

THE EMERGENCE OF THE PERIPHERY IN THE WORLD SYSTEM: FROM THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE TO THE BUENOS AIRES CONFERENCE (1955-1978)

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Introduction

The history of the world system implies the existence of central and peripheral regions. Before decolonization, relations among the periphery happened in a reduced scale and were mediated by the center³. In this sense, the Bandung Conference and other multilateral mechanisms such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77 inaugurated a new stage in world history, being the kickoff of the development of South-South relations. For the first time, the periphery of the world system began to organize itself through shared principles, values and ideas that served as the base for a strategy for external action in a context of Cold War. In this first moment, the main demands were the acceleration of decolonization and the guarantee of non-alignment

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³ For example, the triangular trade flow that linked Europe with America and Africa, that focused on factors of production amongst the three continents created one of the main mechanisms of the social engineering process of the modern era: the systems of plantation in America. (Osterhammel and Peterson 2005). This was a South-North-South arrangement on which there was a small leeway for the development of autonomous relations amongst America and Africa.

with neither of the great powers, maintaining an autonomy that would allow sovereignty and self-determination. In this sense, this article aims to characterize and historically analyze the evolution of relations among the periphery, highlighting the moment of prelude of the present South-South Cooperation, developed between the decades of 1950 and 1970, which established the basis for an economic, political and social agenda that would be rescued in a certain matter in recent time, however, under new basis of organization.

As the articulation between India and China played a fundamental part in the accomplishment of the Bandung Conference, there is in the present time an important discussion concerning the role that intermediary countries have been playing for the promotion of South-South Cooperation. The semi-periphery stands as the legitimate speaker for the development of Southern countries, but, at the same time, it is accused of acting in the same way as countries from the center, under the logic of market expansion and of its strategic interests in a global range. Therefore, it is fundamental to have a discussion that rescues the essential principles of the Bandung Conference, which were established guided by principles such as the non-interference in other countries internal affairs and by the need of developing horizontal relations among underdeveloped countries that should be based on cooperation and reciprocity.

Historically, it's accurate to recognize Europe during the feudal era as the peripheral region in relation to the Arab-Islamic world (Northern Africa and Middle East), where regional systems worked under a tributary logic, in which the distribution of resources was made in accordance with the centralization of power. Various pre-capitalist forms existed in Europe, as well as in other regions, based on the organization of labour and capital in great mercantile cities. This pre-capitalist forms developed themselves precisely in Europe given the context of the maritime expansion (and consequently territorial) and reflected the creation of a new capitalist world system, in which Europe would no longer be the peripheral region (Amin 1997).

The capitalist world system experiences, through the centuries, cycles of accumulation and retraction, with the consequent rise and fall of great powers. If, until the 19th century, there were successive European countries hegemonic periods, that were developed due to the competition among States over flowing capitals, the 20th century was characterized by emergence of the *Pax Americana*, after two world wars that realigned the balance of world power. In economic terms, this did not mean the relegation of Europe into a new peripheral condition, given that right after the Second World War a great part of North-American investments was destined to the reconstruction of the European continent, within the logic of North-North Cooperation. Such attitude

was necessary to give continuity to the expansion of the capitalist world system and to secure the monopoly of the Northern capitalist powers over global governance. Brazil's failed attempt of being the sixth permanent member in the Security Council of the UN showed that the Third World would not have voice in strategic international issues.

Given that the capitalist world system expanded itself due not only to the interstate competition over the flowing capital, but also due to the formation of political structures with broader and more complex organizational capacities to control the social and political means, what was verified among the powers of the North was not only competition, but also an increased concentration of political power (Arrighi 1996). To Latin-American countries and Afro-Asiatic colonies, which were a great part of the global population and territory, little room for maneuver and action for their development and autonomy would be granted. In spite of that, the political dimension of the socialist subsystem represented, during the Cold War, a possible alternative in a context in which the struggles for national liberation claimed for greater autonomy and independence from the capitalist metropolis. It is within this context that the idea of the Third World, the Non-Aligned Movement and of the substitution of East-West political fight for an economic North-South struggle⁴ raised.

Within this context, the present article attempts to set a historical and analytical approach about the emergence of the periphery, its main demands and forms of articulation. In order to do this, methodologically South-South relations different moments will be identified. Geographically, the expansion of Third World ideas and practices will be highlighted, which, in a first moment, were concentrated exclusively in parts of Asia and Africa (the Bandung Group) and only later consolidated in Latin America, in particular in the 1970s. Furthermore, in accordance with the theory for collective action (Olson 1965) the characteristics of the organizational arrangement among the periphery will be highlighted, as well as its strategies for action and the instruments used to guarantee bloc cohesion in each period. At the same time, the place of the periphery in the contemporary world system will be pointed out (Amin 1997; Amin 2010; Arrighi 1996; Wallerstein 1992);

In the first section of this article, the initial phase of South-South relations will be analyzed, with the Bandung Conference as the starting point for the establishment of a common strategy, as well as the principles and values that would conduct the relations among the countries of the Third World. Ins-

⁴ The mix of the ideas of national independence and socialism was the main ideological source from which some Third World principles were developed (also, it should be mentioned that the majority of nations that took part in the Bandung Conference declared themselves socialists).

stitutionally, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G-77 were created, and the first political and economic initiatives for cooperation among Southern countries were presented. The new independent countries (in a formal sense) reacted to neocolonialism through an attempt of establishing horizontal relations with countries that faced common problems, such as inequality, poverty, hunger and high rates of child mortality.

This claims, presented in the principles of Bandung and the many conferences that would later refer to the subject of development then, would start to be defended within the ambit of the UN that would constantly institutionalize and cover the agenda of South-South Cooperation. For that, in the second section of this article, the main questions presented by Southern countries in terms of political and economic agenda in international organizations will be highlighted, in the context of the strengthening of the bipolar dispute during the Cold War and the 1970s. In 1978, for the first time in a UN Conference, the concept of South-South Cooperation was used. From the 1980s onwards, there was a mitigation of the relations among the periphery, in the context of the deepening of the East-West dispute, the multiplication of neoliberal experiences and of North-South cooperation under conditionalities, mainly the demands for fiscal adjustments and economic austerity as criteria to receive aid. So, in the third section of the article, which consists in the conclusions, the present moment of South-South Cooperation will be analyzed. After the reflux of the neoliberal decade, South-South Cooperation reached a new political mood in the form of coalitions of variable design, that add a component of revision of the international order in terms of East-West as well of North-South relations.

1. From Bandung to Havana (1955-1966): decolonization and the emergece of a Third World agenda

The first phase of the Cold War happened during another expansion of the capitalist world system, under North-American hegemony. The early years after the Second World War were characterized by the search for influence zones by the US and the USSR, as well as by the reconstruction of Europe, through the Marshall Plan⁵, and by the transformation of Japan into a kind of US protectorate. Through Asia in general, national liberation movements began to develop and would later spread to Africa in 1960's decade.

⁵ For Asia, a kind of Marshall Plan, the Colombo Plan, that forecasted US financial aid for the rebuilt of Asian nations hit by war and the socioeconomic development of countries in the region.

The fact that the movements for liberation occurred initially in Asia granted that continent a *status* of leadership in the process of formation of the Third World. The Bandung Conference was the manifestation of such Asian protagonism in the movements in favor of decolonization.

As placing themselves as the third force in the Cold War game, Asian countries, in particular India and China, broke with the idea of bipolarity and brought about the idea of a premature multipolarity. In this sense, *Pax Americana* brought with it a greater instability, given that, unlike what happened in the successive European hegemonies in earlier centuries, the periphery stopped being directly related to the center, in the form of colonies. The fact that India and China, unlike the Soviet Union, were victims of colonization, granted them a greater degree of legitimacy to be the speakers and leaders of the Third World, which carries implications in the external projection of both countries in the 21st century.

US action in Asia was already present in a sense of being a substitute to French and English presence and to pressure socialist regimes in the first stage of the decolonization (China, Korea, Vietnam) and of the nationalist fights (India and Indonesia). In Asia, the US was interested, as the new economic power, in investing their capital surplus and in expanding the tentacles of their transnational enterprises. In this sense, it was in favor of the abolition of forms of protectionism, supporting the decolonization. For that, part of their strategy consisted in creating a new pole of power in Asia, Japan, through the restoration of the Japanese economy, besides the investment in relations with Taiwan, securing the sovereignty of the island, which had a strategic value due to its proximity with China (Visentini 2011).

Specifically, the issue with Indonesia motivated the realization of the Colombo Conference, where the articulation of a neutralist front to counterweight the action of the Americans, which took the place of the French in the conflict, was addressed. The Colombo Conference was attended by India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar) and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and was a sort of rehearsal for the Bandung Conference⁶ that would occur a year later. In

6 It is worth mentioning that before the Second World War and the movements of decolonization, several conferences that united the former European colonies were realized. The examples were the Berlin and the Brussels Conferences. In 1926, at the Berlin Conference India presented a report that showed “the limits that the policies of traditional European powers imposed on any effective effort in favor of peace and the conditions of cooperation amongst Europe and Asia. The first mistake of the European people- as read in this report- is that they always focus almost exclusively on international problems from an European point of view; the second is that they never acted in order to eliminate the eventual cause of hostility of Asia towards Europe” (Guitard 1962, 11). In the Bandung Conference, the leaders Sukarno and Nehru remembered that the first manifestation of solidarity amongst the oppressed people happened

1954, India and China jointly declared the five principles that would conduct their relation: pacific coexistence, reciprocal respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both parts, non interference with internal affairs, non aggression, equality and reciprocal privileges.

A year later in the Bandung Conference, for the first time leaders representing the Asian and African peoples reunited, inaugurated the Afro-Asiatic solidarity and the emergence of the Third World in the international scene. The Conference represented the first step towards awareness regarding the role that the new independent countries were to play in the world, as of representing the excluded, the oppressed and the rejected in the great international discussions of the center. At the time of the conference, the majority of the countries in Asia had already conquered their formal political independence and in Africa the struggle for national liberation had already started. In this sense, the Conference united different groups of the same movement for emancipation, each going through their own stage of development, besides uniting countries with distinct political systems, from monarchy to socialism. The heterogeneity of the countries, which could have been an obstacle for their collective action, was overcome by their shared desire of leaving underdevelopment behind. Bandung, therefore, represented an attempt to turn around the logic of the Cold War and bring about the debate of North-South instead of East-West, and to make a position as an alternative power pole that would make the Cold War far more complex than it could appear to be.

The fundamental principles agreed by the participating countries were, above all, the struggle against colonialism and racism, the right of all peoples to self-determination (principle that was already covered by the UN Chart, but would be reinforced), the fight for independence and for freedom of choice of States regarding their political systems and options of external insertion during the Cold War. Non-alignment, in this sense, did not necessarily mean an equal distance, but in fact meant that the countries could have the freedom to position themselves as they chose (example of that was the fact that Chou En Lai, during the Conference, waved in the direction of the United States, proposing to the Americans a joint declaration of pacific coexistence).

at the Brussels Conference in 1927, and in Berlin in 1926. In accordance with Guitard (1962), "Berlin was the capital of a Germany that was deprived of colonies and that became a refuge of the first nationalist of the British, French and Dutch nationalists. It was there that the representatives of the colonized nations, supported by the USSR, emboldened and helped by certain political, literary and scientific personalities of the European left and by some governments of Hispanic America, impatient with US economic tutelage- the Congress was financed by nationalist China and Mexico- decided that they would celebrate in Brussels in 1927, a congress of the oppressed people (...). Albert Einstein and Ms. Sun-Yat-Sem among others participated in this Conference." (Guitard 1962, 12).

Thus, Bandung meant the first concert among the periphery regarding a strategy for collective action in the global scene. Besides that, it represented the origins of a culture of the South (Wallerstein 1992), and of a Third World agenda, with its priorities related to social development, and not only an economic one. Moreover, Bandung prematurely launched the idea of the need to recognize the differences, something that is getting stronger in the 21st century (Fraser 2007). At the end of the Conference, a statement regarding five questions was declared: A) Economic Cooperation; B) Cultural Cooperation; C) Human rights and self-determination; D) Problems of the dependent people; E) Promotion of Peace and World Cooperation.

Regarding economic cooperation, the urgent need of promoting the economic development in Afro-Asiatic regions was highlighted, respecting national independence, through technical assistance (the term that has been recently replaced by “technical cooperation”) among the participants or through multilateral or bilateral agreements with the rest of the world. The creation of a special UN fund for economic development was also requested, and it was recommended for Afro-Asiatic countries to vary their exports by manufacturing raw materials and fomenting inter regional fairs and regional delegations exchange programs. Besides that, it demanded the creation of an international agency for atomic energy, insisting on the need to use such energy for peaceful means (Guitard 1962).

As for the cultural cooperation, the final declaration valued Africa’s and Asia’s intellectual wealth and recommended the development of scientific, literary and artistic missions, the exchange of books, teachers and students. In the section “Human Rights and self-determination”, the need of a full adhesion to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was confirmed and the need for already independent nations to help other colonized countries to achieve their sovereignty was confirmed. Concerning the “Promotion of peace and world cooperation” the desire for expanding the amount of international organizations was manifested and it was solicited to the UN Security Council a chair for Afro-Asiatic countries to participate in its ambit. Furthermore, the defense of disarmament and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction were reinforced, as well as the suspension of nuclear tests (Guitard 1962). At last, the final statement of the Bandung Conference signaled Ten Principles for Coexistence, which are:

Chart 1 – Bandung Ten Principles of Coexistence

1. Respect for fundamental human rights, as established in the goals and principles of the UN Chart;
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;
3. The recognition of equality of all races and all nations, small or big;
4. Non-intervention and non-interference in other countries internal affairs;
5. 5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself individually or collectively, as established in the UN Chart;
6.
 - a) Rejection of every agreement of collective defense that would serve the particular interests of great powers, whatever they may be;
 - b) Rejection of every pressure that a power, whatever it may be, tries to exercise over another;
7. Abstention from acts of threat of aggression or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a country;
8. Resolution of all conflicts through pacific means, such as negotiation or conciliation, arbitration and resolution in courts, as well as other pacific means that may include the interested countries, as established in the UN Chart;
9. Stimulation of mutual interests and cooperation;
10. Respect for justice and for international obligations;

Source: Guitard 1962.

The Ten Principles of Bandung translate the global strategy of the countries of the Third World, in a Cold War scenario. The main concern is to avoid a direct or indirect conflict between the superpowers and to avoid the repetition of the alliance system that culminated with the Second World War, which could generate a new global conflict. In the economic field, the conference materializes what Samir Amin (2010) calls “ideology of development”, which reached its peak precisely between 1955 and 1975, phase of the pike of American hegemony in the world system. Development, at that time, was seen as “a will to develop productive forces, to diversify production, namely industrializing it, as well as a will to the national State the direction and control of this process” (Amin 2010). In addition to symbolizing the emergence of the periphery in the world system, Bandung also influenced and inspired the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), after the Belgrade Conference, in 1961.

The principles of Bandung were adopted by NAM and their accom-

plishment became a standard for countries to adhere the bloc. The idea was to stimulate an active participation in international politics by the part of member countries, acting based on basic principles, values and ideas, such as self-determination; national independence; sovereignty; territorial integrity; opposition to the *apartheid*; non-adhesion to multilateral military pacts and independence of non-aligned countries from the rivalries between the two blocs in dispute; struggle against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations; struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and foreign occupation and domination; disarmament; non-interference in other States internal affairs and pacific coexistence among all nations; rejection of use or threat of use of force in international relations; fortification of the UN; democratization of international relations; socioeconomic development and restructuring of the international economic system; as well as international cooperation (NAM 2015).

These principles were already discussed at Bandung, but they would be institutionalized after the Non-Aligned Movement, which would act to secure that the peoples oppressed by foreign occupation and domination could exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. Such action would be hindered by the great diversity within the bloc, in ideological, political, economic, social and cultural terms. Countries such as Cuba⁷ would have a greater contestatory posture facing American power and, in certain situations, would defend the Soviet Union before the NAM, rejecting the thesis of two imperialisms and defending that the USSR, as a socialist and anti-imperialist country, would in fact be an ally of the Third World (Fernández 2003). Other countries fought precisely for gaining more autonomy towards the Soviet Union, such as Tito's Yugoslavia, for example.

In this regard, marked by a strong idealist component, the coalition had difficulty in evolving due to economic and political heterogeneity among its members, which made harder an incisive collective action in favor of development (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2009). Moreover, several recently inde-

7 From 1959 till 1967, the priority of the Cuban foreign policy was to stabilize and to consolidate the revolution. During this period, however, there was a support for guerrillas in Latin America and the defense of progressive causes all around the world, which is defined by Fernández (2003) defines as the export of revolution. In this phase, Cuba was expelled from the OAS and isolated from the rest of the continent, and sought Moscow's economic and moral support, even though there was disagreement regarding how the revolutionary strategy should be. So, this was not a period of significant convergence between Cuba and the Soviet Union, mainly because the Soviet Union felt unease due to Cuba's participation in NAM, for example. From 1968 to 1974m Cuba and the Soviet Union reached a closer relation due to Cuba's support of Czechoslovakia. Therefore, with economic and military aid and protection, Cuba was free to exercise a greater international protagonism in the 1970s. (Fernández 2003)

pendent countries were still tied to indirect domination by more powerful industrialized countries (in spite of the formal independence), which hampered the mobilization for an autonomous path of development (Linhares 2006).

Despite this, the demand for accelerating economic development in the Third World and, above that, for fomenting a more balanced trade between North and South, was widely defended by peripheral countries at the time. In this sense, the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the appearance of the G-77, in 1964, represented the capacity of influencing and of the political weight that developing countries would then exercise within the ambit of the UN, pressuring for a new international economic order more fair and equal. The goal of the G-77 is, therefore, to provide the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and to improve their capacity of joint negotiation in the UN system.

In the Joint Declaration of the G-77 at the Geneva Conference in 1964, problems regarding the commercial deficit in developing countries and the deterioration of trading terms were highlighted (Grupo dos 77 1964). In the Chart of Algiers, of 1967, it was emphasized the need of a new global agreement regarding commodities, given that developed countries augmented their degree of protection over several agricultural products (while the average price of primary products exported by developing countries has diminished 7% since 1958, the export prices for the same products in central countries have risen 10%). According to the Chart,

With a few notable exceptions, the terms and conditions of development finance are becoming more and more onerous; the proportion of grants is declining; interest rates are increasing; repayment periods are shortening and development loans are becoming increasingly tied. Discriminatory practices and arrangements in the field of shipping and increasing freight rates have aggravated further the balance-of-payments position and hindered the effort to promote the exports of developing countries. (Grupo dos 77 1964).

The Chart of Algiers symbolized, therefore, the first joint and organized claim over subjects that would be readdressed and still be in discussion in the 21st century, as the issue on tributary barriers of developed countries over agricultural products. The Chart signals that the G-77 is based on the assumption that “In a world of increasing interdependence, peace, progress and freedom are common and indivisible” and, “Consequently the development of developing countries will benefit the developed countries as well.” (Grupo dos 77 1964). Thus, there is a clear notion that the responsibility for the devel-

opment of the peripheral countries lies as well on developed countries, being a collective global action. The Chart also highlights that developing countries must reduce the inequalities among them, given that even within the Third World itself there are countries more industrialized than others.

In this extent, it is worth noting that the G-77 Conference in Algiers was preceded, a year before, by a conference that would mark the beginning of the solidarity that included, besides African and Asian continents, the Latin-American continent. That is the Trilateral Conference in Havana, of 1966, that founded the Organization of Solidarity of the People of Asia, Africa & Latin America (OSPAAAL). This conference would have a character of revolutionary solidarity, condemning imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism. While the G-77 would have a character associated to the UN and would set economic development as the center of debate, the Trilateral Conference would carry the denunciation of social problems, such as hunger, poverty and misery in the Third World, and had a normative character in the sense of fomenting and instrumentalizing the struggles for liberation throughout the world.

Therefore, what is observed in this initial phase of development of South-South relations (1955-1966) is an attempt to first consolidate the decolonization of Afro-Asiatic peoples through national liberation struggles and, at the same time, present an agenda of development for the Third World, bringing for the first time to discussion in international organizations issues such as poverty, misery, hunger, racism and economic inequality. At that time, autonomous multilateral mechanisms connecting the periphery of the global system were created, such as the Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Trilateral of Havana, which would serve to instrumentalize the strategies of external politics of Third World countries during the Cold War, providing the basic principles and values that go beyond economic character, possessing a social and political dimension. At the same time, mechanisms such as the UNCTAD and the G-77, reinforce disparities in international trade and pressure for an agenda on development that takes into account the agro-exporting character of Third World countries and strengthens their industrialization.

It is worth noting that the emergence of these agendas on development is strongly related to the promises that the world system under American hegemony presented to developing countries, confirming the “ideology of development” (Wallerstein 1992; Amin 2010). And, so being, the *Pax Americana*, as mentioned, is already born with a character of instability, in a great part due to the appearance of a more autonomous periphery. According to Arrighi (1996), “they were promised the right to self determination and develop-

ment (that is, aid for developing countries, in order to equate their conditions to that of wealth and well-being standards established by Western nations)” but as consequence “expectations were generated, which began to present a serious threat to the stability of North-American hegemony and eventually were responsible for anticipating its crisis”. In this regard, the emergence of the periphery possesses systemic implications and, in this initial moment, would contribute to the crisis of the American hegemony and the beginning of a conservative reaction that would reach its peak in the decade of 1980.

2. From Lusaka to Buenos Aires (1967-1978): The new International economic order and the emergence of South-South cooperation

The phase that started with the turning of the decade of 1960 to 1970 marks the beginning of the decline of American hegemony due to the Vietnam War and the appearance of competitors at the economic level, such as Europe and Japan, that rebuilt themselves precisely through the North-North Cooperation developed by the US during the post-war. According to Wallerstein (1992), while the period of 1945 to 1967 was characterized by political and military domination and an irrefutable US cultural leadership, the period that came after that was one of systemic reactions to their hegemony, reactions which differed from classic anti-systemic movements (nationalism and socialism), and were connected to the global revolution of 1968, the wars on Algeria and Vietnam and to the emergence of the Third World. Moreover, in the cultural sphere, the very ideology of development was getting weaker, given that the new decolonized countries realized that national independence did not mean complete liberation from economic ties and, consequently, started to more vigorously denounce systemic inequalities.

What was verified, then, after 1967 was the strengthening of an agenda on economic development that had already been launched in the middle of the 1960s by UNCTAD and the G-77. The Non-Aligned Movement itself would acquire a more economic connotation. As Amin (2010) highlights “the Non-Aligned Movement [...] would progressively shift its stance from a political solidarity based on the support of liberation struggles and refusal of military pacts to an ensemble of economic demands towards the North”. Furthermore, this period represented the first dialogues in UN in order to instrumentalize South-South relations and to deepen the idea of technical cooperation among developing countries. Geographically, the inclusion of Latin-American countries in the agenda of the South was reached, bringing with it the economic agenda developed by CEPAL in the decade of 1950, with

the denunciation of the deterioration of trading terms of the countries of the region.

The economic context of the end of the 1960s, it is worth mentioning, is one of decline of the participation of developing countries in the global trade exports from a third in 1950 to a sixth in 1969. Moreover, there was an increase in the negative impact of the decline of financial flows in terms of percentage of developed countries' Gross National Product (GNP) to developing countries and of the crescent financial flows from developing countries to developed ones, through debt payments, shares, royalties and financial and commercial services. Poverty in developing nations was evidenced as a critical problem, within an unequal economic global context inherited from the colonial past. In this sense, the occupation of part of developing countries' territories by past metropolis or minority governments deprives these groups of their natural resources and is itself an obstacle for their development.

Given this scenario, the Lusaka Conference, of 1970, brought with it the notion of *collective self-sufficiency*, that is, peripheral countries should not wait for the benevolence from rich countries to create a new international order. This meant Third World countries were responsible for their own development, with "a greater control over their natural resources, a search for their own scientific and technological development, for improvements in their educational systems, as well as for external measures (greater technical and economic cooperation among these countries, associations and increase in commercial exchange, etc.)" (Pino 2014, 164).

Besides the economic agenda, in Lusaka it was also reinforced the need to: a) take effective and concrete measures against all forces that violate non-aligned countries' independence and territorial integrity of non-aligned nations; b) keep up with the efforts to promote the dissolution of great military alliances, in circumstances that would secure the safety of all people; c) affirm the right of all people to participate equally in international relations, being the democratization of international relations an imperative; d) offer support for disarmament; e) intensify joint efforts to end colonialism and racial discrimination (for that end, it was reiterated their moral, political and maximum possible material support to national liberation) and; f) carry on with their efforts in the sense of strengthening the role and efficiency of the UN, as well as of promoting its universality, granting, for example, to the Popular Republic of China its rightful place in the organization, and the admission of other countries, including those that are divided (MNAL 2015).

The Lusaka Conference, therefore, materialized the idea that peripheral countries were then responsible for their own development, representing an increased awareness of their trajectories by emergent nations, not leaving

aside, however, the denounce of inequalities and injustices in the international economy arena. In Lusaka, it was demanded of the member countries a fair use of natural resources that promoted social well-being, employment, income and social opportunities. In 1973, the Non-Aligned countries presented the Chart of Algiers, positioning themselves in favor of the end of conflicts in several Third World regions. For the Middle East, the Chart claimed for the acceptance of UN resolutions that obliged Israel to evacuate occupied territories in 1967; condemned illegitimate appropriation of Palestinian territory and claimed for the establishment of rights for the Palestinian people. As for Southeast Asia, the Chart celebrated the Paris Agreements which were considered a victory for the Vietnamese people; condemned North-American interference in Indochina; encouraged countries to help in the reconstruction of Vietnam; condemned the invasion of Cambodia, affirming that the government formed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk was legitimate; supported pacific reunification action pursued by Korean people and the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea. For Africa, the Chart of Algiers condemned racist regimes that relied on economic, political and military support from Western countries; denounced unequal aid that certain African countries received from NATO; affirmed that only armed fight could put an end to colonial domination in the region. For Latin America, the Chart condemned the existence of colonial domination in the region and stated its support to the fight of the people of Puerto Rico for their freedom and independence; besides, it demanded that the US would remove their military forces from territories of Cuba, Panama and Puerto Rico, and returned them to their rightful owners.

During the Algiers Conference, in 1973, member countries sent the UN Secretary General a request to convene an extraordinary session of the General Assembly, in order to debate problems concerning feedstock trade and development. A year later, the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (Resolution 3.201 of 1974) was achieved, in order to foment the commitment of member countries on distributing natural, economic and human resources more fairly, determining an increase in the aid for developing countries, the promotion of favorable conditions of financial resources transfers to peripheral countries, as well as State sovereignty in the management of natural resources and economic activities. At the same time, the Program of Action on the Establishment of a New Economic Order (Resolution 3.202), sought to instrumentalize and guide the practices of the countries, including in one of its items the need to reform the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1974, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Resolution 3.281, of December 1974) was also elaborated.

In this sense, the New International Economic Order was represent-

ed by a group of proposals (most of them from Third World countries) that aimed at expanding UN institutions, presenting a challenge for International Law at that current time (Rajagopal 2003). Concerning cooperation practices, in the 1970 decade, the criticism regarding the North-South assistance model increased and the concept of South-South cooperation started to be theoretically developed, and was operated and regulated through several international organisms, but specially in the UN: in 1972 the work group on technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC) was created and, in 1974, the Special Unit on Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries, associated to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), was established and was “the focus of South-South cooperation inside the organization, by promoting, managing and coordination this cooperation and linking the UNDP and the G-77” (Pino 2014, 65).

Then, at the first time, in the Buenos Aires Conference of 1978, there was an attempt to organize and institutionalize the practice of South-South Cooperation within the UN. The Buenos Aires Action Plan, which was a result of the debates of the conference, developed the concept of technical cooperation based on reciprocity and horizontal character, instrumentalized by the exchange of knowledge, information, technology and management techniques on the field of public politics regarding education, health, agriculture, among others. The year of 1978 was a milestone for South-South Cooperation given that, for the first time, peripheral countries jointly established concepts and principles, emphasizing the idea that the social practice of one country could be applied to another to generate development. Summing up it referred to “the promotion of self sufficiency of developing countries and of strengthening their capacities to analyze, identify and solve their main issues” (Pino 2014, 66). In order to instrumentalize, organize, and promote the practice of South-South Cooperation, the High Level Committee for South-South Cooperation (subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly) was created, which became an important normative entity concerning cooperation among developing countries.

Considering the evolution of the relations among the periphery at period, what was observed at the systemic level was that South-South Cooperation became increasingly institutionalized within the UN, while autonomous mechanisms of action, such as the Non-Aligned Movement, started to lack importance, becoming more of dialogue forums and ideological manifestations. In terms of collective action, it is weakened as the number of members increases and, in order to be effective, it requires some members to be willing to handle the economic and political costs in a disproportional manner, in the name of the cohesion of the group. Thus, the initial moment of South-

South relations was marked by challenges to coordinating collective action, but also by a greater boldness from the countries of the South to present their demands, after the decolonization of the majority of Afro-Asiatic countries. The progressive industrialization of the periphery, according to Amin (1997), weakened the typical polarization of the capitalist world system, and contributed, in the period analyzed, for the decline of American hegemony, which became increasingly contested, in the form of anti-systemic movements and the eruption of Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World.

Conclusions

The period from 1955 till 1978 marked the consolidation and establishment of an agenda for the periphery and the international insertion of a third bloc in the international Cold War order, contributing for the decline of the American hegemony. This period was divided in two main phases: from 1955 to 1967 there were national liberation conflicts in Africa and Asia, non-alignment and development of the first arrangements connecting the global periphery such as the Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement, the UNCTAD and the G-77; and from 1967 to 1978, demands were concentrated on the fight for a new international economic order and on the need to develop and institutionalize South-South Cooperation. As a consequence, in this first moment, a sort of conservative reaction is observed during the decades of 1980 and 1990, that would serve as an obstacle for South-South Cooperation and to place the periphery within a North-South cooperation logic, given the advances of neoliberal principles, which demanded, as a condition for cooperation, that developing countries pursued fiscal adjustments.

In this sense, the logic of the periphery in the decade of 1980 and beginning of the 1990s is a reflux of the social agenda on development and of the cooling down of typical arrangements of the Cold War, such as the Non-Aligned Movement. However, after the middle of the 1990 decade, a new impulse for South-South Cooperation was verified, reorganized under a new power logic observed with the end of the Cold War, this time with the emergence of an active semi-periphery. During the period analyzed in the present article, from 1955 to 1978, it was verified that peripheral countries struggled to act according to a logic of collective action, given the heterogeneity of their members. The most powerful countries of the Third World, such as China, India and Brazil, acted according to the power logic of the Cold War, frequently distancing themselves from dealing with the costs of leading the Third World. Therefore, there was not a complete consonance between the external action of the periphery and of the semi-periphery. China, specially, when al-

lying itself with the US in the decade of 1970, contributed to counterweight Soviet power, under the logic of the strategic tripolarity developed by Kissinger and Nixon. Brazil, even though having experienced some moments of a more globalist paradigm and of diversification of its partnerships with other continents, for the majority of the period was aligned to the North-American logic of ideological border doctrine, keeping the communist threat away from Latin-American countries. As for India, the country went through an approximation to the Soviet Union, in particular after the Americans supported Pakistan, and with it established an axis from Aden to the Strait of Malacca, opposing the Sino-American axis.

In this sense, the initial moment of the emergence of the periphery starting at the Bandung Conference was characterized by a moderate participation of the middle powers, which tried to place themselves under the power logic of the Cold War, seeking the advantages of an alliance with one of the great superpowers. However, in the present moment of South-South Cooperation, with the end of the Cold War, semi-peripheral countries have started to act in a more synchronized manner with the periphery and among each other, establishing blocs such as BRICS and IBSA. These new arrangements have a reformist character of the international order, and seek new solutions and forms of cooperation to deal with problems concerning development, an issue of extreme importance for the periphery. The creation of the Bank of the BRICS and military cooperation have signaled a crescent leading role of these group of countries, which have carried themselves as the speakers for developing countries through their models of cooperation, distinct from the North-South logic that was predominant during the decades of 1980 and 1990.

China has based its cooperation on the principles of equality and mutual benefits, absence of political and economic conditionalities and a component of implicit criticisms against the alleged second intentions of North-South Cooperation. More recently, the country has been focusing on economic cooperation and built of infrastructure in the continent, in a sort of geoeconomic dispute with the old powers inserted in the region. India, for its turn, has been contributing to the insertion of intensive technological goods and pharmaceutical products at low costs in the African continent and its cooperation is specially focused on the areas of Information Technology, nuclear energy, aerospace technology and renewable energies. For instance, Brazil has been investing in a diplomatic high profile and in a technical model of cooperation, in particular with Latin America and Lusophone African countries, through the sharing of technical expertise and social technologies from government organs and public Brazilian companies such as the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), Ministry of Health (MS), EMBRAPA, FIOCRUZ,

and others. In this sense, the periphery in the post-Cold War period has a broader range of strategic options, what implies that it has been benefited with the greater multipolarity, which created new alternatives of alignment and cooperation. This does not mean that South-South relations are solely an expression of solidarity and altruism, given that they are still subject to the interests of National States as autonomous unities.

Nevertheless, history has thought, that the emergence of the periphery may bring with it a kind of conservative reaction, such as the observed during the decades of 1980 and 1990. In this sense, it is important to pay attention to the systemic reactions of traditional powers to the emergence of new poles of power, specially the BRICS. Another point worth noting is the fact that the situation of the periphery depends heavily on how the semi-periphery acts, which can surrender itself to the logic of high politics and be used as a chess piece by the superpower in its own game. The construction of hegemony, as Arrighi (1996) stresses, has a component of leadership, such as, the ability to turn an individual will into a general one. This way, strategic options of semi-peripheral countries must take into account long term impacts over the periphery, in order to build mutual trust. The BRICS, therefore, must build institutional mechanisms that give voice to the periphery, and not only to seek concentration among them. As the BRICS presented an alternative model for the financial and monetary monopoly of the Bretton Woods System, in the political field there should be more discussions considering an alternative system for the UN, a system that should be more democratic and that takes into account the weight of the periphery, in terms of political unities and in relation to the rest of the world, as well as in terms of population and participation in the global economy.

This is not only a question of searching for solutions in both the institutional and international level, as the Neoliberal theory in International Relations proposes, but also of thinking in more realist ways about strategies that unite semi and peripheral interests and add to a greater balance and decentralization of world power. Therefore, in the present context, of hegemonic crisis, what matters is the dispute of ideas, values and principles, directly associated to the capacity of the semi-periphery to produce alternatives and solutions for development. The periphery (above all, Africa) can benefit from the geoeconomic struggle between the center and the semi-periphery, as investment and cooperation alternatives multiply. Nevertheless, it is for the periphery to establish its own priorities and forms of action, which may or may not recover the coordination strategy of the Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement period.

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyze the initial stage of development of South-South relations and the emergence of the periphery, taking into account that South-South Cooperation, as known today, gave its first steps in the context of the Cold War, with the decolonization of Afro-Asiatic countries and the formation of the first arrangements connecting the global periphery, such as the Bandung Conference and the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, the G-77 and of the UNCTAD. In this initial phase, the goal was to guarantee decolonization and non-alignment. Since the decade of 1970, countries from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa began to be increasingly involved with the agenda of the Third World, in an attempt to foment political, economic and technical cooperation among developing countries. South-South Cooperation became progressively institutionalized within the UN, in particular due to the Buenos Aires Conference in 1978.

KEYWORDS

Periphery; South-South Cooperation; Bandung Conference; Buenos Aires Conference; BRICS.

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