

Kari Möttölä

From Aspiration to Consummation and Transition: Finnish Neutrality as Strategy in the Cold War

Introduction: a changing milieu driving and retrenching a policy of neutrality

Pursuing a policy of neutrality was a key element of Finland's national security strategy throughout the Cold War years, but its form and substance as well as, consequently, significance varied in the construction and implementation of the comprehensive line of foreign policy. Within the trajectory of external and domestic milieu change, the role and policy of the Soviet Union as a privileged great-power neighbor capable of shaping the bipolar structural confrontation constituted a key factor, underpinning the conduct of an eastern policy as a parallel strategic element juxtaposed with the driving of the neutrality policy.

While the time-span of the article covers the Cold War as a whole, a special focus is placed on the period around the protracted ending of the era leading to an emerging new order, on which a renewed debate has been stirred by new primary and secondary source material. The perspective signifies a paradoxical, if not ironical, turn of events. Having reached the long-sought status of neutrality recognized universally, including by the Soviet Union (in 1989), within a couple of years (by 1992) Finland had concluded a basic strategic transition. Fundamental aspects of the neutrality and eastern policies were replaced with political commitment to, and structural engagement within, the west, spearheaded by the search for accession to the European Community/Union in what was perceived as a new European and world order.

Although the reassessment left remnants of neutrality intact, as Finland did not join a western or any other military alliance, which would determine its status in case of war, the swift turn embraced the country's security strategy, foreign policy, national identification and international alignment – all issue-areas where its cold-war neutrality had served as a key qualification.

At the same time, the fate of neutrality verified the historically and geopolitically driven pattern of Finnish strategic thought and action; a successful policy was replaced as new possibilities were opened in the environment. As neutrality as an aspiration had become consumed, the actor was ready to move on to further transition with adjustment to a new regional and global setting.

Nordic heritage as a democratic society, which helped to establish a bridgehead to the wider western community during the Cold War, became operational for growing cooperation among the like-minded five as a complement to Finland's European orientation.

On the other hand, the ambiguity of events, the vagueness of decisions and the incompleteness of actions in the European security order, as the policy-making environment around the closing of the Cold War, make the transition phase particularly interesting and revealing for a country located at the geopolitical fault-line. Although Finland's agency grew stronger in step with the relaxation of East-West tension, its action remained subject to the inherently limited maneuverability of a small state, a condition emphasized by the particular geopolitical position.

The complexity or indeterminacy of the concept of neutrality did not help Finland's planning or decision-making, as its capability for intelligence and foresight was challenged if not proved fallible in the fog of rapidly moving events towards the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, resort to unilateralism, even risk-taking, emerged as a pattern in what was viewed as an actionable situation.

In the end, the impact on Finnish policy from changes in the role and policy of the Soviet Union and a new Russia became a variable in the change of the great-power order. In hindsight, it is intriguing to ask whether it brought a sustainable change for Finland's structural position.

Applying policy analysis, and based primarily on secondary sources, the article concerns the Soviet/Russian factor in the emergence and application of neutrality in Finnish foreign policy during and at the end of the Cold War. The core research question stands how, in the practice

of Finnish foreign policy, neutrality as status and policy was calibrated with the eastern policy as response to the Soviet/Russian use of hard and soft power towards Finland and its strategic environment.¹

I Strategy and doctrine as elusive concepts: the significance of the Nordic tradition

Strategy as survival and statecraft

While high in the hierarchy of social concepts, dealing with normative and survivalist themes, *strategy* is at the same time an operationally diffuse term determined by, and expressive of, power in international politics. Great powers, capable of shaping international order, will conduct *grand strategy*, while smaller states would be pursuing *security strategy* to negotiate challenges in the external milieu at hand.

While it is dealing with the ideationally and politically calculated relationship of means to significant or vital ends, some analysts see strategy predominantly as the practice of statecraft. Rather than focusing on the substance of the end-state, they measure strategy as the art of creating power with the purpose of getting more security out of the next intermediate situation than the starting balance of power would suggest.²

Although with limited structural power, not only due to a defeat in war but as a small state largely on its own, Finland did not start in 1944-45 from 'a year null', having survived as a functioning society and a constitutional democracy capable of making sovereign decisions on its future course. Strategy as statecraft, allowing for accommodation and practicality, was a natural approach for a country, which saw ahead a narrow road marked by great-power dictates and power plays.

As for the asymmetric bilateral relationship with the eastern great-power neighbor, Finland could take lessons from a long and painful but at times successful experience of living together with the empire in its various historical forms, including being annexed as an autonomous part, and not only the recent confrontation. At the same time, the margin of error was narrow, as Finland was faced with a great power for which strategy contained above all concern about military and territorial security. A relatively small issues could turn into sensitive challenges or serious threats to its status as a great power and leader of an ideological bloc.

Nordic co-operation as a sub-region

Both in policy and of scholarship, the Finnish model was derivative of the particular Nordic approach to international security. Being faced with a common geopolitical region, and drawing from a common societal and cultural heritage, the Nordic countries mixed ideational affinity with foreign policy co-operation supplanting the divides of Cold War alignments. With Denmark, Norway and Iceland having joined NATO as founding members with national limitations and Sweden and Finland having chosen the path of neutrality of varied versions, the Nordic sub-region aspired to a privileged status of low tension through strategies of caution and stability.

It is indicative of the appreciation of common geopolitical destiny that an identical concept of security policy (*säkerhetspolitik*) commanded a central place and acquired an indigenous content in joint Nordic discourses. Hence, the importance of the Nordic background for understanding how strategy and doctrine molded Finnish foreign policy planning and practice. The Nordic connection not only served regional policy making of security interest, but it also offered a conduit for inserting the Finnish shape of neutrality into the western strategic realm as a rational and prudent component in a sub-regional security order variably named 'Nordic pattern' or - most famously albeit controversially - 'Nordic balance'.³

There was an underlying confidence in the Nordic pattern of distinct identity and geopolitical sustainability as a region of conflict prevention in the wider European security order. In an indirect response, the Soviet attitude towards a peaceful *Norden* and its components was by and

large *status quo*-oriented rather than revisionist – at least as long as the Nordics facilitated predictability and stability in their mutual co-operation and external orientation. A peculiar Nordic-Russian discursive exchange of deterrence and cooperation emerged.

While absorbing the presumed stability of its immediate environment as added value, Finland never took Nordic responsiveness as a substitute security guarantee in the political-military sense. In fact, Finland was wary of interpretations which foresaw a Nordic balance producing an automatic redress of any change in its components, which would limit the sovereign choice of states involved. The inter-governmental Nordic Council, where Finland became a member in 1955, did not even discuss or deal with security-policy issues in the early Cold War years.

Whatever deterrence value the Nordic mix of alignment and neutrality might have had, the Soviet Union kept its Nordic neighbors alert by taking initiatives which tested their security and defense policy fundamentals; such as Finland's scope of military cooperation with its treaty partner and Norway's and Denmark's adherence to NATO's nuclear strategy. The Soviet moves – more blatant in the early decades of the Cold War – turned out to reflect variation in the great-power political atmosphere rather than to present serious attempts towards creating new reality on the ground.⁴

Neutrality and security with a Nordic linkage

In the Nordic tradition, *doctrine* as a means-end or input-output construct is a mid-range concept focusing on foreign policy as a course of action in using social and material tools and resources to achieve declared or undeclared objectives, which are determined and designed by the strategic calculus based on value-based normative and experience-based empirical guidelines. The strategic part of doctrine provides instrumental values and sustaining objectives determining policy positions. The argumentative part reflects the fundamental values and goals, which are derived from and driven by the perception the country entertains on the mechanism and functioning of the world order, in particular the behavior of great powers and international organizations. The capability for implementation is derived from hard and soft power resources allocated for situational and long-term strategic purposes.⁵

A programmatic guide for positions and actions to be taken, but also a yardstick of conduct expected from the state, doctrine as a course of action serves as an instrument for shaping the perceptions of foreign (and domestic) monitors and peers. A state claiming to follow the path of neutrality is judged by a particular set of rules of behavior based on international law and politics as declared by the state itself, other neutrals or by the world community.

Although Finland as an entity had spent centuries under Swedish and Russian rules, and enjoyed independence merely since 1917, the Finnish leaders could refer to a historical and geopolitical notion of neutrality embraced in multilateralism in charting a way for a new foreign policy line for the country in the post-war order. Finland had been an active member of the League of Nations, albeit the results were mixed: the settlement of the Finnish-Swedish dispute recognizing Finland's sovereignty over the Åland Islands with autonomy in 1921 was among the first and few successful motions of the collective security organization, whereas sanctioning the Soviet Union for its aggression against Finland 1939 was one of its last actions.

Joint Nordic neutrality pronounced 1939 by the five countries turned out to be a desperate last-minute gesture rather than a working guarantee, as only Sweden was saved from being drawn militarily into the war. Although, after an aborted post-war attempt at a Nordic defense union (without Finland), the region became a mix of alliance, neutrality and a sphere of influence, Nordicity did not disappear from the realm of security policy among the five countries with their common cultural, societal and rule of law heritage.

While embarking on a trajectory of highly-ranked progress in societal, technological, economic and welfare domains – sometimes seen as an ideological 'third way' of market economies -, the Nordic countries followed a habit of mutual responsiveness regarding their common security

environment and generated regular co-operation and coordination in non-defense issues such as UN affairs and development, accumulating soft power as exemplary citizens of the world.

Another Nordic legacy innovation of relevance for security and defense policy is the model of *total defense (totalförsvaret)*, whereby economic, cultural, communicative and psychological resources are harnessed to underpin diplomatic and military efforts in protecting the society and citizens in the event of emergencies, not only (but ultimately including) war. Developed in the post-Cold War era as a policy for *societal security*, most recently renamed *comprehensive security*, overall resilience is stressed both as a form of governance and a platform for empowerment. In pursuance of a sustaining but developing philosophy, public-private coordination and non-military capabilities as modes of small-state power have been generated to underpin a Finnish defense strategy of denial as a precondition for what in practice if not in letter served armed neutrality in the cold war and a militarily non-allied strategy within the EU membership.⁶

Of particular relevance for building and updating the ideational basis for neutrality, is the educational activity targeting elite and public opinions originally called *spiritual national defense*, pursued also in Sweden. As a similar indigenous activity in Switzerland and Austria, *geistige Landesverteidigung* served as a model for Finland. Not only pursued as a contributing factor to territorial national defense, it has served to protect the sanctity of neutrality viewed as part of national identity, albeit that aspect was of less central and operational in the Finnish case.

The spiritual or societal construction of neutrality became a tool in the ideological Cold War, as neutral countries were pressured not only from the east but also from the west where the compatibility of neutrality with democracy was questioned. While scholarly and epistemic western contacts were instrumental in the launch of spiritual national defense as a way to progressive societal cohesion in Finland as well, including integrating the Communists into the parliamentary life, it was more than in the neutral peers promoted as a tool for securing a common ‘will to fight for the country’ in military defense based on universal conscription.⁷

As a whole, as the Finnish foreign and security policy embraced a two-track pattern, signified and materialized by the eastern and neutrality policies, it is of high but often ignored importance to understand the contextual relevance of the Nordic affinity and legacy in all its aspects for Finland’s performance in the Cold War.

II The Soviet factor in the *Yalta plus* order: the juxtaposition of eastern policy and neutrality

In a paradigm shift, as a result of its defeat in the war, “to find a solution to” the bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union became “dominant in Finland’s foreign policy” and vital to the survival of the nation.⁸ In the follow up to the Yalta order, Finland started its cold-war trek as a Nordic democracy with indigenous juridical, societal and cultural features largely intact - with the addition of the legalized communists in the parliamentary political life. As a cautious path, the neutrality aspiration was facilitated by the Nordic connection to western relations and multilateral roles.

In tracking and explaining the combination of Nordicity, eastern policy and neutrality as an ideational and practical doctrine of foreign policy, the concept of *instrumental objective* helps to identify and analyze policies employed as intermediate steps towards reaching or securing fundamental goals, in a progressive pattern, many of which such as sovereignty, independence or democracy typically are immutable. Throughout the Cold War, the Finnish doctrine of foreign policy contained two main sets of objectives pursued in the frameworks of *an eastern policy* and *a policy of neutrality*, respectively. Defense policy constituted a perennial component with particular applications in consideration of both eastern and neutrality policies.

In the primary area of eastern policy, a consistent challenge was to maintain mutual trust with the Soviet Union on common understanding of the *modus vivendi* as designed bilaterally in the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA, 1948) framed by the great-power arrangements outlined in the closing phases of the war and formalized in the Paris Peace Treaty (1947). Since the onset of the Cold War, it became an underlying task for Finnish foreign policy to

manage pressure from the eastern great-power neighbor towards any security-policy collaboration or politico-military integration which would have violated norms of sovereignty or crossed limits of an acceptable neutrality.

In the complementary field of neutrality policy, however strong suspicions and doubts existed in western government chambers and punditry, the assumption called for keeping Finland sufficiently outside of entanglement in great-power conflicts of interest to be able to conduct an autonomous and active foreign policy. The objective was not only to follow the custom of the neutrality sect as such but to create an enlarging space for Finland as a credible actor. Although Finnish neutrality was contested and questioned, it was of vital significance for the country's ability to secure its interests within the western community of states and organizations, in particular in trade but also in security benefits and responsibilities accrued to members of the sphere of common values, while remaining non-allied politically and militarily.

What made the Finnish doctrine complex and unique was the effect of the juxtaposing, balancing and coordinating of the two parallel policies on their successful implementation and for the security and defense policy as a whole.

Among the most sensitive and potentially most fateful issues was Finland's commitment in the politico-military field. The Finnish solution of territorial defense driven by universal conscription with the purpose of generating a mobilization-based force capable of protecting the entire area of the country signified a scenario of armed neutrality befitting a country pursuing a peer-recognized policy of neutrality. At the same time, the ('positive') security guarantees in the Finnish-Soviet FCMA Treaty included the possibility of defense co-operation embracing Finnish territory in military crisis threatening Finland or Soviet territory in aggression through Finland. Such a hybrid defense arrangement brought political and legal tension into the Finnish doctrine, with the potential for damaging the international acceptability and credibility of neutrality. At the same time, there was domestic argumentation and Soviet pressure to ascertain the will and capability to fulfill the obligations of the bilateral treaty.

While Finnish foreign policy makers at large trusted in, and sought to reconfirm, the compatibility between the prioritized eastern policy as framed by the FCMA treaty and the aspired neutrality policy as pursued in regional and multilateral contexts, the attitudes of their Soviet counterparts as well as other makers and shapers of Soviet policy remained frustratingly ambiguous or vacillating.

As it turned out, the space and role allotted to Finnish neutrality in bilateral relations and international affairs in Soviet discourses followed the variations in tension flowing from the Cold War politics of power and in ideological or political stability inside the Soviet camp. A period of thaw favored a more permissive conception of the Finnish policy of neutrality including its added value as an example in wider international relations; whereas a period of tension called for a more restricted interpretation to serve – or prevent harm to – Soviet national and bloc interests.

The Finnish pattern of response sought to take advantage of Soviet flexibility as if to place a deposit to the capital of mutual confidence, as a potential Soviet recognition of the Finnish understanding of its international position. In case of intransigence or regression in Soviet assertions, Finnish players moved to disregard a damaging interpretation, reformulate a viewpoint or nail down a stand of no retreat. At times the Finnish-Soviet argumentation on phrases and formulations resembled a shadow boxing the significance of which remained indeterminate.

The closest situation, where the compatibility between the eastern and neutrality policy doctrines would have been openly broken, was the 1961 'note crisis' when the Kremlin called for political negotiations drawn from the stipulations of the FCMA treaty on steps, which presumably could have led to military collaboration, to rebut what was called West German and NATO's threatening moves in the Baltic Sea region. In meeting with N.S. Khrushchev, President Urho Kekkonen succeeded in thwarting the suggested military consultations (formally suspended but never to be raised again), while committing Finland to observe closely security developments in Northern

Europe. While a watchdog role could be seen as a concession to the Soviets concerns, it served as justification for what would be pursued as an active and peaceful policy of neutrality and buttressed by a surge of procurement modernizing Finnish defense.⁹

The note crisis took place in a precarious phase of the Cold War, around the Berlin crisis of 1961. As a result of the political shock, the active Finnish security policy followed the dual purpose of reassuring the Soviet Union of its treaty partner's reliability and disengaging the northern region from East-West tension, which, consequently, would help to prevent situations from arising where the issue of military consultations with the Soviets could be introduced. The proposal for a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone (1963) was the most prominent of Finland's initiatives in the context of regional security policy.¹⁰

Another incident with potentially disastrous consequences for the image of Finnish armed neutrality was the alleged proposal in 1978 by Soviet defense minister D. Ustinov on joint Finnish-Soviet military exercises in peacetime. While denying that such a proposal had been made, the Finnish government took the chance of redrawing a red line between what is mutually agreed in the FCMA treaty and what would be incompatible with Finland's international status. The Ustinov proposal is reported to have taken place – and thwarted – informally (in sauna) during the official visit to Helsinki.

The Ustinov case occurred during the emerging phases of the 'new' Cold War, but it was also a sensitive period domestically in Finland. Throughout the 1970s, in the context of three consecutive parliamentary defense committees assigned to prepare white books (issued 1971, 1976, and 1981) on security and defense policy, a heated debate had arisen on the security and defense obligations of the FCMA treaty and the way of keeping Finland outside military conflicts or surviving in serious crises.

A mainstream agreement across the political spectrum – as registered in the white books - confirmed the original understanding of the letter of the FCMA treaty, whereby the articles on military cooperation could be implemented if an attack (by Germany with its allies) has occurred against Finland or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory or if such a threat is mutually established. At the same time, as a difference with a military alliance, it reminded of Finland's primary responsibility for the defense of its territory. In case of a proven inadequacy of the Finnish capability to repel an attack, Soviet military assistance would not be automatic, and would be based on mutual agreement and confined to Finnish territory. In addition, the level of the strength of defense forces remained the sovereign decision of Finland.¹¹

An expert debate of greater sophistication – combining theory and speculation - juxtaposed two schools of thought with differing judgement on the best way to strengthening Finnish security in view of serious or existential threats. Having in mind the Soviet Union as a 'crypto enemy' most likely to draw Finland into war – although a western initiative would not be excluded -, the analyses had to address the Russian/Soviet traditional strategy of offensive defense. Consequently, there was distrust that the Soviet side would not follow the letter of mutual consent in the treaty but move unilaterally when it felt threatened.

One group consisting predominantly of scholars and political activists prioritized the need for reassurance and crisis management; the Soviet side must not be allowed to doubt Finland's readiness to comply by the FCMA treaty clauses in full – the core rule being not to let Finnish territory to be used for militarily threatening the Soviet Union - as the way of thwarting Soviet unilateral moves. An added value was to be gained by an active policy of peace- and stability-promoting initiatives. Another group consisting mainly of government officials and their partners in foreign affairs and defense establishments placed the emphasis on the credibility of neutrality and the deterrent value of national defense. Finland should follow the pattern and logic of armed neutrality in all directions and avoid speculation on military cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Technically, the dispute concerned the grey area between an attack and a threat of an attack; whether military cooperation could take place only when an attack has taken place. While

treaty committed the parties to confer when the threat of an attack is mutually recognized, the parliamentary consensus formulation noted that military-policy clauses can be applied in such a case but does not concretely identify the kind of means - possibly beyond military consultations - could be undertaken. Politically, the dispute concerned the hierarchy placing eastern policy and neutrality. While the confidence school accused the opponents of adventurism, the neutrality school blamed the opponents for subordinating Finnish neutrality through the FCMA treaty to Soviet security interests. While the moment of truth never came, and the treaty belongs to history, the debate on a correct and legitimate course has continued to the day in commentaries and interpretations presented in histories, memoirs and biographies.¹²

As a 'track-two' Soviet commentary, 1957, an edited volume by Soviet experts on international law professed to characterize the FCMA treaty as an agreement on guaranteeing Finnish neutrality rather than one on mutual (military) assistance and to suggest that it could be used in defining the position of neutral states in the European system of collective security. Beyond the situation concerning aggression prescribed in the FCMA treaty, Finland is only obligated not to get involved in alliances directed against the Soviet Union, in other words observe neutrality. The determination of the treatise from Moscow was widely referred to by Finnish actors, including foreign ministers, scholars and commentators, from the late 1950s to the 1960s, as a proof of Soviet acceptance of Finnish neutrality as generally understood in provisions of international law.¹³

The volume came out during the thaw of 'Geneva spirit' initiated by Khrushchev when the Kremlin looked favorably on neutrality and non-alignment in the context of peaceful coexistence. His regime was engaged in a series of political breakthroughs: reconciliation with Yugoslavia, the end of the occupation of Austria and the return to Finnish sovereign control of the Porkkala area leased to the Soviet Union as a naval base in the peace treaty. The combination of events in 1955 included the prolongation of the FCMA treaty and the Finnish membership of the United Nations.

Notwithstanding whether all Soviet experts should be taken as messengers of the official line, it turned out soon enough that commentaries - even when published in prestigious fora - would become missteps with a new situation framing Soviet interests.

The winds of change became evident in joint communiqués issued on the occasion of high-level visits and in the critique against Finnish comments which relied on argumentation from the said Soviet legal experts. Whereas joint communiqués until 1970 had referred to Finland's 'established peaceful policy of neutrality', in 1971 the eastern partner pushed through a new phrasing, which quoted Finland's 'aspiration to pursue a peaceful policy of neutrality' as part of the basic direction of foreign policy embracing a priority status for the relations with the Soviet Union based on the FCMA treaty.

Soon a book under pseudonyms known to be privy to the official policy continued the discursive backlash by rebutting the interpretations drawn from the 1950s legal experts as false. In a restrictive language, the FCMA treaty was characterized as 'a treaty on military cooperation' and to be implemented as a totality. Finland's aspiration to remain outside conflicts of interests of great powers is to be subordinated to its obligations under the military clauses of the treaty concerning threats of aggression against Finland and its eastern neighbor.¹⁴

The 'Bartenyev-Komissarov debate' was waged in the 1970s when the aftermath of the Prague crisis of 1968 had tightened the Soviet grip over its socialist allies. A particular spill-over on Finland was a transient public discussion on the effect of the 'Finnish example' encouraging mavericks or dissidents among Eastern European governments and civic societies. As the Finnish take-on stressed the differences between the FCMA treaty and the Soviet-Eastern European bilateral defense treaties, the Finnish leadership disclaimed any interest in such an ambition and saw the linkage as harmful.

In the end, the military clauses of the FCMA treaty turned out to have a political and preventive role, as they never came to be tested in a real situation. The scenarios in official reports did not include Finland as a separate or main target of aggression in European conflict, which would

leave a role for a credible Finnish indigenous defense as a factor in a militarized crisis. The key puzzle in the tug of war in communiqués and commentaries concerned the compatibility of the military clauses with neutrality in case of a major war involving the Soviet Union. While the Finnish view envisaged Finland pursuing neutrality as long as military actions would not touch Finnish territory, the Soviet view seemed to argue that such military events could not take place without affecting Finnish territory opening wide the option of military consultations leading to joint actions. The space and role for Finnish neutrality was starkly different in the two argumentations.

III Opening space in the *Paris order*: Finnish neutrality consumed at the ending of the Cold War

An expanding policy of neutrality

The cumulative and expansive implementation of neutrality policy was aimed to strengthening Finland's international position, normalizing its western profile and winning wider international recognition of its status. All objectives would serve as building blocks of effective sovereignty and self-determination of Finland as an actor. With political achievements and diplomatic victories – mainly in the form of mediation or good offices and high positions in international organizations – resulting in growing visibility, Finland would accumulate political capital to be consumed in difficult situations, in particular with the Soviet Union watching and monitoring Finnish behavior.¹⁵

There was wide understanding among the Finnish elites in the early and mid-Cold War periods that security had a distinctly geopolitical meaning. Finland had to work to preserve and enhance an external and internal autonomy of action. While strategic thinking could be characterized as expressing 'national realism', in the later Cold War period openings emerged for pursuing 'liberal' or normative objectives by an active and peace-promoting neutrality policy. While the Soviet Union remained a key cause for national realism, the European and global security community was targeted in the value-driven thinking.

The conclusion from the immediate post-war imbroglio was retrenchment from engagement in international politics. The Geneva thaw, when Finland was admitted to the world organization in 1955, led to reassessment. Although the UN system of collective security embraced the option of binding decisions on members, the right to veto at the Security Council would make clear that Finland would not be obligated to join an armed action against one of the great powers.

Pursuing its mode of neutrality, Finland was able to take a decision to abstain in the non-binding General Assembly resolutions on the 1956 Hungarian, 1968 Czechoslovak and also 1979 Afghanistan conflicts when the Soviet Union was pushed against the wall for its violation of the UN Charter. While the Finnish public opinion expressed sympathy towards the victims, in the Hungarian case with humanitarian assistance and in the Prague case taking to the streets in political protest, the most difficult case for the Finnish government in its realism-driven application of neutrality was the Afghan situation. Not only had the western powers less understanding for the Finnish position of non-condemnation of the Soviet aggression but a potentially harmful discussion arose on any parallelism between the Soviet action as 'assistance' to the Afghan regime in observance of a mutual defense treaty and the treaty option of Soviet assistance in defense of Finnish territory.

According to a succinct categorization, Finland pursued a policy of continuous and conventional neutrality, without anchoring the legitimacy of its status in international law, but resorting to flexibility and adaptability as intrinsic features of its line of neutrality.¹⁶ As a result, when faced with strategic choices at the unraveling of the Cold War order and the subsequent period of transition to a new political era (ca 1989-1992), Finland could apply a policy of neutrality apt to undergoing and absorbing changes in substance and milieu. Adaptation, taking the form of both positive and negative acquiescence, became a working tool, as milieu transformation offered increasing opportunities for an active and goal-seeking neutrality policy.¹⁷

Neutrality was contributing to systemic transformation as a result of the enhanced acceptability and respectability the four established neutral states as a group (N+N) had gained in the East-West order from the 1970s and towards the end of the 1980s. The main driver was their instrumental role in the framework of the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Politically and doctrinally as important was Finland's smooth membership, as a natural and equal participant, in the N+N group with the other three countries carrying stronger credentials: the permanent neutrality under international law in the case of Switzerland and Austria and the long and successful history of continuous neutrality and peace in the case of Sweden.

Finland's efforts to consolidate its neutrality status through mediation, analytical expertise and other 'good services' had started in UN peacekeeping and multilateral arms control. Hosting the Helsinki 1975 summit (and the preparatory and first stages of the conference) was duly appropriated in policy declarations as a historical achievement. It was Finland's original action to take the initiative for the process by picking a Soviet suggestion and turning it into a form acceptable to all countries responsible for security in Europe and its proficiency in leading unofficial bilateral and multilateral exploratory talks that constituted a breakthrough in Finland's diplomatic standing as a neutral player. Consulting with all the relevant countries on a vital security issue was a unique opportunity to market Finland's neutrality policy, and to have the patience and discipline of an impartial instrumental role with the aim of getting everybody onboard cemented the added value to the functionality and credibility of the Finnish policy.¹⁸

What followed upon the peaking of the prestige of neutrality in the European order, transition to the 'Paris order' where the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of democracy and market were put into practice as guided and governed by the Charter of Paris (1990), binding on all participating states under their common and co-operative security regime, led to a rapid loss of its instrumental relevance as a system-serving force. While the four neutrals ran the preparatory working groups, France took over as host in finalizing the outcome. Later on in the 1990s, as the CSCE was transformed into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the corresponding diplomatic tasks were to be handled by the host countries as well as the chairmanship states.

The Gorbachev phenomenon: 'new thinking' embracing Finland

While the inauguration of the *Helsinki order* offered a multilateral framework for pursuing and strengthening neutrality policy, bilaterally Finland had to continue trotting the rough terrain originated in the *Yalta order*. As the only among the defeated co-belligerent with Germany party to the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, Finland had implemented the obligation to recognize the legitimate security interests of, and ensure friendly relations with, the Soviet Union as dictated in the great-power arrangement at Yalta, with all its consequences for the aspiration of a policy of neutrality.¹⁹

Although the Finnish government did not place undue faith in the right-to-neutrality clause in the Decalogue of the Final Act having bilateral significance, one of the most aggressive Soviet moves to limit or undermine Finnish neutrality, the Ustinov proposal of 1978 for joint military exercises took place after the Helsinki summit, albeit in the 'second Cold War'.

There were softer and harder pushes by Soviet military over the years for deepening military co-operation beyond reciprocal military-to-military visits for the exchange of professional information and a few Finnish students attending the Soviet Frunze military academy. They led nowhere due to Finnish evasive or polite rebuttals. Even though the Ustinov initiative was taken seriously at the time, it has been questioned whether it was an individual or lower-level attempt rather than a power-play directed from and sanctioned by the leadership in the Kremlin.²⁰

It was not until Mikhail Gorbachev during his first visit to Helsinki in 1989 recognized Finland in the joint declaration as 'a neutral Nordic country' that the ghost of arbitrary and damaging Soviet political maneuvers questioning Finnish sovereignty and neutrality was removed. There were several bearings and consequences at play.

The formulation originated from the Kremlin as an unexpected move and welcomed by the Finnish side which had set the aim at avoiding the cumbersome joint description of the Finnish line used since 1971 and lastly 1987 without thinking as achievable its replacement with an unequivocal recognition of neutrality. As for the Gorbachev formula, the core value for Finland was not only the content but also the method. Finland was the subject in the determination of her own line of foreign policy instead of an object of one jointly drafted and agreed with the Soviets, who in a corresponding manner introduced their own line in the Helsinki declaration.

Consequently, the pronouncement meant that Finnish neutrality - as a status as well as strives of policy - was compatible with the purpose of the FCMA treaty. In line with the traditional understanding of neutrality Finland was entitled to neutrality in war among outside parties, making it possible to remain neutral in a great-power conflict involving the Soviet Union.²¹

Characteristic of the pattern and substance of the leadership by President Mauno Koivisto, the Finnish government did not rush to overly emphasizing the significance of the neutrality recognition. Koivisto's tactical and also strategic directive throughout the transitional era was not to cause the Gorbachev leadership any undue harm, which might encourage the hardline or conservative opposition to push back and undermine his reforms or risk political and societal chaos in the Soviet Union.

It was also logical that Finland did not move to push a joint evaluation on the sustainability of the FCMA treaty, which was duly referred as a positive bilateral experience in the 1989 declaration. Throughout the Gorbachev years, the role of the FCMA treaty had in practice been downgraded both as a symbol of reference and a tool of political control in bilateral relations; it had become 'like a poster on the wall'.²² Moreover, while the bilateral situation seemed to be well under control, fluctuation and uncertainty in the wider international order helped to keep in mind the hard security core of the FCMA treaty: the vital importance for the nation's security of not causing any mistrust in the Kremlin towards Finland's pledge not to let its territory be used for aggression against the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, looking further into the future, the Soviet stress on the linkage between Finnish neutrality and the significance of neutrality at large in the new Europe did not go unnoticed or unanalyzed by the Finnish policy makers. Even if a Finnish membership in the evolving European community – not to speak of NATO – was not on the agenda in a serious way in the public discussion or behind the scenes, one should be careful lest neutrality as championed by the great-power neighbor become another tool to indirectly limit Finland's freedom of choice. Nor was there a time or need to make Finnish neutrality normatively or structurally dependent on the reshaping of the European security regime.

The long-aspired change happened in fundamentally changed circumstances internationally as well as inside the Kremlin. An irregularity – or, as it turned out to be, a discontinuity - in the Kremlin's customary policy towards the small northwestern neighbor, the initiative was not another bilateral power play but rather an embrace of the case of Finland within the policy of 'new thinking' Gorbachev had introduced as a vehicle for reshaping the global status of the reforming Soviet Union. Clearly, for a Soviet regime pursuing a new domestic and world order, the bilateral relations with Finland no more had the similar strategic significance or involved the same need for control over the small neighbor's domestic politics as during the era of East-West bipolarity proper.

Moreover, the Helsinki affair as well as the events a year later when Finland unilaterally removed the legal remnants from the Paris Peace Treaty and undue implications of the FCMA treaty limiting its sovereignty in security and defense policy, brought to the open the effect of the realignment and division of power inside the Kremlin ensued from transition to a centralized presidency working outside the CPCC apparatus and superseding the MID (albeit that in 1989 Gorbachev was still a General Secretary he had a circle of trusted advisers of his own).

In 1990, the Gorbachev power center was ready to ignore the efforts by the orthodox CPCC and MID officials to continue a tug of war with their Finnish counterparts on the relative

significance of the treaty obligations for Finland's neutrality aspirations as an indication of the neighbor's proper place in what was in practice a withdrawing Soviet zone of influence.

In the analysis of Gorbachev's Finnish dossier it should also be noted that in October 1989 Gorbachev had an agenda full of issues related to the disintegration of the eastern bloc leading to the fall of the Wall a month later, which further diminished Finland's significance as a foreign policy issue. By 1990 he had become under growing pressures by hardliners and conservatives who thought he was going too far and selling the country down the drain around the issue of German unification. The strained and aggravating situation was discernable for the Finnish negotiators in the 1989 and 1990 encounters.

Although the FCMA treaty obligation was a main reason why Finnish neutrality did not fit to the mainstream understanding of international law, Finland did not precipitously embark on amending or replacing the treaty even when the international atmosphere might have made such an initiative justifiable and feasible. In parallel with such growing issues as all-European security and Western European integration rising higher on the government and public agenda, the Finnish-Soviet treaty was left to lose its practical significance under the weight of international and domestic Soviet change.

As a subtle but tangible diminution of the special relationship based on the post-war treaty complex Finland took a unilateral action in 1990 to nullify the stipulations limiting Finnish sovereignty of the Paris Peace treaty (Part III, banning certain types of weaponry including materiel and civilian aircraft of German origin, atomic weapons, and also placing a maximum level for the strength Finnish peacetime defense forces). In the same wave, Finland declared as obsolete the references in the FCMA treaty to Germany as a potential attacker.

The push for amending the application of the Peace Treaty originated in 1989 from the defense ministry concerned about the hindrance or complication the provisions inflicted on the modernization and strengthening of the country's military by procurement in the global market where weapons systems or parts often included German technology. The problem was not new and some cases had been solved by agreement with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom as signatory powers before in the case of special missiles and mines.

While the immediate reason was practical, the issue of restricted Finnish sovereignty became part of the motivation package as the German question continued unravelling as an international dispute. Throughout the 'PAX project' the basic rule of conduct was unilateralism: Finland would not submit the envisaged steps under negotiation with the signatories albeit they would be informed prior to the official announcement, which took place (on 21 September 1990) upon the 2+4 agreements reached on German unification.

As the peace treaty part of the project managed by the MFA had progressed far, and as the 2+4 negotiations were leading to the return of full sovereignty of a unified Germany, it became apparent that Finland could not remain as the only world war two belligerent left with legal restrictions on its sovereignty. While Helsinki went on with the project without being certain how and when the German solution would materialize, the connection between German and Finnish sovereignties became apparent.

In the last moment, it became equally evident that the notion of Germany as a potential aggressor in the Finnish-Soviet treaty would become absurd after a united Germany – in an *Ersatz* peace treaty - had been recognized as a sovereign partner with the leading, former victorious powers, not to mention Germany's position as a key contributor to European détente and transition to a new era. Consequently, the Finnish government issued a parallel statement concerning the FCMA treaty and declaring the reference to Germany as inoperative in the new circumstances.

In both cases of 1989 and 1990, the Gorbachev leadership was contacted by the direct communication channel (the KGB resident/Gorbachev's advisor) between the Soviet leader and President Koivisto. In a more elaborate operation, President Koivisto notified about the PAX plan – and received an unrequested green light – in the context of the Gorbachev-Bush summit in Helsinki

in early September. The MID was informed in the preceding days, while the UK was informed only at the last moment. Echoing the ingrained pattern followed also in the Gorbachev visit 1989, the MID, disgruntled over the unilateral method, tried to conduct a post-mortem by suggesting a mutual note on the remaining restriction over the size of Finnish defense. A similar gesture was made by the UK resentful for Finnish unilateralism. The suggestions were effectively ignored or rejected by the Finnish side holding on to the stand on reclaimed full sovereignty over its defense and procurement policies and on the legitimacy of its unilateral act in adapting post-war issues to the emerging post-Cold War Europe.

In the updating of the eastern and neutrality policies, the moment to act became the aborted coup in Moscow in August 1991, whereupon Finland commenced two history-making processes of turning into a 'full-fledged' western European state by refining or replacing both of the two key policies with new instrumental goals.

Shortly after the *Putsch*, Koivisto had indicated through the confidential channel to Gorbachev a need for a new treaty. With the post-coup Soviet regime taking the initiative, negotiations were started in September concluded with initials in November with a Soviet team, although it was clear that the representatives of the Russian Federation sitting in sidelines were calling the shots. President Koivisto had met with the newly inaugurated Russian president Boris Yeltsin in June, when the future of the political structure of the eastern partner(s) remained unclear.

References to the Paris Peace treaty and the FCMA Treaty included in the initial MID draft as a sign of continuity were rejected by the Finnish side who emphasized the exercise as a new beginning in a new international situation. Pursuing a two-track approach, envisaging a two-level treaty structure, the Finnish side negotiated with Russia on separate agreements in the areas of economics and cooperation between adjacent regions. When the plan on signing the Finnish-Soviet treaty on 'good neighborliness and co-operation' fell down with the collapse of the Soviet Union in December, Finland and Russia completed in a rapid manner a corresponding political text with changed titles for what became a treaty on 'the basis of relations' signed in January 1992.²³

The new agreement was drafted in line with the *Paris order* defined in the Charter for a New Europe to be similar in content with those of allied and other western countries with the Soviet Union/Russia, especially the Soviet-German agreement of 1990. Most importantly, the agreement included no obligation for bilateral defense co-operation – only 'negative' non-use security assurance instead of any 'positive' guarantees - while including such themes of the new Europe as the protection of national minorities. The inviolability of borders was reconfirmed as a matter of principle and also to soothe the Russian side nervous about the public discussion in Finland about the status of ceded territories.²⁴

A twofold approach emerged in military security and defense affairs. On one hand, the dissolving Soviet Union and the emerging but weakened Russia was transferred as a security policy challenge from a primarily geopolitical problem to the agenda of risks to political, economic and societal stability. As a neighboring country, for a short period, a potential cross-border destabilization by uncontrolled migration or refugee flows was put on the agenda. At the same time, although military threats geopolitically seemed to have been removed, uncertainty regarding Russian troop movements in the connection of withdrawal from Germany and the Baltic states as well as the future of the Russian military defense establishment became causes for an active Finnish defense and military-to-military diplomacy towards the eastern neighbor.

The net impact on Finnish defense policy was a reconfirmed and crystallized doctrine of independent defense, free from the constraints of the FCMA treaty, based on universal conscription, mobilization-driven territorial defense of the whole country and military non-alliance. For a short period, when Finland was preparing for accession to the EU, the defense solution was defined as the remaining 'core' of neutrality, allowing for participation in deepening forms of multilateral peacekeeping and civilian-military crisis management, whereupon neutrality was discarded from the

foreign policy lexicon. In addition, the significance of Nordic cooperation was stressed as a reassuring identity factor in the transition phase from neutrality to a European choice.²⁵

In preparation for another clean slate, in leaving the Cold War behind, in the area of affiliation with western European economic and political integration, where the cold-war neutrals ended up dispersing widely, Finland seemed to go fastest and furthest in assessing and concluding the extent of incompatibility of neutrality with membership of the European Community/Union. In parallel with the negotiations with Russia, the government started substantive preparation of an application for accession to membership of the European Union emerging from the Maastricht summit. As a crucial point, in the note prepared for the Commission *avis*, Finland made no legal or de facto exception or reservation as regards the bilateral relationship with Russia or the practice of neutrality while confirming full commitment to the common foreign and security policy including the goal of common defense (albeit with the 'Irish reservation' concerning the non-NATO members) in the Maastricht treaty.²⁶

Afterthoughts

In hindsight, the transition phase ending the Cold War was not a particularly taxing time for Finland compared with the pressures experienced during the heyday of Soviet power in bipolarity. The timely and successful adaptation of the eastern and neutrality policies indicated and verified that the country joined the emergent new world order as a competent and capable sovereign actor.

Although Finland moved into the newly open and allowing environment with seeming smoothness and profitability, the breadth and rapidity of change tested the capability for anticipation, intelligence, information gathering, and planning in foreign policy. It was evident that Finland acted in many situations unaware of the extent or consequence of changes which ultimately affected her position, or where she was involved, as a neighbor of the Soviet Union and internationally.

The functioning of self-sufficiency testified to an enhanced agency in the Finnish performance. At the same time, as Finland was located at a geopolitical fault-line, legitimately depicted as a zone of influence, the structural factor driven by the ups and downs of Soviet power has to be systematically included in the assessment of the real extent and sustainability of the wider room of maneuver brought about by the skillful update of the Finnish foreign policy doctrine.

All the elements of the triangle served their roles in supplanting the structural constraints of the Cold War order. The neutrality policy acted as a conduit to a new choice in the basic orientation of foreign policy. The Nordic linkage was a stabilizing factor in softening the impact of change in identity called for in the European direction. The puzzlement of dealing with a weak Russia in transition was not to attract Finland to underestimating the significance of the eastern relationship, however normalized it may have become. Whether transposed in substance or geography, the possibility of a Russian-driven fault line was to remain in post-Cold War change.

¹ I have dealt with, and made assessments of, the Finnish experience from the Cold War in the following articles shortly after the end of the era, which are used here as a sounding board and source: Kari Möttölä, "Finland's Foreign Policy and Defense in a Changing East-West Security Environment," in Ciro Elliott Zoppo, ed., *Nordic Security at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 71-93; Kari Möttölä, "Neutrality as Strategy, 1945-1990: Success or Failure? The Case of Finland: Seeking Security in a Narrow Space" (1993) (*unpublished manuscript*); Kari Möttölä, "Puolueettomuudesta sitoutumiseen: Turvallisuuspoliittisen perusratkaisun muutos kylmästä sodasta Euroopan murrokseen," in Tuomas Forsberg and Tapani Vaahtoranta, eds., *Johdatus Suomen ulkopoliittikkaan: kylmästä sodasta uuteen maailmanjärjestykseen* (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 1993), pp. 62-135. ["From Neutrality to Commitment: Change in the Security Policy Solution from the Cold War to European Transformation" in *Introduction to Finnish Foreign Policy: From the Cold War to a New World Order*]. As an indication of the relative weight of Finland, albeit its unique geopolitical position, there is but one reference to Finland, dealing with the FCP, in a recent leading monograph on the ending of the Cold War. See Robert Service, *The End of the Cold War 1985-1991* (London: Macmillan, 2015).

² Jolyon Howorth, "The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Bargain?" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2010), pp. 455-474; Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

³ See Arne Olav Brundtland, "The Nordic Balance: Past and Present," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. I, No. 4 (June 1966), pp. 30-63; Erik Noreen, "The Nordic Balance: A Security Policy Concept in Theory and Practice," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (March 1983), pp. 43-56. On Sweden's secret military contacts and commitments during the Cold War, as a revelation to change evaluations on Nordic balance see Mikael Holmström, *Den dolda alliansen: Sveriges hemliga NATO-förbindelser* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2011).

⁴ Cf. special issues of the Nordic journal *Cooperation and Conflict* on the timely themes of security policy at decennial intervals: Vol. VII, No.3-4 (March 1972) 'Five Roads to Nordic Security'; Vol. XVII, No. 3/4 (November 1982) 'Nordic Security Today'; Vol. XXVII, No. 4 (December 1992) 'Peace Dividend'. The journal was published initially by Nordiska samarbetskommitten för internationell politik and later on by the Nordic International Studies Association, both important epistemic communities for Nordic scholars.

⁵ Leading and influential texts at the time, Katarina Brodin, *Finlands utrikespolitiska doktrin* (Stockholm: Läromedelsförlagen, 1971). [Finland's foreign policy doctrine]; Osmo Apunen, "Suomen ulkopoliittikan doktriini – toiminnallisia perspektiivejä," in Harto Hakovirta and Raimo Väyrynen, eds., *Suomen ulkopoliittikka* (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 1975). ["Finnish foreign policy doctrine – dynamic perspectives", in *Finnish foreign policy*].

⁶ For a recent report see Kari Möttölä, *Finland's Comprehensive Security: Challenges and Responses* (Helsinki: Network for European Studies, University of Helsinki, 2014).

⁷ Johanna Rainio-Niemi, *The Ideological Cold War. The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland* (New York-London: Routledge, 2014); on Finnish public opinion on the FCMA treaty over the Cold War years, see Unto Vesa, "Suomalaisten suhtautuminen yya:han," in Unto Vesa, *YYA: Aika ja sopimus* (Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskus, Tutkimuksia, No. 81., 1998), pp. 107-127. ["Finns' attitudes towards FCMA," in *FCMA: Time and Treaty*]; on Finns' practical views on history of the nation see Pilvi Torsti, *Suomalaiset ja historia* (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2012). [The Finns and History].

⁸ President J.K. Paasikivi, using a metaphor on climbing back from the deepest of gorges, in a speech on the independence day, in Helsinki 6 December 1944, Pekka Visuri, *Paasikiven Suomi suurvaltojen puristuksessa 1944-1947* (Jyväskylä: Docendo, 2015), p.120. [*Paasikivi's Finland squeezed by great powers 1944-1947*]

⁹ Raimo Väyrynen, *Conflicts in Finnish-Soviet relations* (Tampere: University of Tampere, 1972); Pekka Visuri, "Noottikriisi," in Tuomas Forsberg et al., eds., *Suomi ja kriisit. Vaaran vuosista terrori-iskuihin* (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2003), pp. 50-72. [*Finland and crises; from the years of danger to terrorist strikes*]

¹⁰ Although the Nordic NWF proposal was a non-starter for NATO and the West, a lively international think tank discussion emerged over the years, see Kari Möttölä, ed., *Nuclear Weapons and Northern Europe – Problems and Prospects of Arms Control* (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1983).

¹¹ Aimo Pajunen, "Finland's Security Policy in the 1970's: Background and Perspectives," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. VII, No. 3/4 (November 1972), 171-192; Kari Möttölä, "The Politics of Neutrality and Defence: Finnish Security Policy Since the Early 1970s," in *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. XVII, No. 3/4 (November 1982), pp. 287-313.

¹² The mainstream historiography has largely sided with the priority of neutrality and deterrence over reassurance and confidence, see Timo Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö. Ulkoasiainhallinto ja ulkopoliittikka Kekkonen kaudella. II Uudistumisen, ristiriitojen ja menestyksen vuodet 1970-1981* (Helsinki: Otava, 2008), pp. 49-53 [The President's ministry; foreign affairs administration and foreign policy during the Kekkonen period; II the years of reform, conflict and success 1970-1981]; Juhani Suomi, *Taistelu puolueettomuudesta* (Keuruu: Otava, 1996); Jukka Tarkka, *Karhun kainalossa. Suomen kylmä sota 1947-1990* (Keuruu: Otava, 2013). On recent return to the contest of narratives, see Osmo Apunen, "Vaikenemisen politiikkaa: Suomettumisen ja Matti Pulkkinen älymystökritiikki *Romaahenkilön kuolemassa*," *Kosmopolis*, Vol. 45, No. 4, (2015), pp. 40-56. ["The politics of silence: Finlandization and Matti

Pulkkinen's critique of intelligentsia in *The death of a novel figure*"]; Jaakko Blomberg, "Mistä uhka Suomen turvallisuudelle?" *Ydin*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2016): 56-59. ["Whence threat to Finnish security?"]; Paavo Lipponen, *Muistelmat 1* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2009) [*Memoirs I*]. On the evaluation of the FCMA treaty in hindsight, see Vesa, *YYA*.

¹³ Klaus Törnudd, "Kollektiivinen turvallisuus, puolueettomuus ja yya-sopimus," in Pertti Torstila et al., eds., *Suomen liikkumavara* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2011), pp. 45-57. ["Collective security, neutrality and the FCMA treaty" in *Finland's room for manoeuvre*].

¹⁴ T. Barten'ev and Ju. Komissarov, *Tridsat' let dobrososedstva. K istorii sovetsko-finlyandskikh otnoshenii* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1976); T. Bartenjev and J. Komissarov, *Kolmekymmentä vuotta hyvää naapuruutta* (Keuruu: Otava, 1977) [Thirty years of good neighbourliness]; Juri Komissarov, *Suomi löytää linjansa* (Keuruu: Otava, 1974) [Finland finds her line]; for the opening comment in the Finnish debate see Max Jakobson, in *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 29 August 1976 and in *Demari*, 15 September 1976.

¹⁵ Jan-Magnus Jansson, "An expanding foreign policy," in *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1975* (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1976).

¹⁶ Harto Hakovirta, *East-West Conflict and European Neutrality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).

¹⁷ On adaptation theories generically and in the Finnish case, see Hans Mouritzen, *Finlandization. Towards a General Theory of Adaptive Politics* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1988).

¹⁸ Markku Reimaa, *Helsinki Catch. European Security Accords 1975* (Helsinki: Edita, 2008).

¹⁹ Max Jakobson, *Finland in the New Europe* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).

²⁰ Pekka Visuri, "Yya-sopimus turvallisuuspoliittiselta näkökannalta," in Unto Vesa, *YYA: Aika ja sopimus* (Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskus, Tutkimuksia, No. 81., 1998), pp. 33-56 ["The FCMA treaty from the viewpoint of security policy" in *FCMA: time and treaty*].

²¹ Jaakko Blomberg, *Vakauden kaipuu. Kylmän sodan loppu ja Suomi* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2011). [Longing for stability; the end of the Cold War and Finland], pp. 129-136.

²² In the words of an insider in a critical oral history interview conducted 10 March 2016 in the framework of the research project *Reimagining Futures in the European North at the End of the Cold War* (The Academy of Finland). The article has benefitted also from an associated interview session conducted 22 October 2015. The author was present in both sessions. The transcripts will be made available for research purposes in due course.

²³ Treaty between the Republic of Finland and the Russian Federation on the Basis for Relations, signed on 20 January 1992.

²⁴ Blomberg, *Vakauden kaipuu*.

²⁵ "The military doctrine of Finland," Statement by Vice Admiral Jan Klenbeg at the CSCE seminar on military doctrine, Vienna 17 January 1990.

²⁶ "Finnish positions on foreign and security policy," Memorandum submitted to the European Commission (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 26 October 1992).

Final draft sent to the editors in December 2019 for publication in:

The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe
Edited by Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko and Peter Ruggenthaler

The book came out in 2021 published by Lexington Books (Lanham London)