

Facing the Threat of Modern Islamic State Insurgency to Increase National Resilience

Suharto Ladjide¹, Pujo Widodo², Resmanto Widodo Putro³

Doctoral Study Program, Universitas Pertahanan RI, Bogor, Indonesia

Email: suharto@idu.ac.id

(**Received:** March 21-2021; **revised:** April 20-2021; **published:** June 30-2021)

ABSTRACT

The threat of insurgency or modern rebellion of Islamic State in Indonesia is strongly influenced by the Southeast Asian regional environment which has a region with religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity. Ethnic, religious, racial, and intergroup conflicts have caused economic, political, and psychological losses. This article aims to describe and analyze using a variety of approaches applied in Indonesia to face the modern insurgency of the Islamic State using qualitative analysis methods. The technique of collecting data and information is through literature study. There are several jihadi organizations and groups that carry out operations, such as Jamaah Islamiyah, the Indonesian Mujahideen Council, and others. The vitality of radical and extremist groups is able to rise to renew leadership in the organizational network structure based on personal closeness, friendship, and family. National resilience as a dynamic condition of the nation and the conception of national development in achieving the goals and ideals of the nation, which is tough and tenacious and capable of developing national strength in dealing with all kinds and forms of threats, challenges, obstacles, and disturbances both coming from within and from within. outside, which threatens and endangers the integrity, identity and survival of the nation and state, especially the threat of modern Islamic State insurgency. Modern insurgency may never develop sufficient military strength to carry out conventional operations and must therefore rely on terrorism and psychological and political means. Therefore, facing the threat of the Islamic State, the Government of Indonesia must map the transformation of ISIS in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, so that it is faced with proportional efforts and actions such as dealing with domestic insurgency, regional cooperation, and the involvement of extraregional forces within the ASEAN framework.

Keywords: Islamic State, insurgency, national security

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's geographical and natural conditions have the potential for insurgency development. The territory of the Republic of Indonesia is very strategically important in the regional and global scope; despite the various threats of insurgency that always give pressure and strong political contradictions. The diversity of ethnic groups, religions, races, and groups are factors that unite national resilience, which includes ideology, politics, economy, social, culture, defense and security (Wingarta, 2016).

The Southeast Asian region is occupied by the Malay and Melanesian races who have strong racial closeness inhabiting about 25 thousand large and small islands. Of the 650 million people living in Southeast Asia, more than 40%, or 260 million, are Muslim. Most of the Muslim population is concentrated in Indonesia (203 million or 88.2%), Malaysia (16.6 million or 60.4%), and Brunei Darussalam (269,000 or 67.2%). Although the numbers are

not significant in Singapore (15.00%), the Philippines (4.7 million or 5.1%), Thailand (3.9 million or 5.7%), Myanmar (1.9 million or 3.8%), Vietnam (0.08%), and Laos (2000 or under 1.00%), the Muslim population in these countries makes the total Muslim population in Southeast Asia larger than other regions, especially in Asia. Muslim and non-Muslim groups are concentrated on the dominant island or region but still live in heterogeneous groups. Some regions still maintain homogeneity in certain regions in certain countries in Southeast Asia (Helmiati, 2014).

Ethnic and religious conflicts, which often look like clashes between Muslims and followers of other faiths, are permanent factors in Southeast Asia. In such conflicts, a special role is played by the Muslim movement in the south of the Philippines, tasked with maintaining the confrontation between backward Muslims and Christian centres. Initially, the movement was purely separatist, but in the 21st century it began to gain an Islamic feel. Ethnic and religious conflicts, in which there are Islamic factors for various reasons, occur in Indonesia, Thailand, and Myanmar (Fadhly, 2018).

In addition, Southeast Asia is one of the theaters of independent, active and large-scale military operations of radical terrorist organizations and insurgents. Radical Islam in Southeast Asia is divided organizationally, also on dogma, strategy, and politics. But they are united by a desire to Islamize the region, anti-Americanism, anti-communism, and hostility to Western civilization. Radical terrorist cell networks cover the entire region, especially the populous states with significant Muslim populations.

In Indonesia, 19 groups are linked to the Islamic State (IS), 15 groups have sworn allegiance to Al-Baghdadi as their leader. In Malaysia, five groups, including Darul Islam Sabah, have pledged to support ISIS. There are three such groups in the Philippines. A division of the largest Abu Sayyaf group swears allegiance to Al-Baghdadi (Djelantik & Akbar, 2016).

There are many jihadi organizations and groups operating. For example in Indonesia there is the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) or Indonesian Islamic State, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) or Indonesian Mujahidin Council, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), and Jamaah Ansharut Khilafah (JAK) (Syarif, 2019); in the Philippines there are the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Abu Sayyaf, and Maute (Chaidar, 2020); in Thailand there are the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-K) or the National Revolutionary Front-Coordination, the military unit of Runda Small Group, linked to the BRN-K Patani Freedom Fighters (Freedom Fighters) Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) or Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement, and - Gerakan Muslim Mujahidin Patani (GMMP) or Muslim Mujahideen Movement Patani (Liow, 2006).

Currently, radicalism in the name of Islam is being carried out and brought up in the family environment, promoted in mosques and religious orders, and instilled in traditional Islamic boarding schools (pondok and pesantren). Usually, graduates not only maintain a spiritual bond with the 'senior' coach, but also maintain personal and/or corporate contact with each other. Often, its development is through family relationships.

The vitality of radical and extremist groups, their ability to rise up, and renew leadership are built into a network structure of their movements and organizations. Due to the nature of the network of connections that radical extremist groups can have, they easily

retaliate against the actions of the Police which they perceive as arrogance of authority. A vast network of extremist cells spread across the archipelago, because they are closely linked by personal, family, and religious beliefs or sects, making them difficult to identify and destroy. The suppression by the Police led to the fact that radical extremists temporarily stopped their activities. New leaders replace old leaders by recruiting from among the younger generation. Southeast Asian radicals have links to international terrorist organizations that are mutually supportive as they have personal relationships that grew during training camps in Pakistan, Mindanao, Syria, and others (Liow, 2006).

METHOD

This study used a descriptive qualitative method aimed at providing an overview of ways to deal with the threat of modern Islamic State insurgency in order to increase National Resilience. Data collection techniques used interviews and literature study. Primary data obtained through interviews with National Disaster Management Agency Task Force personnel who had served in Aceh and Poso, while secondary data obtained from books, journals, operational reports, and other government sources. The validity and validity of the data obtained by means of triangulation of sources.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The threat of insurgency has had negative effects on Indonesia's National Resilience. The shift from traditional military threats to non-traditional threats is the background for the birth of insurgency groups that have an influence on Indonesia's National Resilience. Domestic political instability is marked by the threat of Islamic State insurgency in the form of conflict and separatist movements under the guise of religion. To deal with the threat of insurgency, the Indonesian government needs to develop a policy strategy according to the vision, mission, and development of the situation, through understanding and approaches.

The Transformation of Southeast Asia into the ISIS Hotbed

Muslims in Southeast Asia are scattered in various countries and are ethnically heterogeneous. The ethnic majority of Muslims are Javanese, Malay, Chams (Tamas), Maranao, Magindanao, Arakan, and others. Muslims are also in minority ethnic groups, such as Batak, Ambon, Manado, Papuan, Visayas, Tagal, and others. Most adherents of Islam are South Asian (Austronesian) and speak the Polynesian Malay language family, but they are still different from each other in terms of language, culture, lifestyle, level of social, economic and political development, as well as in many ways (Kettani, 2009).

The Southeast Asian Muslim community looks very fragmented into heterogeneous groups in ethnic, linguistic, and socio-cultural relations, separated territorially and politically. Southeast Asian Muslims are characterized by great differentiation in the depth and nature of the impact of Islamic norms on the way of life and worldviews of various ethnic groups and religious groups. This is due to the gradual and peaceful spread of Islam,

the peculiarities of its perception by various ethnic groups and socio-cultural strata of medieval society, the nature and degree of influence of the indigenous and Hindu-Buddhist traditions as a pre-Islamic religion. Among Southeast Asian Muslims, there are also differences in terms of Islamic orders, sects, and/or tareqas.

The noted features of the region's Islamization contributed to the establishment of a moderate Islamic view among most of the region's Muslims and a negative attitude towards fanaticism and extremism as foreign elements to syncretic beliefs characterize many of Southeast Asian societies. However, another fact shows that Muslims do not automatically vote for an Islamic party.

Indonesia, for example, although the majority of the population is Muslim (88.22% of the Indonesian population), only 31.25% of voters in total chose five Islamic parties in the 2014 election (Addiansyah, 2019) and decreased to 29.26% in the 2019 election (Tamtomo, 2019). Di Malaysia, Partai Islam Panmalaysian (PAS) hanya menerima 8,11% (18 suara), dan Barisan Nasional (BN) yang Islam moderat mendapatkan 35,29% (79 suara). In Malaysia, the Panmalaysian Islamic Party received only 8.11% (18 votes), and the moderate Islamic Barisan Nasional got 35.29% (79 votes). Events that occur in the Islamic world as a whole also have a significant impact (The Straits Times, 2018)

Fighting Insurgency in Indonesia

Although the Indonesian political regime has been quite stable, the entry of ISIS in Indonesia is believed to take advantage of Indonesia's political instability. The Indonesian government has been being actively fighting radicalism and terrorism, and in general has achieved success in fighting and combating terrorism (Haryadi & Muthia, 2017). Indonesian law enforcers have been also very active in using existing domestic security laws, which provide broader powers to combat terrorism as a threat to national security.

The incident of insurgency in Indonesia in the last decade has received a lot of attention because it is suspected of having links to the ISIS and other international terrorism organizations. Indonesia is even very strict in observing and tightening monitoring of international financial transactions to prevent the ISIS funding.

Indonesia has made various advances in dealing with modern insurgents. Radicalism and modern extremism have actually become a continuation and development of the movements that emerged in this country immediately after the proclamation of independence in 1945. In the era of the 1962-1965 period, the extremist group of the Indonesian Communist Party was basically defeated, but most of its members and supporters they remain in various parts of Indonesia, and they continue to be in contact with each other. During the New Order period 1965-1998, the repressive government had closed the door to political and ideological pluralism and expressions of dissatisfaction with the regime (Ismail, 1999). Demonstrations against Islamic ideology, suppressed by the authorities gave rise to extremism, the idea that only by violent means is it possible to show one's will. and make dreams come true. Although actions against insurgents are increasingly being carried out by the government and security forces, sentiments and radical terrorist movements in modern Indonesia continue to rise and be renewed, continuing to exist in a latent form.

The ideas of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia, which were born during the anti-colonial era of the national liberation war, have never died throughout the history of this republic. In recent years, the spread of radical views in Indonesia, especially among young people, has been significantly influenced by the ISIS activities.

The Indonesian government is improving the law and strengthening other measures to combat terrorist threats, one of which is President Joko Widodo banning the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia organization (Aswar, 2018) in July 2017. This decision allows the government to dissolve organizations deemed to be contrary to the state ideology of Pancasila and threaten the stability and integrity of the country. On the same day, the international jihadist organization Hizbut Tahrir was dissolved by government decree. It should be emphasized that this decision is not meant to discredit Islamic organizations or the majority Muslim population in Indonesia, but instead it supports the largest moderate Islamic movement in Indonesia, which has millions of followers. Previously, counter-terrorism in Indonesia was concentrated in the hands of the Police (Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88), now the government allows the TNI to carry out anti-terror operations independently. However, Joko Widodo assessed that military means alone were not enough to overcome terrorism. He has consistently asserted that his government's main focus should be on the use of 'soft power' based on religious and cultural values. The main tools in the fight against terrorism and extremism are carried out through the methods of deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration into society, especially ex-militants, and most importantly, eradicating the roots and origins of terrorism.

International cooperation and interaction between civilizations is urgently needed. The confrontation between separatists and jihadists has dragged on for decades through negotiations and deals failing and giving way to bloody armed clashes.

One of the policies carried out by the Indonesian government is psychological preparation of the people so that the terrorist attacks that have occurred do not eliminate their belief in the state and religion. In addition, the security regime is being tightened directly in the country itself. In addition to implementing tough anti-terrorism laws, Indonesia established a mechanism for the rehabilitation of former ISIS fighters.

Regional Cooperation

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) takes very seriously the dangers of the ISIS movements to the region. Terrorism flourishing in Southeast Asia threatens vital strategic and trade routes through the Straits of Malacca, Sulu Sea, and South China Sea, and can also undermine internal political stability not only in countries with significant Islamic populations, but in the region as a whole (Amin, 2018). The anti-terrorist cooperation of regional countries has increased significantly.

The President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, is committed to presenting the state to protect citizens and provide a sense of security, implying that President Joko Widodo will make policies and strategies in dealing with terrorism as a form of combating the threat of insurgency. At the same time, he proposes not to limit the international fight against terrorism only to military methods, pointing out the need to implement deradicalization

programs (Yunanto, 2017). ASEAN Foreign Ministers intend to counter the spread of extremist material on social media. Countries with significant Muslim populations in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines show particular concern. In June 2017, at the initiative of Indonesia, foreign ministers and high-level representatives of the armed forces, police and intelligence services of these countries agreed that in order to counter the formation of a stronghold of the Islamic State extremist group in the region, the exchange of intelligence data and other information must be carried out. intensified, and sources of funding for terrorist activities must be cut off. , block the use of the Internet and, in particular, social networks as platforms for broadcasting content of terrorism and radicalism. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia have agreed to take action to fight illegal arms smuggling, prevent terrorists from escaping, and eliminate the potential for radical messages to spread through social groups, education and religious events.

Since radical Muslim groups linked to the Abu Sayyaf terrorist movement threaten the national security of countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia have expressed their readiness to provide military support to the Philippines. The three countries have even held a Trilateral Maritime Patrol (TMP) which regularly conducts naval operations to combat maritime terrorism in the Sulu Sea. Pirates associated with terrorists often attack merchant ships. This route is also used by illegal Filipino immigrants to enter the territory of the states of Sabah, Malaysia, and Tarakan, Indonesia. In addition to the hostage-taking, pirates attacked oil tankers and bulk carriers. The Sulu Sea is part of a global transport route that delivers up to 80% of the oil to China and Japan (Suproboningrum & Kurniawan, 2017). A formal agreement was signed by Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines on joint patrols in the waters off the islands.

Other Southeast Asian countries are also not standing still. Vietnam and Singapore share concerns over terrorism. They reaffirmed their readiness to fight terrorism and extreme violence. The two countries intend to effectively use the mechanism of strategic consultation, exchange of information on the fight against terrorism, and strengthen the relationship between defense forces, especially in the field of naval and aviation, as well as cooperation in the fight against piracy. Security was the main topic of the ASEAN Summit in August 2017 in Manila (Lisbet, 2017). The summit participants reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining peace and ensuring security, against terrorism in the region. However, observers note that territorial disputes between Southeast Asian countries, mutual distrust, and limited material and technical capabilities often complicate the implementation of the agreements reached.

Involvement of Extra-Regional Powers

Indonesia, within the framework of ASEAN together with ASEAN member countries, is ready to cooperate with other countries in security issues and the fight against global terrorism. The great extra-regional powers, especially China, the United States, Russia, and Australia (Nainggolan, 2018), which strive to maintain stability and security in the region, and freedom of navigation, are also interested in this. ASEAN has great strategic importance for international trade because half of international sea transportation routes pass through the Southeast Asian region. In 2020, the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Singapore carry

221 warships and 37,334 merchant ships transiting, through the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea, passing an average of 3,900 ships every year, which is a great danger because of the high probability of being attacked and/or pirated by pirates and terrorist groups (TNI Angkatan Laut, 2021).

Southeast Asia is a priority area for China's foreign policy, especially recently, as China consolidated itself on islands in the South China Sea and began implementing the giant 21st century Belt and Road Initiative, including the creation of two sea routes from China's coast through the South China Sea. South China Sea to the South Pacific region and to Europe via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Both routes pass through areas where there are Muslim populations in the region and are in danger of becoming the ISIS strongholds. Therefore, China is very interested in the safety of these sea routes and has a sharp negative attitude towards their transformation into a zone of terrorism and extremism. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea are meaningless in the face of the shared danger of radical attacks and terrorism. Common interests are far more important than differences between China and ASEAN countries.

The United States has actively joined in anti-terrorist activities. The United States regards the Southeast Asian region as a realm of geopolitical interest and has a strong position in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States continues to fight for freedom of navigation and air routes in Southeast Asia, in solidarity with all countries in the region. The United States-ASEAN Summit is evidence that in recent years the parties to the partnership have achieved a great deal in terms of mutual trust and understanding of the common task of and working with ASEAN member states in the face of the threat of transnational insurgency. The United States announced its support for the government in the combat against anti-terrorism (Windiani, Peran Indonesia dalam Memerangi Terorisme, 2017).

The fight against terrorism and transnational crime occupies a central place in the Russia-ASEAN dialogue. Russia also has an interest in preserving and strengthening ASEAN as a regional organization that has succeeded in maintaining internal political stability and freedom of navigation. ASEAN and Russia adopted a work plan to counter terrorism and transnational crime and held regular meetings at the level of senior officials and experts. The deepening of cooperation between Russia and ASEAN can be realized in improving the information exchange system between intelligence services, improving methods of tracking suspicious persons, and developing law enforcement practices. Russia has become part of an international group that opposes terrorist activity and transnational criminal organizations (ASEAN, 2018).

Anti-terrorist cooperation has also been being developed between countries in Southeast Asia. Russia and Indonesia have developed a declaration against the spread of terrorist ideology and expect the approval of this document to be approved by their ASEAN partners. Russia will support Indonesia's efforts to counter any threat, including the threat of terrorism, which is common in both countries.

Australia also intends to help ASEAN countries to fight the spread of extremism. Australia is ready to work with Southeast Asian countries to fight terrorism.

CONCLUSION

While the dangers of the Islamic State movement into Southeast Asia are real, there are serious factors and forces that make it possible to successfully counter it. ASEAN countries oppose jihadist and radical terrorists with a united front and strengthen cooperation.

The internal political situation in Southeast Asian countries, especially with significant Muslim populations, is quite stable. Radicals and jihadists in the region are divided organizationally and ideologically. The main part of the Muslim Ummah of Southeast Asia is in a moderate Islamic position and does not welcome radicalism and, moreover, the methods of terrorist activities.

Influential and powerful non-regional powers are prepared morally, ideologically, politically, logistically, and even with armed force to support the opposition to jihadism in Southeast Asia..

REFERENCES

- Addiansyah, M. N. (2019). Koalisi Partai Politik Islam Pada PILPRES 2019: Antara Ideologis dan Pragmatis. *Jurnal Pemikiran Politik Islam POLITEA*, 2(2), 189–198.
- Amin, K. (2018). ISIS Menuju Asia Tenggara: Ancaman dan Kerja Sama Keamanan Kawasan dalam Menghadapi Peningkatan Ekspansi ISIS. *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional*, 6(2), 1–13.
- Aswar, H. (2018). Destructing the Islamist in Indonesia: Joko Widodo Policy and Its Controversy. *International Journal of Malay-Nusantara Studies*, 1(1), 62–79.
- Chaidar, A. (2020). Masyarakat Mindanao, Abu Sayyaf dan Masalah Keamanan Kawasan. *Jurnal Cakrawala*, 1–44.
- Djelantik, S., & Akbar, T. . (2016). *Terorisme Internasional dan Fenomena ISIS di Indonesia*. Bandung: LP2M Universitas Katolik Parahyangan.
- Fadhly, F. (2018). Pemahaman Keagamaan Islam di Asia Tenggara Abad XIII-XX. *Jurnal Studi Agama Milla*, 18(1), 51–78.
- Haryadi, A., & Muthia, N. (2017). Gerakan Politik Negara Islam Irak dan Suriah (ISIS) dan Pengaruhnya terhadap Indonesia. *urnal Transborders*, 1(1), 1–17.
- Helmiati. (2014). *Sejarah Islam Asia Tenggara*. Pekanbaru: LP2M Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Syarif Kasim.
- Ismail, F. (1999). *Ideologi Hegemoni dan Otoritas Agama*. Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana.

- Kettani, H. (2009). Muslim Population in Asia. *International Journal of Environmental Science and Development*, 1–9.
- Liow, J. . (2006). *Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology and Politics*. Washington DC: East-West Center.
- Lisbet. (2017). *ASEAN dan Isu Laut China Selatan*. Jakarta: Majalah Info Singkat Hubungan Internasional DPRRI.
- Nainggolan, P. P. (2018). *Kerja Sama Internasional Melawan Terorisme*. Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia.
- Suproboningrum, L., & Kurniawan, Y. (2017). Diplomasi Maritim dalam Keberhasilan Patroli Terkoordinasi Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapura di Selat Malaka. *Jurnal Politica*, 8(2), 163–187.
- Syarif, H. (2019). *Ini 5 Kelompok Teroris yang Masih Aktif di Indonesia*. Diambil dari <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/380478/15/ini-5-kelompok-teroris-yang-masih-aktif-di-indonesia-1617033804>
- Tamtomo, A. B. (2019). *NFOGRAFIK: Perolehan Suara Partai Politik dalam Pemilu 2019 Versi KPU*. Diambil dari <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/05/22/16141831/infografik-perolehan-suara-partai-politik-dalam-pemilu-2019-versi-kpu>
- The Straits Times. (2018). *Malaysia General Elections: Result. Retrieved from The Straits*. Diambil dari <https://graphics.straitstimes.com/STI/STIMEDIA/Interactives/2018/05/malaysia-general-elections-live-results/index.html>
- TNI Angkatan Laut. (2021). *Data-data Operasi*. Jakarta: Pusat Komando dan Pengendalian.
- Wingarta, P. S. (2016). Rejuvenasi Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Pendekatan Kewaspadaan Nasional). *Jurnal Kajian Lemhannas RI*, 26, 17–31.
- Yunanto, S. (2017). *Ancaman dan Strategi Penanggulangan Terorisme di Dunia dan Indonesia*. Bekasi: Institute for Peace and Security Studies.