

Human Aspects in NATO Military Operations: Project developed under the framework of NATO's Defence against Terrorism Programme of Work with the support of Emerging Security Challenges Division/ NATO HQ

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NATO HUMINT CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE

Coordinators:

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Human Aspects in NATO Military Operations

**ORADEA
2014**

NATO HUMINT CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE



HUMAN ASPECTS IN NATO MILITARY OPERATIONS

ORADEA 2014



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EDITORIAL NOTE

The complexity of the subject and its research focus areas had the potential to pose some challenges generated by the diverse methodologies utilized by the participants who come from widely diverse backgrounds. To better cope with these challenges a Harmonization Group (HG) for the HAOE Project was been established. Members of HG possessed a high degree of expertise reflective of individuals with a solid background in strategic leadership, extensive military operational service and sound academic expertise. The HG provided a valuable feedback regarding the project's relevance for NATO's adaptation to emerging security challenges, and acted as a guarantor of the quality and consistency of the project's outcomes.

The Harmonization Group was chaired by Dr. Jamie Shea - NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emergency Security Challenges, Great Britain, supported by:

- Brigadier General Cristian-Iulian Dincovici - Chief of Military Intelligence Directorate, Romania,
- Major General (Ret.) Andrew MacKay - Former General Officer Commanding of the Army's 2nd Division Scotland, Northern England and Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and,
- Dr. Paula Holmes-Eber - Professor of Operational Culture, Marine Corps University, United States of America.

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*“Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions,
and its own peculiar preconceptions.”*

Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz

*“Cultures are never merely intellectual constructs. They take form
through the collective intelligence and memory,
through a commonly held psychology and emotions,
through spiritual and artistic communion.”*

Tariq Ramadan

*“The questions that universals raise, above all questions of human nature,
will find their answers and their implications in thought and study
that cross the boundaries of biology, the social sciences, and the humanities.
Seeking answers to these questions will lead to a truer account
of what humanity is and who we are.”*

Donald E Brown

*“Learn all you can.... Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and
enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect inquiry.
... Get to speak their dialect ... not yours. Until you can understand their
allusions, avoid getting deep into conversation or you will drop bricks.”*

T.E. Lawrence

INTRODUCTION

The Human Aspects of the Operational Environment (HAOE) project has its roots in the challenges posed to current North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Afghanistan. However it is obvious that focusing only on Afghanistan would not be enough since in the future NATO will be presumably involved more and more in operations outside its territory, and that the large majority of such operations will be represented by Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO).

The local population has been always one of the most important features of the operational environment, and as the conflict between the adversaries increasingly spreads among it, gaining local population's support becomes the new centre of gravity of military operations.

In NA5CRO NATO will have to interact directly with the local population that encompasses the entire range of ethnic groups and cultures and different actors from military/paramilitary, local governance, NGOs, criminality, security domains. Different environments require different capabilities. Therefore, a solid environmental understanding is vital during the operational planning and preparation phases, in order to ensure that appropriate capabilities are deployed.

A thorough understanding of the local population is needed to comprehensively approach the operational environment, to enhance population support for NATO operations, and to improve the operational effectiveness and security.

The NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence (HCOE) assumed that the right manner to overcoming these challenges could be found only by a comprehensive approach, involving the military alongside academia and international and governmental organizations. Therefore the present project brought together subject matter experts (SME) from different domains with the goal of sharing their knowledge and current understanding of human aspects of the operational

environment, in order to contribute to the improvement of NATO's Comprehensive Approach Strategy, and to act as a catalyst for the multidisciplinary research related to this topic.

This book consists of seven chapters, each of them encompassing the report drafted by the corresponding research panel and their focus areas are shortly described below.

The first chapter defining the main drivers of human action presumes that a military force has limited ability to meet all the requirements of a stability/security operation. Even though the local population is the likely centre of gravity of many future NATO operations, not all relevant local population characteristics can be understood in advance of an operation, but some general patterns concerning the basic drivers and motivators of human actions can be discerned from the scholarly literature, and these main drivers may help guide tactical and field leaders. Furthermore, understanding the goals of the relevant parties can minimize conflict and maximize cooperation. Conflict is likely when the people's goals appear to frustrate each other. Alternatively, when a group believes that by pursuing its own goal and another group can facilitate the realization of their goal, cooperation is likely.

Behavioural science research has demonstrated that a people's explicit attitudes are only part of the story. Drivers of which a person is not consciously aware can motivate one's actions. As a result, simply asking community and political leaders, "What do your people want?" can reap information that is inadequate and misleading. This chapter summarizes current scholarly perspectives on basic human needs and the main drivers of human action while recognizing that there is no one simple way to capture all drivers. Three common models of human motivation illustrate the difficulty of creating one comprehensive model – the rational choice theory, the evolutionary fitness maximization model, and Maslow's hierarchy of needs.

These views are critically summarized and then some further considerations that deepen our ability to predict drivers of human action are offered. Finally, we end this treatment with a model of human security that draws upon many of the successful features of the previous models of drivers of human action.

The second part assumes that for understanding human environment the use of history is a critical component in perceiving local populations and developing parameters for analyzing them in conjunction with the social sciences. The role of history is important because it serves as a source of information about how societies and peoples behave. Past experiences offer significant insights into current behaviours, attitudes, beliefs and actions, as well as explanations as to how societies have become what they are today.

History offers the most critical evidence for explaining how people behave in current social settings, and provides extensive data that can be used to understand how societies function. This understanding of how societies function is a key element in enabling security missions to build rapport with and support from local populations. Working in conjunction with the social sciences, the historical understanding of a population will aid the effectiveness of developing cultural awareness among those forces operating in unfamiliar environments.

The third chapter examines the challenges posed by communicating across different cultures and proposes a communication strategy based upon a constructive approach.

Cross-cultural communication is a key element in building rapport with other cultures. Understanding how people get information and adapting the message to the level of the target audience are the fundamentals of efficient communication. For effective management of a constructive cross-cultural communication it is essential to understand the cultural and social environment, particularly the social system, its sub-systems, and dynamics.

‘Cross-cultural competence’ is viewed as a fundamental pillar for NATO military and civilian personnel who must interact with people from other cultures. We should consider also that NATO’s own multiculturalism can represent an important advantage in portraying the Alliance to the others.

The fourth chapter assesses contemporary dynamics of the local situation, positing them as crucial elements of the Human Aspects of the Operational Environment that should be more formally incorporated in NATO planning and operations in order to yield success and ensure a stable peace. The first portion analyzes the change in contemporary war by depicting the

complexity of the operational environment and defining the multitude of actors. Here, the salience of narrative and identity in various locales is examined. The nature of conflict in the information age is also addressed, including social media, strategic communications as well as official and unofficial information flows.

The second portion describes how to best analyze dynamics of the local situation. Various group typologies and organizational structures are provided. Also, ASCOPE (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events), Social Cultural Analysis (SOCINT) and Social Network Analysis (SNA) are defined and presented as under-utilized tools that can effectively depict the connection between and among apparently disparate structures and actors. The chapter concludes with recommendations on the most effective training and uses of these mechanisms to supplement traditional analysis.

In the fifth chapter the understanding of population's perception and acceptance of NATO operations starts from Admiral James Stavridis warning that we have to keep in mind that locals will always look differently at military personnel than civilian one, even when providing humanitarian assistance.

Based on this observation, the intent of this chapter is to provide tools and advice on ways NATO can influence the perception and acceptance of its mission based on the realities of 21st century kinetic and non-kinetic military operations, especially, as NATO continues to expand its operational focus well beyond its traditional sphere of influence as it is the case with on-going or recently concluded operations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

The book's sixth section focuses on the issue of measurable indicators of the population's attitude toward NATO. It deals with basic questions, such as: what are attitudes? And how can we measure them? But it also deals with a military application: How are attitudes survey findings currently used in the operational environment? And how can we improve the efficiency of measurement and the use of survey research for tactical, strategic, and policy objectives?

It is argued that there is considerable room for improvement both when it comes to our understanding of attitudes and actual measurement, as well as the translation of research findings to military application. Despite a large number

of NATO doctrinal publications which mention the importance of attitudes of the local population relative to NATO operations (PYSOPS, INFO Ops, COIN), there has been no comprehensive effort to consider, analyze, integrate, and publish doctrine on attitudes of the local population.

The final chapter addressing NATO capabilities transformation to better adapt to the human environments presumes that analysing NATO operations over the last two decades and examining NATO's role in present and future Security Environments, as defined by the NATO Strategic Concept, it can be concluded that NA5CRO will continue to represent the core of NATO missions.

At present, the entire NATO military machinery is primarily focused on meeting the requirements of major combat operations. Therefore most of the NATO (as well as national) doctrines and procedures, are designed to support this type of operation. The current education and training process is mainly focused on combat skills, thus taking precedence over meeting the specific requirements of Peace Support Operations. Nevertheless, since the main task of the armed forces is defending NATO territory and our shared values, changing this approach is not desirable.

However, some changes in the current operational thinking and planning, as well as reshaping the education and training process have a real potential to increase our forces capability to cope with the challenges they are facing in current operations. The chapter's conclusion highlights the need for recognizing a comprehensive approach as the key for understanding HAOE, and the human aspects as a key element of the comprehensive approach. Acting in this respect by adapting strategic communications, the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), and the proposals of the Joint Capability Integration Development system (known as well as DOTMLPFI) would result in improving NATO's effectiveness in achieving the objectives of stability operations.

The book ends with a brief conclusion that highlights the increasing relevance of the human aspects for the current and future NATO operations. Recent experiences in the field proved that the lack of detailed knowledge of military about the human aspects, the way that culture influence them, and furthermore, some prejudices and stereotypes, is still an impediment to successfully fulfil the strategic tasks and objectives.

Whatever combination of terms we will use for defining it, the Human/Cultural Aspects/Dynamics/Environment/Factors remain a key element of the future military operational environment, especially in counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, stability, and support, transition, and reconstruction operations.

CHAPTER 1

MAIN DRIVERS OF HUMAN ACTION

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1. Introduction

A military force has limited ability to meet all the requirements of a stability/security operation. Even though the local population is the likely centre of gravity of many future NATO operations, not all relevant local population characteristics can be learned in advance of an operation. Therefore, to conduct advance planning, NATO needs an information source for salient features of a local population. Also, tactical and field leaders need a repertoire of appropriate questions to ask members of the local population in order to gain necessary information about that group. To these ends, this first panel presents general principles and raises questions about key drivers of human actions. There will be specific exceptions to these general principles; yet, this panel seeks to describe drivers of human actions which appear to apply across diverse local populations.

Human goals vary across time and place, but most spring from a set of basic drivers of human actions including fundamental needs. Recognizing the features of these “universal” basic needs and drivers enables military planners to anticipate the goals of groups and individuals in any particular operational environment. Furthermore, understanding the goals of the relevant parties can minimize conflict and maximize cooperation. Conflict is likely when people’s goals

appear to frustrate each other. Alternatively, when a group believes that by pursuing their own goal another group can facilitate the realization of their goal, cooperation is likely.

One obvious strategy for determining someone's goals and motivations is to simply ask that person. Behavioural and psychological science research, however, has demonstrated that a people's explicit attitudes are only part of the story. Actions can be motivated by drivers of which a person is not consciously aware. Further, explicit beliefs and attitudes are shaped by the actions that spring from these non-conscious drives. As a result, simply asking community and political leaders, "What do your people want?" can reap information that is inadequate and even misleading. For these reasons, a general portrait of the typical drivers of human action as discerned by the relevant sciences is necessary for considering the human aspects of the operational environment.

This panel summarizes current scholarly perspectives on basic human needs and the main drivers of human action with recognition that there is no one simple way to capture all drivers. Three common models of human motivation illustrate the difficulty of creating one comprehensive model: (1) rational choice theory, (2) the evolutionary fitness maximization model, and (3) Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Below we summarize the insights provided by the models and note important limitations that prevent any one model alone from being a sufficient model for anticipating the goals of individuals or groups in operational environments. We then offer some further considerations that deepen our ability to predict drivers of human action. Finally, we end this panel with a model of human security that draws upon many of the successful features of the previous models of drivers of human action.

To set the scene, one anecdote is illustrative—particularly as similar events have been reported in multiple parts of the world. The story goes this way: NATO forces (or another well-intended foreign group) build a well so that the women of a community have safe, ready access to drinking water. NATO recognizes the importance of good drinking water—that it satisfies a basic human drive or need for potable water. Nevertheless, soon thereafter the well is found destroyed or has been abandoned. Why? Because walking to fetch water some distance away met needs beyond obtaining water, such as time to socialize away from the watchful eye of the men folk. The resources and efforts to create a well were wasted because of failure to consider all of the drivers of human action and a failure to harmonize those drivers. Satisfying one driver at the expense of others may ultimately be fruitless.

1.1. The Complexity of Human Behaviour: A Preliminary Caution

Unlike the explanations and predictions offered by physics and chemistry, those offered by the human and social sciences are always partial and probabilistic. For instance, whereas we may be able to say with almost perfect certainty that pure water at sea level will boil when it reaches 100 degrees Celsius, our predictions concerning human behaviour can never be held with such certainty. Human behaviour is much more complex than the behaviour of water molecules. Nevertheless, the relevant sciences can improve dramatically upon our experiences, casual observations, or “common sense” that yields understandings of human aspects of the operational environment. The observations from this panel—and indeed, the rest of this document as well—draw upon our best understanding of what typically happens and so can generate informed best guesses for tactical purposes.

1.2. Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory casts humans as rational economic decision-makers. According to this model, people make a choice to act by balancing economic costs versus benefits to maximize their gains and get as much of a good for the lowest material cost. Such a view comes from microeconomics and can sometimes predict broad-scale trends in economic systems well. However, at the small-scale or individual level, such a view of human decision-making has major weaknesses. People do not always rationally calculate the costs and benefits associated with various goods and activities. For instance, one experiment showed that university students tended to regard an object (coffee mug) that had just been given to them as more valuable than if it did not belong to them, as if mere possession increases value (Van Boven, Dunning & Loewenstein, 2000). Likewise, economic games show that people will sometimes reject an offer of money that they perceive as unfair and rather accept no money at all. For instance, in economic games, when an anonymous other offers to share only one-tenth of a pool of money, keeping nine-tenths, people across cultures typically reject the one-tenth even if they will receive no money at all and they have no reason to think they will engage in exchange with the anonymous person ever again. That is, people will punish others at cost to themselves even though this is “irrational” from a rational choice theory perspective (e.g., see Henrich, et al, 2005).

Perhaps more importantly for HAOE, it appears that some valued items fall completely outside of rational economic decision-making. Those goods are

called “sacred values” (Ganges, et al., 2011). These sacred values, whether they are sacred lands, free religious exercise, or one’s mother, cannot be traded for monetary compensation or the like. In fact, in contrast to regular economic goods, the suggestion that they could be bought or bartered is offensive and may become *more* offensive the greater the price offered for them. Consider if someone were to offer \$1000 for your mother. Offensive? But if they then offered \$10,000, would you be less or more offended? Most people would be more offended because such negotiations suggest that at the right price one’s sacred values can be bought. Though it may be that in some places selling a family member (e.g., a daughter or mother-in-law) is not offensive, in every place, *some* actions are motivated aside from economic considerations and to treat them as economic may be disastrous.

Main Implications from the Rational Choice Model

- *On a population level, humans will tend to move toward decisions that minimize personal costs and maximize material gains.*
- *But on the individual level, in specific situations, many other factors trump economic considerations, particularly moral and religious values.*
- *Local populations will tend to be attracted to arrangements they regard as economically beneficial to them, but economic considerations cannot be the only drivers considered of large tactical mistakes can be made in terms of human factors.*

1.3. Evolutionary Fitness Maximization Model

The fitness maximization model comes from evolutionary sciences (including anthropology, biology, and psychology), and regards humans, like all animals, as vehicles for genetic propagation. That is, humans are naturally driven to behave in ways that maximize the likelihood that their genes (off-spring) will out-reproduce others’. Basic predictions from this model include drives to:

- Obtain nourishment including water and food, particularly foods of high caloric and nutritive value that were scarce in ancestral environments such as fats, proteins, sugars, and salts.
- Create or find shelter as necessary and otherwise protect selves from the elements as the natural environment requires. Because this drive is tailored to particular environmental concerns, it is

knowledge that is passed down culturally rather than what would be considered “instinctual”.

- Fight or flee enemies or predators, and create secure spaces that minimize risks from violent harm. As with shelter, though the fight-or-flight instinct seems to be part of evolved human nature, the particular modes of fighting or fleeing appear to be heavily culturally shaped, as are the techniques for creating secure spaces.
- Procreate by balancing the number of offspring birthed with ability to provide for those offspring until they are mature enough to provide for and reproduce themselves. Importantly, reproductive strategies are not the same for men as for women given that men can reproduce more rapidly at a smaller personal cost than women. Likewise, a fitness maximization model predicts that typically sons will be valued more than daughters because of their greater potential to spawn offspring, and children approaching reproductive years will be more valued than younger children.

Such an evolutionary perspective, when applied creatively, has been very productive in explaining patterns in human behaviour. Nevertheless, this model fails to solve many problems relevant to operations planning and execution. For instance, if humans are fundamentally driven to maximize the success of their genetic line, entire families fighting to the death and/or engaging in suicide attacks appears inexplicable. If you and your siblings are dead, your genetic line is, obviously, in a poor position to out-compete others.

Main Implications from Evolutionary Fitness Maximization Model

- *Like other animals, humans have a basic drive to survive, reproduce, and maximize the number of their children and grandchildren. Women and men typically have importantly different strategies in fulfilling these drives.*
- *Unlike other animals, humans can and do sometimes act against their “genetic best interest”.*
- *Nevertheless, in general, harmonizing NATO objectives with the survival and reproductive goals of a local population likely will reduce conflict and increase cooperation.*

1.4. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

Maslow's hierarchy of needs is a widely applied theory of human need-seeking behaviour. Maslow's hierarchy asserts that people have a set of needs that must be met in order, starting with the most basic and progressing in complexity. The five classes of needs in ascending order are:

- (1) physiological (i.e., food, water, sleep, sex),
- (2) safety (i.e., security for one's self, family, and resources),
- (3) love and belonging (i.e., relationships, community, sexual intimacy),
- (4) esteem (i.e., achievement, reputation), and
- (5) self-actualization (Maslow, 1954). Self-actualization is highly subjective but can be characterized by an individual seeking mastery, attaining ideals, and expanding their skills.




Figure 1.1: *The hierarchy of human needs – A. Maslow (Maslow, 1943)*

According to Maslow, lower needs must be satisfied before higher needs and only one level is satisfied at a time. For instance, once basic physiological needs are met (enough food and water) then security becomes a concern. Put another way, one will typically risk safety to obtain physiological needs. Likewise, if people are starving to death, they will not be concerned with their reputation. If lower order needs are not met, individuals will abandon the pursuit of higher needs in order to gratify the lower. The fulfilment of these needs, according to Maslow, leads to both health and happiness (Maslow, 1954). When considering

human development, children are more concerned with the first three levels (minus sexual drives and intimacy).

While Maslow's hierarchy is popular, it is only partially supported by empirical research. Tay and Diener (2011) conducted a study with a sample of people from 123 countries examining how the fulfilment of needs is related to subjective well being (SWB, people's feeling of being happy or well off). This study confirmed that the needs described by Maslow are present in a broad range of cultural contexts. The data partially supported Maslow's hierarchy order in that basic and safety needs were met before psychosocial needs (Tay & Diener, 2011). Psychosocial needs refer to the human need to exist in a community and participate in meaningful relationships. Basic safety and psychosocial needs were generally met before more abstract needs such as autonomy (i.e., people perceive themselves to be free, able to choose what to do with one's own time), respect (i.e., feeling respected by others, being proud of something), and mastery (i.e., experience learning new things, doing what one is best at; Tay & Diener, 2011). Each of these needs is met faster if the needs preceding it have been met (*ibid*). For example, while it may be possible for people to obtain respect in a war-torn area where their safety needs are not met, they could have exerted more effort toward achieving respect had their safety needs already been met.

Basic and safety needs are the lowest order needs and they were generally found to be met before higher order needs. Operationally, these results suggest that to have the most impact on SWB in the shortest amount of time, it is important to secure basic physiological needs and safety needs first. That said, it is possible to have higher needs met before basic and safety needs. For instance, people can gratify their need for belonging by finding solace in a community while their need for safety is frustrated in a war zone. Additionally, each need was found to have a unique impact on improving SWB, independent of other needs. This finding suggests any approach aimed at increasing SWB should be multi-faceted, including efforts directed at fulfilling each need simultaneously. For instance, employing locals to perform jobs—even small jobs—may increase SWB more than simply giving aid, particularly if those jobs contribute to the needs of the local community. Level 1 basic needs are met simultaneously with Level 4 esteem needs.

In addition to these findings, an individual's basic and safety needs were largely contingent upon the country in which one lives while higher order needs were more dependent upon individual experiences (Tay & Diener, 2011). Basic and safety needs are determined more by factors beyond the control of the individual. Such events could be famine, war, and natural disasters that may

disrupt food production and distribution and impinge upon the safety of individuals and their families. Psychological needs (i.e., psychosocial, autonomy, respect, mastery) are more related to individual experiences such as their experience living in a community, feeling free and respected, and being able to do something well. This suggests that the fulfilment of basic and safety needs might be better fulfilled at the societal level (e.g., ensuring peace in a region and basic food and shelter) while higher needs should be met through measures that are aimed at individual experiences (e.g., interactions with occupying forces, personal opportunities). It was also found that when a society had higher rates of needs being fulfilled, the nation's average SWB was higher; more so than would be predicted by individual fulfilment of needs (*ibid*). This further supports the idea of national efforts to increase SWB.

Maslow's theory has also been critiqued for being geared specifically towards the fulfilment of needs in a western, individualistic society. Different cultures may prioritize different needs. For instance, individual esteem needs may be more highly valued in an individualistic culture than in a collectivistic culture (Oishi, Diener, Lucas & Suh, 1999). When striving to meet the needs of people in different cultures, the relative importance of each need should be assessed and the plan to meet these needs should be adjusted accordingly.

Main Implications from Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

- *Lower-level, basic needs (such as need for food, water, safety for self and children, health, and property) tend to be higher priority for people and less cross-culturally variable.*
- *Nevertheless, local contexts and other factors (such as moral and religious concerns) may importantly modify how these needs are prioritized.*
- *It may be most effective to target several levels of needs simultaneously.*

1.5. Limitations of the Models

These three models have some meaningful convergence. The models agree that people will generally act in ways to get those things that they want or need with the least amount of loss of other things they want or need. The most common and fundamental needs will relate to food, water and survival needs, and core social relationships, particularly concerning family relations.

Nevertheless, these general patterns must be augmented by other concerns or else they remain very crude pointers.

To date no one model capturing all main drivers of human action has been successfully discovered by social and behavioural scientists. Each of the models above has shortcomings and limitations. Perhaps it is best to use them in conjunction with each other to predict or explain those aims that motivate human action. Further, all three may be usefully augmented by considering the foundations of human sociality, morality, and religion. We consider these shapers below briefly.

2. Important Modifiers of Human Action

Humans are distinctive among animal groups in the complexity of their social arrangements. These social arrangements are managed in part by value systems. Some of these we identify as morality. Others, often including postulated relationships with spirits, ancestors, gods, or other supernatural forces and powers, we call religions. The foundations of human sociality, morality, and religion inform and shape the drivers of human action. To illustrate the importance of these modifiers on basic needs and drivers, consider the error of air-dropping pork in predominantly Muslim areas of the Balkans. The good intention was to meet a basic human need for food, but it ignored the fact that social, moral, and religious factors can dramatically impact how people seek to satisfy these needs and act on their common drives. Consequently, the food drop failed to meet that need and, instead, offended and alienated the local Muslim population for whom pork was considered religiously taboo, morally reprehensible, and disgusting.

2.1. Human Sociality, Networks, and Social Dynamics

A leading theory for why humans have evolved such large brains for their body size is the social brain hypothesis: humans have particularly large brains to manage the large number of social relationships they develop and maintain. These relationships are critical for cooperative resource-sharing practices, for passing down locally-important survival information, and for collective problem-solving including building, farming, hunting, and defence. Human sociality is structured around nested rings of intimacy and trust. People average about five

closest, most intimate relationships (which typically includes the closest friends and family members); then approximately 15 (inclusive) in the next layer of relational closeness, and typically around 150 in their active network of personal relationships (including family members). When it comes to who to trust and who one feels obligation toward, this 150 is particularly important: “These individuals seem to be characterized by a level of reciprocity and obligation that would not be accorded to individuals who fall outside this critical circle” (Dunbar, 2008, p. 9). The drive to help and reluctance to harm individuals in this 150 will be high. Researchers in this area have observed that not only are personal social networks organized around this number, but traditionally, villages, churches, and even military units have tended to average around 150 members (Hill & Dunbar, 2003). It appears that 150 is roughly the size a group can be to self-regulate through social pressures and personal obligations without strong hierarchical power structures. Everyone can know everyone else and monitor each other’s behaviour; hence, in intimate social groups of 150 or fewer, defection is rarer than in larger social units.

Naturally, discovering key players’ social networks in an operational environment could be critical human intelligence because of its implications for identifying personal motivations and obligations. Observing how different individuals’ networks overlap could likewise reveal potential for cooperation or conflict. Becoming part of another’s personal active network immediately changes one’s relationship and triggers a different level of trust and potential cooperation. More details on the local dynamics appear in Panel 4.

As already suggested, human sociality has implications for moral and religious reasoning. Humans will tend to be most morally concerned about those in their circle of 150. That is, these individuals will be attributed moral rights and responsibilities even when others are not. Someone is likely to make sacrifices for a member of this personal social network (and particularly the inner circles of 15 or 5) that he or she would not make for others. Likewise, at least in traditional societies, members of one’s active social network of 150 will tend to be members of one’s own religious community and share one’s religious commitments. Moral and religious shapers of human action are discussed below.

Main Implications of Research on Social Networks

- *A high level of trust and moral obligation is reserved for approximately 150 personal relationships. Become part of that circle of relationships and you gain influence and opportunity for*

cooperation.

- To influence a person, be trusted by or influence members of that person's primary social network.
- Identifying the social networks of key persons in an operational environment is critical human intelligence.
- Teams or communities of fewer than 150 are easier to manage through social obligations and pressure without strong hierarchical power structures once everyone knows each other.

2.2. Social Influence and Dissemination of Ideas

The main drivers of human action are shaped into particular local expression through social learning dynamics. A full discussion of such learning is beyond the scope of this panel, but a few observations may be helpful when NATO forces are placed in a position of needing to either monitor how opinion and action is being shaped by local dynamics (see also Panel 4), or trying to influence local attitudes and behaviour.

Evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists have suggested that humans do not blindly respect the testimony or imitate the example of just anyone, but are subject to a number of social learning biases that help them pick out models for learning or imitation. *Similarity bias* is the tendency to imitate or learn from those that we regard as similar to ourselves on important dimensions such as age, gender, clan, tribe, ethnicity, religion and class (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Young children even prefer to learn from people with similar accents to one's own, using accent as a more important marker of similarity than race (Kinzler, K. D., Shutts, K., DeJesus, J., & Spelke, E., 2009). *Prestige bias* is another powerful shaper of learning. People who appear prestigious are more likely trusted as sources for learning information and used as examples for acting—even if the prestige is borrowed from an irrelevant domain (Chudek et al, in press). For instance, a prestigious athlete or musician may be regarded as a credible source for information on politics or international policy, not because of demonstrated competence in those areas but because of a halo of general prestige. Of course *skill* in a particular domain is important. If someone wants to learn to hunt, they will gravitate toward the practices of the most skilled hunter (or at least the hunter who appears most skilled and/or successful). On top of these three, *conformity* is a general pressure that humans experience. We tend to think and act like the majority of people in our social group.

Main Implications of Social Learning Biases

- *To know who it is that someone is influenced by, consider who it is they regard as relevantly like themselves (e.g., in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity), and regard as prestigious and skilled.*
- *For NATO to influence local populations, soliciting the aid of individuals who are prestigious and relevantly similar to the various subpopulations in question (including young people, elderly, women, men, different clans, etc.) would be advantageous.*
- *Sometimes NATO forces themselves will be regarded as particularly skilled and/or prestigious already but may not be relevantly similar to the local population but can elevate the prestige of locals strategically (e.g., through associating with them publically).*

2.3. Moral Foundations

When people are committed to moral ideals they may radically break away from the patterns of action predicted by rational choice theory, the evolutionary fitness maximization model, or Maslow's hierarchy of needs. People have been known to commit their lives (even to death) to deeply held values. Though these deeply motivating values vary across individuals and cultural groups, nevertheless, there may be some cross-culturally recurrent patterns in moral intuitions and judgment.

Leading theorists in human values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992) have attempted to narrow down basic morals by supporting their premises based on underlying social and biological necessities of human beings. Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), (Haidt & Graham, 2007) proposes five facets of morality that occur cross-culturally (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987), underlying most societies. MFT encompasses the following foundations:

- *Harm/Care* is a foundation springing from the fact that humans are intensely social animals having uniquely close attachments to others. Specifically, humans feel for others through kindness, gentleness, and nurturance. Harming others (particularly in one's social group) without their consent is generally considered immoral in any cultural environment. Likewise, failing to care for a member of one's group (e.g., family) is generally considered immoral.

- *Fairness/Reciprocity* is associated with the evolution of reciprocal altruism, in which a human being may reduce his or her own wellbeing in order to increase another's wellbeing while expecting the other will act similarly at a later time. Humans appear to be very sensitive to violations of these kinds of fairness relationships.
- *In-group/Loyalty* concerns the sense of obligation people sense that they have to their core social group. The size and character of the group may vary depending on the size and complexity of the society. Core family members and close friends are part of most everyone's in-group in which certain loyalty expectations govern interactions. It is generally considered reprehensible to betray one's in-group and virtuous to make personal sacrifices for the greater good of the group. A family member may make personal sacrifices for the betterment of their family or nation. Someone who is disloyal to an in-group may be ostracized because they can no longer be trusted.
- *Authority/Respect* is a moral foundation associated with human beings' history of hierarchical social arrangements, beginning within the family unit with children respecting the authority of parents. This foundation is primary to leadership, support, respect for authority, and honour for traditions. It follows that certain people are entitled to hold power or privilege and the authority to make certain decisions, and submitting to recognized authority is regarded as a moral imperative. The idea that harming or betraying a leader is the same as harming or betraying someone of comparable rank and status is unusual.
- *Purity/Sanctity* may have evolved from human's disgust and contamination instinct that evolved for avoiding pathogens by setting apart clean spaces and having strong visceral reactions to contact with contaminating objects. These disgust mechanisms and related actions have been co-opted by cultural systems so that certain groups of people or actions could be seen as disgusting and contaminating and marking off special "clean" or sacred spaces is a good way to avoid contamination. Behaviours, people, places, and objects may all become impure in a viscerally felt, morally charged way. Sometimes such emotional reactions are mysterious to outsiders as when a holy space is "defiled" by a foreigner entering it without being ritually "purified".

These five foundations appear to drive moral reasoning in most all societies and operate largely through emotions and intuitions rather than through reasoned reflection (Haidt et. al., 1993; Shweder, et. al., 1987). Nevertheless, these foundations may vary in terms of their relative importance as well as the particular size and shape of the relevant moral circle. That is, whom it is that counts as having moral status can range from all of humanity (and even some animals) to only one's kin group. For instance, it may be perfectly permissible to harm people who speak another language in many societies, but it is almost never permissible to harm one's family members. It is important to recognize that the universal expansion of moral considerations to humans and even many animals (apart from religious protections for some animals) is a product of western cultures and their Judeo-Christian heritage, and should be regarded as rare even as it becomes more widespread. On the other hand, the relatively high degree of collective social identity in non-western cultures is associated (generally) with stronger affirmation of the loyalty, authority, and sanctity foundations—foundations that some westerners do not recognize as morally important but regard as negotiable social conventions.

Note too that moral judgments may be driven more by the unconscious processes behind these five foundations than by explicit teachings, moral heroes, and morality tales. Thus, even when popular moral tales or exemplars are universally celebrated, the population within any nation may be split. Careful observation and research are necessary in order to determine a culture's most valued morals.

Main Implications Concerning Moral Foundations

- *Moral norms importantly shape how people seek to satisfy their basic needs and their other behavioural choices.*
- *Local variability exists but generally people's moral sensibilities focus on a few basic foundations that are cross-culturally recurrent and emotionally driven.*
- *Traditional moral foundations are broader than many western societies and concern loyalty, authority, and sanctity, as well as harm and fairness.*

2.4. Religion

In this section we discuss (1) the naturalness of religion, (2) the importance of religion as a driver of human action, and (3) suggestions for how to approach religion.

According to a 2009 Gallup World poll, 84% of adults in the world say religion is an important part of their life (Crabtree, 2010). Many cognitive and evolutionary scientists of religion argue that the prevalence of religious belief is because of what they call “naturalness of religion”. They propose that a belief in gods or a God naturally occurs as a result of typical cognitive development (Barrett, 2012, p. 4; see also Boyer, 2002). Specifically, Barrett argues that all humans have natural cognitive systems that are used to make coherent sense out of the world around them (e.g., ones that serve to recognize the presence of other intentional beings, like humans or animals in one’s surroundings). He argues that these cognitive systems cooperate to make people naturally receptive to religious belief (Barrett, 2011, p. 130). These cognitively natural predispositions are then culturally elaborated and acted upon in order to form *religions*—individual and communal thoughts and actions related to the believed existence of superhuman agents.

Two important implications can be drawn here. First, some type of religious commitments and activities will likely be encountered in almost all operational environments. Therefore, religion represents a significant human aspect of the operational environment during strategy development. Second, the specificities of religious expression will vary greatly from culture to culture as cognitive predispositions are elaborated on by cultural worldviews, history, geography, political climate, etc. Understanding the influences of these factors on religion is an integral part of preparing for religious engagement.

There may be nothing more fundamentally human than the ability to imagine future outcomes and develop plans for living out goals (Emmons, 1999). While general goals are important, those that involve “striving toward the sacred” are psychologically of *ultimate concern* (Emmons, 1999, p. 6). They are what make human life meaningful, purposeful, valuable, significant, and consequently, they substantially amplify goal commitment and motivation. The implication is that if religious goals, convictions, or rituals are impeded by NATO missions/forces, the amount of resistance relative to other blocked goals will be substantially greater. Emotion theorists posit that anger results when one’s goals are frustrated or blocked (Power & Dagleish, 2007, p. 95). Impeding religious goals will likely result

in emotionally powerful and motivationally significant resistance, of both psychological and physical nature. In addition, moral emotions likely have evolved through selection pressure because of the way they bond social groups together (e.g., see previous section on moral foundations regarding harm/care and in-group/loyalty; Haidt, 2001, p. 826). In other words, moral groups survive to pass on their genes. Therefore, righteous anger not only manifests itself individually, but through social bonds and networks. Impeding religious goals is a recipe for a highly motivated, angry mob. Holy wars of all sorts are a testament of this dynamic.

Alternatively, finding avenues of commonality between NATO goals and the religious goals of local people would go a long way toward building rapport and encouraging peaceful cooperation. A preliminary way of identifying commonalities is by asking local religious leaders and laypeople about their religious traditions, and listening for common concerns, then cooperating together toward the development of a list of common goals. (Official religious leaders are not necessarily the best source for information concerning the laypeople's religious goals and so both sources are important.) For example, promoting peace is a core value of many religions. Encouraging joint participation toward peaceful goals that are situated within religious ideology would be a powerful means of uniting people together. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa following Apartheid is a great example of uniting people through common goals (see Lederach, 2005 for further examples and theoretical approaches to uniting enemies towards peaceful efforts). A great deal of psychological research has exhibited the power of common goals on group cohesion. For example, a classic experimental study called the Robber's Cave experiment demonstrated how the group friction between ardent enemies was dramatically reduced through the introduction of common goals (e.g., pushing the broken-down bus that they were riding in together; see Sherif, 1961). In addition, honouring religious expression and facilitating the accomplishment of religious goals is likely to result in positive emotions of trust and happiness, rather than anger.

One common way in which religion has helped to create cooperative communities is through group religious practices. Research shows that people who participate in religious practices together tend to trust each other more, are more cooperative, and have more stable and economically successful communities (Bulbulia, 2009; Sosis & Ruffle, 2003). This bonding effect may be because ritual participation provides an opportunity to display or signal one's commitment to the group and the group's values that is relatively hard to fake.

Main Implications Concerning Religion

- *NATO nations are among the least religious in the world. Religion is a prehistoric, natural way to organize life.*
- *Religious values are highly motivating.*
- *For the operational environment it would be helpful to consider:*
 - (1) understanding how religion informs and facilitates the goals of the local people,*
 - (2) avoiding frustration of specific religious goals,*
 - (3) listening, collaborating, promoting and encouraging goals that are common to the local religion (such as peace, conflict resolution, and reconciliation), and*
 - (4) finding ways to participate in those common goals together.*
- *Participation in religious rituals (if permissible) may be an effective way to build trust.*

2.5. Expectations and Frustrations of Drivers

Humans typically accommodate to levels of resources and how much their drives are typically satisfied in their environments, and adjust their expectations accordingly. Hence, reduced access to jobs, health care, and education in some places leads to demonstrations against the government or rioting but not in neighbouring societies with poorer conditions. Frustrated expectations can create conflict above and beyond absolute levels of drive satisfaction.

2.6. Heuristics for determining the main drivers of human action

The main drivers of human action summarized above represent general patterns based upon current research. Exceptions will arise and science and experience will produce new insights that may be relevant to the operational environment. NATO's decision-makers and field commanders cannot always wait for these developments but must have tools for evaluating probable main drivers in a specific operational environment. The use of social and human sciences in operations planning and execution may be valuable to nuance these observations.

Additionally, below are some heuristic questions—some ways to generate best guesses—at what the main drivers or motivators in a given place might be.

2.6.1. Is the driver present in the first 6 years of life?

Many of the most fundamental aspects of human drives, preferences, and ways of thinking arise early in life due to evolutionary selective pressure, and continue to structure human thought and action throughout life. Typically pre-school-aged children across cultures have more in common with each other than older children or adults who have been formally educated or more thoroughly enculturated and indoctrinated. Hence, asking one's self, "How important would this driver be in motivating a five-year-old?" is a good heuristic for evaluating a possible driver. Some important exceptions exist, especially concerning reproductive motivations—a five-year-old does not have important reproductive and related drives.

2.6.2. Has the driver been with us for thousands of years?

Many of the most fundamental aspects of human drives are due to evolutionary selective pressure that shaped our species over hundreds of thousands of years and are relatively unchanged for the past 10,000 years (at least). If ancient peoples were driven by this driver of action, chances are that so are people who will be part of the HAOE. A variant on this heuristic question is, "Was the driver invented by someone at sometime during history?" If it was, it is less likely to be a fundamental driver than if it was not.

2.6.3. Does the driver involve or require special tools, technologies, or organized institutions?

Generally, those aspects of human expression that require cultural innovations are newer, more transitory, and less recurrent across cultures. Being able to speak and gather with whom one wishes requires no tools, technologies, or institutions. These are human fundamentals. Getting a high school degree requires an educational institution. Access to the internet requires information technologies. Hence, these specific wants (a high school degree or internet access) are less likely to be a main driver across HAOEs, but older, more ancient drives (e.g. for acquiring important skills and information), are more cross-culturally recurrent.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations: Operational Implications and Human Security

The limitations and convergence among the models presented above and the additional factors identified as main drivers of human action lead us to make one broad recommendation and several specific ones concerning human aspects of the operational environment. The first general recommendation is to adopt a broader view of human security for security operations (see below). We then conclude by briefly summarizing and adding to some of the implications offered above.

3.1. Human Security Model

Identifying the main drivers or motivators of human action is a critical human aspect of the operational environment if one's aim is to minimize conflict and work collaboratively with local populations. Identifying local goals—typically variants on the themes suggested by the three models above—would be the first step to identifying sources of potential conflict and cooperation. Of course, the direct relevance of these main drivers will vary depending upon the level of operational goals under consideration. Likewise, the reality of goal conflict versus goal harmony is not the only relevant factor here. If local or NATO perception is that there are goal conflicts when there are in fact none, conflict may arise nonetheless (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 6). Nevertheless, identifying actual drivers of human action will help limit the problem space for tactical planners and field commanders to identify real goal convergence and real goal conflict, both important aspects of the operational environment.

Our primary recommendation is for NATO to take a broad view of human security for use in security-stability operations on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This broad view may be called a Human Security Model, and treats security to satisfy basic needs and drivers as part of the security aims of an operation. If winning security for local populations to act to satisfy their basic drives is a NATO objective and is duly implemented, cooperation with local populations will be high and operational success more likely. The Human Security model recognizes certain fundamental drivers of human action and then argues that to have “security” requires that one has reasonable access to satisfying those drives. That is, security is not merely about being safe from bodily harm—as the

term “security” is often used—but security consists of being safe from threats against one’s basic drives being satisfied.

The foundational concepts of the Human Security model were first published in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1994 Development Report, but have undergone development subsequently. Drawing upon this development, we present for consideration seven aspects of human security that may be grouped under three “freedoms” that NATO stability operations should seek to guarantee for local populations:

- *Freedom from Fear* refers to an individuals’ condition of protection from violent conflicts, conflict-precipitated poverty, and protection from the effects of a government’s inability to perform its duty to prevent various forms of inequality. Emergency assistance, conflict prevention and resolution, and peace building promote *freedom from fear*. The aspect of security that Freedom from Fear captures is
 - (1) *Personal (physical) security*. Personal Security is the absence of violence toward the person, and is one of the vital elements of the human security, represented in Maslow’s second level of needs, and the basic self-preservation and survival drives identified by the Evolutionary Fitness Maximization model of action drivers. The predictability of violence varies by time and place. There are many types and sources of violent threats. Some of these include: one’s own state (physical torture), other states (in war), other groups of population (as a result of tensions provoked by various issues), delinquency and organized crime (urban violence), threats mostly specific to women (rape, domestic violence), or even the person himself, by addiction (e.g., to drugs), self-mutilation, or suicide. If individuals and communities are to have personal security, they must have the right to preserve their life and healthiness, and to live in a safe and sustainable environment (Head, 1991).
- *Freedom from Wants* moves beyond basic physical security, recognizing those just as fundamental to humans (and even a more fundamental level on Maslow’s hierarchy) are drives to secure physiological needs such as food, water, and protection from elements. Pursuing Freedom from Wants involves a holistic approach for meeting human needs thwarted by famine, diseases,

and natural disasters, events that affect many more people than violent conflicts. These sources of uncertainty should be addressed by four other aspects of security:

- (1) *Food security* is mankind's permanent access (both physically and economically) to basic food. Food is "available" when people have the right of gaining necessary food, by own production effort, by purchasing or receiving it through social services support. Thus, food accessibility is prefigured as a necessary – but not sufficient – condition of security.
 - (2) *Health security* means freedom from diseases and maladies that have a high mortality rate. Many of these illnesses have roots in malnutrition and precarious life condition, but unhealthy lifestyle and diet may also increase susceptibility to such illnesses.
 - (3) *Economic security* primarily means the assurance of a basic income. Income is normally obtained by performing a remunerated lucrative activity; otherwise, it can be obtained via publicly budgeted social assistance service networks. Economic security also implies adequate measures to reduce imbalanced access to working opportunities thereby eliminating artificial poverty and improving the quality of community's material life.
 - (4) *Environmental security*: Human beings depend on a healthy physical environment; the main environment threat to environmental security is the sometimes irreversible decline of local and global ecosystems.
- *Freedom to Live in Dignity* is a variation of "freedom to act on one's own behalf" (Ogata & Sen, 2003), a construct that advocates for the rule of law and democracy. In 2005, the UN Secretary General's report, "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Freedom for All" (2005), brought this third dimension to the concept of human security. It captures two additional aspects of human security more closely associated with higher levels of Maslow's hierarchy:¹

¹ Freedom to Live in Dignity is typically elaborated to include a right to live under Western democratic ideals, but as such an elaboration cannot be scientifically justified as a basic, pan-human natural drive or need, we leave these freedoms or 'rights' aside here, and employ a reduced version of Freedom to Live in Dignity.

- (1) *Community security* is achieved by ensuring protection against legal/political discrimination on the basis of age, gender, ethnicity or social status. It also includes maintaining access to safe social networks, knowledge, and information, as well as the right to free association. The concept of community security is based on the idea that a person’s social context is a fundamental aspect of their humanity. Furthermore, individual security is predicated on the security of the person’s reference group/ community/organisation. Belonging to a certain community constitutes a risk factor to the personal security if that group is a target of traditional oppressive practices that survived modernization.
- (2) *Political security*, the last dimension of the UNDP human security model, requires a society to be built on basic human rights and values. This political dimension also includes individual and collective rights of access to justice and protection against abuses, and freedom to exercise religion.




Figure 1.2: Human security assessment models – peacetime vs. crisis (Kis, 2012b, 228)

If NATO operations pursue these three freedoms (Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Wants, and Freedom to Live in Dignity) and their seven constituent aspects of security, NATO’s aims will share a general mapping onto basic drivers of human action. Highlighting these different drivers in a security framework elevates the need to consider all drivers simultaneously in a security operation.

In addition to its comprehensiveness, this broad view of human security also recognizes that the relative importance of drivers of human action may change during crises and other contextual changes. The illustration below is a representation of some of the human aspects within a given territorial system

(Ianoş, 2000) from human security standpoint.² The aspects are categorized by evaluation/importance level (strategic/ operational/ tactical) and by degree of local stability (peacetime vs. crisis situation). Assessment of the human aspects of an operational environment requires military analyses and condition estimates, while peacetime assessments offer researchers the chance to gather baseline data that can be used to calibrate the local matrix. The diagram notes a difference in the order of perceived priorities in matters of security related to the change of safety condition in the general life environment.

In a crisis response operation, security stakeholders demand clear ranges of action wherein their contribution will be valued (e.g., one stakeholder may be exclusively interested in relieving human physiological needs to ensure human survival, perhaps by providing food or potable water). Relevance of the external actors on each stage of the human needs varies, and in each situation we must establish a cohesive estimation of the needs along with a robust understanding of how they can be prioritized, fulfilled and sustained.

3.2. Additional Recommendations

In addition to adopting the Human Security model for security-stability operations, we make a number of further recommendations. By way of summary, we synthesize the conclusions provided in each sub-section presented above, and then offer some additional recommendations that emerge from our general treatment of drivers of human action.

To influence key individuals, become part of their personal social network or influence members of their personal social network. A high level of trust and moral obligation is reserved for approximately 150 personal relationships. Become part of that circle of relationships and you gain influence and opportunity for cooperation. Alternatively, if one can “win over” a number of people in a key player’s social network, it will be much easier to “win over” that key player through their influence.

To be a credible source of information or target for behavioural imitation, it is best to be regarded as relevantly similar to the audience as well as skilled in a valued domain or prestigious. Likewise, to know by whom it is that someone is

² A security stake in the definition of territorial systems embodies: safety indicators, resources’ sufficiency and perception of freedom, all these characteristics outlining a certain level (status) of human security (Kis, 2012a).

influenced, consider whom it is they regard as relevantly like themselves (e.g., in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity), and regard as prestigious and skilled. For NATO to influence local populations, soliciting the aid of individuals who are prestigious and relevantly similar to the various subpopulations in question (including young people, elderly, women, men, different clans, etc.) would be advantageous. Sometimes NATO forces themselves will be regarded as particularly skilled and/or prestigious already but may not be relevantly similar to the local population but can elevate the prestige of locals strategically.

Identify how moral foundations are manifest and discover religious and “sacred values”. The important modifiers of these needs – moral and religious values and practices – must be identified for any operational environment. These values and practices often generate considerable social cohesion and willingness of people to make enormous personal sacrifices. They also fall outside of economic negotiations. Traditional moral foundations are broader than many western societies and concern loyalty, authority, and sanctity, as well as harm and fairness concerns. Promoting and encouraging goals that are common to the local religion(s) and NATO’s objectives and finding ways to participate in those common goals together may be particularly fruitful.

Manage expectations and frustration. Frustrated expectations can create conflict above and beyond absolute levels of drive satisfaction, so it may be strategic to seek to gauge and influence expectations as much as satisfy perceived wants and needs.

Relative importance of drivers change with context, status, sex, age, etc. Understanding the specific local manifestations of these basic action drivers cannot be determined by simple consultation with the leading class of that community. The drivers will likely vary considerably by rank, status, age, sex, and so forth. Hence, a broadly representative picture of drivers is needed.

Create conditions that address multiple needs/drivers simultaneously. Because drivers vary by age, sex, status, and so forth, and also because their priority may vary as a function of expectations and environmental stressors, often a good strategy when trying to create security to satisfy these drives is to address multiple categories simultaneously. Returning to the illustration of the un-used well, the failure of the well was not because it wasn’t useful to meet a basic need. It failed because it pitted two needs—two drivers—against each other instead of harmonizing multiple drives together.

Main Drivers are not always consciously accessible. It is easy to support that determining the motivations and passions of a people is relatively easy: just

ask. But research in the psychological sciences has shown that people often are not aware of their own primary drives and motivations. So, direct questioning will not always reveal them accurately. In many cases it is better to systematically observe behaviour and emotional responses to situations to identify root drivers. Another heuristic amplified in the document is to consider those needs that humans have had for millennia, all over the world. Generally, the old needs are still the most basic and most recurrent ones.

Social and human scientists are needed in the operations planning and execution process. We echo the US military initiative “to provide socio-cultural teams to commanders and staffs in order to improve the understanding of the local population and apply this understanding to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)”³. NATO, like the US, recognizes the great need for the MDMP to have access to and use better understanding of the local population.

This research panel (and those that follow) stress the necessity of understanding the human aspects of the operational environment through synthesizing data, and analyses of people *as they live and act* as a part of societies, populations, communities, and other groups, including their activities, relationships, and perspectives (stakeholders, drivers, enablers and processes). This identified need ensures support for new efforts to *understand* the local population and leaders welcome new suggestions about how to achieve this. However, any plan must ensure that a wide range of social sciences are involved: cultural studies, demographics, social geography, political science, religious studies, sociology, and especially scientific psychology (e.g. social and evolutionary), and anthropology (e.g. cognitive and evolutionary), so that they each can provide a unique contribution. It may be possible in many cases for civilians with appropriate clearance to contribute to operations in various capacities, but it may also be important for NATO and the military forces of the alliance to cultivate officers with training in critical areas of the human sciences.

Recommendations

- *Primary recommendation is for NATO to take a broad view of human security for use in security-stability operations on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This broad view may be called a*

³<http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/>

Human Security Model, and treats security to satisfy basic needs and drivers as part of the security aims of an operation;

- *To influence key individuals, become part of their personal social network or influence members of their personal social network;*
- *To be a credible source of information or target for behavioural imitation, it is best to be regarded as relevantly similar to the audience as well as skilled in a valued domain or prestigious;*
- *Identify how moral foundations are manifest and discover religious and “sacred values”;*
- *Manage expectations and frustration;*
- *Relative importance of drivers change with context, status, sex, age, etc.;*
- *Create conditions that address multiple needs/drivers simultaneously;*
- *Main Drivers are not Always Consciously Accessible;*
- *Social and human scientists are needed in the operations planning and execution process.*

CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN ENVIRONMENTS

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1. Introduction

“History is not a cookbook which gives recipes; it teaches by analogy and forces us to decide what, if anything is analogous. History gives us a feel for the significance of events, but it does not teach which individual events are significant. It is impossible to write down a conceptual scheme and apply it mechanically to evolving situations. Certain principles can be developed and certain understandings can be elaborated through a study of history, but it is impossible to predict in advance how they apply to concrete situations.”

Dr. Henry Kissinger

“Awareness of the cultural dimension will not necessarily guarantee victory, but ignorance of it, history shows us, will guarantee defeat.”

Dr. Huw Lewis⁴, Lecturer in Defence Studies, King's College

⁴ Lewis, Dr. Huw, “Will history repeat itself in Afghanistan?” BBC News, July 15, 2009.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8151294.stm

Objectives

Use history and other disciplines from the humanities and social sciences to establish parameters for the analysis of local populations.

- *Impact of interaction (or not) with the “West” (i.e. colonialism/imperialism) on politics, economics, society, values, national aspirations and so forth.*
- *How do these experiences (or lack of them) affect local perceptions of the West (NATO)?*
- *Historical analysis is a significant element in the development of country profiles.*
- *Help provide insights as the decision making process is studied.*
- *Provide insights into propaganda and other mass persuasion mechanisms.*
- *Enhance understanding of human networks that are able to transform vision into policy.*
- *Apply history as part of a multi-disciplinary approach in an effort to understand cultural similarities and differences.*

2. The Importance of the Historical Background

History serves as an important vehicle by which these objectives can be achieved, especially when utilized in conjunction with other disciplines from the humanities and social sciences. History gives us a storehouse of information about how people and societies behave. The experiences of the past also provide insights into current behaviours, attitudes, beliefs and actions as well as how communities have come to their current status. Therefore, history gives us key evidence about past behaviours and actions and how they have shaped present day communities in a variety of ways.

Critical to developing a working relationship with the local population is an understanding of how these people behave in social situations. Again, historical knowledge can play a vital role by providing critical evidence which can help explain how people have come to behave in a variety of social settings. History offers the only set of extensive data and evidence for analyzing how

societies function, and this is an essential component for the success of a security mission as it tries to build rapport and support within the local population.

As an effort is made to understand the circumstances that have brought about the development of present day societies and cultures, it is important to keep in mind that the present is built upon the past. Therefore, understanding current situations requires some knowledge of events that took place. It must be kept in mind, however, that events in the recent past may offer clues to the occurrence of a major development, but the *causes* of change may have to be explained by looking further back in the past in order to identify them. It is this ability to examine the past that enables us to understand and analyze *why* things change and apply this understanding to the present day. By identifying the factors that precipitate change, it becomes possible to understand not only the process of change but also why some societies or cultures resist change.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that history provides the most extensive source of evidence for the study of humankind. It offers a database that brings to light the complex processes of social change, both in the past and the present. It also gives societies and cultures a sense of identity. The data provided through the study of history reveals a wealth of information about the formation of families, groups, institutions and nations and can help explain how they have remained cohesive over time. Many different groups and institutions use history in order to reinforce their sense of identity and a failure to appreciate this can lead to misunderstandings or conflicts that might otherwise be avoided.⁵

However, it must be understood that history does not offer absolutes, nor does it provide complete answers. Whether utilized alone, or paired with other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, history, despite the many sources of evidence that are available to us, does not offer a complete picture of the past. It is a discipline that requires interpretation of the existing evidence, and not all scholars may agree on historical interpretations. Moreover, events from the past, while they may appear similar to events taking place in the present, will also be different in any number of ways. It is just as important to identify and learn from these differences in order to produce historical analogies that may be applicable to a current situation, especially in making an effort to understand an unfamiliar society or culture.⁶

⁵ See Peter N. Stearns, "Why Study History" at <http://www.historians.org/pubs/free/WhyStudyHistory.htm>

⁶ The process of developing effective historical analogies, especially for decision makers, can be found in Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, 1986.

Using history effectively both as an analytical tool, and for trying to determine how best to interact with foreign cultures and societies will not be an easy task. The role of the historian has been compared to that of explorers and cartographers mapping an unknown land as they fill in bits and pieces to create as accurate a picture of the strange territory as possible. No matter how complete the map becomes, there will always be empty spaces that will require additional exploration. The same holds true for historical analysis.⁷

History can also be used for political or other purposes. Historical memory can be selective, for example. There may be a tendency to respond to a NATO security or stability mission on the basis of past experiences with outsiders. Depending on that experience, the local population may have a preconceived viewpoint about the presence of NATO forces in their homeland and that will affect how they respond to that situation. Opponents to a NATO mission may twist the historical record to present an interpretation of the past that emphasizes the negative experiences of a foreign presence at some time in the past, even though that event may have proved extremely beneficial, in order to build a sense of suspicion and antagonism toward the presence of foreigners on their soil.⁸ Or, the opposite could take place. Proponents of a NATO mission to their country could downplay negative consequences of dealing with outsiders in the past in order to encourage support of the mission, perhaps for their own purposes. Therefore, it is essential to be sensitive to the historical viewpoint of any foreign society or culture in which NATO may become involved in order to have as complete a historical analysis and understanding of the local population as possible before beginning any operations there.

Why History?

- *Aids in the understanding of people and societies*
- *Provides an understanding of change and how present-day societies have come to be*
- *Gives us the only extensive body of evidence and database for the study of humankind*
- *Focuses attention on the complex processes of social change, including those that take place in the present day*
- *Provides societies and cultures with a sense of identity*

⁷ See John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past*, 2002.

⁸ The ways in which history can be manipulated are examined in Jill LePore's *The Whites of the Their Eyes: The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle over American History*, 2010 and Margaret McMillan's *Dangerous Games: The Uses and Abuses of History*, 2008.

- *Offer clues as to how a society might react or respond to a security or peacekeeping mission*

3. A brief survey of the Impact of Empire and Colonialism

From the earliest days of recorded history, the organisation of human habitation is written down in terms of “culture”, “civilisation” and “empire”. Long before the organisation of the modern world into the Westphalian state system, the ebb and flow of the ancient, classical and medieval empires left a layering of historical myth/memory that modern concepts of nationalism and local community identity have absorbed to a greater or lesser degree. “The notion of a collective memory implies a past that is not only commonly shared but also jointly remembered.”⁹

There is hardly a place on Earth that has not experienced some form of “conquest” in the past, or been responsible for such adventure. There are various interlinking and overlapping experiences that have impacted on the community of nations. Roughly, there are six key processes, ranging from the immediate traumatic to the gradual consensual:

- Colonialism,
- Occupation,
- Conversion,
- Absorption,
- Transplantation and
- “Voluntary” unions.

The legacy of each of these on present day community perspectives will depend on the degree of historical memory and interpretation and the nature of the “takeover”, as is obvious.

The terms “imperialist” and “colonial” are, today, closely associated with European global adventure. However, in the United Kingdom a famous comedy group¹⁰ coined a phrase that has become popular, “What did the Romans ever do for us?”, an amusing recognition that the Roman invasion of Britain, two

⁹ Anna Catalani *“Telling Another Story: Western Museums and the Creation of Non-western Identities”*, 2010

¹⁰ Monty Python’s Flying Circus ‘The Life of Brian’.

thousand years ago, and the subsequent absorption of Britain into the Pax Romana still resonates and defines aspects of life in the UK, and large parts of Europe, to this day. The same can be said of the ancient dynamic colonisers who left memory of conquest, slavery and profound change in language, religion and social structures such as (to name but a few) the Greeks under the Macedonian dynasty (Alexander), the Persians (Darius and Cyrus), the ancient Egyptians, the Mongols, the Umayyids, Abbassids, and Fatimids, the Saffavids and Moghuls, the Chinese Qin, Han and Tang Imperial dynasties as well as in the Americas, famously, the Aztecs, Incas and Mayans, and in Africa the Benin, Zimbabwe and Zulu Empires. From the safety and comfort of text books and armchairs we are able to read of acts of aggression against neighbours, of armies pitched against each other, of sieges and seizure followed by the appalling experiences of the defeated, sacrificed, massacred or sold into slavery. All histories recall brutal episodes of great cruelty, inexcusable injustices of oppression, cultural destruction, obliteration of language and religion, and enslavement.

The modern European High Imperialism, beginning in the nineteenth century, defines the world today and was of an entirely different order. There had always been the notion of technological advantage in expansionist activity in the past, such as the bow and arrow, the stirrup and the axle. High Imperialism was much larger in scale and characterised by the enormous disparity in power between colonisers and colonised, because of industrialisation and the technological advantages of the steam ship, rapid firing rifles, machine guns, the telegraph and the railway. “Whatever happens we have got the Maxim gun, and they have not”.¹¹ Motivations for colonial expansion in this period have also left indelible marks on the colonised. In the simplest terms, the search for raw materials to feed the industrial revolution, of luxury goods to amuse and feed the growing consumer class, for land to provide for aspiring scions of lesser noble families or the new industrial wealthy, for a supply of people for cheap labour, servants and slaves.

The second key experience is that of occupation. This is a human experience that, again, reaches back through ancient times. When the population of the whole earth was a few millions, before the drawing of boundaries and delineations of territories in the pre-agrarian era, groups and families of humans would move around, travelling vast distances, in search of grazing for animals, water, safer fishing, more agreeable climate, a better future for the clan. People move when stressed. In the past this was easier because the perception of the

¹¹ Hillaire Belloc, the character of William Blood in *“The Modern Traveller”*.

world in the age of exploration, in Europe, from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was that of vast open spaces, of unclaimed land, of total ignorance or dismissal of the peoples already inhabiting the coveted spaces.

From the turmoil of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, all across Europe, persecuted groups began to think about escaping, to rebuild their lives in a new place, led by God to lead lives dictated by Biblical truth in a promised land. The most notable of these groups, spearheading a wave of migration from Europe into other continents which had the most far-reaching consequences, were the Pilgrim Fathers into North America and the Boers into Southern Africa. The speculators, traders and armies followed over the centuries. A third occupation occurred in Australasia. Having secured Australia and New Zealand for the British Empire, the “empty” lands were filled by adventurers looking for life-changing opportunities in trade, prospecting or ranching, and, most notoriously, as a convenient empty space on the other side of the world on whose shores the United Kingdom could dump its felons. Transportation to Australia was a statutory punishment. Most of the condemned stayed in Australia at the end of the sentence. The original nations of North America, Australia and New Zealand were driven off their lands so that these states are now referred to as part of the “Anglo-Saxon world”. White European settlers into the African colonies acquired land, status and political pre-eminence, but were never secure after these colonies gained independence and outcomes in the post-colonial years have varied considerably and continue to fuel provocative policies concerning the ownership and use of land.¹² Therefore, migrating populations have been a source of conflict as they settled or occupied land and displaced or dominated indigenous groups across all continents. Long memories of previously owned land, access, lost traditions and language have emerged as grievances in civil unrest.

Overlapping the first two examples, a third could be the experience of conversion. Dating from the first religiously motivated exodus of Muslim Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula in the century after the prophet Mohammed’s death in 632 CE, colonisation and conquest across Northern Africa, around the Mediterranean into the Middle East and Asia was the start of a massive, largely natural and convenient, conversion of all the indigenous populations. Established, centuries old religions were marginalised or became largely extinct and the

¹² In 1800 the Western powers held 35% of the Earth’s surface. In 1878, land holding had risen to 67% and by 1914 Western powers held 85% of the world’s land. During this period, Britain gained 66 million new subjects, France 26 million and Germany 12 million. The Italians, Portuguese, Belgians and Spanish also had significant subjects.

universal use of Arabic dominated local languages. There is confusion now as nationalist and democratic sentiments in the Middle East and North Africa compete with Islamic/Islamist notions of supremacy in the struggle to shape futures. For example, the Berbers, whose ancient writ runs across North Africa, have reclaimed their pre-Islamic alphabet and are beginning to resist Islamic culture in some areas.

The experience in South America was shaped by Roman Catholic religious revival during the Reformation era in response to the Protestant challenge to the supremacy of Rome in the 16th and 17th centuries – the Age of Discovery. The Catholic Church inaugurated a great mission to spread Christianity in the New World and to convert the Native Americans and other indigenous peoples. The missionary effort was a large part of the justification for the colonial conquests of the Native Americans by the catholic powers of Spain, France and Portugal. “For Prince Henry the Navigator of Portugal and his contemporaries, the colonial enterprise was based on the necessity to develop European commerce and the obligation to propagate the Christian Faith.”¹³

The Spanish were committed by Vatican Decree to convert the New World indigenous subjects to Catholicism. “If we had to choose a single, irreducible idea underlying the Spanish colonialism in the New World, it would undoubtedly be the propagation of the Catholic Faith. Unlike other European rivals, the British or the Dutch, Spain insisted on converting the natives of the lands it conquered ... More than any set of economic relationships with the outside world, more even than the language first brought to America’s shores in 1492, the Catholic religion continues to permeate Spanish-American culture today, creating an overriding cultural unity which transcends the political and national boundaries dividing the continent.” (5) Rather like the Umma in the Muslim world order. However, critically “The catastrophe of South America’s rape at the hands of the Conquistadores remains one of the most potent and pungent examples in the whole history of human conquest of the wanton destruction of one culture by another, in the name of religion”¹⁴

Protestant Christian missionary incursions into the African continent converged with the ‘Scramble for Africa’ from the mid-nineteenth century. Missionaries from the newly formed biblical societies in the United Kingdom were moved to visit little-known regions and peoples, at great risk to life and limb. In many instances they became explorers and pioneers of trade and Empire, the

¹³ Jan van Butselaar, *“Bridge or Barrier: Religion, Violence and Visions for peace”*, 2001.

¹⁴ Adrian van Oss, *“Catholic Colonialism: a parish History of Guatemala”*.

most famous of whom was David Livingstone. "The missionaries played manifold roles in colonial Africa and stimulated forms of cultural, political and religious change."¹⁵

Britain had been exploiting the African continent for some years before Congress of Berlin in 1884, when the other European powers, and the newly formed powers of Italy and Germany, joined in the challenge to British supremacy in Africa. This overt colonialism had a huge effect that completely changed the nature and face of a continent. "Boundaries did exist but not in the modern European sense. They were linguistic, cultural, military or commercial and they tended to criss-cross and overlap, without the neat delineations so much beloved by Western statesmen since the treaties of Westphalia. Colonial European logic played havoc with the delicate cobweb of relationships".¹⁶

The colonialists created capital cities, railway networks, administrative structures and western schools, introducing European languages. It was not a uniform impact for it depended on which western power was in control, the industry surrounding the extraction of raw materials, minerals and other goods and the extent and purpose of European settlements. "The greatest single effect was the totally artificial boundaries which united at least two, but usually very many more, recognisably distinct peoples, and, conversely, divided homogenous groups between two or more different countries".¹⁷ Also, the huge size of the colonial administrative areas laid down the blue print for the doubtfully viable states. The colonial powers' answer to managing the complexity of the different and various lands they governed was the tendency to use one favoured or dominant ethnic group. Following independence the scene was set for explosive re-organisation of what had been workable only with highly centralized and sporadically brutal enforcement.

More seriously, in terms of community identity was the impact of slavery. At its peak, whole nations were hollowed out, the fittest and best being selected for transport to the New World, or the Middle East. Slaves had been traded for centuries before the arrival of the Europeans. In the aftermath of tribal conflicts, defeated enemies and their families were routinely sold. However, the industrial scale of the trans-Atlantic slave trade changed the nature and ethnic

¹⁵ M Jordan *"In the name of God: Violence and Destruction in the World's Religions"* 2006; Heather Sharkey in *"Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa"*, John Comoroff, 1986.

¹⁶ Gerard Prunier, *"From Genocide to Continental War: The 'Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa"*, Hurst, 2009.

¹⁷ Paul Gifford, *"African Christianity; Its public Role"*, Hurst, 2001.

dynamics of North, Central and South America and, possibly, sent West African civilisations into stagnation.

The European powers did not limit the drawing of lines of maps to Africa. Many tribal cultures on the receiving end of great power expansion and post-war settlements, found themselves arbitrarily bound together, as unequal partners, or torn apart according to the convenience of the Imperial powers. Present state boundaries bear witness to this as turmoil rages in significant parts of Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent. Tensions remain in large parts of the world, including Europe, where separatist and liberation movements still exist as violent groups or political parties. The list is exhaustive.

Simultaneously with the pressure of growing independence movements in the post-war world, the global political division was being played out in increasing intensity as the Cold War dominated decision-making and support in all the immature nations. The highly centralised, authoritarian administrations created by the colonial powers, and which created a sense of alienation amongst the governed, were usurped by “Liberation Movement” cadres to create new exploitative elite kleptocracies before the newly independent states had any chance to evolve. The impact has been to create extreme poverty through distorted development, and vulnerability because of dependency on aid.

Much of the focus of discussion of “Empire” tends to concentrate on the European model of global empire, dependent on sea power. However, there are the nation-states that are, in fact, contiguous empires and have grown through expansion and absorption of neighbouring peoples through the centuries, and now find themselves facing rebellion, subversion and resistance as cohesive cultural groups fight for recognition. China, Ethiopia and Iran are modern examples. In attempts to prevent coherent resistance, or to dilute ethnic homogeneity many authoritarian leaders have resorted to transplantation of peoples internally. The Soviet Union, memorably, used this method both as punishment and as inducement across all the soviet states. Pakistan, China and Saudi Arabia, for example, have relocated favoured ethnic or religious groups to take over key positions in troublesome areas. As a result, the former elite ethnic groups have been “stranded” in newly independent states. The response of Serbs finding themselves as minorities in the successor states to Yugoslavia is an awful warning, as was the decision at Versailles to gift the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia.

The euphoria following the end of the Cold War masked a worrying development in the family of nations. The break-up of the Soviet Union led to a cascade of states into the United Nations, notably those that had been subject to

conquest, or absorption. The notion of strength in unity seemed to be irrelevant as peace broke out between the two super powers. “Voluntary” unions of all sizes began to be fragile as the need to hang together diminished. The notable dissolution of a nation state was the “Velvet Divorce” between the Czechs and the Slovaks. A catastrophic break-up was that of Yugoslavia. The European Union has, unwittingly, provided cover for small nations to declare their interest in breaking away from old unions. The most notable of these is Scotland and the rise of the Scottish Nationalist Party, with independence at the heart of its agenda. The United Kingdom is a prime example of a political entity forged by historic occupation and ‘voluntary’ union of crowns in 1707. Ireland has resisted from the first day of Union in 1802 to this day, bar the six counties of Northern Ireland. Quebec in the Canadian Union has a powerful nationalist movement. Catalonia and the Basque region are other such in Spain. Most states with ‘Union’ as in the USA and ‘Federal’ as in Germany or Ethiopia, reflect the decision to join together to form one political unity and all our histories reflect the struggle and heartache in the making. The extent to which this process was a success and how it was achieved is a clue to the future integrity of some states, and the likelihood of breakdown in the future.

As previously discussed, the world has been defined in terms of empire, and of memories of lost cultures, languages, religion and traditions. The intensity of the experience of loss and destruction quite clearly is linked to distance in time, the relative progress of the nation and the advantages delivered. Economic grievances, demographic stress and literacy levels play into the hands subversive groups. Significant ancient minorities continue to exist and are persecuted or tolerated, but can become catalysts for nationalist, separatist movements depending on geographical location, religious differences and sense of betrayal. Language revival/retrieval has been on the increase as a marker of growing confidence amongst minorities, whether oppressed or not. Where borders have sliced through clearly defined ethnic groups border disputes erupt, or regional, political meddling in the spirit of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’, has the potential to destabilise large areas. We are all aware of these global problems and the complexity of resolving such long-running grievances.

The lines drawn on the map are the states defined in the current world order. We must be very clear about how the states formed - by revolution, resistance, colonial independence, occupation/acquisition or evolution. It is crucial to understand not only the recent history, but the historical myth/memory of status, language, religion, old tribal, cultural boundaries and kinships, the natural trading and dealing instincts, the nature of loyalties and folk heroes past

and present whose name can be invoked for 'glorious' purposes. By understanding and, more importantly, by using that knowledge a security or peace-keeping operation is much more likely to move from grudging acquiescence to positive acceptance.

Implications of Empire and Colonization

- *18th and 19th century colonialism help define the modern world*
- *Colonial/Imperial occupations of the past may have left long standing grievances in the present*
- *Past imperial/colonial occupations have set up present day conflicts – nationalism/democratization vs. Islamic fundamentalism as an example*
- *Arbitrary redrawing of maps in Africa, Asia, India and the Middle East*
- *Implications created by transplantation or forced removal of peoples*
- *Emergence of modern day nationalist movements*

4. Cultural Intelligence

In 21st century warfare, a lack of understanding of culture not only can have negative consequences to military operations at all levels of the operational spectrum but also (and above everything else) put in danger the lives of soldiers and civilians alike. As a consequence, a solid understanding and application of cultural awareness should be a pre-requisite in the planning and execution of military operations, particularly in low intensity conflicts, such as the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. To this end, one way to lighten cultural challenges in low intensity conflict is by developing *cultural intelligence*, which in a military sense, "is a complicated pursuit in anthropology, psychology, communications, sociology, history, and, above all, military doctrine."¹⁸ As a result, the application of cultural intelligence (at times) can be more effective and even surpass that of traditional military intelligence.

Unfortunately, there is not "a one size fits all" that encompasses human culture which is extremely diverse and intricate, as we are not dealing with machines or clones but rather with human beings that have rational thoughts and

¹⁸ Center for Advanced Defense Studies (CADS), 2.

feel emotions. Therefore, as one studies culture one must take into consideration many aspects of a specific country/society to include:

- Composition (ethnicity, sex, languages, level of education, etc.)
- Institutional influences (religious, political, economic, etc.).
- Where an individual falls within that society (opportunities of advancement, pluralistic vs. individualistic society, interests, etc.)

Consequently, the study of history of any country/society is essential to understand many of these aspects. The example of T.E. Lawrence provides an excellent case study on the benefits of understanding the history and culture of a particular society.

T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, was a British officer assisted Bedouin Arab tribes in their fight against the Ottomans Turks during World War I. Prior to the outbreak of war he had been an anthropologist and archaeologist with a deep understanding of Arab customs and culture. This enabled him to obtain “a profound understanding of native [Arab tribal] ways, [thus becoming] a nationalized Arab instead of merely a European visitor in Arab lands.”¹⁹ He wrote; “In my case, the effort for these years to live in the dress of Arabs, and to imitate their mental foundation, quitted me of my English self, and let me look at the West and its conventions with new eyes: they destroyed it all for me.”²⁰

Beyond his battlefield successes, one of Lawrence’s greatest achievements was in providing insights to understanding Arab culture by penning *The Twenty Seven Articles*. Originally published in 1917, *The Twenty Seven Articles* provide guidelines on how to deal with Arabs based on his keen observation of their customs and culture. A close study of his observations and dictums as they appear in *the Twenty Seven Articles* reveal universal codes that are critical to deciphering any country/society. Two critical dictums are discussed below.

Dictum 1: “The beginning and ending of the secret of handling [Arabs] is unremitting study of them”

The first step to understanding this dictum is to remove the word Arab and replace it with a specific target audience, whether they are, for example, Sudanese, Berbers, Bedouins or Kurds. Moreover, what this dictum implies is that

¹⁹ Liddell-Hart, B.H. *Lawrence of Arabia*, New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1989, 11-12.

²⁰ Lawrence, T.E. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, New York, NY: Anchor Books, 31.

you must learn everything about a specific society/culture: their books, their history, their customs, and, if possible, their language. Strive to achieve language proficiency. Learn how historical events have affected behaviour, beliefs, and relationships with others. Learn about religious beliefs and practices, their food, their tastes, their customs, and so forth. Opportunely, there are many tools available in the 21st century to assist in the study of a specific society/country, including, among others, anthropology and other social science books, language classes and cultural exchanges.

A perfect example of how this comes into play occurred back in World War II with the publication of *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, written by American anthropologist Ruth Benedict in 1944. This book included a comprehensive study aimed at understanding Japanese culture and how to comprehend and predict the behaviour of the Japanese by making references to a series of contradictions within their traditional culture. In her study, she tried to “use Japanese behaviour in war as an asset in understanding them, not as a liability” in order to comprehend how “the Japanese would behave, [and] not how we would behave if we were in their place.”²¹ As such, this book was extremely influential in shaping American ideas about Japanese culture and even affected the way the United States used Emperor Hirohito as a unifying symbol in the post-war period, not unlike the way he was used during the war, thus ensuring a smooth transition of power, enabling the occupation as well as legitimizing the new power structure.

The successful application of the first dictum leads to the second dictum which states:

Dictum 2: There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible, or inscrutable (enigmatic) in the [blank] experience of them, and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you to foresee their attitude and possible course of action in nearly every case.

Having a basic understanding of a specific country/society is just the first step as it is imperative to recognize the intricacies of their culture. To this end, an understanding of their prejudices or biases is indispensable, including the treatment of minorities, women or other specific groups within that society. Determining if these prejudices are driven by religion, education, social structure,

²¹ Benedict, Ruth, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989, 5.

political systems or other elements is critical to this understanding. It is equally important to remember that we also come from a stereotyped culture with prejudices of our own that must be overcome. These realizations can help shape the attitude of the local population toward a NATO operation taking place in their country.

The experience of Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Christopher Hughes during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom serves as a case in point. On the morning of April 3rd 2003, the men of LTC Hughes reached the holy city of Najaf and were approaching the Imam Ali Mosque to request from Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani a religious proclamation allowing an American presence in the city. In the meantime, a large crowd of locals blocked the soldiers' path, fearing they were going to destroy the mosque. The situation grew tense by the minute until LTC Hughes asked his soldiers to stand down and point their weapons to the ground. He then directed his soldiers to smile at the crowd and wave at them while slowly backing away until they were far away from the mosque. The crowd understood the universal goodwill gesture and calmed down and a dangerous situation which could have resulted in unnecessary bloodshed was defused. Later that day, Grand Ayatollah Sistani issued the requested decree.²² Not only did the actions of LTC Hughes prevent unnecessary violence, but by preventing damage to the mosque there were strategic ramifications to the overall Iraqi campaign. By avoiding damage to or the destruction of the Mosque the possibility of a revolt by the Shi'ite majority against the coalition was prevented.

In conclusion, the level of cultural understanding depends on the individual and how much effort is invested in expanding that knowledge. Yet, regardless of an individual's level of cultural knowledge, it does not take a cultural expert to recognize the significance of culture and how culture can work to their advantage by simply applying these dictums as advocated by one of the foremost cultural experts in history, T.E. Lawrence.

Cultural Intelligence

- *Cultural awareness is essential prerequisite for all planning and execution of political-military operations*
- *Need for "cultural intelligence" – melding of historical and social science analysis, linguistics and military doctrine*

²² Field Manual (FM) 6-22. *Army Leadership*. October 2006, 6-43.

- *Identify and determine how cultural prejudices may impact upon building popular support for a security or peace-keeping mission*

5. Historical analysis develops and maintains popular support for the operation

Military operations have taken place for thousands of years, however the importance of popular support for them and their success has not always been acknowledged. Some variables for the justification of military operations have been identified as, for example, anticipated financial or political benefits, prospects for success, costs, the tolerance of casualties and consensus support from political leaders. Perceived advantages of warfare have included new colonies and economic growth of the enterprises supporting the military machine with their requirements, such as weapons, uniforms food and other supplies. While considering and planning for security or peace keeping operations, NATO would be well advised to keep in mind past responses of individual members to military operations. Any failure to prepare the home population's understanding of the rationale for taking part in such operations may result in growing opposition that could undermine a member's ability to participate successfully in them. It is just as important to understand the participant's previous experience with popular support or opposition to its involvement in past wars or military operations in order to gain acceptance for planned involvement in a current arena of conflict. Doing so carries the same level of importance for NATO members as does an understanding of the human terrain in which these operations may be taking place. Thus, detrimental events that may occur in the operational environment due to a lack of cultural understanding may also serve to undermine support for the operation back home. Therefore, an understanding of the human environment within the operational theatre is essential not only to avoid harmful or adverse incidents that can be damaging to the operation itself, but also to maintain popular support back home. The following case studies highlight some cornerstones of acceptance for military operations.

5.1. Case Study: Spain 1808: Anticipated Political Benefits Result in Resistance

The secular ideals of the Enlightenment and those of the French Revolution found supporters in Spain among those who supported the idea of a constitutional monarchy and some progressive reforms. The term "Afrancesado",

meaning “turned French” was applied to those who favoured these principles, and likely supported the alliance between France and in the early years of the Napoleonic Wars. However, by late 1806, Napoleon had grown increasingly dissatisfied with his ally’s performance, particularly at the Battle of Trafalgar. Following the 1807 invasion of Portugal, the occupation of Spain and the placement of his brother, Joseph, on the Spanish throne in 1808, Napoleon may have hoped to rely on the support of the Afrancesados in the administration of the occupation. Some Afrancesados seem to have viewed the French domination of the Spanish throne as a better option than the dismemberment of their country, while others may have hoped that the Napoleonic Code might bring about the reforms they hoped for.²³

However, Napoleon misjudged the situation badly. Although, through his brother, Napoleon would follow through on his promises to abandon feudal and clerical privileges, the installation of Joseph as king helped precipitate resistance to French interference in Spanish affairs. Riots in Madrid a month before Joseph’s coronation were soon put down, but more uprisings occurred and by the time of Joseph’s official installation as king, most of Spain had taken up arms against the French invader.²⁴ Most Spanish liberals came to oppose the occupation for the violence and the brutality that followed.

Although Napoleon had intended to bring Spain under French control for some time, as he had grown suspicious of his ally, he failed to plan effectively for doing so. He may have overestimated the degree of support he had among the Afrancesados, and the degree to which the Spanish people would resist his efforts to integrate Spain into the French Empire. Totally misunderstood was the role of the Catholic Church and its importance in the rural areas. The destruction of churches due to the maxims of the anti-clerical French revolution was another factor that moved the Spanish population to resistance. By failing to plan adequately for the invasion of Spain and underestimating the reaction to his interference in the politics of the Spanish throne, Napoleon significantly reduced his chances for success in the Iberian Peninsula. He may also have overestimated the degree of support he would receive from the Afrancesados and failed to consider the reaction to the implementation of liberal and anti-clerical reforms among those in the rural areas of Spain. Taken together, the combination of poor planning and misjudgements locked France into a military conflict in Spain that might otherwise have been avoided.

²³ <http://eres.indproxy.org/edoc/FacPubs/loy/WardT/Afrancesado-08.pdf>

²⁴ http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/campaign_french_invasion_spain_1808.html

5.2. Case Study: Failure to Build Popular Support at Home

For the majority of individuals, support for their nation's involvement in a conflict is built upon expectations about key factors including the outcome, direction, value and costs of the conflict. Among the critical factors that will come under consideration is the number of military and civilian fatalities that may be sustained during a security or peacekeeping operation. Without appropriate information and context the home population has no real basis upon which to build an informed opinion about national participation in actions of this sort.

Japan entered World War II with strategically limited aims and with the intention of fighting a limited war. Its principal objectives were to secure the resources of Southeast Asia and much of China and to establish a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" under Japanese hegemony. The failure of this strategy and the eventual victory of the Allied Powers inflicted substantial losses on the civilian population through constant bombardment from the air, while the military suffered heavy casualties in a variety of naval and land engagements. More than two million Japanese died during World War II.²⁵

The suffering experienced by the Japanese, along with Article Nine (the "no war clause") of the Japanese Constitution of 1947, may have made Japan reluctant to assist another country in a peacekeeping operation sixty years later. The Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, was able to persuade his government in 2003 to authorize sending a small military force to Iraq in support of the American invasion. The Japanese contingent was tasked primarily with humanitarian work and was prohibited from combat except in self-defence. Threats from Iraqi insurgents against the Japanese force along with protests at home led Japan to withdraw its small contingent in 2006.²⁶ After six decades of peace, Japan's political leaders may have determined that the Japanese people would support a small military operation of this sort. Another explanation might be that the government's leaders agreed that the objectives of the operation were worth the cost and risk, increasing the likelihood of support from those who found their leaders credible and trustworthy. However, in the case of Japan and many other supporters of the Iraq intervention in 2003, this construct failed.

²⁵ http://www.japanww2.com/wt_list.htm; <http://warchronicle.com/numbers/WWII/deaths.htm>; <http://www.holocaust-history.org/~rjg/deaths.shtml>; <http://www.worldwar-2.net/casualties/world-war-2-casualties-index.htm>.

²⁶ Sobel, Furia and Barrat (eds). *Public Opinion and International Intervention*, pp, 109 – 134; <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2003/12/japa-d16.html>; <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hgvCrCTt0km-ijKgQQmoBDy3hkBg>; http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_WorkingPaper_NIC_Japan_PatelCampbell_Oct2008.pdf.

Similar examples could be found within NATO and elsewhere: Spain's government had sent about 1,400 troops to Iraq, despite widespread public opposition. It removed its troops in 2004. Thailand, Hungary and Iceland were among those nations that removed their forces in 2005. Norway and Italy withdrew in 2006, Slovakia and Denmark in 2007 and more than a dozen nations removed their forces in 2008.²⁷ Media reports about accusations of the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners and the fear of high casualty rates during the support of the mission by these countries, among factors, may have caused popular support to decline as well.²⁸

Another example is the Federal Republic of Germany, which sent troops to Afghanistan in support of the United States in 2002. The resulting shock from the 9/11 attacks led the government to believe that it had to assist its American allies. Adding to this conclusion was a traditional friendship between Germany and Afghanistan dating back to the 1920s. However, studies have shown that most of the German population did not consider the Afghanistan conflict to be urgent political issue.²⁹ In the end, Germany eventually joined other war-weary NATO states in minimizing their participation in the mission. This, along with the economic issues that have affected Europe over the past several years, has contributed to a planned reduction of NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Therefore, political leaders urging popular support for their military in missions like the present ones in Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya need to explain to their populations, in detail, the advantages of these commitments. In effect, this is about expectations management. Negative side effects such as casualties or alleged atrocities reported in the media can undermine popular support for even a successful military operation. The people's trust in their political leaders must be high and can be easily lost. Understanding previous popular responses to a nation's involvement in earlier conflicts can serve as a useful guide to preparing the home population as a nation plans to take part in a new one. Therefore, clear and achievable mission goals must be established along with a definite plan for the eventual end of the mission.

²⁷ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-National_Force_%E2%80%93_Iraq

²⁸ See Sobel, Furia and Barratt, *Public Opinion and International Intervention*.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-156. Although the chapter discusses the German role in the 2003 Iraq War and the following occupation, the lessons from that conflict are instructive in regard to Germany's participation in the Afghan War; <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/12/western-support-afghanistan-war-collapsing>; <http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2010/04/28/declining-support-in-germany-for-afghan-operation/>; <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=9>; <http://www.economist.com/node/15954464>.

Developing and Maintaining Popular Support for the Mission

- *Political/military leaders need to explain in detail the anticipated advantages of the mission to local populations in order to earn their trust and support*
- *Negative side effects can undermine popular support quickly*
- *A people's trust in their leaders can be easily lost*
- *Understanding previous responses to involvements in earlier conflicts can be a useful guide to preparing a population for a new one*
- *Clear and achievable mission goals must be established and communicated to the home population*

6. Independence Movements

Historical assessments must also take into account the aspirations of a people to have their own state. This is especially true with the dissolution of the “voluntary unions” such as Czechoslovakia following the end of the Cold War. The experiences of the states that were once under Soviet domination, for example, might lead to the creation of a historical connection with those nations that were once part of colonial empires. The possible affinity that these states might have with former colonies might be useful to NATO in terms of building support for a security or peacekeeping mission among local populations in these types of states. Units from these nations may be especially valuable in the effort to build local support for a NATO mission as they may be less likely to be perceived as Western “occupiers” or “neo-colonialists”.

Popular Aspirations and Nationalism

- *Cultural/historical assessments must account for aspirations to statehood – particularly in line with dissolution of so-called “voluntary unions”*
- *Affinity of such states with nations that were once colonies may be useful for efforts to build popular support within a local population for a NATO mission in their country*
- *May be less likely to be perceived as Western “occupiers” or “neo-*

colonialists”

7. Additional considerations and recommendations

While historical analysis can serve as an effective foundation for understanding unfamiliar societies and culture, it must always be kept in mind that history is not an exact science. History is a discipline that relies on interpretation, while teaching by both example and analogy. Since historians often deal with evidence that is incomplete, they must rely on their best judgement in trying to explain historical causes and effects. Ultimately, history does teach by analogy, but determining whether or not an analogy is appropriate requires careful analysis and consideration of a variety of factors, especially in regard to the effort to understand another culture that may be quite different from one’s own.³⁰ It should be kept in mind, that the population in those regions or countries where NATO might find itself conducting security or peacekeeping operations will apply their own past experiences and historical analogies in their assessment of the operation as they determine whether or not to support it. The natural inclination may be to seek out areas of commonality as both sides try to understand one another. This may be a good thing, but it is in seeking out commonalities and differences that analogies must be carefully considered and analyzed. Effective application of historical analogies requires recognizing and understanding both *likenesses* and *differences* when doing so.³¹ This is especially so when analyzing cultural similarities and dissimilarities. Making assumptions about cultural similarities may result in overlooking differences that may be of greater importance than what both sides may have in common.

Political-military organizations rely on intelligence analysis for the process of planning policies and/or operations. This requires identifying patterns of behaviour and predictions about how local populations might react to toward NATO intervention in their homeland, and historical analysis can play a key part in this process. Therefore NATO operational planning processes should include elements of intensive self-study in regard to some of the issues noted above, as well as the careful analysis of those cultures that with whom NATO may be

³⁰ An excellent discussion of the process of determining whether or not historical analogies may be relevant to a present day situation can be found in May and Neustadt’s *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*.

³¹ Neustadt and May, pp. 89, 156, 235, 237, 269.

interacting. While intelligence analysts are often required to provide assessments and forecasts within a brief period of time, this may not be beneficial to effective cultural analysis and preparations for building support from the local population for an intervention by NATO in their homeland. NATO might be well advised to consider the creation of a permanent cultural analysis unit that can begin the work of identifying those regions or nations where intervention may be most likely in the foreseeable future. Such a unit could be tasked to begin research and analysis of critical areas and their populations where NATO forces may be sent. Utilizing and implementing historical analysis and social science methodologies, plans can be formulated by a unit such as this that contain critical information about the cultures of these regions/nations and recommendations for training NATO personnel in regard to building local support for the mission in which they might be involved. Such a unit would likely need to be a permanent structure, as constant monitoring of conditions and events in these critical areas will be necessary.

As a political-military organization, NATO requires the tools necessary to effectively study the processes that shape the attitudes, beliefs and opinions of the cultures in which it might be required to carry out an operation of some sort. This will be especially so when dealing with non-democratic nations or organizations that oppose democratic values. What will be required is intelligence analysis that will incorporate not only the techniques of historical analysis, but also those of the various academic disciplines within the social sciences, including cultural anthropology, psychology, political science and sociology to name but a few. Analysts will be asked to deal with a great many variables, both independent and dependent, as they study other cultures.³² Therefore, the integration of the methods of thinking utilized by the social sciences and humanities into the process of intelligence analysis will be critical to effective preparation in terms of dealing with non-western cultures. In this regard, history will serve to provide a foundation from which the diversity of human interactions can be analyzed in order to prepare NATO forces for 21st century operations.

³² See Gaddis, *The Landscape of History*, pp. 53, 55, 60, 64-65, 73 and 91, regarding thinking about variables in historical analysis.

Recommendations

- *Historical analysis should be the foundation for preparing to build support among the local population for peacekeeping/security operations.*
- *Utilize historical analysis along with other disciplines to develop cultural awareness in order to maximize opportunities to build rapport with the local population.*
- *Historical analysis should not be limited to the recent past, but should take into account long term factors and influences that have created a sense of identity within the local population.*
- *Analyze the local population's history of relations with outsiders in order to anticipate how they may view the presence of NATO forces in their country.*
- *Learn everything possible about the culture in which the operation will take place, utilizing history, linguistics, and the social science disciplines to do so.*
- *Local populations need detailed explanations of the anticipated benefits of the mission in order to earn their trust and support – this is true for the home population as well.*
- *Learn about a population's previous responses to conflict to anticipate possible reactions to a new one, especially a NATO intervention in their homeland.*
- *Minimize the possibility that NATO forces may be perceived as occupiers" or "neo-colonialists".*
- *Develop and maintain a cultural analysis unit to identify regions or countries where NATO intervention might be most likely in order to prepare NATO personnel for operations in such places.*
- *The integration of the methods of thinking utilized by the social sciences and the humanities into the process of intelligence analysis will be critical to effective preparation in terms of dealing with other countries.*
- *Keep in mind that historical analysis can provide insights, clues and*

guidelines in preparing NATO forces to interact with local populations – but it does not deal in absolutes! Because history teaches by analogy and example, it will take careful study and analysis to identify the critical elements that will help NATO forces build support from the local population within the operational environment.

CHAPTER 3

THE COMPLEXITY OF CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

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1. Understanding the social systems and sub-systems: first step to communication

Knowledge of a culture is the way to communicate with respect. Respect between cultures is the key to success.

In a world that is increasingly interconnected, the success of organizations and their people depends on effective cross-cultural communication. In all these interconnections, communication needs to be as constructive as possible, without misunderstandings and breakdowns. Research on the nature of linguistic and cultural similarities and differences can play a positive and constructive role.

Why is it important to improve intercultural communication? Lack of knowledge of the other culture can lead to embarrassing or amusing mistakes in communication; but such mistakes may confuse or even offend the people we wish to communicate with, making the conclusion of agreements or relationships difficult or impossible. To conduct a constructive cross-cultural communication it

is fundamental to understand the cultural and social environment: in particular the social system and the sub-system structures and dynamics.

The conduct of operations in “other” cultural areas³³ needs an approach oriented to local «systems» and «sub-systems» and not a simple and generic approach to «tribes» (often used in theatres of operations as well as Afghanistan and Iraq); in brief, the concept is: «local instead of tribal».

The term “social system” is a large classification and the elements that compose it can include family, cultural groups, religious organizations, ethnic organizations, and states, among others. The social system is a complex unity formed of many often diverse components subject to a common plan or serving a common purpose.

A society is a system of sub-systems and social changes are driven by internal dynamics of the parts (not excluding external influences) and by the coupling together of the parts into the whole; social actions are seen as a consequence of the dynamic tendencies of each sub-system and of the interaction of the sub-systems.³⁴

A social system is a bounded set of interrelated activities that together constitute a single entity; it is based on individuals or groups of persons who interact and mutually influence each other’s behaviour. These groups and organizations within the social system can be identified as “sub-systems” of the social system. If a part of a system is itself a system then that component is classified as the sub-system of the larger one. Thus, any organization or group can be classified as a sub-system of the society. Society contains various types of sub-systems because the society at large expects and gains some advantages from the existence of such sub-systems.

According to Talcott Parsons,³⁵ there are four primary constituents that are part of the more general system of social dynamics:

1. social systems,
2. cultural systems,
3. personality systems,

³³The term “cultural area” as used here is meant to define a specific social group with common values, norms and traditions, but not confined by formal boundaries as well as country or regional borders, divisions, administrations.

³⁴Robert Hanneman, *Systems and subsystems. Alternative views of societal dynamics*, in “Computer assisted theory building. Modeling dynamic social systems”, SAGE publ., Newbury Park 1988, p. 283.

³⁵Talcott Parsons, *The System of Modern Societies*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, SNK ed. 1971, pp. 4-8.

4. behavioural organisms.

All four are abstractly defined relative to the concrete behaviour of social interaction.³⁶

Sub-systems are social units created and maintained by the society in order to help the society itself accomplish tasks that are impossible to achieve if there are no such sub-systems:

- *Provision of means to achieve common needs*: sub-systems provide means to achieve group's various types of needs ranging from basic to advanced (Example: job opportunities, security and safety, collective support).
- *Sub-Systems preserve knowledge, traditional norms, rules, and justice*: most of the common rules are respected, applied and transmitted to new generations by the sub-systems.
- *Sub-Systems make the entire society*: conventionally, especially in sociology, it is believed that society is a collection of individuals and their families; in specific cultural groups, individuals are a subordinated part of the group (sub-system), which is located in a predominant position (individual needs are less important than group needs).

Finally, because any society is a collection of various types of sub-systems, it is fundamental be aware of internal equilibriums and external dynamics in order to interact and communicate with its elements. *In brief, subsystems are the subject NATO needs to communicate with.*

Main Implications Concerning Social Systems And Sub-Systems

- *The success of organizations and their people depends on effective cross-cultural communication.*
- *Lack of knowledge of the other culture can lead to embarrassing or amusing mistakes in communication.*
- *The conduct of operations in "other" cultural areas needs an approach oriented to local "systems" and "sub-systems".*
- *Sub-systems are social units which helps society itself to accomplish fundamental tasks:*

³⁶ Talcott Parsons, *The System of Modern Societies*, cit.

- (1) *Provision of means to achieve common needs.*
 - (2) *Sub-Systems preserve knowledge, traditional norms, rules, justice.*
 - (3) *Sub-Systems make the entire society.*
- *It is fundamental be aware of internal equilibriums and external dynamics: sub-systems are the subject NATO needs to communicate with.*

1.1. The social sub-system's environment

In line with Parsons' approach, analyzing the interrelations among the four aforementioned sub-systems of action – and between these systems and the environments of action – it is essential to underline the phenomenon of *interpenetration*. Perhaps the best-known case of interpenetration is the *internalization* of social objects and cultural norms into the personality of the individual. Learned content of experience, organized and stored in the memory apparatus of the group, is another example, as is the *institutionalization* of normative components of cultural systems as constitutive structures of social systems. The boundary between any pair of action systems involves a “zone” of structured components or patterns that must be treated theoretically as *common* to *both* systems, not simply allocated to one system or the other.

It is by virtue of the zones of interpenetration that processes of interchange among systems can take place. This is especially true at the levels of symbolic meaning and generalized motivation. In order to communicate symbolically, individuals must have culturally organized common codes (cultural, traditional, ideological codes and rules) that are also integrated into systems of their social interaction (a clear example is the *Pashtunwali* Code³⁷ for the Pashtun people of Afghanistan and Pakistan).

³⁷ **Pashtunwali** is a non-written ethical code and traditional lifestyle which the indigenous Pashtun people follow. Some in the Indian subcontinent refer to it as "*Pathanwali*". Its meaning may also be interpreted as "the way of the Pashtuns" or "the code of life". Pashtunwali dates back to ancient pre-Islamic times and is widely practised among Pashtuns, especially in rural tribal society. In addition to being practiced by members of the Pashtun diaspora, it has been adopted by some non-Pashtun Afghans or Pakistanis who live in Pashtun regions or close to Pashtuns, and have gradually become Pashtunized over time.

There are ten main principles of Pashtunwali. Although Pashtunwali is believed to date back to the pre-Islamic period, its usage or practice does not contravene basic Islamic principles.

The structure of social systems may be analyzed in terms of four types of independently variable components: values, norms, collectivities, and roles.³⁸

- *Values* take primacy in the pattern-maintenance functioning of social systems; they are conceptions of desirable types of social systems that regulate the making of commitments by social units.
- *Norms*, which function primarily to integrate social systems, are specific to particular social functions and types of social situations. They include specific modes of orientation for acting under the functional and situational conditions of particular collectivities and roles.
- *Collectivities* are the type of structural component that have goal-attainment primacy. They include statuses of membership: members and non-members (inside or outside the system). There is also differentiation among members in relation to their statuses and functions within the collectivity, so that some categories of members are expected to do certain things that are not expected of other members.
- *Roles* are the type of structural component that has primacy in the adaptive function (a group of individuals who, through reciprocal expectations, are involved in a particular collectivity). Hence, roles comprise the primary zones of interpenetration between the social system and the personality of the individual.

Many norms regulate the action of indefinite numbers of collectivities and roles, but only specific sectors of their action. Therefore, a collectivity

Pashtunwali rules are accepted in Afghanistan and Pakistan (mainly in and around the Pashtunistan region), and also in some Pashtun communities around the world. Some non-Pashtun Afghans and others have also adopted its ideology or practices for their own benefit. Conversely, many urbanized Pashtuns tend to ignore the rules of Pashtunwali. Passed on from generation to generation, Pashtunwali guides both individual and communal conduct. It is practiced by the majority of Pashtuns and helps to promote Pashtunization.

Pashtuns embrace an ancient traditional, spiritual, and communal identity tied to a set of moral codes and rules of behaviour, as well as to a record of history spanning some seventeen hundred years.

Pashtunwali promotes self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, love, forgiveness, revenge and tolerance toward all (especially to strangers or guests). It is considered to be the personal responsibility of every Pashtun to discover and rediscover Pashtunwali's essence and meaning.

Although not exclusive, the following ten principles form the major components of Pashtunwali. They are headed with the words of the Pashto language that signify individual or collective Pashtun tribal functions: Melmastia (hospitality); Nanawatai (asylum); Badal (justice); Tureh (bravery); Sabat (loyalty); Imandari (righteousness); Isteqamat (trust in God); Ghayrat (courage); Namus (protection of women); and Nang (honour).

³⁸ Talcott Parsons, *The System of Modern Societies*, cit.

generally functions under the control of a large number of particular norms. It always involves a plurality of roles, although almost any major category of role is performed in a plurality of particular collectivities. However, social systems are comprised of combinations of these structural components. To be institutionalized in a stable fashion, collectivities and roles are "governed" by specific values and norms, whereas values and norms are themselves institutionalized only insofar as they are "implemented" by particular collectivities and roles.³⁹

Example: Afghanistan as study case.

Afghan society is based on durable social and cultural connections between groups (sub-systems) as part of a complex system. Afghanistan is home to a multiplicity of ethnic and linguistic groups, as well as several religious sects and other religions. Historic and geographic factors created and preserved this diversity although varying degrees of cultural assimilation continuously take place and a considerable degree of cultural homogeneity exists. Ethnicity means different things to different groups. Any simple classification is bound to have exceptions for an Afghan society that has never been static within fixed boundaries.

Tribal society organization (supra-system), in particular the Pashtun one, descends from a common ancestor, who is the reason for the relation between the subjects; the subjects are thought of as family groups and not individuals. Every group, as a sub-system, uses the identification term *qawm* to explain a complexity of affiliations, a network, of families or livelihood. Each has a rich density of meanings. Every individual belongs to a *qawm*, which provides protection from outside encroachment, support, security, and assistance, which can be social, political or economic. Frequently a village corresponds to a *qawm*, but it does not necessarily exist in a precise geographic setting. In a more restricted sense *qawm* refers to descent groups; in tribal areas *qawm* refers to a common genealogy from an extended family (*khori*), or clan (*khel*), to tribe (*millat*) or tribal confederation (*watan*). Most simply, *qawm* defines an individual's identity in his social world.

The *Pashtunwali* code (system of values, norms, collectivities, and roles) is the source of legitimacy of the tribal institutions. Knowledge and application of traditional norms is a responsibility of the elders (*spingiri*) and of the "wise

³⁹ Ibid.

individuals” who take part to the collective assemblies (*jirga* and *shurà*), the *jirgadar*.

The hierarchical organization of tribal groups is structured on concentric circles of solidarity (fig.1):

- The core group of Afghan tribal society is *khōr* (“home”, or “family”); a very close relationship that ties all the components of the family to the head of the family. It is based on loyalty among its members and respect for hierarchies.
- The second level is the *khel* (or *khankhel*) the «clan», composed of some *khōr* strongly linked by social and historical reasons. Usually it is led by a community representative (*malek*, or *walì*, or *wakel*) elected by the *jirgadar*.
- The third level is the *qawm*, which is the primary solidarity group; it is formed by more *khel* who are linked according to security, cooperation, source access, and opportunity reasons. The *qawm* defines the individual within his social environment.
- This is followed by the *millat* (nation, people or ethnic group), in which most *qawm* may be included.
- The *mamlakat* could be envisioned as the “country” of a people; it is the presence of a specific and defined extended community (without a formal geographic delimitation) which contributes to form the highest level of the group: the *watan*, translated by the term «homeland» of all Pashtuns.

Nota bene: In conclusion, what is fundamental to understand is the fact that loyalties and connections between and within the sub-systems are based on a bottom-up process; essentially for this reason, a communication process must follow a specific track based on these lines and connections between the (sub)systems, therefore avoiding an approach based on “modern institutional” lines of communication.




Figure 3.1: Afghan Pashtun tribal organization

Main Implications Concerning Social Sub-System's Environment

- *In order to communicate symbolically, individuals must have culturally organized common codes.*
- *The structure of social systems may be analyzed in terms of four types of independently variable components: values, norms, collectivities, and roles.*
- *Afghanistan as study case:*
 - (1) Afghanistan is home to a multiplicity of groups.*
 - (2) Tribal society organization (supra-system) descends from a common ancestor.*
 - (3) Pashtunwali code (system of values, norms, collectivities, and roles) is the source of legitimacy of the tribal institutions.*
- *The communication process must follow a specific track based on the lines and connections between the (sub) systems, avoiding an approach based on a "modern institutional" line of communication.*

1.2. Approach to social systems and local matters

A social systems perspective could provide the best theoretical basis for the application of the cross-cultural communication.

The adoption of systemic thinking – using the mind to recognize patterns, consider unity, and form some coherent wholeness – is considered useful in order to complete the picture of the social systems.⁴⁰

In brief, “Macro vs. Micro” and “Whole vs. Part” represent two different points of view in regard to social systems:

- The *Holistic Viewpoint* (where the whole determines the actions of its parts and the people are determined by society); implies “downward” causality
- The *Atomistic Viewpoint* (in which the whole is the sum of its parts and the persons determine the society); implies “upward” causality.

These two positions are important and powerful when applied to the task of deciding how to intervene in human behaviour. This duality has emerged as the historical distinction between “casework” and “community organization”, or as “individual change” vs. “social change”. Both positions are significant and should be considered when examining human affairs and going through local systems. An approach inspired (not exclusively) by the Atomistic viewpoint is recommended.

It is very important to be aware of the concept that each social system whether large or small, complex or simple, is simultaneously a part and a whole. A social unit is made up of parts (sub-systems) of which it is the whole (supra-system) while, at the same time, it is part of some larger whole (sub-systems). Therefore, any system is by definition both “part and whole”.

Furthermore, it is important to comprehend the system (supra or sub-system) which will be approached, identifying the perspective from which the *observer* (NATO operator) views, and analyzes the system and its environment. The idea of “part and whole” requires the observer to be aware of both the components of the sub-system and the supra-system in order to understand it adequately.

⁴⁰*Social Systems Theory. Human Behavior and the Social Environment*, Lecture Paper, California State University, in <http://www.csub.edu/>.

Exploring a system means being able to understand the dynamics of sub-systems and to be accepted within the system as observer or recognized counterpart in a constructive dialogic relationship. Schematically, a social system approach requires:

1. Definition of the social system object of the study;
2. Definition of the components that constitute the social system;
3. Definition of the significant environmental systems;
4. Definition of one's own position relative to the supra-system.

The basic "stuff" of a system is information and resources. System action can be understood as the movement of information:

- Within a system;
- Between a system and its environment.

What occurs in and between social systems in order to establish a cross-cultural communication are "transfers of information" and reciprocal trust between the external actor (observer, operator, and counterpart) and the sub-systems; in such circumstances, the cross-cultural communication must be based on the following operator's capabilities:

1. Competence;
2. Capacity for action;
3. Action;
4. Trust;
5. Power to take decision.

Finally, information collection is the effect of a positive communication activity and is derived from a variety of sources including the physical capacities of the members, social resources such as loyalties, shared sentiments, common values and resources from its environment. It should be kept in mind that an important source for personal appreciation is the recognition of one's status by society and one's colleagues in a group.

Systems and subsystems are permanently linked because each one is the reason for the existence of the others, according to the principle that the whole is the sum of the parts and the parts are recognized in their entity as elements of the whole. Recognition, respect, dynamics, economy, justice, and so forth are not separate entities; a system performs them at the same time. In any exchanges between the whole and its parts, all elements receive some input, results, advantage/disadvantage, and have some goals met.

The reciprocal nature of the transactions and exchanges should be kept in mind because interaction with a sub-system could have consequences affecting the equilibrium between sub-systems and supra-system (part and whole). If one function (or other dynamics) is always dominant, the other functions could be neglected, to the detriment of the total system.

It is important to consider the social (as well as the political and traditional) organization keeping in mind that organization is not synonymous with higher levels of complexity. Furthermore, the measure of effectiveness of the organization is its capacity to fulfil the system's goals, as well as the goals of its components.

Groups (within sub-systems) with problems are generally disorganized groups, and the reasons for this disorganization can emanate from internal dynamics and/or external forces; this could happen when:

1. The aspirations of one or more members is in opposition to supra/sub-system goals;
2. The elements of the system are disrupted or unclear;
3. The environment exercises a disorganizing influence on the system (oppression, injustice);
4. Access to sources is denied from the supra-system (unemployment, welfare benefits cut off);
5. External actor supports a group that creates a disadvantage for the others.

The NATO operator (as mediator) must be aware and has to be conscious about these topics and must be able to give an answer (if requested) contributing to the mediation process, or to a possible solution; always keeping in mind his external role and not putting himself in a factious (perceived or otherwise) position.

Finally, the NATO operator has to know who is who and who the individual with whom he has to speak is (see below, paragraph 3).

Main Implications Concerning The Approach To Social Systems and Local Matters

- *Social systems perspective could provide the best theoretical basis for the application of the cross-cultural communication.*

- *The “systemic thinking” approach is useful in seeking to complete an image of social systems.*
- *Each social system is simultaneously a part and a whole. A social unit is made up of parts (sub-systems) to which it is the whole (supra-system).*
- *Social system approach: comprehend the system which will be approached, identifying the perspective from which the mediator (NATO operator) observes. Schematically the approach requires:*
 - (1) Definition of the social system which is the object of the study;*
 - (2) Definition of the components that constitute the social system;*
 - (3) Definition of the significant environmental systems;*
 - (4) Definition of one’s own position relative to the supra-system.*
- *Cross-cultural communication must be based on the following mediator’s capabilities:*
 - (1) Competence;*
 - (2) Capacity for action;*
 - (3) Action;*
 - (4) Trust;*
 - (5) Power to make decisions.*
- *Keep in mind the reciprocal nature of the transactions and exchanges: conduct businesses with a sub-system could have consequences to the equilibrium between sub-systems and supra-system.*
- *The NATO representative has to know who is who and who the individual with whom he has to speak is.*

2. What NATO has to improve?

2.1. Socio-cultural analysis

Socio-cultural analysis is a primary concept based on cross-cultural competencies/abilities and an adequate intelligence process. Interaction, dialogue and communication between NATO elements and civilians require a specific set of cross-cultural knowledge and skills. Understanding how the local population

thinks and behaves can help NATO avoid making massive cultural mistakes and increase the chances of positive communication and operational impact.

Working, interacting and dealing with partners across cultures raises challenges and demands new attitudes and skills. Direct experience shows that without the right approach, cultural differences greatly reduce effectiveness in the early stages of a relationship. Active management of the intercultural communication process and a conscious effort to acquire new skills will drive to competitive advantage.

Because of the necessity of an in-depth socio-cultural analysis, it is necessary to expand cultural communication competencies/abilities and develop intelligence analysis processes.

2.1.1. Cross cultural communication competencies/abilities

The concept of cross-cultural competence is centered on the capability to understand and act in a culture different from one's own: it is a fundamental pillar for NATO military and civilian personnel who must interact with people from other cultures. Cross-cultural competence is a set of culture-general knowledge, and abilities developed through education, training, and experience that provide the ability to operate with efficacy within a culturally complex environment.

Cross-cultural competence can prove very advantageous, as it equips individuals with the necessary knowledge, abilities, and personal characteristics that enable them to operate effectively in culturally different situations. Furthermore, cross-cultural competence provides a conscious knowledge of a "culturally appropriate, adaptable mode", helping to mitigate undesirable outcomes by supporting critical skills, in particular for conflict resolution and communication. Recent events demonstrate how a lack of cross-cultural competence can provoke cultural misunderstanding and security problems (in particular Insider threats/green-on-blue attacks); these cultural mistakes continue to place NATO personnel at risk.

In contrast with the high level of technology that maximize the distance between military members and antagonists on the battlefield, the emergent nature of the NATO missions has increased the need for adaptive interpersonal interaction and capabilities. These kinds of employment often require close interaction between ground personnel and those from other cultural backgrounds. In these scenarios, the military need to communicate, negotiate,

and conduct local key-leader engagement is vital: NATO personnel must be able to proceed and respond appropriately to any situation.

Institutionalizing cross-cultural competence may require an organizational cultural change using multipronged approaches that comprise a number of cross-cultural resources, including:

1. Education and training;
2. Individual/unit-level assessments;
3. Information (at local and regional levels);
4. In progress research (info-collection) activity on the field.

2.1.1.1. 3M approach: three levels of analysis (Macro, Meso, Micro)

The concept level of analysis is a social sciences approach that points to the location, size, or scale of a research target. The “3M approach” is based on three levels of analysis: Macro-level, Meso-level, and Micro-level.

- *Macro-level analysis generally traces the outcome of interactions, such as economic or other resource transfer interactions over a large population.* Examples of macro-level units of analysis include the nation, the society in general, international relations and regional equilibriums. It is based on the systemic level of analysis, which explains outcomes from a system wide level that includes the state. It takes into account both the position of states in the international system and their interrelationships. The position of states constitutes the systemic *structural* level of analysis. This involves the relative distribution of power, such as that of states or alliances, great, mid-level, or small powers, and geopolitics. The interaction of states constitutes the systemic *process* level of analysis. At this level, we are concerned with which state or alliance aligns with which other state or alliance and which state or alliance negotiates with other states or alliances. It is a general topic that must be clear for all NATO strategic communications operators.
- *Meso-level analysis, in general, indicates a population size that falls between the Micro- and Macro-levels, such as a community, an organization or a regional group; it may also refer to analyses that are specifically designed to reveal connections between Micro- and Macro-levels.* Examples of Meso-level units of analysis

include clan, tribe, community, solidarity organizations, villages, towns, cities, formal organizations and state institutions. It is centered on the domestic level of analysis that locates causes in the character of the domestic system of specific states and organizations. Thus, conflict is caused by aggressive or warlike groups, not by evil, inept, or misguided people or the structure of power in the system. The failure of domestic institutions may also cause open conflict and war. . Domestic level cases may come from various characteristics of the domestic system. Stable and failed institutions are domestic level factors affecting state behavior; a failed state usually means an institutional breakdown at domestic level of analysis. Thus, we can explain the ongoing local/regional conflicts in terms of absence of capabilities and institutions able to prevent such conflicts; however, system wide institution does not always mean harmony among groups. It is a specific level that must be understood by all the NATO strategic communication operators, in particular the key-leaders, mediators, subjects involved in business with major local organizations and governmental institutions.

- *Micro-level is the smallest unit of analysis in the social sciences; it is the more important for cross-cultural communication. At the Micro-level (also Local-level), the subject typically is a small group of individuals in their social setting, or in a particular social context.* Examples of Micro-levels of analysis include local key-leaders, local relationships, families, local alliances, conflicts and dynamics. It is based on the analysis of the individual level, which identifies the influence on events that individual leaders or the immediate circle of decision-makers within a community or small group have. It focuses on human actors identifying the characteristics of human decision-making. For example, the cause of a local conflict could come from the particular leaders in power; a leader (or a would-be community leader) might be considered the source from which the cause originated. It may be that he seeks power to hide a sense of inferiority, or it may be his inability to understand the conflict dynamics, or he could have different interests. All of these possibilities are drawn from an individual level of analysis. It is the fundamental level that must be clear to all NATO operators, in particular the key-leaders, mediators, subjects involved in durable relationships with local

representatives and business activities based on direct communication.

From the basis of strategic communication planning, meso- and micro-levels are the most important categories upon which NATO should apply the cross-cultural competencies that will focus on the primary communication activities.

2.1.1.2. Understanding of local decision processes

The guiding principles of communication at all levels have to be developed to support local decision-making. This includes decisions made as part of the development of the Strategic Communication plan.

Local decisions should be made in the context of, and be consistent with, NATO goals, national policies and local priorities, prioritization processes and governance frameworks. Cross-cultural communication should create a linkage between all these elements.

In brief, NATO should:

- Support decision-making groups, with a clearly designated focus of accountability, which include a locally defined mix of members with the appropriate range of skills;
- Be aware about criteria for decision-making: demonstrate understanding and respect for the local decision-making procedures that allow recommendations to be developed through collaboration.

Furthermore, decisions should be based on the best available evidence, take into account the appropriate ethical frameworks and comply with basic requirements:

- NATO decisions-process in respect of local traditions and procedures;
- Take reasonable steps to engage with local stakeholders to help increase understanding of local priority;
- Clear communication with stakeholders;

- Communication about NATO policy and actions should include the processes, decisions and the rationale for decisions, while maintaining appropriate confidentiality;
- Establish assurance processes to monitor the application and performance of decision-making arrangements, and to enable learning to be incorporated into future process improvements.

Moreover, the goal of being aware of the local decision-making organizations is to provide a simple overview of how local government decision-making works. It addresses the key questions about local decision-making organizations processes, including:

- The unique aspects of collective decision-making – how decision-makers and the public determine which course of action best serves the community's interests.
- Who does what – the similarities and differences in the roles that villages, communities, cities and districts play in enacting policies and providing public services; the division of authority among village, town, city traditional or governmental institutions/organizations; the key decision-makers in local government and the role of the elders.
- How decisions are made – the unique rules that govern public agency decision-making, when public officials must step aside from the decision-making process, and the distinction between central governmental and traditional acts.

2.1.1.3 Understanding of dissent and criticism: read the social causes and the political consequences

Conflicts and wars are the origin of a variety of social ills, such as poverty, interethnic conflicts, widespread thievery and crime, among others.

In Afghanistan, for example, blood feuds continuing through generations are legendary, and revenge is regarded as a necessary redress of wrongs: the civil war has strengthened these tendencies. The ongoing civil war had continued to kill, wound, and displace thousands of civilians. Kabul has been largely without electricity since 1994. Water, phones, and sewage systems have been destroyed. Years of war have separated and impoverished extended families that traditionally cared for widows and fatherless children. Lastly the foreign military

presence, generally read as a military occupation, is characterized as the presence of soldiers who lack respect for the local culture, norms or traditions.

Dissent, protests and criticism against the foreign military presence usually have political, social and cultural origins. In line with a strict approach, some media and newspapers have reported very strict evaluations, as such as:

- ***“In Afghanistan, the Coalition has violently occupied the country for more than a decade”***; it has, as the former military commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal himself explained, ‘killed what he called an “amazing number” of innocent Afghans in checkpoint shootings’’.⁴¹ For example, demonstrators in Kabul in 2012 protested because the “Americans had violated cultural and religious traditions”.

Additional examples:

- ***“This is not just about dishonoring the Koran, it is about disrespecting our dead and killing our children,”*** said Maruf Hotak, 60, referring to an episode in Helmand Province when Coalition soldiers urinated on the dead bodies of men they described as insurgents and to a recent erroneous airstrike on civilians in Kapisa Province that killed eight young Afghans’’.⁴²
- ***“Foreigners are invaders, and jihad against foreigners is an obligation”*** said Abdul Sattar Khawasi, a **member of the Afghan Parliament**’’.⁴³

Absence of communication as well as the media’s influence on public opinions, both local and global, could support a sort of “fault line conflict” based on cultural divergence mixed with negative operational events; this result could drive the local population to receive a more amplified message of conflicts between the factions. This is, undoubtedly, a situation closed to any opportunity of dialogue: no prospect of communication between the actors is possible in a way characterized, on one hand, by a deficiency in strategic policy and, on the other hand, by shortcomings in cultural competences and assets. Thus, cross-

⁴¹ Gen. StanleyMcChrystal: *We’ve Shot ‘An Amazing Number’ Of Innocent Afghans*, Huffington Post, 2 April 2010, in http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/02/mcchrystal-weve-shot-an-a_n_523749.html.

⁴² Alissa J. Rubin, *Afghan Protests Over the Burning of Korans at a U.S. Base Escalate*, New York Times, 27th of February 2012, in http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/world/asia/koran-burning-in-afghanistan-prompts-second-day-of-protests.html?_r=0

⁴³ Ibidem.

cultural communication competence could contribute (in particular if combined with a strategic socio-political approach) in supporting cross-cultural communication (see Paragraph 2.2).

2.1.2. Adequate intelligence analysis process

In accordance with *NATO ACO Directive (Ad) 95-2* and *ACO Strategic Communications directive*, “an assessment of the information environment in which NATO is to conduct operations/activities is essential to inform effective Strategic Communication planning and delivery, involving all of the information disciplines as appropriate, and building upon their existing planning, analysis and assessment capabilities”.

In particular:

- Analysis of the information infrastructure, the cultural dimension, the key decision-takers and opinion-formers, and NATO’s own capabilities are necessary to plan and execute missions and operations.
- Strategic Communication planners should leverage all available open-source information, and Knowledge Development capabilities to develop an understanding of the information environment, potentially supplemented by contractor support.
- Analyzing potential audiences is important, as NATO/ACO must communicate to a variety of external audiences with differing interests and priorities. These range from conventional media, through IOs/NGOs and academia, to adversaries. External audience analysis and assessment capabilities are critical to the success of this process.⁴⁴

In order to make this activity successful, the implementation of an Operational and Cultural Network (OCN), as useful support for Intelligence purposes is recommended.

2.1.2.1. The Operational and Cultural Network (OCN)⁴⁵

The implementation of an Operational and Cultural Network (OCN), a graphical and digital construction would create the capability to categorize the

⁴⁴ACO Directive (Ad) 95-2 and ACO Strategic Communications (StratCom Process & Planning), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

⁴⁵Theoretical approach proposed by the Author of this contribution.

elements of a society in primary groups in accordance with their self-representation (supra-systems, systems and sub-systems). The proposed OCN would operate on the Macro, Meso, and Micro-analytical levels, focusing on each one in line through the process of socio-cultural analysis.

Each level represents a focal point for Strategic Communication.

The capabilities to be developed by the proposed OCN would be:

- Definition of the operational research fields (socio-cultural approach);
- Description of the subjects (systems and sub-systems) within the main levels (Macro, Meso, and Micro);
- Definition of the communication targets, both active and passive:
 1. Active: information collection and communication activities conducted by specialized personnel (specific socio-cultural approach); other than Intelligence branch activities, but in strict coordination with them;
 2. Passive: subject targets of the NATO strategic (but also operational and tactic) communication activity (elders, leaders, communities, etc.);
- Create an exhaustive database, which would serve to explain local alliances, conflicts and social dynamics;
- Generate a visual representation of the aforementioned alliances, conflicts and social dynamics upon which NATO must opportunely work with in order to achieve results, goals and, finally, accomplish the mission.

2.1.3. Understanding Local Decision Processes: Communication and Intelligence

It is necessary to invest in communication systems and capabilities to ensure that NATO will be informed and engaged in activities, decision making and local development processes. This participative and facilitative communication approach respects the capacity and capability to know where to go and how to get there. Robust local decision-making is all part of this approach and will assist in developing the cooperation and mutual support based on an appropriate cross-cultural communication activity.

NATO Strategic Communication operatives will need to be proactive rather than reactive to the challenges that effective cross-cultural communication will entail. These individuals will also have a responsibility to be active participants

in “local strategic” issues which help develop better approaches to planning, problem solving and reaching potential.

Concerning the intelligence process, cross-cultural competence offers knowledge, competencies, and abilities to promote effective comprehension of culturally complex situations. These include:

- Facilitating effective requirement determination, info-collection and analysis,
- Building effective interpersonal relationships with local populations and/or non-traditional/non-state actors and discern the intent of their leaders,
- Aiding partnership building with an array of GO/NGO to assist in promoting foreign country national security.

While socio-cultural analysis is a collection of techniques to enhance and discern the meaning of socio-cultural knowledge, cross-cultural competence represents a collection of capabilities that are necessary to increase the effectiveness of thinking/analytical techniques. Cultural sense-making and perspective-taking will aid in neutralizing cognitive and cultural bias that often influences the intelligence cycle, outcomes and products. Cultural priming represents one approach to mitigating bias through sense-making and perspective-taking. A comprehensive cross-cultural competence learning program (see next section) should be considered across the Intelligence Community to enhance and better facilitate the mission.⁴⁶

See Table 1, «*Understanding Local Decision Processes: Communication and Intelligence*».

Main Implications Concerning Socio-Cultural Analysis

- *Communication and intelligence process require cross-cultural knowledge because of the necessity of an in-depth socio-cultural analysis.*
- *Institutionalizing cross-cultural competence requires an organizational*

⁴⁶ See the contribution of James Stavridis, *To Know the World*, in Robert R. Greene Sands and Thomas J. Haines, «Promoting Cross-Cultural Competence in Intelligence Professionals. A new perspective on alternative analysis and the intelligence process», *Small Wars Journal*, April 2013, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/promoting-cross-cultural-competence-in-intelligence-professionals>.

cultural change using a multipronged approach comprised of:

- (1) Education and training;*
 - (2) Individual/unit-level assessments;*
 - (3) Information;*
 - (4) In progress research (info-collection) activity on the field.*
- *Implement the “3M approach”, based on the three levels of analysis:*
 - (1) Macro-level*
 - (2) Meso-level*
 - (3) Micro-level.*
 - *Dissent and criticism: understand the social causes and the political consequences.*
 - *Adequate intelligence analysis process supported by the Operational and Cultural Network (OCN):*
 - (1) Definition of the socio-cultural, and operational fields;*
 - (2) Description of the subjects within the 3M levels;*
 - (3) Definition of the communication targets;*
 - (4) Creation of a database designed to explain local dynamics;*
 - (5) Visual representation of local dynamics.*
 - *Cross-cultural competence:*
 - (1) Offers knowledge to promote comprehension of cultural situations;*
 - (2) Facilitates requirement determination, info-collection and analysis,*
 - (3) Builds effective interpersonal relationships,*
 - (4) Aids partnership building.*
 - *A comprehensive cross-cultural competence learning program should be developed across the Intelligence Community to enhance and better facilitate the mission.*

Understanding Local Decision Processes: Communication and Intelligence⁴⁷			
1.1. OUTCOME: Communication through effective understanding of the social-cultural environment and interaction with counterparts			
STRATEGY		ACTIONS	
1.1.1	Increase NATO operators' cultural awareness; in particular be aware of social and cultural organization and structure of the systems/sub-systems involved in cooperation activities.	1.1.1.1	Define the hierarchical structures, leaderships, the individuals/elders influence/role/position within the group/society drawing an operational-cultural network (OCN) map ("Who is who, and who is the counterpart") and understand individual role, responsibilities, power, influence (formal/informal).
		1.1.1.2	Acquire competences on social-political-traditional norms and show full respect for power rules.
		1.1.1.3	Identify the correct interlocutor (in line with point 0.1.1.1).
		1.1.1.4	Plan the schedule according to local times (respect of local decision-making procedures and times).
		1.1.1.5	Participate in collective discussions concerning cooperation between NATO and local community expressing and underlining NATO intents, goals and mission.
		1.1.1.6	Communicate with respect for social traditions and roles.
1.1.2	Prepare well trained and competent groups of specialist in cross-cultural communication (academics, militaries, specialists, etc.).	1.1.2.1	Before deployment basic and advanced cultural training and ongoing (in theatre) training on the field.
		1.1.2.2	Interpreter vs. translator: adopt a cultural mediator as conflict preventer (well trained, briefed, and extremely conscientious about his / her mission and role).

⁴⁷ Scheme derived from the "Kingborough Council Strategic Delivery Plan" 2010-2015.

2.1. OUTCOME: Engaged and informed community sectors			
STRATEGY		ACTIONS	
2.1.1	Create partnerships and dialogues with local communities and support residents to work for collective solutions to community needs (in agreement with local norms, traditions and rules).	2.1.1.1	Survey residents, elders and power groups on their views regarding community engagement and priorities for community involvement.
		2.1.1.2	Support the operations and activities of local (formal and informal) organizations and institutions.
		2.1.1.3	Investigate options for new approaches for community partnerships.
		2.1.1.4	Sustain the Community Participation Strategy, which supports the concept of local action and external cooperation.
2.1.2	Ensure that cooperation organization services are accessible and responsive and information is available to meet community needs and expectations	2.1.2.1	Monitor and evaluate cooperation organizations service standards including the management of community requests in conjunction with Action 1.2.1.3 <i>Communication approach</i> .
		2.1.2.2	Regularly review cooperation activity information strategies to ensure those with special needs are able to access a reasonable level of support.
2.1.3	Encourage the community to be engaged in local decision-making processes (according to local traditional, formal, religious norms and rules).	2.1.3.1	In conjunction with the development of Action 1.2.1.3 <i>Communication Approach</i> and Action 1.1.1.4 <i>Community Participation Strategy</i> , implement an awareness campaign to increase participation in local discussions and activities.
2.2. OUTCOME - Effective communication approach and inclusive, balanced consultation process			
STRATEGY		ACTIONS	
2.2.1	Increase community awareness and understanding of cooperation organizations and ensure locals and	2.2.1.1	Review the effectiveness of current communication approach and services including participation to local community assemblies.
		2.2.1.2	Develop a comprehensive

	elders are provided with relevant information in a range of channels and formats to meet their needs.		understanding of local communication needs to reflect the profile and diversity of the NATO personnel (operators).
		2.2.1.3	Develop and implement a NATO Communication Strategy, which addresses principles and protocols for communication and offers a multifaceted approach to communication tools and channels (traditional and technologic).

2.3. OUTCOME - Local relevance and influence

STRATEGY		ACTIONS	
2.3.1	Promote NATO interests and aims through participation and cooperation in key local and regional initiatives.	2.3.1.1	Actively participate in the local councils, assembly, and activities and support the development and implementation of local strategies, including planning and development, physical infrastructure, economic development, environmental performance and social well being.
		2.3.1.1	Actively support the local leaderships and the commitment to the partnership agreements between central government, local institutions and NATO forces.
2.3.2	Promote the concept of resource sharing to deliver cost effective services to the community.	2.3.2.1	Explore opportunities for resource sharing with other communities (groups/sub-systems) and other relevant organizations on key strategic initiatives.
2.3.3	Support partnerships and cooperation with other institutions of GO/NGO to ensure the vision of NATO mission can be achieved.	2.3.2.2	Actively research and develop opportunities for initiating joint projects.
		2.3.2.3	Develop and maintain strong networks and communication channels with other institutions of government.

2.4. OUTCOME - Strong local decision making and delivery

STRATEGY		ACTIONS	
2.4.1	Encourage local representatives to participate in the activities	2.4.1.1	Incorporate local engagement in decision-making opportunities in the <i>Community Participation Strategy</i> ,

	and decisions involving (directly or indirectly) communities their areas.		Action 1.1.1.4.
2.4.2	Increase opportunities for the participation of local people in local decision-making processes and community life.	2.4.2.2	Implement the NATO StratCom Plan.
2.4.3	In accordance with security standards and NATO policy, ensure decision-making processes involving locals are accessible and available to the community.	2.4.2.3	As part of the <i>Community Participation Strategy</i> Action 1.1.1.4 review the options for community meetings and forums (assemblies).
		2.4.2.4	Conduct public meetings/forums/assemblies in local areas that focus on local issues of interest.
2.5. OUTCOME - Fair and just statutory compliance administration			
STRATEGY		ACTIONS	
2.5.1	Support best practice governance standards in the delivery of statutory and community responsibilities.	2.5.1.1	Develop systems that facilitate continuous improvement in NATO operations and services.
		2.5.1.2	Confirm (or not) that all legal requirements are being met.
		2.5.2.3	Support the development of associated procedures for their effective implementation.
2.5.2	Support all legislative changes which impact on the local government.	2.5.2.1	Support review and update governance and corporate policies and procedures to encompass changing legislative and statutory requirements.
2.5.3	Support the promotion of a sense of a fair and just statutory compliance administration with the community through a commitment to open and accountable decision-making.	2.5.3.1	Support and maintain policies on decision-making, corporate ethics and code of conduct arrangements that uphold the StratCom Plan core values.
2.6. OUTCOME - Forward planning and leadership			

STRATEGY		ACTIONS	
2.6.1	Ensure NATO activities are in agreement with official procedures.	2.6.1.1	Develop and maintain an integrated tactical and operational planning process.
		2.6.1.2	Develop a long term asset management plan based on a step-by-step approach.
2.6.2	Ensure NATO's strategic and operational communication planning process continues to be well-informed and reflective of community needs and aspirations.	2.6.2.1	Develop appropriate strategies for effective consultation processes through the <i>Community Participation and Communication Approach</i> , Actions 1.1.1.4 and 1.2.1.3
3.1. OUTCOME – Adequate intelligence process based on socio-cultural analysis			
STRATEGY		ACTIONS	
3.1.1	Verify that NATO operational intelligence planning process at the tactical level continue to be reflective of NATO's strategic needs and goals.	3.1.1.1	Create the OCN (Action 0.1.1.1): Knowledge of the terms and names (structure/composition) is the way to understand the socio-political net based on the concept of social groups (family, clan, sub-clan, social status, etc..).
		3.1.1.2	Create a OCN database paying attention to phonetic transposition (one way to read and spell names and personal data avoid repeating the same subjects, etc.).
		3.1.1.3	Define the insurgency nature: evolution (ongoing) of the phenomena and the role of the supra-tribal ideology and traditional structures.
3.1.2	Promoting Cross-Cultural competences in Intelligence Professionals (Strategy 0.1.1).	3.1.2.1	Plan training in advanced cultural activities (Actions 0.1.2.1)
		3.1.2.2	Promote an open information sharing approach: common know-how and competences.
		3.1.2.3	Introduce a new perspective on alternative analysis and the intelligence process.
3.1.3	Distinguish "local conflicts"	3.1.3.1	Adopt an in-depth social-cultural

	from “insurgency”.		analysis approach.
		3.1.3.2	Change approach to conflicts, from “tribal” to “local”: understand local dynamics case by case, step by step, building the ongoing cultural mosaic.
		3.1.3.3	Define the boundaries of the three levels of analysis (Macro, Meso, Micro = Strategic, Operational, Tactical).
		3.1.3.4	Comprehend dissent and criticism: read social causes and political consequences from different points o view (political, military, social, economical, religious, etc.)
3.1.4	Distinguish “local insurgency” from “external elements” and local “reasons from “external ideologies”.	3.1.4.1	Resolve “local problems” in order to avoid influences and linkages with external pressures and manipulation.
3.1.5	Adopt the “intelligence of the name” method.	3.1.5.1	Focus on the knowledge of the individual and social “name construction” and meaning: it’s the way to build the map of the socio-political net.
		3.1.5.2	Define local and regional alliances and conflicts in accordance with the position of the “subject” within the OCN.

Table 3.1: *Understanding Local decision processes*

2.2. How to do it? A brief guideline for a cross-cultural communication training model

*2.2.1. Micro-strategy cross-cultural communication approach: Cultural Awareness Program*⁴⁸

NATO components deployed in areas of operations need adequate cultural skills in order to approach to different cultures. A “Micro-strategy cross-cultural approach”⁴⁹ – a mix of bottom-up and top-down processes – is the result of a conscious commitment to prepare military personnel with specific and defined cultural *criteria* required to operate efficaciously. This section (the starting point for a critical discussion) will focus on a socio-cultural approach methodology to the contemporary asymmetric battlefield and in support of the intelligence process.

A “Micro-strategy” approach could achieve long-term objectives through individual effort; it could also obtain a balance with some limitations on the classic military approach.

2.2.1.2. Changing approach: from “tribal” to “local”:

Particular attention has been given to changing the erroneous perception of cultural areas, here defined as “local” instead of “tribal” (see table 1, Actions 2.1.3.2). A change in approach to conflicts is necessary; this entails evaluating local dynamics case by case, step by step, in order to build an ongoing cultural mosaic.

The “simplified tribal approach” contributes to several counterproductive results obtained in conflicts resolutions activities: the dynamics of socio-cultural areas are “local”, and as “local” should be approached because unconscious ignorance of local cultures is the origin of the lack of ability in communication, or in key leaders engagement activities.

A Micro-strategy cross-cultural approaches program (Cultural Awareness Program) is based on a basic cultural training set on complementary study-

⁴⁸ This section is derived from a previous article published by the Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS): C. Bertolotti, *Counterinsurgency and «micro-strategy» approach. Societies, Cultures and Conflicts of Contemporary Afghanistan: beyond the “cultural awareness” course*, Military Centre for Strategic Studies, CeMiSS, Rome 2011.

⁴⁹ Approach introduced by the Author to Italian advisor teams in Afghanistan (Omlt/Mat/Pat). Test phase applied to contingents Omlt XI, XII and XIII, Mat/Pat/OCCAT from 2009 to 2013 (in progress).

modules of specific theoretical lectures, which is accompanied by Academics (anthropologists, sociologists, historians, specialists in local languages, etc.) and the contribution of scientists (MA/PhD) for basic and advanced training; further step is the learning phase in “theater” (*on the field-ongoing learning*) followed by a fully-critical sharing of experiences and, finally, the “experiences-reports analysis” and the “training standards revision”⁵⁰ (See Fig. 2).



Figure 3.2: Cultural training cycle

2.3. Cross-cultural competence training

A change in teaching methodology – top-down process and bottom-up development – mainly academic supported by role games and simulations, and availability of “end of mission” experience reports should be a primary focus of cross-cultural competence training.

At the end of a complete cycle of cultural training, an operator will be able to understand the cultural area in an historical, social and geopolitical context; in particular he will be able to:

- Apply an appropriate approach to local cultures;

⁵⁰ These preliminary activities took about a year – first phase of planning, study, field research and use of techniques as *focus group* and semi-structured interviews – and a second experimental phase lasting a further year – courses, lessons, discussions, and analysis.

- Understand local dynamics, social and operating contexts;
- Improve his knowledge through direct interaction (*on the field-going learning*);
- Recognize the struggle for "local power" from the activity of insurgents;
- Contribute to the intelligence process;
- Provide immediate feedback to improve the later stages of cultural training.

In brief, this training method is structured on:

1. Basic cultural training (all personnel)
2. Advanced cultural training (key specialists – Cultural Advisors)
3. Ongoing (on the field) training (all personnel)

2.3.1. Cultural Awareness Program (CAP) and Cultural advisor

The goal of the CAP program is the individual risk reduction connected with cultural miscomprehension thanks to the support of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs): sociologists, anthropologists, ethnologists, psychologists, historians, linguistic mediators, etc. A key figure useful during the training phase pre-deployment and, eventually as “on the field” will be a Subject Matter Expert (a Special Cultural advisor).

2.3.1.1. Essential aims of the project:

The project will produce the following main outcomes:

- Improve adequate and standard cultural skills:
 1. Implement a communication system based on acquired information, in order to obtain outcomes at strategic level.
 2. Capability to manage the communication plan in order to obtain general consensus.
- Improve personnel safety through a not-kinetic method;
- Problem solving: conflict understanding, prevention and containment;
- Obtain an adequate staff capacity about socio-cultural interpretation and understanding, both in planning and operational phases;

1. Improving a safe approach to the operational environment (through dialogue and correct communication strategy);
 2. Conflict prevention/containment;
 3. Protect and respect traditional aspects and local cultural systems through correct management of acquired information;
 4. Reduce the level of risk, direct or indirect, deriving from an inappropriate socio-cultural approach (physical security risks).
- Adopting the professional figure of the “on the field SME”⁵¹ (Special Cultural Advisor at Brigade/Battalion level) will make it possible to obtain the following results:
 1. Optimize the operators cultural capacity;
 2. Define potential political and social developments;
 3. Understand cultural context with immediacy, in order to prevent risks and assess each situation;

2.3.1.2. Learning methodology

The methodology which the project is based upon includes the following procedures:

- Training: individual/team including lectures, conferences, workshops, role-plays and focus-groups;
- Multidisciplinary approach to cultural environment (sociology, anthropology, psychology, geopolitics, strategy, economy, media – including Psy-ops).
- Continuous updating and distance learning MCOOS (Massive Open Online Course).

2.3.1.3. “On the field” SME’s capabilities and requirements

- High professional and cultural background (MA/PhD);
- “Gender” operational capacity (the presence of women specialists is required);

⁵¹ The professional figure of the “on the field SME” is not intended to be a substitute or surrogate of the Human Terrain System project, but a more flexible support and advisor to decisional processes, planning phases and commander/operator’s general needs.

- Ability to contribute to the intelligence process (analysis) and operations planning.

2.3.1.4. Cross-cultural training and CAP effects

Training outcomes are articulated in regard to actions that will have positive effects on the mission and goals over the short, medium and long term. As a result the CAP will be able to facilitate positive outcomes at all levels; in brief:

- At tactical-operational levels: enhancement of a cultural approach that improves the ability to understand the local dynamics, in order to reduce the level of risk (including staff physical security); promotion and use of the "reading of the socio-cultural context" approach;
- At the strategic level: knowledge of local and regional dynamics in order to better understand and assess wide ranging and long term developments.
- At the political-institutional level: desirable working relationships between GO and NGO.
- At the academic level: the best use and sharing of resources, tools, available technology and scientific-academic products (publications, databases, research and analysis, etc.).

What is being proposed is a process of cultural training standardization through *e-learning* activities (basic and advanced phases) integrated by seminars, lectures and conferences; in brief, these project activities are intended to:

- Reduce the "cultural gap" and "cultural shock";
- Limit direct and indirect risks for operatives;
- Accomplish the mission.

The implementation of this project will produce cultural knowledge for operational purposes. Furthermore, it will be useful in regard to the establishment of the OCN (see para. 2.1.2.1).

Main Implications Concerning the Cross-Cultural Communication Training Model

- *Micro-strategy cross-cultural communication approach:*
 - (1) *A mix of bottom-up and top-down processes;*
 - (2) *Result of a conscious commitment to prepare military personnel;*
 - (3) *Specific and defined cultural criteria required to operate efficaciously;*
 - (4) *Long-term objectives through individual effort;*
 - (5) *A balance with the limits of the classic military approach.*

- *Changing approach: from “tribal” to “local”.*
- *Change the erroneous perception of the cultural areas.*
- *Standardize cultural training and knowledge.*
- *(Cultural Awareness Program) Micro-strategic cross-cultural approach program is based on the principle of “top-down process and bottom-up development”, in brief:*
 - (1) *A basic cultural training system based on complementary study-modules and advanced interactive seminars;*
 - (2) *On the field on-going learning;*
 - (3) *A fully-critical sharing of experiences;*
 - (4) *Analysis of experience reports and “training standards revision”.*

- *Expected outcomes:*
 - (1) *Appropriate approach to local cultures;*
 - (2) *Understanding of local dynamics, social and operating context;*
 - (3) *Improve knowledge through direct interaction;*
 - (4) *Recognize the struggle for “local power” from activities of insurgencies;*
 - (5) *Contribute to intelligence process;*
 - (6) *Immediate feedback to improve the later stages of cultural training.*

3. Conclusions and recommendations

3.1. Expand Cross-Cultural communication competences

In order to be able to clearly understand the dynamics characterizing the contemporary battlefield, the expansion of cultural communication competence/ability and the development of the intelligence analysis process are necessary. Thus, it is important to:

- Invest in cross-cultural competence training;
- Implement an Operational and Cultural Network (OCN), in support to Intelligence activity.

Furthermore, the comprehension of systems/sub-systems dynamics and communication process, and how to communicate across cultures is vital: this is fundamental to build “cultural intelligence”. In particular:

- Subsystems are the subject NATO needs to communicate with in order to obtain success in the mission.
- Social systems understanding requires analyze it in terms of:
 1. Values,
 2. Norms,
 3. Collectivities,
 4. Roles.

Connections between and within the sub-systems are based on a bottom-up process and top down dynamics (and *vice versa*).Consequentially, a communication process must follow a specific track based on the lines and connections between the (sub)systems, seeking to avoid the adoption of an approach based on “modern institutional” lines of communication.

- The transition from war to peace and the more general conflict resolution process requires a comprehensive cross-cultural communication approach supported by NATO because it would facilitate discussion amongst communities and diverse civil society sectors about their relationship with the central government as well as the future relations between diverse groups (meant as systems and sub-systems). A political settlement without significant progress on these dimensions is unlikely to produce a

consensus supporting conflict resolution and sustainable peace, or, in other words, NATO missions and goals.⁵²

A comprehensive cross-cultural communication process in NATO's areas of operations requires a much more deliberate design than currently exists. Some topics that must be emphasized through an effective communication process are:

- Local communities have to be involved in all the decision-making processes in order to create an ongoing mechanism and forum for identifying key issues, work and activities with the NATO counterpart.
- Local governments, as well as local civil society, have to be involved and supported in the design of a comprehensive conflict solution process based on permanent dialogue.
- The local government, civil society and NATO (as well as the international community) could invest time in training by technical support teams on principled negotiation and mediation processes through cross-cultural communication.

Furthermore, cross-cultural communication is the sum of courses of action which are based on, and utilize, the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture of identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation or promote national interests. *The establishment of a dialogue (resulting from a positive cross-communication effort) and the conduct of business with a sub-system could have consequences to the equilibrium between sub-systems and supra-system.*

In conclusion, cross-cultural communication:

- Must be based on the principle of the smart-power, soft-power and cultural approach as part of the conflict solution;
- Has to be a tool to change the conflict approach with a cultural approach; in brief, cross-cultural communication should be a means (a tool), not the end (aim);
- Should bring people together and build a bridge between different cultures, positions, opinions;
- Finally, it could support (but not substitute) the classic approach to military operations.

⁵² See Lisa Schirch, *Afghan Civil Society and a Comprehensive Peace Process*, Peace Brief n. 99, United States Institute of Peace, 21 July 2011.

3.2. Additional recommendations

The topics presented in this section are intended to illustrate a proposal with limited costs and able to apply value to available sources (both inside and outside NATO) while limiting direct and indirect risks to the safety of the operators in the field while enabling them to accomplish the mission.

- In regard to cultural training, in addition to the role of the SMEs in cultural training activities during the pre-deployment phases, it is recommended that, as needed, the employment of “on the field” SMEs (as special cultural advisors) should take place. Doing so may guarantee adequate and continued support to ongoing operational activities.
- The special contribution of SMEs will be the acquisition of additional information useful for the support and facilitation of the planning and decisional process as well as responding to operational developments.
- The advisory activity and analytical support of SMEs in the field will contribute to the assessment and evaluation of the pre-employment training activity, in an attempt to avoid deficiencies in cross-communication skills and competence.
- In addition, the analyses and assessments provided by SMEs will contribute to the intelligence process. Such analyses, systematically recorded, will then contribute to the creation of the aforementioned OCN, which will be implemented as the result of the *information sharing* policy.

In conclusion, a final consideration is offered. Correct and complete assessments, advice and analyses are based on the access to reliable, inclusive and extended information. For this reason it would be useful to:

- Guarantee access to information (unclassified and classified) to academics, researchers, scholars and to all the SMEs able to contribute to NATO missions;
- Avoid the over-classification of recorded data, information and reports, in order to make them available to a large number of SMEs;
- Revise the policy regarding the SMEs access to classified information: possibly declassify data, information and reports essential for socio-cultural analysis and social research.

Recommendations

- Expand Cross-Cultural communication competences:
 - (1) Invest in cross-cultural competence training;
 - (2) Implement an Operational and Cultural Network
 - (3) Necessary to comprehend systems/sub-systems dynamics and communication processes
- Cross-cultural communication:
 - (1) Based on smart-power, soft-power and cultural approach;
 - (2) A tool to change the conflict approach with a cultural approach;
 - (3) Bringing people together;
 - (4) Support (but not substitute) classic approach to military operation.
- Cultural Awareness Program (CAP) and Cultural advisor:
 - (1) Individual risk reduction
 - (2) "On the field" Subject Matter Expert (a Special Cultural advisor)
- "On the field" SME's capabilities and requirements:
 - (1) High professional and cultural background;
 - (2) "Gender" operational capacity;
 - (3) Contribute to the intelligence process
- Learning methodology:
 - (1) Basic and advanced Training;
 - (2) Multidisciplinary approach to cultural environment;
 - (3) Distance learning MCOOS (Massive Open Online Course).

CHAPTER 4

DYNAMICS OF THE LOCAL SITUATION

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1. Introduction

The Human Aspect of the Operational Environment (HAOE) encompasses actors and factors that military forces need to understand and/or influence to effectively support the host nation. Opponents seek to maximize these same elements via lethal and non-lethal mechanisms.

Understanding the plethora of contemporary, human local dynamics in theatre is therefore a critical component of a successful operation and a stable peace. Despite the salience of this analysis, there is no clear HAOE doctrine to define and frame dynamics of the local situation.

This lacuna adversely impacted operations in UNOSOM in the 1990s, recent efforts in Libya, NATO ISAF COIN missions, as well as others. Although these lessons highlight the need for planning that embraces a clear understanding of local dynamics in the HAOE, the slow pace of institutional change endemic to large political and military entities is also quite problematic. This is particularly relevant given that other actors in theatre do not share the same encumbrances and adapt quickly to fluid dynamics.

Macro-level changes in contemporary conflicts and wars also impact the local situation. The vast majority of twenty-first century conflicts no longer mirror dynamics of the Westphalian, state-centric wars that have been analyzed by academics as well as political and military leaders. It took 300 years since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to establish 50 states. Since 1948, however, the amount of countries has quadrupled.⁵³ Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority have fragile institutions with little evidence their process will be any faster or smoother than the previous countries' development.

In addition, there is now also a preponderance of local, regional, and global actors at the sub-, national-, and supra-national levels who effectively impact the conduct and termination of war. Their transnational reach is coupled with their ability to maximize the ever-changing technological advancements of this digital age. As a result, it is quite difficult to understand and thwart their efforts. Adding to this complexity, many of these groups evolve and devolve; employ different strategies and tactics; take shape in various organizational structures; hold legitimacy among passive and active supporters alike; provide para- or proto-state governance when a government cannot or will not; and effectively use technology to communicate, attack, organize, recruit, retain and influence other actors to include nation states.⁵⁴

Concomitantly, a mushrooming of international and non-governmental organizations (NGO), corporations, and international organizations (IGOs) in theatre also contribute to the fog of war. This additional layer of complexity is apparent in collection activities related to intelligence as well as to the

⁵³ Itamara Lochard, *Understanding Low Governance States: A quantitative and qualitative assessment of armed groups, governance and intrastate conflict*, Medford, MA: Jebesen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2004; Itamara Lochard, "Non-State Armed Groups in Cyber-Conflict: Goals, organization and relationships," paper presented at the *U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense Highlands Forum*, the Aspen Wye River Plantation, Maryland, April 2008; Itamara Lochard, *Non-State Armed Groups and the Dynamics of the Local Situation*, Working Paper, Oradea, Romania: Human Aspects of the Operational Environment Project, NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence, October 2012.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

development of other organizations such as Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) bodies. Their impact on the local situation must be factored into any effective post-conflict, stabilization planning. For instance, the number of NGOs and IGOs has increased by a factor of 300 and 10, respectively, in only a few decades.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the impact of transnational corporations (TNCs) operating in many fragile states is also a factor. The top 50 TNCs had greater budgets than three-quarters of existing states in 2006.⁵⁶ Yet, despite their relevance, most non-state actors are not reflected in international laws and are frequently not considered in traditional intelligence analyses.

An understanding of the challenges faced by multinational forces also merits consideration. Disturbances posed by short rotation cycles, various levels of clearances, and the potential to impact the economic and societal fabric of the host nation cannot be overstated and require extreme vigilance. In addition, there are complexities due to language and translation/interpretation issues, which are not only apparent in the multinational nature of the cadre of forces but also can be seen when dealing with a local population. Finally, there is also friction caused by various types of military cultures within one nation as well as among multiple ones operating in theatre.

Other key changes in contemporary crises which impact the local dynamics are the 'net-speed' environment in which operations take place. The decrease of seasoned reporters to meet the demands of the 24-hour/7-day per week news cycle as well as the role of social media has changed the definition and impact of 'live news', 'weapon', and 'enemy'. This places a greater onus on leaders to evaluate and respond to events quickly and appropriately to manage the contagion effect. In addition, more senior leaders must rely on younger, more technically adept staff that do understand technological threats but are not seasoned enough to make appropriate decisions. The increased interconnectedness of this information era equally helps friendly and enemy non-state actors who can more easily coordinate operations and finance activities undetected. Furthermore, this cyber age also affords non-state armed groups a reach that used to be relegated only to states.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Lochard, 2004, 2008, October 2012; Lesley Simm, *"Competing Narratives, Identities and Loyalties"* Working Paper, Oradea, Romania: Human Aspects of the Operational Environment Project, NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence, October 2012; Haaris Ahmad, *"Strategic Factors in the Dynamics of the Local Situation"*, Working Paper, Oradea, Romania: Human Aspects of the Operational Environment Project, NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence, October 2012.

This first half of this chapter seeks to provide a blueprint of the crucial components that comprise the dynamics of the local situation which need to be incorporated into NATO planning and operations. This requires an analysis of how narrative and identity in multiple locales has become a salient aspect is conducted. In addition, the need to assess the nature of conflict in the information age must be factored to include social media, strategic communications, as well as both official and unofficial information flows. Third, the economic footprint of operations on the local environment must be considered.

The second half of the chapter focuses on mechanisms that can best assist in analyzing the human elements in emerging local dynamics. For instance, understanding the organizational structure of non-state armed groups is critical. Likewise, employing ASCOPE (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events) to supplement traditional analysis is advocated. Furthermore, elements of Social Cultural Analysis (SOCINT) and Social Network Analysis (SNA) are defined and presented as under-utilized tools that can provide an effective mechanism to understanding the connection between and among apparently murky structures and changing actors. Recommendations on how and when to best implement these mechanisms are provided.

Implications:

- *The slow pace of institutional change is problematic.*
- *Since 1948 the number of nation-states has quadrupled; most have fragile institutions whose development and progress is unlikely to be smooth*
- *The preponderance of local, regional and global actors at various levels may effectively impact the conduct and termination of war. The digital age has enhanced their transnational reach, while their constant evolution and devolution in various levels of complexity add to the difficulty of understanding their strategy and tactics in order to thwart them.*
- *Non-state actors also contribute to the fog of war, making their impact on the local situation a critical component of effective post-stabilization planning. Because international law rarely reflects the activities of non-*

state actors, they are not often considered in traditional intelligence analyses.

- *Challenges faced by multinational forces must be taken into consideration.*
- *Present day operations take place in a 'net-speed' environment, which requires leaders to evaluate and respond to events swiftly in order to manage the contagion effect. Both friendly and enemy elements can benefit from the ability to coordinate operations or finance activities without detection.*

2. Key Components of the Dynamics of the Local Situation

The logical starting point to drafting an effective doctrine is to identify the components that require assessment. Some generic information can be found in various aspects of the operational area as such culture, religion, history, economy, infrastructure, political factors, technology, geography/terrain, as well as assessments on centre of gravity ecosystems, neighbours, competing narratives, concepts of identity, loyalty, among other elements. However, the spectrum of variables is extensive and can vary widely from one locale to another. In addition, each of these factors is interlaced by a multitude of actors and elements, creating a highly complex system. Continuous analysis is therefore warranted. In particular, three components are key to understanding and predicting major aspects in the dynamics of the local situation that relate to NATO operations.

In addition to conducting layered assessments prior to an operation, recognizing that influence from abroad in the form of states, proxies, Diaspora populations, NGOs, corporations, international organizations, non-state armed groups, as well as lone actors is key.

Moreover, understanding various actors' goals, interactions between and among them, their organizational patterns, and levels of legitimacy within a population is required. Factoring the impact of regional and transnational trends

and actors on local actors is also necessary. Another central component is assessing who does or does not have access to various media, communication, and technology – to include both official and unofficial information flows.⁵⁸

2.1. Competing Narratives, Identities, and Loyalties⁵⁹

As NATO has moved towards complex operations beyond members' territories, there is the recognition that the Alliance must be prepared to respond across the full spectrum of intervention scenarios *"...that not only apply to the prevention and mediation of conflict but also extends to the stabilization of environments emerging from, or still in, violent conflict, in order to support recovery and provide a platform for political, economic and social progress."*⁶⁰ According to the Oxford Dictionary definition, a narrative is *"a spoken or written account of connected events in order of happening"*. Understanding the nature of the narratives that cascade from elites to local communities and vary according to the nature of governance can help guide the management of influence and message. Furthermore, although ideally civil authorities should take the lead, in the event of state collapse, or in the absence of a legitimate civil authority, it is important to recognize that the military takes on the role of enabler.

"The success of both civil and military activities is determined in the cognitive realm and is a function of key target perception".⁶¹ This requires the Alliance be able to identify aspects that comprise the local facets of narrative, and appropriately manage that sense of shared identity, belonging, and loyalty.

*In order to be effective, it is thus critical that the Alliance's narrative be framed in a manner that the target population understands. According to multiple surveys, Afghans do not understand why the NATO is there despite the existence of the Alliance's detailed efforts to explaining its presence in Afghanistan. Simply, NATO's narrative document does not mesh with the target population's notion of the world.*⁶²

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Simm, October 2012.

⁶⁰ NATO, "Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter Insurgency AJP-3.4.4," 0012, February 2011, 0107.

⁶¹ NATO, "Allied Joint Doctrine, COIN 0111-0112."

⁶² William Reeve, a veteran BBC World Service correspondent in Afghanistan, fluent in Dari and Pashto, friend to Taliban and Afghan government figures, has asserted in multiple venues that Afghans have said they want security above all else over the last three decades. In general, they are not aware of

This highlights an inherent dichotomy in the manner in which various regions developed which should be considered when developing future narratives. For Alliance countries the idea of ‘the people’ as a unified force overrode the regional and the local, suppressing diverse languages and cultures in the interests of a national narrative. This has been the lens through which we have viewed and measured ‘the other’ across the world. However, this progression of events is not universal. Elsewhere, oral history, local, communal memories, family/tribal accounts, and narratives are more deeply embedded, rooted, and more enduring than any other recent imposition of state boundaries in the Westphalian or international model. In such locales, these are the narratives that are most important in understanding people and place in the event of military interventions. They are also the narratives and loyalties that can be manipulated to challenge security and stability, or managed to create a permissive environment for dialogue, co-operation and consent which can be lost as well as won.⁶³

The impact of how ‘human rights’ is defined, enforced, and policed by nations in the international community is also a factor. Even though there are fundamental shared values, however, in large parts of the world lip service is paid to human rights. The perceived ‘imposition’ of western values can cause incomprehension and resentment. For instance, gender roles vary greatly across nations. In addition, often the solution to a crisis is portrayed as a separation of religion and politics via the creation a civil, secular, state. However, this is contradictory to organizational structure of devout Muslim countries. Another conflating issue is that these concepts of democratic process and the rule of law are transmitted to the local community level through the very same media that has contributed to radicalization and violent mobilization.⁶⁴

In addition, there are some commonalities to consider such as notions of patriotism and groups identifying with the nation through a construction of a communal, collective past. There are recognisable themes and subjects of

dynamics beyond their borders, have not fully registered the impact of 9/11, have a loose attachment to any idea of centralised authority, and are a largely illiterate tribal society; Simm, October 2012

⁶³ For instance, the impact of operational blunders in the war against the Taliban, high casualty cost to the Afghan civilian population and the immediate, opportunistic influence exploitation by the Taliban, drastically undermined consent and support both for the National government and for ISAF. See the UK PCRU *“Hot Stabilisation: Helping Countries Recover from Violent Conflict”* May 2007; Simm, October 2012.

⁶⁴ Simm, October 2012.

national history, with stories of sacrifice, endurance, struggle, pain, and pride made concrete by the erection of monuments, commemoration on currency, road names, national days, and remembered events that reach back centuries to reinforce the collective identity. Every nation has them.⁶⁵

A third element to factor is that the shaping of narrative is fluid and continuous. Increasingly, religious faith and affiliation are transcending notions of patriotism and either feeding into national narratives or minority groups as a means of strengthening identity. At local levels these sentiments are being manipulated by radicalisers to create to create tensions, enhance sense of grievance, and play on desires for religious purity and exclusivity, sectarianism, revolutionary mobilisation, or conversely, resistance to change, progress, and development. Moreover, changes in global society take different turns in different locales even within the same region, as witnessed recently in variations of the Arab Spring across the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. Here, the evolution of new narratives and loyalties is apparent. The management or mismanagement of this process can be profound in the consequences for subsequent stability and security.⁶⁶

The Venn diagram below (Figure 1) of greed, creed, and grievance is a framework to illustrate the interlinking regional and local complexities. Here genuine and perceived injustices and grievances of communities and peoples along with struggle for recognition, rights or justice overlap with struggles over resources, monopolies, exploitation, and plunder. In such instances, the coherence of a religious or political creed can be the catalyst for rebellion or resistance. Communities perceiving a threat to metaphysical security by the abstract character of the modern often seek to 'de-modernise', returning to an imagined past with an uncomplicated narrative that provides simple answers.⁶⁷ An example of this can be seen with contemporary dynamics of the Tuareg in Mali.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Nandy, A., "Twilight of Certitude," *Alternatives: Global, Local and Political*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April-June 1997; Simm, October 2012).

⁶⁸ Simm, October 2012.




Figure 4.1: *Factors Impacting Narratives*

There are a few contributing factors to this interaction. People retreating into a single ethnic or religious identity are vulnerable to having grievances reinforced by perceived inequality and institutionalised discrimination. Societies with a shared experience of discrimination and exclusion are also more susceptible to a single narrative, which binds together multiple sources of resentment and proposes a simple solution. In addition, the failure of the state to provide security and justice, made worse by an oppressive and predatory security sector will fuel disloyalty.⁶⁹

Recent events in Syria also demonstrate this process. Here, ineffective or blocked political participation, widespread corruption of the political process, elite domination, erosion of tribal authority, suppressed election results, and little hope of change create frustrations. Coupled with the failure of organized civil and political groups to achieve change despite attempting to engage with the state by peaceful means (meetings, marches, and demonstrations), resistance becomes polarised into ethnic, linguistic, and religious groupings with diminishing common ground. This produces exclusive political agendas, which in turn, can fuel conflict and sectarianism. Often in such circumstances, groups that are banned for calling for political rights or equality typically go underground. For instance, the ANC, Muslim Brotherhood, and Sinn Fein each continued to work with a clear narrative to build up strong constituencies of support with appealing solutions and military wings ready to take direct, violent action.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Simm, October 2012.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

At the individual level, the search for personal and group identities can lead to conflict with national and communal loyalties. The use of the Internet has made access beyond state boundaries effortless and outside the control of the moderating influences of families and communities. Loyalty to international groups such as the Umma, Global Anti-Capitalist Movement, Greenpeace, or Animal Rights confers a transcendent solidarity. Moreover, this same technological advancement has also spread simplistic narratives that generate grievances and outrage and exclude alternative ideas, explanations or perspectives.⁷¹

Other facets in a society can also impact narrative. For example, ideals of masculinity and honour are increasingly difficult to fulfil in some societies and the loss of self-esteem can be considerable for young men. Living out a dream as a warrior in societies that have left behind those notions can lead to fantasy narratives. In addition, centres of education, especially those that operate learning by rote, can manipulate narratives, especially regarding religious and doctrinal purity, suspicion, and rejection of 'otherness'. It can also lead to alienation from civil authority and hatred of wealth and corruption, in contrast to the poverty and virtue of the religious group.⁷²

Implications of Competing Narratives, Identities and Loyalties:

- *The components that require assessment must be identified*
- *However, the spectrum of variables can vary widely from one locale to another. Additionally, each of these factors is interlaced by a multitude of actors and elements, creating a highly complex system, which warrants constant analysis.*
- *The perceived imposition of western values can cause incomprehension and resentment.*
- *Commonalities such as notions of patriotism and groups who identify with the nation through a construction of a communal, collective past must be considered.*
- *The shaping of a narrative is a fluid and continuous process. Religious faith and affiliation are increasingly transcending notions of patriotism and are feeding into national narratives or minority groups as a means of strengthening identity.*

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

- *The coherence of a religious or political creed can be the catalyst for rebellion or resistance. Communities that perceive a threat to metaphysical security by an abstract character of the 'modern' will often seek to 'de-modernise' and return to an imagined past with an uncomplicated narrative that provides simple answers.*
- *Societies with a shared experience of discrimination and exclusion are often more susceptible to a single narrative that brings together multiple sources of resentment and proposes a simple solution.*
- *At the individual level, the search for personal and group identities can conflict with national and communal loyalties.*
- *Other facets in a society, such as idealizations of masculinity or honour, can create fantasy narratives that may conflict with national or communal loyalties.*

2.2. NATO Troops and Doctrine as a Facet of the Local Situation⁷³

Second, it is important to be cognizant of the impact of various doctrines and policies by NATO, coalition partners, host nations, non-NATO actors, as well as interagency relationships on the local population. According to the Chinese warrior philosopher Sun Tzu, *"know yourself and you will win all battles"*, but too often NATO operations fail to account its own organizational dynamics in the study and understanding of the HAOE and dynamics of the local situation.

This requires the need to assess the interaction and synchronization of political objectives effectively supported by the timely application and the right mix of military and civilian operations, capabilities, and activities.

There is also no policy to address the reality of interacting with complex social and tribal relationships and determining whom to support. There is also the need to create a methodology on how to obtain information on the region in question to provide dispassionate views on effective interaction, social customs,

⁷³ Benjamin Clark, *"NATO Troops in the Dynamic of the Local Situation"*, Working Paper, Oradea, Romania: Human Aspects of the Operational Environment Project, NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, October 2012; Ahmad, October 2012.

and how to best approach the HAOE. Finally, the role of historical colonial or military relationships in an area of operation should inform actions but must be assessed for biases.⁷⁴

Language translation remains a key challenge in many operational areas for NATO, but it also remains a challenge within NATO. Notwithstanding NATO's published guidance and standing requirements for English and French, language remains a barrier to effective partnership, training, education, and operations across NATO. If there is an inability to effectively communicate amongst the Alliance, consider the challenges of understanding local dynamics working through an interpreter in another language. Civilian–military (civ-mil) dynamics also remains a vital weakness within NATO and partner nations. Professional education, exchange schooling and assignments, and routine collaborative civ-mil planning are the exception, not the rule amongst NATO nations and military operations. Robust military capability is often inappropriately substituted when civilian capacity is lacking, which creates problems in terms of expectations as well as perceived equities. For instance, despite the best of plans, ISAF's 2009-2011 troop surge was not accompanied by a similar/parallel surge in civilian capacity.⁷⁵

Standard ISAF troop/unit rotations of 4, 6, or 12 months also run afoul of the basic human/cultural instincts of most Afghans, which is to seek and maintain long-term rather than transactional relationships. The well-documented effects of constant ISAF troop turnover erode continuity and leads to fighting the war six months at a time, which is not lost on our Afghan partners, who have seen an endless stream of ISAF partners and mentors over the last 10 years. In addition, national, service, and branch/community culture amongst NATO nations and partners also pose a challenge. An example of NATO and national cultural challenges is apparent when, for instance, posting an Army light infantry officer to work with a naval submarine engineering officer.⁷⁶

The cultural, language, and social challenges and differences are quite apparent. Success in leading change in an area of operation is often tied to effectively understanding these complex dynamics and adjusting actions, responses, and words accordingly. However, there will be disparities among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of interpreting these aspects. Hence the need to harmonize these views and adjust accordingly is needed.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

Implications of NATO Troops and Doctrine as a Facet of the Local Situation

- *The impact of various NATO doctrines and policies, as well as those of coalition partners, host nations, non-NATO actors and interagency relationships on the local population must be kept in mind.*
- *There is a need for a methodology on how to obtain information on the region in question in order to provide dispassionate views on effective interaction, social customs and how best to approach the HAOE.*
- *The role of historical colonial or military relationships in an area of operation should inform actions but must also be assessed for biases.*
- *Language translation remains a key challenge for NATO in many operational areas, and is also a challenge within NATO. Language remains a barrier to effective partnership, training, education and operations across NATO. If this is a challenge within NATO, consider the challenges of understanding local dynamics in another language while working through an interpreter.*
- *Standard troop/unit rotations of a few months to a year may run counter to those societies that seek to develop and maintain long-term relationships.*

2.3. Economic Footprint of NATO Operations on the Local Situation⁷⁷

A third critical aspect to consider in assessing the local situation is that any foreign intervention tends to further complicate an already complex local situation. Introducing a significant external actor or group of actors (e.g., different military units, plus diplomatic and development assistance organizations, in addition to international and non-state actors such as NGOs) understandably creates misbalance in an already fragile local equilibrium. Moreover, although foreign intervention will bring money and other resources into the local society, it will also yield unavoidable economic repercussions (price level, rent, labour

⁷⁷ Dean C. Alexander, "Facilitating Economic Activity in Conflict Zones", Working Paper, Oradea, Romania: Human Aspects of the Operational Environment Project, NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, October 2012; Clark, October 2012; Peter Kovacs, "Economic Aspects of the Local Situation", Working Paper, Oradea, Romania: Human Aspects of the Operational Environment Project, NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence, October 2012; Clark, October 2012, Ahmad, October 2012.

market, and new patterns of consumption). Likewise new incentive structures may strengthen or weaken sectors of the local economy.⁷⁸

NATO operations have the potential to produce both positive and negative effects on local economies, and rarely is there no impact whatsoever – there is almost always a footprint/outcome of NATO operations whether planned or unplanned, controlled or deliberate, or unintended and emerging.

The amount and type of impacts created by NATO operations on a local economy is influenced by many factors including size, scale, and duration of operations; amount, character, and length of combat and kinetic operations; and the degree and effectiveness of comprehensive/whole of nation/whole of government planning and coordination. NATO forces own cultural awareness, preparation, and consideration of the human aspects of the operational environment *vis à vis* the local economy is a key determining factor, but the law of unintended consequences frequently prevails. Hence, the best NATO intentions and planning may be undone by complex and changing operational realities, failure to fully understand and interact with human/social/cultural factors, and the realities of coalition politics and warfighting.⁷⁹

For instance, the generally well-intended flow of donor-nation funding, aid, contractors, and jobs in Afghanistan over many years produced many results – not all positive and not all intentional. In fact, in the absence of a long-term multi-national, coherent, and coordinated economic aid strategy for Afghanistan, many will argue that corruption, criminal patronage networks, and failure of government institutions are attributable, in part, to ill-conceived and poorly executed western economic aid. The converse is also true. Afghan communications, hospitals, schools, roads, electrical, and other infrastructure are incredibly improved since 2002. Both views are accurate.⁸⁰

As NATO operations begin and continue over time in any given Area of Responsibility (AOR), local economies have potential for explosive growth and development to provide cash flow for fledging governments, while concurrently new market forces may be created with unintended and often dire consequences.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Clark, October 2012.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

The introduction of hard currency to the fabric of fragile states', lethal competition for lucrative resources and power relationships, the emergence of new banking practices and industry, flagrant money-laundering, increased corruption at all levels, black marketing of or related to NATO fuel, supplies, and equipment, in addition rapid growth of criminal patronage networks seeking to leverage new opportunities may all be caused directly or develop as a result of NATO operations, particularly in the absence of effective whole of government/whole of nation planning. Depending on conditions and economic expertise available, destructive economic trends may or may not be readily identifiable or preventable. Fledgling host nation financial, economic, and government institutions may or may not be able to discern and respond, or they may in fact be part of the tidal wave of change that sweeps over limited government institutions. The long historical record of frequent problems and major economic challenges with black marketing, corruption, and secondary markets is not new to military operations, yet NATO and ISAF planners were apparently surprised by these trends in Afghanistan, or at least unable to respond effectively over the course of 10 years of operations.⁸¹

Following the rapid success of military operations in Iraq in 2003, the subsequent dismantling of Iraqi armed forces and Baathist party purges left hundreds of thousands of young Iraqi men without work, disenfranchised, and hungry. Coalition and U.S. planners failed to prepare for and mitigate a vast array of destructive economic impact on post-combat operations and military defeat of the Iraqi Army. The complex new economic situation compounded sectarian violence, challenged the emergence of new Iraqi government institutions, and undercut efforts to stabilize the situation. The harsh lessons of failures in planning and execution of post combat economic and other vital whole of government efforts in Iraq paint a grim but clear picture of how of economic issues and NATO operations are intertwined.⁸²

In addition, the influx of resources can easily lead to or strengthen corruption, and thus undercut governance or the juridical systems. Relatively well-paid jobs with foreign or international organizations may unbalance the labour market or channel more qualified personnel into higher-paid but low-quality jobs, as evidences by professors or engineers who become drivers, translators, among other dynamics. If foreign intervention includes significant military forces, these might lead to a different balance of power in the host nation, or it might produce opposition or resistance towards the outside military

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

presence. In any case, it will necessarily make the foreign forces into a local power centre.⁸³

This might unfold as outsiders being in a supporting role to a functioning and legitimate government. Or it might turn the outside forces into just another militia amongst many others. In either scenario, a significant foreign armed presence cannot help but become a key local power player. As a result, local power dynamics cannot be unchanged by an intervention. Generally, they will become even more complex. Even if a foreign intervention plainly aims at stabilizing a local government, is not just a technical operation, but a highly political enterprise. This too is not avoidable, but also a necessary goal of the operation, if it is to succeed. According to the Field Manual Counterinsurgency of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *“The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government ... A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting success without the HN (host nation) government achieving legitimacy”*.⁸⁴

Moreover, in certain instances, an intervening multinational force can be the most important economic actor locally. War and post-conflict periods directly impact production, trade, employment, human resources, and the prevalence of illicit markets. Limited electricity and transport capacities undermine economic development, including job growth, while simultaneously raising the costs of doing business.⁸⁵ For instance, infrastructure needs for *“rural farming communities include transport and communication services, energy, water and irrigational facilities and extension services”*.⁸⁶

*In order to create effective entrepreneurship training in the stabilization phase of an operation, the Alliance needs to cater training to local requirements as well as partner with entities with a record of success.*⁸⁷

⁸³ Ahmad, October 2012; Alexander, October 2012; Clark, October 2012.

⁸⁴ US Army/US Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24, Chicago 2007, p. 37 (emphasis added); Ahmad, October 2012.

⁸⁵ Iyer, L. & I. Santos. (2012, June). Creating jobs in South Asia's conflict zones. *Policy research working papers*, 6104, 2, supra note 13. World Bank. Retrieved from http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000158349_20120625094609 ; Alexander, October 2012.

⁸⁶ Unlocking the African Moment – Rural Infrastructure in Africa. (2012). *DSM paper series*, Development Support Monitor 2012. Retrieved from http://www.africanmonitor.org/am_dsm.html; Alexander, October 2012.

⁸⁷ For instance, the “most popular sectors that Liberian women are seeking skills training in are restaurants, catering, retail, agribusiness, and tailoring.... In Afghanistan, the [10,000 Women program]

In addition, special safe economic zones may need to be created. These offer duty-free imports, solid infrastructure, with a goal of encouraging exports.⁸⁸ “SEZs have been established in several post-conflict countries, helped attract foreign investors, and spurred job creation. Despite these positive aspects, it is equally important to recognize that NATO may also interfere with the interests of local power brokers or illicit markets. This may increase local tensions and/or violence. Hence, both macro and micro economic factors of troops in the local area must be carefully assessed.”⁸⁹

In addition, a multitude of partnerships between and among government, business, business associations, and nongovernmental institutions have promoted commerce and assuaged the levels of conflict. Such relationships have also fostered the development and adherence by many companies to voluntary codes of conduct connected with their business activities. These “partnerships have helped businesses understand the role they play in areas like human rights, equity and violent conflict as well as helped setting standards of behaviour”.⁹⁰ Hence, an assessment of the role of such entities on the ground, how they are perceived by multiple other actors, their impact on the local dynamic, as well as potential areas of conflict and/or cooperation to affect greater efficiency of effort is warranted.⁹¹

There are a number of governmental organizations that aid in contributing economic vitality. For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense’s Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), seeks “to reduce violence, enhance stability, and restore economic normalcy in areas where unrest and insurgency have created a synchronous downward spiral of economic hardship and violence. TFBSO creates stabilization by developing economic opportunities through a range of efforts, including encouraging investment by U.S. and international businesses, developing a country’s natural resources in a way that is economically sound and environmentally responsible, and assisting industrial development and agricultural revitalization”.⁹² “TFBSO had ample

is administered through the Thunderbird School of Global Management and the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF). The most popular sectors among women entrepreneurs are construction, food production, and handicrafts (i.e., woodworking and silk). The program aims to train 300 women in 5 years,” Lemmon, G.T. (2012, May). Entrepreneurship in post-conflict zones. *Working paper*, Council of Foreign Relations, *supra* note 16, at 12; Alexander, October 2012.

⁸⁸ Iyer & Santos, *supra* note 13, at 20; Alexander, October 2012.

⁸⁹ Alexander, October 2012.

⁹⁰ Evers, T. (2010, December 6). Doing business and making peace? *Occasional papers*, 3, 16. Utrikepolitiska Institute, *supra* note 3, at 17; Alexander, October 2012.

⁹¹ Alexander, October 2012.

⁹² <http://tfbso.defense.gov/www/index.aspx>; Alexander, October 2012.

*successes while it operated in Iraq, and, presently provides important economic development activities in Afghanistan. More specifically, TFBSO have been primarily concentrated in the minerals, energy, indigenous industries, agriculture, and information technology sectors of the Afghan economy”.*⁹³

Likewise, there are many non-governmental organizations that assist in economic development globally. Examples are the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, regional development banks (i.e., Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, Latin American Development Bank), among others.⁹⁴ Also, national finance and development institutions (i.e., Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and U.S. Agency for International Development) among many others, succours in economic development.⁹⁵ There are also various non-profit organizations that undertake economic development and business accelerator activities in conflict zones and developing countries including. For instance, Mercy Corps provides “*financing, equipment, training or technical support. These projects help people find jobs, build their businesses, supply their communities with the goods they need —and improve their lives*”.⁹⁶ Also, “*Mercy Corps-sponsored microfinance institutions, savings and credit cooperatives, loan-guarantee programs, and technical support reach more than one million people in over a dozen countries*”.⁹⁷

Bpeace is “*a non-profit coalition of business professionals offering pro-bono access to our expertise, technical assistance, networks and proven methodologies to help entrepreneurs expand their businesses into sustainable and profitable enterprises. [They] select motivated entrepreneurs we call Fast Runners to receive access to our services*”. The organization operates in Afghanistan and Rwanda, and plans to initiate activities in Bosnia and El Salvador.⁹⁸ Cherie Blair Foundation “*invest[s] in women entrepreneurs so they can build and expand their businesses - and in doing so benefit not only themselves but also their families and communities. The Foundation focuses its efforts on Africa, Asia and the Middle East in countries where women have made strides in education and have the*

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ <http://www.worldbank.org/>; <http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>;
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/home ;
www.iadb.org; www.adb.org; www.afdb.org/en/; www.isdb.org; Alexander, October 2012.

⁹⁵ <http://www.usaid.gov/>; <http://www.opic.gov/>;
http://www.deginvest.de/EN_Home/About_DEG/index.jsp ;

<http://www.cofides.es/english/Default.aspx> ; Alexander, October 2012.

⁹⁶ <http://www.mercycorps.org/topics/economicdevelopment> ; Alexander, October 2012.

⁹⁷ <http://www.mercycorps.org/topics/microenterprise>; Alexander, October 2012.

⁹⁸ <http://www.bpeace.org/about-us/impact.html>; Alexander, October 2012.

*potential to succeed in business but lack the necessary support”.*⁹⁹ Other examples include, the Small Enterprise Impact Investment Fund increases access of capital to small and medium-sized enterprises in developing countries.¹⁰⁰ Business Edge, part of the International Finance Corporation, offers training seminars and self-study books for managers and business owners of small and medium-size companies in developing countries.¹⁰¹

Assessing the current and/or potential role of these actors in a post conflict phase is critical. Influence (both positive and negative) on powerbrokers, local and national government institutions, and rule of law must be ascertained.

While NATO has tremendous capability to plan and conduct successful military operations, it is frequently the non-military functions including rule of law, governance, development, and economic opportunity that drives the eventual outcome of NATO operations. Stability operations also require inherent understanding and consideration of economic issues as instability and economic opportunity are linked. Local actors are quick to seize new economic opportunities generated by the influx of tens of thousands of NATO combat and support soldiers and facilities but far too often the legitimate needs of the local or national government are lost or stolen due to inadequate planning.¹⁰²

Implications of the Economic Footprint of NATO Operations on the Local Situation

- *Any foreign intervention will complicate an already complex local situation, and will yield unavoidable economic repercussions. Likewise, new incentive structures may strengthen or weaken sectors of the local economy.*
- *Even the best intentions of NATO may be undone by complex and*

⁹⁹ <http://www.cherieblairfoundation.org/about-us>; Alexander, October 2012.

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.symbioticsgroup.com/news/latest-news/seiif-oxfam-and-symbiotics-target-investment-industry-with-new-sme-fund>; Alexander, October 2012.

¹⁰¹ http://www.businessedge-me.com/cms.php?id=about_be_what_is_business_edge; Alexander, October 2012.

¹⁰² Alexander, October 2012.

changing operational realities, the failure to fully understand and interact with human/social/cultural factors and the realities of coalition politics and warfighting.

- *NATO operations over time in any AOR may bring about explosive growth and development that will provide cash flow for fledgling governments, while concurrently, new market forces may be created that may result in unintended or dire consequences.*
- *Depending on conditions and available economic expertise, destructive economic trends may or may not be readily identifiable or preventable.*
- *The influx of resources can easily lead to or strengthen corruption, thereby undercutting governance or the judicial system.*
- *A significant foreign armed presence cannot help but become a key local power player. As a result, local power dynamics cannot be unchanged by an intervention. Even if the objective is to stabilize a local government, a foreign intervention is not just a technical operation but also a highly political enterprise.*
- *In certain circumstances, an intervening multinational force can be the most important economic actor locally.*
- *Special safe economic zones may need to be created. However, interference by NATO in the interests of local power brokers or illicit markets may increase local tensions and/or violence.*
- *While a variety of partnerships between public and private entities may promote commerce and minimize the effects of conflict, the role of these entities on the ground, how they are perceived by other actors, their impact on the local dynamic and potential areas of conflict/cooperation in order to affect a greater efficiency of effort is warranted.*
- *Numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations that can assist economic development.*
- *NATO has tremendous capability to plan and conduct successful military operations, but frequently the non-military functions drive the eventual outcome of NATO operations.*

3. Tools to Assess Actors in the Local Situation

By definition, understanding the dynamics of the local situation requires an examination of all actors involved. Two tools are delineated here provide a micro-analysis of networks. The first defines group dynamics and structures while the second set focuses on dynamics amongst individuals. Each approach provides key information re local actors as well as their connection to other local, national, regional, and/or transnational actors.

3.1. Understanding Non-State Armed Groups on the Local Situation¹⁰³

There is very little analysis on the organizational structure of non-state armed groups. This is due to the plethora of large data sets measuring only certain types of groups, difficulties in harmonizing definitions which leads to disparate metrics, and the often exclusion (until recently) of criminal, gang, and other local groups that have the reach and power of many states. The Lochard model metric merges these various large datasets, along with individual research on each group, into one totalling ~1,750 insurgents, terrorists, militias, criminal organizations, gangs, and malicious cyber actors greater than 1,000 in strength who have been active at least once from 1996 to the present. It then layers these data with metrics of governance correlated as well since 1996 to the present, areas of operation, para-state capabilities, as well as technological reach. New typologies of groups are presented along with the organizational structures in which they may appear, evolve, or devolve. By employing this model, a portrait of non-state armed groups' role in the local situation can be obtained.¹⁰⁴

The Lochard model categorizes the groups in the dataset according to function and or goal – international criminal organizations, millenarian or religious extremist groups, insurgents/ revolutionaries, the New Left, and local actors. By avoiding the sticky challenges related to defining and measuring terrorism and

¹⁰³ Itamara Lochard, *“Understanding Low Governance States: A quantitative and qualitative assessment of armed groups, governance and intrastate conflict”*, Medford, MA: Jebson Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2005; Itamara Lochard, *“Non-State Armed Groups in Cyber-Conflict: Goals, organization and relationships”*, paper presented at the *U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense Highlands Forum*, the Aspen Wye River Plantation, Maryland, April 2008; Itamara Lochard, *“How Non-State Armed Groups and the Dynamics of the Local Situation”*, Working Paper, Oradea, Romania: Human Aspects of the Operational Environment Project, NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence, October 2012.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

other typologies that other datasets face, this approach is able to capture a wider set of actors while concomitantly avoiding smaller groupings that reflect only minor criminality or protest rather than a effect based activity that aims to impact a nation state. In addition, the organizational structure of each of the 1,750 groups is assessed, yielding five additional categories related to their organizational structure – hierarchical, franchise, hub-spoke, core, and flat/networked. Interestingly, each may appear, evolve or devolve into any of the structural typologies inherent to each functional grouping, in no particular order. There is no clear line of progression or decentralization for any of the sets present.¹⁰⁵

The *hierarchical model* is where there is a clear head and chain of command. This was for example typical of the large South American drug cartels of the 1980s. The next is a *franchise model* where the exact same structure is replicated in another AOR or type of commodity, akin to any corporate franchise. Here, the head of each franchise reports to the main. Third, is a *hub and spoke* model, wherein various types of groups of differing organizational structures are at each end of the spoke. Their uniting force is the commodity(ies) or issue(s) in which they cooperate (located in the hub). There is clear knowledge of being in a network, but each has its own head, chain of command, structure, and goals.¹⁰⁶

A fourth depiction is the *core model* where non-state armed groups are at various rings often unaware of other groups within their own or other rings. For instance, the silk route demonstrates the long pattern and variation of interconnected groups who form an effective chain. Unlike the hub and spoke model, there is no clear connectivity between these groups, and they may have various sizes and forms. Finally, there is the *flat/networked* pattern that has been dubbed the future of conflict, with the clear example being al-Qaeda. However, not all terrorist groups are flat; actually, most are not.¹⁰⁷

The same is true for the broader category of millenarian/religious extremists. In addition, there is no empirical evidence that terrorist or other groups naturally devolve towards a less hierarchical, loose network. There is no doubt many groups do have this structure; however there are far greater numbers in the other organizational typologies. Not realizing the true trajectory

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

of how groups evolve will result in the inability to garner proper analysis of the local situation and thus prolong conflicts.¹⁰⁸

In terms of functional categories, international criminal organizations may appear in all five of these organizational patterns. They are also the most prolific in terms of the use of technology. Here, however, it is primarily for profit or the movement of illicit goods. Their business model dictates the economic goal as well as a high connectivity to informal economies. Their area of operations includes local, national, regional, transnational, as well as transit areas.¹⁰⁹




Figure 4.2: *Lochard 2004 Model of Non-State Armed Groups' Organizational Structures – Hierarchy, Franchise, Hub-Spoke, Core, and Networked*¹¹⁰

Another category is millenarian or religious extremist groups that seek to destroy, not disrupt, another people or state as their main objective. As such, their targeting tends to be of civilian populations with very long planning times.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

They are closely linked to international criminal organizations as well as marriages of convenience with other groups. These tend to appear in the *hub and spoke* or *networked/flat* structures.¹¹¹

A third category is the insurgent or revolutionary groups that do not seek millenarian goals but are trying to change a political, economic, or territorial aspect of a state. As such, they do not want to destroy the state. These are primarily structured in hierarchical, franchise, and hub-and-spoke models. Unlike the first two functional categories, these groups' AOR is not transnational, but rather local, national, and regional. Their sense of timing is usually shorter as well. Moreover, their hubs tend to be in areas where culture and theology can support their message and goals.¹¹²

New Left structures are a fourth functional category that has emerged in the past 20 years, seeking to keep the state in check by providing high para- or proto-state governance capacities. Examples include very large gangs (upwards of 80,000 strong), violent anti-globalization groups, as well as violent single-interest groups (such as violent variations of animal rights or environmental groups. They are reactionary, operating mostly at the local and national levels. They are quite structured appearing with hierarchical, franchise, and hub-and-spoke organizational patterns. They too are not flat/networked either.¹¹³

Local groups comprise the fifth category and are prolific in post-conflict settings with very short-term goals. Typologies include militias, warlords, and pirates. These usually provide no governance features to the populace and are very loose in structure. A final category is *strategic non-violent action* as well as *cyber groups* who employing cyber/technology as a primary manner in which to organize or as a weapon. Examples can be gleaned from the orange, rose, tulip, and cedar revolutions as well as recent uprisings in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region.¹¹⁴ These have the three loosest organizational structures (flat/networked, core, and wheel-and-spoke).

The key reason for employing such an analysis of non-state armed groups is that it demonstrates how they are structured, provides patterns of evolution and de-evolution, portrays linkages to other groups, as well as provides their sense of timing and goals. All employ technology to cooperate, communicate, finance, project power, and increase reach. Many also employ it for criminal

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

purposes, espionage, as well as to debilitate adversaries by launching technical attacks. The levels of sophistication to do this only need to reside in one arm or node of the network, and are rarely correlated with the overall typology of the group. For instance, Afghanistan has one of the lowest levels of internet penetration, yet non-state armed groups are prolific in the use of technology there for strategic communications and other purposes. Because these groups can adapt and morph to existing challenges rather easily, they are at a considerable advantage as they can quickly adapt to maximize the situation on the ground to their benefit, unlike the slow process of large militaries and/or multinational forces.¹¹⁵

3.2. Socio Cultural Intelligence (SOCINT) and Social Network Analysis (SNA) Tools¹¹⁶

Social Cultural Intelligence (SOCINT) is the process of directing and/or directing data in any social science. This includes geography, anthropology, psychology, economics, archaeology, religion, demography, criminology, and political science. Analyzing, producing, and disseminating this data yields greater situational awareness in any operational environment. Although, SOCINT is not a recognized intelligence discipline, it is used in intelligence analyses that focus on a local population's composition, attitudes, and other human-related aspects. It is not a new method. It is in line with current effects-based operations approach that stresses the importance of garnering the local populations' support and limiting collateral damage.¹¹⁷

Understanding of the structure and dynamic of the human operational environment is one of the key elements of the success in most recent military operations.¹¹⁸ Enemies are not only hierarchical as existed in the Cold War but may take many organizational patters, evolve and devolve as well as shift allegiances often.¹¹⁹ Peace support, counterinsurgency, and antiterrorism operations heavily depend on the support of the local population, hence the first

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Lűdek Michalek, *"Development of Indicators: Essential Elements of Information for HAOE"*, Working Paper, Oradea, Romania: Human Aspects of the Operational Environment Project, NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence, October 2012a; Lűdek Michalek, *"Social Network Analysis and Socio-Cultural Intelligence – Basic Concepts and Usage"*, Working Paper, Oradea, Romania: Human Aspects of the Operational Environment Project, NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence, October 2012b.

¹¹⁷ Lűdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Lochard, October 2012a, 2012b.

demand is “to win hearts and minds”. This is impossible without deep knowledge of local society – its structure, key leaders, group relations, and power distribution. Any society exists in the form of social network where individual members are connected to each other by specific relations or links.¹²⁰

One of the effective tools for getting such knowledge seems to be Social Network Analysis (SNA), which allows getting complex insight into any social network, to understand relationships that form social network, and also to understand the specific position of the individual elements of interest of such network. SNA is used in SOCINT to understand groups’ social, ethnic, religious, tribal, sectarian, and religious composition.¹²¹ Examples of groups that can be analyzed using this approach include political organizations, leaders, public media, web page linkages, social-networking sites, criminal organizations, and other non-state armed groups.¹²²

SNA is an approach to analyzing organizations that focuses on the relationships between people and/or groups as the most important aspect. It provides an avenue for analyzing and comparing formal and informal information flows in an organization, as well as comparing information flows with officially defined work processes. This applies equally to both active and passive information. As such, this type of analysis helps determine position, power and influence of each individual node in the network.¹²³

The first goal of SNA is to visualize communication and other relationships between people and/or groups by means of diagrams. The second goal is to study the factors that influence relationships and to study the correlations between relationships. The third goal is to draw out implications of the relational data, including bottlenecks where multiple information flows funnel through one person or section (slowing down work processes), and situations where information flows does not match formal group structures. The fourth and most important goal of SNA is to make recommendations to improve communication and workflow in an organization.¹²⁴

SNA as a method of studying social structures (networks) comes from psychology method of sociometry. Most network analysts cite Joseph Moreno’s

¹²⁰ Lüdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.; Lochard, October 2012.

¹²³ Lüdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

¹²⁴ Erlich, Kate and Inga Carboni, *Inside Social Network Analysis*, Accessed 7 March 2012; [http://domino.research.ibm.com/cambridge/research.nsf/0/3f23b2d424be0da6852570a500709975/\\$FILE/TR_2005-10.pdf](http://domino.research.ibm.com/cambridge/research.nsf/0/3f23b2d424be0da6852570a500709975/$FILE/TR_2005-10.pdf); Lüdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

introduction of the tools and methods of sociometry, in 1934 as the year in which the formal analysis of social networks began. SNA became much more popular with researchers in the early 1970s when advances in computer technology made it possible to study large groups. Within the last ten years, SNA has risen to prominence in a number of fields, including organizational behaviour, anthropology, sociology, and medicine.¹²⁵

SNA has also been used in the business world to analyze communication flows and increase their efficacy. In such instances is equally used to assess the consumer, their network or an organization. Law enforcement is another area where SNA has been prevalent to collect, trace, and identify communications of criminals or other illicit non-state groups. SNA is also employed by social media networking sites (e.g., Facebook or LinkedIn) to identify, recommend, or rank potential friends/contacts, based on the analysis of the pattern of existing contacts of a client. Civil society organizations also employ SNA to uncover conflicts of interest in hidden connections between government bodies, lobbies, and businesses. A final example of the use of SNA can be gleaned in the mobile telephone and cable operators employing SNA-like methods to optimize the structure and capacity of their network.¹²⁶

The main advantage of SNA in comparison with other traditional social science methods is that a targeted social structure can not only be described but can also effectively reveal the hidden connections that drive the network. Obviously such a capability is very desirable for any type of assessment related to the level of connectivity between or among individuals or groups. In current stability or counterinsurgency operations, the use of SNA more than doubles the ability to identify links, relationships, and position of the key individuals as well as uncover hidden or not-obviously visible power or information nodes.¹²⁷

Structural characteristics can be attributed to networks as a whole. These include the *size* (the number of persons who participate in it), the *density* (proportion of existing social relationships compared to all possible relationships in a network) and the *cohesion* of a network. This last characteristic refers to the number of intensive and affective social relationships within networks. It is assumed that social networks with many mutually affective relationships are more permanent and durable than if they were only to consist of instrumental relationships. Thus, for example, within many ethnically-based criminal groups

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Lůdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

that there are affective and other forms of emotional relationships with family members. These networks have stronger group cohesion as a result.¹²⁸

SNA uses several basic measures for description and analysis of the position, power, and influence of the each single node of the network.¹²⁹ It can be employed in any military or intelligence setting to better understand the network. This includes the decision-making process, position and power of the nodes, and information flows. SNA may also be employed to determine how to eliminate, fight, and/or disrupt the activity of a targeted network, by determining which information node is the most influential (see node 10 in Figure 4.3). It can also identify how/where to best spread information; determine the most effective area to cut the information in the network; and illuminate where a network can be split (see green line in Figure 4.3).




Figure 4.3: Example of SOCINT/SNA

The quality and strength of the lines between nodes in a SNA help examine are which relations are most important locally as well as the strength and quality of relationships between individual elements of the network. For example, families are important everywhere however variations in culture, ethnicity, religion, politics, and economic factors can yield different dynamics.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Gerben Bruinsma and Wim Bernasco, Criminal groups and transnational illegal markets. A more detailed examination on the basis of Social Network Theory, in *Crime, Law & Social Change* 41: 79-94, 2004. Netherlands: Kluwer Academia Publisher; Lüdek, October 2012.

¹²⁹ The following explanations of the basic SNA measures, including graphs are based, adapted and quoted from Cheliotis, Giorgos. *Social Network Analysis (SNA) including a tutorial on concepts and methods*, National University of Singapore. [Accessed 5 October 2010]; <http://www.slideshare.net/gcheliotis/social-network-analysis-3273045> ; Lüdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

¹³⁰ Lüdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

Description and analysis of different social networks that are part of the human operational environment is one of the key elements of successful operational and intelligence planning process in most current conflicts.¹³¹

*Understanding the structure, control, and flow of information and identifying and analyzing the position, power, and importance of any single element of network is the basic knowledge for many passive as well as active kinds of operations.*¹³²

In a passive way such knowledge is important to evaluating of the impact of one's own military operations. In offensive kind of operations, knowledge of the network is essential in determining possible avenues of exploitation for information collection, psychological operations (PSYOPS), Force Protection, elimination of the network activity, and other uses.¹³³

Current sophisticated SNA software tools are a very good and effective analytical method for obtaining such knowledge. Moreover, many are free or of little cost. Three of the most common commercial SNA tools are ORA, PAJECK and IBMi2ANB. They can be used to manage large networks and data while provide visualization tools to presentations easier, more effective, more flexible, and easier to transfer. Compared to other network tools, it is quicker; however it is time consuming to implement correct and complete data points. Mind-mapping often helps as a first-step. These software tools measure five things: degree-centrality, betweenness centrality, like-betweenness, closeness centrality, and eigenvector centrality.¹³⁴

Degree centrality measures a how many people one node is able to reach or influence directly. The in/out numbers associated with it demonstrate the links

¹³¹ See for example *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. Joint Publication JP 2-01.3.* (June 2009), p. II-45 – II-54 or *Counterinsurgency FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5.* (December 2006), p. B-10 – B-17; Lüdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

¹³² For example SAGEMAN, Marc. (2004). *Understanding Terror Networks* deals with the global terrorist networks and how they work while NANCE, Malcolm W. (2008). *Terrorist Recognition Handbook. A Practitioner's Manual for Predictions and Identifying Terrorist Activities* provides more practical instructions how to use the SNA in the fight agyinst terrorist groups and organizations; Lüdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Lüdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

into or out of the network. It measures the degree of connectedness, influence, or popularity to assess which nodes are central to the spread of information / influence to others. It demonstrates the immediate 'neighbourhood' of reach. Here, numbers 3 and 5 have the highest degree or number of other nodes that it can reach. Hence, it shows the most active members of the node.¹³⁵

Betweenness centrality measures how likely a node is the direct route between two people. It identifies the 'gatekeepers' in the network as well as the paths running through them. It shows which nodes are likely to be in communications paths between other nodes. As a result, it helps determine where the network will fall apart if cut, and who will be cut. Here, node 5 has higher betweenness centrality than 3.¹³⁶




Figure 4.4: Degree Centrality




Figure 4.5: Betweenness Centrality

Link-betweeness is related to this. It measures links *between* nodes and helps identify critical nodes for communication inside the network. This is identified in the circle below from IBMi2 Analysts' Notebook program.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.




Figure 4.6: Link Betweenness

Closeness centrality measures speed of communication. It determines how fast any one node can reach everyone in the network. Hence it measures the shortest path. It is very useful where the dissemination of information is a key factor. Here, the lower the number of a node, the higher the speed. Nodes 3 (1.33) and 5 (1.33) have the lowest values and thus the highest speeds.¹³⁸




Figure 4.7: Closeness Centrality




Figure 4.8: Eigenvector Centrality

¹³⁸ Ibid.

Eigenvector centrality measures how well a node is connected to other well-connected nodes. The higher the eigenvector, the greater will be the connectivity to other nodes with high eigenvectors. This is similar to how Google determines page rankings or LinkedIn determines levels of influence by measuring how many other highly connected people to whom one is connected.¹³⁹

As discussed in this section, the use of SNA can be employed in multiple ways during an operation as well as prior to engaging. However, more training and teaching of SNA methodology is needed to military, intelligence analysts, as well as others. Likewise, SOCINT needs to be an established organizational structure for both intelligence and non-intelligence uses. Inserting it in the existing AJP 2 NATO publication¹⁴⁰ and applied only when necessary (e.g., Peace Support Operations, Crisis Response Operations and COIN). Likewise, SOCINT should be included in the Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC) structure. The main use is to support directional control of collection efforts in SOCINT and HAOE, provide analysis of information, and produce relevant intelligence.¹⁴¹

Implications Regarding the Use of Tools for the Assessment of Actors in the Local Situation

- *The primary reason for the analysis of non-state armed groups within the local situation is that it demonstrates how they are structured, provides patterns of evolution and de-evolution, portrays linkages to other groups and provides their sense of timing and goals.*
- *An understanding of the structure and dynamic of the human operational environment is one of the key elements of success in the most recent military operations.*
- *Winning “hearts and minds” requires a deep knowledge of local society – its structure, key leaders, group relations and power distribution. Any society exists in the form of a social network where individual members are connected to each other by specific reasons or links.*
- *Social Network Analysis (SNA) focuses on the relationships between people/groups as the most important aspect. It serves to visualize*

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ AJP 2 *Allied Joint Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security Doctrine*. NATO HQ, 2003. [online] [22-08-2012] Available from WWW: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/73422647/4/SECTION-II-%E2%80%93-INTELLIGENCE>; Lüdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

¹⁴¹ Lüdek, October 2012a, 2012b.

communications between people or groups through the use of diagrams, studies the factors that influence relationships and their correlations, identifies the implications of the relationship data and makes recommendations for the improvement of communication and workflow within the organization.

- *The main advantage of SNA is that a targeted social structure can be described and the hidden connections that drive the network can be revealed.*
- *More training in SNA methodology is needed for the military, intelligence analysts and others. Also, Social Cultural Intelligence (SOCINT) should be an established organizational structure for both intelligence and non-intelligence uses. SOCINT should be inserted in the existing AJP 2 NATO publication and applied only when necessary.*

4. Conclusion and Recommendations

The twenty-first century security environment faced by NATO includes complex and constantly evolving asymmetric, unconventional, and irregular threats posed by transnational actors and states wielding new technologies, significant financial resources, powerful information, and strategic communications tools. Often, they work with and through global narco-criminal networks to threaten peace, stability, and regional security. Moreover, there remains a continued grave threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and material.

Just as NATO's security challenges have evolved from a bipolar cold war setting, so too has NATO's awareness of the inextricable relationship of alliance political military objectives with Human Aspects of the Operational Environment (HAOE). Whether it is expressed in the lexicon of population-centric counterinsurgency, human terrain and geography, social network analysis, or "hearts and minds of the people", all point to the centrality of a growing understanding of the HAOE and an appreciation of how NATO must embrace, explore, and move forward to institutionalize it.

While discussion of HAOE has not coalesced to the point of imminent NATO doctrinal development, this critical topic routinely informs alliance political and military leaders and command staff at all levels from whole of nation planning efforts; to comprehensive operational planning; to planning, coordinating, and executing tactical operations. Cliché perhaps, but it really *is* all about people and relationships; who they are; and how we understand and interact with them in increasingly complex and dynamic environments. This panel briefly considers “Dynamics of the Local Situation” as a vibrant example of the relevance of HAOE and considers the need for NATO to institutionalize HAOE using a DOTMLPFI approach.

Understanding the Human Aspects of the Operational environment, and specifically dynamics of the local situation, is not merely a nice supplement to other analyses. It is a mission-essential component of planning and successful execution of future NATO operations. Only a COPA/WoG/WoN approach will truly enable the necessary cultural/organizational changes needed for future NATO operations in the complex security environment of the 21st century. Below are several recommendations on how to implement this.

- *Correct diagnosis of the local dynamics problem is essential*

NATO will most likely face multiple challenges in future contingencies, so it is important to get a detailed understanding of the dynamics of the target political, security, economic and socio-cultural system. NA5CRO planning must consider the be country-centric model addressing all this systems from the central to local perspective. In developing this understanding, NATO should keep in mind at least two views of the problematic situation: an external view and an internal view¹⁴². The inside view is from the perspective of both local officials and the population. This view reflects long-standing tensions and struggles between key local factions. The external view will probably reflect a series of functional problems along the lines of the various stakeholders and agencies engaged in the effort; some of them tend to define problems in terms of their own expertise or/and interest.

¹⁴² C. Richard Nelson, *How should NATO handle Stabilisation Operations and Reconstruction efforts?*, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Policy paper, 2006

It is assessed that reconciling these two views is essential for successful of NATO Stability and Reconstruction operations. Given the goal of achieving a locally led, sustainable peace, successful Stability and Reconstruction operations will need to do more than just functional problem-solving. They need to transform any local conflict into a situation in which key local leaders see it as in their own self-interest to develop a process of collaborative decision-making—away from a more typical zero-sum game view. With such requirements in mind, a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the local political and security systems is crucial. Such an understanding also can reduce the chances that S&R resources may have the unintended consequences of exacerbating local rivalries.

- *Employ A Comprehensive Operations Planning Approach*

Comprehensive Operations Planning/Whole of Government/Whole of Nation (COP/WoG/WoN) approach to planning is vital from the first discussions of potential operations at the most senior level. Leaders must direct and supervise detailed and continuous *collaborative* planning and information-sharing throughout the entire spectrum of NATO operations, with all stakeholders present, engaged, and transparently communicating. Traditional approaches to inter-service, interagency, or multi-national planning built on the model of coordination and de-confliction will not suffice if complex factors are to be effectively addressed throughout the planning and conduct of NATO operations.

Military planners and non-military planners and experts must come together early enough, with a clear charter to work collectively, and remain engaged throughout operations. Economic and political concerns, factors, and outcomes must be addressed in an approach that will not be efficient or comfortable for traditional military planners. Yet the failure to consider and address the whole realm of economic factors in any given NATO operations augurs badly for eventual success particularly in the realm of stability operations.

- *Allocate Appropriate Authorities and Resources to Comprehensive Planning*

COPG/WoG/WoN as detailed Recommendation 5.1 is not within most military planner's comfort zone and it requires generational application of focused leadership, patience, and new organizational culture. To be truly effective this requires resources of time, money, human capital, the right facilities, and support. Despite several years of effort, NATO doctrinal, organizational, as well as institutional acceptance and support of COPG/WoG/WoN, planning remains

woefully under-resourced. It is perhaps a generation away from being a routine and reflexive response to planning. So, too, it is with authorities needed for truly effective COPD/WoG/WoN planning and execution of future NATO operations.

Within each NATO nation and amongst partners our various national government branches and departments generally operate on a last-century model with authorities closely guarded and dispensed cautiously in a slow and deliberate hierarchical manner. Fights over power, information, and authority are the norm, not the exception. NATO doctrine for planning and execution using COPD/WoG/WoN approach will only grow slowly over time if senior leaders aggressively lead change and organizational reforms (DOTMLPFI) to institutionalize those authorities, resources, and practices needed. From a military standpoint, economic considerations for planning are but one of many that demand new military planning approaches.

- *Obtain Proper Resources for Expertise and Continuity*

Planning efforts must be resourced with the right level of economic and operational expertise. Few many military planners have the requisite training, education and functional expertise for planning and integrating the economic aspects of major NATO operations. These capabilities and economic expertise exist primarily outside military organizations. Therefore, the need to pursue interoperability, professional education and training, and routine interagency collaborative planning to change the outcome of a known/predictable deficit of planning expertise is necessary.

This will require the pursuit of long-term organizational change and institutional reform, even while responding to current operational needs with ad-hoc, limited duration partnerships. Professional schooling, interagency assignments, directed training and exercises focused on non-military planning challenges, in addition to other tools must be considered in order to correct the imbalance. While recent NATO operations in Afghanistan are hardly the only useful model, our collective experience in the relevance of economic and other non-military planning factors in successful stability operations points to the need for a sea change in NATO institutional approaches.

▪ *Conduct Continuous Assessment and Planning*

NATO planners need to consider impacts on the local (as well as the national and regional) economy before, during, and post operations. This requires astute military and non-military assessments of the local dynamic to properly observe, record, and respond to change.

▪ *Conduct Pre-deployment Assessments of the Local Situation*

Understanding dynamics of the local situation begins with pre-deployment training for all ranks to understand the regional and national history, geography, terrain, culture, tribes, language, and operational environment of Afghanistan. Layer this with historical understandings, economic assessments, analysis of the dynamics of narrative and identity. Employ assistance from interpreters to verify preliminary assessments followed by in-country verification. Include positive and negative non-state actors' level of legitimacy among various sectors of society as well as an assessment to which elements of the local population have access to information, technology, and media. Pre-deployment training such as this is mission critical, rather than mission enhancing.

▪ *Use ASCOPE to Better Understand the Local Situation*

Many of the tools used by ISAF to improve training and COIN focus apply equally well to understanding the dynamics of the local situation. Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events (ASCOPE) is a tool used to quantify and understand the populace and their environment. It provides a more quantifiable measure of the populace's environment and shows how each part of the ASCOPE makes up and influences the areas (populace) strengths and vulnerabilities. This requires training at home station and upon arrival in-country but produces a unifying approach to understanding the dynamics of the local situation. In the case of Afghanistan, in-country training for ISAF (Phase III training) personnel upon arrival normally consists of "Induction" training of three to five days to review key skills and tasks. Additional training is sometimes provided for key leaders at the COIN Training Center in Kabul, where HAOE, COIN, and social/cultural topics are taught. As the ANSF assume lead for security, COIN training focus will shift from ISAF to the ANSF.

- *Include SOCINT in NATO AJP2, the Joint Intelligence Centre Structure, and Training*

Socio-cultural Intelligence (SOCINT) should be officially recognized as a special functional category of intelligence (similarly to Target Intelligence) by inserting it in the existing AJP 2 NATO publication¹⁴³ and applied only when necessary (e.g., Peace Support Operations, Crisis Response Operations and COIN). Likewise, SOCINT should be included in the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) structure. The main use is to support directional control of collection efforts in SOCINT and HAOE, provide analysis of information, and produce relevant intelligence. SOCINT can also be incorporated without the word “intelligence” in the title, akin to the US Human Terrain efforts. As such it could be called “Knowledge Management Directorate” working closely with the CJ2. Teaching and training Social Network Analysis methodology and tools to intelligence analysts and others will assist in better understanding complex networks, communication and power vectors, as well as linkages between and among various groups locally, regionally, and trans-nationally.

- *Be Aware of the Impact on Pre-Deployment Planning on Local Dynamics*

Likewise, the potential impact of NATO pre-deployment assessments on local power brokers and economic drivers should be factored in terms of how it may positively or negatively impact dynamics. The example of NATO operations in Afghanistan and the impact of a torrent of western investment fundamentally altered the Afghan economy, providing new goods, services, and growth, while fuelling massive corruption and creating new centres of power and money.

- *Increase Understanding of Non-State Armed Groups in the AOR during Pre-Deployment Phase*

Knowledge of non-state armed groups in the AOR is equally relevant and woefully incomplete. Understanding their locale, leadership structure, organizational patterns, goals, power base, finances, and foreign fighters/facilitators with whom they cooperate is essential. Working to achieve that level of understanding begins with intelligence analysis in coordination with

¹⁴³ AJP 2 *Allied Joint Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security Doctrine*. NATO HQ, 2003. [online] [22-08-2012] Available from www: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/73422647/4/SECTION-II-%E2%80%93-INTELLIGENCE>.

assessments from subject matter experts. Pre-deployment training, professional military education, leader training, as well as in-country training complete the picture.

▪ *Be Cognizant of Post-Deployment Variables on Local Dynamics*

As NATO operations grow in size and longevity, an assessment of how it may impact local economic opportunities for fuel, transportation, support, and other goods and services vital to sustainment is needed. In addition, there is a need to weigh local economic risks and opportunities weighed with NATO mission support and future stability. The trade-off between long-term investment opportunities and security must be considered.

Recommendations

- *Correct diagnosis of the local dynamics problem is essential;*
- *Employ a Comprehensive Operations Planning Approach;*
- *Allocate Appropriate Authorities and Resources to Comprehensive Planning;*
- *Obtain Proper Resources for Expertise and Continuity;*
- *Conduct Continuous Assessment and Planning;*
- *Conduct Pre-deployment Assessments of the Local Situation;*
- *Use ASCOPE to Better Understand the Local Situation;*
- *Include SOCINT in NATO AJP-2, the Joint Intelligence Centre Structure and Training;*
- *Be Aware of the Impact on Pre-Deployment Planning on Local Dynamics;*
- *Increase Understanding of Non-State Armed Groups in the AOR during Pre-Deployment Phase;*
- *Be Cognizant of Post-Deployment Variables on Local Dynamics.*

CHAPTER 5

PERCEPTION AND ACCEPTANCE OF A NATO OPERATION/MISSION

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1. Introduction

NATO is expanding its operational focus well beyond its traditional sphere of influence, as it is the case with on-going or recently concluded operations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This creates a new set of challenges; the most important of these being the legitimacy of NATO presence in the area. As such, a proper evaluation about NATO operations perception has to be based on data acquired from all societal layers and a careful consideration of the relations among them.

To this end, it is necessary to achieve a balance within communications transmitted by the appropriate bodies to a target audience. Such messages should serve as expressions of official policy in a manner that is not insensitive to local feelings or beliefs so that the legitimacy of the mission does not come under question. Based on this, the purpose of this chapter is to recommend ways NATO can influence the perception and acceptance of its mission based on the realities of 21st century kinetic and non-kinetic military operations.

2. A Question of Legitimacy

In political science, one of the principles for any claim to power is legitimacy. If the mission appears to be lacking have legitimacy (legitimacy being defined as the acceptance of authority and its actions or policies) NATO's presence in the operational theatre may be challenged by the local population. Some of these legitimacy problems can be political, economic or cultural in nature.

Legitimacy is important because both it emphasizes the role of norms within international society and it shapes and constraints actual state conducts. Also "the degree of legitimacy present in any particular international order is directly related to the stability of that order."¹⁴⁴

With regard to military intervention, the United Nations Security Council is the body best suited to authorize military actions. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has stated that the UN stamp of approval confers "unique legitimacy."¹⁴⁵ This is critical in regard to NATO since the UN Charter serves as a fundamental principle of the alliance because it provides the legal basis for the creation of NATO and establishes the overall responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security. It is the framework from which the Alliance operates.¹⁴⁶

As such, NATO was founded on the basis that the North Atlantic Treaty upholds the rights and obligations of Allied nations as well as their international obligations in accordance with Articles 7 and 12 of the UN Charter.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, NATO works strictly under the confines of international law and mandate. Consequently, UN Security Council resolutions have provided the mandate for NATO's major peace support operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. Recently concluded operations in Libya were executed in accordance with IAW UN Security Resolutions 1970 and 1973. However, some societies may have other sources of legitimacy, which will have to be respected before conducting military operations. Failing to do so can result in a lack of support for a future NATO mission.

¹⁴⁴ Clark, Ian. *Legitimacy in International Relations*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007, 12.

¹⁴⁵ Goldstein, Joshua S. *Winning the War on War; The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide*, New York, NY: Plume Books, 2012, 131-132.

¹⁴⁶ NATO Handbook. Brussels, Belgium: Public Policy Division, 2006, 255.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 256; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

For example, the so-called “War on Terror”¹⁴⁸ has been viewed and exploited by some radical elements as a conflict against Islam as a whole, rather than Islamic fundamentalism, thus undermining the conflict. This is so because some Islamic societies believe that “God is concerned with politics, and this belief is confirmed by Shari’a, the Holy Law, which deals extensively with the acquisition and exercise of power, the nature of legitimacy and authority, the duties of the ruler and subject, among other things.”¹⁴⁹

In the case of Afghan society, there is a strong conservative tradition of devotion to Islamic, ethnic and tribal canons and this tradition cannot be changed overnight. Therefore, if one were perceived as antagonist of Islam, he would encounter resistance. Consequently, it becomes important to recognize and respect these beliefs and traditions, as well as to work within them, in order to achieve legitimacy within the theatre of operations.

A Question of Legitimacy

- *Legitimacy emphasizes the role of norms within international society because it shapes and constrains actual state conduct.*
- *With regard to military intervention, the UN Security Council is the body best suited to authorize military actions.*
- *It becomes important for NATO to recognize and respect locally established rules of legitimacy (e.g. beliefs, canons and traditions) and work within them in order to achieve legitimacy within the theatre of operations from the early stage of planning process.*

3. Colonial Legacy

As discussed earlier, at one point or another throughout the history of the western world, several nations became colonial powers. This European colonial period began with the discovery of the Americas in the late 15th century and reached its apex in the 19th century during the period known as the “scramble for Africa.” During this period, the Western nations established colonies or “spheres of influence” in every corner of the world.

¹⁴⁸ NOTE: “War on Terror” is not an officially recognized NATO term.

¹⁴⁹ Lewis, Bernard, “The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror”, New York, NY: Random House, 2004, 8.

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, 80 colonies have achieved their independence.¹⁵⁰ However, the colonial legacy has affected the political, economic, cultural, racial, ethnic and religious composition of numerous nations throughout the world and arguably has been the root cause of many conflicts (territorial, ethnic, religious) in these former colonies.

This colonial legacy must be taken into account in the context of modern military operations, both kinetic and non-kinetic, as this can have a significant impact, which can be either positive or negative, on the native population. This is particularly important when NATO undertakes military operations as NATO is mainly composed of European nations, some of which are former colonial powers.

If a previous colonial power has had a turbulent relationship with its former colonies prior to or after independence then this relationship should be carefully evaluated in regard to its potential implications upon a proposed operation. The former colony's history, as well as the relationship (if any) between this particular nation and its former colonial ruler, must be carefully evaluated. Has the relationship been turbulent or amicable, for example? This is particularly true in regard to relations between former colonial powers in NATO and those nations in Africa and the Middle East that were their colonial possessions.

There are examples of amicable relations between former colonial powers and their colonies. For instance, in Latin America there is still a rich Spanish and Portuguese heritage throughout Central and South America despite the bloody wars of independence in the past. This heritage has defined the region in terms of its language, religion and other characteristics. Moreover, there have been instances in which Latin American nations have asked that their former colonial power (Spain) arbitrate in territorial disputes, as it was in the case in 1891. In this case, Colombia and Venezuela asked the Spanish Crown to mediate in a maritime delineation disagreement in the Gulf of Venezuela.¹⁵¹

The British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK) highlights a contemporary example of excellent military cooperation between a former colonial power and colony. BATUK is a permanent non-armoured training support unit based north of Nairobi. By accord with the Kenyan Government, "six infantry battalions per year

¹⁵⁰ "United Nations and Decolonization", <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/> accessed 12 September 2012

¹⁵¹ "El conflicto fronterizo en el Golfo de Venezuela", <http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/geografia/ctemc/ctemc09b.htm> accessed 13 September 2012

carry out six-week exercises in Kenya as well as three Royal Engineer Squadron exercises which carry out civil engineering projects and two medical company group deployments which provide primary health care assistance to the civilian community.”¹⁵² The key to the success of this enterprise is that many local people are employed by the British military, which also uses local providers and contracting to stimulate the economy. This transparent engagement coupled with an historic tradition (Kenya is part of the Commonwealth of Nations) translates into mission acceptance by the local populace with little opposition.

Western nations have a tendency to have short memories; this is not the case with many other nations, especially those with a colonial past. Therefore, if a particular NATO nation has had a turbulent relationship with any of its former colonies prior to or after independence, this should be seriously taken into account as this could adversely affect any proposed operation before it starts. This is particularly true in the Middle East. Consequently, consciousness of the colonial legacy (if applicable) of x or y nation must be carefully considered and cannot be ignored as this experience has become an intrinsic part of the identity of these states.

Taking into consideration some countries’ negative experience with colonization and their positive experience with former communist regime countries in the 20th century (some of which are now members of NATO) offers another perspective when considering possible operations in these countries. These post-communist countries gained experience in dealing with former colonial nations during the so called “communist support program to third (less developed) world countries” as part of their foreign policy. Most of these post-communist countries still maintain a good relationship with these emerging nations - something NATO may have overlooked.

The East European, post communist NATO countries, can offer another perspective to crisis resolution and/or situation assessment, as a result of their own experiences and expertise. Due to a variety of factors (e.g. country / army size, economics, politics, etc) it would be very difficult for any of these countries to undertake the role of leading a stability or peacekeeping mission. However, these nations can assist in building a relationship within an operational environment. Appointing a leader (force commander, similar to how the UN does it) from these nations can change the perception and acceptance of a NATO mission by the local population (e.g. to avoid perception of the mission as

¹⁵² “The British Army in Africa”, <http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22724.aspx> accessed 28 October 2012

“western occupation/neo-colonialism”). Doing so, however, will require acceptance by the nation tasked with providing the majority of troops to the operation.

Self-recognition of the colonial legacy of some NATO members and the impact of their actions upon other nations is the first step to fully assess the perception and acceptance to any future NATO military operation.

Colonial Legacy

- *The colonial legacy has affected the political, economic, cultural, racial, ethnic and religious composition of numerous nations.*
- *The colonial legacy must be taken into account in the context of modern military operations.*
- *If a particular NATO nation has had a turbulent relationship with any of its former colonies prior to or after independence, this should be seriously taken into account as this could adversely affect any proposed operation before it starts.*
- *Post communist NATO countries and their interactions with former colonies in the 20th century can offer another perspective to crisis resolution and/or situation assessment in former colonial nations as a result of the experiences and expertise they have acquired.*
- *Self-recognition of the colonial legacy of some NATO members and the impact of their actions upon other nations is the first step to fully assess the perception and acceptance to any future NATO military operation.*

4. Kosovo Peace Building Experience

Since June 1999, NATO has been at the forefront of peacekeeping efforts to prevent further bloodshed and establish stability in Kosovo. To this end, the United Nations passed Security Resolution 1244 with the intent of widening the international efforts to build peace and stability in this troubled region. Resolution 1244 authorized the creation of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to begin the long process of building peace, democracy, stability and self-government in the shattered province.

When the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) mission first arrived in Kosovo in June of 1999, it found a society in chaos without any law and order. Into this disordered environment, some 900,000 Kosovo Albanians who had fled Serbian security forces returned with unprecedented speed. The UNMIK mission was dependent on the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), a joint NATO command that included troops from 37 countries, who were tasked with maintaining a secure and stable environment. The UNMIK mission would not have had a chance to do so without the presence of the KFOR.¹⁵³

The UNMIK tasks were divided in three parts:

- (1) Administer Kosovo.
- (2) Create the institutions and other conditions necessary for Kosovo to exercise substantial self-government.
- (3) Facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's final status.

However, the key to achieving these tasks was not just the commitment of generous resources (over three billion Euros in civilian aid) but applying principles learned in previous peace-building experiences, especially in Bosnia. Nevertheless, in the case of Kosovo the UN and NATO had a lot more to learn.¹⁵⁴

Therefore, UNMIK organized itself into four pillars:

- (1) Pillar one, which created a multi-national UN police force and a multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service that would eventually replace the international police. It also created a judicial system from the ground up.
- (2) Pillar two, which managed all of Kosovo's public services. Since transferring authority in many areas, the UN is currently scaling down and playing more of an advisory role.
- (3) Pillar Three, managed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) dealt with democratization and elections.

¹⁵³ Steiner, Michael. "For Example, Kosovo. Seven Principles for Peace-Building." Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global>, January 2003. (Hereafter cited as Steiner, "Kosovo")

¹⁵⁴ *ibid.*

- (4) The European Union (EU), who as Pillar Four, took responsibility for rebuilding physical infrastructure and is still helping to create the foundation for an EU-compatible economy.¹⁵⁵

To fill the administrative vacuum after the war, UNMIK first created joint administrative structures. Later, in 2001, UNMIK and Kosovo representatives collaborated in drafting a Constitutional Framework as the basis for Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Kosovo-wide elections organized by the OSCE created a multi-ethnic Assembly and Government. The Government has eleven ministries including finance, education, health, transport and social-welfare. Two sets of municipal elections also yielded multi-ethnic municipal assemblies across Kosovo.¹⁵⁶

As a result of NATO's experiences in this region, it would be wise to focus on seven principles, which may be considered to be essential to the success of peace-building efforts anywhere. These principles are as follows:

4.1. Begin with a clear mandate

A peace operation has to start with a clear set of objectives. This may seem obvious. But even in recent missions, this elementary principle has been ignored. Within the Dayton Peace Agreement, the primary objective was to end the fighting in Bosnia or, at a minimum, to have a lasting cease-fire agreement.

A mission's objectives also have to be realistic, both in terms of what the local population wants and what can actually be achieved. In Kosovo the aim was not nation building but institution building: the UN was fostering institutions and attitudes that the people of the region would be able to build themselves. This doesn't mean cloning EU societies but, rather, creating the basis for a stable and functional society.

In Bosnia, although the High Representative was clearly the most senior international official, the various international organizations have been quasi-autonomous. In the beginning there was no coordinated decision-making process. This structure made it difficult for the international community to coordinate its own efforts, much less anyone else's. In Kosovo, UNMIK acted on the lessons learned in Bosnia and built a new kind of structure. It created the four pillars previously mentioned, each with a well-defined mandate and all of them

¹⁵⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *ibid.*

subordinate to the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General.¹⁵⁷

4.2. Match the mandate with the means to achieve it

If the mission is given a far-reaching mandate, it must also be given the capacity to follow through. This applies both to legal powers and authority and to human and physical resources. First and foremost, it is essential to establish security and the rule of law - the very basis for all other progress. Courts need the authority and resources to dispense justice. Police need the authority and resources to enforce it.

An example of this is the Kosovo Central Fiscal Authority (CFA), UNMIK's tax service, and its Customs Service. The CFA and Customs together collected 80% of the money that went into Kosovo's budget. The CFA was merged with Kosovo's Ministry of Finance.

Additionally, Resolution 1244 made UNMIK the ultimate authority in Kosovo. That gave the UN and NATO the power to carry out police investigations, the powers of arrest and the authority to try suspects and imprison criminals. These were not advisory powers, as the international police in Bosnia had, but executive powers. Powers such as these are critical to meeting the challenge of a NATO security mission - achieving fundamental standards that apply to all functioning societies.¹⁵⁸

4.3. Get it right from the beginning

The tone of the entire mission is set in its very first days. The beginning is no time for trial-and-error. This is necessary first, in order to establish credibility and second, because it is much more difficult to correct the course later on. Bosnia lacked the civil mandate and the means to begin strongly; Kosovo had the mandate but still lacked the means in the beginning.

The international community shied away from making Bosnia a protectorate. There were two reasons for this: the ideological legacy of decolonization and a terror of 'mission creep'. Kosovo, by contrast, was front-loaded - or so it seemed.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *ibid.*

But even in Kosovo implementation was too slow. The military prepares in advance for crises and NATO was ready. But the civil mission in Kosovo only had ten days to prepare. The UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations must be given sufficient time and resources to respond quickly and effectively to crises as they arise. UNMIK was operating with a skeleton staff.

The summer and autumn of 1999 saw the most vicious reprisals, both among Kosovo Albanians and by the Albanian majority against Kosovo Serbs and members of other minority communities. Members of rival Albanian groups kidnapped, tortured and murdered one another. People in Kosovo say there have been more Kosovo Serbs killed after the war than during it. Local politicians and former fighters struggled to fill the power vacuum. As a consequence, developing legitimate democratic institutions was delayed by the need to dismantle the structures that emerged in the first six months of the mission.

UNMIK did not focus on organized crime at first because it didn't have the means to do so. Taking advantage of the situation, criminal gangs spread their tentacles throughout the political and legal vacuum. Starting in 2001, all the security forces shifted their resources to suppressing organized crime. Both the police and Justice improved their strategic cooperation with KFOR. Though more remains to be done, UNMIK's efforts against organized crime demonstrate the value of coordination and objective-driven policy.¹⁵⁹

4.4. Learn as you go

International missions need to be 'learning organizations.' Critical to this is admitting that mistakes have been made. Learning cannot take place without recognizing that things have not been done right in the first place. Criticism will be more effective for the mission and less damaging politically if it comes from within the mission itself rather than from outsiders.

To be effective, missions must study the environment - its political rivalries and alliances, how people make a living and the stories they tell one another. The mission needs to conduct public opinion surveys and consultations with the public in order to understand how people view their situation.

Essentially, the mission has to recognize what priorities are critical. For example, because of Kosovo's open status, it was not clear in the beginning whether UNMIK would or could engage in privatization. But UNMIK came to

¹⁵⁹ *ibid.*

recognize that privatization was essential to putting Kosovo's economy on its feet.¹⁶⁰

The key to success in these endeavours is to listen to the local people and to seek their advice. It might seem trite, but it is important to remember that no matter how great the effort on the part of mission personnel, the local population knows its own society better than outsiders do. Lessons Learned' has become a bit of a buzzword, but that doesn't mean everyone is capable of doing it effectively.¹⁶¹

It is also critical to maintain an ongoing learning environment because a mission also requires standards by which it can measure its achievements. For example, UNMIK created a list of eight benchmarks as a basis for measuring Kosovo's progress. These benchmarks were designed to cover the basic requirements for any functional democratic society and included:

- (1) Democratic institutions.
- (2) The rule of law.
- (3) A viable market-based economy.
- (4) Property rights.
- (5) Multi-ethnicity and returns.
- (6) Freedom of movement.

The point of listing and publicizing them was to ensure that all of the relevant actors - the international community, NATO, UNMIK, Kosovo's institutions and civil society – clearly understood the mission's objectives. From the international perspective, this process made it easier to identify both achievements and problems. In Kosovo the UN hoped the standards would help to concentrate people's minds on Kosovo's key challenges.¹⁶²

4.5. Finish what you start

Once the international community has begun a peace-building mission, it has to see it through until the society and its institutions have become sustainable.

Finishing what has been started is critically important for two reasons. The first is for the credibility of other peace-building missions. Secondly, leaving

¹⁶⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁶¹ *ibid.*

¹⁶² *ibid.*

business unfinished can lead to the creation of even worse conditions than the original intervention was meant to address.

The problem is that peace building, although it must never be open ended, is a long-term process while political logic in individual governments is nearly always focuses on the short-term. Concluding a mission before its aims have been achieved may be the most common mistake of the international community has made in the past.¹⁶³

Afghanistan offers an excellent example of this type of error. After nearly a decade of supporting the mujahedeen, Afghanistan was suddenly abandoned by the anti-Soviet coalition. Rival warlords and the Taliban competed to fill the resulting power vacuum, however, that void was only filled after the events that followed 9/11.¹⁶⁴ The same can be said about Iraq.

Therefore, one of the reasons that measuring progress is so important is that the actors need to identify the time when they should make the transition from peacekeeping to development. The focal point of the development stage should be consolidating the rule of law and creating the institutions and regulations of a market economy. What is important about this is that a great deal of expertise exists in these subjects, but they are never applied to post-conflict areas because they are kept separate from each other (i.e. peacekeepers are kept in a box marked “peacekeeping” and developers are locked in a box marked “development” with little or no cooperation and coordination between them).¹⁶⁵

The point of creating a yardstick like UNMIK's standards is to gauge when to make the transition from one stage to another and to determine when the mission itself is no longer needed.¹⁶⁶

4.6. It is about the right sequence (the essential sequence)

The focus should be on security and the establishment of rule of law as these is the element that forms the basis for creating a stable state. A peace-building mission must establish order out of chaos. In this phase, the mission is in control of everything. Order means no discrimination, no violence, no bullying. This is the essential framework for creating stability.

¹⁶³ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ *ibid.*

The mission's first priority must be security and the rule of law. In Bosnia the UN made a mistake by holding elections before establishing the rule of law.

On the other hand, in Kosovo, UNMIK established consent through information, dialogue and participation. In this stage, regulations, laws and an administrative framework were created. An essential part of this process is the creation of effective institutions that deliver the key benefits of peace. This process must extend to all elements of the local population. Elections may be vital but they must wait until the time is right to hold them. Consent for the established order must be institutionalized so that they will be absorbed into a society. The processes of peaceful coexistence, democratic decision-making and conflict resolution must become habitual.¹⁶⁷

Ultimately, the peace-building or stability operation's endgame is to transfer its responsibilities to a qualified partner. The mission has not succeeded until it has become unnecessary. Returning to the example of Kosovo, the eight benchmarks were the standard by which progress was measured in terms of achieving that goal. The transfer of responsibilities can only be achieved if the transition is properly carried out. This is the most critical and potentially volatile mission stage. A gradual transfer of responsibilities is essential in order to be certain that the society's institutions have the capacity to support them. Pacing this process correctly can prove to be a serious challenge. The problem is that once the transfer of responsibilities begins, unrealistic expectations may occur. These, in turn, may lead to impatience, which can then produce friction.¹⁶⁸

The UN worked with other partners in Kosovo to transfer responsibilities as quickly as they were able to manage them. Thousands of political representatives and civil servants were under pressure to learn quickly. On the part of the mission, this required continuous consultation, sensitivity and consistency throughout the transition process. In this phase, the support of the international community is especially imperative. In responding to the tensions of the transfer phase, it is critical for the international community to avoid sending mixed signals and vital to speak with one voice.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ *ibid.*

4.7. Encouraging social change

Peace building does not mean creating clones of western European societies. Clearly, a range of traditions is consistent with sustainable stability. But not all are. The UN must accept that the process of change from violence to peace is a struggle in which it will have to take sides. The UN may or may not choose to work with any one entity from among those who support the process. But UN authorities will have to support those who are for the peace process and oppose those who are against it.

The UN also has to try to change general attitudes that may appear to be 'traditional' if in reality they undermine the mission and are keeping it from achieving its objectives. For example: corruption and cronyism can seriously hinder a mission in the pursuit of establishing security and stability. "Corruption may have been practiced since time immemorial, but it retards the development of any society."¹⁷⁰

The empowerment of local women has been shown to be perhaps the most reliable single predictor of overall social and political development. In most parts of the world women have limited access to education and employment. Knowing this, international missions should not hesitate to improve conditions for women in these societies wherever they can¹⁷¹.

The willingness to challenge some traditionally accepted social norms, however, does not mean forcing change on a society. Encouraging change in a society must be the result of a dynamic process of mutual learning. "The international community brings its experiences to a community that wants to leave conflict behind and enjoy the fruits of peace. The peace-building mission must also learn from the local community to understand its values and ways of doing things. The point here is that building peace doesn't allow avoiding the hard challenges just because they're deeply rooted. When the UN finishes a mission, a healthy and self-sustaining society should be left behind. Otherwise weeds will grow back and entangle the UN for years to come."¹⁷²

4.8 The Art of Letting Go

The good news is that the UN has demonstrated that peace building is not an exercise in futility, as some media, international organizations and both

¹⁷⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *ibid*; The UN Millennium Project

¹⁷² Steiner, "Kosovo".

Kosovo and Serbian representatives have argued. It is instead a manageable human enterprise subject to the determined application of certain basic principles. When looking at a conflict, the international community can legitimately decide whether or not to intervene. Clearly, the UN can't intervene everywhere. However, the UN has to be serious about it and follow it through. When it comes to peace-building, this means adhering to tested principles.¹⁷³

First, a mission must go in with a clear mandate. Second, it must have the authority and resources to do the job. Third, it must get it right from the beginning. Fourth, it must learn from the host society and from its own mistakes. Fifth, it must finish what it starts. Sixth, it must first establish security and the rule of law as the framework for democratization. Seventh, it must try to change the host society's practices which can hinder the successful achievement of the mission's goals - even if they are 'traditional.' In the end, this is about handing over responsibilities, not clinging to them. As such, the key is to build up the importance of those to whom we need to hand over. Letting go is not easy but it is the measurement of success.¹⁷⁴

Kosovo Peace Building Experience

- *When the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) mission arrived in Kosovo in June of 1999, it found a society in chaos without any law and order.*
- *As a result of NATO's experiences in this region, it would be wise to focus on seven principles, which may be considered to be essential to the success of peace-building efforts anywhere.*
- *First, a mission must go in with a clear mandate. Second, it must have the authority and resources to do the job. Third, it must get it right from the beginning. Fourth, it must learn from the host society and from its own mistakes. Fifth, it must finish what it starts. And the two hard ones: Sixth, it must first establish security and the rule of law as the framework for democratization. Seventh, it must try to change the host society's practices which can inhibit the successful achievement of the mission's goals - even if they are 'traditional.'*

¹⁷³ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *ibid.*

5. Importance of Maintaining the Moral High Ground

For over a decade, NATO has been involved in complex counterinsurgency and asymmetric type operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Insurgency is more than combat between armed groups, but rather, a political struggle with a high level of violence. This is further complicated by language and cultural differences. Cultural misunderstandings can have devastating effects to the mission. This is not only a battle against a faceless enemy but much of this struggle is being carried out in the “marketplace of ideas.” As such, it is imperative to maintain the moral high ground at all costs.

To this end, NATO must advocate adherence to high moral standards. This will deny opportunities for the adversary to take advantages of one’s mistakes. In the end, the object is to win the support of the local population; this is what is at stake.

Anger is a normal reaction for troops who witness traumatic events, but mission leaders must encourage and enforce restraint. Strict adherence to Rules of Engagement (ROE’s) and human rights is critical are crucial if a mission is to achieve success. For example, according to General David Petraeus, the former U.S. Commander in Iraq, the Abu-Ghraib incident “tarnished our image in Iraq and worldwide.”¹⁷⁵

In the aftermath of the Abu-Ghraib incident, detainee operations were completely overhauled. Health care was improved as well as transparency. For instance, the International Red Cross inspected the detention centres on numerous occasions. This is why it is imperative to take immediate corrective action when violations are identified. If the mission intends to establish the rule of law, a good way to do that is to start out by observing the law itself.

The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual (Field Manual 3-24)¹⁷⁶, developed in the wake of the United States military experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, warns of the dangers of losing the moral high ground. It specifically states: “A key part of any insurgent’s strategy is to attack the will of the domestic and international opposition. One of the insurgents’ most effective ways to undermine and erode political will is to portray their opposition as untrustworthy

¹⁷⁵ <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haditha/interviews/petraeus.html> (Interviews Gen. David Petraeus, Frontline, Rules of Engagement, interview conducted 1 August 2007)

¹⁷⁶ U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual (Field Manual 3-24).para. 7-25, pg. 161

or illegitimate. These attacks work especially well when insurgents can portray their opposition as unethical by the opposition's own standards."

To address this, the Field Manual highlights the importance of treating non-combatants and detainees humanely, according to internationally recognized values and human rights standards.

Importance of Maintaining the Moral High Ground

- *Insurgency is more than a combat between armed groups, but rather, a political struggle with a high level of violence in culturally complicated environment.*
- *Advocate adherence to high moral standards. This will deny opportunities for the adversary to take advantages of one's mistakes.*
- *The price for losing the moral high ground is very high having implications from tactical up to strategic level.*

6. NATO instruments analyzing its perception and acceptance by local population

Currently within NATO force structures there are existing assets (branches) with convenient procedural background on analyzing and evaluating perception and acceptance of NATO mission by local population as Intelligence (and HUMINT particularly), Psychological operations (PSYOPS), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Commander Advisory Group (POLAD, LEGAD, Cultural Advisor). All these branches possess series of documents as doctrines, Standing Operating Procedures (SOP), etc describing their role and responsibilities, and unfortunately having delimitative functions which influence coordination and effective cooperation including knowledge sharing among them. Measurement and evaluation of local population perception is a subject of Panel 6.

Recent ground operations established two new disciplines, Key leader engagement and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, and they can be viewed as the future NATO capabilities.

6.1 Key Leader Engagement as a Valuable Messaging Tool

Properly transmitting NATO's message not only is critical to achieve acceptance of the mission and achieve desired effects. In line with the principles described in Chapter 1 points 2.1, 2.2 and 3.2 NATO can improve its messaging via effective Key Leader Engagement (KLE). To this end, Key Leader Engagement (KLE) "is about building relationships over time with enough strength and depth, so that they can then support our interests during times of crisis."¹⁷⁷ Key Leader Engagement includes building and maintaining working relationships with persons or entities that have influence in the theatre. These relationships are sustained by face to face, deliberate and focused meetings in order to achieve desired effects.

Before deploying its forces, NATO should initially identify key leaders in the operational theatre. In an informational operation environment the IO messages are released to the public. In a KLE environment, the strategic KLE messages are controlled by the engager and the results from key leaders can be predicted and expected. KLE is of crucial significance because it holds the power to convince the population of a country of the *legitimacy* of NATO's presence in the theatre and of NATO's genuine support and care for the population. One example of this is using KLEs to gain local support for deeply unpopular night operations in Afghanistan.

Key leaders (KLs) include government officials but also student groups, women's groups, grass roots leaders, tribal elders and religious leaders, among others. Such KLs should be identified collectively by NATO nations or by individual nations stationed in separate parts of the country, sharing the information with the other NATO nations. Key leaders are individuals who hold significant influence over a group of people. Methods of contact can vary and differ by region, but may include approaching the KL via telephone, translators or local power brokers. Direction regarding identifying KLs would come from each NATO section's supervisor, and political/cultural advisor. Successful KLEs depend on the cultural mores of a nation and may include shared meals, official office visits, and the development of genuine friendships, both in one-on-one situations or group settings. A situation in which KLE can be very successful is in the case of a NATO officer befriending a KL and using this influence to communicate NATO messages to the population in a time of crisis. The crisis could result from a NATO misstep and the KL might be able to defuse tensions by convincing the population that

¹⁷⁷ U.S. Joint Forces Command. *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy*, p.52.

such a mistake was not NATO's intention in order to eliminate potentially violent protests.

Of paramount importance in Key Leader Engagement is a NATO officer's intimate knowledge of local customs, languages, religion and other defining factors. A female NATO official who very freely and jovially approaches a deeply traditional tribal or religious elder in rural Afghanistan is likely to cause him to take offense at the manner of her approach. By doing so, she will probably fail to complete her assignment and significantly discredit the mission in that area. Situations like these can be avoided if NATO officers are fully and extensively trained in the religious, cultural and linguistic customs of the area. This cannot be accomplished in a one-day seminar or by reading of a book on local customs. The local culture must be studied and genuinely interacted with in low-risk situations before a NATO official can successfully engage key leaders. It is best if knowledgeable local advisors or other NATO officers who have spent considerable time in theatre conduct the KLEs. KLE is based on genuine friendships and these friendships must be developed and maintained over time.

KLE is a cyclical process requiring thoughtful intentionality. The following steps outline the basic steps of a KLE cycle:

- (1) **Identify key leader/entity** (including the potential for long term influence and evaluation of the KL network). Identifying key leaders require social network analyses of a particular person of interest. Analysts involved in this process must be properly educated and having broad knowledge of the local situation. Other branches represented at Headquarters, including INTEL, PSYOPS, CIMIC, and Commander Advisor Cells must support the whole process and relevant information must be shared. In case of an erroneous Key Leader identification, a negative effect on the perception of NATO's mission by local population may result.
- (2) **Develop a negotiation strategy.** This includes contingencies and counters to unfavourable responses and reviews of previous post-engagement reports. The primary objective and supporting objectives and the preliminary conditions required to achieve these objectives must be established. Determine in advance what the mission will be able to offer in order to achieve the desired results. Finally, predict the probability of favourable responses to a request or a desired outcome and develop the best alternative when efforts to achieve an agreement fail.

- (3) **Rehearse KLE.** This includes discussing the desired results and common terms with the cultural advisor, designate a recorder and photographer, determine which person takes the lead (in many cases, this is the cultural advisor), practice social nuances (including greetings and leave-taking), and conduct standard mission planning (security, logistics, communications, contingencies, etc.)
- (4) **Engagement.** Be certain to adhere to local meeting etiquette; focus on the objective while respectfully listening; under promise and over deliver. Conclude the business portion by clarifying or repeating agreements made.
- (5) **Debriefing.** Submit a full post-KLE report to appropriate personnel or departments. Ensure relevant KL information gets returned to the designated database in order to prepare for future engagements.
- (6) **Re-engage.** Reengage KLEs and sustain relationships.

Why is this necessary? Conducting KLEs validates the mission in the eyes of the public, allowing the communication of NATO strategic messages to the public to take place via those individuals or groups who already have influence and legitimacy in the theatre. This in turn strengthens local leaders, thereby strengthening the sustainable leadership, while providing opportunities for future leaders to be legitimized.

Identifying Key Leaders, developing a KLE matrix and providing thorough assessments of these KLEs can greatly assist NATO command groups and all others engaging key leaders to deliver NATO mission strategic or priority messages effectively to national key leaders and thereby to the greater public. A recently concluded JFC Naples NATO Rapid Response Force certification exercise highlighted the importance of using and exploiting KLE as a strategic communication tool. As such, KLE must be formally incorporated as part of the overall NATO doctrine.

6.2 Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams - OMLT

The Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) program is an important part of NATO's contribution towards the development of local armed force by providing training and mentoring. They also provide a liaison capability

between the local armed forces and NATO/Coalition forces, co-coordinating the planning of operations and ensuring that the local armed forces units receives necessary enabling support (including close air support, casualty evacuation and medical evacuation).

Due to the fact that OMLT members daily interact with armed forces leaders and members, they can play a vital role in the evaluation process of NATO perception by local populations. They can also transmit messages, which can strengthen the acceptance of NATO's presence. Currently, the processes of evaluation and messaging can be limited or veiled by the processes of bureaucratic reporting. Therefore, processes related to perceptions and evaluations of the local situation, as well as the transmission of core messages, must be formalized (e.g. reporting format, information flow, etc) as an essential part of NATO doctrine.

NATO instruments for analyzing its perception and acceptance by local population

- *NATO forces possess structures and assets (branches) with suitable procedural backgrounds for analyzing and evaluating perception and acceptance of NATO mission.*
- *All these branches are doctrinally framed, enabling them to create conditions for the delimitation of their functions, allowing them to influence coordination and effective cooperation between them.*
- *Recent ground operations have established two new disciplines, Key Leader Engagement and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams which can be further developed as future NATO capabilities.*

7. Conclusion

Mission legitimacy must be achieved and maintained. To this end, these five principles must be achieved:

- (1) Strict Adherence to the International Rule of Law and its cohesion with locally accepted rules of law.
- (2) Recognizing the importance of historical experience.
- (3) Employing the local population as part of the larger process of engagement.

- (4) Preserving non-combatants lives and dignity.
- (5) Seeking and exploiting direct communication with critical members of the local population at all levels.

All of these are essential to help validate NATO's mission and promote its acceptance.

Recommendations

- Mission legitimacy must be achieved and maintained. Clear NATO definition and policy on the level of legitimacy acceptance must be established.
- NATO must reconsider implementation of the UN seven peace-building principles based on best practices developed in Kosovo.
- Assess the historical relationship with the country or countries involved in a potential crisis area.
- Establish a force commander, following the example from the UN, chosen from an acceptable country / region involved in crisis.
- Doctrinally formalized Key Leaders Engagement and Operational Mentor and Liaison Team functions.
- Identify Key leaders and approach them before the beginning of an operation.

CHAPTER 6

MEASURABLE INDICATORS OF THE POPULATIONS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS NATO

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1. Introduction

The ability of NATO forces and leaders at all levels to understand the culture and attitudes of the peoples and nations where we contemplate operations should inform all aspects of planning, training, campaign design, and operations. Whatever level of preparation and cultural understanding we may bring to the effort must be supplemented by effective survey of the attitudes of the local population toward NATO and key actors in areas of NATO operations. Properly planned and consistently executed professional surveys of popular attitudes can provide key information to help NATO understand vital trends and developments in the location population and their perceptions towards NATO, the so-called "Human Terrain".

The operational effectiveness can be enhanced or diminished by the effective and timely understanding of attitudes concerning NATO operations. The art form is “how” to plan, train, prepare for and consistently survey/understand attitudes in the increasingly complex operational environments of irregular activity, insurgency, and asymmetric threats NATO faces today.

Despite a large number of NATO doctrinal publications which mention the importance of attitudes of the local population relative to NATO operations (PYSOPS, INFO Ops, COIN), they have been rarely considered, analyzed, and integrated in a systematic manner. A brief look at ISAF operations 2002-2012 reveals a wide variety of efforts to survey attitudes of the local population that vary by time, nation, regional command, echelon/level of command, military or civilian organization, etc. Unfortunately, such efforts are characterized by inconsistent application of survey tools and methods, inconsistent training and preparation, non-standard execution, and widely inconsistent collection, analysis, storage, marking, sharing, and reporting of data.

Although there has been, over time, increased NATO awareness of the challenges to effectively survey attitudes, there is little evidence of a comprehensive Civilian-military, or even exclusively military (NATO/ISAF) effort to create and publish basic standards for surveys on popular attitudes. Consider the complexity required to standardize training, preparation and execution of surveys amongst the following: an 18 yr old US Marine corporal in Regional Command South (RC-S), a seasoned German civilian BMZ official in Regional Command North (RC-N), contracted Afghan workers in Wardak Province (Regional Command East (RC-E)) or NGO workers in Kabul, and there are dozens more such complex types, most of which rotate on a 6 month tour. Each has his own background, experience, education, and operational role: without a forcing function for standardization and professionalization such as doctrine for Human Aspects of the Operational Environment) HAOE, surveys of local attitudes carry a huge risk of providing misleading or inaccurate data, skewed by time and quality of data, critical analysis, and accurate reporting.

Indeed, one might say that attitudes are a neglected area in military missions on political/policy, strategic, and operational levels. The present contribution describes the potential role of attitude research in NATO stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The research will focus on the nature of attitudes and their relation to behaviour. The operational, strategic, and policy relevance of attitudes in military context will also be discussed, as well as relevant considerations in this context. Attitudes are critically important yet understudied in military context.

Key Points

- *Operational effectiveness can be enhanced or diminished by the effective and timely understanding of attitudes concerning NATO operations.*
- *Attitudes of the local population relative to NATO operations (PYSOPS, INFO Ops, COIN) have been rarely considered, analyzed, and integrated in a systematic manner.*

2. What is an attitude?

Attitudes have been one of the most widely researched and used concepts in psychology. Psychologists have assumed for a long time that attitudes and other associations in memory are stable structures that underlie behaviour in a variety of situations (e.g. Allport, 1935; Beck, 1976). The function typically attributed to attitudes is to provide valenced summaries of one's environment that serve as a "predisposition or readiness for response" (Allport, 1935, p. 805). Attitudes signal people about whether objects in their environment are good or bad and thus perform an important approach/avoidance function (Fazio, 1986; Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956). Eagly and Chaiken (1993), for example, defined an attitude as "a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour" (p. 1). Consistent with this approach, people are typically asked to rate the positivity or negativity of their feelings toward everything from social issues and consumer products to political candidates and romantic partners, and they have little trouble doing so. These ratings are further used to make predictions about or to explain corresponding behaviours (buying behaviour, voting, health-promoting or health compromising behaviour, etc.).

Attitudes are comprised of three components – affective, cognitive, and behavioural. The affective component is how one feels about an entity. For example: "I feel angry about NATO's presence." The cognitive component is what a person believes or knows about an attitude object. For example: "I believe the presence of NATO is a threat to my safety." Finally, the behavioural component is how an attitude towards an object influences our behaviour. For example: "I will avoid NATO troops and *not* cooperate with them."

The relative prominence of an attitude object in the perceptual field is known as salience. Attitude strength refers to the extent to which attitudes have impact on behaviour and information processing and the degree to which they are stable over time and resistant to change (Krosnick and Petty, 1995). The positive or negative value of an attitude object is referred to as valence. NATO troops, for instance, can be quite a salient object in the environment and consequently elicit strong and persistent positive or negative valence. For example: “I am very much aware of NATO’s presence” (salience) *and* “it makes me very angry” (valence) and “I am not willing to change my opinion” (strength).

Because of widespread use and potential, attitude concepts have occupied a central place in social research and interventions. The main assumption of this research was that in order to promote behavioural change, one must first understand and change individuals’ beliefs/attitudes toward the targeted behaviour (i.e. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). In order to do so, for many years, the assessment of attitudes relied exclusively on questionnaires and on individuals’ endorsement of positive or negative statements about the attitudinal object (i.e. “Drinking alcohol is good-----bad”). In line with this approach, the typical behavioural change attempts were based on providing individuals with relevant information (i.e. about negative consequences of drinking) that would presumably result in attitudinal change and corresponding behavioural change. However, comprehensive evaluations of the predictive impact of attitudes on behaviour have been rare, and the case for natural attitude as a strong precursor to behaviour may not be as strong as some of the basic research would suggest (i.e. Stacy et al., 1994). To understand and overcome such inconsistencies regarding the attitude-behaviour relationship, researchers re-evaluated both the conceptualization as well as the traditional measurement of the attitudes. Regarding the conceptualization several issues are particularly relevant.

First, attitudes have been traditionally conceptualized as bipolar (presumably reflecting a natural tendency to classify something as either positive or negative). However, one of the most important aspects of behaviour in natural context is individuals’ ambivalence. For instance, people hold both positive and negative alcohol-related beliefs (e.g. Wiers et al., 2006) with positive attitudes usually relating to immediate and negative cognitions to later outcomes. These findings challenged the assumption that attitudes represent stable evaluations or action tendencies and suggested a different approach whereby attitudes are constructed in the moment based on information that happens to be currently accessible. From this point of view attitudes can be conceptualized as the current state of activation of associations rather than evaluations stored in memory (e.g. Wilson et al., 2000; Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 2007). A given attitude object likely

has not just a single attitude associated with it, but rather a network of attitudes. Regarding drinking, an individual may have positive attitudes toward drinking when thinking about drinking with friends but negative attitudes when thinking about the day following the drinking party. Such attitudinal nuances would be lost with the traditional approach of bipolar stable attitudes that does not take into account the relevant momentary context. Similarly, attitudes towards NATO may not come along a positive versus negative dimension, since people may hold both positive and negative attitudes towards NATO.

Second, the traditional view of attitudes and attitude-behaviour relationship is a primarily deliberative one, assuming that attitudes are consciously accessible and serve as deliberative input into intentions and behaviour. This view has been challenged by the growing evidence suggesting that although intentionality can be important, the lion's share of behaviour is dictated by automatic processes, independent of intention (Bargh, 1994; Fazio, 1990). From this perspective, behaviour is driven less by an individual's explicit, deliberative evaluations toward the attitudinal object, but rather by previous associations between a certain context and certain behaviour. One relevant example is that of female crack cocaine users' engagement in sex exchange for crack cocaine. When assessed explicitly, women may have negative attitudes toward such behaviour and express intentions to avoid it. However, a drug craving induced spontaneously by internal (i.e. emotional state) or external cues (i.e. the view of a crack pipe) may automatically activate and render more positive the behaviours (sex trade) previously associated with successful alleviation of the craving. This may increase the likelihood of a person's involvement in such behaviour, despite negative attitudes and even in the absence of conscious intentions to behave accordingly (Kopetz et al., in preparation). This research speaks to the need of assessing attitudes and corresponding behaviours in specific contexts and in a manner capable of tapping into potential automatic processes underlying behaviour. Obviously, these are also topics to take into consideration when measuring the populations' attitude towards NATO.

Regarding the measurement of attitudes, the traditional approach was primarily based on individuals' endorsement of different statements regarding the object of the attitudes. However, whether an individual endorses a statement or not, is not fully determined by the attitude proper. It also depends on the individual's awareness of his/her attitude as well as on the willingness to reveal that attitude, on social desirability, and self-presentation concerns (Snyder & Swann, 1976). To overcome this problem, researchers have recently developed more indirect measures of attitudes. Some of these measures are based on the

assumption that people spontaneously avoid negative stimuli and approach positive stimuli (approach/avoidance paradigms, i.e. Forster & Strack, 1997; Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2005, or eye-tracking paradigms). Other measures, probably the most widely used, are based on representations in associative memory (Implicit Association Test (IAT) and affective priming procedures) and assume that people respond faster when presented with pairs of stimuli that are strongly rather than weakly associated in the memory. From this perspective a positive attitude would be evidenced by a faster reaction time to an attitudinal object when paired with a positive rather than a negative adjective (i.e. Olson & Fazio, 2003).

Key Points

- *An "attitude" has been defined as "a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour".*
- *Attitudes are comprised of three components – affective, cognitive, and behavioural.*
- *Attitudes have been traditionally conceptualized as bipolar (presumably reflecting a natural tendency to classify something as either positive or negative). However, one of the most important aspects of behaviour in natural context is individuals' ambivalence.*
- *The traditional view of attitudes and attitude-behaviour relationship is a primarily deliberative one, assuming that attitudes are consciously accessible and serve as deliberative input into intentions and behaviour. This view has been challenged by the growing evidence suggesting that although intentionality can be important, the lion's share of behaviour is dictated by automatic processes, independent of intention.*
- *Regarding the measurement of attitudes, the traditional approach was primarily based on individuals' endorsement of different statements regarding the object of the attitudes. However, whether an individual endorses a statement or not, is not fully determined by the attitude proper. It also depends on the individual's awareness of his/her attitude as well as on the willingness to reveal that attitude, on social desirability, and self-presentation concerns.*
- *Researchers have recently developed more indirect measures of attitudes.*

3. Attitudes towards NATO in Afghanistan

Open-source information on measurement of attitudes towards NATO is hard to come by (cf. Lyall, Blair, and Imai, 2012; Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, 2012). In order to get a sense of current measurement practices, a literature search was conducted. We used Google to gain a general sense of the available reports on attitudes towards NATO, followed by the use of specialized literature databases in psychology (PsychInfo) and the humanities and social sciences (Project Muse) to identify relevant scientific literature. In all cases, the initial focus was specifically on attitudes towards NATO in its most recent security assistance reconstruction mission in Afghanistan.

In Project Muse, no hits were for the search keys of “attitudes” AND “NATO” AND “Afghanistan”, while the two hits in the PsychInfo database did not pertain directly to measurement of the Afghan populations’ attitudes. In PsychInfo, the search term “attitudes” AND “Afghanistan” did yield a substantial number of hits (99 to be precise), but most of the identified literature focused on issues that are less relevant for present purposes. Specifically, the literature appears to focus on one of three categories: (1) Attitudes towards the war in Afghanistan among Western Samples; (2) Health-related attitudes among the Afghan population; and (3) Attitudes among soldiers in Afghanistan and veterans of the war. None of the published articles focuses specifically on the issue of measurable indicators of the populations’ attitude. Only an informal Google search, which using the search term “measuring attitudes in Afghanistan” yielded a very limited number of hits, did show an unpublished paper by Princeton political scientists Jason Lyall, Greame Blair, and Kosuke Imai. Their “Explaining support for combatants during wartime: A survey experiment in Afghanistan” exactly addresses the issues under investigation. The literature references of that paper contained another directly relevant unpublished paper by Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov on “Winning hearts and minds through development: Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan”. These two publications will be subjected to closer scrutiny below. Next to these papers, first-hand observations were used of the German reception of an extensive survey study by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research to illustrate the broader political and policy context of attitude research in the context of stabilization and reconstruction missions.

3.1. Winning hearts and minds through development: Evidence from a field experiment

The primary interest of a study by Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov was to demonstrate the effects of development programs in Afghanistan on perceptions of well-being, attitudes towards the government, and levels of security in surrounding areas. The authors identify several hypotheses regarding the possible effects of developmental aid in Afghanistan, predicting either increases in violence after aid (a 'bargaining model' suggesting that aid is considered a reward for violence), decreases in unemployment and decreases in violence (an 'opportunity cost' model suggesting that violence undermines economic interests once these become available), no changes (a 'grievance' model suggesting that developmental aid does not affect underlying social and ethnic grievances), and decreases in violence and increases in support for the government (a 'hearts and minds' model suggesting that aid undermines support for the insurgency and contributes to stability of the governance structure).

Of greatest interest here are the methods used to assess these hypotheses. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP), a \$1 billion aid program to improve service and infrastructure of the rural population, is analyzed for its impact, whereby 250 villages (25 per district with a total of 10 districts) that received treatment were selected and carefully matched with 250 villages that did not receive treatment. A total of 13,899 respondents participated in the study. The study consisted of a varied set of instruments, including a male household questionnaire administered to ten randomly selected male heads-of household; a male focus group questionnaire administered to a group of village leaders in each village; a female focus group questionnaire administered to a group of locally important women; and, a female individual questionnaire. These questionnaires were, except for the female focus group, administered before (Aug-Sept 2007) the start of the National Solidarity Programme and twice during the programme (in October 2007 and May 2008, and November 2007 and August 2008). The investigators also tracked changes in security incidents before and during the implementation of the programme.

The questionnaires relied heavily on self-reporting from the participants. A confederate would approach villagers and then follow a carefully determined protocol to reach out to participants. The participants were expected to respond to items related to general characteristics and social services, economic status, perception of government and associated parties (including ISAF), and perception of security. The protocol contained over 150 items, irrespective of the groups

under investigation. For each item, multiple-choice response options were provided.

The authors of the study find that the development program led to increases in economic well-being and to a more positive outlook on the participants' security situation. Additionally, the authors find increased positivity in attitudes towards the Afghan government, as well as towards NATO, as a result of the aid program. There is also mention of decreased violence as a result of the program, but only in areas with moderate levels of violence (measured before the program implementation). In areas of considerable violence, the program is reported to inhibit increased government trust as a result of the program and de-escalation of violence.

3.2. Explaining support for combatants during wartime: A survey experiment in Afghanistan

Lyall, Blair, and Imai (2012) have recently published on the Internet a report of their attempts to better understand how 'wartime victimization' (i.e. non-combatants facing direct or indirect exposure to violence) affects civilian attitudes towards combatants. They conducted their research in five Afghan provinces in which the Taliban was particularly active at the time of measurement (Uruzgan, Loghar, Khunar, Khost, and Helmand). The authors argue that attitudes towards combatant parties among civilians are not merely a function of the parties' relative responsibility for the victimization, but rather, depend on social identity. If a civilian has a prior identification with a particular attacking combatant party, attacks on the civilian are hypothesized to contribute less to the civilian's negative attitude towards that attacking combatant party than if the civilian has no prior identification or an opposing identification.

To examine this, the authors use "Endorsement experiments" (Bullock, Imai & Shapiro, 2011) in which participants are asked to indicate on a five-point scale (with an additional "don't know" option) their agreement with a policy proposal that is either endorsed by the Taliban, by ISAF, or no endorsement is specified. The study referred to four policy topics: prison reform, direct election of district councils, reform of the Independent Election Committee, and strengthening of anti-corruption policies. Extra care was spent on the selection of these topics as to ensure there was: 1) opportunity to combine the cases for aggregated statistical analysis; 2) sufficient knowledge in the sample to complete the survey and "don't know" responses are minimized; 3) realism to the policies and the endorsements; 4) sufficient variation in views as to avoid ceiling or floor

effects. The questionnaire was then distributed by an Afghan owned research centre called ORCA (Opinion Research Centre for Afghanistan) in 204 villages, each with 20 to 2,509 inhabitants. These villages were chosen on the basis of random selection, going down from first the provincial level (a random selection of five out of 13 Pashtun Majority provinces), to the district level (a random selection of one-third of the districts in a province), to the village level within each district (a random selection of villages from the districts, with a minimum of 10% of villages with a district being selected). In total, 2,754 only male villagers participated in the study.

The key analysis involved a comparison of the effect of victimization by the Taliban and ISAF on support for these parties (whereby support is measured on the basis of the endorsement experimental technique described above). Of interest, and in line with the authors' argument, the research shows an asymmetrical effect of victimization. If the Taliban has directly or indirectly caused harm to the participant, there appears to be little effect on support for the Taliban nor on support for ISAF. In contrast, if ISAF has directly or indirectly caused harm, it leads to more negative attitudes towards ISAF and more positive attitudes towards the Taliban. Thus, the authors demonstrate the importance of prior social identification in the effects of attacks on support from a population. The findings also demonstrate the use of indirect measures to uncover significant aspects of the factors that underlie community support. Finally, the findings demonstrate the importance of context in attitude formation (i.e. the same influence measure may produce stronger results in one context than in another context).

3.3. Reception of attitude research: The German case

Next to written reports on attitude research in Afghanistan, we also obtained a first-hand report of the reception in Germany of a specific enquiry in Afghanistan, carried out by The Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ASCOR). ASCOR is advertised as Afghanistan's only registered commercial market and opinion research agency. In 2010, they published an extensive attitude survey in Afghanistan. Among a sample of 1,691 in 34 provinces, the agency held face-to-face interviews. It is this research that allowed the media throughout the world to report on the apparent progress of NATO in Afghanistan. For example, ABC News inferred from the results: "Blame on the United States and NATO for violence has eased – but their overall ratings remain weak". Beyond the specific outcomes of the research, however, it is the perception of the results that is of particular interest. In Germany, soon after the

publication of the results, discussion erupted among politicians, policy makers, and the army. Indeed, what had been presented as “scientific” or “evidence-based” was eagerly, and easily, discarded as “unscientific”. These criticisms are of interest to mention here, because they also pertain to the surveys reviewed above.

First, the survey research was criticized for containing some very complicated items that require knowledge of world affairs and politics. This knowledge, however, may have been lacking among the Afghans under investigation. Consequently, the participants may have recognized symbols of NATO, or any other military organization present in Afghanistan. But that doesn’t mean participants were able to reflect on it, or able to tie the organization to different aspects of world politics. In the face-to-face interviews, opinions may thus have been constructed on the spot, and immediately forgotten at the end of the interview. Those who wanted to dismiss the results of attitude research could thus easily do so. The research may have not tapped into real attitudes. It may have created them on the spot.

Second, the survey contained about 150 questions, and was heavily criticized for that amount. Not all of these 150 questions may have required an understanding of global affairs. But still, 150 questions is a lot. It is a lot for undergraduate students that typically participate in attitude studies. But answering 150 questions certainly is an insurmountable challenge for someone who has never heard of opinion research; let alone participated in it. Here, it is simply the ability of the research group that falls short.

Third, motivation in answering the questions was argued to have played an obscuring role. Questions about education level or financial capabilities are not easily answered in a culture where answers to these questions communicate one’s all important social status, and indeed, one’s legitimacy to express an opinion. Moreover, answering questions with a target audience in mind is very important in Afghanistan. That is, in a country where decades of war have made distrust a defining feature of the fabric of society.

Fourth, the total number of 1,691 participants may appear quite impressive. However, it is quite a small number in comparison to the task at hand. Afghanistan is hardly a single country; with 17 major ethnic groups and multiple languages, diverse and challenging terrain and geography, over 70% illiteracy, and a history of local power brokers and warlords rather than strong centralized government. And once the diversity of Afghanistan is recognized, it would make sense to consider sampling more carefully.

3.4. What the findings indicate

In the studies described above, we see how the neglect of recent insights in attitude research leads to conceptual and practical, often negative consequences. The research by Beath and colleagues, and the research by Lyall and colleagues, appear to have involved considerable monetary and human resources, but the outcomes of both studies appear to be fairly limited. In both cases, support for a specific hypothesis in the context of counterinsurgency theory was obtained (although not necessarily validated). However, both efforts seem to depend to a great extent on verbal reporting of attitudes that the researcher assume to be present. But, that may not be the case. Indeed, both studies seem to ignore what is known on attitude measurement (although the study by Lyall et al. provides an interesting turn to more implicit measurement by systematically varying sources that participants are requested to endorse). The German reception of the outcomes suggests that attitude research in Afghanistan is, at present, difficult to interpret, to frame it positively. But also, to frame it more negatively, research outcomes are easily neglected or reframed in strategic and political context, and generally accompanied by a significant lack of western researchers' understanding of the social, cultural, and historical context of Afghanistan. And this should be considered in the light of the considerable human and monetary effort that has been spent to obtain the results.

In general, there still considerable amounts of work remains to be done to increase our understanding of attitudes in Afghanistan, to cut the cost of measurement, and to find ways in which attitude research outcome can inform policy making. Specific to NATO operations, there are many complex additional cultural and organizational challenges related to measuring, understanding, and effectively responding to attitude research in Afghanistan; existing research should not be assumed to offer clear answers and accurate insights on attitudes.

Key Points

- *The research by Beath and colleagues, and the research by Lyall and colleagues, appear to have involved considerable monetary and human resources, but the outcomes of both studies appear to be fairly limited.*
- *The German reception of the outcomes suggests that attitude research in Afghanistan is, at present, difficult to interpret. Also, research outcomes are easily neglected or reframed in strategic and political context, and generally accompanied by a significant lack of western researchers' understanding of the social, cultural, and*

historical context of Afghanistan.

4. Conclusion

We may conclude that the potential of attitude research in military context is considerable. Indeed, in peace support operation, understanding the attitudes of the local population must be considered a key ingredient to a successful mission. Attitude research is critical in the context. At the same time, the way attitude research is currently conducted, and used, opens up so much for room for interpretation to such an extent that its actual use for military purpose seems to be quite limited. Also, from the perspective of NATO, there is simply no comprehensive effort to consider, to analyze, integrate, and to publish a doctrine on attitudes of the local population. In NATO context, the considerable potential of attitudes is underutilized at best. But, at worst, it is sometimes painfully neglected.

What to do? It is suggested that in order to optimally profit from attitude research for NATO operations, it is of importance to:

- (1) *Invest in a broader overview of available measures to assess the population's attitudes, and their use for short-term and long-term planning.*

There are many measures of attitudes. Some are obvious, others less so; some are more effective, others less so. Recently, NATO's Research and Technology Organization (Task groups HFM-160 and HFM-183) published a report on "measuring the effectiveness of activities that influence attitudes and behaviours". The report contains an impressive overview of the strengths and weaknesses of a considerable number of measures to assess attitudes. While this seems to be a good start, the report does not contain any description of the cognitive architecture of attitudes, and consequently fails to specify the psychology of the local population before measuring. This makes it difficult to determine which measure is most suitable. Additionally, the NATO report discusses measurement techniques in quite general terms (e.g. the merits of "interviews"), but these techniques come in quite diverse forms, and one technique to assess, for example, attitudes

from behaviour, may be quite different than another. Thus, we should still invest in a broader overview of available measures to assess the population's attitudes, while also specifying the relevant cognitive mechanisms involved in attitude formation, and how the measures can be tailored specifically for NATO purposes.

- (2) *Develop a framework to more effectively interpret the outcome of attitude research in a NATO context.*

Next to attitude measurement techniques and data, it is critical to specify how the data should be used. And here, interpretative frameworks are critically important. If there is, for example, an increase in the number of people who are positive towards NATO, what does that mean? First of all, what is an increase? And then, are all increases good? These are all essential questions of the results of data are to be used effectively. Frameworks should be developed to effectively interpret the outcome of attitude research.

- (3) *Use advances in technology to improve the quality of attitude data gathering and analysis.*

Things have changed over the years. Attitude research is no longer a matter of a personal face-to-face conversation, or filling out a paper questionnaire with a pencil. There are now of many computerized techniques that can be useful (many of the techniques have been discussed in the chapter). Clearly, advances in technology enable more efficient and precise measurement. What is more, the technology available to NATO (e.g. Satellites, X-Ray vision, etc.) seems to be much more advanced than that available to psychologists. Here, NATO could fruitfully collaborate with science to develop even more sophisticated techniques.

- (4) *Soldiers should be trained to identify, interpret, and use these attitudes.*

It should be apparent that whatever technology is available, observing, measuring, properly interpreting, reporting and planning, still are, and likely will be, human endeavours. Attitudes research cannot exist without people, people filling out questionnaires, but also, people doing the research. Training people in identifying, properly interpreting, and using attitudes,

may thus be critical to in improving the efficiency of measurement to detect the local population's attitude towards NATO.

(5) *Current doctrine should be revised.*

The existing work of NATO's Research & Technology Organization (Task groups HFM-160 and HFM-183) should be leveraged as a starting point. A NATO working group should be established to consider and pursue institutional change to NATO doctrine for Human Aspects of the operational environment writ large, and the use of measuring attitudes of the local populations in particular.

Recommendations

- *Invest in a broader overview of available measures to assess the population's attitudes, and their use for short-term and long-term planning*
- *Develop a framework to more effectively interpret the outcome of attitude research in a NATO context*
- *Use advances in technology to improve the quality of attitude data gathering and analysis*
- *Soldiers should be trained to identify, interpret, and use these attitudes*
- *Current doctrine should be revised*

CHAPTER 7

TRANSFORMING NATO CAPABILITIES TO ADAPT TO HUMAN ENVIRONMENT(S)

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1. Introduction

The recent NATO operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya demonstrated that understanding the human environment in a conflict zone and comprehending the motivation behind the active or passive support offered by a

part of local population to NATO opponents is a keynote element implying aspects covering different NATO capabilities.

It is generally agreed, within both the military and civilian realm, that culture, or human factors/ aspects/environment is an important factor in military operations, especially in irregular warfare and stability, support, transition, and reconstruction operations.

According to some authors, *“socio-cultural factors affect every level of engagement in irregular warfare, from the interpersonal interactions while negotiating with local leaders, military advisers training their counterparts, to group and societal engagement during strategic communication and influence operations”*¹⁷⁸.

Others¹⁷⁹ argue that gaining a complete and accurate understanding of a culture requires spending years living in the region, learning the language and interacting with the local people, things that the military cannot do. These authors consider that despite their seeming diversity, all cultures are organized according to a predictable set of categories or dimensions:

- Environment, referring to the unique interdependent relationship developed by all cultures with their physical environment.
- Economy, addressing cultures’ specific systems for obtaining, producing and distributing the items that people need or want to survive in their society.
- Social Structure dealing with way in which cultures assign people different roles, status and power within the group.
- Political Structure, detailing how cultures systems determines who leads the group, and how they make decisions.
- Belief Systems, covering cultures’ shared set of beliefs and symbols that unite the group.

The importance of understanding the operational environment is highlighted as well within different NATO publications, but with limited factual information or without further development and guidance in respect of human aspects/factors of the Operational Environment (OE).

¹⁷⁸ Abbe, Allison and Halpin, Stanley M., *The Cultural Imperative for Professional Military Education and Leader Development*, U.S. Army War College, 2010, p.20.

¹⁷⁹ Salmoni, Barak A and Holmes-Eber, Paula, *Operational Culture for the Warfighter Principles and Applications*, Marine Corps University Press, 2009.

Despite the significant place on understanding the operational environment, the existing NATO publications do not clearly define this term. The NATO Glossary of terms and definitions AAP-6 defines the environment¹⁸⁰, but not the operational environment. The Allied Doctrine for Operations AJP 3(A) also fails to define either the operational environment, it just simply explaining its meaning within Section II – Command Factors, as being “generally factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force and complete the mission. This includes ***the sea, land, air and space environments, the adversary and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and the information environment within the JOA and areas of interest.***”

Many important elements can be considered here as being relevant for the operational environment, but a key one is missing: ***the local population***, or the “humans”, as it is mentioned in the definition of the environment provided by AAP-6. This missing piece is likely the result of an unintentional error, since within the text of the above mentioned publication there are several references regarding the importance of the local population within operational environment.

However, whatever may be the term that will be used for the human aspects/ dynamics/ elements/ factors of the operational environment, it is surprisingly that despite the overall recognition of the high importance placed upon it, this element is insufficiently addressed within NATO publications, especially in regard to transforming NATO capabilities in this field.

Although it may not be ideal, the following definition for the purpose of this study is proposed:

Human Aspects of the Operational Environment represents a complex set of elements, factors, processes, interactions, and perceptions in a society

¹⁸⁰ NATO Glossary of terms and definitions AAP-6, 2012 - *Environment: The surroundings in which an organization operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna, humans, and their interrelation.*

affected by medium or major violence that might either influence the operations of military forces, or determine the outcome of the conflict. HAOE refers to psychological, cultural, and sociological factors in connection with an historical, political, military, and economic context of crisis situations. They are of the highest relevance in Stability and Reconstruction Operations, COIN, Peace Keeping/Enforcing, and similar operations.

Analyzing the extent and manner how this “complex set of elements, factors, processes, interactions, and perceptions” is addressed within existing NATO publications, led us to the conclusion that the “human aspect” of the operational environment has been neglected at all decision making levels, and that a Concept, a Training Approach and Proper Capabilities, integrated into a Coherent Operational Framework are needed in this respect.

It is not expected that the findings and proposed solutions within this chapter will solve all the gaps in understanding the population in a conflict zone, however the contributors consider that it will be a useful tool for all elements of the military involved in planning and executing operations and missions, and it could be the trigger for a further development of the topic of human aspects, providing a framework for a common perspective that will help NATO forces prepare to operate in a highly complex, uncertain and changing security environment.

Transforming NATO capabilities to adapt to the Human Environment requires the consideration of the Comprehensive Approach¹⁸¹ principles, and the potential implications for different assets having interaction on regular basis with

¹⁸¹ The Comprehensive Approach is a global concept that, although often associated with civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), goes beyond the existing NATO doctrine on enhanced civil-military cooperation. Furthermore, CIMIC is often mentioned in conjunction with counterinsurgency, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT-Afghanistan), peace operations, stability operations and crisis management.

NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, underlines that lessons learned from NATO operations show that effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian and military instruments. Military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international security. Allied leaders agreed at Lisbon to enhance NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management as part of the international community’s effort and to improve NATO’s ability to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction

the local population – Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT), Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Reconnaissance (RECCE), Special Operation Forces (SOF).

Considering this broad coverage several key issues having a direct impact on them have been briefly analysed, before addressing the proposed solutions for transforming NATO capabilities following the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (DOTMPLFI) elements.

2. Security environment

The most important element to be considered when addressing the need for transformation of the capabilities refers to the main characteristics of the global security environment in which the respective capabilities have to be employed.

The Multiple Futures Project (MFP) developed by the Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT) in 2009, highlighted the challenges posed by the future security environment as well as the need for NATO forces to understand the human environment in theatre and to be able to efficiently communicate with the people, authorities and actors.

The MFP study describes 4 multiples futures - Dark Side of Exclusivity, Deceptive Stability, Clash of Modernities and New Power Politics¹⁸² - and is based on the analysis of 19 national studies on the future security environment as well as the ACT body of work on drivers, futures, and challenges.

Using the results of 21 workshops and based on the highest degree of commonality, nine drivers of change were identified as most relevant to global development over the next 20 years:

- *Friction* at international decision making level.
- *Economic Integration* of globalised actors.
- *Asymmetry* of wealth and power.
- *Changing State Capacity* and the distribution and management of power.
- *Resource Allocation* of raw materials, energy, water and food.

¹⁸² The Multiple Futures Project – Navigating towards 2030, Final report, April 2009, p.13

- *Competing Ideologies and World Views.*
- *Climate Change* impacting international relations and commerce.
- *Use of Technology* and innovation likely to produce breakthrough events.
- *Demographics* including migration and urbanisation.

The existence of an evolving security environment in the early twenty-first century, that creates new global challenges have also been noted by different regional organizations over the past ten years ago. According to the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) threats to security and stability in the OSCE region are today more likely to arise as negative, destabilizing consequences of developments that cut across the politico-military, economic and environmental and human dimensions, than from any major armed conflict¹⁸³.

The OSCE strategy identifies similar factors posing a challenge to global security and stability in the 21st century:

- *Lack of openness and transparency in politico-military matter.;*
- *Globalization, liberalization and technological change offering new opportunities for trade, growth and development, but having not equally benefited all participating States.*
- *Environmental degradation, unsustainable use of natural resources, mismanagement of wastes and pollution affecting ecological systems and having a substantial negative impact on the health, welfare, stability and security of States.*

An EU Commission's Study identifies six main dimensions of the future shaping the security environment¹⁸⁴:

- *Global demographic and societal challenges.*
- *Energy and natural resource security and efficiency, environment and climate change.*
- *Economy and technology prospects;*
- *Geopolitics and governance: EU frontiers, integration and role on the global scale;*
- *Territorial and mobility dynamics;*
- *Research, education and innovation.*

¹⁸³ OSCE, *OSCE strategy to address threats to security and stability in the twenty-first century*, December 2003, p.1

¹⁸⁴ European Commission, *Global Europe 2050 Summary Report*, October 2011, p.4.

Another study identifies 4 mega-trends shaping our world up to 2030¹⁸⁵:

- *Individual empowerment;*
- *Diffusion of power;*
- *Demographic patterns;*
- *Growing food, water and energy nexus.*

It can be noticed that since the release of the MFP study these drivers have continued to be relevant, some of them being highlighted as well within the New NATO Strategic Concept adopted in 2010 by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon and are mentioned as referenced within other more recent studies. This chapter will focus only on those drivers/features common for most of the studies which address future security environment and global trends¹⁸⁶.

2.1. Competing (Clash of) Ideologies and Worldviews.

This is a permanent issue affecting the security environment, having been mentioned within different studies beginning with the last decade of the past century. Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' rests on the claim that broad cultural and/or religious affinities are now supplanting national loyalties¹⁸⁷.

This key feature of the security environment is mentioned within all four envisioned multiple futures as well as within other recent studies dedicated to analyzing the future operational environment¹⁸⁸, and refers to alienation, disagreement and confrontation based on different cultures, values, religion, and historic geopolitical perspectives of international actors. The changing global security situation has seen a shift in emphasis from the certainties of super-power confrontation towards more complex interactions of state and non-state actors.

Furthermore, the terrorism, along with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, is likely to remain principal threats. It is assessed that the clash of ideologies also constitutes a trigger for potential frictions in international decision making, a feature of the fourth multiple future – New Power Politics. Friction refers to the ease with which decisions are made at the international level, ranging from cooperation to confrontation.

¹⁸⁵ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, December 2012, p.ii.

¹⁸⁶ List of literature is contained at the end of the panel report

¹⁸⁷ Walt, Stephen M., *International Relations: One World, Many Theories*, Foreign Policy, Washington, Spring 1998, Iss. 110.

¹⁸⁸ TRADOC, *Operational Environment 2009-2025*, August 2009.

2.2. Resource Allocation (Conflict on resources and global inequality)

The majority of studies related to this topic, encompass essential resource issues such as availability, affordability, access to and competition. Although sufficient resources are likely to be available to sustain the growing global population and the global economy, the distribution and access to these resources will be uneven, and shortages will occur at local or regional levels, increasing the likelihood of societal instability and of disagreement between states, thus providing the triggers that may ignite conflict.¹⁸⁹

It is envisioned as well that economic, social and political inequality of opportunity will continue to fuel perceptions of injustice among individuals and groups unable to have met their expectations, generating tension, unrest and instability, both within and between societies¹⁹⁰.

Other studies estimate that the competition for resources such as water and food is unlikely to result in state-on-state conflict, although internal or inter-regional disputes could possibly break out amongst people trying to secure these resources for their survival¹⁹¹.

2.3. Globalization (Economic/Integration)

The globalization issue is present within all of the reference documents, including military publications,¹⁹² as a major feature influencing the security environment, being considered an all-encompassing trend. It refers to the extent to which national and regional economies trade, and their level of functional integration. Emerging powers will play a key role within economic integration affecting the balance of power in the world and it is likely to have a shift from hegemony to national pluralism.

According to the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends 2030, by 2030 Asia will have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms of global power, based upon GDP, population size, military spending, and technological investment.

¹⁸⁹ UK MOD Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), *Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040*, 2010, p.73.

¹⁹⁰ Idem, p.22.

¹⁹¹ Canada National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends*, January 2009, p.5.

¹⁹² AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (November 2009) and “*The Future Security Environment (FSE)*”, produced by the Intelligence Sub-Division, Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT 2007).

Most of the global trends studies foresee that over the next forty years, the United States is likely to remain a critical player, but will cede at least partial authority to China while low and middle-income countries in Asia and Latin America will become an immensely powerful force in the world economy. Another study estimates that China alone will probably have the largest economy, surpassing that of the United States a few years before 2030¹⁹³.

Globalization is directly linked with competing worldviews, since it has shown a tendency to empower some while marginalizing others, and generating tensions between individual and group identity. Although it contributes to a steady rise in shared economic interests between and among countries, it is assessed that globalization provides no sure remedy for international suspicions and rivalry¹⁹⁴.

Globalization, competition for resources and competing ideologies and tensions in political and social structures combined with ideological, religious and cultural distinctions may generate other features of security environment: complexity, unpredictability and uncertainty.

2.4. Complexity, Unpredictability and Uncertainty

The MFP's concluding remarks stress that the future security environment will be dominated by complexity and unpredictability, features posing real challenges to the solidarity among allies, regarding the strategic unity of values and ideas, burden-sharing, and commitment to its decisions, as an alliance's most powerful tools. As the changing global security situation has seen a shift in emphasis from the certainties of super-power confrontation towards more complex interactions of state and non-state actors, this will remain a real challenge in framing the proper response from international community. The implications derived from the foreseen multiple futures scenarios reveal that the security environment will continue to evolve but it will be subject to a variety of unforeseeable developments on political, social, technological and military domains.

¹⁹³ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030*, November 2012.

¹⁹⁴ NATO, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement - Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO*, May 2010.

2.5. Demographics

Demographics reflect domestic and regional population trends related to birth, death, age, gender, structure, ethnicity, and the other characteristics of a state's population. Current social and demographic trends will have a significant impact on the changing future security environment, increasing the potential scope and intensity of intrastate conflict and warfare conducted by non-state actors¹⁹⁵. The world's population growth, estimated to reach close to 8.3 billion people by 2030, could have significant social effects such as expanding urbanization, growing the gaps between social classes, poverty, unemployment and migration, all of which can be triggers for conflict.

2.6. Use of Technology/ Innovation

Nowadays the use of technology has become more and more a factor having significant impact on the security environment. It refers to the continuous evolution and increased access to technology, especially for non-state actors. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare, nano & bio technologies as well as space related technologies will have the major global effect on the security environment¹⁹⁶. The increased dependency of today's critical infrastructure on networked computer systems in conjunction with the level of access to newest technology cause the computer hacking to become a serious security threat.

2.7. Key Environmental Constraints

Consideration must be given to climate change as any long-term significant development that may have an impact on international relations. Increasing water scarcity and growing energy needs are further shaping the security environment in areas of concern to NATO. The World Economic Forum Report 2013 highlights the importance of understanding the implications of the changes in the energy landscape, as well as that of other natural resources and warns that this issue must be examined not only from the perspective of the

¹⁹⁵ National Intelligence Council, Long Term Strategy Group, *2025 Security Environment: Final Report*, June 2008.

¹⁹⁶ Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2010)

quantity and distribution, but as well within larger ecosystems of societal usage¹⁹⁷.

Climate change negatively impacts mostly developing countries – which are already under economic hardship and social stresses – inflating existing tensions and instabilities.

3. Future operations

As a direct consequence of the foreseen security environment characteristics the contributors consider that the main features of future operations will be represented by:

- *Complex operational environment*: Simultaneous engagement of forces throughout the full operational spectrum – air, land, maritime, space, and cyber – with a higher pace of operations and an increasing role of non-kinetic means.
- *Combined joint expeditionary operations*: Because the most unstable areas with the greatest potential for conflict lie outside of NATO territories, developing expeditionary capabilities, as directed by most current NATO doctrine, becomes a must.
- *Increasingly confronted by Hybrid Threats (HT)*¹⁹⁸: Threats will come through a hybrid form of warfare employing conventional, irregular, and criminal capabilities, integrated operationally and tactically at the lowest level possible, mainly in urban environments and in locations where the Alliance lacks capabilities support.

¹⁹⁷ Global Agenda., World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2013

¹⁹⁸ HT refers to those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives, according to Bi-SC Input to a New NATO Capstone Concept for the Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats, 25 August 2010. The main feature of HT is the employment of a combination of actions, both conventional and non-conventional, against military and civilian objectives in an increasingly unconstrained operational environment to include non-physical domains (cyber, info/media, financial). The HT activity is difficult to attribute to a proximate adversary or actor as well as to identify of its originator or sponsor and may be the result of an ambiguous cooperation between sponsor states, terrorist, and insurgent organizations, corrupt governments or individual actors.

- *Diffuse Non-conventional Adversaries:* This element is directly linked with the HT challenge. We face an important paradigm shift from the traditional concept of a super-power confrontation in which the enemy is identified as state actor (states or rogue states) toward more complex interactions of state and non-state actors. Because NATO has demonstrated its ability to quickly and effectively conduct major combat operations, states countering NATO will increasingly rely on sponsoring and exploiting surrogates and proxies to generate asymmetric challenges. Since the use of criminal and terrorist elements as well as other non-state actors gives nation-states options for effectively opposing NATO interests and objectives without direct action, their role will likely increase in future operations.
- *Urbanization of warfare:* Population growth trends, especially in developing countries, indicate that by 2025 more than 60% of the world's population will live in cities. From a military perspective, urban warfare is extremely challenging due to its specific features and requirements (increased number of troops, severe limitations in effective use of fire-power, manoeuvre within a multidimensional confrontation environment—underground, ground level, and buildings—and presence of civilians).
- *Population – centre of gravity:* In future operations, operating areas will increasingly overlap with densely inhabited areas. Subsequently, the local population will represent a key feature of the operational environment, and gaining the population's support will become a key prerequisite for success.
- *Comprehensiveness:* Recent NATO operations have demonstrated that the military is not able to effectively deal with the challenges posed by stability operations on its own. The complexity of such operations requires a multidisciplinary approach and enhanced inter-agency cooperation.

4. NATO's Role & Mission

The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO's territory and populations. In order to assure

their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively the three essential core tasks mentioned within the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept and reiterated in the 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration: Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security.

Considering the transnational nature of the contemporary threats, the robust military capabilities needed to address the full spectrum of conflict and crisis, beyond NATO borders, it is assessed that these three core tasks make the most sense. Within a future cooperative multipolar world order, NATO would be viewed as a key element in a globalized collective security and crisis management system, a forum for allied security debates on the full range of global issues and how best to address transnational shared threats¹⁹⁹.

Whatever NATO's missions might be, all are relevant from an HAOE standpoint. The Alliance will likely have to respond to security challenges caused mainly by poor governance or a lack of governance. Most of the studies addressing global trends estimate that these challenges will be generated by a mix of factors related to the rampant extremist ideologies, uncontrolled and illicit migration, and frictions caused by competition for and access to resources. All those triggers are elements of the HAOE, which must be right understood and considered for a proper response to these challenges.

4.1. Strategic requirements

To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, the following issues must be considered while adapting NATO capabilities:

- *Enhanced Intel Sharing:* Intelligence sharing must take place between NATO Nations, NATO bodies and with other partners to better estimates when and where crises might occur, and how they can best be prevented or how NATO might have to respond to them.
- *Specific Doctrine:* Although some of the approached topics are covered to a certain extent by AJP-3.4²⁰⁰ and the subsequent series²⁰¹ this is insufficient for achieving a sound and common

¹⁹⁹ Herd, Graeme P., *Securing the West in a Post-Western World order: NATO's Third "Transatlantic Bargain"?*, CCSP Policy Paper, January 2013, p.3

²⁰⁰ NATO, *AJP-3.4 Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*

²⁰¹ AJP-3.4.1 Peace Support Operations; AJP-3.4.2 Non-combatant Evacuation Operations; AJP-3.4.3 Military Support to Civil Authorities (under development); AJP-3.4.4 Counter-Insurgency; AJP-3.4.5

understanding of the human dimension of the operational environment.

- *Tailored Force Structure:* A tailored forces structure requires further development of military capabilities and TTPs for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations.
- *Enhanced Civilian Crisis Management Capability:* Enhancing the “appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability²⁰²” established at NATO HQ and ACO, to interface more effectively with civilian partners, build on the lessons learned from previous NATO-led operations and covering relevant HAOE issues. This capability may also be used for integrating civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum as well as employing and coordinating civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors.
- *Training support for HN:* Building local forces in a crisis zone and develop training capabilities, so that local authorities to be able, in a reasonable timeframe but as quickly as possible, to maintain security with minimum international assistance.
- *Comprehensive Approach to Operations:* The establishment and common understanding of a comprehensive approach strategy on both sides (military and civilian), including identification and training of civilian specialists from member states available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, who will be able to work alongside with military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions.
- *Enhanced Political Cooperation:* Broaden and intensify political consultations among Allies, as well as with other partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before, during and after.

Military Support to Stabilisation and Reconstruction (under development); AJP-3.4.9 Civil-Military Cooperation.

²⁰² NATO, Chicago Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, p.5

As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen highlighted, as well as expanding the range of issues where NATO cooperates, the alliance must also expand the range of nations with whom we engage.

“... we need an alliance that is globally aware, globally connected and globally capable. This is my vision for NATO”²⁰³

4.2. Factors influencing NATO

4.2.1. A fundamentally human and non-linear environment

NATO's primary mission is collective defence, yet aside from the maritime Operation Active Endeavour, all operations have taken place outside of NATO nations' boundaries and most have blended elements of conventional and asymmetric warfare.

Consequently, operating in foreign sometimes far-away countries creates specific constraints that need to be addressed. Indeed, operating in any country requires action within an interconnected system with its own rules and actors.

4.2.2. Direct and Indirect Complexity

It is generally understood that when planning a military operation abroad, complexity and uncertainty are two key parameters to deal with. Yet it is worth keeping them in mind and especially the potential repercussions at all levels, as NATO plans activities in such an uncertain environment. Uncertainty derives from the multi-faceted complexity at hand and two essential levels of complexity can be distinguished.

The more direct one is to operate on foreign soil against clearly defined opposing forces. However, military operations today are increasingly “wars among the people” to paraphrase Rupert Smith, where the opposing forces are

²⁰³ NATO, *Delivering security in the 21st century*, Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Chatham House, London, 4th July 2012.

represented by diffuse insurgencies, rather than industrial conventional wars where two state actors fight against each other

4.2.3. Uncertainty in decisions

Complexity undoubtedly leads to uncertainty. This uncertainty greatly affects the ways, means, and ends of any military operation. It is indeed very difficult to anticipate the consequences of a given action. Robert Merton outlined four common factors that increase the potential for unexpected consequences²⁰⁴:

- the impossibility of predicting all possible outcomes,
- errors,
- “the imperious immediacy of interest”, and
- basic values.

Those reasons are not mutually exclusive and can even overlap. While the first is difficult to rectify, the other three demand more scrutiny.

Errors are often linked to the assumption that past solutions can work again. The roots of this thinking are often a lack of appreciation between the specificities of different situations especially when they display seeming similarities.

The “imperious immediacy of interest” is an ambiguous concept. It does not preclude actors from acting rationally, that is to say to achieve certain goals or acting according to their own interests, but they either exclude or fail to take into account the potential fallout a course of action can generate.

The role of basic values is understood, but often overlooked. Whatever actions that are taken, whatever decisions that are made, in most cases are based on values that NATO believes in and acting against them can influence our actions. This factor does not necessarily imply a conscious choice.

These three examples illustrate that the unexpected consequences of NATO’s actions could be limited if we are more careful about the choices and decisions we make.

Interpreting as accurately as possible the local context and the effects NATO’s actions can cause depends on how much one can differentiate between the constitutive and constraining aspects of culture. Culture can indeed have a

²⁰⁴ Merton, Robert K., “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 1, No. 3, December 1936, pp. 894-904.

constitutive role that shapes our actions and our reactions, but it can also restrain us from behaving and acting in certain ways²⁰⁵.

Debates in the United States about the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have rekindled the role of understanding the local context and taking into consideration the human environment as an element to ensure successes and victories.

So far, it has been shown that complexity and uncertainty are inherent aspects of modern conflicts. In addition, it has been determined that focusing on understanding the local context has become a primary concern for any military operation among to succeed in gaining the support of the local population. The chapter will now turn to the implications that it conveys for the political-strategic level.

4.3. The role of the political-strategic level

Complexity and uncertainty are indeed two central components that the political-strategic level has to tackle. Arguably, if there is a failure to address those issues at the highest level, there will invariably be fallout at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The clearer the vision and guidance that NATO's political-strategic level can deliver the better for all of the levels below.

4.3.1. Consequences on the political-strategic level

In most non-conventional military operations, like Counterinsurgency, stability operations, peace enforcement and peace keeping, among others, military capabilities and military tactics generally are of secondary importance. Therefore, NATO's military superiority in regard to military capabilities and technology compared to any potential adversary often is of limited relevance in dealing with such operations. Afghanistan is a case in point. Instead, the human factors are of key importance. Often they constitute the centre of gravity in such operations. Success generally will not be decided by overwhelming firepower or mobility, but by winning over the population. This goal is of high tactical importance, because it can cut off insurgents from logistical support, recruitment and intelligence. But generally it also is strategically decisive, because any non-conventional armed group without political support in society will be reduced to

²⁰⁵ Michael N. Barnett, "Culture," in Paul D. Williams, *Security Studies: An Introduction*, 2nd edition, Oxon: Routledge, 2012, pp. 172-173.

being just a criminal gang. In this case it could be isolated, separated from the population and would therefore be much more vulnerable to state repression.

In this sense winning the loyalty and respect of the population is the main battleground, which has to be won to make military operations effective. Any effective strategy in non-conventional operations should focus on winning over the population. Military superiority and tactical efficiency cannot be substitutes for such a strategy.

Such a strategic focus has to put legitimacy at its centre. Political and military forces which are not perceived as legitimate (or: more legitimate than the opposition) by the population, will hardly win the loyalty of the population.

Winning the contest for legitimacy therefore is key for successful counterinsurgency, stability, peace keeping/enforcement operations. This applies to the legitimacy of NATO, NATO troops and NATO operations, but even more to the legitimacy of a host government supported by NATO. If such a government is perceived as illegitimate or as less legitimate than the opposition by its own population, the supporting foreign troops will be tainted as well. Even if NATO troops operate with restraint, culturally sensitive, and efficient, they still will be seen as illegitimate if their main purpose is to support a discredited and/or illegitimate host government. Also, working with notorious warlords or other non-state actors for tactical reasons will undercut the legitimacy of NATO troops and NATO operations.

This dependency on often dubious host governments is one of the key vulnerabilities of external strategy development. Without a cooperating host government external forces would be hardly more than occupation troops - which would undercut their legitimacy. But if the host government is incompetent, corrupt, repressive or otherwise illegitimate, being its supporter would have the same effect. Transforming the host government into an efficient and legitimate entity in the eyes of the local population therefore is a keystone for successful military operations. Without this, NATO operations will lack a key precondition for success. NATO strategy has to offer a working solution to this problem, if it is expected to achieve the desired goals.

4.3.2. Implications for NATO's political-strategic pillar

Despite the caveat that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is an intergovernmental body, the following recommendations do not require the NAC to change its procedures. First, the NAC sets the tone for all levels of war below

and has a role to pave the way adequately. Second, the NAC's role is to act as "the paragon of good practices." Third, it should strike the right balance between a top-down and bottom-up approach to allow all levels to contribute to the whole of the operation.

First, the role of the NAC is to set the right tone. We have seen that all levels of war have both vertical and horizontal dimensions that make them interdependent. The NAC is the institution that sets the strategic end-states, and the priorities for the operation. Moreover, it sets the level of fighting commitments in terms of resources (both human and material)

Second, the NAC needs to act as the "paragon of good practices." According to the new Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), the NAC retains the ultimate authority to approve military documents. Throughout NATO's Crisis Management Process, the NAC intervenes politically at six junctures. Before the execution (phase 5), the NAC has played a role five times:

- To decide that a crisis requires assessment and advice on the developing situation (the Political-Military Estimate).
- To task SACEUR to develop a response strategy.
- To issue the NAC Initiative Directive (NID).
- To approve the CONOPS and the OPLAN.
- And to give formal authorization to execute the OPLAN.

This authority gives the NAC tremendous power and it should be used wisely and effectively. As Paul Van Riper stated, in "a non-linear system, there are no right or wrong approach, just better or poorer ones²⁰⁶." It requires an operational design that is broad and thoughtful.

Third, it is important to strike the right balance between a top-down and bottom-up approach. Once the execution has begun, all levels of war may be confronted with situations that require adaptations at one level or more. The new COPD anchors more responsibilities to the top political-strategic level, i.e. diplomats and civil servants. In the different phases of the crisis management process, the role and influence of military officers are diminishing to the point that the distinction between the political and the strategic is waning. Yet, the longer an operation lasts, the more the strategic and operational levels are gaining influence; additionally, this phenomenon holds true when an operation

²⁰⁶ Paul Van Riper, "The Foundation of Strategic Thinking," *Infinity Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 2012.

mobilizes vast human resources²⁰⁷. Indeed, periodic mission reviews gives the military commanders a platform to interject greater influence. A top-down approach gives the political-strategic level more responsibilities but it can also lead the political-strategic level to disregard valuable inputs from levels below. A heuristic approach offers the opportunity for valuable tactical level assessments to be incorporated upward because as we have emphasized, actions on the ground can have political fallout.

4.4. Economy influence

Another aspects restricting military and NATO itself is the economical factor. Despite globalization and increasing economic integration, the economic crisis of the past few years demonstrated that the global economy still has vulnerabilities. This economic crisis influenced most of the NATO nations' budgets, thus directly impacting through cutbacks and reductions the military spending and the budgets of their Ministries of Defence.

Moreover, according to the World Economic Forum Global Risks 2013 Report, the global risk thought most likely to manifest itself over the next 10 years is *severe income disparity*, while the risk rated as having the highest impact, if it were to occur, is *major systemic financial failure*²⁰⁸. The challenge is more obvious since it will increase the potential for conflicts while the NATO's need for resources to mitigate these conflicts will grow.

NATO already realized that it has to do more with less and has presented its Smart Defence Concept during the NATO Chicago summit (20-21MAY2012). However, the decision on military budgets and its spending are directly under the political control of the individual member governments.

NATO is of course the sum of its members' ambitions. At present there is a growing gap between aspirations/agreed concepts, and the willingness of member nations to meet commitments. In other words, to achieve maximum effect in a large complex space over time and distance with limited resources would likely require a truly radical reform of the NATO command structure, not to mention a new set of relationships with key partners vital to mission success.

²⁰⁷ Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre, "From Strategy to Operations – or the Other Way Around?", in Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre (eds.), *Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from Gulf War to Gaddafi*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 20-21.

²⁰⁸ The World Economic Forum's *Global Risks 2013* report is developed from an annual survey of over 1,000 experts from industry, government, academia and civil society who were asked to review a landscape of 50 global risks




Figure 7.1: Budgetary spending FY2012

4.5. Understanding NATO

NATO will be required to effectively operate in increasingly complex situations within both Article 5 and Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. The complexity derives firstly from the high number and diversity of actors present in the operational environment, and secondly from the heterogeneous composition of the Alliance itself.

NATO is the sum of its members' ambitions and can be described as a country consisting of 28 tribes, each tribe with its own political system which are, on one hand, generally very similar, but, on another slightly different as each has its own unique characteristics. In order to use NATO effectively to accomplish the things they wish to do, the allies primarily need to have, not identical, but compatible interests²⁰⁹.

NATO has a huge structure, combining hierarchical and matrix type's connections. Moreover its management consists of political and military parts and the whole system is closely tied to individual nations. It has different links to other non-NATO nations and international organizations and with the gradual implementation of the comprehensive approach strategy the number of connections will grow.

The complexity of the entire system, which by nature is a bureaucratic system, is closely connected with the complexity of decision making processes influenced by different committees, commissions and working groups, framed by

²⁰⁹ Herd, Graeme P. and John Kriendler – *Understanding NATO in the Twenty-First Century: Alliance Strategies, Security and Global Governance*, p.27 (2013).

priorities and standards, and digitally overloaded. All of these create conditions for a delay in decision making and/or a lack of coordination which supports the above mentioned uncertainties. Despite this complexity and uncertainty, NATO was and is still able to reach workable solutions, to assume collective responsibilities, and to present synergy and coherence.




Figure 7.2: Interrelationships within NATO

4.5.1. Decision making

A more agile NATO command and control (C2) construct is needed with clearly defined roles and responsibilities of different NATO bodies, entities, agencies, as well as committees and working groups. Subsequently in the contemporary international security environment the Alliance requires a smaller but nevertheless effective cluster of headquarters (HQs) that can rotate seamlessly without any loss of institutional memory or operational momentum. These headquarters should all conform to a common set of C2 standards, enabling a plug-and-play structure easily augmentable as and when required.

A perspective in dealing with diversity, which exists amongst the different cultures comprising the Alliance, is presented by the concept of a Human Approach to Operations²¹⁰.

The Human Approach to Operations is defined as using the consideration of human nature to anticipate operational consequences and impacts, and to improve the effectiveness of crisis management.

5. Remarks on HAOE terminology and strategy

“Human Aspects of the Operational Environment” after the experiences in Somalia, Afghanistan and other deployments seem to be a key variable of successful operations. In all these cases Western military forces were never lacking military superiority. In regard to size, mobility and firepower (and financial resources) the forces of NATO or NATO member countries have been so overwhelmingly superior to any and all adversaries that traditional military thinking would have suggested easy, fast and convincing victories. Those did not happen, or they only occurred in regard to military forces organized and fielded by nation-state governments, like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and, Afghanistan of the Taliban, as well as Muammar Gaddafi's Libya. On the other hand, the use of military force against some non-state actors has been less than convincing. For instance, all of NATO's expensive and impressive military capabilities after more than a decade of war did not result in victory in Afghanistan when facing an often illiterate adversary of perhaps 25 or 30,000 fighters without an air force and with a comparably meagre budget. The main reason obviously is that this and comparable wars have not been conventional military ones, but of a completely different character. Counterinsurgency (COIN), as should be well known by now, basically is not a military confrontation, but a political struggle in which military force is only one variable amongst others, and not even the most important one. The Field Manual "Counterinsurgency" of the US Army and the US Marine Corps (FM 3-24) was not the first military document to describe this clearly:

“In fact, some capabilities required for conventional success—for example, the ability to execute operational manoeuvre and employ massive firepower—may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations.

²¹⁰ Denux, Valerie, COL/ACT Medical Branch, *Mastering the Human Aspects in Operation – Medical contribution, Food For Thought Paper*, October 2011.

Nonetheless, conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail.”²¹¹

It is very difficult not to agree with this observation. Also the key reasons are well known, though not often taken into account:

“Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate.”²¹² Therefore, victory can hardly ever be won only by military means: “Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government's legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency.”²¹³

This is a political not military achievement. Several analysts and military officers have accordingly emphasized that the centre of gravity in counterinsurgencies and similar operations - and therefore the key to success - is the loyalty of the population, not destroying enemy forces or controlling territory.

If these lessons from the last several decades of counterinsurgency operations are correct, then the ‘Operational Environment’ does not have some ‘human aspects’. These ‘human aspects’ are not just *aspects* of something else, but they are key, the centre of gravity of these specific kinds of war. The human society is not a *factor or aspect* in COIN, but the real battlefield, and this battlefield is a political not military one. Former British General Rupert Smith appropriately coined the term *“war amongst the people”* and wrote:

“War amongst the people is different [compared to other, conventional war: it is the reality in which the people in the streets and houses and fields - all the people, anywhere - are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force.”²¹⁴

If the people, the whole population of another country, are the centre of gravity, the most important resource, the victims and actors, and the battlefield of the war at the same time, it is obvious that military force has to have a completely different meaning and relevance than in war against another state.

²¹¹ US Army/US Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24*, Chicago 2007, p. LII

²¹² *ibid*, p. 2.

²¹³ *ibid*, p. 6

²¹⁴ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force - The Art of War in the Modern World*, London 2006, p. 3f; emphasis added J.H.

Success or failure in COIN or related operations will be decided by political, social, economic and cultural measures. Military operations may (or may not, depending on timing and approach) play important supporting roles. They can buy time for political reforms, and they can be very useful to help create a secure and stable environment for it. But they will hardly ever be decisive. If no coherent political-economic-social strategy is in place to resolve the basic problems of a given society, or if this strategy is not implemented resourcefully and competently, military operations will only prolong the conflict, but hardly ever decide it.²¹⁵

A 'comprehensive approach' should be developed from the centre of gravity (winning the trust of the population by creating or strengthening legitimacy of governance). An appropriate civil-military strategy, which places the loyalty and trust of the population at its centre, has to be developed. Separate civilian and military sub-strategies have to serve this integrated approach and should not be allowed to undercut it.²¹⁶

The problem for NATO and its member countries is not, that these considerations would not be known and clear. The opposite is true. But the problem is that they are very rarely implemented. Winning the loyalty and support of the population by creating a legitimate and effective government (in the words of Rupert Smith: "*capturing the will of the people*" in obvious opposition to capturing territory or enemies) is accepted on paper, but often ignored in reality:

"Capturing the will of the people is a very clear and basic concept, yet one that is either misunderstood or ignored by political and military establishments around the world. The politician keeps applying force to attain a condition, assuming the military will both create and maintain it. And whilst for many years the military has understood the need to win the 'hearts and minds' of the local population, this *is still seen as a supporting activity to the defeat of the insurgents rather than the overall objective*, and it is often under-resourced and

²¹⁵ Jochen Hippler, "Counterinsurgency - Theorien unkonventioneller Kriegführung: Callwell, Thompson, Smith, und das US Army Field Manual 3-24" [Counterinsurgency - Theories of Unconventional War: Callwell, Thompson, Smith, and the US Army Field Manual 3-24; in German], in: Thomas Jäger / Rasmus Beckmann (Hrsg.), *Handbuch Kriegstheorien*, Wiesbaden 2011, pp. 256-283

²¹⁶ Jochen Hippler, *Counterinsurgency and Political Control – US Military Strategies Regarding Regional Conflict*, INEF-Report 81 (Institute for Development and Peace), Duisburg 2006; online: http://www.jochenhippler.de/US_Counterinsurgency.pdf

restricted to low-level acts to ameliorate local conditions and the lot of the people.”²¹⁷

When military and civilian deployments take place in a context of violent conflict, the different actors tend to apply off-the-shelf instruments and off-the-shelf strategies they are used to and feel comfortable with. Development officials implement their standard development programs, soldiers focus on what they know best and are trained for - but in this process the strategic approach in regard to the centre of gravity tends to get lost. Winning over the population gets translated into “hearts-and-minds” talk, and this in turn is often simply seen as civic action, media operations and PSYOPs. This is not enough. Establishing the legitimacy of a host government is not achieved by well-drilling or providing other useful services by foreign troops - it often requires a complete overhaul of state structures and procedures, even a change in political elites. It often requires a readjustment of the state-society interface. It is obvious that no military force is in a position to achieve this basic goal of COIN or comparable operations. This is a key challenge for NATO. If a civilian strategy and the personnel and financial resources to implement it are lacking, military forces are placed in an untenable situation. They are used as a substitute of policy, instead of being an instrument of policy. This is politically unwise. It also is irresponsible towards the soldiers serving in violent conflicts, since they are sent in harm's way without the tools of success.

6. Findings and recommendations

6.1. General considerations

Understanding the human aspects of the operational environment is an essential factor of planning for success across the full spectrum of military operations. While the adage that “*warfare is political conflict by other means*” is widely recognized, combatants who underestimate the impact of the human element in military operations do so at their risk. During the Second World War and the reconstruction that followed, as well as during the Cold War, understanding human aspects of the operational environment was considered essential.

²¹⁷ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force - The Art of War in the Modern World*, London 2006, p. 277f; emphasis added; J.H.

Substantial improvements by NATO are needed in understanding human aspects today. In particular, NATO must take a longer-term view and build upon increased capability achieved in recent operations. It must institutionalize the best of current programs and processes so that this capability is also available across the full spectrum of military operations, including increased emphasis on activities, referred to as Phase 0, that seek to mitigate the likelihood of armed conflict.

To be effective in the long term, NATO must develop more coherence in the Alliance's efforts to enhance human aspects awareness. Most importantly, its capability must be expanded beyond the focus of current armed conflicts so that both the HQs and military services to have the flexibility to adjust rapidly to events in other places in the world. Playing "catch-up" will not be an efficient option.

Establishing a separate military social science structure would probably not contribute much to fostering cultural awareness in NATO. However, an interagency coordination structure for preparing teams of International Organizations (IO), Governmental Organizations (GO), and eventually Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) representatives for stability operations, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), would contribute much to the preparations for future engagements. Such a structure would provide both socio-cultural knowledge and human aspects astuteness. It would also foster interagency participation and enable the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Strategy in combat operations.

Using Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) has often been a challenge due to some difficulties that have been encountered, such as:

- Lack of framework, procedures and funding for effectively engaging and sharing expertise with academia and think tanks.
- Insufficient training of military personnel and key advisors in the area of human aspects, mainly with respect to cultural/social studies, network analysis, and human dynamic models and simulations.
- Lack of pool of military SMEs and an attractive career path for military personnel in the human aspects area.
- Obstructive security rules and documents classification and "releaseability".

Within academia, think tanks and NGOs there is considerable expertise in human aspects knowledge and a willingness to share and constantly improve this

expertise, but NATO does not currently efficiently employ these existing resources, which could enhance military capabilities during operations and provide a thorough human aspects understanding.

Within different NATO bodies and NATO nations there are considerable human aspects databases, but they are independent of each other and have been created for use by specific elements of the NATO and the international community²¹⁸. Furthermore, no common formats, metadata, or ontology have been established. The majority of these databases are not properly maintained, fully populated, updated, or interoperable. Another issue is the limited access and interaction with these databases is usually tailored to specific users, making them of limited utility to others. In addition, some data, such as those related to trends, attitudes, and beliefs, are difficult to extract from open source documents, are proprietary and held by corporations that conduct polls, or do not exist in regions or at levels of granularity necessary for operations.

The operational environment encompasses not only the threat but also the physical, informational, social, cultural, religious, and economic elements of the environment. All of these elements are essential for understanding the causes of conflicts, developing an appropriate approach, and anticipating subsequent effects. Proper understanding of the OE by NATO in recent operations was influenced by the prevalence of a conventional approach to operations (i.e. operations planning, Intel support). Furthermore, a comprehensive understanding of OE requires adequate capabilities (HUMINT, interpreters, SME support or fused Intel), that have proved to be insufficient in recent operations.

Recent operations proved as well that winning in combat is not enough to be successful and that on a local or global scale the strategic objectives can be achieved without engaging in combat actions. NATO was slow to recognize the importance of information and the battle for the narrative in achieving objectives at all levels; it was often ineffective in applying and aligning the narrative to goals and desired end states.

Belatedly, Coalition forces realized that the key to success lay in the hearts and minds of the population, but often the campaigns directed to win hearts and minds have been focused on trying to change opinion or attitudes and not behaviour²¹⁹. In their book, Major General Andrew Mackay and Commander

²¹⁸ Defense Science Board (DSB), *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics*, March 2009.

²¹⁹ Mackay, Andrew and Tatham, Steve, with a chapter by Rowland, Lee, *Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People And Their Motivations Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict*, 2011.

Steve Tatham demonstrate that the defining characteristic of resolving armed disputes will be people's behaviour, and our ability to understand and modify that behaviour. Relevant in understanding the importance between beliefs, attitude and behaviour, the authors mention a field experiment conducted by Harvard trained psychologist Elisabeth Levy-Paluck, on the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic tensions in Rwanda. During a yearlong field study she used dedicated crafted radio programmes in an effort to change beliefs, perception of social norms and behaviour. Paluck's conclusion was that while the study did little to change the personal beliefs of the subjects, it was very effective at instilling social norms, which drove the observed measurable changes in behaviour.

Before achieving the desired behaviour of the target audience, a clearly defined mission and achievable desired end-state are essential for an operation's success. These primarily derive from proper understanding of both NATO capabilities and the operational environment.

For example, while all the Alliance members voted for the Unified Protector Mission in Libya, less than half have effectively participated, and less than a third have been willing to get involved in strike missions. Some authors argue that many of those allies stay on the sidelines because they do not have the necessary military capabilities to participate and not because they don't want to take part in the mission²²⁰.

Finding a proper balance between what is wanted, what is possible and what can be accepted represents a prerequisite for a successful NATO operation.

Transitions between phases of operations offer opportunities for advancing NATO's strategic interests if they are managed well; alternately, they are opportunities for the enemy or for the failure of the intended objectives if they are not. NATO management of transitions in recent operations had shown:

- Flaws in preparation, faulty assumptions, and inadequate branches and sequels.
- Disconnects between military and civilian planning efforts.

²²⁰ Herd, Graeme P. and Kriendler, John, *Understanding NATO in the Twenty-First Century: Alliance Strategies, Security and Global Governance*, 2013, p.29.

- Insufficient resourcing of key transitions.
- Lack of guidance and unity of effort from strategic leadership.

NATO doctrines, training, and equipment were often poorly suited to operations other than major combat, forcing extensive and costly transformation, and in the process, affecting the mission. Similarly, forces were trained to win against another nation's armed forces, and were not prepared to combat adaptive insurgencies as, for example, the one in Afghanistan.

In regard to this issue, on March 2010, the Security Defence Agenda (SDA), the British Council, and NATO organized a conference on the role of cultural relations in conflict prevention and resolution. According to the Conference Report²²¹ the event demonstrated how "cultural" projects on the ground can improve dialogue, and hence playing a part in both preventing conflict and stabilizing post-conflict theatres. Much of the debate dealt with cultural relations in the field of conflict resolution, which put the spotlight directly on Afghanistan. The report highlighted that at a previous SDA event, a NATO representative had stressed that the Alliance's comprehensive approach meant all international bodies working together, but 18 months later, NATO's Deputy Branch Chief Joint Operations Colonel Per Mikkelsen admitted that the Alliance was still on a learning curve. During the same event NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Operations, Martin Howard, agreed that pre-deployment training in this area was probably not enough and that civil-military operations in Afghanistan needed cultural issues and relations to be embedded in the overall planning.

This will be a challenging issue involving both interagency and internal coordination and planning, thus a proper integration of different services and branches could bring synergies in creating a force multiplying effect.

In the recent operations interagency coordination was uneven due to inconsistent participation in planning, training, and operations; policy gaps; resources; and differences in organizational culture. Similarly, the military was challenged in working with NGOs, a type of organization that interacts frequently with some civilian governmental agencies / bodies but less commonly with the military. Overall NATO interagency coordination was unable to connect the full extent of national capabilities in order to meet the operational requirements.

²²¹ Security & Defence Agenda, SDA International Conference Report, *Conflict prevention and Resolution: The Role of Cultural Relations*, Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels, March 2010.

NATO is now a hub for a global network of security partners which have served alongside NATO forces in Afghanistan, Libya and Kosovo²²².

Partnering is an inherently interagency activity, but there was an overall lack of unity in these efforts. Partnering between NATO and host nations is essential for NATO to achieve its strategic goals and promote a number of key objectives. Partnering enables the host nation to develop a sustainable capacity to provide security and counter threats that can provide an exit strategy for NATO and offer an alternative to sustaining a large NATO footprint on the ground. Partnering also enhances as well the legitimacy of NATO operations and freedom of action. Finally, partnering offers NATO a way to advance its objectives through influence rather than through direct action.

NATO's new Strategic Concept identifies "cooperative security" as one of NATO's three essential core tasks. However, previously establishing and sustaining coalition unity of effort was a challenge due to competing national interests, cultures, resources, and policies. Critical challenges when operating with partners included:

- national caveats,
- interoperability,
- training,
- tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs),
- resources,
- national interests,
- culture,
- information sharing, and
- inclusion in planning.

6.2. Recommendations

The proposed short to mid-term solutions for transforming NATO capabilities panel follow the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (DOTMPLFI) elements:

²²² US President Barack Obama and NATO SG Anders Fogh Rasmussen statement before Chicago Summit (2010)

D - Doctrine key recommendation

Development of a NATO umbrella document under Bi-SC coordination regarding HAOE and subsequent revision of the existing doctrines to include HAOE in order to provide the framework for oversight and coordination of activities related to human aspects in NATO HQs as well as in TOs.

The importance of human aspects for the military operations, or other similar terms used to address this issue (i.e. human dynamics, human terrain, operational culture, cultural aspects) is generally recognised by many of the NATO nations. Some of them are more advanced in developing initiatives and approaches regarding human aspects but there is no NATO umbrella document in this respect. Consequently there is no regulatory framework and effective oversight, planning and coordination of activities related to human aspects.

The importance of the population within an operational environment is mentioned within AJP 3(A) Allied Doctrine for Operations but it has been concluded that these references are not being sufficiently emphasized. The essential points refer to:

- The importance of the consent of the population regarding the presence of a force charged with a Peace Support Operation (PSO) mission.
- The impact of the PSO's professional conduct in its relations with the local population as it works to earn its respect.
- The partially dependability of the force on the civilian population for resources and information.
- The aim of CIMIC in establishing and maintaining the full cooperation of the civilian population and institutions in order to offer the joint force commander the greatest possible moral, material, environmental and tactical advantages.
- The commanders' moral and legal responsibility towards the civilian populations.

- Harmonizing the military commander's aims and methods with those of the civilian population and institutions in the area as part of a collective strategy to meet the conditions for military success.
- The role of Public Information Offices (PIO) activities during the preparatory stage of an operation, with the aim of accurately and rapidly informing the population within the Joint Operational Area (JOA) of NATO's mission, thereby gaining their understanding and support.
- The needs of the indigenous population which are likely to be inextricably linked to the mission.

The recently introduced and still not institutionalized Comprehensive Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (CIPOE) incorporates some elements related to culture but does not reflect properly more relevant human aspects that can have a significant influence on military operations.

Intelligence provides the commander with a *prediction* of his adversary's likely tactics or an *assessment* of his capabilities and it is generally admitted that possession of intelligence is a battle-winning factor. However, considering the definition of Intelligence, which states that it is "*The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations*"²²³, it is clear that the role of Intelligence is not being fully exploited. As presently conducted, there is an overwhelming approach directed towards intelligence collection about adversary forces and much less focusing on collecting information regarding local populations in potential areas of operation.

Crisis Response Operations and the HAOE as a part of them, covers a much broader spectrum of activities, processes and factors compared with a relatively simplified intelligence role during high intensity warfare, which focused mainly on the enemy. Consequently, the intelligence structure and its policies, procedures and education must be adapted to these new challenges. A more complex and comprehensive approach from the intelligence staff, including close coordination and cooperation with other relevant military branches and staff will be required. Intelligence perspectives on the significance and value of information, over-classification of information as a protective measure and reluctance in sharing information are other elements which should be reconsidered. Intelligence gathering should actively engage departments and

²²³ AAP-6 NATO Glossary of terms and definitions, 2012.

agencies government-wide as well as commercial and NGO resources and capabilities in the collection and use of data and preparation of products.

Additional considerations and recommendations include:

- Existing national concepts, doctrines and studies (Human Dynamics, Human Terrain, Operational Culture, and Cultural Aspects) provide a valuable background in this respect.
- Make NATO HQ's responsible for developing a comprehensive strategy to provide human aspects awareness for future NATO operations, to include among others knowledge management and sharing, directives on education and training, human aspects cells/advisors and other requirements that may be deemed necessary.
- Develop ways to include the HAOE in the operational planning as part of CIPOE and eventually reflected as a separate annex of Operational Plan (OPLAN).
- Adapting the role of Intelligence, to better reflect the importance of Human Aspects for understanding the OE and building the Common Operational Picture.
- Assess the utility and feasibility of developing Sociological Intelligence (SOCINT) capabilities for NATO.

O - Organization key recommendation

Establish a specialized structure within NATO HQ or subordinate Strategic Commands (ACT/ACO) to act as a coordinator and centralized body for human aspects knowledge, as well as dedicated cells within subordinates commands' Peace Establishment (PE) and Theatre of Operations (TO's) Crisis Establishment (CE).

Additional considerations and recommendations include:

- Human Aspects understanding is more than knowing the well-known dos and don'ts of a given region which can be easily learned by all military personnel. What is more difficult is to reach the

proper regional expertise combined with postgraduate level education in social sciences related disciplines. In order to achieve this NATO has to adapt its organizational structure to institutionalize human aspects as a formal element of its operational planning.

- Personnel assigned within this body should reflect a variety of backgrounds: military experts, social sciences professionals (psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, and linguistics), security and public safety advisors, medics, and engineers as well as IO, GO, and NGO representatives. Clear responsibilities would be required for each position in order to avoid duplication of effort or conflicting advice.
 - A body such as this can assist the military and civil participants with achieving readiness for stability operations and can also form and train as well multi-disciplinary teams for the augmentation of any NATO country team.
- Include deployable civil-military SME teams to act as a Comprehensive Advisors Cell for Commanders and/or an Alternative Analysis Team:
 - Commander's Comprehensive Advisory Cell (Civilian Advisory Cluster)²²⁴: Organizational synergy can be improved by having political and development advisors cooperate closely with military commanders in the field.
 - This cell can incorporate existing advisors (e.g. Political Advisor, Cultural Advisor, etc), however some new advisors will be needed (e.g. anthropologist, psychologist, sociologist, linguist etc).
- Include a Civilian Planning Element:
 - High Readiness Forces (HRF) HQs must be able to effectively 'plug and play' with a cadre of civilian experts built around a dedicated Civilian Planning Element (CPE) itself embedded in civil-military planning and the civil support elements of a headquarters²²⁵.

²²⁴ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), Commanders Initiative Group (CIG) - Programme Paper: ISP PP 2010/01, *Operationalizing the Comprehensive Approach*, March 2010

²²⁵ Ibidem

- The CPE must be able to pass on knowledge and the know-how to preserve continuity of the campaign.
- Enhancement of Existing Crisis Management Capabilities:
 - Including HAOE among civilian crisis management capabilities established at the NATO HQ and ACO.
 - Incorporation of HAOE (as branch/section) into already existing NATO Civil – Military Fusion Centre (CFC), extending the CFC teams / focus areas and number of remote interim research support organizations; the CFC’s current main focus is on Afghanistan, the MENA region and anti-piracy but could be extended to potential conflict areas.
- Socio-cultural Intelligence (SOCINT) cell:
 - A SOCINT cell can be included into the Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC) structure.
 - The main role would be the support of direction and control of the collection effort in the field of the socio-cultural and human aspects of the operational environment as well as the analysis of acquired data and information and production of relevant intelligence products.
 - Another option would be the establishment of a specific organizational structure (similar to the US Human Terrain System [HTS]) focusing on the SOCINT function under a neutral (not intelligence related) name within the Knowledge Management Directorate, which would nevertheless closely coordinate its activity with the Intelligence Staff (CJ2).

T – Training key recommendation

Considering the life-long learning as the key in preparing NATO forces for the complexities of the future, support the NATO Bi-SC in modifying the standard curriculum at NATO training organizations, as well as national curricula, to incorporate various types of units training in human aspects, tailored to individual units’ missions.

Additional considerations and recommendations include:

- Expand the curriculum in this area for professional military education to provide relevant advanced degree education. Develop innovative processes for recruiting and rewarding human aspects expertise.
- Joint Force Commands (JFCs) should direct the combatant commanders to develop TTPs for employing enhanced knowledge of human aspects in anticipation of stability operations with NATO forces in non-combatant roles, cooperating closely with combatant commands, NATO agencies, and NGOs, as well as allies and host nations.
- Consider planning and organizing an annual NATO Joint Military and Civilian Exercise focused on implementation of Comprehensive Approach Strategy.
- Invite participation of interagency and NGO representatives in mission readiness exercises during planning and in after-action review.
- Establish education and training for Intelligence analysts on the HAOE domain to complement a more technically oriented military education with human science education.

M – Material key recommendation

Create a proper Human Aspects architecture allowing user-friendly and quick access to all dedicated databases, including the facility of sharing data among multiple users.

Additional considerations and recommendations include:

- Define and implement a more robust research effort to explore the potential of relevant science and technology efforts in cross-cutting human aspects research, linking dynamic network analysis to findings and models with direct military relevance.
- Operational commanders should generate general and specific requirements for data collection to populate the Human Aspects

databases with regional, sub regional and local information, as well as assuring products preparation and evaluation. They should provide guidance, direction and support to forces deployed in respective AO for documentation of relevant human aspects.

- One good example of employing the material capability is the US HTS connectivity to a reach-back centre in the USA, allowing access via this centre to a Subject Matter Expert Network (SME net).

L – Leadership key recommendation

Educate leaders on the importance of Human Aspects in the Stability Operations, acquiring awareness and skills to manage Intercultural factors in Multinational Military Operations.

Additional considerations and recommendations include:

- The key abilities necessary for leaders in regard to the HAOE should address overcoming cultural barriers to effective teamwork, generating and promoting trust and mutual respect, as well as dealing with communication, conflict resolution, diplomacy, mediation and negotiation.
- Joint education and training with personnel from different departments and civilian organizations.
- Understanding the importance and role of information management within current and future operations. Ensure communication strategy considering all relevant actors' instruments of power; cultural, religious, and other demographic factors; and employing innovative, non-traditional methods and sources.

P – Personnel key recommendation

Identifying what skills, knowledge and competences are needed in HAOE field and developing the new force capabilities by considering the need of

qualified people for both peacetime and wartime.

Additional considerations and recommendations include:

- It seems that emerging security challenges of the 21st century will require 2 types of armed forces:
 - first one, quick entry forces to win the battle (Marine, Air Force, Navy, SOF, Army),
 - second one stabilization forces (Army, SOF).
- The current military machinery of all NATO countries supports the first category. Most of the NATO (as well as national) doctrines and procedures are designed to support the first type. Education and training are mainly focused on combat skills (from the early beginning of the military career) and take precedence over PSO. In addition to this the most of the Military Research organizations and institutions including military industry, are primarily supportive of quick entry forces.
- It may be naive to propose having two different types of armed forces, especially in context of the recent economic situation, but it seems that the desired solution for countering emerging security challenges of 21st century requires a shift in the current paradigm. This transition will influence not only the personnel but also other DOTPLMFI capabilities. First, they must be identified and specified:
 - Required capabilities (including new, novel capabilities) – Personnel and Organizations.
 - Identification of new TTPs – Doctrines.
 - Rapid changes within / adaptation of Education & Training (E&T), as well as development of E&T for newly identified capabilities – Training, Organizations, People.
 - Adaptation of Research and Development to new capabilities, including military research organizations and military industry - Organizations.

F – Facilities key recommendation

It is concluded that there is no need for building new facilities to support the implementation of the HAOE concept. The existing infrastructure within NATO bodies and HQ in TOs allows fulfilment with a minimum effort those HAOE requirements related to DOTMPLI elements.

I – Interoperability key recommendation

A broad range of common standards needs to be developed, agreed upon and implemented between military and civilian actors.

Additional considerations and recommendations:

- Implementing the HAOE as part of the Comprehensive Approach Strategy, within a military organization will require improved interoperability based on the partners' willingness to cooperate. Internal institutional prejudices between different military services, branches and disciplines must be set aside in order to build up a proper cooperative environment.
- It is imperative to avoid confusion based on differences in understanding regarding terms of reference when the NGO's and the military occupy the same space and where missions may overlap.
- The establishment and common understanding of a comprehensive approach strategy on both sides (military and civilian) is a pre condition for success. As far as it is practical, an agreement on the common use of language and standardization of terms should be encouraged. A key issue in achieving interoperability is describing in common terms what each participant does.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

Findings and recommendations presented throughout this chapter will not be addressed again in this closing part. Instead the paragraphs below summarize the key recommendations grouped according to a possible implementation horizon.

Short term implementation:

- Designating a single NATO body to coordinate different working groups and panels dealing with human aspects within NATO;
- Establishing a designated body/structure responsible for human aspects knowledge within NATO;
- Establishing a pool of subject matter experts in the social science and humanities that can support and assist NATO in human aspects field;
- Defining a suitable framework for partnering with external subject matter experts, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, academia, and think-tanks;
- Designing a human aspects database architecture;
- Assessing the utility of establishing socio-cultural capabilities for NATO;
- Assessing the feasibility of assigning and training specially designated stabilization forces.

Medium term implementation:

- Developing a Bi-SC Capstone Concept on Human Aspects of the Operational Environment;
- Revision of draft AJP-3.4.5, *Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, to address human aspects as key part of the operational environment;
- Establishing deployable civil-military advisory teams with extensive expertise on social sciences and humanities;
- Revising the Comprehensive Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment process to properly reflect the human aspects;

- Revising the Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive to reflect human aspects as a separate Annex or Appendix or other appropriate manner;
- Revising the missions and tasks of Intelligence to include human aspects-related responsibilities;
- Establishing a SOCINT cell under J2 at Strategic and Joint Forces Command level;
- Developing E&T curricula for training SOCINT analysts;
- Developing interdepartmental, inter-agencies & inter-organizations common E&T programmes;
- Adapting the TTPs and training programmes of combat units to include human aspects awareness;
- Considering an annual NATO combined joint military and civilian exercise focused on implementation of Comprehensive Approach Strategy.

The findings and recommendations presented by this panel will provide the foundation for enhancing NATO capabilities in respect to Human Aspects of the Operational Environment. Although all implications presented are of some significance to NATO, the Alliance will eventually have to decide how it will adapt, considering that the implementation of decisions taken now might become effective only in the medium and long term.

CONCLUSION

History proves that human aspects have always shaped military conflicts. Although awareness of this realm cannot guarantee success in current and future conflicts, a lack of awareness can certainly solidify resistance of local actors, result in unintended repercussions, and generate, if not a self-defeating policy, then a failing one.

Lessons learned from current operations and the efforts made to address them must not be overlooked. To capture and make the best use of these lessons learned, NATO needs an enduring capability, one that extends beyond the focus of current military operations and institutionalizes human aspects considerations into conceptual frameworks, doctrine, training and planning.

Realizing that the battle space of the future may be the human mind, this study considers implementation of human aspects related subjects as a new force capability requiring a new mindset, new procedures, new decision-making processes, and revisions to education and training programmes.

The strategic environment has evolved into a highly complex, dynamic and adaptive system, with multiple and new actors – both state and non-state. Nowadays, the economic, political and social structures have become as important for NATO Operations as military capabilities.

Defined as a perceived incompatibility of goals and interests between two or more parties, conflicts proved to be and will remain an inevitable aspect of human relations. Culture is a part of every social conflict because conflicts occur in human relationships.

Recent NATO Operations proved that the lack of detailed knowledge of military about human aspects, the way culture influence them, and furthermore, some prejudices and stereotypes, is still an impediment to fulfil their task. Deployed in areas where culture it is totally different form theirs, military will tend to oversimplify conceptions, opinions or images which are generalized to a large population. Furthermore, while neglecting to identify and exploit the common values of different cultures, some stereotypes, which deny individuality

as members of a group, are commonly associated with simplistic, false and usually negative generalization.

The more we know about all aspects of the operational environment, the better the quality of our decisions, planning and execution. The findings provided within this paper are meant to be an overall framework for decision makers and planners, to be aware on what we considered as being relevant human aspects with a key influence on the Operational Environment and on the success of the NATO Mission.

Whatever combination of terms we will use for defining it, the Human/Cultural Aspects/Dynamics/ Environment/Factors remain a key element of the future military operational environment, especially in counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, stability, and support, transition, and reconstruction operations.

Although awareness on human aspects of the operational environment cannot guarantee the success in current and future conflicts, the lack of it certainly boost resistance of local actors, result in unintended repercussions, generating, if not a self-defeating policy, then a failing one.

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Upon retirement Clark returned to Afghanistan 2009-2011 to support COMISAF Counterinsurgency Advisory & Assistance Team. He supported counterinsurgency and irregular warfare requirements at JWC in Norway, JFTC in Poland; NATO Centres of Excellence in Romania and Turkey, NATO School Oberammergau, and Allied Command Transformation. Requested by-name as Strategic Advisor to COMISAF, Clark returned April 2013 to ISAF HQ's in Kabul serving in the Commander's Action Group. Clark is an avid traveller, reader, and distance runner living in Virginia with his family.

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Ms. Oana POPESCU, Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning, Romania

Founder of Global Focus, a think-tank with a focus on Romania's Euro-Atlantic position in relation to major strategic issues, regional cooperation and the emerging world. Editor-at-

large of Foreign Policy magazine Romania. Also Director of the Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in Bucharest and Secretary General of Romania Black Sea Gateway, a business association which promotes Romania as a regional hub for EU-Asia trade. Formerly a journalist (has interviewed prominent figures like Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, Bob Woodward or Francis Fukuyama) and Foreign Affairs Adviser to the Romanian Senate President, she was also Programmes Director for the Aspen Institute Romania.

Oana is a writer, researcher and consultant in foreign affairs, political strategy, democratization, transitions and conflict transformation, often invited as a commentator and analyst on TV and radio shows.

Her work engagements have included research projects for the European Council on Foreign Relations and the Swedish Crisis Management Research and Training Institute (Crismart). Her expertise focuses mostly on the Balkans, Middle East and Afghanistan.

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Dr. Sorin-Gabriel SEBE, University of Bucharest, Romania

Dr. Sorin-Gabriel Sebe teaches in the Department of Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies at the University of Bucharest in Romania.

He graduated from the Faculty of Mathematics, University of Bucharest in 1986 (the graduation thesis: *Non-Riemannian Geometries in Dislocation Theory*). From 1990 to 1995 he worked as a Research Associate at GPM2 Laboratory in Grenoble, France, in the realm of mathematical modelling of irreversible phenomena.

In 1996 he joined the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest (FSPUB) and currently, beyond teaching, serves as Vice-Dean. He received his PhD in sociology in 2004 (the final thesis: *Subjective Quality of Life Modelling*) from the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bucharest.

He was a general manager at INSOMAR, a national wide opinion polls and market studies company (2004-2006).

His research as a political science academic has primarily been concerned with the processes associated to the democratization of former non-democratic regimes, such as the reform of the intelligence apparatus and the development of a political market. He favours a trans-disciplinary approach on research, having as current interest the development of a curriculum for the study of intelligence in academic settings, in a political science faculty, in a former communist country.

Mrs. Lesley SIMM, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), NATO, Great Britain

Lesley Simm graduated from Nottingham University in 1975. Following post-graduate work at London University she worked for the British Council in Iran, then Somalia and Tanzania.

Lesley lectured in history and politics for some years before returning to the Horn of Africa where she spent years researching in Ethiopia and travelling regionally in East Africa and the Middle East, focussing on the new security environment following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Until very recently, Lesley was Senior Research Fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom and Director of a networked research cluster covering theology, philosophy and ideology in strategic regions, to support operational deployment in current theatres.

Lesley is now a Senior Fellow of the Institute for Statecraft, a Senior Associate Fellow of the Defence Academy and supports HQ ARRC as an Associate, briefing on the understanding of cultural, religious and ideological environment in areas of interest.

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Brian R. Spisak is from the USA and is Assistant Professor in the Department of Management and Organization, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, VU University Amsterdam.

Dr. Spisak blends the fields of social and organizational psychology with the study of biological and cultural evolution to investigate how and why we have developed leadership in large-scale social networks, and how this information can be applied to make groups more effective in times of conflict and cooperation.

Dr. Spisak's work utilizes a multidisciplinary approach and diverse techniques such as agent-based modelling to better understand and forecast behaviour. This human factors data is then applied to the decision making process at all levels of planning. His work has been applied to various objectives including a recent project funded by the United States Office of Naval Research titled, "Reducing intergroup conflict through leadership selection and behaviour: Using social network influence to foster peace."

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Currently COL SURDU is the head of Concept Development and Experimentation Section within the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence and the “Human Aspects of the Operational Environment” Project Manager.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AD	Anno Domini
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AO	Area of operation
AOR	Area of operation responsibility
BC	Before Christ
CIMIC	Civil military cooperation
CP	Collection plan
DOTMLPFI	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability
ESCD	Emerging Security Challenge Division
EU	European Union
GO	Governmental organization
HAOE	Human Aspects of the Operational Environment
HQ	Headquarters
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
INTEL	Intelligence
IO	International Organizations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NA5CRO	Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO HUMINT COE	NATO Human Intelligence Centre of Excellence
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OPCOM	Operational command
OPCON	Operational control

OPFOR	Opposing forces
OPLAN	Operational plan
OPORD	Operational order
OPSEC	Operational security
ORBAT	Order of battle
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSINT	Open source intelligence
PSYOP	Psychological operations
RECCE	Reconnaissance
ROE	Rules of engagement
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SME	Subject matter experts
SOF	Special operations forces
SOP	Standing operating procedures
STANAG	Standardization agreement
TACOM	Tactical command
TACON	Tactical control
TF	Task force
TO	Theatre of operation
UN	United Nations

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed within this paper are entirely and solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect official thinking and policy either of the organization they represent or NATO.



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