Summer 8-15-2020

On Staying Open While Seeing Red: Predicting Open-Mindedness and Affect in Politics

Emily Hanson
Washington University in St. Louis

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS
Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences

Dissertation Examination Committee:
Alan Lambert, Chair
Hillary Anger Elfenbein
Josh Jackson
Calvin Lai
Mike Strube

On Staying Open While Seeing Red: Predicting Open-Mindedness and Affect in Politics

by

Emily J. Hanson

A dissertation presented to
The Graduate School
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

August 2020
St. Louis, Missouri

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Appendices

List of Abbreviations

ATF: Appraisal Tendency Framework

FoR: Frame of Reference

MC: Moderate Conservative

ML: Moderate Liberal

OMC: Open-Minded Cognition

PI: Partisan Identity

PT: Perspective Taking

RWA: Right-Wing Authoritarianism

SC: Strong Conservative

SDO: Social Dominance Orientation

SL: Strong Liberal

Trait OM: Trait Open-Mindedness

Acknowledgements

Thank you to my advisor, Alan Lambert, for your mentorship and for giving me a strong foundation to build upon for the rest of my career. Thank you to the members of my committee for your time and insight throughout my years at WashU. Thank you to my lab mates, Fade and Stephanie, for your advice and encouragement.

I owe the greatest thanks to my parents. I have been lucky in every way a daughter could hope to be. Mom, thank you for letting me check out the whole library, for sewing my wizard robes, and for keeping your girls rooted in a world of expanding possibilities. Dad, thank you for teaching me the helper rules, to keep my towel close, and most importantly how to grok myself and others.

Thank you to my sisters, Sara and Toby. Every year the world becomes crazier, but I have been fortunate to face everything from petty grievances to a pandemic with the two people I admire most at my side. The world is wrong about middle children; being wedged between you two has always been the best seat in the house.

Thank you to my grandmother, Loretta Weiss. No one ever had to tell me that a woman could be unapologetic in asserting her opinions or independence because I grew up watching you.

Thank you to my network of adopted aunts and uncles: Mary Ellen and Bob, Joan and Larry, Mark and Anne, and Andrea and Marvin.

Thank you to my lifelong friends Cat (my big friend), Chelsea (my Hebrew school soulmate), Elizabeth (the better twin), and Jamie (the least common). You are the best people this planet has to offer, and I can now assert that as my expert opinion.

Thank you to the Heathers + Asher, I wouldn't have made it out of Wake Forest without your friendship, the Bash Bro office paradise, and our shared candy supply. Thank you to my friends and classmates at WashU and my St. Louis family: Mickey, Sankalp, and the Kracen-Wallace clan.

Thank you to my friends and colleagues at the ACLU of Missouri. Each of you has changed my life and expanded my perspective in ways for which I will never cease to be grateful.

Thank you to my beloved Archie for being a constant companion in quarantine and otherwise.

Thank you to Ricky for loving me despite every open microwave door and spilled beverage.

Emily J. Hanson

Washington University In St. Louis

August 2020

For Henry

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

On Staying Open While Seeing Red: Predicting Open-Mindedness and Affect in Politics

by

Emily J. Hanson

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychological and Brain Sciences

Washington University in St. Louis, 2020

Professor Alan Lambert, Chair

This dissertation examines whether people who *claim* to be dispositionally open-minded, *d*o in fact, demonstrate such open-mindedness when they are actually presented with political opinions that run counter to their own. In Study 1, participants rated their partisan identity and dispositional open-mindedness prior to reacting to a series of fictional Facebook posts that varied in both their political ideology and political extremity. The results of this study demonstrated that the most consistent predictor of "open" reactions (operationalized in terms of both cognitive judgements and affective reactions) to each type of Facebook post was whether it was congruent with the participants' partisan identity. Importantly, this effect was never moderated by dispositional open-mindedness. Thus, the degree to which a participant was high (vs. low) in open-mindedness did not significantly attenuate partisan bias or act to increase the likelihood of "open" reactions to outgroup political views. Study 2 utilized a similar design, except in this case participants were asked to *predict* how open they thought they would be to the same set of political issues used in Study 1. The results of Study 2 demonstrated that participants predicted they would be most open to attitudinally consistent political views. As in Study 1, these predictions were not moderated by dispositional open-mindedness. This means that participants who rated themselves as highly open-minded were not any more likely to predict they would be

open to outgroup political opinions than those participants who scored themselves low in open-mindedness. This research both builds upon and significantly extends prior work in both the psychological and political science literatures. The implications of these results and future directions are discussed.

Chapter 1: Introduction

"Open-minded" is one of the more complimentary labels that could be used to describe another person. In everyday language, this term is used to describe someone who is open to all points of view, including—and especially—ones that run counter to their own. In other words, being receptive to a point of view is easy if you happen to already agree. However, it is much harder to maintain such openness when someone is expressing a counter-attitudinal point of view. For example, we are impressed when a politically conservative person can appreciate and understand a liberal point of view and, conversely, when liberals are able to do the same with conservative opinions. This does not mean, of course, that such people will abandon their long-held preferences when they are exposed to opposing arguments. Rather, "being open-minded", in this context, refers to instances in which people can understand and appreciate the merits of differing viewpoints, as opposed to automatically rejecting it as "stupid" or "ill-informed".

The question of central interest in this dissertation is whether people who *claim* to be open-minded (as measured in the context of a personality inventory) *do*, in fact, demonstrate such open-mindedness when they are actually presented with opinions that run counter to their own. In considering these issues, I am assuming that the quality of "being openminded" is a trait-like construct, in the sense that it refers to a relatively stable quality of the self. Before any further discussion of the theory and methods involved in this dissertation, it is useful to briefly review how I will operationalize this trait.

Models and Measures of Trait-Based Open-Mindedness

In this dissertation, I operationalize open-mindedness based on two highly correlated individual difference measures: Perspective Taking (Davis, 1983) and Open-Minded Cognition (Price et al., 2015). I will discuss each in turn.

Perspective Taking

The Perspective Taking (PT) scale was developed as part of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). The paper that initially introduced the IRI (Davis, 1983) has been cited more than 8,000 times, making it one of the most highly cited papers in the psychological literature in the last forty years. The IRI is a measure of dispositional empathy that is comprised of four subscales: Empathic Concern, Perspective Taking, Personal Distress, and Fantasy. Of these subscales, the empathic concern (EC) index appears to be the most widely studied index (see Davis, 1994; Batson et al., 2002). This is almost certainly due to the close connection of EC to concepts that are familiar to the general public, such as compassion or sympathy.

Nevertheless, the PT index has stimulated significant amounts of research in its own right (see Alterman et al., 2003; Bernstein & Davis, 1982; Cohen, 2010; Corcoran & Mallinckrodt, 2000; Giammarco & Vernon, 2014; Hawk et al., 2013; Gilet et al., 2013; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Sevillano, Aragones, & Schultz 2007). Here, too, this index offers some obvious connections to concepts that are familiar to most laypeople, such as "being open-minded". Davis (1983) defines PT as "the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others" (p. 113-114). The items in the PT scale reflect this focus on cognitive perspective taking (e.g. "*I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective"* (See Appendix A for full list of items). PT is associated with reduced stereotyping/prejudice (Ku, Wang, & Galinsky, 2010), greater satisfaction in romantic relationships (Franzoi, Davis, Young, & Richard 1985), and reduced anger in response to interpersonal conflict (Mohr et al., 2007).

As one concrete illustration of the dynamics associated with this facet of empathy, participants who scored high in PT were better able to understand the motives of negotiation

partners and thus were "able to uncover underlying interests….to craft more efficient deals with greater collective and individual gain" (Galinsky et al., 2008, p. 383). Thus, openness to understanding your adversaries' point of view, or what the authors call a "think for your partner strategy", appears to lead to better outcomes. To date, most of the evidence to indicate that PT is associated with open-mindedness to other viewpoints has been generated in the context of research on business and negotiation settings (e.g., Axtell et al., 2007; Grant & Berry, 2017; Parker & Axtell, 2001;). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that this relationship between PT and open-mindedness would generalize to other contexts.

Somewhat surprisingly, I am not aware of any research that has directly tested the relationship between perspective taking and the degree to which people display openness to counter-attitudinal opinions. To be sure, *one might presume* on the basis of prior research that participants scoring relatively high (vs. low) in PT might be more open to hearing opposing political views. However, I am not aware of any studies that have directly examined this issue.

Open-Minded Cognition

Price and colleagues (2015) recently developed the Open-Minded Cognition (OMC) scale. Given its relatively recent publication, there is comparatively less research on OMC compared to the PT index. However, it still represents a reasonably well-validated measure of open-mindedness and, as I note ahead, is significantly correlated with perspective taking. OMC is defined as a participant's "willingness to consider a variety of intellectual perspectives, values, opinions, or beliefs—even those that contradict the individual's opinion" (Price et al., 2015, p. 1488). This closely corresponds with the definition of PT posed by Davis, reflecting a similar emphasis on cognitive consideration of other points of view. The measure is comprised of six

items, for instance "*When thinking about an issue, I consider as many different opinions as possible*" (see Appendix B for full scale).

As noted above, OMC is a much newer scale than the PT index. Nevertheless, much of the research that *has* been conducted on OMC, parallels the PT literature (Ottati et al., 2015; Wilson, Ottati, & Price, 2017). However, I am not aware of any research that has examined the general capacity for OMC to predict the degree to which participants are actually "open" to counter-attitudinal views.

Analyses Clarifying the Overlap Between Perspective Taking and Open-Minded Cognition

On intuitive grounds, one might expect the PT scale (Davis, 1983) to correlate quite strongly with the (newer) OMC scale (Price et al., 2015). However, the scholars who introduced the OMC scale do not report any data on the nature of this overlap. Indeed, Price et al. (2015) make no mention of PT at all. Nor am I aware of any subsequent research over the last five years to investigate the overlap between these two measures.

In the context of the present dissertation, my goal was to construct a statistically reliable index of open-mindedness, broadly defined. Hence, given the potentially strong overlap between the PT and OMC scale, it seemed useful to consider the possibility that the two scales combined might capture this construct better than either scale in isolation. I was able to formally examine the scales' overlap using data that I had already collected in the context of studying other aspects of empathy and social judgment. Although my prior research was not directly related to the issues of concern in this dissertation, several of these studies (combined N = 3,407) measured PT and OMC. This provided me with the opportunity to conduct principal components analyses (PCAs) on these two scales to determine whether there was an identifiable component common

to both. Indeed, as I note ahead, the degree of overlap was high enough to suggest that the two scales are probably measuring the same underlying construct.[1]

Summary of Analyses (*N* = 3,407)

Here I report results from eight different samples, collected via Amazon's Mturk between December 2015 and June 2019. Because the results from each study were similar, I report only the findings from the combined sample. After reverse scoring contrait items, analyses revealed reasonable internal validity for both PT (α = .79) as well as the OMC scale (α =.75). As an initial (and informal) indication of their overlap, the internal reliability of a single index based on all items from both scales was slightly higher than the separate scales (α = .84). Further analyses revealed that the two scales were highly correlated, $r(3407) = .62$, $p < .001$.

Next, I ran principal component analyses (PCA) on the 13 items from both scales using three different rotation solutions: (a) no rotation, (b) varimax (which forces the components to be independent), and (c) oblimin (which allows them to be correlated; Jolliffe, 2011). All three approaches yielded strong evidence of one meaningful underlying component, on which all 13 items loaded highly (all lambdas > .39). The primary component accounted for 38.34% of the variance. This result did not differ across rotation approaches. The pattern of loadings on this

[1] The analyses reported here do *not* purport to be a formal theoretical assertion of an underlying dimension (or factor) common to both scales. Such an endeavor would require far more analyses with samples even bigger than I have used here, and would also require consideration of correlated but conceptually distinct constructs such as empathic concern. Rather, my goal here is a more modest: To report some data with a moderate-sized sample that provides a reasonable justification for forming a composite measure of trait OM based on both scales. In a set of additional analyses (not reported in this dissertation) I also conducted analyses using the PT and OMC scales separately, and these analyses generated implications nearly identical to those reported in the main text.

primary component is shown in Appendix C. In summary, these analyses provide a reasonable basis for concluding that the degree of overlap between the two scales is fairly high and that they are likely measuring the same underlying construct. Hence, in the sections to follow, the trait index was based on an average of all 13 items.

The labeling of this index is somewhat arbitrary. Indeed, given that the scales overlap so highly, one could just as easily call it "perspective taking" as to call it "open-mindedness". However, the term *perspective taking* has some additional implications and theoretical baggage not relevant for present purposes (e.g., the ability to experience the world through the other person's eyes.) Keeping this in mind, I use the term "Trait Open-Mindedness" (abbreviated as *trait OM*) throughout this dissertation to refer to this index.

Brief Consideration of Other Trait Constructs

Although trait OM is clearly most relevant to the aims of my dissertation, it is useful to briefly contrast this construct with other types of trait measures. Stated differently, this section provides a rationale for why trait OM is best fit to the aims of my research, while acknowledging that there are other constructs with which it might share some conceptual and statistical overlap.

Authoritarianism

The authoritarian construct has a long (and, often, quite contentious) history in the social sciences, beginning first with work by Erich Fromm (1929) and popularized in a well-known book by Adorno et al. (1950; see also Bass, 1955; Janowitz & Marvick, 1953; Lipset, 1959; Maslow, 1943; Roberts & Rokeach, 1956; Rokeach, 1948). Scholars have long proposed that authoritarianism is associated with cognitive rigidity and the tendency to be closed-minded to alternative viewpoints (e.g., Adorno, 1950; Rokeach, 1960). Given this long history, even a cursory review of this area is not possible (for relevant overviews see Adorno et al., 2019;

Altemeyer, 1988, 1998; Baars & Scheepers, 1993; Christie, 1991; Jost, 2006). However, I will briefly discuss a few key points that are especially relevant to present concerns.

For purposes of my dissertation, there are two related, and quite fundamental, problems with using any measure of authoritarianism as a measure of trait OM. First, measures of authoritarianism do not *directly* measure this construct. In other words, authoritarianism is conceptually associated with closed-mindedness, but nothing in the scale actually measures this quality directly. This problem is inherent to all commonly used measures of authoritarianism, including the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 1981). A related problem is that measures of authoritarianism are, by definition, measures of conservative ideology. Hence, even if one were able to infer a person's degree of closed-mindedness by their scores on a measure of authoritarianism, such a measure would be perfectly confounded with political ideology (Feldman, 2013). As such, RWA is not useful as a measure of trait OM in the present research.

Intellectual Humility

Intellectual humility refers to a person's acknowledgment that their own beliefs could be flawed or incorrect (Leary et al., 2017; McElroy-Hetzel et al., 2019). Intellectual humility is a construct with a long history in philosophy and one that is commonly discussed in the context of open-mindedness (Adler, 2004; Gardner, 1993; Hare, 1987, 2009; Riggs, 2010; Spiegel, 2012). However, Leary and his co-authors (2017) have recently developed a 6-item psychological measure that includes items such as, "*I reconsider my opinions when presented with new evidence"* and *"I accept that my beliefs and attitudes may be wrong*". IH is positively correlated with willingness to hear opposition views and exposure to outgroup political materials (Porter & Schumann, 2018) as well as Big 5 Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness (Haggard et al., 2018; Leary et al., 2017). IH is also negatively correlated with

narcissism, intolerance to ambiguity, and dogmatism (Haggard et al., 2018; Leary et al., 2017). IH is certainly relevant to a broader understanding of how people react to outgroup opinions. However, the perception of one's fallibility is distinct from the predisposition to consider other points of view. The former is firmly rooted in perception of the self, while the latter has little to do with self-concept. Hence, IH seemed to be of tangential relevance to the present research.

Openness to Experience

Openness to Experience (hereinafter, OTE) is a subscale in both the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) and the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992). OTE scales measure imagination, curiosity, and attention to aesthetics and emotions (Costa & McCrae, 1992). However, there are longstanding disagreements as to the precise meaning of the construct (for a review see Woo, Saef, & Parrignon, 2015). Moreover, OTE encompasses a wide range of characteristics, most of which are not directly relevant to open-mindedness. In fact, a cross-cultural study of 104,365 participants across 63 countries found that PT and OTE were *not* significantly correlated (Chopik, O'Brien, & Konrath, 2017). For these reasons, OTE also seemed to be, at best, tangentially related to the issues of main concern here.[2]

Summary

In my dissertation, an important goal was to measure individual differences in open-mindedness. For reasons noted above, I operationalized this construct based on two highly

---

[2] The dissertation committee suggested including Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT; Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013) as another relevant scale. However, in our pilot studies AOT was not highly correlated with PT ($r(65) = .24$, $p > .05$) or OMC ($r(65) = .28$, $p = .024$). This was also true in both studies of the dissertation (mean $r = .36$). As such, AOT was not included in the measure of trait OM used in the dissertation.

overlapping measures, the PT scale from Davis' empathy instrument (Davis, 1983) as well as OMC (Price et al. 2015). There are theoretical reasons to suspect that these scales might overlap with other constructs (see above), but the PT and OMC scales were, in combination, clearly most relevant to my goals.

On the Predictive Validity of Trait-Based Approaches: A Brief Overview

Most, if not all, research on traits must ultimately consider a critical question: Does a person's score on a trait measure reliably predict specific behaviors? Research examining the contrast or congruency between self-reported personality and behavior has been at the forefront of personality research for several decades (Allport, 1966; Bem, 1972; Block, 1968, 1977; Bowers, 1973; Damian et al., 2019; Epstein, 1977, 1979, 1980; Fiske, 1974; Funder, 2012; Magnusson & Endler, 1977; Mischel, 1968, 1983; Revelle & Condon, 2015; Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006; West, 1983, for a comprehensive review, see Beck & Jackson, 2019). This question became particularly salient in the context of what eventually became known as the "person vs. situation debate" (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). A critical issue in that debate, at least in its initial stages, was whether traits are capable of accounting for meaningful amounts of variance, above and beyond that accounted for by situations (Allen & Potkay, 1973; Bem & Allen 1974; Epstein & O'Brien, 1985; Funder, 2006; Hogan, 1991; Kenrick & Funder, 1988; Mischel, 1968; Shweder, 1975).

This literature is far too vast to adequately summarize here but a few points are worth emphasizing. This debate began in earnest with Walter Mischel's 1968 book "*Personality and Assessment*". The most well-publicized aspect of Mischel's (1968) argument is that even the most well-designed personality measures would predict only trivial amounts of variance in

behavior, given the inherent "power" of situations to drive behavior.[3] To choose just one example cited by Mischel, Hartshorne and May (1928) appeared to demonstrate low cross-situational consistency in the cheating behaviors of elementary school children. When Mischel's critique first appeared, many -- but certainly not all -- researchers (e.g., Allen & Potkay, 1973; Scheweder, 1975) agreed with Mischel's conclusion that a trait-based theory of personality was, in his words, "untenable".

However, this position now seems to have been overstated. In the 1970s, research started to provide clear evidence that traits *and* situations exert important influence on behavior (for an overview, see Funder, 2003). For example, Endler and colleagues suggested that the *interaction* of personality and situational variables accounted for more variance in behavior than personality or situations alone (Endler, 1975,1977; Endler and Hunt 1966, 1968; Endler & Magnusson, 1974). The interactionist approach ultimately stimulated a great deal of research by other scholars (e.g., Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984; Geukes et al., 2017; Judge & Zapata, 2014; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Orom & Cervone, 2009; Tett & Guterman, 2000; Van Mechelen, 2009). For example, Mischel and Shoda (1995) proposed the Cognitive Affective Processing System model (CAPS) which assumes that people differ not only in their cognitive-affective mediating units (i.e., beliefs, goals, affect, construals), but also in how these mediating units will "interact with each other and with psychological features of situations" (p. 246). The interaction

[3] Strictly speaking, Mischel (1968) did not completely disavow the meaningfulness of *all* individual differences. For example, some of his own research appears to demonstrate powerful consistency of certain types of skills/achievements, most notably the ability to delay gratification (e.g., Mischel, 1961; Mischel, Shoda, Peake, 1988).

of these mediating units with the psychological factors of a situation results in unique behavioral patterns between people who may have similar levels of a given trait.

This interactionist approach has certainly proven to be useful. However, a strong version of the interactionist approach also runs the risk of downplaying the importance of considering traits in their own right. Stated another way: traits *and* situations, in their own right, have the potential to independently influence behavior, even while acknowledging the obvious importance of potential interactions (Funder, 2003). There are many research paradigms which demonstrate that traits (e.g., the Big Five inventory) can predict outcome variables with impressive effect sizes that far exceed the pessimism of Mischel's earlier writings (Bastian, Burns, & Nettelbeck, 2005; Buss, 1989; Jackson et al., 2015; Lahey, 2009; Roberts et al., 2007; Specht, Egloff & Schmukle, 2011). For example, DeNeve and Cooper (1998) found personality traits such as extraversion, neuroticism, emotional stability, and locus of control were all predictive of subjective well-being. Another study by Paunonen (2003) demonstrated that traits such as neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness predicted more concrete behaviors including alcohol consumption and attending parties.

On the Value of Multiple (vs. "Single-Shot") Outcome Measures

In addition to the matters noted above, it is also useful to make brief mention of a well-known insight by Seymour Epstein and his colleagues. All else being equal, traits will do a better job of predicting a given outcome if the latter is operationalized using multiple measures as opposed to one measurement instance (informally, "single shot" measurements). As Epstein and O'Brien (1985) noted, "single behavioral acts tend to be (a) low in reliability and (b) low in generality. Given the low reliability of single acts, nothing can be expected to predict them well" (p. 532). In other words, the relationship between traits and a particular outcome tends to be

stronger when the predictor *and* outcome variables are operationalized using multiple items (Epstein, 1977, 1979, 1983; see also Buss & Craik, 1984; Diener & Larsen, 2009; Mesquita, Barrett, & Smith, 2010; Schwarz, 2007, 2012; Schwarz & Oyserman, 2001). It is also worth noting that averaging over time can potentially obscure some important aspects of within-person variability (Beck and Jackson, 2018; Beck and Jackson 2019; Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1998;).

Will Trait OM Predict Receptivity to Counter-Attitudinal Opinions?

This brings us back to an issue of central concern in my dissertation: Would one expect participants scoring high (vs. low) on trait OM to demonstrate greater "openness" to opinions running counter to their own? (I will refer to open-minded behavior as "receptivity" or "cognitive receptivity" to differentiate it from trait OM.) In the context of politics—the central domain in this dissertation—this could be concretized in the following way. Suppose that a participant was (a) ideologically liberal and that (b) that they scored high in trait OM. Compared to other (equivalently) liberal participants who score *low* in trait OM, would we expect this participant to demonstrate greater receptivity to politically conservative opinions? The same set of issues pertains to politically conservative participants. All else being equal, would we expect conservatives scoring high (vs. low) in trait OM to demonstrate greater receptivity to opinions expressing liberal points of view?

There is very little prior research that examines the predictive validity of trait OM for receptivity to counter-attitudinal views. Despite the absence of such data—or, perhaps, because of it—it is possible to take a range of different positions on this matter. In the discussion to follow, I first consider some reasons for "optimism", in the sense that one might be confident that a measure of trait OM would, indeed, predict such receptivity. I then consider some reasons for pessimism, *viz*., that trait OM might *not* predict such receptivity to counter-attitudinal

opinions. To clarify, this latter pessimistic viewpoint does not simply reiterate the concerns raised by Mischel (and others) that traits are *fundamentally* incapable of predicting meaningful variance in behavioral reactions. Rather, this section will consider some dynamics relevant to the political intolerance literature which suggests (albeit indirectly) that psychometrically sound and conceptually meaningful measures of trait OM may not predict participants' actual reactions to outgroup political views.

Reasons for Optimism

Mischel himself, later acknowledged that prior criticisms of trait measures were overstated (Mischel, 2004). As discussed in the previous section, there is ample research to demonstrate that trait measures can, in fact, predict behavior (e.g., Roberts et al., 2007). There is also evidence to demonstrate that specificity matching between predictors and criterion variables serves to increase predictive validity (Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007). For example, narrower personality measures, such as need for achievement or need for understanding, are often better predictors of specific behaviors than more general trait measures like Conscientiousness or Agreeableness (Paunonen et al., 2003; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001). One could argue, perhaps, that trait OM measures (i.e., PT and OM) are *relatively* narrow in that they ask targeted questions about how one reacts to other's perspectives. Thus, trait OM might be expected to have stronger predictive validity relative to more general trait measures.

Admittedly, it would be possible to concretize my measure of trait OM even more, by specifically referencing open-mindedness to political views (e.g., "How open are you to politically views that are different from your own?"). Although such specificity is possible (see Price et al., 2015), trait-based measures of open-mindedness have historically *not* made reference to specific domains. Hence, to remain consistent with the prior research on trait-based openness,

my measure of this trait does not ask participants to evaluate their own levels of openness in a specified context. I will discuss this issue further in the general discussion.

In the context of this dissertation, another reason for optimism lies in the relatively constricted time frame of the design. The studies in this dissertation took fewer than 20 minutes to complete, on average. Thus, participants were asked to rate their trait OM and respond to political opinions all within a short timeframe. For this reason alone, one might argue that my design would be conducive to finding strong relationships between the trait and the outcome variables. Stated another way, it is presumably harder to find a strong impact of the trait if the outcome variable was measured months or years later.[4]

Reasons for Pessimism

Even within the present design, however, there are still reasons for pessimism in the sense that one might not obtain a strong relationship between trait OM and receptivity towards counter-attitudinal political opinions. These considerations are most relevant to the political intolerance literature, considered below.

Implications of the Political Intolerance Literature

Political intolerance is defined as the unwillingness to "put up with" or allow for the expression of groups or ideas that one dislikes or finds objectionable (Gibson 2013, p. 46; see

---

[4] However, such an "optimistic" outcome could be interpreted in a more cynical way. Briefly, any consistency found between traits and outcome variables in "one shot" studies could reflect a self-consistency effect (Lecky, 1945). In my dissertation, people who initially claim to be high in trait OM might feel motivated to be receptive towards outgroup views to maintain consistency. (Note that this could also occur if the order of the trait and outcome variables were reversed.) However, this alternative interpretation is moot as I did not find any evidence of such consistency in the first place.

also Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus, 1979). Strictly speaking, political tolerance "has to do with what one expects of the state, not of oneself" (Gibson, 2011, p. 417). Thus, in this literature, tolerance indicates the degree to which a participant believes the government should allow a given viewpoint to be freely expressed**.** Nevertheless, researchers in this area presume that participants' responses to these questions provide valuable information about their individual attitudes toward these "objectionable" views. Hence, although this area of research certainly does not measure "traits" in a conventional sense, it is interesting to see that issues relevant to theory and research on personality are pertinent here as well.

Beginning with Stouffer's 1955 survey of American support for "McCarthyist" restrictions on the freedoms of communists, political scientists have long been interested in the relationship between participants' abstract endorsements of political tolerance (e.g., *I believe everyone should have the right to free speech*) and the degree to which they agree with the rights of "objectionable" groups to publicly air their views (e.g., *I believe the KKK should have the right to free speech*). Although there are some complexities in this area, it is useful to highlight a particularly provocative implication of this work. People who *claim* to be in support of free speech -- when asked in the abstract -- show a surprising disinclination to support such freedom when asked about specific views (Gibson & Bingham, 1983; Kuklinksi et al., 1991; McClosky & Brill, 1983; Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1993). For example, past research has indicated that more than 90% of Americans say they "believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be" (Peffley, Knigge, & Hurwitz, 2001, p. 380), but less than 40% support allowing advocates of offensive groups such as the KKK to speak (Gibson, 1992; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1993).

One of the overarching implications of this research is that relatively "abstract" probes about tolerance do not always align with how people react to specific groups or ideologies. Notably, this is true *even when these reactions are measured in the same setting in which participants had just indicated how broadly tolerant they are*. This has potential implications for the kinds of results one might obtain with measures of trait OM, including the present set of studies. In particular, that abstract claims about open-mindedness may not *necessarily* predict responses to concrete opposing viewpoints, especially those that are strongly discrepant from the self.

Summary

I am not aware of any research that has directly investigated whether abstract measures of trait open-mindedness reliably predict issue-specific receptivity to specific points of view, even when traits and reactions are measured in the same time frame. Even so, when this question is considered against the backdrop of prior research in psychology and political science, there are reasons for optimism *or* pessimism on this question, depending on which research one considers. On the one hand, there are several reasons to suppose that abstract measures of trait-based open-mindedness *might* reliably predict behavioral reactions, especially in paradigms in which the outcome variable is measured shortly after the assessment of the trait.

However, there are just as many reasons to suppose that people who claim to be open-minded would *not*, in fact, demonstrate such openness when measuring their specific reactions to ideologically objectionable views (see, especially, the consideration of the political intolerance literature). One element of my dissertation was designed with this latter literature in mind. In particular, I varied (as a within-subject variable) the degree to which the "opposing" view was

extreme or relatively moderate, with the anticipation that dispositionally open participants would be more likely to demonstrate receptivity towards the latter class of items.

On the Role of Affect in Open-Mindedness

Up this point, I have focused on the ability of trait OM to predict what might be regarded as a relatively "cognitive" openness to another's point of view. However, this dissertation also studies the relationship between trait OM and affective reactions to counter-attitudinal views. It is certainly true that open-mindedness refers to a person's tendency to consider differing viewpoints in a cognitive manner. However, a primary characteristic of being open-minded may also be the tendency to remain calm, or "keep a cool head", when hearing opinions that one disagrees with, as opposed to getting angry or frustrated. I am not aware of any research that has explored whether affective reactions to outgroup opinions are predicted by trait OM or whether affective reactions are correlated with cognitive receptivity.

This notion that affect may be a central component of open-mindedness is supported by research on the appraisal tendency framework (ATF; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Frijda, 1988; Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). The basic idea of this approach is that different types of emotions (even when they share the same valence) can have reliably different consequences for judgment and behavior (Eadeh et al., under review; Lambert et al., 2010; Lambert, Eadeh, & Hanson, 2019). Of greatest interest here, anger has been found to lead to increased heuristic processing, including reliance on experts and stereotypes (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). In the specific domain of politics, studies have shown that anger leads to greater reliance on partisan labels (i.e., endorsing a candidate based on party membership rather than issue agreement) (Bodenhausen,

Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Huber et al., 2015; Parker & Isbell, 2010; Weeks, 2015;). Thus affect, and anger in particular, can be expected to influence how receptive a participant is to counter-attitudinal points of view. Although current measures do not adequately capture the affective side of open-mindedness, it seems likely that people who are high (vs. low) in trait OM would be less likely to display negative affect or get angry when exposed to opposing views.

More recent studies in the political intolerance area have also demonstrated that affect -- and hostility-related feelings in particular -- plays a role in influencing the level of tolerance shown toward outgroups (Halperin et al., 2013; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Kuklinski et al., 1991; Marcus et al., 2006;). For instance, a recent study of Israeli participants found that group-based hatred (i.e., feelings of hostility) was the strongest predictor of political intolerance for Palestinian Citizens of Israel (PCIs; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). In this case, political intolerance was measured in terms of whether participants thought PCI groups should be outlawed, phone-tapped, or allowed to speak on television, and whether PCIs should be allowed to vote in elections, to be elected to parliament, or to be elected prime minister. Affective hatred towards Palestinians was a stronger predictor of intolerance than commonly posed predictors such as support for democratic norms, ingroup identification, religiosity, education, political orientation, and education. This suggests that affect plays a strong role in influencing the way general beliefs about democracy are applied to specific targets. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that negative affect may play some role in diminishing cognitive receptivity to outgroup views (see summary of predictions on p. 25 for more detail).

Summary

Prior research does indicate that emotions, such as anger, have reliable consequences for judgment and behavior. However, I know of no studies that have examined the relationship

between trait OM and affective reactions to counter-attitudinal views. The current literatures on the ATF and the affective dynamics of political intolerance have significant implications for open-mindedness (e.g., Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Parker & Isbell, 2010). For example, studies indicate that anger leads to increased reliance on heuristic processing and partisan labels (e.g., Huber et al., 2015). This suggests that anger, and negative affect in general, may act to decrease receptivity. To the best of my knowledge, this dissertation is the first study to examine the affective dynamics of open-mindedness.

Chapter 2: Study 1 Introduction

The overarching question tested in Study 1 was whether people who rate themselves as open-minded would actually respond in a more open-minded way to political viewpoints that run counter to their own. As such, each participant in Study 1 was asked to consider opinions that were consistent as well as inconsistent with their ideological stance.

The general methodology of the study may be summarized as follows: In the initial part of the study, I assessed participants' partisan identities (i.e., whether they identified as a Democrat or Republican) as well as their level of trait OM. Participants then read and reacted to four fictional Facebook posts in a randomized order. Two of the Facebook posts argued for liberal points of view. One of these views was relatively extreme and the other was a moderate liberal view. Similarly, two of the posts argued for conservative points of view. One of the views was extremely conservative and the other was more moderate. After reading each Facebook post, participants rated their cognitive receptivity (i.e., the degree to which they found a point of view reasonable) as well as their affective reactions (i.e., happiness, anger, disgust). In the sections below I will provide greater detail on the use of extreme and moderate points of view, and my operationalization of partisan identity.

On the Utility of Varying the Extremity of Political Opinions

The design of Study 1 varied not only the ideology of the Facebook posts, but also the extremity of the opinions expressed in the posts. Half of the Facebook posts expressed opinions that were rated in a pilot test as politically moderate (see ahead for greater detail on pilot testing). The other half of the posts expressed opinions that were rated as politically extreme. Varying the ideology of the posts allowed for the examination of the predictive validity of trait OM for receptivity to ingroup (vs. outgroup) points of view. Varying the extremity of the opinions in the

posts allowed me to examine whether this predictive relationship changed as a function of the strength of the points of view judged.

Stated another way, varying the extremity of the opinions may help to identify boundary conditions as to the predictive validity of trait OM for cognitive and affective reactions. For example, when participants are reacting to *extremely* partisan views, the influence of trait OM may be somewhat attenuated. This closely aligns with findings in the previously discussed political intolerance literature. In particular, participants are often intolerant of extreme views or groups despite how tolerant they may *claim* to be (e.g., Gibson & Bingham, 1983; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1993). What is less clear from the political intolerance literature is if this pattern of findings remains consistent for relatively *moderate* outgroup views. Hence, the design of this dissertation allowed me to determine whether trait OM exerted a stronger influence on receptivity in the context of politically moderate views. I will discuss these predictions in much greater detail below.

On my Operationalization of Partisan Identity

As noted earlier, open-mindedness is most relevant when responding to opinions that run counter to one's own. Hence, I needed to determine what would constitute a salient outgroup, or counter-attitudinal, political opinion for each participant. This was most efficiently accomplished by collecting approximately equal samples of participants whose general identities were strongly aligned with left or right-leaning political viewpoints, defined broadly. In other words, given the nature of the theoretical issues at stake in this dissertation, the participants of greatest interest were those for whom politics represented a reasonably important facet of the self. Conversely, participants who were not interested in politics in the first place or have only weak political preferences were *not* useful in the context of my dissertation.

I emphasize this point here because in other theoretical contexts, one would normally want to use a measurement technique that retains the continuous nature of political preferences. In this particular context, however, the nature of "being open-minded" was most interesting to study when one could assess how people reacted to points of view that oppose their strongly held views. Hence, while I am cognizant of the potential loss of information (and potential artifacts) by categorizing inherently continuous variables (Altman, 2014; MacCullum et al., 2002; Maxwell and Delaney, 1993; Sarle,1995; West, Aiken, & Krull, 1996) the approach taken here appears to be well-justified.

A Note on Partisan Identity vs. Political Ideology

In this context it was also important to make a distinction between two different ways of conceptualizing and measuring political identity. *Partisan identity* refers to a participants' political party membership and strength with which this identity is held (Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015). In the United States, partisan identity is most commonly measured on a continuous scale ranging from some variation of *Extremely Strong Democrat* to *Extremely Strong Republican* (Bankert, Huddy & Rosema, 2017). These measures also typically include options for participants to list other party affiliations (e.g., "Independent" or "no party affiliation"). In contrast, *political ideology* refers to the various political beliefs that a person holds (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Political ideology is typically measured using either a bipolar (i.e., "left-right") liberal to conservative scale or by asking participants to rate their preferences for specific policies (Jost, 2006; Kroh, 2007).

As one might expect, past research has demonstrated a reliable relationship between partisan identity and political ideology (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006; Campbell et al., 1960; Bartels, 2002; Druckman, Peterson, & Slothus, 2013; Huddy, 2015). This means, for example,

that Americans who strongly identify with Democrats -- a party historically associated with liberal ideologies – tend to express more positive attitudes towards liberal (vs. conservative) points of view.

These considerations raise a very important issue, with which political scientists/ psychologists have grappled for many decades: There are many different ways to measure a person's political views, each with advantages and disadvantages (Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015; Jost 2006). One relevant issue is a "bandwidth" tradeoff. For example, asking a person about their attitudes towards government-sponsored healthcare has the advantage of specifying their appraisal of a particular politically relevant issue. However, it is also true that a wealth of other considerations may determine a person's appraisal of this policy, some of which may have nothing to do with political ideology. The use of broader measures (e.g., self-ratings along a *strongly liberal* to *strongly conservative*) continuum has the advantage of focusing on general self-identification. However, two people may give identical ratings (e.g., "moderately liberal"), but define this phrase in different ways.

In short, there is no such thing as a perfect measure in this, as well as in other domains of the social sciences. In other contexts, the somewhat obvious solution is to have all participants fill out a diversity of measures and then calculate a composite (i.e., mean) score. Alternatively, one could take a more complicated approach and construct individual measures of correlated, but distinct, dimensions of ideology (e.g., economic vs. social liberalism).

In my particular case, however, I was constrained by an important practical consideration. In particular it was important to minimize participants' awareness of my interest in their partisan identity, in order to avoid unwanted demand effects (Mummolo & Peterson, 2019). Thus, the prescreen had to be structured so that participants would not be able to easily

discern at the outset of the study that I was especially interested in their political views. Hence, I used one item to measure partisan identity so that this variable would not stand out from the rest of the questions in the prescreen.

Given the necessity of choosing just one item, my reading of the literature is that partisan identity would serve my purposes fairly well. Indeed, several studies suggest that partisan identity is a highly salient aspect of the self that predicts a broad set of behaviors in its own right (Gerber et al., 2010; Greene, 1999, 2004; Huddy, 2013; Huddy & Bankert, 2017; Johnston, 2006). Of particular relevance is a highly cited paper by Goren (2005) which presented converging lines of evidence that partisan identity can often be more useful in predicting politically oriented outcomes than political ideology. For example, Goren found that partisan identity was more stable than abstract political ideologies (e.g., beliefs about equality or family values). He also demonstrated that although deep-seated political principles do influence ideological beliefs, this was not the case for partisan identity. Thus, partisan identity is highly resistant to change, and the strength of this identity often operates independent from political beliefs. A subsequent study by Goren, Federico, and Kittilson (2009) also demonstrated that partisan identity cues strongly influenced participants' support for or opposition to various issues and values. Based on this research, I judged a single-item measure that focused on partisan identity to be appropriate for present purposes. However, I included several manipulation checks in both studies to verify this assertion (see below).

Overview of Pre-Screening Procedure

As I have stated, I was only interested in collecting a sample of participants who felt strongly about their political views. Thus, I needed to be able to efficiently gather a sample of participants that met these criteria. Toward this end, I used a pre-screening task in the beginning

Study 1 to "screen" participants out on the basis of their partisan identity (i.e., those who didn't strongly identify with the Democratic or Republican party). The pre-screen asked about their age, race, gender, religion, education, and political party preference (see Appendix D). Political party preference was rated on the following scale: 1 (*Extremely Strong Democrat*), 2 (*Moderately Strong Democrat*), 3 (*Lean Democrat*), 4 (*Independent),* 5 (*Lean Republican*), and 7 (*Extremely Strong Republican*). Participants were also able to indicate that "None of these labels apply to me". I only accepted participants who identified themselves at the extreme ends of the scale. Specifically, the participants who identified themselves as "Extremely Strong" or "Moderately Strong" Democrats or Republicans. Participants who gave any other answer for partisan identity were told they did not meet the necessary demographic criteria to continue the study.

Summary of Predictions for Study 1

Study 1 tested a series of hypotheses across three dependent variables. The first dependent variable was what I called *cognitive receptivity*. This variable measured the degree to which participants found the point of view expressed in a given Facebook to be well-reasoned or persuasive (see below for greater detail). A second dependent variable measured participants' positive affective reactions to each Facebook post. The third dependent variable measured participants' negative affective reactions to each Facebook post. I expected these variables to be significantly correlated with each other, but also believed they represent theoretically distinct measures of participants' reactions to counter-attitudinal views. As I will show in the results section, the pattern of correlations supported this notion. The dependent variables were correlated, but the magnitude of these correlations was quite small. As such, I will present the hypotheses and analyses for cognitive receptivity and affective reactions separately.

For each of these three outcome variables, I used the multivariate general linear model (GLM) option in SPSS to analyze my data. These analyses involved a total of four variables. Two of these variables—trait OM and partisan identity--represent between-subject factors and refer to characteristics of the participants. The other two variables, both of which were within-subject factors, refer to the qualities of the Facebook posts: Post ideology (i.e., whether they represented liberal or conservative points of view), and post extremity (i.e., whether the viewpoint in question was ideologically moderate or extreme). I will discuss my predictions for each type of dependent variable separately.

Cognitive Receptivity

First, I predicted that participants would be most receptive to Facebook posts that were consistent (vs. inconsistent) with their partisan identity. For example, I expected Democrats to be more receptive to liberal (vs. conservative) posts. Conversely, Republicans should be more receptive to conservative (vs. liberal) posts. This hypothesis corresponds to a predicted partisan identity X Facebook post ideology interaction. This predicted two-way interaction should be qualified further by Facebook post extremity, such that the tendency to embrace ideologically consistent (vs. inconsistent) posts will be stronger if those posts are extreme than if they are moderate. This second prediction corresponds to a predicted three-way interaction involving partisan identity, Facebook post ideology, and Facebook post extremity.

The third prediction was the most theoretically important as it reflects the hypothesized effect of participants' levels of open-mindedness (i.e., trait OM) with respect to their reactions towards different types of Facebook posts. Recall that all participants were presented with four different types of posts, in randomized order, as part of a 2 (post ideology: liberal vs. conservative) x 2 (post extremity: extreme vs. moderate) within-subject design. The theoretical

issues at stake differ as a function of both of these within-subject factors, but it easiest to grasp these issues if we begin with ideologically consistent posts.

In the prior discussion, I framed "open-mindedness" as being characterized by openness to views that run *counter* to one's own. For the ideologically *consistent* posts, of course, we are talking about something else entirely, namely, viewpoints towards which participants will likely be highly receptive. Thus, Democrats should naturally be inclined to be "open" to liberal posts, regardless of whether these posts are moderate or extreme. A conceptually analogous state of affairs applies to Republicans. Here, such participants should be open to conservative posts, both moderate and extreme. Consequently, I did not predict any significant effects of trait OM for either moderate or extreme ideologically consistent posts.

Next consider the ideologically inconsistent posts, which were the posts of greatest interest in my dissertation. In these cases, one might expect trait OM to attenuate participants' tendencies to reject these views out of hand. However, recall that within the ideologically inconsistent posts, one post will be moderate and the other extreme. For posts that are both ideologically inconsistent *and* extreme, I did *not* expect trait OM to moderate partisan bias. In this case, it seemed more likely that participants would *always* reject these kinds of posts, regardless of whether they were high or low in trait OM. Stated another way, posts that are extreme *and* inconsistent with participants' views should tend to *always* fall outside of participants' "latitude of acceptance" (Hovland, Harvey & Sherif, 1957), even among those who scored high in trait OM.

Finally, consider the ideologically consistent posts expressing moderate views. In this case, I *did* predict that trait OM would moderate the effects of partisan bias such that cognitive receptivity to outgroup views would be higher for those who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM.

In the case of Democrats, for example, their tendency to reject moderately conservative posts should be attenuated among participants who scored relatively high (vs. low) in trait OM. A conceptually analogous prediction pertained to the Republican participants. Here, their tendency to reject moderately liberal posts should be less pronounced among participants who scored high vs. low in trait OM. As implied by this line of reasoning, the role of trait OM as a moderator should be relatively circumscribed: This trait should only play a role in qualifying cognitive receptivity when the posts are inconsistent with participants' own partisan identity, and when these posts are moderate. Statistically, this prediction corresponds to an expected interaction involving all four variables (i.e., partisan identity, trait OM, Facebook post extremity and Facebook post ideology.

Hypotheses Concerning Affect

The prior hypotheses concerned the ability of trait OM to predict cognitive reactions to the Facebook posts. A distinct but related set of questions posed in this dissertation concern the relationship between affect and open-mindedness. At the broadest level, I expected to find that participants would feel positively toward posts that were ideologically consistent and feel negatively toward those that were inconsistent (i.e., partisan identity X Facebook post ideology interaction). As with receptivity, this interaction should be qualified by post extremity, such that the tendency to feel positively toward ideologically consistent (vs. inconsistent) posts would be stronger if those posts were extreme than if they were moderate. Similarly, the tendency to feel negatively toward ideologically inconsistent (vs. consistent) posts should be stronger if those posts were extreme (vs. moderate). For both affective variables, this corresponds to a predicted three-way interaction involving partisan identity, Facebook post ideology, and Facebook post extremity.

The unique contribution of this dissertation lies in the examination of *whether trait OM is a good predictor of affective reactions to counter-attitudinal viewpoints.* For both affect variables I predicted a four-way interaction between trait OM, partisan identity, Facebook post ideology, and post extremity. (Note that as with cognitive receptivity, the effect of trait OM on positive or negative affect toward ideologically consistent posts was not of great theoretical interest.) For the ideologically inconsistent posts, I predicted that participants would report high levels of negative affect toward extreme outgroup views regardless of whether they scored high or low in trait OM. Thus, I predicted that trait OM would not lessen the influence of partisan bias on affective reactions. Likewise, I expected that participants would report low levels of positive affect toward extreme outgroup views regardless of whether they scored high or low in trait OM.

For moderate, ideologically inconsistent posts I predicted that trait OM would moderate the effects of partisan bias such that negative affect toward outgroup views would be lower for those who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM. For example, Democrats' tendency to feel negatively toward moderately conservative posts should be attenuated among participants who scored relatively high (vs. low) in trait OM. For positive affect, I made an analogous prediction that trait OM would moderate the effects of partisan bias such that positive affect toward outgroup views would be higher for those who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM.

Exploratory Analyses Regarding of Affective Moderation

The final set of analyses conceptualized affect in a manner somewhat different than the previous discussion. Here I considered the role that affective reactions may play in moderating

the influence of trait OM on cognitive receptivity.[1] Thus, for both affective states I predicted a moderated moderation effect (Hayes, 2018) in the form of a three-way interaction of affect (positive or negative), partisan identity and trait OM on cognitive receptivity. The nature of this potential effect is most easily grasped in a diagram, see Figure 1. As this figure shows, I expected the degree to which affect, aroused in the context of an outgroup point of view, might diminish the tendency for participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM to be receptive. Thus, trait OM moderates the relationship between partisan identity and cognitive receptivity and negative affect moderates this moderation.

The first set of analyses tested whether the degree to which an outgroup post aroused negative affect would reduce the tendency for high trait OM participants to be more receptive to outgroup views relative to those who scored low in trait OM. Stated another way, it tested whether negative affect would further moderate the two-way interaction between trait OM and partisan identity. The second set of analyses examined whether positive affect further moderated the two-way interaction between trait OM and partisan identity. In this case, I tested whether the degree to which an outgroup Facebook post aroused positive affect would increase the tendency for high trait OM participants to be more receptive to outgroup views relative to those who scored low in trait OM. I used PROCESS (Hayes, 2017) to run these analyses for each Facebook post type (i.e., strong liberal, strong conservative, moderate liberal, moderate conservative).

---

[1] Importantly, the analytic approach taken here *was* noted in my pre-registration, but was explicitly noted as exploratory. Hence, while these analyses are *not* post-hoc, they should be properly framed as investigating issues for which I did not have a strong, a priori expectation in the form of a formal hypothesis.

A General Note About Analytic Techniques

As noted in an earlier section, I had an *a priori* interest in the moderate (as opposed to extreme) Facebook posts, insofar as I predicted an interaction of trait OM and participants' partisan identity for these posts. In the context of examining the moderate liberal posts, for example, I predicted that participants' reactions would vary as a function not only of their partisan identity but also their levels of trait OM. I also predicted a conceptually similar interaction for the moderate conservative posts. In the case of the extreme Facebook posts, however, I predicted only a main effect of partisan identity, with no role of trait OM.

Framing my predictions in this way -- by highlighting different types of predictions for different types of posts -- is conceptually straightforward and easy to understand. Indeed, this is the way that I presented these predictions in the pre-registration. This type of framing, by extension, suggests that it would be important to compare the results from separate analyses on each of the four classes of Facebook posts. For this reason, I report these analyses in the section to follow. Nonetheless, conducting separate analyses on the four posts does not allow me to simultaneously test for the presence of potential interactions involving between and within-subject factors. For example, I also predicted that the impact of participants' partisan identity (Democrat vs. Republican) should vary as a function not only of the ideology of the Facebook posts, but also the extremity of those posts.

In short, it was also useful to report an initial omnibus analysis involving *all* of the variables in my design—within as well as between—prior to presenting the separate regression analyses on each of the Facebook posts. This omnibus analysis is relatively complex, as it involves (a) two different types of between-subjects factors, one of which was categorical and

the other continuous (partisan identity and trait OM, respectively) along with (b) two within-subject variables, both categorical, and both pertaining to the qualities of the Facebook posts).

Although there are likely to be several different options for analyses in this case, I used a variation of the multivariate GLM option in SPSS. In this approach, partisan identity was modeled as a categorical predictor, trait OM was modeled as a (standardized) continuous predictor along with the two within-subject factors of Facebook post type, both categorical (ideology and extremity). In the context of this analysis, trait OM was technically treated as a covariate. However, in the output SPSS provides conceptually interpretable (and in the context of my dissertation, relevant) tests of all possible main effects and interactions, including but not limited to trait OM. For example, it allowed me to test for the presence of the predicted 3-way partisan identity x Facebook post ideology x Facebook post extremity interaction, while controlling for individual differences in trait OM. This analysis allowed me to test for the presence of a higher-order interaction involving trait OM in combination with partisan identity and the characteristics of the Facebook posts.[2]

In summary, I analyzed the primary data in two ways. In the initial analyses I report the results of a multivariate GLM (see above) and I then report follow-up regression analyses on each of the four classes of Facebook posts. As I note ahead, the implications of the omnibus analysis nicely complemented that of the regression analyses, and vice versa. I make note of this

---

[2] It could be possible to run an even more complex omnibus test which incorporated not only the between and within subject factors noted above, but also the three types of outcome variables (cognitive receptivity, positive affect, negative affect) in a single analysis. However, such an analysis would be extremely difficult to interpret and even more laborious to report. Also, this would almost certainly necessitate a series of subsequent analyses for each of the three outcome variables, and this is precisely what I ended up doing in the main analyses.

latter point because, even though there are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches, they ended up generating the identical conclusions.

Overview of Sample Construction

In this section I provide a brief summary of several related issues as they bear on the final sample size of Studies 1 and 2. Some of these issues are complex but it is important to emphasize three important points at the outset: First, the sample sizes that I ultimately collected were the largest that I could have possibly obtained, given the constraints of my design and the source of participants from which I was drawing. Second, although the samples were somewhat smaller than I initially intended, this fact does not appear to pose a major concern with respect to the interpretation of the results that I ultimately obtained. As a third and related point, I found a remarkably parallel set of findings from both studies, despite some methodological differences between them.

In the sections below I provide additional information about these matters although, for practical reasons of space (and expositional clarity), this information is provided in summary form only. Readers interested in further details may consult Appendix E.

Preliminary Power Analysis

The conceptualization and design of this dissertation were firmly grounded in *a priori* theory on perspective taking. However, the design, itself, was relatively novel. In other words, I was not aware of any other research (including my previous work) that had studied these matters in precisely the way that I did here. Hence, unlike some other types of dissertations, estimates of the sample needed to detect the predicted effects (i.e., *a priori* power analyses) could not be drawn directly from published research.

Therefore, it seemed prudent to conduct a pilot study in the service of generating reasonable estimates of the needed sample. In this context, I am not referring to the preliminary studies that were used to construct the experimental stimuli; information about those initial pilots are provided in the Method section of this dissertation. Rather, I refer here to a "trial run" of Study 1 using the measures and methods that were identical to that used in Study 1. The pilot study in question was run *before* writing the pre-registration for the formal study and was never intended to be published.

Using a set of calculations described in Appendix E, I used G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) and the data from the pilot in question (n = 74) in the service of generating what I deemed at the time to be a reasonable estimate of the needed sample. I am cognizant of the fact that the relatively small size of this pilot necessarily limits the accuracy of the power analyses (Moore at al., 2011), However, I was also aware of the possibility that a large pilot test might have unduly drained the limited number of acceptable participants on Mturk.

The power analysis led me to estimate that I needed a total sample of 229 participants in both studies. Based on the design of this dissertation, I needed the samples to be balanced, not only in terms of Republicans and Democrats but also between the "Extreme" and "Moderate" participants within each party. As such, I intended to recruit 58 participants in each of the four partisan identity categories (i.e., 58 Extremely Strong Democrats, 58 Moderately Strong Democrats, 58 Moderately Strong Republicans, 58 Extremely Strong Republicans).

Relevant Screening Procedures

Now that I have laid out the intended size of my sample, it is necessary to briefly summarize an "oversampling procedure" -- which was preregistered -- that was needed to account for a small, but non-trivial, number of non-usable participants on Mturk. It is unrealistic

to assume that every participant is devoting reasonable attention to the present studies; however, this concern is somewhat greater for online studies (Barenboym, Wurm & Cano, 2010; Clifford & Jerit, 2014; Dandurand, Shultz, & Onishi, 2008). Several recent studies suggest that online samples obtained from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (along with other sources) contain a non-trivial number of participants who use bogus IP addresses in order to circumvent U.S. residency requirements. Workers circumventing this rule are sometimes called "farmers" (Moss & Litman, 2018) and often have an extremely poor command of the English language (see also Kennedy et al. 2018). In Studies 1 and 2 (both of which were preregistered), I used a set of *a priori* exclusion criteria to screen out such participants, in advance of any other data analyses. Readers interested in more on the exact exclusion criteria and procedures may consult Appendix F. (The protocol to be described below does not include the exclusion of "repeat" participants who attempt to take the survey twice. This is a more straightforward and relatively rare issue, and these participants are easily detected and excluded.)

In past studies in our lab, the typical exclusion rate for farmers or other problematic participants for any given sample is about 15%. I used the following two-step procedure to determine and obtain the needed sample size. First, I used *a priori* power analyses to determine the needed sample size of *valid* participants (see earlier discussion). Second, as part of an "oversampling" process, I determined the total number of participants I would need to *initially* collect in order to reach that target sample, taking into account the expected 15% exclusion rate.

We have used this procedure in previous studies in our lab, and it generally worked well in my dissertation. However, I unexpectedly ran into one challenge that appeared to be specific to my design. In both studies of this dissertation I encountered an unexpectedly high rate of "farmers" among participants claiming to be extremely strong and moderately strong

Republicans. (I cannot be sure why this occurred, but it is possible that such workers perceived that they would be more likely to "slip in" to my study if they posed as this type of participant.) The precise sampling procedure used to address this issue for each study is discussed in greater detail in the sections to follow.

Chapter 3: Study 1 Methods

3.1 Sample

I intended to collect a sample of 232 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk). In order to account for the expected 15% exclusion rate, I initially recruited 264 participants. As noted earlier, there was an unexpectedly high rate of "farmers" and "repeaters" among the Republican participants. As such, it was necessary to collect data from 368 participants to obtain the necessary sample. In total, 136 participants were excluded from analyses in accordance with the criteria laid out in Appendix F.

Thus, the final sample was comprised of 229 participants (64% female and 78% white). Due to the unusually high number of farmers, I was only able to recruit 49 Extremely Strong Republicans. As a result, I adjusted my sample to maintain the desired balance between Democrats and Republicans, as well as the balance of Extremely and Moderately strong partisans. The final sample was as follows: 49 Extremely Strong Republicans, 65 Moderately Strong Republicans, 65 Moderately Strong Democrats, and 50 Extremely Strong Democrats. In this sample any comparison between Democrats and Republicans involved nearly equal samples (114 and 115), and this sample included nearly equal counts of Moderate Democrats and Republicans (65 vs. 65) and Extremely Strong Democrats and Republicans (50 vs. 49). See Appendix G for more information on the sample and data collection.

3.2 Overview of Procedure

After providing informed consent, participants completed both the individual difference block and the Facebook post block. The order in which these blocks were presented was completely randomized (see Appendix H for a schematic representation of study design). The individual difference block included the two measures of central interest to this dissertation,

Open-Minded Cognition (OMC; Price et al., 2015) and Perspective-Taking (PT; Davis, 1983). This block also contained a set of scales that were not of central concern and served as distractors (i.e., were included to make my interest in open-mindedness less obvious). These scales included measures of Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT; Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013), Empathic Concern (EC; Davis, 1983), and the Ten Item Personality Measure (TIPI, Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003).

The individual difference block also included two measures of political ideology, Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Mavor, Louis, & Sibley; 2010) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Ho et al.; 2015). I used these scales to verify that responses to the single-item partisan identity measure were consistent with responses to SDO and RWA (see Appendix I for a full description of the items in all scales). If my single-item measure was valid, I expected to see that Republican participants scored significantly higher on both RWA and SDO compared to Democrats.

In the Facebook post block (see Appendix J), participants read and responded to four fictional Facebook posts. Each Facebook post presented a point of view in a distinct category of ideology and extremity (i.e., strong liberal, moderate liberal, strong conservative, moderate conservative). Participants read one post from each category in a randomized order. (For purpose of clarity, Facebook posts categories will always be referred to as *liberal* or *conservative* and participant partisan identity will be referred to as Democrat or Republican).

Within each of the four Facebook posts categories, I created two posts arguing for two distinct points of view that were matched in their ideology and extremity. For example, in the extreme liberal category, one post argued for canceling student loan debt and the other for banning assault rifles. Participants were randomly assigned to view only one of the posts in each

ideological category. Thus, participants read four total posts, one post in each ideological category, and within each category participants were randomly assigned to see one topic out of two possibilities. I used multiple posts to expand the generalizability of any findings. The posts within each category were extensively pilot tested to ensure they did not significantly differ on any of the dependent variables (see below for greater detail on posts and pilot tests). After reading each post participants expressed their affective as well as attitudinal reactions to each point of view. Finally, participants completed a demographics section.

3.3 Measures

Trait Open-Mindedness (Trait OM)

Trait OM was measured using the Perspective Taking scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index and the Open-Minded Cognition scale. As discussed earlier, our prior studies demonstrated that these scales loaded on the same component. Hence, I chose to use their combined means to measure trait OM ($\alpha = .87$). Note that PT was answered on a scale ranging from 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 6 (*Strongly Agree*), and OMC was answered on a scale from 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*). Thus, prior to combining the scales, I standardized the mean for each measure. See Appendices A and B for a complete listing of these items.

Partisan Identity

For reasons outlined above, partisan identity was operationalized as a categorical variable. This was measured using a single item in the pre-screen (see Appendix D for full pre-screen) in which participants rated their political party affiliation on a scale from 1 (*Extremely Strong Democrat*) to 7 (*Extremely Strong Republican*). As stated before, I only accepted participants who identified as Extremely or Moderately Strong Democrats or Republicans.

Facebook Posts

Participants read and responded to four fictional Facebook posts (see Appendix J for posts and instructions). The posts varied across four levels of political ideology and extremity (i.e., strong conservative, strong liberal, moderate conservative, moderate liberal). The viewing order of the four types of Facebook posts, as well as the specific posts each participant read, were randomized. I further structured the design to ensure that equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats saw each post.

Pilot Tests. The development of the Facebook posts required extensive pilot testing. First, I tested a large list of political opinions (e.g., *We spend too much money on the military; Social security should be privatized*) to identify a subset that were clearly recognized by an ideologically diverse sample as strongly as well as moderately conservative and liberal (n = 82; see Appendix K for full list of items). In the second pilot test (n = 75), I selected 18 opinions to develop into longer statements (e.g., "*We have to protect the little guy. We cannot let corporations decide how the economy will work instead of protecting the middle class. The government should regulate the economy to make sure Americans and their interests are protected.").* Participants rated how persuasive, logical, and well-reasoned they found each statement, as well as how strongly they agreed with it (see Appendix K for all items). From the second pilot study forward, I only collected data from Extremely or Moderately Strong Democrats and Republicans to mirror the intended sample in the final study.

In the final pilot test (n = 74) I created fictional Facebook posts, which included a gender-neutral default icon, a gender and race-neutral name (i.e., Alex Johnson, Sam Jones, Jamie Brown, and Jordan Williams), and the text developed in the prior pilot tests. This pilot used the same design that was employed in the full study, namely participants only saw one Facebook

post for each of the four ideological categories. Participants rated the posts on the exact set of dependent variables used in the final study. The third pilot was used to narrow the design to two Facebook posts in each ideological category as well as for power analyses (see Appendix J for final Facebook posts).

Dependent Variables

There were three classes of dependent variables: cognitive receptivity, positive affect, and negative affect. The full text of each question used for these dependent variables is available in Appendix L.

Cognitive Receptivity. Participants rated how *persuasive*, *logical*, and *well-reasoned* they found each post on a scale from 0 (*not at all)* to 100 (*very much so*). Participants rated how open-minded they were to the opinions expressed in the posts on the same 0 to 100 scale. They then rated how willing they would be to have a follow-up conversation with the author to better understand their opinions on the 0 to 100 scale. Participants also rated on a scale from 1 (*Extremely Unlikely*) to 7 (*Extremely Unlikely*) how likely they would be to "like" the post or to send the author a "friend request" on social media. Finally, they rated how strongly they agreed with the point of view in each post on a scale from 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*).

The last three items discussed above (i.e., "like" the post, friend request, and agreement) were answered using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 7. In contrast, the other 5 questions were answered on a scale from 0 to 100. To combine each of these questions into a single composite measure of cognitive receptivity would have necessitated standardizing each item prior to calculating an overall mean (i.e., adjusting the item mean to zero, and the standard deviation to 1). The composite mean would also have been standardized. In the context of this

dissertation, standardizing the dependent variables in this way would have limited my ability to make theoretically meaningful comparisons across the four classes of the dependent variables.[1] Thus, to allow for the interpretation of mean differences, I only included the items answered from 0 to 100 in the composite measure of cognitive receptivity (mean $\alpha = .92$). The results did not change with all items included in a standardized dependent variable.

Affective Reactions. I measured affective reactions across a set of eight randomized items including *happy, excited, angry, frustrated, content, annoyed, disgusted*, and *proud*. Participants rated each item on a scale from 0 (*not at all)* to 100 (*very much so*). These items were used to form two indices, one capturing positive affect (averaging across *happy, excited, content,* and *proud*; $\alpha = .91$) and another measuring negative affect (averaging across *anger, annoyed, frustrated*, and *disgusted* ($\alpha = .91$).

[1] For example, I would not be able to tell if the mean cognitive receptivity for moderate liberal posts was significantly different from the mean receptivity for strong liberal posts.

Chapter 4: Study 1 Results

4.1 Preliminary Analyses of Study 1

Prior to reporting formal analyses for Study 1, it is useful to consider some preliminary matters that are either directly or indirectly relevant to those findings.

Validity of Partisan Identity Measure

An important desideratum in my dissertation was to create two groups of participants for whom their affiliation with the Democratic or Republican party represented an important aspect of the self. Hence, I only allowed four groups of participants to participate in the study: Those who identified in the prescreen as "extremely strong" or "moderately strong" Democrats and "extremely strong" or "moderately strong" Republicans.

As noted in my preregistration protocol, analyses involving this variable could, in principle, take two approaches. One approach was to *collapse over* the "moderately strong" vs. "extremely strong" distinction, resulting in an operationalization of partisan identity with two levels (Democrats vs. Republicans). The other, more complicated, approach is to operationalize partisan identity as a 2 x 2 matrix, crossing party identification (Democrat vs. Republican) with extremity (extreme vs. moderate). As it turns out, the pattern of results was nearly identical regardless of which approach I took. Thus, for the sake of expositional clarity, I operationalized partisan identity with two levels, Democrats and Republicans, collapsing over whether participants characterized their partisan identity as extremely or moderately strong.

Participants' scores on the RWA and SDO scales provide converging evidence regarding the validity of the approach taken here. If the partitioning of participants into two groups was valid, one would expect these individuals to have generated *much* different scores on RWA and SDO. ANOVAs confirmed this expectation. Republicans scored far higher in RWA than

Democrats, $F(1,227) = 210.97$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .48$ ($M = 4.21$, $SD = .87$ vs. $M = 2.42$, $SD = .98$). Likewise, Republicans scored far higher in SDO than Democrats, $F(1,227) = 91.79$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .29$ ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.10$ vs. $M = 2.13$, $SD = .96$). These findings validate my assumption that the partisan identity groups do, in fact, represent two groups of people who differ greatly with respect to their ideological beliefs.

Check for Order Effects

Recall that participants were randomly assigned to either complete the individual difference or the Facebook block first. It could be the case that rating one's dispositional open-mindedness prior to reading the Facebook posts resulted in systematic differences in the dependent variables. The same could be true for participants who read Facebook posts and then rated their open-mindedness. As a result, it is was necessary to check for order effects before conducting more complex analyses. An initial set of ANOVAs (see Table 1 for details) confirmed that there were no significant effects of order. As none of the variables differed across the order conditions, I did not control for order in the analyses to follow.

4.2 Correlational Analyses

Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of the dependent variables. Table 3 presents the correlations between the dependent variables across the four Facebook posts types. As I expected, cognitive receptivity was positively correlated with positive affect for each Facebook post type. However, the magnitude of these correlations was moderate. For example, even though cognitive receptivity and positive affect toward strong liberal posts were significantly correlated ($r(229) = .55$, $p < .001$), the correlation was not high enough to suggest that the two variables were interchangeable. The results also demonstrated that cognitive receptivity was negatively correlated with negative affect. However, once again, the magnitude

of these correlations was small. These results support my decision to analyze the three outcome variables separately.

4.3 Main Analyses

For each of the dependent variables (cognitive receptivity, positive affect, and negative affect), I used the multivariate general linear model (GLM) option in SPSS (see earlier discussion) to test the predicted main effects and interactions of (a) two between-subjects factors (partisan identity and trait OM), operationalized as categorical and continuous variables, respectively, and (b) two within-subjects factors (Facebook post ideology and post extremity). I used this analytic approach in three separate analyses, for each type of outcome measure.

4.3.1 Cognitive Receptivity

The omnibus GLM model (see Table 4) generated a main effect of Facebook post extremity, $F(1, 225) = 11.71$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. This effect indicated that, on average, participants were more receptive to Facebook posts expressing moderate ($M = 50.99$, $SD = 26.52$) as opposed to strong ($M = 46.93$, $SD = 28.81$) points of view. There was also a significant main effect of Facebook post ideology, $F(1, 225) = 15.42$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. This main effect indicated that, on average, participants were more receptive to liberal ($M = 52.42$, $SD = 28.15$) than conservative ($M = 45.51$, $SD = 27.18$) Facebook posts. This latter finding does not take partisan identity into account, and, as I show ahead, it does not undermine my ability to examine the issues of central interest to my dissertation.

The two-way interaction between partisan identity and Facebook post extremity was not significant, $F(1,225) = 1.25$, $p = .265$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. This null effect was expected since it collapses over whether the posts themselves represented liberal or conservative points of view. There was a significant two-way interaction of partisan identity and Facebook post political ideology, $F(1,$

225) = 168.24, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .43$. As seen in Figure 2, Democrats were more receptive to liberal compared to conservative posts ($M = 65.31$, $SD = 22.00$ vs. $M = 33.62$, $SD = 24.51$), and this pattern was strongly reversed for Republicans ($M = 39.41$ $SD = 27.25$ vs. $M = 55.49$, $SD = 25.89$). This analysis serves as both a manipulation check and a confirmation of my prediction that participants would be more receptive to posts expressing ingroup (i.e., attitudinally consistent) views.

Analyses also generated a significant three-way interaction involving partisan identity, Facebook post ideology, and Facebook post extremity, $F(1, 225) = 23.51$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$. These findings are presented in Figure 3. Consider first, the pattern for Democrats (top half). These participants were less receptive to conservative (vs. liberal) posts but this opposition was especially pronounced when the conservative posts were strong rather than moderate. A conceptually analogous pattern emerged for the Republican participants (bottom half). Here, these participants were less receptive to liberal (vs. conservative) posts but this opposition was again more pronounced when the posts expressed strong rather than moderate points of view.

The preceding set of analyses provide a foundation for addressing issues of even greater theoretical interest in this dissertation: *To what extent, if any, would trait OM qualify partisan-driven bias to reject counter-attitudinal points of view?* Analyses did reveal an effect of trait OM, but it was not what I expected: Overall, higher scores on trait OM were associated with a general tendency to demonstrate greater receptivity to all of the Facebook posts, $F(1, 225) = 17.78$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. Notably, this effect was *not* qualified by partisan identity as the two-way interaction with trait OM was not significant, $F(1,225) = .19$, $p = .667$. $\eta_p^2 = .00$. (The absence of this 2-way interaction is statistically equivalent to saying that trait OM did not moderate the effects of partisan identity.) Indeed, there was not a single instance in which trait

OM significantly interacted with the partisan identity. Conceptually, this means that whatever effect emerged for trait OM, it did so *independent* of the political views of the participants.

There was only one instance in which trait OM interacted with any of the other variables in the design. This emerged in the form of an interaction involving trait OM and Facebook post ideology, $F(1, 225) = 5.00$, $p = .026$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. This interaction reflected that higher scores on trait OM were associated with greater receptivity to liberal, compared to conservative, posts. This effect is of limited interest as it does not include partisan identity or show that trait OM moderated the bias of left-leaning or right-leaning participants. Nevertheless, for the sake of completion, it is useful to report additional correlational analyses to further understand the nature of this contingency.

Consider, first, the liberal posts. In this case, Trait OM was positively correlated with cognitive receptivity for these posts, regardless of whether they represented strong ($r(229) = .30$, $p < .001$) or moderate ($r(229) = .26$, $p < .001$) points of view. For the conservative posts, the relationship between trait OM and receptivity was still positive, but not statistically significant ($r(229) = .09$, $p = .197$ and $r(229) = .04$, $p = .560$, for the strong and moderate conservative posts, respectively). It is important to keep in mind, however, that these effects collapse over participants' partisan identities. The pattern of greater interest is that any effects of partisan identity emerged independent of trait OM, a finding that I explore in more detail below.

Additional Regression Analyses for Cognitive Receptivity. One of the more interesting implications of the preceding analyses is that the effects of partisan identity emerged independent of trait OM. The nature of this independence can also be shown in a set of separate regression analyses on each of the four types of Facebook posts. These analyses are, of course, somewhat redundant with the implications of the GLM. However, given the importance of these

findings, the separate regression analyses are informative (see Table 5). In these analyses, as was the case for the GLM, partisan identity was operationalized as a dummy-coded categorical variable (0 = Republican, 1 = Democrat) and trait OM was operationalized as a continuous variable and standardized prior to these analyses.

Strong Liberal Posts. Democrats (vs. Republicans) showed a robust tendency to be more receptive to the strong liberal posts, $b = .55$, $t(226) = 10.37$, $p < .001$, CI [25.96, 38.15]. Of course, this finding can also be framed another way: Republicans were much more likely to reject these posts compared to Democrats. There was also a significant main effect of trait OM, $b = .24$, $t(226) = 4.58$, $p < .001$, CI [4.37, 10.95], indicating greater receptivity among participants scoring relatively high vs. low in trait OM. Of greater interest, and consistent with the implications of the GLM, there was no evidence of an interaction involving trait OM and partisan identity, $b = -.07$, $t(225) = -1.06$, $p = .291$, CI [-10.26, 3.09] for the 2-way interaction of trait OM and partisan identity.

Moderate Liberal Posts. Democrats were also more receptive to moderate liberal posts compared to Republicans, $b = .32$, $t(226) = 5.21$, $p < .001$, CI [10.56, 23.41]. Here again, this can be framed in terms of a tendency for Republicans to reject these posts more than Democrats. As in the case for the extreme liberal posts, participants scoring high (vs. low) in trait OM were more receptive to these posts, $b = .23$, $t(226) = 3.80$, $p < .001$, CI [3.22, 10.16] for the main effect of trait OM. Also consistent with the preceding analyses, there was no evidence of an interaction involving trait OM and partisan identity, $b = .04$, $t(225) = .46$, $p = .643$, CI [-5.39, 8.71].

Moderate Conservative Posts. For these posts, the only predictor of receptivity was partisan identity, with Republicans showing more receptivity compared to Democrats, $b = -.30$, $t(226) = -4.64$, $p < .001$, CI [-22.02, -8.89]. Null effects of trait OM were found both in the

absence of a main effect (b = .12, t(226) = 1.83, p = .069, CI [-.26, 6.84]) as well as the absence of an interaction with partisan identity (b = -.04, t(225) = .67, p = .671, CI [-8.76, 5.65]).

Strong Conservative Posts. Similar to moderate conservative posts, receptivity was predicted only by partisan identity, with Republicans showing more receptivity compared to Democrats, b = -.45, t(226) = -7.59, p <.001, CI [-32.01, -18.81]. No effects of Trait OM were found with these analyses, either as a main effect (b = .09, t(226) = 1.43, p =.153, CI [-.97, -6.16]) or in combination with partisan identity (b = -.01, t(225) = -.16, p =.872, CI [-7.84, 6.66]).

4.3.2 Positive Affect

Here I consider a different outcome measure, the degree to which participants expressed positive affect towards the Facebook posts. However, the analytic approach used here, via GLM, was the same as for cognitive receptivity (see Table 6 for full results). (To facilitate comparison with the earlier analyses, I present the results of this analysis in the same order as before. As I report each analysis, I make brief note if the effect did, or did not, parallel that found with cognitive receptivity.)

In contrast to the receptivity analyses, these analyses did *not* reveal evidence of a main effect of Facebook post extremity, F(1, 223) = .39, p = .532, η_p^2 = .00. Thus, participants did not express more positive affect toward moderate (M = 24.23, SD = 25.36) as compared to strong (M = 23.35, SD = 27.35) points of view. There was, however, a significant main effect of Facebook post ideology (F(1, 223) = 27.59, p < .001, η_p^2 = .11) that paralleled what I found with cognitive receptivity. This main effect indicated that, on average, participants felt more positive affect in response to liberal (M = 27.64, SD = 28.02) as compared to conservative (M = 19.94, SD = 24.69) posts.

The two-way interaction between partisan identity and Facebook post extremity was not significant, $F(1,223) = .19$, $p = .666$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$. There was, however, a significant two-way interaction of partisan identity and Facebook post political ideology, $F(1, 223) = 103.92$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .32$. This effect was similar to that found with cognitive receptivity. Democrats expressed more positive affect toward liberal compared to conservative posts ($M = 36.25$, $SD = 29.40$ vs. $M = 13.33$, $SD = 20.63$), and this pattern was reversed for Republicans ($M = 18.95$ $SD = 22.91$ vs. $M = 26.60$, $SD = 26.13$). There was also a significant two-way interaction of Facebook post ideology and post extremity, $F(1, 223) = 6.30$, $p = .013$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. This effect was not found in the analysis of cognitive receptivity. This interaction indicated that participants generally reported more positive affect in response to liberal (vs. conservative) posts, and this difference was especially pronounced for moderate (vs. strong) points of view (see Figure 4).

Consistent with the results involving cognitive receptivity, analyses revealed a significant three-way interaction involving partisan identity, Facebook post ideology, and Facebook post extremity, $F(1, 225) = 19.08$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$. These findings are presented in Figure 5. Among Democrats (top half), participants expressed approximately equal levels of positive affect toward liberal posts with a pronounced decline for the conservative posts. Republican participants, in contrast, showed a low level of positive affect toward strong liberal posts (bottom half). Republicans showed similar levels of positive affect for moderate liberal and moderate conservative posts, and the greatest degree of positive affect for strong conservative posts.

Unlike the cognitive receptivity analyses, the GLM did *not* generate evidence of a main effect of trait OM for positive affect, $F(1, 223) = .10$, $p = .750$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$. Nor was there an interaction with partisan identity, $F(1, 223) = .00$, $p = .967$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$. However, analyses did reveal an interaction of trait OM and Facebook post ideology similar to what was found with

cognitive receptivity, $F(1, 223) = 5.55$, $p = .019$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. However, further analyses demonstrated that trait OM was only significantly correlated with strong conservative posts ($r(228) = -.13$, $p = .043$). Thus, higher scores on trait OM were associated with less positive affect toward strong conservative posts, but for all other post types there was no relationship between positive affect and trait OM.

As in the case of cognitive receptivity, I conducted four sets of supplemental regression analyses on each of the Facebook posts separately. However, these analyses only revealed main effects of partisan identity which are conceptually redundant with the implications of the GLM, reported above. Notably, none of these regression analyses demonstrated main effects or interactions involving trait OM. The regressions results are reported in Table 7 but are not expanded upon here.

4.3.3 Negative Affect

As with cognitive receptivity, the omnibus GLM (see Table 8) generated a main effect of Facebook post extremity, $F(1, 223) = 17.55$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. This effect indicated that, on average, participants felt more negative affect toward Facebook posts expressing strong ($M = 32.75$, $SD = 30.13$) as opposed to moderate ($M = 27.31$, $SD = 25.25$) points of view. I also found a significant main effect of Facebook post ideology similar to that found in the analyses of cognitive receptivity, $F(1, 223) = 6.77$, $p = .010$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. This main effect indicated that, on average, participants felt more negative affect toward conservative ($M = 32.08$, $SD = 28.05$) than liberal ($M = 27.98$, $SD = 27.33$) Facebook posts. Again, this does not take partisan identity into account.

The two-way interaction between partisan identity and Facebook post extremity was not significant, $F(1,223) = .55$, $p = .460$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$. Again, paralleling cognitive receptivity, there was

a significant two-way interaction of partisan identity and Facebook post political ideology, $F(1, 223) = 85.79$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .28$. Democrats expressed more negative affect toward conservative posts relative to liberal posts ($M = 41.67$, $SD = 28.25$ vs. $M = 22.13$, $SD = 24.47$), and this pattern was reversed for Republicans ($M = 22.41$, $SD = 24.31$ vs. $M = 33.89$ $SD = 28.79$). There was also a significant two-way interaction of Facebook post ideology and post extremity, ($F(1, 223) = 12.87$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. This finding is similar to the two-way interaction found with positive affect. This interaction reflected that a similarly high degree of negative affect was expressed toward both types of strong Facebook posts (i.e., strong liberal and strong conservative) and moderate conservative posts, but there was significantly less negative affect reported toward moderate liberal posts (see Figure 6). Again, this interaction does not take partisan identity into account and is thus of limited theoretical importance.

Analyses revealed the same significant three-way interaction involving partisan identity, Facebook post ideology, and Facebook post extremity found in the prior two sets of analyses, $F(1, 223) = 5.84$, $p = .016$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. These findings are presented in Figure 7. Democrats expressed less negative affect toward both types of liberal posts with a marked increase for the conservative posts (top half). A similar pattern emerged among Republicans (bottom half). These participants expressed a great degree of negative affect toward strong liberal posts which then decreased as posts moved along the ideological spectrum from moderate liberal to strong conservative.

Similar to the results with cognitive receptivity, the analyses revealed a marginal main effect of trait OM for negative affect, $F(1, 223) = 3.18$, $p = .076$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. However, there was not a significant interaction between trait OM and partisan identity, $F(1, 223) = 1.25$, $p = .264$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. Analyses showed the same interaction of trait OM and Facebook post political

ideology that was observed for the prior two dependent variables, $F(1, 223) = 6.52$, $p = .011$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Further tests demonstrated that trait OM was significantly correlated with strong ($r(227) = -.21$, $p = .002$) and moderate ($r(228) = -.14$, $p = .038$) liberal posts (see Table 3), but had no significant relationship to either of the conservative posts. Thus, higher scores on trait OM were associated with less negative affect toward liberal posts but did not have any relationship to negative affect toward conservative posts. Note that these effects are again of limited interest as they do *not* include partisan identity.

Additional Regression Analyses for Negative Affect. Here again, I ran separate regression analyses on each of the four types of Facebook posts (see Table 9). (In this case, however, it is worth recalling that the omnibus GLM analyses, reported earlier, showed a marginal main effect of trait OM. For this reason, it is useful to report these regression analyses in some detail here.) As in the case of cognitive receptivity, each of these analyses entered the main effects of trait OM and partisan identity in the first block, with entry of the two-way interaction in the second block.

Strong Liberal Posts. Democrats (vs. Republicans) showed a robust tendency to express less negative affect toward the strong liberal posts, $b = -.24$, $t(224) = -3.81$, $p < .001$, CI [-23. 38, -7.43]. However, there was a significant main effect of trait OM indicating that participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM felt less negative affect toward strong liberal posts, $b = -.18$, $t(224) = -2.86$, $p = .005$, CI [-10.56, -1.94]. This main effect of trait OM is similar the result found with cognitive receptivity. There was no evidence of a two-way interaction, $b = .09$, $t(223) = -1.11$, $p = .270$, CI [-3.83, 13.63].

Moderate Liberal Posts. As was the case for the strong liberal posts, Democrats expressed less negative affect toward these posts compared to Republicans, $b = -.14$, $t(225) = -$

2.18, p = .031, CI [-12.38, .68]. Neither the main effect of trait OM (b = -.12, t(225) = -1.88, p = .062, CI [-6.21, .15]) nor the two-way interaction (b = -.15, t(224) = -1.76, p = .080, CI [-12.15, .68]) were significant.

Moderate Conservative Posts. For moderate conservative posts, the only predictor of negative affect was partisan identity. Republicans showed less negative affect toward moderate conservative posts compared to Democrats, b = .30, t(226) = 4.76, p < .001, CI [9.85, 23.75].

Strong Conservative Posts. Similar to moderate conservative posts, the only predictor of negative affect toward strong conservative posts was partisan identity. Republicans showed less negative affect toward strong conservative posts compared to Democrats, b = .39, t(226) = 6.40, p < .001, CI [15.51, 29.32].

4.4 Exploratory Analyses Probing for Additional Moderation Effects Involving Affect

In the context of the GLMs presented above, I probed for, but failed to find, the presence of any interactions involving trait OM and partisan identity for any of the outcome variables. Conceptually, these null effects show that trait OM did not moderate the (obviously strong) effects of partisan identity when examining participants' reactions to the Facebook posts.

In this last section, I report the results of the exploratory analyses testing for the presence of a moderated moderation effect involving affect. As was noted in the summary of predictions (p. 25), I wished to examine whether the degree to which participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM are able to maintain a high degree of cognitive receptivity toward outgroup posts might depend on their levels of positive or negative affect. This corresponded to the presence of a moderated moderation effect involving the interactive effect of three variables: partisan identity, trait OM, and affect (see Figure 1 for a conceptual representation of this effect) I tested the moderating effects of both types of affect (i.e., positive and negative) separately, and will

discuss each in turn. Note that the analyses involving negative affect were formally pre-registered, however, I did not register the analyses of positive affect.

I used Model 3 in the PROCESS macro for SPSS to test for the presence of this moderated moderation (Hayes, 2017). Although my main interest was in the possible emergence of a three-way interaction, this model also tested for all other potential effects involving affect as a moderator. For example, these analyses also tested whether negative affect moderated the influence of partisan identity, independent of trait OM. (Note, however, that the analyses testing the two-way interaction of trait OM and partisan identity are redundant with the GLMs, presented earlier.) I ran these analyses separately for each of the four types of Facebook posts.

Moderation Effects Involving Negative Affect. There was a significant two-way interaction of negative affect and partisan identity for cognitive receptivity, but only in the case of moderate liberal posts, $b = .35$, $t(222) = 2.28$, $p = .024$, CI [.05, 6.48]). This interaction reflected that although Democrats were more receptive to moderate liberal posts compared to Republicans, this difference was more pronounced among participants scoring 1 SD above the mean in negative affect (see Figure 8). (Here and elsewhere, the division of participants into those scoring +/- 1 SD away from the mean is relevant only to the graphing of the results; the analyses themselves retained the continuous nature of the variables.) Stated another way, there was very little difference in receptivity between Democrats and Republicans who expressed low levels of negative affect toward this post. However, among participants who reported feeling a great deal of negative affect, Democrats were much more receptive than Republicans. The three-way interaction of trait OM, partisan identity, and negative affect was not significant for any of the Facebook posts.

Moderation Effects Involving Positive Affect. I also ran the same moderated moderation analyses using PROCESS to examine all main effects and interactions involving trait OM, partisan identity, and positive affect on cognitive receptivity to the four Facebook posts. There was a significant two-way interaction of partisan identity and positive affect for the strong liberal, moderate liberal, and moderate conservative posts. I will first discuss the interaction for the liberal posts (Strong Liberal: b = -.32, t(221) = -2.70, p = .007, CI [-.56, -.09]; Moderate Liberal: b = -.20, t(221) = -2.04, p = .043, CI [-.39, -.01]). As displayed in Figure 9a, Democrats and Republicans who scored 1 SD above the mean in positive affect expressed roughly equivalent receptivity toward the moderate liberal posts. However, among participants who scored 1 SD below the mean in positive affect, Democrats were more receptive to moderate liberal posts than Republicans. As shown in Figure 9b, a parallel pattern was found for the strong liberal posts.

In the case of the moderate conservative posts, Democrats and Republicans who scored 1 SD above the mean in positive affect again showed more receptivity toward the moderate conservative posts (see Figure 10). However, among those scoring 1 SD below the mean in positive affect, Republicans were more receptive to the moderate conservative posts than Democrats (b = .30, t(219) = 2.38, p = .018, CI [.05, .55]). Thus, for all three interactions, participants who scored high in positive affect did not display a great deal of partisan bias in their receptivity to the posts. In contrast, participants who scored low in positive affect showed partisan bias in receptivity to outgroup views.

There were also two cases in which I observed a two-way interaction of trait OM and positive affect on cognitive receptivity. In the case of strong liberal posts, the interaction narrowly missed conventional levels of significance, b = -.25, t(221) = -1.97, p = .050, CI [-.49,

.00]). As displayed in Figure 11a, this interaction reflected a large main effect of positive affect such that those who scored 1 SD above the mean were much more receptive than those scoring 1 SD below the mean. However, this disparity was greatest for participants who scored low (vs. high in trait OM. This same interaction arose for the moderate liberal posts, reflecting that the tendency for participants who scored 1 SD above the mean in positive affect to be more receptive than those at 1 SD below was less pronounced among those scoring high (vs. low) in trait OM, b = -.19, $t(221)$ = -2.55, p = .012, CI [-.33, -.04] (see Figure 11b). As with negative affect, however, the three-way interaction between partisan identity, trait OM, and positive affect was not significant for any of the Facebook posts.

Chapter 5: Study 1 Discussion

As one might expect, participants' tendency to accept vs. reject the Facebook posts was strongly determined by their partisan identity. For example, Democrats showed a strong tendency to accept liberal points of view and reject conservative points of view. The same opposite pattern was observed for Republicans. The pattern of results also remained consistent for the analyses on positive and negative affect.

Interestingly—and unexpectedly--the influence of partisan identity, as noted above, was *not* moderated by individual differences in open-mindedness (trait OM). In the case of Democrats, for example, this meant that regardless of the participants' score on trait OM they were no more or less likely to be "open" to outgroup views. An analogous pattern arose for Republican participants. Among Republicans, those who scored low in trait OM were just as unlikely to be "open" to liberal posts as those who scored high. Notably, the absence of any moderation effects held regardless of what type of outcome variable was used. Nor did the results vary between moderate and extreme points of view. These results make clear that trait OM does not moderate partisan bias regardless of whether you measure biased reactions in terms of affective reactions or cognitive judgments.

Taken in isolation, one alternative interpretation of these surprising results is that I was not able to properly (or adequately) measure trait OM. However, several aspects of my design and results mitigate that interpretation. First, my measure of trait OM was comprised of two scales that are psychometrically and conceptually sound. PT in particular is a subscale of a very highly cited measure (i.e., the Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1983). Equally important, results showed that trait OM *did* play a role in driving some interesting aspects of participants' reactions to the posts. *However, these effects always arose independently of partisan identity.*

I did find a main effect of trait OM for cognitive receptivity and negative affect. However, trait OM never moderated the effects of partisan identity on either outcome variable. I also found an interaction of trait OM with Facebook post ideology. Although the precise nature of this interaction varied across the three dependent variables, it generally revealed a tendency for those scoring high in trait OM to be more open to liberal posts and less open to conservative posts. However, this interaction did not take partisan identity into account and is thus of limited theoretical interest.

Aside from the alternative interpretations noted in the preceding section, one could also question whether these findings are idiosyncratic to this design or a specific political issue. However, these results verify and extend conclusions previously discussed in political intolerance literature. In particular, the finding that general endorsements of tolerance do not predict specific support for outgroup targets or views (e.g., Gibson, 2011). Thus, this pattern of findings is not unrelated to those in the political intolerance literature. A related concern could be that these findings are specific to a given political topic. As mentioned in a previous chapter, for each type of Facebook post (strong liberal, moderate liberal, strong conservative, moderate conservative), I randomized what topic each participant read about. Thus, these findings generalize across eight separate political issues.

An additional finding of interest concerns the lack of order effects. I previously suggested that participants who had just rated their trait OM might demonstrate an increased motivation to be more open to outgroup views to appear consistent. However, given the lack of any order effects, this doesn't seem to have been the case. By this I mean, even when participants said that they were very open-minded *right before* they reacted to counter-attitudinal views, I still saw no reliable effect of trait OM on receptivity to outgroup views.

Chapter 6: Study 2 Introduction

Study 1 demonstrated that the strongest predictor of participants' reactions to political Facebook posts was their partisan identity. More notably, trait OM did not moderate this relationship for any of the dependent variables. Thus, participants' dispositional open-mindedness never reduced the influence of partisanship on receptivity or affect. In Study 2, I measured individual differences in partisan identity and trait OM, as in the first study. However, the outcome variables were somewhat different: In Study 2, participants were asked to predict how they thought they would respond to a particular political viewpoint.

Aside from its obvious connections to the affective forecasting literature (see below), this approach allowed me additional leverage in understanding some of the surprising results from Study 1. In that earlier study, participants who scored high in trait OM showed no signs of "setting aside" their own partisan biases when they responded to outgroup political views. In Study 2, the direct request for a prediction meant that participants were now forced to explicitly consider whether they would be open to others' viewpoints. Thus, this study tests whether participants who just affirmed their high level of open-mindedness would report an intention, at least, to be receptive to these kinds of viewpoints.

On People's Ability to Assess/Predict Reactions and Affect

Prior literature on affective and behavioral forecasting provides robust evidence that people are not always skilled at predicting how they will feel or act in a future scenario (Gilbert, Driver-Linn, & Wilson, 2002; Norris, Dumville, & Lacy, 2011; Sandstrom & Dunn, 2011; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). For example, participants over-estimate how long they will feel negative affect after an adverse life (Buehler & McFarland, 2001; Gilbert et al., 1998) and in other cases predict they will feel a completely different emotion in a given situation than what

they later report (Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). Studies have also shown that participants are not skilled at predicting their future behavior; for example, subjects tend to overestimate the likelihood of their own generosity (Epley & Dunning, 2000).

A recent study by Dorison et al. (2019) demonstrated a general tendency for participants to exaggerate the negative affect they would experience when exposed to outgroup political views. For example, Clinton voters somewhat over-estimated how negatively watching Trump's inaugural speech would make them feel. Democrats and Republicans also overestimated how negatively they would feel while watching speeches by senators from outgroup political parties. These forecasting errors were shown to underlie behaviors that reduced exposure to counter-attitudinal political materials. Notably, these over-estimations were significantly reduced if participants read a summary of the research on affective forecasting errors before they made predictions about their own emotions.

This research has important implications for Study 2, as this study aims to determine whether participants are adept at predicting how they will react to outgroup political opinions. However, in this study participants were only asked to predict these reactions to political views. In this sense, participants in Study 2 were asked to play the role of "predictors", as opposed to "experiencers". This latter role is more applicable to the participants in Study 1 (Blumenthal, 2005; Gilbert et al., 1998; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) [1]

---

[1] Unlike prior work in the affective forecasting literature, participants were not randomly assigned to the experiencers vs. predictors role. Although this is not a major detriment for Study 2, it meant that I could not run a single statistical analysis that directly contrasted experiencers vs. predictors. Nevertheless, because I deliberately designed Study 2 to be as similar to Study 1 as possible, this *did* allow me to make reasonable comparisons between the two sets of findings. I lay out these comparisons in the General Discussion.

Implications and Predictions for the Present Study

Unlike Study 1, participants in Study 2 were explicitly asked to predict how they would respond to a particular set of political statements. The important question at this point is what these predictions might look like, and how these might—or might not—match the results I obtained in Study 1. It is heuristically useful to address this issue in two parts, first concerning partisan identity, and then in terms of trait OM.

Expected Effects for Partisan Bias

In Study 1, partisan identity had a very strong effect in terms of how participants actually responded to the Facebook posts. In Study 2, I expected that participants would have fairly good insight into this process. In other words, when it came to anticipating the role of partisan identity in accepting/rejecting opposing political viewpoints, I expected that participants would be excellent predictors. For one thing, participants are likely to be very aware of their own partisan identity. By this I mean that participants who identified as moderately strong Democrats, for example, are aware that they strongly align with this party. It seems likely, too, that participants have practical insight into how their partisan identity informs their proclivity to accept vs. reject political views. This is to say, I expected strong Democrats, for example, would be very likely to predict that they would be more open to liberal vs. conservative points of view.

Study 2 used the same, carefully normed set of political views as Study 1. This allowed me to examine participants' predictions not only as a function of the statements ideological slant (i.e., whether it was liberal or conservative), but also in terms of whether it represented a moderate or extreme point of view. Here again I expected participants to be fairly accurate and reveal a pattern closely approximating what I found in Study 1. For example, when Democrats were asked to predict their cognitive receptivity, they should generate predictions suggesting (a)

fairly high receptivity to the two liberal statements, regardless of whether they were strong or moderate, and (b) far less receptivity to the conservative statements, especially for the extreme conservative statement. I expected a conceptually analogous pattern to arise from the Republicans. Based on the results of Study 1, I had no reason to suspect that participants would be any less accurate in formulating predictions about their affective reactions. All in all, then, the predictions made by participants in Study 2 were expected to closely match the data from Study 1, at least with respect to the dynamics associated with partisan identity.

Expected Effects for Trait OM

Far more interesting for my purposes was whether participants' predictions would match the pattern obtained in Study 1 with respect to trait OM. In broaching this issue, it is useful to keep in mind two (related) aspects of the way that I measured trait OM. First, the measures, themselves, were relatively transparent. By that I mean, participants were likely to be well aware that we were measuring their beliefs about being open (or closed) minded. Second, participants were likely to have good "meta-awareness" in terms of how they were answering the questions and whether they were scoring relatively high or low on the scale. Thus, in some sense, this measure was likey to capture what might be characterized as a set of schematic beliefs about their personal qualities. Here I do *not* suggest that these beliefs about the self are necessarily false. Rather, my point is that the *psychological function* of these beliefs may not be dissimilar to that of other highly schematized views.

I raise these issues here because they are potentially relevant to the affective forecasting literature. In particular, research in this areas often assumes that errors are attributable to the influence of pre-stored, highly schematized beliefs about the self and others (see Gilbert et al., 1998). In this context, therefore, my point is that participants' predictions as to how they are

likely to react may draw, at least in part, on their pre-stored beliefs about the self (e.g., "*I am the type of person who tends to be open*").

These considerations set up an expectation that sharply contrasts with results obtained in Study 1. Recall that in the first study, participants were just as likely to show partisan bias, regardless of whether they scored high or low in trait OM. I expected something quite different in Study 2. I hypothesized that participants who scored high (vs. low) trait OM would use this belief in their open-mindedness to generate a prediction that they would be more open to moderate outgroup views. Thus, the tendency for Republicans to predict they would be less receptive to moderate liberal views should be attenuated among participants who scored high vs. low in trait OM. Similarly, the tendency for Democrats to predict they would be less receptive to moderate conservative views should be lessened among participants who scored high vs. low in trait OM. Statistically, this corresponds to a four-way interaction of partisan identity, trait OM, statement extremity and statement ideology.

My hypotheses for the affective outcome variables were similar. I expected that participants who score high (vs. low) in trait OM to use this belief in their open-mindedness to generate a prediction that they would feel less negatively (and more positively) toward outgroup political views. For example, Democrats who scored high in trait OM would predict they would feel less negatively (and more positively) toward moderately conservative views relative to the predictions made by of those scoring low in trait OM. I expect the opposite pattern for Republicans. Thus, I am again hypothesizing a four-way interaction of trait OM, partisan identity, statement ideology, and statement extremity.

Chapter 7: Study 2 Methods

7.1 Participants

I intended to collect a sample of 230 participants (115 Democrats and 115 Republicans) on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk). Recall that I had significant difficultly recruiting "Extremely Strong Republicans" in Study 1. In Study 1, there were no theoretically important differences between participants who rated themselves as extremely or moderately strong partisans in either party. Thus, to avoid my previous sampling difficulties, I only recruited participants who rated themselves as "Moderately Strong" Democrats or Republicans in Study 2.

In order to account for the expected 15% exclusion rate, I initially recruited 264 participants. Yet again I experienced an unexpectedly high rate of "farmers" and "repeaters" among the Moderately Strong Republicans. As such, it was necessary to collect data from 278 participants to obtain the necessary sample. In total, 49 participants were excluded from analyses in accordance with the criteria laid out in Appendix F. The final sample was comprised of 229 participants (67% female and 77% white). After several reposts of the study, I was only able to recruit 108 Moderately Strong Republicans. In order to satisfy the power analyses, it was necessary to expand the sample of Moderately Strong Democrats to 121 participants (see Appendix M for details on selection procedures). This imbalance was not of great theoretical concern as the results in Study 1 were consistent across partisan identities.

7.2 Overview of Procedure

In Study 2, participants imagined how they thought they would react to a set of political views, rather than reading and reacting to fictional Facebook posts (see Appendix N for schematic representation of study design). Thus, participants were asked to predict their reactions to political views, rather than actually react to them. Aside from this, the design of Study 2 was

identical to the first study. I used the same text from the Facebook posts in Study 1, however in this case the materials were presented as hypothetical opinions a person could express not as social media posts. I edited the dependent variables to reflect this change (see below). I also removed the two questions about social media. All other questions, blocks, and randomization procedures were identical to Study 1.

7.3 Measures

Trait OM was measured in the same manner as Study 1 (i.e., mean of standardized PT and OMC scales; $\alpha = .88$). Partisan identity was also measured in the same manner (i.e., single item in the pre-screen). However, in this case, I only accepted participants who identified themselves as "Moderately Strong" Republicans and Democrats. For simplicity, I will refer to participants as Democrats and Republicans.

Predicted Reaction Block

In this section participants read an initial set of instructions that were as follows: **"***Imagine how you might react to various points of view. You will read a description of a hypothetical point of view (e.g., "Imagine a conversation in which someone is telling you that they believe public school teachers should make more money.") and describe how you might react or feel.*" Following this, participants were randomly assigned to read four types of statements corresponding with the same four levels of ideology and extremity used in Study 1 (i.e., strong liberal, moderate liberal, moderate conservative, and strong conservative).

As in Study 1, within each of the four statement categories, I used two statements arguing for two distinct points of view that were matched in their ideology and extremity. The statements used the same text as the Facebook posts, but in this case they were displayed as quotes rather than social media posts (see Appendix O for full text). Participants were randomly assigned to

view only one statement in each ideological category. Thus, participants read four statements total, one in each ideology and extremity category, and within each category participants were randomly assigned to see one topic out of two possibilities. The study was completely randomized to ensure that equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats saw each point of view at each ideological level.

Dependent Variables. Participants rated each statement across a randomized set of 14 questions (see Appendix P for full question text). Six of the questions measured participants' predicted receptivity, and the other eight measured predicted affective reactions to the statements.

Predicted Receptivity. First, on a scale from 0 (*Not at all)* to 100 (*Very much so*) participants rated how *they thought* they would judge the statements across the following domains: persuasive, logical, and well-reasoned. Using the same 0 to 100 scale, participants rated how open-minded *they thought* they would be to the opinions in the statements. Participants rated how willing they thought they would be to have a follow-up conversation with the person expressing each point of view on the scale from 0 to 100. I formed an index of predicted receptivity by taking the overall mean of these five items (mean $\alpha = .89$).

As in Study 1, there was a final item that asked how strongly participants thought they would agree with this point of view. This item was not included in the composite measure as it was answered on a different scale (i.e., 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*)).

Predicted Affective Reactions. Using a scale ranging from 0 (*Not at all)* to 100 (*Very much so*) participants rated how *they thought* discussing the point of view in each of the statements would make them feel. Predicted affect was measured across the same set of eight randomized items as in Study 1: happy, excited, angry, frustrated, content, annoyed, disgusted,

and proud. I formed the same indices of positive and negative affect (mean Negative $\alpha = .92$; mean Positive $\alpha = .89$).

Chapter 8: Study 2 Results

8.1 Preliminary Analyses of Study 2

Prior to reporting formal analyses for Study 2, I again consider some preliminary matters that are relevant to the main analyses presented ahead.

Validity of Partisan Identity Measure

Here again, I operationalized partisan identity with two levels, Moderately Strong Democrats and Republicans. I tested participants' scores on the RWA and SDO scales to verify that the single-item measure was valid. Republicans scored far higher on RWA than Democrats, $F(1,227) = 214.41$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .49$ ($M = 4.10$, $SD = .88$ vs. $M = 2.40$, $SD = .88$). Republicans also scored higher on SDO than Democrats, $F(1,227) = 193.06$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .46$ ($M = 3.53$, $SD = .91$ vs. $M = 1.98$, $SD = .77$). These findings validate my assumption that the partisan identity groups represent two groups of people who differ in their ideological beliefs.

Check for Order Effects

As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to either complete the individual difference or the statement block first. Thus, it is was again necessary to check for order effects. An initial set of ANOVAs revealed one effect of order for the dependent variable that measured predicted positive reactions to strong liberal statements (see Table 10). Further analyses indicated that the results did not change in any meaningful way when I used the residualized version of this variable. As this order effect only arose for one variable, and given that the results did not change, I continued the analyses below using the un-residualized variable.

8.2 Correlational Analyses

Table 11 presents the means and standard deviations of all the dependent variables. Tables 12 present the correlations between the dependent variables separately for the four

statement types. As in Study 1, the correlations between these variables were not strong enough to suggest that the outcomes variables were interchangeable or that they should be analyzed together.

8.3 Main Analyses

I again used the multivariate general linear model (GLM) option in SPSS to test the predicted main effects and interactions of (a) two between-subjects factors (partisan identity and trait OM) and (b) two within-subjects factors (statement ideology and extremity). I will report the results of the omnibus models using the same approach as Study 1. For each of the outcome variables, I begin by noting the presence of any significant main effects and interactions, temporarily collapsing over trait OM. After reporting these initial effects, I then consider the effects involving trait OM. Beyond these parallels to Study 1, however, it is important to keep in mind that the outcome variables are different in the case of Study 2. In this latter study, I explicitly asked participants to predict how they would respond to the statements in question.

8.3.1 Predicted Cognitive Receptivity

The omnibus GLM analysis (see Table 13) generated a main effect of statement extremity, $F(1, 225) = 13.39$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. This effect indicated that, on average, participants predicted they would be more receptive to statements expressing moderate (M = 61.38, SD = 23.48) as opposed to extreme (M = 56.66, SD = 25.74) points of view. There was also a significant main effect of statement ideology, $F(1, 225) = 15.23$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. This main effect indicated that, on average, participants predicted they would be more receptive to liberal (M = 62.54, SD = 24.72) than conservative (M = 55.50, SD = 24.49) statements. This effect is again not of great importance as it collapses over partisan identity.

The two-way interaction between partisan identity and statement extremity was not significant, $F(1,225) = .13$, $p = .721$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$. This null effect was expected, as it collapses over whether the statements themselves represented liberal or conservative points of view. There was a significant two-way interaction of partisan identity and statement political ideology, $F(1, 225) = 230.42$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .51$. As seen in Figure 12, Democrats predicted they would be more receptive to liberal compared to conservative statements ($M = 72.81$, $SD = 19.17$ vs. $M = 44.41$, $SD = 23.19$), and this pattern was reversed for Republicans ($M = 51.01$ $SD = 24.09$ vs. $M = 67.92$, $SD = 18.67$). As in the prior study, this analysis serves as both a manipulation check and a confirmation of my hypothesis that participants would predict they would be more receptive to points of view that expressed ingroup views.

Of greater interest, the analyses revealed a significant three-way interaction involving partisan identity, statement ideology, and extremity, $F(1, 225) = 26.82$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$. These findings are presented in Figure 13. Democrats made approximately equal predictions about their receptivity to both types of liberal statements (top half). Their predictions significantly decreased for both conservative statements and were lowest for strong conservative views. Next consider the Republican participants (bottom half). Republicans predicted they would be least receptive to strong liberal statements (left), their predicted receptivity slightly increased for moderate liberal statements. Republicans made equally high predictions about their receptivity to conservative statements. This pattern of results is very similar to those obtained in Study 1.

The next set of analyses provide leverage on the question: *To what extent, if any, would trait OM moderate partisan bias in predictions about receptivity to counter-attitudinal points of view?* The analyses revealed a pattern that was remarkably similar to Study 1, indicating that higher scores on trait OM were associated with a general tendency to predict greater receptivity

to *all of the statements*, $F(1, 225) = 11.34$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. Correlational analyses demonstrated that trait OM was positively correlated with predicted receptivity for the extreme ($r(229) = .25$ $p = .003$) as well as moderate ($r(229) = .218$ $p < .001$) liberal statements. For the conservative statements, the relationship between trait OM and receptivity was not statistically significant for the extreme ($r(229) = -.07$, $p = .294$) or moderate ($r(229) = .08$, $p = .232$) statements.

As in Study 1, however, these effects are *not* qualified by partisan identity, as the two-way interaction with trait OM was not significant, $F(1,225) = .41$, $p = .522$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$. Indeed, once again there was not a single instance in which trait OM significantly interacted with the partisan identity. Thus, the effects of trait OM operated *independently* of participants' political views. In all, these analyses demonstrated that, as in Study 1, trait OM did not moderate the tendency for partisan identity to limit predicted receptivity to outgroup views.

Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Cognitive Receptivity. As in Study 1, I conducted follow up regression analyses to further examine the observed main effect of trait OM for each of the statements separately. As I show below, these analyses demonstrated a strong effect of partisan identity, but there was no indication that these effects were moderated by trait OM (see Table 14).

Strong Liberal Statements. For these statements, Democrats showed a robust tendency to predict they would be more receptive to the strong liberal statements relative to Republicans, $b = .50$, $t(226) = 8.54$, $p < .001$, CI [20. 17, 32.28]. There was also a significant main effect of trait OM, $b = .12$, $t(226) = 2.01$, $p = .045$, CI [. 07, 6.53]. This main effect indicated that, independent of partisan identity, participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM predicted they would be

more receptive to strong liberal statements. However, there was no two-way interaction, b = .02, $t(225)$ = .30, p = .767, CI [-5.55, 7.51].

Moderate Liberal Statements. As was the case for the strong liberal statements, Democrats predicted that they would be more receptive to these views compared to Republicans, b = .32, $t(226)$ = 4.90, p < .001, CI [8.74, 20.47]. Once more there was no evidence of a main effect of trait OM, b = .09, $t(226)$ = 1.39, p =.167, CI [-.93, 5.33], nor of an interaction, b = .01, $t(225)$ = .10, p = .923, CI [-6.02, 6.64].

Moderate Conservative Statements. For these statements, Republicans predicted they would be more receptive to the moderate conservative statements relative to Democrats, b = -.39, $t(226)$ = -6.13, p < .001, CI [-24.71, -12.69]. There was a significant main effect of trait OM, b = .19, $t(226)$ = 2.91, p = .004, CI [1. 52, 7.94]. This main effect demonstrated that participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM predicted that they would be more receptive to moderate conservative statements. However, there was no evidence that this pattern was moderated by trait OM, b = .06, $t(225)$ = .74, p = .459, CI [-4.04, 8.92].

Strong Conservative Statements. Similar to moderate conservative statements, Republicans predicted they would be more receptive to the strong conservative views relative to Democrats, b =- .64, $t(226)$ = -11.86, p < .001, CI [-37.50, -26.81]. Neither the main effect of trait OM (b = .11, $t(226)$ = 1.93, p = .055, CI [-.06, 5.65]) nor the two-way interaction (b = .03, $t(225)$ = .47, p = .643, CI [-4.40, 7.12]) were significant.

8.3.2. Predicted Positive Affect

I use the same approach to examine the dependent variables concerning predicted positive affect. The omnibus GLM (see Table 15) indicated that there was no main effect of statement extremity, $F(1, 225)$ = .08, p = .783, η_p^2 = .00. There was a significant main effect of

statement ideology ($F(1, 225) = 20.00$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$). This main effect indicated that, on average, participants predicted they would feel more positive affect in response to liberal ($M = 36.28$, $SD = 27.65$) as compared to conservative ($M = 28.02$, $SD = 25.66$) statements.

The two-way interaction between partisan identity and statement extremity was not significant, $F(1,225) = 1.26$, $p = .263$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. There was a significant two-way interaction of partisan identity and statement ideology, $F(1, 225) = 117.80$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .34$. This interaction indicated that Democrats predicted they would feel more positive affect toward liberal compared to conservative statements ($M = 41.78$, $SD = 29.18$ vs. $M = 17.36$, $SD = 20.64$), and this pattern was reversed for Republicans ($M = 30.12$ $SD = 24.941$ vs. $M = 39.98$, $SD = 25.30$).

Analyses also revealed a significant three-way interaction of partisan identity, statement ideology, and extremity, $F(1, 225) = 13.29$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. These findings are presented in Figure 14. Democrats (top half) predicted they would feel approximately equal positive affect toward liberal statements. There was a pronounced decline for the conservative statements. Republicans predicted they would feel the least positive affect for strong liberal statements (bottom half). Their predicted positive affect gradually increased as the statements moved from moderate liberal to strong conservative. This pattern of results mirrors those found for predicted cognitive receptivity and what I found for experienced positive affect in Study 1.

The analyses did not reveal a main effect of trait OM for predicted positive affect ($F(1, 223) = 1.87$, $p = .173$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$), nor was there an interaction with partisan identity ($F(1, 223) = .87$, $p = .353$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$). Thus, participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM were not more likely to predict they would feel positive affect toward ingroup or outgroup statements. This is the same result that was obtained for positive affect in Study 1. Once again, these analyses

demonstrated that, trait OM did not influence the tendency for partisan identity to limit predicted positive affect to outgroup views.

Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Positive Affect. Again, I examined separate regression analyses for each of the statements. These analyses are of limited interest, as the GLM revealed no main effect or interaction involving trait OM. Consistent with the results of Study 1, each of the regression analyses also demonstrated a strong effect of partisan identity, but no main effects or interactions involving trait OM. These regressions results are reported in Table 16 but are not expanded upon in text.

8.3.3 Predicted Negative Affect

The omnibus GLM (see Table 17) showed a main effect of statement extremity, $F(1, 225) = 12.67$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. This effect indicated that, on average, participants predicted they would feel more negative affect toward extreme ($M = 38.66$, $SD = 29.22$) as opposed to moderate ($M = 32.74$, $SD = 26.18$) points of view. There was also a significant main effect of statement ideology, $F(1, 225) = 8.52$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. This main effect indicated that, on average, participants predicted they would feel more negative affect toward conservative ($M = 38.87$, $SD = 27.31$) than liberal ($M = 35.52$, $SD = 28.09$) statements. Again, this does not take partisan identity into account.

The two-way interaction between partisan identity and statement extremity was not significant, $F(1,225) = .17$, $p = .679$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$. There was a significant two-way interaction of partisan identity and statement ideology, $F(1, 225) = 98.78$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .31$. This interaction indicated that Democrats predicted they would feel more negative affect toward conservative relative to liberal statements ($M = 44.39$, $SD = 27.45$ vs. $M = 22.35$, $SD = 23.56$), and this pattern was reversed for Republicans ($M = 32.68$, $SD = 25.71$ vs. $M = 42.80$ $SD = 29.09$). There was also

a significant two-way interaction of statement ideology and extremity, ($F(1, 225) = 5.60$, $p = .019$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$ (see Figure 15). This interaction reflected that participants predicted they would feel more negative affect toward conservative, relative to liberal, statements, and toward extreme, relative to moderate, statements.

Analyses revealed a significant three-way interaction of partisan identity, statement ideology, and statement extremity, $F(1, 225) = 18.79$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$. As seen in Figure 16, Democrats predicted they would feel approximately equal levels of negative affect toward liberal statements (top half). This prediction greatly increased for moderate and strong conservative statements. Republicans predicted they would feel similar levels of negative affect toward moderate liberal, moderate conservative, and strong conservative statements (bottom half). They predicted they would feel significantly more negative affect toward strong liberal statements. Again, this pattern of results is nearly identical to those obtained in Study 1.

Similar to Study 1, the analyses revealed a significant main effect of trait OM for negative affect, $F(1, 225) = 5.74$, $p = .018$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. This effect indicates that participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM tended to predict they would feel less negative affect toward the statements, in general. However, there was no significant interaction between trait OM and partisan identity, $F(1, 225) = .43$, $p = .511$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$.

The analyses also showed a significant three-way interaction of trait OM, partisan identity, statement extremity, $F(1, 225) = 4.21$, $p = .041$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$). I decomposed the interaction to better understand this result and tested a unique model for each level of statement extremity. Thus, I ran two general linear models with two between-subjects factors (partisan identity and trait OM) and one within-subjects factor (statement ideology). However, the interaction between

trait OM and partisan identity was not significant for moderate ($F(1, 225) = 2.53$, $p = .113$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$) or strong statements, ($F(1, 225) = .18$, $p = .676$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$).

Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Negative Affect. Here again, I ran separate regression analyses (see Table 18) on each of the four types of statements to better understand the main effect of trait OM seen in the preceding GLM.

Strong Liberal Statements. Democrats predicted they would feel less negative affect toward the strong liberal statements, $b = -.40$, $t(226) = -6.34$, $p < .001$, CI [-31. 52, -16.57]. There was not main effect ($b = -.07$, $t(226) = -1.06$, $p = .290$, CI [-6. 14, 1.84]) or an interaction ($b = -.06$, $t(225) = -.76$, $p = .449$, CI [-11. 16, 4.96]) involving trait OM.

Moderate Liberal Statements. Here again, Democrats predicted they would feel less negative affect toward moderate liberal statements compared to Republicans, $b = -.24$, $t(226) = -3.58$, $p < .001$, CI [-19.04, -5.51]. Neither the main effect of trait OM, ($b = -.11$, $t(226) = -1.59$, $p = .112$, CI [-6.53, .69]), nor the two-way interaction ($b = -.16$, $t(225) = -1.85$, $p = .066$, CI [-14.04, .45]) were significant.

Moderate Conservative Statements. For these statements, the was a significant main effect of partisan identity indicating that Republicans predicted they would feel less negative affect toward moderate conservative views compared to Democrats, $b = .17$, $t(226) = 2.49$, $p = .031$, CI [1.87, 16.03]. The was no main effect of trait OM, ($b = -.13$, $t(226) = -1.89$, $p = .060$, CI [-7.40, .16]), nor was there a significant two-way interaction ($b = -.08$, $t(225) = -.88$, $p = .380$, CI [-11.03, .4.22]*)*

Strong Conservative Statements. Similarly, Republicans predicted they would feel less negative affect toward strong conservative views compared to Democrats, $b = .33$, $t(226) = -5.03$, $p < .001$, CI [11.28, 25.80]. In this case, there was a significant main effect of trait OM, $b =$

-.15, $t(226) = -2.22$, $p = .027$, CI [-8. 25, -.50]. This effect indicated that participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM predicted that they would feel less negative affect toward strong conservative statements,

Chapter 9: Study 2 Discussion

In contrast to Study 1, Study 2 was oriented toward understanding how participants would *predict* their reactions to the counter-attitudinal political views. As I anticipated, one aspect of these predictions closely matched the results of Study 1. In particular, participants reliably predicted they would be most open to statements that were consistent with their partisan identity and reject those that were not. This was also true for the outcome variables concerning affect.

Results did *not*, however, support my predictions with respect to trait OM. In the case of participants' who scored high in trait OM, I expected to see a kind of "benign self-schema" emerge, in the sense that they would expect themselves to be relatively free of partisan bias. For example, I expected the Democrats who scored themselves high (vs. low) in trait OM to strongly predict they would be open to conservative views.

However, the results did not confirm this hypothesis. Just as in Study 1, there was a main effect of open-mindedness indicating that participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM predicted they would be more receptive to all of the statements, in general. But trait OM never moderated the effects of partisan identity. In a sense, therefore, I found that participants were remarkably *accurate* in their predictions about trait OM, in that these predictions matched what happened in Study 1. Participants who rated themselves as highly open-minded were no more likely to predict they would be open to outgroup views than those who scored low in trait OM. Thus, in contrast to the prediction I made above, Democrats who scored themselves high (vs. low) in trait OM *did not* predict they would be more open to conservative views.

The absence of any moderation effects held regardless of what type of outcome variable was used (i.e., predicted cognitive or predicted affective reactions). This means that participants

who scored high in trait OM were not any more likely to predict they would feel positively or negatively about outgroup views than those who scored low in open-mindedness. For example, high trait OM Republicans did not predict they would feel more positive affect toward liberal views than Republicans who scored low in trait OM. Similarly, Republicans who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM were not more likely to predict they would feel less negative affect toward liberal views.

This pattern of findings, although unexpected, is very interesting. This study indicates that subjects appear to have very good insight into the limitations of trait OM in moderating partisan bias. This suggests that, at least in the domain of politics, participants are fairly adept at predicting how they will feel about and react to outgroup views. I will discuss the implications of these findings in greater detail in the section to follow.

Chapter 10: General Discussion

General Summary

A major goal of this dissertation was to determine whether dispositional open-mindedness (i.e., trait OM) actually predicted more "open" reactions to outgroup political views. A key prediction was that participants' tendencies to reject such views would be moderated by trait OM. For example, I predicted that Democrats would be more open to conservative points of view if they scored relatively high (vs. low) in trait OM. I tested this and other related propositions in the context of two paradigms. Study 1 measured participants' actual reactions to such views. In contrast, Study 2 asked participants to predict how they thought they would respond to these opinions.

However, my predictions about trait OM were not supported by the data in either study. Across both studies and all outcome variables, the single most consistent and powerful predictor of "open" reactions was partisan identity. In particular, the nature of participants' cognitive receptivity to these posts (as well as their affective reactions) was dictated by the "match" between their partisan identity and the type of viewpoint represented by that post. With respect to trait OM, however, the results of the two studies were remarkably consistent: *I did not find a single instance, in either study, in which trait OM moderated the impact of partisan identity*. I discuss these parallels in more detail below.

A Closer Look at the Parallelism from Studies 1 and 2

In combination, the two studies reported in this dissertation bear on the psychological dynamics of what the researchers in the affective forecasting literature refer to as "experiencers" (Study 1) and "predictors" (Study 2). Unlike other studies in this area (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998), I did not randomly assign participants to these roles. There were also some differences in the exact

way that I operationalized partisan identity between the two studies. For these reasons, there are limitations in the extent to which I could conduct formal statistical comparisons across the two studies.

Keeping this caveat in mind, it is heuristically useful to make some informal comparisons across these data sets. Such comparisons more vividly illustrate just how similar the results of the studies really were. For example, consider cognitive receptivity. In Table 19, I display the relevant means for this outcome variable as a function of the major variables in my design (Facebook post/statement type, type of outcome variable, partisan identity) for both Study 2 (top row) as well as Study 1 (bottom row).[1] To be sure, there were a few variations across the two studies. However, the more remarkable implication is how similar the results were for all three outcome variables. For example, Democratic "predictors" expected they would score a 37.83 on receptivity to strong conservative views, and Democratic "experiencers" scored 31.13. As another example, Republican "predictors" expected they would score a 46.89 on negative affect toward strong liberal posts, and the Republican "experiencers" scored a 41.83.

Nevertheless, one slight difference is worth noting. In particular, the "predictors" in Study 2 tended to overestimate the valence of their reactions relative to what was reported by the "experiencers" in Study 1. On average, participants overestimated receptiveness by a modest degree, 10.09 points (out of 100). The difference scores for affect were similar, with Republicans overestimating positive and negative affect to a greater degree than Democrats. These results make clear that, at least in the domain of politics, participants are surprisingly aware of how

[1] By putting the means from Study 2 first, this table reverses the chronological order in which the two studies were conducted, but in this context, it is more useful to first consider participants' predictions.

powerful partisan identity is in influencing reactions to outgroup views, regardless of how open-minded they perceive themselves to be.

The tendency for the "predictors" to overestimate affective reactions relative to the "experiencers" is fairly similar to results found by Dorison et al. (2019). The authors found a tendency for partisans (in this case, Clinton and Trump supporters) to over-estimate the negative affect they would experience as a result of contact with outgroup views (i.e., Trump's inaugural speech, speech by opposing party senator). Across five studies, they asked participants to rate how they would feel watching videos of or reading material about outgroup (vs. ingroup) political figures (e.g., Donald Trump and Barack Obama). These same participants later rated their actual affective reactions after exposure to these materials. The results indicated that participants overestimated the degree of negative affect they would experience. This dissertation demonstrated a similar tendency to over-estimate negative affect (albeit not within the same participants) and shows a similar tendency to over-estimate positive affect.

Addressing Some Alternative Explanations

Prior to considering the implications of these findings for the broader psychological and political science literatures, I will first discuss a few potential alternative explanations.

Trait OM Operationalization

As I noted in the discussion of Study 1, one could question whether I adequately operationalized trait OM. However, there are compelling reasons to believe that my measure of trait OM was methodologically sound. First, the personality measures that were used to construct the trait OM variable (PT and OMC) are well-validated and psychometrically sound. The paper in which the PT subscale was proposed has been cited more than 8,000 times on Google Scholar. Given that PT has a much longer history than OMC, there is a larger amount of research to

establish this scale's validity. As was mentioned in the introduction, past research has demonstrated that higher PT is associated with lower stereotyping/prejudice (Ku, Wang, & Galinsky, 2010), greater satisfaction in romantic relationships (Franzoi, Davis, Young, & Richard 1985), and reduced anger in response to interpersonal conflict (Mohr et al., 2007). However, the two scales are highly correlated (see earlier discussion on p.5) and demonstrated a high degree of internal reliability (see p. 39 and p. 66). Hence, there is no evidence that the trait OM measure was "weak" or lacking in terms of my ability to capture the underlying construct.

Second, in both studies I found main effects of trait OM, indicating that those who scored high on this variable were generally more open to the points of view tested. This finding validates that trait OM did, in fact, capture the tendency to be more open-minded on average. Thus, it seems unlikely that the results of this dissertation could be attributed to the way that I operationalized trait OM. My results could, however, highlight the need to measure open-mindedness in a more contextualized manner in order to improve predictive validity. I shall return to this line of reasoning in my discussion of the literature on Frame of Reference effects.

Partisan Identity Operationalization

It seems even less likely that the present results could be attributed to problems with the way that I operationalized partisan identity. In both studies, I found statistically significant and rather large (in terms of effect size) effects involving partisan identity. The results were highly significant for each of the different types of outcome variables (i.e., receptivity, affect) and were consistent with my predictions. Moreover, supplemental analyses with RWA and SDO also validated the meaningfulness of this variable. I could indeed have operationalized the political views of the participants in a number of different ways. For example, I could have used a continuous measure of political ideology (i.e., bipolar scale of liberalism vs. conservatism; Jost,

2006). However, using the current measure of partisan identity my predictions were not only confirmed, but the effect sizes for these findings were quite robust. In combination, these considerations provide compelling evidence that the approach I used to measure partisan identity effectively captured the construct.

Statistical Power/Sample Size

One could also question whether I had adequate statistical power to detect the effects of trait OM and any interaction with partisan identity. As I noted in an earlier section of this dissertation (see p. 34), I ran into some unexpected difficulties when recruiting strong Republicans in both studies, but particularly in the case of Extremely Strong Republicans in Study 1. As was outlined in the methods sections and elaborated upon in the appendices, I gathered the maximum number of strong Republicans possible on Mturk. Each study was posted multiple times over several weeks, and with each repost there were clear diminishing returns in terms of the balance of good subjects to "farmers". This necessarily imposed some limits on the sample sizes that I was able to collect. This concern should not be completely dismissed, of course. However, any concerns along these lines are less serious than they might otherwise be, given the remarkably parallel pattern of results obtained across two independent samples in the context of Study 1 and Study 2.

Another consideration is worth noting as well. Suppose that both studies had generated weak evidence of a trait OM moderation effect that did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Such a pattern would, of course, raise serious concerns about insufficient power to detect a hypothesized effect. However, this is not what happened. Neither study showed any reliable evidence of such moderation effects in the first place. For this reason alone, the problem of "insufficient power" does not appear to be greatly concerning, at least as it bears on

the role of trait OM as a moderator. Stated differently, it seems unlikely that I would have obtained any evidence of such moderation, even if I had recruited a sample double or even triple the size used in this dissertation.

Operationalization of Cognitive Receptivity

A final consideration bears on the way that I operationalized participants' cognitive receptivity. One might argue that I could have taken alternate paths in operationalizing this variable. However, in both studies I found a reliable main effect of trait OM indicating that those who scored high in this trait also typically scored high in receptivity to the Facebook posts and statements. This variable also had high internal reliability in both studies (α = .91 and .89). Thus, the specific items I used "hung together" well and they appear to have captured the intended construct. Given these results, I would argue that this variable was adequately specified.

There are certainly different approaches to measuring receptivity that would be interesting. For example, in a future study I would like to ask participants to write a 5-6 sentence response to an outgroup political Facebook post. This data could then be subjected to qualitative analyses in LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 2015). However, this approach would not have worked in the context of this dissertation. In my experience, the quality of written responses from Mturk workers declines if multiple writing tasks are assigned. This is also confirmed by formal research on Mturk data quality (see Lovett et al., 2017). Thus, I did not think asking participants to write a paragraph response to four Facebook posts was the best path in this dissertation. Other interesting approaches would have been to measure reaction times or facial expressions. Here again, this would only be possible in a completely new paradigm. These are approaches I would like to explore in future research (see below), however, in the context of the present dissertation I believe my operationalization of receptivity was sound.

Broader Implications and Future Directions

Having addressed these alternative explanations, I will now review the ramifications of these findings to several literatures. As discussed in prior sections, the implications of this dissertation are particularly relevant to research on political intolerance, the predictive validity of trait OM, frame of reference effects, the role of affect in open-mindedness, and affective forecasting. I will discuss each in turn.

Political Intolerance

The political intolerance literature provides robust evidence that abstract endorsements of tolerance do not reliably predict tolerant reactions to specific groups or perspectives running counter to the self (Gibson 2013; Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus, 1979). My research both confirms and extends this pattern of findings. First, this dissertation confirms that general endorsements of open-mindedness do not necessarily predict open-minded reactions to specific outgroup views. However, my research also greatly extends this work by using an individual difference measure to examine personal openness to outgroup political views.

Within the political intolerance literature, researchers commonly ask detailed questions about participants' political attitudes (i.e., personal political ideology), their general support for political tolerance (e.g., "*I believe everyone should have free speech*"), before measuring their support for tolerance for particular groups (e.g., "*I believe communists should have free speech.*") (e.g., Gibson & Bingham, 1983; Kuklinksi et al., 1991; McClosky & Brill, 1983). It is important to remember, however, that the focus of political tolerance measures is whether a participant believes *the state* should show tolerance toward a particular group or view (Gibson, 2011). Therefore, when a researcher in this area asks whether a group should have free speech, the intention is to capture whether the participant believes *their government* should allow this

group to have freedom of expression. Thus, their outcome variables aren't measures of whether the participant, as an individual, is interested in hearing this perspective or whether they, as an individual, think this speech is objectionable. But rather, these studies measure whether the participant believes *their government* should allow free speech in general and for specific views. In contrast, this study asked participants about their *individual* willingness to be open to a specific point of view. Thus, this research more closely targets participants' personal willingness to engage with outgroup views.

Second, this is the first study I know of that uses both partisan identity and individual differences in open-mindedness to predict receptivity to outgroup views. Political scientists have used many different types of political attitude measures in their past research, such as support for democracy (Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002). However, I know of no past work that has instead measured participants' dispositional tendency to be tolerant or open to various points of view. In demonstrating that trait OM does, on average, predict greater open-mindedness and that trait OM does not moderate partisan bias this dissertation provides a valuable addition to political intolerance literature. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to use a personality measure to replicate and extend the findings obtained by political scientists.

Study 2 also advances the political intolerance literature in another interesting way. This literature has never established whether participants are *aware* of the incongruence between their general endorsements of tolerance and the rejection of certain groups. In Study 2, I asked participants to rate how open-minded they were in a general sense and then predict how they thought they would react to specific outgroup views. These results indicated that even the participants who rated themselves as highly open-minded did not predict they would be open to outgroup views. Thus, this dissertation provides the first evidence that people are acutely aware

of how partisan bias limits their openness. In my future research I would like to examine how participants reconcile this incongruity. For example, what kinds of explanations participants use to resolve any dissonance that this discrepancy between self-rated traits and behavior may provoke.

Predictive Validity of Trait OM

Second, this research is relevant to the literature on the predictive validity of trait measures. As discussed in the introduction, there is a long history of research on how well trait measures predict behavior (e.g., Lahey, 2009; Roberts et al., 2007). There is also a wealth of research examining how the PT scale predicts behaviors such as stereotyping (e.g., Axtell et al., 2007; Franzoi, Davis, Young, & Richard 1985; Grant & Berry, 2011; Ku, Wang, & Galinsky, 2010; Parker & Axtell, 2001). However, I know of no research that has examined the predictive validity of measures of dispositional open-mindedness for reactions to counter-attitudinal political views.

The results of this dissertation do suggest that trait OM is a good predictor of open reactions. The main effect of trait OM found in this dissertation did demonstrate that those scoring high (vs. low) in trait OM were, on average, more open to political views. However, there was no evidence that trait OM tempered the effect of partisan bias. Moreover, in Study 2 participants who scored high in trait OM didn't predict that their own dispositional open-mindedness would result in greater openness to outgroup views. Thus, highly open-minded people don't believe they will be, and in fact aren't, open to outgroup politics.

This lack of a moderation effect is an important finding for the literature on trait OM. I would argue that being open to differing views is an archetypal example of what it means to be open-minded. This dissertation shows that high scores on trait OM don't actually predict greater

openness to outgroup views. This suggests that research aimed at producing a better measure of this construct may be warranted. However, it is important to note that this dissertation only studied trait OM in the context of partisan identity and political viewpoints. Thus, conclusions drawn from this work about the predictive validity of trait OM may only be relevant in this specific domain. In my future research, I would like to examine these hypotheses for a different social identity and in a different intergroup setting (e.g., sports rivalries).

Frame of Reference Effects

A related point concerns the literature on predictor and criterion matching (Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007). This research has demonstrated that narrow measures are often better at predicting behavior relative to abstract personality measures. By narrow I mean measures that capture more precisely defined aspects of personality (i.e., need for cognition, need for affect), rather than a more general disposition (i.e., neuroticism, agreeableness). Although the measure of trait OM used here was reasonably narrow, in my future research I would like to explore how my results might shift if I were to use a more targeted predictor. There are several insights from the Frame of Reference Literature (FoR) that I believe are relevant to these considerations.

The literature on FoR effects provides robust evidence that creating highly contextualized trait measures can improve predictive validity for concrete behavioral outcomes (Holtropp et al., 2014, Holtropp, Born, & de Vries, 2014; Robie et al., 2017; Schmit et al., 1995). For example, imagine that you were trying to predict whether someone is a hard worker. An FoR researcher would first suggest you specify your research question even further, meaning a hard worker in what context? If you are trying to predict whether the subject is a hard-worker at school, then you should ask that specific question: To what degree are you a hard-worker *at school?* You

could also ask whether they are a hard worker at work or at home. But by asking participants how they perceive themselves in specific environments, this research suggests you may improve your ability to predict behavior within that same environment.

In the context of this dissertation, I wanted to test the efficacy of commonly used scales, which by and large tend not to be contextualized. In my future research, I would like to employ an FoR approach and examine whether narrowing my measure of trait OM improves predictive validity within the domain of politics. Thus, instead of asking "*How open are you to other's opinions?*", I might ask "*How open are you to other's political opinions?*" Of course, one must be cautious about being so specific that your predictor becomes functionally indistinguishable from your outcome variable. Thus, I would not ask "*How open are you to counter-attitudinal Facebook posts?"* Fortunately, there is a version of the OMC scale that specifically asks about openness to political views (Price et al., 2015). I did not use this contextualized version of OMC here, as a) there is no parallel scale for PT and b) as previously stated, I was interested in more typical methods of capturing traits. However, I would like to incorporate this version of the scale into my future work (see below).

Affect and Open-Mindedness

As was previously discussed, this dissertation is the first study I am aware of that examines the relationship between trait OM and affective reactions. I was also interested in the association between affective reactions and cognitive receptivity. The pattern of correlations in both studies demonstrated that receptivity was positively associated with positive affect and negatively associated with negative affect. Thus, participants tend to be cognitively open to points of view that "feel good" and less open to views that "feel bad". Although this finding is

not particularly novel, this is the first study to measure the affective reactions that co-occur with cognitive receptivity.

Of greater theoretical importance, this dissertation also demonstrated a reliable main effect of trait OM in predicting reduced negative affect, but no interaction with partisan identity. Thus, similar to the findings for cognitive reactions, participants who considered themselves to be open-minded were just as likely to react to outgroup views negatively as people who scored low in trait OM. Similarly, for positive affect I found no main effects of trait OM, nor any interactions with partisan identity. Thus, participants who considered themselves to be open-minded were not any more likely to react to outgroup views positively compared to people who scored low in trait OM. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate the affective consequences of partisan identity and trait OM. In my future research I would like to continue to explore the role of affect in open-mindedness. For example, by examining the consequences of priming threat (e.g., having participants read that an opposing political party is likely to win an important election) prior to measuring participants' affective and cognitive reactions to outgroup political views.

Affective and Behavioral Forecasting

Finally, this dissertation is relevant to the research on affective and behavioral forecasting. Prior work has shown that people often are not adept at predicting how they will feel or behave in future scenarios (e.g., Sandstrom & Dunn, 2011; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). However, in this dissertation the "predictors" were remarkably accurate in estimating how a sample of similar "experiencers" reacted to political points of view. The results demonstrated the "predictors" expected they would only be open to attitudinally consistent points of view, despite how open-minded they perceived themselves to be. The results obtained with the "experiencers"

in Study 1 were exactly parallel to this. There was a small tendency to over-estimate the intensity of all three outcome variables, but the general pattern of results was very similar across the two studies. This suggests that strong partisans are acutely aware of how their identity limits the degree to which they are open to other's political views, regardless of how open-minded they may simultaneously believe themselves to be. This is an interesting addition to the affective forecasting literature, particularly as it relates to previously discussed work by Dorison et al. (2019). Their study also found that participants' affective forecasting errors underlie selective exposure to politically consistent news and media. In the future, I would like to examine whether partisans' apparent awareness that they are not open to outgroup views predicts avoidance of counter-attitudinal news.

Future Directions

In the previous section I briefly alluded to some avenues for future research. I will lay out the future directions of this research more explicitly here. First, I would like to use this paradigm to examine the predictive validity of trait OM in a different domain. I would need to find a social identity similar to partisan identity in that there are clear ingroup and outgroup distinctions. One potential domain is sports rivalries (e.g., Miami Dolphins vs. New York Jets, Cardinals vs. Cubs). Second, I would like to use this same paradigm, but instead of the present measure of trait OM, utilize a contextualized measure as suggested by the literature on FoR effects.

I am also interested in developing new paradigms to test hypotheses related to trait OM. For example, I would like to develop a study in which participants provide longer written reactions to outgroup Facebook posts. I would be able to look for more subtle differences in these written pieces to indicate whether participants were giving the author's point of view open-minded consideration. There is also a literature on experimentally manipulating whether

participants receive instructions priming perspective-taking motivations (e.g., Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Davis et al., 1996) and similar work priming empathic motivations (e.g., Batson et al., 1981; Batson & Ahmad, 2009). I would like to incorporate this into future research by randomly assigning participants to read instructions asking them to be open-minded or to read materials indicating the importance of open-mindedness to people who share their partisan identity prior to reacting to outgroup views.

Finally, I am very interested in further examining the findings from Study 2 demonstrating that participants are aware of the limitations of trait OM in attenuating partisan bias. In particular, I would like to study the types of explanations that participants use to justify the conflict between their endorsements of their own trait OM and their predictions that they will not be open to outgroup political views. I predict that, in the domain of politics, there may be some form of moral ranking (Bartels, 2008; Nichols, 2002; van Willigenburg, 2000). By this I mean that the personal importance that participants place on being open-minded might be significantly lower than the importance of rejecting perspectives that are seen as immoral or unethical. If this were found to be true, participants' awareness of their own inconsistencies as observed in Study 2 would represent a conscious moral choice rather than an unconscious hypocrisy.

Conclusion

The idea that personality traits like open-mindedness or empathy may serve to attenuate bias is very compelling. However, the results of this dissertation provide no evidence that trait OM does, in fact, predict greater openness to counter-attitudinal views. My past research has dealt with similar questions regarding dispositional empathy (Davis, 1983). In this research I made several attempts to capture the capacity for empathy to reduce bias toward stigmatized

outgroups. For example, I have examined whether empathy mitigates the tendency for SDO to predict greater attributions of blame toward victims of sexual assault, AIDS patients, and victims of police shootings. In some cases, I found evidence to support this idea, but the effects tended to be small and didn't always replicate. In each case, just as in this dissertation, the most reliable finding was that SDO predicted greater blame and lower sympathy for stigmatized targets, regardless of a participant's level of dispositional empathy.

Even in the face of these previous results, the idea that open-mindedness could provide a brake on people's pre-existing prejudices seemed sensible. As such, I designed this dissertation to be a much more direct examination of the potential for personality traits to attenuate bias. However, yet again I did not find results that supported this idea. Taken together, these data suggest it may be reasonable to set this notion aside or to consider re-conceptualizing common measures of trait-based open-mindedness and empathy. In Study 2, the participants demonstrated that they were already aware of what my data have indicated across several paradigms. Namely that in the end, dispositional open-mindedness and empathy are traits that can predict benevolent outcomes, but the capacity for a trait to operate in this way is limited by pre-existing biases. Perhaps the most profitable avenue for future work in this domain is to examine how to effectively increase motivations to overcome these biases so that the better angels of our traits can shine through.

References

Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (2006). Exploring the bases of partisanship in the American electorate: Social identity vs. ideology. Political Research Quarterly, 59(2), 175-187.

Adler, J. (2004). Reconciling open-mindedness and belief. Theory and Research in Education, 2(2), 127-142.Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. Oxford, England: Harpers.

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. *New York*, 633.

Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brenswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (2019). *The authoritarian personality*. Verso Books.

Allen, B. P., & Potkay, C. R. (1973). Variability of self-description on a day-to-day basis: Longitudinal use of the adjective generation technique. *Journal of Personality*, *41*(4), 638–652.

Allport, G. W. (1966). Traits revisited. *American psychologist*, *21*(1), 1.

Altemeyer, B. (1981). *Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. University of Manitoba Press.

Altemeyer, B. (1998). The Other "Authoritarian Personality." In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 30, pp. 47–92).

Alterman, A. I., McDermott, P. A., Cacciola, J. S., & Rutherford, M. J. (2003). Latent structure of the Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index in methadone maintenance patients. *Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment*, *25*(4), 257-265.

Altman, D. G. (2014). Categorizing continuous variables. *Wiley StatsRef: Statistics Reference Online*.

Axtell, C. M., Parker, S. K., Holman, D., & Totterdell, P. (2007). Enhancing customer service: Perspective taking in a call centre. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, *16*(2), 141–168.

Baars, J., & Scheepers, P. (1993). Theoretical and methodological foundations of the authoritarian personality. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, *29*(4), 345-353.

Bankert, A., Huddy, L., & Rosema, M. (2017). Measuring partisanship as a social identity in multi-party systems. *Political behavior*, *39*(1), 103-132.

Barenboym, D. A., Wurm, L. H., & Cano, A. (2010). A comparison of stimulus ratings made online and in person: Gender and method effects. *Behavior Research Methods*, *42*(1), 273-285.

Bartels, D. M. (2008). Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making. *Cognition*, *108*(2), 381-417.

Bartels, L. M. (2002). Beyond the running tally: Partisan bias in political perceptions. *Political behavior*, *24*(2), 117-150.

Bass, B. M. (1955). Authoritarianism or acquiescence?. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *51*(3), 616.

Bastian, V. A., Burns, N. R., & Nettelbeck, T. (2005). Emotional intelligence predicts life skills, but not as well as personality and cognitive abilities. *Personality and individual differences*, *39*(6), 1135-1145.

Batson, C. D., & Ahmad, N. Y. (2009). Using empathy to improve intergroup attitudes and relations. *Social issues and policy review*, *3*(1), 141-177.

Batson, C. D., Chang, J., Orr, R., & Rowland, J. (2002). Empathy, attitudes, and action: Can feeling for a member of a stigmatized group motivate one to help the group?. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *28*(12), 1656-1666.

Batson, C. D., Duncan, B. D., Ackerman, P., Buckley, T., & Birch, K. (1981). Is empathic emotion a source of altruistic motivation?. *Journal of personality and Social Psychology*, *40*(2), 290.

Batson, C. D., Early, S., & Salvarani, G. (1997). Perspective taking: Imagining how another feels versus imaging how you would feel. *Personality and social psychology bulletin*, *23*(7), 751-758.

Beck, E. D., & Jackson, J. J. (2019). Consistency and change in idiographic personality: A longitudinal ESM network study. *Journal of personality and social psychology*.

Beck, E. D., & Jackson, J. J. (2019). Within-person variability.

Bem, D. J. (1972). Constructing cross-situational consistencies in behavior: Some thoughts on Alker's critique of Mischel. *Journal of Personality*, *40*(1), 17-26.

Bem, D. J., & Allen, A. (1974). On predicting some of the people some of the time: The search for cross-situational consistencies in behavior. *Psychological review*, *81*(6), 506.

Bernstein, W. M., & Davis, M. H. (1982). Perspective-taking, self-consciousness, and accuracy in person perception. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, *3*(1), 1-19.

Block, J. (1968). Some reasons for the apparent inconsistency of personality.

Block, J. (1977). Advancing the psychology of personality: Paradigmatic shift or improving the quality of research? In D. Magnusson & N. S. Endler (Eds.), Personality at the cross-roads: Current issues in interactional psychology (pp. 37–64). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Blumenthal, J. A. (2005). Law and the emotions: The problems of affective forecasting. *Ind. LJ*, *80*, 155.

Bodenhausen, G. V., Sheppard, L. A., & Kramer, G. P. (1994). Negative affect and social judgment: The differential impact of anger and sadness. *European Journal of social psychology*, *24*(1), 45-62.

Borkenau, P., & Ostendorf, F. (1998). The Big Five as states: How useful is the five-factor model to describe intraindividual variations over time?. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *32*(2), 202-221.

Bowers, K. S. (1973). Situationism in psychology: An analysis and a critique. *Psychological review*, *80*(5), 307.

Buehler, R., & McFarland, C. (2001). Intensity bias in affective forecasting: The role of temporal focus. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *27*(11), 1480-1493

Buss, A. H. (1989). Personality as traits. *American Psychologist*, *44*(11), 1378.

Buss, D. M., & Craik, K. H. (1984). Acts, dispositions, and personality. In *Progress in experimental personality research* (Vol. 13, pp. 241-301). Elsevier.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Chopik, W. J., O'Brien, E., & Konrath, S. H. (2017). Differences in empathic concern and perspective taking across 63 countries. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *48*(1), 23-38.

Christie, R. (1991). Authoritarianism and related constructs.

Clifford, S., & Jerit, J. (2014). Is there a cost to convenience? An experimental comparison of data quality in laboratory and online studies. *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, *1*(2), 120-131.

Clore, G. L., Schwarz, N., & Conway, M. (1994). Affective causes and consequences of social information processing.

Cohen, T. R. (2010). Moral emotions and unethical bargaining: The differential effects of empathy and perspective taking in deterring deceitful negotiation. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *94*(4), 569-579.

Corcoran, K. O. C., & Mallinckrodt, B. (2000). Adult attachment, self-efficacy, perspective taking, and conflict resolution. *Journal of Counseling & Development*, *78*(4), 473-483.

Costa Jr, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Four ways five factors are basic. *Personality and individual differences*, *13*(6), 653-665.

Damian, R. I., Spengler, M., Sutu, A., & Roberts, B. W. (2019). Sixteen going on sixty-six: A longitudinal study of personality stability and change across 50 years. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *117*(3), 674.

Dandurand, F., Shultz, T. R., & Onishi, K. H. (2008). Comparing online and lab methods in a problem-solving experiment. *Behavior research methods*, *40*(2), 428-434.

Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *44*(1), 113.

Davis, M. H. (1994). Social psychology series. Empathy: A social psychological approach.

Davis, M. H., Conklin, L., Smith, A., & Luce, C. (1996). Effect of perspective taking on the cognitive representation of persons: a merging of self and other. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *70*(4), 713.

DeNeve, K. M., & Cooper, H. (1998). The happy personality: A meta-analysis of 137 personality traits and subjective well-being. Psychological bulletin, 124(2), 197.

Diener, E., & Larsen, R. J. (2009). Temporal stability and cross-situational consistency of affective, behavioral, and cognitive responses. In *Assessing Well-Being* (pp. 7-24). Springer, Dordrecht.

Diener, E., Larsen, R. J., & Emmons, R. A. (1984). Person× Situation interactions: Choice of situations and congruence response models. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *47*(3), 580.

Dorison, C. A., Minson, J. A., & Rogers, T. (2019). Selective exposure partly relies on faulty affective forecasts. *Cognition*, *188*, 98–107.

Druckman, J. N., Peterson, E., & Slothuus, R. (2013). How elite partisan polarization affects public opinion formation. *American Political Science Review*, *107*(1), 57-79.

Eadeh, F., Dorison, C. , Slochower, J., Hanson, E., Peak, S., Skallerund, K., & Lambert, A. (under review). Terrorist Threat, Affect, and Ideological "Shifts to the Right": An Anger-Affordance Model. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.*

Endler, N. S. (1975). The case for person-situation interactions. *Canadian Psychological Review/Psychologie canadienne*, *16*(1), 12.

Endler, N. S. (1977). The role of person-by-situation interactions in personality theory. In *The structuring of experience* (pp. 343-369). Springer, Boston, MA.

Endler, N. S., & Hunt, J. M. (1966). Sources of behavioral variance as measured by the SR Inventory of Anxiousness. *Psychological Bulletin*, *65*(6), 336.

Endler, N. S., & Hunt, J. M. (1968). Triple-interaction variance in the SR Inventory of Anxiousness. *Perceptual and Motor Skills*.

Endler, N. S., & Magnusson, D. (1974). *Interactionism, trait psychology, psychodynamics, and situationism*. Psychological Laboratories, University of Stockholm.

Epley, N., & Dunning, D. (2000). Feeling" holier than thou": are self-serving assessments produced by errors in self-or social prediction?. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *79*(6), 861.

Epstein, S. (1977). Traits are alive and well. *Personality at the crossroads: Current issues in interactional psychology*, 83-98.

Epstein, S. (1979). The stability of behavior: I. On predicting most of the people much of the time. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *37*(7), 1097.

Epstein, S. (1980). The self-concept: A review and the proposal of an integrated theory of personality. *Personality: Basic aspects and current research*, *81132*.

Epstein, S. (1983). Aggregation and beyond: Some basic issues on the prediction of behavior. *Journal of Personality*, *51*(3), 360-392.

Epstein, S., & O'Brien, E. J. (1985). The person–situation debate in historical and current perspective. *Psychological Bulletin*, *98*(3), 513–537.

Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A. G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G* Power 3: A flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. *Behavior research methods*, *39*(2), 175-191.

Feldman, S. (2013). Comments on: Authoritarianism in social context: The role of threat. *International Journal of Psychology*, *48*(1), 55-59.

Fiske, D. W. (1974). The limits for the conventional science of personality. *Journal of Personality*.

Franzoi, S. L., Davis, M. H., & Young, R. D. (1985). The effects of private self-consciousness and perspective taking on satisfaction in close relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *48*(6), 1584.

Frijda, N. H. (1988). The laws of emotion. *American psychologist*, *43*(5), 349.

Fromm, E. (1929). Psychoanalysis and sociology.

Funder, D. C. (2003). Implications for Person Perception Accuracy and Self-Knowledge. *Social judgments: Implicit and explicit processes*, *5*, 115.

Funder, D. C. (2006). Towards a resolution of the personality triad: Persons, situations, and behaviors. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *40*(1), 21–34.

Funder, D. C. (2012). Accurate personality judgment. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *21*(3), 177-182.

Galinsky, A. D., Maddux, W. W., Gilin, D., & White, J. B. (2008). Why It Pays to Get Inside the Head of Your Opponent: The Differential Effects of Perspective Taking and Empathy in Negotiations. *Psychological Science*, *19*(4), 378–384.

Gardner, P. (1993). Should we teach children to be open-minded? Or, is the Pope open-minded about the existence of God?. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, *27*(1), 39-43.

Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., Dowling, C. M., & Ha, S. E. (2010). Personality and political attitudes: Relationships across issue domains and political contexts. *American Political Science Review*, *104*(1), 111-133.

Geukes, K., Nestler, S., Hutteman, R., Küfner, A. C., & Back, M. D. (2017). Trait personality and state variability: Predicting individual differences in within-and cross-context fluctuations in affect, self-evaluations, and behavior in everyday life. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *69*, 124-138.

Giammarco, E. A., & Vernon, P. A. (2014). Vengeance and the Dark Triad: The role of empathy and perspective taking in trait forgivingness. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *67*, 23-29.

Gibson, J. L. (1992). The Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and Political Freedom. *American Political Science Review*, *86*(2), 338–356.

Gibson, J. L. (2011). Political Intolerance in the Context of Democratic Theory. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*.

Gibson, J. L. (2013). Measuring Political Tolerance and General Support for Pro–Civil Liberties Policies: Notes, Evidence, and Cautions. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *77*(S1), 45-68.

Gibson, J. L., & Bingham, R. D. (1983). Elite tolerance of Nazi rights. *American Politics Quarterly*, *11*(4), 403-428.

Gilbert, D. T., & Ebert, J. E. (2002). Decisions and revisions: The affective forecasting of changeable outcomes. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *82*(4), 503.

Gilbert, D. T., Driver-Linn, E., & Wilson, T. D. (2002). The trouble with Vronsky: Impact bias in the forecasting of future affective states.

Gilbert, D. T., Pinel, E. C., Wilson, T. D., Blumberg, S. J., & Wheatley, T. P. (1998). Immune neglect: a source of durability bias in affective forecasting. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *75*(3), 617.

Gilet, A. L., Mella, N., Studer, J., Grühn, D., & Labouvie-Vief, G. (2013). Assessing dispositional empathy in adults: A French validation of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement*, *45*(1), 42.

Goren, P. (2005). Party identification and core political values. *American Journal of Political Science*, *49*(4), 881-896.

Goren, P., Federico, C. M., & Kittilson, M. C. (2009). Source cues, partisan identities, and political value expression. *American Journal of Political Science*, *53*(4), 805-820.

Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann Jr, W. B. (2003). A very brief measure of the Big-Five personality domains. *Journal of Research in personality*, *37*(6), 504-528.

Grant, A. M., & Berry, J. W. (2011). The necessity of others is the mother of invention: Intrinsic and prosocial motivations, perspective taking, and creativity. *Academy of management journal*, *54*(1), 73-96.

Greene, L. R. (1999). Representations of the group-as-a whole: Personality, situational, and dynamic determinants. *Psychoanalytic psychology*, *16*(3), 403.

Greene, R. L., & Clopton, J. R. (2004). Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2).

Haggard, M., Rowatt, W. C., Leman, J. C., Meagher, B., Moore, C., Fergus, T., ... & Howard-Snyder, D. (2018). Finding middle ground between intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility: Development and assessment of the limitations-owning intellectual humility scale. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *124*, 184-193.

Halperin, E., Canetti-Nisim, D., & Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2009). The central role of group-based hatred as an emotional antecedent of political intolerance: Evidence from Israel. *Political Psychology*, *30*(1), 93-123.

Halperin, E., Porat, R., Tamir, M., & Gross, J. J. (2013). Can emotion regulation change political attitudes in intractable conflicts? From the laboratory to the field. *Psychological science*, *24*(1), 106-111.

Han, S., Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2007). Feelings and consumer decision making: The appraisal-tendency framework. *Journal of consumer psychology*, *17*(3), 158-168.

Haran, U., Ritov, I., & Mellers, B. A. (2013). The role of actively open-minded thinking in information acquisition, accuracy, and calibration.

Hare, R. M. (1987). Moral reasoning about the environment. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, *4*(1), 3-14.

Hare, W. (2009). What open-mindedness requires. *Skeptical Inquirer*, *33*(2), 36-39.

Hartshorne, H., & May, M. A. (1928). Studies In the nature of character, Vol. 1. *Studies in deceit*.

Hawk, A. T., Konda, S. S. M., & Makarov, D. E. (2013). Computation of transit times using the milestoning method with applications to polymer translocation. *The Journal of chemical physics*, *139*(6), 08B611_1.

Hayes, A. F. (2017). *Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach*. Guilford publications.

Hayes, A. F. (2018). Partial, conditional, and moderated moderated mediation: Quantification, inference, and interpretation. Communication Monographs, 85(1), 4-40.

Ho, A. K., Sidanius, J., Kteily, N., Sheehy-Skeffington, J., Pratto, F., Henkel, K. E., ... & Stewart, A. L. (2015). The nature of social dominance orientation: Theorizing and measuring preferences for intergroup inequality using the new SDO scale. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *109*(6), 1003.

Hogan, R. T. (1991). Personality and personality measurement.

Holtrop, D., Born, M. P., & De Vries, R. E. (2015). Relating the spherical representation of vocational interests to the HEXACO personality model. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, *89*, 10-20.

Holtrop, D., Born, M. P., de Vries, A., & de Vries, R. E. (2014). A matter of context: A comparison of two types of contextualized personality measures. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *68*, 234-240.

Horberg, E. J., Oveis, C., & Keltner, D. (2011). Emotions as moral amplifiers: An appraisal tendency approach to the influences of distinct emotions upon moral judgment. *Emotion Review*, *3*(3), 237-244.

Hovland, C. I., Harvey, O. J., & Sherif, M. (1957). Assimilation and contrast effects in reactions to communication and attitude change. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *55*(2), 244.

Huber, M., Boven, L. V., Park, B., & Pizzi, W. T. (2015). Seeing Red: Anger Increases How Much Republican Identification Predicts Partisan Attitudes and Perceived Polarization. *PLOS ONE*, *10*(9), 139-193.

Huddy, L. (2013). From group identity to political cohesion and commitment. *Oxford handbook of political psychology*, 737-773.

Huddy, L. (2015). Group identity and political cohesion. *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource*, 1-14.

Huddy, L., & Bankert, A. (2017). Political partisanship as a social identity. In *Oxford research encyclopedia of politics*.

Huddy, L., Mason, L., & Aarøe, L. (2015). Expressive partisanship: Campaign involvement, political emotion, and partisan identity. *American Political Science Review*, *109*(1), 1-17.

Hurwitz, J., & Mondak, J. J. (2002). Democratic principles, discrimination and political intolerance. *British Journal of Political Science*, *32*(1), 93-118.

Jackson, J. J., Connolly, J. J., Garrison, S. M., Leveille, M. M., & Connolly, S. L. (2015). Your friends know how long you will live: A 75-year study of peer-rated personality traits. *Psychological Science*, *26*(3), 335-340.

Janowitz, M., & Marvick, D. (1953). Authoritarianism and political behavior. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *17*(2), 185-201.

John, O. P., Donahue, E. M., & Kentle, R. L. (1991). The big five inventory—versions 4a and 54.

Johnston, R. (2006). The politics of changing human geography's agenda: textbooks and the representation of increasing diversity. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, *31*(3), 286-303.

Jolliffe, I. (2011). *Principal component analysis* (pp. 1094-1096). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. *American psychologist*, *61*(7), 651.

Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. *Annual review of psychology*, *60*, 307-337.

Judge, T. A., & Zapata, C. P. (2015). The person–situation debate revisited: Effect of situation strength and trait activation on the validity of the Big Five personality traits in predicting job performance. *Academy of Management Journal*, *58*(4), 1149-1179.

Kennedy, R., Clifford, S., Burleigh, T., Jewell, R., & Waggoner, P. (2018). The shape of and solutions to the MTurk quality crisis. *Available at SSRN 3272468*.

Kenrick, D. T., & Funder, D. C. (1988). Profiting from controversy: Lessons from the person-situation debate. American psychologist, 43(1), 23.

Kroh, M. (2007). Measuring left–right political orientation: The choice of response format. Public Opinion Quarterly, 71(2), 204-220.

Ku, G., Wang, C. S., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). Perception through a perspective-taking lens: Differential effects on judgment and behavior. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *46*(5), 792-798.

Kuklinski, J. H., Luskin, R. C., & Bolland, J. (1991). Where is the Schema? Going Beyong the "S" Word in Political Psychology. *The American Political Science Review*, *85*(4), 1341–1356.

Lahey, B. B. (2009). Public health significance of neuroticism. *American Psychologist*, *64*(4), 241.

Lambert, A. J., Eadeh, F. R., & Hanson, E. J. (2019). Anger and its consequences for judgment and behavior: Recent developments in social and political psychology. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 60, 103-173.

Lambert, A. J., Scherer, L. D., Schott, J. P., Olson, K. R., Andrews, R. K., O'Brien, T. C., & Zisser, A. R. (2010). Rally effects, threat, and attitude change: An integrative approach to understanding the role of emotion. Journal of personality and social psychology, 98(6), 886.

Larsen, R. J., & Ketelaar, T. (1991). Personality and susceptibility to positive and negative emotional states. Journal of personality and social psychology, 61(1), 132.

Leary, M. R., Diebels, K. J., Davisson, E. K., Jongman-Sereno, K. P., Isherwood, J. C., Raimi, K. T., … Hoyle, R. H. (2017). Cognitive and Interpersonal Features of Intellectual Humility. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, *43*(6), 793–813.

Lecky, P. (1945). Self-consistency; a theory of personality.

Leith, K. P., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Empathy, shame, guilt, and narratives of interpersonal conflicts: Guilt-prone people are better at perspective taking. Journal of personality, 66(1), 1-37.

Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice. *Cognition & emotion*, *14*(4), 473-493.

Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *81*(1), 146.

Lerner, J. S., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2006). Portrait of the angry decision maker: How appraisal tendencies shape anger's influence on cognition. *Journal of behavioral decision making*, *19*(2), 115-137.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Political man: The social bases of politics.

Lovett, M., Bajaba, S., Lovett, M., & Simmering, M. J. (2018). Data quality from crowdsourced surveys: A mixed method inquiry into perceptions of amazon's mechanical turk masters. *Applied Psychology*, *67*(2), 339-366.

MacCallum, R. C., Zhang, S., Preacher, K. J., & Rucker, D. D. (2002). On the practice of dichotomization of quantitative variables. *Psychological methods*, *7*(1), 19.

Magnusson, D., & Endler, N. S. (1977). *Personality at the crossroads: Current issues in interactional psychology*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; New York: distributed by the Halsted Press Division of Wiley.

Marcus, G. E., MacKuen, M., Wolak, J., & Keele, L. (2006). The measure and mismeasure of emotion. In *Feeling politics* (pp. 31-45). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Maslow, A. H. (1943). The authoritarian character structure.

Mavor, K. I., Louis, W. R., & Sibley, C. G. (2010). A bias-corrected exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis of right-wing authoritarianism: Support for a three-factor structure. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *48*(1), 28–33.

Maxwell, S. E., & Delaney, H. D. (1993). Bivariate median splits and spurious statistical significance. *Psychological bulletin*, *113*(1), 181.

McClosky, H., & Brill, A. (1983). *The dimensions of tolerance: What Americans believe about civil liberties*. Russell Sage Foundation.

McElroy-Heltzel, S. E., Davis, D. E., DeBlaere, C., Worthington Jr, E. L., & Hook, J. N. (2019). Embarrassment of riches in the measurement of humility: A critical review of 22 measures. *The Journal of Positive Psychology*, *14*(3), 393-404.

Mesquita, B., Barrett, L. F., & Smith, E. R. (Eds.). (2010). *The mind in context*. Guilford Press.

Mischel, W. (1961). Delay of gratification, need for achievement, and acquiescence in another culture. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 62(3), 543.

Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment. New York, NY: Wiley.

Mischel, W. (1983). Delay of gratification as process and as person variable in development. Human development: An interactional perspective, 149-165.

Mischel, W. (2004). Toward an integrative science of the person. Annu. Rev. Psychol., 55, 1-22.

Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure. *Psychological review*, *102*(2), 246.

Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Peake, P. K. (1988). The nature of adolescent competencies predicted by preschool delay of gratification. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *54*(4), 687.

Mohr, P., Howells, K., Gerace, A., Day, A., & Wharton, M. (2007). The role of perspective taking in anger arousal. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *43*(3), 507–517.

Moore, C. G., Carter, R. E., Nietert, P. J., & Stewart, P. W. (2011). Recommendations for planning pilot studies in clinical and translational research. *Clinical and translational science*, *4*(5), 332-337.

Moss, A. J., & Litman, L. (2018). After the bot scare: Understanding what's been happening with data collection on MTurk and how to stop it [blog post].

Mummolo, J., & Peterson, E. (2019). Demand effects in survey experiments: An empirical assessment. *American Political Science Review*, *113*(2), 517-529.

Nichols, S. (2002). Norms with feeling: Towards a psychological account of moral judgment. *Cognition*, *84*(2), 221-236.

Norris, C. J., Dumville, A. G., & Lacy, D. P. (2011). Affective forecasting errors in the 2008 election: Underpredicting happiness. *Political Psychology*, *32*(2), 235-249

Orom, H., & Cervone, D. (2009). Personality dynamics, meaning, and idiosyncrasy: Identifying cross-situational coherence by assessing personality architecture. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *43*(2), 228-240.

Ottati, V., Price, E. D., Wilson, C., & Sumaktoyo, N. (2015). When self-perceptions of expertise increase closed-minded cognition: The earned dogmatism effect. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *61*, 131-138.

Parker, M. T., & Isbell, L. M. (2010). How I vote depends on how I feel: The differential impact of anger and fear on political information processing. *Psychological Science*, *21*(4), 548-550.

Parker, S. K., & Axtell, C. M. (2001). Seeing another viewpoint: Antecedents and outcomes of employee perspective taking. *Academy of Management Journal*, *44*(6), 1085-1100.

Paunonen, S. V. (2003). Big Five factors of personality and replicated predictions of behavior. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *84*(2), 411.

Paunonen, S. V., & Ashton, M. C. (2001). Big five factors and facets and the prediction of behavior. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *81*(3), 524.

Paunonen, S. V., Haddock, G., Forsterling, F., & Keinonen, M. (2003). Broad versus narrow personality measures and the prediction of behaviour across cultures. *European Journal of Personality*, *17*(6), 413-433.

Peffley, M., Knigge, P., & Hurwitz, J. (2001). A multiple values model of political tolerance. *Political Research Quarterly*, *54*(2), 379-406.

Porter, T., & Schumann, K. (2018). Intellectual humility and openness to the opposing view. *Self and Identity*, *17*(2), 139-162.

Price, E., Ottati, V., Wilson, C., & Kim, S. (2015). Open-minded cognition. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *41*(11), 1488-1504.

Revelle, W., & Condon, D. M. (2015). A model for personality at three levels. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *56*, 70-81.

Riggs, W. (2010). Open-mindedness. *Metaphilosophy*, *41*(1-2), 172-188.

Roberts, A. H., & Rokeach, M. (1956). Anomie, authoritarianism, and prejudice: A replication. *American Journal of Sociology*, *61*(4), 355-358.

Roberts, B. W. (2007). Contextualizing personality psychology. *Journal of personality*, *75*(6), 1071-1082.

Roberts, B. W., Walton, K. E., & Viechtbauer, W. (2006). Patterns of mean-level change in personality traits across the life course: a meta-analysis of longitudinal studies. *Psychological bulletin*, *132*(1), 1.

Robie, C., Risavy, S. D., Holtrop, D., & Born, M. P. (2017). Fully contextualized, frequency-based personality measurement: A replication and extension. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *70*, 56-65.

Rokeach, M. (1948). Generalized mental rigidity as a factor in ethnocentrism. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 43(3), 259.

Rokeach, M. (1960). The open and closed mind: Investigations into the nature of belief systems and personality systems.

Sandstrom, G. M., & Dunn, E. W. (2011). The virtue blind spot: Do affective forecasting errors undermine virtuous behavior?. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *5*(10), 720-733.

Sarle, W. S. (1995). Measurement theory: Frequently asked questions. *Disseminations of the International Statistical Applications Institute*, *1*(4), 61-66.

Schmit, M. J., Ryan, A. M., Stierwalt, S. L., & Powell, A. B. (1995). Frame-of-reference effects on personality scale scores and criterion-related validity. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *80*(5), 607–620.

Schwarz, N. (1990). *Feelings as information: Informational and motivational functions of affective states*. The Guilford Press.

Schwarz, N. (2007). Retrospective and concurrent self-reports: The rationale for real-time data capture. *The science of real-time data capture: Self-reports in health research*, *11*, 26.

Schwarz, N. (2012). Why researchers should think “real-time”: A cognitive rationale. *Handbook of research methods for studying daily life*, 22-42.

Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1996). Feelings and phenomenal experiences.

Schwarz, N., & Oyserman, D. (2001). Asking questions about behavior: Cognition, communication, and questionnaire construction. *The American Journal of Evaluation*, *22*(2), 127-160.

Sevillano, V., Aragonés, J. I., & Schultz, P. W. (2007). Perspective taking, environmental concern, and the moderating role of dispositional empathy. *Environment and behavior*, *39*(5), 685-705.

Shweder, R. A. (1975). How relevant is an individual difference theory of personality? 1. *Journal of*

Shweder, R. A. (1975). How relevant is an individual difference theory of personality? *Journal of Personality*, *43*(3), 455–484.

Specht, J., Egloff, B., & Schmukle, S. C. (2011). Stability and change of personality across the life course: the impact of age and major life events on mean-level and rank-order stability of the Big Five. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *101*(4), 862.

Spiegel, J. S. (2012). Open-mindedness and intellectual humility. *Theory and Research in Education*, *10*(1), 27-38.

Stouffer, S. A. (1955). *Communism, conformity, and civil liberties: A cross-section of the nation speaks its mind*. Transaction Publishers.

Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J., & Marcus, G. E. (1979). An alternative conceptualization of political tolerance: Illusory increases 1950s–1970s. *American Political Science Review*, *73*(3), 781-794.

Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J., & Marcus, G. E. (1993). *Political tolerance and American democracy*. University of Chicago Press.

Swann Jr, W. B., Chang-Schneider, C., & Larsen McClarty, K. (2007). Do people's self-views matter? Self-concept and self-esteem in everyday life. *American psychologist*, *62*(2), 84.

Tett, R. P., & Guterman, H. A. (2000). Situation trait relevance, trait expression, and cross-situational consistency: Testing a principle of trait activation. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *34*(4), 397-423.

Tiedens, L. Z., & Linton, S. (2001). Judgment under emotional certainty and uncertainty: the effects of specific emotions on information processing. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *81*(6), 973.

Van Mechelen, I. (2009). A royal road to understanding the mechanisms underlying person-in-context behavior. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *43*(2), 179-186.

Van Willigenburg, T. (2000). Moral compromises, moral integrity and the indeterminacy of value rankings. Ethical theory and moral practice, 3(4), 385-404.

Weeks, B. E. (2015). Emotions, partisanship, and misperceptions: How anger and anxiety moderate the effect of partisan bias on susceptibility to political misinformation. *Journal of Communication*, *65*(4), 699-719.

West, S. G. (1983). Personality and prediction: An introduction.

West, S. G., Aiken, L. S., & Krull, J. L. (1996). Experimental personality designs: Analyzing categorical by continuous variable interactions. Journal of personality, 64(1), 1-48.

Wilson, C., Ottati, V., & Price, E. (2017). Open-minded cognition: The attitude justification effect. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 12(1), 47-58.

Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2003). Affective forecasting. *Advances in experimental social psychology*, *35*(35), 345-411.

Woo, S. E., Saef, R., & Parrigon, S. (2015). Openness to Experience. In J. D. Wright (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition)* (pp. 231–235).

Woodzicka, J. A., & LaFrance, M. (2001). Real versus imagined gender harassment. *Journal of Social Issues*, *57*(1), 15-30.

Tables

Table 1
ANOVA testing for order effects (Study 1)

Variables	df	F	p
Trait Open-Mindedness	1, 227	.21	.664
Strong Liberal Receptivity	1, 227	.46	.498
Moderate Liberal Receptivity	1, 227	.09	.767
Moderate Conservative Receptivity	1, 227	.14	.704
Strong Conservative Receptivity	1, 227	.78	.380
Strong Liberal Positive Affect	1, 227	1.31	.253
Moderate Liberal Positive Affect	1, 227	.17	.681
Moderate Conservative Positive Affect	1, 225	2.23	.137
Strong Conservative Positive Affect	1, 226	1.43	.232
Strong Liberal Negative Affect	1, 225	.05	.824
Moderate Liberal Negative Affect	1, 226	.39	.531
Moderate Conservative Negative Affect	1, 227	.99	.321
Strong Conservative Negative Affect	1, 227	1.89	.171

Note: Designation of ideological strength (e.g., moderate liberal) refers to the type of Facebook posts.

Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables (Study 1)

Variables	MEAN	SD
Strong Liberal Receptivity	50.34	29.48
Moderate Liberal Receptivity	54.40	26.81
Moderate Conservative Receptivity	47.49	26.22
Strong Conservative Receptivity	43.53	28.14
Strong Liberal Positive Affect	25.68	28.37
Moderate Liberal Positive Affect	29.53	27.53
Moderate Conservative Positive Affect	18.74	23.14
Strong Conservative Positive Affect	21.16	26.18
Strong Liberal Negative Affect	33.53	31.85
Moderate Liberal Negative Affect	22.38	22.77
Moderate Conservative Negative Affect	32.37	27.75
Strong Conservative Negative Affect	32.07	28.59

Table 3
Correlations Between Trait OM and All Dependent Variables For Each Type of Facebook Post (Study 1)

Variables	Trait OM	SL Recept.	ML Recept.	MC Recept.	SC Recept.	SL Pos.	ML Pos.	MC Pos.	SC Pos.	SL Neg.	ML Neg.	MC Neg.	SC Neg.
Trait OM	1.00	.29**	.30**	.09	.04	.07	.09	-.10	-.13*	-.21**	-.14*	.04	.06
SL Recept.	.29**	1.00	.55**	.01	-.22**	.55**	.34**	.02	-.23**	-.31**	-.05	.27**	.43**
ML Recept.	.30**	.55**	1.00	.12	.01	.31**	.61**	.11	.00	-.02	-.15*	.26**	.33**
MC Recept.	.09	.01	.12	1.00	.51**	.07	.11	.53**	.27**	.20**	.25**	-.21**	-.06
SC Recept.	.04	-.22**	.01	.51**	1.00	-.19**	.01	.23**	.67**	.33**	.22**	-.05	-.37**
SL Pos	.07	.55**	.31**	.07	-.19**	1.00	.55**	.35**	.00	-.28**	.05	.18**	.33**
ML Pos	.09	.34**	.61**	.11	.01	.55**	1.00	.40**	.26**	-.05	-.08	.22**	.31**
MC Pos	-.10	.02	.11	.53**	.23**	.35**	.40**	1.00	.43**	.21**	.28**	-.14*	.06
SC Pos	-.13*	-.23**	.00	.27**	.67**	.00	.26**	.43**	1.00	.41**	.32**	.05	-.29**
SL Neg	-.21**	-.31**	-.02	.20**	.33**	-.28**	-.05	.21**	.41**	1.00	.53**	.31**	-.01
ML Neg	-.14*	-.05	-.15*	.25**	.22**	.05	-.08	.28**	.32**	.53**	1.00	.31**	.14*
MC Neg	.04	.27**	.26**	-.21**	-.05	.18**	.22**	-.14*	.05	.31**	.31**	1.00	.37**
SC Neg	.06	.43**	.33**	-.06	-.37**	.33**	.31**	.06	-.29**	-.01	.14*	.37**	1.00

SL Recept., Strong Liberal Receptivity; ML Recept., Moderate Liberal Receptivity; MC Recept., Moderate Conservative Receptivity; SC Recept., Strong Conservative Receptivity; SL Pos., Strong Liberal Positive Affect; ML Pos., Moderate Liberal Positive Affect; MC Pos., Moderate Conservative Positive Affect; SC Pos., Strong Conservative Positive Affect; SL Neg., Strong Liberal Negative Affect; ML Neg., Moderate Liberal Negative Affect; MC Neg., Moderate Conservative Negative Affect; SC Neg., Strong Conservative Negative Affect.
**p<.05, **p<.01*

Table 4
GLM for Cognitive Receptivity (Study 1)

Variables	df	F	p	η_p^2
Partisan Identity	1, 225	.91	.340	.00
Trait OM	1, 225	17.78	<.001	.07
Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	.19	.667	.00
Post Ideology	1, 225	15.42	<.001	.06
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity	1, 225	168.24	<.001	.43
Post Ideology*Trait OM	1, 225	5.00	.026	.02
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	.001	.977	.00
Post Extremity	1, 225	11.71	.001	.05
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity	1, 225	1.25	.265	.01
Post Extremity *Trait OM	1, 225	.001	.977	.00
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	.71	.400	.00
Post Ideology*Post Extremity	1, 225	.000	.990	.00
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Partisan Identity	1, 225	23.51	<.001	.10
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Trait OM	1, 225	.16	.686	.00
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	1.20	.275	.01

Table 5
Additional Regression Analyses for Receptivity (Study 1)

		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
SL	Step 1								.41
		Trait OM	7.66	1.67	.24	4.58***	4.37	10.95	
		PI	32.06	3.09	.55	10.37***	25.96	38.15	
	Step 2								.41
		Trait OM* PI	-3.59	3.39	-.07	-1.06	-10.26	3.09	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
ML	Step 1								.41
		Trait OM	6.69	1.76	.23	3.80***	3.22	10.16	
		PI	16.99	3.26	.32	5.21***	10.56	23.41	
	Step 2								.41
		Trait OM*PI	1.66	3.58	.04	.46	-5.39	8.71	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
MC	Step 1								.31
		Trait OM	3.29	1.80	.12	1.83	-.26	6.84	
		PI	-15.6	3.33	-.30	-4.64***	-22.02	-8.89	
	Step 2								.31
		Trait OM* PI	-1.56	3.66	-.04	.67	-8.76	5.65	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
SC	Step 1								.45
		Trait OM	2.60	1.81	.09	1.43	-.97	6.16	
		PI	-25.41	3.35	-.45	-7.59***	-32.01	-18.81	
	Step 2								.45
		Trait OM*PI	-.59	3.68	-.01	-.16	-7.84	6.66	

Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative.
PI: Partisan Identity (0 = Republican ,1= Democrat).
**p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001*

Table 6
GLM for Positive Affect (Study 1)

Variables	df	F	p	η_p^2
Partisan Identity	1, 223	.71	.402	.00
Trait OM	1, 223	.10	.750	.00
Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 223	.00	.967	.00
Post Ideology	1, 223	27.59	<.001	.11
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity	1, 223	103.92	<.001	.32
Post Ideology*Trait OM	1, 223	5.55	.019	.02
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 223	.26	.614	.00
Post Extremity	1, 223	.39	.532	.00
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity	1, 223	.19	.666	.00
Post Extremity *Trait OM	1, 223	.91	.340	.00
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 223	2.97	.086	.01
Post Ideology*Post Extremity	1, 223	6.30	.013	.03
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Partisan Identity	1, 223	19.08	<.001	.08
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Trait OM	1, 223	.00	.999	.00
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 223	.13	.716	.00

Table 7
Additional Regression Analyses for Positive Affect (Study 1)

		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
SL	Step 1								.40
		Trait OM	.92	1.88	.03	.490	-2.78	4.62	
		PI	22.17	3.48	.39	6.38***	15.32	29.02	
	Step 2								.40
		Trait OM* PI	-1.95	3.82	-.04	-.51	-9.47	5.57	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
ML	Step 1								.23
		Trait OM	1.96	1.93	.07	1.01	-1.85	5.77	
		PI	11.52	3.58	.21	3.22**	4.46	18.57	
	Step 2								.23
		Trait OM*PI	.61	3.93	.01	.16	-7.13	8.36	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
MC	Step 1								.17
		Trait OM	-2.03	1.65	-.08	-1.23	-5.28	1.22	
		PI	-6.51	3.06	-.14	-2.13*	-12.53	-.49	
	Step 2								.18
		Trait OM* PI	3.51	3.34	.09	1.05	-3.08	10.10	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
SC	Step 1								.39
		Trait OM	-2.73	1.74	-.10	-1.57	-6.16	.70	
		PI	-19.12	3.23	-.37	-5.93***	-25.48	-12.76	
	Step 2								.39
		Trait OM*PI	-1.72	3.54	-.04	-.49	-8.68	525	

Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative.
PI: Partisan Identity (0 = Republican ,1= Democrat).
**p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001*

Table 8
GLM for Negative Affect (Study 1)

Variables	df	F	p	η_p^2
Partisan Identity	1, 223	2.93	.088	.01
Trait OM	1, 223	3.18	.076	.01
Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 223	1.25	.264	.01
Post Ideology	1, 223	6.77	.010	.03
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity	1, 223	85.79	<.001	.28
Post Ideology*Trait OM	1, 223	6.52	.011	.03
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 223	2.10	.148	.01
Post Extremity	1, 223	17.55	<.001	.07
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity	1, 223	.55	.460	.00
Post Extremity *Trait OM	1, 223	.68	.412	.00
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 223	2.72	.101	.01
Post Ideology*Post Extremity	1, 223	12.87	<.001	.06
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Partisan Identity	1, 223	5.84	.016	.03
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Trait OM	1, 223	.59	.445	.00
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 223	3.41	.066	.02

Table 9
Additional Regression Analyses for Negative Affect (Study 1)

	Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
SL	Step 1						.32
	Trait OM	-6.25	2.19	-.18	-2.86**	-10.56 -1.94	
	PI	-15.41	4.05	-.24	-3.81***	-23.38 -7.43	
	Step 2						.33
	Trait OM* PI	4.90	4.43	.09	1.11	-3.83 13.63	
	Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
ML	Step 1						.20
	Trait OM	-3.03	1.62	-.12	-1.88	-6.21 .15	
	PI	-6.50	2.98	-.14	-2.18*	-12.38 -.62	
	Step 2						.23
	Trait OM*PI	-5.73	3.26	-.15	-1.76	-12.15 .68	
	Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
MC	Step 1						.30
	Trait OM	.25	1.91	.01	.13	-3.51 4.00	
	PI	16.80	3.53	.30	4.76***	9.85 23.75	
	Step 2						.31
	Trait OM* PI	-4.58	3.86	-.10	-.10	-12.19 3.03	
	Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
SC	Step 1						.40
	Trait OM	.65	1.89	.02	.34	-3.08 4.38	
	PI	22.42	3.50	.39	6.40***	15.51 29.32	
	Step 2						.41
	Trait OM*PI	-6.36	3.83	-.13	-1.66	-13.90 1.18	

Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative.
PI: Partisan Identity (0 = Republican ,1= Democrat).
**p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001*

Table 10
ANOVA testing for order effects (Study 2)

Variables	df	F	p
Trait Open-Mindedness	1, 227	.99	.320
Strong Liberal Receptivity	1, 227	.94	.333
Moderate Liberal Receptivity	1, 227	.92	.339
Moderate Conservative Receptivity	1, 227	1.22	.270
Strong Conservative Receptivity	1, 227	2.49	.116
Strong Liberal Positive Affect	1, 227	5.88	.016
Moderate Liberal Positive Affect	1, 227	.08	.777
Moderate Conservative Positive Affect	1, 227	.93	.336
Strong Conservative Positive Affect	1, 227	2.82	.094
Strong Liberal Negative Affect	1, 227	.09	.770
Moderate Liberal Negative Affect	1, 227	.13	.721
Moderate Conservative Negative Affect	1, 227	.00	.992
Strong Conservative Negative Affect	1, 227	.22	.638

Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables (Study 2)

Variables	MEAN	SD
Strong Liberal Receptivity	60.98	26.42
Moderate Liberal Receptivity	64.09	23.03
Moderate Conservative Receptivity	58.67	23.92
Strong Conservative Receptivity	52.33	25.06
Strong Liberal Positive Affect	35.53	28.97
Moderate Liberal Positive Affect	37.02	26.33
Moderate Conservative Positive Affect	27.52	24.26
Strong Conservative Positive Affect	28.52	27.07
Strong Liberal Negative Affect	36.61	30.27
Moderate Liberal Negative Affect	28.44	25.91
Moderate Conservative Negative Affect	37.03	26.45
Strong Conservative Negative Affect	40.71	28.17

Trait OM, Trait Open-Mindedness; *RWA, Right-Wing Authoritarianism; SDO, Social-Dominance Orientation*.

Table 12
Correlations Between Trait OM and All Dependent Variables For Each Type of Statement (Study 2)

Variables	Trait OM	SL Recept.	ML Recept.	MC Recept.	SC Recept.	SL Pos.	ML Pos.	MC Pos.	SC Pos.	SL Neg.	ML Neg.	MC Neg.	SC Neg.
SL Recept.	.25**	1.00	.44**	-.08	-.26**	.58**	.30**	-.13*	-.19**	-.48**	-.14*	.15*	.12
ML Recept.	.18**	.44**	1.00	.08	-.12	.21**	.56**	.04	-.13	-.15*	-.28**	.10	.17*
MC Recept.	.08	-.08	.08	1.00	.42**	.00	.08	.56**	.34**	.22**	.18**	-.29**	-.09
SC Recept.	-.07	-.26**	-.12	.42**	1.00	-.08	.02	.39**	.67**	.32**	.22**	-.08	-.35**
SL Pos	.18**	.58**	.21**	.00	-.08	1.00	.48**	.19**	.14*	-.42**	-.09	.11	.11
ML Pos	.05	.30**	.56**	.08	.02	.48**	1.00	.30**	.19**	-.13*	-.20**	.08	.13*
MC Pos	-.06	-.13*	.04	.56**	.39**	.19**	.30**	1.00	.58**	.25**	.21**	-.21**	-.10
SC Pos	-.09	-.19**	-.13	.34**	.67**	.14*	.19**	.58**	1.00	.27**	.28**	-.05	-.32**
SL Neg	-.17**	-.48**	-.15*	.22**	.32**	-.42**	-.13*	.25**	.27**	1.00	.49**	.17*	.17*
ML Neg	-.17**	-.14*	-.28**	.18**	.22**	-.09	-.202**	.21**	.28**	.49**	1.00	.40**	.22**
MC Neg	-.08	.15*	.10	-.29**	-.08	.11	.08	-.21**	-.05	.17*	.40**	1.00	.48**
SC Neg	-.06	.12	.17*	-.09	-.35**	.11	.13*	-.10	-.32**	.17*	.22**	.48**	1.00

SL Recept., Strong Liberal Receptivity; ML Recept., Moderate Liberal Receptivity; MC Recept., Moderate Conservative Receptivity; SC Recept., Strong Conservative Receptivity; SL Pos., Strong Liberal Positive Affect; ML Pos., Moderate Liberal Positive Affect; MC Pos., Moderate Conservative Positive Affect; SC Pos., Strong Conservative Positive Affect; SL Neg., Strong Liberal Negative Affect; ML Neg., Moderate Liberal Negative Affect; MC Neg., Moderate Conservative Negative Affect; SC Neg., Strong Conservative Negative Affect.
**p<.05, **p<.01*

Table 13
GLM for Predicted Cognitive Receptivity (Study 2)

Variables	df	F	p	η_p^2
Partisan Identity	1,225	1.89	.171	.01
Trait OM	1,225	11.34	.001	.05
Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1,225	.41	.522	.00
Statement Ideology	1, 225	15.23	<.001	.06
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity	1, 225	230.42	<.001	.51
Statement Ideology*Trait OM	1, 225	.45	.501	.00
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	.15	.700	.00
Statement Extremity	1, 225	13.39	<.001	.06
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity	1, 225	.13	.721	.00
Statement Extremity *Trait OM	1, 225	.10	.754	.00
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	.01	.941	.00
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity	1, 225	.90	.344	.00
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan Identity	1, 225	26.82	<.001	.11
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Trait OM	1, 225	1.47	.227	.01
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	.41	.737	.00

Table 14
Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Receptivity (Study 2)

		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
SL	Step 1							.54
		Trait OM	3.30	1.64	.12	2.01*	.07 6.53	
		PI	26.23	3.07	.50	8.54**	20.17 32.28	
	Step 2							.54
		Trait OM* PI	.98	3.31	.02	.30	-5.55 7.51	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
ML	Step 1							.35
		Trait OM	2.20	1.59	.09	1.39	-.93 5.33	
		PI	14.60	2.98	.32	4.90***	8.74 20.47	
	Step 2							.35
		Trait OM*PI	.31	3.21	.01	.10	-6.02 6.64	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
MC	Step 1							.39
		Trait OM	4.73	1.63	.19	2.91**	1.52 7.94	
		PI	-18.70	3.05	-.39	-6.13***	-24.71 -12.69	
	Step 2							.39
		Trait OM* PI	2.44	3.29	.06	.74	-4.04 8.92	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
SC	Step 1							.62
		Trait OM	2.80	1.45	.11	1.93	-.06 5.65	
		PI	-32.16	2.71	-.64	-11.86***	-37.50 -26.81	
	Step 2							.62
		Trait OM*PI	1.36	2.92	.03	.47	-4.40 7.12	

Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative
PI: Partisan Identity (0 = Republican ,1= Democrat).
**p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001*

Table 15
GLM for Predicted Positive Affect (Study 2)

Variables	df	F	p	η_p^2
Partisan Identity	1, 225	6.40	.012	.03
Trait OM	1, 225	1.87	.173	.01
Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	.87	.343	.00
Statement Ideology	1, 225	20.00	<.001	.08
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity	1, 225	117.80	<.001	.34
Statement Ideology*Trait OM	1, 225	.30	.585	.00
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	.60	.440	.00
Statement Extremity	1, 225	.08	.783	.00
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity	1, 225	1.26	.263	.01
Statement Extremity *Trait OM	1, 225	2.47	.118	.01
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	.30	.583	.00
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity	1, 225	2.66	.104	.01
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan Identity	1, 225	13.29	<.001	.06
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Trait OM	1, 225	1.23	.269	.01
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	2.05	.154	.01

Table 16
Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Positive Affect *(Study 2)*

		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
SL	Step 1							.29
		Trait OM	3.69	2.04	.12	1.81	-.33 7.72	
		PI	13.61	3.83	.24	3.56***	6.07 21.16	
	Step 2							.31
		Trait OM* PI	6.44	4.11	.14	1.57	-1.66 14.54	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
ML	Step 1							.15
		Trait OM	.42	1.92	.02	.22	-3.36 4.21	
		PI	7.62	3.60	.15	2.12*	.53 14.70	
	Step 2							.15
		Trait OM*PI	1.20	3.88	.03	.31	-6.45 8.85	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
MC	Step 1							.35
		Trait OM	.87	1.67	.03	.52	-2.43 4.17	
		PI	-17.41	3.14	-.36	-5.55*	-23.59 -11.22	
	Step 2							.35
		Trait OM* PI	2.32	3.38	.06	.69	-4.35 8.98	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI	R^2
SC	Step 1							.53
		Trait OM	1.76	1.70	.06	1.04	-1.58 5.11	
		PI	-29.14	3.18	-.54	-9.16***	-35.41 -22.87	
	Step 2							.53
		Trait OM*PI	.13	3.43	.003	.04	-6.63 6.90	

Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative
PI: Partisan Identity (0 = Republican ,1= Democrat).
**p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001*

Table 17
GLM for Predicted Negative Affect (Study 2)

Variables	df	F	p	η_p^2
Partisan Identity	1, 225	.68	.410	.00
Trait OM	1, 225	5.73	.018	.03
Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	.43	.511	.00
Statement Ideology	1, 225	8.52	.004	.04
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity	1, 225	98.78	<.001	.31
Statement Ideology*Trait OM	1, 225	.37	.542	.00
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	3.21	.074	.01
Statement Extremity	1, 225	12.67	.001	.05
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity	1, 225	.17	.679	.00
Statement Extremity *Trait OM	1, 225	.08	.780	.00
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	4.21	.041	.02
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity	1, 225	5.60	.019	.02
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan Identity	1, 225	18.79	<.001	.08
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Trait OM	1, 225	.19	.663	.00
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan Identity*Trait OM	1, 225	1.11	.293	.01

Table 18
Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Negative Affect (Study 2)

		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
SL	Step 1								.42
		Trait OM	-2.15	2.02	-.07	-1.06	-6.14	1.84	
		PI	-24.04	3.79	-.40	-6.34***	-31.52	-16.57	
	Step 2								.42
		Trait OM* PI	-3.10	4.09	-.06	-.76	-11.16	4.96	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
ML	Step 1								.28
		Trait OM	-2.92	1.83	-.11	-1.59	-6.53	.69	
		PI	-12.28	3.43	-.24	-3.58***	-19.04	-5.51	
	Step 2								.31
		Trait OM*PI	-6.80	3.68	-.16	-1.85	-14.04	.45	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
MC	Step 1								.18
		Trait OM	-3.62	1.92	-.13	-1.89	-7.40	.16	
		PI	8.95	3.59	.17	2.49*	1.87	16.03	
	Step 2								.19
		Trait OM* PI	-3.41	3.87	-.08	-.88	-11.03	4.22	
		Variables	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	t	CI		R^2
SC	Step 1								.32
		Trait OM	-4.37	1.97	-.15	-2.22*	-8.25	-.50	
		PI	18.54	3.68	.33	5.03***	11.28	25.80	
	Step 2								.34
		Trait OM*PI	5.85	3.96	.13	1.48	-1.95	13.64	

Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative
PI: Partisan Identity (0 = Republican ,1= Democrat).
**p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001*

Table 19.
Mean scores for all dependent variables in Study 1 and 2.

Cognitive Receptivity		*Strong Liberal*	*Moderate Liberal*	*Strong Conservative*	*Moderate Conservative*
Republicans	Predictors (Study 2)	46.24	55.79	68.57	67.28
	Experiencers (Study 1)	33.50	45.32	56.04	54.93
Democrats	Predictors (Study 2)	74.14	71.51	37.83	50.98
	Experiencers (Study 1)	67.02	63.59	31.13	40.10
Positive Affect		*Strong Liberal*	*Moderate Liberal*	*Strong Conservative*	*Moderate Conservative*
Republicans	Predictors (Study 2)	27.35	32.89	43.44	36.48
	Experiencers (Study 1)	14.26	23.65	31.00	22.19
Democrats	Predictors (Study 2)	42.84	40.72	15.20	19.52
	Experiencers (Study 1)	36.78	35.71	11.34	15.31
Negative Affect		*Strong Liberal*	*Moderate Liberal*	*Strong Conservative*	*Moderate Conservative*
Republicans	Predictors (Study 2)	46.89	35.71	32.09	33.28
	Experiencers (Study 1)	41.83	25.94	20.93	23.88
Democrats	Predictors (Study 2)	24.75	21.95	48.40	40.38
	Experiencers (Study 1)	25.31	18.95	42.92	40.41

Figures

Figure 1
Proposed Moderated Moderation Models





Figure 2
Two-way Interaction between Partisan Identity and Facebook Post Ideology for Cognitive Receptivity (Study 1)



Figure 3
Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity, Facebook Post Ideology, and Post Extremity for Cognitive Receptivity. Graphed Separated for each Partisan Identity Group (Study 1)



Figure 4
Two-way Interaction between Facebook Post Ideology and Post Extremity for Positive Affect (Study 1)



Figure 5
Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity, Facebook Post Ideology, and Post Extremity for Positive Affect. Graphed Separated for each Partisan Identity Group (Study 1)



Figure 6
Two-way Interaction between Facebook Post Ideology and Post Extremity for Negative Affect (Study 1)



Figure 7
Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity, Facebook Post Ideology, and Post Extremity for Negative Affect. Graphed Separated for each Partisan Identity Group (Study 1)



Figure 8
Two-way Interaction between Negative Affect and Partisan Identity for Cognitive Receptivity to Moderate Liberal Posts (Study 1)



Figure 9a
Two-way Interaction between Positive Affect and Partisan Identity for Cognitive Receptivity to Moderate Liberal posts (Study 1)



Figure 9b
Two-way Interaction between Positive Affect and Partisan Identity for Cognitive Receptivity to Strong Liberal posts (Study 1)



Figure 10
Two-way Interaction between Positive Affect and Partisan Identity for Cognitive Receptivity to Moderate Conservative posts (Study 1)



Figure 11a
Two-way Interaction between Positive Affect and Trait OM for Cognitive Receptivity to Strong Liberal posts (Study 1)



Figure 11b
Two-way Interaction between Positive Affect and Trait OM for Cognitive Receptivity to Moderate Liberal posts (Study 1)



Figure 12
Two-way Interaction between Partisan Identity and Statement Ideology for Predicted Cognitive Receptivity (Study 2)



Figure 13
Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity and Statement Ideology and Statement Extremity for Predicted Cognitive Receptivity (Study 2)



Figure 14
Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity and Statement Ideology and Statement Extremity for Predicted Positive Affect (Study 2)



Figure 15
Two-way Interaction between Statement Ideology and Statement Extremity for Predicted Negative Affect (Study 2)



Figure 16
Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity and Statement Ideology and Statement Extremity for Predicted Negative Affect (Study 2)



Appendices

Appendix A
Perspective Taking Scale (PT)

1. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (-)
2. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.
4. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments. (-)
5. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
6. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
7. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

Appendix B
Open-Minded Cognition (OMC)

1. I have no patience for (political/ religious) arguments I disagree with.
2. I often "tune out" (political/ religious) messages I disagree with.
3. I believe it is a waste of time to pay attention to certain (political/ religious) ideas.
4. I try to reserve judgment until I have a chance to hear arguments from both sides of an (political/ religious) issue.
5. (When it comes to politics/ religion) I am open to considering other viewpoints.
6. When thinking about a (political/ religious) issue, I consider as many different opinions as possible.

Appendix C
Principal Component Analysis (Component 1)

Items:	No Rotation
I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.	0.74
When thinking about an issue, I consider as many different opinions as possible.	0.73
I try to reserve judgement until I have a chance to hear arguments from both sides of an issue.	0.70
I am open to considering other viewpoints.	0.70
I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.	0.69
I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.	0.67
Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.	0.67
When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while	0.63
If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments. (-)	0.55
I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (-)	0.52
I often "tune out" messages I disagree with.	0.46
I have no patience for arguments I disagree with.	0.48
I believe it is a waste of time to pay attention to certain ideas.	0.39

Appendix D
Pre-Screen

Instructions: This initial section will take no more than 10 seconds to complete. Our research is oriented towards assessing respondents who meet certain demographic criteria. In order to determine whether you meet these criteria, please answer the questions below. You will know if you met the criteria within a few seconds, just by responding to the items below. If you don't meet the criteria, you can just simply return the HIT. Doing so will not affect your worker rating in any way whatsoever. If you do meet the criteria, rest assured, you can then complete the rest of our survey uninterrupted.

1. Gender
    a. Male
    b. Female
    c. Trans*
    d. Non-Binary
    e. Other

2. Age

3. How would you describe your political party preference?
    a. Extremely Strong Democrat
    b. Moderately Strong Democrat
    c. Lean Democrat
    d. Independent
    e. Lean Republican
    f. Moderately Strong Republican
    g. Extremely Strong Republican
    h. None of these labels applies to me

4. What is your current religious affiliation?
    a. Catholic
    b. Protestant
    c. Jewish
    d. Islam
    e. Hindu
    f. Buddhist
    g. Atheist
    h. Agnostic
    i. Spiritual, but not religious
    j. Other

5. Ethnicity
    a. White
    b. Black
    c. Hispanic
    d. Asian
    e. American Indian/Alaskan/Hawaiian Native
    f. Other

6. What is your highest level of education?
    a. Some high school
    b. High School
    c. Some college/Associate's Degree
    d. Bachelor's Degree
    e. Some postgraduate study
    f. Master's degree
    g. Doctorate/Medical degree
    h. Other

Appendix E
Power Analyses

Power analyses were conducted to determine a reasonable number of participants to allow for sufficient power in both studies of this dissertation. The estimates for sample size were based on the results of a small pilot study (n = 74) with a design similar to the pre-registered study. Initial analyses of the pilot test generated some evidence of a two-way interaction of trait OM and partisan identity for the moderate conservative posts (p = .069). The power analysis was generated on the basis of these results. Using G Power (a priori F test, Linear multiple regression: Fixed model, R^2 increase, power = 0.80, alpha = 0.05), I used the obtained partial R^2 of 0.041 and a model testing 2 predictors (i.e., trait OM and partisan identity). The results indicated that a total sample of 229 participants was needed to obtain adequate power. It is important to note that at the time I conducted these power analyses the analysis plan for this dissertation was to run four separate regression analyses corresponding to the four ideology/extremity levels of the Facebook posts rather than an omnibus GLM. Both types of analyses are presented in the results sections of this dissertation.

Appendix F
Exclusion Criteria

Exclusion screen 1: Given the nature of this research, I restricted the sample to U.S. citizens based on self-report to a question at the end of the survey (i.e. Are you a U.S. citizen?).

Exclusion screen 2: This survey contained four tasks designed to flag "farmers" and non-conscientious subjects. Any worker who failed two or more of these screens was automatically excluded. Workers who failed one (but passed the other three) were considered on a case by case basis prior to analyses.

a. Towards the end of the survey, participants were required to provide a short (minimum characters = 45) response to this query: "In a sentence or two, please give your "best guess" as to what this study was about. What hypotheses were we testing?" . Farmers often write cryptic responses in broken English (e.g., "social judgement study very well. this study very useful .i like the study") or copy pseudo-relevant responses from the internet (e.g., "Point estimation and interval estimation, and hypothesis testing are three main ways of learning about the population parameter from the sample statistic").

b. Following a suggestion by Moss and Litman (2018), this task asked participants to write down "the 'everyday' (common) name of the fruit/vegetable pictured below", accompanied by a picture of an eggplant. The vast majority of participants write "eggplant", but a small number write Brinjal (a common name for this plant in Asia).

c. In this task, participants were asked to select the correct definition of "moody' from four choices (guilty, easy to fool, gullible, emotionally unpredictable).

d. Participants are presented with a picture file containing two statements, both of which contain very obvious grammatical errors (e.g., "Last night I couldn't finishes the job. I had a hard time getting motivating; No problem, I completes understanding") Participants are asked to choose one of four appraisals of these sentences: (a) both statements are correct, (b) statement A but not B is correct, (c) statement B but not A is correct, and (d) both are incorrect.

Appendix G
Study 1 Sample Detail

In accordance with the preregistration, after collecting and cleaning the sample I checked the number of participants in each category of partisan identity without doing any further analyses. I planned to repost the study until each partisan identity category reached 58 participants for a total sample of 232. However, after multiple reposts I was only able to obtain a sample of 49 Extremely Strong Republicans. During data collection I gathered a sample of 57 Extremely Strong Democrats, 66 Moderately Strong Democrats, and 65 Moderately Strong Republicans. I chose to address the limited sample of Extremely Strong Republicans by increasing the sample of Moderately Strong Democrats and Republicans to 65 and narrowing the sample of Extremely Strong Democrats to 50 (see table below for comparison of intended vs. actual sample). As I had more participants than necessary in some categories, I randomly selected 7 Extremely Strong Democrats and 1 Moderately Strong Democrat to exclude from analyses. Random selection was conducted using Research Randomizer (www.randomizer.org), as suggested by the Social Psychology Research Network.

	Extremely Strong Democrat	*Moderately Strong Democrat*	*Moderately Strong Republican*	*Extremely Strong Republican*
Intended Sample	58	58	58	58
Actual Sample	50	65	65	49

Appendix H
Schematic Model of Study 1

Order 1.



Order 2.



Appendix I
Individual Difference Block

Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale

1. Willingness to be convinced by opposing arguments is a sign of good character.
2. People should take into consideration evidence that goes against conclusions they favor.
3. Being undecided or unsure is the result of muddled thinking.
4. People should revise their conclusions in response to relevant new information.
5. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness.
6. People should search actively for reasons why they might be wrong.
7. It is OK to ignore evidence against your established beliefs.
8. It is important to be loyal to your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear against them.
9. There is nothing wrong with being undecided about many issues.
10. When faced with a puzzling question, we should try to consider more than one possible answer before reaching a conclusion.

Empathic Concern Scale

1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
2. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. (-)
3. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
4. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (-)
5. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them. (-)
6. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
7. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.

Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA)

1. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path
2. It may be considered old fashioned by some, but having a normal proper appearance is still the mark of a gentleman and, especially, a lady.
3. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
4. Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.
5. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticising religion, and ignoring the "normal way" things are supposed to be done.
6. We should treat protestors and radicals with open arms and open minds, since new ideas are the lifeblood of progressive change.
7. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.
8. There is no "ONE right way" to live life; everybody has to create their own way.
9. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.
10. The real key to the "good life" is obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and narrow.
11. Once our government leaders give us the "go ahead"; it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.
12. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.
13. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.
14. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)

1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
2. No one group should dominate society.
3. Group equality should NOT be our primary goal.
4. It is unjust to try to make groups equal.
5. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.
6. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.
7. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
8. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.

The Ten-Item Personality Inventory TIPI

I see myself as:

1. _____ Extraverted, enthusiastic.
2. _____ Critical, quarrelsome.
3. _____ Dependable, self-disciplined.
4. _____ Anxious, easily upset.
5. _____ Open to new experiences, complex.
6. _____ Reserved, quiet.
7. _____ Sympathetic, warm.
8. _____ Disorganized, careless.
9. _____ Calm, emotionally stable.
10. _____ Conventional, uncreative.

Appendix J.
Facebook Posts

Instructions: In this section you will read and rate statements similar to what you might see on social media websites. The statements will express a variety of opinions on different issues. Please read each one carefully. Afterwards, you will be asked to make some ratings of the post you just read, using a series of different rating scales.

indicates not used in final study

Strong Liberal







*

Moderate Liberal

Sam Jones

... ·

Our criminal justice system is not working. The jails are too full and the cost to our communities too high. The way to reduce crime is to invest in community development and education.

Like · Comment · Share

Sam Jones

... ·

We have to protect the little guy. We cannot let corporations decide how the economy will work instead of protecting the middle class. The government should regulate the economy to make sure Americans and their interests are protected.

Like · Comment · Share

Sam Jones

... ·

The quality of education that our students receive should not vary by what
* state they live in. The federal government should set nationwide metrics for standardized testing in K-12 education.

Like · Comment · Share

Moderate Conservative



Strong Conservative

Jordan Williams

... ·

Obamacare is not working. It has made healthcare more expensive for the average American and it hasn't improved the quality of care. The United States should repeal the Affordable Care Act.

Like · Comment · Share

Jordan Williams

... ·

Any organization that poses a threat to the United States needs to be dealt with strongly, with the full force of the American military. We have to make sure the military is always ready to defend Americans against existing and new threats. We should put more money into funding the military.

Like · Comment · Share

Jordan Williams

... ·

We have to protect America's border security and American's lives and
* jobs. The government should tighten our borders, and any person who is in the United States illegally should leave. We need to secure our border and prevent illegal immigration.

Like · Comment · Share

Appendix K
Pilot Tests

Pilot Test 1.

Scale: 1 (*Extremely liberal*) to 7 (*Extremely conservative)* .

Item	Mean	SD
The United States should have universal healthcare, or Medicare for all.	2.23	1.71
We need to forgive student loan debts for many young Americans.	2.23	1.51
We need raise taxes on the wealthiest Americans.	2.49	1.62
We need to ban assault rifles.	2.52	1.79
We need to raise taxes on the wealthy to address the budget deficit.	2.55	1.67
We need to do more to address the historic wrongs perpetrated on the black community. The government should do more to provide aid.	2.56	1.67
Income inequality is a serious problem in American society .	2.61	1.57
Climate change is mostly caused by human activity and we need to take steps to address it.	2.63	1.57
Transgender people should be allowed to use the bathroom of their choice.	2.66	1.96
Russian interference in U.S. elections is a serious problem.	2.67	1.65
Abortion should remain a protected right.	2.70	1.71
The United States should keep the Affordable Care Act.	2.74	1.65
LGBTQ Americans have the right to protection from discrimination.	2.75	1.67
Businesses should not be allowed to refuse service based on personal or religious beliefs.		
We need to get rid of the detention camps at the Southern border.	2.78	1.80
We need to expand LGBTQ rights. For example, it should be illegal to fire someone for their sexual preference.	2.78	1.56
We spend too much money on the military.	2.82	1.77
Transgendered people should be allowed to live as openly and freely as anyone else in our society.	2.82	1.65
The government should provide aid to those suffering from drug addiction.	2.84	1.48
Discrimination still limits Black people in the United States today.	2.89	1.52
We need to fix our immigration system to provide undocumented people with a path to citizenship.	2.93	1.67

Most wealthy people just had more advantages in life. They aren't necessarily more hard-working than others.	2.95	1.56
Currently, women are not equal to men in American society.	2.96	1.69
The government should not play a role in deciding when abortion is, or isn't, ethical.	3.04	1.75
We need to pass common sense gun reforms like universal background checks.	3.06	1.61
The government should regulate corporations to make sure they are engaging in safe and fair practices.	3.07	1.50
The government should actively support and fund public transportation like trains and buses.	3.16	1.45
The government should be working to find solutions for homelessness.	3.23	1.46
The government should not allow new companies like Uber and Postmates to only hire independent contractors. They should have to formally hire their employees to protect their labor rights.	3.29	1.60
The government should invest in educating people for jobs in the new tech economy.	3.39	1.50
Public parks and land need to be protected for future generations.	3.41	1.50
The federal government has the responsibility to take care of safety concerns like lead pipes and toxic paint in our homes and workplaces.	3.49	1.46
Students with disabilities should be educated in a combined classroom together with non-disabled students.	3.51	1.49
The way to reduce crime is to invest in community development and education.	3.52	1.57
Public parks should be run by the government.	3.56	1.47
The government should regulate the economy to make sure Americans and their interests are protected.	3.57	1.65
The federal government should set nationwide metrics for standardized testing in K-12 education.	3.73	1.24
Social security should continue to be a government service.	3.78	1.54
America should stop meddling in other countries' affairs.	3.79	1.57
The government needs to build better roads and airports in order to boost the economy.	3.80	1.48
Students with disabilities should be educated in a separate classroom tailored for special education.	4.11	1.32
The United States should have both public and private healthcare options.	4.11	1.38
Individual states should set their own metrics for standardized testing in K-12 education.	4.27	1.42

The government should invest in bringing back manufacturing jobs.	4.35	1.49
The United States should keep its current system of healthcare.	4.51	1.71
Mass transportation is better handled by private services like Uber and Lyft rather than government-funded public transportation.	4.59	1.41
The government should enforce strict anti-drug laws to deal with drug addiction.	4.70	1.68
The government should respect the free-market and not regulate the economy.	4.78	1.57
America should continue to be the leader of the world.	4.82	1.40
Currently, women are equal to men in American society.	4.88	1.42
We need to cut government programs to address the budget deficit.	4.93	1.81
LGBTQ people do not have a right to special legal protections.	5.00	1.81
Public parks should be run by private businesses.	5.01	1.43
Social security should be privatized.	5.01	1.55
I don't care whether someone says they are transgender, I just don't want it rubbed in my face.	5.02	1.60
The government should let corporations regulate themselves.	5.04	1.77
Abortion should only be allowed in cases of rape and incest.	5.04	1.64
The government should not interfere with employment practices at businesses like Uber and Postmates. If individual workers don't like a company's policies, they can work elsewhere.	5.06	1.27
If black people tried harder they could be just as well off as White people.	5.09	1.74
Climate change is not man made. We do not need to significantly change our way of life.	5.10	1.98
Border camps are an effective deterrent for illegal immigration.	5.11	1.71
Homelessness is a private problem that should be left to private charities and individuals to resolve.	5.11	1.54
Universal background checks are not useful. Bad guys will always find ways to get guns.	5.12	1.65
The government should stay out of the business of healthcare.	5.13	1.66
Income inequality is not a problem in American society.	5.15	1.66
We need to protect religious freedom for all Americans. For example, a baker should not have to bake a wedding cake for a gay or lesbian wedding if they have a religious objection.	5.20	1.73
The way to reduce crime is through harsh punishment and policing.	5.23	1.78
The Second Amendment must be protected for all citizens.	5.24	1.63
Most wealthy people deserve their money. They work harder than others.	5.29	1.52

Russian interference in U.S. elections is a hoax that wasted taxpayer dollars.	5.32	1.72
Federal land should be available for development and oil drilling.	5.35	1.54
Transgender people should use the bathroom that matches their biological sex.	5.37	1.80
Student loan debts are the result of personal choices and people should be expected to pay them off on their own.	5.37	1.49
We need to secure our border and prevent illegal immigration.	5.41	1.65
We have already addressed any historic harms done to the black community. Black Americans need to work hard to fix the problems in their own communities.	5.43	1.47
We should put more money into funding the military.	5.43	1.61
The United States should repeal the Affordable Care Act.	5.44	1.73
The government should not raise taxes on the wealthiest Americans.	5.46	1.72
Climate change is a hoax.	5.51	1.83
Abortion should be banned.	5.84	1.88

n = 82

Pilot Test 2

Agreement Instructions: In the task to follow we would like you to rate how strongly you personally disagree or agree with the point of view expressed in the same set of statements. Scale: 1 (*Strong disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree)*.

Receptivity Instructions: In the task to follow we would like you to rate your personal reactions to each statement along a scale ranging 0 (Not at All) to 100 (Very Much So). Three reactions measured: persuasive, logical, and well-reasoned.

	Item	Mean Agreement	Mean Receptivity
SL	Our current healthcare system is a mess. People are too stressed out about going broke to actually get the medical care they need. The United States should have universal healthcare, or Medicare for all.	Democrats: 6.29 Republicans: 3.89	Democrats: 72.51 Republicans: 47.10
	It is not fair that the wealthiest people in the U.S. aren't paying their fair share of taxes. The middle class is struggling and the 1% have all the money. We need raise taxes on the wealthiest Americans.	Democrats: 6.03 Republicans: 4.43	Democrats: 76.82 Republicans: 54.13
	It is crazy that we still allow people to buy any weapon they want. We need to think about the safety of our kids and communities. We need to ban assault rifles.	Democrats: 5.81 Republicans: 2.86	Democrats: 71.53 Republicans: 30.97
	Americans with student loan debts are struggling to make ends meet. They cannot start businesses or buy homes while paying off their debts. We need to forgive student loan debts for many young Americans.	Democrats: 5.65 Republicans: 4.11	Democrats: 71.37 Republicans: 48.42
ML	I cannot believe in places like Flint, Michigan people still do not have clean drinking water. The government should protect public safety. The federal government has the responsibility to take care of safety concerns like lead pipes and toxic paint in our homes and workplaces.	Democrats: 6.03 Republicans: 5.71	Democrats: 80.86 Republicans: 75.71
	Our criminal justice system is not working. The jails are too full and the cost to our communities too high. The way to reduce crime is to invest in community development and education.	Democrats: 6.19 Republicans: 5.03	Democrats: 74.26 Republicans: 61.35

	We have to protect the little guy. We cannot let corporations decide how the economy will work instead of protecting the middle class. The government should regulate the economy to make sure Americans and their interests are protected.	Democrats: 5.55 Republicans: 4.26	Democrats: 65.88 Republicans: 53.01
	The quality of education that our students receive should not vary by what state they live in. The federal government should set nationwide metrics for standardized testing in K-12 education.	Democrats: 5.68 Republicans: 5.06	Democrats: 67.59 Republicans: 63.74
MC	The government should stay out of our wallets and businesses. It should be easier to do business in America, not harder. The government should respect the free-market and not regulate the economy.	Democrats: 3.74 Republicans: 4.80	Democrats: 36.83 Republicans: 60.13
	Women do not have it bad in the United States. American women can go to the same schools, get the same jobs, and have all the same rights as men. Women are equal to men in American society.	Democrats: 2.94 Republicans: 4.69	Democrats: 32.62 Republicans: 57.99
	Our federal debt is out of control. We cannot continue to spend money we don't have and then ask for more from the taxpayers. We need to cut government programs to address the budget deficit.	Democrats: 3.68 Republicans: 5.20	Democrats: 38.48 Republicans: 65.23
	Drug abuse is a huge problem in American society. We have to keep drugs out of our communities. The government should enforce strict anti-drug laws to deal with drug addiction.	Democrats: 3.29 Republicans: 5.06	Democrats: 43.30 Republicans: 63.93
	The law should not protect certain types of people over others, or tell Americans how to think. LGBTQ people do not have a right to special legal protections.	Democrats: 2.42 Republicans: 4.94	Democrats: 21.47 Republicans: 60.17
SC	Racial inequality is not the average American's fault or their responsibility to fix. We have already addressed any historic harms done to the black community. Black Americans need to work hard to fix the problems in their own communities.	Democrats: 2.58 Republicans: 4.97	Democrats: 21.76 Republicans: 55.23
	Obamacare is not working. It has made healthcare more expensive for the average American and it hasn't improved the quality of care. The United States should repeal the Affordable Care Act.	Democrats: 2.48 Republicans: 5.54	Democrats: 27.82 Republicans: 67.10

Any organization that poses a threat to the United States needs to be dealt with strongly, with the full force of the American military. We have to make sure the military is always ready to defend Americans against existing and new threats. We should put more money into funding the military.	Democrats: 2.84 Republicans: 5.91	Democrats: 37.83 Republicans: 69.58
Every life must be protected. There is no getting around the fact that abortion is murder. Abortion should be banned.	Democrats: 1.90 Republicans: 5.09	Democrats: 23.48 Republicans: 60.30
We have to protect America's border security and American's lives and jobs. The government should tighten our borders, and any person who is in the United States illegally should leave. We need to secure our border and prevent illegal immigration.	Democrats: 2.71 Republicans: 6.00	Democrats: 28.59 Republicans: 78.44

n=75

Appendix L
Study 1 Dependent Variables

On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), please provide your judgments of the Facebook post above:

1. Persuasive
2. Logical
3. Well-Reasoned

4. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the point of view expressed in the post above?
   a. Strongly disagree
   b. Disagree
   c. Somewhat disagree
   d. Neither agree nor disagree
   e. Somewhat agree
   f. Agree
   g. Strongly agree

5. How likely would you be to send this person a "friend request" on social media?
   a. Extremely unlikely
   b. Moderately unlikely
   c. Slightly unlikely
   d. Neither likely nor unlikely
   e. Slightly likely
   f. Moderately likely
   g. Extremely likely

6. How likely would you be to "like" this post on social media
   a. Extremely unlikely
   b. Moderately unlikely
   c. Slightly unlikely
   d. Neither likely nor unlikely
   e. Slightly likely
   f. Moderately likely
   g. Extremely likely

7. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how willing would you be to have a follow-up conversation with this person to better understand their opinions on this issue?

8. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how does reading this post make you feel?
   a. Happy
   b. Excited
   c. Angry
   d. Frustrated
   e. Content
   f. Annoyed
   g. Disgusted
   h. Proud

9. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how open-minded are you to the opinions in this post?

Appendix M
Study 2 Sample Details

In accordance with the preregistration, after collecting and cleaning the sample I checked the number of participants in each category of partisan identity without doing any further analyses. I planned to repost the study until each partisan identity category reached 115 participants for a total sample of 230. However, after multiple reposts, I was only able to obtain a sample of 108 Moderately Strong Republicans. During data collection I also gathered a sample of 125 Moderately Strong Democrats. I chose to address the limited sample of Moderately Strong Republicans by increasing the sample of Moderately Strong Democrats to 121 (see table below for comparison of intended vs. actual sample).. Again, I had more Democrat participants than necessary, so I randomly selected 4 Moderately Strong Democrats to exclude from analyses. Random selection was conducted using Research Randomizer (www.randomizer.org), as suggested by the Social Psychology Research Network.

	Moderately Strong Democrat	*Moderately Strong Republican*
Intended Sample	115	115
Actual Sample	121	108

Appendix N
Schematic Model of Study 2

Order 1.



Order 2.



Appendix O
Political Statements

Instructions: In this section we would like you to imagine how you might react to various points of view. You will read a description of a hypothetical point of view (e.g., "Imagine a conversation in which someone is telling you that they believe public school teachers should make more money.") and describe how you might react or feel. The statements will express a variety of opinions on different issues. Please read each one carefully. Afterwards, you will be asked to make some ratings of what you just read, using a series of different rating scales.

Imagine someone shared the following opinion:

Strong Liberal:

a. "It is crazy that we still allow people to buy any weapon they want. We need to think about the safety of our kids and communities. We need to ban assault rifles."
b. "Americans with student loan debts are struggling to make ends meet. They cannot start businesses or buy homes while paying off their debts. We need to forgive student loan debts for many young Americans."

Moderate Liberal:

a. "Our criminal justice system is not working. The jails are too full and the cost to our communities too high. The way to reduce crime is to invest in community development and education."
b. "We have to protect the little guy. We cannot let corporations decide how the economy will work instead of protecting the middle class. The government should regulate the economy to make sure Americans and their interests are protected."

Moderate Conservative:

a. "Our federal debt is out of control. We cannot continue to spend money we don't have and then ask for more from the taxpayers. We need to cut government programs to address the budget deficit."
b. "Drug abuse is a huge problem in American society. We have to keep drugs out of our communities. The government should enforce strict anti-drug laws to deal with drug addiction."

Strong Conservative:

a. "Obamacare is not working. It has made healthcare more expensive for the average American and it hasn't improved the quality of care. The United States should repeal the Affordable Care Act."
b. "Any organization that poses a threat to the United States needs to be dealt with strongly, with the full force of the American military. We have to make sure the military is always ready to defend Americans against existing and new threats. We should put more money into funding the military."

Appendix P
Study 2 Dependent Variables

On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how do you think you would judge the statement above:

1. Persuasive
2. Logical
3. Well-Reasoned

4. How strongly do you think you would agree or disagree with the point of view stated above?

a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Somewhat disagree
d. Neither agree nor disagree
e. Somewhat agree
f. Agree
g. Strongly agree

5. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how willing would you be to have a conversation with this person to better understand their opinions on this issue?

6. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how do you think discussing this point of view would make you feel?

a. Happy
b. Excited
c. Angry
d. Frustrated
e. Content
f. Annoyed
g. Disgusted
h. Proud

7. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how open-minded do you think you would be to the opinions in this statement?