

Wittgenstein and Contemporary Theories of Language

edited by

Paul Henry and Arild Utaker

Papers read at the French-Norwegian seminar in Skjolden,

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Collège International de Philosophie

Wittgensteinseminara i Skjolden

Wittgensteinarkivet ved Universitetet i Bergen

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Wittgensteinarkivet ved Universitetet i Bergen

Wittgensteinarkivet er et forskningsprosjekt ved Filosofisk institutt ved Universitetet i Bergen. Prosjektet ble startet 1. Juni 1990. Dets hovedmålsetting er å gjøre Ludwig Wittgensteins etterlatte skrifter tilgjengelige for forskning. Wittgensteinarkivet arbeider med sikte på: (1) å produsere en komplett, maskinleselig versjon av Ludwig Wittgensteins etterlatte skrifter, (2) å utvikle programvare for presentasjon, gjenfinning og analyse av tekstene i vitenskapelig arbeid, (3) å stille de maskinleselige tekstene og analyseredskapene til disposisjon for vitenskapelig ansatte ved Universitetet i Bergen og gjestende forskere.

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Working papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen

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Preface

When we met in Luster county, Sogn, some months ago, the idea was not to have just another seminar on Wittgenstein. Rather, we wanted to confront his philosophy with a specific theme; the situation within contemporary theories of language. Those theories – be it in philosophy, linguistics, computer sciences or textual studies – occupy an important and problematic place in modern thought. The question is perhaps not so much to accept them or reject them, but more how we should discuss them and how we should understand them. For such a purpose Wittgenstein's philosophy might be particularly apt in order to stimulate our thinking. On the other hand, we can in this way measure his philosophy with respect to its power or its absence of power in dealing with questions that contemporary theories of language cannot but make us ask.

We tried to do this in 1992. Our discussions, the good atmosphere, and most of all the place that made up the indispensable framework of our words and sayings, cannot – of course – be reproduced in written form. Nevertheless, what follows are the papers presented at the seminar and some of the comments that were given after each paper. The papers have kept their original colloquial form and they have not been significantly revised by their authors.

Some words must be added about the background of the seminar: In 1914 Wittgenstein had a cottage built in Skjolden, a small village in the county of Luster in western Norway. Not only was this the place where he wrote much of what was later to become his two most famous works of philosophy, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, it was also a place he loved, both for the beauty of its landscape and for the many close friends he

made there. In recognition of what Wittgenstein has meant to Skjolden and of what he still means to Norwegian philosophy, the Wittgenstein Seminars in Skjolden were founded in 1990.

French philosophy is not well known in Norway and Norwegian philosophy is not well known in France. The bridge spontaneously gave itself: Many Norwegian philosophers are interested in Wittgenstein. And in France there is a growing interest in Wittgenstein. So Collège International de Philosophie, the Wittgenstein Seminars in Skjolden, and The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen decided to organize the 1992 seminar in Skjolden as a French-Norwegian Wittgenstein seminar.

We wish to express our gratitude to the *County of Luster*, both for their economical support and for their hospitality, giving us some unforgettable impressions of the Norwegian landscape of Wittgenstein.

We thank Professor *Heinz von Foerster* for sharing with us his recollections of Wittgenstein during an evening address sponsored by *Norsk Hydro*, whom we also thank for their contribution to and interest in the seminar.

Last, but not least, we wish to thank the *Norwegian Research Council* (NAVF) and *Collège International de Philosophie* (CIPh), for their economical support.

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Wittgenstein and Contemporary Linguists

In the *Yellow Book*, that is to say the notes for the Cambridge lectures of the years 1932 to 1935, in the middle of a discussion about what makes the difference between hypotheses and grammatical rules, Wittgenstein suddenly asks us to consider all the things about which we would have to change our minds in order to be able to accept as an hypothesis that there is a hippopotamus in this room. He thus chooses a hypothesis which is at the limit of absurdity in order to compel us to consider that which we would otherwise escape. Wittgenstein has used the same trick many times. For instance, when, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, he considers the proposition "a rose has no teeth", saying that we would like to take it as obviously true, more sure than the one stating that a goose has none, but that this is not, in fact, so clear if we look at the matter more closely. Whereas we know where we have to look in order to check whether geese have teeth or not, we do not know at all, at first sight, where we could find the teeth of a rose. There could be, for example, a drawing or a photography of a hippopotamus somewhere in this room. Or there could exist a species of hippopotamus not bigger than a mouse, or a fly, or even smaller, that has remained unnoticed up to now. What grants that an hippopotamus is a very big animal? His discussion about the teeth of the rose leads Wittgenstein to the very strange proposition that it is more accurate to say I know what you think than to say I know what I think. He says that we have here a whole cloud of philosophy condensed in a drop of grammar. From Wittgenstein's point of view, this is a question of grammar. The same holds for the

proposition: "there is an hippotamus in thisroom". What we have to do with such a proposition depends upon what we mean by a hippotamus. The hippotamus can very well be a fat, more or less unpleasant, awkward, person, if we have in mind that an hippotamus is that kind of being. All this shows very clearly that Wittgenstein's concept of grammar is very far away from that of the linguists.

I cannot pretend to cover such a broad topic as "Wittgenstein and contemporary linguists"; I should have better entitled this paper: "Some remarks about Wittgenstein and contemporary linguists". I have chosen this topic because very few people seem to have been really interested in it. "Wittgenstein and language" that is almost a *lieu commun*. But "Wittgenstein and linguistics" or "Wittgenstein and linguists" that does not seem to have been much studied. We have linguists who have tried to use some of Wittgenstein's ideas about language. We have other linguists who have rejected vigorously any of those ideas as a kind of provocation. But who has tried to understand why at the same time this interest and this repulsion?

First of all, let me draw your attention upon the fact that Wittgenstein does not seem to have been interested in the works of the linguists. He does not seem to have been acquainted with any of those. Anyway, his main concern is with the philosophers and the logicians, not with the linguists.

For instance, Wittgenstein has discussed extensively *names*, and names have also worried Frege and Russell, as well as any of those we consider to be "philosophers of language". The question of names has been linked to that of the logical constants. What does Wittgenstein say about names? He does not try to tell us what is a name; he does not try to

show that, as a linguistic expression, a name is a specific kind of such expression, having a specific linguistic function. He criticizes our way of using such expressions as "names of ..."; "names of numbers", "names of colors"; "names of directions (in space)" ... In the *Brown Book* he shows that we use the different expressions we call names in very different ways; he denies that there is something common to all the different uses of such expressions; he says that those uses must be studied case by case and that if some of them appear as governed by rules, we should not take as granted that there is a super-rule that we could call the rule of names of which the different rules of names would be special cases. In particular, he criticizes the idea that such a rule of names would be that any name refer to an *object*; he says that if we do so, we have to consider numbers, colors, directions, and so on, as objects, and then what we call objects appear to be so different things that we are compelled to say that we have *different kinds of objects*. We are then compelled, he tells, to say in particular that we have *concrete objects* on the one hand and *abstract objects* on the other. This is how philosophical problems arise, because as soon as we differentiate between abstract and concrete objects, we have to discuss what these two types of objects have in common, as well as what makes the difference; we would so be led to discuss the specific modality of existence of each kind of objects. Shall we, for instance, conceive this distinction in the line of that introduced by Plato between the tangible and the intelligible, between the numbers as numbers and the numbers used by merchants and speculators, between the numbers which can be handled only by thought and those which have a visible and tangible body. As you know, Wittgenstein attacks, in the *Blue Book*, those who say that a number and a numerical sign are two different kinds of objects (the number one and the sign "1") for instance. So Wittgenstein sees behind the problem of names a problem that has worried philoso-

phers since philosophy exists, that of ontology. And as you know also, from Wittgenstein's point of view, philosophical problems are only pretended problems arising from our uncritical use of language.

If we now turn our eyes towards the linguists, things are completely different. As a matter of fact, we can see that at least in some grammars, we also speak of names, of different kinds of names; common names and proper names, names of objects and names of persons, and so on. But, from a consistent linguistic point of view, this has to be justified, whatever grammarians of the past have done. It is not obvious and self-evident that the category of names is a linguistic category. If, as a linguist, we want to use such a category, we have to show that at least in some languages, or even in one language, we have a class of expressions which have *all* one common linguistic function, a function that differentiates the expressions of this class from other expressions. But it might well be that in a given language, the category of names does not exist. There has been, among linguists, a long discussion about whether there exist languages in which there are no verbs, the famous case being that of the Basque language (in which there is instead an ergative function which can be attached to almost any kind of words). We could have a similar discussion about the existence of names in some languages. But it might even be that we should conclude that the category of names does not exist as a linguistic category in any language. Finally, in the case that such a category exists as a linguistic category, it might well be that what linguists then call names did not always coincide with what we are used to call names (think, for instance, of the distinction between the masculine and the feminine).

So, linguists also have to discuss what we call names as well as about what they call names. But when they discuss that

point they do not do it as Wittgenstein does. What Wittgenstein has in mind is our usual way of speaking of names, our usual way of distinguishing between different kinds of names given that this differentiation is also used by philosophers in an uncritical way, as if it was obvious and self-evident that it is grounded. He does not discuss the way linguists speak of names. That, in many cases, the linguists have also followed uncritically the usual way of speaking of names, is a point on which we cannot but agree. The question whether it is possible or not, from a linguistic point of view, that is to say from the point of view of the linguistic function of words and expressions, to speak of names and of different kinds of names, remain. And this has to do with what linguists require.

The linguists require at least two things. First, they require that it is possible, within any language, to distinguish between classes of expressions or units on the base of their linguistic function. Second, they require that the classes of expressions, their functioning, as well as their relations, can be defined in such a way that we get a basis of description of any language whatsoever. This second possibility has to do with that of general linguistics. These are the minimal requirements for any linguistics. They presuppose that we can speak of languages, i.e. that we can distinguish what belongs to a given language from what does not. And we know that this can raise many problems which are not solved by speaking of dialects instead of languages. To be able to speak in terms of dialects also requires that we can distinguish between what belongs to a given dialect and what does not. In that case too, we have to use notions such as those of grammaticality or correctness or the like. Without the possibility of using such notions, no linguistics is possible. But there is another specificity of languages. The case of languages is not alike that of an animal for instance. If we

have to do with animals, and if that animal is not a dog then it is another animal, a cat or whatsoever. Despite the fact that the definition of zoological taxonomies might raise problems, the situation is not the same with languages. What does not belong to a given language, no matter whatever the criterion might be to decide that, does not necessarily belong to another language. Moreover, that which does not belong to a given language, without belonging to another, can still belong to a language and have a meaning. Furthermore, anything that has meaning does not necessarily belong to language. So linguists need to be able to speak of the language in general; they need to be able to put within language things that do not belong to any language but to language in general. In other words, they need to be able to distinguish what belongs to language in general from what does not. We all know that, for instance, gestures may have more or less the same meaning as linguistic utterances (pointing with one finger to an object, nodding one's head, and so on).

Wittgenstein has placed himself in a position in which he might appear as having get around all the difficult problems that these fundamental requirements of any possible linguistics arise. For instance, it happens that, in some cases, he puts on the same level gestures and linguistic utterances. It also happens that within an argument he refers to words or utterances belonging to different languages. But, precisely, in those cases, he does not deal with those words and utterances as belonging to different languages. On the other hand, his notion of language games raises problems which have some similarities with those which the linguists are confronted. What makes the difference between one language game and another game? What kind of relations exists between the different language games? What makes the difference between what is a language game and what is

not a language game? Can we find within Wittgenstein's writing a definite concept of language?

No more than I have attempted to discuss what Wittgenstein says about names or language games, will I try to discuss whether the requirements of the linguists are grounded or not. Let me just draw your attention upon the fact that those requirements define an ideal. How this ideal can be reached, as well as to which extent it can be reached, is another point. I have recalled all this only to stress the fact that Wittgenstein's point of view and that of the linguists appear as radically different. And that raises a question: does what Wittgenstein has written or said about language have any relevance for linguists and linguistics? This will be my question today.

Saying that Wittgenstein has made of language a crucial concern for philosophy implies *ipso facto* that his conceptions deserve to be considered by linguists has, I think, induced much confusion. More precisely, I will try to show that the attempts to *apply* – I insist on that word "to apply" – some of Wittgenstein's ideas to linguistics, have generated confusion because those ideas were not relevant from the point of view of linguistics. These attempted applications have induced confusion on both sides; they have led to betray Wittgenstein's conceptions and to betray linguistics. But I will also try to show that if we drop the idea of *applying* Wittgenstein's ideas to linguistics, then we can see that some of his ideas are relevant for linguistics, but in a very specific way. In order to avoid the confusions just mentioned, I think that this relevance must be very precisely defined and circumscribed.

I have stressed the difficulties linguists are confronted with. I have more or less presupposed that there exist such a thing

as *the* linguistic point of view. Linguists need to believe that such a point of view exists and that it can be precisely and without ambiguity defined, but that does not imply that this belief is grounded. As for the contemporary linguists, we can see that very few of them have attempted to clear up that point whereas it is obvious that among all those who claim to be linguists, there is no agreement about what is linguistics, what it should be or can be. The question which is raised today, bears precisely upon the possibility to reach such an agreement. Today, in France at least, this question is even raised at an institutional level because linguistics has been put among what is now called the "sciences of language" and because, among those pretended sciences, the specificity of linguistics appears as diluted. That among those sciences of language we find that part of psychology (cognitive or not) that deals with language, that part of neurophysiology or neuropathology that deals with the use of language, its acquisition, its disturbances, that part of sociology which, under the name of sociolinguistics, deals with language, and so on – all this cannot but reawake the old devils that, since the very beginning of linguistics, linguists have perceived as threatening their knowledge and identity. When I discuss with my linguists friends today, many of them appear to be more or less in a state of anxiety or even of anguish, seeing threats all around them. Others seem to be ready to burn all the saints they have revered and to pass with weapons and luggage in the camp of the threateners. Some of them, eventually, call for Wittgenstein for support and legitimization of what they are doing.

On the other hand, if we consider the past history of linguistics, we can ask ourselves whether linguists have not always felt more or less insecure about what they are doing. The case of Baudouin de Courtenay gives a very exemplar instance of what I am talking about. As you now, Baudouin

has with his pupil and colleague Kruszewski contributed in a very decisive way to the elaboration of the concept of phoneme and thus to the foundation of phonology. Baudouin is the one who claimed, in his inaugural lecture in Saint-Petersburg in 1870, that linguistics should be considered as an independent science, not to be confused with psychology or physiology. Baudouin is also the one who has agreed for a while with the opinion of Kruszewski according to which the only firm base which the science of language can have has to be found within language itself and not outside it (i.e., among other possibilities, within the brain or the society ...). This conception of what should be linguistics has led Baudouin and Kruszewski to elaborate a whole set of concepts or notions which have been later retaken and re-elaborated by Saussure and other pioneers in linguistics. But Kruszewski died prematurely and it seems that his death has been quite dramatic. At least, this death has been very dramatic for Baudouin. What has happened is that, after Kruszewski's death, Baudouin has rejected the whole of what he had done in collaboration with Kruszewski. Baudouin had followed the teaching of one of the founders of the Leipzig school, Alfred Lieskens. Whereas, at the same time of his collaboration with Kruszewski, he had taken some distance with that psychophysics, it is on that base that he has rebuilt his conception of language and of linguistics during his last years. The psychophysics of the Leipzig school imposed to him theoretical as well as methodological orientations: a strong separation between the physical aspects of language, which had to be studied by physical and physiological methods, and its psychological aspects which had to be investigated by means of introspection, both being linked together according to conceptions inspired by Fechner. The psychological aspect of the phoneme, in order to be able to be studied by means of introspection, had to be conceived as belonging to the conscious linguistic representation of the

individual. This led Baudouin to deny that there exist such things as languages; he was driven to argue that the reality of language is purely individual and that the only reality of language is that of idiolects. To speak of the properties of the Russian language, for instance, became, from his point of view, a convenient but misleading way of speaking. When we look more closely at Baudouin's last texts, we can see that all his anxiety became focused on the modality of existence of linguistic entities, especially that of the phoneme. He seemed to have also feared in a very acute way what, when we are speaking and listening, remains out of our conscious control. On the contrary, what had so much impressed Kruszewski when he met Baudouin was the stress the later was putting on the unconscious feature of the forces operating within language. Baudouin has ended his life in a state of deep depression, saying that all the disappointments he had to face during so many years made him pessimistic and have deprived him of any desire to live. He said that he considered himself as a superfluous and worthless being.

I could comment upon this by just saying that to commit oneself to the study of language is not free from any threat upon one's psychological equilibrium. But the story I have just told raises, I think, a more fundamental question as similar events seem to have repeatedly occurred all along the history of linguistics. Think on what happened to Saussure when he started to find anagrams in any piece of language and not only in Latin verses. Saussure seems to have experienced, in those circumstances, something which was close to madness. If later he seems to have been more quiet, he has dropped his investigations on anagrams. But, first, that does not mean that his experience with anagrams has not had a decisive influence upon his later conceptions, those expressed in his famous lectures on general linguistics. Second, if Saussure has adopted in his *Cours* a position in the

line of that taken at the beginning by Baudouin and Kruszewski, in his investigation of the Germanic legends which he carried on at the same time, he was somehow contradicting what he was saying in the *Cours*. This leads me to consider the strange kind of desire which might push people to become linguists, a kind of desire which might be somewhat masochistic since it might be that, in the last resort, linguists can never be sure that the knowledge to which they devote all their efforts is not purely illusionary.

One may say that the case of the linguist is not so specific as it may appear. We have the cases of leading scientists who, like J.F. Mayer or Georg Cantor, have experienced such a deep insecurity about the grounding of what they had discovered that this has left them without defenses in front of serious mental disorders. Nevertheless there seem to be something specific to the study of language, at least with the attempts to build a science of language as did Saussure, Baudouin and Kruszewski. If we agree upon the fact that language has something to do with our existence as subjects, if not with our existence as living beings, then studying language concerns our existence as subjects. Language is not any kind of object of scientific investigation, especially if one considers that the proper ground for this investigation has to be found within language and not outside it. That may explain why those who have devoted themselves to the study of language have been so strongly and recurrently inclined to escape this fate by looking outside of language for bases able to account for it. Considering language as a form of behavior, eventually as a rule governed form of behavior, or as a mean of communication of thoughts (while taking as granted that thought exists independently of language), or as a code for communicating information (also existing independently of language), stand among the available means which have been recurrently used for this end.

This is what Baudouin, going back to a psychological account of language, did at the end of his life. As long as he has not been alone facing the intrinsic evanescence of linguistic entities (the languages, the phonemes ...) Baudouin has been able to stick to his position, even if we can find in his early writings some confusions or indications which can explain the later drift of his thought. It seems that after Kruszewski's death he has not been able anymore to face alone uncertainty and doubts about the existence of linguistic entities. His comments about Kruszewski's works, in the necrological note he wrote about his former friend, sound like the bitter echoes of an unhappy love-affair. He was much unfair in his evaluation of Kruszewski's contribution to linguistics because, without that friend, he was pushed to withdraw as quick as possible to positions that he felt more secure for himself, even if those positions revealed themselves afterwards, as the end of his story tells, to be nothing but *pis-allers*.

Now, we can understand why Wittgenstein's ideas upon language have exerted such a mixture of fascination and repulsion upon linguists. To put it in a few words, I may say that Wittgenstein has put his finger straight in the middle of the wound with a precision, an accuracy and an insistence which has never been matched. Furthermore, we can say that he has not only put his finger straight in the middle of the wound; he has at the same time cut all the possible ways of withdrawal. More systematically than anyone else, Wittgenstein exposes the traps of all forms of psychologism. Those who have attempted to interpret what he means by language games in a sociological way have obviously betrayed his thoughts. And for him, as for the founders of linguistics, language cannot be accounted for from the outside. In other words, more than any one else, Wittgenstein compels linguists to be faithful to themselves and to face

their fate; he compels them to clear up their point of view, what makes its specificity, what it requires. Today, given the situation of confusion in which linguistics is, that cannot but deserve consideration. But that does not imply that Wittgenstein gives to the linguists the means for grounding linguistics. On the contrary, his position may be understood as denying the possibility of any linguistics whatsoever.

Some linguists have well seen that. They belong among those who have shown their concern with the problem of the epistemological status of linguistics, and who have tried to give to it at least the beginning of an answer. There are rather few of them. But I know at least one who has attempted to grapple with that problem in a book recently issued: Jean-Claude Milner in his book *Introduction a une science du langage* (Paris, Le Seuil, 1990). In his attempt, Milner could not but encounter Wittgenstein. In fact, he refers to him only twice, but at crucial steps. Furthermore, he says something that I feel very important; that linguists cannot demonstrate that Wittgenstein is wrong in his basic conceptions of language, even if those imply that no linguistics, conceived as a science of language, is possible. As you know, the fact that you cannot demonstrate that a statement is wrong does not imply that this statement is right and, conversely, the fact that you cannot demonstrate that a statement is true does not imply that this statement is wrong. Mathematicians know that well. In that sense we might speak of a Wittgensteinian conjecture about language. Moreover, I insist upon that point, formulating statements that cannot be demonstrated as being right or wrong is, first of all, not easy at all, not trivial, and, furthermore, always highly meaningful.

But we have a problem. What does it mean to say that we cannot demonstrate that Wittgenstein is wrong (or right)?

When Milner says that, it is of course in reference to a precise issue, not about Wittgenstein's sayings as a whole. It concerns what I have recalled at the beginning, i.e. that from Wittgenstein's point of view we just have words and expressions that we can use, that our uses of words and expressions must be studied case by case, that if those uses appears as governed by rules, those rules do not combine themselves together so as to make a whole or an unified system. Then, says Milner, if we follow Wittgenstein, we have to conclude that there is no such a thing as what we call *a* language, that we have just language games, and that what we call a language or the language does not exist or exists only as exists for Spinoza the general idea. Wittgenstein's point is that there are no rules common to all possible language games, even that speaking of all possible language games is meaningless. Having in mind, when we speak of a language, instead of what we call, for instance, Norwegian, or French, or English, but dialects or anything of that kind whatsoever, does not change anything in that respect. What is the case is that Wittgenstein rejects the minimal requirements under which any linguistics is possible. Therefore, says Milner, if we follow Wittgenstein, we have to declare that linguistics is illusionary.

We might be inclined to say that Wittgenstein's position is close to that one of Baudouin de Courtenay at the end of his life. But there are in fact fundamental differences between the two conceptions. First, even such a thing as Baudouin's idiolect does not exist for Wittgenstein; for him, there is no unified systematicity of that kind either. Anyone is, by turns, engaged in one or another language game, but there is no general, unified systematicity of all language games. Second, Wittgenstein does not establish his views upon language on psychological considerations as Baudouin did. There is a link between these two points because what linguists have

always tried to save is the idea that any language makes a unified homogeneous system. That holds at all levels, that of the languages, of the dialects or even if, like Baudouin, they make use of the concept of idiolect, at that level too. Of course linguists agree that within language one must distinguish between at least a phonological, a syntactical and a semantical level. But the general theoretical assumption that there is a single type of organization common to all these levels has been dominant within linguistics. According to this general assumption, language as an object would be describable by progressive complexification (combinations of phonemic traits making phonemes, combinations of phonemes making words, combination of words making sentences...). Structuralism has given this assumption its greatest extension in linguistics, making of language a structure of structures. In that conception of language, this one is organized in levels of stratification, the law of organization of each level being the same, for instance that of a linear structure in which all the properties can be stated in terms of contiguity (syntagmatic contrasts) and of distinctivity (paradigmatic opposition). (See, for instance, Roman Jakobson, "Two aspects of language and two types of Aphasias", in Jakobson, R. and Halle, M., *Fundamentals of Language*. S'Gravenhague, Mouton, 1956, pp. 55-86 or Noam Chomsky, *Aspects of the theory of syntax*, Cambridge (Mass.) M.I.T. Press, 1965, n. 2, p. 131).

It has been almost spontaneously admitted that language has a homogeneous, unitary, structure. But such a hypothesis, whatever has been its fecundity, is a very strong one. It has led linguists constantly to look for speculative justifications. Saying that language is a psychological reality or a social reality or that the basic organization of language is determined by that of the brain, are the justifications which have been most frequently ventured because the mind, or

the society, or the brain, have been conceived as having also a homogeneous, unitary, structure. But it must be noticed that, first, such justifications have not had any concrete incidence upon linguistic descriptions and, second, that, if on the theoretical level, we have had this hypothesis of homogeneity, at that of empirical description, even within structuralism, language has been treated as heterogeneous and not homogeneous. When Wittgenstein says that language is a toolbox, that words are tools which like any tools can be used in so many different ways, that there is nothing in common to all these different ways of using words as tools, he adopts a conception of language as heterogeneous and not as homogeneous. In that sense we might say that Wittgenstein can help linguists to break with the hypothesis of the structural homogeneity of language and, so, to put their theory in agreement with their practice. But the insistence of Wittgenstein upon the heterogeneity of language has been developed for philosophical ends, not in view of linguistic description and theory. In fact, Wittgenstein does not give any key for that description or theory. What he can bring to linguists is essentially critical and not constructive. He insists upon a problem which has always worried linguists without giving them the means for solving it. We nevertheless should not underestimate the importance of Wittgenstein's critic of the assumption of the structural homogeneity of language.

As already said, Milner mentions Wittgenstein once more in his book. And this concerns another crucial point, a critic of the use by Chomsky and the Cambridge School, as well as by the cognitivists, of the notion of "unknown rule". What Wittgenstein has written about what it is to follow a rule has been used to criticize Chomsky. Milner does not reject those critics. He just draws from them conclusions which are the opposites of those which have been made (See for instance,

G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, *Language, Sense and Nonsense*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1984). He recognizes that the way Chomsky uses the notion of "unknown rule" is very problematic. But instead of saying, as it has been the case, that this should led us to reject any of the theories of language of the kind proposed by Chomsky, Dummett, Davidson or others, he proposes to drop the notion of a rule, at least within linguistic theory. Following up to a certain point Searle, Milner says that what we are used to name rules within linguistics (rules of grammar, rules of transformation, or the like), should be and can be reconsidered in terms of laws. Moreover, he says that it is because he uses the notion of "unknown rule" that Chomsky has been led to look in the direction of psychology and, beyond psychology, in that of biology. The problem for Chomsky was that of giving a ground for the notion of "unknown rule", even if this ground has no incidence upon the way he concretely accounts for such or such property of language. The concrete identification of those properties could not but remain based on purely linguistic considerations, biology or psychology being in fact of no help. On the other hand, Milner contests that what Wittgenstein says about rules can give a ground for using such a notion within linguistics. If we are faithful to Wittgenstein's conceptions, we cannot separate the notion of rule from that of a game. Then, if we agree upon the fact that dealing with language in terms of language games, as Wittgenstein does, is in contradiction with the minimal requirements for any possible linguistics, we are led to conclude that what Wittgenstein can bring to linguists is to push them to give up their attempts to deal of language in terms of rules (tacit or explicit). There too, we can see that this does not tell to linguists what to do, but at least what not to do. And that might be priceless.

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Comment on Henry's Paper: On the Difficulties in Thinking of Language

Some years ago both linguistics and the linguistic turn in philosophy promised a new and well-grounded start for the sciences of language and for philosophy. As you all know, things did not turn out that way. Neither linguistics nor philosophy of language succeeded with their "revolutions". But this situation is of course more dramatic within linguistics than within philosophy. Different positions and theories of the same object, as well as different positions on how to talk about it, is normal in philosophy but not in a science. Therefore this situation may be confronted more seriously by a linguist than by a philosopher; the linguist may feel more dramatically that he cannot cope with what is supposed to be his object. Furthermore, within philosophy of language the reference to language has been mostly subordinated to questions as how we can justify that a proposition is true – or in what sense our words or sentences have references. Thus, with respect to language proper, it is perhaps the linguist which is the philosopher on the condition that he is not absorbed by methodological issues, on the condition that he experiences the difficulties in thinking of language.

The "misadventures" of linguistics and philosophy of language reveals the obvious fact that language is not any kind of object. It might be that this situation is not an effect of insufficient methods and procedures; that a linguistics can satisfy all the demands for scientificity and still be unsuccessful – or that a theory within philosophy of language can satisfy the most sophisticated formallogic and still be unsuc-

cessful: Object and method may pass by one another. Anyway, it seems that language poses itself as the obstacle we meet when we try to reflect upon it – thus the confusions and mystifications in our talk on language. But if we grant that this obstacle is something inherent in language, eluding ("le contourner") it amounts to loose language and thereby to think about something different. In my reading of Paul Henry's paper, this is the important point. What is more, Paul Henry proposes here an original explanation of the constant recurrence of reductionism both in linguistics and in philosophy of language. The explanation is not only that our language is experienced as an obstacle when we try to think it, something to be clarified by a light outside of language. But, furthermore, this obstacle is closely related to the way we are made subjects in being turned into speaking beings: "Language has something to do with our existence as subjects, if not with our existence as living beings, then studying language concerns our existence as subjects". The same can be said of "madness". Thus it is not a pure coincidence that some of those who have been closest to think of language without reducing it to something else, have in some way or another been close to "madness". There is something which, with the terms of Michel Deguy, could be called "La folie de Saussure". Particularly, the link between "madness" and the study of language, may appear when the stress is put upon the unconscious feature of the forces operating within language (as Saussure did in his way of thinking of language). And this will easily be reinforced if, quoting Henry's paper, "it might be that linguists, in the last resort, never can be sure that the knowledge to which they put all their efforts is not purely illusionary".

Within this picture, Paul Henry, poses the relationship between Wittgenstein and the linguists in a new way. The point is not the traditional one in using Wittgenstein in refer-

ring to the pragmatics of language as an argument against for example Chomsky. The point is rather the opposite one. For granted that Wittgenstein exposes the traps of reductionism with respect to language, he compels linguists to be faithful to themselves. But this is a position where Wittgenstein only can tell the linguist what not to do. If this is some form of support, however, it might be a diabolical one; "his position may be understood as denying the possibility of any linguistics whatsoever". Cling to your object, but your science is illusory. A message that should be received by the linguist as "Cling to your object, but your science may be illusory".

I accept the paper's argument: Neither can Wittgenstein demonstrate that the linguists are wrong, nor can the linguists demonstrate that Wittgenstein is wrong. This follows from the radical difference between Wittgenstein and the linguists – a difference that makes the importance of the relationship between Wittgenstein and linguists. I wonder however, if this difference may even be greater than envisaged by Henry and if in making it so we may also, in some sense, get them closer to each other. This is the question that occurred to me when I read Paul Henry's paper. My answer will be affirmative. But I have neither sufficient time nor space in order to develop it in some detail. I will limit myself to two issues: 1) The question of the structural homogeneity of language. 2) The question of the presuppositions underlying linguistic and philosophical perspectives on language.

1) In what sense does Wittgenstein deny the thesis of the structural homogeneity of language presupposed in linguistics?

If we claim that Wittgenstein is offering descriptions – assembling reminders – of different ways we are using language, it is in no sense obvious how such would-be descrip-

tions could serve as arguments against a theory; theories being on another level than the one Wittgenstein is creating for his own thought. There are at least two possibilities: Wittgenstein and the linguists are doing radically different things. So different that we could imagine Wittgenstein accepting the right for the linguist to speak for instance of a language as Norwegian or French. I think this interpretation can be substantiated, and substantiated in a way that can clarify Wittgenstein's philosophical discovery: Even if I understand a sentence in its linguistic sense (because I speak the same language), it might be that I do not understand it. The question of the linguist is thus; I understand my own language and how am I to explain that? The Wittgensteinian question is on the contrary; I do not – in many cases – understand my own language and how am I to explain that? Language and culture (the cultural conditions for the use of language) are consequently of primary importance for Wittgenstein. The same is not the case for the linguist. In this reading Wittgenstein is interested in discourses, not in languages (in different languages).

The other possibility is the following one: Granted that Wittgenstein does something radically different from the linguist, this is just what can make him into the unhappy consciousness of the linguist – of constantly reminding him of what his science might blind him from. In this sense a reading of Wittgenstein could liberate the linguist by bringing him to a reflection of his own object. Thus, he may see his own science as a possible illusion. But this does not necessarily mean that a science of language for Wittgenstein is an illusion. The liberating effect of seeing one's own science as a possible illusion, could quite simply amount to a realization of its contingency: There could be another science – another theory – of language. For this reason the linguist could very well stick to his thesis of the structural homoge-

neity of language, but he could add that he did not have any proper theory for it. The condition – of course – is to accept Wittgenstein's voice as the voice of the foreigner. Chomsky does not: "One difficulty, however, in interpreting Wittgenstein, is that it is unclear when what he says is to be taken literally. Some remarks are so outrageous that one can only suppose that something else was intended (e. g. when he asserts that thinking may be an activity performed by the hand, when we think by writing)" (in Morgenbesser: *Essays in Honor of Ernst Nagel* p. 283). Chomsky states here clearly how we can avoid listening to someone foreign to one's own profession: Do not take it literally, something else must have been intended, or it must be taken in a metaphorical sense. Chomsky will not be interrupted – but how can he then have a hope of thinking something he has not thought before? How may Wittgenstein awaken the philosopher in the linguist?

Therefore it is not excluded that the linguist may try to think his thesis of the structural homogeneity of language in directions indirectly inspired by Wittgenstein. He might for instance turn skeptical to his concepts of codes and rules – suspect that they on the one hand might be empty (in explaining nothing) on the other hand that their popularity might be linked to the relative ease by which they can enter into formalization. In this case, Wittgenstein is not only the philosopher telling what not to do. He might shed a new – unexpected – light on what you are doing and at the same time open up new possibilities (which of course do not follow directly from Wittgenstein as some sort of an alternative). This could be a "therapy" for linguists, having a foreigner to express their problems and distress to and through. It might even be that such a relation would be better than the one between Wittgenstein and the philosopher: This one can turn too narcissistic by abolishing the differ-

ence between Wittgenstein and the philosopher (reading him or trying to listen to him). Or we can simply say that Wittgenstein is a philosopher only for someone who can feel at the same time both the fascination and the resistance of his thought (we cannot repeat it but we can think against it).

2) Much has been written on the common grounds of linguistics and philosophy. It has been argued that the concepts of sign and name have constituted such a common core. The question is then if linguistics – I'm thinking primarily of Saussure – has broken with those traditional conditions and if Wittgenstein in another way also can also be said to inaugurate such a rupture. This question is of course too vague and too general. And furthermore; even if we should reflect upon the history of our concepts, this does not mean that we can neatly circumscribe the current conditions for our thinking about language. Of course there are such conditions, as the distinctions between expression and meaning, and between expression and form (structure). And these are functioning in our discourses on language both within philosophy and within linguistics. But if we say that this is all, if we say that this can make what we say about language transparent, we cannot but fool ourselves. What is more, it might be that both modern linguistics and the linguistic turn in philosophy arose precisely at that moment where there was no more common ground for our culture's way of thinking language; thus what is reflected is perhaps that it is language itself that has been a problem. Nothing in our culture is thought about in so many different ways as we think about language. It is enough to be reminded of the difference between Frege and Saussure in order to realize this. And if we agree that Chomsky is closer to Frege than to Saussure, we realize that this difference is not simply a difference between philosophy and linguistics.

So it seems that the modern discovery of language as a groundless ground implies at the same time the dispersions in our efforts to think it – that our thinking it makes us realize that this thinking has no ground either – or that its foundation in our concepts is groundless. But this is only one side of the coin. Because granted what has just been said, we may encounter language and our thinking about language as something grounded in ourselves. Or as something that concerns ourselves in our existence as subjects. And this means that not anything can be said about language. We have good reasons for distinguishing between right and wrong perspectives on language; Wittgenstein as an argument against reductionistic (and psychologistic) views of language – without claiming for this a scientific or a transcendental basis (a basis that again might be of such a type that we thereby can lose the specificity of language).

Finally, Wittgenstein might help the linguist (and his reader) to ask the following question: Do I understand what I am writing (reading), is it comprehensible? One of my favorite quotations from Chomsky is the following one: "We have practically no understanding of the semantic component – no one has even been able to devise a really good terminology for the semantic representation of sentences, let alone the rules that apply to them" (*Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar*, 1972, p. 58). Is there a semantic component in language that the linguist has practically no understanding of? Maybe Chomsky assumes something like that. But then he seems to forget that he as a linguist is using words and inventing terms – among them the expression "semantic component". In this case there is no semantic component that awaits a discovery in such a way as to make a proper semantic representation of sentences possible. There is only a hope – and perhaps an illusion – created by a certain term and more generally by a certain discourse. If we do not see

such a simple fact the linguist is unable to read himself on the level of his own words, of his own language. The consequence is conceptual confusions. But this conceptual confusion is made invisible through the concentration on methodology; methods of formalization, rewriting rules etc. And this connection appears to be systematic; Methodology and conceptual confusions are mutually supporting and reinforcing each others. His concept of science makes him blind for his own concepts as they are given in his own discourse. This leads the linguist to a preoccupation with the methodology of linguistics, not to a preoccupation with the ontology of language (what is language? what is our concept of a language?), not to a preoccupation with the history of his own concepts. But saying this implies that it is not necessarily linguistics as linguistics that is problematic. It might be that there is something wrong with our conception of science granted that a science turns so easily idle and so easily into confusions when confronted with an object as language. Otherwise we have to conclude that language is *the* philosophical object. Or maybe this is not the alternative. Maybe language as a philosophical object has to be considered from a linguistic perspective.

However, I'm not quite happy with my last sentence. Let me add a word on the relationship between Wittgenstein and the linguists (as I interpret it in Henry's paper). Both, Wittgenstein and the linguists, are aware of a blindness in language; In Wittgenstein this is thought of as a surface given within our language-games, in linguistics this is thought of as a depth in our grammar. But this is perhaps the lesson of Wittgenstein: The surface of language is as difficult to see as it is easy to go wrong in its depth. Does this mean that the surface and the depth of language (the heterogeneity and the homogeneity of language) are one the same thing?

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Language, Computer Sciences and Tacit Knowledge

There are various conceptions of the nature of language in circulation in linguistics. Common to all of them is, however, some reliance on the concept of rule, explicit or implicit. Typical in this respect is the remark of Jerrold Katz in *The Philosophy of Language* where he contends that "one who knows a natural language *tacitly* knows a system of rules".¹ A natural as well as a constructed language is conceived as a system of rules in some sense. On the syntactical level this does not seem to meet with unsurmountable difficulties. On the semantical level the situation is far more problematic. It is for instance basic to Katz' conception of language that rules also are constitutive of linguistic *meaning*. And some version of this idea has to be correct if the more ambitious aims of the computer sciences be realized, as one is here radically dependent upon the possibility of translating the meaning of each and every linguistic expression into a set of machine readable rules which are formulated in such a way that there is a definite answer to any possible case of application.

Ludwig Wittgenstein developed his own version of this idea of language in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* where he made an intriguing attempt at grasping the relation between language and the world based upon the assumption that language can picture actual and possible states of affairs in the world in virtue of having logicalform in common. Essential to this picturing relationship was a general rule of projection:

1. Jerrold J. Katz, *The Philosophy of Language*, Harper & Row, New York, 1966, p. 100. The emphasis is mine.

A gramophone record, the musical ideas, the written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world.

There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, and (...) to derive the score again. (...) That rule is the law of projection that projects the symphony into the language of musical notation.²

In the *Tractatus*-period a proposition was for Wittgenstein a picture of reality, and the supposed method of projection was to think out the sense.³ Later he came to realize that he had confused the method of projection with the lines of projection.⁴ Nevertheless, these few remarks should suffice to

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2. The reference is to *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D.F.Pears & B.F.McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London (1961), 4.014 and 4.0141. In the sequel I am going to refer quite extensively to central writings from Wittgenstein's *Nachlaß* that have been edited and published as separate works. I shall use the following more or less conventional abbreviations for his writings:

T= *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Oxford (1922).

PI= *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford (1953).

OC= *On Certainty*, Oxford (1969).

PG= *Philosophical Grammar*, Oxford (1974).

ROC= *Remarks on Colour*, Oxford (1977).

RFM= *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Oxford, 3. revised edition (1978).

C&V= *Culture and Value*, Oxford (1980).

3. T, 4.021 and 3.11.

4. Peter Winch tells us that Wittgenstein once made a remark to this effect in conversation with Rush Rhees. See his article "The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy" that serves as an introduction to the volume, *Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, London (1969), which he himself edited. At pp. 12-13 Winch tries to spell out what might be involved in confusing the method of projection with the lines of projection in this context as that is far from clear.

indicate that a special concept of rule was to be found at the very heart of Wittgenstein's theory of how language and the world were related. In addition comes the general use this concept had in logic.

In a linguistic version this idea was also exploited by the logical positivists. Thus we see that the concept of rule was a basic tool in the philosophical tradition for understanding both the nature of language in general and the character of concepts in particular. Such an approach is still very much alive in certain quarters as indicated earlier. Against this background it is easily understood that an explication of the main content of what is involved in Wittgenstein's analysis of rule-following behaviour and rule-governed activities is not merely of exegetical interest to the Wittgensteinian scholar. It has in fact wide ramifications for all those scientific enterprises that essentially involve or are based upon some particular conception of the nature of concepts and the human language.

This set the scene for Wittgenstein's interest in rule-following behaviour and rule-governed activities in his later philosophy. His former rationalistic conception of the nature of language is there turned into a pragmatic concern for the application of the rules that he earlier saw as essential to the nature of language. When he finally discovered that he had confused the method of projection with the lines of projection he also came to see that the *use* of language was not something that was only contingently related to its nature: It should instead be thought of as constitutive of it. This explains why he is so obsessed with the fact that a rule does not dictate its own application.

But he also operates with a much wider concept of language than the one he worked with in *Tractatus*. In his later philosophy he includes such things as gestures, facial expressions, posture, the atmosphere of the situation, as well as such situationally determined actions as, for example, smiling and

nodding to an acquaintance as we are passing, turning one's back on somebody and going off without saying a word, standing on the quay and waiving goodbye to friends, sitting in a restaurant and making a discreet sign that the waiter's presence is desired, attending an auction and making an offer with a little hand movement, etc.

This extended concept of language is aimed at capturing all the means we make use of in our day-by-day situations to make ourselves understood. In the pragmatic perspective it is quite natural to make such things part of the concept of language, since they are all sense-making means in the situations in which we use or react to a sentence with understanding. If this seems far-fetched you just need to remind yourself of the fact that a sentence does not say, of itself, that it is to be taken as, say, an assertion. Other elements in the situation must be understood in a certain way if this is to be the natural response to it. The very same sentence could in different contexts express quite another thought content. Take for instance the sentence: "Laurence Olivier was convincing as Hamlet". It may be used to convey many different types of thought content depending upon the wider context in which it is employed. Let me just indicate a few of them:

1. It could be used to convey a description of his interpretation of the Hamlet role in the contextually implied production.
2. It could be used to give expression to a certain interpretation of his performance in a naturalistic perspective.
3. It could be used to evaluate both his interpretation of the role and his performance of it.

These are logically speaking very different types of thought content that must be kept apart lest confusion should arise.

But if we do not know the closer details of the current use-situation, we will not be able to make up our minds about what is actually said. From this it follows that our mastery of a natural language must include a kind of grasp or practical understanding of an enormously large repertoire of situations involving the use of language. One must know what is going on in a concrete case, and that kind of knowledge cannot be had from any sort of linguistic inventory. The adequate use of pieces of language, and the appropriate response to it, requires a situational understanding and a judgmental power that transcends what can be derived from the meaning immanent in the sentence alone. This is one of the reasons why Wittgenstein urges us to investigate the use of language. That will lead us to the discovery of the necessary interplay between the sentence form and the character of the situation in which it is applied.

One of the most striking features of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is perhaps his turning away from dealing with rules and their logical form to investigating what it means to follow rules. In this way the application of the rule and the very nature of the situation of the user become the focus of his philosophical interest. This is sometimes called "the pragmatic turn". Since one and the same rule can be followed in different ways, the correspondence rules of the logical positivists cannot do what was asked of them: constitute the meaning of the empirical concepts and thus mediate between language and reality. What guarantees that a rule is followed in the same way time after time cannot itself be a rule at all. It must in the end depend upon our actions and different kinds of spontaneous reactions involving what Wittgenstein once called *intransitive* understanding.⁵

This is the deeper significance of his remark that rule-following is a *practice*.⁶ This concept is one of the key concepts in his later philosophy. We meet here most of the themes that dominated his thinking during this period. It is therefore not

unreasonable to consider his later philosophy as a kind of practice philosophy, if by this term we mean all philosophy that operates from the insight that there exists a complicated network of mutually constitutive relations between concept formation, human reactions and activities, and what we call our reality. To learn to master a natural language is, in this perspective, not to learn how to formulate well-formed sentences on the basis of syntactical rules and with the help of language signs, which are tied via correspondence rules (semantic rules) to a certain segment of reality. It is, instead, to learn to master an enormously large repertoire of situations where use of language is included in an exceedingly varied, but non-eliminable way. In other words, it is a matter of mastering human reality in all its complexity. It is a matter of learning to adopt an attitude towards it in established ways, reflecting over it, investigating it, gaining a foothold in it, and becoming familiar with it. This is accomplished mainly because we are born into it, grow up in it, and eventually are trained in the practices of linguistic involvement.

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5. The expression "intransitive understanding" is used in *Philosophical Grammar* (PG), p. 79, where Wittgenstein tries to make up his mind about how to characterize the understanding of a picture. He gives us the following options: "If I say "I understand this picture" the question arises: do I mean "I understand *like that*? With the "*like that*" standing for a translation of what I understand into a different expression? Or is it a sort of intransitive understanding?" If the latter is the case, "then what is understood is as it were autonomous, and the understanding of it is comparable to the understanding of a melody". He gives us to understand that he goes for the second alternative. Thus we see that understanding a picture or a melody has an intransitive character in the indicated sense. This also applies to the understanding of poetry where we are said to understand "something that is expressed only by these words in these positions", *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) I, § 531. In this context it is once more a question of having an alternative expression for what is understood or not: "We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by other.)" *ibid.*

This, then, is the background for maintaining that there exists an internal relationship between concept formation, forms of human reactions and activities, and the reality which emerges as our reality by virtue of the concepts we have formed on this basis about it.

But now we might feel tempted to ask: "What is the importance of Wittgenstein's conception of practice?" To give an adequate answer to this question would take a book. I have elsewhere tried to indicate the main lines of such an answer. In this context it should suffice to mention a selection of the most prominent features relevant to the case at hand. One of the things he achieves by emphasizing the concept of practice is drawing attention precisely to the factors that are constitutive of meaning in situations involving the use of language in a non-eliminable way. One of the more surprising things that surfaces in this perspective is that the very exercise of an activity might be a constitutive part of the formation of concepts. The content of a concept can thus be regarded as a function of the established use of its expression.⁷ The exercise of a given practice is consequently to be taken as a necessary element as regards the expression of a concept. To document that one does in fact master a given concept one has to be accepted as a competent performer of the series of established activities or practices which incorporates the concept. The practice can thus be said to represent the application of the concept. This yields the following principle of conceptual mastery:

6. The concept of practice is introduced in the middle of his discussion of rule following in PI, § 202, to emphasize its most fundamental aspect. It articulates the observation that there exists a way of understanding a rule that is not an interpretation, an understanding that is expressed in ways of acting. Its character as intransitive understanding is fairly clearly indicated in OC, § 139, where Wittgenstein says that "the practice has to speak for itself". I return to this question and elaborate upon it below.

The grasp a given concept gives us on the world is expressed adequately only in practice.

It is our application or practice which shows how we understand something. That is probably what Wittgenstein has in mind when in his lapidary style maintains that "practices give words their meaning".⁸

But the concern for the *use* of rules or the rule-following *behaviour* has also other sources. Kant had a long time ago suggested that concepts in fact were best understood as rules. The general form of this conception of concepts was hypothetical in character:

If X has the properties P1, P2, P3, ... Pn, then X is an O.
Husserl improved upon this conception by pointing out that concepts should be understood as *hierarchies* of rules, i. e. rules that contain other rules under them.

The first and most important thing about Wittgenstein's analysis of rule-following is to get an inkling of the very

7. There is some need for caution in the way of expressing this point, since the traditional understanding of rules and concepts takes it for granted that the rules or the concepts can be articulated in their entirety. When, in the previous text, I have put rule and formulatable conceptual content more or less on an equal basis, this has been a concession to the tradition in the name of convenience. At this point in my presentation it is therefore incumbent on me to call attention to the fact that for Wittgenstein there is also such a thing as a rule that can only be partially articulated. Accordingly we can talk about rules and thus about rule-following activities also when it is a matter of being incapable of articulating the rule itself completely by verbal means, and not only when it concerns the very performing of the practice in question. Consequently we shall have to distinguish between that type of intransitive understanding which in general is attached to the application of concepts and the one that is a function of the logical character of the rule or concept itself. There exists a kind of family resemblance between these two types of intransitive understanding, but they have different sources and are thus different in kind.

8. This remark is to be found in a manuscript that has been published in two different books, *On Certainty* and, *Remarks on Colour*. In the published material it turns up as § 317 in the latter.

basic level at which it is conducted. It is the level where no demonstrations are possible, where no definitions can be given, where the possibility of giving reasons no longer exists. It is the level where you might be able to get some glimpses of the limits of the intelligibility of the human language. Wittgenstein at one place describes it as the level where one is in a position to grasp what he calls "the limits of the empirical". And he also indicates that these limits consist in "ways of comparing and ways of acting".⁹ Operating at this level Wittgenstein cannot possibly make any use of theories. That explains why he keeps insisting that philosophy is an activity contributing to the clarification of the logical grammar of our concepts. This clarifying task is, it should be insisted, not wholly therapeutical in character. The repeated application of his language-game analysis, which essentially consists in making various comparisons and rearrangements, is aimed at producing an insight into the nature of language:

(W)e too ... are trying to understand the essence of language its functions, its structure. (And this essence is found in) something that lies open to view and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement.¹⁰

This is why he says that "philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain".¹¹ This is not only a remark about Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, it is just as much a remark about the level on which he thinks that a proper philosophical investigation should be conducted. It is the level "before all new discover-

9. RFM, VII, § 22.

10. PI, § 92.

11. Ibid., § 126.

ies and inventions" are made.¹² Philosophy simply makes us aware of things that are already there. One of the means for doing that is by rearranging "what we have always known".¹³ This element of rearrangement is absolutely basic to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. That explains why the order of his remarks carries such weight with him. Each one of them should be seen in connection with a selected group of other remarks. Otherwise none of them will be understood in the right way. This is, of course, an indirect way of communicating the kind of understanding that Wittgenstein wanted to produce in his readers. But to him it was the only way that was open to philosophy as he conceived of it. This, by the way, also goes some way to explain why Wittgenstein was struck by what he called "the queer resemblance between a philosophical investigation and an aesthetic one".¹⁴ He once remarked that "Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten" – (Philosophy ought really to be written only as a poetic composition.)¹⁵ And this is all connected with the very basic level on which philosophy operates, according to Wittgenstein.

After thus situating the rule concept in the context of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, let me then return to his analysis of rule-following as it is here we meet with what was earlier called "*intransitive* understanding" – and probably with some kind of knowledge that are not translatable into verbally articulate rules – an aspect of our grasp of the world that has become known as *tacit* knowledge. We should by now be in a better position to understand what he is after when he says such a seemingly outrageous thing as that there is no choice when we obey a rule: "I obey the rule *blindly*"¹⁶ is Wittgenstein's way of putting it. It is a remark

12. Ibid., § 126.

13. Ibid., §§ 92 and 109.

14. C&V, p. 25.

15. Ibid., p. 24.

that has to do with the possibility of determining sense or fundamentally making sense, if that expression is more to your taste. In this respect rule-following plays the same role in his later philosophy as did the idea of atomic propositions in *Tractatus*.

This much is clear from some of the things he says about the opposition between interpreting the expression of a rule and the plain rule-following. Thus there is far more to rule-following than the rule that is followed. The rule itself is in fact the least important element in the analysis that Wittgenstein made of the phenomenon of rule-following. It is the very *act* of following it and *how to establish its identity* that occupies the centre of his interest. And the reason for this should by now be clear. To go on to apply a word or react to a signpost in certain determinate ways are considered to be conditions for the possibility of making sense, to express the point in a Kantian way. Looking at the rules themselves does not get us anywhere in these fundamental matters. What stands fast for us, as he puts it in his last work, *On Certainty*, does not do so in virtue of some intrinsic and self-evident quality, "it is rather held fast by what lies around it".¹⁷ Essentially the same point is also expressed in *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (revised edition, 1978) where he says that "(w)hat, in a complicated surrounding, we call "following a rule" we should certainly not call that if it stood in isolation".¹⁸

What is at stake then in his analysis of rule-following behaviour and rule-governed activities is the bit-by-bit uncovering of those aspects of our mastery of language that are conditions for the possibility of communicating simpliciter. This is more or less clearly stated in the last paragraph in his analy-

16. PI, § 219.

17. OC, § 144.

18. RFM, VI, § 33.

sis of rule-following in *Philosophical Investigations*. It goes like this:

If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.¹⁹

But here one should not be tempted to try to specify what kind of judgment he is talking about. For it is not an agreement in any specifiable type of judgment or opinion, it is said to be an agreement in form of life.²⁰ It is in other words not a question of relating to any propositional content expressed by the judgments, but rather a means of making us realize how fundamental are our ways of acting and reacting when it comes to establishing a system of meaningful signs in human communication.

This must suffice as an indication of the light in which Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following behaviour should be seen. Let us then take a closer look at what goes on in the relevant passages in *Philosophical Investigations* and elsewhere where the question of rule-following is on the agenda. There exists a manifold of human activities that appropriately could be described as rule-following activities: applying a concept to situations that are different from those in which the concept was first acquired, developing a series of number on the basis of its principle, acting according to a moral norm in a particular case, playing a game in conformity with the rules that hold good for it, following a definition of a given word, subscribing to the laws that apply to making up one's will, etc., etc.

In cases like these we are tempted to think that it is our *understanding* of the rule involved that makes us act or react

19. PI, § 242.

20. *Ibid.*, § 241.

in the proper way on future occasions of following the rule. But if the supposed rule is formulated verbally we immediately realize that its verbal expression can be interpreted in different ways. Thus the rule cannot itself guarantee that it is followed in the intended or established or correct way. And neither can a new rule be formulated in order to determine how the first one is to be followed since exactly the same kind of problems will arise in connection with it as with the first one.

We have already touched upon the fact that Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* terms following a rule a *practice*.²¹ If we ask what is achieved by this way of looking at rule-following, we get a fresh approach to our basic question. The concept of practice is namely called upon to resolve the paradox that Wittgenstein develops when investigating what is involved in saying that we do act according to rules. He outlines the conceptual conflict in this way: "No course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule".²² This seems to be completely detrimental to our most deeply ingrained intuitions in these matters. His next remark, though, complicates things still more. He proceeds by pointing out that "if everything can be made out to accord with a rule, it can also be made to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here".²³ This shows the full extent of the predicament we find ourselves in if acting according to rules is thought to involve an understanding of the rules that has the character of interpretation. In a concrete situation the following might be the case: Whatever we do is, on one interpretation, in accord with the rule, and on another interpretation it is in conflict with the very same rule. Such

21. Ibid., § 202.

22. Ibid., § 201.

23. Ibid., § 201.

an outcome is, of course, intolerable. Wittgenstein's way out of the quandary is to insist that

there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation; but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying a rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.²⁴

Hence we must resist the temptation to think that every kind of action according to rules is a matter of interpretative understanding of the rules since this creates an logically impossible situation. The alternative is a kind of understanding that is expressed in acting in concrete cases. That is why Wittgenstein in the following paragraph concludes that "hence also "following a rule" is a *practice*". This is the end of a series of logico-grammatical remarks concerning rule-following behaviour that is aimed at showing at least three interdependent and far-reaching conclusions about how language and world are related. The first one has to do with the rejection of the name-object model for mental predicates, exemplified here by the term "understanding". It is not the case that there need to be an internal and mental object of a sort that is always present when we correctly say that somebody understands something. The model requires this since the mental object is supposed to be or guarantee the meaning of the term "understanding". The second conclusion has to do with the rejection of the idea that only the presence of an interpretation of the rule can explain why we normally go on acting or applying the term in question in the intended way in the future. We both can and do manage quite well without such an interpretation. That means, on the other hand, that we have to accept another kind of understanding that is primarily expressed in acting the grasping of a rule

24. Ibid., § 201.

that is exhibited in following it in the customary way. This turns out to be the kind of understanding we have already met with under the name "intransitive understanding".²⁵ This is a most appropriate expression that catches the very kernel of the point being discussed here. The third conclusion has to do with the rejection of the idea that interpretation should be considered a basic category in the explication of how a system of communication is possible. It is in this context that the concept of practice has an important task to perform. Interpretation and practice are in fact by Wittgenstein made out to be opposites. Interpretation is to him something that involves conscious intellectual activity. To interpret is to form an hypothesis. But such a hypothesis or interpretation can in no way be said to determine meaning, as we already have had occasion to see. To assume that "every action according to a rule is an interpretation"²⁶ creates a conceptually impossible situation. At some point, though, it must be possible to indicate what in fact does determine meaning, otherwise we are caught in a circle with no escape a really vicious one. This is exactly what the concept of practice is supposed to accomplish. In one place Wittgenstein simply notes that "(p)ractice gives words their meaning".²⁷ In what is in fact the very same manuscript, but published as a different book, he states that "(r)ules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself".²⁸ This remark has a peculiar aphoristic character and it is more than reminiscent of the aphorism that Wittgenstein used in *Tractatus* to convey the inexpressibility of logic. It goes like this: "Logic must take care of itself".²⁹

25. See note 5.

26. PI, § 201.

27. ROC, § 317.

28. OC, § 139.

29. T, 5.473.

The point of the indicated opposition between interpretation and practice should by now be fairly clear. Wittgenstein is reaching for some means to make his reader realize that there is more to knowing the meaning of a word than abstractly knowing the rules according to which the word is used. And this additional element is brought out with the help of the concept of practice. For this non-interpretative way of grasping a rule is thought of as a kind of rock bottom that is, in different ways, involved in all determination of sense, or concept formation if you prefer that way of putting the point. An interesting consequence of this is that if anything is rightly to be talked about as a rule, it must of necessity be related to an established way of following it. And that means that rules actually get their identity from the very practices in which they are embedded.³⁰ The question of the identity of a given rule has, however, more to it than its being "inscribed" in a particular practice. Earlier I quoted Wittgenstein's remark to the effect that only in complicated surroundings could we sensibly talk about "following a rule". Understanding a rule cannot thus be an isolated or chance happening. It must of necessity be related to an integrated whole making up a human language. This is indicated by Wittgenstein when he is commenting upon what goes into understanding a given sentence: "To understand a sentence means to understand a language".³¹ A more hesitant way of expressing essentially the same point can be found in *Philosophical Grammar*: "The understanding of language seems like a background against which a particular sentence acquires meaning".³² The same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for practices since the manifold of practices has

30. The question of the identity of rules I have treated more fully in my article, "Rule Following and Tacit Knowledge", *AI & Society. The Journal of Human and Machine Intelligence*, Volume 2, No. 3 (1988).

31. PI, § 199.

32. PG, p. 50.

been shown to be the very anchoring point for human language. And "(l)anguage, I should like to say, relates to a way of living".³³ Only by having a sufficient mastery of the manifold of practices making up a language can one be said to understand the particular rules that could be abstracted from them. This understanding is furthermore not primarily of an intellectual kind. The grasp that the mastery of a particular concept gives us of something can only adequately be expressed by being practised. It is our application or practice that shows how we understand something. From this it follows that rules or concepts can never be fully understood except by those who successfully master the manifold of practices making up a human language. This does not preclude the possibility of constructing elaborate theories or models showing how the human mind and the human language works. But it is a sort of reminder that such theories of necessity are forced to leave out that very aspect of human languages that lies at the bottom of all sense-making – that it is *practice* that gives extractable rules direction, point, unitary application and identity as "these" or "those" particular rules. This aspect of our mastery of a natural language essentially escapes being articulated in the form of verbal rules or propositions. It is instead a necessary conditions for the application of any kind of rule as a rule. Accordingly the computer sciences shall never be able to reach their most ambitious aim of simulating human intelligence *in toto*.

33. RFM, VI, § 34.

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A Void in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

I am no scholar on Wittgenstein, nor on scholars on Wittgenstein. This needn't be said, as you are bound to discover yourself, but I thought it best to tell you, since, in a sense, I have come not to praise but to bury. The works I shall attend to are basically *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI).

Without perhaps being able to give a decisive argument, let me say that I go with those who hold there are deep-running agreements and similarities between the early and the later works of Wittgenstein. One may substantiate such a claim in several ways: biographically, Wittgenstein's *philosophical heart* was pretty constant, from the start to the finish his idol was Frege, given his temperament I would find that implausible unless he also admired Frege for his problems and philosophical depth (when he, late in life, *Zettel*, § 712 writes "The style of my sentences is extraordinarily strongly influenced by Frege. And if I wanted to, I could establish this influence where at first sight no one would see it.", this is no mere stylistic matter); thematically, there is a substantial overlap of central topics between *Tractatus* and later works, just spell out the list in the preface to PI (meaning, understanding, proposition, logic, foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness), furthermore, central positions remain in place, e.g. the adherence to meaning as truth conditional, and the view of logic, where logical relations are seen as revealed through the use of ordinary sentences, tautologies are neither pictures of facts, nor are logical truths the most general laws of nature, as Frege thought; finally,

the character of Wittgenstein's remarks about philosophy, his 'metaphilosophy', has a constant core.

The plan I follow is this: first, I detail some features of what I take to be his metaphilosophy, and see them as spelling out the impossibility of giving explanations in philosophy (indeed of philosophy itself), not merely on the articulation thereof; secondly, I sketch the *Tractatus* answer to a particular problem, the one probably overshadowing every other in Wittgenstein's view, viz. the problem of linguistic meaning; thirdly, I argue that its replacement in PI, required, since he gave up the *Tractatus* answer, is strictly speaking not there (this is the void I found) and I go on to suggest what should take its place, in strict conformity with his metaphilosophy. ("Metaphilosophy" is my term, Wittgenstein himself, in PI § 121, denied that there is a second-order philosophy, it is all philosophy, on the same level as it were; I am just picking out those remarks that would be second-level if we were to use that word: remarks about philosophy, philosophers, etc.)

What then are his metaphilosophical pronouncements? Going by the *Tractatus* we have that the problems of philosophy are posed because the logic of our language is misunderstood. The proper consequence to draw from this, according to Wittgenstein, is that what can be said can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must be silent about, that is, we cannot think about it either.

This is from the preface. Later in the book we get such sentiments as that the whole of philosophy is full of fundamental confusions (3.324), that the deepest problems are not problems at all, that most propositions and questions in philosophy are not false but nonsensical, and arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language (4.003). As descriptions of philosophy, we get things like "All philosophy is a

critique of language" (4.0031), and that it aims at the logical clarification of thought. Philosophy is furthermore not a body of doctrines but an activity, consisting essentially of elucidations (4.111). And, from 6.54, we get that for anything to serve as elucidations means that those who understand them recognize them as nonsensical. A concomitance of this position on philosophy is, for Wittgenstein, that, even though philosophy is not one of the natural sciences (4.111), the correct method in philosophy is to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science (6.53). In 4.11 we hear that all true propositions belong to natural science, the place of philosophy is above or below natural science, setting limits to its sphere (4.113). On a more detailed level we have "in philosophy the question what we actually use this word or this proposition for repeatedly leads to valuable insights" (6.211). Finally, we hear that all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order (5.5563).

Much of this is found also in the *Philosophical Investigations*, in a subtly altered form.

The depth of philosophy is the depth of a grammatical joke. Problems that arise through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth, their roots are as deep as the forms of language. And, startlingly, their significance is as great as the importance of our language (§ 111).

The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of the bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language (§ 119). We suffer from an urge to misunderstand the workings of our language (§ 109).

Philosophy can only describe language, not interfere with it. It leaves everything as it is (§ 124).

If one tried to advance theses in philosophy it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree

to them (§128). Philosophy only states what everyone admits (§ 599), is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language (§ 109) and aims at complete clarity, which simply means that all problems disappear (§ 133). But, philosophers are like savages, misinterpreting the expressions of civilized men (§ 194).

In addition to § 97, there are two other paragraphs extremely important as expansions on *Tractatus* 5.5563 (that our everyday language is perfectly in order), § 81 and § 194. Wittgenstein brings in the concepts of game, calculus and machine to show how we are tempted to think we measure language up against an ideal one, and that logic, as an instrument of assessment, is really descriptively true only of the ideal language. (The "when we do philosophy we are like savages" occur at the end of § 194.)

This stuff is very similar to the *Tractatus* material, one difference is that *Tractatus* has only marginal remarks about the philosopher. Another difference, very marked, is that science is virtually absent in PI. Wittgenstein seems to have interjected grammatical remarks between philosophy and science, evicting the latter from his concern. This shift seems due to a marked inclination to disfavour explanations as against descriptions. Grammatical descriptions seem important to Wittgenstein for two reasons, they evade the strictures on theses and explanations, and they are marked with truth, thus replacing the need for science. I shall ignore this shift, as the change is probably caused by his lack of belief in the possibility of giving relevant explanations. The best way of combatting that is to provide explanations. A marked similarity is that both works must consider philosophical activity to be a perennial one. This is due to the nature of the causes behind philosophy. That he, in the *Tractatus*, claimed to have found the truth, is beside the point. Even the truth may have to be found, and stated, again and again. It is here

well worth remarking that even though Wittgenstein speaks of the philosopher as a savage, it is not the philosopher who by his activity creates the misunderstandings underlying philosophy: both the *Tractatus* and PI make clear that it is us, humans (the chattering classes), who, by knocking up against the limits of language, misunderstand it, the philosopher is just the whipping boy. His remarks about *us*, that we (not the philosophers) are confused about language, misunderstand it, goes well with the notion that although language is perfectly all right, radical work needs to be done with us. What it goes less well with is the notion that it is philosophical thinking alone that needs to be stopped. As I read Wittgenstein, he is easily misread on this point. The therapy needed is not to stop us doing philosophy, but to stop us running up against the limits of language. ("The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to." § 133) Since this is not a philosophical discovery, what makes me capable? The answer is: whatever capable of removing the causes behind philosophy.

The picture theory

I assume most here know the *Tractatus*, so I shall not go into great detail. The salient points are these: sentences, as logical pictures of possible worldly circumstances, are themselves facts, these facts are propositional signs in a projective relation to the world. The propositions spell out their meaning by expressing their truth conditions. The curious, and important, thing about propositions is that because they contain everything but the projected, including their own projective relations, they vouch for their own meaningfulness. The projected is the propositional sense, so the proposition doesn't contain its own sense, but it includes the

possibility of expressing its sense. (3.11; "The method of projection is to think the sense of the proposition.") When we entertain (think) a proposition, we think its sense. Elementary sentences cannot but help showing off their sense, so they cannot be misunderstood, there is no place for interpretation. (As we all know, Wittgenstein keeps this structural spot in PI.) Logic has set up the proposition, both in its relation to us and in its relation to the world, in such a way that its ability to picture the world is self-explanatory. As I see it, this is the crucial point, there is no problem about meaning because propositions impose on us their own meaningfulness.

When Wittgenstein came to disown the picture theory he did so because he rejected the way the theory made propositions contain the projective relation to the world, in other words, he came to reject the picture theory's explanation of its own meaningfulness. Rush Rhees is reported to have stated in conversation that Wittgenstein later said that in the *Tractatus* he confused the method of projection with the lines of projection. This is one way of distinguishing the explanatory part of the picture theory from what I shall later call the theory of meaning part. Wittgenstein must have come to realize that when he, in the *Tractatus*, believed he gave an account of meaning, he merely presented, in schematic form, which meaning a proposition would have.

There is, by the way, an overkill in the transition from the *Tractatus* to PI. Wittgenstein has two rejections of the picture theory, the first in the *Tractatus* itself. His metaphilosophy alone is sufficient to reject the picture theory. But the actual rejection (caused by Sraffa's Neapolitan gesture, if folklore is to be trusted), suggesting that his metaphilosophy is idling, seems to have been brought about by a change in his views on logic: logic cannot show that propositions satisfy the

intelligibility conditions put on propositions, not in the way required by the picture theory. What *Tractatus* claimed was that propositions and suitable parts of the world share the same logical form, thereby explaining the existence of language, since we, when thinking the sense of a proposition, project it onto the world. Such an explanation doesn't, strictly speaking, account for the existence of language, the sheer existence of the signs is not accounted for, but, that apart, the picture theory explained meaning. When Wittgenstein later, in *PI*, tried to explain the role of truth, see e.g. paragraph 136, he introduced two expressions and tried to contrast them: belong to and fit. The bad picture is to imagine that since "a proposition is whatever can be true or false", the concept of truth fits a proposition in such a way that we could use it "to determine what is and what is not a proposition." But, "what a proposition is is in one sense determined by the rules of sentence formation (in English for example), and in another sense by the use of the sign in the language-game. And the use of the words "true" and "false" may be among the constituent parts of this game; and if so it *belongs* to our concept 'proposition' but does not *fit* it." Put *logic* in for the *truth values* and we get a perception of what Wittgenstein saw as wrong with the picture theory.

What I suggest is that he didn't reject the picture theory's notion of what meaning is, an issue I shall return to. Wittgenstein's rejection of the picture theory was a rejection of something else: the explanation of meaning. The picture theory is, or has the form of, an explanation, it satisfies the condition: if true, it explains (accounts for) whatever it purports to be an explanation of. With hindsight we can say that the explanatory part of the picture theory is the negative part of Wittgenstein's view, it showed itself not to be the truth, by showing what unutterable, philosophical nonsense it was. So, having lost the picture theory, we are short of an expla-

nation of meaning. What in PI does do that? My answer, in short, is, nothing.

I said a moment ago that Wittgenstein held on to the *Tractarian* view on meaning, basically the view that meaning is given by spelling out the truth conditions of propositions. To do so is the work of a theory of meaning. (Please put no stress at all on *theory*.) Let me first spell out the ground rules. The thing of importance to be accounted for in a theory of meaning is *semantic value*, a notion fairly close to Fregean *Bedeutung*. A theory of meaning for a given language gives us the semantic values, for expressions (or utterances) of that language, where expressions range from sentences down to the smallest meaning-contributing features of the language. Classically, sentential semantic values are the truth values, and designators have objects as semantic values. Linguistic meanings, as ordinarily understood, contribute to the fixing of values, so a large part of a theory of meaning is the lexicon and syntax. A theory of meaning thus purports to give us the actual ties between linguistic expressions and the world. But, the theory of meaning, by itself, does not tell us how there came to be *these* ties, nor how there came to be ties at all. In other words, a theory of meaning does not, as such, contain an explanation of meaning. (I prefer here to state this as a problem about how something actually exists "how does language exist", rather than as a problem about transcendental conditions "How is language possible".)

As I have said, the picture theory gives both a theory and an explanation of meaning, what Wittgenstein basically gave up when he dropped it, was the answer it gave to the second, the existence question. But, to drop such a reply doesn't, in itself, entail that it is impossible to give an explanation of meaning, only that philosophy cannot give any, says the metaphilosophy. My claim is further that we

haven't been given an alternative explanation in the *Investigations*. So, by looking at an example, let us see what he does do in PI.

First, and very shortly, allow me to suggest something about the way to understand the early remarks in PI, those where Wittgenstein plays down talk of meaning, in favour of talk of use of words. I agree that these paragraphs are to be read as constituting an attack on the picture theory. But, my suggestion is that these remarks are directed at that part of the picture theory I claim he wishes to give up, the part that explains meaning. Wittgenstein gives up the 'glassy essence of logic', thus the stress on variety, differences in use, lack of one essential feature to all circumstances, etc. His target is therefore not meaning as such, notice the seemingly innocuous §§ 10 and 13, where he admits that talk of signification needs to be accounted for and explained. When Wittgenstein, in paragraph 10, says "Now what do the words of this language *signify*? – What is supposed to shew what they signify, if not the kind of use they have? And we have already described that.", he doesn't deny that words signify, he claims that determining the use of the word shows us its signification.

Having just said that, to the example. My focus shall be on the very first language game in PI, the shop example. This is fairly complicated, involving three (or, a bit perversely, two) persons, and two situations. Someone sends someone shopping, that is the first, (don't read "else" with the second "someone" and we may have two persons). Then the shopper enters the shop and engages the shopkeeper, that is the second situation. The shopper delivers a slip with three words written on it, and the shopkeeper acts on them. I shall here disregard the fact that the words were written down, and not uttered, by the shopper, we could pretend the

words were said, it doesn't matter. The words are "five red apples". My central contention is this: Wittgenstein is mistaken if he believes that the meanings of the words dictate that the shopkeeper act. If the utterance was not the utterance of an order his actions would be misplaced. (As they would be if, say, his daughter came in to show she could pronounce the words. If she came in 'playing shop', he would go through the motions.) So the words do not direct the shopkeeper to act, the speech act of ordering goods does. The words merely dictate what he does, how he complies with the order. It is therefore essential to the example that someone goes shopping.

In the early part of PI too much stuff has been freighted from the speech act domain towards the semantic one, Wittgenstein talks sometimes as if words do not have a specific limited set of meanings, but as if they have many, as many as the ways they are used. I believe this is a mistake, (but given what I have suggested goes on in those remarks, I can understand why the text gives that impression). Most, if not all, words certainly have more than one meaning, but occasionally none are operative, as they would be in our example, if the words were uttered by the shopkeeper's daughter. However, when the meanings are not idle, then the words bring with them, into the situation, definite, relevant meanings.

People might think that I, in my estimate of the shopping example, grossly underplay the stress put by Wittgenstein on the speech act character of that incidence, and of linguistic intercourse in general. But that is not my complaint at all. As a matter of fact, I believe it is natural to give Wittgenstein two reasons for putting the words on a slip of paper, (1) it gives a commonsense look to the situation, as if the shopper is, say, a mother sending a child carrying the slip, (2) hand-

ing over a piece of paper seems more of an action than uttering a few words. (Wittgenstein's stress on actions can also be seen in the important place given to bedrock (§ 217), when we turn the spade after reaching the end of justifications. This has taken the place occupied in *Tractatus* by the concept of interpretation not being applicable to elementary sentences.) What I really complain of is that we are given no explanation of how the speech acts themselves came to be. The picture theory explained meaning because of its own structure, the speech act aspect in PI doesn't explain meaning because it doesn't explain itself, it lacks the self-explanatoriness of the picture theory. By that, I mean we will not have accounted for the speech act of ordering goods, or the language game of shopping, or what not, by saying that it is a game we play, or by saying that the utterance of the words is integrated into activities. By saying this we haven't explained why, or rather, how, we came to perform such actions, or be involved in such activities. *This is what we do* is no explanation. So, what would an acceptable explanation look like?

The replacement

Is it possible to replace the discarded part of the picture theory? And, doesn't he himself argue against the necessity, and possibility, of a replacement? I shall not enter the debate whether Wittgenstein argued thus, apart from what I have said earlier about the absence of science in PI and its replacement by grammatical statements. (It is of course boringly true that they replace the elucidations.) I shall restrict myself to two claims: one, a replacement is needed, languages exist, people communicate, how this came to be is explainable; two, I believe an explanation exists, at least one on the right lines. This brings me to the theme of this conference, because

the explanation I shall mention for you belongs in modern American philosophy of language: in the works of Ruth Millikan, first and foremost in her book *Language, thought, and other biological categories*. At the outset Millikan has an excellent question: "If we can understand why singing fancy songs helps song birds, why emitting ultrasonic sounds helps bats, why having a seventeen-year cycle helps seventeen-year locusts, why having ceremonial fights helps mountain sheep, and why dancing figure eights helps bees, surely it is mere cowardice to refuse even to wonder why uttering, in particular, *subject-predicate sentences*, *subject to negation*, helps man. Surely there is some explanation for this helping that is quite general and not magical." (pp 7-8)

In order to find an explanation Millikan sets up, among other things, a system of theoretical concepts, which, by trading on analogies between biological and sign devices, are meant to cover both. Her strategy, then, is to identify, at least some of, the proper functions such devices serve. The usefulness of these functions then accounts for the proliferation of devices capable of carrying out these functions. All this enables her, among other things, to explain the formation of content within an historical, evolutionary framework (content as in mental content and propositional content), and to account for intentionality in naturalistic terms. It is, however, my intention *not* to discuss Millikan's work here, only to introduce her as someone who does do what Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy advises us to do: deliver statements conforming to science. But, let me throw you one morsel. Millikan's theory is opposed to the figure of the meaning rationalist, she calls meaning rationalism a syndrome, and claims that virtually every thinker on the topic of meaning suffers from the syndrome. *Tractatus* might be called the typical meaning rationalistic work. A meaning rationalist sees meanings as a Cartesian sees ideas, they are

available for introspection, virtually infallible introspection. The exploratory work into them is armchair work. In short a meaning rationalist, though admitting that we may have false beliefs, utter false statements, nails to his mast the claim that we cannot err in thinking that we think. According to Millikan, this is precisely what we may, on occasion, be doing. Millikan believes that one may, quite literally, engage in what one believes is thinking about the world, and be mistaken in that belief. For her false beliefs, or false thoughts, or propositions, relate to true ones as a defective heart is related to a healthy one. This is a view of the relation between the true and the false very different from that of the meaning rationalist, which comes out like this: "The sense of a proposition is determined by the two poles *true* and *false*." (Notebooks, page 97)

For Millikan, Wittgenstein is as I said, a representative meaning rationalist, but this refers mainly to the author of the *Tractatus*, what about the so called later Wittgenstein? As far as I can judge, he seems fairly unimportant. At the same time, some consider Wittgenstein to have had basically a naturalistic project. Is Wittgenstein at all thinking along such lines? Darwin is mentioned once in *Tractatus*: "Darwin's theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science." (4.1122) This is rather cryptic, slightly better is "Everyday language is a part of the human organism and no less complicated than it." (from 4.002). But I am afraid that the context of the remark removes any punch it might otherwise possess. In later works, the reference to Darwin, in *Culture and Value*, is less then helpful: "What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new point of view." (p 18) And, in the powerful passage Part II, xii, when Wittgenstein says "But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; since we are

not doing natural science; nor yet natural history – since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes", one feels that he has gone off the boil. Surely this is precisely what he should be doing, – if he wanted the truth.

There are some other remarks I ought to mention, even though I, in the final analysis, do not believe they are relevant against the above estimate. Earlier I referred to the paragraphs where Wittgenstein introduces the concepts of machine, game and calculus. Well, late in part I of PI he has some remarks where he touches on what I believe to be very much the same topic, but which might give a different impression, the remarks are §§ 490-8.

"To invent a language could mean to invent an instrument for a particular purpose on the basis of laws of nature (or consistently with them); but it also has the other sense, analogous to that in which we speak of the invention of a game." (§ 492)

"We say: "The cock calls the hens by crowing" – but doesn't a comparison with our language lie at the bottom of this? – Isn't the aspect quite altered if we imagine the crowing to set the hens in motion by some kind of physical causation?

But if we were shown how the words "Come to me" act on the person addressed, so that finally, given certain conditions, the muscles of his legs are innervated, and so on – should we feel that that sentence lost the character of a *sentence*?" (§ 493). The answer to the last question is, I take it, no.

"Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfil its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs." (§ 496)

"When I say that the orders "Bring me sugar" and "Bring me milk" make sense, but not the combination "Milk me sugar", that does not mean that the utterance of this combination of words has no effect. And if its effect is that the other person

stares at me and gapes, I don't on that account call it the order to stare and gape, even if that was precisely the effect that I wanted to produce." (§ 498)

Wittgenstein is probably doing quite a few things here. First, I read the passages as giving a natural law governed compulsion, as an alternative to the machine rails from § 218. And that passage is, of course, a part of the debate about rules and the way they can be said to direct and govern meaning and behaviour. Secondly, I read him as saying that if we were said to react in this way, no matter, because the rigidity of the natural law rule is perceived in comparison with our language. The concept of language is strong enough to hold together both the idea of game and the idea of natural law governed processes, they are compatible. So Wittgenstein thinks he is disarming the attack he presents and replies to in these paragraphs.

Perhaps I ought also to mention a paragraph in the middle of the debate about rules, viz. § 198, the second part of which reads: "I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.

But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom."

Wittgenstein is quite clear here that meaning is not a one-off happening, that it requires training into customary behaviour. But this is still far from what, I claim we need to look for. And, the reason why I am, finally, not too impressed with Wittgenstein here is that the crux has not been touched: content and intentionality have not been explained naturalistically. To say that individuals are trained into meaningful

behaviour is not to say anything explanatory about how such meaningful behaviour arose. Meaningful behaviour, linguistic or otherwise, doesn't come into being because it is behaviour people are trained to do, much nonsensical behaviour is of such complexity that it takes practice to master it. If linguistic devices are to operate meaningfully in behaviour, it is because they are meaningful devices, most likely operable over a broad spectre of contexts. For Millikan, it is possible for something to be a meaningful device because the device has stabilizing functions, functions evolved over time. The linguistic devices have proved their usefulness, so over time they have become standardized and stable. There is a tag in biology: ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, but in linguistic matters the training an individual goes through to become a speaker does not carry that speaker through the stages his words have been through, nor are his word tokens carried through those stages. But his words, the words he uses, are meaningful because they have been through those stages.

Why didn't he come closer than he did? My final suggestion is that something held him captive, and to indicate what, I should like to read you two passages from someone he so misquoted, St Augustine. The passages come from Book X of the *Confessions*, on memory, which for Augustine meant much more than the faculty for remembering. By the way, God is referred to by the expressions "Power of my soul" and "Truth".

Paragraph 1. "May I know you, who know me. May I 'know as I also am known'. Power of my soul, enter into it and fit it for yourself, so that you may have and hold it 'without spot or blemish'. This is my hope, and that is why I speak."

Paragraph 65. "Truth, when did you ever fail to walk with me, teaching me what to avoid and what to seek after when I reported to you what, in my inferior position, I could see and asked your counsel?..... Without you I could discern none of these things, and I found that none of these things was you. Nor was I you, though I had made these discoveries. I traversed everything, and tried to make distinctions and to evaluate each entity according to its proper rank. ... you are the abiding light by which I investigated all these matters to discover whether they existed, what they were, and what value should be attached to them. I listened to you teaching me and giving instructions.And sometimes you cause me to enter into an extraordinary depth of feeling marked by a strange sweetness. If it were brought to perfection in me, it would be an experience quite beyond anything in this life. But I fall back into my usual ways under my miserable burdens. I am reabsorbed by my habitual practices. I am held in their grip. I weep profusely, but still I am held. Such is the strength of the burden of habit. Here I have the power to be, but do not wish it. There I wish to be, but lack the power. On both grounds I am in misery." (I have used the translation by Henry Chadwick, Oxford 1991.)

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The Duality of Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Actuality

The question for me today is whether something like a Wittgensteinian phenomenology exists or not. The way in which I'll try to answer this is to show that the works of Wittgenstein do indeed bear evidence of phenomenological questioning. Now, one must acknowledge that there are in fact *two* paradigms of what is termed "phenomenology". The first task then is to determine the difference between them. However, as the two paradigms will appear irreducible to one another, we'll have to face a new question – and this one is very arduous: how are we to state the consistency of Wittgenstein's thought through its own evolution?

It is worth noting, in the first place, that Wittgenstein himself answered the question (at least formally) in a well known sentence in *Remarks on Colours* (1950): "There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems" (I, § 53). This assertion, taken in its literal sense, should compel us to admit that Wittgenstein, at the time he was interested in the foundations of psychology (that is from 1945 to 1951), even if he used to title parts of his work "phenomenology", wasn't in fact setting out to establish what one might consider phenomenology in its proper sense. For his ultimate position (the sentence just quoted was written one year or less before he died) gives evidence of a stubborn resistance to phenomenology.

And yet, this is a very surprising fact. For what Wittgenstein did first and foremost when coming back to philosophy

(1929) was to turn to phenomenology in order to overcome the difficulties inherent in the *Tractatus*.

The main reason for him to settle once again in Cambridge was – as he disclosed it to Schlick – the opportunity to "make a study of visual space" (Letter to Schlick, 18. 02. 1929). This question is in fact a critical point which we ought to scrutinize, in the first place, because Wittgenstein's concept of phenomenology in its primary form (that is in the earlier thirties) – namely the idea that "phenomenology is grammar" – is somewhat enigmatical.

As far as I can see, the reasons for such a lack of clarity are three in number. First: Wittgenstein, while planning a phenomenological way of thinking, didn't refer at all to the Husserlian one, which however the fellows of the Vienna Circle were at the same time criticizing.

A second feature of the enigma, and not the least one, is the fact that Wittgenstein, at the very moment he was entering a phenomenological way, retrospectively characterised the logical symbolism of the *Tractatus* as "primary language" or "phenomenological language". A very surprising fact, in my opinion, not to say a groundless one (at least at first sight). Finally, after 1932 – and this is one more ground for us to be puzzled – any mention of phenomenology suddenly disappears from Wittgenstein's writings. *Philosophical Grammar* scarcely hints at the notion (except for one appendix to the first part of the book), and as for the subsequent texts, they simply ignore it.

We may note that, the term itself (phenomenology) is re-introduced many years later, especially in *Remarks on Colours*; the connotation of it however is then quite different from what it was in the former texts. In fact, the new mean-

ing of "phenomenology" precludes the possibility of setting up any phenomenological *theory* whatsoever.

– I –

If we want to understand where the difficulties came from, which Wittgenstein met with on his phenomenological way in the earlier thirties, the main point to take good note of will be the prominent part which visual space already plays in the *Tractatus*, although it is mentioned only three times. Indeed, the very possibility of solipsism and mere realism coinciding – in other words, the possibility of determining the world (*die gesamte Wirklichkeit*) as being *my* world (*als begrenztes Ganzes*); cf. *Tractatus*, 2.063 and 6.45 – hinges on this notion of visual space.

The fact that visual space *is* the crucial point for the philosophical purpose of the *Tractatus* also results from the *Notebooks 1914-1916*, where we see Wittgenstein, first puzzled with the infinite divisibility of space, getting round the difficulty by means of a new concept of infinity – this one consistent with the principles of logical atomism. For, by setting forth in the *Notebooks* the existence of *minima visibilia*, Wittgenstein gets rid of the "continuous space", now regarded as a "secondary construction", which he intends to replace by a space which we *can't* divide *ad infinitum*. Patches in our visual field are supposed to be the elements of such a space. And even if every patch is further composed of points, it nevertheless *functions* as a "simple object" (cf. *Notebooks*, 18.06. 1915).

Now it's worth noting that the theory of visual space as it is set up here makes it possible for the *Tractatus* to conclude as it does – namely "mystically". All I need to produce proof of

this assertion is the fact that Wittgenstein, the first time he introduced "the mystical" (May 25th 1915), did so in order to warrant the idea of an indivisible *minimum visibile*. For, if it's true that science rests on the thesis of infinite divisibility, it's also true that "the urge towards the mystical comes of the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science" (*Notebooks, ibid.*).

The project however which Wittgenstein carried out at the beginning was put back in the melting pot as early as 1929. *Philosophical Remarks* shows that we are not entitled to reduce the paradox inherent in visual space in the way the *Tractatus* tried to do. For, even if "the existence of a smallest visible difference is contradictory to continuity", it's still necessary that the *minima visibilia* on the one hand and the continuity on the other must be "reconcilable with one another", since continuity *is* in fact *what we see* from the very moment we reach the "limit of the distinguishable (*an der Grenze des Unterscheidbaren*)" (cf. *op. cit.*, XII, §§ 136-137).

Now the criticism of the first conception of space and the denial of the independance of elementary propositions have a tight connection with one another. And it is a matter of fact that this denial is one of the main arguments Wittgenstein calls upon against the *Tractatus*, in the mean time. What he was indeed aiming at during this period was to demonstrate:

(1) That his first way of questioning was misleading for two reasons: because he believed it possible for propositions to be infinite in number, just as though an "infinite number" were something conceivable (cf. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1932, "Miscellaneous Notes"*, p. 119), and because he believed that logic deals with an "ideal" language, not with the ordinary one (cf. *Philosophical Remarks*, I, § 2).

(2) That both the conception of the proposition – including its logical space – and the conception of space in proper sense were concerned in such a twofold mistake. That isn't to be wondered at, since from the beginning Wittgenstein had a perfect knowledge of the complexity of the latter as "logical complexity" opposed to the Cartesian *partes extra partes*. What he had overlooked – blinding himself to the faults of logical atomism – was only that space, in accordance with such logical complexity, must also be continuous.

One may easily verify, that in 1930, as well as in 1915, the conception of the proposition within a logical space on the one hand, and the theory of visual field on the other, share in fact one and the same destiny. Thus, at the time of the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein was asserting – in response, so to speak, to the conception of the infinite as number – that "a proposition can [...] quite well treat of infinitely many points without being infinitely complex in a particular sense", and similarly that it is "perfectly possible that patches in our visual field are simple objects", though the "*theoretical* visual field" is composed of "infinitely many points" (cf. *Notebooks*, 18. 06. 1915). A thesis to which, after 1930, he replies that in fact "we can see or experience but finite fragments", so that our visual space, even if it's boundless, still remains finite (cf. *Philosophical Remarks*, XII, § 136).

Besides, while the *Notebooks* drew from the non-infinite divisibility of visual space the conclusion that beyond the essentially fluctuating sphere of "what is the case", "there is some simple indivisible, an element of being, in brief a thing" – in other terms the "substance of the world", as the *Tractatus* put it – *Philosophical Remarks* for their part try to show, in consequence of the new conception of the visual space, that the signs we use could hardly refer to "really sim-

ple objects" (a kind of "*Ding an sich*", to speak with Kant; cf. *Philosophical Remarks*, XXII, § 225). For all they need to have a meaning is to be related to immediate experience.

Obviously, the main purpose of this round of corrections is to remove any possibility of understanding the world as being *my* world – an indirect means, in fact, of depriving "the urge towards the mystical" of what it was avowedly resting on. To produce proof of what I am asserting here, I might mention the fact that the analysis of visual space in 1915-1916 resulted in the discovery of the subject as "limit of the world" (an astonishing limit to tell the truth, since the subject is nevertheless supposed to be present *within* the visual field itself), while, on the contrary *Philosophical Remarks* later asserts as a principle of the new approach that "the visual space has essentially no owner", cf. *Philosophical Remarks*, VII, § 71).

The main point in all this is that Wittgenstein introduced the famous axiom "phenomenology is grammar" for no other reason than to get rid of his former solipsism. For what is meant by this axiom is that phenomenology can't be reduced to psychology – even not to a rational one – so that one has no right to fill up the logical structure of visual space with raw contents, the way Wittgenstein himself did in fact in the *Tractatus*, when he left the subject abashed at the unfathomable "*daß sie ist*".

For instance, the difference between hallucinating and perceiving, which Wittgenstein sets forth in a section of the *Big Typescript* (the title of which is precisely "*Phenomenology is grammar*"), is intended to show how essential it is to make a sharp distinction *whithin the visual experience* between (1) what belongs to the constitution of the subject, for instance the light-spots I "see" if someone strikes my head – an expe-

rience through which not the least parcel of the world gets unveiled –, and (2) what on the contrary makes it possible for me together together all I feel, giving it the form of a world. On this distinction, I quote *Philosophical Remarks*, I, § 1:

"An octahedron with the pure colours at the corner-points provides a rough *Darstellung* of colour-space, and this is a grammatical *Darstellung*, not a psychological one. On the other hand, to say that in such and such circumstances you can see a red after-image is a matter of psychology. The later may, or may not, be the case; the former is *a priori*; [...] using the octahedron as a *Darstellung* gives us a bird's-eye view of the grammatical rules."

Thus, Wittgenstein came to the point of understanding that it is of no use to call upon a subject conceived of as the central point for visual images. If we are really to question really the visual space – that is, the possibility of it – we must first of all bring out the grammar at work therein, in other words, the network of internal relations proper to the colour phenomenon. For, in this period, it's still the "colour patch in the visual field" that functions as the paradigm of visibility – just as it was at the time of the *Tractatus*.

Now the process of its becoming grammar requires phenomenology – formerly confined to silently "contemplating the world *sub specie aeterni*" – to reform the very conception of "logical grammar" or "logical syntax" as set up in the *Tractatus*. For, Wittgenstein now ought to deprive the truth functions of the general significance they had been given in the *Tractatus* in order to insert them in a "more comprehensive syntax", namely "the inner syntax of propositions". He is indeed perfectly aware of the fact that not only the form but

also the content of a given proposition is bears witness to a secret accordance or pre-established harmony between thought and reality. Hence the extensively revised conception of the propositional image, now developed into a "propositional system" or compared to a "ruler" *all* of whose "graduating lines" [not only the end-points of these lines as at the time of *Tractatus*] "are laid against reality" (cf. *Wittgenstein and The Vienna Circle*, "System of Colours", 25. 12. 1929). Hence also the wide ranging program of a "philosophical grammar" in the form of a book that wouldn't be a series of chapters side by side, [but] would have a quite different structure", since it was intended to draw the line "between phenomenological and non phenomenological", in other words "between the logic of content and the logic of the propositional form in general" (*Philosophical Grammar*, I, Appendix V).

– II –

Nevertheless we have to face the difficulty I mentioned at the beginning, namely the fact that *Philosophical Grammar* is precisely one of the last texts to discuss phenomenology. In later years, Wittgenstein simply gave up any idea of a pre-established harmony between language and the world. Thus the phenomenological theme too disappears, as well as the project of a philosophical grammar in the form of a synopsis, just as though the phenomenological chapters of the book Wittgenstein was planning to write during the years 1931-1932 had only ever been a metaphysical dream.

Thus it's easy to understand why Wittgenstein, when later on he meets again the very same questions he had believed for a while to have answered thanks to a phenomenology of his own invention, then asserts that there is nothing of the

kind – no "ideal representation of what is seen" at all – and that "a phenomenological use of the word 'see'" is but a lure. For such an ideal representation leads us to the following dilemma: Either it has to be a "photographically (metrically) exact reproduction in a picture of what is seen" – say, features and colours of a given dog –, but in this case the picture is totally unfit to make the expression *seen* (the joy of the dog, which I can only "somehow notice"). Or if we want the picture to convey accurately an expression (for instance a *smiling* face), how is it supposed to do so? Through "the corresponding lines and shapes of the parts of the face"? But "corresponding to what"? Should we say: to the *ideal truth* of the smile? How are we to *see* something like that? (cf. *Remarks on The Philosophy of Psychology*, I, §§ 1066-1071).

Obviously there is something wrong on either side of this dilemma. The lesson we ought to draw from it is that the only "ideal" or "truth" we are entitled to pursue, is to describe things in their aspects – granted that every description does consist in bringing into play a set of artificial means. This is indeed the main thesis of *Remarks on Colours* (1950). According to this very last text, to believe in a "phenomenology" is held to be a "temptation", for instance the temptation to assume the existence of *true* colours, free from "any spatial or physical interpretation of visual experience". (Wittgenstein called them "the colours of places in our visual field", cf. *op. cit.*, I, §§ 60-61). This ultimate thesis deserves close attention, for it invalidates in fact the basic assumption of the so-called "phenomenological theory of colours" which Wittgenstein had outlined in the twenty first section of *Philosophical Remarks* (1930). For he intended in this section to found the metric of colours on a "phenomenological investigation of the sense data". His starting point was to assume "simple colours, existing simply as psychological appearances" as a basis for a theory of colours dealing only

with "what is really perceptible", in opposition to "any hypothetical object, like waves, cells, etc."

By laying out this approach in his own "Farbenlehre", Wittgenstein intended to set himself up as a rightful heir to Goethe, whom in fact he was reading at the time, as it appears from a fragment of *Culture and Value* of 1931: "I think that what Goethe intended really to find was [...] a psychological theory of colours". Now it's precisely the same Goethean *Farbenlehre* which *Remarks on Colours* tries, twenty years later, to refute by showing that Goethe, instead of giving us a genuine phenomenological approach, could just afford "remarks [that] couldn't be of any use to a painter; they could be of hardly any to a decorator". A hard judgment, no doubt, not only towards Goethe but also – and this is our point – towards the first "phenomenological" attempt Wittgenstein himself made in 1930. For if, at that time, he could write: "What I need is a psychological theory of colours, or rather a phenomenological one, not a physical or physiological theory" (*Philosophical Remarks*, XXI, § 218), in 1950 he lays down the basic but contrary principle of his new method of analysis as follows: "We do not want to establish a *theory* of colour (neither a physiological nor a psychological one), but rather the *logic* of our colour concepts. And this accomplishes what people have often unjustly expected of a theory" (*Remarks on Colours*, I, § 22).

On the whole, it appears very clearly that, between the first Wittgensteinian statement about phenomenology and the latter, there is a gap, just as though the former distinction between a psychological (or phenomenological) theory on the one hand and a physical (or physiological) one on the other were found to be *null and void*. As a result, any possibility of connecting the *grammar* of colours with a *theory* of colours is also denied. For the true opposition is not between

theories of different kind: it is between a *theoretical* way of thinking (whatever it may be) and a *logical* one. Now what's the meaning of this latter position of the philosopher, if not the very same statement he made at his beginning, – namely: "we *feel* that even if all *possible* scientific questions are answered *our problem is still not touched at all*" (*Notebooks*, 25. 05. 1915) – or, to put it as it is in *Remarks on Colours*: "we stand there like the ox in front of the newly-painted stall door" (II, § 12).

From all these texts, we may conclude, in my opinion, that the former concept of phenomenology – not only as a method but also as so-called "phenomenological data" – has finally been rejected by the later Wittgenstein. All the more reason for us to scrutinize closely, in respect both of its method and its object, what Wittgenstein regarded as "phenomenology" at the time of *Philosophical Remarks*.

According to the first paragraph of this text, the possibility of the "phenomenology" is "the *immediate* representation (*Darstellung*) of the *immediate* experience". An untoward redoubling of the immediate, one might say. Maybe. And yet one has no right to infer from this insistence upon the immediate, that the "phenomenological" paradigm used in the *Remarks* is but mere phenomenalism. This supposition could hardly be possible, since it is precisely by means of *this* paradigm that Wittgenstein intends to refute the Tractarian solipsism.

We can set forth the basic thesis of *Philosophical Remarks* in the following form: it is perfectly possible for phenomenology to spare the phenomenological language; there is no need to call upon a "direct and exact description". All Wittgenstein needs in order to carry out his 1930 project is to find out the "wheels turning idly" in the ordinary language (cf. *Wittgenstein and The Vienna Circle*, "Wheels turning idly",

22. 12. 1929). Thus the only one method which is appropriate is no longer the so-called "phenomenological description": it is grammar (cf. *Philosophical Remarks*, XXII, § 229).

That's why we have now to ask: what is the deep-seated meaning of the axiom 'Phenomenology is grammar'? For all we have done so far is to state its cathartic effect on the *Tractatus*. But if we interpret this famous axiom in the light of the beginning of *Philosophical Remarks*, we'll see that Wittgenstein doesn't intend to define grammar and phenomenology through one another (as a strictly phenomenological method would require him to do), but rather to insist on the grammar's being able to accomplish *all* the duties which fall on phenomenology.

Does this mean that the idea of "phenomenological language" had in fact been revoked as early as 1929, that is, at the beginning, not at the end, of the phenomenological episode, and that consequently the usual way to conceive this *quaestio disputata* is the right one? I don't think so.

It is true that § 2 of *Philosophical Remarks* could put us on the wrong scent. For, in this paragraph, Wittgenstein is setting forth that logic ought to deal with "*our* language", not with an "ideal" one. Thus one could believe that he already admits the thesis which *The Blue Book* will later regard as the basis of the "new thoughts", namely: "Ordinary language is all right" (*op. cit.*, p. 28). But if we consider the question carefully, we soon realize that such a reading isn't the right one. For it is out of the question for Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Remarks* to give up the primary language, which is still (and which will remain until the end of the intervening time) the very foundation of his philosophical project.

In truth, Wittgenstein's position on this question at the time is somewhat difficult to unravel:

- (1) He is cutting off, so to speak, the phenomenological language (as we saw).
- (2) Instead of entering the labyrinth of the phenomenological description, we can reach our goal by means of grammar – not only an easier way, but also a philosophical gain for us.
- (3) Nevertheless, *Philosophical Remarks* still regards the phenomenological language as the ultimate warrant (at least *de jure*).

In brief, the way in which *Philosophical Remarks* propounds what I might call a structural equation between the synoptical representation through grammar and the immediate representation given by phenomenology, means that Wittgenstein is using again – only with reversed arms – the good old strategy of the *Tractatus*, in which he inferred from the so-called "general form of the proposition" that "we have a concept of the elementary proposition apart from its special logical form" (5.555).

Thus, to believe that there is a contradiction in *Philosophical Remarks* between the passages in which Wittgenstein intends to avoid using the phenomenological language and those in which he calls upon it, would be but a mistaken opinion.

Now, if we want to determine the real meaning of the phenomenological paradigm still at work in the *Remarks*, we have to state the following question: what was it that forced Wittgenstein to maintain a void place for phenomenological language? The answer is in § 53:

"There is not – as I used to believe – a primary language as opposed to our ordinary language, the 'secondary' one. But one could speak of a primary language as opposed to ours in so far as the former would not permit any way of expressing a preference

for certain phenomena over others; it would have to be, so to speak absolutely matter of fact³⁴."

A statement somewhat involved in style. Nonetheless it appears clearly from it that, if the philosophical analysis must still refer to a primary language as opposed to the ordinary one, it is no longer possible to regard the latter as *secondary* language. For what Wittgenstein has in fact discovered, between 1915 and 1930, is that primary language can't be *isolated* from the ordinary one. So that what is at stake is a new conception of the relation between the two languages. What has shifted indeed is the way to conceive the logical elucidation of the language: the former pattern was a kind of *Begriffsschrift*, the new one is built on the idea of an "absolutely matter-of-fact" language.

Once again: does all this mean that in 1930 Wittgenstein, in his search for the "*ideale Darstellung*" would have found a quite different way from the one he was following at the time of *Tractatus*? The answer is "no" – however paradoxical it may sound. For what he was looking for, in 1930 as well as in 1915, by invoking a primary language, was the possibility of a merely objective "*Darstellung*" of the world. In the *Notebooks*, for instance, the "symbolism of generality" enjoyed the privilege of an "impersonal representation of the world" (*Notebooks*, 27. 10. 14); and we read in *Philosophical Remarks* (VII, § 71) that "the essential thing is that the *Darstellung* of visual space is the *Darstellung* of an object and contains no suggestion of a subject".

34. The German "*sachlich*" has been translated by R. Hargreaves and R. White by "impartial". I have found this translation inappropriate and prefer "matter of fact".

Thus the middle period texts tried to bar the way of solipsism and its mystical train by shifting visual space towards *pure* objectivity.

Now there is of course a price to pay for this – a high price, in fact. See for instance § 72 of *Philosophical Remarks*, according to which nothing in the "structure of visual space [...] forces me into interpreting the tree I see through my window as larger than the window". Moreover, Wittgenstein in this text agrees with the statement that "what corresponds to the tree in visual space is, surely, *obviously* smaller than what corresponds to the window".

An odd "phenomenological" analysis, one might say. For what it means is that the theoretical objectivism overcame at last the grammar, so that the true name of "phenomenology" at the time was neither "grammar" nor "phenomenological description", but "theory of knowledge" (See, *Philosophical Remarks*, VI, § 57). Besides, this theory of knowledge was supposed to be able: (1) to "constitute" the "physical object" on the basis of "sense data" – that is, in a merely "objective" process; (2) to interpret consequently the "phenomenological statements" as "individual cross-sections through hypothesis", namely the hypothesis of physics (cf. *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, "Hypotheses I" and "Hypotheses II"). In other words it was a *physicalist* and *positivist* theory of knowledge. No wonder then that Wittgenstein, after reading "Physikalische Sprache als universale Sprache der Wissenschaft", got so angry that he accused Carnap of plagiarism.

Thus, the lesson we have to draw from this period is the following: Whether the elements of the so-called phenomenological language are elements of being or elements of representation – accordingly, whether the "ideal representation" is "the absolutely general description of the world", as

in the *Notebooks*, or "the direct and exact description", as in *Philosophical Remarks* – it doesn't make any significant difference. For in both cases there are still ultimate elements, to which the description is supposed to reduce its "*descriptum*". In other words, in both cases the analytical description, which necessarily involves a *theoretical* construction, is substituted for the descriptive analysis, which on the contrary ought to be a naked description.

Wittgenstein is becoming aware of this situation in *The Blue Book*. This is why he tries (after 1933) to get rid of any remnant scientism, (1) by introducing a sharp distinction between causes and reasons, (2) by giving up the "ideal language" as a norm for the usual one, (3) by an unprecedented criticism of the "immediate" as such.

Now it remains to be seen how such multifarious overturnings offered a golden opportunity for the very last phenomenological project of Wittgensteinian thought – this time, a genuine one.

– III –

To give evidence of the authentically phenomenological character of the description in *Remarks on Colours*, let us read III, § 50:

"The bucket which I see in front of me is glazed shining white; it would be absurd to call it "grey" or to say "I really see a light grey". But it has a shiny highlight that is far lighter than the rest of its surface part of which is turned toward the light and part away from it, without appearing to be differently coloured. (*Appearing*, not just *being*.)"

The last sentence is touched up in III, § 246 as follows:

"But it has a highlight that is far lighter than the rest of its surface, and because it is round there is a gradual transition from light to shadow, yet without there seeming to be a change of colour."

What is here the lesson Wittgenstein is giving us? As far as I can see, the lesson is the following:

The bucket appears as it is: if I see it white, it's because I'm seeing *it* in *its* colour (and in its form too) without having to go through any isolated sheet of "impressions" in *causal* sense. For:

"It is not the same thing to say: the impression of white or grey comes about under such and such conditions (causal) and: it is an impression in a certain context of colours and forms." (I, § 51)

To talk of the perceptive context instead of a supposed "cause" means that perception has nothing to do with the classical – say: the Cartesian – "intellect at work", collecting and interpreting multifarious "sense data", nor with the Husserlian scheme of composition between "*hylè*" and "*morphè*".

Nevertheless the perception always refers to an articulation *internal* to what comes into sight. *Appearing* therefore is now acknowledged as the measure of *being*.

The latter conclusion is particularly important for the Wittgensteinian thought. For the perceptive context – in the first place the "system of colours" – is a *logical net*, so to speak, in which our colour concepts are always already inserted. It

has nothing to do with a "nature" of colours. What is it, then? The answer is to be found in *Zettel*, § 358: "It is akin both to what is arbitrary and to what is not arbitrary". Better to quote the whole passage:

"We have a colour system as we have a number system. Do the systems reside in *our* nature or in the nature of things? How are we to put it? – *Not* in the nature of numbers and colours.

Then is there something arbitrary about this system? Yes and no. It is akin to what is arbitrary and to what is non-arbitrary." (*op. cit.*, §§ 357-358)

What is meant here, in my opinion, has nothing to do with any pragmatism or relativism whatsoever. Wittgenstein's thought here is still what it has ever been: mere logic. For he tries to demonstrate:

(1) that the system is "arbitrary" in so far as it is deprived of any rational ground, since its constituent rules do not reflect anything: neither so-called "immediate data", nor rules seated beyond the language;

(2) that the system is "non-arbitrary", because, in spite of the fact that it can be modified, applications of it, whether they are real or imaginary, obey "the laws of appearance".

For instance it's a logical law – not an empirical one – that "white water is inconceivable" (*Remarks on colours* I, 23), in the same way in which "we can't imagine four-dimensional colours, that is, colours which, besides degree of saturation, hue, and brightness, allowed of a fourth determination." (*Zettel*, § 269).

Now this notion of logical context (or contexture, or even simply *texture*) of perception helps us to understand the

famous statement of *Remarks on Colours* (III, § 73): "There is no such thing as the *pure* colour concept". Such concept doesn't exist because there *is* no colour without the logical game appearance is playing with itself. Only in the context of the rules of this game are we able to find out a *determined* identity of colours. Such identity is of course a conceptual one, there is nothing substantial in it.

Thus, according to the "last" Wittgenstein, the only possibility for us to bring "phenomenological problems" to a successful conclusion (and to avoid being caught in the trap of substantialism) is to know that description will never meet with "ultimate elements". If we see phenomenological description in its true perspective (like in *Remarks on Colours*), we must acknowledge that there is neither any "immediate data" nor any possibility of considering colour as referring to an undetermined "*x*". For the very same reason, there isn't anything like "direct and exact description", nor *a fortiori* any so-called "objective" description. All those metaphysical fictions are now replaced by "interpretation". For visual experience *does* always involve an interpretation.

I have asserted that Wittgenstein's last conception of phenomenology was a genuine one. As a proof, I might quote *Remarks on Colours*:

"Isn't similar to the fact that we often see a distant object merely as distant and not as smaller? Thus we cannot say "I notice that he looks smaller, and I conclude from that that he is farther away", but rather I notice that he is farther away, without being able to say how I notice it." (III, § 171)

As you have certainly noticed yourselves, this is exactly the same exemplification as in *Philosophical Remarks* (§ 72), except in this particular, that it has been *reversed*.

I might lay stress on the fact that the very possibility of a truly phenomenological thought rests on synthetical a priori being acknowledged. And it too is a reversed process. Let it be remembered for instance, that Wittgenstein, in an "addendum" to a conversation with Schlick and Waismann (*Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, "Anti-Husserl", 30. 12. 1929), simply refused to admit synthetic a priori judgement. At the question of Schlick: "What answer can one give to a philosopher who believes that the sentences of phenomenology are synthetic a priori judgments?", Wittgenstein's answer is the following:

"Now suppose the statement 'An object cannot be both red and green' were a synthetic a priori judgement and the words 'cannot' meant logical impossibility. Since a proposition is the negation of its negation, there must also exist the proposition 'An object can be red and green'. This proposition would also be synthetic. As a synthetic proposition it has sense, and this means that the state of things represented by it *can obtain*. If 'cannot' means *logical* impossibility, we therefore reach the consequence that the impossible *is possible*."

On the contrary, we read in *Lectures on the foundations of mathematics* (1939), that the very same statement: "An object is not red and green at the same time" *is* a synthetic a priori proposition (cf. Lecture XXIV).

Now the last step towards phenomenology in a proper sense is to take the word "phenomenon" itself in a phenomenological sense. This is precisely what *Remarks on Colours* does, by putting it as a main principle that "...we can speak of

appearance alone, or we connect appearance with appearance" (III, § 232) – "*we*", that is to say "wephilosophers", as opposed to the psychologists, who only connect appearance with "reality".

Accordingly, *Philosophical Investigations* peremptorily affirms:

"Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us." (I, § 126)

and:

"We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena; our investigation, however, is not directed towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the '*possibilities*' of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the *kind of statement* we make about phenomena." (I, § 90)

Thus Wittgenstein revokes his former conception of possibility as shade of reality, and of grammar as frame of phenomena. That's why we have a right to speak of the "new thoughts" as a truly phenomenological *approach* to philosophical questions. A method, not a theory.

At this point we have reached the possibility of comparing accurately Wittgenstein's achievement with both the Husserlian *and* the Heideggerian thought. A task which would take, of course, a long time – too long for me today, anyway.

Just one word on this point, by way of conclusion: In my opinion, Wittgenstein's phenomenology could fairly free us from the *fundamentalism*, in which Husserl has been caught.

And as for Heidegger, I'm not quite sure he had taken an exact measure of the risk.

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Comment on Rigal's Paper

The following remarks will deal primarily with questions of clarity and translation, and only secondarily with questions of content.

(1) E. Rigal wants to handle the problem "whether something like a Wittgensteinian phenomenology exists or not." She writes that "there are in fact *two* paradigms of what is called 'phenomenology'", which are irreducible to one another. Let us call them "phenomenology-1" and "phenomenology-2". I take the "there are" in the sense of "there are in Wittgenstein's writings". Otherwise the question we next have to face, according to E. Rigal, would make no sense as a question we *have to* face: "how are we to state the consistency of Wittgenstein's thought through his own evolution?". Now, if we accept that Wittgenstein held both phenomenologies at different times, say phenomenology-1 at the beginning and phenomenology-2 at the end of his philosophizing (after 1929), then there arises a question of *continuity*, but not of *consistency*. Only if phenomenology-1 and phenomenology-2 are irreducible to one another, and contradictory would there be a question of consistency.

(2) E. Rigal writes: "In after years, Wittgenstein simply gives up any idea of pre-established harmony between language and the world." To *give* something *up* at a special time, one must have *accepted* it before. To give up *any* idea of ... presupposes that there are, or could be, more than one. Which idea was accepted by Wittgenstein, before it was given up by him? If the idea was that of a philosophical grammar,

expressing the essence of things, then it is not clear how E. Rigal could remark that "the project of a philosophical grammar in form of a synopsis" disappeared in Wittgenstein's later writings in accordance with, for instance, PI § 371: "*Essence* is expressed by grammar." (See also PI § 373) If the idea of a "pre-established harmony between language and the world" consists of the idea that our use of language is based on conventional rules (is a rule-following behavior) and that these rules would not be how they are if the world were not how it is, then it is also not clear, why *this* idea is given up by the late Wittgenstein. It seems that there is more a continuity, consisting in further development, elaboration, criticism, etc. of former concepts than a break. Furthermore, what does "pre-established" mean? Pre-established with respect to whom, or what? Here some clarification seems to be necessary in my view.

(3) E. Rigal writes: "All these metaphysical fictions are now replaced (by Wittgenstein – R.R.) by 'interpretation'. For visual experience *is* always involved in an interpretation." (Note the quotation-marks in the first sentence, and their absence in the second one.) Then she quotes from *Remarks on Colours* (III, § 171): "Isn't it similar to the fact that we often see a distant object merely as distant and not as smaller? Thus we cannot say 'I notice that he looks smaller, and I conclude from that that he is farther away; but rather I notice that he is farther away, without being able to say how I notice it.'" In my eyes this Wittgensteinian remark is just one in favour of our not interpreting while making visual experiences. We do *not* conclude anything, we simply *see* something as *merely* distant. We are *not* able to say how we notice that he is farther away. Interpretation, at least in some cases of the word's use, is characterised by concluding, being able to say how we come to a special experience, and the like. At

least at first sight there is here a contradiction in E. Rigal's remarks that should be clarified.

(4) E. Rigal quotes *Remarks on Colours* III, § 73: "There is no such thing as the *pure* colour concept." She continues: "Such concept doesn't exist because there *is* no colour without the logical game appearance plays with itself." Wittgenstein's text goes as follows: "There is no such thing as *the* pure colour concept." The difference is clear, I think. With the last sentence it is compatible that there are *more than one* pure colour concept. Wittgenstein aside, do there exist one or more pure colour concept(s)? Of course there are or is such (a) concept(s), as we see in the example of the sentence "Red is a pure colour, but grey is not." Wittgenstein's quoted remark is not denying that we are right in using the phrase "pure colour" in sentences like this.

(5) Finally a remark on translation. E. Rigal writes that one aspect of the difference between Wittgenstein's position in 1930 and in 1950 was the later repudiation of *theory-construction*. She quotes a sentence from *Philosophical Remarks* (XXI, § 218) and a passage from *Remarks on Colours* (I, § 22). Whereas in the German original of the latter quotation Wittgenstein really uses the phrase "Theorie der Farben", in the German original of the first quotation he uses the word "Farbenlehre". Both expressions need not have the same meaning, and indeed have not, otherwise the following German sentence would be a contradiction: "Die Farbenlehre Goethes ist keine Theorie, sie ist vielmehr der Harmonielehre vergleichbar." This sentence is not a contradiction. So Wittgenstein's later remarks on his aim of finding the logic, or grammar, of colours (colour-words) need not stand in contradiction to his earlier remarks on his search for a psychological, or better phenomenological, "Farbenlehre".

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The Failure of Wittgensteinian Therapy and the Philosophical Law of Truth

Wittgenstein wanted to cure us, as philosophers, from our unilateral and para-scientific cramps that arise when we strive for certainty in the face of conceptual confusions (begriffliche Verwirrungen). These confusions are produced by misunderstandings, by social contradictions, and by the failure of our communication with others. Our solution is to seek security by coming to agreement with ourselves, by reducing the subject-matter of our troubles to a problem of coherence within ourselves. Thus our problem is reduced to a psychological one or to a problem of agreement with our partners which could be produced by argumentation; in other words philosophically.

In Wittgenstein's diagnosis this means that we try to find a theoretical solution for a practical problem. The urge for certainty by theoretical means cannot but strengthen our conceptual confusions. Therefore, we have to look in another direction, to another context for our problems: These problems must be solved within language-games and by the language-games themselves without the intervention of our chronic reflection and cramps. Only then can we recognize that our social contradictions and our disagreement arise from the fact of not being able to apply our words to our situation in order to be aware of what we have to perceive, to know, to desire, and to do. When we look for a theoretical solution to these problems, we forget the way language-games work and become forms of life. It would be enough to

remind us of the multiple ways language-games work in order to be able to dissolve these theoretical cramps and to stop idle thought. The sign that we have succeeded in curing ourselves would be that we become able to stop this chronic use of thinking when we want to do so.

Against this diagnostic and this wishful thinking, I wish to affirm the following theses: The Wittgensteinian way of describing the use of language is the only one which dooms us to be what he wanted to prevent us from being. If we believe it, we are obliged to privatize our language-game in such a way that it cannot be cured anymore. It is the only way which obliges us to let the language-games go idle. The reason is that we try to do what we are unable to before we submit ourselves to this therapy.

The Wittgensteinian therapy is based upon a dynamical view of language which is both similar to and opposed to the logical view of language in *Tractatus*. The concept of language-game is founded upon a harmony between words and perception, words and action and words and desire. When the language-game is working, this harmony makes up the consensus with our partners, with ourselves and with the world. In this way the harmony between our words and our life is presupposed in much the same way as the logical harmony between our propositional pictures and the depicted facts was presupposed. As you may remember, this presupposition was necessary in order to state the factual truth of propositions and on this basis to calculate their molecular truth. But to state those factual truths and to achieve a complete logical determination of the world, was impossible. And this mainly for two reasons: First, the facts of the world – and not the scientists – had to judge the truth of the elementary propositions. Second, this was only possible if the world had been completely analyzed. Of course,

such an analysis could never be achieved because we do not have epistemological criteria which could allow us to identify the end of analysis.

Analogically when the language-game is working, it is supposed to produce an agreement between the thoughts or the words emitted and the phenomena of life which are "answering" it in the right way. When we are rightly using our language-game, we have to be the same good listeners to ourselves that we had to be in the *Tractatus* as we had to see the visible answers of confirmation or refutation that the world was supposed to give. Granted this theory we may feel that we are able to stop thinking about philosophical problems; the language-games, when we imagine that they are functioning as they should, are dissolving them for us. But this way of escaping our problems can only be achieved in a psychological sense: It is impossible to find in a magical way the proper use of language which gives the answer to our problems of life in a way that assures the agreement with our social partners and ourselves. The acceptance of this feeling to be able to stop thinking when we want to, is as much psychological as the acceptance of the contingency of the world by the willing subject was. When we accept to be able to stop thinking, we also accept to be unable to give the solutions of life that our use of language-games was unable to give us. Our peace is only psychological, but our problems remain unsolved.

Wittgenstein, however, is unable to recognize that these effects remain psychological and private because he cannot recognize that his theories are false. Although they are still good railings against the psychological and private intuitions of the cognitivists (as if they could be objective results of anthropological inquiries), they transform the use of language-games and of thought into a psychological short-cir-

cultured circle of speaking and listening to oneself without the intervention of reality. My argument is that metaphysical and anthropological premisses leading to such an effect are false and that Wittgenstein was unable both to solve the logical problems of science as well as the philosophical problems of life because it was impossible for him to realize this. I will now try to show why.

Human beings are not endowed with extra-specific instincts like the other well-formed living beings. A human being is not programmed to perceive stimuli and to link this perception to the "right" reactions and answers in order to get the consummatory actions that it needs. Confronted with the impossibility of perceiving the world and of answering its own perceptions in a pre-formed manner, a human being is obliged to feel itself in a kind of hiatus with the world. It cannot link its organs of perception with its organs of action, and, as a consequence, it cannot but feel itself as possessed by an indeterminate fear, by a phenomenon of anguish. In order to overcome this anguish, a human being has to learn a language; that is, it has to use language as an apparatus of both emitting and receiving sounds and of linking the perceptual apparatus of the ear with the apparatus of action. The reason is that language – the sounds being simultaneously emitted and received – creates the only bridge between a human being and reality; this means the reality of the world, the reality of its social partners, and its own reality.

This adjustment of language to reality (and to perception) occurs as an adherence to verbal representations endowed with a cognitive power manifesting itself by the phenomenon of belief. The adjustment of language to action expresses itself in the adoption of the intention of acting and the adjustment of language to consummatory actions manifests

itself through the identification with desire. When the language-game is working, these adjustments are as given as the world we breathe within. They are therefore no subject of reflection. But as soon as the language-game does not work, beliefs, desires, and intentions disappear. Then it produces a "social contradiction"; mutual disagreements as well as conceptual confusions following from this situation. In this way the original hiatus appears again and again.

But we are still not in a position to understand this situation. From the metapsychological standpoint (which is common to users of language and to Wittgenstein) everything looks as if the use of language can be described in terms of projecting sounds towards the world in order to give it meaning and in order to give meaning to others and to ourselves. A second step seems to be the following; one has to recognize the actual occurrence or lack of occurrence of the facts corresponding to our descriptions. One has to recognize oneself and others as listeners which are in agreement with us as speakers when our words organize our actions, desires or feelings. Then one would only have to confirm the agreement with ourselves by the agreement of our words with reality and with our social partners, because this intersubjective agreement occurs independently of our will to produce it and is therefore as objective as the visible world is an instance of an objective judgement. However, it is not as simple as this.

As speakers or thinkers, we cannot recognize the meaning we give to our words without presupposing *and* posing the truth of the proposition which we are thinking. We cannot identify anything we speak about without thinking our proposition to be true. Truth is prior to sense or meaning and is a condition for the use of language. Both Peirce and Prior have stated; "every proposition affirms its own truth",

or "to use a proposition is to affirm its truth". Wittgenstein could not see this point because he believed (like the cognitivists today) that language comes after visual perception and builds itself as a copy of perception. But it is the contrary which is the case; as a living being born one year too early and as thus being an aborted being, it has to utter sounds in order to see its environment and in order to do what it does and what it has to do.

This priority of truth in what we say and think, implies that we are not allowed to give the visible facts the power to judge our proposition instead of judging it ourselves. For in order to affirm a proposition we must think it as true. This means that we must judge it as true as we have to think it as a true one in order to be able to think it at all. The occurrence or non-occurrence of the described facts is not sufficient for certifying the truth or falsity of our propositions. To know that snow is white, is to know that for the snow to exist is for it to be white. If we believe in the priority of the visible facts, we are obliged to believe that for the snow to be white is for it to be what it is for the eyes. But we know what snow is if, and only if, we can identify the specific process of crystallization which produced the snow and its whiteness. In order to be able to do that – to identify the snow with this process – and in order to be able to recognize the truth of the proposition that is describing that, we must think of it as true and judge that the reality of the snow has among all its appearances one and only one "property" that gives it its existence (such and such a process of crystallization).

In Wittgensteinian terms, my point could be put in the following manner: The common logical form between propositions and facts cannot be something which can be presupposed as a preexisting harmony. Instead, "the internal logical form" that Wittgenstein was looking for in the

Notebooks, is this harmony of objectivity which is posed by the predication, the use of referring expressions and the affirmation of the proposition which judges itself as true, as if it was thought of as a true proposition in order to be thought at all. But this interpretation is excluded by the interpretation Wittgenstein gave of propositions of the kind "Fa". One can no longer analyze it by writing: " $\$x (fx) \cdot x=a$ ", reducing it thereby to a conjunction of the predicate of a property to an undetermined thing and of the use of the proper name referring to this thing. By affirming "Fa", we are indeed affirming the objectivity of the identity which we are thinking between the thing (we are referring to) and the mode of existence we are attributing to it by the use of a predicate. This necessity of judging the truth of our proposition without being able to found this truth upon preexisting facts, was declared impossible and "philosophical" by Wittgenstein when he declared that his own propositions were nonsense. But in doing so he was obliged to judge his own propositions – as every language-user must do – and to recognize them as "true", as "definitively true".

This philosophical judgment was excluded by Wittgenstein. It is nonetheless what is presupposed in every utterance and as such is something that nobody can prohibit. Everybody who utters or thinks a proposition must judge its objectivity by judging the objectivity of its truth. This law of truth is valid not only for the cognitive propositions – the so-called "descriptive" propositions – but also for the prescriptive ones and for the propositions expressing feelings or mental states. The time of judgment by which we submit our propositions to the law of truth is indeed necessary if one wants to escape this short-circuited use of our phono-auditive sounds by which we invoke a preexisting agreement with the facts or with the others as a kind of preexisting auditive echo, transcendent to every use of language and as such some-

thing that every picture and every language-game is judged by.

By reducing truth to correspondence with facts or to consensus with our social partners and with our life, Wittgenstein transformed the use of every proposition into an experience of confusion or doubt; *begriffliche Verwirrung*. The reason is simply that he excluded the only move which allows us to leave our biological, original and chronic disarray. By declaring this move a nonsensical one, he could not judge its objectivity, and for the same reason it was impossible for him to recognize the falsity of the propositions he had declared definitively true; that is, his own philosophical propositions. Thus he was unable to see that this philosophical move defines our ordinary use of language as well as every illocutionary speech-act. This move – the philosophical law of truth – by means of which we judge the truth of the proposition in order to think it at all, can only be avoided at the following price: We are necessarily privatizing our language-games as well as our therapeutical efforts to dissolve our cramps. Wittgenstein was indeed unable to judge the reality of these cramps and for the same reason unable to judge the objectivity of their dissolution.

Wittgenstein's denial of the philosophical law of truth implies not only a privatization of the use of language that is repeated blindly by his followers. What is more, it gives every use of language – intended only to be "a move in a language-game" – an autistic character. He thereby prohibited himself and others to speak because he could not understand what happens when we speak; that which is given in every speech-act, the philosophical use of judgment.

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Comment on Poulain's Paper: Propositional Truth and Agent's Knowledge

From Poulain's paper several charges against Wittgenstein can be extracted: Wittgenstein's therapeutic strategy against conceptual confusions (which allegedly arise when language-games go idle)¹ is misconceived and turns on his dismissal of the theoretical-philosophical moment of judgment of (universal) truth. In Poulain's view, Wittgenstein's diagnosis leads mistakenly to an attempt to show the flies the way back into the pre-given practical or transcendental set-up (which has to *show* itself) and to an exorcising of validity-claims. This, however, must lead (against Wittgenstein's own concern) to a privatization of language beyond cure. Furthermore – and not unconnected – Wittgenstein seems to disregard the *acts* of the philosophical subject or interlocutor quite generally, acts like affirming or judging propositions (to be true). He misconstrues speech acts, their illocutionary forces and validity-claims. The pertinent kind of judgement, Poulain says, "was excluded by Wittgenstein. It is none the less what is presupposed in every utterance and as such something that nobody can prohibit. Everybody who utters or thinks a proposition must judge its objectivity by judging the objectivity of its truth. This law of truth is valid not only

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1. I take Poulain's reconstruction to something like this: According to Wittgenstein "confusions are produced ... by the failure of communication with others" and are (traditionally and mistakenly) seen either as a psychological problem or as a lack of that kind of agreement with our partners "which could be produced by argumentation, in other words philosophically." To activate philosophical reflection at this point, however, would be, in Wittgenstein's view, "to find a theoretical solution for a practical problem".

for the cognitive propositions – the so-called 'descriptive' propositions – but also for the prescriptive ones and for the propositions expressing feelings and mental states."

I think these allegations are hardly warranted as they stand in Poulain's paper, although they are not quite arbitrary either. In what follows, I will try to make clear my own view on these questions, having recourse to Poulain's account.

1. *Logical harmony*. Let me start with Wittgenstein's therapeutic ambition (in *Philosophical Investigations*) and its parallel in *Tractatus*, the condemnation of his own statements as senseless. According to Poulain, "[t]he Wittgensteinian therapy is based upon a dynamic view of language which is both similar to and opposed to the logical view of language developed in the *Tractatus*. The concept of language-game is founded upon a [idea of] harmony between words and perception, words and action and words and desire. When the language-game is working this harmony makes up the consensus with our partners, with ourselves and with the world. In this way the harmony between our words and our life is presupposed in much the same way as the logical harmony between our propositional pictures and the depicted facts was presupposed [in *Tractatus*]."

It is true that Wittgenstein postulates a kind of preestablished "harmony" between propositions and facts in *Tractatus*, a harmony which is indeed a presupposition for truth (and falsity). But this harmony, viz. the correspondence between objects and names, and the sameness in logical form between the world of facts and language, is not so suspect as Poulain suggests. It is, of course, not meant as any apriori determination of which propositions are, in fact, *true*. On the contrary, it is a precondition for propositions' openness and bipolarity as to "yes" and "no". (2.201, 4.023f.) So,

when Poulain counts as a shortcoming of the *Tractatus* that it disregards the judging subject, that "the facts of the world – and not the scientists – had to judge the truth of the elementary propositions" (which could at most be done "if the world had been completely analyzed")² he is in my view much too hasty and overlooks that the transcendental "harmony" does not *compete* with the business of science, which is to ascertain contingent truth, but is its precondition. Of course we must have it *both* ways, and according to *Tractatus* we do have it both ways: the *subject* projects a picture (of a possible state of affairs), asserts a proposition (as true); and it depend on the world (and in so far the *world* decides ("judges")) whether the proposition is true. But the transcendental set-up ("harmony") is the precondition for both "judgements".

It might indeed seem as if Poulain's picture of Wittgenstein lacks one dimension, such that a certain necessary multiplicity collapses. It overlooks that both in *Tractatus* and in *Philosophical Investigations* the "harmony" makes out the logical *frame* on the basis of which we can project or claim contingent matters, it is not as such already a true-or-false *theory*, it does not compete with science.³

2. *Linguistic harmony.* If we turn to the *Philosophical Investigations*, the preestablished "harmony" essentially includes a kind of agreement between language-users. The social and

2. Cf. also: "The occurrence or non-occurrence of the described facts is not sufficient for certifying the truth or falsity of our propositions." [The scientific subject and its judgement is also necessary]

3. The obliteration of the distinction between empirical theory (truth) and transcendental preconditions is, of course, no specialty of Poulain (if he makes himself guilty of it) but rather a general feature of recent holism, e.g. in Quine. (Cf. my essay "Die Verabsolutierung des Begriffs der empirischen Theorie – der Fall Quine" in Böhler/Kuhlman (eds.): *Kommunikation und Reflexion*, Suhrkamp 1982.)

institutional character of language, its essential non-private character, is stressed. Poulain links this up with anthropological considerations clearly reminiscent of Arnold Gehlen. "Human beings are not endowed with extra-specific instincts like the other well-formed living beings. A human being is not programmed to perceive stimuli and to link this perception to the 'right' reactions and answers in order to get the consummatory actions that it needs. Confronted with the impossibility to perceive the world and to answer its own perceptions in a preformed manner, a human being is obliged to feel itself in a kind of hiatus with the world. It ... cannot but feel ... anguish. In order to overcome this anguish, a human being has to learn a language." The adjustments of language [which mediates between our inner world, our actions, our social partners and the world] are normally "no subject of reflection". "When the language-game is working, these adjustments are given as the world we breath in. ... But as soon as the language-game does not work, beliefs, desires and intentions disappear. Then it produces a 'social contradiction'; mutual disagreements as well as conceptual confusions following from this situation. In this way the original hiatus appears again and again."

So far Poulain seems to agree with Wittgenstein (as he pictures him). But then Poulain goes on to announce his disagreement and to show that Wittgenstein misses the remedy or the only move which can relieve us in this situation: the law of truth. Wittgenstein misses the role of truth as it is inescapably involved in acts like affirming "because he believed ... that language comes after visual perception and builds itself as a copy of this one. But it is the contrary which is the case; as a living being born one year too early and as thus being an aborted being, it has to utter sounds in order to see its environment and in order to do what it does and what it has to do."

The point seems to be once more that Wittgenstein overloads preestablished harmony. Against the Wittgensteinian recourse to given harmony "in practice" (which may be threatened by theoretical/philosophical ambitions) Poulain again and again stresses what he considers to be the decisive move: the submission of our pictures or moves in language-games to the obligations deriving from their inescapable character of being validity-claims. "The moment of judgement by which we submit our propositions to the law of truth is indeed necessary if one wants to escape [the] short-circuited use of our phono-auditive sounds by which we invoke a preexisting agreement with the facts or with the others as a kind of preexisting auditive echo ..."

By barring this move, and "reducing truth to the correspondence with facts [*Tractatus*] or to consensus with our social partners and with our life [*Philosophical Investigations*] Wittgenstein ... excluded the only move which allows us to leave our biological, original and chronic disarray." Wittgenstein was "unable to see that this philosophical move defines our ordinary use of language as well as every illocutionary speech-act". He neglected or did not understand "what happens when we speak, what is in act in every speech-act: the philosophical use of judgement". But, says Poulain, the philosophical law of truth can only be avoided at the price of giving every linguistic move an autistic character and of privatizing whatever efforts we make to reach out toward others and even our therapeutic efforts to dissolve our cramps.

3. *Alternative or supplement.* I feel sympathy with much of this. There is, however, also the feeling that things are not sorted out properly and put in their right place (with the right kind of limitation). Or – again – I feel that Poulain's

account suffers from a lack of differentiation which may nullify his good points. Let me try to sustain this somewhat.

First, it is not quite easy to say what Poulain's position is with regard to the "Gehlen" point. At times he obviously seems to side with it. The way out of man's original (distressing) "openness" has to pass by (linguistic) socialization and institutions. This would then be in perfect harmony with the Wittgensteinian attacks against the illusions of some kind of sovereign "inner", mental instance (the intending subject) which is not anchored in and (also) constituted through the essentially public and "outer" medium of language. And this crucial point has of course to be recognized – as far as it goes. At other times, however, Poulain seems rather to be stressing a post-conventional (post-traditional) universalist, anti-rhetorical point, in particular the transcending and idealizing character of validity-claims (say along Apel-Habermasian lines).

Now, these two moments are certainly compatible. Indeed, in my view they both need to be emphasized. The trouble with Poulain's statement is, however, that when the latter moment is stressed, it is done in way – or so it looks to me – which refuses to give Gehlen (i.e. Wittgenstein) his due; the argument seems to be directed against "Aristotelian" traditionalism and Gehlenian institutionalism *tout court*. That is, it seems to neglect a distinction between what we could call (the) language-independence of reason "before" and "after" the advent of language; i.e. between methodic-solipsistic illusion and post-conventional universalism, or between (the idea of) "pre-social" subjectivity and (the conception of a language-dependent or language-generated) "*post-social*" reflexivity.

So, it is not clear to me what exactly the charge is when it comes to (Wittgenstein's ideas about) social (linguistic-practical) harmony and para-scientific (philosophical-theoretical) cramps. The phrase "as soon as the language-game does not work" is e.g. ambiguous, not least on the background of Gehlen's perspective and Wittgenstein's possible deplorable "Gehlenianism". Does it mean the (imagined) distressing primitive state of hiatus "before" language and institutions ("uses") –, or does it mean the situation where the language-game is indeed working, only that *we* (in Wittgenstein's view) are stupid enough, or too lazy, not to stick to it but rather leave it and take language to some kind of theoretical-philosophical holiday (§ 38)? Of course we might say – along with Gehlen – that the difference is not that important, the important thing is the sting against free-floating intellectualism and the admonition: go back to work! (An attitude which Poulain wants – or so I believe – to counteract in the name of "the law of truth".) However, in Poulain's epistemological context the distinction is important, because he does not seem content with *adding* something to the working of language-games as a logical precondition, completing the picture, as it were (in this case we could agree to the Wittgensteinian-Gehlenian handling of the primitive state as far as it goes and only criticize its insufficiency). Poulain seems to want to *replace* it. But this throws us back into the primitive "state of nature" and the question: what is Poulain's *alternative* to the Wittgensteinian-Gehlenian styling of human intentional life through institutions and language-games?

At this point, strangely enough, Poulain seems to offer the law of truth as his solution: "The moment of judgement by which we submit our propositions to the law of truth" – allegedly neglected by Wittgenstein – seems to be offered as "the only move which allows us to leave our biological origi-

nal and chronic disarray". But this is confusing. Firstly, it claims far too much from the law of truth, and it conflicts with Poulain's Gehlenianism when we read the remark made in the beginning that to overcome the original anguish "ahuman being has to learn a language". Nevertheless Poulain seems to insist, as when he writes: "The common logical form between propositions and facts cannot be something which can be presupposed as a preexisting harmony. Instead ... this harmony of objectivity ... is *posed* [my emphasis, AØ] by the predication, the use of referring expressions and the affirmation of the proposition which judges itself to be true ..." It seems, indeed rather clear that Poulain's remedy against the anguish of the "state of nature" is not logical form or language as a form of life, but the *positings* or (validity) *claims* inherent in human speech acts. This, however, must be a rather extreme overloading of the illocutionary force of human statements. It isn't that strong.

4. *Agreement*. A further point concerns the notion of agreement and Wittgensteinian therapy. Throughout Poulain's paper, I have the feeling that he levels the difference between agreement in opinions and agreement in language or form of life. At times one has the impression that he wants to replace "preexisting agreement" of the latter kind with agreement on truthclaims and other validity-claims. (This would be a kind of reverse to the move of Heidegger, when he somehow dismisses the trivial, apophantic "correspondence" truth and favours a notion of emphatic truth, truth as destiny of being, the advent of which is an "opening up" of a world (Lichtung, logical space, meaning-universe).⁴) Or per-

4. My position would be once more that we must have it both ways. The emphatic notion concerns the preexisting space *within* which apophantic truth is possible (and necessary). (Cf. E. Tugendhat: *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, Berlin 1970 and G. Skirbekk: "La vérité chez Heidegger", in: *Rationalité et Modernité*, Paris: L'Harmattan 1992)

haps he rather makes too much out of the Quine-Davidsonian denial of the distinction between what belongs to language (meaning) and what depends on matters of fact.⁵

In any case, we have to distinguish between harmony, agreement ("Verständigung") as a logical and hermeneutical *presupposition* of sense (and thus for the *seeking* of agreement through linguistic-argumentative exchange generally), and harmony, agreement (Verständigung) as a *result* of discussion etc. The first kind of agreement is a precondition for that kind of "agreement with our partners which could be produced by argumentation" *as well as* a precondition for *disagreement*. We can have a lot of disagreement of the latter kind without destroying *language* (indeed, language is a precondition of disagreement), whereas disagreement at the first level equals – if Wittgenstein's argument against private languages is valid – the disappearance of language.

In PI § 242 Wittgenstein talks about the agreement between language-users which belongs to linguistic meaning, as an agreement which is not only an agreement in "definitions" "but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements." But Wittgenstein does not really by this move obliterate the distinction between *presuppositions* for linguistic exchange (what belongs to the language-game, to the rules, as it were) and possible *results* of such exchange. His point does *not* "abolish logic". Let us recall § 241: "'So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?' – It is what human beings *say* that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."

5. At least from the speaker's point of view this distinction *has* to be presupposed: the speaker *uses* language to *say* something.

It is, of course, crucial not to abolish the distinction between linguistic agreement as something (if private languages are impossible) beyond which there is nothing – i.e. agreement as something which opens up the "space" in which our opinions move – and on the other hand agreement as synchronization of opinions, as parallel moves or the like. The first is a condition for the possibility of *having* opinions, converging or diverging, for the very possibility of agreement and disagreement. To overlook this would indeed be to abolish logic. And it would be to destroy the good sense of Wittgenstein's game metaphor: we agree on the (constitutive) rules of the play – which is a precondition for playing – but *within* the play we have options and different players make different, opposite moves (we can disagree in our moves in a lot of ways, even if we may agree in the last resort in our evaluations or judgements on the moves (which are good and which are bad)). Of course, we must – and we can have – both things simultaneously: agreement in language and a vast variety in *what we say*. Acceptance of a "law of truth" should be no problem either. Poulain, however, seems to me to simplify the picture and to put us before a dilemma where both horns are equally impossible: to accept the logical necessity of some preestablished – quasi-transcendental? – scaffolding or harmony (agreement in language) and deny the law of truth; *or* to deny the mentioned necessity and having recourse to the law of truth exclusively.

True, Wittgenstein says that we follow rules blindly, but this does not make him an authoritarian conservative which denies autonomy and the role of argument. The blindness pertains to the constitutive rules. Even when we follow the rules of chess blindly, we do not play it blindly (the rules do not prescribe the play). We do follow the constitutive rules of the language-game of giving orders (and obeying) blindly, but we do not give and follow *orders* blindly (atleast

we should not, and Wittgenstein does not claim that we should). The language-game of asking questions and answering also has its constitutive rules, which we follow blindly (when we master the language); but we do not answer questions blindly, as a rule we try to be truthful. (A question does in a sense prescribe *some* answer, but not its content.)

5. (*Cognitive*) Acts. As for validity-claims I will not defend Wittgenstein to the bitter end. I do in fact believe that something has to be added. Even if there is a considerable progress in his views on this point from *Tractatus* to *Philosophical Investigations* there is something left to be wanted (which concerns the "law of truth" and which has indeed to do with Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophy). But let me confine myself to the mentioned progress. The saying/showing thesis of *Tractatus*, according to which the miracle that language – and we in using language – perform cannot be *said*, but has to *show* itself (in that use). Logical form, which is common to world and language and which makes depicting or saying possible, cannot itself be said, i.e. depicted. But Wittgenstein's attempt to save the transcendental form or *limit* of the world which makes logical pictures of facts possible from being a depictible fact in the world, is in a way overdrawn or too radical.

For one thing, it keeps from being verbalized those "forces" and acts through which logical pictures are projected. If "epistemological" verbs (think, say, know ...) have a place at all in the *Tractatus* theory, then *either* purely "transcendentally" in the act of projecting (in the first person, as it were) – or (in the third person form) as a part of natural science, i.e. (psychologically) as depicting something happening *in* the world (not in logic) (4.11). Thanks to the "either" part one cannot simply say that truth and the thinking of proposi-

tions as true do not have a proper "transcendental" role in the *Tractatus*. (But one can in a sense regret that *truth* is absolutized and "acts" and forces other than those of describing states of affairs are suppressed. See below.) But first of all there is no *mediation* between what shows itself in the use of language (in the first person) and what is stated or said in the third person. In the third person form our thinking and saying ("A thinks p") has to be analyzed *either* as illegitimate sentences of the form "'p' says p" or somehow as (behaviouristic?) statements within natural science. This lack of mediation would in a sense dissolve our (natural) language into *two* languages; one (behaviouristic) observation language – with associated theoretical language – in which other subjects are depicted – along with the rest of the world, a language in which I can *say* (i.e. depict) what they do and say, and one language in which I form/ articulate my consciousness (my intentions) and/or my acts and possibly *show* myself in colloquy (through my speech acts).

However, perhaps we are not entitled after all to state the "either" part. Perhaps all we can say is that Wittgenstein – in talking about the "philosophical" subject – marks the place where epistemological verbs would belong; that he, in contradistinction to Kant, does *not* assert that an "I think" has to accompany all our propositional pictures.⁶ If we distinguish, along with the saying-showing-doctrine, between two kinds of consciousness: consciousness of objects and *act*-consciousness (Tugendhat, E.: *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, 1976: 82f.) it is clear that the lat-

6. We could put it this way: When it comes to verbs for the (spontaneous) actions of our understanding Wittgenstein does not even provide a room for an "I think" which has to accompany all my "pictures". But, contrary to Kant, he does make an attempt to analyze "A thinks p". His analysis can, however, hardly be accepted. And no wonder if he doesn't succeed; in his perspective the first person present tense form is lacking!

ter doesn't really have any language according to the *Tractatus* construction. Rather we must say that an act-constitutive language is *missing* in *Tractatus*. A language, in which the transcendental (philosophical) I can form its "agent's knowledge" (Ch. Taylor) is left out or somehow reduced to the logical power itself, which directs language – as depicting – toward the world. (*Tractatus* 5.54ff.) Maybe this is so, while the *use* of language is "one-dimensional" in *Tractatus*: all act-forming verbs, which might have differentiated the use of world-depicting propositions, reduce themselves to this single one: the thinking of the sentence meaning (as description), and so such verbs become *redundant*.⁷ According to the picture-theory of *Tractatus* language reduces itself to the "p"s, the propositions which depict possible states of affairs and the facts of the world. The act itself is not articulated, apart from its pictorial content.

All of this is thoroughly amended in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. The ("transcendental"-act-)monism of *Tractatus* is exploded. We are now told that there is no fundamental canonical logical form (or force), but a multitude of kinds ("countless" kinds says Wittgenstein). Acts and act-verbs are now abundant, and first of all, he now envisages a (anti-Cartesian and anti-Kantian) *mediation* between the performativ-expressive act-constituting *use* of verbs in the first person (which *do not depict the act*) and depicting *non-first-person-present-tense* uses which *say* who does what. The "doctrine of showing" certainly recurs somehow in *Philosophical Investigations* too, but it is now a matter of course that act-verbs have a role in the first person present tense as *act-constituting* forms of consciousness, most conspicuously as perfor-

7. That is, one could imagine at least a distinction between "I think (assert, judge) that p" and "I consider (hypothetically) that p" corresponding to the distinction between states of affairs (Sachverhalte) and facts (Tatsachen).

mative or expressive utterings in language-games, as well as descriptive roles. We can link this up with Wittgenstein's new theory of the constitution of "psychological" verbphrases generally. These predicates (their meanings) are now conceived of as having essentially *two* roots. Accordingly, "A thinks that p" is now treated quite differently from what it was in the analysis of the *Tractatus*. In *Tractatus* it was interpreted as an illegitimate statement which tries to *say* what cannot be said but has to *show* itself. Now, the first person perspective (the "own case", including the performative intention-in-action: "I think that p" (the thinking of p)) *and* the third person perspective (including *observation* of thinking and speaking people) are both considered as necessary for the meaning of the verb.

To sum this up: Substitution of the first person must be possible (against objectivism/scientism), declination must be possible (against dualism) and paralogisms must (and can) be avoided!

A last word: I still think that Poulain is right in claiming that there are some deficiencies in point of universalism in (the later) Wittgenstein.

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Words and Objects

I shall talk about words and objects, but at some point it will turn out that I have also been talking about concepts and practices. The concepts and practices I will be talking about, will be the concepts and practices of practical work. I shall be doing so by discussing one example at some length, and since I have spent the last two months in a fishing village in Northern Norway, trying to learn about the world of coastal fishing, I shall take my example from that world. But the scenes I describe are drawn from my first visit to a fishing village, several years ago. And the one long conversation is a construction out of several short ones.

A short exchange

It's a winter morning in a fishing village in Lofoten. There is a gale blowing and it is ten o'clock. I have just come to the place to try to capture the gray winter light with my camera, following in the footsteps of Matti Saanio, in a humble way. I am not a photographer. I am a philosopher and a townsman, and I know very little about fishing villages, except that there is where most of our coastal fishermen live, that most of them fish from boats less than 40 foot long, and that their catches are processed in the village. The drying racks are to be seen all over the place. I also know that the fishermen leave the village harbour early in the morning and return with their catches late in the afternoon or early in the evening. And that is about all I know about fishing villages.

I am in the village shop buying some bread and a few other articles that I shall need for the next couple of days. While I

am about to pay for my purchases, an old man manouvres into the shop, fighting with the gale about the door. Walking towards the counter, he darts a quick glance at the dog lying in the corner, wagging its tail at him, and addresses the shopkeeper:

- I see Fidel is already in.
- Yes, it had its mast broken the other night.
- So that was Fidel.

And that is all. What do I make of the short exchange between the old man and the shopkeeper? I take it stepwise, as I hear it, bracketing the second remark while working on the first, etc.

I see Fidel is already in. Who is Fidel? Is it the dog? I noticed that the old man took notice of the dog before he spoke. And what he then said, did seem to have been drawn upon some observation that he had just made. If Fidel is that dog, then that dog does not usually appear in the shop until after 10 o'clock. But Fidel is also a man's name. A few sixty-eighters called their sons and daughters after the revolutionary heroes, such as Fidel, Rosa, etc. So Fidel may well be a young fisherman that the old man had observed between the houses on his way to the shop, a great many hours before any fisherman should be in. But a fisherman will not be back in the harbour before his boat is back in the harbour, so Fidel might also be the name of a boat. Whatever "Fidel" is the name of, be it animate or inanimate, it is the name of some individual mobile something, the has come in, wherever *in* is, from some place without, wherever *out* is, and has done so *somewhat sooner than expected*.

That's all the old man's remark tells me. There is more to be read from the remark about the situation between the old

man and the shopkeeper, but not, I think, about whatever the two of them are talking about.

Not knowing who or what the proper name "Fidel" refers to does not perhaps count as not understanding the remark. But it is not only that I have not as yet identified the bearer of that name. I do not even know whether it is the name of a dog, a man, a boat, or what. And not knowing that is an obstacle to knowing what division between *in* and *without* the remark draws on, and therefore also to knowing what manner of movement the movement from *without* to *in* is. And not knowing either does count as not understanding the remark, or as not quite understanding it.

Yes, it had its mast broken the other night. Fidel must be a boat. Of all the mobile objects that I know of, only boats have masts. Sailing boats certainly have masts, but so do many motor boats and most fishing boats, for whatever reason. So the boat Fidel had its one mast broken the other night, and that is why it has *come in sooner than expected*. And so *the harbour* is probably the place where Fidel is *already in*, and *without* is the sea, or more accurately the village fishing grounds, if Fidel is a fishing boat.

The shopkeeper seems to have heard a question in the old man's remark: "I see Fidel is already in. Do you know why?" The shopkeeper knows why and tells him: "*Because it had its mast broken the other night.*"

But if Fidel is a motor boat, which it most certainly is at this time and place of the year, why should having its mast broken be a reason for breaking its schedule, whatever that schedule was, and head for the harbour? There obviously was a schedule of some sort, be it a timetable, if it is a ferry, the regularities of the working day, if it is a fishing boat, or what. But why break it for a broken mast, when the boat is

driven by engine? I see no connections. I cannot make head or tail of it, though I understand that the boat Fidel had its mast broken the other night.

So that was Fidel. I take it that the old man has already heard that a boat had had its mast broken the other night, but that he hadn't been told until now that it was Fidel. Which implies that the old man has not himself seen Fidel in the harbour this morning, or at least not enough of it to see its broken mast. But his first remark did present itself as being based on some observation of his own. What he has seen, then, is either just enough of Fidel to identify it as Fidel, or Fidel's owner, about in the village at this unlikely time of the day.

And that is about as far as I come, trying my very best.

I understand each of the three remarks of this short exchange. If I did not quite understand the first remark until I had heard the second, I certainly did upon hearing the second. I know what the talk is about, the boat Fidel, and I understand what is being said about it. There is no single word or phrase, in any of the three remarks, that I do not understand well, and the grammar of each one of them is equally perspicuous. And should there be more to the understanding of a remark, something that cannot be pinned down to grammar or vocabulary, then that something more will surely be present in my ability to translate it into some other language that I also know well. I do not know that I had any trouble, with either of the three remarks, in translating it from Norwegian into English.

And yet I cannot make head or tail of the exchange. What is it that I cannot make head or tail of? I understand that the shopkeeper's remark is in answer to (what I understand he understands to be) the old man's implied question. I under-

stand that the old man is enlightened by that answer and so, unless he be a fool, that it does answer his question. It is only that I myself do not see how it does so, that is, how it explains why Fidel is already in, and a great many hours before schedule, if Fidel is a fishing boat. (Fidel had had its mast broken the other night. So, if Fidel is a fishing boat, it had been heading for the fishing grounds this very morning, with a broken mast – before it returned because of the broken mast. Either Fidel is not a fishing boat or I am quite lost.)

Remarks and explanations

We should perhaps make a cut between the remark and the explanation and say that I understand the remark but not the explanation (that it gives). The *remark* that I understand is "*Fidel had its mast broken the other night.*" (I take it to be a wooden mast, and not an aluminum one, since it is said to have been *broken*, not *bent*. And I take it that it broke at some vital point, and not for example 5 cm. below the top, with only ornamental consequences. That it is a wooden mast, and that it broke at some vital point, I count as parts of what I understand when I understand the remark.) The *explanation* that I do not understand is what that remark implies (or what that remark being given in reply to the old man's implied question implies): *that is why Fidel had to head for the harbour.* And here it is the *that is why* bit that I do not understand, whereas the old man does. But what I do not understand, then, is not those very words, "that is why", or "therefore", or "so", etc., but what it is about *Fidel*, or about *fishing boats*, or about *ferries*, or about *boats*, or about *whatever*, that makes it necessary, or wise, or at least intelligible, that having had its mast broken, Fidel should head for the harbour.

So it is my knowledge of the world that is somewhat lacking, not my mastery of my own language. There is consolation in that, because that short exchange turned out to be only the first of a series of exchanges, between villagers, that I could not make head or tail of. Though I am quite sure that I could have produced a good translation of every single remark of each one of the exchanges.

The cut between (our understanding of) remarks and (our understanding of) explanations seems to parallel the cut between (our knowledge of) language and (our knowledge of) the world. As a speaker of my own language I understand the remarks made in it, not any and every remark, but any remark made in everyday language, with only everyday words in it. But when a remark is made in explanation of something, then I shall not understand the explanation unless I am knowledgeable about those affairs of the world that the explanation draws on. So it seems that explanations make up no part of what I understand when I understand what is said in my own language. Understanding explanations is no part of what I learn when I learn to speak. But in learning about the affairs of the world I also learn to explain and to understand the explanations that others give, as much of it, that is, as I have learnt about the affairs of the world. Learning to speak, though it prepares us for the affairs of the world, is something else. Or so it seems. But is it so?

The basic question of the philosophy of language can be framed like this: What is it that we learn when we learn to speak? (What makes the voices that we are surrounded with, as infants, come alive as talk? What prepares us for that? And for what does it prepare us? I see the whole of Wittgenstein's *Philosophische Untersuchungen* as being addressed to that question.) I shall ask a less basic question. When we

have learnt to speak, part of what we have learnt is to master a stock of everyday words. My question is: When we have learnt to master this or that everyday word, what is it that we have then learnt? That is, what is it that we master when we master a word? I shall only talk about words that refer to objects, in the simple sense of solid objects, though what I say about such words will have implications for any word that can be said *to refer* to something, be it an object, an action, an activity, a situation, an institution, etc. My examples will be of words that refer to artifacts, whether complete artifacts, such as a boat, or incomplete artifacts, such as a mast or a rudder.

One very everyday word of the fishing village is the word "boat". And the boat that is closest to the 8 or 10 year old child is *the rowing boat*. That's the boat that it can handle all by itself. What has the child learnt when it has learnt to master the word "rowing boat"? It has, for example, learnt to handle that word as a substantive, whatever it is that it has then learnt. It has learnt to distinguish rowing boats from boats that are not rowing boats, and also from rafts, which are not boats, but float on water and high enough to carry people or cargo. That is, the child has learnt to recognize rowing boats, those objects, as the objects that we call "rowing boats". Or (is that the same?) it has learnt to use the word "rowing boat" to refer to such boats and to such boats only.

How does the child recognize a rowing boat when it sees one? By its shape, perhaps, or by its shape being one of three or four distinct shapes. But its shape, then, is not simply the shape of the hull, but also its being equipped with thwarts and rowlocks, at least two of them, one for each oar, and two tholepins for each rowlock. That's how the child tells that it is a rowing boat. Saying that, I take it that the two rowlocks are properly placed relative to the each other, that the pair of

rowlocks are properly placed relative to the thwart, and that the arrangement of thwart and rowlocks is properly placed within the frame of the hull. And "properly placed" now means: placed so as to make the boat fit for rowing, with the rower seated on the thwart, each of his two hands on each of the two oars, the oars on place in the rowlocks, etc. So in the child's (or in our) preception of the rowing boat as a rowing boat, with the oarlocks etc. in their proper places, there is an understanding of what it is to row it, and of what it takes to row it.

There is a stage in the building of a rowing boat, where the hull has been completed, but where it has not as yet been fitted with thwarts, rowlocks, etc.. That is, the hull has been completed but not the rowing boat, since it cannot as yet be rown. That is, the child who masters the word "rowing boat", has not only learnt to distinguish rowing boats from other boats, but also to distinguish complete or completed rowing boats from rowing boats that still lack some equipment before it can be rown.

In the child's, and in our, perception of the rowing boat there is an understanding of what it is to row. But there is more to that than understanding how the thwart, the rowlocks, etc., are placed to fit the rower's rowing. There is also this, that if you loose your oars, you cannot row. If the foremost tholepin breaks, you cannot row. If the thwart is not there, rowing will at least be awkward, in calm weather, and impossible in rough weather. If there is a hole in the hull, below the water line, the boat will not sink, if it is a wooden boat, but it will be impossible to row. All this, and more, enter into our understanding of what a rowing boat is, and so order our perception of it, or make us perceive the order that there is to it.

To master the word "rowing boat" is to apply that word right, and that implies recognizing a rowing boat when you see one. That, in turn, implies recognizing the order that there is to it, or enough of it to see that it is in order, ready for rowing, or that it is not in order and not ready for rowing. And the order that I have sketched, if only a fraction of the order that a boatbuilder could tell us about, is perhaps enough for that recognition. It is also enough to make us understand that the recognition of that order is also the recognition of a great many possibilities of explanation. If the rowing boat is in order, it projects the possibility of whatever action or activity that it takes a rowing boat to execute. If it is not in order, some or all of those projections will be severed, depending on the way in which it is not in order. And the recognition of those projections, or of those severed projections, is built into our recognition of a rowing boat as a rowing boat, and so into our mastery of the word "rowing boat", and so into our understanding of remarks where that word is applied.

For example, if someone says, speaking about a particular boat, "Two of the tholepins broke", or "... are broken", then, if you understand that *remark*, you also understand that (with the appropriate context supplied) it works as an *explanation* of either of these situations: The boat came adrift. Peter had to come to the rescue. John is making a new pair of tholepins. Peter could not join the regatta. John had to ring Mary to tell her he would be an hour late. Etc., etc.

In learning to master this or that word, we also learn to recognize the object that the word refers to. If that object is an artefact, but not perhaps a work of art, recognizing that object involves recognizing its place in our activities and what that place requires of it as to its material and design. An oar is not simply a wooden pole that is broadened and

flattened towards one end. It is one of a pair, and the pair of them is for rowing with, in a rowing boat. It is only when you know what rowing is and how it is done that you know enough of what an oar is to recognize an oar when you see one. And then you also know enough to understand that a child may be too weak to handle the oars, that if one oar is lacking you cannot row, that a non-swimmer may keep afloat with one oar under each armpit, etc. That is, if you master the word "oar", you also know enough about oars to make them enter into explanations of this or that.

The distinction between understanding a remark, simpler, and understanding the explanation that it gives, still holds. For example, I still do not understand the explanation that the shopkeeper gave, though I understand his remark (the remark that, in that exchange, is that explanation). The parallel distinction between language and the world also holds, for example in the simple sense that the word "rowing boat" is not at rowing boat, that the word "oar" is not an oar, that the remark "One oar is missing" is not itself the situation it describes, etc. But the distinction is not a distinction between two distinct realms, so that we may be at home in one without being at home in the other. We make ourselves at home in language through making ourselves at home in the world. And we learn to explain as we learn to speak. The common understanding that lies beneath our common language is not only a common understanding of the rules of language. It is also a common understanding of the way the world works. That is what the rules of language attach to.

A word and its object

A couple of days after the short exchange, I was still in the village, I came across an advertisement in a newspaper that might well be called a "coastal newspaper". Not only is it

printed in a coastal town, it also addresses itself mainly to coastal matters. The advertisement caught my eyes because it displayed the name of some object in large, capital letters and a picture of that object underneath.

**TRENGER DU NY
MESAN?**



BESTILL NÅ -FOR LEVERING
NÅR DET PASSER DEG.

FAGMESSIG UTFØRT I
EKSTRA KRAFTIG
PLASTBELAGT NYLONDUK.
HOLDER SEG MYK I KULDE.

PAFØR MALENE OG SEND
HELE ANNONSEN TIL OSS.

NAVN.....

ADR.....

KONTAKT OSS OGSÅ VED
NYANSKAFFELSE ELLER
REPARASJON AV
PRESENNINGER, SEIL,
KALESJER OG
SILOPRESENNINGER.
UTLEIE AV PRESENNINGER

Joh. Løvdal %
STIPE MASSE/STREKSTREK BODD

TOLLBUKT 9 POSTBOKS 203 8501 BODD

ENGROS - DETALJ
TLF.081-24080

That is how I used to picture objects and their names, the objects below and the names above, and the arrangement showing which object belongs to which name.

The advertisement is an offer, from some firm or workshop, to make a certain article upon request and cut to measure. The word naming the article is "MESAN", and the picture underneath that word is a picture of a MESAN. But now I am really only deleting the quotes from the word naming the word to arrive at the word naming the object (that that word names). I really do not know what a MESAN is, and the picture of it does not help me a lot.

I had not come across this advertisement, or this word even, in any of our national newspapers. So I took it that the word "MESAN" is a word of the coast. And wanting to learn about the coast, I set myself the task of learning that one word, that is, of learning what object it refers to. It is my experience that learning one thing well gives you knowledge of many things. And

it does not matter much where you begin.

My question is not: What does the word "MESAN" mean? But: What is a MESAN? That is the more natural question. And at least with words that refer to objects, I do not think there is anything to the first question that an answer to the second question does not answer.

Though the word "MESAN" does not occur in the short exchange between the old man and the shopkeeper, it turned out that when I had learnt that word I understood how the shopkeeper's remark answered the old man's question, and I understood it because I had learnt that word. So a word may well be operative in a remark without occurring there.

Let us see what the text together with the picture can tell us about what a MESAN is. The heading is a question: "Do you need a new MESAN?" Then there is the picture, and it is the black, trapezoid shape that is the picture of a MESAN.

The arrows belong to the text. But all that that black, trapezoid shape tells us about a MESAN, is that it is a (black?) trapezoid shape of something, with that angle to that corner of it. It says nothing about the material of the thing and nothing about its size or sizes. Is the picture drawn in the scale 1: 1, 1: 100, or what? But the question "Do you need a new MESAN?" does indicate that, whatever the thing is, it is subject to wear and tear.

The text below the picture, the first eight lines, says: Order now – for delivery when it suits you. First class workmanship. Made in extra strong, plastic covered nylon cloth. Stays soft in cold weather. Write down the measurements and send the advertisement to us, with your name and address. (The next seven lines of text tell us what else the firm JOH. LØVOLD can do for us.)

This text tells us that the thing comes in different sizes, but it does not give us the scope of variation. Or is the thing a MESAN whatever the size? The material is nylon cloth, plastic covered nylon cloth. Can it come in other material and still be a MESAN? We are told that with that material the MESAN stays soft in cold weather. So I take it that staying soft in cold weather is a requirement, or at least a virtue. And likewise with the extra strong cloth. But then, perhaps, whatever strong or extra strong cloth that stays soft in cold weather will do. But what is strong or extra strong cloth? A strong thread for sowing may be weaker than a rope that is too weak for climbing. So what counts as a strong cloth depends on what sort of wear and tear a MESAN is subjected to. And that we do not know. Except that its staying soft in cold weather indicates that its use is out-of-doors.

There is a practical air about the advertisement, in particular to the wear and tear bits: extra strong cloth, stays soft in cold weather. So I take it that a MESAN is a practical thing, for practical use. In that case its shape is not simply a geometric shape, that can be folded around any of its edges, or turned any number of degrees around any one of its points, without losing any of its properties. It is a practical shape, that is, it is an oriented shape, that perhaps loses all of its non-geometrical properties upon any such transformation. If so, that oriented shape does look like a sail, and everything that is said about the MESAN, in the advertisement, fits well with its being a sail. But it does not look like the sails I have seen on the sailboats in the town harbour. They are, all of them, rightangled triangles. It looks like a sail from a picture book of nineteenth century sailing crafts. There are a few such sailing crafts still around, but probably less than 10 in the whole of Northern Norway, and most of them are owned by nautical museums, who will have their own sailmaker. There can be no market for sails for old sailing crafts, and if

there is no market for them, they don't exist in the market. And there will be no advertisements offering such product. When it comes to the making of the more utilitarian artifacts, such as sails, we should add a fifth cause to Aristotle's four: *the market*. Such things will not be brought into existence if there is no market for them.

And that is about as far as I come, trying my very best. A MESAN is a trapezoid cloth, a trapezoid of the form shown in the picture, made for some practical use, probably out-of-doors.

It looks like at sail for a nineteenth century sailing craft, but being in production and being advertised, it cannot be that. But if it isn't I don't know what it is.


So, mustering my scattered bits of knowledge has not enabled me to identify the thing that the word "MESAN" refers to. It has brought me to an impasse, as did my attempt to understand the short exchange.

Learning about the object

I cut out the advertisement and pocketed it in my wallet. That same evening I found the old man from the short exchange at a table in the coffee house, and I ventured to approach him about the advertisement. He had seen me around with the camera, he told me, and asked what I was doing in life and in the village. I told him, and learnt that he had just pensioned himself off as the skipper of 78 foot net-boat. I also learnt that his youngest son had taken over and that his two older sons already had their own boat.

- I don't know what philosophy is, but I do know what a MESAN is. What do you know about fishing boats?
- Not much.
- But you have seen one?
- Yes. I have not been down to the harbour here, but I have seen fishing boats.
- Do you think you could draw one?

He was asking me to show him what I had seen, or what I thought I had seen. I produced my pen and drew a picture on the white space of a newspaper. Like this:




- All right. That's an old type but still around, with the wheelhouse aft. There is the bent exhaust-pipe coming through its roof, and the wheelhouse-door to the starboard, so you cannot see it from here. And the cabin cap is placed before the mast. But that mast, that's roughly where one-masted sailboats have their one mast. If a fishing boat has a foremast, it has two mast, because it always has a mast aft. Also the foremast, if there is a foremast, will be placed on top of the cabin cap, which has a very strong frame for that very reason. That gives you a better working space.

The old man then drew it like this:



- That's the boat you have seen.
- You are right. Now that you have drawn it, I remember.
- Yes, except I haven't drawn the necessary stays, and only one of the necessary ropes. But now that you remember what a fishing boat looks like, I shall draw you a MESAN.
- We already have a drawing of it.
- Right, but that tells you only what it looks like, not what it is.
- All you can draw is what it looks like.
- Let me show you. We begin with a line for the sea and then we place a fishing boat in it, but one of the more recent types this time, with a fore wheelhouse and an aft mast only. Like this:




The wheelhouse has been built in one piece with the cabin roof, and that one piece is made of aluminum. The hull is of wood and so is the mast and its two beams. This boat is, let us say, about 24 foot long, and it is easily han-

dled by one man alone. It is a very common type around here. I am sure you recognize the MESAN.

- So a MESAN is a sail.
- Of a sort, yes.
- But why does an engine-driven boat need a sail?
- Well, the MESAN is not for sailing. With only one sail and in that position, there isn't much you can do, sailingwise.
- I am afraid you have me confused. I know now that a MEASAN is a sail, or a sail "of a sort" as you said. So it needs a mast and a couple of beams. I can also see the point of two of the ropes. The upper short rope is to hold the upper beam in position, and the long rope is to hold the lower beam in position.
- The lower short rope is to fasten the lower beam to the stern. Without that rope, the lower beam would be swinging to and fro, sidewise, as the wind blows, and the whole construction would be of no use.
- That's what confuses me. If that sail is not for sailing then what is the use of that whole construction?
- Remember this is a fishing boat, and it lies still when fishing. Say there is a strong breeze blowing, and that's still fair weather, but it's enough to turn your boat sideways as soon as you stop to fish, if you have no MESAN. And lying side-ways to the waves, there will be a great deal of sideways rolling, which makes for quite uncomfortable fishing, even if it's only a strong breeze.
- That I understand.
- Perhaps you do. Think of yourself seated at your writing desk writing a letter, but with the floor and everything on it heaving to and fro. That's about the situation of the fisherman at work in a strong breeze without a MESAN.
- Then he better not be without it. But how does it help?

- I'm not quite sure how it does it, but I know what it does. It prevents the waves from turning the boat sideways.
- Is it the waves that do it? I thought it was the wind, the strong breeze.
- It's the waves, helped by the wind. We use the same words, "strong breeze", "small gale", etc., to describe both the force of the wind and the size and manner of the waves. In fact, it's from the manner of the waves that we read off the force of the wind. When there are strong breeze waves, there is a strong breeze wind. In the old days, in the days of the sailing boats, it was the force of the wind that was important. Nowadays, with boats like this, it is the manner of the waves that matters. So I don't know why we still speak about reading off the wind from the waves.
- Thank you, you just gave me a fine example.
- I'm not sure that I know what I gave you a fine example of, but you are welcome to it.
- But how does the MESAN prevent the waves from turning the boat sideways?
- When you stop to fish, or when you are about to do so, you point the boat straight against the wind and the waves. The bow will then cleave the waves and they will affect the boat the same on each side of it. With the boat in that position, the wind will just pass the MESAN on each side of it. Like this:



As the effect on the boat, by the waves, is only roughly the same on each side of it, the boat will soon be turned towards one side or the other. And as the boat is turned towards one side, the MESAN will be edged into the wind, so that there will be a weather side to it and a lee side. Like this:



And now comes the bit I'm not sure about. Some say that the wind on the weather side will push the MESAN back again and so turn the boat up against the wind. Remember that the MESAN is held in a fixed position. This is the explanation that I understand, and well enough to see that that is not how it works. If this were the true story, the MESAN should have been made of cardboard, that stays flat, and not of cloth, that curves and so weakens the pushing of the wind. It is not the pushing that straightens the boat, though it does slow down its turning towards sideways. The other story is about pulling rather than pushing. It tells us that the wind rushing along the lee side of the MESAN creates a vacuum there, which sucks the MESAN towards lee, and so turns the boat up against the waves again. The way the boat suddenly gains momentum and straightens itself fits well with this story. The trouble about it is that I don't quite understand it. If a "vacuum" means no air or very little air, I don't understand how that can come about. So there you are. The story that I don't believe in, that's the one I understand. And the story I believe in, that's the story I don't understand.

But whatever the explanation, this movement to and fro will go on for as long as you are lying still, but with the MESAN up the boat will always straighten itself and never be brought into the very awkward sideways position.

- That story about the vacuum on the lee side, that's the story I have been told about sailing against the wind. Like you, I don't quite understand it, but the man who tried to instruct me is very knowledgeable about such matters. So the MESAN is a sail after all. At least it works as a sail each time it straightens the boat.
- Yes, it works as a sail for a few seconds, and then again five minutes later, and so on. That's why I spoke of it as a sail "of a sort". And now you know what a MESAN is, don't you? The English word, by the way, is "mizzen".
- Yes, now I know what a mizzen is. You have taught me thoroughly. I have one more question though, if you permit me.
- Go ahead.
- When the boat stops to lie still, will it not then be driven backwards by the wind and the waves? And the more so since the mizzen prevents it from being turned sideways?
- It's the boat that you stop, not the engine. The propeller is still working, just enough to keep the boat in position.
- Thank you. I now see what the contribution of the mizzen is, to this type of fishing. The engine, or the propeller, keeps the boat in position, while the mizzen secures the boat's orientation in that position, so that it will keep its bow headed against the waves, or roughly so.
- Right. And without a mizzen, fishing will not only be uncomfortable, it will be dangerous, and certainly in a gale. You were in the shop yesterday, when I asked the shopkeeper about Fidel. May I ask if you understood our short exchange.

- I understood every word of it and yet I couldn't make head or tail of it.
- I thought perhaps that was so. I have noticed that townspeople often know less than eight year old children about fishing and fishing boats, less than eight year old children of a fishing village, I mean. And so often you don't understand the simplest remark about such matters.
- So it is.
- It must be quite strange to hear your own language spoken and not understand it. In my youth, I worked on a Scottish netboat from Ayr. I didn't know five words of English when I first came on board, but two weeks later I was a native speaker of netboat-English, I mean the English that you speak when working on a netboat. When we were seated in the mess room, and not working, the talk could be about anything and everything, and then I was lost, for a long time. But not on deck. For the same first two weeks we had man from Glasgow on board, as a tourist. He was a bank clerk, if I remember rightly. He was often on deck, standing aside so as not to be in the way, but looking at us working. I wonder what he saw. I should have liked to hear him try to describe it, though he couldn't have done so in netboat English. He told the skipper that he couldn't make head or tail of what we were saying. That was on his first day, but he wasn't much better off on his last day. Of course we didn't have time to teach him, but then I didn't receive any instruction either. So there he was, among his own countrymen, and after two weeks he still didn't understand much of what we were saying, while on deck, working. I have thought about that. What I think is that you cannot learn the name of a thing if you don't know the thing it is the name of. He knew nothing about the gear and how to work it, and so he didn't know what our words were about, or what there was to say. I knew the gear and the work as soon as I set my eyes on the deck. A Scottish netboat is not so different from a Norwegian netboat, not on the West coast of Scotland it isn't. So I

knew what there was for the words to be about and what there was to say. I didn't know one English netboat word when I first came on board, but they rushed into their right places as soon as I heard them spoken. At least, that is how I remember it now. When I was told to do something, to tighten a rope, to look up for something, etc. I knew at once what I was told to do, or not to do. It would have worked as well had they said "hey" each time. But then I wouldn't have learnt the language.

- You said you didn't know what philosophy is. You have just given a lecture in philosophy. And a fine lecture it was, you don't mind my saying so.
- I don't mind. I enjoy talking to people who enjoy listening. When I come home, I shall read what my dictionary says about philosophy.
- If it says anything about the philosophy of language, then that is what you have lectured on, with that story about you and the bank clerk.
- Well, I have met a few bank clerks since then. You are only the last in a long series. I sometimes feel like that bank clerk myself, when I listen to the young people talking.
- I am a little less of a bank clerk now than before you explained the mizzen to me. Now that I know what a mizzen is, I understand why Fidel had to return to harbour before time. There was a gale yesterday. But why did Fidel set out for the fishing grounds in the first place, with a broken mast?
- I am not sure why he did it, but there was no gale when he set out, at 6 o'clock, only a moderate breeze. The gale blew up all of a sudden around 8 o'clock.

At this point, but only at this point, did I congratulate myself upon having understood, at last, the short exchange from the day before. My understanding of what it is to fish in a gale, in a 24 foot boat, and alone, was still somewhat lacking.

But I counted my understanding of that particular exchange as complete.

To honour my teacher, the only gesture at hand, in that coffee house, was to offer him another cup of coffee. But two weeks later I was able to send him a few of my twilight pictures from that fishing village, together with two lucky shots of Fidel's mizzen at work in a gale, as seen from its weather side.

Concluding remarks

When Arild Utaker asked me to talk to this seminar, he also told me that he wanted me to expand on a particular point that I make in the essay *The two Landscapes of Northern Norway* (Inquiry; no.3, 1988) I make that point in examining the constitution of the concept of a *natural harbour*, or perhaps of that object. The concept of a *natural harbour* is the concept of a particular landscape formation, like the concept of an *island*, or that of a *bay*, but it is not quite on a par with them. Whereas we can teach someone the concept of an *island* by pointing to a few islands, and to a few non-islands such as promontories and skerries, we cannot teach someone the concept of a *natural harbour* without introducing ships and boats. In a world where there are no boats, or only boats that can easily be drawn ashore by their own crews, there is nothing to yield the concept of a harbour. Though nothing is lacking of that which, in our world, goes to make up so many natural harbours.

After a short discussion of the concept of a *natural harbour*, I write, in *The Two Landscapes*:

The method of investigating *the concept* of a harbour, therefore, is this: Situate yourself within the practice

that this *object* belongs to, and then investigate *the object* and *its* contribution to that *practice*.

.....

Of a *word* that refers to such an object, there is not much to say beyond that it refers to *that* object, pointing to it.

I apologize for quoting from my own writing, but those are the lines that Arild Utaker wanted me to expand on.

As I understand myself, I have already complied with Arild Utaker's request. I first did it, in a negative way, in my analysis of the short exchange between the two villagers. (The style of that exercise is at least reminiscent of the style of Arne Næss' exercises in what he calls "occurrence analysis", in *Interpretation & Preciseness*.) The point of that first exercise is to show that our *everyday language* does not constitute a realm of its own. It is in every bit of its existence tied to our *everyday world*, with its diverse activities, artifacts, weather, terrain, etc.

To the understanding of a remark, there belongs both an understanding of the situation in which it is made, the occasion for its making, etc., and an understanding of that which the remark is about. In all four of my examples, I speak about our understanding of that which a remark is about, when it is about an artefact. If, for example, the remark is about a coastal fishing boat, then my understanding of that remark is no better than my understanding of coastal fishing boats, that is, of their design, the point of this or that piece of equipment, etc., which, in turn, draws on my understanding, or knowledge, of the world within which they operate, the world of coastal fishing. I make that point in each of the four examples.

It is not grammatical to speak about understanding, or not understanding, a stone. And yet I speak about our understanding, or not understanding of a coastal fishing boat,

which, grammatically, is on a par with a stone. But an artefact, such as a coastal fishing boat, or its mizzen, is not only for something. That which it is for is embodied in its very design, as its *raison d'être*, in its material, in the equipment attached to it, etc. The point of an artefact, that which it is for, is internal to it. It is that which is recognized in the recognition of it. So, when I speak about our understanding of a tholepin, that is awkward only if you are not able to see *the point* of the tholepin embodied in the tholepin. If you still find it awkward, there is a simple way out. Every place where I write "our understanding of x", where x is an artefact, you just take it as a shorthand for "our understanding of the point of x".

Next, I complied with Arild Utaker's request in my analysis of what it takes to recognize a rowing boat as a rowing boat, and so what it takes to master the word "rowing boat" (after you have already learnt to speak). When I speak about an artefact, such as a rowing boat, then I speak about an object that has its own, internal ramifications to artifacts and activities that the remark is not about. There will be the inward ramifications to tholepins, thwarts, etc., and the outward ramifications to rowing, rowable water, landing places, etc.. if I say about a rowing boat, for example that it lacks a tholepin, I do not then speak about its thwarts, or about its oars, or about rowing it. And yet, you will not understand what my remark is about if you do not know what rowing is, that you need oars to row, a thwart in its proper place, etc. So in the very recognition of that which a remark is about, when it is about some artefact, there is a recognition of its standard place in our activities, of what we can do, if it is in order, or of what we cannot do, with that particular exemplar, if it is not in order. That is, in the very recognition of the object, there is a recognition of a great many explanatory schemes, The object is loaded with them, with its being made of that material, its being of that design, in that position, etc.

We are about to launch the rowing boat when I notice that there is a tholepin lacking, and say so: "There is a tholepin lacking". In saying that I say, or imply, that we cannot row that boat (until we have found another tholepin (to replace the one that is lacking)). I also imply that otherwise that boat is in order (or enough so for us to launch it and row). The last implication is of the sort Grice calls a "conversational implicature". It is detachable. But the first implication is not. We are about to launch that boat, but I cut short my launching motions with the remark "There is a tholepin lacking". That remark explains why there is no point in launching that boat. It cannot be rowed, not for as long as there is that tholepin lacking. If you don't see that that is what I am saying, or that that is implied by what I am saying, then you don't understand what I am saying. That is, if that remark of mine is not understood as that explanation, then it isn't understood. That is, with no understanding of the world of rowing, with its network of implications between its gears and its activities, and between gear and gear, there is no understanding of that remark either.

Can the existence of one object imply the existence of another?

Oars come in pairs and the existence of one of a pair implies the existence of the other. If the other has been destroyed, it must be replaced. If not, the one that is left will lose its existence as an oar. Within a given rowing technology, the existence of one tholepin implies the existence of three more. It takes four tholepins to make up the necessary pair of pairs, one pair to each side of the gunwale of a rowing boat (and in their proper position with respect to rowing the boat, etc.) In that way, the existence of one tholepin implies the existence of a rowing boat, and so of a boatbuilder with a boatbuilder's tools and materials, and so, within a given technology, of trees. That one tholepin also implies the existence of rowing, and so of a rower. If there are none of these things, within that world, then that tholepin-looking object is not a tholepin, not within that world.

Within a given realm of human activities, or within a given practice, there is a network of implications between activities and activities, between activities and artifacts, between artifacts and their natural surroundings, and between artifacts and artifacts. Within that realm, each such implication exhibits a necessary truth. What is not necessary, is the existence of that realm. But that contingency does not disturb any of the local necessities within that realm. There might have been no rowing boats. Yes. And then that network of implications teaches you what else there would not have been, and what else there might not have been.

Are these necessary truths truths of language? That is, truths by definition? Only if you incorporate a good understanding of what a rowing boat is, and of what it is to row one, into our understanding of the words in question, "rowing boat", "oars", "rowing", etc. We can do that. But that is not what lies behind the standard examples of truths of language, or behind any of the standard analyses of such truths. So, within a standard understanding of what a truth of language is, they are not truths of language.

Third, I complied with Arild Utaker's request when I reported to you how I learnt what a mizzen is (as far as I learnt it, that is) or what I had to learn to learn that. When philosophers of language speak about the meaning of a word, they don't say, or not anymore, that it is what the word stands for. Perhaps because that formula has (been thought to have) lured us into searching for objects where there are none, or worse, into finding objects where there are none. But also because, even when the objects are there, such as mizzens, we don't seem to be on the right track if we say, for example when I am hoisting the mizzen, that I am hoisting the meaning of the word "mizzen". Meanings are not made of for example cloth, not even of cloth that stays soft in cold weather. The standard formula, nowadays, is that the meaning of a word is its contribution to the sentences in which it is applied. I have not applied this formula, though, and I am not sure that I know how I could have let that formula guide me in my search for the meaning of the word "MESAN", or the word "mizzen".

In the *Blue Book* Wittgenstein replaces the question "What is the meaning of a word?" with the question "What is an explanation of the meaning of a word?" For any particular word, Wittgenstein's question is, I think, "How do we teach someone the meaning of that word?" And for a particular teaching situation that question should, in turn, be taken to say; for example: "What do I have to teach him to teach him the meaning of that word?" The answer to that is, it depends on what he knows already. It also depends on what word it is, and on what he needs it for.

Fidel is in the harbour, together with most of the other fishing boats. You are looking for Fidel but you are not quite sure what it looks like. I tell you it's the only one with a yellow mizzen, but you don't know what a mizzen is, and I tell you it's the sail on the aft mast. And that's enough for you to find Fidel. It is perhaps also enough for you to think that you have learnt a new word. And so you have, since now you know what the object called by that name looks like, or what that object is called. But you may still be lost in most conversations involving that word, at least in the fishing village. That's because you still don't know what a mizzen is. So many remarks will draw on implications that do not float from that object as you know it. Your mizzen is still too much of a stray object. It has not as yet found its place within its proper network of implications.

There isn't more to be said about *the word* "mizzen" than: "*that* is what that word refers to" – pointing to a mizzen, or perhaps drawing one, in the manner of the old skipper. If that does not bring you far, it is your understanding of *that object* that is lacking. And so it is with all the words that refer to artifacts.

Explaining such words, the very first move is to point to their objects. That may not achieve much, not even a clear delineation of the object. Never mind, the work has just begun. The real task is to teach you about that object. Wittgenstein's question about explaining the meaning of a word must be transformed into a question about explaining the point of an artefact, the artefact that the word refers to: What do I have to teach you to teach you the point of that artefact? And the question about the point of an artefact, is the question: What does that artefact contribute to the activities in which it is applied?

With the mizzen, and a little more than halfway through my lesson, I tried to sum up its contribution in this way: "The engine, or the propeller, keeps the boat in position, while the mizzen secures the boat's orientation in that position, so that it will keep its bow headed against the waves, or roughly so." When we have understood how the mizzen secures that orientation, and the point of its being so secured, then we have understood what the mizzen contributes to that type of fishing. And only then have we recognized that object in its place within its proper network of implications. Only then do we see that object as the repository of possible explanations that it is, i.e. among the fishermen, i.e. in reality.

Permit me one last question. Someone asks you about the word "mizzen", about what it means or what it refers to. What do you have to teach him to teach him the meaning of that word? Part of the answer is, of course: It depends on what he knows already.

Setting out to teach me, the old skipper's first move was to find out what I already knew, and that's where he began. With a five year old girl from some inland town, he might have had to begin with teaching her about boats, about the

fish that swim in the sea, about various ways of catching fish and why we try to catch them, etc. They might both have a long way to go, passing a great many words and a great many explanations, before they arrive at the point where the skipper can teach her what a mizzen is, or the meaning of the word "mizzen". What, then, is the meaning of the word "mizzen", if it is what you have to teach someone to teach that someone that meaning?

Does all that the skipper has to teach the child to teach her the meaning of the word "mizzen", belong to the meaning of that word? Or should we make a cut somewhere, between that part of the teaching that *prepares* the child for being taught the meaning of the word "mizzen" and that part which is the very teaching of it? If you say *yes*, clearly we must make that cut, then where do we make it? I am not sure that we need to answer that question, or that we need to ask it.

Whatever the child has already learnt about the sea, about objects that float and objects that sink, and perhaps about swimming and drowning, *she brings all that with her* when the skipper teaches her about rowing boats, sailing boats and motor boats, in that order, and she brings *all that* with her when she learns about fish, fishing, fishing boats, etc. But what is it that she will bring with her, from one chapter to the next, if all that she has to go by is what the skipper has told her? How do we learn what it is that she has learnt, if all we have to go by is what she can reproduce of what the skipper has told her? To secure her knowledge of what a rowing boat is, for example, and to secure his own knowledge of her knowledge, the skipper had better teach her to row – first in calm weather and then in a moderate breeze, so that she will learn what the wind and the waves do to a rowing boat, about her own strength and so about the strength of the

wind, etc. One day, when she is rowing against the wind and the waves, the skipper should ask her to pull in the oars. That will teach her about sideways rolling, and with a little explanation, the skipper will teach her how the boat is turned sideways. Etc. And even the smallest of rowing boats can be equipped with a mast and a sail. Etc. The skipper will now be teaching the inland town child the same way as the children of the fishing village are being taught. He will learn from seeing her at work what she has learnt and what she has yet to learn, and he will know what skills and understanding she has to bring with her to the next stage.

There will be an interplay of contingencies and necessities in this story, and as the child gets a firmer hand with the oars and a sharper eye for the space of handling them, some of the contingencies will transform into necessities. E.g. the oars, the oarlocks and the thwart will connect into one group of objects and places, internally connected via the activity of rowing. That group is hardly detachable from the rowing boat, or the rowing boat from the sea, etc. With what she learns when she learns to row, the child will also learn to recognize such internal connections. Objects will connect with their proper activities into groups, and groups will connect with groups. She will learn such truths as: You cannot row with one oarlock missing. It is stupid to place the thwart on line with the oarlocks. The boat must be in the sea before you can row it. Etc. She will perhaps learn some such truths Meno-wise, so that it may take a Socrates to teach her some of what she already knows.

When she comes to the mizzen, the mizzen will connect with the mizzen mast, with the position of the mizzen mast within the construction of the boat, with the sort of weather and the sort of fishing that requires a mizzen in that sort of weather, etc. With the mizzen securely placed within its

proper network of internal relations, and a few strong contingencies, why try to detach it from that network, in order to get a simple, one-piece object for the word "mizzen" to refer to, or to mean? Cut loose from its proper network, that object is not a mizzen. It cannot, cut loose, work as a mizzen, and it is not, cut loose, intelligible as one. That object derives all its intelligibility from that network. As that intelligible object, the mizzen implies its proper network and is implied by it.

The geometrical terms "point", "line", "angle", etc., may be said to be defined by the axioms pertaining to points, lines, angles, etc., and so also by the theorems that we derive from those axioms. We may perhaps venture an analogous view of words that refer to artifacts. For example, that the word "mizzen" is defined by the necessary truths pertaining to mizzens. Only it is through our experience with mizzens, in our working life at sea, that we learn the truths about mizzens. After several years of fishing we may still discover new truths about mizzens. (It hasn't been in *that* weather before.) As we understand more about what the mizzen contributes to what, and about what it takes for a mizzen to do so, some of the truths we have learnt transform into necessary truths. Those truths, that is my proposal, go to define the word "mizzen", or rather, the object that that word refers to.

The realm of those truths is identical with the network of internal relations within which the mizzen has its place. As it takes a great deal of experience to come to see those truths, and to see them as necessary truths, it takes a great deal of experience to come to see the mizzen for what it is. And so all that we have to learn to learn what a mizzen is, belongs to the concept of a mizzen, or to that object.

But the very first step, learning about the word "mizzen", is simple: you just point to a mizzen and say: that's what the word "mizzen" refers to. That's all you have to do to introduce *the word*. And that's all we can do by way of explaining a *word*: introduce it. It does not take you far, either in your understanding of what a mizzen is or in your understanding of exchanges about mizzens, among fishermen. But now that you know what object that word refers to, you can go on from there to learn about that object.

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Multi-Dimensional Texts in a One-Dimensional Medium

The paper discusses one of the tools which may be used for representing texts in machine-readable form, i.e. encoding systems or markup languages. This discussion is at the same time a report on current tendencies in the field. An attempt is made at reconstructing some of the main conceptions of text lying behind these tendencies. It is argued that although the conceptions of texts and text structures inherent in these tendencies seem to be misguided, nevertheless text encoding is a fruitful approach to the study of texts. Finally, some conclusions are drawn concerning the relevance of this discussion to themes in text linguistics.

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My aim in this paper is to show one of the ways in which information technology opens the door to an entirely new approach to text studies. That computing provides us with powerful tools for manipulating and analyzing texts is a well documented fact. My claim, however, is that the use of information technology in textual studies may also help us explicate traditional concepts of text by way of stimulating a new kind of text analysis.

If possible, I would have liked to start out by suggesting possible answers to questions like: What is a text? What is

the ontological status of the text? What is the epistemological status of texts? However, I have come to think that these questions do not represent a fruitful first approach to our theme at all.

The answer to the question what a text is depends on the context, methods and purpose of our investigations.

Texts have been studied by many and diverse disciplines – in so-called analytical bibliography [Kraft p 77-79] or codicology texts are studied as physical objects with physical properties. In classical, medieval, and biblical philology and text criticism the physical objects containing texts are called text witnesses, the text being an abstract entity. In linguistics texts are sometimes regarded as discourse events, sometimes as strings of sentences [de Beaugrande and Dressler, Halliday and Hasan].

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Our concept of text has to a large extent been shaped by the limits and possibilities of the media which have traditionally carried texts. In this perspective, the computer is a new medium which will create new kinds of texts, i.e. change the subject matter of our study, thus changing also our concepts of and ways of dealing with texts.

My main concern here is that adapting our traditional concepts of texts to the use of the new medium may also help us explicate our traditional concepts of texts and give us a better understanding of existing ways of dealing with and relating to texts.

This effect becomes particularly clear in attempts to transfer texts from traditional media to the new medium, a process

which may be seen as an attempt to represent multi-dimensional texts in a one-dimensional medium.

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Why I call texts multi-dimensional will hopefully become clear from the discussion further below. But what is the reason for calling the computer a one-dimensional medium? After all, computers display text on screens and in paper printout, which may look exactly like traditional printed text.

Internally, a computer represents a text as a long string of characters, which in turn will be represented by a series of numbers, which in turn will be represented by a series of binary digits, which in turn will be represented by variations in the physical properties of the data carrier.

For the present purpose, we may regard the conventional data text file format as essentially a one-dimensional string of characters. This format is significantly different from the traditional book or printed paper. It is even more different from *handwritten* material. Handwritten material is structurally more informal than printed texts. Variations which in print will be discrete and easily identifiable may in manuscripts be gradual and hardly discernible.

If the means of representation placed at our disposal is essentially only a long string of characters, how can all the information contained in a written manuscript page be mapped on to this one-dimensional format? The answer is simple enough:

We insert special, reserved character combinations, so-called codes, into our long character string. These codes indicate

features such as line endings, page brakes, start of underlining, end of underlining, and so on.

Still, there is only one way of reproducing *all* the information, and that is by the production of an exact duplicate. First of all, we have to ask: Which parts of the information conveyed by a document are to be retained? How do we distinguish between form and content, between the ("relevant") information contained in the manuscript and the more accidental traits of its actual appearance on paper?

The very fact that questions like these are asked, and that attempts are made at both asking and answering them in a systematic manner, is perhaps one of the most promising and fruitful outcomes of recent discussions on text encoding.

There are several different kinds and uses of text encoding. The purpose of *descriptive* text encoding is not to prepare for some specific mode of presentation or analysis, but to represent as accurately as possible the textual information, the logical structure of the text, and the internal relationships between different text segments. In this way, modes of presentation and analysis may be decided on afterwards, independently of the initial preparation of the text.

In order to facilitate exchange of computerized texts and text software, there is an urgent need for standardization, not only of hardware and internal representation formats, but also of markup languages. (In the following, I will use the terms 'markup language' and 'markup' interchangeably with 'encoding systems' and 'text encoding'.)

In 1986, Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML) was established as an international standard by the International Standards Organization [ISO 8879-1986].

SGML is, strictly spoken, not itself a markup language, but a formal grammar for the design and specification of markup languages.

In SGML, a text is associated with a Document Type Definition (DTD). The DTD defines a document type, declaring which basic constituents a document may have, how they should be marked up, and how these marked-up elements may be combined.

An SGML-encoded text is a hierarchy of serially ordered text elements, the structure of which adheres to the declarations given in the associated DTD.

Since the DTD is specified in a highly structured formal language it is possible to design computer programs to check whether any given text adheres to the specifications and definitions given in a DTD. This has several advantages and increases control over composition, analysis, and manipulation of texts.

The "father" of SGML, ... Charles Goldfarb of IBM Corporation, suggests that from now on, "...the techniques available for processing rigorously-defined objects like programs and data bases can be used for processing documents as well." [Goldfarb, p 60]

SGML was not only launched with a great deal of optimism, but also received with enthusiasm, particularly in bureaucratic and administrative milieus. SGML has a strong prescriptive power which makes it well suited for exerting control over the structure of documents. E.g., SGML has already been adopted by the US Defence Department and the EEC's administration.

This kind of optimism and enthusiasm persists also to day. I recently received an invitation to an international workshop on document processing, which says: "...document processing can be fairly assessed as being in a state similar to that obtaining for programming languages prior to the development of syntax- and semantics-directed compilation techniques, and that obtaining for databases prior to the development of relational and deductive data models. It is time to exploit current techniques and ideas from computer science to raise principles and models of document processing to the same intellectual level as principles and models for programming languages and databases." [From an announcement of "The First International Workshop on Principles of Document Processing" on TEI public discussion list, mid-May 1992]

Surprisingly perhaps, SGML was met with the same kind of enthusiasm in humanistic research disciplines. Already in 1988, the Text Encoding Initiative (TEI) was launched. TEI is a large cooperation project aiming at the establishment of standards for text encoding in the humanities within the framework of SGML.

TEI includes several dozens of text scholars within nearly all humanities disciplines, – ranging from linguistics over philosophy, literature, and history, to classicists and bibliicists.

TEI as such does not commit itself to any particular theory of texts, neither are the views expressed by TEI necessarily shared by all members of the project. TEI has actively encouraged the expression of conflicting views, and has been an extremely stimulating forum for the discussion of text theory.

Nevertheless, there are some basic conceptions of text laying behind this project which are in my eyes rather dubious.

Though they still seem to persist, these tendencies were particularly clear in the early phases of the project. As the project has proceeded these views have been modified and diversified.

For the purposes of discussion, I will allow myself to construe something which might be called an "early prototypical" TEI view. This view can be expressed in the following theses:

1. To mark up texts descriptively means first and foremost to mark up the logical structure of the texts. In printed or written texts, established conventions of typography or paleography convey the logical structure. Therefore, we should not encode the typography, but the underlying feature.
2. Since traditional typography is inaccurate and unstable, we may also mark up structural elements which are only implied by the text and a result of our subjective interpretation or analysis.
3. In this manner, we will be able to maintain a sharp and clear distinction between the text itself and the encoding. Markup is not itself part of the text but tells us something about it. Markup makes the structural organization and our interpretation and analysis of the text explicit.
4. Although details of text structure differ from genre to genre and from text to text, all texts are hierarchies of linearly ordered objects. In this respect, SGML is well suited for the encoding of texts. Admittedly, some texts contain elements which overlap. In such cases, however, the overlapping elements belong to different hierarchies, and since SGML allows for the coexistence of several hierarchies in one and the same text this poses no technical problem.

(It should be kept in mind, then, that these views are not necessarily representative neither of the TEI (at least not any more), nor of any individual member of TEI. However, see Coombs et al (esp. p 934 and 942-945), DeRose et al, TEI P1, and also to some extent Sperberg-McQueen 1991. All of those come very close to several of the theses above.)

In opposition to the "early prototypical" TEI view expressed in the above four statements, I will claim:

1. What is regarded as the structure and what as the content of a text depends on the purpose of analysis. Any text may be said to have many kinds of structure (physical, compositional, narrative, grammatical). It is not clear which of these is to be counted as the 'logical' structure. Thus the definition of 'descriptive markup' says nothing, unless we also say what it is that we are describing.

The identification of the "underlying feature" of typographical convention is interpretational. Besides, the relationship between (outer) appearance and (inner) structure is sometimes very close, e.g. in realistic poetry.

2. There are no facts about a text which are objective in the sense of not being interpretational. However, being interpretational does not mean being entirely subjective – there are some things about which all competent readers agree, at least for all practical purposes.

A simple example: We normally regard capitalization and full stop as typographical evidence of a sentence, which is the underlying, 'structural' feature. However, when encoding manuscripts, we often have to decide whether we regard a letter as capitalized or not and a mark as a comma or a full stop, partly on the basis of the visual evidence, partly on our interpretation of the text.

3. Unless further qualified, the notion of making 'the structure' explicit in the codes is of little help, because (a) all structure cannot be made explicit at the same time (there are endlessly many structures), and (b) as soon as something has been made explicit it has become part of the text, which has thereby changed, and acquired a new structure. There is a similarity here to Wittgenstein's distinction in the *Tractatus* between showing and saying – the structure of the text shows itself in the text. It is quite symptomatic that the "text itself" on the TEI view seems to consist roughly of the encoded elements, i.e. that part of a text which occurs between tags.

Taking punctuation as an example once again – although a full stop is mostly represented not by a tag but rather as part of a tagged element, it would be highly appropriate to regard it as an indication of an underlying structural feature – the sentence.

4. It is a serious limitation that SGML enforces a prescriptive, top-down approach to text analysis and presupposes hierarchical structures.

Any formal language is bound to have its limitations and to favor certain biases – "...devising a representational system that does not impose but only maps linguistic structures" [Coulmas p 270] is impossible.

If not in theory, then at least in practice, any use of SGML, with its DTDs, invites us to prescribe or predict the structural order of the elements encoded in a text. Since SGML presupposes that the entire text is somehow marked up, this enforces a top-down approach to document design.

Furthermore, SGML presupposes that the design is hierarchical, or alternatively that the text is represented as consisting of a number of concurring hierarchies.

In many cases, a prescriptive, top-down approach presupposing (one or several) hierarchical structure(s) may be well

suited to the goals of analysis and composition. In a large number of cases, however, these features of SGML will be detrimental to the purposes of investigation and analysis.

There is a notable tendency in TEI to distinguish between, on the one hand, the information and, on the other, its actual representation on a physical medium. What we seem to be searching for, then, is the key, the "mode of representation", or the specific rules governing the representation of each different kind and feature of textual information on a specific physical medium.

As soon as we have identified these rules, it would seem like an easy task to specify their corollaries for the representation of the same kinds of information on another kind of medium.

However, the kinds and features of information contained in printed texts are probably shaped just as much by the means of expression at our disposal, as vice versa. Our concept of a text is partly a product of the historically mediated knowledge of limits and possibilities of expression posed by the medium carrying texts.

This exemplifies a general point concerning the cultural impact of innovation throughout the history of information technology. Sinding-Larsen makes a similar observation in his studies of the development of musical notation in the medieval ages: "An improvement of the tools for *description* of a certain domain will, in general, also be the starting point for new design and *prescription* which will change the domain originally to be described." [Sinding-Larsen 1988b, p 111.]

When TEI started, I was working on an improvement of the Norwegian Wittgenstein Project's encoding scheme for Wittgenstein's manuscripts [cf Huitfeldt & Rossvær 1989]. The

fourth point above, i.e. the prescriptive, top-down approach and hierarchical structure of SGML, convinced me that I had to design a quite different encoding scheme for the Wittgenstein Archives. This led to the development of what I have called a Multi-Element Code System (MECS) [Huitfeldt 1992].

MECS is in many respects similar to SGML. As in SGML, codes may be declared in a separate "document definition". The syntax of this document definition lacks much of the expressive power of SGML's DTD. I have therefore found another name for it: code definition table (CDT). Alternatively, codes may be declared simply by using them in the text (in-line declaration). MECS allows for the reconstruction of CDTs (what I have called "minimal CDTs) from encoded texts. MECS does not presuppose any hierarchical structure – any element may overlap with any other element. Finally, MECS includes syntactical means for the representation of structures which in SGML have to be treated in a more roundabout way.

One might say that in SGML everything is forbidden unless it is explicitly permitted or mandatory; while in MECS everything is permitted unless it is explicitly forbidden or mandatory.

Paradoxically, perhaps (since SGML is advocated by so many adherents of so-called "descriptive" markup), SGML is excellent for prescriptive purposes, where the aim is to exert strict control over the structure and content of documents which are still to be created.

MECS, however, is better suited for descriptive purposes. When our aim is to describe already existing documents, we cannot expect to know all about their structure and content

in advance. A code system which forces us to prescribe an order in advance may easily lead us to prescribe an order which is perhaps not there in the document at all.

To sum up, I allow myself to characterize MECS, in contrast to SGML, as a code system which encourages a descriptive, bottom-up approach to text analysis, not presupposing a hierarchical structure of texts. This has led to some in my eyes rather illuminating discussions with other members of TEI.

For example, on the top-down vs. bottom-up approach to text structures and the prescriptive vs. descriptive attitude, my problem with SGML is the following: Designing a registration standard of a project aiming at a machine-readable version of Wittgenstein's manuscripts, we do not want to superimpose a structure on these texts which is not in accordance with a sound interpretation of them. This is precisely the risk we run by predesigning a DTD to which all documents have to conform.

The reaction from other members of TEI has been that I suffer from an illusion that theory-independent gathering of data should be possible. SGML enforces you to make your hypothesis about texts explicit. This does not mean that you may not revise your DTD if you find that your hypothesis was wrong.

However, in our project we are not particularly interested in testing any specific theory about the structure of Wittgenstein's manuscripts in terms of possible structural relationships between text elements encoded in certain specific ways. What we want, is a representation based on a sound interpretation. Therefore, we want the transcriber, who is a highly competent reader, to interpret the text and to mark it in accordance with his interpretation. The transcriber's interpretation is not theory-independent, but it is not couched in

terms of markup structures either. An exhaustive description of structural relationships between differently marked-up text elements may be an interesting by-product, but cannot be the starting point of our work.

My problem with (concurrent) hierarchies is similar: Even if SGML allows me to have several concurrent hierarchies in a text, I am not convinced that Wittgenstein's manuscripts are basically hierarchical structures. Potentially, for all that I know, any feature may overlap with any other feature. Besides, I do not even know what the hierarchies should consist of, or whether the identification of such hierarchies would be particularly illuminating.

Other members of TEI have recently suggested [Renear et al 1992] a very interesting answer to this objection: That two text elements overlap is in itself a criterion that they belong to different conceptual frameworks, theoretical perspectives, or modes of analysis, such as the compositional, the metrical, the physical, the narrative etc.

This view is difficult to assess, since not much specific has so far been said about what a theoretical perspective or conceptual framework is. I have three comments:

1. It is still unclear why such a conceptual framework should demand that the features/elements recognized in a text must be hierarchically ordered. Is this an empirical or an a priori observation? Is the possibility of overlap the only criterion that two features belong to different frameworks? If it *did* turn out that all analyses based on different frameworks do yield different hierarchies, this might be an extremely interesting empirical discovery. But what if it turns out that the hierarchical order is an a priori truth. Would this then be a discovery about our concept of a text?

2. Admittedly, our experience at the Wittgenstein Archives seems to confirm the observation to a very large extent, – in most cases when we find that two features overlap we also find that they are very different kinds of features, e.g. the one belonging to the physical organization of the text (pages, lines), the other e.g. to what we might call the semantic macrostructure (paragraphs, sentences). But this is far from always the case. Some examples will illustrate this:

If a deletion overlaps with an underlining, there is no problem recognizing these features as belonging to very different "perspectives". However, what if two tokens of the same type, e.g. two underlinings, overlap? How could we possibly justify that they belong to different "perspectives"?

Wittgenstein, like many others, used one kind of underlining to indicate emphasis and another kind of underlining to indicate uncertainty or dissatisfaction. These features often overlap. Does that necessarily mean that they belong to different "perspectives"?

Chapters, sections and sentences are normally regarded as features belonging to the same "perspective" (the compositional?). Normally, they form nice hierarchies. But what if we find a chapter break in the middle of a sentence? Should we conclude that contrary to what we believed, sentences and chapters belong to different "perspectives", or should we conclude that what we believed to be one complete sentence divided by a chapter break is really two (perhaps incomplete) sentences, or not sentences at all?

3. Finally, and most importantly, I am struck by the lack of imagination in this approach: Why on earth should texts by all means be hierarchies? No doubt, there are many hierarchical structures, and no doubt this is important, but there are countless other relations between text elements which

are worth while finding and investigating – overlap, substitution, discontinuity, parallel texts, cross-references, etc.

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I will not pursue this discussion any further here. Irrespective of which of the parties are judged to be on the right track, I believe the discussion serves to establish my main point: The use of modern information technology in textual studies may help us reach a better understanding of traditional concepts of and ways of dealing with texts.

This is one of the relationships between our understanding of linguistic phenomena and the development of a new technology. It has been suggested that our language in general has to a large extent been shaped by the technology of writing [Ong, Goody]. It has also been suggested that linguistics draws many of its most basic concepts from features peculiar to written language. [Harris, Coulmas] This is a bit surprising, since at least in the early stages of modern linguistics speech was regarded as the primary form of language.

Linguists have traditionally concentrated on microstructures of language on or well below sentence-level. It is therefore interesting that the recent call (during the last one or two decades) for a concern with larger chunks of language has taken the form of an urge for linguists to concern themselves with texts, and typical that some linguists immediately started to talk about texts as "discourse events". [cf. de Beugrande]. The primacy of the spoken seems to persist, even though most non-linguists would probably regard the written and not the spoken as the primacy of texts.

One of the alternative approaches is also typical of modern linguistics – typical, that is, of its concern with sentences as

primary units: The attempt to study texts as strings of sentences displaying a certain degree of cohesion and coherence. Texts must consist of sentences, since they must be grammatically well-formed. And since not any arbitrary collection of sentences constitutes what we would like to call texts, there must be some connection between them – that of cohesion and coherence.

Linguists claim that writing is a secondary form of language – writing represents speech, and does so only more or less successfully. However, Florian Coulmas suggests that the prominence of such objects as phonemes, words and sentences as basic units of linguistic analysis is a reflection not so much of their prominence in speech, but rather of their prominence in writing. While the earliest alphabetic writing systems were *scripta continua*, and thus had no way of representing word and sentence boundaries, the later invention of punctuation and spacing made writing a more precise tool for the description of these crucial elements of speech. Coulmas points out that those features of speech which are typically relegated to appendixes and play subordinate roles in linguistic text books are precisely those features which have not found any expression in writing, so-called supra-segmental or prosodic features like melody, rhyme, rhythm, and intonation. [Coulmas, p 39-40 and 270]

Linguistics has concentrated on features which have already found their expression in writing, and at least to some extent tended to disregard features which have not. It looks as if linguistics, while claiming speech to be the primary form of language, gets some of its basic concepts of analysis from writing: "The units of linguistic analysis are derivative of the units of written language" [Coulmas, p 270]

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Comment on Huitfeldt's Paper: The Dynamic Identity of the Text

The aims of the Wittgenstein Archives are neatly circumscribed. The work is, however, taking place within a vast area of research, constituted by several different fields partly overlapping each other. A few of these fields, like textual criticism, have a long history, others, like the development of software for different purposes, are a result of efforts made during the last few decades to systematize theoretical and practical problems involved in the use of information technology. If we lump the relevant research fields together by the designation "textual studies" – or even "textual sciences", a term apparently growing into fashion – we may discern certain fundamental problems common to the most diversified disciplinary fields within this large area. In commenting upon Claus Huitfeldt's thought-provoking paper, I should like to point out some problems of particular relevance for future discussions.

The implications of "machine-readability" within textual studies range from very practical problems in the construction of databases to complicated speculations on the effects of using non-linear texts, like hypertext (programmes giving the possibility to browse in large masses of material and to construct different textual entities). The international argumentative situation constitutes to some observers a promising and to others an exasperating condition of "betwixt and between". I borrow this characterization from the anthropologist Victor Turner; it is used by him to describe the function

of rituals in sacralizing contexts of meaningful action by setting them apart from profane everyday life. Rituals thus organize certain interpretations of changes in social life.

Some rituals of the scholarly world are certainly undergoing modifications, resulting from the strain of adjusting to the demands for as well as the needs of institutions like the Wittgenstein Archives. New coalitions and new factions pop up – not in the manner of fungus, rather more often than not as a result of cumbersome cultivational work. The staff involved in the real research and footmanship of this kind of institutional upstarts within the University society has no reason whatsoever to ask for a more guarded conservatism, neither in bureaucratic policy nor in common scholarly modes of thought, than what has hitherto been displayed. It seems deplorably safe to predict that for some time yet to come, computerized text analysis or information technology within the humanities shall not represent major challenges to the formalized conduct of (Norwegian) University budgetary and organizational measures. Like ritualized behaviour generally, administrative measures tend to incorporate new definitions of themselves and their relations to the surrounding world in such a way as to further mythical explanations of practical problems, without bothering to worry about flagrant discrepancies between what people are supposed to accomplish and what means they are given to accomplish.

No, the real challenge represented by the automatization of textual criticism should be sought elsewhere. It should at least partly be sought in the possible de-automatization of some scholarly conventions for dealing with textual material.

I venture to suggest that this "elsewhere" ought to be properly mapped. Furthermore, that it should be a proper task for institutions like the Wittgenstein Archives to contribute to such a mapping. By the term "mapping" I refer to procedures that are mostly underestimated by laymen (in our context that is, scholars observing any field of research they aren't originally initiated to), notably the efforts of getting to know the proper questions to ask in order to get to know the landscape you are moving in. There is need for a topographical registration of the cultural geography of these intellectual fields, where viewpoints and itineraries of the people moving there differ to a considerable degree, according to their positions as well as to the way they use their particular field maps. Such "topographical description" is a phase of research often overlooked in the humanities, which accounts for much curious eclecticism as well as for some rapid changes of scholarly fashions in shirts and arm-chairs.

Generally, the consequences of such like scholarly ignorance are that new theories or methodologies in the humanities tend to be met either by a dull so-called "sound scepticism" without much real scientific discussion, or by enthusiastic great expectations bordering on fantasy. (After some time, the state of affairs within this argumentative discourse tends to create a certain melancholic frustration in apprentices as well as adepts suggesting new solutions to a problem.) On the question of machine-readable versions of different kinds of textual material, the attitudes towards scientific problems involved tend to fall into either one of two major categories on each end of a scale. One end of the scale belongs to the waiters of traditional disciplines ("Sorry sir, this is not my table"), whereas the other end is represented by the entrepreneurs of new enterprises ("This is the future, imagine the profits, man!"). Somewhere in between, or perhaps altogether outside such a scale, we find some knowledgeable

people telling us about the actual practical limits and the theoretical puzzles involved. Claus Huitfeldt's paper certainly places him and the Wittgenstein Archives in such a *tertium datur*-category.

Huitfeldt himself does contribute to a topographical description of problems within the research field, by describing practical problems and by pointing at the necessity of reworking traditional concepts of textual analysis as well as the philosophical problems evoked in this process. This is altogether another attitude than that of the above mentioned waiters and entrepreneurs of the humanities; neither content to serve nor to rule the field, the Wittgenstein Archives strive to redefine the framework for the coexistence of different fields of textual studies.

Trying, now, to restrict myself to the subject at hand, notably the transcription and editing of Wittgenstein's texts, I should like to point at certain *areas of questioning*. I believe that four areas are in particular need of being discussed:

- 1) the relation of philosophy to philology,
- 2) the problem of intentionality in texts,
- 3) the relations between orality and literacy, and
- 4) the possibility of a critical hermeneutics.

Consciously, I have chosen to divide my comments into four subsections, in order to avoid the mythical triade. The division in three parts of a story, a lecture or a paper is so often used for pedagogical and argumentative purposes that it tends to be taken for granted as an organizational principle of academic discourse. But beware; the triadic division also tends to evoke the fairy-tale impression of a well-rounded and already finished process of thought, as produced by the narrative scheme of beginning, middle and end.

My point of departure is an aphorism by Wittgenstein, found in the notes published as *Philosophical Remarks*. I shall elaborate my understanding of the point made in this aphorism before I proceed to my four areas of questioning. Like so many others I have found the reading of *Philosophical Remarks* rewarding, the volume bears testimony to the gradual reformulation of argumentative strategies and perspectives in the transitional phase of Wittgenstein's thinking, in between the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. The second period of § 66 reads:

Philosophers who believe you can, in a manner of speaking, extend experience by thinking, ought to remember you can transmit speech over the telephone, but not measles.

By the same token: You can replace the signs of more or less coherent typescript or handwriting by sequences of codes that will be seen as offering information when represented as texts on the computer screen. But you *cannot* transmit the experience of having accomplished such a feat! You won't be able to codify the different kinds of feelings, thoughts, tacit knowledge or even all the overtly conscious knowledge that goes into the work. In order to even try to do such a thing, you will have to construct another text. And in order to explain what went on in your work on the explanatory text, the "text of second order", you'll probably find it necessary to write still another text. And so on, in an infinite regress.

A comparable problem is constituted by so-called "metapoetry", the comments directed towards the art of writing or reading poetry or fictitious texts that might be included in the text or even made into the major theme or motive. A writer is not obliged to put into his text explanations of how and why he came to write the text in the way he wrote it,

and the general public in our time doesn't expect a poet or a novelist to do so, either. Still, he might do exactly that, and by subtle hints or by explicit postulates demask his interests, his dispositions or his position in the world – in the way modernists and before them baroque poets incorporated the *Sitz im Leben* of the writer.

Diversified metacomments, for instance in the form of allusions or allegorizations on the writing process or the function of the text, most often mark the poem or the fiction as non-realist. Meta-poetry tends to destroy any illusion of the text being a direct report on occurrences in the world, and implicitly problematizes the function of language.

Such metacomments should not be regarded as reports on the poets' experiences in writing poetry or creating fictitious universes, even though the very term "metapoetry" invites us to think that the author is stepping out of his text in order to comment upon it. This view of the text is in itself metaphorical, it tends to steer the reader away from the question of how such constructions of a writer's perspective become features of the poem itself. These features are part of the very "texture" whose genesis or function or tendency (etc.) could be explained and which, therefore, is the result of reflection upon the experience of reading the poem.

This kind of reflection cannot possibly double or imitate the experience of the poet in writing the poem, even if the poet's intention might have been to invoke particular kinds of reactions. This is to say, contrary to popular belief, that a poem does not transmit the experiences of the poet to the reader, even when the poem itself gives clues to the principles of its own creation, and it does not fix the experience of the poet in writing. Popular belief in how the impact of poetry comes about is a variant of the positivist view; one imagines that the

poet calculates his "signals" as if they were arrows hitting the reader's sensibilities, to make the proper reflexes and sentiments surge forth. But this kind of vision tends to overlook how reading is an activity steeped in and dependent upon other kinds of experience. The study of poetry could be said to represent a special case of more general investigations of how awareness of experience comes about.

Traditional hermeneutics used to consider texts as an expansion of the reader's field of experience in the "encounter" with the text, whether the concern is to reconstruct the original "meaning-content" or to explain the "reader's response". In some respects, the deconstructionist trends in textual analysis rely upon a similar notion of how texts affect the experience of the reader: preconceived notions, propositions presupposed or explicated in texts, figurations of imaginal figments or illusions are broken down by contradictions created by the reading of the text. Strangely enough, the very basis for discovering homologies between textual material and experience tend to be overlooked: both are constructions.

The tendency to treat "experience" as if it were something purely given – individually or collectively – goes with the view that "reality" is something originally pure and the experience of it is "tainted" by ideology, theory or bias. Descriptive procedures derived from phenomenology, hermeneutics and deconstructivism included, tend to perpetuate the dualism between "real" life and (illusory) "constructions". The ensuing discussions of "realism" as opposed to "relativism" in their turn tend to obfuscate the subject matter by diverting into scholastic quarrels on how to define and thereby confine the opponents' positions as well as one's own.

Instead of clinging to the age-old antagonism between "real" and "constructed" one might hold that *the experience of reality is constituted by constructions of competing descriptions that are given explanatory force*. This is to say, nothing more and nothing less, that our experience of reality is dependent upon our perception of conflicts between different ways of describing the causes and effects of changes. If we are aware of such conflicts, we may see options and strive to make a choice, if not, we accept the received views and stand or fall by them. Becoming aware of conflicts or possible conflicts in the description of life implies on the one hand to start to question the construction of descriptions, and on the other hand to face the challenge of constructing our own description(s).

Accordingly, the said antagonism between "real" and "constructed" dissolves. It may be replaced by questions of how the processes of construction of experience and the construction of textual understanding may be compared to each other and how they interweave.

Huitfeldt's paper wisely calls for reforms in textual studies, and poses some challenges to certain presuppositions amongst literary critics on how one should treat the problems of textual criticism. The paper does so by making classical problems in textual criticism as well as new methods for tagging texts relevant to the development of philosophical problems. It might hold some interest to elaborate somewhat on one of the traditional concerns of textual criticism, the problem of establishing a textual *stemma*, a necessary prerequisite for any kind of textual criticism that compares older and newer versions of texts.

The philological method *stematology* is the reasoned construction of a tree-like model showing how new copies or versions of a text are branches on a common stem. A stemma

makes for a model, or a map, of "family resemblances" for texts with common origins ("stemming from somewhere"); these common origins show by correspondancies and dependencies between different text versions, so that it may be possible to reconstruct a history of different schools of copists, or, in certain cases, different traditions of dealing with the subject matter (for instance, different narratological patterns). Such is also the general problem outlined by Huitfeldt for the special case of describing the development of Wittgenstein's writings. The description is intended to organize the text material in certain manners, so that programs for machine-reading makes the search for an origin, a line of development and the comparison of different versions easier and more efficient. This is, by the way, congruent to Wittgenstein's own view that description has a logical priority over analysis.

Models that systematize stemmas to make tagging coherent are, like all models, replacements for that which is modelled. Such models fill similar functions as theories do in relation to the objects studied, but the assumptions made in the descriptions aren't always explicated. Models represent systems of relations between elements, thereby subsuming different elements within categories. This is also the job metaphors do in the use of language. They tend either to uphold old categories or to create new ones, and thereby alter classificatory schemes; the metaphor gives a focus, a way of regarding objects, themes and problems. In a similar way, a model prescribes how objects or problems under study should be regarded.

Stemmatology and other kinds of philological reconstructivist procedures have old practical uses in different disciplines. The construction of a stemma has been employed in order to date manuscripts and in certain cases printed ver-

sions of a text (inparticular, incunabula), or to reconstruct an original version of a text, eventually suggesting a starting point for diverging manuscript traditions.

One of the more famous examples of how stemmatology has been put to use, is the conjecture (not reconstruction) of a Gospel of "Q", a lost text supposed to be the original main source (Q = Quelle) for the three synoptic gospels of the New Testament. Such conclusions are reached by analyses of structural features of the text, "Gattungen" (genre features), markers of "Sitz im Leben" and topics dealt with in the synoptics, in this case paleographic evidence from different manuscript versions has played a lesser role than in most stemmatological reconstructions. In other cases, external evidence from archaeology or even references in other texts have proved to be important. Related problems are constituted by the text material found in Qumran in the period 1947-1956, the texts popularly known as the Dead Sea Scrolls. To the detriment of many a scholar of ancient Middle East culture, history of religions, biblical studies etc., the major part of the Qumran texts never have been published or been made available for normal research. Thus suspicions arose, and in recent years blatant accusations, that those in charge of the Qumran material willfully have delayed the publication as long as possible and that their published interpretations of certain texts or text fragments are deliberately misleading, furthermore, that the reason for these machinations is to prevent a possible fall into disrepute of "official", that is, Church-sanctioned, theological explanations of how the Qumran material affects interpretations of New Testament texts. When all relevant texts finally are made available for philological scrutiny, it will be possible to construct sound procedures to replace the hitherto more or less impressionist methods for dating Qumran texts, as well as the rather haphazard conjectures constructed to explain

their context. New programs for machine-based analysis are bound to become the focus of attention in a not too distant future.

The Qumran quarrels is only one among a host of examples of how philological research in our time integrates a critical examination of handed-down beliefs, or "doxological systems". The Wittgenstein Archives could be regarded as another such example of how older notions are being reevaluated. The Wittgenstein Archives could, possibly, also become a test case in establishing sound principles of evaluating *doxologically bound* traditions, that is, accepted canons of systematized interpretation, within philosophy as well as philology. The Wittgenstein Archives prepare a well-defined material (produced by one individual only) for machine reading. But by doing this work, they also prepare the grounds for wide-ranging future discussions on the interpretation of Wittgenstein's work, as well as on the relations between philosophical and philological investigations.

The leap from Qumran and the New Testament to Bergen and the Wittgenstein Archives is not that farfetched. Again I shall allow myself to get to the point by the somewhat roundabout way of another historical example. "Comme chacun sait", as the French say whenever they feel that an audience ought to be reminded of what they should know, the starting point of early modern textual criticism was the exposure of a forgery. The problem of forged manuscripts, as well as the subcategory of plagiats, has represented an intellectual and moral challenge to philological disciplines ever since the celebrated Italian humanist Lorenzo Valla attacked the supposed "Donation of Constantine" in the first half of the fifteenth century. It was the intimate knowledge of Latin usage of different epochs that made possible the most important features in Valla's deconstruction of this letter,

which stated that the Emperor Constantine donated the Lateran Hill to the Church. The authenticity of this document had been questioned before, but Valla analysed the linguistic forms as well as certain anachronistic descriptions, such as terms referring to ecclesiastical positions that didn't exist in Constantine's time. He concluded that the "Donation" had been written in the early part of the twelfth century. Thus Lorenzo Valla established the basic principles of textual criticism. Ever after, the examination of textual authenticity has been an integral part of philological research.

Somebody might think that the mention of Valla's demasking of a mediaeval forgery could be a kind of unsubtle hint at a registered dissatisfaction with the actual condition of some of the published Wittgenstein works. Somebody might be right. But this is not to say that any of the published Wittgenstein works are tampered with or falsely reconstructed – as were the case of Nietzsche's *Nachlaß*, for instance. I just want to point at the obvious possibility that in some cases editors have been guided by particular interpretational perspectives in their choice of how to render different versions of Wittgenstein's original manuscripts. Whereas this is a quite honourable and has generally been considered an acceptable practice, the problem remains that the published texts by their form and selectiveness constitute the availability for the reader to a certain set of possible questions. The organization of the text material favours certain kinds of interpretations.

One rather obvious question to ask, is: during the process of making the authentic versions of Wittgenstein's texts – whether they are fragments or interpolated manuscripts, available to a general academic public in the form of machine-readable versions – what might the Wittgenstein Archives do to develop discussions about the interpretations

presupposed in already published versions? And the most obvious answer to this question is that the Wittgenstein Archives cannot but leave these publications in their present state, but may nevertheless contribute to an evaluation of them. The less obvious question to ask, perhaps, is: what might the Wittgenstein Archives do to focus the question of how biases in interpretation are affected by the new kind of availability of Wittgenstein manuscripts? This question may be rephrased to give it a more general scope: what might be done to further the awareness of relations, or rather affiliations, between philological criticism of texts and philosophical understanding of texts on the basis of this particular collection of manuscripts?

I quite agree with Huitfeldt when he sticks to the pragmatic dimension, without launching a quest for ontological definitions. Such questions as "what is a text?" tend to create too many impractical definitional boundaries for the concept of text. A pragmatic approach to the understanding of texts is to stress the question of *how* rather than the question of *what* a text is. The only feature common to every text is that it is a part or a specimen of discourse fixed in writing by conventional signs. I do insist that spoken discourse, video recordings, films and even untranscribed tape recordings should not in their primary manifestations be regarded as texts, even though such material may be analysed by the same or similar methods as those employed in textual analysis, and even though they might be transformed into texts.

The reason for using a minimal definition is that it concerns the means by which discourse is fixed – by writing – and therefore poses particular problems in the understanding of *how writing and reading functions*. It might be that the proposed minimal definition of text is somewhat fuzzy. I tend to regard this kind of fuzziness as an advantage. It gives the possibility to search for principal problems in understand-

ing the practices of writing and reading, whereas starting off with the grand question of how to distinguish essential features of "the text itself" tends to make us jump to conclusions. The ontological question doesn't allow for the study of how a text is formed and how it transforms the subject matter.

Philosophers are keen readers, trained to discern the argumentative possibilities given in a text, often with a very high degree of sophistication. Unfortunately, quite a few philosophers also often seem to be oblivious to what goes into the constitution of the texts they are reading. This forgetfulness seemingly results in a desire to leap directly at the *Sachlage*, the theme or subject dealt with in the text. This desire to make the grand leap is manifested in the theories of hermeneuticians like Gadamer and Habermas. Gadamer, in his *Wahrheit und Methode*, explicitly relegates the questions on form to the realm of technicalities and methodology, and considers the search for *die Sache* to be the real philosophical quest. Habermas, in his *Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns*, systematically overlooks any kind of linguistic and philological evidence to counter his grand theory of how civilization developed, and brushes away rhetorical theories of language use as being irrelevant.

By the Gadamerian and Habermasian moves, philology (in a broad sense, textual criticism as well as literary criticism) is relegated to the position of philosophy's hand maiden, preparing the field for the real action. One could imagine worse positions, of course, and since the middle of the eighteenth century, when philologists became selfconscious and taken up with the task of defining the scientificity of their endeavours, they have usually been content to forsake what they regarded as metaphysical speculation – with some major exceptions, like the speculative work of Herder and the later historicists. After the time when Schleiermacher had

laboured towards the unification of philosophy and philology by the joining of hermeneutics and rhetoric, a new divorce process was conducted by Schleiermachers pupil Boeckh in the 1880'ies. Ever after a mutual suspicion has strained the relations in these disciplines' cohabitation within the faculties of arts. The genesis of these uneasy relations may be followed backwards in history to the humanist quarrels of the Renaissance, when Lorenzo Valla, in his usual sarcastic mode, characterized the practice of philosophers, "who", as he put it, "restrict to themselves the name of friends of wisdom". Well, on the other hand it might be justified to say that since the late eighteenth century philologists often have been too happy to remain "friends of words".

This division of labour between disciplines, and the division of world-views it entails, becomes untenable when one considers the implications of preparing a critical machine-readable edition of the writings of such a philosopher as Ludwig Wittgenstein, in particular when the code system (as described by Huitfeldt) is designed to serve multivariate purposes.

Doesn't this very classical philological work of reconstructing and reflecting upon the many different versions of Wittgenstein's formulations, examples, aphorisms and elaborations of thought patterns imply a challenge to certain philosophical presuppositions about how ideas, thoughts and arguments are developed by their mediation in writing?

I now introduce my second area of questioning, that of intentionality. Doesn't the transcriptional work in itself beg the question of how to get at, describe or understand the author's *intention*? Transcription is not so menial a task as some would have it, but implies serious considerations on what is more and what is less important, and careful

employment of signs, codes and explanatory devices. Therefore, transcriptional work also implies a question of how to interpret the author's intention.

Wittgenstein claimed, in *Philosophical Remarks*, § 20: "If you exclude the element of intention from language, its whole function then collapses". §§ 23-24 read as follows:

§ 23: If, when learning a language, speech, as it were, is connected up to action, can these connections possibly break down? If so, what means have I for *comparing* the original arrangement with the subsequent action?

§ 24: The intention is already expressed in the way I *now* compare the picture with reality.

"Picture" in this context must be related to the kind of visual pattern that Wittgenstein in another context calls "paradigm", when discussing the appearance of contradictions in mathematical calculations. I quote the very last periods of F. Waismann's shorthand transcript of Wittgenstein's talks and conversations 1929-1931 (placed by the editor as Appendix 2 in *Philosophical Remarks*, Oxford 1975 edition, pp. 317-346):

What are we supposed to be afraid of? A contradiction? But a contradiction is given me with the method for discovering it. As long as the contradiction hasn't arisen, it's no concern of mine. So I can quite happily go on calculating. Would the calculations mathematicians have made through the centuries suddenly come to an end because a contradiction had been found in mathematics? If a contradiction does arise, we will simply deal with it. But we don't need to worry our heads about it *now*.

What people are really after is something quite different. A certain paradigm hovers before their mind's eye, and they want to bring the calculus *into line with this paradigm*.

To start the reasoning backwards: This last statement seems to imply something very much alike the point that Thomas Kuhn later was to develop into a criticism of Karl Popper (especially in a few of the essays in *The Essential Tension*): It is simply not true that scientists normally adjust their way of reasoning to the experiences they gain in discovering falsifications. On the contrary, scientists tend to force their findings into the paradigm they have adjusted to, that is, to the *way* (Greek: *methodos*) in which they are used to deal with a problem. Therefore we have problems in analysing real change when writing the history of science, as opposed to the linear description of how one solution to a problem neatly fills the place of an older one.

Such paradigms, or exemplary ways of dealing with a problem, constitute objects of "the second order" for research, of how to evaluate the outlook of the analyst. This brings me back to the question of how already made interpretations (or ready-made interpretations) and presuppositions (or biases) determine the edition of textual material of this kind. The point I am trying to make is not that editions are "tainted" by the editors' biases, but that the critical examination of scholarly presuppositions is a necessary prerequisite for assessing the value of new suggestions. And that such an examination has some rather intriguing implications for the analysis of intentionality.

It is a question of how "the picture of Wittgenstein" in "the mind's eye" of the editor affects *both* the possible intentions that an editor may recognize in himself, *and* the recognition of possible intentions in the writings of Wittgenstein. On the

one hand, this is to say that the intentions of an editor *aren't entirely his own*, but that he in the very process of acquiring intentions and putting them into action by necessity must depend upon his training, his intellectual field of work, his position in this field, his colleagues (perhaps) or his public – and various other elements that might go into the construction of intentions. On the other hand, this does *not* amount to saying that the intentions of the editor (or the *in casu* text encoder) does not belong to himself at all, because *he takes on responsibility for the intentions he puts forth in acting* – like the action of editing or encoding. So, intentions belong at one and the same time to the acceptable and recognized moves in practice (in the same way as concepts, according to Kjell S. Johannesen's paper, "can be regarded as a function of the established use of its expression") *and* to a personal sphere of responsibility.

This view of intentions as embedded in action – in this case the acts of writing, of editing writings and of reading texts – makes for another and somewhat more dynamic view on the *structure* of a text than what is often presupposed. The structure of a text has by necessity an historical dimension as well as a social dimension, the merging of these dimensions is usually shown by distinctive stylistic features, in particular the genre. The individual work within every genre (for instance a poem, a novel, a letter, a thesis, a treatise) is indebted to other texts within the same or even in other genres (a characteristic feature of an essay is that it quite freely may use elements from different genre traditions). We may say that such relations of dependance is the result of a process of adaption on the part of the writer, we may regard it as an application on the part of the reader, or we may label the phenomenon "intertextuality". The point remains that a text invariably show traces of the impact other texts have made – in phrasing, in the uses of signs, and – if it's not too

small a fragment – in genre features. Some genres have a history of being anti-genres, for instance the novel from Cervantes to Diderot or modernist poetry, their "raison d'être" is a kind of protest against earlier forms of the genre and by this mode of existence they are transforming the genre. In a similar way, Wittgenstein's way of writing is from the outset negatively dependent upon the earlier way of writing philosophy, and he develops his style of writing into a way of philozophising *against* other styles and textual patterns in the process of establishing his own views.

The interpretation of the intentionality of a text is to interpret the possible frames given for understanding by the stylistic features of the text. We might say that textually structured intentions live a "double life"; that of the literate culture they are inserted into and are dependent upon, and that of the individual contribution represented by the text. Style as the result of conscious creation is opposed to accident, style is the individual way of the writer to impose his will on his medium.

The double life of intentions fascinated the ancient sophistic rhetoricians, who put their knowledge into more or less effective use by seeking to influence their contemporaries to choose between possible patterns of intentions. Unfortunately, Platonic philosophical tradition always tended to dismiss such choices on the grounds that to place people in such situations was an immoral way of trying to exploit people's faith as well as their bad motives. This moral pointer distorts the problem of understanding how we acquire intentions.

In everyday life we do feel free to say that this or that person doesn't understand what he is saying, or even to claim that X and Y doesn't know what they are doing. Such talk is, under certain circumstances, held to be quite literally true, as for instance by some of the participants in the discussion on

whether or not Knut Hamsun, Nobel laureate in literature, really understood what he said when he condemned the dying KZ-prisoner and Nobel Peace Prize winner Carl von Ossietzky as a traitor, or what he later wrote in his necrology on Hitler.

Far less dramatic examples, and more intellectually intriguing ones, are given by different kinds of authors returning to their own text; revising it, dismissing it entirely to later extract and use parts from it, reappraising the text and interpolating sections to it or even commenting upon it. The point made by the old and worn joke that makes someone saying "I won't know what I have written until I've read it, will I?" comes to mind, a more pertinent comment could perhaps be "I don't know exactly what I meant until I have rewritten it". When asked about what he meant to say in this or that work of his, the novelist and poet Tarjei Vesaas used to answer: "I meant what I wrote". But he also is recorded to have commented upon the papers of a conference on his writings, that he had never before thought of many of the meanings now attributed to his works. Such a comment is not necessarily ironic, I should rather think it refers to a common experience for many a writer: the text not only takes on new meanings or loses some of its old meanings as the world changes around the text, but it also unfolds new kinds of possible meanings – or even new kinds of meaninglessness. What is at one period of time regarded as redundancy of meaning in a text, might later on be considered as constructive elements or destructive clashes of contradictions.

And thus we arrive at the problem of "the first order" when asking how intention is established in writing, notably the question of how to understand the intention of the original author who wrote these texts that are being edited, encoded, regrouped and generally put under the scrutiny of textual

criticism. Please allow me repeat the quotation from § 24 of *Philosophical Remarks*: "The intention is already expressed in the way I *now* compare the picture with reality". Note that it is the question of *how* the comparison is made, the methodical features of the comparison, that is underlined.

What is, then, to be *compared* in the process of transcribing these particular texts? Different versions of the text, one would presume. Wittgenstein's collected Nachlaß constitute a rather bewildering mass of reformulations, cut-up fragments, fragments pasted up in new orders, interpolations, emendations, slashes and almost any kind of variations on the original versions that one might dream of – or have nightmares about, I should think, if one is charged with the task of organizing this strangely amorphous material.

Supposedly, a certain temptation to violate the form – or rather, formlessness – of this given material might present itself to anyone approaching it. It is constituted by the impatient desire to reformulate any *how*-question into a *what*-question, like: "Oh, bother, what is Wittgenstein's aim here? What is he talking about? What is his subject?" Of course, a concordance (as, for instance, arranged by a programmed search through the files) may relieve the reader of most of an otherwise painstaking job of contextualizing expressions, concepts and subjects. Working along the lines of identifying "key words" is to choose a method of reading that mediaeval exegetes used to call "lectio brevio potior", representing the view that the simplest interpretation is the best, we may somewhat inexactly translate the scholastic slogan into: "the best way is a shortcut".

The resulting new conceptualizing of Wittgenstein's manuscripts might lead to perspicuous analyses of his concepts. The essentialist temptation in such cases might, however, be to recreate Wittgenstein systematically as a kind of concept-maker, a filigree word-smithhammering out his con-

ceptual universe, one tiny bit after another. One would then, in a way, have access to "the way I *now* compare the picture with reality", that is, if one really presupposes that Wittgenstein's concepts and ways of expressing himself are to be considered pictures of reality. And one has then made the feat of reconstructing Wittgenstein into his very opposite. – I mildly suggest that in the adoption of essentialist procedures resides at least a certain danger of misrepresenting the material.

A more exciting and comprehensive approach to this bulk of manuscripts is, I do believe, to adopt the competing scholastic principle of "lectio difficilior potior"; the most difficult reading is the best. We should accept the very formlessness – apparent or actual – as an invitation to examine how Wittgenstein conducted his own investigations into his own philosophical language. By comparing different versions, could these versions be said to have different *clues* to understanding, could their *patterns of construction* be discerned to be distinctively different in any way? Could rhetorical points be differentiated by their stylistic or aesthetic features, and do such features have determinate functions in Wittgenstein's recorded second thoughts and reformulations? In particular, what could be done to give access to a comprehensive study of Wittgenstein's *examples*? The way this philosopher stresses and elaborates on different types of examples is a constitutive part of his philosophizing, it is probably the one most important methodical feature of his argumentative strategy.

Marcus B. Hester discussed, in *The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor* (The Hague/Paris 1967), how figurative language constitute *ways of seeing*. It is the stylization of the metaphor that defines what possible intentions could be discerned. Hester underlines the Wittgensteinian point that intention must be defined by the way in which the poet expresses himself. His

considerations are based on Wittgenstein's understanding of language use, accordingly, Hester's views could hold some interest when we discuss the representation of Wittgenstein's own uses of language. The use of examples and counter-examples seems to constitute Wittgenstein's own critical method. The Nachlaß shows how Wittgenstein incessantly returns to his examples, to modify them and comment upon them from new angles. Contrary to what is often taught, Wittgenstein does not usually "use" examples as practical illustrations for some more or less abstract principle. Instead, he explores the possibilities for thought in the use of examples, and is always on the lookout for such principles as are embedded in an example. In some respects, Wittgenstein's treatment of examples resembles the kind of new uses an artist might find for an "objet trouvé": The impression is sometimes given that he has found the example, and then asks what it might be an example of.

Wittgenstein constructs his arguments enthymemically. That is, he invites to an analysis of the leading principles and the direction of the narratives presented in the form of examples, instead of presenting a syllogistic logical procedure. To proceed by enthymemical argumentation may create an impression of nearness when used in front of an audience, but in a text such procedures often offer a *Verfremdungseffekt*, a feeling of estrangement in the reader. Biases and presuppositions are turned inside-out or pursued in their consequences.

In this respect, Wittgenstein's Nachlaß has a certain resemblance to the sceptical way in which Michel de Montaigne treated his own book of *Essais*, the genre he invented in order to be able to write. Into a copy of the first edition (1580) Montaigne inserted comments, additional examples, corrections, afterthoughts in the margins and onpasted-in pieces of paper. Montaigne continued his revisional work

until his death in 1592. His personal copy of *Essais*, with all the alterations, was the basis for the posthumous sixth edition of 1595, just as he had ordained before his death. Montaigne stated that he wrote in order to understand himself. He was, in fact, one of the first moderns to problematize the knowledge of the self, and he did so by the continuous correction of his self in his own writings, in which he never ceased to question the validity of what he had heard, seen and read – what constituted the validity of his knowledge of his world.

We have for ever lost the voices of these authors' texts. But the traces that show how they reflected upon the voices and texts of their times are there, in the interpolations, the emendations and the comments they made. And it is exactly in the way such thinkers as these have gone about reworking their own language, that we may search for the answer to *how subjectivity is constituted in such a way of writing*. To put it otherwise, perhaps somewhat boldly but, as I hope, suggestively: it is actually possible to study how Wittgenstein, like Montaigne, develops a critical attitude *towards the sources of the subject's own intentionality*.

I haste to add that it is *not* the "author's workshop" of the romantic historicists that I suggest to look for in Wittgenstein's Nachlaß, nor is it the intellectual development of the historical individual Ludwig Wittgenstein. What I do think may be an awarding study, is the investigation of how this text material brings to light the process by which individuality is constituted, how a subject is objectivized in a carefully constructed manner and being manifested as a textual product.

In *Philosophical Remarks*, Wittgenstein remarks on the relation between subject and object:

§ 71: Visual space is called subjective only in the language of physical space. The essential thing is that the representation of visual space is the representation of an object and contains no suggestion of a subject.

Well, then: Aren't the texts at hand to be considered as visual space? Aren't many of the questions raised in Huitfeldt's paper questions concerning the visual representations of the text material? In textual criticism, anyhow, it is the visual appearance of the texts that first comes under scrutiny. More generally, the question of how readability and visuality is related in the understanding of texts, is a question of how the observance of sign patterns is turned into a critical examination of the uses of language.

Such a critical examination of the visual patterns of a text leads to reflections on the difference between *representation* and *composition*: A text is not the visual representation of a message in a similar way as letters are supposed to be visual representations of sounds. Writing implies the construction of interrelated patterns of visual representations and different levels of prescriptive rules for organizing complexities of written discourse. Among these rules are genre characteristics, which presuppose knowledge in the reader of how other, earlier or contemporary, texts are constructed. To study the complexity of a textual composition is, therefore, to critically examine prescriptive rules of how one should approach, describe, present and represent a subject or an argument. Such a study implies considerations on the *ethos* and *pathos* which is appropriate when dealing with a subject and proposing arguments within a certain genre. Such considerations constitute the starting point for the study of collective, that is, culturally determined, intentionality.

By now, I have already introduced my announced third area of questioning: the relation between orality and literacy, that is, of written discourse as opposed to spoken discourse.

Earlier, I quoted Wittgenstein's question: "If, when learning a language, speech, as it were, is connected up to action, can these connections possibly break down?" An answer to this question is that the connections between speech and action break down whenever writing represents discourse. Writing is another type of action than talking, reading is another type of action than listening. The writer is not necessarily conscious of everything that goes into his writing, but his construction of the text is nevertheless deliberate, he writes for some purpose – not necessarily for the purpose of conveying a message to someone (one might write diaries, for instance, to be able to get a clear picture of what has happened and in order to remember it later on). Anyhow, to put pen to paper or to open a new file on your harddisk is to go through motions that are learned and usually practiced for certain purposes.

Anyone who has had the experience of collaborating with another person on a manuscript (or even of writing a contribution to a collection of essays), knows that one adjusts to certain constraints of how to write on certain subjects – or to avoid writing in certain manners on certain subjects – as well as to an agreed division of labour. But this kind of adjustment – or the efforts made to avoid such adjustments – to constraints in the production of a text, is also present to the person writing in solitary confinement. Such literate – or "scriptural" – constraints are what makes reading learnable, but the knowledge of them is not necessarily sufficient to make a text understandable to a reader.

The reader may ignore what kinds of constraints the author was under during the time of the production of the text he is reading, or he may on the contrary be acutely aware of them. The reader may even read deliberately at cross-purposes, he may freely choose to search for other kinds of information in the text than the writer of the text intended a reader to look for. The situation of the reader, that he has such a possibility to choose among interpretational options and to weigh alternative ways of understanding the text, already shows that the act of reading cannot be symmetrical to the act of writing.

Reading is no simple decoding of encoded authorial messages, but implies constructive cognitive work on the part of the reader. The reader brings his experience of other texts and of his other practices to bear on what he reads. This is why many an old text never ceases to surprise readers. The act of reading may transform the way in which the reader looks at the constraints in his culture or in his participation in different fields of practice – different "language games". A text should, therefore, from the reader's viewpoint be regarded as a *dynamic entity*, where meanings in a well-constructed text may change over time according to such possibilities as are present to the reader.

Written and oral discourse have different *organizational principles*. This problem is systematically ignored by analytical philosophers discussing the function of speech acts. Accordingly, they tend to concentrate on single phrases or propositions and to furnish those with imagined contexts of oral communication, as if every kind of language use emerges in speech situations. Their "logocentrism" makes them unprepared or unwilling to discuss, for instance, the function of texts when read aloud or silently by language users, and it

creates a blind spot in their analyses of communication in a literate society.

One very important feature in any text is that it sets up an alternative context to the speech situation when referred to or used by interlocutors in speech. Every phrase in a text is understood in its relation to other phrases in the text, and this relation is normally not just given by the linearity or the series of phrases following each other. The totality of the text is governed by aesthetic, rhetorical, grammatical and sometimes logical principles, determining the syntax of the phrases and thereby the semantics. Understanding of a text also entails knowledge of other texts of similar or different types, often a whole series of texts within a particular tradition. This is why texts commonly considered to be "classical" tend to change meaning over time, as interpreters have gained knowledge of other texts relevant to understand the genre or the intertextuality. The Bible, Homer, the fragments of the sophists, the works of the two Senecas or the works that were attributed to Duns Scotus are all examples of text complexes that are quite differently interpreted now than, say, two or three generations ago.

In oral communication, discourse is not arrested or fixed as in written discourse. Semantic determinants of oral language use are of other kinds, mostly social: conventions of how to behave towards people, power relations, the knowledge or the lack of knowledge that interlocutors have of each other, the actual historical situation, the corroborate purposes of the collective speech situation or the particular aims of individual participants. The difference in organization of written and spoken discourse is experienced as soon as we encounter a thought-figure like irony, where a meaning contrary to the explicitly expressed one is conveyed. In a speech situation, the understanding of ironical comments implies

an acute awareness of the positions of the interlocutors, whereas textually formulated ironical comments cannot be appreciated without an understanding of how textual elements are related in the construction of a contrarywise way of referring to something.

When speech act theoreticians pick out propositions for closer scrutiny, they tend to treat spoken phrases as if these were cut-out text fragments thrown haphazardly into the world. One of the famous examples of John Searle is: "The cat is on the mat". Normally, we don't go around telling each other of cats' whereabouts. If we consider a normal situation of small-talk, it can be of greater consequence to pay heed to the way in which we often achieve an ironical effect by metaphorizing statements on the scheme of ostensive references: "As you know, Peter is a real tomcat. I'm rather worried about his health, because yesterday he sat on the mat all night!". This metaphor functions as a deliberately planned category mistake where characteristics of species are mixed, the effect being that Peter is classified – perhaps as admirable, perhaps as contemptible, anyhow as someone who distinguishes himself by his behaviour. In order to uphold a conversation, we do not reduce suchlike metaphors to their elementary referential properties, we accept the language game and jumps between classificatory strategies, and new clues may lead us on to new variations on a theme. In contrast, in a discussion of the metaphoricity of Baudelaire's sonnet poem *Les chats*, we are confined to the stratagems and structure of the poem when we want to elucidate what categorizations the text allows for. Searle's cat could have found a natural habitate in a nursery rhyme or in an elementary textbook for the first grade in primary school, in such cases we should consider how the rhyme is used to develop children's awareness of distinctive factors in language by playing with words.

In *Les mots et les choses*, Michel Foucault discussed how the early classifications of natural science, commerce and literature organized the world during the emergence of modernity. More generally, one could say that the impact of the text upon the world consists in the ordering, reordering and sometimes even desorganizing of our views of experience and information.

An obvious difference between oral and written language is that writing may be introduced into spoken discourse, whereas spoken discourse cannot be introduced into an already existing text without altering the text by writing and thereby creating a new text. The point is not just a banality; the classical scholar Eric A. Havelock has argued that the awareness of such a difference was the starting point for the ancient Greeks' awareness of history as well as for the necessity of logic. A text is an object with a history; there was something before the text was written, and something has happened since, there is one situation before reading the text and another situation afterwards.

To represent historical development by writing down a story is to fix the telling of events within a certain representational pattern, to discuss the interpretation of the story is to compare the validity of this pattern with the validity of conventional conceptions or formulas known to the participants in the discussion. Therefore, referring to representations of history implies considerations of causes and effects, not only as presented by a story written down, but also of any text: A list of objects classifies the objects listed as belonging to a type or types, a code of law sets some normative statements into the world, an edict orders people about, a story may beg questioning or provoke conflicting interpretations.

Much has been said and written during the last few decades on differences between oral, traditional societies and literate, modern societies. I should not want to impose such discussions upon the Wittgenstein Archives, only to suggest that it might be relevant to consider how the state of much of the text material in the Nachlaß in some respects resembles what one might find in a "manuscript culture", like monasteries and universities of the late middle ages. The uses of manuscripts are of other kinds than the uses of print; manuscripts have a much more restricted circulation and copying them invariably creates more or less subtle changes both in their appearance and in their content. Before the coming of the printing press, manuscripts were mostly written to be read aloud, and contributed therefore to the ordering of oral culture within certain institutionalizations. We have maintained similar uses of manuscripts, like reading papers in a conference or circulating manuscripts for comments, or even the introduction of a new work into scholarly dialogue by the doctoral dissertation. In such instances, the texts constitute the agenda and they govern the individual and collective performances. Such uses of texts often contribute to a ritualized freezing of the speech situation, conferences seem to be a mode of existence suspended from the flow of everyday time.

But in the case of Wittgenstein's Nachlaß, the author hasn't allowed his texts to remain fixed entities in well-ordered series. The author seems to use his own texts as arms in a struggle between what he once thought and wrote and what he now wants to write and think. When Wittgenstein ordained that translations into English of his writings always should be accompanied by the German original when published – an ordainment not always respected –, one of the reasons could have been that the reading then would allow for a comparison between language games, sty-

listic nuances and semantic possibilities in the two languages.

In the Scandinavian countries ever since the great pedagogical reforms provoked by Grundtvig in the first half of the last century, we are wont to praise "the living word", the liveliness of spoken discourse, as the primary source of insight and understanding. But there is a distinct possibility that speech may make it more difficult for us to find truth, because we are led to accept intrinsic conventions and norms that rule oral communication, and the costs of questioning conventional usage might be so great that we often refrain from such activities, unconsciously or consciously. To study Wittgenstein's way of writing could challenge the presuppositions of such logocentric traditions. By returning to his own texts in order to alter them, Wittgenstein arrests conventions and struggles with those thought-patterns that he wants to free himself and others of. Thereby he shows how writing gives possibilities to question received views on how language functions.

Thus, and finally, my fourth proposed area of questioning comes up in the guise of a conclusion: the possibility of a critical hermeneutics.

Textual criticism implies critical examination not only of the form of the texts that are present as objects for study, but often also of beliefs and notions that have guided former or contemporary interpreters. Literary criticism implies evaluations of the validity of interpretative strategies as well as particular interpretations of texts. Rhetorical criticism may be said to imply a critical study of the circumstances under which persuasion is possible, and this is a tradition that might be brought to bear on the question of how the uses of texts contribute to the construction and identification of collectively recognizable intentionality.

All these traditions within textual studies have bearings on the way one treats epistemological problems in the uses of texts. Therefore, critical philosophical analyses of texts should pay heed to the lessons to be learnt from philological investigations, and philological examinations of textual material should pay heed to the philosophical problems involved.

To take into account the interrelatedness between philosophy and philology is altogether another endeavour than to simply promote collaboration between experts within different disciplines which boast their own particularities in problems and problem solving. It means that we should pose other problems than those commonly accepted within the disciplinary matrixes, that is, the paradigms. Analysing the construction of subjectivity and intentionality in texts implies considerations on *how language unwinds and is understood within time*.

In order to approach the question of how the understanding of language itself is culturally bound, these bindings or determinants should be critically studied as *productive entities*, patterns being introduced into and guiding the situations of writing, reading and talking. Such an investigation of how texts function as dynamic entities constitutes a critical hermeneutics, taking into account the cultural historicity of concept complexes.

My suggestion is that the designation "critical hermeneutics" could be taken to refer to the study of interpretational matrixes within particular cultural settings. Perhaps my use of the notion of "interpretational matrix" is in need of some elucidation. It could be considered as analogous to Kuhns "disciplinary matrix" – commonly accepted guidelines, ways of conducting research and teaching, institutionalizations

that ensure the production of knowledge within the reproduction of a common understanding of how a discipline functions.

An interpretational matrix is, then, the ensemble of available patterns of interpretations, the stratagems for understanding how to acquire knowledge, the procedures for validating interpretational possibilities.

In the comparisons between interpretational clues of available texts and the clues of interpreting past experience, reside possibilities for the critical examination of the construction of personal as well as collective *identity*.

Willard Van Orman Quine once said, in his much-quoted work *From a Logical Point of View*:

Identity is a popular source of philosophical perplexity. Undergoing change as I do, how can I be said to continue to be myself? Considering that a complete replacement of my material substance takes place every few years, how can I be said to continue to be I for more than such a period at best?

Quine suggested that we ought to consider how abstract entities gain their hold upon our imaginations, so that we too readily commit ourselves to the use of general terms in descriptions of identity, a procedure which makes us confuse general terms with singular ones. He proposes a pragmatic view on what he calls our "conceptual scheme", we can change and improve our eclectic heritage bit by bit while continuing to depend upon it for support – like Neurath's philosopher, who is compared to a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea. Quine flatly declares that we cannot detach ourselves from our conceptual scheme

"and compare it objectively with an unconceptualized reality".

Quite obviously we cannot un-conceptualize the experiences which constitute our relations to the social and material world, we are in need of concepts and symbols to be able to think. But what we can do, is to compare our conceptual schemes, or rather our interpretations of ourselves, with those interpretational matrixes offered by the stories, the examples and the classifications presented to us by the texts of our culture. Such comparisons between language games allow us to break out of the conceptual boundaries of the particular language games we exist within, and to take on responsibility for intentions that may go against the intentionality commonly accepted within the practices we partake in. This analogous mode of reflection constitutes, I do believe, an ethical significance in Wittgenstein's encouragement to compare examples. It makes it possible to analyze and even criticize assumptions integrated into our tacit knowledge.

Quine's approach to the understanding of how we pragmatically insist upon being ourselves by being aware of how we change, seems to me to suffer from his own insistence upon the methods for identifying objects conceptually. What of our recognition of the ambiance of a refreshing friendly discussion, or of the enmity of opponents in budgetary discussions in a faculty board, what about the identification of the point of a story, the usefulness of an example for an argument, the stylistic appropriateness of elaborations in a speech, the pleasure of being surprised by the turns of a poem read silently or aloud, the annoyance of listening to a bad singer? These kinds of identifications cannot be pinned down, neither by general nor by singular concepts. They do, however, constitute ways of learning and ways of judging

ourselves and others. And the interpretations such reading of identifications entail, may be compared to alternative or similar patterns of interpretations in texts. By such an approach to texts, we establish a kind of "participational objectivation" in our identification of our own selves and of the possibilities of intentions.

Like the aforementioned scientists in their laboratories or seminars, we tend in everyday life mostly to comfort ourselves by reascertaining our experiences. In some respects, Quine's improved conceptual scheme and the ship of Neurath's mariner are variations on this theme. One would suppose that Neurath's mariner would have difficulties in rebuilding, say, a schooner into a destroyer (and where is Neurath's lumberer?). Quine's use of Neurath's metaphor invites us to reassure ourselves that the more we change, the more we remain the same, as much unaffected by passing pirates and supply ships as by visits to foreign shores. Another well-known metaphor, that of the "encounter" between reader and text, is often interpreted somewhat similarly, in that it is taken to mean that the reader assimilates into his awareness of his own inner being whatever he encounters when reading. But the trouble is that texts often prove to be very uncomfortable to our self-consciousness. At least, the history of reading habits tells us that a self-comforting smugness is no necessary result of reading. On the contrary, texts have been known to alter readers' experiences of themselves quite thoroughly.

Thus, a critical hermeneutics implies efforts to understand how writing and reading might alter self-consciousness and provoke change in culturally bound contexts. The study of Wittgenstein's Nachlaß under such a perspective could tell us something of how consciousness of the possibility to

compare language games makes it possible to break some of the boundaries set up for us in language games.

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Form in Language: Wittgenstein and Structuralism

What kind of object is language? With this question we should aim at an explanation of language – its conditions and causes. This does not mean that the answer has to be naturalistic. In speaking of noises and ink on paper naturalism is as blind as "transcendentalism" to the specificity of language and of linguistic perception. Thus, my aim in this paper is to indicate a way of explaining language by, at the same time, explaining its irreducibility. "Form in language" or "linguistic form" are the terms that – hopefully – will carry my arguments, while my doubts and hopes will be connected to both Wittgenstein and structuralism.

In Wittgenstein's thinking on language there is no concept of linguistic form. Instead we have logical form (and "logical grammar"), language-games and rules. Besides, *Tractatus* introduced the peculiar way of speaking of language as something general (by having a logical syntax independent of specific languages as for instance sanskrit or urdu). This also gave the subsequent alternative of speaking of occurrences of language-use as if there were no different languages involved. Did the shopkeeper understand english or did he only understand german?

Structuralism can develop a concept of linguistic form that is independent of the concept of rules and of codes; that is as a way of thinking of linguistic form as a "gestalt" not reducible to its elements. Second, linguistic form cannot be understood as something independent of linguistic expression and content. I doubt we can find something like this within linguistics. One of the reasons is that form is commonly thought of as a product of a formalization. Another reason is that language – in spite of Saussure – is seen from the point of view of the speaker. The consequence; a concept of form justifying the distinction between invariant and variant. Against this, I will argue that in language there are only variations and relations between variations. Here there is a use for Wittgenstein's concept of "family-resemblances" and for his hint that a grammar is arbitrary. There is no patriarch or code that determines the identity of a member of our family. Or if we think there is, it is a politically determined identity.

In this way I will try to open the field for a concept of linguistic form as something local, historical (subject to change) and linked to the specific

materiality of language. Something between a picture and a ruler. Something that is neither analogical nor digital. Something that has nothing to do with Hjelmslev's notion of a system under a linguistic sequence. It has rather to be understood as the organization of the sequence with respect to its own temporality. As a form – gestalt – this is of course something that is primarily shown, i. e. perceived. What we hear we cannot write about in the same manner as we hear it.

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My wish is that I could have started on a point where I was already understood; that you – my ears – gave the content of my talk. Wishful thinking – especially in philosophy if we regard it as a difficulty or disturbance of understanding; thus, as an absence of the other giving the meaning to our words. But feeling this, we may seek the meaning of words everywhere – in intentions, things, rules, ideas etc. – except in the ear of the other. Was this the fate of Wittgenstein? I do not know. But I will argue that it is the fate of philosophy of language being a symptom of a problem it doesn't understand. This is the problem of the meaning of what we say – do the others understand it? do I understand it myself? And the common solution is to search for what gives meaning to our words, to reassure ourselves about the relationship between language and reality. This is a solution I'm deeply dissatisfied with. On the one hand it offers no reflection on language, on the other there is no reflection on culture or society. In speaking of linguistic meaning – of how words in language get their meaning, both language and culture are presupposed. Culture is presupposed both as the context for language-use and as the content being expressed; what is talked about. Language is presupposed as something linguistic and is as such of no problem for the philosopher. His problem is that of accounting for how a word as a linguistic expression gets its meaning.

Let me put it in a slightly different way. Theories of linguistic meaning confuse two distinct problems. On the one hand the problem of how something can become language – be an expression within a language. On the other the problem of how a culture makes up the content of what we say. This means that a study of language-use may grasp neither the cultural conditions nor the linguistic conditions of what we say. Both the linguistic expression and the facts talked about are considered as something given; the problem is the one of their relationship and not the one of their respective constitution or formation. Therefore words and things are circumscribing each other in a closed circle that assures – for us – their identities. The closing of language is thus reflected and founded in the very discourse on language.

In what follows I shall only be concerned with linguistic conditions for what we say. My question; how is something made into a linguistic expression? And my answer; this is possible in virtue of the form in a given language. Form in language.

Linguistic expression: Wittgenstein once wrote something like this. How can I know what you are thinking when I only have access to the signs in your talk? Here comes the answer put as another question: How can I know what I'm thinking since I too only have access to my signs or words? And in *Zettel*, § 140: "Ever and again comes the thought that what we see of a sign is only the outside of something within, in which the real operations of sense and meaning go on". But there is no outside hiding something. There are no meaning-bodies – "Bedeutungskörper" – parallelling our expressions or signs. This means that linguistic meaning is not something distinct from a linguistic expression. I quote from *Philosophical Grammar*: "I say the sentence "I see a black patch there", but the words are after all arbitrary so I will replace

them one after the other by the first six letters of the alphabet. Now it goes "a b c d e f." But now it is clear that – as one could like to say – I cannot think the sense of the above sentence straight away in the new expression" (p. 44). So what the sentence says is given in the sentence or in our perception of the sentence. This we feel when we try to replace it in the way Wittgenstein indicates. In one sense there is therefore no other way of answering the question about the meaning of a word than by simply repeating it: "I feel fine sitting just here" – what do you mean? I mean what I'm saying; "I feel fine sitting just here". In other words: In order to be a linguistic expression the expression has to have meaning. If we speak of the expression – the word – on the one hand and on what gives it meaning on the other, this is easily forgotten. Forgetting this, we are led to looking for truth-conditions or use-conditions that are assumed to make the meaning of a sentence. Language and linguistic expressions are thus over-looked and there is created a problem of linguistic meaning that systematically ignores the specificity of linguistic expressions. A discourse is created that cannot be but blind to the materiality of the linguistic expression.

Here we can see that Wittgenstein goes in different directions – reflecting of course that there are different directions to go. Stressing the unity of expression and meaning, the analogy goes to music; he compares the understanding of a sentence with the understanding of a piece of music. This aspect draws upon the perception of a sentence or what we could simply call linguistic perception. Indeed, we may say that it is as perceived that the identity of meaning and expression is obvious. Another way to understand something is to continue for oneself or to be able to use words as others use them. But I will pick up one thought from Wittgenstein as particularly important in this context. A language is a technique. Of course, technique not in an instrumentalistic sense, but in a sense that a technique makes

something possible which without it wouldn't be possible. (Man is thus an animal created by his own techniques). Techniques being more important than what an instrumentalistic point of view can imagine. With respect to linguistic expression, we can then say that they are techniques. Or; the materiality of the linguistic expression is a form of technique. It is not a technique operating on a material, but a material – the meaningful sound – being itself a technique and having as such a grammar. This is not a grammar of a picture or of an object, but a grammar of a process taking its time – something we do when we speak. But here I find a systematic ambiguity in Wittgenstein. "Use" means two different things. The use of a word can mean its use in language. This use is then just what makes it a word. Or it can mean the use within a certain context – linked to certain social use-conditions. Of course both forms of uses are involved, but my argument has been that we have to distinguish clearly between them. Furthermore the concept of language-game seems to give priority to the second sense. From this it is evident that Wittgenstein can sharpen our attention on how we can do things with words. But it is not at the same time evident that he can sharpen our attention on how we can make utterances or discourses by sounds. Let me repeat; something is an expression by being used and perceived. This means both that it must be part of a language and that it is part of a specific context (with specific use-conditions). Even if Wittgenstein is stressing both aspects, the priority seems to go to the second. If this is right, he is – together with philosophy of language – in danger of losing language.

A sign is the loose sense that the term "language" takes within philosophy of language. Saying that a word gets its meaning from – an so on – there is no indication whether the word is taken to be something oral or something written, or something else. There is furthermore no reflection upon the

fact that there are different languages. The reflection is more guided by a view on concepts that makes the philosopher a member of the conceptual international or the international conceptual. We should ask why? Why is it so difficult to think of language in its specific materiality? – to think of language? Granted that what we then are thinking is just what makes a language a language and not something reducible to something else. Granted that the identity of expression and meaning, as just stated, is a semantical or symbolic presupposition with respect to language.

Well – if we are to answer that question – we must – instead of speaking about something we call language, talk about the ways we are talking about language. What are the grammars of our discourses on language?

Concepts of language: I think that the dominant concept of language both within philosophy of language and linguistics is hidden in the distinctions between linguistic expression and meaning, and between linguistic expression and form. This means that a linguistic expression is either a surface linked to an underlying form (a code or a system) or it is an item linked to a context or an intention giving it its meaning. Saying this, implies that what is currently regarded as the opposite conceptions of language – formalism and contextualism – become only opposite sides of the same coin. Neither of them presuppose the identity of linguistic expression and meaning. In contextualism you get the impression that it is the context that gives meaning to our sounds or marks. In formalism the meaning is something given afterwards; syntax precedes semantics. On the one hand the physical expression, or if you wish the medium, on the other hand the meaning or the message. This means also that speaking of linguistic or logical form, the form is something independent of a specific expression or medium. Stating this independence we get what we could call the metaphysics of modern linguistics and philosophy of language. My own the-

sis is this; linguistic form cannot be understood as something independent of linguistic expression and meaning. As I will try to show later on, this follows from my way of thinking of the identity of expression and meaning.

Formalism and contextualism are thus two ways of escaping the linguistic materiality – escaping language – and by that the possibility of understanding form in language. A more interesting concept of language can be found in the grammar that indeed must be seen as the opposite of generative grammar, the comparative grammar of the last century. Here there can be no universal language. There can only be different languages belonging to different families of languages. Languages had to be compared to each other with respect to analogies and differences. The comparative method, therefore, was also a method of discovery. In this context the grammarian could only refer to languages – not to an universal thought as in the preceding general grammar of Port Royal nor to an universal language as in generative grammar. But we could also say that the Indo-European proto-language occupied the place where, under the influence of the new logic, generative grammar was to put an universal language.

Anyway, comparative grammar excluded in advance the concept of language that generative grammar is suffering from. That means that it did open up for a concept of linguistic form that doesn't fall within generative grammar: A concept of linguistic form linked to its comparative method which insists on the horizontal and that which is combined – combinations. We could say that language from now on could be the paradigm of a form – not the organism (as in organic form), not the machine (as in mechanical form), and not mathematics (as in logical form). But what would it be like to think that? – something that is excluded from the philosophical tradition. Perhaps you would have to be a

non-philosopher in order to try to think it, granted that what is new in philosophy emerges outside philosophy. – Who tried? Of course, Ferdinand de Saussure – misunderstood as the founder of modern linguistics. Saussure was a scholar in Indo-European languages and in comparative grammar who tried to make a theory of language on the basis of that grammar. But at the same time this is one of the lines of what was later to become structuralism. Using this term that figures in the title of my paper, I must distinguish between two structuralisms; One starting with Saussure, the other with Roman Jakobson. Saussure is stressing that the sign, the expression, is semantical, while Jakobson – with his point of departure in phonology – makes the sign into a signal – something physical that can be treated by codes. My structuralism, then, is the one of Saussure. But of course this is a Saussure that I hope to marry to Wittgenstein.

Saussure-Wittgenstein: There is at least one evident link between Saussure and Wittgenstein. I have in mind that they both think in a comparative manner. There is in Wittgenstein a comparative philosophy echoing comparative grammar. No transcendental philosophy, but comparative philosophy. Nothing is hidden – we have to compare, not to interpret. They join therefore an "empiricism" that is not speculative; that means neither psychological nor logical. An empiricism that breaks with the classical opposition between the general (abstract) and the individual (concrete). That means not to concentrate on the individual thing or action, but on the individuation of the individual thing in its relationship to other individual things. Not a thing (identity), but relations between things being at the same time the individuation of things. In this way both Saussure and Wittgenstein were preoccupied with the problem of identity. Saussure; the individuation of the linguistic sign as what-gives it its identity. But the differences between them are important. I think Wittgenstein did not succeed in thinking

of what he in a broad sense called the grammar of a language, because he did not develop a concept of grammatical or linguistic form. Maybe he remained caught up in logic in a way that made it impossible for him to go from logical form to grammatical form. Even though he remarked; "Mathematical logic has completely deformed the thinking of mathematicians and philosophers" (*Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* p. 300). Another reason might be that he was too close to his own problems (this being of course also his greatness). But he was so occupied with the use-conditions of language – seeing these both as necessary for thinking and talking and belonging to a culture he detested – that I think he would refuse my academic distinction between linguistic conditions for our talk (linked to our linguistic perception) and its cultural conditions. Or my distinction could have been assumed silently if he could have written poetry or novels. This would of course have given another therapy than the one given by his therapeutical empiricism.

I said that Wittgenstein was perhaps caught up in his concept of logical form. But this does not mean that Wittgenstein follows the presupposition stating the external relation between form and expression. In *Tractatus* the logical form is linked to expressions – signs – in a way that *shows* the logical form; The form is something which shows itself¹. It is evident, however, that this concept of form is linked to the primacy of the visual. It is a written symbolism that shows the logical form of language.

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1. Wittgenstein's concept of logical form has not had any impact upon logic and linguistics. Perhaps the reason is that this concept is linked to his thesis that there is no meta-logic, no meta-language. The alternative has been to focus upon rules, rules that can be stated in a meta-language; Rules in language, not form in language.

We find the same concept of form in his later philosophy: "I would like to say "what the picture tells me, is itself". That is, its telling me something consists in its own structures, in its own lines and colours" (*Philosophical Investigations* § 523). This is a visual form that cannot be a point of departure for an understanding of grammatical form. Here, we can see the contribution of Saussure. Agreeing with Wittgenstein that a form is as form linked to a medium or a materiality, he breaks with the presupposition of thinking this as a visual form. Related to language this can only be a form for the specific materiality of language which, as spoken, is an auditive or an acoustic materiality. The importance of Saussure is then to approach language from the perspective of the ear – from the perspective of linguistic perception. Thus breaking with the primacy of the eye and the gaze in the philosophical tradition – a primacy that cannot but overlook the specific materiality of language, a primacy that may make you deaf to what I have said on the linguistic expression and its identity with its meaning.

Linguistic form: If you still follow me, I will try to approach the topic of my paper more directly. But I hope that by now you may feel some of the difficulties and obstacles in doing that: Our dominant way of thinking of language from the standpoint of the visual making thereby our distinctions between expression and meaning, form and expression, seem evident. This makes us further speak for instance on representation – as if a sentence can represent something or as if language is some form of a mirror. And it makes it natural to concentrate on language as an activity belonging to the speaking 1st person – thus forgetting that we are also using language when we are listening. And last but not least writing, with its atomic letters and atomic signs, being visual, is implicitly the paradigm of language. Let me say it like this; the linguistic expression or materiality is no topic in philosophy of language because it thinks of language on the basis of

an implicit theory of this materiality. It cannot think of it because it belongs to its presupposition; seeing it as something visual belonging to the 1st person speaking subject representing something in the world. Maybe this is the reason why both linguistics and philosophy of language is blind to the necessity of making a theory of language explaining why man has to be a talking animal and explaining by that the symbolic or semantical character of language. This is excluded as long as one takes as the point of departure in an implicit theory of language that in my opinion is clearly wrong. But if I'm right, I cannot convince anybody thinking within the framework I'm criticizing. Or maybe I could do that if I continue in a more Wittgensteinian manner – making you hear something with as small examples as possible and doing that without this quasi-orality that is the game of the reading of a paper. But I'm talking a language that is not my own, so I need a paper, something written some days ago. And this also means that I'm not quite sure how I will react to it when reading it. You may object that here I'm only creating problems: Let us discuss and so the truth will be seen, let us discuss so we can decide who is right. This is what we have seminars for. But I have never experienced this and I think it a great illusion. What is more, my demand is more than that; I want to be understood, feeling at the same time the impossibility of just that. By the same token, it will be impossible to solve the problem with an identification with the understanding belonging to the other. Of course this can happen, as in love or in poetry, but philosophy is not communication in this sense nor discussion.

This is no digression. I want to circumscribe a paradox; a philosophy of communication that cannot think the other as the condition for an understanding of what we say. And a philosophy that thinks this other as a condition – the primacy of the second person – for language – a philosophy of

the ear – but without being able to make real that condition even if it can exclude the solution of philosophical communication and discussion as pseudo-solutions.

But let me not dramatize. What is normal is of course what might not be the case in philosophy. The normal case is that the other is a condition for the understanding of your own utterance. Only in this way can a child learn a language. It can say what it hears from the other when the other hear the same thing as the child itself is hearing when saying something (This is the principle of G. H. Mead). A concept of grammatical form should account for just this: the patterns which make us hear something as something, the patterns of a linguistic sequence which make this into a linguistic sequence. One way of stating the question is this; what makes something into the same word? What in a linguistic pattern makes us recognize the regularity that makes us perceive patterns – and accordingly something as the same word or sign? Note that the problem is not to account for the way we make or do things with words. The problem is more fundamental: how we make signs with sounds in a manner that shows that there is no difference between the sound and the sign.

Just to presuppose a common language, will here amount to no explanation. But this is a common way to go. The argument runs like this: When we speak, our words are occurrences of a language we have in common – a system or a code. My words, as something individual – as spoken by me, are thereby occurrences of something general and common that, compared to my concrete utterances, have the status of constants or invariants. A linguistic form, then, defines a linguistic constant independent of its specific occurrences. As an occurrence we can only have a variant, a realization coloured by the specific individual and the specific context. We can never meet the constant or the invariant

itself, in other words, that which is assumed to belong to the deep-structure or to the common core of language. So there is in some sense an invisible language that doubles the invisible heaven of concepts in philosophy. In fact the same thought-figure is involved. The concept doubles in a mystical manner an individual thing explaining the individual thing as falling under a general concept. Language doubles in the same manner my words or utterances explaining their identity as being occurrences of some general constants or invariants. Indeed, it is a mystical and platonic concept of language where, as in generative grammar, everything is deduced from nothing. What is at stake is the following; a language cannot be accounted for in the perspective of the traditional distinction between the general (common) and the individual. If we do this there is no possibility of grasping form in language. The only thing we can do is to speak of codes or to invent rewriting rules; a method of formalization that has nothing to do with the actual forms in a language.

The alternative in denying this distinction implies that we may see the form in a language as that which makes up the identity of linguistic utterances without its being on a level other than that of the linguistic expressions. Both formalism and contextualism claim that they account for the occurrences of linguistic expressions. Formalism by appealing to an underlying system – a system of rules – contextualism by appealing to the context and the speaking subject. Both overlook the grammatical form on the level of the linguistic expression. An example: looking at the screen of my PC, I see something that consists of formed patterns I can read. But inside, I have been told, there are digital codes. They produce what I can see on my screen – but that does not mean that they can explain what I can see or read on that very same screen. I read signs, but my PC "reads" signals. Therefore there is no language in my computer and there is

no language behind what I say as comparable to codes in my brain. But if you accept the distinction between expression and meaning or content, then you are free to call the physical signals in the computer a language. You may by now guess the importance of my concept of linguistic form. And also its difficulty. For this form can be neither a digital form nor an analogue form.² The first being one of codes, the second being linked to the visual.

Linguistic form has nothing to do with representation. What is at stake is the specific organization of a linguistic sequence operating upon its auditive materiality. For Saussure, this means something that is determined by the fact that we speak within a temporality which makes our words possible. Linguistic form is the grammar of linguistic temporality, words following each others, rhythms, repetitions, pauses; the gestalt of what we hear displayed through the dimension of time. In short, something comparable to music.

Wittgenstein's notion of language as a technique makes perfect sense in this context. We have a form related to a sign-technique that must be regarded as a process; starting, going on, ending, making discourses or poems. But this is only possible through the ear of the other. This does not only mean that a linguistic occurrence is something understood by the other. It also means that it must be related to comparable occurrences in such a way that this relationship makes what we call a word something essentially repeated. A linguistic item in a sequence is a linguistic item if it can be repeated in other sequences. This is essentially because the existence of – let us say a word – is a relational existence in the sense that it gets its identity from the web of linguistic sequences and from its repetitions within them. This means that what is repeated is not an identity – the same word. Every speaker

2. But it might be said to be closer to an analogue form in the sense that we are identifying patterns through it.

says a word in slightly different ways and this implies that we have only variations and nothing but variation. Therefore, it is the variations that make the identity of a word and not an invariant or constant that the variations are supposed to manifest in the individual speech. To use Wittgenstein's term we can say that the variations hold family-resemblances to each other. The links between them are – so to say – horizontal and comparative which means that these links are not explained by an identity on another level. Instead we have relations between variations – lines of variations. And this makes up the form of a language – the form being the systematicity of the variations. If we accept this, there is no essential difference between the individuality of my phrase – the fact that I'm saying it – and the fact that it is understood by the other. For the individuation of what makes the words in what I say is at the same time the relations – the form – that makes us hear it as a linguistic sequence: The individualization of my utterance is at the same time what gives it its linguistic identity. Differences and variations are not parasitic to a language, do not threaten language. On the contrary, it is just what makes language possible. To say the opposite, would presuppose a code or an invariant which can explain variants and so called deviations; a standard or a normal language. But this is a political entity, not a linguistic entity. As Saussure has stressed, a language in this sense is a construction; there are only dialects and variations between dialects.

According to this point of view, a language cannot but change. Change and thereby history is not something external to it. A language cannot but be spoken in different ways and that means that it will also change because here there is no identity that is repeated or presupposed. This means, that with respect to language a form or a system cannot but change. But this change is a change without origin and without finality. The traditional opposition between system and

history can therefore only be dissolved if we give up the metaphysics of history on the one hand and the metaphysics of the system on the other (the system being an universal atemporal order). This means that grammar is arbitrary – a grammar does change, but it doesn't have to change in a definite direction. Chance and order are two sides of the same coin. So the patterns of our language change, otherwise there would have been no language or a created artificial language. And they change because our words are not things and not something that can copy a model of some super-linguistic kind. But the word is not a nothing either; it consists in those auditive differences and variations forming the patterns of our language.

It is essential for such a pattern to be linked to time – time being just what makes a linguistic sequence possible. If you still believe in a referent making the word what it is, this might be difficult to see. What is, then, the pattern of such a time-sequence? It is not causal in the sense that a word is an effect of the word preceding it. It is not intentional in being linked to an intention in the speaking subject. It is not logical in the sense of giving the form of an inference. What we have is what I have tried to speak about – difficult as it is – grammatical or linguistic form. But here I cannot give you a clear-cut theory or a method that can formalize what I have called "form in language". Maybe such a form can only be shown in the use of language and that those who try to formalize it are trying to write down what can only be shown in what we say. So let me say the last sentence that I wrote in my abstract: What we hear we cannot write about in the same manner as we hear it.

Comment on Utaker's Paper

First of all, I want to express my real agreement with the general orientation of Arild's paper, and particularly with his original attempt to link the with the statements of the Saussurian linguistics. I also want to express my pleasure in listening to his paper, which, by contrast with the dominant trends among Wittgenstein's interpreters, doesn't project any analytical claim on the second philosophy.

More precisely, I agree with the following main presuppositions of his project:

(1) The decision to throw a bridge across the comparative grammar and the comparative philosophical method Wittgenstein recommended, and the conclusions he draws from it – namely that, according to Wittgenstein and Saussure, the so-called universal language has to be rejected as a mere prejudice. Of course, we have here a fundamental difference between Wittgenstein and analytical philosophers, which is reflected in some respects in the fight between generative and comparative grammar.

(2) The claim that the linguistic form is as an essentially material form, as Saussure suggested it, when he decided to treat the "linguistic sign" as a "two-sided psychical entity", and that we have consequently to contrast a right structuralism (the Saussurian one) with a wrong one, unable to avoid formalistic traps (Jakobson).

(3) The claim that the linguistic expression taken in its Wittgensteinian sense has to be regarded as a kind of technics. That is in fact a central point of Wittgenstein's contribution, in as much it commands not only the decision to treat words as tools, but also the cardinal distinction between the meaning and the bearer of a name.

Obviously, Arild's aim is to show that the Saussurian approach of the linguistic form on one hand and the Wittgensteinian one on the other hand are focusing on the same solution. That's the reason why he stresses the fact that the Wittgensteinian notion of context isn't reducible to the linguistic context (i.e. the place and function the system of language ascribe to the word), but always involves social and cultural use-conditions. We have here a possibility to draw an illuminating parallel between what Saussure presents as the "linguistic value" and what Wittgenstein sometimes call "the 'soul' of the words" (see PI, § 530). And, as far as I can see, there are some more arguments for the Wittgenstein – Saussure marriage Arild has in view, for instance the fact that a close link exists between the Saussurian assertion: "language isn't a mere nomenclature", and the Wittgensteinian conviction according to which the name itself isn't "a label attached to a thing". In my opinion, a lot of convergences could be picked out which would tend to show that Wittgenstein and Saussure, even though they used quite different weapons, were really engaged in one and the same fight, and tried to unravel the naturalistic and psychological traps. As a proof, just compare the Saussurian definition of language as form, which, as Saussure himself emphasized it, implies that language is "not substance", and the way in which Wittgenstein, in *The Blue Book*, wants us to simply give up seeking for substance behind the substantive.

Now, although I really agree with Arild's general attempt, I must confess I'm very reluctant to follow him when he asserts that the Wittgensteinian approach of the linguistic form finally failed, whereas the Saussurian one was a complete success. This assertion makes it appear that in fact Arild wants to force Wittgenstein to marry Saussure – I mean, that he wishes to correct some features of the Wittgensteinian thought by means of Saussurian linguistics. Hence the strategy he adopts: he first concedes that Wittgenstein had foreseen the two different levels of the linguistic form, but then he traces a "systematic ambiguity" in the way Wittgenstein tried to elaborate them. According to Arild, the language-games wouldn't permit to clearly distinguish these levels nor to properly connect them. Arild concludes that, though Wittgenstein was on the verge to discover the material form, he stopped half-way: of course he managed to escape formalism in rejecting the assumption of an universal, purely syntactical, logical form, but he had to pay a lot for this, in as much the use-conditions through which he reached the material form made the form "independent of a specific medium". Thus, in some respects, Wittgenstein's later contextualism is nothing but a reversion of his earlier formalism and it constantly exposes him to the "danger of losing language".

The main argument Arild invokes, is that Wittgenstein has given priority to the second level (i. e. the socio-cultural use-conditions) of the linguistic form. That's the very point of my reluctance. Of course, I concede that everything is not clear cut in the Wittgensteinian approach of meaning as use. Hasn't Wittgenstein, as late as 1950, himself noticed that what he was trying to say "sounds like pragmatism" (On Certainty, § 422)? So, there is a real difficulty here. But in order to solve it, do we need to assume something like a move from language-games as calculi to language-games as

forms of life, as it has often been asserted? Such a claim would mean, in Arild's perspective, that the second Wittgenstein would have simply exchange the immaterial logical form for a pseudo-material form: theraw socio-cultural contents; in brief, that Wittgenstein has merely given up questionning about the logic of our language. I'm afraid such was not his aim at all. As he has noticed himself in *Philosophical Investigations* (§ 242), the two kinds of agreement (in definitions and in judgments) he discovered to be the fundamental conditions of the use of language seem "to abolish logic", but that's a mere appearance: "they don't do so", he added.

Therefore, in my opinion, we have to complicate a little bit the achievement of Arild's project...

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Wittgenstein's Later Manuscripts: Some Remarks on Style and Writing

Die Aufgabe der Philosophie ist, das erlösende Wort zu finden. (MS 105, 1929: p. 44)^{1 2}

*The task of philosophy is to find the redeeming word.*³

It is this that Wittgenstein reminds us of – and himself – time and again from his earliest writings onwards. The task of philosophy is to find the saving word, the word that liberates from a philosophical problem. A philosophical problem

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1. Manuscript numbers refer to Professor von Wright's catalogue of the "Nachlaß" in Von Wright 1982: pp. 35-62. Datings indicate the date on which Wittgenstein wrote the remark(s) in question: they refer to the last mentioned date in the manuscript, or, in the case of undated manuscripts, or manuscripts whose date is problematic, to the date given in von Wright's catalogue. Page references are to page numbers in the original; in the case of unpaginated manuscripts I quote the first words of the page which I take to be page 1 and count from there. In quotations from the originals I try to be as faithful as possible and as far as the facsimiles allow. The following markings require explanation: ~~xxx~~ = xxx deleted; {xxx|yyy} = yyy written on top of xxx; {xxx} = xxx written on top of unspecified or illegible characters; ^{xxx} = xxx inserted (in, above, below line, marked or unmarked); xxx = xxx underlined by wavy line; xxx = xxx underlined by straight line; @ = unreadable character; <...> = my omission of text; <!> = authentic error or outmoded orthography; <xxx> = incidental comment of mine. As a member of the staff at the Wittgenstein Archives I feel obliged to make clear that the markings I use here do not represent those used in the machine-readable version produced at the Archives.
 2. As with many of Wittgenstein's remarks also this one exists in different versions and occurs in different contexts. Cf. GT 1991: p. 32; GT 1991: p. 44; MS 105, 1929: p. 44; MS 107, 1929: p. 114; MS 115, 1933: p. 30; MS 115, 1933: p. 66; TS 213, 1933: p. 409; MS 146, 1933-1934: p. 55 ("Wenn mir <...>" on page 1).
 3. Translations into English are printed in Italics.

is nothing but a problem of language – the task of philosophy is therefore to correct the philosophical misuse of language.

The striking thing is that the solution of these linguistic problems takes place in language itself. Words themselves are the medium of the philosophical inquiry: they create the philosophical problem and also lead to its solution.⁴ Philosophical inquiry consists therefore in trying out different words and different combinations of them: just as we try different keys or different number combinations to open a lock.⁵ It is this that Wittgenstein did: he tried out different words in order to find **the** word, that combination of words which would liberate him. The essential medium for this search was writing as a process and an activity.

Wittgenstein was a very impatient and sometimes intolerant man. Most of his friends acknowledged that communication with him was difficult and often unsatisfying.⁶ We cannot doubt that he himself wished and longed for long and fruitful discussions, but he also did everything to complicate any conversation and human contact. Thus Wittgenstein was left to transfer the oral dialogue into solitary writing: there he could work on his own, and wasn't forced to make any compromises. His notebooks and diaries became the platform where the whole theatre of philosophy and life went on. He shared the philosophical dialogue, his thoughts and inner life with the paper. When investigating Wittgenstein's manuscripts one gets the impression that writing became for Wittgenstein an aim in itself. We must see this also in the

4. Cf. PG 1974: § 95: "<...> It is *in language* that it's all done. <...>" Cf. MS 114, 1933/34: pp. 143, 151, 152 and MS 108, 1930: p. 195.

5. Cf. MS 109, 1930: p. 214.

6. Cf. Georg Henrik von Wright in Von Wright 1982: pp. 15f, 31; Norman Malcolm in Malcolm 1984: pp. 24ff, 30ff, 52f; Fania Pascal in Rhees 1984: pp. 18, 32f, 39ff, 46f.

context of his ideal of serving the spirit which he refers to in his First World War Notebooks⁷: writing was for him a distinguished way of doing just this.

Wittgenstein's writing can be seen as the particular medium, the motor, the carrier of his philosophizing and of his philosophical development. We should regard the various aspects of his writing process such as deleting, overwriting, crossing out, slips of the pen, underlining, marking, inserting, varying etc., and his tendency to revise and rewrite as the tools of his work. As such they deserve our careful consideration. Significantly, writing meant for Wittgenstein – and surely not only for him – not just the pinning down of a philosophical thought but rather the causing, carrying and structuring of it, letter by letter, word by word, sentence by sentence; and it meant, contesting words with words and looking for a possible dialogue.

In the first part of this paper I consider the idiosyncratic formulations with which Wittgenstein handles his question "what can be said". In the second part I shall focus on the vivacity of his manuscripts: the procedural dimension, the private struggle, the presence of personality (particularly exemplified in the secret code passages). Thirdly I deal with the conversational and reader oriented dimension of his style. Finally I shall turn to his use of alternative formulations as a technique and to the conspicuous aesthetics of his work. As far as possible I shall illuminate these points in Wittgenstein's own words. The examples I present will show some of the variety and multiplicity to be found in his manuscripts. It is my hope that the reader will feel encouraged to follow up the references and examples.

7. GT 1991: pp. 21ff.

"All philosophy is a 'critique of language'"⁸

Wittgenstein states in a manuscript:

Ich sammle gleichsam sinnvolle Sätze über Zahnschmerzen. Das ist der charakteristische Vorgang einer grammatischen Untersuchung. (MS 107, 1930: p. 285)

I am so to say collecting meaningful sentences about tooth-ache. This is the characteristic procedure of a grammatic investigation.

This quotation throws light on large parts of Wittgenstein's later manuscripts. Wittgenstein wants to collect sentences which make sense – he wants to find out whether certain sentences **do** make sense. What initiates the philosophical inquiry is a feeling of awriness, a feeling of puzzlement about the use of words. The particular investigation is often opened with an interrogative phrase such as: Can anyone believe it makes sense to say ...? Could one say ...? Can I think of ...? Is it possible to think of ...? What does it mean to say ...? Is it meaningful to suppose ...?

Significantly Wittgenstein asks many more questions than he answers. But where he does propose answers, either provisional or ultimate, we frequently find phrases which correspond stylistically to the above mentioned questions: You can of course say ... I can say ... It does make sense to say ... One can think of ... One cannot say ... It is meaningless to suppose ... etc.

These phrases appear repeatedly throughout his texts and remind us of the grammatical nature of the inquiry. One should study all the different aspects and different shades of emphasis used in these phrases, for example: the personal (**Ich** kann sagen – *I can say*), the impersonal (**Man** kann sagen – *One can say*), the interlocutive (**Du** könntest sagen – *You could say*), the indicative (Wir **sagen** – *We say*), the subjunc-

8. TLP 1961: 4.0031.

tive (Einer **könnte** sagen – *One could/might say*), the weak (Ich **sollte/soll** sagen – *I should say*), the emphatic (Man **muß** sagen – *One must say*).⁹

In the following I present a sequence of questions and answers which deal with "what can be said". For this purpose I have selected a sequence from the first 50 pages of MS 107, 1929:

- Hat es nun einen Sinn zu sagen <...>? (p. 5)
- Nein{. D | , d}as darf keinen Sinn haben. (p. 6)
- Denn inwiefern kann man von der Realität sagen <...>? (p. 6)
- Umgekehrt könnte man ^{auch?} sagen <...> (p. 7)
- Das sagt man wohl: <...> (p. 8)
- Wenn <...> dann kann ich sagen <...> (p. 9)
- Es kommt mir vor <...> (oder soll ich nur sagen: <...>) (p. 11)
- In diesem Fall kann man nämlich sagen: <...> (p. 12)
- Im Fall von <...> kann man das nicht sagen. (p. 12)
- <...> & es wäre unsinnig zu sagen, <...> (p. 12)
- Hat es einen Sinn zu fragen, <...>? (p. 15)
- Man kann sagen, <...> (p. 19)
- Und man kann weiter sagen, <...> (p. 19)
- Diese Überlegung wäre natür{lic}h unsinnig <...> (p. 20)
- Darauf könnte man sagen: <...> (p. 20)
- Man könnte nun sagen: <...> (p. 23)
- Dann könnte man auch nicht mehr sagen, <...> (p. 23)
- Wenn ich sage: <...>? (p. 24)
- Und wenn wir sagen, <...> (p. 25)
- Wenn {wi}r sagen: <...> (p. 26)

9. The variety of applications of the modal verbs in these formulations needs to be acknowledged. For one example consider essentially different uses of "können", such as the difference between "können" in the context of proposing possibilities and examples ("Denn es könnte Einer sagen wollen: <...> – *For someone might feel like saying: <...>*" in PU 1984, PI 1978: § 56) and "können" in a grammatical proposition ("Und so kann man nicht sagen 'Rot existiert', <...> – *Thus one cannot say 'Red exists', <...>*" in PU 1984, PI 1978: § 58). Typically, Wittgenstein uses the negated "können" very often in grammatical propositions.

Wenn ich sagen kann: <...> dann hat es einen Sinn & ist richtig zu sagen <...> (p. 28)

Ist es hier richtig zu sagen: <...> (p. 28)

Das würde heißen, daß die Frage <...> unsinnig & also unberechtigt wäre. (p. 28)

Ist es aber denkbar <...>? (p. 28)

~~Und~~ ^{Oder} soll ich nun sagen <...>? (p. 29)

Wenn ^{man} aber nicht sagen kann, <...>? (p. 30)

Man könnte dann sagen, <...> (p. 31)

Man könnte das | <arrow pointing to section above> einfacher auch so sagen: <...> (p. 32)

<...> & ich könnte doch nicht sagen <...> (p. 33)

Und doch könnte ich – glaube ich – nicht sagen <...> (p. 33)

Ad<!>erseits könnte ich aber doch nicht sagen: <...> (p. 33)

Die Frage nach <...> wäre also unsinnig, <...> (p. 33)

<...> so daß {m}an sagen könnte: <...> (p. 33)

Was würde es heißen <...>? (p. 33)

Man könnte sagen: <...> (p. 35)

Von <...> zu reden hat einen Sinn <...> (p. 36)

Ich würde also sagen: <...> (p. 38)

Man könnte es dann auch ganz naiv so sagen: <...> (p. 39)

Dann wäre ja der gute Sinn von <...> bewiesen. (p. 39)

Könnte man etwa so sagen, <...>? (p. 41)

Kann man sagen: <...> (p. 41)

Oder kann man sagen: <...> (p. 45)

Kann man sagen: <...>? (p. 46)

Man könnte sagen{: |, } <...> (p. 46)

Oder man könnte sagen, <...> (p. 46)

Man könnte also auch so sagen: <...> (p. 47)

Könnte man nun aber nicht sagen: <...> (p. 47)

Oder hätte <...> nur dann einen Sinn, <...> (p. 47)

Man könnte auch sagen: <...>¹⁰ (p. 49)

Searching for sense consists in searching for what can be said, since what cannot be said cannot be thought, and this is for the philosopher a comfort:

10. Cf. also EPB 1984: pp. 198-207; PI 1978: § 49ff, § 227, § 587; ÜG 1984: §§ 74-76.

Was ich nicht denken darf, kann die Sprache nicht ausdrücken. Das ist unsere Beruhigung. (MS 107, 1929: p. 2)

What I'm not permitted to think, language cannot express. This is our comfort.

However, the search for sense cannot avoid passing through stages of nonsense. One could even say that talking nonsense is necessary in order to acquire sense. It is also the case that the criteria of sense are brought into being by means of sentences which themselves do not have sense. This is expressed in the following quotation:

Es ist oft nicht erlaubt in der Philosophie gleich Sinn zu reden, sondern man muß {oft} zuerst den Unsinn sagen weil man gerade ihn überwinden soll (MS 107, 1930: p. 266)

*One is often not allowed to start straight off with sense, but must often talk nonsense first since it is **this** which has to be overcome.*

The philosopher sometimes has – in order to teach the right, meaningful use of words – first to use a misleading and not fully sensical expression. This happens, for example, in *Eine Philosophische Betrachtung*, where Wittgenstein gives a description of how our philosophical problems come into being:

Ich habe früher mit Absicht den irreführenden Ausdruck gebraucht: "ein voll entwickelter Fall"; denn diese Worte drücken aus, was wir über Fälle, wie die beschriebenen, zu denken geneigt sind: <...> Unser Bild und unsere Ausdrucksweise nehmen wir von einem speziellen Fall her, wenden sie auf nahe und entfernt Verwandtes an; und möchten nun sagen: eigentlich haben wir überall das gleiche. (EPB 1984: p. 234)

It was on purpose that I used above the misleading expression, "a fully developed case"; for these words express what we are inclined to think about cases such as those described: <...> We derive our picture and our manner of expression from a particular case and apply them to closely and distantly related things; and then we want to say: actually it's all the same.

Wittgenstein's attempts to make sense, his fumbling along the border between sense and nonsense, his struggle with language itself comes out very clearly in his manuscripts. He makes his struggle visible. All the to and fro, the back and forth, is recorded in the written word. In the next chapter I'll concentrate on this dimension which makes his writings so lively and personal.

"I don't know my way about"¹¹

What Wittgenstein wrote was single remarks, exercises, parts (roles) of a dialogue which he later and repeatedly revised and rearranged in the search for a suitable form. Ultimately he was never satisfied, either with the remarks themselves or with their arrangement.¹² His writings do not form a system, but rather trace single processes: Wittgenstein did not see it as possible to present final results even if he wanted to, and this was the nature of his enduring struggle, a struggle which he dramatised in a conversational form. What in the interpretation of the *Philosophical Investigations* is often called the opponent is nothing but the oppo-

11. PI 1978: § 123.

12. Cf. PI 1978: Preface: "I have written down all these thoughts as *remarks*, short paragraphs, <...> It was my intention at first to bring all this together in a book whose form I pictured differently at different times. <...> After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. <...> I should have liked to produce a good book. This has not come about, but the time is past in which I could improve it." Cf. also Hilmy 1987: p. 20: "The first point that must be established is that Wittgenstein *wished* to write a 'book' in the more conventional sense. <...> During the course of his efforts Wittgenstein did not decide that a stylistically conventional book would be undesirable, but rather came to the conclusion that he no longer had the strength satisfactorily to achieve the goal he had set for himself."

ment in Wittgenstein himself, which is just as real in him as is the protagonist. With Stanley Cavell we might call two of the voices in Wittgenstein's writings (how many voices are there in Wittgenstein?) "the voice of temptation" (I feel tempted to say ...) and "the voice of correctness" (You can't say that ...):

In speaking of this struggle I take for granted that Wittgenstein is the name of both sides in it, both voices (for my purposes now I need only invoke two), which I have called the voice of temptation and the voice of correctness. (Cavell 1989: p. 38)

In *Eine Philosophische Betrachtung*, the voice of temptation speaks for example in

Wir werden geneigt sein, zu antworten, <...> (p. 118)

Man möchte sagen: <...> (p. 120)

Dann sind wir versucht zu denken, <...> (p. 122)

Fast möchte man so etwas sagen wie, <...> (p. 133)

<...> denn, möchten wir sagen, wie kann <...>? (p. 133)

(Man ist hier vielleicht versucht, fortzufahren: <...>) (p. 136)

Wir sind geneigt zu sagen, <...> (p. 138)

Hier wäre man geneigt zu sagen, <...> (p. 138)

<...> man geneigt wäre zu sagen, <...> (p. 138)

Das legt die Auffassung nahe, <...> (p. 138)

<...> würden manche geneigt sein zu sagen, <...> (p. 175)

<...> so bin ich geneigt zu sagen, <...> (p. 208)

Du bist vielleicht geneigt zu sagen, <...> (p. 218).

The voice of correctness on the other hand shows itself in this text as much more friendly and helpful than in earlier manuscripts. The indulgent suggestions ("Wir wollen nun <...> – *Now we want to <...>*" (p. 135) etc.), reminders ("Aber vergessen wir nicht, <...> – *But let us not forget <...>*" (p. 138) etc.), instructions ("Und nun betrachte <...> – *Consider now <...>*" (p. 168) etc.), conclusions and summaries ("Wir sehen, <...> – *As we see, <...>*" (p. 170) etc.), the frequent involving of the partner ("Denke, Du hättest zu beschreiben, was Du in einemsolchen Falle wirklich getan hast. – *Imagine you had to*

describe what you really did in such a case." (p. 126) etc.) ... and the recurrent use of the inclusive "we" lend the voice of correctness – in contrast to the abrupt tone of some of the earlier mentioned examples ("You can't say that!", "That's nonsense!") – an aspect of considerate leadership.

The very first manuscript which Wittgenstein started after his return to Cambridge in 1929, MS 105, provides a good example of the procedural dimension of his philosophising. The dialectic of extemporisation¹³ is clearly demonstrated in the opening pages of the manuscript:

Ist ein Raum denkbar <...>? (p. 1)
Und das heißt nur: <...>?
Nun fragt es sich: <...>?
Wie läßt sich aber <...>?
Es scheint viel dafür zu sprechen <...> (p. 3)¹⁴
Aber dagegen läßt sich etwas einwenden: <...>
Aber man kann sagen: <...>
Di{e} Sache schaut aber in Wirklichkeit schwieriger aus <...>
Wenn z.B. <...>
Dann wäre also <...> (p. 5)
Kann man <...>?
Man kann gewiss<!> sagen: <...>
Irgendwie scheint es mir <...> (p. 7)
Man könnte glauben <...>
Es scheint <...>
Das würde heißen: <...> (p. 9)
Wie verhält es sich aber dann <...>?
Wie kann man <...>?

13. Cf. in this context what von Wright says about Wittgenstein's way of lecturing: "As might be expected, his lectures were highly 'unacademic' <...> He had no manuscript or notes. He *thought* before the class." (Von Wright 1982: p. 29)

14. The text runs on the recto-pages.

Kann man <...>?
 Kann man sagen <...>?
 Nehmen wir an <...>?
 Man könnte sagen <...>
 Aber warum soll ich nicht <...>
 Es scheint mir also: <...> (p. 11)
 Was ist <...>?
 Es scheint mir <...>
 Ich kann z.B. sagen: <...>
 Es ist eigentlich von vornherein wahr^rscheinlich <...>
 Es ist doch sehr seltsam <...>
 D.h. <...> (p. 13)
 D.h. <...>
 Es wäre vielleicht nützlich <...> (p. 15)
 Die Frage ist dann etwa: <...>
 Verhält es sich so <...>?
 Man könnte gewiss<!> <...>

Remarkable in the context of Wittgenstein's search for sense and fixed points are the recurrent references to, as one might say, nothing more fixed than his own instinct, intuition or taste: It seems to me ..., I've a feeling that ..., Something tells me ...

Herewith a list of such expressions:

Irgendwie scheint es mir <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 7)
 Ich ahne daß es möglich sein wird ohne Wahrheitsfunktionen auszukommen (MS 105, 1929: p. 8)
 Es scheint mir also: <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 11)
 Ich habe das Gefühl <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 25)
 Etwas sagt mir <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 69)
 Es kommt mir so vor <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 69)
 Ich habe einen instinktiven Wunsch nur mit den Begriffsumfängen zu operieren <...> (MS 105, 1929: p. 121)
 Dabei ist mein Gefühl folgendes: <...> (MS 106, 1929: p. 72)
 Einerseits fühle ich <...> Andererseits kann ich nicht verstehen <...> (MS 106, 1929: p. 80)
 Das Gefühl ist: <...> (MS 106, 1929: p. 163)

Wir fühlen: <...> (MS 106, 1929: p. 202)
 Ich fühle so: <...> (MS 107, 1929: p. 11)
 Ja es ist mir als wäre <...> (MS 107, 1929: p. 55)
 Ich fühle <...> (MS 108, 1930: p. 192)
 Zu Grunde liegt allen meinen Betrachtungen (das Gefühl) die Einsicht, <...> (MS 108, 1930: p. 194)
 Man fühlt <...> (MS 108, 1930: p. 195)
 Das Gefühl an das ich jetzt alle meine Betrachtungen knüpfe <...> (MS 108, 1930: p. 208)
 Denn in mir wehrt sich nicht bloß etwas dagegen daß <...> sondern eben auch daß <...> (MS 109, 1930: p. 118)
 Und nun wehrt sich etwas in mir dagegen, zu sagen@: <...> (MS 115, 1933: p. 12)
 Hier bin ich nun geneigt zu sagen: <...> Aber ich fühle auch daß das eine irreführende Ausdrucksweise ist. (MS 115, 1933: p. 20)

In these lines the use of "I" is not a mere rhetorical devise but something drastically personal. Wittgenstein doesn't spare the paper stock-takings and recollections (Is that correct? How shall I continue? I do not know my way about ...). He comments on the progress he welcomes and on the setbacks he suffers. We get an immediate and very intimate impression of his philosophising from remarks such as:

Ich sehe noch kein System in allen diesen Fragen. (MS 105, 1929: p. 12)
 Ich habe die intensive Auffassung noch immer nicht ganz durchgeführt! (MS 105, 1929: p. 16)
 Ich werde scheinbar, wider meinen Willen, @ auf die Arithmetik zurückgeworfen (MS 105, 1929: p. 19)
 Wie geht es weiter? (MS 105, 1929: p. 27)
 Ist nun nicht der Begriff der Distanz einfacher zu verstehen? (MS 105, 1929: p. 49)
 Aber wie ist dieser Zusatz zu machen?! (MS 105, 1929: p. 78)
 Brauche ich jetzt nicht Zeichen für <...>? (MS 105, 1929: p. 127)
 Aber jetzt stürmen 100 Fragen auf uns ein! (MS 106, 1929: p. 78)
 Ich habe noch nicht ein ganz gute<!> Gewissen. (MS 107, 1929: p. 115)
 <...> (Ist das so?) (MS 107, 1929: p. 115)
 Ich bin mit allen meinen Gedanken über diesen Gegenstand noch immer in einem furchtbaren {Wir}rwar#<!> zwischen erstem &

zweitem Ausdruckssystem. Das mei{s}te von demwas ich {j}etzt sagen möchte ^{braucht man &} kann man gar nicht sagen. (MS 107, 1930: p. 265)

<...> ist des Rätsels Lösung. (obschon ich sie noch nicht durchschauen kann) (MS 108, 1930: p. 265)

Was für Konsequenzen will ich daraus ziehen?! (TS 213, 1933: p. 35)

Hier ist noch eine große Lücke in meinem Denken. Und ich zweifle, ob sie noch ausgefüllt werden wird. (MS 176, 1950: p. 34)

When writing, Wittgenstein must have felt overwhelmed by the quantity of thoughts to be dealt with. In MS 115, 1936: pp. 118-292 for example he repeatedly promises to return to connected themes at later times (pp. 176, 210, 213, 219, 226, 236, 247, 249, 255, 272, 278, 284).

A very striking feature of Wittgenstein's writing is to be seen in his secret code passages, now so well known and widely referred to since the publication of the so-called Secret Diaries.¹⁵ The code which unlocks these passages is a very simple one and consists – roughly speaking – in the reversal of the alphabet, such that z=a, y=b, x=c, w=d, v=e, u=f, t=g, s=h, r= i or j, q=k, p=l, o=m, n=n, m=o, l=p, k=q, i=r, h=s, hh = ss or ß, g=t, f=u, e=v, d=w, c=x, b=y, a=z, Umlaut-z = ä, Umlaut-m = ö, Umlaut-f = ü. "Rxs" reads for example "Ich".¹⁶ Concerning the use of code in the First World War diaries McGuinness says:

Code-entries begin on 15 August <1914>, perhaps because Wittgenstein was about to go towards enemy territory. The code is a simple one (a = z, b = y, etc.): all the same he shows a comparative facility in using it from the first, so that he had perhaps practised it earlier. The aim was of course not concealment for ever but concealment from anyone who casually picked up the book. (McGuinness 1988: p. 212)

15. "Geheime Tagebücher", published by Wilhelm Baum (GT 1991); Cf. the review in Unterkircher 1991.

16. Cf. Huitfeldt/Rossvær 1989: p. 193.

Ray Monk comments on Wittgenstein's later use of the secret code as follows:

<...> as soon as he returned to Cambridge, he reverted to a practice he had not kept since the *Tractatus* had been published: he began to make personal, diary-like entries in his notebooks. As before, these were separated from his philosophical remarks by being written in the code he had used as a child. (Monk 1990: p. 267)

Even so, it should be noted that Wittgenstein didn't reserve his secret code exclusively for "personal, diary-like entries". Many remarks which one wouldn't describe as "personal" or "diary-like" are written in code. Some of them, now published in *Culture and Value*, have the character of aphorisms or casual remarks on unrelated subjects, for example "A good simile refreshes the intellect." (CV 1980: p. 1e; MS 105, 1929: p. 73); "Mendelssohn is not a peak, but a plateau. His Englishness." (CV 1980: p. 2e; MS 107, 1929: p. 98); "In former times people went into monasteries. <...>" (CV 1980: p. 49e; MS 131, 1946: p. 79)¹⁷ On the other hand, Wittgenstein didn't always write personal, diary-like entries in code. In MS 105 (1929) we find in standard script: "Wieder in Cambridge. Sehr merkwürdig. <...>", "Mein Gehirn ist in keinem günstigen Zustand. <...>" (p. 2), "Ich habe sehr genußreiche Diskussionen mit Ramsey <...>", "Ich gehe {i}n der Wissenschaft nur gern allein spazieren." (p. 4). In MS 109 (1930): "Engelmann sagte mir, <...>" (p. 28).

Wittgenstein himself makes a reflexive comment on his use of the secret code, itself in code:

Vh r{s|h}g oviqdf<Umlaut-f>iwrt dvp_xsv Vipvr_xsgvifut vh
mri rhg mznxvh rn vr_nvi tv{h|s}vr_mvn h<!>xsirug nr_vwvi af
{hx}sivry_vn dzh rxs nr_xsg tvi{n}v p_vhyzi hxsivry_vn
om<Umlaut-m>xsgv. (MS 106, 1929: p. 4)¹⁸

17. Cf. Pichler 1991: pp. 1, 2, 28.

It is remarkable what relief I derive from writing in secret script certain things which I don't particularly wish to be legible.

To me it remains unclear why Wittgenstein encoded certain passages and not others. The encoding of certain remarks might have had a separating function, to show that they do not really belong in the immediate philosophical discourse, just as Wittgenstein distinguished other such remarks with brackets, special section marks etc.¹⁹ They can also be seen to represent the points where he "waxes lyrical" or turns to themes of ethics or aesthetics. It is in this context noteworthy that in the notebook-drafts these remarks were written in standard script. It looks as if Wittgenstein translated them into code only when copying them into the manuscript-volumes, which have a more official character.²⁰ There are also some cases where Wittgenstein in the middle of remarks jumps from normal script to the use of code or the other way round.²¹

Regardless of whether or not a certain comment is in code, it is interesting to note that Wittgenstein recorded his stray thoughts and the outsider-observations concerning the ongoing work in the middle of his investigations. He also gives written expression to depressions and raises his morale with

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18. Transcribing Wittgenstein's secret code passages begs a question about the activity of reading: in order to identify the single handwritten characters (especially in the secret code!) one has first to grasp the word as a whole. Cf. Huitfeldt's discussion of the (impossible) distinction between representation and interpretation of text in Huitfeldt 1991: pp. 100-102.
 19. Cf. von Wright about the remarks published in *Culture and Value*: "It is not always possible to separate them sharply from the philosophical text; in many cases, however, Wittgenstein himself hinted at such a separation – by the use of brackets or in other ways." (CV 1980: Preface)
 20. Cf. MS 153a, 1931: ("Anmerkungen <...>" on page 1) 24 and MS 110, 1931: p. 242 ("Es ist beschämend <...>"); MS 153a, 1931: p. 243 and MS 111, 1931: p. 81 ("Eine Art <...>").

encouragements to continue. This shows the close connection of philosophy and life in Wittgenstein's work.

"Words are deeds"²²

Wittgenstein's texts are highly interlocutive, or dialectical, and his use of language is very oral. Open, for example, *Eine Philosophische Betrachtung* and you find yourself in the middle of a lively dialogue full of questions and answers, proposals and rejections:²³

Das ist wahr, wenn Du sagen willst, <...> (p. 118)

Es sei denn, daß Du sagen willst, <...> (p. 118)

Denken wir uns <...> (p. 118)

Aber was heißt es, <...>? (p. 118)

Ist es nicht so: <...> (p. 118)

Stelle Dir dagegen den Fall vor, <...> (p. 126)

Denke an einige Beispiele: <...> (p. 126)

Denke, Du hättest zu beschreiben, <...> (p. 126)

21. Cf. MS 118, 1937: 27.8., 1.9., 4.9. (Pichler 1991: p. 15). Cf. in this context also CV 1980: p. 7e: "<...> If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it, unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside! / The honourable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only by those who can open it, not by the rest. <...>" and Z 1981: § 74: "A sentence is given me in code together with the key. Then of course in one way everything required for understanding the sentence has been given me. And yet I should answer the question 'Do you understand this sentence?': No, not yet; I must first decode it. <...>"

22. CV 1980: p. 46e.

23. Concerning the interlocutive style of Wittgenstein's writings, consider von Wright's remark about the affinity between Wittgenstein and Plato: "From Spinoza, Hume, and Kant he said that he could only get occasional glimpses of understanding. I do not think that he could have enjoyed Aristotle or Leibniz, two great logicians before him. But it is significant that he did read and enjoy Plato. He must have recognized congenial features, both in Plato's literary and philosophical method and in the temperament behind the thoughts." (Von Wright 1982: p. 33)

Könnten aber diese Regeln <...>? – Gewiß. – Andererseits aber:
 ist eine Regel <...>? (p. 133)
 Wir wollen nun <...> (p. 133)
 Denke Dir <...> (p. 133)
 Denke wieder daran, was Du erlebst, fühlst, <...> (p. 185)
 Denke Dir diesen Fall: <...> (p. 185)
 Überlege Dir etwa diese Fälle: <...> (p. 185)
 Vergleiche damit den Fall: <...> (p. 192)
 Vergleiche damit dies: <...> (p. 192)
 Vergleiche damit: <...> (p. 192)

I want to focus attention on certain particles which Wittgenstein uses frequently and which among German linguists are generally regarded as elements of spoken language, of oral dialogue and argumentation. They are the particles "gerade", "ja", "doch", "eben". Here I would like to point to a special usage. They serve often as "consensus constituting particles"²⁴, in other words, they serve to state, assert and remind of points about which the speakers have already reached agreement or of things which ought in themselves to be patently clear. We will look at some examples of their usage, this time chosen from MS 108, 1929-1930: pp. 1-100:

Aber ich meine gerade <...> (p. 37)
 Aber in <...> verhalten es sich eben gerade so. (p. 92)

Die ~~Zeichen~~ mathematischen Zeichen sind ja wie die Kugeln einer Rechenmaschine. (p. 17)
 Denn diese Ausdrucksweise sagt ja doch alles was wir sagen wollen & was sich sagen läßt. (p. 28)
 Aber so etwas braucht man ja gar nicht annehmen. (p. 29)

24. I use the term as applied by Jutta Lütten in Lütten 1979: pp. 30-38 ("Konsensus-Konstitutiva"). Lütten describes their special functions as follows: "'doch' appelliert an das Vorhandensein einer gemeinsamen Kommunikationsbasis <...>: appellativer Rekurs / 'eben' konstatiert die Faktizität einer gemeinsamen Kommunikationsbasis: konstativer Rekurs / 'ja' assertiert die Gewißheit einer gemeinsamen Kommunikationsbasis: assertativer Rekurs" (Lütten 1979: p. 36) The function of "gerade" is similar to that of "eben".

Es ist ja klar <...> (p. 33)

Der Satz <...> sagt doch offenbar <...> (p. 6)

Denn es scheint doch <...> (p. 22)

Und hier bedienen wir uns do{c}h offenbar <...> (p. 32)

<...> bezeichnet doch nicht einen Zustand <...> (p. 36)

Ich beschreibe eineⁿ ~~Tatsache~~ Sachverhalt doch nicht ^{dadurch}
<insertion mark underlined by wavy line> daß <...> (p. 37)

Doch offenbar, nein! (p. 56)

<...> so muß man doch sagen <...> (p. 62)

Aber so ist es doch nicht! (p. 63)

Es gibt eben in der Mathematik nur <...> (p. 11)

<...> ist eben alles was wir sagen können. (p. 21)

Man darf eben über eine Sache ^{nicht} einmal das {E | e}ine und
einmal das andere sagen. (p. 53)

Die Wahrheit ist (eben) <...> (p. 53)

Unsere Erkenntnis ist eben, <...> (p. 53)

<...> sind eben grundverschiedene Satzformen. (p. 66)

<...> denn dies sind eben die Permutationen von <...> (p. 74)

<...> & aus eben diesem Grunde kann ich auch nicht sagen
<...> (p. 83)

<...> ich kann eben nicht erkennen <...> (p. 83)

Das Dazwischenliegen der Mischfarbe ist ~~ebe~~@ eben hier <...>
(p. 83)

Ein "in der Mitte" gibt es eben hier ~~gar~~ nicht. (p. 86)

Die Begriffe <...> sind eben hier überhaupt nicht zu brauchen
<...> (p. 86)

<...> dann muß man eben durch Regeln gewisse Übergänge
ausschließen <...> (p. 88)

"Eben" is probably the most crucial of these particles in Wittgenstein's writings. It is used to say that this and nothing else is my point ("That's just what I'm saying"). It functions at its strongest as a stamp of approval. If in a dialogue one justifies a sentence by use of the word "eben" one demonstrates oneself to be in the right position: the speaker marks his statement as the indisputable truth – there is no alternative, basta! – we have come to the limits of our discussion. In

this application the word confronts us with our shared habits of acting and communicating and it indicates the boundary which Wittgenstein wishes to make clear to us: That's just how it is. That's just the way I act. That's just the way we speak.

One can attribute to the word "eben" the same function as Wittgenstein occasionally claims to be the goal of philosophy:

Das Ziel der Philosophie ist es eine Mauer dort zu errichten wo die Sprache ohnehin aufhört. (MS 108, 1930: p. 277)

The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall where language has already stopped.

Wittgenstein wants the reader to focus on the process of thinking, rather than on the search for coherently ordered results or for a system.²⁵ Thus he doesn't want the reader to take once and for all an ultimate position. He wants the reader to struggle with both sides as he himself does, and he wants him/her to follow his instructions. Wittgenstein pushes examples ("Betrachte dieses Beispiel: <...> – *Consider this example <...>*" (EPB 1984: p. 132) etc.), counter-examples ("Vergleiche mit <...> den folgenden Fall: <...> – *Compare with <...> the following case: <...>*" (EPB 1984: p. 140) etc.), thought-experiments ("Denken wir uns eine Sprache, <...> – *Let us imagine a language <...>*" (EPB 1984: p. 146) etc.) under the reader's nose and tells him/her to: Look! Imagine! Suppose! Think of this! Don't forget! Remember! Be aware! etc., and he also says: I'll tell you what to do and where to go! Wittgenstein doesn't spare the reader the drama of the struggle he himself experiences. He provokes him/her to take

25. Cf. PI 1978: Preface: "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own." Cf. also Bambrough 1974: p. 118: "Wittgenstein does not present a philosophical system or series of doctrines."

sides in the dispute, which means, different sides, since the sympathy of the reader is never directed at just one figure. The reader might be disappointed when the journey has no destination, or at least an unexpected one or when Wittgenstein suddenly says: this **is** the destination! or: **regard** this as the destination!²⁶

At one point Wittgenstein said:

Ich mache Versuche mich, oder meinen Hörer, in's Wasser fallen zu lassen & ihn dann herauszuziehen um so eine Rettung zu demonstrieren. Aber es geht nicht sehr elegant: einmal gelingt es mir nicht recht ihn ins Wasser zu werfen & ich wälze ihn auf der Erde herum ohne ihn ins Wasser zu bringen, & dann wieder habe ich ihn ins Wasser geworfen aber ich bringe ihn nicht mehr heraus & er ist in^{der} Gefahr zu ertrinken. (MS 109, 1930: p. 173)

I try to let myself – or my listener – fall in the water and then pull him out in order to demonstrate a rescue. But it doesn't work elegantly: sometimes I don't really manage to throw him in the water and I tumble him about on the ground without getting him into the water, at other times I have thrown him in the water but can't get him out and he is in danger of drowning.²⁷

This is exactly what he does in the discussion of the shopping-example (PI 1978: § 1) which serves, in one respect, to show the short-comings of the Augustinian attempt to explain language. But my own response to this text was a strong experience of how dogmatic Wittgenstein (one should better say: the voice of correctness in Wittgenstein) was in refusing to give any explanation concerning the example. I myself identify with the questions raised by the

26. Cf. Z 1981: § 314: "<...> the difficulty – I might say – is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. 'We have already said everything. – Not anything that follows from this, no, *this* itself is the solution!' <...>"

27. Cf. Goodman who speaks of Wittgenstein's "aim of 'bumping' the reader into a new awareness of the world". (Goodman 1976: p. 145)

opponent. I even feel provoked by Wittgenstein to ask those questions. His example, in dealing with numbers and colours – and in the very way it is presented – is certainly one which does leave many questions open. But Wittgenstein dismisses them as if they were irrelevant. For any reader familiar with traditional academic philosophy and interested in the question of meaning this is completely unexpected. Why does Wittgenstein do this? Answers could be: He wants the reader to reconsider the way in which he formulates questions. He wishes to warn the reader not to expect linguistic answers to all questions. He denies right at the beginning of *Philosophical Investigations* to give an explanation of meaning. He wants to make it clear, that he is the boss.

"Über die allmähliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Reden"²⁸

With regard to Wittgenstein one might also say, "Über die allmähliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim **Schreiben**" – "*On the gradual completion of thoughts when **writing***". Wittgenstein was aware of the problem of how the sheer activity of speaking or writing determines the progress of our thoughts. He himself takes the risk entailed in writing. He knows, and expects, that through the process of connecting words he will end up in areas which are not predictable and expresses this point in the following remarks:

Ich greife oft im Schreiben meinem Denken vor. (MS 112, 1931: 25.10.)

In writing I often anticipate my thought.

28. *On the Gradual Completion of Thoughts when Speaking*, title of an essay by Heinrich von Kleist, probably written in 1805/1806. Kleist 1985: p. 347.

Ich denke tatsächlich mit der Feder, denn mein Kopf weiß oft nichts von dem, was meine Hand schreibt. (MS 112, 1931: 27.10.)

In fact, I think with the pen, since my head often knows nothing of what my hand writes.

Having acknowledged writing as a medium of investigation rather than simply as one of transmission it is worth noting the role of drawings and diagrams in Wittgenstein's work. Drawings give rise to problems as well as to solutions.

Und zwar mache ^{zeichne} ich einen P{a | l}an ^{Ich mache einen Plan} nicht nur um mich anderen verständlich zu machen sondern auch um selbst über die Sache klar zu werden. ({d | D}.h. die Sprache ist nicht nur Mittel zur Mitteilung) (MS 109, 1930: p. 73)

Indeed, I draw a diagram not only in order to make my thought clear to others but also to understand the matter myself. (I.e. language is not just a means of communication.)

Drawings often provide the only way to explore and present specific problems and have in those places clearly a vehicle-function. Therefore some of his drawings must be seen not only as additional illustrations but as essential media of accessing and showing a problem.²⁹

Wittgenstein's use of writing as a tool is clearly exemplified in his handling of alternatives, the investigation of which constitutes a field of research in itself. One should look at the development of these alternatives in terms, both of their quantity and quality, and of the different ways in which he introduces them scriptually (no marking; marking with parentheses, brackets, double-slashes ...; special comments and instructions ...). The frequency of alternatives increases in

29. Cf. Biggs 1992, who has paid special attention to Wittgenstein's use of drawings as part of visual experience (Biggs 1992: pp. 4ff, 10f). Biggs has also made a catalogue of sources of the drawings and diagrams in the published work. (Forthcoming)

his later writings: in the first two manuscripts, MSS 105 and 106 from 1929 (encompassing together 438 pages) we meet the phenomenon of alternatives ca. 550 times; in the 78 pages of MS 174 from 1951, ca. 250 times. Pages 118-292 of MS 115 from 1936 ("Philosophische Untersuchungen. Versuch einer Umarbeitung."; published in *Eine Philosophische Betrachtung*, cf. EPB 1984) seem to mark a high point in this tendency: in this text, containing 175 pages, Wittgenstein resorts to the use of alternatives ca. 2700 (!) times.³⁰ Most of Wittgenstein's alternatives barely affect the course of the argument in which they appear. Nevertheless we must be careful to note that the border between questions of style and questions of meaning is very problematic; two different formulations will never make the same point or have the same role³¹. We could say that writing alternatives is editing the world in different ways, and searching for alternatives is searching for alternative ways to see the world.

It often seems that Wittgenstein writes alternatives for their own sake. We have the impression that he is merely marking time with his pen. One can find him doing nothing better than making syntagmatic and paradigmatic substitutions; changing – on purpose – between "daß"- and infinitive-constructions, indicative and subjunctive, definite and indefinite articles, articles and demonstrative pronouns etc. All this may be in order to avoid fixing the point too exactly, or, in the hope of finding inspiration. We must not forget that writing is not depicting a thought but rather creating and carrying it, so that "finding the right expression" does not mean that we have accurately expressed a preconceived thought but rather that we like the thought this expression gives us.

30. I count the number of places where Wittgenstein uses alternatives and not the number of alternative formulations, which would give a higher figure.

31. Cf. Huitfeldt 1991: p. 97.

What does it mean to find the right word? It doesn't mean that the found word expresses the point of my thought best, but it means, that I like best the particular point, made by this particular expression. This is true at least in many cases of Wittgenstein's and everyone's writing.³²

Wie finde ich das 'richtige' Wort? Es ist allerdings ^{als} vergliche ich Worte nach feinen Geschmacksunterschieden. <...> Aber ich muß nicht immer urteilen ^{beurteilen}, erklären, warum dies oder dies {W}ort nicht stimmt. Es stimmt einfach ^{noch} nicht. Ich suche eben weiter, bin nicht befriedigt. Endlich komme ich zur Ruhe, bin {b}efriedigt. So schaut eben das Suchen aus; & so das Finden. (MS 131, 1946: p. 183)

*How do I find the right word? It is in any case as if I compared words with a gourmet's palate <...> But I needn't always explain why this or that word isn't right. It simply is not yet right. So I keep on searching and am not satisfied. Finally I come to rest, I'm satisfied. **This** (and nothing else) is the nature of the search and of the finding.*

Even so, in the following I will mention some **criteria** of searching and finding, criteria according to which Wittgenstein decides which alternative is preferable when it comes to their evaluation. When Wittgenstein is not satisfied with an expression – or where he senses that an expression could mislead (to psychologism for example) – he usually underlines it with a wavy line (with a straight broken line in type-scripts³³). Here I will mention three criteria which guide his writing and which are particularly illustrated by his alternatives.

32. Cf. TLP 1961: 4; PI 1978: §§ 330ff; MS 108, 1930: p. 278; MS 115, 1936: p. 282; MS 137, 1948: p. 45; MS 138, 1949: p. 17.

33. Cf. WWK 1979: p. 166: "<...> Wittgenstein shows typed sheets from his manuscript to Waismann and makes remarks about certain signs. A word which is underlined in this way: --- means: Wittgenstein is in doubt whether it is to be retained or not. <...>"

One criterion is Wittgenstein's preference for direct everyday language. This is obviously connected to the programmatic remark in *Philosophical Investigations*, § 116:

What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.

His ideal of writing ordinary everyday language finds expression in several instructions and comments, such as the following, which he occasionally makes regarding the substitution of a word:

[ich sollte hier ein gebräuchliches Wort setzen] (MS 108, 1930: p. 53)
*[I ought to put here a commonplace word]*³⁴

Another criterion is – as for many writers – that of economy.
What goes for logic also goes for language:

Was, in der Logik, nicht nötig ist, hilft auch nicht [ist auch nicht hilfreich von Nutzen]
Was nicht nötig ist, ist überflüssig. (MS 109, 1931: p. 294)
In logic, what is unnecessary, is of no help. What isn't necessary is superfluous.

We find applications of the criteria of economy for example in the history of the paragraphs of *Philosophical Investigations*. Of course, writing more economically doesn't necessarily lead to more clarity, at least not from the reader's point of view. What is unclear in the *Philosophical Investigations* is often clear in earlier versions of the paragraphs in question.

Thirdly: Wittgenstein's writing is strongly determined by an aesthetic dimension. This can be briefly exemplified with

34. Cf. TS 213, 1933: pp. 412, 420 (Published in PH 1989: pp. 182, 190).

regard to rhythm, punctuation and stress. Wittgenstein discusses in a manuscript of 1946 the following:

Die Verwendung gewisser Wörter dem Satzrhythmus zu-
liebe. Dieser könnte uns viel wichtiger sein, als er uns
tatsächlich ist. (MS 131, 1946: p. 96)

*The use of certain words for the sake of a sentence's rhythm. This
could be much more important to us than it in fact is.*

His fanatic search for the right words, his occupation with the fitting rhythm and word order is impressively shown in MS 152, 1937: pp. 37f, 86³⁵, where on three pages he rehearses the opening to the first paragraph of *Philosophical Investigations* which eventually resulted in the simple and short "Augustinus, in den Confessiones I/8: " (PU 1984: § 1). I quote only some of the attempted formulations:

Augustinus stellt ^{hat ...} das Lernen der menschlichen Sprache
~~mit folgenden Worten~~ ^{so} dar: (p. 37)

Augustinus beschreibt das Lernen der Sprache so: (p. 38)

In den Confessiones (I/8) beschreibt Augustinus, wie das
Kind die Sprache lernt. Er sagt (p. 38)

Augustinus sagt in den Conf. ~~der Mensch~~ ^{das Kind} lerne ~~die~~
Sprache ^{seine Muttersprache} so: (p. 87)³⁶

We can also note a careful use of punctuation in Wittgenstein's manuscripts which is evidently not determined by grammatical rules but which generally has an important rhythmical function. Regarding particular cases of punctua-

35. As indication for the date of this manuscript I take the date reference in the preface draft on page 13 (Mathematic formulae on page 1): "Dieses Buch stellt meine Anschauungen über die Philosophie dar –<dash deleted, comma inserted> wie sie sich in den letzten acht Jahren <Since 1929> entwickelt haben." Cf. also the date references in the preface drafts of MS 117, 1938: p. 110-126, particularly the one on page 120. Cf. Von Wright 1982: p. 130.

tion in his manuscripts, Wittgenstein very often proposes several alternatives³⁷ or makes comments on it explicitly³⁸. Punctuation is occasionally also used to achieve an alienation effect:

Punkt am Ende des Satzes. Gefühl des Unabgeschlossenen, wenn er fehlt. (TS 211, 1932: p. 417)

Fullstop at the end of a sentence. A feeling of incompleteness when missing.

The use of straight underlining in the manuscripts or of double spacing in the typescripts – which usually appears in the publications in italics, or, in the case of original double underlining, in upper case – shows again the oral dimension of Wittgenstein's writing. These phenomena are used at such points where Wittgenstein wants the reader to lift his voice in order to clarify the thought by appealing to vocal habits.³⁹

Finally I would like to turn from the style of writing to the style of reading and quote a recommendation of Wittgenstein's, regarding how he should be read:

36. In order to gain the full picture of the development of the first four paragraphs of *Philosophical Investigations* through the whole Nachlaß compare: MS 111, 1931: pp. 15ff. – TS 211, 1932: pp. 11ff. – TS 212, 1932-1933 (cuttings) – TS 213, 1933: pp. 24ff. – MS 114, 1933-1934: pp. 35ff. – MS 115, 1933-1934: pp. 79f. – [AWL 1982: pp. 46f. (1933-1934)] – MS 141, 1935: p. 1 – D 310, 1934-1935: p. 1 – MS 115, 1936: pp. 118, 166 – MS 140, 1936-1937: p. 42 – MS 152, 1937: pp. 37f., 86f. – TS 220, 1937-1938: §§ 1-5 – TS 226, 1939: §§ 1-7 – TS 227, 1944: §§ 1-4 (Some of the dates have been inferred on the basis of stylometric studies).

37. Cf. MS 109, 1930: p. 1; MS 115, 1933: p. 67; MS 115, 1936: p. 253; MS 175, 1950: p. 41.

38. Cf. MS 114, 1932: ("27.5.32. <...>" on page 1) 33, MS 115, 1933: pp. 52, 61.

39. Cf. on punctuation and reading: CV 1980: p. 48e ("If you <...>"), 57e ("Sometimes a sentence <...>"), 68e ("I really <...>"); on intonation: MS 115, 1936: p. 263; on the feeling of familiarity when looking at words or sentences: MS 150, 1935-1936: pp. 1ff.

I really want my copious punctuation marks to slow down the speed of reading. Because I should like to be read slowly. (As I myself read.) (CV 1980: p. 68e)⁴⁰

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