il nome di quello, e quelli, da cui, e da quali, l'avvevano pigliete, come pure il luogo, et altre avanti dette circostanze, ciò che non facendo loro dentro del sudetto termine, senza pregiudicio minimo delle ragioni, attioni et ipoteche competenti al creditore, o creditori dal primo fatto contratto, instrumento, polizza o altro ricapito contro de vascelli, bastimenti, accessorii tutti, partecipi, noli et altro, quali siano tali e quali restino detti inosservanti rispettivamente tenuti et obligati nomine proprio non solo per il capitali, cambii, et accessorii, ma etiamdio verso cuisvoglia all'emenda di ogni danno, spesa et interesse, venisse per tale inosservanza in qualonque modo caosata per dette somme prese, ma non denonciate.

Con dichiarazione che chi fuori del dominio di Genova non solo darà a cambio marittimo in genere, ma etiamdio per ultimo espedimento di qualsivoglia

vase navigabile a capitani e patroni sudetti rispettivamente dentro del termine da dichiararsi da detto magistrato a proportione della distanza di questa città al luogo dove saranno stati detti danari dati come sopra, possa per mezzo di qualsivoglia persona anche illegittima far notare in detto libro a credito di chi avesse

[5r]

dato a cambio marittimo o per ultimo espedimento come sopra la somma con le altre tutte già sopradette circostanze, non resti però in questi anche termini liberato il capitano o patrone che l'avverà pigliati dall'onere di far scrivere nel detto libro in tutto come sopra et ad effetto che quanto sopra possa restare adempito pienamente, ordinare la publicatione di questa legge, non solo nella presente città ma etiamdio in tutte le giurisdizioni dell'una et altra riviera e regno di Corsica, e che altresì ne sii data notizia giontamente con la copia della presente a tutti li consoli che per la natione genovese ritrovansi fuori stato, perché possano valersene rispettivamente secondo sarà loro prescritto da detto magistrato.

Che nel detto libro da continuarsi per sudetto effetto non sii lecito ad alcuno il scrivervi solo, che al cancelliere o in sua absentia da uno de sotto cancellieri di detto magistrato e tutte le note che saranno scritte in quello si dall'uno che dall'altro de sudetti debbano esser firmate dall'istesso cancelliere, altrimenti non habbino vigore alcuno e restino come se fatte non fussero, qual cancelliere non possa partirsi dalla cancelleria così la mattina, che la sera, senza che prima revisto non habbia detto libro, fatte tutte le note, che come sopra gli saranno state presentate, e sottoscritte le notate da uno de sottocancellieri. E ciò sotto pena del sindacato, privatione della cura di cancelliere, ruffaccimento de danni, il tutto a giudicio di detto magistrato.

E perché detto libro si fa solo perché siino noti li delitti che sono o saranno caosati sopra de vascelli et altri bastimenti, come sopra doverà perciò restar ad ogniuno palese con che però lo cancelliere, il quale ne avverà cura, non lo lasci alle mani di chi che sia, ma si veda da lui o da uno de sottocancellieri ad istanza de terzi, a quali potesse in qualonque

[5v]

modo spettare, et alla loro presenza le note quali desiderassero vedere.

Che sia cura di sudetto magistrato il far dar essecutione intiera circa quanto sopra, con rinovare lo stabillimento già fatto della mercede da scuodersi da

ministri per fare quanto sopra, purchè non ecceda un ottavo di scuto di argento, o sua valuta, per ognuna delle sudette note da ripartirsi fra di loro secondo al stile di detta cancellaria, e se insorgeranno qualche difficoltà, differenze o dubietà fra ministri, e fra gl'interessati circa le sudette note state fatte, o tralasciate di fare nel detto libro, et in altro qualonque modo nascessero debbano le medemme restar giudicate, e terminate da detto magistrato salva in reliquii l'autorità che compete all'istesso per la sua institutione, o regole. Et ita in omnibus ut antea instari decretum illustrissimus magistratus dd. Conservatorum Maris Janua in quarto et legitimo numero congregatus ad calculos omnibus favorabiliter concurrentibus, absente illustrissimo d. Clemente De Maris relinquo ex dictos collega, die prima mensis augusti 1705.

Ioannes Andreas Caferata notarius atque cancellarius

Appendix IV Election of the *calcolatori*, 1594

Source: ASG, NG 631, Atti dei calcolatori, 11/07/1594.

+ MDLXXXIII die XI julii

Magnificus Joannes Baptista Zerbinus electus ad officium calculatorum per tempus solitum per sermentum senatum ad calculos.

In cancellerie notarii Jacobi Ligalupi cancellarii et scrivanii

Appendix V Election of the *calcolatori*, 1667

Source: ASG, NA 8478, UGG 10, 11/05/1667.

Electio calculatoribus

1667 die 11 may

In Nomine Domini Amen. Excellentissimus Domini Antonius Grimaldus ex una, et Patronus Benedictus de Moro ex altera parte spontes et omnimodo.

De communi concordia, et consensu elligunt in calculatorem ad faciendum calculum danni iactus, et aliorum de quibus in Consulatu dicti patroni Benedicti postentati in Cancelaria Illustrimus DD. Conservatorum Maris Ganuae D. Nicolaus Bivium absentes.

Cum Bailia opportuna, et solita condi in similibus

Promittentes

Homologantes, et acceptantes sub hipp.ca et obligabimus

Denunciantes

De quibus omnibus

Per me Jo. Jacobum infrascriptum notarium actum Genus in saloto ad planum ause domus habitationis dicti exce.mi Antonii Grimaldi site in viculo Sancti Mathei an.o ex nativitate Dominus millesex.no Sex.mo Sessag.mo septimo Ind.e quarta secundum Genus Corsu die mercury, undecima may in 3y Presentis Simone Grixella, Jo. Maris et Matheo Sebiaphino et Thomas testibus ad pred.a vocatis et rogati.

In est Jo. Jacobus infrs. Notarius

Appendix VI Report of the *patrone* Giacomo S. Michele, 1638

Source: ASG, NG 2084, Atti dei calcolatori, 09/10/1638. Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id50512.

[...] congregare, sedentes, nihil omnimodo audito dicto p. Jacobo Sanmichele petente apperiri, et publicari consolatium in actis per eum presentatum clausum et sigillatu, illumque approbari videndum maxime quia fuit ad eius Intentiam citatus dicto Jo. Stephanus marengus ut interessatus qui nihil opposuit et quicquid ad Calculos mandaverit apperiri dictum consolatium ut supra presentatum per dictum Jo. Jacobum quo aperto cum approbaverit et approbant salvis juribus et exceptionibus novoru cumque Instec. Habentium in eo, et instec. Testes Joannes Bapta Casanova et Thomas Monteverde vocati

Testimoniale dell presente Jacomo di Sanmichele di Lavagna

Al nome di Dio amen a dì 9 di ottobre 1639 ab Incarnazione stilo di piombino Il *patrone* Jacomo sanmichele di Lavagna dominio di Genova con suo giuramento deferitoli e da esso preso in forma sponse qualmente venerdì prossimamente passato primo dello stante, partitosi da Civitta vecchia con il suo vascello leuto nominato Santo Antonio Bonaventura con cinque marinai carico di 42 caratelli di stracci peso di napoli, 52 cantara di canepa dell'istesso peso e navigando per la volta di Genova dove doveva e deve scaricare e consegnare la detta mercantia al signor Gio. Stefano Merengho, cioè la canepa et al magnifico signor Bartolomeo Caneri le stracci, gionte a ponto a cala di farro e castello marino lontano da terra da tre miglia l'uscì all'incontro una tartana e brigantino de francesi et esso con li marinari fuggiti sopra lo schifo a terra a salvarsi, li detti tartana e bregantino abbordati al nostro liuto presero quello, volsero e poi se ne andorno via al fatto suo. E visto che di già ci potevano assecurare a tornare a vascello, ci tornammo e cominciammo a navigare e presero questo primo terreno di Piombino nel porto del quale hora ci troviamo e fatto diligente ricerca, e perquisitione della robba che manca e stata predata da detti francesi trovo che mancavano le infrascritte robbe e mercantia, cioè un quartarolo de vino, quattro o cinque scudi di pane, robbe di dosso come cappotti, camice e altro, trenta balle di canepa in circa che a pesa seranno da quarantaquattro cantara in circa e come si vederà e troverà nella consegna, ventisette pezzi da otto di danari che presero dalla cascia la quale scassorno,

sette canne di dobletto commesso da amici e quattro canne di ferrandina, et a fine consti della verità domanda essaminarsi li infrascritti noi marinari e vicedersi il detto che ciascheduno e tutto in ogni miglior modo

Nicoleo del Viola, di Lavagna

Lorenzo Conti, di Lavagna

Angelo Poleri, di Lavagna

Stefano Casteletto

Batta Biola Garzone

[...]

Appendix VII Report of the *patrone* Santino Fugone, 1640

Source: ASG, NG 2084, Atti dei calcolatori, 21/03/1640. Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id50238.

[...]

Idem Santino Fugone di Sestri di Levante con suo presente denunzia, e manifesta in tutto come in appresso.

Cioè che ritrovandosi nel porto di Porto Torres con sua feluca, e sei marinai carica di formaggio sardo sopra quale vi era cantarelli cento tre peso sardo et essendo già spedito, e dovendosi partire da questo detto porto il giorno de giovedì passato che furono li quindici del presente in sera di mezzanotte partiti da detto porto con detta sua feluca in compagnia di altre due una di presente Orlando Mulli, e l'altra di Domenico Severisio ambi di detto luogo di Sestri, quali tutti navigassimo il restante di detta notte con li venti da terra et al giorno arrivassimo sopra dell'isola Rossa, nel qual luogo si diede il vento a mezzogiorno, et arrivassimo circa a sere venti il venerdì procedendo a detta notte alla torre della Sponsaglia [Corsica] alla qual torre si prese parlamento li diede nova il Torregiano di essa de una barca senza neminare di che fusse, la quale andava navigando per quelli contorni, la qual barca havendola essi vista di permesso in detto luogo tutto il detto giorno di venari et il sabbati, e domenica procedenti per causa di detta barca, la quale si stava tratenendo in quelli luoghi detti giorni. Domenica la mattina circa hore quindici havendo fatto la loro solita scoperta, e non vedendo piú la detta barca si partirono tutti, e tre di conserva con calma e vento in terra navigando con reme, et arrivassimo la sera di detto giorno di Domenica all'Isola delli corsi nel qual luogo stettero tutta la notte et il lunedì mattina, nel far del alba ci partissimo con calma alle reme, e navigassimo tutto detto giorno et arrivassimo circa ore venti nella fiumara di Solenzara, nel qual luogo trovassimo *patrone* Martino di Sestri con due filuche pur di Sestri, et un leuto della Bastia alli quali demandati se vi fusse niente di nuovo alle parte di qua verso la Bastia dissero che non vi era niente di nuovo e stato in detto luogo circa tre hore ci partissimo da loro circa le venti tre hore passate con bonaccia senza venti alle reme navigando detta notte arrivassimo circa a sere di mezzanotte alla torre della Fiorentina [near Monte Cristo] con il vento in terra, e mentre eravamo sotto la detta torre, che venivamo verso la Bastia a reme, e a vela, ne uscí da terra una lancia de francesi, la quale subito venne alla nostra

volta a suon di muschettate dicendo amaina Canaglia che tutto in un tempo ci venne da poppa, e ne saltarno detti Francesi sopra la nostra Filuca con arme alla mano cinque pistole armi bianche cortelle, et altre arme dicendo abasso Canaglia amaina tirando continuamente delle moschettate, il che visto esso padrone, e ritrovandosi lontano da terra circa un tiro di pietra diede di mano di subiti al sacchetto che teneva sotto un banco di detta feluca dentro del quale vi erano da £ sei cento circa di moneta cioè in numero settanta sette levantini, e pezze trenta tre da otto reali dua scudi di argento una e doppia, e mezzo d'ore, cioè la doppia era di Firenze et un scudo d'oro di Napoli, e più lire dieci di moneta genovese, qual sacchetto haveva nella mani, e procuró lanciarsi in mare per andare a terra, e salvare detti denari, ma cosí tosto, che li detti francesi cioè uno di essi lo afferró di dietro, e lo tenne forte il che visto esso padrone pose detto sacchetto da mezzo al formaggio alla staminara della filera, e dopo poi detti francesi hanno preso quattro de mei marinari, e portati sopra della loro lancia , et a esso patrone con un altro marinaio, et il patrone lo lasciarono su detta loro feluca che ponendosi sopra di essa tre francesi armati et furono fuori con detta nostra feluca navigandosi, et volteggiando tutta la notte la mattina nel far del alba avendo essi francesi visto la barca, che restava di fuori a detta torre lontana dal terreno due miglia circa ne portarono dove detta barca, et ivi prima fecero montare a detto patrone, et lo inuminciorono a intero per che roba havessi dentro la filera; gli respose che era formaggio sardo caricato a mio conto proprio per portare in terra ferma a vendere, videro anche la mia patente quale diceva che quella era falsa, et che eravamo napoletani montati in detto luogo di Napoli. Di piú il capitano di detta barca domandó a esso primieramente che denari avesse imbarcati, li respose che li denari, che io l'aveva erano da lire sei cento circa in un sacchetto fra denaroni, pezze da otto scudi di argento, e doppie d'oro et moneta genovese come io detto sopra, et essendo anche sopra la nostra filuca li francesi che ho detto sopra, uno di quelli havendo ritrovato detta sacchetta la presentó al detto capitano alla mia presenza dal qual capitano fu pigliato tutto il formaggio, che aveva che era file, che constava pezzi otto cento di moneta sarda sopra detta filuca come presero con tutta la nostra roba cosí mia come de marinaie fece tutto pressare sopra detta barca, e tutto detto giorno ci hanno trattenuti persino a ore venti una havendo tra ieri consiglio circa quello dovevano fare delle nostre persone a quale il patrone pregava per l'amor di Dio, che mi dessero il fatto mio stante,

che era mio proprio e non di napolitani, e da esso capitano ali sera fu detto, che meritava che mi appendesse a un pennone di detta barca, et che non mi voleva dare cosa alcuna al fine però fece prendere sei file di detto formaggio pezzo di moneta genovese, che era in detto sacchetto, et mi le diede relavandomi la filiera con la vela, tende a reme, e poi licenziato a me con miei marinai, che remarono sopra la sua barca, e lasciò et da ivi partiti siamo arrivati la notte seguente qui nel porto della Bastia senza toccare in altro luogo a ore quattro di notte circa, et il fatto é seguito in tutto come sopra. [...].

Hanno presi sopra la detta sua feluca robbe sue proprie, un trapuntino pieno di lana, un moschetto con sua fiasca, una coltella, tre camiscie, due parre calzonetti, due parre di calzoni i quali un paro di drappo e l'altro di cattisso [?] due casacche di drappo, una camiciola bianca, et un panno di calzetta che fra tutte le suddette robe erano a valuta de lire cinquanta e piú tutte le robe delli suoi marinari; quali tutti sono restati senza alcuna cosa come da loro sará dichiarato mentre saranno esaminati per mezzo del loro [...].

Appendix VIII Report of the *patrone* Gregorio Graffigna, 1640

Source: ASG, NG 2084, Atti dei calcolatori, 19/04/1640. Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id50324.

[...] hier mattina giorno di mercoledì a hore 15 circa essendo sopra il capo di Varazze detta l'aspera con fortuna di mare e vento cominciando alleggerire e buttare in mare per vedere di salvarsi detto leudo si abuió e annegó lontano da terra mezzo miglio circa e cosí annegato e sommerso detto leudo se ne vennero in terra nudi

[...] carico di mosta, balle quattro al saio, un sacco di lino, 14 tra salcissoni e mortadelle, rubbi due in tre carne salata in tre pezzi, spettanti le suddette cose al detto patrone e altri interessati con esso si cosí aumenta cosí in altra maniera, e piú casse tre serrate, quattro carreghe da giorno di cairo, un caratello nuovo di capacità di una mezzarola, due cavalletti da letto di legno spettanti al signor vicario di luogo di Chiavari in quali li avevano caricati per condurle al Bogheto, un fagotto di roba per consegnare a Finale, e che hier mattina giorno di mercoledì a hore 15 circa essendo sopra il capo di Varazze detta l'aspera con fortuna di mare e vento cominciando alleggerire e buttare in mare per vedere di salvarsi detto leudo si abuiò e annegó lontano da terra mezzo miglio circa e cosí annegato e sommerso detto leudo se ne vennero in terra nudi dove gionti chiamarono aiuto per vedere di recuperare detto leudo che pareva et essendovi andati molti marinai con cavi e altro lo tirorno in terra traverso assai maltrattato si nel corpo come negli attrezzi e con detto leudo si ha salvato straquato in terra balle tre d'assaio, il sacco lino, carne salata carratello, carreghe, li due cavalletti et una cassia la quale aperta per vedere che roba vi era alla presenza di molti marinai sevi è ritrovato robba di dosso da huomo e donna si acciò non patisca, due piatti di stagno, due piccolini ed una pezza di formaggio a segno che vi manca due casse di salsiccioni e mortadelle, una balla alsaio, tutti li attrezzi di detto leudo escluso la vela et arbore, cioè le tende d'arbagio, due ceroni di tela, il ferro, due agumene, destre e parone, sacchi due di roba de marinai, cinque cabani e tre coperte di detti e piú detto fagotto di roba da solo di andava consignato ad un nostro di Chiavari che travaglia a Finale che perciò ne fanno la presente manifestazione consolato acciò appaia della veritá. [...]

Appendix IX Report of the shipowner Diego Tipa, 1667

Source: ASG, *CdM* 85, Atti Civili, 12/01/1668. Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id50646.

[...] comparse innante noi D. Giuseppe Lo Burgio et Antonio d'Amico consoli della regia corte del consolato di genti di mare di questa invictissima et fidele città di Trapani Simone Tipa di questa presente città, procuratore di Dieco Tipa della città di Napoli, uno delli figli e coherede unito del quondam Giuseppe Tipa, curatore et legittimo amministratore di Antonio et Domenico Salvatore Tipa, fratelli carnali d'esso Diego, figli et coheredi umili similmente del detto quondam Giuseppe, loro comune padre olim patrone principale del Pitacchio noto nostra signora del fraro e san francesco di Paula di portata di salmi ottocento incirca che si capitanzava per capitani Michele Lombardo di questa presente città in virtù di procura a noi exhibita e presentata fatta nella città di Napoli e per gli atti di notario Pietro Giacomo Ferrigno a ventinove di dicembre prossimo passato 6 aprile 1667 [...].

Appendix X Report of the *patrone* Lorenzo Cappello, 1698

Source: ASG, CdM 285, Testimoniali segreti redatti all'estero, 10/06/1698.

Voyage recorded in the *AveTransRisk* db as the id50441.

[...] procedendo da Salonich per andare a Marsiglia con scirocco che durò tutto il giorno seguente, e poi si girò a Tramontana, quale mancò e di nuovo si mise scirocco lontano dal Marittimo sessanta miglia incirca, et qual provai a seguitare il mio cammino, e ritrovandoci sopra Montalto lontani dal terreno circa cento miglia, si mise un libeccio si forte la notte delli tre maggio passato che ci necessitò a mollar in poppa et a far gettito, ma rinforzando il tempo cattivo ci necessitò di nuovo a far gettito di maggior somma e fossimo forzati a correr sempre col treglio a discretion del mare, e del vento, e seguitando il cammino alla meglio che potevamo non potendo conoscere terreno per essere le montagne offuscate se non quando fossimo in terra, dove ci convenne investire nella spiaggia di Cornero in luogo detto la Castellania. Vedendoci affatto persi e seguendo salvare almeno la vita se potevamo, essendo tutti fuori di speranza, onde rotto che fu detto scafo, si è procurato di ricuperare quel poco sia stato possibile, che è stato grano quale era presso la spiaggia, quale si è venduto ad un macolino per pezza centocinquanta, e questo per ordine di monsignor illustrissimo Giorgio Spinola Governatore di questo luogo, col qual denaro si sono pagate alcune spese di quarantena. Furno ricuperate ancora due ancore piccole, essendosi perdute le due maggiori con la gumina. Parimenti, si sono ricuperati due cannoni di ferro assieme con nove patieri, e dieci sartie mascoli, si sono ricuperati ancora l'arbore del trinchetto assieme con sua antenna, et antenna di maestra con sua vela latina, con suoi pennoni e vele quadre e diversi altri attrezzi di detta barca, la qual roba è convenuto vendere per pagarne altre spesa; perciò io sono venuto a darne notitia a Vostra Signoria signor Console, acciò mi facci le testimoniali, e facci esaminare li testi, e per informatione di quanto io ho detto potrà esaminare alcuni miei marinai, che qui meco sono venuti [...].

Appendix XI Maps of places cited in chap. 4 and 5

Source: My elaboration based on the 'Map' function in the *AveTransRisk* database.

In Chapters Four and Five I cite places located between Northern Europe, the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. I built the following maps to facilitate the reader finding each place cited. I excluded Newfoundland, Arkhangelsk and the Canary Islands since they are clearly recognisable in the maps included in the Fourth Chapter.


Map XI.1 Northern Europe




Map XI.14 North Africa



Map XI.2 Atlantic Europe



Map XI.3 Mediterranean Spain



Map XI.4 Mediterranean France



Map XI.5 Corsica




Map XI.6 Sardinia




Map XI.7 Liguria



Map XI.8 Central Tyrrhenian Sea




Map XI.9 Calabria




Map XI.10 Apulia



Map XI.11 Northern Adriatic Sea



Map XI.12 Sicily



Map XI.13 Eastern Mediterranean



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