



12th Asia Pacific Sociology Association (APSA) Conference



PROCEEDINGS

Volume 2

TRANSFORMING SOCIETIES: CONTESTATIONS AND CONVERGENCES IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

15-16 FEBRUARY 2014
Chiang Mai, Thailand

Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University



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ANNEX 556

Thailand Policy on Migrant Education: Patterns of Words and Outcomes

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Outline of the Paper

As a consequence of the importation of cheap labour from neighbouring countries, many children from those countries currently reside in Thailand. Does Thailand have a policy about education for these children? If so, what is it?

In pursuing these questions, the present paper first presents a conceptualization of 'policy' which tries to avoid the fallacy of treating official statements as definitive, complete or coherent expressions of the mind of the State. It then presents some essential background information on labour migration to Thailand and the problem of education for migrant children, before examining Thailand policy on the latter. The policy examination is done firstly by collecting official statements that apparently express policy. These are fragmentary, coming from the National Constitutions, Thailand's ratification of the international Convention on the Rights of the Child, and regulations issued by the Cabinet and the Ministry of Education. The statements are compared with outcomes for the children; a mismatch is identified and analysed. A similar analytic procedure is then applied to the more specific case of policy on Migrant Learning Centres. The paper then wraps up with a discussion of whether and how the gap between policy words and outcomes may be narrowed in the future.

Using the Concept of Policy

These two questions about Thailand's policy on migrant education are less straightforward than at first they may seem. Thailand does not have an explicit policy covering migrant education. But the lack of a statement labelled as the definitive policy does not mean that there is no policy at all. Students of government can try to deduce what policies are, using evidence in a variety of places: constitutions, laws, administrative regulations, statements by ministers, and the actions of state offices at various levels.

A problem here is that these pieces of evidence may not fit together very well; there may be gaps and contradictions. This indicates a difficulty in the concept of public policy. The idea of a policy seems to suggest a coherent set of intentions and plans belonging to a unitary actor or an alliance of actors (Jones, 1984, p.26). But governments and States are combinations of actors which may have differing interests and influences, and which may therefore be partly at cross-purposes in their intentions and plans (Schaffer, 1984). One way for ministers and bureaucrats to maintain a sense of command and control amidst the mess of cross-purposes is to refer to a gap between stages of policy and implementation. However, such a gap sets up failures: failure of implementers to be carry out instructions, and of policy-makers to be realistic. A way of dealing with cross-purposes which reduces the emergence of failure is to refrain from articulating policy clearly and publicly. Within this there can be two variants. It may be that some actors have a clear mutual understanding of their

policy which they hide from a wider group. But it may also be that actors avoid creating clear policy or relating their actions clearly to policy. In the latter case, policies may still be said to exist, albeit in relatively vague and fragmentary form.

Some students of political processes understandably choose to avoid these complexities and ambiguities. They may do so by treating policy as self-evident, but this is to turn a blind eye to the importance of hidden interests in determining actions, and to the systematic potential of accidents and apparent failures to serve particular interests (Schaffer, 1984). Or policy may be treated as irrelevant; but this prematurely denies the actual or potential roles of rational discussion, planning and decision-making in determining outcomes. Questions of policy can be useful prisms for examining matters which are strongly affected by government behaviour, so long as the approach does not involve naively technocratic assumptions.

Characteristics and Numbers of Migrants

In order to discuss Thailand's policy on education for migrant children, some background information is necessary on the problem of these migrants and their education.

Thailand is almost certainly hosting at least two million – and probably many more¹ – migrants from the neighbouring countries of Burma, Cambodia and Lao PDR (Chantavanich, 2012). (This is without considering people registered as 'displaced', who are largely confined to special camps or 'temporary shelters' and who are not considered as 'migrants' for the purpose of the present paper.) In 2011, there were more than a million migrant workers officially registered (Office of Foreign Workers Administration, 2011). Besides the registered workers, there were additionally more than 1.4 million family members and unregistered workers, according to a conservative estimate by the Thai Interior Ministry (Huguet et al., 2011, p.11).

About 80 per cent of the migrants are from Myanmar, and a high proportion of these come from Karen and Shan States: historically areas of political and economic marginalization where there have been ethnic-based groups in armed opposition to the Burma military regime.

According to government regulations, the migrant workers from these neighbouring countries may only be employed in unskilled occupations, such as agriculture, fishery, construction and domestic service, although it is thought that many are also engaged in arduous semi-skilled work in manufacturing and other sectors (Chantavanich, 2012). Thailand's national income has risen faster than that of its neighbours in recent decades, resulting in higher standards of living for its citizens, and fewer people willing to undertake menial jobs. Yet these economic sectors, on which prosperity is built, still require large amounts of cheap unskilled and semi-skilled labour.

Part of Thailand's economy thus depends on the migrants for its international competitiveness. But this does not mean that Thailand creates conditions as attractive as possible for them. The desperate plight of many people in the marginalized areas of Myanmar has made them ready to accept or risk being subjected to wages and working conditions far below the legal minimums in Thailand. This is in the interests of employers who wish to keep labour cost low, and is made

¹Huguet et al. (2012) estimate the number as approximately 3.5 million, but the basis of this estimation is unclear. There has been no comprehensive survey.

possible by inconsistent and erratic policing of immigration and labour conditions (Pongsawat, 2007; Arnold and Pickles, 2011) fostered by a poorly-designed regulatory system (Paitoonpong & Chalamwong, 2011).

Child Migrants and the Problem of School Attendance

Many of the migrants are long-term, the older ones bringing or forming families. Hence there are among them many children either born outside Thailand, or born inside but ineligible for Thai citizenship. Again, there are no accurate estimates of the number, but it almost certainly runs into hundreds of thousands. In a one-off registration of irregular migrants in 2004, 7.2 per cent were under the age of 15. An ILO report in 2009 put the number of child migrants and children of migrants under 18 at 377,000 (Huguet et al., 2011, pp. 11-12).

The proportion of these children attending school is also hard to estimate. Research by Supang Chantavanich (2007) suggests that in 2004 it was only about 17 per cent. According to a government report to United Nations on May 12, 2011, around 60,000 are enrolled in local state schools (Kritiya, 2011, p. 118). This means that probably tens of thousands, and possibly hundreds of thousands of migrant children of school age are not attending full-time school.

High-level Policy Statements

At a high level, Thailand has been giving out signals of policy favourable to the cause of education for migrant children since at least the early 1990s. It hosted the World Conference on Education for All in 1990 (WCEFA, 1990) and followed this up in 1992 by ratifying the (1989) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

The CRC commits signatories to make 'primary education compulsory and available free to all' and secondary education 'available and accessible to every child' (Article 28). For secondary education, States must also 'take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case of need' (Article 28). Education must be directed to developing respect for the child's 'own cultural identity, language and values' as well as 'the national values of the country in which the child is living [and] the country from which he or she may originate (Article 29).

As a move towards fulfilling this, in 1992 the Cabinet mandated the Ministry of Education to provide education in particular ways to certain groups of non-Thai children – including Vietnamese, Laotian, Nepalese, Chinese, and displaced children from Burma – after they had been registered (Premjai et al., 2013, p. 222).

Meanwhile, the National Constitution of 1991 stipulated (Section 40) that 'every person shall have equal right of receiving primary education'. This was extended in the 1997 Constitution (Article 43) –

A person shall enjoy an equal right to receive the fundamental education for the duration of not less than twelve years which shall be provided by the State thoroughly, up to the quality, and without charge.

– a provision which has not significantly been changed in later Constitutions. When this constitutional right was incorporated in the 1999 Education Act, the interpretation of 'a person' was

again allowed to revert to meaning someone with state-issued identity documents (Premjai et al., 2013, p. 222).

Following criticism by the committee of the CRC, in 2004 the Ministry of Education drew up a new set of regulations about the admission of students into schools. It said schools had a duty to admit all children of school age, and that children without identity documents could be admitted on the basis of personal history testimonies by parents, carers, NGOs or – if necessary – the children themselves. The Cabinet approved these regulations on 5th July 2005 and added a resolution which strengthened the measures. Under the latter resolution: schools should receive per-head funding from the government on account of such children, just as they do for Thai students; all students should be entitled to a certificate of education on completion of their studies; and students without identity documents should be allowed a mobility permit to enable them to move in the country in order to find a suitable school (OEC, 2008, pp. 11-14).

Immediate Explanations for Limited Change in Outcomes from 2005

After 2005, the numbers of migrant and stateless children attending state schools increased to an extent that was significant but limited (Nongyao, 2012a, Premjai et al., 2013 p. 223).

The 2005 Cabinet resolution has certainly prompted more schools to admit more migrant children, both by clarifying their duty to do so, and by including such students in the schools' per-capita funding. But several further obstacles have remained unaddressed, calling into question the high-level statements of policy goals.

Schools still often refuse to admit migrant children. They can no longer do so by saying they are not allowed to – or lack a mandate – but in the end there is no real necessity for them to provide explanations for their decisions in this regard, and no convenient mechanism by which a potential student can claim his/her right to education from a particular school or local education authority.

As partly-autonomous entities, schools may have differing motives for refusing (or agreeing) to accept migrant children as students. Some commentators believe that a major reason is deep-seated cultural prejudice against migrants and foreigners (e.g. Thithimadee, 2012, p.5). But there is also a range of more rational causes.

The Cabinet's approval of a per-head grant payment to schools for migrants at the same rate as Thai students in many cases only covers a small proportion of the real additional cost to a school of admitting a migrant child. Such a child will often begin without much command of Thai language, and lack some cultural background assumptions and general knowledge common among the majority of students. When the migrant has already received some schooling, the content of this may differ substantially from what has been learnt at the same age by the majority of Thai students. If such a child is admitted to the school and these factors are ignored, the migrant student is unlikely to learn much there, and may have a depressing effect on the learning of fellow-students and on the general standards of the school. But in order to address these factors the expense will often be great. Teaching staff will have to be specially trained – or special staff hired – in order to connect with the migrants' language and culture. Those staff will have to struggle with a lack of appropriate curriculum variations, and of teaching materials appropriate to the migrants' language and culture

backgrounds within the overall framework of the Thai national curriculum. Many of the migrant students may well need to be taught in a separate classroom from the Thai students at the same level of study, and this may need to happen in several grade levels in the school. But the physical infrastructure of most schools is already inadequate to meet the existing demands.

Migrant students are also relatively likely to cause difficulties for a school by withdrawing after a short period, whether because of academic difficulties or changes in family circumstances. Moreover they are frequently relocated to different sites by their employers or employment agents or mere conditions in the job market. Even registered migrant workers lack long-term job security; the government issues stay permits for only one or two years at a time. To some extent the migrant students are cushioned from this instability by the provisions in the 2005 regulations for their freedom of movement. But many do not find themselves able to take full advantage of these provisions, as they and their families wish to stay together or in fairly close contact.

While these factors help explain why schools may continue to refuse admission to migrant children, some of them also make reasons for potential students not to apply for school entry in the first place. The obstacles of culture and language may well deter children and their families even where there is a school ready to deal with them. The prospect of having to change schools frequently is also a drawback. It is usually difficult for a school to be found for a migrant child within a reasonable distance of where the family is staying.

Another major factor for the migrant family is the financial burden of sending a child to school. Even when schools make no tuition charge, attendance still has real costs which fall heavily on the poor. They can ill afford to pay for things like transportation and extra-curricular activities, or to forgo the contribution which children can make to the household economy either in paid work or looking after the home and helping take care of younger children. Thai students from poor families are eligible for student loans from the government, but no such public facility is available for migrants or people without official identification documents.

For the many migrant workers who are not legally registered, there is a fear when applying and sending children to school, that their illegal status may become apparent to the state authorities, and expose them to additional harassment or even detention and deportation.

Finally, many of the families of migrant children remain unaware of the procedures and periods for applying to schools. Although the Ministry of Education has created national regulations which enjoin local education offices to publicize these widely – including to migrants – the local offices do not often appear to have made a significant effort in this regard (Thithimadee, 2012, p.5).

Analysis of the Clash between Policy Statements and Outcomes

The above narrative shows a large gap between policy statements and actual outcomes. Various high-level statements suggest an intention for Thailand to provide schooling for all migrant children; but after many years this is still very far from having become a reality. The immediate explanations for this offered in the last section suggest a range of measures which could close the gap.

More trained bi-lingual and multi-lingual teachers need to be hired. Translations and special curricula need to be developed and implemented, to facilitate the transition of students who will

enter schools without strong skills in Thai language, and without the same background life experiences and educational experiences as the majority of Thai students. This will involve an investment in additional teaching materials. Additional classrooms will also need to be built and equipped. Migrant students need to be provided with loans and grants to counter-act the economic costs to their family of sending them to school. Information about school attendance needs to be targeted more to migrant families.

All these measures seem to demand substantial extra public expenditure, and this observation goes a long way toward explaining the gap between policy statements and outcomes. One way of expressing the situation might be: 'The policy cannot be implemented for lack of funds'. But when, over a long period of time, credible steps are not taken to implement a stated policy, one may question whether it is a real policy. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to accept Schaffer's dictum that 'public policy is, after all, what it does' (Schaffer, 1984, p.189). In this case, then, the policy is better seen as going no further than the effective provisions of the 2005 Cabinet resolution. It is to allow schools to accept migrant children, but not necessarily to ensure such children's international rights to education are fulfilled.

Lack of funds is not a complete explanation for the gap between high-level policy statements and observed outcomes. In a government budget, funds can be allocated between different purposes according to the balance of perceived advantages and disadvantages. In the present case the balance is probably affected by a potentially widespread feeling that plentiful funding for the education of migrant children would encourage further migration of children in order to receive schooling, and that this is not a fair burden for Thailand to bear. This attitude was articulated, for instance, by a Ministry of Education official interviewed in Thithimadee Arphattananon's study (Thithimadee, 2012, p. 5). The official's words even indicated a policy (in at least one locality) to avoid publicizing the right of migrant children to access Thai schools.

A comprehensive system of schooling for migrant children would also be against the immediate interests of some current work agents and employers. Many migrant children are engaged in the work force, often at very low rates of pay. Others contribute labour to the household economy of their parents, thus helping increase the supply and decrease the costs of adult migrant labour (Nongyao et al, 2008). This is true even while at the same time, the possibility for some children of entering schools in Thailand may act as an incentive for other migrant worker families.

However, since these attitudes, approaches and interests are at variance with Thailand's commitments under the Convention on the Rights of the Child – and arguably under the National Constitution too – it would be hard for the Thailand government to lay them down formally and openly as its policy, and it does not appear to have done so. Therefore it seems more accurate to infer that the policy of the Thai state includes abstaining from clearly laying out – and working out – its policy on education for migrants.

Policy Approaches and Outcomes on Migrant Learning Centres

The problem of education for migrant children has been partly mitigated by the formation of uncertified schools known as 'migrant learning centers' (MLCs). These centers started appearing in the 1990s. They are mostly run by members of the children's ethnic community who tend to be

intellectuals opposed to the Burmese military regime and sympathetic - if not affiliated - with opposition groups in Karen and Shan states. Some of the centers are very school-like, teaching a program of basic education which in some cases extends from kindergarten to post ten levels. They mainly use Burmese as the medium of instruction (although many use Karen, Shan and other regional languages at the lower grades) and their curricula have mainly been based on the Burma national curriculum, although amended in line with more pluralistic political values. Other MLCs are more like Sunday or night schools or social drop-in centers, where tuition in one or a few academic subjects is combined with community support activities. The latter typically include lessons in basic Thai language, social and cultural orientation, basic legal knowledge, health care and vocational training in skills like using computers. Most of the more vigorous MLCs receive funding from international aid or charitable agencies. According to the government in 2011, there were about 130 MLCs nationwide (Kritiya, 2011, p.188).

Thailand policy toward the MLCs has shifted significantly after 2005. Before that date, the agencies of the Thai state were generally hostile to the centres. In legal terms, education in Thailand is only permitted to take place under the auspices of various kinds of regulated institution. These kinds of institution include schools, where status as a school depends on strict adherence to a national curriculum and other conditions of operation. 'Learning centre' is another of the general categories included in the 1999 Education Act, but learning centers can only be registered under specific types which need their own regulations, and no such regulations have yet been finalized which would cover the MLCs. Consequently, in the 1990s and early 2000s MLCs were not seen as having educational validity, and their interactions with the Thai State fell mostly under the latter's policies for immigration and national security. State security forces apprehended many of the Burmese teachers who worked in the MLCs on the grounds that they lacked work permits (and indeed were ineligible to apply, since only low-skilled occupations are available to migrants from Burma). Some of these teachers were deported; others forced to make unofficial monthly payments to police. Such harassment was a factor leading to the closure of some of the early MLCs, and necessitating practices of discretion among the others.

Since 2005, however, the Ministry of Education through its local offices has sought to engage constructively with the MLCs. This has involved the Ministry offices interceding with the State institutions of national security and immigration at local level to moderate their approach. How – if at all – this change in priorities is co-ordinated at national level remains unclear. It is seen mainly through specific actions of local state actors. These actions vary in their details from place to place according to circumstances. But they are well represented by the case of Mae Sot, a town and district near the border of Burma, where there is a large population of migrant workers and of MLCs.

In Mae Sot the local education department (PESA2 Office) opened up communications with MLCs in 2005-2006 through the Burmese Migrant Workers Education Committee (BMWEC). BMWEC had been formed by some of the early MLCs in 1999 in order to share ideas and information. At first, it was constrained to work privately among those centers, while they kept a low profile. After 2005 however, BMWEC was allowed to establish public office premises in one Mae Sot town (where there is a large population of migrant workers) and strengthen its secretariat. It became a channel of communication and influence between MLCs and the Thai authorities. At the same time, it was able

to attract charitable funding from abroad and aid agency collaboration. It became a conduit for resourcing many of the MLCs, channeling teacher salaries, running costs and teaching materials.

BMWEC helped set up regular forum meetings bringing together MLC leaders with representatives of the PESA2 Office. These meetings started taking place in 2006, and by 2009 they had become a regular monthly fixture. They were also attended by members of international agencies concerned with the education of the migrant children. The PESA2 Office then established a Migrant Education Co-ordination Centre (MECC). At first, PESA2/MECC officials would occasionally intercede with the Thai security services when the latter had problems with the MLCs and their staff. More recently, security service personnel have also been attending the forum themselves, and MLCs and their staff have been experiencing much less harassment in recent years, despite continuing to operate on a basis which appears to be technically illegal. BMWEC began providing teachers with an ID card which gave them de facto protection, and was later replaced by a more official card issued by the PESA2 Office.

Through these channels of communication and discussion, the PESA2 Office has encouraged or pressurized the MLCs to adopt and follow curricula which are more closely aligned with the Thai national curriculum, and to put more emphasis on teaching Thai language (Nongyao, 2012b). As with the apparent high-level policy on making education available to migrant students, this approach to the MLCs has made limited progress.

It has faced two main obstacles. One is a shortage of resources. To change curricula requires considerable work on their design, the new books and other teaching materials to be used, and the re-training of teachers. The Thai government has not allocated a significant budget for this purpose. But some achievements have been registered along these lines with support from charitable and international aid agencies.

The other main obstacle is resistance from the MLC leaders, staff, and many of the students. These people are interested largely in the MLCs' role as producing future citizens of Myanmar. A shift away from Burma curriculum and languages makes it harder for migrant students to transfer back to the educational system in their home country. Many of the leaders and teachers are also currently interested in engaging with struggles to reform the Burma national curriculum within that country. And personally most of them would find it difficult to continue to work as teachers using Thai language and curriculum.

Analysis of Policy Approaches and Outcomes on Migrant Learning Centers

The Ministry of Education has not laid down a clear official policy on MLCs. The centers still lack legal status. However it is clear that since 2005 there has been a semi-official policy of tolerating them and being seen to encourage them to improve their standards and conform more closely to the Thailand national curriculum. This policy does not involve any urgent goals for the development and achievements of MLCs. Rather it seems to mean allowing the existence of an MLC sector to take some of the pressure off the Thai state regarding the delivery of an adequate education for all migrant children. It creates a space in which charitable and aid agencies – and, indeed, academics – can focus their involvement on providing expert assistance in special curricula, pedagogic strategies and organizational problems of the centres, and mobilizing voluntary resources to implement their

strategies, rather than putting pressure on the Thailand government to fulfill the obligations of the state.

Prospects for Policy Development

Thailand policy on migrant education thus accommodates a balance between demands for the human educational rights of the children, and a belief among government and public that providing education for all migrants would be costly. It manages this balance partly by refraining from fully and openly stating itself as a coherent policy.

Actors concerned primarily with the human educational rights of the children might attempt to shift the balance through intensified lobbying or public campaigns, pressuring government to articulate policy more clearly. Their attempts to do so would be strengthened if they could present a clearer and more substantiated picture of the scale and effects of the educational deprivation that is being suffered. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the numbers of children who do not receive a full education, though believed to be large, are vague. Some commentators have plausibly argued that providing education to them would have great benefits as well as costs for Thailand; children in school would be less likely to participate in the illegal economy and be drawn into serious crime (Thithimadee 2012 p. 4). This argument, too, might benefit from more solid research.

It is essential to bear in mind that public policy on education for migrant children has been formed in the context of conditions and policies for migrant labour. The large black market in migrant labour has persisted despite several initiatives since the 1990s apparently aimed at registering and regularizing migrant workers (Natali, 2013). The initiatives have been widely criticized for setting up procedures which were over-complicated and costly, and hence limited in their reach. If – as we have argued – it is wrong to say that Thailand has a policy of providing education to all migrant children, it may also be unsafe to assume that Thailand has a policy of regularizing migrant workers and regulating the migrant labour market. The segregation of the market into irregular, semi-regular and regularized sectors provides an array of options to suit different types of employer, including exploitative ones. As in the case of migrant education, the lack of a comprehensive and publicly-articulated migration policy (Huguet et al., 2012) may itself be understood as part of a policy which avoids the open emergency of conflict between human rights obligations and labour laws on the one hand with various economic and political interests on the other.

Recent geopolitical events, however, may provide a stimulus for change in these policies. Political reforms in Myanmar – manifest especially since the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in late 2010 – and ceasefires and peace agreements in some of the areas that have been producing migrant workers have raised hopes of improved livelihood opportunities, educational provision and general standards of living in those areas. This may in time reduce the supply of migrants ready to work under exploitative conditions in Thailand, and increase the incentive for Thailand to ensure better conditions for unskilled migrant workers, including education for their children. At the same time, the apparent economic and political liberalization in Myanmar has given some extra impetus to the development of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Although the current blueprint of the AEC speaks of the labour market mainly in terms of an aim for free movement of *skilled* labour, the AEC agenda tends to prompt general re-thinking of industrial strategies in the ASEAN countries, and the AEC framework may also provide opportunities for co-ordination and policy clarification regarding

migrant labour that is unskilled. Progressive policy on these lines is spurred by a process in the UN of dialogue on migration and development, supported partly through the Global Forum on Migration and Development (United Nations General Assembly, 2013).

If such processes prompt Thailand to formulate in public a more coherent policy on migrant labour, this might provide openings for more effective advocacy on the education of migrant children. The costs involved in this education could be seen more clearly as a corollary of the economic benefits of migrant labour. If a commitment follows for adequate resourcing of migrant education, then other policy questions about the nature of this education will open up in a more meaningful way. If MLCs are no longer seen primarily as a low-cost alibi for Thailand's failure to provide adequate facilities for migrants in state schools, then a more principled discussion can take place about appropriate curricula. There may continue to be an option for migrant students, whether to be educated in primary alignment with the Burma or the Thailand national curricula, but within both systems there is scope and need for more thinking on how to accommodate students from diverse backgrounds and prepare them for a multicultural present and future. More importantly still, ways need to be found of bringing into school the migrant children who at present are receiving no education at all. Thailand policy has hardly even begun to address these matters.

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Impact of Ethnic Conflict on Children: The Kukis Indigenous Group of Manipur in North East India

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Introduction

Conflict, a universal phenomenon, affects the lives of people in many ways. The northeast of India in general and Manipur in particular, has been in the throes of a violent conflict in recent times. The 1990s witnessed conflicts between various groups, among which one of the most prominent ethnic clashes was undoubtedly between the Nagas and Kukis, turning the hills of Manipur red during much of the early and middle parts of the 1990s. The 1990s in Manipur was an important historical time for the Kukis, as they experienced mass killings, mass displacements, and physical and mental injuries. Villages in various parts of the state were affected differently, and the post-conflict rehabilitation was also different among the various segments. The years before and since the 1990s in Manipur witnessed a phenomenal chain reaction in terms of the number of insurgencies that took place among the Kukis, a process catalyzed by the virtual absence of any effective state intervention, and the state's impotence at instilling any sense of confidence among the victimized community (Koireng, 2008).

At that time a number of villagers deserted their homes for the relative safety of neighboring and larger settlements. One significant issue that arose at this time was the large number of children having to deal with the repercussions of socio-political unrest in the state, something which has since led to increased vulnerability and that has a profound physical, psychological and developmental impact on them. This paper is based on a study conducted among the Kuki Indigenous group in Manipur, which lies in the northeastern part of India. The study shows the impact of political instability on the development status of children. The socialization process of the children within their families and the community networks that exist are unusual, as many children live in camps or temporary rehabilitation sites. The displaced children also have to deal with institutions set-up solely to accommodate and care for them. The findings of this study demonstrate the nature of the problems arising in terms of access to services such as education in a conflict situation. Even many years after the conflict took place, this study shows the underlying consequences of year after year of recuperation. Despite development and technological advancements in recent years, the impact of the past conflict is still felt by people in the study area, and especially the most vulnerable children.

Concept of Ethnic Conflict

The term ethnic is taken from the Greek word 'ethos', which means a group of people who are culturally distinct from others (Govers et al., 1997). By ethnic group sociologists generally mean a relatively stable socio-cultural unit performing an unspecified number of functions, bound together by a language, often linked to a territory, and derived actually or allegedly from a system of kinship (Narang, 1995).

Ethnic conflict has become a very common form of social and political struggle in the modern world. Dena (1999) in his article writes that when ethnic differences are used consciously or unconsciously to identify one opposing group from another, and when such differences are also used as a powerful mobilizing weapon for social action, then ethnicity can become a contributing factor in the nature and dynamic of the conflict. He further says that beneath so-called ethnic conflicts lay social, political and economic conflicts between groups of people who happen to identify each other in ethnic terms. Stavenhagen (1995) stated, "ethnic conflicts generally involve a clash of interests or a struggle over rights; rights to land, to education, to the use of language, to political representation, to freedom of religion, to the preservation of ethnic autonomy or self-determination and so forth."

The northeastern region of India has been engulfed with a myriad of problems both in terms of variety and volume. One problem which has been in prominence in most of the northeastern states of India is the rise of sectarianism and the growth of micro-nationalism characterized by the agenda of exclusivist identities (Koireng, 2005). Such negative ethnic assertion considerably affects relationships at the inter-state and intra-state levels among the various ethnic groups, and this is also experienced in Manipur.

The Kuki-Naga clash of the 1990s, which rocked the whole of Manipur, cannot be attributed solely to one single factor; it was the result of both historical as well as contemporary factors. Traditional rivalries, unresolved inter-village disputes, sporadic as well as systematic violence committed by one group against another, a fight for control over homelands, a lack of political will on the part of the state government, inefficient administration, ineffective law and order enforcing agencies, etc.; all these contributed to the outbreak of conflict (Koireng, 2008).

Shimray has identified the following factors as being responsible for the emergence of distinct ethnicities in Manipur: (i) distinctive social and cultural identities manifested by all social groups in the state, (ii) limited social and cultural interaction between the different ethnic groups despite the physical and linguistic affinities among them, and (iii) heightened importance of historical and religious differences in political struggles against the dominance of larger and more powerful ethnic groups (Shimray, 2001).

Manipur, which is no exception to ethnic conflict, experienced a series of violent ethnic clashes that occurred within its territory in the 1990s. Hussain and Phanjoubam (2008), who conducted a study and gave a status report on internal displacement in Assam and Manipur, identified the Kuki and the Naga clash as one major inter-ethnic conflict that turned the hills of Manipur ablaze during much of the early and middle parts of the 1990s. As of today, Manipur may be said to be the worst case scenario in the northeast as far as insurgency is concerned. The entire socio-economic life of the state has taken a downturn, in such an atmosphere of political uncertainty and instability.

Due to prolonged food shortages, the affected communities have developed deficiencies of macro- and micro-nutrients. Macro-nutrient deficiencies cause starvation and finally death itself whereas micro-nutrient deficiencies cause a deterioration of the immune system, wound healing ability and oxygen supply, leading to high mortality and morbidity due to infectious diseases like measles, diarrhoeal diseases, respiratory infections, malaria and tuberculosis (Toole et al., 1988). The increased risk of infectious disease due to lack of clean water, shelter and sanitation, is mentioned as affecting individuals, but on a community level, the epidemic potential of these diseases can be devastating (Sharp, 1993).

Problems and Rehabilitation of the Affected People

Even after almost two decades since the conflict began, Manipur still manifests remnants of the ethnic conflict. The conflict left behind gory stains of inhumane killings and tarnished the soil of Manipur. Not only did it cause physical harm to the people, but it has also since affected the social, political and economic life of the people. Kidnappings and killings are still common even to this day. Bandhs and agitations have become the norm. The socio-economic condition of the state is still severely depressed, crippling the economic activity and institutional structures of the societies there.

The Kuki-Naga clash led to large-scale displacement. The nature of displacement includes spontaneous fleeing from life threatening situations, as well as organized and planned population transfers and relocations involving the use of force and other human rights abuse. Those displaced were exposed to a multitude of problems. Even for the population who were indirectly affected, they continue to bear the brunt of the conflict. Land, which is a lifeline for the people, has become disconnected from the displaced population since their eviction from their original villages. Many of them have become daily wage laborers to sustain their means of livelihood. The fear of venturing out from their respective villages has greatly affected the education of the younger population. Even the life of the local population has come to a standstill. During the conflict, there were many cases of killings while people were engaged in agricultural work in the fields, and this has since limited their livelihood options. All their savings were liquidated during the conflict, and the prices of essential commodities skyrocketed, due to the disruption to transportation.

In spite of the widespread destruction experienced, the state's response to people affected by the conflict was often ad-hoc and largely insufficient, and the displaced were therefore often left in extremely vulnerable situations. The state not only failed to contain the clashes, but also to address the grievances of the affected people.

Studies conducted on the impact of ethnic violence have shown that conflict results in negative public health consequences, as mediated by population displacement, a disruption of economic activities, food scarcity and the collapse of basic healthcare. Studies have also shown how, in addition to violence-related mortality, disruption in the delivery of basic services, including electricity, water and health care, raises death rates among non-combatants during conflict and even after it has ended (Margaret E Kruk et al., 2010).

The Kuki-Naga clash led to a large-scale displacement, and many people continue to be in a state of forced displacement, both at the individual and group levels. Those displaced were exposed to a

multitude of problems. Land was their most valued asset, as they got everything for their survival from it. But after being displaced, many of them became wage laborers. The nature of displacement includes spontaneous fleeing from life threatening situations, as well as organized and planned population transfers and relocations involving the use of force and other human rights abuse. Many youths started engaging in various activities like drug addiction, alcoholism and theft. In short, the younger population among the displaced led a wayward and undisciplined lifestyle, as the roles of the seniors and village elders - as agents of social control – were not available to them.

The period during the violence witnessed the complete halt of the inter-dependent economic ties of the two communities. There was fear of venturing out from their respective villages, which mainly affected the education of the younger population. During the period of the clash, there were many cases of killing while engaging in cultivation works. As such, livelihood options were squeezed, and with the depletion of savings, the condition of the affected population became worse. Due to the disruption of transportation, the prices of essential commodities also skyrocketed. The state government not only failed to contain the clashes, but also at redressing the grievances of the affected people, which made the situation more volatile.

Boyden Jo et al. (2002) of the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, conducted a study on war-affected and displaced children in the South Asian countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka between January and April 2001. In their study, they highlighted the children's experiences of conflict, such as social disruption, service access, impoverishment, civil and political violations and threats to the physical integrity of children; plus a transformation in children's roles and responsibilities, and large differentials in children's vulnerabilities. They also highlighted the psycho-social responses to conflict. They clearly identified the environmental threats to children commonly associated with conflict, which include displacement from homeland, family dispersal, separation and discord, destitution, loss of service access and social interaction, and the intimidatory presence of military personnel (Boyden et al., 2002).

A recent study by the National Child Rights Commission led by Shantha Sinha, Chairperson of the commission, presented the findings of an eight-day visit to camps in Assam, Manipur and Tripura to study the condition of children, especially those living in refugee camps (CRC, 2008). The underlying goals and the much-acclaimed policies and measures that are formulated in the UN Convention on the Human Rights of Children are far from being realized in these places. Displaced children in Tripura suffered sub-human conditions in various relief camps, with high rates of child mortality due to a lack of access to primary health care and other basic facilities like proper food and shelter. There are also instances of female child trafficking. The same study team also reported that children in the northeastern states live in poverty and without proper healthcare, education and nutrition, especially those living in the refugee camps.

The relief camps for internally displaced people in the northeast are reportedly in a deplorable condition. Camps for the displaced across the region are said to lack adequate shelter, food, health care, education and protection. This pattern has been confirmed by earlier reports which have documented that the displaced are housed in buildings and makeshift shelters, with little health care and no access to formal education (South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, SAHRDC, March

2001), meaning they suffer acute hardship. The relief camps have inadequate basic amenities such as potable water, sanitary facilities, schools and primary healthcare centres. There is a lack of credible information on numbers and subsistence needs of the displaced, which leaves large numbers of people unassisted and unaccounted for. It is thereby felt that there is an urgent need for national authorities to conduct surveys in conflict-affected areas to document the number of internally displaced and their specific needs.

Impact on the Younger Generation

The impact of the conflict has been felt most by those directly involved in the violence and the displaced population, those who experienced it first-hand. However, the repercussions of the conflict and political instability have not spared the general population either. Young people have faced the brunt of the havoc and have had to pay a hefty price, as many educational institutions have not functioned efficiently due to the unstable conditions brought-about by socio-political unrest in the state. During the conflict, members of the younger generation fled in great numbers to other parts of the country to pursue their studies or in search of other job opportunities which their parent state denied them. In fact, this has become a trend for the past few years, with most young people migrating out of Manipur to escape the harsh realities of the unbalanced and unfavorable living conditions in the state. With their means of livelihood impacted, the effects have also very much been felt in the area of health. Academic pursuits, particularly at the pre-marital level, came to a complete halt for one to four years after the conflict. Many students completely abandoned education; education came to a standstill during the Kuki-Naga conflict. Outside the study areas, the lives of the students across the state were greatly disturbed and chaotic. Many Kuki students attending schools in Naga villages, and vice-versa, had to give-up their studies due to the severity of the conflict.

My study shows that many people between the ages of 19 and 34 could not complete their education due to the conflict, and remain as drop outs having not completed high school. The main reasons for not attending school or obtaining formal education are that schools are located too far away, transportation not available, education is not considered necessary or required for household work, farm or family businesses, or for keeping guard and vigil over the village; that it costs too much, is not required for the care of siblings, plus that the students are not interested in their studies, there are no proper school facilities, school buildings were destroyed during the conflict, and that it is not safe to travel or attend school.

In the light of the problems faced by northeast India, which is afflicted by various ethnic and political conflicts, one can clearly notice the predicament faced by these children affected by the ongoing socio-political instability, which is unfavorable for the growth and nurturing of children. This has led to an increase in their vulnerability and; thereby, has had a profound physical, psychological and developmental affect on them. The issue that arises, and which is of greatest concern, is that a number of children face a threat to their very survival, needing not only care and protection but also resources for their rehabilitation and development. A large number of children are in a deplorable state of existence and need carefully pre-meditated welfare services (Phanjoubam, 2007). The pillars of the protective environment, such as family and community, have crumbled or have been deliberately undermined, exposing children - who are the most vulnerable group – to the many

harmful by-products of war. Some of the most serious effects are killings, torture and other forms of violence; the recruitment of child soldiers, displacement and separation.

Children are any nation's most 'supremely important asset', and the Indian state produced a national policy on children in 1974; stating goals and outlining policies and measures in support of this strategy. It states: "their nurture and solicitude are our responsibility" and "equal opportunities for development to all children during the period of growth should be our aim, for this would serve our larger purpose of reducing inequality and ensuring social justice." The Constitution of India also gives directions to the state on specific child development concerns, and grants them protection. More recently, India has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), signifying India's commitment to meet the protection, survival and development needs of children. However, the nature of the problems faced by such children; of the large numbers involved in the study region, has revealed the paradoxical nature of the various goals and commitments laid down for the betterment and the development of the lives of children. There is a great need for strong political and administrative commitment, integrated policies, coordinated action, and an effective delivery system.

At this point of time, it is necessary to take stock of what has been achieved and what is yet to be achieved, so that the child development goals set by the nation can become a social reality. The development status of children is affected by some key social and economic factors – illiteracy, poverty, unsatisfactory levels of infrastructure development, the poor state of public social services and civic amenities, and the political instability that disrupts the smooth functioning of the various developmental projects and ventures.

Many studies have been carried out into the conflict-related issues in the northeast, and these have proved instrumental in helping to understand the situation in this conflict-prone area of the country. However, it is evident that there is a major dearth of required documents or literature which looks at issues related to those children affected by socio-political unrest in the region.

The government's response to people fleeing conflict is often ad-hoc and largely insufficient, and as a result, those people displaced are often left in an extremely vulnerable situation. The impact of armed conflict cannot be fully understood without looking at the related effects and community-based solutions that draw-on local culture and an understanding of child development. The disruption of food supplies, the destruction of crops and agricultural infrastructures, the disintegration of families and communities, the displacement of populations and the destruction of educational and health services and of water and sanitation systems, all take a heavy toll on children.

The government's intervention on the displaced population in general and the children in particular, has been minimal. According to a report made by an NGO group on behalf of and presented to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CORE, 1998), the Indian state has lapsed in its duties; constituting a serious lacuna in the state party's initial technical report. The report made by the committee is the first comprehensive review of the government of India's response to and progress against the UN convention. Its findings also state that the indigenous characteristics of the children, as indigenous and tribal people constitute the majority of the population, do not find the required reflection in country level analyses and the implementation of the convention on child rights (CRC).

Displacement is one of the most visible and disruptive effects of ethnic conflict. Children are forced, along with their families, or as orphans, to flee their place of origin and move to a place within their home country or across an international border that is frequently unknown and often offers a

harsher environment. Conditions of displacement put at risk virtually the entire range of rights guaranteed to children by the CRC, including survival, protection, and development without discrimination. The sudden and violent onset of displacement, by shedding family and community networks, can deeply disrupt the psychological well-being of children. Displacement increases children's vulnerability during the reintegration period following displacement as well, increasing the risk of poverty resulting from loss of land, inheritance or other legal rights, incarceration or discrimination, inability to resume schooling and related problems. This paper essentially brings out how displaced children in general are found to show poorer indices of health through conducting anthropometric measurement.

Conceptualization

The theoretical framework of the study is within the social model of health theory, embracing the context of health and illness beyond the biological model. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO; 1948) health is "a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely absence of diseases or infirmity." Later "the ability to lead a socially and economically productive life" was also included in the definition by the WHO (1978). Health is a resource for every day, not the objective of living; it is a positive concept embracing social and personal resources as well as physical and psychological capacities (Kishore, 2002).

The social model suggests that individual and community health results from complex cultural and structural influences affecting particular groups of people – ethnic minorities, women, the elderly, etc. This interpretation thus incorporates the wider social perspectives that affect individuals' well-being. It focuses on the barriers and difficulties that prevent the 'ill' person from having access to health and 'normality'. These include: lack of information or education on health care; lack of transport facilities to enable contact with doctors, hospitals etc., lack of support from and contact with others; limited protection by legislation; lack of funds or limited access to financial support; limited work opportunities. The theoretical framework of the study will be within the social model of health theory (Nettleton, 1995), embracing the whole context of health and illness beyond the biological model. The framework of social model of health is such that it takes into account the result of complex and interacting material structural and behavioral cultural factors in understanding the health of individuals and communities.

Whereas the focus of the medical model is on pathologies, clinical interventions and patient behavior, the social model focuses on environment and collective measures. Social determinants of health are the economic and social conditions that shape the health of individuals, communities, and jurisdictions as a whole. Social determinants of health are the primary determinants of whether individuals stay healthy or become ill (a narrow definition of health). Social determinants of health also determine the extent to which a person possesses the physical, social, and personal resources to identify and achieve personal aspirations, satisfy needs, and cope with the environment (a broader definition of health). Social determinants of health are about the quantity and quality of a variety of resources that a society makes available to its members. These resources include, but are not limited to, conditions of childhood, income, availability and quality of education, food, housing, employment, working conditions, health and social services. Social determinants of health such as occupation, monthly income and standard of living, social support, household assets, education,

access to health care, food patterns, quantity and variety, frequency of meal are taken into account for the study. These are to be viewed as a collective phenomenon of the villages with different experiences of the conflict and rehabilitation.

Study Sites

The displaced population had first-hand experience of the conflict by fleeing from their homes and land; however, the repercussions of the conflict were also indirectly felt by many who had lived under the constant threat of conflict and violence. Of those who were displaced, rehabilitation has occurred in various ways; some have gone back to resettle in their own village sites while others have made the refugee camps their 'permanent' home. In this regard, three sites have been selected for the study: one resettlement camp of those affected in the ethnic clash in the 1990s, one village settlement to which people returned, and one village which faced the indirect effects of the conflict, but its people were not displaced.

The first settlement site is a resettlement colony called Chavangphai, which is now considered part of Moreh town in Chandel district. The town is divided into various wards, in which Chavangphai comprises part of ward 7. The second settlement site is Gelnal village, which has been set up at the same site where houses were previously attacked and burned. This village is located in the Sadar Hills West Sub-division of Senapati district. These two villages represent the settlement sites which faced a severe and direct impact of the conflict. The third study area is Waichong village, which was not evacuated, nor was it directly affected as severely as the others. However, it was also in constant grip of fear and threats during the conflict and so was not spared the ramifications of the conflict. This village is also located in the Sadar Hills West Sub-division of Senapati district. The village has since suffered the indirect impacts of the conflict in a number of ways.

Social mapping of the three selected villages was initiated in the early phase of the field study project. Anthropometric measurements were conducted on selected age groups, to determine the nutritional status prevalent in the three study sites. Secondary sources like published books, articles from journals, local magazines, unpublished reports and documents, and newspapers archives that gave accounts during the conflict situation, were also used to build a background to the study, the violence and the impacts of the conflict.

The Study Population

The Kukis are one of the three major ethnic groups in Manipur, the other two being the Meiteis and the Nagas. Manipur, with a population of 2,570,390 (2011 census, Government of India) has an area of 22,327 sq km. Out of this, 58.9% live in the valley, mainly inhabited by the Meiteis, and the remaining hill areas are inhabited by the Kukis and the Nagas. The geographical feature of Manipur is such that there is a valley in the middle surrounded on all sides by hills. The valley constitutes about one-tenth of the total area, while the hills make up the remainder. Manipur lies between latitudes 23°50'N, and longitudes 93°10' and 94°30'E; the state is bounded by: Nagaland to the north, North-Cachar Districts in Assam to the west, Mizoram to the south and Kabow valley and the Chin Hills of Burma to the east. The international border with Burma extends for 352 kilometers.

Village Profiles

Chavangphai

Most of the settlers in Chavangphai originated from the eastern part of Ukhrul district, while a few settlers are from Chandel district. In either case, they are displaced populations from the Kuki-Naga clashes in the early 1990s. Chavangphai is situated in the southeast part of Moreh town. The Lailok River divides the area from Canaan Veng and Muslim Nagar which lie to the west and south of the area respectively. In the northern part of Chavangphai, lies S. Mouljol village, while to the east lies Burma.

Gelnal Village

Gelnal village was established in the year 1928. It was earlier known as *Lammatek*. This place was populated with oak trees which created a beautiful, picturesque scene. As such, when Pu. Gouthang and Pu Chongkhosat Lhangum, two brothers, first settled in this place, they renamed the village *Gelnal*. After Pu Gouthang passed away in 1964, his son Pu Thangkhosat Lhangum, who was just 20 years-old, then took over the chieftainship.

Tujang Vaichong village

Tujang Vaichong is one of the oldest and most significant villages among the Kukis, because the first Kuki Baptist church was established in this village in 1914. Tujang Vaichong is located in the Sadar Hills, a sub-division of Senapati district. A road which connects with Kangpokpi and Tamenglong passes through the village.

Anthropometric Measurement

This paper discusses the impacts of the conflict on health, by taking into account health indicators such as height, weight, BMI and mortality rates over the last five years. The determinants of health that are used in the study are food habits, the quantity and quality of food, and access to health care.

The nutritional status of certain age groups was assessed using anthropometric measurements. The purpose of studying the nutritional status was to examine differences across the three areas and between the two generations (young and older) in each area. The various determinants used in the three study areas helped developed an understanding of differences or trends in terms of nutritional status.

Anthropometry is defined as a technique that deals with the measurement of the size, weight and proportions of the human body. The anthropometric measurements described in this study are standing height, recumbent length and weight. Weight is the measurement of a person's total body (DLHS, 2002-04). The weights of the adults and children over two were taken using a weighing machine; they were made to stand on the weighing machine wearing only light dress and in bare feet. For children unable to stand or were reluctant to stand on their own, they were held either by the mother or an elder member of the family, and then made to stand on the weighing machine together. The weight of the child was then derived by subtracting the weight of the mother from the total weight of both the mother and the child.

Height is also an important measurement in the assessment of nutritional status, and its interpretation in children is dependent on knowing the age of the child (Latham, 1997). Height or stature is the distance from the crown of the head to the bottom of the feet (heels). The height measurement for children of two years of age and older was measured in bare feet with the help of a flexible steel measuring tape, with the person standing against a vertical wall facing outward. Children less than two years-old were measured by letting the child stay in the supine position and pressing his or her knee against a bed or floor. The distance from the crown of the head to the bottom of the feet (heels) was then measured.

Study Design

To conduct an anthropometric study of the three villages, the heights and weights of children below the age of five were taken using the snowball sampling method. To derive an equal number for a comparative study among the three villages, 50 children were used, as this was the maximum number of children that could be collected in one of the villages. The study assessed the nutritional status of children using anthropometric measurements and related determinants. Interviews with households and mothers were undertaken using interview schedules. The heights and weights of children below five were measured.

Anthropometric Measurement of Children

Anthropometric measurements and dietary surveys among the children were carried out to assess the nutritional status of children less than five years-old. Measurements then were developed as indices: three indices were calculated to assess the nutritional status of the children. The three indices of nutritional status were expressed in standard deviation units (SD-Z scores) from the median of the International Reference population. Calculations were conducted of the nutritional status of children using these three indices, and were compared with a reference population. The indices used to determine the nutritional status of the children were calculated using the WHO anthropometric calculator.

Children are categorised as undernourished when they are more than two standard deviations below the reference median of any indices. Those children who fall more than three standard deviations below the reference median are categorised as severely undernourished. Three standard indices of physical growth were used here to assess the nutritional status of the children (NFHS-3).

Weight for Age (Underweight)

This is a composite measure of poor nutrition that assesses both chronic and acute under-nutrition. Children are characterized as underweight when they are more than two standard deviations below the reference median weight for their age, and as severely underweight when they are more than three standard deviations below the reference median weight for the median reference child of the same age and sex.

Height for Age (Stunting)

The measurement of linear growth retardation in children and of chronic under-nutrition, with children categorised as stunted if they are under-nourished. Children fall under the category of

stunted when they are more than two standard deviations below the median reference population with regard to their height for age, and as severely stunted when they are more than three standard deviations below the median of the reference population, in comparison with a reference child of the same age and sex.

Weight for Height (Wasting)

This is the measurement of a person's body mass with regard to body length, and is used to measure the prevalence of acute under-nutrition. Children are considered 'wasted' when they are more than two standard deviations below the median for the reference population, in relation to weight for height, and as severely wasted while they are more than three standard deviations below the median, in comparison with a reference child of the same height/length and weight.

Literature on the relationship between these anthropometric indicators and the selected socio-demographic, environmental and economic variables demonstrates that dietary intake and infectious disease, and the interaction between these two factors, are the primary biological determinants of children's post-partum growth patterns (Pebley & Goldman, 1995). Protein-energy malnutrition signifies an imbalance between the supply of protein and energy, and the body's demand for these to ensure optimal growth and function. Malnutrition in children is the consequence of a range of factors that are often related to poor food quality, insufficient food intake, and severe and repeated infectious diseases, or frequently some combination of these three (De Onisa & Blossner, 1997).

Rahman et al. (2008), in their study on malnutrition in Bangladesh shows that demographic situations such as increasing levels of maternal health and child's birth size; high socio-economic conditions such as higher parental education levels, household economic class and media exposure; improved health system practices such as good immunization and supplementation practices and standard living conditions as well as health facilities, and also residency in the more developed divisions, are important factors associated with a lower prevalence of malnutrition.

The prevalence of inadequate growth or malnutrition among children is a significant health policy concern in the developing world, because it is a precise indicator of nutritional status and is associated with mental development and learning ability, and also with body size as well as work capacity in adult life (Rahman, 2008).

This paper presents the varying determinants of health, such as food habits and the quantity and quality of food ingested, alongside the findings from the health indicator survey of height, weight and mortality rates (over the last five years) across the three study areas.

Table 1: Determinants of Nutritional Status in the Three Villages

Determinants of nutritional status	CHAVANGPHAI (fully displaced and in a new location near the edge of town)	GELNAL (devastated, but returned to the old village)	TUJANG VAICHONG (indirectly affected)
Food patterns and food items	Rice, lentils, vegetables, meat, eggs for the sick, grains on a weekly basis or daily basis now; access to varieties of food limited based on purchasing power; even now all kinds of food items are found but restricted based on budget.	More rice than before, more vegetables grown in the home gardens, both leafy and potatoes, pumpkins, yams and beans widely found. Fish and meat scarce; sold to fund children's education), eggs and milk.	Food items similar to Gelnal but greater use of non-vegetable items; weekly market on Saturdays sells all kinds of food items from the area.
Frequency and quantity	2 to 3 meals a day; tea and snacks in between	2 to 3 meals a day; tea and snacks in between	2 to 3 meals a day; tea and snacks in between
Food sufficiency	Majority depend on food bought from the market on a daily basis; less than five months food sufficiency	Majority throughout the year (grains, non-market resources). Most households have agricultural land to produce enough rice for the whole year; some households buy low quality rice from the market and mix it with locally grown rice.	Majority throughout the year (grains, non-market resources). Most households have agricultural land to produce enough rice for the whole year. Some households buy low quality rice from the market and mix it with locally grown rice.

Food intake is better in terms of quantity and diversity in Gelnal and Tujung Vaichong. Anthropometry shows the impact of this, with Chavangphai having the poorest indices. Mortality differences show the highest death rate in the past five years in Chavangphai, with Gelnal next and Tujung Vaichong the best. Health indicators such as height, weight, BMI and death rates within the last five years indicate that Chavangphai, the settlement of the displaced population, has the worst health indicators.

Our study data shows that living in a more developed area has not benefitted the nutritional status of the study population, since their standard of living has worsened despite better cash incomes. Table 2 shows the village distribution of the nutritional status of the group from 0 to 5 years-old.

Table 2: Distribution of Weight, Stunting and Wasting among Children in the Study Villages

	Underweight: Weight for age (in %)		Stunting: Height for age (in %)		Wasting: Weight for height (in %)	
	<-2SD	< -3SD	<-2SD	< -3SD	<-2SD	< -3SD
	Chavangphai	32	6	34	6	14
Gelnal	24	2	26	6	8	2
Tujung Vaichong	22	2	24	4	10	2

Source: Primary data

In Chavangphai, 32% of the children fall in the category of underweight (under <2SD i.e. moderate under nutrition), while 6% are under <-3SD (severely undernourished). For stunting, 34% show moderate stunting, while another 6% are severely stunted. For wasting, 14% of children are in the moderate wasting category, while 6% are severely wasted. The children in Gelnal and Tujung Vaichong show similar levels of under nutrition; but better than the moderate and severe degrees of underweight, stunting and wasting in Chavangphai. Clearly, the better incomes in Chavangphai are not translating into better child nutrition. Higher expenditure on other items and a dependence on the market for staple food could explain this phenomenon. Changes in the mothers' work statuses might also be affecting child care and so nutritional status.

Mortality Rates

One of the health indicators measured was mortality rates over the last five years. The data on mortality rates shows the correlation of displacement with high death rates. The displaced population in the new settlement area was found to have been more susceptible to death. In the new settlement area, where the displaced population has resettled, violence with other communities has persisted from time to time, leading to loss of life, especially among the younger male populations. The drastic change in climatic conditions, from a cold to a hot and humid climate, could also be a reason for the vulnerability of the displaced population.

Table 3: Mortality Rates over the Last Five Years

Study sites and total population	Chavangphai (1158 population)	Gelnal (780 population)	Tujung Vaichong (687 population)
No. of deaths	29	16	8
Deaths per 1000 population	25	20	12
Ages and causes of death	4 people (70 to 80 yrs); 12 people (2 to 10 yrs); 4 people (15 to 20 yrs); 3 people (24, to 30 yrs); 6 people (40 to 51 yrs). Causes of death: old age, malaria, AIDS, maternal death, accidents, killed due to clashes or violence	7 people (60 to 90 yrs) 3 people (6 to 10 months old) 3 people (7, 11, 16 years-old) 3 people (42, 43, 45 years-old) Causes of death: old age, typhoid, cold, diarrhea, one drowning case	2 people (above 60) 3 people (30 to 45) 3 people (5 to 15) Causes of death: old age, typhoid, AIDS

Source: Primary data

From the table, Gelnal shows the highest number of deaths among the elderly group between the ages of 60 and 90, while in Tujang Vaichong the causes are mainly old age and communicable diseases. In Chavangphai, there is a greater death rate at younger ages, with communicable diseases, accidents and intentional injuries being high. Clearly, the effect of the aftermath of the violence has had a differential impact on the health of those displaced to and rehabilitated in new sites, relative to that of those who settled back in their old village or were not displaced at all. This is despite the shift to an urban area, an increase in cash incomes and greater access to markets, educational institutions and health services.

Conclusion

There are higher levels of under-nutrition in the displaced settlement area, based on the determinants standard of living, main occupation, household assets, incomes, educational profiles, food habits and food sufficiency, which indicate that these variables may have a strong influence on determining the nutritional status of the population. In other words, it is the socio-economic profile which determines levels of access to all these resources and so determines nutritional status. The proportion of underweight and stunted children was found to be higher in Chavangphai, which also shows the lowest amount of land possessed among the three study populations.

It is difficult to clearly identify the influence of the conflict on general development over the years and rural-urban differences; however, what the findings here demonstrate is the serious health implications of displacement and rehabilitation, even if a new area promises better and more modern development levels, due to poorer life conditions across a number of several dimensions.

The study shows that the conflict has had a different impact on the Kukis, who were subject to direct violence and displacement, with a greater impact on the children in particular. Returning to a familiar place with the same community members leads to better outcomes than when located in a new place, and with a break-up of the old community.

In spite of the recurring incidence of internal displacement and the severity of the phenomenon in the northeastern part of the country, the state is seen as doing precious little to either prevent its recurrence or tackle the plight of the people, and especially the vulnerable children. In fact, apathy has been the hallmark of the state's response to internal displacement in particular, and the conflict affected population in general (Goswami, 2007). Even all these years after the conflict, this study shows the underlying consequences of conflict year after year, from which those affected, particularly the displaced population, are still recuperating. There is a need for greater sensitivity to be shown towards the conflict-affected population, especially those displaced, for peace and long-lasting development to prevail.

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Trends in Determinants of Employment for Women Parenting Infant Children in Japan

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Introduction

Japanese society has experienced long economic downturn since the second half of 1990s. After the financial crisis in 1997 Japanese economy became deflationary. There was a deterioration in the employment situation where the unemployment rate had reached 5.4% in 2002, which was considered the highest since 1945.

Japanese economy went through somewhat a phase of recovery between 2003 and 2008 Lehman Shock. However, the process was said to be “the recovery without actual sensation” (White paper on the economy and public finances, 2007). Though the unemployment rate had fallen since 2003, the growth lay at non-standard employment. Such expanding income disparities had drawn many concerns.

In terms of social policy, women’s employment was actively encouraged by policies that promoted gender equality during the period between 2003 and 2008. The childcare leave benefit was raised in 2007. The number of day care center was planned for increase, even though there were many discussions on whether the quantitative increase of day care centers would result in the qualitative decline in childcare services.

This paper attempts to explore the possible impact on women’s employment as a result of the economic conditions and policies set from 1998 to 2008. This paper employs data collected from three National Family Research of Japan surveys (NFRJ98, NFRJ03, and NFRJ08) and seeks to examine whether the mechanisms employed by the women with infants had changed through the ten-year period.

1. Employment Situation of Japanese Women

The ratio between women to men among employees had gradually grown since 1990s. However, a limited number of changes had occurred in women’s continued employment following childbirth over the last 20 years. According to the 13th National Fertility Survey conducted by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research in 2005, almost 70 percent of women who gave birth to their first children between 2000 and 2004 had given up their jobs after childbirth or were already outside the labor market when they gave birth. This tendency had not changed much in comparison to statistics collected for the second half of the 1980s.

In contrast, a clear pattern existed for women to return to work once their children were somewhat older. According to the 2007 Employment Status Survey conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, although the employment rate for women whose youngest children were under one year of age was 28.3 percent, the employment rate for women whose youngest children were seven years of age was much higher: 63.0 percent.

2. Preceding Studies on the Determinants of Women's Employment and the Objective of this Study

By hypothesis, the working patterns of women with infants were influenced by (a) their human capital, (b) their need for extra income, and (c) the availability of support resources in the form of household chores and childrearing. With respect to (a), if a woman possessed a high human capital, she could avail herself at a "higher" price in the labor market. This would allow her greater ease in choosing to work and maximizing her human capital. With respect to (b), it had been predicated that it should be easier for a woman to choose to work when her household had a greater need for extra income (e.g., when the other stable sources of income, such as the husband's income, are low). With respect to (c), a woman might choose to work more easily if appropriate support resources for household chores and childrearing were made available (in many cases, these resources were provided by the husbands or the couple's parents).

Previous researches that had examined the determinant factors of women's employment in Japan had argued that the availability of support resources for household chores and childrearing in conjunction with each household's need for extra income had exerted a stronger influence than women's personal human capital.

According to the effect of educational qualification, which was a typical form of human capital for women, analyses of data obtained till 1990s had not given a consistent answer to the question of whether attainment of higher education had encouraged women's full-time employment. Brinton's (1993) analysis of married women with children suggested that women's educational attainment did not exert a meaningful effect on their employment patterns. Osawa (1993) discovered the existence of a significant correlation between women's employment and educational attainment among women whose spouses were below 60 years of age. However, she had also noted that this tendency was not apparent during these women's childrearing periods. Next, Tanaka (1998) discovered that possession of university degrees did not exert significant effects on whether women would continue full-time employment after the birth of their youngest children. These tendencies might have changed since 2000. In addition, Shirahase (2009) had conducted an analysis of the 2005 Social Stratification and Social Mobility (SSM) Survey. Shirahase (2009) discovered that possession of university degrees exerted positive effects on standard employment of women below 59 years of age. However, these effects were not necessarily apparent for women with infants. On the other hand, Iwama (2008) revealed that possession of university degrees did not exert significant effects on married women's employment. As seen so far, in Japan, women's educational attainment did not exert a definite effect on the encouragement of women's employment. This result differed from results discovered in other countries (Shirahase, 2009; Nishimura, 2010).

Further, the husband's income had been used as a representative variable to measure the need for extra income. Analyses that employed this variable had consistently confirmed that the presence of the husband's income discouraged the wife's employment. The negative effect of the husband's income on the wife's employment was repeatedly confirmed by Takayama and Arita (1992), Osawa (1993), Nagase (1994), Kojima (1995), and Hirata (2008). This negative effect was apparent on both the wife's standard and non-standard employment, including part-time employment (Osawa, 1993; Nagase, 1994; Kojima, 1995).

Studies conducted on support resources for household chores and childrearing had pointed out that co-residence with parents encouraged women's employment. Kojima (1995) demonstrated that co-residence with either the wife's or the husband's parents or proximate residence with the wife's parents during the first child's infancy encouraged the wife's employment. Nagase (1994) contended that, although co-residence with a mother (either the wife's or the husband's mother) encouraged the woman's standard employment, it did not correlate with non-standard employment, including part-time employment. However, some studies suggested that these effects of co-residence with parents had weakened. Osawa and Suzuki (2000) analyzed data collected during the mid-1990s. They discovered that co-residence with parents did not exert an effect on the employment of women with youngest children aged below three years of age. Senda (2002) demonstrated that, although co-residence with parents could have encouraged women's continuation of standard employment between the times of their pregnancies with their first children to the first birthday of those children in the birth cohort before 1958, a similar effect was not observed in the birth cohort after 1959.

This paper builds on insights collected from the above-mentioned prior research. It provides a discussion of an analysis of employment patterns of married women during their life stage as mothers of their youngest children aged between 0 and 6 years. It raises the following questions:

1. Does the wife's educational attainment (i.e., human capital) encourage her employment? If so, is the effect stronger in newer, rather than older data?
2. Does the husband's income (i.e., the need for extra income) correlate with the wife's employment?
3. Does co-residence or proximate residence with parents (either the wife's or the husband's parents) encourage the wife's employment?
 - If so, does it exert different effects on standard employment and non-standard employment?
 - Does co-residence/proximate residence with the wife's parents exert a different effect than co-residence/proximate residence with the husband's parents?
 - Has this effect weakened during the past few years?
4. Can the husband's involvement in household chores and childrearing be positively correlated with the wife's employment?

The following sections of this paper provide an analysis of data collected from NFRJ98, NFRJ03, and NFRJ08 with respect to the above-mentioned questions. It also provides comparison of the results of this analysis.

3. Methods

3.1. Data and the Subject of the Analysis

Data used for analysis of this paper comes from three National Family Research of Japan surveys (NFRJ98, NFRJ03, and NFRJ08), which were conducted by the Japan Society of Family Sociology. These data sets are nationally representative samples, and sample size of each data set is 10,500 for NFRJ98, 10,000 for NFRJ03, and 9,400 for NFRJ08.

The subjects of the analysis were limited to women who were married at the time of each survey and whose youngest children were between 0 and 6 years of age (NFRJ98: n=313 ; NFRJ03: n=432 ; NFRJ08: n=333).

3.2. Variables

The dependent variable is wife's employment status. In this study, three categories were used: "standard employment," "non-standard employment" (including part-time employment, dispatch work, and so on), and "not in employment." To simplify the analysis, self-employed individuals and family workers were excluded.

The following independent variables were employed. The wife's educational attainment was selected as a variable that expressed her human capital. The husband's income was selected as a variable that expressed the need for extra income. Variables selected to express support resources included the residence's proximate distance from the wife's mother, the residence's proximate distance from the husband's mother. The details of each variable are listed below.

We divided the wife's educational attainment into three categories: "secondary education or below," "college" (i.e., junior colleges, vocational colleges, and advanced vocational colleges), and "university level or above." Only a few subjects had educational attainments below junior high school. Therefore, we combined them with subjects who had high school level educational attainments (i.e., secondary education).

The husband's income was recorded in bands of approximately one million yen. For the purposes of this analysis, the median value in the band was used. For example, "no income" = 0 yen, "less than a million yen" = 500,000 yen, "between a million and 1.29 million yen" = 1,150,000 yen, "between 1.30 and 1.99 million yen" = 1,650,000 yen, and "between 2.00 and 2.99 million yen" = 2,500,000 yen. The top band of "above twelve million yen" was assigned the value of 13,500,000 yen. When this variable was put into the multinomial logit analysis, the values divided by 1 million were used to make it easier for interpreting the coefficients.

A variety of different items were presented to respondents during three surveys related to the residences' proximate distance from the wife's and the husband's mothers. Finally, as shown in Table 1, these choices were standardized into four categories: "co-residence," "proximate residence," "less than one hour," and "more than one hour."

3.3. Methods of Analysis

Table 1: Responses Related to the Distance of the Residence from the Wife’s and Husband’s Mothers and the Categories Used

Multinomial logit analyses that used the wife’s employment status as a dependent variable were conducted. The three data sets collected from NFRJ98, NFRJ03, and NFRJ08 were analyzed separately, and the results from these models were compared.

Categories used in this paper	NFRJ98	NFRJ03	NFRJ08
1: Co-residence	1: Co-residence	1: In the same building	1: In the same building (sharing the front door) 2: In the same building (not sharing the front door)
2: Proximate residence	2: Next door/ in the same plot	2: In a different building in the same plot 3: Next door	3: In a different building in the same plot
	3: Within walking distance	4: Within walking distance	4: Less than 15 minutes
3: Less than one hour*	4: Less than one hour	5: Less than one hour	5: More than 15 minutes but less than 30 minutes 6: More than 30 minutes but less than 60 minutes
4: More than one hour*	5: Less than three hours	6: Less than three hours	7: More than one hour but less than three hours
	6: More than three hours	7: More than three hours	8: More than three hours

4. Results

4.1. Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 2. The mean and standard deviation of each of the quantitative variables (the age of respondent, the age of youngest child, the husband’s income) are shown. With respect to categorical variables (employment status, educational attainment, the residence’s proximate distance from the wife’s/husband’s mother), the frequency and proportion of each category are shown.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

		NFRJ98		NFRJ03		NFRJ08	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
N		313		432		333	
Employment status	Standard employment	49	15.7	58	13.4	59	17.7
	Non-standard employment	65	20.8	86	19.9	101	30.3
	Not in employment	199	63.6	288	66.7	173	52.0
Education	Secondary level	130	41.5	161	37.3	182	54.7
	College	146	46.6	204	47.2	90	27.0
	University level	37	11.8	67	15.5	61	18.3
Residence distance with wife's mother	Coresidence	20	6.4	17	3.9	23	6.9
	Proximate (within 15 min.)	39	12.5	48	11.1	78	23.4
	15 min. - 1 hour	142	45.4	183	42.4	113	33.9
	Over 1 hour	93	29.7	155	35.9	101	30.3
	Deceased	19	6.1	29	6.7	18	5.4
Residence distance with husband's mother	Coresidence	57	18.2	60	13.9	50	15.0
	Proximate (within 15 min.)	50	16.0	72	16.7	71	21.3
	15 min. - 1 hour	92	29.4	149	34.5	72	21.6
	Over 1 hour	100	31.9	129	29.9	117	35.1
	Deceased	14	4.5	22	5.1	23	6.9
		Mean	S. D	Mean	S. D	Mean	S. D
Age of youngest child		2.72	1.97	2.70	1.97	2.74	2.03
Age of respondent		33.50	3.72	34.38	4.06	34.90	4.21
Husband's income (million yen)		550.14	243.23	518.90	224.34	504.91	213.20

Categories used in this paper	NFRJ98	NFRJ03	NFRJ08
1: Co-residence	1: Co-residence	1: In the same building	1: In the same building (sharing the front door) 2: In the same building (not sharing the front door)
2: Proximate residence	2: Next door/ in the same plot	2: In a different building in the same plot	3: In a different building in the same plot
		3: Next door	
	3: Within walking distance	4: Within walking distance	4: Less than 15 minutes
3: Less than one hour*	4: Less than one hour	5: Less than one hour	5: More than 15 minutes but less than 30 minutes 6: More than 30 minutes but less than 60 minutes
4: More than one hour*	5: Less than three hours	6: Less than three hours	7: More than one hour but less than three hours
	6: More than three hours	7: More than three hours	

Regarding the wife's employment status (self-employed women and family workers were excluded), in comparison with NFRJ98 and NFRJ03, the proportion of "not in employment" women declined and the proportion of employed women increased in NFRJ08. In particular, the proportion of "non-standardly employed" women was significantly higher than NFRJ08. Although about 20 percent of the women surveyed in NFRJ98 and NFRJ03 fall into this category, the proportion of women surveyed in NFRJ08 is about 30 percent.

With respect to the wife's educational attainment, it is clear that the proportion of women in the "secondary education or below" category decreased and the proportion of women in the "university

level or above" increased between NFRJ98 and NFRJ08. The proportion of women in the "college" category gradually increased between NFRJ98 and NFRJ08.

With respect to the residence's proximate distance from the wife's mother, the proportion of women categorized under "proximate residence (within 15 minutes)" was larger in NFRJ08 than in NFRJ98 and NFRJ03. However, the proportion of women categorized under "between 15 minutes to one hour" was smaller. No major difference among the three data sets was observed with respect to "co-residence" and "more than one hour."

With respect to the residence's proximate distance from the husband's mother, the proportion of women categorized under "co-residence" was higher in NFRJ98 than in NFRJ03 and NFRJ08. The proportion of women categorized under "proximate residence (within 15 minutes)" was 21.3 percent in NFRJ08. This figure was larger than the figures calculated for other categories. The proportion of women categorized under "between 15 minutes and one hour" equaled 34.5 percent in NFRJ03, which was a greater amount than other categories. In each data set, we discovered that the proportion of women categorized under co-residence with the husband's mother was higher than the proportion of women categorized under co-residence with the wife's mother.

4.2. Multinomial Logit Analysis

Multinomial logit analyses of determinants of the wife's employment status were performed. Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the results for NFRJ98, NFRJ03, and NFRJ08, respectively. The dependent variable is the wife's employment status. Based on our assumption that "not in employment" is the reference category, we estimated the relative likelihood of the wife's finding either "standard employment" or "non-standard employment." The independent variables used were the wife's age, the wife's educational attainment, the husband's income, and the residence's proximate distance from the wife's and husband's mothers.

With regards to the results of the analysis of NFRJ98 data (Table 3), the results revealed that if the wife's educational attainment was higher than secondary education, the likelihood of her standard employment increased. However, the wife's educational attainment did not exert a significant effect on non-standard employment. In addition, as the husband's income increased, it was less likely that the wife was employed. The likelihood of the wife's standard employment was significantly higher when the wife lived with her mother than when the wife's mother lived more than one hour (are you referring to one hour's drive?) away. The residence's proximate distance from the wife's mother did not exert a significant effect on non-standard employment.

Table 3: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Wife's Employment (NFRJ98)

(Ref.) Not in employment	Standard		Non-standard	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Intercept	-3.153		-2.354	
Age	.068	1.070	.056	1.058
Education				
Secondary (Ref.)				
College	1.344 **	3.833	.057	1.058
University	1.574 *	4.828	.034	1.035
Husband's income	-.343 ***	.710	-.097	.908
Residence of wife's mother				
Coresidence	1.367 *	3.923	-.294	.746
Proximate	.536	1.710	-.078	.925
15min.-1hour	.302	1.353	.187	1.206
Over 1hour(Ref.)				
Deceased	-.071	.931	.410	1.507
Residence of husband's mother				
Coresidence	.905	2.472	-.075	.928
Proximate	-1.015	.362	-1.216 *	.297
15min.-1hour	-.021	1.021	-.053	.948
Over 1hour(Ref.)				
Deceased	-1.792	.167	-.946	.388
-2 loglikelihood	491.664			
χ^2	48.656 ***			
Cox & Snell R2	.144			
Nagelkerke R2	.172			
N	313			
*p<.05, **p<.01,***p<.001				

With respect to the residence's proximate distance from the husband's mother, the likelihood of the wife's non-standard employment was significantly lower when she lived within fifteen-minute radius of her husband's mother than when the husband's mother lived more than one hour away.

With respect to the results of the analysis of NFRJ03 data (see Table 4), the results revealed that the higher the wife's age, the greater the likelihood of her standard employment. However, the wife's age did not exert a significant effect on non-standard employment.

Table 4: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Wife's Employment (NFRJ03)

(Ref.) Not in employment	Standard		Non-standard	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Intercept	-4.796		-1.341	
Age	.095 *	1.100	.043	1.044
Education				
Secondary (Ref.)				
College	.292	1.340	-.433	.649
University	1.456 **	4.287	-.705	.494
Husband's income	-.178 *	.837	-.156 *	.856
Residence of wife's mother				
Coresidence	.225	1.252	.978	2.658
Proximate	.692	1.997	-.180	.836
15min.-1hour	.233	1.262	-.246	.782
Over 1hour(Ref.)				
Deceased	.426	1.532	.173	1.189
Residence of husband's mother				
Coresidence	.801	2.227	.434	1.544
Proximate	.495	1.640	-.363	.695
15min.-1hour	-.089	.915	-.681 *	.506
Over 1hour(Ref.)				
Deceased	-1.451	.234	-.235	.791
-2 loglikelihood	664.376			
χ^2	53.145 ***			
Cox & Snell R2	.116			
Nagelkerke R2	.141			
N	432			
*p<.05, **p<.01,***p<.001				

If the wife's highest educational attainment was a university degree or higher, the likelihood of her standard employment was significantly higher in comparison with women who possessed only secondary educations. The husband's income discouraged the wife's employment. The residence's proximate distance from the wife's mother did not exert a significant effect on standard and non-standard employment. With respect to the residence's proximate distance from the husband's mother, if she lived within fifteen-minute to one-hour radius of her husband's mother, she would be significantly less likely to be non-standardly employed than when she lived more than an hour away.

Finally, with regard to the results of the analysis of NFRJ08 data (see Table 5), the wife's age did not show a significant correlation with her employment.

Table 5. Multinomial Logit Analysis of Wife's Employment (NFRJ08)

(Ref.) Not in employment	Standard		Non-standard	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Intercept	-.395		-1.852	
Age	-.018	.982	.042	1.042
Education				
Secondary (Ref.)				
College	.160	1.173	-.177	.838
University	.626	1.870	-.440	.644
Husband's income	-.152	.859	-.174 *	.840
Residence of wife's mother				
Coresidence	1.640 *	5.157	1.035	2.815
Proximate	.959 *	2.609	.855 *	2.352
15min.-1hour	.454	1.575	.467	1.595
Over 1hour(Ref.)				
Deceased	.323	1.382	.824	2.279
Residence of husband's mother				
Coresidence	.060	1.062	.162	1.176
Proximate	-.873	.418	.350	1.419
15min.-1hour	.623	1.865	.934 *	2.546
Over 1hour(Ref.)				
Deceased	.114	1.121	.702	2.017
-2 loglikelihood	612.592			
χ^2	48.098 ***			
Cox & Snell R2	.134			
Nagelkerke R2	.155			
N	333			
*p<.05, **p<.01,***p<.001				

While the wife's educational attainment did not exert a significant effect on standard and non-standard employment, the husband's income discouraged the wife's employment. If the wife's mother lived with her or lived in close proximity, she would be significantly more likely to be standardly employed than wives whose mothers lived more than one hour away. When the wife's mother lived in proximate distance, she was also more likely to be non-standardly employed than wives whose mothers lived more than one hour away. With respect to the residence's distance from husband's mother, if the husband's mother lived within one hour radius, she would be significantly more likely to be non-standardly employed than when the husband's mother lived beyond one hour away.

5. Discussion

The analyses conducted for this study had clarified the effects of human capital (educational attainment), the need for extra income (the husband's income), and support resources (the residence's proximate distance from the wife's and/or the husband's mothers) on the wife's employment. This section examines the similarities and differences surfaced through the results of the analyses conducted on the three data sets. It also discusses the background of women's employment behavior.

With respect to the wife's educational attainment, her educational attainment at university or above positively correlated with her standard employment in the case of NFRJ98 and NFRJ03, but not in the case of NFRJ08.

The analyses of data collected from NFRJ98, NFRJ03, and NFRJ08 did not reveal any consistent tendencies in the effects of post-secondary education, such as junior college, vocational college, and advanced vocational college, on women's employment. Postsecondary education appeared to encourage the women's standard employment only in the data set collected from NFRJ98. This finding suggests that, as more women pursue four-year university education, educational attainment at the junior college, vocational college, and advanced vocational college levels had been devalued in the labor market.

No clear shared insights were discovered as related to non-standard employment in the three data sets.

With respect to the effects of the husband's income, which was designed to measure the need for extra income, this variable consistently showed a discouraging effect on the women's employment. Furthermore, this effect was confirmed for both standard and nonstandard employment. Previous studies had consistently noted that the husband's high income discouraged the wife's employment. Although this study was exclusively focused on women with infants, the same effect was confirmed. During the ten-year period investigated, the husband's income was an important determinant of employment for women with infants.

The effects of support resources also warrant discussion. Proximity with the wife's mother exerted an encouraging effect on the wife's standard employment in data sets collected from NFRJ98 and NFRJ08. This effect was not clearly apparent in the data collected from NFRJ03. However, the supportive effect that co-residence or proximate residence with the wife's mother had on the wife's employment did not weaken over the ten-year study period.

With respect to the husband's mother, no clear tendency was found between her co-residence with and proximate residence to her daughter-in-law, and women's standard employment. This finding was common among all three data sets. When husband's mother lived within the one hour radius, women's non-standard employment was encouraged only in the data collected from NFRJ08.

Based on these results, it is possible to gain some insights into the changes of background of women's employment behavior during the ten-year period.

The effects of women's educational attainment had changed during the ten-year period. In other words, women's educational attainment at the university level or above had exerted an encouraging effect on women's standard employment in the data collected from NFRJ98 and NFRJ03, but not in the data collected from NFRJ08. These results indicate that until early 2000s, those women who attained education below college level had chosen not to work in this life stage with infants, because they could not expect much income in the labor market. On the other hand, in the period after mid-2000s when economic situation was difficult and household income was declining, those who attained education below college level pursued to work because of the financial need of their households, even though the income from their employment was not so high.

The effects of residence proximity with wife's mother had also changed during the ten-year period. In the data collected from NFRJ98, only co-residence with wife's mother enhanced women's standard employment. On the other hand, in the data collected from NFRJ08, co-residence and proximate residence with wife's mother showed encouraging effect on women's standard and non-standard employment. It seems that dependency on relatives for childcare did not weaken in the

period after mid-2000s. Rather, there was an increasingly heavy dependence on woman's mother for childcare in recent years. It seems that more meaningful insights are gained when the correlation between educational attainment and residence proximity with women's mother is taken into account. In all data sets used in this study, women's educational attainment and residence proximity with women's mother are somewhat correlated; those women who attained university degree or higher were more likely to live far away from the women's mothers as compared to those who completed only secondary education. These relationships imply that, in the period after mid-2000s, those women who attained comparably lower education had to or chose to work because of the financial needs of their household, and that they managed to work with childcare support from their mothers who were likely to live in proximate distance from them. On the other hand, those women who attained higher education would face either-or decision about their employment. This is because their mothers, who would give much support for childcare, tended to live far away from them. Therefore, the result of analysis on data collected from NFRJ08 showed different types of difficulties in different groups of women concerning the relationship between employment and childcare under the severe economic situation in Japanese society.

6. Conclusion

This paper analyzed the employment status of married women with infants by the use of three data sets collected from NFRJ98, NFRJ03, and NFRJ08. The woman's human capital (educational attainment), the need for extra income (the husband's income), and support resources (the residence distance with mother/mother-in-law) were examined as determinants of women's employment.

Some changes had occurred in the effects of women's educational attainment and the residence's proximate distance from the wife's mother during the ten-year study period. The encouraging effect of women's higher education on standard employment was not found in more recent survey. This is because women who attained comparably lower education and might otherwise choose not to work were working in the severe economic situation in the period after mid-2000s.

Availability of childcare support from women's mother played a more significant role for women's employment, since the possibility to choose "not to work" was shrinking during the difficult economic climate. Those women who attained comparably lower education and had to work to meet their domestic financial need managed to work with support from their mothers who were likely to live close to them. On the other hand, those women who attained higher education faced a difficult dilemma between working and not working as ever. This is because they could not expect childcare support from their mothers who had a tendency to live far away from them.

Thus, the results of this study implied that the harsh economic situation in Japanese society during 2000s had influenced the mechanisms of women with infants to be employed.

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Note: The data for this secondary analysis, National Family Research of Japan 1998 (NFRJ98), 2003 (NFRJ03), and 2008 (NFRJ08) by the NFRJ Committee, Japan Society of Family Sociology, was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Center for Social Research and Data Archives, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo.

An earlier version of this paper was published in Tanaka Shigeto (Ed), 2013, *A Quantitative picture of contemporary Japanese families: Tradition and modernity in the 21st century*. Sendai: Tohoku University. The earlier version was substantially modified in this paper. Data sets were re-analyzed with different samples, and the content of discussion was completely rewritten.

Identifying Grey Area and People in Between: a Case of Community Learning Center in Phetchaboon, Thailand

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Abstract

This article was a part of the dissertation called “The Participatory Development of Public Space for Urban Community Learning: A Case of Nong Naree Public Park, Muang District in Phetchabun”. It aimed to reveal the problematic of public space for learning in urban community and policy process for sustainable development based on local needs. The author applied 3 communities surrounding Nong Naree Park as “the good example”. By using quantitative methods, 364 local participants were individually interviewed. Then, qualitative methods such as documentary study, focus group, and in-depth interview were applied. Numbers of social development actors involving in policy formation were purposely observed and interviewed. The grey area here referred to poor planning and management of urban space for learning in Muang District in Phetchabun. The people in between referred to urban residents living in target communities. Without the consideration of local administrative government, these urban residents became invisible and lacked good learning opportunities. The results revealed the root of development problems concerning lack of public spaces for learning. Unfamiliar experiences, misunderstandings from different cultures, socio-political conflicts, and unskilled participatory learning were common. The development plan and implementation which was mostly constructed without concern for local needs led to conflicts of interest, corruption and poor management. To solve these problems, the author applied participatory policy processes for the development of urban community learning. Four determinant factors were identified: 1) security of life and assets; 2) the development process of learning communities; 3) community participation; and 4) implementation planning for integrating missions involving organizations, communities, and agencies.

Keywords: community learning center, urban residents

1. Introduction

Public spaces are important for sustainable cities. It is the key element that makes citizens of cities motivated and involved in social activities and social life. It provides dynamics that contribute to the social life of urban citizens around the world. Public spaces bring comfortable spaces as well that help citizens learn, give and share with each other (Zetter & White, 2002).

Public space refers to the open space which shape and function the urban society. Therefore, it offers activities and an environment that functions within the urban structure. Moreover, the public

space allows equal accessibility to all people. With sufficient public space, urban citizens are able to take part in community - driven society. Good public space thus increases participatory value which benefits the community. The space provides visitors with a crystal image of city life and culture. Thus, the existence of public space is crucial for urban sustainable development. By focusing on the area and the people, the life of common people is related. The relationship of space and people makes the places are more meaningful. The symbols and values of the specific location generates cultural environment that reflects the diversity of cultural values and local history(Nathiwutthikun, 2007).

Thailand has a lot of cultural capital. Public spaces are found in various communities in Thailand. The spaces contain a specific geography and social cultural environment that are both used to convey knowledge. The history of a public space is normally rooted in folk wisdom, both directly and indirectly. In the north of Thailand this includes indirect forms of entertainment such as architectural drawings petition, Likay, Lamtad(Thai Central traditional dramatic performance), SalorSor Sung or the application of local wisdom concerning art and dance (Sirasuntorn, 2007).

Public areas are important for the persistence of cultural and heritage capital. However, the development policy based on modernization has undergone many changes that shape the public space. This resulted in unequal opportunities to get public benefits and to have participatory learning social diversity in urban communities. To understand the social relation among common citizens as well as those of state or local authority, the interaction between local residents and public space is a crucial mechanism. It exhibits numerous forms of the rigorous conciseness authority (Eoseewong, 2003).

Nong Naree Park is a public space of the Phetchabun municipality. An area of approximately 413 Rai of water surface, 311 Rai of forest land is 102 Rai located in the municipality of Phetchabun. The public space is adjacent to the district Sadiang SOA. It is surrounded by three communities, the Phetchabun municipality, the Phetchabun Provincial Administrative Organization, and the Sadiang District Administrative Organization. The public space has been compromised for personal gain. Houses and food stores have been built ignoring past relevant state authorities, creating friction and deterioration. Environmental problems such as water pollution, solid waste problems and deforestation are common. Moreover, social problems, including the mingling of teenagers, controversy and the destruction of public property are regularly reported. Economic issues including the expansion of a variety of restaurants are enormous. Private halls and monthly rental rooms have increased. These complicated issues surrounding the Park have led to conflicts among citizens and avoidance behavior involving authorities (Report Phetchabun Municipality Council, 2001, p. 17).

Currently, the Park has no integrated development policies. Therefore, the author realized the importance of such issues. There should be a research study to guide the development of public space efficiently. By focusing on the issue of public participatory development of communities, he expected that the community learning and effectively managed in the manner of integrating the joint policy of the local government would bring a better socio-environmental situation to the Park. The most important goal is the development of public spaces in order to contribute to the

community resources. By this, he expects that the results will bring better policy implementation to the particular area.

2. Objectives

- 2.1 To study the process of policy development of Nong Naree Park
- 2.2 To develop the management process for the public space by adopting the participatory development approach
- 2.3 To design a participatory management model suited for local organizations.

3. Scope of the Study

3.1 Space Scope

The author purposely selected Nong Naree park as his target area. The Park's outstanding characteristic provides a challenging perspective for the research process. As the open public space, the Park provides various social activities to local people. Nong Naree park includes community no.1 of the municipal Phetchabun, Mu 5 and Mu 11 of the Sadiang SAO.

3.2 Population Scope

The author focuses his target population from the 3 communities. These communities are under the authority of Phetchabun municipality, Phetchabun Provincial Administrative Organization, and Sadiang District Administrative Organization.

3.3 Period Scope

Started operation from the year 2012 to 2014.

4. Research Method

Qualitative research was applied to this study. Focus group techniques and in-depth interview were adopted. 30 participants from local communities were interviewed. The use of case study techniques allowed the author to investigate in-depth information from development actors. Then, 5 case studies from administrators were in-depth interviews. Last, the author applied the Delphi technique for evaluating and forecasting the study output. 5 cases were used in the exhibit the power of "the good example".

Quantitative research was later applied. The study population was 4,069 people from three communities. The sample was calculated using the Taro Yamone framework. 364 people were identified in the samples. The author also adopted the Social Impact Assessment (SIA) technique to evaluate the social impact emerging from the existence of the Park. He applied questionnaire surveys to reveal the current situation.

5. Result

The study revealed that the Park has long been dealing with socio-economic problems and poor management, and lacked local participation and also lacked being a space for learning and development. These problems increased the negative impacts on the Nong Naree Park. Furthermore, the poor planning of involving organizations and state authorities pushed the Park into the grey

area. Criminals, noise pollution, crowded and unplanned construction became the main topics of concern for the police. However, numbers of activities such as local annual festivals and unplanned construction increased public awareness of the park. Issues such as zoning of restaurants have been rested. Insufficient garbage bins and irregular collection schedules were mentioned by local residents. The public dialogue increased community concern. The situation enlarged the opportunity for the involvement of organizations to invest in activities around Nong Naree. This led to public consideration and social consciousness among local residents. As a result, planning events were regularly organized throughout the year.

This study led to the systematic formulation among local administrators and Head of Government. By using in-depth interview and the case study approach, the author was able to identify some crucial issues as follows:

1. Suchat Techanarawong, Fisheries Phetchabun announced the social activities involving systematic management and promoting Nong Naree Park to be a learning space about fresh water fish, fish trading, and conservation project for Giant Gouramy fish.
2. Mr. Pratin Naksumran, Chief Executive of the Sadiang SAO announced the activities concerning the importance of strengthening community power. The public dialogue provided the greatest concern among local residents. This led to the intense conversation related to problems of natural resource invasion and public land use. As a result, activities were introduced to reduce public land invasion. This led to an increased community awareness, a sense of belonging and an understanding of community rights.
3. Mr. Paitoon Jeamwijit, Expert director of natural resources in Phetchabun announced the socio-cultural activity such as Flower Festival in Nong Naree Park, and zoning design for lotus preservation for active learning.
4. Mr. Akaradej Tongjaisod, Chief Executive of the Phetchabun PAO, created large natural learning activities. By adopting Chainat Bird Park model, and Bueng Chawak Aquarium model; the communities were able to promote the Ocean Park and the Amusement park.
5. Aram Meedeth, Chairman of the Municipal Council, announced an urgent problem of wastewater from surrounding house, restaurant and dormitory. This led to public concerns and the social movement of community leaders. As a result, problems of buses, and insufficient traffic routes were improved.

6. Discussion

The preliminary analysis data emerged from focus groups among community leaders provided changes to the development of Nong Naree Park. A group of community leaders told stories including the history of the community. This increased public consciousness and historical pride among the citizens in three communities. Problems in Nong Naree Park were described in detail. In order to solve the problems and view lesson learned from public dialogues, local residents from surrounding communities around Nong Naree Park were allowed to share and participate in the learning platform. Although the development of a linear public space from the past continue to impact to the present condition, the problems affecting people living around the Nong Naree Park have been experienced through participatory learning. By this, the problems were identified and the determinant development factors were investigated. First, the physical public space led to the desire of development of the Nong Naree Park to be a beautiful park. It has been announced as a public

space for tourists as well. Second, the social problem of teen crashes and assault were seen as destroying public property.

The analysis of the data obtained from the questionnaire revealed the crucial need to establish a community learning space, to have economic development, participation of the community, and a need for better management. The analysis of the in-depth interviews exhibited the power of the executive government in Phetchabun Province. To develop the physical and social solutions, it was thus crucial to bring all involving social actors to the development process. Moreover, the policy designation was an important factor in the development of public space. Currently, the communities are deciding to develop Nong Naree Park into an Ocean park and Amusement park. More native flowers are needed in the garden. The introduction of the seasonal flowers festival has increased public interest. To promote Nong Naree Park to be an urban learning space about fresh water fish, trade of fish, such as Giant Gouramy fish; the local residents have provided the greatest effort. The community awareness and public consciousness helped reduce problems including land invasion. Nonetheless, an urgent problem is the wastewater from houses, restaurants and dormitories. However, the learning and sharing involving social actors created a better opportunity for Nong Naree Park.

7. Conclusion

Nong Naree Park provides the power of “the good example”. It is a case study that helped identifying development issues. The results from focus groups, in-depth interviews and questionnaires from population focus on Nong Naree Park revealed the invisible problems. Moreover, data from stakeholders and the head officer of the local government are able to articulate the problems and solutions for in Nong Naree Park. By using the participatory learning model, numerous social activities have been introduced. The author suggested that by using public dialogues, and integrated learning and sharing; the use of Nong Naree Park is the good practice of lessons learned from social reality.

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Filial Piety across two Cultures: Vietnam and Korea

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1. The Theoretical and Factual Basis

1.1 Theoretical Basis

In terms of pictography, the word, “filial piety” 孝 is derived from the image of a person carrying his/her father (or mother) on his back in the road. “Filial piety” basically has two parts: the top of the character refers to the old person while the “child” refers to the younger person at bottom of the character (Ly Ngac Nhi, 1997, p. 267). According to Dao Duy Anh’s *Sino-Vietnamese Dictionary*, “filial piety” means honoring one’s parents wholeheartedly. Filial piety is one of the most important ethical values in Confucianism. Along with Loyalty (忠) and Benevolence (义), Filial Piety (孝) sets the rules of human behavior within the realm of social and familial relationships in Vietnam and East Asia.

Filial piety has been greatly appreciated by Confucian scholars. In the *Analects*, “弟子入则孝，出则悌” means “Good man must be filial at home, must respect the superiors”. According to the Chinese legend, filial piety was “originated from virtue defined by Yao Shun” (Wu, 2010: 24). According to *Shuo Wen Jie Zi* (说文解字), filial piety means “serving parents”. Confucius’s students had many times asked their master about filial piety. Being a symbol of social morality and fine ethics, the scope and effect of filial piety is confined within the family sphere. In the Western Han Dynasty, when the apparatus of the governing state had been completed and the formality regulations were promulgated, filial piety was strongly applied as one of the important norms of social morality. The obligations in “Three Basic Relations” (*Sangang*三纲) and “Five Constant Virtues” (*Wuchang*五常) also defined the concept of filial piety. As one of Three Basic Relations’ obligations, filial piety has been commonly perceived as the important spirit behind the hierarchical family relationships (between parents and children). Filial piety is also defined by humanity (Wu, 2010, p. 24). Filial piety, along with brotherhood harmony/esteem, specifies the hierarchical order in each family or each clan; greatly contributing to the sustainability of social order. Confucius once said: “宗族稱孝焉，鄉黨稱弟焉” (Filial piety should be treasured in family relationships and harmony/esteem should be cherished in the village ties). In *Daxue Classic* (大学), the ancient text used filial piety to express dignity and to regulate the standards of a gentleman with the purpose of governing the nation and conquering the world. *Doctrine of the Mean/Chung Yung* (中庸) used filial piety to establish a neutral world. Quoting Confucius, Mencius commented that the basic meaning of filial piety only revolves around the family sphere.

However, along with history, the significance of filial piety has been expanded into “practicing humanity” (行仁). Those treasuring humanity will get humanity and will always have the aspiration to be useful to the community. Moreover, they have an immense compassion for all things, as the

ancients referred “to those who are clement to people will also love beings” (仁民爱物). Thus, in the broader sense, filial piety has been developed into Humanity (仁). During the Ming Dynasty, filial piety had been associated with loyalty. This was especially so when Zhu Yuanzhang applied filial piety policies with respect to the motto “turning filial piety into loyalty” (移孝为忠) or “loyalty comes before filial piety and filial piety obeys loyalty” (忠先于孝, 孝服从忠) (Shu, 2010, pp. 40-50).

Characteristics of filial piety in the Confucian tradition are tied to practical social life of each family without any special regulations in contrast to many other categorizations. “Every family has a style of family tradition; therefore, filial piety is to be differently performed in different circumstances, regions and historical eras (Dong, 2010, p.3). This reflects the diversity of filial piety in terms of the perceptions of people from different classes, ethnic groups and nations regardless of the influence of Confucian ideology.

Therefore, the conceptualizations of filial piety are completely different in accordance to the different philosophies developed by different people. In a study of the incest motif in Greek and Indian mythologies, Indian author K. Ramanujan (2006) identified the existence of differences between the Oriental and Occidental trees of life. In the West, the tree of life is upright. The parents are at the roots of the tree symbolizing family background, while the children are at the treetop reaching new heights in their era. On the other hand, the Oriental life style is in total contrast; with the roots on the top falling over to the treetop below. In this philosophy, the children are always lurking behind or in the shadow of their parents.

In the East, particularly the countries under the Chinese cultural influence, the conception of filial piety has many differences. Even the nature of the orthodox Confucian ideology in society is diverse (such as righteousness is treasured in Vietnam, while loyalty-filial piety in China, obedience-respect in Korea, loyalty-bravery in Japan (Nguyen Ngoc Tho, 2010)). Those differences originated due to many factors, but perhaps most importantly from the natural and social environment which has shaped the diversity of economic-cultural forms as well as the conception and the cultural personalities of each nation.

1.1 The Factual Basis

When discussing the cultural relations between Vietnam and Korea, the former writers usually emphasize the similarities, such as the fate of history, the ideology of traditional societies, the conception of the universe and human beings, however those remarks do not reflect appropriately the fundamental nature of these two cultures. Observed under the perspective of cultural typology, the two cultures clearly show their different starting points created by different types of economic and cultural origins.

Vietnam is a tropical monsoon country in Southeast Asia which has an economic-cultural foundation mainly based on paddy rice cultivation (Tran Ngoc Them, 2001). When considering Vietnam’s traditional culture, researchers refer to the Northern region of Vietnam where the Vietnamese (Kinh) is the dominant group. As a matter of fact, ancient Vietnamese people who inhabited this region lived an agricultural lifestyle and in closed and autonomous villages.

In regards to the historical dimension, Vietnam's culture underwent three major cultural periods, including (1) the period of local culture formation which is recognized as dating from the prehistoric to 111 BC when Zhao Tuo invaded North Vietnam; (2) the period of dispute and cultural exchange with China, in which India's cultural exchange with China was the deepest (from 111 BC to present); and (3) the period of interaction with Western culture (from XV-XVI centuries until the present time).

With rather fine natural conditions such as topography, soil, climates and specific historic-social conditions, Vietnam's culture originated in the heart of traditional Southeast Asian farming civilization. Vietnam's inevitable culture is made of the mutual interaction of three harmonious elements, including (1) the convenient living environment with the warm climate and rivered terrains, (2) the static quality of the gatherers-farmers of Austro-Asiatic residents who have developed to become the modern Vietnamese, and (3) the paddy rice agricultural life. This *yin* cultural typology has been more or less modified from outside, especially from Confucianism in relation to China and from the influence of Western civilization.

The above conditions have had an impact on defining the important features of Vietnam's cultural characteristics, directly affecting the perceived notion of filial piety in traditional culture, including collectivism, interaction with harmony, yin-oriented essence, and a synthetic and flexible culture (see also Tran Ngoc Them, 2006).

South Korea is located in the southern Korean peninsula, and has worse terrain than Vietnam. A majority of the area is comprised of rocky hills (~ 70%) and a narrow less silted coastal plain which is often submerged. South Korea lies in the temperate belt, being relatively cool in the summer and cold in the winter. Those natural conditions defined the nature of "mixed farming and herding 农牧双存" in Korea's traditional economic-social form.

Unlike Vietnam with 54 ethnic groups, South Korea is relatively homogeneous in terms of its ethnic composition (almost Koreans). The ethnic homogeneity easily creates consensus and uniform characteristics of the consciousness, concept and cultural performances.

Both Korea and Vietnam experienced similar historic-social conditions, but each country had its own nature. There were three phases in both nations' history, consisting of (1) the formation of local cultures, (2) the period of being against Chinese cultural influence, and (3) the period of re-independence and cultural development. However, Vietnam was dominated by China for nearly ten centuries, while South Korea in particular (the entire Korean peninsula in general) was dominated for about three centuries. The time South Korea was under the direct influence of China was shorter, so the time for recovery and national development was longer. South Korea began the process of modernization way earlier than Vietnam, so their experiences with controlling the new challenges among family relations, including filial piety, are richer and more effective.

In respect to cultural personalities, both nations have a harmonious attitude towards nature, but there is quite a difference in the nature and characteristic of the communities' sense of awareness, thinking styles, emotional moral ties and social nature.

Though both the Koreans and Vietnamese value community awareness, the starting points are different. The Vietnamese show prominent social collectivism because their lives are in rural closed villages, whereas Koreans respect the clan-based life which is inherently hierarchical. While the Vietnamese have a generally abstract mind which is strongly associated with traditional collectivistic paddy rice cultivation, the Koreans are more capable of analytical thinking and show the harmony between synthetic and analytical sources. As a result, the Vietnamese are more sentimental while the Koreans want the harmony of sentimentalism and rationalism (see Tran Ngoc Them, 2010).

In regards to cultural essence, Vietnamese society demonstrates an ambivalent relationship between horizontal (collectivistic equality) and vertical (Confucianism-based hierarchy), while Korean society emphasizes social hierarchy (vertical). In the article “The Cultural Perspective of Vietnamese–Taiwanese Marriage”, the author Phan Thu Hien (2010) compares the social characteristics between Vietnam and Taiwan. In this article it is emphasized that Vietnam’s social development is on the “horizontal axis” while Taiwan’s is on the “vertical axis”. This statement by the author is entirely consistent with our analysis of Vietnamese and Korean societies.

In relation to China, South Korea and Vietnam deal with the cultural exchanges through interaction in an active and passive manner. Using Confucianism as an example, Koreans are relatively active and systematic with their learning attitude, while Vietnamese are rather passive and absorb only what they need rather than the whole (Tran Van Doan, 2002, pp. 82-88).

2. The Perception of Filial Piety in Vietnam

2.1 The Origins and Development Process of Filial Piety in Vietnam

There is no historic book clearly noting the time and circumstance of the appearance of the Filial Piety tradition in Vietnam. However, through the interdisciplinary approach we can determine it existed from at least the era of Van Lang – Au Lac (文郎瓯骆时代, 700 BC - 300 BC). At that time, the society gradually moved from a matriarchal to patriarchal axis, in addition the nuclear family structure improved and the moral relationships were strengthened (shown by decorative patterns on the surface of the Dong Son drums: Dong Son Communal House, trio of father–mother–son, three deers and others) (see also Tran Ngoc Them, 2001). Pham Duc Duong (2000, p. 63) stated that as the ancient Vietnamese people transferred from the midlands to exploit the plain deltas around Hanoi, the model of great multiple-generation family of matriarchy dissolved and “smashed into the nuclear families”.

The tradition of filial piety in this period is also an endosmosis through a series of legends and myths, such as the legend of square and round shaped rice cakes (Lang Lieu Prince and Banh Chung–Banh Day), Mai An Tiem legend, Son Tinh–Thuy Tinh legend (My Nuong Princess obeyed the arrangement made by her father, the king), My Chau–Trong Thuy legend (King An Duong Vuong killed his daughter, My Chau, because of her disloyalty and lack of filial piety), etc. Though the origins of those legends and myths need to be further discussed, they all partially reflect the ancient social norms.

Further evidence of the filial piety tradition during this period is ancestor worship. No one knows when it started, however the ancient Vietnamese people performed this cult ritual at least in the Bai Yue (百越) period (see Tran Ngoc Them, 2001). Similarly, according to Vu Quynh–Kieu Phu in *Linh*

Nam Chich Quai (岭南摘卦/ *Lingnan Zhi Guai*), the third Hung king's beautiful 18-year-old daughter named Tien Dung, did not want to get married and instead was interested in traveling. There was the lineal village of Chu 渚, where the fishermen's son named Chu Dong Tu (渚童子) was living. Unfortunately, his house caught on fire, leaving no wealth except a fabric loincloth for both the father and son. Before his last days, the old sick father asked the son to keep the loincloth, however the son did not keep it for himself, and he used the loincloth to cover his dead father instead (see Tri Buu, 2014).

In regards to social reality, Vietnamese ancestry during Van Lang–Au Lac period was mainly the paddy rice farmers primarily living in high rural collectivist communities since they had to deal with unexpected disasters such as floods, droughts, and pests as well as social challenges like thieves, invaders, etc. Community relations were performed based on nuclear family relations, in which the moral ethics between the generations remained the backbone. Filial piety was formed on that basis and had existed before the Confucian ideology penetrated into Vietnam.

Thus, filial piety derived from the reality of farm life in Vietnam. It is both hierarchical and bias towards the principle of equality (horizontal axis) due to the enclosed village based living settlements and the paddy rice cultivation. Han Shu (汉书) noted: "The Luo Yue civils, when father and son have to bath in the same river..." (骆越之民，父子同川而浴). Regarding the nature of filial piety, it was popular and existed in every family without any theoretical basis. Therefore, there were no criteria or standard to identify and use to assess filial piety until the Vietnamese adopted Confucian ideas from Han China.

Through thousands of years under the Han's domination, filial piety has been theorized and associated with the social ethic criteria such as the obligations in three core relations and five constant virtues. Filial piety moved from the family to society and shifted from a folk status to the mandarin nature. In reality, without in-depth analysis, one might make the mistake in assuming Vietnam originally received "filial piety" from China. The Chinese filial piety concept played a theoretical role which modified the locally-born popular filial piety tradition when Vietnam shifted to feudalism. Being a combination of two sources, the tradition of filial piety in Vietnam has its own characteristics making it entirely unique in relation to Vietnam's cultural characteristics.

1.1. The Characteristics of the Conception of Filial Piety in Vietnam

As above mentioned by Dong Jin Yu (2010, p. 3), filial piety is generally associated with the practical life of families within society, so the nature of filial piety is also influenced directly by the structure and nature of family and society.

Traditional Vietnam was generally a horizontal society, family interests were placed in the common interests of the village. Therefore, filial piety was bound by many sub-systems comprised by other social thinkers.

Firstly, filial piety means to be reconciled with righteousness because of humanity. Family relationships (filial piety) are drawn on social relations (righteousness). Communal conventions play a key role and strongly influence the way each member lives, so families share society feelings. Filial piety is in parallel with righteousness; both filial piety and righteousness share the common value of

humanity. According to Vietnamese popular thought, a filial child is a righteous one who has compassion, harmony with social space, and of course respects their parents. When someone is going to have a child, people say: “Whether daughters or sons, those who are both filial and righteous are more valued”.

Secondly, filial piety reconciles with loyalty. While loyalty and filial piety exist at two different levels in China, at the national level and the clan/family level, they are strongly unified in Vietnam. The concept of great filial piety emerged early in the 15th century in the story about the scholar Nguyen Trai seeing his father Nguyen Phi Khanh off to a jail in China. Nguyen Phi Khanh taught him that “filial piety towards parents is only minor filial piety (小孝), while towards the nation, the homeland, the country is the great filial piety; and son, you have to bear on the great filial piety (大孝)” (see Phan Ngoc 2001). Those who have filial piety in mind should esteem great filial piety as the top priority. Throughout history, the Vietnamese have defeated all the foreign invaders in order to protect this great filial piety. As a matter of fact, filial piety in Vietnam is strongly attached to patriotism, having a deep love for the Fatherland.

In addition, filial piety in Vietnamese cultural traditions is united with loyalty and righteousness under the main idea of patriotism (大孝). This pluralistic combination of values is entirely logical since it stems from the inherent personality characteristics which consisting of: collectivism, harmony-esteemed essence, yin nature, synthesis and flexibility. As a result, filial piety in Vietnam is not an extreme hierarchical virtue, and it is not too squeamish and harsh for practical life.

Historically, filial piety in Vietnam has shown the essence of multi-dimensional synthesis. The first combination comes from the original internal function and the external Confucian theoretical framework. Secondly, it is the link and synthesis between the popular people and the mandarin class.

Like any other East Asian country, Vietnam is currently witnessing profound changes in the process of modernization which has a direct impact on the family structure and multi-dimensional changes of moral virtues. The modern Vietnamese individual can take advantage of the coexistence of minor and great filial piety to preserve and promote the significance and the wide spread of filial piety. Similarly, the Chinese have also posed similar questions since they have had to bear so many challenges relating to policies in recent decades focusing on economic development and the “one child policy” (Dong Jin Yu, 2010, p. 3).

In regards to nationwide diversity, filial piety is influential and significant in Northern and Central Vietnam, whereas it is relatively sparingly adhered to in Southern Vietnam. The newly-exploited land of Southern Vietnam is the homeland of migrants who are mainly living in nuclear family structures. The social thought has changed as they adjust to fit the new living environment. As a result, filial piety tends to be simplified, democratized and diversified. The Southern Vietnamese rarely place filial piety in the important conjunction of loyalty, righteousness and harmony. They especially tend to encapsulate the notion of filial piety within the family which is influenced by their own view of filial piety. For example, the Mekong River Delta ladies will easily marry Taiwanese or South Korean men, mainly because of filial piety, since the concept of great filial piety (大孝) is no longer significant and multiculturalism is more popular.

In order to demonstrate the impacts of filial piety in all aspects of life, the paper limits the survey to two typical fields: religion and customs. In religion, Vietnamese filial piety demonstrates a deep connection with diverse spiritual beliefs and popular religions. Filial Piety is the foundation of familial ancestor worship (祖先崇拜), the Mother Goddess belief (母神崇拜) and national ancestry worship (国祖崇拜). With synthetic thinking and a mystical mind, the Vietnamese worship their ancestors for not only to perform filial piety but also because of the desired luck. Though covered by the Confucian theoretical outline, popular filial piety has become a fusion of philosophical ideas between Buddhism and Taoism, and this has become one of the basic ways in which these two regional religions have entered into Vietnam. In the new religions such as Caodaism (高台教) and Hoahaoism (和好教), filial piety is still a central theory. In Christian ceremonies, God and ancestral worship are considered the two basic tasks for Vietnamese believers. As a matter of fact, Vietnamese filial piety associated with religious activities came from the foundation of synthetic and flexible mindedness by and for the folk people. The decentralization of Vietnamese filial piety is expanding widely because it is passing beyond the family framework, however its original hierarchy does not disappear, it is merely stimulated by mental and spiritual factors rather than social hierarchy.

In customs, filial piety is most evident in the life-cycle customs as well as in traditional festivals and holidays. In the life-cycle customs, filial piety is taken as the lodestar throughout the rites of venerating parents in marriage ceremonies, rituals concerning the salvation of the dead's soul in funeral rituals and ancestral anniversaries etc. Meanwhile, ancestor-worshipping rituals are the core basis of all traditional holidays which show a full range of good values of the social ethic education. For instance, The Lunar New Year Festival lasts at least two weeks and demonstrates filial piety through things such as the ritual of tomb decoration before the Lunar New Year, inviting ancestors to come back home on the 30th of Lunar December (腊月三十日) and serving ancestors daily during the New Year holiday. In the Dragon Boat Festival (端午节), ancestral worship is also the center ritual etc. The concept of filial piety is perceived in the popular way, therefore the performances are also based on popular activities. There is no classical record regulating the rituals of ancestral worship, except for the book *Tho Mai Gia Le* from the Nguyen Dynasty (1802-1945).

In summary, the tradition of filial piety in Vietnam was identified and implemented with the interaction of synthetic, flexibility, rural collectivism and within a paddy rice agricultural society. Filial piety is understood and performed in diverse and flexible ways.

3. The Perception of Filial Piety in Korea

3.1 The Origin of Filial Piety in Korea

The cultural tradition of Korea in particular and the Korean Peninsula in general originates from "agricultural along with nomadic" lifestyles which emphasize family ties and lineage.

Given the poor natural conditions², the Korean people have tried their best to overcome the challenges for survival and development. Additionally, since the location is close to traditionally imperialistic China, concerns over political and cultural influences from this giant state have always

² The majority of the land is rocky mountains and there are other unfavorable conditions consisting of long winters, low rainfall, low quantity of alluvium, etc.

been on the list of the Korean's priorities, only after the challenges coming from nature. These factors have helped to shape the characteristics of laboriousness and patience, ranked among the top in the world, as well as the hatred-swallowed characteristic (see also Tran Ngoc Them, 2010).

In choosing a way of organizing their lifestyle, the Koreans are inclined to prefer gathering families—generations rather than living in rural villages with non-lineage members like in Vietnam. With the above-mentioned harsh conditions, the Koreans have to mobilize their resources. They tend to assist each other and share the output among members of the same lineage. As a result, Korean culture highlights the feature of lineage solidarity in comparison to Vietnam's rural popularity. Vietnamese writer Tran Thi Thu Luong (2011) noted that "Korean culture imbued of humanity with quite outstanding characteristics: love-based, harmony with nature, sensitive and delicate mind". The author emphasized that "love-based spirit is firstly the love toward one's family" and "family means happiness", therefore "those decomposed from a family endure the worst unhappiness". The Koreans underestimate the relationship between basic family members, including the members of the same generation and between generations together. Korean and Asian viewers are not to forget the images of family union (re-union) and family values implied in Korean films such as *Medical Brothers* (1997), *Glass Slipper* (2002), *The Unstoppable High Kick* (2006), *Famous Princesses* (2006), *Tie a Yellow Ribbon* (2007), *Royal Family* (2011), *Darling* (2012), *My Daughter* (2012), etc. The Vietnamese people, for the sake of promoting family values through Korean film even changed the name of the film *The Unstoppable High Kick* to *The Family is Number 1* (Gia dinh la so 1) on Vietnamese TV channels. The famous writer Tran Ngoc Them (vanhoahoc.edu.vn) stated, "In the Korea culture, family is not simple a cell of society, but rather, it becomes a dominant factor of the whole society, it's really a "tenet"- the familism (家庭主义)". The Chinese writer Fei Xiaotong (费晓通) (quoted in Tran Thi Thu Luong (2011)) used the term "society of acquaintances (熟人社会)" to describe the lineage-oriented society. The "society of acquaintances" is composed by all those who share the same blood. Korea is certainly a country where the "society of acquaintances" or "the incubators" of familism denominate (see also Lee Kwang-kyu (2003, pp. 133-141)). In Southern China there are only lineal relationships, whereas in Northern China the relationships of separate lineages in a shared rural atmosphere exist (Ma Guoqing, 1999, pp. 107-111). In Korea there are obviously lineal relationships, which are the seeds of familism (see also Lee Kwang-kyu, 2003, pp. 133-141)). It is clear that Korean society is an ideal environment for filial piety to be formed and grow. Its traditions cause a consolidating of family morals and social hierarchy. Apparently, Korean society has been developing in a rather different mode in comparison with Vietnamese society.

Since the Koreans have interacted a lot with Chinese culture, especially since the introduction of Confucianism, filial piety has gained more philosophical significance making it more lucid and firm. The interaction between the indigenous elements and foreign arguments that originated in China, such as Koreans' filial duty, strongly support to each other.

In history, Korean society has established class mechanisms since the era of the Three Kingdoms. In the period of the Choseon Dynasty (朝鲜), a four class society consisting of nobles (yangban 两班), the middle class (jungmin 中民), commoners (sangmin 常民) and those of humble background (cheonmin 便民) surely had a strong influence on forming the emphasis on hierarchy in Korea. Tran Thi Thu Luong (2011, p. 61) wrote, "The soul of the hierarchical culture (Korean style) does not only lay in

the upper-lower or rich-poor classification or behavior but also in the concrete regulation: there must be the complete obedience of the lower class toward the upper class, in return, the upper class are responsible for respecting and protecting the lower class”.

3.2 The Nature of Filial Piety in Korea

Korean society highlights familism and lineage hierarchy and takes them as the foundation for shaping and nurturing the filial piety tradition. In terms of organizing communal life, family hierarchy is strongly maintained since the Koreans show complete obedience toward their superiors such as children toward their parents, wives toward their husbands etc. The Koreans have a saying: “keep order (hierarchy) even when you drink cold water”, which indicates that submissiveness and hierarchy are always present in every aspect of life. Lineage culture covers family culture. By and for the power of lineage tradition, the concept and performance of filial piety is expanded from the family level to the lineage level and finally officialized at the national level. In Korean society, the family hierarchy continues to be maintained, promoted and even strengthened when expanded to the lineal scale. In other words, the concept of filial piety in Korea was promoted and implemented in the vertical direction while in Vietnam on the horizontal axis. Korea’s filial piety has a tendency for hierarchy, whereas Vietnam’s filial piety oftendecomposes the hierarchy.

The nation, in turn, is of higher importance than lineages. The Koreans respect the ethical value of “loyalty” in their behavior at the national level. Significantly, “loyalty” in Korea is built up on the foundation of “filial piety”. The latter is used to nurture and educate the former. From this perspective, we can point out the similarity between the development of “loyalty” from “filial piety” in Korea and the concept great filial 大孝(filial to all of the people) originating from 小孝(filial to parents) in Vietnam. However, Korean “loyalty” has a hierarchical feature since it developed from hierarchical based “filial piety”. As a result, “filial piety” in Korea is also understood as “respectfulness (敬)” or “obedience (顺)”, also including “loyalty (忠)”, “filial piety (孝)” and duty”. However, the Vietnamese style of “filial piety” is a mix of loyalty-patriotism and “integrity” in the context of multi-lineal collectivism in Vietnam.

Among the Korean generations, there exists an absolute concept of filial piety. Filial piety is considered to be the basis of relationships between human beings in a family and traditional society. Children, at any age, are only ‘kids’ (小子) through the elders’ eyes. Significantly, in any case the parents are always right. Undutiful children are condemned by society. For men, undutiful crimes consist of six actions, in which the first few actions are related to not being obedient to their parents and abandoning them. These six actions are, 1. Being lazy, disobedient to parents; 2. Being addicted to gambling and alcohol, abandon parents; 3. Being fond of money, indulging their wife and children; 4. Being lustful, abandon parents; 5. Being fond of violence, kill good people, make parents endangered or ashamed; 6. Being unable to give birth to a son. For women, the biggest crimes are related to disappointing their parents, especially their parents-in-law with actions such as, being disobedient to parents-in-law, being unable to give birth to a son, being adulterous, being jealous for ill-founded reasons, being involved in scandals, having hereditary diseases, stealing, etc.

The Koreans maintain a habit of evaluating an individual directly through their family. In forms of address, they have a tendency to address by family name, such as “the Li’s son” and “the Kim’s

daughter” as an indicator of filial and moral ties to a family (see also Tran Ngoc Them, vanhoahoc.edu.vn)

Korea’s filial piety is regarded as a clear two-way compromise between normal philosophies and morality. The lower class respects the upper class; the latter protects and sacrifices for the former. This is still acknowledged in the morality found in Vietnam, yet it does remain especially when referring to Southern Vietnam. Kim Jae Un (1991, p. 134) once remarked: “If the Japanese can sacrifice his own life for his country, a Korean tends to sacrifice himself for the happiness of his family” (see also Tran Ngoc Them: vanhoahoc.edu.vn). Currently in Korea, the large-scale traditional family is being replaced by the nuclear family system which focuses on the relation between the husband and wife. There is a significant shift from the vertical direction (between the older generations to younger generations) to the horizontal one (the same generation). This change is proven clearly by the generations that are embracing the influence of the individualistic Western-style education and are gradually loosening the traditional moral relations. However, in his article Tran Ngoc Them (vanhoahoc.edu.vn) cited the Korean writers’ research findings which show, “In Korean society, the collectivism is still being maintained, along with it, the individualism is still parallel existence and development”.

Historically, filial piety in Korea has some characteristics which fit the nature of Confucian filial piety when it is highly conceptualized, the Koreans have got a complete philosophical system; therefore, they tend to understand and perform in perfect appropriateness. This is the fundamental difference between the traditional notions of filial piety in Korea and Vietnam. In Vietnam, there is a hierarchy in a rural collectivistic equality between these two factors, hierarchy and equality, both eliminate and coexist through mutual interactions.

In order to approach this issue of the cultural aspect in Korea, the rest of this paper analyzes specific case studies in two significant areas dealing with the filial piety philosophy: religion and customs. The Koreans used the word “filial” to teach loyalty and chivalry. The code of Korea Confucianism mainly focuses on family-based filial piety education through ancestor worship and hierarchical principles. As a matter of fact, ancestor worship is considered the central foci of filial piety in Korea.

In regards to religious composition, one can see that filial piety is not closely associated with the popular religions³, or at a certain level the combination is vague and unclear as in the case of Vietnam. For example, Korean Confucianism is somehow directly influenced by mandarin Chinese culture, therefore it has strongly embraced the mandarin values rather than the popular virtues. If there has been a fusion among Korean classical religions, it has been the general synthesis of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and shamanism.

In life-span customs, marriage, longevity and funeral ceremonies are the ones which strongly express the full significance of filial piety. For Korean people, singleness is a great “misfortune” and “disloyalty”, therefore no-children is one of the top concerns of seniors. Historically, Korean marriage custom is extremely complex, “it may take many years to complete” (Lee Kwang-kyu, 2003, p. 188). Korean people attach much importance to custom which is considered as an expression of

³ Ancestor worship excluded.

moral standards of family and society. Therefore, the custom is rarely simplified, except some rituals for newly-born child in modern time. They believe that a compliant manner will allow compliant manners and as a result all of the hierarchical system in the family will be upset. Wedding ceremonies, the worship of ancestors and expression of sincere respect or gratefulness toward parents are still important activities. The Koreans expect their children to understand that their happiness is not only for their own sake but also for the family and the lineage. It is quite different from the case of Vietnam, where marriages aim to meet the common needs of villagers before the desire of the family and aspirations of couples (Tran Ngoc Them, 2001). After marriage, the “heirless” status is one of the most disrespectful sins⁴, even when the couple gives birth to a daughter they are still considered to be committing a disrespectful sin due to the concept of hereditary succession deeply rooted in the minds of Koreans. This concept similarly appears in old Vietnam but to a lesser degree, especially when people exhort themselves by a proverb “no regarding son or daughter they are, the only wish is to get a righteous, dutiful and virtuous child⁵”.

Celebration of longevity is an important ceremony for the children to manifest their respect for their parents. Historically, when grandparents or parents turn 60 (the ending year of an Oriental Zodiac circle of the ancient cosmology), they are cordially and victoriously invited to join a special longevity ceremony. Korean writer, Lee Kwang-kyu (2003, p. 194), considered the longevity celebration on the 60th birthday to be one of the most important ones among the rites of passage in Korea. All descendants and relatives respectfully gather and wish them longevity. This custom is treasured by the Koreans because it contributes to the education of people about the long-lasting filial piety under a vivid and effective custom.

Funeral ceremonies in Korea are no less solemn. Descendants’ filial piety will be evaluated based on the way they organize ceremonies for the deceased. Ceremonies of sacrifice, with shrouding and burying are very meticulous, which preserves the rules and ensures two basic functions: the salvation of the deceased’s soul and ethic education among the living people (filial piety included). Elements of fengshui (pungsu 风水) in burial sites are much treasured by Koreans since they wish to select a ground containing the “myeongdang” element (myeongdang 夢堂) to offer their deceased ancestors (Lee Kwang-kyu, 2003, p. 197-198). In civil life, there have been a lot of arguments or conflicts between neighbors. They fight each other for the sake of getting the myeongdang burial site for their ancestors. Rituals and similar meanings can equally be found in Vietnamese culture, except in Southern Vietnam where the custom is simplified and shortened. Within three years of the funeral, Koreans always show torment and suffering, the sin of self-consciousness since they think they are too undutiful to keep their parents alive (Lee Kwang-kyu 2003, p. 199). Meanwhile, the Vietnamese are mournful for one to three years (depending on the region and religion), however they are not self-tormented since they strongly believe that life and death are part of the two sides of the yin-yang circulation. The Vietnamese say: “When the bamboo gets to be old, the young sprouts usually appear,” or “The other-world, the eternal world of all, this secular is just temporary (生寄死归)”.

⁴ According to Confucian philosophy, there are three big disrespectful sins of a married man, to be heirless is the third one.

⁵ Gái mà chi, trai mà chi, sinh ra có nghĩa có nghi thì hơn.

The Korean Lunar New Year festival, also called Spring Festival, the tomb-visiting festival on the fifth of the first lunar month and Mid-Autumn Festival are also filial piety based customs found in Korea. At Spring Festival, the ceremony of wishing longevity toward the seniors after the ancestral offering rituals is compulsory. Children and grandchildren kowtow and wish their grandparents longevity and good health. The longevity wishing ritual during the Spring Festival in Korea has gradually become a concrete symbol of the filial piety tradition which is popularly appreciated by people around the world. Right after the Spring Festival all Koreans are to practice ancestor worship by cleaning and decorating their ancestral graves (similar to Qingming Festival in China). In comparison, the Vietnamese don't make the tomb-visiting festival an important rite since they organize the anniversary of the deceased annually. Korean Mid-Autumn Festival (Chuseok 七夕节) is the second biggest practiced filial holiday since family reunion, respect and family hierarchy are core values of all rituals. Therefore, Chuseok is also known as Family Thanksgiving Day in Korea. The third filial festival is on Double Nine Day which is for those who still have not gotten a chance to visit parents, grandparents and ancestral graves and therefore take advantage of this day to go back home (Lee Kwang-kyu 2003,p. 206).

The long-lasting traditional family system in Korea is being replaced by the nuclear family system which focuses on the ties between husband and wife or transfers the focus from the older generation to the younger generation. This change is evident as the next generation is being impacted by Western modernized education which promotes individualism, causing the gradual loss of traditional morality. However, in his article, the author Tran Ngoc Them (vanhoahoc.edu.vn) quoted the results of a Korean author who shows that, "Collectivism in Korea, in company with individualism, is still being maintained, is still co-existing and developing". In short, this kind of high hierarchical society is built on the foundation of normative familism. Filial piety in Korea demonstrates the norm, vertical standard (y-axis), and contributes to the sustainability of hierarchy and a well-ordered society in Korea from the past to the present.

4. Conclusion

Originating from different contexts of racial origin and ecological conditions, while also sharing similarities in historic-social contexts, Vietnamese and Korean cultures both have got quite different characteristics. The former has a tendency to reach collectivistic equality, or hierarchy decomposition, since it has been built on a vertical social foundation, whereas the latter always tries to maintain and promote family and social hierarchy on the basis of a society treasuring familism.

Given the two different types of society and culture, traditions of filial piety in Vietnam and Korea also have got important differences, though these two cultures share the same orthodox ideology with Confucianism. In Vietnam, filial piety is harmonized with the thought of being loyal to the king (patriotism), integrity, senior-junior order (悌), the spirit of communal equality and sentimental attachment (compassion). Meanwhile, in Korea, familial and social morals are based on filial piety, which is considered the origin to be used to build national morals on the spirit of hierarchy.

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Challenges of Traditional Handicraft Villages in Mekong Delta, Vietnam

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Abstract

Although the traditional handicraft villages in the Mekong Delta have greatly contributed to increased income and reduced poverty in rural areas, they have grand challenges of sustainable development. This study examines the challenges of cultural change, material resources, fast urbanization, and global economic integration that have an effect on the development of traditional craft villages in the Mekong Delta. The study also discusses how government policies have provided solutions to village socio-economic and cultural conditions in traditional handicraft villages.

Overview of the Mekong Delta Traditional Handicraft Villages

The traditional handicraft villages are considered factors that have greatly contributed to increased income and reduced poverty in rural areas. In the Mekong Delta, Vietnam, there are more than 200 traditional handicraft villages that make various handicrafts, absorbing about 200,000 laborers. Many of them were founded a long time ago with each traditional craft village having a cultural base with its own identity. Some of the famous Mekong Delta traditional handicrafts are pottery, traditional silk, mats, wooden furniture, rattan and bamboo products, flowers, rice pancake, weaving, etc. The small traditional handicraft enterprises are drawing the participation of at least 30% of all households and making at least 50% of the village's total income (World Bank, 2012).

From many years ago, handicraft villages evolved as families used free time between harvests to create products for their daily needs. Moreover, traditional handicrafts are non-agricultural which gives the chance to earn money for number of households and labors during the flood season. The Mekong Delta residents greatly benefit from the season of flooding by using extra time to make fishing nets and other fish catching tools.

The growth of traditional handicraft villages in the Mekong Delta can be considered to have two causes. First, is the growth of international tourist arrivals in the Mekong Delta and the increase of tourism in handicraft villages located near large cities such as Ho Chi Minh City and Can Tho. The second is the open air market that has existed since Vietnam has been a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). On the other hand, they have grand challenges regarding sustainable development.

The Effect of Cultural Change and Urbanization on the Labor Force

The change and development of the Mekong Delta cultural elements have positive effects such as upgrading people's living and cultural standard. New cultural values are reborn as an industrial lifestyle, the adoption of new technologies, etc. However, it is also one of the challenges in the Mekong Delta villages because of some problems.

Firstly, the market mechanism creates a lifestyle market and deterioration in living conditions in some parts of residents' lives and this leads to a pragmatic way of life. The attitudes of producers are changing to the trend of "fast food" and the quality is decreasing. The appreciation of money is the reason why the artisan value has decreased and the business man value is on the rise. This makes the community linkage loosen, it can be said that the money linkage is tight but the cultural linkage has loosened (Binh, 2011).

Secondly, the youth in the Mekong Delta traditional villages are attracted by new chances from urbanization and globalization. They prefer to be long-term employees in the industrial parks with a "high value job" than be an artisan in traditional villages. Besides the salary of a worker there is the stability of working hours in comparison with that of an artisan in traditional villages (Ngan, 2013). With those reasons, there is a huge migration from rural provincial areas to cities, and it decreases the number of young residents in rural areas. At the same time, urbanization gives opportunities to other household members with several job options. Individuals can provide services like petty trade, be porters, and offer personal transport service on motorcycles in and around the market places. The poor residents can earn money by selling lottery tickets, working as laborers gardening, and harvest and package fruits for others. Slowly but surely, the heritage of the traditional villages, traditional crafts and lifestyle gained over the years is also disappearing.

Thirdly, it is important that nearly all of the traditional handicrafts in the Mekong Delta are community-based, tradition-driven, and purchased for cultural or utilitarian reasons by a largely domestic market. The reconnection between old artisans and young artisans is needed in responding to craft education and training. The artisans can transfer their experiences and secrets by teaching their children. When they were a child, children in the village helped in production which helped to create more artisans and develop their job. It is also a way artisans can pass along their experiences and secrets. Contrary to this belief, the change in culture leads to a loosened connection between generations. Therefore, the young generations can't receive the introduction and experiences of elders with the skills of making traditional products. In consequence, the youth doesn't know how to develop traditional handicrafts correctly. It seems with each generation there are fewer and fewer children interested in the knowledge of their parents because of this some types of traditional forms of art are disappearing.

Urbanization, Climate Change and Limited Raw Material Resources

The sustainability of traditional handicraft villages depends on the limited resources of traditional raw materials. Most of the Mekong Delta traditional villages make arts and crafts from natural raw materials found in the countryside like rattan, bamboo, water hyacinth, woods, and Palmyra tree. However, the traditional handicraft enterprises have the opportunity to export natural material products to the U.S. and EU markets. The challenge for the enterprises is how to manage and maintain the natural material resources.

The Mekong Delta urbanization ratio over the last decade is 2.5% per year and this invasion of modern infrastructure affects the sensitive ecological areas and species. In addition, climate change creates problems for land use and the Mekong Delta ecology. One of the problems in sharing raw materials is the weak cooperation between handicraft households in the same village and the weak cooperation between enterprises in the region. Therefore, raw materials are declining and some

enterprises depend on outside sources causing an increase in prices. Price increases also cause a lack of competition in the open market (Ngan, 2011).

In the future, some traditional handicrafts like making wooden furniture will disappear because of limited material resources. Enterprises have found a way to import wood from outside (industrial wood), but the competition between the enterprises in taking the material leads to a conflict of having and using the natural resources (Ngan, 2013). Moreover, the regional economic linkages in the Mekong Delta are not good enough to help the enterprises overcome the "material crisis", since the enterprises are local.

The Challenge of Global Economic Integration and Government Involvement

The Vietnamese government has traditionally played a limited role in the success of the Vietnamese handicraft industry. In 2006, Vietnam joined the WTO, it created open air market for the Mekong Delta traditional handicraft villages. In addition to finding a market for the handicrafts, exporting industries also work to adapt goods to better suit the global markets' ever-changing taste, as well as improving the quality of handicrafts (Szydowski, 2008, p.51) but it also creates many challenges for local villages.

First of all, a successful handicraft industry is one which employs a large number of artisans and craft workers as well as one which generates revenue. The Mekong Delta craft enterprises need an association of artisans and find output way for their production because of the economic competition. Although, the number of laborers is large there is minimum of labor in high quality. There are not many artisans who can research new styles of products and how to apply new techniques. They are not formally trained and always depend on their experience. Now in the Mekong Delta, some households produce traditional handicrafts and in addition households produce modern handicrafts that are of a lower quality. Even in the case of a skilled craftsman, the quality may be random, and simply copying popular foreign products is still prevalent.

Secondly, copyright protection is another big problem for traditional villages in the Mekong Delta. Their goods in the open market are mixed with other goods from outside, though the quality is different. However, the Mekong Delta households cannot clearly know this problem and cannot find the right way to solve it. In fact, the registration of copyright protection needs to follow some regulations which is difficult for the community to understand. In other words, the copyright protection has to connect with the "One Village - One Product" movement.

Thirdly, to develop the production, the households need to find capital to invest in production but the role of the state in preferential loans is too small. To solve this problem, the producers have to use equity with high interest loans. The policy of the government does not meet the need of households. Although some policies of the government such as Decree No. 178/1998/QĐ-TTg, Decree No. 41/2010/NĐ-CP, Decree No. 41/2010/NĐ-CP, 4/2010/TT-NHNN, and district-level policies are given only the medium-sized enterprises have chances to access this benefits. The household producers have difficulty with big loans because they cannot show their force and production scale in the future, and this inhibits the household's production speed; the amount did not meet their production needs.

Moreover, in Vietnam, overlapping management is a big problem for developing handicraft villages in a professional way. The state makes policies for the development of traditional handicraft villages, but at the district level. The rural development policies lie in the hands of the District People's

Committee which gives the District People's Committee great control over the allocation of funds and the direction of rural development. In fact, the District People's Committee prefers to favor heavy, large-scale industries. They believe that large-scale industries will generate more profits than small-scale industries. This is the cause of limitations of social funds for traditional handicraft villages. On the other hand, the Association of Viet Nam Crafts Villages does not have a good solution for the cooperation between the handicraft artisans and craft workers, or for the handicraft exporting companies and tourist companies.

Finally, due to their lack of marketing skills, most of the villagers depend on middlemen for their sales, and therefore receive less profit for their products. In the recent years, international tourism has introduced Western consumers to Vietnamese handicrafts, which are attractive to tourists because they are able to connect the product to the village where it was created. In reality, most traditional handicraft villages have poor infrastructure and small scale production, so it is very difficult to build up tourism. Furthermore, Vietnam's rank in Travel & Tourism Competitiveness (Report 2008–2011) compared to some other Asian countries is not good because of the tourist management and policies. So, the Vietnamese traditional handicraft producers will have to cooperate with those from other Asian countries in the same marketing environment.

Solutions for the Development of Traditional Handicraft Villages

According to the study, the Mekong Delta traditional handicraft villages need to apply solutions relevant to each village's socio-economic and cultural conditions to take advantage of their current resources by doing things such as:

- Build up the "One Village - One Craft" movement in the Mekong Delta with the preparation of sources capital collection through the banks system and bank of social policy to step by step increase effective use of capital.
- Make copyright law training courses for households and establish a law consultant system in the Association of Handicrafts Villages at the district level.
- Carry out projects to train people in making handicrafts and help improve their labor qualifications in traditional craft villages by cooperating with colleges of art to educate people about art and art techniques.
- Make plans to organize traditional villages in industrial zones as a solution to production area and closely manage the process to avoid using non-purposed land.
- Make plans to develop the raw material regions in the Mekong Delta such as rattan, bamboo, water hyacinth and industrial wood.
- Make new types of tourism based on the Mekong Delta handicraft villages by balancing the linkage between villages, the government including both the local and central authority, tour companies, universities and other stakeholders.

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Amplifying Risk After Fukushima Nuclear Accidents – Deterioration in Quality of Life for People with Disabilities in Fukushima City

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Summary

A massive earthquake and tsunami occurred in East Japan on 11 March 2011. These natural disasters triggered a severe technological disaster, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant accident in Fukushima prefecture. The effects of these disasters have not yet been fully felt. In particular, issues associated with the nuclear accident in Fukushima prefecture have remained very serious. This paper explores issues in the deteriorating quality of life for people impacted the Fukushima nuclear disaster prefecture. The discussion focuses on people with disabilities who live in Fukushima city. People with disabilities are vulnerable to disaster, so special support needs to be provided. However, their damage and problems have not yet been clarified after the disaster. This paper looks at their problems at the present time through fieldwork. What sorts of factors have deteriorated the quality of life of people with disabilities following 3.11, and what sort of support needs to be developed? These main questions are discussed from the viewpoint of environmental justice as one of the important concepts of environmental sociology.

The research is mainly based on interviews with people with disabilities who use home welfare services, and the staff of the home welfare services office that provides these services. Those surveyed have lived in Fukushima city, which is located approximately 60km from the plant. Some of these areas have been highly contaminated. They have been exposed to an extraordinary situation. This research was conducted from November 2011 to May 2013, and will continue after the publication of this paper.

The two factors that have deteriorated their quality of life are radioactive contamination and the decreased number of care workers. The former will harm their health and the latter will lead to deterioration in their quality of life. Today, the latter issue is an urgent problem. The decrease of care is directly connected to restrictions on their daily activities. This situation means that people with disabilities will be deprived of opportunities to hear about vital information, and deprived of a chance to get compensation from the nuclear accident.

1. Background and Aim of the Research

On 11 March, a massive earthquake and tsunami struck East Japan. The natural disaster triggered a severe technological disaster - the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident. The effects of these disasters have not yet been fully felt or understood. Particularly, in the Fukushima prefecture, where the plant is located, the situation is still very serious. This paper discusses the deteriorating quality of life for victims who have been impacted by the Fukushima nuclear accident. In this paper, the discussion focuses on people with disabilities who live in Fukushima city (1). Firstly, this is because while a lot of people have suffered as a result of this accident, the situation that vulnerable

people are confronted with is more severe. Secondly, there are some categories of vulnerable people; children, pregnant women, elderly people, medical patients, handicapped people and so on, but problems involving people with disabilities have not been made clear compared with that of other vulnerable people. The issue in focus is protecting children and pregnant women from nuclear substances, so the problems experienced by people with disabilities has been somewhat neglected. There are only a small number of articles in newspapers and academic research on this topic. For these reasons, focusing on people with disabilities will contribute to making clear one aspect of the massive disaster in East Japan.

Fewer news stories and attention do not mean fewer problems have been experienced. People with disabilities are confronted with severe problems including the decreasing number of workers offering nursing care services for them. They need welfare services in their everyday life, but in the future, there is a possibility that they cannot get services. This is an urgent issue that needs to be addressed. This paper addresses the situations of people with disabilities and the problems they face, using fieldwork on environmental justice, an important concept of environmental sociology. What sorts of factors deteriorate the quality of life of people with disabilities following 3.11 and what sort of support structures need to be developed? These are main questions to be discussed.

2. Analytical Framework

The Emergence of Environmental Sociology

“A social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint;

or;

which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestation”(Durkheim, 1982, p. 59).

French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) – an advocate of sociology - defined ‘social facts’, mentioned above, in order to establish a unique discipline of sociology. Social phenomena cannot be understood through physical inspection, geographical observation and psychological analysis but can be accomplished by treating social facts as things of nature. Since Durkheim’s achievements, when discussing social phenomena, sociology has legitimized itself as a discipline by keeping distance from biological and geographical factors. However, after the 1970s, sociology could not ignore these factors because of the occurrence of environmental matters (Dunlap & Marshall 2007, p.330). In particular, the “Energy Crisis” of 1973-1974 facilitated the establishment of environmental sociology. As the symbolic title Limits to Growth by Rome Club in 1972 indicates, the heavy dependence on fossil fuels was highlighted as a concern among modern industrialized countries. Dunlap and Catton - originators of environmental sociology - submitted a new concept; New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) which was defined as ‘an alternative set of assumptions stressing the ecosystem-dependence of human societies’ (Dunlap & Catton, 1979, p. 250). NEP was conceptualized to criticize the anthropogenic discipline of mainstream sociology; Human Exemption Paradigm (HEP). NEP, which emphasizes the existence of an ecological limit and the importance of maintaining harmony between man and nature, has been widely accepted as a key concept on environmental issues.

Environmental Risks and Environmental Justice

One of the most severe environmental accidents in 1980s was the Chernobyl disaster, a catastrophic nuclear accident that occurred on 26 April 1986 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine SSR (today's Ukraine). This disaster is considered the worst nuclear disaster in history, and one of only two reactor incidents classified as a Level 7 event on the International Nuclear Event Scale. After the Chernobyl disaster, studies of environmental sociology shifted their attention to the distribution of exposure to environmental hazards, and nuisance facilities, influenced by the risk theory developed by Ulrich Beck (Dunlap & Marshall, 2007, p. 337). This approach remains one of the most common ideas in today's environmental sociology. Many researchers have studied environmental risks that transcend class, national and generational boundaries.

Moreover, some empirical research into natural and technological disasters has subsequently looked into the Risk society thesis (Dunlap & Marshall, 2007, p. 337). Čapek (1993) who researched the Carver Terrace neighborhood in Texarkana, Texas, revealed the strong relationship between contaminated areas and those who faced damage. He saw that technological disasters tended to occur in areas featuring a high African-American population, making it into an issue of racial justice. The "Environmental justice" framework was developed as a prominent part of national dialogue over citizen empowerment and the environment. This concept was used as an important tool in order to construct their damage as a problem and mobilize environment movement. Čapek states "environmental justice is premised on the notion that the rights of toxic contamination victims have been systematically usurped by more powerful social actors, and that "justice" resides in the return of these rights" (Čapek, 1993, p. 8). Environmental justice can be understood as a conceptual construction, or interpretive "frame" (Snow et al., 1986). According to Čapek, the principle of environmental justice guarantees three basic rights: the right to information, the right to a hearing and the right to compensation.

Environmental Sociology and Disaster

Discussions about Environmental risk shifted the direction of environmental sociology towards distribution of environmental hazards and nuisance facilities. The environmental justice thesis reveals that these phenomena have been impacted by minority people disproportionately. Environmental risks are distributed unfairly. Studies about natural or technological hazards and disasters have discussed how environmental risks impact upon actual disasters.

Natural Disasters

there are many types of natural hazards, including earthquakes, tsunami waves, flooding, hurricanes, tornadoes, landslides, wildfires and etc. Nigg and Mileti (2002) point out that the existence of a natural phenomenon is necessary for a natural disaster to occur, but it is not sufficient enough to damage to a society. "Natural disaster events that have similar physical characteristics may not have similar social consequences". Damage to an individual or a society depends on people's hazard perception, emergency preparedness and response planning and mitigation. "The study of natural hazards and disasters tends to bridge the gap between the built and natural environments" (Nigg & Mileti, 2002, p. 273).

Environmental extremes can bring devastating damages as disasters to people, houses, and communities, but people can imagine a way to discovery. In most case of natural disaster, the

physical and social community has resilience from the disaster. Sometimes a community makes its solidarity more strong after natural disasters (Solnit, 2010).

Technological Disaster

However, technological disasters contrast sharply with natural disasters. This type of disaster that is caused by such as nuclear substances and harmful chemicals does not destroy houses, buildings and infrastructures physically. Kroll-Smith et al. (2002) argue that people can only detect the existence of technological disasters through the use of technical methods and apparatus because causative materials and their impacts may be invisible to human senses. Therefore, "it may be difficult to identify all the victims of technological disasters. In addition, the variable experiences and knowledge of the victims can be expected to result in quite different subjective assessments of damage of potential for harm" (Kroll-Smith et al., 2002, p. 296). The extent of danger by technological hazards can be measured technically, but its interpretation of the investigation results vary from person to person. How people interpret the situation depends on social context of each individual. Lidskog (1996) indicates how people perceive risks by technological hazards differently through a case study of the accident of a chemical factory in Seveso Italy. In this case, residents perceived environmental risks in the area differently from scientific opinion. In general, formal risk analysis is thought to best be conducted by a mathematical analysis of expected rates of mortality and morbidity that is based on estimated relationships between undesirable consequences and the degree of exposure to harmful substances. However, in practice, the residents facing technological disasters evaluate the risk by themselves. So, it is thought that designing a method for discovering risks from technological disasters is more difficult than that of natural disasters. In addition, technological disasters are caused by malpractice by a chemical company or the failure of a governmental agency. They try to minimize the damage and avoid the high costs of repairing the contaminated environment, and also provide compensation to the victims (Kroll-Smith et al., 2002, p. 304). Some research shows that the institutional denial of the damage worsens the stress of victims, and creates obstacles to their ability to cope with the hazard. Technological disasters create a stressful conflict between the company involved and the respective governmental agency. How they analyze the extent of the conflict differs from how victims perceive the impacts of the disaster and their risk. This point is an important difference between natural disasters and technological disasters.

3. What happened? – 3.11 Disasters in East Japan-

Earthquake, Tsunami, and Nuclear Accident

The Great East Japan Earthquake is one of the most serious disasters that have struck Japan. The earthquake was a magnitude 9 that occurred at 14:46 JST on 11 March 2011, with the epicenter approximately 70 km from the coast of Miyagi prefecture, north Japan. It was one of the most devastating earthquakes in the world. The earthquake triggered massive tsunami waves that reached heights up to 40 meters and 10km inland. As of 30 January 2013, a report by National Police Agency of Japan confirmed 15,880 deaths, 6,132 injured, and 2,700 missing(2), 128,914 buildings had totally collapsed, 268,897 were assessed as half collapsed and 733,974 partially damaged.

Nuclear Accident

The earthquake and the tsunami caused nuclear accidents at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant that is located the coastal area of the Fukushima Prefecture. The Plant comprises six separate reactors operated by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Because of these disasters, four reactors were damaged severely; three of them were measured Level 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. It is said that the total amount of radioactivity released into the atmosphere was approximately one-tenth as much as was released during Chernobyl accident. Radioactive substances from the plant polluted a broad area in Eastern Japan. After the accident, the Japanese government declared a nuclear emergency. The Prime Minister instructed that people within a 20km radius of the plants should evacuate, and those who live between a 20 and 30 km radius should stay indoors. However, the authority stated evacuation by residents outside 20 km was not compulsory. Today, some parts of the area are allowed to be entered into. However, it is estimated that approximately 160,000 people have evacuated from their towns (4); 100,000 have moved within the Fukushima prefecture, and 60,000 have moved to other prefecture (5).

The 3.11 disaster in East Japan was a complicated mixture of natural disaster and technological disaster. The earthquake and tsunami waves created the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, but it is difficult to assess this through just the one lens. The contaminated area can be interpreted according to different measurements and perceptions of the damage and the involved risk. TEPCO and the Japanese government tried to minimize the damaged area to people living inside the Fukushima prefecture, but residents of neighboring prefectures complain of their damage and severe risks they also face.

4. A Case Study in Fukushima City

In this chapter, the discussion is focused on the issues faced in Fukushima city that were caused by the nuclear accident. TEPCO and the government regard this area as less contaminated because of its distance from the plant. However, some people in the city have experienced severe exposure to radioactive substances. This has created a problematic conflict between TEPCO, the government, and the city's citizens.

Damages in Fukushima City

The fieldwork has been conducted in Fukushima city. Fukushima city is the capital of the Fukushima prefecture. There was little damage by the great earthquake and no damage by tsunami. However, the issues caused by the nuclear accident are severe. The population is 284,175 (As of December 2012), and has fallen following the disasters. Fukushima city is about 50 to 60 km from the plants, meaning some areas have not been polluted but other areas face high levels of radiation. The level of contamination depends on mainly geographical factors. One difficult problem that Fukushima city has faced has been the absence of compensation payments for when citizens are forced to evacuate. Where the area was not compulsorily evacuated; many citizens who voluntarily chose to avoid risk of radiation were not able to receive monetary compensation. Compensation payment from TEPCO is mainly based on the distance from the nuclear plant. 50-60 km is not recognized as an impacted area under the current compensation conditions.

The Object of the Study

The fieldwork is mainly based on interviews with people with disabilities who use home welfare services, and the offices that offer the services. Those surveyed lived in Fukushima city. It was conducted since November 2011, and will continue after the publication of this paper.

This study focuses on a welfare service office in Fukushima city. This office offers nursing care for people with disabilities who don't live in an institution or with their families but by themselves (6). The office name is IL (Independent Living) Center Fukushima, established in 1996 with Non-Profit Organization status. This is the one of the biggest nursing care service offices for people with disabilities in Fukushima city. As of December 2012, 116 people have used nursing care services from the office, and 148 people have worked as personal assistants.

Damage After the Disasters

1,568 handicapped people were killed by tsunami waves. There are 76,568 handicapped people in the coastal areas. So, almost 2% died. This ratio is twice as much as people without disabilities (7). Regarding issues faced by the tsunami, the condition of people with disabilities has been regarded as a serious topic. However, it is not still clear about damage by the nuclear accident. Indeed, no person was killed by the nuclear accident in Fukushima city. It is very difficult to grasp the extent of the damage. In this paper, the number of evacuees is used to comprehend the damage of the nuclear accident. This data is one of most useful and objective indicators.

Evacuation from Fukushima City

As mentioned above, many people have been evacuated from Fukushima city temporarily or have moved to another city permanently. The same problem can be seen in this office. Regarding users, which means people with disabilities who use this office, the figure has remained constant. However, until now when five people were evacuated from the city at the same time, the office started to offer services for some evacuees of the tsunami waves. On the other hand, the number of the workers has been decreased gradually after the accident. One reason is that, not surprisingly, the care workers are also victims of this accident. One staff member of IL center Fukushima said to me that most employees who evacuated are around 40 years old so they have children. They moved in order to protect their children from radioactive substances (8). Now, sometimes the office has to refuse a request for nursing care from people with disabilities because of its lack of workers. A staff member told me "We have been forced to prioritize those who have special and serious disabilities" (9).

Not Only IL Center Fukushima

The problem of the falling number of care workers can be seen not only in IL center Fukushima but also in other offices. The Fukushima Minyu paper, a local newspaper in the Fukushima prefecture, reported that after nuclear accident many welfare service offices for people with disabilities in Fukushima city have confronted the issue of a lack of care workers (10). Approximately 75% of offices think that numbers will continue to decrease in the future. The reason for the decrease is mainly the effects of the nuclear accident. As mentioned above, many workers have evacuated to guard their children from radioactive substances.

5. Discussion

Problem After the Accident?

However, the office also said that the lack of care workers was also a problem before the 3.11 disaster. Low wage has been one of the biggest issues before the disaster. So, it can be argued that the effects of the nuclear accident have made worse the trend of decreasing numbers of workers. In addition, one staff member told me that “working as care worker for elderly people is more popular than people with disabilities. In particular, people want to work at institutions because of better income. In general, working in the home welfare services office has tended to be avoided. Today some new institutions were established because the number of elderly people is increasing. They invited a lot of workers.” (11).

Conclusion

Severe symptoms caused by the nuclear accident have not yet appeared visibly among people with disabilities. This is a characteristic of technological disasters – perceiving the extent of radioactive substances is difficult because the substances are invisible. The invisibility of the nuclear accident creates an obstacle to effective action. The damage from the nuclear accident harms people not only directly but also indirectly. Physical damage may appear a few years later or after 10 or 20 years; it is very hard to predict. This is one aspect of the invisibility. On the other hand, the decreasing numbers of care workers has already been seen in the two years since the accident, and this will make their quality of life worse. People with disabilities in Fukushima city have been exposed to two risks. The first one is a risk by radioactive substances that deteriorate their health, and the second one is a risk caused by the decreasing numbers of care workers. The decrease of care is directly related to restrictions on their daily activities. This situation means that people with disabilities will be deprived of opportunities to get information and the chance to claim compensation from TEPCO and the government. Although, in general, while only the former is understood as a direct issue, the latter also needs to be understood as a form of damage. This is the conclusion of this paper. Of course, all citizens are victims, but it can be said that the impacts have not been distributed equally. This severe situation can be understood as a form of environmental injustice.

Contributions

Japan is a country that faces many disasters. Huge earthquakes will happen again in the future. This research will contribute to designing prevention measures for future disasters. In addition, from the global perspective, sharing of this research will develop collaboration in the Asia-Pacific region to support vulnerable people during disasters. It will contribute to the reduction of risks from future disasters in the Asia-Pacific.

Notes

(1) In this paper, people with disabilities are limited to those who have a physical disability. Those who have an intellectual or mental disability are not included in the study. Research for people with intellectual or mental disabilities has been left for future research.

(2) Damage Situation and Police countermeasures associated with 2011 Tohoku district – of the Pacific Ocean Earthquake (January 30, 2013)

(4) Asahi News Paper (02 Aug. 2012).

(5) <http://www.cms.pref.fukushima.jp/download/1/kengaihinanuchiwake250117.pdf> (Dates: 27 Feb 2013).

- (6) This style of life is called independent living. The independent living movement started in the beginning of 1970s in the USA, and later spread around the world.
- (7) Mainichi Newspaper (24 Dec 2012).
- (8) The same opinion can be read in the Newspaper of IL center Fukushima (Jan 2012, only Japanese).
- (9) Interview with the staff of IL center Fukushima (Date; 30 May 2012)
- (10) Answers from 24 offices that offered home welfare services for people with disabilities in Fukushima city. The following data is taken from an article in the Fukushima Minyu paper (7 February 2012).
- (11) Interview with a staff of IL center Fukushima (Date: 30 May 2012).

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Indigenous Communities Confront Changes in Mondul Kiri and Ratanakiri provinces, Cambodia

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Abstract

Since the early 1990s impacts have been observed from the improved infrastructure, lowland immigration, corporate investments in large pine and rubber plantations, and mining exploration in Cambodia. Northeast Cambodia, rich in natural resources and inhabited by indigenous people, has been no exception. A study conducted using participatory action research (PAR) over the past year mobilizing indigenous communities to analyze their own issues and develop their own actions to respond to the impacts has brought about important findings and results. The study focused on three communities in Ratanakiri and Mondul Kiri provinces. In 2012 an additional two villages in Mondul Kiri were studied using qualitative and quantitative approaches. Findings indicate that land and forest resources, indigenous communities normally depend on for their living have been mainly affected by corporate investment and individual powerful businessmen. These resources have been mainly used for cash crop production. Even the community holding communal land title has been affected. This appears to be possible due to 1) the lack of law enforcement against encroachment; 2) historical absence of boundary demarcation, administratively at district and commune levels; and 3) the disregard of the principle of free, prior and informed consent by business companies and powerful individuals before investing in the areas where local residents live. As a result, community people stood up against the challenges with interesting results. While they have not been able to address the issues they faced completely, they took important steps including 1) engaging the sub-national level authorities to support community demand for allocation of land, taken away by companies, that belongs to them and now the issue is being brought to international level attention; and 2) took action against illegal activities to deter them. While these actions have been somewhat effective they may not be sufficient when there is a lack of support from relevant stakeholders. It is concluded that despite the fact that community people worked very hard thus far, the external pressures to take over large tracks of land and deplete resources is stronger than the communities can handle, and hence call for comprehensive governance of land and natural resources.

Keywords: indigenous community, natural resources, governance, Cambodia

General Cambodian Context

Since the early 1990s impacts have been observed from the improved infrastructure, migration, corporate investments in large pine and rubber plantations, and mining exploration in

⁶ This paper is based on the ADIC research projects in Cambodia's Mondul Kiri and Ratanakiri Provinces funded by The Embassy of Finland in Bangkok, Forum Syd, and International Development Research Centre (IDRC) through the Learning Institute (LI) from 2012-2013.

Cambodia. Northeast Cambodia, rich in natural resources and inhabited by indigenous people, has been no exception. A paper by ADB (2012) indicated that Cambodia's transport sector had been a major focus for Asian Development Bank (ADB) since the bank resumed its Cambodian operations in 1992 receiving 23% of all ADB loans and grants. With this ADB assistance, over 4,000 kilometers of national, provincial, and rural roads have been rehabilitated or upgraded. With these road improvements, the rural poor can now access markets and basic social and financial services more easily, including health care, schools, skills training, credit, and agricultural extension services.

In the past decade, Cambodia has enjoyed high economic growth and has seen a reduction in poverty and which can be attributed to the general peace and political stability of the country. According to CDRI (CDRI, 2013) the past decade saw economic growth averaging 9.7% per annum. At the same time, poverty has been reduced significantly (around 10 percentage points in a decade) and continues to fall, from 35.0% in 2004 to 30.1% in 2007. As a result of economic development, income per capita increased from \$250 in 1998 to an estimated \$795 in 2008. The study added that agriculture accounts for 32.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) and 59.0% of the total labor force. But questions remain about what benefits this growth brought to the overall poor and rural majority of the population. The fact that this growth was primarily as the result of growth in the garment and tourism sectors, the export of raw agricultural products, and construction, is considered to be narrow and may be vulnerable to external pressures (CDRI, 2013).

Since the mid-90s, there have been two major development strategies in the land and forest sectors which occur almost in parallel – the granting of forest and economic land concessions.

With respect to forest concessions, it is important to first examine forest cover. Cambodia's forest cover is estimated at approximately 60 percent of the total land area in 1992/93, down from about 75 per cent during the 1960s. As a major contrast to the above, in 1990, the country had forest about 70 percent of the country's total land area. Forest cover has since declined about 57 percent of Cambodia's total land area (CDRI, 2013). The rate of forest exploitation has increased remarkably and can be attributed to the opening up of the Cambodia's economy to the region and the world in general, and to the political context of Cambodia specifically. The three political parties, in the efforts to strengthen their powers, have logged in areas under their control. This situation lasted until the late 1990s, mostly through illegal activities (ADI, 2004).

In 1994 in order to reverse this trend, international donors led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank promoted better forest management through forest concessions. In four years, 30 forest concessions were granted by the Royal Government of Cambodia, totaling 6.5 million hectares or 35 per cent of Cambodia's total land area. In late 2001, due to cancellation, 15 timber concessionaries absorbed 21 concessions totaling 4.2 million hectares or 26 per cent of the country's land area (ADI, 2004).

There was a clear belief that granting forest concessions would effectively reduce illegal logging and to gain more revenues from forest exploitation but it did not achieve it. Instead, illegal logging continued. The World Bank estimated that illegal logging may generate US\$ 100 million annually. For the period of seven years from 1992-1999 Cambodia's timber exports were US\$ 2.139 billion but the amount that actually went to into the national revenue was only US\$ 98.8 million. What is even

more disturbing is that the forestry concessions badly impacted local communities with severe forest deforestation and degradation. In the face of growing concern, there has been contrasting recommendations. In mid-2004 the World Bank-funded Technical Review Team recommended the approval of six concessions with about 340,000 hectares in high value forest areas, but the April 2004 Independent Forest Sector Review (IFSR) funded by bilateral agencies and the World Bank suggested otherwise, and then recommended the support for community forestry efforts (ADI, 2004; McAndrew & Oeur, 2009).

The second strategy is the promotion of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs), which started in 1995. This occurred before the 2001 Land Law and the Sub-decree on ELCs in December 2005. According to the Sub-decree, an ELC is “a mechanism to grant state private land through a specific contract to a concessionaire to utilize for agricultural and industrial-agricultural exploitation, which includes cultivation of food crops or industrial crops, raising animals and aquaculture, construction such as a plant or factory and facilities for the processing of domestic agricultural raw materials, or a combination of some or all of the above activities.” (Article 2 of Sub-decree on ELCs, 2005 in Ngo & Chan, 2012).

Ngo and Chan (2012) added that the Sub-decree on ELCs stipulates that land is granted to ELCs using the following five criteria: i) the land has been registered and classified as state private land; ii) a land use plan has been adopted by the Provincial-Municipal State Land Management Committee and the land use is consistent with the plan; iii) An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) has been conducted for the land use; iv) land plan has resettlement options in accordance with the existing legal framework and procedures; and v) The land plan has provisions for public consultations regarding economic land concession projects or proposals with territorial authorities and residents of the locality.

The sub-decree further affirms that access to private land shall be respected and there will not be involuntary resettlement by lawful land holders. Of the total 1.5 million hectares of ELCs as of April 2010, about 1 million hectares was granted by MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) to 87 companies and other half million hectares sit inside the protected areas under the management of Ministry of Environment (MoE). It is important to note that many ELCs are not working or no major progress made (Ngo & Chan, 2012).

ELC operations have implications for natural resource management in Cambodia. At the end of 2012, 1.5 million hectares of land were provided to private companies, 80% for rubber. The majority of the ELCs are in forested areas, resulting in forest cover reduction. It was expected that rubber plantations will generate about 1.3 million new jobs. But only 20% of ELCs land areas have been cultivated and only 8% of expected new jobs employed. Therefore, it is a concern that these ELC companies are primarily engaged in illegal timber harvest and/or land speculation. Also, deforestation results from the lack of a nationwide system of secured land ownership (CDRI, 2013). Economic concessions require large areas of land and will end up affecting a significant number of rural populations who are the poorest and most vulnerable. There are always contrasting views that while those in favor of the economic concession model state that high value plantations are a method for economic development, others counter claiming does not provide tangible benefits to

the rural poor and even negatively impacts their livelihoods and well-being (Middleton& Hak, 2005, Vize& Hornung, 2013; Figure 1; Appendix 2).

ELCs have shifted land ownership rights which have resulted in conflicts affecting between 400,000 and 700,000 Cambodians. It remains unclear if ordinary Cambodians have benefited from land concessions (Vize&Hornung, 2013). While several laws were passed and are relevant to ELCs such as the Land Law (2001), the Forestry Law (2002), and the Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management (1996), in practice there are cases of abuse such as the ELC areas should not exceed 10,000 hectares but whose actual areas are much greater. ELCs aimed to bring more income for the state (via land rentals, charges and taxes), for private enterprise promotion and creating jobs for rural communities, and ultimately contribute to poverty reduction objective; but there has been no major indication of any of these proposed benefits actually reaching the citizenry. Instead, it serves only elite controlled logging and land speculation (Middleton&Hak, 2005).

Context of Northeast Provinces

Northeastern Cambodia consists of the provinces of Ratanakiri, Monduliri, Kratie, and Strung Treng. These areas are home to many indigenous people. In fact, there are about 23 different indigenous ethnicities in Cambodia, and belong to 455 communities in 13 of all provinces. In the Northeast's Monduliri and Ratanakiri provinces there are about 179,000 or about 1.34 per cent of the national population (Vize& Hornung, 2013). Indigenous communities are culturally connected to their land and thus deeply depend on it for all aspects of their livelihoods. They inhabit some of the most natural-resource rich areas. These areas are well known for their productive soils which thus are attractive to economic land concessions (Rabe, 2013).

Indigenous communities have significant cultural differences, but share common challenges. First, since they live in area rich in natural resources and given the improved infrastructure, these areas become important targets for development. Their land has great potential for industrial agriculture, particularly for rubber. Some of their land areas taken over by ELCs contain high value timber, an attraction for logging. ELCs have taken over large tracks of indigenous land in Ratanakiri Province for growing palm oil, coffee and cashew nuts. In the early 2000s they started planting rubber and teak, and engaged in gem mining. In Monduliri Province pine tree plantations were set up (Middleton& Hak, 2005; McAndrew & Oeur, 2009; Vize& Hornung, 2013). Second, Cambodia's indigenous people practice collective ownership for individual dwellings and common areas such as burial grounds, spirit forests, and farmland. All these are associated with the land. This is much different from the majority Khmer economic systems that consider indigenous peoples' land be better utilized for private or so-called "state" development (Vize & Hornung, 2013).

The arrival of investment companies via the ELC system has had profound consequences for the indigenous peoples of the Northeast. The granting for forest concessions and economic land concessions without the involvement of indigenous groups has negatively impacted their lives by reducing their ability to carry on their traditional subsistence activities. In 2000 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Concession Review found that the seven companies holding concessions in Kratie did not abide by their contracts. ADB found that there were no minimum annual royalties paid, no submission of financial statements, unacceptable forest management planning, and breach

of investment agreements. Moreover, concessionaires and the military worked closely together to conduct illegal logging. The 2004 World Bank-funded Technical Review recommended that one concession (Everbright CIG Wood) continued to operate in Kratie, but this was in contrast to Global Witness's call in 2001 for cancellation of that company due to its illegal logging (McAndrew & Oeur, 2009).

The study also revealed that the Forest Concession Review gave very a poor performance to Hero Taiwan Company operating in Ratanakiri compared to other reviewed forest concessions and the Malaysian Samling company operating in Mondulkiri and Kratie provinces for not abiding by their contracts. The illegal logging activities not only created more deforestation and degradation but also reduced access to non-timber forest products such as resin, and also intruded into spirit forest areas (McAndrew & Oeur, 2009). A case study in Mondulkiri, Kratie and Kampong Speu revealed that the impact of ELCs indicated that the granting of ELCs usually involves land that the local people claim as farmland and homestead land as well as forest resources. This often results in conflicts between the company and the villagers, because the Sub-decree on ELCs has not been followed. For example, there was a lack of effective public participation with territorial authorities on site identification. Also in many cases Economic and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA) were not done before the granting of the ELCs. At the same time, local residents and settlers encroached the land and caused conflicts (Ngo & Chan, 2012). Even a recent CDRI study found that Illegal logging remains a problem, particularly in old-growth areas in Mondulkiri and Ratanakiri provinces (CDRI, 2013).

Indigenous Communities at the Crossroads

Cambodia's 2001 Land Law has a provision that states the collective land ownership for indigenous people is important in indigenous people's culture. Article 26 of the Land Law recognizes collective ownership of land through communal land titles which includes residential, agricultural and cultivated land as well as land reserved for shifting cultivation. But the granting of communal titles has been slow as only three out of more than forty communities have completed the process and received the titles. At the same time, Cambodia started a private land titling scheme in June 2012 but this has nothing to do with communal land titling despite it had occurred in the indigenous communities. This caused concerns as indigenous people with private titles cannot participate in communal titling program (Vize & Hornung, 2013). Only five communal titles have been granted to indigenous communities, but RGC has claimed that three more will be granted in May. Forty-nine more villages have completed the process and are waiting for final approval (Rabe, 2013). Of important note, the article 2 of sub-decree on procedures of registration of land of indigenous communities (Cambodia Sub-decree, 2009) state that the objectives of this Sub-Decree are to provide indigenous communities with legal rights over land tenure, to ensure land tenure security, and to protect collective ownership by preserving the identity, culture, good custom and tradition of each indigenous community. Article 6 described the type of land including residential land or Land on which the community has built houses; land on which the community practices traditional agriculture such as actual cultivated land, rice and farm land; reserved land necessary for shifting cultivation which has been recognized by administrative authorities and agreed by the neighbors; spiritual forest land, can be one or more plots, for each community shall not exceed seven (07)

hectares in total size; and burial ground forest land (cemeteries) can be one or more plots, for each community shall not exceed seven (07) hectares in total size.

Due to the increasing pressure over land issues, Prime Minister Hun Sen issued Directive No. 01 in May 2012 for a moratorium for issuing license to new ELCs it also contains a provision that communities would get their land back if affected by ELCs. The nationwide land titling program was made public by Prime Minister on June 14, 2012, which appeared after Instruction 15 on July 4, 2012 (Vize & Hornung, 2013). Under the issuance of Directive 01: Measures Reinforcing and Increasing the Efficiency of the Management of Economic Land Concessions, the Government suspended all Communal Land Titling (CLT) processes in July 2012. The Directive outlined processes for issuing private land titles and have used thousands of student volunteers to demarcate land where there are in conflicts with ELCs. The majority of the 26 study villages affected by Directive 01, and respondents were not satisfied with the private titling process and outcomes explaining that the policy did not secure their communal land rights. Though they would like communal titles, they stated they felt pressure to accept private titles. They appear to be caught in between the long awaited communal titles and the immediate need to have private titles because of their land is located close to ELC companies (Rabe, 2013).

Directive No. 01 is subject to criticism, even with tremendous amount of support by foreign aid for Cambodia thus far, because the program bypassed state institutions responsible for issuing and recording land titles. The costs were covered by The Prime Minister and other members of his ruling Cambodian People's Party to a total of US\$600,000. The Directive was seen as not upholding the rights of indigenous peoples because of preference given to company land leases and NOT indigenous people's customary land rights. Moreover, after the student measuring was over land conflicts still existed between ELC companies and indigenous communities (Rabe, 2013). Another consequence is that the Land Law provides that land owners cannot hold both private and collective titles, and hence those who hold individual land titles are out of the communal land circle, which ultimately negatively affects the social cohesion and solidarity (Vize & Hornung, 2013).

As the implementation of the Directive is early we will see the change in the status of the private land title recipients. Likewise, as the status of communal land titling process has been slow thus far it remains to be seen if the indigenous community people who are currently interested would opt out from the communal process and take up private rights in the short term.

Research Questions

Impacts on indigenous communities differ in form and severity between locations within the larger scale of provinces. Therefore, it is important to examine the level of impact and responses of particular communities. We have two main research questions:

- How have national development policies changed access to land and natural resources by indigenous people in our three communities?
- How successful have collective effort of the three communities been in responding to these land policy changes affecting them?

Methodology

This study employed both qualitative and quantitative approaches (see appendix 1). In Ratanakiri, the study used qualitative participatory action research (PAR) methods for the period of 2013. Conceptually, PAR is a cyclical process which researchers and the community start with identifying problems or concerns, raise questions, collect data and analyze, develop actions, implement actions, learn from the implementation and start the cycle again. The process requires researcher's efforts, flexibility and creativity in engaging with community and close follow-up.⁷ Practically, this included training the community representatives to understand the PAR process and steps, mobilizing indigenous communities as a whole to analyze their own issues and develop their own actions to respond to these changes, and quarterly follow up of the program team. Prior to actual implementation of the PAR training course, Analyzing Development Issues Centre (ADIC) staff conducted preliminary visits to Ratanakiri province to establish contacts with relevant agencies, communities, and local authorities to be able to better understand the situation of the indigenous people in potential commune sites. The Highlander Association (HA) in Ratanakiri Province is ADIC's principal partner in this PAR project.

For pre-visit, ADIC staff and a senior Highlander Association (HA) staff conducted the pre-visit from 8 to 13 January 2013. During the pre-visit they talked to NGO partners and non-partners, government officials at commune levels, villagers, villager chiefs, People's Organization representatives, and an evaluator of an NGO program on natural resource management in Ratanakiri. The team visited several communes include Talav, Malik and Yatung communes in two different districts. Based on the visits the Highlander Association (HA) and ADIC decided to select Yatung commune in Oyadav district, and Talav commune in Andong Meas district to participate in the project. The principal reasons were two: 1) the communes are distant enough from each other to provide an opportunity to compare progress of the project and of the communities' participation in implementation their plans; and 2) both communes faced land encroachment issues that local communities were willing to address. While Talav commune faced land encroachment by private companies, Yatung commune faced boundary disputes between villages and encroachment by a mining concession.

As for the PAR training course, it was held for a period of nine days. To that extent, the process has begun to move towards the expected results. By design, the PAR training course links participatory research with the development of community action plans. The action plans have been developed. What remains is the implementation of the community action plans. The research participants in the PAR training courses were selected from among focal persons or *chon bong koal* in Khmer working with the Highlanders Association (HA) in the target villages of the two selected communes. The PAR training was held in Kanat Thom village of Talav commune, Andong Meas district from February 27 to March 7, 2013 with participation of 12 PAR researchers. This training was facilitated by a senior ADIC staff, assisted by two ADIC PAR facilitators and one PAR facilitator from Highlander Association.

During the first four days of each training course the participants were introduced to the concept of PAR. They started with an understanding of what research meant to them and then they were asked to draw village resources maps followed by storytelling based on the resources or issues found on

⁷ Wadsworth, What is Participatory Action Research?

the map. After they told their stories which centered on land, forests, rivers and threats to these, the participants were asked to raise questions about each story they told. This process of learning through storytelling and raising questions was done to help them develop the skills for conducting household conversations and interviews in the field.

The participants were asked to select one of the most important stories told in class (within the village) to focus the discussion and to set the theme that emerge for the PAR. Based on this theme, they were asked to set their vision/dream given the selected theme and story, and then they were asked to devise strategies of how they would achieve their dream. They determined the possibilities and identified constraints and priorities, keeping in mind what might be feasible given the resources and capacities constraints of the local communities. Then they undertook stakeholder mapping analysis. This helped them to determine who to go to for soliciting support and who may block them from being able to see through the prioritized possibilities. Then, the facilitators asked them to come back with individual commitments that could help them realize the possibilities.

Although some of the participants were illiterate in Khmer they actively participated in the discussions throughout the processes. The facilitators had to engage them in the discussion by being more illustrative with simple drawings and sometimes facilitators asked them to do the drawings by themselves. These methods proved to work well in both communes.

At the start of the actual field work, the participants were reminded that the examples discussed in the first four days of the classroom served only as guides and they were reminded that these examples should not be used to influence the thinking of the community people that they would interview.

The first day of the field work began with pilot interviews as the participants, working in pairs, spent their morning interviewing one or two households and/or one of two focus groups with three to six households in each group. The participants then convened back in the classroom to reflect on the




Figure 1: Map Indicating Study Sites and Area of Economic Land Concessions

information they had collected and to discuss the difficulties they had experienced. All of these were written in flipcharts to be reviewed again on the fourth day. The same process was continued until the morning of the fourth day. In the afternoon of the fourth day the facilitators and the participants started to pull together the output of the interviews written on all flipcharts to develop preliminary analyses of the situations in each village.

On the ninth or last day of PAR fieldwork, the participants

convened all villagers in a meeting to share their preliminary analyses from their interviews. A representative of the participants presented the preliminary findings and analyses and encouraged the villagers to further develop this and validate what they felt were accurate. The villagers were then asked to develop a community action plans based on the agreed upon findings and analysis that would address the issues identified. This community action plans have been reviewed periodically and updated with further analyses as the situations changed.

In Mondulkiri, qualitatively, it was done almost in similar way except that PAR training days were split half to accommodate the schedule of participants during transplanting time in July and August 2013. This project was funded by Forum Syd to conduct PAR which includes collection of data and analysis but was done by community researchers, who are selected from within the villages.

An extra method was done in Mondulkiri prior to PAR processes. It was done for six months from January to May 2012 which combined qualitative and quantitative approaches. As part of the larger studies funded by International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the two selected villages under the current PAR target areas used survey as a method to select 25% random sample. The sample size was in compliance with the same study done in 2002. The villages selected were Ochra and Pou Kong located in Srae Preah commune, Keo Seima district, Mondulkiri province.

Apart from the survey done in the village, the research team has organized village meetings using a number of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) tools to collect the data such as village mapping, seasonal calendar, timeline, and problem tree analysis. Key informants such as village chief and elders were interviewed to gain historical insights about land use and forest changes. At the same time, the in-depth interviews were made using tape recorders for later transcription.

Study Community Profiles

The three communities have some similar and different characteristics. For similarity, they all have participated in the communal land titling processes. While Ochra village received communal land title in May 2013, the adjacent Pukong village in the same commune and Kanat Thom village in another province have gone through similar process but have not yet received titles. Other similarities include land encroachment as well as illegal logging activities which have been prevalent despite frequent community crackdown efforts, and it is literally referred to as a ‘push-return aquatic plant or *veik jork* effect’ in Khmer. The difference here is that Ochra and Pukong villages belong to the indigenous Bunong communities who have not had their land measured for private titles by groups of students, and that is the opposite of Kanat Thom village which is home to indigenous Kachok community and have had their private plots measured (see Table 1).

Table 1: Location and Population of the Three Villages

Name of village	Type of Indigenous Group	commune	District	province	Household	Population
Kanat Thom	Kachok	Talav	Andong Meas	Ratanakiri	204	868
Ochra	Bunong	Srae Preah	Keo Seima	Mondulkiri	34	137
Poukong	Bunong	Srae Preah	Keo Seima	Mondulkiri	67	329
Total					305	1,334


Below discusses the details of impacts and responses that community people and their leaders have had, mainly since early 2012.

Impact of Illegal Logging Activities

One of the impacts is about land encroachment committed by powerful individuals and ELC companies. All three communities Ochra, Pukong and Kanat Thom struggled to adapt to changes due to competition from ELCs and other powerful business actors. In Ochra village, even with communal title that community people are holding in hands, the land areas were cleared by more than forty households from Snoul district of Kratie province, which is adjacent to Mondulkiri province. They cleared the areas for settlements and cassava growing. When the people from Ochra went to visit the areas in order to measure the cleared land using GPS tool, they learned that about 60 hectares of forest areas were totally destroyed. These intrusions are possible because of long distance from the village center to the forest areas and time space between patrols by villagers in collaboration with local authority.

Another major impact is illegal logging activities. These are widespread in Ochra and Pukong villages since 2012. In 2013 in Ochra, three incidences of land clearance and resin trees cutting were exposed by the villagers' movement with support of local authorities, police and forestry officials. One person was arrested; chainsaws and three motorbikes were confiscated. Also, during an overnight the barefoot patrol by local communities, police and commune authorities, officials of Forestry Administration, and two ADIC staff, they were able to seize seven chainsaws, one oxcart, four oxen and two loggers. Of these, the first seizure included four chainsaws, one Cambodian logger who worked for an unidentified company, who had signed on a letter with promise of no return, who was released. (See Figure 2).

Figure 1: Exact Locations of Illegal Logging Activities Occurred in Pukong village (Photo by ADIC Staff)



Powerful local elites try to breakdown indigenous communities' enforcement so that they can take land and forest resources. For instance, one of the illegal loggers said to community representatives while encountering in the forest that "whether you accept money or not we will cut the trees and take it anyway, so it is better that you as community take some money." Another way to please villagers was that companies would negotiate with community people to accept small compensation such as traditional rituals in villages but it has never happened. The community had no choice but to accept it and remain vulnerable. This allows illegal practices to continue into expanding land areas. Using resource mapping exercise in all three communities during participatory action research (PAR) training sessions, it appears that clearance of forest, logging and land expansion are widespread, especially in boundary areas of the communities.

While the impact on villagers' income has been obvious, stakeholders involved keep accusing each other. From point of view of local authority such as the commune council, Forestry officials speak same words as illegal loggers that "villagers sold their resin trees" and if villagers do not consent they would not cut down. In contrast, villagers in Pukong and Ochra said that they never allowed loggers to cut their resin trees, instead loggers cut down first and when meeting owners of resin trees, they paid one tree for 20,000 riels (roughly US\$ 5). Due to the benefit that people enjoyed ever since they have the markets for resin, the value of resin trees far outweighs the amount paid by loggers. So, the indigenous people's livelihoods are under threat as household income still flows in from forest, especially resin trees. Some households own more resin trees than others. During the participatory action research in July 2013, both Ochra and Pukong villagers highlighted "resin trees are our money, clothes, monosodium glutamate (MSG), salt, children's schooling, etc.", and this is more critical for vulnerable indigenous people, especially widows. Figure 2 in Pukong, many resin trees were cut down by illegal persons in area which is only 5.5km away from the village center. An indigenous woman lamented that "resin trees are like our family members and even more important for widow families, it is like our husbands that provide main source of income for families, and also said cutting them down is like killing our family members."

In 2013 Development and Partnership in Action (DPA), an NGO working in the area, did interviews with households in Pukong to collect the number of resin trees that each household owns and their estimated values. One resin tree may generate an average income of 6,045 Riels (US\$ 1.5) per month or US\$ 18 per year. It was estimated that an average of US\$ 1,493 per household per year or US\$ 41,796 for all households may be generated from resin. However, altogether, there are twenty eight households in Pukong that were affected with the loss of 2,322 resin trees. If looking at income solely from resin trees, households lost almost two thirds of their annual income. This is particularly severe on those households who have few alternative sources of income other than resin tapping.

The survey data in 2012 indicated that forest income remains important for indigenous community households even with more diversified source of income. There has been a dramatic drop in forest-based income, especially from resin. For instance, households Ochra and Pukong villages earned 34% of household cash income from forest products versus 43% in 2002/03. Resin accounted for 8% of income in 2012 compared to 28% in 2002/03. Upland crop and wetland rice have been clearly expanded. Upland crops increased from 12% in 2002/03 to 17% in 2012. Wetland rice also increased from 12% in 2002/03 to 17% in 2012 (see Table 2). The drop in income reflects the on-going effects of illegal logging activities in the area.

The survey data in 2002/03 further revealed that the overall income increased almost three times from 2002/03 to 2013 but remain household poor. Using constant price to control the inflation, an average household income is US\$ 529 in 2002/03 compared to US\$ 1,399 in 2013. Using the current price and against value of annual household cash income for both communities, they are very low at US\$ 2,505 per annum while an average household size is large with six members and only half or three members of the households worked to contribute to household income. This indicates an approximation that poor household earned about one US dollar per person per day.

Table 2: Average Household Income among Sampled Households in Ochra and Pukong Villages

Particulars	2002/03		2012		
	Srae Preah commune 2002/03 US\$	% Share sources	Average Ochra, and Pukong US\$ constant price 2002/03*	Average Ochra, and Pukong in US\$	% Share sources
Upland crops (total)	62	12%	234	419	17%
Upland rice	22	4%	81	144	6%
Upland crops (other than rice)	40	8%	154	275	11%
Cassava	n/a	n/a	28	50	2%
Cashew nut	n/a	n/a	34	61	2%
Wet land (paddy) rice	65	12%	237	424	17%
Pigs raised	53	10%	74	132	5%
Chickens raised	15	3%	27	49	2%
Ducks raised	1	0%	5	10	0%
Food gathered from the forest	11	2%	24	43	2%
Other products gathered from the forest	218	41%	447	800	32%
Liquid resin	150	28%	107	192	8%
Animals hunted or trapped	33	6%	232	416	17%
Fish caught	13	2%	37	66	3%
Goods made and sold	9	2%	6	10	0%
Goods bought and sold	17	3%	42	75	3%
Wage work	33	6%	31	56	2%
Remittances	n/a	n/a	3	5	0%
Total income	529	100%	1,399	2,505	100%
n=	74		24		

Source: (So, Hak, Oeur,, and McAndrew, 2014) *Conversion rate of 2012 income to constant 2002/03 prices is made at 149.624/83.606 equals 178.96/100

Impact of Economic Land Concessions on Land and Forest

Some NGOs have promoted communal land titling program to secure indigenous people access and control over their land. In contrast, powerful elite have lobbied community people to have individual land titles. Also, they are encouraged by local authority including village chiefs and commune councils, even when it is against the Land Law and sub-decree. For example, Srae Preah commune councilor encouraged villagers to have private land titles when group of students measured land by

saying that villagers would have better benefit later such as using it as collateral for loans when they need money for health care, investment, etc. But NGOs such as Development and Partnership in Action (DPA) working in Srae Preah commune and Highlanders Association (HA) working in Kanat Thom village have been facilitating the communities to have access to the communal titles to ensure long term land tenure security, but the process of private land measurement has placed a communal titling process to a halt thus far.

While there has been no visible impact of ELC companies on land in Ochra, more than forty families from neighboring Kratie province, who were believed to have connection with high ranking officials, have entered secretly to clear the 60 hectares of the communally titled areas of Ochra. They even grow cassava on it. As for Pukong, there has been no clear sign yet on the land encroachment by ELC companies except the fact that their resin trees have been cut down and often villagers accused the involvement of the company workers. However, one may have a legitimate concern that the ELC Company Benh Hoeurk Rubber concession in the area covers part of Pukong's land and also areas of community-based production forestry (CBPF). CBPF by design is the government initiative to give rights to three communities including Pukong, Ochra and Pucha to harvest timbers in the area in a well-planned manner so that they have revenues to manage their resources effectively and also for community development activities. Recently, it is planned to exploit timbers in about 60 hectares of the total demarcated areas of more than 8,000 hectares (see Figure 3). However, by all accounts this initiative is only in initial stage of preparation.




Figure 2: Map of Srae Preah Commune Indicating Ochra and Pukong Villages, and ELC Companies (Sources: So, Hak, Oeur, and McAndrew, 2014)

Despite the facilitation by the NGO Highlander Association (HA), working in the village for years and facilitated Kanat Thom village through the process of getting their communal title, they are at bay for community's cultivating land were measured by group of students for private titles (see Figure 3). One community representative said "they felt regretful that other plots of land were not measured as well." The pressure from three ELCs surrounding their village has been so strong that residents have started to accept private titles rather than waiting for communal one which has been protracted for too long. According to the community representatives, ELC companies have been in operation in the areas to clear forest and grow rubber trees since 2012. In contrast to the legal provision of free, prior and informed consent, the community people were unaware of the ELC investment and they only reacted once the ELC companies started their work. Their forest reserve and spirit forest have been cleared in stages without notice. This shows when ELC areas overlap with land legally measured by the students and other communal land areas such as reserved forest for access to non-timber forest products many difficult conflicts occur. Of particular concern is that the areas that stand the chance to loss are those in isolated or archipelago-like areas (see Figure 4).




Figure 3: Exact Land Plots in Kanat Thom Measured by the Group of Students from 28 January – 26 February 2013, and Company's Areas that Overlap the Measured Areas

In Kanat Thom village, the students measured only the land under cultivation which covers a total of 846.90 hectares. Some plots are as small as 0.06 hectare and the largest 16 hectares. On average each household own 4.15 hectares. There are 422 out of 446 plots with names of owners indicated in the list of private land registration. Of these plots, 204 households own land an average two plots each, with a range from minimum of one to maximum of five plots. The men-headed households

own larger areas (4.35 hectares) compared to women-headed (2.26 hectares) and single household (2.43 hectares). It is even more interesting to see that actively working ages constitute higher proportion of land areas they currently own (See Table 3). Moreover, it is not surprising to see that 30% households or less own 58% of the total measured land titled areas while 50% households or less own 78% of the total measured land titled areas. This indicates significant inequality of land distribution within Kanat Thom village.

Table 3: Private Land Ownership by Age Range in Kanat Thom Village

Age range of land owners	Number of Plots	Areas in m2	% share
65-85 years	10	202,133.00	2
45-64 years	115	2,318,166.00	28
18-44 years	280	5,707,148.00	69
Total	405	8,227,447.00	100

Responses to Impact of Illegal Logging and Economic Land Concessions

Despite the pressures on these communities, they stood up against these challenges with interesting results. While they have not been able to completely address the issues they faced, they have worked hard and have taken important steps including responding to illegal logging activities, voicing concerns at a district forum on land encroachment, and advocating for support from government agencies.

The collaboration within each community has been strongly led by community leaders or representatives. They usually meet and discuss among themselves before preparing for actions. In Ochra and Pukong, they often work together to address the illegal logging issues because they have a common challenge and also they are located next to each other. When they observe illegal logging activities the community people always file complaints to the local authority and Forestry Administration (FA) supported by World Conservation Society (WCS), police, and military police. But as soon as both Ochra and Pukong community representatives have reported illegal logging activities to their commune council or Forestry officials, they observed that they have never been able to arrest the loggers or seize equipment. This can be explained by the different interests that are involved in controlling the illegal logging activities. In some instance it was the actual commune authority that threatened the community people in Pukong, who want to report all illegal activities to relevant agencies. This indicates the key idea that local people and their community leaders have little trust in the local authorities to enforce the rules and laws. In addition, they observed that during patrolling or cracking down activities they often fail to seize materials, equipment and loggers. This has led to the idea that they themselves need to deal with the issue on their own first before reporting to local authorities.

Subsequently, the community and their leaders took stance by patrolling forest areas or responding to reported illegal activities by their own villager fellows who encountered in the forest, and interestingly this has led to a few successful cases already. Usually, it is the villagers who report the illegal activities. So, they arrest illegal loggers first and then invite local authorities and others to intervene. That has been a very successful approach because they have been able to seize loggers and equipment such as chainsaws and motorbikes. Partoling is part of the community activity to

protect their land and natural resources. The community people have divided themselves into small patrol groups, they conduct patrols every month and they have observed a reduction in illegal logging. At one point, the patrol were conducted (28-29 November 2013) when two ADIC staff also joined to witness the activities. As a result, eleven chainsaws, one oxcart, and illegal loggers were seized in forest areas of Pukong village. At the same time, in-migrants still secretly come to clear land in the communal land titled area in Ochra village.

Apart from addressing illegal logging activities, the people in Ochra has taken important measure to let the group of initially nineteen households to move away from the informal settlement areas During the third quarter of 2013, but the Ochra community people allowed them to wait until they harvest their cassava and the settlers agreed. In addition, Ochra community people and their leaders repainted the boundary posts to make it clearer to outsiders by using their community resources (Resin Committee's savings) and other sources. Later, the villagers and representatives of Ochra villages learned that the settlers have increased up to forty households and denying moving out of the areas. With the strong effort of the community people who advocated for intervention from district, commune authorities, police and Forestry Administration officials, and with legal communal land title in hands the community representatives mobilized community people together with commune authority, court officials and Forestry Administration officials to deal with the illegal settlement case successfully during 14-16 March 2014. This activity was led by Forestry Administration officials and local authorities of sub-national levels including– village, commune, district and province. The reason that this case was led by Forestry Administration officials was because the settlement of Khmer in-migrants whose houses were built and have grown cassava right within a huge Seima Biodiversity Area, which is under the Royal Decree, and they have even further encroached into communal land title area of Ochra village. During August 2013, an estimate of about 50 hectares of land and forest were cleared but a measurement together with Forestry Administration officials in February 2014 reached 145 hectares including the communal land area.

Also, Kanat Thom community people and their leaders have taken important steps to secure ELC maps and license of the company. This was an effort to try to clarify the land areas to be occupied by any company growing rubber surrounding their villages. In addition, they have erected wooden poles to mark the forest areas left to claim. However, this was not successful because the company did not recognize poles that were set up without participation of company as well as local authorities at different levels. The community representatives have also submitted a letter for recognition to the district level in order to claim the forest left. But district authority requested to revise before it reaches the provincial level and demand supporting documents. While Kanat Thom community faced prolonged process of waiting to hear responses, they have linked up with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other sixteen communities affected by Hoang Anh Gia Lai (HAGL) Company in order to explore ways to respond to their problem. Through this effort, a complaint was filed by seventeen communities through a group of NGO on 10 February 2014 to the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), the independent recourse mechanism for the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Of important note, the HAGL obtained loan from IFC through Dragon Capital, amongst others. A few months later, according to Radio France Internationale (RFI) and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries (MAFF) website, the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries issued a

joint inter-ministerial decision with Ministry of Environment (MoE) that all ELC companies must respect and protect the interest of communities, and suspend the operations immediately upon the protest of the communities, and also warn for revoking the licenses if not complaint (RFI, 2014, and Prakas, 2014). In addition, according to Radio Free Asia (RFA), the HAGL decided to suspend its land and forest clearance operations in Ratanakiri from May-November 2014 (RFA, 2014).

As a result of the complaint, the IFC, HAGL and seventeen communities agreed to sit a table to negotiate tentatively set for November 2014. The involvement of government officials at different levels including Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, and Ministry of Interior are necessary throughout the processes that lead up to the negotiations. However, concerns remain amongst the community representatives given their limited capacities on legal knowledge and their level of confidence to negotiate with many different levels of stakeholders which will be moderated by CAO. There have been some supports provided by a group of NGOs to build capacities of communities to be able to sit at the negotiation table on equal footing with company's representative. Given the need of involvement of the government agencies and the limited capacities of the communities, the date of first negotiation as perhaps more than once is needed, may have to be delayed as the proposed November 2014 is approaching and all parties involved, especially the community people, are not well prepared.

Conclusions and Implications

When seeing the extensive national coverage of ELCs, especially in areas rich in natural resources, has led to the conclusion that significant impacts on small communities is inevitable. Along with these are powerful investors who are still involved in logging and land grabbing. Obviously, the three communities under study have been affected differently by ELC operations and individual investors, all which have impacts on the community forest areas and spirit forest as is the case of Kanat Thom village in Ratanakiri. Likewise, powerful people whether connected with ELC company or not have moved in to settle in the areas belonging to Ochra village.

Even though community people, in Ochra and Pukong, have been working hard to respond to the challenges of illegal logging and the cutting down of resin trees, it has been plagued by short term impacts or referred to above as *veik jork* effect. This means that it is considered to be short term because their engagement has been local while the wider movement of illegal logging activities and land conflict occurred throughout Cambodia still continue. They have been constrained in their effort when they call for support from government agencies with little or ineffective responses. Moreover, when they took action to arrest loggers and equipment, it is the authority who released the seized equipment and loggers. This demoralizes the effort of the community people and their leaders.

However, the community in Ochra has taken a strong stance against land encroachment by outsiders who have cleared communally titled areas. Because of their strong legal backing for their land they enforced their communal title. They have been able to identify influential people to support them and negotiate with outsiders and let informal settlers to go out of the areas. In contrast, in Kanat Thom where the pressure on the communities from rubber companies surrounding their communities has been too strong and the community's acceptance of private land titles have led to

a situation that that they have to live with what is left for them. However, the community became enthusiastic when they established links to national level and international level that has brought their issue to public attention. As a result, the government has ordered ELC companies to suspend their operations nationwide. However, the challenge for the community people is their limited capacity and exposure to national and international level forums or platform for negotiation to demand for appropriate solution to the land encroachment.

On the basis of the above efforts in the three communities, there appear to have four major issues that have constrained community effort to a large extent. First is that current boundary demarcation at commune level and conflicting land claims occur even between the community people themselves. Rabe (2013) has shown that there is a need to prioritize mapping of indigenous communities so that the outer boundaries of indigenous villages are clear and can be used as evidence in land use conflicts.

Second is the lack of any tripartite (community, government and companies) dialogue taking place where stakeholders discuss freely and seek appropriate solutions for providing mutual benefit. One significant exception has been the recently organized government district forum that begins to provide a good platform for people to voice their concern. The community representatives have observed some changes that government agents are more cooperative in responding community issues. However, it remains unclear how or even if this forum will continue to serve the benefit of the community. While conflict may continue to persist without some kind of free and open facilitated processes which multi-stakeholders come together to share information, discuss issues, make joint decision, and joint planning, a promising avenue is expected that the negotiations with unbiased moderation between parties in conflict is more likely to occur in 2015.

Third community people lack detailed information regarding ELCs which make it difficult for them to confidently have dialogues with companies as well as seek support from local authorities. Therefore, as Middleton and Hak (2005) have pointed out all information regarding the planning and operation of the ELC should be made available to the public including clear detailed maps of the projected concession boundaries.

Fourth two of the three study communities as well as more than forty others are still in the process of communal land titling (CLT) program. As CLTs can help preserve the land, livelihood, culture, and identity of indigenous people and indigenous people are endowed with this right under national laws, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) should prioritize the formalized distribution of CLTs to indigenous peoples. So, the Government should develop a clear and rigorous plan with hard deadlines to speed up CLT processes, especially for the forty-nine villages in Cambodia that have received recognition as Legal Entities by the Ministry of Interior and are waiting for their communal titles.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Data Collection Methods and Community Action Plan Implementation

Particulars	2012						2013					
	Jan-Feb	Mar-Apr	May-Jun	Jul-Aug	Sep-Oct	Nov-Dec	Jan-Feb	Mar-Apr	May-Jun	Jul-Aug	Sep-Oct	Nov-Dec
Ratanakiri province, Kanat Thom village												
Pre-visit							✓					
PAR* training								✓				
Village meeting and action plan								✓				
Implementation								✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Community reflection										✓		✓
Household survey												
Key informant interviews												
FGD** for cash values												
PRA*** methods												
Land measurement data							✓					
Validation workshop												
Mondulkiri province, Ochra and Pukong villages												
Pre-visit									✓			
PAR training										✓		
Village meeting and action plan										✓		
Implementation										✓	✓	✓
Community reflection											✓	✓
Household survey	✓	✓	✓									
Key informant interviews	✓	✓	✓									
FGD for cash values		✓										
PRA methods	✓	✓										
Validation workshop									✓			

* PAR = participatory action research

** FGD = Focus Group Discussion

*** PRA = participatory rural appraisal

Appendix 2: List of Large-Scale ELCs in Mondulakiri Province

No.	Company Name	Crop	Size (Ha)	Location	Status
1	MUHIBBAH MASTERON CAMBODIA JV co.,Ltd	Jatropha	7,800	Keo Seima	Active
2	Agro-Forestry Research	Rubber	7,000	Keo Seima	N/A
3	Sienglong Greenland Investment	Rubber	7,000	Keo Seima	N/A
4	Land Developing	Rubber	7,000	Keo Seima	N/A
5	Rithy Kiri Seima**	Rubber	5,000	Keo Seima	Not active
6	Mondol Agri-Resource Co.,Ltd	Rubber	9,100	Koh Nhek	Not active
7	UniGreen Resource Co.,Ltd	Rubber	8,000	Koh Nhek	Active
8	Kovy Phama	Rubber	5,345	Pichreada	Active
9	DakLak	Rubber	5,108	Pichreada	Active
10	Seithey Kola**	Rubber	4,273	Pichreada	Active
11	D.C.T	Rubber	4,000	Pichreada	Active
12	Heng Heang Siv Chanthou	Rubber	4,000	Pichreada	Not active
13	Varanasy (Khouv Jili)	Rubber	2,705	Pichreada	Active
14	WUZHISHAN	Pine Tree	10,000	Sen Monorom and Oraing	Active
15	Huo Ling	Pine Tree	8,400	Sen Monorom and Oraing	Active
	Total		94,731		

Source: Provincial authorities in Mondulakiri province (as of 12 July 2010) cited in Ngo and Chan (2012)

Participation of All Stakeholders of the Elephant Tourism Industry in Northern Thailand

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Abstract

The elephants were used in the tourism industry because they are intelligent enough to perform various forms of entertainment, as a tourist attraction. Elephants in the tourism industry work in elephant camps which are located in the popular tourist provinces such as Chiang Mai, Phuket, Chonburi, Kanchanaburi, etc. These intellectual beasts can perform many acts such as playing soccer, drawing, and painting on canvas while holding a paintbrush with their trunk. Other elephant shows show off their skills by dragging logs, while other elephants are used as taxis for tourists. Tourists are given a view of the town by riding on their back and all the way to the hotel. Elephants that are a part of the eco-tourism or conservation scheme are focused on giving tourists a nature education. There are 4,313 elephants living in Thailand (2013). 1,241 elephants live in upper northern part of Thailand. 558 of them live in 38 tourist camps around the Chiang Mai province. Their economic contribution has created 97,155 Thai baht (\$US3,238.5) per month, or 1.16 million Thai baht (\$US38,777.5) per year. The market price of each elephant is between 1-2 million Thai baht.

There are six stakeholders in the elephant business. They can be classified into categories: (1) those who are concerned about the animals including mahouts (elephant handlers), or veterinarians (2) those related to business management, including firms and related entrepreneurship with respect to the production and management of elephant owners, managers, administrative staffs, and crews in the camp. (3) Other groups that gain benefit are the tour guides, travelling agencies and tour operator agents, hotels, hotel shuttle and van drivers. (4) Local communities, including retail businesses in the community that are nearby the elephant camp. (5) Government agencies such as elephant hospitals, the Department of Livestock, the Department of National Parks and private entities such as foundations, universities, etc.

The main activities in the elephant tourism are: (1) elephant shows, such as drawing on canvases and T-shirts, playing soccer, playing music, demonstration forced to follow orders elephant mahout. There is also an elephant ride through the river and nature activities. This has also led to the elephant dung being converted to paper products as souvenirs to tourists. Some camps transform it into fertilizer, planted soil, and biogas. There is an elephant bathing demonstration and watching the

relationship between the mahout and their elephant. Each elephant has its own mahout. Most of them are hill-tribe people who are able to communicate with elephants in the show. Both English and Chinese languages are used to describe the activities of elephant show by the camp staff. The other activities by the elephants that add to business revenue include: 1) a wheeled cart, (2) restaurants, (3) selling related and local products to tourists such as photo frames made from elephant dung paper, tourist photos taken with elephant and (4) bamboo rafting.

The common health problems with elephants in captivity are usually derived from several factors. The first factor involves the improper handling by a non-professional mahout or an amateur mahout. These mahouts lack of proper understanding when compared to a professional mahout with special emphasis on their care and compassion given to their elephants; and the non-professional mahouts' lack of skills on how to restrain the elephants is another huge difference. The second factor is that the general health risk from routine work may lead to open wounds or sores. On some occasions, the improper use of a restraint hook to control the elephant during work can also generate wounds. The third factor relates to the inappropriate state of the elephant's workplace and elephant housing condition. The last factor contributing to health problems in in-captivity elephants is inappropriateness camp management.

Although elephant-related tourism business has been around for a long time, it never had the proper provisions or guidelines regarding the use of elephants. This made several non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), Born Free Foundation (BFF), and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) raise the issue of elephants' welfare in Thailand. They proposed that all inhumane and non-welfare activities on captive elephants be eliminated and eradicated.

The problems arising today are of the following: (1) the different demand of tourists, (2) supply-side problems, including the issue of the decline of tourism and infrastructure problems; (3) an understanding of the role of the tourists who want a friendly environment for elephants; (4) elephant camp businesses play a crucial role in structuring the population, including the conservation of elephants, and in determining the market value of elephant. These issues have a direct impact on capturing wild elephants, exporting elephants abroad and locating stray elephants; (5) price competition among the firm in elephant tourism business, problem areas for elephants, less space to grow elephant food crops and increasing costs of food for the elephants; and (6) lack of standard services of the business elephant affecting market development. . Therefore, finding ways to achieve development (a) setting the agency to responsible for cognition and academic information in terms of elephant welfare as well as to educate the personnel involved with tourism for both entrepreneur or mahouts guide to achieve communication and provide accurate information to tourists (b) create concrete health and a standard welfare policy for elephants as the means for a future sustainable environment.

Keywords: Asian Elephant, Elephant Tourism Industry, Northern Thailand, stakeholder

Introduction

The captive and wild populations of Asian elephants in Thailand are almost geographically isolated from each other entirely. The captive population, comprising approximately 60% of the total population, is found mainly in the North and Northeast part of the country where the isolated wild populations, numbering a total of 1,000-1,500 individuals (Lair 1997; Lohanan, 2002), are distributed primarily in the Central and Western regions, most of which are in protected areas (Pimmanrojngool & Wanghongsa 2002).

Today, Asian elephants occur in isolated populations in 13 countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. Recent reports from across the 13 Asian elephant range States suggested that there are between 39,500 and 43,500 wild Asian elephants. In addition, there are approximately 13,000 domesticated (working or former working) elephants in Asia. It is quite certain that over 50 percent of the remaining wild Asian elephants live in India (Pravettoni, 2011).

This paper aims to investigate the participation of all stakeholders in the elephant camps of northern Thailand, mainly in the Chiang Mai province. This work gathered secondary data from most of the literature and conducted in-depth interviews with some stakeholders in the elephant camps located in Chiang Mai. This paper addresses the following research questions: 1) To analyze the market of elephant camp from both demand and supply sides 2) To investigate the participation of each stakeholders in the elephant camp in northern Thailand. 3) What are the problems and improvements of both elephant welfare and tourism industry in the northern part of Thailand?

Status of the Asian Elephant in Thailand

Thailand possesses an estimated 3,000-3,500 wild elephants, most of which live in protected areas within 68 forest conservations, 38 national parks, and 30 wildlife sanctuaries. The total range area inhabited by wild elephants is around 52,000 square kilometers or 30 percent of the area of forest conservation in Thailand. The captive elephant, which numbered around 3,295 elephants in 2013, declined significantly from 100,000 elephants in 1883. In 2013, there were 1,421 elephants that had been distributed in Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Son, Lampang, Phrae, Nan, Phayao, Sukhothai and Tak provinces (National Institute of Elephant Research and Health, Department of Livestock Development; DLD). However, according to the statistics from the Elephant Institution of Thailand (2013), Chiang Mai has 558 elephants that have been distributed to 38 elephant camps around the province, especially 330 elephants in the Mae Taeng district alone.




Figure 1: The Asian Elephant Population Estimation and Distribution

Source: Pravettoni (2011)

However, contrary to most other countries, Thailand holds a higher number of captive elephants than wild. The former comprises of approximately 60% in total population. The number of wild and captive elephants in Thailand falls under different legislations. The wild population essentially comes under the 1992 Wildlife Protection Act which grants it a certain level of protection from any form of anthropocentric use. As for the captive population it has come under an outdated 1939 Draught Animal Act, which classified these beasts as working livestock, similar to cattle, buffaloes and oxen. Internationally, the Asian Elephant is classified as “Endangered” on the IUCN Red List (1994) and is thus protected under the CITES Act, restricting and monitoring international trade (Goldfrey, 2009).

Types of Asian elephants in Thailand are divided into two groups: wild and captive elephants. In the past, captive elephants were divided into three, namely: (1) Northeastern elephant which will be kept in use. But some of them could be commanded for corralling wild elephants from Laos or Cambodia to train. The unattractive elephant could be sold to the logging industry in the northern Thailand. (2) Northern elephants are assigned to a particular task logging task in primary forest (Figure 1). Some elephants in the north were not captured from the wild, but instead were bought from the eastern and Karen village along the Thai-Myanmar border. (3) The Karen elephant would be kept for logging and used as station wagon. Karen elephants are captured from the wild with a small corral or snare by the Karen people. These elephants are usually sold to an owner or mahout in northern Thailand (Pensak et al., 2003).

From Logging Industry to Tourism Industry

Thai elephants were used in teak logging, but after a 1989a ban on logging, there were mainly incentives to transfer these elephants from the logging industry to the tourism industry. During this period, there were many important issues such as: (1) The 1989 Logging Ban practically reduced 70% of work overnight for captive elephants in Thailand (Laknavichian, 2001; Tippraset, 2002). (2) Dramatic reduction in legal employment for working elephants and the mahouts. For the mahouts, their elephant is a source of income. In addition, the mahouts have to provide food in the amount of 120 -200 kg per day for these animals in order that they can carry on with their health. Thus they have to look for alternative employment (Duffy & More, 2010; Kontogeogopoulos, 2009). (3) The current lack of employment for the remaining captive elephants is considered to be one of the major problems for the conservation of elephants in Thailand (Ratanakorn, 2002; Lohanan, 2002; Lair, 2002). The logging industry provided employment for a significant number of elephants, especially in the Northern provinces. In conclusion, elephants had to face a career change in the business throughout the country such as tourism, logging both legal and illegal, homelessness, etc. Presently, captive elephants in Thailand are divided into 6 groups: (1) legal logging (2) tourism business (3) sideshow (4) street wandering (begging) (5) hotels and resorts, and (6) the zoo.



Figure 2: The Elephant was Used in Logging Business Before 1989

Elephant in Tourism Industry

Chiang Mai (old name, Lanna before King Rama V) played an economic role in Northern Thailand, and at that time, this city was not subjected to rule by the central government. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the British timber firms, notably the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation and the Borneo Company Limited, entered into the teak trade in the late 1880s and early 1890s.⁸ Due to the northern area (Lanna) being adjacent to the colonies of England, the 1855 treaty bearings allowed the British firms to trade with Thailand. The logging companies introduced new techniques

⁸http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deforestation_in_Thailand

by using elephants as a labor force. The amount of wood brought in the elephants was more than ever. Thus, it had increased the demand for logging elephants.

The elephants in Chiang Mai also played a key role by serving as transportation for King Rama VII and the Queen of Siam, who visited Chiang Mai in 1926. Hundreds of elephants were brought from the timber company, the ruler of Chiang Mai and Lamphun to be used as The King's and Royalties' transportation paraded from the railway station to the city. This later became a traditional way of accommodating the elite of Thai society in Chiang Mai. Later on it was transformed into a concept for tourism where one can enjoy sightseeing around the town or the forest by taking a ride on the elephant's back.

New patterns of utilizing elephants involved in tourism activities, especially in northern Thailand started in 1977 due to foreign demand. This led to riding elephants along with hiking, rafting, and staying in an ethnic tribe village. In the early stages of the venture's rainfall patterns, the nature of the elephant was just over one mile in hiking. But later, elephant-related tourism have been improved in attracting and answering the needs of tourists. The elephants generated huge revenues for the Chiang Mai tourism industry. This can be seen from more than 38 elephant camps (March, 2013) in Chiang Mai, which is approximately more than 1 in 6 of the whole elephant population in the country. Thus, the economic value associated with the elephant has rapidly increased since demand for the use of elephants in the tourism business. Captive Elephants reconfigured and mobilized the historical practice as a labor force in the logging industry to attract international tourists (Duffy & Moore, 2010). Not only were they admired for their ingenuity but also for their good memory, elephant were trained to do various postures, which attracted the attention of tourists. They were brought into tourism from working within an attraction known as the "elephant camps" which are mostly found in the provinces with international tourist destinations like Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Lampang, Mae Hong Son, Kanchanaburi, Pattaya, Chonburi, Surat Thane, Trang, Krabi, and Phuket. Elephants that are used in the tourism industry are divided into these categories: 1) a variety of elephant skills such as playing football, drawing and painting pictures on canvas by using trunk to hold a paintbrush, showing dragging logs or timber with turkey lifting strength as a model to show the two elephants to tourists for a ride on an elephant. 2) elephant riding by sitting on the seat on elephant's back, also known as, elephant taxi to the hotel, and overlooking the attractions, 3) elephants that can work both as an elephant show and elephant taxi. 4) The ecotourism or conservation with a focus on giving knowledge of the natural environment and the conservation of the environment with elephants.

Market of Captive Elephant in Tourism Industry

From the interviews⁹, the market price of each elephant is not the same. It depends on the satisfaction of the buyer and seller. Approximately, elephant's price varied as followed: (1) a calf is worth 1.2 million Thai baht; (2) a young female is worth 1.4 -1.5 million Thai baht; and an elephant with tusks is worth more than 2 -2.4 million Thai baht. Moreover, elephants which have long tusks are worth 2 million Thai baht. All payments are made in cash.

⁹ To preserve the confidentiality of information provided by informants, quotations used throughout this paper are not attributed by name to specify individuals.

Table 1: The Prices of Elephants in the Different Age Intervals Both in Male and Female

Elephant Ages	Male	Female
8- 20 yearsold	800,000 - 1,000,000 (\$25,806.45 -\$32,258.06)	1,200,000 - 1,400,000 (\$38,789.68 -\$45,161.29)
20-30 years old	1,000,000 (\$32,258.06)	800,000 - 1,200,000 (\$25,806.45 -\$38,789.68)
>30 years old	500,000-1,200,000 (\$16,129.23 -\$38,789.68)	500,000-900,000 (\$16,129.23-\$29,032.26)

Note: Exchange Rate 31 baht: \$US1; *Source: From Interviews*



Figure 3: If the elephant is travelling by truck, a stall is built for it. (That stall can easily be dismantled and used again for the same type of truck: ten-wheel, six-wheel, etc.)



Figure 4: If the elephant has to travel far (more than one day), the mahout should know the specific places to buy or find food and water.



Figure 5: When transportation involves a vehicle, the mahout should know whether the elephant is familiar with climbing on and getting off the truck.



Figure 6: If the elephant was transported by motor vehicle, the mahout or manager must be satisfied as to the size and the condition of the vehicle, in order to assure a safe and punctual arrival.

Elephant Camp in Northern Thailand

We can divide elephant camps into small or large size depending on number of elephants, the size of the camp grounds, and financial success. Each camp also represents the different types of stakeholders who are involved in the camp as well. The details are briefly described as follows. The number of elephants in a small-sized-camp is 3-15 elephants, a medium-sized camp has 15-30, a large-sized camp has over 30 animals. The largest camp contains up to 90 elephants. In the tourism camp, the elephants are divided into 4 statuses: (1) all belong to the camp and same owner (2) some belongs to the camp, and some are hired. (3) All elephants and mahouts are hired. (4) Gathering the elephants from local owners and Karen to form a camp. These systems cause the numbers of elephant of each camp are not stable. During the high tourism season, the numbers increased significantly, or during the traditional season of the mahout's hometown, they move back with their elephants, which cause the numbers to decrease.

The elephant in the tourism camps perform 2 kinds of activities: (1) a major activity such as interaction with tourist, entertainment demonstration of obedience, skills, and intelligence (Kontogeogopoulos, 2009). An example of activities are tourist feeding elephants bananas or sugar cane, elephants painting, playing musical instruments, kick soccer ball, dunking basketball into hoops, show (circus), logging demonstration. Moreover, some elephant activities come from a mahout's commands that order the elephant to follow; (2) Minor activities which also generate income from tourists are restaurants, coffee shops, souvenirs, accommodation, i.e., hotel, home stay.

The other type of elephant camp is called an eco-friendly elephant camp. Some examples of an eco-friendly elephant camp are "Thai Elephant Home", "Baan Chang Elephant Park", and Patara Elephant Farm¹⁰. These camps offer a chance for tourists to learn the elephant's way of life. Not only does a tourist get a chance to ride an elephant, but also spend some quality time with it in the natural environment. The activities for tourist for one-day owning an elephant are learning how to ride and commanding the elephants like a professional mahout, taking a bath and playing in the mud with them, learning the quirks and behaviours of the elephant, and staying in the camp which is well provided with good accommodation. For the volunteers program, learning to help with the reforestation project or elephant rescue, help young university students to continue their education. This is the example of elephant camps in northern Thailand which focus on volunteer activities or mahout with tourist who love nature and love elephants. It is a form of activity for co-existing with elephants naturally.

Large elephant camps or standard camps have good management with a great environment, good pollution management, and a resident veterinarian. But most of elephant camps in Chiang Mai are under the supervision of many organizations, especially elephant mobile clinic of National Institution of Thailand, Forest Industry Organization (FIO), National Institute of Elephant Research and Health, DLD, and academic service of universities such as Chiang Mai, Kasetsart and Mahidol University.

Price Rate in Elephant Camp

The price rate of elephant riding ranges from 200-500 Thai baht (\$6 - \$16) per hour per person for one elephant. Also the price ranges from 600-1,000 baht (\$19 - \$32) per hour for a package consisting

¹⁰ www.thaielephanthome.com, www.baanchangelephantpark.com, and www.pataraelephantfarm.com

of elephant trekking/oxcart ride and bamboo rafting in that camp. Main sales revenue comes from advance booking (70%) and walk-in tourist. Price ranges are 800 Thai baht (\$25) person for walk-in tourist and lump sum price is 1,500 Thai baht (\$48) per person. Other activities are listed with the following prices: 1) oxcart riding charge 50 Thai baht (\$1.6) per person using travel agency and 100 - 150 Thai baht (\$3 - \$4) for walk-in tourists. 2) The bamboo rafting price is 150 Thai baht per person. 3) The elephant riding price is 250 Thai baht (\$8) each, and finally for watching buffalo skill in agriculture is 80 Thai baht (\$2.5) each. 4) Food price is 100 Thai baht (\$3) per meal for travel agency and 150 Thai baht (\$4) for general touring.

Mahout

Most of the mahouts are half Karen/half local people from around the camp. The mahout salary is between 3,500-4,500 Thai baht (\$112 - \$145) in small camps, and 10,000 -20,000 Thai baht (\$322.5- \$645) in bigger camps. Most of them are provided with free rice and shelter by the camp. In the certified government camps, 40 local mahouts receive rice and boarding. Most mahouts have appropriate working hours (the elephant shows are only in the morning time) certified camps or Karen owner's camps, owners, and mahouts have to feed and work with their own elephants. Some camps are in cooperation between local owners and the Karen. There is no single owner, but it is managed by the local elephant owners. They share the benefits according to the number of hours worked. Normally, job description of an elephant camp could be characterized into management, information, structure, and community participation.

Stakeholders with Captive Elephant in Tourism Industry

The study was conducted by interviewing. The collected data has been divided as followed (Figure 7):

1. Those concerned with the animals including mahout and veterinarian.
2. Camp management or business, including production and management units, including elephant owner, camp administrative, and assistant manager.
3. Related work elements in elephant camp generally consists of:
 - Photography (photographer made pictures with sales package)
 - The rafter (staff who manage bamboo raft)
 - Souvenirs shop (store owners, salesman, gift manufacturers)
 - Food court (chef, people working in the kitchen, and wholesale food ingredients)
 - Foreign volunteers
 - Hotel and accommodations
 - Elephant insurance company
 - Elephant food (agriculturist, car driver, worker and pellet food factory)
4. Related business outside the elephant camp
 - Tour guide
 - Travelling agency
 - Accommodation agency
 - Shuttle bus business and van driver
 - Car and bike renting shop
5. Community

- Retail businesses such as shops, restaurants, handmade souvenir around elephant camp
 - Local people who works in elephant camps
6. Government Officials
- National Elephant Institution of Thailand, Department of Livestock Development, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperate
 - Department of National Parks and Plant Conservation, Ministry Natural Resources and Environment
 - Department of Provincial administration, Ministry of Interior
 - Private entities such as foundations, universities, zoological organization, etc.




Figure 7: Elephant Camp Management

Conclusion

The studies found that the participation of each stakeholder involved with the elephants in the tourism industry in northern Thailand were the following:

- Elephant camp owners (or firms) are crucial to the structure of elephant populations, including the conservation of elephants, and determination of the price of individual elephants. This has a direct impact on threats to capture wild elephants, and sending them abroad, and street wandering (begging) elephants.
- High competition of elephant camps lead into lower prices. Space areas for elephants and space to grow food crops for elephants, and high costs are associated with taking care of the elephants. These problems directly affect the lives and health of elephants.
- Doing sustainable business in the elephant camps requires all stake holdersto create a positive camp: elephant owners, mahouts, tourism officials, tour guides, tourists, veterinary medicine, animal rights activists, people of local surrounding communities, government

agencies, etc. This awareness should be based on loving the elephants, attending to their well-being and reproduction efforts.

- Nowadays the popularity of tourists, especially foreigners, demand to take part in learning about the culture, traditions and ways of life of a mahout, and folk wisdom is becoming highly associated with the elephants. The Elephant camp owner should be adaptable to recognizing the importance of the elephant, as well as having a quality of service knowledge with the personnel. More important is the collaboration between organizations, both public and private, including small, medium, and large elephant camps to achieve business sustainability and to uphold the well-being of elephants in the future.
- For legal-related activities, the government should be more specific about a central organization or department to provide a better understanding and accurate technical information. In terms of the elephant welfare, there should be a focus on the appropriate working, housing, and restraining the elephants as well as educating and communicating to the personnel involved with tourism, such as entrepreneurs, mahouts, and tour guides to achieve understanding and to provide accurate information to tourists or camp visitors.
- Thai government agency who is responsible for setting up the elephant standards and management, and also plays an important role to persuade all participants to handle the elephants ethically and sustainably which falls in line with most of the works about captive elephant of Thailand such as Lohahan (2002), Lair (1997), and Kontogorogopoulou (2009).
- There are many NGOs involved with the elephant camps to make proper suggestion that are diversified in many aspects.

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Internal Migrants and Malaria: From Deficient Public Health Delivery to Costly Private Providers

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Introduction

This presentation deals with migration and malaria in Cambodia. It is an updated analysis of an executive master obtained from Geneva in December 2013 (Pen, 2014). The chosen topic is of vast concern (Prothero, 1965), but so far, besides endless discussions at the highest level and slow debates within international agencies, it has been neglected by policymakers in terms of public health interventions.

Some studies have focused on health practices in general either in an historical (Guillou, 2009), anthropological (Ovesen, 2011; Crochet, 2008), political (Grundy, 2009) or a socio-economic perspective (Jacob, 2006; Lanjouw, 1999), but the crucial aspect of the circulation of the people has rarely been examined in the health context. In contrast, the role of the private health sector is becoming more and more visible with regard to migration patterns. Consequently, in order to analyze the public/private health activities' consequences on these increasing migration dynamics, I am going to focus on the local health responses to mobile populations and migrants in a remote malaria endemic area in north-east Cambodia, where I did my fieldwork in 2013.

For many centuries, malaria has remained a significant public health burden, especially in Africa and to some extent in Southeast Asia. In Cambodia, the national malaria response program was launched by the Ministry of Health in 1951, as supported by the World Health Organization (WHO) and other international development partners. This vertical program was recast in 1990 when the political situation became more stable after the civil war. Efforts have been strengthened since the late 2000s, with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) goal number 6 being to combat the incidence of malaria and to enhance the capacity of the National Malaria Center (CNM) under technical and financial support, including the Global Fund (GF).

Recently, malaria prevalence has declined, from 4.2% in 2004 to 2.9% in 2007, but the number of malaria-related deaths increased by around 34% in 2009 when compared with the previous year. Migration is seen as one factor contributing to this increase. In 2012, CNM estimated that up to three million people were at risk of malaria, in particular migrants and the mobile population (CNM, 2013).

Cambodia nowadays has a highly mobile population; 35% of the total population had migrated internally by 2004 (IOM, 2006) and probably many more since. Many poor people are migrating because of poverty, landlessness, lack of income-generating activities, high population density, and

natural disasters (Bourdier, 2010). Some families are migrating from areas with low or no malaria transmission to areas with a higher incidence, which increases their risk of acquiring malaria; more than local inhabitants. This increase in risk is significant because the migrants have very little biological immunity to the parasite (Shah, 2008), and have, as we will see below, limited access to public healthcare services. Migrants face difficulties in reaching public health facilities because of marginalization, remote working living conditions, cultural influences (ethnic and religious differentiation) and poor quality services.

Consequently, migrants frequently adopt self-medication practices without seeking proper diagnosis and treatment from qualified professional health workers, making them prone to being worse off than they were, particularly in places where there is limited access to proper healthcare services.

Presentation and Rationale of the Study

Sofar, studies dealing with in-migrations have been poorly documented in Cambodia, especially in Monduliri, a province that has one of the highest incidences of malaria (2.7% in 2010) in the northeastern region. In order to design intervention strategies that better address the needs of migrants, it has become of great importance to have a clear understanding of the experiences and challenges that migrants face concerning their attitude with health.

The circulation of people from rural to rural areas is increasing in Cambodia. Whatever the motivating reasons, these displacements are nowadays facilitated by transport facilities and a relative security that was difficult to imagine fifteen years ago, mostly because absence of good roads, limited security and political instability. Also, competition for land is escalating and the remaining available places for those who intend to settle are located in remote forest areas where malaria is endemic and where access to health services (mostly public) is most of the time extremely limited. Seasonal migrants involved in repeated spatial displacements to generate an income by working in the forests, in nearby plantations or on cash crop farms, do face the same constraints. As a result, they frequently remain isolated at the place of destination and have poor interactions with native communities and local structures, including health services, whenever the latter exist. On the other side, private health providers are flourishing, because there is an unfulfilled demand, and they take the opportunity to act as substitutes for the public health system.

The study took place in a 5000 strong commune in Monduliri province, and aims to describe the motivations and challenges faced by migrants in accessing malaria-related healthcare services. It also aims to identify the strengths and challenges faced by the public health sector in a context where privatization of the health sector is escalating. The present work focuses on a remote malaria-endemic area, Busra commune, which borders Vietnam (in the northeast of the country). This huge territory was originally solely inhabited by ethnic Bunong people. Nowadays, Khmers from the valleys are coming. A few of them have already managed to find a plot of land; some do have the intention to settle, while others are principally attracted to work for a limited time in rubber plantations and in small cassava farms. As it happens, elsewhere in the province, and to some extent in most of the rural areas in the country, in-migrants are informed neither about their ability to access existing public health services, nor how to getting in touch with these services. What should be a right turns out to be a privilege, or the exception to the rule, particular as many of the migrants

are perceived as undesirable (as we shall see later).

Besides, various health interventions decided at the national level are not locally implemented in the very places where new migrant populations are living. There is access to local health services, sometimes with a reasonable quality of care provided, but at a high cost through an expanding private sector, frequently managed by public health civil servants. This *laissez-faire* situation is highly paradoxical at a moment when both the National Program against Malaria and international donor agencies have been insisting for years on the urgent need to concentrate their efforts on mobile populations (Bourdier, 2010), because of the close association between migration and malaria.

Migration Patterns

I schematically define the migrants into two-type: long-term and short-term migrants. The long-term migrants refer to the Khmer Buddhists and Cham Muslims who come with skills in agri-business and production from lowland provinces. The Khmer arrived in larger numbers from 2005 to 2008, seeking agrarian land and for employment. They produce cash crops (cassava, pepper and rubber) which are mostly exported to Vietnam. They also run small or large grocery shops, food stores, pharmacies and transportation services. This multi-business engagement has transformed their livelihood from land leasers or small plot owners, to large-scale farmland holders. However, the proportion of this group is small in comparison with the number introduced by the rubber European Socfin Company. In 2009, this company employed 1,633 people, of which 60% was from the lowland provinces.

The Cham group, consisting of more than 100 families, came to settle in late 2008 on a Social Land Concession (SLC) located in a forested area, 30 kilometers from the commune town, after the Socfin compound and just before the Vietnam border. The concession has led to confrontation between the ethnic Bunong community and the Cham, who are the main beneficiaries of the SLC. The former accused the latter of grabbing their collective community land, which has been utilized by their ancestors for generations.

Short-term migrants are seasonal workers who come in groups of 10 to 15 from the same or nearby villages in the plains. They arrive once they have finished rice transplanting and harvesting at home. Those who come for cassava planting arrive between April and May, and for harvesting stay from November to February. Their working duration can last from two-weeks to up to three months. The common challenge faced by these migrants is their legitimacy. The majority of migrants do not have proper residence documents, and this creates further marginalization and social discrimination. This lack of integration has some influence on their health-seeking behaviors, especially their access to the public health facilities, including the village malaria workers (VMWs).

Migrants and Malaria: Knowledge, Attitudes and Experience of Malaria

In order to establish migrants' level of access to health services for malaria, it is necessary to find out their understanding and experiences of the disease. I will now discuss three major points: 1) migrants' knowledge of malaria, 2) past and present experiences of malaria infection, and 3) health-seeking behaviors at the place of destination.

The first aspect deals with perceptions of people. Among the migrants, a double terminology is utilized when referring to malaria: *krun-changh* and *changh*. The word *krun* in Khmer means 'high fever' and *changh* means 'to lose' or 'to be defeated'.

People pointed out to me that cold, fever, shivering and headaches are the common symptoms of malaria infection. However, other unrelated symptoms such as dizziness, exhaustion, loss of appetite and body pains were mentioned to a lesser extent. They acknowledged the infection based on these symptoms rarely confirmed by a physician, with a rapid test or a microscopic investigation. The dilemma, according to them, is that these symptoms are quite similar to those of typhoid and typhus infections. But the distinction between these categories of disease is essentially based on the absence of shivering, which means the migrants presume they may have typhoid and not malaria.

There is not a single answer regarding the causes of malaria infection. Bunong traditional healers propose the use of a variety of plants against malaria (Nomad RSI, 2011). Migrants are in touch with the Bunong traditional healers, and have many plausible explanations the origins of the disease. A mosquito bite is associated with unhygienic, environmental practices. Nonetheless, some of the migrants who work in the forest claim, based on supposedly practical experiences in this physical environment, that drinking un-boiled water collected from a ditch may also be a reason for contracting the infection. An addition, some migrants are convinced that spatial displacement, by moving from place-to-place, may cause a malaria infection.

Moreover people, especially when they are newcomers, have a tendency to connect the forest spirit with a powerful energy that can hamper their health, mostly through malaria. This argument can be found in an idiom that goes '*changh-teuk-dey*'. *Teuk-dey*, means 'water and soil' and *changh* means 'lost' or 'evaporated', but another indirect expression is *maschas-teuk-machas-dey* or 'forest spirit'. Linguistically, having a malaria infection signifies that the body cannot adapt to a new environmental setting, or cannot overcome the lord of the earth or the local spirit (*maschas-teuk-machas-dey*) watching over the forests.

Those who have or have not experienced malaria have similar answers; that sleeping under mosquito-nets, drinking boiled water, using mosquito coils, wearing clothes that cover the body, making bonfires at night, and maintaining environmental hygiene, prevent malaria. Since the local health interventions miss out migrants, peers and neighbors are seen as provisional health counselors and mentors. The transmission of awareness can take place in this way, meaning that a person can influence others living in the same social environment for a long period. For instance, a male forest worker told me, "my wife packs me a mosquito net, but I rarely use it, because my colleagues do not use them, even if malaria is a known disease in an area".

Regarding the experiences of malaria infection, most migrants travel to places where malaria prevails, either highly endemic malaria areas (northern provinces), or other places where *P. falciparum* dominates, the only lethal species, causing severe malarial anemia and cerebral malaria.

Unsurprisingly more male migrants contract malaria than females due to their economic activities and social engagements in the evening (socializing, drinking and meeting). Frequently, male migrants are employed to work in thick forests and in rubber plantation as wage laborers, tractor drivers and

nurserymen. Their working places can be 50 to 70 kilometers from the main commune. Because many people migrate as part of a group or with their families, several can be infected with malaria at the same time. Some contract malaria even before they are able to make any savings. There have also been reported cases of infected migrants returning to their home province or migrating to another province and introducing new cross-infection cases, while others have died because they delayed treatment. Such movements from an area with existing drug resistance to another malaria endemic area like Mondulki have created an additional risk for the spread of resistance (see White, 2008).

There have been no official records and no formal reported cases of malaria-related deaths among migrants in Busra. Yet, some VMWs in the commune observed that the death rate was “high” in 2008 and 2010, without being in position to say what is meant by “high.” A VMW assumed that some seasonal migrants who collected non-timber forest products (NTFP) died on their way to the health center, or later when they arrived at the referral hospital in Sen Monorom district, which is an hour’s drive from the commune. Some malaria infected migrants prefer to have medical care in their homeland, as they have negative opinion (exaggerated or not) on the quality of local services and do not trust the health professionals’ commitment in “backwards” provinces like Mondulki, which are supposed to have poorer resources and fewer skills than those available at home. Such a reluctance to use local services, and to opt for returning home in order to be treated correctly, frequently delays treatment, with deadly consequences. It is not uncommon for migrants to pass-away before receiving proper treatment.

Migrants are rarely visited by the public health actors and local authorities at their work places. At best, they are occasionally given basic information by their employers about the risk of malaria infection. Interestingly, the cause of malaria infection as interpreted by the employers is frequently related to *changh teuk-dey* rather than mosquito bites. This misleading information causes the workers to be less careful about effective prevention, based on mosquito avoidance. This biased communication between public health services and private entrepreneurs (transformed for the occasion by private health informants) is illustrative of the malfunctioning intervention of the national malaria program with regard to migrants.

Health-seeking Behaviors

I will now say a few words regarding the health-seeking behaviors of migrants, with a particular emphasis on the constraints they face in terms of access malaria healthcare. I will show that the public health response is constantly creating additional constraints, which incites migrants to go to private clinics and to rely on self-medication practices, including traditional remedies - not those carefully administered by the Bunong traditional healers (Nomad RSI, 2011) - and cocktail medicines bought from private pharmacies.

In the commune under scrutiny, there is a single health center providing essential services such as medical consultations, vaccinations for children, maternal healthcare and free malaria treatment. In addition, the center has initiated a community voluntary-based approach, by forming village health support groups (VHSGs) and VMWs, for carrying out health promotion and education among the residents (CNM, 2010).

However, this grassroots strategy does not target at all migrants and mobile workers, especially in Busra. Therefore, there is a low fraction of users among the new comers, although the service is affordable for everybody (0.25 dollar for consultation, and 0.50 dollar for diagnosis). This low proportion of migrant and mobile population users is also associated with other factors like working conditions preventing them reaching the health center (HC) when open, the absence of policies in favor of in-migrants, and limited human rights implementation at the grassroots level (migrants are perceived as potential troublemakers).

Concerning working conditions, most migrants and seasonal workers are employed in the rubber company, from which it is very difficult to have time off (only after 5 p.m. and during weekends) when the HC is closed and there are no staff on stand-by except for baby deliveries. This is where the private sector and self-medication treatment become realistic alternatives.

The mushrooming of private pharmacies has appeared in the commune since 2007, when the rubber company arrived. These pharmacies are predominantly run by former HC pharmacists and health counselors from lowland areas and also by the current local HC workers. The private services frequently cost twice the public ones. However, the attendance of migrants is pretty high because of their strengths; they provide satisfactory and flexible services to clients 24 hours, and home visits on request. In addition, better stocks of medicines and testing equipment prevail, and credit (without interest) is available.

The public health sector has neglected these points, those which could create a better relationship with the laypersons. Due to this organizational deficiency, potential clients feel uncomfortable and do not believe the quality and adequacy of the public health services.

I also observed that public workers tend to quickly touch-base with the patients during medical examinations, in contrast to the private providers who cross-examine their patients and, subsequently, develop close physical relationships when it comes to the moment of examining them. As one female migrant worker remarked:

I just brought my daughter to *pet-ekka-chun* (private worker). He confirmed that she has pneumonia. I trusted what he said because he conducted a good examination with modern equipment and touched her everywhere. I did not find this with the health center.

Her impression, far from being anecdotal, reminds us that the use of modern technology is not always sufficient to attract clients. The important factor is that the clients feel reassured if the health provider is able to show them, at first, sympathy. But this should not be the reason to blame the HC staff. Conversely, perhaps, it is beyond the public officers' endeavors due to their low remuneration. The low salary is a major obstacle to being motivated and performing well. And what they do in their private consultation room is frequently what they assume they cannot do, whatever the reasons, in the public HC, which is perceived as anonymous and unfriendly.

Another appealing factor is that the private health providers are good at complying with clients' demands. Migrants are constantly in a hurry each time they visit the private clinics. As soon as they arrive, they immediately ask the *krou-pet* (seller) to compound some cocktail drugs, not always with

a diagnosis. The quantity of the compound is based on their economic status; and they mostly ask for one to two prescriptions. In five minutes, this cocktail is ready. Private providers are; therefore, associated with a prompt and effective service (Ovesen & Trankell, 2011).

The *pet-ek-kachun* (private worker) makes good contact with patients by not hesitating to compose such cocktails for the patients, even if it is for malaria treatment. Frequently they mix at least three different types of tablets which include multi-vitamins, anti-fever tablets and painkillers (something which is not possible at the HC which will give, justifiably, only a *paracetamol* capsule in the case of fever).

An additional constraint is the ethnic background of the health attendants at the HC. The migrants who have the initiative to visit the HC are frustrated when they discover that the majority of health workers are ethnic Bunong. This creates a certain defiance when trying to establish patient/care giver links, aggravated by the communication barrier. Nowadays most ethnic people speak Khmer, but they are not always fluent. The newcomers' idiom experience is different from the migrants, who have lived longer in the commune. The latter are quite familiar with the tone of the native inhabitants, but they still lack confidence and remain skeptical about the ability of the Bunong health workers. It is also generally perceived that the Bunong health staff has a lower education in comparison to the Khmers. In this respect, local people develop prejudices against the migrants and the migrants build unreasonable opinions on the native people.

Migrants at the Crossroads of Private Health Intervention

Let me now pay attention to private initiatives implemented at the local level such, as social marketing of artemisinin combination therapy (ACT) and mosquito-net distribution. The role of the pharmacist in self-care and self-medication has for long being depicted in both academic and regional literatures (De Savigny, 2004, Mc Combie, 2002, WHO, 1998, Kroeger, 1983) and I will not dwell on that point.

I will not mention either the village malaria workers, a voluntary-based initiative (CNM, 2010), which has already been analyzed in another SOREMA paper (Bourdier, 2013) and depicted in another context in Mondulkiri with the SOREMA program (Desplain, 2012). I will just add that migrants are remaining largely untargeted by local malaria volunteers, and also by other village health workers, since the mandate of the latter is to deal with reproductive health and saving activities.

Let us turn instead to two interventions: the social marketing of malaria drugs and the distribution of impregnated mosquito nets. For more than ten years, the potential role of the private sector in malaria intervention has been widely recognized, and has led to a nationwide program proposing ACT in the private places (Gelband, 2007, Yoeung, 2011). This policy implemented in Cambodia has been taken for granted, without taking into account the fact that careful studies have already shown the frequent correlation between out-of-pocket health expenditure and debt in poor households in Cambodia (Van Damme, 2004). Other risks related to this "wild" and uncontrolled drug marketing have also been evocated in another SOREMA study (Bourdier, 2014). The initial social marketing management project was handed over to the NGO PSI in 2003 (Yoeung, 2011). It was responsible for all aspects of the program, including procurement, packaging, sales, and distribution of RDTs and

ACT, promoting behavior change communication, and training of private providers on malaria diagnosis and treatment. Since the handover, PSI started distributing *Malarine* and *Malacheck* to private providers and retailers. They were supposed to distribute the drugs within the private, regulated bodies, but very frequently the same drugs became available in the unregulated private sector (non-registered pharmacies, groceries and petty shops etc.). In August 2013, a new malaria drug called “eurartesim” (also an ACT) was introduced to Busra. Malaria drugs are therefore available in many places in the private sector and migrants, being aware of this, prefer to use this resource.

On the other hand, and in contrast to what was expected at the international level with the promotion of drugs in the private sector (AMFm Task Force, 2007), the absence of appropriate mechanisms to monitor the quality performance of the private providers (private cabinets, pharmacy holders and retailers) and the drugs suppliers (either PSI or other NGOs), has led to additional problems in the public sector (see also Oxfam, 2012), as it receives, too late, patients referred from the private sector. This will also generate more confusion in the future, giving the view that stock-outs occur, not only in the public but also among the private providers, depending on whether PSI receives anti-malarial drugs. This issue became so extreme that private clinics in Busra have had to purchase ACT from civil servants working in the HC.

The poorly planned interaction between public and private health sectors has also had negative consequences on the mosquito-net policy in Cambodia. Mosquito-nets are considered a major preventive measure against the infection, even if a study related to mosquito impregnated jackets in the context of SOREMA program has shown its numerous limitations (Ham, Kong & Bourdier, 2013). Admitting the utility of the mosquito-net intervention, one of the challenges of preventing malaria is to assure the availability of properly treated mosquito nets (insecticide-treated nets: ITNs). Some forest workers in the commune frequently spend their nights in the deep forest without a mosquito-net, either because they pretend to be unable to afford it, or because they believe that malaria is not solely caused by mosquito bites. Since 1996, the ITNs have been part of the malaria control program and the WHO/GMP has recommended the purchase of long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs), because they are designed to maintain biological efficacy against vector mosquitoes for three years. The program intended to cover all people at risk from malaria. In 2009, the LLINs were imported and distributed to the private sector in Cambodia by PSI, in collaboration with health centers, yet the materials were not kept available in the health center where migrants had the possibility to get them when they wanted.

The main targets, as called by the local authorities, for the nets were mobile populations and forest workers. The nets were handed to people based on their length of stay; for example, the health actors distributed the nets to the migrants who settled in the commune for over one year. This meant that those working for rubber companies or for individual landlords, did not receive the nets, but they could occasionally borrow them from the landlords. In some other provinces, like Kratie, Family Health International (FHI) organizations distributed the LLINs to the employers, but such an intervention has not been carried out in a systematic way in Busra.

On the other hand, I observed that the long-term migrants who have been working for the rubber companies for more than three years, frequently complain that they have received a net only once.

Other migrants said that they could not get the nets because they did not attend the original meeting (allowing them to receive the material) organized by the health center or by the commune office. They could not attend this meeting because they had been working far away in the forest or in a distant farm. Furthermore, although others made the effort to attend the meeting, they left before receiving the insecticide-treated mosquito-nets because, according to them, the meeting had been taken up by many 'unnecessary speeches', which had nothing to do with health and, anyway, they had had to return to work. In other words, nothing was properly organized for the most vulnerable groups, such as migrants.

Conclusion

To conclude, I suggest that the social marketing of drugs, designed to lower the price of anti-malarial drugs within the private sector, and the supply of mosquito-nets supposed to cover most of the people at risk from malaria, does not entirely work for the benefit of migrants in the study commune. The program has not been adjusted to suit them, and we may wonder whether this is partly done deliberately, to not welcome the migrant population (See Pen, 2014). To date, the majority of them, especially those who work in the forest, have not received any LLINs, neither from the local health services nor from the private providers, and so far nobody has thought about dealing with this unbalanced distribution between local people and migrants.

Furthermore, the cost of malaria treatment in the private sector remains much higher than in the public sector, and the lack of quality control, which should be performed by the provincial health department, creates a bias which allows the private providers to take advantage of their patients by providing unnecessary medicines that can turn out to be harmful.

Added to this, the roles, limits and responsibilities of both public health staff and private providers should be simultaneously defined more clearly. For instance, the rampant absence of proper regulations allows private health actors to do what they want, sometimes to the detriment of the patients. The public sector cannot just wait and see: after a long period of lethargy, the Ministry of Health should take immediate actions in order to enhance the quality of public health services, to provide cost-effective intervention approaches which are more accessible to poor people, who constitute the majority of the mobile population moving between rural areas.

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In the Absence of their Fathers: The Impact of Father's Migration in Sri Lanka on Children Left Behind

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Abstract

Migration can be described as a strategy used by individuals to alleviate unemployment, under-employment and family poverty. Many people migrate in order to provide a better future for their family, especially their children. However, despite the economic benefits that migration provides, the psychological costs inflicted upon children are much larger and could possibly violate children's rights, as well as their childhood development, survival and education. However, the impact of mother's migration on children may be different from that of father's migration. According to studies, when fathers migrate that in contrast to the mother's migration, affects children in many positive ways. For one, it reduces the need for the family to depend on child labour. Furthermore, an increase in the general income results in an overall well-being of the children. Some studies have found that in the absence of men, families do well since women adjust to situation taking all the responsibility of household chores and children caring (Asis, 2004). Opponents of this view stress the importance of the father's role as a disciplinarian and figurehead, both of which are lost when fathers migrate.

This paper examines the impact of father's migration on the children left behind in Sri Lanka. The study was conducted in five migrant source communities in three districts. The majority of field data was gathered using anthropological data collection methods. The principal respondents of the study consisted of 150 children whose fathers were employed in Middle Eastern countries as unskilled or semi-skilled workers at the time of study. 75 of the 150 children are boys, within which 65 are of the age of 10 years old and over. 60 boys stated that they want to go abroad when they grow up

The study evaluated the impact of the absence of fathers in terms of psychological, behavioral, academic performance and social interaction on the children left behind. According to this study, the impacts of father's migration on children left behind are both negative and positive. However, positive impacts have generally exceeded negative cases, except for a few instances that are related mainly to psychological factors. The study also revealed that the impacts of father's migration vary according to the gender and age of the children. Absence of a "role model" negatively affects many male children, creating psychological stress among them and long-term adverse impacts on child development. This is especially prevalent among children belonging to the 10-15 year age group. Male children who are missing the father's role of disciplinarian results in some socially-unacceptable behavior, i.e. dropping out of school. This situation seriously affects boys under 17 years old and in some cases girls as well. Children over the 10-15 year age group, irrespective of gender are generally happy about the material benefits that result from the migration of their fathers.

Introduction

Migration can be described as a strategy used by individuals to alleviate unemployment, under-employment and family poverty. A consequence of migration is the removal of a member or members of the family from both the physical and social space of the household. This temporary separation of a family member affects the whole family, especially children. However, for many migrants, their primary objective is to provide a better future for their children. Nevertheless, despite the economic benefits that migration provides, the psychological costs to children are larger and could violate children's rights, their psychosomatic development and education (Save the children, 2006). However, the impact of the mother's migration on children may be different from that of father's migration (Battistella & Conaco, 1998). The children of migrant mothers experience more emotional problems, an increased school-dropout rate, more exposure to abuse, and acquire more adverse personality traits, such as stubbornness and the joining of gangs (Antman, 2012; Athauda, 2000; Hettige, 1999). On the other hand, it has been shown that father's migration affects children in many positive ways. The extra income that the migration of father brings lessens, noneed for the family to depend on child labour, thereby providing better educational opportunities for children. Furthermore, the general increase in family income results in the overall well-being of the children (Park et al., 2010). Asis (2004) is also of the similar view which holds that in the absence of men, families do better-off since women are required to adjust to the situation, therefore taking over all the responsibilities of the household including caring of children and taking important family decisions. This situation lead to empower the women and Disagreeing with this view, Booth (1995) stresses the importance of the father's role as a disciplinarian and figurehead when interpreting the detrimental effect of father's labour migration on school children in Swaziland.


This paper discusses the situation of Sri Lankan children whose fathers are in Middle Eastern countries working as contract workers. The study shows that there are both negative and positive impacts of father's migration on children left behind in terms of economic, social, psychological and academic performance in the study area. It was also shown that the migration of fathers causes less emotional problems for children. However, depending on the context and gender of the children, the impacts of father's migration on children left behind may differ.

Migration of Men in Sri Lanka: An Overview

Overseas migration of labour is not a new phenomenon in Sri Lanka. Since the beginning of the 19th century, there has been an outflow of workers, though on a very small scale, that primarily involved Tamil males migrating to Malaysia (De Fontgalland, 1986). The early post-independence period especially in 1960s saw an outward movement of Sri Lankans, and it also mainly consisted of the male head, with the women and children taking part only as supporting roles in the process. In the late 1960s, out-migration from Sri Lanka took a new turn. In what is described as the "brain drain", Sri Lankan professionals consisting mainly of men migrated either as individuals or with their families for permanent settlement in the West. Following the opening of the economy in 1977, the migration of contract workers began to be popular. Contract worker migration began as an outflow of male workers responding to the new employment opportunities in construction and infrastructure development in the Middle East, mainly as a result of the oil price increase in 1973. Women began to migrate later, eventually becoming the majority of the flow of contract workers until recent.

Today the number of Sri Lankan employees working abroad is approximately 1.9 million, 93% of which are settled in Middle Eastern countries. From the years 1986-87, the share of female migrant workers consisted of 24% of the migrant population. This increased to 55% in 1988 and later to 75% in 1997. Since then, there has been a gradual decrease in the share of women workers, and in 2011 this number was as low as 48.33%. On the other hand, the share of male migrant workers has increased from 25% in 1997 to 51.67% in 2011. The figure below (Fig. 1) shows the situation of female migration and male migration in Sri Lanka for last five years. It is notable that the majority of them are concentrated in Gulf region (SLBFE, 2011).

Figure 1: Composition of Male and Female Migrants-2007-2011



Source: Annual Statistical Reports, 2011; Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment, Colombo

The majority of male migrants are in the 25-40 year age group (SLFEB, 2011), which means that the majority of Sri Lankan male workers are in their mid-marriage life and having children. Today the nuclear family system in Sri Lanka has become important than earlier. In this case, it is inevitable that the absence of one of the parents will affect the children. Although there have been many studies dealing with mother's migration and its impact on children, relatively little attention has focused on the impact of father's migration in Sri Lanka. Researchers have generally explained impact of the fathers migration as part of the impact of migration on the family left behind (see Ukwattha, 2010) and did not give more attention on it. Therefore in aiming filling this research gap this paper focuses on how the absence of the father affects the children left behind in Sri Lanka.

The Study and the Study Area

This study is based on one component of the survey dealing with the 'Impact of parents migration on children left behind', conducted in 2013. In selecting the sample of the study, the total departure for foreign employment by district recorded by the SLFBE for the year 2011 were used as they were in the latest published data at the time of the sample selection. According to the available data, the districts of Colombo (Capital of the country), *Gampaha* and Kandy recorded the highest number of

migrant departures in 2011 as well as in previous years (See SLFBE, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, and 2005). For this study, the Kandy district was selected due to its higher number of departures. In addition, the districts of *Ratnapura* and *Kurunagala* were selected because of the researcher's personal interest (Selected districts and total number of male departure are in Table -1 in 2010).

Table 1: Departure of Male Migrants in Selected Districts

District	Number
<i>Kandy</i>	13,067
<i>Kurunegala</i>	7,816
<i>Ratnapura</i>	3,017

Source: Annual Statistical Reports, 2011; Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment, Colombo

The economy of the two communities of study, i.e. the districts of *Kurunagala*, are based on agriculture, with paddy farming and vegetable cultivation being the main economic activities. In *Kurunegala* district, the majority of the people in the study area were found to be of two types, namely, owner and non-owner cultivators. The latter group therefore had only operational rights and not legal ownership of the land. In this study, this community will be referred to as a "traditional village". In the *Kandy* district, the members of the sample community were fully dependent on the selling of their labour. This area will be referred to as a "colony", due to it being an artificially-created settlement, not a traditional village. There is no agricultural land in this area. The other sample community of the *Kandy* district is situated within the city limits and will be referred to as a "slum area". It is an urban low-income settlement. Originally, it was a settlement created to house sanitary workers employed by the *Kandy* Municipal Council. Today, many settlers of this area are involved in informal sector activities rather than working for the Municipal Council as sanitary labourers. The community selected from *Ratnapura* district mainly depends on gem-mining and remittances from the Middle Eastern countries. People refer to this area as "*Dubai Watta*" (Dubai Settlement/Neighbourhood).

Method of Data Collection

The study was conducted in five migrant-source communities in three districts (*Kandy, Kurunagala and Ratnapura*). In selecting the sample communities, the researcher first selected three Divisional Secretariat Divisions (one administrative division lower to the district) from the three selected districts. The Gulf area was selected as the region of destination for male migrants who are not involved in professional types of work.

In addition to urban-rural distribution of the population, ethnic distribution and other social-economic characteristics of the community were considered. The sample consisted of 150 household units. The principal respondents of the study were 150 children whose fathers were in Middle Eastern countries working in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs at the time of the study. The majority of them were employed in construction work. Of these 150 children, half of the respondents (75) are girls.

The field data was gathered using anthropological data collection methods due to my focus being on the gathering of qualitative data. Household and individual case studies, in-depth interviews, discussions and participant observation were the techniques used for this purpose. The principal

data gathering technique employed was group discussions and informal interviews, due to the respondents being of the 5-18 year-old age group. In collecting demographic data of the respondents, a questionnaire prepared both in the Sinhala and Tamil language was used. For Sinhala-speaking respondents, the researcher herself administered the questionnaire. The help of a Tamil-speaking research assistant was used in order to administer the questionnaires and interviews to the Tamil-speaking respondents who came from the 'Slum area' in *Kandy*. However, many respondents and their family members could understand and speak Sinhala, providing a fortunate advantage to the researcher. Information gathered from both Tamil and Sinhala sources was later translated into English. Secondary data for the study was obtained from existing literature and reports and the database of the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), and Sri Lanka Branch of International Migration Organization (IMO).

Since there is no comprehensive sampling frame to identify the migrant households, a random sampling method could not be adopted for the study. Therefore, the snowballing technique, i.e. asking respondents themselves to introduce other respondents, was implemented. Although the snowballing technique does result in a bias by generating respondents that originate from the same social circle (thus, having similar characteristics), this non-probability sampling technique has been found suitable when a population is not visible, making it difficult to identify respondents (David & Sutton, 2004, p.152). In this case, due to the respondents being children, the researcher asked the adult of household, especially from the mothers of the children, to introduce another family with children of whom fathers are currently in Middle Eastern countries working as contract workers.


Conducting the discussion and establishing a good rapport with the parents of the respondents as well as respondents over 10 years old was not a major issue within the interviewing process. Yet there was an issue in motivating children less than 10 years of age into cooperating within the discussions. The beginning of the "talk" (interview/discussion) proved to be the most difficult. The strategy adopted by the researcher in this regard was to visit the same household several times and develop a friendship with them, sometimes with toys or sweets. The principal researcher and the two assistants were females, which provided another advantage in establishing rapport among the children. The respondents/children belong to the age group of 6-18 years, and the samples of respondents are shown below (Table 2).

Table 2: Number of Respondents

District	Name of Community	No. of Respondents		Total
		Girls	Boys	
Kandy	A	17	15	32
	B	16	18	34
	C	15	17	32
Kurunagala	D	13	12	25
Ratnapura	E	14	13	27
	Total	75	75	150

The age level of the respondents of the study areas is as below (Fig: 2)

Figure 2: Age Level of Children



According to the above figures, it is clear that the majority of respondents are in the adolescence and pre-adolescence age group. Of the respondents, 63% belong to the 12-18 year age group. Regarding the education-level of the children, half of the respondents who are currently in school study in grades 6-11. Out of the 150 children, 48 were not in school at the time of study. The majority of these children that are currently not in school have failed their OL (Ordinary Level) examination, while a few are dropouts. Most of them are currently staying at home without any productive employment. Two male respondents were working as sales assistants and one girl is working as a nanny in a rich household nearby.

The above description clearly demonstrates that almost all of the children are in the age that needs protection from both parents. The well-known scholar, Ken Wilber explains that all human beings have to pass through nine steps in life; beginning at birth, growing up and ending at death (Wilber, 2000). According to him, the third step to sixth step of child development is crucial. This is because at the end of this period, he/she is ready to enter into the adult world. If the child is not systematically fully-grown within these stages, it will affect his/her entire life negatively. Moreover, Wilber states that any traumatic experience that the child faces in his/her childhood will cause a condition called prenatal pathology. The absence of one parent in this period, especially children in nuclear families will result in this type of problem.

While the Father is Away: Impact of Father's Migration on Children Left Behind

The study evaluated the impact of the absence of the fathers in terms of economic, academic performance, psychological, behavioral and social interaction on the children left behind. As commonly believe in international migration of parents, both positive and negative impacts on children were observed in the study area.

Economic Impact on Children Left Behind by Fathers

The findings of the study show that many male members migrate because of low or irregular income levels within the household. Almost all of them were engaged in some kind of economic activity before they migrated, but these were not sufficient to maintain a family, especially in regards to providing for the needs of the children.

The study found an improvement in the general income level of the household with the remittances of male migrants, even within a short period of their migration. Most importantly, it improved the well-being of the children. For example, before the migration of their fathers, 6 boys and 2 girls out of the 48 children who did not go to school were working in boutiques and a nearby rich household as helpers. However, after fathers started sending money home, 6 of them were able to stop working. The explanation of one girl given below illustrates the new situation;

“Before my father went to Saudi Arabia, we were in a horrible situation. He did not have regular work. He just went around and found work and brought home a very small amount of money. Some days he brought home something to cook only. Especially during rainy days, he did not have work and we had to spend the day hungry. We have five members in our family and I am the eldest one. So finally I found work in a doctor's home to look after their children. It was not really an easy task. When my father came to see me, I cried saying that I wanted to go home. He also cried. Three months ago he went to Saudi Arabia with a group of (masons?) as a helper. Then he asked me to leave the work. He sends us enough money for food and other things.”(18, Educated up to year 9, Area D)

This description demonstrates that the father's migration had reduced the need of the child to work and improved the economic environment of the children. One of the respondents who worked in the boutique said that after his father migrated, he stopped working and joined an electronic-goods repairing class. Furthermore, he also plans to go abroad when he is an adult.

The study also found that many children who are going to school are also participating in extra classes (English, Math, Computer, etc.). In addition, after performing their OL or AL examinations, some girls are going to classes to learn a skill, such as cosmetology, dress-making, flower-making etc. While some are receiving these economic benefits with their father's migration, others continue to deal with economic hardships. In some cases their hardships have doubled. One of the respondent's mothers explained it as below;

“My husband went to Dubai nine months ago to work as a gardener in a home. The first two months he sent some money. After that he did not. He did not even call or send letters. I heard from another that he is having an affair with a married lady who is working as a housemaid in the same house. I have three children, I do not have a regular job. I am working in houses as a cleaner, but the money I get is not enough. My elder daughter (15 years) stopped going to school since her friends are laughing at her, talking about her father's love affair. She is planning to go to work as a housemaid in a nearby house of a university professor starting next month.” (She talked more while crying and the daughter also had the same story, two other children also joined the discussion with sorrowful faces - Area D)

Social Impact of Father's Migration on Children

In this regard, we found that with the absence of their fathers, there are both socially negative and positive impacts on the children left behind. When a father migrates, many children get a special place among friends because of the material objects they obtain from their father. Some children showed us valuables such as bicycles, toys, wrist-watches, etc. that they have received from their fathers abroad. In addition, within the household, many new electrical items can be seen, while other households have added new sections to house itself. These material benefits make children proud and happy. Those who do not receive such material objects are not happy about their father's migration, though they have received other benefits. The statement of one respondent given below represents the view of those who are not happy;

“At my school, some children laugh at me because my father is working in Dubai. They sometimes call me 'Dubai girl'. I do not like it, and when my father calls me, I ask him to come home and stay with us working here...”(10 years old girl . Area A).

Impact of Fathers' Migration on the Education of Children

As one of the main objectives, this study tried to understand how father's migration affects the education of children, especially their academic performance. To measure the impact, several indicators such as children's interest in attending school, marks received from term tests, class position, time spent on academic work at home, expectations for the future, attitude of teachers about these children (to get this information the researcher informally met several school teachers who teach these children) were used.

Interest in Attending School

Interest in attending school was measured by the number of school absences of the children. Those children with a lower number of absences were considered to have a higher interest in school. The following table (Table 3) shows the amount and percentages of school absences of those children still attending school.

Days of Absent (in a Month)

Days	Percentage
0	6.25
1-2	34.38
3-4	40.6
Over 5	18.77
Total	100.0

Source: Field Survey 2013

According to the above graph, there is a high level of absenteeism among children of parents who have migrated. This indicates a less interest in education. This seems to have close links with the reduced parental control due to the father's absence. The following is the view expressed by one parent and is representative of the majority of mothers/ guardians;

“My son is not really weak in school work, but he does not like to wake up in the morning. When he feels lazy, he complains that he has a stomach pain, headache or toothache. Some

days he says today it is useless to go to school since the teacher is on leave, or not teaching today. When we allow him to stay at home, there are no more complaints and he goes to play with his friends. If his father was here at home he would never make such false complaints. He is afraid of his father. But he never listens to me..." (Mother of grade 8 Student, 13ys, Area B).

The above clearly shows how the absence of the father affects the academic performance of children. This situation can be seen more so among male children than female children. In Sri Lanka, which is a patriarchal society, it is sometimes very difficult to fill the gap of the father by someone else since the father has a special place in the family. According to Robert Bales (1972), mother's role as social/ emotional leader of the family is not sufficient to control the behavior of the children. But the father's role as a task leader who often imposes physical punishment to children has better control and the children's behavior is better in the presence of the father. Kwaka (2010) reveals from her study in Ghana that there is a clear relationship between the absence of fathers and lower levels of school attendance by children.

Leaving School

Around 10% of the respondents of the study areas had left school before completing year 10, namely, before being required to perform the main government-conducted examination called the G.C.E. (OL) examination. All of these respondents stated that they hope to migrate when they have found suitable employment. The following passage expressed by one male respondent is representative of their thinking and expectations;

"I hate reading and I hate to study from books. Why are we suffering with those books and pencils?... If we can go abroad, we can earn in a month what educated people earn in a year..." (18 years old, now going for driving lessons and intend to go to abroad to work as a driver)

A similar situation was found in Mozambique (Yabiku, 2012) reveals that when family members migrate, the interest in education gradually decreases among children as they feel that finding a job abroad is the easiest way to succeed in life. But in Sri Lanka, parents' ultimate aim is to provide a good education for their children.

It is of interest to note that this situation is also limited to male children. Psychologists also agree that the father is the main role model of young male children, so it is not surprising that this situation is common among male children who want to build their future imitating their fathers.

Performance in School Work and Involvement in Extra Activities

A majority of the respondent children who are attending school studied in schools outside their village even though there are schools in their village. According to the data, children's academic performance varies greatly. When their performance in school work was examined by checking their end term report cards, we discovered that only 7 out of 102 students got more than 80 marks out of 100 for the main subjects in school. Of them, 5 were girls.

In terms of class position, the majority of them occupied positions between 6-15, (the average class size is 35-40 students showing an average level of performance. Around 21% are in between

positions 1-5. It is notable that the group of students of the lowest performers is smaller than that of the students who achieved the best.

If we compare this situation to the Ghanaian case (Kwaku, 2010), when both parents are at home academic performance increases (they got the top 10 positions), whereas when one parent is absent, academic performance is low (positions 11 to 40). In our study, we paid special attention to children who are not performing well in the class. It reveals that they are not doing homework assigned to them and mothers cannot control them. It is important to note that many of those who neglect school work are male children. One of the mothers whose son was 13 years old explained the situation below. Her explanation represents the general view of the mothers who have a difficult time controlling their children.

“My son is very stubborn. He does not listen to me. When his father calls home, I always ask him to advise him thoroughly But he never blames him since he is living far away and he does not want to hurt him either. But when my husband was at home, he always behaved well. I wish he were here...” (Mother of respondent)

According to this statement it is clear that it is difficult to control children, especially male children, when the father is away. Some girls also misbehave when their fathers are not at home. They tend to have love affairs and unnecessarily spend remittance money on cosmetics. A mother of an 18 year-old girl stated;

“My daughter is so stubborn. She does not want to listen to me. She always asks for money to buy perfume, dresses, nail polish etc. unnecessarily. After her father left, she gave up schooling before sitting her AL. Several times, I have asked her to continue her studies but she does not listen. Even her father calls her, asking her to go to school. But she is now going to a computer class in town. Some of my friends said that she is misbehaving with a boy. When I asked her about it, she blamed me. Now I keep my mouth shut. If her father were here I am sure she never would have behaved like that.” (Mother of a respondent, Area C)

The majority of mothers who are living separately from their extended family are always suffering from anxiety. They worry about their children, especially about their safety. According to the neighbors of one study area, some male children are addicted to drugs and smoke. However, we could not verify these claims.

Some children are worried about the absence of their fathers due to some other reasons. One who performs well in volleyball said that he has to go out of the area for practice, but there is nobody to accompany him. He wished that his father was with him.

As one 8 year old girl said,

“One day our teacher asked us to make a doll house with cardboard with the help from our mother and father. My mother helped me but others' home were very beautiful and they said that their fathers helped them. I wish my father were with me.” (10years old)

(Her mother proved this statement saying that she was crying, asking father on that day and refused even food the day she experienced this unpleasant situation.)

Although this is a simple feeling of a child, it shows that the absence of one of the parents affects children harmfully and that one day it will get converted into negative attitudes toward the parents (Kwaku, 2010).

However, in the end, all of this depends on the nature of the family and the education level of the parents. Research conducted in China revealed that the education level of the mother affects female children's education while the education level of father affects male children's education (Wang, 2012). In our study area almost all the parents have a school education and some have studied up to G. C. E. (Advanced Level), which is the year 12 examination. Almost all of them wanted to provide a better education for their children, enabling them to get a good job.

Psychological Impact of Father's Migration on Children

Many psychologists who specialize in child psychology and child development agree that the absence of a parent badly affects the psychological development of children. In his book titled "A brief History of Everything" (Wilber, 2000), Ken Wilber analyses the development of a child's consciousness and shows how traumas affect the psychological development of a child. According to him, the development of consciousness is a process, passing through nine stages from birth to death. From these stages, the fourth stage (the rule/role stage from Age 7-11), fifth stage (formal reflective stage from age 12-16) and sixth stage (vision-logic from 16-21) are very important. He sees these stages like a ladder; if one stage collapses it will affect the other stages as well. Therefore, these are the most important stages of a child's development. Wilber states, "the ladder metaphor is useful because it indicates that the basic component of consciousness do emerge in fairly discrete stages, if you destroy a lower rung, all the higher rungs go with it" (Wilber, 2000, p. 129).

The study sample of our research belongs to the age brackets that Wilber (2000) considers as very important. When children develop/grow up, they need adults, especially the mother and father. Adults not only provide protection but also serve as guides who can help show children the correct path. A child is socialized through the family, which consists of both the mother and father. Of these, the father is responsible for discipline and protection of the family while the mother is responsible for looking after the children and the home (Wang, 2012). According to these conditions, there is no doubt that father's migration/absence negatively affects the children psychologically. According to Graham's research (2012) in Eastern Asia, children's stress levels increase when their parents are not with them. They found that especially in Thailand and India, children are not psychologically steady when their fathers migrate and are left with their mother to look after them.

According to our research, this situation becomes graver when a child is living in a nuclear family rather than an extended family. It was found that within an extended family, the uncle and/or grandfather performs the role of the father, resulting in a psychologically more stable child than one without any father figure. In our sample, 78% of the families were belonging to nuclear families. Many of them are waiting for these fathers to arrive. These children stated that they would rather have their father back at home than an increase in material objects. The children who live in an

extended family do not bother much about their father and are happy about the material benefits they receive from their father who is abroad.

Furthermore, the absence of the father negatively affects many children. These negative impacts vary according to their gender and age. The absence of a "role model" negatively affects many male children, creating psychological stress among them and long term adverse impacts on child development. This is especially seen among children belonging to the 10 -15 year age group in the sample. Children who are over 15 years, irrespective of gender, are happy about the material benefits of their father's migration. However, the absence of the father's role as disciplinarian causes some socially-unacceptable behavior such as dropping out from school. This situation is a serious problem among boys of the above age category and in some cases for girls as well. This is true especially when mothers are not educated or less educated. The extended family, especially uncles and adult cousins, also play an important role as emotional supporters of children.

In addition, the behavior of mothers who are without the support of fathers negatively affects the children i.e. some mothers neglect their guiding role of children, as they are more concerned about their comfort, especially when mothers are involved in illicit love affairs and other similar socially-unacceptable behaviours. There are two such cases found in the study area. One mother in the study area has left with another man, keeping her two small children (6, 4) with their grandmother. The father continues to send money for the children. According to the grandmother, the children are always asking for their mother and father. According to her

"We ask our son-in-law to come home soon because we also are old, But he is not willing to come due to what his wife did. He said it is a shame to him. Yes it is true but we are worried about those little ones... Now the boy (6 year old) is a bit stubborn and does not want listen to us. Always want to go out with children older than him... We do not know what to do ..."
(67years old, Area E).

According to child psychologists, children who are growing up without their parents tend to adopt deviant behavior in the future. In the study areas, some mothers are suffering from anxiety because their husbands are not with them at home. They feel isolated and sometimes cannot cope with the problem of being home alone. The younger mothers who are living alone with the children are the most affected by this situation. One of the children explained this situation in front of her mother as below. It clearly shows how father's migration affects children indirectly as well.

"Before my father went to Oman, my mother was so quiet and she never hit us or blamed us. She was so kind. But two-three months after my father left, she changed completely. She is always in an angry mood and ready to blame us for everything, whether we are wrong or not. My younger brothers (5 and 8 years old) are a bit mischievous and every day she hits them. I am sorry about my brothers. When she hits them, I shout at her. She does not hit me but always blames me. Some nights she is crying alone." (Mother, 37 years old also accepts what her daughter (16 years) says, nodding her head. She said that she feels very lonely after he left. (Area B)

However, according to the study irrespective of gender children are happy about material benefit they receive from their father (It is around 88%). It is interesting to note that out of 60 boys who are over 10 years, 55 said that they want to go abroad when they are adults, thus imitating their fathers.

It was also found in the study area that the situation is different according to the transnational arrangements they make regarding looking after the children. The frequency of contacting home and the children as well as network support minimizes the effects of the father's absence. Many mothers said that their children are happy after they receive a phone call from their fathers whereas some mothers said that after a telephone conversation children become upset.

Conclusion

The generally held view is that children who are left behind by migrant parents are disadvantaged. Literature says that the situation is worse when the migrant is a mother. According to this study, the impacts of father's migration on children left behind are both negative and positive. However, the study found more positive impacts except for cases that related mainly to psychological factors. Father's migration does not have the same level of negative impacts on children as mother's migration. The study also found that impacts of father's migration vary according to the gender and age of the children. Furthermore, the absence of the father affects children indirectly when mothers feel lonely. Finally, it was found that the type of home environment children live in i.e. extended or nuclear family, is an important intervening factor.

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Community Participation in Urban Infrastructure Upgrading: from Theoretical Effectiveness to Practical Feasibilities: A Case Study in Can Tho City Viet Nam

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1. Problem Identification

The urban population in Viet Nam in general and urban population in Southern Viet Nam in particular have been increasing rapidly while the investment in infrastructure and public services within the cities have not been able to keep up with their real demand. The amount of low income urban residential areas has increased, and they haven't followed the existing urban planning of the city. Additionally, under the requirement of the new municipal socio-economic strategy, more residential areas in the city will be impacted by upgrading activities. This has resulted in the deterioration of the environment and negative impacts on people's health on a large scale. Therefore, it is necessary to apply a new approach, creative thinking and low-cost measures in urban upgrading activities in order to solve the challenges occurring during the urbanization process in Viet Nam.

Among the various approaches, the upgrading of poor urban residential areas, together with enabling local people to participate in infrastructure supervising as well as the maintaining of activities is the trend that has received the most current concern by urban managers. Firstly, the upgrading of poor urban residential areas is one way to reorganize urban residential areas which do not cause the need for much movement and evacuation as well as the changing of the livelihoods of the residents. In other words, it is also an effective way to stabilize urban land-use. Secondly, upgrading activities become more sustainable due to the existence of community participation. Concretely, community participation brings many benefits to upgrading activities. This includes: (1) the creation of a consensus among people on the costs and benefits of upgrading activities. This will allow the implementation of activities to be more advantageous, (2) transparency of the implementation process of the project to society, (3) an increased environmental awareness and will to protect the environment by local people towards their residential area.

To date, community participation in upgrading activities faces two main constraints. These are the institutional arrangement and capacity of the people. To overcome these constraints, such upgrading urban projects such as those in Ho Chi Minh city, Can Tho city, Hai Phong city and Can Tho city, the environmental sanitation project in Nhieu Loc-Thi Nghe canal, the sanitation and urban upgrading project in Tan Hoa-Lo Gom canal etc., have carried out some pilot projects relating to the mobilization of the community in the project's improvement activities. Moreover, some sub-districts with their dynamic characteristics have also started initiatives for upgrading activities in their localities.

Considering what has been said above, the gathering and systematization of knowledge and experience of projects and local authorities relating to community participation in upgrading activities and identification of the suitable participation models can provide beneficial references for functional agencies, urban managers and local authorities. In addition, it also contributes further materials for lectures and research concerning urban issues.

2. Objectives

The research consists of five specific objectives:

1. Identify and analyse the policies related to the construction and maintenance of infrastructure in residential areas;
2. Identify community resources while participating in upgrading activities as well as factors affecting their participation;
3. Identify and assess the models of infrastructure upgrading in residential areas using the participatory approach;
4. Recommend institutional and management models that are suitable for community participation in upgrading activities within residential areas.

3. Research Method

Study areas were undertaken in 3 sub-districts of Ninh Kieu district, Can Tho city. Namely An Hoi, An Phu and An Binh sub-district. Can Tho city is the largest city of the Mekong river Delta with an area of 1390 km² and a population of 1.2 million (2009).

- An Hoi sub-district is representative of the sub-districts that participated in the urban upgrading project of Can Tho city. The project received financial and technical assistance from the World Bank, that is to say, this project, like the others is based on an urban upgrading model that received assistance from the outside.
- An Phu and An Binh sub-districts were representative of sub-districts that didn't participate in the urban upgrading project of Can Tho city at the study time – namely, an urban upgrading model without assistance from the outside.
- The research utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods. The collection tools include structured questionnaires with the sample size of 150 households and in-depth interviews with 10 people who are representatives of the local authority and management board of the urban upgrading project of Can Tho city.

4. Results

4.1 Urban Upgrading Models in Can Tho City

The research findings show that there are two models of urban infrastructure upgrading existing in Can Tho city. One model is based on the support from outside actors while the other depends solely on local resources. The upgrading works in residential areas include small alleys, drainage systems, piped water systems via lighting systems.

Both models use the participatory approach while the types of contribution from people include: (1) Contribution of opinions relating to the amount of contributed money, (2) Contribution of opinions on technical issues and the way of implementation, (3) Contribution of opinion on supervision and quality of upgrading work, (4) Contribution of money, (5) Contribution of labour and (6) Participation in supervision activity.

4.2 Participation of People in the Upgrading Activities of Residential Infrastructure

People in the study areas perceive sufficiently the importance of the concept of community participation in the upgrading activities.

The most common form of the participation of people is “Financial contribution”. This type of participation is compatible with the potential durability that is reported by the people as they participate in the urban upgrading activities.

The types of participation requiring technological knowledge including “Contribution of opinion on technical issues and the way of implementation” and “Contribution of opinion on supervision of quality of upgrading work” occupied a low rate. This is also the main constraint being raised by people when asking them about what difficulties they face in participating in the upgrading activities. These constraints affect the effectiveness of the participation of people in upgrading activities.

“Contribution of labour” in upgrading activities is popular in the rural areas whereas in the urban areas it seems to be not suitable and accepted.

Most of households realize that their opinions play an important role in upgrading activities. However, the majority of households did not contribute their opinion towards the owner of the construction work. These are the main actors influencing the quality of the work as well as livelihoods of the residents. The local authority is considered a main actor to receive the feedback of people, however more than half of the respondents stated that they were not satisfied with the replies from the authorities on all levels.

Regarding the maintenance of upgrading work, local people perceive the importance of their participation. According to them, maintenance guarantees a better quality of life, it is public property and people have a responsibility towards it and its maintenance to assist the long use of work. Respondents report that they carry out the maintenance by themselves and did not receive any support.

4.3 Recommendations of People towards Forthcoming Upgrading Activities

- To facilitate the participation of people in upgrading activities being more effective, respondents recommended the role of each actor in the system as following:
- Local authority is in charge of the mobilization and participation of the people, as well as the provision of information and the collection of feedback.
- Local mass organization plays a role in promoting people to join upgrading activities and cooperate with the local authority in providing information to the people.

- Local people contribute their resources under the advice of the local authority and have a duty of maintaining the upgrading works.
- Moreover, the poor urban communities also need the financial support, technical advice and the concern of the local authority to improve their living environment.

4.4 Institutional and Operational Organization of Upgrading Activities

The literature review suggests that legal documents (including regulation and instruction from central to grassroot levels) relating to community participation in residential infrastructure upgrading are sufficient. The main orientation for community participation is regulation, namely “Democracy at the grassroots level”. This follows the formula of “People know, people do and people supervise”. However, generally-speaking these documents have yet to be concretized within the implementation process.

Concerning the organization of upgrading activities, in both models, the upgrading activities are arranged in accordance with the process and carried out by representatives of the residential community together with the local authority.

For the upgrading model of the project of urban upgrading in Can Tho city, under the financial and technical assistance of the WorldBank, the upgrading process is planned and designed more methodically and at the same time the role of stakeholders from the district to residential community is also institutionalized more clearly. Its limitations and constraints include: (1) There is a lack of co-operation between the project management board and the local authority, (2) Members of the community supervising team do not qualify for the work and (3) Capacity of the local authority is limited in providing information to people as well as solving their queries.

For the upgrading model without outside assistance, the limitations and constraints include: (1) There is a lack of consensus concerning regulations on the technical standards of upgrading work, (2) There is difficulties in mobilizing the contribution of people due to a lack of financial support, (3) People continue to play a passive role in participation and (4) Operation of the work management board is still a formality.

Both upgrading models did not work well relating to information reception and feedback, mechanics, and maintenance activity.

5. Recommendations

According to the findings, the lessons learned about the constraints affecting community participation and organization of upgrading activities can be grouped under the following six categories:

- Regulations relating to upgrading activities
- Provisions and feedback information for people
- Supervision of people in upgrading activities
- Capacity and perception of the local authority
- Capital resources of upgrading activities in urban poor communities

- Participation of people in the maintenance of upgrading work

To solve these constraints, the recommendations of the research group are as follows:

5.1 Concretization of Regulations related to Upgrading Activities

The functional agencies should concretize the regulations and instructions so that the local authority can implement upgrading activities easily, conveniently and synchronistically. As a result, it will reduce the difficulties in urban management at the local level.

5.2 Institutionalization of Information Provision and Feedback

Guarantee all people in the local area the opportunity to access information adequately and accurately concerning plans of upgrading activity implementation and the regulations of infrastructure construction, urban reorganization, evacuation and resettlement.

- Information provisions and feedback for the community need to be concretized.
- All requirements of information mentioned above need to be institutionalized into clear regulations.

5.3 Facilitate the Supervision by the Community

Enhance the motivation of people in participating in the supervision of activities through implementing propaganda activities so that people know about their rights of democracy at the grassroots level, in which there is a right of supervision by the people.

- Functional agencies, local authorities and social organizations should provide technical knowledge and legal support so that the community can carry out this task.
- Recommendations of the community need to be considered carefully by managers at all levels as well as be solved timely and reasonably.

5.4 Building Capacity of Cadres at the Grassroots Level

- Provide training courses with essential topics for cadres at the grassroots level so that they are competent in the management of the living environment of the residential community.

5.5 Assisting Finance for Upgrading Activities in the Urban Poor Communities

- Municipal authorities should establish urban infrastructure upgrading funds for poor communities. Fund sources are formed by the capital contribution of various actors such as the state, sponsors at home and abroad and the local community. This fund can assist in the upgrading activities of poor communities by providing long term credit with low interest.

5.6 Enhance community participation in the maintenance of upgrading work

- Design and promulgate regulations relating to the maintenance of urban infrastructure in the residential area. This should emphasize the importance of the role of people in the upgrading area.

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Japanese Myth as the Cultural Heritage of Local Japan

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1. Introduction

The first official gathering of ancient Japanese myth was *Kojiki* (古事記), a piece of literature of retold stories believed to be the first written literary book of Japan (completed in the year 712), while *Nihonshoki* (日本書紀) is said to be the first book on recorded history of Japanese nation (completed in the year 720). *Kojiki* was compiled from a story teller named *Hiedanoare* (稗田阿礼), conveying his memory of folklore to *Oonoyasumaro* (太安万侶) to make written record. It was mentioned in the preface of the book that it was Emperor *Temmu's* initiative to compile those records, legends and folklore so that the next generation knows the facts. Again, it was Emperor *Temmu's* (天武天皇) idea to compile *Nihonshoki*, aiming to spread this national history book to foreigners. The book was written in the same format as Chinese history text books by royal family members, government officers and *Oonoyasumaro* himself. It took 40 years to finish this book.

During the time from approximately the sixth to the seventh century, Japan was divided into many cities. Many wars occurred to conquer the power and *Yamato* Dynasty captured the power, formed the federal government and ruled the country. In the year 672 there was a civil war called *Jinshin no ran* (壬申の乱), resulting in that Emperor *Temmu* captured the ruling power which was handed down to him. He considered that history text books would be the foundation for the ruling regime with the emperor being the head of the country, leading the country to be stable and secure. This was the reason why the two literary books were written with similar purposes. The differences of the two books were that the first book aimed to convince the people in the country to accept and share the same consciousness, and the other book aimed to spread the concept of a stable and secured foundation of Japan to the foreigners.

Japanese Myth in the two literary books is important in studying history, the relationships among various races of ancient Japan and, the expansion of emperors' ruling power by establishing unity among many territories causing the people to be peaceful. It also specified the details about beliefs and culture of *Izumo* (出雲) and *Hayato* (隼人) tribes. This could be seen not only of the Emperors' ruling tribe but also other tribes were considered as important.

Japanese myth tells about the origin of various islands, crops and grains, natural phenomenon, gods and goddess and the relationship with nature. People still go to pay homage to Shinto Shrine (*Jinja* 神 = god 社 = the place to exist) even in today's society. Besides, rituals for the modern Japanese are still in practice such as worship of god and goddess for each season. The rituals to sweep away troubles and bother, paying homage and praying at the shrines as well as various local festivals are arranged.

In the twenty first century, Japanese Myth of *Kojiki* was popular when “*Kojiki* Spoken Language edition (Kougoyaku *Kojiki*, 2006) by Miura Sukeyuki, a researcher specialist in ancient literature, wrote the new style of *Kojiki*, using language spoken by an old man. By this technique, the difficulties of literature were decreased while the literature contents were still full and completed. These were very impressive to readers. During the same time, there were many researchers who wrote *Kojiki* in easier versions such as “Enjoy the Easier *Kojiki*”; *Omoshiroi hodo yoku wakaru Kojiki* (2006, by Yoshida Atsuhiko) “Let’s study *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* one More Time; *Mouichido Manabitai Kojiki to Nihonshoki*” (2007, by Tada Gen) and many *Kojiki* cartoon versions.

There was the 1,300th anniversary of *Kojiki* in 2012. These literary works were organized with various kinds of magazines, history, culture and tourism presented their articles on Japanese myth. The cities mentioned in *Kojiki* were very popular among tourists. These could be seen from five governors’ news conference: Nara, Fukui, Tottori, Shimane, Miyazaki to organize several programs for the celebration. Nara Prefecture, for example, would distribute guide books explaining Japanese Myth related to tourist spots, or, “Myth Expo”(Shinwahaku 神話博) would be organized by Shimane Prefecture, and Miyazaki Prefecture would organize the promotion campaign travelling back to the past by the old railways to the seaside cities of god, for example. This local tourism promotion campaign through Japanese Myth by the local government could be considered successful with good cooperation from the private business sector and for the local people.

2. Japanese Myth: Not the Only One

Every Wednesday night between 2-30 October 2013, in total 5 times, the researcher had an opportunity to attend special lectures on academic services for third party on “The World of Japanese Myth Echo to Each other-*Kojiki* Japan Islands and Asia”¹¹ organized by Rissho University and Shinagawa district. The content of the lectures could be concluded as follows:

The 1st Lecture: The topic of a special lecture, “What do the Myths tell-Elementary *Kojiki*?” (by Miura Sukeyuki’s special lecture, “*Shinwa wa nani o kataruka-Kojiki nyuumon*” Rissho University and Shinagawa-ku, October 2013).

There are not only *Kojiki* or Japanese Myth, but there are also related myths. Myths are stories narrated and conveyed from ancient illiterate age, from generation to generation. There were some mixtures of the north and the south culture and there were legends similar to Japanese Myth,¹² in Indonesia, for example. During the war, *Kojiki* was interpreted politically. This was the wrong idea since *Kojiki* was being told prior to the formation of Japan to console people who were occupied. Those people were other races merged with *Yamato* Dynasty(大和). Praising the Emperor, therefore, was not *Kojiki*’s charm. There was no word of “*Nihon*”(日本) in *Kojiki*’s manuscript while there were hundreds of those words in *Nihonshoki*. The word “*kiki*”(記紀)¹³ was created later and

¹¹ / 平成25年度 立正大学文学部公開講座（品川区共催）『響き合う神話世界—古事記、そして列島とアジア』2013年10月2日～30日（全5回）

¹²/北方的と南方的

¹³ / 記紀神話 (*Kiki shinwa*) means Japanese myths of *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki*. *Ki*(記). The first ‘*Ki*’ is the last character of *Kojiki*. *Ki*(紀). The second ‘*Ki*’ is the last character of *Nihonshoki*, means the records of history and story dynasties.

interpreted politically. Although the two literature books are obviously separated and the main core of *Kojiki* was writing of storytelling (*Monogatari o kataru*), *Nihonshoki* was a record of history (especially of the emperors).

The 2nd Lecture: Shiga Setsuko's lecture, "Story telling of animal gods- myth of Ainu's request" (Shiga Setsuko's lecture, "*Doubutsushin no katari - Ainu no shinwa*" October 9, 2013).¹⁴

According to *Ainu* Folklore,¹⁵ a story teller told the stories about their myths by singing. Varieties of animal creatures appeared in the myths. *Ainu* tribes believed that humans were capable of catching the animals for food, since those animals were god given. The relationship between gods and human beings was that gods in the form of animals were food for human beings.

A myth similar to *Kojiki* was found; it was about a rabbit telling its story or about after-death souls which still existed in another land. They were reborn as animals again, thus indicating the belief that the death was not the end of life. *Ainu* Myth passed to generations verbally, with no written record. The story teller would repeat the words to indicate that he meant certain kind of animals, and all were voices without any written record. *Ainu* Myth had its role to convey information to the people in the same village. At present, there are only 14 *Ainu* Story Tellers left. Researchers on *Ainu* Language try to learn and conserve this culture of myth telling story in order that it could be kept and maintained in the future.

The 3rd Lecture: Shimamura Kouichi's lecture, "Ryuugyuu - Uta in Myth Pattern" (Shimamura Kouichi's lecture, "*Ryuugyuu no shinwa-uta toshiten no shinwa*", October 16, 2013).¹⁶

Okinawa Island¹⁷, location myths were being told in form of *Uta* Songs. We can learn about *Ryuugyuu* Myth from these songs in the same way we learn about *Kojiki* by reading. In the village, there were women who acted as the agents of gods called "*Noro*" or the medium between human being and the gods called "*Yuta*". They sang *Uta* in rituals. *Ryuugyuu* used to be one country with various separated cultures. Even today we still see these differences.

The three main beliefs of myth from *Uta* were: land was god given, people were born from the land, leading to agriculture. Myth was not history in the same way as the Emperor's ruling power did not mean "nation". Before the war, the nation state tried to retrieve the myth to explain that the emperor's ruling power was the same as a nation state. The myths were more pure than that and they are "present". Okinawa myth was handed down to the people by singing stories. By telling the stories they heard to people in the villages again and again, the singers and the audiences could remember the songs.

¹⁴ /志賀雪湖『動物神の語り～アイヌの神謡～』

¹⁵ / Ainu (アイヌ) An indigenous tribe of Northern Japan, similar to Jomon period (BC145-BC10). They currently reside on Hokkaido and Chishima islands.

¹⁶ /島村幸一『琉球の神話～ウタとしての神話～』

¹⁷ / Big islands in the south of Japan, named Okinawa prefecture. It was originally Ryuugyuu state of islands which were governed by the King since 1429. It was later over ruled by the Country of Satsuma in 1609. It was later ruled under the seizure of USA after the World War II, and was returned as part of Japan in 1972.

The 4th Lecture: Miura Sukeyuki's lecture, "Where did myth come from?The layer overlapping of ancient history in *Kojiki*" (Miura Sukeyuki's lecture "*Kojiki no kosousei*", October 23, 2013).¹⁸

"*Kosou*"(古層) refers to layers overlapping of various races from the ancient history. Japanese people came from various different lands, merging and combining among tribes and became Japanese people of the present time. In *Kojiki*, myths and legends from different sources were gathered, particularly Japanese sea culture (*Nihonkai bunkaken* 日本海文化圏); and *Izumo Shinwa* Myth, for example. When *Yamato* gathered different tribes and combined them as an empire, many cultures mixed together and overlapped each other. This could be seen from *Kojiki*'s outlook describing the land of under world, the land of ocean and the land of heaven reflecting the concept of culture-by-the- sea people. While heroic deeds of gathering the lands and belief of secret power were the concept of the eastern people; there were stories assumed to be conveyed from Korean islands (from the north), and later crossed the sea from the south, resulting in various myths when retold in *Kojiki* format attached with tales of adventure and supernatural power in fable style. These are reasons why *Kojiki* has been popular until today.

The 5th Lecture: Yamada Hitoshi's lecture, "Japanese Myth in Asia and the Pacific Coast" (Yamada Hitoshi's lecture "*Asia- taiheiyou no naka no nihonshinwa*" October 30, 2013).¹⁹

It has always been said that the three major sources of Japan's ancient culture were *Izumo*, *Yamato* and *Hayato*. But many more tribes had their own ethnic culture of folklore and myth tales. *Kojiki* was a literature book of different types of legend collections. Regarding linguistic analysis, Japanese language had its root from Altaic language which was one of an Austronesian Language, found in Southeast Asia and Pacific Ocean Islands. The people who travelled across the sea conveyed their culture in addition to their languages.

There was a legend similar to *Inaba* Rabbit was found in *Kojiki*. (a tale of rabbit made a trick so that the sharks set themselves as a bridge for the rabbit to cross the sea); Northern Asia's legend, (a fox made a trick and the fish made themselves as a bridge); and a legend of a minority group in China, (a rabbit made a trick and the soft-shelled turtles set themselves as a bridge). These could be assumed that the legends might be a tale retold from the south of China.

The legends about Goddess Konohana (*Konohananosakuyabime*) described choosing between a beautiful girl and an ugly girl so that the human's life expectancy could be decided.

In the legend of *Umisachi-Yamasachi*, the hero had to go the underworld to find the lost fishhook. This was similar to an Indonesian legend. These legends were told from agricultural and fishery culture, therefore, the transference of Austronesian languages might explain the origin of Japanese *Kojiki* myth. The main content of this special lecture was that there was not only one Japanese Myth. All four scholars indicated that the content and the origin of *Kojiki* Myth, *Ainu* and *Ryuugyuu* Myth and Southeast Asia Myth, showing the agreement of each myth and the linkage of Japanese culture with other countries of their long histories. According to the interview given by a core

¹⁸ / 三浦佑之 『～古事記の古層性～』

¹⁹ / 山田仁史 『アジア・太平洋の中の日本神話』

organizer, professor Miura Sukeyuki, the organizing committee from Faculty of Art, Rissho University, the result of this second special lecture aiming to publicize knowledge to the community could be concluded as follows:

There were, more than expected, 450-470 participants made up of scholars, students and general people in each of the five lectures. This might be because Professor Miura had his special lecture on "Famous Literature in 100 Minutes: *Kojiki*: History Not the Only One"²⁰ for NHK documentary program in September 2013, resulting in various viewers attending the lecture.

Most Japanese interested in *Kojiki* said that they wanted to know the origin of Japanese and history to study today's Japanese identity. However, Professor Miura was not able to tell whether they found those identities through better understanding of *Kojiki*.

The important content the organizers wanted to communicate to the public were, for example, various aspects of myths, ancient legends with stories conveyed from inside and outside Islands of Japan. These were mixed and merged to become one literature called *Kojiki* which does not mean that there is only one history for Japanese people of *Kojiki*.²¹ It is not history evidence but a story being told with various aspects (*monogatari*).

3. Myth and Pictures of Wartime History

The Deity of Sun named "Goddess Amaterasu" is the main character playing a significant role in the myths of deities. She is the Sun protecting heaven and earth to have light during the daytime. She gave birth to the ancestors of the Emperor Dynasty. It is the myth in *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* confirming the Japanese emperors are descendants of the heavenly divinities to convince people to realize and respect the power of the descendant of the Sun.

In the history of war between the tribe inherited as emperors and Izumo tribe, Yamato eventually won the authority to rule the state. The myth of Izumo (出雲神話) is the major part of the myth of divinities in *Kojiki*. Even though both are different in presenting the myths concerning the deities of Izumo, they state that authority to rule the state was transferred from God Ookuninushi to Goddess Amaterasu. Goddess Amaterasu sent her son from heaven to negotiate with the former ruler to transfer the authority to him. This reflects the political characteristic of ancient Japanese people in transforming war to peace by using belief and faith toward gods and spirits of gods dwelling in the nature as a tool.

Japanese government's prewar policy was centered on a massive restructuring of the political system. Primary schools' textbooks emphasized the political militarization and imperial sovereignty by using the re-told stories in Japanese Myth which explained the relation of Emperors and Gods. *Kojiki* was applied because the myths of deities narrate the origin of Japan and the foundation of imperial administration. The content of the myths of deities in this textbook presents the pride of the country ruled by an emperor who has the supreme authority. Most topics in the Japan State-

²⁰ /三浦佑之、2013年10月30日公開講座終了日にまとめた「日本神話の一つではない。」

²¹ /NHK「100分de名著 古事記 歴史は一つではない」2013年9月水曜日11:00-11:25, The literature text books of *Kojiki* were published and broadcasted countrywide in September 2013

textbooks 4-5th editions (1933-1940, 1941-1945) during the World War II showed the effort of the governments to teach children to pay the highest respect to the Emperor as the "Nation". The major contents of these wartime Japanese textbooks were about the history, pride of Japanese people and honor of Emperors' mightiness to cultivate patriotism in children. Then, the image of *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* became the pictures of the dark period of war.

Kounoshi Takamitsu,²² a specialist on Ancient History and Literature presented his research on "Ancient History Tale Retold -The Changing Form of *Nihonshoki*" to the International Academic Conference under the topic of "Ancient Eras Reflecting Each Other", at the Faculty of Literature, Meiji University. The main ideas of the presentation were as follows:

"*Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* are stories of history, but this does not mean that the two stories are not true. They, however, emphasized the history being conveyed by a story telling. The two stories were conveyed through ages (*Katarareta rekishi*). *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* had been criticized for a long time. Various aspects of analysis and interpretation gave clearer points of view towards realities in history. Yet, before seeking those facts, it must be known that the two stories were the story telling conveyed through ages which were being changed, towards the present time. Before releasing, some parts of *Nihonshoki* were changed from the original manuscript. During previous study, *Nihonshoki* was not analyzed deeply and as carefully as it should be."

Nihonshoki was classified as history text book of Japan. The precise indication of historical events as well as dynasties of the emperors, resulted in *Nihonshoki* being a reliable book. However, Japan's history kept on changing, combined with modern technology and advancement of searching for new information, such as the discovery of *Oonoyasumaro's* burial tomb in 1979. He was the important person who composed *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki*, eradicating doubt whether the two books were written in the 8th century. Besides, the discovery of the Ancient Izumo Shrine (*Izumo Taisha* 出雲大社) which was significantly related to *Kojiki* Myth, lead to an estimation of the prominent height of the original shrine. However, the debates in the academic history sphere still persist. Applying *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* with history study is of good evidence, while some parts are only 'stories' as well.

The problems are related to image of the two books caused by the mixture of their contents and the creation of new work supporting political policy which emphasized the importance of the army and the emperors during the pre - world war two periods. Miura Sukeyuki said "When entering the new era, (*Kindai*),²³ *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* were called by the same name as *Kiki* so that it would be easier. The governments of that time wanted the emperors' ruling power to be accepted. Japanese Myth and folklore were written in new version to benefit them. Bringing some contents from both *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki*, mixing them together in textbook for compulsory education, *Kojiki* was considered as a composition written by ancient nation state aimed to honor the emperors, and aimed to be used as a textbook like *Nihonshoki*."²⁴

²² / 神野志隆光、2013年10月31-11月2日 明治大学大学院文学研究科『1国際学術研究会 交響する古代Ⅳ』

²³ /近代Means Meiji Period (1868-1912), Taisho Period (1912-1926), Showa Period (1926-1989)

²⁴ /三浦佑之『100分de名著 古事記』NHKテレビテキスト2013年9月 第1巻第30号、NHK出版、p.5

Kojiki was a tale-like story. There were characters doing heroic deeds, making it very enjoyable to read. However, *Nihonshoki* was like a history textbook, not aiming for entertainment, but to publicize the reliable emperors' stories. Bringing the two books, blending them together, giving a new title of "*Kiki*", the government of that time wished to bring the entertaining style in *Kojiki* to create reliability like history textbook, "*Nihonshoki*". As a result, *Kojiki* was classified as a political tool or the literature aiming to praise the emperors and give favor to the military regime. Both Kounoshi and Miura shared the same idea that reading of *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* changed during the time the governments applied them to political reasons, leading to inaccurate understanding from the original book. Therefore, the work should be split into two books so that the real value of each work would be appreciated. The researcher believes that the current readers tend to review their original literature again, particularly for *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* which were apparently changed in content before and during the war.

4. The Role of Local Government on Tourism

Year 2012 was the 1300th anniversary of the composition of *Kojiki*. In the prefectures with tourist spots mentioned in Japanese Myth, the local governments prepared the budget to organize and publicize many projects for their prefectures. The great and well known activity was Japan Myth Expo in Shimane province, starting on July 21, and closing on November 11, 2012 with total viewers of 729,262.²⁵ The expo was held at a large open space next to the *Izumo* Archaeology Museum near Izumo Shrine. There was a light and sound show on the largest screen in the country. The show was about Japanese Myth. There were booths selling food and famous produce of the prefecture, specially designed souvenirs, *Kagura*²⁶ show and demonstration of *Magatama* crystal ball²⁷ production. The viewers, both children and adults, had a good time and gained knowledge about Japanese Myth and local history as well.

Shimane Prefecture has local myth called myth of Izumo (*Izumo Shinwa* 出雲神話). There was respected heroic god named *Susanoo*, one of the Three Great Gods, *Amaterasu* (The Sun goddess), *Tsuguyomi* (The Moon God) and *Susanoo* (God of Storm). God *Izanaki* gave birth to them by washing his eyes and nose with *Misogi* (禊) Ritual after he came back from the land of the dead. *Susanoo* stirred up problems causing *Amaterasu* to hide away in the cave and made troubles to many gods, so the gods had to invite her out of the cave and he was expelled from heaven. On the way to the Land of *Ne no kuni*, he conquered the eight-headed giant snake and helped save a beautiful girl from sacrifice.

²⁵ / Information from news of Yomiuri (Shimane) Newspaper, November 12, 2013 morning publication

²⁶ / 神楽 The show for god-like, a typical show of Chinese Lion Dance. It is presented as plays with dance, and joyful and exciting music. The tale of play was told in each episode in a small Kagura theater. The play of *Kojiki* Japanese Myth was adjusted to Kagura in that *Amaterasu*, the Goddess of the Sun, escaped into the cave. It was also when *Susanoo* conquered the eight-headed giant serpent.

²⁷ / 勾玉 Crystal ball similar to the shape of mango was embroidered as a necklace or earrings which were antique type decorations and believed to be an identity decoration of *Amaterasu*, the Goddess of the Sun who retains highest power of heaven. Crystal ball was one of the three sacred symbols representing the emperor (mirror, sword and *Magatama* crystal ball). This is currently used as an amulet kept for sustainable happiness.

The Conquer of Giant Snake Mythical Episode was well-known and was told across the country. Another Heroic God of Izumo was *Ookuninushi*, the great god who made the land of human beings stable and well established. Later, he gave this land to *Amaterasu's* descendant to rule and he requested that an eternal sky-high shrine be built for him, leading to the original *Izumo Shrine*. The well-known *Ookuninushi's* story was *Inaba White Rabbit Episode (Inaba no shirou usagi)*. At present, *Inaba* is a part of Tottori Prefecture. The story was about *Ookuninushi*. Who followed all his brothers to ask the beautiful princess of *Inaba* to marry them. On the way, he saw a rabbit and its hair plucked out. The rabbit wept and wailed. The rabbit said that it played the trick, saying that it would count the number of the sharks and then deceived the sharks to set themselves to make a bridge for him to cross; then came the last shark, the rabbit was forgetful and laughed at the sharks. The angry sharks plucked the rabbit's hair.

Ookuninushi's elder brother deceived the rabbit to soak itself in the sea and then sunbathe, feeling the heat of sun burn, so *Ookunushi* advised that it should be soaked in fresh water and mingle itself with flower pollen. The rabbit helped foresee that the princess would select and marry him. This story was very popular and told through ages until today.

Nara and Miyagi Prefectures arranged many activities continuously, including the printing of commemorative books to celebrate the *Kojiki* 1300th year anniversary, special lectures, shows, storytelling, and festivals in many Shrines. Nara Prefecture established the new office under the name of "Department of Charming Promotion of Nara Prefecture" (*Nara no Miryoku souzouka*), highlighting on tourist spots related to *Kojiki* Myth and the internet- books on local history.²⁸ Not only telling legendary *Yamato* Empire but also presentations of impressive dialogues were performed.

"Miyazaki: Land of Mythology" (*Shinwa no furusato, Miyazaki*) was shown on sign- boards and brochures distributed in many places to promote Miyazaki Prefecture. In Miyazaki, there were many places mentioned in the Myth such as Legendary Wash Pond, believed to be the place where God *Izanaki* gave birth to The Three Great Gods. One of them was Goddess *Amaterasu*, a female ancestor of the Emperors' Dynasty. There were many god shrines, where gods resided. There were many significant episodes such as the episode describing that God *Izanaki* together with God *Izanami* gave birth of the land. The episode describing that Goddess *Amaterasu* and God *Susano* fought against each other and used their child's gender to make judgment. *Amaterasu* gave birth to the father of the god who was coming down from heaven to rule the country.

There was the love story between God *Ninigi* and *Konohana no sakuyabime*, the beautiful Goddess who had to prove her pure love by locking herself in fire. Myth about *Konohana no sakuyabime* was outstanding in respect to her being a symbol of beauty and prosperity like Sakura. She gave birth in the fire to prove that her sons are heavenly divinity (*Amatsukami*) or descendant of Goddess *Amaterasu*. The story about the adventure of God Brothers, *Umisachi* and *Yamasachi* also has been retold until these days.

Legendary Myths related to many places in the prefecture, indicating the origin of all creatures. Besides, there were many shrines worshiped by people since the ancient

²⁸ / <http://www.pref.nara.jp/miryoku/narakikimanyo/zue-kojiki/>

time. Government sector as well as private sector helped and gave good cooperation to tourist programs of the prefecture. This included tourism promotion office, the shrines, bus companies, train authority, volunteer guide associations, even housewife farmer groups and general people. They gathered to organize the activities to celebrate 1300 years of *Kojiki* Myth. Success evaluated by increasing number of tourist from all parts of the country in 2012, causing activities related to legendary myths to still go on continuously. Like every year, *Miyazaki Jinguu Shrine Annual Festival* is arranged magnificently as usual. The Public relations linked the theme to the *Kojiki* Myth which makes this festival even more widely known this year. According to the legendary myth, Miyazaki Jinguu Shrine was the place where Emperor *Jimmu* (*Jimmu Tennou* 神武天皇) the Japanese's First Emperor resided.

5. The Importance of the Local Gods and Goddess

Shinto Shrine is a sacred place for each community. Before entering the area where a god resides, the people will walk pass Torii Pillar (*Torii* 鳥居), hence, their hands and their mouths must be washed. This is one of the wash up rituals to purify their bodies before meeting gods. People can go to pay homage to the gods they are faithful to all year round. Moreover, the shrines can be used as the places to perform important rituals such as the wedding ceremony, the ceremony performed when the children reach 3-5-7 years old, the rituals to sweep away the troubles and brother. People may come for blessing before performing important activities of their lives such as taking entrance examination or taking a long journey. Performances and shows dedicated to gods have been local cultural heritage for a long time.

The collected legendary of *Kojiki* Myth was like folklore retold for a long time in each community. All legendary gods of impressive roles resided in the shrines and were worshiped for a long time. Stone and trees believed to be sacred would be tied up with holy rope (*Shimenawa*) and be worshiped.

The Japanese of the present day still believe that there are natural "power spots" (パワースポット) giving sources of energy. People touching the old trees or strange stones can be seen. Some people bear their hands to the entrance of the cave where they believe gods reside, to absorb natural energy to their bodies. Legendary Myths tell us stories, focusing on the importance of the amazing nature, creating relationships between the people and their communities, which are tourist spots, generating income to rural areas.

6. Conclusion

Japanese have profound engagement with the nature. The concept is that gods reside in nature and pay homage to the sacred beings are auspicious. Shinto rituals were taught since the ancient time. It was believed that Gods resided in each Shinto Shrine engaged with the local communities. There were Legendary Myths retold in different local communities, and they were compiled into only one Legendary Myth in a role of Legend and National History: Literature called *Kojiki* and history textbook called *Nihonshoki*. Japanese Legendary Myth was used as a tool to cheer up and encourage the people to love their country and respect the emperor enough to sacrifice their lives for him during the World War II. This image made such Japanese Legendary Myth fade away little by little from scholars and new generation writers who focused on separate legendary myths from history which

were not linked to war or militarism. In the twenty first century, *Kojiki* became popular again in the role of story or tales when local communities were mentioned in the myth brought this kind of popularity to publicize and promote prefectures and tourist spots. Those activities were particularly arranged to celebrate 1300 years of *Kojiki*. They encouraged people countrywide to highlight caring of local communities and created bright and active countryside. Important factors which could not be missed out were hard efforts of the people in the areas. They managed to conserve local cultural heritage very well, considering from traditional festival which have been organized continuously for a long time. Paying homage to shrines has always been in practice. Belief in gods and sacred being in nature can be considered as cultural heritage passing to the next generations. Japanese Myths are like the bindings of people's mind to their hometowns.

This paper is part of the research on the Japan Foundation Short-term Fellowship Program for 2013-2014, which is the study of the relation of the Japanese Myth in *Kojiki* and Japanese people's thinking concerned to their homeland at the present time. The research method included interview and site visiting in October-November 2013.

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Disappearing Spaces: Life Experiences of Higaunon in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, Philippines

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Abstract

This study aims to document the cultural, religious, economic, political and environmental experiences of the Higaunon in Barangay Tankulan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, Philippines in order to examine the changes or continuities in their cognitive and physical spaces. Using life history method, three groups of young, adult and aged key informants were chosen using snowball sampling technique.

The findings in the study reveal that the Higaunons are aware and proud of their ethnic identity which forms the basic part of their cognitive spaces. However, the cultural practices that are at risk of disappearing are their traditional rituals in agriculture, courtship and wedding, thanksgiving, conflict management, selection of tribal leaders, among others. The influence of media, education, modernization, Christianity, and intermarriages between Higaunon and non-Higaunon lead to the failure in the transmission of the Higaunon culture especially to the younger generation. Their ancestral domain and natural resources which comprise their physical spaces are also fast disappearing because of the influx of migrants, encroachment of big corporations, and government legislations resulting to land conversion of the Higaunon land.

In conclusion, the postmodern theory of Pierre Bourdieu on habitus and field are noted to operate in varying degrees in the different age groups studied. The older generations being the repository of knowledge and active practitioners of the Higaunon culture have bigger habitus than the younger generation. On the other hand, the younger generation has bigger field than the older ones because of the structure or the external forces that impinge upon the culture of the Higaunon.

Keywords: Higaunon, habitus, field, acculturation, *binukid*, ancestral domain

Introduction

The Indigenous Peoples (IPs) of the Philippines held a distinct culture before the colonization of the Spanish, American, and Japanese in the archipelago. Formerly, the indigenous people were the original settlers having the highest regard on their customs and rituals. However, as time goes by the IPs evolved into a minority group of decreasing social, economic, political power. Technology threatened their traditions and modernity infringed on their rights (Ting Jr. et al., 2008).

In the study of Burton (2010), she stated that Northern Mindanao of the Philippines is endowed with rich biodiversity. The people have a broad understanding of their ecosystem as the source for their own existence. However, with the encroachment of the migrants into their habitat and the government's policy on public land use, these indigenous communities have changed. With displacement, they have to leave or abandon their traditional culture, particularly the indigenous knowledge of their subsistence system and the uses of varied plants that maintained their existence over the centuries.

Indigenous Peoples are usually involved in the ancestral land claim issue. For instance, in the study of Manabilang (2009), she discussed the fear and terror brought by the mining operations of Toronto Ventures Incorporated (TVI) to the Subanons of Mt. Canatuan, Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte which forced the said IP to leave their ancestral domain. The study gives emphasis to the horrible effects of mining to the economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental life of this indigenous people. In the case of Barangay Tankulan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, the Indigenous People specifically the Higaunon tribe also experienced changes in their cultural, economic, political and environmental aspects. It is also observed that these changes have significant bearing on the continuity and disappearance of their physical and cognitive spaces which could only be understood by comparing the life experiences of the different Higaunon age groups.

Objectives of the Study

This study aims to document the continuities or disappearance of the cognitive and physical spaces of the Higaunon in Barangay Tankulan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon by examining the changes in their cultural, religious, economic, political and environmental experiences. Specifically, this study attempted to trace the early settlers in the locale; the life-stage experiences of the informants in terms of their culture, religion, economy, politics and environment; the spaces in their lives that have continued or have disappeared based on their recall of their life stages and the factors contributing to the continuity or disappearance of their spaces.

Theoretical Framework


The postmodern theorists like Pierre Bourdieu explain the objective and subjective structures being the basis of representation and analysis of social experience. He is also credited for the concept habitus and field. His arguments about habitus and field focus on the actor as the actors of social world. Moreover, he contends that structures exist in the social world in order to identify the different struggles besetting the occupants in their social space given their corresponding historical account.

Habitus is defined as the subjective mental structures or cognitive structures of the individual to deal with the social world. On the other hand, field is a system of relations among the objective positions within it. According to Bourdieu, the field is an arena of battle or the field of struggle (Ritzer, 1996). The structure of the field is "to illustrate and to obtain the via-strategies that undergird and guide the strategies whereby the occupants of these positions seek, individually or collectively, to safeguard or improve their position, and to impose the principle of hierarchization most favorable to their own products" (Ritzer, 1996).

Bourdieu's theory explains the reality of false opposition between the objectivism and subjectivism within his thought, the "absurd opposition between individual and society" (Ritzer, 1996). Objectivism is a means of assurance of a historical matrix or framework to determine the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or righteousness. On the other hand, subjectivism means the interest of the people to provide their environment or itself in the social world (May, 2001). As applied in this study, habitus and field constitute the historical struggle in the Higaunon's past to trace their cultural identity (cognitive space) given their position in their own physical space, their ancestral land, with the entry of migrants and wealthy landlords.

Figure 1 below shows the connections of the variables in the study. As an ethnic group, the Higaunon has a distinct culture and identity, history and natural resources which were handed down to them by the early and native settlers in the barangay. The life experiences of the Higaunon with respect to their cultural, religious, economic, political and environmental aspects helped in determining the factors that have caused the continuity and disappearance of their physical and cognitive spaces. These factors have brought effects or changes on their current situation as Higaunon which could be either positive or negative. The negative effects or changes necessitate desirable responses on their part.

Figure 1. Analytical Framework of the Study



Methodology

This study utilized a qualitative research method employing ethnography. The term qualitative means that the "data are not reduced to numbers, added, or subtracted." The qualitative data provided the researchers the depth of understanding that could be learned through careful observations and interviews. According to Malinowski, the qualitative data give the researcher a complete and accurate picture of social organization together with its parts (as cited by Hessler, 1992).

With the use of ethnography, the data in this study were gathered using non-participant observation complemented with key informant interviews. Walcott (2008) defined ethnography as the science of *cultural description*. It was also stated that ethnography is “primarily a process that attempts to describe and interpret social expressions between people or groups” (Berg, 2009).

In order to capture the life experiences of the informants, this study also made use of life history method. For Atkinson (1998), life history is “a fairly complete narrating of one’s entire experience of life as a whole, highlighting the most important aspects.” Through the use of this method, the informants also narrated their life experiences which captured when and how their physical and cognitive spaces had disappeared or continued over time.

There were nine informants who were interviewed in this study comprising of three aged Higaunon (60 years old and above), three adults (35 to 55 years old), and three young adults (20 to 30 years old). There were three male and six female informants whose ages are 22-82. Five of them were married and four were single, four finished college, seven were Roman Catholics, and their monthly income ranged from P1,500 to P33,559. Married informants got married at ages 19 to 32. They usually had their first child when they were 20 to 32 years old. The aged Higaunon informants who were grandparents already had their first grandchild at ages 44 to 52 years old.

In choosing the informants of the study, the researchers used snowball sampling technique. This technique is used when the informants of the research is difficult to locate. The researchers collected data on the few members of the target population he or she can locate, and then asked those individuals to provide information needed to locate other members of that population whom they know (Patton, 1990).

Strict adherence of research ethics was observed in the data gathering proper. Assurance of leisure time of the key informants was also considered. Furthermore, researchers also considered the cultural beliefs and traditions of the Higaunon in Barangay Tankulan through participation in the rituals required by the religious leaders before and after we conducted the research. Analysis of data also made use of qualitative approach employing cross-case thematic data analysis.

Results and Discussion

Early Settlers in Barangay Tankulan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon

The original Higaunon settlers in the area bore the family names with Higaunon ancestry like Tinga, Onahon, Gumaling, Lumala, Mancawan, Lahayon, Lompon, Sambalan, Sanhiron, Binayao, Hinoyog, and Dagunlay. Among the Higaunon families mentioned, Gumaling was the first mayor appointed by the Americans in the municipality of Maluko (the previous name of Manolo Fortich) during the pre-war period way back 1920s. He was the only Higaunon settler who was able to obtain the highest political position so far.

The coming of the first multinational company in Tankulan, Del Monte Corporation, changed the physical and social landscapes of the area. The company started business in 1928, cultivating the ancestral land of the natives and turning it into a pineapple plantation (PASAGI Annotated

Document, 1997). It has been responsible also for the exodus of migrants coming from the Visayas archipelago due to the employment opportunities provided by the company.

The American Philippine Company came in 1914 and established more than 10,000-hectare ranch in Barangay Tankulan and Dicklum, bringing with it families who were ranchers (PASAGI Annotated Document, 1997). Also, migration of rich and prominent Christian families followed bearing the family names of Cordovez, Fortiche, Domingo, Alberece, Hisona, and Valdehueva. These families had eventually assumed powerful roles in the community as they inhabited Manolo Fortich while the natives were relegated into the subordinate position. Cordovez was a judge and rancher. Fortich was a rancher from Cebu who was appointed governor during the American period and later moved to Bohol in 1990s. Domingo served for two terms as mayor and was credited for changing the name of the municipality from Maluko to Manolo Fortich during his term per Republic Act No. 1720, approved in June 21, 1957. Albarece, originally from Ilocos, was appointed mayor of Manolo Fortich and was responsible for improving the town's social services. Hisona served as councilor. Valdehueva was also a known rancher.

The other group and institution that came later to Tankulan were the Muslims and the 52nd Engineering Brigade of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) whose families are now occupying spaces in the barangay. As seen, the intrusion of all the structural forces above demonstrate the context upon which other changes in the aspects of the Higaunon can be described.

Life-Stage Experiences of Higaunon

Culture

A Higaunon could identify their fellow Higaunon by their physical appearance and their manner of speaking their native language which is the *binukid*. Their tone in speaking the dialect is distinct from the other affiliated linguistic groups and only a Higaunon can distinguish that. They could also be recognized by their Higaunon family names, their traditional costumes which are very colorful and full of symbolisms, their preference for traditional food (*dakan*, leaves of tubers cooked in a mixture of coconut milk), and their own cultural beliefs and practices.

All of them are aware that *binukid* or the Higaunon dialect has been the language used in their community. They have been proud that they are Higaunon by blood since the younger generations show notable success in their own professions which bring name to the community. They equally compete with the non-Higaunon very effectively.

Most of them are aware of the Higaunon's cultural beliefs and practices especially in agriculture. However, only the aged informants followed these practices. The adult and young adult informants knew only the beliefs and practices but are not familiar as to the process of performing them. Since the traditional knowledge is confined only to the older community members, the younger generations failed to integrate the same fully into their life. What exacerbates the situation also are the processes of intermarriage and modernization penetrating the life of the natives due to intensified inter-ethnic contacts brought about by heavy in-migration of non-natives, formal education and the influence of Christianity. All these forces put the preservation of Higaunon cultural heritage at stake.

With respect to their courtship and wedding beliefs and practices, the ritual called *pamalas* (a ritual done to drive away misfortune) is performed before the day of the wedding ceremony of the couple. In observing the practice of thanksgiving, they also perform the rituals called *pamuhat* (offering) and *pamahandi* (sharing ritual). Again, these are popular only among the aged Higaunon but not among the younger ones.

They also mentioned their historical or sacred places. Most of them considered rock formations and bodies of water like the Mangima River and Sosohon Creek as sacred areas being ritual sites. In establishing land boundaries, the Higaunon natives used ropes, wires and plant boundary markers like *binog tree*, mango tree and bamboo. They utilized the limits of eyesight and the distance they can point a finger at as land demarcation. At present, concrete boundary markers locally called "*muhon*" are more commonly used.

In the past, conflicts were resolved with the help of the chieftain or other tribal leaders. But today, this process is no longer followed by the Higaunon in Tankulan. Most of the informants recounted that during their childhood years, they were practitioners of their native traditions. However, nowadays, Higaunon culture is slowly disappearing because only the old generation preserved the tradition. The failure lies in the inability of the older generations to transmit the traditional knowledge to the younger generations. Put simply, traditional knowledge is the restricted domain of the aged ones. This brings the younger Higaunon less exposed to the cultural hallmarks of their tradition. Enculturation of cultural beliefs and practices of the group is not successfully obtained. All these make the Higaunon culture at risk of disappearing. As a consequence, the older generation has bigger habitus and the younger generation has a bigger field.

Religion

Magbabaya is the supreme being of the Higaunon. He is god the father who is believed to have resided in trees, stones, lands, and even in water. The Higaunon also believed in the spiritual being in nature which they called *apo*. This IP still observed the traditional ways in connecting with their supreme being by performing *pamuhat* or *pamahandi*. These rituals are done in dedication to their gods and deities and as a way of letting Him enter into the lives of the natives and give them a bountiful life.

Generally, old informants still stick to their traditional religious practices because they usually perform rituals especially when good things happen, while younger Higaunon are not practicing them anymore. The influence of the field like Christianity, education, social, technological changes and the demise of aged people who are the repositories of their culture lead to the slow disappearance of their religious practices and rituals. The habitus is slowly vanishing especially among the young ones because of the aforementioned external factors.

Economy

During their childhood, most of the Higaunon in Barangay Tankulan are farming their own land. Their economic resource provides them with adequate food for the family. The majority of the informants live in houses made of bamboo, *nipa* (palm), *cogon* grass, and lumber/wood. Their dress/clothing used to be handmade from fabrics peddled by the merchants in their place. Now, they usually use second hand clothing or the *ukay-ukay*. However, most of them do not use their traditional clothing

anymore since wearing the same occurred only when they have their tribal meetings and during their annual ethnic festival called *Kaamulan* being held in March at Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. This is the occasion where the seven ethnic communities in Bukidnon come together, notably the Higaunon, Talaandig, Pulangihon, the Central Bukidnon Matigasalug, and the Southern Manobo groups which include the Matigasalug, Umayamnon, and Tigwahanon (Aguado, 2009).

One of the causes for the disappearance of Higaunon ancestral domain was through selling their lands to the migrants. Sometimes, they just bartered their lands with primary commodities like salt, dried or canned fish, wine, etc. Also, the switch in the occupations of the younger generation who have become professionals and who are no longer interested in land management is the other factor. This consequently leads to the failure of the family to pass on their rights over their ancestral domain to the next generation.

Moreover, some structural and legal forces drove the natives out of their own land. For instance, based on the document of PASAGI (Higaunon tribal council), the natives were coerced to leave their ancestral land to give way to the migrants who put up businesses in the area, like ranches. This was done through land conversion of native lands approved by the national government before the implementation of IPRA. Instead, the natives became the cattlemen, horsemen, *muchachos*, and *alalay* (domestic helpers) of these ranchers. To give way to the Nellore, Brahmins and Herefords stock of cows from Texas, USA, the Talaandig-Higaunon were evicted, banished and driven out from their ancestral land. Thus, these forces caused the disappearance of ancestral land of the Higaunon.

The above discussions point out that the Higaunon's economy has been largely affected by structural forces that explain the disappearance of their ancestral domain which is their physical space. Moreover, their marginalization is also the result of globalization and modernization as the capitalists move into the area converting the land use of Tankulan from agricultural to commercial farming. The economic transformation of the place reduced as well the economic position of the native settlers since they became the subordinate class serving the capitalist migrants.

Politics

The traditional political structure of the Higaunon comprises of the supreme *datu* and council of elders and other positions like warriors and religious specialists. The most sought-after qualities of a leader include the following: trustworthiness, approachability, education, maturity, integrity, helpfulness, servanthood, godliness, commitment to duty, and will power in order to help solve the problems of the community.

Many problems were brought to the Higaunon leaders but the most common one is about their ancestral domain claim against the migrant capitalists especially the Del Monte Corporation. Since 1920, this corporation has been utilizing the Higaunon ancestral domain. Right now, the tribal leaders and aged Higaunons are taking actions to force the corporation to recognize their claim. The process of claiming back their land is not easy and resistance on the part of the powerful capitalist is indeed strong. However, since only the aged Higaunon are usually the ones who continue to protect and fight for their ancestral lands, this implies that if the aged ones cease to fight for this cause, it will be the start of the total disappearance of their physical space.

If there are serious feuds in the Higaunon community, a ritual called *Tampoda* or *Tampudaho Balagon* (peace pact symbolized by the ceremonial cutting of a rattan strip) is employed to resolve the conflict. This is a traditional institution employed in managing feuds. It is symbolized in an unwritten pact or agreement arrived at for the protection of life, legacy and land; it embodies mutual trust in maintaining peace and unity (Rodil et al., 1999). A *tampoda* is facilitated by a *datu*. In this ritual, a thin strip of *balagon* (rattan) which symbolizes the source of hatred and anger is laid across the hard surface of a rounded piece of wood to be cut by a single stroke of a bolo by the *datu*. Usually a *datu* represents each of the two parties and holds either end of the strip of rattan. At the same time, a chick is laid on the piece of wood beside the thin strip of rattan. The chick's neck and the rattan strip must be cut at the same time. This is offered to the violent spirits that drive the families into feuds and make them so angry as to kill each other. The blood that has been let from the chick's neck stops the spirits' coercion on the feuding families. The strip of rattan that is cut is buried with the chicken, if the latter is small. If the chicken is big enough, it is cooked.

Politically, the traditional leaders of the community have a great role in keeping order and in claiming back their ancestral domain. However, the younger generations are no longer aware of the traditional selection process in choosing a *datu* and their scope of power. Furthermore, younger successors to Higaunon leadership are beginning to refuse their hereditary positions because of their desire to find more gainful employment. Also, with modernization, premium is given to achieved position which gives the bearer a higher prestige compared to an ascribed one.

Environment

In previous times, there were lots of trees in Barangay Tankulan which contributed to the freshness of air. The richness and conduciveness of the land to commercial farming attracted migrants and capitalists to settle in the area. However, as more migrants had arrived, more houses also have to be built which demanded more trees to be cut down. Other natural resources of the community were also affected like pollution of the rivers and streams since the people lack discipline and politicians did not have the will power to implement environmental laws. Also, the land utilized for commercial agriculture like pineapple plantation became acidic due to heavy reliance on fertilizer. The air quality was also affected because of the use of pesticides.

In agriculture, the natives started using fertilizers in the 80s or 90s. Prior to this, the soil was fertile enough to nourish plants without fertilizers. The Higaunon preferred to raise domesticated animals either for their daily consumption or for additional income. They domesticated pigs, chickens, goats, and especially cows and carabaos to help them in their farms.

Environmental deterioration and depletion of the natural resources in Tankulan had been the result of population pressure, commercialization of farming, overgrazing of land because of the ranches, among others. The challenge of their environmental preservation, being part of their physical space, is immense since the causes are complex and the natives have limited capabilities to handle them. The older Higaunons are more aware of these concerns than the younger generations as the former were the ones who had seen the unfolding of events that caused all these environmental issues.

Conclusions

The cognitive spaces of the Higaunon which shape their ethnicity and identity is the habitus. This means that the habitus indicates the awareness of the Higaunon on their cultural beliefs and practices which emphasize the retention of strong adherence to culture. On the other hand, the field is the structure that adversely affects the capacity of the Higaunon to abide with their culture. It constitutes the forces responsible for the continuity or the disappearance of the Higaunon's cognitive spaces. The entry of capitalist corporations, the migrants, intermarriages, modernization, education, and Christian influences represent the external forces or the field that impinge upon the social world of the Higaunon.

Land intrusion of capitalists, non-Higaunon entities and individuals into the domain of the Higaunon had both desirable and undesirable effects. The awareness of the Higaunon of their political rights as enshrined in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 prompted the aged informants to assert their rightful claims to their ancestral land. Land for the indigenous people is a central issue because it identifies their existence (see for instance Molintas, 2004; Manabilang, 2009; Baretto et al., 2010). On the other hand, the undesirable aspect of this land intrusion is the disappearance of the physical space of the Higaunon.

The land of the Indigenous People can be equated to their culture because the loss of the land could also cause the loss of their culture. It is the central part of their existence which differentiates them from other people (Ting Jr. et al, 2008). In the study of Rodil (1994) pertaining to the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs), land is sacred because they have a distinct relationship with their land for it shapes their culture. The loss of their land gravely threatens the essence of their existence. For them, no person owns the land because everybody has access to it (Ting Jr. et al., 2008).

The aged Higaunon have bigger habitus than the younger ones because the former have kept and maintained their adherence to their cultural heritage. Habitus is their cognitive space that subjectively preserves their culture. However, because of the external forces or structures like modernization and education comprising of the objective reality, field, and the failure of the aged Higaunon to transmit their rich culture to the younger generation, the younger Higaunon obtain a smaller habitus. Inversely, the latter have bigger field than the aged population in the community. This tendency has been captured by Koers (2012) when he argued that a number of present and future technological advances will permanently influence the preservation, management, dissemination, usage, and creation of cultural heritage.

Recommendations

An extensive study on ancestral domain claim issues and problems among the Bukidnon tribes is recommended to give emphasis to the commonalities and differences of the experiences of the seven ethnic tribes in the province. Also, by documenting the disappearance of both the cognitive and physical spaces of the Higaunon, it is suggested that in the design of the mother tongue-based learning modules/instructional materials of the Higaunon in the ongoing implementation of K-12, significant inputs should take account the elements of their culture capturing the language and

beliefs and practices of this people. This gesture would ensure cultural transmission and continuity of the Higaunon cultural heritage.

The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, although late in implementation, may be of help to inspire the IPs as to assert their right to self-determination, respect and recognition. The role of the National Commission on the Indigenous People (NCIP), the local government unit (LGU), Civil Society Organization (CSO) have been vital in ensuring that the ancestral domains of the IPs are protected and preserved against migrant intrusion and development aggression perpetrated by capitalists.

Furthermore, the tribal council of the Higaunon (PASAGI) being their legitimate political representation should establish more networks or linkages with Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) or CSOs to help advance their cause if the government fails to take action in the preservation of their ancestral domain and culture.

Moreover, possible support can be provided by the National Commission for the Culture and the Arts (NCAA) through fund provisions in the possible establishment of a school of living tradition/ learning center for the Higaunon IPs. Also, in this center, livelihood training and capacity building activities can be conducted in order to benefit the community.

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From Dait-Dait to Resettlement: Impacts of Mining Operations to the Mamanuas in Surigao Del Norte, Southern Philippines

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Abstract

This study aims to examine the changes in the life of the indigenous people, the Mamanua, in Cagdianao, Claver, Surigao del Norte, Southern Philippines due to development aggression caused by large-scale mining. These Mamanua were displaced from their ancestral domain, forced to abandon their *dait-dait* (small traditional house) and resettled in a community away from their main sources of living. Using a survey design, there were 30 Mamanua respondents included in this study who were asked to compare their conditions before and after their involuntary resettlement.

The findings demonstrated that significant economic, socio-cultural, and environmental changes occurred among the Mamanua which brought some positive and negative changes in their lives. Increased opportunities in income, livelihood sources, education and capacity building were the most beneficial outcomes of these changes. Inversely, they also perceived remarkable shifts in their traditional livelihood patterns, systems of traditional leadership, indigenous knowledge transmission, health care practices and mode of economic exchange. The extractive nature of mining activities also contributed to the rapid deterioration of their natural and physical environment.

Keywords: *dait dait*, involuntary resettlement, mining, indigenous people, Mamanua

Introduction

The Philippine archipelago is made up of 7,107 islands with a total area of 300,000 sq. km. It has a current population of nearly 104 million people (NSO, 2012), 75% of which belong to 8 major ethnic groups and the remaining 25% are divided among different ethnic groups and indigenous tribes. The Philippines has more than 110 ethnic tribes and cultural communities whose cultures and traditions are in varying states of extinction. These vanishing ancestral traditions and customary laws used to define social relationships and values and promoted efficiency of economic activities (Tribes and Tribal, 2007). One of the many ethnic tribes known to exist is the Mamanuas. Many of them live in the mountains of the CARAGA Region, and government statistics as of 2005 estimates the Mamanua population to be 54,394. Mamanuas are recognized by the Philippine state as Indigenous Peoples.

The word Mamanua (also spelled Mamanwa) is taken from the native words “Man” which means first, and “banwa” means forest and uncultivated land (MCN International, 1989). The Mamanuas

believe in *Magbabaja* (God) who created mankind. Further, Mamanua bears a striking physical resemblance to the Negritos. Their other name is Mamanua Negritos and is believed to be the descendants of the original settlers of the Philippines. Mamanuas are described as mountain people who are black-skinned, small of frame, kinky haired, snub-nosed and have black eyes. Generally, they are short people with an average height of 1.35 to 1.5 meters. Their names are derived from nature - from mountains, bodies of water, trees and wildlife (United Suriguenos, 2003). They speak the Mamanwa language (Minamanwa). These people are mostly from Agusan del Norte and Surigao (Wikipedia.org, 2013).

However, changes happen from time to time and so thus the Mamanuas. These people who used to live in mountains are now residing to and interacting with the lowlanders. The cause of this situation is attributed to modernization because Philippines is hoping for a more developed and industrialized country; like for instance the opening of the Benguet Mine in 1907 which is the first modern gold mine in the country. It was followed by another 17 adjacent gold mines in Baguio district. The peak of U.S. colonial rule in the Philippines during 1930's was considered as the boom years of the country's large scale mining industries, especially in gold mining. In 1936, the country's third mining law was enacted (Commonwealth Act No. 137) and the Bureau of Mines was also created. Before the outbreak of World War II, there were forty (40) operating gold mines producing thirty (30) tons per year. In the country's export trade, gold was the third most important commodity, exceeded only by sugar and coconut respectively (Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement Org., 2009).

Unfortunately, environmentally devastating socio-economic ventures, large-scale indiscriminate mining and industrial logging have brought incalculable damage to their primary source of livelihood and cultural sanctuary. The consequent destruction of their environment resulted in the further degradation of ancestral cultures which are largely shaped by the indigenous people's interaction with the natural elements. These resulting losses of their cultural identities coupled with the devastation of their environment have resulted in the serious economic displacement and cultural disempowerment of these communities. Thus, tribal communities in various geographical areas are thus among the most impoverished and marginalized sectors of Philippine society (ACPC, 2005).

Presently, the ancestral lands of the Mamanuas in Surigao del Norte covered in this study have been used by the Taganito Mining Corporation (TMC). It is the second largest Mining Company in the place. It has been shipping nickel ore to Japan since 1989, to Australia since 1999, and to China since 2007. This company was registered with the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) on March 4, 1987. It is 65% owned subsidiary of the company, and is primarily engaged in the exploration, mining and exporting of nickel ore located in Claver, Surigao del Norte (Ferolin, 2007).

In this development, the Mamanuas living in their ancestral lands since time immemorial were forcibly moved out. They are now resettled in Sitio Punta Naga, Cagdianao, Claver, Surigao del Norte, Southern Philippines. Being displaced from their own land, the Mamanuas as Indigenous People (IP) have been affected by development aggression initiated by a mining company in their locality.

Objectives of the Study

This study seeks to determine the impacts of the mining operation of Taganito Mining Corporation (TMC) among the Mamanuas in Punta Naga, Cagdianao, Surigao del Norte. In particular, this study attempts to trace the background information such as the origin of Mamanuas, their customs and traditions, concept of environment and ancestral domain and the entry of TMC. It also captures and includes the many facets of changes in the economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental aspects that occurred among the Mamanwa as impacts of mining operations before and after resettlement.

Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on modernization theory, the concept of development aggression and acculturation. These are used to explain the reasons, processes and factors involved that led to the changes in the lives of the resettled Mamanuas in the research locale attributed to Taganito Mining Corporation (TMC).

At its core, modernization theory suggests that advanced industrial technology produces not only economic growth in developing societies but also other structural and cultural changes. The common characteristics that societies tend to develop as they become modern may differ from one version of modernization theory to another. However, in general, all assume that institutional structures and individual activities become more highly specialized, differentiated, and integrated into social, political, and economic forms characteristic of advanced Western societies (Armer & Katsillis, 2010).

As a product of modernization, development brought upon by the Taganito Mining Corporation contributes to social change in various aspects in the lives of the resettled Mamanuas in the area of study. From their *dait dait* (their traditional houses), they now live in concrete houses; some are able to purchase vehicles, go to formal school and obtain jobs in TMC as laborers.

On the other hand, the pain of modernization is aptly captured by the arguments of development aggression which is under the dependency theory. It tries to explain the failure of non-industrialized countries to develop economically in spite of investments from industrial countries. The central argument of this theory is that the world economic system is highly unequal in its distribution of power and resources and places most nations in a dependent position in relation to the industrial powers (Ferraro, 2008).

Economic growth on the other hand, in the advanced industrialized countries did not necessarily lead to growth in the poorer countries. Indeed, various studies suggested that economic activity in the richer countries often led to serious economic problems in the poorer countries. However, the loss of ancestral domain of the Mamanuas to foreign investors, specifically TMC as the major mining company responsible for the resettlement of these IPs, is a clear case of development aggression. Thus, development from the point of view of the company is measured in terms of providing various assistance/programs extended to resettled Mamanuas at the expense of the latter's displacement from their original abode.

Another one is the concept of acculturation, which is a complex concept, such as the linear model and the two-dimensional model. The linear model is based on the assumption that a strong ethnic identity is not possible among those who become involved in the mainstream society and that acculturation is inevitably accompanied by a weakening of ethnic identity. Alternatively, the two-dimensional model suggests that both the relationship with the traditional or ethnic culture and the relationship with the new or dominant culture play important roles in the process (Gowing&Scott, 1971).

Using the two-dimensional model, J. W. Berry has suggested that there are four possible outcomes of the acculturation process. These are (1) Assimilation (movement toward the dominant culture), (2) Integration (synthesis of the two cultures), (3) Rejection (reaffirmation of the traditional culture), and (4) Marginalization (alienation from both cultures). Similarly, Sodowsky and Plake (1991) have defined three dimensions of Acculturation: Assimilation, Biculturalism (the ability to live in both worlds, with denial of neither), and observance of traditionality (rejection of the dominant culture).

Furthermore, acculturation explains the process of cultural and psychological change that results following meeting between cultures (Berry& Sam, 2010). The effects of acculturation can be seen at numerous levels in both interacting cultures. Acculturation often results in changes to culture, customs, and social institutions at the group level. The manifestations of group level effects of acculturation often include changes in food, clothing, and language. At the individual level, differences in the way individuals acculturate have been shown to be associated not just with changes in daily behavior, but with numerous measures of psychological and physical well-being (Wikipedia.org).

In both balanced and unbalanced types of contact situations, there are different responses on the part of the peoples involved which may be characterized as “acceptant acculturation” and “resistant acculturation.” As implied, acceptant acculturation indicates a general receptivity on the part of one people to change in the direction of the other; resistant acculturation, a lack of receptivity to do so (Gowing& Scott, 1971).

Since the Mamanuas were forced move to the lowland community, this gave them the opportunity to have a constant contact with the lowlanders. This process also allowed them to adopt some cultural beliefs and practices of the Christian majority like means of communication, education, world view, and way of living. On the other hand, there are focal aspects of the Mamanua culture that does not die easily (resistant acculturation) or with inter-ethnic contact there emerged some dual practices in which the IP and non-IP culture coexist.

Methodology

This study used triangulation method as its research design. This method is a combination of both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The qualitative approach in this study involved the use of in-depth interviews, observations, and document analysis as the data gathering tools. On the other hand, the use of survey questionnaire containing closed-ended and open-ended questions as research instrument was employed in the quantitative aspects and in comparing the conditions of the respondents before and after resettlement.

Thirty (30) resettled Mamanuas in the research locale were surveyed using convenient sampling. On the other hand, three (3) key informants were also interviewed and included; a personnel of the National Commission of the Indigenous People (NCIP), church leader in the resettlement area and the barangay chair in barangay Cagdianao. Observance of research ethics was practiced before the data gathering took place and proper entry protocols were done before community entry.

Research Locale

Claver is a second-class municipality in the province of Surigao del Norte, Philippines. It has a total land area of 322.60 square kilometres (124.56 sq. mi) and it is the largest municipality of the province. Claver frames within the grid 125° 0' to 125° 0' north latitude and 9° 21' to 9° 37' east longitude (Ferolin, 2007). As of the 2010 census, it has a population of 23,702 people (Wikipedia.org).

In the northeast, Claver is bounded by the Pacific Ocean, to the west by the town of Gigaquit, and to the south by the boundary town of Carrascal, Surigao del Sur. It is approximately 60 kilometers (37 mi) southeast of the provincial capital, Surigao City.

Claver is politically divided into fourteen (14) barangays which are the following: Bagakay (West Poblacion), Cabugo, Cagdianao, Daywan, Hayanggabon, Ladgaron (Poblacion), Lapinigan, Magallanes, Panatao, Sapa, Taganito, Tayaga (East Poblacion), Urbiztondo and Wangke (Wikipedia.org, 2013).

Those Mamanuas who are directly affected by the mining operations were originally from Barangay Taganito and Urbiztondo. They were relocated many times, in some areas in Brgy. Taganito until they were finally resettled in Sitio Punta Naga located in Barangay Cagdianao. This sitio is about 25 kilometers away from the actual mining site. Punta Naga has two housing villages, the Gawad Kalinga for the resettled non-IPs and Mamanua Village for the IPs.

The Mamanua Village is located in the seaside of North-eastern tip of Claver, facing Bucas Grande Island. The area is exclusive for the Mamanuas where it is located away from the Gawad Kalinga (non-IPs). This allows the resettled Mamanuas to have privacy and adjustments in their new environment.

The Mamanua Village also consists of two Mamanua communities with two tribal leaders. The upper part of the village is headed by Datu Reynante Buklas, the tribal leader from Taganito. The lower part is also for the resettled Mamanuas from Urbiztondo headed by Datu Alicia Patac.

Results and Discussion

Origins of the Mamanua

According to the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) in CARAGA, Mamanuas are one of the Indigenous Peoples in Surigao del Norte. They are culturally distinct group of people living in marginal-out-of-the-way places of Northern Mindanao particularly in the provinces of Agusan and Surigao. In Surigao del Norte, they are most concentrated in the suburbs of Claver, Gigaquit, Bacuag,

Alegria, Mainit, Malimono, Tubod, San Francisco, Placer, and Surigao City. They are classified as full-blooded Negritos in every respect, physically and culturally.

The Mamanuas traditionally live in “*dait-dait*”, the windscreen used to protect themselves from the weather. It utilizes materials such as wild banana, coconut fronds, grass, and bamboo for flooring. Rattan is used to tie the house together. The Mamanuas also build bigger versions of *dait-dait* which they use as communal houses. These houses are built by joining together windscreen to form a tent-like shelter. In which the center is left vacant for ritual dancing and other social activities. They typically transfer their sites when the area seems to breed diseases, as indicated by the abundance of flies, or when the area no longer yields enough food for the band (NCIP, 2006).

The political system of the Mamanua is an informal one which was largely based on respect for elders who exert control over judicial affairs and maintain peace and order within the band. In terms of education, Mamanua children acquire education from their parents. Usually, the father taught the boys and the mother taught the girls. In terms of making a living, Mamanua parents impart their knowledge through apprenticeship. Religious education is also transmitted to the children orally (NCIP, 2006).

There is a direct relationship between indigenous culture and the land or immediate environment from where it springs. One may say that land is the material foundation of indigenous culture. Some evidence that support these statements are the following: Mamanuas are python meat-eaters; they practiced indigenous medications with the use of their flora and fauna for the cure of a variety of ailments that they suffer, skin diseases and cosmetics, utilize forest and land resources for livelihood needs.

Loss and destruction of ancestral land can mean not only loss of livelihood but also of their culture and identity. Loss of their land has also effect on their interaction with their gods, deities, and spirits. Their enculturation process is also enhanced by their connection to their land.

Mamanua’s view of ancestral domain was made by mutual agreements where the rivers, creeks, mountains and old trees become the traditional boundaries between tribal sectors and clans. Some of these places, particularly the burial sites, were being planted of bamboo trees to serve as markers, while others locate their burial grounds next to an abyss or earth cut for easy identification when necessary.

Community Entry of TMC (Taganito Mining Corporation)

The Taganito Mining Corporation (TMC) is a mining branch of Nickel Asia, a member of Zamora group of companies operating in Claver, Surigao del Norte, and is one of largest lateritic nickel ore suppliers in the Philippines. The operation began in 1986 and covering up almost 5,000 hectares. The nickel ore that they extract is mainly exported to China and Japan (NAC Annual Report, 2012).

TMC never consulted nor gave assistance to the Mamanuas for almost 20 years. It was only after the implementation of the IPRA in 1997 and the Mining Act in 1995 that TMC started to have concerns over the Mamanua in 2006 when the company signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with these IPs. In the MOA, TMC is committed to give 1% royalty share from their gross output to the directly affected Mamanuas as mandated by the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and the Indigenous Peoples Republic Act of 1997. This is done in exchange of using the ancestral lands of the IP for mining operations.

They were resettled by the mining company to Barangay Cagdianao from their original Barangays which are Taganito and Urbiztondo. TMC also built concrete houses, clinic, school, church, basketball court and provided basic services like water and electrical supply in the area. They were also given educational opportunities and accessed to formal jobs, skills training and on-the-job training programs. TMC also funded a mine rehabilitation program to restore the natural environment of the damages caused by TMC. They also planted native tree species endemic in the area such as *payuspos* and *mangkono* and forest trees like *antipolo*, *mangium*, *bagras* and *auriculiformis* to regenerate the forest in the mined-out area.

Implementation of MOA through Assistance provided by the Mining Company to the Resettled Mamanuas

The succeeding discussions are derived from the secondary data taken from various sources like Nickel Asia Annual Reports, TMC Publications (Taganito Times), among others, which summarize the major programs, assistance, facilities extended by Taganito Mining Corporation to the Mamanua:

Economic Assistance

- Under employment, some Mamanuas are for exploration works such as drilling or environmental unit and loading or maintenance crew every shipment. The TMC provided work to them in which they are capable of (MOA).
- Financial assistance to Mamanuas every year from 2006 to 2031 worth five hundred thousand pesos (PhP 500,000.00) (MOA).
- In December 4, 2009, the mining company turned over two (2) Toyota Hi-Lux Cars, two (2) single motorcycles to the Mamanua community with their respective Datus and socio economic projects for the whole community worth 5 million pesos (Surigao Today, 2009).

Livelihood Assistance

- Mamanua women of the Taganito Mining Community commenced Handicrafts Development cum Production Training-Workshop together with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Surigao del Norte. The participants learned the basics of handicraft production which included the proper selection of quality Romblon/Pangtod leaves, drying, stripping (*gilas*), roping, weaving/centipeding, dyeing, molding and varnishing (Quirequire2007).
- The Communications Technology Working Group (CTWG) facilitated coconut planting in some parts of the Mamanuas ancestral domain during the 2nd quarter of 2007. The coconuts are imported and fast growing varieties, which they could harvest after five years only. The TMC also gave a carabao to 10 families as part of livelihood (Ferolin, 2007).

Environment Assistance

- The Taganito Mining Corporation and the Environmental Management Bureau signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) last March 22, 2011. All managers and supervisors of TMC signed a note of commitment to protect their surroundings including the river system in whatever jobs or positions they occupy and do (Taganito Times, 2007).
- There were sixty-three (63) youth leaders from the mining communities who were enrolled in Taganito and Claver National High Schools who participated in the first Environmental Youth Camp and Leadership Training supported and conducted by the Taganito Mining

Corporation on July 29-30, 2011. The program was entitled “*Kamp Kalikasan at Kabataan.*” It was an opportunity for the youth of the barangay of Claver (host mining community) to participate in environmental projects (Dela Rosa, 2011).

- The TMC also assisted in reshaping the mine-out area and backfilling of top soil in preparation for planting for mine rehabilitation. In 2011, there was an inventory of 34,045 planting stocks which were used for the 2012 reforestation. In 2012, a total of 90,605 remaining seedlings were carried over to 2013 reforestation. There were 5,000 seedlings produced from the Contracted Seedling Program (Taganito Times, 2012).

Health Assistance

- In 2012, TMC and Taganito High-Pressure Acid Leach (THPAL) organized a 3-day medical and surgical mission to the mining communities: serving both the IPs and non-IPs on February 18 to 21, 2012. A team of (forty) 40 doctors and volunteers from Manila Adventist Medical Center and Far Eastern University (FEU) Medical Society of California assisted about 2,000 people from mining communities of Surigao del Norte and Dinagat Islands (Taganito Times, 2012).
- TMC provides water treatment facility in the midst of current water scarcity. Residents mostly from the host mining communities lined up every day in order to have a quality and safe water to drink (MDA, 2013).
- TMC and THPAL both shouldered each PHP 74,592.74 for the materials and labors for the construction of the TB DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment Strategy) Clinic in Punta Naga established in December 10, 2012 through a signed resolution by the eighteen (18) Mamanua tribal leaders. It is a tripartite coordination between the Department of Health, National Commission for the Indigenous People and the mining companies: Taganito Mining Corporation and Taganito HPAL (THPAL) (Urbiztondo, 2012).

Education and Leadership

- Mamanuas were assisted in terms of formulating their 2010 community plan, financial literacy, the planning and implementation of a Mamanua store and cafe’ adjacent to the new housing area, and other initiatives, including the continuing provision of Indigenous Learning System (ILS) teachers (MOA).
- Under the Adopt-A-School-Program, TMC and THPAL spent 10 million pesos for the bright future of the Mamanua children. The first complete elementary school from Grade 1 to Grade 6 built under the Adopt-A-School-Program in the CARAGA region. The school was built in May 2012 and finished 6 months after (October 2012). The school was a well-furnished building with sixteen (16) classrooms, a faculty room, a complete library, a kindergarten room and ALS room (Asilo, 2012).
- Last November 23, 2012 at Tavern Resort Hotel, the Canadian Embassy in coordination with the Surigao Chamber of Mines conducted a BizCamp summit. This summit was designed to enhance the capabilities of BizCamp trainers in implementing entrepreneurship training for the host communities. There were 30 delegates including Mamanua and the TMC (Asilo, 2012).

Infrastructure Support

- TMC brought the affected Mamanuas to a temporary resettlement site located in Barangay Taganito. However, the TMC built houses for them made of plywood but it was inappropriate for their cultural practices. This relocation site area was already used in mining and finished using the land and the water there is polluted (Amnesty International, 2007).
- After two years in their temporary resettlement, in 2010 with respect to the Mamanuas in the area of the operations, the TMC constructed 120 housing in coordination with the Gawad Kalinga Foundation for the indigenous tribal communities of Taganito and Urbiztondo. Funding for this project is over and above the company's commitment under its Social Development Management Plan (SDMP) (Urbanek, 2010).

Impacts of Mining Operation to the Mamanua

Economy

The traditional occupations of the Mamanua are subsistence farming, hunting and fishing. The money economy did not have much value in their life before because goods are shared and sometimes bartered. However, their farming and fishing practices as well as their economic sufficiency remained the same which could mean the integration of their traditional economic practices and modern ways. This process could be labelled as biculturalism. However, with their resettlement due to the entry of mining company, they started adapting to other forms of livelihood like employment in mining exposing them more to the use of money economy. With modernization, some traditional economic practices of the Mamanuas like barter system as a medium of exchange has been eroded and shifted into a more innovative one which is introduced by the mainstream society. Modernization theory captures this particular change, as money economy as a kind of economic system, facilitates acquisition of goods and commodities in the daily economic transactions of the Mamanua. Also, more interest in using modern gadgets like cellular phones becomes predominant in their lives at the present.

With regard to the income of the Mamanua, the study pointed out that the same has increased after resettlement because of the mining assistance and job opportunities offered by the company. They are also becoming dependent from the mining company, to quote *"At present, many of us only depend on the benefits provided by the mining companies. Our income now becomes bigger than before because of mining. Our way of living is easier nowadays than before; today we can buy food and dress of our own and sometimes load for our cellular phone."* Money orientation and availing of modern gadgets have been few of the economic changes in their lives brought about by mining, a shift from the traditional and more community-oriented emphasis.

Politics

The political system of the Mamanua is largely based on respect for elders who exert control over judicial affairs and maintain peace and order within the band. The system is an informal one, a product of significant Mamanua traits such as frankness and the lack of desire to seek power and influence for self-interest.

The band can be considered as a democratic political organization. The main duty of the chieftain, usually the elder, is to maintain peace and harmony within the band. The accepted rules or laws are

those norms enshrined by tradition. The chief is also expected to be a *"tambayon"*, an eloquent speaker and a good counselor or judge.

The Mamanuas have their own unwritten laws. These indigenous laws are transmitted orally and through actual practice from generation to generation up to the present time. These laws vouch for their affairs, disputes settlements, fishing, farming, burial, sacred and residential grounds and their daily activities and occupations. Willful violations of these laws, however, would give rise to disputes and those found guilty thereof are duly punished.

However, with their resettlement, the major change in politics is the strengthening of the alliance of the chieftains of the affected communities which entered a MOA with TMC. There is a need for representation of the Mamanua in securing that the IPs are able to get the benefits due them as stipulated in the MOA and as mandated by the IPRA and the Mining Act of 1995. However, political conflicts ensued in since the other chieftains claiming also their rights in the lands used by the mining company are concerned. The kinship system has also weakened as loyalties now are centered on leaders who can secure the best economic benefits for the Mamanua community. This idea is echoed by one of the respondents, *"I agree that our kinship weakens, maybe it is because of the lowlanders (Christians) who became our new friends."* Biculturalism takes the form of changes in their politics as the political leaders tried to secure their community interest as they also enjoy the luxuries and comfort provided to them by the financial assistance and commodities they have obtained from the mining company.

Religion Beliefs and Practices

What seems to be strong and stable is the religious core of the Mamanua. This study discovered that they still believe in *Magbabadja* as the Supreme Being who they believe dwells in nature. They still offer religious rituals and practices to connect themselves with their god and other nature spirits. It is the aspect of the Mamanua that seems to be less affected by the processes of assimilation and modernization being the locus of their religious identity even after resettlement. Their belief in *Magbabadja* is still strong despite the penetration of Christian religious groups in the area. This is strongly expressed by this statement from the respondent, *"Our beliefs in our God have not changed even after our resettlement."*

Language and Education

Mamanua language (Minamanwa) has been the same even after resettlement. They prefer to use their own dialect in communicating to each other both before and after they have been resettled. Their ways of relating and communicating with each other using their own dialect are not tempered even with their resettlement. This is the process of reaffirmation of their ethnic roots which in the acculturation process can be subsumed under the category of rejection – rejection of the ways of the other people.

Before resettlement, the Mamanuas refused to be educated and learn the ways of Christian majority. However, what is apparent at the present is the preference of the Mamanua to go to formal schooling because of access and availability of teachers, as they said *"Before, educational practices were not proper. Today, the school provided by the mining company is near. Teachers are*

available to educate our children who learn more knowledge. Before, we could not send our children to school because our houses were very far."

Language is a very important indicator of ethnic identity. However, Mamanuas cannot escape the ethnic stereotype attached to them being physically distinct due to their skin color and hair texture. The non-IPs usually called them *kongking* which literally means monkey and is in fact derogatory in nature. However, the recognition and support provided by the mining company to them enhanced their self-esteem. This is captured by this statement of the informant, *"There is nothing to be ashamed about. We are popular in the town because the mining gave us assistance in exchange of using our land. Before, there were few people who called us kongking because we are ugly and black. I do not want to be called kongking either. But later on, the people stopped calling us in such name anymore."*

Health

The Mamanua has its own indigenous health care system utilizing the rich flora and fauna resources in the community. They also have their own health care providers in the presence of the *baylan* or traditional religious healer. When they were resettled, there was a significant change in the health awareness and preference on health care management system. This time, because of the availability of modern health care providers and facilities, the Mamanuas already subscribe to modern medical system. Their concept of health and illness has already changed based on the perspective of modern health. However, what is still prevalent is coexistence of dual health-seeking behaviour systems where they employ both the modern and indigenous health care management systems which they believe enhanced their well-being. A respondent has this to say, *"Our resettlement is of big help because we are able to learn new ways to treat ourselves; we are also able to enjoy a better life."*

Perception of the Respondents towards their Geophysical Environment

Changes or significant differences were founded in the environmental condition of their soil, air and water which point out to the environmental destruction brought by the mining companies to their natural environment. There was indeed a huge natural environment damage in the area based also on the observation of the researchers who visited the places surrounding Cagdianao.

Topsoil erosion and deforestation due to open mining has been noted by the respondent to quote *"We cannot use the soil for planting anymore because it is mined out and it is very dusty."* The loss of vegetation is caused by miners who removed or extracted topsoil before they start the operation, cutting and clearing the trees in the process.

The conditions of their bodies of water like sea, rivers and lakes had been polluted due to siltation and water contamination because of acid drainage. This respondent has this to say, *"The water was really good before because we only got it in the springs. It was very safe and we did not get any illnesses"*.

Air quality deterioration at the present is articulated by this respondent, *"We still feel the freshness of the air but during early morning and night time only. The air is so polluted during the day."* Dustiness and the humidity of the air are the major physical traces of environmental degradation in the place. The mining company remedied this problem by sprinkling water on the road everyday to minimize the dustiness. Despite the attempt of the mining company to mitigate the environmental

hazards of mining through reforestation and other efforts, still, mining results in irreversible environmental damages.

Summary Conclusions

The Mamanuas who live in Claver were once close to nature. They had a self-sufficient economic activity, rich culture and tradition and its social organization was simple. They survived through fishing, hunting and farming in their natural habitat. They considered their place as their ancestral domain.

Because the area is very rich in natural resource especially nickel ore, interested capitalists came and developed the place into a mining area. Many Mamanuas were displaced and were relocated many times because of the entry of the mining companies. It was then unfortunate that the mining capitalists never gave attention to the Mamanuas who owned the place for almost 20 years. Many of them live in poverty and experienced a dreadful quality of life. Their natural environment has also been destroyed that resulted into different kinds of pollution compromising environmental integrity.

These situations indicate the development aggression experienced by the Mamanuas who became victims rather than partners in development planning. In the nation's quest for development, the capitalists usually take precedence over and above the natives who need the most attention because of their abject poverty. This can be said to be the price of uneven development.

However, things became better when TMC concluded a MOA with the IP. Also, the company included both the IPs and the host community in its Social Development and Management Plan (SDMP) which is the corporate social responsibility (CSR) arm of the company. These company efforts improved substantially and altered the conditions of the IPs.

The social change in the Mamanua community has implications to the acculturation process experienced by the resettled respondents. Using John W. Berry's two-dimensional model of acculturation, the processes of assimilation, rejection and biculturalism were evident. In this study, assimilation is notable among the Mamanuas in the following aspects; means of living, source of income, importance of money, perception of economic sustainability, materialism, kinship relationship, formal and informal education, adoption of Christian ways, health awareness and health care management . In fact, the respondents in their village have cars, motorcycles, and gadgets like cell phones which for them provide positive effects to their lives. The grip of Mamanwa tradition has weakened resulting in the adoption of the cultural practices of the dominant non-IP.

Acculturation however, also takes the form of rejection which is defined as reaffirmation of the traditional culture. The retention of the cultural hallmarks of a culture is noticeable as an outcome. This process was observed in the following experiences of the Mamanuas; farming and fishing practices, economic self-sufficiency, ways of communication, identity, and health concept. These are the practices which define the Mamanua as to who they are.

Moreover, the last acculturation process that emerged was biculturalism. Biculturalism is the synthesis of the two cultures. This process was manifested in their current political practices and

rituals and health management of the IPs. Syncretism and subscribing to both modern and traditional health management systems that was noticeable in the respondents.

Furthermore, the geophysical environment of the IPs (in terms of its air, soil, and water quality) suffered from degradation. The sustainable development framework which looks at the balance of economic feasibility, social viability and environmental integrity is not achieved in the community. Development in the mining sites seemingly proceeded at the expense of the environment.

Recommendations

Based on the results of the study, the researchers would like to recommend the following:

A comparative study could be made between the resettled and non-resettled Mamanua residents for the whole province of Surigao del Norte, Philippines to determine the multi-faceted impacts of mining operations into the area and the residents. This way, patterns of similarities and differences in these multi-ethnic communities can be documented so that areas calling for actions intended for policy making, economic, social and environmental inventions can be drawn.

Also, an environmental impact assessment can be conducted in the mining sites to monitor the extent of environmental damage that can be attributed to the mining activities. Polluters' tax can be demanded to these companies based on the seriousness of damage they pose to the environment.

Aspects pertaining to the process of community empowerment have not been thoroughly explored in the study. The theoretical positions related to power relations, power struggles and related social processes are recommended in order to note potential community forces or relations that can be tapped for sustainable economic development.

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**“JentonTurunJenton”:
Kinship and the Leadership of *Tumenggung Nggrip* among “Orang Rimba”
Indigenous Communities Jambi, Indonesia**

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Background

Political leadership in indigenous communities, and of *Tumenggung Nggripin* particular, and his views on existence in Bukit Duabelas National Park, is the basis of this paper. The Orang Rimba²⁹ community is flexible in the face of changes that are occurring in TNBD, Jambi in Indonesia. Its members have adopted a new culture that is derived from an ‘out group’ (the people)³⁰ in order to survive as an indigenous people living in the forest. Orang Rimba community’s leaders still exist because *Tumenggung Nggrip* has been able to lead and develop policies on sustainable livelihoods, for the present and future.

Tumenggung Nggrip leads the Orang Rimba according to customary law, using expertise in managerial politics, and controls both the group and its relations with outsiders. The *Tumenggung* form of leadership is more visible when solving problems; and ingenuity is required so that he commands respect in the community. Disobedience, defiance and even a mass exodus are forms of disagreement that can take place if political decisions made and policies developed are not satisfactory to the group. The break-up of a group happens not only due to conflict, but also due to the availability of resources or a population explosion, after which a group may break-up into smaller parts, leading to some competition to become a *tumenggung*. Ultimately, customary rules (*rimbo law*) which state “jenton turun jenton”³¹ (males replace males) are still strong in the jungle, followed by elections of *Tumenggung*. *Tumenggung* through kinship gives the children a golden opportunity to take on political leadership in the jungle, and this system was previously responsible for accommodating Orang Rimba living in TNBD, within the midst of changes in forest conditions.

The study of forms of leadership among indigenous communities such as the Orang Rimba is important given their presence in a particular area. *TumenggungNggrip* leadership of indigenous people like the Orang Rimba in TNBD can help us to see and analyze the existence of the community. Research on indigenous leadership is still important, and the results of this study may help explain the survival of the community in the face of socio-cultural change.

²⁹ Orang Rimba, called Orang Kubu (Dirty) Suku Anak Dalam (government called) are indigenous people who live in the Jungle, they are still living simply by hunting and gathering, living under the big trees as well as having their own religious.

³⁰ People means they are not part of Orang Rimba, such as citizens

³¹ It means the local culture of the Orang Rimba that governs how the chief/traditional leaders could only be replaced by the next generation of male gender and leadership systems such as dynasty

Leadership in the form of the *Tumenggung* can be analyzed using an historical approach. *Tumenggung* is derived from Orang Rimba groups in other areas (Makekal Hulu), after which it moved to Kedundung Muda. The leader uses kinship ties, and it is believed *Tumenggung* elders and representatives are able to treat members of the public who are sick. Mangku Besemen is trusted to lead ceremonies and customary assemblies. The selection mechanisms in place have been around a long time, and *Tumenggung Nggrip* became a leader through a selection process, for which he had to match certain criteria. After that, a ceremony was held for his selection and appointment as a *Tumenggung*. The *Jenton Turun Jenton* (males replace males) is the customary rule for leadership within the Orang Rimba system. *Tumenggung Nggrip*'s parents came from the population in Makekal Hulu. His father, formerly Tenggana Ngembar, used to be a *Tumenggung* before. *Tumenggung Nggrip* then replaced him in the leadership position. *Tumenggung Nggrip* moved from Tanah Makekal upstream to Kedundung Muda. Politically, *Tumenggung Nggrip* has benefited from having a father who was a former *Tumenggung*, as he was greatly respected by people in the community. In Kedundung Muda, his brothers were so old that it was easy for *Tumenggung Nggrip* to become leader of his citizens in everyday life. *Tumenggung Nggrip* can also speak Indonesian, likes gardening and can relate well with the Malays and migrants around TNBD.

Research Objectives

This paper describes a form of leadership in the Orang Rimba community through *Tumenggung Nggrip*'s kinship views. Political life in the Orang Rimba, and for *Tumenggung Nggrip*, is very interesting to study because individuals who lead societies have an important role to play in their existence and in their relations with outsiders. *Tumenggung Nggrip*'s leadership and decision-making roles regarding the rules and customary fines used against members of the community are very important in terms of preserving customary rules, those that have prevailed since the groups were first set up. Local politics can be analyzed as a form of democracy, but the practice tends to be influenced by the attitudes of the leader and the rule of law and customs in this community. A problem arose for the group when their presence in the middle of the forest began to change. One highly visible role of *Tumenggung Nggrip* is to deal with changes in Bukit Dua Belas National Park. Through the form of leadership set up by the Orang Rimba, and managed by *Tumenggung Nggrip*, one can see the common threads that exist in the lives of local communities; how they live together in the face of rapid change.

The process of social development among the Orang Rimba, as performed by the government, is not optimal, as there are several social and cultural constraints within the forest environment. In addition, the government's strategies do not address the potential for and existence of societies in the forests. For example, housing development programs are developed ex-situ, as opposed to in the jungle, where customary laws prevail in Melangun culture³². This means the program does not run optimally. Abandoned houses built by the Orang Rimba are left in Melangun culture when members of the group died in them.

Orang Rimba's social and political organization is built on the concept of family, marriage and family relationships. The group was formed as a regional power-sharing framework based on the flow of a

³² Melangun concepts meaning they (the orang rimba) leave their homes to travel to a new wilderness to grieve, then within a few years, they return.

river, and is based on a mutual kinship system in the jungle. Individuals are united by marriage and then generate a kinship. This kinship system has implications for political power and the role of its members. As Ted. C Lewellen wrote in 'Political Anthropology', the indigenous people of the area retain a simple band-shaped society, and tend to use their political kinship for social relations. The number in each group is small. Tumenggung Nggrip can easily lead people because there are only about 350 people in his group. His capabilities and political skills are used to maintain customary rules and to ensure they are adhered to by all individuals in the group. A stratification system among individuals is the dominant trait, with customary law guaranteeing the certainty of social and political everyday life. Therefore, Tumenggung Nggrip and his representatives have a close relationship with family, as confirmed by the customary rules 'Jenton Turun Jenton' (male replaces male). This rule is reflected in the leadership activities during a Tumenggung's rule. Leadership activities can be carried out by one person only; however, alliances can be formed to help with the activities. Political activities are now defined as activities related to leadership and power.

'Cognatic system' written by Jeremy H. Kemp explains the underlying kinship of a family in Southeast Asia, where kinship is generally traced through the mother or father. The Orang Rimba's cognatic kinship system is much more than a unilineal kin group, and similar systems can be found across Polynesia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. This kinship system has no clear rules, even some cognatic systems show a pattern that leads to use of residential land for regeneration and livelihoods. The political system is flexible, in the face of socio-cultural changes in society. Tumenggung Nggrip has adopted these changes so that the group can remain in the forest. The existence of internal community dynamics has emerged as a reaction to Tumenggung Nggrip's leadership, and in the face of environmental change. Now, Tumenggung Nggrip's group can live with the environmental change experienced in Bukit Duabelas National Park.

This study starts from a theoretical perspective, using a conceptual framework to interpret the findings from the field. A theoretical perspective can determine the focus of a research project, and theory is important because as a researcher one not only has to learn theory and gain an understanding of the local community, but also criticize and suggest changes to that society. Symbolic anthropology is based on the concept that society has a system of symbols and meanings in place with a so-called culture, and aims to study and examine the processes used to give meaning to the human world and people's actions. Ethnographers want to explain the phenomenon behind the facts that appear on the ground. Ethnography can criticize the status quo and assumptions used to underpin the operation of power and social control in society. Ethnographic methods are important when a researcher or others want to overcome social conditions; as a starting point for research.

Methods of Data Analysis

The data analysis was performed to explain the form of indigenous community leadership used by the Orang Rimba, through Tumenggung Nggrip, and cover the leadership and political life of Tumenggung Nggrip during his daily activities. Activities and events of Tumenggung Nggrip associated with his political, economic and socio-cultural activities will be analyzed in terms of leadership within the Orang Rimba, and other indigenous communities. Orang Rimba society is located in an area called Kedundung Muda, and the leadership of Tumenggung Nggrip is the focus of this paper.

Rombong (band) and Tumenggung Nggrip

Organized groups in the Orang Rimba are described by Ted C. Lewellen as bands, and consist of small groups of hundreds of members. Each group is also usually the nuclear family. The division of labor is simple, such as by gender and age. A band is formed by bonding customs, traditions, customs, values, and everyday symbols. These bands have forms of informal and situational leadership, in which a head man (a *Tumenggung*) can make a decision after customary deliberation. Orang Rimba leaders are given the title *Tumenggung*, which is a concept of cultural heritage, especially from the Srivijaya Kingdom. It involves a bilateral kinship system, in which kinship affects the composition of the group. Social systems are formed through marriage relationships. Rombong are also formed from the existing systems used by kinship families, with economic relationships formed from individual reciprocity within groups. They still use a barter system and share the spoils from hunts for the fulfillment of their daily needs. Economic activities and the exchange system connect individuals within the group, who then organize (as a band) more closely. Ownership of property is slightly stronger than kinship, and is created by each member. Political activity is still controlled by the *Tumenggung*, but the ability to lead and engage in politics is still owned by individuals, those who have more authority and expertise than others. Social control within the group is carried out through customary law and equality. Religious systems have grown based on influences from outside the forest, but they still worship gods and nature. The band *Tumenggung Nggrip* in Kedundung Muda lives in the jungle within Bukit Duabelas National Park. *Tumenggung Nggrip* Membership Composition

The Orang Rimba live in groups according to the *tumenggung* leadership system, which spreads down to sub-groups in accordance with the "bediom" or residential areas. The region of the *Tumenggung Nggrip* is bounded by the Muara Bungo and Air Behan Rivers, with the central government in Kedundung Muda. Learning from experience and choosing close relatives brings together members of the group who have tended to conflict. This method is used to control existing resources, with a higher rank meaning resources are distributed to close relatives. More relatives also increase the political power of the *Tumenggung* system. The diagram below shows the leadership structure of and relations among the *Tumenggung Nggrip*.



Groups tend to split-off from the main group, meaning there are a total of 11 sub-groups, as shown in more detail in the table below.

NO.	Location	Sub Group	Amount/Families
1.	KedundungMuda	1. TumenggungNggrip 2. Mangku Besemen 3. Gemambun 4. Mulung 5. Meluring 6. Nyingkap(his wife died)	6Pesaken (Households)
2.	TanahKepayong	1. Njalo	1Pesaken
3.	PisangKrayak	1. Prabung	1Pesaken
4.	AirBehan	1. Setapak 2. Nyatang 3. Bekulam 4. Sedih 5. Meratai	5Pesaken

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NO.	Location	Sub Group	Amount/Families
5.	Muara AirBehan	1. Besadu 2. Ngandun 3. Pelanggar 4. Begento 5. Nyejuk 6. Sicikat Lundang 7. Cangking 8. Neliti 9. Ngampun	9Pesaken
6.	Suban Gemuruh	1. Ngayat 2. Nurai 3. Nutup 4. Meredu 5. Ngimbau 6. Pembilang	6Pesaken
7.	Sako Talun	1. Najuk 2. Besangkil 3. Melehai 4. Nyubur 5. Beramal 6. Ngeledeng 7. Ejas 8. Dobang 9. Kluhu	9Pesaken
8.	Teruyon	1. Ninjo 2. Kepia 3. Doyet 4. Prado 5. Neka 6. Jubai 7. Genap 8. Sergi (new households) 9. Mulau (widower) 10. Gaek (dowry)	10 Pesaken
9.	Belukar Sejelai	1. Selambai 2. Nyabal 3. Siray 4. Merbab 5. Melancar 6. Lirip 7. Bekaco 8. Uga 9. Bereban (dowry) 10. Nyusup (dowry)	10 Pesaken
10.	Sungai Tengkuyung	1. Laman 2. Sidun	2 Pesaken

NO.	Location	Sub Group	Amount/Families
11.	SPI – SPG	1. Meriau 2. Ngelawang 3. Nganduy 4. Spendek 5. Lora 6. Budak Itam 7. Nyerak 8. Mentik	8 Pesaken
			67Pesaken

1. Kinship

The relationship between the Orang Rimba in sub-groups is based on close relatives among nuclear families, plus brothers in-laws and sons-in-law.

2. Common Interests

The existence of common interests helps maintain resources, fields, *benuaron* (economic land areas) and shrubs, and leads to sub-groups merging.

3. Characteristics of the Group

The Meriau groups and others differ in terms of their cultivation activities from groups in Kedundung Muda, Pisang Krayak and Tanah Kedayong. Bands in Pisang Krayak and Tanah Kedayong cultivate seasonal crops such as tubers, as a source of food, and rubber as a source of income. The Ninjo group and Meriau tend to oil palm plantations.

4. Distribution of Resources

In terms of spatial location, *benuaron*, tanah peranakan³³ and rubber fields among the bands in Pisang Krayak, Kedundung Muda, Tanah Kedayong and Belukar Sejelai occur close together. The groups Air Behan, Estuary, Bukit Suban, Rumbling and Sako Talun interact with each other and even with bands from Tumenggung Celitai at Kejasung Besar, due to their relatively close proximity when compared to those in Kedundung Muda.

5. Relations With the Outside World

Rombong Kedundung Muda, Belukar Sejelai, Teruyon, SPG-SPI, Pisang Krayak and Tanah Kedayong have a close relationship with the village of Bukit Suban, both in terms of economic and social relations. Tumenggung government activities performed by Tumenggung Ngrip and Mangku Besemen are more intensive when compared to princes or other dignitaries, such as vice Tumenggung, Bepak Meratai and Depati Setapak, who rarely associate with outsiders.

³³ Tanah Peranakan areas in the forest are the source of the economy and the lives of the jungle. Each family has the Tanah Peranakan land with boundaries that have been agreed within the band.




Picture 1: Tumenggung Nggrip with Anthropologist

Kinship Orang Rimba at Rombong Nggrip

Kinship systems and the social organization of Orang Rimba are preceded by the term "beneficiary", and are defined as female relatives and the relatives of the wife. The heir has a position and a strong and important role in the social organization, while nuclear families have less economic and political independence, because of they are next of kin.

Tumenggung NggripNginang (Istri ke-1)



Beraden Nari Bungo Sergi Jujur Kemetan Besanggul Bekantong Sunting

The matrilineal kinship system is a source of pride among the Orang Rimba. It is not the male Orang Rimba but members of the group that adhere to the matrilineal system. A sense of pride arises when a daughter marries a man who is either single, divorced or married. The nuclear family for Rimba is called a *ridge* and consists of a husband, wife, unmarried girls and boys who have not reached puberty (*flunky*). If the boys are grown-up they are obliged to separate from the parents' home and stay in a *perjako* (single boys), which are usually located close to their fields. This is a form of education which includes learning how to live independently and search for food before getting married.

Meaning the Orang Rimba retain a *reciprocal exchange* relationship, based on mutual relationships or reciprocation-based traditions and customs associated with the status of the individual and the tradition of mutual aid. One aspect of reciprocal kinship is mutual help. In addition, there is a

collective nature in terms of the form of togetherness shown; people give help based on reciprocity, with people giving each other mutual acceptance.

Political kinship is bound through marriage patterns in the village (dibendul empat), forming kinship groups or sub-groups that attempt to maintain power. Tumenggung Nggrip is the son of the previous Tumenggung, Tengganaï Ngembar; meaning the "jenton turun jenton" customary rules were followed. His father died in 2009, and before he died, Mr. Bepak Ngembar served as Tengganaï, and as an adviser to the Tumenggung. Tumenggung Nggrip then replaced the Tengganaï, reinforcing the idea that the Tengganaï is a prestigious position, as a Tengganaï is required to understand indigenous issues very well. The selection of close relatives unites members of the group, and is used as a strategy to effectively manage natural resources among close relatives. In addition, political kinship helps to maintain the Orang Rimba as a group (through regeneration). In *Rombong*, Tumenggung Nggrip appears to have the rank of a prince.

One important aspect of his political career is that Tumenggung Nggrip has a broad knowledge of customary law, for he is required to be a very astute lawyer, and should be able to talk and argue about such laws. Knowledge and ingenuity are often used to manipulate the law and deal with infraction cases also. This is important, especially for those who are directly involved in the process, in the form of managing the fines process, for which fines are paid using fabric. For Orang Rimba, the benchmark measure of the amount of fabric paid for each violation is set in customary law; however, bargaining with and manipulation of the law can influence the final decision. The leaders' shrewdness is shown through use of a straightforward language, clear intonation, controlled emotions, expressions and body gestures, in order to convince others. Times of political debate test and demonstrate the quality of the Tumenggung, and they often refer to *koncing kawon ake minum, tai kawon ake makan*³⁴ as an apology before the start of a conversation, or when wanting to respond to the opinion of other actors. In such a case, the other person will reply in a more vibrant style, aiming to influence the final decision.

No	Name of Orang Rimba (Role)	Families	Relationship
1	Tengganaï Ngembar	Tumenggung Nggrip	Son (ke-2)
		Meratai	Son (ke-1)
		Bebayang	malelaw (Mengkanak)
		Besemen	malelaw
		Setapak	nephew of men
		Begento	malelaw
		Besadu	malelaw (Mengkanak)
2	Tumenggung Nggrip	Meratai	sibling
		Bebayang	brother-in-law
		Besemen	brother-in-law (Besan)
		Setapak	malelaw (Mengkanak)
		Begento	brothers
		Besadu	brothers

³⁴ Eating and talking together are common priorities among the Orang Rimba communities

No	Name of Orang Rimba (Role)	Families	Relationship
3	Meratai	Bebayang	brother-in-law (Besan)
		Besemen	malelaw
		Setapak	brothers
		Begento	brothers
		Besadu	brothers
4	Bebayang	Besemen	(orang tua berdulur)
		Setapak	brother-in-law (Besan)
		Begento	brother-in-law
		Besadu	brother-in-law (Besan)
5	Besemen	Setapak	brothers
		Begento	brothers
		Besadu	brother-in-law (Besan)
6	Setapak	Begento	Urang Hubanon (Nuclear family)
		Besadu	malelaw
7	Begento (Bepak Ngeliling)	Besadu	Mengkanak (malelaw)

Money and fine fabrics are also owned by Tumenggung Nggrip, for as chairman of the group he receives a proportion of the cloth specified in each suit. Kinship and lineage systems are now difficult to trace because the role of each ruler and *Menti*³⁵ in the leadership structure is blurred. The blurring of the roles of each prince and *Menti* has influenced Tumenggung Nggrip's dominance as the supreme leader of the group. His role is vague in the absence of clear rules and regulations, as oral traditions and rules are very flexible and supple. Tumenggung Nggrip; therefore, has to determine and interpret the legislation and customary laws according to his abilities and aptitude.

Skill and shrewdness when using the law is a requirement for a Tumenggung to maintain political power, as well as the ability to hunt, collect treasure and other prominent capabilities. However, the key requirement is the inheritance of leadership through the descent system (Jenton Turun Jenton), and this is what led Tumenggung Nggrip to be appointed.

The status of the group's economy can be seen in the distribution of food and possessions, or *louq mempeka*, while kinship can be seen through the bonds of marriage, or the *semendo* tradition. This tradition generates relationships that bind the in-law and son-relationships. *Mamok kemenakan* has an economic perspective, while *mertuo mempekais* is a motivation for the wife's family, especially the in-laws. Under the kinship structure the husband's wife receives a dowry, while the husband joins his wife's family. The position of Tumenggung also has economic significance for the Orang Rimba. There is no remuneration for being the Tumenggung; for continuous and formal work deciding or resolving cases in the Rimba community. The 'salary' of the Tumenggung is generally obtained from the distribution of fines, which are divided according to the decisions of those who have contributed to the customary settlement. Fines are penalties for violations, and are imposed in

³⁵ minister

the form of cloth. Fabric is a valuable that brings widespread benefits, and the role of very large fines is to keep the customary rules in place. For each fine, the Tumenggung receives a proportion, though not all types are submitted to the Tumenggung; some are paid as pigs, deer, tapirs and other animals.

Social kinship among the Orang Rimba influences service and dedication; or the obligations and rights to a binding relationship based on affinal, consanguinity cousin and sibling relations. Devotion and service are evident in the relationship between daughters-in-law and *mentuha* (male in-laws) and also between *Kemenakan-mamok* (nephews and aunts). Devotion implies compliance, responsibility and rights to *kemenakan mamok*, and an obligation to visit *kemenakan mamok*, who gives advice as part of a *belabe* (becakop-cakop – a discussion during which advice is given on customary arrangements). *Kemenakanis* obliged to serve and obey the *mamok*. The relationship between the *mamok* with *kemenakanis* very strong, and is often referred to as *kemenakan (male)*. *Mamoks* are very powerful from childhood, and a child's *ego* can stay and live in the *mamok* indefinitely, meaning the position of children is hardly visible from the outside.

Marriage is able to bind and strengthen cultural relations within the Orang Rimba groups, such that polygamy, especially among the Orang Rimba leaders and dignitaries, has become a trend.

Based on an interpretation of kinship among the Orang Rimba, a lot can be inferred about the kinship relationships and patterns in Rimba, TNBD from the egalitarian language used. Tumenggung Nggrip has a dominant role in the regulation of community life, though women's wider, dominant role may have been the cause of this man gaining "recognition" as the prince, due to marital relationships. The son of a Tumenggung is expected to be able to inherit his father's leadership status under as Rimbo Law, via *Jenton Turun Jenton*. Democratic attitudes are shown by Tumenggung Nggrip when making decisions on customary fines for those who violate customary laws. One such *seloka* (customary law) is '*Bonor hukum penghulu pecat, salah hukum penghulu pecat, hopi tehukum penghulu pecat*', though Tumenggung Nggrip can still interpret customary laws based on his personal views.

There is a hypothesis that "restrictions" in authority exist among Orang Rimba members; for example, according to Boehm (in 'Bollinger Society') a *reverse dominance* exists that means Tumenggung coercive action is not needed, but this also means a Tumenggung does not have the power to act according to his will. On the ground, the vagueness and ambiguity of customary law allows Tumenggung Nggrip interpret and modify common law in accordance with the situation. A Tumenggung can be characterized by the amount of wealth or pieces of cloth he owns, and based on the customary court decisions made. Political leadership within the Orang Rimba can be seen in the political succession rules, as political succession may occur when a death occurs and due to old age. In such cases, the succession may lead to uncertainty if there is competition among several male relatives who are interested in becoming the Tumenggung. The basic principle among the Orang Rimba social setting is: '*Alam sekato Tuhan, rakyat sekato penghulu, rumah sekato Tenganai, bini sekato laki, adik sekato kakak*', or 'the nature of any such condition is the will of God, obedient to the ruler of the people, must comply with Tenganai home affairs; a wife should be obedient to her husband and a brother should be obedient to a brother'. Compliance with the law is required but is not absolute, and some people breach the law. However, if the reason for this is acceptable, then

the disobedience is ignored and actually regarded as something positive. If it is seen as good, then any further decision must be obeyed, absolutely. If the wrong decision is made, then it does not have to be obeyed. The rules are like the proverb, '*Rajo AdilRajo Disembah, Rajo Lalim Rajo Disanggah*', which means 'Tumenggung refutation is a form of protest'. Actually, Tumenggung positions are hereditary, so only descendants of the Tumenggung are deemed worthy to occupy the post.

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Housing Subsidies as a Viable Alternative in Solving Problems of Informal Settlements in Danger Zones

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Introduction

One of the pressing issues being discussed in the Philippines is that of the PhP 18,000(USD429)³⁶ housing subsidy to be provided to informal settler families (ISFs) in the danger zones³⁷. The issue of allocation of public goods such as land and the PhP 18,000 subsidy has been met with various reactions prior to its implementation varying from allegations to the government on possibly romanticizing the plight of the informal settlers (Spot.ph, 2013), proposing band aid solutions which will prove ineffective in the long run (Jison, 2013), to conducting a program which will prove “expensive” or politically risky (Malig, 2013) that only targets the waterways with informal settlers as opposed to other urban areas.

In spite of these contestations, this paper opts to investigate the viability of the housing subsidies in solving the housing problems. This paper argues that the PhP 18,000 housing subsidy is a **redistributive mechanism**. To borrow the concept from Polanyi (1944), “redistribution is a mode of exchange wherein all goods and money are given to centralized governments who disperses money out”. In this case, there is an assumption of unequal distribution of resources so a need for the government to function as an “allocative center” in an era characterized by privatization and liberalization, is deemed necessary.

Further, the PhP 18,000 housing subsidy, as seen in the broad spectrum of social policy and human development, is a **targeting mechanism** which in particular aims to address the needs of informal settler families along danger areas. Targeting, as Mkandawire (2005) pointed out, ideally provides social benefits to the eligible or truly deserving whilst almost by its definition leads to segmentation and differentiation in service provisions.

This paper contends that the PhP 18,000 housing subsidy is the most viable solution, among other alternatives for the government, in addressing the problem of informal settlers’ families living in danger zones in Metro Manila. The succeeding sections attempts to tell us why.

³⁶ PhP42=USD1

³⁷ Danger zones as defined in Section 28 of Republic Act 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) – the “esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, or playgrounds”. Danger zones, as set by the parameters of the study, are considered as those living within the three-meter legal easement areas from the waterways which are more likely to overflow during natural calamities thus having the capacity to greatly affect families living on and along the area. These three-meter legal easements from waterways are considered government property and the utilization of these areas for any forms of settlement are considered illegal.

Qualitative methods of data-gathering were utilized to help answer the research endeavor. Both primary and secondary data were gathered. Parallel to the focus group discussions (FGD), key informant interviews among representatives of national government agencies, and review of related program documents were also carried out. To give voice to the informal settlers, a focus group discussion was held to look into the perception, acceptance and recommendations of members of the community on the PhP 18,000 housing subsidy. The FGD was held in *Barangay*³⁸ Pineda, which was selected due to its proximity to Pasig River- a priority waterway for clean-up in Metro Manila.

Setting the Context: Political and Geographic Sidelining of Informal Settler Families in Metro Manila

Informal Settler Families (ISFs), often tagged as squatters, slum dwellers, makeshift dwellers and more generally as the urban poor, pertain to those households who have established themselves as either (1) dangerous due to the risks possibly experienced due to their place of residence, (2) and those who reside in areas owned by other individuals or firms. Le Banc (2005) pertained to informal settlements as sites of overcrowding, crime, lack of proper sanitary conditions that will cause health hazards, poor urban planning and the lack of proper conditions for human development.

Moreover, ISFs can also be perceived as human resources who not necessarily live in areas of “disorder, dilapidation and decay”, (Laquian, 1972) who reside illegally on public and private land, often “at the periphery of the subdivisions, along railroad tracks, estuaries, dumpsites, sidewalks, marshlands, cemeteries, market places, bridges, makeshift pushcarts and other dangerous sites” for residential, commercial or any other purposes. As a “basic human resource”, they lack access and opportunities for education; some of them make a living as construction workers, engineers, plumbers and the like and reside in unhealthy and unsanitary areas often lacking in basic services (Medel, 1989).

With the dismal social and environmental condition of informal settlements in Metro Manila, the ISFs are as well sidelined in terms of policy and prioritization for growth. More than the perceptions of various individuals and the tortuous process of existing programs on land acquisition and housing, informal settlements are seen as “forgotten places” in Metro Manila (Shatkin, 2004).

Increasing magnitude of the ISF is brought about by the unaddressed need to solve the problem posed by the urban bias hypothesis wherein most resources are “systematically allocated... structured as to provide rural people with inefficiently few resources” (Lipton, 1977). Urban growth and development is then manifested by the increasing disparity between the increase in property values and shelter needs of the already-marginalized sector of society. As Shatkin (2004) put it:

This settlement symbolizes the role of the urban poor in Philippine society – their central role in the country’s efforts to build an export-oriented economy in response to the challenge of globalization, their political and social invisibility and the hazardous and precarious nature of the settlements in which they reside.

³⁸Barangay means village

National Government Programs for ISFs

At the national level, the government has extended its efforts in taking measures in conferring legal security of tenure for the informal settlers families (ISF) as anchored on the Urban Development and Housing Act and in reference to the international covenants that strives for “safe and adequate shelter for all”, such as the Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements, the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements and Habitat Agenda.

Programs such as the Presidential Land Proclamation which acted as an immediate instrument of tenure for poor living on public areas (COHRE, 2008) intend to provide Certificate of Entitlement to Lot Allocations (CELAs) to program beneficiaries. Under the National Housing Authority (NHA), in-city and off-city relocation sites are provided for the ISFs. Under the Community Mortgage Program (CMP), the government can allow the ISFs to own the blighted lots they occupy through a financing scheme of the Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC). While these existing housing programs aim to address the secure tenure problem, it does not specifically target the ISFs within the danger zones until recently, in the 2009 aftermath of typhoon Ondoy (international name *Ketsana*) when the Department and Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) decided to allocate post-disaster housing assistance for victims of disaster but on a limited scale.

Since there is no targeted intervention for housing provisions on danger areas, the PHP 50 billion ISF fund was mobilized for relocation of informal settlers to a safer ground. The government has set aside PHP 10 billion per year (for five years from 2011 – 2016) to relocate informal sector families living dangerously along river banks, *esteros*³⁹ and other water ways. This commitment was auxiliary to the 2011-2016 Philippine Development Plan, particularly under Agenda 16 which states the recognized need to achieve resilience and adaptability of the communities in natural disasters. This was also further mobilized through the Metro Manila’s Flood Control Master Plan and the Supreme Court Mandamus on Manila Bay Clean-Up (SC.gov.ph, 2011), in pursuit of a flood-resilient Metro Manila by clearing up and de-silting of the waterways for a safer Metro Manila. Moreover, the PHP 50 billion commitments were further activated by the current administration’s Covenant with the Urban Poor, which included the need to look into urban poor housing. The Covenant was entered into between the urban poor and then-Presidential aspirant Aquino. The signing of the covenant signaled support from the urban poor sector in view of the fulfillment of the promises entered into the covenant. In particular, provision 8 referring to Post-Ondoy Rehabilitation Program, states Aquino’s promise to cater to the needs of ISFs in danger zones. As mentioned in the Covenant:

We recognize that most people living in hazardous areas are forced by circumstances to live in these places because the government has failed to provide viable alternatives. We will explore new approaches that address both the housing and livelihood needs of Ondoy-affected families. (PCUP, 2011)

A National Technical Working Group (NTWG) was then created with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) as the lead agency to study how the fund commitment would be best utilized. One of the NTWG’s initiatives was a study which revealed that there are 550,000 ISFs in Metro Manila; 104,000 of whom are in danger zones and 60,000 are living on top of or along waterways. The same study also exposed the increasing housing backlog or the unmet need for


³⁹ *Estero* means an inlet canal

housing in the previous years in Metro Manila and the insufficiency of the housing bureaucracy programs in addressing such, especially those ISFs in danger zones.

According to the Medium Term Development Plan (MTPDP) for 2005-2010, the projected housing need is 3.7 million units and around 12 million or 31% of which comprise the housing backlog. In the table below, it can be seen that about 20% of the ISFs in Metro Manila (107,997 households) reside in danger areas. Also, the housing backlog as indicated in the Philippine Development Plan is currently 3.6 million and it is expected to reach about 5.8 Million by 2016 (NEDA.gov.ph, 2011).

Table 1: Informal Settlers in Metro Manila by Category (NHA, 2007)

Categories	Number of Households	Percentage
Danger areas	107,997	19.83%
Areas earmarked for government infrastructure	35,198	6.46%
Government- owned lands	179,653	32.99%
Privately owned lands	219,457	40.83 %
Areas for priority development	2,304	0.42%
<i>Total</i>	<i>544,609</i>	<i>100%</i>



San Juan River Quezon City, San Juan, and Mandaluyong	Maricaban Creek Taguig, Makati, and Pasay	Estero Tripa de Gallina Pasay and Makati	Estero de Sunog Apog Manila
Tullahan River Quezon City, Caloocan, Valenzuela, and Malabon	Manggahan Floodway Pasig	Estero de Maypajo Manila, Caloocan, and Navotas	Pasig River Pasig, Makati, Mandaluyong, and Manila

As described in Table 2, a significant percentage of the city's population lives in critical areas that are prone to any drastic changes in the water level. Manila, being a low-lying city surrounded by two major waterways (the Laguna de Bay and the Manila Bay), the city is normally experiencing floods during the monsoon season of June to December.

Figure 1: Priority Waterways in Metro Manila. The residents residing in these areas are mandated to move out as soon as possible.

With almost nineteen percent of the population living in critical waterways, Manila needs to act fast and smart in order to mitigate the damage in property and loss of lives that come with the annual monsoon rains.

Informal settlers in Metro Manila	Data
Population of Barangays along Critical Waterways	2,241,635
Total Population of Metro Manila (2010 census)	11,855,975
Percentage of Metro Manila's Population living along critical waterways	18.91%

Table 2: Informal Settlers in Metro Manila by Population (GMANews, 2010)

PhP 18,000 Housing Subsidy and *Oplan Likas* (Operation Relocate)

As anchored on the PhP 50 billion ISF fund for relocation of informal settlers living dangerously along river banks, *esteros* and other waterways, the PhP 18,000 housing subsidy program was then conceptualized and became an integral part of the DILG's program on voluntary pre-emptive relocation entitled *Oplan Likas* (Operation Relocate). *Oplan Likas* seeks to provide voluntary pre-emptive evacuation for the ISFs in danger zones. The government acknowledges that not all ISFs can be immediately relocated because the housing availability does not match the high demand of ISFs, so some activities were instead implemented in parallel. This included DILG's aligning of city disaster plans, launching an ISF Disaster Preparedness Kit (with flood drills), and formulation of people's plan through community-level consultations.

The PhP 18,000 cash subsidy, which will be drawn from the PhP 50 billion fund, is a transition fund to be used by each informal settler family in relocating to a more decent residence while housing units are not yet available. The PhP 18,000 will be utilized in paying for the rent expense of the informal settlers who voluntarily avail of the program.

The DILG is working in collaboration with DSWD in implementing this scheme. The DILG is the lead agency in spearheading the transfer of ISFs living in danger zones and high-risk areas. It is also mandated to oversee the social preparation of ISFs and implementation of the program to ensure that the proper message is delivered to the general public. The DSWD is mainly responsible for the transition phase of the informal settlers which requires the agency to assist the families in adopting to the new living environment such as facilitating the possible places for relocation, in particular through assisting on the initial spending of the PhP 18,000 for the purposes of rent, and on providing proper guidance to the ideal allocation of the remaining cash subsidy balance of the families.

The PhP 18,000 interim shelter fund, computed through providing each family with PhP 1,500.00 per month (12 months) is intended for the 19,440 ISFs living along the eight priority waterways in Metro Manila: San Juan River, Manggahan Floodway, Tripa de Gallina, Maricaban Creek, Tullahan River, Pasig River, Estero de Maypajo and Estero de Sunog Apog (as seen in Figure 1). The PhP 18,000 subsidy will be given until year 2016 to cater to the remaining 104,000 ISFs in the danger zones (such as canals, creeks, railroad tracks and dumps) in the country (Burgonio, 2013). As confirmed by the DILG Undersecretary, this interim shelter fund is cheaper than the fund to be allotted to respond to the ISFs in terms of relief, rehabilitation and evacuation in flood occurrences during typhoons (Burgonio, 2013).

The PhP 18,000 interim shelter fund or “relocation subsidy” then seeks to address the housing backlog as well as the need for suitable and safe settlements for the urban poor community in the Philippines. As a targeting mechanism it seeks to, in general, “promote inclusive growth and reduced levels of poverty” through (1) “strengthening basic services to the poor” and (2) “reducing their vulnerability from disasters and climate change” in particular as part of a broader program for (1) clearing up the waterways for a safer Metro Manila and (2) relocating ISFs to safer settlements.

Economic Implications of the PhP 18,000 Subsidy

In the Philippines, the 2010 National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) reports that the country’s population of 92.30 million (Census.gov.ph, 2012) is currently housed in 19.72 million housing units which will give a per capita of approximately four (4) people. The statistics also shows that 2.4% of the total housing units (equivalent to 473,176 units occupied by at least 1.8 million people or 2% of the entire Philippine population) are built in lots without the consent of the owner, with Metro Manila registering the highest at 5.1% of the total population.

The government could provide incentives to households in terms of the following: (1) cash transfers in terms of a lump-sum or installment allocation, (2) housing vouchers that can be exchanged into housing units or cash for housing loans in a pre-determined date, or vouchers that can partially pay the cost of a private housing and (3) actual housing units constructed by the state and provided either for free or for a highly-discounted price.

DiPasquale (1996) would argue that the state “should subsidize housing to encourage a minimum level of housing consumption in terms of quality and quantity”. This ensures economic redistribution and increasing the access of these goods to ideally all sectors of the population. As supported by Olsen (cited in Sinai & Waldfogel, 2002) the general effect of these programs is targeted to the population on the lower-income stratum because it is assumed that they will consume inadequate amounts of housing because the market will choose to exclude them, or the poor people will choose other goods rather than housing. Thus, many states such as the United States spend as much as USD 25 billion annually for mass and subsidized public housing.

Many economists argue that liberal policies will result to an automatic efficiency in the allocation of economic activities and resources, as long as the incremental costs will be equal to the benefits. This approach dictates that adjustments made by different subsidies on the market will shift the demand-supply curve and the equilibrium. This assumes that aside from the subsidies, there won’t be any more distortions from the market.

However, the circumstances of “market failures” or economic inefficiency can arise on imperfect scenarios. These can arise if the benefit-cost model implicit in market decision-making is distorted due to unforeseen or uncounted circumstances such as information asymmetry (e.g. providing subsidies to unnecessary sectors, etc.).

The need to correct these market failures leads to the rise of subsidies. These mechanisms are said to improve economic outcomes by (1) providing resources to the underprivileged sectors in the society and (2) correcting the failure of the market mechanism to create an efficient allocation of goods and services.

Both rationales are operative in the sense that it adjusts, corrects and alters economic outcomes to encourage a more efficient operation of the market economy. However, liberal economic theorists view subsidies with skepticism. The most prominent is the redistribution argument where you tax

other economic activities on the expense of promoting other economic sectors which distorts market outcomes. The free-market argument states that an activity worth undertaking is the one which will have a sufficient demand to meet the supply vis-à-vis, and thus generate a profit. Subsidies, if placed on Adam’s Smith’s framework, are signals that certain economic activities are unable to generate enough profit and thus, a reflection of market failures. By altering prices and by departing to the market-generated level of demand and supply, the function of the invisible hand is interfered, leading to undesirable outcomes.

In this paper, a distinction developed by Musgrave (1959, cited in LeBlanc, 2005), can be used in analyzing the PhP 18,000 housing rental subsidy. According to Musgrave, subsidies can introduce the following changes on the economy:

1. Allocation: Any policy can result to the change in the mix of goods and services in economy.
2. Distribution: The aim of policies is to redistribute income from the rich of the poor. The question is “how will these policies change the implementation of income redistribution, and how will they be sustainable in the long run.”
3. Stabilization: Increase in government expenditures will have effects on the economy’s aggregate level of employment and output.

The table below shows the following implications of these effects:

Table 3: Summary of the Effects of Housing Subsidies on the General Economy (LeBlanc, 2005)

Interventions	General Economic Effects
1. Allocation	1. The subsidy will cause housing prices to lower compared to other goods. If housing is a normal good, the substitution effect and the income effect is positive, leading to an increase in consumption. 2. By lowering the price for housing today, the consumer may alter the perception between present and future consumption thereby opting to avail of the housing in anticipation of higher prices in the future. Certain types of subsidies such as minimum down payment requirements, encourages saving for today in order to pay for future consumption.
2. Distribution	1. Distribution may vary: it can either be vertical (transfer flows from the rich to the poor; requiring the rich to pay more to fund subsidies for the poor) or horizontal (incomes of household sub-groups in a particular range are compared before and after the redistribution). 2. Redistributing income can have profound changes in the underground economy. Subsidies will cause these settlers to be formally included in the recognized economy, which can either be beneficial (inclusion to social services previously denied to them) or detrimental (inclusion may come at a price, such as rents or additional taxes, which may represent a foregone income for the family for their basic needs).
3. Stabilization	The evaluation of the effectiveness of housing subsidies can be measured in three major categories: (1) administrative simplicity, (2) targets, coverage and efficiency and (3) flexibility, sustainability and visibility. A high score registered in these criteria represent a healthy economy.

Providing housing subsidies will provide a significant impact to the provision of the private housing market. These are indicated in the succeeding table.

Table 4: Summary of the Effects of Housing Subsidies on the Private Housing Market (DiPasquale, 1996)

	Rents	Land Value	Construction	Stock
Demand-based Interventions (tenant-based subsidies such as cash and housing vouchers)	Increase in value	Increase in value	Increase in value	Increase in value
Supply-based Interventions (public housing units built and owned by the government)	Decrease in value	Decrease in value	Decrease in value	Decrease in value
Tax Incentives (monetary incentives to rental housing)	Decrease in value	Increase in value	Increase in value	Increase in value
Relaxing local building regulations	Decrease in value	Decrease in value	Increase in value	Increase in value

Given the information above, there might be a need for providing direct cash transfers instead of housing subsidies. Direct cash transfers can provide an easy solution for improving the standard of living of the informal settler families. Triest (2009) argues however that this can only be effective in economies characterized with information symmetry.

Information symmetry ensures that both the buyer and the seller have the same access to pertinent information. In simplest sense, the other party does not hide any information to the other. Unequal or asymmetric information results in market failures, which will be sites of economic inefficiency. In the case of conditional cash transfers for example: the qualified recipients may actually use their additional money to fulfill other economic needs if the provider has no access to the socio-economic background of the recipients. These cash transfers may be used to functions that are not targeted by the program (such as engaging in gambling), and thus generate negative externalities that can further deepen the cause of poverty.

Gathered literature shows that distortions from the neoliberal conceptions of the “invisible hand” and market-dictated outcomes will prompt market failure. Subsidies are seen by many economists as “signals for economic failure” and are mechanisms to put the supply and demand back-on-track, which should be effective if market forces alone are responsible for allocation.

However, development economists argue that subsidies for the poor such as housing subsidies are not mere correction mechanisms. They generate positive externalities through the improvement of communities. The aggregate effects of poverty amelioration, equal distribution of income and a non-obstruction of economic efficiencies caused by these subsidies can enhance economic efficiency and in turn, promote human development. These subsidies which generate positive externalities can actually be effective than mere cash dole-outs or direct provision of services.

Social Implications of the PHP 18,000 Housing Subsidy

The “problem” of the informal settlers in Metro Manila, as discussed in this paper, was framed as a problem related to (1) the need to clear the waterways and build infrastructures (Supreme Court Mandamus on Manila Bay Clean-up, 2011), (2) promote a flood-resilient and flood-free Metro Manila, as well as (3) put the informal settler families and ultimately, Metro Manila to safety by making them less vulnerable to flooding (Draft Joint Memorandum Circular, n.d.). Seen in this light, it

is interesting to note how the government resorted to providing both a rental subsidy (the PHP 18,000 transition fund) and housing units to address the housing backlog.

The anchoring of the problem of flooding to poverty can be perceived as a targeting mechanism because the government determined the ISFs as the “truly deserving” or as beneficiaries, and it utilizes their resources to address both the underlying challenges in clearing the waterways and “evicting” or voluntary relocating ISFs and in an attempt to overcome market failures. In this sense, can the government, as an *allocative* center, efficiently redistribute land and housing? In the long run, given the scarce resources and “limited number of possible actions”, rational choice theorists would argue that the success of the program depends primarily on the calculated costs and benefits to the individuals and the satisfaction it brings. At the same time, Besley and Kanbur (1990) may question such program on the grounds that “poverty targeting has become the new panacea – as if more poverty can be reduced with less expenditures”. Aside from such paradox in an attempt to redistribute, there is also a question on the government’s bureaucratic capacity to implement the program.

In the *Oplan Likas* Program, prior to the disbursement of the PHP 18,000 rental subsidy, various stakeholders are involved as follows: the Department of the Interior and Local Government(DILG), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), National Housing Authority (NHA), Social Housing Finance Cooperation (SHFC), People’s Organizations (POs), City and barangay administrators, Local-Government Units (LGUs), Local Inter-Agency Committees (LIACs) for the eight priority waterways and informal settler families. In a multi-stakeholder program, patterns of trust and reciprocity are important. Institutional capacity-building is prerequisite to gaining the support from various stakeholders but capitalizing on the stakes of involved individuals and agencies may take time. Thus, the program can then be perceived as a perfect venue for investing in social capital defined as the “shared knowledge, understandings, institutions, and patterns of interaction that a group of individuals bring to an activity” (Ostrom,1997) to craft institutions or, to craft “sets of rules to allocate benefits from a physical facility and to assign responsibility for paying its costs”.

Based on an interview with DILG Consultant Jayson Miranda, the multi-stakeholder nature of the program is seen as one of the bottlenecks in the implementation. There are delays in implementing activities within LIACs, among LGUs, among national, city and *barangay*-level POs. The DILG is currently working on harmonizing the goals and interests of all those involved. More than sustaining social capital (and collective action), the challenge lies in agreeing on the set of rules. To quote Ostrom (1997):

...the time relevant to develop workable rules, known to all relevant parties, is always substantial. If this is the first time a set of individuals has attempted joint activities, the time needed and the level of contestation involved in the process will tend to be higher than in settings where individuals have worked well together in the past.

Nevertheless, harmonizations or negotiations are seen as a sign of good diplomacy. In fact, the program seeks to capture a multi-dimensional approach in addressing the problem of ISFs through involving different agencies and individuals. In this case, capacity-building is achieved (and strived for) by empowering the urban poor through participating in formulation of People’s Plans for their *barangay* or community and involvement of the urban poor in the formulation of Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (BDRRM) plans. At the same time, through “voluntary resettlement

or relocation” or “voluntary pre-emptive resettlement”, the government encourages participation while promoting a notion that demolition and forced evictions are ultimately the last resort. At the same time, participatory planning can be seen as an attempt to relinquish the general public’s negative perception on government programs – or mistrust in government programs in particular.

However, despite attempts to form rules, build trust and capacitate the ISFs, it can be argued that there are still huge incentives to free ride. To quote Wade (1987): “Under what circumstances will villagers co-operate to supply themselves with goods and services that they all need but could not provide for themselves individually?” North (1981) asserts that ideologies play a role in overcoming the problem of free-riding; individuals thus change their ideological perception when their experiences are contradictory and when their expectation of a system’s “fairness” is not met.

As North (1981) put it:

Successful ideologies must be flexible so that they can capture the loyalty of new groups or retain the loyalty of older groups as external conditions change...

any successful ideology must overcome the free rider problem. Its fundamental aim is to energize groups to behave contrary to simple, hedonistic, individual calculus of costs and benefits...

To the extent that the participants believe the system fair, the costs of enforcing the rules and property rights are enormously reduced by the simple fact that the individuals will not disobey the rules or violate property rights even when a private cost/benefit calculus would make such action worthwhile.

Thus, the PhP 18,000 rental subsidy, as part of a bigger program, is a viable alternative as it seeks to primarily ensure the participation of the beneficiaries – the underprivileged sector- through formation of trust and capacity-building activities. In fact, apart from “mutual understanding and enforcement of rules”, Polanyi (1944) considers trust as one of the factors for market transactions. Polanyi further states that the so-called “subordination of human purposes to the logic of an impersonal market mechanism” is one of the flaws in market liberalization. Thus, it can be argued that the utilization of the country’s form of government or of its vibrant democracy is hinged on the idea of redistributing resources.

Direct subsidies, or the PhP 18,000 rental subsidy for temporary housing can be perceived as the government’s most rational choice as it has potential to provide for maximum gain with minimal costs. At the same time, while it should be emphasized that the disbursement of the PhP 18,000 is not a stand-alone policy, it can be perceived as a temporary solution. It should be treated as a component in line with the broader plan of the national government in terms of social protection. In this sense, as a temporary solution, it can be perceived as providing for immediate (but pre-emptive) relief to informal settler families within Metro Manila.

The Ways Forward

Program and Policy Recommendations

In the short run, will the redistributive aspect of the program be effective? The group asserts that the program will work given the following recommendations. First, there is a need for a legal project document outlining the objectives of various agencies to measure the expected outcomes, and to set clear rules and policies in line with each national government agency's mandate. As mentioned in Picciotto (1997), effectiveness is embedded in project agreements – or in the “set of contracts linking principals and agents”.

Next, there is a need for “rational targeting” of beneficiaries in order to prevent leakage and undercoverage and to ensure that such an approach will indeed reach the intended beneficiaries (and not be used as mechanisms by other individuals). The disbursement of the PhP18,000 to the urban poor sector of the population should be, by all means, monitored as it may be used by those who intend to gain election votes or to lobby their own personal interests.

At best, this paper proposes that a Magna Carta for policy realignment and harmonization of agency goals be achieved. Given the challenge caused by delays in dealing with Inter-agency meetings and activities, there might be a need (1) to lay down the objectives of agencies such as the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) in terms of their projects on infrastructures along the eight priority waterways; (2) to secure the support and commitment of LGUs on housing units and land available in their respective areas and put down in writing the available resources; as well as (3) to realign priorities and lines of coordination within LGUs, among city and national level, especially in terms of disaster risk reduction (DRR) initiatives for forming climate-change resilient communities. At the same time, the Magna Carta would help determine which cities and inter-agency committees intend to provide for voluntary pre-emptive relocation of those beyond the three-meter easement in order to better pool together resources.

In line with a Magna Carta, an ongoing mapping of flood areas in Metro Manila may also be utilized as it may illustrate panel or transitional data on the extent of flooding (especially since danger zones in reality go beyond the three-meter easement from waterways).

In the long run, the urban and suburban development frameworks and policies should be revisited given the possible push and pull of informal settlements in the urban and sub-urban areas. Provided that some of the ISFs move from the rural to urban areas, aside from safety, it would be better to understand what could actually push the ISFs away from danger zones or what could pull them voluntarily, and rationally, to safer grounds or to off-city government housing projects could be explored and analyzed.

This paper also recommends that a Readiness Assessment or feasibility study be conducted to possibly quantify the needs of ISFs in terms of the (1) feasibility of relocation sites and the transportation costs, and the (2) transfer of livelihood and social services to relocation sites especially since the ISFs as beneficiaries, more than housing, mostly look to the city to earn a living and provide education for their children.

At the same time, proper documentation of the disbursement of the PhP18,000 rental subsidy should be conducted or readied especially given the assumption of the bounded rationality of ISFs, and in order to safeguard the use of the PhP 18,000 for other uses (and not as originally intended). At the same time, proper monitoring of the use of PhP 18,000 could help track potential positive

spillover effects, assuming that project savings may help finance “repeater” projects or assuming that such a program can be anchored towards another development issue or an existing government program (if maximum utilization of resources is needed).

Apart from the abovementioned practices, the group suggests the construction of a sound statistical and geographical database to prevent leakage, double counting and under-coverage. Such can be patterned from the DSWD’s National Housing and Targeting System which was the basis of the *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program* (4Ps or the conditional cash transfer [CCT]). While the DSWD will utilize the biometrics data of the household heads, this may prove to be a challenge as other members of the household may eventually attempt to tap into the government’s resources and secure the PhP 18,000 and the housing subsidy. At the same time, a community-based monitoring system (CBMS) may be put up to help facilitate the validation purpose.

There is also a need to provide a monitoring and evaluation framework which could determine and select the key indicators of the program’s success as well as monitor its extent to provide for capacity development of the government and the ISFs and competency development for national agencies, LGUs and People’s Organizations.

Consultations with the Informal Settler Families

Certainly not the least, the implementers of the program should never fail to consult the ISFs in all stages of its implementation. Most of the ISFs have dissenting opinions and various conditions for agreeing to possible relocation as indicated during the focus group discussion of the impact of the PhP 18,000 subsidy on the ISFs conducted at *Barangay Pineda*, Pasig City last January 2014. According to them, relocation is acceptable provided that (1) they are provided with a source of income and/or opportunities for earning a living, (2) they are near schools, (3) they are relocated as a community and are situated with the same members of their community so they can easily adapt to a new environment and that (4) they are moved to a place within the same city. A participant in the discussion also stressed that the relocation should not favor certain groups or individuals who are in “good terms” or have a good relationship with those in authority, to wit “*Walang palakasan*” (*No favoring of certain people*). Still, a participant pointed out her reservations on relocation by saying that they would be thrown to areas outside the city. As she mentioned during the FGD, “*Di basta-basta itatapon kung saan nang ‘di alam*” (“*We should not be thrown out of the city easily and without our prior knowledge*”). Yet another group of participants pointed out that with the PhP 18,000 relocation allowance, it is then the responsibility of the households to decide on how they will use the amount to sustain their livelihood. “*Kahit nasaan ang tao (wherever the person lives)*, he can survive.

It was found out that only minimal number of ISFs have a relatively correct understanding on how the PhP 18,000 relocation subsidy is being implemented. None of the FGD participants do have an understanding of the rationale of the program. In the FGD conducted, it was observed that the issue of relocation was not seen in relation to the PhP 18,000 disbursement and the acknowledgment that the ISFs are located in the danger zone. For one, the participants consider flooding as a common occurrence. A usual flood, according to them, is up to the waist level. When asked of the situation of flooding in their area, they also noted that the water current rises and subsides rapidly (“*Mabilis tumaas at bumaba. Madali lang bumaba*”). Thus, they do not evacuate during floods since for them, the water usually subsides in one (1) hour. This notion of frequent flooding in relation to their perception of their level of risk and danger is challenged by the definition of “danger” and/or

“danger zone” by the participants. For one, the participants mentioned that (1) the residents on the river, or about 100 families are in danger zones whereas (2) the families five meters from the waterway are safe. To quote, *“ligtas ka, pero tatangayin ang bahay” (You are safe, but your house will be washed away)*.

While some participants do not consider those within the five-meter easement as part of the “danger zone”, there is also a seeming divide between the notion of the danger zone and the disbursement of the PhP 18,000 which are reflected in the recommendations on relocation. Simply put, the issue of the PhP 18,000 relocation subsidy, relocation and danger zone are not seen as part of one program. According to one FGD participant, the PhP 18,000 may be used to improve the lives of the informal settler families – and that the ISFs may decide on how to use it. Still, there are those who are aware of its use – to help the ISFs adjust and rent in the new relocation sites or in temporary housing prior to relocation.

Apart from the different notions on the disbursement, the ISFs also mentioned how such an amount would not be enough and the sustainability of such a program may prove ineffective in the long run. While the latter may be attributed to lack of information on the nature of the PhP 18,000 (as a “transition fund”), there may be a need to look into monitoring, if not ensuring the sustainability, of the said program. On the side of the ISF, there may be a need to provide them with disaster and risk awareness and preparedness program so then they will be more proactive and react appropriately to risks.

Continuing Challenges to Program Implementation

Thus, the group contends that the P18,000 rental subsidy is the most viable solution to address the needs of ISFs. The disbursement, as part of the bigger program, promotes a holistic approach. The challenge lies in measuring the impact of the program and sustaining collective action and social capital throughout time. At best, it provides for the immediate needs of the (1) ISFs for safer housing and of the (2) national government, for a flood-free Metro Manila and a record of zero casualties during flooding.

According to Karaos et al. (2012), dealing with secure tenure approaches pose continuing challenges vis-à-vis the social, economic and political realities which include the (1) declining supply of land and rising land prices, (2) high population growth in cities and increasing densities in informal settlements, (3) laws on easements and danger zones, (4) leveraging of resources on large-scale and tapping of funds from the private sector and (5) sustaining of subsidies for secure tenure.

Most urban areas have privately-owned structures and its growing densities escalated land prices. Accordingly, land use decisions are driven by market forces and the government is met with the challenge of preserving control over the land. On the other hand, a high population growth in cities may lead to overcrowding in informal settlements. Tenure approaches built around land ownership are not ideal and land consolidation is seen as beneficial compared to dividing land into small parcels. There is also a need for models which could help tap into private sources of funds in order to leverage resources on a large scale. At the same time, the laws on easements and danger zones should be guided by community-based assessment of own hazards in order to inform policies. The greatest challenge, however, has to do with sustaining subsidies for secure tenure. In the long run, the government may look into designing and investing on appropriate subsidies for the urban poor (Karaos, et al., 2012).

Important Acronyms:

BDDRM- Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction Management
CCT- Conditional Cash Transfer
CELA- Certificate of Entitlement for Lot Allocations
CMP- Community Mortgage Program
COHRE- Center on Housing Rights and Evictions Concerning the Philippines
DILG- Department of the Interior and Local Government
DSWD- Department of Social Welfare and Development
FGD- Focus Group Discussions
ISF- Informal Settler Families
LGU- Local Government Units
LIAC- Local Inter-Agency Committees
MMDA- Metro Manila Development Authority
MTDP- Medium Term Development Plan
NHA- National Housing Authority
NSCB- National Statistical Coordination Board
NTWG- National Technical Working Group
PPPP- Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps)
SHFC- Social Housing Finance Corporation

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Autonomous and Planned Adaptation Options to Climate Change of Select Southern Philippine Coastal Communities

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Introduction

Building resilient communities in the context of climate change is now unbeatable in creating convergence. In 2011, five Asian countries were among the top ten most affected by climate variability and extreme weather events as listed in The Global Risk Index of 2011. Thailand, Cambodia and Pakistan occupied the top three positions, in the order given. The Philippines ranked 5th, and Sri Lanka ranked 10th. TS Sendong (international name: Washi) that rampaged the Philippines in mid-December claimed about 1600 flood victims, making the country top the list in the highest number of casualties posted. In 2013, the Philippines ranked 2nd in the Climate Risk Index due to the human casualties that resulted from Typhoon Yolanda (International name: Haiyan). Climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction and management (CCA-DRRM) are agenda that have been thrust to local, national and global levels of governance and assistance.

Extreme weather events generally affect most the coastal communities. Coastal areas are prevalent in Asia Pacific countries, and these are experiencing varying levels of coastal erosion, sea level rise, coastal flooding, and salt water intrusion. This vulnerability is particularly high in the Philippines due to its archipelagic nature. It is not, however, only the presence of the many coastal communities in the country that spells its vulnerability. The fact that the Philippines is a developing country implies that its vulnerability is also due to what the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat has recognized: it has “fewer resources to adapt socially, technologically, and financially” (UNFCCC, 2007).

Adaptation refers to processes, actions or options to adjust to or cope with new conditions. Adaptation to climate change has been defined severally, but the definitions converge to mean taking appropriate actions to reduce the negative effects of climate change or take advantage of positive ones (IPCC, 2001; UNDP, 2005; Smit et al., 2000, cited in Malik, 2010).

Adaptation to climate change is either *autonomous* or *planned*. IPCC (2001) has differentiated the two. Autonomous adaptation is one “that does not constitute a conscious response to climatic stimuli, but is triggered by ecological changes in natural systems and by market or welfare changes in human systems. It is also referred to as *spontaneous adaptation*.” By contrast, planned adaptation is “the result of a deliberative policy decision, based on an awareness that conditions have changed or are about to change and that action is required to return to, to maintain, or to achieve a desired state.”

This paper is culled from a year-long research project commissioned by the WorldFish Center that looked into the climate change adaptation strategies in selected coastal communities in the Philippines. The study team’s contribution to the national project was the conduct of the study in the Mindanao context, hence only the findings in selected coastal communities in Mindanao are presented.

Objectives

This paper focuses on climate change hazards in six coastal communities in Mindanao and the adaptation actions pursued for the period 2002-2012. It describes the autonomous adaptation to these hazards by households and by entire communities, compares planned adaptation options to climate change of the grassroots level of governance vis-à-vis planned adaptation options of the municipal or city government unit, and identifies emerging issues in adapting to climate change.

Methods

A triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods was used. One qualitative method used was the participatory hazard and vulnerability mapping, which identified effects of climate change on certain areas and sectors in the community, on livelihoods, etc. This was done by officials of *barangays* (the smallest political unit in the Philippines) studied together with officers of people’s organizations in the *barangays*. Community maps were first drawn by the participants, and on this map the location of hazards such as flooding, sea level rise and coastal erosion were marked, using color-coding (e.g. orange, red and blue indicate areas vulnerable to flooding, salt water intrusion,

and typhoons/storm surges). Symbols (e.g., triangle for houses, square with flag on top for schools) were used to identify on the map vulnerable sectors. The participatory hazard and vulnerability mapping was capped with a focus group discussion (FGD) to determine timelines (recalling when the hazards have been observed), and to determine the autonomous adaptation measures done to manage/reduce effects of hazards.

FGDs were also conducted to identify the planned adaptation options to certain climate change impacts. These underwent two levels of discussions: the *barangay* governance level and the municipal governance level for the Misamis Oriental study sites, and the *barangay* and city governance levels for the Iligan City study sites. The planned adaptation options in the different governance levels were then compared and contrasted to determine the priority options. Ability to achieve multiple goals, availability of budget, availability of manpower skills, social acceptability and urgency were the criteria used in prioritizing options. Key informant interviews (KIIs) were also done to obtain additional information or to clarify some data and processes that are vital to the study.

Quantitative methods involved a survey of sample household heads in the six *barangays* identified as study sites. Sampling was done only to households situated one kilometer from the coast to ensure that the respondents have familiarity with coastal climate change hazards. A quota sample of 300 respondents was chosen. As the selected Misamis Oriental study sites came from three municipalities and the Lanao del Norte study sites came only from Iligan City, the total number of respondents from Iligan City was made equal to the total number of respondents from a Misamis Oriental municipality.

The Study Sites

This study focuses on the coastal communities in two provinces in the northern part of Mindanao: Lanao del Norte and Misamis Oriental. For Lanao del Norte the study sites are three coastal *barangays* in the city of Iligan, namely Buruun, Dalipuga and Tambacan. In Misamis Oriental, the study sites are *Barangay* Baybay in Alubijid, *Barangay* Gimaylan in Libertad and *Barangay* Luyongbonbon in Opol. The coastal communities studied are located in the adjoining Macajalar Bay and Iligan Bay; these are two major fishing grounds in Northern Mindanao.

The Macajalar and Iligan Bays became the major industrial port and entry point for new migrants and settlers. The growing number of industries around the region has contributed largely to the environmental degradation of the two bays. The coral reefs in Macajalar Bay have declined from good at 59% in 1997 to 38% in 2008. The deterioration is primarily caused by siltation (Ecological and Fisheries Profile of Macajalar Bay, 2008). Abundant coral distribution used to be found in the deeper portion of the southern and eastern side of Iligan Bay. Near the Kiwalan Cove, where industrial activities abound, the coral reefs were reported as early as 2002 to have low esthetic value due to siltation and low coral growth formation (Quiñones, et al., 2002).

The selected *barangays* met two major criteria agreed upon by the members of the research team: prevalence of flooding and coastal erosion. Aside from these, the pervasiveness of poverty and the extent of dependence on coastal marine resources for livelihood were also taken into consideration.

Misamis Oriental Study Sites

Barangay Luyong Bonbon in Opol had 807 households in 2012, 206 of them situated within a kilometer from the shore. It is home to a large population of residents dependent on fishing. This has been like this for many years already. Deep sea operations used to be based in this barangay. The old fishing port and a defunct cold storage and processing facilities are still there. The busy fish market situated along the highway, however, is now only a memory.

It is evident from ocular examination that the once vibrant fishing village has diminished to a large extent. While fishing boats still lined the shore, fishing was no longer as lucrative as it was observed about 7-10 years ago. As the cold storage plant has ceased operations, so has the public market along the highway. Based on the situation of residences along the shore, sea water level has increased through the years and has encroached into the residential lots.

Barangay Baybay in Alubijid is also a fishing village comprising of 380 households, 229 of which are found within a kilometer from the shore. It is on the accretion area on the mouth of the river. Evidently, the hazard of flooding is present. The residents have observed also that the community's beach has expanded compared to what it was in the 1980s, resulting in a gain of around 100 meters of dry land. This is a phenomenon that the residents do not understand well but are grateful for. Abject poverty is evident in the area. Indicators include houses made of light materials and there is the lack of infrastructure development. The village used to have a large solar salt production facility involving many villagers but the land area devoted to this is now reduced in size with only a few individuals running the project. A small area for mangroves could also be found in the village which serves as nursery for young crabs which are then transferred to a small facility which houses a crab fattening project.

Barangay Gimaylan in Libertad is another fishing village that is still surviving based on the number of fishing boats that can be seen anchored on the bay. About 250 of its 405 households could be found within a kilometer from the shore. Poverty is evident in the make-shift type of houses owned by the fisher folk. Some of these houses and properties are already on stilts, an indication of sea level rise and coastal erosion.

Iligan City, Lanao del Norte Study Sites

Barangay Buruun in Iligan City is one barangay blessed with a number of springs that spawned a number of resorts. These resorts are also very proximate to the coastal area. The flow of tourism income does not trickle down to the grassroots level as economic difficulties beset majority of its 1,616 households, most of which are into fishing. About 1580 households could be found within the one-kilometer distance from the shore. This is one barangay where dynamite fishing is still reported; apprehended fishers claimed that their engagement in the illegal act was a desperate effort due to the lack of livelihood activities. Around 50 boats, 30 motorized and 20 non-motorized, are registered in the area. Other means of fishing exist, such as the use of the "payaw" and "gala".

The existence of climate change has also impacted not just on the community's economic activity but also caused residents to relocate away from the shore where most of their livelihood is taking place. Houses along the coast used to be at least 50 meters away from the sea but the occurrences of sea level rise and coastal erosion reduced this to only 2-5 meters. This has forced many fisher folk

living in make-shift houses to relocate to the hills across the road; the hills have steep slopes, thereby exposing the residents to yet another hazard: soil erosion and landslides.

Barangay Tambacan was once a thriving fishing village of Iligan. Its coastal resource in the past was abundant with fish and other marine life forms. However, the three rivers that traverse the community and discharge water to its coast are now a recipient of indiscriminate throwing and dumping of almost all sorts of domestic and industrial wastes and other rubbish, affecting the fishery resources. Nipa palms that used to line the shore have also disappeared and have been replaced with rows of makeshift houses. Tambacan had 1,984 households in 2012, around 1,737 of which found within a kilometer distance from the shore.

Aside from the coastal erosion and sea level rise that is taking place, the barangay is frequently experiencing flash floods recently due to the increasing incidence of heavy rainfall; the flash floods are worsened during high tide especially that Tambacan is an estuarine community.

Barangay Dalipuga is host to several industrial activities but fishing is still prevalent in the community. The latest count (2012) showed 35 motorized and 50 non-motorized fishing boats in the area. Average catch from the non-motorized boats is a low 2 kilograms a day. There is a small fish farm in the area for breeding and experimental purposes. The community also hosts a 45-hectare fish sanctuary. An artificial reef program was also initiated in this barangay, with 447 modules installed.

The community has 2,283 households, with 2,267 households posted as within a kilometer distance from the coast. Dalipuga is experiencing coastal erosion, affecting livelihoods and homes along the coast. Flash floods have been reported to usually occur in the months of May, June, August and December.

Profile of Respondents

The sample respondents were either the heads of households or a member who could make household decisions as well as fishing or farming activity decisions. Based on this qualification, most of the respondents in the six study sites were males, or ranging from 80% to 92.50% in the different study sites. They were in the age bracket 46 – 51 years old, generally married (70% to 85%), with a mean household size of five. About 46% of the respondents from communities in the province of Misamis Oriental have had only elementary education, 38% attended high school, and 16% made it to college. Respondents from the communities of Iligan City had better schooling opportunities, with about 58% finishing high school or had several years in high school; 23% either obtained a college degree or had some years in college; only 9% did not go beyond elementary schooling. Armed with a high school or college education and some practical skills, a sizable 30% to 62.5%, found employment in either the private or government sector, although as laborers, carpenters, janitor or clerks. Some earned their keep as officials of the *barangay*. There were those who run microbusinesses (16% - 40%). Almost all respondents claimed to also fish or farm on weekends. Those mainly into fishing and farming, however, comprised 13% to 58% of the respondents. Low fish catch, low farm productivity, or low pay, forced the respondents to take multiple jobs to provide for their household needs.

Respondents reported that average monthly expenditures on food were highest in 2012; the smallest monthly average was posted in Baybay (PhP5,116), the biggest in Tambacan (PhP7,738). Baybay respondents' average food expenditure was below the country's food threshold in 2012, which was PhP5,458 (NSCB, 2012). The value of the consumption of own produce (e.g., fish catch), however, was not factored in. Monthly average expenditures on education, meanwhile, were only PhP433 among Gimaylan respondents and PhP869 among respondents coming from Dalipuga. The figures are the lowest and highest mean expenditures posted.

Respondents reported that monthly expenditures on household repairs and maintenance ranked second highest, or next to that of food: these ranged from PhP1,021 (Tambacan) to PhP4,978 (Dalipuga). The expenditures were, in general, directed to efforts to make the dwelling sturdier to withstand the ravages of weather.

Participatory Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment of Climate Change Effects and Costs

Participatory hazard and vulnerability assessment of climate change effects involved delineating areas, population and resources at risk through participatory mapping, resulting in the Hazard and Vulnerability Map of each barangay studied. Complementing the participatory mapping were FGDs, key informant interviews and survey of sample household heads to generate a more in-depth understanding of the climate hazards and their socio-economic effects,

In all instances, although in varying degrees, the residents in the study sites were found to be vulnerable to flooding by sea water or by the overflowing of rivers and creeks. Key informants and FGD participants attributed flooding to natural causes as high tides and storm surges, and to anthropogenic causes such as deforestation and dumping of solid wastes in rivers, creeks and canals. Similar to the members of the scientific community, some key informants attributed flooding to observed sea level rise as evidenced by fast-eroding shores. Sea level rise is a characteristic of global warming. The rising atmospheric temperature associated with global warming causes the melting of portions of icebergs, raising the sea level. Pilkey, et al. (1996) wrote about a collaborative French-American project in 1994 that employed the Topex/Poseidon satellite and reported sea level rise worldwide that measures about a tenth of an inch per year --- a rate of one inch per decade. The authors pointed out that the effects of sea level rise can be seen with absolute certainty in the rapidly eroding coast of the Mississippi Delta.

Respondents and key informants in this study were wary of the effects of sea level rise to their shores; some communities have even lost their sandy beaches. Oral historical account provided by the elderly depicted shores that were eroding fast starting in the 1970s to the time of the conduct of the study. Losses in shoreline were reported to range from 20 to 50 meters. Barangay Baybay in Alubijid is a notable exception as residents claimed that it has gained about a hundred meters of land from the shoreline since the 1970s.

Salt water intrusion is similarly a common occurrence, affecting all communities studied.

Estimated cost of damages to assets and properties due to hazards were obtained from sample households. Estimated costs per household were found to be generally low, reflecting impoverished conditions. The opportunity costs or foregone earnings, e.g., loss of income resulting from not being

able to fish, were reported by respondents to be higher than the estimated cost of damages. The costs of damages and foregone earnings combined posed a heavy burden to poor households.

Flooding

The study found out that among the coastal communities studied the most vulnerable to flooding were those which are near rivers or creeks. Baybay and Gimaylan in Misamis Oriental, and Tambacan and Buruun in Iligan City would easily get flooded when the rivers traversing these communities would overflow. Luyongbonbon in Misamis Oriental and Dalipuga in Iligan City, meanwhile, would get flooded due to the overflowing of creeks in these communities. Bodies of water traversing a community were reported to cause flooding when there was heavy rainfall, and because the flood water drains to the sea, a high tide would aggravate the flooding. Solid wastes that accumulated in rivers and creeks were cited to also aggravate flooding as drainage and spillways got clogged up by heaps of plastics, mineral water containers, and aluminum packages of fruit juices or junk snack items, tins, and other refuse. This was found to be particularly prevalent in Luyongbonbon and in Tambacan.

Areas near rivers that were found to be susceptible to flooding were usually small farm lots (Baybay and Gimaylan) and schools in the elementary and high school levels (Tambacan and Buruun). Moreover, schools and Day Care centers could also be found in areas where flooding occurred, which was the case in Luyongbonbon and Dalipuga. In Luyongbonbon, school children oftentimes had to wade through the flood. Though generally only knee-high and would subside gradually in about half an hour after the rain, respondents said typhoons would make the water rise up to 3 feet and would take several hours for the flood to subside. In all cases poorer households were the ones affected most by flooding as they live in one-storey houses on lots that have not been backfilled or elevated.

The small farm lots affected were reported to be generally planted to banana, corn, vegetables and palay, more often for subsistence purposes but some farms would yield a produce that would allow a minimal surplus for the market. Flooding, therefore, also put at risk the food security and sources of income of small farmers who, at the same time, were also municipal fishers. Makeshift houses are also within the periphery of these flood-prone areas. Farmers cum fishers reportedly either evacuate and live with relatives in drier lands or choose to remain in their homes when flooding occurs. In either option, farmers inevitably forego income generation. Evacuation was said to be non-negotiable when a storm was announced and deeper flood waters were expected. This again would lead to foregone earnings.

In Baybay, flooding also affected the salt beds as well as the small inland fishponds that were established primarily to boost food security of the residents. The areas devoted to *lampakanay* (a reed used in weaving baskets and trays or used in floral arrangements) would also be flooded. Baybay residents therefore lament that practically all the community's sources of food and livelihoods are affected by flooding.

Foregone earnings in the study sites were posted to reach PhP8,000 during a flood, an amount generally higher than reported estimated cost of damages due to flooding except for the estimated costs of damages attributed to Tropical Storm Sendong (international name: Washi). Moreover, illnesses were reported to also occur after flooding; these included diarrhea, typhoid fever and coughing, whose medication also required the use of scarce funds.

Flooding near schools would lead to the suspension of classes from time-to-time – officially or informally – to prevent school children from wading in the flood and to keep them safe.

Flooding was posted to have occurred about 30 times in Baybay and Tambacan over the 11 year period covering 2001-2011. Household respondents indicated as many as 10 floods taking place in Buruun for the period 2001-2011.

Gimaylan and Luyongbonbon also reported flooding due to storm surges which were becoming stronger and more frequent. Heavy winds would cause waves as high as 7 to 9 feet in Gimaylan, causing damages to coastal houses and structures in the process. Coastal flooding due to storm surges, however, was reportedly shallow; it was the damaging impact of the waves on infrastructure that was mentioned as the cause for alarm.

The two recent floods experienced in the study sites were those caused by Tropical Storm Ondoy (international name: Ketsana) in 2009 and TS Sendong on December 16-17, 2011. Local government units, disaster management offices and even the affected communities said they never could have predicted that the resulting floods due to TS Sendong would be so disastrous and would claim close to 1,500 lives and cause billions of [Philippine] pesos worth of destruction to crops and properties. Mindanao, particularly Region 10, and specifically Misamis Oriental and Iligan City, used to be perceived as a typhoon-free area, a blessing the island and its component regions have enjoyed for decades, and have served as a strong motivator for investment decisions. The onslaught of TS Sendong changed that perception.

Estimated damages to their homes attributed to by the respondents to TS Sendong (their worst flood scenario) ranged only from PhP2,185 (Luyongbonbon) to PhP12,400 (Tambacan), which included already damages to appliances as stoves, radios and television sets and refrigerators. The amount of damages claimed suggests low cost housing materials and depreciated appliances.

Sea Level Rise and Coastal Erosion

Sea level rise and coastal erosion were identified as hazards in all study sites except in Baybay, which, as earlier mentioned, were reported to have gained about a 100 meters of shore when compared to the 1970 shore measurements. The area gained was used for the creation of inland fishponds. This unusual gain in shoreline may be due to some coastal protection measures in neighboring communities; waves confronted with seawalls and bulkheads may have receded, carrying sand to the shores of Baybay. A study to explain this phenomenon still needs to be done, however.

Gimaylan key informants and respondents claimed that coastal erosion and sea level rise have reduced Gimaylan's shore of about 50 meters in the 1970s to only about 10 meters currently. This has affected the factory site of a women's livelihood project on fish paste, locally known as

ginamos. This fish paste is made of anchovies or *bolinao*, which was frequently caught in large quantities by the fisher spouses of women engaged in the value-adding project. Another women's livelihood project reported to be affected is the processing of dried seaweed into chips for snacks. Households are similarly affected. The nearness of infrastructure to the shore worsened the effect of storm surges. The flooding due to a storm surge, respondents claimed, does not do as much damage as the repeated beating of the huge and strong waves on the walls of the structures. The repetitive impact of the strong waves would weaken the walls and consequently cause these to fall. Even the concrete walls erected to protect public infrastructure as the social hall and the basketball court were reported to be slowly crumbling. Storm surges would keep the community alert and community patrols would be conducted round the clock to keep people and properties safe.

In Luyongbonbon, coastal erosion and sea level rise are observable even in areas across the national highway parallel to the shore, especially during high tide. Key informants said that flooding would also occur during high tide, and while this was only at depths of 2 – 6 inches, this would last for days in low-lying areas and become breeding places for dengue-causing mosquitoes. The community, in fact, features as one where the incidence of dengue is moderately high among very young children and school children during the rainy months. Sea level rise was also said to take place during rainy months.

Suffering more are the fisher folk of Talisay, a seaside area in Luyongbonbon. The fishers and their households live on makeshift houses on stilts as the sea level has gone up to breast-height and even up to about six feet during high tide. Fisher-respondents said that sea level rise has resulted in making their life and fishing activity difficult. The absence of an affordable private relocation site to affected households on one hand, and the apparent neglect for policy action to have the fishing households relocated explains the prevailing circumstances.

In Buruun, households along the shore can also be observed as bearing the burden of coastal erosion and sea level rise. Dwellings along the shore are semi-permanent to permanent structures and are quite new, or only about 10 years old. These are owned by employees in private or government offices or residents who are into microbusinesses. The distance of the structures from the sea is only some 2 to 3 meters during the conduct of the study in 2012. The previous occupants, fisher folk who are allegedly informal settlers, were told to vacate the area due to the hazards of coastal erosion and sea level rise. The current occupants said that the shoreline was still about 10 meters away when they constructed their homes and have provided for some form of protection against further coastal erosion, but they did not expect its hastened pace of this phenomenon. The fishing households who vacated the shores relocated to the nearby steep hills and mountains across the national highway – allegedly informally also – to be able to continue with their fishing activity. They face the hazard of soil erosion there as Buruun's highlands are indicated in the Iligan geohazard map of 2011 as highly vulnerable to erosion. They also expressed difficulty in fishing especially that sea level rise and coastal erosion makes it difficult for them to find a nearby area to dock their fishing boats.

Small-scale quarrying of sand or sand mining by several residents also emerged in the FGDs as a major contributory factor to coastal erosion. Commercial sand mining was long prohibited in the barangay precisely because of the fast-eroding shore, but it served as an additional (and illegal)

source of income to fishers who complain of low fish catch. Gleaning, which used to be a livelihood activity of fishermen's wives, has yielded very little income since the 2000s and is now non-existent.

Tambacan fishing families are also vulnerable to coastal erosion and sea level rise and the flooding which usually accompanies it during high tide. This is also true for the many micro-enterprises of informal settlers that are found in the community, as well as for the diasporic Badjao community which has recently taken residence there. The shore was characterized as wide in the 1970s, but has been largely reduced. There is, however, a sediment formation in the shallow part of the sea, making it appear as if a piece of land has been reclaimed. Key informants said that this was not yet observed up to the 1980s. The sediment formation may be due to many factors, both natural and manmade; drastic changes in sea level rise and wave currents are two of the possible natural causes while the extraction of coastal aggregates (commonly referred to as quarrying) by residents themselves for home improvement. This phenomenon similarly needs to be studied.

In Dalipuga, households along the coast – many of them informal settlers who have earlier been beneficiaries of government relocation efforts – have been found to be the most vulnerable to sea level rise and coastal erosion. Beach resort owners are affected as well, but they are in a position to implement adaptive measures. Resort owners claimed, however, that it would take a while for them to recoup their investments as many of their clients already prefer mountain resorts which have ample space for kids to run around. Farmers who used to rely on copra making from coconuts harvested from trees by the beach now have to look for alternative income sources. Like returning relocatees who cannot survive on very minimal fish catch, many of these farmers have reportedly become drivers of tricycles that have become a common form of transportation to the interior sections of the community. Driving a tricycle is a form of livelihood which is easy to enter due to low skill and capitalization requirements. Income from this livelihood is minimal, however, and the unlicensed drivers run the risk of being penalized and his tricycle impounded.

Saltwater Intrusion

Fresh water sources producing salty water that is getting saltier through time is also another challenge in the study sites. This started to be felt in the period of the 1960s to the 1970s, but was only noticed much later in Gimaylan, or in the 1990s, as some respondents recalled. This is not a problem, however, in the Iligan study sites which have access to the water district. Buruun residents, in addition to having Level II or Level III water connections, have access to abundant spring water.

The Misamis Occidental study sites, however, were either not connected or only had Level I connection with the municipal water district. Deep wells were the main sources of water. To the respondents and FGD participants, their water has turned "*tayam*", or has become salty and even tastes like rust. In Baybay, the presence of small black particles have also been observed, in addition to being "*tayam*". As water has become "hard" and "dirty", bathing and the washing of clothes and utensils have also been rendered difficult. It is in Baybay where saltwater intrusion is most problematic.

Autonomous Adaptation of Households and Communities and Planned Adaptation Options

Climate change adaptation policy generally focuses on *planned* adaptation measures but in households and communities where climate change was not yet understood, adaptation consists of *autonomous* responses to multiple hazards to lives and livelihoods. Many of the hazards -- drought, flooding, sea level rise, coastal erosion -- are now increasingly seen, however, as resulting from variabilities of climate:

Autonomous responses are adaptive responses where the capability of households and communities becomes the primary consideration.

Autonomous Adaptation Strategies

Reducing damages and inconvenience due to flooding pushed households to elevate the floor of their houses (Tambacan, Buruun, Luyongbonbon). Building a second floor was even a better option for the well-off (Tambacan, Buruun). Where coastal erosion and sea level rise result in year-round flooding of varying levels, and rising with the high tide, houses were seen as reconstructed atop stilts (Luyongbonbon, Tambacan, Buruun), the stilts varying from being made of wood to concrete, indicating that some households are worse off and others are better off.

Flooding due to sea level rise, or due to both sea level rise and the overflowing of the river in communities located near estuaries, prompted residents to surround their homes with piles of sandbags. The respondents said this was man's job and claimed the sandbags prevent floodwater from entering their homes, or significantly reduce the inflow of floodwater. Additionally, household paraphernalia that are kept in the backyard such as pails and basins, and even slippers, are prevented from being carried away to the sea or river as the sandbags serve also as protective fences. The piles of sandbags were reported to go higher through time as the sea level rose higher. The sand comes from the community's beaches, however, thereby adding to coastal erosion, as the respondents themselves observed. As dela Cruz, et al. (2000) correctly stated, disasters create consequences that increase vulnerability even more, which could result to another disaster.

In Buruun, coastal erosion and flooding pushed households of fishers to relocate to the hills which are just about half a kilometer away from their previous homes along the shore. Local government officials said these households are informal settlers on the hills, just as they were once informal settlers by the shore. Relocation could have been done to safer places, or those identified by the local government, as the hills are prone to soil erosion. Continuing access to the sea for fishing was the main reason for taking the risk and face yet another hazard. An observer may question the rationality of the measure, but to the fishers, nothing could be more rationale than being able to fish and eat daily. This is yet another case of the extreme vulnerability of the poor to hazards, including those caused by climate change. This also is another sad example of "disasters creating consequences that increase vulnerability even more" (dela Cruz et al., *ibid.*, 2010).

The space vacated by the Buruun informal settlers, meanwhile, has been occupied by the better-off, as evidenced by the permanent structures now lining the shoreline. These residential houses, however, are now only 1 to 2 meters away from the sea. Thick concrete fences serve as shield to big waves and flooding due to high tide, but not during the months of December to January where seawater would inundate the houses up to a meter's depth. The residents would then have no choice

but to vacate their homes during these months, and would return putting up more protective measures.

In some study sites (Luyongbonbon, Dalipuga, Tambacan) respondents reported their efforts at de-clogging canals near their homes of solid wastes, mainly plastic refuse, to enable flood water from higher elevation areas to flow unobstructed to the sea. This was generally done by women, and has increasingly evolved into becoming a community response. Solid waste management also forms part of river management in Tambacan; no river dredging has been reported, but this is a clamor of the community for many years already that has fallen on deaf ears.

The effort of individual households to put up structures that attempt to resist pressure from the waves or to redirect or prevent flooding by a river or by the sea, is similar to autonomous efforts by communities to put up massive ripraps or embankments. These are generally erected out of piles of stones and cement. In Gimaylan, concrete slabs which are the refuse of repairs along the national highway traversing the barangay were used as embankment to prevent coastal flooding and reduce damage to community infrastructure caused by strong oncoming waves. Using the Filipino *bayanihan* spirit, which means voluntary and collective rendering of service, the heavy concrete slabs were brought from the highway piece by piece to the portion of the community shore where the onslaught of tall waves was strongest. In less than six months, however, the protection afforded to this section of the coastal community by the embankment has resulted in the redirection of flooding and strong wave pressure to the unprotected areas of the same community, which resulted in tension between the "protected" residents and those newly-exposed to the hazards.

Vegetative protection measures as mangroves along the shores, bamboo planted on riverbanks and tree growing on community-identified spaces have also been found to be common adaptive responses to flooding, coastal erosion, and eroding riverbanks, by the entire community. True to prevailing literature about mangroves (Unnikrishnan et al., 2013; Priya et al., 2010; Bell & Lovelock, 2013), the communities studied found them to provide protection from coastal erosion, storm surges, typhoons and the consequent flooding. Key informants also attested to the ancillary benefits mangroves provide, such as serving as nurseries for small fishes. Mangroves abound in the fish sanctuary of Libertad, the municipality where Gimaylan belongs. However, significant numbers of mangroves were also destroyed by extreme weather events, and even by the repetitive effects of strong wind and waves, a finding also noted by Bell and Lovelock (ibid.). The strong wind and waves practically rendered useless community attempts in Gimaylan (about a kilometer away from the fish sanctuary) and Tambacan to do mangrove reforestation. Agriculture officers and environment officers interviewed said location, coast characteristics, and action of waves indeed affect the survival of mangrove propagules, prompting them to try to experiment on ways to give protection to the tender propagules.

Vegetative protection that have long existed are often complemented with seawalls and breakwater structures. These were generally built using funds from the national government (e.g., through the Department of Public Highways) because of their huge costs.

Some scientific studies on the use of bulkheads (such as seawalls, embankments) or the so-called "shoreline armoring" as a fix to coastal erosion point to bulkheads as *also* a cause for coastal

erosion (Pilkey et al. 1991; Pilkey et al., 1996, op cit.). Other studies, meanwhile, stressed that the bulkheads' contributing to coastal erosion take place when there is no thorough understanding of how a seawall should be designed and maintained in the location it was built (Magoon et al., 1989; Griggset al., 1988) thereby rendering this engineering solution for eroding coasts as compounding the problem. The seawalls in the communities studied looked similar, suggesting that their construction may not have considered requirements by the specific biophysical environments.

Autonomous actions on saltwater intrusion generally involved shifting to purified bottled water for drinking (expenditures for this could go from PhP200 – PhP 300, depending on the number of very young children in the household) and where accessible, fetching of water for cooking, washing, and bathing from another source, which was the case in Luyongbonbon and in Gimaylan. In Baybay, residents buy fresh water for drinking and cooking from an enterprising household which invested in tapping to the water district. A cubic meter of water per month was estimated to be needed for these purposes, resulting in an average monthly expenditure of PhP104. Fetching water from this source for bathing increased water expenditures. As earlier mentioned, saltwater intrusion affected more the residents in the Misamis Oriental study sites as these were not connected to the water district. Adaptation to saltwater intrusion was a day-to-day responsibility – and struggle – of women, generally mothers, who spend a significant portion of their time and household budget to access safe water and keep the household members protected from waterborne illnesses, maintain household cleanliness, and provide fresh clothes.

Planned Adaptation Options

Separate FGDs were done with barangay representatives and with the municipal/city officials in identifying and prioritizing planned adaptation options for climate change hazards. The separate FGDs would determine convergence or divergence in options and their prioritization in the two levels of governance. The *what to do* aspect was something that the barangay LGU, in all the study sites, did not earlier think about. Initial discussions, therefore, lacked serious thought, especially in the prioritization, despite the criteria that were set (ability to achieve multiple goals, availability of budget, availability of manpower skills, social acceptability and urgency). This is attributable to the lack of awareness – at the time of the FGDs in June to July 2012 – of Climate Change Adaptation-Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (CCA-DRRM) principles and practices.

Clarification on prioritized options that were done 4 to 5 months later resulted in new or revised options. The barangay officials claimed that this was because the earlier FGDs triggered discussions on CCA-DRRM and put CCA-DRRM on the barangay agenda. Moreover, at the time of the follow up, the municipal/city LGUs had already conducted a series of meetings/trainings on CCA-DRRM with barangay officials as mandated by Republic Act 9729 (Climate Change Act) and Republic Act 10121 (DRRM Act) to provide capacity development for CCA and disaster preparedness. Furthermore, the national government had mandated the mainstreaming of DRRM in the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) that was being prepared for the next year. Particularly in Region 10, mainstreaming CCA-DRRM became more urgent and more meaningful as many Misamis Oriental and Iligan City communities were severely affected by TS Sendong.

Prioritized planned adaptation options selected by the respective communities studied generally required engineering solutions (such as the establishment of seawalls, sea breakers, concrete ripraps

on river banks), also referred to as “hard solutions” (Gero et al., 2011). The development of relocation sites was also already a top priority for target groups, specifically those sectors in the barangay most frequently affected by floods. Relocation was a non-option earlier in Gimaylan and Luyongbonbon, but has long been a clamor in Tambacan for several years already. The fear of the loss of livelihood (fishing) was the foremost consideration in the former cases where strong and tall waves due to storm surges were the main risk factors. However, identifying nearby elevated places as relocation sites to still allow fishing made relocation an acceptable option. In the latter case, which pertains to an estuarine community, it is the high risk to lives and properties posed by frequent flooding to a depth rising beyond five feet that made relocation a high priority. Cost-recovery measures were considered in the relocation option; this means relocatees will amortize their new homes over a period of 25 years in affordable amounts, and this was something that the target beneficiaries readily agreed to.

The prioritization of options was in anticipation of more severe climate change effects. These are options requiring huge logistical support – primarily funding – access to which was acknowledged as difficult. Some vegetative solutions were also identified to complement the hard options, but as these take a longer time to manifest protective capacities, the community [*barangay*] officials stressed the need for the urgent implementation of hard solutions to ensure that lives, properties and livelihoods are given immediate protection. The vegetative options were those which the barangay officials and other community members considered as yielding also some livelihood, such as the layered planting of bamboo, fast-growing trees and fruit trees on river banks. The choice of particular species to grow utilized local knowledge on soil quality-tree species matching. The bamboo would later be used as inputs to engineered-bamboo products (such as bamboo tiles for desks and tables), the fast-growing trees for firewood and house repairs, and the harvest of high-value fruits sold in its raw or processed form. The growing of mangroves, with its ancillary benefits like serving as nursery for fishes, was still considered but this came with an appeal for assistance from appropriate government agencies for better means of planting and nurturing to ensure that the propagules survive. It was obvious from the follow up interviews that the leadership in the communities studied, comprising of *barangay* officials and representatives of people’s organizations, had started to take a long, hard look at their circumstances and decided to act on them.

On the other hand, vegetative options, particularly the growing of mangroves, were the ones prioritized by the municipal or city LGUs. Enforcement of policies such as the building code, water code, ban on sand mining or quarrying, and solid waste management, information and education campaigns on climate change and its hazards, also referred to as the “soft options” (Gero et al., *ibid.*) were similarly given high priority. Budget constraint surfaced as a major cause for not favoring hard options. Other causes for not prioritizing certain hard options included the municipal/city representatives’ *a priori* knowledge of plans for a particular barangay by the city LGU, such as the plan to reclaim land in Tambacan, which renders superfluous the barangay residents’ clamor for the construction of a seawall or sea breaker.

Overall, weak convergence in the determination of planned adaptation options for flooding, coastal erosion and sea level rise in the two levels of governance was therefore evident.

To reduce the effects of salt water intrusion in the Misamis Oriental study sites, the Iligan model of connecting households to the water district was the planned adaptation option. This was the best option. Water from the municipal water districts was only for PhP12 per cu m for a consumption level of up to 15 cu m (stepped up pricing is being adopted for water conservation purposes). Assuming an average water consumption level of 5 cu m per month would only mean an outlay of PhP60 and is a big saving in a mother's time, which can then be used for income-generating activities. Computations done by the research team on the cost effectiveness of this option for both households and the municipal government (which shall receive cost recovery measures for connecting the barangay to the water district) resulted in a convergence in the prioritization of this option. Citing the fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goal of providing access to safe water by 2015 was also a great help in the prioritizing of this option and its immediate implementation. As of this writing, work toward this effort is in progress, with the study sites having already at least Level I water connections or having community faucets.

Conclusions

The vulnerability of coastal households in the study sites is a manifestation of flaws in development planning, weaknesses in governance, issues in inequity, and lack of understanding of sustainable development. This resulted in autonomous adaptation strategies that were mostly in consideration of the short-term period only as these depended heavily on their low income and asset status, and their lack of access to alternative livelihoods.

Costs of damages to households due to climate change impacts, notably flooding, were very low, reflecting income and asset poverty. The low value of damaged properties conveyed to these coastal households a faint voice in the general effort to access disaster risk reduction measures.

Loss of income or foregone earnings during extreme weather events, or additional expenditures to access a basic resource as safe water due to salt water intrusion or to cure an ailment due to adverse weather make climate change a heavier burden to the poor. As found out by the study, the foregone earnings and the additional expenditures are of greater costs than direct property damages.

Climate change adaptation has implications on gender role. Men take primary responsibility for adaptation to flooding, storm surges and coastal erosion. Women ensure that the household is protected from the effects of saltwater intrusion.

Planned adaptation options reveal some divergence in priorities arrived at in the community [*barangay*] level and middle-level governance. Proximity to risk points, as demonstrated by *barangay* officials, and seeing the "bigger picture" in planning adaptation strategies, as professed by representatives of municipal/city LGUs, result in some contestations between the *barangay* and the municipal/city DRRM agenda, which may lead to ineffectiveness in reducing risks and vulnerabilities.

Recommendations

Autonomous adaptation strategies by households and communities need to be tempered by an understanding of CCA-DRRM principles and aligned with planned measures for building resilience. Moreover, principles of inclusive growth need to also be infused during the community engagement process such that problems of poverty and inequity are simultaneously addressed.

Planned adaptation, meanwhile, has to be the outcome of continuous dialogue among stakeholders and implemented in collaboration with the academic and scientific community, professional groups and agencies charged with the responsibility of adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change. It should be given priority in logistical support, with cost-recovery measures introduced where possible thereby expanding the reach of scarce funds.

Factoring in a livelihood component to planned adaptation measures, a potential found in vegetative adaptation measures, need to be studied and implemented to enhance community resilience not only to bounce back but also to “bounce forward.”

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Transborder Civil Society and International Mega Development Project in Myanmar: A Case Study of Dawei Deep Sea Port and Industrial Estate Project

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Abstract

The Dawei Deep Sea Port Development and Industrial Estate is a large collaborative project between Thailand and Myanmar, by both the governments and private sectors which began in 2008. The agreements have been made in several patterns; Official Development Assistance (ODA), a joint venture between the state through Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and lead to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as a core development strategy of Myanmar from agricultural to industrialized country.

According to this study, strategy of the Government of the Union of Myanmar, in response to official development assistance and foreign investment in the Dawei project, found that there are strategic changes in the project from several causes. Internal factor is political change in Myanmar after the 2010 general election when the laws are modified to accord with the new constitution.

The country has prepared for the opening up even more after the change to democracy, in particular, the amendment of Foreign Investment Law which was enacted in 2012. The investors from all over the world are interested in Myanmar as a new investment space with high potential. The new law is expected to boost foreign direct investment. The bilateral agreements between Burmese government and foreign governments have been made for infrastructure and large scale industrial development in many areas of the country.

The strategy has also changed due to the delay of the project from lack of funding and conflicts in the area that caused the governments of Thailand and Myanmar and Italian-Thai Development Public Company Limited (ITD) who was granted the project's concession have modified the plan and invite foreign investors to share investment.

The study result of the social and economic impact to local community of the construction of the Dawei Deep Sea Port, found that it affected to the economy of community, household and individuals extensively due to the loss of arable area, lack of raw materials lead to the shutdown of local businesses. The project is still lack of information providing, public hearing and participation from the community. The study of environmental, social and health impact assessment are lack of transparency and participation from related parties. The lives of several thousand Dawei people have changed. The conflicts between local people and private sectors as a result of the project are still ongoing, in terms of arable land, housing, social, career, and culture. It comes from relocation policy from the project area where community with a rich history that spans several centuries has been relocated to new sites.

The project also has motivated a rising movement of civil society in the form of cross-border movements. Group of activists, scholars from Thailand have exchanged information with local activists and Dawei villagers and strengthen capacity with cooperation of the public to demands the

development project to be transparent, fair, and respect for human rights and community's rights from both the public and private sectors of the two countries partners of this project. This is a crucial step in the democratic development in Myanmar that just started recently.

1. Introduction

The Dawei Deep Sea Port Development and Industrial Estate is a large collaborative project between Thailand and Myanmar, by both the governments and private sectors which began in 2008. The agreements have been made in several patterns: Official Development Assistance (ODA), a joint venture between the state through Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and lead to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as a core development strategy of Myanmar from agricultural to industrialized country.

Governments of Thailand and the Union of Myanmar have made an agreement on May 19, 2008 by signing a memorandum of understanding to develop the Dawei Deep Seaport, an Industrial Estate and transportation link between Dawei and Bangkok. Later on June 19, 2008 the Union of Myanmar government has signed an agreement with Italian-Thai Development Public Company Limited (ITD) for conducting a feasibility study of the project. After two years, on November 2, 2008, ITD made an agreement with the Port of the Union of Myanmar to obtain rights to develop the Dawei Deep Seaport, including the industrial estate and transport links between the two countries. The Union of Myanmar has a policy to establish this area as ' Dawei Special Economic Zone '. ITD is one of Thailand's largest contractor, who has been awarded a concession to develop Dawei area of 250 square kilometers of the Union of Myanmar for 75 years to develop the area into a large industrial estate of the world with investments in the first stages over 240 billion baht in a period of 4 years and 6 months from 2012.

The objective of the government of the Union of Myanmar is to make Dawei a new "Gate Way" to attract new investors. All doors are open to infrastructure development to support investors from all over the world and accommodate future growth of the country.

Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has assigned the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, together with the Ministry of Interior as the main organizations to integrate economic development Kanchanaburi province to be the centre of western part of Thailand.

The opportunities and pressures that led to the development of Kanchanaburi is its border with Tenasserim Region, the site of Dawei Deep Seaport project. Political situation in the Union of Myanmar has changed after general election in 2010, making international community raise importance in forming a relationship with the Union of Myanmar. The new policy of the government of the Union of Myanmar is also featured on the Dawei deep seaport and opening new areas for the industry to support foreign direct investment.



Photo: <https://www.daweidevelopment.com>)

Integrated plan for the economic development of Kanchanaburi western region consists of a number of projects including the Dawei deep seaport project which is under construction in the Union of Myanmar. This is expected to bring the greatest benefits to the two countries.

The key factors for the expected success are: the participation of the Union of Myanmar; cooperation from the government of Thailand in infrastructure and transit system setting; the completion of East-West Economic Corridor which would link to Thailand by the route number 9, that includes official border check point and favorable regulatory mechanisms. Dawei deep-sea port project would open Thailand to New Global Maritime Route which is a business opportunity to expand trading with Union of Myanmar. Thailand expects to move its investment to Myanmar to reduce operating costs.

However, from the preliminary study of the relevant authorities of Thailand found that the development in western area of Thailand to link to Dawei deep seaport project which is under construction in the Union of Myanmar has a number of obstacles. The problems within Thailand are: transport system between Kanchanaburi - Bangkok is still not good enough; infrastructure is under standard; land occupied without a certificate of ownership; earthquake risk; lack of services business and the migrant workers registration system also did not respond to the economic vision of border province.

2. Agreement Patterns between Thailand and Myanmar in Dawei Deep Seaport Project

2.1 Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Thailand

Policies of the Union of Myanmar, especially on international relations and economy before the transition to democracy were controlled by the military government's which caused decades-long sanctions led by the U.S. and European Union.

This results in a lack of financial support from international financial organizations both World Bank and Asian Development Bank which has halted providing direct assistance to the Union of Myanmar for more than two decades, prior the uprising and crackdown in 1988, alluding to the relationship between the Union of Myanmar and democratic countries in the West has no progress.

In addition, the relationship between the Union of Myanmar and the international NGOs was getting worse due to strict policy and not respect for human rights which is the principle of these organizations. This condition does not allow these organizations to operate fully function in the Union of Myanmar. It causes major official assistance in the Union of Myanmar that came from Asian countries, especially from Japan. While the United States is leading a boycott of the Union of Myanmar, the United States is the second most assistance funder into the Union of Myanmar after Japan. People's Republic of China (PRC) also provides assistance and cooperation in the economy that focuses on the development of infrastructure, energy exploration and providing support for the establishment of state-owned enterprises. This also paves the way for Chinese investors into the Union of Myanmar. However, because of the infrastructure in the Union of Myanmar is not ready for investment. Therefore, the Chinese government has provided assistance in these areas even before the political reformation.

Concerning the assistance of Thailand to the Union of Myanmar in the past, it has assisted the Union of Myanmar in two aspects: one is the development of infrastructure and the second is social assistance, with emphasis on education. Previously, the Thai government supported projects in Dawei which included the construction of the deep seaport, industrial estate and transportation (roads, railways, power grids and gas/ oil pipelines) to connect between Kanchanaburi and Dawei. Some parts of the transportation have some progress but in the part of deep seaport and industrial estate both governments have changed the plan from Official Direct Assistance to a Special Purpose Vehicle in a joint venture and investment between these countries.

2.2 Special Purpose Vehicle: SPV

Investments in Dawei have been modified their form due to problems in the implementation of both the funding and the conflicts in the area. In June 2013 an agreement between the Government of Thailand and the Union of Myanmar has been made to change the cooperation to Special Purpose Vehicle: SPV.

In November 2012 the Governments of Thailand and the Union of Myanmar have established a joint committee to develop Dawei Special Economic Zone and related projects. The working groups have three levels of collaboration: Joint High-Level Committee: JHC; Joint Coordination Committee: JCC; and Joint Sub-Committee: JSC to complete the Dawei project.

JCC has agreed to fund the Dawei project by establishing Special Purpose Vehicle, which Thailand and the Union of Myanmar are holding 50 percent as a preliminary agreement to jointly invest equally 50 million baht for a business concession in Dawei project including funding for infrastructure development.

Thailand assigned Neighboring Countries Economic Development Cooperation Agency: NEDA to set up SPV with Foreign Economic Relations Department (FERD) of the Union of Myanmar, the SPV would select potential interested investors to invest in Dawei Project which consists of seven large projects, including deep seaport project, road link between Dawei and Ban Nam Pu Ron in Kanchanaburi, industrial electrical systems, plumbing systems, telecommunication, real estate projects and shopping malls. The total investment is estimated up to 213 billion baht.

2.3 Foreign Direct Investment: FDI

Government of the Union of Myanmar has a policy to encourage foreign direct investment since the military ruled. A former foreign investment law was promulgated on 30 November 1988 with the goal to persuade investors to invest in the natural resources of the Union of Myanmar for maximize the benefits to develop the country both the income distribution among population and labor skill development.

As mentioned above, the Union of Myanmar aims to enhance the development in terms of infrastructure to support industrial developments which are operating in many areas of the country. On November 2, 2013, President Thein Sein has approved a new foreign investment law of the Union of Myanmar after submission the draft to parliament in March 2013 and has been amended several times. However, there is a conflict between the requirements of the Government of the Union of Myanmar in attracting foreign investment and protecting local businesses. The investment law is regarded as a signal to initiate investment in the Union of Myanmar after the country official opening.

Japan is interested to join the investment In the Dawei project as invitation of the Government of Thailand and the Union of Myanmar. In November 2013, the issue has already been discussed between. Mr. Pongsak Raktapngpaisarn, Thailand's Minister of Energy and Mr. Setsuo Luchi, President of The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) Bangkok, on investments in Dawei industrial estate development projects. JETRO insisted that Japan intend to invest in this project as a major manufacturing base.

Currently, China and South Korea are also interested in the project. The Government of the Union of Myanmar would open bidding to those interested to develop Dawei Project Phase 1, within January 31, 2014 which are light industry, such as food, appliances and textile. The winning bidder will have to invest in a small port and two –lane road from the industrial estate to the border of Thailand.

3. Impact from the Project

3.1 Economic Impacts of Development Projects in Dawei Deep Sea Port and Industrial Estate

Problem of arable land is the big issue that causes conflict in the area both among affected villagers themselves and between villagers and project. The relocation for the project has been affected at

least 30,000 people who will lose land, farm, paddy fields, betel nut and cashew nut garden which is the main industry in Dawei. It takes time longer than 5-3 years to grow and harvest them. Cashew plantation approximately 12,000 acres is in the location of the Dawei industrial estate project, in Nabule, the shore district of Dawei. This area will be a construction site for factories, roads and preparing for industrial estate buildings.

3.2 Environmental Impacts of Development Projects in Dawei Deep Sea Port and Industrial Estate

After Map Ta Phut industrial estate was established just a few years (1988) (people living in Map Ta Phut and nearby areas began to complain more and continuously about environmental impact but did not get any response to the problem seriously by all involved parties. Dawei people have learned about the possible impacts from non-governmental organizations from Thailand by led them to a field trip in Map Ta Phut area, Rayong province in Thailand that caused Dawei villagers began worrying about what would happen to their homeland.

The concerns are about pollution that will occur from the Dawei deep seaport project. Current, environmental problems that occur from the project after it has been started in a period of time are local roads that have large trucks use all the time and the villager face difficulty in using the road, especially in the rainy season. In the dry season, it was too dusty. While the water resources of the community were destroyed with the erosion of the embankment, contaminants into the soil and water until it cannot be used for consuming.

3.3 Social Impacts of Development Projects in Dawei Deep Sea Port and Industrial Estate

There are about nine communities with population of around 4,000 families in the relocation project. ITD and the government of Myanmar will consider the relocation of each family and compensation they would receive. The compensation will have two main parts: the compensation of property assessment and compensate by building a new house. ITD is responsible in both part of compensation.

Social issues found after the project started are the cultural conflict: different lifestyle of local people, project staff and migrant workers from other areas of the Union of Myanmar. There were some bars opened on the beach area that caused local villagers unhappy from fear of crime and other problems. The number of workers and products from Thailand has increased and caused local consumerism much higher such as buying motorcycle from Thailand is very popular among villagers because in Dawei goods was largely imported from Thailand.

In addition, the much higher land prices also make people worry that they could not live in Dawei anymore due to the higher cost of living and land is too expensive. Currently, the price is up to 15 - 20 times before the project start. Especially, in the street near the project that made the local people cannot buy land to create a new family in the same area as their relatives live.

3.4 Movement of Civil Society in Dawei

The changes to the democracy of the Union of Myanmar is affected the dramatically changing of media context. In the past, media control mechanism make media could not play more roles like in the present days. The online technology which is faster and more widely has contributed greatly to the development of democracy in the Union of Myanmar. In the case of civil society in Dawei it also

has connected through communicating via the internet and in the actual daily face-to-face communication.

Dawei Civil Society

Dawei civil society consists of various groups: a network of women's groups and religious organizations, ethnic and professional and coordinated mainly by Dawei Development Association (DDA).

Dawei Development Association-DDA was founded by young people in Dawei focusing on the development that is environmentally friendly, respect land rights and has a good natural resource management for sustainable development in the region. When the project began, they have gathered a group of young people, social groups and residents in Dawei to discuss on the issue. Later, they have coordinated with other NGOs both in Yangon and Thailand. The members of the DDA have also worked in Dawei for those NGOs, thus making the network has more extensive connection. They also have connection with the media and set up their local media group, Dawei Watch Media Group, which is produce daily news in Dawei, particularly, issues related to the project. It was published via online media website <http://www.ddamyanmar.com/> and Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Dawei-Development-Association>.

However, there are many obstacles in the operation, including the slow and expensive Internet. Human resources are new to the news production. The conflict in the area makes the news reporting sometimes dangerous and must be followed up carefully.

In addition, the youth organization of Karen women in the area who live close to the Dawei airport also joined the network in the area monitoring the work of the project. They have been training and guiding by organizations in Thailand and Yangon. Professional organizations that participate in the network are lawyers in Dawei. The group was set up to help people who face problems from various unfair laws. The high number cases recently are land disputes, including cases caused by Dawei deep seaport project and the dispute from previous military rule law. Apart from these, monks, village leaders and doctors who are respected by local people also joined in the movement that made negotiation stronger.

Transborder Civil Society from Thailand

Main organizations that have worked with civil society movement in and out of the Union of Myanmar in the Dawei project issue are Semsikkalai that works with Buddhism network in the Union of Myanmar for several years, Healthy Public Policy Foundation, Ecological Alert and Recovery-Thailand (EARTH), Foundation for Ecological Recovery (TERRA), and Earth Rights International. These organizations had organized a press conference and provide educational information about the impact of the project in Dawei.

These organizations have urged the government of Thailand to participate more in the Dawei projects i.e. the National Economic and Social Development Board should make the project plan with transparency and allow people to be informed and involved in the decision making process because this project is not the only internal project in the Union of Myanmar but it has connection to Thailand directly, and is likely to have impact on the natural environment and social seriously. They

urged that investors and government of Thailand need to build trust with the people of Myanmar that the project will not cause adverse effects, especially in the natural environment and public health. Otherwise, confidence and trust in the neighboring country will not occur.

Recommendations

The Union of Myanmar still has no law to examine environmental assessment from development project. It should not become an opportunistic gap for the foreign capitalists to take advantage. It should be developed by taking into consideration the benefit to the public. The environmental, social and health impact assessment of this project should be holistic, transparent and fair, open for public to access to information and should receive public opinion directly.

In addition, the Government of the Union of Myanmar, and local agencies in the area should prepare to deal with the consequences, including the impact assessment, surveillance, pollution, accidents and disaster preparation. The Government of Thailand and foreign investors should be encouraged to establish mechanisms and personnel against such risks. The citizens of both countries must play a key role in making suggestions and act to protect the rights of citizens in the area, monitoring the work of the project and provide information to ensure that development is sustainable and fair.

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Single-Parent Families and Educational Attainment in Japan

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Introduction

In recent years, whether social and economic inequality is expanding in contemporary Japanese society has widely been discussed. Among these discussions, the level of education people acquire is one of the important determinants of attaining higher social positions. In much research on social stratification and social mobility, the fact is well-known that whether people can attain a higher level of education mainly depends on class origins, and where they are born and raised. Although many research studies have examined the effects of class origins on educational attainment, these analyses are mainly based on children living in two-parent families (intact families). This means that most research has excluded from the discussion people who lacked one or both of their biological parents during their childhood.

According to Vital Statistics, the divorce rate in Japan has been dramatically increasing since the 1990s, and its rate was 1.99‰ in 2011, compared to 1.01‰ in 1950. Although this rate is lower than those in western countries, such as the United States and England, it can be estimated that the number of Japanese children who grow up in a single-parent households is steadily increasing.

Figure1 indicates the trends of the percentages of children under the age of 18 living in single-parent households during the past four decades in Japan, using Population Census. As shown, the rates of children who live in single-parent households have been rapidly increasing since 1995. The total percentage of children living in single-parent households in 2010 is 9.70% and almost 2.5 times as high as 3.60% in 1970. During the 1970s, the overall rates of single-parent are relatively lower, and the percentage of children living in single-parent households is 2.90-3.10% in single-mother households, and 0.50% in single-father households, respectively. This figure also shows that more Japanese children are likely to experience single-mother households rather than single-father households. Along with the growth of single-parent households, the percentage of children living in single-mother households has been increasing from 3.10% in 1970 to 8.80% in 2010. In contrast to the increase in single-mother households, the percentage of children who live in single-father households ranges from 5.0% to 9.0% and shows no dramatic change during the last forty years. This recent change in family forms, where Japanese spend their childhood, implies that the total number of people who live in single-parent households is rising, and that previous studies in the field of social stratification and social mobility did not focus on this, but have done in recent years.

In Western countries, a lot of empirical studies on children living in single-parent families have been accumulated since the 1960s. Most research defines children from single-parent households as: (1) children who experienced the separation from either their biological father or mother, (2) children whose biological father or mother died in their childhood, (3) children with a non-married father or

mother^[1].




Figure 1: Trends in Divorce Rates and the Percentage of Children Under the Age of 18 Living in Single-Parent Households in Japan

Among these findings, it is widely recognized that single parenthood is negatively associated with children’s educational outcomes in most Western countries (McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994). In addition, children raised in single-parent families tend to marry and bear children earlier and have higher risks of divorce than those from two-parent families (McLanahan & Bumpass, 1988; Amato & DeBoer, 2001)

Compared to a substantial number of research studies on children from single-parent families in Western countries, little research has addressed the issue in Asian countries, including Japan. A few studies in Japan point out that children raised in single-mother families are less likely to attend tertiary education than children from two-parent families, and that this disadvantage can be partly explained by economic conditions in households (Inaba, 2011; Yoda, 2012). Their findings are consistent with the results of research in Western countries, but how growing up in single-parent families results in children’s lower educational attainments remains unclear.

Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine the educational attainment process, where children of single-parent families have difficulty in attaining a higher education, relative to those in two-parent families, especially focusing on academic performance at the completion of compulsory education, advancement rates to high school, dropout rates from high school, and advancement rates to higher education.

Review and Analytical Model

Educational Attainment of Children from Single-Parent Families

In Western Countries, a great number of research studies have investigated how family structure affects children’s educational outcomes, especially in the fields of demography, sociology of the family, and the sociology of education. Especially in the United States, with the dramatic growth of divorce rates since the 1960s, many studies have paid much attention to the consequences of family disruptions on children’s socio-economic attainment, including educational attainment. Many

studies show that children from single parent families tend to attain lower educational attainment, and are more likely to quit school than children raised in two-biological-parent families, which results in children living in single-parent families experiencing a lower occupational status (McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994; Biblarz & Raftery, 1999). In addition, children raised in single parenthood are more likely to marry and bear children earlier, when compared to children in two-biological-parent families (McLanahan & Bumpass, 1988). These findings suggest whether children are raised in single parenthoods or not is as important the determinants of their life courses as class origin, gender, and race.

Children Growing up in Single-Parent Families in Japan

In contrast, few empirical studies have examined the effects of single parenthoods on children's educational attainment in Japan. One of the reasons for this is that the Asian countries, including Japan, did not experience higher divorce rates until the 1990s, compared to Western countries. Because of these social backgrounds, older research on single parenthood in Japan mainly focused on their living arrangements and the institution of child support in the field of welfare sociology (i.e. Shimoebisu, 2008), and did not consider the life course of children from single-parent families until the 1990s. However, from the perspective of the poverty of children, since the 2000s researchers have begun to focus on the association between single-parent families and children's occupational attainment. A few previous empirical studies in Japan indicate that children who live in single-parent households in Japan show the lower advancement rates to junior college or four-year university than their counterparts of two-parent households (Inaba, 2011; Yoda & Hayashi, 2010). These findings are consistent with those of previous research in Western countries. Furthermore, the negative effect of single parenthood on educational attainment has been increasing; in other words, these differences between family structures are expanding (Yoda, 2012). These findings imply that the increase in the divorce rate in Japan may expand the absolute number of children who are raised in single-parent households and they are less likely to attain higher occupational attainment through their lower levels of education attainment.

Why do children from single-parent families attain lower educational outcomes? Previous research in Japan focused on the economic deprivation hypothesis. This hypothesis presumes that the income levels in households in childhood determine the advancement to higher education. The relative rates of poverty (i.e. less than 50% of median in equivalent household income) in single-mother households fluctuate between 50 and 60% from 1985 to 2009, which are consistently the highest among Western countries and other Asian countries (Abe, 2008). The reason for this result is associated with the male-dominated labor market, which is characterized by gender segregation and the discontinuous careers of Japanese women. In fact, the negative effects of single-parent families on educational attainment are partly explained by economic conditions in households (Yoda & Hayashi, 2010; Yoda, 2012). However, controlling for the level of household income, these effects remain statistically negative, and there may be other factors that causes the disparity in educational attainment between single-parent families and two-parent families.

Hypothesis and Model

As noted above, empirical research on the negative association between single-parent families and children's educational outcomes in Japan have gradually been accumulated. However, these

previous analyses mainly focused on the lower level of education people living in single-parent families finally acquired, and little attention is paid to the educational attainment process— that is, how and why they attained the lower level of education. Previous researches in Western or other Asian countries examine the differences in educational outcomes before higher education, such as the level of academic performance, educational aspiration for attending higher education, completion rates of high school, or dropout rates from high school, among family structures (McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994; Park, 2007; Park, 2008). In the Japanese educational system, which emphasizes selective paper examination and is characterized by a single-track school system, to what degree children are successful in earlier educational stage before higher education is the important determinant of advancement to junior college or four-year universities, independent of the level of household income.

Considering these factors above, we need to examine the influence of family structures on the educational attainment process in accordance with the model below (Figure2). I will address two problems: (1) Do children from single-parent families already attain lower educational attainment in earlier educational stage before higher education?, and (2) does the factor of educational institutions in Japan completely explain the negative association between single-parent families and educational attainment?

In this study, I will evaluate the differences among family structures in the level of academic achievement, the advancement rates to high school, the dropout rates from high school (that is, the completion rates of high school), and the advancement rates to junior college or four-year university.




Figure2: Educational Attainment Process Model

Methods

Data

The data used for this study are taken from the Japanese General Social Survey (hereinafter JGSS), which was collected by JGSS Research Center at Osaka Four-year university of Commerce, and conducted over a ten-year period from 2000 to 2010. The target population is men and women aged 20 to 89 and living in Japan at the time of the survey. Each survey used a stratified two-stage random sampling method and included a nationally representative sample. I combined the JGSS data of the year of 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008. In this study, the sample is restricted to

respondents who were born between 1935 and 1988, and the total sample size is 18,452 cases which have valid response to the variables used in the following analysis.

Measures and Analytical Methods Used

Dependent Variables

Educational attainment is one of the major children's outcomes which most of the studies on social stratification and social inequality have focused on, and we can examine the differences in various types of educational attainment among family structure by using JGSS data.

The analyses in this study examine the effects of family structure on four educational outcomes: (1) the level of academic achievement at the age of 15, (2) advancement to high school, (3) dropout from high school, and (4) advancement to junior college or four-year university. First, the level of academic achievement at the age of 15 is measured as five point scale from 1. "far below average" to 5. "far above average"^[2]. This variable was evaluated retrospectively at the time of survey. Second, advancement to high school is coded as 1 if respondents completed high school or more and 0 if they graduated from the compulsory education and did not attend high school. Third, dropout from high school is coded 1 if respondents attended high school, but did not complete it (quitted high school), and 0 if respondents attended high school and graduated from it. Therefore, respondents who graduated from the compulsory education and did not go on to high school are treated as missing. Finally, I operationalized advancement to higher education as a multi-value variable coded 1 if respondents graduated from high school and did not attend tertiary education (neither junior college nor four-year education), 2 if respondents who graduated from high school enrolled in junior college, which generally offers a two-year course and is called "tandai" in Japanese, and 3 if respondents who graduated from high school enrolled in four-year university. You should note that respondents who did not attend high school or those who dropped out high school are treated as missing.

Independent Variables

Family Structure

The most important independent variable in this study is family structure during the respondents' childhoods. JGSS provides the information on whether a respondent lived with his or her father and mother at the age of 15. Using this information, I distinguished three categories of family configuration: respondents who lived with (1) both the biological parents, (2) a mother only, (3) a father only. Reflecting these three categories of family structure at the age of 15, we created two dummy variables for (1) single-mother family and (2) single-father family. A single-mother family is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if respondents lived with their mothers only and 0 if otherwise. Similarly, a single-father family is coded 1 if respondents lived with their fathers only and 0 if otherwise. The reference category of these two dummy variables is those who lived with both of two biological parents^[3]. I excluded respondents who lacked both their fathers and mothers (47 cases) from the following analysis.

However, there are some limitations to this measurement of family structure. First, I could not discern the cause of the formation of single-parent family (death, divorce, or wed-locked) from the

JGSS data. This means that both widowed single-parent family and divorce single-parent family are combined into a single category. Second, JGSS does not provide information on the timing of family disruption. Previous research studies point out that the cause and timing of formation of single-parent family have different effects on children's educational achievement and well-being (Biblarz & Gottainer, 2000). In spite of these limitations, JGSS are appropriate data which examine the effects of family structure on children's educational attainment in Japan.

Control Variables

In addition to the main variables for family structure, I included two types of control variables: (1) respondents' attribution, (2) family socio-economic background.

First, two measures of respondents' attribution consist of respondents' gender and birth cohort. Respondents' gender is a binary dummy variable having 1 if respondents are male and 0 if they are female. Second, in creating the variables for birth cohort, we divided respondents into four categories in accordance with Ojima (2002): (1) 1935-46 cohort, (2) 1947-61 cohort, (3) 1962-71 cohort, and (4) 1972-88 cohort. First, the 1935-46 cohort consists of respondents who were born before the World War II and, through former elementary school education, entered the existing junior high school for the first time. Second, the 1947-61 cohort includes the respondents who experienced the rapid growth of advancement rates to high school and tertiary education and went on to higher education during the high economic growth period. Third, the 1962-71 cohort consists of the generation who corresponded to the period when under the restrictive policy the advancement rates to tertiary education remained stable in both men and women. Finally, the 1972-88 cohort includes those who correspond to the second baby-boom generation during the early 1970s. In the following analyses, we created three dummy variables whose reference category is the 1935-46 cohort.

Family socio-economic background is measured by parental education and level of household income at the age of 15. Parental education is constructed by higher level of educational attainment of the parents. In the case of respondents from single-parent family, the level of educational attainment of a single parent is employed. The variable for parental education is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if respondents whose parents attain the lower level of education than junior college or four-year education, and 0 if otherwise. If both of these two data are missing, we employ a dummy variable denoting 1 as missing data. Level of household income at age of 15 is, like the variable for the level of academic achievement at the age of 15, measured as five point scale from 1. "far below average" to 5. "far above average"^[4].

Analytical Approach

The statistical analysis of this study was conducted based on three approaches. First, I compared the characteristics of single-parent families with those of two-parent families. Second, I examined the association between family structure and educational outcomes. Third, using binary logistic regression and multinomial logistic regression as statistically empirical analyses, I examined the effects of family structure on advancement to high school, dropout from high school, and advancement to tertiary education (junior college or four-year university)^[5].

Results

Characteristics of Single Parent Families

Table1 presents the percentage of respondents who lived in single-parent families at the age

Table 1: Proportions of Single-Mother Families and Single-Father Families

birth cohort	Single-Mother Family		Single-Father Family	
	Proportion(%)	N	Proportion(%)	N
1935-46	12.6%	659	2.7%	142
1947-61	6.0%	385	1.5%	96
1962-71	5.0%	172	1.0%	35
1972-88	5.0%	169	1.7%	59
Total	7.5%	1385	1.8%	332

of 15 across four birth cohorts. The percentage of children raised in single-mother family varies from 5.0% to 12.6%, while that of single-father family ranges from 1.0% to 2.7%. Among all birth cohorts, 1935-46 birth cohort shows the highest proportion of both single-mother family and single-father family. The reason may be that the World War II (1939-1945) led to the absolute increase in the number of children whose either mother or father was killed in the war. In addition, this birth cohort accounts for 46.4% of all cases of the respondents from single-parent family in this analysis, which implies that about half of single-parent family included in this analysis are caused because of the death of single parent due to the war. In other three cohorts, the proportion of single-parent family is relatively lower, showing 5.0-6.0% in single-mother family and 1.0-1.7% in single-father family, respectively. In Figure1, the percentage of children from single-father families is persistently less than 1.0% while that from single-mother families gradually increases. In Japan after the 1970s, most women tend to have the legal custody of their children after marital dissolution. Therefore, it is feasible that the percentage of single-mother family is consistently about four to five times higher than that of single-father family.

Figure3 (on the left) shows the average point in the level of household income at age of 15 by family structure and birth cohort. In the earlier birth cohorts, the differences between family structures seem trivial, but in the latest birth cohorts, the differences are dramatically expanding. Although its point in two-parent families (2.61-2.99) does not prominently differ from that in single-father families (2.46-2.88), the average point of single-mother families is consistently lower than the other family type across all cohorts. This result reflects the higher risk of poverty in single-mother families, compared to two-parent families and single-father families. On the other hand, the level of parental education is lower among children with a single parent. The proportion of parents whose academic credential is junior college or four-year university is 14.9% in single-mother families and 22.0% in single-father families, whereas that in two-parent families 24.0%. This pattern reflects the fact that single parents in single-mother or single-father families are those who tend to have relatively lower educational attainment and who are more likely to marry the spouse whose characteristics are almost similar to them, resulting in facing the risk of divorce due to economic insecurity in households.

Differences in Educational Attainment between Family Structures

Association between Family Structure and Educational Outcomes

In this section, I will review the differences in educational attainment: (1) the level of academic performance at the age of 15, (2) advancement rates to high school, (3) dropout rates from high school, and (4) advancement rates to junior college or four-year university, among family structures.




Figure 3: Level of Household Income and the Level of Academic Performance at Age 15

Figure 3 (on the right) represents the average level of academic performance by family structure across four cohorts. Interestingly, the average points of children raised in both single-mother families and single-father families are statistically lower than those of two-parent families. While children from two-parent families get the grade score ranged from 3.14 to 3.61, its average point of children from single-parent family is consistently lower across all cohorts, varying from 2.93 to 3.60 in single-mother families and from 2.22 to 3.61 in single-father families. Although as noted above, economic condition of single-father families is higher than that of single-mother families, whereas there is virtually no difference in the academic performance at the age of 15 between these two single-parent families. Therefore, we can conclude that children who are raised in single-parent families tend to get lower grade at the age of 15 than those in two-parent families, regardless of whether they lived with a single mother or with a single father.

Figure 4 and Figure 5 show advancement rates to high school and junior college or four-year university by family structure at the age of 15. As for advancement to high-school, those who lived in single-mother families or single-father families show lower advancement rates than those from two-parent families. However, the overall rates of those entering high-school has been consistently increasing across all cohorts, regardless of family structures at the age of 15. Among the recent two cohorts, over 90% of respondents advance to high-school as a whole trend. In spite of this overall upward advancement rates to high school, about 10% differences persistently remains between single-parent families and two-parent families.




Figure 4: Advancement Rates to High-School by Family Structure and Birth Cohort




Figure 5: Advancement Rates to Junior College and Four-Year University by Family Structure

The gap in advancement rates to junior college or four-year university among family structures is especially prominent. The proportion of children from two-parent families who attend junior college or four-year university has been dramatically increasing across all birth cohorts, and the total percentage of these two groups reached more than 50% in the 1972-88 birth cohort, which corresponds to the expansion of higher education in post-war Japanese society. In contrast, children raised in single-mother families or single-father families at the age of 15 does not trace the same trend as those from two-parent families. Children from single-parent families are less likely to attend higher education than those from two-parent families. The most recent birth cohort (1972-88) shows a little more increase of children from single-parent families who attend junior college or four-year university than the other birth cohort. However, the disparities among family structures have been gradually expanding.

Table2 presents dropout rates from high school by family structure at the age of 15. As a whole, 1.8% of all respondents quitted high school, but the dropout rates vary by family structures.

Table 2: Family Structure and Dropout Rates

		High-School		Total	
		Completion	Dropout		
Family Structure	Two-Parent Family	14214 98.3%	240 1.7%	14454 100.0%	
	Single-Mother Family	972 97.1%	29 2.9%	1001 100.0%	
	Single-Father Family	237 97.5%	6 2.5%	243 100.0%	
	Total		15423 98.2%	275 1.8%	15698 100.0%

$\chi^2=9.056, df=2, p<.05$

Children from single-parent families are more likely to drop out high school than those from two-parent families. The dropout rates are the highest 2.9% in single-mother families, and those rates in single-father families are the second highest (2.5%), compared to 1.7% in two-parent families.

Multivariate Analysis Using Binary Logistic Regression and Multinomial Logistic Regression

In the above section, I reviewed the association between family structure at the age of 15 and educational outcomes. Using binary logistic regression and multinomial logistic regression, I will examine the direct effects of family structure on three educational outcomes (advancement to high school / dropout from high school / advancement to junior college or four-year university) and the mediating factors explaining these associations.

Table 3 shows estimates of binary logistic regression models predicting advancement to high school. Model 1 indicates that both single-parent family and single-father family have statistically negative effects on advancement to high school at the level of 1%, suggesting that living in single-mother families or single-father families decreases the probability of attending high school, controlling for respondents' gender and birth cohort. Model 2 examines whether the negative effects of family structure on advancement to high school found in model 1 can be explained by economic and cultural resources in households by adding the variables for the level of household income at the age of 15 and the level of parental education to model 1. When controlling for these added variables, the coefficients of both single-mother family and single-father family decrease. Comparing model 1 with model 2, the coefficients of single-mother family decrease to a large degree from -.541 to -.270, and this change of the main effect of single-mother family means that the negative effects of single-mother family on advancement to high school is explained about 50% by economic and cultural resources in households. However, as for single-father family, these two variables included in Model 2 have little explanation for the negative effect of single-father family (-.597 → -.547).

Table 3: Binary Logistic Regression of Advancement to High School

	model1	model2	model3
	b(SE)	b(SE)	b(SE)
Intercept	.729(.038) **	-.141(.096) **	-3.005(.156) **
Family Structure(ref:two-parent family)			
Single-mother family	-.541(.070) **	-.270(.072) **	-.286(.074) **
Single-father family	-.597(.138) **	-.547(.140) **	-.482(.142) **
Gender(male=1)	-.027(.045)	.033(.045)	.077(.047)
Birth cohort(ref:1935-46)			
1947-61	1.439(.050) **	1.415(.051) **	1.695(.054) **
1962-71	2.582(.095) **	2.508(.095) **	2.939(.100) **
1972-88	2.699(.100) **	2.523(.101) **	3.089(.107) **
Level of household income at the age of 15		.449(.027) **	.381(.028) **
Level of parental education (ref:junior college or four-year university)			
High-school or less		-.337(.062) **	-.332(.065) **
DK,NA		-.602(.085) **	-.517(.088) **
academic performance at the age of 15			.932(.037) **
-2loglikelihood	13154.340	12779.756	11972.088
Cox&Snell R-square	.122	.139	.176
Nagalkerke R-square	.214	.245	.310
N		18452	

**p<.01 *p<.05 †p<.10

This result suggests that the causes which lead the lower advancement rates to high-school among children from single-mother families differ from those from single-father families. Furthermore, in Model3 the variable for the level of academic performance at the age of 15 is added to Model2. This variable is statistically significant and indicates the higher level of academic performance children get, the more likely they are to attend high school. In addition, the change of coefficients of family structure from Model2 to Model3 implies that the effects of family structure on advancement to high school are partly mediated by the academic performance at the age of 15. However, even if controlling for this variable in model3, the coefficients for both single-mother family and single-father family remain statistically significant. Therefore, only all these variables included in Model3 cannot fully explain the mechanism that prevents children raised in single-parent from attending high school.

Table 4: Binary Logistic Regression of Dropout from High School

	model1	model2	model3
	b(SE)	b(SE)	b(SE)
Intercept	-4.163(.145) **	-3.701(.286) **	-1.514(.380) **
Family Structure(ref:two-parent family)			
Single-mother family	.541(.202) **	.359(.207) †	.340(.208)
Single-father family	.349(.419)	.302(.420)	.072(.423)
Gender(male=1)	.442(.123) **	.415(.123) **	.389(.124) **
Birth cohort(ref:1935-46)			
1947-61	-.318(.164) †	-.308(.164) †	-.513(.166) **
1962-71	-.353(.192) †	-.314(.192)	-.631(.196) **
1972-88	.126(.169)	.222(.169)	-.190(.179)
Level of household income at the age of 15		-.244(.075) **	-.185(.075) *
Level of parental education (ref:junior college or four-year university)			
High-school or less		.242(.157)	.205(.158)
DK,NA		.288(.238)	.148(.240)
academic performance at the age of 15			-.725(.088) **
-2loglikelihood	2737.121	2722.228	2646.158
Cox&Snell R-square	.002	.003	.008
Nagalkerke R-square	.013	.019	.048
N		15698	

**p<.01 †p<.05 †p<.10

Table4 shows the estimated coefficients of binary regression model predicting dropout from high school. Model1 includes the variables for family structure, respondents' gender and birth cohorts. A notable point is that only the coefficient for single-mother family is statistically significant at the level of 1%. This means that children from single-mother families, different from those from single-father families, face the higher risk of quitting high school than those from two-parent families. In model2, by adding the variables for the level of household income and parental education, we examine the mediate effect between single-mother family and dropout from high school. Model2 shows that the coefficient of single-mother family decreases from .541 in model1 to .359, and the effect turns statistically significant at the level of 10%. Model3 adds the variable for the level of academic performance at the age of 15 to Model2. Controlling for academic performance at age 15, the negative effect of single-mother family is no longer statistically significant, which indicates that the association between single-mother family and dropout in high-school is fully explained by the level of children's academic achievement at the age of 15.

Table5 presents the estimated coefficients of multinomial logistic regression predicting the advancement to junior college or four-year university. Like above two binary logistic regressions, model1 includes the variables for respondents' characteristics: family structure, gender, and birth cohort. For both junior college and four-yearuniversity, the negative effects of family structure on attending junior college or four-year university is statistically significant, which suggests that children

from single-parent families are less likely to attend tertiary education than those from two-parent families. Model2 includes the variables for the level of household income at age 15 and the level of parental education in Model1. These variables explain the higher proportion of negative effect of single-mother family on attending higher education than those of single-father family, and the association between single-mother family and advancement to junior college can be fully explained. Model3 examines whether academic achievement at the age of 15 can account for the negative effects of family structure on advancement to junior college or four-year university. Surprisingly, controlling for the level of academic performance at the age of 15, the association between family structure and higher education becomes no longer statistically significant, except that the effect of single-father family on advancement to junior college remains statistically significant at the level of 10%. Therefore, we can conclude that the level of academic performance at the age of 15 is the most important determinants of whether children from single-parent family will attend higher education as a mediate factor and the effect of this factor remains persistently in the sequent educational stages.

Discussion

In this study, I have examined differences in the level of educational attainment between people from two-parent families and those from single-parent families, focusing on the following educational attainment process: (1) the level of academic achievement at the age of 15, (2) advancement rates to high school, (3) dropout rates from high school, and (4) advancement rates to junior college or four-year university. Three important conclusions were derived from the empirical analysis in this study.

First, children from single-parent families are more likely to face the various disadvantages in educational attainment before advancing to higher education. The absence of a biological father or mother causes children to get the lower of academic performance at the age of 15. In addition, in spite of the recent growth of advancement rates to high school, the disparity in opportunity for attending high school has been persistent between children from two-parent families and their counterparts from single-parent families. Even if those from single-parent families can advance to high school, they have the higher likelihood of quitting high school than those from two-parent families. These findings suggest that the effects of the absence of single parent on children's educational attainment have already existed in the earlier educational stages.

Table 5: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Advancement to Higher Education

junior college (ref:high-school or less)	model1	model2	model3
	b(SE)	b(SE)	b(SE)
Intercept	-.691(.331) *	-2.264(.355) **	-3.544(.294) **
Family Structure(ref:two-parent family)			
Single-mother family	-.371(.116) **	-.140(.119)	-.141(.088)
Single-father family	-.647(.253) *	-.593(.020) *	-.321(.168) †
Gender(male=1)	-.856(.058) **	-.796(.059) **	-.772(.059) **
Birth cohort(ref:1935-46)			
1947-61	.787(.083) **	.804(.083) **	.836(.057) **
1962-71	1.087(.088) **	1.080(.089) **	1.208(.063) **
1972-88	1.343(.089) **	1.256(.089) **	1.477(.065) **
Level of household income at the age of 15		.273(.033) **	.362(.024) **
Level of parental education (ref:junior college or four-year university)			
High-school or less		-.626(.060) **	-.822(.045) **
DK,NA		-.944(.109) **	-1.142(.081) **
academic performance at the age of 15			.690(.029) **
four-year university (ref:high-school or less)	model1	model2	model3
	b(SE)	b(SE)	b(SE)
Intercept	.398(.220) †	-2.132(.246) **	-5.864(.523) **
Family Structure(ref:two-parent family)			
Single-mother family	-.599(.087) **	-.202(.091) *	-.069(.130)
Single-father family	-.535(.164) **	-.487(.171) **	-.403(.257)
Gender(male=1)	.700(.038) **	.802(.040) **	1.283(.058) **
Birth cohort(ref:1935-46)			
1947-61	.456(.054) **	.474(.056) **	.765(.083) **
1962-71	.765(.059) **	.733(.062) **	1.215(.091) **
1972-88	1.160(.059) **	1.005(.061) **	1.739(.089) **
Level of household income at the age of 15		.479(.025) **	.433(.035) **
Level of parental education (ref:junior college or four-year university)			
High-school or less		-1.016(.045) **	-1.156(.061) **
DK,NA		-1.261(.080) **	-1.020(.106) **
academic performance at the age of 15			1.003(.042) **
Cox&Snell R-square	.093	.157	.196
Nagalkerke R-square	.110	.185	.232
McFadden R-square	.052	.091	.116
N		15423	

**p<.01 *p<.05 †p<.10

Second, in interpreting the effects of single-parent family on children's educational success, the economic condition in household at the age of 15 and the level of academic performance at the age of 15 play a significant role in explaining the differences in educational attainment among family structures. In this study, we treated these variables as the mediating factors which can explain the association between family structure and the educational attainment. In Figure 3, we find that the

level of household income at the age of 15 and the level of academic performance at the age of 15 are relatively lower among the students from single-parent families. This means that the economic hardship in household and the ability of children to perform academic achievement have a great and persistent effect on the educational attainment in the subsequent educational stages. However, the negative effects of family structure on advancement to high school remains statistically significant even after controlling for these two factors. Therefore, we will need to explore other causes which single-parent families have a negative effect on children's educational attainment process from the other perspectives such as parent-child interaction, child's incomplete socialization and role-models.

Third, the negative effects of single-mother family on the educational attainment process differ from those of single-father family. In the empirical analysis of this study, we find children from single-mother families have the higher likelihood of leaving out high school than those from two-parent family, whereas we cannot find the differences in dropout rates from high school between the students from single-father families and their counterparts from two-parent families. One of the reasons for this is that the level of household income, as indicated in Figure 3, is the lowest in single-mother households, whereas there is little difference in household income between single-father households and two-parent households, indicating in the multivariate analysis of this study that economic condition in household at the age of 15 can explain less higher proportion of the effects of single-father family on educational attainment than those of single-mother family. This result implies that the causes which lead children from single-parent families to attain the lower levels of education than those from two-parent families may differ between in single-mother families and single-father families, and that which single parent (father or mother) was absent in household can be one of the important factors which affects the lower educational attainment of children from single-parent families. These findings also suggest that the amount of economic and cultural resources which households possess or lack differ among the types of single-parent family (single-mother family/single-father family), and there may be some different mechanisms which produce the social inequality of the opportunity for attending higher education between two types of single-parent families.

In summary, I can conclude that people who experienced the family disruption due to parental divorce, parental death, or non-wedlock in their childhood follow the more complicated educational attainment process which cannot be fully explained by the socio-economic resources in household or the level of children's academic performance, compared to those from two-parent family. Previous research in Japan focused only on the association between family structure and advancement to tertiary education (junior college or four-year university) and examined whether the level of household income can explain children from single-parent families attain the lower level of education than their counterparts from two-parent families. However, this study revealed that as in western countries, children from these single-parent families face the various kinds of difficulty in attending higher education in earlier educational stages, such as: (1) lower levels of academic performance, (2) lower advancement rates to high school, (3) higher dropout rates from high school, and (4) lower advancement rates to junior college or four-year university. In contrast to these findings, some of the negative effects of single-parent family on children's educational attainment process statistically remain, even after controlling for the level of household income and children's academic performance. Considering the finding that the gender of single parent can have a different

effect on educational attainment, we may reveal the gender differences in the formation of academic skills and the career-path selection through parent-child interaction not only between in single-parent family and two-parent family but also between in single-mother family and single-father family.

The findings of this study also imply that behind the expansion of higher education in Japan, these disadvantages make children from single-parent families remain in the lower level of education or the lower socio-economic status. In other words, the lack of one of the biological parents in childhood has the possibility of promoting the intergenerational reproduction of poverty; for example, children whose father was absent in their childhood faces the risk of economic poverty, which, through their lower levels of education, causes them to inherit the lower socio-economic status. With the growth of divorce rates, we can predict that the total number of children who live in single-parent family will be increasing, and the social inequality will dramatically expand among family structures in childhood.

In spite of these noticeable findings; however, there are some limitations to this study and problems that should be tackled and resolved. First, due to limitations in the survey data used in this study, I operated the respondents whose father or mother was not at home at the age of 15 as children from a single-mother family and those from a single-father family, respectively. Therefore, I could not examine whether the negative effects of single-parent family on children's educational success would vary across the cause of the formation of a single-parent household, due to: (1)parental divorce, (2)single-parent death, or (3)wedlock. Second, there is another possibility that the change in the transformation of family structure from two-parent family to single-parent family actually have a great effect on the change in children's educational outcomes, rather than family form at the given point. In addition, the two variables for household income at age of 15 and the level of children's academic performance that we employed as important mediate factors are measurements respondents retrospectively answered at the time of survey. Therefore, these variables involve the problem concerning measurement errors. If the change in family form from one type to another and the corresponding change in household income and the level of children's academic performance negatively affect the children's educational attainment, the negative effect of the status of family structure at the particular point may offer misleading results. In order to overcome these limitations associated with cross-sectional data, the association between family structure and educational outcomes using the longitudinal data should be examined, and the more accumulation of this data is expected.

Despite these limitations, this study makes a significant contribution to the studies of social stratification and social mobility, in that I was able to uncover the educational disadvantages of people from single-parent family, which previous studies in the field of social stratification and social inequality have not paid much attention to. The results of this study imply that these research studies will need to reconsider and reconstruct the measurement of class origin, of which the measurement of a father's occupational position is the most important index, in order to accurately capture the consequence of the growing diversity of family forms during childhood on social inequality^[6]. Taking into account the recent demographic changes in Japan, such as the growing number of children with single parents, further empirical analyses of the relative and trend

patterns resulting from the association between socio-economic background and social inequality, should be carried out in the future.

Notes

- [1] In the United States, the proportion of cohabitation in total households has been increasing, and the cohabitation is one of the noticeable topics on the diversity in family forms (Raley et al. 2005). Details are not discussed in this study.
- [2] In the case of the respondents who had a missing value in the variable for the level of academic performance at the age of 15, we substituted it for the average points across family structures and birth cohort. More details are followed: (1) two-parent families (1935-46 cohort: 3.64, 1946-61 cohort: 3.34, 1962-71 cohort: 3.24, 1972-88 cohort: 3.17), (2) single-mother family (1935-46 cohort: 3.64, 1946-61 cohort: 3.17, 1962-71 cohort: 2.99, 1972-88 cohort: 2.93), (3) single-father family (1935-46 cohort: 3.61, 1946-61 cohort: 3.17, 1962-71 cohort: 3.00, 1972-88 cohort: 2.22).
- [3] More specifically, JGSS does not provide the information on whether the respondents from two-parent-family lived with both their biological fathers and mothers or one of their parents is a stepmother / stepfather. Previous research indicates that people raised in step-families are more likely to attain the lower socio-economic status than those from two-parent families, as well as those raised in single-parent families (Biblarz and Raftery 1999). However, because it can be expected that the number of children from step-families are much smaller, the effect of step-family on the results in this study seems trivial.
- [4] Like the variable for the level of academic performance at the age of 15, the respondents who had a missing value for the level of household income at the age of 15 get an average point across family structure and birth cohort. More details about the imputed averages are followed: (1) two-parent families (1935-46 cohort: 2.74, 1947-61 cohort: 2.78, 1962-71 cohort: 2.86, 1972-88 cohort: 3.01), (2) single-mother family (1935-46 cohort: 2.21, 1947-61 cohort: 2.15, 1962-71 cohort: 2.08, 1972-88 cohort: 2.22), (3) single-father family (1935-46 cohort: 2.52, 1946-61 cohort: 3.17, 1962-71 cohort: 3.00, 1972-88 cohort: 2.87).
- [5] In order to control the effect of imputation on the results of this study, I added a dummy variable coded 1 if respondents had a imputed value as an independent variable to the regression models (not shown in the results).
- [6] Miwa (2011); for example, examined the intergenerational social mobility in Japan by using the models in which class origin is measured by incorporating both father's and mother's occupation.

Acknowledgements

The Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) were designed and carried out by the JGSS Research Center at Osaka University of Commerce (Joint Usage/Research Center for Japanese General Social Surveys, as accredited by Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), in collaboration with the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo.

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Measuring Social Vulnerability to Flooding Among Urban Poor Households in Metro Manila Riverine Communities

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Abstract

Earlier works measuring urban vulnerability to flooding focused largely on the social characteristics of cities and municipalities, highlighting the need to develop methodologies/tools that will broaden our understanding of social vulnerability. This study attempts to enhance existing measures of social vulnerability by integrating the social characteristics of political-administrative units with ecological-environmental factors in estimating the flood vulnerability of 17 cities and municipalities in Metro Manila. Using principal component analysis (PCA), this enhanced measurement or estimation of social vulnerability was done by 1) applying Cutter's social vulnerability index developed for understanding vulnerability of American cities to Metro Manila cities and municipalities, and 2) developing an expanded model of social vulnerability by incorporating ecological-environmental factors into the analysis. Comparing the two analytical approaches show that the second analysis yielded a more refined measurement of social vulnerability.

Keywords: social vulnerability, flooding, principal component analysis

1. Introduction

The Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. (Porio, 2011; Yumul et al., 2011; Zoleta-Nantes, 2002). The country gets an average of 20 typhoons annually, and this causes heavy precipitation and flooding to the capital city, Metro Manila (Porio, 2011; Yumul et al., 2011). With an increasing population in Metro Manila, there is also an increasing potential for loss of lives and properties (Porio, 2011; Yumul et al., 2011).

The concept of *vulnerability* has various definitions in the literature, depending on conceptual models and frameworks (Cutter, 1996; Adger, 1999; Downing et al, 1995). From the standpoint of this study, vulnerability is the susceptibility of people to the harm caused by exposure to a hazard. A number of studies have already been conducted on the physical/meteorological component of flooding, but little is known about the social aspects contributing to vulnerability (Birkmann, 2006; Cutter et al., 2003). This study seeks to extend the knowledge obtained in the studies conducted by

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Cutter et al. (2003) and Birkmann (2006) on social vulnerability to environmental hazards, and answer the following questions: What socio-demographic characteristics render people vulnerable to flooding in Metro Manila? Which of the cities/ barangays in Metro Manila are more vulnerable to flooding, not only because of the hazard magnitude, but because of the social characteristics of people living there?

2. Theoretical Framework

The figure below shows the theoretical framework for this study. It illustrates how an individual's "social location" and "geophysical context" interact, and how they, in turn, shape the social and physical-environmental vulnerabilities respectively. The term "social location" refers to the socio-demographic characteristics of the people, such as gender, age, income level, occupation, where as "geophysical context" refers to the physical and environmental condition of the place. Based on the figure, one's social location influences one's social vulnerability, and one's geophysical context influences one's physical-environmental vulnerability. These two vulnerabilities, in turn, interact and form the overall vulnerability of a certain area.




Figure 1: Theoretical Framework for the Study

3. Factors Affecting Social Vulnerability in the Literature

The social characteristics that affect social vulnerability to flooding most often found in the social science literature are given in Table 1. The relevant researches (both local and international) that identified these social characteristics are also included. Age, Socio-economic status, gender, and education are among the most widely accepted indicators of social vulnerability.

Table 1: Social Factors and Vulnerability in the Literature

Social Vulnerability Concept	Characteristics of High Vulnerability	Sources
Age	Old People	Birkmann et al., 2008; Tapsell et al., 2002; Cutter et al., 2003
	Very Young People	Birkmann et al., 2008; Cutter et al., 2003 Cola, 1993
Socio-Economic Status	Low Income	Porio, 2011; Bankoff, 2003; Zoleta-Nantes, 2002
Gender	Female	Porio, 2011; Neumayer & Plumper, 2007; Peterson, 1997;
Education	Lower Education	Steinführer & Kuhlicke, 2007
Family Structure	Single Parent Households; Large Families	Blaikie et al., 1994; Morrow, 1999
Renters	Renters	Cutter et al., 2003 Morrow, 1999;
Special Needs	Disabled; Homeless; Institutionalized	Cutter et al., 2003; Morrow, 1999
Population Growth	Rapid Population Growth	Cutter, Mitchell, & Scott, 2000; Morrow, 1999
Social Dependence	High Dependence on Social Services	Cutter et al., 2003 Hewitt, 2000; Morrow, 1999
Employment and Occupation	Unemployed; Employed in Service Sectors	Cutter et al., 2003; Hewitt, 1997; Mileti, 1999
Infrastructure	Infrastructures that are prone to damage	Cutter et al., 2003; Platt, 1995

4. Methodology

In order to find a way to measure social vulnerability to flooding in Metro Manila, socio-economic data were collected for three different levels of analysis: (1) city level; (2) barangay level; and (3) household level. The city and barangay level dataset were obtained from the 2010 Census of Population and Housing (CPH) of the National Statistics Office (NSO). On the other hand, the household level dataset was obtained from the Japan Bank International Cooperation (JBIC) survey conducted by Porio (2009) among 300 urban poor households in 14 communities located in the three flood basins: 1) Pasig-Marikina river basin, (2) West Manggahan, and (3) the KAMANAVA area (Kalookan, Malabon, Navotas, Valenzuela). Table 2 below shows the socio-economic variables used in this study.

Table 2: Socio-Economic Variables and Vulnerability Concepts Addressed

Concept of Vulnerability adapted from Cutter et al (2003)	Vulnerability indicators from the NSO (2010) – <i>City/ Barangay Level Analysis</i>	Vulnerability Indicators from Porio (2009) – <i>Household Level Analysis</i>
Age	Percentage of population below five years old	Percentage of population below five years old
	Percentage of population with age of sixty-five and above	Percentage of population with age of sixty-five and above
Gender	Percentage Female	Percentage Female
Special Needs	Percentage of Population Disabled	Percentage of Population who are Occasionally Sick
	Percentage with Difficulty in Walking	
	Percentage with Difficulty in Seeing	
Education	Percentage of Population that did not finish High School	Percentage of Population with Less than 10 Years in School
		Median Years in School
Family Structure	Percentage of Population Separated/ Divorced	Percentage Widower
	Percentage of Population Widowed	Percentage Live-in
Socio-economic Status	Poverty Incidence	Number of persons in household
		Median Income
Renters	Percent Unemployed	Percentage of Renters
	Percentage of Population as Renters	
Infrastructure	Percentage of Population as Rent-Free with No Consent	Percentage of Households with Only One Floor
	Percentage of Population with Roof Made of Makeshift Materials	Percentage of Households with Housing Materials Made of Wood and Iron
	Percentage of Population with Outer Walls Made of Makeshift Materials	Percentage of Population with No Electricity
	Percentage of Population with Dilapidated Houses	Percentage of Population with Tapped Water or Deep Well
		Percentage of Population with No Septic Tank

Principal components analysis (PCA) was used to reduce and group like variables into component groups for classification and ease of further analysis. The authors were then able to arrive at a minimum number of components that adequately accounted for the covariation among the larger number of variables.

A Social Vulnerability Index Score was then constructed in order to have a quantitative measure of social vulnerability. The index have a range of values from 0 to 1, where values close to 1 indicate higher social vulnerability to flooding, whereas values close to 0 indicate lower social vulnerability to flooding.

5. Results and Discussion

A. City Level PCA

Table 3 shows the results of the city level PCA. Five (5) components of social vulnerability were extracted from the analysis, namely: (1) Social Structure of the Community; (2) Disabilities and Difficulties; (3) Housing Materials; (4) Housing Conditions; and (5) Land Tenure. These components and the dominant variables for each are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Findings of the City Level Principal Component Analysis

Component	Name	Percent Variation Explained	Dominant Variables	Component Scores (with Cardinal Directions Adjusted)
1	<i>Social Structure of the Community</i>	39.80%	Percent Under 5 Years Old	+0.914
			Percent Female	+0.894
			Poverty Incidence	+0.819
			Percent of Population who Have Not Completed High school	+0.805
			Percent of Population over 65 Years Old	+0.785
2	<i>Disabilities and Difficulties</i>	23.62%	Percent with difficulty in walking	+0.808
			Percent with difficulty in concentrating	+0.802
			Percent with difficulty in communicating	+0.709
			Percent with difficulty in seeing	+0.566
3	<i>Housing Material</i>	12.30%	Percent with Makeshift Roof	+0.919
			Percent with Makeshift Wall	+0.772
4	<i>Housing Condition</i>	7.01%	Percent that Need Major Repair	+0.726
			Percent Dilapidated House	+0.667
5	<i>Land Tenure</i>	5.60%	Percent Renter	+0.941

Scores were then generated for each component, and were then summed in order to compute for the overall score of vulnerability. Each component was thought to have an equal contribution to the overall vulnerability, so no weights were assigned to any of the components. The Social Vulnerability Index Scores for the 17 Cities and Municipality are given Table 4 below.

Table 4: Social Vulnerability Index Scores of Metro Manila Cities/ Municipality

Social Vulnerability Ranking	CITY/ MUNICIPALITY	SOVI Score
1 (Most Vulnerable)	Navotas	3.79
2	Malabon	3.04
3	Caloocan	2.16
4	Manila	1.74
5	Valenzuela	0.18
6	Paranaque	0.07
7	Marikina	- 0.17
8	Las Pinas	- 0.31
9	San Juan	- 0.41
10	Muntinlupa	- 0.58
11	Pateros	- 0.58
12	Quezon City	- 0.59
13	Mandaluyong	- 0.73
6	Pasig	- 1.49
15	Pasay	- 1.94
16	Makati	- 1.94
17 (Least Vulnerable)	Taguig	- 2.25

B. Barangay Level PCA

For the barangay level analysis, two (2) key cities (and their barangays) were analyzed: Pasig and Marikina.

Table 5: Findings of the Barangay Level Analysis for Pasig and Marikina

City	Component Number	Name	% of Variance Explained	Variables	Component Loading
Pasig	1	Social Structure	33.15	% female	0.899
				% who did not finish high school	0.875
				% 5 years old and below	0.838
				% 65 and above	0.779
				% separated/divorced	0.656
	2	Difficulties	19.89	% difficulty hearing	0.908
				% difficulty walking	0.898
				% difficulty communicating	0.758
				% difficulty seeing	0.689
	3	Housing	10.23	% with makeshift walls	0.771
				% dilapidated houses	0.760
				% rent-free with no consent	0.753
	4	Renting	13.082	% people renting	0.709
5	Disability	9.130	% people with disability	0.906	
Marikina	1	Housing and Age	50.125	% homes with makeshift walls	0.912
				% homes with makeshift roofs	0.848
				% who did not finish high school	0.824
				% 65 and above	0.771
				% below 5 years old	0.735
	2	Family Structure and Gender	15.025	% separated	0.807
				% widowed	0.787
				% female	0.632
	3	Disability	11.664	% people with disability	0.700

In order to further enhance the measurement of social vulnerability, two additional variables were added into the analysis: (1) Expected Flood Height in case of *Ondoy*-like events, and (2) Mean Elevation. The new components of social vulnerability for the two cities are shown in the table below. The results show that for both Pasig and Marikina, the addition of the two physical variables has also resulted into a new component of vulnerability: the environmental component.

**Table 6: Findings of the Barangay Level Analysis for Pasig and Marikina
(with Environmental Variables)**

City	Component Number	Name	% of Variance Explained	Variables	Component Loading
Pasig	1	Social Structure	33.26	% female	0.841
				% who did not finish high school	0.787
				% 5 years old and below	0.723
				% 65 and above	0.719
				% separated/divorced	0.714
	2	Difficulties	19.91	% difficulty walking	0.915
				% difficulty hearing	0.902
				% difficulty communicating	0.768
				% difficulty seeing	0.715
	3	Housing	9.723	% with makeshift walls	0.837
				% dilapidated houses	0.811
				% rent-free with no consent	0.688
	4	Renting	6.76	% people renting	0.913
5	Disability	5.90	% people with disability	0.921	
6	Environmental/ Ecological	7.74	Flood height	0.825	
			Mean Elevation	-0.746	
Marikina	1	Social Dependence	41.64	% difficulty hearing	0.916
				% difficulty walking	0.846
				% separated	0.772
				% difficulty communicating	0.744
				% widowed	0.735
	2	Housing Conditions	18.20	% makeshift outer walls	0.947
				% homes needing major repair	0.857
				% makeshift roof	0.809
	3	Disability	8.33	% disabled	0.966
	4	Environmental/ Ecological	14.27	Mean Elevation	-0.937
Flood Height				0.895	

The original top five vulnerable barangays, together with the adjusted barangays, are given in Table 7 below:

Table 7: Social and Socio-Environmental Vulnerability Indices for Pasig and Marikina

City	Original Top Five Vulnerable Barangay (Social Variables Only)	Adjusted Top Five Vulnerable Barangays (Social AND Environmental Variables)
Pasig City	Santa Cruz	Pinagbuhatan
	Santa Rosa	Palatiw
	Santa Lucia	Santa Lucia
	Bagong Katipunan	Santo Tomas
	San Miguel	Maybunga
Marikina City	Tumana	Tumana
	Concepcion Dos	Malanday
	Fortune	Tanong
	Santa Elena	Santa Elena
	San Roque	San Roque

C. Household Level PCA

Finally, the last section involved another principal component analysis, but this time, household was used as the unit of analysis. Five (5) components accounting for 80.01% of the variance were extracted. The rotated component matrix is shown in the table below.

Table 8: Findings of the Household Level Principal Component Analysis

Component	Name	Percent Variation Explained	Dominant Variables	Component Loading Scores (with Cardinal Directions Adjusted)
1	Education	28.88%	Median Years in School	- 0.910
			Percentage of Households who have not finished High School	+0.907
			Percentage of Students with Less than 10 Years in School	+0.769
2	Social Structure and Network	21.23%	Number of Persons per Household	+ 0.802
			Percentage Female	+ 0.736
			Percentage of Population with No Social Networks	+ 0.728
3	Income and Access to Services	13.51%	Percentage of Households with No Septic Tank Toilet	+0.797
			Percentage of Households with No Electricity	+ 0.768
			Median Monthly Income	- 0.623
4	Housing Condition	9.82%	Percentage of Households with Only One Floor	+0.836
			Percentage of Population with Housing Material of Wood and Iron	+0.738
5	Land Tenure	6.57%	Percentage of Renters	+0.893

The Social Vulnerability Index Scores for the 14 barangays are listed in Table 9.

Table 9: Social Vulnerability Index Scores for the Households

Social Vulnerability Ranking	Barangay	Social Vulnerability Index Score
1 (Most Vulnerable)	Napindan, Taguig	3.54
2	Calzada, Taguig	3.49
3	Ibayo Tipaz, Taguig	2.94
4	San Agustin, Malabon	2.78
5	Longos, Malabon	2.78
6	Bangculasi, Navotas	2.24
7	Bagumbayan South, Navotas	1.31
8	West Navotas	1.08
9	Bgy. 28, Caloocan	0.45
10	Bagong Ilog, Pasig	-0.51
11	San Joaquin, Pasig	-1.45
12	Roasario, Pasig	-1.49
13	Tumana, Marikina	-2.66
14 (Least Vulnerable)	Ugong, Pasig	-2.83

It is important to note that these findings given above are consistent with the findings of Porio (2011) in her article entitled “Vulnerability, Adaptation, and Resilience to Flood and Climate Change-Related Risks Among Riverine Communities in Metro Manila”. Porio found a strong interaction between the environmental-ecological vulnerability of the riverine communities with the social vulnerability of the urban poor in these areas (Porio, 2011). Of the three flood plains in her study, the residents in the West Manggahan and KAMANAVA flood plains (who have less income and education) also tend to be more vulnerable and thus suffer more losses and inconveniences due to flooding (see Table 10 below).

Table 10: Environmental and Socio-economic Vulnerabilities of the Three Flood Plains from Porio’s (2011) Study

Flood Plain/ Areas	Environmental Characteristics	Socio-Economic Characteristics
Pasig-Marikina	Living in flood-prone areas along the riverlines/ riverbanks, clogged waterways	Median monthly income: P18,000 Ave. Education: 9.5 years
KAMANAVA	Living along flood-prone riverlines; near the coast (prone to floods and sea level rise/ tidal surges), land subsidence, clogged waterways	Median monthly income: P15,000 Ave. Education: 11 years
West Manggahan	Living along flood prone riverlines (Manggahan Floodway, Napindan Channel) near Laguna Lake, swampy lands/ wetlands, clogged waterways	Median monthly income: P8,000 Ave. Education: 7.5 years Housing dilapidated or made of light materials, migrants/renters, more women-headed households, low access and pay more for services

(obtained from Porio, 2011)

6. Conclusion

This study showcased how vulnerability may be studied on a multi-level scale of analysis: city-level, barangay-level, and household-level. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used to extract a

number of components of social vulnerability from both NSO data as well as household data. Finally, incorporating additional dimensions to the PCA led to a broader understanding of vulnerability. By looking at the intersections of socio-economic and ecological-environmental factors at the household and community levels, it led into the development of an expanded, multi-level, and more refined model of social vulnerability.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the National Statistics Office (NSO), most especially their administrator Carmelita N. Ericta, as well as the staff of the Databank and Information Services Division (DISD) for all the assistance given to the authors.

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Transborder Human Trafficking: Migration Challenges For ASEAN Countries

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Introduction

At the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007 in Cebu, Philippines, the ASEAN Leaders committed to accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015 as envisioned in the ASEAN Vision 2020.⁴² The ASEAN Vision 2020 clearly stipulates:

We envision our rich human and natural resources contributing to our development and shared prosperity. ... We commit ourselves to moving towards closer cohesion and economic integration, narrowing the gap in the level of development among Member Countries, ensuring that the multilateral trading system remains fair and open, and achieving global competitiveness. ... We will create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN Economic Region in which there is a free flow of goods, services and investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socioeconomic disparities.

The AEC 2015 will establish ASEAN as a single market and production and transform ASEAN into a region with free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labours, and freer flow of capital.⁴³ The free flow of skilled labours will raise a crucial challenge for ASEAN member states since each member state has different migration policies. To respond this challenge, all ASEAN member states should 'align their governance and management of labour migration with international and regional obligations, guidance, and best practice'.⁴⁴

Diverse economic strengths among ASEAN member states intensify the movement of people to find a better life in other more developed ASEAN countries. The United Nations reported that there were 70.8 million international migrants in Asia.⁴⁵ There are approximately 100,000 migrant workers in Brunei.⁴⁶ The number of Indonesian migrants in Thailand (1,459), Malaysia (1,397,684), the

⁴¹ The author is a member of Asian Public Intellectuals (API) community. A special gratitude is given to the Nippon Foundation, Japan under the Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Program which has provided the generous funds to join the APSA International Conference from 15-16 February 2014 in Chiang Mai, Thailand.

⁴² ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, Jakarta, ASEAN Secretariat, January 2008, p.5, available from www.asean.org/archive/5187-10.pdf.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ UN Women, *Managing Labour Migration in ASEAN: Concerns for Women Migrant Workers*, p.9, available from www.unwomen.org; <http://asiapacific.unwomen.org>.

⁴⁵ United Nations, *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision*, available from <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/>

⁴⁶ Department of State, the United States of America, *Trafficking In Persons Report June 2013*, p.106, available from www.state.gov/documents/organization/210737.pdf.

Philippines (5,865), Cambodia (505).⁴⁷ 22.156 migrants from Vietnam live in Laos and 17.039 migrants from Myanmar live in Malaysia.⁴⁸ The flow of migrant workers in the ASEAN region in 2015 will increase and it will not limit to skilled labours and talents as stipulated by the ASEAN 2020. Unskilled migrant workers, particularly those who work at domestic spheres will also increase.

In 2007, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers,⁴⁹ which determines the obligations of ASEAN member states to provide migrant workers with adequate access to the legal and judicial system, to facilitate the exercise of consular function by consular or diplomatic authorities of countries of origin when a migrant worker is arrested or committed to prison or custody or detained in any manner, to set up policies and procedures for facilitating recruitment, preparation for deployment overseas and protection of migrant workers as well as repatriation and reintegration to the countries of origin, and other aspects of worker migration, to establish and promote legal practices for regulating recruitment of migrant workers, to adopt mechanisms for eliminating recruitment malpractices.⁵⁰ In short, the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers aims to promote fair treatment towards migrant workers. The Declaration basically focuses on legal or documented migrant workers, yet to the some extent, the obligations in the Declaration may also cover illegal or undocumented migrant workers. Although the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers imposes a number of obligations on ASEAN member states, many migrant workers in ASEAN countries still face difficulties, discrimination and even inhumane treatments. The condition is even worse for migrant workers who are qualified as victims of human trafficking.

Human trafficking is a type of slavery in the modern age since it deprives people of human rights and freedom. Therefore, the United Nations declares that human trafficking constitutes a serious crime against human rights. The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children which was adopted by the United Nations in 2000 defines that 'trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation'.

Human trafficking occurs in the ring of migration. In other words, when migration takes on elements of coercion, force, abduction, fraud, deception or exploitation, it becomes 'human trafficking (Trafficking in Persons)'. Human trafficking incidents are rampant and may be more rampant in the ASEAN region due to the implementation of the AEC 2015. This is because when ASEAN moves towards full economic liberalization and consequently it will benefit the ASEAN people, more ASEAN people from less economic level wish to leave their country to seek better life. Some of those people

⁴⁷ A complete data regarding migrants in the ASEAN region can be found in the International Organization for Migrants, available from <http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/world-migration.html>

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ ASEAN, Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, adopted at the 12th ASEAN Summit, 13 January 2007, Cebu, Philippines, available from: <http://www.aseansec.org/19264.htm>

⁵⁰ Decent Work Country Programme (2006-2010), ILO 2007, p.158.

may not be lucky and trapped into trafficking ring. Within the ASEAN region today, 'Cambodian children are trafficked to Vietnam and Thailand to work as street beggars, Indonesian women are trafficked into Malaysian to work as domestic workers, Laotian men are trafficked onto Thai fishing boats, Vietnamese women are trafficked through false marriages into numerous commercial sex industries, Burmese women are trafficked into Thailand to work as domestic workers'.⁵¹

It is apparent that human trafficking remains a greater challenge in the ASEAN migration cycle. The questions is 'how and who will respond to this challenge'. This paper will mainly discuss the significance of collaborative actions between the ASEAN governments and ASEAN people in combatting human trafficking in the region. More specifically, this paper focuses on transborder (international) human trafficking rather than domestic trafficking in the ASEAN region. The paper suggests that the sharing model between the country of origin (sending country) and the destination country (receiving country) should be adopted by ASEAN countries in order to strengthen a comprehensive collaborative measure against human trafficking in the ASEAN region.

Linkage between Migration and Human Trafficking in the ASEAN Region

Human movement or migration among ASEAN countries has occurred long before the establishment of ASEAN on 8 August 1967. The establishment of the AEC 2015 will attract more and more ASEAN people to migrate in the region in order to meet labour shortages in several ASEAN countries. The AEC 2015 will facilitate the free movement of people, particularly migrant workers with skills and talents. Yet, it should be noted that the free movement of people echoed in the AEC 2015 is referred to 'legal or documented migration'. Migration of ASEAN people is not always conducted through a legal and appropriate channel. 'Illegal or irregular' migration also occurs in the ASEAN region when people from one ASEAN member country enter another ASEAN country without having received legal authorisation. The IOM reported that 'around 30-40 percent of all migration flows in Asia are estimated to take place through irregular channels'.⁵² In the ASEAN region, 'irregular migration constitutes a sensitive policy issue and irregular migrants are vulnerable to human rights abuses, discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion'.⁵³ Migrant workers, irregular migrants are among the most vulnerable people and they often perform the "three Ds"- dirty, dangerous and difficult work. In Malaysia, for example, Indonesian irregular migrant workers suffer from a number of exploitation. They often suffer severe restrictions on their freedom of movement; psychological and physical abuse, including sexual abuse in the case of female migrants. Pervasive labor rights abuses in the workplace include extremely long hours of work without overtime pay, no rest days, and incomplete and irregular payment of wages.

A number of ASEAN people have also been smuggled to enter another ASEAN country. The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol) defines 'migrant smuggling as: the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other

⁵¹ International on Social Welfare, *Trafficking and Related Labour Exploitation in the ASEAN Region*, November 2007 p.22, available from <http://www.icsw.org/>

⁵² International Organization for Migrants (IOM), available from www.iom-seasia.org.

⁵³ International Council on Human Rights Policy, *Irregular Migration, Migrant Smuggling and Human Rights: Towards Coherence*, Geneva, Switzerland, 2010, p.vi, available from www.ichrp.org.

material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident.’ Based on this definition smuggled migrants refers only to the illegal movement of persons across international borders. It is often questioned whether smuggled migrants are automatically human trafficking victims. Human trafficking is legally different to migrant smuggling since in order to qualify as ‘human trafficking’, there are key elements must be fulfilled, namely ‘the element of action’ which consists of recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons; ‘the element of means’ which covers Threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position of vulnerability, giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve consent of a person having control over another; ‘the element of purpose’ which includes exploitation (including, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others, or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs). These elements should not be fulfilled entirely to qualify a trafficking if a victim is a child. To qualify a trafficking in children is only necessary to show an ‘action’ such as recruitment, buying and selling, for the specific ‘purpose’ of exploitation.⁵⁴

Based on the legal term, human trafficking is different from migrant smuggling, yet the operation of migrant smuggling may lead to human trafficking action if coercion or deception is used to facilitate the victim’s agreement and there is a purpose of exploitation involved in migrating the victim outside his/her country. It can be argued that migrant smuggling does not require an exploitative purpose or the elements of force, deception or fraud since the smuggled migrant has knowledge and a greater control of the situation, i.e. choice of destination, negotiated fee, etc. Today, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Many trafficking victims were once migrated as smuggled migrants and then they would end up as trafficking victims when they could not pay the whole fee to the smuggler. In this situation the exploitative end-purposes of trafficking could come into play, especially when the smuggler started to exploit the smuggled migrants and placed them in a debt bondage situation. In the beginning, the status of victims was smuggled migrants and eventually their status could turn to be internal trafficking victims when they were exploited by the smuggler. However, it is still debatable whether the purpose of exploitation is sufficient to qualify smuggled migrants as trafficking victims.

Human trafficking is closely connected to migration and it is an unintended consequence of migration. Human trafficking is a serious phenomenon in the ASEAN region. Most of ASEAN countries are the source, transit and destination countries for men, women, and children trafficked internally and internationally, mostly for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labor. Human trafficking in the ASEAN region is driven by the pushing and pulling factors. The pushing factors can be divided into economic, socio-cultural and political factors. Economic factors consist of poverty, lack of job opportunities, imbalanced urban-rural development and insufficient income. Socio-cultural factors are comprised of gender bias, consumerization, dysfunctional family, low education and peer pressure. The pulling factors are the demands of skilled and unskilled jobs in the formal and informal sectors, booming recruitment agencies in many ASEAN countries, mushrooming clubs, and peer influences. Common modus operandi for transborder (international) trafficking are fraudulent

⁵⁴ The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (the 2000 UN TIP Protocol), art. 3(c).

documentation, tourist arrangements, Overseas Performing Artists (OPAs), escort services, false marriages, training scheme, blind advertisements, contract substitution, Artist Record Book (ARB), and Au Pair System.⁵⁵

Modus operandi of human trafficking in all ASEAN countries is almost similar. Recruiters target the vulnerable groups by giving the potential victims all kinds of nice and false promises. They frequently use fraud, deception, threats, abuses of authority, debt bondage, marriage or relationships, abduction, confinement, or rape. Recruiters usually seek for potential recruits in local communities, aided by headhunters who know the community and its residents well enough. The headhunters help recruiters convince potential recruits or their parents to allow their children to leave. The recruiters often give cash to the parents. To facilitate transit, a recruit's personal documents, such as his or her birth certificate, are faked. Once in transit, the recruits are not allowed to talk to anyone outside the group and to handle their legal or travel papers. When the recruits reached their destination, they are told that their transportation expenses, along with other incurred expenses, would be deducted from their salary. Having huge debts to pay, they have no choice, but to work as ordered by their recruiters. Most of the recruits finally end up as prostitutes or laborers in bondage.⁵⁶

The Approaches of ASEAN and its Member States to Human Trafficking

All ASEAN member states provide national legal instruments to curb human trafficking. Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines have ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol as it is shown by the following table.

Table 1: Anti-Trafficking Legal Instruments

Name of State	National Law	The 2000 UN TIP Protocol
Brunei	The Trafficking and Smuggling of Persons Order of 2004	-
Cambodia	Law on the Suppression of Human trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of 2007	2 July 2005 (r)
Indonesia	Law No. 21 of 2007 concerning the Elimination of Trafficking in Persons	28 September 2009 (r)
Laos	The Lao Penal Law of 2005 (Articles 24 and 27)	26 September 2003 (a)
Malaysia	The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2007 (Act 670) – as Amended in 2010	26 February 2009 (a)
Myanmar	The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law of 2005	30 March 2004 (a)
Philippines	The Anti-Trafficking Act of 2003	28 May 2002 (r)
Singapore	Women's Charter of 1966 (as amended in 1996) and the Penal Code	-
Thailand	The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2008 (BE 2551/2008)	18 December 2001 (s)
Viet Nam	Viet Nam Penal Code of 1999 (Articles 119 – 120)	-

Among ASEAN countries, Laos, Singapore and Viet Nam have not enacted a special law to regulate human trafficking. It is frequently debated whether it is necessary for all ASEAN member states to a

⁵⁵ Rina Shahriyani Shahrullah, 'A Comprehensive Study on the Philippines' Legal Approaches to Combat Human Trafficking: Suggestions for Indonesia', *Asian Alternatives For A Sustainable World: Transborder Engagements in Knowledge Formation*, The Work of the 2007/2008 API Fellows, p.70, available from http://www.api-fellowships.org/body/international_ws_proceedings/year7.pdf

⁵⁶ Ibid.

national anti-trafficking law. It is also often asked if a national anti-trafficking law can guarantee the elimination of human trafficking in each ASEAN member state. These questions are not easy to answer because the progress of each ASEAN member states in combating human trafficking does not merely rely upon whether it has a special national trafficking law or not.⁵⁷ Brunei in 2004 issued the Trafficking and Smuggling of Persons Order, yet based on the TIPs Report 2013 in 2010 and 2011 Brunei is placed on Tier 2 Watch List and in 2012 and 2013 this state is placed on Tier 2 which is similar to its ranking in 2009.⁵⁸ Cambodia has enacted Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation in 2007 and ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol on 2 July 2005. However, Cambodia is placed on Tier 2 Watch List in 2013 due to the failure of the Cambodian government to demonstrate progress in its anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts.⁵⁹ Indonesia passed its anti-trafficking law under Law No. 21 of 2007 concerning the Elimination of Trafficking in Persons. This state has also ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol on 28 September 2009. Based on the TIPs Report 2013, this state is placed on Tier 2 since the enactment of anti-trafficking law in 2007.⁶⁰ Laos does not have a specific anti-trafficking law, but Articles 24 and 27 of The Lao Penal Law of 2005 provide provisions relevant to human trafficking. Based on the TIPs report 2013, Laos is placed on Tier 2 from 2011 to 2013.⁶¹ In 2007 Malaysia enacted the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2007 and it was amended in 2010, yet Malaysia remains on the Tier 2 Watch List.⁶² This progress of this state in combatting human trafficking used to drop to Tier 3 in 2009. Myanmar (Burma) enacted its Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law in 2005, yet since 2005 until 2011 Myanmar was placed on Tier 3. This position of this state from 2012 to 2013 is on Tier 2 Watch List.⁶³ The Philippines enacted its Anti-Trafficking Act in 2003 and ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol on 28 May 2002. From 2011 to 2013 the Philippines is placed on Tier 2 and this state used to be placed on Tier 2 Watch List in 2009 and 2010.⁶⁴ Singapore has not enacted an anti-trafficking law or ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. A number of provisions relevant to human trafficking is provided by the Women's Charter of 1966 (as amended in 1996) and the Penal Code. Similar to the Philippines, from 2011 to 2013 Singapore is

⁵⁷ Tier 1: Countries whose governments fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Tier 2: Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. Tier 2 Watch List: Countries where governments do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards, and

- a) the absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing;
- b) there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year, including increased investigations, prosecution, and convictions of trafficking crimes, increased assistance to victims, and a decreasing evidence of complicity in severe forms of trafficking by government officials; or
- c) the determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional steps over the next year.

Tier 3: Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so. Department of State, the United States of America, *Op.Cit.*, p.44-45.

⁵⁸ *Id.* at p.106.

⁵⁹ *Id.* at p.117.

⁶⁰ *Id.* at p.199.

⁶¹ *Id.* at p.229.

⁶² *Id.* at p.250.

⁶³ *Id.* at p.112.

⁶⁴ *Id.* at p.301.

placed on Tier 2 and used to be placed on Tier 2 Watch List in 2010.⁶⁵ Thailand enacted the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act in 2008, yet since 2010 to 2013 this state is placed on Tier 2 Watch List.⁶⁶ It is interesting that prior to the enactment of its anti-trafficking act, Thailand from 2006 to 2008 was placed on Tier 2. Viet Nam does not enact an anti-trafficking law, yet the Viet Nam Penal Code of 1999 provides relevant provisions governing human trafficking under Articles 119 – 12. This state does not ratify the 2000 UN TIP Protocol, but it is placed on Tier 2 from 2012 to 2013.⁶⁷

The ranking of most ASEAN countries based on the TIP Report 2013 is Tier 2 which means most ASEAN governments do not fully comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act's (TVPA) minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. It is arguable whether the USA TVPA is the appropriate indicator to measure the progress of ASEAN countries in curbing human trafficking in the region. Since there is still no perfect tool for this purpose, the TVPA minimum standards may be used to examine and measure the efforts of ASEAN countries in combatting human trafficking. Apart from the ranking of each ASEAN member state under the TIPS Report 2013, all ASEAN member states has increased their efforts to combat human trafficking either by improving anti human trafficking mechanisms and systems of prevention, protection, prosecution, rehabilitation and collaboration at bilateral and multilateral level. A multilateral MoU has been signed by ASEAN member states in the greater Mekong region in 2004. Myanmar signed a bilateral MoU with Thailand in 2003. Cambodia signed MoU with Vietnam on bilateral cooperation to eliminate trafficking in Children and Women in 2005. Cambodia has MOUs with Thailand which facilitate the return and repatriation of trafficking victims.⁶⁸

Human trafficking is also a complex issue in the ASEAN region; therefore the responsibilities to combat human trafficking should not only be imposed on the ASEAN member states which are categorized as the country of origin (sending countries). The host countries (receiving countries) in the ASEAN region should also perform serious and concrete actions to combat human trafficking. In other words, a collaborative measure among ASEAN member states are required to combat human trafficking comprehensively. Accordingly at the regional level, all ASEAN member states are committed to preventing trafficking in persons, punishing offenders, and protecting victims of trafficking. These commitments are expressed in the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children⁶⁹ which was adopted by the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN Member Countries on 29 November 2004 in Vientiane, Lao People's Democratic Republic. The Declaration consists of the following measures:

1. To establish a regional focal network to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, particularly women and children, in the ASEAN region;
2. To adopt measures to protect the integrity of their respective passports, official travel documents, identity and other official travel documents from fraud;

⁶⁵ Id. at p.327.

⁶⁶ Id. at p.359.

⁶⁷ Id. at p.393.

⁶⁸ International Organization for Migrants, ASEAN and Trafficking in Persons: Using Data as a Tool to Combat Trafficking in Persons, p.16. available from <http://www.iom.int>.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

3. To undertake regular exchange of views, information sharing on relevant migratory flows, trends and pattern, strengthening of border controls and monitoring mechanisms, and the enactment of applicable and necessary legislations;
4. To intensify cooperation among our respective immigration and other laws enforcement authorities;
5. To distinguish victims of trafficking in persons from the perpetrators, and identify the countries of origin and nationalities of such victims and thereafter ensure that such victims are treated humanely and provided with such essential medical and other forms of assistance deemed appropriate by the respective receiving/ recipient country, including prompt repatriation to their respective countries of origin;
6. To undertake actions to respect and safeguard the dignity and human rights of genuine victims of trafficking in persons;
7. To undertake coercive actions/measures against individual and/or syndicate engaged in trafficking in persons and shall offer one another the widest possible assistance to punish such activities; and
8. To take measures to strengthen regional and international cooperation to prevent and combat trafficking in persons.

All ASEAN member states reaffirm their commitment to accomplish the elements of the Declaration and put their maximum efforts to realise these commitments into action. In order to optimize the implementation of the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, in 2006 the Inter-agency Ad-Hoc Working Group on Trafficking in Persons was created. The main task of the Inter-agency Ad-Hoc Working Group to establish the 2007-2009 Work Plan to Implement the Declaration. The Work Plan primarily focused on developing common standards and strengthening criminal justice responses. On 27 June 2007 the 7th ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) in Vientiane, Lao PDR endorsed the ASEAN Practitioner Guidelines on Effective Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Persons. The overall objective of these Practitioner Guidelines is to assist the criminal justice agencies of ASEAN Member Countries in their goal of securing justice for victims and ending the impunity of traffickers.⁷⁰ The Guidelines which consists of two parts namely: Part One covers evidential matters which consists of strengthening of the legal framework, specialisation and co-operation, management of the victim as a witness, special measures for child victims, witness protection issues, and trial Issues. Part Two covers international operational and legal/ judicial co-operation which consists of international operational co-operation, international legal/judicial co-operation in general, international legal/judicial co-operation which specifically governs on extradition, international legal/judicial co-operation dealing with mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and networking particularly between specialist investigators, prosecutors and Central Authority legal officers.

In addition to the Guidelines, the ASEAN's Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) also endorsed a Handbook on International Legal Cooperation on Trafficking in Persons Cases in 2008. The Handbook can be used by judicial officials, prosecutors and other criminal justice officials

⁷⁰ As finalized by the ASEAN Ad-Hoc Working Group on Trafficking in Persons, 25 June 2007, Vientiane, Lao PDR; and endorsed by the 7th ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime, Vientiane, Lao PDR, 27 June 2007.

who deal with human trafficking cases. The Handbook consists of five chapters and 'it provides basic information on cooperation tools including mutual legal assistance and extradition as well as guidance on how these tools can be used most effectively in the specific context of regional and international cooperation in TIP cases'.⁷¹

Transforming Law in Book into Law in Action by Public Intellectuals

It is obvious that all ASEAN member states have been provided with a complete set of legal instruments, guidelines and handbook on how to implement the ASEAN legal instruments. Yet, a question remains whether human trafficking incidents can be minimized after the issuance of the instruments, guidelines and handbook. The answer to this particular question should be best approached by a legal theory which is developed by Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Satjipto Raharjo.

Mochtar Kusumaatmadja developed a theory of law which is called 'Teori Hukum Pembangunan' (Law-Development Theory). This theory is derived from the theory of Roscoe Pound that points out the end of law as follows:

It [the legal order] may well be thought of as a task or as a great series of tasks of social engineering; as an elimination of friction and precluding of waste, so far as possible, in the satisfaction of infinite human desires out of relatively finite store of the material goods of existence'.⁷²

In the opinion of Roscoe Pound, 'law as a tool of social engineering is more concerned with actual operation of law rather than its abstract content'.⁷³ Different from Roscoe Pound, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja was in the opinion that law should not be used as 'a tool', but it should be used as 'a means'. According to Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, 'law is a means to maintain order in society'. The role of law is 'to ensure the dynamic changes occur in regular manner'. Law is 'a society's renewal media which means that law should serve as a director for society's actions to support the development'.⁷⁴ Satjipto Raharjo⁷⁵ established 'Teori Hukum Progressif' (Progressive Legal Theory). This theory emphasises that 'human interests, namely human welfare and happiness should be the ultimate aim of law'. The theory regards that law is merely as a process⁷⁶ to achieve the happiness of human; consequently law should be progressive and responsive to meet such objective.

Based on the approaches of Law-Development Theory and Progressive Legal Theory, all abstract contents of ASEAN Declaration, Guidelines, and Handbook should be transformed into concrete actions in order to achieve the goals of ASEAN. All ASEAN governments and their people should play

⁷¹ Surin Pitsuwan, 'Foreword by the Secretary-General of ASEAN', *ASEAN Handbook on International Legal Cooperation in Trafficking in Persons Cases*, the ASEAN Secretariat, August 2010, p.iii, available from <http://www.aseansec.org>.

⁷² Roscoe Pound, *Interpretation of Legal History*, Harvard University Press, 1946, p.160.

⁷³ Dhyani, S.N., *Fundamentals of Jurisprudence*, Central Law Agency, Allahabad, p.331.

⁷⁴ Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, *Hukum Masyarakat, dan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional*, Binacipta, Bandung, 1976, p. 4.

⁷⁵ Satjipto Rahardjo, "Indonesia Butuhkan Penegakan Hukum Progressif", *Harian Kompas*, 15 Juni 2002.

⁷⁶ Satjipto Rahardjo, "Hukum Progressif: Hukum yang Membebaskan", *Jurnal Hukum Progressif*, Program Doktor Ilmu Hukum Univ. Diponegoro, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2005, p.16.

active and concrete roles in combatting human trafficking. Human trafficking should be treated as a latent problem of ASEAN people, thus it needs actual and concrete actions from all ASEAN people to tackle the problem comprehensively. It may be argued that the involvement of all ASEAN people to combat human trafficking is impossible since the understanding of all ASEAN on human trafficking issues is still lacking. This is true that most of ASEAN people are still not aware of human trafficking issues, therefore the first step is to communicate the issues to all member societies in ASEAN countries. The task of communicating the human trafficking issues can be well conducted by Public Intellectuals in ASEAN countries.

Public Intellectuals are those—academics, researchers, media professionals, artists, creative writers, NGO activists, social workers, public servants and others with moral authority—who are committed to working for the betterment of society by applying their professional knowledge, wisdom and experience.⁷⁷ Public intellectuals who consist of academics, researchers, media professionals, artists, creative writers, NGO activists, social workers, public servants and others with moral authority should become frontliners to communicate and combat human trafficking in their own societies. Their commitment to working for the betterment of society by applying their professional knowledge, wisdom and experience can be used as a means to curb transborder trafficking as well. Public intellectuals can work individually or together with other ASEAN public intellectuals based on their field of work/interests and competencies. The following table shows concrete actions which can be done by public intellectuals.

Table 2: Responses of Public Intellectuals to Combat Human Trafficking

Type of Public Intellectuals	Concrete Actions against Human Trafficking
Academics	-Teaching students and integrating human trafficking in the courses or curriculum -Conducting research -Publishing research findings -Presenting papers, etc.
Researchers	-Conducting research -Publishing research findings, etc.
Media Professionals	-Publishing articles on newspapers/magazines including e-publications -Broadcasting talk shows or dialogues on TV, etc.
Artists	-Producing artistic works containing messages to combat human trafficking -Write songs and poems on human trafficking -Performing musical concert, theater/acts, movies for human trafficking victims -Conducting exhibitions with human trafficking themes, etc.
Creative Writers	-Writing scripts, novels, comics including e-books with human trafficking themes, etc.
NGO Activists	-Establishing programs/activities relating human trafficking for communities -Assisting and outreaching human trafficking victims, etc.
Social Workers	-Assisting human trafficking victims -Becoming volunteers including pro bono legal consultations (pro bono lawyers), etc.
Public Servants	-Implementing good governance -Providing reliable public services and transparent information -Being honest and fair in performing their tasks, especially for law enforcers, etc.

⁷⁷ API Newsletter, available from <http://www.api-fellowships.org/body/archives.php#newsletters>

In addition to conduct concrete actions in their own country, it is suggested that public intellectuals also establish a collaborative engagement with other public intellectuals in other ASEAN countries. They should be transparent and open in sharing information, knowledge, roles, responsibilities, resources and services relevant to human trafficking. The sharing model⁷⁸ below can be used by all public intellectuals in ASEAN countries in their efforts to combat human trafficking in the ASEAN region. The implementation of the sharing model is a challenge not only for public intellectuals in the ASEAN region, but it is also a challenge for public intellectuals in the global world.

Figure 1: Public Intellectuals Sharing Model



Conclusions

The AEC 2015 will transform ASEAN into a region with free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labours, and freer flow of capital. The free flow of skilled labours and talents may be followed by the flow of unskilled labours who wish to find a better life in other ASEAN countries. Up to now, many migrant workers in ASEAN countries still face difficulties, discrimination and even inhumane treatments. The worst conditions for migrant workers remain unsolved, particularly migrant workers who are qualified as human trafficking victims. When migration takes on elements of coercion, force, abduction, fraud, deception or exploitation, it becomes 'human trafficking (Trafficking in Persons)'. Human trafficking incidents are rampant and may be more rampant in the ASEAN region due to the implementation of the AEC 2015 because when ASEAN moves towards full economic liberalization, more ASEAN people from less economic level wish to leave their country to seek better life.

⁷⁸ The Sharing model was firstly presented by Rina Shahriyani Shahrullah at the seventh Asian Public Intellectuals Workshop on the theme "Asian Alternatives for a Sustainable World: Trans-border Engagements in Knowledge Formation". Yogyakarta, Indonesia, November 22-26, 2008.

Human trafficking is as a latent problem of the ASEAN governments and ASEAN people, thus actual and concrete actions from all ASEAN stakeholders are required to tackle the problem. All ASEAN member states are committed to preventing trafficking in persons, punishing offenders, and protecting victims of trafficking. These commitments are expressed in the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. To realise the commitments, all ASEAN governments and ASEAN people should play active and concrete roles in combatting human trafficking. It becomes imperative to raise awareness on human trafficking to all ASEAN people. All stakeholders should actively participate to deliver this task. Public intellectuals which consist of academics, researchers, media professionals, artists, creative writers, NGO activists, social workers, public servants and others with moral authority should become frontliners to communicate and combat human trafficking in their own societies. Their commitment to working for the betterment of society by applying their professional knowledge, wisdom and experience can be used as a means to curb transborder trafficking as well. Public intellectuals can work individually or together with other ASEAN public intellectuals based on their field of work/interests and competencies.

Since the AEC is approaching, all ASEAN governments and ASEAN people should be ready with all positive and negative impacts of the AEC 2015. Many challenges will be faced by ASEAN in the area of migration when the AEC 2015 is in place. Yet, all challenges in migration including human trafficking issues should be wisely resolved by involving all ASEAN people. People-to-people contact in the ASEAN region should be started from the grassroots, so ASEAN people will consider the problems in migration and human trafficking as their own problems. The active roles of ASEAN people through their concrete actions can provide sustainable solutions for human trafficking.

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Dropout Rates from Higher Education and Social Stratification in Japan

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to explore the factors which affect the decision among students to drop out of higher education in Japan. While the number of people who drop out cannot be ignored in contemporary Japan, very few studies have examined this issue, and there is no established theory in the field of sociology regarding education in the country. Almost all of the prior research has used data from students belonging to just one school, and has never focused on the interactions between the school environment and individuals. In this study, 2,356 respondents who had graduated or dropped out from a higher education institution were studied using empirical data analysis based on national representative survey datasets. The researchers expected to be able to generalize the causal factors and to examine how those factors changed by birth cohorts. In the study, the researchers focus on the interaction between school types and individual factors. The results of a logistic regression analysis show four factors have a significant effect on dropout rates, these being gender, the number of years the mother was in schooling, the mother's employment status, and the respondents' educational aspirations at the age of 15. While the effect of gender on drop out rates disappears for the young birth cohort, the research confirms the importance of the mother as a determinant for both the elder cohort and the young. As for determinants of dropout rates among those who studied at a private university, the causal mechanism identified is identical to that of the whole sample. These results reveal that it is important to enhance student aspirations with regard to higher education up to the age of 15, and for their family's to provide support during school, and particularly the mother. In addition, aspirations to go on to higher education are dependent on the social stratification experienced by the student when growing up. In order to compensate for any disadvantages within the school environment, we should discuss concrete action, such as the introduction of university-level educational programs for freshman.

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to explore those factors affecting the decision of students from Japan to drop out of higher education. The proportion of students advancing to higher education in Japan today is more than 50%, and so going through higher education has become common. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show changes in the number of undergraduate students at universities or colleges in Japan between 1950 and 2010. From these figures, we can see a considerable increase in the use of private schools. The number of students at national and public universities or colleges is also gradually increasing. Junior colleges, technical colleges and professional training colleges are not included in these figures, so more people participate in higher education than the figures show.

Figure 1: Number of Undergraduate Students in Japan (Source: School Basic Survey)





Figure 2: Number of University Students in Japan (Source: School Basic Survey)



How many students, in fact, drop out in such a situation? Figure 3 provides a comparison of dropout rates between OECD countries and Japan. The lowest is that of Japan, which is almost half of the rate in Denmark - the second lowest. The figure gives the impression that dropping out of college in Japan is not a serious problem at all.




Figure 3: International Comparison of Dropout Rates(Source: OECD indicators)

According to an article by Yomiuri Online on August 3, 2012, almost 43,000 students dropped out from university in 2011. This does not include students who dropped out from junior colleges, technical colleges and professional training colleges. Hence, there are more students who drop out, and this number cannot be ignored. Despite this fact, dropping out, especially from higher education, is not a big concern in Japan. In order to estimate drop out rates, one has to calculate it basic school surveys, while those from high schools are clearly indicated in the paper 'Investigations of Various Problems on Student Counseling'. In addition, very few studies have examined this issue as part of the sociology of education. Very little is known about dropout rates, meaning that people who drop out are treated as a minority.

In fact, many people do not complete college, and some have a hard time surviving because of their decision. In other words, there is a possibility that the gap in the model of occupational attainment is larger in reality than that estimated, and there is a need to reveal the determinants of dropping out from the point of view of examining the options to prevent it.

There is no established theory on dropout determinants, especially from higher education institutions, because of the lack of previous studies. Also, almost all of the previous research has used data from students belonging to just one school, and have focused on either the environment or individuals. They have also not validated which factors have the significant effect, whether innate such as gender or social stratification, or acquired such as grades or aspirations. In short, the most significant dropout determinants have not yet been established.

Therefore, here we explore the general factors which influence the decision to dropout, focusing on inherent, acquired and environmental factors, and using data, not from just one school, but from a national survey.

Literature Review

As discussed above, little research has addressed the problem concerning the risk of students dropping out in Japan. In this section, we review the previous research that has been carried out and those factors determining why students decide to drop out of school.

Social Origin

Much previous literature in Japan reveals that the association between a person's social origins and their children's educational attainment is consistent and persistent (Kondo & Furuta, 2011; Furuta, 2011; Ojima, 2002). In social stratification and social mobility research, it has been well-known for a long time that social origin has a great effect on the occupational attainment process including educational attainment (Blau & Duncan, 1967). Therefore, social origins can be an important factor causing students to decide whether or not they leave school.

In previous studies on the relationships between social origin and school dropout rates, various types of measurement on social origins have been used. In Sewell and Shah (1967), for example, social origin is measured using a factor-weighted index consisting of: (a) father's occupational prestige, (b) the levels of parental education, (c) the economic and financial ability of parents to pay for tuition (school expenses), (d) the ratio of tuition fees to domestic finance (household accounts), (e) the number of cultural assets, and (f) household income. They pointed out that social origins measured by these items have a positive effect on school completion rates, which implies the lower the socio-economic background people are raised in, the more difficult it is for them to graduate from school (Sewell & Shah, 1967). Other findings indicate that parents' incomes have the same effect on children's school completion rates (Chen & DesJardins, 2006). In particular, a scholarship system decreases the risk of school dropouts (Stratton et al., 2008). Kaji (2010) also insists that the appropriate and efficient operation of scholarships can completely reduce the differences in the risk of dropping out among people of different class origins. In contrast to these findings, however, Bean (1980) found no relationship between class origins and school dropout rates. Whether or not the relationship between social origins and dropout behavior exists, how social stratification affects the risk of dropping out has been widely discussed.

The Level of Educational Aspiration

The level of children's educational aspirations can be another important factor which affects the risk of dropout, independently of class origin and students' academic performances. A large body of research in Western countries has measured the level of educational aspiration by asking respondents whether they regard graduation from university as important or not, as this decreases the probability of them leaving school early (Champman, 1983; Chen & DesJardins, 2006). Little previous research in Japan, however, has examined the effects of educational aspiration on dropout rates. The work of Koga (1999) found virtually no difference in educational aspiration levels (whether they aspire to advance to four-year university or not) between students who dropout of high school and those who do not.

Social Background and the Educational System in Japan

While some research has considered individual or micro-factors, such as socio-economic background, academic performance or the level of educational aspiration, which affects the decision

on whether to dropout, others have highlighted the educational system or social background as important macro determinants of individual dropout behavior.

One of the important macro factors is the change in social conditions, including the transformation of the labor market. According to Katayama (2010), the percentage of students who find work after graduation from high-school, and the ratio of job offers to applicants intended for high-school students who will enter labor market shortly after graduation, is linked to changes in dropout rates at high school. In Japan, the tight high school labor market due to the economic downturn has increased the percentage of students quitting high school, which in turn has caused more young people to engage in non-regular employment (so-called *Hiseiki-Koyo*). These students also lack a consciousness about the importance of working (Katayama, 2010). Although these results can be attributed to the choices of individuals and to individual responsibility, these research studies suggest that little has been done to examine the social and environmental factors surrounding high-school student drop outs. In addition, whether the effects of the labor market and social background vary over time is an important issue yet to be discussed.

As a second factor, it needs to be considered whether the Japanese educational system and educational facilities themselves are related to the rate of school dropouts. The total number of students per faculty, the ratio of students to teachers, the ratio of part-time teachers to full-time teachers, and the average number of students per lecture, are all linked to the risk of students not attending or leaving university (Maruyama, 1984).

In addition to this, students' recognition or evaluation as to whether university is of benefit affects the extent to which they make positive a commitment to higher education (Bean, 1980).

Hypotheses

In our research, we assume that there are three factors which increase the risk of individual dropouts from junior college or four-year universities: (1) inherent factors, (2) acquired factors, and (3) external factors.

Inherent Factors

Inherent factors include respondents' genders and class origins, and the employment status of their mothers. Class origin is measured by the father's occupation, the parents' level of education, and the economic conditions at age 15 (details are described below). We hypothesize from previous research that class origins determine children's access to higher education and their awareness of the importance of graduating from a prestigious university. The cost of advancing to higher education is very high, regardless of the school attended — national school, public school or private school, which means socio-economic background can be an index for whether children are able to go on to higher education or not. In addition, the extent to which children emphasize the importance of attending and completing brand-name university is mostly determined by class origin, which implies that the higher the socio-economic background, the more likely a student is to consider graduating from a higher education facility. Therefore, the effect of class origin on the decision as to whether they will leave out higher education or not, remains statistically significant, controlling for respondents' gender and birth year. Furthermore, the mother's employment status (full-time/part-time/unemployed) determine the extent to which mothers can interact with their children. Mothers are

thought to play an educational role in forming and monitoring children's attitudes concerning higher education. The less time mothers spend on communicating with their children, the higher the risk the children will dropout of school, which suggests that children whose mothers engage in full-time work are more likely to leave out higher education than those whose mothers work as a part-time workers or are unemployed.

Acquired Factors

Two measures can be used to assess the children's acquired factors: the children's academic performance and children's educational aspirations at the age of 15. At 15 years-old, Japanese children graduate from the nine-year compulsory education program and go on to high school and junior college, or four-year university. These factors determine the extent to which children can adjust themselves to the school environment. Academic performance and educational aspirations also affect the children's awareness of the importance of completing higher education after advancing there directly.

Therefore, children who attend education institutions but have lower level educational aspirations are more likely to leave out higher education.

External Factors

External factors can be measured in three ways: the types of university attended (national or public university/private university/junior or technical college/vocational school), the types of department or faculty attended, and the birth cohort. In previous studies, there has been found a statistically significant difference in dropout rates between national or public university and private university students. In addition, differences in dropout rates have been found among the types of department or faculty attended, for example, 12% for Business Administration, 9% for International Studies and 3% for Medicine (Yomiuri Online, 03/08/2012). Therefore, we predict that the kind of faculty or department at university children attend, will have an effect on dropout rates. Birth cohort also reflects the trend for going on to higher education, and so changes in the total number of undergraduate students and university institutions. The dramatic popularization of higher education may have caused an absolute increase in the number of students dropping out. This means children who belong to the recent birth cohort are at greater risk of quitting university. However, the year children were born can be regarded as an inherent factor. In our study, when we examine the main effect of birth year on dropout rates, we interpret this factor as inherent, whereas when checking the interaction between other external factors and birth year, we see it as external factor.

Data and Variables

Datasets

The data used for this study were taken from the 2005 Social Stratification and Social Mobility (SSM) survey, and youth and prime panel data from the 2008 Japanese Life Course Panel Survey (JLPS). The former survey is a large-scale social survey and has been executed every ten years since 1995. The 2005 SSM data were collected for the 2005 SSM study group, with the survey using interviews and self-administered questionnaires among those aged 20 to 69. The number of respondents was 5742 and there was a 44.1% response rate.

The Japanese Life Course Panel Survey is a follow-up study by the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo which has been carried out since 2007. The youth panel data were collected from those aged 20 to 34 in Japan. The number of responses was 2716 and there was an 80.7% response rate. The prime panel data were collected from people aged 35 to 40 in Japan. The number of respondents was 1245 and there was a 87% response rate. Both surveys were used by mailing the self-administered questionnaires and visiting for collection.

In this study, those who both graduated from or dropped-out of higher education are regarded as participants, but those who did not go on to higher school at all are not included.

Variables

The dependent variable is a composite measure which asks whether or not a person graduated from the school attended last, and this study used a dropout dummy variable (1: dropped out, and 0: graduated). For respondents who attended more than one higher education institution, the response was given for the first school attended.

The independent variables used were as follows:

Birth Cohort: People born in 1973 to 1989 - dummy variable (reference is people born between 1935 and 1972.) This dummy includes young people (15 to 34) as of 2007.

Gender: Male - dummy variable (reference: female).

Parents' Education: Years of schooling from terminal education (dropped out regarded as graduation.)

Father's Occupation: After grouping fathers' main occupations for each responses based on the SSM8 classification, we classified [professional] and [management] into "upper non-manual", [clerical] and [sales] into "lower non-manual", and [skill], [non skill], [half skill] and [agriculture] into "manual." We then made two dummy variables (reference: lower non-manual).

Mother's Employment Status: We classified [management, executive] and [full-time worker] into "full-time worker", [extraordinary employment, part-timer, part-time job], [temporary worker] and [contract worker] into "part-time worker", [self-employed, free-lance], [family worker] and [domestic side job] into "self-employed, family worker, etc.", and [did not working] into "no jobs/housewives." We then made three dummy variables (reference: full-time worker).

Living Conditions at Age 15: In both surveys, the response categories ranged from (1) rich to (5) poor, but in this study, it was reversed and a five-point scale measure was used.

Self-Reported Grade at age 15: In both surveys, the responses for academic grade ranged from (1) good, to (5) bad, but in this study, it was reversed and we used a five-point scale measure.

Educational Aspiration: For the question, "which school did you want to go when you were 15 years-old?", we made three dummy variables: "junior and high school", "junior college, technical college, vocational school" and "no hope" (reference: college).

School Type: About the school the respondents graduated from or dropped out of, we made three dummy variables: “private”, “junior college, technical college” and “vocational school” (reference: four-year college national and public).

Department: About the department which they graduated from or dropped out of, we made four dummy variables: “social science”, “science, engineering, agriculture”, “medical” and “commercial science, domestic science, art” (reference: the humanities).

Data: We used an SSM dummy variable in order to control dataset differences.

Analysis

In this section, we describe the results of the logistic regression analyses for the dependent variables. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. After that, Table 2 and Table 3 show the results of the logistic regression analyses.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	N	min	max	mean	standard deviation
dropout	2356	0	1	0.060	0.237
born in 1935-1972	2356	0	1	0.529	0.499
born in 1973-1986	2356	0	1	0.471	0.499
male	2356	0	1	0.505	0.500
upper nonmanual	2356	0	1	0.297	0.457
manual	2356	0	1	0.370	0.483
father's years of schooling	2356	6	18	12.603	2.987
living condition at the age 15	2356	1	5	3.225	0.780
mother's years of schooling	2356	6	18	11.804	2.306
no jobs/housewives	2356	0	1	0.310	0.463
part-time worker	2356	0	1	0.272	0.445
self-employed, family worker, etc.	2356	0	1	0.228	0.420
self-reported grade at the age 15	2356	1	5	3.659	1.007
junior high/high school	2356	0	1	0.096	0.295
higher education except for university	2356	0	1	0.153	0.360
no aspirations	2356	0	1	0.113	0.316
private	2356	0	1	0.472	0.499
junior colleges, technical colleges	2356	0	1	0.239	0.426
vocational school	2356	0	1	0.138	0.345
social science	2356	0	1	0.294	0.456
science, engineering and agriculture	2356	0	1	0.211	0.408
medical science	2356	0	1	0.085	0.279
commercial, domestic science, art	2356	0	1	0.159	0.366

Determinants of Dropout Rates from Higher Education

As with all models, to control the difference between the SSM data and JLPS data, we injected SSM dummies. The youth cohort and male dummy were injected into Model 1, then we confirmed the effect of the steadiest individual attribute factors. The birth cohort variables were injected into Model 2. The birth cohort variables or home support variables, and mother factors, were injected

into Model 3. The SSM dummy and individual acquisition factors were injected into Model4. Both individual acquisition and innate factors were injected into Model 5. The SSM dummy and the external circumstances factors - educational institution, were injected into Model 6. Model 7 was constructed as a full model using individual acquisition, innate and external circumstance factors.

The first key point is that the male dummy has been a significant effect for the all model. From model 7, after other factors were controlled, male respondents are more likely to drop out about 1.5 times than female respondents. At hypothesis stage, we expected that women is less likely to drop out is influenced by the time background or school type. However, man is likely to drop out, because it was influenced by other factors that were not considered in this analysis.

Second point is the effect of factors about mother. The mothers' years of schooling and housewives dummy have been significant effects. For mothers' years of schooling, it is negative effect. When themothers' years of schooling increase one year, the probability of dropout decreases 1.1 times. Based on the measurement in this analysis, the difference of one step of educational background is at least two years difference. Therefore, if mothers' educational background is different of one step, the risk of dropout is also different about 1.2 times. On the other hand for mothers' employment, compared to student with mother who is full-time employment, the student with mother who was housewife is less likely to drop out. After other factors were control, the risk of dropout is different twice times among them. In addition, it is also remarkable point that the modes of employment and the risk of dropout are not a significantly related among students with mothers who are working. Given that the living condition at 15 years old and fathers' occupation did not have a significant effect in model 7, this effect of mothers' educational year and employment status shows the importance of mothers' role on child care or support of school life rather than the effect of birth year focused on bearing cost of higher education.

Table 2: Results of the Logistic Regression Analyses

	model 1	model 2	model 3	model 4
	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)
constant	.050	.093	.250	.102
SSM	.869	.819	.767	1.025 †
born in 1973-1986	.911	.987	1.041	
male	1.800 **	1.771 **	1.824 **	
father's occupation (ref. lower nonmanual)				
upper nonmanual		1.018	1.015	
manual		1.151	1.104	
father's years of schooling		.942	1.006	
living condition at the age 15		1.015	1.058	
mother's years of schooling			.495 **	
mother's employment status (ref. full-time worker)				
no jobs/housewives			.876 **	
part-time worker			.729	
self-employed, family worker, etc.			1.472	
self-reported grade at the age 15				.858 **
educational aspiration (ref. four-year university)				
junior high/high school				1.191 †
higher education except for university				.834 †
no aspirations				1.737 **
Cox&Snell R ²	.005	.007	.013	.005
-2loglikelihood	1056.147	1050.792	1036.844	1056.585
AIC	1064.147	1066.792	1060.844	1068.585
N			2356	

note: † $p < .1$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed test)

Table 2: (cont.)

	model 5 Exp(B)	model 6 Exp(B)	model 7 Exp(B)
constant	.297	.024	.110
SSM	.822	1.248	1.054
born in 1973-1986	1.016		1.027
male	1.828 **		1.542 †
father's occupation (ref. lower nonmanual)			
upper nonmanual	1.035		1.028
manual	1.118		1.101
father's years of schooling	1.014		1.022
living condition at the age 15	1.068		1.052
mother's years of schooling	.871 *		.875 *
mother's employment status (ref. full-time worker)			
no jobs/housewives	.508 *		.522 *
part-time worker	.892		.933
self-employed, family worker, etc.	.749		.761
self-reported grade at the age 15	.879		.944
educational aspiration (ref. four-year university)			
junior high/high school	1.030		.983
higher education except for university	.998		.907
no aspirations	1.673 *		1.566 †
types of higher education (ref. national/public university)			
private school		1.897 *	1.686
junior colleges, technical colleges		1.078	1.024
vocational school		4.154 **	3.036 **
department (ref. humanities)			
social science		1.319	1.075
science, engineering and agriculture		1.777 *	1.419
medical science		.885	.899
commercial, domestic science, art		1.462	1.506
<hr/>			
Cox&Snell R ²	.016	.014	.024
-2loglikelihood	1029.161	1034.589	1010.080
AIC	1061.161	1052.569	1056.080
N		2356	

note: † $p < .1$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed test)

The third point is the effect of educational aspirations. In model 5, the effect of aspirations lower than four-year college disappears. The reason for this is because educational aspiration is explained by the respondents' social origins. When an aspiration was not formed, however, the effect is significant in model 7. People who did not decide their future at 15 are 1.6 times more likely to drop out than people who wanted to go to college or graduate from school at that age.

We also found a relation between vocational school students and the risk of dropout. In model 7, the absolute value of the regression coefficient for the vocational school dummy is the largest. Compared to college students, vocational school students' dropout risk is three times higher. With other factors controlled, we suggest there is due to the environment and the vocational school system, or other factors not included in the analysis, and so might influence vocational school student dropouts.

As for comparing the fit of the models, the best fit is seen model 7 (full-model) based on AIC. Given that the regression coefficient for the vocational school dummy is the largest in model 7 when compared to model 3 (only acquisition factors), model 4 (only innate factors) and model 6 (external circumstance factors), the AIC of model 6 is the smallest. Therefore, we expect external circumstances to lead to a greater risk of drop out than the effects of individual acquisition and

innate factors. On the other hand, when mother factors were injected, the AIC decreased greatly (from model 2 to model 3). Given that the AIC of model 3(only innate factors) is less than model 5(individual factors), the absolute value of the regression coefficient for the housewife dummy is the largest in model 5 and the absolute value of the regression coefficient is large following the vocational school, so the effect of mothers is important.

Comparing Dropout Determinants Between Birth Cohorts

Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regression using two groupings: the 1935 to 1972 birth cohort and the 1973 to 1986 birth cohort. We will use only model 7 in these last sections, because we want to make sure the differences in effects can be assessed.

Table 3: Birth Cohort Comparison of the Logistic Regression Analysis Results

	birth year	
	1935-1972 Exp(B)	1973-1986 Exp(B)
constant	.038	.058
SSM	.707	1.863 †
male	2.755 **	1.009
father's occupation (ref. lower nonmanual)		
upper nonmanual	1.054	.992
manual	1.245	.956
father's years of schooling	.973	1.130 †
living condition at the age 15	1.206	.924
mother's years of schooling	.870 †	.878
mother's employment status (ref. full-time worker)		
no jobs/housewives	.668	.465 *
part-time worker	1.718	.568 †
self-employed, family worker, etc.	1.090	.467 †
self-reported grade at the age 15	1.110	.790 †
educational aspiration (ref. four-year university)		
junior high/high school	1.271	0.612
higher education except for university	1.605	.464
no aspirations	1.778 †	1.173
types of higher education (ref. national/public university)		
private school	1.503	1.849
junior colleges, technical colleges	.676	1.638
vocational school	2.124	4.283 *
department (ref. humanities)		
social science	1.112	1.093
science, engineering and agriculture	1.357	1.604
medical science	0.734	1.094
commercial, domestic science, art	3.014 *	.817
<hr/>		
Cox&Snell R ²	.045	.028
-2loglikelihood	525.688	452.370
AIC	569.688	496.370
N	1246	1110

note: † $p < .1$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed test)

The first point to note is the effect of the male dummy. When the sample is divided by cohort, the male dummy that always has a significant effect does not affect the recent cohort. From this, the

result of the effect as a whole might be influenced by the old cohort. Thus, differences in sex do not have an effect on the likelihood of dropping out at the present time.

Next point is the effect of parents' education and mothers' modes of employment. In the older cohort, a higher score for the mothers' time in school is likely to reduce the probability of dropping out. In the recent cohort, however, the relation is no longer found, instead, fathers' time in school has a significant effect. Moreover, the increase in fathers' time in school influences the ease at which people dropout. When the fathers' years in school increase by one year, the probability of dropping out increases 1.1 times. On the other hand, for mothers' employment statuses, there is no significant difference in the dropout rate for the older cohort, but a significant difference in the recent cohort, where students with mothers who are in full-time employment have the highest dropout rate.

The third point is the effect of aspirations. In the older cohort, the effect of aspiration is not formed, so is significant at only a 10% level, but in the recent cohort, there is no effect. Instead, the self-reported grade at 15 years-old has a significant effect at a 10% level. If it increases one step, the probability of dropout decreases about 1.3 times. This may suggest where a student goes to university, as this is determined by the academic grade. This is because the variance in quality or substance of higher education influences whether someone graduates or not. It could also be that the aspiration is determined by the record.

Finally, we can confirm the largest absolute discipline value for the logistic regression coefficients (B) in the two models. In the old cohort, it is "commercial science, domestic science, art", and in the more recent cohort group it is the 'vocational school' dummy. In both cohorts, the effects of external factors are greater than the individual, innate factors, or the acquisition factors, at age 15.

Discussion

In this study, we verified what factors affect the decision to dropout using individual level datasets. The results of the logistic regression show that environmental factors have the most significant influence, and in particular attending professional training colleges. However, even if controlling for the effects of acquired factors, the mother's years in schooling and employment status have a significant effect. This suggests the possibility that the risk of dropout depends on innate factors.

Here we would like to interpret the findings regarding each factor within the hypotheses. First is the innate factors. About gender gap, the hypothesis that the effect of gender would go after controlling for school type was not supported, but the hypothesis that the effect of gender would go when the sample was split into cohorts was supported. Furthermore, the effect of social origins was supported partially, that is, whether the possibility of committing to higher education is influenced by the difference in education by background. However, on this, the meaning of dropping out may change depending on whether the fathers' or mothers' years in schooling have the most influence. On the other hand, the difference in dropout risk due to economic status was found only for the "junior college, technical college" category. Moreover, the meaning of dropout here was seen as positive; in order to have the chance of obtain more desirable higher education. As a result, the hypothesis was not supported. About the effect of mothers' employment status, the hypothesis was supported

approximately. A difference in dropout rates was found between those whose mothers were in full-time employment, rather than between working mother and no-working mother children. The result also identified a number of mothers who could not correspond, because they have the burden of a job and supporting the children's school life.

About the acquisition factors, the results show the effect of recode at 15 years, and here the effect of educational aspiration was different from the hypothesis. The effect of a recode at 15 years-old remains only when the school type is controlled(3), because the recode determined the aspiration levels, meaning the school type depended on the aspiration. Therefore, the hypothesis may be supported roughly. One interesting point is that the recode directly determined the risk of dropout.

About the circumstance factors, the effect of school type was not supported; only at the vocational school was there a significant risk of dropping out. From this, there might be a mechanism that is not explained; such as scale or diversity. In addition, we should note that the dropout mechanism was changed by interaction of circumstance factors and individual factors, because the variables that had an effect on each school were different. The direct effect of birth cohort was not found. That is, if students had the same condition, the risk of dropout did not depend on the cohort. This is different from the hypothesis. On the other hand, the variables that had an effect were different between cohorts; the condition that increased the risk of dropout was different between cohorts.

As mentioned above, today, the effect of social stratification cannot be ignored in studies of educational achievement in Japan. However, from the point of view of the dropping out, it is said to have no significant effect, or the effect cannot be validated.

In this study, we examined determinants by using national survey datasets under the hypothesis that one's social stratification would affect the decision whether to drop out or not. The result proved the effect of that; the first study in Japan to verify this.

Considering the results, that circumstances at age 15, or the occupation of the respondent's father does not have a significant effect, there seemed to be no difference in terms of the risk of dropping out from financial aspects of socio-economic status. However, it is not so simple, because factors which can be affected by social stratification, such as grades or educational aspiration at age 15, contribute to dropping out. Results suggest the possibility that the institution of higher education which one enters varies by socio-economic status of the student, and that this determines whether the student can graduate.

Primarily, the risk of dropping out varies according to parents' years in schooling. In other words, it impacts the child's level of affinity for higher education, including the importance of higher education for each student's aspirations. Moreover, the effect of the mother's years in schooling are explored by Kikkawa (2009). So, from the point of view of education for children, the difference is more serious than that for financial aspects.

From these results, one can see sufficient evidence of the influence of social stratification on dropout rates. Specifically, this study shows the existence of cultural differences in terms of receiving

education related to social stratification, and the possibility that cultural reproduction can explain more about the education gap in Japan, more so than Furuta(2011), who prefers to use a rational choice model to explain why the education gap still exists in Japan, even since World War II, because cultural reproduction or the presence of conflict among several social groups, does not present itself in actuality.

In the research area of education attainment analysis, there is an assumption that people who graduate from an institution of higher education are the same as when they entered. Therefore, whether freshmen can achieve the goal of graduation or not has not been studied. However, the gap is more serious than ever thought, because there is a difference in possibility as to whether one can graduate or not, even if everyone who enters an institution of higher education appears the same. In other words, there is a gap in the two phases of educational achievement: the first is whether one can enter the institution or not, and the second is whether one can graduate or not. Fortunately, the results also show that the effect of environmental factors is the most significant, suggesting that controlling the environment can close the gap and the risk of dropping out.

When we analyzed by cohort, the effect of the mothers' years in schooling disappeared, but the fathers' years in schooling had a significant effect on the risk of dropping out. This might suggest a change in the meaning of dropping out. More specifically, the result may have been due to the acceptance of a "positive dropout" by the father from higher educated. Hersog (2005) also showed that students from middle class backgrounds tend to move to different higher schools, and this trend may expand in the future. Furthermore, there was a difference in the risk of dropping out between students with the mother acting as a housewife and working. From this, we have already described the increased burden for working mothers with children, linked to social advancement. In addition, it is interesting to note that the effect of aspirations disappeared and the effect of recoding at 15 years had a direct effect on whether choosing to drop out or not. From this, "the aspiration not formed" might be equal to "wish to go to college or graduate school." In other words, the aspiration is determined by the recoding automatically. Thus, the direct effect of recoding at 15 years is observed only when the school type is controlled, because the risk of dropout is different by school type, which is determined by aspirations.

Our suggestions for preventing people in Japan from dropping out of university or college are as follows:

The results of our analyses show that the risk of dropping out is higher if students do not have any aspirations. If students decide their school only based on grades, they show less willingness to enter. Hence, to avoid dropouts, it is important to examine those aspects which impact behavior in addition to grades; for example, whether the school environment motivates the student to attend, whether the system supports the students' studies, and whether the traditions of the school are suitable for making friends.

After students enter school, it is important for them to make friends by attending lectures or getting involved in club activities, because this will make them think twice about dropping out. In other words, friends help people attend and commit to the school.

Children should be encouraged to consider what they want to be and what they should do to achieve that prior to the age of 15, because aspirations at this age influence the decisions made to drop out or not later. There is a need to consider the ways this can be achieved and for parents to confirm the best choice for their children. To enhance their aspirations to undertake higher education will help lower the risk of dropping out.

Students with mothers working full-time are at a higher risk of dropping out; working mothers are extremely busy due to the need to balance both housekeeping and work. Hence, to avoid children dropping out, it is important that both mothers and fathers do housework and raise the children together, in an equal manner. The significance of the mother's time in school suggests mothers, not fathers, play an important role on raising their children. However, from the above it is clear that there is a need for fathers to cooperate with the mothers when raising their children from when they are infants. In addition, fathers should be able to communicate with their children anytime, to support them with behavioral aspects.

To decrease the number of students dropping out, it is necessary to deal with a variety of student needs through cooperation with schools and other institutions, as this should reduce the number of people who enter school unwillingly. Cooperation between faculties and across institutions nearby, and announcing such cooperation to students, is also important. In addition, setting targets to have more students attend lectures, and encouraging student participation in club activities while freshmen, will help them make friends. In other words, indirect approaches may be more effective at preventing students from dropping out, helping their self-esteem and promoting closer relations among students, rather than a direct approach such as forcing them to attend lectures.

The latest dropout analysis to use national survey data in Japan is by Maruyama, in 1984, so such studies have not been undertaken for almost a quarter of a century. Hence, one of the most important findings of this study is the need to assess the current theory on school dropout rates by carrying out further studies.

Individuals' features were also used as an independent variable in this analysis. However, subjective factors such as commitment were not measured in this dataset, and these are considered some of the most important determinants of dropout rates. As a result, this study lacks such an analysis. In addition, there is a need to take into account longitudinal processes in future research work (Chen and DesJardins 2006), such as considering key events and the stages at which these events occur, or distinguishing stop-outs from dropouts. Methodological limits imposed by the lack of suitable datasets regarding dropout rates reveals the low level of interest in higher education issues and the lack of research into dropout rates in Japan as a whole.

Acknowledgements

The data for this secondary analysis, the Japanese Life course Panel Survey datasets (depositor: ISS panel survey project, University of Tokyo) was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Center for Social Research and Data Archives, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. We are also grateful for the 2005 SSM data management committee to give us permission for using the 2005 SSM-J dataset.

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Local Responses and Changing Policies in Japan: Transnational Workers from Southeast Asia

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Prepared for presentation at the 2014 Meeting of the Asia Pacific Sociological Association, Chiang Mai. An improved version of this presentation is published as "Health-care Work in Globalization: News Reports on Care Worker Migration to Japan" in 2016 from the *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 25(1): 7-26. Please direct correspondence to Chika Shinohara, 1-1 Manabino Izumi, Osaka 594-1198 JAPAN (shinohc@andrew.ac.jp). I thank Koichi Hasegawa and Yoshiaki Nemoto for support of this project. I also thank Median Mutiara, Shiho Sawai, Sayamol Charoenratana, Itsuki Saio, and Risa Kitamura for their assistance with various aspects of this research. This research was supported by grants from the Center of Social Welfare Promotion and National Examination and Japan Center for Economic Research.

Abstract

Since 2008, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) has initiated healthcare worker migration from Indonesia and the Philippines to Japan. Soon, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian societies are expected to follow the two countries. Along with the new policy and social change, what issues have arisen and been reported in Japan? How do different groups of Japanese understand healthcare work and worker migration from Indonesia and other Southeast Asian societies? Drawing on analyses of Japanese national news reports on the transnational care workers, this paper introduces how this social change affected by globalization shapes related policies and local cultural understanding toward a new social issue. The healthcare worker candidates from Southeast Asia to Japan are required to acquire the Japanese language and pass the national examinations within a particular period to continue working in the country. National news reporting toward the transnational care work began growing as local responses to the actual challenges experienced by Southeast Asian and Japanese health care workers. As time goes, Japanese tend to respond negatively to the issue; however, they intend to face cultural challenges, slowly making changes in the language and license examination policies. This project pays particular attention to the social issue construction and policy institutionalization processes in globalization and around EPA care workers from Indonesia to Japan. The contribution of this study is to understand how a national context, affected by globalization and local problems, such as rapid aging and expected care worker shortages, constructs and transforms social policy and culture toward an emerging issue.

Keywords: Globalization, social change, transnational worker, law

Introduction

The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) has initiated healthcare worker migration from Indonesia and the Philippines to Japan since 2008. Vietnam is starting its healthcare worker migration to Japan in 2014. Soon other Southeast Asian societies are expected to follow these countries. Along with the new policy and social change, what issues have arisen and been reported in Japan? How do different groups of Japanese understand healthcare work and worker migration from Indonesia and other Southeast Asian societies? And how have the EPA care worker policy arranged and changed over time? Drawing on analyses of Japanese national news reports on the transnational care workers, this paper introduces how this social change affected by globalization shapes related policies and local cultural understanding toward a new social issue.

The EPA care workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam do not start working immediately after arrival in Japan. They are healthcare worker “candidates” from Southeast Asia to Japan and are required to acquire the Japanese language and pass the national examinations within a particular period to continue working in the country. Japanese national news reporting toward the transnational care work began growing as local society responded to the actual challenges experienced by Southeast Asian and Japanese health care workers. This social policy change, due largely to globalization of economy, initiated people in Japan to not only accept nurses and elderly care workers from Southeast Asia, but also encounter accompanying issues, problems, and new socio-cultural challenges. As time goes, Japanese tend to respond negatively to the issue for the economic cost; however, they intend to face cultural challenges, slowly making changes in the language and license examination policies. This project pays particular attention to the social issue construction and policy institutionalization processes in globalization and around EPA care workers from Southeast Asia to Japan. The contribution of this study is to understand how a national context, affected by globalization and local problems constructs and transforms social policy and culture toward an emerging issue.

Policy and Culture in a Japanese Context: Growing Economic Partnership Agreements

A growing number of countries and economic regions in the world have initiated economic partnership and free trade agreements (EPAs and FTAs); Japan is not an exception. By July 2013, Japan had already signed and started EPAs and FTAs with 13 countries/regions where most of them are in Southeast Asia (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). And it had also been in negotiation for such agreements with 10 countries/regions (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). Japan signed EPAs with the majority of Southeast Asian countries, such as with Singapore in 2002, Malaysia in 2006, Thailand in 2007, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines in 2008, and Vietnam in 2009. Of those, with each Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, Japan has a bilateral agreement about their healthcare worker candidates migrating to Japan for care work. Although Japan does not officially accept “worker migrations”, health care worker “candidates” and other “student” workers from Asia now officially enter the country for the purpose of learning and acquiring professional skills.

Japanese Local Responses and Changing Policies toward EPA Care Workers

This is a sea change. Japan, reluctant to immigration and such legal change, now accepts international healthcare workers at a small number of hospitals and elderly care institutions. As a fastest aging society in the world and with one of the longest life expectancies on average, Japan apparently need to prepare for the near-future shortages of nurses and elderly care workers. Although more women in Japan are now in employed, the majority of working women in Japan quit their jobs upon marriage or the first pregnancy. Nursing and elderly care are gendered jobs that the vast majority of such professionals are women. This also affects Japan's shortage of healthcare workers within the country. Along with such changes, Japan's national policy and social culture have started transforming and accepting healthcare workers from Southeast Asia.

Therefore, the theoretical research question for this paper is; how do policy and culture toward transnational workers change over time? To be specific, what are the Japanese policies like toward migrant healthcare workers from Southeast Asia? How does society respond to the change? How are they changing over time? This paper theoretically explores the questions and provides policy descriptions, case stories, and news reporting trends on the new social transformation.

The EPA Care Worker Policy: Japan's Official Stance with Migrant Care Workers

Japan signs a bilateral agreement with each country it receives care workers from. Currently, as part of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), Japan has launched its migrant care worker agreement with Indonesia (2008), the Philippines (2009), and Vietnam (2014) (Japanese Ministry of Welfare, Health, and Labor 2012, 2013, 2014). These three countries send agreed numbers of nurses and elderly care workers to Japan each year. For instance, Japan started its discussion meetings for EPA since 2005. When it started, the Philippines had already begun its EPA discussions with Japan including their plan to dispatch their nurses to Japan. Indonesia, learning about the plan between Japan and the Philippines, demanded Japan to accept nurses and elderly care workers from Indonesia (reported in Yomiuri Shimbun Newspaper April 14, 2005). With Thailand, where Japan already signed and launched EPA in 2007, Japan has not yet begun accepting care workers. Yet, Japan-Thailand EPA discussion meeting reports include the migrations of elderly care and spa therapist workers as future possibilities (Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2013). Thus, migrant EPA care workers and their candidates to Japan come from a variety of ASEAN societies with different historical, religious, and cultural backgrounds.

Japan's official policy, for accepting healthcare workers from Southeast Asia, is due to enhance economic exchange under EPA, not because of its shortage or future shortage of care workers within the country. The Southeast Asian care workers go to Japan to study the language and its advanced medical and care knowledge. Care worker candidates are required to take the Japanese language training for the first six months of arrival in Japan to learn the communicative Japanese language for care work. And they are required to acquire the Japanese language and pass top levels of Japanese language examinations for non-native speakers. In addition, the care workers are required to pass their professional skill examinations in Japanese, either nursing or elderly caring, within agreed years (4-5 years) of their stay in Japan. Nurse candidates, for instance, are already licensed at home, have two years or more work experience as nurse before arriving at Japan. Elderly care worker candidates are already licensed nurses at home or studied equivalent healthcare for three to four years before arriving at Japan. Hence, healthcare worker candidates from Southeast Asia arrive in Japan with their

professional licenses from home countries. And then, after arrival they study the language and professional knowledge to pass the Japanese examinations as they work as “candidates” at hospitals and elderly care institutions for additional years. The migrant healthcare worker policy in Japan is, therefore, demanding and time-consuming one.

Southeast Asian EPA Care Workers and Candidates to Japan

Until 2013, Japan has accepted the total of 892 healthcare workers and candidates (392 nurses and 500 elderly care workers) from Indonesia (Japanese Ministry of Welfare, Health, and Labor 2012). Table 1 shows the changes in numbers since 2008. The first year in 2008, 104 nurses and 104 elderly care workers, thus, the total of 208 healthcare worker candidates arrived in Japan. The number grew to the total of 362 from Indonesia in 2009. Following years showed declines in the numbers of migrant worker candidates (Table 1). Of those arriving in Japan, all nurse candidates and 99% (7/500 candidates) of elderly care candidates were required to take the Japanese language training after arrival. After the language training, the candidates work at hospitals, clinics, and elderly care institutions as they improve their language skills and study for their license examinations. Upon passing the license examinations for nursing or elderly caring within the agreed years (4-5 years), they obtain official work visa to continue working as professionals in Japan.

However, in reality EPA healthcare worker candidates from Southeast Asia face a number of obstacles in the Japanese language and culture. The Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 also affected the living and decision-making of the candidates (Ohara-Hirano 2012). Such challenges have been reported by the national and international media. According to the Japanese Ministry of Welfare, Health, and Labor (2013), of the EPA healthcare worker candidates including both from Indonesia and the Philippines only three (1.2%) nurse candidates passed the national license examination (total applicants were 254) in 2010. In 2011, 16 passed out of 398 (4%). And in 2012, 47 (11.3%) passed out of 415. All the nurse candidates from Indonesia and the Philippines were already professional nurses back home having more than two years of work experience as nurses. Their success rates of the nursing examination among Southeast Asian candidates are extremely low, considering their professional background and over 90% of Japanese passing the nursing examination. Likewise, the much lower rates of the elderly care worker candidates from Southeast Asia pass the national license examination. Around 60% of Japanese (76% women, 24% men) qualified the elderly care specialist examination while only 38% of Indonesian and the Filipino candidates passed the same examination in 2012.

For Japan while this is the first time after the Second World War to accept a large number of healthcare workers from abroad, Indonesia, for example, has been dispatching their nurses to Saudi Arabia (1,200 nurses), Kuwait (700), Malaysia (200), the Netherland (107), Singapore (17), the United States (12), and Norway (10) (Data from 2009, Indonesian Ministry of Health 2011). Therefore, for Indonesian healthcare workers Japan is one of the few options in which some of them are more familiar to them culturally and religiously. For Filipino nurses, too, Japan is only one of the few countries they can choose to work. And among many of these options, Japan is perhaps the harder, if not the hardest, to work as they need to learn the Japanese language and pass the license examination in the language.

Table 1: Nurse and Elderly Care Worker Candidates from Indonesia to Japan 2008-2012

Data: Ministry of Welfare, Health, and Labor 2012

Years	Nurses	Elderly Care Workers	Total
2008	104	104(3)*	208(3)
2009	173	189(1)	362(1)
2010	39	77(2)	116(2)
2011	47	58(1)	105(1)
2012	29	72	101(1)
Grant Total	392	500(7)	892(7)

*The numbers in () are those who are exempt from the required 6-month-language training due to their high enough Japanese language skills (Level N2 or higher). For instance, in 2008, of 104 elderly care worker candidates, exempt ones are three and the remaining 101 candidates had lower Japanese language abilities.

Theoretical Possibilities for Local Responses

As the success rates for the license examinations have been extremely low, the Japanese Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Labor and scholars have begun investigating the healthcare workers and their work conditions. The Ministry in particular responded to the challenges in the license examination questions that they allowed inserting phonetic writings on hard-to-read Chinese characters and English translations of symptoms and illnesses. They also extended one additional year of stay in Japan for the candidates so that they can take the license examination again with a hope that the feeling of inequality among migrant healthcare worker candidates from Southeast Asia to be diminished. In addition, journalists have started reporting the voices of the Southeast Asian care workers and Japanese medical staff who work with the migrant workers. Yet, the majority of healthcare worker candidates from Indonesia and the Philippines ended up leaving Japan by the end of their contract between 2008 and 2012 (reported with a chart on March 14, 2013 by the Asahi Shimbun Newspaper).

How do local Japanese policy and culture toward transnational workers respond to each other over time? How are policy and culture, thus local responses, changing over time? We can hypothesize that H₁) the effect of globalization, H₂) economic benefits, and H₃) gendered work-family traditions shape local responses to the migration of healthcare workers from Southeast Asia.

H₁) Globalization of economy and culture could affect local responses to the healthcare worker issue, shaping the Japanese response more toward the global standard. Japanese government ministries and medial organizations, as well as individual workers, gradually accept migrant workers making changes in their institutional and individual practices.

H₂) Economic costs and benefits could form the outcomes of migrant workers. If migrant healthcare workers from Southeast Asia are cost efficient for Japan and Japanese medical institutions, the number of such workers would grow and migrant workers would be accepted locally.

H₃) Gendered work-family traditions and expectations in Japan could shape the Japanese local responses to migrant workers. As Japanese women nurses and elderly care workers quit their work upon marriage and first pregnancy, migrant healthcare workers are accepted in place for such openings.


This is still on-going research; yet, the following summarizes news reporting on migrant healthcare workers from Southeast Asia between 2005 and 2013.

Newspaper Reporting on EPA, Care, and Exams - Indonesia

This study examined national newspaper reporting as a representation of social response to the migrant worker issue. I chose the top two largest subscribed national newspapers in Japan, Yomiuri (over 10 million subscription per morning in 2012) and Asahi (over 7.6 million subscription per morning in 2012) Shimbun Newspapers, for this project. I searched articles with keywords such as nursing, care, Indonesia, EPA...etc. and counted them to see the overall trends of article appearances. I also grouped article contents by story type and changes over time. In particular, cultural adaptations, language abilities, and license examinations are the major concerns of the migrant healthcare workers and received much attention, this project collected data focusing on the issues. News reporting on the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Southeast Asia started appearing from 2002 in Yomiuri Shimbun Newspaper and in 2003 in Asahi Shimbun Newspaper (Figure 1 and Figure 2). As part of EPA, articles on migrant healthcare workers from Indonesia appeared in 2005 for the first time. Overall, the number of articles reporting migrant healthcare workers from Indonesia increased in the year EPA was launched (2008). I will report details of the news-reporting on the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Southeast Asia.

Figure 1: Yomiuri Newspaper Article Counts

Figure 2: Asahi Newspaper Article Counts



These national newspaper articles report certain types of stories and information at different time periods. In Japanese national news reporting, the contents of articles showed at least seven different stories and information types. And overall, they tend to inform migrant healthcare workers and their issues negatively such that they experience language and cultural challenges. I typed such articles from Type A through G. A) simply reporting information, B) global contributions, and Japan's role in the world, C) Japan's problems, D) EPA candidates' living experiences, E) language and license examinations – contents, policy, and informing the processes, F) teaching Indonesian and Muslim cultures, and G) others. At the beginning, A) simple reporting articles were dominant; yet C) Japan's problems and E) exam related issue articles grew as EPA's migrant healthcare worker began arriving in Japan. Compared to these, Indonesian news reporting show much more positive stories and types of contents on their migrant care workers going to Japan and work (not shown details here but research conducted by Median Mutiara). Nevertheless, the newspaper reporting both in Japan and Indonesia shared their much interest in the language and license examination issues. These tell how much social attention is paid toward examinations. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show newspaper articles on EPA healthcare workers and examinations including words such as Indonesia, EPA, Care, Nurse, and Exams. My presentation will report how such articles tell stories on exam related issues.

Figure 3:

Yomiuri Newspaper Article Counts/Exams





Figure 4:

Asahi Newspaper Article Counts/Exams



Interviews with Specialists

In addition to the analyses of national news reporting on migrant healthcare workers from Southeast Asia, I also conducted interviews with specialists of the issue in Japan and in Indonesia in 2012-2013. The interviews were semi-structured individual questioning with scholars who study discriminations, immigration, foreign policies, international exchange, and language educators and non-profit organization activists. A number of issues were raised in the interviews with Japanese specialists; yet, two major common points shared by the majority were 1) stratifications within/among native and migrant healthcare workers would emerge in Japan, and 2) expectations toward migrant healthcare workers and problems they face. The same interviews were conducted in Indonesia. 1) Japan was a country where many would dream to go with high expectations in general. For nurses and care worker candidates, Japan was one of the few choices for migrating to work. And 2) such healthcare workers from Indonesia would tend to have lower “rights” consciousness than those from the Philippines. This means that the history of dispatching nurses and other workers is longer for the Philippines than for Indonesia. Thus, due to the history and also to the language, Filipino workers have more opportunities to access information from Euro-American cultures including worker’s rights related issues. I will report the summary of interviews in my presentation.

Conclusion

Drawing on analyses of Japanese national news reports on the transnational care workers, this paper introduced how this social change affected by globalization shaped related policies and local cultural understanding toward a new social issue. The EPA care workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam did not start working immediately after arrival in Japan. They were healthcare worker “candidates” and were required to acquire the Japanese language and pass the national examinations within 4-5 years in order to continue working in the country. Japanese national news reporting toward the transnational care work began growing in 2008 as local responses to the actual challenges were experienced by Southeast Asian and Japanese health care workers. This social policy change, due largely to globalization of economy, initiated people in Japan to accept nurses and elderly care workers from Southeast Asia. It also introduced accompanying issues, problems, and new socio-cultural challenges to local society. As the policy started, Japanese tended to respond negatively to the issue due to the economic cost; however, interestingly they also intend to face cultural challenges, slowly making changes in the language and license examination policies. This project paid particular attention to the social issue construction and policy institutionalization processes in globalization and around EPA care workers from Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, to Japan. This study contributed to understand how a national context, affected by globalization and local problems constructed and transformed social policy and culture toward an emerging issue.

An improved version of this presentation is published as follows (please cite the following paper):

Shinohara, Chika. 2016. Health-care Work in Globalization: News Reports on Care Worker Migration to Japan. *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 25(1), 7-26.

Government Data Sources

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). *Nichi-Indonesia Keizairenkei* (Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement) on the Homepage of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2011. Retrieved on May 1, 2013 from http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/fta/j_asean/indonesia/index.html.

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Health Care Services Trade Liberalization in Southeast Asia: Prospects and Challenges

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Introduction

Today, economic, political, cultural and social integration of nation-states in the world is highly evident. This increasing interconnectedness of these societies can be attributed to globalization, which does not only eliminate the concept of space between societies but also increases interdependence due to the web connecting them to each other. This connection heightens their interaction especially in terms of economic activities. Globalization paves way to the creation of intertwined market where goods and services are being exchanged. This exchange is made possible by bilateral and multilateral agreements between nation states. Countries and their people become less and less bounded by physical territory and distance. Stringent trade policies have been replaced with policies that lessen, or in some cases, totally eliminate trade barriers. As a result, products and services are now easily exchanged among countries covered by various trade liberalization agreements.

In the advent of the 21st century, countries within Southeast Asia highly associated economic development with trade liberalization (Chandra, 2010), thus creating policies that would facilitate greater mobility of products and services produced by member states. This made Southeast Asia one of the most economically open regions in the world. The region is not only a member of World Trade Organization (WTO), but it has also created numerous regional trade liberalization policies like ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) in addition to ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), Bilateral Free Trade Agreement (BFTA) and Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement (BEPA). Aside from these, each country within the region also has their own bilateral and multilateral agreement with countries outside the Southeast Asia to further push the liberalization of trade in their country.

Although, trade liberalization in the region started with the idea of lessening the trade barriers among exported and imported goods, today, services sector of the economy is already among its priority. This sector plays a crucial role not only in binding countries within the region, but also in integrating the region to the global market. Trade liberalization made a remarkable impact not just on the progress and development of the country, but also to the welfare of the people. However, not all impacts of such process may be beneficial for all, but it has undeniably opened opportunities to people and countries to uplift their social and economic status by presenting employment opportunities and better access to commodities. Health care services is among the services that have been liberalized, and it is also listed as one of the most in demand services both within the region of Southeast Asia and outside the ASEAN. It is significant

contribution to the GDP of most countries in the region is also apparent (ASEAN Secretariat, n.d.).⁷⁹ However, the question of how liberalized the health sector in the region and how much liberalization policies helped facilitate the mobility of health care providers in Southeast Asia are the main queries of this paper.

In connection with the foregoing argument, this paper offers a discussion on trade policy in health care service in Southeast Asia and reviews existing patterns of trade and its impact. Furthermore, this paper aims at the following specific objectives, a) identify the existing regional policies on health care service trade and assess the progress of various policies, b) present the current trend in health care service trade in Southeast Asia, as well as determine the provider and receiver countries of medical workers, and lastly, c) present the effects of health care trade in the region.

Health Care Matters in Southeast Asia

People are the foundation of the society. They comprise all sectors and are responsible in making the society function, but for them to be able to do so, they need to be equipped with knowledge, motivation and they must be functional to realize their full potential as well as the full potential of the society. With this, good health care becomes vital in the social and economic development of the country. Good health is fundamental in having healthy members of the society which is essential to attain a sustainable progress by ensuring the productivity and quality of the people.⁸⁰

In a region like Southeast Asia where countries are not all affluent, equitable health care is among the pressing issues that are continuously being addressed. Access to health care varies significantly among countries which is influenced by social, political and economic conditions of the country, and such differences in access to good health care cut across groups, gender and individuals such as between rich and poor in developing country.⁸¹ Another factor that influences access to health care in most countries in the region is the health policies and programs. Each country has their own health care plan for their population that is usually aligned towards the goal of having a healthy citizenry.

Countries in Southeast Asia designed their health care system to address the internal need for health care of their people, thus most of them did not include policies or programs on mobility of health care professional outside their country, or accepting health care professional from other country.⁸² Programs on mobility of health practitioners are not seen as the primary tool to have equitable health care.

However, according to the World Health Organization, an adequately-paid workforce is one

⁷⁹ The service sector in Southeast Asia accounts to 40-50% of the total gross domestic product of most countries in the region.

⁸⁰ Availability of health care, access to health care and economic development of the country are directly related to each other. Wide access to health care creates healthy citizen who then become a productive member of the society responsible in developing the country.

⁸¹ This situation is more visible in the rural areas wherein most of the time health care services are not even available to them.

⁸² However, in countries wherein plans on mobility of health practitioner has been included, very little attention is given to his because this is not the top concern of the health administrators of the country

of the key factors to have an equitable healthcare. This will hold medical practitioners to deliver services to their home country instead of working abroad and leaving their country short-handed of medical professionals. Massive outflow of healthcare professionals is one of the obstacles in attaining equitable health care in the region, especially in developing countries.

Healthcare and Economic Development

Good quality of health services available for the people in a country plays significant roles not only in human development but also in the economic development of a country. People in a prime health condition fuel the development of the country. However, several factors complicate the access to health services. Economic progress of a country is one factor that highly influences the type of healthcare available in the area. More often than not, developed countries tend to lavish more stable and better quality health services as compared to that of developing and poor countries. Furthermore, the rise in per capita income of the citizen and the country as a whole influences the allocated amount of money spent on healthcare. In most of the studies conducted (Arunanondchai & Fink 2005; Bardak, 2005; Stilwell, 2003), these two variables are directly related to each other.⁸³ This trend is quite evident among affluent Southeast Asian countries, for instance Singapore and the wealthy middle class in Malaysia and Thailand. On the other hand, less well-off countries continue to fret about the availability of healthcare rather than the quality of health services provided in their areas. These countries constantly encounter the problem of excessive demand for health services due to the shortage of supply of healthcare professionals. Sometimes, the shortage does not automatically reflect less number of medical workers produced in the country, rather it signifies the movement of healthcare service providers to other countries.

Despite the problematic effects of the professional mobility, international community developed an increasing appreciation on movement of professional for it facilitates the transfer of financial and social capital through financial resources, technological advancement, etc. (ADB, 2005; Bardak, 2005; Stilwell, 2003). The trade in healthcare services is an important phenomenon in the region since many of its members are major providers of health professionals not only within the region but outside ASEAN as well.

ASEAN Countries and the Production of Medical Professionals⁸⁴


Although, not all ASEAN countries produce large number of healthcare professionals, the region still houses the countries with the highest ratio of medical worker per capita (countries like the Philippines deploys medical practitioners who generate large amount of money out of their profession). According to Arunanondchai and Fink (2005) and Zimmermann (2011), Southeast Asian countries are either consumer or producer of healthcare services. Philippines and Indonesia are considered major exporters of healthcare professionals for they are among highest producers of healthcare professionals in the region (Mikic, 2007). On the other hand Singapore and Brunei are considered importers of healthcare professionals despite the volume of local production of health care professionals (Arunanondchai & Fink, 2005).

⁸³ An increase in income of the individual also increases consumption and demand for health services as in the case of Malaysia and Singapore

⁸⁴ This discussion does not factor in volume of undocumented healthcare professionals who are working abroad.

In addition, Thailand and Malaysia have high demand on healthcare professionals but unlike Singapore and Brunei, Thailand and Malaysia are able to cover their demand for such professionals with local labour. On the other hand, Laos, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar almost have the same supply and demand ratio of/for healthcare professionals, while Philippines remains the highest producers (Mikic, 2007) of healthcare professionals (nurses in particular) in the region, but only a few of those are in the country to meet the local demand.

A relationship between the mobility trend of healthcare professionals and economic status of the ASEAN countries may be evident in the above discussion. Most of the affluent countries in the region tend to rely on the manpower coming from other countries to meet their needs for healthcare services, while countries with low income rely mainly on domestic supply of manpower. However, such correlation may be insufficient or misleading in establishing a concrete trend in health care services in Southeast Asia because of the presence of other variable like political in/stability of the country.



Sources: WHO Global Atlas Data and Country Report 2005

Figure 1: Medical Workforce in ASEAN per 100 Thousand of Population⁸⁵

ASEAN Policies Toward Greater Mobility

The greater demand for healthcare professionals and the importance of this sector to the economy pushed ASEAN to include it in the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement on Services (AFAS). This sector followed information technology professionals and other professionals on the list of trade services⁸⁶ (Manning & Bhatnagar, 2004). However, health care service trade began to occur way beyond the promulgation of any agreement between the ASEAN member countries. The

⁸⁵ This represents the disaggregated data World Health Organization (WHO) on the numbers of nurses, dentist, physician etc.

⁸⁶ The inclusion of health services is quite recent as compared to other services sector. However, currently AFAS includes seven services sectors, business services, financial services, IT services, transport services, construction services, health services, and a newly added service sector the tourism services.

Philippines is one of the pioneers in sending healthcare professionals abroad. Because of this, the ASEAN took the step to officially draft policies that would harmonize healthcare service trade in order to facilitate greater mobility of workers within the region (ASEAN Declaration of Health, 2006).

This led to the development of ASEAN policies which aim at providing greater opportunity for the medical workers. Among the solid steps taken by ASEAN are the creation of AFAS in 1995 which aims to: “enhance cooperation in services among countries in the region in order to improve efficiency and competitiveness of services industries, diversify production capacity and supply, and distribution of services” (ASEAN Secretariat, n.d.), *Declaration of ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting*, the promulgation of *Mutual Recognition Agreement on Nursing Services*, and the development of *Mutual Recognition Agreement on Medical Practitioners*.

The “Declaration of 5th ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting” (2002) paved way towards gradual harmonization of standards and regulations for health services. This became a venue for the initial planning on how to organize the health sector of the region especially the healthcare providers. Another achievement of the said meeting is the intensification of networking among the health institutions, healthcare professional and the agencies handling the production and regulating the health professionals like schools and regulatory boards.

Furthermore, in the Declaration of 8th ASEAN Ministers Meeting, concerns about health professional were again brought up and leaders proposed that ASEAN members should recognize the education or experience obtained, requirements met, and license or certification granted in other ASEAN member countries for the purpose of licensing or certification of services suppliers. In this way, barriers towards working in ASEAN region would be lessened, and as such, flow of people working in the said sector would be less restricted.

Hence, among the steps taken, MRAs⁸⁷ are considered most helpful in liberalizing the health services sector. It paved way to the mutual recognition of qualifications of healthcare professionals across the region in accordance to the domestic rules and regulations of member countries. Specifically MRA works on the recognition of educational attainment, work experiences, licenses and other certifications obtained from other countries within the region. Furthermore, recent improvements in MRA aid the exchange of information and expertise on standards and qualifications promote adoption of best practices on professional medical services and provide opportunities for capacity building and training of medical practitioners.

ASEAN Policies, What Now?

Notwithstanding the various declarations done by ASEAN to address the mobility issue, the problem on stringent policies continues to exist. To strengthen the campaign towards liberalization of healthcare service trade, healthcare was identified as one of eleven priority sectors for integration in the Summit of ASEAN Economic Ministers. This move also affirms the need for the economic and health sectors of the ASEAN to work hand in hand in realization of the goal to liberalize the healthcare service trade in the region (Mattoo &

⁸⁷ MRA is a recent development in ASEAN, it was first implemented in 2001, however as early as 1995 (the time of AFAS conception) leaders already recognized the importance of MRA in the elimination of services trade barriers.

Fink, 2002).

The incorporation of health services sector in AFAS had so far not contributed to greater liberalization in the region. The four negotiating grounds under AFAS have not resulted in commitments in the health services sector. Due to this, policies imposed to health care professionals working within the Southeast Asia depended on the country where they are going to work. The recognition of the qualifications of these workers lies on the hands of the agencies handling the licensing of such profession. In the case of nurses, decision on recognition of foreign nurses is left to the nursing board or nursing council of the host country (Barlett & Tri Thanh, 2006). For physicians, a doctor who wants to practice his profession in a foreign country will have to apply for registration in the host country. They must be recognized and licensed in that country in accordance with its domestic regulations. However, these are just the minimum requirements medical practitioners must satisfy before they could practice their field. Thus, contrary to the usual outcome of an agreement and/or declaration, wherein unified and general rules are being established, MRAs failed to create a unified policy that serves as standard of qualifications. Rather, MRAs and declaration only laid down the general procedure that a medical practitioner who wishes to work within the region must follow. Therefore such agreement and declaration only formalized the role of the receiving country to determine who are allowed to work. This resulted to the creation a country specific policy rather than a regional policy on the said matter.

Country	Institution Involved in Pre-Employment
Brunei Darussalam	<i>Nursing Board for Brunei</i>
Kingdom of Cambodia	<i>Ministry of Health</i>
Republic of Indonesia	<i>Ministry of Health</i>
Malaysia	<i>Malaysia Nursing & Midwifery Boards</i>
Lao People's Democratic Republic	<i>Ministry of Health</i>
Kingdom of Thailand	<i>Thailand Nursing Council</i>
Republic of the Philippines	<i>Professional Regulation Commission, Board of Nursing</i>
Union of Myanmar	<i>Ministry of Health & Myanmar Nursing and Midwifery</i>
Socialist Republic of Vietnam	<i>Ministry of Health, Socialist Republic of Vietnam</i>
Republic of Singapore	<i>Singapore Nursing Board</i>

Source: ASEAN Ministry of Health

Figure 2: Nursing Board Involved in the Pre-Employment in ASEAN

Policies of Selected ASEAN Countries

Since Mutual Recognition Agreement has not yet materialized, Southeast Asian countries adhere to their own policy in screening applicants. This led to the diverse hiring process among nation states in Southeast Asia. More developed ASEAN member countries have their own workforce plan to ease the hiring process of medical professionals. Singapore and Malaysia started to adopt liberal policy toward foreign medical professionals. Their policy include training, continuing education and other measures to attract foreign workers (Abidin, 2005). However, despite the perks to entice foreign medical professionals, these two countries require employment pass and temporary practice certificate. In Singapore, employment pass or S Pass, is not exclusive among medical professionals, this requirement is a requirement for all foreign workers who want to work in Singapore. On the other hand, a Temporary Practice Certificate (TPC) from the Nursing Board of

Malaysia must be secured to be employed in a private hospital.

Other ASEAN member countries have more stringent policy in hiring medical workers. Indonesia and Thailand have less number of foreign medical workers due to their registration requirements, which include citizenship and/or residence in the said countries as well as language proficiency. In Indonesia, there is a small number of foreign doctors employed⁸⁸. Most of these foreign doctors are usually hired as administrators and managers of foreign hospitals while others are hired as faculty in overseas training programs for nurses.

Brunei is another nation with a strict hiring policy for foreign medical personnel. It has an explicit preference for medical practitioners from Malaysia and Indonesia which is seen in the population of migrant workers in this field (Kamaruddin et al., 2005). This special preference may be linked to commonalities in cultural background.⁸⁹

In Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, inflow of medical personnel is minimal. These countries are still on the process of building regulatory framework of accreditation and guidelines for employing foreign medical professionals. However, aside from the internal policy as a factor for minimal inflow of foreign workers in these countries, this phenomenon may also be attributed to the low demand for health services in these areas.⁹⁰

Hence, individual policies of countries in the region act as an obstacle in attaining a more liberalized health sector, but these obstacles are in fact associated with not having a unified and functional regional policy.




Figure 3: Level of Mobility of Medical Personnel within ASEAN⁹¹

⁸⁸ However, this may be due to factor like (almost) sufficient number of Indonesian doctor in their country which leads to lesser demand for foreign practitioners.

⁸⁹ The preference for traditional sources also serves as a barrier for employment. Hiring country prioritizes medical practitioners that have similar cultural background as them because these migrant workers needs little adjustment to go about their system unlike migrant workers from a different cultural background.

⁹⁰ It is understandable since there is small demand for such services then it is reflected also in the demand of foreign health personnel. Thus, the need to come up with a framework for hiring foreign medical workers is not seen as a must.

⁹¹ Using the ASEAN index of mobility wherein 1 represents most liberal policy and 0 represents most strict policy, Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore are among the Southeast Asian nations with most open policies,

Healthcare Professional Trade Pattern

Discussion of trade in health services often adopts a vague definition of what comprises trade. Included mode of supply in the part of the discussion of trade in healthcare professional in order to trace how these professionals are moving within and outside the Southeast Asia. Two primary modes of supply are apparent among healthcare professional. First is movement of individual service provider to the country that needs the service, and second is the consumption abroad (Arunanondchai & Fink, 2005). Although there are other modes of supply, the above mentioned modes are highlighted in this paper.

Movement of Individual Service Provider to the Country that Needs the Service

The first mode of supply, the service provider is the one moving to the country of the client/s to render service. This type of trade pattern is driven by the increasing supply of well-educated professionals in the sending countries and the excess demand of healthcare professionals in affluent countries (Chanda, 2001; Arunanondchai & Fink, 2007). The growing population and the increasing importance of healthcare in developed countries also influenced the demand for healthcare professionals.

Southeast Asia host two of the biggest healthcare professional exporters in the world, Philippines and Indonesia. As of 2007, an estimated 163,756 Filipino nurses were deployed abroad.⁹² Most of the destinations of these nurses are outside ASEAN region. Among the top working destinations⁹³ of the Filipino nurses are United States, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, United Kingdom and other countries in Europe and West Asia (Lorenzo et al., 2007; Avila & Manzano, 2005). Due to the ballooning demand for nurses abroad, nursing schools almost double their number and some of these schools designed their curriculum to meet the needs of foreign market.

followed by Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Burma, while the Philippines is considered the least open when it comes inward mobility of foreign health professionals. This data is generated from the existing World Health Organization 2008.

⁹² This data only covers the nurses known to POEA and does not include nurses who are not officially listed in POEA.

⁹³ Based on number of migrant workers in the health services sector.

Work Setting	Number (in thousand)	Percentage
I. Local/National	29,467	15.25
A. Service		
1. Government Agencies	19,052	9.86
2. Private Agencies	8,173	4.23
B. Education	2,241	1.16
II. International	163,756	84.75
Total	193,223	100
Source: POEA data		

Figure 4: Distribution of Nurses in Various Work Setting⁹⁴




Figure 5: Deployment Trend of Nurses in the Philippines⁹⁵

In Indonesia, the main destination of healthcare professionals is the Islamic countries. West Asian countries like United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are the common recipients of Indonesian healthcare professionals. However, to a lesser extent Malaysia and Singapore are also export destinations of these professionals (Chanda, 2001). The cultural affinity explains this geographic pattern of trade. Consequently, unlike Philippines, Indonesia has more problematic healthcare system due to its export of health personnel. The healthcare system in most cases is understaffed. Aside from Philippines and Indonesia, Malaysia is an exporter of healthcare professionals at the same time, like Singapore, it is also an importer of medical workers. Malaysian healthcare professionals often work in Singapore and Saudi Arabia.

Consumption Abroad

This second pattern, consumption abroad, the client is the one going to the source of health

⁹⁴ Despite the bulk number of nurses being produced by schools in the Philippines and being licensed under the PRC, only a handful are working in the country while majority are working abroad.

⁹⁵ From the Professional Regulation Commission of the Philippines (2004).

services as in the case of medical tourism.⁹⁶ Currently, some Southeast Asian countries have become significant centers of health tourism. Thailand is considered as the ASEAN hub of medical tourism, which offers a combined package of healthcare treatment and a get away/vacation. Among the highly sought after health services offered in Thailand are body enhancement procedures and other aesthetic related medical procedures. However, Malaysia and Singapore are not far behind Thailand in medical tourism (Pannarunotai & Suknak, 2004).

Clients of health tourism in the mentioned countries are mostly Asian and small frequency of people from western societies. Japanese is the largest clientele of Thailand, and only 7% of its total clients are from Southeast Asia. On the other hand, clientele of Malaysia and Singapore are largely comprised of people from Southeast Asia. (Arunanondchai & Fink, 2005)

	Export Revenues	Number of Patients	Percentage of Patients' Origin
Malaysia	RM 150 million (\$40 million)	More than 100,000	60 percent from Indonesia, 10 percent from other Southeast Asian countries
Singapore	\$420 million	210,000	45 percent from Indonesia, 20 percent from Malaysia, 3 percent from other Southeast Asian countries
Thailand	Around 20 billion baht in 2003 (\$482 million)	470,000 (2001) 630,000 (2002)	42 percent from East Asia (mostly Japan), 7% from Southeast Asian countries

Sources: Singapore Tourism Board; Abidin and Kamaruddin (2005); Arunanondchai (2005)

Figure 6: Revenues from Health Tourism

The booming of health tourism in Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia may be attributed to the low price of their medical services compared to the medical services being offered in developed countries, and also to the increasing good reputation of hospitals of Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. The specialized services Thai hospitals are offering (not available in other countries), also attract clients. Coping with the increasing popularity of health tourism is the Philippines. The well-qualified and English-speaking Filipino healthcare professionals might just be the key for a well-embraced medical tourism promoted in the country.

	Coronary by-pass graft surgery	Single private hospital room per night
Malaysia	\$ 6, 315	\$ 52
Singapore	\$ 10, 417	\$ 229
Thailand	\$ 7, 894	\$ 55
United Kingdom	\$ 19, 700	Not available
United States	\$ 23, 938	\$ 1, 351

Source: Abidin, Alavi and Kamaruddin (2005)

⁹⁶ Medical tourism is an increasing trend in Southeast Asia which entices clientele to not only avail the medical services offered in the country but also visit its tourist destinations. This strategy to attract clientele from other countries is anchored on the quality yet affordable health services being offered.

Figure 7: Comparison of Prices

Barriers to the International Mobility of Medical Worker

In the earlier discussions some of the hindrances in the mobility of medical workers have been discussed. However, aside from those there are other barriers that limit the flow of these workers within ASEAN region. Among the commonly cited reasons are language and lack of regional standardization.

Language requirement usually acts as a major hindrance of the recognition of previous training acquired. Another one is the preference for traditional sources in which hiring countries give higher priority to those medical practitioners that have similar cultural background as them (Mattoo et al., 2005). Citizenship requirements also made it impossible for foreign healthcare professionals to work in countries that require such qualification. This situation is further aggravated by lack of regional standards in screening applicants.




Figure 7: Level of Inward Mobility of Medical Personnel (1 = most liberal)

Effects of Healthcare Professionals' Mobility

The effects of trade liberalization in health services are enormous and multifaceted. Although, economic impact is the commonly seen effect of trade liberalization, it is not limited only to this. It can also affect the life chances⁹⁷ of people. Furthermore, impacts of trade liberalization are always twofolds, the first one governs the sending country and the second governs the receiving country. Whether the impact is on the sending or receiving country, both may experience varying degrees of positive and negative effects of liberalizing the health services sector.

On the part of the clients, they are presented with wider choices of medical services—services that may not be available in their origin country. In addition to that, patients who seek medical treatment in this region spend lesser amount of money for medical service. On the part of recipient country, introduction of foreign medical workers may uplift the quality of services

⁹⁷ Which may include the type of disease people may acquire and die of, and even their life span.

provided. While for the foreign workers, it entails better opportunity, thus better quality of life for their families. This movement of workers is also seen as a positive catalyst of change through the idea of 'brain gain' (ASEAN-ANUM Migration Research, 2005). From this perspective, migration of professionals has potential in creating positive effects on the progress and development of the source country. Movement of workers prevents the possible unemployment. Moreover, it will help in the increase of the salary of those professionals left behind because of the decrease of available manpower in the source country (Chandra et al., 2010). In addition, the migration may encourage or increase the number of enrollees.

On the other hand, mobility of medical workers has long been perceived as destructive to the sending country. Public investment given to education may not be maximized because of this mobility of workers. Both temporary and permanent migration of workers may cause the loss of quality human resources⁹⁸, thus curtailing economic development in the source country (Herman, 2009; Chanda, 2001). It will also stiffen the competition between foreign workers and local medical practitioners, thus causing impacts on the local labour market. Furthermore, this might cause the decline in quality of medical services available in the countries providing medical workers abroad. Thus, shortage of highly skilled medical workers in the supplier country may cause severe problems in the health system (Timmermans, 2002).

Conclusion

The importance of the health sector is undeniable. For this reason, the demand for medical services continues to grow, and to meet this demand, medical workers tend to work beyond the boundaries of their country. With the increasing number of medical providers working within Southeast Asia, agreements are essential for managing migration of these workers in such a way that both provider and receiver countries will benefit from such an arrangement. This is where mutual recognition agreements are highly important to pave the way for the smooth mobility of the workers.⁹⁹ However, almost all countries in Southeast Asia have strict policies with regard to the flow of health care professionals. The disparity in policies of ASEAN countries hampers the movement of medical professionals. The differences in policies may be associated to the degree of economic development and social aspects of the countries.

Thus, ASEAN as a regional body aims to liberalize trade in health services as well as other services sectors. Regional integration and policy entails several advantages for Southeast Asian countries. From the economic perspective, liberalization of health care markets is synonymous to economic gain to the country supplying medical workers and to the country receiving the medical workers. However, this liberalization may also intensify the existing problem of inequitable access to health services. Furthermore, because this program of ASEAN in liberalizing health care services trade is still in its infancy stage, the economic effects of it in the region are not yet visible, but its social impacts are already apparent.

Right now, the real problem of ASEAN is its lack of uniform labour standards on the

⁹⁸ This will always be shadowed by brain drain

⁹⁹ Agreements that liberalized trade has proven its positive impacts, therefore carefully drafted trade pacts in health sector will surely enhance not just the economies in the region but also the well-being of the people.

movement of healthcare professionals which puts aspiring workers abroad to a vulnerable state.¹⁰⁰ The regional labour standard will not only polish the problem with regard to the mobility of workers, and facilitate a smooth flow of medical practitioners in the region, it can also be a tool to ensure that the flow of workers in the region will not be harmful to both sending and receiving countries. At the same time it can safeguard the welfare of workers and lessen the exploitation that some of them experience.

Currently there have been several commitments crafted by ASEAN to liberalize not just the health sector but other services sectors as well. Various ASEAN declarations have contained policies on liberalization, but until now the implementation of such policies is not felt in the region. Trade liberalization will not take off unless issues mentioned earlier will be addressed by our leaders. Thus, commitment of the leaders to concretize such programs is necessary to materialize it, after all, if this regional policy will be promoted and properly implemented the entire region will benefit from it.

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¹⁰⁰ This is further complicated by cultural differences that cemented the stringent policy of most ASEAN member nations.

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Governance Reforms and State Formation: A Political Geography Perspective

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CDRI, Cambodia

Cambodia, over the past two decades, has made considerable efforts to forge democratic governance. Most significant has been the decentralisation and deconcentration (D, andD) reform, with the specific purpose of promoting local accountability, representation and responsiveness through increased local participation (RGC, 2005). To further those aims, the government has established local elections where local citizens can choose their representatives. At the same time, the government has arranged for the delegation of central roles and responsibilities to lower levels of government and administrative units to perform certain public functions and manage local development planning (RGC, 2005).

While reflecting the interests of its citizens, the extent of the state's capacity to be accountable, responsive and representative remains a controversial subject. Some scholars argue that D, andD has begun to have some positive impact on the nature of state operations (CDRI, 2013; Chheat et al., 2011; Heng et al., 2011; Ojendal & Kim, 2006). Others contend that the reform's success has been shallow (Craig & Pak, 2011; Hughes, 2009; Ledgerwood & Vijghen, 2002; Niazi, 2011; Rusten et al., 2004; Un, 2006, 2009, 2011; Un & Ledgerwood, 2003; Un & So 2009, 2011). These differing accounts probably reflect the various stances of the observers. Those who hold a more or less positive view tend to look at D, andD from a comparative perspective with insight from local level. On the other hand, those with a sceptical view tend to examine progress from a normative perspective using a legal-rational framework of analysis. Without judging or taking sides, this paper attempts to contribute to a richer understanding of the impact of reform on the formation of the Cambodian state from a political geographer's perspective. Using the example of territorial resource governance, specifically the demarcation of the flooded forests surrounding the Tonle Sap Lake, this paper discusses the real democratic or non-democratic nature of state operation in terms of accountability, representation and responsiveness.

Governance Reforms

Cambodia has seen a series of governance reforms over the past decades. One of the most important is decentralisation and deconcentration (D, andD) which formally began in 2001. As mentioned above, some of the specific goals of D, andD include improved local accountability, representation and responsiveness (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2005). Accountability is defined simply as answerability or the ability to give an account or explanation for one's action. In this paper, it is defined from a decentralisation point of view as consisting of the accountability of elected representatives to their constituents, and the accountability of executive state agents to elected representatives (Manor, 1999). Representation is defined as the opportunity for local people to have their needs and interests presented before government (Diamond, 1999). Responsiveness is measured in terms of the speed, quality and quantity of response, the extent to which the citizens can access to the state and the extent to which local concerns are reflected in political agenda. It is

also measured by the extent to which state policies and legislation respond to demands, and how people's grievances are alleviated (Yishai, 1984).

The aims of promoting accountability, representation and responsiveness are supported by strategies such as: (1) local elections to allow local people to elect their own representatives, (2) the transfer of responsibilities for local development and (3) the transfer of finance. In 2008, the Royal Government of Cambodia passed a law that was deemed crucial for the success of D, andD. Known as the Organic Law, it was based on the reviews of the responsibilities and functions of the ministries, institutions, departments, units and authorities at all levels. It also came from the realisation that there was a need for better coordination among state institutions. The significance of this law was to establish a unified administration at sub-national level in order to strengthen the unity of the state and facilitate all public administration activities. To further that aim, the law requires that functions and responsibilities are transferred along with the appropriate resources, capacity building and empowerment, and power and duties. (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2008).

In reality, opinions are divided over the extent to which D, andD has brought democratic values and practices into Cambodia. On the one hand, there are scholars of comparative perspectives who view the progress and success of D, andD as positive. For example, Ojendal and Kim (2006) argue that the democratising effects of D, andD are becoming evident as the relations between the local state officials, such as commune and village chiefs, are transformed from anger and fear to admiration and respect. On democratic-deepening effect of D, andD, Ojendal and Kim (2011) argue that there is a growing perception that commune council are democratically elected. The public believe that they can hold the commune authority accountable for their actions through the mechanism of election. In a similar manner, Heng et al. (2011) argue that D, andD has resulted in improved accountability and responsiveness of the locally elected representatives to their people.

In the other camp, however, there is a general consensus that D, andD has not produced much meaningful impact on democratic strengthening and local development effort in Cambodia. From an international perspective, Bratton and Walle (1992) argue that the success of a regime transition depends heavily on the behaviours of the political elites, and on the social and historical conditions of the host countries. For Cambodia, Blunt and Turner (2005) argue that the country does not possess the social, political and cultural norms that are prerequisites for democratic transition to take place successfully. Blunt's and Turner's (2005) point on Cambodia's lack of social, political and cultural foundations for a successful democratic transition can find support in early studies. For example, Mabbett and Chandler (1995) argue that popular legitimacy has never been the source of power in Cambodia. The state rules by creating both fear among the citizens and distance between the ruled and ruler. In the same manner, Boua (1993) argues that Cambodia is a very hierarchical society and that it lacks a tradition of democracy. From a social fabric point of view, social institutions in Cambodian society, particularly in rural communities, strongly feature patron networks and kinship ties (Ledgerwood & Vijghen, 2002). These are not conducive to the success of a transition to democracy. In the early stage of D, andD reform, Rusten et al. (2004) argue that the lack of clearly assigned roles and responsibilities for the locally elected representatives have constrained the effectiveness of D, andD reform. It resulted in "a centralized democracy" (Rusten et al., 2004: 83) where order still largely flows from the top. Some years later in similar thoughts, Huges

(2009) argues that the effects of the reforms have mostly been procedural with quantitative indicators of democratic tools. These include the general election, the commune election and the local planning, albeit little democratizing effects (Hughes, 2009). Meanwhile, the objective of a system of check and balance is replaced by the fusion of power between different branches of state where the judiciary is not politically independent enough (Un, 2009). These rather negative views on the likelihood of D, and D success are supported by evidence from recent studies (Craig & Pak, 2011; Eng & Craig, 2009; Horn & Craig, 2009; Pak & Craig, 2009; Un, 2006, 2011; Un & So, 2011). All in all, the literature on accountability in Cambodia generally questions the feasibility of downward accountability, representation and responsiveness of the state toward its citizens.

Decentralisation and Recentralisation

In addition to the D, and D studies that question the prospect of accountability, representation and responsiveness, there are two powerful arguments that are worth mentioning in the context of this paper. First, Ribot (2002) argues that while the central state tends to decentralize roles and responsibilities for local development to the local state, these transfers are often not followed by the transfer of power. Ribot (2002) goes on to argue that in this kind of decentralisation, the local state is effectively transformed into a body that is not autonomous but an extended arm of the central state. In addition, Ribot et al. (2006) argue that the state tends to recentralize its control over the locality while appearing to engage decentralisation. This is achieved through the retention of power and finance (Ribot et al., 2006). This argument clearly suggests that the local state is not given enough power and resources to be downwardly accountable. These points on limited decentralisation are significant in suggesting that a state is not to be viewed as a single entity and that the relationship between the central and the local state should not be overlooked in any study of the state.

The second argument comes from a study by Vandergeest and Peluso (1995). They look at the role of the state in resource governance and argue that the state actively controls the space in which communities operate in a process called state internal territorialisation. Their argument finds support among political geographers such as Bakker and Bridge (2008) who also argue that resource governance is an area of active state control.

The combination of the two arguments raises doubts over the extent to which D, and D can promote state accountability, representation and representativeness. It suggests that the central state might find strategies to retain control and domination over the local state and local communities. Specifically for this paper, the two arguments suggest that the state might officially appear to decentralise its roles and responsibilities to create a structure of locally-based governance. Yet, it concurrently employ other strategies such as territorial resource control to retain its power over the society. This understanding complicates the analysis of accountability, representation and responsiveness of the local state. This is because what affects local accountability is not simply a matter of political decentralisation but other forces and strategies such as territorial resource control.

This paper will explore this issue in relation to the discipline of political geography. Huxley (2008) argues that the state actively claims responsibility over resources governance and, at the same time,

it effectively claims legitimate control over both nature and human society.

State Internal Territorialisation and Territorial Strategies

Territory is a specific place in space with a clearly marked boundary. It is often occupied by individuals, social groups or institutions for a particular purpose (Jones et al., 2004). Territory is understood on two broad scales. The first is territory on an international scale. Gottman (1973) sees territory on this scale as defensible space, separated by international borders to separate different states. Second, territory can be understood at national level or within the national boundary. This scale of territory gains its significance at times of relative international peace and when there is an increasing focus on state efforts to control territory within its territorial sovereignty.

It is this second aspect of territory that proves crucial for the study of the power relationship between the state and society. This gives rise to the concept of state internal territorialisation. For instance, Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) argue that the state tends to territorialise its power in a certain politically defensible space. Within this space, the state's power is derived on the basis of the jurisdiction or administrative responsibilities to control the space. In this process, the state controls the communities that exist in it. This argument suggests that the state can employ territorial strategies to retain or even strengthen its control over the society.

The point made by Vandergeest and Peluso on the internal territorialisation of state power confirms Sack's (1986) concept of territoriality. Sack (1986) argues that territorialisation refers to human attempts to exert control and influence over a specific place. It is a process that involves shifting the logic of resource governance, mapping, communication of the intention to control, demarcation and enforcement (Sack, 1986). Sack's (1986) points are important for this paper and will be used as a guide for the analysis of territorial strategy and accountability, representation and responsiveness of the state. They involve shifting the logic of resource governance, mapping and demarcation.

To further our understanding of how territoriality is related to state accountability, representation and responsiveness, there is a need to understand the concept of space and place, and what power they hold over human lives.

The Concept of Space

Lefebvre (1991) sees space as having two important conceptualisations: lived space and representational space. Lived space is the space that has meanings and emotional attachment. It is a space of rich social meanings that arise out of the human experience in this space. Representational space, on the other hand, is space of emptiness free of human experience and existence.

The two different conceptualisations of space tend to be held by different social groups. Those in power tend to view space as empty and abstract space, which can be represented in ways that suit their geographical imagination. Such imagination includes protected forest, economic development zone and national park or community forestry. This conception of space is often held by distant state actors, policy makers and resource planners, whose lack of experience in the space allows them to view it as abstract homogeneity. This view of space is harmful to the lived space (Lanegrán, 2007). For those who have experience in a specific space, the space is not just an abstract space but has a

rich socially-given meaning (Shields, 1991). Shields (1991) goes on to argue that space is a place of meaning influenced by its history that sets in motion a certain feeling about it. The empirical datum of geographical space is mediated by an edifice of social constructions which become guides for action and constraints upon action.

An understanding of the two conceptions of space is essential for this paper which aims to understand the accountability, representation and responsiveness of the state toward its citizens. It allows for an analysis of how a certain space is viewed by the state and how that differs from the reality of space as experienced and understood by the local people. More importantly, the different conceptions of space as held by different groups of actors can result in attempts to impose a certain viewpoint of nature by one group over another. That is, how different social groups, especially those in power, attempt to represent a certain local space to suit their geographical imagination, and how this process of the representation of space reflects instances of accountability and representation.

Moreover, space holds a certain power over lives as it contains material resources, such as land, water and forest to support lives and it has the power to evoke a certain emotional power from those who experience it (Penrose, 2002). The different conceptions of space and its representation that alter human access and relations to space have the potential to provoke a certain kind of response. This response can be either physical or emotional, which is important for this paper. As the local space is represented differently, there is the potential of a demand for accountability and representation from the state. This could potentially offer an opportunity to analyse state responsiveness, which is defined as access, output, agenda, policy and impact (Yishai, 1984).

The Concept of Place

As an important concept in political geography, place has three aspects - location, locale and sense of place (Agnew, 1987). These aspects of place are worth discussing here for they pertain to the understanding of the concept of place. In fact, the making or remaking of place relates to the concept of accountability, representation and representativeness. First, as location, a place refers to a specific point on the surface of the earth. This point can be represented or identified by a specific numerical reference, i.e. GPS. Second, the locale aspect of place depicts a place as constituting of its surroundings that define its geographical setting. Agnew (1987) argues that the locale aspect of a place is constitutive of the material surroundings of the place and they collectively define the function of the place. For example, a place surrounded by stalls and street shops can be defined as a market place. Third, 'a sense of place' can be explained as a sense of attachment for a place is not only representing a geographical point of existence. This sense of attachment arises out of the human existence and experience in place. It is this third aspect that ties the concept of place to the concept of space and power. Representational space often results in the making and remaking of certain local places, which affects access to certain spaces and places, and alters the human relationship to that place (Gottman, 1973). Thus, the human relationship with that place is altered in ways that can provoke significant emotional response. This allows for the conceptualisation of place and space as important lenses for the analysis of power relationships, accountability, representation and responsiveness, which is the focus of this paper.

Research Method and the Case Study

To understand the issues of state accountability, representation and responsiveness, this paper employs the case study research method. A state project to demarcate protected flooded forests in the Tonle Sap area was selected. Implemented between mid-2010 and 2011, this project emerged within international development discourse on environmental protectionism and amid rising national concern over environmental destruction in the Tonle Sap area, particularly the clearance of flooded forests. For example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in a 2005 report demonstrates the rapid decline in the area of flooded forest, from 795,000 hectares in 1985 to 370,000 hectares in 1992 and less than 20,000 hectares in 1997. This was due mainly to rice cultivation and fuel wood collection. Consequently, the prime minister made an announcement calling for a clearly marked boundary between the flooded forest and floating rice areas. In doing so, the prime minister also emphasised the need for development to respect existing farmland.

While the objectives of the demarcation were based on rational resource governance, it took place in a complex, diametrically opposed political context. On one hand, it purports decentralisation that aims at promoting local accountability, representation and responsiveness. On the other, it adopts neo-patrimonialism that features elite politics and the accumulation of wealth and power. Thus, the manner in which the demarcation project was carried out provides unique and important insights into the democratic or non-democratic nature of the state in Cambodia.

In terms of the case study material, this paper benefits from a doctoral research project undertaken to examine territoriality and state power in Cambodia using a methodological combination of document analysis, formal and informal interviews, and field observations of the Tonle Sap demarcation project (Kim, 2013). Document analysis entailed a desk review of state policy documents on Tonle Sap governance, NGO reports and development partners' project reports such as ADB's Tonle Sap Initiative. Qualitative data was collected in formal interviews with state officials who have formal responsibilities for Tonle Sap governance, and informal interviews/conversations with experts who do not have formal responsibilities but have hands-on knowledge of the Tonle Sap's geography and governance history. This group includes local farmers, opinion leaders and state agents at sub-national levels. Data on local accountability, representation and responsiveness were obtained from field observations and participants' observations. These observations focused on the interactions among state agents at different levels and state agents' interactions with local citizens, particularly in the study commune in Pursat province. For a more detailed discussion of the data collection method, its reliability and validity, see Kim (2013).

Findings

As resource exploitation in the Tonle Sap is deemed unsustainable, the prime minister announced a new resource governance regime for the area. This new regime is based on the understanding that the threat to the Tonle Sap comes from the clearing of flooded forest. This appears to have been made partly or mainly possible by the lack of a clearly marked boundary between flooded forests and floating rice areas. The absence of boundary demarcation meant that local farmers could expand their cultivation land without appearing to encroach on flooded forest. Thus, the prime minister called for a clearly marked boundary. The manner this boundary line is marked strongly

reflects the extent to which decentralisation is occurring in Cambodia. The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. The first two look at the top-down process of the state's territorial strategy of mapping and demarcation, and the last one looks at the local process of appeal against the state's action. Studying these processes yields significant insights into the issues of state accountability, representation and responsiveness.

Mapping and Accountability

The case study at hand is Tonle Sap demarcation, which looks particularly at the way the new definitive map of the Tonle Sap was drawn up. It suggests that state accountability in this instance is highly questionable. The new map directly concerns at least three important actors: state actors in charge of resource governance, local authorities and local farmers. For the Tonle Sap area to be accurately represented on the new map, all three needed to work in close collaboration.

The case study material indicates that local citizens did not have any role in the making of the new map. For a start, to the local people, space is much more than a mere empty space for reclassification. Although they have customary knowledge of the local landscape based on true-life experience, they were not given a chance to contribute their ideas or represent their interests. Results of the interviews suggest that they were not aware that state agents in charge of collecting data for the new map had come into their area. As a result, they were denied the chance to participate in the data collection survey and thus were excluded from the production of the new map. Meanwhile, the locally elected representatives had no meaningful role in the data collection or the production of the new map. Interviews with some local authorities suggest that locally elected representatives were not even aware of the changing policy on the resource governance regime for the Tonle Sap area, which evolved into the need for the new map. Commenting on the presence of the central state agents in their locality, one of local representatives said, "They were doing something. But it is their job, and they didn't tell us what it is." In the absence of local inputs, the new map represents the local landscape in the Tonle Sap area, which has been deprived of the local customary knowledge of local land use. Such knowledge provides the basis for property rights. The new map, as it stands, was made without consideration of pre-existing local land uses. It is simply made in line with ministerial guidance and the rigid plan to demarcate 645,000 hectares of flooded forest. For example, in the case study commune, an estimated 80 percent of the floating rice area was marked as protected forest.

The case study material suggests that the way the new map of the Tonle Sap area was made features a strong line of upward accountability. This refers to the upward flow from the cartographer to the minister. Based on interviews with local officials and local farmers, the cartographers, who collected data to form the basis of the new map, were more accountable to the minister who pre-fixed the size of the flooded forest area at 645,000 hectares. Setting the size of the protected area beforehand determined the course of data collection. This had nullified the process of collecting data on local geography, ecology and everyday land uses. On the contrary, it is merely a process akin to a modernist state project based on rational resource planning and conservation. It can be argued that fixing the specific size of the area to be set aside could be justified as necessary for the protection of the nation's fisheries resources, which further serves the interest of the nation at large. Nonetheless, it left the cartographers with an inadequate role as surveyors of the local landscape to construct a

map that reflected local reality. In this respect, the fixing of the size stands not for accountability but for enclosure and the exclusion of a certain group of people, namely those living in the area.

The way the new map was developed and the boundary marked did not allow any opportunity for the local authorities to be accountable to their constituents. Although the new map concerns their territory, all management responsibility and decision-making power rest in the hands of the central agents. These agents tend to view the space in question as abstract space and translate geographical reality into generalised data. This inclination towards ecological simplification, accommodated by their distance confined those cartographers to produce an incomplete map. It represents the space in the Tonle Sap in ways that have displaced local land uses and ecological services. More importantly, they have displaced local knowledge of the space in the Tonle Sap area. The other aspect of accountability – that which exists between the executive agents of the state and locally elected representatives – is absent. The case study material suggests that the central state agents in charge of data collection for the map effectively sidelined the local authorities, treating them as logistics persons rather than as counterparts. This suggests that the central state agents were not required to explain their decisions or justify their actions to the local authorities. Interviews with the local authorities reveal that there was no consultation or discussion of any sort between the cartographers from the central ministry and the local authorities concerning the nature of data collection for the new map.

Territorial Demarcation and Downward Accountability

The translation of the map data into physical boundary demarcation took place in the study commune on 8 March 2011. The manner in which the demarcation was carried out shows a serious absence of local accountability. Under the D, and D framework, local citizens vote to elect their local representatives, i.e. commune chiefs. Those chiefs, in exchange for the vote, are expected to act in the interests of local citizens. Field observations, however, reveal that for matters such as the demarcation, decision-making power does not rest on elected local representatives. Instead, the power falls on the central state agents assigned to the specific task. Local authorities are treated as *senatika-entourage*, who are expected to follow the central agents, provide logistics support and do as they are told (Kim, 2013). This working arrangement inhibits local accountability. It also means that local authorities have no meaningful roles or responsibilities in the demarcation process.

For the central state agents, there exists a distinct line of upward accountability. As they are not elected by the locals, they have no formal duty to respond to local citizens. Instead, they answer to their political leaders in the central ministry whose political operation is far from the pure legal-rational bureaucracy of a public office with a fixed jurisdiction. Field observations suggest that the realities of local accountability in the supposedly decentralised Cambodia were the opposite of an ideal type of bureaucracy. The top leader at ministerial level first determined the size of area to be protected. The cartographer then responded with a new map. This is followed by the field agents in charge of the demarcation who actualised the state project of geographical imagination. Direct observations of the interactions between the field agents in charge of the demarcation and local farmers showed that local realities and local customary knowledge were effectively ignored. In fact, demarcation was based on GPS (Global Positioning System) coordinates pre-set by agents from a distant place.

I have been dispatched here to place the pole. I don't have the authority to decide [where it goes] or change the position of it. I just follow my machine [GPS]... The machine does not lie, and it points out to me that the position of the pole should be here.

(Team leader in charge of pole-placing project, Pursat, 8 March 2011)

Field agents often made the excuse of being pressured or overpowered by the top. In so doing, they effectively exonerated themselves for not taking local realities into account.

Territorial Demarcation and Upward Accountability

Intuitively, the absence of a downward line of accountability would be taken as indicative of the presence of an upward accountability. However, the case study material suggests that upward accountability, a common conception of neo-patrimonialism, is also in question. Indeed, the material suggests that one cannot speak of a linear line of upward accountability. Besides, it shows that detailed attention is needed to understand how accountability exists at different levels of the state. The case study sheds light on the disjuncture found in the concept of upward accountability. At the time of the demarcation in 2011, the national policy, particularly the order of the prime minister on the Tonle Sap demarcation, emphasised the need for a clearly marked boundary line between the flooded forest and floating rice areas. This policy objective, if observed carefully, creates two important criteria for determining the positions of the boundary poles. At a broad level, it calls for a clearly marked boundary line between the two zones, while at the same time it requires that the status of existing farmland be respected. Field data shows that the first criterion to demarcate the areas was actualised. However, the second, which was to respect existing farmland, was overridden by field agents' duty to follow the map and their street-level logics. Field observations suggest that the field agents' obligation to follow the map created by their line ministry effectively countermanded the national policy of respecting existing farmland. In other words, whenever the positioning of the poles affected small and powerless local farmers, the field agents remained strict in following the map even if it meant the enclosure of local floating rice areas. This suggests a break in the line of upward accountability which was assumed to exist from the agents to the prime minister. The material reveals that state agents are more accountable to their immediate superiors than they are to the distant boss at the top, who had made it clear that existing farmland was to be respected.

Field data shows that the field agents carried out the physical demarcation based on the challenges presented by their travel logistics. For instance, the time of the first demarcation round coincided with the rainy season of 2010, during which much of the Tonle Sap floating rice area was flooded. The flooding made it difficult, if not impossible, to access some of the areas marked on the map. According to local interviews and field observations, field agents determined the position of the boundary poles in some locations based purely on their ability to get to the area.

They just drove to the end of the village road, got off their truck and placed the pole.

(Interview, a farmer in Pursat, 9 February 2011)

This comment suggests that the field agents' positioning of the boundary poles was not done on the basis of rational resource planning, nor on orders from the top, but rather on street-level logic determined by travel problems.

At the same time, the case study material also suggests that the field agents' actions can be attributed to their pursuit of rents. Analysis of the national discourse concerning the demarcation, particularly the prime minister's emphasis on respecting existing farmland, together with evidence on the ground, suggests that there were opportunities for field agents to correct the wrong done during the first phase of demarcation. The prime minister's renewed order, which emphasised on following the actual physical and geographical landscape and not the pre-made map, was understood to give the field agents discretionary power to ensure accurate demarcation. However, evidence suggests that the field agents, instead, used that discretionary power to exact rents from local farmers (see Kim, 2013).

Elsewhere, where powerful interests were involved, the boundary line demarcation skirted the farmer's land regardless of the pre-existing legal status of the land. A recent field trip to other areas of the Tonle Sap floodplain discovered that in some places within Kampong Thom province, field agents had drawn the boundary line around the farmland of important government figures so that their land was unaffected.

Overall, the case study of the demarcation project suggests that there is no local accountability as such. Local authorities are often sidelined by specially assigned agents from the central state who are in full control of every meaningful aspect of state action. This diminishes D, and D's ability to bring about local accountability. Meanwhile, upward accountability cannot be assumed to be firm. Empirical evidence based on observation of the demarcation project suggests that upward accountability is not a simple straight line to the top. In fact, it depends on, among other things, the agents' direct superior viewpoint on conservation and development, street-level logic and rent-seeking opportunities.

Local Demand, Representation and Responsiveness

In the face of state action that affected the local way of life and their livelihoods, local farmers did try to oppose the action of the state that displaced the local lived space of floating rice. Even so, the analysis of this local appeal suggests that the locally elected representatives were not able to represent local interests in the way that the D, and D reforms intended.

The case study material shows that no local authorities at any level took any initiative to represent the local floating rice farmers affected by the demarcation. Interviews with the village and commune chiefs concerned reveal that those local officials were not willing to stand up, at least not openly, for the local citizens. Some raised the issue verbally and voiced their objections against the decisions and actions of the central agents that led to the enclosure of existing farmland in their locality. However, they were unclear in their intent. Moreover, analysis suggests that local officials were quick to back down and retreat to their comfortable position of obedient junior partners. This is because, as field data suggests, locally elected representatives were not given any clear and meaningful role in the demarcation project, which was widely presented as the "PM's project." In effect, the central agents harnessed the power of association with the prime minister to demand full compliance from the local agents. The case study suggests that in this kind of complex arrangement, the D, and D aims for greater autonomy and broader responsibilities for the locally elected representatives can at times be ousted by the neo-patrimonial practice of centralised power. When that happens, as in the case of the Tonle Sap demarcation, the local representatives do not have the

ability to represent local interests, and both the local agents and local citizens are at the whim of central agents.

The case study material shows that, in the absence of a formal mechanism of representation, local people can represent and act in their own self-interests. The initiative and momentum for the local movement to challenge the central state agents came mainly from local farmer leaders. This group of leaders consists of those farmers who own a sizable amount of farmland. While their identity, values and interests are the subject of a lengthy discussion, available data indicates that this group was crucial to the local appeal. This is because they initiated the movement by going around the villages to lobby the farmers who were affected and encourage them to come forward and join forces to file an appeal. The group also played an essential role in sustaining the movement by supplying both ideas and material resources.

Local movements, such as the farmers' lobby group, appeal against the enclosure of their floating rice areas but cannot ensure local representation. Analysis of the dialogue between the central agents, the local representatives and the local leaders reveals the severely unequal balance of power between them. The tone of the local appeal letter addressed to the agent in charge of the demarcation, for example, sounds more like a polite request than a demand for an explanation of the central agents' action: "Please, Your Excellency, re-examine and reconsider the matter." The local people are at the mercy of the agents who have no responsibility towards them. Similarly, the state agents are not in any way bound to be accountable to the local citizens. This is implied in the servile tone of the appeal letter and the way the central agents handled local attempts to appeal. Data shows that the central state agents alone made decisions about who could participate in the appeal process, the manner in which the appeal could take place, and the outcome of the appeal.

The local appeal can be taken as further evidence of locally elected representatives' lack of responsiveness to local citizens' demands. Field observations show that when local people expressed their intention to appeal against the state action, the local authorities rejected or avoided their claim.

I heard about it [the enclosure of local floating rice land] too, but let me talk to the commune chief first to see if he would allow me to do anything.

(Village chief, Pursat, 10 March 2011)

This is confirmed by further observations, which reveal that the commune chiefs waited for instructions from the district chiefs who also waited for instructions from the provincial governor. This illustrates that, for issues such as the Tonle Sap demarcation, the local authorities are still heavily influenced by the old practices of upward accountability, that is, the traditional relationship of subordinate. The custom of waiting for orders or approval from higher authorities is working in the opposite direction to the logic and objectives of decentralisation. In other words, it hampers local state responsiveness to local demand.

Although the local state actors appear to be infringing the regulatory framework of D, and D and doing their citizens a disservice in the process, their conduct is readily understandable. The remnant of the past political practice of upward accountability is shaped by a neo-patrimonial arrangement

where top leaders confer certain central state agents the power to take direct state action. It is amplified by an atmosphere of accusation, intimidation and threat of imprisonment exploited by the central agents who domineer the local discourse of appeal. The central agents took advantage of their perceived access to the power of the prime minister to pre-empt any attempt that challenged their actions. Further analysis of the appeal dialogue reveals an interesting discourse that frames and reframes the local attempt to counter the power of the central state as illegal. Data from interviews and participants' observations shows that the central agents employed an active strategy. It seeks to accuse local authorities who might wish to defend local floating rice farmers as colluding with unscrupulous business people, and threaten them with handcuffs. Besides taking over the local process of appeal, the central agents had the ability to monopolise responsibility for issues such as boundary demarcation. Collectively, these abilities severely affect the local authorities' line of accountability and their inclination to represent local interests. One interesting revelation was the discovery that the governor was unwilling to endorse the local appeal for fear of potential political consequences orchestrated by the concerned central state agents.

Due to the active discourse against local authority involvement in the appeal as well as the traces of political centralism distorting upward accountability, the local authorities were not able to represent the interests of the farmers affected. The case study material clearly suggests that the local authorities, apart from being brushed aside in the demarcation process, were more inclined to steer clear of the matter altogether.

Discussion and Conclusion

Based on insights from the state project to demarcate the Tonle Sap area, this paper argues that for such matters as resource governance, the state does not exhibit enough downward accountability to local citizens. This is due to a complex and overlapping working arrangement between the central state agents and locally elected representatives that arises out of the tension between the decentralisation reform, on the one hand, and neo-patrimonial orders on the other. Local governments do not extend accountability towards their constituents. It is not due to their failure to discharge their clearly assigned roles and responsibilities. On the contrary, it is because they are excluded from the assignment of roles and responsibilities necessary to deal with the matter. Further, the findings of this paper reveal an interesting break in the line of upward accountability. It suggests that, in the case of state agents, it is not a straight bottom-up line to the top person. This line has, in fact, multi-dimensions including the immediate superior's influence and the agents' own logic, which in this instance consist of travel logistics and rent-seeking interests.

This paper also argues that the legal institutional framework of decentralisation co-exists with patterns of neo-patrimonialism in this system results in the exclusion of locally elected representatives from state projects. For instance, the Tonle Sap demarcation renders local governments incapable of representing the interests of their constituents. Empirical evidence shows that local authorities are still suffused with the old practices of centralism in that they have more respect for hierarchy than they do for their public duty. Meanwhile, the central agents' access to neo-patrimonial power allows them to preside over local governments, impeding the ability of locally elected officials to represent local interests.

In terms of responsiveness, the findings demonstrate that the level of local governments' responsiveness is less than positive. Insights from the Tonle Sap demarcation project surface a few gaps in terms of local governmental responses. Taking land conflict issue as an example, the local governments have failed to initiate actions that constitute responsiveness to local demand and to refuse to support local movements initiated by their local constituents. This is due to risk aversion amid a culture of fear, amplified by an active discourse of threat contrived by the central agents.

This paper concludes, from a political geography perspective, that the governance reforms have not had significant and meaningful impacts on the democratic deepening of the Cambodian state. This is because accountability, representation and responsiveness are at times replaced or even displaced by a top-down practice of neo-patrimonial orders.

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Identifying Grey Area and People in Between: A Case of Homosexual Male Prostitutes in Pattaya, Thailand

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Abstract

This article was part of the use of grounded theory for learning project named "Identifying grey areas and the people in between". It had three major objectives. First, the author identified a grey area of marginal group by selecting homosexual male prostitutes living and working in Pattaya, Chonburi as the target populace. Then, current situation and problems of modern slavery in the form of homosexual male prostitutes were highlighted. Last, three individual cases were investigated using grounded theory. The research methodology included documentary and qualitative methods. After a massive literature review concerning the evolution and the emergence of homosexual male prostitutes, data was collected by in-depth interviews and participant observations. The narrative technique and content analysis were adopted. The article highlighted the crucial need to identifying grey area where problems were submerged in processes of social development. Three case studies outlined the "significance of good examples". The cases exhibited processes, mechanisms and consequences of inequality occurring among homosexual male prostitutes. Lack of power and invisibility, these people in between became an invisible object to society. They were dehumanized, abused, brutalized, had their freedoms removed and were as the objects in various businesses. They were bought, sold and manipulated by the owners. These people in between were finally situated into the lowest social class. The article offered an alternative solution of empowerment, an opportunity for a virtual community for enlarging social dialogue, and a better dialogue for social policy.

Keywords: Grey area, people in between, homosexual male prostitutes

Introduction

In 2013, modern slavery takes many forms, such as slavery, forced labor or human trafficking. Theoretically, slavery refers to the condition of treating another person as if they were property something to be bought, sold, traded or even destroyed. Forced labor is a related but not identical concept, referring to forced work without consent, by threat or coercion. Human trafficking is another related concept, referring to the process through which people are brought, through deception, threat or coercion, into slavery, forced labor or other forms of severe exploitation. Whatever term is used, the significant characteristics of all forms of modern slavery is that it involves one person depriving another person of their freedom: their freedom to leave one job for

another, their freedom to leave one workplace for another, their freedom to control their own body. (Walk Free Foundation, 2013b)

Walk Free Foundation (2013) revealed the shocking statistics of modern slavery in Asia. The organization estimated that 72.14% of the estimated 29.8 million people in modern slavery were in Asia. The region has a number of countries with relatively low prevalence and risk of enslavement (such as Australia and New Zealand), and has some countries where the prevalence and risk of enslavement were significantly high (such as Pakistan, India and Thailand). In addition, Thailand ranked fourth (49.71 percent) Asia. The country has many forms of modern slavery. (Walk free foundation 2013a). Among them include; forced labor and exploitation of prostitution were the two most notable forms.

Traditionally, prostitution has been found in Thai society in various forms. However, Simon de La Loubere (1687) recorded that the form which was most found was the female prostitutes in the King Narai era. Later, King Rama I announced the law of the three seals preventing female prostitutes to be witnesses because of their "social status".

Because of their "invisibility", (not merely female prostitutes but also homosexual male prostitutes) they were excluded from historical records in Thai society. Nonetheless, prostitution appeared in newspapers such as, during the reign of King Rama VIII there was evidence of changing the prostitutes form to male prostitutes. For instance, Sri Krung newspaper (1935) reported the news of an arrested illegal opening a whorehouse where the boys were caught acting as prostitutes. Apart from that, newspapers often presented an image of male prostitutes and linkages with homosexual male groups. Moreover, stigmatization of male prostitutes in form of deviant behaviors and the cause of wide spread of HIV in Thailand have also been commonly found.

The Truth and Stigmatization

The Office of Disease Prevention and Control 9, Phitsanulok (2007) reported that AIDS and HIV infected patients in Thailand became one of the most important development barriers. Between 1984 and 2007, there were 330,000 infected patients. Among them, 229,042 were males, 101,698 were females, or rates of 2.2:1 between male and female. 91,074 infected patients died (65,126 were males and 25,948 were females). Fatality rate was 27.53% (28.43% were males and 25.51% were females infected patients). In 2007 it was found that there were 10,375 AIDS and HIV infected patients (fatality rate was 16.57 and dead rate was 2.92 per hundred thousand populations). 6,436 male and 3,939 female were infected, or rates 1.6:1 between males and females. 1,181 infected patients deceased. (767 were males, 414 were females). Fatality rate was 11.38% (11.92% were males and 10.51% was females). Of the total, there were 10,091 new AIDS and HIV infected patients of Thai nationality (97.26%), among them 6,259 were males; 3,832 were females, or rates 1.6:1 between male and female. 1,117 infected patients died, 726 were males and 391 were females. Fatality rate was 11.07%.

During 1984 and 2007, the total AIDS and HIV infected patients was about 325,326. Among them, 225,375 were males, 99,951 were females, or rates of 2.2:1 between male and female. 89,590 infected patients died. (64,053 were male and 25,537 were females). Fatality rate was 27.54% (28.42% were males and 25.55% were females). In 2004, the problems had reached its highest point. The Bureau revealed that there were 45.10 per hundred thousand populations in Thailand who

turned themselves into AIDS and HIV infected patients. The country earned the highest mortality rate in 1999 or about 14.62 per hundred thousand populations.

Apart from this, the Bureau of Epidemiology (2011) reported that during 1984 and 2011, they were 372,847 infected patients and 98,153 deaths cases. These victims were mostly found among the working class group. They were between 20-44 years old. Laborers were the most significant group of AIDS and HIV infected. According to risk factors and the year of onset, it could be classified that AIDS and HIV infected patients in Thailand originated in the risky sexual behaviors. Although evidence revealed that 209,606 AIDS and HIV infected patients emerged among poor blue collar workers with risky sexual behaviors, nonetheless, stigmatizations among male prostitutes remained very strong.

Studies revealed that the increasing numbers of homosexual male prostitutes related to poverty, poor planning health policy, and risk behaviors. In 2002, for instance, the greatest consideration of Ministry of Public health related to AIDS and HIV wide spread led to the significant decline of the patients. Although the challenge had later been made concerning unreliable information sources after the Public Health Service Reformation, one ugly truth had been notified. That was inaccessibility to one target groups who had long been notified as the major cause of problem, homosexual male prostitutes. The national HIV surveillance found that, the rate of prevalence in homosexual male prostitutes was invalid. In some areas, the information showed differences between the statistical report and a new surveillance system where such an aggressive campaign to prevent HIV infection had been operated (Limanon & Prajaknes, 2007).

Unfortunately, Tourism in Thailand has recognized that providing sexual related services to tourists such as night clubs, bars, and massages in Pattaya City, Bangkok, Phuket, and Chiang Mai were unavoidable. Although lately "This World Rocks Tourism Page" described nightlife in the Pattaya City as "Sex Capital of the World", not much operation had been done. In 2013, "This World Rocks" was currently announced that the prostitution industry in Thailand became the highlight of most tours. The Page also outlined that the places will be the most popular tourist attraction trend in the coming year (This World Rocks, 2013).

Considering the above situation and impact, the authors focused her research question in the invisible victims, male prostitutes. The increasing number of prostitutes in Pattaya city provided the most attractive destination for the researcher. Without better policy planning, the aggressive tourism policy of Thailand will stimulate the increase of modern slavery in the form of male prostitution. The authors thus identified the Pattaya City as "grey area". She first explored the South Pattaya in order to find the male prostitutes, as the "people in between".

Objectives

There were three major objectives. First, the evolution of homosexual male prostitutes in Thai society was reviewed. Then, the current situation and problems of modern slavery in the form of homosexual male prostitutes in the Pattaya City were explored. Last, the author proposed policy suggestions.

Scope of the Study

The author identified a grey area of marginal group by purposely selecting homosexual male prostitutes living and working in Pattaya, Chonburi as the target populace. They were marginal and

sui juris who were willing to be a part of the study from the beginning till the end. The study was conducted on December, 2013. Three homosexual male prostitutes were individually interviewed and observed.

Research Methodology

The study methods included documentary and qualitative. After a massive literature review concerning the evolution and the emergence of homosexual male prostitutes, data was collected by in-depth interviews and participant observation. The author applied the case studies method for grounded data from the original sources. She later outlined the significance of the good example technique. Narrative techniques and content analysis were adopted, and the presentation was in the form of case studies.

Result

1. Evolution of Homosexual Male Prostitutes in Thai Society

Prostitution in Thailand was first appeared in "A New Historical Relation of the Kingdom of Siam 1691, Simon De La Loubere" (De La Loubere, 1986). Simon De La Loubere was a French Ambassador who had developed friendly relations with the Kingdom of Ayutthaya. During the reign of King Narai, the memoirs recorded about prostitution in the Kingdom of Siam that;

"The Siamese Lords are not less jealous of their Daughters than of their Wives: and if anyone commits a fault, they sell her to a certain man, who has a privilege of prostituting them for Money, in consideration of a Tribute which he pays the King: 'Tissaid that he has six hundred, all Daughters of Officers in esteem. He likewise purchases Wives, when the Husbands sell them, being convicted of infidelity.'" (De La Loubere, 1986, p. 74)

"These are the Offices which are called from within. Beside these, there are others which are called from without, for the Service of the Province. All have an entire dependence upon the Governor; and although those without have the like Titles, yet they are every inferior to the Officers within. Thus an Oc-Meuang within the Palace, is superior to an Oc-yaw without; and in a word it is not necessary to believe that all those who bear great Titles, must always be great Lords: That infamous fellow who buys Women and Maidst to prostitute them bears the Title of Oc-ya; he is called Oc-ya Meen, and is a very contemptible person. There are none but debauch'd persons that have any Correspondence with him. Everyone of the Officers within has his Lieutenant, in Siamese Balat, and his Register in Siamese Semien, and in his House, which the King gives him, he has generally a Hall to give his Audience." (De La Loubere, 1986, p. 85)

So, it could be said that prostitution could act freely in Ayutthaya and must be paid the tax which was called the "duty- prostitute". Although, Prostitution was a profession that was not appropriate the king found that they provided a good source of income. Therefore, he kept them for taxation (Poumisak, 2007, p. 213).

In 1804, prostitution appeared in "The law of the Three Seal". The code of witness manner referred to 33 individuals who could not witness to that "if there was a lawsuit, the prostitutes can't be taken as a witness. Nevertheless, in the case that..." (The law of the Three Seal V. 1, 2005, p. 279)

The prostitutes were also identified in the code of spouses that "if any men marry women actors, dancers, performers, beggars, and prostitutes. If these women were mistresses, they would be given penalty similar to Umdang-Ou..." (The law of the Three Seal V. 2, 2005, p. 297)

In addition, prostitutes were recorded in legend of the creation of Wat Kanika Phon. In King Rama III, Wat Kanika Phon built by Kun Mae Fang. It was a house of prostitution in Ratanakosin (Wikipedia, 2013).

Later, developments of prostitution were linked to the enactment to control prostitutes such as the Venereal diseases control Act (Rattanakosin era, 127) enacted by King Rama V. Before the Act, Thailand did not have any mechanism to resolve the prostitution problem. But, there was imposition. Then, the government of Thailand had enacted several laws to control prostitution for example, Prostitution prohibition Act (1960), Prostitution prevention and suppression Act (1996), and Human trafficking prevention and suppression Act (2008) used in present.

Therefore, prostitution has long been developed and had a close relation to Thai society. The relationship was close both in terms of way of living and the law. The definition of prostitute referred to "the person, male or female who engages in sexual intercourse for money and things. That the action is the same sex or different sex and it acts as a profession or an occasional." (Mattariganond, 1983, p. 5).

The form of male prostitutes may possibly develop from females. There was no evidence concerning male prostitution appearing in Thai society. The case of male prostitution did not include transgender or transsexual females. Rather, it meant both homosexual male and heterosexual male prostitutes. This study found evidence in Sri Krung Newspaper on Thursday, June 20, 1935. The Newspaper presented headline "Illegal establishment brothel and child prostitution". Inside content mentioned that "the arrest of Mr. Karun or Mr. Tuadam which an act of persuasion and seduction the boys age between 9-12 year old for prostitution". ("establishment brothel" 1935, p. 24). Whereat, the term "Tuadam" was later become the representation to meaning of anal sex (Saiyud, 2007).

Later, Thai Rath, a mass newspaper in Thailand, reported on Tuesday, October 12, 1965 that there was criminal behavior among homosexual male prostitutes. The Newspaper mentioned that "the homosexual male prostitutes group had behaved badly, prostitution, and stealing belongings of foreigners."

The news reflected the negative attitude of the journalist about homosexual male prostitutes and social threats found in society during that particular time. The Article 999 about "civilized people in the dark" in Thai Rath during 15-17 October 1965 reported that "homosexual male prostitute is a social problem at the national level, the government will need to control closely managed. And there should be legislation to deal with this homosexual male group." (Romjumba, 2002, pp. 71-4).

Today, male prostitutes or homosexual males are found in other groups such as in heterosexual male (Sumpao, 2003, p. 24). The situation roots from social factors such as broken families, economic factors, education factors, and consumerism in Thailand (Mungkhung, 1999, pp. 52-4).

Although the history of the male prostitute wasn't properly recorded, this form of sexual services has long been identified by Thai people at all levels. The popularity of homosexual male prostitutes, however, has been increasingly found in Thailand, such as in Pattaya City, Bangkok, Phuket, and

Chiang Mai. Now, prostitution is an obvious illegal social situation. Nonetheless, lack of power and invisibility of these male prostitutes are common. They are victims of corrupted local state officers, being physical and psychological abused as well as invisible in Thai society. They are one of the group of "people in between" living in the "grey area". They are sold and bought in the darkest corners of the brightest cities like Pattaya. They remain the group of "the powerless, and lack social bargaining". They are one of the most invisible groups in policy planning.

2. Current Situation and Problems of Homosexual Male Prostitutes

The author had spent days and nights on the street of Pattaya. The area at night was crowded of tourists and prostitutes both males and females. Some of them were very young. She informally introduced herself to the owners of brothel, the author requested permission for an interview in-depth. There are 3 case studies were individually interviewed. The details of each case was presented as follows;

CasestudiesI: Nong Nam

Nong Nam came from Phetchabun province. He graduated high school or grade 6th. He resided with his mother and grandmother because of his parents' separation. His family has long been in an agricultural farming. Because of poverty, he became a male prostitute in his teenaged years. He first started his career as a young waiter in a restaurant with others young employees. Later, he was persuaded from his friends to join a prostitution business. Within 2 months, he received compensation of 2,500-3,000 baht per month. Each night he went out with customers. Because of his youth, he received approximately 2,000 baht per night.

Nong Nam enjoyed working as a prostitute. He is not a forced prostitute. Every day he willingly and happily sells himself to customers. He stated that "I have a career that giving me a very good compensation. Nobody forced me to do it. I'm happy to have sex with my customers."

He has been working in this prostitution for 2 months. He received welfare from employer such as regular blood checking (every 3 months) by private authorities. Every year the employer gave him three days free travelling trip to Kanchanaburi province without any charge. He thought the trips were his bonus.

However, he concerned that his career was not sustainability. Although he is happy with it, but he concerns that being a prostitute is a risky occupation. For him, this is not only the risk of sexually transmitted diseases, immorality, but also being socio-physical-psychological abused by local officers and society. During the interview, he implied the power limitation in terms of lacking the freedom of choosing his own customers, paying unfair commissions to state officers, and insufficient social insurance during his illness.

CasestudiesII: Pee Bas

Pee Bas is a 25 years old male prostitute. He came from Chachoengsao province. He is another young male prostitute who had turned himself to be a male prostitute after his graduation from high school grade 6th. His family are poor and uneducated farmers. Before joining the prostitution, he had a career as an ice cream salesman at a department store in Bangkok. Because of his broken-heart with his boyfriend, he went to work in Pattaya on the advice of a friend. After one year working without promotion, he started using his working environment as the place to find customers. As a handsome young prostitute, he receives about 19,000 baht per month.

His reasons for being in prostitution included his break-up with his boyfriend, financial difficulty within his family, and the potential opportunity of living his life the way he wants. He wants more money and doesn't care how he can earn it. He sold himself to old customers and strangers. By this, he thinks money can make him happy. He announced that being a male prostitute doesn't require demanding work or intelligence. Lacking of property or home, his work allowed him to be employed anyway and anytime. The only disadvantage is his lacking of legal protection, social welfare, and social dignity. Although he has working as a male prostitute for one year, he has no savings. He expected that he might retire at the age of 28. He plans to save money and returning home after his retirement. Nonetheless, the socio-cultural environment in Pattaya is very persuasive for consumerism. At the end of the interview, he declared his unhappiness in terms of the lack of independence, lack of power to negotiate, and lack of social space. Sometimes, he feels like he is only "something" which has been used to satisfy sexual needs of the customers. He needs a better social status in Thai society. He thought that money was the only way to earn it.

CasestudiesIII:Pee Gay

Pee Gay is 28 years old. He came from a happy family in Roi-Et province after his graduation high school grade 3rd. His parents were poor farmers. He as a salesman in the department store. Nonetheless, low payment and limited social welfare pushed him to Pattaya to find a new job. He was finally persuaded by a friend to be a prostitute. He finally became a male prostitute for 8 months. He receives 2,500 baht per month and extra payment between 1,000 and 2,000 baht each night.

His reasons of being in prostitution are his loving night life and drinking alcohol with customers. He confessed that he has been addicted to make money through sexual intercourse. He is willing to be in the business without being forced or deceived. He has regular blood tests every 3 months, 2 days' vacation each week, and three days free trip to Kanchanaburi province every year.

Since being interviewed Pee Gay has been working in Pattaya for nearly 8 months. However, he had to cut his income and give money to corrupted state officers as a commission. With each sexual intercourse, he has to give part of his income to the corrupted officers. Because of the corrupted system, he feels the unfairness. In addition, he has shown negative attitude toward society. Being a male prostitute, he feels unaccepted from Thai society; unsecured work in an illegal environment, immorality, low social status, and risky from HIV infections. He felt powerless to negotiate and earning backs his social dignity. He does not know how to recover his reputation.

3.PolicySuggestion

This article revealed the interconnection between being male prostitution and numerous ignorant social policies. Therefore, problems of homosexual male prostitutes in the Pattaya city can't be solved unless a better socio-economic plan and strategy have been implemented. Moreover, problems of powerless, dehumanization and physical-mental-social abuse of these male prostitutes cannot be solved unless Thailand reduces the corruption and improve social welfare for all. To be more specific, the author suggested that:

First, a better social welfare for all needs to be created for the male prostitutes who has risky health problems. Do's or Don'ts behaviors of these "people in between" can lead to serious health problems for the whole society. Effective information, preventive campaign and regular blood checking need to be included to all employers' policy.

Second, to empower this group, the establishment of local supportive organization is crucial. The organization will provide information, negotiation, and regulation consultant, empowerment, and social spaces for public dialogue.

Last, to reduce the gap between illegal activities of corrupted state local officers and male prostitutes, a strong social networking needs to be constructed.

Discussion

This article revealed historical development of prostitutes in Thailand. Then, the causes of homosexual male prostitutes were explored by using three case studies. The author intended to use the three individual cases as the “good example” of revealing interconnection between the “people in between” who are living in “the grey area” and within the poor management of the state policy. By applying grounded theory, she managed to exhibit the relationship between the bigger picture of underdevelopment based on poor designation of development policy and the invisible group named male prostitute. She supported Charmaz (2006) by allowing grounded data to begin her academic journey instead of towering her conceptual framework from existing foreign theories and concepts. The flexible guidelines and systematic methodology introduced her inductive experiences of being stigmatized as a male prostitute herself. Grounded theory helped her get started, stay involved, and enjoy working in the project. By applying Glaser and Strauss (1967), Glaser (1978) and Strauss (1987), she was able to explore analytic ideas during long conversations and temporal order of being sold. Instead of using common development concepts such as identity or peripheral group, she allowed the situation giving her categories. She has a strong belief that by doing this she will be able to construct her grounded theories through her past and present involvements as well as her interactions with the “people in between” and their perspectives. By adopting a case study approach, she is challenging the theoretical rendering which offers merely an interpretive portrayal of the studied world, and not an exact picture of reality.

Conclusion

Prostitution in Thai society first appeared in the Kingdom of Ayutthaya during the reign of King Narai. Simon De La Loubere recorded about prostitution in the Kingdom of Siam in various forms. These included unequal power relations between women, the challenging benefit of interest between prostitution, slavery, and royalty of the state system. In 1804, prostitution was appeared in “The law of the Three Seal”. The code of witness manner referred to 33 individuals who could not witness, and the prostitutes were also identified in the code of spouses. In King Rama III, prostitutes were recorded in legend of the creation of Wat Kanika Phon. Later, developments of prostitution has been linked to the enactment for control prostitutes.

In short, it could be said that prostitution has long been developed in Thai society. This had a close relation of patron-client and corrupted system in Thai society. The relationship was close to dairy living of common Thais both in term of way of living and the law. There was no crystal-clear evidence concerning the origin of male prostitutes in Thai society. Nonetheless, evidences were exhibited in the form of news in social publication such as newspaper. These included those appeared in Sri Krung Newspaper on Thursday, June 20, 1935. The Newspaper presented headline “Illegal establishment brothel and child prostitution”. Later, Thai Rath, a mass popular newspaper in

Thailand, reported on Tuesday, October 12, 1965 that there was a criminal behavior among homosexual male prostitutes.

Today, male prostitutes or homosexual male is commonly found in other group such as the heterosexual male. The situation rooted from social factors such as broken family, economic factors, education factors, personal sexual preference, and consumerism in Thailand.

Now, prostitution has become an obvious illegal social situation. They are one of the “people in between” living in the “grey area”. They are sold and bought in the darkest corners of the brightest cities like Pattaya. They remain the group of “the powerless, and lack social bargaining”. They are one of the most invisible groups in policy planning. People laugh at them, and they are verbally and culturally abused. They have been pushed to the lowest class of Thai society.

Pattaya City was identified as a grey area. Male prostitutes were chosen as a “good example” for identifying the “people in between”. The study found that, these male prostitutes have become a part of the prostitution business through following the advice of their friends. They are willing to occupy their jobs without coercion. Their reasons of being in prostitution included money, good time, and opportunity in a better living. They don’t care how they earn it. They love the night life, drinking alcohol, and sexual addiction. They know that being prostitute is a risky occupation. This is not only the risk of sexually transmitted diseases, immorality, but also being physically, mentally and socially abused by local officers and society. They are unhappy in terms of the lack of independence, lack of the power to negotiate, and lack social space. They feel unaccepted, insecure from illegal work, immorality, low social status, risky from HIV infections, powerless to negotiate and earning backs their social dignity.

Of the situation, the authors suggest a better designation in social development policy. Three major recommendations are identified. First, a better health and social welfare for these people in between are crucial to reduce sexually transmitted diseases, HIV infections, and better opportunity in living. Second, a better establishment of representative organization is necessary. These social organizations should provide information, negotiation, and regulation consultants, empowerment, and social spaces for a better public dialogue. To empower these male prostitutes, the establishment of social support units will allow these male prostitutes to be visible. It will help protect them from socio-cultural abuse. Lastly, to reduce the gap between legal activities and corrupted state officers; a strong social networking needs among these male prostitutes be to be constructed.

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From “no Culture” to “bro Culture”: Discourses of Religious Harmony and Religion’s Role in the Mediation of Minahasan Identity in North Sulawesi, Indonesia

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As the early afternoon shadows slid across the open-air stadium in North Sulawesi’s highland town of Tondano, the colorful costumes of the thousands of performers gathered on the field faded in the momentary dimness, giving their spectacle over to the two most prominent features outside the stadium walls: Lokon mountain’s verdant volcanic peak, and the whitewashed spires of a Christian church. Illuminated by the waning light, these two features iconically invoked the landscape of Minahasa, a region in the North Sulawesi province, as a frame for the ‘cultural’ event unfolding in the stadium below. The stadium’s strategic location in the heart of the Minahasa region, not in the more easily reached provincial capital of Manado, consciously invoked the cultural, ‘localized’ nature of this event. Even the stadium’s name, “Stadion Maesa,” is a nod to Minahasa’s transformation, from a loose confederation of regional sub-ethnic groups, into a mapped locality on the northern tip of the island of Sulawesi.

Participants, uniformly spread across the field, looked less like ritual practitioners than players on a stage, carefully color-coordinated retinues moving in time to the same drumbeat, but enacting the movements of different “ethnic” dances. The dancers were flanked by long rows of *kolintang*, an instrument resembling a large wooden xylophone,¹⁰¹ all carefully arranged so that the uniforms of the various *kolintang* ensembles participating could be seen from the risers. The audience for this event was a single individual: Lucia Sinigagliesi, an American representative from the Guinness World Records organization who served as the official jury to preside of the simultaneous setting of four world records: one for the world’s largest *kolintang*, one for the world’s largest bamboo music trumpet, one for the largest music bamboo orchestra (*orkes musik bambu*), and one for the largest *kolintang* ensemble in the world.

Yet even as the organizers of the event, a group called the North Sulawesi Institute of Cultural Art (Institute Seni Budaya Sulawesi Utara, ISBSU), utilized this performance to showcase Minahasan culture on the world’s stage, the gathering also exposed the ambiguities inherent in defining what constitutes culture in Minahasa. The costumed participants on the field represented the different ethnic groups listed on the North Sulawesi Province’s Office of Culture and Tourism website. Their dances were accompanied by a disembodied voice speaking over the loudspeaker to narrate a tale of the mythical origins of the Minahasan people, one of the ten cultural subgroups officially recognized in the province. Even though the official position on societal categories in the North Sulawesi Province avoids linking ethnic groupings to religious identity, it seemed that the

¹⁰¹ The Minahasan *kolintang* resembles a xylophone and is made of lightweight wood. Although it is part of the same family of instruments referred to as *kulintang*, *gulintangan*, or *totobuang* in other regions of Southeast Asia, Minahasans view the instrument as unique to their region, since it is composed of wood, not metal.

performance of culture at this event was unmoored from the articulations of history that unambiguously linked Minahasa with Protestant Christianity. Although the link between Minahasa and its Christian past was conceptually separated, symbols of religious identity were still visible that day as Muslim women in *jilbab* played the *kolintang* next to men in Catholic frocks in the effort to achieve the world record.

In a poem called "Life's Harmony" written for the event by the ISBSU's founder, Benny Mamoto, the concept of harmony is a central motif linking Minahasa and the North Sulawesi region to the cultural past;

*The trumpet's call resounds to every corner of the world
Proclaiming the energy of peace from North Sulawesi
The melodious tinkling of the kolintang's bamboo keys
Reflects the song back touch our inner selves
The bamboo orchestra music and kolintang fuse into one,
Singing the soft tune of harmonious life ...
Today, in this cool and beautiful place ... the world sees us.
We demonstrate the beauty and richness of the cultural art of the
Minahasa people. The world listens to us.
We reveal the majesty of the character of local wisdom that is an inheritance from our
ancestors. Today, in this place ... we transmit the energy of Nusantara unity. We incite
the energy of world peace...*¹⁰²

Belonging to the largest predominantly Christian administrative unit in Indonesia, ethnic Minahasans define themselves against both the neighboring Muslim provinces to the south and the Muslim Javanese, the predominant ethnic group in Indonesian politics. Much of their identity has centered on their willing adaptation of Western cultural mores introduced by the Dutch during the colonial period, and most importantly, their early conversion to Protestant Christianity that facilitated their role as subaltern colonial elites during the period of the Dutch occupation. Dutch missionaries in the region employed traditions and life-cycle rituals, selectively reinterpreting local myths of origin to correspond with biblical imperatives of unity. These processes have encouraged the original tribes of this region that came to be called Minahasa, to think of themselves as belonging to an overarching ethnic identification based in the principles of Christian brotherhood. The name Minahasa itself, which refers both to a geographic region within North Sulawesi and an ethnic identification, is an adaptation of the term from one of the many indigenous regional languages that means "to unite" or "become one." The development of Minahasa as a place was realized as part of the colonial encounter, an interaction that necessitated inhabitants of the northern territory of Sulawesi not just to recognize who they were, but who they were in relation to the moral and ontological concerns of Christianity.

The majority of the inhabitants of the North Sulawesi Province¹⁰³ are Christian, and more

¹⁰² This poem was part of the official brochure for the 'Peristiwa Kebudayaan tingkat Dunia Pemecehan Rekor Seni Budaya, part of the 2009 North Sulawesi Arts and Culture Festival). The translation is by the author.

specifically, Protestant, representing 63.6% of the total population of the province. Muslims are listed as the next largest population in terms of religious demographics, at 30.9%. Catholics, who could be included under the heading of the Christian majority in the country register as a presence, although not a large one, at 4.40%. Hindus, Buddhists, Khonghucu and “others” make up less than one percent of the population.¹⁰⁴ In reality, not all the original tribes included under the umbrella term Minahasa were Christians (Wenas, 2007, p. 24), but those subgroups that historically associated with Islam are small in number and were peripheral to the central mountainous geography from which Minahasan culture is thought to emanate. Muslim groups who have had a presence in the region since the colonial period were excluded from the dominant ethnic identification due to their religion and to their affiliation with other regionally based identities in other parts of the archipelago. For example, the Arab Village (Kampung Arab) on the outskirts of Manado city, was originally known as the Ternate Village (Kampung Ternate) after traders and soldiers from the Sultanate of Ternate were enlisted by the Dutch East Indies Company to protect company interests around the port of Manado (Wenas 2007, p. 23). Despite 150 years of intermarriage with Minahasan women and the loss of their Javanese language abilities, Muslims in the Jawa Tondano village who settled on the shores of North Sulawesi’s Tondano lake, made a distinction between themselves and their neighbors through their historical association with the island of Java. Other immigrants, such as itinerant merchants hailing from the nearby province of Gorontalo, were also viewed as outsiders on account of their religion and their ties with Muslims from other regions or provinces.

As a political unit, North Sulawesi contains a Christian majority and a Muslim minority, a reversal of the Indonesian national profile. Although Christianity has acted as a unifying principle from the past, it provided a rather unstable anchor for defining who or what is unquestionably Minahasan. Using religion amongst the defining characteristics of an ethno-regional identity is problematic in terms of religious diversity within the political boundaries of the North Sulawesi Province. For one, pursuing the exclusive link between Christianity and Minahasa blocks access to new forms of power available through recently re-politicized constructions of cultural representation known as *adat*. More importantly, it endeavors to make Minahasanness and Christianity mutually exclusive, drawing stark lines of difference across previously gray zones of inclusion. As grounds for exclusion that pits Christians against Muslims, it threatens to explode the careful political maneuverings of Christian politicians who want to see their majority Christian province get ahead nationally: politicians who promote cultural frameworks based in localized expressions of brotherhood between Muslims and Christians, glossed by the oft-repeated slogan in the regional creole “*torang samua basudara*,” meaning “we are all brothers.” Both Christian politicians and Muslim locals have a joint goal of gaining for the region more recognition and a better position in the nation. No one sees disrupting the carefully cultivated harmonious religious relations as the means to doing so. The link between

¹⁰³ At the time of the 2010 census, the North Sulawesi Province was divided into 15 *kabupaten* or districts and *kota* or provincial city districts: Bolaang Mongondow, Minahasa, Kepulauan Sangihe, Kepulauan Talaud, Minahasa Selatan, Minahasa Utara, Bolaang Mongondow Utara, Kepulauan Siau Tagulandang Biaro, Minahasa Tenggara, Bolaang Mongondow Selatan, Bolaang Mongondow Timur, Kota Manado, Kota Tomohon, Kota Bitung and Kota Kotamabagu. Census data is recorded and calculated in accordance with these district divisions.

¹⁰⁴ BPSRI Sensus Penduduk 2010 Penduduk Menurut Wilayah Sulawesi Utara <http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321&wid=710000000>

cultural identity and Christianity would imply that Muslims are outsiders by default.

Furthermore, Minahasa's Christian history depicts past culture in the region as one that no longer is intact due to the efforts made by the Dutch Reformed missionaries when they inserted biblical meaning into traditional concepts and languages. By 1880, 90% percent of the population in the colonial territory of Minahasa had converted to Protestantism and began to adopt more westernised lifestyles under the tutelage of the Church and the Dutch East Indies Company. Although world religions such as Christianity are aligned with ethnic identifications in many regions of Indonesia, a number of factors make this difficult in the case of Minahasa. First, the kinds of museumized cultural relics such as housing styles, regional dress, dance and language that are the standard index of a shared cultural particularity provide a weak basis for Minahasan identity, as these practices were either transformed or dispensed of under the pressures of colonial rule. Those cultural objects that did endure have either been decontextualized through contact with Christian logics (and therefore are no longer considered purely cultural) or they represent only one group in Minahasa.¹⁰⁵ Contemporary deployments of traditional practices, especially in public performances meant for the tourist's gaze, also draw on standardized tropes for the performance and representation of regional cultures that are endorsed by the state (Acciaioli, 1985, p. 157; Hitchcock & King 2003, p. 4; Hoskins, 2002, p. 186; Picard, 2003, p. 109, Picard & Wood, 1997, p. ix; Spyer, 1996a, p. 25). These cultural productions for national and international audiences highlight the structural and ideological factors that contribute to the thinking that Minahasa has no "culture" to market, given the region's association with Christian and colonial domination. This association has stymied the efforts of both regional proponents of the cultural revival movement and the local tourism board in promoting Minahasa as a cultural destination, displaying unique dances and traditions.

Deciding exactly who and what constitutes the authoritative definition of culture in Minahasa will be difficult to answer in the way that cultural identity is conceptualized in Indonesia: as a locally-bound unit, with recognizable practices belonging to one group that are both distinct in content while being standardized in form. If Christianity cannot be used as the basis to define the nature of North Sulawesi's culture, what can take its place? The subordination of Christianity's role in the making of Minahasa might support better religious relations locally, but it threatens to erase the religion's influence on the region's distinct cultural history.

One strategy of maintaining Christianity's visibility without excluding other religious groups, especially local Muslims, is to construct locality through the terms of a common national discourse on community relations – the discourse of *kerukunan beragama*, or religious harmony. As Greg Acciaioli notes, discursive invocations of idioms of national harmony as an expression of local culture are a common strategy in overcoming divisive regional interests. By promoting a Minahasan identity that does not make religion a requirement of belonging, the basis for community inclusion shifts to new criteria of belonging such as the relationship shared by those who are associated with the same region, contrasting Minahasa along horizontal relationships with Indonesia's other

¹⁰⁵ For example, there is no Minahasan language, but a number of regional languages that are not mutually intelligible. The regionally specific language, Bahasa Manado, originated from a Malay trading tongue that eventually developed into a regional dialect that today corresponds to regional, not ethnic, boundaries.

ethnicities. Cultural displays in North Sulawesi, like the one at the Guinness World Record event, seek a solution to the problem of the historical alignment of Christianity with cultural practices in the region, a convergence that cedes ownership of culture to only one portion of a diverse population. The national discourse on religious harmony, or *kerukunan beragama*, in North Sulawesi speaks – or wishes to speak – in the voice of the national public. The insistence that North Sulawesi is a paragon of community relations and serves as a model for other provinces, the centrality of the region's role in the national affairs of Muslim-Christian relations. Efforts to align with the national ideology of peaceful religious relations are not unique to North Sulawesi and much of the language are drawn from the local public displays of 'harmonious life' which originates directly from the official government discourse on the desired state of religious relations in Indonesia (Acciaioli, 2001, p. 105).

Promoting harmonious relations and the ideal of the brotherhood as a cultural trait is employed to mitigate the threat that Minahasan identity will be rendered invisible as the relationship between religion and culture is brought under scrutiny on a national scale. The concept of *adat*, originally developed as a legalistic framework of Dutch governmentality that served to codify native populations, suggests an association with the realm of culture in the national parlance, a term used to index a standardized system for measuring cultural difference on the national scale (Spyer, 1996a, p. 25). However, the post 1998 Reformasi era has seen the concept *adat* employed more often in a sense that is reminiscent of political claims of indigeneity. It draws on an international discourse of recognition of an indigenous groups' ability to make claims against the state and agitate for the local control of resources. As a blanket term for the politicized practices and discourses that define a relationship between place, history and cultural community, the term *adat* encompasses elements of the national mandate on harmony between societal groups (Acciaioli, 2001; Aragon, 2001; Bowen, 1988; Li, 2001; Spyer, 1996). Yet the contemporary redefinition and deployment of the concept of *adat* as something that refers to practices and institutions from the past that pre-date government interventions (Henley & Davidson, 2008, p. 817) doesn't always concur with religious perspectives on what constitutes culture. This poses a challenge to Christians who want their religious history to remain a mark of distinction for their cultural community.

The terms *adat* and *kebudayaan*, respectively translated as tradition and culture, have distinct lexical meaning in the Indonesian language, but they are often used interchangeable in everyday conversation. The semantic slippage between the historical concept of *adat* as a reference to specific practices codified as quasi-legal codes for arbitrating land claims during the colonial period, and the practices or objects that symbolically represent cultural difference in Indonesia, demonstrates the way these concepts are aligned in common-sense understandings of difference and the politics of representation. Without the mitigation of national frames for communal life, the more atavistic definitions of the *adat* revival ideology can evolve into a fundamentalist alignment of religion and local identity. If religion is seen as an imported or foreign attribute, it minimizes the role it plays in regional political communities based on the idea of a shared cultural heritage.

As public displays of cultural art in Indonesia are presented to an ever-widening audience, they invoke comparisons between ethnic groups in the same way that the nation-state does. They are represented as decontextualized performances or objects that stand in for specific places, but could essentially be performed anywhere: on national television, on a stage for diplomats, or overseas at

an 'Indonesian' cultural night. This expanded form of address in North Sulawesi, the one that refers to the "we" of the nation, brings us back to those political boundaries that the state used to categorize cultures according to their geographic location. By serving as an example of model relations between Muslims and Christians, the province is discursively positioned as different in comparison to other place-based ethnicities in Indonesia. It is not in alignment with religion, yet it makes religion central to the picture in line with the nationalist ethos of culture as an emblem of regionality. Contrasting North Sulawesi with other regions highlights the weak and fractured nature of ethnicity that does not encompass the diverse populations and histories of the region. It posits that a history of shared relations between religious groups can stand in as an object of cultural distinction. This nod to the deterritorialized, cosmopolitan ties that underlie Minahasa's establishment recognizes how connections to elsewhere are in part what makes one local (Brown, 2005, p. 241). It can, therefore, be located in the realm of the cultural through portable, public displays of cultural art that stand in as symbols of regional identity.

From a local Muslim perspective, discourses that situate local Muslims as ethnically similar to Christians in the region are used in contrast with their co-religionists in places like Java. Both Muslims and Christians alike contrast the political and social characteristics of Muslims in North Sulawesi with that of the "mainstream" Muslims in the country's political center. The absorption of Minahasan identity into the ethno-regional frame can fuse religious identity with local characteristics, seemingly making Muslims in North Sulawesi more like their Christian regional counterparts than Indonesian Muslims from other regions. A Muslim representative of the Department of Religion in Manado, explained that, when visitors from one of Indonesia's largest Muslim civil organization's had visited the region to learn about a program for interreligious relations run by the local government, the differences between Javanese Muslims and Muslims from North Sulawesi were notable. For instance, he contrasted Muslims in North Sulawesi with Muslims from other regions who follow the prescribed religious rules about greeting non-Muslims with the shortened version of the phrase *assalamu'alaikum*.

Recently the head of NU (Nadhulatl Ulama) came. We gave an explanation about BKSAUA, and those in Jakarta salute us for what is going on here, we're still fortunate with everything. This is what a North Sulawesi person is, especially a Minahasan, especially a Manadonese, if he does something, if he says *salam*, there's no one who thinks it's wrong. He's better than a Javanese person, I'm sorry to say, but those Muslims have difficulty saying *salam*, right? Try and see, everything is possible for him, even if it's just saying *salam*

These kinds of statements are striking in the contemporary context where Muslims increasingly express their anxiety over "contamination" by proximity to Christian communities. This is part of the burgeoning repietization movement that swept the Islamic world beginning in the 1970s and 1980s (Hefner, 2005, p. 18). Largely a civil society movement, the resurgence of pietistic Islam is concerned with the purification of Islamic practice, especially within the public sphere. This concern considers the effect that interreligious activity might have on Muslims and the implications for their ritual practices. Anxieties over community "mixing" were explicitly aimed at traditions of cooperation between Muslims and Christians. An example of this could be seen by the request made by the Indonesian Muslim Ulema Council that the attorney general remove sections from national

textbooks that encourages students to observe the holidays of other religious groups. This is, a reiteration of a 1981 *fatwa* preventing Muslims from attending Christmas celebrations (Bowen, 2003, p. 237). Attention to the boundary policing between Muslim and Christian groups extended to the micro-linguistic level where Muslim scholars debated if it was appropriate for Muslims to answer the standard Arabic greeting *assalamu'alaikum'* if it originated from a Christian speaker (ibid., 238).

North Sulawesi residents feel a responsibility not only to protect Christian interests, but also to demonstrate how regional logics make Muslims in Minahasa different to Muslims living closer to the center. Cultivating religious harmony has also accentuated a sense of cultural difference that has the power to transect religious loyalties in favor of regional solidarity, refuting the idea that all Muslims are oriented towards politics that are an anathema to Christian citizens. Therefore, the meaning of local identity in Minahasan is about the relationship between the Muslim majority and the Christian minority in the Indonesian nation and how the international character of those religious subject positions are mediated through the terms of national belonging.

The performance of regional harmony as a mark of cultural distinction overlaps with the project of regional *adat* practitioners and activists who seek to delineate an ontological division between Christianity and Minahasan culture which does not exist. They prioritize the idea of *adat* as a platform for political mobilization, similar to other civil society organizations that represent regional interests in the process of democratic participation within the state (Acciaioli, 2007, p. 345-346). They construct their version of what represents Minahasa today by imaging a past that can be unearthed from the weight of the region's protracted interaction with Protestantism. The power of the discourses that question the relationship between culture and religion has opened a space for local Muslims to make public claims that they too are Minahasans. The resurgence of the concept of *adat* as a political resource for calculating identity highlights social relationships in a shared territory as one of its core principles. This way of measuring who belongs to Minahasa not only minimizes the exclusivist alignment of Minahasa with Christianity, but also validates consocial forms of identity such as a shared history of interaction, language, and interreligious marriage between Muslims and Christians that played a part in delineating Minahasa's boundaries both geographically and abstractly. Ironically, the presentation and performance of Minahasan identity in the kinds of standardized public displays that present cultural identity as immutable, timeless and primordial are the very same events that are increasingly inclusive of the diverse local population and highlight the ideal of a regional, multi-religious cultural brotherhood. As Christian Minahasans have been debating the possibility of a culture without Christianity, they have perhaps unwittingly created new alternatives for belonging.

In Indonesia, groups use a number of strategies to gain recognition for the unrecognized ties that have both social and conceptual weight in their everyday interactions. They may demonstrate that particularistic practices share a conceptual similarity with already recognized categories, such as the state-sponsored world religions (Monnig-Atkinson, 1983, p. 685). Alternately, local practices can be subsumed under religion, marking cleavages between religions or across denominations. Minahasa provides an apt case study of how the historical denial of the ontological divide between culture and Christianity for Christian-identified ethnic groups in Indonesia can be problematic in light of the renewed viability of representations of tradition (*adat*) that correspond to categorical definitions of

difference based in locality. Christianity is undeniably a characteristic of particularistic belonging in North Sulawesi. Displaying difference through the state discourse of harmonious relations may seem to be a compromise between being Christian with “no culture” and representations of culture that deny how Minahasa took shape conceptually through its historical association with Christianity. Yet this equation promotes an inclusive cultural identity that ultimately makes Christianity visible through the terms of the non-threatening nationalist idiom. This is not overtly Christian politics, but, instead, politics infused with the Christian values inculcated in North Sulawesi’s history where Christians and Muslims alike adopt the Protestant Christianity’s concern with the division of the world into proper categories as part of the production of difference, and engage with the implications of what the principle of brotherhood means for their region.

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Serving Family and Community: A Preliminary Study of Elderly Women among Meranao Muslims in Southern Philippines

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Introduction

Age represents one dimension of social organization as well as social stratification. Age determines peoples' status, roles, entitlements and privileges. Social institutions like schools, the military, government, legal, health and insurance agencies require an age regimen among people wishing to access entrance or claim privileges. However, age as an important organizing principle in society has not received enough attention the way concepts of race, class and gender do.

Even in an affluent nation such as America, the study of aging and ageism has been overlooked, at least, until 1985, from the perspective of academic feminism.

*When Barbara Macdonald spoke on a plenary at the 1985 NWSA convention, she was **angry!** A pioneer in feminist aging studies, Macdonald described a four-year fight to get the topic of aging included in a plenary session. She took feminists to task when she asked, "Has it never occurred to those of you in Women's Studies, as you ignore the meaning and the politics of the lives of women beyond our reproductive years, that this is male thinking? Has it never occurred to you as you build feminist theory that ageism is a central feminist issue?" (Macdonald, quoted in Marshall, 2006)*

Likewise, inside and outside academia, there is a tendency to characterize and essentialize the elderly (60 years old and above according to UN definition) based on their physical and external appearance which further serves to marginalize them from what is valued and considered normal – youthful, active, strong, good-looking - in so called "civilized" societies.

Yet, every society within a cultural and historical milieu has its own way of treating the elderly. Reviewing Simone de Beauvoir's "The Coming of Age" (1949), a seminal work on aging and the elderly, Proyect (1972) wrote:

"... the more primitive a society, the better it treats the old since they are a real asset in understanding the environment that provides food and shelter. Also, since a communal society has no interest whatsoever in profits or money, there is little incentive to throw "unproductive" members of the tribe to the wolves. "Close and affectionate" relationships are common among the Navajo elderly and their grandchildren. Their families are matrilinear and the women are respected. The Jivaro people have particular use for the elders since it is "thanks to their experience that the knowledge of animals and plants and also of pharmacology has been able to evolve".

Another issue that tends to occlude further understanding of the elderly, thanks to critique coming from Third Wave feminism, is to see (women), or in the present case of old people as a monolith, a homogenous group, disregarding their various social locations in terms of family membership, education, socio-economic status, health and well-being. Furthermore, the gender dimension stares in the eye as the elderly groups 60 years old and above tend to be numerically dominated by females as age advances and women outlive men as widows and divorced or separated (NSO, 2010).

Philippine population stands at 92.3 million according to the 2010 Census of Population and Housing (CPH) of the National Statistics Office. The population of the Philippines may be considered as generally young with a median age of 23 with the population aged 0-14 composing 33.4% of the total population. The proportion of working age population, people aged 15-64, has shown a consistent increasing trend – from 51.4 percent in 1970 to 62.3 percent in 2010 (or an average annual rate of 2.8 percent)(Albert, 2012).

The proportion of population in the older age group (65 and above) had increased from 2.9 percent in 1970 to 4.3 percent in 2010. However, the number of persons 65 years and above had increased at a faster rate of 3.4 percent per year. In general, the Philippine population is characterized by a growing proportion in the working ages and a slightly increasing elderly population (Ibid).

The “graying” of Philippine population has yet to come. This could be one reason why academic interest has not yet picked up. Studies on population aging and that distinct age category –the elderly or older persons - tend to be limited among a small circle of demographers and few social scientists¹⁰⁶. The study problems focus on living arrangements (Domingo et al., 1993; Cruz, 1998), work, income and expenditure patterns (Gultiano & Agustin, 2008), promoting health and well-being, expanding employment opportunities and enabling environment (Racelis, Abrigo & Salas, 2012) and care and social support for the elderly from the family. Generally, the elderly are viewed from broad, macro perspectives, although these approaches are not uncommon nor bad for a growing field of study.

Nevertheless, the study and awareness of aging and the elderly is inevitable when what used to be young and supple becomes old, an oddity; when what used to be normal becomes an “other” or what de Beauvoir considers old as akin to woman as the other sex. The words of Marshall, a feminist, reverberate thus:

Each of us has confronted, or will eventually have to confront, the physical, psychological, social, and other changes that happen with time; all of us who live will eventually belong to the "Othered" category that is old age (Ibid).

Study Objectives

Rather than represent the elderly as determined actors of system logic in fixed identities, I approach older women from their own perspectives and view them as active agents. In this paper, my goal is to explore and understand the process of aging, how we grow old as experienced by women. This

¹⁰⁶ Although the inclusion of two panel sessions on the elderly in the recently concluded 2014 Annual Scientific Conference of the Philippine Population Association on January 20-21, 2014 is commendable.

shall be achieved by surfacing the roles and contributions of older women in Meranao Muslim society, one of the largest Muslim groups in the predominantly Christian island of Mindanao, Philippines. The specific questions to be answered are the following:

1. What activities and responsibilities do older women as parents and grandparents take?
2. What roles do they assume in the community as mandated by the traditional social structure?
3. How did they make sense of their roles? Who are their allies? What are their gains?

Theoretical Background

Third Wave Feminism: Difference, Social Location

Earlier conceptualizations of *womanas* universal and monolith point to their similar form of subordination and invisibility based on sex-gender socialization. However, reacting to the above conceptualization as reflecting some women's Western white middle class bias, Third Wave feminists, identifying themselves as women of color, starting from the late eighties have pointed out women's varying social location in terms of age, gender, class, race/ethnicity, religion, disability and other dimensions of hierarchy. They contend that the 'calculus of pain' or subordination vary depending on women's social location.

Adding another layer of hierarchy based on age –that of being old- all the more adds to women's disadvantage, early feminists argue. However, Third Wave feminists point out that this should be viewed from women's social location which shows that women differ across societies and culture, thus being woman and old need not put one in subordinate position, but instead on a privileged status¹⁰⁷. At the same time, the above feminist group holds that the identification of vectors of subordination and privilege has come to be the "cutting theoretical edge." (Lengermann & Niebrugge in Ritzer, 1996, p.333).

In Simone de Beauvoir's *The Coming of Age*, we are reminded that old age is our universal destiny. Beauvoir tells us that its lived meaning is specific to our historical, class and cultural situations. It keeps making the point that if we speak of old age as a universal category we will miss the crucial differences among the aged that the myths and images of aging hide. Further, unlike *The Second Sex* which speaks of a single myth of femininity, *The Coming of Age* tells us that the image of the aged differs from time to time and place to place.¹⁰⁸

In the latter work, there is prescription for a meaningful aging from the author herself. Here's an excerpt:

There is only one solution if old age is not to be an absurd parody of our former life, and that is to go on pursuing ends that give our existence a meaning—devotion to individuals, to

¹⁰⁷ For an insider perspective, the author herself an Ibaloi-Bontoc from Luzon, Northern Philippines, see Zenaida H. Pawid, "Growing Old, Gracefully and Wisely: Cordillera Indigenous Women After Fifty", *Women in Action* (3:2000). Isis International-Manila. 1998-2000. Another work on Samoki women's life course from childhood to maturity to old age and views women as the "giver of life" is that of Virginia B. Dandan, "Women's Lives in an Ethnic Community: A Profile of the Samoki", *Review of Women's Studies* Vol. 1 No. 1, 1990.

¹⁰⁸ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2004.

*groups, or to causes—social, political, intellectual, or creative work. In spite of the moralists' opinion to the contrary, in old age, we should wish still to have passions strong enough to prevent us from turning in upon ourselves. One's life has value so long as one attributes value to the life of others, by means of love, friendship, indignation, compassion.*¹⁰⁹

Growing Old: The Last Stage of the Life Course

Another perspective that informs this paper is the action-interaction model of the life course perspective. Unlike adulthood-work life cum the reproductive stage, the older stage – the end-of-life stage- of the life course is less theorized particularly in the Philippines. As a concept, life course is defined in Natividad, ed. (Introduction, 2004, citing Elder, 1996) as follows:

...the life course refers to age-graded life patterns embedded in social structures and cultures that are subject to historical change. These structures vary from social ties with family and friends at the micro-level to age-graded life patterns and hierarchies in work organizations and to policy dictates of the state. Change in the life course shapes the form, content and process of individual development and such change may be prompted in part by the maturation or aging of the individual as well as by social forces (Ibid., p. 2).

Moreover, four major themes underlie the life course theory. These are: 1) the interaction of individual lives and historical time; 2) the dynamic relationship between human agency and social constraints; 3) the timing of life events along age-graded normative patterns; and 4) the interconnectedness of individual life histories.

All four themes emphasize the social embeddedness of life events and individual lives. Life course is the individual's life lived in time as a product of the dialectical interaction between structural/institutional pressure and human agency as well as the agent's negotiation between constraints and opportunities. As an example, in a study of American elderly women, the emphasis was on "the interaction between historical events, personal decisions, and institutional opportunities and on how experiences early in life affect subsequent outcomes" (Quadagno, citing Elder, 1999, p.15). Aside from the above themes, important concepts are human agency, transition, trajectory and life event.

The action-interaction model of the life course challenges static conceptions of the 'life cycle' or 'family cycle' as "fixed and repetitive sequence of ages and stages within human life and experience. The term 'life course' has been adopted as a way of envisaging the passage of a 'lifetime less as the mechanical turning of a wheel and more as the unpredictable flow or river" (Hockey & James, 2003). Life course becomes a conceptual way of seeing individual lives being fashioned within social constraints and historical contexts rather than following a life cycle in repetitive sequence of stages.

Aging as Activity Rather than Disengagement

A common perspective concerning the elderly is that of old people who are physically fragile and slow and gearing towards retirement or are retired, and thus, a decline in activity. However, emerging frameworks in the social sciences and academic feminism hold that rather than aging as

¹⁰⁹ Simone de Beauvoir. 1972, Excerpts from *The Coming of Age* by Simone de Beauvoir. Copyright © 1972 by Andre Deutsch. Reprinted by permission of the Putnam Publishing Group. In Hutchison, 2010.

vulnerability or end, aging may be seen as transition, a 'new beginning', a period of continuing growth, and a period

of "life-harvesting", when one becomes more appreciated as a wise person, a "sage"...Anthropologist Joan Halifax, who has studied tribal shamans and medicine people discovered how the elders of tribal societies have shown the developmental possibilities of old age. "Elders function like old cobblers and dressmakers, sewing us back into the fabric of creation" (Halifax, quoted by Apuan-Narciso in Guerrero, ed., 1999, p. 29).

The view that old people need not become the persons that they have been stereotypically seen has been offered in the concept of "successful aging."

...successful aging means just what it says—aging well, which is not aging at all. The three main components of successful aging—avoiding disease and disability, maintaining mental and physical function, and continuing engagement with life—are important throughout life, but their realization in old age differs from earlier life stages (Rowe & Kahn, 1998, in Hutchison, 2010).

Similarly, in one of her books, *The Measure of My Days*, (1979) which she wrote at the age of 80, Florida Scott Maxwell wrote: "Age puzzles me. I thought it was quiet time. My seventies were interesting and fairly serene, but my eighties are passionate. I grow more intense as I age".

Such celebrations are consistent with the position of developmental psychologists' idea of aging as period of integration and self-actualization and the activity theory which is a reaction to the functionalist disengagement theory. The activity theory holds that "to the extent that elderly people do disengage, they substitute new roles and responsibilities for the ones they leave behind" (Macionis, 2012, p. 359).

The Distinctiveness of Meranao Muslims¹¹⁰

Maranaos belong to the second largest of thirteen (13) Muslim groups primarily located in Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and southern Palawan which, all-together are variably estimated in different sources to compose 2 to 5 million. Majority of contemporary Meranaos live in the province of Lanao del Sur, one of four provinces and two cities that compose the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Lanao del Sur registered as having the second largest population of 933,260, next to Maguindanao Province with 944,260 total population (NSO, 2010). However, according to a survey conducted by the defunct Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) Regional Offices, as of 1992, Meranaos had the largest population among the 13 Muslim groups at 1,844,685, followed by the Maguindanaons at 1,589,683.

Méranaos as a people traditionally occupy the area bounding Lake Lanao, 2,300 feet above sea level, fifty kilometers from the northern seacoast and thirty seven kilometers from its southwestern seacoast, "making them unique among the Muslim groups in terms of their non-coastal, inland

¹¹⁰ This section is adapted from my dissertation entitled *Negotiating Gender, Culture and Religion in Marriage and Family Life Transitions: Herstories of Fourteen Meranao Muslim Women*, 2008 with some updating on population facts and figures.

location. Unlike all the other Muslim groups who are located along coastal areas or major river systems, the Méranos are isolated in the highlands of northwestern Mindanao. This isolation contributed to the preservation and/or development of certain features which are not commonly encountered among other Philippine ethnic groups" (Baradas, 1977).

These features include ranked descent, arranged marriage with complicated bride price transactions, a system of elite titles, specific association of line of descent with particular localities, a notion of a precise social contract, and a system of rank differentiation (Ibid.).

The underlying principle in all of the above features is the concept of *pet-a-pengampong sa ranaw* (four states or principalities of Lanao) whereby Méranao social organization is based (Mednick, 1965; Warriner, 1975, 1984-85; Barcenas, 1984-85; Saber & Tamano, 1985-86; Tawagon, 1996). These states are supposed to have been founded by kin-related ancestors who either descended from mythical and historical heroes in epics (like *Rajah Indrapatra* and the *Darangen*) or from Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) through his daughter Fatimah down to Sarip Kabunsuan who converted the Maguindanao and Meranao peoples (Saber & Tamano, 1985-86) to Islam.

Within each state or principality are several subdivisions which are generally classified as *inged-a-pegawidan* (townships of super-ordinate status) or *inged-a-pegawid* (townships of subordinate status) which in turn are subdivided into smaller *agama* (community) where real society is lived. Blood relationship which can be traced from the founding ancestors is called *bangsa* which means "royal descent" (Saber & Tamano, 1985-86), but from an outside observer (Warriner, 1984-85), simply *bangsa* (meaning descent line; lineage). In Méranao society, "who one is, what right and duties one has in relation to others, who one is affiliated with and where one belongs all depends upon who one's ancestors were" (Ibid.).

Women in Meranao Society

Central to Meranao social structure is some amount of deference accorded to women coming from both culture and Islam. Women are regarded as *montiya* (precious jewel) which needs care and protection. As such, a family that is short of fulfilling that obligation, with its women members degraded/humiliated in public would compel its male members to take action, violent it may be (Saber, Tamano with Warriner, 1960).

The role of women in reproduction as bearers of the next generation is valued both in Meranao socio-cultural milieu and in Islam. Children are highly valued to continue the family line and to make for a big, powerful extended family. A big family is important for the acquisition, maintenance and restoration of family *maratabat* (pride or reputation), political aspirations and for other interests (Ibid.).

Among Meranaos, respect for women can also have religious basis. This can be gleaned from the Prophet's view of women below:

It is told that a man came to the Prophet and said: "Who is the most deserving of my protection?" The Prophet answered: "Your mother." The man then asked: "Then who?" The Prophet answered: "Then your mother." Lastly the man asked: "Then who?" The prophet answered: "Then your father" (Ibn al Hajjaj, quoted by Qaddura, p. 4).

Furthermore, women in Maranao society are said to occupy a special place by virtue of their customary laws (*adat*) and this is easily observable in everyday transactions. Such deference is especially true to women from the royalty who can assume traditional position/titles parallel to those of men¹¹¹ in the class structure. Women have titles of their own such as *Bai-a- Labi* (meaning “Great Lady” which is equivalent to the male sultan), and lesser titles like *Ba’i- a- Dalomancob*, etc. which they pass on to the deserving heirs (Tawano, p.120). As occupants of titles, they assume duties and responsibilities as well as enjoy and are accorded rights and privileges.

There are scanty empirical studies about Meranao Muslim women’s status. One available study is that of Umpa’s masteral thesis (1972) on family decision-making involving 200 married Meranao women in Marawi City representing a cross-section of population in terms of educational attainment. This study asked specific areas of decision-making ranging from daily preparation of food to travel to buying a car or jeep. It showed areas of decision-making in various activities in the household. While women dominated in only two areas, specifically, in the “daily preparation of food” and “setting aside some portion of monthly income”, most decision areas were jointly decided including the marriage of children. College education was found to have statistical significant relationship to active participation in decision-making.

Recently, there is evidence of interest among Meranao women to go to school. This interest is demonstrated by enrolment in the province of Lanao del Sur showing females dominating the secondary, post-secondary, college undergraduate, college degree graduate and post-baccalaureate categories (NSO, 2010). Whether it is decision-making in the family-household or outside of it, education is expected to have positive effect on women’s social status.

Data and Methods

Partial data for this paper was culled from research for my dissertation entitled *Negotiating Gender, Culture, and Religion in Marriage and Family Life Transitions: Herstories of Fourteen Meranao Muslim Women* (2008). Data were gathered about women across the life course in each significant transition such as entry to marriage, marriage and reproduction, becoming subsequent wife, getting out of marriage, widowhood, and the later years. The research employed a qualitative-descriptive research design and conducted 26 in-depth interviews of women and four men. Expanded life stories of 14 Meranao women were derived from the in-depth interviews. Various modes of observation like participant observation and simple observation were also used.

This paper intends to shed more light on the last transition/stage of the life course – the older years. Moreover, the life stories of four women from my dissertation research – those of Norhata, Potri, Lawan, and Salma (not their real names) shall be utilized. In addition, for the purpose of updating data for this paper, I conducted two more extended interviews and a focus group discussion (FGD) on Meranao older persons or elderly in January and early February 2014.

Using qualitative data, the paper analyzes data by listening to Meranao women’s life stories, interpreting in-depth interviews and FGD data (the last technique was participated by both women

¹¹¹ A Maranao woman informant, herself having *pegawidan* status, however, avers that this may be true to women of the past, and that contemporary women title-holders may not have as much real power as what they have been imagined to have.

and men). The analysis attempts to provide understanding of the lives of older Meranao women: the role and responsibilities they assumed as parents, grandparents and widows; their roles in the wider community; how they made sense of these roles and the gains from these roles and activities. The data is limited to Meranao Muslims only.

Definition of Terms

For the purpose of clarity, the following terms are conceptually and operationally defined, to wit:

Older or Elderly Women. Women belonging to the last few stages of the life course. Adopting the UN definition, it refers to women 60 years old and above. The Philippine Office of Senior Citizens (OSC) officially establishes them as *senior citizens* starting from age 60.

'Meranao Muslim women' and 'Meranao women'. These terms will be interchangeably used here to mean one and the same group.

Human Agency. The life course perspective identifies three modes of human agency: 1. *Personal agency* is exercised individually, using personal influence to shape environmental events or one's own behavior. 2. *Proxy agency* is exercised to influence others who have greater resources to act on one's behalf to meet needs and accomplish goals. 3. *Collective agency* is exercised on the group level when people act together to meet needs and accomplish goals (Bandura, 2006, cited in Hutchison, 2010). In this paper, human agency include the actions, decisions and responsibilities of older women (personal agency), as they are assisted and /or supported by individuals like father and husband (proxy agency); and family (collective agency).

Transition. Change in roles and statuses that represents a distinct departure from prior roles and statuses.¹¹²

Trajectory. Long-term pattern of stability and change, which usually involves multiple transitions.

Life Event. Significant occurrence involving a relatively abrupt change that may produce serious and long-lasting effects. For example, the death of a spouse is a life event that involves both transitions and trajectory within the family as well as transitions and trajectory in other domain like income-earning and in other social groups.

Discussion: Activities and Responsibilities of Older Meranao Women

AS PARENTS

Despite the recent trend toward establishing a conjugal home among newly-married Meranao couples, many Meranao families still accommodate married children in parents' homes, thereby making for an extended family. The family household of Rashidah (not her real name) consists of three families – her and her husband with 3 unmarried children, a married son with his wife and child, and a childless married daughter with her husband. Rashidah¹¹³, short of five months to becoming 60 years of age, explains and summarizes her role and responsibilities (along with her husband) in relation to their adult children:

¹¹² This and the succeeding concepts are adapted from Hutchison, 2010.

¹¹³ Interview, Dr. Anisah Pangcatan, January 16 and 23, 2014, Marawi City.

Providing for our children's needs

Deciding jointly with my husband the academic course our children would take, in what school and the school's location

Discreetly looking for marriage partners for our children of marriageable age regardless of gender

Being consulted by married son about his entrepreneurial plan to augment the income he receives as an employee in an educational institution

Even if they are already adults or with lives of their own or with families, we feel that we are still morally bound to look after them.

While we respect some of their decisions, our responsibilities to them never end. We cannot let them go kahit may pamilya na sila (even if they already have their own families)

Whether married children reside with their parents or not, parents are always concerned with their children's lives. Lawan, 68, a widow grandparent, said:

If our children have problems, even if they don't seek help, we have to help them.

AS GRANDPARENTS: Expanded Responsibilities

As women advance in age, responsibilities as parents do not end. Contrary to the stereotype idea that the older stage of life is more laidback with the individual having more control for personal interests and leisure, Meranao women's responsibilities to children are not severed and are extended to grandchildren. For one study participant, Potri, 54, a widow grandparent, said: "*nag-increase ang responsibility, hindi nabawasan*" (my responsibility increased, it did not decrease).

My role as a grandmother and a mother is heavier. I have a bigger role because I am involved in the affairs of my children... like when one of my children went on a pilgrimage, I was requested to temporarily move to Marawi to supervise her family. She wants me to see how her helper treats her children...So my responsibilities have increased rather than decreased.

Rashidah:

When my son and her wife go out of town, we don't mind leaving to us, and taking care of their child. In fact, I think we tend to spoil our grandchild especially because he is the first grandchild.

Lawan: A Meranao cultural practice:

I have so many responsibilities (now as grandmother) ...we cannot extricate ourselves from responsibilities. In our culture, as long as a parent is alive, his/her responsibilities to his/her children never ends. In fact, those responsibilities are extended to the grandchildren...

In fact, when they were young mothers still schooling for college education, Lawan's and Potri's children were reared by their own mothers. (Within the feminist literature, *mothering* is a role that need not necessarily be done by the blood mother but by anyone who performs the role and imbibes the values and attitudes of mothers).

In turn, Lawan reared her eldest *apo* (grandchild). In effect, this grandchild has now gotten two sets of parents: his own biological parents and his parents' parents. Lawan treats him as one of her own children also deserving of equal privileges and whatever inheritance they may have from her¹¹⁴. She even reminds her children to do the same. This practice is built in the Meranao cultural and kinship system that assures the continuity of family descent line and ties from the parents to children to children's children.

Lawan:

In fact, we were the one who took care of our eldest grandchild. His parents got married while still studying. When their eldest child was born, we took him while he was still in the hospital's nursery room. We were the one who spent for all his need. We were the one who raised him.

WIDOWS: As Parents, as Grandparents and as Husbands' Replacement

For many married women, the death of a husband is a life-changing life event. It can be emotionally and mentally devastating, and in some cases depending on one's socio-economic status, financially devastating. The death of a husband signals the transition and/or trajectory to a life without a partner after decades of shared life, and being identified, as couple. Widowhood means a trajectory and orientation to the life and responsibilities formerly occupied by the husband.

Women are typically wedded to men who are older than them making the later years of the life course to be numerically dominated by females. A cursory look at some statistics may prove this point. In 2000, NSO data show that ever-married women in Marawi City registered an average age at first marriage of 21 years. About 9.21 % of ever-married women of 15-49 years old got married at the age of 18 years. Furthermore, data on sex ratio in Lanao del Sur in 2010 showed more females for the age groups 75-79 and 80 and above while, data about widowed population show more females (13,589) than males (5,036); and more separated/divorced females (5,739) than males (3,446) (NSO, 2010).

There is a striking similarity between the stories of two widows, Norhata, 53, and Lawan, 68, in the way they have assumed responsibilities in their husbands' *agama* or community. Norhata's husband had responsibilities to his *agama* as *sultan* while in the case of Lawan's husband, Daud, his grandfather was the original *sultan* in his community. In their own words, "*ako ang naging substitute*" (Norhata); "*ako ang kapalit*" (Lawan).

Norhata: "*ako ang naging substitute*" (I became the substitute)

It should be noted that their roles now are in conformity with the wishes of their husbands when they were still alive. Norhata's husband wanted her to maintain her make-up, the orderly arrangement of their house, the usual participation in social obligations in relation to relatives, the

¹¹⁴ Also expressed in an interview by Ms. Norjannah A. Manalocon, January 20, and February 4, 2014, Marawi City. Ms. Manalocon, now in the teaching profession, was practically reared and grew up from childhood to maturity with her grandmother while her mother was still studying in college. Her grandmother was basically a disciplinarian to her and provided most of her needs.

regular cleaning and visitation of his grave and of his family, and most importantly, to attend all the community ceremonies and rituals in his behalf (“substitute”).

Lawan: “*ako ang kapalit*” (I became his replacement)

With the demise of her husband, Lawan, moved in the house of her married daughter’s house. Incidentally, this house was constructed on her husband’s share of property from his parents. This inevitably drew Lawan geographically close to the people of her husband, and thus to discharge responsibilities as if she were her husband (“*ako ang kapalit*”, or I became his replacement).

The responsibilities included settling conflicts in property division, political matters, and issues related to building a new mosque for the *agama/inged* and dealing with rival families, etc. (“*ako ang naka-shoulder sa mga problema ng community nya*”)(on my shoulders landed the problems of his community) . While she admitted that she had experienced dealing with such responsibilities before as *Bai-a-labi* herself, she now realized the big difference because she has to do it alone (“*buhay na walang partner*”)(life without partner), whereas before they dealt with those responsibilities together.

Community Roles

This section deals with the roles played by Meranao women in the *agama* which is considered the smallest socio-political and religious unit of Maranao society, or in Warriner’s words, “where life is actuality lived.” The *agama* is organized at the base of the pyramidal structure of the Maranao traditional political system of organization. It is relatively a small community ranging from three to twenty families bound together by kinship bonds, group alliances, as well as socio-religious and political activities. Most members are kin-related whether by blood or affinity.

Meranao women can assume a traditional community position by being installed as a *Bai-a-Labi* (literally “great lady”) which is akin to the position of a *Sultan*¹¹⁵; both are considered traditional leaders of a community whose domain may vary in size. There is a system of leadership and assumption of titles such that there are communities wherein only *Bai-a-Labi* from the womenfolk is selected, at the same time there are communities wherein only *Sultan* from the menfolk can be given the title.

The installation of a woman to the title of *Bai-a-Labi* is in accordance with the indigenous *taritib* (rules prescribing rank and arrangement) and *igma* (customary laws). These codes are explicit about the manner of succession, even the details of the ceremony, the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of the title-holder (Briones, 1984-85).

¹¹⁵ For lack of space here, ambiguities involving the succession (such as term and qualifications) to traditional titles, will be dispensed. Nevertheless, the role of traditional leaders such as the *sultans* has recently come to the fore as Meranaos demand for their participation in the transition to the development of the Bangsamoro territory as mandated by the recently concluded Framework Agreement for Bangsamoro formation. See Nash Pangadapun in <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/572800/muslim-council-of-elders-urged>

As women advance in the life course, roles that involve activities outside the immediate family that have been assumed early in the life course get equal attention. The perspectives of Rashidah, 59, grandmother and Potri, 53, Lawan, 68, and Salma, 77, all widow grandmothers, will be presented here.

The *Bai-a-Labi* (or *Bai*): The Person and the Role

The most important qualification is family descent, that is, one's family belongs to one of the 15 original (*pegawidan*) sultanates of Lanao. However, not all who could claim to a royal lineage gets additional prestige through assumption of the leadership role. Lawan was very clear about this:

Having this title adds prestige to my being a member of the royal family. However, even if one is a member of a royal family, but does not have any title in the municipality where one's family belongs, it is as if you are not really a member of that royal lineage.

Salma, a 77-year old widow, shared that at one point in her life, she was considered to become a *Bai-a-Labi* because after all her mother was a *Bai-a-Labi* herself. According to Lailah, Salma's daughter, her mother, is entitled to the title of *Bai-a-labi* because her grandmother, Salma's mother, had been a *Bai-a-labi* of one of the sultanates in Lanao until she died.

If we have to be a Bai-a-Labi and there is a feud, we have to settle it but we have no money. When someone wants to marry, "Bai-a-labi, you give one thousand pesos." "Ah, I don't have money." [ha ha ha].

According to Lailah, Salma refused the offer because the latter felt that she might not give justice to the title since she had no wealth. Whatever wealth or economic means she had, it was used for the schooling of her seven children who are now professionals or income-earning on their own whom she consider as her "jewels."

Aside from the lineage of a *Bai*, Potri talks of other requisites of a *Bai* like character, knowledge of *salsila*, and economic means:

A Bai and a Sultan must not have a bad record because they represent their people. If there are contests, the Bai has to attend or send her representative. If there is a wedding, the Bai has to contribute. If someone dies, the Bai has to help. The Bai has to contribute not only money but also has to have an entourage of people who accompany her, so that the people will say, "ahh, the Bai-a-Labi is coming".

The Bai has to know the genealogies of her people. But, I don't know that; I was at that time devoted to my studies. I could not do anything because they asked me to just conform, so I was only then a nominal Bai. But when my husband entered the military service we participated actively in all the affairs of the community since we had the means at that time.

Potri, a doctorate degree holder and a professor in a downtown college, elaborates on the effect of education to the performance of a *Bai-a-labi's* responsibilities.

...if you have a title (as *Bai*), education reinforces that title. I am a *Bai-a-Labi* but I have to prove it to the people. We need a degree for economic and social stability. Thus a degree is important for the survival of a family. We cannot rely on that title (*Bai-a-Labi*) because there is no remuneration. Besides, to be a *Bai*, we need financial resources. If there's none (financial resources), the title

cannot be maintained. People will look for another Bai if we cannot support their needs. So, I studied to have a stable job because to be a Bai-a-Labi is a temporary social position.

As a college professor, they respect me, they trust me...because I'm a Ph.D. so, they believe in whatever I say (laughs). Example, when I invite them to attend seminars, like religious seminars, the people attend, not only because I am a Bai but also because they trust and respect me.

The aleem (religious leaders) involved me in their activities, like when they have programs, they invite and give me a part in their programs. They also asked me to contribute for the mosque. I also organize groups, conduct seminars, and I utilize the aleem too to be my resource speakers – and my own money is used to pay these ulamah (religious scholars). In a Muslim community, where there is no separation of church and state the aleem is highly esteemed. The Sultan recognizes the aleem's role. The imam or the religious leaders act as consultants.

Responsibilities of a Bai-a-Labi

Lawan:

My role as Bai-a-Labi is not very difficult, because my responsibilities are laid down. Such as when there are activities in the community I should participate, be ready to help and to give support to the people on the community).

... during the Ramadhan, one activity is to serve food to the people after their evening prayer. Also, if somebody is to be married, and I am informed of it by the man it is my role as a Bai-a-Labi to give a share to the dowry to be raised; if it is a prospective bride who approaches me I have to help in preparing/decorating the venue.

Potri:

I need to help as a Bai, such as settling of rido or dispute; if the other conflicting party does not have money to pay the fines, the Bai has to offer that amount/money...There are no material incentives though I have prestige. Besides, I know God will help us.

The moral presence of a Bai is important to her constituents.

Last Saturday, I went to Calanugas, it's far, it's near Malabang...The place looks like an "encounter area" for the military and the rebels. If it wasn't for my being a Bai, I don't want to go there, but my mother and cousins asked me to go along with them... to fetch the in-law of my father's cousin. So we took the risk.

Thus for the sincere, well-meaning women who are aware of the responsibilities of the Bai-a-labi, holding the title is no joke. The commitment and time of a Bai-a-labi and the support of her family, knowledge of the community's *salsila*, the social skill (such as knowledge of *pananaroon* or traditional sayings involving practically important aspects of Meranao social life) in dealing with her people, and most importantly financial resources are main requirements to be an effective Bai-a-labi. The refusal of Salma to her relatives' proposal to make her a Bai-a-Labi, and the reluctance of Potri, thus, may be viewed within this context.

Gains of Being *Bai-a-Labi*

In the olden days, the constituents of the Sultan paid tributes to him. But that practice has stopped especially with the interpretation that it is un-Islamic by the *ulamah*. Given the responsibilities of a *Bai* without any material/monetary reward attached to it, why do women want to become *Bai*?

Potri:

In the Meranao society, it is a status symbol and a sign of royalty. But I don't value this because I am educated. Besides, even if I have a little time I still go to our community. As long as I have the means (financially and otherwise) I help others, whether I have the title or have no title. But my mother said that it would be better to have a title so that I will be committed to the responsibility. "Your children and your grandchildren will also inherit this title and they will be proud about it (laughs). It's full of responsibility...without material benefit.

Lawan:

Having this title adds prestige to my being a member of the royal family. Even if one is a member of a royal family, but does not have any title in the municipality where one's family belongs, it is as if you are not really a member of that royal lineage.

The fruits of having the title put the incumbent not only in respect to relation to her community, but also in relation to her husband. The husband provides financial, moral and material support. Potri's husband was such a husband and he served as her main representative in many social gatherings when he was still alive. In addition, husbands are expected to give them relative freedom to do as they please without having to explain lengthily their whereabouts. Potri said:

*The husband has to maintain that respect. He has to understand that you need funds to support your programs. He should give you freedom, he should trust you in your decisions. He should be understanding about your activities like attending meetings which come with the role of *Bai*.*

Lawan and Potri said that the decisions of the *Bai-labi* are respected. Their constituents consult them and they dispense responsibilities pertaining to social, moral, religious, and judicial concerns. Regardless of present observations about the real power of a *Bai*, the important contribution of a woman holding a title to her family/kin-group is that she "seals" their claim to royalty and the chance of her children and grandchildren to assume the title in the future. Most importantly, being a *Bai-labi* reinforces the family's social standing or *maratabat*.

Lawan was guided by her father in her own way of breaking the traditional mold of women of being confined at home by enrolling and studying in a public school system and having a job of her own. Potri and her husband strived to have high education and raised their children with the support of their families. She consented to her mother's wish to assume leadership of their community with the promise that they will support her.

Lawan's and Potri's interpretation of their respective roles as *Bai-a-labi* differ. While it was not difficult ("*hindi mahirap*") for Lawan, Potri took the role seriously ("*mahirap*") believing it is an Islamic responsibility and especially as it comes into conflict with her other roles as mother,

grandmother, professional, and school administrator. Nevertheless, both continue to hold the title in behalf of their families believing they had the right to it which would then accrue to high prestige for the family. Their continued hold of their titles were made possible by the assurance and commitment of their respective families and husbands (*"inaalagaan ang title"*). Yet, even without their husbands, as widows, they may continue holding their titles for a lifetime.

The Elderly among the Meranaos

Within Meranao society and culture, old people are generally regarded with respect for their experiences in life. They are considered "wise persons" and their advices and opinions are sought especially in matters pertaining to norms and practices central to the Meranao way life. Most important of these are those pertaining to marriage and family life, sexuality, politics, settling of disputes, genealogy (*salsila*) and the like. For example, the decision of the elderly about the dowry can overpower the decision of parents of prospective marrying couples. Moreover, their knowledge of conflicting parties' genealogy is "the strongest instrument of the elders in settling disputes".¹¹⁶

The care and respect accorded to the elderly do not discriminate the women. In fact, women who have extended significant contribution in the family or society could be valued more than the men who have not done the same. (FGD; Rashidah, 2014). This is not inconsistent with the society's general deference to women as mentioned earlier.

The elderly is expected to be taken care of by immediate family. If by chance he/she has not married, the next group of people expected to care for her are the nephews and nieces or cousins. Other people who are expected or do care for the elderly are distant relatives or even people who are not biologically related but who have been recipients of their generosity.

It is unthinkable for Meranaos to neglect their elderly. Not to take care of them involves *mawag* (shame) before the eyes of the community, a condition which families avoid in this society which is highly conscious of their *maratabat* or pride. There is belief that neglect of the elderly could lead to *morka* (bad fortune). (FGD, 2014)

From the Islamic perspective to which Meranaos subscribe, it is generally believed that if there is a second god next to Allah, this would be the parents. (FGD,2014). The responsibility of caring and protecting parents especially in old age is inculcated in the minds of Muslims. In the Sunna or the Traditions of the Prophet, it is said that the Prophet (s.a.w.) was once asked three times as to how one could go to paradise. His answer was: "Your paradise is in the heels of your mother", repeating it three times. Only on the fourth statement did he say that: "Your paradise is in the heels of your father" (Rashidah, 2014)

By Way of Summary

Becoming an elderly is not a stage of retirement. Rather, among Meranao Muslim women study participants, it was a stage when women's responsibilities expanded to the needs of children and grandchildren. Where kinship is a fundamental factor in this society, parents are concerned with the

¹¹⁶ PS 308 Focus Group Discussion, Mindanao State University, Marawi City, January 22, 2014.

welfare of their children and grandchildren until they die. Widowhood creates a void in women's lives but which could be filled in by activities and social roles in their husbands' communities.

As women advance in the life course, roles outside the immediate family that have been assumed in earlier life get equal attention. This consists of deliberate planning for their community and also for the deceased husband's community (for widows) and to devote time and concentrate on social, cultural, educational, economic and religious activities in their communities.

In accordance with the Meranao *taritib and igma* (customary laws) and *bangsa* (descent line), women could assume roles of leadership in their community. Traditionally, the most important qualification is family descent/lineage, that is, one descended from a family or kin group whose claim to leadership and status are recognized, by which a title (for example, as *Bai-a-Labi* or *Bai*.) is conferred on women.

Regardless of whether one is currently married or already widowed, women may continue serving their communities (some may have been conferred the title in early adulthood) for as long as the people continue to support them and there are many cases of women holding it for a lifetime. College education is an important asset of women title-holders who could use this resource in dispensing their roles beyond the traditional expectations.

How women act and perform their roles in accordance with these titles may depend on their own attributes and motivations, allies or support from their family and kin (proxy and collective agency), their own perspectives on their role and the manner they assumed their role.

From the stories, women with royal titles (*grar*) and their families are generally respected. Aside from the respect, women with ranks have more relative autonomy which allows them to act as they please. Husbands and family members actively participate in the direct management and coordination of *Bai-a-labi's* constituent community, thus freeing her of mundane activities. Regardless of present observations about the *real* power of *Bai-a-Labis*, the important contribution of a woman holding a title to her family is that she "seals" their claim to royalty and their chance to assume the title in the future, in addition to the reinforcement of the family's collective reputation.

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Cultivation of Values and Social Networks among the Elderly; Unyielding to their Fate via an Elderly Sports Club¹¹⁷

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Abstract

The elderly as a group includes people who are generally neglected by their families and society. In today's societies they are usually left alone at home, and hence become depressed as a result of feeling worthless. When they are ill, their relatives usually provide only the minimum care required. This results in, not only the deterioration of elderly people's physical health, but also mental trauma. However, some elderly people do not yield to their fate and try to find alternatives that will make them more accepted by society. The elderly in this study have gathered together and built networks via the space created by an elderly person's sports club, which in addition to making them healthy, makes them feel valued and happy, because they can join in with social activities alongside people of the same or similar age; running competitions and even extending their social relationships to include other networks, through the spaces created by culture and traditions. These activities also help to cultivate values in them.

Introduction

Over the last 2 or 3 decades, the number and the proportion of the elderly, or those who are over sixty, has had a tendency to increase sharply in Thailand. It is noticeable that the rate of increase is much faster than that of the whole population. As can be seen, in 1990 there were 4 million elderly but in 2000, the number increased 50% to six million. It is expected that in 2020, the number will be 11 million (Phothisita, 2008) or 17% of the Thai population of about 65 million; meaning one in six will be the elderly. However, Thailand became an aging society in 2009, when the number of the elderly reached 7.6 million or 11.5% of the population (Prasatkun & Wawatthanaphong, 2011), as a society is considered aging when the number of elderly is more than 10% of the population (Shryock, 2004). The number of female elderly was found to be higher than that of males, though there were more babyboys. This reflects the fact that the mortality rate of males is higher than that of females. The reason for the rapid increase of the elderly is because the fertility rate has been high but the mortality rate has continued to decrease. So the generation of population that used to be a large number of children in the past has grown into the working population and finally the elderly. The decreasing mortality rate is due to advances in medicine applied in terms of public health (Nodel, & Chayowan, 2009; Smith, 1993).

However, the increasing number of elderly, coupled with changing economic and social conditions,

¹¹⁷ This paper is part of the thesis, 'Senior Citizens' Sports Club: A Space for Getting Together and Social Network Creation of Health Oriented People.'

has effected a change in people's way of life. Family members have to go out to work as a result of economic necessities so many elderly are left at home without sufficient care. In some cases, they are even hurt physically by their family members (Phothisita, 2011). Also, a survey of common and prevalent chronic diseases in the elderly found that conditions such as high blood pressure, diabetics, high cholesterol, stroke, angina pectoris, paralysis and partial paralysis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, cancer and kidney failure usually develop in middle-age and continue to old age as multiple diseases, causing problems in treatment and control. In a survey of depression, it was found that the older people get, the higher the tendency they have to develop the condition. This is especially true with the elderly who have to depend on other people, or those with chronic diseases. It was found that 12.1% (1.5 million) of this group of elderly people had depression (Ekphalakon, 2010), as reported by the Ministry of Public Health (Thailand Depression Center, Department of Mental Health, 2012).

Becoming elderly involves a process of physical, mental and social changes, as well as the confrontation with and adaptation to such changes (Atchley, 1997). Though unavoidable, the elderly can choose to be normal, abnormal or pathological old age people. Normal elderly means those who change according to their age as they should, for example, having grey hair, smaller body, wrinkled skin, long-sightedness and slower movements, but with no genetic diseases. They have control over the food they eat and their emotions. They exercise properly, so as to keep both their body and mind as healthy, as they should at their age. Abnormal elderly, or those with diseases, are those with chronic physical/mental diseases which are the result of genetics, the environment or inappropriate behavior, such as being stressed as a result of their way of life, risky behavior like smoking, a lack of sleep, eating poor food and doing no exercise. This condition paves the way for diseases to attack the body, starting from middle age and carrying on to old age. Hence, such people become the pathological elderly (Attasanchai, 2011).

With the changing economic, social and environmental conditions in Thailand, from an agricultural society to an industrial one, the family structure has also changed from an extended to a nuclear family structure, so the elderly have to live alone without anyone to depend on. Hengphum's (2013) research concerning violence against the elderly in the family found that the elderly being neglected has become a more frequent problem, whether it is passive neglect—being refused or not cared for well, active neglect—not being cared for intentionally, or self-neglect—living alone though one cannot care for oneself.

Being neglected is a factor that makes the elderly depressed, with symptoms and syndromes affecting emotions, motivation and physical stability. Such people tend to be sad and depressed, have distorted thoughts with automatically negative thinking towards themselves, the world and their future. They feel that they are worthless, discouraged and without hope, and hence, distance themselves from society. They are not interested in doing any activities and want to die (Beeber, 1996). The depressed elderly feel that their life is valueless; they feel guilty or blame themselves about what they have done, though that maybe trivial in other people's view. In one study it was found that 60% of elderly people want to die and 15% commit suicide (Lotrakun, 2009).

In short, these elderly think that they are worthless. When they are ill, their relatives care for them to fit the apparent symptoms. This results in the elderly feeling weak, both physically and mentally.

Nevertheless, there are some elderly who do not yield to their fate and go searching for ways to make society aware that they are still valuable. They gather together and build networks through elderly sports clubs, and the study club: Songkhla Elderly Sports Club, is an outstanding example of such an organization. The elderly that go there have been in physical retirement for many years, but have chosen to get out of their houses and form a sports groups and network, to train and compete in the Elderly National Sports Competition, instead of going to the temple to make merit or just stay home and rest like others. The study group have even won first prize from Phrachaoworawongtheu Phraongchao Somsowali Phraworarachathinaddamat for 9 consecutive years. I was prompted to study how the Songkhla Elderly Sports Club built its values and networks, and it is hoped my results found will be useful in setting guidelines for organizations involving the elderly; to work for the benefit of them and society.

Objective

To investigate how the study elderly people built their values and networks through the Elderly Sports Club

Methodology

This qualitative research study gathered information mostly through field data collection, as follows:

The area for research was the Tambon Kamphaengphet community, Rattaphum District, Songkhla Province. Since it is a strong community, many clubs have been set up including the Songkhla Elderly Sports Club, which has consistently joined the National Elderly Sports Competition. There are as many as 30 athletes in the area.

The informants were the Songkhla Elderly Sports Club's members. Data collection was done by documentary research and field work by observing the activities of the Songkhla Elderly Sports Club during their meetings, training and playing, and by in-depth interviews with the informants in the study area. Data analysis was done by classifying the data, interpreting them and drawing conclusions. The results were obtained in the form of an analytic description.

Results

Value-Building Through the Sports Club

The respondents said they saw the value of joining the group via the sports club. The reasons why they joined the club and activities were as follows:

Main Reasons for Joining the Club

To overcome life's problems as an elderly person re: their own physique, family, society and income.

When reaching old age, the body and the brain can work less efficiently. The elderly become less vigorous and flexible, as a result of the body change process - their physique, as well as in society. Joining the elderly sports club can make their health better and make them feel more valuable from having done social activities with athletes of the same or similar age, like joining the running competition and the National Elderly Sports Competition. They can also establish relationships

through their networks with other groups of different cultures and traditions, which enhances their value even more.

The elderly who are members of the club talked about how they have been able to overcome some of the negative aspects of old age, such as physical illness, income decreases and family members leaving to form new families. They talked to me about their backgrounds, their health before joining the club, the reasons why they joined it and their activities, as follows:

I am 82 years-old... Before I joined the club, I was a rice farmer. I used to exercise using a rod, because that's what they do in the Elderly Club at Rattaphum Hospital, of which I was a member. I have to have my diabetes treated at the hospital at times according to the appointments I have with the doctor. I sometimes feel lonely especially during the day when I have to be alone at home. My husband goes out. But it is good that I have a mobile phone so I can talk to my children. Each day, if I don't join the activities, I stay home to take care of the orchard around the house so I have something to do all day. Since I joined the Elderly Sports Club, I have found that I have no free time. I am busy going here and there because there are a lot of members and also a lot of activities all the time.

(Auntie Nung, interviewed on September 25, 2013)

Auntie Song, a 65 year-old retired teacher taking an early retirement scheme in 2005, talked about the reason why she joined the club. She said that someone persuaded her to join and eventually she became a runner and part of the Runner Network.

When I was 55, I took the 2005 early retirement scheme to take care of my orchard which grows rambutan and mangosteen. After turning 60, I stopped and gave it all to my children. I have pension and money from letting houses, plus a little more income from selling orchard produce. The fruits are more for consumption in the family and for giving to others. At the meetings to select the athletics representatives, I bring along a lot of fruit to give. Sometimes, friends give me their fruit also. I became an athlete because the secretary of the club persuaded me to do so.

(Auntie Song, interviewed on September 28, 2013)

She also told me about her motivation for joining the club nine years ago; to overcome the physical results of old age, lower the chance of getting genetic illnesses and take good care of her health.

When I was a teacher, I knew nothing about exercise because I was usually active and always did all the chores. I never hired anyone to do them for me. I thought that I was healthy without any illnesses. However, my mother had diabetes and my father died of cancer and that can be genetic. I am old now so I have to be careful. Also reading a lot of articles in journals giving advice and suggestions about how to care for your health, I decided to become an athlete at the club, when the club secretary asked me to. I think exercise can slow down the aging process. Joining the National Elderly Sports Competition pushes us to regularly exercise; to have a goal. At first I competed in a walkathon - 4 km and 10.5 Km in different locations. I then trained for other field sports. When the club joined any competition, I helped with this, until I was asked to take-up the position of club's registrar.

(Auntie Song, interviewed on October 15, 2013)

Activities of Club Members

Club members can be club athletes, join the training, apply to be representatives in competitions, or join other members' merits-making activities; some are both athletes and committee members. They join the meetings, give opinions and make suggestions for administering the club. Auntie Song told me the following:

In 2005, I was Songkhla Province representative to compete in the National Elderly Sports Competition at Ratchamangkhaphisek Stadium (Hua Mak in Bangkok). I helped with various kinds of work such as taking the athletes to report to the games, preparing food and accommodation for those who are very old. During the competition, I received help from many club committee members. The first time I competed in the 5,000 meters walkathon, I didn't win any prize, but then I competed in the 4x100 relay race and won the gold medal. Though I was old and overweight, I won and hence felt very confident and proud of myself. I was proud because I have never played sports and I still could do it. Part of the success was the suggestions and help from friends and club committee. Before that, the club secretary took me to compete in the 4 km fun run and the 10.5 km mini marathon. I came in first and received a trophy to take home and display in the living room. When my children or anyone else visited me, they asked about it. I am healthier, eat better, sleep better and am not stressed. I feel contented and happy that I was once praised by Kamphaengphet's Lord Mayor.

(Auntie Song, interviewed on October 2, 2013)

The Building of Social Networks for Elderly People Through the Sports Club

The Songkhla Elderly Sports Club does activities involving networks. Besides being members of the sports club, some elderly also join other clubs at the same time, such as the Government Official Pensioner Club, the Rattaphum Hospital Elderly Club, the Walking and Talking Club, the Rattaphum Running for Health Club and the Binla Radio News Reporter Club. This latter club is broadcast on So.Wo.Tho. Songkhla F.M. 90.50 Mhz. during 5.00-7.00 a.m. daily. The program disseminates news about the members' activities, and the experiences they have had. Most news is about merit-making, cultural events or festivals. Anyone who has come across any happenings can call in and report on air. Hence, they can establish friendships, as can be seen in the following interview.

Sometimes after a bike ride, I call in on the Binla Ha Khao program, to let them know where I ran in a competition the day before, what the atmosphere was like, who organized it and for what purposes. I talk also about the prize my friends and I received. Sometimes, there are people calling in to praise me; that I am old but still can run. Some ask for advice in starting an exercise. Some are even younger than me but never exercise, and have this and that disease. I give them suggestions on air so all people in Songkhla can hear too. After doing the work for some time, when someone has a problem with exercising, the DJ cites me as an example.

(Auntie Song, interviewed on October 2, 2013)

Within our own network, when we arrange an event for making merit, a funeral, a wedding, or a procession to ask for the hand of the bride-to-be from the parents of the groom, I usually get asked for help or to be the guest-of-honor. I go to every event. Sometimes, there can be

more than one event at the same time, so I will have to split them with my husband. That way, we can attend more than one event. When there is an event at my home, they will come too. For example, when the Songkhla Elderly Sports Club arranged a sports competition to select the representatives at Tambon Kamphaengphet Municipality Stadium, they brought fruit from their orchards for everyone to eat. Or you can call to ask them to buy lunch for the athletes; they will deliver it to the field. Besides, the fruit from my orchard are not usually sold now. Rather, they are for eating in the family and giving away at meetings, athlete representative selection, or sports competitions.

(Auntie Song, interviewed on October 2, 2013)

What are the Benefits of Being a Part of the Network?

Having networks is like having friends. At the beginning, joining the Songkhla Elderly Sports Club was just for sports training and learning the techniques needed for each type of sports so that one can prepare for the competition with the Elderly Sports Club in other provinces all over the country, However, sports opens the way for each member to train together, to help one another and to get advice on techniques and the rules for each sport. When competing, they can encourage and cheer one another. Both before and after the games, they help one another with other matters “Acquaintances are as close as relatives” which means whoever is in trouble, has problems or is arranging a merit-making event, can invite others through the club. When people know about it, they will go both informally as individuals and formally as representatives of the club. This results in good feelings for the host, as this interviewee revealed:

When I held an ordination for my son, I told a few close friends at the club about it but on the day, many people both members and committee came with money to contribute to the event. Some also gave their money as individuals. They spared their time and gave me an honor to come so I felt closer to the club and friends there. We talked small talk and I really appreciated their friendship.

(Uncle Nung, Interviewed on October 2, 2013)

When my father-in-law died, a committee member of the Elderly Sports Club drove from far away to the funeral. He phoned to ask me to order a wreath on behalf of the club and when he arrived, he paid for the wreath and gave some money for the funeral. There were also friends from other running clubs too. I felt as if they were relatives and really appreciated what they did.

(Uncle Song, Interviewed on October 2, 2013)

The comments above reflect the building of social networks among the elderly in the study area, whether in the form of formal clubs like Binla Radio News Reporter Club, Government Official Pensioner Club and Rattaphum Hospital Elderly Club, or other health promotion clubs, the Walking and Talking Club, the Rattaphum Running for Health Club, as well as informal groups of friends. They bind together and do things beneficial to the society, the group and themselves, making all members in the network see the value in themselves. According to Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs theory, of the 5 steps, they have reached their potential in the third, fourth and possibly fifth step.

Discussion

The results of the study reveal the value built by the elderly through joining the club. The key reason for doing this is to overcome their deteriorating health due to old age, plus their physical condition, and that of their family, society and income. It can be explained that what the elderly want at this age besides tangible things are things concerning their mind; acceptance and seeing the value in themselves. All these have an influence on the mental condition of the elderly, making them think positively of themselves which, in turn, makes them feel more satisfied with their lives. This is in line with the results of Siriphanit's study (1995).

Joining the club reveals that besides the sports competition, which makes their lonely lives at home more colorful, the elderly also joins the athletics network, which creates the opportunity for them to attend meetings and express their views and make decisions together. This makes them feel proud and see the value in themselves, because they feel closely tied to the club when they make suggestions which are taken and followed by other members. They have chances to make decisions and solve problems together and; hence, feel happier in doing activities and eventually motivated to do more.

Besides, participation in the operations of the Songkhla Elderly Sports Club instills unity among them; they can be together, like brothers. The committee members of the club, especially, are a good model in terms of operating and developing the club. This is in accordance with Chuchuang's study, which found three factors influencing the decision to join an Elderly Sports Club: 1) power boosting, 2) motivation, 3) communication within the organization, and that support from the government and private sector influences people to join. Together, they predict the role in social development activities of the Elderly Club as being 45%.

Recommendations and Implementation of the Results

1. The results show that joining the activities in the Elderly Sports Club makes the elderly see the value in themselves. The club is also a prototype for elderly health promotion drives. Hence, the development of the Elderly Sports Club's activities should be encouraged, such as arranging study visits or work visits in other areas, in order to sustain elderly people's physical and mental potential.
2. The results reveal that taking part in activities that respond to the members' needs, and relationships within the network, make a de facto contribution to the success of the club. Thus, specifying the form of activities in the Elderly Sports Club, such as taking turns at hosting the training, choosing the athletes to represent the club, holding meetings on the go, organizing functions in different occasions, etc. should be based on the desires of the members who participate in the decision-making about what they want to do.

Suggestions for Further Research

A study or studies on ways the members of the Elderly Sports Club are successful in their competitions and consistently make the club outstanding at sports, and how they care for their health, should be conducted.

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Identifying the Grey Area and People In-Between: A Case of the Destructive Culture of Traditional Boat Racing in Nan, Thailand

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Abstract

This article was a preliminary study of a larger doctorate study entitled “The Development of Community Innovation for the Creative Health Promotion: A case of the traditional boat racing in Nan, Thailand”. First, it aimed to investigate the problematic root of history, development and the relation between contemporary boat racing and life style of social actors involving in the racing process. Second, it searched for a solution and practical mechanism, as well as a better development process, for contemporary traditional boat racing. The author identified destructive culture of the contemporary boat racing in Nan, Thailand as the “grey area”. The author first applied documentary research for her literature review. Then, she divided three groups of social actors involving in the racing as the people in between. These included the boat leaders, the crew and cheerleaders. The author first adopted survey research for her overview analysis during September and October (2009-2010). Then, she used qualitative research for investigated depth information. This included three focus groups and nine cases interviewed in-depth with the target groups. The data was later analyzed by using narrative analysis and content analysis. The author found that: boat racing of Nan had a long history of more than 200 years old. Today, dramatic changes in terms of definition, goal and management processes have brought about four major impacts, including socio-cultural changes, economic and health impacts. The result showed three strategies as solutions: 1) increasing recognition and awareness of negative impacts among social actors, 2) locating new mind sets based on creative culture, 3) establishing new regulations based on local awareness and demand. By doing this, the author expected that the capability of social actors would be strengthened and problems of destructive culture would be declined. The study synthesized an alternative development by promoting healthy sport based on participatory concern, local recognition and an empowering creative thinking process among involved social actors. This would be beneficial development for local communities as well as those visitors and tourists. To promote traditional boat racing as the creative culture, the author highlighted that cultural practices based on creative and sustainable development was needed. By this, the local administrative government should be reconsidering the new form of traditional boat racing. This should start from the policy level to the practical one. This case study exhibited the power of the “good example”, which offered a social development strategy for bringing Thailand to a healthy lifestyle based on creative culture. The author highlighted healthy boat racing for the tourist industry as a better form of creative socio-economic development.

Keywords: destructive culture, unhealthy social actors

Introduction

The traditional boat racing of Nan province, Thailand has had a history of more than 200 years old. The boat racing has long been a folk custom, which highlights culturally unique value through the Great Naga race boat. This symbolic function has been displayed through many material and abstract occurrences. In addition, every race boat shows an original head-prow and tail of a Great Naga, which is called "Hua-Oh" and "Hung-Wan". There was a strong ancient belief that Great Naga was a supernatural power god who could give sufficient rain for a period of time. Therefore, the villagers took to racing Great Naga boats on the river when they were confronted with periods of drought. The Great Naga race boats represented the peaceful and tranquil land. At the community level, the local residents worshiped Great Naga in all forms (Committee of Nan Unique, 2006; Nan Province, 1997; Kurbkum, 2006; Naksuk, 2009; Choksukawat, 1962). In the past, the community had an ancient imagination of the relationship between the legendary Great Naga and the Great Naga boat. The floating of the boat on the water represented the image of the Naga: "the overall effect of the decorative pieces is impressive, and from a distance the boat looks indeed like a Naga swimming in the river" (Davis, 1984.)

Nowadays, the boat racing takes place every year during September and October or November depending on the level of water in Nan River. Many people happily participate in the boat racing and related activities. Such activities create the highest feeling of coterie groups both in and between nearby local community. These activities aim to bring back the community's spiritual engagement, cheerfulness and cooperative network. Thus, it could be said that the participation of boat racing has been used as a tool for community empowerment since an ancient period until now. For local people, joining local activities to support boat racing refers to being part of the same group. This leads to a strong sense of belonging as well as the strength of social networks among community members. Thus, the boat racing is a combination between local culture and traditional engagement (Thongkiew, 2009, 2010.)

During the last decade, the boat racing has become popular among local residents and tourists. On one hand, it has become a symbol representing traditional village activities. On the other hand, the racing had turned itself into the major source of income for involving actors. This provided dramatic changes to the race, leading to the critical situation of the traditional boat racing. During the preliminary study, the author found various forms of conflicts of interest, competitiveness, and the emergence of destructive values. The situation has become increasingly serious. The problems are not only increasing conflict between race boat teams and organizer teams, but they have expanded to competitive challenges between the local government and villages. Furthermore, many race boat teams of the local villages disagreed with unfair judgments. Some teams became the winners with skepticism at large. Many decided to get advantage in the game by changing the head-prow, tail and body of the Great Naga boat. With limited budgets and lacking professional coaching, small villages lose most of the races. Consequently, they were disappointed and don't want to join the boat racing competition in future events. Because of the unequal resources, unfair judgments, and communication gaps most races often ended with protestation from involving stakeholders. These critical situations displayed the result of destructive culture emerged from the boat racing competition (Thongkiew, 2010, 2012).

Objectives

This article has two objectives. First, it aimed to investigate the problematic root of history, development and the relation between contemporary boat racing and life style of social actors involved in the racing process. Second, it searched for a solution and practical mechanism, as well as a better development process, for the contemporary traditional boat racing.

Scope of the Study

The author identified destructive culture of the contemporary boat racing in Nan, Thailand as the “grey area”. The racing represented an example of invisibility of problems and crisis in forms of inequality of resources, unfair judgments and interchangeability among power and authorities. Then, she divided three groups of social actors involved in the racing as “the people in between”. They exhibited the gap of poor and vulnerable racing teams and involving actors in the Racing process. They were disappointed by unfairness and faced the loss of social status after losing the racing competition.

Research Methodology

The author used qualitative research for investigative in-depth information. These included nine cases interviewed in-depth and three focus groups interviewed with key informants. Forty-four individual participants from forty-four villages, which had boat-racing teams in Nan province were interviewed and observed. The author applied both the participant and non-participant observations within six fields of the boat racing competition. The investigation was carried on to reveal the situation and key persons who were involved the racing process. Finally, the author applied semi-structured interview guidelines with twenty cases, namely the boat leaders, the crews and cheer boat leaders whose teams participated in the race. The data was later analyzed by using narrative analysis and content analysis.

Result

The study found that:

1. The traditional boat racing was the folk custom that has been indicated in three dimensions of socio-cultural relativity of local residents, including strong sense of historical consciousness, cultural relativity in lifestyle and sufficient economy in practice.
2. The root of conflict was changing the goal of boat racing from a more expressive symbolic function to a serious competition, which focused on a material reward placed by related organizations. In order to be the winner, some race boats were using various techniques. These included the following three methods:

2.1 Transforming the traditional boat shape into the new design in order to reduce the size of the boat, such as a smaller head-prow, tail and slimmer body of the Great Naga boat to enable it to move faster. The new design later became a mass

popularity feature. This change provided new forms of boat racing, which in turn led to new values and social relations of involving actors.

2.2 Hiring expensive, professional, outside coaches instead of local experts in order to win the race.

2.3 Spending more budget to prepare their race boat. This study found that the estimated total budget was over eight millions baht -between 100 000 and 800 000 baht per village in 2008.

3. This cultural relativity recently became a critical situation. It involved a large number of people, organizations, and various kinds of illegal and immoral activities such as gambling, conflicts, and alcohol consumption.

4. There were three strategies of solutions suggested, as well as a better development process in the contemporary traditional boat racing:

4.1 Using creative adult participatory learning to increasing recognition and awareness of negative impacts among social actors,

4.2 Introducing new mind-sets based on creative culture and

4.3 Establishing new regulations based on local awareness and demand.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study showed that the dramatic changes in terms of definition, goal and management process brought about four major impacts, including socio-cultural changes, economic and health impacts. Although the new design appeared in few teams, such changes have been significantly increased. This influenced the value, as well as attitude, of other boat teams who wanted to be the winner. Consequently, many boat racing teams from poor villages were disappointed. They have been discouraged and upset by their defeat. Worse still, the competition led to conflicts among stakeholders. The author highlighted this situation as destructive culture. By this, stakeholders who were proprietorship of their community culture were blind to the situation and did not recognize negative impacts. The increasing community frustration and pressure from the surrounding socio-cultural oppression of the aggressive competition provided tension in the community. Most importantly, four major impacts were evident to involving actors, including the loss of traditional race boat design, reduction in the sense of belonging and the strength of community. These results did not merely employ conflict among actors but destroyed the spiritual cooperative network of local villages.

Suggestions from Research

The author expected that the capability of social actors will be strengthened and problems of destructive culture would be declined. The study synthesized a better alternative development by promoting healthy sport based on participatory concern, local recognition and empowering creative

thinking processes among involving social actors. The use of adult learning techniques allowed all involving actors to participate in the learning process. This would be beneficial development for local communities as well as visitors and tourists. To promote traditional boat racing as the creative culture, the author highlighted that cultural practice based on creative and sustainable development was needed. By this, the local administrative government should reconsider the new form of traditional boat racing. This should start from the policy level to the practical one. This case study exhibited a power of the “good example” which offered social development strategy for bringing Thailand to a healthy lifestyle based on creative culture. The author highlighted healthy boat racing for the tourist industry as a better form of creative socio-economic development.

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The Civil Service Reform Towards Good Governance in Indonesia and Thailand

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Introduction

Culture is the reflection of the economy and politics. The dominant and newly emerging forces in the economy and politics are also embedded in culture. However, culture is neither simply the ideological reflection of current forces nor the contra distinctions in the economy and politics. It is also the accumulation of notions, customs, habits and the like which dates back to prehistory, and persist in current circumstances as long as there are transmitters and they are part of the social and psychological make-up of people within local sites.

The bureaucracy has a structure that breeds its own administrative culture. Incoming political leadership often reacts to the bureaucracy it inherits by instituting personnel purges or reorganizing or both, either to cleanse the old system and reorient it to the needs of the new dispensation, or to reshape the administrative culture and values in facilitating targeted policy and program objectives. Consequently, a new political order carries its own political culture to the regime-bureaucracy relation. As the bureaucracy accommodates and eventually trusts the new regime, an administrative culture supportive of the political leadership ensues.

Thailand: Norms and Values

In Thailand, the new bureaucratic culture was introduced by King Chulalongkorn who understood the demand of his time, opening the way for administrative reforms, systematic modernization and absolute royal control. From this time onwards, Bangkok's appointed bureaucracy was instituted, control over the Buddhist Monkhoo (Sangha) established, general education introduced and a modern communicators network built up. In the process, the corves system was abandoned and the slaves emancipated (Prizzia, 1986). However, official political culture is preoccupied with teaching morality. If everyone knows manners and behavioral conduct, the external world consisting of the wider society will be in good order. In bureaucratic manner, responsibility is specified in within six categories of duties, namely the obligations to oneself, to the family, to the school class and fellows, to the school, to the community, and to the nation-state. There are then specified in sets of six rules to follow. For example, the duties to the nation-state are: (1) to respect the law, (2) to pay taxes, (3) to assist the officials in maintaining national stability, (4) to be loyal to defending the Nation Religion-King, (5) to preserve national independence, Thai arts and culture, and (6) to let the good of the nation prevail over self-interest (Bunsong, 1991).

¹¹⁸ The author is a member of Asian Public Intellectuals (API) community. A special gratitude is given to the Nippon Foundation, Japan under the Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Program which has provided the generous funds to join the APSA International Conference from 15-16 February 2014 in Chiang Mai, Thailand.

The Thai bureaucracy is highly institutionalized with well-established norms and values and designated bureaucratic behavior. Human relationships in the bureaucracy are based upon certain established patterns. Then, a bureaucrat's advancement in the system tends to depend largely on the favoritism; the art of currying favor with one's boss has been developed over the years. When a person is promoted rather rapidly in the bureaucracy, the term normally heard is "liakeng", which literally means "good at licking", a Thai analogy to a domestic pet which learns how to please its master by licking (sucking up)¹¹⁹. A generous comment would be "khao chao khao nai kent" (he knows how to smoothly approach his lord and master). Therefore, there is a general impression that the Thai bureaucratic system is plagued with personalized or patron clientelism. Even though it might not be completely true, a study of the attitude of a group of 300 public officials who underwent a training course at the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) in 1977 supported the fact¹²⁰. From the study, 95 percent of the respondents believed that professional advancements in the bureaucracy depends on a patron-client relationship; 82.7 percent believed that it depends on money, and 93 percent on knowledge and ability.

Aside from the self-contradictory result because almost the same group of respondent's, believed that professional advancement in the bureaucracy depends on the patron-client relationship (95 percent) and knowledge and ability (93 percent), it showed that these two factors were the most important factors in explaining the professional advancement in the Thai's bureaucracy. In essence, this is a combination of favoritism and merits system. This is a very characteristic. Favoritism should not be viewed as one-way system. It is a patron-client system of: "you scratch my back and I scratch yours"¹²¹, which involves three levels of relationships-for superiors, subordinates and equals. As one writer puts it: "Working in bureaucracy, you must try to gain experience, to understand human relations and to be able to catch up with all the tricks. You cannot just depend on work efficiency but you must also use your knowledge to understand the nature of environment. That is to be able to succeed in a bureaucracy, you must be pulled by your superiors, pushed by your subordinates and supported by your equals (Pooyai dueng, poonoidun. Kou samaeokan sanubsanoon)"¹²². Therefore, the art of gaining favor inside the bureaucratic culture is not an easy task. It involves a number of people, techniques and sacrifices in terms of one's principle and self-respect.

Another feature of the Thai's bureaucracy is the significant role of the bureaucrats in the administration and politics. These career bureaucrats, especially those in the top echelon, have virtually monopolized political and administrative power, running the routines as well as initiating

¹¹⁹ This kind of a so-called "bureaucratic culture" is also similar to the Indonesia 's Civil Services which practiced "*Asal Bapak Senang* (ABS)" means "as the boss wishes".

¹²⁰Thinapan Nakata. "Bureaucratic Corruption in Thailand: Incongruities between Legal Codes and Social Norms," Monograph in Public Administration, School of Public Administration, NIDA, Bangkok. April 1997, pp. 31-33.

¹²¹ Ibid, pp. 26-36.

¹²² Kroo Ha (Pseudonym), "Cha Pen Huana (To Be a Boss)" in Warasarn Rachakasn (Civil Service Journal) Vol. IX, No. 2 (B.E. 2507), pp. 21-23.

policy. Thus, the bureaucrats assume administrative as well as political power. Therefore, the feature of the bureaucracy in Thailand can also be described as a “bureaucratic polity”¹²³.

The concept of the bureaucratic polity referred both to a particular type of political regime and also to the influence of Thai bureaucratic culture on the mode of governance. Military rules frequently ousted elected governments in Thailand and substituted their own form of rule, coopting civilian elements as they saw it. The power of bureaucrats stemmed in large part from the reliance of the military on the bureaucrats elite in order to rule effectively. Thus, the bureaucratic polity was one in which bureaucrats were permanent member of the political class. Chai-anan (1987) provides a typical analysis of Thai bureaucratic culture: the bureaucracy was hierarchically organized in order to reflect differential status and power consideration rather than a national division of labor or chain of command; it gave priority to personnel relations of patron age and dependency, with deference and loyalty being more important than merit, and it emphasized above all else security for its members.

Thai bureaucracy was typified by corruption, factualism, departmentalism and a tendency to diffuse responsibility for making decisions so as to preserve the status and autonomy of individuals, cliques and departments (Siffin, 1966, pp. 200-1). Purchase of office was common in the senior ranks (Ockey, 2004, pp. 148-9). “Money politics” dominated the electoral and parliamentary processes. However, the bureaucracy retained a considerable degree of control over polity as well as administration, because coalition governments were generally weak and indecisive (Bidhya, 2001).

In sum, functional nationality was not the main organizing principle of Thai bureaucratic norms and practices. Nevertheless, there were some parts of the state machinery that developed a reputation for technocratic excellence, such as the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) and the Bank of Thailand (BOT). But even these islands' apparent technocrats of reforming zeal were something of a mirage¹²⁴. The influence of political on the bureaucratic culture is still significant. “.....because top official wanted to please politicians in order to keep their position secure. (Nukul Commission, 1988, pp. 169-72).

Indonesia: Morality and Corruption

In countries such as Indonesia where civil servants, like politicians, are key government decision makers, government employees are sometimes viewed as community leaders. In this sense, civil servants may be expected to perform many duties in the community where they live, following practices established during the Dutch colonial era. Such role calls for adherence to norms and morality meaning the civil servants must avoid irregularities and always obey the rules when conducting their activities (Magnis, 1996; Natakusumah, 1990). Therefore, civil servants should not engage in illegal activities such as bribery, corruption and other misconducts.

¹²³ The term “bureaucratic polity” was developed by Fred Riggs to describe his model for understanding the Thai political system as he found in the 1900s. See. Fred Riggs: Thailand = The modernization of a bureaucratic polity; Honolulu, East-West center press, 1966

¹²⁴ From discussion with the faculty members of the Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Tuesday, March 25, 2008.

Friederich (1940) noted growing importance of internal values and moral and professional standards among bureaucrats. In their absence, abuse of power can easily arise in the government sector. A study by Meir and O'Toole (2006) shows that bureaucratic values are far more important in explaining bureaucratic output and outcomes than political factors. This should be taken to mean that external political control is unimportant, but it does show that paying serious attention to the values of civil servants is important.

Ensuring that civil servants give high priority to honesty, responsibility and integrity with regard to their routine duties can be accomplished through well planned human resource development. Human resource development for civil servants starts with their recruitment and continues until they leave government service. Recruits should undertake job and requirement analyses before undertaking recruitment activities. Furthermore, to allow the civil service to select the best candidates, the recruitment process should be fair and open.

The next step in human resource development for civil servants is education and training. This should be provided regularly for those at every level, as is already done in the armed forces. Considering the importance of trainings, in Indonesia training and education plays a major role in the effort to increase the quality of civil service. However, training and education (*pendidikan dan pelatihan - diklat*) aims not only at the improvement of job-and work-related skills and knowledge. Forming the attitudinal and behavioral characteristics of civil servants, and ensuring their political allegiance with the program of the government has always been an integral part of the human resources development programs of the government.

To complement public sector reform in improving transparent and accountable governance, Indonesia implemented a series of measures designed to combat corruption during the reformation period. The corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was formed in 2003, five years after the fall of the Suharto's government, to coordinate and supervise anti-corruption efforts, while focusing on eliminating and preventing corruption and conducting a system review. It undertakes this mission on the assumption that a comprehensive, systematic and long term approach is needed to achieve a corruption-free Indonesia, which must by definition include the holistic participation of all stakeholders. As such, its aim is to become a driver of change in cultivating a culture of anti-corruption in Indonesian society, government, and the business world (Sunaryadi, 2007).

The KPK is independent from the executive, legislative, and judicial branches and responsible to the general public. It receives funding from the state budget and donors. Its activities include coordination, supervision, investigation, prosecution, prevention, and system review. In terms of staff, it has five commissioners, two advisors, and 600 staff members. These human resources face a population of over 220 million people, 4 million of whom are public servants, within the many provincial and local governments.

The KPS's duties include supervision and coordination of institutions authorized to eradicate corruption; investigation, indictment, and prosecution of corrupt acts; preventive actions against corrupt acts; and monitoring state governance, and prosecutions against criminal acts of corruption; implement a reporting system for the purposes of eradicating corruption, request information from relevant institutions for the purposes of eradicating corruption; arrange opinion hearings and

meetings with institutions authorized to eradicate corruption; and request for reports from relevant institutions pertaining to the prevention of criminal acts of corruption. Law No. 30 of 2002 on the Corruption Eradication Commission provided the basis for the functions, authority, and duties of the institution.

One initial challenge in the fight against corruption related to the way in which it was defined. Over the 1971-2004 period, laws and regulations tended to address only those types of corruption that represented a direct loss to the state apparatus. As of 2006, a publication called *“Memahami Untuk Membasmi”* now identifies 30 distinct types of corruption, many of which were previously overlooked. In addition to defining 2 types of corruption representing a loss to the state, other major categories of corruption include 12 types of bribery, 5 types of embezzlement, 6 types of procurement fraud, 1 type of procurement conflicts of interest.

The KPK also faced other challenges. Its establishment followed a long history of anti-corruption measures, most of which had focused primarily on investigation of existing cases of corruption, rather than on prevention (see: Table 1). As a result of this lack of emphasis on prevention, many of the lessons learned from early efforts were not applied on an ongoing basis. Consequently, Indonesia found that the same kinds of corruption were equally prevalent over the course of decades. For example, people at similarly high level positions were arrested for comparable offences in the 1950s, 1970s, 1980s, and again in the 2000s. Similarly, the same types of procurement corruption happened in 1983 and 2003. Areas perceived as highly corrupt in the 1970s continued to give the same impressions.

Table 1: History of Key Anti-Corruption Measures in Indonesia, 1957-2007

1957	Order to fight corruption (Military Commander)
1967	Presidential Decree to fight corruption through prevention and repression (Corruption Eradication Team)
1970	Presidential Decree to access corruption and its solution (Commission of Four)
1977	Presidential instruction to take disciplinary action in operations and administration (Disciplinary Team)
1987	Ministry of Finance order for a special operation on corruption in taxation (Special Re-Audit on Tax Return)
1999	Asset examination and disclosure law for public officials (Public Official Wealth Examiner)
1999	Government regulations to investigate complex corruption (Corruption Eradication Joint Team)
2003	KPK established
2005-2007	Timtas Corruption Eradication Coordination (Attorney General. Police. Auditor)

Source: Author’s Compilation from Various Sources

To address this situation, the KPK has aimed to use an integrated program implementation approach, which includes capacity development, prevention, repression of corruption, and public involvement and participation. This entailed a shift in focus for program to combat corruption. The KPK placed attention on the issue of bribery, catching “big fishes”, winning public trust, using court video recordings, bureaucratic reform, and integrating investigation and prevention measures. These polices have resulted in many highly publicized cases where senior officials were caught “red-

handed” on videotape in the process of conducting an illegal act. At the same time, court video recording helped to increase transparency and public awareness of court procedures and decisions. Between 2007 and 2010, significant anti-corruption reforms were completed to increase legal certainty, reduce budget leakages, increase investment, and increase state revenues. The ongoing commitment to anti-corruption is expected to gradually increase citizen trust in government, while additionally improving investor confidence.

FinalRemarks

Civil Service Reform as parts of the bureaucratic reform should be designed to reduce corruption. If officials are paid much less than those with similar training elsewhere in the economy, only those willing to accept bribes will be attracted to the public sector. The rest will work in private enterprises. But in spite of the low pay, positions in the state bureaucracy can be valuable assets. In some developing countries there is a lively market for bureaucratic positions that generate large bribes. Positions in corrupt police departments are likely to be especially valuable (Phongpaicht & Piriyarangan, 1994). Civil service wages should be set equivalent to the wages of those in similar positions within the private sector so as to enable service without corruption and misconducts.

Bureaucratic reform is expensive and politically difficult, and it may seem beyond the capacity of many poor countries. Yet it cannot be avoided in any credible reform effort. Therefore, structural and administrative reforms which have been introduced in most developing countries should be directed to free the civil service from politics and the civil servants from political pressure. This is the primary reason for the merit-based civil service reforms in which entry into the service is qualification-based determined, among others, by competitive examinations and promotions to higher positions are based on performance, competence and other merit based standards and not on connections.

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Identifying Grey Area and People in Between: a Case of Educational Inequality among Poor Students in Lower Northeastern of Thailand

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This article has two objectives: 1) to explain the overall current situation of inequality in Thai educational system which had negative impacts on poor students in rural area; and 2) to offer policy suggestions to help poor students in the worst scenario. The author used documentary research to describe the current situation of inequality in education. Grounded theory was used before in-depth interview and non-participant observation were adopted. Data was analyzed by narrative technique and content analysis. The author finally offered policy suggestion for resolving the problem. First, inequality of education was identified as the “grey area”. Then, poor students from agricultural families in lower Northern Thailand were highlighted as the “people in between”. Although the government has launched the “Free of Charge” education policy, massive expenses for “being a student” obstructed these poor students from achievement. Problems of inequality rooted from numerous social factors which included school administration, class instructors and parents of the poor students have affected remote schools for ages. Without addressing these two key elements of the grey area and the people in between, reforming education is of no use. This education inequality has increased the impoverishment of the families of the students. Moreover, geographical location of schools, unfair budget, corruption, and lack of education funding obstructs the opportunity for advancement among the poor students. They are marginalized, socially and culturally abused and become invisible. The author suggested that new form of educational funding policy needs to be created to help these poor students.

Keywords: inequality of education, poor student

1. Introduction

Inequality in Thai education system is a complex issue. It originates from poor educational policies as well as the structure of inequality which has long been established in Thai society. The issue has been discussed endlessly throughout the last decade. Although the government is concerned about this problem, recent studied found that the issue is due to numerous factors and barriers. Four important factors are 1) accessibility to educational services such as location of school, quality of teaching and learning environment 2) unequal budget allocation between urban and remote rural schools 3) discrimination because of the disabilities, poverty and social under privilege of the students and 4) cultural barriers involving parents’ negative attitude towards study environment and importance of education (Sinlarat, 2011; Schmidt, 2011).

Problems of educational inequality persist in the form of unequal distribution of educational opportunities among different regions. Although the government has put down the educational

policy for students to get education free of charge for 15 years, no explicit and practical implementation has been done. This has led to an increase in other cost of schooling such as membership and alumni fee, clothing, hiring foreign and specialized teachers, computing attendants, accidental and life insurance, regular health check, utilities for air conditioned rooms and overtime staff expenses. The cost became the greatest barrier for poor students (Nattapondleamcharaskul, 2012).

In 2008, studies identified common problems. 1,675,165 or 11.23 of %Thai children aged 3-17 years had to leave school because of their poverty. In addition, children aged 3-5years who got the opportunity to attend pre-primary education was merely 53.8 %, and only those living in Bangkok and surrounding area had the most chance. The worst situation, however, was found among the northeastern children (Wittayakornchiengkul, 2008; Oviedo, 2009).

In fact, the patronage system of Thai education created inequality among the poor by offering them an opportunity for “powerless”. The lack of accessibility to funding, choice and standard of education unintentionally pushed these poor students out of the school system. Simultaneously, those who were able to maintain their obligation within the school ran into debt. Moreover, the system led to a serious problem of “corruption” among school principals and staffs (Sarinee, 2011).

The current study found that the number of underprivileged children in Thailand was increasing due to social factors (Figure 1) like divorce, poverty and social negligence. The problems were hidden in forms of high dropout rate, low learning result, low inspiration, school fighting and poor social adaptation to school environment. Inappropriate curriculum, inexperienced teachers and low standard of school along with the cited factors complicated the problem which left the underprivileged students behind. As a result, number of students leaving school has increased every year (Wittayakornchiengkul, 2009; Glaeser et al., 2009; Ferreira & Gignoux, 2010).




Figure 1: Situation of Poor Students in Thailand, 2007-2013

Source of Data: Department of Information. The Office of Basic Education Commission) 2013(

The major causes of this vulnerability are 1) occupation of parents 2) income 3) values of parents towards education. (Perry & Francis, 2010) Considering the current situation, children from the families of poor farmers in northeast of Thailand are the most vulnerable group. They get less

chances to acquire formal education as well as less opportunities for a better future (Kaewmee, 2008).

The situation of the poor students has deteriorated day by day as they come across many difficulties in life. Not only poverty but also the lack of effective education policies has blocked their educational opportunities. To understand equality in education, the author has carried out this research by keeping in mind the above-mentioned reasons.

2. Purpose of the Study

- 1) To explain the current overall situation of inequality occurring in Thai education system which negatively impact the poor students in rural areas.
- 2) To offer policy suggestion for helping poor students in the worst scenario.

3. Research Methodology

The qualitative study was applied by using case study to create grounded theory with in-depth Interview technique and non-participant observation. The author collected data from parents, teachers and school administrators. Then the data was analyzed by narrative technique and content analysis.

4. Result

4.1. The Generality in Poor School Children

Most of the students in this school are from poor families which earn their livelihood by doing dramatic performances or who work in vegetable farms after having migrated from the other areas. The fact is that these people lack life security, knowledge, counseling in education and hygienic condition to take care of them.

“At first, the schools administrators have come and found poor students who are children with family migrate from other area here”(Administrator, 2014).

There is lack of qualified teachers in the school, less number of students and usually the school runs on public donations as they do not have sufficient budget.

“Teacher inadequate in schools but have limited of budget”(Administrator, 2014).

The school is very shabby. Buildings look old and silent because of less numbers of students. The villagers nearby the school take their children to other schools, as their atmosphere is better for learning.

“Look from outside are seen shabby and old building. No repented for long time”(Administrator, 2014).

The school building has enough rooms to accommodate students but comparatively has less students and limited number of teachers.

“The building had enough but there lack of student and teacher”(Teacher, 2014).

Usually the schools get a funding of 240 baht per student from the government. Hence, due to limited number of students, the school gets limited funds from the government and has to depend on public charities and donations.

“The budget has been received by bursary per students”(Administrator, 2014).

The individual academic abilities and skills of the students have to be taken into account as some tend to excel in performing, some in singing and some in praying to Buddha. Generally the poor students progress less than the ordinary or urban students as it is considered that their mother was in poor condition during the pregnancy.

“Student have different in potential someone ability in performance, folk dance and singing but learning calculate or academic may be slowly than student in urban” (Administrator, 2014).

It has been found that children of Thai traditional dramatic performance families tend to drop out of school as they want to work for their families. Their family too wants them to drop out of school and help in their work.

“Student dropped out in this school are Thai traditional dramatic performance. When they go to shown the children go with their family so they absent to Schools don’t come again”(Teacher, 2014).

4.2. Situation of Poor Student in Rural Area

4.2.1. Conditions of Poor Students

An overview of the condition of the poor students of these schools who do not get care in their families as well as guidance in education consists of several cases as follows:

1) First case refers to the children hailing from families engaging in Thai traditional dramatic performance: The family migrates from other areas and do not send their daughters to school for better education, whereas their other children are often absent from schools in order to perform with their family. Obviously those children are obligated to assist with their family career. It is certain that parents will send all their children to be educated if they have enough money. Therefore, poverty is the main cause of not sending their children to school.

2) Second case refers to the children living with their grandparents: The youngest studies in grade 1 and the elder sister in grade 5. Their divorced mother works in the urban and does not care to send money to her daughters who live with their grandparents. Their grandparents are low income laborer and face financial insecurity. These children face the problem of being neglected.

3) Third case refers to a family of 5 members: The father is a low income laborer who works in a vegetable garden. He married a foreign wife. Their eldest daughter studies in grade 10, son in grade 4 and the youngest in grade 1. When the father gets drunk, he generally beats them. He throws his wife out of the house who then takes one of her daughters and goes to sleep in their neighbour’s house. These children face the problem of life security.

4) Final case refers to a group of poor student in the back of schools: Their family live separately and the children live with their grandparents. These children are neglected by their parents and lacks care and do not get access to proper education.

“Poor student in this schools had different situation and almost living with grandparent, they’re elderly worker and poverty”(Administrator, 2014).

“Family of Poor student has occupation in farmer and low income”(Teacher, 2014).

4.2.2.General Living of Poor Student

For this research, the researcher had visited the poor students at their homes in order to interview and conduct non-participant observation. It was found that:

The first household comprised of children who lived with their elderly grandparents. They live in a house with zinc roof and bamboo walls. The road leading to the entrance of the house is overgrown with grass. Surrounding the house is a vegetable garden planted by their grandparent to sell vegetables and run the family. The grandfather suffers from asthma and often has flashes. The children have to live with their grandparents because their mother got divorced.

“The children living with grandparent since them a little until day learning in high school. They were look after somebody as best as one could, they usually work in vegetable garden pull out the necessary weed from garden. The receive wage per hour to work and unstable”(Grandparent A, 2014).

Girls are rarely asked anything regarding the level up to which they want to study and where they want to study. Their guardians have no idea on how to plan the future of their daughters. The children’s interest determines the support they would receive for their education. In this case, the children want to learn in the schools near their habitat.

“Want to learn close house”(Daughter A, 2014).

In the second case the children live with their father and attend primary schools. Presently they live alone and are building a new house as their old house was overcrowded with family members of various ages and some are disabled. Their house is not very hygienic which affect their mental and physical health. These children are neglected as their parents have to work as labourers all day long. Their parents wants to send them to study in urban schools but cannot afford the cost of education which included membership and alumni fee, clothing, hiring foreign and specialized teachers, computing attendants, accidental and life insurance, regular health check, air conditioned rooms, overtime staff expenses and travelling expense to increasing charge in daily life.

4.2.3.The Inadequacy of School Uniforms

The government provides each student with two sets of uniforms. Sometimes the school gives the money to the students to buy their uniform which is generally not adequate to buy the uniforms. Since they cannot afford two sets, their single set of uniform becomes dirty.

"The student receive money or cloth from governance but they make their dirty and avulsion" (Administrator, 2014).

"The money gave from government not enough to buy some of Schools uniform and the uniform not enough use in each week"(Teacher, 2014).

4.3. Policy Suggestion

4.3.1. Learn Free 15 Years Policy

This policy did not expand opportunity for poor student in higher education because cost of higher education is high in schools at big urban areas. The Government does not offer much in comparison to the fees. Although free and compulsory education is given to students' up to grade 10, neglected and poor students do not have the power to learn according to the law.

"For many of poor students, even though it is free for education. They are not interested to learn because they have to work for family. E.g. Thai traditional dramatic performance family"(Administrator, 2014).

"If I have sent my daughter to pursue education, we think we would face the other cost although have learning free policy"(Parent B, 2014).

4.3.2. Student Loan Fund

There is loan facility available for people who want to send their daughters to study in urban areas. But the interest rate is very high and could be afforded only by middle class people and bureaucratic and wealthy families. Poor student cannot learn in rural area because of their parents' low income.

"Right now the schools doesn't collect other cost, but poor student from poor family must to help family to work"(Administrator, 2014).

4. Other Suggestions

It would be better if other organizations provide the necessary support to improve the academics as well as buildings or get more budgets for hiring quality teacher in those schools. If it is possible they should create educational funding model to help poor student to study. Funding should be provided to help these students to expand their opportunities of learning without having to worry about helping their parent. Furthermore, if education funds are provided to poor students, the schools should manage the bank accounts of the students.

"If possible have educational funding for poor student, I think that's good to help expanding opportunity educational"(Administrator, 2014).

“That’s good if happened of educational funding for poor student but schools should to control the spent money of student instead their family” (Teacher, 2014).

5. Discussion

The research found that these poor students are increasingly facing difficulty in life. They are neglected and have to live in crowded and poor living conditions. Their parents and guardians are farmers and low income laborers and work hard to take care of their families and have no time to attend to and provide educational guidance to their daughters. Therefore, the children lack the opportunity of access to quality education systems such as instruction media and teaching aid. In addition, poor students were neglected. Simultaneously the poor student also had risk and can be related the study done by Anyamanee Buranakanon)2010 .(She studied about evaluation educational policy for underprivileged and poor and found that the household of poor students are big families and they live with the elderly persons. In addition, their household are farmers and earn low income. Most of them live in north eastern of Thailand and rural area. Besides household, other characteristics are migration and low education and income.

In policy suggestion it was found that although the government has launched the “Free of Charge” education policy 15 years is not really free because the students require membership fee. The charge increases for higher level learning as well. Poor student have habitats far from schools and must pay travel cost to schools. In addition to this, it was found that the policy lacked transparency in budget allocated to the poor students. Nattapondleamcharaskul (2012 (studied about Analysis Educational expenditure of Thailand household under policy learning free 15years project. He found that learning free 15 years policy is not really free because there are many charges such as membership and alumni fee, clothing, hiring foreign and specialized teachers, computing attendants, accidental and life insurance, regular health check, air conditioned rooms, and overtime staff expenses. Their cost becomes the limitation for poor student to get equal education as other students. Average school expenditure is 25,000 Baht in one year and is not affordable to poor families.

Considering education policy launched nowadays, it was found that student loan fund do not help poor families to expand opportunities for access to education because the poor families are not able to avail the loan facilities. Direk Patmasiriwat (2012) studied Investment in children of Thailand and found that poor household does not receive any benefit as they lack the power to take a loan. In addition, inequality of household still exists and this study suggested policies for solving the problems of underprivileged poor student. They are: 1) provide free funding for poor student 2) establish funding for local administration authority for management of local area.

6. Conclusion

Inequalities in education still remain and cause many problems increasingly and continually and it seems there is no solution yet. The problem evince that they lack opportunity to access better education and dropout rate of children dramatically rose up. In the meantime, the poor students usually live separated and lonely. The poor children’s family lack life security, health security and socialization. The policies of the last government aimed to solve problems of educational

underprivileged children through legislation about compulsory education, learn free 15 years policy and student loan funding. These policies did not reduce inequality of education of poor students. Therefore, we should create free education funding for poor students so that they can be supported directly to solve the above mentioned problem.

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Factors Affecting the Media Industry in Thailand

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Introduction

The role of media in economic development has long been recognized, and in economic theory, people who possess more information can make better decisions. The media is expected to serve as an information provider, leading to better economic performance, however, governments typically attempt to control the flow of information available to the public, especially in authoritarian regimes. In many developing countries, governments are able to control all broadcast media, though tend to be less successful with printed media.

In Thailand, the printed media has diminished in importance in recent years, while broadcast media and the internet have expanded due to the introduction of new technology, leading to the faster delivery of and easier access to information and entertainment. This technology is still developing at a rapid pace, and has become a main driver for the significant changes taking place in the media industry today. The transition from analog to digital has increased the productivity of frequency usage, resulting in a rise in the number of channels of a high quality. Satellite transmission has allowed many new players to enter the broadcast market, while new reception devices have broadened public access. Technology continues to impact upon and influence society at all levels. Added to this, the transfer of regulatory power on broadcasting to an independent organization has reduced the Thai government's ability to control and censor the media. It is expected that such changes in the media landscape will help improve the efficiency of the media market going forward.

This paper aims to discuss those factors influencing the effectiveness of the media at promoting better political, economic and social outcomes, and examines the that have taken place changes in the media industry in Thailand over recent times, with a particular focus on broadcast television.

I. Factors Affecting the Role of the Media in Economic Development

In economic theory, the availability of information helps people make better decisions regarding markets, because information is a crucial determinant of the efficiency of political and economic markets. In political markets, citizens require information about candidates; so as to make voting decisions. Consumers require information to select products.

Generally, citizens and consumers receive the information they need through the mass media, which includes newspapers, radio, television and the internet. The media can play a key intermediary role, collecting information and making it available to citizens and consumers (Djankov et al., 2002). New information can change people and cultures, create new demand, stimulate public debate and facilitate collective action. The media, therefore, can affect politics, economies and culture,

supporting institutional changes and market developments. Open information flows can promote institutional reform by affecting people's incentives and by sharing ideas and knowledge. Greater access to all media can provide a voice for social groups to create pressure for changes in institutions and norms behaviors. In addition, efficiency in the media industry can lower the cost of information to citizens and consumers, and provides a mechanism to overcome the problem of asymmetry of information between the principals (citizens) and agents (government) (World Bank, 2002; Dyck & Zingales, 2002; Coyne & Leeson, 2004). However, the media usually depends on several interest groups, such as the state and regulators, advertisers and their consumers. Balancing these different interest groups is critical (Islam, 2002).

Studies by World Bank (2002) have pointed out that the media needs to be independent, accountable, and able to provide relevant information and reflect diverse social views in order to improve governance and support markets outcomes. Usually, a country's media has three similar problems: concentrated ownership and restricted competition, financial dependence, and less media freedom due to state regulation. This leads to a distortion in the provision of information and reduced independence. Also, poor access to information and low quality journalists also reduce the quality of information provided. A lack of competition, as well as low levels of literacy, human capital, and technology, can limit media reach. In contrast, due to the power of information providers, the media also needs to be checked and balanced, which can be done by promoting competition in the industry, as well as using some forms of state regulation (World Bank, 2002; Islam, 2002; Coyne & Leeson, 2004).

Media Independence/Autonomy

Important factors that influence media independence are its ownership structure of media, laws and regulations, and funding (World Bank, 2002). The ability of media sources to act without interference from external agencies is critical in their role as an information provider (Coyne & Leeson, 2002).

1) Ownership: Ownership is a principal determinant of independence¹²⁵ as media owners may distort information provided to their consumers. Djankov et al. (2002) found that ownership structures around the world are very concentrated. The studies measured media ownership in 97 countries, both developed and developing. The results showed that:

Press ownership: 57% Families, 29% State, 6% Other, 4% Employees, 4% Widely held.

TV ownership: 60% State, 34% Families, 5% Widely held, 0% Employees, 1% Other

Top radio station ownership: 72% State, 24% Families, 2% Widely held, 0% Employees, 2% Other

Overall, findings indicated that the family owned company and the state were the major owners of media firms. Only 4% of media enterprises were widely held. The state controlled 29% of

¹²⁵The authors argued that "although the media ownership data do not measure all the factors that affect media independence, particularly media regulations and financing, they do measure one of the most important factors affecting the media" (World Bank, 2002).

newspapers, 60% of television stations, and 72% of top radio stations, while family-controlled accounted for 57% of newspapers, 34% of television stations and 24% of top radio station. Some privately held media were also closely related to the state through business, family and personal associations. This led to greater influence from state control. Classified by level of development, it found that 21 countries (all of them developing) had government monopolies of daily newspapers, and 43 countries (40 of them developing) had state monopolies of television stations (Djankov et al., 2002).

The study also investigated the consequences of state ownership on a number of political, economic and social indicators. In general, high levels of state ownership of the media were associated with low economic, political and social outcomes. The results in detail were as follows (Djankov et al., 2002):

- **Freedom of the press.** Media in countries with high levels of state ownership were much less free. Furthermore, Islam (2002) found a positive correlation between free media and democracy.
- **Political markets.** Government ownership of the press has a negative effect on citizens' rights and corruption. The effect of government ownership of the press was statistically significant, while government ownership of television was not. This was explained by authors that the presence of a private press, which was more common, provides a check on state television, ensuring free flows of information than would occur if both were in state hands. The data confirmed that the outcomes were worse when the state owned both newspapers and television than when it owned only one of them.
- **Economic freedom.** Higher state ownership levels within the media were associated with weaker security of property, risk of confiscation and a low quality of economic regulation. The results were statistically stronger for the press than for television and radio.
- **Social outcomes.** Countries with higher state ownership levels were associated with inferior education and health indicators, such as school attainment, enrollment levels, student to teacher ratios, life expectancy, infant mortality and malnutrition.

2) Laws and Regulations: Licensing, content laws, and defamation and insult laws are measures of state regulation. Fundamentally, the purposes of state regulation are to promote freedom of expression and to protect the public interest. In general, the licensing of media enterprises can be used to control the media. With limited spectrum frequency used in broadcasting, some forms of licensing broadcasting are needed to define property rights. However, many countries employ licensing to control both technical requirement and content. Sometimes, licensing is used to limit competition.

Generally, content regulations are defended on the grounds of protecting cultural interests, consumers and sometimes state security. Content regulations allow governments to control or influence information flows (World Bank, 2002; Islam, 2002). However, content regulation has been considerably challenged by new media forms.

Restrictive defamation laws lead to a decline in investigative journalism. Fundamentally, defamation and insult laws aim to protect the reputations of individuals and ensure the accuracy of reported news. However, politicians sometimes exploit the legal system to take action against the media. The World Bank (2002) discussed the issues concerning a balance between protecting people from defamation and encouraging investigative journalism. There were three findings: first, if libel is a criminal offense rather than a civil offense, journalists lean towards self-censorship, second, the plaintiff bearing the burden of proof, that allegations are untrue, gives journalists considerable freedom when reporting; and third, if the law provides protection for libelous statements about matters of public interest, journalists can better investigate arbitrary government behavior and predatory business practices.

3) Funding: Advertising is a major source of media enterprises' revenues, so advertisers may use advertising budgets to control media content. Financial support from the state can induce incentives for friendly coverage of the government and reduce the watchdog role of the media. Some countries prohibit direct subsidies of media organizations to prevent the state from jeopardizing independence. Some countries still provide subsidies with some limitations, if such subsidies are not linked to media content and media independence (World Bank, 2002). In many developing countries, the government budget is the significant source of advertising revenue for the media (Coyne & Leeson, 2004). Besides, advertising revenues from concentrated private sources can also influence content. It has been found that news is not reported if it might hurt advertising revenues and thus harm the financial position of media firms. Advertising from diverse sources is likely to reduce bias in content (World Bank, 2002; Owen, 2002; Carrington & Nelson, 2002).

Quality of the Media

The media can be an effective mechanism in supporting economic development when it has the capacity to provide high quality information that permits more informed consumption and production decisions. The quality of media depends on competition, access to public information and human capacities.

1) Competition: Competition among media outlets increases the supply of information to voters and consumers, and helps preventing distorting information by few media firms. Competition is closely related to ownership issue. If media ownership is concentrated in a few firms, competition will be less, and information flows may reflect only the views of the government and influences. Competition among media firms will certainly ensure a broader coverage of social and political views and limit the abuse of power by media due to check and balances among firms in the industry. Moreover, minority voices as well as those of the poor are more likely to be presented. Some countries try to promote competition in the media industry by restricting market concentration, though in practice it is still difficult to apply the measure efficiently (World Bank 2002; Coyne & Leeson, 2004).

2) Access to Public Information: Fast and easy access to public information is essential for media to investigate issues effectively and produce high quality reports. Information of government's procurements and expenditures helps taxpayers to monitor government offices. All public data help citizens make better decisions. The information market will work efficiently if access to

public information is fast and easy. If government officials can delay the access to information, this will reduce the ability of the information market to develop and function. Furthermore, availability of information to public fosters an environment of competition between media sources to obtain and report that information quickly, accurately and effectively. In such circumstances, check and balance between media will also arise (Coyne & Leeson, 2004; World Bank, 2002). Many countries have implemented freedom of information laws to enable citizens to access certain information on request. However, experience shows that information laws do not work effectively in various developing countries.

3) Human Capacities: Human resources are also crucial to quality of media. Overall, it is found that it is often difficult to find well-trained employees to staff media firms, especially in developing countries (Coyne & Leeson, 2004). Inability to gather and analyze information accurately or misreporting of information will weaken the ability of media to support political and economic markets.

Reach and Consumer Demand

Higher media penetration helps to promote greater participation of citizens and consumers. The effect of media on society, therefore, depends a lot on whom it reaches. However, it has been found that the reach of media varies tremendously across countries depending on their income levels. Experiences in several countries have shown that better access to the media can improve social outcomes as well as economic and political indicators (World Bank, 2002; Islam, 2002). Basically, how much access people have to media forms depends largely on government policies. For example, people in remote areas may need government financial support to access the internet. Government policies can improve media access in various ways, such as removing barriers to entry for new media enterprises, increasing media competition, reducing unnecessary costs in media industry, granting financial support to remote areas due to high costs of media access, and improving literacy; as well as media and computer literacy. However, for the media to play a positive role in economic development, consumers are also crucial; they must demand high quality information, as well as keep monitoring the media to ensure accountability and responsibility.

II. Media in Thailand

Like other countries, the mainstream media in Thailand is facing a challenge from 'new media'. Major media forms, such as newspapers and television, aim for nationwide audiences. With technological limitations, radio is generally regional and area based. This section discusses the structure of the printed media and television broadcasting in Thailand, plus media consumption, and takes a look at changes in the Thai media landscape

Structure of the Thai Media: Overview

Overall, newspaper readership in Thailand has declined considerably, by 14% annually between 2007 and 2009, dropping from approximately 26.3 million in 2007 to 24.5 million in 2008 and 18.9 million in 2009. This was the result of a shift in news consumption from print media to new media (Tangkitvanich & Wongkitrungruang, 2010). However, the decline of overall print consumption did

not change the structure of the print media in Thailand. Thai Rath daily newspaper still accounted for about 50% of market share, defined in terms of readership, with a more than 1 million circulation and more than 10 million readers (Tangkitvanich & Wongkitrungruang, 2010; Paireepairit, 2012). In second place was Daily News with a market share of 28%. The share of these two newspapers adds up to nearly 80% of the market. In terms of print media enterprises, there are 5 large daily newspaper corporations: Vacharaphol company (Thai Rath), Si Praya-kanpim Company (Daily News), Matichon PCL. (Khao Sod and Matichon), Nation Multimedia Group PCL. (Kom Chad Luek, Krungthep Turakij (business), the Nation (English), Post Publishing PCL. (Post Today) and Bangkok Post (English)). This indicates that Thai printed media is concentrated in the hands of a few family-owned enterprises.

The Thai broadcasting industry is dominated by various government agencies which have owned spectrum frequencies for more than 5 decades. Major agencies are the Royal Thai Army, Mass Communications Organization of Thailand (MCOT PCL., a state owned enterprise), and the Government Public Relations Department (PRD). These agencies operate their own radio and TV stations, and at the same time grant concessions to private companies to run TV and radio. With limited spectrum frequency, Thailand has only 6 TV stations. However, the penetration rate of television broadcasting is very high, reaching more than 95% of households (Table 1).

Table 1: Households Owning Media Broadcast Equipment in Thailand

	2007		2008		2009	
	HH (million)	% of THH	HH (million)	% of THH	HH (million)	% of THH
TV set	17.7	96.3	18.6	97.2	19.2	97.4
Radio set	11.6	63.9	11.4	60.3	n/a	n/a
PC	3.18	17.5	3.58	19.6	3.87	20.3

HH: Total number of households owning the equipment, THH: Percentage of total number of households in the country.

Source: Tangkitvanich & Wongkitrungruang, 2010, p. 11

Over the past decade, a number of satellite TV stations have been established. Before 2008, they were illegal and unlicensed. Originally, satellite TV in Thailand began as a service for those who wanted to watch foreign channels. Thai satellite TV channel began from political movement against Thaksin Shinawatra in 2005. The anti-government, yellow shirt movement set up ASTV and employed such broadcasting as a mechanism of movement. They sent broadcasting data to Hong Kong via internet and aired programs from Hong Kong satellite to avoid government censorship (Paireepairit, 2012). Noting the inability to stop and punish ASTV, other satellite TV stations used the same tactics. The red shirt movement started its own station in 2007. A satellite channel supporting the Democrat Party has also been operating since 2011. Some satellite TV stations, especially political satellite TV, have arisen before obtaining licenses. However, the Broadcasting Business Act of 2008 legalizes cable and satellite TV, and allows those cable and satellite TV to advertise. This has induced a number of new entrants to enter the satellite TV business. It also grants interim licenses for community radio stations. By January 2013, over 300 licenses had been granted to cable and satellite TV stations operating more than 600 channels. In general, lower barriers to entry have attracted new participants to the cable and satellite market. Some mainstream media have set up

their broadcasting stations or joined with other satellite TV stations (preparing for the digital TV in the future), such as Nation group, Matchon group, Daily news company, as well as newcomers such as Spring News and Voice TV. This led to a diversity of news sources.

Currently the operators of satellite platforms dominate TV broadcasting access because they broadcast free-to air TV (terrestrial) channels as well as satellite TV channels. Due to a decline in the price of satellite dishes and the difficulties faced receiving terrestrial signals in some areas, TV viewers turn to the use of satellite dishes as well as cable to watch free-to-air terrestrial TV. A number of viewers who watch TV by satellite and cable reception have increased significantly during 2007-2013 from 14% to 19, 31, 45, 50, 64 and 78% respectively (Table 2).

Table 2: Percentage of TV Viewers by Platform, 2007-2013

Year	Terrestrial aerials	Satellite dishes and cables
2007	86	14
2008	81	19
2009	69	31
2010	55	45
2011	50	50
2012	36	64
2013 ^f	22	78

^f: forecast

Source: Nation Broadcasting Corporation Public Company Limited, Annual Report 2012, p. 60

According to National Electronics and Computer Technology (NECTEC), internet users in Thailand have increased from 18.3 million users in 2009 to 21 million users in 2010 (cited in Paireepairit, 2012). Paireepairit (2012) argues that the number of internet users in Thailand is relatively low compared with other Asian neighbors due to higher internet costs, a delay in the implementation of broadband and 3G infrastructures, and a limitation in the use of English among the population. However, there were about 14.2 million Facebook users in 2012, and the number of Thai twitter users is very high. Thais also use YouTube a lot in terms of media consumption. This shows that Thai people will access new media and social media forms if they can. The Internet User Profile of Thailand 2009 report by the NECTEC (cited in Tangkitvanich & Wongkitrungruang, 2010) revealed that the most important reasons for people to consume online news are convenience (56.5%), followed by freedom to choose (18.3%), the capability to participate in discussion (13.2%) and low costs (9.8%). Many kinds of benefit from consuming news online are also cited by the survey, such as the variety of information available (42.6%), freedom of expression (26.7%), increased participation (21.4%), immediacy (4.9%) and ease of searching for foreign news (3.3%). In short, choices, interactivity and speed were seen as the main benefits of online new media. In contrast, accuracy, objectivity and impartiality, the key principles of good journalism, were not mentioned as reasons for consuming online news (Tangkitvanich & Wongkitrungruang, 2010).

Most mainstream media outlets have news websites, but these websites do not generate significant revenue. For example, the advertising spend on the internet in Thailand was still less than 1% the national total in 2013 (Table 3). Therefore, media organizations are reluctant to invest more in order


to produce high quality content; they mainly use those websites for updating news or presenting some parts of content published in the newspaper.

Media Consumption

It appears that the consumption demand for mainstream media has slightly declined. Newspaper readership declined from 26.3 million people in 2007 to 18.9 million people in 2009. There was a 22% fall in the radio audience during 2007 to 2009, and the number of news radio stations in Bangkok declined from over 1 million stations in 2007 to 800,000 stations in 2009. The overall terrestrial television rating slightly decreased during the same period (Tangkitvanich & Wongkitrungruang, 2010). However, mainstream media outlets still dominate the media landscape, with the increasing competition from new media.

Advertising expenditure in the media industry grew at an average rate of 3.86% annually during the period 2006 to 2013, slightly higher than the average economic growth rate, which grew at 3.64% annually (Figure 1). The share of advertising expenditure on terrestrial free-to-air channels, including channel 3, channel 5, channel 7, channel 9 (MCOT) and channel 11 (NBT), accounted for 59-60% of national total during 2005-2013. The share of advertising expenditure on newspapers was second at 15.7% of total advertising expenditure during the same period. However, such a share declined significantly from 19% in 2005 to 13.26% in 2013. The share of radio advertising revenue declined slightly from 7.47% in 2005 to 5.5% of the national total in 2013. Advertising expenditure through internet increased considerably from 172 million baht in 2008 to 877 million baht in 2013, but was still less than 1% of the national total (Table 3).

Figure 1: Growth Rates of the Economy and Total Advertising Expenditure, 2006-2013



Sources: Bank of Thailand and AGB Nielsen Media Research

Advertising expenditure on TV grew at 4.3% per year on average higher than the growth rate of advertising industry during the period 2006 to 2013. Newspaper faced a negative growth of revenue from advertising, while radio also had very low growth rates of revenue from advertising during the same period (Table 3).

Table 3: Advertising Expenditure by Medium, 2005-2013

Medium	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Million Baht									
TV	50,020	53,473	53,491	51,137	52,935	60,766	62,238	68,105	69,249
Radio	6,392	6,596	6,318	6,933	6,168	6,116	5,918	6,358	6,321
Newspapers	16,248	15,425	15,809	15,282	14,149	15,000	14,541	15,183	15,258
Magazines	6,148	6,179	6,067	5,998	5,426	5,694	5,824	5,595	5,518
Cinema	1,443	2,086	4,841	4,173	4,856	5,987	7,224	7,906	7,519
Outdoor	4,529	4,667	4,481	4,229	3,965	3,849	4,278	4,532	4,153
Transit	708	994	956	1,372	1,764	2,188	2,643	2,960	3,512
In Store	114	314	570	826	819	1,121	1,618	2,733	2,623
Internet	n/a			172	259	290	470	573	877
Total	85,602	89,735	93,035	90,120	90,341	101,010	104,754	113,945	115,029
Percentage Share									
TV	58.43	59.59	57.50	56.74	58.59	60.16	59.41	59.77	60.20
Radio	7.47	7.35	6.79	7.69	6.83	6.05	5.65	5.58	5.50
Newspapers	18.98	17.19	16.99	16.96	15.66	14.85	13.88	13.32	13.26
Magazines	7.18	6.89	6.52	6.66	6.01	5.64	5.56	4.91	4.80
Cinema	1.69	2.32	4.67	4.63	5.38	5.93	6.90	6.94	6.54
Outdoor	5.29	5.20	4.82	4.69	4.39	3.81	4.08	3.98	3.61
Transit	0.83	1.11	1.03	1.52	1.95	2.17	2.52	2.60	3.05
In Store	0.13	0.35	0.61	0.92	0.91	1.11	1.54	2.40	2.28
Internet	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.29	0.29	0.45	0.50	0.76
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Growth Rates (percent)									
TV		6.90	0.03	-4.40	3.52	14.79	2.42	9.43	1.68
Radio		3.19	-4.21	9.73	-11.03	-0.84	-3.24	7.43	-0.58
Newspapers		-5.07	2.49	-3.33	-7.41	6.01	-3.06	4.42	0.49
Magazines		0.50	-1.81	-1.14	-9.54	4.94	2.28	-3.93	-1.38
Cinema		44.56	108.10	-3.87	16.37	23.29	20.66	9.44	-4.90
Outdoor		3.05	-3.99	-5.62	-6.24	-2.93	11.15	5.94	-8.36
Transit		40.40	-3.82	43.51	28.57	24.04	20.80	11.99	18.65
In Store		175.44	81.53	44.91	-0.85	36.87	44.34	68.91	-4.02
Internet		0.00	0.00	0.00	50.58	11.97	62.07	21.91	53.05
Total		4.83	3.68	-3.13	0.25	11.81	3.71	8.77	0.95

Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research

There are two private companies operating the terrestrial free-to-air TV stations. Bangkok Broadcasting and Television (BBTV), family owned company, has operated Channel 7 under a Royal Thai Army concession since 1967. The present concession will end in year 2023. Bangkok Entertainment, a subsidiary company of BEC world Public Company Limited, has operated Channel 3 under an MCOT concession since 1970. BEC world PCL is listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand however Maleenon family still owns more than 50% of the company share. The concession will end in year 2020. The rest are owned by state agencies. The Royal Thai Army has owned and operated Channel 5 (TV 5) since 1958; the Government Public Relations Department has owned and operated channel 11 (NBT) since 1988, NBT receives revenue from a government budget, as well as advertising. MCOT, a state owned enterprise listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, has owned and operated Channel 9 (Modernine TV) since 1955. As a state enterprise, MCOT is still under

supervision of the Prime Minister's Office and Ministry of Finance, while the Thai Public Broadcasting Service, an independent state agency founded in 2008, owns and operates the Thai PBS TV station without advertising, receiving its revenue directly from excise taxes on tobacco and liquor.

Table 4 shows the market share classified by audience for 2012. Channel 7 accounted for the largest share at 47%, while the second ranked, Channel 3, accounted for 33%. These two channels make up to 80% of national TV audiences, up from 73% in 2009. If market share was classified by revenue from advertising, channel 7 would own the largest share at about 28-31% of total advertising on TV. Channel 3 would receive 28%, while channel 5 and 9 would account for similar shares at about 18-19% (Table 4). Over the period 2009 to 2012, NBT received the smallest share, at 4%.

Table 4: Share of Free-to Air Television Stations (2009 - 2012) (percentage)

Channel	2009	2010	2011	2012
Classified by Audience				
Ch 3	28	30	30	33
Ch 5	9	8	7	6
Ch 7	45	44	46	47
Ch 9	10	10	9	8
Ch 11	3	3	3	1
Thai PBS	5	5	5	4
Classified by Advertising Expenditure on TV				
Ch 3	29	27	28	28
Ch 5	20	18	18	18
Ch 7	28	31	31	31
Ch 9	19	20	19	19
Ch 11	4	4	4	4

Source: MCOT: Annual Report, various years.

Advertising on satellite and cable television stations is not included in the advertising spending on TV shown in Table 5. It is estimated that advertising expenditure on cable and satellite TV was about 9,653 million baht in 2012, growing 29% from the previous year (Nation Broadcasting Corporation PCL., 2012). This amount of advertising accounted for 12% of total advertising expenditure on terrestrial, cable and satellite TV that year. This indicates that although a number of cable and satellite TV channels outnumbers terrestrial TV channels hundreds of times, they still have a small share of the audience. Terrestrial TV, especially Channels 7 and 3, are the major players in the market.

Changes in the Media Landscape

The structure of broadcasting is changing due to technological progress and the implementation of new laws. With satellite transmission, many new players have entered the broadcast market, as new reception devices have helped to broaden public reach. Further, the transition from analog to digital has increased productivity of frequency usage. New technology has led to an increase in the number of TV channels, which has helped to promote competition in the industry. Since the 1997 Constitution was introduced, a new independent organization to manage and regulate the broadcast industry has been set up to liberalize the industry from state control. In this regard, government

agencies cannot not impose new license/concessions on broadcasting, however, due to some political and legislative struggles for more than 10 years, the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) had never been established. The Constitution of 2007 allowed a merging of NBC with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) as one independent body, namely National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC). Two important laws have been passed: the Broadcasting Business Act of 2008 and the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission ACT of 2010. Finally, 11 NBTC commissioners were appointed in late 2011. The NBTC Act allows any concession given to broadcasting and telecommunication operators to continue until the end of the contracts. The commissioners set a plan for digital terrestrial broadcasting during 2012-2013, and under this plan, 48 digital TV channels will be allowed.

1) Laws and Regulations

In general, almost every government has tried to reduce the threat posed by the media. The Thai government usually interferes with the media using both soft and hard measures. While direct control of state media and censorship of private media are used as the main intervention mechanisms, financial interventions have recently emerged as a new instrument. For example, the government's advertising spend on television reached 2.77 billion baht or about 5.3% of the total advertising spend on television in 2009 (Tangkitvanich & Wongkitrungruang, 2010); the Prime Minister's Office had an advertising budget of more than 1 billion baht per year on average during the period 2006 to 2013 (Table 5). Often media companies that are friendly to the government receive larger advertising revenues from government agencies. With the power of money, the government can exercise considerable control over information flows in the media market.

Table 5: Advertising Expenditure by the Prime Minister's Office

Government (Prime Minister)	Year	Advertising Expenditure (million baht)
Thaksin Shinawatra/ Surayud Chulanont	2006	787
Surayud Chulanont	2007	1,090
Samak Sundaravej/Somchai Wongsawat	2008	744
Abhisit Vejjajiva	2009	1,034
Abhisit Vejjajiva	2010	1,347
Abhisit Vejjajiva/Yingluck Shinawatra	2011	1,479
Yingluck Shinawatra	2012	1,043
Yingluck Shinawatra	2013*	1,199

*only January -November

Source: Thai Publica: www.thaipublica.org/2014/01/government-statistics-on-advertising. Accessed 31 January 2014

The following are examples of political interference during the periods of the Thaksin Shinawatra and Abhisit Vejjajiva governments.

“Political interference with the media becomes even more harmful when political power merges with big business. During the premiership of Thaksin Shinawatra, intervention in the media was especially heavy handed. Cooperative outlets were allegedly rewarded with handsome advertising contracts from the government, his family-owned empire and his political allies’ business. In addition to advertising money, the government can also reward

friendly media with some privileges. For example, the Manager Media Group, during its honeymoon with Thaksin government, got a contract from the MCOT to run a prime time television. The group's debt to the state-owned Bank was also reduced from THB 1.8 billion to THB 200 million" (Tangkitvanich & Wongkitrungruang, 2010, p. 71).

"Under the current Abhisit administration, the climate of censorship against red-shirt media has also spread under the state of emergency decree declared on 7 April 2010. Accused of spreading misinformation, community radio stations sympathetic to the red-shirt movements were raided and closed down, and the transmissions of satellite-based People Channel (PTV), the major mouthpiece of the red-shirts, were suspended by Thaicom, a satellite operator, under the order of Ministry of ICT. Red-shirt print media, Voice of Thaksin, Red News and Truth Today, were also banned. The situation seems to be worse on the internet. A report by Sawatree Suksri finds 74,686 URLs blocked by the MICT" (Tangkitvanich & Wongkitrungruang, 2010, p. 72).

The landscape of media regulation has clearly changed since the passage of the NBTC Act in 2010. The direct control over broadcasting has shifted from the government to NBTC. By the Constitution of 2007 and NBTC Act of 2010, the NBTC is required to be an independent regulator and is accountable to the Senate. The NBTC act determines a number of ways to guarantee the independence of NBTC from political and business interference. Firstly, the NBTC is financially independent, as most of its budget is financed by license fees. Secondly, political office holders and people working in telecommunication and media sectors are barred from becoming NBTC commissioners. Finally, the Senate selects the commissioners from the list proposed by the Ad hoc Committee consisting of professional associations, academic and civic groups. Besides, the Senate can appoint another committee to monitor and evaluate the performance of NBTC.

NBTC can grant licenses for any activities related to broadcasting and telecommunications operation, including internet providers. NBTC is also responsible for the content regulation of broadcasting, however, content regulation on the internet is regulated by the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology, under the Computer Crime Act of 2007.

According to the Broadcasting Business Act of 2008, there are three categories of broadcasting license: public, community and commercial. Commercial licenses are further divided into national, regional and local levels. With legal provision and an increase in number of channels due to new technology, it is expected that media ownership will no longer be concentrated in state agencies and large media companies, and competition in the industry will also increase.

2) Broadcasting: From Analog to Digital Terrestrial Television


As mentioned above, there are 6 channels of free-to-air nationwide television stations under analog terrestrial system. Two private companies operate the most popular TV stations under concessions, their total audience share accounting more than 70% of total viewers during 2008 to 2012. This indicates a high concentration, like the print media, in which only 2 enterprises had market share of nearly 80% over the same period.

In 2013, NBTC decided to categorize frequency spectrums for the 48 digital TV channels into 3: 24 commercial, 12 public and 12 community channels. The licensing request on the community and

public service channels is determined by a 'Beauty Contest', whereas that of the business service channels is by auction. The period for commercial licenses is set as 15 years. For the 24 commercial channels, they are further divided into 4 categories: 7 high definition varieties (HD), 7 standard definition varieties (SD), 7 standard news and 3 standard youth and family channels. Each bidder can hold a maximum of 3 different licenses, but not with HD and news channels together. Also, variety and children's channel are required to provide at least 25% of news and related content, and documentaries.

From analog to digital, adopting DVB-T2 system, broadcast activities (from producer to consumer) will increase from 3 major steps to 5 major steps. Usually, in the analog system, only station providers must receive state permission. For the digital system, station providers have been separated into 3 steps, that is, channel provider, network provider and facility provider (Figure 2). Each qualified operator will be granted a license from NBTC.

Figure 2: From Analog to Digital



NBTC has decided to give 6 licenses for network providers. Each network provider can operate only one multiplex. One multiplex (Mux) comprises of 2 channels of high definition and 6 channels of standard definition. By June 2013, NBTC had granted 5 network provider licenses without an auction to the Royal Thai Army (operator of CH5), receiving 2 licenses operating 2 multiplexes, MCOT (operator of CH9), NBT and Thai PBS, all for a period of 15 years. For the facility provider, licenses were awarded to ThaiPBS, MCOT and TOT (telecommunication operator) for 15 years. In general, the operator of Mux and facility provider, as well as commercial channel provider, will pay 4% of its gross income; 2% for NBTC administration and 2% to NBTC's Research and Development Fund.

The auction took place on 26 and 27 December 2013. In total, 29 companies and 41 applications bid for 24 digital terrestrial commercial TV licenses, and the winners of the auction are shown in Tables 6 and 7.

With a starting price of 1,510 million baht, the nine companies competed for seven HD licenses. The first winner offered 3,530 million baht, and the two sixth ranked offered 3,320 million baht. The average bidding price was 2.24 times higher. For the standard definition channels auction, the

starting price of 380 million baht rose 6 times on average. Competition among the 16 bidders was very high; the first ranked bidder offered 2,355 million baht and the seventh ranked 2,200 million baht.

Bidding for the news channels raised the starting price by 6 times, while the winning price for the children's channels was 4.7 times the starting price.

Table 6: Winners of the High Definition and Standard Definition Variety Channels Auctions

Variety Channels (High Definition)		Variety Channels (Standard Definition)	
Company	Final Bids (million baht)	Company	Final Bids (million baht)
BEC-Multimedia (BEC-World/ Channel 3)	3,530	Thai Broadcasting (Workpoint/ Satellite TV)	2,355
Bangkok Media and Broadcasting (Prasat Prasert Prasarttong-Osoth/ Satellite TV)	3,460	True DTT (True Vision/ Cable TV)	2,315
Bangkok Broadcasting and Television (Channel 7)	3,37	GMM SD Digital TV (Cable/Satellite TV)	2,290
Triple V Broadcast (Thai Rath newspaper)	3,360	BEC-Multimedia (BEC-World/ Channel 3)	2,275
MCOT (Channel 9)	3,340	RS Television (Cable/Satellite TV)	2,265
Amarin Television (Satellite TV)	3,320	Mono Broadcast (Cable/Satellite TV)	2,250
GMM HD Digital TV (Cable/Satellite TV)	3,320	Bangkok Business Broadcasting (Nation Group/Satellite)	2,200
Total	23,700	Total	15,950
Starting price: 1,510 million baht		Starting price: 380 million baht	
Incremental price per bid: 10 million baht		Incremental price per bid: 5 million baht	
Final bids/starting price (on average): 2.24		Final bids/starting price (on average): 6.00	
Number of bidders: 9 companies		Number of bidders: 16 companies	

Source: NBTC

Table 7: Winners of the Standard Definition News and Children's Channel Auctions

News (Standard definition)		Children's (Standard definition)	
Company	Final Bids (million baht)	Company	Final Bids (million baht)
NBC Next Vision (Nation Group/ Satellite TV)	1,338	BEC-Multimedia (BEC-World/ Channel 3)	666
Voice TV (Satellite TV)	1,330	MCOT (Channel 9)	660
Thai TV (TV pool/ (Satellite TV))	1,320	Thai TV (TV pool/ (Satellite TV))	648
Spring News Television (Satellite TV)	1,318		
Thai News Network (TNN/ Cable TV)	1,316		
DN Broadcast (Dailynews Newspaper)	1,310		
3A Marketing (content provider for TV5)	1,298		
Total	9,238	Total	1,974
Starting Price: 220 million baht		Starting Price: 140 million baht	
Incremental price per bid 2 million baht		Incremental price per bid 2 million baht	
Final bids/starting price (on average): 6.00		Final bids/starting price (on average): 4.70	
Number of bidders: 10 companies		Number of bidders: 6 companies	

Source: NBTC

Overall, 17 enterprises will operate the new 24 commercial digital TV stations. Among these, only BEC multimedia received 3 licenses, while MCOT, GMM, Nation, True and TV pool received 2 licenses each (Table 8). Most of media operations and content providers won the digital licenses, three from the printed media, three from analog terrestrial TV, and the remainder from satellite TV, except 3A Marketing, the content (news) provider for Channel 5 (Table 9). However, many enterprises have business networks outside of the media.

Table 8: Winners of Digital Licenses: Classified by Group

Name	Variety (HD)	Variety (SD)	News (SD)	Children (SD)	Total
BEC Multimedia (CH3)	Yes	Yes	no	yes	3
BBTV (CH7)	Yes	No	no	no	1
MCOT (CH9)	Yes	No	no	yes	2
Amarin	Yes	No	no	no	1
Bangkok Media and Broadcasting	Yes	No	no	no	1
GMM (Cable/Satellite)	Yes	Yes	no	no	2
Thai Rath	Yes	No	no	no	1
MONO	No	Yes	no	no	1
RS (Cable/Satellite)	No	Yes	no	no	1
Workpoint	No	Yes	no	no	1
Nation	No	Yes	yes	no	2
True (Cable)	No	Yes	yes	no	2
Daily News	No	No	yes	no	1
TV Pool	No	No	yes	yes	2
Spring News	No	No	yes	no	1
Voice TV	No	No	yes	no	1
3A Marketing	No	No	yes	no	1
17 Groups	7	7	7	3	24

Table 9: Winners of Digital Licenses: Classified by Business Background

Company/group	Daily Newspaper	Terrestrial TV	Satellite/Cable	Others
BEC Multimedia		yes		Entertainment
BBTV		yes		Banking
MCOT		yes	yes	
Amarin			yes	Publishing
Bangkok Media and Broadcasting			yes	Hospital/Airlines
GMM			yes	Entertainment
Thai Rath	Yes		yes	
MONO			yes	Telecommunication
RS			yes	Entertainment
Workpoint			yes	Entertainment
Nation	Yes		yes	Publishing /Education
True			yes	Telecommunication/Food
Daily News	Yes		yes	
TV Pool			yes	Entertainment
Spring News			yes	Content provider (news)
Voice TV			yes	various businesses

3A Marketing			Content provider (news)
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State owned terrestrial TV channels, except MCOT, received digital broadcasting licenses automatically on public services categories. By law, public services TV cannot carry commercial advertising, except for Royal Thai Army notices classified as national security public services.

Conclusion

In summary, although mainstream media has long dominated the information market in Thailand, its importance has diminished slightly in recent years, and especially printed media. The broadcast media, and the internet, have expanded due to new technology; bringing faster delivery and easier access to information and entertainment. This technology is still developing at a rapid pace, and has become a main driver for significant changes in the media industry. The transition from analog to digital has increased the productivity of frequency usage, resulting in a rise in terrestrial free-to-air TV channels, from 6 analog to 48 digital channels, and of a higher quality. Furthermore, satellite TV has also allowed many new players to enter the broadcasting market. With technology and a change in law and regulations, the broadcast media landscape has been transformed in a number of ways.

Broadcasting has been liberalized by shifting from a state controlled and limited competition scenario, to become more competitive and transparent under NBTC licensing. The new broadcasting technologies, such as digital and satellite, and low barriers to entry, have attracted new participants to the digital terrestrial, cable and satellite television market. Due to an increase number of broadcasting operators, ownership of the media will be less concentrated. New players will help to increase competition and thus lower the influence of the few, existing organizations. However, cross-media ownership arising from the integration of the media market, such as print and broadcasting, may affect levels of competition in the information market, as well as checks and balances among media enterprises.

In addition, the transfer of regulating power in broadcasting to an independent organization has reduced the Thai government's ability to control and censor the media. However, each year the government can spend several billions of baht on advertising, resulting in a certain power to intervene with media information flows. Also, advertising expenditure may not grow fast enough to finance all new entrants. The mass media market is a capital intensive, and this may obstruct quality improvements.

An expansion of the media industry and the lower cost of broadcast receivers, have broadened public access, except for access to new media due to limited internet infrastructure. Although audiences now have more choice and control over how content is received and consumed, they have a growing difficulty in distinguishing between fair reporting and deliberate distortion for business and political ends.

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The Impact of IMT – GT Development Policies: The Transitional from Rice Fields and the Utilization of Forest to Rubber and Palm Oil Plantations

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Abstract

Understanding the phenomenon of rubber and palm oil plantations encroaching in the south of Thailand by concentrations, not only as a consequence of the economic development plan policies under three divisions, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand but also is the aftermath of the global trade and industrial zones. These concepts reflect the rich forest resources of the South were to be torn down anytime. It was found in the duration of 20 years, the usable forests of the communities are gone. A discourse of the state territorialization "Palm oil Plantations for Keeping and Rubber Plantation for Eating," to convert natural resources into capital, has caused a negative impact on farmers who take advantage of these resources by using the forest as a residence and source of livelihood. They turned into industrial plants as rubber and palm oil plantations which price based on market mechanism. But does anyone think the impact that will occur to the environment and natural resources are obsolescent?

Keywords: IMT-GT, territorialization, palm oil and rubber plantations

Introduction

The reduction of food crops has become a world-wide problem. Even Thailand which has never been the food sources of the world. In the present, the agricultural crops planted in areas throughout the country significantly decreased. Food crops are mostly changed to renewable energy crops. Finally, there is a concern that in the future, the people of Thailand may face food shortage problems like other countries in the world. Dr. Dejrat Sukkamnert, lecturer in the Faculty of Economics at Kasetsart University, said that the Southern hemisphere at present is the largest producer of palm oil and rubber at 72.5%, while it remained rice growing area for consumption in only two provinces, Nakhon Si Thammarat and Phatthalung. If farmers abandoned growing food crops in lieu of rubber and palm oil, then the more food prices will rise.

The statistical office of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Office of Agricultural Economics determines that the food consumption in Southern Thailand from

their own production is only 6.9 percent when compared to the amount of raw food materials purchased, 76.4 percent. In the East, they buy food raw materials from shops accounted for at 58.2 percent because their own food consumption from production reached 41.8 percent, while Southern food consumption from production was only at 23.6 percent. This showed that southern region is the second place after Bangkok that has to pay money to buy food from the store.

The largest rice producing areas in the South of Thailand are Pak Panang, Songkhla lake basin area, Tapi basin area in the province of Nakhon Sri Thammarat, Phatthalung, Songkhla and Surajthan. The major ecological landscapes are made up of rice fields and Toddy palm, but now they are diminishing due to the changing farmland into black tiger shrimp fields. Statistics show the reduction of rice fields in the south which reduced continuously. The agriculturists have changed from rice farmers and shrimp farmers to growing commercial crops such as rubber and palm oil only (Office of the National Economic and Social Development, 2010). Especially in the relationship policy among three countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand (IMTGT) which has affected the area of rice farms and forest community in the south, has decreased drastically. The cooperation plan is to develop the southern areas to be an agriculture and industrial economic zone. The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives is Thailand's representative and therefore has a policy to make farmers turn to grow rubber plantations by setting up a rubber plantation fund.

As mentioned above, the questions for researchers is how has the government used their authority under the IMT-GT project to pass rice fields and forest communities into rubber and oil palm plantations. And, what is the impact of rubber and palm oil plantations on the natural resources, including rice fields and community forest; and finally, what kinds of recommendations can the researchers give to the related departments on the impact on the natural resources and the environment.

The Research Objective

To study the transition of rice fields and forest for utilization of rubber and palm oil plantations as a display of territorialization to convert natural resources into capital, as well as the impact of rubber and palm oil plantations on the farmers and its effect on economics, ecosystems, biodiversity, food stability, culture, and society.

The Research Methodology

1. The area of this study is southern Thailand. We have selected three provinces (1) Suratthani, (2) Songkhla, and (3) Pattalung. Suratthani and Songkhla which have huge rubber and palm oil farms. Pattalung also has produced variety of rice as in-season rice, upland rice and dry season rice as a rice granary in south Thailand.
2. As key informants of this study the researcher chose farmers from different areas, 5 palm oil farmers in Suratthani, 5 rubber farmers in of Songkhla and 5 rice farmers in Phatthalung. The total of 15 farmers was interviewed in different three provinces.
3. The data collected from documents and related literatures and also observed the ecosystem, the south plantation of industrial crops in the farm fields and usable community forests as well as the in depth interviewed with farmers.

4. The analysis and editing data with triangle method, personal, place and timing during data collection. After that we categorized, decoded, and did data summarization and presentation with descriptive statistics.

The Results

(1) The transition from a farm field with usable community forest to rubber and palm oil farms in the south with the territorialization and de-territorialization. Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) have explained the expansion of rubber and palm oil farms in the south. It began with the government announcing for the empty space to be reserved for forest and national parks which does not allow anyone to use it, this process called the territorialization. We have studied that the concept of managing forest resources before Rama V's bureaucratic reformation. The management of forest resources in a position beyond the control of the state that was in a way for each community to have their own customs, but after the bureaucratic reformation, during this important transitional period. The management of power structure is centralized and modern. The forest department was set up in 1946 and there were announcements to use various policies and laws for forest and land protection. Later, the legislative powers declared that all valuable woods were to be transferred to the federal government. For example, the private ownership of land is a Western concept which was used for the Civil and Commercial Code (1930), the Wildlife Preservation and Protection (1938). The parliament enacted this land code and the land code (1954) and in particular, the legislation of the *Parliament forest Act* (1941). This gave the government vast authority to manage natural resources, especially the way that government attempted to use the law as a tool for natural resource management. But the villagers did not understand the laws, and believed that their communities were the owners of the forest because they have lived and dependent on the forest for a long time before the laws were launched. The legislation of the *Parliament forest Act* has allowed private companies use of forest resources and does not concern the communities living there before which turned the villagers with no documents into illegal residents. Finally, they had to leave the area. These problems revealed the different thinking in natural resource management between villagers and the government, and government continued to employ De-territorialization. The government considered their legislative powers and their increasing monopolized power management of soil, water, and forest while community argued that the rights and responsibilities in the management of natural resources should belong to the community who has their own guidelines and regulations.



In present-day, we found that commercial-based agriculture crops are grown in large scale plantations. The government played a greater role in supporting and facilitating market mechanisms with a connecting world market. The government does not provide a real reason why they are in favor of rubber plantations, but only said it adds to the economic well-being by evaluating the GDP. While the conservationists thought the rubber and palm oil plantations have destroyed society's

sustainable production, and made natural resources and the community's forest are bereaved. The huge expansion of rubber plantations, in which government has no plans to assess their impact as well as the preparation of a plan to measure the negative impact that might occur in the future. Somboon Charoenjirathakun (2013) studied the effects of the promoting of rubber plantations with no planning and found that farmers in the south switched to plant rubbers because rubber price is higher and from year 2003 – 2011, the price was higher and higher until it reached 180 baht per kilogram in 2011.



This added to the expansion of rubber plantations and it was called the “rubber rush.” Support from the government by providing assistance and organizations such as: the office of the rubber replanting aid fund, the rubber research center, the bank for agriculture and agricultural cooperatives made the farmers and interesting people turned to grow more rubber. In 2010, Thailand had a rubber plantation area of 17.96 million hectares, but the real numbers may actually be 20 million rai from SPOT-5 satellite images which show the change from rice farms to rubber and palm oil farms by forest invasion particularly in 1st and 2nd forest basin which is water source forest and mostly they planted monoculture rubber plantations which caused severe flooding. Particularly, in the South, there was a lack of knowledge and it was less reliable to believe that rubber plantations lead to the stability of Thailand in the long run. There are several considerations in the rubber process development system whose farmers, societies, and government agencies need to realize that the rubber plantation affects food security in-country. Changing rice field to rubber furrows with carelessness, and giving inaccurate knowledge to farmers on the problems and issues and the side effects of tree rubber, its production, and food security.

The palm oil is the significant industrial crop of the South because the south is appropriate for growing rubber trees. Moreover, since the government policy defined oil palm as a source of renewable energy in the country, this has made the planted area increase continuously. The cultivated areas have increased from 2.06 million hectares in 2003 to 2.75 and 3.20 million acres in 2005 and 2007 respectively.

The production of palm oil in the last 5 years from 2003 to 2007 increased at an average of 11.45 percent per year. In 2007, the quantity of palm oil produced was 6.39 million tons, the main growing areas were in Krabi, Chumphon, and Surat Thani. Krabi has the largest growing area accounted for at 537,637 rai (39.4%) followed by Surat Thani's planted areas at about 405,213 rai (29.70%), and Chumphon's planted areas at about 216,798 rai (15.89%) respectively.



(2) Rubber and Oil Palm Plantations under the IMT-GT : The expansion of industrial crops in the south of Thailand for the past 50 years has divided into 4 Sessions: the first session was the expansion of rice plantations in 1977. In 1997, there was capability for produce rice about 252,505 tons with total value 1,767.5million baht and areas for planting dry season rice were 34,970 rai, the productivity was 480kg per rai. In the present, statistical reports, for the total planting rice areas in the south was only 1,373rais.

The second session, the expansion of shrimp farming occurred in 1987-1988. In particular, the coastal areas of the South had been converted into shrimp farms with several lands along the sea starting from Paphanang to Sathingpra. The foreign companies named Aqua Star said that it bought the land in Ranote district, about 8rais at a price of 7.000baht per rai for shrimp farming in Thumbon, Rava, and Khongthan. The company made an investment into shrimp farming while the Ranote villagers had physical help. It succeeded in the beginning stages, but it lost in later stages because the company did not attend to the farmers. The farmers were not happy and they had prosecuted. Moreover they faced disease problems in the shrimp. Moreover, shrimp farming also affected rice farming the most because the salt water from shrimp farm absorbed into rice farm and damaged the rice. In some farmers' cases, they had transformed from rice cultivation to shrimp farming. Sometimes, there was conflict between the rice farmers and shrimp farmers because the impact of salt water from the shrimp farms.

The third session, the expansion of rubber plantations had occurred in 1997 – 1998. The total areas of rubber plantations were 648,418 rais and the tapping rubber trees were about 503,510 rais, which accounted for 77.7 percent of the total rubber plantations. The average yield was 270 kg per rai per year with total value of 3,398.6 million baht per year.

The fourth session, the expansion of palm oil plantations had occurred in 2007. The history of palm oil was founded when Prince Pradiphatphubarn imported and cultivated at rubber experiment lab at Hatyai district, Songkhla province in 1929. After that Mr. Suwan Reunyot, director general of the Department of Public Welfare had initiated the promotion of palm oil plantations in Khaungalong industrial estate, Satun province. Each member planted 16 rais, which accounted for total area about 20,000 rais, and in the same year the palm trees were grown for commercial use by palm oil industrial and palm garden limited company with areas 20,000 rais at Thumbon Phaipraya, Amphur Ao-Lueng, Krabi provinces. This was a beginning point of commercial oil palm plantation development till present, the successful policies to promote the planting of oil palm plantations in Thailand, which has made the plantation areas expand rapidly to 4 million rais in 2011. The government has set out the strategy for the palm oil industry in 2004-2029 to produce and use of

biodiesel as a renewable energy and they intend target of oil palm plantations expansion to 10 million rais.

The expansion of such industrial crops is the result of collaboration between the government and the market. The political discourse can be seen in the form of government policies and institutional mechanisms. They operated government departments that help such as the Rubber Research Center, the Office of the Rubber Replanting Aid Fund, Palm Oil Research and the Development Center and Biodiesel Research Center of Prince of Songkhla University, all supporting rubber and palm oil plantation expansion under the regional economic cooperation project among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (IMTGT).

IMT-GT Project

IMT-GT program was established in 1993 by Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesian leaders' agreement to stimulate sub regional economic cooperation, including transportation by land, sea and air; industry trade and investment, financial, agriculture, fisheries, livestock, telecommunications, human resource development, and customs. The cooperation areas are comprised of five southern border provinces of Thailand: Songkhla, Satun, Patthani, Yala and Narathiwat; four states of Malaysia: Penang, Kedah, Perlis and Perlis; and two provinces on Sumatra island of Indonesia: Aceh and North Sumatra. At present, the cooperation areas cover more than 592,576 kilometers and the total population is 69.5 million which consists of 14 provinces of southern Thailand and 10 provinces of Indonesia by adding: West Sumatra, South Sumatra, Riau, Riau island, Jambi, Bengkulu, Bangka - Belitung and Lampung and 8 states of Malaysia by adding: Kelantan, Selangor, Melaka and Negeri Sembilan.



The government of these three countries agreed to promote the role of the private sector, to create economic growth, environmental and infrastructure for facilitating economic development and pushed IMT-GT to be part of the economic development plans of each country. The major goals of the project are as follows:

(1) To increase the volume of trade and investment in the IMTGT area, (2) To increase the export volume from the IMTGT area to global markets, (3) To improve the livelihoods of people in the IMTGT area and the three countries. The private sectors were a key role to lead in the development and public sectors would support in operations as public utility and infrastructure etc.

IMT-GT projects required both direct and indirect support from the government and other related agencies because this project was new concept with no guidelines and forms developed and could not adopt other development projects with any suitable applications for the IMT-GT. As a consequence, IMTGT was the project that had no institutes for data collection and evaluation, and the project implementation about invasion cultivation of rubber and oil palm plantations.

(2) To promote infrastructure project supporting rubber and palm oil industry: The policies to promote infrastructure about transportation between the three countries as the motorway between the cities (motorway Hat Yai - Sadao, Songkhla Province). ADB bank encouraged financial loans up to USD 300 million or approximately 9,000 million baht. Hatyai – Sadao motorway was an expressway to support the transportation from special economic zones at Sadao border and it was this factor that encouraged the farmers to grow more rubber and oil palm trees. As well as the Development of Phuket Port in the coastal areas of the Andaman sea; Port Naklua, Amphur Kantrang, Trang province; Port Tammalang, Satun province. ADB bank encouraged Port Tammalang was to be tourism port which connected Phuket to Langkawi of Malaysia, and Aceh of Indonesia. Port Ban Naklua was especially for fright carriers. The remaining projects belonged to Malaysia (2 projects) and Indonesia (6 projects) and mainly on infrastructure development projects by linking trade and investment lines in the IMT-GT together, with a total budget of 5.10 billion U.S. dollars, or about 1.8 billion baht in which led to change the Sub-Regional IMT-GT in next few years.

Rubber and Palm Oils Downstream Industries

The Federation of Thailand Industrial (2012) by southern border provinces special zone field collaborated with the National Innovation Agency (Public Organization: NIA) under the IMT-GT projects had established innovative business networking of the objectives to encourage the innovative production development processes, create new products and new services and business models from members of industries in southern Thailand as well as provide support, consulting and development proposals of innovative projects for industrial company members. The project held a meeting and industrial site visit with NIA during 9-11 October 2012. For development of innovation projects as well as monitoring the implementation of innovative business networking programs in southern Thailand which effectively and met the objectives. The meeting has considered more four projects:

1. Innovative projects "palm oil boiling pot with applying heating water instead of the steam" by Siam Virgin Oil Company Limited.
2. Innovative projects "The feasibility study of separating the fatty acids from in crude palm oil by using gas bubbles" by Samorthong Palm Oil Company Limited.
3. Innovative project "Gas CNG, LNG Production System from wastewater treatment of palm oil distillation factory" by Bang Sawan Oil Palm Limited Public Company.
4. Innovative project "Heat loses system of Biogas engine exploitation in the streamed palm oil process and refined oil palm.

Impact and Reaction from the Invasion of Rubber and Oil Palm Plantations

(1) Economic Impact

Discourse of government for farmers about "Palm oil Plantations for Keeping and Rubber Plantation for Eating." Farmers have switched rice farms to rubber and palm oil farms because of high productivity. When we considered the reality of production, rubber and oil palm planters in the South had status as a labor, not capitalist or entrepreneurs and only some of them owned rubber and palm oils plantations. However, if they owned plantations when they had produced and harvest the plants, they had to employ workers for the rubber plantations, the workers who take care of everything from weeding, fertilizing, tapping for latex rubber, and the benefits were usually divided 60:40 or 50:50.

(2) Ecological, Biological and Food Stability Impact

The effects were the loss of a forest water source, flooding and windstorms including the area for rice plantations in southern Thailand decreased significantly. Especially the rice in the southern, in the district of Koh Samui, Suratthani which in the past the rice plantation areas were about 10,000 rais but now no rice plantation areas for more than 20 years. Food insecurity is silent. We did not face shortage of food and scramble problem. But it appeared in the form of food prices gradually increasing. Consumers had to purchase products at a higher price. As the prices of agricultural products were not incentive enough, who were affected most? The poor who did not produce their own food.

(3) The Social-Cultural Impact

The generosity of the community and self-reliance culture of households and communities are decreasing. This is consistent with the study of Somboon Charoenjirathakun's "Potential and constraints of rice production for the stability of farmers in Pattani province" regarding the expanding rubber cultivation without boundaries many years ago. Particularly, the cultivation plantations expanded into the forests and fields. The results impacted the community in a holistic manner: economic, social, and cultural.

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Different Positions to Moderate Islam: Migration and Religious Transformation within Indonesian Muslim Immigrants in London

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Introduction

The article addresses the impacts of migration on the transformation of religious life as experienced by Indonesian Muslim immigrants in London regarding their religious tradition, moderate Indonesian Islam. The discussion revolves around the concept of the translocation of culture in which a (ethno-religious) tradition brought in by immigrants undergoes changes and modifications; blending and mixing with the tradition of the locals; and contextualised by local and transnational socio-political circumstances (Werbner, 2005). Related to this, I argue that the current local and international politicisation of Islam has a tremendous influence on the ways Indonesian immigrants in London construe their ethno-religious tradition. In the West, particularly Britain, however, the tradition of Moderate Islam, though gaining public popularity as a friendly form of Islam that respects religious pluralism and tolerance, has been widely debated and contested within the growing number of Muslim immigrant communities and their offspring (see Mamdani, 2002; Modood & Ahmad, 2007). For Indonesians in London, their perceptions of moderate Indonesian Islam, as a virtue of their ethno-religious tradition, have been re-constructed differently through the interplay of societal processes of their assimilation into either the minority Muslim immigrant community or the secularised British society of London.

The Contestation of Moderate Islam in the Global Context

Moderate Islam denotes a politico-religious tradition embraced by Muslims who disagree with the Islamist ideology of Muslim fundamentalism, extremism or terrorism. Though highly contested, the tradition of moderate Islam has gained an important recognition in the context of the current escalation of tension between Islam and the West, which is infamously termed a 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington, 1993; cf. Lewis, 1993; Khan, 2007). It is said that within the Muslim community, on the one hand, there exist the Islamists who represent a non-conformist group standing head-to-head against Western political domination and in opposition to Western secular and liberal ideology (Sayyid, 1997; Halliday, 2003; Roy, 2007; Al-Azmeh, 2009). On the other hand, Muslims who eagerly accept liberal democracy and the principle of human rights, respect people of other faiths and are self-critical of Islamic politico-religious views and traditions, are identified as moderate (Khan, 2007; Modood & Ahmad, 2007).

Besides its political nuances, nonetheless, Khan (2007) points out that moderate Islam is deeply rooted in theological underpinnings. In contrast to Islamist ideology, the moderate tradition has been built from different religious methodological interpretations, orientations and primordial normative preferences, which are defined as peaceful, non-violent and accommodating to different

socio-cultural and political contexts. Similarly to fellow Islamists, however, moderate Muslims share politico-religious impulses to implement Islamic tenets in micro and macro social contexts albeit in a substantive form rather than a formal one (i.e. application of *Sharia* law or the foundation of an Islamic state); build a virtuous society that treats others with dignity and respect; and embraces the common humanity of all. Moderate Muslim scholars prefer to conduct *Ijtihad* – defined narrowly as a juristic tool relating to critical reasoning, interpreting and articulating Islamic doctrines as relevant to contemporary socio-political contexts – instead of the military *Jihad* promoted by radical and militant Islamists (ibid). The characterisation of moderate Muslims echoes Safi's (2003) thesis on the discourse of 'progressive Muslims' which was linked with the scholarship of Muslim intellectuals engaging critically with classic Islamic literature and traditions in order to reconcile them with contemporary issues of social justice, gender equality and religious pluralism within Muslim and wider societies (cf. Kurzman, 1998; Kersten, 2011).

In contrast to the perceived virtue of Moderate Islam, Mahmoud Mamdani (2002) accuses that the growing popularity of the term expressed in mainstream Western media as something more to do with the politicisation of Islam imbued with such a hidden agenda to divide Muslims. Moderate Islam is thus linked to the socio-religious media frame of 'good Muslims' – identified with the political acceptance of Western domination – that is contrasted to 'bad Muslims' – who preserve their Islamist politico-religious aspirations and relentlessly fight against the West. In the context of the presence of Muslim immigrants in the West, Modood and Ahmad (2007) critically point out the socio-political and religious accommodative stance of Moderate Islam is deeply imbued with an apologetic position, accepting the powerlessness of Muslim immigrants especially in terms of the socio-political ethic to challenge the liberal and secularised milieu of the receiving society. To some extent, Tariq Ramadan (2010) states that Moderate Islam connotes to Muslim immigrants with a sense of cowardice; a Westernised, surrendering of their tradition and selling-out their politico-religious identity for the sake of integration and assimilation into the secularised Western society.

The Construction of Moderate Indonesian Islam: a Brief Historical Note

In Indonesia, moderate Islam has been proudly and traditionally embraced by the majority Muslim populace (Eliras, 2004; Laffan, 2006; Hwang, 2009; Pringle, 2010). According to Azra (2006), one of the leading Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, moderate Islam is believed to be deeply rooted in Indonesian ethno-religious cultures, which were arguably forged and developed in different forms and directions in contrast to the apparently more orthodox Middle Eastern Islam. The moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam is celebrated by the socio-historical religious pluralism and tolerance in the country since the pre-Islamic era. The success of the initially experimental adoption of a democratic political system along with the growing Islamic religious piety of the Indonesian Muslim middle classes has consolidated moderate Islam in the contemporary period (Azra & Hudson, 2008; Hefner, 2000; Houben, 2003; Effendy, 2003; Mieztner, 2009). Additionally, the moderate Indonesian Islam has been widely praised by the mainstream media as well as Western leaders including former and current British Prime Ministers, Tony Blair and David Cameron, and especially the US President, Barack Obama¹²⁶. The latter figure has shown a strong appreciation for the

¹²⁶ I found the term moderate Islam/Muslim associated with Indonesia throughout various mainstream media accessed via the Internet such as the Guardian, BBC, the New York Times and others.

tradition given that he spent four years of his childhood in Jakarta¹²⁷. This international recognition is thought to support self-conscious Indonesian Muslims in maintaining religious moderation (Laffan, 2006).

Nevertheless, Laffan (2011) contends that moderate Indonesian Islam have been constructed through the historically contingent narratives of the early Islamisation process and its subsequent developments; and as a product of the Dutch colonial and orientalist policies governing the politico-religious affairs of their Muslim subjects in the Dutch East Indies, which were later adopted by the secular Indonesian government in the post-independence periods. There exists two main historical arguments affecting its construction, first, the syncretistic and hybrid socio-religious cultures of Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia blending Islam with Indic Hindu-Buddhists traditions, (Coedès, 1968; Lombard, 1996); and second, the peaceful conversion to Islam paved through cultural contacts, pioneered by Sufi itinerants and international Muslimtraders from India, Middle East and China, instituting a religious-cultural accommodation and a syncretic mystical tradition with a lesser concern to nurturing Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxis (John, 1993; Ricklefs, 2001; 2006; Lapidus, 2002). To some extent, the Dutch colonial and orientalist policies also had a crucial role in the construction of the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam. Islam was first seen as a potential (political) threat to the Dutch colonial rulers. Despite politically repressing Indonesians, the Dutch rulersadopted a policy to accommodatelsamic (ethno-) religious practices and traditions.The policy was further followed by an attempt to domesticate and drive their Muslim subjects away from the politico-religious influence of the Pan-Islamic movement¹²⁸ first emerged in the Middle East; and promote the pre-Islamic traditions inspired by Hinduism and Buddhism, alongside the locally Islamised ones (ibid;Benda, 1958).

The nature of moderate Indonesian Islam was examined in Geertz's classic thesis,*Islam Observed* (1968), which compared the different socio-cultural and political influences of Islam both in Western and Eastern corners of the Muslim world, between Morocco and Indonesia. In accordance with his earlier book, *The Religion of Java*, Geertz (1962) examined the Dutch orientalist innovation of harnessing the dominant legacy of Indian Hinduism and Buddhism during the foundation of Indonesian Islam (Coedès, 1968; Lombard, 1996). It is said that Islam was adapted and adopted, subsumed into and blended with the old Indic Indonesian cultures, beliefs and traditions. Consequently, Islam had not stimulated the major societal (and political) religious changes in Indonesia as was seen in the *Maghrib* of North Africa where Islam had a major impact on civilization, innovation and beliefs (cf. Gellner, 1981). The Islamic culture of Indonesia has developed within the conscientious socio-religious environment, embodying cultural diversification, syncretisation, compromise, flexibility, reflection and religious multifariousness, which is theantithesis to the aggressive, determined, homogenising, uncompromising, religiously rigorous and dogmatic nature of its Moroccan counterparts (Varisco, 2005). It makes sense to characterise the (Malay-)Indonesian

¹²⁷ The recognition of the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam can be found in a speech delivered by the US President Obama on the Muslim World on 4th June 2009 (for details of the speech, see http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).

¹²⁸ In this policy, the role of the Dutch Orientalist Professor, Snouck Hurgronje (d. 1936) as an Advisor on Native and Muslim Affairs to the Dutch colonial government, and his Western and Indonesian disciples were very prominent (see Benda, 1958).

Islam as the archetype of the impure, imperfect and heterodox variants of Islam developed in the far-eastern periphery of the Muslim world (Geertz, 1962; 1968)¹²⁹.

Indonesian Muslim Immigrants in London: Arrival and their Polarized Religious Trajectories

The arrival of about 7,000-10,000 Indonesian Muslim immigrants in London¹³⁰ has shown rather different migratory routes and patterns compared to other Muslim immigrants in Britain, who are dominated by labor and economic migrants from the new commonwealth countries, refugees, exiles, asylum-seekers from countries with political connections to the former British Empire, educated professionals and capital investors from oil-rich Arab countries since 1960s-1970s (Ansari 2004; Hussain, 2008). The arrival of Indonesians can be differentiated according to two immigration waves, before and after the 1990s, on the basis of their different motivations and socio-economic backgrounds. In the first wave, a small number of Indonesian immigrants came to London to work either for British companies, branches of Indonesian companies or were appointed as local staff at London's Indonesian embassy. There were also considerable numbers of Indonesian women intermarried with White British men who previously worked in Jakarta. This first wave of Indonesian immigrants was mostly consisted of educated professionals and/or came from middle-class economic backgrounds. The next wave of immigration in the 1990s was motivated by different issues. There were a number of Indonesian students who prolonged their stay along with educated-professionals and especially legal and illegal immigrant workers. There was also another group of intermarried Indonesians, not only women with White husbands but also husbands from other minority ethnic groups holding British passports such as Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Caribbean or Middle Easterners. The legal or illegal semi- and unskilled labor immigrants are mostly females (domestic) workers¹³¹, who had previously worked in the Middle East. These Indonesian workers are usually mixed with fellow Southeast Asian (e.g. Filipino) co-workers as many of them have received assistance from *Kalayaan*, a British charity organization assisting migrant domestic workers (see www.kalayaan.org.uk, n.d.).

The two waves of migration have influenced the polarizing religious trajectories of Indonesian Muslim immigrants in London. I identify three different groups within London's Indonesian Muslim community with regard to their different religious integration trajectories, first, the traditionalists; second, the revivalists; and third, the secularists. The term 'traditionalist' refers to Muslim immigrants with an orientation of pursuing and reproducing ethno-religious traditions brought in from their home country; and to forming or affiliating their exclusive ethno-religious-national groups in diaspora (Vertovec, 2009; Ameli, 2002). Most traditionalist Indonesians are a part of the 1970s-1980s migration wave as they are largely free from the influence of 1990s Islamic reformism inspired by Middle Eastern transnational Islamic movements among the growing number of urban Muslim

¹²⁹ Geertz's works on Indonesian Islam, though still very influential, has been widely criticised by numerous scholars (see Hefner, 1997; Laffan, 2003; 2011; Varisco, 2005 and many others).

¹³⁰ This is a rough estimation based on the 2001 Census reporting the presence about 7,000 Indonesian-born people in Britain (ONS, 2003).

¹³¹ As reported by the BBC Indonesian Service (7 May 2010), the Home Office issued 1,798 visa permits for Indonesian domestic workers in 2009. This number seemed to fluctuate in 2007-8 but then remained stable contributing to 12% of the 16,500 immigrant domestic workers in Britain.

middle-classes in Indonesia (Hefner, 2000; Eliraz, 2004). The revivalist group, who are part of the post-1990 arrival wave, shows similar orientations to pursuing and reproducing their Islamic traditions yet leaning towards the universally standardized (Sunni) religious orthodoxy, influenced by the 1990s Islamic reformism, and showing a readiness to participate in the wider Muslim immigrant associations. In contrast to two groups, the secularists have preferred to adopt the secular culture of British society, as part of their assimilation path, by individualizing their religiosity, disassociating from any religious association and freeing themselves from any religious authorities (Cesari, 2004; 2005).

Different Positions to Indonesian Moderate Islam

For Indonesian Muslim immigrants in London, their perceptions of the moderate religious tradition of Indonesian Islam brought in from the home country have been contextualised by the persisting antagonistic relationship between Islam and the West; the current internationalisation and politicisation of Islamic affairs; and importantly by their polarised socio-religious trajectories in the diaspora. To delineate the topic, I draw on Werbner's argument (2005, pp. 745-7) concerning the translocation of culture alongside the integration of Indonesian immigrants into the minority Muslim community and wider British society, in which the 'form and content' of moderate Indonesian ethno-religious traditions have become "open, changing and fluid and yet experiencing a powerful imperative" (Hall, 1990; 1992). The analysis is then elaborated based on three different patterns of Indonesians' religious trajectories: first the traditionalists; second the revivalists; and third the secularists. I argue that according to these three different ethno-religious patterns, the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam is differentially defined, asserted and articulated by the three respective groups.

The Traditionalists: Asserting the Moderate Tradition of Indonesian Islam

The traditionalist Indonesian Muslim immigrants in London have generally been content to embrace the tradition of moderate Indonesian Islam as their distinct Muslim identity, which is to an extent concomitant with their preference to pursue Indonesian ethno-religious traditions; to group with fellow ethno-nationals instead of other immigrant co-religionists; and their disinterest in adopting the universally standardised (Sunni) Islamic orthodoxy that is currently developing within the diasporic Muslim immigrant community in Britain. That said, the moderate Indonesian religious tradition is imbued with religious tolerance, pluralism and respect for others with different faiths, which is perceived as distinct from the religiously conservative traditions of fellow Indo-Pakistani, Arab or Somali Muslim immigrants they encounter in the diaspora. The combination of being few in number and having a different physical appearance and culture to the majority Indo-Pakistani Muslim immigrants, has led to the traditionalist Indonesians in London asserting a self-conscious claim to being (ethno-)religiously different and detached from the wider Muslim community in the city.

As discussed earlier, the tradition of moderate Indonesian Islam has been constructed through the historically contingent narrative of Islamisation – defined as a peaceful process brought about via trading networks, Sufi itinerant journeys rather than through any political or military force from foreign Muslim countries – and a *longue durée* assimilation with the pre-Islamic legacies of the Indic

Hindu and Buddhist traditions (Geertz, 1962; 1968; Ricklefs, 2001; Lapidus, 2002). Unsurprisingly, the rhetorical stance of the peaceful and acculturated, not to mention the culturally hybrid and syncretistic moderate Indonesian religious tradition has a strong influence on the way the traditionalist Indonesian immigrants in London define Islam. Royandi, a senior figure in the group has a clear view on this.

As I understand it, all (of the differences associated with Indonesian Islam) derive from the manner in which Islam came to Indonesia and in which Indonesians embrace Islam. Instead of by conquest or war that brings dramatic socio-political changes, Islam was blended into the Indonesian culture. You know Wayang¹³², don't you? The coming of Islam did not destroy (Hindu-inspired stories of) Wayang but modified them by injecting the monotheistic message of Islam. In my home town, Cirebon (West Java), in the old Sultanate of Cirebon, there was a Gong¹³³ named 'Shahadatain'¹³⁴ (to symbolise the Islamisation of the local culture). In other words, Islam adapted to and was adopted into the Indonesian culture rather than alter it altogether. The process has shaped the tradition of Indonesian Islam, which is more tolerant (to other faiths) and open to new influences from different cultures including here in Britain (Royandi, 17 May 2010).

Related to Royandi's view, it must be noted that it is still debated among academics whether Indonesian Islam, defined as inherently peaceful, tolerant and open to adopting other cultural influences, was a result of its different historical development compared to the more rigorous and orthodox Islamic traditions of the Middle East (Eliraz, 2004; Hwang, 2009; Pringle, 2010). But reiterating Laffan's (2006; 2011) argument, among traditionalist Indonesians in London, there exists a sense of being ethno-religiously different as a result of the marginalised image of Indonesian Islam in the Muslim world, profiled by Western media as an example of the 'Good Muslim' (Mamdani, 2002).

The tradition of moderate Islam thus stands for a non-conservative or non-political religious trajectory, which is believed to be embedded in the ethno-religious understanding and practices preserved and perpetuated by the majority of Indonesian Muslims. Edi elaborates his personal view of this religious trajectory:

I think being moderate implies a sort of softness or being less fanatical about Islamic doctrines. You know, here in London, we encounter different religious traditions from different Muslim (ethno-national) groups. Pakistanis and Middle Easterners are seen to be more committed to following all of the religious rules. They actively participate in the local Mosque, consume only halal food and most of the women wear a hijab. Indonesians are not like that. We mostly prioritise other factors like common decency wherever we live. I would say that 'moderate' means conducting rituals and other

¹³² *Wayang* is a very popular traditional Indonesian puppet theatre. Though inspired by sacred Hindu stories of Ramayana and Mahabharata, it is believed that *Wayang* was modified and used as the primary cultural medium in the early phase of the spread of Islam particularly in the island of Java.

¹³³ A *Gong* is a traditional Indonesian (and Southeast Asian) musical percussion instrument made in the form of a metal disc and hit with a mallet to play.

¹³⁴ *Shahadatain* is the first and primary pillar of Islam that literally means believing in one God and the Prophet Muhammad as His messenger. Testimonies to these beliefs are required in a conversion to Islam.

religious practices in a modified way, not challenging the socio-cultural norms and customs of the locals. So, being 'moderate' means that we adapt to modern lifestyle, by wearing a suit instead of a salwar kameez or taking off the hijab but retaining the principle of preserving modesty in female dress codes. You know, some Pakistanis here refuse to wear a tie because it symbolises the cross. For me, that is just too much (Edi, 9 March 2010).

The moderate religious tradition denotes a flexibility and openness to modification and adaptation, adjusting to the local socio-cultural contexts (Azra, 2006). In other words, a statement typical of this group as noted by Edi, the observance of Islamic rituals and other sanctioned practices has to be conducted in accordance with local cultures. In the context of the diaspora, where Muslims are in the minority and the local culture is secularised as it is in Britain, the observance of Islam has to be moderated, modified or changed. Among the traditionalist Indonesians immigrants in London, to some extent, the moderate non-conservative religious trajectory can be illustrated by their relaxed attitude towards total conformity to orthodox Islamic tenets like the separation or limiting of contact between men and women, *halal* dietary rules and the obligation for women to cover *Aurat* for modesty. It has also been shown in their apolitical stance particularly seen in their reluctance to participate in Muslim politico-religious engagements (e.g. public rallies and mass protests), which are intended to challenge the established secularised or Christianised customs and the British political system.

According to this understanding, nonetheless, the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam has a negative connotation implying impiety and a disinterest in politics, for which it is criticised by Western-based Muslim scholars like Tariq Ramadan (2010; Khan, 2007; Modood & Ahmad, 2007). It is said that the stance taken by moderate Islam is deeply imbued with an apologetic position, accepting the powerlessness of Muslim immigrants especially in terms of the socio-political ethic to challenge the liberal and secularised milieu of the receiving society. In other words, despite having no intentions to surrender their ethno-religious tradition, traditionalists have no interest in actively engaging in the socio-political life of the host society or articulating their distinct socio-religious and political ideas.

Hamim, a leading figure of this group, admits that the tradition of moderate Indonesian Islam has something to do with their heterodox ethno-religious culture and that their claim to represent moderate Islam comes from their religious ignorance and lack of Islamic knowledge.

For Indonesian immigrants at large, considering the tradition in Indonesia, observance of Islamic rituals are best guided by an Imam or acting Imam. This is because they are lacking in Islamic knowledge, relatively speaking. As you know, I have done my job here leading rituals and religious activities (named pengajian) for over thirty years. Before, most Indonesians here did not care about their religion at all ... That is why we call ourselves moderate Muslims, because Indonesian Muslims (particularly women) do not properly cover their Aurat. Actually, if we embraced Islam, we would follow its rules completely ... but this is not what Indonesians are about. As you can see here, they go to pengajian but not to learn Islam. They go just to chat and socialise. Observance of rituals seems to be marginal (Hamim, 19 January 2010).

A similar view is conveyed by Fadillah, a female Indonesian preacher. She came up against various obstacles in persuading her fellow countrywomen to wear a *hijab* in all their daily activities rather than just for attending *pengajian*.

For the majority of respondents, however, the moderate Indonesian Islamic tradition in London has a new currency in the context of growing Islamic fundamentalism, radicalism and even extremism and terrorism within the British Muslim community (Laffan, 2006; Modood & Ahmad, 2007; Khan, 2007). Ibrahim, one of the senior figures, insists that owing to their moderate religious tradition, Indonesian immigrants in London are fairly immune to the influence of radical and militant Islamist ideology compared with fellow Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Somalis, particularly the youth, among whom this radical and divisive politico-religious ideology has found its supporters (Gest, 2010). Immunity from the non-conformist religious stance also has something to do with their reluctance to join local mosque congregations and other Muslim immigrant organisations in the city. During my fieldwork, this traditionalists' view was corroborated by their frequently stated indifference towards Islamist ideas and movements such as *Hizb-ut Tahrir*, *Al-Muhajiroun* or *Tablighi Jamaat*.

To some extent, the traditions of moderate Indonesian Islam can be seen as a cosmopolitan stance toward religious pluralism and recognition of the virtues of other faiths and traditions. As noted by Otto, a martial arts master, the pluralist character of the ethno-Indonesian religious tradition can be seen in his learning and teaching of *Silat*¹³⁵.

In Silat there is a strong Islamic tradition that to reach an expert level or senior Pendekar, you must learn and perform Islamic rituals and rules on a daily basis. I largely avoid insisting on this for my disciples. But yes, among my senior disciples, I explain the religious aspect of Silat in more open ways. In general, I try not to show a strong link between Silat and religion, especially Islam. What I always emphasise is the spiritual aspect of Silat, which is not only relevant to Muslims but also to other religions like Hinduism. In our school here, we have Indian students who are Hindus. We also have White students who are Christian or who have no religion at all, yet believe in the supernatural power of God. Suffice it to say, Silat is universal, as is Islam, I believe. Everybody can learn Silat just as everybody can learn the virtues of Islam. In my opinion, all religions share a similar message of humanity. In our tradition, this is expressed in the language of Islam. Yet in other traditions, it is articulated in different languages. It is common for us here to discuss the singularity of God's message. But because of our narrow-minded (ethno-religious) views, we often fail to recognise it (Otto, 17 May 2010).

The link between the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam and the spiritual movements of the 'New Age' is also expressed by Teguh, a master of the modern Indonesian spiritual movement of *Subud*¹³⁶, and Arifin, a spiritual healer trained under the Sufi-inspired (west) Javanese tradition. I first

¹³⁵*Silat* or *Pencak Silat* is an indigenous martial art that originates in Southeast Asia including southern Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. The martial art has a strong ethno-Islamic tradition both in its philosophy and practical trainings.

¹³⁶*Subud* is an Indonesian spiritual movement founded by Muhammad Subuh Sumohadiwidjojo in the beginning of the 20th century. The name is taken from the Javanese word of the Sanskrit derivation, '*Susilo*,

met Teguh in the PMI. We agreed to meet again later for an interview in June 2010 at a Quaker house in Wandsworth, South West London after a teaching session of *Latihan Kejiwaan* (spiritual training) with his fellow *Subud* practitioners. According to Teguh, though open to people from different religious backgrounds, *Subud* originates from the moderate and specifically syncretic tradition of Indonesian Islam. In one respect, *Subud* does nothing to violate the primary tenet of Islamic faith; but it does try to spread its peaceful message without forcing or persuading people to embrace Islam. Similarly for Arifin, he provides his spiritual healing therapy to anyone who needs it. Though he claims it is not his intention to convert non-Muslims, he told me with pride that some of his patients converted into Islam after his healing methods cured their illness. He believes that his Sufi-inspired spiritual healing therapy conveys the non-violent and peaceful message of Islam to the people of this country.

The Revivalists: from Moderate Islam to the Search for an 'Authentic' Islam

For the revivalist group, the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam has been regarded both positively and negatively as the antithesis to the religiously conservative Middle Eastern and/or South Asian Islam. Moreover, some of them have tended to reject and criticise it while others have attempted to link its ethic of openness to religious transformation to universally standardised (Sunni) Islamic orthodoxy. Their dual stance correlates with their politico-religious standpoint which was forged by critical appraisal of local, national and international Islamic affairs combined with enthusiasm to join the wider Muslim immigrant associations in Britain. As I argue in other parts of the thesis, they share their (politico-)religious trajectory with second generation British Muslim immigrants and show more eagerness to be involved with their (politico-religious) activities, albeit in a relatively limited way (Lewis, 2007; Kabir, 2010).

For most respondents, the tradition of moderate Islam has been construed as being in their past, their religious stance before and/or in the early years of residing in Britain. Conveying a view typical among the revivalists, Oni, a 'born-again' Indonesian Muslim woman in London, insists that the term describes her former religiosity. Coming from Bali, the only Indonesian Island inhabited by a majority Hindu population with a Muslim minority, Oni points out that the welcoming culture and conciliatory ethno-religious tradition shaped her religious understandings and practices. She illustrates this tradition of moderate Islam by noting that even though her family were devout Muslims, there was no obligation for her to wear a *Jilbab* or *Hijab* and she was allowed to learn and perform traditional Hindu Balinese dances, which are criticised by Muslim clerics as being vulgar and expressing blatant eroticism particularly given the tight and revealing costumes worn. Similarly, Susilo describes how his past religiosity was shaped by the moderate ethno-religious tradition of his hometown in the northern coastal area of Java, being as it was imbued with Sufi-inspired mystical beliefs and superstitious practices. He further confesses to experiencing religious loss when moving to the Indonesian capital of Jakarta. After immigrating to London, his involvement in some Islamic religious circles combined with an impetus to preserve his religious identity in secular British society transformed him from a so-called moderate to a religiously conservative Muslim such that he abandoned his heterodox beliefs and practices.

Budhi and *Dharma*', which generally means the making of peace with God Almighty. The movement has spread worldwide including Britain (see <http://www.subud.org.uk>).

Aside from seeing the tradition of moderate Indonesian Islam as representing their former religiosity, some revivalists have openly criticised it and ultimately rejected it. Sri, a 'born-again' Indonesian Muslim woman, gave me her personal opinion:

I gave birth to my first son in 1982. At that time, my Islamic understanding did not oblige me to do anything. I did not mind if people around me were drinking (alcohol) or not. I was very (religiously) moderate or even liberal at that time. I saw my (Muslim convert) husband praying five times a day, which was more than enough even though he would often go to the pub with his friends, or leave a bottle of wine on our dining table. I did not object at all ... But, this was clearly my own ignorance, I did not know enough about Islam. My Islamic teacher at Kampong had not taught me properly about Islam. He was very moderate. He simply told me to pray every day, not to consume pork, not to drink alcohol, and that was it. He did not even teach me to wear a Jilbab (hijab) ... Everything changed about ten years ago. I felt my life had become stagnant because I had realised how ignorant I had been about my religion, may Allah forgive me (Sri, 17 January 2010).

The propensity among the revivalists to reject the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam is expressed by their reluctance to participate in or attend London-based Indonesian Islamic religious circle named *pengajian*. According to Nanik and her husband Shobirin, ever since they experienced a religious transformation during their involvement in the Arab dominated Muslim immigrant religious circle in Portsmouth, they have felt uncomfortable with the mixed gender activities in the *pengajians*. For this couple, gender separation is fundamental to Islam but lamentably ignored by their fellow countrymen and women in London. A similar view is also conveyed by Jasmin, who because of this preferred to join her husband's Bangladeshi communal groups in Tower Hamlets instead of her fellow ethno-national groups.

The Indonesian religious groups and events seem to be too secular for me. Men and Women mix freely without segregation ... In Bangladeshi communities, we are separated. So, women mix with women and men with men only. In wedding ceremonies, we are also separated ... It was very different in Indonesian cultural or religious events and activities. Genders are mixed. My husband dislikes it very much and criticises it a lot. That is why I personally choose not to attend such activities too often (Jasmin, 16 June 2010).

Nanik, Shobirin and Jasmin's views were representative of others in the revivalist group who are generally critical of their home country ethno-religious tradition.

Rejection of the moderate religious tradition is related to its being negatively connoted with a lack of commitment to conform to the Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxis. Moreover, revivalists equate moderate Islam with liberal or secular Islam, which are characterised by creative or progressive Islamic religious adaptation and adoption of Western liberalism and secularism (Kurzman, 1998; Safi, 2003; Kersten, 2011). To note, given the increased religious conservatism among the revivalist Indonesian Muslim group in London, such openness and progressive religiosity is definitely unwelcome. In sum, though having a slightly different rationale, revivalists' rejection of moderate Indonesian Islam seems to relate to its unpopularity and has a negative connotation among the

Muslim immigrant community in Britain with being 'Westernised' or 'selling out' one's politico-religious identity (Modood & Ahmad, 2007; Ramadan, 2010).

Similarly to the traditionalist group, however, some revivalist Indonesians in London recognise the positive facets of the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam. A prominent figure in this revivalist group, Usman, insists that the way Islam was embraced by Indonesians through long-term cultural and trading contacts with Arab, Persian and Indian Muslim merchants instead of conquest by foreign Muslim armies, has made Indonesians religiously moderate in terms of adaptability and responsiveness to changing socio-cultural contexts (cf. the previous statement of Royandi, a senior figure of the traditionalist group). The moderate religious tradition is associated particularly with gender equality within the Indonesian Muslim community in contrast to the perceived patriarchal ethno-religious tradition of fellow Indo-Pakistanis or Arab co-religionists. Usman links the moderate tradition with open and mixed gender interaction within Indonesian *pengajians* in London. This opinion is shared by Eliza, an Indonesian woman who intermarried with a White British convert living in Ilford, a neighbourhood dominated by Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

As you know, Indonesians seem to be more religiously moderate ... [I mean] Indonesian women have a fairly equal role to men. Unlike the Pakistani communities here where the women are somewhat left behind. They are not allowed to join a mosque congregation and they have to be seated separately from men at social or cultural gatherings and events. The fate of Arab women is pretty much the same. They cannot go out of the house without being accompanied by a male acquaintance. In my opinion, this is not how it should be. Men and women should have the same rights in the community. I am glad that I am Indonesian and that my husband learned Islam in Indonesia. And of course our community here is more open to female involvement (Eliza, 5 May 2010).

This confident appraisal of the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam resonates in the way religious doctrines are taught and learned within *pengajians*, which are unsurprisingly perceived as lenient, flexible and tolerant. This ethno-religious preference is expressed by Nizma in her experience of looking for a religious teacher for her daughters.

At first, my kids joined pengajians. I tried to familiarise them with Islam. When they were older, around 9 or 10, I began to search for a private tutor but I could not find any within the Indonesian community, so I had to hire somebody from a different ethno-cultural background. I wanted to show them that Indonesians are not the only Muslims. There were tutors available - mainly Arab or Pakistani. But I was minded to be cautious. Not all religious teachers really understand Islam properly. Eventually, I decided to hire an Algerian mainly because of his English fluency, whereas Pakistanis have quite a different accent. You know, my daughters are mixed-race, half White, half Indonesian. Problems began to emerge because his Islamic culture and the way he taught were very different to my childhood experiences in Indonesia. I would say his methods were too harsh, very stiff and uncompromising. For example, in the teaching, when my kids made a mistake, gave the wrong answer to a question or made errors reciting the Qur'an, he would instantly yell and hit the table, 'Not like that!' My kids then cried. For some weeks, it seemed that they felt under a lot of pressure during classes and I also felt threatened ... then I realised that our Islamic culture was different. We learn and practice Islam in a

gentle, accommodating and lenient way ... An acquaintance from Morocco told me that 'the best Muslim in the world is Indonesian, because you are so gentle, kind and sincere'. I did not know why she said it, but maybe it was true (Nizma, 14 January 2010).

The moderate religious tradition that Nizma refers to is very similar to Geertz's (1968) cultural dichotomy between the docile, lenient and flexible Indonesian Islam and the aggressive, uncompromising and rigorous Moroccan Islam (Varisco, 2005). Suffice it to say, the revivalist view of moderate Indonesian Islam shares some similarities with the views of their fellow traditionalist Indonesians in London.

Nevertheless, the view of the revivalist Indonesians in London differs to that of the fellow traditionalists in terms of the radical and militant Islamist ideology and movements (e.g. *Hizb-ut Tahrir* or *Al-Muhajiroun*). Of course the revivalists, like many Muslims, condemn terrorist attacks in the name of Islam and criticise the use of violent and dissenting political maneuvers perpetuated by the radical and militant Islamist groups that exacerbate tension between Islam and the West. Their politico-religious orientation is articulated by an active yet critical engagement with British society particularly related to local and international Muslim affairs through participation in public protests or mass rallies initiated by British Muslim organisations. Nonetheless, having shared a normative and idealised purpose to build a virtuous Muslim society, they show such a reluctance to completely denounce the uncompromising Islamist ideas and activities. Neng has a view on this as seen below:

For me, they are my friends. I know some of them personally, like people in the Al-Muhajiroun, a radical Muslim group here. I even attended one of their meetings. Once, I had an argument with one of them, a female activist of course, as men and women are always separated. I expressed my disagreement with their anti-Western standpoint and questioned why they used speeches to incite hatred towards non-Muslims and why they liked to burn the US or British flags in their campaigns, discussions and public protests. I did not say that they were wrong but I just questioned why they always show such an unfriendly, uncompromising image of Islam in their actions. I asked why they did not try to promote peaceful means, even while criticising any unjust policies of Western states in order to gain respect from the public ... In my opinion, Islam should be presented, particularly in Britain, as a peaceful religion which respects human dignity. It is our duty to introduce this view to non-Muslims here (Neng, 1 February 2010).

It should be noted that relating to their conservative religious trajectory, these revivalist Indonesian immigrants in London have to an extent accepted the idea of Islamic doctrines being an all-encompassing system, in line with the beliefs promoted by militant and radical Islamist groups. This is problematic as it sets them apart from fellow traditionalist Indonesians who unhesitatingly reject radical Islamist ideology altogether. As Neng insists, many revivalists retain a respect for Islamist movements including *Hizb-ut Tahrir* and *Al-Muhajiroun*, in spite of their occasional critique and having no intent to join them. This politico-religious stance is shared by most members of the revivalist group.

The Secularists: the Quest for a Non-Islamic Indonesian Tradition

The secularist Indonesian immigrants in London have undermined their Muslim heritage in the process of integration into British secular society. This tendency is concomitant with their status as

partially practising Muslims and/or having followed a secularised socio-religious trajectory after immigrating to Britain. Whether they conceal it consciously or not, their Muslim heritage is to a large extent irrelevant to them as they limit their involvement with or even detach from any ethno-religious Muslim associations and socio-cultural (and political) events. With the prevalence of Islamophobia and the securitisation of Islam, it goes without saying that a Muslim heritage is best concealed in order to integrate into secular British society.

Despite its irrelevance, most secularist Indonesian Muslims have a view of the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam similar to that of fellow traditionalist countrymen. For them, the tradition describes the flexible, relaxed and adaptable characteristics of the ethno-religious traditions of Indonesian Islam. Ridwan's comment below shows that the non-orthodox and non-fanatical connotation of moderate Indonesian Islam justifies a partial adherence to Islamic practices which is contrasted with the religious devotion of fellow revivalist Indonesians and Indo-Pakistani, Arab or Somali Muslim immigrant co-religionists perceived as conservative.

If I had to explain my Muslim-ness, I would say it is moderate in a similar sense to the general acquiescence of most Indonesians. What I mean by moderate is characterised by a social openness to interact with non-Muslims; my whole life is not defined by and dictated to by Islamic tenets. Put simply, it is quite different to the ways of my Bangladeshi or Pakistani neighbours, particularly the radical and militant Muslims, who lead their life fully guided by Shariah (Ridwan, 11 February 2010).

Similarly, Ratna considers her secularised, religious propensity as by product of the moderate Islamic teaching she received from her family during her childhood. It must be noted that Ratna had grown up in the 1970s when the ethno-religious tradition in Indonesia had not been transformed yet by the wave of Islamic reformism that came later in the 1990s. Having married a Catholic Briton and immigrated to England, her ethno-religious trajectory has been to adapt to the secularised environment she has lived in since the 1980s.

As I remember, my grandma had never worn a fully covering Jilbab (hijab) in her entire life. In my family here and in Jakarta, most of my female relatives have never worn hijab. It does not mean they are not devout Muslims – they are devout, even though I am not. What I learnt about being Muslim, as my grandpa said, is to believe in God, try, if you are able, to observe the rituals like praying five times a day, fasting in Ramadan and giving alms. But the most important part of being a Muslim is being good to other people and avoiding doing any harm to them. In terms of dress code, wearing clothes that satisfy public decency is more than enough (Ratna, 10 May 2010).

For the secularists, admiration for the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam has allowed them to subsume or conceal their secular trajectory. In other words, under the umbrella of this tradition, they are able to preserve their Muslim heritage while actively becoming secular in terms of exempting themselves from the observance of Islamic rituals and sanctioned practices. In the context of diaspora, by acquiescing to this moderate tradition, they are free and eager to adopt and assimilate into the secularised culture of British society. Suffice it to say, the secularist Indonesian immigrants in London have exerted the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam in the same way

Ramadan (2010) criticised it as a negative act of selling out their Muslim politico-religious identity through acculturation to Western secularised values (Khan, 2007; Modood & Ahmad, 2007).

In defending their view, similarly to their fellow traditionalists, moderate Islam is construed as the best tradition to enable Muslim immigrants to integrate into the host society. This opinion is common among members of the secularist Indonesian immigrants in London like Ratna and Ridwan. For them, the assertion of moderate Islam has been shaped by their disillusionment with the current wider developments of radical and militant Islamic ideology, which is blamed for radicalising Muslim immigrants particularly the youth (e.g. referred to as homegrown Muslim terrorists) and stimulating the formation of an exclusive ethno-religious enclave separated from British society (cf. Cattle, 2004; Philips, 2006). Accordingly, the Islamist ideology and movement are perceived as a potential threat to Western secular and liberal democracy as explained in Huntington's (1993) thesis of the 'clash of civilisations' and the 'myth of the Islamic threat' (Esposito, 1999; Halliday, 2003). For Ridwan, whose opinion is typical of others in this group, having voluntarily immigrated to the West and having a Muslim heritage, there is no choice but to become a 'Good Muslim' and to willingly relax or abandon his ethno-religious traditions and try to adapt and assimilate to the (secularised) culture of the host society. In other words, it does not make sense to be a 'Bad Muslim' who uncompromisingly commits to their faith and religious tradition and to politically challenge the established Western secular cultures of the receiving society (Mamdani, 2002).

To some extent, the disillusionment with Islamist ideology has something to do with the acceptance by the secularist Indonesians in London of the culturally syncretistic tradition of Indonesian Islam, which is perceived to have a different character compared to other Islamic traditions developed in the Middle East and/or South Asia. Related to this, stating a view common to members of this group, Agus questions the role of Islam within the multiple layers of Indonesian culture.

Islam is a 'foreign religion' as it was imported to the Indonesian archipelago just a few centuries ago. It was mixed and adapted to our culture ... but of course there are some parts of Islam that remain not accepted ... For me, you might call me a Muslim, but deep in my heart, I remain a Javanese. It makes a huge difference compared to other (revivalist) Indonesians, Malaysians or Pakistanis here. I embrace Islam in its adapted form, in line with my Javanese heritage, which tolerates and respects other beliefs ... So, all those radical or militant Islamist groups, I definitely cannot accept them. It is said that Islam is a way of life, which dictates that all its rules must be observed. That sort of religious ideology is not for us; it belongs to the Arabs (Agus, 1 June 2010).

Similarly to the general views expressed by fellow traditionalist and revivalist Indonesians in London, Agus' statement resembles Geertz's (1962, 1968) thesis on the adoption and acculturation of Islam into the (Javanese) Indonesian culture thus mixed and blended with the pre-Islamic Hindu and Buddhist traditions (Coedès, 1968). As a result, instead of having become the primary source of social enlightenment, Islam is believed to be only one layer among the many cultural layers of Indonesian society as a whole (Lombard, 1996). Based on the above argument, Agus asserts that the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam espouses a particularly accommodating attitude and openness to various different cultural traditions including (Western) secular and liberal values, which as an immigrant requires him to assimilate into British society. Additionally, he rejects the acclaimed

totalising and uncompromising system of the Islamic doctrines as promoted by the religiously conservative Muslims or the radical and militant Islamist groups. To note, however, the 'syncretic' and heterodox Javanese ethno-religious tradition has unfortunately experienced a gradual decline in terms of public affinity and membership, having been massively challenged by the growing religious conservatism within the Indonesian Muslim community both in Indonesia and London (Hefner, 2011).

The disenchantment with the all-encompassing system of Islamic doctrine has encouraged the secularist Indonesian immigrants in London to search for and preserve the non-Islamic Indonesian tradition. These efforts are seen in their communal gatherings where they play *dangdut*, a form of (Malay-)Indonesian popular music. To reiterate, the association between *dangdut* and eroticism both in its lyrics and performances of its (mostly female) singers is perceived as a direct challenge to Indonesian religious tradition (Weitraub, 2011). Having continued to play the music frowned upon by Islam, the secularist Indonesians in London have attempted not only to disassociate themselves from the increased role of religion among the Indonesian Muslim community in London but also to preserve their non-Islamic Indonesian tradition (cf. Werbner, 2004 on the popularity of the hybrid '*Bhangra*' music among Indo-Pakistani Muslims). In addition, their occasional public performances at Indonesian cultural events, supported by the Indonesian Embassy in London, have to some extent undermined the growing ethno-religious conservatism within the community.

Concluding Remarks

Throughout the article, I discuss the different positions taken by Indonesians in London regarding the moderate tradition of Islam. Their views have been considered in the context of persisting antagonism between Islamic-West relations, the current internationalisation and politicisation of Islamic affairs and importantly their polarised socio-religious trajectories in the diaspora. Based on three different patterns of Indonesians' religious trajectories –the traditionalists;the revivalists; andthe secularists – I consider that the approach to the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam has been defined, asserted and articulated uniquely by these three different groups. For the traditionalists, the moderate tradition has been embraced positively as a compensation for their limited incorporation into the wider minority Muslim community, which in some respects they perceive as religiously too conservative, orthodox and/or radical and militant. For the revivalists, though asserting its virtue, they have shown a critical standpoint to the moderate tradition of Indonesian Islam as religiously syncretistic, impure and/or far from the authentic and legitimate form of Islam. For the secularists, they have shared the similar assertiveness of the traditionalists to this moderate religious tradition – understood as essentially flexible, relaxed, adaptable and less rigorous – in order to justify their partial practice of Islam and their individualised religious propensity.

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An Educational Journey to Recognition and Opportunity – First Steps

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Introduction

This paper is the second of three papers relating to migrant education in Thailand. These papers combine to map a journey being undertaken by a small group of grassroots researchers and educators including the panel presenters; a journey that has a clear destination in mind that, when achieved, will enable hundreds of thousands of migrant children and youth living in Thailand to realize their rights to an education under Articles 28 to 30 of the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989). In summary, these Articles place a high value on education, stating that primary education should be available free to all children. Its goals are to develop children's personality, talents and abilities to their fullest potential, encouraging them to respect human rights, their own and other cultures. Article 30 has specific relevance to migrant education when it states that minority or indigenous children have the right to practice and learn about their own culture, language and religion, especially in countries where this culture is not that of the mainstream population (UNICEF, n.d.).

In the first paper, Professor Nongyao Nawarat outlined various Thai Education policy directives that in theory enable all migrant children in Thailand to access education. However, she notes that a large chasm exists between these policy statements and actual outcomes.

In Thailand today, it is conservatively estimated that there are 400,000 migrant children under the age of 18 predominantly from Myanmar. This number is made up of children of long term and irregular migrant workers and displaced children. Of this number, less than 20% are represented in education statistics (Jampaklay, 2011, p.97).

In the case of migrant children [from Myanmar], either they do not have access to education and health services, or the access is limited and often inadequate (Regional Thematic Working Group on International Migration including Human Trafficking, 2008, p. 91).

It is the purpose of this paper to highlight this issue and to inform action being implemented to address it.

Current Education Options in Thailand for Migrant Children

For the 20% of migrant children accessing education in Thailand, they are either attending Thai Ministry of Education schools or migrant learning centers. In the past decade, due to significant changes in Thai Government policy, numbers of migrant children accessing education in Thai government schools has doubled to an estimated 42,000 in 2008. Even so, this is only 11% of the

conservatively estimated migrant child population with many school districts reported to intentionally placing obstacles preventing migrant children enrolling in school (Sciortino & Punpuning, 2009). For those migrant children who are enrolled, they study in Thai language, under the Thai curriculum whose aim is to *enhance the capacity of all learners ... to attain a balanced development in all respects ... [to] fully realize their commitment and responsibilities as Thai citizens and members of the world community* (Ministry of Education Thailand, 2008, p. 4).

The remaining 9% study in migrant learning centers situated in areas where migrant workers are concentrated; for example, Mae Sot, Mahachai, Ranong and Phang Nga. Migrant learning centers are community based learning spaces which rely almost entirely on international funding for all aspects of their running. They have a quasi-legal status, in that they are recognized within the Thai Ministry of Education as centers to provide education to migrant children, but are not registered education entities able to provide any form of centralized accreditation to their students, either in Thailand or in Myanmar.

The curriculum used in these centers varies widely. The majority language medium is Burmese with some teaching in their ethnic language. English and Thai language are also taught in most centers. While these centers offer a more culturally sensitive education to their students, the quality of that education varies resulting from overcrowding, limited financial and human resources impacting on basics such as teaching personnel, educational materials, food and sanitation (Purkey, 2006). The majority can only provide a basic primary level education with only a few progressing to Grade 10 and even fewer to Post 10 status. Without accredited certificates, the options for future employment or study are very limited. It is a precarious existence for these students, many of whom have been displaced from their villages in Myanmar as a result of the long standing conflict in their native areas.

The author established and was Director of a Post 10 migrant school for four years. In an essay, one of her students aptly described the situation faced by these young people:

This kind of occurrence happens to our people because of the social degradation in our country. Moreover, social deterioration and poverty also impoverish people's education, well-being and economy. They have to ask permission before doing anything. They look like butterflies which fly without colors in Thailand (Ywa Hay Tha, 2013).

The migrant learning centers in Thailand afford the migrant children and youth a level of education. However, it occurs under a cloud of uncertainty and fears; uncertainty of next steps after they finish their course, uncertainty of staffing, fear of being arrested and deported and fear of their learning centers shutting down because of withdrawal of funding as so many NGOs are shifting their attention away from migrant areas in Thailand to inside Myanmar.

In Myanmar, the country from which the majority of the migrant children and youth originate, discussions at government level are also occurring to investigate how to integrate the learning migrant children have achieved in Thailand into their education system. These talks are at embryonic

stage with no set policies yet in place to address the issue of how migrant children can continue their education if their parents return to Myanmar.

While Thai government policy and the will of migrant educators have shown commitment to provide education to migrant children and youth in Thailand, the challenge remains in the changing political milieu how to improve the quality of this education to meet the standards set out in Articles 28 to 30 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989) to which both Thailand and Myanmar are signatories.

An Action Research Paradigm

It is this challenge of improving the quality of migrant education that led a small group of like-minded educators within the migrant community living in Thailand to undertake an ambitious project aimed at establishing a migrant education system fully accredited by both Thai and Myanmar governments. From an initial brainstorming meeting in an upper room of a migrant school in Chiang Mai in 2012 attended by seven people, this project has rapidly grown involving members of all migrant education communities across Thailand, researchers in the education field, as well as government officials in the areas of labor and education in both Thailand and Myanmar.

After the first networking meeting held in Mae Sot in October 2012, the project adopted the name Migrant Education Integration Initiative (MEII). MEII falls within the tenets of an action research paradigm, defined by Reason and Bradbury, (2006, p. 1) as,

A participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a participatory worldview which we believe is emerging at this historical moment. It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people.

Its success to date is evidence of the principal values guiding action research, being the abiding respect for people's knowledge and the notion that human systems can be best understood and changed if it involves the members involved in those systems (Brydon-Miller, Greenwood & Maguire, 2001).

The project is currently in the beginning of Phase 4. Through an iterative process from first identifying the problems facing migrant education in Thailand, the MEII team through a participatory process have gathered and interpreted data from all areas where migrant children reside across Thailand. The evidence from this data has led the team to formulate action which has guided its next phase. Results are continually being evaluated which is informing both short and long term strategies. For a detailed description and analysis of the MEII activities to date, please refer to the paper prepared by the MEII Chairperson, Kyaw Kyaw Min Htut, entitled, *Creating A Unified Curriculum And Accreditation System For Migrant Schools*.

Literature Informing the MEII Research Project

Research carried out over recent years under the auspices of the International Organization for Migration (2011) and the International Labor Organization (2010) have broadened the knowledge and understanding of the situation facing migrant education in Thailand today.

MEII is further guided by international rights documents which have a focus on education. Specifically, Education for All (EFA), ASEAN's Socio Cultural Roadmap – 2009-2015 and the South East Asia Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO), being programs to which both Thailand and Myanmar are signatories, are foundational in guiding the MEII vision and strategies. The rights based principles that set the standard for the achievement of EFA by the year 2015 have particular import in this process.

EFA principles and values to provide a level of quality of education for all children globally includes the promotion of cohesion, stability and integration, building respect for peace, empowering positive social transformation and building capacity (UNCF/UNESCO, 2007). A further rights based approach to education is seen in the ASEAN Socio Cultural Community Roadmap (2009). Linked to the principles developed for the EFA, is the principle of respect for the different cultures, languages and religions of the peoples of ASEAN and a mandate to recognize their common values and willingness to adapt these to present realities, opportunities and challenges (p. 67). The first characteristic of this principle is "Advancing and prioritizing education" with the strategic objective of ensuring the integration of education priorities into ASEAN's development agenda. Within the list of actions arising from this objective is three that specifically relate to the current migrant education situation in Thailand:

- i. In line with EFA goals, achieve universal access to primary education across ASEAN by 2015 ... through advocacy for equal opportunities in education regardless of social class, geography, ethnicity, background or physical disabilities.
- vii. Strengthen collaboration with other regional and international educational organizations to enhance the quality of education in the regions.
- xi. Support learning of ASEAN languages and promote exchange of linguists (pp.68-69).

Students and those who teach them within the migrant education system in Thailand are among the many peoples of ASEAN.

SEAMEO, a regional intergovernmental organization established in 1965, acknowledges education as a priority area for enhancing regional understanding and cooperation for a better quality of life in Southeast Asia. Working in collaboration with ASEAN and EFA, SEAMEO have initiated projects focusing "reaching the unreached" in education in its member countries. With no formal accreditation system for students studying in the 150 plus migrant learning centers in Thailand, they are effectively "unreached" within both Myanmar and Thailand's education systems.

Conclusion

This paper has provided a brush stroke depiction of the background to the Migrant Education Integration Initiative, a grass roots action based research currently being undertaken seeking to redress identified issues relating to migrant education in Thailand. It will close with a poem composed by the recently retired Head of the Global Partnership of Education, Dr Robert Prouty, which I believe encapsulates the ethos of this research.

My Right to Learn – a Poem by Robert Prouty

I do not have to earn the right to learn. It's mine.
And if because of faulty laws and errors of design,
And far too many places where still far too many people do not care –
If because of all these things, and more,
For me, the classroom door, with someone who can teach,
Is still beyond my reach, still out of sight,
Those wrongs do not remove my right.

So here I am. I too am one of you
And by God's grace, and yours, I'll find my place.
We haven't met. You do not know me yet
And so you don't yet know
That there is much that I can give you in return.
The future is my name and all I claim is this: my right to learn.

(cited in UNCF/UNESCO, 2007).

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Ageing Farangs in Thailand – A Glimpse into the Growth Industry of Aged Care for Foreigners in Thailand

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Thai immigration figures show that British, American and German retirees made over 35,000 applications for retirement visas in Thailand in 2012, with this number forecasted to increase to 45,000 by the end of 2013 (Holliday, 2013). As this population group ages, requiring care assistance, the question arises, “Is Thailand a good place for foreigners to access aged care, or is it better to return to countries of origin for this last phase of life?”

A recent study into this phenomenon revealed that the very reasons ageing farang retire to Thailand, being pleasant weather, low cost, amiable living, are the same reasons many decide to remain and seek aged care when the need arises (Howard, 2008). Another reason for ageing farang seeking aged care in Thailand relates to the rising cost and low availability of quality aged care in their home countries. For some, sons have married Thai wives and now live in Thailand. For both cost effectiveness and a desire to be closer to family, this group of people opts to seek aged care in Thailand.

This paper presents the findings of an embryonic case study of Western foreigners accessing aged care in Chiang Mai. Social and economic aspects are explored revealing a growing need and responses to this phenomenon.

Background to this Study

The author is an Australian social worker who has lived in Thailand for seven years mostly involved in volunteer work within the refugee educational sector on the Thai-Burma border. However, she experienced a sea change in mid-2013 when she moved to Chiang Mai to accept a teaching position in the Faculty of Social Science, Chiang Mai University. This move coincided with an invitation to stay and help in a volunteer capacity at Dok Kaew Gardens, an aged care facility in McKean Hospital, Chiang Mai, whose residents are majority farang of varying Western nationalities.

The opportunity to renew skills from her professional experience in training and counseling in areas of care of those with dementia and physical rehabilitation encouraged her to accept this invitation. For the past eight months while living and interacting with the residents of Dok Kaew Gardens, her natural research curiosity has led her to begin an independent study into the whys and wherefores of this phenomenon.

Her approach to this research project can be described in terms of “blue skies research.” Ziman (2000, p. 22) identifies this type of approach as *pure science, exploratory, innovative, curiosity-driven*

and fundamental. Linden (2008, p. 1) adds that the flexibility of a “blue skies” approach to a research project enables creativity and often *leads to outcomes not envisaged at the outset*.

Principles of Aged Care

For the purposes of this paper, terms relating to aged care are defined as follows:

- **Elderly care** (more commonly referred to as aged care in Western contexts) is the fulfillment of the special needs and requirements that are unique to senior citizens. This broad term encompasses such services as assisted living, adult day care, long-term care, nursing homes, hospice care and in-home care (Stetson University, n.d.).
- **Ageing in place** refers to the ability to remain living in the community with some level of independence, rather than institutional care (Davey, Nana, de Joux & Arcus, 2004, p. 133). It is characterized by the functional, symbolic and emotional attachment of homes, neighborhoods and communities (Wiles et al., 2011).
- **Aged care diamond** refers to the four main institutional arrangements for care of the elderly as being located in the family, State, market and voluntary sectors (Razavi, 2007, cited in Knodel and Chayavan, 2011, p. 3).

Research Site and Researcher Role

Dok Kaew Gardens is a multi-tiered aged care center located within the wider McKean Hospital and Rehabilitation Center, Koh Klang, Chiang Mai. Established in 2009, it is the brainchild of McKean’s long serving Deputy Director, Mrs. Heather Smith whose foresight recognized the need for such a facility as she became aware of increasing vulnerability of older farangs living in Chiang Mai and wider Thailand areas.

Dok Kaew Gardens provides aged care at two levels; Lotus wing, a low care semi-independent living, and Jasmine wing, a high care for those experiencing dementia and and/or physical disabilities. In low care, there are twenty furnished single rooms, each with bathroom, Wi-Fi connection and cable television. Connecting doors in some rooms enable a married couple to stay using one room as a sitting, living room and the other as a bedroom. In high care, residents have their own room similar to low care, but housed within a spacious secure building with 24 hour care staff. All residents are encouraged to join together for meals and activities in the separate dining and common room which has library, computer, lounge and hairdressing facilities. Currently, twelve residents live in Lotus wing and eight residents are cared for in Jasmine wing.

The cost of care in Dok Kaew including all meals and basic medical care is 33,000 baht per month in low care and 45,000 baht per month in high care.

As a researcher, this is an ethnographic study exploring the *webs of meaning* (Geertz, 1973) surrounding Dok Kaew Gardens and other aged care facilities in the Chiang Mai area. My role in this study is clearly emic, in that I am living and working in one of these settings, where my “self” is both a source of and location for experience and action, enabling an inclusive approach to the research

(Fook, 2002, p. 81). My research role can also be described in terms of active membership and participant observatory, in which it can be seen that the role is perhaps the primary source of the ethnographic data to be collected (Adler & Adler, 1987; Hoey, 2014).

Discussion

“Ageing in Place” has become the buzz word for policy makers in the area of Western aged care. With the rising cost of institutional aged care facilities, coupled with the rising aged population, the search for alternative care of the elderly within their own homes is being highlighted as a more optimal option. Globally, there have been significant changes in cultural, economic, social and political settings over recent decades impacting on the well-being of the aged and their ability to “age in place.” In the USA, the ageing population is escalating with more than 300,000 people reaching retirement age annually and the projection that by 2050, one fifth of the population (90 million) will be represented in this age group (GIA, 2013). Experiences of ageing have been described in both positive terms such as freedom and active engagement, but more often in negative terms such as slowing down, loss and loneliness (Chen, 2001). While most older people desire to “age in place”, the reality in Western countries today where families are smaller in size and living busy lives across wide geographical areas including other countries, the negative aspects of ageing are often more prevalent in their lives. The Health and Elder Care Research team at Stetson University state that one third of American citizens aged over 65 are suffering from depression mostly due to loneliness.

With increasing morbidity as this generation age, comes the need for increasing residential aged care facilities. While the social and emotional cost of this cannot be understated, it is the economic cost that receives the most attention. In the UK, even with residents contributing in excess of £30,000 per year for their care, central and local government authorities have to supplement increasing amounts to maintain national care standards. In his satirical comedy that focuses on this aspect of aged care, Maurice Jones in his novel “Last Resort” (2012) depicts the fictitious scenario where a financially beleaguered British Local Authority transfers all the residents of one of its aged care homes to “The Land of Smiles” as a major cost cutting exercise. While there are many ethical considerations in this idea, Jones does raise the question if the functional, symbolic and emotional attachment of home and community that characterizes the ethos of “ageing in place” could not be achieved in this setting.

As a means to explore this concept further, this paper will now present four Dok Kaew residents’ case study profiles. Names and some personal details have been changed to protect identity but the essence of their situations has been preserved.

Bella

Bella is a Western European woman who is 90 years old. She had lived alone in an apartment for many years after the death of her husband and had little contact with family who mostly lived in other parts of the country. Her one son lives in northern Thailand with his Thai wife. As time went by, Bella’s ability to mobilize outside her apartment became less and family were beginning to consider care homes in her city. When her son suggested that he and his wife could employ carers for much less than the cost of a care home in Europe, Bella decided to make the move to the Land of

Smiles. This arrangement worked fine for twelve months, but as her care needs increased and her son spending more time away from home for his work, Bella became more socially isolated with no common language in the home. It was at this point, that Bella consented to move to Jasmine wing of Dok Kaew Gardens.

Bella speaks fluent English, French and German. She is gregarious by nature and enjoys engaging in conversation in any of these languages with other residents and the expatriate volunteers who regularly visit Dok Kaew.

Gordon

Gordon is a bachelor aged 78 who moved to Thailand from USA when he took early retirement. He was attracted to the Land of Smiles by the climate and lifestyle and lived an independent life for many years until an illness resulted in his need for a wheelchair for mobility. Gordon soon found that while Thailand was a great place to live as a healthy mobile adult, it was much more difficult to live independently when dependent on a wheelchair for all mobility.

In considering his options, Gordon opted to remain in Thailand as he enjoyed the climate and had no family ties to USA. He had developed some good friendships here, so decided to move to Dok Kaew where he could maintain his social network, a considerable level of independence and access appropriate care.

Lillian

At age 95, Lillian from USA has seen many changes in her life. She raised a large family, worked in a professional capacity until retirement and participated in many philanthropic activities until becoming incapacitated by Alzheimer's disease. Lillian had visited Thailand on many occasions as three of her sons have lived and worked here for many decades. As her dementia progressed, it was evident she could no longer maintain an independent lifestyle in her home. With family here in Chiang Mai, it was decided to bring Lillian to Dok Kaew Gardens. For the first two years, Lillian managed with some assistance to live in her own room in the low care Lotus Wing. With the help of her sons, staff and volunteers, Lillian developed a routine that enabled her to function effectively in this environment. However, in recent months she has suffered significant mental and physical deterioration and required transfer to the high care Jasmine wing. Her family continues to visit regularly and staff encourage Lillian to participate in her surroundings as much as possible.

Richard

Richard is one of the younger residents at Dok Kaew at age 76. Richard moved to Thailand when his wife died 10 years ago. They had no children. He and his wife were regular holiday visitors to the Land of Smiles, so he thought it would make a good change to move here after her death. He rented an apartment and became involved in various expatriate activities, maintaining a good lifestyle on his social security from his home country. As years progressed, Richard's friends were aware of his forgetful memory and lapses of judgment and became increasingly concerned for his well-being. Following one particular incident, Richard was hospitalized and it was recommended that he consider accessing aged care. Further discussions occurred and Richard decided that he did not want to return to his home country, but would agree to move to Dok Kaew Gardens.

While Richard is in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease, his sociable nature and physically healthy status enable him to maintain a level of independence within the safe environment of Dok Kaew.

Conclusion (Preliminary Findings and Future Direction)

Modernization has reduced the global world to a global village. Advances in technology, transportation and living standards in the West make the East an attractive, viable option for retirement. Conversely, these same advances have resulted in major changes to cultural mores and norms in Western society, whereby its increasing ageing population are becoming more isolated with care standards less than optimal in many instances and institutional care costs skyrocketing.

The aged care diamond concept developed by Razavi (2007) has import here for understanding the increase of Westerners accessing elder care in Thailand. The interrelationships of the four aspects that make up this diamond require much deeper exploration in the context of ageing farang care in Thailand. At this embryonic stage of the research, it is enough to recognize how the changing structures of family in Western societies have placed an increasing responsibility for aged care on the State. In turn, this has resulted in the development of a burgeoning aged care industry and a greater reliance on volunteer sectors to fill the holes in the State safety net where the elderly requiring care regularly are falling through.

It is therefore not surprising that a growing number of Western retirees and expatriate offspring of Western elderly are considering accessing aged care facilities here in Thailand. Dok Kaew Gardens may have been one of the first such care centres in northern Thailand, but since its opening, many other similar facilities have been established. These centers are ably creating nurturing and caring environments for Western ageing farangs and providing a socially and economically viable option to the overburdened Western aged care system.

Over coming months, I plan to expand this ethnographic study to gain a greater understanding of the scope of this phenomenon in Thailand. For now, as a closing to this paper, the words from a promotional flyer of another farang based aged care facility in the Chiang Mai area gives direction for continued study,

The loving warm and respectful treatment of the Thais towards older people should be especially emphasized.

Dok Kaew Gardens and other likeminded facilities employ Thai staff as the carers for their residents. The recognition of this value inherent in Thai culture lends cognizance to the definition of elder care as the fulfillment of the special needs and requirements that are unique to senior citizens.

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Crossing the River: Xiangxi Miao Spirit Messengership

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1. The Origin and Modern Realizations of Xiangxi Miao Sorcerers

Modern Xiangxi Miao people often say that in ancient times, humans and spirits could meet and communicate with each other. At that time, the passage between *yangjian* 阳间 ‘the living world’ and *yinjian* 阴间 ‘the nether world’ was much easier. “Now that the two worlds have become divided, only the sorcerers may, with impunity, venture into the otherworld and return safely to the living world” (Tapp, 1989, p. 59).

The *Song of Creation*, which is sung during funerals, tells how Xiangxi Miao *wushi* 巫师 ‘sorcerers’ originated, and highlights several themes of this thesis:

One day, *Taishang Laojun* 太上老君 ‘the Universal Lord of the Way and its Virtue’¹³⁷ descended into the living world, disguising himself as an old beggar in dirty clothes in order to test the filial piety of his three apprentices. The apprentices were wearing a long gown, a red gown, and plain Miao clothes, respectively. When the “beggar” got to a river, the apprentices approached him. He asked them to carry him across the river. The apprentice in the long black gown refused, because he was afraid to be sullied by the beggar. The apprentice in the red gown agreed to carry him, but paused to take off his shoes. Only the apprentice in plain Miao clothes agreed immediately, and carried the “beggar” across the river without any hesitation. After crossing the river, the Universal Lord reverted to his celestial identity, and based on his apprentices’ reactions, taught each the apprentices a different kind of *wushu* 巫术 ‘sorcery’ in order to interact with the other world. The Lord explained to his three apprentices the implications of their actions: The first black-robed apprentice who had refused to sully his clothes would from now on have to stand throughout the performance of rituals, and moreover must speak and read scripture solely in Chinese. If he made mistakes, his eyes would be destroyed by spirits. The second red-robed apprentice, who had agreed to carry the Lord but had hesitated, wouldn’t need to read scripture books, but was still required henceforth to perform rituals standing and in Chinese. He was allowed to make some mistakes in his performance. But only the third man, who had unhesitatingly carried the Universal Lord across the river, would be allowed to perform rituals in the Miao language. Furthermore, he would be permitted to sit during the performance, and his actions and language were allowed flexibility.

¹³⁷ The *Taishang Laojun* 太上老君 is the third of the most venerable gods of Daoist religion, the so-called Three Pristine Ones. The others are called “the Universal Lord of the Primordial Beginning” (*Yuanshi Tianzun* 元始天尊), and “the Universal Lord of the Numinous Treasure” (*Lingbao Tianzun* 灵宝天尊) (Yin, 2005, p. 49). That the Daoist deity *Taishang Laojun* 太上老君 appears in the Miao legend indicates how deeply integrated Chinese Daoism is into Miao spiritual practice.

As told by Mr. Wu Songmou in Shanjiang山江village, July 20, 2009.

All three apprentices represent major spiritual-magical figures in Miao society. The first man in the legend became the primordial Miao *daoshi*道士 ‘funeral conductor, Daoist monk’ specializing in Miao funeral rites conducted in the local Chinese language. His black gown symbolizes the elite ranks of the dominant Daoist religion introduced by the Chinese. The second man became the primordial *badui zha* ‘Han spirit messenger, Ch. 客老司’¹³⁸ specializing in legendary ancestor worship rituals, which are also conducted in Chinese. His red gown symbolizes his dominant rank in the spirit world itself. The third and final man became the primordial *badui xiong* ‘Miao spirit messenger, Ch. 苗老司’ also specializing in legendary ancestor worship rituals, which are conducted in the Miao language.

As we have seen above, there are two kinds of *badui* in Xiangxi area: *badui zha* ‘Han Chinese spirit messenger’ and *badui xiong* ‘Miao spirit messenger’. This paper analyzes the performance of the latter sorcerer, the *badui xiong*, in present-day Xiangxi Miao communities. We hypothesize that the *badui xiong*’s spiritual practices serve to restore social harmony when it has been disrupted. We choose to focus on the *badui xiong* spirit messengers because they are the Miao aboriginal sorcerers and their performances are less and less practiced in present-day Xiangxi Miao area.

2. Miao Ethnicity and the Xiangxi Miao

Xiangxi湘西 is located in western Hunan湖南 Province in the central part of the People’s Republic of China. It is a mountainous area located in the Wuling武陵 range of the eastern Yunnan-Guizhou云贵 Plateau. Administratively, Xiangxi is on the border of Hunan with Hubei湖北 and Guizhou贵州 Provinces (see Figure 1 below), as well as the Chongqing重庆 Municipality. Xiangxi is formally an ethnic minority of the “Tujia-Miao Autonomous Prefecture” and is home to 30 official ethnic groups (*minzu*民族 ‘Nationalities’). The predominant two groups are the Tibeto-Burman Tujia土家 and the Hmong-Mien Miao苗.

The Miaos of Xiangxi Prefecture speak Western Xiangxi Miao language [ISO 639-3: mmr], which belongs to the Hmongic branch of the Hmong-Mien language family (Lewis, 2009). Hmong-Mien languages are spoken throughout much of Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar. In China, Hmongic (Miao) languages are spoken in Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guangdong Provinces (see Figure 2 below). In China, the Hmong-Mien languages are referred to as the *Miao-Yao*苗瑶 languages.


In China, all Hmongic speakers are considered to belong to one macrogroup termed Miao, and, as such, the Miao constitute one of China’s largest nationalities (7.39 million people according to the 2000 census, cited in Wu, 2007, p. 1). The Miao population of the Xiangxi Prefecture numbered 886,100 in 2000 (Tong, 2007, p. 13). The use of the term “nationality” (*minzu*民族) to refer to the Miao is a constructed category that essentializes ethnicity. Beginning in the 1950s, the Chinese government used the umbrella term “nationality” to include dozens of subgroups. “Based on Miao linguistic distinctions, three main divisions of the Miao were designated. The Xiangxi Miao or Eastern

¹³⁸ Any Chinese terms and toponyms used in this thesis are written in Latin-script transliteration followed by their Chinese characters. *Badui* is a Miao language term.

dialect, which was relatively unified, was spoken in Hunan and northeastern Guizhou by those who had formerly been classed as the Red Miao” (Schein, 2000, pp. 84-85).

We maintain the Chinese scholarly tradition of referring to both subgroups as Miao (e.g. the Xiangxi Miao) and the macrogroup (the official Miao Nationality), as well as those languages. Hmong refers only to Hmongic groups outside China.


Figure 4: Hunan Province (Xiangxi Tujia-Miao Autonomous Prefecture is circled)



Source: <http://www.ethnic-china.com/Geo/Hunan/Hunan%20Map.jpg>

We recognize that the choice puts my terminology at odds both with Western scholarship (which uses Hmongic for the macrogroup and languages in and out of China, but Miao for the ethnic group within China) and with Hmong expatriates in the West. “The Hmong in the West in recent decades have consistently rejected the Miao term itself as derogatory” (Schein, 2000, p. 96). Nonetheless, our use of the term Miao for the ethnic and macrogroups is legitimized by its widespread acceptance by the Miao peoples in China. The term also has had a long history and is widely known (Long, 1985, p. 6).

Figure 2: Hmong-Mien (Miao-Yao) Ethno-Linguistic Area (Xiangxi is circled).



Source:<http://www.starferrymusings.com/?p=655>

3. Methodology

We utilized three primary techniques: participant observation, interviews, and the comparative method.

3.1 Participant Observation

“Participant observation...means only the researcher lives among the people he or he is studying, takes part in their social life, and watches what is happening, asking questions when one does not understand” (Murphy, 1989, pp. 246-247). Participant observation allowed us to acquire a close and intimate familiarity with the *badui xiong* messengers and the *chu-badui* rituals through an intensive involvement with them within Miao communities.

Between 2011 and 2013, We conducted participant observation in the Xiangxi Tujia-Miao Autonomous Prefecture of Hunan Province, in the villages of Shanjiang山江, Quangongping千工坪,

Machong麻冲, Paibi排碧, Muli木里, Duli都力, and Laershan腊尔山. There are 30,000 people living in these seven villages, and 99 percent of the total population is Miao (2000 census, cited in Tong, 2007, p. 13). During this summer fieldwork, we did extensive onsite participant observation during five *chu-badui* performed by the *badui xiong* indifferent places. We obtained informed consent from all participants before conducting any fieldwork.

The genders, ages, names, marital status, and home villages of the *badui xiong* performing rituals we observed are summarized as the following Table 1. The identified *badui xiong*'s genders, ages, and marital status helped us analyze what kinds of people in Xiangxi Miao communities are likely to become the *badui xiong*.

Table 1: The Gender, Ages, Names, Marital Status, and Home Villages of the *Badui Xiong*

Role	Gender	Age	Name	Marital Status	Home Village
<i>badui xiong</i> 1	male	85	Wu san	married	Shanjiang
<i>badui xiong</i> 2	male	50	Long Hepang	married	Muli
<i>badui xiong</i> 3	male	35	Long Xianjin	married	Duli
<i>badui xiong</i> 4	male	45	Wu Xiangyu	unmarried	Machong
<i>badui xiong</i> 5	male	55	Wu Xiangqu	married	Laershan
<i>badui xiong</i> 6	male	67	Long kuan	married	Paibi
<i>badui xiong</i> 7	male	47	Zhang You	married	Machong

These *chu-badui* performances we witnessed are summarized as follows (see Table 2). Hexian's paternal grandfather is a *badui xiong*. Hexian's parents and most of his relatives have great respect for *badui xiong*, and we have witnessed a number of the *chu-badui* performances since childhood. Therefore we believe we are well-informed about the *chu-badui*. During our fieldwork, however, our role changed from purely that of a participant to that of participant-observer, that is, an insider-outsider. In the role of an anthropologist, we had wanted to make audio recordings of all the *chu-badui* performances. While we were allowed to observe any ceremonies we wanted to, we was not allowed to record *chu-badui* performed in Laershan and Muli.

Table 2: *Chu-badui* Performances Observed

Role	Location	Date	Topic
Performance 1	Shanjiang	May 15, 2011	<i>nongnie</i> 'eating the buffalo, Ch. 椎牛'
Performance 2	Quangongping	June 2, 2012	<i>huqing</i> 'drinking blood, Ch. 喝血酒'
Performance 3	Quangongping	July 10, 2013	<i>chamie</i> 'looking for the soul of the dead, Ch. 寻亡魂'
Performance 4	Shanjiang	January 6, 2013	<i>qunong</i> 'thanking the deceased ancestors, Ch. 还愿'
Performance 5	Laershan	December 25, 2013	<i>nongba</i> 'eating the pig, Ch. 椎猪'
Performance 6	Shanjiang	January 13, 2014	<i>qunong</i> 'thanking the deceased ancestors, Ch. 还愿'

3.2 Interviews

Our participant observation was enhanced by conducting direct interviews. While participant observation allowed us to better understand the *badui xiong*'s behavior, interviewing helped us ask questions that elicited better insights into the motivations for the *badui xiong* spirit messenger.

We conducted interviews with six *badui* spirit messengers, and two *daoshi* Daoist monks. Like other Miaos living in these villages, the *badui xiong*, the *baduizha* spirit messenger, and the *daoshi* Daoist monk are farmers. On the recommendations of friends and relatives, we interviewed them in their houses, doing so in the evenings, since they worked in the fields during the day. We asked respondents, depending on their expertise, to provide insights into their families, recruiting methods, rituals, paraphernalia, clients, patron spirits, and behaviors as spirit messengers. In addition, we interviewed at least 20 people (adults of various ages and levels of knowledge, who were neither *badui xiong* nor *badui zha*) in various nearby villages about their views on the *badui xiong*. Most of these interviewees were with our friends and relatives, and some interviewees were introduced to us by our relatives. Therefore, before interviewing, it was easy for us to invite them all to come together in one person's house, explain our research on the *badui xiong*, and obtain informed consent before asking questions.

3.3 Comparative Method

We also used the comparative method in our analysis: "the first task is to look for what used to be called 'parallels,' similar social features appearing in different societies, in the present or in the past" (Radcliffe-Brown, 1951, p. 15). We compared the *chu-badui* with Chinese Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist practices. Such comparison is a demonstration to distinguish different rituals in the same society. The information of the *badui xiong* and the *chu-badui* is from our interviews and observations, whereas that of Buddhist, Confucian, and Daoist practices is from literature and interviews.

4. Methods of Recruiting Messengers

"*Badui xiong*" is a Miao language term. *Baduixiong* Wu Yunting 吴云庭 suggested to us that "*ba*" has the meaning of "father" or "male;" "*dui*" has the meaning of "son" or "descendants;" "*xiong*" refers to the Miao. Thus, "*badui xiong*" can be explained to be "father and son of the Miao." "*Chu-badui*" refers to "perform spiritual practices," and "*chu*" means "to perform". Among the rest parts of the article, we use *badui* to represent *badui xiong*.

The *badui* in Xiangxi Miao communities are men who range in age from their middle thirties upwards. Like candidates for Chinese spirit messengers in present-day Singapore, who have to undergo a course of preparation for a specified time period (Elliot, 1955, p. 60), the *badui*'s messengership is also learned, taught, or inherited. The *badui* Long Hepang 龙和平 and the fortuneteller Long Yunchang 龙云昌 have suggested to me that there are two ways that a Xiangxi Miao can become a *badui*. The first is based on the inheritance 继承. Among a family or a clan of the *badui* messenger, a young male member must be selected to inherit the *badui* when the old *badui* (his father) becomes old. Son-in-laws might be chosen to inherit this career unless the old *badui* does not have sons or nephews. However, this mechanism which facilitates *badui* messengership is a person's *bazi* 八字, an eight-character horoscope composed of two characters each from a person's

year, month, day, and hour of birth. An appropriate logonumeric combination indicates suitability for the demands of *badui* messengership. A person with such a *bazi* horoscope is supposed to have a natural ability to communicate with spirits and can be selected to be the *badui*. A person without this will not be qualified as a *badui*. For example, the fortuneteller Long Yunchang told us that if a person was born at sunset on the sixth day of the sixth month in the Year of the Rat, that *bazi* horoscope is suitable for a *badui* messengership.

The second mechanism is based on the belief that *badui* messengership does not derive from human agency, but from the power of spirits. If a person is chosen by spirits to be a *badui*, there is no escaping this duty. However, if a person has not been selected by the spirits, he cannot become a *badui*, however much he may desire it. If a person is chosen by spirits, the spirits will initially reveal themselves through a specific kind of dream. If that person refuses to accept the messengership, spirits will cause trouble, haunting them so they become strangely ill and continuing to do this until they agree to become a *badui*. The messenger Wu Xiangyu told us that he agreed to become a *badui* when he was 35 years old in order to cure his unexplained illness. A spirit told him through a series of dreams that his illness would be cured if he agreed to be a *badui*. After agreeing, his illness magically vanished two days later, and then learned to be a spirit messenger from an old prestige *badui*, performing “as a messenger between spirits and humans” (Firth, 1959, p. 141).

Once a *badui* has embarked on a career, there are several conditions and restrictions. One is that he should approach spirit possession in a “pure” state of mind, resulting in part from an abstinence from sexual intercourse for a significant period prior to performance of rituals. In addition, he is forbidden to eat the meat of animals having four hooves(四蹄动物) like dogs and goats. The *badui* must also be an honest person. As an additional condition of the greatest importance, the *badui* cannot refuse to perform rituals simply because they perceive themselves as being under compensated by clients. To refuse to perform on material grounds risks having their craft of messengership withdrawn by the spirits.

5. Paraphernalia

A wide range of paraphernalia is essential, or at least desirable, for a *badui*'s performance. During the performances, the Xiangxi Miao *badui* wear plain clothing, in contrast to Han Chinese *badui* (*badui zha*) and Daoist funeral conductor, who wear special sets of clothing.

The tools of a *badui* are important to the success of the *bu-badui* performance, and they constitute the basic items found on a ritual altar (typically a table). Before a performance, clients must prepare the altar, which includes a table, *joss* paper “money,” incense sticks, a bowl of uncooked rice, five bowls of rice wine, a bowl of cooked pork, a bowl of *tofu*豆腐, an oil lamp, a piece of new cloth, and some money for the *badui*'s performance. In addition to those prepared by the clients, the *badui* should put his own essential tools such as *dongxin*(two sections of bamboo Ch. 竹柝) (see figure 3), *galing*(brass bell Ch. 铜铃) (see Figure 4), and *gua*(divination Ch. 卦) (see Figure 5) on the table. These are considered to be basic *bu-badui* paraphernalia. These paraphernalia, which are of special significance to the *badui* during the *chu-badui* performances, are summarized in Table 3. These paraphernalia cannot be lacked during a performance. Once one is lacked, the consultation will be failed.

For example, Author Hexian's brother's family practiced a *chu-badui* ritual thanking the deceased ancestors on January 13, 2014. The *badui* Wu Meizhong吴妹中realized that he could not

successfully consult the spirits by practicing *gua* divination because author Hexian’s brother forgot to prepare a bowl of *tofu* before the performance. The *badui* Wu suggested to us that, during a performance, when the *gua* divination appears one *yin*阴 and one *yang*阳 on the ground after being thrown, indicating that he is unable to consult spirits successfully. The *gua* divination of the *badui* is a couple.

Table 3 shows that each item has its own essential function. Each item that is not prepared properly can directly affect the performance of the *chu-badui*. Nowadays, some basic items of the *chu-badui* altar have been replaced. For example, the oil lamp has now been replaced by candles. This change may be due to the obsolescence of the oil lamp after the 1980s, when electricity became commonplace throughout the Xiangxi area. Also, candles are inexpensive and convenient to use during the performance.

Table 3: Significance of Ritual Paraphernalia

Items	Functions
table	Serves as the main body of the altar; items below are placed on it.
<i>tofu</i>	Serves as the food for spirits do not eat meat.
<i>joss</i> paper	Symbolizes the money used in the otherworld.
oil lamp	Represents the moon, lighting the roads for the <i>badui</i> in the otherworld.
piece of cloth	Used to ward off evil spirits.
incense sticks	Serve as torches, lighting the roads for the <i>badui</i> in the otherworld.
pork	Serves as meat for the spirits.
uncooked rice	Serves as rice for the spirits.
rice wine	Serves as drinks for the spirits.
<i>dongxin</i> bamboo	Used to summon his spirit soldiers through striking it.
<i>galing</i> brass bell	Used to command his thousands of spirit soldiers through ringing it.
<i>gua</i> divination	When thrown, determines the success or failure of consultation.

During a performance, the altar table is placed in the center of the main room of the house, or beside a fireplace. Paper “money,” a piece of cloth, a bowl of cooked pork, a bowl of uncooked rice, and five bowls of rice wine as well as the *badui*’s own essential tools are placed on the table. Money, three burning incense sticks, and a burning oil lamp or candles are placed on or inserted into the bowl of rice grains. A chair for the *badui* is placed beside the table. The altar is able to provide spiritual forces for the *badui* during the performance. In the past, the *badui* usually collected the cloth, rice grains, pork, and a little money (about 5 RMB – then about US\$0.75) as compensation for his performance. Nowadays, however, rice, pork, and clothing are no longer sorely needed; instead, for one performance the *badui* just collects a much larger sum of money as compensation (at least 200 RMB – about US\$30, or the equivalent of a week’s wages).

Figure 3: The *Dongxin* (Two Sections of Bamboo Ch. 竹桥) (The *dongxin* is circled)



6. The *Chu-badui* Ritual's Role in Achieving Social Harmony

What is the social value of the ritual known as *chu-badui*? Superficially, the ritual serves as a personal consultation. We hypothesize that it also serves to maintain and restore social harmony when it has been disrupted. In this part, we explore how the *chu-badui* improves and restores social harmony by imposing social norms. The information in this part is based directly on our interviews and observations during 2009 and 2013. During the *chu-badui*, the *badui* messenger consults spirits on human problems of health, wealth, infertility, crops, harvest, rains, and family conflicts. "There is an interactive relation between spiritual practices and society, and this interaction is able to achieve social peace and harmony in the living world and the metaphysical world" (He, 2007, p. 39). This part explores this interaction and its dynamic relationship with social experience.

6.1 Social Harmony in Xiangxi Miao Communities

In the local context, *roudouju* 'social harmony' (Ch. 社会和谐) entails balance among humans, between humans and spirits, and between humans and nature. In the Miao villages of Shanjiang 山江 and Laershan 腊尔山, village heads Wu Songjie 吴送杰 and Long Bingting 龙丙厅 explained normative social harmony to me. These are *taishi duzhan* (lit., 'people having health'), *rouyangqing* (lit., 'obtaining good harvests'), *linie jiukou, liku daiguo* (lit., 'giving thanks and observing filial piety'), *rougadai* (lit., 'having auspicious housing *fengshui*'), and *rongyangsang* (lit., 'having thriving domestic animals'). The above expressions summarize what constitutes the three kinds of social harmony for the Xiangxi Miao: that among humans, between humans and spirits, and between humans and nature. However, villager Wu Songmin 吴淞民 in Machong 麻冲 village explained these expressions to us in local Chinese. These expressions that are also Chinese show that the local Han

Chinese are subject to such norms. The strong influence of Confucianism on Xiangxi Miao society is noticeable in these norms: giving thanks and observing filial piety indicate Confucian respect for parents and ancestors.

Figure 4: The *Galing* (Brass Bell Ch. 铜铃)



Figure 5. The *Gua* (Divination Ch. 卦) (The *gua* divination is circled)



Source: <http://image.baidu.com/i?ct=503316480&z=&tn=baiduimagedetail&ipn=d&word=苗族打卦>

Social harmony in the local context is different from English social harmony. “Social harmony is about maintaining a level of equilibrium in economic terms in civil society. Thenatural tensionsthat exist within any plural human collective are ameliorated through cross cultural understanding, respecting, iteratively renegotiating and maintaining a level of balance in the power relations, resources, functioning and capacities between potentially conflicts groups, whether these be based on broadly economic, political, social, racial and religious or cultural distinctions” (Galla, 2009, p. 3). English social harmony focuses on balance among humans. By contrast, social harmony of the Xiangxi Miao entails balance between humans and spirits (e.g. respect for deceased ancestors) and between humans and nature (e.g. having auspicious housing geomancy) in addition to balance among humans.

6.2 Applying the Theory of Structuration

In addition to its normative nature, the *chu-badui* is also a social activity, to which it is useful to apply Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration. We take the fundamental social structure to be social harmony. “Structure...refers to systems of generative rules and resources” (Giddens, 1976, p. 127). In the Xiangxi Miao context, the rules and resources are the societal norms mentioned in 3.1: maintaining health and wealth, observing filial piety, obtaining good harvests, and having auspicious housing *fengshui* and healthy domestic animals. Together, these social practices constitute or reconstitute social harmony as the fundamental social structure of the Xiangxi Miao. Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration emphasizes the relation between human agency and structure. “The social structures are both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very messenger of this constitution: each act of constitution at the same time is an act of reconstitution. The structure that produces actions conducted by agents is, during the performances of those actions, reproduced” (Giddens, 1976, p. 121).

The theory of structuration is useful in analyzing the relations among the spirit messenger, the ritual, and social harmony in the Miao society because the theory of structuration emphasizes the active flow of social life. “Social life is seen as a series of ongoing activities and practices that people carry on, which at the same time reproduce larger institutions” (Giddens & Pierson, 1998, p. 76). In Xiangxi Miao communities, the messenger is a divining person who exerts power; the rituals constitute a continuous flow of community interventions conducted by the messengers; and social harmony organized by rules and resources is recursively produced or reproduced by such rituals. According to the theory of structuration, therefore, the *badui* serves as an agent, the *chu-badui* as human agency or action, and social harmony is the fundamental social structure of the Xiangxi Miao.

6.3 Spiritual Harmony, Interpersonal Harmony

An important collateral effect of villagers gathering for the *chu-badui* is the maintenance of social relationships. In Xiangxi Miao communities, the *badui* is often summoned to perform the *chu-badui* to solve specific problems, “when something goes against people’s will, for example, [which] in a given year includes poor harvest, lack of rain, infertility, high child mortality or illness, or the progressive thinning of trees” (Schein, 2000, p. 222). Neighbors and relatives are invited to attend the performance. Some other villagers might also attend the *chu-badui*, even if they were not specifically invited. The villagers’ participation reflects the integration of spiritual activities into Miao society (He, 2007, p. 39), because the villagers consider spiritual practices to be a part of their daily

routine. The Xiangxi Miao focus on realizing harmony between humans and spirits through spiritual practices.

The village head Wu Songjie told me that social harmony depends primarily on good friendship among relatives, friends, neighbors, and villagers. A host family is socially obligated to inform relatives, neighbors, and other villagers of the date of a *chu-badui*, normally a week in advance, whether or not these other people would be interested in the ritual. In the summer of 2013, Hexian's maternal grandmother's family invited the *badui* Wu San 吴三 to perform the *chu-badui* of eating the pigs. One month before the performance, she informed Hexian's mother, aunts, other relatives, neighbors, and some other villagers that her family would perform the *chu-badui* on July 15, and invited them to come to join performance.

Some people attend the *chu-badui* merely to meet and greet relatives, friends, and neighbors; not all believe in the rituals. Furthermore, attendees often chat during a performance. "The *chu-badui* is not a very somber ritual, and the audience may talk and laugh during the performance" (Ma, 2005, p. 55). During a performance, attendees sit or stand around the *badui*, as he consults with the spirits. Meanwhile, listeners greet each other and talk about their crops, incomes, harvest, health, weather, and the old days. Through this chat, villagers reach agreement in opinions, manners, and news. The *chu-badui* thus is both an opportunity for relaxation, and a way to achieve social harmony.

The *chu-badui* unites people, and yet at the same time allows them to express their differences. Therefore, the ritual not only achieves harmony between humans and spirits; it also is an opportunity for people to achieve harmony among themselves, which fosters close friendships.

6.4 Restoring *Fengshui* 风水

In the eyes of the Xiangxi Miao, the harmonious spatial orientation and construction of houses, known as *fengshui* is important. "Village orientations were determined by geomancy. Their houses were constructed of wood, stone, or mud brick, depending on location" (Schein, 2000, p. 52). It is the *fengshui* of the home that determines how powerful the spirits are in protecting and blessing family members. If the home's geomancy is powerful, then the spirits will be powerful. If the home's geomancy is awry in any way, however, the spirits may well be ineffective so that family members and domestic animals are often sick.

During a performance, the *badui* uses *dai* 地 'location' and *rao* 力 'power' to describe the harmonious orientation and construction of a household spirit's "house." The *badui* uses the number of locations (*ji huai dai* 几块地) and the number of powers (*ji huai rao* 几块力) to measure household spirits' housing geomancy. The numbers selected often range from one to nine. The higher the number, the more power to protect humans the spirit possesses. For example, *jiao huai dai* 九块地 'nine locations' and *jiao huai rao* 九块力 'nine powers' are considered excellent housing *fengshui*. In contrast, if a spirit merely possesses a single location (*a huai dai* 一块地 'one location') and a single power (*a huai rao* 一块力 'one power'), then the house has terrible *fengshui*.

The Xiangxi Miao believe that the supernatural movement replicates actual movement. During a performance, when the *badui* practitioner "arrives" at a household spirit's "house," participating

audience members consult the *badui* on the spirit's housing geomancy. Once the spirit has a good geomancy, family members and domestic animals can keep healthy and family harmony is more likely to be achieved, they believe. If a spirit's housing geomancy is unsatisfactory, participants may consult the *badui* for advice on how to restore the housing geomancy.

We witnessed a *chu-badui* thanking the deceased ancestors, performed by the *badui* Long Hepang 龙合榜 in Quangongping village on June 2, 2012. During this performance, the *badui* visited household God (*Pourong*) and clients consulted the messenger on this Household God's housing geomancy. In the following, the *badui* thanking the deceased ancestors:

Badui: We are going to visit *Pourong* Household God, to consult him on the problems of the mortals.

Client: Please ask *Pourong* Household God about his housing geomancy. Is his housing geomancy good or bad?

Badui: The housing geomancy of your Household God is *jiao huai dai* [nine locations] and *jiaohuai rao* [nine powers]. His housing geomancy is excellent. *Pourong* Household God, if your housing geomancy is really nine locations and nine powers, please allow me to practice the divination: one is *yin*, the other is *yang*. The *badui* told me that *yin* and *yang*, the two opposing principles in nature, the former feminine and negative, the latter masculine and positive.

Practicing divination during the *chu-badui* is a way to determine a household's future (dis)harmony. *Yin* and *yang* of the divination, which a spirit asks the *badui* messenger to practice during the ritual, ensure that the determination of *fengshui* is auspicious [*jixiang* 吉祥]. If one *yin* and one *yang* of the divinations practiced by the *badui* are the same *yin* and *yang* the spirit requested, household harmony will be achieved.

In addition to *Pourong* Household God, clients consult *Pounong* 'Rescuer God' (Ch. 雄神) on his own housing geomancy. If *Pounong* Rescuer God's housing geomancy is unsatisfactory, a family is more likely to experience high child mortality, infertility, and frequent illness, which are disruptions to the achievement of social harmony. Thus the *badui* should tell mortals how to restore the disrupted housing geomancy, so that *Pounong* Rescuer God will possess more power to bless mortals. The following sample is from a *chu-badui* looking for the soul of the dead, performed by the *badui* Wu Xiangyin in Shanjiang village on July 10, 2013.

Badui: Let's visit *Pounong* Rescuer God and measure the width and length of his housing geomancy. *Pounong* Rescuer God in your house is not as powerful as *Pourong* Household God. He has seven locations and nine powers.

Client: Is *Pounong* Rescuer God not powerful with his seven locations and nine powers?

Badui: The location of your *Pounong* Rescuer God is not so good because he only has seven locations.

Client: What shall we do to restore *Pounong* Rescuer God's housing geomancy?

Badui: At *lidong* 立冬 [the start of winter], you may buy him some pork and rice wine, and invite a *badui* spirit official to visit *Pounong* Rescuer God. In addition, you should place some cinnabar (Ch. 辰砂) under *Pounong* Rescuer God's shrine. Then his housing geomancy can rise to nine locations and nine powers.

The *badui* Wu Xiangyin explained that cinnabar can cleanse spirit houses and exorcise evil spirits. Families sometimes place cinnabar besides the household gates if they feel disturbed by evil spirits. For example, children often cry in the evening. The Xiangxi Miao usually get cinnabar from mountains or buy it from local markets.

During this ritual, *badui* Wu also visits *Pounie* buffalo God (Ch. 水牛神), who is in charge of the future prospects for the crop harvest of a family. As with the other spirits, if buffalo God possesses good housing geomancy, then crop will have a good harvest. When crop has good harvest, the family is at peace; a peaceful family brings out social harmony. The following is an excerpt from a buffalo God *chu-badui*.

Badui: We shall look at *Pounie* Water Buffalo God's home and measure the width and length of his housing geomancy.

Client: Please check whether the housing geomancy of Water Buffalo God is good or bad.

Badui: Water Buffalo God of your house has nine locations and nine powers. His housing geomancy is excellent.

Client: Water Buffalo God is powerful. Please bless crop harvest in the living world, and make us live in a harmonious life.

The above three excerpts show that the Xiangxi Miao pay close attention to the geomancy of spirits' abodes and consult the *badui* for this purpose. If the spirits' housing geomancy is unsatisfactory, the *badui* and the spirits will inform mortals how to restore it. These ritual actions show one method for achieving harmony. Housing and village *fengshui* is related to social harmony that Xiangxi Miaos are seeking to achieve. Frequent illnesses, infertility, and high child mortality resulting from bad housing *fengshui* produce social tension and anxiety because people in a village treat each other as brothers and sisters. During the performance of the *chu-badui*, the *badui* consult spirits on how to keep family members and domestic animals healthy. These actions are related to Giddens's (1984) theory of structuration, in that ritual social actions conducted by the messengers as agents constitute or reconstitute social structures and, thus, social harmony.

6.5 The *Chu-badui* Helps Domestic Animals Thrive

Financial losses are one of the elements that disrupt the achievement of social harmony. The Xiangxi Miao people are farmers, and their incomes come mainly from livestock: domestic animals such as

pigs, chickens, and goats. Abundant and healthy domestic animals guarantee harmony. During the *chu-badui*, when the spirits see some unexpected financial losses to a family's livestock, mortals may consult the spirits to achieve the harmony. I witnessed such a performance by the *badui* Wu Xiangqin 吴香琴 in Laershan 腊尔山 village on January 6, 2013. Through a messenger, *Pouzu* household God explained to one client how to stem financial losses, speaking in Miao, but using the Chinese terms noted below:

Pouzu Household God: You may consult a fortuneteller on a *churi* 出日 [auspicious day for an outing]. On that day, buy one pound (*jin* 斤) of paper "money" and divide it into three bundles. Then sit beside a fireplace, throwing the three bundles back over your shoulder, one bundle at a time. Someone else should pick up the paper "money," take it outside and walk 220 steps westwards. Whomever they end up, they should then burn the paper "money." From then on, your family's fortunes will become better and better.

The clients' consultation of spirits about a family's financial losses shows that stemming financial losses is also part of the achievement of social harmony.

6.6 The *Chu-badui* Resolves Family Conflicts

Xiangxi Miao people believe in the Chinese saying "if a family lives in harmony, all affairs will prosper (家和万事兴)." Interpersonal harmony in a family results in wealth and health. The *badui* Long Quanheng 龙全生 told me that family conflicts cause disharmony, including poor harvests, unexpected personal financial losses, and illness. During the *chu-badui*, immortals often remind mortals to maintain and reestablish harmonious relationships among family members. The *chu-badui* can be used in anticipation of possible conflicts, proactively seeking to avoid them. If conflicts have taken place, the *chu-badui* is performed to achieve harmony. A dialogue between *badui* messenger and Hexian's maternal uncle Long Shuangquan 龙双全 during the *chu-badui* performed by the *badui* Wu Xiangying in Shanjiang village on December 25, 2013, demonstrates this phenomenon:

Uncle Long: We will mind whatever you tell us. We invited the *badui* to visit you today. Please tell us whether you have seen any problems in my family.

Badui: Your family's fortunes were not trending auspiciously last year and this year, because of some conflicts between you and your daughter-in-law. Have you forgotten the conflicts?

Uncle Long: They were so small that we did not take them personally.

Badui: Some illnesses happened to your family members due to your conflicts. To avoid another illness, you and your daughter-in-law must promise to stop having conflicts.

Uncle Long: Dear *Pounong Rescuer* God, we promise not to complain about each other again. And we are ameliorating our relationship. Please bless us and take illnesses away...

Apart from dealing with conflicts between mothers- and daughters-in-law, spousal relations are another common focus of the *chu-badui*. A couple's marital harmony influences a family's stability, harmony, and the growth of its children. Therefore, elders often consult spirits on the relationship between their sons and daughters-in-law. For example, Hexian's mother Long Jinkui 龙金葵 consulted *Pounong* Rescuer God on his own relationship with his wife. The following dialogue took place between his mother and the *badui* Zhang Yin 张音 in his brother's home.

Mother: Will Hexian [the author] and Hongmei [his wife] dislike each other in the future?

Badui: No, they will not. They will grow old together. Please let me practice divination with one *yin* and one *yang* to ensure they both live to a ripe old age.

Mother: Yes, it is one *yin* and one *yang*.

Badui: Their affection will be stronger and stronger, because they descended into the living world simultaneously.

Family conflicts cause disharmony. During the *chu-badui*, the spirits often remind the mortals to stop family conflicts to avoid illnesses.

6.7 The *Chu-badui* Enacts Reciprocity and Social Hierarchies

As is common in Confucian societies within the Chinese realm, the Xiangxi Miao worship ancestors, and show piety toward higher-ranked male social superiors. In Xiangxi Miao communities, such ancestors include spirits, deceased ancestors, and elders. It is important for the Xiangxi Miao to show ancestors this filial piety and show them gratitude. Gratitude for favors and kindness (Ch. 恩) and filial piety (Ch. 孝) are the Confucian norms that govern Miao social harmony. The Xiangxi Miao also use the Chinese concepts above, *en* 恩 and *xiao* 孝, to govern social harmony. It is impossible for a family or a community to achieve harmony while these aspects are neglected.

During the *chu-badui*, the *badui* enacts social reciprocity; that is, the social premise that favors must be repaid with other favors. The deceased, the spirits, and the elders should be shown respect to avoid illnesses or other misfortunes. If a member of one's family is sick, it is believed that some members of this family did not give thanks for favors or observe filial piety, which caused the spirits' dissatisfaction and resulted in illness. The immortals can then show the mortals how to achieve harmony, as in the following dialogues among the *badui*, and my maternal grandmother Tang Meihong in a performance in Shanjiang 山江 village on December 25, 2013:

Badui: *Pounong* Rescuer God complained that your family did not know how to give thanks.

Grandma Tang: We gave thanks for what you did for us. Why did you say that we did not know to give thanks?

Badui: No, you did not...

Badui: Dear *Pounong* Rescuer God, please do not let the illness come down to humans. Meanwhile, please sweep away illnesses from the mortals.

Grandma Tang: Yes, please help us.

Badui: *Pounong* Rescuer God mainly complained that you two housewives (mother- and daughter-in-law) did not take good care of him. You often insulted him while cooking.

Grandma Tang: We will be very careful later. Would you please get rid of the illnesses from my family?

Badui: Since you two have agreed to take good care of *Pounong* Rescuer God, he will drive all illnesses out of your house. However, you two should select a day to kneel down in front of *Pounong* Rescuer God, burning some incense and paper “money” in apology. Remember not to cook meat or pork oil on that day. Do you agree with him?

Grandma Tang: Yes, we will do as you told us...

Spirits embody elders, who should be respected. Spirits therefore permit social relationships to exist after the death of the actors. Disharmony such as illness and conflicts will arise when the spirits have been insulted by humans.

As norms of social harmony, *en* and *xiao* (giving thanks for favors and showing filial piety) must be shown to ancestors. During the *chu-badui*, if such reciprocal gestures are absent, or the flow of reciprocal gestures is disrupted, then the *badui* and spirits guide participants in restoring this reciprocal flow. Restoring the balance of favors and social hierarchies indicates that the *chu-badui* is a ritual activity enhancing the Xiangxi Miao’s possibilities of achieving social harmony.

6.8 The *Chu-badui* Indicates Self-Sacrifice

In Xiangxi Miao communities, the older generations care for the younger generations and may even sacrifice their lives for them if necessary. “The main features of harmony are dialogue, tolerance, co-existence and development” (An, 2009, p. 4). Care and self-sacrifice, to some degree, are manifestations of family members’ mutual tolerance. On the other hand, family members’ mutual tolerance makes care and self-sacrifice feasible. We argue in this section that the realization of harmony also requires considerable mutual aid and self-sacrifice.

This mutual care and self-sacrifice can be seen in a *chu-badui* performed in my maternal grandmother’s house on December 25, 2013. During the performance, Hexian’s maternal grandmother Tang Meihong told the *badui* – while they were possessed by *Pounong* Rescuer God – that he (my grandmother) could carry the family’s illnesses himself if need be. My grandmother wished that the spirit would therefore remove all illnesses from other family members. He knew he was too old to labor in the fields and had no other projects he wanted to pursue. The young people, however, needed to labor in the field and make money to support the whole family. My maternal grandmother’s offer of self-sacrifice to the younger generation shows that Miao elders care deeply for the young, and they dare to shoulder heavy responsibilities. This self-sacrifice is one of factors constituting social harmony in Xiangxi Miao communities.

Badui: Pounong Rescuer God has seen that some illnesses will take place in your family.

Grandma Tang: Please figure out who might become ill.

Badui: Pounong Rescuer God said the illnesses would happen to both the old and young.

Grandma Tang: Please *Pounong* Rescuer God and look at the illnesses carefully. Do not let them happen to the young, because they should stay healthy in order to work in the fields, making money to support their families. I am too old to work, and have nothing to pursue. If illnesses are unavoidable, let them befall me.

The Xiangxi Miao advocate care and self-sacrifice, which are also norms of social harmony. Elders dare to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the younger generation. This action shows that the *chu-badui* performance mirrors social harmony in Xiangxi Miao communities. It also shows that the *chu-badui* helps clarify familial and social relationships that will be implied by ongoing relationships. Care and sacrifice also imply reciprocity. The grandmother is, through him discourse as facilitated by the *badui*, articulating the structure of an ideal familial social network in which the elder generation can express its love while also expecting gratitude and respect.

6.9 The *Chu-badui* Advocates Selflessness

Selflessness is another strategy for achieving Xiangxi Miao social harmony, and Xiangxi Miao selflessness is usually seen during the performance of a *chu-badui*.

Although the main aim of the ritual is to consult spirits about a household's health, wealth, crops, harvest, and conflicts, the host family rarely forgets to also consult spirits on dangers affecting the whole village. Villagers are supposed to treat each other like brothers and sisters. If something bad occurs and creates disharmony, a family should consult spirits to solve these problems. June 2, 2012, Hexian witnessed a performance by the *badui* Long Ximei in his brother's house. Clients consulted *Pounie* Water Buffalo God (Ch. 水牛神) on the possibility of life-giving rains for the farmers' crops via the messenger:

Badui: There is drought in July of this year, and there will be shortage of water at that time.

Client: You should provide an average amount of rain. Farmers work very hard. Please do not let a drought come to us.

Badui: Dear *Pounie* Water Buffalo God, we farmers plant crops and want to have a good harvest. Please *Pounie* Water Buffalo God provide an average amount of rain.

In addition to consulting Water Buffalo God, clients consulted *Dudeng* 'Earth God' (Ch. 土地公) and *Gejiong* 'Mountain God' (Ch. 山神) to ensure the safety of the whole village and avoid dangers. If misfortunes causing social disharmony are seen by spirits, clients will ask the spirits how to restore social harmony. In the following example, clients consulted *Dudeng* Earth God on safety and dangers in Shanjiang Village.

Badui: We have arrived at *Dudeng* Earth God's house. *Dudeng* Earth God is in charge of the safety of the whole village. Let's look at *Dudeng* Earth God's house. His house is "sparking" with light and no coffins [symbolizing death] are found inside.

Client: It is very nice not to have coffins in *Dudeng's* house. *Dudeng* Earth God should protect your descendants, and not let coffins stay inside the house.

Badui: From now on, if *Dudeng* Earth God can defend your villagers and take away all illnesses, please give them an odd number of rice picking up [odd numbers of rice grains ensure that the villagers keep healthy].

Client: Yes, I picked up the odd number of the rice. *Dudeng* Earth God must protect us well.

Badui: Okay, *Dudeng* Earth God has promised that no death will come to the village this year.

Client: All people in this village are your descendants. Some of them are living outside the village. Would you agree to protect them too?

Badui: Please do not worry. *Dudeng* has agreed to protect them too.

Although the *chu-badui* is performed for personal consultation, as can be seen above, often the whole village benefits. Thus the *chu-badui* focuses on not only the harmony of a single household, but also on the collective harmony of a village.

6.10 The *Chu-badui* Gets Rid of the Illnesses

In the eyes of Xiangxi Miao people, illness directly disrupts a family's harmony, and only a return to health restores this harmony. If a member of one's household falls ill, Xiangxi Miao invite a *badui* to consult the spirits on causes and treatments. During a performance, when a *badui* is visiting a certain spirit, clients inquire about the health of family members, because some family members will be experiencing illness and the achievement of harmony with respect to health is actually not so easy. A performance of the *chu-badui* we witnessed on May 15, 2011, in Muli木里village involved consulting *Gejiong* Mountain God on treatments, after clients were told that there would be the illnesses in the family.

Client: It is very nice to meet you. You should protect us and take good care of us. We have sent you a great deal of money and rice.

Badui: Please tell the children to be careful this year, because I have seen some coffins come down.

Client: You should take good care of us and take the coffins away.

Badui: It is hard, because both the aged and the young have been selected to die.

Client: Generation after generation of your descendants rely on your protection.

Badui: It is hard for me to protect the aged, but you may make three *bi bushai* 'sweet wormwood knots' (Ch. 青蒿结) and seven bamboo torches 竹火把 for the children. You must place these things at the west end of the village on August 15 and the coffins will be swept away.

In Xiangxi Miao communities, wormwood and bamboo torches are also used to sweep away misfortunes caused by evil spirits. On an auspicious day (August 15 of that particular year), wormwood and bamboo torches could have been placed at the west end of the village from which the evil spirits usually come, and the misfortunes could have been swept away. Additionally, such torches must also be placed near the head of a household after performing the *chu-badui*, so that the *badui*'s spiritual power can temporarily reside there.

A stable temperament also constitutes "health." In another performance in my brother's house, Hexian mother Long Jinkui consulted Fertility Goddess about my unexplained "illnesses":

Badui: Hexian [the author] is good and clever. However, he is often angry with himself.

Mother: Why is he often angry with himself sometimes?

Badui: He is angry about some things that he is unable to do. You may help him plant some moon and sun trees [fir trees] so he will not be angry with himself and let him have a good feeling.

There are some fir trees at the entrance of each village in Xiangxi Miao communities. Fir trees ensure a village's safety and continued power over evil spirits. When a messenger diagnoses someone as ill, family members can plant a fir tree at the entrance of the village. The sick person's safety then can be ensured. The planting of fir trees at the entrance to a village is a public act of sacrifice and piety. A stand of fir trees becomes a clear sign of a community in which there is honor, respect, and obedience to spirits. This would be an example of a personal issue being expressed as something that affects the community as a whole, making it clear that achievement of harmony for an individual also contributes to the harmony of the whole village.

The Xiangxi Miao pay attention to the health of the family members because health affects social harmony. The *chu-badui* can restore the disrupted health of family members.

6.11 The *Chu-badui* Defeats Evil Spirits in the Otherworld

The Xiangxi Miao people believe the otherworld is an authentic reflection of the living world; the otherworld has good and bad persons, rivers, mountains, trees, and even legal systems. In the course of a journey into the otherworld, the *badui* might meet with evil spirits standing by the road, asking for food and money. Evil spirits seriously disturb a *badui*'s performance, so they should be defeated or killed. "Evil spirits in the otherworld represent bad people and local bullies in the living world. They destroy social order and harmony, and humans have the privilege to punish them" (Ma

2006, p. 44). Strictly speaking, to achieve social harmony evil spirits should be killed. However, a *badui* and clients often try peaceful methods before resorting to force because the forceful destruction of evil spirits is something that is risky and harmful. If negotiation does not work, the *badui* then calls together him or his own spirit soldiers to defeat or kill the evil spirits. In a performance of the *chu-badui* expressing gratitude to Deceased Ancestors performed in Hexian's brother's home on January 13, 2014, the *badui* dealt with the evil spirits by first attempting negotiation, followed by brute force:

Badui: We have arrived at a place where people are bleeding. I have seen much blood, so I am very scared.

Client: Hurry up, hurry up, and leave this place at top speed.

Badui: Please the mortals, send the evil spirits money because we are scared. (Participants burned paper "money" for the evil spirits outside the house.) In addition, please send us some bullets.

Client: Please do not worry about them. We have sent them money and gifts. If they still do not disperse, kill them with your horses and guns.

As illustrated above, the *badui* and clients often attempt to persuade demons to leave by burning some paper "money" for them, which is a strategy in which anyone could participate. If the demons still do not agree to leave, force vested in a specific individual is the next resort.

Below is another performance from Shanjiang village, recorded on June 2, 2012.

Evil spirits: "Ai hu!" [horrible sounds] Give us money! Give us money....

Client: Who gives you money? There is no way.

Badui: There are too many devils with bleeding faces. They look horrible.

Evils spirits: Money, money... [The evil spirits keep asking for money]

Client: Just give you some money this time. You may take your money outside the house, and please do not disturb the *badui* messenger's performance ever again.

Evil spirits: No, we need more money.

Badui: There are too many evil spirits here. Some died by drowning, from a gun or a knife wound. They look ugly.

Client: Since they do not want to leave, *badui*, please summon your master and soldiers to come to catch and kill them all.

Badui: Most Exalted Lord Lao *Taishang Laojun* 太上老君 comes to kill the evil spirits and protect me in order not to be disturbed by them...

The *badui* resorts to the protection of a Daoist deity: the Most Exalted Lord Lao *Taishang Laojun* is associated with the Daoist religion, specifically with the Chinese philosopher *Laozi* 老子. This practice reinforces the syncretism with Daoism. Both good and evil spirits are ruled by the Daoist deities. Daoism is so powerful that it will kill the evil spirits. Daoism also plays a central role in the funeral *Song of Creation*, in which *Taishang Laojun* is the master of the *badui* (see Part 1).

The ritual of the defeat of the evil spirits can advance social harmony; the pursuit of peace and harmony is crucial to the Xiangxi Miao.

This part has explored the *chu-badui's* role in achieving harmony within Xiangxi Miao society. The *badui* performs the *chu-badui* for communication with spirits that can play a specific role in maintaining and restoring social harmony when it has been disrupted. This relation between spirits and society through the *badui* as mediator is related to Giddens's (1984) theory of structuration. In the Xiangxi Miao context, the *badui* is a divine who serves as an agent, performing the *chu-badui* as human action. Social harmony is fundamental to social structure. The ongoing human actions (the rituals) conducted by agents (the messengers) recursively constitute or reconstitute fundamental social structures (social harmony). The theory of structuration, which focuses on the relations between social practices and structure, is thus applied to the relationships among the messenger, the ritual, and social harmony of the Xiangxi Miao.

7. Conclusions

7.1 The Reciprocity between Humans and Spirits

In the previous parts, we described the performances of *badui*, including their recruitment and paraphernalia. In addition, I discussed how the ritual known as the *chu-badui* serves to achieve social harmony.

In Xiangxi Miao communities, humans and spirits are subject to principles of reciprocity. The *chu-badui* describes, promotes, and enacts this reciprocity by providing instruction on how it is to be conducted, by repaying the spirits' favors with human favors and vice-versa. Worshippers of the spirits regularly burn *joss paper* "money" and incense as offerings; in return, spirits are expected to reveal their supernatural knowledge. However, the most direct and powerful method by which to acquire a favor in return for offerings is to invite a messenger, which is also a method of inviting the spirits. *Badui* mediate a reciprocal relationship between the human and spirit worlds.

In the clients' eyes, the *badui* are described as omnipotent specialists because they can satisfy all kinds of requests for spiritual intervention through their relationship with the spirits. Clients are able to find solutions to their problems using the *badui*.

7.2 A Syncretic Matrix of the *Chu-badui*

The *chu-badui* is both animist and profoundly syncretic. The Miao believe in animism. However, with Chinese migrations to Miao regions and Miao migrations within China as well, Miao encountered Chinese major religions: Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, and Shenism. Some traits of these religious systems blended together syncretically in the Miao spiritual practices. Specifically, the strong influence of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism is demonstrated in the *chu-badui*. For

example, the participants send food to their deceased ancestors and show them Confucian filial piety, address Fertility Goddess who is a Buddhist, communicate with *Tudigong* Earth God who represents Daoist religion.

7.3 The Decline of the *Chu-badui*

In the last twenty years, the *chu-badui* has been in decline in Xiangxi Miao communities due to internal and external factors.

Internally, secrecy about *badui* messengership has resulted in a lack of young practitioners. To keep their superior social status and mystery of their craft, the *badui* are unwilling to reveal their craft to their audiences, which has resulted in fewer young people being interested in spirit messengership. Moreover, in present-day Xiangxi Miao communities, many of the young people consider the messengership a deceptive activity because they do not believe that humans can communicate with spirits.

In addition, as noted earlier, *badui* are strictly selected on the basis of *bazi* horoscopes. The messengership is learned, taught, or trained. A person must self-select. Even when someone's *bazi* horoscope would qualify him or her for messengership, he or she does not necessarily have an interest in becoming a messenger. Since new messengers cannot be recruited, existing messengers cannot pass on their knowledge of craft to apprentices. Thus, within Xiangxi Miao ritual practice, the *badui* messengership may contain "the seed of its own decline" (Elliot, 1955, p. 168). The restrictions that prohibit recruiting and training apprentices have resulted in the decline of the *chu-badui*.

With regard to the external factors, in present-day Miao communities there is no direct governmental interference in religious activities, unlike during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Nonetheless, *chu-badui* are still seen by local authorities as backward and unhealthy. In contrast, the Han Chinese practice of ancestor worship, also practiced by the Miao, "received a certain amount of official understanding and tolerance" (Tapp, 2001, p. 147).

Another factor in the *badui's* decline is the improvement of village health. Since the 1980s, rural healthcare improvements have included the creation of convenient and inexpensive hospitals and clinics where the patients can be cured. In contrast, performing the *chu-badui* to consult spirits on the illnesses needs to do many essential preparations, such as making appointments with the messengers, informing relatives and villagers, buying enough *joss* paper and incenses, and preparing a red rooster and a peach branch. Concomitantly, fewer and fewer Xiangxi Miao patients first seek healing from *badui*. In present-day Xiangxi Miao communities, the exorcism ritual is performed only if the patients cannot be cured in clinics or hospitals.

The *chu-badui* serves to address disruptions to social harmony, while at the same time reinforcing the need for *badui* messengership as a fundamental element of Miao culture and society. This practice restores social harmony when it has been disrupted. The Miao are identified as animists, and animism informs a great deal of spirit messengership. With the Miao migrations within China and vice versa, Xiangxi Miao spirit messengership is performed as a syncretic matrix of animism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism. Syncretic spirit messengership helps to advance social

cohesion and acculturation. Thus, the gradual disappearance of this practice is a problematic trend because it may affect Miao identity, social cohesion, and acculturation.

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Enhancing Farmers Group to Strengthen ASEAN Economic Community: Case of Farmer Group in Pasaman District, West Sumatra, Indonesia

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Abstract

The agriculture sector is important for the ASEAN economy and the region is a primary world supplier for some agricultural produce. Statistics show that the agricultural sector contributes between 10-35 percent of the GDPs in a majority of ASEAN countries, except Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore. Yet, the agriculture sector's employment ranges from 30%-70% of employment in the region. This reflects a disproportionate contribution between labor employment and sector economic contribution which also means there is large number of farmers in the region. To face this situation, AEC Blue print adopted a policy to promote ASEAN agricultural cooperatives as a means to empower and enhance market access of agricultural products, to build a network mechanism linking agricultural cooperatives, and to fulfill the purpose of agricultural cooperatives for the benefit of farmers in the region. ASEAN would strengthen the strategic alliance between the agricultural cooperatives in ASEAN through bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation; establish business linkages among the potential agricultural cooperatives within ASEAN; and promote direct investment and strategic partnership with ASEAN agricultural cooperatives producers, consumers, and traders. Hence, farmer organization is vital in realizing an agricultural cooperative. Based on case studies in Pasaman District, West Sumatra, Indonesia, this paper describes the status of farmer groups in Indonesia and their potential to be transformed into regional farmers' cooperation. The cases were made among rural farmers in the process of transition from subsistence to world economy. It found out that farmer organizations are yet to favor the market economy; there is a declining trust among rural villagers on the farmer organization and a declining role of local leaders. The farmers, in turn, run to money lenders to satisfy their needs for external funds and in the marketing of agricultural products. This patron-client relationship is exploitative in nature, hence this farmer organization is not conducive for AEC 2015. There many things to do to strengthen farmer groups. This paper proposes mediation by the Asian Public Intellectuals (API) community to connect farmers groups within ASEAN member countries.

Keywords: production base, farmer cooperative, market, agribusiness

¹³⁹ A member of Asian Public Intellectuals (API) community. First author would express deep gratitude to the Nippon Foundation, Japan under the Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Program which provided the generous support that enabled the author participating in APSA Conference, 15-16 February in Chiang Mai, Thailand.

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Introduction

Southeast Asia follows a regionalism movement for economic development by setting up a regional free trade area. Following Frankel (1997), a regional free trade area generally known as regionalism is an agreement among a group of countries to strengthen their economic links, particularly by removing barriers to trade and investment among themselves. With more than half billion population in the region, half of China or India, ASEAN is a significant market for the world. Total trade value within ASEAN as of 2012 reached 2,388,592.3 million USD, and increased tremendously from 2011 which was valued at 598,242.2 million USD (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012). ASEAN contributes 25% of total export value in the Asia-Pacific region and less than 25% of import value which means ASEAN has a trade surplus (UNESCAP Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 2011). It is no wonder that the regionalism movement is a rational economic choice for ASEAN.

ASEAN continues to integrate the economy of its members by entering the ASEAN economic community (AEC) by 2015. Similar to other previous successful regional economic integrations such as the European Economic Community (EC), AEC would transform ASEAN into a single market and production base, a highly competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully integrated into the global economy (ASEAN Secretariat, 2008). Agriculture is among its top priority integration sectors, while regional cooperation on Food, Agriculture and Forestry (FAF) aims to enhance intra- and extra- ASEAN trade, promote cooperation, a joint approach and technology transfer among ASEAN member and non-member countries, and promote ASEAN agricultural cooperatives as a means to empower and enhance market access of agricultural products, to build a network mechanism linking agricultural cooperatives, and to fulfill the purpose of agricultural cooperatives for the benefit of farmers in the region. AEC seriously takes into account the types of farmers in the region which is mostly small scale farmers. Farmer cooperatives are one of the AEC's targets.

Borrowing from some prominent scholars and institutions, small-scale farmers are those: "operated units in which most labor and enterprise come from the farm family, which puts much of its working time into the farm" (Lipton, 2005); those with a low asset base, operating less than 2 hectares of cropland (World Bank, 2003); farmers with "limited resource endowments, relative to other farmers in the sector" (Dixon, Taniguchi & Wattenbach, 2003); and those farmer (crop or livestock) practicing a mix of commercial and subsistence production or either, where the family provides the majority of labor and the farm provides the principal source of income" (Narayanan & Gulati, 2002). Given considerable variation in defining small-scale farmers, Nagayets (2005) defines small farms as smallholders who are confined to farms of less than 2 hectares of owned or rented land where farm family provides the primary source of labor and that farming constitutes a principal source of income for the family. In Indonesia, the average farm size of small farmers varies from 0.3 to 0.7 ha in Java and approximately 1 to 3 ha outside Java with limited capital (Zakaria, 2003). "Small-scale" is often equated with backward, nonproductive, non-commercial, subsistence agriculture (Kirsten & van Zyl, 1998). Non-commercial agriculture may not fully apply to small-scale agriculture, since many of them are involved in the market economy.

In Asia, small farms are a prevalent type of production. Devendra (2007) characterizes small farms as "preponderance and emphasis on mixed crop–animals systems across a variety of agro ecological

zones. Mixed farming is the backbone of agriculture, many categories of which are models of diversification, efficiency and resilience in Asia. In global terms, small farms in Asia account for an estimated 87% of all farms of under two hectares of land." Devendra (2007) also reveals that in some part, small farms tend to adopt market oriented agriculture.

Small farms produce low quality and quantity of agriculture products. Usually middle men collect these products, improve on their quality, then market them to local and foreign markets. The value added is obtained by middle men. The small farms only produce low material and the price was determined by these middle men. With opening the regional markets and by setting up an ASEAN a production base, all producers in the region could be united in a coordinated effort. In the agriculture sector, farmers' households in region must be organized and coordinated.

Farmer organization is important when small farmers enter the global market. The benefits of farmer organization are also clearer when it comes to accessing credit, seed, and fertilizer. Farmer organization is a critical factor in making markets work for the poor particularly in high value products (Hellin, Lundy, & Meijer, 2007). Whether ASEAN regionalism of economy would benefit small scale farmers remains to be seen. The ASEAN Economic Community would prove that later on. However, pre-assessment can be made by looking at contemporary characteristics of farmer groups in the region.

Along with the global trend, where farmers produce high value products instead of cereal crops indicate that agricultural production is becoming market-oriented rather than a subsistent one. IFPRI [International Food Policy Research Institute] (2005) reports that farmers have moved away from cereal crops, following IFPRI recommendation that with 'low world cereal prices, agricultural development should now focus on high-value commodities and value-added processing rather than food staples production.' In Indonesia, for example, small the farmers are now cultivating perennial cash crop i.e. cacao, oil palm, however, they are commonly price taker and the economic surplus is enjoyed by middlemen, in this case local traders. The traders not only provide credit for input which has to be paid much higher, to provide working capital with higher interest rates, and buy the product at a lower price. Unless the small scale farmers organize themselves into feasible groups, they would remain marginal, and under the AEC they are not going to benefit. But, how feasible are farmer groups strengthening under AEC?

Asian Public Intellectuals (API), a fellowship program under Nippon Foundation, aims at creating a pool of intellectuals who would respond to regional issues. The program that was started in 2001 has pooled more than 300 public intellectuals through 15 years of fellowship programs. The pool of intellectuals who themselves live and work in Southeast Asia, are important stakeholders - responding to regional, social, political, economic, and cultural issues. The creation of AEC is one of major issues that need API concerns.

Taking into account small farmers organizations in facing AEC as well as the existence of the API community, this paper aims at; 1) presenting contemporary characteristics of farmer organizations of small scale farming in economic transition, 2) critically analyzing the feasibility and collaboration with similar farmers in the region under the umbrella of the ASEAN Economic community, and 3) discussing the role of Asian Public Intellectuals (API) in connecting farmers in the region.

The Study

This paper is based on studies commissioned by the Pasaman District government West Sumatra Province, Indonesia to Andalas University where the author is affiliated with both institutions.. The main objective of the study was to provide scientific basis for the local government in developing an agricultural sector especially in promoting commodities in ways that were physically, economically, socially, and culturally suitable to the local context. The main reason was that under market economy, farmers grow commodity which is not sometimes physically and socially suitable, this led to miscalculation of benefit and cost on the farmer's part. Nevertheless, this means the farmers are responsive to market demand. The study also identified what factors should be improved in case some commodities appear to be suitable only to local conditions and markets. Here the farmer organization appears strongly. This is because new commodities would be better adopted if farmers, especially small holders, were under a good organization or group.

The study has been conducted in two consecutive fiscal years, 2012 and 2013. In the first year, the study covered Duo Koto Sub-district involving 2 (two) nagari (village in the context of Minangkabau of West Sumatra province); while in the year 2013, the study covered 3 nagari in Tigo Nagari subdistrict. The local government intends to conduct the study covering all nagaris in the year to come.

The selection of two districts was based on consideration that the farmers of the two districts have been newly involved in the market economy from previous subsistence farming through shifting cultivation. Their economy is in transition. But, the two districts are in prevalently poor areas in Pasaman District.

This is an interdisciplinary study involving science, economics, and social science; more specifically it employed a soil scientist, an agricultural technology scientist, an economist, sociologist and anthropologist. Physical characteristics of the area that were investigated include: soil property, climate, local agricultural infrastructure, and local natural resources. Economic aspects include: a market for farm input and output, sources of capital, and commodity trend prices. Social aspects include: households' characteristics, local-social organization, and local leadership. This paper will mainly use data from the social aspect of the study.

Data collection techniques for the social aspect include, in depth interviews, household surveys, and observation. Household surveys were conducted with 159 respondents, more or less 30 households per nagari. Total samples constitute 1% of total farmers' households in each nagari. The sample was randomly drawn from list farmers' household in each village. Distribution is per household as shown in Table 1.

Table 3: Distribution of Household Sample by Nagari

Districts	Nagari	No of Hh sample
Duo Koto	Tonang Raya	31
	Cubadak	30
Tigo Nagari	Binjai	34
	Malampah	29
	Ladang Panjang	35
	Total	159

Data Collection Technique

Data covering physical, socioeconomic, and culture. Relevant to this paper, data on farmers' organization, local leadership, market for input and output, as well as patron-client relationship are important in dealing with paper objectives.

The Result and Discussion

Salient Feature of Study Sites

Dua Koto subdistrict is a typical mountainous area with elevation ranges from 600 – 1250 meters above sea level, while Tigo Nagari subdistrict is a low medium to mountainous area, elevation ranges from 50 – 1100 meters above sea level as shown in Table 2. These areas are blessed with a high rainfall since they face the Indian Ocean in the west that brings rain to the areas. The Elevation determines local agro climate which further determine crops selection.

Table 4: Elevation of Studied Village

Sub-districts	Village (Nagari)	Elevation(meter asl)
Duo Koto	Tonang Raya	610- 1250
	Cubadak	610- 1250
Tigo Nagari	Binjai	50-500
	Malampah	100-1000
	Ladang Panjang	100-1100

The villages are connected to port and to other cities through road networks. They can be reached between 4-5 hours from Padang, the capital of the province and the Teluk Bayur seaport, a major seaport in the province, on the west coast of Sumatra Island. Proximity to the urban area and sea port affects farming practice and crop selection.

Farming Characteristics

Farmers in the two sub-districts practice multiple farming systems, on a small scale, they grow rice in irrigated land, perennial cash crops, horticultures, animal husbandry, and fishpond. Average land size for each farming type is presented in Table 3.

Table 5: Land Occupation by Type of Farming

Type of farm land	Duo Koto		Tigo Nagari		
	Simpang Tonang	Cubadak	Binjai	Ladang Panjang	Malampah
Paddy field (ha)	0.18	0.3	0.64	0.67	0.75
Small holder plantation (ha)	0.42	0.67	0.94	0.55	0.71
Dry land farming (ha)	0.01	0.09	-	0.17	1.47
Fish pond (m2)	5.61	34.73	-	0.02	1.24
Home garden (m2)	35.84	12.67	-	-	17.38

As shown in Table 3, Duo Koto Sub-district is located in a narrow valley area with a rather steep slope. This leaves only a little land for agriculture, Tigo Nagari on the other hand is located on the foot of Pasaman Mountain, it has a larger area suitable for farming. As such, farm land occupation in Tigo Nagari is larger than Duo Koto. But all in all, average land occupation is less than 2 ha, these are typically small holders. Given that land occupancy, farmers grow rice as their staple, some perennial cash crops and small scale animal husbandry, as shown in Table 4.

Table 6: Number of Farmer by Agriculture Commodities They Produce in the two Sub-Districts

Agricultural commodity	Duo Koto				Tigo Nagari					
	Simpang Tonang (N = 31)		Cubadak (N = 30)		Binjai (N=34)		Ladang Panjang (N=35)		Malampah (N=29)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Annual crops										
Rice	31	100.00	29	96.67	26	76.47	28	80.00	23	79.31
Maize	2	6.45	0	0.00	1	2.94	8	22.86	0	0.00
Ground nut	3	9.68	0	0.00		0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Upland rice	0	0.00	3	10.00		0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Perennial crops										
Rubber	14	45.16	23	76.67	1	2.94	2	5.71	2	6.90
Cacao	7	22.58	10	33.33		0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Coffee	3	9.68	1	3.33		0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Cinnamon	4	12.90	0	0.00		0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Beatle nut	2	6.45	1	3.33		0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Cardamom	2	6.45	1	3.33		0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Oil Palm	1	3.23	0	0.00	24	70.59	13	37.14	14	48.28
Vegetables					1	2.94	0	0.00	1	3.45
Chili	7	22.58	8	26.67		0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Egg plant	0	0.00	1	3.33		0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Peas	2	6.45	1	3.33		0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Animal/husbandry										
Cattle	2	6.45	1	3.33	6	17.65	3	8.57	6	20.69
Buffalo	0	0.00	0	0	4	11.76	4	11.43	3	10.34
Goat	1	3.23	2	6.67	1	2.94	2	5.71	1	3.45
Chicken	16	51.61	8	26.67	2	5.88	2	5.71	3	10.34
Duck	6	19.35	0	0.00	1	2.94	0	0.00	1	3.45
Fresh water fish	3	9.68	1	3.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00

The above Table shows that farmers are engaging in market economy by producing perennial cash crops, such as; rubber, cacao, coffee, cinnamon, and oil palm depending on their agro climate. Rice is still the main annual crop grown by farmers as their staple. However, when investigated in more detail, how the farmers obtain their farm inputs and where they sell their products, it shows that local traders who also happened to be money lenders are the main partners. This can be seen from how the farmers purchase farm inputs such as seed, chemical fertilizer, and pesticide. This reflects weak farmer groups and farmer cooperatives.

Farmer Groups

The agriculture sector plays an important role in employment among ASEAN countries. Table 5 illustrates agricultural employment in some ASEAN countries. These data were taken from national statistics of each country. Percentage of labor employment in agricultural sector for Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia are predicted to be higher since these countries still rely on agriculture similar to Vietnam.

Table 7: Employment by Agriculture Sector among Some ASEAN Countries

Country	Employmentsector	% EMPLOYMENT
Philippines 1)	Farmers, forestry workers and fisherman	13.00
Vietnam 2)	Agriculture, forestry, and fishery	45.00
Thailand 3)	Agriculture, forestry, and fishery	35.15
Indonesia 4)	Agriculture	38.10

Source:

1) *Philippines National Statistic office 2012*

2) *General Statistics of Vietnam, Rural, Agricultural and Fishery Census 2011*

3) *Thailand National Statistic Office: Summary of the labor force survey in Thailand: March 2013*(<http://web.nso.go.th/>)

4) *Indonesia Investments*(<http://www.indonesia-investments.com/finance/macroeconomic-indicators/unemployment/item255>)

Table 5 also reveals a high proportion of small scale farmers in the region. These are the farmers with cultivated land below 2 ha per household. Attempts have been made by governments of each country to strengthen small farmers.

Realizing the significant or majority of farmers in Indonesia are small holders, government s have been trying to develop farmer groups. Nuryanti and Swastika (2011) report that in Indonesia, ‘a farmer group was defined as a group of farmers who informally consolidate themselves based on their common goals in farming activities. Initial spirit of establishing a farmers’ group is to strengthen farmers’ bargaining position, especially in terms of collective purchasing of farms inputs and selling their agricultural products efficiently. Indonesia has a long experience in formation of farmer’s groups since Mass Intensification (BIMAS) and special intensification (INSUS) were launched in the 1970s-1980s. Currently, mostfarmers’ groups in Indonesia are not formed by farmers themselves, but are mostly formed as a response to the government program that requires farmers to become members of a farmers’ group. Most of the government support for farmers, such as distribution of subsidized fertilizer, agricultural extension, subsidized farms credits and other programs are distributed to farmers group or farmers’ group federation, and the introduction and promotion of a new technology are also delivered through farmers’ groups’ (p. 115). At the beginning of 21st, number of farmer group in Indonesia reached 254,882 which is classified into 5 (five) classes, i.e.; beginner, early advanced, advanced, mature, and without class. Their compositions are; beginner 98,849 groups, early advanced 89,326 groups; advanced 46,882 groups, mature 13.421 groups, and no class 6,344 groups. However the extent to which these groups fulfill its mandate is subject to question.

The intention to scale up farmer groups facing market economy, an effort is being made to create federation of farmer group by which accessing of farm input and market for the products more feasible. However, reports show that ‘the number of farmer groups is important, there are not so

many structured organizations with active members that are functioning regularly' (Bourgeois, Jesus, Roesch, Soeprapto, Renggana & Gouyon, 2003).

An assessment was made among small scale farmers in Pasaman district. The study assessed i.e.; Local Leadership, farmer organization, the function of farmer groups, the number of group members, the year of farmer groups, patron client relationship, and service rendered by patron. Local leadership was assessed based on farmer knowledge on the existence of local leadership. The response was then categorized into three categories, i.e.; 1) respondent could not identify leadership figure, 2) respondent could identify a general leadership figure, and 3) respondent could identify leadership figure in agriculture. As shown in Table 7, farmers could identify local leadership and general leadership such as head of village, but few of them could identify leadership in agricultural activity. This showed that local leadership in agricultural was weak or absent.

With regards to farmer organization, their responses were categorized into 4 categories; 1) farmers do not know the farmer organization, 2) there is no farmer organization, 3) there is only atraditional farmer organization, 4) there is formal farmer organization. The results show that farmers in Duo Koto sub district have more knowledge about farmer groups while farmers in Tigo Nagari admit that they do not know about farmer organizations or if there are farmer groups operating in their area.

When the follow up inquiry was made about the function of farmer groups, the responses were categorized into; 1) do not know, 2) the group is inactive, 3) the group functions only when there are government subsidies, 4) the group functions well in solving farmers' problems. The results show that in villages where farmer groups exist, the existence is only felt during a distribution of government subsidies, such as rice seed, seed of perennial crops and fertilizer.

If these small farmers do not join the farmer groups the following question would be where and how they were involved in market economy, such as: purchasing farm input, obtaining farm credit, and marketing farm products. Their alternative is engaging in a patron-client relationship. Table 6 illustrates how farmers obtain farm inputs for maize, one of the market oriented crops. Farmers obtain farm input by credit from their patron. The patron is a local trader where they mostly provide services such farm input and marketing of farm products. The general definition of patron-client relationship according to Hall (1974) is 'a relationship between individual patrons and his client which bias against the later who is, by definition, economically and politically far weaker, although the patron may be dependent on the collective support of his various clients in critical situations such as in promoting electoral fraud or in disputes with neighboring land owners'. Rahman and Wahid (1992) found that the exploitative patron-client relationship can be transformed as in the case of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Given such circumstances, how would they benefit from the ASEAN Economic Community?

Table 8. Payment for Maize External Farm Inputs in Malampah Village

External inputs	Form of payment		Total
	Cash	Credit	
Seed	5	9	14
Fertilizer	5	10	15
Pesticide	4	9	13

Maize farming is a dominant crop by village in Malampah village. As shown in Table 6, most farmers obtain their external inputs by credit from local traders who also happened to be money lenders (tauke), farmers have to pay in kind during harvest.

Table 9. Sociocultural Aspect of Farmers in Duo Koto and Tigo Nagari Sub-districts, Pasaman District 2013

Sociocultural aspect	Indicator	Tonang Raya (n=31)		Cubadak (N=30)		Ladang Panjang (N=35)		Binjai (N=34)		Malampah (N=29)		Total	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Local Leadership	Respondent could not identify leadership figure	3	9.68	6	20.00	22	62.86	2	5.88	21	72.41	54	33.96
	Respondent could identify a general leadership figure	11	35.48	12	40.00	13	37.14	29	85.29	7	24.14	72	45.28
	Respondent could identify leadership figure in agriculture	17	54.84	12	40.00	0	0.00	3	8.82	1	3.45	33	20.75
Farmer organization	Do not know	1	3.23	4	13.33		0.00		0.00		0.00	5	3.14
	No FO	4	12.90	8	26.67	20	57.14	13	38.24	25	86.21	70	44.03
	Only traditional FO	0	0.00	3	10.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	3	1.89
	Formal FO	26	83.87	15	50.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	41	25.79
Function of farmer groups	Do not know	6	19.35	15	50.00	20	57.14		0.00	21	72.41	62	38.99
	The group is dysfunction	3	9.68	3	10.00	12	34.29	8	23.53	0	0.00	26	16.35
	The group function only of any government subsidy	20	64.52	10	33.33		0.00		0.00	0	0.00	30	18.87
	The farmer group well function in solving farmer problem	2	6.45	2	6.67	3	8.57	13	38.24	4	13.79	24	15.09
Number of group members	Do not know	13	41.94	20	66.67	20	57.14	16	47.06	21	72.41	90	56.60
	Few farmer become a member	3	9.68	2	6.67	12	34.29	16	47.06	6	20.69	39	24.53
	Half farmer become member	15	48.39	7	23.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	3.45	23	14.47
	Almost all farmer become member	0	0.00	1	3.33	1	2.86	2	5.88	1	3.45	5	3.14
Patron client relationship	Engage in a patron client relationship	3	9.68	6	20.00	11	31.43	20	58.82	9	31.03	49	30.82
Service rendered by patron	Farm input, marketing, and other needs	0	0.00	3	10.00	2	5.71	1	2.94	3	10.34	9	5.66
	Input and marketing	1	3.23	0	0.00	5	14.29	17	50.00	6	20.69	29	18.24
	Input only or marketing only	2	6.45	3	10.00	4	11.43	2	5.88	1	3.45	12	7.55

ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)

Since the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation among the Countries of Southeast Asia, known as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, the ASEAN has made much progress in several areas of cooperation including regional security, regional economy, and sociocultural aspect. Along with the development of a number of member countries from only 5 countries in the beginning, it doubled in 1997 and by this time the member countries are 10, i.e. Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam. Regional economic cooperation continues to grow, in 1992 ASEAN declared as a free trade area under umbrella of AFTA by freeing trade among ASEAN countries, the members countries agreed to remove trade barriers such as tariff. Removing tariff found out not automatically boost trade within ASEAN, non-tariff barrier still exist. In addition, there are many more potentials for economic cooperation among member countries.

During the 40th Anniversary of ASEAN and the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 2007, the ASEAN member states agreed on The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint. The blueprint was prepared and aimed to “achieve higher levels of economic dynamism, sustained prosperity, inclusive growth and integrated development of ASEAN.” The ASEAN Economic Community shall be implemented by 2015. It has one year to go! The AEC Blueprint will transform ASEAN into a single market and production base, a highly competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully integrated into the global economy. This is a comprehensive economic development blue print. For more information about AEC Blue print please refer to <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community>.

With regards to agriculture and farmer organization, as a single market and production base, the AEC Blue print shall be comprised of five core elements: (i) free flow of goods; (ii) free flow of services; (iii) free flow of investment; (iv) free flow of capital; and (v) free flow of skilled labor. The AEC blue print also determines Priority Integration Sectors; one of the priority sectors is agriculture. In addition, cooperation under Food, Agriculture and Forestry (FAF) aims at: 1) enhancing intra- and extra-ASEAN trade and long-term competitiveness of ASEAN’s food, agriculture and forestry products/commodities; 2) Promote cooperation, joint approaches and technology transfer among ASEAN Member Countries and international, regional organizations and private sector; 3) Promote ASEAN agricultural cooperatives as a means to empower and enhance market access of agricultural products, to build a network mechanism linking agricultural cooperatives, and to fulfil the purpose of agricultural cooperatives for the benefit of farmers in the region.

Actions to be taken to promote ASEAN agricultural cooperatives include:(i.) strengthen strategic alliance between agricultural cooperatives in ASEAN through bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation; (ii.) Establish business linkages among the potential agricultural cooperatives within ASEAN; and (iii.) Promote direct investment and strategic partnerships with ASEAN agricultural cooperatives, producers, consumers, and traders.

Agricultural cooperatives are taken into account by AEC Blue Print most probably because of the small scale nature of farm enterprises among ASEAN members. Given that small scale farm producers made it difficult to enter the global market unless they are united under farmer cooperatives or surrender to large merchants who coordinate the market. Surrendering to larger

merchants for farm input, working capital, and market created a disadvantage to small farmers as the farmers had to bear the high transaction cost. Farmer cooperatives on the other hand, require a strong farmer organization. Given the above reality of farmer organizations at the field level, it needs strong effort to strengthen farmers' organization and to link them with farmer cooperative in countries of ASEAN members.

Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Community

Asian Public Intellectuals (API) is a program developed by The Nippon Foundation to establish a pool of intellectuals. Public Intellectuals are defined as those committed to working for the betterment of society by applying their professional knowledge, wisdom, and experience¹⁴¹. The rationale of this program is to meet the challenge of the 21st century where Asia would face political, economic, and social challenges that transcend national boundaries. It was conceived that 'to meet these challenges, the region needs a new pool of intellectuals who are willing to be active in the public sphere and can articulate common concerns and propose creative solutions'¹⁴². API Fellowships Program was launched on July 8, year 2000 in Malaysia, in cooperation with major academic institutions in Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, to provide public intellectuals in the region opportunities for professional activities and exchanges toward a better future for Asia. In recent years, the API has expanded to the countries of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV). As of now, 338 fellows have finished their fellowship and join API's pool of intellectuals. From the profile of 338 API fellows, their area of geographical distribution is shown in Table 8.

Table 10. Distribution of API Fellows by Country of Residence

Country	Frequency	Percent
Cambodia	3	0.9
Indonesia	70	20.7
Japan	58	17.2
Laos	3	0.9
Malaysia	59	17.5
Myanmar	2	0.6
Philippines	65	19.2
Thailand	72	21.3
Vietnam	6	1.8
Total	338	100.0

By profession, API fellows consist of artists, journalists, academics, and NGO activists. They were selected using open recruitment in each country. The selection process quit taught, each applicant send a proposal with complete CV. They went through two stages of selection, administrative selection and interview. Administrative selection resulted in more or less 10 – 15 percent of the applicants selected. They were then interviewed by an international panel of selection committees, only half of them passed and then these fellows went through a fellowship program where each fellow could have activities in a country other than their own for the of duration 1 year with premium support from The Nippon Foundation. English language is one of main selection tools, the interviews were given in English, and all communication and reporting were made in English. Each fellow can have

activities in four other countries out of five. By having a fellowship abroad, the API experience living in other countries and be sensitive to regional issues found in other countries, and compared it to the same in own country. After finishing their fellowship, the fellows enter the pool of Asian Public Intellectuals (API) as the API community. Their main duty is to be sensitive and responsive to regional issues.

The API fellows equally reside in five countries; Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. The four late comers are Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. There is a big pool of intellectual

¹⁴¹ <http://www.api-fellowships.org/body/index.php>

¹⁴² API website

concerns about major issues affecting the region including the creation of AEC (ASEAN Economic Community). They are also supposed to be sensitive to small farmers facing regionalism. Specific to rural agriculture and farmer organization, there is enough interest from API members. Judging from their API project title, the work of API fellows is relevant to the AEC and farmer organization strengthening is presented in Table 9. These fellows also scattered in all ASEAN member states.

API fellows are interested in studying farmer rights, rural development, access to land, free trade, technological impact on farmers, agrarian livelihood, urban agriculture, women in fishery, security of people living near forests, farmer leadership, rural development and agrarian politics, de-agrarianization, women workers in plantations, contract farming, land grabbing, etc. There are many more topics of interest related to regionalism and peasantry among API fellows.

Table 11: Work of API Fellow Relevant to Peasantry and Global Economy in Southeast Asia.

YEAR	Country	API project title
2003	Malaysia	Farmers' Rights to Seeds in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand
2003	Indonesia	A Study of Rural Development in Two Asian Countries: A Benchmarking Process for Best Practices
2004	Indonesia	Towards Successful Access to Land? A Case Study of Success and Failure of Land Reform in the Philippines and Indonesia
2004	Indonesia	Free Trade in Asian Agriculture: An Economic Perspective of Thailand
2004	Thailand	Gene Revolution and its Impacts on Farmers: A Comparative Study between Indonesia and the Philippines
2006	Thailand	Transformations in Agrarian Livelihood and the Sustainable Agriculture Movement under Globalization
2008	Indonesia	Urban Agriculture in a Developing Country: The Experience of the Philippines' Urban Agriculture Programs
2008	Philippines	Women in the Fishery Sector in Asia
2009	Indonesia	Socio-economic Security for Poor People Living around the Forest Area
2009	Japan	The Role of NGOs and Farmer Leadership in Ensuring Food Security in Rural Sumatra
2010	Indonesia	Rural Development, Agrarian Politics and Rural Social Movement
2010	Japan	Development of Malay Rice Growing Villages under De-Agrarianization
2012	Malaysia	Women Plantation Workers Organizing in Southeast Asia: A Study of Women in Plantation Unions
2013	Laos	Contract Farming: What Lao PDR Could Learn from Thailand's Experiences
2012	Thailand	Investigating the Problem of Land Grabbing by Multinational Companies in Aceh: Impact on Human Rights and Local Traditions

Discussion

This is a preliminary analysis on linkages among AEC, farmer groups, and the Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Program. AEC is a new economic opportunity for small farmers in ASEAN countries by having coordinated production and marketing to boost entry to global and regional markets. Coordination means integrated management on agricultural production and agroindustry among small peasantry in the region. Farmers in the region are united into collaborative agribusiness rather than competition between ASEAN members. Coordination on agroindustry means the processing of final products is carried out in ASEAN countries rather than in foreign countries. Rubber and oil palm are two major products produced by mainly in ASEAN countries for global market. In the past, each country produced, processed, and marketed the product by themselves and they competed with each other. Under AEC, they would have been pooled as a production unit.

The problem is, in its current characteristics, it is difficult for small farmers to benefit from ASEAN economic community. AEC requires farmer cooperatives, as the case in Pasaman District, West Sumatra, Indonesia farmers are yet to be united under a strong group. Leadership is absent and farmer organization is weak. They rely on local money lenders for their farming activities in an exploitative patron-client relationship. There is need for mediation among small holders in Southeast Asia.

The API community may take the role to mediate small scale farmers in the region. API fellows reside and work in all ASEAN countries and many of them are interested in rural peasantry. If API community manages this issue, their existence would be felt stronger by the public at large.

Conclusion

Although small farmers constitute a big number of farmers, they are not yet insolid groups. This condition needs special attention especially when attempts are being made to improve their welfare. Farmers' groups are still volatile, the groups formally created by the government for the purpose of government subsidy programs. The groups are yeta unit that helps farmers help themselves.

The creation of the ASEAN economic community does consider the circumstances of the big number of small farmers in region; such as farmer cooperatives as a way of strengthening small holders' participation in regional markets. The opportunity of a regional free market may not act in favor of small farmers if their organizations are weak. Farmers have never known what their counterpart do in neighboring countries since there has been no contact between them, there is no regional farmer organization.

The process of creating the pool of Asian Public Intellectuals under the sponsorship of The Nippon Foundation opens up opportunities for farmers to be connected by the facilitation of the API community who resides in all ASEAN member countries. There is potential for this group to help strengthen small farmers' organizations and to connect farmers in different countries. There is enough interest among API fellow regarding farmers' group issues. These fellows may create a thematic group to help small farmers in the region.

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Hmong Dubbed Series: The Production and Consumption of Asian Dramas among the Hmong Community in Vientiane, Laos

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Contextual Background: Who are the Hmong?

According to Yang (2008), the Hmong are a diaspora, with their ancestral home being in central China. It is said that throughout their 5,000 year history, the Hmong have been pushed and pulled from north to south, east to west and from the lowlands to the highlands of China. In China, due to the expansions of the Han Chinese and the strictures imposed by the government, the Hmong, who were originally indigenous to China, began to migrate into Southeast Asia and in particular the countries of Vietnam, Laos, Burma and Thailand after the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

The Hmong living in Laos can be found in the northern provinces of Laos, as well as the central provinces, and in Vientiane city. Hmong people there are called “Lao Soung”¹⁴³, a term which refers to those who live in the mountainous areas of the country. Since the Lao government introduced a policy to move mountainous populations to the lowlands, so the term ‘Lao Soung’ has been replaced by the term ‘ethnic Hmong’, which is now the official reference.

The Hmong group is considered an ethnic minority in every country in which it resides. Being an ethnic minority, Hmong people have had to adapt to the cultures, languages, social and political contexts of their respective host countries. For example, Hmong women in Laos have adopted the Lao *sinh* (Lao-style long skirt) as their main item of clothing, and most speak the Lao language next to their mother tongue. Similarly, the Hmong in Thailand have learned to speak Thai, in order to fit-in there.

When one asks who the Hmong are, the answers are normally complicated; there is no single answer. However, Lee (1996) tries to explain “Hmongness” based on Hmong history, mythical origins, cultural practices and beliefs. He states that to be considered “Hmong” one must speak the Hmong language - which is distinct from all other languages. However, being members of a minority and living among many other ethnic groups, most Hmong need to learn, in addition to their mother tongue, one or more local or national foreign languages.

Lee (1996) points out other important facets to being Hmong in the post-modern era - those related to my research. He says that for the Hmong in their many different settings, new trends and ideas emerge all the time, both within their own society and from outside. Thanks to the initiatives of Xu Thao (a Hmong producer) and other enterprising Hmong people in the United States, we now have

¹⁴³ Lao Soung is an ethnic group, speaking a Hmong-Yao language - representing about 10% of the Lao Loum and Lao Theung people. Lao Loum refers to those majorities who live in the lowland. Lao Theung refers ethnic minority who live in the upland.

international movies dubbed into the Hmong language, plus Hmong videos and feature movies, documentaries, music and dance adaptations from far and wide (such as India, Japan, Laos, Thailand, the US and China). There is now even Hmong rap music. This represents real progress and shows that the Hmong culture is dynamic and not static; that it can develop and change.

Recently, people in Laos have been able to enjoy Lao television programs as well as foreign channels. Lao television channels include the Lao national channel, Channel 3 and the Lao Star channel. Importantly, a fifteen minute Hmong language program is shown on the Lao Star channel, which covers mostly government news, plus local news focused on the lives of Hmong people, and with a few minutes given-over for entertainment. However, the most popular channels for the majority of people in Laos are the Thai channels, specifically Channels 3, 5 and 7. Nevertheless, this does not mean most people understand Thai – in particular those from the ethnic minorities may not. This is why Hmong producers have started to produce their own entertainment programs - to fulfill the needs of Hmong people.

Background and Rationale

The Hmong who live in the West still consider Laos to be their “homeland.” According to Schein (2004), the Hmong diaspora started to return to visit families or relatives in Laos during the 1990s. She further states that dozens of the primarily male Hmong who travel to Laos are involved in the production of videos, those that give diverse representations of the land they call home. These tapes - shot, edited and marketed by the Hmong, form part of a huge Hmong media scene in which hundreds of newspapers, magazines, audio-cassettes, CDs, music videos and videotapes are produced and sold, all within the Hmong market. Video production first emerged from the much larger and older music scene, and features Hmong bands from around the world, as well as recordings of traditional music on cassettes and CDs – as distributed throughout Hmong diasporic communities. Videos are made by a range of amateur and semi-professional producers, many of whom have established companies, with names such as Hmong World Productions, Asia Video Productions, Vang’s International Video Productions and ST Universal Video. The tapes are dubbed into the Hmong language and are targeted exclusively at intra-ethnic consumption. The Hmong diaspora sends these products back to relatives in Laos as commercial commodities, especially the audio-visual items. Lately they have also started to dub Asian movies into the Hmong language, which are proving very popular among the Hmong audience worldwide.

Today, the viewing of TV programs from Thailand has become routine. Over the last few years, the Ministry of Information and Culture has co-operated with a Chinese cable TV company to establish cable TV in Laos, enabling Lao audiences to watch more foreign television programs. Among these, Thai programs are by far the most popular, largely due to the similarities between the Lao and Thai languages and culture. Thai soap operas are particularly popular (Schoenweger, 2006, p. 9). While Lao people watch Thai TV programs and Korean series via satellite or cable TV, Hmong people living in Laos tend to have created different ways of consuming these genres.

Being an ethnic minority group in Laos, where the official language is Lao and where television programs are broadcast in the Lao language, Hmong people wish to consume media that is broadcast in their own language. As a result, about two decades ago, Hmong media producers started to create different kinds of Hmong media products in order to fulfill these needs. According to Lee (2007), the first few Hmong movies were made in the United States in the early 1990s by Hmong amateur

production companies. Many Hmong genres were created at that time, from rock music and love songs set in the US, through to kung-fu style action and war movies, storytelling, history and documentaries about Hmong life in Thailand, Laos or China (Lee, 2007, p. 3). These products were distributed throughout the Hmong diasporic communities, and were also sent to relatives in Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Nonetheless, these products are not the main subject of my research. In order to meet a worldwide Hmong audience, Hmong producers later began to dub Asian films, including Thai, Korean, Chinese and Indian TV dramas and films into the Hmong Language. Hmong dubbed media will thus be the main focus of my research.

In recent years, there have been a number of studies carried out into the Hmong media, mainly focused on Hmong productions. Schein (2004) conducted research entitled 'Homeland Beauty: Transnational Longing and Hmong American Video'. In her study, the focus is on Hmong-American videos - videos produced by those Hmong living in the US who travel back to their homeland in Asia to become involved in the production of amateur videos about the places where they travel to and the people they meet. She found that Hmong-American videos tend to communicate the sense of loss and longing felt by Hmong people outside of Asia. She also states that during the consumption of such media products, people may develop social images and senses of community and identity that are supra-local, and that media production and circulation can itself generate certain forms of transnational mobility and new types of transnational relations. She also suggests that through the process of creating products which reflect Hmong males' yearning for women in their homeland, Hmong men might be induced to actually return to their homeland in pursuit of erotic encounters.

Similarly, Lee (2007), in his work 'Cultural Reinvention in the Hmong Diaspora' states that Hmong homeland videos are good at connecting people to each other, because they represent individuals and cultures at the local, national and transnational levels. They bring into sharper focus ideas and "symbolic systems" - to provide answers to questions of individual and collective identity, such as: Who am I? And: What could I be? More importantly, Hmong videos encourage Hmong exiles to make vicarious visits to their ethnic brethren at home, to sample cultural traditions that are missing from their lives abroad, and to recapture the past as part of a process of reconstructing a new identity, one based on the same culture, language and history.

In a similar research study about Hmong media produced by the Hmong diasporic communities in the West, Prasit (2003) argues that Hmong identity is being reproduced through different forms of audio-visual media. Stories contained in these videos and VCDs are not just based on popular Hmong folk tales, but also reflect recent events as well. He further insists that Hmong people are using relevant media technologies to unite and reproduce social memory, and recreate their identity. Although the transnational Hmong have no place or nation-state of their own, by producing and consuming these media forms, they are able to imagine a "Hmong transnational community" for themselves, in a globalized world.

However, based on my experience of being Hmong and living in Laos, I have noticed that Hmong people consume both Hmong videos produced by Hmong transnational communities, as well as foreign movies and TV dramas dubbed into the Hmong language. Among these movies, I noted that Hmong women prefer watching Thai soap operas and Korean dramas; because the images are easy to understand and are different from those portrayed in Hmong movies. Hmong men; meanwhile, prefer Thai and Chinese action movies both in Thai and Hmong, though the images portrayed in these action movies involve violence, and the actions of the characters represent things people

cannot do in their real, everyday lives.

It seems that media scholars thus far have focused their attention on Hmong media products produced by the Hmong and about Hmong culture, while ignoring Hmong dubbed audio-visual media. More importantly, they have tended to focus on Hmong diasporic viewers rather than looking at how Hmong viewers in their homeland react to such products. I therefore argue that dubbed audio-visual media can also be considered part of the Hmong media market, since the language output is Hmong, even though the content is different. The other significant issue with this dubbed media, something I have found after watching several such drama series, is that the translators tend to add new cultural elements and new vocabularies into the programs. This is perhaps because the programs come from different cultural contexts, wherein the Hmong language is sometimes unable to provide a direct translation. During the dubbing process; therefore, the producers sometimes need to create new terms, and as a result, dubbing can cause changes to the Hmong language – particularly in terms of creating new vocabulary.

Research Questions

My research study drew on media products dubbed into the Hmong language and sought to answer the following questions:

1. How and in what ways have Hmong producers, both in Laos and in the US, appropriated transnational television dramas (Thai and Korean) and localized them for consumption by a Hmong audience in Laos?
2. How do these dubbed media products help maintain and develop the Hmong language – based on the new cultural elements found in contemporary life?

Research Objectives

Within the real-life situation of the emergence of Hmong-dubbed media production houses in Vientiane, it is noticeable that the diffusion of these dubbed media products among the Hmong community has become a new form of media consumption. As a result, this research paper aims to explore three main points, as follows:

1. To understand how Hmong translators/dubbers use their role in order to indigenize transnational media at the local level and attract Hmong audiences.
2. To explore the impact Hmong-dubbed media products have had on the Hmong language in a contemporary setting.

Methods

The research methods include in-depth interviews with translators, audience members as well as participant observation both in the process of dubbing and distribution with audience members when they watch these dubbed-media. I also interviewed Hmong CD sellers at Talat Sao Mall, and I bought Thai and Korean dramas both in Thai Language and Hmong dubbed-version to analyze how language is changed in local level.

Overview of Hmong Audio-Visual Media

Here, I will not confine my discussion of Hmong audio-visual media to any specific country, because all of the media products created are related to each other. It has to be said; though, that most of Hmong music videos, movies and video documentaries produced would not have come about if not supported by the Hmong diaspora. As mentioned elsewhere in this research, the Hmong in the US started to shoot what might be called 'Hmong homeland videos', covering places in both Thailand and a few in Laos. A few of the initial videos were concerned with political issues during the war in Laos; for example, the movie *Vaj Yim Leej Sawv Rog Cob Fab*¹⁴⁴ is a movie about a Hmong leader named *Va Yi Leng*, and is set during the war in Laos, in 1975. In addition, some of the movies are about Hmong history, storytelling and legends, with the most popular Hmong storytelling movies being love stories, in particular *NujNplhaib thiab Ntxawm*¹⁴⁵ and *Nraug Ntsuag thiab Zuag Paj*¹⁴⁶. These movies are popular among, not just elderly people, but also young adults and children as well. These movies are represented as being Hmong cultural reproductions and are aimed at the younger Hmong generations, both in Laos and abroad.

Today, it is not only Hmong movies about Hmong history and storytelling that are produced, but also movies about contemporary Hmong life. Mostly, these movies are made by Hmong-American producers; however, some are not that well-made and some sometimes look down on Hmong traditional culture. For example, some movies show couples striking or beating each other, or wives riding on their husbands' shoulders which is looked down upon within Hmong traditional culture - as women are expected to obey men's decisions. In addition, in one movie a character called *Npawg Tooj* originally appeared, acting in a funny way - and was later portrayed again and again by a range of actors.



Figure 1: The Character *Npawg Tooj*

According to Lee (2007), in some movie scenes the audiences can see the camera tripods and other movie-making equipment left on the ground behind or in front of the actors, and sometimes the audiences can hear the amateur director telling the actors what to do. In addition, some of the story lines are hard to believe, with the acting either being too laid-back or over-acting (especially in the comedies), and it is difficult to sit through an entire film without getting bored or feeling

¹⁴⁴ 'Va Yi Leng (name of the actor) starts the Jao Fa War' was produced by Star Pictures Studio in 1992.

¹⁴⁵ This movie, called 'Nou Prai and Yer', is about an intelligent man and a beautiful lady, in which a tiger-man takes her away deep into the jungle in Thailand.

¹⁴⁶ This movie is a love story about an orphaned man and a lady called Youa Pa, and takes place in Thailand.

embarrassed. Lee argues that because the producers intend to make the movies funny, sometimes it appears as if Hmong culture is being looked down upon.

However, as well as Hmong videos portraying Hmong life, Hmong producers in the US have realized there is a demand among Hmong audiences for watching foreign media, but produced in the Hmong language. Around the mid-1990s, these producers started to dub foreign productions, especially Asian dramas, into the Hmong language, and I will describe this development in more detail in the following section.



Figure 2: Hmong Movies and Music Videos

The Flow of Asian Dramas into Laos

Due to the similarity between the Lao and Thai languages, Lao people receive Asian dramas (in this research I will look only at Thai Lakorn and Korean dramas) from Thailand in two ways.

Firstly, Lao people receive Thai Lakorn and Korean series directly through Thai television channels, especially the three most popular channels - Channel 3, Channel 5 and Channel 7. Lao audiences also receive dramas from other Thai channels, those that broadcast Thai soaps and Korean series. However, some of the Korean series broadcast through the Thai television channels are not shown during prime time, though Thai soaps usually air every night at around 8:30 p.m. through the above three channels. Channel 5 broadcasts an hour-long episode of a Thai soap, including commercials, every Monday to Thursday between 8:30 and 9:30 p.m., while Channels 3 and 7 run two-hour episodes from 8:30 to 10:30 p.m. These last two channels run three different Thai soaps: Monday to Tuesday, Wednesday to Thursday, and Friday to Sunday (Amporn, 2008).

Secondly, Lao audiences can buy Asian dramas (mostly Korean series and Chinese movies) that have already been translated into Thai by Thai dubbing companies, in the form of CDs or DVDs, and these are available in every CD shop in Vientiane. Interestingly, I was impressed while walking around Talad Sao Shopping Mall in Vientiane; for I saw a large range of genres, including Thai soaps just broadcast on Channels 3, 5 and 7 in the form of DVDs in every CD shop. Thai soap operas and Korean series are not only well known among Lao people, but are also very popular among the Hmong worldwide.

However, due to the language barrier, some Hmong people prefer to watch Thai soap operas and Korean series dubbed into their own language.

Due to this flow of Asian dramas into Vientiane, the city has become a center for the distribution of Asian dramas, and the new Talad Sao Shopping Mall has become a symbol for the change towards modernity in the country. In addition, the previously very small CD and DVD shops have grown in size and are full of imported movies. According to Schoenweger (2006), the spread of “easy” technology in the production, manufacture and distribution of DVDs has led to a drop in costs and a boom in sales. DVDs are now commonplace household commodities across Laos, as players and discs have become readily available and more affordable.



Figure 3: Thai Lakorn DVDs at Talad Sao Mall in Vientiane

Hmong producers/translators choose the appropriate Thai soaps and Korean dramas to dub into Hmong, in order to sustain the demand for Hmong language media. To do this, these producers/sponsors in the US, together with their relatives in Vientiane, have set up production houses, as I will describe in the following section.



Figure 4: Picture of Hmong-Dubbed Thai Lakorn DVDs



Figure 5: A Thai Lakorn Series from Channel 7 Dubbed into Hmong

Dubbing Production Houses

The term 'production house' can be used in conjunction with the Shan community in Burma, who consume Thai Lakorn programs by dubbing them into their own language (Amporn, 2008). In Amporn's research study, she describes the interesting and recent phenomena of Thai Lakorn programs being copied and dubbed by Shan producers in their houses, using members of their families as translators and distributing the products among the Shan community in Burma. In the case of Hmong-dubbed media, I borrow this term because the Hmong production houses are similar to the Shan versions, though I would say that the Hmong production houses are more complex in their set-up and more professional.

There are those dubbing production houses in Vientiane sponsored by Hmong-American investors, in which the investors first connected with their relatives in Laos, who now manage the production

process. In such cases, the Hmong-American investors and the production houses in Laos are often linked through family or close-friend relations. In the cases of the friends, the Hmong-American investors control the entire dubbing process, and the managers in Laos (friends) act as employees, whereas among relatives, the Hmong-Americans act as co-partners - identifying the dramas to be dubbed, and with the relatives in Laos providing support in terms of labor costs and other expenses. In this latter type of arrangement, the production houses belong to the Hmong in Laos - who control the dubbing process and pay for the translators themselves. However, the Hmong-American producers still play an important role – deciding what dramas should be dubbed. Importantly, the main target audience for these production houses is in the US, and they tend to focus on dubbing Asian dramas.

The second type of arrangement involves the dubbing production houses set up by Hmong families in Vientiane. These production houses are smaller than those outlined above; each has only one or two computers on which to do the dubbing, and they use family members as translators. There are now around four to five small production houses like this in Vientiane. During my data collection process, I talked with a lady called Youa Yang while she was selling the master-copy of an animal documentary to a CD shop owner in Talad Sao. When I asked her about the production process and how she sells the products, she told me that her production house had been set up by her parents, and that they now focus on dubbing animal documentaries already dubbed into Thai. She further said that selling the master copies to Hmong-American sponsors is of benefit, but that her production house is small and she does not have many relatives working there.

The other production houses in this category seemed interesting, but unfortunately I could not gain access to see them; therefore, they are not included in this research study.

Dubbing Process

Before dubbing begins, the drama is first watched by all the translators, who then discuss it as a group, to explore the main story line or characters in the drama and what title should be used, as well as the names of the characters. They will then inform their sponsor whether they plan to use the original names or Hmong names. The first decision sometimes lies with the Hmong-American producers, and sometimes depends on the translators.



Figure 6: A Translator Dubbing a Thai Lakorn Drama

The following diagram conceptualizes the dubbing process used in each of the production houses. The production supervisors play two important roles; firstly, they give advice on what dramas should be dubbed, then they check the master CDs after the dubbing process has been completed. If there are any errors, the master CDs will be sent to the production house for editing. Each production house has a controller to control the lip-sync process. After the dubbers have finished dubbing, the controller collects the dubbed drama from each of the translators/dubbers in order to create a final CD, which is then sent to his/her supervisor in the US. At the same time, the language advisors help the translators when they face any difficulties or come across any technical terms. During my observations, I noted that the language advisors are also the owners of the production houses, and that most of the translators/dubbers do the voiceover/lip-sync for each of the characters assigned by the controller. The following figure shows the process of dubbing of Hmong production houses in Vientiane.




Figure 7: The Dubbing Process

Localizing Contents

In this section I will describe how the Hmong translators/dubbers try to make the content of the Thai Lakorn or Korean series, which is considered modern, more 'Hmong' through the dubbing process. The Hmong dubbers change the Korean songs into Hmong songs, and also add sad Hmong songs to sad scenes. For example, one drama I saw a love story among three people. The woman, *Paj Zib* (a blind child) and the man, *Ntsuas Yas*, are friends, and they have loved each other since they were young. However, her aunt takes her to the US, leaving *Paj Zib* and *Ntsuas Yas* apart. The drama then continues by showing *Paj Zib's* life with another man. However, they return to Korea after *Paj Zib's* eyes are cured and she becomes a singer. While living in America, she keeps in contact with *Ntsuas Yas*; however, because her aunt wants her to marry *Ntsa Wus*, they pretend that *Ntsuas Yas* is dead. *Ntsuas Yas*, after finding out that *Paj Zib* will marry his friend, does not tell *Paj Zib* who he is, as *Paj Zib* was blind when they were together and so has never seen him before.

Actually, I saw this series in Thai, and realized that when the actress sings, she still sings in Korean; however, when I saw the Hmong version, I found it more attractive – as the Hmong song really fits the content. Therefore, I was wondering how Hmong translators translate such Korean songs into Hmong, since they do not know Korean. During my data collection exercise, I asked the staff about this issue, and one of the translators said:

"We don't know any of the Korean words; what we do is create content for the song in line with the content of the drama. For example, in this case we might assume the song says something about her and her boyfriend. This is one of the techniques we use when dubbing."

Lee Yang, 20 years-old

The way in which the translators translate the Korean songs into Hmong is that they maintain the Korean melody, and then the translator/dubber sings the song in Hmong, in line with that melody. This is why the songs being sung fit well with the content of the dramas. The following table gives an example of a Korean song translated into Hmong:

In Thai soaps and Korean dramas that already dubbed into Thai, the producers also tend to add a song; however, they add only one song. When dubbing into Hmong, the Hmong producers tend to add sad Hmong songs to the sad scenes; moreover, they also re-edit new scenes into the dubbed versions in cases where they use such songs – by incorporating flash-backs. For example, at the engagement of *Paj Zib* and *Ntsa Wus* in the Korean drama mentioned above, the producers have added a sad Hmong song and a flash-back of when the characters were young.

In addition, the dubbers not only make foreign dramas 'Hmong' by changing the songs in the original dramas into Hmong and adding Hmong songs into suitable scenes, they sometimes use accents (of the Green-Hmong dialect) in Thai and Korean dramas, those that have foreign characters. For instance, one of the dubbers told me that most foreign characters in the Thai and Korean dramas tend to speak the original language but not very clearly, using a different tone when compared to the Thai and Korean characters. Therefore, the Hmong dubbers add a Green-Hmong dialect, to differentiate between the foreign characters and those from Thailand or Korea.

Maintaining Hmong Language

Since the appearance of Hmong dubbed dramas, the Hmong people I spoke to said they have rediscovered Hmong vocabulary. In order to compare audience members with regard to maintenance of the Hmong language before and since watching Hmong dubbed dramas, I asked my respondents to state how they feel their Hmong language has improved since watching them. Among the 34 returned questionnaires¹⁴⁷ I received, 88.23% of the respondents said that before the emergence of Hmong dubbed-media, they didn't know many Hmong words, even common words. Also, 82.35% of the respondents said their Hmong speaking has improved, particularly based on the way the main characters talk to each other - in a soft and sweet voice. Similar to the questionnaire study, when I carried out an in-depth interview with Ma Yang, a Hmong University student in Vientiane, she said:

"When I was young, I did not know how to say the words keng (talent), bolisat (company), ngaan lieng (party) and many other words in the Hmong language. However, after watching Hmong-dubbed dramas, I began to learn many Hmong words that we do not use in our everyday lives. Even now, I still use many Lao words when I speak Hmong, but at least I know these words in the Hmong language".

I also interviewed Kha Thao, a controller and son of the owner of Production House B. Even though Kha Thao is Hmong, his Hmong language ability is not fluent. He told me he has learned much of his Hmong since his parents opened the production house in 2005. He said:

"I did not speak Hmong before, even though my parents used to speak Hmong with our relatives. Mostly, we used Lao in our everyday life, so I did not think I needed to use our own language. As a result, many times I could not talk with my relatives, who are from the rural areas. Furthermore, I sometimes heard them blame my parents for not speaking Hmong with me. Thanks to the dubbed-media, my Hmong speaking is much better now."

Importantly, during our discussion I learned many Hmong words which I also did not know before. For instance, he told me that a watch, called *mong* in Lao, is translated into Hmong as *lub tam pheej* (pronounced, 'lou tar pheng'). Another example is the term *kaan wee chai*, ('research'), which is translated into *kev tshawb fawb* in Hmong (pronounced 'kea cherfer'). As Lee (1996) explains, "Hmongness" is based on Hmong history, mythical origins, cultural practices and beliefs, among other things. He then points out that a Hmong is expected to be able to speak the Hmong language, which is distinct from all other languages.

In addition, when looking at Hmong language as a part of Hmong culture, Hmong translators also find ways to invent new vocabulary in order not to go against Hmong cultural traditions. Generally in Hmong culture, men are raised to be strong and should not participate in girls' activities. Elder people always say "men should not talk and act like women (*tham lus poj niam*). In Hmong society, if a man acts like a woman, people will not respect him. Thus, it was interesting to hear the translators dub a Thai Lakorn program, *Prajan See Roung*, which features a ladyboy (*kathuey* in Thai and Lao). In the series, the dubber names him 'Kalia'. This name is in fact a female name in Hmong. The translator, Ma Her, said: "If we use a male name, the name may not fit with the way a *kathuey* acts, because we don't have *kathuey* in our society. That's why we use a female name." Actually, 'Kalia' in the Hmong language is both a female name as well as a noun to describe a kind of worm (a chrysalis),

¹⁴⁷Most of the general audience members were university and high school students

implying something not grown up. The fact that the dubber used this term to symbolize a man who does not perform like a man shows his intention to preserve the Hmong traditional culture of male power. If he had used a *kathuey* style name, it might have had a negative impact for Hmong men.

Another point is that before the emergence of Hmong-dubbed media, generally Hmong parents named their children according to the materials they used in their everyday life or found in the surrounding environment, plus most of the names were simple - including cooking equipment like spoons, dishes, knives and pots, or farming tools like axes, mallets and so on (Hmong names such as *Diav, Riam, Rauj, Kaub, Vab, Choo, Yias, Zeb, Hlau and Ntaj* etc.). Interestingly, I watched a Korean series dubbed into Hmong, and the female character's name had been changed into a Hmong name *Paj Zib Thoj*, from the original Korean *Paak He In*. This change was interesting, as most Hmong names start with only one syllable. However, the translators are now creating new types of Hmong name, those that start with two syllables, look good and are more interesting, such as *Paj Zib*. Other popular Hmong female names used in Hmong-dubbed dramas include *Luag Ntxhis, Kaj Siab, Laim Txias, Paj Dawb, Nkauj Hli, Duab Ci*; while popular male names include *Koob Meej, Ywj Pheej, Hnub Qub, Tsim Nuj* and so on. One of my informants said:

"I watched a Korean drama in which the character's name was Laim Txias. She was so cute, smooth and beautiful, with her sweet voice. Actually, I know that the voice was the translator's, but I pretended it was the actress's own voice. I really like her, so after I gave birth, I gave my baby this name, even though my daughter is not as cute as the Korean actress."

Mai Lee, 19 years-old

Hence, on the issue as to whether the Hmong language is being lost among the younger generations to the Lao language, Hmong production houses or dubbers seem to have emerged as new players in relation to the survival of the language, and not only for Hmong people in Laos but also for those in other countries, particularly in the US, as the dubbed media there is considered modern and better in terms of the physical content, images and scripts used. Furthermore, the dubbed media contains, not only the Hmong language used in everyday life, but also new Hmong vocabulary elements translated from the original version - such as technical or scientific terms that previously did not exist. Therefore, in the following section I consider how the translators have been able to create new Hmong vocabulary in order to adapt the Hmong language to contemporary life.

Developing the Hmong Language

Like other development issues, language is developed as a part of people's every day practices, meaning that new terms emerge as new technology is developed. When dubbing foreign dramas into Hmong, it is necessary to use a large range of Hmong words, and I was told by a translator that there should only be one language used in a dubbed movie - as Hmong American audiences probably won't understand new Lao and Thai words. Mai Yang, the owner of a Production House in Vientiane, told me that when they dub they first try to establish the meaning of technical Thai words. She stated:

"Once we dubbed an action series in which a policeman was hunting for a thief, and suddenly the signal which told the policeman the position of the thief, disappeared. So, the policemen said 'No signal! No signal'; and we could not find the word 'signal' in the Hmong language, so we just used the word 'Saan Ynaan' - a Thai word, which is also used in Lao. When the master

CD was checked, our sponsor told us not to use any other language, so we finally used a Hmong word related to electricity ('hluav taws xob huab cua'), because we were thinking that a signal was something that cannot occur without electricity."

Interestingly, when I watched a Thai Lakorn program dubbed into Hmong and I heard the term "*kab mob aws tsiaj tuaj tis*", I did not really understand what this new Hmong term meant. However, I finally understood that this term means โรคไข้หวัดสัตรีปีก in Thai, or 'bird flu'. This term had not been translated directly from the Thai โรคไข้หวัดสัตรีปีก because in Hmong *kab mob* means disease, *aws* means a kind of disease that affects a specific area for a short period of time but the people or animals die quickly, and *tsiaj tuaj tis* means poultry. Therefore, this Hmong term "*kab mob aws tsiaj tuaj tis*" is perfectly understandable in the Hmong language, but is a new term; however, the meaning is quite different from the term in both the Thai and Lao languages. More and more new terms in Hmong are being created through the dubbing of selected dramas.

However, each of the production houses is an individual business and has its own sponsor in the US. The sponsors in the US and the owners of the production houses in Laos are normally close relatives. Some of the production houses are legally registered, but others emerge on a regular basis to compete with them. For instance, some translators, when they have enough experience, leave to set up their own production businesses or move to another production house that is paying more. As one *Youtube* viewer¹⁴⁸ stated in relation to a Thai Lakorn program:

"I wonder why they changed some of the voices; for me, I liked the guy playing the main character in the program entitled Vauv Toj Siab. I've been watching YKM entertainment (the production Yawm Sij Qhib Kev Vam Meej) lately, but I haven't heard him dubbing. Sometimes it seems like the girls change too..."

The productions sometimes overlap, dubbing the same Thai soap operas but with different titles, characters' names and using different dubbing methods. For example, I found that the Thai Lakorn program '*Prajan See Roung*' had been dubbed by two different production houses on *Youtube*. The first production house "Hmong Production" entitled this Thai Lakorn '*Muaj Niam Yug Tsis Muaj Niam Hlub*' (Born without a mother's love), and changed the characters' names into Hmong names. In contrast, the second production house "T and T Production" entitled this Lakorn into *Koj Yog Tus Kuv Hlub* (You are my love) and maintained all the character's original names as well as used the original Thai song.

In addition, the ways in which each production house translates and creates new Hmong vocabulary are different - they just translate based on they think is correct, but do not consider whether the words will be accepted by other Hmong people or not. The translators simply go with what their language advisors and sponsors suggest. I interviewed a translator at Production House A, asking how they translate Thai vocabulary that does not exist in the Hmong language - like the days of the week. He said:

"We translated the days into Hmong, as Zij Hnub, Zij Hlis, Zij Kuag for Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, but for the rest I do not remember...but I keep the calendar with those days translated into Hmong language on my desk, so that when I need to use it, I could see from the calendar."

¹⁴⁸ I found that all the comments posted about the dubbed dramas on *Youtube* were in English, so I assumed that most of them had been posted by the Hmong diaspora.

However, when I asked the same question to one of the translators at another Production House, he said “we don’t translate in that way. We just use the first day for Monday, the second day for Tuesday and so on.” The reason for this is that the Hmong do not have the days in a week like other people - Hmong people generally use first, second, third respectively both for the days and the months. In some instances, the translation of Thai words by the production houses varies a lot depending on the translator. For example, the Thai term *Kan Sadieng* was translated into *Phiaj Yeej* and *Cuav Xyw* by two different production houses. This is because Hmong-dubbed media products are driven by marketing; therefore, it seems that each production house creates its own dubbing methods in order to compete with the others, rather than finding common and more appropriate ways to use the language.

As Anderson (1991) suggests, nations are not the determinate products of given conditions, especially language; rather they have been imagined into continuation. Thus, in line with economic purpose of Hmong-American producers and due to a lack of control by the Lao government in setting up the production houses, the Hmong producers, both in the US and Laos, have set up their own supra-imagined community, using Hmong language in Hmong-dubbed media as a way for Hmong audiences all over the world to come to imagine their “community.”

Another point is that for many centuries, the Hmong language was purely an oral form of communication - there was no alphabet, no written texts and no cultural incentive to develop a writing system. As a result, cultural aspects and learning were passed on to the next generation based on memory - elders were the individuals who had the greatest levels of knowledge and broadest memories about the skills and abilities necessary for everyday life.

However, nowadays, the Hmong-Romanized writing system is used widely across all Hmong media, including audio-visual media, and in particular for sub-titling Hmong music videos as well as Hmong-dubbed media. Therefore, the dubbed media products have functioned to maintain and expand the use of the Hmong-Romanized alphabet among Hmong people worldwide. Although this writing system may not have been accepted by the majority of host countries, it is very important in terms of allowing communication among Hmong people around the world. Now, all the younger Hmong generations can read and write using this system – meaning that the Hmong-dubbed products are being loaded on to *Youtube*, allowing people to search for and find the dramas they want by typing in the title using the Hmong-Romanized writing system. However, due to the lack of internet access in Laos, the main audience for watching Hmong-dubbed media on *Youtube* remains the diasporic viewers. This use of the Hmong writing system based on new technology reveals that Hmong people are not averse to using such technology, and as a result this writing system is being used widely among the Hmong communities scattered around the world.

Modernizing the Hmong Community

As stated before, the Hmong people are an ethnic minority who live in the mountainous areas of northern Laos. In the past, Hmong people were referred to as Lao Soung and sometimes known as *Pouak Miew* (Miew people) by the majority Laotians, and this term is usually used by them in conjunction with the word *cha*, or ‘stupid’. The Hmong, in addition, are considered uneducated and backward, and involved in carrying out shifting-cultivation and raising animals. In terms of their agricultural practices, in the past Hmong products were available only at local markets.

Within their many different settings, new trends and ideas emerge all the time among the Hmong, both from within their own society and from outside. Thanks to the initiatives of Xu Thao (the name of a Hmong production house) and other enterprising Hmong in the United States, there are now Hmong videos and feature movies, documentaries, music and dance adaptations from all sources, far and wide, and in particular Hmong-dubbed international movies. There is even Hmong rap music. This represents real progress, and shows that the Hmong culture is dynamic and is not static; it has developed and changed (Lee, 1996).

Hmong production houses have also emerged in recent years and have played an important role in helping to produce dubbed media products for Hmong people. There are now many specialist Hmong audio-visual media shops - setting a clear boundary between the Hmong's and other's media products. Also, Hmong-dubbed dramas are now consumed in almost every Hmong household, revealing the different ways in which media may be consumed. As a result, the Hmong do not have to follow Lao forms of media consumption, and in particular Thai media and imported media in the Thai language. Living in Laos, where the Lao and Thai languages are similar, Lao people who can understand and speak Thai are considered educated and up-to-date. However, watching Thai Lakorn and Korean series in the Hmong language, the Hmong whom I interviewed said that seeing the beautiful images and interesting content created by the Thai and Korean superstars, but speaking in Hmong, is much better than watching them in Thai. Thanks to the work of the translators - who make use of media technology, Hmong people are able to reach out to each other without fear and without shame (Lee, 1996). Interestingly, young adults who watch such Hmong-dubbed dramas not only use CDs at home, but also watch them on *Youtube*, plus download them onto their laptops and mobile phones.

Summary

This research paper concludes that the boom in Hmong-dubbed media production houses in Vientiane highlights the way in which Hmong people have been able to empower themselves and create a space of their own in terms of imported media consumption. In addition, these production houses provide work opportunities to young Hmong people who would otherwise have little opportunity to showcase their talents, plus space to demonstrate their capabilities in the use of new technology, even though they are amateurs. Moreover, Hmong-dubbed media highlights the interdependent relationship that exists between Hmong-Americans and Hmong-Laotians, each of whom play a different role within the productions process in terms of money, ideas and the use of the Hmong language.

Given that these days most Hmong in Laos speak the majority Lao language, some Hmong vocabulary is not used, particularly among the younger generation. As a result, Hmong-dubbed media has an important role to play in helping to maintain the Hmong language within contemporary life, even if some may not speak every single Hmong word after watching the dubbed-dramas. As a result, the Hmong translators are helping to rediscover Hmong vocabulary, that which Hmong people may have forgotten, plus are helping to create new Hmong vocabulary on a regular basis. As well as consuming imported media in the Thai language, Hmong audiences are now consuming media in their own language, in which every single word spoken is Hmong. Therefore, Hmong-dubbed media is helping the Hmong community to stay up-to-date and take part in contemporary life, which is important since the ethnic Hmong language is usually labeled by the dominant Lao culture as backward and rural. Riggins (1992), claims that "ethnic minority media are making a substantial contribution to the

continued survival of minority languages. The skills of imperfect speakers are improving, languages are being modernised by the addition of new technical vocabulary related to contemporary life....“

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Maintaining Muslim Maintaining Muslim Communal Boundaries in Thailand's "Upper South": Potential Causes of Ambivalent Behaviors

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Abstract

When interacting with Muslim communities in Thailand's "Upper South", which can be roughly defined as the area south of Hua Hin and north of Pattani, the author encountered among leaders of some of these communities concerns about "boundary maintenance" that seemed to mark of "sacred space" and "sacred behaviors" more distinctively than the author had observed in his earlier encounters with Muslims in the United States and in Yemen. The author also observed that these behaviors and ambivalences were not uniformly distributed in the local communities, as some leaders seemed more openly welcoming than others. In attempting to explain these differences within Thailand's Muslim communities, and between the Thai communities and the ones encountered elsewhere, the author seeks to do so in terms of historical and contemporary issues within the local communities and in terms of the pressures encountered in their interactions with the Buddhist majority, especially around the time of the author's field studies.

The author notes that, contrary to likely local and international expectations, the more open receptions seemed to be extended by leaders who were associated with Thailand's relatively "reformist" streams of Islam, while the relatively ambivalent behaviors were associated with relatively leaders who had arisen within relatively "traditionalist" structures, though not in such a way that broad generalizations could be made. The article explores several potential reasons that may have contributed to these ambivalences, including recent changes within the Muslim communities and recent upsurge in Islamophobic rhetoric. The article concludes by highlighting a suggestion by one informant that the leaders showing the relatively open stances may be leaders who had received relatively greater instruction in secular subjects, in addition to their Islamic Studies training, and briefly suggests some reasons why reformist leaders in Thailand may have been relatively likely to have received such training.

Keywords: Thailand, Muslims, Group Boundary Maintenance

When interacting with Muslim communities in Thailand's "Upper South," the author, who had previously done fieldwork among Muslims in Yemen and the United States, was surprised to encounter some "boundary maintenance" behaviors, showing ambivalence about interactions with religious "others," that contrasted with the behaviors he was accustomed to encountering in Muslim communities outside Thailand. These ambivalences included anxiety over such things as female head coverings, non-Muslims entering Muslim mosques, whether non-Muslims' attempts to express Arabic-language greetings of peace should be answered in kind, and more. These ambivalences were not uniformly expressed, and indeed there were other Muslim leaders in Thailand who seemed to encourage these very same behaviors. Nevertheless, they were expressed frequently enough, and in

enough different social realms, and by significant enough leaders, that the author considered them to merit analysis.

The present paper explores some of the factors and considerations that may have underlain these expressions, considering both historical factors and potential contemporary concerns. The paper also explores some of diversity among Thailand's Muslims. While rejecting the conventional "Old School" ("traditionalist") vs. "New School" ("reformist" or "Salafist") dichotomy as overly neat and as not actually reflecting the mutually influential diversity of Thailand's Muslim communities, the article does accept that the division retains some heuristic value. Noting that the boundary maintenance behaviors were relatively more pronounced among leaders who had arisen through "traditionalist" institutions, while being somewhat less pronounced among "reformist" leaders, the article finishes by articulating a Muslim informant's suggestion that a greater openness to outsiders may have been more likely among Muslim leaders whose education had included extensive exposure to secular subjects in addition to strictly Islamic ones, and it offers suggestions as to why Thailand's reformist-trained leaders might be relatively likely to fall into this latter camp.

As the article unfolds, it first details some of the boundary maintenance behaviors that the author encountered in Thailand. Then it articulates the article's central thesis, after which it explores some of the factors that may have contributed to concerns about boundary maintenance. It closes by returning to the central thesis suggests some of the reasons why it may be valid, and calls for further research on the issues discussed.

Opening Vignettes

Head Coverings

In late 2013, not long after I had begun teaching at a university in Thailand's "upper south," a Thai female colleague arranged a meeting with one of the leading Muslim officials in a nearby provincial center.¹⁴⁹ Out of respect for Muslim sensitivities, the colleague decided to wear a scarf as a head covering. It was not as large nor was it worn in the style of the Muslim *hijab* head coverings common in that area, but the scarf was large enough and opaque enough that the intent of covering was clear.

Our initial reception seemed remarkably frosty, and I was not sure why. However, before many minutes had passed, the Muslim leader asked if we were both Christian. We said that I was, but that my Thai female colleague was Buddhist. Apparently that was no better, because our interlocutor quickly made it clear that his main concern was not our particular religion, but rather the idea of a non-Muslim woman wearing a head covering that looked like the Muslim *hijab*. He said that my colleague should be careful not be misunderstood as engaging in *lian baep* (imitation, or perhaps mockery) of the Muslim community. He did not say why this would be a problem.

A few months later I was listening to a Thai Buddhist graduate student delivering an interim report on fieldwork that she was conducting among Malay Muslim women in Thailand's "southern three

¹⁴⁹ The term "upper south" is often used in Thai geographical parlance, but with inconsistent definitions. For purposes of this paper, I will define the "upper south" as that portion of Thailand's southern peninsula that extends from Chumphon Province in the north to Songkla and perhaps Satun provinces in the south. In other words, it refers to all of those provinces from Chumphon southward that do not have a Malay-speaking majority population. As for the specific locations of the field sites and specific identities of interviewees mentioned in this article, I am deliberately leaving them vague in the interest of intracommunity peace and in order to protect the reputations of the people interviewed.

provinces.”¹⁵⁰ She said that she also wore a head covering when going on interviews, but she was careful not to wear an actual *hijab*, as she wanted to cover herself enough to show respect to local sensibilities, while also avoiding direct imitation (*lian baep*). This person, similarly, failed to say why *lian baep* would have been a bad thing in this instance.

Mosques as Exclusive Spaces

Several months later, my colleague took me to visit another Muslim leader located in her area. This leader, a village *to imam* (Malay: *tok imam*), or village mosque leader, was also Chair of the local Provincial council of Imams (the provincial council of mosque leaders). We therefore expected him to be relatively well informed about Islam and correct practice. I was surprised, therefore, to hear him say another things that seemed at odds with what I had been told or observed in Muslim communities elsewhere. He claimed, among other things, that women and non-Muslims were not allowed to enter mosques. He also claimed that only one mosque was allowed per village, and claimed that this was a rule that originated in Islam, not in the Thai state. I was especially surprised by the first of these claims, because I had never encountered this rule in any of the Muslim communities that I had encountered in other countries, such as Yemen or the United States. Furthermore, even in Thailand I had been to mosques where both female and male non-Muslims were invited to participate, albeit with the women participating in the separate screened-off space reserved for women.

At first, I thought that this notion of the mosque as a sacred space exclusively reserved for Muslims was unique to this individual. However, that proved not to be the case. A few months later I was visiting the leader of another local Muslim community. Consistent with my practice elsewhere, I went into the mosque while waiting for the imam. When he arrived, he informed me that I had to wait outside, because non-Muslims were not allowed inside the mosque. At still another location, I was visiting what Thai Muslims call a “private Islamic school” (those interested in learning more about this institution, which was instituted in the late twentieth century, should consult Joll, 2011, Liow, 2009, and Taweeluck, 2016). On one of my visits to the school, made during the month of Ramadan, I requested permission to observe the noon prayers being made by the students in lieu of eating lunch. I had been told that I would be allowed to do so. However, the person actually supervising the students’ gathering into the room used as a mosque seemed nervous about the idea, saying that he was not certain that all the parents would understand. For that reason I chose not to participate, nor even to be in the room while the prayers were taking place. This was the first time I remember ever having a Muslim request that I not even observe the prayers, let alone participate in them.

Greetings

Additional “boundary maintenance” behaviors surrounded the greetings that are customary between Muslims, and—quite often—between Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, even in Thailand,

¹⁵⁰ Here again I am translating Thai terminology, though this time with a clearer referent. The “southern three provinces” (*saam jangwat phak tai*), also known as forming the bulk of the “southern border” region (*chaai daen phak tai*), normally refers to the Malay-Muslim-majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, all of whose ethnic Malay residents now claim the historical heritage of the once-independent sultanate of Patani, which once encompassed the entire area. People of Malay heritage who live outside those three provinces have reportedly maintained their Muslim identity and practice, but have been less careful to preserve their traditional Malay dialects, mostly transitioning to Thai language and Thai identities. One of the most frequently mentioned examples of this is the heavily Muslim province of Satun, which was reportedly once part of the Malay kingdom of Kedah and was also primarily Malay-speaking (see Liow, 2009; Smalley 1994, pp. 155ff).

where the *wai* is the most common form of greeting among non-Muslims, when two Muslim men meet in Thailand's upper south they are likely to shake hands and then tap their respective chests. Another version of this greeting (which I first observed at a Muslim elementary school in southern Thailand and later in some villages) was to shake hands and then pass both hands lightly across the sides of the face. There seemed to be a degree of free variation between the two kinds of greetings. However, the second behavior seemed more common among the junior partners to the exchange, especially when school children greeted their teachers and other social superiors, as if taking in the scent of the blessing that had just been bestowed by the benevolent superior. In both cases, it is common to speak the Arabic phrase "Assalaamu aleikum" ("Peace be unto you") and for the response to be "Wa aleikum salaam" ("And unto you be peace").¹⁵¹

In my previous fieldwork among Muslims in the United States and Yemen, it was common for me to be included in these greeting rituals, even when the people greeting me knew I was not Muslim. In Yemen I was frequently greeted with hand-shakes in the Yemeni style, in which the two men stood at least twice as close to each other as Americans would, in which the hands were shaken in an almost horizontal style across the chest (elbows out) rather than in the more extended stance common among Americans, and in which the final motion of the handshake was emphatically upward, leading to the tapping of one's own chest.¹⁵²

However, in southern Thailand, I encountered mixed reactions. More than one locally influential *to imam* (community religious leader) told me that it was not permissible for a non-Muslim to say "*salaam aleikum*" (Peace be unto you). If I were to point out that this greeting had been welcomed by members of Muslim communities elsewhere, some of them might backtrack and say that if a non-Muslim were to utter the "Peace be with you" greeting, then it is not permissible for a Muslim to respond with "*wa aleikum salaam*" (and unto you, peace). Another variant of this objection (among several) was to suggest that even if the short greeting (*salaam aleikum*) could be said, then the longer versions (such as *salaam aleikum wa ramattullah* – Peace to you and the blessings of God) could not be said, because that fuller greeting was reserved for Muslims only. And yet, in still other cases, I met Muslims who had not trouble with the idea of greeting me with a handshake, exchanging greetings in Arabic, and tapping our chests when we were done.

Explaining the Receptions – Central Theses

In the discussions that follow, I want to speak first of the group that seemed to be exhibiting "exclusionary" or "community boundary maintenance" behavior, then of the group that seemed more open (the one exhibiting what I would call "welcoming" behavior), and then—inspired by some comments from local Muslim interlocutors—suggest some of the things that may underlie the differences between the two groups and some of the reasons for the different kinds of reactions.

¹⁵¹ Other greetings are also possible. For example, in Yemen, it was also common for the opening Arabic exchange to be "Salah al-khair" (roughly translatable as "How are you doing?"), with the expected response being an emphatic "al-hamdullillah" ("God be praised" or "Thanks be to God").

¹⁵² In North America, these handshakes among Muslim men tended to resemble the North American style, and often were not even marked as "culturally Muslim." Among strictly observant Muslims in southern Thailand, the practice seemed to be somewhere in between the American and Yemeni styles of handshakes, but with some version of a final motion toward the chest fairly common among relatively strictly observant men.

A Counter-Intuitive Thesis

One of the main theses of this paper will be that the divide between “exclusionary” and “welcoming” behaviors maps onto the local Muslim communities in ways that are counter-intuitive from the perspective of popular (and even many scholarly) interpretations of recent developments in Thailand’s Muslim communities. In the face of a series of representations of local religious developments that suggests that the increasing influence of “reformist” (often also assumed to be “militant”) elements in Thai Muslim communities has led to increasingly exclusivist behavior and increasing self-separation from non-Muslim communities, and in the face of suggestions by some that these trends are inspired by money and educational influences from foreign sources such as Saudi Arabia, this researcher seems to be finding that the “exclusivist boundary maintenance” behaviors described above were most common among those who had had *LESS* significant exposure to these influences.

Divisions among Thailand’s Muslims – Two Groups? Or Many Streams? — Why the Conventional Stereotypes Don’t Work

Yet even this proposition does not entirely accurately describe the behavioral variations encountered by this researcher. Therefore, as we unpack this central idea, we will also consider some of the stereotypes commonly voice even within Thailand’s Muslim communities, such as the assumption that there is a divide between “Old School” and “New School” Muslims, or between “Wahabis” and traditionalists, or between “reformist” Muslims and traditional or “syncretistic” Muslims. None of these binary sets of categories—which are often treated as if they were functional synonyms—is entirely accurate. For example, almost all Thai Muslims, including the self-styled “anti-Wahabis,” show influences of reformist Islam, and there is considerable mixing of influences among all Sunni Muslim communities in Thailand.

Potential Additional Factors

None of these binary sets of categories—which are often treated as if they were functional synonyms—is entirely accurate. For example, almost all Thai Muslims, including the self-styled “anti-Wahabis,” show influences of reformist Islam, and there is considerable mixing of influences among all Sunni Muslim communities in Thailand. Therefore, in understanding the behavioral boundaries between the more “welcoming” and the more “exclusionary” behaviors, we need to take a more complex approach that considers multiple factors.

Differences among Educational Systems

One such factor, suggested by one of my Muslim interlocutors, may be differences in Islamic educational systems within Thailand. A second such factor may have been local adaptations to the pressures of maintaining community distinctive in the midst of a society where Muslims have been both numerical and socio-economic minorities for decades and even centuries. A third factor may simply have arisen from that fact that until recent decades cross-regional interaction among Muslim communities, though strongly encouraged by certain elements of Islamic tradition, were practically difficult, so that even in the most observant communities, and even in those communities that nominally shared the same traditions of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), it was possible for small but important variations to develop; consequently, the practices that developed in outlying areas such as Thailand’s upper south, where Muslims were a relatively small minority, might in subtle but important ways be very different from the practices that were developing in areas, such as Yemen, where near-universal Islamic social practices were the norm.

Effects of Differences in Ethnic, Social, and Historical Positionings

All of this is further complicated analytically by a social and political history in which a culturally, religiously, ethnically, and politically distinct area (the former sultanate of Patani) has been incorporated into a modern nation-state that was busily redefining its identity, administrative practices, and discourses of rule on the model of Western European forms of mid-to-late-twentieth century nationalism that assumed one nation, one people, one citizenship, and that assumed that assimilation into that single conception of nationhood was necessary for full citizenship and the full practice of human rights, including the public practice of minority religions and the public use of minority languages. In the United States and Western Europe, as in some Asian countries such as Indonesia and perhaps India, there have been halting efforts to move toward more pluralistic versions of social nationhood. However, in Thailand, at the start of the twentieth century, there still seemed to be great reluctance on the part of the dominant social groups to recognize that Thailand was in fact a socially, linguistically, and plural society.¹⁵³

This larger context has created additional complications for members of Thailand's "upper south" Muslims. On the one hand, they consider themselves Thai and not Malay, and many of their leaders do not identify with the Sultanate of Pattani and are critical of the Patani-Malay separatist violence in Thailand's southernmost provinces. Yet some of these same leaders may have received their main Islamic studies education in southern borderland institutions where Malay was one of the primary languages of instruction.

Potential Reaction to Increasingly Strident Anti-Muslim Discourses in Thailand and Neighboring Countries

A potential additional factor is defensiveness in the wake of increasingly strident anti-Muslim discourses in Thailand and surrounding countries. I have been an observer of Southeast Asia for more than thirty-five years, and though in recent years I have been in a somewhat different setting (a university in Thailand's upper south) than I was during my earlier visits (usually located primarily in Bangkok), the anti-Muslim rhetoric among non-Muslims seems much more evident now than I have ever heard before. Today it proceeds in waves, seemingly enabled by social media such as Facebook and Line, in addition to the more traditional media of television, radio, and tape-recorded sermons.

There are at least two kinds of this anti-Muslim discourse. One of these is misinformation about the religion that casts it in a negative light. The other is a discourse suggesting that the Muslims pose a physical and social threat to the Thai Buddhist nation, partly through acts of extremist violence (if in the Far South), and partly through their spreading physical presence nation-wide.

The first of these, misinformation about the religion, comes from simple mutual ignorance, possibly compounded by the uneven distribution of Muslims in Thailand, and especially their concentration outside the areas of media concentration. This is complicated further by fear that the reformist strains of Islam that have become increasingly visible in the nation may be associated with violent extremism. Adding to this is the tendency for even some Thai Muslims to refer to their fellow Muslims as "Wahhabis" in a way that treats "Wahhabi" as a synonym for "extremist" (see treatment in Liow, 2009, for example).

¹⁵³ There has in fact been progress toward recognizing and even celebrating pluralism, but the politics promoting, or at least permitting, use of local languages and local cultures have been inconsistent and subject to frequent change.

Even among the most educated classes, formal training in comparative religion and/or Buddhists-Muslim dialogue, in the secular academic sense, is relatively rare. There exist such programs at Mahidol University in Bangkok and at Payap University in Chiangmai, and some public intellectuals have also been calling for greater understanding of each others' religions.¹⁵⁴ However, in the general public, the desire for these kinds of approaches seems fairly weak.

Again, one must be careful not to overgeneralize. For example, when in September 2016 I visited a public celebration of Eid al-Adha (the celebration of the climax of the *hajj*) that was held in the heart of Nakhon Si Thammarat town, the audience was of mixed religious backgrounds, and the people who (rather accurately) explained to me what the celebration was about appeared to be Buddhists, not Muslims.

However, I have also met a seemingly well-educated Buddhist from the same general area who claimed to have "carefully studied" Islam, and then proceeded to tell me a series of highly unlikely explanations of the "real reasons" for certain practices in Islam. In spite of this supposedly extensive self-study, my interlocutor conflated the Christian Crusades with the initial conflicts between Muslim Medina and pagan Mecca (a set of wars that happened about 500 years apart), attributed certain practices and rules to Islam that did not actually appear to be followed, and more. Some of my conversations with Buddhist graduate students and faculty have also revealed general ignorance about actual Muslim practice and teachings, although not necessarily on the same grounds.

This general ignorance about Islam opens the general public to easy acceptance of the anti-Muslim discourses that have been promoted by certain hyperconservative Buddhist groups in recent years.¹⁵⁵ One of the most frequently repeated of these was the claim that there is now a Muslim plot to take over Thailand through aggressive evangelism, through having large families at a time when Buddhists have embraced birth control, through aggressively pursuing intermarriage with Buddhists who would be required to convert to Islam as part of the marital agreement, by using foreign funds to buy up land that had not previously been owned by Muslims, by requesting use of sharia inheritance law (especially in the case of Muslim-Buddhist intermarriages) for the same purposes, by building mosques where there had not previously been robust Muslim communities, by frequenting only Muslim businesses, and more.¹⁵⁶ Some of these charges are clearly not true (evidenced, for example, by the many observantly-dressed Muslims who shop for groceries at Tesco-Lotus grocery stores and 7-11 convenience shops, the many Muslims who can be found eating at restaurants that are not exclusively halal, and more. Still others are based on misunderstandings, as when non-Muslims

¹⁵⁴ A Muslim graduate of the College of Islamic Studies at the Pattani campus of Prince of Songkla University who now teaches in a "private Islamic school" said that she had studied comparative religions at the College of Islamic Studies as well. However, she reported, when she was attending the College in the late 1990s, there was still "just one course," and though the course was well intended, she now wished she had received much broader exposure to the study of religions other than Islam.

¹⁵⁵ I have observed that some Christians have been prone to repeat some of these same discourses of fear among themselves, even though the origins were in propaganda by Buddhist conservatives, often repeating some of the same themes, and passing on the anecdotal stories among themselves without even trying to disguise their pro-Buddhist origins.

¹⁵⁶ At least in Thailand's upper south, intermarriage between Buddhists and Muslims was once very frequent, and if a spouse converted as part of the marital arrangement, up until recently the conversions could go in either direction. I have met numerous Thai Buddhists who had Muslims (including male Muslims) among their ancestors as recently as one or two generations ago. Today, there is reportedly a greater preference for marriage within Islam and for intermarriages to involve a conversion to Islam. However, field reports are mixed as to how strict the expectations are for those who convert.

object to the building of mosques in areas where in fact there already had been sizable Muslim minorities. And the fear of “exclusive” Muslim schooling misunderstands the complexities of the range of Islamic schooling that actually exists.¹⁵⁷

Potential Fear of “Losing Control” of a Boundary Marker Just as it is Becoming More Visible

Yet another possible contributing factor could be the fear of losing control of communal boundary markers just as they are becoming more visible. This issue could be of importance to both “reformist” and “traditionalist” Muslim leaders, as both groups become more visibly “reformist,” “scripturalist,” and “modernist” in their outward appearance.

For example, throughout Southeast Asia, the wearing of the *hijab* head covering has become much more common over the past forty years, including in societies where it had never been common before. As noted by Chaiwat Satha-Anand (1994) and others, it was as recently as 1986-1988 that Muslim women in Yala and Pattani protested for the right to wear distinctively Islamic dress in school and university classrooms. In early 1988, the Ministry of Education promised “to amend [school] uniform regulations to accommodate Islamic dress” (Chaiwat, 1994, pp. 288-289), and by the mid-2010s uniforms including the hijab were a standard option in many universities in southern Thailand. In addition, in the area where I work it has become increasingly common to see Muslim men and women wearing distinctively Islamic dress in such public places such as department stores and restaurants, or even just walking along the road. For men, this may include a long robe, a beard, and a skull-cap; for women, it may include long, loose dresses, hijab, and (in rare cases) a *niqab* covering all but the eyes. Not all local Muslims have taken up these practices.¹⁵⁸ But the trend toward publicly visible practice has been significant and rapid enough to draw comment from non-Muslims.

Also reportedly developing rapidly in the area where I work is increased instruction in Islam for the common people, and not just in the form of “Islamic schools” for the young. One local *imam* informed me that over the past ten years he had been developing weekly lessons for members of his community. The number of registered “private Islamic schools” and weekend informal Islamic schools also seem to have been growing. The development of Islamic media such as the “White Channel” has also provided greater opportunities to access reformist Islamic instruction, at least for those who can afford cable or satellite television, and there have been an increasing series of major public events that appear designed to bring in special speakers to give instruction to the faithful.

Fear of Misbehavior by Non-Muslims Imitating Muslims

In the midst of this increasing attention to outward behaviors and increasingly intensive Islamic instruction, some local Muslim individuals have suggested that perhaps the ambivalent attitudes I encountered among some local Muslim leaders may have been motivated by the fear that I — and other non-Muslims — might mis-use or misunderstand the practices that we might imitate. My interlocutors admitted that they were speculating, and did not necessarily agree with the leaders’

¹⁵⁷ Liow (2009) suggests, for example, that even in the three southern Malay-Muslim-majority provinces centered on Pattani, most Muslim school children attend government schools and receive their specialized Islamic instruction in private schools that hold classes on weekends and evenings. This was even more the case in the areas where I have been studying.

¹⁵⁸ For example, in one local Muslim village that I visited, almost nobody wore distinctively Muslim dress, few women were wearing the hijab, and few of the men had facial hair. When I remarked to my student guide, who had done extensive participant-observation fieldwork in the village, that the village seemed to include an interesting mix of Buddhists and Muslims living and working together, she informed me that in fact the village was one hundred percent Muslim.

objections. However, one such interlocutor suggested that leaders who said that non-Muslims were not allowed to say *salaam aleikum* may have been fearing that we might slightly mispronounce the word *salaam* in a way that would give it a significantly different meaning. As for concern about non-Muslims entering mosques, the concern might be similar to one that I had seen expressed in a guidebook written for tourists to Yemen—the book advised that local leaders were not likely to allow tourists to enter the mosques, because in previous years tourists had acted improperly.

Differential Attitudes and Differential Education?

Nevertheless, we must come back to my initial assertion that these expressions of ambivalence about communal boundary maintenance were not universally encountered. In some communities I visited, I (and other non-Muslims) were sometimes welcomed to observe and even join in the prayers, conventional Islamic greetings were offered and received, and more.

Upon reflection, it appears that I and other non-Muslims were somewhat more likely to receive these welcoming gestures from leaders who were associated with certain “reform” trends in Thailand’s Islamic streams. However, I need to clarify what “reformist Islam” means in the contemporary Thai Islamic context. As noted earlier, Muslims in Thailand (and apparently also in Malaysia) have long posited an opposition between New School (“reformist,” or perhaps even “Wahhabi”) and Old School (“traditionalist,” and perhaps even “syncretic”) Islam. However, in the course of my actual fieldwork, it appeared that the two categories overlapped so thoroughly as to function more as epithets than as actual analytical descriptions of socio-religious categories. Local leaders who were critical of so-called “Wahhabis” might actually be exhibiting “reformist” characteristics themselves, and many individuals who had a relatively Old School orientation, signaled in part by their adherence to traditional schools of Islamic law (*fiqh*), might also exhibit some characteristics of the Salafism that is supposedly associated with New School Islam.

Yet, overall, it seemed that local leaders associated with “New School” orientations, and whose claims to leadership seemed to be based on their personal study of the Quran in the modern sense, seemed somewhat more “open” than those who had developed leadership positions through more conventional hierarchical systems. This may seem counterintuitive, given the conventional stereotypes (found in both Thailand and North America) that associate reformist Islam with militant extremism. However, it may be consistent with another factor that was pointed out to me by yet another Muslim interlocutor.

As I was discussing this hypothesis with my interlocutor, she suggested that the real issue might not be “reformist” or “traditional” training, but rather the amount of instruction the leaders had received in *saai saaman* (secular) subjects offered in government schools and in “private Islamic schools.” This proposal might actually be consistent with my thesis. The widespread institution of government-recognized “private Islamic schools” that include secular education alongside Islamic studies is only some fifty years old. Thailand’s two Islamic colleges (Fatani University in Pattani, and Prince of Songkla University’s College of Islamic Studies) are both fairly young, and reportedly also offer secular subjects alongside Islamic Studies instructions (see, e.g., Liow, 2009). Thai (and Thai-Malay) Muslims studying abroad at universities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States similarly receive instruction in multiple subjects. And it has long been known that, at least outside Thailand, in the

early days of modern Islamic reformist movements in places like Egypt, they initially tended to grow most rapidly in university settings.¹⁵⁹

However, my interlocutor seemed to be making no special claims for the value of “reformist” Islam in itself. Instead, she seemed to be suggesting that it was the broader range of world views encountered in the course of the newer forms of education that made some of these individuals more open and creative in their interactions with non-Muslims. She was suggesting that traditional education in institutions that stressed only Islamic studies without also offering non-Islamic subjects might have led to relatively narrow mindsets and less of a likelihood to see some of these issues from multiple perspectives. In other words, she was suggesting, the relative openness may have come not so much from Salafist teachings or orientations but rather from the relatively broader religious and secular educations that those leaders had experienced in the course of acquiring those teachings and emphases.

Final Points

All of these explanatory proposals are admittedly speculative. I have the disadvantage of discussing these matters at a particular point in time, without the benefit of long-term study. Furthermore, much of the available literature on Muslim communities in the upper south (nor even in other parts of Thailand) appear to have highlighted the behaviors discussed in the opening vignettes, perhaps for understandable reasons. Indeed, had I not previously engaged with Muslim communities outside of Thailand, I might never have considered these behaviors to be “something to be explained” historically or sociologically. And yet I think these points, and my speculations about them, deserve further analysis. It is worth pointing out, for example, that both in Yemen and in southern Thailand the Sunni Muslims typically follow the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence (*fiqh*), yet I encountered these behaviors only in southern Thailand. Consistent with the work of some scholars on the “Geography of Religion” (e.g., Levine, 1986; Park, 2004), it might be worth considering what factors unique to southern Thailand might be most closely associated with these differences. This paper’s suggestions should be considered merely opening hypotheses meriting further analysis, testing, and reformulation, while remaining mindful that the social arrangements being observed are highly complex and rapidly changing.

¹⁵⁹ Another piece of evidence for the association of certain kinds of higher education with local reformist developments was suggested to me by another local Muslim interlocutor, himself probably of non-reformist persuasion, who suggested that when there were multiple mosques in the same village it was often because Muslims who had “received education” elsewhere came back and were able to draw people out of the local community mosques to meet separately elsewhere. Note that I am expressing this observation in my interlocutor’s “voice.”

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Characterizing One-Time Sex in Social Venues in Liuzhou, China: Implications for STI/HIV Prevention

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Background

“One-time sex” (defined as having sex only once with a partner) has increased in China according to recent national surveys; while, the risk of heterosexual transmission of STI/HIV has also rapidly increased. Given the dearth of research on non-commercial one-time-sex (OTS), we aimed to characterize the meanings and occurrences of these sexual relationships, and explore potential associations with STI/HIV risk behaviors.

Methods

As part of an ongoing study of entertainment and service venues in Liuzhou, China, we conducted in-depth interviews with 45 people who were identified as having experienced non-commercial OTS, from August to November 2011. During the interviews, we asked participants to describe how they found OTS partners based on their social network, how they formed their OTS relationships and how they understand their OTS, and how OTS influenced their sexual behavior. Transcripts were analyzed with ATLAS.ti with perspective of subjective construction.

Results

Participants who engaged in OTS reported that: 1) While forbidden during the Maoist era, sexual behaviors such as OTS have re-emerged due to rapid social development. 2) Participants use their social networks to find OTS partners. 3) Entertainment venues play an important role in facilitating people’s social networks which include OTS relationships. 4) Because of introductions through social networks, participants are likely to believe that their OTS partner is free of HIV. This may lead to a lack of understanding of the importance of condom use to decrease their vulnerability to STI/HIV

Conclusions

For future interventions in China, there is a continuing need to strengthen awareness of STI/HIV prevention methods especially in more frequently occurring OTS relationships. In addition, entertainment venues of all types – not only those devoted to commercial sex work, facilitate risky behaviors and should not be ignored by STI/HIV prevention campaigns.

Keywords: one time sex, STDs/HIV, social network, venues

1. Introduction

1.1 One Time Sex as Social Phenomenon in China Today

From 17th century until now, China has been experiencing a dramatic sexual revolution, which covers many different aspects of sexuality, such as the pattern of sexual behavior, sexual morality, sexual perception, sexual relationships, sexual health and related policy etc. (Pan Suiming, 1994). One Time Sex (OTS) as one of sexual relationships becomes a social phenomenon in Chinese society and has been increasing significantly within last decade. Huang Yingying and Pan Suiming (2012) demonstrate in their nation-wide survey that from 2000 to 2010 - OTS prevalence in Chinese people's life times increased from 1% in 2000 to 2.9% in 2006 and 8.3% in 2010. Meantime, according to an internet survey¹⁶⁰ conducted by Sohu website during Valentine's Day in 2012, 12,398 (21.43%) female chose OTS as their gifts for Valentine's Day, and 15.99% males guessed women like OTS. Although this website survey does not provide not strong academic evidence proving OTS prevalence, it is at least a folk perception that OTS is not strange for Chinese people in modern China. Therefore, it is no doubt that more and more Chinese people have been involved with OTS recent years.

1.2 OTS as One of Main Reason Leading to an Increase in HIV/STI Risk

Little research was carried on about relation between OTS and STI/HIV transmission in China. According to the latest Chinese official report, by the end of 2009, it was estimated that 740,000 (560,000-920,000) people were living with HIV/AIDS (PLHIV) in China.

44.3% of whom contracted HIV through heterosexual contact. It is assumed that if individuals have zero or only one life-time partner, they should not contract sexual transmitted infection. Many researchers hold the view that multiple sexual partnering has to play a key role for HIV/STI sexual transmission, which includes OTS (Mah & Shelton, 2011; Mah & Halperin, 2010; Kretzschmar & Morris, 1996; Halperin & Epstein, 2004; De, Singh et al., 2004; Doherty, 2011). However, few studies pays attention to reasons of HIV transmission caused by OTS.

1.3 Characters of OTS Boosting in China

OTS is growing in China with various characters. Liu Zhongyi (2011)'s research mentioned that when compared with women, men are more likely to have OTS (Bateman, 2008) - which is confirmed with Huang Yingying and Pan Suiming's (2012) quantitative data that prevalence OTS in China is higher among men (7.9%) than women (2.7%). Among men, occupation, income, drinking, smoking, and long-term sexual partnerships have a significant association with OTS; while among women, significant correlations include: marital status, sexual norms and sexual desire, long term sexual partnerships, and dancing. Liu Zhongyi (2011) also demonstrated that most of OTS men aged from 20-40 held variety of jobs. For OTS women, who were 2-3 years after marriage or 10 years after marriage, especially some women whose husbands are too busy to take care of them and they don't need spend time take care of baby. For both men and women, being good looking and being well-educated are also important characteristics for OTS. In addition, a website¹⁶¹ points out that many sexually active students in university or collegewere highly involved into OTS. Then OTS facilitated by the internet (Zheng Yi, 2005; Liu Zhongyi, 2011), the chat software-QQ and some chat rooms help people meet each other through the internet, which other research has confirmed. A Chinese magazine-"Ren Zhi Chu"¹⁶² conducted an internet survey in China 2007, and found that 79% of

¹⁶⁰<http://women.sohu.com/20120214/n334723618.shtml>2012/02/14

¹⁶¹<http://bbs.rednet.cn/thread-4912781-1-1.html>2012/01/17

¹⁶²<http://www.gdutbbs.com/thread-191284-1-1.html>2012/01/23

students never had sex before entering university, while 33% of students had one night stands during semester vacation, of which 80% of the one night stands were based on internet contact. Condom vending machines provide people an opportunity to buy condom without face to face interactions, as Chinese traditional cultures lead people to be shy to buy condom in the shops. So machines and the cheap price can help some young people to explore their curiosity on sex. It is little known how OTS is facilitated within social networks, and how people interpret their OTS and relevant sexual behavior.

1.4 Subjective Construction on OTS Study

This study tends to take the concept of subjective construction as part of social construction theory to be a perspective to explore OTS in China. Karl Marx presents one of his great insights that human nature is shaped by society and changes historically. Vance (1991) and Gagnon, Parker (1995) state social construction perspectives on sex that not only has a physiological drive, but also is constructed through specific social and historical contexts. Based on this social construction point of view, Pan Suiming and Huang Yingying (2007) summarize "subjective construction" perspectives about sex. "Subject" means people who are sexual practitioners, construct sex with their own understanding and experience under the social and historical contexts. From this perspective, OTS study's emphasis on form and development processes of OTS, which involve factors of: culture, economy, relationships in social networks etc. It is very interesting to look at what is people's subjective construction on OTS, how it is reflected in their sexual behavior, and what kind of factors were involved in OTS within its form process.

1.5 Definition of One Time Sex in China

One Time Sex (OTS) in some studies,¹⁶³ just like one night stand¹⁶⁴, is when you pick up somebody in a bar, that you do not know, take her to your place, have sex, and leave in the morning. However, OTS as a social phenomenon can be found in Tang dynasty from Chinese history, Jiang Xiaoyuan¹⁶⁵ mentioned OTS in his novel that Tang people were very open to sex, while OTS was so called "Lu Shui Fu Qi"--one night couple (Pan & Huang, 2007). Pan Suiming (2008) states that OTS in China is different from the above description, OTS are just new words in this country today and its meaning is constructed subjectively by Chinese people. Therefore, this study tries to explore how people interpret OTS with their own experience in current social context.

2. Method

We undertook this study to explore qualitatively how people in Liuzhou who have had OTS describe their experiences while studying the role of venues in forming OTS relationships. This research took place as part of a larger study conducted in Liuzhou, which is a venue-based survey called the Priorities for Local AIDS Control Efforts (PLACE) method (Sharon, 2005), it is a rapid assessment tool to monitor and improve AIDS prevention program on OTS in local city. Venues in this study are those places where people conduct socializing activities, such as KTVs, karaoke bars, pubs, discos, night clubs or parks etc.

¹⁶³ http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4dd47e5a010009jd.html2012/03/28

¹⁶⁴ <http://www.articlewebshop.com/difference-between-one-night-stands-and-long-term-relationships.html>2012/04/01

¹⁶⁵ <http://book.yzdsb.com.cn/system/2010/06/16/010544323.shtml>2012/02/07

2.1 Research Site

We selected Liuzhou, a city with a population of 3.69 million in Guangxi province, as our research site. The reports of people in Liuzhou who have engaged in OTS are very high compared to national data. According to survey data, the prevalence of OTS experiences in Liuzhou in 2008 was 9.7%, while it was 2.6% for China nationally in 2010 (Pan, 2011). This stark contrast from the national data shows the need to study OTS in Liuzhou.

2.2 Sampling and Recruitment

We approached 65 people and 45 agreed to participate in in-depth interviews from August to November 2011. We recruited participants with the following eligibility criteria: lived in Liuzhou for at least five years; self-reported non-commercial OTS; and aged 18 years and older. We identified and recruited people with OTS experiences through: 1) participants who reported non-commercial sex during an ACASI survey collected as part of the parent research study (n=11); 2) several clinical doctors in a Liuzhou hospital who engaged in HIV/STD prevention outreach activities who introduced us to people in their network who were willing to talk with us about OTS (n=27); and 3) a snowball sampling of participants who recommended those in their social networks who had experienced OTS (n=7).

2.3 Data Collection

Two trained Chinese interviewers, who are Sociology graduate students in Renmin University of Beijing, the authors of this paper (Zhang Nan and Baoyu) are trained interviewers and conducted all the in-depth interviews. Each of the 45 interviews happened one-on-one in private space to preserve participants' confidentiality. To build rapport, prior to the start of the interview, the interviewers met with participants in a coffee shop or restaurant, and from there proceeded with the one-on-one interview in a private space.

With the permission of the participants, we digitally recorded the interviews (n=38). For those who did not agree to recording (n=7), we took notes during the interview and immediately expanded them to recreate as much of the conversation as possible when the interview was finished. The interviews took between 30 minutes and 2 hours. We developed interview guides using "subjective construction" perspective to collect information about: 1) how OTS experiences are informed by people's social networks; 2) the places and activities that facilitate OTS; 3) sexual risk behaviors – like condom use – that occur during OTS; and 4) how people understand OTS.

All of interviewees' names and some details in this paper have been changed to protect people's identity and confidentiality. Verbal informed consent was collected from all participants of this study after we explained that their interview would be anonymous. Participants received 100 RMB (about \$16) after the interview. The research was approved by Renmin University of China IRB.

Table 1 Demographic Information of Participants in Liuzhou who Have Had OTS (n=45)

Demographic Characteristics	Number
Gender	
Male	23
Female	22
Marital Status	
Not married	16
Married	21
Divorced	8
Category of concurrent sexual experience	
OTS	22
OTS + other sexual relationship	23
Most of them aged from 18 to 65	

2.4 Data Processing and Analysis

All interview data were transcribed in Chinese into electronic transcripts. All transcripts were analyzed in Chinese using ATLAS.ti by the first author, who also translated quotations included in this manuscript into English. For the analysis, the first author developed a code list according to the topics covered in the interview guide. Through reading the transcripts and applying codes, the first author took the lead on identifying emergent themes, discussing findings with study team to develop interpretive codes, and applying the codes to the transcripts. As a team, the authors were involved in the process of interpreting the findings and identifying the meanings of the findings presented.

3. Results

3.1 Social Networks Facilitate the Introduction of Potential OTS Partners

Social networks in this study are networks of various social relationships for individuals and organizations, in which people interact with each other during normal social activities. OTS as one of the social activities which was based on people's social networks. Through the research, we found out no matter how people knew their OTS partners, such as through a friends' birthday party, dancing, internet, a work party etc., they were normally acquainted via a social network first, then they met their potential OTS partners through their network activities. In another words, OTS partners meet each other based on their social networks.

3.1.1 People Meet Their OTS Partners Through Activities of Social Network

Social networks, as an objective reality, provide certain chances for people, who will potentially have OTS. OTS people join different activities within different social networks that bring people to meet each other, such as a business network, a friend network or a hobby network etc. From in-depth interviews, OTS people said that they were directly or indirectly introduced to their OTS partners through different activities of social networks. Moreover, if people wanted to be members of specific social networks, they had to join certain activities, such as sharing the same interests or hobbies. For example, photography enthusiasts who may need to know how to use camera as essential skills, then they can join relevant activities within this network.

“Many of my friends are photography enthusiasts, one time we went to a sight spot to take pictures and stayed at a local guesthouse that night, the owner of that guesthouse was a nice girl.....she was my OTS partner.” (Lee, male, 31 year old, married, government officer)

The internet also can be a base for social network, people make some software to build their social relationships through a suppositional social network—chat rooms or some other sort of communication internet space. Importantly, people can move from suppositional internet based relationships to reality (face to face interaction) after internet communication, some of them could be OTS partners.

“I found my OTS partner through the internet QQ (a chat software).....it is easy to find people who want to have OTS, you can search some websites and chat rooms from internet.....or if you try to search someone who still on the QQ after duty, you just talk with them directly.....you will find that many people were lonely (to be OTS partners).”(Wang, male, 53 years old, self-employment, divorced)

The social network is dynamic, meaning it is very open to accept new members, in a period, people within certain social network can freely come and go. So people can have chance to meet new friends through this process, some of them may be potential OTS partners. For example Jianguo is a white-collar worker, and within his working social network, he always meets new and different business clients, one of clients become his OTS partner.

“My second OTS partner was my business client” (Jianguo, male, 26 year old, unmarried, white-collar)

Therefore, based on different social networks, people meet different OTS partners during different social activities. In other words, who their OTS partners will be will depend on what kind of social network they belong to, and what kind of activities they engage in. Such as drug user to drug user, internet player looking for internet friends, photographers finding hotel host from sight view place etc. This study is not aimed at finding all of types of social networks that facilitate how people know each other for OTS, mainly we are trying to find evidence to prove that OTS happens within people’s social networks and explore how it works.

3.1.2 Based on Social Network Facilitating, People’s Own Understanding about OTS Affect Sexual Behavior

This study tries to explore people’s understandings of OTS from the perspective of subjective construction, which may help to picture various own understandings of local people about OTS experiences and related sexual behaviors.

As long as OTS is mentioned, it is easy to imagine that woman and man meet each other in a bar over the weekend, they drink and dance together, then have sex, and finally go their separate ways and never meet each other; while people construct OTS subjectively with their own understandings. Because everyone has an identity in their social networks, people interpret their OTS depending on partners’ social identity with different meanings which certainly influences their sexual behavior.

3.1.2.1 Familiar OTS Partners Bring Trust on Sex

Some people don't think OTS partners have to be strangers, whoever he/she is, such as an old friend, colleague, or even a potential boyfriend/girlfriend within their social network; this means their OTS is based on relatively long-term relationships. So they tend to trust this kind of relationships. As long as they only have sex once, this is what their understanding is of OTS. By this reason, they trust their partners and relationship, many people, but not all, may not use condom with OTS partners. In addition, how much their trust OTS partner is safe from STD/HIV depends on how much they know their partners. If OTS partners are complete stranger, they may lose trust in them. Consequently, their sexual behavior, such as condom use, will be different with familiar partners. For instance, Jianguo's first OTS was his English teacher in high school, they knew each other for three years, they just sort of like each other without saying this for long time and while drinking alcohol at a goodbye graduation party their relationship ignited.

"We drank a lot at the graduation goodbye party, I became very brave to told I liked her...I didn't use a condom with her, she was a teacher of mine for three years, I didn't think she was a bad woman..."(Jianguo, male, 26 year old, unmarried, white-collar)

However, condom use in Lili's story is totally different. Lili is a beautiful girl who always hung out in various Venues of this city, in which many male patrons would like make friend with her. She said she always changed sexual partners within short periods of time which included some OTS partners. Importantly, she mentioned that she would use condom with some OTS partners with whom she was not very familiar with, even someone was introduced by her friends.

"He was my friends' friend, during that day, we had dinner, then coffee, karaoke.....he said he liked me, we finally had OTS during that night.....we used condom.....because I just met him, I had to be careful with this, I will die if he transmitted an STD or HIV to me." (Lili, female, 20 year old, unmarried, cosmetician)

Therefore, people tend use condoms with strange OTS partners rather than familiar partners.

3.1.2.2 Subjective Construction on Role of OTS Partners Cause Different Sexual Behavior

Based on Social Network Facilitating, some people gave different meanings to the role of their OTS partners which may lead to their OTS without a condom. Take Lee's story as example that he met a girl who was the owner of a guesthouse during a photography enthusiast trip, they had a very happy time together during days in that guesthouse. Then that girl came to Liuzhou met him again and had OTS. During the OTS, Lee thought girl is sort of his lover, they have sex because of love, so they did not use condom. Finally they broke up after OTS because Lee was married.

"I think she is my lover, I know she is not bad girl.....so we don't use condom." (Lee, male, 31 year old, married, government officer)

Some people didn't think they will have OTS, as they try to treat their partner as boyfriend or future husband, but after sleeping together one night, they never contact each other again, even someone still dating each other, but they never have sex again, finally they broke up. They concluded this is OTS too. Weiwei was divorced, when she was introduced to a man as potential a "boyfriend" who was actually married; her friends did not want her to be lonely. This was supposed to be a multiple sexual partner's relationship. They hung out for a while and felt good to each other. So during their first sexual encounter, they did not use a condom as the man was considered as expected boyfriend.

After that, the man never contacted her again. Weiwei thought this was her first OTS without a condom.

"We didn't use a condom, do you hear of anyone who uses condom with their boyfriend?"(Weiwei, female, around 40 year old, divorce)

On the other hand, some people don't think their OTS partners are so serious, it is nothing but sex between them and their sexual partners. By this belief, they may use a condom without trusting each other.

Da Qiang is a businessman who always goes to bar to socialize with his business friends. He met his latest OTS partner one week ago in a night club, they drank the whole night then had sex. As Da Qiang thought this girl was a strange sexual partner, they didn't trust each other, so it was easy to use a condom.

"I thought she was a stranger, we slept together only for sex...I didn't trust her (for without any STD/HIV), I thought she didn't trust me either, we were at a bar, haha!...we used a condom." (Da Qiang, male, 40 year old, married)

Consequently, the role of OTS partners by people's understanding is obviously to influence condom use among OTS. People may not use condoms with their partner, if they think the role of their partners involves love and a long-term sexual relationship etc. which means they trust each other,, though they still construct this as OTS if they only have sex once then end the relationship. In contrast, people will use condoms if they don't trust their partners.

3.1.2.3 Regular Job Proves "Clean" Social Status for OTS

Sometimes people trust their OTS partners because of their occupation and social status. As a "regular job" is considered as sort of "clean" social status, which is one of reasons for OTS partners can be trusted without a condom. A regular job was described by people to mean: a decent and legal job, such as a teacher, doctor, factory worker, businessmen etc., which is opposite to non-regular jobs, such as a gambler, sex worker and drug dealer etc. By this point of view, some people think OTS partners with regular job are safe (without STD/HIV), so they don't need use a condom to prevent diseases with these decent and legal people. From an interview, Wang (male, 53 years old, self-employed, divorced, 2nd OTS partner)'s OTS partner is a doctor, he thought the doctor was not only clean in terms of occupation, but also the doctor professionally knows how to prevent herself from STD/HIV infection. So he did not use a condom with that female doctor.

3.1.2.4 Function of Condom is Limited Only for Contraception

Because social networks facilitated OTS partners, some OTS people no longer worry about the risks of STDs/HIV from sex. So the main function of condoms becomes pregnancy prevention. From this point of view, some married women think OTS is not a big deal, as they were married and had given birth already, and virginity for them was not important either, and some women had IUD. Hence, at that moment OTS without condoms is not that hard to be accepted. One of female interviewees--Yue Jie, 35 years old, married, cleaner, though in an unhappy marriage with lots of quarreling.. She doesn't want to stay at home and will go hang out with friends in KTV bars. She said she used to have OTS with a man without a condom, and because of her marital status and not being a virgin, there was no need to worry about condoms, and she had an IUD. So she thinks a condom is not necessary

for OTS. In this story, the function of condom is only for contraception, but because trust was based on social networks facilitated by OTS, they ignored the possibility of getting an STD/HIV infection.

3.1.2.5 Meaning of Non-Commercial OTS

We find out that no payment is an unwritten rule for OTS, as many people think OTS should be pure emotion and sex without any payment involved, is the main drive for them to pursue OTS. Even when certain money or gifts were involved with their OTS, they still gave the impression there were no payments. Why do they construct their OTS as noncommercial sex? From the research we find that they think if money is not involved into their OTS, then OTS may be mostly for sex or love, and that makes OTS clean, as people believe money makes their OTS like a deal which is linked to sex workers. In the meantime, they gave two reasons for their dislike of commercial OTS: 1) they think commercial OTS will make it "dirty", which is related to sex workers and easy get STDs/HIV infection. 2) Commercial sex is business, which is not relationships involved OTS anymore for them. Furthermore, in terms of their different understandings of noncommercial and commercial OTS that will reflect on their different sexual behavior. Some people think noncommercial OTS is clean so that there is no need use condoms.

For example, Lao Xu (male, around 30 years old, unmarried, businessman) had an OTS experience, he said "I won't give money to her, if I did, then the nature/essence of this (OTS) is changed, I can spend money on dinner, travel and hotel, but I never pay her for OTS." He cannot buy OTS from girl, as he thinks that would make him feel like hung out with a sex worker, which insults him. Finally, he did not use condom during this OTS with support from his so-called no payment explanation.

All in all, from OTS people's subjective perspective, they construct OTS with different meanings which are the reasons for their sexual behavior. Local people give OTS a broad meaning. Meanwhile, social networks help people to identify who are their OTS partners which works together with other factors, such as social status, occupation, IUD use etc., to synthetically influence people's understandings on OTS and condom use.

3.2 Role of Venues to Catalyze OTS

Several quantitative studies show that venues provide the environment space for some specific activities that may help OTS to form (Huang Yingying & Pan Suiming, 2012; Sharon, 2012). People dance, sing songs, and drink alcohol -normal activities in KTV, karaoke bars etc., especially, some venues mix the Karaoke, dance and sexy/porn performance which offers the chance for potential OTS partners to flatter each other with intimate action. In addition, some drug users were found to take K Fen (Ketamine), Shen Xian Shui (Gamma-hydroxyl Ding Bing ester) etc. together in KTV rooms. These drug users are potential OTS people too.

Venues play a key role for facilitating local people's normal social activities which includes a friend's party, business socialized activities and OTS. Some OTS interviewees said that they find an OTS partner through group activities in venues rather than as a single person in venues, which means venues provide place for socializing that help OTS people to get to know each other. People usually go to venues for fun where they are directly or indirectly introduced to their OTS partners. For example, Xiao Bai (female, 25 year old, clerk) went to a night club and joined a big group, one of her OTS partners was directly introduced to her by her friend. While someone find his/her OTS partner by himself/herself, as group activities provide chance for OTS people to feel free select who is sexual partner for tonight.

3.2.1 Venues Influence People's Thinking to OTS

3.2.1.1 OTS Happens in Venues is Culturally Rooted in People's Subconscious

People who claimed some venues facilitated OTS, said that they knew people could find OTS in venues before they go there and they had realized the possibility that they may engage in an OTS relationship in these venues if they go. Therefore, when they really find OTS in venues, they don't think it is hard to accept. Juan Juan (female, 45 year old, barber) always goes to a dancing bar with her friends, she described the dancing bar as a place where the environment was conducive for easily meeting new people (potential OTS partner) with its intimate dancing, low lighting and suggestive music. She said that "many open men and women dance closely there, some men always look for sexual partners in that place.....I think everyone knew that people may find some relationships there." Especially some young people may try to find some relationship in venues.

"Did you hang out at a KTV or night club? The love song, sexy video, plus dancing closely between young boy and girl, it is not easy to control sex (laugh)..." (Xiaobai, female, 25 year old, clerk)

3.2.1.2 People Think Alcohol and Drug Catalyze Their OTS

It is not hard to imagine that some activities in an environment of venues, such as taking drugs and drinking alcohol plus suggestive songs, porn videos and intimated dancing with low light, easily influences the chance of finding potential OTS patrons. Many OTS people said that drinking alcohol in venues would improve their sexual drive to OTS. They play the game which encourages them drink more, which combined with the environment mentioned before, catalyzed the potential OTS people to have sex. In Jian Gou's story (male, 26 year old, unmarried, white-collar), he drank and danced with a girl during a friend's party in a KTV bar. Alcohol made him brave and a little bit drunk, then he touched her leg and hugged her, the girl did not refuse him. They had OTS that night.

In addition, Taking drugs could also promote the possibility for OTS. Tian Shu (male, 20 year old, unmarried, businessman) always gathered with some friends in a KTV room to take K Fen (Ketamine). He said that he used it to have OTS in the bathroom of a KTV with a girl, who was his friend's friend.

"I took too much K Fen (Ketamine) with a lot of male and female friends in a KTV room, I was too high to control myself, at that time I thought whole world was mine...I really needed sex, then I fucked a girl in the bathroom (of KTV)...condom? I couldn't find one at that moment...I thought K Fen worked on me." (Tian Shu, male, 20 year old, unmarried, businessman)

Therefore, People think drinking alcohol and taking drugs are sort of reasons for out control, losing self-control and stimulating their sex needs, then they could have inevitable OTS.

3.2.1.3 Staying at Venues "Too Late" is a Trigger for People to Have OTS

According to local people introduction that it is peak time during 11 PM to 1 AM for various venues in this city, that means many patrons do socializing activities in venues until mid-night. Some OTS people construct that "late time" reminds them to have sex or gives a chance to have OTS. In Jia Bao's story (male, 38 year old, married, factory worker), he met a beautiful girl in dancing bar, they danced whole night, but it was hard to ask that girl go to a hotel for OTS, as many their friends were around them. He had to wait until all of them went home, he got a chance and, asked her for OTS. And many female OTS people said late time is last reason for them to have OTS, such as, "It is too late, my dorm is closed, I have no place to go, so I go with him" and "It is mid-night, I was too drunk to go home, he brings me to hotel and we had OTS." "Too late" may not necessary factor to lead OTS, while it combining with other above factors in venues situation, "too late" become a trigger for people to have OTS.

4. Conclusion

This paper has argued that objective reality influences peoples' subjective construction. On the other hand, people construct/reinterpret objective reality and reflect on it through their social actions, such as sexual behavior.

Table 2

	Objective Reality on OTS	Relations in Between Objective Reality and Subjective Construction on OTS	Subjective Construction on OTS
Social Network	Social networks facilitate potential OTS partners to know each other	<p>People meet their OTS relationships which are directly or indirectly introduced by their social network</p> <p>People trust their social networks and based on this, they subjectively construct OTS with their understanding that it is reflected on sexual behavior, such as someone who doesn't use a condom during OTS</p>	<p>Based on Social Network Facilitating, People's Own Understanding about OTS Affect Sexual Behavior:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Familiar OTS partners create trust during Sex 2. Subjective Construction on Role of OTS partners Cause Different Sexual behavior 3. Regular Job Proves "Clean" Social Status for OTS 4. Function of Condom is limited Only for Contraception 5. Meaning of Non-commercial OTS
Relations in Between Social Network and Venues	Support each other. Venues provide places for socializing activities of social network. Meantime, social network activities support business of venues		Sometimes worked together on construct OTS, when people find OTS partners in Venues
Venues	Venues provide an environment space for some specific activities that may help OTS to form, such as dancing, singing, drinking alcohol and taking drugs etc., although not all of OTS happened in Venues.	<p>Certain activities in venues objectively influenced OTS people's behavior and thinking.</p> <p>On the other hand, people subjectively accept OTS catalyzed by venues.</p>	<p>Venues Influence People's Thinking to OTS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. OTS happens in Venues is culturally rooted in People's Subconscious 2. People think alcohol and drug catalyze their OTS 3. Staying at venues

			"too late" is a trigger for people to have OTS
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Venues play a very important role in catalyzing people's OTS, and venues are key places for people's socializing activities.

As a sexual revolution was developed quickly in recent years in China, many people became more open to various sexual relationships (Pan Suiming, 1994; Huang Yingying & Pan Suiming, 2012). Many directly or indirectly experienced people's perception to sex, such as mass media (TV shows, movies, newspapers etc.), friends' experiences and their own personal experiences. Extra or casual sexual experiences were embedded in some people's subconscious.

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Faith and Nation-State: the Cultural Symbolism and Benefit Transfer of Myanmar Buddhist Monks in Mangdan Temple

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Abstract

After experiencing the impacts of politics under the modern nation-state, and the effects of socio-economic transformation, it appears that there has been a sharp decrease in the number of local ethnic monks following Achang traditional religious culture. The presence of worshippers with their religious needs and their traditional network makes Myanmar Buddhist monks settled in the Achang temple. Myanmar Buddhist monks have taken the role of the traditional local ethnic monks. In the process of their continuing settlement and localization, the traditional cultural symbols of Myanmar Buddhist monks bring secular benefits to the believers and play an important role.

Keywords: faith; nation-state; symbol; transfer

It has become a common phenomenon that there are too many temples without monks of the Theravada Buddhist order in China. The flow of Myanmar monks into China became an important way to solve the situation. The monks, known as a special group, paid more attention to working on crossing the border, under the believers' request. In fact, the faith requirement is important but not the only condition for the monks to cross the border. Mangdan temple is a temple that has contained relatively more Myanmar monks and abbots for a long time, in the Husa Achang minority Theravada Buddhism temple. The interaction between believers and Myanmar monks proves that the believer's faith requirements are the main agent bringing in Myanmar monks in the preliminary stage. However, the secular interests play a more and more important role in the process of continually bringing in Myanmar monks.

1. The Flow of Myanmar Monks to the Mangdan Buddhist Temple

The group of Myanmar monks in the Mangdan Buddhist temple comes from a special social space that embeds the social space of regulation. Thus their social space becomes the vital part of the investigation. Mangdan Buddhist temple is located in Mangdan village, Mangbing Village committee, Husa Heung, Longchuan County, Dehong Prefecture. It's hard to establish the complete history of Mangdan village. The village elders recall that the indigenes migrated from "Mengsatong" in Myanmar. There are 42 families with 168 people. 161 people are Achang, 5 are Jingpo, 1 Dai, and 1 De'ang as of July 2013.

The main form of income for Mangdan villagers is crop farming and manufacturing. The Husa plain climate is cool. Most soil in the region is acidic, thus the production of rice is only around 500 kilograms a year. Comparatively speaking, the economic value of planting rice is relatively limited for the villagers. After harvesting rice, the traditional farmer will plant oilseed for one season. The last 2 to 3 years, under the support of the government, the tobacco planting area has become larger. The local villagers use dry soil to plant corn. The Tsaoko plant, which likes damp and some light is in good condition for growth in the area and becomes the main mountain plant. The main manufacturing in

the local area is creating Husa knives. Most of the knife-making families use the families manual mill production method. Normally 2 or 3 people, often fathers and sons, can complete the whole process of making a knife. The handicraft is passed on from generation to generation.

Most of the villagers believe in Duolie sect of Theravada Buddhism. Although a few of the Jingpo do not believe, most of the villagers are Buddhist. Duolie sect has the most strict commandments among the four sects of Theravada Buddhism. The monks in the Duolie sect prohibit smoking, drinking, driving motorcycle, sleeping in a luxurious bed, talking and laughing with girls, eating food after noon and so on. There are cows, cats and cocks for to wake up, for those raised in the believer's family.

The Mangdan Buddhist temple is located in the entrance of the village which is near the asphalt road outside the village. It's hard to figure out when the oldest temple was established. Village elders dictated that one summer night, the temple (built in first half of 20 century) burned into a pile of ashes. The main body of the temple was rebuilt in 1982 using funds solicited from local villagers. Subsequently, some new buildings were established. The present temple mainly includes the basilica, the commandment room, a monk dormitory, a kitchen, a gate and so on.

Daily support and maintenance of the Mangdan temple are provided by believers. Rebuilding or repairing of the temple normally tends to mobilize the force of whole village. After consultation by all the villagers, responsibility for the daily diet of monks is taken in turns by each family. There is no fixed income for the daily operation of the temple. When the time to repair or other fund charges is needed, a meeting will be held to call for funds. The funds are equal to the cost, so there aren't many surplus funds. In recent years, villagers pay the electricity charges for the temple – 10 Yuan a family. If the collection is not enough, the rest will be fetched from funds raised by believers in the merit box.

The management leader responsible for managing the temple and organizing believers to hold various activities is called "Zhuangdega". Normally the Zhuangdega is the role of prestigious people who can give sermons. There is no reward for them, the only thing can get is extra worship from villagers.

The appearance of Myanmar monks in Mangdan temple is ascribed to the sharp reduction of local Achang monks. The reduction of Achang monks was caused because the traditional culture of the Achang minority faces the impact of the modern society and adapts periodically. As no people know the characters of the Achang minority, all the history, agriculture and medical science knowledge are all recorded in a series of ancient books in Dai characters. Most of those books kept collected in the temple. Through systematic education and learning of Dai language, the ancient language can be understood. Thus, the monk masters the Dai language to act as an initiator of culture and an instructor of life in traditional Achang society. They are very much respected. Meanwhile, Achang living in Husa are surrounded by Dai. The Traditional headmen of Achang and headmen of Dai have a close relationship. Dai language and Dai characters are the main tool for them to communicate. Therefore, learning Dai language is a necessary process for achieving social status. There are more monks in the Husa Achang temple tradition due the reason above.

A series of political and social revolutions after 1949 made the political order and religious ecology change. As the government vigorously promoted Chinese education, most Achang mastered the Chinese language and Chinese characters. The history and technical expertise can be recorded in

Chinese characters. The impact of Chinese language and Chinese characters became larger and larger due to demonstrations from the government. The importance of the Dai language has weakened. Meanwhile, the leaders of the new political order are speaking Chinese. Thus, they don't create the opportunity for the local person to learn the Dai language. In the temple they can also achieve high social status. The enthusiasm of entering temple decreased sharply. In addition, due to the impact of a series of political activities from the late 1950s to 1970s, the prospects of the Achang monks in Husa district appeared bleak. What's more, one generation did not accept Monastic education. Although there is no change in belief in Buddhism and despite the rebuilding of the temple and the re-invite of the monks after the recovery of religious policies in 1980s, the break in the education of Buddhism is hard to compensate for.

The improvement of the economic standard of living of Achang in the most recent 30 years made decreased interest among the people of entering temple as a monk. In the 1980s, when the Husa district implemented production quotas, the economic standard of living of villagers improved greatly. Especially the Teng-Rui road across Husa plain is opened; cars and motorcycle are bought into every village. The opportunity of going out is more and more. The connection of cable television opened the view of village. The impact of outside culture made the traditional cultural traits disappear gradually. New working opportunities provided more possibility in life for young people. Thus the possibility and desirability of getting high society status through entering temple decreased to a fairly low level.

The situation of Monastic education, maintaining the heritage among the low interest of being monk for local people, the functioning and soothing of ethno identity of Theravada Buddhism is not being lost. The masses of believers are still hoping the monks can pray and chant Buddhist scripture to eliminate suffering and help them to float into the kingdom of heaven. The Achang need Theravada Buddhism identity to distinguish them from the Han and the Lisu in the Husa plain. As there are less young people who would like to become monks, in order to fulfill the requests of religious requirement, the local believers are inviting nearby Myanmar monks to become abbots. In addition, there are lots of Achang who migrated to Myanmar at the end of 1950s, so the connection between the two places is continuous. This created strong support in the town for inviting monks from Myanmar.

After the rebuilding of Mangdan temple in 1982, villagers continuously invited Myanmar monks to come. In 1983, the villagers invited 2 monks from the Yangren Street of Myanmar near Longchuan County. But the 2 monks who normally mastered in the Temple of Yangren Street seldom went back to Mangdan temple. Around 1992, the 2 monks resumed secular life and settled down in Mangdan village. About the same time, 2 young men in the village became monks. One of the young men resumed secular life and the other died of disease. After 1999, before closing day every year, the villagers will invite abbots to Mangdan temple from Myanmar. But normally the abbot will not stay a long time here, normally they come before closing day and leave after opening day. This situation continued till 2007. According to the introduction from a Myanmar abbot who is settled in a village near Longchuan County border, a monk named "Bingdadili" was invited from Myanmar and after a long time another monk named "Gaoyingda" was invited. They are coming from the same Benglong minority (in China they are called De'ang) village. After that, some young monks from Bingdadili's hometown temple went back to Mangdan temple before every closing day. But those young monks will not stay for a long time here. The longest time is one or two years, and the shortest time is after the opening day they will return back to Myanmar.

2.The Daily Life of Myanmar Monks in Mangdan Temple

The monks' daily life in Mangdan temple is supported by the villagers. The villagers make meals and send them to the Buddhist temple. Each family sends a meal a day. Monks purchase food boxes. The villagers who have sent today's meals send the boxes to the next village's home. The villagers naturally assume this responsibility. Mangdan temple belongs to the Theravada Buddhism Duolie sect. Monks strictly uphold the commandment of "Do not eat after noon". The villagers send the temple daily meals only twice a day.

The cassock mainly dedicates to the Buddhist temple. The monks seldom buy their own cassock. In addition to the cassock, monks occasionally wear their cassock with daily clothes - they wear a T-shirt inside the cassock, or a hat. The main reason for doing this is just to stay warm. Sometimes, young monks wear beautiful clothes. These daily clothes are usually purchased by the monks themselves, and the amount is not too much.

The Monks' daily schedule is extremely regular. Monks get up at 5 in the morning. They are led to have morning classes in the basilica. After the morning class, they return to their accommodation. Then Bingdadili turns on the stereo, and broadcasts the Scriptures to the villagers through the big horn hanging in the basilica. The villagers bring breakfast to the temple at 7:00 in the morning. About 8:00, they stop broadcasting the Scripture through the big horn. Monks begin their leisure time. The young monks clean the temple or wash their clothes. After that, they take a break or watch TV. Sometimes, Bingdadili watches TV with young monks. Sometimes, he stands by the window to see the traffic or the mountains in the distance. At 12 o'clock, the villagers deliver the lunch to the temple. After lunch, the young monks mostly have a rest. Bingdadili regularly has talks with monks from other temples. Due to the insistence on discipline of "not eat after noon", the villagers do not send meals in the evening, but instead the monks can eat fruit, pastries and other food to supplement their nutrition. Around 8 o'clock, Bingdadili leads the monks to start evening classes. The evening class will end within half an hour, and then the monks will go back to sleep.

In the daily life of the monks, one of the leading forms of entertainment is watching TV. The second year after Bingdadili came to Mangdan Temple, he, along with many villagers, bought a 21-inch color TV through with the help of the PWM Countryside Agency. In the same year, he bought a VCD player in the Yingjiang County. Subsequently, the villagers sent a satellite TV receiver to the Buddhist temple, which was subsidized by the Heung government. The television and VCD player are placed in Bingdadili 's room. Between morning classes and evening classes, young monks spend their time watching TV.

Conversation is another way to pass the time. The foundations of the temple are about 2 meters higher than the road adjacent to the temple. There are no walls; you can clearly see the paddy field, the birds, and the mist on the mountain opposite. There is a simple bench that was made by the monks. There is a very broad view facing outside. When it does not rain in the afternoon, the monks sit on the bench, and talk about things. The bench is so important to the monks, and they have repaired it many times when it was damaged. The bench is made of wood. Some bamboo was added when it was repaired. It has become a simple and strange product. Nevertheless, it is still one of the places where the monks like to stay.

Bingdadili, who is a Myanmar monk, has the same religious beliefs as the MangDan villagers. This is an important reason why he is based in the MangDan temple. Because of the different ethnic identity and cultural systems, they need to make some adjustment to the process of cultural integration. At the beginning of entering the MangDan temple, they face issues around language adaptation. They are all from the Benglong ethnic minority group. Before they came here, they use Benglong and Dai language. The villagers in MangDan mainly use Achang language. A few villagers, such as Zhuangdega, can use Dai language. When Bingdadili came here, he can only communicate with Zhuangdega through the Dai language. He needed Zhuangdega's translation. Two or three months later, Bingdadili has learned basic Achang language. After half a year, he can speak Achang language fluently. He has just a few barriers in communicating with villagers. After a few years, he knows some simple Chinese, but he still cannot communicate with villagers in Chinese.

The daily income of monks comes mainly from the villagers who worship in festivals or in Buddhist ceremonial activities. This does not change for the despite the fact they are from Myanmar. During religious festivals, villagers dedicate some money or other things to the temple. These things include rice, cakes, daily necessities, one or two Yuan, or a bouquet of flowers. After the ceremony, Zhuangdega will collect the money and give it to monks. Generally, there is about 20 kilograms of rice, forty or fifty Yuan, some cakes and daily necessities. In addition, due to the important influence of Theravada Buddhism to Achang's social life, villagers will invite the monks to celebrate marriage, funerals, in homes, during illness, and they will even sacrifice village gods. The villagers will dedicate some money to the monks for these activities. Bingdadili said that the villagers will pay 20 to 50 Yuan per Buddhist ceremonial activity. Although the payment is not much, the incomes of the monks were not low. Because there are no other monks near the village, the monks in MangDan temple are usually invited. It is estimated that the total annual income the monks obtain from a variety of activities is about 3,000 Yuan. Because the daily lives of the monks are fully supported by the villagers, this income is enough to cover the monks' spending, and there is even a slight surplus.

The monks' daily life in MangDan temple is simple and comfortable. For monks, the main event is chanting, and they have a lot of free time. But the space is very limited. Under the constraints of strict discipline, the monks seldom go outside. This is really different from the villagers who are always busy. The monks are not allowed to enter the villagers' home except when they are invited, and they seldom enter into the village. Therefore, there is an obvious tension between monks and villagers. As a result of the absence of a normal network of relationships, the construction of the monks' social network is not smooth. Bingdadili seldom has contact with others in the village except Zhuangdega, even though he has lived in village for a long time.

The difficulty caused by the reconstruction of a social network makes the Myanmar monks strengthen their internal relationships to compensate for the lack of external social network. It also brings psychological satisfaction. The people who have interactions with Bingdadili are Myanmar monks around the Husha area. Theravada Buddhism around the Husha area includes both the Duolie sect, who keeps strict commandments, and the Run sect, who have loose commandments. The Run sect does not limit the travel of monks as they can both enter their own village or other villages. Although Bingdadili rarely goes out, this does not affect the other Buddhist monks who go to MangDan temple. As long as it is not during rainy weather, other Buddhist monks often ride a motorcycle to MangDan temple and chat with him. Since 2007, he always invites some monks from his hometown. These monks can clean the temple, and they may bring news from his hometown.

The language barrier and isolation of the social environment limits the monks to receiving information from outside. They have had the television for six years. Because they know little Chinese, they seldom watch Chinese programs. The villagers placed a satellite-receiving device in the temple, which makes them receive TV from Southeast Asia and other countries. Monks mainly watch Thai language programs, and sometimes they watch Myanmar language programs. When Bingdadili came here, he bought a mobile phone to have contact with the outside world. Within these years, he has used several mobile phones. Because the mobile phone is on a Chinese operating system, and Bingdadili cannot understand it, the phone can only be used to make a call, and other basic functions are not really used. He mainly contacts other monks by calling, and he rarely calls the villagers. Except from television and phone (modern media), there are no Chinese newspapers, books, letters that have contact with the outside world. The monks receive limited information from the outside world, because monks and villagers do not have contact frequently. The relatively isolated environment in the temple social network is dominated by monks of Myanmar nationality, and maintains Bingdadili's identity to hometown. Bingdadili is very clear about the identity of the Myanmar. He has been in the MangDan temple for 7 years, and he has adapted the Achang language and life. He will stay in the MangDan temple for a long time. He has not considered taking Chinese nationality or getting married to a local. He is more concerned about his family who are hundreds of miles away. He goes back home once a year, and visits his relatives.

3.The Culture Symbol and Benefit Transfer of Myanmar Monks

A large number of Myanmar monks entered into China because of a lack of local Chinese Theravada Buddhist monks. They didn't have a unified or clear management system to control the government or citizen level yet. Different regions, according to their own choices, actually create some temporary management measures. In Mangdan temple, Longchuan County, the local government regulations state that every Myanmar monk who is settled in a Chinese temple has to report to the national administration within basic information. But on how to regulate the Myanmar monks, the local government has not clearly defined the requirements.

While maintaining a stable situation, the Myanmar monks in Mangdan temple are still deviant. The villagers are willing to bear the responsibility due to the fact that Myanmar monks represent the traditional religious culture, combined with the secular interests of the village, in addition to meeting the villager's religious demands. As the ordinary one of many villages in Husa Heung, Mangdan is neither the political centre nor the local religious cultural centre of history, and the Mangdan's economic development level is relatively backward at this stage. But according to a hand-written research obtained from an elder in the village, Mangdan is the first Achang village in Husa Heung. This statement was inscribed on steel, which was erected at the entrance of the village in 2004. According to the stele records: *"the Mangdan village was created in 932 AD. It was the first place of Husa developed. The word 'Mangdan' means 'putting tools'. Mangdan village was a wealthy and developed place in local history. In the heyday of Mangdan there were more than 360 households. In 1836 AD, A mage from Ruili came to Mangdan and declared himself as the king. The Tusi sent troops to repress the mage. All the houses in Mangdan were burnt down and most of the villagers were killed."* The villagers created series of constructions in their religious life to make Mangdan the veritable "first village" of Achang in Husa Heung. The Mangdan villagers rebuilt the "Golden Deer" tower, which is located on a hilltop beside the village. Nearby steel records indicate that the tower is nearly 1,100 years old. The Mangdan temple was constructed by villagers as the first temple of Achang in Husa Heung. They think the temple was destroyed by a mysterious fire in 1964, which is an

omen on the coming disaster facing Achang's Buddhist history. The villagers rebuilt the commandment room of Mangdan temple in 2010. Only the important Theravada Buddhist temples have commandment rooms. In order to match the important position of Mangdan temple in Achang people's religion life, the importance of monks living in the temple increased. Therefore, the local people have been inviting monks as abbots since the rebuilding of the Mangdan temple in the 1980's. Over a period of nearly 30 years, monks have consistently been invited by the villagers. The monks not only satisfy the Mangdan villagers' religious needs, but can also be invited by other villages' people to meet needs in their own religious life. This helps to strengthen the Mangdan temple to be the religious center of the area.

At some level, the Myanmar monks living in the temple can satisfy the Mangdan villagers' religious pride. Local believers are so proud that the Myanmar Duolie monks, who strictly uphold the commandments, can be invited. In their mind, the other sect's monks who are invited by other villages in Husa can't abide by these commandments. Their behaviors, including smoking, drinking, freely going in and out of the village, always going out on motor-cycles, is incompatible with their beliefs. However, Mangdan temple monks uphold the commandments very well and they rarely go outside of the temple. They are more adapted to the villagers' definition of being a "monk". The villagers often say: "We have the true monks, but other villages don't."

The presence of temple and monks, in addition to meeting the locals' imagination and religious pride as the first village and the first temple in Husa, also brings more economic interests to the locals. The locals' construction of the first village and the first temple of Achang in Husa and the local government's demands to promote the traditional culture of Achang coincide. Mangdan village was considered as the typical village of the Achang traditional culture by the Husa Heung government and other bodies. They therefore entered the view of higher level of government and the outside world. Longchuan County Comprehensive Agricultural Development Husa Heung Implemented the quality rice low-yielding farmland project in Mangdan village, and the nearby Laifu village, in 2006. The government invested 1.75 million Yuan to complete 3,600 Mu of low-yield farmland. Projects include the construction of canals, the building of a drying yard and a tractor road, among other things. Mangdan village was listed among the provinces key poverty alleviation villages in 2008. The government implemented four poverty alleviation and development projects. The village was listed as fulfilling the project of protecting and developing minorities, as a featured village in 2010. The Longchuan County government invested 100 million Yuan to expand village roads and undertook projects including residential building repairs, drinking water, villagers' rooms and construction of the village gate. In the same year, Mangdan village was listed as Achang traditional cultural tourism village by the Longchuan County. This series of government construction projects didn't change the level of economic development of Mangdan village, but largely improved the village's public facilities, and facilitated the villagers' life.

The Myanmar monks in Mangdan temple have no direct relationship to the first temple and the first villagers who constructed it, nor is this seen as the most important reason for bringing a series of construction projects to the village. The monks, however, as the symbol of traditional religious culture with the support of the villagers, restored the village's traditional culture systems and attracted the government's attention. There is a clear link between the town's symbolic historical nature and the series of investments made by the government.

In short, the collision of the traditional religious culture of Achang with the modern nation-state and globalization is seen through the presence of Myanmar monks in the Mangdan temple. With the same religious and cultural background, Myanmar monks gained steady support in the Mangdan village, despite their different ethnicity and nationality. The Myanmar monks continued to stay in the village and the cultural symbols of the monks facilitated the village receiving practical interest; this provides an important reason for the necessary presence of Myanmar monks.

Road Events and Village Process: An Anthropology Study on the Roads of Yushichang

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Abstract:

The construction and use of roads make rural areas of the minority groups get rid of the state of separation or isolation quickly and integrate in a more broad political and economic process and also make the binary relationship between locality and globalization collide directly. In the process of road construction and use in Pumi rural community, the interference of external forces and the reaction of locals becomes an important event in the development of the village. The geographical conditions and the development demand of Yushichang village settlement are the main reasons why the villagers are eager to build roads, but its' label "a village that refuses roads" is the biggest obstacle. After roads were built, the ecological environment, economy and living, society and culture of the village created a so-called "engineering resilience" phenomenon. By this process, the people of Yushichang are trying to create their own modernity.

Keywords: road, globalization, locality, engineering resilience theory, Yushichang

The relationship between regional economic development and road construction, which form a consensus in China nowadays to some extent, has been proven repeatedly. This concept is deeply rooted among people with a saying, "Building roads is the first step to becoming rich". For the development of ethnic minority countryside, the importance of roads is self-evident and its influence is also extensive. From an anthropological point of view, roads are not only a kind of infrastructure, but an important way to adjust the relationship between the village and the outside areas with their functions being to promote: goods flowing, population movement, information dissemination and so on. To a certain degree, because of the endless connectivity of roads, the connotation of so-called "outside" is likely to extend infinitely, or even to a globalized context, which make the binary opposition between globalization and locality something that is digested gradually.

In Yunnan's ethnic rural areas, building roads eliminate the state of separation or isolation and integrate a more broad political and economic process. Thereupon the ecological environment, economy and living, traditional culture, and even social structure of the village are dramatically changed. This change is inevitable to be intervened by external forces, but it does not mean that the village accepts external influence unconditionally. As Marshall Sahlins says, "What early capitalism amazes us most is that traditional culture is not always incompatible with capitalism, and it cannot be

easily modified by weakness.”¹⁶⁶ In the process of roads construction and use, we can see the most direct interaction between locality and globalization.

Yushichang Village submits to the Qinghua Committee of Hexi Village, Lanping County, Yunnan Province. It has a total population of 400, and all of them are Pumi ethnic group. The villagers plant grain crops such as maize, wheat, potatoes etc. with animal husbandry being the main source of income. In recent years, they also plant some cash crops like walnuts and crude medicines to improve the villagers' income level in a way. Yushichang Village preserves a relatively intact traditional culture and a good ecological environment of Pumi ethnic group; and such commendable status is owed to road obstruction by the outside and hence they strongly insist that roads should not be built.¹⁶⁷ Before 2009, there was no vehicular access to Yushichang, and villagers came in and went out over rugged and steep mountain roads; goods transportation relies on backing by man or horse. After experiencing difficulties, a passable road was finally built at the end of 2009 in Yushichang.

If the road construction of Yushichang is regarded as an event, and a series of changes caused by building road as the process, then the event-process analysis method could be employed to explain it. By this method the nature of the social action-building roads can be revealed, and the metaphor of road globalization and the locality adaptive strategy of ethnic villages' locality are interpreted from another side.

I. Why Build Roads? Mountain Village Settlement and Roads

Settlements and roads are two direct products of interaction between people and their surrounding environment. Settlement Geography “studies how human beings gather on the surface of earth and how settlements and natural environment are interdependent”, and consider that settlements and roads are an important trace left by human being's activities; roads link closely with settlements, because settlements create roads, and roads create settlements too.¹⁶⁸ The northwest of Yunnan is mountainous area with many rivers, rugged roads, and inconvenient transportation. Natural separation of Yunnan geographical environment, which make numerous ethnic groups be in an isolated state, preserves its traditional culture. As for the Pumi ethnic group settled on this area, their village is closely tied to roads, and the relationship between the two is important.

The form and development of different human population's settlements have a close relationship with terrain, climate and resources. As most Pumi villages in northwest Yunnan, Yushichang is located in a ramp zone in semi-mountain. This kind of village settlement is different from the one described by Zhou Xing and other persons- Yuanjiang ethnic groups choose to live in the mountainous area on their own initiative because the town area is too hot.¹⁶⁹ Why the Pumi ethnic group choose to live in a ramp zone in semi-mountain is closely related to its history and culture. One the one hand, this condition is determined by a historical move of Pumi ethnic group. It experienced

¹⁶⁶[美]萨林斯著，王铭铭、胡宗泽译：《甜蜜的悲哀：西方宇宙观的本土人类学探讨》，北京：生活·读书·新知三联书店，2000年版，第134页。

¹⁶⁷朱凌飞：《玉狮场：一个被误解的普米族村庄——关于利益主题话语权的人类学研究》，《民族研究》，2009年第3期。

¹⁶⁸胡振洲著：《聚落地理学》，台北：三民书局，1977年12月版，第3页、171~177页。

¹⁶⁹周星著：《元江发展模式与地方族际社会》，载于马戎、潘乃谷、周星编：《中国民族社区发展研究》，北京大学出版社2001年版，第293页。

a long period of migration in the process of its development. In the mid-13th century, when the Pumi ethnic group moved from the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to the northwest of Yunnan Province gradually, other ethnic groups had occupied most town areas and valley zones with good living conditions. In order to avoid conflict with them, the Pumi ethnic group chose to live in an area with higher altitude. On the other hand, this condition is affected by production and living customs of Pumi ethnic group. Its traditional means of livelihood depends on animal husbandry, along with farming. The semi-mountainous ramp zone of northwest Yunnan is feasible for both farming and animal husbandry-livestock can go downhill in winter to ward off the cold, and go uphill in summer to escape the heat, and villagers can plant wheat, maize, rice or potatoes, oat, buckwheat according to different altitudes and climates. Therefore, it's suitable for the Pumi ethnic group to live in semi-mountainous ramp zone. In addition, the vertical geographical distribution of different ethnic groups allow for extensive and deep communication with other nationalities, not only in exchanging goods, but learning from each other in culture. There exists the phenomenon of mixed culture in some Pumi villages, for example, some Pumi can speak the languages of Bai, Lisu, and Yi. This plays an important role in communicating with other ethnic groups and promoting national unity of this region. Pumi ethnic group's village settlements, which are in a semi-mountainous area, make road construction play a crucial role in the process of economic, social and cultural development.

Mountains and rivers cut off the northwest of Yunnan Province, making the transportation is inconvenient and it keeps the Pumi isolated from the outside. Before the 1950s, the isolated state of Yushichang village functioned in preventing bandits¹⁷⁰ and avoiding ethnical conflicts. At the same time, under natural economy, villagers are self-sufficient in clothing, food, and living. And other production and living goods and materials were obtained by exchanging with Bai, Lisu and Yi ethnic groups on horseback, so the function of roads is not obvious. At the beginning of 1950s-1980s' collectivization period, China depended on its powerful administrative system to break traditional the village boundaries and social structures by using political, economic, or educational approaches. Thus people were reorganized and Yushichang had a multifaceted connection with the external society. At this period, the importance of roads began to appear. However, limited by economic level and technical conditions, the building of village roads could not be carried out. Until the beginning of 1980s, the reform and opening-up made Yushichang village involved in a more broad and deep political and economic process, and roads hindered the economic and social development of the village is obviously manifested. Economically, the self-sufficient way was passed, instead, a commodity economy emerged in the villagers' production and life gradually. But road problems became the weakness of commodity circulation. The outward transport of agricultural and forest products such as walnuts, apples, crude medicines and wild mushrooms relied on horseback, and it's more difficult to transport manufacturing goods and instruments into the village, thus the development of production is delayed. Regarding education, Yushichang Village built the best primary school among local Pumi communities with the help of Lanping Jinding Zinc Company, but building materials were transported into the village by horseback, resulting in transport cost adding up to 0.2 million. In recent years, the policy of centralized school sponsoring requires that children who are upon grade three must go to village committee or where township government located for education, but going out is inconvenient. Some children drop out of school for this reason. In environmental protection, the wooden houses that Pumi ethnic group lived in need a lot of wood, and the wood needs to be changed every few years. The wood is from cutting thick and straight

¹⁷⁰The local people called the Tibetan bandits who are come from neighboring counties and often harass them.

trees, which causes a great damage to forest resources. From the perspective of improving living conditions, related departments offer “poverty tile” freely, but it needs to be transported by villagers themselves, and the transport of other building materials are also expensive, so villagers rely on the forest to find building or repairing houses. At the same time, the fire pit of Pumi ethnic group should keep burning all year round to cook or for warmth, and this wastes a lot of wood. If their economic level can satisfy the villagers’ use of clean and effective energy, for example, electricity, solar energy, wind energy, or methane, the threat to forest is to decrease naturally. In addition, the villagers have the habit of drinking beer, but there is no one to purchase empty bottles door to door. So, the villagers usually pile the empty beer bottles around houses, or at farm fields because carrying goods by horseback will cost too much, which leaves a huge hidden trouble to environment. Regarding social problems, because of poverty and obvious roads obstruction, the marriage matches of young generations in Yushichang has become a social problem that cannot be ignored. The singleness problem is increasingly prominent because most females in the village are out-married and females from other villagers are not willing to marry in, thus bringing a huge problem for the harmony and stability of the society. Hence road construction of Yushichang Village has grown more urgent.

Outside Yushichang Village, road construction and the use of Lanping County, Hexi Village or Qinghua Village Committee have been in continuous development. In 1963 the Jianlan Highway was built, and in 2011 it was extended as the secondary one; the transportation from Kunming to Lanping, going through Dali and Jianlan, has been improved. In 1992 the Weilan Highway, which is from Lanping to Hexi Village, then to Weixi County of Diqing State, has been built, and reconstruction and expansion project of the secondary roads have been involved in the national highway construction of the 12th five-year plan. In 2005, the Weilan highway that forks to Qinghua village committee is a 5 kilometer stone road that cars can directly get to Qingkou Village. The transportation condition have improved largely. When the outside world hindered by mountains became extensive, the road from Qingkou Village to Yushichang has preliminarily been built at the end of 2009, until then Yushichang was brought into the economic and social network made up by roads.

II. The Obstruction of Building Roads -a So-Called Village That Refuses Roads

The construction of a village road is not only a matter of economic ability or technical level, because land occupying, wood cutting and transportation safety are concerned, and approval and permission from land, forestry, environmental protection and transportation departments are necessary. For Yushichang, apart from dealing with all kinds of approval processes, the biggest problem during building roads is the pressure from public opinions. The villagers say: “The road of Yushichang is the only village road that must be approved by Yunnan Transportation Ministry.” Why Yushichang is called “a village that refuses roads” is directly related to this.

In the mid-1980s, the people of Yushichang refused roads. In February, 1980, the affiliated department of Lanping Forestry Bureau founded a timber company, and established a cutting field by Desheng River in 1983 to cut national wood of Qinghua, Hexi Village. At the end of 1990, the cutting area reaches to 21510 mu (3543acre). In 1984, the Forestry Bureau of Nujiang State invested in Hexi Village to establish the State Forestry Bureau—Qingshuijiang Forestry Centre and to cut the national forest of Qingshuijiang. The cutting area is up to 10229 mu (1697acre). In order to make wood cutting and transportation convenient, the cutting field of Lanping County dug 38.9-kilometer arterial

road from 1972 to 1990 (width: 7 meters)¹⁷¹ and 55.9-kilometer convenient road (effective road width is about 4 to 5 meters). The 12-kilometer highway from Weilan highway to Qinghua Village is the product of this period. In 1986, the forest road of Qingshuijiang Forest Field, Nujiang State, built to the collective forest of Yushichang's back hills and the people began to cut trees, which was prohibited by the people of Yushichang. The villager Yang Jinhui recorded this process: "The lumbermen from Nujiang State intend to cut trees, so we will litigate with the village government. After it turns out to be useless, we organize about 50 to 60 villagers to damage wood that the lumbermen have carved up. This event is called a peasant uprising of small size by the governor later." Because of this event, the process of the road building was stopped.

Around 2005, a musician named Chen Zhe came to Yushichang to carry out its "Tufeng Plan" project, trying to have a "Yive transmission" of folk art in a native place. The project is why Yushichang can preserve its ethnical culture and a good ecological environment is the obstruction of roads, so the opinion that Yushichang should reject roads is favored. The conflict between the former villager and the timber company is dug out and put it under a discourse frame of "protection and development". Yushichang is labeled "a village that refuses roads", and this attracts much attention from the outside, for famous television program, newspapers and magazines report Yushichang. It is regarded as a typical example to refuse roads in order to protect forest and protect its traditional ethnic culture.

The famousness of Yushichang dates back to an "ice point" on *China Youth News: A village that refuses roads*. The author Zhou Xinyu records the difficult trip coming into the village, and describes the ecological environment of Yushichang and the traditional culture of Pumi ethnic group, presenting opinions of Yushichang people to road construction. Zhou Xinyu put forward such problems to the village officer: "Aren't you worried about building roads leads to cutting trees and bad habits of the outside world make the village not so rustic?" She expresses her concern frankly in the essay: "Will the primeval forest become history and the final spiritual homeland that never occur again?" Reading between the lines, we can see that as a reporter who cares about ecology, she hopes "the pure land" of Yushichang can last, and the best way is the refusal of roads.¹⁷² Feng Yongfeng, the author of *Guangming Daily*, sets on this island too, and he published an essay named "A Pumi Village that is Confused by Roads" in *China Economic Times*. In the essay, he writes: "Natural forest and traditional culture is related to each other. However, both natural forest and culture are facing threats of building roads." If not building roads, how villagers get rid of poverty and how local herbal medicines and animals be transported outside to create economic values? It is still "a village that confused by building roads."¹⁷³ In another ecologic work *A Country that Have no Trees* written by Feng Yongfeng, the author takes Yushichang as an example to investigate the reasons why Chinese forest is decreasing and expresses his concern;¹⁷⁴ Yuan Yue, the author of *Sanlian Lifeweek*, sets foot on Yushichang because gathering materials about forest system reform, he found that the forest reform, which was proceeded hotly everywhere, was not carried out. The reason is there is some controversy on the division of national forest and collective forest. The author describes the means of livelihood and poverty state of the villagers vividly, but they are at the end of their wits. On

¹⁷¹所引用数据参见兰坪白族普米族自治县林业局、林业公司编：《兰坪白族普米族自治县林业志》，云南民族出版社1997年版，第329、331页。

¹⁷²周欣宇：《一个拒绝道路的村庄》，《中国青年报》，2006年9月20日“冰点特稿”。

¹⁷³冯永锋：《一个被修路所惑的村庄》，《中国经济时报》，2006年10月11日。

¹⁷⁴冯永锋：《没有大树的国家》，法律出版社2008年版。

account of strict forest policy and ecological regulations, the people of Yushichang have a huge forest treasure but live a poor life and therefore become “a policy-poor village.”¹⁷⁵ The investigation of Yuan Yue cannot avoid the problem of building roads, but he doesn't make a judgment on its values, instead he centers on policy adjustment and system innovation, which is more valuable to Yushichang. One of the most influential reports owes itself to a program called *Green Space* in CCTV10-a *village that refuses roads*. The program explodes: “The forest is the guide of roads, but professional team cuts trees all the way. Roads approaches to Yushichang day by day, which is initially hid in a mount of forests.” The program acted a dramatized scene in the 1980s of villagers finally saved primeval forests by struggling fiercely with cutting team. Those men claimed “preserving trees than die”, and they destroyed wood that has been cut with hoes and axes to force cutting company to give up. Finally a sign written “Prohibiting digging roads!” was erected. The program ended up with “A village that ever refused roads wins a chance of sustainable development”, adding a perfect period to the story.¹⁷⁶ But we didn't see from the program how Yushichang could develop sustainably after refusing roads. Besides, Yunnan Television Station's purpose of shooting the feature *The Legend of Yushichang* is to know the villagers' real thoughts and give “the people of Yushichang a discourse chance.” In this program, reporters interviewed villagers and other outsiders who supported or opposed building roads respectively and let them express their own attitudes about it.¹⁷⁷

Through the spread of various media forms, more and more people know about the village that refuses roads, and most voters are full of “respect” to the villagers. Yushichang has become “the holy land” and “the pure land” in most people's eyes and it also become the most famous ethnic village in Chinese ecological world. The road of Yushichang is not the matter of villagers or the local government, but a “media event” and a public topic with even more participants. In the context of globalization, what this media event implicates is intellectual elites' concern of ecological deterioration and the loss of cultural diversity; they are eager to find “an anti-global example”, but they are ignore the marrow of anti-globalization is to search for human side in the process of globalization. Therefore, the key to the problem lies in what the construction and use of roads means to the people of Yushichang. All statements are based on theoretical hypothesis, and only persistent observation and empirical study can give a convincing answer.

III. The Influence of Building Roads- the Engineering Resilience Between Road Construction and the Village

The ecological Engineering Resilience Theory says that engineering resilience is the self-recovering ability of living things, and this ability makes them avoid disturbing property and get back to a balance state after they make some changes or shocks of external conditions. After researching on Zhou Yongming thinks that culture possesses such an engineering resilience ability—when facing changes caused by roads, most regional traditional culture takes on an obvious declining tendency right the first time, then they could finish self-improving and self-recovering gradually, instead of collapsing or reconstitution along the beginning track.¹⁷⁸ For Yushichang, whether its ecological environment, traditional culture or social structure leads to the appearance of engineering resilience

¹⁷⁵袁越：《一个“政策性贫困”的村庄》，《三联生活周刊》，总第491期（2008.08.11出版）。

¹⁷⁶中央电视台第10频道“绿色空间”栏目2008年7月15日（上集）、16日（下集）19：37播出。

¹⁷⁷该专题片于2009年9月6日和13日分上、下两集在云南电视台经济频道《都市条形码·封面》中播出。

¹⁷⁸周永明：《道路研究与“路学”》，香港：《二十一世纪双月刊》8月号，总第120期。

because of building roads. The writer will focus on road construction and village change after three years of building roads.

1. Roads are Built but Trees Fall? —On the Protection and Use of Forest

Yushichang is surrounded by a resourceful forest, so a lot of opposition opinions from the outside worry about so-called “roads are built but trees fall” before the road is finished. After the road was built, cutting trees became a sensitive topic.

At the beginning of road construction, the neighboring Qingkou Village came up a wave of illegal logging, because the villagers of Qingkou Village thought that once the road was built, trees by the road would be cut down. They would rather cut trees by themselves than have them cut by others, so most villagers participated. At last the village government and the village forestry station took this event seriously, and fined hundreds or thousands of yuan, as well as confiscated wood that had been cut. Yang Jinhui, who was the forest ranger of the village, said what Qingkou Village did hasn't influenced Yushichang Village, but in the collective forest of Yushichang, four rare torreyas that stand close to roads are found to be cut, - the most thick one of which is with 112-centimeter diameter, and the age of the tree reaches to hundreds of years. After the investigation by the police, the illegal logging is neither done by people of Yushichang, nor transported through the road of Yushichang.

In March, 2011, the Forestry Head Company of Nujiang State—Qingshuijiang Field cut trees, and about 40 villagers of Yushichang tried to prevent it. After four days, they insisted to be in the field and not allow lumbermen to cut trees. The forest belongs to the national forest, and cutting is conducted according to related regulations “intermediate cutting”, aiming to adjust forest stand or density to improve the living environment of stand, to make use of middle space, and to improve output and quality of the stand. The state-owned Qingshuijiang Field is partly neighboring with the collective forest of Yushichang, and is naturally linked to pieces. Historically, there is some dispute regarding ownership of the forest. What's more, the people of Yushichang hold that their ancestors have devoted much to the protection and management of the national forest; when fire happens, the Yushichang people themselves put out the fire, so they should get some dispensation from forestry cutting. After coordinated by the county and the village government, the people of Yushichang got a sum of money total to 0.15 million and the money was given away to every family according to total amount of persons. The outside knows the cutting event by some unknown channels, but the result is “the People of Yushichang are cutting trees.” Yunnan Television Station, which is always caring about the ecological protection of Yushichang, even sent out reporters to Qinghua Village Committee and Yushichang to have a secret interview. The actual fact is, Qingshuijiang Forestry Field gave 4500-square cutting index to private logging team, but the team didn't obey the standard of intermediate cutting” in the cutting process. For convenience and efficiency, they cut good forest rapidly; even two first-grade state protection trees *Taxus chinensis* were cut. Thus the event rose to a criminal case, and the person in charge of the logging team was sentenced.

Yunnan pine is a common tree in Yushichang and its neighboring villages, and it is the main source of the industrial raw material rosin. The traditional way of collecting rosin is to pick up blocks in tree root, which is no harm to pine trees and at the same time could decrease the danger of fire. But the recent way of collecting rosin is like rubber tapping, to cut an opening in the pine trees and let rosin flow out. According to the villagers, if pine trees are cut an opening for collecting rosin, it is just like a person's blood vessel is cut, trees will die in a few years. With rosin price in the market increasing,

many pedlars order rosin with villagers of Hexi Village at the price of 1 to 1 yuan every pine tree. Part of villagers, in neighboring committee or some villagers' groups, went to the mountain for cutting rosin. Luckily this didn't happen in Yushichang. The villager Yang Xingchan emphasizes that the forest of Yushichang is also protected after building roads, most of which should owe to the influence or pressure of external factors. Additionally, the original plan of an electricity project of Songda Group, Qinghua village committee, is to be along Yushichang River. To eliminate the hidden danger of high-voltage wire, more than 3000-square wood needs to be cut. Under the influence of public opinion to Yushichang, any cutting behavior is sensitive, let alone such a huge cutting that must attract strong attention of the outside community. Coordinated by the village government and the village forestry station, a decision was made to change its' route through Desheng village committee. Although the increase in route length and investment, the forest of Yushichang is finally protected.

In order to protect the forest, ecological environment needs to be protected, and human pollution should be avoided. The general opinion is, when roads are built, there will be more outside persons and commodities that may lead to more serious pollution, but the fact is the opposite. For example, beer bottles, which are thrown out around houses or at farm fields, bring threat to the village environment and the safety of persons and animals. In the village, there have been persons to purchase beer bottles at the price of 0.2 Yuan each, but it needs villagers to transport them down to mountains by horseback. It's not a cost-effective way, even though transporting 100 bottles each time, the income is just 20 Yuan. After building roads, the situation changed, because the purchase station can be driven to directly from the village for purchasing, and even villagers themselves don't have to collect the bottles. The persons from the purchase station select bottles themselves, and then pay money to villagers. By this way villagers solve part of "tea and cigarette money", and the more important thing is to decrease their damage to environment. So, when older villagers have free time,, they collect beer bottles by hand and wait for businessmen going door to door for purchasing.

In fact, some trees in Yushichang were cut, for we found some residual stubs beside the road when we went to the village. The investigation found that trees that have been cut down are used in daily life. Before villagers could use cleaner and more environmental-friendly resources, or have enough economic ability to build houses, the normal use of wood could not be prohibited. Due to the "storm" caused by road construction, the forest of Yushichang became the target of media and government. Local or outside illegal loggers dare not cut trees. From this point of view, the public opinions show their positive value. In addition, the Pumi ethnic group call themselves "friends of the forest". How Pumi villages can preserve their good environment relates to its traditional "mountain ecological culture" of "the harmony between nature and human".¹⁷⁹ Pumi ethnic group's Pantheism belief, which is usually acted as offering a sacrifice to vaclusian spring, the god of mountain, or sacred tree, makes them adore and revere some old trees or water source or in the forest, so they preserve trees which keeps them in a harmonious state with their neighboring ecology.

2. "Building Road is the First Step to be Rich?" The Economics and Livelihood after Building Road

The most important reason, or the most direct purpose that villagers expect to build roads is to develop economics, to improve production conditions, and to improve standards of living. But after the road was built, how did villagers' means of livelihood and economic conditions changed?

¹⁷⁹参见兰坪原旅游局局长杨世鲜的相关论述, 及葛荣玲: 《图腾崇拜与生态平衡》, 《语文学刊(读写教学版)》, 2005年第6期

The last four years' economic statistics of Yushichang villagers' group

Year	Households(family)	Population(person)	Per-capita grain(kg)	Per-capita income (yuan)
2009	86	361	314	1163
2010	86	365	320	1393
2011	86	368	418	1732
2012	86	369	442	1980

The table above is the last four years' economic statistics of Yushichang villagers' group. What needs to be explained is, the statistics are finished by villagers' groups, and the method is to pick out one family that stands for a wealthy family, medium-income family and a low-income family separately, then calculate their mean number as per-capita income of the whole village. From the table, we can find that village's grain and income have been increasing. The per-capita income of 2012 increased by 70% than 2009, which shows the positive function of road construction to economic development to some extent. When the road was built, Yang Wanjiu, a villager, bought the first farm vehicle, which was the first vehicle in the village and drove it into Yushichang. Later, He Guangquan and Yang Shufan also bought farm vehicles, Re Lizhuo and Yang Biao bought tractors, and Yang Jinting bought a minibus. So, there are six vehicles in the village. Farm vehicles and tractors are mainly used to freight, and the minibus is used to transport passengers. But in some cases, there is no distinct division between the two. From Hexi street to the village, the minibus fare is 15 to 20 yuan for everyone, if carrying goods, 10 yuan more is needed for every 50 kilograms. Apart from driving to Hexi and Tongdian from Yushichang every weekend, nearby villages are also passenger destinations. It is said that he can earn as much as 700 yuan every weekend. As for freight transport from Hexi to Yushichang, the price is 300 yuan for one tractor, and 500 yuan for one farm vehicle. Now some families in the village are building new houses or leveling the land, which needs a lot of cement, gravel and bricks, therefore their business is good. Besides going to Hexi, villagers need to transport firewood or agricultural products occasionally, so using tractors is more convenient than using mules or horses, but 50 yuan needs to be paid for one tractor.

The most obviously in Yushichang is no doubt a rumbling and dusty scene, which is a land field that was completed and put into operation after the Spring Festival of 2011. This directly profits from road construction. On the one hand, road construction makes it possible to transport large sand and gravel processing machinery to the village. On the other hand, road construction provides basic conditions to the transport and sale of land and gravel. Of course, the raw material of the land field—stones' source is crucial. Two brothers of He family found a stone slope a few yards from the slope, then they built a road that is dozens of meters' long connected with the main road to change it into a stone field, as well as the raw material field of the sand field. In a "new rural construction" project, the sand field of He family offers all gravel that hardening roads of Yushichang needs, thus a considerable sum of money is saved. The more important things, such as when families rebuild or repair their houses, which need a lot of gravel, and the farm vehicle of He family can achieve home delivery service. Before this, villagers need to transport building materials from Hexi or Tongdian, and freight fare costs more than half of construction cost. It is also worth mentioning that two brothers of He family employed three workers. One is from a Yi village on the hill called Bashi, and the other two are local teenagers; they can earn 50 yuan for each person each day, and it is a considerable sum of money in Yushichang. During July, 2007, the business of the land field is profitable.

Before 2009, there were three canteens in Yushichang, namely Jianhua, He Weike and Yang Shuqing. They replenished their goods from Hexievery Saturday on horseback before the road was built, and the inventory was limited. After the road was built, two canteens, He Shitang and Yang Guangxun were added and their way of stocking were changed. They even don't need to go to the street themselves, because calling to supply and marketing cooperative is enough. After they make the phone call, tractors in the village will help to carry the goods, and they could settle accounts later. Taking beer, which villagers like most, as an example. Before building roads, a hinny can back at most four dozen cases of beer (12 bottles for each dozen), with freight fare reaching to 80 yuan. The wholesale price is 30 yuan for each dozen, so the cost added to 50 yuan for each dozen. They sold the beer at the price of 4 yuan for each bottle in the village, and then each dozen was just sold for 48 yuan. Canteens lost 2 yuan for selling a dozen beers. Usually, they didn't take the livestock freight and manual work into account, so the family who haven't a mule or a horsecanny on a canteen. After building roads, the freight for each dozen of beer is 2 yuan, and the retail price for each bottle is 3.5 yuan. Selling a dozenbeers can earn 10 Yuan. The canteen of He Shitang sells at least 10 dozenbeer every week, the whole village sells at least 50 dozenbeers every week, and during the festival or busy harvest the number is beyond this. And the price of other commodities such as barley wine, cigarettes, white sugar and other daily necessities decreases than before. Under the precondition that villagers' income keeps invariable, the consumption ability is improved and living standard is also improved. He Shitang stocks about 100-yuan goods, and all could be sold out. The business of He Kewei and Jianhua is better. Five canteens of Yushichang located differently. Generally speaking, villagers will choose the nearest one to consume. However, the competition between canteens begins, and interpersonal relationship, on credit or not, goods kinds and price become means of competition.

As most villages in China, and the people of Yushichang, building new houses is an event in the family, and it needs to be prepared for many years. From 2010, Yushichang people showgreat enthusiasm on building houses. Such families including Yang Guangxian, Yang Shiquan, YangYixun, Yang Ziguang, Yang Gongtang, He Shitang, Yang Wengui, Yang Sanyue, He Yumei, Yang Yuhai, Yang Xingchan, Yang Jinzhou, Yang Zhouming, Yang Li, Yang Guanghui, Yang Zhourong, Yang Jinxun, Yang Yichun and so on began to build new houses. There are also more families who plan to build new houses, and families who are notbuilding houses temporarily plan to change the dirt land in the yard to cement land at least. There is no doubt that the stimulating factor behind this is road construction. For example, Yang Shiquan families have been prepared for many years for building new houses, and a few tears ago they began to prepare raw materials in the pinery. The village forestry station permits the 4-square wood, and then the cattle will transport the wood from the trough in the hillside to the residence base. Some persons are required to set up house frame before road construction, and they began to construct it after building roads .Because cement, gravel and bricks are needed to transport from the outside; transporting by automobiles or tractors will save nearly half of the cost, time and labor by horseback. One horse can carry 2 bags of cement a time, and going downhill needs 2 hours, and going uphill needs 3 to 4 hours, totaling to more than 6 hours. One horse can just back one time a day, and Yang Shiquan family uses concrete to build walls. It is estimated 400 bags of cement are needed, and if transporting with mules and horses, 200 labors are needed .If hiring hands, and every labor is counted 80 yuan per day, the total freight is 16000 yuan. Adding the selling price of 27 yuan for per bag of cement, the price is in total to more than 10,000 yuan and cement accounts for 0.02 to 0.03 million. Stones are transported from the hillside, and then scrapped into pieces by hands. Sand is transported from Yushichang River, and not

to mention bricks. Yushichang had timber houses or adobe houses before, but no brick houses. It's unimaginable for the people of Yushichang to build a brick house before building roads. After road construction, cement, gravel, bricks and other building materials can be transported in. And the cost is decreasing dramatically, for the freight of transporting cement from the country to the village is 300 yuan, and each time 20 to 30 bags can be transported, with freight reaching to 6000 yuan, saving 10,000 yuan than backing by mules and horses. After the He family opens the sand field, the price of gravel reduces from 450 yuan each vehicle (150 yuan for buying price+300 yuan for freight) to 300 yuan, saving thousands of yuan. Tiles used in the roof are from poverty tile offered by the government, and are transported to the house gate. If there is no road, villagers need to transport twice. As stated above, building roads provides much more convenience for Yushichang people to build houses and it is the main factor that leads to great changes of the village.

Of course, the most convenient thing of building roads is to create conditions for export sales of farm products. Villagers transported kidney beans, walnuts, medicines, and even pigs, chickens and sheep by horseback before building roads. Apart from high transport cost, the profit of villagers is greatly damaged, and the positivity of developing a commodity economy is contained, which is disadvantageous to increasing income and improving standard of living. After building roads, the people of Yushichang began to do business in front of their doors. All kinds of businessmen drive to the village and purchase, and the price is nearly the same as that in Hexi street. For example, kidney beans are 6.2 to 6.4 Yuan for each kilogram, and wild pepper is 40 yuan for every kilogram. Businessmen pack goods and put them on vehicles themselves, so villagers do not have to. If villagers are not satisfied with the price, they could not sell. On 23rd, July, 2011, several businessmen from Eryuan, Dali came to Yushichang to buy sheep and prepare for upcoming Torch Festival. This time Yang Guangxun sold two sheep at the price of 1,120 Yuan, and Yang Li sold six at the price of 1,120 Yuan. The two families made a bargain with businessmen and finally made a deal at a satisfying price.

The two deep pits in the root of slope attracted our attention. Each was 75 square meters and one meter deep, and they are fishponds dug out by the villager Yang Jinzhou. Fishponds were dug near the Spring downstream to use spring water for fish-farming when the temperature in winter decreases. And a small pool was built from cement under the scared water of the spring. The people of Yushichang never had fish farming before, and even fish was rare in villagers' dietary structure. Yang Jinzhou just tried it. However, in August, in a follow-up survey, the writer found the fishpond was deserted, and Yang Jinzhou didn't achieve expected success, because of the environments like the climate, altitude is not allowable, and the technology of the fish-farming is low.

What can be understood is, not all persons can grasp the opportunity when it comes up. For different villagers, the meaning of building roads is also different. Some competent persons grasp the opportunity to join in the trend of commodity economy, and their economic income and standard of living have improved dramatically. But experience, technic or ability is limited; part of villagers profit less from road construction. There is such opinion in the village: "Roads were built, but just 15% of people profits from it." They think using roads also costs because fares and freight are also a big burden for a part of villagers. Obviously, "a part of people become rich first", and gap between the rich and the poor enlarges gradually. The wealth-oriented social stratification is manifesting, and then the social status distinguished by age, seniority in the family hierarchy, and

affinity in traditional society will be changed to form new social identity differences, or even political identity differences.

3. Conservative or Liberal? - The Tendency of Social Culture Development

Cultural change is a gradual and slow process, and it's difficult to observe obvious change in the short term. There is no doubt that building roads can promote the spread of information, the flow of population and goods, and arouse the change of livelihood, life, and ideology. If we take road construction as a variable, we can investigate other factors and analyze reasons for changing and unchanging.

Village landscapes are the most visible change of Yushichang. Village settlements are directly related to human beings and the environment, and the change of village landscapes indicates what the environment means to villagers. In January, 2008, when the writer came to Yushichang for the first time, the village was a traditional settlement of Pumi ethnic groups, which was made up of wooden houses in the slope. And houses are smoked into smoky gray, constituting an integral whole with trees and fields in the slope harmonious and peaceful. Outsiders thought it as the landscape that an ethnic village should have, and it is also why Yushichang is considered a village that preserves the traditional culture of Pumi ethnic group. For example, Chen Zhe insists that the people of Yushichang should preserve wooden houses and refuse brick houses. For villagers, wooden houses and related life are forced by choice, and this kind of landscape is regarded as a manifestation of economic backwardness and poor life. More people yearn for spacious and bright brick houses or western style homes. It's undeniable that wooden houses are closely related to traditional customs and means of livelihood of the Yushichang people, but to some extent they cannot satisfy people's modern material needs. After building roads, there are more and more brick houses emerging in Yushichang with the help of government, and the village landscape has changed. For outsiders, Yushichang has lost its unique feature of a Pumi village, but villagers think this is a sign that they catch up with the standard of living found outside the village. Letting the people of the Pumi ethnic group live in wooden houses is outsiders' own wishful thinking, because the village has been changing all the time and building roads just accelerates that change.

While the change of the village landscape shows up in the material level first, the spiritual level and systematic level are slower and less obvious. The adjustment between people and space in village structure and living environment is also a potential and gradual process. The building material of Yushichang's newly-built houses change, but the original structures are kept. The newly-built houses ("zhengdai, similarly hereinafter"), two wing rooms beside (poluo), an animal enclosure (weng), a yard in the middle (rongdi) and a fire pit that functions as the Pumi ethnic group's center of daily life and ceremonial activities. It's possible that tiles and electrical equipment are used, but its fundamental structure and taboos are best preserved. The seat of families or guests beside the fire pit still demonstrates respect for seniority, has distinctions between gender, and ancestor worship is conducted in festivals or marriage and funeral ceremonies.

Road construction is not equal to the openness of thoughts. The conservativeness of Yushichang is as before, for the funeral of Yang Guodong shows this clearly. At the end of 2012, Yang Guodong, who was 86 years old, and the "Shibi"¹⁸⁰ of the Pumi ethnic group, passed away. A director who was shooting a documentary of Yang Guodong hoped to shoot the elder's funeral, especially the grand

¹⁸⁰The officiant of the folk religion ritual in Pumi.

sheep offering("Rongken") ceremony. Although the director had a close relation with Yang family and tried to persuade them, the sons of the elder cannot reach an agreement, so they refused the filming of the funeral. In the eyes of Yang family, the sheep offering ceremony during the funeral represents an intimate contact between descendants and the ghosts, it's scared and grand. If outsiders or cameras are present, they will disturb the ghost. What needs to be discussed is, the gap between modern image technology and the old sheep offering ceremony. The amusing characteristics and the record, screen, and spread functions are incompatible with the emotions such as secrecy, sacredness, and sorrow in the funeral.¹⁸¹ Therefore, roads make it easier for people to get into the village, but it doesn't mean the inertia of traditional culture will be overthrown.

This kind of cultural inertia is also promoted by other forces. Because the Qinghua village committee is named by the Provincial Department of Culture as the "the protection zone of Pumi ethnic groups' traditional culture", together with the promotion of Chen Zhe's "Tufeng Planther" implementation of some projects brought practical benefit to villagers. Therefore, locals have a deep understanding towards „national traditional culture" and built up an invisible cultural consciousness. They don't think preserving tradition is negative conservativeness to some extent. In addition, the Pumi ethnic group is a nationality that has a small population, totaling to 40 thousand in the whole country. This strengthens the cultural crisis consciousness of the Pumi ethnic group to a certain degree, and they have consciousness of protecting and inheriting some things that can indicate their cultural identity, such as the Pumi language, the fire pit, the sheep offering, the three festivals(WuXi, Qing Ming, Zhonguan), and so on.

The social morality of Yushichang also changes, which is the general opinion from outsiders and government officials, and even local villagers. Yushichang was rustic and peaceful before 2005. but not now. From the writer's point of view, the reasons are as follows: Firstly, building roads promote goods circulation, thus strengthening the commodity consciousness and competition consciousness, and some people "haggle over every penny". Secondly, the tough process of building roads awakens right consciousness and self-consciousness of villagers, so they begin to strive for their deserved interests; Third, the village is short of authority and opinionated leaders. According to villagers, after the passing of the original village committee director Yang Zhouzhe and ShiBiYang Guodong, there is no one else who could fill their roles. Emile Durkhem thinks that social integration method, which is the base of other social relationships, changes with social development.¹⁸² The change of Yushichang's social morality is the transformation from "mechanical solidarity" to "organic solidarity". The linking relationship founded on emotion, morality and ideal in traditional society must change to an interdependent relationship because of life demands and function dependency, and the most obvious feature is the economic relationship based upon material interests. In a way, we can say that Yushichang is on the way from a traditional society to a modern society, as T.Parsons says.¹⁸³ Great changes have taken place with people's values, life attitude and code of conduct.

¹⁸¹参见朱凌飞：《人类学视野中的艺术传播与社会权力建构》，《思想战线》，2013年第4期。

¹⁸²参见[法]涂尔干著、渠东译：《社会分工论》，北京：生活·读书·新知三联书店，2000年月版，第33~93页。

¹⁸³参见[英]安德鲁·韦伯斯特著、陈一筠译：《发展社会学》，华夏出版社1987年版，第29页。

IV. Conclusion: The Metaphor of Road's Role in Interdependence

Building roads is an important event in the development process of Yushichang village. Centering on this event, the village experienced a series of changes. On the one hand, the road event itself attracted attention of the outside and made Yushichang a "famous village" beyond local experience, and all kinds of information and values spread widely with all kinds of people coming in. On the other hand, road construction creates conditions for a developing economy and improving standards of living, and means of livelihood. From our investigation, there was a wave of logging at the beginning of road construction and it rapidly put villagers in high spirits, but all went to quiet and orderly quickly, and Yushichang seemed to go back to the original track. This process is a kind of engineering resilience phenomenon.

From Marshall Sahlins' research, "Non-western peoples' struggle to create their own modern culture destroyed the western's widely-accepted perception that tradition and change, customs and reason oppose to each other. The most obvious is, it destroyed the concept in the 20th century that tradition and development oppose to each other."¹⁸⁴ A road's essence is a kind of passageway, and its value to a community lies in communicating from interior to exterior. So-called exterior can extend infinitely, even to the context of globalization. The construction and use of roads undoubtedly make the ethnic groups in Yunnan's remote mountainous areas get rid of the state of social isolation, and finally involve in globalization and structure modernity. According to the research on historical change of the Pumi ethnic group in Yushichang, so-called "tradition" is a tradition that also changes. And the industrialization (commercialization) of ethnic groups' culture indicates so-called "modernity" dates from tradition. What is of main concern is, how past knowledge is conveyed in the present life and how does it exert its influence.

After the enthusiasm brought by road construction has faded away, how the villagers make use of available resources and external conditions to gain more development power under the country's strict ecological regulations and the inertia of national traditional culture becomes another difficult problem. During August, 2013, Lanping county government decided to strengthen support to the development and protection of Yushichang the country's strict ecologic village, to solve the water problem of men and animals, and to take a series of measures to promote the inheritance and protection of the Pumi ethnic group's traditional culture to push the development of culture, industry, and tourism, and trade forward. Yushichang gains another important development opportunity and will change deeply and greatly in society and culture.

¹⁸⁴[美]萨林斯著，王铭铭、胡宗泽译：《甜蜜的悲哀：西方宇宙观的本土人类学探讨》，北京：生活·读书·新知三联书店，2000年版，第125页。

ANNEX

Conference Schedule