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The Boston Miracle Version 2.0: The Organizing Role of Technology in the Boston Police Department's Community Problem-Solving Strategy

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The Boston Police Department (BPD), in the 1990s, successfully implemented a community problem-solving strategy to reduce juvenile violence (e.g., a 63% reduction in youth homicides between 1996 and 2000). The subsidence of the "Boston Miracle" (i.e., 160% increase in youth homicides from 2000-2006) is documented in later research. The current study follows the qualitative, case study approach. It presents the results of an analysis of twelve semi-structured, in-depth interviews with police personnel, personal observations of patrol and community meetings, and department archives. This paper shows how the BPD borrowed from the past and incorporated new technologies to implement their latest iteration of a Community Problem-Solving (CPS) strategy. It demonstrates the challenges and best practices in CPS for large, urban police departments.

Keywords: community policing, problem-solving, juvenile, technology, Boston

A review of policing in the modern United States reveals a dynamic evolution in strategy, technology, authorization, demand, function and structure (Kelling & Moore, 1988), and is defined most conspicuously by police relationships with the community. In the early years of policing in the modern United States, indignation with the corrupting closeness of police, politicians, and the public sparked drastic moves to "get the politics out of the police and get the police out of politics" (Miller, 1977, p. 11). However, the police estrangement from the community that resulted from this new Reform Era of policing came to a head in the 1960s. Riots and police inability to successfully combat crime and work with the community challenged the police to find new ways of relating to the community. Rising crime rates, the fear of crime, and emerging research on the ineffectiveness of principal police tactics (i.e., preventive patrol and rapid response) assisted the police in reappraising their profession (Kelling & Moore, 1988). The community problem-solving (CPS) era resulted, and is the period in which this study of the Boston Police Department (BPD) is situated.

Racial tensions between the BPD and its citizens mark the history of Boston's police-citizen relations. Significantly, in 1974, a federal court order to desegregate Boston's public school system resulted in riotous outbursts and racially driven assaults. The busing riots, as they came to be known, underscored police-citizen hostilities that arose from the police de-

partment's alienation from its citizens and moved the BPD closer to its CPS era. Though calls for the BPD to become more involved in the community followed, harsh police tactics and corrupt practices in the BPD continued to strain police-citizen relations (Braga, Hureau, & Winship, 2008).

In May 1991, the St. Clair Report reviewed the BPD's management and supervisory systems and recommended an overhaul of BPD's leadership to implement vast changes in hiring, training and promotional practices, strategic planning capabilities, technological innovation, CPS policing, case management, and internal affairs (St. Clair, 1992). By 1995, Commissioner Paul Evans was beginning his tenure as leader of the BPD. He oversaw the creation of a "locally-initiated, neighborhood-driven" strategic plan for neighborhood policing (which included input from police personnel, citizens, and other stakeholders) (Strategic Plan for Neighborhood Policing, 1996, p. 2). This "Boston Miracle" embodies the value of these changes and is the lens through which this research is presented.

The following questions guide this research on the BPD:

1. How does the BPD reflect a CPS organizational strategy (as evidenced by changes in their legitimacy, function, organizational structure, administrative process, external relationships, demand, technologies, tactics, and outcomes)?
2. How do BPD police personnel view the effect of this strategy on the work they do?

This research demonstrates the BPD's most recent attempts to reestablish the community and law enforcement collaborations of the Boston Miracle, in order to successfully combat rising violent crime rates (for which juveniles were again increasingly responsible). By placing the BPD experience within its recent historical context and presenting the reflections of BPD personnel, this study offers a snapshot of one police department's experience using new technologies to refocus their CPS strategy.

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Theoretical Framework

Community problem solving. Police personnel, academics, policy analysts, and the public often conceive of and operationalize CPS differently. CPS represents different tactics, philosophies, and organizational strategies to different people, sometimes even within the same police department. Terms used in discussions of CPS include, community-oriented policing, problem oriented policing, neighborhood policing and team policing. These terms encompass various policing philosophies, strategies, and tactics. CPS specifically describes the most recent era of modern policing. The term captures both the policing organizational strategy and the wide range of activities explored in this study. In conducting a case study, this research explores the BPD's police personnel's views of their CPS organizational strategy. Specifically, the role of technology and community collaborations in reducing violent crime is analyzed.

Skogan (2006a, p. 28) states, community policing is "an organizational strategy that leaves setting priorities and the means of achieving them largely to residents and the police who serve in their neighborhoods... [It] is a process rather than a product." It is a philosophy that undergirds all aspects of police operations, including how the department is organized, how police spend their time, how police measure their performance, and how police view their relationship with the people they serve. Though little evidence supports the crime prevention benefits of community policing, research examines the ability of a community oriented police department to improve their relationships with citizens and to assist them in community-based activities.

Problem-solving policing is a process by which the police department works with the community to respond proactively to a wide range of problems, and is a tactic used by community oriented police departments (Reisig, 2010). Eck and Spelman (1987) advanced and refined Goldstein's (1979) ideas in their research on the successful implementation of a problem-solving model that included scanning, analyzing, responding, and assessing (or, the SARA model). This model has become the most accepted understanding of how police departments implement problem-solving policing. Problem solving is a method used by a community-oriented department to respond to a variety of community needs. Clarke (2002) differentiates between community-oriented policing and problem-oriented policing, noting, community policing "seeks to strengthen relationships with communities and engage their assistance in the fight against crime. Problem-oriented policing, on the other hand...is mostly directed to reducing opportunities for crime through environmental changes and criminal or civil enforcement" (p. 3). Research confirms the success of police problem-solving in a number of communities and for a range of crimes and problems (Braga et al., 1999; Hope, 1994; Sampson & Scott, 2000; Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001; Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck, 2010).

This paper adds to the knowledge of successful crime prevention by exploring the BPD experience implementing the CPS organizational strategy and by interpreting police personnel's perceptions of their specific problem-solving efforts. The

present research not only offers examples for police practitioners, but also gives police researchers, and professionals, insight into how police personnel understand and implement a CPS organizational strategy to effectively reduce juvenile violent crime.

Organizational strategy. Organizational strategy describes the business of public service agencies (e.g., the BPD) (Andrews, 2003).¹ Elements of a police organizational strategy (i.e., legitimacy, function, structure, administrative processes, external relationships, demand entrance and management, tactics, technologies, and outcomes), adapted from Kelling and Moore (1988), inform this study. Moore, Sparrow, and Spelman (1997) offer a similar typology, distinguishing between four types of innovations: programmatic, administrative, technological, and strategic. This paper explores the most pertinent aspects of the BPD's CPS strategy.

The function of a police department operating within a CPS strategy, manifests the successful establishment of positive working relationships with citizens and other community groups, in responses to lower level offenses (as defined by the community), and in connecting these relationships and responses to reductions in crime, disorder, and fear. Data on citizens' perceptions of the police department, and on citizens' compliance and cooperation with the police reflect the department's legitimacy in the community; it also suggests that how police perform their duties (e.g., procedural justice) may show to be more important than the outcomes of their work (i.e., order maintenance or crime reduction) (Tyler, 2002; Fagan & Tyler, 2004). Therefore, for police legitimacy, the traditional ways of measuring what police do, and their effectiveness in doing it, may not account for its most pertinent aspect; that is, the manner in which they fulfill their responsibilities, an integral element of the successful implementation of the CPS strategy.

A police department's relationship to its external environment refers to the department's social, political, and economic situation (specifically, the police department's access to economic resources, the political context in which the department operates, and the department's relationship with the union, the community, and other law enforcement agencies). A police department operating under the CPS organizational strategy should have a sustained, sincere, and productive working relationship with citizens and other community groups, as well as support from local politicians (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Such relationships defined the successful efforts of the Boston Miracle.

The avenues in place for an organization to receive demand for their service as well as the interpretation and management of that demand, speak to how the police department views their relationship with the aforementioned groups. Demand enters the police organization through contacts with citizens, while on patrol or in the precinct house, formal meetings and collaborations with community groups, citizen calls to 9-1-1, local politicians, or general surveillance (and crime analysis) technologies. In a CPS strategy, demand enters the organization at all levels and lines, and mid-level police personnel have the authority and resources to work within limited geographic areas to manage and

¹For a brief discussion of how corporate strategy applies to public institutions, see Kelling (1989).

respond to that demand in neighborhood-specific ways. Additionally, contact with citizens and community groups would be increased and calls for service prioritized based on seriousness and time since occurrence. Finally, avenues should be put into place by which line personnel are freed from responding to non-emergency calls for service, thus using their time in other community building and problem-solving activities.

Tactics used in the CPS era include, police-community meetings, foot patrol and arrests for misdemeanor offenses. Braga and Bond (2008) and Braga et al. (1999) discuss other effective tactics used in a problem-solving process (e.g., dealing with problem properties, civil remedies, collaborations with community groups, and environmental design changes). Police operations should include these tactics and should evidence the proper use of technologies in support of them, such as at CompStat. Though CompStat aids police departments in creating (and holding commanders accountable for) problem-solving strategies at the highest levels of the police organization, problem-solving at the line level often takes a different form (e.g., interacting with citizens, community groups, and other law enforcement or city agencies to respond to geographic hot spots of crime and disorder as determined by multiple data sources). These patrol and investigative tactics are further supported by new technologies, on a real-time, daily, and long term basis.

Nearly 60% of police agencies with 100 or more sworn personnel claim to follow some version of a CompStat process (Weisburd, Mastrofski, Greenspan, & Willis, 2004). Police departments use CompStat in various ways (e.g., as a management tool, as a problem-solving exercise, to transmit the executive leader's values to command staff, and to hold personnel responsible for using their own problem-solving skills to respond to data-derived crime and disorder problems) (Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2007). Thus, the CompStat process (and the technologies involved in it) may directly relate to a police department's implementation of CPS.

The "Boston miracle." The Boston Miracle refers to the period in the 1990s when the BPD successfully implemented their Operation CeaseFire and Ten Point Coalition programs to dramatically reduce rising juvenile violent crime rates. As part of the Operation CeaseFire approach, community groups offered services to seriously involved gang members, while criminal justice agencies collaborated to provide assured punishment if said gang members continued on their criminal path (Kennedy, Piehl, & Braga, 1996). The Ten Point Coalition was an unprecedented collaboration between the BPD and leaders of relevant Black clergy, which lent legitimacy in the historically strained Black communities to the crime-fighting and community-building efforts of the BPD (Braga et al., 2008). These efforts, in conjunction with the citizen-initiated neighborhood-based policing strategic plan, formed the organizational and functional basis by which the police began to work with citizens to respond to an array of neighborhood-specific and citywide problems. As a result of the programs, after a steep rise in youth homicides (both as homicide victims and perpetrators) in the early 1990s, Boston saw an even greater decline in the number of homicides in the latter half of that decade. The drop in youth and adolescent homicide (victimization and perpetration) contribut-

ed overwhelmingly to this decline (Braga et al., 2008). Kennedy et al. (1996) attribute part of this decline to the collaborative efforts of academics, community groups, and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

The miracle, however, did not last. Braga et al. (2008) document the breakdown in collaborations between the BPD and community groups and the coinciding increase in violent crime. With the success of the 1990s as a reference point and prelude, the current research continues Boston's policing narrative and illuminates the role of a CPS police organization in responding to citizens' needs. As violence rates fluctuated through the first decade of the 21st century, the BPD and their community partners have undergone a number of administrative, staffing, technological and strategic changes. This study will offer insight into these changes and how they were viewed by police personnel.

Method

Sample

Though scholars debate the role of CPS in lowering crime rates, a large majority of police departments have implemented some form of CPS (Skogan 2006b; Hickman & Reaves, 2001; Erickson, 1998). This paper presents the findings of an in-depth case study of the BPD to explore how one police department interprets and implements a CPS strategy to respond to violence in their community. By looking inside the elusive "black box" (Braga et al., 2004, p. 219) that often arises in evaluations of police activities, this paper illuminates the processes by which a CPS strategy can lower juvenile violence. King (2009) noted that while previous research has "disregarded the importance of history, process, and the temporal dimensions of organizations" (p. 213), the current study's review of past research, and a retrospective analysis of the department's experiences, enhance this study's contribution to the field by "including time and process" (p. 229), and "introducing an historical and temporal element to organizational studies" (p. 232).

Procedure

The BPD case study consists of semi-structured interviews; observations on ride-alongs with patrol car units; walk-alongs; inter- and intra-agency meetings; nearly 1,500 online local news articles; and unrestricted access to the BPD archival documents.² Departmental data were collected during a field orientation in spring 2009 and during intensive research visits in summer 2009 and spring 2010. The main data collection source is twelve semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with key personnel within the BPD. With the initial assistance of

²Disagreement among the various unions prompted the police commissioner to prohibit this researcher from administering a survey to their personnel. Though the Office of the Police Commissioner was willing to assist, Union representatives cite two reasons for not allowing the researcher to administer surveys (a fear that the information obtained from a survey can be used negatively against their personnel and a desire to keep their personnel from becoming "survey monkeys," expected to assist with the many requests they receive for survey data).

my department contact, a purposive and snowball sampling method was used to select interview participants from the BPD, based on their history with (and the positions held within) the department. Interview subjects consisted of the following ranks: six superintendents, three captains, one lieutenant, and two sergeants. The interview transcripts and the researcher's field notes were analyzed using the coding and node schemes offered by NVivo 8.0 (a computerized qualitative data-management program). Online news articles and BPD archives supported, refuted, and contextualized the findings.

Results

The analysis of interviews with command level personnel, BPD archives, observations of BPD personnel, and a review of online news articles clarifies the BPD's recent experience with CPS. It also reveals BPD personnel's views on their department's efforts, and offers suggestions for how the BPD re-iterated a CPS organizational strategy in response to the community's calls for the BPD to reduce violent crime. The BPD's implementation of a CPS organizational strategy is one that wrestled with their violent crime reduction goals while maintaining their CPS focus.

Function

About his first full year as Commissioner of the BPD Edward Davis wrote, "We enhanced that commitment [to community policing] by ensuring that its philosophy informed all of our decisions and guided all of our actions" (Boston Police Department, 2008, p. 3). The BPD official mission statement read, "We dedicate ourselves to work in partnership with the community to fight crime, reduce fear and improve the quality of life in our neighborhoods. Our Mission is Community Policing" (Boston Police Department, 2010, p. 2). The BPD's successes in combating youth gun violence in the 1990s epitomized for many the CPS strategy. The BPD, like many police departments, has been, at different times, more and less committed to a community policing philosophy.

The BPD personnel interviewed in this study clearly articulated the multifaceted function of the BPD. In-depth interviews with BPD command staff contextualized the BPD mission statement and revealed a community-based, neighborhood-specific, problem-solving function. The police department, through various tactics, worked with the community to define problems (ranging from loud neighbors to gun violence) and created and implemented solutions (from removing a bench from an apartment complex to arresting neighbors). The interview data reflected BPD's balance of working with the community to fight crime, reduce disorder, and improve the quality of life.

As respondent BOS_05³ first admitted, "Our mission has always been to protect the public, reduce crime." He then explained:

³These codes are used to keep the interview respondents' identities confidential and correspond to an interview log that can only be accessed by the researcher. This interview log contains respondent identifying information such as name and rank.

Where I think we're getting better is, we understand we have to deal with all the little issues too, the gang disturbances, the kids in the park, the problems of that particular neighborhood...let's address their concerns, whether it's gang caused, or kids drinking down the park...We know what the neighborhoods want by talking to them, going to the community meetings, working with their neighborhood advisory groups, and listening to them day in and day out. Community policing and problem solving in policing hot spots, it all works, but the main parts of this is dealing with the community and working with them to solve the community's problems, not just the police problems-the community's problems.

Although people often view crime control and community policing as opposites, this quote displays the BPD's recognition of the need to respond to a variety of citizen concerns, the most pressing concern being public safety. What is noteworthy, given the traditional emphasis on crime control through arrest and rapid response to calls for service, is the baseline acceptance of the need for police to work with the community in policing signs of physical and social disorder and other low-level forms of community offending.

Another respondent (BOS_01) portrayed the BPD's history with community policing as auguring the current iteration of that strategy, which relied on the crime and disorder control function of police. This foundation, he stated, brought the BPD to a clearer understanding of the many functions of the police department. He relayed:

The first basic tenet of community policing is, you got to go out there and arrest the fucking bad guys. If I'm trying to walk up and down the street and get everyone jobs and alternative programming and they're slanging dope and carrying guns and shooting kids, the community is not interested in that. They need to have the crime stopped first. Some people confuse community policing with not arresting people. The first tenant, stop the disorder and that means making arrests, and then talk to kids about alternatives.

Concerning community policing, this respondent portrayed the role of an initially strong police presence (i.e., arresting) in creating perceptions of safe and orderly neighborhoods. Respondent BOS_11 added:

An important part of [community policing] is that we arrest criminals, we want people to feel safe in their neighborhoods. That message needs to be promoted among the officers. Then, additional messages (looking at quality of life issues, problem solving with the community, and doing prevention work with youth) will really start to form nice.

These statements reflect an understanding of the role of citizens' perceptions in forming productive problem-solving relationships with the BPD and evidence their mission to reduce crime and fear and improve the quality of life, while first emphasizing the police responsibility to arrest those who break the law. Respondent BOS_05 went on to explain:

Police presence is probably the biggest that make people feel, if they see the police officer and they know the police officer on the beat, if they have a relationship with the district and they feel like they could call somebody like the community service officer, that makes people feel better.

Respondent BOS_01 explained the challenge of getting BPD officers to understand their proper function, within the community policing strategy. He states:

I have a challenge, even today, where officers feel we don't want them to make an arrest up there. That's not the case, if an arrest is warranted, it's warranted. I don't need you to arrest just for the sake of an arrest. The community sees us more problem solving in dealing with quality of life issues than they do arrest because we talk to them, we survey them. If areas with major crimes going on (whether it's homicides, ton of youth violence) and we'll survey the community and ask them what the issues are, and they'll tell us, abandon cars, speeding cars, people illegally dumping stuff. Jesus, what about the homicide? Yeah, that's a problem, but we got to get rid of these kids that graffiti up the place. So, you know, they'd rather us focus on quality of life stuff too.

Although police maintain the sole ability to enforce the law and to legally arrest a suspected lawbreaker, the community expects the BPD to also assist in maintaining order by dealing with quality of life concerns. The BPD works with the community to reduce crime and disorder, which enhances citizens' perceptions of their city and of the BPD. A biannual survey of a representative sample of Bostonians contextualizes these findings (Pulavarti, Bernadeau, Kenney, & Savage, 2007).⁴ The 2006 survey asked respondents to state how serious a problem is each of fifteen conditions listed (ranging from noise to gun usage). The top five conditions that the highest percentage of respondents listed as somewhat serious or serious included: a) litter and trash lying around; b) cars broken-in; c) drug sales; d) burglary; and e) vandalism. These problems reflect the variety (and notably nonviolent nature) of problems the BPD respond to in fulfilling their problem solving and crime and disorder reduction strategy. The data showed that the BPD did in fact work with the community to define a wide range of problems and to respond with a variety of solutions. Therefore, though the BPD functions to reduce crime, it also works to lower the fear of crime and to enhance citizens' quality of life. The BPD's use of external relationships, demand management, and other tactics and technologies are discussed below.

External Relationships

Data from this study revealed the BPD's response to quality of life concerns, thus enhancing their relationship building mechanisms from the 1990s and finding new ways of relating to and working with a number of external entities. Upon taking office, Commissioner Davis, charged by the mayor with reducing violence and enhancing community relationships, discussed his commitment to the community policing philosophy as one that is not only a "specialized program," but one that ensures all units within the BPD "operate with a community-policing philosophy" (O'Brien, 2007, p. 1). Interview and archival data posited mechanisms that support the BPD in working (and building relationships) with the community: expanding the community service officer within each district; training in the academy; a BPD blog and Twitter site; a Text-a-Tip pro-

gram; attending community meetings to receive advice and feedback about BPD efforts; and the Safe Street Teams (SST). Respondent BOS_05 commented, "We can put all these elaborate names on [these programs], theories and different strategies, but the plan is, working with the community, working with your neighbors, in development, using the resources..." These programs increase the amount and quality of the BPD's positive contacts with their citizens.

Though beat integrity and police collaboration with citizens, to define a variety of problems and responses to those problems in areas of crime and disorder hot spots, are features of the SST (discussed below) and Street Outreach Team (SOT), the remaining patrol force works under a similar neighborhood and citizen interaction focus. Respondent BOS_13 reported:

It's just talkin' to people, talkin' to the community, and listenin' to what their needs are, because just because we're the police, and we're here, doesn't mean that we know what's goin' on, and what the issues are in different communities, and the thing is, different communities have different issues, especially with a city like Boston which is very divided.

Like, in West Roxbury, their needs might be very different than Roxbury is, given the populations in those two areas. So, you have to talk to people and find out, what are their needs, not tell them what you wanna do for them, but tell me what you need from me. This will build a good relationship...Before we just went and did police work and responded to calls, then see you later! Now it's like, almost, we go to different meetings, different functions, like this [cookout] today.

In discussing the role of quality of life enforcement, and the need to place that enforcement within its proper neighborhood context, he continued, "Quality of life is number one...Every community has their own idea of what quality of life is."

Respondent BOS_09 added, "It's the quality of life issues that's driving them crazy. Not the things that happen to a particular person, but the things that affect the greatest amount of people." Working with the community to define problems generates a police response to quality of life concerns. Field Interrogation Observation (FIO) forms, Code 19's (also known as "walk and talks"), the Reporting Area Project (RAP),⁵ the SOT, SST, attendance at community meetings, a biannual survey of citizens, and data management and analysis technologies assist the BPD's efforts in measuring and implementing solutions to crime and disorder problems (as defined by the community). They also provide evidence of the BPD's efforts to reduce crime and enhance relationships with the community.

The FIO forms and Code 19's are carry overs from the 1990s push for community policing and are meant to increase the quantity and quality of police interactions with citizens. The FIO forms document these interactions and any information gained from the interaction, and Code 19's and the RAP provide ways for patrol officers to call in their time to dispatch, making the walk and talk a viable and formally acceptable method of patrol. The "relationship based" focus of the BPD improves community relationships, assists with crime prevention efforts, and helps after a crime is committed. For instance,

⁵The Reporting Area Project expands on the "walk and talks" by assigning patrol officers to small, geographic areas in which they must spend at least one hour of their patrol time interacting with citizens and solving problems.

⁴This survey was conducted just prior to Commissioner Davis' appointment to the BPD. However, the findings are still worth exploring in lieu of data from the yet to be published 2010 community survey. The 2006 data are especially relevant, given the fact that Commissioner Davis' tenure began that year. Also, presenting aggregate level survey data makes it difficult to disentangle the neighborhood level issues and concerns that this paper explores (Pulavarti et al., 2007).

respondents noted how positive relationships come into play, after an egregious crime or BPD mishap, to ease tensions in the community and to more quickly rebound from such incidents. As respondent BOS_07 stated, "There's community leaders that we could reach out to explain what happened, to ask for time to correct the situation." Observations during a walk-along in one of the SST areas revealed the genuine relationships the officer had with various people during the walk. The amount of knowledge that the officer and citizens had of each other's lives and their discussions on various community programs and detailed neighborhood happenings evidenced the authenticity of these relationships. The officer gave numerous examples of the payout of the BPD's relationships with that neighborhood. These relationships created knowledge sharing and empathy and gave officers an understanding of the social geography of those hot spot areas, thereby facilitating neighborhood-specific, community-based responses to problems of crime and disorder.

Bi-weekly Operation Impact meetings represented a more law-enforcement bend to community collaborations in which, as respondent BOS_12 explained, the BPD focuses on "high propensity kids." This signaled a return to the successful collaborative and "pulling levers" approach of the BPD that led to the Boston Miracle and evidenced the BPD's attempts to focus on high risk people and places. In cases where the BPD felt they had "done all we can with the carrot on" these repeat offenders (or, "impact points"), officers, based on information shared at bi-weekly Impact meetings, may use "minor arrests" to get a potential violent crime suspect (or victim) off the street. He further stated, "We work hand in hand with the housing officers, the Safe Street Teams, the street workers, the federal prosecutor's office...We'll work with parole, we'll work with probation-and a lot of these kids are on probation..." Though this unit (i.e., the Youth Violence Strike Force) collaborated with various agencies to provide a "carrot" to known high propensity for violence individuals, it also acted as the strong arm of law enforcement (the "stick") when information led the officers to believe that putting an individual in jail would reduce the person's likelihood of being a violent offender or victim. Arrests for a minor offense triggered a known offender's violation of probation or parole conditions and, in turn, prevented (or at least delayed) a violent act or acts. The YVSF's regular tactical-planning and information-sharing Operation Impact meetings represented the BPD's attempt to institutionalize the "pulling levers" approach of Operation Cease-Fire, made famous in the 1990s.

Demand

Building relationships with the community takes time-whether a patrol officer builds a one-on-one relationship with a citizen during a walk and talk or a detective attends a multi-agency information sharing meeting (such as Operation Impact or YVSF meetings). For most patrol officers, the time they have to put in to building relationships is secondary to responding to calls for service. Though training in problem-solving at the academy, walk and talks, the STT, the SOT, and the RAP encourage BPD officers to take time to work with the community, it remains up to the individual officer's discretion

and capabilities to use that time wisely. As one police supervisor (respondent BOS_09) told his officers:

You have to write reports, you got to answer calls, you got to bring the car over to the shop; there's all kinds of things you have to do, but ultimately, you're going to have a lot of free time. And that's going to determine the kind of police officer you're going to be, is how you handle your free time, the decision making you make, the discretion that you use, that right there is sort of like the core of the community policing, the rest you just have to put up with.

Other respondents discussed how technology (e.g., communication and CAD systems) gave supervisors a clearer picture of how their officers spent time responding to calls for service. This information gave supervisors ammunition to help their officers see that they had the time to partake in these community-building activities (when not responding to the radio). Another respondent (BOS_10), however, described the reality faced by officers who must respond to calls for service, while also trying to work with the community:

The majority of the work of the patrol officers in the cruiser is still somewhat reactive. We're trying our best to shift that over, but it's hard to do it when you have minimum staffing levels, and you have to answer X amount of calls, all day long...The way the free time is broken down, it's not spread out all as much as we would like it to be. It would be great if we just had 4 hours of calls and four hours of free time, but you get forty minutes of good time, and then 15 to 20 minutes of down time. You continue that throughout the day, and that's where you come up with your 40%. They don't really have as much free time as you would think to really go out and target some of these things. So, we're still kind of married to the radio response.

The respondent acknowledged the common perception that patrol officers had a large percentage of "free time" and pointed out that how that free time was allocated (i.e., by dispatching officers to respond to calls for service) could determine the quality of the officer's community building responses, for even the most motivated of officers.

Another way in which the BPD formally works with the community is through Constituent Response Teams (CRT). These collaborations between the BPD and other city agencies were created by Mayor Menino in 2009 and were aimed at using data on problems of disorder and quality of life to proactively and comprehensively respond to such problems. The SST and SOT, already discussed, also represent units whose main responsibility is to proactively interact with citizens to prevent (and respond to) problems. These collaborations have the authority, resources, and time to receive and manage the demand that arises for their service in their (geographic and content) areas. Respondent BOS_12 explained:

The guys in the blue and whites, the uniform guys, they do it [make referrals to other agencies] to a limited degree, just because they're busy on certain radio calls. They're not really given the same kind of leeway we have in Safe Street Teams. The Safe Street Teams are basically on the bikes, they don't get a lot of radio calls, they aren't being pulled all over the place where the uniforms, got cars, and the service calls are wrapping you up in the one man cars. So, you've got walkin' beat guys, they're comparable to the Safe Street Teams.

The respondent noted the benefit of having officers assigned to the SST and to walking beats, where they were free from responding to many calls for service. Respondent BOS_01 added:

Now we have 13 teams of six officers and a supervisor walking in the hot spot areas, all driven by our crime data, and that's it, that's their job. We don't take them and put them in the wagon, we don't take them and put them to watch prisoners one night if we're short. Every night, it's those officers. Now if they're on vacation we don't replace them, but those guys, 'You own it. You own this geographical area, you deal with everything in there. Speeding cars, drug dealing, homicides, you own it all.'

Technology and meaningfully organized data on crime and disorder hot spots served as the initial reason for allocating these resources to those specific parts of the city. A captain (respondent BOS_10) explained how direct input from the community and mapping technologies guided the BPD's ongoing allocation of resources:

I think we've gotten more into lookin' to proactive type policing where we're targeting hot spots in response to hot spots based on crime mapping, and input from other sources, the community, community meetings and complaints from the various constituents, we tend to target things in response to that.

In addition to units that have the leeway to get involved with the community, the BPD encourages all of its patrol officers to proactively work with citizens. These interactions inevitably place a demand on the officer's time—whether by stopping an individual for a low level offense in a high crime area or conversing with a local business owner about problems affecting his patrons. The Reporting Area Project and Code 19's (walk and talks) encourage all officers to take the time to get involved with the community. Respondent BOS_05 noted the difficulty in getting the personnel to understand the need to balance the radio and community responsibilities:

We're trying to make them do their Code 19's, get out, talk to people in the community, go to community meetings. It's always a fine balance between answering their radio calls and dealing with issues. But making sure they stay within their sector in dealing with their problem areas, that's what we're trying to instill now, dealing with issues and the really hot spot areas of the city at every district.

Though the BPD has specific units that problem solve with the community, the BPD is also finding ways to encourage a CPS mindset for all personnel within the organization. This section concludes with BPD tactics that indicate a CPS strategy and the technologies that support such a strategy within the organization.

Tactics and Technology

Various tactics and technologies are used to fulfill the BPD's function in the CPS organizational strategy. Respondent BOS_11 gave a brief history of the BPD's community policing philosophy, reporting that the BPD moved from an arrest-based approach in the 1980s and early 1990s to one where "we really saw the need to expand the way we viewed policing" and "we started to think more comprehensively—enforcement, intervention, and prevention, as well as forming partnerships with law enforcement agencies, the community, clergy, and the business community." Though the strength of and reliance on these tactics and collaborations have changed over time, the BPD's most recent strategies represent a return to the successful efforts of the Boston Miracle. They included, increased, formal and informal community contacts, real time data analysis, and violent and disorderly hot spots policing. The influence of bro-

ken windows policing, CompStat, and supporting technologies underscore these tactics.

Broken windows policing. Operating with a belief that relationships matter and that "small things lead to bigger things" (respondent BOS_13), the BPD instituted SST and a SOT. These teams focus police attention on the high-risk people and places that contribute to disproportionately high levels of violence. Policing low level offenses against high risk criminals and in high risk places (and using non-arrest alternatives for those offenses) assists police in sending signals of neighborhood control and may increase citizens perceptions of the BPD. Discussing the BPD's response to lower-level offending and acknowledging the need to respond to these "smaller" quality of life offenses without relying too heavily on arresting individuals, respondent BOS_10 reported, "[We use] some of the smaller issues to address some of the bigger issues."

Beginning in 2007, and borrowing from the earlier idea of "Same Cop, Same Neighborhood" (or beat integrity), and from Commissioner Davis' time as Superintendent in Lowell, MA, the SST are now involved in 13 violent crime hotspots in Boston (as directed by crime mapping techniques).⁶ Patrol officers in these teams maximize their positive interactions with citizens in high crime neighborhoods by patrolling on foot and bicycle, attending various community functions, and by working with citizens to respond to specific problems of crime and disorder. Their visibility serves not only as a deterrent to those who would wish to disturb the evolving control mechanisms in the neighborhood, but also as reassurance to citizens who expect to see a police presence and who view the BPD as a legitimate source of assistance, and as a necessary form of formal social control in otherwise disorganized neighborhoods.

Respondent BOS_05 detailed the officers' experiences as members of the SST:

...they're realizing that there's more than just runnin' and gunnin'. It's getting out there, riding bicycles, talking to people in the busier districts to working with their issues and staying in that spot where they're seeing the patterns and the times that things happen or the people who belong and the people who don't, the crimes that are happening and how they prevent them, how do they help stop them, work with different community groups, whatever issue it may be. But yeah, the younger officers always want that—they're going to always strive to maybe go to a drug unit or a gang unit or some other unit to do something different.

The deputy's excerpt corresponded to this researcher's observations of a captains' meeting, in which the captains in attendance agreed that many young officers were not suited to work with the SST because they did not appreciate the work the teams did. In other words, the captains believed the younger officers preferred the "runnin' and gunnin'" aspects of police work. The deputy's discussion also echoed observations from a meeting of the SST commanders who valued having the same officers in the same neighborhoods doing "hot spot policing," "at the problem locations and at the right times." Similarly, the captains enjoyed having officers take ownership of a small geographic location, which, they reported, allowed the officers

⁶See Braga & Bond (2008) for a more in-depth explanation of the Safe Street Teams' Lowell, MA ascendants.

to focus on and prevent specific problems of disorder and violence.

CompStat. Technologies used in CompStat, Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) and the Real Time Crime Center (RTCC), assist the BPD in measuring the outcomes of their work and in focusing police efforts on high risk people and places. Respondent BOS_11 described some new technologies and the institution of the BRIC and RTCC:

The ShotSpotter (identifies locations of gunfire), the development of the Boston Regional Intelligence Center in 2005 as a central depository for analyzing and evaluating and distributing information to the department, and, most recently, the Real Time Crime Center, which monitors different locations in the city, has had positive benefits for the department. Cameras in the neighborhoods, things like that have played a part. I think sometimes they're looked at as these new silver bullets to deal with crime, and I don't think it's that, but it's a good addition that allows for a timely response to some issues of crime in neighborhoods.

Additionally, respondent Bos_06 explained how the data gathered and analyzed by these technologies helped to focus BPD resources on hot spots:

You know what I think is pretty effective, hot spots through crime analysis. We have a unit downstairs, they take all that information as it becomes available. That information is sent back to the different commanders, they have their meetings on it. You know exactly where your problems are, you don't have to guess. Anytime something happens, we have that information right from the computer. I open up my computer now and I can tell you what's going on in any parts of the city. The hot spots know where they are, now let's develop a strategy. What do we need to do here, what's going on here. You got shots fired, got drugs, you got petty theft, you got people stealing cars and stripping them, whatever the problem happens to be, where they're happening at. And you've identified those so-called hot spots. Now you have resources. Put together a plan or strategy, how you're going to deal with it...And don't forget, always involve working with the community, you still have your community meetings, you still have your crime watchers, you still are working with a lot of your outside agencies, parole, probation, you name it.

These technologies have given the BPD detailed information on incidents. This information is then used to make decisions about tactics and resource deployment to crime and disorder hot spots.

Respondent BOS_10 explained how the real-time reports offered by the BRIC assisted his personnel in getting information from the detectives to patrol officers on a frequent basis:

The BRIC, the supervisors all read it. We have the detective supervisors, and basically their responsibility is when a flyer comes out that we're lookin' for a certain guy that pertains to our district or even remotely, they'll make up several copies, and they'll mention it at roll call. We don't so much hand it out individual, but we'll put a stack of them on the desk and they'll grab them. Watch out for this guy, watch out for that guy. It happens on robberies, happens on car breaks, or things like that. We get the information to the BRIC; they get back to us a nice flyer, with nice pictures. They'll take the crime mapping portion of it, and put that on the one piece document. We'll have a description of the problem, a little map of where it's happening, if we have any type of indication of time of day. That gets handed out and the guys, they'll take that, and it's very helpful. That's what I mentioned earlier, where it took weeks before, we could get that in hours now. In most cases, the very next day we'll get somethin' back from the BRIC. The detectives are responsible for getting that out, and they've done a great job.

When needed, the BRIC is able to get information to all relevant personnel about a specific problem place or problem person. Respondent BOS_04 gave an example of how BPD's school resource officers were able to notify BPD personnel when a school fight may have implications for violence in the street, or when an incident in the street involved gang-involved youth, which could result in school violence.

Respondents discussed other uses for these technologies; for example, computerized report writing that save officers time and in-car mobile data terminals that increase patrol officers' access to information. The time and information gained from these technologies improves the patrol response to neighborhood problems. However, respondent BOS_07 summed up the incongruity of technology's role in community relationship building:

So much of [the 'community-oriented policing philosophy] is relationship based. I mean, can we take the information the community gives us and use technology to try to categorize it and sort it and spit it back out in a meaningful way, can we develop strategies through technology? Yeah, I guess so. We can analyze crime trends and crime data and stuff like that so, I don't know. Those things are very valuable, but I don't know that they enhance community oriented policing more than just the attitude of the officer or again, about discretion of what's he going to do with his time, and the relationships that he forms...

The abilities of these technologies to receive, store and process large amounts of information is indeed valuable to police work. New technologies also give supervisors insight into how their patrol officers spend their time, which can be used to train an officer in how to spend his or her time problem solving and interacting with citizens. Nevertheless, respondent BOS_03 added, "Technology will help us, but it's really understanding your people, the people you service." Both respondents identified the danger of losing the interpersonal basis of their work and the need for officers to properly use their discretion and form productive relationships with citizens.

Finally, these technologies help the BPD in reporting their "performance statistics." For example, the SST tracks numbers of moving violations arrests, FIOs, and city ordinance violations in reporting changes in Part I and Part II crimes. With regards to the SST, the FIOs and ordinance violations "are used quite a bit because that's their strategy on the so-called 'broken windows'- the public drinking and the panhandling, along those lines" (respondent BOS_10). The BPD is still searching for ways, however, to measure the relationship building aspects of police work. As respondent BOS_03 stated, "Most of the things we measure are things that we can count. It's much more difficult to measure the intangibles."

Furthermore, respondent BOS_13 relayed, "CompStat doesn't measure the things that we're talking about, community policing type of things, and that's what [one high ranking BPD official] is trying to get to." Respondent BOS_01 added:

It's based on building relationships. Ordinarily in police work, we measure cops on how many arrests did you make, how many tags did you do, how many motor vehicle stops did you make, how many stops to people did you make on the street where you filled out a field interrogation observation form and you pat for someone (if you thought you needed to) for weapons...That's what we measure at CompStat. Where are the arrests, where are the tags, where are the FIOs? We don't measure how many

community contacts you have, how many positive things have you done for the community, how many community meetings did you attend, how many disputes did you mediate and resolved without law enforcement action being taken, how many friends have you made out there?...So then try and build a relationship with the community when their only experience with a police officer is they're getting a ticket, they're getting arrested, or they're getting tagged...No one, until recently, have we started defining good cops, the officer who's working with the kids and the community doing community service. We don't give out medals for that. We give out medals for getting guns, and engaged in shootouts and getting kilos, we don't give out medals for taking kids to summer camp, and teaching kids how to write a resume, and talking to a gang kid in a mediation out of not going over and retaliating and trying to get himself focused on positive stuff.

This respondent explained the various interactions the BPD had with its citizens and the affects of those interactions on BPD-citizen relationships. He suggested that new training, department recognition, and new ways of measuring police work could facilitate a more neighborhood-based, citizen-focused function.

CompStat does, however, help personnel to "coordinate on trends and patterns of investigations" and to "paint the big picture, the broad picture of what is going on" (respondent BOS_11) by bringing together representatives from drug and gang units, district detectives, specialized units and the uniformed branch. In addition to CompStat's role in facilitating information sharing, respondents also view it as a setting for holding commanders accountable. Respondent BOS_11 also described CompStat as fulfilling the role of an "accountability process at the district level" and as an:

Open problem process, not a punitive process, but the expectations are clear on whether it's lookin' to reduce crime by 10% or looking to how we deal with the issue of gangs, how we work with schools, whatever the priority might be for that particular district, there are discussions about what the best way to go about that is, and then make a clear message that once the meeting's over, that you've got to deal with that issue.

Respondent BOS_02 discussed both the accountability and information sharing function of the CompStat process, "I see it as accountability, but it's also good to share information with folks across the board of what's working and what's not working." All of these factors contributed to the BPD's move toward getting officers to take ownership of specific areas and indicated the BPD's focus on high risk people and places.

Discussion

This study demonstrates the BPD's continued move to a CPS organizational strategy, highlighting the department's perceptions of the relationship between CPS and crime control, and discussing the role of technology in organizing these functions. Many scholars and practitioners believe the policing profession to be operating under the precepts of the CPS strategy. Though this research displays the BPD's definite and purposeful moves toward such a strategy, it also portrays the primacy of crime control as the continued end to the BPD's CPS actions. Furthermore, this research shows how the BPD uses technology to organize and enhance its CPS activities. It also demonstrates the primacy of arrests and crime reduction as the purpose for such technologies, and cautions that the BPD

should not rely on technology at the expense of their relationships with the community. This case study of the BPD has presented the remarkable acceptance of the CPS organizational strategy as a driving force in the BPD's operations. It also suggests that the community policing philosophy that led to the Boston Miracle has been born again—a relationship based incarnation that is now being assisted by evolving technologies.

Though this study did not give evidence of the BPD's renewal of the same kind and quality of ongoing, formal relationships with community groups, it does show how the BPD has used the legitimacy and success of their past community relationships to improve their policing service. The BPD has incorporated new technologies and positive interactions with individuals in specific neighborhoods. Technology may be used to increase the BPDs number of positive contacts with citizens; organize real-time intelligence on hot spots and repeat offenders; and track the crime control effects of the BPD's CPS efforts. Commanders in this research also suggest technology be used to monitor officer's time and to facilitate more formal recognitions of officers' CPS activities.

In addition to walk and talks, SST, SOT, and RAP, the use of technology to organize and interpret large amounts of data helps to manage officers' time. It offers information to act upon and may solve accountability issues. Together, these efforts allow the BPD to manage emergency calls for their service as well as the on-going neighborhood specific problems affecting their citizens. New technologies assist department personnel in informally teaching others about this new role. Personnel within the departments show how data and communication technologies allow supervisors to explain the "who, what, when, where, why and how" of their actions, facilitating a shared understanding of their mission. It also serves as a response to officers and supervisors who would argue that there is not enough time to be involved in such CPS activities. Access to data on how officers spend their time gives supervisors the opportunity to discuss with their officers ways in which that time could be used in a manner consistent with a CPS strategy.

Respondents described the incorporation of technology, and the data they produce in the CompStat process, as assisting them in identifying trends across districts, and as enhancing the accountability of district captains. These indicate a problem-solving element at the higher levels of the BPD (though often centered on more serious crime problems) (Braga & Weisburd, 2006). At the lower levels of the organization, mostly informal interactions and the use of daily information from the BRIC encourage both the patrol and investigative units to work together in maintaining responsibility for their geographic areas. The current challenge facing the BPD is getting all police personnel to understand their role in the CPS strategy, or as respondent BOS_11 stated, "The challenge for us is just to...empower the officers at the front lines to be problem solvers within the community."

Finally, based on respondents' interviews, it is suggested that the BPD use their cutting edge technologies to better organize and highlight the CPS activities of their personnel. Issues involving supervision of police and accountability speak to the ways a police department measures their personnel's efforts and outcomes. As respondent BOS_07 noted, "You have to be

able to tell [officers] how that [change] affects their experience, how that affects their job performance, how they're going to be judged on it with meaningful metrics." People respond to what gets counted, documented, and rewarded. Using technology to create new outcomes and measurements can change the work environment for a police department's personnel. It assists the department in making tactical decisions and can even shield the police department from accusations that would hurt their legitimacy with the community (Reuss-Ianni & Ianni, 2005; Sparrow, 1988; Alpert & Moore, 1997).

Though this research contributes to the understanding of the strengths, challenges and activities facing police today, it is not without its limitations. Yin (2003) explains the value and limits of case study research. For instance, while the findings of the current research may not be statistically generalizable to all police departments, they are analytically generalizable and, therefore, useful to police departments and their leaders when deciding among possible paths on which to move their organizations (Yin, 2003). Nonetheless, this study presented the findings of a case study of a police department widely recognized for both its CPS and technological endeavor. It serves as an example for police and criminal justice professionals as they continue to recognize the role of neighborhood-specific, quality of life enforcement, and new technology in maintaining legitimate working relationships with citizens to prevent crime in the current era of policing.

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