



Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe

Working Paper

Mapping Policy Patterns of Populist Parties. A Quantitative Cross-Country Analysis

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Abstract

The aim of this study is two-fold. It will try to identify populist policy fields' patterns in contrast to non-populist positions; it will measure the impact that populist parties have on other parties' policy positions and the party system. The analysis's critical questions are the following: Do populist parties have a stable core of policy positions? Or does their essential policy direction change over time? On which policy positions do they give up? Is there a distinct cluster of populist policy positions that distinguishes populist parties from their contenders within the party system? What impact do populist parties have on other political parties' policy positions, and the party system's competition mode (centripetal or centrifugal)? These perspectives may also contribute to the broader discussion if the rise of populist parties reflects the emergence of a new cleavage in Europe.

The research design is based on a quantitative cross-country data analysis with party manifestos as the core unit of analysis (MARPOR data set). Four hypotheses will guide this analysis: The first hypothesis (flexible policy program) refers to the widely acknowledged definition of populism as a 'thin ideology' due to the few core concepts introduced by Mudde (2010). It will test if populism is more flexible in terms of its policy goals and or guiding principles than fully-fledged ideologies like liberalism or socialism. The second hypothesis (representation gap) picks up on the notion of populist policy supply. It takes a closer look if populist parties try to pursue a different kind of policies outside of or in contrast to the mainstream. The third hypothesis (contagion effects) points to the relation between the electoral success of populist parties and the policy adaption of other parties, especially among established parties. It will test the impact of the electoral success by populist parties on other political parties, especially parties with a conservative, nationalist, or centrist-right ideology. Finally, the fourth hypothesis (polarization effects) deals with the impact of populist parties on the party system (Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018). It will analyze if populist parties have polarizing effects on the political party system, changing the party competition mode from centripetal to centrifugal.

The sample, extracted from the MARPOR data set, includes manifestos of political parties from twenty different European countries. For a comparative approach between West- and East-European party systems, this analysis restricts itself to the recent 'wave of populism' 1990-2020 (Mudde 2013; Andersen & Bjørklund 1994).

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1. Research Questions and State of Research

The successes of populism – maybe with Donald Trump’s turbulent presidency as the peak so far – have stimulated various research fields in political science. The growing concern about an era of ‘populist democracies’ (Pappas, 2014) has, for instance, renewed the interest in the phenomenon of populism by empirical research of comparative politics (Wuster & Kailitz 2017) as much as by normative analysis of political theory (Müller 2016). A common focus of these recent trends picks up on the challenges of populist parties and their policies to liberal democracies. This focus has also been of growing importance in research on political parties and party systems (Albertazzi & Müller 2013; Kriesi, 2014; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012). The purpose of this paper to contribute to this stream of research. It does so in emphasizing the ‘supply-side’ of populist parties. Building on a comparative analysis of populist parties and a quantitative approach to their policy positions within the right-left continuum, the key questions this paper tries to answer are the following: Is there a cluster of policy positions that distinguish populist parties from other (established) parties? Do these policy positions reflect their anti-establishment attitude (Jagers & Walgrave 2007)? Furthermore, do they have an impact on the party competition and the party system in general?

In contrast to the renewed interest in populism in other political science fields, the research field of party politics ranked populism always high on the agenda. This focus held even when this attention has strikingly contradicted the lack of political power of populist parties (Mudde 2013). What is the reason for this ‘insatiable demand’ (Bale 2012)? Following Mudde (2016b), this demand has resulted into ‘three waves,’ with each wave following its research paradigm. The *first wave* (1945-1980) is characterized by the quest for continuity between pre-war and post-war periods. Studies in this period take on the fascist legacy and try to find answers to whether the democratic rupture after World War II has been deep enough to leave the dreadful past behind. Whereas this ‘wave’ was mainly dominated by (German and French) historical analyses, the *second wave* (1980-2000) has been heavily influenced by the American social sciences and its ‘modernization theory’ (Bell 1964; Lipset & Raab, 1970). This approach tries to prove the point that mainly ‘losers’ of the modernization belong to the electorate of radical parties and that roughly 10% of the electorate voting for radical parties is within a ‘normal’ range of basically every stable democracy – the ‘normal pathology thesis’ (Klingemann & Scheuch 1967; Mudde 2010). In this perspective, radical or populist parties result from a particular demand of voters, making these parties an independent variable that influences the stability and configuration of a party system that characterizes, according to Mudde, the *third wave* (since the 2000s).

In sum, during the first and the second wave populist parties, as part of the radical left- and right-wing spectrum, serve as an indicator for the integration and stability of the (newly) established democracies (first wave) and the (European) party systems (second wave). With the third wave, however, populist parties have become of interest not only as products but also as producers or ‘suppliers’ of new policies (Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 2007; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012). As suppliers, it was common to describe their role as ‘challengers’ of the established parties and party systems – within Europe mainly from the right-wing of the political spectrum (with exceptions, e.g., Spain), outside Europe also, and maybe

predominantly, from the left-wing (Priester, 2007; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013).¹ Mair (2011) took this role attribution even one-step further. He claims that a division of labor shapes the European politics' political process, increasingly furthering the hollowing out of democratic party government. The populist parties focus on representing 'the people,' whereas the established parties are consumed by governing the polity.

There are two things to be said to Mair's assessment. First, he stressed the nexus between the rise of populism and the weakness of representative democracy in a most comprehensive way – a nexus, he thought, could lead to a 'partyless democracy' (Mair 2000; 2002). Second, as illuminating as his analysis is, his idea of labor division between populist parties and established parties seems to be relatively static, though, as Kriesi (2014) has already pointed out. There is no reason to believe that citizens hang on to this kind of functional split between the 'core' of parties that govern (Smith, 1989) and the others that represent dissatisfaction. Instead, it is more likely to assume a more dynamic process in which populist parties have their share in transforming the party systems. And this assumption seems to be even more plausible after the long cycles of de-alignment in Western Europe and growing experiences of governing parties in Eastern Europe. Against this background, it becomes clear that at present, one of the critical questions of the research on party systems is whether populist parties are a 'threat or corrective for democracy' (Decker 2006; Mény & Surel 2002; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012; Mudde 2016a). Will they provide a chance to stop de-alignment processes and connect the party system again closer to the society's cleavages (Kriesi 2014)? Or will they, as Mair feared, foster the process of hollowing out the European model of party democracy up to the point of 'partyless democracy'?

These questions depend mostly on the party competition and the influence that populist parties exert within this competition with other parties. Several studies have shed light on these contexts: Some of them aim at specific issues, among them especially at the immigration issue (Akkerman 2015; Carvalho 2014); others evaluate the impact on the polity dimension (Rooduijn 2013; Williams 2006); and both perspectives have increasingly included Eastern Europe into the picture (Minkenberg 2002; Minkenberg 2015; Pirro 2015; Pytlas 2016). However, insights into the long-term effects of populist parties on the party system itself are somewhat sparse (Mudde 2014). And many of them are still linked to case studies (Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018). Some provide valuable analyses of the party system's specific qualities (e.g., Akkerman & Rooduijn 2015: inclusion/exclusion of populist parties).

This contribution is two-fold to evaluate the impact populist parties can impose on their competitors: It will try to identify populist policy fields' patterns in contrast to non-populist positions. It will measure populist parties' impact on other parties' policy positions and the party system. The analysis's critical questions are the following:

¹ Usually, these two types are dubbed as 'exclusionary' (right-wing) and 'inclusionary' (left-wing) populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013; Priester 2011). Considering the 'war of words' (Mudde 1996) in the field of populism, it is quite astonishing that this differentiation has been generally accepted since both types of populism are in effect highly exclusionary. This is obvious for right-wing populism, which frames 'the people' as a national entity. Nevertheless, it also applies to left-wing populism with its class-oriented concept of 'the people' (Mény & Surel 2000). The left-wing model of 'the people' might appear to be more open and permeable compared to the right-wing model, but is, however, nevertheless based on the distinction between the 'haves' and the 'have nots,' which is, of course, a matter of an exclusionary distinction (and decision to be made).

Tab. 1 – Overview of Research Questions

Research Questions
Do populist parties have a stable core of policy positions? Or does their essential policy direction change over time? On which policy positions do they give up?
Do populist parties change their policy positions and their anti-establishment attitude once they have entered the government?
Is there a distinct cluster of populist policy positions that distinguishes populist parties from their contenders within the party system?
What impact do populist parties have on other political parties' policy positions?
What impact do populist parties have on the party system's competition modum (centripetal or centrifugal)?

These perspectives may also contribute to the broader discussion if the rise of populist parties reflects the emergence of a new cleavage in Europe (Bornschieer 2010; Bornschieer & Kriesi 2015; Hooghe & Marks 2018; Ignazi 1992; Ignazi 2017; Kriesi et al. 2008; Merkel 2017; Norris & Inglehart 2019; Swank & Betz 2003; Zürn & de Wilde 2016).

2. Theoretical Perspectives and Hypotheses

2.1 *Thin-centered ideology*

As a starting point for exploring the theoretical dimensions connected with the five research questions, this paper uses the widely acknowledged ‘minimal’ definition of populism introduced by Mudde (2004; 2007; 2010). This definition restricts itself to the necessary and sufficient core of the concepts, guided by Sartori’s (1970) conceptual strategy that a limited number of propensities (low intension) can cover a wide range of empirical phenomena (high extension). Against this background, populism is defined as ‘a thin-centered ideology. This ideology considers society as a divided entity ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people’ (Mudde 2004: 543). In a broader sense, this definition reflects two main characteristics: the democratic but authoritarian approach to politics in general and the pretty vague, hence flexible approach to policy programs. Both features are of matter for the operationalization and therefore need some elaboration.

The populist approach to politics is democratic but illiberal (Pappas 2013). In general, populists tend to lack a pluralistic understanding of society. They do not like the complexity of politics, nor do they appreciate institutions (Canovan 2002). Usually, they see them as an expression of an ongoing self-reflexive cycle, vain in attitude and purpose, which in the end is of help only for politicians, but seldom for ‘the people.’ In contrast, a populist ideal is a form of ‘pure politics of non-politics’ or ‘perfect anti-politics,’ according to Rosanvallon (2006: 271–277). The fewer politics, the better it is. Insofar as there is a need for politics, it is best done by non-politicians using common sense and acting as a ‘spokesperson of the *vox populi*’ (Abt 2011: 930).² This gyroscopic role of the spokesman reveals a plebiscitary understanding of politics, prone to a flickering attitude toward the policy dimension.

This ‘flickering’ aspect of policy-making is reinforced by Mudde’s reference to populism as a “thin ideology.”³ Since it contains only a few core concepts, populists typically connect their views with a ‘host ideology’ to exploit and enrich their policy program to make up for this lack of substance. Consequently, the populist ideology is much more flexible already on its essential goals and or guiding principles than fully-fledged ideologies. For instance, take the difference between the True Finns with a heavy focus on ethnicity and nativism and the former Dutch populist party of Pim Fortuyn with his image as a liberal defender of the western culture (Reuter 2009). Populists maybe passionate about some of their ideological convictions, but ultimately, they are vague, undefined, and undetermined. In this sense, they have, as Taggart noted, “an empty heart” (Taggart 2004: 274f.). This ‘empty heart’ of populist parties finds its expression in a broad and loose range of policy positions. Except for a particular core of policy issues, mostly colored with a distinct anti-establishment flavor, populist parties seem to care not too profoundly about a coherent policy program over a more extended period. This, at least, is the main upshot of the *flexible policy program thesis*. It

² Taggart (2002: 67) also emphasizes the direct linkage between masses and elites. However, he prefers the concept of ‘heartland’ instead of ‘people.’

³ The distinction between thick and thin-centered ideologies is a conceptual suggestion made by Freedman (1998). Whether this is an appropriate conception of populism is a subject of debate; see Stanley (2008) and recently the critique by Aslanidis (2016).

will test if populism is more flexible in terms of its policy goals and or guiding principles than fully-fledged ideologies like liberalism or socialism.

<i>Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis</i> : Populists parties have a “thin-centered ideology” (Mudde 2004). Beyond a fixed core they are more flexible in their policies than other parties.	H1
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2.2 Representing and Governing

Things may change, however, once the populist parties are in power. Then, electoral demands and the ‘cost of government’ influence their decision-making process because now the obligation to call the shots and suffer the consequences of disappointing the populist base.⁴ In any case, their anti-establishment approach must be refined or even invented since the option of radical opposition towards the political system is diminished (Kitschelt 1995). In this context, it is worth remembering Sartori’s critical appraisal of Downs. Down’s insight was that the political market is not a one-way-road but an ideological dimension (Sartori 2005: chp. 10/1): The voters’ demand is not the only thing that matters, the supply-side of parties matters, too. As suppliers, political parties can actively respond to demands and create them by themselves, for instance, by stretching the political market. This basic assumption does not downplay the relevance of cleavages.

On the contrary, it emphasizes the party elites’ role – in a similar fashion to Lijphart (1968) – and their skills in managing the policy supply in the wake of potentially new cleavages and creating chances for their ‘product’ on the political market. One of Sartori’s core ideas seems that the political market is made of ideology, and ideology allows for adjustable and flexible positions (Sartori 2005: chp. 10/4). Do populist use this room for political maneuvering once they are in power? As Mair has noted, it is challenging to balance the two main functions of political parties: representing and governing (Mair 2009). As governors, populist parties are no longer the fringe party on the edge of the right-left scale. Instead, they need to manage (rather than meet) demands. Moreover, they must prove themselves as a performer in the public’s eyes – a role in which they need to consider not only the demand but also the supply side of politics.

<i>Power Matters Hypothesis</i> : In government, populist parties become more “established” by giving up on some policies typical for populists. Once the lose power, they return to their “pet” policies.	H2
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2.3 Dissensus Conflicts

The recent successes of populist parties are connected to their capacity to re-vitalize cleavage structures with new issues. This holds especially for the right-wing populist parties and their strategy to ‘culturize’ conflicts that were once conflicts of socio-economic distribution or re-distribution. In their seminal work on cleavage structures and party systems, Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 10) use the functional-ideological axis to show the different modes of conflict management and resolution in an ideal typed way. For them, economic conflicts belong to the ‘rational’ type that typically produces compromises via bargaining. This, of course, changes substantially if, e.g., entitlement issues of social security (scope, amount, etc.) become an issue of ‘welfare chauvinism’ and by that an ideologically loaded topic of

⁴ The Trump presidency is a case in point: e.g., no replace and repeal *Obama care*.

inclusion and exclusion (Norocel 2016). Conflict resolution is no longer determined by competition and compromise but by culture or identity. Therefore, the conflict's characteristics change from compromise or consensus to 'dissensus' (Aubert 1963).

Similarly, populist parties – left and right alike – have re-vitalized the center-periphery cleavage due to the contrast between the 'pure people' and the 'corrupt elite' (Kriesi 2014: 375). Firstly, this kind of framing portrays the conflict in a fashion of intensified morality with a clear-cut contradiction between 'the people' vs. 'the elite' as the age-old story of 'the good vs. the evil.' Secondly, within this framing, the conflict between 'the people' vs. 'the elite' is reinforced by and fueled with the mechanisms of bottom-up demands and top-down decisions. The opposition to the top-down decisions aggregates quite easily into an opposition 'to the system.' Therefore, populist parties attempt to contrast themselves from the policy consensus among 'established' political parties (Kitschelt 1995; critical Kailitz 2006). They typically appeal to the public by emphasizing that they are different from 'the elites' and their partisan games. Populists claim that these political elites pursue only their interests and fail to represent 'the people.' Is this claim only populist rhetoric, or is it a policy strategy designed to exploit representation gaps? The *representation gap hypothesis* picks up on the notion of populist policy supply. It takes a closer look at whether populist parties try to pursue a different kind of policies outside of or in contrast to the mainstream.

<i>Gap of Representation Hypothesis</i> : Populist parties make use of their anti-establishment approach to politics by exploiting policy issues that established political parties fail to represent.	H3
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2.4 From Outsiders to Insiders

As for the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe, Ignazi (1992; 2017) has argued that they result from a "silent counter-revolution." Just like the Greens, which originated from the cleavage between materialism and post-materialism since the 1970s in West Europe, the right-wing populist parties have sprung, according to Ignazi, from the same cleavage as a countermovement. This approach can be linked to Mudde's 'Zeitgeist thesis' (Mudde 2004). It invites a paradigmatic shift in the research on these parties (Mudde 2016b: 16): Regardless of their centrifugal strategies (which may potentially endure), they come into the picture as relatively integrated members of the party system, and no longer (only) as outsiders or new challengers. To what extent do these parties only cultivate forms of 'pure politics of non-politics,' as Rosanvallon (2006) has dubbed the populist approach? Do they have long-term policy preferences, or is the core of their policy the de-legitimation of party government, as we know it?

Moreover, do populists seek to provide alternatives to the policy mainstream? Furthermore, do they have the power to push the agenda within a party system? Alternatively, are their claims of representing 'the people' only a rhetorical device without impact on other parties. These questions point to the effect that the rise of populism has on the party systems in Europe.

The *contagion hypothesis* picks up on the relation between the electoral success of populist parties and the policy adaption of other parties, especially among established parties. This phenomenon has been dubbed 'Rechtsruck' (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009), at least for political parties with a conservative, nationalist, or centrist-right ideology.

Contagion Hypothesis: With success of populist parties at the ballot boxes, other parties (of the same political spectrum) feel the pressure to take a stance and react to this pressure by taking over populist positions. H4

As for the party systems, one of the critical questions is whether this polarization changes the dynamics of the party competition from centripetal to centrifugal dynamics. This process is, in essence, what Mair (2011) was worried about when he coined the phrase of the ‘hollowing out’ of party politics. The dysfunctional division of labor can quickly end up in a vicious cycle between parties with an almost exclusive focus on the representative function and parties with a sole focus on the governing role. The *polarization hypothesis* deals with the impact of populist parties on the party system (Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018). It will analyze if populist parties have polarizing effects on the political party system, changing the party competition mode from centripetal to centrifugal.

Polarization Hypothesis: The rise of populism effects the mode of competition between parties. The party system becomes more centrifugal, fragmented, and polarized. H5

3. Data set and Indices

The following analysis uses the *Manifesto Research on Political Representation* (MARPOR) data with the recent dataset version 2020a (Volgens et al. 2020).

3.1 MARPOR

The sample used for this study includes manifestos of political parties from 15 different European countries. For a comparative approach between West- and East-European party systems, this analysis restricts itself to the recent ‘wave of populism’ (von Beyme, 1988; Andersen & Bjørklund, 1994; Decker, 2004; Luther, 2008; Mudde, 2013) from 1990-2019. This study uses two partially overlapping data sets for this period: PSW and PSG (fig. 1, tab. 2).

3.1.1 Established Party Systems in West Europe (PSW)

Five different data samples of populist parties have been compared for the PSW sample construction (Franzmann & Lewandowsky 2020; Mudde, 2013; Taggart 1995; van Kessel 2015; Wolinets 2018). Because of analytical clarity, this study follows a narrowly defined selection of cases. The compilation focuses on stable party systems as a base for a clear-cut assignment of the manifestos to classical non-populist party families (NPP) and a straightforward identification of right-wing populist parties (PP). Consequently, the present selection is mostly identical to the sample of Franzmann & Lewandowsky (2020), which has been expanded in some cases (app. 1.1).


In addition to identified populist parties, the data set also includes those “relevant parties” (Sartori 2005) of each the party system of the PSW sample that belong to one of the following party families (PF): Greens (GRN), Liberals (LIB), Conservatives (CONS), Social Democrats (SocD), Socialists (SOC). The assignment’s basis is the party affiliation at the EU level or the parties’ self-description (e.g., in case of Switzerland; see the app. 1.1 for the complete list of the PSW sample). The assignment aimed to identify the right-wing populist parties, not right-wing extremist parties. Those were excluded from the sample. In sum, the data set contains 98 populist manifestos and 509 non-populist manifestos that were assigned to other party families.

3.1.2 European Party Systems with Populists in Government (PSG)

The intention behind this sample’s creation is to investigate the impact of government participation on populist parties. This sample contains only manifestos of populist parties, namely those that, first, have already (co-)formed or supported a government. Furthermore, second, have written a manifesto based on this experience, which is coded in the Manifesto 2020a dataset. The latter condition is necessary for the empirical observation of populist once they are in power. For this reason, prominent and more recent examples (e.g., Syriza in Greece) are not included.

The basis for the selection was the samples of Franzmann / Lewandowsky (2020), <https://popu-list.org/> and for the government periods <http://www.parlgov.org/>.

Fig. 1 – Samples PSW and PSG



Tab. 2 – PP and Non-PP manifestos

	manifestos	PSW (■)	PSG (■)
PP	133	98	80
Non-PP	509	509	-
Σ	642	607	80

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Source: Creator: CrazyPhunk, ed. by Georgi (GNU-Licence), online: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Europa.svg>.

3.2 RILE and Other Indices

This dataset based on party manifestos provides for the so-called RILE index. This index is a scale with the purpose of mapping party manifestos in the universe of the right-left continuum as a one-dimensional spatial model that can be applied to the different European party systems.

RILE index (Right-Left Score) aggregates party policy positions, categorizes them as either ‘right’ or ‘left’ policy positions, and measures the cumulated score of political parties on various items of these two scales:

$$\text{RILE}_{\text{Score}} = |\text{score}_{\text{Right}}| - |\text{score}_{\text{Left}}| \quad [0 > \text{score}_{\text{Right}} \vee \text{score}_{\text{Left}} < 100 \text{ [with a uniformly continuous interval of the RILE}_{\text{Score}} \text{ from } -100 \text{ to } +100]]$$

A positive sum of these two scales indicates an overall policy position on the right side of the right-left continuum, a negative sum a left position.⁵ In a similar fashion the CULT index covers the socio-cultural dimension of the RILE, just as the ECO index the socio-economic dimension and the POSTM index the positions along the Materialism v. Post-Materialism dimension. These indices are defined in the following way:⁶

$$\text{CULT}_{\text{Score}} = |\text{CULT}_{\text{Right}}| - |\text{CULT}_{\text{Left}}| \quad [0 > \text{CULT}_{\text{Right}} \vee \text{CULT}_{\text{Left}} < 100 \text{ [uniformly continuous interval of the CULT}_{\text{Score}} \text{ from } -100 \text{ to } +100]]$$

$$\text{ECO}_{\text{Score}} = |\text{ECO}_{\text{Right}}| - |\text{ECO}_{\text{Left}}| \quad [0 > \text{ECO}_{\text{Right}} \vee \text{ECO}_{\text{Left}} < 100 \text{ [uniformly continuous interval of the ECO}_{\text{Score}} \text{ from } -100 \text{ to } +100]]$$

$$\text{POSTM}_{\text{Score}} = |\text{POSTM}_{\text{Right}}| - |\text{POSTM}_{\text{Left}}| \quad [0 > \text{POSTM}_{\text{Right}} \vee \text{POSTM}_{\text{Left}} < 100 \text{ [uniformly continuous interval of the POSTM}_{\text{Score}} \text{ from } -100 \text{ to } +100]]$$

⁵ For the composition of the RILE index, see the appendix.

⁶ For the composition of the CULT, ECO, and POSTM indices, see the appendix.

4. Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis

Given the *Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis*, populist parties have a less steady or stable stand on policy positions. In contrast to political parties with an affiliation to ‘thick-centered ideologies’ (liberalism, socialism, etc.) ideology, populist parties with a ‘thin-centered ideology’ tend to have incoherent policy positions right-left continuum, which are sometimes even mutually exclusive. The following approaches try to make sense of this hypothesis and use various techniques of analysis. Table 3 provides a quick overview of the different approaches, methods, and the sections in which they are the research subject.

Tab. 3 – Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis: Approaches

Questions	Analysis	Focus	Method	Sec.
Do populists have core policies?	Manifestos; PF	Inter-PF	Mean/median comparison of policies: boxplots	4.1
Do populists have a stable ranking of their priorities?	Manifestos; PF	Inter-PF	Policy ranking ordered by mean	4.1
Do populists switch easily between “hot” topics?	Manifestos; PF	Inter-PF	SD comparison: boxplot	4.1
Do populists switch easily between “lame” policy issues?	Manifestos; PF	Inter-PF	Spread-Analysis: RILE, CULTURE, ECO, POSTM; Cohen’s d	4.2
Do populists ignore policies?	Manifestos; PF	Inter-PF	Median-mean difference: boxplots; Cohen’s d	4.3
Is the populist party family internally policy-divers?	Manifestos; PF	Intra-PF	Frequency of items; SD comparison	4.4
Do populists switch between their priorities?	Manifestos; PF	Intra-PF	Mean/median comparison of top 3 policies: boxplots	4.4


Note: PF = party family

4.1 Policy Profiles

Do populists have a stable policy core at all? Or does *vox populi* mean frequently turning one’s flag to the wind? This study will look at the center of populist policies to answer this question. It is a quantitative analysis of party manifestos; and it starts with the following idea: Suppose there is a focus on specific policies in these manifestos. In that case, high mean values are expected for these (few) policies (due to strong statistical outliers), while correspondingly smaller mean values for the remaining policies. If, on the other hand, the range of topics is scattered (over periods, between parties, between manifestos, or even within each manifesto) or if the focus is less clear or even variable, the expected distribution will be broader with correspondingly fewer outliers (fig. 2-3).

Fig. 2 – Distribution of Policy Items: PP v. NPP

Fig. 3 – Distribution of Policy Items: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

MARPOR 2020a

According to the interquartile range (IQR),⁷ the mean distribution of the policy items is broader for the populists in the middle range than for the other parties. Moreover, both the 4th quartile and the median are above the average of the other parties. In other words: Because the lower 50% and 75% of the policy categories are more strongly represented in percentage terms among the Populists (e.g., compared with the Greens), whereas the policies in the upper range have less relevance.

Fig. 4 – Policies-Ranking by Mean: PP v. NPP



Source:

MARPOR 2020a.

According to the initial considerations, priorities are “outliers,” i.e., topics with the highest mean values compared to the other policy items. However, these values are smaller for the Populists compared to the other party families. Only the Liberals are similarly “restrained,”

⁷ The IQR measures the width of the interval in which the middle 50% of a sample lies, i.e., the mean values of the policy categories.

while the Socialists and Greens place a much stronger emphasis on thematic priorities (app. 2.1).

The policy ranking confirms this finding (fig. 4). Suppose we arrange the MARPOR dataset items for each party family according to the mean's size and compare the respective distributions with each other. In that case, slight but discernible differences in prioritization between the Populists and the other parties emerge.

Fig. 5 – Policies-Ranking by Mean: PP v. GRN





Fig. 6 – Policies-Ranking by Mean: PP v. LIB



Source: MARPOR 2020a.


Source: MARPOR 2020a.

Like the Liberals, the Populists' top issues are less prominently represented in the manifestos. This difference is also illustrated by the two boxplots, which show on the one hand the difference between the populists and the Greens – with a noticeably different weight in the top issues – and on the other hand the difference to the Liberals, where there is hardly any difference in the top issues (fig. 5-6).

In sum, the populist's focus on their priorities less strong compared with progressives. They contribute less to the populist's policy profile. What are the reasons? One of them could be that the populists change their top issues more frequently than other parties. Consequently, the mean values reflect issue cycles. According to the motto: What was a hot topic yesterday has already cooled down today. From a structural point of view, this assumption should be evident from the percentage distribution of policy items within the party manifestos. More precisely, the distribution should display a high variance: many large, few small values. The standard deviation for each manifesto may prove the point: A larger standard deviation suggests that the percentages in a manifesto differ more for different categories. Do populist parties change their top issues more often than other parties? As an indication for this possibility, this study looks at the structure of the party families' manifestos and compares the percentage distribution within the manifestos.⁸


⁸ To give an example: Let us assume that social democratic and populist manifestos always follow the same pattern: the top issue typically gets 50%, the second 30%, and the third the remaining 20%, and each manifesto

Fig. 7 – SD of each Manifesto:
PP v. NPP



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 8 – SD of each Manifesto:
All PF



Source: MARPOR 2020a

A simple measure of the distribution of percentages within a manifesto is the variance across the per101-per706 categories. Since a maximum of 100% can be distributed in total, the remaining categories' percentage value necessarily turns out to be below, provided that a few categories take a high percentage value. Since the variance is sensitive to “outliers,” it follows that the higher the variance within a manifesto, the weightier some top issues are. Suppose the party family's variance is now distributed in a higher range overall than that of other party families. In that case, it can be assumed that specific topics tend to be more prominent in the individual manifestos than in the comparison families.

In a comparison of the variances, the populists tend to be on average or slightly above (though not significantly; fig. 7). The comparison to Social Democrats is revealing in this context (fig. 8): The latter have higher average values in the top issues compared to the Populists. However, the manifestos' variance (with a somewhat narrow distribution) is lower on average and significantly so, albeit with a small effect size. This result suggests that populists have at least comparable weights of top issues in each manifesto. However, the lower mean value then provides evidence for the thesis that populists are more flexible in top issues. The comparison with Socialists or Conservatives also suggests this.

4.2 Policy Hopping

The approach of *policy hopping* assumes that populist parties change their policy stance more often than other parties. They may be not less ideological in the many fields of ordinary policy-making (characterized by high RILE scores) – and even try to politicize them –, but they switch from one position to another over time (characterized by scores indicating a broad policy range).

corresponds to this distribution. And suppose that social democrats had *welfare (positive)* at 50%, while populists had *europe (negative)* at only 10% after counting the top issues. This distribution would lead to the following conclusion: Given a constantly similar distribution of percentages within the manifestos *welfare (positive)* is the first choice for social democrats, on the agenda in every manifesto, while populists switch.

4.2.1 Operationalization

The RILE-spread tries to capture this second element with an index robust against policy switches within the Right-Left spectrum (positive/negative scores) but reflects the range of them. The following matrix (tab. 4) translates this assumption into a model of ideal-typed outcomes. Hereafter, right-wing populist parties should be displayed in the *first* quadrant (whereas left-wing populist parties are not the subject of this analysis, would be displayed in the *fourth* quadrant).

Tab. 4 – Matrix of left- and right-wing populism

		RILE-Spread	
		Low	High
RILE-Score	Right	II	I
	Left	III	IV

The logic of the spread index – the spread score in-/decreases with the policy range. See the following formula:

$$RILE_{spread} = RILE_{RIGHT score} * RILE_{LEFT score}$$

The logic of the spread index does not only apply to the RILE, but also to the other indices, CULT, ECO, and POSTM.

4.2.2 Findings

This analysis uses the PSW sample to test this approach of the *Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis*. As expected, the plot (fig. 9) clearly shows the high RILE scores of PP, compared to the NPP bulk. The RILE spread does not provide a clear-cut distinction between the populists and the other party families.

Fig. 9 – RILE-score & RILE-Spread: PP v. NPP





Fig. 10 – RILE-Spread: All PF



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Source: MARPOR 2020a

The picture becomes somewhat clearer if we compare the manifestos of the party families. The boxplot displays the difference of the RILE spreads between the PP and the other political parties (fig. 10), and it shows the differences between the Greens and the Socialists on the one side and the populists on the other. In both cases are the mean and median of the left party manifestos below the average, whereas the populist manifestos are clearly above.

Tab. 5 – Difference between PP and NPP: Spread (Cohen’s d)⁹


Populists (n=98)	GRN (n=85)	LIB (n=118)	SocD (n=108)	SOC (n=72)	CONS (n=134)	All NPP (n=509)
RILE-Spread	1.14***	0.12	0.42**	0.93***	0.24	0.34**
ECO-Spread	0.55***	0.25	0.09	0.66***	0.42**	0.01
CUL-Spread	0.89***	0.70***	0.72***	0.87***	0.13	0.71***
POSTM-Spread	0.61***	0.60***	0.58***	0.66***	0.06	0.50***

Source: MARPOR 2020a | *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001.


This distinction is confirmed by the relatively large effect size, measured by *d* (see tab. 5): The group difference Populists v. Greens is relatively high (*d* = 1.14), like the difference with the Socialists (*d* = .93), and, to a lesser extent, with the social democrat difference (*d* = .42). The other indices reproduce the same group distinctions in terms of the different spreads, but to a lesser degree (indicated by *d* with lower scores in each column; see tab. 5). The boxplot for the POSTM index is another case in point (fig. 12). However, it is worth

⁹ The guideline to interpret the effects of *d* (Cohen’s *d*) is: 0.2 = small, 0.5 = moderate, and 0.8 = strong (Cohen 1988).

noting the effect of the POSTM index. The plot (fig. 11) shows a clear cleavage and the dimension Materialism v. Post-Materialism, dividing the Greens and the Populists into two separate ideological camps.



Source: MARPOR 2020a



Source: MARPOR 2020a


As for the parties center-right of the European party systems, the differences are much smaller not only in the RILE scores but also in the RILE spread (fig. 10). However, they are still discernible, and in areas where one would expect these differences (tab. 5). Compared with the Conservatives, the differences with the populists are mainly in economics ($d = .42$). In the case of the Liberals in the cultural area (CULT $d = .70$; POSTM $d = .60$) - in each case with moderate effect sizes.

4.3 Policy Ignorance

Instead of changing topics and positions, populist's policy flexibility can also its expression in being mostly indifferent to several policies. How can we quantify such an attitude? Suppose the following procedure: We determine the percentage for each policy item in which it appears in all manifestos of a party family, regardless of its "weight." The core topic of a manifesto is included in the calculation in the same way as a one-time marginal note.

The overview of the topics that can be found most frequently in the manifestos of the populists in terms of number. As mentioned (see 4.1), the following ranking again shows that the populists use their top themes less frequently than the other parties – except for the Liberals (app. 2.3). If we now turn from the frequency per item to the overall distribution – and here above all to the ratio of median and mean –, we see at first glance a uniform distribution. The mean value is almost identical between populists and the other parties. Only the median of the populists is slightly higher (fig. 14).


Fig. 13 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. NPP



Source: MARPOR 2010a.


However, the comparison between party families (fig. 15), especially between Populists and Greens, is instructive (given that the median is a very robust measure, whereas the mean is sensitive to distributional margins).

Fig. 14 – Share of Policies in all Manifestos: PP v. NPP



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 15 – Share of Policies in all Manifestos: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

For the populists, the median is to the mean's right, which suggests a left-skewed distribution. In other words, the low number of cases that the policy items have on the broader half to the left of the median decreases the mean. In contrast, some issues repeatedly appear in the manifestos increase the mean, while the bottom 50% of policies are much closer together in the Green manifestos. What conclusion can we draw from these results? We cannot confirm the assumption that populists ignore policy issues. Not all issues are

always on the agenda, but this finding does not justify any conclusions beyond that. Does the result change if we look at the individual parties below the party families? The contrast between populists and non-populists looks familiar (fig. 16). There is not much say about the result of this comparison.


Broken down by party family affiliation, however, there are some discernable effects. The populists are above the average of their competitors in both median and mean values. One might interpret these findings as a sign of superficiality on the populist’s side, especially in cases where policies appear that are not expected to be an integral part of the populist profile (e.g., *environmentalism positive*; see fig. 17). Nevertheless, it would be far-fetched to speak of it as a form of sustained policy ignorance.¹⁰

Fig. 16 – Share of Policies per Party: PP v. NPP



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 17 – Share of Policies per Party: All PF



Source: MARPOR 2020a

4.4 Internal Diversity

The question of the internal diversity of the populist party family still needs to be answered. What is the operative idea? We identify each party’s mean value in each policy category and then determine the standard deviation in each policy category between the parties’ family parties. This is a simple procedure to measure the parties’s difference within a party family regarding a particular policy. The distribution of these standard deviations is shown in the boxplots (fig. 18-19). The assumption underlying this procedure is that if the populist parties differ significantly among themselves – especially if they fluctuate on the core issues – there should also be high standard deviations in many policy categories, at least, higher than for the other party families. Thus, the distribution should tend to be above that of other party families. The boxplots show, the result for the Populists tends to be ahead of the left-wing parties only. The median of the distribution is below that of the Liberals, the mean of the distribution below that of the Liberals and Conservatives. The upper quadrant is just ahead,

¹⁰ Cohen’s d indicates medium effects for the mean differences in the Greens case, which tends to confirm the previous findings, since more categories < 2 are found for the Greens, or a lower standard deviation of the lower 80% (app. 2.4).

but all in all, these findings do not justify the assumption that the Populist’s family is internally more diverse.¹¹ Yet, it may be possible to sharpen the analysis a little more.

Fig. 18 – Internal Diversity of Party Families: PP v. NPP





Fig. 19 – Internal Diversity of Party Families: All PF



Source: MARPOR 2020a


Source: MARPOR 2020a

A look at the weighting of the top three issues of each party (fig. 20) indicates internal heterogeneity. The Populists are behind the Greens; and for the Socialists, though the differences are marginal. Compared with the other party families, however, the boxplot for the Populists (with higher mean and median) indicates higher percentages of the top 3 issues. Why should this be read as an indication of internal diversity? As already shown (see 4.1, fig. 4), the average top three of the populist party family tends to be weaker than the other party families. The top-3 of the individual parties, in turn, tend to be above the top-3 of the parties in other families, except for the Greens.

In other words, populist parties do give weight to their top issues, but these issues change between parties (or within a party). What is a ‘hot issue’ for a populist party often does not have it for the party family (hence the comparatively low mean value). Moreover, to this extent, we can also speak of a somewhat higher internal diversity within the populist party family.

Fig. 20 – Top-3 Policies: All PF

¹¹ However, the standard deviation in the data set varies with the weighting of the categories due to the percentages. For the distribution of the coefficients of variation and (since these are again sensitive in the range of values close to 0) and the coefficients of variation of all policy categories that average at least 1 percent, see the corresponding presentation in the appendix.



Source: MARPOR 2020a

5. Power Matters Hypothesis

What influence does the takeover of the government have on populist parties? Do populists use their newfound power to implement their programs? Or does the program change under the table due to the multiple circumstances that new governments typically must consider? The *Power Matters Hypothesis* formulates the expectation that populist governing parties will have to make several concessions in their policies with the effect that they become “more established.” These restrictions will, in turn, be abandoned as soon as these parties no longer must bear the “costs of government.”


5.1 Operationalization

The following analyses are based primarily on the PSG sample. This sample includes all manifestos of populist parties that, first, participated in or actively supported a government in the period 1990-2019 and, second, participated in an election with a manifesto from this position of government participation (or immediately afterward, if the respective government was dissolved before the end of the respective legislative period). Only based on the second condition can the possible effects emanating from government participation be examined.¹²

In terms of Populist’s participation in government, we have divided manifestos into three phases for the 1990–2019-time frame:

- *In government*: manifestos during the government period, including those manifestos that precede the deselection or take place in the transition to new government participation or support from the PP.
- *Pre-government* (in opposition): manifestos published before the PP was even involved in government.
- *Post-government* (in opposition): manifestos in opposition and after first-time participation in government.

Fig. 21 – In Government and Opposition



Based on these three groups, we have identified the mean values for the items per101-per706 of the MARPOR data set, for the indices (see 3.2), and for mini-spreads following the logic of the RILE spreads. With the help Cohen’s d, we calculate the effect sizes using the group of populists *in government* serves as the reference group. For an East-West comparison, the mean values are also compared with the PSW sample, i.e., more precisely with those populists who are not included in the sample, because they were not involved in government in any way in the reference period.

¹² As a result, some prominent cases of populist governments or government participation are not included in the sample. These include M5S in Italy and Syriza in Greece.

5.2 Findings

Are there differences between the populists who are in government and those who pursue politics in opposition? And what are they? Answers to these questions will be provided by analyses of the two samples PSG and PSW. In the first case, the “government-experienced” populists are compared based on the phase classification (pre-government, in government, and post-government). This is followed by a comparison between the “government-experienced” populists and those without any government involvement.

5.2.1 Populists in Government und Opposition (PSG)

The following table contains the twelve items in which *populists in government* and *populists in opposition* differ most clearly from each other. The items are ordered according to the effect size (tab. 6).


Tab. 6 – In government (n = 26) and opposition: Top-12 (effect size)

Variable	Label	in opposition (n=54)	pre-government (n=34)	post-government (n=20)
per603	traditional morality +	0.59*	0.55*	0.71*
per402	incentives	0.56*	0.83**	0.15
per414	economic orthodoxy	0.55	0.43	0.57*
per305	political authority	0.53	0.41	0.61*
per704	middle class and professional groups	0.47	0.81*	0.05
per202	democracy	0.42*	0.54*	0.26
index con-spread	(constitution+ * constitution -)	0.42*	0.50*	0.54
per304	political corruption	0.38*	0.48*	0.31
per401	free market economy	0.38	0.68**	0.37
per105	military -	0.38*	0.56*	0.09

Source: MARPOR 2020a | *p ≤0.05, **p ≤0.01, ***p ≤0.01.


The range of effect sizes for the two-group comparison *in government* and *opposition* is relatively small (.38-.59); the sizes are all in a low-moderate range. The effect becomes noticeably stronger in three cases, provided that the subgroups in the three-group comparison *pre-government* and *post-government* are considered. The following items then stand out: *(economic) incentives* (.83), *middle class and professional groups* (.81), and *traditional morality* (.71). We should examine these items in more detail:

Fig. 22 – Incentives (economic):
In Government v. In Opposition



Source: MARPOR 2020a


Fig. 23 – Incentives (economic):
Pre-, In, and Post-Government



Source: MARPOR 2020a


In the first case of (*economic*) *incentives*, the differences are already striking in the two-group comparison (fig. 22). In the three-group comparison, it shows that the contrast is mainly caused by the opposition group “pre-government” (fig. 23). This finding suggests that populists learn to use the instruments of supply-side oriented economic incentive control (tax breaks, etc.) for their purposes (and their clientele). They develop a different view of this policy area in the “post-government” phase; and it seems that the government experience contributes to this change.

Fig. 24 – Middle Class/Professional Groups:
In Government v. In Opposition



Source: MARPOR 2020a


Fig. 25 – Middle Class/Professional Groups:
Pre-, In, and Post-Government



Source: MARPOR 2020a


In the second case, the two-group analysis for the item *middle class and professional groups* is not particularly meaningful due to the numerous outliers (fig. 24), but the three-group comparison is more so. This comparison suggests that the affinity of populists to the functional elites increases with the period of government and especially in the aftermath of this period (fig. 25). Somewhat exaggeratedly, one could say that populists become more “bourgeois” because of their experience in government.

Fig. 26 – Traditional Morality +:
In Government v. In Opposition



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 27 – Traditional Morality +:
Pre-, In, and Post-Government




Source: MARPOR 2020a

In the third case, the period of government is different from the two opposition phases. The differences are already striking in the two-group comparison (fig. 26): Whereas populists are reluctant to refer to traditions, religion, family life, etc. during their time in government, it appears to be a suitable tool for them in opposition.


This assumption is not only based on the apparent differences in the median and mean values; it is also supported by the three-group comparison (fig. 27). *Traditional morality positive* seems to be a good/useful opposition theme to which the populists return even in their post-government era. – In two other policy areas we can see the same back and forth: *political authority* and *political corruption*.

Fig. 28 – Political Authority:
In Government v. In Opposition



Source: MARPOR 2020a


Fig. 29 – Political Authority:
Pre-, In, and Post-Government



Source: MARPOR 2020a


It is evident that affiliation with the government or the opposition plays a role in both themes. One issue – *political authority* (fig. 28-29) – is pro-government, possibly also because it helps to play off official bonuses. The other – *political corruption* (fig. 30-31) – tends to be anti-government and is a typical rallying cry of the opposition. Therefore, it is not surprising that the contrast between government and opposition can be seen in both the two-group and three-group comparisons.

Fig. 30 – Political Corruption:
In Government v. In Opposition



Source: MARPOR 2020a


Fig. 31 – Political Corruption:
Pre-, In, and Post-Government



Source: MARPOR 2020a


The situation is similar for two other topics: While *democracy* is a typical opposition issue, *economic orthodoxy* is typically close to the government. This is already reflected in the respective two-group comparisons (fig. 32, 34). In the case of democracy, the three-group range also shows that the emphasis on democracy decreases in the post-government period compared to the pre-government phase (fig. 33). In both stages, however, the issue acquires greater importance than during the government phase.

Fig. 32 – Democracy:
In Government v. In Opposition




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 33 – Democracy:
Pre-, In, and Post-Government




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 34 – Economic Orthodoxy:
In Government v. In Opposition



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 35 – Economic Orthodoxy:
Pre-, In, and Post-Government



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Monetary and budgetary requirements are at the core of *economic orthodoxy* (fig. 35). Moreover, they are part of the standard repertoire of every government to keep political desires in check. And populists seem to be no exception. Accordingly, the recourse in post-government also sinks to the level of the pre-government opposition periods.

Fig. 36 – Free Market Economy: In Government v. In Opposition





Fig. 37 – Free Market Economy: Pre-, In, and Post-Government



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Incidentally, the *free market economy* theme underscores that *economic orthodoxy* is less ideological than government power's practical option. Suppose the two-group comparison already shows a clear difference (fig. 36). In that case, the three-group comparison suggests that government time triggers a learning process - apparently with a dampening effect for belief in the free market economy (fig. 37).

5.2.2 Populists with and without Government Experience (PSG/PSW)

Government experience plays a role. Several items reveal differences that, taken together, indicate that populists become more “established” during their time in government and afterward.

Tab. 7 – With (n =53) and Without Government Experience: (effect size)


Variable	Label	PSW (n=80)
cult_r	CULT-Score _{right}	0.82***
per410	Economic growth+	0.71***
cult	CULT index	0.69***
pm_r	POSTM-Score _{+right}	0.69***
per603	Traditional morality +	0.62**
pm	POSTM	0.60**
per109	Internationalism -	0.58**
rile_r	RILE-Score	0.55**
per108	Europe +	0.54***
trad_morality_spread	Traditional morality+ * Traditional morality-	0.51*
internationalism_spread	Internationalism+ * Internationalism -	0.50**
per110	Europe -	0.49*

Source: MARPOR 2020a | *p ≤0.05, **p ≤0.01, ***p ≤0.01.

Do such differences again emerge in comparing the two groups of *populists with government experience* and *populists without government experience*? As in the previous section, a group comparison based on effect size (Cohen's d) will serve as a search movement (tab. 7). The twelve items that can be used to distinguish the two groups are ordered according to the effect's strength.


Looking through the list, the cluster of socio-cultural topics is conspicuous. At the same time, socio-economic issues are mostly absent, except for *economic growth+*, which is influenced by fundamental questions about the societies' future viability (e.g., reconciling economy and ecology). In the present context, the effect size reflects Western and Eastern Europe's different economic strengths. In this sense, the boxplot below (fig. 38) reveals the greater reluctance on populists in the West than to the higher approval on the part of populists in the PSG sample, which Eastern European populists dominate.

Fig. 38 – Government Experience: Economic Growth +



Sourxe: MARPOR 2020a


Fig. 39 – Government Experience: ECO-Index



Sourxe: MARPOR 2020a


That this is less about an ideological position in economic policy is also suggested by the ECO Index, where Western European populists by and large hold a fundamentally more pro-business stand (fig. 39). As it turns out, *economic growth+* represents a thematic “outlier” not only as an economic issue but also ideologically. A small selection in this regard:

Fig. 40 – Government Experience: CUL-Score + (rechts)




Sources: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 41 – Government Experience: CUL




Sources: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 42 – Government Experience: RILE-Score (right)



Sources: MARPOR 2020a


Fig. 43 – Government Experience: RILE



Sources: MARPOR 2020a


Based on the two indices, RILE and CULT, a clear pattern emerges: The *populists without government experience* are ideologically positioned further to the right of the political spectrum; this applies not only to the RILE as a whole and the selection of “right-wing” items; it also applies to topics of the socio-cultural axis (e.g., *national way of life positive, law and order positive, or multiculturalism negative*) or to the dimension *materialism v. post-materialism* (app. 3.2).

Fig. 44 – Government Experience: Europe -



Sources: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 45 – Government Experience: Traditional Morality+



Sources: MARPOR 2020a

Even on *traditional morality*, which in many respects still has a more tangible reality in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe, populists with government experience are more reserved (fig. 45). Finally, this also applies to *europe* itself, with negative (fig. 44) and positive (app. 3.2) connotations. Perhaps this ideological restraint is an expression of the greater pragmatism that usually accompanies government activities. Particularly given the strength of eurosceptic attitudes in both Western and Eastern Europe, this pragmatism on the part of populists in the government headquarters of Eastern Europe has repeatedly made it possible to cooperate with the EU to secure funding for numerous infrastructure measures.

6. Gap of Representation Hypothesis

Suppose the ideological orientation of populists and their policy positions are somewhat more flexible, as the section on the flexible policy program hypothesis has shown in part (4.). In that case, populist parties may spot gaps of representation and strategically occupy them. Do populists make use of their anti-establishment attitude by exploiting policy issues that established parties fail to represent? How to identify these strategies? And what are these potential gaps of representation? We understand the representation gaps as a lack of contestation between political parties across the policy fields. Moreover, we use the standard deviation (SD) of ideological positions as an indicator for party competition within a particular policy field: low values indicate a consensus between the parties, whereas high values signal that the parties differ substantially from each other. Based on these ideas, the following sections try to identify gaps of representation and assess the distance between the populist parties and the other political parties that opens the space and the opportunity for populists to contest strategically established policy positions or consensus forms.

6.1 Operationalization

In this section, the research program's operationalization contains several steps: Do populist parties represent new issues at all? And in what ways do they fill a supposed policy gap? What gaps in policy representation do we find? And finally, in which fields is there a consensus among the other parties that could be attacked and politicized by the populists?

(1) *Neue Policies*: The analysis uses an index developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) for the "effective number of parties" (ENP) to answer the question of whether populist parties represent new issues at all and thus (substantially) fill a policy gap. However, the focus here is not on parties but on policies in a parliament at a given time. The formula of the Laakso-Taagepera index is the following:

$$ENPol = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2} \quad | \text{ mit } p_i = \frac{per_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n per_i}$$

Where n is the number of policy categories (per variables in the data set) > 0 and per_i is the average of the i-th per variable at election time in the party system.

The last term plays a role in two ways: First, it is calculated as a pure average, in which each party contributes equally weighted to the total mean - and thus enables an answer to the question of whether the populists enrich the policy supply. Second, it is the average weighted by the parties' electoral success, combined with the question of whether de facto new policies also enter parliament (if the electoral outcome reflects demand). The difference between the ENPol values – with and without populists – will explain whether the populists effectively represent new policies.

(2) *Gap of representation*: The analysis uses two instruments to identify representation gaps. The gap is defined as the maximum distance between the mean value of the populists and that of the nearest party family. The effect size of the mean difference between populists and the respective party families helps to assess the relevance of the gap. In this way, we also consider policy items, where the distance between the populists and some of the party families is relatively small.

In addition, it is necessary to consider the respective circumstances of the time. For example, suppose a party with a percentage value of 5% for the item *europe (negative)* was possibly

on the fringe of the party spectrum in 1990. In that case, this party could perhaps embody the policy mainstream with this value in 2019. As the overall importance of an item increases, its variance in the data set tends to increase.¹³ If both observations concern the same item, as indicated in the example, they are initially aggregated without considering the location- and time-specific variances that occur within a party family. In case of doubt, however, relevant information might be lost.

For this reason, we have developed an additional heuristic tool for calculating the representation gaps: Normalized distances are used instead of percentages per policy. More precisely, the calculation is based on a manifesto's distances to the average in the respective party system at the election time, divided by the standard deviation. Finally, we weigh the quotient according to the electoral success of the parties. Since this calculation focuses on the distance from the center of gravity of the party system, it is an anomaly index. It is composed as follows:

Ano(p, y, c) gives the value of a party x at election time y in party system c from the percentage of the associated policy category Per(p, y, c). It holds:

$$Ano(p, y, c) = \frac{Per(p, y, c) - \overline{Per(y, c)}}{sd(y, c)}$$

with

$$\overline{Per(y, c)} = \sum_{i=1}^n PerVote(p_i, y, c) \cdot Per(p_i, y, c)$$

and

$$sd(y, c) = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n n \cdot PerVote(p_i, y, c) \cdot (Per(p_i, y, c) - \overline{Per(y, c)})^2}{(\sum_{i=1}^n n \cdot PerVote(p_i, y, c)) - 1}}$$

Here, n denotes the number of parties in the respective country's dataset at the election time.

(4) *Policy consensus*: In the search for policy areas in which there is a high degree of agreement among the non-populist parties, we restrict ourselves to issues of significant duration and, at the same time, high weighting, i.e., top issues that consistently appear in the top-3. With this in mind, we identify top-3 per election year for all party families and average each case across years (*weight*) and determine the percentage of years in which each issue appears in the top-3 (*duration*). Items above average in weight and time are defined as consensus.

(3) *Up and down of policies*: Finally, some considerations are needed to capture the policies' trends. For this purpose, the analysis divides the given period of 1990-2020 into three sections of roughly equal size according to the number of manifestos:

Tab. 8 – Number of Manifestos per Period

	1990-2000	2001-2010	2010-2019
all	225	215	213
Sweden	22	22	16

¹³ Note: Because of the lower limit of 0%, the fluctuations for an item with an average value of 2% cannot be as strong for an item with an average value of 20%.

Denmark	27	25	17
Finland	26	16	25
Netherlands	21	39	24
France	13	12	20
Italy	35	35	24
Germany	15	15	13
Austria	18	16	12
Switzerland	35	21	32
United Kingdom	13	14	30

Sources: MARPOR 2020a

For each period, the ranking of policies by mean and trend are determined for populists and non-populists alike.

6.2 Findings

6.2.1 New Policies

The first question, whether the populists represent new policies, can be answered relatively quickly by looking at the following table: The contribution certainly differs from country to country. In some countries, however, the share of policy representation is not insignificant. These countries include Switzerland, France, and Germany.¹⁴ However, the group comparison in the aggregate of the mean values only yields a significant value in the unweighted data.¹⁵

Tab. 9 – Effective Number of Policies: PP v. NPP

Country	unweighted			weighted		
	All	All NPP	PP-Difference	All	All NPP	PP-Difference
Sweden	15.2	14.4	0.9	14.8	14.2	0.5
Denmark	19.6	18.5	1.0	16.4	15.7	0.7
Finland	16.8	15.8	1.0	16.4	15.7	0.7
Netherlands	23.2	22.3	1.0	24.4	24.1	0.3
France	23.4	21.0	2.4	22.4	20.5	1.9
Italy	19.2	18.1	1.2	18.8	18.0	0.8
Germany	25.0	23.4	1.7	25.9	24.6	1.3
Austria	20.6	18.7	1.9	20.7	19.0	1.7
Switzerland	23.1	20.7	2.5	22.6	19.2	3.4
United Kingdom	21.0	20.1	1.0	18.8	18.6	0.2

Sources: MARPOR 2020a





¹⁴ The weighting component is not able to change the picture in the long term.

¹⁵ Aspects of the party system may also play a role here.

6.2.2 Policy Priorities

In searching for the policies that cause the greatest ideological gap between the populists and the other party families, a list of the top-10 has first been drawn up. The following boxplots illustrate two of these top issues. ¹⁶

One can see the gaps between the populists and the other party families (fig. 46-47). While in the case of the *national way of life (positive)*, the Conservatives also represent this issue, albeit to a much lesser extent than the populists, there is no competition in the case of *europa negative* (fig. 48-49).



Sources: MARPOR 2020a

Sources: MARPOR 2020a

The table below provide a complete overview of the differences in policy representation (tab. 10). It contains the top 10 identified by the distance measurement (black) and the other topics included because of the group comparison because size (red).

Tab. 10 – Gap of Representation: PP v. NPP (*top-10, effect size*)

Populists (n=98)	GRN (n=85)	LIB (n=118)	SocD (n=108)	Soc (n=72)	Cons (n=134)	All NPP (n=509)
national way of life +	1.13***	0.94***	1.10***	1.11***	0.73***	1.42***
internationalism -	0.94***	0.84***	1.04***	0.56***	1.06***	1.18***

¹⁶ For the remaining subjects, see the boxplots in appendix (app. 4.2).

europa -	0.63***	0.82***	0.86***	0.44**	0.76***	1.12***
multiculturalism -	0.87***	0.55***	0.83***	0.83***	0.72***	1.03***
law and order +	1.68***	0.82***	1.02***	1.44***	0.44**	1.00***
military +	1.26***	0.54***	0.84***	1.23***	0.38**	0.82***
equality +	1.29***	0.52***	1.21***	1.66***	0.42**	0.78***
europa +	0.67***	0.92***	1.11***	0.40*	0.97***	0.70***
traditional morality +	0.67***	0.62***	0.63***	0.66***	0.09	0.67**
protectionism +	0.38**	0.45**	0.39**	0.37**	0.35*	0.63**
internationalism +	0.90***	0.62***	0.78***	0.63***	0.52***	0.61***
labour groups +	0.63***	0.39**	1.04***	1.48***	0.32*	0.61***
peace	0.91***	0.52***	0.71***	1.24***	0.54***	0.58***
welfare -	0.84***	0.04	0.76***	0.89***	0.34*	0.57***
education -	0.58***	0.17	0.64***	0.59***	0.36*	0.52**
gov-admin efficiency	0.76***	0.21	0.21	0.71***	0.28*	0.41*

Source: MARPOR 2020a | Note: black = max. distance; red: effect size.

The relevance of cultural themes (*national way of life positive, traditional morality positive, multiculturalism, equality*), which play a central role in the group distinction between the populists and the other party families, is already known from different analytical contexts. However, this issue area is not the strongest in terms of numbers. Also, if Europe is included, a good third of the topics relate to international politics (*internationalism positive/negative, europa positive/negative, military+, protectionism, peace*). Besides, the negative reference to internationalism achieves one of the largest effect sizes in the mean comparison of the various policies. A third category consists of topics related to the welfare state in the narrower or broader sense (*welfare, labor groups, education*).

These three categories are suitable for accentuating the differences between the individual party families. Thus, international politics is also the area in which the difference between the populists and the Conservatives becomes tangible. The latter tend to be much more pro-European and global than the former. The cultural issue area is the critical point in which the Liberals can easily distinguish themselves from the Populists.

Fig. 50 – Gap of Representation: Welfare (negative)





Fig. 51 – Gap of Representation: Welfare (negative)



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Source: MARPOR 2020a

In comparing the populists with the parties on the left spectrum, the effect sizes are almost universally large, including the welfare state's issue. Here, the contrast to the bourgeois parties becomes apparent. An illustrative example of this is the item *welfare negative* (tab. 10): The group comparison on the part of the populists with the Greens (.84), the Socialists (.89), and the Social Democrats (.76) produces high effect sizes in each case, while the comparison with the Liberals results in no effect (.04) and with the Conservatives only a moderate one (.34). The boxplot in the two-group comparison underscores this issue's general relevance for the group distinction (fig. 50); however, the party families' overview reveals once again the ideological camps (fig. 51), which can be assigned to the left and right here.¹⁷

Tab. 11 – Anomaly Index: PP v. NPP (*top-10, effect size*)

Populists (n=24-97)	GRN (n=26-84)	LIB (n=34-118)	SocD (n=31-104)	Soc (n=22-69)	Cons (n=36-130)	All NPP (n=157-497)
internationalism -	1.19***	1.13***	1.05***	0.53***	1.29***	1.35***
national way of life +	1.54***	1.15***	1.36***	1.50***	0.56***	1.27***
education -	0.98***	0.53*	1.17***	0.98***	0.87***	1.17***
multiculturalism -	1.42***	1.20***	1.31***	1.28***	0.47***	1.12***
europe -	0.87***	1.41***	1.56***	0.32	1.06***	1.12***
law and order +	1.96***	0.95***	1.15***	1.63***	0.37*	1.06***
labour groups -	0.82***	0.29	0.92***	0.85***	0.64***	0.94***
military +	1.58***	0.74***	0.99***	1.54***	0.40***	0.90***
traditional morality +	1.14***	1.00***	0.97***	1.10***	0.12	0.85***
equality +	1.41***	0.51***	1.75***	1.63***	0.38***	0.81***
europe +	0.75***	1.36***	1.30***	0.20	1.07***	0.79***
labour groups +	0.75***	0.44***	1.85***	1.67***	0.43***	0.74***
anti-growth economy+*	1.99***	0.51***	0.56***	0.95***	0.50***	0.64***

¹⁷ On the economic dimension of populism and its cartography in Europe: Manow 2018; see also Rodrik 2018 and Oesch 2008, 2015.

peace	0.87***	0.56***	0.61***	1.36***	0.44***	0.60***
welfare -	1.44***	0.08	1.22***	1.34***	0.20	0.59***
internationalism +	0.96***	0.73***	0.93***	0.43*	0.43***	0.59***
national way of life -*	1.12***	0.64***	0.77***	1.20***	0.57***	0.58***
multiculturalism+*	0.77***	0.79***	0.66***	0.66***	0.58***	0.56***
military -	1.68***	0.29*	0.72***	1.57***	0.12	0.56***
environmentalism+*	2.17***	0.48***	0.42***	0.51***	0.13	0.54***
traditional morality -*	0.99***	0.66***	0.63***	0.92***	0.06	0.52***

Source: MARPOR 2020a. | Note: black = max. distance; red: effect size. | *new items.

This classification is confirmed by the standardization underlying the calculation of the anomaly index (tab. 11). With this index, it is also possible to identify some additional policy items relevant for analyzing the representation gaps. These new items strengthen the cultural dimension's contrast (*national way of life, traditional morality, multiculturalism positive*) between populist and non-populist parties. And the same is true for the closely related dimension of materialism v. post-materialism (*anti-growth economy positive* and *environmentalism positive*). Accordingly, the group comparison effects between the populists and the left-wing parties, especially with the Greens, are also most significant.

Fig. 52 – Anomaly Index:
Environmentalism (positive)





Fig. 53 – Anomaly Index:
Environmentalism (positive)



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Source: MARPOR 2020a

The boxplot reveals the conflict (and potential *cleavage*) on these dimensions between the Greens and the Populists' families (fig. 53). A representative example is the item *environmentalism+*, whose distribution is a mirror image of the item's *national way of life (positive)*. The significant value of the effect size of the group comparison between Populists and Greens is exceptionally high (2.17). The results of the anomaly index suggest that populists do not limit themselves to representing individual policies. Their concerns go beyond that and are directed at the zeitgeist: Populists are broadly concerned with offering an alternative to postmaterialism, for which the Greens are the main representee. Ignazi (1992, 2017) has found the term "silent counter-revolution" for this orientation. This term is apt insofar as it does justice to the comprehensive claim to the representation made by the populists. This family of parties, as evidenced by their policy orientation, sees itself not only

as a counter-movement against the establishment but, in many cases, also as an alternative to the left-liberal-green mainstream.

6.2.3 Policy Consensus

For some years now, however, this populist counter-movement has no longer been ‘silent.’ Rather, the gaps in representation that, from the populists’ point of view, arise due to a neglect of tradition are being marked and politicized. As a rule, this happens through a ‘blame game’ in which not only the progressive parties are fought, but also the parties to the right of center, which from the populists’ point of view has in many cases become part of a policy consensus together with the left-wing forces. It is against these forms of party-political consensus that the populists are directed.

The following table (tab. 12) lists those topics that, due to their scope (weight) and frequency (duration), have acquired particular importance in the manifestos and contribute quite significantly to the profile of the respective party family.


Tab. 12 – Policy Consensus: Top-3

Items	Populists	GRN	LIB	SocD	Soc	Cons	NPP	SUM
welfare +	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
environmentalism +	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	6
equality +	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	5
education +	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	4
gov.-admin. efficiency	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	3
labour groups +	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
law and order +	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
political authority	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
tech. & infra.	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
traditional morality +	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
anti-growth economy +	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
democracy	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
national way of life +	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SUM	6	6	6	6	4	6	4	

Source: MARPOR 2020a

As can be seen, there are only two issues on which populists can be part of an overarching policy consensus, namely *welfare positive* and *environmentalism positive*. As seen, however, the position measures already presented in the boxplots on these issues (fig. 50-51, 52-53) indicate entirely different, almost anticyclical behavior, especially between the party families of the Populists and the Greens.


Fig. 54 – Policy Consensus (Top-3): PP & Non-PP



Source: MARPOR 2020a

The plot (fig. 54), in which the top issues are plotted by duration and weight, underscores the difference that generally exists between the populists and the other political parties. The first quadrant shows the top of the pops of each side. This comparison indicates the greater weight left-wing parties give to their policies, but more importantly, it shows that the two sides' ideological orientation differs. No issue relevant to the populists has comparable importance on the other side – and vice versa.

Fig. 55 – Policy Consensus (Top-3): All PF



Source: MARPOR 2020a

If we differentiate the plot according to party families (fig. 55), the picture is confirmed. The populists have similarities, if any, with the liberal party family and, to some extent, with the Conservatives. But concerning the issues that have been particularly relevant over the years (first quadrant), similarities with these party families are also absent.

6.2.4 Ups and downs

In some policy areas, the difference between the populists and the other parties has widened. This observation is particularly true for the topics europe (positive/negative) and internationalism (negative). While negative references to the international order have dropped significantly among the non-populist parties and the issue thus occupies one of the lower ranks (50th place), the populists do not participate in such a growing international openness; the topic remains unchanged in the midfield (25th place). The widening is even more apparent in the field of European policy. Euroskepticism climbs to one of the front ranks (no. 4), while it remains in the bottom third for the other political parties (no. 34); likewise, positive references to Europe can be found in the top third without significant fluctuations (no. 14). For populists, on the other hand, the positive image of Europe continues to fall (38th place), making Europe one of the key differentiators between the party families. Meanwhile, the delta amounts to 20 rankings for europe positive and 30 rankings for europe negative.

Fig. 56 – Increasing distance: PPs





Fig. 57 – Increasing distance: All NPPs



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Source: MARPOR 2020a

The following table provides a list of the ups and downs (tab. 13). It also shows that the three items of growing polarization are contrasted by only one example where the ideological gaps have narrowed, namely in the *national way of life (positive)*. While positive references to

one’s own national culture have always been among the top issues for populists (rank 3), it has generally gained momentum among the other party families in recent years, rising from rank 31 to 18 (app. 4.4). Nevertheless, a gap of 13 ranking places remains.

The differences are also in this order of magnitude for those issues that have established themselves as fixed parameters, with no further loss or gain in importance over time. For populists, this includes *law and order* (rank 3-2 / NPP: 11-8), for Non-Populists *equality* (rank 2-3 / PP: 17-14). As the top issues of the respective side, they make a significant contribution to the programmatic profile. Simultaneously, they also serve to differentiate between the parties: Populists often take a skeptical view of inclusion, while left-wing parties generally do not favor policies that are tough on crime.

Tab. 13 – Up and Downs of Policies: Trends

Items	Down (general)	Up (general)	Increasing distance	Keeping distance	Reducing distance
traditional morality +	x				
labour groups -	x				
military +		x			
multiculturalism -		x			
internationalism -			x		
europe -			x		
europe +			x		
law and order +				x	
equality +				x	
education -				x	
national way of life +					x

Source: MARPOR 2020a

The ‘winners’ on both sides include multiculturalism negative (PP: 28-11 / NPP: 45-31) and military positive (PP: 23-16 / NPP: 36-27), both issues that undoubtedly play into the hands of the populists and enable them to differentiate themselves from left-wing and progressive parties sharply. Among the losers is traditional morality positive (app. 4.2), which also experienced a sharp drop in the populist rankings (PP: 1-15 / NPP: 21-32). Like the slippage of the labor groups (PP: 40-48 / NPP: 54-53), which probably reflects the general loss of power of trade unions in Europe, the loss of importance of traditional moral concepts is perhaps due primarily to the spirit of the times.

7 Contagion Hypothesis

The *contagion hypothesis* is a follow-up to the previous *gap of representation hypothesis*. It states that the electoral gains of populist parties are an incentive for other parties to react to this situation by adopting the policy stands of the populist. Ideally, the design differentiates between the following scenarios: first, the anti-establishment positioning with the populist party visible on the scene and the opportunity to portray itself as fundamental opposition; second, the populist successes at the ballot box. And third, the adaption in which other political parties react and adjust to the positions of the populists intending to win back voters. This analysis limits its perspective to right-wing populism and wants to measure the so-called the *Rechtsruck* within party systems.

7.1 Operationalization

The election results measure the success of political parties. We use this indicator (MARPOR 2020a: *pervote*) and correlate the data with the change in other parties' indices or party families to capture other political parties' possible reaction. The logic is the following:

t0 The populist party achieves a particular election result. This is known to the non-populist parties whose reaction is to be explored, and these ...

t1 ...can adjust their offer for the next election.

The changes in the index scores on the side of the non-populist parties at time t1 are correlated with the populist election result from t0. Thghis way we hope to identify a possible adjustment to the populist election result.

In line with the *contagion hypothesis*, the focus is on the Conservative party family. As a party family on the right-wing ideological spectrum, they are closest to the populists. Specifically, the following correlations were examined and generally calculated using analog-linear regressions:

Cons ~ PP: Correlation of the change in RILE-scores (RILEchange) of each conservative party with the election result (PPvotes) of each populist party within the same party system.

Cons ~ sum(PP): correlation of the change in RILE-scores of each conservative party with the summed election result of all populist parties within the same party system.

mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP): correlation of the average change in RILE-scores of all conservative parties with the summed election result of all populist party within the same party system.

mean(Cons) ~ PP: Correlation of the average change in RILE scores of all conservative parties with the electoral performance of each populist party within the same party system.

Analogously to this procedure regarding the Conservative party family (Cons), we determine the position changes of the other party families, i.e. for the Green (Green), Liberal (Lib), Social Democrat (SocD) and Socialist (Soc) party families. As for the *Rechstruck* within the party systems, we determine the index mean values of all non-populists as a whole (AllNPP).

7.2 Findings

The following table (tab. 14) shows the results of the respective correlations. However, it does not indicate a correlation for any of the indices used: RILE, ECO, CULT and POSTM.¹⁸ What if the reaction is less ideological, but more an undirected response? Because of this possibility, we repeat the calculation, but use for absolute values to determine the potential change in the policy positions. The table shows some significant values (tab. 15), but the dispersion remains strong; moreover, the effects are essentially attributable to a few countries (especially Italy).

Tab. 14 – CONS: Reactions of Populist Elections Results (*Rechtsruck*)

Indix	score ~ vote	cor	p-value	n
RILE	Cons ~ PP	-0.01	0.90	99
	Cons ~ sum(PP)	-0.07	0.53	72
	mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP)	-0.10	0.49	47
	mean(Cons) ~ PP	-0.02	0.85	70
ECO	Cons ~ PP	-0.01	0.94	99
	Cons ~ sum(PP)	0.03	0.83	72
	mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP)	0.02	0.88	47
	mean(Cons) ~ PP	-0.03	0.80	70
CULT	Cons ~ PP	-0.04	0.72	99
	Cons ~ sum(PP)	-0.12	0.30	72
	mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP)	-0.17	0.25	47
	mean(Cons) ~ PP	-0.06	0.64	70
POSTM	Cons ~ PP	-0.01	0.91	99
	Cons ~ sum(PP)	-0.08	0.49	72
	mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP)	-0.07	0.64	47
	mean(Cons) ~ PP	-0.01	0.90	70

Source: MARPOR 2020a

¹⁸ The plot does not provide any further clues either. See for example the plots for the RILE and CULT index (app. 5).

Tab. 15 – CONS: Reactions of Populist Elections Results

	score ~ vote	cor	p-value	n
RILE	Cons ~ PP	0.13	0.21	99
	Cons ~ sum(PP)	0.38	0.00	72
	mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP)	0.50	0.00	47
	mean(Cons) ~ PP	0.16	0.20	70
ECO	Cons ~ PP	0.08	0.45	99
	Cons ~ sum(PP)	0.02	0.85	72
	mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP)	0.09	0.57	47
	mean(Cons) ~ PP	0.16	0.19	70
CUL	Cons ~ PP	-0.04	0.69	99
	Cons ~ sum(PP)	0.13	0.27	72
	mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP)	0.20	0.17	47
	mean(Cons) ~ PP	-0.05	0.67	70
POSTM	Cons ~ PP	0.10	0.31	99
	Cons ~ sum(PP)	0.22	0.06	72
	mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP)	0.28	0.05	47
	mean(Cons) ~ PP	0.13	0.28	70

Source: MARPOR 2020a

For illustration purposes, the following plots the RILE index's and POSTM index's values. The left side shows the plots *without* directional responses (fig. 58-62); the right side displays them *with* directional responses (fig. 59-63).

Fig. 58 – RILE: Cons ~ sum(PP) (abs.)




Fig. 59 – RILE: Cons ~ sum(PP)




Fig. 60 – RILE: mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP) (abs.)




Fig. 61 – RILE: mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP)




Fig. 62 – POSTM: mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP) (abs.)





Fig. 63 – POSTM: mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP)



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Source: MARPOR 2020a

The scatter-plot on right side (fig. 59-63) show no significant values whatsoever. On the left side (fig. 58-62), correlations in the case of RILE can be traced primarily due to the “Italian dots.” In the case of POSTM, a rudimentary correlation is discernible in that the changes on the *materialism v. post-materialism* dimension also increase with rising election results, albeit with an overall overly broad, almost diffuse scattering.

Against this background, it is not very surprising that the search for a correlation between possible policy changes of all non-populists (measured by the mean values) and the election results of the populists yields hardly anything (tab. 16).

Tab. 16 – Reactions of Populist Elections Results (*Rechtsruck*): NPP

	score ~ vote	cor	p-value	n
RILE	mean(AIINPP) ~ sum(PP)	-0.11	0.42	53
	mean(AIINPP) ~ PP	-0.02	0.84	83
ECO	mean(AIINPP) ~ sum(PP)	-0.27	0.05	53
	mean(AIINPP) ~ PP	-0.11	0.30	83
CUL	mean(AIINPP) ~ sum(PP)	-0.04	0.80	53
	mean(AIINPP) ~ PP	-0.02	0.88	83
POSTM	mean(AIINPP) ~ sum(PP)	-0.11	0.44	53
	mean(AIINPP) ~ PP	-0.03	0.80	83

Source: MARPOR 2020a

A single significant value can be observed, namely in the ECO index. Since this value's ideological direction points to a sales movement to the left, it can hardly be understood as a sign of a shift to the right. In this case, too, the country effect (Italy) is visible (app. 5).

Tab. 17 – Reactions of Populist Elections Results (*Switzerland*): NPP

	score ~ vote	Cor	p-value	n
RILE	mean(AIINPP) ~ sum(PP)	-0.71	0.07	7
	mean(AIINPP) ~ PP	-0.22	0.39	18
ECO	mean(AIINPP) ~ sum(PP)	-0.61	0.14	7
	mean(AIINPP) ~ PP	-0.15	0.56	18
CUL	mean(AIINPP) ~ sum(PP)	-0.19	0.68	7
	mean(AIINPP) ~ PP	0.02	0.93	18
POSTM	mean(AIINPP) ~ sum(PP)	-0.31	0.49	7
	mean(AIINPP) ~ PP	-0.14	0.58	18

Source: MARPOR 2020a

A breakdown by country is not sensible due to the small number of cases. The exception is Switzerland (tab. 17). And indeed, one of the RILE values is almost significant. But the plot (app. 5) allows two different interpretations, which is why this example also has no significance. The same applies to correlations with individual party families (app. 5)

Finally, we briefly consider whether populists, for their part, react to the election results of other parties. In the case of right-wing populists, we analyze they respond to their competitors in the right-wing camp. As can be seen, however, the following table (tab. 18) does not provide any indications of this.

Tab. 18 – Populistist Reactions to CONS & LIB

	score ~ vote	cor	p_value	n
RILE	PP ~ LibCons	-0.03	0.62	210
	PP ~ sum(LibCons)	-0.06	0.62	69
	mean(PP) ~ sum(LibCons)	0.03	0.86	49
	mean(PP) ~ LibCons	0.01	0.95	151
ECO	PP ~ LibCons	-0.01	0.93	210
	PP ~ sum(LibCons)	-0.02	0.84	69
	mean(PP) ~ sum(LibCons)	0.00	0.99	49
	mean(PP) ~ LibCons	-0.02	0.79	151
CUL	PP ~ LibCons	-0.02	0.82	210
	PP ~ sum(LibCons)	0.13	0.28	69
	mean(PP) ~ sum(LibCons)	0.12	0.41	49
	mean(PP) ~ LibCons	0.01	0.88	151
POSTM	PP ~ LibCons	0.02	0.78	210
	PP ~ sum(LibCons)	0.04	0.76	69
	mean(PP) ~ sum(LibCons)	0.04	0.78	49
	mean(PP) ~ LibCons	0.06	0.49	151

Source: MARPOR 2020a

8. Polarization Hypothesis

The analysis of representation gaps has already provided evidence of growing polarization within different policy areas. In this section, we will now examine whether the party-political organization of populism promotes the polarization of party systems in Europe. Again, and again, the fragmentation of individual party systems is referred to in this context. In Germany, for example, the degree of fragmentation at the federal level is now as high as it was at the time of the first Bundestag elections in 1949—with the result that the difficulties of forming a stable government are growing. This circumstance is likely to fuel disenchantment with politics, from which fringe parties, extremist parties, and populist parties tend to benefit. Therefore, it is worth looking at the functioning of party systems, whose integrative power suffers to the extent that polarization grows in conjunction with fragmentation. Is there a connection between the rise of populist parties and the fragmentation of party systems? And is there a connection between polarization and fragmentation? These questions are at the heart of what follows.

8.1 Operationalization

Wie lassen sich die Phänomene der Polarisierung und Fragmentierung fassen und mit dem Populismus in Bezug setzen? Den Ausgangspunkt stellt zunächst einmal das Phänomen der Polarisierung dar; im Anschluss daran wird die Fragmentierung näher bestimmt, um beide Befunde im Anschluss daran in Beziehung zu setzen.

(1) *Polarization*: We define polarization as the parties' ideological distance at the poles of the respective party system. And the ideological distance is measured by the RILE range, and the other index ranges. As for an answer to the question of a general tendency toward polarization, we need to correlate the ranges with the course of time (election years), in fact on two levels: First, in aggregate form looking at party families; second, broken down by country. In this context, it is also essential to clarify whether we find populists at the poles of the ideological spectrum at all. This is done, among other things, by counting which of the various party families occupies the marginal positions within a party system.

(2) *Fragmentation*: Analogous to polarization, we must also ask whether we can speak of a general tendency toward fragmentation for this phenomenon. The Laakso-Tagepera index, which has already been presented (see 6.1), is used for this purpose. This index measures the *effective number of parties* (ENP) in parliament.

$$ENP = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}$$

n: Number of parties with at least 1 seat in parliament

p: Share of the election result of the *i*th party in the election result of all parties with at least 1 seat in parliament.


Fragmentation is again carried out at two levels: First, for the party families in aggregate form; and second, for the respective party systems per country. On this basis, we address the question of whether there is a correlation between fragmentation and the number of populist parties. Here, the means of choice is a correlation between the ENP index, and the proportion of votes cast for populist parties.

(3) *Polarization and fragmentation*: Based on the ENP determination and the distance analysis qua RILE index, the relationship's question can then be addressed: Is there a relationship between fragmentation and polarization? And what part do populist parties play in this? With the following statistical methods we will answer these questions: first, a correlation between RILE score range and ENP, and second, a (multiple) linear regression.

(4) *Bipolarity*: Finally, we deal with the question of whether polarization within the party systems (also) finds expression in an intensified formation of camps. This requires answering the thorny question of how a political camp can be defined. Two approaches have been developed for this purpose, which will be used in the analysis:

- On the one hand, a camp can be determined by the party system's mean (MPS), whereby the mean is not weighted by the election result (it is a matter of the supply of ideology, not its demand). On this basis, all parties to the right of the MPS mean belong to the right camp, and all parties to the left of the mean belong to the left camp. The following questions are then at the heart of the analysis: does the mean shift over time? And does the distance between the means of the left and right camps increase?
- Second, we position the political parties along a spectrum with the respective indices. The largest gap in the middle of the spectrum is defined then as a moat separating the two camps. At the heart of this approach is the question of whether and to what extent moats grow over time.

Fig. 64 – MD between two score neighbors



8.2 Findings

8.2.1 Polarization

The table reports the correlations between the range of the four indices - RILE, ECO, CULT, POSTM - and the passage of time in election years. Does the range increase over time? And can we thus speak of a growing polarization among party families? No, we find no indications. At best, the POSTM index offers a hint, but here, too, there is no significant value.

Tab. 19 – Growing Polarization of Party Systems

Indices	cor	p-value
RILE-Range ~ election_year	-0.06	0.575
ECO-Range ~ election_year	-0.07	0.560
CULT-Range ~ election_year	0.12	0.310
POSTM-Range ~ election_year	0.20	0.071


Source: MARPOR 2020a.

The country-level is somewhat more informative. Like the aggregation level, several correlations can be assumed - for example, in the case of Sweden, which only just missed a significant value (.67) in the case of the POSTM (fig. 65). However, in the absence of sufficient significance, this largely remains mere conjecture. But there are a few tangible exceptions (app. 6.1):

- RILE: Sweden (-.81); CULT: Denmark (.81); ECO: Sweden (-.70); POSTM: Denmark (.67), Switzerland (.84).

In two of the five cases, polarization decreases over time. In the other three cases, it increases. This hardly justifies speaking of a general trend of polarization. Nevertheless, these examples provide indications that polarization is primarily “cultural.” In this respect, the Swedish case on the dimension of materialism v. post-materialism also has a particular significance because the logic of polarization is evident here, which is not evident for Sweden in the RILE and ECO indices because of the direction of the correlation points in precisely the opposite direction.

Fig. 65 – Growing Polarization: POSTM-Range (Countries)



Source: MARPOR 2020a

If the findings regarding polarization at the country level are somewhat mixed, at least the question of populists and their ideological position within the party systems can be answered relatively clearly. They are indeed on the fringes, both in the right-left spectrum as “right-wingers” and in the other dimensions (CULT, ECO, and POSTM). Among the progressive parties, this position changes: The Socialists occupy this marginal position in the RILE and ECO indexes; the Greens in the CULT and POSTM.

Tab. 20 – Polarization: Right-most and Left-most Parties

Indices		Populists	GRN	LIB	SocD	Soc	Cons
RILE	max.	50.0	0.0	22.6	1.6	0.0	29.0
	min.	1.6	27.4	0.0	22.6	50.0	3.2
CUL	max.	75.8	0.0	8.1	3.2	0.0	19.4
	min.	0.0	72.6	4.8	8.1	17.7	1.6
ECO	max.	30.6	1.6	35.5	4.8	0.0	30.6
	min.	6.5	22.6	1.6	22.6	45.2	6.5
POSTM	max.	77.4	1.6	9.7	1.6	1.6	11.3
	min.	0.0	72.6	8.1	6.5	16.1	1.6

Source: MARPOR 2020a.

In the CUL and POSTM dimensions the max/min values are recognizably higher than those of RILE and ECO, which is why we can assume that the actual drivers of polarization are to be found here. And it also stands to reason to attribute particular importance to the populists for the polarization of party competition due to their quadruple marginal position in the various dimensions. Some indications of this are provided by the indices' correlations (score-ranges) with the populists' vote share.

Tab. 21 – Polarization: Indices Score-Range ~ PP-Vote

	cor	p-value
RILE-Range	-0.08	0.43
CUL-Range	-0.10	0.33
ECO-Range	-0.07	0.50
POSTM-Range	-0.07	0.51

Source: MARPOR 2020a.

At the aggregate level, these are unproductive (tab. 21). At the country level, however, some findings can be compiled (app. 6.1). In a few countries, polarization increases with the strength of the populists. In these cases, the values are not only significant but also reflect a strong correlation:

- CULT: Denmark (.78), Netherlands (.72), Italy (-.50); ECO: Netherlands (.92); POSTM: Denmark (.81).

We take these findings as an indication that populists have a sometimes considerable polarization potential for party competition.¹⁹

8.2.2 Fragmentation

Like polarization, we find no general trend toward fragmentation of political party systems (tab. 22). At the country level, things are different (fig. 66). Five of the ten selected party systems are affected by growing fragmentation.

Tab. 22 – Growing Fragmentation: ENP


¹⁹ Italy is the exception here. But the Italian party system has the peculiarity of comprising several populist parties, which in turn have very different ideological orientations.

	election_year ~ ENP	election_year ~ n(parties)
corr	0.18	0.16
p-value	0.109	0.166

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Countries, where the degree of fragmentation of the party system is increasing include Sweden (.85), Denmark (.93), Finland (.84), the Netherlands (.76), and Germany (.71).

Fig. 66 – Fragmentation: ENP (*Countries*)



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Moreover, these fragmentation processes are also related to the populists. This is indicated by the ENP index correlation with the share of votes for the party family of pop-up lists (app. 6.2), indicating a weak but significant correlation (.26). And this finding is corroborated by counting the individual party systems in a country overview (app. 6.2).

8.2.3 Fragmentation and Polarization

Is there also a connection between fragmentation and polarization? And what part do populist parties play in this? The four indices are again used and correlated with the ENP index to answer this question. The results are consistently significant, and the correlations are at least in the moderate range (tab. 23). Therefore, this question about a correlation between the two phenomena can be answered in the affirmative: there is a correlation, which is presumably also reciprocal.


Tab. 23 – Polarization & Fragmentation: Indices and ENP

Indices/Correlations	Cor	p-value
RILE-Range ~ ENP	0.42	0.000
CUL-Range ~ ENP	0.61	0.000
ECO-Range ~ ENP	0.47	0.000
POSTM-Range ~ ENP	0.61	0.000

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 67 – Polarization & Fragmentation:
POSTM-Range ~ ENP

(Plotted lines: connection between the predicted points)



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Polarization creates incentives for centrifugal party competition, in which the battle is not for voters in the center but voters in the respective camp. This usually favors small parties that can present themselves as authentic representatives of “expressive voting.” Such centrifugal party competition has polarizing consequences because it furthers outbidding among the parties within a camp.

However, we can make no further statistically reliable statements about this triangle of fragmentation, polarization, and strength of populist parties. In any case, the additional knowledge that populist parties are also in the party system – in addition to the knowledge of the ENP – does not contribute to a more reliable prediction: The p-values are not significant ($\Pr(>|t|)$, see tab. 24) and the effect of the PP factor is irrelevant, as can be seen from the plotted lines (fig. 67).

Tab. 24 – Polarization & Fragmentation: POSTM-range ~ ENP (+ PP)


		Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
POSTM-range ~ ENP	(Intercept)	-0.2	9.7	-0.02	0.98
	ENP	13.9	2.0	6.81	0.00
	r-squared	0.38			
	adjusted r-squared	0.37			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.00			
	<hr/>				
POSTM-range ~ ENP + PP	(Intercept)	-1.4	9.7	-0.15	0.88
	ENP	12.8	2.3	5.69	0.00
	PP	7.9	7.0	1.14	0.26
	r-squared	0.39			
	adjusted r-squared	0.37			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.00			

Source: MARPOR 2020a

8.2.4 Bipolarity


Finally, we need to address whether polarization may also be expressed in the form of (intensified) camp formation. Two approaches have been developed for this purpose: First, the mean party system (MPS) approach, and second, the maximum difference (MD) approach. Linear regressions have been calculated for both methods to measure the stock formation based on the different indices (RILE, CULT, ECO, and POSTM) and second to estimate the PP factor's weight.²⁰

Fig. 68 – Bipolarity: MD/RILE



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. 69 – Bipolarity: MD/CULT



Source: MARPOR 2020a

²⁰ An exemplary presentation of the two regressions can be found in the appendix for the RILE index (app. 6.4). The lists of results for the different correlations can also be found there.

As a result, however, the findings are relatively meager. No significant values can be found for the variant MPS. The alternative variant MD at least has significant correlations, but these are illustrated in the two plots. These are based on the one hand on the RILE (fig. 68), and on the other hand on the CULT index (fig. 69).

As can be seen, both plots show a significant negative correlation that is equally weak in both cases ($cor = -.23$, $p\text{-value} = .04$; app. 6.4). Thus, the difference between the camps tends to decrease over time as the regression line indicates. Moreover, the red line provides a heuristic impression of the PP factor's relevance, which is not significant in either case (and lacks significance). At the country level, there are only a few significant findings to add, which, moreover, contradict the assumption of camp formation:

- RILE/MSP: Schweden (-.79), Niederlande (-.88);
- RILE/MD (standardized): Finnland (-.72).

In sum, we find that the party systems' constellation does not reflect an increasing polarization.

9. Conclusions

This contribution to the DEMOS project is to investigate the relationship of populists to the content dimension of politics. It aims to answer whether populist parties change their programmatic perspectives once they are in power (WP 5.1). Also, it examines the influence they exert on other political parties and the party system (WP 6.3). To this end, we have conducted several analyses at different levels: inter-party family comparisons and intra-party family comparisons. The following sections summarize the main findings with a view to the four central hypotheses.

9.1 Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis

Due to the numerous approaches to analyzing this hypothesis, the following chart provides an overview of the main findings of the analyses:

Tab. 25 – Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis: Findings

Questions	Findings	Focus
Do Populists have core policies?	Yes, but less prioritized than, e.g., the Greens.	Inter
Do Populists have a stable ranking of their priorities?	Yes, but less clear-cut than the average of all non-populists.	Inter
Do Populists switch easily between “hot” topics?	Not really; Populists stick to their guns.	Inter
Do Populists ignore policies?	Not more than other parties.	Inter
Do Populists switch easily between “lame” policy issues?	No, they do not.	Inter
Is the Populist party family internally policy-divers?	Yes, more than parties center-left, but not more than parties center-right.	Intra
Do Populists switch between their priorities?	Yes, more than parties center-right in terms of the top-3 priorities.	Intra

9.2 Power Matters Hypothesis

(1) Populists’ experience in government is not without consequences in some policy areas. We find expected effects in the areas of *political corruption and political authority*. Whereas these effects demonstrate a “opportunistic” behavior, results in other fields suggest learning effects because of the time in government. Cases in point are the items (*economic incentives and middle class and professional groups*). In these cases, the populists do not return to their pre-government positions. Instead, their post-government positions’ data suggest that the populists become more “established” because of the government period.

(2) Moreover, some populist issues are determined by the government-opposition distinction. These include *traditional morality (positive)*, *democracy*, and *economic orthodoxy*. While Populists see *traditional morality positive* and *democracy* as practical opposition issues, *economic orthodoxy* seems to serve as a typical “government-friendly” issue, even for populists in power.

(3) The impression that populist parties approach the profile of established parties through government is also evident in the *intra-party* family comparison of populists. *Without* government experience, populists become “more populist” than their counterparts from parties *with* government experience. And these differences are evident in both socio-cultural and socio-economic terms. Moreover, the East-West comparison is striking: Populists from Central and Eastern Europe tend to appear more pragmatic.

9.3 Gap of Representation Hypothesis

(1) With the populists’ electoral success, they represent new issues in Parliament. However, the picture is mixed due to the strong effects of country-specific differences. In sum, the result shows the vital relevance of socio-cultural issues. From the populists’ point of view, the central representation gap is the emergence of a mainstream for which they want to offer an alternative. A particularly prominent example of this is the positive reference to the *national way of life (positive)*.

(2) Closely related to the cultural dimension is the area of international politics, including Europe. The decidedly Euroskeptical attitude (*europe negative*) contributes significantly to the profile of populists, who differ in this respect from liberals and conservatives. Moreover, populists take a hostile stance toward growing internationalization. The rejection of multiculturalism in the national sphere finds its logical continuation in the nation-state’s advocacy in the international sphere.

(3) In general, populists oppose a policy consensus that emphasizes the inclusion side of politics, both in the national and international spheres. Populists want to distance themselves from this pro-inclusion policy, which is advocated primarily by left-wing parties but is also widely supported by the liberal-conservative party camp. And they want to offer a political alternative. Some of these “alternative” policies also encompass classic welfare items, but they manifest themselves primarily in the rejection of post-materialist policies. Populists are particularly opposed to these policies.

(4) There is hardly any support for this opposition in the other party families. And the different conjunctures found for various issues on both sides hardly change this overall picture. Instead, it shows that the populists want to be at the forefront of the zeitgeist that rejects the left-liberal-green mainstream. They want to lead the counter-revolution (Ignazi) formed in recent decades in reaction to post-materialism.

9.4 Contagion Hypothesis.

In the context of the contagion hypothesis, the various approaches have revealed few robust results that would warrant confirmation of the hypothesis. This area may require some in-depth qualitative drilling beyond the scope of this analysis.

9.5 Polarization Hypothesis

(1) The data does not provide evidence for a general tendency toward polarization, nor for a general trend toward fragmentation. However, at the country level, we could gather several indications supporting a growing polarization and fragmentation. Moreover, the data demonstrate the relationship between fragmentation and polarization, presumably in the form of mutually reinforcing effects.

(2) Moreover, the findings confirm the assumption that populists find themselves at the party systems' poles. The CULT and POSTM indices, in particular, underscore their outsider position. Moreover, these indices reinforce the findings that a new cleavage separates parties open to inclusion from populists, who advocate exclusion-oriented policies in many areas.

(3) Overall, we could not condense the findings into a model that provides statistical evidence for the populists' share of polarization. Nor could we demonstrate an increased formation of camps as an expression of polarization.

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Appendix

1. Data Set and Indices

1.1 MARPOR [ad 3.1]

Tab. A-1 – PSW-Sample: PP

Country	ID (MARPOR)	Party name	Abbreviation
Sweden	11951	New Democracy	NyD
Sweden	11710	Sweden Democrats	SD
Denmark	13951	Progress Party	FP
Denmark	13720	Danish People's Party	DF
Finland	14820	True Finns / Finnish Rural Party	PS / SMP
Netherlands	22430	Livable Netherlands	LN
Netherlands	22720	List Pim Fortuyn	LPF
Netherlands	22722	Party of Freedom	PVV
Netherlands	22730	Forum for Democracy	FvD
France	31720	National Front	FN
Italy	32710	National Alliance / Italian Social Movement-National Right	AN / MSI-DN
Italy	32720	League / Northern League	L / LN
Italy	32610	Go Italy	FI
Italy	32629	House of Freedom	
Italy	32061	People of Freedom	PdL
Italy	32630	Brothers of Italy / Brothers of Italy - National Centre-right	FDI / FDI-CDN
Italy	32956	Five Star Movement	M5S
Germany	41953	Alternative for Germany	AfD
Austria	42420	Austrian Freedom Party / Freedom Movement	FPÖ /
Austria	42710	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZÖ
Austria	42951	Team Stronach for Austria	TS
Switzerland	43710	Swiss Democrats	SD/DS
Switzerland	43711	Federal Democratic Union	EDU/UDF
Switzerland	43810	Swiss People's Party	SVP/UDC
Switzerland	43902	Geneva Citizens' Movement	MCG
United Kingdom	51951	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-2 – PSW-Sample: GRN

Country	ID (MARPOR)	Party name	Abbreviation
Sweden	11110	Green Ecology Party	MP
Denmark	13230	Socialist People's Party	SF
Denmark	13110	Alternativ	
Finland	14110	Green Union	VL
Netherlands	22110	Green Left	GL
Netherlands	22951	Party for the Animals	PvdD EÉLV / Les
France	31110	Europe Ecology - The Greens / The Greens	Verts
France	31111	Ecology Generation	GE
Italy	32110	Green Federation	FdV
Italy	32111	The Girasole ('Sunflower')	
Germany	41112	Greens/Alliance'90	Greens/90
Germany	41113	Alliance'90/Greens	90/Greens
Austria	42110	The Greens / Green Alternative	GRÜNE / GA
Austria	42120	Peter Pilz List	PILZ
Switzerland	43110	Green Party of Switzerland	GPS/PES
Switzerland	43321	Independents' Alliance	LdU/AdI
Switzerland	43120	Green Liberal Party	GLP
United Kingdom	51110	Green Party of England and Wales	GPEW

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-3 – PSW-Sample: LIB

Country	ID (MARPOR)	Party name	Abbreviation
Sweden	11420	Liberals / Liberal People's Party	L / FP
Sweden	11810	Centre Party	CP
Denmark	13410	Danish Social-Liberal Party	RV
Denmark	13420	Liberals	V
Denmark	13001	Liberal Alliance / New Alliance	/ NY
Finland	14420	Liberal People's Party	LKP
Finland	14810	Finnish Centre	SK
Finland	14901	Swedish People's Party	RKP/SFP
Finland	14430	Young Finnish Party	NSP
Finland	14440	Movement Now	
Netherlands	22330	Democrats'66	D'66
Netherlands	22420	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	VVD
France	31421	Radical Party	PR
France	31425	Republic Onwards!	
Italy	32310	Pannella-Sgarbi List / Pannella-Riformatori List / Pannella List	/ LP
Italy	32410	Italian Republican Party	PRI
Italy	32420	Italian Liberal Party	PLI
Italy	32321	Italian Renewal	RI
Italy	32421	Daisy - Democracy is Freedom	M-DL
Italy	32460	Civic Choice	SC
Italy	32451	More Europe	E
Germany	41420	Free Democratic Party	FDP
Austria	42421	Liberal Forum	LIF
Austria	42430	The New Austria and Liberal Forum / The New Austria	NEOS FDP/PLR / FDP/PRD
Switzerland	43420	FDP.The Liberals / Radical Democratic Party	FDP/PLR / FDP/PRD
Switzerland	43531	Liberal Party of Switzerland	LPS/PLS
Switzerland	43120	Green Liberal Party	GLP
United Kingdom	51421	Liberal Democrats	LibDems
United Kingdom	51430	Alliance Party of Northern Ireland	Alliance

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-4 – PSW-Sample: CONS

Country	ID (MARPOR)	Party name	Abbreviation
Sweden	11520	Christian Democrats / Christian Democratic Community Party	Kd / KdS
Sweden	11620	Moderate Coalition Party	MSP
Denmark	13330	Centre Democrats	CD
Denmark	13520	Christian Democrats / Christian People's Party	K / KrF
Finland	14520	Christian Democrats in Finland / Finnish Christian Union	KD / SKL
Finland	14620	National Coalition	KK
Netherlands	22521	Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA
Netherlands	22526	Christian Union	CU
France	31624	Democratic Movement / Union for French Democracy	MoDem / UDF
France	31625	Rally for the Republic	RPR
France	31626	The Republicans / Union for a Popular Movement / Union for the Presidential Majority	/ UMP
France	31630	New Centre	NC
France	31631	Centrist Alliance	AC
France	31430	Union of Democrats and Independents	UDI
Italy	32520	Italian Popular Party / Christian Democrats	PPI / DC
Italy	32528	Pact for Italy	PI
Italy	32521	Christian Democratic Centre	CCD
Italy	32522	White Flower	
Italy	32901	European Democracy	DE
Italy	32530	Union of the Center / Union for Christian and Center Democrats	UdC / UDC
Italy	32904	South Tyrolean People's Party	SVP
Italy	32952	Italy in the World	InM
Italy	32953	Popular Democratic Union for Europe	P-UDEUR
Italy	32640	Labour and Freedom List	3L
Italy	32051	Popular Civic List	CP
Italy	32055	Us with Italy	NcL
Italy	32090	Coalition of South Tyrolean People's Party and Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party	SVP-PATT
Germany	41521	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	CDU/CSU
Austria	42520	Austrian People's Party	ÖVP
Switzerland	43520	Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland	CVP/PDC
Switzerland	43811	Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland	BDP/PBD
United Kingdom	51620	Conservative Party	Conservatives
United Kingdom	51621	Ulster Unionist Party	UUP
United Kingdom	51903	Democratic Unionist Party	DUP

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-5 – PSW-Sample: SocD

Country	ID (MARPOR)	Party name	Abbreviation
Sweden	11320	Social Democratic Labour Party	SAP
Denmark	13320	Social Democratic Party	SD
Finland	14320	Finnish Social Democrats	SSDP
Netherlands	22320	Labour Party	PvdA
France	31320	Socialist Party	PS
Italy	32220	Democrats of the Left / Democratic Party of the Left	DS / PDS
Italy	32320	Italian Socialist Party	PSI
Italy	32330	Italian Democratic Socialist Party	PSDI
Italy	32529	Democratic Alliance	AD
Italy	32111	The Girasole ('Sunflower')	
Italy	32329	Olive Tree	
Italy	32611	New Italian Socialist Party	NPSI
Italy	32221	Rose in the Fist	RnP
Italy	32903	Autonomy Liberty Democracy (Aosta Valley)	ALD
Italy	32955	The Union – Prodi	
Italy	32440	Democratic Party	PD
Italy	32031	Free and Equal	LeU
Germany	41320	Social Democratic Party of Germany	SPD
Austria	42320	Austrian Social Democratic Party	SPÖ
Switzerland	43320	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland	SPS/PSS
Switzerland	43321	Independents' Alliance	LdU/AdI
Switzerland	43540	Christian Social Party	CSP/PCS
United Kingdom	51320	Labour Party	Labour
United Kingdom	51902	Scottish National Party	SNP
United Kingdom	51340	Social Democratic and Labour Party	SDLP
United Kingdom	51901	The Party of Wales	PC

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-6 – PSW-Sample: SOC

Country	ID (MARPOR)	Party name	Abbreviation
Sweden	11220	Left Party	V
Denmark	13229	Red-Green Unity List	EL
Finland	14223	Left Wing Alliance	VAS
Netherlands	22220	Socialist Party	SP
France	31220	French Communist Party	PCF
France	31021	Left Front	FDG
France	31230	Left Radical Party	PRG
France	31240	Indomitable France	
Italy	32212	Communist Refoundation Party	PRC
Italy	32213	Party of Italian Communists	PdCI
Italy	32021	Civil Revolution	RC
Italy	32230	Left Ecology Freedom	SEL
Germany	41221	Party of Democratic Socialism	PDS
Germany	41222	The Left. Party of Democratic Socialism	L-PDS
Germany	41223	The Left	LINKE
Austria	42220	Austrian Communist Party	KPÖ
Switzerland	43220	Swiss Labour Party	PdAS/PdTS
Switzerland	43020	Together on the Left	EAG
United Kingdom	51210	We Ourselves	SF

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-7 – PSG-Sample: Populists in Government

Country	ID	Party	Abbreviation	out of government	out of opposition	N
Norway	12951	Progress Party	FrP	2017	1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013	7
Denmark	13720	Danish People's Party	DF	2005, 2007, 2011	1998, 2001, 2015	6
Finland	14820	True Finns / Finnish Rural Party	PS / SMP	2019	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011.	8
Italy	32710	National Alliance / Italian Social Movement-National Right	AN / MSI-DN	1996, 2006	1992, 1994, 2001	5
Italy	32720	League / Northern League	L / LN	1996, 2006, 2013	1992, 1994, 2001, 2006, 2013	8
Italy	32610	Go Italy	FI	1996, 2006	1994, 2001, 2018	5
Italy	32061	People of Freedom	PdL	2008	2013	2
Austria	42420	Freedom Movement / Austrian Freedom Party	/ FPÖ	2002, 2006	1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2008, 2013,	9
Austria	42710	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZÖ	2006	2008	2
Czech Republic	82430	ANO 2011	ANO	2017	2013	2
Hungary	86421	Alliance of Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union - Christian Democratic People's Party / Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Party - Hungarian Democratic Forum- Alliance / Federation of Young Democrats	FiDeSz- MPSz-KDNP / FiDeSz- MPP-MDF / FiDeSz	2002, 2014	1990, 1994, 1998, 2006, 2010	7
Poland	92436	Law and Justice	PiS	2011	2001, 2005, 2007, 2007, 2011	5
Slovakia	96710	Slovak National Party	SNS	1994, 1998, 2010	1990, 1992, 2006, 2006, 2011	8
Slovakia	96711	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	HZDS	1994, 1998, 2010	1992, 2002, 2006	6

Source: MARPOR 2020a

1.2 RILE and Other Indices [ad 3.2]

Composition of the RILE index

RILE-Score_{Right} = per104 + per201 + per203 + per305 + per401 + per402 + per407 + per414 + per505 + per601 + per603 + per605 + per606 [military +] + [freedom & human rights] + [constitution +] + [political authority] + [free market economy] + [incentives] + [protectionism -] + [economic orthodoxy] + [welfare -] + [national way of life +] + [traditional morality +] + [law and order +] + [civic mindedness +]

RILE-Score_{Left} = per103 + per105 + per106 + per107 + per403 + per404 + per406 + per412 + per413 + per504 + per506 + per701 + per202 [anti-imperialism] + [military -] + [peace] + [internationalism +] + [democracy] + [market regulation] + [economic planning] + [protectionism +] + [controlled economy] + [nationalisation] + [welfare +] + [education +] + [labour groups +]

Composition of the CULT index

CULT_{Right} = per104 + per109 + per601 + per603 + per605 + per608 [military +] + [internationalism -] + [national way of life +] + [traditional morality +] + [law and order +] + [multiculturalism -]

CULT_{Left} = per105 + per106 + per107 + per501 + per503 + per602 + per604 + per607 + per705 [military -] + [peace] + [internationalism +] + [environmentalism +] + [equality +] + [national way of life -] + [traditional morality -] + [multiculturalism +] + [minority groups]

Composition of the ECO index

ECO_{Right} = per401 + per402 + per407 + per414 + per505 [free market economy] + [incentives] + [protectionism -] + [economic orthodoxy] + [welfare -]

ECO_{Left} = per403 + per404 + per405 + per406 + per409 + per412 + per413 + per415 + per416 + per504 [market regulation] + [economic planning] + [corporatism/mixed economy] + [protectionism +] + [keynesian demand management] + [controlled economy] + [nationalisation] + [marxist analysis +] + [anti-growth economy +] + [welfare +]

Composition of the POSTM index


POSTM_{Right} = per104 + per109 + per110 + per304 + per305 + per406 + per410 + per601 + per603 + per605 + per608 [military +] + [internationalism -] + [europe -] + [political corruption] + [political authority] + [protectionism +] + [economic growth +] + [national way of life +] + [traditional morality +] + [law and order +] + [multiculturalism -]

POSTM_{Left} = per105 + per107 + per108 + per407 + per416 + per501 + per502 + per503 + per602 + per604 + per606 + per607 + per705 + per706 [military -] + [internationalism +] + [europe +] + [protectionism -] + [anti-growth economy +] + [environmentalism +] + [culture +] + [equality +] + [national way of life -] + [traditional morality -] + [civic mindedness +] + [multiculturalism +] + [minority groups] + [non-economic demographic groups]

2. Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis [ad 4.]


2.1 Policy Profiles [ad 4.1]

Fig. A-1 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-2 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & CONS




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-3 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & GRN




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-4 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & LIB




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-5 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & SOC



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-6 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & SocD



Source: MARPOR 2020a


2.2 Policy Hopping [ad 4.2]

Tab. A-8 – Difference between PP and NPP: RILE (Cohen’s d)

Populists (n=98)	GRN (n=85)	LIB (n=118)	SocD (n=108)	SOC (n=72)	CONS (n=134)	All NPP (n=509)
RILE	1.94***	0.56***	1.66***	2.55***	0.60***	1.14***
ECO	1.26***	0.09	0.94***	1.69***	0.21	0.59***
CUL	3.15***	1.59***	2.10***	2.78***	1.11***	1.73***


Source: MARPOR 2020a | *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.01.

Fig. A-7 – RILE: PP v. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-8 – RILE-Spread: PP v. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-9 – RILE: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-10 – RILE-Spread: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-11 – CUL: PP v. NPP



Source: MARPOR 2020a


Fig. A-12 – CUL -Spread: PP v. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-13 – CUL: All PF

Fig. A-14 – CUL -Spread: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-15 – ECO: PP v. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-16 – ECO -Spread: PP v. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-17 – ECO: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-18 – ECO -Spread: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-19 – POSTM: PP v. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-20 – POSTM -Spread: PP v. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-21 – POSTM: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-22 – POSTM -Spread: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-23 – POSTM and POSTM-Spread: PP vs. All-NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-24 – POSTM and POSTM-Spread: PP vs. CONS




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-25 – POSTM and POSTM-Spread: PP vs. GRN




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-26 – POSTM and POSTM-Spread: PP vs. LIB




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-27 – POSTM and POSTM-Spread: PP vs. SOC



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-28 – POSTM and POSTM-Spread: PP vs. SocD



Source: MARPOR 2020a


2.3 Policy Ignorance [ad 4.3]

Tab. A-9 – Cohen’s: Differences in number of small items

Items (N ≤)	GRN	LIB	SocD	Soc.	CONS	NPP
0	0.06	0.11	0.19	0.02	0.04	0.02
1	0.44	0.08	0.09	0.17	0.16	0.05
2	0.53	0.06	0.05	0.08	0.11	0.07
3	0.31	0.08	0.19	0.03	0.20	0.06
4	0.15	0.12	0.17	0.19	0.13	0.10
5	0.03	0.12	0.12	0.28	0.24	0.16
6	0.18	0.27	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.26
7	0.11	0.13	0.17	0.35	0.13	0.17
8	0.15	0.09	0.00	0.25	0.01	0.08
9	0.14	0.17	0.02	0.20	0.09	0.06
10	0.21	0.02	0.09	0.01	0.38	0.09
11	0.19	0.11	0.12	0.06	0.32	0.11
12	0.20	0.14	0.21	0.01	0.26	0.11
13	0.22	0.17	0.26	0.04	0.23	0.12
14	0.24	0.29	0.26	0.02	0.32	0.17
15	0.21	0.26	0.21	0.08	0.32	0.16
SD of policy-categories						
50 %	0.46	0.09	0.01	0.32	0.02	0.12
75 %	0.48	0.10	0.01	0.11	0.11	0.09
80 %	0.62	0.19	0.13	0.25	0.03	0.22
50 % (0 not counted)	0.44	0.41	0.15	0.28	0.24	0.10
75 % (0 not counted)	0.48	0.11	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.11
80 % (0 not counted)	0.20	0.13	0.31	0.02	0.22	0.12


Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-29 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. CONS




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-30 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. GRN




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-31 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. LIB




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-32 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. Soc.



Source: MARPOR 2020a


Fig. A-33 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. SocD



Source: MARPOR 2020a


2.4 Internal Diversity [ad 4.4]

Fig. A-34 – Internal Diversity of PF:
CoV in policy cat.



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-35 – Internal Diversity of PF:
CoV in policy cat. (mean > 1)



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-10 –Top-3 for each Populist Party

Party	Country	Top-3		
New Democracy	Sweden	economic orthodoxy	gov-admin efficiency	freedom & human rights
Sweden Democrats	Sweden	welfare +	national way of life +	law and order +
Progress Party	Denmark	incentives	free market economy	economic goals
Danish People's Party	Denmark	national way of life +	multiculturalism -	law and order +
True Finns	Finland	welfare +	democracy	equality +
Livable Netherlands	Netherlands	technology & infrastructure	education +	gov-admin efficiency
List Pim Fortuyn	Netherlands	gov-admin efficiency	technology & infrastructure	law and order +
Party of Freedom	Netherlands	law and order +	multiculturalism -	national way of life +
Forum for Democracy	Netherlands	political corruption	democracy	national way of life +
National Front	France	national way of life +	law and order +	traditional morality +
League	Italy	decentralisation	technology & infrastructure	gov-admin efficiency
House of Freedom	Italy	technology & infrastructure	gov-admin efficiency	incentives law and order +
Five Star Movement	Italy	environmentalism +	market regulation	welfare +
Alternative for Germany	Germany	democracy	europe -	national way of life +
Austrian Freedom Party	Austria	gov-admin efficiency	environmentalism +	equality +
Alliance for the Future of Austria	Austria	law and order +	equality +	welfare +
Team Stronach for Austria	Austria	gov-admin efficiency	political corruption	market regulation
Swiss Democrats	Switzerland	national way of life +	environmentalism +	market regulation
Federal Democratic Union	Switzerland	traditional morality +	law and order +	political authority
Swiss People's Party	Switzerland	law and order +	europe -	free market economy
Geneva Citizens' Movement	Switzerland	law and order +	national way of life +	welfare + education +
United Kingdom Independence Party	United Kingdom	europe -	welfare +	national way of life +

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-11 –Top-3 for each Populist Party (with mean values)

Party	Country	Top-3			
New Democracy	Sweden	economic orthodoxy 19.4	gov-admin efficiency 10.8	freedom & human rights 9,0	
Sweden Democrats	Sweden	welfare + 15.4	national way of life + 10.2	law and order + 8.8	
Progress Party	Denmark	incentives 8.8	free market economy 8.7	economic goals 6.8	
Danish People's Party	Denmark	national way of life + 13.9	multiculturalism - 12.6	law and order + 11.4	
True Finns	Finland	welfare + 11.4	democracy 7,0	equality + 6.4	
Livable Netherlands	Netherlands	technology & infrastructure 9.6	education + 9.4	gov-admin efficiency 8.1	
List Pim Fortuyn	Netherlands	gov-admin efficiency 11.7	technology & infrastructure 10,0	law and order + 7.1	
Party of Freedom	Netherlands	law and order + 13.5	multiculturalism - 13,0	national way of life + 11.1	
Forum for Democracy	Netherlands	political corruption 14.1	democracy 10.6	national way of life + 9.2	
National Front	France	national way of life + 11.1	law and order + 9.4	traditional morality + 7.9	
National Alliance	Italy	gov-admin efficiency 14	political authority 9.3	law and order + 7.2	
League	Italy	decentralisation 9.7	technology & infrastructure 9.3	gov-admin efficiency 6.7	
Go Italy	Italy	political authority 11.4	gov-admin efficiency 10.4	incentives 8.4	
House of Freedom	Italy	technology & infrastructure 16	gov-admin efficiency 15.9	incentives 8,0	law and order + 8,0
People of Freedom	Italy	incentives 14.2	technology & infrastructure 12.2	gov-admin efficiency 12.1	
Brothers of Italy	Italy	law and order + 13.5	culture + 8.5	welfare + 7.4	
Five Star Movement	Italy	environmentalism + 24.3	market regulation 14	welfare + 8.6	
Alternative for Germany	Germany	democracy 10.9	europe - 9.8	national way of life + 7.5	
Austrian Freedom Party	Austria	gov-admin efficiency 6.1	environmentalism + 5.1	equality + 5.1	
Alliance for the Future of Austria	Austria	law and order + 12.3	equality + 11.6	welfare + 9	
Team Stronach for Austria	Austria	gov-admin efficiency 11.3	political corruption 8.4	market regulation 6.7	
Swiss Democrats	Switzerland	national way of life + 18.5	environmentalism + 11.3	market regulation 7.6	
Federal Democratic Union	Switzerland	traditional morality + 37.3	law and order + 6	political authority 4.9	

Party	Country	Top-3			
Swiss People's Party	Switzerland	law and order + 7.9	europa - 6.8	free market economy 6	
Geneva Citizens' Movement	Switzerland	law and order + 15.3	national way of life + 9.5	welfare + 7.9	education + 7.9
United Kingdom Independence Party	United Kingdom	europa - 17.9	welfare + 10.3	national way of life +	7.7

Source: MARPOR 2020a

3. Power Matters Hypothesis [ad 5]

3.1 Operationalization [ad 5.1]


Tab. A-12 – Countries included in PSG

Party	Country	Code	n			
			in government	pre- government	post- government	in opposition
FrP	Norway	12951	1	6	0	6
DF	Denmark	13720	3	2	1	3
PS / SMP	Finland	14820	1	7	0	7
AN / MSI-DN	Italy	32710	2	2	1	3
L / LN	Italy	32720	3	2	3	5
FI	Italy	32610	2	1	2	3
PdL	Italy	32061	1	0	1	1
/ FPÖ	Austria	42420	2	4	3	7
BZÖ	Austria	42710	1	0	1	1
ANO	Czech Republic	82430	1	1	0	1
FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP / FiDeSz-MPP-MDF / FiDeSz	Hungary	86421	2	3	2	5
PiS	Poland	92436	1	3	1	4
SNS	Slovakia	96710	3	2	3	5
HZDS	Slovakia	96711	3	1	2	3

Source: MARPOR 2020a


3.2. Findings [ad 5.2]

Fig. A-36 – Constitution+ * Constitution-:
In Government v. In Opposition




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-37 – Military -:
In Government v. In Opposition




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-38 – Constitution+ * Constitution-:
Pre-, In, and Post-Government




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-39 – Military -:
Pre-, In, and Post-Government




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-40 – POSTM-Score + (right):
In Government v. In Opposition




Sources: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-41 – POSTM:
In Government v. In Opposition




Sources: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-42 – Internationalism -:
In Government v. In Opposition



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-43 – Europe +:
In Government v. In Opposition



Source: MARPOR 2020a

4. Gap of Representation Hypothesis [ad 6.]

4.1 New Policies [ad 6.2.1]


Tab. A-13 – Effective Number of Policies: Cohen’s d

	Mean	sd	Cohen’s d	p-value
unweighted	1.49	1.32	0.38	0.04
weighted	1.27	1.66	0.30	0.10

Source: MARPOR 2020a


4.2 Gap of Representation [ad 6.2.2]

Fig. A-44 – Multiculturalism -: PP vs. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-45 – Law and order +: PP vs. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-46 – Multiculturalism -: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-47 – Law and order +: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-48 – Equality +: PP vs. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-49 – Internationalism +: PP vs. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-50 – Equality +: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-51 – Internationalism +: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-52 – Gov.-Admin. efficiency: PP vs. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-53 – Internationalism -: PP vs. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-54 – Gov.-Admin. efficiency: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-55 – Internationalism –: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-56 – Europe +: PP vs. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-57 – Labour groups +: PP vs. NPP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-58 – Europe +: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-59 – Labour groups +: All PF




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-60 – Anomaly Variable:
Education – (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-61 – Anomaly Variable:
Labor groups – (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-62 – Anomaly Variable:
Education – (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-63 – Anomaly Variable:
Labor groups – (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-64 – Anomaly Variable:
Military + (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-65 – Anomaly Variable:
Traditional morality + (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-66 – Anomaly Variable:
Military + (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-67 – Anomaly Variable:
Traditional morality + (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-68 – Anomaly Variable:
Anti-growth economy + (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-69 – Anomaly Variable:
Peace (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-70 – Anomaly Variable:
Anti-growth economy + (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-71 – Anomaly Variable:
Peace (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-72 – Anomaly Variable:
Traditional Morality – (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-73 – Anomaly Variable:
National way of life – (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-74 – Anomaly Variable:
Traditional Morality – (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-75 – Anomaly Variable:
National way of life – (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-76 – Anomaly Variable:
Multiculturalism + (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-77 – Anomaly Variable:
Military – (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-78 – Anomaly Variable:
Multiculturalism + (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-79 – Anomaly Variable:
Military – (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-80 – Anomaly Variable:
Environmentalism + (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-81 – Anomaly Variable:
Welfare – (PP v. NPP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-82 – Anomaly Variable:
Environmentalism + (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-83 – Anomaly Variable:
Welfare – (All PF)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-87 – Policy importance and length of time in the top-3: PP & SOC




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-88 – Policy importance and length of time in the top-3: PP & SocD




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-89 – Policy importance and length of time in the top-3: PP & LIB



Source: MARPOR 2020a


Fig. A-90 – Policy importance and length of time in the top-3: PP & GRN



Source: MARPOR 2020a


4.4 Up and Down of Policies [ad 6.2.4]

Fig. A-91 – Declining topics: PPs




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-92 – Declining topics: All NPPs




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-93 – General Trends: PPs




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-94 – General Trends: All NPPs




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-95 – Reducing the distance: PPs




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-96 – Reducing the distance: All NPPs




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-97 – Keeping the distance: PPs



Source: MARPOR 2020a


Fig. A-98 – Keeping the distance: All NPPs



Source: MARPOR 2020a


5. Contagion Hypothesis [ad 7.]

Fig. A-99 – CONS RILE_{changes} ~ PP_{votes}




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-100 – CONS CUL_{changes} ~ PP_{votes}




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-101 – ECO: mean(AINPP) ~ sum(PP)



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-102 – Switzerland: mean(AINPP) ~ sum(PP)



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-14 – GRN: Score-Change ~ PP-Vote

	score ~ vote	cor	p_value	n
RILE	Green ~ PP	-0.05	0.66	82
	Green ~ sum(PP)	0.01	0.95	55
	mean(Green) ~ sum(PP)	0.01	0.94	47
	mean(Green) ~ PP	-0.02	0.89	67
ECO	Green ~ PP	-0.04	0.73	82
	Green ~ sum(PP)	-0.01	0.94	55
	mean(Green) ~ sum(PP)	0.03	0.86	47
	mean(Green) ~ PP	0.01	0.96	67
CUL	Green ~ PP	0.08	0.48	82
	Green ~ sum(PP)	0.10	0.48	55
	mean(Green) ~ sum(PP)	0.07	0.62	47
	mean(Green) ~ PP	0.06	0.60	67
POSTM	Green ~ PP	0.05	0.68	82
	Green ~ sum(PP)	0.05	0.70	55
	mean(Green) ~ sum(PP)	0.08	0.60	47
	mean(Green) ~ PP	0.06	0.65	67

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-15 – LIB: Score-Change ~ PP-Vote

	score ~ vote	cor	p_value	n
RILE	Lib ~ PP	0.07	0.51	97
	Lib ~ sum(PP)	0.06	0.65	67
	mean(Lib) ~ sum(PP)	0.14	0.41	37
	mean(Lib) ~ PP	0.12	0.40	55
ECO	Lib ~ PP	-0.02	0.83	97
	Lib ~ sum(PP)	-0.06	0.63	67
	mean(Lib) ~ sum(PP)	-0.03	0.87	37
	mean(Lib) ~ PP	-0.01	0.96	55
CUL	Lib ~ PP	0.12	0.25	97
	Lib ~ sum(PP)	0.17	0.17	67
	mean(Lib) ~ sum(PP)	0.18	0.28	37
	mean(Lib) ~ PP	0.14	0.31	55
POSTM	Lib ~ PP	0.05	0.62	97
	Lib ~ sum(PP)	0.05	0.67	67
	mean(Lib) ~ sum(PP)	0.15	0.39	37
	mean(Lib) ~ PP	0.11	0.44	55

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-16 – SOC: Score-Change ~ PP-Vote

	score ~ vote	cor	p_value	n
RILE	Soc ~ PP	-0.01	0.93	59
	Soc ~ sum(PP)	0.14	0.41	38
	mean(Soc) ~ sum(PP)	0.14	0.42	37
	mean(Soc) ~ PP	-0.02	0.89	56
ECO	Soc ~ PP	0.00	0.97	59
	Soc ~ sum(PP)	-0.15	0.37	38
	mean(Soc) ~ sum(PP)	-0.16	0.35	37
	mean(Soc) ~ PP	-0.01	0.96	56
CUL	Soc ~ PP	-0.02	0.89	59
	Soc ~ sum(PP)	0.10	0.55	38
	mean(Soc) ~ sum(PP)	0.07	0.67	37
	mean(Soc) ~ PP	-0.04	0.77	56
POSTM	Soc ~ PP	-0.11	0.41	59
	Soc ~ sum(PP)	-0.02	0.89	38
	mean(Soc) ~ sum(PP)	-0.06	0.74	37
	mean(Soc) ~ PP	-0.13	0.33	56


Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-17 – SocD: Score-Change ~ PP-Vote

	score ~ vote	cor	p_value	n
RILE	SocP ~ PP	0.01	0.92	100
	SocD ~ sum(PP)	0.02	0.87	62
	mean(SocD) ~ sum(PP)	-0.02	0.89	52
	mean(SocD) ~ PP	-0.01	0.96	80
ECO	SocP ~ PP	-0.15	0.14	100
	SocD ~ sum(PP)	-0.28	0.03	62
	mean(SocD) ~ sum(PP)	-0.26	0.06	52
	mean(SocD) ~ PP	-0.16	0.16	80
CUL	SocP ~ PP	0.03	0.77	100
	SocD ~ sum(PP)	0.03	0.80	62
	mean(SocD) ~ sum(PP)	-0.08	0.59	52
	mean(SocD) ~ PP	-0.03	0.81	80
POSTM	SocP ~ PP	0.07	0.50	100
	SocD ~ sum(PP)	0.07	0.58	62
	mean(SocD) ~ sum(PP)	-0.04	0.75	52
	mean(SocD) ~ PP	0.00	0.98	80

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-103 – SocD ~ sum(PP)




Source: MARPOR 2020a

6. Polarization Hypothesis [ad 8.]


6.1 Polarization [ad 8.2.1]

Fig. A-104 – Election-year ~ RILE-Range




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-105 – Election-year ~ CULT-Range



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-106 – Election-year ~ ECO-Range



Source: MARPOR 2020a


6.2 Fragmentation [ad 8.2.2]

Tab. A-18 – Correlation: Share of PP ~ ENP

	share of PP ~ ENP
Cor	0.26
p-value	0.018

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-107 – Correlation: Share of PP ~ ENP



Source: MARPOR 2020a


Tab. A-19 – Fragmentierung des Parteiensystems: ENP und real NP (*per Country*)

country	election	No. PP	ENP	real NP	Diff. ENP	Diff. Real
Sweden	09-2006	0	4.2	7		
Sweden	09-2010	1	4.7	8	0.5	1.0
Denmark	09-1994	1	4.5	8		
Denmark	03-1998	2	4.7	10	0.2	2.0
Netherlands	05-1998	0	4.8	9		
Netherlands	05-2002	2	6.0	10	1.1	1.0
Netherlands	09-2012	1	5.8	11		
Netherlands	03-2017	2	8.3	13	2.5	2.0
France	03-1993	0	3.7	4		
France	05-1997	1	4.9	6	1.2	2.0
France	06-2007	0	2.8	5		
France	06-2012	1	4.3	10	1.5	5.0
Italy	04-1992	2	6.0	12		
Italy	03-1994	3	6.6	11	0.6	-1.0
Italy	04-2008	2	3.0	5		
Italy	02-2013	4	4.6	12	1.6	7.0
Germany	09-2013	0	2.8	4		
Germany	09-2017	1	4.6	6	1.8	2.0
Austria	11-2002	1	2.9	4		
Austria	10-2006	2	3.4	5	0.5	1.0
United Kingdom	05-2010	0	2.9	3		
United Kingdom	05-2015	1	3.8	11	0.9	8.0

Source: MARPOR 2020a.


6.3 Polarization and Fragmentation [ad 8.2.3]

Fig. A-108 – RILE-Range ~ ENP




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-109 – ECO-Range ~ ENP



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-110 – CUL-Range ~ ENP



Source: MARPOR 2020a; Plotted lines: Connection between the predicted points.

Tab. A-20 – Linear Regression: RILE-Range ~ ENP

		Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
RILE_range ~ ENP	(Intercept)	20.8	8.9	2.33	0.02
	ENP	7.7	1.9	4.09	0.00
	r-squared	0.18			
	Adjusted r-squared	0.17			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.00			
RILE_range ~ ENP + PP	(Intercept)	20.6	9.0	2.29	0.02
	ENP	7.5	2.1	3.62	0.00
	PP	0.8	6.4	0.12	0.90
	r-squared	0.18			
	adjusted r-squared	0.16			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.00			

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-21 – Linear Regression: CUL-Range ~ ENP

		Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
CUL_range ~ ENP	(Intercept)	4.1	7.3	0.56	0.58
	ENP	10.3	1.5	6.74	0.00
	r-squared	0.37			
	adjusted r-squared	0.36			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.00			
CUL_range ~ ENP + PP	(Intercept)	3.7	7.3	0.51	0.61
	ENP	10.0	1.7	5.90	0.00
	PP	2.0	5.2	0.39	0.70
	r-squared	0.37			
	adjusted r-squared	0.36			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.00			

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-22 – Linear Regression: ECO-Range ~ ENP

		Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
ECO_range ~ ENP	(Intercept)	4.6	5.9	0.78	0.44
	ENP	5.8	1.2	4.66	0.00
	r-squared	0.22			
	adjusted r-squared	0.21			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.00			
ECO_range ~ ENP + PP	(Intercept)	4.8	6.0	0.80	0.43
	ENP	5.9	1.4	4.29	0.00
	PP	-1.1	4.3	-0.25	0.81
	r-squared	0.22			
	adjusted r-squared	0.20			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.00			

Source: MARPOR 2020a

6.4 Bipolarity [ad 8.2.4]

Tab. A-23 – Linear Regression: mean(RILE) ~ year (+ pp)

		Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
mean ~ year	(Intercept)	1122.23	251.92	4.45	0.00
	year	-0.56	0.13	-4.47	0.00
	r-squared	0.21			
	adjusted r-squared	0.20			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.00			
mean ~ year + pp	(Intercept)	1193.64	255.94	4.66	0.00
	year	-0.60	0.13	-4.68	0.00
	pp	3.70	2.71	1.36	0.18
	r-squared	0.22			
	adjusted r-squared	0.20			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.00			

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-24 – Linear Regression: max_diff(RILE) ~ year (+ pp)

		Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
max_diff ~ year	(Intercept)	539.43	244.98	2.20	0.03
	year	-0.26	0.12	-2.12	0.04
	r-squared	0.05			
	adjusted r-squared	0.04			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.04			
max_diff ~ year + pp	(Intercept)	628.93	246.87	2.55	0.01
	year	-0.30	0.12	-2.47	0.02
	pp	4.64	2.62	1.77	0.08
	r-squared	0.09			
	adjusted r-squared	0.07			
	p-value (F-Test)	0.04			

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-25 – Linear Regression: mean(CUL) ~ year (+ pp)

		Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
mean ~ year	(Intercept)	-353,81	184,12	-1,92	0,06
	year	0,17	0,09	1,87	0,07
	r-squared	0,04			
	adjusted r-squared	0,03			
	p-value (F-Test)	0,07			
mean ~ year + pp	(Intercept)	-242,62	178,78	-1,36	0,18
	year	0,11	0,09	1,27	0,21
	pp	5,76	1,90	3,04	0,00
	r-squared	0,15			
	adjusted r-squared	0,12			
	p-value (F-Test)	0,05			

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-26 – Linear Regression: max_diff(CUL)/sd(CUL) ~ year (+ pp)

		Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
camp_diff_sd ~ year	(Intercept)	-1,30	4,02	-0,32	0,75
	year	0,00	0,00	0,72	0,47
	r-squared	0,01			
	adjusted r-squared	-0,01			
	p-value (F-Test)	0,47			
	camp_diff_sd ~ year + pp	(Intercept)	-2,07	4,11	-0,50
year		0,00	0,00	0,90	0,37
pp		-0,04	0,04	-0,92	0,36
r-squared		0,02			
adjusted r-squared		-0,01			
p-value (F-Test)		0,47			

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-27 – Linear Regression: mean(ECO) ~ year (+ pp)

		Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
mean ~ year	(Intercept)	989,73	139,37	7,10	0,00
	year	-0,50	0,07	-7,15	0,00
	r-squared	0,40			
	adjusted r-squared	0,39			
	p-value (F-Test)	0,00			
	mean ~ year + pp	(Intercept)	980,36	143,22	6,84
year		-0,49	0,07	-6,88	0,00
pp		-0,49	1,52	-0,32	0,75
r-squared		0,40			
adjusted r-squared		0,38			
p-value (F-Test)		0,00			

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-28 – RILE ~ Election year

	cor	p-value
Mean value	-0.45	0.00
Mean value (Parties right of the mean)	-0.41	0.00
Mean value (Parties left of the mean)	-0.32	0.00
Difference between left and right camp's mean	-0.17	0.13
Maximum difference between two score neighbors	-0.23	0.04
Difference between left and right camp's mean (standardized)	-0.10	0.39
Maximum difference between two score neighbors (standardized)	-0.17	0.13

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-29 – CUL ~ Election year

	cor	p-value
Mean value	0.21	0.07
Mean value (Parties right of the mean)	0.27	0.02
Mean value (Parties left of the mean)	0.20	0.07
Difference between left and right camp's mean	0.08	0.47
Maximum difference between two score neighbors	-0.09	0.44
Difference between left and right camp's mean (standardized)	0.08	0.47
Maximum difference between two score neighbors (standardized)	-0.23	0.04

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-30 – ECO ~ Election year

	cor	p-value
Mean value	-0.63	0.00
Mean value (Parties right of the mean)	-0.53	0.00
Mean value (Parties left of the mean)	-0.57	0.00
Difference between left and right camp's mean	-0.05	0.64
Maximum difference between two score neighbors	-0.16	0.16
Difference between left and right camp's mean (standardized)	0.08	0.50
Maximum difference between two score neighbors (standardized)	-0.20	0.07


Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-31 – POSTM ~ Election year

	cor	p-value
Mean value	0.15	0.19
Mean value (Parties right of the mean)	0.21	0.06
Mean value (Parties left of the mean)	0.10	0.36
Difference between left and right camp's mean	0.15	0.18
Maximum difference between two score neighbors	0.06	0.60
Difference between left and right camp's mean (standardized)	0.06	0.57
Maximum difference between two score neighbors (standardized)	-0.08	0.49


Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-111 – RILE: Mean ~ year




Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-112 – CUL: Mean ~ year



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Fig. A-113 – ECO: Mean ~ year



Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-32 – RILE: Mean value ~ election year

country	cor	p-value	n
Sweden	-0.86	0.01	8
Denmark	-0.59	0.12	8
Finland	-0.76	0.03	8
Netherlands	0.44	0.28	8
France	-0.56	0.25	6
Italy	-0.79	0.02	8
Germany	0.06	0.90	8
Austria	-0.54	0.13	9
Switzerland	-0.63	0.10	8
United Kingdom	-0.58	0.13	8

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-33 – RILE: Mean of values right of the mean ~ election year

country	cor	p-value	n
Sweden	-0.95	0.00	8
Denmark	-0.35	0.40	8
Finland	-0.62	0.10	8
Netherlands	0.43	0.29	8
France	-0.66	0.15	6
Italy	-0.68	0.07	8
Germany	0.09	0.84	8
Austria	-0.53	0.14	9
Switzerland	-0.61	0.11	8
United Kingdom	-0.58	0.13	8

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-34 – RILE: Mean of values left of the mean ~ election year

country	cor	p-value	n
Sweden	-0.41	0.31	8
Denmark	-0.70	0.05	8
Finland	-0.60	0.11	8
Netherlands	0.35	0.40	8
France	-0.01	0.99	6
Italy	-0.74	0.04	8
Germany	-0.02	0.96	8
Austria	-0.59	0.10	9
Switzerland	-0.64	0.09	8
United Kingdom	-0.39	0.34	8

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-35 – RILE: MSP ~ election year

country	cor	p-value	n
Sweden	-0.79	0.02	8
Denmark	0.38	0.35	8
Finland	-0.43	0.29	8
Netherlands	0.22	0.60	8
France	-0.88	0.02	6
Italy	-0.22	0.60	8
Germany	0.18	0.66	8
Austria	-0.35	0.36	9
Switzerland	-0.42	0.30	8
United Kingdom	-0.01	0.97	8

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-36 – RILE: MD ~ election year

country	cor	p-value	n
Sweden	-0.64	0.09	8
Denmark	0.10	0.82	8
Finland	-0.66	0.08	8
Netherlands	-0.15	0.72	8
France	-0.71	0.11	6
Italy	-0.12	0.78	8
Germany	0.10	0.82	8
Austria	-0.05	0.91	9
Switzerland	-0.10	0.82	8
United Kingdom	-0.30	0.48	8

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-37 – RILE: MSP (stand.) ~ election year

country	cor	p-value	n
Sweden	-0.28	0.50	8
Denmark	-0.09	0.84	8
Finland	-0.30	0.47	8
Netherlands	0.05	0.91	8
France	0.18	0.74	6
Italy	-0.02	0.97	8
Germany	0.30	0.47	8
Austria	-0.33	0.39	9
Switzerland	-0.60	0.12	8
United Kingdom	0.28	0.50	8

Source: MARPOR 2020a

Tab. A-38 – RILE: MD (stand.) ~ election year

country	cor	p-value	n
Sweden	-0.03	0.94	8
Denmark	-0.15	0.72	8
Finland	-0.72	0.05	8
Netherlands	-0.18	0.67	8
France	-0.61	0.20	6
Italy	-0.10	0.81	8
Germany	-0.03	0.94	8
Austria	0.36	0.34	9
Switzerland	-0.01	0.99	8
United Kingdom	-0.50	0.20	8

Source: MARPOR 2020a