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A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF CHINA'S THIRTEENTH FIVE-YEAR PLANS FOR
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Planning, Design and the Built Environment

by
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May 2021

Accepted by:
Dr. Mickey Lauria, Committee Chair
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ABSTRACT

The fundamental promise of socialism in China is to provide common prosperity for all. However, after 40 years of economic reform since the 1980s, China has become one of the most unequal societies in the world. The Five-Year Plan has been one of the most important public policy tools of the Chinese government since 1953 to guide the nation's economic and social development. Considering China's socialism promise, the existing social and spatial inequality, and the central importance of the Five-Year Plan, it demands a rigorous evaluation of how the issue of inequality between different social groups and regions is addressed in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020). This study fills the gap by critically and systematically analyzing the goals and strategies of the national, provincial, and city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans in China. My research reveals that China's Thirteenth Five-Year Plans do address the issue of imbalanced development. The five-year plans' social implication is that there are slightly more goals and strategies benefiting the capitalist class than the working class. However, neither the capitalist nor working class interests dominate the plans and the biggest policy target group of the plans is the general public. The five-year plans' spatial implication is that, although spatial issues are not of central importance, there are many more goals and strategies benefitting the rural areas than the urban areas and more goals and strategies benefitting the Western and Central region than the Eastern region. This finding suggests that spatial planning in China prioritizes reducing spatial inequality. Overall, in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, Chinese governments actively sought to deal with the issue of imbalanced development. Theoretically, my research findings strengthen the validity

of the claim that the Chinese capitalist class enjoys political privilege to influence policymaking for their own interests. At the same time, my findings support the Marxist claim that class struggle plays a vital role in public policymaking in China. However, my research findings do not support the claim that the political power of Chinese capitalists has been growing since 2010, and do not support the claim that Chinese capitalists are more active at the local level.

DEDICATION

This is for my parents. Without your sacrifice and love, none of this is possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to thank my advisor Dr. Mickey Lauria. He has been with me since day one in Clemson. It's been a long and challenging journey. But having him as my advisor makes the whole process so much more interesting. May good health envelop you.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT

“Philosophical theory itself cannot bring it about that either the barbarizing tendency or the humanistic outlook should prevail in the future. However, by doing justice to those images and ideas that at given times dominated reality in the role of absolutes - e.g., the idea of the individual as it dominated the bourgeois era - and that have been relegated in the course of history, philosophy can function as a corrective of history, so to speak” (Jay, 1996, p. 329).

The fundamental promise of socialism in China is to provide common prosperity for all. However, after 40 years of economic reform since the 1980s, China has become one of the most unequal societies in the world (Jain-Chandra et al., 2018). The fundamental promise of socialism in China is to provide common prosperity for all. The Five-Year Plan has been one of the most important public policy tools of the Chinese government since 1953 to guide the nation's economic and social development. Considering China's socialism promise, the existing social and spatial inequality, and the central importance of the Five-Year Plan, it demands a rigorous evaluation of how the issue of inequality between different social groups and regions is addressed in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020). This study fills the gap by critically and systematically analyzing the goals and strategies of the national, provincial, and city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans in China. Essentially this research investigation aims to do justice to China's Thirteenth Five-Year Plan in terms of its implications for the issue of social and spatial inequality in China.

The Five-Year Plan in China

The Chinese government has been making Five-Year Plans for Economic and Social Development since 1953. Despite the economic reform in 1978 that incorporated market mechanisms into the socialist economy, the five-year plans have been playing a central role in China's public policymaking (Heilmann & Melton, 2013). From 1949, when People's Republic of China was founded, to 1978, China's economy had remained socialistic run by the state, and the private sector was either incorporated into the new socialist institutions or eliminated. Learning from the Soviet Union's five-year planning model, the First Five-Year Plan was made in 1953 and guided the planned economy. The economic goals in the plan prioritized the development of heavy industries such as mining, steel manufacturing, and technology which laid foundation for future industrialization (Hu et al., 2010). After the success of the first five-year plan, the government has kept making five-year plans for the planned economy. The Chinese government adopted the economic reform policy in 1978 and gradually transformed the centrally planned economy to a mixed economy and opened the door for foreign investors. Instead of being abandoned, the five-year plan planning model was gradually transformed from its former role of allocating resources to a new role of public affairs governance planning. It now mainly serves to coordinate policymaking, mobilize resources, and control the economy at the macro level (Hu, 2013). By 2020 the most recent five-year plan produced by the Chinese government is the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan that was intended to cover the development from 2016 to 2020.

The Chinese government published 331 Thirteenth Five-Year Plans in 2016 including 1 national plan, over 30 provincial plans, and 300 city plans. Given the central importance of the five-year plan in public policymaking in China and the proliferation of the planning practices, there is still a gap in knowledge about the spatial and social implications of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans for different social groups and regions. Beside the broad overall official claim that the five-year plan is a reflection of all Chinese people's vision, it is largely unknown how the interests of different social groups and regions are reflected in the plans. The formal official mid-term evaluations focused on post-implementation results and do not include pre-implementation analysis. In addition, the academic research in China on the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans has offered little systematic scrutiny of the plans' goals and strategies in terms of their potential spatial and social implications.

The Five-Year Plan and China's Socialist Development

Two reasons make filling this knowledge gap important for China's future socialist development. First, the fundamental promise and goal of socialism in China is to provide common prosperity for all (Chang, 1996). But now after 40 years of economic reform, China has become one of the most unequal societies in the world (Jain-Chandra et al., 2018). Thus, it demands a rigorous evaluation of how the issue of inequality between different social groups and regions are addressed in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020). After the 1978 economic reform, the Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping argued that common prosperity is the fundamental goal of Chinese socialism

(Chang, 1996). Common prosperity refers to the abundance of wealth generated by the advancement of productive forces and the public ownership of the wealth (Chang, 1996). It means the elimination of poverty and extreme inequality between the rich and the poor. It envisions a society where most people can live a good life. However, common prosperity does not necessarily entail an egalitarian society. Deng Xiaoping (1986) said that “our policy is to let some people and some regions get rich first, so that they can lead and help the lagging regions. It’s the leading regions’ obligation to help the lagging ones” when he met the Prime Minister of New Zealand. The Communist Party leaders after Deng have all supported the reform policy. Despite the government’s promise of common prosperity, extreme income and wealth inequality have taken root in China. Xi Jinping (2017) the President of China, emphasized during the 19th National Congress Meeting of the Communist Party, the principal social contradiction of China now lies between people’s ever-growing demands for better lives and imbalanced and insufficient development. Briefly summarized, imbalanced development refers to economic disparities between the rural and urban regions, between the eastern, and western and central regions, and the income and wealth gap between the rich and the poor in China. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate how the five-year plans address the issue of imbalanced growth and whether or not the plans are fulfilling the government’s promise of common prosperity for all.

Second, with the maturing of the market economy and the ever-growing private sector in China, achieving common prosperity could face serious obstacles. In 2018, the private sector in China contributed over 60 percent of the national GDP and brought in

over 50% of the governmental fiscal revenue (Meng, 2018). A large portion of China's national economy now is controlled by the private sector. Chen et al. (2008) argued that according to their survey, the capitalists in China were able to transform their economic power into formal political power. The power imbalance between capitalists and other social groups such as the working class could lead to domination of capitalists in politics and prevent equitable policymaking. Forester (1982) argued that in developed capitalist countries, progressive planners need to be able to recognize systematic sources of misinformation and structural imbalances of power among different social groups during planning process. Groups such as industrial capitalists and property developers, they tend to be more powerful in terms of their ability to influence political decisions. Their ability to manipulate public discourse and take advantage of public resources for their own interests have been well recorded (Stoecker, 2010). It was argued that "the sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure" (Marx & Engels, 1958, p. 362). With the private sector playing a more and more important role in resource allocation in China, in many places the economic base has been shifted from the former socialistic one to now capitalistic. Despite the different interpretations of Marx and Engels's "base-superstructure" thesis (Smith, 1984), the well-agreed argument is that with the change in the economic base or national economy, the superstructure including public policy making, could be changed accordingly. China's recent anti-corruption campaign (Pan & Tian, 2017) proves the tight connection between the corrupted officials and business groups. The large number of party officials prosecuted and punished during

Xi's administration shows how widespread the issue has been. The private sector has had great influence on China's politics.

To sum up, the private sector in China has been growing since the 1978 economic reform. The business groups have had great influence in China's politics and the power imbalance between the rich and the poor is very likely to thwart the plan for common prosperity. Thus, it is important to systematically check and make sure the five-year plans are true reflections of the socialist vision, rather than the ones that are in favor of the more powerful capitalist elites.

Research Questions

1. Is the issue of imbalanced development addressed in China's Thirteenth Five-Year Plans at national, provincial and city level? If yes, through what goals and strategies as listed in the plans?

2. What are the relationships between the goals presented in China's Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, and imbalanced development? Do the goals in the national, provincial and city plans tend to reduce, maintain, or reinforce different aspects of imbalanced development in China?

3. Does the capitalist class benefit more in China's Thirteenth Five-Year Plans than the working class in the national, provincial, and city plans?

4. Does the capitalist class benefit more in China's Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan than in the Twelfth National Five-Year Plan?

5. Does the capitalist class tend to benefit more in the five-year plans in the city plans than in the national and provincial five-year plans?

Research Significance

The fundamental promise of socialism in China is to provide common prosperity for all. However, after 40 years of economic reform since the 1980s, China has become one of the most unequal societies in the world (Jain-Chandra, et al., 2018). Five-Year Plan has been one of the most important public policy tools of the Chinese government since 1953 to guide the nation's social and economic development. Considering China's socialism promise, the existing social and spatial inequality, and the central importance of the Five-Year Plan, it demands academic attention to examine how the issue of inequality between different social groups and regions are addressed in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020). This study fills the gap by critically and systematically analyzing the goals and strategies of the national, provincial, and city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans in China. Essentially this research investigation aims to do justice to China's Thirteenth Five-Year Plan in terms of its implications for the issue of social and spatial inequality.

My research aims to make four major contributions: First, theoretically, by evaluating multiple plans, on the one hand, the research will produce a micro theory of Chinese government's social action which explicates the social and spatial implications of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans; on the other hand, it will provide empirical evidence to shine light on extant theories of Chinese capitalists' political participation; Second, practically, the research findings can be used by Chinese citizens to demand the social

chang related to five-year plans such as more participation in the plan making; the findings can be used by the organizations and individuals involved in the plan making to reflect on their own practices because my research provides a unique perspective to examine the five-year plans; the findings can also be used by scholars who study Chinese history because my research investigates and describes historical documents, the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans. Third, my research contributes to plan evaluation literature by providing an example of advocacy planning evaluation and connecting plan evaluation results to other social theories. Last but not the least, methodologically, the research will serve as an example of critical evaluation of socio-economic plans and pave the way for future researchers who are interested in critical social science research.

CHAPTER TWO

IMBALANCED DEVELOPMENT, FIVE-YEAR PLAN RESEARCH, AND CLASS ANALYSIS

The Existence of Imbalanced Development in China

Xi's administration in 2017 declared that China's principal social contradiction now lies between people's ever-growing demands for better lives and imbalanced and insufficient development. The imbalanced development is defined mainly in two aspects, spatial inequality, and income and wealth inequality (Xi, 2017). Spatial inequality refers to the huge economic disparity between the urban and the rural regions, and between eastern, and western and central regions. Income and wealth inequality refer to the huge gap in income and accumulated wealth between the rich and the poor, as measured by the Gini coefficient.

In China, urban residents' disposable income per capita is almost 3 times as much as rural residents' disposable income per capita in 2015 (Jiang & Zhou, 2018). Despite the rural residents' slightly faster income growth, the gap has remained large in 2015.

Table 2.1 2013-2015 China's Urban and Rural Residents' Income

| Year | Urban Residents' Annual Disposable Income Per Capita (U.S. Dollar) | Rural Residents' Annual Disposable Income Per Capita (U.S. Dollar) | The Index of Urban Residents' Income (Year 2013=100) | The Index of Rural Residents' Income (Year 2013=100) | The Gap between the Income of the Urban and Rural (nominal)(Times) |
|------|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2013 | 4268.9 | 1520.8 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 2.807 |
| 2014 | 4652.2 | 1691.7 | 109.0 | 111.2 | 2.750 |

| | | | | | |
|------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|
| 2015 | 4967.3 | 1821.6 | 117.9 | 121.1 | 2.731 |
|------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|

(CSY, 2016, p.171)

Spatial inequality can also be observed in the inequality between the eastern, central, and western regions. Though the GDP and income per capita gaps between the three regions have been decreasing, the gaps are still significant (Liao & Wei, 2016). In 2015, the eastern region accounts for 51.6% of the national GDP, with urban residents' annual disposable income of 5918 dollars (36691 yuan, in Chinese currency) and rural 2306 dollars (14297 yuan); the central region, which included north-eastern region, 28.3% of the national GDP, with urban residents' annual disposable income of 4372 dollars (27105 yuan) and rural 1807 dollars (11205 yuan); while the western region accounts for 20.1% of the national GDP, with urban residents' annual disposable income of 4264 dollars (26437 yuan) and rural 1467 dollars (9093 yuan).

Table 2.1 The Key Economic Indexes of Eastern, Central and Western Regions in 2015

| | Eastern | Central | Western |
|--|---------|---------|---------|
| (Regional GDP) / (National GDP) (%) | 51.6 | 28.3 | 20.1 |
| Urban residents' annual disposable income per capita (U.S. Dollar) | 5918 | 4372 | 4264 |
| Rural residents' annual disposable | 2306 | 1807 | 1467 |

| | | | |
|------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| income per capita (U.S. Dollar) | | | |
|------------------------------------|--|--|--|

(CSY, 2016, p.842)

(Liao & Wei, 2016, p. 1) reviewed the last three decades' literature (1980-2010) on China's regional development and arrived at the conclusion that "recent studies have reached a consensus that the coastal-inland divide has largely been widened during the reform period." The coastal region refers to the eastern region and inland region refers to the central and western region. They argued that interregional inequality between the three regions consistently increased from 1952 to 2013. "Values of the Theil index, CV, and the Gini coefficient increased by 798%, 284%, and 276% during the period of 1952-2013" (Liao & Wei, 2016, p. 7). Theil index, Coefficient of Variation (CV), and the Gini coefficient have been widely used to measure regional economic inequality. CV is a dispersion index and the computed results are sensitive to outliers. The Gini coefficients are calculated based on a Lorenz Curve and the results can be easily confounded by high values (Fan & Sun, 2008). The Theil index, a type of entropy indices, has the advantage that "can be decomposed into additive terms that depict the inequality among and within groups of elements in a system" (Fan & Sun, 2008, p. 6)

Yang (2014) compared the contribution of the three regions to China's national GDP from 1980 to 2012 and argued that despite slight changes, the disparity between the three regions remains significant. For example, in 1980, the eastern region's GDP accounted for 52.32% of the national GDP and the central region, 32.21% and the

western region, 16.47%; by 2012, the percentages are 55.63%, 24.37%, and 20%. The quotient between the eastern and central region increased from 1.68 in 1980 to 2.26 in 2012; the eastern and western quotient decreased from 3.18 in 1980 to 2.82 in 2012.

In addition to the increased spatial imbalance in China, the imbalance between income and wealth of the rich and the poor has been getting worse since the 1980s' economic reform. Income and wealth inequality is generally measured by income and wealth Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient values from 0.4 to 0.5 are considered as indicators of huge disparity between the rich and the poor. And the ones bigger than 0.5 show extreme inequalities.

The consensus among scholars is that the income Gini coefficient, before the 1978's economic reform, is no greater than 0.2 (Yang, 2014). During the early 1980s, it rose to 0.28; 1995, 0.38; and 2000, 0.458 (Yang, 2014). Each year's income Gini coefficient in the first decade of the 2000s was greater than 0.47. In 2013, the Gini coefficient reached 0.473 which was higher than 90% of all the countries in the world (Yang, 2014). The wealth Gini coefficient's increase was even more dramatic than the income coefficient because wealth tends to be accumulated through time. From 2002 to 2012, the wealth Gini coefficient had grown from 0.387 to 0.739 (Li, 2018). It indicates that the top 1% rich in China holds over 33% of the nation's wealth. This is striking because the high inequality was reached in only ten years.

Five-Year Plan Research in China

The literature lacks critical perspectives

Given the significant and increasing spatial, income, and wealth inequality in China and the central role played by the Five-Year Plan in China's social and economic development, it is reasonable to ask the question how the issue of imbalanced development is addressed in the most recent Five-Year Plans, the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020). Unfortunately, the answer was not found in the current Five-Year Plan literature. The plan evaluation literature primarily compares what is in the plan and what has happened in reality after implementation, and pays little attention to the plan content itself (Gu & Wang, 2014). The dominant evaluation approach is rational and conformance-based. The potential economic and social implications entailed in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans have escaped the academic scrutiny in China.

After reviewing the Five-Year Plan mid-term evaluation literature, Hao (2013, p. 61) argued that plan evaluation in the Chinese context involves examining

“target and goal completion, planning indexes progression, plan implementation, characteristics of regional plans, main progresses made, main problems run into, planning experiences, and future development strategies”.

This evaluation approach offers little critical analysis of the plan's goals and their potential implications for different regions and groups. Yan and Wang (2012) reviewed China's Five-Year Plan research and concluded that overall, past evaluation research lacks rational analysis and quantitative approaches. They conducted a quantitative evaluation of China's 11th National Five-Year Plan measuring the conformity between

the plan's goals and what had happened after implementation. The study acknowledged that one of the key shortcomings of the study was that it failed to examine the legitimacy of the plan's goals. Hai (2016) evaluated several city five-year plans in Henan Province comparing the five-year plans' indicator system with national and provincial systems. Hai (2016) argued that the design of Henan's five-year plans' indicator systems was not rational enough. Because on the one hand, policy makers needed more concrete analysis of local economies especially the extent of local industrialization. On the other hand, the planning process lacked the efforts to connect local conditions to national policies.

The Evolution of the Five-Year Plan in China

Despite the lack of critical research on the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, scholars have been writing about the evolution of previous five-year plans. In the past seventy years of development, China's Five-Year Plan has gone through huge transitions. The literature provides strong evidence that the five-year plan has had substantial impacts on China's regional disparities. These effects support the necessity of evaluating how the issue of imbalance had been addressed by previous five-year plans.

Wu (2016) argued that before the 1980s, inland areas, the central and western region of China, were prioritized by the planning policy for national industrial development (Falkenheim, 1985). Raw material access and national defense were among key considerations for the decision (Riskin, 1987).

However, after the 1980s, under the guidance of economic reform and opening-up policy, the eastern region became the main beneficiary of government planning which led to huge inequalities between the eastern and other regions. The eastern coastal region

attracted most domestic and foreign investments. Almost all of economic experiment zones were located in coastal regions such as the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.¹ Wu argued (2016, p.48) that “the country has gradually turned away from the centrally planned economic system to the market-orientated economic system (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Zhang & Zou, 2012).” Wu (2016) also pointed out three shifts of the five-year planning system

“a shift of focus from the previous quantity of economic output to the present quality of economic development; A transformation from the previous focus on the isolated development mode to the coordinated development mode; A transformation from previous Government-dominated planning to current Government-led planning with public participation (p.48-49).”

Planning policy emphasis has been changed from promoting the eastern coastal region to a more coordinated regional development framework since the late 1990s. Thus, the disparity between eastern and others regions began to be addressed in five-year plans. However, the thirteenth five-year plans’ social and regional implications have not been covered in the literature. The main characteristics and regional implications of China’s previous five-year plans (1950-2014) were summarized by Wu (2016, p.41-65) as follows.

(1) Centralized planning period (1953-1980):

¹ A special economic zone is an area where market mechanism is introduced and private business is encouraged. The area overall is planned to attract foreign investments with benefits such as cheap land and tax exemption or reduction.

First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957): The First Five-Year Plan marked the beginning of China's socialist modernization and industrialization. The main beneficiary of the national development policies was the north-eastern part of China which is a part of the central region (Wu, 2016). The region was selected primarily because of its inland location (a national defense strategy), industrial foundation, access to raw materials, and proximity to the Soviet Union. Wu (2016, p.42) argued that the region "enjoyed more than one-quarter of total capital construction investment in the country, including new factory constructions centering on metallurgy, coal, machinery and other heavy-industry sectors." However, China still was one of the most egalitarian societies at the time (Zhang & Zou, 2012). Because capitalist class was eliminated and all workers' wages were not significantly different.

Second Five-Year Plan (1958–1962): Considering the prioritization of the inland regions during the first five-year plan, the government adjusted its policies and started to distribute more resources to the coastal regions as well. But the plan was suspended in 1962 mainly because of the Great Leap Forward movement which set impossible goals and caused a decline in national productivity.

Third Five-Year-Plan (1965-1970): The biggest winners in the third five-year plan were still the inland regions. Wu (2016) argued that the plan had three major goals: One was to guarantee the production of food; another was to strengthen national defense; and the last, to develop infrastructures, education, and culture. With the threat of coming wars, the Chinese government strategically located key industries and infrastructures

projects in inland areas. Coastal regions are comparably more vulnerable to potential air strikes than the western inland regions. The so called Third-tier regions,

“covers 13 provinces and other relevant areas, including most provinces in the western region, such as Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, as well as some mountainous areas in the central region, such as Shanxi, Henan, Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces” (Wu, 2016, p.44)

Fourth (1971-1975) and Fifth Five-Year-Plan (1976-1980): The fourth and the fifth five-year plan proposed a decentralizing strategy and divided China into different economic regions such as north-eastern, south western and central regions (Wu, 2016). Each region was encouraged to developed their own industrial systems. China was one of the most egalitarian societies until the 1967’s decentralization policy (Zhang & Zou, 2012). Wu (2016, p.46) cited two studies to confirm this divergence which emerged during the 1960s. The first one is study of inter-provincial economic disparities and the other one is Kanbur and Zhang’s (2005) study of regional inequality in China. Kanbur and Zhang (2005) argued that significant regional inequality did not emerge in China until the 1960s.

In summary, from the first to fifth five-year plans, inland regions had been the main beneficiaries of national investment. Naughton (1988) argued that the inland regions received about two-thirds of government investments during the early socialist construction and millions of skilled workers lived near these factories. However, the living standards between different regions were not significantly different because of the

similar wages and similar level of consumer goods production. But this prioritization of the Third-tier regions was soon to be changed.

(2) The early reform and opening-up period (1980-1990):

Sixth (1981-1985) and Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990): The coastal regions became the major beneficiaries of the new policy of reform and opening-up. Most public investments and private investments, domestic and foreign, were concentrated in coastal regions where new economic development zones were set up.

Wu's summary (2016, p.60) of the Sixth and Seventh Five-Year Plans is worth quoting here. In the Seventh Five-Year-Plan (1986–1990), the Chinese Government proposed that

“speed[ing] up the development of the eastern coastal regions, focus[ing] on energy and raw material development in central regions, and actively prepar[ing] for further development of the western regions.....To be specific, support for economic development was given to the eastern region and portal cities rather than to industrial cities in inland areas and the Third-tier region. On the whole, the main theme of the country's planning policies shifted from preparing for industrial output against war and natural disasters towards stimulating economic growth in coastal regions. From the Sixth to the Seventh Five-Year-Plan, there was an obvious increase in the government investment ratio into the eastern region and portal cities. With the ‘visible’ support of planning policies, new spatial disparities emerged.”

(3) Market-oriented planning system (1991-2000):

Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) and Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000):

Facing the widening economic gap between the East and West, and between the urban and rural areas, the two five-year plans both emphasized the goal of coordinated development which was meant to deal with the growing regional disparities (Wu, 2016).

However, despite the governmental incentives and the relocated investments and industries to the west and central regions, the regional disparities still increased and reached its peak height around 2005 as demonstrated by Liao et al., (2016). Wu (2016, p.74) argued that “as a ‘pioneering development’ region, the eastern region attracted all the necessary production factors to stimulate its regional economic growth.”

In the coastal regions, growth-poles, central coastal cities, province capital cities and key periphery towns were set up as the engines of the regions.

(4) Contemporary planning policies (2001–2014):

Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) and Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015): the Chinese Government kept pushing the coordinated development principle during this time. The guiding planning principles for the three periods of five-year plans stayed stable. Key implemented regional planning programs were: “the development of the western region, the revitalization of north-eastern region and other old industrial bases, the rise of the central region, and the pioneering development of the eastern region, aimed at narrowing the development gap between regions” (Wu, 2016, p.83).

The eastern region was supported to upgrade their industrial structures and prioritize high tech and high value-added industries. The western and central region were planned to assume more roles of manufacturing and raw material production (Wu, 2016).

The economic gap between different regions had been slightly narrowed. But the forces of agglomeration in wealthier regions remain powerful. Despite government

incentives and investments to promote the development in the west and the central regions, the economic disparities are likely to continue (Wu, 2016).

In summary, five-years plans have had great influence in China's social and economic development. The issue of imbalanced development has started to be addressed since the Eighth Five-Year Plan. However, extant five-year plan research offers little critical and systematic scrutiny of the implications of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans for different regions and social groups. It's not clear whether and how the issue of imbalanced development is addressed in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans at national, provincial and city level in China. This lack of knowledge poses the danger of failing to fulfill the socialist promise of common prosperity for all, which runs against the fundamental promise of the government.

The Process of making Five-Year Plans

The making of the five-year plans at national, provincial, and city level follows a similar general process, preparation and research phase, the making of the five-year plan proposal phase, and the making of the five-year plan (guideline text) phase (Ding, 2018; Hu, 2011). Despite being carried out by different organizations at different levels of Chinese governments, the three-phase plan making is upheld across the three levels of five-year plans.

At the national level, the first phase of plan making is preparation and research phase. The process starts with mid-term evaluation of the last national five-year plan led by National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) which is one of the departments of the State Council. The evaluation lays foundation for the upcoming

preparation and research. A yearlong preparation and research are mainly comprised of baseline information collection and completion of major research projects. The National Development and Reform Commission is the main organization that leads the mission. For example, 39 major research projects were revealed by the commission for public competition for the preparation of the Twelfth National Five-Year Plan. Over 60 research organizations were selected and thousands of researchers participated the projects (Hu, 2011). Based on the preparation and research, NDRC drafts the Basic Ideas for next five-year plan. This draft will be reviewed and commented by experts from different ministries of the State Council and also leaders and experts from different provinces. The final draft will be submitted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council. Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party including the President of China are in charge of reviewing the Basic Ideas, circulating of the draft, building political census, and political mobilization (Hu, 2011).

The second phase of the five-year plan making is drafting the proposal for national five-year plan. Under the leadership of the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Party, NDRC and the research agencies of the State Council start to draft the five-year plan proposal. At the same time, five-year plans of different ministries of the State Council, of the provinces and cities are being made. These ministry, province, and city plans are used to support the making of the national five-year plan. Members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, members of the Standing Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference, selected

research organizations, and think tanks will all contribute to the draft (Hu, 2011). Once a good of draft of the proposal is completed, it will be sent out to different ministries, provinces, the Communist Party members, other independent party member, and the public for reviewing and comments. After multiple times of reviewing, revising, reviewing, and revising, the final draft of the proposal will be submitted to the annual Fifth Plenum of the Communist Party of China Central Committee for approval.

The last phase of national five-year plan making is to produce a plan guideline text. With the foundation of the proposal, the first draft of the guidelines will be produced by NDRC. Before sending the final draft to National People's Congress for approval, NDRC organizes multiple sessions for industry associations, ministries at different levels of governments, national commission of planning experts, and the general public to provide feedbacks. After approved by the State Council and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party, it turns to National People's Congress to review and approve the final draft.

The provincial and city plans are made in the similar process as the national plans. Instead of the National Development and Reform Commission, it's the Provincial and City Development and Reform Commission that take the responsibility of drafting. The provincial and city governments organize and coordinate the whole plan making process. The completed draft is sent to Provincial and City People's Congress for approval.

Chinese scholars argued that this three-phase plan making process is collective, participatory, and deliberative (see Ding, 2018; Hu et al., 2017; Meng, 2014; Hu, 2011). The decision makers in the process are very diverse groups and the decisions are made

collectively and deliberatively. For example, involved organizations include the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the State Council, People's Congress, People's Political Consultative Conference commission, independent research groups, and planning expert commission. The reviewing and revising process during the drafting is repetitive and deliberative. Wide ranges of organizations and opinions are consulted, considered, and incorporated in the plan (Hu et al., 2017). Ding (2018) recorded and analyzed the roles of the main participants in a district five-year plan making process. Like the making of the national five-year plan, the district government including leading officials, the City Development and Reform Commission, other departments, and the street level staff, was mainly responsible for organizing, coordinating, and drafting. The committee of District People's Congress and People's Political Consultative Conference supported and approved the five-year plan. Experts offered intellectual assistance during the research, reviewing, revising, and decision-making process. The last group of participants analyzed by Ding (2018) were interest groups. There were representatives from business, higher education, independent parties, and the general public. All of the representative attended meetings with the government except the general public. The participating mechanisms for the general public were mainly based on internet.

Despite the claim that the five-year plan making process is participatory and inclusive, the general public still lack appropriate mechanisms to participate in the five-year plan making (Ding, 2017). The plan making process is indeed participatory and inclusive for different governmental organizations, party elites, technical experts, business representatives, and People's Congress representatives. However, it's still

challenging for the general public to exert influence during the plan making. The mechanisms for the public to get involved is mainly limited to internet channels such as emails and social media platforms. As showed by Ding, the business groups had face-to-face meetings with the district officials and the meeting generated 16 modification suggestions for the district five-year plan while the general public never met any officials and no suggestions generated. This case study evidences the political power imbalance (Forester, 1988) between the capitalists and the general public. It's has not been examined in the five-year plan literature that whether this power imbalance could distort the plan to favor the interests of the capitalist class.

Plan Evaluation and A Critical Plan Evaluation Study

Planning Evaluation Background

Scholars have paid attention to plan or planning evaluation since the Second World War with the rise of rational planning paradigm (Oliveira & Pinho, 2010). The evolution of plan evaluation theory and practice has been approximately paralleled with the evolution of planning theory (Khakee, 1998). Evaluating plans or planning is to tell the good ones from the bad ones. In order to make such judgments, the first step is to define what planning is or to argue what planning should be (Alexander & Faludi, 1989). This task is primarily dealt with in the literature of planning theory. There is a consensus in the planning field that the planning paradigm has shifted from rational planning to communitive planning (Healey, 1996). For example, Oliveira and Pinho (2010, p.344) presented the evolution of planning approaches summarized by Innes (1995): “rational-

comprehensive planning, incremental planning, advocacy planning, implementation-oriented planning, strategic planning, transactive planning, negotiative planning, and communicative planning”. Correspondingly, plan evaluation approaches went from the dominance of rational evaluation, to communicative evaluation, and to pragmatic and integrated evaluation (Guyadeen & Seasons, 2016). These approaches are complementary to each other and not in conflict. Different approaches could be followed in a single evaluation study (Alexander & Faludi, 1989). Detailed descriptions of the approaches will be provided later.

(1) Lack of Advocacy Planning Evaluation

Despite the growing research interest in plan evaluation in the 21st century, two issues demand more academic attention. First, compared with other plan evaluation approaches, the advocacy planning approach has not been well explored. Davidoff (1965) was the champion of advocacy planning and he argued that during the planning process, different social groups might not be equally represented and heard. The groups of lower socioeconomic status are often less represented and left unheard. Thus, planners should represent the poor and the vulnerable groups who cannot compete with the rich and the powerful such as developers and bankers without extra supports. For this approach, good planning is the ones that give extra help to the poor and the vulnerable groups and make sure they are well represented, heard, and that their interests are safeguarded in plans.

However, none of the three main approaches to plan evaluation as mentioned above emphasizes the importance of equal representation and fair decision-making during planning process. Rational planners argued that plans should be made to control the

future and they are the blueprint of future arrangements. (Wildavsky, 1973; Laurian et al.,2004). Guyadeen and Seasons (2016, p.218) argued that “the success of (rational) planning is judged by the degree of conformance between outcomes on-the-ground and planning policy prescriptions, and the promotion of planning goals and objectives through available implementation instruments”. Talen (1996) believed that more research needs to be devoted to plan implementation because it’s important for planners and the public to understand whether planning and plans are making desired changes in the real world. In addition to the blueprint argument, Alexander (1981) argued that rational planning seeks to develop optimal strategies to achieve desired goals. Proposed strategies in plans must be demonstrated as superior to their alternatives (Faludi, 1986). The main evaluation criterion for this aspect of rational planning is how well the superiority of the proposed strategies are justified. For example, the Cost-Benefit Analysis, Planning Balance Sheet Analysis, and Goal Achievement Matrix are typical tools used to seek optimality during planning. The two evaluation criteria of rational planning, conformance and optimality, have nothing to do with equal representation and fair decision-making.

Communitive planning evaluation is performance-based and focuses on planning process (Guyadeen & Seasons, 2016). Faludi (1987) argued that the idea of plans as blueprint to control the future ignores inevitable uncertainties and changes that happen during the planning process and that is unrealistic. Faludi (1987, p.116-137) proposed that planning should strive to create a reference for agencies’ operational decisions, meaning the decision that “represent the commitment to action by the decision-making agent or through which the decision agent deploys other organizations or units in

planning or implementation activities”. Good planning and plans are thus, the ones that are most useful for decisions makers to achieve desired ends such as proceeding of daily operations or achieving long-term goals. This proposal of plan evaluation also ignores equal representation and fair decision-making for different plan-making participants.

The pragmatic integrated evaluation approach argues that considering complex nature of planning activity and widely different contexts of planning, there is no single evaluation approach that suits all situations (Guyadeen & Seasons, 2016). Different plans are designed to fulfill different functions. The most appropriate evaluation approach should be used according to the specific contexts. For example, Hoch (2002) argued that planners should not emphasize rational analysis when evaluating planning because rational approach tends to ignore planning contexts and prevent stakeholders from reflecting, deliberating, and learning during planning evaluation. For a pragmatic and integrated planning evaluation, good planning is the ones that solve problems, suit specific planning contexts, promote democratic participation and mutual learning, and provide opportunities for shared deliberation. This approach touches on participation but the relative vulnerability of the poor and the disadvantaged is not emphasized.

In addition to the three main evaluation approaches, another line of research that has been gaining more planning scholars’ research interests since the 1990s is plan quality evaluation (Berke & Kaiser, 2006; Berke & Godschalk, 2009). Lyles and Stevens (2014) argued that by 2014, the plan quality literature has generated more than forty-five peer-reviewed publications and the growth speed of the literature is accelerating. This approach can be included in the rational planning approach because it seeks the

optimality in plan making in terms of plan text arrangements. For example, Guyadeen (2019, p.3) argued that “plan quality studies tend to focus on determining whether plans are factually comprehensive, have goals that are informed by analysis, and include appropriate policies to help achieve goals.” However, Connell and Daoust-Filiatrault (2018) argued that plan quality evaluation is a distinct type of plan evaluation because it focuses specifically on written plans and evaluates the power of plans to produce an effect as it is embodied in plan texts.

Studies that follow the plan quality evaluation approach share similar constructions of evaluative criteria and all use content analysis as data analysis method. Even though this approach focuses on plan contents, fair distribution of planning benefits has not been well evaluated. This component has rarely been included in the plan quality evaluative criteria. Only in studies that specifically aim to evaluate how equitable the plans are can a fair distribution of planning benefits be found. But compared with other evaluative approaches, they are relatively rare (See Fainstein, 2014; Berke et al., 2019; Shahab et al., 2019).

(2) Lack of Connection to other Social Theories

Second, plan evaluation research findings have not been well connected to other social theories. The utilization of plan evaluation research has been limited mainly in the field of planning or evaluation. Planning products are inherently produced by collective and political processes and can be analyzed and connected to higher levels of social theories. But few studies attempt to make the connection.

My research contributes to plan evaluation literature by providing an example of advocacy planning evaluation and connecting plan evaluation results to other social theories. First, the evaluation proposed in my research can be seen as an example of advocacy planning evaluation. China's Socialism promise of common prosperity for all aims to help the poor and the vulnerable groups and reduce the economic gap between them and the rich. It is in line with the core tenets of advocacy planning. Planning products including official plans in China, therefore, should reflect the interests of the poor and the vulnerable and be designed to narrow economic gaps. My evaluation will check whether the five-year plans address the economic gaps between different social groups and regions. It serves as an example of advocacy planning evaluation that focuses on plan texts. It is critical in the sense that the official claims and evaluations of the five-year plans are not taken for granted. Without systematically examining the content of the five-year plans, oppressive and exploitive arrangements could escape people's attention and prevent them from challenging existing oppression and exploitation. Second, my evaluation results will present how different social groups' interests are reflected in Chinese five-year plans. This presentation connects my research findings to social theories of Chinese capitalist's political participation. This connection expands the influence of plan evaluation literature.

Theoretical Connection

Theories of political participation of capitalists in China

Most studies on Chinese capitalists, or entrepreneurs, have argued that in China, capitalists or entrepreneurs are gaining more political influence since the 1990s at all levels of government, but especially at the local level (see Schubert & Heberer, 2017; Hong, 2015; Guangjin, 2013; Sol, 2013; Kennedy, 2009; Chen et al., 2008; Dickson, 2007; Guiheux, 2006; Heberer, 2003).

Before the 2010s, scholars generally agreed that capitalists in China were loyal and compliant patterners of the State and enjoyed privileged access to influence policymaking (Schubert & Heberer, 2017). Instead of confronting and challenging the leadership of the Communist Party, they worked within political and economic system and profited together with the party leaders (Dickson, 2008; Guiheux, 2006). Guiheux (2006, p.232) argued that “most individuals and groups do not seek autonomy but rather closer embeddedness with the state..... Government-business relations in China, as in much of East Asia, and in sharp contrast to many Western countries, are more cooperative than antagonistic.” Guiheux (2006) also pointed out that these close government-business relations gave capitalists privileged access to policy makers while other groups such as farmers, consumers, and laid-off workers hardly shared this opportunity. Chen et al. (2008) quantitatively examined which factors tend to be associated with entrepreneurs’ behavior of political participation defined as being a member of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference or People’s Congress. Chen et al. (2008, p.298) concluded that their research provides empirical evidence that

“Chinese entrepreneurs are translating their economic power, political identity, and household background into formal political power”. Li et al. (2013) observed that with the improvement of their economic and social status, capitalists’ political awareness and participation has been increasing. For example, Li et al. (2013, p.332) showed that

“during the 1993 – 2008 period, the proportion of private entrepreneurs who are CPC members has shown a rising trend. Among those surveyed in 2008, CPC members accounted for 33.4%, 20 percentage points higher than that in 1993, registering an impressive 151% growth.”

Kennedy (2009) argued that as a result of the marketization of China’s economy, extensive lobbying by capitalists emerged. Schubert and Heberer (2017, p.99) argued that, after 2010, with the deepening of marketization and market maturing, “power relations between the party-state and private entrepreneurs have gradually been ‘reconfigured’ or ‘recalibrated’..... Private entrepreneurs are arguably gaining political influence at all administrative levels in the Chinese political system”. The growing speed of China’s national economy has slowed down from 2007’s 14.2% annually to 2016’s 6.7%. Governments at all levels are experiencing the pressure from national economic restructuring. Public officials depend more and more on the private sector to achieve local GDP targets. Thus, capitalists are gaining a better negotiating position with the government.

My research's contribution to the theories

The primary goal of my research is not to test or expand the theories of Chinese capitalists. However, by showing how the capitalist and working class benefit differently from the Twelfth (2011-2015) and Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020) in the national, provincial, and city plans, the research will provide empirical evidence that supports or challenges the theories. If there are more goals and strategies in these five-year plans that tend to benefit the capitalist class more than the working class, then my research findings will strengthen the validity of extant theoretical claims that the Chinese capitalist class enjoys political privilege to influence policymaking for their own interests over other groups. If compared with the twelfth five-year plans, capitalists are gaining more benefits in the thirteenth five-year plans, then my research supports extant theoretical claims that Chinese capitalists' political power is growing. If the capitalists tend to enjoy more support in the city plans than in the provincial and national plans, then my research supports the extant argument that the capitalists are more active at the local level to safeguard and expand their interests in China.

The theories' implications for my research

The theories of Chinese capitalists suggest that the capitalists' political influence has been growing since the 1990s and they are gaining more power especially after 2010 at local level. But at the same time, other groups such as farmers, workers, and consumers never had similar political privilege to participate in politics as the capitalists. Thus,

according to the theories, it is reasonable to first assume that in the twelfth and thirteenth five-year plans, capitalists benefit more than other groups. Second compared with the twelfth five-year plans, the capitalists are likely to gain more benefits in the thirteenth five-year plan. At last, the capitalists tend to gain more benefits in the city plans than in the national and provincial plans because city level is generally considered as local.

A Marxist Analysis of Class Interests

Threats to Achieving Socialist Common Prosperity

The private sector in China has been growing since the 1978's economic reform and accounted for about 60% of the national GDP by the end of 2017 (Meng, 2018). With the growth of the private sector, its more active political participation, and the current government policy of pushing marketization, the socialist vision of common prosperity could be seriously challenged.

The 1978 economic reform, the consistent pushing of marketization, and the expansion of the private sector in China have given rise to a new capitalist class and working class (So, 2013). The capitalist class is much more powerful than the working classes and have continued to “work hard to try to influence the government to serve their class interests” (So, 2013, p. 67).

The new capitalist class tends to be more powerful than the working class for at least four reasons. First, the new capitalist class in many cases is a fusion of the Communist Party cadres and entrepreneurs (So, 2013). David (2000, p. 15) reports that

“most entrepreneurs, including those in the private sector of the economy...either had social origins in the party-state or were for the most part incorporated into its activities”.

“This hybrid cadre–capitalist class has monopolized political capital, economic capital, and social/network capital in Chinese society” (So, 2013, p.64). Chen (2002, p. 412) commented that, “A large portion, if not a majority, of the bourgeois have prospered from the commercial privileges deriving from political lineage”.

Second, the new capitalist class is well organized and have established fully functioning class networks (So,2013). For example, the organizations include

“All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the China Enterprise Confederation, the China Enterprise Directors Association, the China Township and Village Enterprise Association, and the Chinese Foreign Sector Business Association. They have established extensive organizational networks extending from the national to provincial, city, and county levels” (So, 2013, p.65).

However, the working class are less organized and their local organizing is not connected at city, provincial, or national level (Chan & Hui, 2017).

Third, as argued by Forester (1988), capitalists are much more familiar with governmental affairs than working class people who don't deal with government professionals often. Capitalists also have much more expertise and free time to participate in public policymaking because they can afford to hire professionals to work for them. On the contrary, working class people often lack such freedom and time to participate actively which makes potential misinformation and manipulation during policymaking process possible.

Fourth, recruitment of capitalists into the communist party in 2001 solidified the bond between the party cadres and the capitalists and gave more political power to the capitalist class. This provides more opportunities for capitalist class to manipulate policy making for their own interests. Heilmann and Melton (2013) supported this claim arguing that the Chinese planning system tends to create and sustain the vested interests. For example, in 2007, a new Property Law was passed by the National People's Congress due to the consistent push by the capital class. The law legally protects private property the same as it protects public property.

In sum, a new capitalist class has been formed and it keeps growing stronger. A large number of the capitalists either hold positions in the Party or have tight connections with the Party. Without the working class's strong resistance, this cadre-capitalist class can easily manipulate public policy including five-year plans to serve their class interests at the expenses of the working class, peasants, or consumers. Thus, it is important to check the most recent five-year plan and explore how different social groups' interests are reflected in the plans.

A Marxist Analysis of Class Interests

To evaluate how different classes' interests are reflected in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, I follow a Marxist class analysis approach as described by Wright (2005). Wright presented six major class analysis methodologies in sociology: Marxist class analysis, Weberian class analysis, Durkheimian class analysis, Bourdieu's class analysis, Ricardian class analysis, and Post-Class analysis. Different approaches have different

theoretical assumptions and key research agendas. Marxist class analysis suits my research because of its central concern of exploitation. Wright (2005, p. 16) argued that

“what makes class analysis distinctively Marxist is the account of specific mechanisms that are seen as generating these two kinds of consequences. Here the pivotal concept is exploitation. This is the conceptual element that anchors the Marxist concept of class in the distinctive Marxist agenda of class analysis”.

The “two kinds of consequences” mentioned by Wright refer to the systematic and significant effects of class relation on both individuals’ lives and dynamics of social institutions (Wright, 2005). Wright (2005, p17) defined the concept of exploitation as such:

“Exploitation is thus a diagnosis of the process through which the inequalities in incomes are generated by inequalities in rights and powers over productive resources: the inequalities occur, in part at least, through the ways in which exploiters, by virtue of their exclusionary rights and powers over resources, are able to appropriate surplus generated by the effort of the exploited”.

Exploitation is closely related to another concept, domination. Wright argued (2005, p.18) that

“Domination occurs, first, in the exclusion principle: “owning” a resource gives one power to prevent other people from using it. The power exercised by employers to hire and fire workers is the clearest example of this form of domination. But domination also occurs, in most instances, in conjunction with the appropriation principle, since the appropriation of the labor effort of the exploited usually requires direct forms of subordination, especially within the labor process, in the form of bossing, surveillance, threats, etc.”

The domination described above happens in the realm of production, or the labor process. However, as argued in the last section, considering that the capitalist class in China has been gaining more political influence at all levels of Chinese government, it is reasonable to assume that this domination could also happen in politics which to some extent feeds back to the labor process. The exclusion principle of domination is satisfied in the following. By serving as the Community Party members and public officials and maintaining a tight connection with public officials, the capitalists in China enjoy privileged political resources that are inaccessible to workers. For example, Chan and Hui (2017, p.235) recorded how the Chinese government responded to global capital's pressure after the 2008 economic crisis by retreating from the labour regulations. The retreating legitimized global capital's harsh appropriation.

“The Guangdong provincial government froze the minimum wage rate, put off wage consultations in enterprises and reduced enterprises' contributions to social insurance. The Shenzhen government removed the punitive clauses on wage arrears in the Regulations of the Shenzhen Municipality on the Wage Payment to Employees in October 2009 and altered the definition of wages and overtime work in ways that help reduce enterprises' labour costs”.

The pro-capital measures induced massive labor resistance (Chan & Hui, 2017). Due to the lack of access to political resources, such as mechanisms to participate in policy-making, and increasing exploitation ignored by the government, workers violently protested. And Chinese governments had to respond to the protests by changing some of the measures. Chan and Hui (2017, 235) argued that “this shows that the Chinese state

does not simply reflect the capitalist class's interests. It is a field of class struggles and its policies are simultaneously shaped by capital and labor.”

To evaluate class interests reflected in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, I will first define class interests, then specify a two-location class model, and finally describe briefly how the evaluation process will proceed. Wright's definition of class interest is adopted.

Wright (2005, p.12) defined class interests as

“the material interests of people derived from their location-within-class-relations. ‘Material interests’ include a range of issue - standards of living, working conditions, level of toil, leisure, material security, and other things.”
“When the rights and powers of people over productive resources are unequally distributed – when some people have greater rights/powers with respect to specific kinds of productive resources than do others – these relations can be described as class relations” (Wright, 2005, p.5).

Thus, when I look for class interests in the five-year plans, standards of living, working conditions, level of toil, leisure, material security, and other things related to class locations will be identified and coded. Wright's (2005, p.12) definition of class location is also adopted.

“designate the social positions occupied by individuals within a particular kind of social relation, class relations, not simply an atomized attribute of the person..... A class location is not a class; it is a location-within-relations. The number of such locations within an analysis of class structure, then, depends upon how fine-grained an account is needed for the purposes at hand..... For other problems, a more coarse-grained description of locations-within-relations may provide more insight. In my work on the problem of class compromise I felt a much simpler two-location class model consisting only of workers and capitalists was appropriate” (Wright, 2005, p.9).

I argue that a two-location class model is appropriate for my research. The reason to include a class analysis is to help understand the issue of imbalance as defined before. Two main aspects of the imbalance are the income and wealth gap between the rich and the poor, and the income and wealth gap between the rural and urban residents. A primary source of the gaps comes from the inequality between the wealthy capitalists and the poor rural workers who either work as farmers or migrant workers. An analysis of capital and labor interests is sufficient to show how the two classes benefit differently from the plans and will contribute to the understanding of the imbalance. In 2018, more than 53% of total work force in China worked in the primary industry (agriculture) and the secondary industry (mining, manufacturing, construction, etc.) (CSY, 2019). Compared with the low-skilled workers who work in the primary and secondary industry, the proportion of high-skilled labor, experts, and managers in China is relatively small. Thus, a two-location class model, the capital-labor division, is appropriate for my research.

The goals and strategies in the selected five-year plans will be evaluated systematically in terms of their potential beneficiaries. According to the description of the texts in the plans, two independent and well-trained coders coded which group is direct beneficiary of the strategy. More detailed evaluation procedures will be described in the research design section.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN

Multiple Case Study Research Design

This is an instrumental and multiple case study that aims to explore the issue of imbalanced development in China through describing and analyzing China's Thirteenth Five-Year Plans. There are several reasons why case study is the most appropriate approach for my research.

First, the epistemology of the critical social research underpins my research design. The principal concern of critical social research is not to discover the causes of the observed social phenomena. This makes research designs that are intended to look for phenomenon's causes such as experimental and quasi-experimental design not appropriate. The critical social research is not interested in the relationships between aggregated variables if they don't help the process of criticizing. This rules out typical correlational research designs. The critical social research goes beyond describing social phenomena and interpreting people's lived experiences and their constructed meanings. This rules out research designs such as phenomenological research.

As argued by Lee Harvey (1990, p.7), "critical social research thus aims at an analysis of social processes, delving beneath ostensive and dominant conceptual frames, in order to reveal the underlying practices, their historical specificity and structural manifestations". I want to explore whether and how the issue of imbalanced development is addressed in the Thirteenth FYPs, whether the government is fulfilling

the promise of common prosperity, and whether there are exploitive arrangements embedded in the plans. To answer these questions, I need deep understanding of the Thirteenth FYPs as they were produced by the Chinese government. Crowe et al. (2011, p. 1) argued that

“A case study is a research approach that is used to generate an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of a complex issue in its real-life context..... (And it) is particularly useful to employ when there is a need to obtain an in-depth appreciation of an issue, event or phenomenon of interest, in its natural real-life context”.

Even though case study can be approached in different ways, the “central tenet being the need to explore an event or phenomenon in depth and in its natural context” (Crowe et al., 2011, p.1). Yin (2009, p. 18) defined case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context.” Stake (1995) summarized three types of case study, intrinsic, instrumental, and collective. Intrinsic case study is to learn about a particular phenomenon. Instrumental case study is conducted to explore a particular issue and a collective case study investigates multiple cases at the same time to gain a broader understanding of the phenomenon. Considering the central tenet of case study approach and my need to deeply investigate the FYPs in a naturalistic setting, case study approach is most appropriate research design for me.

Second, I have clearly identifiable cases with boundaries. The boundaries are China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plans. Creswell and Poth (2016, p. 151) defined case study as a research approach “in which the investigator explores a real-life, contemporary bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time.....and reports a

case description and case themes”. The Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020) consist of real-life, contemporary multiple bounded plan documents as cases. The most important reason why I chose to use official planning documents as cases is that I am interested in a phenomenon that happened in the past. The plans were produced during the time from 2011 to 2016. Four years have passed since they were made laws. In this sense, the research is historical. I cannot observe the planning process. Even if there are videos or reports of the planning process, they won’t be as complete, consistent, and rigorous as the official plans. Analyzing well written and circulated official plans provides accurate and deep insights about what were included in the plans, and lays the foundation for making logical inferences and arguments. The evaluation results will serve to better future policy making.

Third, the research is intended to provide an in-depth understanding of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans as cases to shine light on the issue of imbalanced development in China. Creswell and Poth (2017, p.153) argued that

“A qualitative case study can be composed to illustrate a unique case.....Alternatively, the intent of the case study may be to understand a specific issue, problem, or concern and a case or cases selected to best understand the problem. This is called an instrumental case”.

My study is instrumental in the sense that I aim to contribute to the understanding of imbalanced development in China by analyzing multiple five-year plans.

Case Selection/ Purposeful Sampling

Study Population: All of China's Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020) at national, provincial, and city levels ($N > 330$). I will focus on published online official planning papers named Thirteenth Socio-Economic Five-Year Plans.

Sample design: The maximum variation sampling strategy was adopted (Patton, 2002). Provinces selected vary to a great extent in terms of their socio-economic indicators such as GDP, GDP per capita, and the percentage of workforce employed by the private industrial sector. Provincial plans were selected from the three different regions, the eastern, western, and central region. Province GDP in 2014 was selected as an indicator of variation because the main concern of the imbalanced development is economic. The percentage of workforce employed by the private industrial sector indicates the strength of the private industrial sector in the province. It's important because one of the research questions deal with the political participation of the capitalist class. The same sampling strategy applied when the cities were selected in each province.

Sample size: With the maximum variation strategy, I purposefully selected 2 provinces from each region and 2 cities from each selected province and then analyzed their official planning papers. In total, 20 official planning papers were analyzed, 2 National Five-Year Plans including the Twelfth and Thirteenth Plan, 6 provincial Five-Year Plans, and 12 city Five-Year Plans.

The sampling of the eastern region: there are 11 provinces in the eastern region (CSY, 2020). Jiangsu and Hebei Province were selected, according to the maximum variation criterion. Jiangsu Province was ranked as top across all kinds of economic

indicators in 2014 when the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans were made. For example, it had the second highest Provincial GDP in the Eastern region; highest sum of paid-in capital of the private industrial enterprises; highest number of higher education institutions (Yearbook, 2020). Hebei Province had the lowest percentage of people employed in the private sector, second lowest GDP per capita in 2014, and third lowest percentage of GDP contributed by the private industrial sector in the region. In Jiangsu Province, the city of Changzhou and Lianyungang were selected. Changzhou had the highest percent of employment by the private sector and Changzhou had the lowest (Jiangsu Bureau of Statistics, 2020) in 2014. In Hebei Province, the city of Tangshan and Hengshui were selected. Tangshan had the highest percent of employment by the private sector and Hengshui had the lowest (Hebei Bureau of Statistics, 2020).

The sampling of the Central region: there are 8 provinces in the Eastern region. 2 Provinces were selected, according to the maximum variation criterion. Jiangxi Province performed average in terms of GDP, GDP per capita, but had highest percentage of GDP contributed by the private industrial sector. Heilongjiang Province had the second lowest percentage of employment in the private sector and the lowest percentage of GDP contributed by the private industrial sector. In Jiangxi Province, the city of Jiujiang and Nanchang were selected. Jiujiang had the highest percent of employment by the private sector and Nanchang had the lowest (Jiangxi Bureau of Statistics, 2020). In Heilongjiang Province, the city of Tangshan and Hengshui were selected. Shuangyashan had the highest percent of employment by the private sector and Yichun had the lowest (Heilongjiang Bureau of Statistics, 2020).

The sampling of the Western region: there are 12 provinces in the Eastern region. 2 Provinces were selected, according to the maximum variation criterion. Neimenggu Province had the highest GDP per capita, second highest employment percentage in the private sector, and the second highest percentage of GDP contributed by the private industrial sector in 2014 in the Western region. Yunnan Province had the third lowest GDP per capita, third lowest percentage of GDP contributed by the private industrial sector, and about average employment percentage in the private sector. In Neimenggu Province, the city of Bayannaoer and Tongliao were selected. Bayannaoer had the highest percent of employment by the private sector and Hengshui had the lowest (Neimenggu Bureau of Statistics, 2020). In Yunnan Province, the city of Yuxi and Zhaotong were selected. Yuxi had the highest percent of employment by the private sector and Zhaotong had the lowest (Yunnan Bureau of Statistics, 2020).

Data Collection Method

My data collection method is downloading secondary data, the official planning papers published by the Chinese government. The most important reason why I choose to download the official planning papers is that I am interested in studying plans that were made in the past. The plans were produced from 2013 to 2016. Four years have passed since they were made laws. In this sense, the research is historical. Analyzing well written and circulated official plans provides accurate and deep insights about what were included in the plans, and lays the foundation for making logical inferences and

arguments. The inferences and arguments will serve as a critical examination and reflection of past policies and will serve to better future policy making.

For trade-off between breadth and depth, I choose breadth because I want to have a multiple case comparison and get a more generalized conclusion about China's thirteenth five-year plans. Interviewing people and analyzing transcripts can be very time consuming and with limited research time, I prefer to do more plan analysis to increase the validity of my research conclusion in Chinese context.

Data Analysis Method

The five-year plans were analyzed by the method of summative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Hsieh and Shannon (2005, p.1283-1284) argued that

“a summative approach to qualitative content analysis goes beyond mere word counts to include latent content analysis. Latent content analysis refers to the process of interpretation of content. In this analysis, the focus is on discovering underlying meanings of the words or the content”.

This approach suits my research because the answers to my research questions require more than word counts. It requires making sense of the underlying content such as the spatial and social implications of the five-year plans.

The most important reason why I choose to use content analysis is that the answers to my research question are not directly observable. It only comes to light by researchers' reading, analyzing, interpreting, and concluding. In this case, the five-year plans were made in the past and it's impossible to observe the plan making process. Also,

if one of the social groups such as the capitalist class tends to benefit more from the five-year plans, this arrangement could be deliberately hidden in some way and made hard for people to discern. At last, the social implications of the research questions are politically sensitive. Some interviewers might have a stake in the plans and might not be willing to answer questions honestly.

Data Analysis Procedures

The data analysis follows the content analysis procedure described by Zhang and Wildemuth (2016).

Step 1: Data Preparing:

The official five-year plans were downloaded.

Step 2: Define the Unit of Analysis:

The research includes multiple levels of unit of analysis: China overall as a country, regional level, provincial level, and city level.

Step 3: Develop Categories and a Coding Scheme:

The key words for coding are the urban, the rural, the eastern, the central, the western, the rich, the poor, inequality, poverty, anti-poverty, farmers, workers, high skilled professionals, industries, micro, small and mid-size business/enterprise, and entrepreneurs. The Chinese words in the plans that have the liberal meanings of the key words above were highlighted as key words.

The key words were generated from a review of the literature review. As presented in the first section of the literature review, imbalanced development in China is

defined as the spatial inequality between the urban and the rural regions, and between eastern, and western and central regions; and the social inequality of income and wealth between the rich and the poor. Building on Marx's class theory, the rich are represented by the class of capitalist and the poor are represented by the working class (Wright, 2005).

Coding scheme is defined as such:

The first thing coded was whether the strategy proposed in the plan addresses the issue of imbalance. As defined earlier, there are three main aspects of imbalanced development, the economic disparity between the urban and rural regions, between eastern, and western and central regions, and between the rich's and the poor's income and accumulated wealth. If the strategy directly deals with the gap, or it aims to improve the situation of the rural area, the Western and the Central regions, or it supports the poor who could be farmers or workers, then the strategy will be coded as "Y" which means it addresses the issue of imbalance. However, if there are no key words related to the urban, rural, Western, Central, workers, farmers, the poor, and the low-income or the words that have similar meaning are found in the strategy, then the strategy will be coded as "N" which means it does not address the issue of imbalance.

The key words were used to identify strategies related to the different regions and social groups in the five-year plans. In order to understand how different regions and social groups' interests are reflected in the plans, planning strategies' potential direct beneficiaries were coded and put in matrices for later analysis. If no key words related to regions, urban and rural areas and social groups are identified in the texts, and the

strategy is irrelevant to imbalanced development or its implication for imbalanced development cannot be logically reached unless extra information or specific context is provided, then the strategy was coded as NA. The strategy's implication was coded as NA if the strategy benefits more than one group or one region.

The strategies that have clear spatial implications were coded as either "the Eastern region, represented by E", or "the Central Region, represented by C", or "the Western Region, represented by W"; or "the Urban area, represented by U", or "the Rural area, represented by R", or "the general public by G". For Marx class analysis, the strategy will be coded as either "the capitalists, represented by Cap", or "the working class, represented by Wor, or "the general public by G". "G" means the strategy's goal is broad and general and no specific group or region is mentioned and emphasized. If there are no key words related to class or regional interests, it was coded as NA. If a strategy benefits both workers and capitalists, and key words related to class interests are identified, then the strategy were coded as G. If a strategy benefits both the urban and rural areas, and key words related to the spatial interests are identified, then the strategy was coded as G. If a strategy benefits both the Eastern and Western, or Eastern and Central, and key words related to regional interests are identified, then the strategy was coded as G.

The operational definition of direct beneficiary is defined as such:

Direct beneficiary is the region or group that, according to the plan's goals or strategies texts, will directly receive supports as written. The words "support" or the

words with similar meanings have to be found in the texts. The name of the group has to be clearly shown in the texts such as XXX industry or farmers.

Every plan was coded as presented in the table below:

Table 3.1 Coding Matrices

| Plan XXX | | How the Imbalanced Development Addressed | | | Strategy's Implication for Imbalanced Development | Marx Class Analysis | | Spatial Regional | | Spatial Urban/Rural | |
|-------------|------------|--|-------------------|----------------------------|---|---------------------|--|-------------------|--|---------------------|--|
| | | Yes/No | Where in the plan | How addressed | | Direct | | Direct | | Direct | |
| Goal 1 | Strategy 1 | Y | P.21 | 1. xxx 2. xxx 3. xxx | Reduce (Reason, which aspect of the imbalance is likely to be impacted?) | Cap (reason) | | W (reason) | | U (reason) | |
| | Strategy 2 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Strategy 3 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Strategy 4 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Goal 2 | Strategy 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Strategy 2 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Strategy 3 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Strategy 4 | | | | | | | | | | |
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Step 4: Code All the Text

Step 5: Assess Coding Consistency

Step 7: Draw Conclusions from the Coded Data

Step 8: Report Analytic Methods and Findings (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 2-5)

Trustworthiness of the Research

Different Research Paradigms and Different Criteria to Judge Research Quality

Qualitative content analysis as a data analysis methodology, is essentially different from the Positivist methodologies such as statistical modeling and experimental analysis in terms of its research paradigm, purpose, and inference process. The conventional criteria such as internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity are not suitable to evaluate the quality of qualitative content analysis (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). The qualitative content analysis method adopted in my research follows the critical research paradigm described by Fay (1987).

This critical social science research paradigm is different from the Positivist research paradigm in that it does not solely seek to theorize and discover universally applicable and objective laws of human society. It's not interested in abstract laws that transcend time and space unless the knowledge helps the oppressed. Critical social science is also different from the Constructivism in the sense that it does not limit research scope at purely describing subjects' self-constructions or constructed meanings. By presenting evidence and making arguments in particular contexts, it goes further to challenge research audiences' existing knowledge, beliefs, and false consciousness and

help them see themselves or certain social phenomenon differently and stimulate changes (Fay, 1987).

The qualitative content analysis adopted in my research is interpretive and relies on researchers’ subjective judgements to perform the inference process, the Step 5. Thus, the criteria used to judge research that seeks objectivity cannot be applied. Elo et al. (2014, p. 2) argued that “the most widely used criteria for evaluating qualitative content analysis are those developed by (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). They used the term trustworthiness”. The four criteria proposed to establish trustworthiness are credibility, confirmability, dependability, and transferability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The figure below summaries the four criteria.

Figure 3.1 Four Criteria to Evaluate Trustworthiness

| Criteria | Underlying principles |
|--------------------|--|
| 1. Credibility | Engage with the content and context of sources |
| 2. Confirmability | Discuss interpretations Reveal underlying assumptions |
| 3. Dependability | Ensure interpretations are grounded in evidence Adopt different approaches to research |
| 4. Transferability | Allow others to comment on the process of research Build a richly contextualized account of the case(s) under study Permit comparison of context under study to other contexts |

Source: Gill et al. (2018, p. 195)

Establishing Trustworthiness

In the following section, I will first introduce the concept of trustworthiness and then explain how I have established trustworthiness in my research by satisfying the four criteria.

Trustworthiness

Gill et al. (2018, p. 194) argued that

“Trustworthiness equates to an inquirer making their research practices visible, and therefore auditable, enabling others to gain a richer insight into how their findings were produced. ‘Trustworthiness’, instead of ‘truth’, reflects the idea that validation is displaced ‘from its traditional location in a presumably objective, nonreactive, and neutral reality, and moves it to the social world – a world constructed in and through our discourse and actions, through.”

The key point is that establishing trustworthiness is to make the research credible for whoever intends to read and understand the research. High trustworthiness means research audiences find both research process and results highly credible and can be trusted.

Satisfying the Four Criteria

(1) Credibility: Lincoln and Guba argued that (1985, p. 213) “a major trustworthiness criterion is ‘credibility in the eyes of the information sources, for without such credibility the findings and conclusions as a whole cannot be found credible by the consumer of the inquiry report”. Gill et al. (2018, p.195) suggested that the criterion is satisfied when research audiences or readers “agree with or have confidence in the researchers’ interpretations or reconstructions”. Lincoln and Guba (1987) proposed two

principles of credibility: engage with the content and context of sources; and discuss interpretations.

My research was designed to satisfy the two principles. First, engaging with the content and context of sources means being familiar with the research subjects and the contexts the subjects are in by sustained engagement. After two years of consistent study of urban planning and research design in the Ph.D. program, including planning theories and practices, urban economics, and planning evaluation, I am familiar with the subject of plan evaluation. To better understand Chinese planning context, I devoted a large portion of my literature review for Chinese planning history and particularly its five-year planning history. By providing the history and evaluating past five-year plan research, my research design shows the familiarity with the research subject. Second, Lincoln and Guba (1987) argued that peer debriefing should be deployed to discuss researchers' interpretations. Gill et al. (2018, p.196) maintained that "peer debriefing describes an inquirer exposing their work to a disinterested peer to keep the inquirer 'honest', to test emerging hypotheses and identify assumptions or feelings that may cloud good judgment". On the one hand, my four Ph.D. committee members are all experienced researchers in the field of planning and my work will be examined and discussed by them. On the other hand, an inter-coder reliability score was computed to strengthen my research credibility. Usually, a score is considered acceptable when it is equal or greater than 80%

(2) Confirmability

Gill et al. (2018, p.196) argued that “confirmability refers to researchers’ attempts to identify some of their assumptions and predilections in the findings of their study through explicit consideration of their interpretation of the data”. Lincoln and Guba (1987) proposed two principles of confirmability: revealing underlying assumptions; and ensure interpretations are grounded in evidence.

First, this research’s fundamental assumption is that the official evaluations and claims about of China’s Five-Year Plans could be unreliable because of the potential influence of the capitalist class. Even though a Marxist approach of class analysis was adopted in my research, I am not a Marxist. I do find the class analysis useful in identifying potential oppressive arrangements in the plans. But there are many areas that I don’t agree with the mainstream Marxists such as Cohen. For example, I don’t believe capitalism is doomed to self-destruction and socialism is inevitable. I do see some merits of private production but I don’t believe it should be the only way of human production.

Second, to ensure my interpretations are grounded in evidence, I made sure my coding schemes and procedures are transparent and well displayed. The reasons for each judgment made in the coding process was fully presented in the coding matrix. The inference process relied on well-accepted socio-economic theories and logic. Thus, other researchers are able to see the coding process and reflect on and criticize my research.

(3) Dependability

Gill et al. (2018, p.198) argued that dependability “called for interpretivist researchers to explain that their approach and process of developing interpretations is dependable, as they are only likely to yield credible results if they exhibit consistency”.

Lincoln and Guba (1987) proposed two principles of dependability: adopt different approaches to research; allow others to comment on the process of research.

First, a key technique to satisfy the principle of adopting different approaches to research is triangulation (Lincoln and Guba, 1987). Gill et al. (2018, p.198) added that “this principle encourages researchers to use not only different sources, but also different methods and researchers to gather and interpret data”. Part of my evaluation results were triangulated with a labor strike dataset and the conclusion generated was consistent with existing economic theories.

Second, my committee members especially my chair who is also my academic advisor had kept commented on my research process. They have expertise in the field and research experiences to guide my research.

(4) Transferability

Gill et al. (2018, p.199) argued that

“Scholars seeking to meet the criterion of transferability must be able to provide sufficient detail to contextualize their interpretations of a historical event, or what Guba and Lincoln (1994) refer to as a database, to facilitate future judgments about the transferability of findings to other contexts”.

Lincoln and Guba (1987) proposed two principles of transferability: Build a richly contextualized account of the cases under study; Permit comparison of context under study to other contexts.

First, my review of Chinese planning history and Chinese scholars’ research of the five-year plans provided rich contexts of my research case, five-year plans. In

addition to the literature reviewed, the key aspects of the plans were summarized to give more information of the plans' contexts.

Second, my research data, the plans are openly published and accessible to all. This openness and accessibility of my data provides great opportunity for other researchers to gain deep understanding of my cases and their contexts. Interested researchers can compare both my plans' qualities and plans' contexts to their research. Not only my data and their contexts could be useful for future researchers, my methodology serve as an example of critical plan evaluation.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Inter-Coder Reliability Score

As mentioned earlier, an inter-coder reliability score is generally considered acceptable when it is equal or greater than 80% (Miles & Huberman, 1994). After comparing my codes of the National Thirteenth Five-Year Plan with the ones produced by the other coder, the computed score is 87.2%.

After being familiar with the coding rules and framework, the other coder worked independently and produced the codes. He is a Ph.D. student studying political science in Japan and focuses on e-governance. He is familiar with public policy and fluent both in Chinese and English.

The limitation of the score is that there is only one five-year plan that was co-coded by both of us. There are 243 strategies in the five-year plan and our codes differ only in 31 strategies which is 87.2% agreement. However, we reached our consensus after we worked out our mayor coding differences. The major disagreement in the beginning of the discussion was that we had a different understanding about the word “enterprises”. In the National Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, the word “enterprises” was widely used and was an important signal word for coders to identify the capitalist class in the plan. In China, there are both private and public enterprises. When the word appears in the plan text, it’s not straightforward that whether it refers to both of them or just the private enterprises. I coded it as referring to the private enterprises unless there are words

indicating the other way. He coded it for the most part as referring to both of them. We had a discussion and he agreed with me after I listed my three reasons. First, when public enterprises are mentioned in the five-year plans, the phrases used are “state-owned enterprises”. The word “state-owned” is always attached to the word “enterprises” and there are several goals and strategies specifically devoted to the state-owned enterprises. Second, the private enterprises are playing a more and more important role in China especially in new strategic industries such internet, and big data industry. The plan emphasized innovation and job creation which for the most part now come from the private enterprises. Thus, when enterprises are mentioned in the plan text, unless there are words that signal the other meaning, treating “enterprises” as the private ones is not unreasonable. At last, the word “enterprises” was not treated blindly as private enterprises. Constant attempts were made to determine the exact meanings of the word in the specific plan text.

The Issue of Imbalanced Development

National Plans

Yes, following the trend of the Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the issue of imbalanced development in China, is addressed in all Thirteenth Five-Year plans analyzed. Imbalanced development as defined in the earlier section, refers to spatial inequality, and income and wealth inequality (Xi, 2017). Spatial inequality refers to the huge economic disparity between the urban and rural regions, and between the eastern, western, and central regions. Income and wealth inequality refers to the huge gap in

income and accumulated wealth between the rich and the poor, as measured by the Gini coefficient.

In the Twelfth National Five-Year plan, 53 out of 168 (31.5%) strategies address imbalance while in the Thirteenth National Five-Year plan, only 50 out of 193 (20.6%) deal with the issue. The remaining strategies in the plans do not directly address any aspect of imbalanced development. Rather they cover broad topics such as demographic work, public safety, socialism values, environment protection, and climate change.

Table 4.1 The Issue of Imbalance at the National Level

| Plan Names | # Total Strategies (Total) | # Strategies address the issue (Y) | # Strategies don't address the issue (N) |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| 12th National Plan | 168 | 53 31.5% | 115 68.5% |
| 13 th National Plan | 243 | 50 20.6% | 193 79.4% |
| Total | 411 | 103 25.1% | 308 74.9% |

The goals and strategies that address imbalance are mostly shared by the Twelfth and Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan, despite the Twelfth plan's higher percentage of 31.5%, compared with the Thirteenth's 20.6%. The shared goals that address the issue in both plans include agriculture development, rural development, regional development strategies, income distribution and redistribution, public service improvement such as

education and healthcare service, social security programs, and public tax and finance reform.

The main difference between the two plans, in terms of addressing imbalance, is that farmers and the rural areas are emphasized more in the Twelfth plan where the first 4 goals and 14 strategies are all devoted to their concerns. These strategies are specifically designed to support the farmers and rural areas. However, in the Thirteenth plan, attention to their issues is switched to a more general concern of poverty and innovation. There are a few goals and strategies for the farmers and rural areas in the Thirteenth national plan. However, in all Thirteenth five-year plans the goal of “Poverty Reduction and Elimination” serves as an umbrella goal to organize different strategies to fight against poverty. The word “poverty” is used in a general way to include poor people and poor places, both the urban and rural poor. There is no such umbrella goal in the Twelfth plan. The efforts to reduce and eliminate poverty is more organized and systematic in the Thirteenth plan. Thus, it’s hard to judge which of the two national plans emphasizes the issue of imbalanced development more. Different aspects of the issue are emphasized in the two plans. The drop in the percentage of strategies that deal with imbalance can be interpreted as an alarming signal warning people to keep their eyes open for future policies that might ignore or downplay the issue of imbalance.

Provincial Plans

In the 6 provincial plans, 143 strategies (17.6%) out of 811 address the issue of imbalanced development.

Table 4.2 The Issue of Imbalance at the Provincial Level

| Province Name | Region | Total | Y | N |
|---------------|-------------|-------|---------------|---------------|
| Jiangsu | Eastern (E) | 112 | 21 18.8% | 91 81.2% |
| Hebei | Eastern (E) | 110 | 21 19.1% | 89 80.1% |
| Jiangxi | Central (C) | 174 | 34 19.5% | 140 80.5% |
| Heilongjiang | Central (C) | 57 | 10 17.5% | 47 82.5% |
| Neimenggu | Western (W) | 141 | 22 15.6% | 119 84.4% |
| Yunnan | Western (W) | 217 | 35 16.1% | 182 83.9% |
| Total | | 811 | 143 17.60% | 668 82.40% |

All 6 provincial plans have relatively fewer strategies that address imbalance than in the two national plans, with highest percentage of 19.5% in Jiangxi Province and the lowest 15.6% in Neimenggu Province. A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the percentage distributions are homogenous or not between national and province level by RStudio (version, 1.2.5033).

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.002216 rejects the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national and provincial plans. It supports the claim that the distributions of the number of the strategies that address and don't address the issue in the national and provincial plans are significantly different.² A proportion test, with p-value

² A proportion test was performed to determine whether national plans' Y percentage (the percentage of the strategies that address the issue) is higher than province plans' Y percentage or not. The result generated by RStudio shows that p value equals 0.001422 which is less than 0.05. It rejects the null hypothesis that

0.001422 rejects the null hypothesis that national plans' Y percentage is equal to provincial plans' Y percentage. Thus, it supports the claim that national plans' Y percentage is higher than provincial plans' Y percentage.

The provincial plans for the most part follow Thirteenth national plan's goals and strategies except the part of three-region (Eastern, Central, and Western) development goal which is beyond province level. For example, all of the province plans have independent and umbrella goals of "poverty reduction and elimination". The leading and central role of innovation in the economy is upheld. The strategies that address the issue are very similar as the ones in the national plan. They include agriculture development, coordinated and unified rural and urban development, targeted poverty reduction and elimination, income distribution and redistribution, and better public services.

Thus, with similar plan structures and strategies, and lower Y percentage, it can be argued that the issue of imbalanced development is given more attention and emphasis in the national plans than the provincial plans.

City Plans

In in the 12 city plans, 159 strategies (15.9%) among 1001 strategies address the issue of imbalanced development.

Table 4.3 The Issue of Imbalance at the City Level

| City Name | Province | Total | Y | N |
|-----------|----------|-------|---|---|
|-----------|----------|-------|---|---|

national plans' Y percentage is equal to province plans' Y percentage. Thus, it supports the claim that national plans' Y percentage is higher than province plans' Y percentage.

| | | | | |
|--------------|--------------|------|--------------|--------------|
| Changzhou | Jiangsu | 131 | 20 15.3% | 111 84.7% |
| Lianyungang | Jiangsu | 111 | 21 18.9% | 90 81.1% |
| Tangshan | Hebei | 109 | 15 13.8% | 94 86.2% |
| Hengshui | Hebei | 93 | 15 16.1% | 78 83.9% |
| Jiujiang | Jiangxi | 118 | 16 13.6% | 102 86.4% |
| Nanchang | Jiangxi | 41 | 5 12.2% | 36 87.8% |
| Shuangyashan | Heilongjiang | 21 | 4 19.0% | 17 81.0% |
| Yichun | Heilongjiang | 93 | 9 9.7% | 84 90.3% |
| Bayannaoer | Neimenggu | 71 | 11 15.5% | 60 84.5% |
| Tongliao | Neimenggu | 110 | 21 19.1% | 89 80.9% |
| Yuxi | Yunnan | 41 | 6 14.6% | 35 85.4% |
| Zhaotong | Yunnan | 62 | 16 25.8% | 46 74.2% |
| Total | | 1001 | 159 15.9% | 842 84.1% |

All 12 city plans except Zhaotong City's plan, have relatively fewer strategies that address imbalance than in the two national plans, with the second highest percentage of 19.1% in Tongliao City and the lowest 14.6% in Yuxi City. City plans' overall 15.9% is also lower than provincial plans' 17.6%.³

³ Chi-Square tests of homogeneity were performed to compare whether the percentage distributions are homogenous or not between the national and city level, and between the province and city level by RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency tables used are listed below.

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.00005591 rejects the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national and city plans.⁴

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.3207 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across provincial and city plans.⁵

The city plans also follow national plan's structure. For example, all city plans have the independent and umbrella goal of "poverty reduction and elimination". The leading and central role of innovation in the economy is emphasized too. The strategies that address imbalance are almost the same as the ones in the national plans. They propose agriculture development, unified rural and urban development, farmers' urbanization and citizenization, income distribution and redistribution to increase mid-income groups, targeted poverty reduction and elimination, and better public services such as improved education and healthcare service.

Thus, with similar plan structures and strategies, and lower Y percentage, it can be argued that the issue of imbalanced development is given more attention and emphasis in the national plans than both the provincial and city plans. With similar plan structures and strategies, and Y percentage, it can be argued that the issue of imbalanced development is given similar attention and emphasis in the provincial plans and city

⁴ It supports the claim that the distributions of the number of the strategies that address and don't address the issue in the national and city plans are significantly different. A proportion test was performed to determine whether national plans' Y percentage (the percentage of the strategies that address the issue) is higher than city plans' Y percentage or not. The p value equals 0.00003842 which is less than 0.05. It rejects the null hypothesis that national plans' Y percentage is equal to city plans' Y percentage. Thus, it supports the claim that national plans' Y percentage, combining the Twelfth and Thirteenth national plan, is higher than city plans' Y percentage.

⁵ It supports the claim that the distributions of the number of the strategies that address and don't address imbalance in the provincial and city plans are homogenous.

plans. Since the issue of imbalance is less emphasized in the provincial and city plans, the disadvantaged groups and places should be more active at local level to participate in planning making and double-check plan implementation.

The Strategies in the Five-Year Plans and Imbalanced Development

National Plans

In the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 47 (28%) strategies among 168 strategies, tend to reduce imbalance while 39 (23.2%) strategies tend to reinforce imbalance. 82 (48.8%) strategies are not relevant to, or don't not have clear implications for, the issue of imbalanced development. A strategy is considered to reduce imbalance when it benefits either the western region, or the central region, or the farmers, or workers, or the poor, or the rural areas; it reinforces imbalance when it benefits either the easter region, the capitalists, the rich, or the urban areas.

Among 243 strategies proposed in the Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan, 51 (21.0%) strategies tend to reduce imbalanced development while 57 (23.5%) strategies tend to reinforce it. 135 (55.6%) strategies are not relevant to, or don't not have clear implications for, the issue of imbalanced development.

Table 4.4 The Strategies and Imbalance at National Level

| Plan Names | # Total Strategies | # Strategies tend to reduce the imbalance (Red) | # Strategies tend to reinforce the imbalance (Rei) | # Strategies that are not relevant to the issue (NA) |
|------------|--------------------|---|--|--|
|------------|--------------------|---|--|--|

| | | | | |
|--------------------|-----|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| 12th National Plan | 168 | 47 28.0% | 39 23.2% | 82 48.8% |
| 13th National Plan | 243 | 51 21.0% | 57 23.5% | 135 55.6% |
| Total | 411 | 98 23.8% | 96 23.4% | 217 52.8% |

In consistent with the conclusion that the Twelfth national plan have relatively more strategies that address imbalance than in the Thirteenth national plan, there are relatively more strategies that tend to reduce imbalance in the Twelfth plan than in the Thirteenth plan with 28.0% in the Twelfth plan and 21.0% in the Thirteenth plan. The goals and strategies that tend to reduce imbalance are almost the same ones that directly address the issue as summarized in the last section.⁶

The percentages of the strategies that tend to reduce and reinforce imbalanced development are similar in the Twelfth plan and Thirteenth national plan. The percentages are all around 20%. Thus, it can be argued that different goals and strategies that have different implications for the issue of imbalance are both well represented in the two plans. There are no one type of goals and strategies that dominate the national plans.

⁶ For example, in the Twelfth plan, Y's percentage is 31.5% and here Red's percentage is 28.0%. They are very similar because most strategies that deal with the issue of imbalance tend to reduce it. Only in a few occasions, the strategies that address the issue of imbalance have multiple implications which makes it to be coded as "no clear implications, NA". In the Thirteenth plan, Y's percentage is 20.6% and here 21.0%. They incorporate goals such as agriculture development, unified rural and urban development, and better public services. The goals that tend to reinforce the imbalance are mostly shared by both plans and their percentages are almost the same which are about 23%. They focus on private industrial development, foreign commerce and trade, business recruitment, Eastern regional development and urban development

Provincial Plans

In the provincial plans, 152 (18.7%) strategies among 811 strategies, tend to reduce imbalance while 176 (21.7%) strategies tend to reinforce imbalance.

Table 4.5 The Strategies and Imbalance at the Provincial Level

| Province Name | Region | Total | Red | Rei | NA |
|---------------|---------|-------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Jiangsu | East | 112 | 20 17.9% | 35 31.3% | 57 50.8% |
| Hebei | East | 110 | 21 19.1% | 31 28.2% | 58 52.7% |
| Jiangxi | Central | 174 | 38 21.8% | 34 30.9% | 102 47.3% |
| Heilongjiang | Central | 57 | 11 19.3% | 16 28.7% | 30 78.0% |
| Neimenggu | West | 141 | 23 16.3% | 30 21.3% | 88 62.4% |
| Yunnan | West | 217 | 39 17.8% | 30 13.8% | 148 68.4% |
| Total | | 811 | 152 18.7% | 176 21.7% | 483 59.6% |

In the provincial plans, Red's (the strategies that tend to reduce the imbalance) 18.7% is close to Rei's (the strategies that tend to reinforce the imbalance) 21.7%. The 3% difference is not significant. It can be argued that different goals and strategies that have different implications for imbalance are both well represented in the provincial plans. There is no one type of goals and strategies that dominate the province plans. The goals and strategies that tend to reduce imbalance are almost the same ones that directly address the issue as summarized earlier. The goals that tend to reinforce the imbalance

are mostly shared by all provinces. They focus on private sector industrial innovation and development, regional innovation, entrepreneurship, private sector development, urban development, and international commerce. A chi-square test, with p-value 0.05025 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national and city plans.⁷

City Plans

In the city plans, 159 (15.9%) strategies among 1001 strategies tend to reduce imbalance and 194 (19.4%) strategies tend to reinforce it.

Table 4.6 The Strategies and Imbalance at the City Level

| City Name | Province | Total | Red | Rei | NA |
|--------------|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Changzhou | Jiangsu | 131 | 18 | 29 | 84 |
| | | | 13.7% | 22.1% | 64.1% |
| Lianyungang | Jiangsu | 111 | 19 | 27 | 65 |
| | | | 17.1% | 24.3% | 58.6% |
| Tangshan | Hebei | 109 | 15 | 30 | 64 |
| | | | 13.8% | 27.5% | 58.7% |
| Hengshui | Hebei | 93 | 16 | 24 | 53 |
| | | | 17.2% | 25.8% | 57.0% |
| Jiujiang | Jiangxi | 118 | 20 | 17 | 81 |
| | | | 16.9% | 14.4% | 68.6% |
| Nanchang | Jiangxi | 41 | 5 | 9 | 27 |
| | | | 12.2% | 22.0% | 65.9% |
| Shuangyashan | Heilongjiang | 21 | 4 | 1 | 14 |
| | | | 19.0% | 4.8% | 66.7% |
| Yichun | Heilongjiang | 93 | 9 | 22 | 62 |
| | | | 9.7% | 23.7% | 66.7% |
| Bayannaouer | Neimenggu | 71 | 11 | 13 | 47 |

⁷ A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategy implication distributions are identical or not across national and provincial level with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above. The test result shows that the p-value is bigger than 0.05. It fails to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national and provincial level. It supports the claim that the strategy implication distributions are homogenous across national and provincial plans.

| | | | | | |
|------------------|-----------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | | 15.5% | 18.3% | 66.2% |
| Tongliao | Neimenggu | 110 | 20 | 9 | 81 |
| | | | 18.2% | 8.2% | 73.6% |
| Yuxi | Yunnan | 41 | 6 | 5 | 30 |
| | | | 14.6% | 12.2% | 73.2% |
| Zhaotong shao | Yunnan | 62 | 16 | 8 | 38 |
| | | | 25.8% | 12.9% | 61.3% |
| Total | | 1001 | 159 | 194 | 646 |
| | | | 15.9% | 19.4% | 64.5% |

In the city plans, Red's 15.9% is close to Rei's 19.4%. It can be argued that different goals and strategies that have different implications for the issue of imbalance are all well represented well in the city plans. No one type of goals or strategies that dominate the plans. The goals and strategies that tend to reduce imbalance are the same ones that directly address imbalance as summarized earlier. The goals that tend to reinforce imbalance are mostly shared by all cities. They focus on urban spatial layout, urbanization, special zones for development and innovation, internationalization of the city economy, entrepreneurship, foreign trade, and business recruitment.

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.0006324 rejects the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across the national, provincial, and city plans.⁸

⁸ A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategy implication distributions are identical or not across national, provincial, and city plans with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above. The test result shows that the p-value is less than 0.05. It rejects the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national, provincial, and city plans. It supports the claim that the strategy implication distributions are significantly different across national, provincial, and city plans.

In conclusion, first, the national five-year plans combining the Twelfth and Thirteenth national plan, have the highest proportion of the strategies that tend to reduce imbalance. It's higher than the provincial and city plans' proportions. And the provincial plans and city plans don't differ in terms of their proportion of the strategies that tend to reduce imbalance. Second, the three levels of five-year plans don't differ significantly in terms of their proportion of the strategies that tend to reinforce imbalance.⁹

Regional Imbalance and the National Five-Year Plans

Yes, following the trend of the Eleventh Five-Year Plans, regional imbalance is addressed in both the Twelfth and Thirteenth national plans. Among the 168 strategies in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 26 (15.5%) strategies have clear regional implications.

Among the 26 strategies that do have regional implications, 13(50%) strategies benefit

⁹ Proportion tests were performed to determine which plans' "Red" and "Rei" have higher percentages. The contingency tables used are listed above.

The first proportion test, with p-value 0.02202 rejects the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national and provincial plans. It supports the claim that national plans' Red percentage is significantly higher than the provincial plans' Red percentage.

The second proportion test with p value 0.000285 supports the claim that national plans' Red percentage is significantly higher than the city plans' Red percentage.

The third proportion test with p value 0.06156 fails to reject the null hypothesis of the identical proportion. It supports the claim that the provincial plans' Red percentage is not significantly different from the city plans' Red percentage.

The fourth proportion test with p value 0.2794 fails to reject the null hypothesis of the identical proportions. It supports the claim that the national plans' Rei percentage is not significantly different than the provincial plans' Rei percentage.

The fifth proportion test with p value 0.05393 fails to reject the null hypothesis of the identical proportions. It supports the claim that the national plans' Rei percentage is not significantly different than the city plans' Rei percentage. The p value of the last test equals 0.123 which fails to reject the null hypothesis of the identical proportion. It supports the claim that the provincial plans' Rei percentage is not significantly different than the city plans' Rei percentage.

the western and central regions, and 10 (38.5%) benefit the Eastern region. There are more strategies supporting the lagging western and central regions.

In the Thirteenth National Five-Year Plans, 25 strategies (10.3%) among 243 strategies are related to the regional issues. While regional imbalance is addressed in the Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan, it's not prioritized because of the low percentage. Among the 25 strategies that do have clear regional implications, 12 (48.0%) strategies benefit the western and central regions, and 10 (40.0%) benefit the eastern region. There are more strategies that aim to support the western and central regions than the eastern region.

Table 4.7 National Five-Year Plans' Regional Implications

| | Total | # Strategies that benefit the Eastern region (E) | # Strategies that benefit the Western and Central region (W+C) | # Strategies that benefit all three regions (G) | NA |
|-----------|-------|--|--|---|-----|
| 12th Plan | 168 | 10 | 13 | 3 | 142 |
| 13th Plan | 243 | 10 | 12 | 3 | 218 |
| Total | 411 | 20 | 25 | 6 | 360 |

Decreased from the Twelfth plan's 15% to Thirteenth plan's 10%, the strategies that address the regional issues have remained peripheral in the national five-year plans. Among the strategies do deal with regional issues, in both plans, there are more strategies that benefit the western and central regions than the eastern region. It shows that regional

imbalance has been addressed in the national five-year plans even though it's not of central importance. The strategies that aim to support the western and central regions include sustainable agriculture development, additional human talent allocation, transportation network improvement, prioritizing Western region for large-scale projects and making sure the Belt and the Road initiative implemented in the region, supporting ethnic minority areas, encouraging more foreign capital investments, more supports for education especially higher education, and healthcare service development. The strategies that benefit the Eastern region propose pushing agglomeration of service industries in the coastal regions, deepening the opening-up of the coastal regions, promoting integrated development of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei province, strengthening the ocean economy, and supporting Hongkong, Macao, and Taiwan province.

The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan's Urban and Rural Implications

National Plans

Yes, the rural and urban imbalance is addressed in both the Twelfth and Thirteenth National Five-Year plans. In the Twelfth national five-year plan there are 40 strategies (23.8%) among 168 strategies in which key words "rural" or "urban" is identified. Among the 40 strategies that do have clear rural and urban implications, 24 strategies (60.0%) benefit the rural areas, 8 strategies (20.0%) benefit the urban areas, and 8 strategies (20.0%) support both the urban and rural areas in them. There are much more strategies supporting the rural areas than the urban areas. It can be argued that in the

Twelfth National Five-Year Plan, the rural areas are prioritized and given more attention and supports than the urban areas.

In the Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan, there are 47 strategies (19.3%) among 243 strategies in which key words “rural” or “urban” is identified. Among the 47 strategies that do deal with urban and rural issues, 25 strategies (53.2%) benefit the rural areas, 17 strategies (36.2%) benefit the urban areas, and 5 (10.6%) benefit both of them. There are more strategies benefiting the rural areas than the urban areas which supports the claim that rural areas are prioritized and given more attention. However, the 17% difference is much smaller than the 40% difference in the Twelfth plan. Compared with the Twelfth plan, the deemphasis of farmers and rural areas is clear in the Thirteenth national plan. As argued earlier, the specific emphasis of rural areas and farmers in the Twelfth plan is shifted to a more general emphasis of poverty and innovation in the Thirteenth plan. The goals that benefit the rural areas are shared by both plans which include agriculture development, expanding farmers’ income sources, better the living and productive environment, ecological protection and restoration, rural education reform, basic public service improvement, rural land reform, household registration reform, and coordinated urban and rural development. The goals that benefit the urban areas are shared by both plans and propose to develop county economies, city transportation, technological innovation systems in cities, harmonious cities, urban infrastructure, and integrated Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei.

Table 4.8 The Twelfth and Thirteenth National Five-Year Plans’ Urban and Rural Implications

| | Total | # Strategies that benefit the urban areas (U) | # Strategies that benefit the rural areas (R) | # Strategies that benefit both the urban and rural areas (G) | # Strategies that don't have clear implications for the rural and urban areas (NA) |
|-----------|-------|---|---|--|--|
| 12th Plan | 168 | 8 | 24 | 8 | 128 |
| 13th Plan | 243 | 17 | 25 | 5 | 196 |
| Total | 411 | 25 | 49 | 13 | 324 |

Provincial Plans

Yes, the rural and urban imbalance is addressed in all 6 provincial Thirteenth five-year plans. In the provincial plans, there are 159 strategies (19.6%) among 811 strategies in which key words “rural” or “urban” is identified. Among the 159 strategies that do have rural and urban implications, 92 strategies (57.9%) benefit the rural areas, 43 strategies (27.0%) benefit the urban areas, and 24 strategies (15.1%) support both areas. There are much more strategies supporting the rural areas than the urban areas. It can be argued that in the provincial Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, the rural areas are prioritized and given more attention and supports than the urban areas. The goals that benefit the rural areas are shared by most provincial plans which include agriculture development, unified urban and rural development, expanding farmers’ income sources, rural education improvement, village beautification, human-centered urbanization, targeted poverty reduction, cultural development supports, and rural land reform. The goals that benefit

the urban areas are also mostly shared in the provincial plans which include innovative industrial development in cities, urban transportation development, cities as growth poles, integrated development of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei, urban spatial layout optimization, provincial capital development, regional development for cities, urban public service improvement, cultural industrial development in cities, urban industrial cluster development and better urban infrastructure.

Table 4.9 The Provincial Plan’s Urban and Rural Implications

| Province Name | Region | Total | # Strategies that benefit the urban areas | # Strategies that benefit the rural areas | # Strategies that benefit both the urban and rural areas | # Strategies that don’t have clear implications for the rural and urban areas |
|---------------|--------|-------|---|---|--|---|
| | | | (U) | (R) | (G) | (NA) |
| Jiangsu | E | 112 | 6 | 13 | 7 | 86 |
| Hebei | E | 110 | 6 | 13 | 6 | 85 |
| Jiangxi | C | 174 | 9 | 21 | 1 | 143 |
| Heilongjiang | C | 57 | 6 | 9 | 0 | 42 |
| Neimenggu | W | 141 | 4 | 12 | 3 | 122 |
| Yunnan | W | 217 | 12 | 24 | 7 | 174 |
| Total | | 811 | 43 | 92 | 24 | 652 |

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.9597 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national and provincial level and supports the claim that in

the National and Provincial plans, the strategies' urban and rural implication distributions are homogenous.¹⁰

City Plans

Yes, the rural and urban imbalance is addressed all 12 city Thirteenth five-year plans. In the city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans there are 297 strategies (29.7%) among 1001 strategies in which key words “rural” or “urban” is identified. Among the 254 strategies that do have rural and urban implications, 112 strategies (37.7%) benefit the rural areas, 53 strategies (17.8%) benefit the urban areas, and 89 (30.0%) strategies support both areas. There are much more strategies supporting the rural areas than the urban areas. It can be argued that in the city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, the rural areas are prioritized and given more attention and supports than the urban areas. The goals that benefit the rural areas include agriculture development, rural spatial layout optimization, rural land reform, village beautification, farmers' income improvement, poverty reduction, better healthcare, rural education, training for using information technology, unified urban and rural development, social security programs, ecological industrial development, and rural institution reform to help the poor. The goals that focus on the urban areas propose optimization of urban spatial layout, improving service functions of city cores, improving urban transportation, cities as growth-poles, livable and ecological cities, old town regeneration, new town development, industrial agglomeration, city beautification, and increasing urban residents' income.

¹⁰ A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies' urban and rural implication distributions are identical or not across national and provincial level with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above.

Table 4.10 The City Plan’s Urban and Rural Implications

| City Name | Province | Total | U | R | G | NA |
|--------------|--------------|-------|----|-----|----|-----|
| Changzhou | Jiangsu | 131 | 5 | 14 | 8 | 104 |
| Lianyungang | Jiangsu | 111 | 7 | 14 | 10 | 80 |
| Tangshan | Hebei | 109 | 6 | 12 | 4 | 87 |
| Hengshui | Hebei | 93 | 2 | 11 | 1 | 79 |
| Jiujiang | Jiangxi | 118 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 89 |
| Nanchang | Jiangxi | 41 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 18 |
| Shuangyashan | Heilongjiang | 21 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 13 |
| Yichun | Heilongjiang | 93 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 75 |
| Bayannaouer | Neimenggu | 71 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 19 |
| Tongliao | Neimenggu | 110 | 4 | 11 | 8 | 77 |
| Yuxi | Yunnan | 41 | 1 | 3 | 11 | 26 |
| Zhaotong | Yunnan | 62 | 2 | 10 | 13 | 37 |
| Total | | 1001 | 53 | 112 | 89 | 704 |

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.00002377 rejects the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national, provincial, and city plans. ¹¹

The first proportion test with p value of 0.4607 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national and provincial plans. ¹²

¹¹ A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies’ urban and rural implication distributions are identical or not across national, provincial, and city level with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above. The test supports the claim that the strategies’ urban and rural implication distributions are significantly different. Proportion tests were performed to determine which level’s plans have higher U and R’s percentages. The contingency tables used are listed above.

¹² The first proportion test compared national plans with province plans in terms of their implications for the urban and rural areas. The p value of the test is 0.4607 that is bigger than 0.05 and consistent with the chi square test done in the last section. It fails to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national and province level. It supports the claim that in the National and Province plans, the strategies’ urban and rural implication distributions are homogenous.

The second and third proportion test with p value of 0.03235 and 0.004373 both support the claim that in the national and province plans, the R's percentages are higher than the city plans' R percentage.¹³

To conclude, in all of the Thirteenth five-year plans, there are more strategies supporting the rural areas than the urban areas. It can be argued at least judging from plan strategy percentages, the rural areas are prioritized and given more attention and supports than the urban areas in China's Thirteenth Five-Year Plans.

Class Interest and the Five-Year Plans

National Plans

In the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 36 strategies (21.4%) among 168 strategies directly benefit the capitalist class while 27 strategies (16.1%) directly benefit the working class. 105 strategies (62.5%) don't favor any class and broadly benefit the general public.

In the Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan, 47 strategies (19.3%) among 243 strategies directly benefit the capitalist class while 32 strategies (13.1%) favor the working class. 164 strategies (67.5%) are for the interests of the general public. As defined in the earlier section, "directly benefitting" means the group, according to the

¹³ The second and third proportion test examine whether the R's percentages are higher in the national plans and province plans than in the city plans. The first test's p value equals 0.03235 and the second p value equals 0.004373. Both values are smaller than 0.05. They support the claim that in both national and province plans, the R's percentages are higher than the city plans' R percentage. It can be argued that the urban and rural imbalance is given more attention in the national and province plans than in the city plans

plan’s texts, will directly receive supports as written in the plan texts. The words “support” or the words with similar meanings must be identified in the plan texts.

Table 4.11 National Five-Year Plan’s Class Implications

| | Total | # Strategies that benefit the capitalists (Cap) | # Strategies that benefit the workers (Wor) | # Strategies that benefit the general public (G) |
|-----------|-------|---|---|--|
| 12th Plan | 168 | 34 | 31 | 103 |
| | | 20.2% | 18.5% | 61.6% |
| 13th Plan | 243 | 47 | 32 | 164 |
| | | 19.3% | 13.1% | 67.5% |
| Total | 411 | 81 | 63 | 267 |
| | | 19.7% | 15.3% | 65.0% |

Comparing the percentages of the strategies that benefit the capitalist class, working class, and the public, it’s found that in both national plans, the biggest policy beneficiary group is the general public which accounts for about 65.0% of all national strategies. In both the Twelfth and Thirteenth national plan, there are more strategies that directly benefit the capitalist class than the working class. However, the percentage differences are only about 5 percentage. It can be argued that at least judging from the strategy percentages, the interests of the two classes are both well represented in the two national plans. Neither the capitalist nor working class interests dominate the national plans.

The strategies benefiting the capitalist class are mostly shared by both plans which include upgrading and restructuring industries such as manufacturing industry,

optimizing industrial layout, strengthening the innovation of enterprises, guiding enterprise annexation and reorganization, promoting development of mid and small-size enterprises, supporting exporting industries, financial market system development, enterprise brand building, lowering business costs, fostering development of new strategic industries, and bettering business environment.

The strategies benefiting the working class are mostly shared by both plans which include agriculture development, rural development, expanding farmers' income sources, strengthening public services for employment, constructing harmonious capital-labor relations, reforming wage systems, bettering redistribution mechanisms, developing social welfare and charity systems, poverty reduction programs, and workplace safety.

Comparing the Twelfth and Thirteenth plan, it's found that the two plans' class implication distributions are similar. In the Twelfth plan, the percentage proportion is about 1.3: 1: 3.9, and in the Thirteenth, the proportion is 1.5: 1: 4.5.

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.2742 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across the two national plans. It means, compared the workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn't benefit more in the Thirteenth National Plan than the Twelfth National Plan.¹⁴

¹⁴ A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies' class implication distributions are identical or not across the two national plans with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above. The test supports the claim that in the Twelfth and Thirteenth plan, the strategies' class implication distributions are homogenous

Provincial Plans

In the provincial plans, 146 strategies (18%) among 811 strategies directly benefit the capitalist class while 27 strategies (16.1%) directly benefit the working class. 105 strategies (62.5%) don't favor any class and broadly benefit the interests of the general public.

Table 4.12 Provincial Five-Year Plan's Class Implications

| Province Name | Region | High economic performance (H) /Low economic performance (L) | Total | Cap | Wor | G |
|---------------|--------|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Jiangsu | E | H | 112 | 31 | 20 | 61 |
| | | | | 27.7% | 17.9% | 54.5% |
| Hebei | E | L | 110 | 29 | 17 | 64 |
| | | | | 26.4% | 15.4% | 58.1% |
| Jiangxi | C | H | 174 | 29 | 37 | 108 |
| | | | | 16.7% | 21.3% | 62.1% |
| Heilongjiang | C | L | 57 | 11 | 9 | 37 |
| | | | | 19.3% | 15.8% | 64.9% |
| Neimenggu | W | H | 141 | 27 | 20 | 94 |
| | | | | 19.2% | 14.2% | 66.7% |
| Yunnan | W | L | 217 | 19 | 25 | 173 |
| | | | | 8.7% | 11.5% | 79.7% |
| Total | | | 811 | 146 | 128 | 537 |
| | | | | 18.0% | 15.8% | 66.2% |

Comparing the percentages of the strategies that benefit the capitalist class, working class, and the public, it's found that in the Thirteenth provincial plans, the

biggest policy beneficiary group is the general public which accounts for about 66.2% of all strategies. In all provincial plans except in Yunnan and Jiangxi's plan, have relatively more strategies benefiting the capitalist class than the working class. However, in the 811 strategies in the provincial plans, the percentage difference between the two classes is only 2.2%. It can be argued that at least judging from the strategy percentages, the interests of the two classes are both well represented in the provincial plans. Neither the capitalist nor working class interests dominate the province plans.

The strategies benefiting the capitalist class include fostering innovative clusters of enterprises, industrial innovation, cities as innovation centers, building internationally competitive advanced manufacturing bases and strategically new industries, upgrading and restructuring of the economy, attracting and utilizing foreign capital, building great environment for businesses, fostering the growth of investors who invest overseas, bettering service and institutions for innovation and entrepreneurs, development of new strategic industries, supporting business brand building, marketization of public allocation of resources, development of the private sector, integration with the Belt and the Road initiative. The strategies benefiting the working class include development of human talents, fostering new generations of farmers, agriculture development, poverty reduction programs, supporting farmers to migrate to urban areas, rural development, employment supports, social assistance programs, income redistribution, social welfare systems, expansion of public services, job training programs, harmonious capital-labor relations, wage increasing, and modern vocation school systems. These strategies are also mostly shared by the two national plans.

National and provincial plans' class implication distributions are very similar. In the national plans, the percentage proportion is about 1.3: 1: 4.2. In the provincial plans, the proportion is 1.1: 1: 4.2.

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.7679 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national and provincial plans. It means, compared the workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn't benefit more in the provincial Thirteenth Five-Year Plans than in the national plans.¹⁵

Comparing higher economic performance provinces' plans with lower ones' plans, defined by their GDP, GDP per capita, and the percentage of the workforce employed by the private industrial sector, as discussed in the sampling section, it's found that their class implication distributions are homogenous across the two groups. The high-performance provinces are Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Neimenggu province. The low performance group include Hebei, Heilongjiang, and Yunnan province.

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.06668 supports the claim that in both high and low economic performance provinces' plans, the strategies' class implication distributions are homogenous. It means, compared the workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn't benefit more in the high-performance provinces' plans than the low-performance provinces' plans.¹⁶

¹⁵ A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies' class implication distributions are identical or not across national and provincial plans with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above. The test supports the claim that in national and province plans, the strategies' class implication distributions are homogenous.

¹⁶ A chi-square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies' class implication distributions are identical or not across the two groups with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above.

Comparing the plans of eastern, central, and western region in terms of their class implications at province level, it's found that their class implication distributions are significantly different.

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.0000002105 rejects the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across the regions.¹⁷

Proportion tests were performed to determine which plan's Cap has higher percentages among the three regions. The three proportion tests support the claim that the capitalist class benefits significantly more in the Eastern region's plans than in the Western and Central region's plans.¹⁸

City Plans

In the city plans 195 (19.5%) strategies among 1001 strategies directly benefit the capitalist class and 131 (13.1%) strategies directly benefit the working class. 723 (72.2%) strategies don't favor any class and broadly benefit the interests of the general public.

Table 4.13 City Five-Year Plan's Class Implications

¹⁷ A chi-square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies' class implication distributions are identical or not across the regions' plans with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed below. The test supports the claim the plan strategies' class implication distributions are significantly different.

¹⁸ The p value of the first test equals 0.00003606 which is less than 0.05. It supports the claim that plans of the Eastern region have higher percentage of Cap than the plans of the Central region. It means judging from plan strategies' percentages, the capitalist class benefits more in the Eastern region's plans than in the Central region's plans.

The p value of the second test equals 0.0000000379 which is less than 0.05. It supports the claim that Eastern region plans have higher percentage of Cap than the Western region. It means judging from plan strategies' percentages, the capitalist class benefits more in the Eastern region's plans than in the Western region's plans.

The p value of the third test equals 0.16 which is bigger than 0.05. It supports the claim that the percentage of the Cap is not significantly higher in the Central region's plans than in the Western region's plans. It means judging from the plans' strategy percentages, the capitalist class doesn't benefit differently in the Central region's plans and in the Western region's plans.

| City Name | Province | Total | Region | H/L | Cap | Wor | G |
|--------------|--------------|-------|--------|-----|-------|-------|-------|
| Changzhou | Jiangsu | 131 | E | H | 24 | 18 | 89 |
| | | | | | 18.3% | 13.7% | 67.9% |
| Lianyungang | Jiangsu | 111 | E | L | 20 | 13 | 78 |
| | | | | | 18.0% | 11.7% | 70.3% |
| Tangshan | Hebei | 109 | E | H | 27 | 9 | 73 |
| | | | | | 24.8% | 8.3% | 67.0% |
| Hengshui | Hebei | 93 | E | L | 21 | 14 | 58 |
| | | | | | 22.6% | 15.1% | 62.4% |
| Jiujiang | Jiangxi | 118 | C | H | 22 | 17 | 79 |
| | | | | | 18.6% | 14.4% | 66.9% |
| Nanchang | Jiangxi | 41 | C | L | 9 | 5 | 27 |
| | | | | | 22.0% | 12.2% | 65.9% |
| Shuangyashan | Heilongjiang | 21 | C | H | 6 | 4 | 11 |
| | | | | | 28.6% | 19.0% | 52.4% |
| Yichun | Heilongjiang | 93 | C | L | 16 | 7 | 70 |
| | | | | | 17.2% | 7.5% | 75.3% |
| Bayannaoer | Neimenggu | 71 | W | H | 17 | 10 | 44 |
| | | | | | 23.9% | 14.1% | 62.0% |
| Tongliao | Neimenggu | 110 | W | L | 14 | 20 | 76 |
| | | | | | 12.7% | 18.2% | 69.1% |
| Yuxi | Yunnan | 41 | W | H | 8 | 4 | 29 |
| | | | | | 19.5% | 9.8% | 70.7% |
| Zhaotong | Yunnan | 62 | W | L | 11 | 10 | 41 |
| | | | | | 17.7% | 16.1% | 66.1% |
| Total | | 1001 | | | 195 | 131 | 675 |
| | | | | | 19.5% | 13.1% | 67.4% |

Comparing the percentages of the strategies that benefit the capitalist class, the working class, and the public, it's found that in the city plans, the biggest policy beneficiary group is the general public which accounts for about 67% of all city plans' strategies. The finding is consistent across the national, provincial, and city plans. All city plans except Tongliao plan have relatively more strategies benefiting the capitalist class

than working class. However, in the 1001 strategies of all city plans, the percentage difference between the two classes is only 6%. It can be argued that at least judging from the strategy percentages, the interests of the two classes are both well represented. Neither the capitalist nor working class interests dominate the city plans.

The strategies benefiting the capitalist class are mostly shared by the national, provincial, and city plans which include guiding the spatial layout of manufacturing industry, promoting clustered development of service industry, supporting enterprises to build their brands, construction of innovative industrial parks, promoting the development of local financial systems, supporting the development of the private sector, industry upgrading and restructuring, plans for enterprise expansion and growth, building new comparative advantages in foreign trade, attracting more foreign capital, strengthening logistic industry, increasing competitiveness of enterprises, enterprise innovation, promoting clustered industrial development, business recruitment, marketization of public resource allocation, and strengthening construction industry.

The strategies benefiting the working class are also shared for the most part by the national, provincial, and city plans which include agriculture development, rural development, human talent development and attraction, assisting farmers' migration to become urban citizens, income redistribution to benefit the mid and low-income groups, more stable employment, poverty reduction, bettering social security system, more allocation of public service to disadvantaged groups, developing mechanisms to increase people's wages, and bettering job services.

Comparing the national, provincial, and city plans, it's found that the plans' class implication distributions are similar. In the national plans, the percentage proportion is about 1.3: 1:4.2. In the provincial plans, the proportion is 1.1:1:4.2. And in the city plans, it is 1.5:1:5.1.

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.4875 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across the national, provincial, and city plans. It means, compared the working class and the general public, the capitalist class doesn't benefit more in the city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans than at the provincial and national plans.¹⁹

Comparing the higher economic performance cities with the lower ones, as defined by city's GDP, GDP per capita, and the percentage of the workforce employed by the private industrial sector, it's found that their class implication distributions are homogenous.²⁰

A chi-square test, with p-value 0.3721 supports the claim that in both high and low economic performance city plans, the strategies' class implication distributions are homogenous. It means, compared with the workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn't benefit more in the high-performance cities' plans than in the low-performance cities' plans.²¹

¹⁹ A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies' class implication distributions are identical or not across national and province plans with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above. The test supports the claim that in the national, province, and city plans, the strategies' class implication distributions are homogenous.

²⁰ The high economic performance cities are Changzhou, Tangshan, Jiujiang, Shuangyashan, Baoyannaer, and Yuxi. The low economic performance cities include Lianyungang, Hengshui, Nanchang, Yichun, Tongliao, and Zhaotong.

²¹ A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies' class implication distributions are identical or not across national and province plans with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above.

Comparing the plans from the eastern, central, and western region in terms of their class implications at city level, it's found that their class implication distributions are homogenous.

A chi-square test with p value 0.6123 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across the regions in the city plans. It supports the claim that the plans' strategies' class implication distributions are homogenous across regions in the city plans.²²

Application of the Boolean Approach

Why Boolean Approach

There are two reasons for using the Boolean approach in my research. First, my research sample size is relatively small and it's not appropriate for regression analysis. The minimum sample size for linear regression modeling, as a rule of thumb, should be no less than 50 (Green, 1991). My sample size of city plan evaluation is 27. Even if regression model can be formed, the statistic power of the inference will be low. However, the Boolean approach works well with small sample size because it uses Boolean algebra and does not make statistical inference.

Second, Marxist theories of state indicate that class struggle is the key that determines the state's policy orientation (Clarke, 1991). For example, Chan and Hui (2017, p.234) state argue that

²² A chi-square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies' class implication distributions are identical or not across the regions with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above.

“Chinese state’s social policies and development strategies often reflect its response to emerging class struggles within then limit set up by the capitalist social relations of production..... Chinese state does not simply reflect the capitalist class’s interests. It is a field of class struggles and its policies are simultaneously shaped by capital and labour..... An increase in workers’ organizational and structural power subjects the state to greater pressure to respond to worker demands and thus reduces its previous pro-capital orientation in policy- and law-making.” (Chen and Hui (2017, p.234).

The theories recognize the importance of class struggle in China but it is stated in a broad way. One of the strengths of the Boolean approach to case comparison is to elaborate theories and delineate the scope conditions of the causal variables (Ragin, 1987). In my research, assuming significant differences exist between plan analysis results, the Boolean approach is used to elaborate the causal relationships between the results and class struggle. The city plans are selected because capitalist political participation theories suggested that capitalists were more active at local level (Schubert & Heberer, 2017).

An Introduction of a Boolean Approach to Case Comparison

A Boolean approach to case comparison is adopted to explore potential determining conditions of the variations of class interest analysis (Ragin, 1987). I will first introduce the Boolean approach proposed by Ragin (1987) and then I will describe how the approach will be used to analyze the expected results of the Marxist class interest analysis.

Causal Complexity

Ragin (1987) listed three features of social phenomenon that make their causal links complex.

“First, rarely does an outcome of interest to social scientists have a single cause..... Second, causes rarely operate in isolation. Usually, it is the combined effects of various conditions, their intersection in time and space, that produces a certain outcome. Thus, social causation is often both multiple and conjunctural, involving different combinations of causal conditions. Third, a specific cause may have opposite effects depending on context..... The fact that some conditions have contradictory effects depending on context further complicates the identification of empirical regularities.....” (Ragin, 1987, p.27)

The Boolean approach is designed to deal with this multiple and conjunctural causal complexity.

Key Concepts and Procedures of Boolean Approach

(1) “Use of Binary Data” (Ragin, 1987, p.86):

The Boolean approach is used to explore the causal relationships between outcome variables and condition variables identified by theories. It requires both outcome and condition variables to be binary. For example, a researcher interested in exploring the relationship between neighborhood poverty, and crime rates, and neighborhood organization would code the neighborhood poverty variable as binary, such as impoverished represented by “1” and “not” by “0”. Crime rates could be coded as “high” and “low” with “high” represented by “1” and “low” by “0”. Neighborhood organization presence must also be binary. When an organization exists, the case can be coded as “yes” with “1”; when no organization exists, the case can be coded as “no”, with “0”.

(2) “Use of Truth Table to Represent Data” (Ragin, 1987, p.87):

Ragin (1987, p.87) argued that “in order to use Boolean algebra as a technique of qualitative comparison, it is necessary to reconstruct a raw data matrix as a truth table”.

Using the hypothetical example above, I will show how to reconstruct a true table to represent binary data.

Table 4.14 An Example of True Table

| Number of Cases | Condition1: Crime rates (C) | Condition2: Neighborhood organization (N) | Outcome: Poverty (P) |
|-----------------|-----------------------------|---|----------------------|
| 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

All possible combinations of the independent variables are listed and then followed by outcomes. For example, in the first row, it shows that in four cases, when crime rates are low and there are no neighborhood organizations, poverty is not present in the four cases.

(3) “Boolean Addition” (Ragin, 1987, p.89)

Boolean addition is applied to formulate Boolean expressions to represent causal relationships between variables.

“In Boolean algebra, if $A + B = Z$, and $A = 1$ and $B = 1$, then $Z = 1$. The basic idea in Boolean addition is that if any of the additive terms is satisfied (present), then the outcome is true (occurs)..... $A + B = Z$ becomes: if A equals 1 OR B equals 1, then Z equals 1” (Ragin, 1987, p.89).

(4) Boolean Multiplication

Ragin (1987, p. 91) stated that “a product is a specific combination of causal conditions. With uppercase letter indicating presence and lower letters indicating absence”. The true table above can be written as a primitive statement, “ $P = Cn + CN$ ”. (“P” = presence of poverty and “p” = absence; “C” = high crime rates and “c” = low crime rates; “N” = presence of neighborhood organizations and “n” = absence)

(5) Boolean Minimization

The process of minimization is a key procedure in Boolean approach and the results of the process express different combinations of causal relationships.

“If two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression” (Ragin, 1987, p.93).

For example, the primitive Boolean statement, $P = Cn + CN$ can be reduced and written as $P = C$. The causal relationship between P, C, and N is shown by the reduced equation, $P = C$. It gives new information compared with the primitive expression, “ $P = Cn + CN$ ”. This minimization process is essential for theory building.

(6) Necessary and Sufficient Causes

Ragin (1987, p. 99-100) summarized four types of causal relationships:

“A cause is both necessary and sufficient if it is the only cause that produces an outcome and it is singular. A cause is sufficient but not necessary if it is capable of producing the outcome but is not the only cause with this capability. A cause is necessary but not sufficient if it is capable of producing an outcome in combination with other causes and appears in all such combinations. Finally, a cause is neither necessary nor sufficient if it appears only in a subset of the combinations of conditions that produce an outcome” (Ragin, 1987, p. 99-100).

The causal relationships identified by Boolean analysis include the four types. I will show the four types with a new example. (For example, here B= presence of broad community participation, b= low community participation)

$P = NC + Bc$ (No cause is either necessary or sufficient)

$P = NC + BC$ (C is necessary but not sufficient)

$P = NC$ (Both N and C are necessary but not sufficient)

$P = A + Bc$ (A is sufficient but not necessary)

$P = B$ (B is both necessary and sufficient)

Application of the Boolean Approach

The Use of Binary Data:

The binary outcome variable describes the difference between the percentages of the strategy that benefits the capitalist class and the percentages that benefit the working class in China's Thirteenth Five-Year Plan at city level. All 12 cities' percentage differences were calculated and ranked. The top 50% cities were coded as "high" and represented by "1" while the bottom 50% were coded as "low" and represented by "0".

Table 4.15 Twelve City Plans' Class Implication Distributions

| City Name | Province | Cap | Wor | G | Cap-Wor | Codes |
|--------------|--------------|-------|-------|-------|---------|-------|
| Tangshan | Hebei | 24.8% | 8.3% | 67.0% | 16.5% | 1 |
| Bayannaer | Neimenggu | 23.9% | 14.1% | 62.0% | 9.9% | 1 |
| Nanchang | Jiangxi | 22.0% | 12.2% | 65.9% | 9.8% | 1 |
| Yuxi | Yunnan | 19.5% | 9.8% | 70.7% | 9.8% | 1 |
| Yichun | Heilongjiang | 17.2% | 7.5% | 75.3% | 9.7% | 1 |
| Shuangyashan | Heilongjiang | 28.6% | 19.0% | 52.4% | 9.5% | 1 |
| Hengshui | Hebei | 22.6% | 15.1% | 62.4% | 7.5% | 0 |
| Lianyungang | Jiangsu | 18.0% | 11.7% | 70.3% | 6.3% | 0 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---|
| Changzhou | Jiangsu | 18.3% | 13.7% | 67.9% | 4.6% | 0 |
| Jiujiang | Jiangxi | 18.6% | 14.4% | 66.9% | 4.2% | 0 |
| Zhaotong | Yunnan | 17.7% | 16.1% | 66.1% | 1.6% | 0 |
| Tongliao | Neimenggu | 12.7% | 18.2% | 69.1% | -5.5% | 0 |

Three condition variables were selected to describe class struggle. The first variable concerns the number of labor strikes that had happened in the city from 2011-2015. This period of time is when all five-year plans were being made. The frequency of the labor strike is used to show the strength of the working class in class struggle. All 12 cities' labor strike numbers were ranked and the top 50% were coded as "high" and represented by "1" while the bottom 50% were coded as "low" and represented by "0". The data was extracted from China Labor Bulletin.²³ It's a website which collects information and records labor actions in China. The second variable describes the importance of the private sector for local economies which is used to indicate the strength of the capitalists. All 12 cities' percentages of private sector employment in local economies from 2011 to 2015 were ranked and the top 50% ones were coded as "high" and represented by "1" while the bottom 50% were coded as "low" and represented by "0". The last variable shows local economic changes from 2011 to 2015. All 12 cities' annual GDP growth rate changes from 2011 to 2015 were calculated and ranked. The top 50% were coded as "high" variation and represented by "1" while the bottom 50% were

²³ The website of China Labor Bulletin,
https://maps.clb.org.hk/?i18n_language=en_US&map=1&startDate=2020-09&endDate=2021-03&eventId=&keyword=&addressId=&parentAddressId=&address=&industry=&parentIndustry=&industryName=

coded as “low” variation and represented by “0”. The variable is selected because theories suggested that economic changes can influence the power balance between labor and capital (Chan & Hui, 2017). Workers tend to gain more power to negotiate with capitalists when labor supply is low and demand is high.

Truth Table:

All combinations of the condition variables are listed as follows. I will first formulate a primitive Boolean expression to describe the causal relationships between the variables. Then will perform Boolean minimization and get reduced equations. With the reduced equation, I will show how the results are connected to the class struggle theory in the context of Chinese cities.

Table 4.16 A Summary of the Condition Variables

| City Name | Province | variable 1: Labor strike times from 2011 to 2015 | 2011 GDP in Hundred Million Yuan | 2015 GDP in Hundred Million Yuan | variable 2: % of GDP change from 2011 to 2015 | variable 3: Private sector employment % |
|--------------|--------------|---|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|--|
| Bayannaouer | Neimenggu | 4 | 718 | 887 | 0.24 | 0.8 |
| Yuxi | Yunnan | 5 | 876 | 1244 | 0.42 | 0.64 |
| Tangshan | Hebei | 61 | 5442 | 6050 | 0.11 | 0.63 |
| Jiujiang | Jiangxi | 13 | 1256 | 1909 | 0.52 | 0.61 |
| Changzhou | Jiangsu | 13 | 3580 | 5273 | 0.47 | 0.55 |
| Shuangyashan | Heilongjiang | 6 | 472 | 433 | -0.08 | 0.51 |
| Tongliao | Neimenggu | 6 | 1448 | 1877 | 0.30 | 0.43 |
| Hengshui | Hebei | 17 | 929 | 1220 | 0.31 | 0.42 |
| Nanchang | Jiangxi | 18 | 2560 | 4000 | 0.56 | 0.37 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------|--------------|----|------|------|------|------|
| Zhaotong | Yunnan | 5 | 465 | 708 | 0.52 | 0.28 |
| Lianyungang | Jiangsu | 12 | 1410 | 2160 | 0.53 | 0.17 |
| Yichun | Heilongjiang | 18 | 230 | 248 | 0.08 | 0.15 |

Data Sources: China National Bureau of Statistics, 2011, 2015

Table 4.17 A Truth Table to Represent the Data

| City Name | # Labor Strike | Private sector % | GDP change | Cap-Wor Diff |
|--------------|----------------|------------------|------------|--------------|
| Tangshan | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Bayannaouer | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Nanchang | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Yuxi | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Yichun | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Shuangyashan | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Hengshui | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lianyungang | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Changzhou | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Jiujiang | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Zhaotong | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Tongliao | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 4.18 A Truth Table Representation of Data on Causes of Class Interests Analysis Result Variation

| Case number | Conditions: | | | Outcome |
|-------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|
| | Labor Strikes (B) | Private Sector Percentage (R) | Economic Changes (E) | Class Interests Difference (I) |
| | | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Primitive Boolean Expressions

The following primitive Boolean Expression was constructed according to the truth table above. “i” means the percentage difference between the strategies that benefit the capitalist class and the working class is low. “I” means the percentage difference between the strategies that benefit the capitalist class and the working class is high. “b” means the city’s labor strike numbers are relatively low and “B” means the city’s labor

strike numbers are relatively high. “r” means the city’s employment contributed by the private sector is relatively low and “R” means the city’s employment contributed by the private sector is relatively high. “e” means the city’s GDP growth from 2011 to 2015 is relatively low and “E” means the city’s GDP growth from 2011 to 2015 is relatively high.

$$(1) i = bre + brE + Bre + BRE$$

$$(2) I = bRe + bRE + Bre + BrE + BRe$$

Boolean minimization

The law of minimization states that,

“if two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression (Ragin, 1987, p.93).”

Two equations were produced by applying the law of minimization.

$$(3) i = br + re + BRE$$

$$(4) I = bR + Re + Br + Be$$

The second phase of minimization is to minimize the number of the prime implicants, which are br, re, BRE, bR, Re, Br, and Be. A prime implicant chart is used to reduce the prime implicants that can be covered by other prime implicants.

Table 4.19 Prime Implicant Chart Showing Coverage of Original Terms

| | bRe | bRE | Bre | BrE | BRe |
|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| bR | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| Re | ✓ | | | | ✓ |

| | | | | | |
|----|---|--|---|---|---|
| Br | | | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Be | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ |

The chart shows that the first three prime implicants cover all of the terms which makes the fourth one, “Be”, redundant. Thus, the second equation can be reduced as follows.

$$(5) I = bR + Re + Br$$

The final two equations after the minimization are listed as follows.

$$(3) i = br + re + BRE$$

$$(5) I = bR + Re + Br$$

The Interpretation of the Minimized Equations

First, there is no condition variable that is either necessary or sufficient because all terms in the two equations, (3) and (5), contain combinations of causes.

Second, equation (3) shows that there are three types of combinations that produce the result of relatively low percentage difference between the strategies that benefit the capitalist class and the strategies that benefit the working class. The relatively low percentage difference indicates similar representation of the two classes in the plans. The first is when the city’s frequency of labor strikes is low and the private sector employment percentage is low. The second is when the city’s private sector employment percentage is low and economic growth is low. The third is when labor strike frequency is high, private sector employment is high, and economic growth is high.

The condition variable of private sector employment percentage appears in all three terms and it has contrary effects in different situations. When labor strike frequency is low, and economic growth is low, in both situations, the presence of weak private sector causes similar representation of the capitalist class and working class in the Thirteenth five-year plans. When labor strike frequency is high and economic growth is high, the presence of strong private sector also produces similar representation of the capitalist class and working class in the Thirteenth five-year plans. The analysis indicates the importance of private sector employment to the outcome variable and its contrary effects on the outcome.

The importance of the private sector employment percentage is also observed in the equation (5). It appears in all three terms in the equation. When labor strike is low, the presence of strong private sector leads to high percentage difference between the strategies that benefit the capitalist class and the strategies that benefit the working class. When economic growth is low, the presence of strong private sector causes high difference between the two types of the strategies in the plans. The two terms in the equation (5) are exactly contrary to the first two terms in the equation (3) and they produce exactly contrary outcomes. This shows a relatively stable relationship between the four variables. And this relationship supports existing theories and can also be explained by extant theories.

As mentioned earlier, the Marxist theories stress the importance of class struggle in public policy making. For example, Chen and Hui (2017, p.234) argued that “Chinese state does not simply reflect the capitalist class’s interests. It is a field of class struggles

and its policies are simultaneously shaped by capital and labour.” The two equations, (3) and (5) support this claim. Labor strike frequency roughly represents the strength of the working class and private sector employment percentage roughly represents the strength of the capitalist class in the cities. It’s found that when the two classes’ strength is similar, their representation in five-year plans is similar. For example, in equation (3), when labor strike frequency is low and private sector employment percentage is low, the percentage differences between the strategies that benefit the capitalist and working class are low. When labor strike frequency is high and private sector employment percentage is high, the percentage differences between the two types of strategies are low. However, when the strength of the two classes differs, their representation in five-year plans become different and benefits distribution in the plans lean toward the stronger force. For example, in equation (5), when labor strike frequency is low and private sector employment percentage is high, the percentage differences between the strategies that benefit the capitalist and working class are high with the capitalists receiving more benefits.

However, the two condition variables, labor strike frequency and private sector employment percentage, are not necessary nor sufficient for the outcome variable. When the cities’ economic situations change, the results of the two classes’ representation in the five-year plans change too. This supports the claim that economic changes can influence the power balance between labor and capital (Chan & Hui, 2017). Workers tend to gain more power to negotiate with capitalists when labor supply is low and demand is high. For example, in equation (1), high labor strike frequency and high private sector

employment produce similar representation of the two class in the five-year plans while in equation (2), high labor strike frequency and high private sector employment produce different representation of the two class. It's because in equation (1), the high labor strike and private sector employment is accompanied by the presence of high economic growth while in equation (2), they are accompanied by the presence of low economic growth. It makes sense because when the economic growth is high, it can be assumed that the demand for labor is high. The economic situation can give workers more negotiation power so that they receive more attention and supports in the five-year plans. However, when the economic growth is low, assuming low labor demand, the capitalists can gain more power and receive more benefits in the five-year plans.

Theoretical Connection

As mentioned in the earlier section, most studies on Chinese capitalists have argued that in China, the capitalists are gaining more political influence since the 1990s at all levels of government especially at the local level (see Schubert & Heberer, 2017; Hong, 2015; Guangjin, 2013; Sol, 2013; Kennedy, 2009; Chen et al., 2008; Dickson, 2007; Guiheux, 2006; Heberer, 2003). And this study makes connections to the Chinese capitalist theory in three ways.

First, my research findings strengthen the validity of the theoretical claim that the Chinese capitalist class enjoys political privilege to influence policymaking for their own interests over other groups. In all of the 20 five-year plans analyzed, at the national, provincial, and city level, except in Yunnan province, there are more strategies

benefitting the capitalist class than the working class. For example, in the Twelfth national plan, there are 20.2% of all strategies that favor the capitalist class and 18.5% for the working class. In the Thirteenth national plan, 19.7% of all strategies focuses on the capitalist and 13.1% on the working class. At provincial level combining all 6 provinces' strategies, there are 18.9% favoring the capitalists and 15.8% for the working class. At city level combining all 12 cities' strategies, it's 19.5% for the capitalists and 13.1% for the workers. In addition to the higher proportions that favor the capitalists in the plans, the central importance of industrial innovation in the economy from the private sector is emphasized in all of the Thirteenth five-year plans. The empirical findings from my study show that the industrial capitalist class do receive more attention and supports in the five-year plans than the working class even though their interests don't dominate the plan. However, the empirical evidence cannot prove it's the capitalists who actually influenced the policy decision making of the Thirteenth five-year plans. It only makes the Chinese capitalist theory more convincing and encourages future researchers to examine the roles actually played by the capitalists in China during the five-year plan-making process.

Second, my research findings do not support the theoretical claim that the political power of the Chinese capitalist class has been growing since 2010. In my study, a chi-square test of homogeneity was performed to compare the Twelfth (2011-2015) and Thirteenth (2016-2020) five-year plans' class implication. With the p value bigger than 0.05, the test result shows that the two plans' class implications are homogenous. It means, compared the workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn't benefit more in the Thirteenth national plan than in the Twelfth national plan. Even though the

findings do not support the theoretical claim of the increasing political power of the capitalists in China, they cannot prove the claim is false. The political power can be observed in many political activities which include five-year plan making. The failed observation in one activity, the five-year plan making activity, doesn't rule out the possibility of successful observations in other activities.

Third, my research findings do not support the theoretical claim that Chinese capitalists are more active at the local level to safeguard and expand their interests than at higher levels such as at the provincial and national level. In my study, a chi-square test of homogeneity was performed to compare the national, provincial, and city plans' class implications. With the p value bigger than 0.05, the test result shows that in the national, provincial, and city plans, the five-year plans' class implications are homogenous. It means, compared the workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn't benefit more in the city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans than in the provincial and national plans. However, the empirical findings cannot prove the claim is false. Political participation and activeness can be observed in many activities which include five-year plan making. The fact that it's not observed in the Thirteenth five-year plans doesn't rule out the possibility that it can be observed in other activities.

CHAPTER FIVE

IMBALANCED DEVELOPMENT AND THE THIRTEENTH FIVE-YEAR PLANS

Conclusion

The fundamental promise and the goal of socialism in China is to provide common prosperity for all (Chang, 1996). Common prosperity entails eliminating poverty and extreme inequality between the rich and the poor. But after 40 years of economic reform, China has become one of the most unequal societies in the world (Jain-Chandra, et al., 2018). The President of China, Xi Jinping in 2017 declared that the principal social contradiction of China lies between people's ever-growing demands for better lives and imbalanced and insufficient development. Briefly summarized, the imbalanced development refers to the economic disparities between the rural and urban regions, between the eastern, and the western and central regions, and the income and wealth gap between the rich and the poor in China.

With the significant and increasing spatial, income, and wealth inequality, and the ever-growing size of the private sector in China since the 1980s, achieving common prosperity could face serious obstacles. In 2018, the private sector in China contributed about 60 percent of national GDP and brought in over 50% of the governmental fiscal revenue (Meng, 2018). Chen, Lu, and He (2008) argued that according to their survey, the capitalists in China were able to transform their economic power into formal political power. The power imbalance between the capitalists and the workers could lead to the domination of the capitalists in politics and prevent equitable policymaking to achieve

common prosperity. Thus, given the potential obstacles, the significance of imbalanced development in China, and the central role played by the Five-Year Plan in China's social and economic development, it is important to evaluate whether the most recent five-year plans are true reflections of the socialism vision or in favor of the more powerful capitalists.

Unfortunately, such critical and systematic examination of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans was not found in the current five-year plan literature. The five-year plan evaluation literature primarily compares what's in the plan and what happened in reality, and pays little attention to the plan content itself (Gu & Wang, 2014). The potential social and spatial implications of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans have escaped academic scrutiny. And this study fills the gap by critically and systematically analyzing the goals and strategies of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans at the national, provincial, and city level.

The analysis in my study first reveals that all 19 Thirteenth Five-Year Plans do address the issue of imbalanced development. In the national plans, 20.6% strategies address imbalance. In the provincial plans, 17.6% strategies address imbalance. In the city plans, 15.9% strategies deal with the issue of imbalanced development. The chi-square test shows that the strategy distributions between the provincial and city plans are identical and they are significantly different from the national plans. The proportion tests show that National plans have relatively and significantly more strategies that address imbalance than the provincial and city plans. With similar plan structure and plan strategies, it can be argued that the issue of imbalanced development is given more attention and emphasis in the national plans than in the provincial and city plans.

Concerns for regional issues mainly appear in the national plans and rarely exist in the provincial and city plans. The main difference between the two national plans, in terms of addressing imbalance, is that the farmers and rural areas are emphasized more in the Twelfth plan. In the Thirteenth plan, attention to their issues is switched to a more general concern of poverty and innovation. Different aspects of the issue are emphasized in the two plans. It's hard to judge which of the two plans emphasizes the issue of imbalanced development more.

Second all Thirteenth Five-Year plans have similar percentages of the goals and strategies that tend to reinforce and reduce imbalanced development. No one type of goals and strategies dominate the Thirteenth five-year plans. It means that certain goals and strategies mainly aim to benefit the low- and mid-income groups, the working class, the rural areas, and the western and central region, while others mainly support the capitalists, the urban centers, and the eastern region. For example, in the National Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, 21.0% strategies tend to reduce the imbalanced development while 23.5% tend to reinforce it. In the provincial plans 18.7% strategies among 811 strategies, tend to reduce imbalance while 21.7% tend to reinforce it. In the city plans 15.9% strategies among 1001 strategies tend to reduce imbalance while 19.4% tend to reinforce it. Comparing the plans across the three levels, the chi-square tests and proportion tests show that the national five-year plans have the highest proportions of the strategies that tend to reduce imbalance. The provincial and city plans do not differ in terms of their proportion of the strategies that tend to reduce the imbalance. The tests also show that the Thirteenth five-year plans across the three levels, do not differ significantly

in terms of their proportions of the strategies that tend to reinforce imbalance. The key reason for the higher percentages of the strategies that tend to reduce imbalance in the national plans is that only in the national plans the regional disparities are dealt with.

Third the regional imbalance is addressed in the Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan. However, only 10.3% strategies are related to regional issues. Among the 25 strategies that do have regional implications, 48.0% support the development of the western and central region, and 40.0% tend to benefit the eastern region. The guidance for the three regions' development is shared for the most part by the Twelfth and Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan. The main difference between the two lies in the emphasis of economic opening, connection, innovation, and the implications of the Road and the Belt Initiative in the Thirteenth National plan.

Fourth all Thirteenth Five-Year Plans address the rural and urban imbalance. Key words "rural" or "urban" is identified in 19.3% strategies proposed in the National Thirteenth Five-Year Plans. 53.2% strategies directly benefit the rural areas. 36.2% strategies benefit the urban areas, and 10.6% benefit both areas. In provincial plans, key words "rural" or "urban" is identified in 19.6% strategies. Among these strategies, 57.9% benefit the rural areas. 27.0% benefit the urban areas, and 15.1% of the strategies support both areas. In city plans, 29.7% strategies have clear urban and rural implications. Among them, 37.7% benefit the rural areas. 17.8% benefit the urban areas, and 30.0% support both areas. Consistent across the national, provincial, and city plans, there are more strategies benefiting the rural areas than the urban areas. At least judging from the

percentages, the analysis shows that the rural areas were given more attention and supports in the national plans than in the provincial and city plans.

In the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, the deemphasis of the farmers and rural areas is evident when compared with the National Twelfth Five-Year Plan. In the Twelfth national plan, there are 40 (23.8%) strategies in which key words “rural” or “urban” are identified. Among the 40 strategies, 60.0% benefit the rural areas. 20.0% benefit the urban areas, and 20.0% benefit both areas. The 60.0% is higher than national Thirteenth five-year plan’s 53.2%, provincial plans’ 57.9%, and city plans’ 37.7%.

Fifth the Marxist class analysis shows that the biggest policy beneficiary group in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans is the general public. About 65% of all strategies in the five-year plans serve the interest of the general public. The second biggest beneficiary group is the capitalist class. There are slightly more strategies directly benefiting the capitalist class than the working class in national, provincial, and city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans. However, the percentage of the strategies that have clear class implications only account for about 35% of all strategies. For example, in the Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan, 19.3% strategies directly benefit the capitalist class while 13.1% favor the working class. 67.5% strategies serve the interests of the general public. These strategies have no clear class implications for the two classes and no key words were identified. In the provincial plans, 18% strategies directly benefit the capitalist class while 16.1% benefit the working class. 62.5% strategies do not favor any class and broadly benefit the general public. In the city plans, 19.5% strategies directly benefit the capitalist

class while 13.1% directly benefit the working class. 723 (72.2%) strategies do not favor any class and broadly benefit the interests of the general public.

Comparing the Thirteenth national and provincial plans, it's found that the plans' class implication distributions are not significantly different. The chi-square test supports the claim that compared the workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn't benefit significantly more in the provincial plans than in the national plan.

Comparing the provincial Thirteenth Five-Year plans of eastern, central, and western region in terms of their class implications, it's found that their class implication distributions are significantly different. The chi-square test and proportion tests show that the provincial plans of the eastern region have relatively more strategies that directly benefit the capitalist class than both the plans of the western and central region. It means judging from plan strategies' percentages, the capitalist class benefits significantly more in the eastern region's provincial plans than in the western and central region's provincial plans.

The eastern region has been the most developed region among the three regions since the 1980s. It has the largest and most energetic private sector among the three regions. The capitalist class has strongest bases in the Eastern region. The finding strengthens the validity of Marx's base-superstructure argument. Marx's base-superstructure argument goes like this, "the sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure" (Marx & Engels, 1958, p.362-363). With the transformation of the socialist economy to a mixed economy in the eastern region and the tremendous

growth of the private sector, the production relations have been changed from purely socialistic to a mixed one in which capitalist production relation is playing a more and more important role. Planning decision is a part of the legal and political superstructure which can reflect the changes in the superstructure. And my analysis shows that the changes in the superstructure in the eastern regions are very likely has happened because the capitalist class benefit more in the eastern region than in both the western and central region. However, this finding cannot prove that the capitalists are gaining more political power. Future direct observation and interview studies of politics in China is needed to prove this.

Comparing the plans of the high economic performance provinces with the plans of the low ones' plans, defined by their GDP, GDP per capita, and the percentage of the workforce employed by the private industrial sector, it's found that their class implication distributions are homogenous. It means, compared the workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn't benefit more in the high-performance provinces' plans than in the low-performance provinces' plans. Connecting to the finding that the capitalist class benefits more in the eastern region's plans than in the western and central region's plans, my analysis suggests that the regional division could have more predicting power than the pure economic factors for capitalists' political influence.

Comparing the national, provincial, and city plans, it's found that the plans' class implication distributions are not significantly different across the three levels. This finding casts doubt on the claim that Chinese capitalists are more active at the local level to safeguard and expand their interests than at higher levels such as provincial and

national level. At least in the 19 Thirteenth five-year plans analyzed, the capitalists do not enjoy more benefits in the city plans than in the provincial and national plans.

Comparing the high economic performance cities with the low ones, the chi-square test shows that their class implication distributions are homogenous. Comparing city plans of the eastern, central, and western region in terms of their class implications, the chi-square test suggests that their class implication distributions are not significantly different. These findings suggest that city five-year plans are relatively homogenous across regions and economic levels.

To conclude, my research reveals that following the trend in the Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year Plan, China's Thirteenth Five-Year Plans do intend to address the issue of imbalanced development. The biggest policy target group is the general public because in over 60% of all strategies, no specific social groups or spatial areas were identified. The five-year plans' social implication is that there are slightly more goals and strategies benefiting the capitalist class than the working class. However, neither the capitalist nor working class interests dominate the plans. This finding suggests that one of the reasons why the income and wealth gap between the rich and the poor in China remains significant could be that the capitalist class has been receiving substantial and constant supports from the government more than the working class. The five-year plans' spatial implication is that though spatial issues are not of central importance, there are much more goals and strategies benefitting the rural areas than the urban areas, and more goals and strategies benefitting the western and central regions than the eastern regions. This finding suggests that spatial planning in China prioritizes reducing spatial inequality.

Overall, in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, Chinese governments actively sought to deal with the issue of imbalanced development. The next logical step for future research is to examine how the goals and strategies proposed to reduce imbalance were implemented. Theoretically, my research findings strengthen the validity of the claim that Chinese capitalist class enjoys political privilege to influence policymaking for their own class interests over the working class. They also support the Marxist claim that class struggle plays a vital role in public policymaking in China. However, my research findings do not support the claim that the political power of Chinese capitalist class has been growing since 2010 in China, and do not support the claim that Chinese capitalists are more active at the local level to safeguard and expand their interests than at higher levels such as at the provincial and national level.

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