

WHEN AND WHY DO MEN OBEY DURING A CIVIL WAR?

A STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
COMPETING FOR CONTROL IN AFGHAN COMMUNITIES

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A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University
in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Baltimore, Maryland
November 2017

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ABSTRACT

During civil wars, organizations compete to control the behavior of populations, to determine the goals their societies will pursue and how they will be governed. But, very little is known about why they succeed or fail.

This study tested hypothesized causes of organizations' control across a set of Afghan communities where residents trained in participant observation described the actions of the Taliban, government, local informal leaders called Wakils, and residents. The study described the extent to which residents obeyed the rules of each organization and why.

No single factor consistently explains an organization's level of control. Organizations with high levels of external resources do not always control communities' behavior. Organizations that can extract resources from a population do not always control that population's behavior. Organizations that win the agreement of populations do not always control them. And, effective organizations, that consistently execute tasks, do not always win the battle for control. A process translates these factors into control over community behavior. An organization that can collect information about rule breaking and sanction violators can control a population. To do so, it must have enough resources and an effective enough organization that prospective violators are deterred.

Some organizations, like Wakils, build consensus about the rules people should obey and how violators should be punished. Others, like the Taliban and Afghan government, impose rules upon communities. Consensus organizations are more efficient because most people obey the rules and residents will assist the organization if someone violates its rules. However, consensus organizations can only access resources from within their own communities. Imposition organizations can only control a community if they can generate resources greater than those of competitor organizations and they can motivate personnel to take risks by patrolling and sanctioning rule breaking in un-consenting communities.

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Professor S. Frederick Starr and Professor Mara E. Karlan

PREFACE

"The state is a relation of men dominating men. ... If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be. When and why do men obey?" Max Weber, *Politics as a Vocation*, 1918

At two a.m. one morning at the headquarters of the International Security and Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, a group of planners were gathered around a map. One of them, in a fit of coffee and sleep deprivation-induced pique said, "Now that we have these security bubbles, now that we have cleared the Taliban from these areas, we need governance. People keep saying, we need governance, but what does that mean? Are we just going to throw some governance in there? Somebody tell me what that means we need to do."

This experienced military planner and operator knew that whoever "governed", by controlling the population's behavior, won in a fight between insurgents and governments. He knew that no matter how many times the Taliban were driven out of Afghan communities, they would return unless there were some self-sustaining local mechanism to repel them. His frustration was that it was unclear what that looked like and it was unclear what the coalition military or its interagency partners could do to "build governance".

This military planner was asking for a theory of change, a series of actions that would result in control over the behavior of the population by someone other than the Taliban. Though I had studied civil wars and counterinsurgency, and had lived and worked in Bosnia and Iraq for years, I had no answer to his question. I did not know why the Taliban had control over the behavior of some populations and not others and why its control changed over time. No one could clearly see the interaction between the Afghan government, Taliban and different groups within the Afghan population and therefore no one could describe who was winning or explain why. Without that knowledge, it was very difficult to determine what to do to reduce Taliban control. The US had faced the same problem in its fight against Al Qaeda and other insurgent organizations in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere; and that it had faced the same problem in countering insurgency in Vietnam. In all of these places, a gap in causal theory explaining why organizations succeeded or failed had left many dedicated, well-educated, experienced military planners and operators to expend great effort and vast resources to little avail.

This study is an effort to make progress toward an explanation of the causes of organizations' control over the behavior of populations during civil wars. It examines the actions of organizations and the reactions of residents at the community level, where groups and individuals decide whom they will obey.

The study is based on descriptions of Afghan government, Taliban and local leaders called *Wakils*' actions, and the reactions of residents of 11 Afghan communities. In each community, a local resident trained in the methods of participant observation described social life in his home community, omitting any information that could be used to identify the people or communities in question. The study applied these descriptions to chronicling how and why individuals and communities decided to obey or disobey the Taliban, the government or the *Wakils*. As such, the study provides a unique description of social life in Afghan communities after the overthrow of the Taliban regime, during the surge in NATO and Coalition forces and resources, and in the wake of their withdrawal. These descriptions

can increase our understanding of how coalition efforts to counter the Taliban insurgency impacted Taliban progress toward its objective, control over the behavior of the Afghan population.

I hope that the findings from this study can serve future strategists, planners, military operators and policy makers facing insurgencies, failed states and international terrorist organizations. When they stand around that map and ask what they can do to reduce control by insurgent or terrorist organizations, I hope this study can inform their understanding of the problem and help them focus their resources and efforts on actions that reduce insurgent and terrorist organization control over the behavior of populations.

ACKNOWLEDEMENTS

I am so grateful to the many friends, colleagues, teachers, mentors and family members without whose support, knowledge, skills, guidance and love, this study, with all its challenges, would not have been possible.

First, I will be forever grateful to Eliot Cohen, my advisor and teacher, for giving me the opportunity to pursue my doctorate at SAIS. Without the opportunity he provided me and his sage advice, deep knowledge of war, stalwart support and willingness to allow me to undertake a challenging study that is far outside the norm, this study would never have been possible.

I am also deeply indebted to Bill Zartman for his advice, counsel, friendship and quick wit. His deep understanding of civil wars, failed states, social processes and political theory building was invaluable to the design and execution of this study.

I would also like to thank Tom Mahnken, the chair of my dissertation committee, as well as Fred Starr and Mara Karlin, who served on it. I greatly appreciate the care they all took in reading, evaluating and commenting on this study and providing their advice on how to move forward with it. I am also indebted to Thayer McKell, who is the glue that holds the SAIS Strategic Studies Department together. Thayer was always there when I was in a jam and always had a way forward. She is truly matchless and I was so lucky to have her help and encouragement.

Second, I will never be able to repay the debt I owe to my parents, who gave me the sense of adventure and wonder and the will to build knowledge to make the world a better place that drove this study. I must also thank them and my siblings for their love and ceaseless support during my many months in Afghanistan and the many months of analysis and writing that ensued. In particular, this study would not have been possible without my father's tireless efforts as my sounding board, my counselor and my shadow editor throughout this long process. His contributions to the substance and presentation of this study were of inestimable value. I would also like to thank my mother for her editorial support and her encouragement throughout this study.

Third, this study is built upon the work of a set of Afghan researchers who embraced learning to describe social reality with gusto and produced a unique data set that describes in vast detail the difficulties of life in Afghanistan during a tumultuous civil war. Without their tireless efforts, this study would never have been possible and their contribution has made seeing the poverty and violence and the faith in Allah and community cohesion that characterize life in Afghan communities possible.

Fourth, I want to thank my mentors and external advisors who read chapters and provided their advice on how to present this tale and what it would mean for policy and strategy. This study is infinitely better as a result of their input. In particular, the advice of Mike Meese, H.R. McMaster, and John Allen were invaluable. I also want to express my gratitude to Nadia Shadlow and Linda Larkin for reading chapters and providing their input. Thanks also to Stathis Kalyvas and the Yale University MacMillan Center Program on Order, Conflict and Violence for inviting me to present a paper describing the major theoretical finding of this study and for the excellent critiques and advice they provided.

Fifth, I want to thank three friends and colleagues. Giovanna Dore was always there to provide advice, to discuss methods, to read chapters even when they were not yet ready for prime time and to rescue me from my dissertation writing black hole with a glass of prosecco and laughter. Lin Todd was always there when I was stuck conceptually, with a ready ear, sound counsel and encouragement. Patti Morrissey was ever-present, providing encouragement and helping me talk through the different hurdles in this study and see the light at the end of the tunnel.

Sixth, to my friends from these years in Afghanistan, Wil Zemp, Paul Somersall, Wade Yamada, Lynda Granfield, Gerry Leonard, Jean Herve Michelot, and my brother Colin, thank you so much for being my friends and for your support and inspiration in this long endeavor.

Seventh and finally, I want to thank the SAIS Strategic Studies Department, which provided a home for this study and for me during this long process. The support and fraternity that are endemic to the wonderful institution Eliot Cohen has built are magical and without them, this study would not have been possible.

PART 1

Introduction

CHAPTER 1

A Puzzle:

After All that Blood, Treasure and Toil, Why Are Anti-Taliban Communities Left Defending Themselves?

After a day of tending the cows and crops on his father's farm in October of 2014, an Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier home on leave walked to his fifth prayer of the day in the *mazjet*¹ in his home village, which is nestled, along with a hundred other villages, in a deep mountain valley intersected by snow-fed streams. The lofty mountain ridges ringing the deep valley, 80 kilometers from Kabul, became home to hundreds of Taliban fighters from southern Afghanistan and Pakistan during 2013. The remote mountain ridges of this valley had served as a sanctuary for insurgent groups throughout Afghanistan's long history of violently contested government because they provide an effective base for attacks on the Afghan capital.

At a creek, the villager purified himself for his prayers and walked to the *mazjet*, where he and nearly every other adult male from his ancestral village conducted their nightly prayers, moving and speaking as one, offering their prayers to Allah in the hope that after the tests of poverty, uncertainty and violence posed to these poor farmers in this life, Allah will accept them into Paradise on Doomsday.

The young man left the *mazjet* and walked back toward his father's farm. Unbeknownst to the soldier, Pakistani Taliban fighters were lying in wait within shooting distance of the front door to his father's home. As the young man neared the door, they shot him dead before swiftly fleeing back up the escarpment. The young soldier left behind a

¹ *Mazjet* means mosque. Afghans use this term because they believe it is more grammatically correct in Arabic.

wife and a baby son, as well as three sisters and a younger brother. The family cried and prayed and recited the Koran. The women, with the help of their female neighbors, prepared the soldier's body for burial. The men attended his funeral prayers and funeral and the soldier was laid to rest.

The following morning, the villagers found a letter at the *mazjet* from the Pakistani Taliban. The village has a leader, called a Wakil, who is a farmer and villager elected by the male heads of the village households to solve the problems of the people. He read the following letter to the villagers.

“If someone works in the government, we will beat him and kill him. If someone talks to the government, we will kill him. If someone gives food to the government, we will kill him. That person will be an enemy of the Taliban.”

This letter was of grave concern to the villagers as three quarters of the families in the village had at least one member who was serving, as the deceased soldier had been, in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), deployed far from home, but returning periodically for several weeks of leave in the village. These young men's salaries amounted to five times the meager incomes of their entire families, who eked out a living in rain fed, small-scale agriculture. Continued employment in the ANSF was a financial imperative for the villagers, but it imperiled them and their families if the Taliban could strike the village with impunity.²

The village faced the Taliban's threat to kill large numbers of its residents alone, despite significant ANSF presence in the district where the village is located. A *kandak* of

² 141106 Community Narrative R3, 141201 Family 10 Control Measures R3

approximately 600 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers is based 30 minutes by car from the village. None of the soldiers are from this district, and their officers are from far off southern Afghanistan. After the French military departed in November 2012, the ANA *kandak* Commander announced that the ANA's sole mission was to defend Afghanistan from invading armies and that his unit would not provide internal security. Contrary to the Commander's assertion, the ANA's official role was to provide internal security and to support the Afghan police whenever they needed assistance. But, ANA soldiers and officers feared Taliban ambushes. These men were not motivated to risk life or limb to prevent the Taliban from patrolling, harassing, abducting and killing the villagers of these remote valleys. These government personnel sought to generate income for their far-off, similarly impoverished families, and to survive to return to them, continuing to provide security, income and honor to their kin for decades to come. The ANA had therefore stopped patrolling or responding to requests for support immediately after the French military withdrawal. After this large security force stopped providing backup for the 350 police, the police stopped operating at night, thereby surrendering the mountain valleys to the Taliban.

The Wakil told the villagers he had called the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) Commanders to ask them to send patrols to prevent the Taliban from killing villagers in the night. The commanders had responded that they did not have enough guns, bullets or policemen to do this because there were too many Taliban in and around the village.

This government security force inaction occurred despite the United States (US) expending more than \$60.7 billion to train, equip and sustain the Afghan National Security

Forces (ANSF) between 2002 and March of 2015.³ It occurred despite the extensive training and institution building by the Coalition military; the diligent mentoring of the Afghan soldiers and police by an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) battalion stationed in the district in between 2009 and the end of 2012; and ISAF's raids and battles against the Taliban during the same period.

The Wakil asked the villagers what they wanted to do about the Pakistani Taliban. Some villagers argued they should organize the one hundred or so military aged males in the village, where every household had a weapon, into patrols and attack the Taliban if they should come to the village. But, the villagers decided against this approach since there were only a hundred or so weapons in the village and there were by this time 1,600 Pakistani Taliban encamped in the district. Although the Taliban approached the village in groups of only six to ten fighters, if the village began to overtly resist, the Taliban could mass more than a thousand fighters to make an example of the village. And so the villagers made the choice to do nothing. They decided that each family would need to defend itself if and when it was attacked; that everyone should stay inside at night; that they should not turn on outdoor lights; and that no one should ever open the door at night.⁴

The Taliban's rules and their methods of enforcing them were not something anyone in this village wanted. They routinely violated Taliban rules. More than half of the school aged girls from the village attended school. All of the women left their homes without a *burkha* and without a male relative several times per day to work on their family farms, contributing more than half of the farm labor force. Women also left their homes to visit

³ John F. Sopko, US Special Investigator General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives. April 29, 2015.

⁴ 141106 Community Narrative R3

their neighbors and their families. The men joined the ANSF, earning money that fueled an endless series of wedding parties at which music streamed through electronic speakers and men danced. The villagers were all targets, but they did not organize to resist attacks. They believed fewer people would die if they did not organize a defense than if they tried to mount one with the limited resources available in the village. There were only 100 households, and at least 75 military aged males were deployed far from the village. Arrayed against as many as 1,600 Taliban fighters, the villagers believed this force would be unlikely to survive.

The village's efforts to avoid being a target of Taliban attack did not, however, succeed. At midnight several nights later, someone tipped the Wakil off that hundreds of Taliban were preparing to attack the village at 3 a.m. as part of an all-out Taliban effort to overtly seize control of the valleys on either side of the mountain where they lived. The Wakil immediately called the heads of the village's households to the *mazjet* and told them that everyone needed to flee. He organized the villagers into three groups, spiriting the young men away first for fear the Taliban would surely kill them. Because there were only two cars in the village, nearly every man, woman and child, the able-bodied, the sick and the aged, walked in constant fear of Taliban ambush for an hour and 20 minutes in the cold darkness of a November night in the mountains to the District Capital.

The Wakil and one young villager hid, waiting to see what would happen. At 3 a.m., hundreds of Taliban poured down the mountain, firing their AK 47s at the houses. They soon realized the village was empty. They meticulously searched each home, but found not a soul there to punish. For weeks, the ANA, ANP and ALP, supported by aerial bombing from ISAF, fought the Taliban for control over the village, its valley and the neighboring

valley. In the end, the government was able to drive the Taliban back into the mountains and the villagers returned to their homes.⁵

But, no sooner than the villagers had returned to their homes, the ANA, ANP and ALP ceased patrolling or responding to calls for help at night. The Pakistani Taliban's nightly patrols through the village resumed their high pace, as bands of between six and ten fighters moved through the village several times each night. Occasional assaults on the homes of families of members of the ANA, ANP and ALP continued. By March of 2015, the Mullah, who had called for *jihad* against the Pakistani Taliban, and the Wakil, whose son was an ANA officer and who was organizing the people to protect them from the Taliban, were killed by the Pakistani Taliban. As the snows melted in the spring of 2016, the district provided a safe sanctuary for the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, a group of Al Qaeda-affiliated Chechen *salafi jihadists* and a new organization, that had arrived in December 2014, calling itself the Islamic State.⁶

But, did it really have to be that way? In this valley, there were hundreds of villages consisting of hundreds of homes. The residents of these villages did not want young Taliban fighters, imbued with the belief that it was their duty to violently punish people, to move through their villages, harassing and killing people. The villages could have woven themselves into a defensive mesh, comprised of forces greater in size than the 1,600 Pakistani Taliban. Every household had an AK 47 and one or more military aged males. There were 600 ANA, 200 ANP and 150 ALP who could have served to reinforce them, but they did not, and made clear they would not, do so.

⁵ 141206 Community Narrative R3

⁶ 150331 What Happened to Me R3

Despite the disagreement of the population of this mountain village with the Taliban's goals and actions, the Taliban won control of the village, as well as the hundreds of villages in its valley. Was that because the Taliban simply had more resources than the government? In this case, it seems the government had resources enough to prevent the Taliban from controlling this village, but it was ineffective at translating resources into actions. Could the fact that the villagers disagreed with the Taliban have mattered and if so under what conditions?

This puzzle, this question of why the expenditure of blood and treasure to build governments that can sustainably defeat insurgent organizations has failed time and time again, in Vietnam, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Afghanistan, remains unsolved.

Many are therefore tempted to throw up their hands and return to their great fortress island in North America, ardently declaring, never again. However, this declaration of never again has oft been stated and never followed. Further, the assumption that such a withdrawal from the fight will not damage the national security of the US and its allies is flawed.

Beginning in 2013, the US pursued a strategy of ignoring this puzzle in favor of an aerial bombing campaign targeting insurgent organizations in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. Instead of worrying about whether the population agreed with the *salafi jihadist* organizations or whether there was a government that was effective, well-resourced and had popular support, the US focused on locating and killing the leaders of these organizations. The US' aerial bombing strategy was coupled with an effort to simply train and equip existing government security organizations in the weak and failed states where

international *salafi jihadist* organizations rode the backs of local insurgencies. With the exception of additional external military resources, the US and its international allies attempted to avoid involvement in domestic politics, leaving national and local application of those resources to the very governments that had already generated insurgencies. In many cases, as in Iraq, the government, left to its own devices, attacked Sunni Muslim populations that often formed regionally concentrated minorities, giving them little choice but to turn toward Al Qaeda, ISIL and other *salafi jihadist* organizations.

The combination of these strategies proved an abject failure when the Islamic State and Al Qaeda took over large portions of Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya and used these territorial bases to generate assaults in the United States, France, Belgium, Germany, Turkey and Great Britain, among other places.

Thus, the current challenge for the US and its allies in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Tunisia, Libya and Afghanistan is really the strategic challenge it always was. For the US and its allies, it is not a question of whether they will need to intervene in the future to defeat or back an insurgent organization, but how they can improve their ability to do so more effectively and efficiently in the conflicts in which they are currently, and will in the future be embroiled.

This dissertation is an effort to solve at least one portion of that puzzle, starting not at the supra-national, or even national level, but instead at the community level, where people decide with whom they agree, for whom they will fight, to whom they will give information and sanctuary, and most importantly, whom they will obey.

Causal Theory as an Input to Strategy

At the root of these problems of strategy lies a problem of science: the lack of valid theories explaining what causes insurgent or government organizations to succeed or fail. A strategy is in essence a theory that your resources, applied through your actions, will have an effect on your objective. Theory provides explanation of causation, and the tools of warfare and diplomacy provide means to intervene to affect the factors and processes that cause change in an objective.⁷ In the case of building or reinforcing governments in states that are violently contested by insurgencies, the current theory underlying our strategy is objectively insufficient. We lack clearly defined objectives and an explanation of how our actions will affect those objectives.

The first problem with the most recent US strategies is the lack of clear objectives. People variously toss around differing terms, “defeat” the insurgent or terrorist organization, generate “stability” in the host country, generate “popular support” and occasionally generate “legitimate political control” by the partner nation government. Each of these terms is intended to describe the goal for everything the US and its allies are doing, but the meaning of each term is very unclear and progress against many of these goals cannot be measured.

The second problem is that we don’t know what would cause changes in those objectives. US efforts have focused on large factors we assume are related to the objective,

⁷ Colin S. Grey. “The Strategist as Hero” *Joint Forces Quarterly Issue 62, 3rd Quarter 2011*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press. p. 40-1.

like popular support or effective governance, or accountability, or the number of soldiers and police, the number of insurgent personnel killed, or the external financial and personnel resources of the insurgent organization, or GDP or employment growth.

But it remains unclear under what conditions these large scale factors are and are not causing changes in the rather vague objectives. Additionally, many of these large scale factors are poorly defined. For example, what do we mean by popular support? Do we mean that people like and agree with an organization? Or do we mean they provide funds, personnel and other resources to an organization, thereby supporting it, despite their disagreement, in return for remuneration, or against their will, as a result of coercion?

Control over the Behavior of Populations

What the United States and its allies have actually been trying to do is to increase or decrease the control⁸ an organization⁹ has over the behavior of a population. Control over the behavior of a population is the object of the competition between insurgent and government organizations. An insurgency proposes the overthrow of the existing political order and the establishment of an alternative one.¹⁰ Some insurgencies demand a

⁸ Bernard Fall pointed out that it was social control, defined as the extent to which people obeyed the rules of the government or communist insurgency that determined who won the contest in Indochina and that the French military's measures of territorial control did not predict who won. Bernard B. Fall. "Fall Insurgency Non-Military Indicators" in *Military Review*. Leavenworth: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, April 1966. p. 3-11. Jeffrey Race described how the Vietnamese communists defined victory as, "the unchallengeable ability to determine the actions of all within a specified domain, whether it be a hamlet or a nation." This definition is very similar to Fall's definition of social control. Jeffrey Race. *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. p. 148. Stathis Kalyvas described civil war as the competition between insurgent and government organizations for sovereignty or control over a population and territory. Stathis Kalyvas. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. p. 12

⁹ Abdulkader H. Sinno. *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008. Sinno argues that social groups, civilizations, religions, classes and nations do not engage in strategic conflict, organizations do. p. 87. He defines organizations as social structures that incentivize their personnel to act through positive and negative sanctions. p. 27.

¹⁰ US Army Training and Doctrine Command. *Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24)*. Fort Leavenworth: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 2006. p. 1-8. Roger Trinquier. *Modern Warfare*. Translated by Daniel Lee. London: Pall Mall Press, 1964. p. 7-8. Race, 1972. p. 143-8. Paul Berman. *Revolutionary Organization:*

restructuring of society that ensures the equality of all members, either in terms of their power to vote, as in a democratic insurgency, or in terms of their income, as in a communist insurgency. Other insurgencies demand the re-establishment of a particular governmental or social system, like *salafist* Islamic insurgencies that seek to re-establish social order as they believe it was at the time of the Prophet Mohammad; or Shi'ite activist insurgencies that advocate rule by clerics so steeped in Islamic jurisprudence that they can interpret the laws of Islam. Still other insurgencies seek to establish rule by an ethnic group according to the norms of its culture and are normally coupled with an effort to expel those who are members of other ethnic groups, like the long-simmering insurgency in Northern Ireland. In each of these cases, insurgents are really proposing a set of rules for ordering the social world according to their vision and values. The rules that underpin each of these proposed or existing political orders are intended to serve as the basis for an organization's control over the behavior of populations.

The effectiveness of the efforts of insurgent or government organizations to control the behavior of a population is only visible at the point where people decide whether to obey or disobey those rules, at the point where control becomes a social fact, where the organizations' actions succeed or fail in causing individuals to obey its rules.¹¹ A government or insurgent organization's control can be measured by the extent to which the population it is attempting to control complies with whatever rules it seeks to enforce.¹²

Institution Building within the People's Liberation Armed Forces. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1974. p. 1. Kalyvas, 2006. p. 12

¹¹ "A social fact is to be recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals, and the presence of this power may be recognized in its turn either by the existence of some specific sanction or by the resistance offered against every individual effort that tends to violate it." Emile Durkheim quoted in Micahel Hechter and Christine Horne. *Theories of Social Order: A Reader*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. p. 15

¹² Fall, 1966, p. 3-11

Possible Causes of Organizational Control over the Behavior of Populations

Even more importantly, why does a government or insurgent organization succeed or fail in its efforts to control the behavior of populations, to preserve or overthrow a political order? Some assert an organization can only succeed only when a population agrees with its goals, when the organization “wins hearts and minds”.¹³ Others assert it is only when an organization has significant external resources,¹⁴ in the form of money, personnel, equipment or sanctuary, that it can defeat its rival organizations and assert its authority. Still others assert that these external resources only serve to distract an organization from gaining public support for its ideology, or from hiring personnel, garnering funds, equipment, services, information and sanctuary from the population. They assert that an organization’s ability to recruit personnel and levy other resources from a population it seeks to control are the most important determinant of its ability to control that population.¹⁵ Still others emphasize the importance of designing and staffing organizations that can translate any of these resources into actions.¹⁶

A cursory review of some cases of states that have been challenged by insurgencies indicates that no one of these factors consistently explains the outcomes. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, they neither sought nor had popular concurrence with their regime or the actions it wanted to take. They also lacked access to significant internal resources from the population. However, they had significant external resources. The Soviets also had an

¹³ Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning*. London: Faber and Faber, 1967. p. 176-9

¹⁴ Kalyvas, p. 213

¹⁵ Weinstein, p. 170

¹⁶ Berman, Sinno.

organization, the Red Army, that was effective in translating resources into personnel action.

On the other hand, most of the Afghan population believed Afghan *mujihadeen* efforts to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan were justified. The population provided them with personnel, goods, services, information and sanctuary. The *mujihadeen* acquired external resources, though nothing on the order of those committed by the Soviets. The *mujihadeen*, a rag tag mix of villagers and refugees, although not a modern army, were able to generate action by their personnel, even in the face of Soviet firepower. This case would argue that ignoring public opinion caused an effective, well-resourced organization to fail in the face of a less well resourced, less well-organized insurgency. A similar argument could be made about the French fight to maintain control in Algeria. The Afghan *mujihadeen* and the Algerian Front de Liberation National (FLN) did not have resources greater than the Soviet or French militaries, nor were their organizations more effective, but they were victorious.

These cases and others like them seem to argue that popular agreement with an organization's goals and actions is the most important factor in determining whether a government or insurgency wins, until we consider the cases that demonstrate the opposite. In the case of the Russians crushing the Chechen rebels, or the Egyptian military re-asserting control in Egypt, well-resourced, disciplined organizations exerted authority over populations that disagreed with the goals and actions of the government and had a completely divergent goal for how their countries should be governed. Sometimes, the population's agreement does not matter.

It seems that all of these macro-level factors (popular agreement, external resources, internal resources and organizational effectiveness) are related to whether a government or insurgent organization succeeds in its aim of controlling a population, but none of the factors consistently explains the outcomes. The failure of these factors to consistently explain outcomes at the national level indicates that if we want to understand what causes control by government or insurgent organizations, we will have to delve down to the bottom of the conflict and examine it from the micro level. There must be a process we do not understand that is translating different combinations of these factors into control far below the national level, and then aggregating that local control into regional and national control.

Studying Organizations' Control over the Behavior of Populations During Civil War

"All politics is local,"¹⁷ and insurgency is a competition for political control that differs from normal political life only in the application of violence by the competitors to one another and to the population they seek to rule. During an insurgency, political, social and geographic control, and therefore the patterns of order, are fragmented by the violent competition between two or more organizations¹⁸ to dictate the rules. The rules that once governed behavior in a contested area stop being salient. Expectations of whether and when one's actions might elicit a violent sanction become uncertain as insurgent and government organizations actively seek to influence a population to obey their rules, as opposed to those of their rivals.¹⁹

¹⁷ "All politics is local" is a popular political saying, most often associated with House Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Jr. (1912-1994) that was first published in *The Fredrick Star* in Fredrick, Maryland 9 July, 1932. Fred R. Shapiro, ed. *Yale Book of Quotations*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. p. 566.

¹⁸ Kalyvas, 2006. p. 87-91

¹⁹ Tone Bringa. *We are all Neighbors*. Granada Films, 1993. Bringa's ethnographic documentary of a mixed Croat-Bosnian Muslim village during Bosnia's civil war provides an excellent depiction of how the break down of

Under these fragmented conditions, an organization's control and its causes can only be seen at the individual or very local level because that is where an organization's actions intersect with the reality of whether or not people obey the organization's rules. By watching the actions of organizations and the reactions of populations in detail, we can ascertain the level of control each organization has by examining the extent to which individuals, families and communities obey its rules. If we watch for long enough, we can also see how an organization's control changes over time and examine why.

This dissertation compares communities of between 100 and 300 households in Afghanistan in order to determine how external resources, resources provided by the community, agreement or disagreement with the government or the Taliban, and the government and Taliban's effectiveness in taking actions impact government and Taliban control over communities. The dissertation also compares individuals who broke the rules of the competing organizations with those individuals who obeyed them in order to determine whether there is a process organizations apply that results in control and under what conditions.

Participant Observation Research Data

During an insurgency, people are very sensitive about the extent to which they obey the rules of the different armed political organizations competing for power. They fear sanctions for their beliefs, for rule breaking, for rule compliance, for the provision of

common, Yugoslav rules and the impending enforcement of rules by the Croatian Army results first in confusion and disorder and then in the imposition of rules by the relatively more powerful Croatian Army upon the town, resulting in the imposition of Croat nationalist rules, which include the expulsion of Muslim residents. Kalyvas, p. 87-9 describes the fragmentation of sovereignty in civil war.

resources and for their exposure and reactions to personnel from each organization. War is chaotic. The rules of competing organizations often conflict and it becomes unclear how residents should behave in order to increase their chance of survival. Frequently, saying and doing nothing becomes the safest approach to survival. This is particularly true when talking to people from outside one's family, village or community. For that reason, interviews with people about these topics often result in inaccurate information. Researchers put themselves at risk by asking such questions, sometimes leading them not to do so. Under pressure to produce results, they think about what people might have said if they interviewed them and write those answers down. Even if researchers are brazen enough to conduct interviews in areas where armed political organizations roam, respondents often have multiple reasons to conceal the truth about what they believe, what they have done and what they have seen people from insurgent or government organizations do. Even interviews with people about these topics long after the cessation of hostilities are often inaccurate, as people try to justify to themselves and to others how they and those around them behaved under extremely trying circumstances in which the very question of what was right and what was wrong was contested and people were faced with terrible choices.

To address the problems of validity of information arising from interviews and other intrusive research methods in the context of a civil war, this study developed a new method for describing the actions and characteristics of individuals at the local level during a civil war. Participant observation researchers who were long-time residents of the communities under study described the lives of residents of their own communities. After receiving training on research methods, the researchers returned to their home villages to observe and record what individuals said and did in the crucible of an on going civil war.

These researchers described the public characteristics, actions and words of people in their communities without directly interviewing them. These researchers were unobtrusive, were members of the community under study and observed only public behavior.

When studying a violent struggle among competing organizations, it is not adequate to enter a village for a few days with a team of outsiders acting as interviewers, with neat and tidy questionnaires. Members of communities that are the subject of a competition between an insurgent and a government organization treat all outsiders as dangerous. They often get rid of researchers by telling them what they think the researchers want to hear, knowing that when the sun goes down, the outsiders with their foreign methods will be gone.²⁰

By contrast, the trained participant observation researchers are from the communities under study. They are trusted locals who are simply going about their daily business in their home communities. The researchers did not provide the subjects with an incentive to alter what they did or said in their presence. Alongside their fellow residents, the participant observation researchers remained in their communities, even as the conflict roiled around them. The only difference between the researchers and other residents was that they were observing and recording history as it was unfolding.

Participant observation researchers, unlike survey or interview researchers, must identify a sample of individuals and their actions. They must then describe people's characteristics and actions with as little bias as possible. The researchers must also

²⁰ See Chapter 3: Methods, p. 77-78 for a description of the research environment in one of the case study communities and how a researcher from a survey company tried, without success, to get any information from the villagers. 140723 Pakistani Taliban Actions R3.

translate what some of these characteristics and actions mean to people in the community they are studying. During a survey, a researcher needs only minimal training because the instrument and the sampling plan do most of this work for him. But, in participant observation, the researcher is the instrument. For that reason, the participant observation researchers were trained extensively, in a manner similar to the way an undergraduate anthropology student is trained, to describe social and political life. They learned about social data error and how to reduce it. They learned to think relativistically and strip away their own biases when describing people's actions, characteristics and motivations. They learned methods of representative sampling and elite sampling. They developed a set of demographic characteristics based on their understanding of their own social structure. They developed a set of consistent topics they would describe each day, each week and each quarter, to accurately describe life in their own communities in a way that would allow for the comparison of their case studies without preventing the collection of data unique to one community or that had not seemed important enough to them to form one of the topics.²¹ I then worked with them for many months to ensure I did not misinterpret the data they had produced.

To ensure that no harm could come to the subjects of their research because of their research, the researchers omitted all names and never gave the specific names or locations of their communities. The researchers never revealed their own names, so no one could use that information to determine where they lived. The greatest possible precautions were

²¹ During the 1980s and 1990s, George Marcus and other anthropologists innovated, proposing that they could conduct participant observation research in more than one site in order to study a single topic across these different sites. Multi-Sited Ethnography offered the possibility of not just describing social reality in one place, but in using that description to build theory regarding social concepts. See George E. Marcus. "Ethnography in/of the World System: the Emergence of Multi-sited Ethnography," *Annual Review of Ethnography*, 24:95-117, 1995.

taken to ensure the words and actions of subjects could never be associated with their identities so that no armed political organization could use the data to harm them.

The effort to preserve the anonymity of subjects has led to some awkward code names for people and places. For example, each researcher was numbered, so R3 is Researcher 3 and his village is the Kapisa Mountain Village in the Kapisa Mountain District. In each community, the researcher described a random set of residents, so in each community, there is a Family 1 and often a Father of Family 1, Son 1 of Family 1, etc. This stylistic roughness is a small price to pay for ensuring this study can do its subjects no harm.

The data used in this study are from 11 communities in Afghanistan. Some of the data were collected during 2010 and 2011 and represent the height of the US and Coalition presence and resources in Afghanistan. These data allow us to see the extent of control by the Afghan government at the local level at the height of foreign security, governance and economic assistance. In the case of one of the communities, these data were collected throughout 2014 and cover a period stretching from 2008 until the end of 2014. The data about this community are extremely rich and allow for comparison of data across four time periods, including the period after the construction of Afghan government and security institutions and the rapid drawdown in the presence of external security forces. These data allow us to see the impact of the surge in Coalition resources and actions and the drawdown have had on government actions and the impact on control at the local level. Because the data allow us to see the actions of the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, Afghan Local Police, Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban, "Chichini Taliban", local elders, Wakils, Mullahs and local residents, the process by which the populations decide to acquiesce or resist in each of the community cases is laid bare. By describing this process, we can see

how the different factors affect community and individual decisions to resist or acquiesce to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) or the various types of Taliban insurgent organizations.

Community Case Studies

The result of the participant observation researchers' work was thousands upon thousands of pages of written description of life in 11 communities in Afghanistan. In each community, three organizations compete for power. Across all of the communities, in all of the time periods in the data, there are 45 cases of organizations who have a particular level of control over the community where they reside. I selected two communities that provide the ability to compare 15 of the cases that show the widest variation in levels of control, levels of external resources to the government and Taliban, levels of agreement with each of these organizations and the Wakil and organizational effectiveness of the government, Taliban and Wakil. These two community case studies provide the opportunity to parsimoniously study whether and how those factors cause organizations to have control. But, we do not lose the rich context of social life in the communities by attempting to use 11 communities.

The Kabul Market Community provides a detailed case study of an urban, liberal, ethnically mixed community in downtown Kabul during the height of the surge in ISAF resources and actions during 2010 and 2011. The case study describes a traditional market

community that is the most liberal, anti-Taliban community in the data set. It describes how the Wakil brings together a combination of long time residents and new migrants from all over the country into an orderly community, based on consensus about problems in the community and solutions to them. The community contains very poor residents, lower middle class residents and a group of very wealthy residents, many of whom are related to high ranking members of the *mujihadeen* groups who form the basis of the Afghan government. The Wakil works with residents to arrive at rules and sanctions through consensus. He then asks for the resources and authorities he requires from them to enforce the rules they want him to enforce. This approach results in a high level of control over the behavior of most residents of the Kabul Market Community.

The control generated by the Wakil is assailed by chaos emanating from the traditional market that abuts the neighborhood. The market provides income to the community, but it also brings people from all over the capital, who are unaccountable to the Wakil, into the community. The market is also a locus for illegal and un-Islamic activities, including gambling and the sale and consumption of narcotics, alcohol and pornography. While the Wakil has a high level of control inside the community, his control is assailed by disorder emanating from the market, where the government has little control despite a significant, permanent police presence.

Additionally, the Wakil does not have much control over the small number of wealthy residents of the Market Community because they can use their connections in government to avoid being sanctioned, or they can just bribe government officials.

The government has enormous external resources, but its personnel do not patrol to identify rule breaking or sanction it. As a result, the government cannot control behavior either inside the market or in the adjacent Kabul Market Community. The government does not attempt to enforce the rule of law, but relies upon the Wakil to provide order, enforcing rules prohibiting theft, assault, murder, and other crimes. But, the government is so ineffective that it simultaneously undermines Wakil control, upon which it relies, by collaborating with criminal organizations, facilitating armed robberies in the community. The Kabul Market Community provides an example of a community where the Taliban has no control because residents disagree adamantly with its goals, rules and actions, and the Taliban lacks the external resources required to challenge ISAF and the ANSF by overtly patrolling to identify rule breaking and sanction it.

The second community case study presented in this dissertation describes life in a rural village situated in a mountainous and hotly contested area of Kapisa Province. This village sits at the mouth of a mountain valley that forms the social border between Tajiks and Pashtuns in northeastern Afghanistan. The 14,000 foot mountains ringing this valley have served as a natural sanctuary for Pakistani, Afghan and “Chichini” or Chechen Taliban. The case study chronicles life in the Kapisa Mountain Village from the overthrow of the Taliban through the period of *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* rule, the return of the Taliban in 2008, the surge of Coalition actions and activities, the withdrawal of ISAF soldiers in November of 2012, the subsequent collapse of government willingness to patrol and engage the enemy, and finally the surge in Pakistani Taliban resources and activities in 2014.

This case study allows us to compare the competition for control by the Wakil, government and Taliban in the same village across four periods of time during which

external resources, organizational effectiveness varied of the government and Taliban varied greatly.

Throughout these shifts in external resources and organizational effectiveness, government and Taliban organizations attempt to impose external rules on life in the village. But, the Wakil builds and maintains consensus in his traditional village, where the same families have been living and worshipping together, planting and harvesting wheat, corn, beans, blackberries and walnuts from time immemorial. It is this consensus and mutual aid that have allowed the villagers to survive floods, droughts and wars. As dangers come and go, the villagers rely upon their belief that if they just obey Allah's rules and make their families and neighbors happy with them, they will pass the test Allah puts them through in this world and enter Paradise on Doomsday.

In the Kapisa Mountain Village, this consensus based strategy for controlling villagers' behavior is pitted against the government's approach to imposing a centralized government staffed by bureaucrats and committed to western-style democracy and human rights, as well as against the Taliban's strategy of violently imposing on the villagers the Taliban's interpretation of life at the time of the Prophet. The case study of the Kapisa Mountain Village allows us to see the actions of government personnel and the Taliban and the reactions of the residents of the village in terms of their willingness to obey. It also includes a comparison of people from the community who obey and disobey the rules of each organization and identifies a process organizations can use to cause people to obey their rules. This comparison provides insight into how and under what conditions agreement, internal and external resources and organizational effectiveness translate into control.

Major Findings

The ability to see the actions of residents, as well as the actions of the government and Taliban, at the community level from the perspective of a resident trained in participant observation, revealed several findings.

First, Afghan communities are comprised of households that use the same *mazjet* for daily prayers. The *mazjet* serves as the political, social and cultural center of the community. The male heads of household gather in the *mazjet* and select by consensus a leader called a Wakil, whose job is to solve the problems of the people. Wakils identify problems and propose solutions to the heads of the households in the community, who then provide the Wakil with the personnel, money, goods, services, information and sanctuary he requires to implement them. Wakils can propose rules and sanctions; organize patrols; organize the population to forcibly expel an individual or family; undertake infrastructure projects; collect funds to pay for community requirements; and negotiate on behalf of the community with outside organizations, like the government and Taliban. If a Wakil fails to solve the problems of the people, he can be replaced at any time by consensus of the families in his community. The Wakils represented pre-existing rights of legitimate authority that could have been aggregated from the local to the district to the provincial to the national level.

Second, no one factor, agreement, resources or organizational effectiveness, can explain why the Taliban, government and Wakil have different levels of control. Agreement, resources and organizational effectiveness are simply inputs to a process, a series of

actions, any organization can take in order to control the behavior of a population. Any organization that can collect information about people violating its rules and sanction them can control the behavior of a community.

Organizations can take different approaches to executing this process based on their goals; the values of the people whom they are trying to control; the resources those people can offer; their competitor organizations; their access to external resources; and their ability to cause their personnel to act despite risks. There are two main strategies: consensus and imposition. Either one can succeed in generating control, but only under specific conditions.

Consensus organizations, like the Wakil, emphasize the population's agreement with their goals, rules and actions. Because people have assisted in making the rules in their community, fewer people violate them. Because most people in the community agree with the rules and sanctions, when someone does violate the rules, people in the community, moving through the area like distributed sensors, often inform the consensus organization. A consensus organization has less work to do and more help doing it because people agree with its rules and sanctions. Consensus organizations are also effective in acting to sanction rule violators because they are manned by members of the community who, like the other members of the community, agree with the rules and sanctions.

Consensus organizations are, however, vulnerable because their pool of resources is limited. A consensus organization can only access the personnel, money, goods, services and sanctuary that exist within its own community. Because a consensus organization bases its control on community agreement with its goals, rules and actions, it is difficult for

them to ally with other organizations because those organizations normally seek to alter the rules to which the community in question has consented. When another organization wants to impose rules on the community and has more resources, largely from outside the community in question, that it can organize into actions by personnel, than the consensus organization can, that organization wins, gaining control. In many cases, when faced with such an organization, a consensus organization simply stops acting, becoming ineffective in the face of an organization with relatively greater coercive force.

An organization can succeed in causing people to obey its rules even if residents disagree with its rules. However, an imposition organization, like the Taliban or GIRoA, can only win if it has relatively more resources than its competitors and can cause its personnel to patrol and sanction. This is a high bar because convincing a population somewhere else that they should provide personnel, money, goods and services in order to control the behavior of another population is challenging. Even more challenging is convincing personnel to risk life and limb to patrol and sanction violators in a community where people disagree with an imposition organization's goals, rules and actions. Further, imposition organizations face a persistent problem in collecting information about people violating rules in the community they seek to control. Due to limited resources, organizations cannot be everywhere all the time, constantly identifying instances of rule violations. Because residents do not agree to the organization's rules or the sanctions it will impose on neighbors who violate them, when they see a neighbor violating a rule, they are unlikely to provide information to the imposition organization about the violation. Imposition organizations move through communities, and are not part of them, and therefore, without information from the population, their level of control is limited by the information they can collect.

In short, imposition organizations can control the behavior of a population, but only at great cost through an organization effective enough to motivate its personnel to patrol and sanction people in a community where people disagree with the organization's goals, the rules they seek to impose and their actions.

Third, the US' inability to build a partner nation government in Afghanistan that can motivate its personnel to take risks explains the government's loss of control over the behavior of populations at the local level after the removal of ISAF forces from daily operations. The US and its allies expended and continue to expend huge sums of money on this centralized government. But, government leaders and personnel lack a shared conviction about the goals, rules and actions that its personnel should undertake.

This lack of *esprit de corps* results from the top-down approach the US took to establishing and constructing the Afghan government, imposing institutions, rules and leaders from the outside. The US backed many of the fractious, largely exiled, *mujihadeen* leaders that had failed to form a government and brought Afghanistan into chaos between 1992 and 1996, allowing them to take territory. The US used the bare minimum of Special Forces soldiers to coordinate air support and provide some tactical planning and combat support and did not have enough coercive force on the ground to prevent the *mujihadeen* from holding territory. Then, at the Bonn Conference, the US and its allies ratified their leadership, while imposing a constitution with rules and institution which neither the *mujihadeen* leaders nor the population sought. The result was a government that few, if any, believed in, including its own leaders and personnel.

All the while, at the local level, there were leaders who had been selected and resourced by their people to solve community problems. The Wakils could have served as the basis for a cheap, effective, sustainable Afghan government that was accountable to the population. If the US had used slightly more coercive force, it could have empowered these leaders and mediated between them to aggregate them into a functioning government. This would have meant the US would have had to accept the very different values and rules (regarding women's rights and religious freedom) that existed in these communities. But, this would have been a small price to pay for the sustainable defeat of the Taliban and an end to sanctuary for Al Qaeda and associated *salafi jihadist* terrorist organizations in Afghanistan.

The lesson of Afghanistan is that the US' top-down approach to building partner nations that can sustainably defeat insurgencies is expensive and ineffective. The US should in future start from the bottom and work up, empowering consensus based leaders, who often already exist at the local level, rather than imposing exiled leaders and foreign institutions at great cost and with questionable effect.

Lastly, this dissertation demonstrates that multi-sited participant observation through local residents can provide a window into the life of communities during the crucible of a civil war that was previously unavailable. This method produces data that are rich and accurate and provide the basis for comparative case studies that can serve as a source of hypotheses and a method for testing them.

Organization of the Study

This study is organized in the following way. Part 1: Puzzle, Literature Review and Methods consists of this chapter, as well as Chapter 2: Literature Review provides an overview of the literature by theorists and practitioners of insurgency and counterinsurgency on the subject of control and its causes in civil war. Chapter 3: Methods provides a detailed discussion of the methods of research and analysis of the study. This chapter includes a detailed description of the methods of participant observation research used to build the unique data set.

Part 2: Competing Organizations describes the Taliban and Government organizations, as well as a third organization that competes for power with the Taliban and the Government in every community under study, namely the Wakil. Chapter 4 provides the theoretical framework underpinning the description of each organization and how these organizational descriptions relate to the remainder of the study. Chapters 5 and 6 describe the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, including the founding moment of each organization; its ideal type of personnel; its vision of the future; the rules it believes will make this vision a reality; its methods of influencing people to obey the rules; its strategy for achieving its vision; and its organizational structure. Chapter 7 introduces an indigenous organizational form that exists at the local level throughout Afghanistan, the Wakil. The chapter begins with A Tale of Two Cities – Social Order and Social Disorder in Kabul, describing the profound effect Wakils have on controlling behavior at the community level in Kabul. The chapter then details the personnel of the Wakil organization, the ideology of the organization, the set of rules Wakils generally attempt to enforce and the methods by which they attempt to enforce them. It then outlines the Wakil strategy, laying out the ends, ways and means of the Wakil organization. Finally, the chapter characterizes how the Wakil organization ensures that its personnel enact the

Wakil's intentions. Part 2 concludes with Chapter 8, which compares the goals, strategies, rules, resources and systems for motivating personnel of these three organizations, as the basis for understanding their actions in the next section, which comprises the local empirical case studies.

Part 3: Empirical Case Studies includes Chapter 9 and Chapter 10. Chapter 9 describes the Kabul Market Community during 2010 and 2011, at the height of the surge in Coalition resources and actions. Chapter 10, entitled War Returns to Kapisa, describes the Mountain Village in Kapisa before the surge in Coalition resources and actions; during the surge in Coalition resources and actions; after the departure of French military and before the surge in Pakistani Taliban resources and actions; and during the Pakistani Taliban surge in resources and actions. Together, these two community case studies provide the basis for the case study comparison to determine whether there could be a causal relationship between a community's agreement with an organization and that organization's control; between a community providing information, sanctuary, money, goods, services or personnel to an organization and that organization's control; between an organization's access to externally provided information, sanctuary, personnel, money, goods and services and that organization's control; and an organization's effectiveness in translating its intent into action by its personnel and that organization's control. Additionally, the data from these two communities provide ample examples of individuals following and violating the rules of each organization to serve as the basis for identifying a process that may translate the factors described above into control.

Part 4: Findings for Theory and Practice provides a description of the theoretic and policy findings from the study. It consists of Chapter 11 and 12. Chapter 11: Theoretical

Findings provides a detailed description of the findings from the case study comparisons within and across communities. Chapter 12: Implications for US Policy provides a description of the implications of the findings for US efforts to build the capacity of partner states to fight insurgencies and violent extremist organizations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia and similar weak and failed states that are assailed by insurgency.

It is my fervent hope that this dissertation can improve the impact of the resources the US invests in its fight against *salafi jihadist* terrorist organizations that ride on the backs of insurgencies. In that fight, we have toiled and expended blood and treasure, but have repeatedly failed to build partner governments that can sustainably counter or quell insurgencies. We will face more challenges like the ones we faced in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, among others, in the future. It is only by courageously and critically examining our own actions, those of our partners and adversaries and the reactions of the population that we may improve. I hope this dissertation can be of assistance in that regard.

CHAPTER 2 Literature Review

Much of the academic literature on the topic of the competition between government and insurgent organizations for control over the behavior of local populations is embedded in a discussion of revolution, insurgency, counterinsurgency and civil war. The literature focuses on a discussion of the causes of civil war and the causes of violence, in large part because of a wish to prevent them. It has for the most part shied away from the factors and processes that cause outcomes in civil wars.²² Further, many academics who study civil wars study them from the top down because that is how they first appear from the vantage point of some far off, stable country. This approach seldom explains processes or outcomes of civil wars. Civil war is a process of fragmentation and the state's interaction with different populations on its territory, as well as differing security, income, and cultural environments on its territory are often part of the reason a civil war occurs. For that reason, considering topics like the level of democratization, corruption, gross domestic product, etc. in the aggregate across a country where a civil war occurs is problematic. It is the perspective of looking from the outside in that often clouds a researcher's judgment on what to study in terms of civil war.

National level, top down studies of civil wars often result in the conclusion that the causes of revolution are structural. This may be because structures are what one can see from the outside. The work of Theda Skocpol²³ provides a good example of these national comparative cases of civil war. In *States and Social Revolutions*, Theda Skocpol describes

²² Sinno, 2008. p. 2

²³ Theda Skocpol. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1979.

how agrarian, partially bureaucratized monarchies²⁴ were transformed through state collapse, elite conflict and popular uprisings. The revolution itself is a black box from which states emerge that are more centralized, bureaucratic and “mass-incorporating”.²⁵ She argues that structural change in class relations, state function and the international environment led to the revolutions in these three cases. She argues that participation in revolutions is not an individual or group choice, but a reaction to structural changes in society. Individual actors or classes are not the cause of revolution because structural factors cause them to act.

While this analysis puts the state at the center of the causes and outcomes of revolution, other scholars have described revolutions as a form of social movement. Sidney Tarrow²⁶ argues that revolutions and social movements emerge in response to changing political opportunities and constraints. Organizers use shared cultural forms for the mobilization of action and whatever resources are available to them. When political opportunities, political entrepreneurs, dense social networks and “action-oriented” cultural frames coincide, a social movement is more likely to arise. When it occurs in a way that brings about a competition between the movement and the government for sovereignty, a social movement can lead to a revolution.²⁷

²⁴ Skocpol compared the history of the revolutions in France in the late 1700s, Russia between 1917 and the 1930s, and the Chinese Revolution between 1911 and the 1960s.

²⁵ Theda Skocpol. *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. p. 5

²⁶ Tarrow’s work builds on that of Doug McAdam, who studied the civil rights movement in the US. Doug McAdam. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency in the US*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982.

²⁷ Sidney Tarrow. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, p. 10

Distinct from this macro-historical case comparison approach, there are numerous quantitative studies examining the correlation between large macro factors, like poverty or other popular grievances, or ethnic nationalism, and the occurrence of civil wars. Just one example of this quantitative macro-approach is provided by James Fearon and David Laitin's 2003 *American Political Science Review* article entitled, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." The authors compiled and applied existing databases to testing whether the occurrence of civil war correlated with ethnic differences, level of ethnic discrimination, level of democracy, increased poverty, rough territory that provides sanctuary, large rural populations that could provide sanctuary and neighboring states with a large ethnic minority populations that stretch into the state in question. From their study, the authors deduced that many of the factors the comparative case study literature identifies as causing ethnic minorities to become involved in civil wars do not correlate with civil war. These include cultural differences, defined as linguistic or religious, between the minority and the dominant group; degree of economic and cultural discrimination against the minority; and level of political democracy. They argue that it is political opportunity, the conditions for insurgency, that predict its occurrence, not grievances. The conditions that correspond with the emergence of an insurgency are weak or ineffective government, rough terrain, large populations, and access by would be insurgents to foreign weapons and financial support.²⁸ Once again, studies from the top down, from the outside, conclude the causes are structural.

The macro level qualitative, but especially the quantitative, approaches, suffer from serious problems with the availability and validity of data. By their very nature, weak and

²⁸ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97, 1. February 2003. p. 75-90.

fragile states lack governmental and non-governmental organizations resourced and capable of collecting valid data. Additionally, civil wars and looming civil wars provide a research context fraught with peril for researchers and subjects. Researchers are often loath to travel to conflict zones because of the risks of doing so, but also because of the difficulty of collecting data in such fraught environments. People in civil wars are often less than open and honest about their opinions, actions, events that occur around them, their incomes, ethnic identities and other demographic characteristics, among other topics.

There are some notable exceptions to the tendency to study civil wars from the outside, from the top down. There is a collection of literature by people who have participated in civil wars, both as insurgents and counterinsurgents. As Abdulkader Sinno notes, “understanding the processes and correlates of decisive outcomes remains the concern of those directly involved in conflict— those in power, their advisers, and those dedicated to replacing them. Some participants survive long enough to analyze and share their experiences.”²⁹

The lack of a valid explanation of what causes insurgent or government organizations to gain and maintain control at the local level during an insurgency is also evident in the debates among practitioners of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The debates about how best to run an insurgency or counter one revolve around a single axis: Is the support of the population required? Should you leverage existing authority structures? Do you need popular support in order to acquire resources? If so, how do you acquire the different types of resources you need – through force or money or shared beliefs? How

²⁹ Sinno, 2008. p. 2

important is an external sponsor? How important is external sanctuary? And how do you build an organization (government or insurgent) that is effective enough to translate strategy into actions by its personnel?

The US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) states, “The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy.”³⁰ In Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military has sought to convince the population to support the government and not the insurgency by winning their “hearts and minds”³¹ by providing security; generating jobs and income; providing services and repairing infrastructure; and creating a popular, accountable government. The goal of these efforts was to decrease the proportion of the population that is “sitting on the fence” and increase the proportion that supported the government. These efforts were coupled with attacks on the insurgent organization targeting the members of its “network”, while simultaneously working to build centralized security forces that are intended to do the same in perpetuity. The US counterinsurgency approach is based on the assumption that only a government or insurgent organization that can win the willing support of the population can gain control and erode control by an insurgent organization.

During the last decade, US military strategy has vacillated between the construction of highly centralized government institutions and security forces and more decentralized efforts to leverage existing social and authority structures through programs, like the Sunni Awakening in Iraq and Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan. In some of these cases, and in efforts to demobilize and reintegrate insurgents into normal society, the US military

³⁰ US Army Training and Doctrine Command. *Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24)*. Fort Leavenworth: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 2006. p. 1-8

³¹ Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning*. London: Faber and Faber, 1967. p. 176-9

mediated between government and insurgent organizations in order to change the government's particular goals and methods in return for insurgents laying down their arms.

Similar to their counterinsurgent counterparts, many insurgents emphasize gaining popular support for their organization's goals and implementation methods. In particular, Mao Tse-Tung emphasized the importance of mobilizing the population into a revolutionary organization that would overthrow the government. He even advocated institutions for holding his local rebels accountable to the population through local councils.³²

On the other side of the debate, the French governments of Algeria³³ and Indochina, and later the government of South Vietnam³⁴ did not focus on complying with the values, interests and existing social orders of the communities in which they were competing for control. Roger Trinquier's treatise, *Modern Warfare*, posits that, "the goal of modern warfare is control over the populace."³⁵ He cites terrorism as the main method of the insurgents. In his view, in order to gain control over the populace, insurgents infiltrate the population and commit acts of terrorism in order to demonstrate that the state cannot provide security. He proposes that the most important objective in defeating an insurgency is destroying its clandestine organization by identifying its members within the population

³² Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. p. 30

³³ Alastair Horne describes how the French government of Algeria sought to extend only minor reforms to the majority Arab population of Algeria and intended to perpetuate the deep social and economic gap between the ethnically French population and the ethnically Arab/Berber population. Even as violent resistance to these policies rose, the French government did not change them and opted instead to attempt to physically control the population largely through coercion. Alastair Horne. *A Savage War of Peace: 1954-1962*. New York: The New York Review of Books, 1977.

³⁴ Jeffrey Race describes in detail how the average local Vietnamese villager sought to increase his control over his land, the income from his work and the local social order, while the government of Vietnam sought to maintain a system of land ownership that ran counter to these wishes. He describes how the communist resistance had an ideology, values and strategy that fit with the values, and interests of the rural communities who chose to offer information, sanctuary, support and other resources to the rebels. Jeffrey Race. *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.

³⁵ Trinquier. p. 7-8

and killing or capturing them. He argues that the beliefs of the people in this matter are not particularly relevant because when they are faced with coercion from a government or insurgent organization, the people lack the power to resist based on their beliefs. He recognizes the great importance of information from the populace in identifying the location of members of the clandestine organization. He emphasizes the importance of the use of torture and coercion of suspected collaborators or insurgents, as opposed to an attempt to encourage cooperation from the populace, to extract information about the location of individual insurgents.³⁶

The Ba'ath Party under Saddam Hussein in Iraq clearly took the view that insurgent control can be eliminated without popular support for the government. During the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, there were several insurgencies within Iraq and Saddam Hussein directed extremely vicious counterinsurgency campaigns against them. The most significant insurgency was by Shia activists under the leadership of the Sadr family. The Sadrs and their Dawa Party sought to politically mobilize Shia Iraqis to create an Islamic state ruled by a combination of an elected parliament and a judiciary of Shia scholars who could interpret Islamic law to meet the challenges of modernity. When the Shia Islamist movement was already more than a decade old, it encountered Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party rule in 1968 and Saddam's approach to this insurgency was famously brutal. Almost as soon as the Ba'ath Party took power in 1968, it began a campaign that combined the expulsion of large numbers of Shia from Iraq's shrine cities into Iran; the freezing of the assets of the major Shia religious organizations (including those of the religious universities and shrines in Najaf and Karbala); the arrest and torture of members of the Dawa Party; prohibition of public religious marches and violent attacks with tanks and bombers on the thousands of

³⁶ Trinquier.

Shia who defiantly participated; and finally the assassination or execution of the key leaders of the Shia insurgency. At the same time, the Ba'ath Party set up a massive system of clandestine information collection in order to identify people who resisted its rule. The Ba'ath Party's Orwellian surveillance curbed the ability of the Shia movement to operate clandestinely. Although the Ba'ath Party combined these actions with some spending on social programs in the affected Shia majority areas, the government was not focused on gaining popular support for its ideology or reducing popular support for the Shia Islamist movement. It focused instead on the brutal, consistent, application of force to people who opposed the regime.³⁷

Some insurgents, like their government counterparts, also take the view that they do not need popular support for their goals or their methods of implementing them as long as they are very effective at identifying rule breaking and publically sanctioning it. Good examples of this type of insurgent organization include the Taliban, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and the Shining Path in Peru. For example, believing it is their duty to violently enforce the rules of Allah and let that violent sanction serve as a warning, Taliban fighters do not seek the consent of the people of a community. Instead, the Taliban counts on the effectiveness of its fighters in sanctioning rule breaking every time they find it in order to gain and maintain control over people's behavior.

Beyond the practitioners, who, finding themselves participating in the processes below the national level and striving to impact the outcomes, constantly examine processes and outcomes, there is a growing body of academic work examining processes and outcomes of civil wars from the bottom up, using empirical evidence painstakingly collected

³⁷ Joyce N. Wiley, *The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi'as*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

for that purpose. The work focuses on the causes of participation in civil wars, organizations and their effectiveness, and violence in civil wars.

Stathis Kalyvas' the *Logic of Violence in Civil War* rejects the notion that violence in civil war is irrational. Violence is part of the struggle between armed political organizations for control, for sovereignty and it follows a logic. In order to describe this logic, Kalyvas builds a theory of irregular warfare and an explanation of violence's role in it. He does so by first reviewing literature about many civil wars in order to build a theory about the process of irregular warfare and derive a set of hypotheses about how violence would occur if these theories were valid. Using empirical descriptions of the process of the civil war in each village in the Argolid region of southern Greece, he tests his hypotheses and discovers his theories are correct.

Kalyvas argues that civil war occurs when the political opportunities generated by state weakness lead to a competition between two political actors for sovereignty defined as control over the population in a specific territory. Armed political organizations (government or insurgent) gain control over an area when the organization, at the macro level, shifts resources to the micro level fight in the area under study. Control by an organization increases the collaboration of the population with that organization. The population collaborates by providing the most important resource it can to the organization in question, information about the enemy's presence and location. By denouncing the enemy to an organization, the population participates in violence against the enemy. Selective violence against the enemy and its collaborators is therefore a joint process

between members of the population who provide information to the armed organization and the organization. Without selective violence, and therefore without accurate information, an armed political organization can only use indiscriminate violence. Indiscriminate violence cannot cause an organization to have control because it provides potential victims with no reason not to attack the organization, not to collaborate with its enemies. Indiscriminate violence provides no incentives to impact people's obedience to an organization.³⁸

In Kalyvas' theory, exogenous shifts in resources by one or the other armed political organization cause control to shift. Control in turn increases collaboration and the population begins giving the organization information about others who are collaborating with their enemy. These denunciations allow the organization to use selective violence to sanction collaborators, increasing the organization's control.

In *Inside Rebellion*, Jeremy Weinstein examines the role of organizational structure and function of rebel organizations and their relationships with the communities in which they live and operate in determining their level of violence against civilians. Weinstein examines the implications of the constraints resources impose on rebel organization institutional development and behavior. He argues that rebel organizations that have social resources – dense social networks, shared interests, shared identities, beliefs and norms that promote cooperation – are less likely to commit violence against civilians, while those that have economic resources (that are relatively non-labor intensive) are more likely

³⁸ Ibid.

to be violent toward civilians. Weinstein describes the role of the mechanisms for translating these resources into behaviors across his four cases: recruiting, indoctrination, methods of control, approaches to governance, the use of violence and strategies for resilience.

Weinstein's descriptions suggest that the efficacy of a rebel organization in winning popular support might be related to the rebel organization's social endowments, effective leadership and the organization's ability to control its members. However, the rebel organizations Weinstein describes were equally successful in seizing power on the national level if they had social or economic endowments and he did not measure how successful each of the rebel organizations were in controlling the local communities where they operated. Weinstein found that both social resource-rich rebel organizations were less violent than the economic resource-rich organizations toward the civilian population. However, one of each type of rebel organization was successful in its efforts to take power in the government. Weinstein's description does not take into account the factor of the competition between the rebel organization organizations and the government for sovereignty. The rebel organizations are presented as institutions that operate within the context of their communities, based on resource constraints, but not with political competition. Weinstein's explanation is of organizations as actors in the context of resource constraints, but not one that incorporates the system of competition between organizations within a resource constrained environment.³⁹ Competition between these organizations

³⁹ Weinstein's argument is structured in a way that is similar to a description by Paul Berman of the process of institutionalization of rebellion in South Vietnam. In his *Revolutionary Organization*, Berman describes how the institution of the PLAF developed within the existing culture and shaped the behavior of peasants in South Vietnam and its members.

may be the underlying cause of the eventual success or failure of each type of rebel organization, be they social resource-rich or economic resource-rich.

In *Revolutionary Organization*, Paul Berman writes about the Vietnamese communists as a revolutionary organization that transformed its entire society by mobilizing large portions of the population to act on its behalf. Berman argues that revolution is not simply the collapse of an old order, but in the deliberate strategy of a revolutionary organization to control society. The aim of a revolutionary organization is to establish a new political order; to affect all aspects of society: social structure, norms and values, patterns of economic and political activity, and the ways individuals thought of others, of their society and of themselves. He argues successful revolution engenders dual transformations of society – namely the violent destruction of existing ways of life and development of new institutions.⁴⁰

Berman explains how the communist party motivated its personnel to act to achieve shared goals by convincing its members, within their own cultural and social framework, that their activities on behalf of the organization were right and proper. He argues that the organization's greatest asset was its ability to motivate its personnel by making them want to act on its behalf because they believed what they were doing was right. Berman explains how the organization mobilized peasants to join it; how it integrated them into the organization and convinced them to comply with the organization's demands; and how the organization maintained itself against the stresses of sustained warfare.⁴¹ Berman argues

⁴⁰ Berman, p. 1-2

⁴¹ Berman, p. 6

the most important thing the Vietnamese communist party did was effectively integrate peasants into the organization, which he defines as coordinating their behavior to achieve a unified purpose.⁴² He argues they did so through a seamless process of offering peasants an ideology that appealed to them in the context of the collapse of their traditional system and their values, indoctrinating them to generate the patterns of behavior it wanted and providing them with positive incentives for acting according to the organization's intent. He also described how the organization's well-developed system for collecting information about people not acting in accordance with its intent and sanctioning them reinforced this process of motivating people through ideology.⁴³

Using his extensive experience interacting with the many different Afghan *mujihadeen* organizations as a humanitarian organization worker during the war against the Soviets, Abdulkader Sinno expounds a theory that an organization's structure, primarily its level of centralization, determines the extent to which it can execute a set of processes that determine whether the organization survives and whether it is able to eliminate its enemy organizations. Sinno defines victory for insurgent organizations as survival. The last organization standing wins the civil war. He argues that in order for an organization to survive, it must produce incentives for its personnel to execute a set of processes better than its competitor organizations, including formulation and execution of strategy, coordination of activities, mobilization of resources, accessing foreign aid, maintaining

⁴² Berman, p. 14

⁴³ Ibid

control and discipline, resilience in hostile environments, balancing intra-organizational cohesion and competition, and the generation and preservation of knowledge.⁴⁴

Sinno argues that centralized organizations are more effective at executing the processes that organizations engaged in violent conflict must execute because of their discipline, ability to generate and implement complex strategies and raise resources. Sinno writes that a centralized organization is more capable of executing processes in contested areas. But, it is also more effective at generating resources from the population of safe havens because of its coherence and discipline. Sinno identifies the Achilles heel of centralized organizations as their need for a high level of coordination. Without coordination, the specialized components of a centralized organization are unable to complete their tasks.

Sinno argues that if a centralized organization does not have a safe haven, it becomes an easy target for rival organizations and is less likely to survive than a decentralized organization. Centralized organizations rely on close coordination among their specialized branches, which can damage the organization's effectiveness if that coordination is interrupted by rivals. Centralized organizations can also be incapacitated if decapitated and that is increasingly possible if the organization lacks a safe haven. Centralized organizations are also less able to mobilize popular support in contested territory because they are less connected to the local social structure and less adaptive to local needs.

⁴⁴ Abdulkader H. Sinno. *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Sinno argues that in contested areas, decentralized organizations with more autonomous components are more likely to survive than their centralized counterparts. Although they are ineffective at coordinating large scale actions, they require less coordination and therefore expose their functions to less danger. He argues that the decentralized nature of *mujihadeen* field units allowed them to survive the war with the Soviets because they did not need specialized functions and were less vulnerable to having flows of information, command and control and resources cut off. He argues that centralized organizations, like the current Taliban insurgency, are more effective than their decentralized opponents if they have an external sanctuary that allows their leadership to exercise its command and control, training and recruitment and other functions unmolested. Quetta provides that external sanctuary to the Taliban and it allows this centralized organization to operate optimally without fear of decapitation or loss of the specialized functions it needs to survive.

There are several works examining the causes of civil war by explaining why men rebel. These works fall into two categories: those that argue people rebel because of interest, and those that argue people rebel because of their beliefs.

In *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, James C. Scott Using historical descriptions of Vietnam and Burma during the 1930s, Scott describes the awkward intersection between colonial powers and traditional peasant societies. Scott argues that the conditions for a peasant rebellion occur when the government violates the beliefs peasants have about what is just. When the norms of reciprocity and the social right to earn or grow enough to subsist

are violated, an aggregation of angry peasants forms an uprising. Scott argues that peasant uprisings are caused by beliefs, not by economic interests.⁴⁵

Writing in direct contradiction to Scott's book, Samuel Popkin, describing his field work in Vietnam, asserts that norms and values do not explain peasant uprisings. In *The Rational Peasant*, Popkin argues that peasants are rational actors, calculating their economic costs and benefits. Peasants do not participate in collective tasks because of beliefs or values, they do so to maximize their profit. A peasant calculates, "the returns versus the cost of his participation: Peasant institutions, therefore, have a built-in tension: the benefits of valuable village-wide services and leadership versus the chance of personal loss of power concentrated in the hands of another peasant."⁴⁶

Karl Jackson finds that in the *Dar ul Islam* rebellion in Indonesia in the 1960s, participation by peasants in the uprising was based on whether their traditional authority figure, called a *bapak*, chose to participate or not, rather than on individual or village instrumental or ideological factors.⁴⁷ But other accounts of causes of recruitment at the micro level indicate that coercion, fear of other groups and money have been factors that cause individuals to join revolutionary organizations.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ James C. Scott. *Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.

⁴⁶ Samuel L. Popkin. *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. p. 26.

⁴⁷ Karl D. Jackson. *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

⁴⁸ See Paul Berman. *Revolutionary Organization: Institution-Building within the People's Liberation Armed Forces*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books. 1974. Chapter 4. Also, See Weinstein, Chapter 3.

In *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*, Elisabeth Jean Wood argues that participation was based largely, but not exclusively, on ideological factors and the pride the rebels found in taking action to assert their new socially equal identity. Wood conducted ethnographic and interview research during and after the war in the highlands of El Salvador. She found that two-thirds of the people in the area where she conducted her research did not participate in the revolution. What differentiated those that participated from those that did not were not instrumental factors, such as poverty and the need for land ownership, but instead an assertion of their belief that they deserved social equality.⁴⁹

Examining the cases of rebellion against the Germany and the Soviet Union during World War II in Lithuania, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Roger Petersen attempts to explain why people with significantly less money, weapons and personnel risk their lives to organize resistance and rebellion. His work focuses on the motivations of people at the community level to do so and then on how that combines into larger scale rebellion. Unlike many of his fellow researchers, Petersen finds that that beliefs, mobilizing ideologies, strong social structures, action-mobilizing and group cohesion-promoting norms⁵⁰, as opposed to external resources, economic or security interests and organizational fortitude cause people to rebel either as individuals or in groups. Petersen finds that beliefs trump interest, resources and organization in compelling people to rebel.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Elisabeth Jean Wood. *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

⁵⁰ Roger D. Petersen. *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Elisabeth Jean Wood has co-authored a recent article pointing out the need for a program of study to examine the role of ideology in civil war. Wood and her fellow author, Francisco Sanin, define ideology as, “a more or less systematic set of ideas that includes the identification of a referent group (a class, ethnic, or other social group), an enunciation of the grievances or challenges that the group confronts, the identification of objectives on behalf of that group (political change – or defense against its threat), and a (perhaps vaguely defined) program of action.” The authors point out that recent studies of civil war have emphasized other causal factors, like economic interest, external resources, territorial control, information, etc. and neglected ideology. In some cases, people neglect the study of ideology because it is difficult to study. But, they go on, ideology is a very important factor in civil war. It has instrumental functions, like the motivation and coordination of insurgents, or blue prints for strategies and institutions. Beyond these instrumental functions, “some armed groups depend on combatants normatively and emotionally committed to an ideology. Founders cannot therefore choose just any ideology; they must take into account the normative commitments of their combatants: Which ideology will identify, resonate with, and therefore motivate its constituency? Moreover, they choose an ideology from a set of historically relevant ideologies, not from a long list of all possible ideologies.” In this way, ideologies may constrain or guide what a group does. Ignoring ideology as a causal factor in explaining phenomena in civil wars leads to incomplete analysis of causes.⁵²

⁵² Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood. “Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond” *Journal of Peace Research* 2014 51: 213.

In conclusion, practitioners of insurgency and counterinsurgency disagree as to whether the agreement and support of the population, external resources, external sanctuary, or organizational effectiveness cause victory.

Academic studies of civil war focus on the causes of civil wars, violence and the role of organizations and resources in civil war. There is also deep disagreement among them as to the role of ideology, social structure, interests, organizational effectiveness and external resources in determining outcomes.

What the existing academic literature does not focus on is the object of the competition between insurgents and governments, control over the behavior of populations.

Control

There are, however, three authors who actively seek to understand the causes of control. Their definitions of control, as well as their explanations of its causes, vary. The first is Bernard Fall. In an article for *Military Review*, Fall describes how the French failed to understand the extent of communist control in Indochina because they mistook territorial control for control over the population. Fall describes how the French measured their control by determining where they could patrol and where they could base their troops. Because of his interaction with Vietnamese students at the university in Hanoi, Fall recognized that this method fundamentally underestimated the extent of communist control. Fall asked his Vietnamese friends how they knew if a village was under the control

of the communists or the government. From their description, he identified two characteristics that he could measure that indicated whether a village was under government or communist control. He used these measures, of whether there was a government teacher in the village and whether the government was able to collect taxes in the village, to identify villages under government and communist control. Fall showed that the French military assessed that it controlled large portions of North Vietnam during 1953, just one year before the collapse of their regime. When Fall evaluated 5,780 villages, he found that 37% were under Vietminh control and therefore inaccessible to the French, 32% accessible but actually under communist control and that only 31% of villages in under French control. What was more concerning was that when mapped out, the findings showed that the French military believed they had more than 50% control over large areas surrounding Hanoi and the “lifeline” road that linked it to Haiphong, but that in reality, large areas abutting the capital and huge swaths of territory near the road were under communist control. When Fall concludes, “the French criteria of ‘control’ had no real meaning when it came to giving a factual picture of who owned what (or whom) throughout the Vietnamese countryside inside the French battle line, much less outside. The French confused linear mobility or military accessibility with control.”⁵³

The Fall article points to the fact that insurgents faced with an effective, well-resourced enemy do not openly engage patrols or attack bases, declaring emphatically their presence and drawing a devastating attack. Instead, they wait, disguised within the population until they have an advantage. For that reason, the ability for a conventional force to move through or base in an area during a conflict with an insurgent organization

⁵³ Fall, p. 3-6

does not necessarily mean that force has control. It is not territorial control that matters to who wins and loses in irregular warfare. It is social control, control over the rules people obey. In effect, Fall is measuring social control.

Jeffrey Race describes how the communists had a strategy for achieving victory, which they conceived of as control over people's behavior, similar to Bernard Fall's description of social control. In *War Comes to Long An*, Race describes the communist concept of victory as, "the unchallenged ability to determine the actions of all within a specified domain, whether it be a hamlet or a nation."⁵⁴ Race describes how, in the province where he studied the competition between the Vietnamese government and the communist party, the communists were victorious because they had, "a comprehensive view of revolution as a stage by stage social process."⁵⁵ This strategy of victory was comprised of a multi-dimensional effort to mobilize social classes through the contradictions between them in order to generate force. Fall describes how the communists defined force not as coercion, but as, "a group of persons acting in concert so as to determine the actions of others."⁵⁶ Force, by this definition, arose from motivation and could not be created through coercion because, they asked, who would coerce the coercers?⁵⁷ Vietnamese communists conceived of a world in which organizations balanced against one another, with forces, sized by roughly the number of people supporting them; and power, or the effectiveness of each organization, which multiplied force through technology, command and control, etc.

⁵⁴ Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. p.148

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 143

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 142-144

Together, these factors across each of the competing organizations comprised a balance of power.⁵⁸

The communities' goal in this competition was to win in that balance across the country. According to Race, they knew they had dominated the balance of power in the strategic province he studied, Long An, in 1965. But, they needed to wait to overtly demonstrate their victory until they had done so throughout Vietnam, so that the province would not become a target of government ire. Race describes how the communists considered themselves victorious once they controlled the behavior of a village. Communists saw the security of the village as a component of their own control, and realized that overtly announcing their control to the government would destroy the village's security. The communists realized that the resulting loss of control over behavior of villagers would undermine their control and diminish the resources they could garner from a secure village.⁵⁹

Race argues that it is neither agreement alone, nor resources alone, nor organizational effectiveness alone that caused the communist victory in Long An.⁶⁰ His work hints at the idea of an organization executing a process that combines these factors, applying them in concerted action, in competition with another organization, to determine how people behave at the community level.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 144-146

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 146-148

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 174-193

In his estimation, the communists won because they had an effective strategy for mobilizing local residents to take risks in order to influence the actions of others. Race argues that the communists had a clear policy of providing incentives for behavior. The incentives were contingent on individuals behaving according to the intent of the communists. The rewards for local residents who complied with communist intent were also contingent on the survival of the communist organization as a power in the area. These contingent incentives fell into the categories of redistribution of resources, power and status. Race argues that the government's policies, like broad economic development programs, had incentives that were not contingent and had no clearly defined goals.⁶¹

Additionally, Race argues that the communists had goals which coincided with those of the vast majority of the people of Long An, while the government opposed those goals. According to Race, the vast majority of the people of Long An supported a reordering of society, while the government strongly resisted any change to the traditional social system.

Race argues that the communists also effectively used the rural social structure to tie their interests to those of the communities. They did this by using representative local forces to perform functions the local population perceived to be useful. The local community had some control over the incentives used to motivate the forces and the forces had to rely upon the local community for supplies. Together, these requirements produced communist forces that were fundamentally geared toward achieving the support of the local communities. The communists took advantage of local communalism by delegating power

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 174-5

to the local level and allowing local interests to be fulfilled by local communal leaders, rather than subordinating them to the interests of a larger national party.⁶²

The government, on the other hand, was resourced from, staffed by and oriented on the interests of the urban center of Saigon. It therefore neither understood nor served the interests of the population of Long An and failed to develop contingent incentives that would motivate action. The government in Saigon attempted to control the local population by producing direct bonds of loyalty by the individual to the national government through the ideology of nationalism (which had little cultural basis in Long An's culture). The government disempowered its local leadership relative to the national leadership.⁶³ Race describes how the communists' community oriented approach was both cheaper and more effective than the government's top-down approach. The government sought to improve its administrative capabilities, as opposed to actions or outcomes, while the communists sought the goal of control over the behavior of the population at the community level, both as an end in itself and as a source of force (resources) for the fight against the government.⁶⁴

In summary, Race describes a competition between the government and the communist insurgents for the right to determine the future of Vietnamese society. He notes that each organization pursued a different strategy, resulting in different actions. The communist strategy had a clearly defined goal and an idea of how it would get there, by

⁶² Ibid, p. 174-181

⁶³ Race, 1972. p. 174-181

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 159-173

mobilizing the population at the local level and controlling the behavior of the population. He argues that it was not simply people's agreement with the goals of the communists, or the effectiveness of the communist organization, or its ability to embed itself in the social structure. It was some combination of these things that translated into communist control, into the ability to determine how people would behave. But, beyond his observation that all of these factors were part of an effective communist strategy and that the government lacked a strategy for victory, he does not go further into describing what causes one or another organization to gain and maintain control.

Stathis Kalyvas' theory of irregular warfare posits that control is the object of the competition between governments and insurgent organizations. He writes that at the micro level, control causes collaboration and control results from shifts in resources at the macro level, where organizations decide, for reasons exogenous to the micro level fight, to increase or decrease resources.⁶⁵

Kalyvas describes how government and insurgent organizations seek accurate information about people working for, assisting or providing information to their enemies so that it can selectively sanction them. Irregular warfare results when insurgents decide not to face an enemy with superior coercive force. Hiding among the population, seeking the moment of greatest advantage to attack, insurgents are extremely vulnerable to people informing their adversaries of their presence. Likewise, government security forces can only be attacked by insurgents if the insurgents have information about their location. For

⁶⁵ Kalyvas, 2006. p. 111-145

that reason, “political actors seek the exclusive and complete collaboration of all civilians. ... They also seek to prevent civilians from collaborating with their rivals.”⁶⁶ That is how popular support translates into control, but popular support does not simply result from people’s beliefs. It can result from coercion, economic interest, fear and revenge or loyalty to people already supporting the organization.⁶⁷

Kalyvas argues that selective violence is a joint process between civilians and personnel from the competing armed organizations because the civilians are providing the targets, collaborating by providing information denouncing people working for the enemy.⁶⁸ He contends that valid denunciation will only occur when the benefits to the civilian outweigh the costs and that therefore selective violence often does not take place in areas where an organization does not have control.⁶⁹ In the areas where the organization in question does not have control, an informer, who provides information to the organization about the location of its rivals, exposes himself to punishment. In areas where the organization has control, those costs are reduced. For this reason, selective violence does not occur often because of a lack of information in areas outside the organization’s control and because few defectors remain in an area under the organization’s control.⁷⁰

Kalyvas tests his theories by measuring the patterns of control and violence by government and insurgent organizations across the villages of the Argolid region in southern Greece during the civil war there. He tests whether the hypothesized levels of

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 104

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 95-101

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 173.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 13, p. 173

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 209

violence that result from his theories confirm his theory. Kalyvas describes the measurement of control as, “the most significant empirical challenge.”⁷¹ He describes the ideal measure of control, as that identified by Jeffrey Race in *War Comes to Long An*, “the probability that a certain event or class of events will not occur within a defined area within a defined period of time ...”⁷² Kalyvas coded for control based on either combatant being able to move through the village, base in the village, operate overtly or clandestinely in the village.⁷³ Kalyvas used data compiled from interviews with villagers, archival evidence and published histories and memoirs⁷⁴ to code the villages into five zones of control. In Zones 1 and 5, each actor has control and the other actor has no significant access. In Zones 2 and 4, each actor has control, but the other actor has limited access to the population. In Zone 3, the contested zone, neither organization has control and both have access to the population.⁷⁵

While Kalyvas’ theory explains shifts in territorial control, it does not explain what Race was describing, an organization’s ability to determine how people behave across a larger set of topics. It also leaves out the explanation of how organizations generate what the communists of Long An would have called force, or well-resourced, coordinated actions by personnel. And, both Race and Berman would argue that the communists gained control because they had an integrated strategy for mobilizing the population that included people’s beliefs, social structure, coercion, economic interests, etc. Perhaps it is not one or the other, beliefs or resources or social structure or organization that causes control. Perhaps these factors operate alone or in combination under particular conditions to result

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 210

⁷² Race, 1972. p. 277 from Kalyvas, 2006. p. 210

⁷³ Kalyvas, 2006. p. 421.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 393-411

⁷⁵ Kalyvas, p. 212

in control. Perhaps different organizations use different combinations of the factors based on their goals, their assets and the conditions in which they operate to approach establishing control differently. There may be a process, a series of actions, that applies different combinations of the factors to successfully exert control. No one to date has empirically studied the process that translates those factors into people behaving in the way the organization wants them to behave in the context of a civil war.

CHAPTER 3

Methods

This dissertation seeks to explain the causes of government and insurgent organization control over the behavior of populations in a country in which sovereignty is violently contested, Afghanistan.

A review of the literature on the causes of control by insurgent or government organizations reveals that no single factor can explain all outcomes in terms of control. The literature does uncover factors that may be causal under different conditions, including popular support for an organization's goals;⁷⁶ resources an organization can obtain from the population⁷⁷ and from external supporters;⁷⁸ and organizational effectiveness.⁷⁹

However, the accumulated knowledge on the topic of control results largely from national-level studies of a topic whose outcomes are more likely determined at the local level. The literature that does focus on the local level identifies the importance of information and selective sanctioning in causing control.⁸⁰ It also finds that indiscriminate

⁷⁶ Berman, p. 1-6. Race, p. 146-181.

⁷⁷ Weinstein argues that organizations with "social endowments", that rely upon the communities where they operate for resources, are less violent toward the population than those with "economic endowments", which allow them to access resources without the support of the population. Weinstein, p. 47-53. Kalyvas specifically highlights the importance of members of the populace providing information to an armed political organization about its opponents' location and activities. He argues that violence in civil war is a joint process between the people providing information and the personnel of the organization who use it to target violence. He argues this collaboration by the population does not occur because they agree with the organization, but because the organization has control in the area. Kalyvas, p. 173-209.

⁷⁸ Kalyvas argues that organizations shift resources to a region and that macro-level, external resource flow causes them to gain control at the micro level. Kalyvas, p. 111-145

⁷⁹ Berman argues that the People's Liberation Armed Forces were successful because the organization was effective in motivating its personnel to take specific actions. Berman, p. 1-8.

⁸⁰ Kalyvas, p. 146-172.

violence is an ineffective method of control because there is no action other than resistance that can result in a positive outcome for the local population.⁸¹ Finally, the literature focused on the local level explains changes in control based on exogenous shifts in military resources.⁸² The main aspect currently missing from the accumulated theoretical knowledge of the causes of control during an insurgency is the conditions under which the factors described above affect the level of control each organization has. These conditions can only be understood by studying the actions of organizations that succeed or fail in exerting control over the behavior of a population during an insurgency.

In order to explain more fully the causes of control by insurgent or government organizations, this study focuses on the local level. Using local level empirical data collected during the conflict between the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), the study tests the hypothesized causal factors above, and describes the processes by which insurgent and government organizations control behavior.

This study compares cases of organizations taking actions in communities⁸³ and the communities reacting by obeying or disobeying the organization's rules. Each case describes the extent to which people obey the organization's rules and attempts to explain why. A case consists of one organization within one community during one time period. This allows for comparison between organizations competing within community cases.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Kalyvas, p. 111-145, 213.

⁸³ Communities consist of between 100 and 250 households in Afghanistan. In the communities under study, there are organizations with high levels of control over the behavior of a population and organizations with little to no control over the behavior of populations, allowing for comparison both within communities and across them. A detailed description of the data and the communities and how they were selected and compared is contained in the remainder of this chapter.

Additionally, it allows for comparison over time of changes in that competition within a single community.

In an effort to explain what causes the different outcomes for different organizations, each case examines the extent to which residents of a community agree with the rules of the organization, its goals or its actions and how that is related to their compliance with the organization's rules. Each case describes the extent to which people in the community provide the organization with information, sanctuary, personnel, money, goods and services, why they do so and how that is related to the organization's control over residents' behavior. Conversely, each case describes the external resources, in the form of personnel, money, goods, services, information or sanctuary, each organization has and how those external resources affect the organization's control over the behavior of the population. Finally, using a benchmark of the actions each organization says it wants its personnel to take, each case describes the actions of the organization's personnel in the community and evaluates the effectiveness of the organization in causing them to do what it intends. It then evaluates the extent to which actions by the organization's personnel affect whether or not residents obey the organization's rules.

The study then applies these descriptions to testing whether the macro factors of agreement, resources and organizational effectiveness co-vary with an organization's control over the behavior of a community. The study then compares cases in which people obeyed and disobeyed the rules of organizations in order to determine whether there are actions and resources without which no organization can control the behavior of a

community. This comparison is intended to elucidate whether or not there is a process, a series of actions an organization can take, that translates the macro factors of agreement, resources and organizational effectiveness into control.

In order to implement this study, two very different sets of data were required. One was a national level data set consisting of primary and secondary source material describing the organizations, their visions for the future of Afghanistan, the rules they want Afghans to obey and how they plan to cause them to do so. The other data set, the one describing the actions of organizations and the reactions of individuals and communities in Afghanistan was built through a novel empirical research method specifically designed to describe this topic in the context of a civil war.

National Level Data about Organizations

A review of the primary and secondary literature on the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan provided the basis for this dissertation's description of the vision of the social world each organization is attempting to establish and the rules it believes Afghans should obey in order to make that world a reality. It also includes a description of the methods each organization uses to influence people to obey its rules. Primary and secondary sources also provide the basis for a description of the strategy each organization will pursue in order to reach its ends, including the resources it plans to apply to reaching its ends and the actions it intends its personnel take. Finally, the

dissertation provides a description of each organization's ideal personnel and the way each organization attempts to motivate them to act.

These descriptions are intended to familiarize the reader with what the Taliban and government are competing over and how. Without these descriptions, it would be impossible to assess the extent to which people obey the rules of each organization because there would be no basis for what those rules are. Without these descriptions, there would be no set of goals or vision of the future to compare with the beliefs of the communities under study. Further, the description of the origin and nature of resources available to each organization provides an input to assessing whether external resources increase the control an organization has over the behavior of a population. These descriptions also provide the benchmark for determining whether an organization's personnel act upon its intent or not. Without these national level descriptions, it would be difficult for the reader to understand the competition described in the community case studies.

The information that forms the basis for the description of the Taliban and GIRoA was drawn not only from academic and journalistic books about the organizations and the history of Afghanistan, but also from the laws, constitutions, codes of conduct, strategy documents, and public speeches by leaders of each organization. These primary sources allow the organizations and their leaders to speak for themselves about their goals, the rules they would like to enforce and how they would like their personnel to behave.

Community Data

In order to explain the causes of control, research must delve down to the very local level, where insurgent and government organization ability to control or failure to control behavior becomes real when people obey or disobey the rules of each organization. It is at this level that government and insurgent organizations act to influence people to obey their rules. These actions and the reactions of the population to them can only be seen at the point where the pattern of actions by organizations and the individual and group choices about how to react to those actions are made.

Problems with Validity of Interview Data in Civil Wars

This local-level approach requires valid data about social life at the individual and community level during a period when the system of order at that level was violently contested. The study of control during insurgency is plagued by problems with data validity. During an insurgency, armed political organizations compete violently to control people's behavior. In this competition, each organization can use violence to sanction people who violate their rules. Rules clash and people's choices regarding a broad range of their actions can result in violent sanctions by insurgents and government security forces. What people do and say becomes a very sensitive topic. People are loath to be interviewed or filmed because they do not want to give any armed political organization information about beliefs, actions and characteristics that any of those organizations might believe

worthy of a sanction. For people in war zones, saying nothing is often the best approach to survival since beliefs and behaviors that are normal today may be violently sanctioned tomorrow.

As a result, methods developed to collect data in the United States, like survey research or other formal interview methods, do not produce valid data. These methods rely upon the assumption that randomly selected people will open their doors to strangers and provide them with honest answers to their questions. During a civil war, people do not like to discuss their beliefs or actions, or those of their neighbors, insurgents or security forces, with people whose motives are unknown. Additionally, when strange interviewers approach one person's house with a clipboard, people in the surrounding houses can see this interaction and may be concerned the person has given information to the interviewer about them or others in the village, endangering them. These issues of trust increase the likelihood that people will refuse to participate in the survey in question or even that people in the village may run the interview researchers out of the village.

For example, during the spring, summer and fall of 2014, there were several Pakistani spies who came to the Kapisa Mountain Village, not with clipboards and a questionnaire, but posing as beggars. It is common for beggars to approach the back doors of homes in Afghanistan and ask for food. Often, residents invite the beggars in and feed them. In three cases, the beggars asked questions about people in the village working for the government and the villagers, Wakil or elders called the police to have them arrested.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ 140723 Pakistani Taliban Actions R3

These incidents and similar ones in the same village during 2012 and 2013 led people in the village to be very suspicious of strangers asking questions.

In another incident in July 2014, an interviewer from a research company in Kabul that had been paid to conduct a random sample survey in Kapisa Province approached the Son of Elder 1 who was walking in the village. The young man, who was a Tajik from far off Parmon Province, told Son of Elder 1 that he was a television and computer repairman and asked if he or anyone else in the village had equipment that needed to be repaired. Son of Elder 1 told the interviewer that Elder 1's television was not functioning properly and took him home to repair it. While he was repairing the television, the young man asked the elder's son what the government did in the village and what villagers thought about it. Then, he asked what the Taliban did and what the villagers thought about it. Son of Elder 1 was alarmed, thinking perhaps the repairman was a spy and confronted him about it. Son of Elder 1 asked the interviewer whether he was really a repairman or if he was a spy and if he was spying for the Taliban or the government. The interviewer, concerned Son of Elder 1 might call the police, confessed that he worked for a research company in Kabul and that he was repairing televisions to get people to talk to him because no one would answer his questions if he just told them he was a researcher. He explained that he wrote the answers down later. Son of Elder 1 told the young researcher he understood his predicament, but he could not help him. He paid the young man for repairing the television and asked him to leave.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ 140723 Pakistani Taliban Actions R3

This anecdote provides insight into how instruments that are not designed for the social setting of a civil war drive researchers to not implement them as prescribed and drive respondents to be less than honest about what they believe, do and see others do. The results of the survey mentioned above were not based on a random sample of respondents answering a consistent set of questions and responses. Those results were based on the interviewer's interpretation of what a set of respondents he could get to allow him to repair their televisions might have said if they had been asked the questions. Further, respondents might not have given him any accurate information because they distrusted him for asking. One can imagine analysts back in Kabul, writing up the report on this survey, would have recorded the responses into spreadsheets as though they represented the responses of a random sample and as though people had answered a set of consistent questions. They would then draw conclusions from the survey based on those assumptions, blithely unaware that the sample was not random and the responses were actually those of the interviewers, not the respondents.

Further, even if properly implemented in an environment where people do not fear their beliefs and actions could bring them physical harm, survey research can only capture responses to pre-formulated questions at a particular point in time. Surveys ask questions the researchers who author the instrument think are important, leaving open the possibility that the respondent may answer the question, but neither the question nor the answer may be of any great import to him. The authors then analyze the results, often leading to misinterpretations. Because a survey is a snapshot in time of responses to questions, it does not capture processes, series of actions and reactions, effectively.

Multi-Sited Participant Observation by Long Time Residents

Because of the serious problems with the existing methods for empirically describing micro-level interactions during a civil war, this study developed a new method for empirically describing the actions of government and insurgent organizations and the reactions of communities during a civil war. The method is an application of participant observation, the main method of research in anthropology. Anthropologists are painstakingly trained and educated to describe the social world with all its interactions and to translate for people a world away what those actions mean to the people who take them.⁸⁶ Training and education is paramount for participant observation because the researcher does not have a prescribed set of topics, but is instead attempting to richly describe social reality. Whereas the survey form is the instrument in a survey, the participant observation researcher is the instrument. He or she must decide what and whom to describe, how to describe it and then interpret what it means. Anthropologists therefore require robust training on accurately describing and interpreting the social world. Anthropologists normally travel to and immerse themselves in a foreign society to participate in it and describe it from the perspective of a participant. This method is very effective at describing a limited subset of a society in vast detail over time.

A participant observation researcher could describe the actions of organizations and

⁸⁶ Andrew Abbott. *Methods of Discovery: Heuristics for the Social Sciences*. New York: WW Norton and Company, 2004.

the reactions of residents of a community over time as the basis for understanding why organizations succeed or fail in controlling the behavior of populations. But, if that community were in a war zone, a participant observer not from the community he or she was observing would, by his or her simple presence, strongly effect what residents did and said. Outsiders do not have access to daily events; do not understand the meanings of the words, actions and characteristics of people in their cultural context; and generate suspicion by asking questions. An outside researcher might not even be able to participate in life in the community because of the suspicion a foreign researcher would arouse.

But, a participant observer who was describing his own community, where he resided with his family, would not suffer from these problems. If he were simply living in the community and participating in life there, he could describe the actions of organizations and the reactions of his fellow residents, even during the tumult of civil war. In order to do so, he would need to be trained to conduct participant observation, to accurately describe a representative sample of life in his own community without inserting his own biases into it. In order to accurately record what went on in his community, a participant observer would also need to be assured that the data he collected could never be connected to his home community. The data would need to be utterly anonymous, both in terms of the names of the subjects and their community. Anonymity protects the subjects of the research, the researchers themselves and ensures they have no motivation to alter the results.

A problem with participant observation more generally is that the thick descriptions of social reality are often not comparable to one another, limiting their applicability to

testing hypotheses. Unlike a survey, where the questions and answers are fundamentally comparable across respondents, an ethnographic description arises from whatever the participant observer chooses to describe. However, anthropologists began engaging in multi-sited ethnography during the 1980s. By studying the same topics across a set of places, they made it possible to compare cases to develop theories about what caused different outcomes in different cases.⁸⁷ If we had multiple sites in a war zone where a resident was describing the same aspects of life from the perspective of a participant, this problem would also be ameliorated. Another problem with participant observation is that it is unclear how the sample of life that was described is related to the entire community under study. But, there is no reason why a participant observer cannot apply basic sampling methods to improve the representativeness of his observations. Finally, participant observation produces extremely detailed data and therefore cannot be used to describe the entire population of Afghanistan, as a random sample survey might attempt to do. However, this study is not an effort to describe all of Afghanistan. It is an effort to determine whether and under what conditions certain factors and processes cause control at the local level. All that would be required for that purpose would be a small set of communities where different organizations have varying levels of control.

Therefore, this dissertation uses data collected by residents of a set of 11 communities in Afghanistan. These residents were participants in the life of their own communities, where they observed and recorded the actions of residents and personnel from the organizations competing to control their behavior. The researchers collected

⁸⁷ George E. Marcus. "Ethnography in/of the World System: the Emergence of Multi-sited Ethnography," *Annual Review of Ethnography*, 24:95-117, 1995. Simon Coleman and Pauline von Hellerman, ed. *Multi-Sited Ethnography: Problems and Possibilities in the Translocation of Research Methods*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 2011.

information about the characteristics and actions of a random set of residents of their community, based on an ethnographic mapping and geographic sampling method. They also described the characteristics and actions of the leaders of their home communities and the personnel from the government, Taliban or any other armed organization that entered their community. Additionally, they described the event people in the community discussed the most during that week, where they had heard the story and what people in the community said about it. This document, called a Community Narrative, was intended to ensure that the beliefs and values of the community and how they were impacted by the actions of organizations could be understood over time. In order to understand the role of Islam in each community, the data set also include a description of Friday sermons at each community *mazjet* and what men who had attended said about it afterward. In order to ensure the data captured the rules and the organizations enforcing them in each community, researchers described the five most important rules, how they were developed, a set of examples of people violating them and what happened to them when they did so. Finally, in order to ensure the data captured whatever seemed most important to the researchers, they include descriptions of the most important thing that happened to the researcher each day. This document, called What Happened to Me Today began as a homework assignment and became a kind of researcher journal. It captured events both inside and outside their home communities.

Researcher Selection and Training

The researchers worked for an Afghan Research Company⁸⁸ that selected, hired and paid them. The researchers were all high school graduates, but none had a university education. They were selected so they were neither part of the elite, nor abjectly poor. They were all young men who had graduated from high school and could therefore read and write. They were selected so they represented different types of communities in Kabul, including ethnically mixed communities, Tajik communities, Pashtun communities, rural agricultural communities, downtown market communities, planned Soviet communities and communities illegally built on government owned land since 2001.

The researcher in each community received training on thinking from the perspective of other people; on taking field notes; on collecting samples that are representative; on developing consistent descriptions of sets of characteristics;⁸⁹ on having as little impact on the words and actions of subjects as possible; and on protecting their subjects through anonymity of both people and place.⁹⁰ Each researcher also received education on political and social theory relating to institutions and organizations, roles, norms, sanctions, rules, beliefs, values, ideology, social identity and social boundaries,⁹¹ authority, legitimacy, social movements and insurgency, among other topics. The researchers were trained, educated and constantly mentored to improve their methods and

⁸⁸ As part of the holistic effort to protect the researchers and subjects of the data, the research company shall remain anonymous, along with all researchers, subjects and communities.

⁸⁹ As part of their training, the researchers worked together to identify a set of characteristics that differentiate people from one another in Afghanistan. Some of the characteristics, like age, gender, ethnicity, occupation, literacy and education level are familiar from an American perspective. But, others, including what people wear at home and at work, and how many times a day they attend prayers in the community *mazjet*, are not.

⁹⁰ Each researcher was trained to code the identities of residents of all people in the data set and never to refer to himself or his community in writing in the data. This training in maintaining the anonymity of subjects was constantly reinforced during the research, resulting in a data set with no personally identifying information.

⁹¹ This training allowed the researchers to describe the boundaries of their own communities. They drew ethnographic maps and delineated where their communities began and ended. In the case of each and every community under study, the *mazjet* formed the center of the community and determined its membership. The community was comprised of the households that used the same *mazjet*. That *mazjet* had to be close enough to make it convenient for people to walk to it between two and five times per day.

clarify their descriptions. The training and education, intensive for two months, extended throughout the period of the research, as the participant observers constantly improved their descriptive skills.

The resulting data accurately described life in a set of 10 communities in downtown Kabul during 2010 and 2011. During 2010, it became clear that one of the most interesting research opportunities was the home village of one of the researchers in a strategically vital rural mountain village 80 kilometers from Kabul. When additional funding became available at the beginning of 2014, it provided a window into the impact of the withdrawal of ISAF and the increased external resources of the Pakistani Taliban. The research there continued until January 2015 and captures in granular detail life in an anti-Taliban village as ISAF's actions and resources surge and withdraw and as a wave of Pakistani Taliban resources, organized effectively into patrols, abductions and assassinations, washes over it.

A Note on the Protection of Human Subjects

This study relies upon total anonymity as the basis for protecting its subjects. In order to protect the subjects of the research, the data used in this study were collected without personally identifying information (PII) or the name or location of the communities under study. Each person in the data (with the exception of public figures, like President Hamid Karzai) set's name was replaced with a code and the communities under study were renamed. The specific location of each community and therefore the identity of its Wakil, Mullah and elders, as well as insurgents, policemen and other government personnel associated with it cannot be discerned from the data. As a result, any actions or

characteristics that might draw the ire of an armed political organization cannot be associated with the subjects of the research.

In order to ensure this approach was sufficient to protect the subjects of the research, local religious and informal leaders reviewed the methods for collecting the data and found that the methods placed the subjects of the research in no greater danger than they already experienced in their daily lives. The research method was reviewed and approved by local Wakils and Mullahs, as well as the clerical council of Kabul. Finally, the Johns Hopkins University's Homewood Institutional Review Board approved the use of the data in this dissertation.

A Third Organization Competing for Control in Each Community: Meet the Wakil

As soon as the researchers began their first assignments, a character began to emerge in each community called the Wakil. There was a Wakil in all 11 of the communities under study and in each of the surrounding areas. The Wakils were selected by the male heads of household who attended the *mazjet* at the center of each of the communities. Their job was to solve the problems of the people and they were empowered by the heads of the households in their communities to collect money, organize labor and even coercive force to solve those problems. Wakils can propose rules and sanctions to the community. Once the community agrees to rules, the Wakil can use his powers to enforce them. He can even organize the community as a coercive force to expel someone from the community.. This

organization was the most powerful organization in each of the communities under study. For that reason, the second part of the dissertation includes a chapter that applies the empirical data from all eleven communities to describing the Wakil organizations as a third organization competing to control the behavior of each community, alongside the government and Taliban.

Hypotheses

The study applied the data from each community to develop case studies that describe the level of control by the government, insurgent and Wakil organizations; trace and compare the processes by which each organization controls or fails to control the behavior of residents; and test four hypotheses about what causes control by these organizations to vary:

1. If an insurgent, government or local informal organization's goals, values and methods of reaching those goals closely match the goals and values of a community, that organization will be more likely to have a high level of control over the behavior of that community.
2. If a government, insurgent or local informal organization is dependent upon a community for resources (personnel, money, information and sanctuary), then that organization will have more control over the behavior of the community.
3. If an insurgent, government or local informal organization has external

resources (personnel, money, information or sanctuary), then that organization will have more control over the behavior of the community.

4. If a government, insurgent or local informal organization is more capable of translating strategy into action by its personnel, that organization will have more control over the behavior of people in the community.

Cases

The data contain 10 communities with three organizations in a single time period, between 2010 and 2011, and 1 community with three organizations across four time periods between 2008 and 2015, creating a total of 45 cases of organizations with different levels of control. But, testing the hypotheses and identifying possible processes that cause control required no more than 15 cases. By selecting 15 cases of organizations with differing levels of control across two different locations and four periods of time, this dissertation seeks to parsimoniously test the hypotheses and test whether or not there is a process through which they translate into control by an organization. This undertaking requires the detailed description of only two out of the eleven communities in the data set.

The first community is situated next to one of the oldest markets in central Kabul. The data describe the actions and characteristics of residents and personnel from the government, Taliban and Wakil organizations during the surge in Coalition actions and resources between 2010 and 2011. In the Kabul Market Community, the Wakil's consensus-based control is at odds with a system of values of individualism and self-satisfaction that

accompany commerce with the outside world. The Kabul Market Community's Wakil brought order out of the disorder of new, ethnically mixed migrants to the capital and has a high level of control. Residents value the order his rules bring, but, segments of the population, enamored of individualism, resist the Wakil's rules. More people in this community agree with the government's goals and rules than in any other community. But, despite enormous external resources, the government is largely ineffective in causing its personnel to act. Order in this community is constantly assailed by the chaos that surrounds it. The sale of drugs and alcohol and the constant flow of strangers through the neighboring market make the area rife with crime. For the most part, crimes are not committed by the residents, but by outsiders, sometimes with the participation of the police. The one area in which the government, with its Coalition partners, is effective is in attacking the Taliban when the Taliban engage in overt attacks. For that reason, the Taliban appears only once in the data describing the Kabul Market Community. The Taliban has little control over Kabul Market Community residents, more of whom disagree with the Taliban than in any other community. The Taliban cannot patrol to identify rule breaking and sanction it. The government has more control over the presence of the Taliban than in any other community, but it lacks control over other topics.

The Kabul Market Community, therefore, contains three organizational cases within a single time period. The Wakil organization has a high level of agreement, relies entirely upon internal resources and is effective in causing its personnel to act. The Wakil has the highest level of control. The government, on the other hand, has a low level of control over everything except overt Taliban presence. The government has a low level of control despite enormous external resources because it cannot cause its personnel to take actions

according to the organization's intent. The government has the highest level of agreement it has in any of the communities under study, but the population does not provide the government with significant resources. The government's control is low in the Kabul Market Community.

The second community is a hotly contested poor, rural, agricultural mountain village in Kapisa, situated in a district where three different Taliban organizations inhabit the mountain valleys, where a battalion of French troops trained and mentored a *kandak* of 600 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers, 200 Afghan National Police (ANP), and 150 Afghan Local Police (ALP) before withdrawing at the end of 2012. This case study provides us with the ability to compare four periods of time in which the levels of external resources and organizational effectiveness of the government and Taliban vary, as do their levels of control. Similarly, it demonstrates how the Wakil's control declined in the face of declining agreement and competition from at least one effective organization with sufficient external resources. The four periods are demarcated by major shifts in external resources by the government and Taliban organizations. The first period is prior to the surge in Coalition external resources and actions in support of the Government, between the Taliban's flight in the face of *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*⁹² and US Special Forces in 2001 and January of 2010.

During the first period, between 2001 and 2010, the Wakil had a high level of control. The government had significant external resources, but a low level of

⁹² The *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* are a group of Afghan fighters, first mobilized during the war against the Soviets, mostly out of the Tajik population of northeastern Afghanistan (centered on the Panshir Valley) and southwestern Afghanistan (centered on Herat). *Jamat e Islami's* mujihadeen in the Panshir Valley ran a para-state under the command of Ahmed Shah Massoud throughout the civil war and Taliban rule. They were the last remaining organization that held territory and controlled a population in 2001 when the US and its allies decided to overthrow the Taliban regime. *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* form the basis of large portions of the Afghan government and its security forces.

organizational effectiveness. *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*, relatively free from international community interference, manned the security forces and built the fledgling government in the Kapisa Mountain District, the home of the Kapisa Mountain Village. The villagers did not agree with many of the government's goals, rules or actions. But, government personnel, *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* from the Kapisa Mountain District, absorbing international community funding, did not act to cause people to obey government rules. The government had a low level of control during this pre-surge period in the Kapisa Mountain Village.

Between 2001 and 2008, Taliban presence in the Kapisa Mountain District was minimal. In 2008, the organization increased the number of personnel, bringing fighters from southern Afghanistan and Pakistan to live on one of the highest ridgelines in the District, several hours drive from the district capital. However, this small number of Pakistani Taliban had a very limited access to external resources during this period. The Pakistani Taliban's organizational effectiveness was only moderate during this period because they did not constantly seek information about people violating their rules and sanction them. The population of the Kapisa Mountain Village did not agree with the Taliban's goals, rules or actions. The Taliban's control was low during this period.

The Taliban, therefore, during this period, had a low level of control, a low level of external resources and a low level of organizational effectiveness. The villagers did not agree with them and they did not provide the Taliban with resources, in the form of personnel, goods, services, funds, sanctuary or information.

The Wakil had unchallenged control in the Kapisa Mountain Village during the period before the ISAF surge. The Wakil's control during this period resulted from the agreement of the population with his goals, rules and actions. Because they agreed with the Wakil, the villagers provided the Wakil with all the resources he needed to control the village. The Wakil did not have or need external resources. The Wakil organization's personnel, in the form of the elders, Mullah and Wakil, were very effective at acting on their organization's intent. The combination of agreement, internal resources and organizational effectiveness resulted in a high level of control for the Wakil. But, he had very limited external resources.

This situation, within the same village, changed dramatically between 2010, when Coalition resources and actions, external resources, surged into the government's coffers, and the end of 2012, when ISAF military personnel withdrew from Kapisa Province. During the period of the surge, external military personnel, French soldiers, flowed into the district and begin conducting patrols, collecting information about Taliban presence, identifying problems for villages and trying to solve them. They did so on behalf of the government and over time with the support and assistance of government personnel. External government resources increased not only in the form of foreign military and civilian personnel, but also in the form of personnel from the central government. Finally, the surge in personnel was accompanied by a surge in external funding from the Coalition.

During this period, the control the government had over Taliban presence in the Kapisa Mountain Village increased moderately, but the government's control over the

behavior of the population did not increase significantly in terms of other topics, like individual human rights or maintaining order. Government external resources increased during this period, as did government organizational effectiveness. The French battalion conducted regular, joint patrols, both day and night, alongside Afghan police and soldiers. When Wakils called to report Taliban presence, even at night, the French responded, accompanied by Afghan military and police. The villagers, through their Wakil, provided information to the government about Taliban presence and about people whom the Wakil wanted arrested for breaking his rules. The villagers also provided young men to the ANSF in large numbers. All of them worked outside the village. The village provided sanctuary to government personnel, but it did not provide funds, goods or services to the government. The villagers' agreement with the government's goals, rules and actions increased somewhat over this period.

The government in this period experiences a large increase in external resources, increased organizational effectiveness and increased control, but only over Taliban presence. The villagers continue to disagree with some of the governments goals and rules, although they increasingly agree with its actions. The population provides an increased amount of information to the government. The government's control increases, but only over the rules with which the villagers agree.

At the same time, the Wakil's control declines, though not significantly. His control declines apace with the decreased agreement of the villagers, especially young, male villagers employed by the ANSF, with his rules. His control declines because they can reach

out to an organization that has greater resources than the Wakil can raise in the village and is willing to assist the young men in avoiding the Wakil's sanctions. In these situations, the Wakil's organizational effectiveness also decreases when he does not act to sanction the violators. But, on the whole, his effectiveness in executing tasks remains high. During this period, the resources available to the Wakil from the village do not decline significantly. His external resources remain low. The Wakil retains more control over the behavior of the villagers than any other organization.

During this period, the Taliban's control remains constant. Its external resources remain constant, but relative to the government's resources, which are surging, the Taliban's external resources decline. Taliban organizational effectiveness declines also, in the face of its well-resourced and increasing effective government competitor. The villagers continue not to agree with the Taliban's goals, rules or actions. The Taliban's control over the behavior of the villagers remains low.

The next time period, between the surge in Coalition resources and actions, and the Taliban's surge in resources and actions, begins with the French withdrawal of its battalion of soldiers in November of 2012 and it ends when the snows blanket the Kapisa Mountain District in November 2013. During this period after the surge in Coalition resources and actions, the organizational effectiveness of the government declined precipitously. While the Coalition continued to pump external resources into the personnel and organizational structures it had constructed, the government organizations stopped patrolling to identify rule breaking and sanction it at night. The ANA, the largest government security force, with

600 soldiers, stopped patrolling entirely. In response the Pakistani Taliban, with a constant level of resources, but increased relative ability and will to translate them into actions, became more effective, actively patrolling and sanctioning rule violations in the Kapisa Mountain Village.

During this interregnum, the government's control fell to a low level as the Taliban violated government rules by patrolling through the Kapisa Mountain Village, abducting and harassing residents, and killing one itinerant laborer. The external resources available to the government did not decrease greatly. One very specific resource, French soldiers, departed, but they left behind a force of equal size who, at the time they left, were taking the actions the French had taken. What changed for the government was its organizational effectiveness, which dropped. There was no change in the agreement of the residents of the Kapisa Mountain Village or the rest of the District, with the government's goals or rules. They were disappointed in government inaction, with which they disagreed. The residents of the Kapisa Mountain Village continued, during 2013, to provide sanctuary and information to the government. But, the government did not use it. So, during the interregnum, the government has constant external and internal resources and constant agreement by the population. Its organizational effectiveness decreases and so does its control.

During the interregnum, the Pakistani Taliban's organizational effectiveness increases as it translates the constant amount of external resources it has into actions by its personnel. Its control increases somewhat during this period, though the population

continues to send its daughters to school and women work in the fields and men pray less than five times per day in the village *mazjet* and young men continue to join and work in the ANSF. The Taliban's small increase in control was simply manifested in its ability to move freely through the village at night. The population's beliefs about the Taliban, their agreement with Taliban goals, rules and actions did not change.

During this period, the Wakil's control decreased as the organization was decreasingly able to prevent the Taliban from moving through the village, harassing villagers, particularly at night. The villagers' agreement with the Wakil did not decline significantly, nor did their provision of information, sanctuary, personnel, funds, goods or services. The Wakil, Mullah and elders had a constant level of organizational effectiveness. But the external resources, in the form of patrols by government security forces, decreased. Alone, the Wakil faced the onslaught of a Taliban that had more resources than the Wakil could organize and was effective enough to cause its personnel to patrol and sanction people who violated particular rules. It was the Wakil's loss of external resources that led it have less resources it could organize to repel the Taliban than the Taliban could organize to patrol and sanction. The Wakil's control decreased because its external resources decreased. Its internal resources did not decrease. Its effectiveness did not decrease. The population's agreement with the Wakil did not significantly decrease and their disagreement with the Taliban certainly did not change.

As the snow melted in the Spring of 2014, the external resources available to the Taliban ratcheted up, as hundreds of additional Taliban fighters flowed into the Kapisa

Mountain District and encamped themselves largely on the ridge above the Kapisa Mountain Village. These well-resourced fighters became increasingly effective at conducting patrols and sanctioning people for violating their rules. Their concerted effort to identify and kill members of the ANSF resulted in one assassination in the village and the assault on another family there, which repelled the attack. The Taliban also kidnapped and tortured both elders. They then assaulted the village with hundreds of fighters, only to find the villagers had been tipped off and fled. The Taliban's external resources increased and flowed over their effective organization, increasing their control. The government, despite the continued high level of resources, was ineffective and did not attack the Taliban even though it knew it was present in the Kapisa Mountain Village. The villagers' beliefs did not change during this period. They did not begin to appreciate the Taliban or the government. They continued to agree, on the whole, with the Wakil. And yet, the Wakil's control decreased and the Taliban's increased. Within this single case, across multiple time periods, the external resources and organizational effectiveness of both the government and the Taliban fluctuated wildly, allowing for crisp comparisons of the twelve different organizational cases.

The traditional Kabul Market Community and the Kapisa Mountain Village provide a comparable set of organizations with varying levels of control, agreement, internal and external resources and organizational effectiveness. The following table provides a summarized comparison of the variations across these cases.

Organizational Cases

Organization	Control	External Resource	Internal Resource	Agreement	Organizational Effectiveness
Wakil Kabul Market Community 2010-2011	High	Low	High	High	High
Government Kabul Market Community 2010-2011	Low	High	Low	Medium	Low
Taliban Kabul Market Community 2010-2011	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Wakil pre-ISAF Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	High	Low	High	High	High
Government pre-ISAF Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	Low	High	Low	Low	Low
Taliban pre-ISAF Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Wakil ISAF Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	High	Medium	High	High	High
Government ISAF Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	Medium	High	Medium	Low	Medium
Taliban ISAF Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	Low	Medium	Low	Low	Low
Wakil between ISAF Surge and Taliban Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	Medium	Low	High	High	High
Government between ISAF Surge and Taliban Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	Low	High	Medium	Low	Low
Taliban between ISAF Surge and Taliban Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Medium
Wakil Taliban Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	Medium	Low	High	High	High
Government Taliban Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	Low	High	Low	Low	Low
Taliban Taliban Surge Kapisa Mountain Village	Medium	High	Low	Low	High

Additionally, these two communities provide ample examples of people breaking and following the rules of the various organizations in the two most dissimilar case studies in the data set. This allows the study to identify a series of actions that translates agreement, resources and organizational effectiveness into control and then confirm whether it operates across all 15 of the organizational cases or not.

Data in Each Case

In each community, in the case of each organization, in each time period, I used the data about the characteristics and actions of residents of the community and personnel from the Wakil, government and Taliban organizations to examine the relationship between the level of control each organization has over the behavior of the residents and (i) the fit between each organization's goals, rules and sanctions and the values of each community; (ii) the dependence of each organization on the resources provided to it by each community; (iii) the effectiveness of each organization in taking actions against its strategy; and (iv) each government or insurgent organization's efforts to ally itself with local informal organizations.

I conducted three types of analyses across the three organizations in each of these communities. First, I described the level of control each organization has in each community. Second, in the case of each organization, I described each factor within each period of time in each community. I used these descriptions to conduct within community case and cross community case study comparisons to validate and elucidate the relationship between each of these factors and control. Third, I traced the process by which each organization in each community controlled or failed to control the behavior of individuals in

specific instances of rule following and rule breaking. Tracing the process allowed me to examine how, why and under what circumstances the factors identified above caused control to vary.

Measuring Control

Other authors writing on control in civil war, as well as practitioners of counterinsurgency, have commonly measured control by identifying areas where insurgents and government forces have more or less freedom of movement and sanctuary.⁹³ However, control in irregular warfare is political⁹⁴ and it is fragmented, meaning that individuals, families, communities and sets of communities decide whom they will obey with varying degrees of cohesiveness, creating the phenomenon of clandestine spies supporting the organization that is not in control of an area. The fragmentary nature of control differentiates irregular from conventional warfare because the insurgents and the government are embedded in the population they are fighting to control.⁹⁵ Control is a matter of whose rules people obey and allowing forces to move freely throughout an area without providing information to rival organization security forces is just one, admittedly very important, rule. But, insurgent and government organizations are competing to control a much broader set of rules regarding peoples' behavior. In order to measure

⁹³ Stathis Kalyvas measured an organization's control in an area by its varying ability to move through the area in the open and to base personnel there. See Kalyvas, p. 421. Bernard Fall describes how the French military measured control by its ability to move through and base itself in an area. This resulted in a misunderstanding of the level of control by the Viet Minh, who controlled large numbers of villages within the walled off area the French believed they controlled. Bernard B. Fall. "Fall Insurgency Non-Military Indicators" in *Military Review*. Leavenworth: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, April 1966. p. 3-11

⁹⁴ Fall, 1966. p. 3-11. Fall developed metrics based on what Vietnamese students believed indicated government vice insurgent control and laid them out on a map. The indicators included government tax collection and the presence of government teachers. He calls these "non-military" or "administrative" measures of control, but I believe they are political indicators of village obedience or disobedience to government rules. The map showed large areas of Vietnam that were controlled by the Vietminh without French knowledge. The maps elucidate, "... one of the essential verities of counterinsurgency intelligence - conventional military factors are meaningless in that type of war."

⁹⁵ Kalyvas, p. 87-91

control, we must therefore identify the rules insurgent or government organizations want people to obey and describe the extent to which a representative sample of people from the population comply with those rules.

The Taliban, government and Wakil organizations are competing with one another to establish their vision of how the world should be ordered. In order to implement their different visions of life in Afghanistan, each of these organizations has a set of rules that it wants people to obey. These rules are intended to control people's behavior so that the organization in question's version of the pattern of behavior that would characterize their idealized future Afghan social world is achieved. The rules each organization wants people in these communities to obey are described in detail in *Part 2: Competing Organizations*. I derived the rules the government and Taliban seek to influence people to obey from their official laws, documents and declarations. I derived the rules the Wakil wants people to obey from descriptions by the researchers of the rules in their neighborhoods, as well as the descriptions of events in their communities.

Based on an analysis of data about the characteristics and actions of a randomly selected set of individual residents of each case study community, I described the extent to which people in each community over each period of time obeyed the rules of each organization. The Taliban, government and Wakil organizations have different rules, which are described in the chapter about each organization that forms a portion of *Part 2: Competing Organizations*.

The data contain a description of a consistent set of characteristics of each member of a randomly selected set of families from each community.⁹⁶ This set of characteristics includes the normal demographic characteristics, such as age and gender. But, it also includes characteristics that allowed me to measure control, such as the number of times per day males pray at the community mosque or what they wear or whether females in their family attend school or choose their own spouses. Having a consistent measure of these indicators across a randomly selected set of residents allowed me to generalize from these individuals to the larger community. In addition, for each family, there is a description of three publically memorable actions by members of the family. These stories provide an understanding of the extent to which the people in the family obeyed the rules of the three organizations in question, as well as insight into what they valued, how they expended their resources and how they interacted with the government, Taliban and Wakil. This analysis allowed me to estimate the extent to which people in each community who obey the rules of each organization.

Developing and Comparing Descriptions of Agreement, Resources and Effectiveness

I described the extent to which each community agreed with the goals, rules and actions of each organization; the dependence of each organization on the resources⁹⁷ each community provided to it; the amount of external resources available to the organization; and the effectiveness of each organization in causing its personnel to take the actions the organization intended.

⁹⁶ The Kabul Market Community contained 250 households, from which 21 were selected through a random sampling process. The Kapisa Mountain Village is a smaller community, with only 100 households, so only 16 families were selected, using the same random selection process. The boundaries of each community were determined by each researcher, based upon an analysis of where his community began and ended. A full list of the characteristics of each person is included in Appendix 1 Community Case Study Data Set.

⁹⁷ Resources include not only personnel, money, goods and services. They also included two of the most important resources in any civil war, information about rule violations, including the presence of enemy personnel or assistance to a competitor organization; and sanctuary.

I described each factor based on the larger ethnographic data set from each community.⁹⁸ I used the detailed descriptions of these factors to develop an estimate of the level of agreement, internal and external resources and organizational effectiveness. Within each period of time within each community case, I compared the level of each of these factors across organizations. If the organizations with high levels of control share high levels of any one of the factors and organizations with a low level of control do not share high levels of that factor, then the comparison served to confirm that there might be a relationship between that factor and control.⁹⁹ I then compared the factors across the community cases, evaluating whether a high level of each of these factors correlates with the levels of control by organizations across community cases.

Within each community, I described the extent to which people in each community agreed with the goals, rules and actions of each organization. In both of the communities under study, residents discussed openly what they thought about each of these topics in relation to each organization.

I then described the extent to which each organization relied upon resources provided to it by people from each community in order to operate in that community. I described the extent to which people in each community provided four kinds of resources

⁹⁸ The descriptions of the level of control are based upon the actions of a randomly selected group of individual residents of the community. For example, in the Kabul Market Community, the random data set includes 90 individuals and 63 actions. The larger ethnographic data set on the Kabul Market Community includes 376 people and 349 actions. The ethnographic data set provides insight into the things that tie individuals in the community together, such as their leaders and their leaders actions, Friday sermons, the topics people in the community discuss, their rules, instances of people violating the rules, incidents of violence and cases in which people were thrown out of the community, among other topics.

⁹⁹ I used the methods described in Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. Chapters 8 and 9. And, Charles C. Ragin. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 85-102.

to each organization: personnel, information, sanctuary¹⁰⁰ and money, goods and services. I then described the extent to which each organization received outside resources of these four types.

Finally, I described the extent to which each organization's effectiveness in taking actions against its strategy in each community increases or decreases its control over the behavior of that community. I defined the strategies of each organization by reviewing the work of other scholars who had written about the Taliban and GIRA's strategies, as well as documents, statements and speeches by their leaders. Then, I reviewed the ethnographic data describing each community in order to compare the actions of each organization with those it described in its strategy. A detailed description of each organization's strategy can be found in *Part 2: Competing Organizations*.

This analysis allowed me to compare across the organizations within each community and across communities in order to determine whether organizations that had a high level of effectiveness also had a high level of control, adding to or detracting from evidence of a relationship between the two factors.¹⁰¹

Tracing and Comparing Processes of Control

¹⁰⁰ Sanctuary is defined as allowing the organization to move freely through the community without providing information about its presence to the other organizations.

¹⁰¹ I used the methods described in Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. Chapters 8 and 9. And, Charles C. Ragin. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 85-102.

Whether or not there is a relationship between each of these factors and control, the question of why that relationship exists, how it functions and under what circumstances will remain unclear even after the analyses described above. For that reason, in each community, I will evaluate cases in which people followed or violated rules in order to determine if there is a process, a series of actions, without which no organization can control the behavior of a community. By studying how each of the factors (agreement, resources and effectiveness) feeds this process, we can determine how they impacted control in each case. We can then compare the processes of control across organizations and communities to determine if the processes and their relationships to the factors were similar.

In order to trace the processes of control, I identified instances in which people obeyed and instances in which people disobeyed the rules of each organization in each community. I compared what each person and organization in each instance did and why in order to determine why the person broke or did not break the rule in the first place; what the organization did or did not do in response to the rule breaking; why they were or were not able to do so; whether the person changed his or her behavior and why; and how the organization's actions or inaction affected community behavior. Conducting this analysis across all three organizations in all three communities should provide a detailed description of how and under what conditions agreement, resources and effectiveness cause variations in control.¹⁰²

¹⁰² I used methods described in Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. Chapters 9 and 10.

PART 2

Competing Organizations

The Taliban,

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,

&

The Wakil

CHAPTER 4: Introduction to Competing Organizations

The Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) are organizations¹⁰³ engaged in a competition to determine how Afghans will live in the future.¹⁰⁴ While one organization wants to establish an Islamic Emirate in which all people will obey *sharia* law and live as the Taliban believe people did in the time of the Prophet Muhammad, the other wishes to establish a liberal democracy in which individual freedoms and interaction with the outside world drive modern economic and social development. Both of these organizations seek to impose a foreign system using significant external resources upon local populations.

In addition to these two organizations, there is an informal traditional organization that exists at the very local level, operating out of most community *mazjets* throughout Afghanistan called the Wakil. This organization seeks to build unity and consensus among family patriarchs about how they can help one another solve problems facing their community. This is how they and many Afghans believe Mohammad ruled, not by imposing his will, but by providing an example of how people should behave, encouraging them to do so and nurturing a consensus among them about how to proceed. Wakils rule based on the consent of the family patriarchs and use the resources provided by them to solve problems. While the Wakils' vision of the future is more flexible than that of the Taliban or GIROA, it is based on two things that place them at odds with both organizations, rule by consent under

¹⁰³ Abdulkader H. Sinno. *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008. Sinno argues that social groups, civilizations, religions, classes and nations do not engage in strategic conflict, organizations do. p. 87. He defines organizations as social structures that incentivize their personnel to act through positive and negative sanctions. p. 27.

¹⁰⁴ Paul Berman. *Revolutionary Organization: Institution Building within the People's Liberation Armed Forces*. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1974. Berman describes how the PLAF was fighting to determine how Vietnamese people would live in the future. The organization was built to bring that vision of life in the future into being.

a more compassionate form of Islam and their support for a patriarch's authority over individuals within his family.

In order to provide the context necessary for understanding whether each organization is succeeding or failing and why in the case studies that follow, this section provides a national level description of several factors that will enable the reader to compare the level and causes of each organization's control over the behavior of the population.

First, this section describes how and why each organization was founded. Second, it describes the ideal type of personnel each organization seeks. These descriptions are of the ideal personnel each organization aims to have, as opposed to the personnel each organization actually has, giving the reader the knowledge necessary to compare the ideal with the characteristics and actions of the real personnel in the community case studies. It also describes the social world each organization seeks to create; the rules of behavior that would characterize such a world; and the methods the organization wants its personnel to use to influence people to obey its rules.¹⁰⁵ This information will allow the reader to discern the extent to which people in the case studies obey Taliban, GIRoA or Wakil rules and whether personnel sanction rule breaking according to their organization's intent.

This section also describes where and how each organization acquires its resources. These resources include personnel, funds, goods and services. But, they also include

¹⁰⁵ These three factors were drawn from Berman's method for analyzing a revolutionary organization's vision for the future world it seeks to create, its method for convincing its personnel to act according to its intent and the actions it wants them to take.

information, particularly information about people violating the organization's rules.¹⁰⁶ They also include sanctuary. A community can provide sanctuary to an organization by not physically attacking it or providing information to an armed competitor organization about its location. An organization could also find natural sanctuary, in an uninhabited area, like a mountain or desert. Or, it could find sanctuary across a border, where its rivals cannot attack it.¹⁰⁷ Organizations can rely upon resources from inside local communities, or from outside them and this section will describe each organization's approach to acquiring them.¹⁰⁸

This section will then describe how each organization plans to apply those resources in a strategy for defeating its competitor and establishing control. Finally, it describes each organization's internal system for translating goals and resources into actions by its members. Understanding each organization's strategy, the actions it intends its personnel take and the system it has for encouraging them to do so will allow the reader to discern whether the Taliban, GIRoA and the Wakils are successful as organizations in translating their strategies into actions.

This section presents the goals, ideologies, strategies and institutional structures of each of organization as it would like them to be, from the perspective of the organization. The following chapters on the Taliban, GIRoA and the Wakils do not endorse the ideology or approach of any organization. The chapters are an effort to allow the reader to understand

¹⁰⁶ Kalyvas, p. 173-192. Kalyvas argues that information is a key resource in civil war and that when residents provide information to an armed political organization about the location of its competitor, they participate in a joint process of selective violence.

¹⁰⁷ Sinno argues that the most effective organizations in civil wars are centralized, but they can only survive if they have an external sanctuary, like those in Quetta and Peshawar.

¹⁰⁸ Weinstein argues that where an organization acquires its personnel and other resources affects that organization's violence toward the population. Where an organization acquires its resources may also affect its ability to control a population.

what the organizations want; to compare what the organizations want their personnel to do with what they actually do; and to discern the extent to which the communities react by obeying or disobeying each organization's rules.

CHAPTER 5: The Taliban

The Taliban's Founding Moment

The Taliban's bid to govern Afghanistan arose in reaction to the violence, injustice and fractiousness of multiple warlords who vied for control over Kandahar and the road that passes through it from Quetta, Pakistan, through Herat to Iran and Central Asia between 1992 and 1994. Their behavior enraged the local populace and prevented the flow of commerce between Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia, creating both the internal and the external demand for order that the Taliban filled.¹⁰⁹

Throughout the 1980s, local community and tribal leaders built thousands of militias throughout Afghanistan to combat the communist government and Soviet Union.¹¹⁰ Most of the militias were built around very localized, rural *qawm*¹¹¹ identities¹¹² and comprised of the subsistence farmers who made up the bulk of Afghanistan's population. Prior to their rebellion against communist efforts to reform the agricultural sector, these villagers had not considered how they wanted the world to be. The aims of their *jihād* were in large part limited to expelling the Soviets, resuming their previous occupations and preventing a central government from attempting to change the way they lived. The

¹⁰⁹ Ahmed Rashid. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. p. 21-3. Barnett Rubin. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, Second Edition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. p. xii. Neamatollah Nojumi, *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War and the Future of the Region*. New York: Palgrave, 2002. p.117-8. Peter Marsden. *The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 45. Sarah Chayes. *The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban*. New York: Penguin Press, 2006. p. 73-4.

¹¹⁰ Sinno, 2008. p. 130, 145, 154-5. Abdul Salam Zaef. *My Life with the Taliban*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. p. 22

¹¹¹ Sinno, p. 125. "Among Afghans, the word *qawm* designates a solidarity group that is based on ethnic, religious, or even professional ties. The tribal system produces only one kind of *qawm*."

¹¹² Zaef, p. 22

mujihadeen militias affiliated themselves with exiled Afghan Islamist political parties based in Peshawar that directed funding from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and others to them.

Relationships between the Islamist parties and local commanders were fickle. The parties had modern, international Islamist political agendas that were not closely aligned with the interests of the fighters inside Afghanistan, who practiced traditional forms of Islam and were interested in local security and power. These seven Afghan political parties were largely run by members of the Afghan urban elite who were mostly intellectuals who sought to apply international, modern Islamist ideology to building a government in Afghanistan. The party leaders enjoyed a life of opulence and relative safety in Peshawar, while the *mujihadeen* fought at great personal risk, with limited supplies of weapons, ammunition, food and medicine. This imbalance, social class division and ideological disconnect caused friction between *mujihadeen* and the leaders of the parties in Peshawar. Given the lack of a strong ideological or personal relationship between commanders and parties, as well as the number of parties, local commanders could defect from one party to another fairly easily.¹¹³ In southern Afghanistan, Durrani Pashtun¹¹⁴ militias were almost entirely tribal and had very weak relationships with the exile political parties in Peshawar, which had originally formed among students at Kabul University in opposition to the Durrani Pashtun monarchy that preceded the communists.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Nojumi, p. 83-133. Sinno, p. 126-34. Rubin, p. 179-246.

¹¹⁴ Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. They are divided into Durrani and Ghilzai. The Durrani comprise the majority of the Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan, while the Ghilzai comprise the majority of Pashtuns in eastern Afghanistan. The Durrani Pashtuns are organized tribally and control the fertile river valleys of Kandahar and Helmand, as well as the road that runs through their territory from Pakistan to Iran and Central Asia. Their tribal system and wealth were the basis of the pre-communist Afghan monarchy.

¹¹⁵ Rubin, 2002. p. 244-5.

The exception to the tribal and locality based *mujihadeen* fronts in southern Afghanistan was a group of six small fronts of “*Taliban*”,¹¹⁶ or religious students, associated with the *Harakat e Enqelab-e Islami* party of Mawlawi Nabi Mohamadi.¹¹⁷ “Most of the *mujihadeen* fronts were very homogeneous, with most people coming from the same background, same tribe, same family or the same area. The Taliban were different. A group of religious scholars and students with different backgrounds, they transcended the normal coalitions and factions.”¹¹⁸ The Taliban fought alongside the other *mujihadeen* in southern Afghanistan, but they were very distinct from them. As one Taliban commander from that period described, “Fighting alongside the Taliban meant more than just being a *mujahed*. The Taliban followed a strict routine in which everyone who fought alongside us had to participate, without exception. We woke before sunrise to perform the *fajr* or morning prayer in the mosque and afterwards sat together before returning to the camp. We would recite *surat yasin sharif* every morning in case we were martyred that day. Some would then leave to strengthen some front or other or to carry out a raid while others would tend to prisoners, the wounded or spend some time studying. ... Not all the fronts worked in this manner, but we were the Taliban and this was our way. We wanted to stay clean, to avoid sinning and to regulate our behavior.”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ *Talib*, whose plural is *Taliban*, means “seekers” or religious students at *madrassas*.

¹¹⁷ Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi was the leader of *Harakat-i-Inqilab*. This party was one of the first *mujihadeen* parties in Pakistan and was comprised of Afghanistan’s traditional clerics (*ulama*). The party’s program from the period of the *jihād* blames colonial powers for the problems in Afghanistan and advocates applying the Holy Koran and Sunna of the Prophet to all areas of social life. It mentions *ulama*-controlled jurisprudence as a source of law. It proposes a “true and genuine Islamic republic.” Because the *ulama* are to some extent outside tribal struggles, Harakat was less regional than other parties. Mohammadi was a Ghilzai Pashtun from Logar, where he ran a large *madrassa*. He also had large land holdings in Helmand Province. Rubin, p. 211-213. The Taliban are Pashtuns from Kandahar Province, but many are from families of tribally peripheral, itinerant, rural Mullahs, so it makes sense that they would have organized themselves initially under Mohammadi.

¹¹⁸ Zaef, p. 22

¹¹⁹ Zaef, p. 26-7.

After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, some of the *mujihadeen* militias began fighting one another as the government co-opted some and others continued to fight to overthrow the Afghan communist government.¹²⁰ The tribal structures that underlay the non-religious *mujihadeen* fronts in Kandahar Province,¹²¹ beleaguered from the massive dislocation of the population and economy,¹²² fragmented as a result of the communist government's efforts to maintain power by buying off local commanders. As funding from the United States declined, commanders faced the choice of disbanding their fronts or fighting against the *mujihadeen* who continued the *jihad* against the communists. The Governor of Kandahar was handing out "truckloads of money", paying *mujihadeen* groups to fight against their former allies.¹²³ As this situation wore on for years (between 1989 and 1992), the *mujihadeen* fragmented into smaller and smaller groups, focused on providing income for their fighters, who had become used to a higher standard of living than that available to traditional farmers, as opposed to fighting to overthrow the communist government.¹²⁴

Excluded from governing territory by their fellow anti-government *mujihadeen*, the six small Taliban fronts had largely disbanded after the Russian withdrawal in 1989. The Taliban returned to their Islamic studies, preaching or teaching, dispersing to mosques and *madrassas* in Kandahar and Quetta. Some of the Taliban built a compound in Hawz-e Mudat, beside the road in Panjwayi between Kandahar and Herat, that could be defended from government attacks if necessary, but was a *madrassa*, where the Taliban studied and taught villagers about Islam.¹²⁵

¹²⁰ Rubin, p. 155, 158-61.

¹²¹ Rubin, p. 243-5.

¹²² Rubin, Preface, p. 256-7.

¹²³ Zaeef, p. 48-9

¹²⁴ Zaeef, p. 48-50. Sinno, p. 137.

¹²⁵ Zaeef, p. 49-50

When the communist government of Najibullah was overthrown in 1992, the leaders of the various militias and political parties were unable to form a government. The Tajik and Uzbek *mujihadeen* of northern Afghanistan, who had been funded by the Islamist political parties in Peshawar, seized Kabul.¹²⁶ The highly centralized, mostly Ghilzai Pashtun,¹²⁷ Army of Salvation of Gulbadin Hekmatyar fought to gain dominance over them in Kabul. The tribal leaders of Kandahar's Durrani Pashtun *mujihadeen* of southern Afghanistan refused to agree to any government that would be dominated by the ethnic minority militias occupying the capital or Hekmatyar's Army of Salvation. The various national militias made efforts to coerce the Durrani Pashtun *khans* to submit to alliances.¹²⁸

As a result of the failure of the various militias and parties to form a government, in Kandahar Province, between 1992 and 1994, bands of former communist government soldiers, local *mujihadeen*, and Uzbek and Ghilzai Pashtun fighters preyed on commercial traffic and the populace, not only extorting payments, but also kidnapping, raping and murdering travelers and local residents.¹²⁹ This period, which became known among

¹²⁶ Nojumi, p. 83-133.

¹²⁷ The Durrani Pashtun were the basis of the pre-Soviet Afghan monarchy and very few joined the Islamist political parties in Peshawar, which had formed as part of an effort to overthrow the Durrani Pashtun monarchy. During the Soviet intervention, the seven Islamist parties, based in the Northern Pashtun city of Peshawar, as opposed to the Southern Pashtun city of Quetta, received the lion's share of international aid. The Ghilzai Pashtun were organized under the leadership of Gulbadin Hekmatyar, whose Army of Salvation received more Pakistani and US aid than any other militia. Durrani Pashtuns have profound enmity with their Ghilzai cousins and in general despised Hekmatyar. There is deep, long standing antipathy between the Durrani and the Ghilzai Pashtun. The Durrani form the majority of the Pashtun and are based in southern Afghanistan and concentrated along the strategic trade route that runs through Kandahar, Helmand and Herat Provinces. The Ghilzai Pashtun reside mostly farther North and East in the less populated mountainous regions of Afghanistan. The Ghilzai and Durrani Pashtun have historically battled one another for control over southern Afghanistan and in particular Kandahar city. Durrani Pashtun resistance to the Soviets was built around traditional tribal militias, who coordinated their activities through a *shura*. As the population of Kandahar fled to the refugee camps and Soviet operations destroyed the productive capacity of the tribes in Kandahar, the power of the Durrani *khans* eroded, reducing their ability to control their militia members. Rubin, Preface. Chayes, 2006. p. 84-102.

¹²⁸ Rubin, p. 262-4, 278.

¹²⁹ The border point at Spin Boldak was under control by Hizb e Islami Hekmatyar forces, through an alliance with an Achekzai commander named Mansour. Kandahar City was under the control of Mullah Naqibollah Alikozai, the most powerful tribal *mujihadeen* leader in southern Afghanistan. The road between the two was populated by road blocks operated by local forces commanded by Mansour Achekzai, Ustad Halim and Amir Lalai. Nojumi, 2002. p. 117-118. There were also checkpoints being run by former government soldiers and Rashid Dostum's Uzbek militiamen. Sinno, p. 199 and 227. The road to the West of Kandahar was controlled by

Kandaharis as the *mujihadeen* nights, is remembered as the most anarchic and bloody period in living memory in Kandahar.¹³⁰

The behavior of the former *mujihadeen* fighters was so un-Islamic and so unjust that the former Taliban fighters made plans to attack *mujihadeen* checkpoints in the districts of Maiwand and Panjwayi in Kandahar Province. Their goal was to rid their area of the checkpoints and establish order through the application of *sharia* law.¹³¹

They drew up plans to remove the checkpoints from their area and appointed Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund,¹³² who ran a *madrassa* in the tiny village of Sangasar, as their leader.¹³³ At their initial meeting in the fall of 1994, they agreed that *sharia* would be the guiding principle of the movement and that, “[they] would prosecute vice and foster virtue, and would stop those who were bleeding the land.”

The Taliban established their own checkpoint at Hawz e Mudat on the Herat-Kandahar highway. They immediately began implementing *sharia* law in the surrounding areas. They informed the people of their efforts to remove the checkpoints and restore order, and asked them for bread and sour milk in support of their efforts. Within days, 400

a collection of former *mujihadeen* from the city of Pashmol who had not been prominent in Kandahar during the jihad against the Soviets. All of these *mujihadeen* had turned to brigandry. There were additionally places where well-known thieves would simply wait to rob and harass travelers. Zaeef, p. 68

¹³⁰ Chayes, p. 73-4. Zaeef, p. 69.

¹³¹ Zaeef, p. 59-65.

¹³² Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund served as commander of a group of *mujihadeen* from *Herkat Islami*, Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammedi's party, in Arghesan District in Kandahar, which sits north of the road between Spin Boldak and Kandahar between 1989 and the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992. Nojumi, p. 120-1. Mullah Omar was also a participant in the Battle of Sangisar, which was part of the bloody final Soviet assault in southern Afghanistan. During this five day long battle, Mullah Omar lost his eye. Zaeef, p. Mullah Omar is from a family of itinerant Mullahs and was born in Uruzgan. He is a Ghilzai Pashtun and a member of the Hotak tribe. Ghilzai Pashtun lost control over Kandahar and the road that runs through it to the Durrani Pashtun long ago and Ghilzai Pashtun tribesmen fell to a low level of social standing in Kandahar.

¹³³ Zaeef, a former Taliban commander, states that Omar was selected because he had not been a high level commander during the *jihad* and therefore had no political relationship with the commanders of the checkpoints, *mujihadeen* groups, tribal leaders or Islamist political parties. Zaeef, p. 63-5.

people volunteered and the movement sent invitations to Taliban from Helmand and Pakistan. Businessmen and traders began to donate money in large amounts in the hope that the Taliban would bring order to Kandahar and the Chaman-Herat Highway.¹³⁴

After attempting to negotiate the closure of the checkpoints,¹³⁵ Mullah Omar mobilized 30 Taliban fighters from the *jihad* against the Soviets with 16 rifles¹³⁶ and attacked a set of *mujihadeen* checkpoints in Panjwayi.¹³⁷ As they approached each checkpoint down the road, they confronted a different militia leader with different resources and constituencies. The Taliban carefully calibrated their message to the rank and file of their adversary's militia and attempted to co-opt their junior commanders.¹³⁸

Once they had a clear advantage, the Taliban carefully considered which commanders to co-opt and which ones they would disarm or kill. They sought to build alliances with powerful militia leaders who would not tarnish the Taliban's, "finely calibrated image as heralds of a better order and who could enhance their military potential." Commanders who had engaged in predation or who were loyal to the *Hizbe Gulbadine* or *Jamiat e Islami* were, "better discarded, and their followers recruited on an independent basis or disbanded. Capable commanders with solid and large followings who could have put up strong resistance were sometimes targeted for assassination."¹³⁹

When the Taliban could not negotiate the closure of the checkpoint, they attacked it. At the site of the largest checkpoint in Panjwayi, run by a commander named Saleh, the

¹³⁴ Zaef, p. 65-67

¹³⁵ Zaef, p. 68

¹³⁶ Nojumi, p. 117-118

¹³⁷ Zaef, p. 67-75

¹³⁸ Sinno, p. 241

¹³⁹ Ibid, p. 243

Taliban discovered the naked corpses of two women from Herat, whom Saleh's men had kidnapped off a bus en route to Kandahar, raped, beaten and murdered, before throwing their lifeless bodies into a pit. The Taliban hunted down Saleh and hung him from the barrel of a tank. Despite their initial intent to just clear their area (Maiwand and Panjwayi districts) of checkpoints, this incident spurred the Taliban on to take Kandahar.¹⁴⁰

In the areas they captured, the Taliban removed brigands who had been preying on the population. When they did not co-opt the fighters and their leaders, they carefully disarmed them.¹⁴¹ In many cases, the Taliban hung commanders who had wantonly preyed on the populace from the barrels of their own tanks. In each area, they established order through the application of *sharia* law. They gained a public reputation for protecting the poor and innocent from the rapacious commanders who had ruled the area.¹⁴²

Adding to the Taliban's momentum, several important tribal leaders turned over their territory within Kandahar to the Taliban, including Mullah Naqibullah Alikozai, leader of the Alikozai tribe and the most powerful *mujihadeen* commander in southern Afghanistan.¹⁴³ Mullah Naqib provided the Taliban with access to Kandahar City, his base at Hindu Kotai, equipment and even tanks.¹⁴⁴ In return, Mullah Naqib continued to govern his tribal territory in Argandab, as his family had since King Nadir Shah had granted it to them in return for their expulsion of the Ghilzai Pashtun from the city of Kandahar in 1738.¹⁴⁵ The Argandab, overlooking the road through Kandahar, is the most strategic and fertile land in southern Afghanistan. Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Akund followed suit, turning over Arghistan district, east of Kandahar City, to the Taliban without a fight.

¹⁴⁰ Zaef, p. 69

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p. 241-243

¹⁴² Zaef, p. Rashid, 2000. p. 25. Nojumi, p. 117-118.

¹⁴³ Zaef, p. 70

¹⁴⁴ Zaef, p. 70-73

¹⁴⁵ Chayes, 2006. p. 95-101.

As the movement grew in size and resources, it seized the strategic border post at Spin Boldak on the road between Quetta and Kandahar from Gulbadin Hekmatyar's men and allied Achekzai tribal fighters.¹⁴⁶ Starting with the attack on Spin Boldak, the local Taliban were reinforced by hundreds of Taliban from the *madrassas* in Pakistan and supported by money, training and equipment from the *Jamayat ul Islamia Pakistan* (JUIP) Minister of Interior of Pakistan's new government, Naserullah Babar.¹⁴⁷ Minister Babar was intent on gaining passage for trade from Pakistan, through Kandahar and Herat, to Iran and the newly opened, post-Soviet markets of Central Asia. As a result of Pakistan's interest in opening the Chaman-Herat highway to commerce, and Hekmatyar's failure to do so, the Taliban gained access to Pakistani government resources.¹⁴⁸

The new resources fueled the Taliban's ability to capture territory.¹⁴⁹ By December 1994, an estimated 12,000 *madrassa* students from Afghanistan and Pakistan had joined the Taliban.¹⁵⁰ Town by town, the Taliban swept through Kandahar and later Helmand, Farah and Herat, clearing out former *mujihadeen* commanders, establishing order, disarming the

¹⁴⁶ During the jihad against the Soviets, Hekmatyar's *Hizb-e-Islami* (Islamic Party) *mujihadeen* received the lion's share of funding from Pakistan's government (through the ISI) because *Hizb-e-Islami* was the first *mujihadeen*, counter-communist party formed in Pakistan; and because it was linked personally and ideologically to the leadership of the Pakistani *Hizb-e-Islami*, which held power in the Pakistani government and military. Since the Pakistani government distributed the aid, *Hizb-e-Islami* was the best-resourced militia. Hekmatyar centralized power in the party and would not accept ideological or political differences, which led *Hizb-e-Islami* to fragment, as Burhanadin Rabbani, Ismail Khan and others defected and formed their own *mujihadeen* parties. The external parties also had little control over the behavior of their internal commanders or understanding and interest in the problems of local populations. Nojumi, p. 83-94, Marsden, p. 34. The commander at Spin Boldak was an Achekzai tribesman and *mujihadeen* commander named Mansour. Taliban fighters killed him by hanging him from the barrel of a tank as punishment for his fighters' predacious and violent behavior. Matthieu Aikins. "The Master of Spin Boldak: Undercover with Afghanistan's Drug-Trafficking Border Police." *Harpers Magazine*. December 2009. p. 4.

¹⁴⁷ General Babar is a Pashtun from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), close to the Afghan border, and had been the commander of the paramilitary Frontier Corps, which is recruited from local tribes in the NWFP and Baluchistan and provides support to local police in these Pashtun and Baluch tribal areas.

¹⁴⁸ Rashid, p. 25. Nojumi, p. 117-8.

¹⁴⁹ Rashid, p. 26-30. Nojumi, p. 130-133.

¹⁵⁰ Rashid, p. 29.

populace and refraining from looting, raping or pillaging.¹⁵¹ In 1996, the Taliban seized Afghanistan's capital in Kabul, which had been the social base of the communist government and was controlled by the Ghilzai Pashtun, Uzbek and Tajik¹⁵² *mujihadeen* under Hekmatyar, Dostum and Massoud's commands respectively. Although the various *mujihadeen* parties fought on against the Taliban in northern and eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban became the government of Afghanistan, declaring the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

The Taliban's message that it would disarm or kill commanders, establish order through the application of Islamic law and bring peace and Islam to Afghanistan appealed to a conservative, Muslim population exhausted and traumatized by civil war and chaos.¹⁵³ But, in the end, the Taliban's vision of Afghanistan's future was very different from anything the Afghan population imagined. The story of how and why the Taliban's vision is so distinct from that of the rest of the population, and so ingrained in the organization's vanguard, has to do with the dislocation of a group of refugee boys driven into Pakistan by the war against the Soviets in southern Afghanistan.¹⁵⁴

During the war against the Soviets, the United Nations estimates that 3.3 million Afghans were displaced from their homes into Pakistan.¹⁵⁵ The bulk of the Pashtun refugees from southern Afghanistan flowed into Pakistani refugee camps in the barren desert of Baluchistan Province west of the provincial capital and market town at Quetta. The bulk of the Pashtun and Tajik refugees from eastern Afghanistan were displaced into

¹⁵¹ Rashid, p. 33; Nojumi, p. 117-8

¹⁵² The leaders of these groups, Hekmatyar, Dostum and Massoud, became not only the basis for the armed resistance to the Taliban, but an important basis for any possible post-Taliban government.

¹⁵³ Nojumi, p. 23, 89. Rashid, p. 23, 32-3. Marsden, p. 61

¹⁵⁴ Rashid, p. 88. Nojumi, p. 23, 122-4.

¹⁵⁵ United Nations. *Afghanistan and the United Nations*. www.un.org

refugee camps near the city of Peshawar in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. Often isolated far from towns, the families crammed into these camps had few sources of income and minimal educational resources for their children.

The influx of Afghan refugees coincided with the Deobandi¹⁵⁶ *madrassa* movement in Pakistan. Pakistani *madrassas*, buoyed by aid from the government of Zia al Haq and others, recruited young boys from the camps as students. The *madrassas* could provide the sons of Afghan refugees with room, board and an education better than that they could find in the camps. In addition, many of the *madrassas* paid the families salaries in return for their sons' attendance. The *madrassas* themselves were far from the refugee camps, and therefore, a young *talib* was separated from his family for years on end and grew up within the *madrassa*, not within his Afghan refugee community or his family. While these former students are Afghans, they did not grow up within their own families and therefore have beliefs about Islam, authority, *jihad*, *dawa*, gender, violence and other topics that are distinct from those of normal Afghans.¹⁵⁷

The *madrassas* throughout Pakistan were heavily involved in the Afghan *jihad* against the communists. Many of the *mujihadeen* parties headquartered in Peshawar applied aid funds from the United States, other donors and the Pakistani government to the operation of their own *madrassas* in order to train and recruit *mujihadeen*.¹⁵⁸ Mullahs teaching in the *madrassas* often rotated back and forth from the front lines in Afghanistan

¹⁵⁶ Deobandi Islam is an anti-colonial form of Islamic fundamentalism that advocates violent *jihad* to bring about the application of a strict version of *sharia*. Like many anti-colonial forms of Islamic thought, the Deobandi school argues that everything required to rule a community can be found in Islamic scripture and rejects any interpretation. It is distinct from Wahabbism, Deobandism does not reject Suffism. Many of its original teachers were Naqshbandi or Qadiri Sufi prayer leaders. Olivier Roy. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. p. 54-68.

¹⁵⁷ Rashid, p. 23. Nojumi, p. 119.

¹⁵⁸ Nojumi, p. 88. Sinno, p. 226. Rabbani's *Jamat e Islami* and Hekmatyar's Army of Salvation each had their own *madrassa* feeder systems in Pakistan.

and spoke to their *taliban* of the religious duty of *jihad* against the atheist Soviet invaders. Many of the former *madrassa* students fought on behalf of the party that educated them.¹⁵⁹

One particular set of *madrassas* was run by a Pakistani political party representing Pashtuns from the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, called the *Jamayat ul Islamia Pakistan* (JUIP).¹⁶⁰ These *madrassas* became the main source of the leadership and many of the fighters who comprised the Taliban insurgency between 1994 and 1996; the Taliban government and religious police force between 1996 and 2001; and the leadership and much of the rank and file of the current Taliban insurgency.¹⁶¹ The Taliban's vision of Afghanistan's future, their beliefs about the rules people in Afghan communities should follow and the sanctions applied to rule breakers were formed in these *madrassas*. This vision, its associated rules and sanctions, as well as the values of the Taliban are in many ways alien to Afghan culture, something that was created and reinforced among men and boys living in isolation in Pakistani religious institutions.¹⁶²

For example, the Taliban were reared in a totally male society in which, "control over women and their virtual exclusion was a powerful symbol of manhood and a reaffirmation of the students' commitment to *jihad*." This conflict against women is rooted in the political beliefs and ideologies, not in Islam or the cultural norms of Afghanistan. The Taliban are a new generation of Muslim males who are products of a war culture, who have

¹⁵⁹ Nojumi, p. 120

¹⁶⁰ Nojumi, p. 122-4

¹⁶¹ Nojumi, p. 119-124; Michael Semple, "Rhetoric, Ideology and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement." *Peaceworks*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. p. 10, 14, 16.

¹⁶² Nojumi, p. 120. Not all Taliban came from this set of *madrassas*, (Nojumi, p. 125-7) but the leaders of the movement, which is hierarchical and committed to the concept of obedience, are all from these Pakistani *madrassas* and are all from pre-2001 movement. Therefore, the curriculum of these *madrassas* permeates and forms the basis of Taliban institutions. Semple, p. 18-22.

spent much of their adult lives in complete segregation from their own communities.¹⁶³¹⁶⁴ From the perspective of the Taliban, women are a source of corruption and all measures must be taken to remove that corruption from society.¹⁶⁵

The form of Islam the Taliban seeks to enforce is focused more on uniform patterns of behavior based on the organization's interpretation of the Koran and *hadiths*¹⁶⁶ than on the more traditional Afghan concept of a group of people unified in their effort to solve one another's problems through consensus and belief in Allah.¹⁶⁷ At the heart of their beliefs is the idea that Allah made men to pray and that anything that distracts them from doing so should be expunged from social life.

Although the Taliban's clothes and many of their beliefs about how people should behave are traditional and Pashtun, the Taliban movement discourages the pursuit of personal honor in favor of obedience to Allah and places membership in the Taliban movement squarely above family and tribal identity.¹⁶⁸

The period of studying in Pakistan and fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan formed the backbone of the Taliban's ideology and its leadership's deeply shared worldview.¹⁶⁹ The movement's leadership is still drawn from the students of these *madrassas* during the

¹⁶³ Sima Wali. *Statement on Afghanistan to the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus*, 30 October 1997. Wali is head of the Refugee Women in Development.

¹⁶⁴ Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Second Edition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 111.

¹⁶⁵ Michael Griffin. *Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan*. London: Pluto Press, 2001. p. 55.

¹⁶⁶ *Hadiths* are stories of life in the time of the Prophet written by his companions. Different schools of Islamic clerics claim different *hadiths* are the most salient and or the most true, leading to endless debate about the nature of life in the time of the Prophet.

¹⁶⁷ The clash between these two interpretations of Islam is evident throughout the case study data.

¹⁶⁸ Nojumi, p. 119-124; Michael Semple, 2014. p. 10, 14, 16.

¹⁶⁹ Nojumi, p. 119-127. Rashid, p. 32-33.

period of the *jihād* against the Soviets,¹⁷⁰ and many new Afghan recruits are sent to the Taliban *madrassas* in Quetta for at least a preliminary indoctrination and as much as a full education.¹⁷¹ Additionally, many of the Taliban's fighters after 2001 were recruited from the same *madrassas* in Quetta, which had and continue to have many Afghan students.¹⁷²

As the Taliban expanded and gained control throughout southern and eastern Afghanistan between 1994 and 1996, it allied itself with tribes and filled its ranks with locals who were not students from the JUIP *madrassas* in Pakistan. It allied itself with many tribal and community militias who had opposed the tribes allied with the Rabanni government during the civil war. For example, in Kandahar Province, control over the border point at Spin Boldak requires an alliance with either the Achekzai or the Noorzai. The Taliban killed Mansour, the Achekzai *mujihadeen* commander at Spin Boldak in 1994, who had allied himself with Ghilzai Pashtun commander Gulbadin Hekmatyar. They replaced him with a commander from the rival Noorzai tribe.¹⁷³ While the tribes contained some true believers and sent some boys to study in *madrassas*, the tribes are, by their nature, focused on providing physical and economic security to their members first and ideology second. When Hamid Karzai and Mullah Naqib began their American-military backed uprising in 2001 in Kandahar and Uruzgan, the Taliban's true believers fought, but the tribal leaders who had backed them negotiated surrender.¹⁷⁴

The Taliban's True Believers

¹⁷⁰ Semple, 2014. p. 17-24.

¹⁷¹ Abdullah Shahin. "Where the Taliban Train" Institute for War and Peace Reporting, March 2006.

¹⁷² Gretchen Peters. *Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs and Crime are Shaping the Afghan War*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009. p. 14

¹⁷³ Aikins, p. 4

¹⁷⁴ Aikins, p. 4

The core group of Taliban (estimated to comprise roughly 20-30% of the Taliban in 2002)¹⁷⁵ are “true believers” in the Taliban’s ideology.¹⁷⁶ As young boys, they experienced a crisis of identity and purpose when they were driven into utter and hopeless poverty in the refugee camps. The Taliban organization, like any revolutionary organization,¹⁷⁷ offered these disaffected young men a refuge, “from the anxieties, bareness and meaninglessness of ... (their) individual existence. It cures the poignantly frustrated not by conferring on them absolute truth or by remedying the difficulties and abuses which made their lives miserable, but by freeing them from their ineffectual selves – and it does this by enfolded them into a closely knit and exultant corporate whole.”¹⁷⁸ The Taliban provides its true believers with their identity, their purpose and their community. The ideology of the organization provides its followers with an explanation of the ills that have befallen them and a path of action they can take to remedy those ills. This ideology and the actions they take to implement it give the Taliban’s true believers a sense of psychological security that they are taking actions that will bring order and peace to the unbearable, uncontrollable chaos they experienced.

This sense of psychological security is characteristic of members of revolutionary movements and that security may be what ensures the Taliban’s true believers take actions prescribed in the organization’s ideology and strategy. In describing his conversion to communism in Germany in 1930, Arthur Koestler, describes how the ideology of communism made the contradictions, meaninglessness and fears of the world a thing of the past:

¹⁷⁵ Rubin, p. xvi

¹⁷⁶ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*, New York: Harper and Row, 1951. p. ii “... Mass movements generate in their adherents a readiness to die and a proclivity for united action; all of them, irrespective of the doctrine they preach and the program they project, breed fanaticism, enthusiasm, fervent hope, hatred and intolerance; all of them are capable of releasing a powerful flow of activity in certain departments of life; all of them demand blind faith and singlehearted allegiance.” “The true believer -- the man of fanatical faith who is ready to sacrifice his life for the holy cause.”

¹⁷⁷ Paul Berman. *Revolutionary Organization: Institution-Building within the People’s Liberation Armed Forces*. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1974. Berman defines a revolutionary organization as one seeking to overthrow an entire social order in order to establish its own vision of how society ought to function.

¹⁷⁸ Hoffer, p. 41

“To say that one had ‘seen the light’ is a poor description of the mental rapture which only the convert knows (regardless of what faith he has been converted to). The new light seems to pour from all directions across the skull; the whole universe falls into a pattern like the stray pieces of a jigsaw puzzle assembled by magic at one stroke. There is now an answer to every question, doubts and conflicts are a matter of the tortured past – a past already remote, when one had lived in dismal ignorance in the tasteless, colorless world of those who *don’t know*. Nothing henceforth can disturb the convert’s inner peace and serenity – except for the occasional fear of losing faith again, losing thereby what alone makes life worth living, and falling back into the outer darkness, where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth.”¹⁷⁹

The Taliban’s true believers see the world through the lens of an ideology that provides them with an explanation of what causes the ills of the world and the exact pattern of actions they can take to remedy it, thereby achieving a utopian vision of the perfect Islamic community. For the young men and boys raised as *taliban* in the JUIP *madrassas*, Islam is the most important thing. For them, Islam is a way to stem the chaos that has pervaded life in Afghanistan through the performance of the religious duties of *jihad*¹⁸⁰ and *dawa*.¹⁸¹ By fighting against invaders who want to destroy Islam and calling the people to Islam by enforcing its rules, the Taliban’s true believers can take actions that they believe will end the chaos that has characterized life in Afghanistan.

¹⁷⁹ Arthur Koestler, *The God that Failed*. Salem, New Hampshire: Ayer Company Publishers, 1949. p. 23

¹⁸⁰ *Jihad*, meaning struggle, is an important concept in Islam. It can be used to refer to the struggle remain on the path of Islam or it can be used to refer to armed struggle to expel invaders and or infidels. Different Muslims interpret the word to mean different things, but the Taliban interprets it to mean armed struggle against the forces of atheism. (Roy, p. 3-4) *Jihad* is a religious duty and if someone is martyred while performing *jihad*, that martyrdom (*shahdad*), will be rewarded with automatic entry into Paradise on Judgment Day.

¹⁸¹ *Dawa* means the call to Islam and it is also an important Islamic concept. Many Muslims believe *dawa* is an effort to convince people to practice Islam. Many Muslims also see *dawa* as a duty to advise other Muslims to practice Islam more or more correctly. The Taliban believe that *dawa* involves violently sanctioning people for not adhering strictly to the rules and practices of their interpretation of Islam. (Roy, p. 3-4) Many Muslims throughout Afghanistan believe that the Taliban’s approach to *dawa* has the opposite of its intended effect because it causes people to hate Islam. (Kabul and Kapisa data sets 2010-4)

The Taliban believe the world now is chaotic because it is in a state of *jahiliyya* or ignorance of the guidance of Islam.¹⁸² This ignorance was the cause of the chaos in Afghanistan during the *jihad* against the Soviets, during the ensuing civil war and during the reign of the current government.¹⁸³ In order to remedy this chaos, the Taliban's true believers think they must fight a *jihad* against the forces of atheism, while constantly calling the people to Islam by identifying and sanctioning violations of Islamic law within Afghan communities. Taliban believe their actions will cause the perfect, utopian Muslim society to come into being.

The Afghan Taliban's true believers accept that it is their religious duty to engage in *jihad* (which they define as armed struggle) against the forces of atheism in order to defend Islam. These forces have been embodied by the Soviets, the Afghan government they left behind, the corrupt and immoral *mujihadeen* commanders who led Afghanistan into civil war, the United States and its Coalition partners and the current Afghan government. The strong belief by these Taliban in the righteousness and rewards of *shahadah*, or martyrdom while participating in *jihad*, has led many among them to be fearless fighters.¹⁸⁴ The JUIP *madrassas* had taught their *taliban* that participating in the armed struggle was a religious duty. Military training became a regular part of the *madrassas'* curriculum. The Taliban and their teachers lived an uncomfortable, Spartan life, traveling back and forth between the fighting and the sparse, ascetic religious life of a *talib*. These young men sought *mujihadeen* leaders who would comport with the values of honesty, devotion, self-sacrifice and Islamic

¹⁸² Abdul Ala Maududi was the founder of the *Jamat-e-Islami* Pakistan, the original Islamist party in India and later Pakistan. He was an advisor to General Zia ul Haqq, who attempted to proliferate Islamic beliefs in order to create a just, Islamic society, through the establishment of Deobandi *madrassas*. Maududi believed that the Muslim community had slid backwards into a pre-Islamic state of chaos. He equated the current state of culture in the Muslim world with the pre-Islamic *jahiliya* described by Allah through his messenger, the Prophet Mohammad, in the Koran.

¹⁸³ Semple, 2014. p. 6-9.

¹⁸⁴ Nojumi, p. 22, p. 120-4.

purity that they had absorbed in school. But, the *mujihadeen* commanders often fell short of the desires of the *taliban* by being insufficiently Islamic or interested in power and self-importance as opposed to self-sacrifice. The young JUIP *taliban* also deeply despised the opulence, corruption and un-Islamic behavior of the leaders of the *mujihadeen* political parties living in Peshawar and their militia commanders and sought political leaders who would meet their demanding standards. The leaders of the *jihad* against the Soviets failed to meet the expectations of these young men.¹⁸⁵

When the former *mujihadeen* commanders brought chaos upon the people of Afghanistan through their infighting, general lawlessness and un-Islamic behavior, the Taliban of the JUIP *madrassas* turned their *jihad* against these insufficiently Islamic leaders through the re-established Taliban fronts in Kandahar. During their reign in Afghanistan, the Taliban's true believers continued to believe they were engaged in a *jihad* to root out the corruption and atheism of the former *mujihadeen* commanders, including Akmad Shah Massoud, Rashid Dostum, Ismail Khan, and other anti-Taliban commanders. When the United States invaded and overthrew the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan with the assistance of these same *mujihadeen* commanders, the Taliban turned their *jihad* on the infidel invaders and their Afghan allies.¹⁸⁶ In 2003, Mullah Omar declared a *jihad* against the United States, its Coalition partners and the Afghan government.

Beyond *jihad*, Taliban seek to call the people to Islam (*dawa*) by recreating a society of Muslims as they believe it existed in the time of the Prophet Mohammad by enforcing rules regarding the practice of Islam and adherence to a strict interpretation of *sharia*

¹⁸⁵ Nojumi, p. 123-4

¹⁸⁶ Semple, 2014. p. 6-9.

law.¹⁸⁷ The Taliban work to remove any people or activities that could distract men from the worship of Allah, such as women, music, television, various games of chance, and various sports, like soccer, volleyball, flying kites, among many other things.¹⁸⁸ They seek to expunge any foreign cultural influences that have entered Afghanistan's Islamic social world because they believe these foreign influences cause Muslims to stray from the true path of Islam. The Taliban believe that the influence of alien cultures and ideologies on the *mujihadeen* leaders (many of whom were educated at Kabul University, where they were influenced by foreign cultures) caused them to fail in establishing an orderly, Islamic society.¹⁸⁹

The Taliban believe that they know the rules of Islam, that Afghan society has become corrupt and that it is their duty to purify it by violently enforcing the rules of Islam.¹⁹⁰ Taliban fighters believed that questioning their edicts was tantamount to questioning the Koran, which is the word of Allah.¹⁹¹

Finally, although many of the Taliban's true believers are members of Durrani Pashtun tribes, they, "oppose all forms of hierarchy within the Muslim community, including tribes or royalty."¹⁹² Islam is the only identity they value. By valuing their tribal identities less, the Taliban's true believers became neutral arbiters between the tribes of southern Afghanistan. They emphasize village identities over tribal ones and infuse their vision of the ideal village with Islamic, as opposed to tribal, concepts.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁷ Roy, p. 3, Marsden, p. 61-3

¹⁸⁸ Rashid, p. 3

¹⁸⁹ Nojumi, p. 83-133. Marsden, p. 64.

¹⁹⁰ Rashid, p. 21-5.

¹⁹¹ Rashid, p. 107.

¹⁹² Rubin, p. xv.

¹⁹³ Sinno, p. 242-3.

To this day, the movement retains its essential character as a clerical paramilitary, as well as its social base in the Durrani Pashtun tribes of Kandahar. The Taliban's leadership, "continues to function as a sort of Afghan Islamist vanguardist movement – a closed group that claims a divine mission to transform Afghan society without the need for a popular mandate."¹⁹⁴ The movement does not, in their view, require a popular mandate because its mandate is from Allah through the Koran and *hadiths*¹⁹⁵. They believe that the understanding of how the social world should function they gained in the *madrassas* means that they know how people must behave in order for a pure, Islamic society to exist. Obeying the rules of this society will allow people to enter Paradise on Judgment Day and therefore, calling them to Islam by violently enforcing *sharia* is a good in and of itself.

Taliban Utopian Vision

The Taliban aims to re-establish the state it constructed between 1996 and 2001, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The IEA was modeled on the Taliban's interpretation of the Caliphate as described in the Koran and *hadiths*. A Caliphate is ruled by a "leader of believers" or *Amir ul Mumaneen* who is not elected, but is instead selected by a small council of leaders who have religious knowledge and the trust of the community. The Taliban believes that elections are un-Islamic because Mohammad was selected and not elected as *Amir ul Mumaneen*. Also, elections award authority based on the judgment of ordinary people with no special knowledge of Islam, as opposed to Islamic clerics. The *Amir ul Mumaneen* is also the Caliph. People living within the territory of the Caliphate must

¹⁹⁴ Semple, p. 24.

¹⁹⁵ There are thousands of *hadiths* or reports about the words and actions of the Prophet Muhammad. Most of them were written by his companions. The *Sunna* or customary practices of the Prophet Muhammad are the second most important source of Islamic law after the Koran. Henry Munson, Jr. *Islam and Revolution in The Middle East*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. p. 8-9.

pledge their obedience (*ba'it*) to the *Amir ul Mumaneen* as a religious duty under the *sharia*. It is then their religious duty to execute anyone who rebels against him. If the *Amir ul Mumaneen* declares a *jihad*, it is the religious duty of all who have sworn obedience to him to take up arms against the enemy he has identified.¹⁹⁶ The *Amir ul Mumaneen's* decrees and orders carry the weight of Islam and collaborating with infidel invaders is equivalent to a rejection of Islam.¹⁹⁷

It is therefore the Taliban's sacred duty to undertake violent *jihad* against infidels¹⁹⁸ in order to establish an Islamic state that will enforce *sharia* throughout Afghanistan in order to bring peace and security to the people.¹⁹⁹ Mullah Omar said the goal of the Taliban movement is, "To end the mischief in the country, to establish peace and security, to protect life, wealth and honor and to enforce the *sharia*, do *jihad* against the leaders who were devoted for power, and endeavor to make the land of Afghanistan an exemplary state."²⁰⁰

In the view of the Taliban, an exemplary state would be one in which people lived as they believe the Prophet and his companions lived. In this world, there are few distractions from prayer; people who break the rules of *sharia* are brutally punished; no one questions the authority of Allah; there are no foreign cultural influences; and all people live their lives in preparation for Judgment Day. People in this perfect Islamic world would behave in an orderly fashion, not stealing, or killing or committing adultery²⁰¹. They would dress

¹⁹⁶ Nojumi, p. 152-5.

¹⁹⁷ Semple, 2014. p. 7.

¹⁹⁸ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. Code of Conduct (*Layeha*). Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2006, 2009 and 2010.

¹⁹⁹ Nojumi, p. 153.

²⁰⁰ Nojumi, p. 153-4. Nazeer Laghari and Mufti Jameel Khan. *Interview with Ameerul M'umineen*. Peshawar, Pakistan, June 1998.

²⁰¹ Adultery as defined by Afghans is not simply sex with someone other than your spouse. It is any sex outside of marriage, including pre-marital sex.

according to the Taliban's interpretation of Islam. Men would wear beards and turbans and never wear clothes that were influenced by foreign cultures, like jeans or business suits.

In order to eliminate all traces of sexual corruption, the Taliban seeks to establish *pardah*²⁰², which they interpret as separating women from men in every setting (except inside the family home), so that men will not be distracted from worshipping Allah by the presence of women. In order to ensure that men were not distracted from prayer or tempted to think about sin, women would be confined to their homes, whose windows would be painted black. No women would work or would ever interact with men to whom they were not related. If women needed to leave their homes, in cases of emergency only, they would be covered head to toe, including their faces, in *burkhas* and escorted by a male relative.

The Taliban has used its gender policies as the main platform for its opposition to international community's demands that the Taliban moderate its policies. The issue of the Taliban's treatment of women became the benchmark for the Islamic extremism the Taliban valued and the international community opposed. As then Taliban Attorney General Maulvi Jalilullah Maulvizada stated during their reign,

“Let us state what sort of education the United Nations wants. This is a big infidel policy which gives such obscene freedom to women which would lead to adultery and herald the destruction of Islam. In any Islamic country where adultery becomes common, that country is destroyed and enters the domination of the infidels because their men become like women and women cannot defend themselves. Anybody who talks to us should do so within Islam's framework. The Holy Koran cannot adjust itself to other

²⁰² *Purdah* means to curtain in Arabic and it is interpreted in varying ways across the Islamic world. While the Taliban interprets *pardah* as near-total social separation of women from men, in other cultures, *pardah* is the basis of much less restrictive rules, such as women wearing head scarves and modest clothing.

people's requirements; people should adjust themselves to the requirements of the Holy Koran.”²⁰³

Not only do the Taliban believe that women interacting with one another or going to school will lead to the destruction of social order, they believe that women are lesser beings and should have no involvement in governing the area where they reside. As the Taliban Governor of Herat said during their reign, “Women just aren’t as smart as men. They don’t have the intelligence. We categorically refuse to let women vote or participate in politics.”²⁰⁴

All distractions from prayer would be minimized, including television, radio, sports and other endeavors. Sports, including soccer and volleyball, as well as other games that imply that individuals or chance, above Allah, can effect the outcome would be outlawed. This solemn, prayerful, orderly world would allow its residents to behave in ways that would make them likely to gain entry into Paradise on Judgment Day.

Taliban Rules for Creating the Perfect Community of Muslims

One Taliban leader described the rules it enforces as follows, “In the areas under the Taliban government, every kind of wickedness and immorality, cruelty, murder, robbery, song and music, TV, VCR, satellite dish, immodesty, women traveling without *mehraum* (immediate blood relative), shaving of beards, pictures and photographs, and usury have been totally banned.”²⁰⁵ The Taliban believe the rules they enforce are those of Islam at the

²⁰³ Ahmed Rashid. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Second Edition*. New Haven: Yale University Press. p. 111-112

²⁰⁴ Nur Mohammad in *The Women of Afghanistan Under the Taliban*. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2002. Chapter 4.

²⁰⁵ Taliban stated in Muhammad Moosa, “The Taliban Movement and Their Goals” from *Darul Ifta-e-Wal Irshad*, Peshawar, Pakistan June 20, 1998.

time of the Prophet Mohammad. These rules are focused on the entire society practicing Islam in order to create a predictable set of behaviors, as opposed to Islamic beliefs.

If enforced, the Taliban's rules would make their vision of an orderly, Islamic social world a concrete reality. The Taliban's rules²⁰⁶ can be grouped into the following categories: rules prohibiting actions that have negative effects on others; rules to influence people's Islamic practice; rules to cause *purdah* (the segregation of the sexes); rules to improve economic equality; and rules to cause people to provide resources to the Taliban. As part of its strategy to overthrow GIRA by removing its access to resources from the population, like personnel and information, the Taliban also has a set of rules designed to separate the population from the government.

The Taliban's rules prohibiting actions that have negative effects on others include, but are not limited to: no killing; no fighting; no theft; no adultery; no sexual harassment; no alcohol or narcotics; no gambling; and no destruction of property. These rules are intended to establish basic security of person and property, as well as rules governing sexual behavior.

The Taliban's rules of Islamic practice include, but are not limited to: men must pray five times a day in the *mazjet*; no music, dancing or dancing boys; no consumption of narcotics, alcohol or other *haram* items;; no football; no volleyball; no kite flying; no celebrating Nawruz; no sorcery; no modern clothes; and all men must wear a beard and hat.

²⁰⁶ The Taliban's rules were derived from their edicts between 1996 and 2001, researchers' recollections of their rules during that period and published descriptions of their rules by other researchers who have interviewed members of the Taliban.

Taliban rules to cause *purdah* (segregation of the sexes) include, but are not limited to: women cannot interact with men to whom they are not related; women are not allowed in shops or the bazaar; women cannot leave their homes (or in rural areas home villages) without a *burkha* and a male relative; girls cannot attend school; women cannot have jobs outside the home; women should be quiet, unseen, unheard and not “charming”²⁰⁷; and no male doctor can treat a female patient.

Taliban rules to improve economic equality include, but are not limited to: charging set prices for important items, like bread and meat; all scales must measure accurately; no usury; no bride price greater than 55,000 Afs²⁰⁸; and no gifts of jewelry to the bride.

Taliban rules for the provision of money to the Taliban include, but are not limited to: all households must pay 500 Afs to the Mullah per month; all households must pay 1 kilogram of every 10 kilograms harvested to the Taliban; and all households must pay 10% of their revenue to the Taliban.²⁰⁹

The Taliban’s rules relating to its insurgency against GIRoA are intended to separate the population from the government in order to deny the government resources it needs to defeat the Taliban. These rules include, but are not limited to: do not provide information about Taliban activities or location to the government; do not work for the government; do

²⁰⁷ There are many sub-rules to this set, like no nail polish, no jewelry, no colored socks, no laughing, no singing, no loud talking, etc.

²⁰⁸ Roughly \$1,000.

²⁰⁹ “Decrees Announced by the General Presidency of Amr Bil Maruf and the Munkrat (Religious Police)” in 1996. These rules remained in place in all areas where the Taliban had control until the overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001. There are areas where the Taliban has recovered control and is enforcing these rules, but they are few and far between because public enforcement by Taliban fighters leads to Coalition attacks. Published in Edward Grazada. *Afghanistan Diary: 1992-2000*. New York: Powerhouse Books, 2001, p. 62-64.

not work for international organizations (including NGOs); and do not provide sanctuary or hospitality to the government or international organizations.

Methods of Implementation

The Taliban have a sense of the other, in that those who have studied at the JUIP *madrassas* have received instruction in divine knowledge, which is in their view inherently superior to the knowledge gained in other Islamic or worldly educational institutions. For them, society is bifurcated into those who know how people must behave and those who do not know.²¹⁰ From the perspective of Taliban fighters, their religious duty is to brutally enforce the rules of Allah. They thereby intend to demonstrate to everyone that they must obey these rules. The Taliban believe that in so doing, they are making it more likely that everyone will live in an orderly and pure way and therefore be able to enter Paradise on Judgment Day.

The Taliban's methods of enforcing these rules are famously brutal and target individual, as opposed to group or family, behavior. Taliban religious police patrol communities and when they see someone breaking one of their rules, they sanction him or her. Sanction often involves beating the violator with a mule whip or a stick, but can include cutting off people's hands, arrest, and even execution.

Where *sharia* courts are available, fighters are supposed to arrest violators and take them there, where the accused stands without counsel to defend himself before Taliban judges who determine his guilt or innocence and mete out further punishment based on

²¹⁰ Semple, 2014. p. 21.

their interpretation of the *sharia*.²¹¹ The Code of Conduct of the Taliban (issued by Mullah Omar in 2009) emphasizes the importance of taking violators to a *sharia* court and not executing summary judgments.²¹² In the view of many people who lived through the rule of the IEA, summary whippings in the street were a form of harassment and humiliation and showed the Taliban fighters to be bullies bent on demonstrating their dominance over ordinary people. This hatred of public shaming was heightened in communities where Taliban fighters were Durrani Pashtun and the communities where they were charged with providing order were not.²¹³ The 2009 restrictions may be the Taliban leadership's effort to change that image.

The judgments of the *sharia* courts, however, are no less harsh than the Taliban fighters' summary judgments. For example, if a Taliban *sharia* court determines that a man murdered another man, the Taliban call residents to a public place, like a stadium, and give the family of the victim a gun. The family of the victim has three chances to shoot the murderer who kneels some distance from them with his hands tied behind his back. If they fail, it was Allah's will that the murderer go free. If the perpetrator is killed, it was Allah's will that he die.²¹⁴ If a court finds someone guilty of adultery, the Taliban will publically stone that person to death. If someone steals something, the court will order the Taliban to amputate his hand. All of these punishments are public and are intended to create expectations of extreme sanctions for rule breaking.

²¹¹ Antonio Giustozzi, Caludio Franco and Adam Bacsko. "Shadow Justice: How the Taliban Run their Judiciary." Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2013. p. 17-20.

²¹² Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. Code of Conduct (*Layeha*). Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2006.

²¹³ Researcher 1 field notes. Researcher 6 field notes. Researcher 3 field notes.

²¹⁴ Researcher 1 field notes. Researcher 1 was a child during the Taliban time and lived in central Kabul, near the soccer stadium. He and his father were herded into the stadium with thousands of other Kabul residents to watch an execution like the one described above.

The Taliban do not advise people the first time they violate a rule not to do so, giving them a chance to understand what will happen if they violate the rule a second time. By punishing individuals for their first violation of a rule, they do not allow fathers a chance to control the behavior of their wives or children, clashing with traditional Afghan norms. When the Taliban publically sanction someone, it threatens paternal authority and honor because it demonstrates that the father could not control his family's behavior and that he could not defend his family from attack. This demonstration of the father's weakness is an affront to the family's honor and places it in danger by making them appear weak and therefore an opportune target for anyone to attack.²¹⁵ In a country where order has regularly collapsed over a period of 40 years, this threat to family security is quite serious and unwelcome.

Despite the harshness described above, Mullah Omar admonished the Taliban to strive for the welfare and prosperity of all Afghans because he states that the people of Afghanistan are equal to the Taliban. He tells his fighters to protect the life and property of the people and public facilities.²¹⁶ The Taliban Code of Conduct outlaws harming the common people, searching their homes without permission or confiscating their property. It further prohibits summary judgment of spies, instructing fighters instead to submit suspects to *sharia* courts for judgment. This approach limits Taliban fighters' ability to abuse their power in relation to the common people.²¹⁷

Taliban rules intended to separate the population from the government are violently enforced whenever the Taliban can acquire information about collaboration and

²¹⁵ Researcher 1, Researcher 2, Researcher 3 field notes.

²¹⁶ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. "Eid al Fitr Message" Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, December 2010.

²¹⁷ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. Code of Conduct (*Layeha*). Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2006, 2009 and 2010.

have the relative power to sanction the offender. In instances where Taliban fighters can move through an area at night without being immediately confronted by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the Taliban has identified someone who is working for the security forces or providing them with information, Taliban fighters enter the area at night and either ambush the person and kill him or attack his home. Often, they leave night letters explaining why they killed someone in order to inform the rest of the community that if they break that same rule, they will be similarly punished. Another Taliban tactic for enforcing rules separating the population from the government is running checkpoints on the roads running in and out of government centers. They search people for government identification or weapons and capture, torture and normally kill people who have them.²¹⁸

The Code of Conduct instructs the Taliban on how to handle different types of government personnel. In particular, it states that the Taliban should warn teachers and Mullahs who are working for the government not to do so in order to allow them the chance to change their allegiances. Additionally, the Code of Conduct dictates that the Taliban should attempt to convince people working for the government to defect and even serve as double agents. It devotes particular detail to the need to offer amnesty to defectors, even if they are bad people. The Code of Conduct states that harsh punishment should be applied to any Taliban who knowingly kills a double agent.

Reports that a Taliban fighter or leader violated the Code of Conduct result in a trial in a *sharia* court. Fighters can be punished by being expelled from the Taliban. If the

²¹⁸ Researcher 2 and Researcher 3 Field Notes.

violation of the Code of Conduct was also a violation of *sharia*, the fighter can be punished according to its strictures.²¹⁹

Taliban Strategy

The Taliban's Ends

The goal of the Taliban's strategy is to expel the Coalition, overthrow GIROA and replace it with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), which ruled the country between 1996 and 2001. In his Eid message of 15 December 2010, Mullah Omar clearly stated his goals for the IEA after it expels the Coalition, saying that the IEA, "... will implement *sharia* rules in the light of the injunctions of the sacred religion of Islam in order to efficiently maintain internal security and eradicate immorality, injustice, indecency and other vices."²²⁰

The Taliban's Ways

In order to reach these ends, the Taliban did not reach out to the people it sought to rule to ask them about the problems they faced and form a consensus about how to proceed. Instead, the Taliban sought to impose a set of rules of its own making upon the population. They did so under the rubric of the most important value system for the Afghan population, Islam. However, the Islam the Taliban sought to impose was not altered to fit the Islamic beliefs of Afghan communities. The Taliban did seek to affect popular support

²¹⁹ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. Code of Conduct (*Layeha*). Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2006, 2009 and 2010.

²²⁰ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. "Eid al Fitr Message" Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, December 2010.

for itself and the government, but not by altering its externally generated goals for Afghanistan.

The Taliban sought to decrease popular support for the government by pointing out its un-Islamic behavior and weakness, pointing out how the government failed to perform. First, the Taliban has declared *jihad* against ISAF as invaders who it claims are attempting to destroy Islam in Afghanistan, meaning that anyone working for them is working for invaders and assisting invading infidels in destroying Islam. Second, the Taliban points out the un-Islamic and corrupt behavior of GIRoA. Third, the Taliban presents its victory over ISAF and GIRoA as inevitable and demonstrates the weakness of GIRoA through high profile attacks.²²¹

And, the Taliban sought to maintain support from the population by behaving as good Muslims, protecting the property and life of the population. The organization sought to control the behavior of its personnel, ensuring they treated the people as their equals; not harassing or harming them; confiscating their property; engaging in summary executions of suspected spies; or engaging in corruption or other un-Islamic behavior.²²² The Taliban sought to improve its effectiveness in implementing its own vision in order to improve popular support for the organization.

The Taliban was aware between 2008 and 2015 that it lacked the resources and organization required to survive force on force engagements with ISAF and the ANSF. Therefore, the Taliban chose to act as a clandestine insurgent movement, basing itself out of

²²¹ Semple, 2014. p. 7-9.

²²² Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. "Eid Message". Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, November 2004, December 2010, November 2011, October 2012, August 2013, July 2014, October 2014. Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. Code of Conduct (*Layeha*). Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2006, 2009 and 2010.

neighboring sanctuaries in Pakistan and in the many inhospitable, sparsely populated areas of Afghanistan's mountains and deserts.

Within this framework of clandestine operations, the Taliban sought to impose high costs on ISAF in order to encourage it to leave. For that reason, the Taliban engaged ISAF in hit and run, improvised explosive device and suicide attacks. The Taliban also sought to embed its fighters in the ANSF so that they could attack ISAF personnel in what came to be known as "Green on Blue" attacks. These activities were intended to increase the cost of ISAF presence in Afghanistan, decrease ISAF's willingness to interact with ANSF personnel, decrease the willingness of Afghans to join the security forces and demonstrate the Taliban's strength and the government's weakness to the people of Afghanistan. Mullah Omar summed up his message to the United States and its Coalition Partners in his November 2011 Eid Message: "We are never tired and never waver. So, the only choice for you now is to go home because we will never quit."²²³

The Taliban endeavors to decrease the government's control by separating it from the population. It uses ambushes and improvised explosive attacks on ANSF patrols to decrease the willingness of soldiers and police to patrol and engage the enemy. The Taliban also works to identify, kill and publically explain why they killed people working for the government. The Taliban collect information about people working for the government, and in particular, the security forces. They do this by setting up checkpoints to identify people with government identification and by paying informants. They also pay informants and capture and torture elders in order to extract information about the identities of government workers. The Taliban attempts to establish freedom of movement so its

²²³ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. "Eid Message". Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, November 2011.

fighters can kill people working for the government or international organizations. When the Taliban kills someone working for the government or international organizations, it provides the local population with information about why they killed the victim in order to influence people not to work for the government or international organizations, thereby separating the government from the population. Additionally, Taliban fighters periodically conduct attacks on district centers, testing the government's ability to resist them and the Taliban's ability to take over districts and drive the government out.

Throughout its efforts to separate the populace from the government, the Taliban walks a fine line between influencing people not to work for the government and drawing the government's unwanted focus on the area where it is operating. The Taliban will not openly engage in a concerted effort to overthrow GIRoA as long as they believe the ANSF and their international partners have enough relative power to destroy Taliban forces. The Taliban strategy centers on waiting for GIRoA to weaken as international forces withdraw, removing the external resources underpinning the current government's coercive force.

Finally, the Taliban focuses on maintaining unity and obedience within its organization. It maintains unity through a powerful indoctrination program at specific *madrassas* in Pakistan;²²⁴ a strong, hierarchical organization with an information collection and sanction system (see section on organizational structure); injunctions and punishments for infighting;²²⁵ and advice to fighters not to engage in fighting for their own glory, but for Allah and to help their fellow Taliban fighters.²²⁶

²²⁴ Peters, p. 145. Abdullah Shahin. "Where the Taliban Train" Institute for War and Peace Reporting, March 2006.

²²⁵ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. Code of Conduct (*Layeha*). Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2006, 2009 and 2010.

²²⁶ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. "Eid Message". Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, October 2012.

In any one area, the Taliban pursues a phased strategy to gain control over the population. During the first phase, small groups of 3-20 members without formal organization engage in *guerrilla* action. During the second phase, the Taliban introduce more military, administrative and judiciary organization. The military structure will reach up to the province or front level, which is then divided into district level commands. During the second phase, Taliban begin to move through the area in question at night, leaving letters informing people that if they work for the government, they will be killed. The Taliban establishes *sharia* courts, contacts elders and requests that they stop using the government's judicial system. During the third phase, Taliban control the area both day and night. They set up a full judicial and administrative structure and enforce their complete rule set.²²⁷

Resources: The Taliban's Means

In order to implement this strategy, the Taliban requires resources. It needs personnel, money and other goods, information and sanctuary. The Taliban acquires its personnel from two main sources: the *madrassas* in Pakistan (which instruct both Afghan and Pakistani students) and the Afghan population. The Taliban prefers *madrassa* students because they are indoctrinated in the Taliban's ideology. However, the Taliban also recruits Afghans from their communities to fight on behalf of the Taliban. Some of these local recruits travel to Quetta or Peshawar for at least a brief indoctrination to the Taliban's ideology. When the Taliban forms a relationship with a community, its fighters often marry local girls and local boys from those families are sent to the *madrassas* in Quetta for

²²⁷ Mohammad Osman Tariq Elias. "The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: Logar and Wardak." in Antonio Giustozzi, ed. *Decoding the New Taliban*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. p. 51

education, training and eventual integration into the movement.²²⁸ In addition, the Taliban admonishes all Afghans to support and participate in the *jihad* against the invaders in whatever way they can.²²⁹

The Taliban acquires funding in at least four ways: taxes it collects from communities on their income and produce; tariffs on goods transported on Taliban-controlled roads; support from portions of the Pakistani security and intelligence forces; and donations from wealthy Arabs.

The Taliban collects 10% of the income or produce of people living in communities under its control. Produce includes the many crops grown in Afghanistan, but it also includes opium, which provides significant resources to the Taliban. Any person who has a job with a salary in a Taliban controlled area also provides 10% of it to the Taliban.²³⁰ That income includes that which accrues from processing opium into various levels of precursors to heroin, which also provides significant income for the Taliban. In the areas under their control, the Taliban also collects tariffs in return for protection of commercial traffic. The collection of tariffs has been very lucrative because of the large amount of opium and heroin transported on the roads, as well as the food and supplies for ISAF and the international community that have traveled on the road network throughout the country. Additionally,

²²⁸ Antonio Giustozzi. *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*. New York: Colombia University Press, 2008. p. 84.

²²⁹ Mullah Omar's February 2003 Fatwa declaring Jihad against the invaders and the government of Afghanistan states that all Afghans should undertake a jihad to expel the invaders and protect Islam, but if they cannot participate, they should do their best to stay away from the government and the Coalition.

²³⁰ The 10% tax is based on the Taliban's assertion that it is governing an Islamic Caliphate and should therefore receive the *zakat* (religious taxes) described in the *sharia*.

major drug dealers who own refineries and traffic in tons of heroin provide senior Taliban leaders with millions of dollars in return for their cooperation.²³¹

A portion of all of the locally collected taxes and tariffs stay with the sub-commanders at the local level, but a large portion is passed up the chain to their commanders and their commanders' commanders, all the way up to the Finance Committee of the Quetta Shura. Each commander has his own money man who attends the Finance Committee meeting and negotiates on behalf of his commander. The Finance Committee takes the funds from wealthier areas and redistributes them to poorer areas.²³²

In addition, the Taliban leadership is purported to receive support from portions of the Pakistani military and intelligence services. Finally, the Taliban leadership receives donations from wealthy Arabs.²³³

Together, these funds are sufficient to pay Taliban personnel, support the *madrassas* that produce them and pay for equipment, logistics and the Taliban base inside Pakistan. During 2007, NATO estimated that Taliban fighters were paid a monthly salary of roughly \$150, which is a reasonable salary in a country where the average annual income is less than \$500.²³⁴

The Taliban collects information it uses to target people working for the government in several ways. It has paid informants in villages and towns.²³⁵ The Taliban identify people working for the government by capturing and interrogating people,

²³¹ Gretchen Peters. *Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs and Crime are Shaping the Afghan War*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009. p. 145

²³² Peters, p. 124-5

²³³ Peters, p. 147

²³⁴ Peters, p. 146 from Ahto Lobjakas, "Afghanistan: NATO Downplays 'Conventional' Threat in South," Radio Free Europe, January 23, 2007.

²³⁵ Researcher 3 Village Field Notes, 2014.

particularly elders, from Afghan communities.²³⁶ The Taliban also sets up checkpoints and searches passing cars for people with government identification.²³⁷ The Taliban additionally conduct patrols in areas where the presence of police and other security forces is minimal. In some areas, elders and Wakils who are supportive of the Taliban provide them with information.²³⁸ Additionally, the Taliban appears to have access to databases with information about the identity and home addresses of members of the ANSF and other government workers.²³⁹ Since the ministries maintain these databases, the Taliban may be accessing them through ministry personnel.

The Taliban relies upon Afghanistan's many inhospitable mountains and deserts, as well as supportive populations, for sanctuary within Afghanistan. For example, most Taliban groups in Zabul Province, "roam through their respective areas of operations without any permanent base and take shelter in private houses where they are fed either by frightened villagers or by relatives or friends."²⁴⁰

Across the border in Pakistan, the town of Quetta provides sanctuary to the Taliban's leadership, its command and control structure, its *madrassa* base and a place through which it can traffic in opium and heroin. A steady flow of students from these *madrassas* join Taliban units in Afghanistan or serve as suicide bombers. There are hundreds of small, private *madrassas* in Quetta with small numbers of students. Many of these *madrassas* train and educate Taliban fighters. Some Afghan recruits travel to Quetta in order to receive training and education at these *madrassas*. One young, Afghan *talib* from

²³⁶Ibid.

²³⁷Ibid.

²³⁸Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Abdul Awwal Zabulwal. "Taliban in Zabul: A Witnesses' Account." In Antonio Giustozzi, ed. *Decoding the New Taliban*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. p. 185

a small Quetta *madrassa* told a reporter he was recruited by one of his friends in Afghanistan who told him terrible things about the Afghan government and about Americans insulting Islam and abusing, killing and entering the homes of ordinary Afghans. He explained that once he had decided he wanted to wage *jihad* in his homeland, he travelled to a Quetta *madrassa* to study. Another young, Afghan *talib* explained his purpose in studying at his *madrassa*, saying, "I am preparing for *jihad* here, until I am sent to Afghanistan. ... *Jihad* is my duty and martyrdom my hope."²⁴¹ The sanctuary of Quetta allows the Taliban to generate what is arguably its greatest strength: a shared understanding of and belief in the organization's goals and the actions its personnel should take to reach them. The *madrassas* and the Taliban community in Quetta also provide a place where Taliban fighters can rest, recharge and receive medical care.²⁴²

Finally, the sanctuary in Quetta provides the Taliban with places where the leadership of the Taliban can live and meet in relative security, away from ISAF's raids and aerial attacks. This safety also provides the Taliban with a place where they can transact business, like the sale of opium and heroin, in order to make the money required to continue their operations in Afghanistan.²⁴³ Quetta is beyond the reach of ISAF and GIRoA and is therefore a place where the Taliban can safely base its leadership, training, education and other headquarters' functions. The sanctuary in Quetta is an invaluable resource to the Taliban.

Taliban Organizational Structure: Translating Strategy into Actions?

²⁴¹ Abdullah Shahin. "Where the Taliban Train" Institute for War and Peace Reporting, March 2006.

²⁴² Peters, p. 143-5.

²⁴³ Ibid.

The Taliban is a centralized, hierarchical organization with strong, clear, chains of command that are bound by an ideology of obedience. At the top, decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of the *Amir al Momineen*, who makes or approves all decisions about policy, strategy, national level resources and personnel. The *Amir al Momineen* has a deputy through whom his decisions are communicated down to the rest of the organization through *fatwas*, a Code of Conduct (or *Layeha*), Eid messages, committees and emissaries.²⁴⁴ Because of the clandestine nature of the insurgency and the resulting communications issues, local Taliban commanders have latitude in executing tactical operations, but their actions are constrained by the Code of Conduct and by the ideology of the Taliban movement.

As *Amir al Momineen* between 1996 and 2015²⁴⁵, Mullah Omar appointed all military commanders, shadow governors and *sharia* judges for each province and district in Afghanistan. He managed personnel and policies through a set of national and provincial commissions. Military commanders were responsible for the activities of all Taliban fighters, who make up the vast majority of Taliban personnel. Taliban fighters were to conduct patrols, operate checkpoints, collect information, attack government security forces, identify people who work for the government, take prisoners and turn them over to the *sharia* courts, and communicate the people's concerns and complaints to their commanders. Taliban fighters were to encourage people to defect from the government to join the Taliban and protect those who did defect. Taliban fighters were never to harm ordinary Afghans, take their property or enter their homes without permission. They were not supposed to conduct summary judgments, but instead to submit Afghans who worked

²⁴⁴ Semple, 2014. p. 17-18.

²⁴⁵ It was discovered during 2015 that Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund had died during 2013 and that Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour issued orders in his name until he announced in 2015 that Mullah Omar had died. Although Mullah Omar no longer led the Taliban between 2013 and 2015, this was not evident to Taliban personnel, who continued to follow his orders because they believed he was alive.

for the government or broke other rules to *sharia* courts for judgment. The fighters and commanders were also subject to the judgment of the *sharia* courts if they were accused of wrong-doing.

Taliban fighters consist of a mix of men recruited to fight against the government by commanders from their area, as well as Afghan and Pakistani students from the Quetta *madrassas*.²⁴⁶ Commanders report to the Military Commission in their area and are beholden to the Provincial Commission and the Military Commission in Quetta or Peshawar, depending on where they are located.²⁴⁷ Commanders are forbidden from moving into new territory without the express permission of their superiors and the shadow governors of both the places they are leaving and their new locations.²⁴⁸

In addition to the military commanders, each province and district has a set of *sharia* judges who operate courts. Residents can contact the judges to complain of a crime or a civil dispute. They can contact *sharia* judges through local fighters on patrol or through their elders (who are normally given a cell phone number they can use to reach the judges). Judges set up trials in which witnesses provide testimony and judges use the *sharia* to decide cases. The *sharia* courts are temporary and execute their tasks as quickly as possible so as not to attract the attention of government security forces. The *sharia* courts are

²⁴⁶ Abdul Awwal Zabolwal. "Taliban in Zabul: A Witnesses' Account." in Antonio Giustozzi, ed. *Decoding the New Taliban*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. p. 186. Graeme Smith. "What Kandahar's Taliban Say" in Antonio Giustozzi, ed. *Decoding the New Taliban*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

²⁴⁷ Abdul Awwal Zabolwal. "Taliban in Zabul: A Witnesses' Account." In Antonio Giustozzi, ed. *Decoding the New Taliban*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. And Antonio Giustozzi. *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. p. 89-94. Michael Semple, 2014. p. 17-24. Giustozzi, Franco, Baczkowski, 2012. p. 17-18.

²⁴⁸ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund. Code of Conduct (*Layeha*). Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2006, 2009 and 2010.

staffed by graduates of the *madrassas* who are not Taliban fighters. This separate pool of personnel is selected exclusively based on their knowledge of and ability to apply *sharia*.²⁴⁹

In each province and each district within it, there is a shadow governor. The shadow governor implements the decisions of the Quetta Shura Provincial Commission and to some extent orders military operations by commanders. However, in many cases, commanders remain relatively autonomous due to problems of communications, command and control.²⁵⁰

For each province, there is a Quetta Shura Commission to whom all commanders, governors and *sharia* court judges in the province answer. The provincial commission for each province is directed by a member of the Quetta Shura.²⁵¹ Commanders must consult the head of the commission for all important decisions, including the capture, possible punishment or execution of prisoners.²⁵² In addition to the Provincial Commission of the Quetta Shura, each group of leaders, be they military or political or judicial, has recourse to their own commission under the control of the *Amir al Momineen* and their own representation to him and his deputy through the Quetta Shura.²⁵³

At the provincial and district levels, military commanders, governors and *sharia* court judges meet at least once a month in Military Commissions to coordinate their activities and receive messages from the national and provincial levels. However, because of the fast changing nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Taliban

²⁴⁹ Giustozzi, Franco and Baczeko, 2012. p. 19-20

²⁵⁰ Abdul Awwal Zabolwal. "Taliban in Zabul: A Witnesses' Account." In Antonio Giustozzi, ed. *Decoding the New Taliban*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. p. 185

²⁵¹ Zabolwal in Giustozzi, 2009. p. 184

²⁵² Zabolwal in Giustozzi, 2009. p. 184

²⁵³ Giustozzi, Franco and Baczeko, 2013, p. 15-18.

fighters and cell commanders are relatively free to make decisions in response to changes at the very local level in places where the Taliban is under severe pressure from GIRoA.²⁵⁴ However, any action these commanders take must be within the guidance that has already been issued from above or these commanders and fighters risk punishment.

If Taliban leadership hears complaints of misconduct by commanders, fighters or governors, they will be tried in a *sharia* court and punished accordingly. Similarly, judges who engage in misconduct will be referred to a higher level *sharia* court for a trial and punished accordingly.

Taliban Authority System

The Taliban believe that supreme and God-given authority rests with the *Amir al Momineen*. The Amir delegates his authority, which is delegated to him from Allah, through the Prophet, to a college of Amirs. Each *mujihadeen* owes complete obedience to his personal Amir (or commander) and each Amir owes his complete obedience to the *Amir al Momineen*.²⁵⁵ Obedience is one of the key tenets of the Taliban movement's ideology.

In the Spring of 1996, two thousand Afghan *Mawlawis* (clerics who completed higher levels of Islamic training than is available in the *madrassas*) gathered in Kandahar and agreed to appoint Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund the *Amir al Momineen*, or Caliph.²⁵⁶ Because he was selected based on consensus among Islamic clerics, the Taliban believe that

²⁵⁴ Zabolwal in Giustozzi, 2009. p. 186.

²⁵⁵ Semple 2014, p. 1-12.

²⁵⁶ Michael Semple, "A Remarkable Insight into the Mind of a Senior Leader of the Afghan Taliban Movement." *New Statesman*, July 2012. p. 34. Rubin, p. xv.

Mullah Omar's authority is derived from Allah and the Prophet Mohammad.²⁵⁷ The *Amir al Momineen* appoints his deputies and ministers and they are responsible for governing day to day. However, the *Amir al Momineen* maintains absolute decision-making and appointment authority. The *Amir al Momineen* has a *shura* that provides expert advice and assists the *Amir* and his deputies in thinking through problems. The *shura*, however, has no decision-making authority. The *Amir al Momineen's* deputies appoint military commanders (*Amirs*) and shadow governors with his consent. Additionally, every province has a Military Commissioner appointed by the *Amir al Momineen* and his deputies who communicates between provincial military and civilian Taliban leaders and the *Amir al Momineen*.²⁵⁸

The Taliban's success depends on all members of the movement maintaining unity and obedience to the *Amir al Momineen* through the chain of command of *amirs*. The Taliban's ideology instructs members to suspend their individual judgment for the sake of this obedience. According to the ideology, Allah and the *amir* know why the Taliban has to do things individual members might not understand. Divine purpose is the rationale for submitting to Allah. The Taliban member must trust that Allah works through the person of the *amir*. Therefore, the Taliban member's his obedience to the *amir* equates to his obedience to the Prophet and to Allah. Helping maintain the cohesiveness of the movement is equivalent to staying in the fold of Islam. Islam is a fundamental value of the communities where the Taliban recruits fighters. Unquestioning obedience ends only when an *amir* issues order counter to the *sharia* or engages in rebellion.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁷ Michael Semple, 2014. p. 10-11.

²⁵⁸ Antonio Giustozzi, Claudio Franco and Adam Baczek. "Shadow Justice." Kolola Poshta, Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2012. p. 14-18. Michael Semple. "Rhetoric, Ideology and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement" Washington, DC: USIP Peaceworks, January 2015. p. 10-11.

²⁵⁹ Semple, 2014. p. 10-11.

The relationship between the military commanders and the Taliban's civilian governments is clearly defined in the Taliban's Code of Conduct. Military commanders are subject to civilian authority and the authority of their military commanders. A military commander can be removed from command by the *Amir al Momineen* or his commander. There is also a *sharia* court system comprised of judges who are *madrassa* trained and can pass a test involving passing judgment in writing on example cases based on *sharia* law. Any Taliban commander or fighter accused of violating the code of conduct is subject to the judgment and punishment of the *sharia* courts. This is also true of any Taliban shadow governor. Judges are appointed and replaced by the Judiciary Commission, which reports directly to the *Amir al Momineen* and his deputies at the national level.²⁶⁰

The national level authorities maintain control within the organization by constantly rotating personnel through the gubernatorial and *sharia* judge positions so that they do not become personal fiefdoms. The positions as military commanders are relatively less fluid due to concerns that excessive rotation could hurt military command and control. Since many commanders recruit their own forces locally, rotating commanders could cause problems with discipline and retention of fighters.²⁶¹

Indoctrination Techniques

The Taliban's success as an organization rests largely in its shared beliefs about the nature of the world they seek to create; the rules people in that world would obey; the system of governance that would need to be applied to reach it; what they need to do to bring that world into being; and the need to obey their *amir*.

²⁶⁰ Antonio Giustozzi, Claudio Franco and Adam Baczkowski. "Shadow Justice." Kolola Poshta, Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2012. p. 14-18.

²⁶¹ Zabulwal in Giustozzi, 2009. p. 181.

When faced with a problem, even the lowest level of Taliban fighter has a frame of reference for the actions he should take in order to achieve the Taliban's goals. This shared set of beliefs is a result of the Taliban's effective indoctrination techniques.²⁶²

The primary form of indoctrination is education at a set of Taliban-run *madrassas* that inculcate their students with these shared beliefs. Additionally, the national level leadership maintains control over the narrative about the organization's purpose and strategies and the actions commanders and fighters should and should not take through the *Amir al Momineen's* bi-annual Eid messages, *fatwas* and updates to the 2006 Code of Conduct for Taliban fighters. These products are disseminated through the Cultural Commission, which reports directly to the *Amir al Momineen* and his deputies.²⁶³

Group Social Structure

The Taliban began as a movement of Kandahari, Durrani, Pashtun, armed clerics who had studied at the JUIP *madrassas* in Quetta during the war against the Soviets. The Quetta Shura is still peopled by Kandahari Pashtun Durrani who were members of the movement prior to 1996. All of them attended JUIP *madrassas* in Quetta, but most of them left before they graduated in order to fight the Soviets. They all served as leaders in the IEA between 1996 and 2001.²⁶⁴ This tight social background has shaped the Taliban leadership's shared vision of the future and what needs to be done to arrive at it.

²⁶² Smith, 2009. p. 108. In response to open ended questions about their war, low level Taliban fighters from disparate parts of Kandahar Province often repeated the same lines, indicating effective and pervasive indoctrination mechanisms.

²⁶³ Semple, 2014. p. 12.

²⁶⁴ Semple, 2014. p. 21-4.

The second tier of leaders is comprised predominately of pre-2001 IEA formation commanders, police chiefs, deputies to top Taliban commanders, or simply leaders of small groups of fighters.²⁶⁵ Induction of younger men who played no role in the pre-2001 movement has happened, but only at the second tier of leadership and below. But, it has not altered the clerical or social profile of the movement. Younger commanders and leaders are appointed from within the families long associated with the movement, often the younger brothers or sons of Taliban veterans.²⁶⁶

The Taliban also seeks to recruit fighters from outside the Kandahari Pashtun community to use them in areas where other groups reside. Ethnic and or tribal similarities with local populations facilitates the recruitment of more local fighters and makes the Taliban appear from below to be a movement that represents Afghans, as opposed to a movement that is Pashtun, Durrani and Kandahari in nature.²⁶⁷

In areas where tribal authority structures are powerful, recruiting often occurs through those mechanisms.²⁶⁸ In other areas, fighters join the Taliban as a result of grievances. In Graeme Smith's interviews with Taliban fighters, he found that a large proportion of the fighters in Kandahar were farmers defending their opium fields against a government that had outlawed their primary industry; tribesmen who accused the government of tribal bias and corruption; Muslims who accused the government of financial and spiritual corruption; and conservative Afghans who reject the Western influences that

²⁶⁵ Semple, 2014. p. 22.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Zabolwal in Giustozzi, 2009. p. 183-87. Semple, 2014. p. 17-25.

²⁶⁸ Zabolwal in Giustozzi, 2009. p. 183-87. Semple, 2014. p. 17-25.

have flooded Afghan culture in the wake of the Taliban regime.²⁶⁹ In their research on the return of the Taliban in Ghazni Province, Christopher Reuter and Borhan Younus describe how a combination of *madrassa* students coming home from Pakistan and locals recruited by friends or kinsmen through discussions of the abuses and immorality of the government formed the basis of Taliban fighters there.²⁷⁰

Discipline and Informant System

The division of local Taliban representatives into three different groups, fighters, judges and governors, allows for a kind of separation of powers in which each group is observing and reporting on the behavior of the others to one another and to their separate chains of command. Residents can report problems to groups to Taliban fighters who are supposed to regularly patrol or to the *sharia* courts. In most areas, elders can contact Taliban commanders, *sharia* judges and local governors by phone. The Taliban also maintains an extensive network of informants who provide information to higher levels of the Taliban about the behavior of commanders, fighters, judges and governors. Provincial and national Taliban leaders have multiple, overlapping information collection systems to identify failures by their personnel to translate orders are translated into action, as well as instances in which personnel use the authority of the organization for their own personal benefit.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Graeme Smith. "What Kandahar's Taliban Say." in Antonio Giustozzi, ed. *Decoding the New Taliban*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. p. 209

²⁷⁰ Christopher Reuter and Borhan Younus. "The Return of the Taliban in Andar District: Ghazni." in Antonio Giustozzi, ed. *Decoding the New Taliban*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. p. 104

²⁷¹ Antonio Giustozzi, Claudio Franco and Adam Baczeko. "Shadow Justice: How the Taliban Run their Judiciary." Integrity Watch: Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 14-38. This paper is based on semi-structured interviews conducted by Afghan researchers with a total of 26 Taliban judges, 21 Taliban commanders and cadres, 19 court users (of both government and Taliban courts) and 23 community elders (both pro- and anti-Taliban) in districts throughout the country to ensure a regional balance. The districts were selected so they included some long-standing Taliban strongholds (Kandahar, Zabol, Uruzgan, parts of Badghis), others which resisted the Taliban Islamic Emirate until 2001 but joined the insurgency early (Nuristan), others still in which the Taliban presence is rooted in formerly 'Salafi' and Hezb-i Islami networks (Kunar), or in more recently acquired Taliban

If someone reports that fighters, judges, commanders or administrators are abusing their power, the personnel in question are tried at a *sharia* court in a higher echelon of the organization. Punishments for fighters, commanders, judges and governors are severe and include being expelled from the organization and exiled from Afghanistan.²⁷²

The *Amir al Momineen* can replace commanders, governors and *sharia* judges and uses this capability to positively and negatively sanction the actions of personnel within the organization. Additionally, the *Amir al Momineen* has the ability to redistribute money and other resources to his various commanders and a method for positively and negatively sanctioning their actions.²⁷³

The Code of Conduct instructs Taliban to encourage defection by government personnel and provide protection for them after they defect. Taliban who kill defectors or double agents will be tried and punished for their crimes according to *sharia* law. Defectors who have killed Muslims or have a bad reputation cannot become Taliban fighters and should be forced to remain in their homes, but never harmed. If a defector returns to the government and is captured, he is a traitor and he must be tried in a *sharia* court and punished according to its judgment.²⁷⁴ The Code of Conduct states that people cannot work for non-governmental organizations and all NGOs are outlawed. Any school that collaborates with them should be burned. No person can work as a teacher or Mullah for

strongholds (Pashtun areas of Ghazni, Laghman and Wardak) and finally also in areas of very recently established Taliban control (Baghlan, Faryab and parts of Badghis).

²⁷² Giustozzi, Franco and Bacsko, 2013. p. 27-33.

²⁷³ Semple, 2014. p. 10-11.

²⁷⁴ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. Code of Conduct (*Layeha*). Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2006, 2009 and 2010.

the government. Taliban should warn them to stop working for the government and kill them if they do not comply.

Other than their duty to fight against government personnel, the Taliban are admonished never to harm the common people or search their homes without permission. Taliban may never confiscate the property of common people. If the Taliban identify someone they think is a spy, they should capture him and bring him to the *sharia* court to be judged and punished. The Taliban should never judge and punish them alone. The Taliban cannot use the movement's equipment for personal gain. No Taliban should reverse earlier Taliban decisions resolving disputes without express permission from the Imam. Taliban cannot smoke. No under aged boys can be present on the battlefield or in the barracks. Taliban must post a watch both day and night.²⁷⁵ Taliban military commanders require permission from old and new provincial governors if they want to move. Commanders are accountable to their military superiors for spending and equipment. They cannot sell Taliban equipment. Commanders cannot poach fighters from other Taliban units. If someone has been expelled from a unit, he cannot join another one. Weapons and equipment captures will be equally distributed. Booty captured during the fighting can only belong to the foreigners and it will be distributed among the fighters according to *sharia*.²⁷⁶

If Taliban face a problem that is not covered in the code, then they must work to find a solution with the local Taliban political leaders. It is the duty of every Taliban to obey the Code of Conduct. Violators will be tried and punished in *sharia* courts.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁵ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. Code of Conduct (*Layeha*). Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2006, 2009 and 2010.

²⁷⁶ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. Code of Conduct (*Layeha*). Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2006, 2009 and 2010.

²⁷⁷ Mullah Mohammad Omar Akund. Code of Conduct (*Layeha*). Cultural Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2006, 2009 and 2010.

While the Code of Conduct provides specific guidance regarding spies, people working for the government, booty, specific personal behavior and personnel issues, at the tactical level, there remains a great deal of latitude for local commanders. However, if they violate the Code of Conduct, they can be dismissed from the movement.

The Taliban: A Totalizing Ideological Organization Lying in Wait to Impose its Will

The Taliban is a centralized, hierarchical organization of armed clerics born out of a community of rural Durrani Pashtun Mullahs from Kandahar disgusted by the disorder generated by Afghanistan's endless wars. It seeks to establish a utopian vision of an orderly, solemn Islamic community, not by convincing the population of its righteousness, but by violently imposing it. The strength of the Taliban organization lies in the combination of its system of indoctrination and its information collection and discipline system. Indoctrination teaches fighters what they should do and encourages them to believe strongly that this is the only path available to them to obtain entry into Paradise on Judgment Day. The information collection and discipline system ensures they are aware that if they fail to act as the organization wants them to, they will be sanctioned.

The Taliban knows it lacks the coercive force relative to the combined assets of ISAF and the ANSF to impose its will now. So, it is lying in wait, avoiding direct force on force combat, until international forces leave and the ANSF begins to fail to operate. It relies upon the sanctuary of Afghanistan's inhospitable mountains and deserts, as well as its base in

Quetta, Pakistan, to protect itself from contact with ISAF and the ANSF until such a time as the Taliban judge themselves to be stronger than the ANSF. In the interim, the Taliban seeks to maintain its organization, ideology and flow of resources and embed itself clandestinely in the population. The Taliban attacks GIRoA and its connection to the population whenever it can do so without arousing an assault on its resources that will undermine the Taliban's long-term effort to re-establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 6: The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Origins of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

On September 11, 2001, nineteen Arab *salafi jihadist* members of Al Qaeda hijacked four planes. They flew two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York's financial district, one of them into the Pentagon and intended to fly the fourth into the United States Capitol. The attacks left over 3,000 civilians dead. An enraged American public and government sought a method for sanctioning the perpetrators and degrading their capability to execute future attacks. The hijackers and most of Al Qaeda's leadership and fighters had been living, planning and training under the protection of the Taliban government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The United States demanded Afghanistan turn over Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders, shut down Al Qaeda's bases and training camps in Afghanistan and expel Al Qaeda from the country. The Afghan Taliban government refused and the United States organized a military Coalition which overthrew the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and drove Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, or at least into hiding in remote areas.

In order to overthrow the Afghan Taliban as quickly as possible, the United States employed a small number of Special Forces and clandestine operatives to mobilize whatever Afghan anti-Taliban forces they could find. The US allied with the *mujihadeen* leaders whom the Taliban had expelled from Afghanistan into Pakistan and used them to access anti-Taliban groups dormant on the ground inside Afghanistan. The US also allied itself with the last significant resistance to the Taliban inside Afghanistan, the Tajik *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* in their Panshir Valley redoubt. The US backed all of these groups with a

tiny number of special forces soldiers who directed aerial assaults and organized the onslaught of anti-Taliban *mujihadeen* and villagers upon the Taliban.

As a result, the US had to live with the fact that the very *mujihadeen* who had been unable to form a government in 1992 and who had descended into anarchy would become the basis for the new government in Afghanistan. Because the US and its Coalition partners lacked forces on the ground, but had enabled these *mujihadeen* to grab different portions of the territory of Afghanistan, the US and its Coalition partners had no choice but to recognize the very intractable stalemate that had doomed the *mujihadeen* efforts to rule Afghanistan in the wake of the collapse of the communist government in 1992. The result was a government that was destined to be ineffective since its leaders had divergent goals and interests and a history of lawless behavior and disregard for the interest of the population.

By December 2001, almost all of Afghanistan's territory was controlled by this competing set of militias. The leader of each militia was the patron of a social group who attempted to provide money, jobs and services to his *mujihadeen* followers in return for their loyalty. The international community sought to bring them together into a government where they would provide goods and services to every member of the Afghan population without regard to their affiliations through government ministries.

But, for the leaders of the anti-Taliban *mujihadeen*, the state was not a mechanism for governing or developing Afghanistan. It was a mechanism for acquiring resources to support their narrow group of followers²⁷⁸ and to compete with other militias for honor, wealth and power. The extent to which these patrons distributed the spoils they acquired

²⁷⁸ Barnett R. Rubin. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. p. 41-44

varied. But, there is a social gulf between the *mujihadeen* political party leaders, their field commanders and *mujihadeen* and the populations from which the *mujihadeen* were mobilized. The *mujihadeen* and their commanders were dislocated from Afghan society by decades of fighting against the Soviets and then the Taliban. The *jihad* freed these former subsistence farmers from the toiling poverty, suffering and uncontrollable loss they experienced in their villages and transformed them into a band of men acting to change their destinies and in their view, in the end, the destiny of the world, when they expelled the Red Army from Afghanistan. The *jihad* also made them part of a corporate whole, an organization of men who supported one another, whose combined action and coercive force made them capable of garnering salaries from international funders during the *jihad* and then from whatever method their leaders subsequently employed to continue to do so or to garner funds from other activities. In order to maintain their new lifestyle, the *mujihadeen* had to find a source of funding greater than that available through subsistence farming. During the *jihad*, that source had been international funding from the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations, among others. During the civil war, it had been a reduced combination of that same international funding supplemented by money extorted from the impoverished local population and traders traveling through Afghanistan. In the era after the overthrow of the Taliban, it was the international community through the new government of Afghanistan.

These facts separated many Afghans from the spoils acquired by the *mujihadeen* political leaders. The *mujihadeen* networks stretched down to the district level, but were normally un-integrated with the population. In 2001, these commanders became the government. The impoverished farmers who make up the vast majority of the Afghan population, who had suffered through the war with the Soviets, the civil war and the

Taliban, knew the international community was providing huge sums of money to the government on behalf of the Afghan people and they were seeing none of it. Their resentment quickly grew and grew again when they thought back to the civil war and the trouble these self same leaders had brought upon them all.

As the Taliban government melted away and the anti-Taliban *mujihadeen* took more and more territory, the international community belatedly began the task of designing and building a new Afghan government. Atop the unruly, fractious group of ground-holding militias, and the impoverished, ethnically and tribally divided, largely uneducated population of Afghanistan, the international community sought to establish a state that was highly centralized, based on democratic elections, and operated by an impartial bureaucracy that would implement regulations based on laws enacted by elected representatives. To add to the confusion, although the constitution stated that the laws of Afghanistan would be enacted by elected representatives of the population, the international community mandated a set of policies regarding women, Islam, various civil rights, including the freedom of religion, education, health and other topics with little regard for popular or elite views on these issues.

The international community appeared to believe that if it could put in place an organizational structure that combined international standards of human rights, an elected legislature and executive and an impartial bureaucracy, the government would generate popular support. They believed this popular support would result in enhanced control by the government over the population. Instead of looking for existing local authority structures and attempting to determine how these might be aggregated to form a government, the international community sought to impose a foreign organizational form,

with foreign values and populate it with personnel from the armed *mujihadeen* groups whom it had empowered to sweep into the capital and large portions of Afghan territory and seize territorial control. Perhaps the Coalition hoped that its institutional framework and external monetary resources could bring these fractious *mujihadeen* groups together and make them accountable to the population to whom they had little relation.

But, in the end, the *mujihadeen* groups took their fights inside the government organization, using their positions to amass wealth and power, not for the shared aims of the government, but to enhance the power and honor of their patronage network over competing patronage networks. Meanwhile, the government, pumped full of foreign resources, did not function well, having little impact on the daily lives of Afghans.

Quick and Dirty: US Alliance with the *Mujihadeen* to Overthrow the Taliban

Immediately after September 11th, the United States allied itself with any resistance group it could find in Afghanistan or its refugee communities. The US' allies included the Tajik *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*, commanded by Mohammad Fahim in the wake of Al Qaeda's September 9th assassination of its founder and leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud; Hamid Karzai, the leader of the Popalzai clan of the Durrani Pashtun, who had organized international support for Popalzai *mujihadeen* who fought against the Soviets in Kandahar and Uruzgan and had been urging US support to overthrow the Taliban from his refuge in Quetta; Gul Agha Shirzai of the Barakzai tribe, a *mujihadeen* commander's son who served as Governor of Kandahar during the chaos of the *mujihadeen* nights and civil war of the 1990s; Uzbek leader of the Jauzjani *mujihadeen*, Rashid Dostam; Ishmael Khan, Tajik former anti-Soviet *mujihadeen* and Governor of Herat during the civil war; Hazara warlord Karim Khalili.

Because it was so thin on the ground and had so little information about Afghan society, the US allowed these leaders to act as its interlocutors. The *mujihadeen* leaders who failed to form a government or govern effectively within their own areas during the civil war identified who should have power and who should not and the US accepted their judgment on the matter. Further, they used US coercive force not just to eliminate their shared enemies in the Taliban, but any other enemies they happened to have on the ground. This aspect of the relationship with the *mujihadeen* caused the US to fail to ally with several key leaders on the ground in Afghanistan and to attack several others, leading to intractable insurgency.

The Tajik, mostly Pashiri²⁷⁹, *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* had maintained control over the Panshir Valley and had used this sanctuary to fight against the Taliban throughout their reign in Kabul. In 2001, the Tajik *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* fought their way, with the assistance of US Special Forces teams and aerial bombing, down from the Panshir Valley and seized control of Kabul from the Taliban. Burhanuddin Rabbani was the political leader of the *Jamat e Islami* political party. From his exile in Peshawar, Rabbani had served, throughout the fight against the Soviets, as the party's political leader and was one of the largest recipients of US contributions to the fight against the Soviets. Rabbani sent money and supplies to the Tajik *mujihadeen* under the command of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Tajik *mujihadeen* of Ismael Khan in Herat, and episodically to other *mujihadeen* commanders, including Uzbek *mujihadeen* Rashid Dostum. Rabbani was President of the post-communist Afghan government that had presided over the country's descent into civil war and chaos

²⁷⁹ The Panshir Valley is the stronghold of the Supervisory Council of the North. It lies 150 km north of Kabul in central northern Afghanistan. Neither the Soviets nor the Taliban were able to dislodge Ahmed Shah Massoud and his Tajik fighters from this area.

between 1992 and the gradual takeover of the vast majority of Afghan territory by the Taliban between 1994 and 1996.

With the fall of Kabul in November 2001, Rabanni announced that he was the rightful President of Afghanistan, threatening to autonomously establish a government in Kabul that was destined to suffer the civil war government's weaknesses and inability to consolidate power. Members of the international community feared such an outcome would result in an Afghan government unable to control even the capital in the face of pressures from various ethnic *mujihadeen* militias. To make matters worse, Kabul descended into chaos, as victorious Tajik *mujihadeen* looted and committed brutal reprisal murders. Without an international security force to control Kabul, chaos reigned and the specter of a return to pre-Taliban chaos hovered over Afghanistan.²⁸⁰

In the Pashtun south, the home of the Taliban, where the movement of armed clerics' power was firmly consolidated, the United States sought allies wherever it could find them. The two main groups the US backed were led by Gul Agha Shirzai and Hamid Karzai, both of whom were living in exile in Quetta in September 2001.

As pre-Taliban Governor of Kandahar, Gul Agha Shirzai had been too weak between 1992 and 1994 to forestall the chaotic conflict between *mujihadeen* commanders or the thefts, rapes and murders committed by *mujihadeen* fighters during that period. Shirzai's own Barakzai tribal militia participated in the extraction of tolls, kidnapping and smuggling on the Chaman-Herat highway. Kandaharis remembered him as, "a weak figurehead presiding over that awful civil war – the goriest, most rapacious and chaotic period in living

²⁸⁰ Bette Dam. *A Man and A Motorcycle: How Hamid Karzai Came to Power*. Utrecht: Ipso Facto Publishing, 2014. p. 152-3

memory.”²⁸¹ During this period, “action-addicted, heavily armed gunmen, fresh from a decade of war with the Soviets, in small groups from varying tribes -- Popalzai, Barakzai, Acheksai, Alikosai, etc. – set up ‘chains’ on the highway to extract tolls from passing vehicles.” The “chains” were, “dirty ropes strung across the road, with a tent or mud-brick guardhouse on one side, manned by somebody’s fighters. Ammunition belts slung across their torsos, waving Kalashnikovs they did not hesitate to use, the gunmen shook down every car, truck, or bus that passed by.”²⁸² During the period that became known as the “*mujihadeen* nights”, “If the fighters were displeased with the take, or if they were just bored or having a bad day, they might drag a passenger out of a vehicle and shoot him, or her. Or rape him first, then shoot him.”²⁸³

In 2001, the US allied itself with Shirzai, who was then living in Quetta, Pakistan. The US did so despite his militia’s history of lawlessness and human rights abuses, and despite his inability to establish order during the civil war. Given the small size of the Barakzai militia, Shirzai allied himself with the Achekzai, who had controlled the strategic border crossing at Spin Boldak before the Taliban seized the fortress town in 1994, killing its commander, Mansour (an Achekzai *mujihadeen*) by hanging him from the barrel of a tank.²⁸⁴ The Achekzai are still infamous from the period of the *mujihadeen* nights, “for their smuggling, irreligion, foul language, love of money, and expert thievery.”²⁸⁵ Shirzai needed Achekzai support because they alone could control the border crossing at Spin Boldak and prevent the return of control over that strategic position to the Taliban-allied Noorzai tribe. The Achekzai have since controlled the border point at Spin Boldak through Mansour’s

²⁸¹ Chayes, 2006. p. 67.

²⁸² Chayes, 2006. p. 71.

²⁸³ Chayes, 2006. p. 72.

²⁸⁴ Matthieu Aikin. “The Master of Spin Boldak: Undercover with Afghanistan’s Drug-Trafficking Border Police.” Harper’s Magazine, December 2009. p. 4

²⁸⁵ Chayes, 2006. p. 73

nephew, General Raziq. Their subsequent conflict with the Noorzai has been characterized as a government versus Taliban conflict, but it is really a tribal war for control over the revenues accruing from control over the border point.

Unlike Shirzai, who was an uncouth strongman, Hamid Karzai was an urbane member of the Afghan aristocracy, whose family is related to the exiled King, Zahir Shah, had been displaced by the Soviets into Pakistan. Karzai had therefore studied in India and spoke English. During the war against the Soviets, Hamid Karzai studied political science and became fascinated by the crisis in his native land. When he graduated, Karzai returned to Quetta and opened an office that acted as a conduit for American aid to *mujihadeen* from his Popalzai tribe in Uruzghan and Kandahar Provinces.²⁸⁶

After the fall of the Afghan communist government in 1992, the Karzais suffered a setback within the Popalzai tribe, as a competing tribesman, Amir Lailai, gained a position in the post-Soviet government of Kandahar Province. However, Karzai's main agent in Uruzgan, *mujihadeen* commander Jan Mohammad, became Governor of Uruzgan, and Karzai was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Rabbani government. Karzai's stint in the government was short-lived because Rabbani, the leader of *Jamat e Islami*, soon accused Karzai of consorting with his rival political party, Gulbadin Hekmatyar's *Hezb e Islami*. Rabbani had Karzai arrested and interrogated. Karzai escaped, resigned his position and returned to exile in Quetta. When the Taliban came to power, Karzai sought to join the Taliban government as the Taliban's Ambassador to the United Nations, but was rebuffed by Mullah Omar. The Taliban leader did not trust Karzai, not only because of his aristocratic,

²⁸⁶ Dam, p. 38.

tribal value system,²⁸⁷ but also because of his links to the West, and, in particular, to the CIA.²⁸⁸ Mullah Omar is purported to have said, “I would rather a little Taliban than a little Karzai,”²⁸⁹ highlighting his preference for Islam over tribalism. In 1996, after this rejection, Karzai began to work against the Taliban, working to gain US, Pakistani or other backing for an uprising against them. In 1999, the Taliban assassinated Abdul Ahad Karzai, Hamid’s father and chief of the Popalzai tribe and Karzai succeeded him in that position, though he remained in Quetta.

During the period between 1996 and 2001, Karzai nurtured a set of alliances in Uruzgan and Kandahar, among Taliban supporters and Taliban resisters alike. Karzai built these alliances upon tribal, as opposed to ideological, bases. He also assiduously built alliances with anti-Taliban leaders throughout Afghanistan, regardless of their political leanings or history of human rights abuses during the civil war. His allies outside his home territory in Kandahar and Uruzgan included Jalalabad anti-Taliban strongman, Hajji Kadir; the Tajik commander of *Jamat e Islami* forces in and around the Panshir Valley, Ahmed Shah Massoud; Uzbek tribal leader and strongman, Rashid Dostum; anti-Taliban strongman and pre-Taliban ruler of Herat, Ismail Khan; and Hazara strongman, Karim Khalili. During this period, Karzai was a regular visitor to Western embassies in Islamabad and a constant presence at international meetings on the future of Afghanistan.²⁹⁰

When September 11, 2001 arrived, Hamid Karzai immediately seized on the opportunity to acquire funding and support from the US for his anti-Taliban uprising. He

²⁸⁷ Mullah Omar is from a marginal family within the marginal Hotak tribe of the Ghilzai Pashtun who was born in Uruzgan to an itinerant Mullah. His family was poor, and, in the eyes of Karzai, irrelevant. In this way, Mullah Omar was like many Taliban, who embraced the Islamic idea that all men begin as equals and it is only through their actions and devotion to Allah that they can distinguish themselves. Dam, p. 27-8

²⁸⁸ Dam, p. 39-40.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Dam, p. 41-3.

aimed to start in Uruzgan and gather fighters and support as he moved down the mountains toward the Taliban capital in Kandahar, where he planned to leverage the support of his most powerful ally, the most powerful mujihadeen commander in southern Afghanistan, Mullah Naqibullah Alikozai.

As leader of the Alikozai tribe, Mullah Naqib controlled the strategically important Arghandab, and swathes of the only slightly less important districts of Ma'rouf, Arghestan, Maywand.²⁹¹ The Argandab River Valley is home to the richest agricultural land in Kandahar Province. Control over the Argandab River Valley is central to any organization's ability to rule Kandahar and regulate the road that runs through it. Kandahar is a city that has changed hands many times due to its strategic importance as the major caravan city on the road connecting Persia to the Indian subcontinent. In order to ensure sustainable protection of the city by Durrani Pashtun warriors, Nadir Shah granted control of the Argandab to the Alikozai in 1738 in return for their expulsion of the Ghilzai Pashtuns from the city of Kandahar.²⁹² Even the Soviet Union was never able to dislodge the Alikozai and their tribal and *mujihadeen* leader, Mullah Naqib, from the Argandab. The Soviets and their Afghan allies deployed more than 6,000 soldiers, with tanks and helicopters, and fought the Alikozai for 38 days during May and June of 1987 before withdrawing. It was the Soviet's last large-scale operation in southern Afghanistan and many credit Mullah Naqib with having driven the Soviets out of southern Afghanistan.²⁹³

In 1994, Mullah Naqib's forces stood aside and allowed the Taliban to take control of the city of Kandahar based on Naqib's belief that the religious students did not intend to

²⁹¹ Chayes, 2006. p. 286.

²⁹² Chayes, 2006. p. 95-101.

²⁹³ John Lee Anderson. *The Lion's Grave: Dispatches from Afghanistan*. New York: Grove Press, 2003. p. 151-182. Lester W. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali. *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujihadeen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War*. Quantico: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1995. p. 310-316.

impose a government on Kandahar, but instead sought to rid the people of the scourge of the chains and gunmen on the Chaman-Herat highway. His men allowed them to take Kandahar in return for the Taliban allowing Naqib to continue to rule the Argandab in peace.²⁹⁴ Regimes had come and gone in Kandahar, but the Alikozai had always maintained control over the Argandab. One of Karzai's main strengths was Mullah Naqib's willingness and ability to assist him in overthrowing the Taliban, both by serving as a bridge to other tribal leaders still on the ground in Kandahar, and as a source of powerful *mujihadeen* fighters.

Using his connections, an argument about the historic opportunity available to his tribesmen and their allies, and CIA-provided cash and communications equipment, Karzai became the first US-backed Pashtun opposition leader to enter Pashtun southern Afghanistan to begin the post September 11th uprising. Karzai carried the message that, "The West is fed up with the Taliban and they will be driven out."²⁹⁵ He told leaders in Uruzgan and Kandahar that the Americans would finish the Taliban and that now was the time for the Pashtun to rise up against the Taliban to ensure they were not left out of the new Afghan government.²⁹⁶

Karzai's men did not engage in many pitched battles with the Taliban because Karzai used a combination of demonstrated US air power and money and his connections in the Taliban and anti-Taliban tribal elite in Uruzgan to encourage either surrender by the Taliban or uprisings by the population to overthrow them. By the time Karzai arrived in most places, the Taliban government was gone, leaving the tribal social structure that had

²⁹⁴ Chayes, 2006. p. 81-2

²⁹⁵ Dam, p. 92

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

lain beneath them. As Karzai explained to the US Special Forces officers embedded with him, "Here, they are merely farmers, landowners, and small businessmen. They are all poor, dreadfully poor. For them the question is always: who must I support in order to survive? Whether it's the Taliban or someone else is immaterial. At this moment, their hopes are fixed on us."²⁹⁷

The Taliban sent several columns of men from Kandahar to attack Karzai, first in the capitol of his rebellion, Tarin Kot, and later on the road to Kandahar, as his rebellion gained strength. In a series of clashes, the Taliban fighters were largely destroyed by US air aerial bombing directed by US Special Forces embedded with Karzai.²⁹⁸

By December 2001, all of the provinces in Southern Afghanistan had fallen to Karzai's allies. Along with his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, Hamid Karzai had been returning the pre-Taliban leadership to their positions without regard to their behavior or effectiveness in establishing order during the civil war.²⁹⁹ For example, Karzai allied himself with Sher Mohammed Akhundzada in Helmand Province (which sits to the West of Kandahar).³⁰⁰ His father, the Governor of Helmand during the civil war, was a notorious leader who had governed an exploitative system of opium production and smuggling and had been killed by the Taliban.³⁰¹ Karzai provided Akhundzada with funds and US military support. Akhundzada liberated the Kajaki Lake, took the city of Musa Kala and finally Helmand's capital city, Lashkar Gah. Taliban resistance was easily broken, as many Taliban

²⁹⁷ Dam, p. 137-8.

²⁹⁸ Dam, p. 139-144.

²⁹⁹ Dam, p. 161.

³⁰⁰ Dam, p. 161-2.

³⁰¹ Rubin, p. 263-4.

ceded power without a fight to the returning government officials in exchange for amnesty.³⁰²

In general, Karzai accepted the surrender of Taliban fighters and allied tribes in return for amnesty. Many Taliban had surrendered and been allowed to return to their homes unscathed and some of those joined Karzai's forces to attack their former brothers in arms.³⁰³ Other Taliban were allowed safe passage to Quetta, where the Afghan refugee community changed from anti-Taliban to Taliban. For Karzai, the allegiance of former Taliban fighters and allied tribes added to the weight the Durrani Pashtuns could exert through a coalition at the national level.

However, as with many of Karzai's decisions, relationships and old enmities, trumped overall policies. If a Taliban leader had a conflict with the Popalzai, then Karzai would not hesitate to use American military power to kill or capture him. These activities bred the basis for tribal buy in to the Taliban insurgency that followed in Uruzgan and Kandahar. For example, Mullah Shafiq was a prominent tribal leader from Uruzgan who had allied himself with the Taliban. He was just the sort of person to whom Karzai would have offered amnesty. But, Mullah Shafiq (who was a Ghilzai Pashtun Hotak from Uruzgan, like Mullah Omar), had a decades long rivalry with the Popalzai in Uruzgan. Karzai suspected that Mullah Shafiq had had his most important ally in Uruzgan, former *mujihadeen* commander, Jan Mohammed, imprisoned as part of a longstanding feud between the Popalzai and Hotak tribes. Karzai denounced Mullah Shafiq to the Americans as a Taliban who needed to be killed, not because of his different ideas on religion,

³⁰² Dam, p. 162.

³⁰³ Dam, p. 162-5.

democracy or women rights, but because of tribal enmity. While Mullah Shafiq was dead, his tribe was not and it cooperated with the Taliban once it regrouped.³⁰⁴

In December of 2001, as Karzai was selected as the President of Afghanistan's interim government, only the city of Kandahar, the birthplace and stronghold of the Taliban, remained in Taliban hands. Throughout Kandahar Province, Karzai relied upon Mullah Naqib and his Alikozai tribesmen, to take territory, district by district, fighting, negotiating Taliban surrender and restoring largely pre-Taliban leaders to their positions.³⁰⁵ The city of Kandahar was besieged on both sides. Karzai's and Mullah Najib's forces were attacking it from the North, while Shirzai's Barakzai and Achekzai forces attacked it from the East. US Special Forces and aerial bombing supported the siege.

Mullah Naqib reached out to the Taliban leadership, who sent a delegation to negotiate their surrender with Karzai. In return for a cessation of hostilities, a peaceful handover of the city of Kandahar, a public statement of surrender and a call for Taliban to stop fighting, Karzai would allow the Taliban leaders to return to their homes or travel to Quetta unscathed and bring an end to the US-led bombing campaign in Kandahar.³⁰⁶ In return for Mullah Naqib's support and to cement the surrender of the Taliban, Karzai promised Mullah Naqib the governorship of Kandahar.

While the agreement with the Taliban was what the newly selected interim President of Afghanistan wanted, and could have stabilized Kandahar by placing the most powerful tribal leader in the province in charge, the US overruled Karzai's agreement with

³⁰⁴ Dam, p. 164.

³⁰⁵ Dam, p. 185.

³⁰⁶ Dam, p. 180-6.

the Taliban because of the political maneuverings of Gul Agha Shirzai. Shirzai leveraged American hatred of the Taliban and wish to have revenge on anyone who had harbored Al Qaeda to his political advantage. In response to news that Karzai had negotiated the surrender of Kandahar and the Taliban, the Bush administration stated that anyone who had harbored the terrorists would be brought to justice and US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said that he would reject any agreement that allowed Mullah Omar to remain free.³⁰⁷ Gul Agha Shirzai coveted a return to his position as Governor of Kandahar and therefore denounced Mullah Naqib to the Americans, saying that he was Taliban and would never work with them to hunt the Taliban, but would instead help the Taliban against the Americans. He even claimed that Mullah Naqib was harboring Al Qaeda operatives in his home, even though Shirzai knew that to be a fantastic and false allegation. As a result of US lack of support for the surrender Karzai and Naqib had negotiated, and their suspicions of Mullah Naqib, the US pushed Karzai to accept Gul Agha Shirzai as the Governor of Kandahar, putting back in power the very governor who had been unable to stop the predations of the *mujihadeen* there between 1992 and 1994. As a consolation, Mullah Naqib was given control over the police in Kandahar Province.³⁰⁸ This contradiction set up a competition between these Shirzai and Naqib and an incentive for each to use his position to build power inside his tribe and outside the government system.³⁰⁹

The incident with Shirzai and Mullah Naqib is important because Naqib had the power to prevent the Taliban from re-grouping itself in its home communities in Panshwajyi, but the US chose to ignore his efforts to assist them. Instead, the US put someone in power who had shown he could not govern the province, Gul Agha Shirzai. This

³⁰⁷ ABC News "Taliban Agrees to Surrender Kandahar" December 7, 2001. Brian Knowlton. "Rumsfeld Rejects Plan to Allow Mullah Omar 'To Live in Dignity': Taliban Fighters Agree to Surrender Kandahar" *The New York Times*, December 7, 2001.

³⁰⁸ Dam, p. 185-6. Chayes, p. 60.

³⁰⁹ Chayes, 2006. p. 60.

episode is emblematic of the problems the United States experiences when it backs exiles in an effort to overthrow a government or build a new one. These individuals often use the United States' coercive force to settle their scores, as Karzai did with Mullah Shafiq, or to eliminate potential rivals who are more legitimate or powerful than they are, as Shirzai did with Mullah Naqib. By attacking these people or excluding them from power, the United States and its nascent partner government often generate enemies who can amass into an insurgency, or just allow one to happen.

The Bonn Conference and the Birth of the Internally-Conflicted Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

The United States and its partners had begun their overthrow of the Taliban in haste, and, by November 2001, the situation on the ground looked increasingly likely to devolve into an intractable civil war. The pre-Taliban leaders the US had supported throughout the country controlled territory with their famously rapacious militias. Tajik *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* held the capital of Kabul, where Tajik, Pashtun and Hazara ethnic militias threatened a mini-civil war and *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* looted and failed to maintain order. Two different and opposing militias, led by Popalzai chief Hamid Karzai and Barakzai chief Gul Agha Shirzai, held Kandahar Province and the rest of Pashtun southern Afghanistan. Uzbek warlord and tribal leader Rashid Dostum had occupied "his city", Mazar i Sharif. Tajik warlord Ishmail Khan held Herat and threatened to move West with his Tajik *mujihadeen* toward Durrani Pashtun Kandahar. And, Hazara strongman Karim Khalili retained control over the Hazara heartland in Bamyan.³¹⁰

³¹⁰ Dam, p. 151-3

These factions would likely be unwilling, as they had been during the civil war, to share power in the absence of a stabilizing external, military force.³¹¹ The looming prospect of a return to the chaos of the civil war period drove the international community to Bonn, Germany to identify an interim leader and administration; set up rules for elections and transition; write an interim constitution; and build a multi-national occupation force that could secure the country during its transition from Taliban to post-Taliban government.³¹²

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) was formed as a solution to the problem of the lack of a government in Afghanistan in the wake of the swift overthrow of the Afghan Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The US and its Coalition partners wanted a government that could serve as a single interlocutor with the many Afghan factions described above. The Coalition and the United Nations also wanted the new Afghan government to be democratic, based on the rule of law and able to ensure that the population had human rights that met United Nations' standards. The Coalition wanted to ensure that Afghanistan would be prosperous, secure, and no longer characterized by what the populations of the members of the Coalition saw as the brutality and injustice of the Taliban.

The most important decision reached during the nine days of the Bonn Conference was the selection of Hamid Karzai as Chairman of the Interim Administration. Karzai was chosen because he had run a successful Pashtun uprising against the Taliban in Uruzgan and Kandahar; because he was head of the Popalzai tribe of the Durrani Pashtuns; because of his resultant good relations with exiled former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah Durrani; because he had reasonably good relationships with *Jamat e Islami* leaders Rabbani and

³¹¹ Dam, p. 151-3

³¹² Dam, p. 153

Fahim, Ismail Khan, Dostum and other militia leaders holding territory in Afghanistan; and because he was acceptable to the United States, Pakistan, Iran and Russia. Karzai had spent decades courting the US, Pakistan and other international actors in an effort to gain their support first in throwing the Soviets out of Afghanistan and second in overthrowing the Taliban. Because of their familiarity with Karzai and his demonstrated commitment to negotiating with other stakeholders, the international community believed he would be inclusive and democratic and lead Afghanistan to become a modern member of the community of nation states.

For Karzai, however, his efforts to overthrow the Taliban had not been about the role of democracy or women or human rights in Afghan society. They had not been about creating a modern, impartial state based on the rule of law. His efforts had been focused on who was in the state and how power and resources would be distributed. What mattered most to Hamid Karzai was being able to add more allies to his group in order to accrue power and thereby resources. As a patron-client system leader, he valued loyalty over qualifications and ethics.³¹³ The international community assumed that it would be able to work through Karzai to reach its ideological goals for the Afghan state and Karzai assumed he could work with the international community to amass power for himself, his family, tribe and allies.

In order to convince the Tajik *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* to accept Hamid Karzai as interim President, the international community gave them control over a large proportion of the ministries and three of the most important ministries. Mohammad Fahim, who succeeded Ahmed Shah Massoud as commander of *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* after

³¹³ Dam, p. 188.

Massoud's assassination, became Minister of Defense. Yanus Qanooni, who had been a *mujihadeen* fighter, protégé of Massoud and Minister of Interior of Rabanni's feeble civil war government became Minister of Interior. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who had been Massoud's Chief of Staff as Minister of Defense during the Rabanni civil war government, was made Minister of Foreign Affairs.³¹⁴ The Tajik forces, like all *mujihadeen* forces, were able to maintain the territory they had gained and the size of the international occupation was limited so it could not impinge on their activities.

The *Jamat e Islami* ministers set about using their positions in the ministries to acquire jobs for their supporters, funds for patronage and methods for using their positions to extract more funds. These Tajiks saw themselves competing with President Karzai for political support through patronage. Control over the security ministries and access to foreign donors allowed them to accrue wealth and power. They hired many of their own supporters as policemen, soldiers and bureaucrats at the security ministries. They also used their control over the police to allow their militia members to steal, smuggle, kidnap and engage in other illegal activities with impunity. The Tajik *mujihadeen* leveraged their control over these ministries to build power outside of the state through their control over portions of it.

Karzai, Fahim, Dostum and the other allies the US backed to overthrow the Taliban immediately turned to extracting resources from the state to reinforce their systems of patronage. In a country where central governments and invading military forces come and go, developing a network of supporters who will vote for you or provide you with fighters,

³¹⁴ Dam, p. 181.

supplies and sanctuary in the event of a war, is of central importance to leaders.³¹⁵ Traditionally, throughout Afghanistan, the ability of local leaders to, “obtain and distribute resources from the state or the market, through patronage, trade or smuggling,” is important to the leader’s ability to demonstrate to the state and his followers that he is “bigger” than other leaders and should therefore receive support from both. Historically, these leaders have exploited local populations, or provided them with public goods, or both. “Some obtain help from the state to enlarge their wealth and power, even at the cost of alienating the local population. Others build clienteles, and hence networks of power, by providing goods and shielding the local population from the state and its depredations.” In these cases, the exploitative leader is an ally of the state, while the public servant is the state’s competitor.³¹⁶

In the eyes of Karzai, Dostum, Fahim, Abdullah Abdullah, Khan, Khalili and the others, the Afghan state provided an opportunity to distribute jobs and funds ahead of the Afghanistan’s presidential elections; to stockpile funds necessary in the event of another civil war; and to generally demonstrate that they were “bigger” leaders than their competitors, thereby generating interest by the international community and their followers.

However, in the eyes of the international development organizations that descended upon Afghanistan in the wake of the Bonn Conference, they were building a state that would be impersonal and operated by bureaucrats who simply executed regulations derived from

³¹⁵ James C. Scott. “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia.” *American Political Science Review*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Scott describes patron-client relationships as, “an informal cluster consisting of a power figure who is in a position to give security, inducements, or both, and his personal followers who, in return for such benefits, contribute their loyalty and personal assistance to the patron’s designs.” He argues that these relationships determine political outcomes in Southeast Asia.

³¹⁶ Barnett R. Rubin. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. p. 41-44.

law.³¹⁷ The United Nations and the embassies of the Coalition countries believed that Afghanistan's state weakness resulted from the incapacity of state institutions, starting with the central government's ministries, as opposed to the local instruments of government. The solution they proposed was the replication of western, rule of law based, administrative systems in the ministries in Kabul. The systems would be staffed, both in the provinces and in the capital, by a set of administrators, beholden only to the central government, who would enforce the rule of law and provide services without regard to personal interests or relationships. In their vision, elections would identify the legislators who would enact laws and the executives who would determine how the bureaucrats would implement them. The international community's approach ignored the political, social and cultural reality of life at the local level in Afghanistan; and the related lack of trained, capable, educated administrators with the will and capacity to impersonally provide services and enforce the rule of law.

Despite the fact that society in Afghanistan is severely fragmented, the international community believed a highly centralized state was the most effective form of government for Afghanistan because it mirrored the governments of European countries.³¹⁸ The political centralization of the state in Afghanistan is extreme. There are national elections for a national parliament and president. There are elections for provincial councils, though these have limited powers. The President appoints all ministers, Provincial and District

³¹⁷ Adam R. Grissom, "In our Image: Statebuilding Orthodoxy and the Afghan National Army" in Robert Egnell and Peter Halden, *New Agendas in Statebuilding: Hybridity, Contingency and History*. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013. Grissom describes international state building orthodoxy as a belief among international organizations and bureaucrats that states fail because of weak institutions which must be built or reformed so they mirror the institutions of Western nation states. The goal of financial and technical assistance is to build or reform state institutions so that they will administer the rule of law and provide services at the local level in an impersonal manner. The international community's orthodoxy focuses on the capital and the central government, as opposed to the government as it interacts with individuals at the local level. The approach ignores local social, cultural and political reality. p. 184-89. Sarah Lister "Changing the Rules? State Building and Local Government in Afghanistan" in *Journal of Development Studies* Volume 45, Number 6. Routledge, July 2009. p. 994

³¹⁸ Grissom, 2013. p. 184-89

Governors. The lack of a well-developed civil society that connects voters to issues-based political parties means that voting has little impact on policy as it affects individuals and groups at the local level.

GIRoA is not only politically centralized, it is also fiscally and administratively one of the most centralized countries in the world. All budgetary and most staffing decisions are made in Kabul. Most ministry personnel at the provincial and district levels are appointed by the ministries in Kabul. Provincial and district departments of the ministries, as well as governors' offices, have virtually no discretionary spending power and limited input into planning. The governors have only loose coordinating roles, and formally lack authority over the representatives of other ministries in their province or district.³¹⁹ This hyper-centralized state arose out of Hamid Karzai's wish to consolidate political power, and international aid flows, in his own hands and the international community's wish to have a single interlocutor and a state that mirrored those in Western Europe.

The result of these events was the creation of a state which is an awkward organizational, institutional and ideological amalgam. On paper, the institutions of the state are centralized and manned by impartial bureaucrats who execute laws decided upon by elected officials. But, in reality, the organization was staffed by a set of competing patronage systems seeking to maximize the money they could extract from the state and from people who were not their followers through control over the ministries. These GIRoA leaders sought to redistribute the funds they extracted to their narrow set of followers. Karzai and Karzai's rival patrons, Mohammad Fahim, Gul Agha Shirzai, Rashid Dostum, Ishmail Khan, Karim Khalili, etc. had no incentive to build a state in which they feared they

³¹⁹ Sarah Lister "Changing the Rules? State Building and Local Government in Afghanistan" in *Journal of Development Studies* Volume 45, Number 6. Routledge, July 2009. p. 994

might in future no longer control. For that reason, leveraging the state to build patronage made more sense to Fahim, Shirzai, Dostum, Khan and Khalili than investing energy in building a state. Because of the system of competitive elections and the international community's ambivalence toward Karzai and patronage systems in general, not even President Karzai had an incentive to build the state because it could easily be seized from him. Instead, he too built parallel systems of patron-client based governance leveraging the assets of the state.

The centralization of power and its concentration in the hands of a small number of leaders resulted in a span of control and accountability problem for the state. In social systems where one can only trust one's own immediate family, it is difficult to aggregate political power to concentrate it on achieving outcomes.³²⁰ Afghan society was unconsolidated before the war against the Soviets and is riven with conflicts stemming from three decades of war in which tribes and communities had sided with one side or another, generating feuds. GIRoA's political system concentrated the power and wealth of the state in the hands of a small set of leaders in a society comprised of large numbers of highly fragmented patronage systems. This made it difficult for the state to control anything outside those patronage systems and endowed it with little interest in protecting or serving the needs of large portions of the population. It also meant that the patronage systems feeding on the state could leverage the state's institutions either to extract bribes from individuals in the populace who had no relationship with the patron. Members of the patronage systems could also use the state's coercive force for retribution against families who had transgressed against them during the Taliban reign, the civil war or the Soviet

³²⁰ Edward C. Banfield. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. New York: The Free Press, 1958. This book is based on a year of ethnographic fieldwork in Calabria in an effort to explain the persistent lack of democratization, penetration of rule by the state and economic development in that region. Banfield finds a social system in which individuals are unable to trust people outside their kinship groups that leads to an inability to pool political, economic and coercive resources.

occupation. People targeted by the state or its Coalition allies opposed the state and often joined insurgents to fight against it.

In terms of its ideology, the GIRoA was also a study in contradictions and disconnects. The patronage systems were really without ideology. For them, what was important was not what kind of governmental system Afghanistan had, but about who ran the state and reaped its spoils. While the state on paper was framed as a democracy representing the will of the Afghan people, the constitution contained provisions, imposed by the international community, that ran counter to their will. It prescribed a set of internationally sanctioned “human rights” that contradicted many Afghan values, particularly patriarchal honor and Islam. These internationally imposed human rights included freedom to marry whomever you like; freedom to choose your own job and clothing; freedom to choose to be educated. When applied to women, these rights contravened one of the central values of Afghan society, without which no family can be seen as “big” or “powerful”, honor. The population never voted on these provisions, causing some confusion regarding the meaning of democracy. Further, the constitution enshrines Islam, but it allows freedom of religion and allows rights to freedom of speech, freedom to play music, etc. that run counter to Islam in the view of many Afghans. The constitution states that no law shall contravene Islamic law, but does not make Islamic law the law of the land. These aspects of the constitution were also not subjected to a popular vote or enacted by elected representatives.³²¹

³²¹ J. Alexander Thier. “Big Tent, Small Tent: The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan.” Chapter 20 in Laurel E. Miller with Louis Aucoin, ed. *Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010. p. 535-558. Mr. Thier was a facilitator in the constitution making process in Afghanistan and provides a detailed accounting of the process by which it was written, reviewed and accepted by a Loya Jirga.

In short, GIRoA was not developed as a solution to the chaos, poverty, limited potential for economic development and poor infrastructure that characterizes Afghanistan. It was developed as a solution to the international community's need for a government that could serve as an interlocutor, met the international community's normative requirements for a liberal democracy, human rights, the rule of law, impersonal, centralized administration and service provision; and Hamid Karzai's wish to limit the power of possible political challengers.³²² As a result of the formation of an Afghan state with very limited popular input and with a great deal of foreign input, the ideology of the Afghan state is a confusing amalgamation of democracy, hyper-centralization, individual rights, Islam, patronage and modern bureaucratic structures.³²³

The Government's Impartial Bureaucrats

While the Taliban's ideal personnel are true believers, the government's ideal personnel are impartial bureaucrats who execute regulations without regard to their personal interests. American and Western European states strive for an ideal of rational, legal authority bound by laws equally applied to members of their populations by a set of impartial bureaucrats.³²⁴ The international community sought to install just such a bureaucracy in Afghanistan. These personnel would be recruited from throughout Afghanistan, based on their merit, trained in Kabul and then deployed to District Capitals far from their place of origin, where they would take the actions the central government intended as prescribed in written regulations.³²⁵ American and Western European military

³²² Grissom, 2013. 186-209.

³²³ Thier, 2010, p. 535-558.

³²⁴ Max Weber describes the ideal type of legal, rational authority in Max Weber. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York: The Free Press, 1947. p. 328-341

³²⁵ Lister, 2009. p. 995-1006. Lister provides a description of failed efforts to enforce merit-based hiring at the provincial and district government levels through Afghan Public Administration Reform.

and police designed security organizations that were intended to be equally impartial. These security personnel form the bulk of GIRoA personnel and are the main GIRoA personnel with whom individuals interact on a day-to-day basis.³²⁶

In Afghanistan, the effort to create an impartial bureaucracy has resulted in the development of a bureaucratic, military and police system in which personnel often lack the will to act. In a country where familial and community relationships motivate people to cooperate, obey the rules and help one another in the spirit of Islamic unity, partiality drives people to take actions that are for the common good.³²⁷ GIRoA plucked individuals out of the local social structures that restrained them from breaking rules and bound them to act to assist one another in solving their problems. The government placed these young people, freed from the fetters of their social responsibilities and authority structures, in other people's communities. It is precisely the fact that they are not partial toward the communities where they are working that has led them to be indifferent and inactive at best and unruly, corrupt and harmful at worst.³²⁸

In the case of Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel, loyalty to the families who rely upon them as long-term sources of physical and economic security constrains their willingness to take risks on behalf of the communities where they operate. Fighting the Taliban, patrolling and protecting the population from them all involve taking risks. It is precisely because they are not related to the people in the communities where they operate that ANP and ANA are less likely to patrol or engage the

³²⁶ Ministry of the Interior. *Afghan National Police Code of Conduct*. Kabul: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2011.

³²⁷ Rubin, 2002. p. 41-4

³²⁸ For more detail, see community case studies.

enemy. This may explain the relative success of local police who are recruited through their communities in contested areas of Afghanistan.

The institutional structures into which the soldiers, police and bureaucrats are placed exacerbate the tendency of GIRoA personnel toward inaction. The different *mujihadeen* forces from the pre-Taliban civil war dominate the ministries in which Afghanistan's soldiers, policemen and bureaucrats work, and are spread throughout the rank and file of its employees. The leaders from the civil war have treated these ministries as spoils, using them to collect rents from the international community and to extract money from the population. People related to those people Afghans refer to as "high ranking" can use their relationships to leaders of the militias to punish police and bureaucrats for making judgments using the regulations. Since it is difficult to discern who might be able to overturn a decision and cause problems for the bureaucrat or policeman in question, inaction is safer than action. GIRoA provides few disincentives for inaction or misconduct by its personnel because in many cases, leaders all the way up the chain of command within the ministries benefit from some of that inaction and misconduct.

While GIRoA and its international partners have sought to produce government personnel who will serve the Afghan people without regard to their own personal interests, the result has been a bureaucracy that lacks the will to take action. In the context of leaders who are using the ministries in order to extract money from the international community and local population, while staffing them with supporters, GIRoA's impartial bureaucrats have even less will to act.

GIRoA Vision of Afghan Society

The vision GIROA presents of how Afghan society should be ordered is almost diametrically opposed to that of the Taliban. The government has as its goal an economically prosperous, Western-style society based on individual freedoms,³²⁹ individual equality under the law,³³⁰ democracy,³³¹ human rights,³³² centralized institutions³³³ and government-provided, advanced education³³⁴ and health care.³³⁵ GIROA aims for a society in which individuals (male or female, young or old) decide whether or not to seek an education, whether to get a job and of what kind, as well as whom they should marry.

In a revolutionary move, the Afghan Constitution guarantees the equality and non-discrimination against women. In 2009, the Afghan government, under pressure from the international community, passed the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law (EVAW) in order to legislate against that constitutional requirement. It outlaws child marriage, forced marriage, buying and selling women into marriage, *baad* (giving away a woman or girl as part of a negotiated settlement of a dispute), forced self-immolation, rape, beating and 15 other types of violence against women.³³⁶

The government also guarantees the freedom of religion, stating that no one should have the right to force anyone else to practice Islam or prevent them from doing so; or to prevent anyone else from listening to music, dancing, speaking their mind in public, wearing whatever clothes they want, leaving their home when they want and interacting with

³²⁹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The Constitution of Afghanistan. Rights and Duties of Citizens, Articles 22-59. As adopted by consensus at the Loya Jirga January 2004.

³³⁰ Ibid, Article 22.

³³¹ Ibid, Preamble.

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Ibid, Articles 60-142.

³³⁴ Ibid, Articles 43-46.

³³⁵ Ibid, Articles 52-53.

³³⁶ UNAMA. "A Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law in Afghanistan" Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA, November 2011.

whomever they want. The government advocates for moderate, non-violent Islam. President Karzai juxtaposed the government's view of Islam with that of the Taliban in December of 2011, when he tweeted, "Islam is a religion of moderation, not a religion of violence and extremism." He has often stated that the violent and repressive actions of extremists make Islam look bad in the eyes of the world, which includes Muslims and prospective Muslims.³³⁷

The society the government envisions will be increasingly modern, prosperous, healthy and educated. In this future world, the people of Afghanistan will be provided with education and medical services. The government will develop industry, agriculture and mining. In GIROA's vision, Afghanistan will be connected to the outside world through commerce, television, radio, the internet and other communications, exposing it to foreign cultures. The pre-amble to the constitution explains that Afghanistan formed a government in part in order to regain its proper place in the international family of nation states.³³⁸

Government Rules

The government has a set of rules intended to generate a social order based on individual citizens with equal rights asserting their will through democratic elections and their own efforts to improve their economic lot through free commerce. The government's rules³³⁹ can be grouped into the following categories: rules prohibiting actions that have negative effects on others; rules to protect human and individual rights; rules governing

³³⁷ Hamid Karzai. "Statement by H.E. Hamid Karzai President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at the Extraordinary Session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Summit in Makkah Al-Mukarramah, Saudi Arabia" Kabul: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2012.

³³⁸ This description of the government's vision for the future social order is derived from an analysis of The Afghan Constitution; The Afghan Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in Afghanistan; GIROA. *Towards Self Reliance: Strategic Vision for the Transformation Decade*; and speeches by President Hamid Karzai.

³³⁹ The government's rules were derived from the Afghan constitution and laws, government statements and policy documents.

commerce; rules to influence people to provide resources to the government; and rules separating the population from the Taliban.

The government's rules prohibiting actions that have negative effects on others include, but are not limited to: no killing; no fighting; no theft; no adultery; no sexual harassment; no rape; no alcohol or narcotics; and no destruction of property. These rules are intended to establish basic security of person and property and govern sexual behavior. In effect, these rules are designed to restrict individual behavior that would have negative impacts on others.

The government's rules to protect human rights include, but are not limited to: send all children to school; women can choose to leave their homes whenever they choose; women can choose what they wear; women can choose whatever job they want; no one can restrict music or dancing; no one can force anyone else to practice Islam; no one can prevent anyone else from practicing whatever religion they choose; no one can force anyone else to marry; no brideprices; no marriages under 18 years of age; no one can prevent anyone else from dancing or playing football or flying kites or playing pigeons; and individuals are not required to obey their parents after they are 18 years old. No one can infringe upon anyone else's right to speak his or her opinion, both to one another and in the media.

The government's rules regarding commerce include, but are not limited to: prices for certain items, like meat and bread, are fixed; you must pay your rent; you must repay loans; and you must fulfill contracts.

The government's rules influencing people to provide it with resources include, but are not limited to: provide information about the location and activities of Taliban fighters. Interestingly, the government does not impose income taxes on the population and officially demands very little from it financially. The government is funded almost entirely by the international community.³⁴⁰

The government's rules relating to the Taliban insurgency are intended to separate the population from the Taliban in order to deny the Taliban the resources it needs to erode the power of GIRoA and eventually overthrow it. The rules include but are not limited to: do not provide information about government activities or location to the Taliban; do not work for the Taliban; do not provide sanctuary to the Taliban; and do not provide goods, services or money to the Taliban.

Government Methods of Enforcement

The government's methods of enforcement mirror those of Western European states. Afghanistan has built a national police force whose duty is to patrol and investigate in order to identify law breaking and arrest people. People arrested by the police are to be tried in courts of law and fined, sent to prison or executed, depending upon the offense as prescribed in written law.³⁴¹ National elections are held to ensure that the government, its laws, security forces and judicial system are accountable to the population. If someone's rights have been violated, they should report the problem to the government, which will

³⁴⁰ Afghanistan's projected government revenue for 2014 is \$2.4 billion, but its projected expenditures are \$7.5 billion. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 2014 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (January). Arlington, USA: SIGAR. According to the report, Afghan government expenditures increased 10.3% from 2013 to 2014.

³⁴¹ The Constitution of Afghanistan, Articles 25-32, 130, 134, The Afghanistan Compact, The Afghan National Development Strategy, the Afghan Police Law.

sanction the offender without regard to the gender, ethnicity, position or income of the victim or perpetrator.³⁴²

The Code of Conduct for the ANP provides a clear description of the actions the government wants personnel to take and some of the actions it does not want them to take. It states that the core duty of a police officer is to serve the people of Afghanistan by protecting the life and property of citizens, be they men, women or children, and to respect and protect their freedom and lawful rights. Police officers are admonished to obey their superiors and never neglect their duties. They are instructed never to make false statements and to fight every kind of bribery and discrimination. The police are further told to respect the International Declaration of Human Rights and never engage in violence, torture or inhumane treatment. The Code of Conduct directs the police to behave with discipline, obedience, professionalism, loyalty to the goals of GIRoA and in accordance with its constitution and laws. Additionally, they are instructed to be kind to their subordinates. The Code of Conduct prohibits illegal or disgraceful conduct, stating that police cannot be involved in crime or cooperation with criminals; that they cannot allow their personal beliefs or relationships to influence their official decisions; that they cannot disclose confidential information, violate civil rights, abuse their authority for personal gain or withhold information. Policemen must report illegal activity by other police to their chain of command. They are also prohibited from joining political parties.

Police are required to recite the Code of Conduct when they are commissioned and to sign a copy of it. A policeman accused of violating the code will be tried by the Ministry of

³⁴² Throughout the participant observation data, people discuss GIRoA entreating people to report violations of their civil rights to various ministries, particularly the Ministry of Women's Affairs.

the Interior and can be fined, fired and subsequently tried in the courts if the offence involved violating a law.

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Strategy

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Goals

GIRoA's objectives are to defeat the insurgency and build a political and social order based on moderate, non-violent Islam, human rights, social justice, the rule of law and individual freedoms in which Afghanistan is connected to the outside world through communications and commerce.³⁴³

The government seeks to stabilize the security situation nationwide by defeating the insurgency and other illegal armed organizations. It simultaneously seeks to improve the physical and economic security of every Afghan. GIRoA seeks to strengthen its democratic processes and institutions, improve human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services and government accountability. The government seeks to emphasize the freedom of speech and assembly as an important underpinning of a functioning democratic system. Also, the government seeks in particular to improve women's rights, which it sees as a lynchpin for improved economic and social development and integration into the international community. Further, the government seeks to reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through a private sector led market economy and improve the literacy, education and health of its population.

³⁴³ This description of the government's vision for the future social order is derived from an analysis of: The Afghan Constitution; The Afghan Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in Afghanistan; GIRoA. *Towards Self Reliance: Strategic Vision for the Transformation Decade*; and speeches by President Hamid Karzai.

The government seeks to make significant progress toward the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals:³⁴⁴ eradicate extreme poverty, provide universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV, AIDS and other diseases, and develop a policy to more efficiently and effectively apply donor aid to development challenges. Finally, GIRoA and its international partners seek to eliminate the narcotics industry, which is destabilizing GIRoA, funding the Taliban and destabilizing the international system by providing an estimated 80% of the world's illicit opium.³⁴⁵

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ways

The government seeks to root out the Taliban insurgency and the remnants of Al Qaeda by identifying the locations of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters within the population and in their sanctuaries and subsequently killing or capturing them. At the same time, the government is negotiating with the Taliban leadership in order to bring an end to their insurgency and integrate them into the Afghan society GIRoA envisions for the future.

The government has relied upon international security forces to assist it in identifying the location of Taliban and Al Qaeda militants and killing or capturing them. Simultaneously, GIRoA has sought to build security forces that can conduct similar operations to “find, fix and finish” Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. The government has also

³⁴⁴ The Millennium Development Goals were developed by the member states of the UN as a guideline for multilateral and bilateral economic development organizations. They were not developed to address Afghanistan's specific economic development requirements. But, they were adopted by Afghanistan's government at the request of the United Nations.

³⁴⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *World Drug Report 2014*. New York: The United Nations, 2014. p. 21.

sought to cut off the Taliban's access to resources by attacking the narcotics industry and working with US and allied intelligence agencies to cut off other Taliban and Al Qaeda resource flows.

At the same time, the government has sought to defeat the Taliban insurgency by increasing popular support by removing grievances that could fuel the insurgency. GIRoA has therefore sought to protect of individual human rights; provide of services, in particular healthcare and education; and develop an economy in which Afghans can make enough money to be economically secure. The government has also sought to bolster moderate, non-violent Islamic institutions that counter the Taliban's interpretation of Islam. GIRoA hopes that if people value the gains they have made in terms of their security, income, housing and infrastructure, health,³⁴⁶ social welfare, their children's education³⁴⁷ and their freedoms, they will not tolerate the presence of Al Qaeda or the Taliban in their communities.

The government has built a centralized police force, the Afghan National Police, in order to provide physical and economic security to the population. The government intends for the police to patrol and work with people in communities to identify crimes and arrest perpetrators, identify and sanction participation in the Taliban insurgency or Al Qaeda and protect human rights (gender equality, religious freedom, freedom of speech,

³⁴⁶ The Ministry of Health describes how it seeks to provide equitable access to quality health care through a centralized system that educates and certifies health professionals and provides oversight to public and private clinics and hospitals. It also describes a system for hiring and deploying doctors and nurses to public clinics at the district level throughout Afghanistan. Ministry of Health of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. *Vision Statement for Health, 2011-2015*. Kabul: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010.

³⁴⁷ The Ministry of Education describes how it seeks to provide education through a centralized system that is responsive to local *shuras* that hold schools and administrators accountable. The centralized bureaucracy trains and certifies teachers, hires and pays them and determines the curriculum. The ministry also contracts to build and maintain school buildings. Ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. *Strategic Plan, Program One: General and Islamic Education*. Kabul: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008.

etc.). When the police identify someone who has committed a crime, is participating in the insurgency, or violating someone's human rights, the government instructs its police to arrest that person regardless of the person's access to coercive force or money or their personal relationship to the policeman or anyone else in the government. The police then submit the suspect to a judicial process that is intended to fairly apply the rule of law and to a penal system that is designed to impartially execute the judiciary's orders.

The government has sought to build a centralized set of state institutions that will be powerful enough to defend the rights of individuals, not only from groups like the Taliban or criminal gangs, but also from the wishes of their own communities and families, through the police, the Independent Commission on Human Rights and the Ministry of Women's Affairs. When a person's rights are violated, for example, when someone's parents want to force him or her to marry someone against his or her will, that person should be able to go to the government to seek protection. Similarly, if someone wants to play music or to speak his mind and others attempt to interfere with that person's freedom to do so, the person's right to freedom of expression should be protected by the government.³⁴⁸

The Afghan National Army's mandate includes both defending Afghanistan's sovereign territory and establishing internal stability. In areas where GIRoA is fighting the Taliban, GIRoA intends for the ANA to patrol in order to identify the location of Taliban fighters, engage them and kill or capture them. GIRoA intends for the ANA provide support to the police in their efforts to patrol and provide security to the population whenever they require it.

³⁴⁸ Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. *Afghan Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in Afghanistan*. Kabul, 2009.

In areas contested with the Taliban, GIRoA established Afghan Local Police units. The ALP are to be recruited by village *shuras*, provided minimal training, armed and deployed in their own villages to provide security against the Taliban. ALP have the advantage of not needing to travel at night in order to engage the Taliban when they move through villages. They are already in the villages and therefore avoid the threat of ambushes while en route. Additionally, since they are defending their own homes and families, it is believed that they will have greater will to fight the Taliban.

In order to increase employment and wages, and therefore popular support for the government, the government wants to improve economic development by building a market-driven economy. It intends to do so by building a strong environment that enables business by providing security of person and property, enforcing contracts, adjudicating disputes and building workable systems of government regulation. The government wants to enable domestic and foreign investment in private enterprise in order to spur economic growth and job creation. In order to do so, it intends to reduce corruption in the regulation of businesses and settlement of disputes. It aims to do so by streamlining and clarification of regulations; through training and education of personnel; by recruiting new personnel; and creating agencies that investigate and punish corruption. Additionally, GIRoA intends to build up the oversight capabilities of the National Assembly in order to hold the executive branch accountable for corruption and performance.³⁴⁹

The government is also investing in transportation, energy and water infrastructure in order to spur economic growth. It is repairing the ring road that connects all of

³⁴⁹ Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. *Afghan National Development Strategy 2008-2013: A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction*. Kabul, 2008.

Afghanistan's major cities to one another, as well as the roads that connect the ring road to neighboring countries. It is improving its aviation infrastructure to ensure the availability of safe, reliable and inexpensive cargo importation and exportation. The government is attempting to increase the energy available for private industrial activity. Currently, the potential for investment in industry in Afghanistan is limited by the lack of cheap, efficient energy. The government is therefore engaged in an effort to privatize the existing power generation and distribution system, while simultaneously increasing the amount of energy available to prospective investors. Finally, the government is working to increase the efficient provision of water to agriculture, which is the mainstay of the Afghan economy. It has programs intended to expand irrigation for small scale farms and for larger commercial farming enterprises.³⁵⁰

The government is also attempting to increase popular support (as well as the quality of Afghanistan's workforce) through the provision of education and health care. The government is building schools and training teachers and operating government health clinics throughout the country. The government has focused in particular on improving the provision of health care to women in order to reduce Afghanistan's high infant and maternal mortality rates.³⁵¹

The government seeks to ensure popular support and government accountability through the election of a President who appoints governors down to the district level and national, provincial, district and village elections of assemblies or councils. Elected village

³⁵⁰ Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. *Afghan National Development Strategy 2008-2013: A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction*. Kabul, 2008.

³⁵¹ Ministry of Health of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. *Vision Statement for Health, 2011-2015*. Kabul: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010.

councils and *shuras* are intended to ensure that the government bureaucracy provides the services it is intended to provide.³⁵²

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Means

The strategy described above requires a large amount of money because of the high cost of developing and staffing centralized, as opposed to locally generated, government institutions. However, Afghanistan's extremely poor economy, comprised almost entirely of subsistence agriculture, provides few domestic sources of revenue for the government. The international community, and the United States in particular, have provided the lion's share of the funding for the Afghan government.

GIRoA acquires its resources almost entirely from the international community. Between 2002 and 2014, the United States Government alone appropriated \$104 billion in military and development assistance for Afghanistan.³⁵³ In 2013, the Afghan government's domestic revenue was roughly \$2 billion, while its overall budget expenditures were \$5.4 billion. Donor grants made up the difference, funding 63% of the budget. In January 2014, the Afghan Parliament approved a budget that increased GIRoA expenditures by 10.3% to \$7.8 billion. A significant, but unknown, proportion of the domestic revenues are generated by the large number of development projects conducted outside of the Afghan government budget by donors. Off-budget development projects cost more than on-budget development

³⁵² Ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. *Strategic Plan, Program One: General and Islamic Education*. Kabul: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008.

³⁵³ Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction. *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*. July 30, 2014. p. 5

projects in Afghanistan, so the amount of government revenue they generate is significant.³⁵⁴

GIRoA collects very little money from its population. Afghanistan has one of the lowest levels of domestic revenue collection in the world, with an average of about 9% between 2006 and 2013. The average domestic revenue collection rate for low income countries is about 21%.³⁵⁵ GIRoA has put very little effort into collecting taxes. Afghanistan does not have a tradition of a strong central government or a formal economy. Most of its workforce is rural and organized into small family farms that generate only small amounts of produce for sale. These families are extremely poor and therefore collecting taxes from them would be a major strain. Since this has also never been done before, it would surely be very unpopular and could generate unrest. GIRoA's ministries also lack the capacity to collect taxes.³⁵⁶ Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance has stated that tax collection is ineffective because skill levels among its staff are low; tax collection officials are systemically corrupt; and methods, systems and work practices to administer tax collection are insufficient. The Ministry states that compliance with tax laws, even by its own tax collectors, is low.³⁵⁷

The government intends to rely upon aid from the international community while building its economy and revenue collection institutions. Due to the extremely under-developed nature of the Afghan economy, the government is hoping to leverage its vast natural resource wealth in order to pay for the security, economic and social development

³⁵⁴ Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction. *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*. July 30, 2014. p. 3

³⁵⁵ International Monetary Fund. *2014 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report and Statement by the Executive Director for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*. IMF Country Report Number 14/128. May 2014.

³⁵⁶ Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction. *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*. July 30, 2014. p. 8-9

³⁵⁷ Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan, "Revenue Department," <http://mof.gov.af/en/page/422>, undated, accessed 15 May 2014.

programs in its strategy.³⁵⁸ Afghanistan is home to some of the richest mineral deposits in the world. Afghanistan's deposits of copper, gold, tin, lithium, zinc, manganese, chromite, mercury, uranium, bauxite, limestone, marble, emeralds, rubies, lapis lazuli, garnet and epidote³⁵⁹ provide it with an enormous, though difficult to tap, set of resources. It is also home to significant quantities of oil and gas. The government has tendered rights to exploration and exploitation of known copper, oil and natural gas fields and mines and predicts that by 2020, mineral and hydrocarbon extraction will contribute roughly \$650 million annually to the Government's fiscal revenues and increase thereafter to roughly \$1.7 billion by 2025.³⁶⁰ The government is aware that its ability to achieve these revenue goals is directly related to the confidence the international mining and hydrocarbon industry has in the security environment and in the government's willingness to abide by laws and contracts. In addition to this source of revenue, the government intends to increase agricultural production, build more industrial facilities and increase its domestic production and exports.

The government recruits personnel from all over the country and purposefully places them in posts far from their place of origin. The government believes that in so doing, it will be able to generate the "impartial bureaucrats" who will execute regulations without regard to personal interest. These personnel often live inside the district government building, their police station or military barracks and commute home for extended periods so they can be with their large families, who often reside on farms in their village of origin or in large extended family dwellings in their city of origin. These

³⁵⁸ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Towards Self-Reliance: Strategic Vision of the Transformation Decade*. Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, July 2012. p. 4 The Afghan government cites extractives as its main hope for increased revenue generation.

³⁵⁹ Jeff L. Doebrich and Ronald R. Wahl, *Geological and Mineral Resource Map of Afghanistan*. Afghan Geological Survey in cooperation with United States Geological Survey, 2006 version 2.

³⁶⁰ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Towards Self-Reliance: Strategic Vision of the Transformation Decade*. Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, July 2012, p. 4.

government personnel are committed to the long term physical and economic security of their families and are often beholden to their fathers' for providing the family with income. Their salaries are enormous relative to the income families, particularly those living on farms, generate. Given the chaos and violence of the past four decades in Afghanistan, these government personnel are aware that in the long run, it is only their family upon whom they can rely.³⁶¹

A large, but unknown, proportion of the government's personnel originate from the *mujihadeen* groups who were awarded control of various ministries in 2001. These personnel then controlled many of the hiring processes within each ministry.

For example, many of the police and bureaucrats in the Ministry of the Interior were part of Massoud's Tajik, largely Panshiri, *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*. At the local level, some police were recruited expressly from particular tribal militia, like the police in Kandahar, who were from Mullah Naqib's Alikozai tribe; or from an existing anti-Taliban *mujihadeen* militia that had seized the territory. Since the early 2000s, there have been efforts to impose "merit-based" hiring of police and MOI civilians. However, the base of the policing function in Afghanistan has retained its patronage system base in the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* and allied patronage systems.³⁶²

The system of selecting chiefs of police provides an example of how relationships to people in *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*, combined with corruption, resulted in hiring. In order to become a district or provincial police chief, one would need to meet a facilitator related

³⁶¹ The exceptions to this general rule are the Afghan Local Police, who were expressly recruited by their local villages to provide security; and teachers, who generally live within walking or driving distance of their jobs.

³⁶² Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh, 2012. p. 39

to the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* who would contact the person in charge of the appointment of police chiefs and determine how much a position would cost. The cost of buying a post as a provincial police chief varies from \$50,000-\$200,000 and, for a district police chief, \$20,000-\$50,000, depending on how lucrative the post is expected to be.³⁶³ Once a candidate has paid the bribe, he becomes police chief and expects to be able to use his position to extract money from the population or criminal or insurgent organizations. In order to retain his position, he must continue to pass funds up through the system to his patron. This system has created vertically integrated networks of corrupt officials who channel funds up their chains of command. Police chiefs and policemen were purposefully assigned far from their place of origin. The intent was to prevent them from acting based on their personal interests, but the outcome was often that they had no reason not to use their position for personal gain at the expense of a local population to whom they were unrelated and unaccountable. Any policeman seeking to fulfill his duty according to his Code of Conduct, or Islam, and stand in the way of this corruption, risked losing at least his job, if not his life.

District and Provincial Governors are appointed by the President. President Karzai selected governors specifically for their loyalty to and dependence on him. Many also paid for their position. Jan Mohammad provides a good example of how the authority structure worked between the President, and Provincial and District Governors. Jan Mohammad was Karzai's closest ally in Uruzgan. He was a *mujihadeen* commander from Karzai's Popalzai tribe who had been the main recipient of the aid that flowed through Karzai during the war against the Soviets. As Governor of Uruzgan, Jan Mohammad collected taxes on the lucrative poppy production and trade through his district governors. One of the district

³⁶³ Mohammed Resaq Isaqzadeh and Antonio Giustozzi. "Senior Appointments and Corruption within the Afghan Ministry of Interior: Practices and Perceptions." Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2015.

governors had to provide Mohammad with \$1.5 million dollars per year. Non-government middlemen associated with Jan Mohammad collected the payments. In return, the district governors protected the farmers from prosecution for illegally growing poppies. In effect, the Governor was selling his right to implement the government's laws and thereby acting in opposition to the government's intent. The taxes angered the farmers and their tribal leaders, who were cut out of the patronage.³⁶⁴ All of this collection of taxes on illicit activity was made possible by Karzai ensuring that Jan Mohammad maintained his position as Provincial Governor and that he in turn ensured his District Governors remained in position. Vertically integrated structures of extraction like this one, connecting to the ground through different ministries, exist throughout the country.

The international community has put intense pressure on the ministries to recruit personnel based on merit. The government produced the Public Administration Reform, but the characteristics of the personnel have not changed and the bureaucratic mechanisms they created have simply been leveraged by the different patron-client systems against one another.³⁶⁵ For example, President Karzai might try to force "merit based" hiring in MOI in order to thin out the control of the Tajik Panshiris there, while Vice President Fahim (who was the commander of the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* after Massoud's assassination) might push for reforms in the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, which is staffed by personnel of Karzai's choosing.

As part of the international community's effort to root out these patronage networks, international donors have provided GIRA personnel with intensive training and re-training. The training of police, judges, soldiers, teachers and health professionals has

³⁶⁴ Dam, p. 195.

³⁶⁵ Lister, 2009. p. 994

been a major task of the international military coalition and civilian aid agencies and contractors in Afghanistan. Trainers and mentors have attempted to imbue GIRoA personnel with the belief that their role is to serve the people of Afghanistan by protecting them or by making fair decisions or by providing them with high quality services. However, in the context of institutions that reward preferential treatment for members of the patronage network in question and punish efforts to evenly apply regulations and laws, this training is often inapplicable to the reality of life an employee of a GIRoA ministry.

The government collects the information it needs about rule violations in three ways: through the population, patrolling and intelligence collection. The government acquires some information from people in the population who support the government and the rule in question. It also acquires some information from its personnel on patrol. However, the frequency of Afghan police and military patrols has steadily declined since their international military partners transitioned the battle space and stopped conducting joint patrols. The government's intelligence collection organization, the National Directorate for Security, pays informants throughout Afghanistan for information about the location of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. Finally, the international community may provide intelligence information about the location of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters.

The government has sanctuary throughout much of the country due to its relative dominance over the Taliban in terms of coercive force, particularly in the presence of international forces and their air support. The government can move through most areas of the country if it so chooses.

Organizational Structure

GIRoA has a centralized government structure that lacks either a strong ideological basis or a firm connection to the population. It is peopled by competing patronage networks spread across a rational-legal model of government that assumes the presence of “impartial” bureaucrats. The patronage networks connect the government only to the narrow portions of the population they represent. The lack of a firm connection to the population is exacerbated by the effort to place government personnel far from their homes in order to ensure their impartiality. The result has been an inability to understand the interests, needs and beliefs of the populations of the districts, coupled with an unfortunate lack of initiative to solve problems on their behalf. The government as an organization lacks effective methods for holding personnel accountable to the population for the delivery of security, economic development, infrastructure improvements and the provision of services, like education and health care.

The government’s system for indoctrinating its personnel includes extensive training, but fails to generate will among its personnel to act on behalf of the people in the communities where they work when faced with pressure not to do so, either from the insurgency, or from people in their ministry chains of command. Efforts to improve this situation have included the introduction of systems for monitoring and sanctioning behavior, but these have had limited results.

GIRoA is very top heavy, with 29 ministries. The district government positions are seldom completely filled in rural areas. Below the district level, it is very difficult to determine the extent to which funds generate services in villages and communities. GIRoA’s main goal is to deliver security, health, education and other services to the local level. The

district government center is the main vehicle for service delivery in each of Afghanistan's more than 401 districts, which contained 31,700 "communities".³⁶⁶ The district centers are run by governors appointed by the President of Afghanistan, who was, throughout the period under study, Hamid Karzai. Each district also has a representative from each of the line ministries. The governors have only loose coordinating roles, and formally lack authority over the representatives of other ministries in their province or district.³⁶⁷

The ministry representative who is most present in the daily lives of Afghans is the District ANP Chief, who is appointed, paid, trained, equipped, commanded and provided resources by the Ministry of Interior. Of secondary importance are the representatives of the Ministry of Health, who operates the local government health care clinics and the Ministry of Education representative, who operates all of the public schools in the district. Another important ministry representative is the Ministry of Justice's representative, who operates the courts in each district.³⁶⁸ Provincial and district departments of the ministries, as well as governors' offices, have virtually no discretionary spending power and limited input into planning. As a result, decisions about strategies, resource allocation, etc. are made at the national level with little input from district government personnel, let alone the residents of a district.

The underlying organizational problem for GIROA is the disconnect between its stated goals, as agreed to by the international community that provides its funding, and the goals of the leaders of the patronage networks who run GIROA. The goal of those leaders is to accumulate as much power and wealth as possible either to distribute its benefits to their

³⁶⁶ Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), "National SP Operations Manual Version Six," 2012, p. 7.

³⁶⁷ Lister, 2009. p. 994.

³⁶⁸ Frances Z. Brown. "The US Surge and Afghan Local Governance". Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2012. p. 13

clients in large, patronage organizations, or to keep it for themselves. Structurally, the patrons within the ministries create, “vertically integrated criminal organization(s) ... whose core activity is not in fact exercising the functions of a state, but rather extracting resources.”³⁶⁹ Karzai appoints Governors for their loyalty and ability to produce revenue and Fahim appoints District ANP Commanders for the same reason. The occupants of these positions then see the positions as a license to use the position to acquire money that flows down the system to projects, extract money from the population, and or participate in smuggling or other criminal activities. The governor or police chief will keep a portion of the funds acquired through these various activities, while passing another portion back up their chain of command.³⁷⁰ The entire system depends upon Karzai or Fahim or other patrons within the government protecting their subordinates’ right to participate in illegal activities, extract resources from the organization and from the local population. The goals of the patronage system’s extraction model run directly counter to those of the government and impede the government’s ability to cause its personnel to take the actions prescribed in its strategy.

Authority Systems: Elections, Patronage Networks and Competing Chains of Command

The right of the President of Afghanistan to govern through his ministries and governors is based on the idea that his election represents the will of the people of Afghanistan. As such, the international community believes the President of Afghanistan will be accountable to his electorate for fulfilling their basic needs to the extent where they will not rebel against the government. Although elections are intended to produce a

³⁶⁹ Sarah Chayes. *Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2015. p. 61

³⁷⁰ Chayes, 2015. p. 59

government that is accountable to the population, the lack of a well-developed civil society that connects voters to issues-based political parties has meant that voting has little impact on policy. Voting impacts which patron wins the elections, but not what that patron wants the government to do (other than deliver spoils to his followers). Beyond that, elections in Afghanistan have been very publically marred by electoral fraud, meaning that the outcome is not necessarily reflective of the will of the people to elect a particular patron.

The National Assembly is also elected, but has little power to hold the executive branches' ministries to account since it cannot appoint or remove ministers and it does not provide the funds for the operation of the ministries, the international community does. Provincial Assemblies have been elected, but also lack the power to affect the behavior of the governors or ministries at the provincial level or below. While district and even village and community council elections are mandated in the constitution, no elections have been held due to the entrenched resistance of President Karzai.³⁷¹

The authority system within the government is broken down along the lines of the different ministries. Each policeman is beholden to his commander, who is in turn beholden to the District Police Commander, who is in turn beholden to the Ministry of the Interior. Each teacher is beholden to his or her principal, who is in turn beholden to the Ministry of Education representative at the District Government Center, who is in turn beholden to the Minister of Education. In theory, the District Governor is supposed to manage the ministry representatives, but in reality, he is not. He cannot hire or fire them. He cannot influence their budgets and he has no real power to sanction them. He can only control their behavior through their superiors if they are also within the president's patronage network. For

³⁷¹ Brown, 2012. p. 10-11.

example, although the government mandates that the ANA provide assistance to the police as part of their mission to establish and maintain stability in Afghanistan, they often do not do so, but Provincial and District Governors cannot force them to do so.

The informal authority system that underlies the formal system is like a feudal system in which corruption begins at the top and where every member has to pay his superior and in turn requests payments from his subordinates.³⁷² The members of the patronage system within the government see their patron like a family patriarch who allows them to collect informal income through the positions he grants them in return for passing a portions of the spoils up the system to him. The more powerful you can make your patron, the more lucrative a position he can provide you.³⁷³ Because personnel are reliant on their patrons for their positions, they will do as their patrons tell them and not act counter to their patrons' interests, even if their licit positions indicate that they should do so.

Discipline and Informant System

The government's system for monitoring whether its personnel take the actions it prescribes in its strategy is weak and ineffective as a result of corruption throughout the government system. The leadership of GIRoA's commitment to ensuring its personnel take the actions required in its strategy is limited by its commitment to collecting illicit income from the system and distributing it to the various leaders' patronage networks.

³⁷² Antonio Giustozzi and Mohammed Isaqzadeh. *Policing Afghanistan: The Politics of the Lame Leviathan*. Columbia University Press, 2012. p. 89. From an interview with police mentors in 2006.

³⁷³ Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh, 2012. p. 79. From an interview with a police officer in Herat in 2010.

Under pressure from the international community, GIRoA has established various inspection organizations within various ministries. It has also established a separate court to address corruption cases. However, the inspection organizations are only as effective as the leadership of the ministries want them to be. Because the leadership of the ministries has an interest in disciplining its personnel only selectively, many of these organizations have amounted to little more than propaganda for the donor countries. For example, Minister of Interior Atmar (a Tajik Panshiri associated with the Supervisory Council of the North) built several organizations into the previously nearly non-existent inspections and internal affairs functions of the ministry. First, he created a set of six teams that could travel with Interpol to the provinces to investigate misconduct. Second, officers were added to the provincial staffs to conduct investigations of police misconduct. However, Minister Atmar must not have been particularly interested in using these organizations to identify and discipline police misconduct because he appointed Rohullah Raghیب as the MOI's Inspector General. When he was appointed Inspector General, Raghیب had already been accused of corruption. After he was appointed, the teams of inspectors were seldom deployed and there were almost no reports at all of police misconduct. During this period, Raghیب reportedly became very wealthy.³⁷⁴ When local informal leaders approach GIRoA officials at the district or municipal centers about the conduct of government personnel, the officials listen, but often do not communicate the information up the chain of command. Some officials take initiative and meet with communities in their mosques to discuss problems, but only on a case by case basis and not because this is required.³⁷⁵

GIRoA lacked a method for collecting information about its personnel's misconduct or failure to act. It could have punished wrong doers by firing them or imprisoning them for

³⁷⁴ Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh, 2012. p. 94

³⁷⁵ Field Notes, Researcher 1, Researcher 2 and Researcher 3.

offenses, but did not. Even proven misconduct simply resulted in the person being moved to a less desirable position. For that reason, GIROA provides few incentives for its personnel to take the actions it wants them to take and few disincentives for misconduct toward the population.³⁷⁶

Of Two Minds: GIROA's Internal Conflict and Lack of Will to Act

GIROA is of two minds: one is driven by illegal collection of money and power from the international community for personal or patronage network gain and the other is driven by the structure and goals of a rational-legal state. These two systems, one informal, and one formal, clash within the Afghan state, making its intent for its personnel's actions unclear. It is difficult for Afghan government personnel able to be "impartial" toward the population when their superiors are committed to using the state to collect funds for the narrow group to which they are partial. In particular, the *mujihadeen* patronage networks within the government use their positions in the state to compete with one another for power and to accumulate the wealth necessary to fight one another in the event of a state collapse or war.

Further, the idea of an impartial bureaucrat and the UN's interpretation of human rights are foreign to Afghan culture, leaving the government without a value system it can

³⁷⁶ Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh, 2012. p. 66.

use to inspire Afghan government personnel to take the actions the state intends. Since Afghans traditionally focus on building social, economic and physical security for their families, the strategy of deploying people to places far from their home community strips them of these for the benefits to their families and communities as a reason to act.

GIRoA fails to replace these communitarian motivations with a coherent, appealing ideology. The ideology it provides is foreign and there are large portions that are extremely unpopular among Afghans, like women's rights or the freedom of religion. And, the government places these weakly motivated personnel within a set of informal patronage systems designed to extract resources from the state and population and send them up the chain of command for redistribution to a narrow portion of the population. This system discourages personnel from taking actions prescribed in government regulations when they interfere with the collection of patronage. Finally, GIRoA's system of monitoring personnel actions and providing incentives for taking some actions and not taking others is weak because the heads of the various ministries benefit from the flow of money and patronage that are anathema to impartial bureaucracy.

Further, the patronage networks within GIRoA represent only narrow portions of the population of Afghanistan. As a result, the spoils they reap are not distributed broadly, generating grievances against GIRoA by large portions of the population. As a corollary, the patrons within GIRoA are socially accountable for providing government services to only a narrow portion of the population.

In this context, it is difficult to see how GIRoA will be able to implement its strategy to reach the revolutionary ends it seeks of providing security, protecting human rights,

providing educational and health services, and developing the Afghan economy without some revolutionary organizational changes.

CHAPTER 7 A Third Organization: The Wakil

Almost immediately upon the commencement of research in Kabul in 2010, it became evident that a third organization is engaged in the competition for control at the community level throughout Afghanistan: the Wakil. In all 11 of the communities under study in Kabul and Kapisa and in the surrounding communities,³⁷⁷ a local Wakil emerged as the most important political and social organization in the community.

In Afghanistan, communities are organized around the *mazjet* at the center of a set of houses whose residents it serves. In each of these communities, a Wakil has, from time immemorial, been selected by consensus of the male heads of each household to solve community problems. No matter what other organizations at the national or supranational level, like the Afghan monarchy, the Soviet Union, the *mujihadeen* militias, the Taliban or the current government, were doing or attempting to do, Wakils identified problems and worked with residents to solve them. As one researcher aptly put it, "In all of the provinces, in every place where there is a village... there is a Wakil. ... Every government that has come to power in Afghanistan cannot change the rule of the Wakil."³⁷⁸

The Wakils appear to be the traditional form of organization at the local level, but there is very little that has ever been written on them in English. One Pashtun language academic account of life in Kabul in 444 AD describes a leader, then called a neighborhood Kalantar,

³⁷⁷ Although funding was unavailable to complete the research in villages in Kandahar's Argandab District, pilot research identified Wakils in Pashtun villages there also.

³⁷⁸ 110614-Wakil Description-R3

“Every neighborhood had its own Kalantar. These Kalantars were selected based on their wisdom, knowledge, devoutness, piety and good reputation among the community members and they would continue to serve in their role as long as the people were happy with them. The duties and responsibilities associated with being a Kalantar were voluntary and without any material rewards. Kalantars resolved disputes between members of their communities, mobilized the community members to participate in national events, encouraged and prepared the youth to defend their homeland in the event of a war, helped the people in their neighborhoods with their wise advice on the organization of ceremonies held for celebration or mourning and gathered help for them whenever needed. In such cases, they acted as leading figures and caretakers of poor families and orphaned children. They also acted as the middlemen between their communities and government officials. The degree of trust people placed in these Kalantars was so great that, in some cases, they would not choose wives for their sons without consulting them first. And when a problem arose in a family, they would go to a Kalantar for advice.”³⁷⁹

This description fits almost exactly with the Wakils’ role at the community level. The significant role of consensus leaders in Afghan communities is not mentioned in the English language academic literature on Afghanistan.

Unlike the Taliban and GIRoA, the Wakil does not seek to impose a set of rules and a method for enforcing them onto the people of his community. The Wakil seeks instead to build consensus among the families of his community about problems they need to solve and how they should go about solving them. The Wakil acquires most of what he needs from his community, including funding, services, goods, personnel, information and sanctuary. And, in all of the communities under study, the residents provide those resources. When the Wakil asks the government or Taliban for support, he does so only in the context of the consensus of his community. The Wakil is a powerful organization precisely because he constantly seeks consensus among the heads of household in his

³⁷⁹ Prof. Syed Sa’aduddin Hashimi, *Zindagi Ijtimai wa Qabilawi dar Afghanistan*, (Kabul: Matba-e Pohantun, 1366) p.12-16 cited in Hameed Razaq. “Wakil-e-Gozaars’ Duties and their Relationship with Administrative Corruption.” Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2013.

community. He relies upon their agreement to generate orderly, unified, predictable behavior in his community.

The Wakils' power became evident when one compared life inside the communities of houses centered on a *mazjet* and governed by a Wakil and life in the chaotic streets beyond the reach of Wakils, where the government is the only organization acting to control the behavior of the population.

A Tale of Two Cities: Social Order and Social Disorder in Kabul

Kabul City experienced staggering social change between 2001 and 2011. The city's population grew from an estimated 500,000 in 2001 to an estimated 5,000,000 in 2011. In the wake of the Taliban's departure, refugees and displaced persons returned to Kabul. Simultaneously, a massive influx of migrants from other parts of Afghanistan flowed into a capital swollen with aid dollars. The population grew well beyond the existing, dilapidated housing stock and slews of homes were built illegally on government-owned land, without roads, water, electricity or other basic infrastructure. The rapid population growth, coupled with the boom produced by aid dollars, construction and government work, resulted in inflation in housing rents and food prices. An unstable mix of poor migrants from ethnic groups who fought one another during Afghanistan's civil wars resided in crowded neighborhoods where their different values and norms resulted in misunderstandings and conflict. General disorder, however, did not abound in Kabul City. In most of the sprawling city, there was a ponderous sense of order. That order was based on the system of Wakils, elders and Mullahs who established, negotiated and enforced that order. Despite the

diversity of the values, norms and sanctions in the communities under study, the system of social order in each community of houses is remarkably similar.

In Kabul, there are really two cities, an orderly city, which is made up of islands of stability, each anchored by a Wakil, and the chaotic city, where there are no Wakils. In this chaotic city, the government and its police are charged with providing order, but the government's inability to cause its personnel to act according to the organization's intent is constantly manifested.

The Chaotic City

Dust hangs in the blindingly bright air of Kabul as cars, pressed close together in seeming anarchy, make their way across crowded intersections lacking pavement and traffic lights. Traffic police occasionally wade into the traffic to direct parts of the seemingly ungovernable tangle of cars, trucks and horse drawn carts engaged in thousands of separate games of chicken, with each man asserting his honor in the face of the other drivers. The traffic police often retreat soon thereafter to stand and simply watch the unceasing, conflicting tides of cars. Burning trash smokes at the edge of cracked sidewalks as street vendors hock their wares and new migrants construct enormous mudbrick-based buildings that look like they might topple at any moment. Piles of dirt and construction material litter unpaved streets and trash floats down the open sewers that run along their edges. Dirty young children, *burkha*-clad women and old men run and walk alongside cars caught in the snarl of traffic, begging for money or attempting to sell cheap gum, pocket tissues and other trinkets. Young men in jeans and tee shirts hustle down the street alongside old men with

beards and white prayer caps, wearing Western-style waistcoats atop long sleeved cotton shirts that stretch to the knees of their crisp, cotton drawstring pants.

The markets, roads, and business centers of Kabul teem with life that is chaotic. It is impossible to know what might happen next as thousands of strangers interact in a place where the security of person and property are uncertain. The police are not respected by the people in the chaotic city, and do very little. Since the police are the sole providers of security of property and person in the chaotic city, their inaction leads to chaos. The police are well-paid and supplied with ample weapons and ammunition. And yet, they are unwilling to act to identify rule breaking and sanction it. As a result, they lack control and the city is characterized by anarchy.

The capacity of the police to govern is eroded by corruption related to organized crime and the impunity of government officials, their relatives and anyone with money. Thefts of property and assault are common and the police cannot be counted upon to intervene to protect the rights of Kabul's residents to security and property.³⁸⁰ Prostitution, the sale of alcohol and drugs, gambling and other illicit activities occur in these shared areas and are protected by the military, the police and high ranking government officials. International economic development funds drive an economy centered on lucrative and poorly regulated infrastructure contracts and the construction of high-rise buildings, many of which remain empty upon completion. Prostitution, and drug and alcohol sales drive

³⁸⁰ The data contain descriptions of the characteristics of thousands of individuals. The researchers identified a set of characteristics that are socially relevant in Kabul and described them for each person in each story. One of the characteristics is who provides them with security inside their community and outside. Consistently, inside their communities, neighbors provide one another with security. Outside their communities, people rely on the police. However, the data describe how each person's characteristics affect the likelihood that the police would come to their assistance if they were attacked. Police are unlikely to come to the assistance of a poor or powerless looking male if he is attacked because taking an action may get them in trouble. They are likely to come to the assistance of a rich or powerful looking male because not taking an action may get them in trouble.

popular dissatisfaction with the government because they are *haram* (forbidden in Islam). They also form the basis for the Taliban's argument that this government represents disorder, while they represent order and Islam. The people of Kabul associate the chaos of the markets, roads, and business centers of Kabul with government weakness and a lack of Islam. For the people of Kabul, these socially disordered spaces are a visceral, physical representation of the government's weakness and corruption.

At the root of this chaos is an inverted system of incentives for police to act when they see people breaking rules. If a policeman arrests someone and the suspect is related to someone "high ranking" or he is wealthy enough to bribe someone who is, the policeman could be fired, beaten and even arrested.

For example, one "high ranking" government official was driving his car very fast in the wrong direction down a one-way street in crowded central Kabul. He arrived at a traffic circle, where no one was expecting a car to enter the circle from the wrong direction, and careened into a taxi. The taxi driver was livid and the two men got into a fistfight because each blamed the other for the crash. The "high ranking" official believed that he could drive however he liked and that everyone should just get out of the way because he had more power than they did. This belief is deeply offensive to most of the residents of Kabul, who believe for the most part that being a true Muslim requires treating everyone equally, "as a human", and showing respect to everyone, rich or poor, weak or powerful.

A traffic policeman saw the accident and concluded the high ranking man was at fault because he was driving far too fast in the wrong direction down a one way street when he surprised a taxi driver by entering it from the wrong direction and slammed into the side

of the taxi. The “high ranking” man yelled at the traffic policeman and started hitting him. The enraged traffic policeman punched back and a second fistfight ensued.

The “high ranking” man refused to accept the judgment of the traffic policeman, so he called a high ranking police official and had the traffic policeman jailed. In jail, the police beat the traffic policeman until he agreed to apologize to the high ranking man and force the taxi driver to pay for damages to the “high ranking” man’s car. Afraid, the taxi driver paid for the damages to the much wealthier man’s car even though the accident was not his fault. The traffic policeman returned to his post on the circle the next day with two black eyes and various contusions and told people who asked what had occurred. The people who saw the accident concluded that the “high ranking man”, and by extension the government, were illegitimate because they acted solely in their personal interests, which they placed well above those of the people. They also concluded that “high ranking” people can get away with almost anything and that normal people should fear and avoid them.³⁸¹

Because of the lack of accountability of many “high ranking” people, when faced with someone violating the law, or someone in need of assistance, the police in the chaotic city evaluate on a case by case basis whether they should intercede or not. If someone has connections in government or is wealthy, the policeman could get in trouble for arresting them or for helping someone with whom this “high ranking” person had a conflict. When a policeman takes an action, it can lead to the loss of his job. Also, when policemen do not take action in the chaotic city, they are seldom held accountable (unless they fail to assist someone who is high ranking). So, as a policeman in the markets, roads, and business

³⁸¹ 101204-What Happened To Me-R8

centers of downtown Kabul, it is safer to do nothing than it is to do something. It is safer not to arrest people or break up fights than it is to do so.

Incentives for police not to act in the chaotic city are strongly reinforced by the involvement of “high ranking” police and government officials in organized crime. If a low ranking policeman arrests someone for theft, but that person is part of a gang that pays off the district police chief or his boss, then that policeman may lose his job. If the policeman knows the thief is part of a gang that pays “high ranking” people, he would know that he might lose his job if he arrests the thief, and he would know the perpetrator will be released if he arrested the man. While many police in Kabul might prefer to provide security and order, the incentives in the system are stacked against them.

In some cases, the incentives drive the police beyond inaction against crime and into organized crime. In some major markets in the city, the police are no longer welcome because of their participation in criminal and inappropriate behavior. One of the main *bazaars* in Kabul is comprised of hundreds of shops. In 2009, the police and army were stealing from shops, demanding bribes from shoppers and shop owners and harassing women in the *bazaar*. This situation became so bad that there were major protests and the shopkeepers went on strike for three days. The shopkeepers finally organized themselves into a business association and selected an older gentleman to represent them and defend their interests. The business association negotiated not with the Minister of Interior, who controls the police, but with the Minister of Justice, to ensure that no uniformed soldiers or policemen would be allowed into the bazaar. When there are serious problems with the police, the head of the business association goes to the Minister of Justice to complain and the minister has the police chastised. The business owners now have their own consensus-

based organization, sort of their own Wakil, in order to provide their own security and police and soldiers are not allowed in the *bazaar*. The worst of the problems with theft, bribes and harassment in the *bazaar* are now solved, though some pickpockets, colluding with the now exiled police, still prey upon shoppers. The pickpockets are not stealing from the stores and the shoppers are not deterred, so the business association is not too concerned about them.³⁸² However, in this case, which is emblematic of many others in Kabul, the police were not a source of order, but a source of disorder.

Participation in organized crime by the police is enhanced by the power of the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* patronage networks inside the Ministry of the Interior. Because of Fahim Khan's successful bid to take Kabul in 2001, his Tajik, Panshiri *mujihadeen* occupied the city and the Coalition of nations gathered at Bonn had no choice but to make him Minister of Defense and his colleague, Yanus Qanooni, Minister of Interior. From their earliest days, the police force in Kabul and the bureaucracy in the Ministry of the Interior have been intertwined with the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*. Fahim and Qanooni were forced out of government in 2004 when Karzai was elected and replaced them. But, much of the bureaucracy and many of the police were already associated with the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*. Fahim also maintained a powerful para-police force engaged in organized crime. The control of the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* over the Ministry of the Interior was reasserted after the 2009 elections, when Fahim Khan became Vice President of Afghanistan. In 2010, fellow *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* commander, Bismullah Khan Mohammadi, became Minister of the Interior for two years.

³⁸² 101215-What Happened to Me- R10

In sum, police participation in unfair, criminal and inappropriate behavior, demanding bribes and not providing security, have seriously undermined their legitimacy and control over the behavior of Kabul's residents. As a result, when faced with police behavior that is unfair or illegal, some residents will fight back against the police, generating additional chaos.

For instance, a plain-clothes policeman sat down in a communal taxi in Kabul called a Townes. A Townes is a large car whose capacity is about 15 passengers. The Townes cars travel from one pre-identified point to another pre-identified point in the city. The Townes drivers wait until there are enough people in the Townes to make the trip profitable for them and it is their decision as to when they leave. As one researcher described,

"Another boy, who was about 24 years old and wore black traditional clothes, sat down next to me and directed the Townes driver to go, even though there were only five people in the Townes. The driver told him the car was not full yet. Ten minutes passed and no one else came. Once again, the young man next to me told the driver to go. The driver became aggravated and repeated that he had to wait for more people. The driver told the passenger that if he really needed to go faster, then he should take a taxi instead because the Townes would wait for more people."

"The young man in black showed the driver an identification card indicating that he was a plain-clothes police officer and ordered the driver to go. The driver became upset and said, 'Even if you arrest me, I will not move from here until the car is full.' The policeman took out his handcuffs and said, 'I will show you!' The two men got out of the car. The policeman punched the driver. I got out of the car and grabbed the policeman's arms to stop him from hitting the driver. Another 25 year old boy, who had long hair and wore jeans and a black sweater, approached the Townes. He grabbed the driver to restrain him."

"The driver said, 'Okay, let me go. I will not take the policeman, but we can go.' I got back in my seat. Then, the driver took out a knife and stabbed the policeman in the thigh. The policeman ran away and the driver chased him and the policeman yelled that he would go get other police to come back." The driver got into the car and I told him to go. The new boy sat down next to me and the driver left."

“When I got home, it was very late and my mother was very sad. My phone was off and my mother had called, but had not been able to reach me. Mother asked why I was late because I am never late. Then I said, ‘Let me wash my face and then I will tell you.’ She brought me dinner and *chai* and I told her all of the stories about the chaos on my way home. Mother became very sad. She asked why people have to face problems like these. I said that all good and bad actions are from Allah.”³⁸³

Life in Kabul’s public spaces is chaotic and stressful because it is nearly impossible to predict what will happen next. The police do not enforce rules in a predictable manner and therefore people do not know what they can and cannot do in order to avoid sanction. People fear for their safety and the security of their property since the police cannot or will not guarantee it. The capriciousness of the police and the regularity of thefts, assaults and rapes is punctuated by high profile Taliban attacks on markets, government buildings and the airport, among other targets.

The Orderly City

At midday on a typical Friday in May of 2011, in one residential community in north central Kabul, a single deep stream of water flowed out of the *mazjet* where worshippers were performing ablution before Friday prayers. The water from their ritual purification rolled down the center of the dirt road outside the *mazjet*. As the *mazjet* grew distant behind it, the stream of water branched into many streams, flowing from the *mazjet* at the center of the community, toward the various corners of the neighborhood. A counter-veiling tide of men flowed from every corner of the neighborhood toward the *mazjet*. Every male over 14, who was not absent because of travel or illness, walked out of his house toward the *mazjet* in order to do what most of the men believed Allah made humans to do, pray. One such young man, dressed in a long sleeved, white, cotton shirt that stretched to

³⁸³ 110118-5 Police Actions-R3

the knees of his traditional, cotton drawstring pants, toyed with a string of prayer beads as he hurried to catch up with the growing group of men coming out of his street and merging with the men from other streets, all walking together toward the *mazjet* at the center of the community, greeting one another and asking after one another's well-being. At the *mazjet*, continuing to move in unison, the young man and the rest of the men would perform the most holy prayer of the week and hear the Mullah's weekly sermon. Each of these members of the community, young and old, Pashtun and Tajik, rich and poor, literate and illiterate, enters the *mazjet* and quietly stands waiting for the Mullah to enter and commence his weekly sermon. This week, the Mullah talked about a rule that members of the community must follow so that the community can maintain its unity, upon which its order is based. He said,

"Lying is the darkness of faith, and Allah will never forgive a liar because lying creates disunity that is harmful for the people and society. If you want the community to be strong, it must be unified. Do not lie because lies divide the people. Lies make people disagree and then the people of our community will not be united to help one another. If someone lies, the people from the area will not be united and they will not follow the rules of the Wakil because they will not agree on what happened. People who lie might say, 'We are all humans and we do not need to listen to the Wakil or elders of the area.' They say one thing in the face of the Wakil, and they say something else behind his back. These men create disorder and disunity, and Allah will never forgive them. When you do your work, you should not lie. All money earned through work based on lies is *haram*³⁸⁴, and Allah will not forgive the person who makes money from lies."³⁸⁵

The men of the community then prayed the Friday prayer together. They stood as one; prostrated themselves as one; and spoke the same rhythmic Arabic words as one single, unified, ordered congregation.³⁸⁶

³⁸⁴ Forbidden in Islam.

³⁸⁵ 110403-Mazjet Friday-R1

³⁸⁶ 110403-Mazjet Friday-R1

The chaos that characterizes life in the chaotic city stands in stark contrast to life in the Wakil-governed areas. The bedrocks of the system that underpins the orderly city are unity, patriarchal authority and accountability, coupled with the Wakil's ability to organize the community to expel people who behave in a disorderly manner. In each community, the male heads of the households who share a *mazjet* gather to select one among them who will be tasked with solving the problems of the people. This man, called the Wakil, selects elders who will assist him and identifies a Mullah, normally not a member of the community, who will live in the *mazjet* and serve the people as their guide in Islam.

By talking to members of the community, both in the *mazjet* and while strolling the streets and alleys of the community, the Wakil, elders and Mullah work together to identify problems in the community. They then develop possible solutions and offer them to the community for discussion and decisions.

In some cases, the Wakils organize projects to provide shared services for the community and collect the funds required to implement the project. For example, in an illegal settlement on a rocky bit of formerly uninhabited land in northern Kabul, there had never been any water piped into the area and, unlike many places in Kabul City, there is little well water available.³⁸⁷ The residents of this community are poor and the cost of the water carried in weekly on trucks is very high relative to their incomes. Between 2008 and 2011, the Wakil of the area repeatedly asked the government to install pipes to bring water to the houses or at least to install public pumps in the center of the community. In the context of massive aid flows, the government replied that there were many needs in Kabul

³⁸⁷ In many neighborhoods in Kabul City, residents have dug wells that provide their homes with water via hand or electric pumps. This water is generally not very clean, but it is better than going without water. However, this neighborhood is in a dry, rocky area, nestled up against a mountain.

City and limited resources. One of the community elders met someone from a private company with a reservoir that was atop a mountain near the community. This company agreed to install pipes connecting the reservoir to each of the houses in the community if each household paid 25,000 Afs³⁸⁸ and a monthly water usage fee. The elder brought this proposal to the Wakil and the Wakil and elders presented it to the community. The people discussed the problem and agreed that paying for the pipes themselves was the only way to get affordable access to water.

Accepting that the government would not provide them with water access, the community, through the Wakil and elders, took it upon themselves to purchase access from a private company. The Wakil and elders proposed, and the community agreed to, a plan for collecting the money. The plan included donations from the elders, Wakil and other wealthier members of the community. Widows were not asked to pay and the elders and the Wakil ensured poor families did not pay the full amount. The Mullah collected the money from each family and gave it to the elder who had identified the company. One week later, the company broke ground in the community to install pipes.³⁸⁹ The Wakil and elders supervised the work and when they raised concerns, the company addressed them. Within three weeks, all of the houses in the community had water. It was acquired inexpensively and quickly and the people of the community quipped about the government's corruption and weakness. The Wakil solved the problems of the people efficiently, bringing clean water to the community at a reasonable cost.

Wakils also enforce the rules of order, including prohibiting fighting, stealing, killing, etc. through their ability to expel people from the community. For example, a member of a

³⁸⁸ Equivalent of about \$375

³⁸⁹ 110614-Wakil Actions-R3

community on the northern edge of Kabul discovered his hen had been stolen. His neighbor's 16 year old son was notorious in the neighborhood for stealing things, lying, disobeying community rules, and generally harassing and annoying the people of the community. The owner of the hen suspected this boy had stolen his hen. The hen owner waited outside the door of the boy's family compound until the boy emerged carrying a container. The aggrieved man stopped the boy and demanded to see the contents of the container. The boy opened it to reveal the aggrieved man's hen among several other, presumably stolen, hens. The boy ran away, and the angry hen owner took his hen home and then walked to the *mazjet* where he found the Mullah and told him, "My neighbor's son stole my hen." The Mullah said, "There have been many complaints about this boy." The Mullah decided that he would talk about the problems caused by this boy after Friday prayer.

On Friday, the Mullah told the people that the son of one of the members of the community (whom he identified by name) stole a hen from this person (whom he also identified by name) and asked the people what the community should do about this bad action. The Mullah told the people that it was his opinion that if the boy continued to live in the community, then all of the people from the neighborhood would want to leave to live somewhere else because this boy had made the community so chaotic. However, if the people of the community remain in the area, the boy would want to run away because they would seek to punish him. The Mullah concluded that the boy should leave because he repeatedly behaved badly in the community. Some of the people stood and said that they would support whatever decision the elders, Wakil and Mullah made about this boy.

The Mullah asked the father of the boy, who was in the congregation, "Why do you not want to control your son?" The father said, "I have tried many times, and I told him not to steal, but he continues to do this behind my back. Whatever you want to do, I will agree with it."

People in the congregation told the Mullah that they wanted him to make a decision based on Islam about what to do. The Mullah said, "The boy should leave our community, or we should cut off his hand." The Mullah told the father to throw the boy out of his house, so that he would never do this bad action again.

The father of the boy stood in front of all the people gathered at the *mazjet* and said, "From when I was a young until now, I have not done any bad actions in this neighborhood. You know that I am a good person. I have tried to advise and discipline my son, but he will not listen. I throw my son out of my house. If he comes back, I will kill him." The people agreed with the decision of the father of the hen thief.

The Wakil told the people, "The father of the hen thief has thrown his son out of his house in our presence. Now, we must throw him out." The Wakil said that he would sanction anyone who helped the hen thief because the entire community had expelled him. The Wakil said, "We will kill him if he comes back."

The hen thief was not in the *mazjet* during the meeting. Later that day, someone who was present told the hen thief that his father and the community had cast him out; that if anyone helped the hen thief, he would be punished; and that if the hen thief

returned, his father would kill him. The hen thief was frightened that his father or the people of the community might hurt or kill him if he did not leave, and he fled to Iran.³⁹⁰

In this case, a resident reported a violation of the rules of the community, the rules of Allah and the laws of Afghanistan to the Mullah, who is a member of the Wakil organization, and the organization ensured the community agreed upon how the violator should be sanctioned. The perpetrator was so sure the Wakil would follow through with the sanction, acting to throw the boy out of the community, that he fled the impending sanction.

In many cases, the advice of the Wakil, elders and Mullah can change the behavior of a member of the community. For, example, in a very poor neighborhood on the eastern edge of Kabul City, a father had become abusive to his family and they did not know how to solve the problem. The father was an alcoholic who beat his family and destroyed their belongings when he was drunk. He had become so violent that his grown sons, who still lived at home, had built him a separate apartment and furnished it for him so that he would be less able to hurt them and their mother when he was drunk. In a drunken rage, he destroyed all of the new furniture his sons had bought him. During the winter of 2011, the sons of the violent alcoholic finally went to ask the Wakil for help. They told him that their father drinks all of the time and then he does things that are wrong. They asked the Wakil what they should do. He told them to come to the *mazjet* on Friday with their father so they could meet with the elders and solve the problem.

³⁹⁰ 110110-Rules in My Neighborhood-R3

On Friday, the man and his sons met the elders and the Wakil at the *mazjet*. The Wakil advised the father that he is the father of a family, and that he therefore must not do these things. As a father, he is supposed to be an example to his children. The Wakil said, “If you have economic problems, we will help you will solve them. But, why do you do these bad things to your family?” The man listened and considered what the Wakil was saying. He knew that if he did not accept the advice of the Wakil, everyone in the community would shun him. So, he accepted the advice and he changed.

He does not drink anymore and he goes to the *mazjet* as often as he can in order to repair his broken reputation. His name had become bad in the community during the period when he was drinking. The Wakil’s success in solving the seemingly intractable and very delicate problem with the violent, alcoholic father made people in his community confident that he could help solve their problems. After this incident, if people had a problem, even if it was a very sensitive matter, they went to the Wakil because they believed he could solve it.

The Wakil’s advice is particularly effective because the threat of a future sanction, like being thrown out of the community, is normally preceded by advice. When someone breaks a rule, the Wakil visits his home and advises him not to do what he had done again because it is un-Islamic and Allah will be angry with him. The Wakil explains that if the perpetrator continues to violate the rule, eventually, the Wakil will have to throw him out of the community.

The Wakil lacks the ability to do so if the perpetrator is “high ranking”, related to someone “high ranking” or wealthy enough to bribe the government to prevent the Wakil

from expelling him from the community. So, this Islamic advice is very important in convincing people who do not have to comply to comply.

For instance, in one of the communities in central Kabul City, a very wealthy man drank wine almost every night. The man provided money to assist the *mazjet*, but he did not attend prayers there. One week, during his Friday sermon, the Mullah mentioned the man by name and said the man was a very good man but he did not come to the *mazjet*. Several days later, most of the men of the community were walking out of the *mazjet* after evening prayers when suddenly, the man drove his car past the front of the *mazjet* very fast and stopped it in front of his nearby home. The man got out of his car and stumbled around. He was very drunk. The Mullah called to him and asked him why he had not come to the *mazjet* to pray. The man tried to respond, but could not speak correctly and then the Mullah knew that he had drunk wine. One of the elders of the area said to take the drunk man into the *mazjet*. The Mullah said the drunk man could not enter the *mazjet* because he was unclean because he had drunk wine. So, the elders and Mullah advised him there out in front of the *mazjet*, where many people from the community could hear them. One elder said, “You help *mazjet*. You were a good person. Why do you drink wine? Is this new? Did you do this in the past?” The Mullah told the man that he should not drink wine because maybe the elders will make a bad decision toward him – like turn him in to the government for breaking the law. The Mullah said, “If you died now, Allah would never forgive you because you are drinking wine. People won’t be able to pray for you at your funeral because they would be made unclean by your *haram* action.” He said, “You need to come to the *mazjet* and avoid drinking wine.” So, the man accepted the advice of the Mullah and the elders and said he would no longer drink wine.³⁹¹

³⁹¹ 110110-Rules in my Neighborhood-R3

In Kabul, it is an organization based on community consensus, the Wakil, that differentiates the orderly city from the chaotic city. Because of the Wakils' control over residents' behavior, the residents of the orderly city can expect that their neighbors will not attack them, steal from them or harass their daughters or wives. The members of the community develop and therefore normally concur with the rules and sanctions and are usually consulted when the Wakil plans to expel someone. Most people simply obey the rules of the community, however, because when they do not, the Wakil holds the head of the violator's household accountable for the misbehavior of any of its members. The Wakil advises him that the violation is against the rules of the community, and informs him that the entire family will be expelled if the misbehavior continues. If it does continue, the Wakil normally calls a community meeting to discuss the Wakil's proposition that the community should expel the rule breaker's entire family.

When problems arise, residents can seek the assistance of their Wakil. The Wakil and elders can propose new rules for the community, punish people for violating rules, collect money from residents to solve problems, and negotiate with outsiders (including the government and Taliban) on behalf of residents of their community to settle disputes.

However, the Wakils seldom had access to resources from the government to solve these problems. After ten years of massive international aid flows to the government of Afghanistan, even the communities in the capital city of Kabul had serious water, electricity, road and sewer problems. On behalf of their communities, Wakils requested assistance from the government to solve these infrastructure problems, but their requests were normally met with the claim that the government did not have the resources to assist them.

As a result, the Wakils of these communities often collect money from their residents to hire private companies to repair or install public infrastructure.

Residents of each of the communities under study are accountable to their Wakil because they need his assistance and because the Wakil can have them arrested and or have their family thrown out of the community. When people from outside the community, such as the police, bureaucrats, gangsters, or young people enter a community, they bring disorder. They do so because they are not accountable to the community for their behavior. Wealthy residents of the community and those with connections to high-ranking government officials are also unaccountable to the community and are seen as a source of disorder because they are not accountable to the Wakil.

Upon leaving their well-ordered communities, residents interact with people who are not accountable for their behavior. Outside of his community, every resident is freed from accountability to his community leaders and the government fails to hold people accountable to a set of rules protecting property and physical security. As a result, almost anything can happen. People fight with one another and the police. People steal things from one another, sometimes with police complicity. The police and military get in scuffles with one another. Wealthy and powerful people who are totally unaccountable can kill someone and not be arrested or they can have police who challenge them fired or incarcerated. Terrorists and insurgents assault or blow up hotels, market streets, ministries and embassies.

A Unified Consensus of Patriarchs within Islam: the Wakils' Vision

The Wakils seek to generate a compassionate, orderly, world in their communities. They want the residents of their communities to be able to expect that their fellow residents will not intentionally do anything to harm them; that they will assist them in whatever way they can; and come together to provide support for shared needs. The Wakils want their residents to feel like part of a corporate whole, working to promote the interests of the families that comprise it.

Islam provides a template for uniform behavior by members of the community, bringing them together to pray several times per day, mandating that they greet and assist one another, and prohibiting various actions that have negative consequences for others. One Wakil aptly described it on the first day of Eid at the end of Ramadan in July 2014, saying,

“Allah bless you and Allah accept your fast and bless you and forgive your sins. Ramadan is a good month. It is a healthy month. It is good in the Koran. It is a month of unity. Saying 30 *rakats*³⁹² at night makes people unified. They stand side by side. It shows their unity. It means they are all together and they respect each other and they cannot hate the people who are to their left and right. At night, if someone leaves to watch television or listen to music, Allah will not help him. If he prays instead, he will help him. On the morning of Eid, people wash their bodies and perfume themselves and wear new clothes. It is like a person who goes on the Hajj because it is like he is new. He wears white clothes. This was a good month. All of the people fasted. All of the people came to the *mazjet* at night. All of the people showed their unity. No one killed people in the village, not even the Taliban. There were a few problems in this month. I hope Allah helps all of you.”³⁹³

³⁹² Normally, night prayers include 10 *rakats*, but during Ramadan, they include 30, making nighttime prayers much longer. A *rakat* is an iteration of the sequence of Muslim prayer.

³⁹³ 140728 Community Narrative R3

Unity includes a shared understanding of problems and threats that is reinforced by constant interaction. In the community the Wakil envisions, men pray in the community *mazjet* as many times as they can without sacrificing their ability to provide for their families. This brings them together with their Wakil, Mullah, elders and neighbors between 3 and 5 times per day. In the ideal world of the Wakil, these men greet one another and discuss their lives and how they can help one another. When they notice someone breaking the rules of Islam or other rules of the community, the residents either advise the violator not to continue this behavior or they report the violation to an elder, the Mullah or the Wakil.

While residents of this ideal world advise one another, they do not force anyone else to practice Islam. Wakils, Mullahs and elders admonish residents to behave well, providing examples of how Islam makes them good, happy and lucky. Residents of this world treat one another as “humans” who have the right to be treated with compassion and respect. People in the Wakil’s ideal world do not obey the rules, refraining from fighting, harassing people, and stealing; greeting and assisting their neighbors; attending prayers and happiness and sadness parties; etc. because they are forced to. They do so because they want to.

In the world the Wakils seek to perpetuate, the Wakil protects the system of patriarchal authority and family honor (over individual rights). At the center of any family’s honor is the belief in the shared patrilineal origin of its sons. If a family cannot guarantee the paternity of its male children, it brings great shame upon the family. Questionable paternity suggests the family does not have control over its own members’ behavior and calls into question the loyalty and reliability of all its members. Public perception of these

weaknesses puts the family's ability to defend its property, interests and members into question and therefore opens it to possible attack from other groups.³⁹⁴

Every family therefore places great emphasis on protecting the chastity and virtue of its wives, sisters and daughters, controlling where they go, with whom they interact, what they wear, whether or not they attend school, whom they marry and whether or not they get a job. If a family cannot control the females within it, the family appears to everyone else as weak and vulnerable to attack.

There is also an economic motivation for controlling female behavior. When a family wants to find a bride for one of its sons, the father of the family begins to evaluate the different cousins and other eligible girls, normally not within the same village or community. The father of the groom to be then approaches the father of the potential bride to negotiate a bride price that the father of the groom will pay to the father of the bride. Between 2010 and 2015, the prices were between 200,000 Afs and 1,000,000 Afs.³⁹⁵ The father of a potential groom is unlikely to approach the father of a girl whom people suspect has had relationships with boys because if people suspect this is true, then they will not believe the children, and most importantly the sons, belong to the patrilineal family of the groom. So, issues of honor overlap with economic interests in protecting the chastity of daughters and sisters. The Wakil normally does not intercede in these matters or the other matters pertaining to controlling the behavior of family members.

The Wakil respects and reinforces the fact that each family household is led by a single patriarch who is responsible for his behavior and the behavior of every person under

³⁹⁴ Philip Carl Salzman. *Culture and Conflict in the Middle East*. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2008. p. 10-12.

³⁹⁵ Between approximately \$3,000 and \$15,000.

his roof. The patriarch provides everyone in the family with a home, food, money and security. As a result, every person is accountable to his or her patriarch. When someone in the community breaks a community rule, aggrieved residents often visit an elder or the Wakil to complain. Then, the elders and Wakil visit the head of that person's household and "advise" the patriarch that a member of his family has broken one of the community rules. The Wakil and elders ask the patriarch to "control" his son, daughter, brother or wife and ensure that he or she does not break the rule again. Receiving "advice" implies that the patriarch does not have control over the behavior of the members of his family and that if he cannot correct that behavior, he is weak in the eyes of the elders and Wakil. The advice is generally not given in public, so that the head of the household has the opportunity to demonstrate that when he has information, he can control his family members. Sometimes, the head of the household will ask the rule breaker to come apologize to the elders and Wakil before they depart.

Then, the Wakil and elders depart, leaving the patriarch to punish the rule breaker. In most cases, the patriarch physically beats the rule breaker. If the person violates the rule again, the Wakil and elders will advise the father that if it occurs again, the family will be thrown out of the community. At this point, the father can decide to throw the violator out of his house, as the father of the hen thief did. By doing so, a father can keep his family in their home in the community. However, the family will be perceived as weak because the father was unable to control the behavior of the members of his family.

A family's honor can be challenged by someone attacking a member of the family or stealing their belongings. In these cases, the norms of protecting honor would dictate that the male members of the family attack and punish whomever questioned their honor in this

way. The Wakils' ideal community provides families the ability to defend their honor. However, the Wakil would like the victimized family to come to the Wakil, who will then work to repair the honor of the family by sanctioning the perpetrator.

The Wakils throughout the communities under study have differing opinions about social change, knowledge, watching television, using the internet, wearing modern clothes, etc. Some of the Wakils seek to limit contact between their traditional communities and the rest of the world, preserving the unity of the values of the families. Others do not do so.

In general, Wakils seek to improve the income and services available to their communities and assist residents in getting jobs and expanding their capacity. However, they are also concerned about the potential negative impacts of excess wealth, which they associate with people beginning to engage in *haram* activities which they would never have had the time or money to engage in prior, like smoking opium or hashish.

The focus of the Wakils remains solidly on unity, and all of these other factors, allowing the families to preserve their honor, allowing people to enjoy contact with the outside world and prosper, are things they tolerate to extent they need to in order to maintain unity.

In the world the Wakils seek to create, the people of their communities trust one another and their Wakil. They trust him enough to provide him, his elders and his Mullah with information about problems in the community, about people breaking community rules and about the presence of the government or the Taliban there. In this world, the Wakil is the information broker, carefully deciding when and how to approach the

government or the Taliban to assist him in solving problems. He seeks to leverage their resources so that he can access the resources of outside organizations, and he would like the residents to provide him resources toward this end. But, as with everything else, not at the expense of the unity that is his strategic goal and the source of his power. He envisions a world in which unity among his people makes them more powerful as a corporate whole, working together, sharing a clear view of what is going on in their shared space, and developing a plan for what to do about it, than they would be alone, facing the tides of these better resourced organizations.

Rules to Bring this World into Being

The specific rules of the Wakils vary by community since they are developed by consensus, but they can be summarized into general categories that Wakils in all of the communities work to enforce.

For the Wakils, one of the most important rule sets consists of rules designed to generate unity. In each community, Wakils require that adult males attend prayers at the community *mazjet* as many times per day as possible. Wakils also require that people attend and assist their neighbors with what Afghans call “happiness and sadness parties”. These events include weddings, births, funerals, etc. and involve many tasks and many guests coming to visit the family in question. The Wakils require that members of their communities assist one another in these instances and admonish them to help their neighbors whenever their neighbors have other problems. Many Wakils further require that male residents say hello and how are you whenever they see another male resident. All

Wakils require that all adult male residents to attend meetings the Wakil calls at the *mazjet* to discuss problems and arrive at consensus on solutions to them.

A second set of rules all Wakils share governs residents providing resources to the Wakil. When a community decides upon a project, or needs to pay the Mullah's salary, or purchase goods and services for the *mazjet*, the Wakil asks each household to pay its share. All households must do as they are asked if they have the funds. If they are too poor, the Wakil will normally ask someone in the community who is wealthier to provide their share. Additionally, when a project the community agreed upon or the *mazjet* needs labor, all adult male residents must provide labor. According to the Wakils' rules, when residents encounter a problem, or they see someone breaking a community rule, the residents must provide the information to the elders, Mullah or Wakil before any other organization. This rule is of particular import because members of the community can provide that information to any organization in an effort to leverage its coercive force against any other organization or individual; or they can withhold it, if they disagree with the goals or actions an organization would use the information to achieve. With this information, the Wakil can maintain control. Without it, he cannot. Finally, the Wakil requires that all residents provide him access not only to the streets and common areas of the community, but to their homes. The Wakil is the only male who has the right to enter every home in his community. Normally, access to homes is severely restricted because the house is where females spend most of their time and males to whom they are not related by blood or marriage pose a threat to family honor.

Another set of rules shared across the Wakils prohibit actions that are damaging to other people, like fighting, killing, theft, adultery (which includes pre-marital and extra-marital sex), harassment of women.

This set of rules prohibiting negative externalities overlaps with another set of rules shared across the Wakils, those which are part of Islam. In addition to those listed above, the rules of Islam prohibit the consumption of alcohol and narcotics, pornography, incest, gambling, etc.

Finally, the Wakils have rules regarding interaction with outside organizations. Per the Wakil, if a resident wants to join the Afghan National Security Forces or the Taliban, they need his permission. Additionally, the Wakil mandates that people refrain from providing these organizations with information about people violating that organization's rules. If people in the community have a problem, they need to bring it to him, not give it to some other organization which may come into the community and cause havoc. Finally a Wakil normally develops rules about interacting with these organizations in the community. Antagonize them or do not. Attack them or do not. As with all of the rules, to ensure people comply, the Wakil develops the specifics in conjunction with the members of the community in meetings in the *mazjet*.

Personnel

Wakil organizations are comprised of a Wakil, elders and a Mullah who work together to solve the problems of their community. The Wakil and elders are always residents of the community, but the Mullah is often someone hired by the Wakil from

outside the community. This assures the Wakil controls the narrative about what constitutes Islam, which is the value system upon which his ability to maintain unity rests.

The members of the Wakil organization are selected because they have knowledge of the problems of the community, knowledge of Islam and knowledge of how to solve problems within Afghanistan's social system. They are selected for their positions because their fellow residents see them as strong, fair, discrete, holy and intelligent. The particular combination of traits for Wakils and elders varies based on the values of each community. In communities in central Kabul, residents value knowledge from modern education more than they do in the rural communities under study. In those rural communities, knowledge based on experience is more highly prized when selecting elders and a Wakil.

Paramount among these personnel is the Wakil. In nearly every place where there are more than a few houses huddled together, Afghans select through consensus a Wakil whose job is to solve the problems of the people. Communities in Afghanistan are centered on a *mazjet* that males in the community use for daily prayers. With few exceptions, each adult male in these communities prays between two and five times per day in their community *mazjet*, interacting with his male neighbors, listening to the Mullah's Friday sermon, praying together and reciting the Koran, and discussing problems in the community and possible solutions to them. In all 11 of the communities under study, the *mazjet* has served as the center of not only community religious activity, but also community political activity.

A Wakil is a man selected by consensus of the male heads of households in his community. In his efforts to solve community problems, the Wakil can gather resources

from them; ask for resources from other organizations (like the government, Taliban, militias, criminal organizations, NGOs); propose new rules and sanctions to the community; and enforce those rules (once they are accepted in a community meeting). Importantly, Wakils can organize local residents to defend their area or to expel a resident. A Wakil also settles disputes between members of his community and represents members of his community to people outside of his community, including the government. The Wakil is a person who represents his community, is empowered by its members and is accountable to them. If a Wakil fails to adequately solve the problems of the community or behaves in a corrupt or inappropriate manner, he can be replaced as Wakil by a consensus of the male heads of the community households.

The selection of a Wakil for an illegal settlement built on unoccupied land in Kabul provides insight into why Afghan communities believe they need a Wakil and how they go about selecting one. On a gravel-strewn hillside near Kabul airport, several families began to build houses illegally. After two months, there were eight families and they began to have problems. They needed someone to represent them to the government and to other communities and to resolve property disputes between residents. Also, the families were praying in their houses and they wanted to build a *mazjet*. So, they called a meeting and held it in one of the new homes. The people said they needed to find someone who was educated and experienced so he would know how to solve the problems of the community. They agreed that they needed to choose from the five people who were educated. Each person wrote the name of the candidate they wanted to be Wakil on a piece of paper. When the Wakil was selected, he stood and told the people,

“I do not want to be the Wakil, but thank you for trusting me. I will be responsible in this area. I will give a good position to all of the other candidates. I will make them the elders because maybe they know more

than me. I don't want them to be unhappy. If you agree with them, then they will be my elders.”

The Wakil was a Tajik from Parwan whose son fought for Massoud. During their reign, Pashtun people occupied the family's land and claimed it was theirs. So, he moved to the Panshir Valley until the Taliban was overthrown in 2001. When he tried to return to Parwan in 2003, he and his fellow villagers found their homes and farms had been totally destroyed by the Pashtuns who had fled when the Taliban was overthrown. These villagers decided they would have more luck trying to start over in Kabul and moved there. They found the empty land and began to build houses there. The Wakil was 67 years old when he moved to Kabul and became the Wakil in 2003. He could read and write because he had studied until the 6th grade as a child in Parwan. The people accepted him and the elders and the people felt they had a real community, not just a set of houses on a rocky hillside.

When representatives of the government saw the houses, they approached the people and said, “You made houses here? This is the government's land.” The Wakil told the bureaucrats, “The Taliban had destroyed our houses in Parwan and there was a desert here with feral dogs and we built houses here. We know the houses are illegal, but maybe every Afghan is illegal. Everyone can build a house in the desert. It had no benefit for the government.” They all went to the District Police Station together. The head of the police station was a Tajik from northern Afghanistan and he was a good man. The Wakil told him, “I want to be Wakil because I want to be responsible for my area.” The elders explained to him how and why they had chosen this man as their Wakil. The police commander said he was very happy about how the community had chosen their Wakil. He said, “If the people are happy, I am happy. Maybe if they build more houses in Community 3, we will send

police there to provide security.”³⁹⁶ By selecting a Wakil, the people legitimated their illegal settlement in the eyes of the government.

The contested agricultural community on the southern edge of Kabul City provides an example of how Wakils are chosen when a sitting Wakil dies. The selection of this Wakil occurred during the reign of the Taliban and demonstrates the power that communities had to choose their own Wakils even in the context of an organization with vastly greater resources and the demonstrated ability to translate them into coercive force.

In 1996, the 85-year old Wakil died. He was a semi-literate, Tajik farmer whose family has owned large swathes of land in the community for generations. Like many families that own large tracts of agricultural land on the edge of Kabul City, the Wakil’s family is wealthy. The members of the Wakil’s family manage the farm and the old Wakil himself had never held a job other than Wakil. The family hires farmers to farm their land and sell their crops. These farmers tend the crops and harvest them in return for a portion of the produce, which they sell to merchants at the markets in Kabul City.

When the old Wakil died, the Taliban told the residents they must hold a meeting to select a new Wakil. All of the male residents, young and old, rich and poor, gathered in the *mazjet* to select the new Wakil, along with the community elders and Mullah. Several Taliban fighters attended the meeting. All in all, there were about 300 people in attendance.

The Taliban fighters nominated a Taliban supporter who had recently moved to the community as a nominee for Wakil. The Taliban candidate was a 45 year old Pashtun who

³⁹⁶ 110514 Wakil Description R3

wore traditional Pashtun clothes and a long beard. He looked like a Taliban fighter, but he was a property dealer who made about 25,000 Afs per month. He prayed five times a day in the community *mazjet* and gave charity. The people did not know him well and believed his candidacy was an effort by the Taliban to take over their community.

Villagers believed that the son of the Wakil was a good candidate for several reasons. First, he was the son of the old Wakil. He therefore understood the requirements of the job and they felt he would perform the job like his father had done. Second, he was born and raised in the community, so residents knew him well and knew what to expect of him. Third, he was wealthy enough that no one could bribe him. Fourth, he was well educated since he had attended college in England. Fifth, he had a deep knowledge of Islam. Additionally, most people in the community knew the son of the Wakil opposed the Taliban and would be able to interact with them without drawing attacks from them or giving away more of residents' rights than necessary. For all of these reasons, the residents felt confident that he would be willing and able to solve the problems of the people.

The community Mullah, whose family has lived there for generations, was nominated to introduce the qualifications of the candidates. He described each of them and how they differed from one another. Then, the Mullah gave each resident at the meeting a piece of paper and told him to write the name of the candidate he selected on it. The Mullah then collected the votes and counted them. The Wakil's son won with roughly 200 votes, against 100 votes for the Taliban candidate. The Mullah reported the results of the election to the people and declared that the son of the old Wakil was the new Wakil for the community. He remained Wakil in 2011.

The day after his election, the Wakil called another meeting in the *mazjet* to reiterate the rules and regulations of the community to the people. He told them, "If we see anyone smoking hashish in the area, we will punish him or if someone commits adultery, we will punish him or throw him out of the community. If anyone steals, he will be turned over to the Taliban. Also, inviting musical groups to play in the community is prohibited." This action clarified for the people that the rules that had existed under the old Wakil persisted under the new Wakil.³⁹⁷

The villagers were able to defy the Taliban in its effort to impose a Wakil upon them because the election of a Wakil by residents is an accepted form of local governance in Afghanistan. Perhaps the Taliban feared their candidate would not be legitimate enough to control the population of the community.

Every Wakil has elders who assist him in his tasks. Sometimes, as in the community described above, the Wakil selects his own elders. But, in most communities, elders are already in place who were selected by the outgoing Wakil. An incoming Wakil has no choice but to accept these elders, as long as the community has faith in them. Elders serve as deputies to the Wakil, talking to residents, identifying problems and assisting the Wakil in devising and then executing solutions to them. Because the elders work so closely with the Wakil and residents, they can serve as a check on the power of the Wakil. In the cases where a Wakil has been replaced against his will, elders have organized his removal with the support of the residents.

³⁹⁷ 110530-Wakil in the Russian Period-R2

In all but one of the 11 communities, the Mullah is someone the Wakil hires who is not a resident of the community. The Mullah in these communities lives in the *mazjet* the community has built and maintains. His family lives elsewhere and the Mullah sends the wages he receives back to his family. The Mullahs in the communities under study are provided free room and board and make between 5,000 and 30,000 Afs per month. The Wakil ensures the Mullah's wages are collected from the congregation and it is the Wakil's job to maintain the *mazjet*.

The Mullah is the people's guide in Islam. Older Mullahs have little formal Islamic education, but younger Mullahs normally attended at least a government *madrassa* for 14 years. Many of the Mullahs have attended an Islamic University in Pakistan (where many Afghans spent significant time as refugees), or Kabul University's Department of Theology.

Mullahs call the members of the community to prayers five times per day. They stand at the front of the *mazjet* and pray with the people, providing an example of the proper practice of daily prayers. Everyday (except Friday), the Mullah in each of the communities spends several hours educating local children about Islam. In the evening, he sits in the *mazjet* and discusses Islam, especially the stories of the life of the Prophet Mohammad, with the people gathered there. People come to the *mazjet* before and after each time of prayer to ask the Mullah for his advice based on Islam. Often the Wakil and or elders are there with the Mullah, discussing the problems of the community and they also provide advice.

On Friday, the Mullah gives a sermon on any topic he chooses. Sometimes, he will discuss Islamic practice, like how to properly pray or perform ablution or give charity.

Sometimes, he will tell stories of the lives of the prophets. Sometimes, he will admonish people not to commit various sins. And, sometimes, he will make political statements about the elections or suicide attacks or joining political parties. At other times, as when a preacher in Texas burned a Koran in 2011, he will tell his congregation what Islam says about how they should respond to an affront that could lead to rioting and attacks on foreigners in Afghanistan.

Methods of Implementation

Together, the Wakil, elders and Mullah form a team that nurtures unity, collects information about problems and works to solve them through community consensus. As mentioned earlier, the Wakil, Mullah and elders attend every daily prayer and therefore see nearly every adult male member of their community several times per day at the *mazjet*. They greet and engage each member. They are available to advise each about his problems. Additionally, the Wakil and elders walk around their community, informally patrolling to identify problems and talk to people they meet along the way.

Through this ceaseless information gathering, the Wakil, elders and Mullah identify problems in the community and meet several nights a week to discuss potential solutions to them. When the Wakil thinks a problem requires a solution, he calls a meeting of all of the male heads of household in the community to discuss the matter. The Wakil raises the problem and asks the people in the *mazjet* whether they have ideas for how they can solve the problem. The Wakil, elders or Mullah often raise some of the solutions they have discussed. Then, people discuss the pros and cons and arrive at a consensus about a solution. As mentioned earlier, the problems include everything from infrastructure to

disorderly behavior and Wakil can propose projects, collect money, organize labor, suggest a rule and sanction or impose one.

An example of a Wakil making a rule to solve a problem related to disorder is instructive. In the community built illegally on government land in northern Kabul City, there had been a number of fights after people hired bands to come and play at wedding parties, where people listened to music and danced, and some even drank alcohol. Finally, there was an incident that caused the Wakil to propose that bands not be allowed to play at parties in the community. There was a wedding party and the family of the groom hired a band to play for the men.³⁹⁸ Many of the men in the community were dancing at the wedding party and some of them appeared to have been drinking. One of the older, wealthy wedding guests was dancing with a young, handsome man from the community. The older man took out some money while the boy was dancing and waved the money in a circle around the boy's head. This action indicates to people that the boy is his "playboy" or boyfriend. In some circles in Afghanistan, wealthy, powerful older men have young, handsome boyfriends. These "playboys" are almost like the property of the older man. Having a "playboy" shows how powerful and wealthy the older man is. The older man is demonstrating that money is nothing to him (because he has so much of it) and that this handsome boy would rather be with him than have a wife. While these relationships demonstrate the honor to the older man, they bring great shame on the family of the young boy because he is like a woman. His family was too weak to raise him and take care of him, so he belongs to a man who has sex with him. It is a great shame for a family when one of its sons is a "playboy".

³⁹⁸ Women attend a separate happiness party that is normally held in a separate house.

The cousin of the young man who was dancing was an enemy of the older man. He was very angry that his cousin was bringing shame on the family by appearing to be the playboy of an older man and especially this older man. So, the cousin got a gun and shot his dancing cousin in the leg because he had allowed this older man to wave money around him when he danced. Both the enemy and the cousin ran away after the shooting and began fighting one another with knives. The Wakil took the injured dancing boy to the hospital and no one called the police because they would have made the situation worse.

Many of the men from the community had been at the party and had witnessed the violence. During the week, the people of the community had talked about how this was a horrible incident. On the following Friday, the Wakil called a meeting in the *mazjet* to discuss it. The Wakil and Mullah told the people that in Islam, you are not supposed to listen to music and that this incident demonstrated why. Listening to music leads to other bad behaviors, like drinking and fighting with guns and knives. The people in the *mazjet* voted to not allow bands to come to parties in the neighborhood anymore. The people agreed that people could listen to whatever they want in their own homes, but that music at parties caused people to fight. In this case, the Wakil and the Mullah organized people to solve the problem of drinking and fighting at parties in the neighborhood by proposing a rule to the people that they accepted.³⁹⁹

The main method the Wakil organization uses to sanction people who break its rules is to advise them on the first violation and then expel them from the community on the second violation. Advice is intended to convince the violator that it is wrong for him to break the rule and that he should refrain from doing so. But, it is coupled with a threat to

³⁹⁹ 110614-Wakil Actions-R3

throw the person out of the community if the behavior continues. In some cases, the violation is serious enough that the person needs to be expelled from the community.

The community can also organize to physically throw people out of the community without police assistance. In the traditional agricultural community on the southeastern edge of the city, one of the residents had left a cow grazing in his field to go home to eat lunch. When he came back, the cow was gone. When no one found the cow for days, people assumed it had been stolen. One of the boys from the community went to his neighbor's house to borrow something and he saw the missing cow. The boy went to the cow's owner's house and told the owner that he had seen the cow at the farmhouse he had visited. The owner of the cow knocked on the door of the house where his cow was being kept. When the owner of the house came out, the owner of the cow said, "You stole my cow." The owner of the house denied that he had stolen the cow. The cow's owner said, "Let me check your house and if I don't see my cow, then we can be sure that you are not the thief." The owner of the house refused to allow the people to check the house. The owner of the cow sent a boy to bring the Wakil to the house. When the Wakil arrived, he asked, "What is going on?" The owner of the missing cow told the Wakil, "The owner of this house stole my cow and he is lying about it. He says he does not have the cow, but I know it is in his house." The Wakil said, "You relax and I will check the house. Tell me something unique about your cow." The owner of the cow said, "My cow is black and white and he has a special collar." When the Wakil went into the house, he saw a cow matching the owner of the cow's description. The Wakil turned to the man who had stolen the cow, who had lived in the community for nine years and said, "You are a thief and you moved to our area, but you have no humanity. You must leave our area because you will cause our area to have a bad reputation. Because of your actions, the people of this community will face problems inside and outside the

community when people talk about the behavior of the community.” The Wakil did not consult anyone about his decision and he went to the *mazjet*. He told everyone there what had transpired and that the thief had one week to leave the area. The Wakil said, “If he does not leave, then the police will arrest him and the people of the area will kick the family out of the area.” When the people are annoyed at a family, even if the police will not help the community kick the family out, the family has to leave. If the people of the community want someone to leave, then they throw stones at their house or disturb them at night until they want to leave the area.⁴⁰⁰

This example provides insight into how Wakils operate with or without police support by organizing members of their communities to expel people who violate the rules. However, Wakils can also ask the police to arrest a violator, as long as that violator and his family are not high ranking or wealthy enough to prevent the police from doing so.

In 2011 in a rural community on the southern edge of Kabul City, the Wakil called the police to arrest a 16-year old Tajik resident of the community. The young man had brought a girl he was in love with to his family’s home because he wanted to marry her against her parents’ wishes, endangering the community. The boy was in his first year at the high school in the community, where his family has resided since 1999. The young man fell in love with a 15-year old girl who was also studying at the high school, but lives in a different community. They talked to her parents about whether they could get married, but her parents did not want the two young people to marry. After school one day, the boy and the girl ran away to his parents’ house. They were trying to create a *fait accompli* so both

⁴⁰⁰ 110614-Wakil Actions-R2

sets of parents, who did not want them to get married, would agree.⁴⁰¹ They believed that by creating a situation in which the girl's family would be ashamed of the damage to her honor caused by running away with a boy would cause her parents to agree to the marriage rather than incur any further shame. They hoped that his parents would agree to the match because they could probably get a reduced bride price based on the awkward situation in which the children had placed the girl's parents and because they did not want to appear weak to their neighbors.

In asserting their own wishes, both the boy and the girl were breaking all social rules regarding submitting to the authority of their parents. By trying to make their parents agree to their marriage, the girl and the boy showed disrespect to their parents because they were autonomously making this important decision independent of them. They were very young, and the boy hoped his parents would accept the situation and ask the girl's parents permission to marry her.

When the boy's parents arrived home, they were very angry with their son. The boy's father yelled at him, "Your action creates a problem for our family because perhaps her father will become our enemy. You have shamed him by making him seem weak." The boy's mother asked him, "Why did you bring this girl to our home?" The boy replied, "I love this girl and I want to marry her." The boy's mother asked the girl, "Don't you have a home? Why have you run away with my son?" The girl said, "I love your son." The neighbors overheard the shouting and gathered behind the boy's family home to see what was amiss. Because the community system of order is based on a father's ability to control his family's behavior, the family's reputation was damaged because the father seemed weak and

⁴⁰¹ The boy's parents would be unlikely to agree because they would have to pay a high bride price and because they would need to pay and care for the girl and their sons' children until he was old enough to do so.

therefore dangerous to his neighbors when they overheard the fact that the boy had broken such an important family and community rule.

Elder 3, who lives across the street from the boy's house, saw the neighbors gathered there and went over to investigate. The neighbors there told him what they had overheard. The elder was very concerned that this situation with the girl could cause a problem between their community and the girl's community. The Wakil from the girl's community could confront their area's Wakil, saying the boy kidnapped the girl. He could make other Wakils and even the District Police Chief believe that the boy's Wakil was weak and unable to control his area. The Wakil would be ashamed and the Municipality might ask the people of the community to choose a new Wakil because the Wakil could not control the behavior of the people in the area. In this situation, the Wakil could probably defend his job, but overall, it would be bad for him and his community.

So, Elder 3 went to the Wakil's office in the community *bazaar* and informed the Wakil about the situation at the boy's family home. The Wakil and the elder walked to the house, knocked on the front door and were admitted by the boy's father. The Wakil asked the father, "Why are you arguing? And what is this girl doing in your home?" The father told the Wakil, "My son brought this girl from another area home and the girl told me that she loves my son. My son also loves her." The Wakil asked the boy's father, "Is the girl's family aware of your son's action?" The boy's father told him, "No, the girl ran away from school with my son and her family probably has not realized she is missing yet."

When the Wakil heard the story, he called to the police checkpoint commander and asked him to send a policeman to the boy's house. When the policeman arrived at the house, he knocked on the door and the father allowed him in because the Wakil was in the house.

The policeman asked the Wakil, "What is the problem?" The Wakil told him, "This boy ran away from school with this girl and her family is not aware where she is. Now, you have to arrest the boy and take him to the checkpoint so that the government can decide what to do about him." The policeman said, "What the boy did is kidnapping. I will take him to the checkpoint and then to the district police station." The people at the station will decide whether or not he will go to court. If he were found guilty at the district court, then they would sentence him and take him to the central jail, where he would probably serve two months. Taking a girl (even with her consent) to an unfamiliar family's house is considered a form of kidnapping in Kabul because the parents of the girl were not informed that she would go over to the boy's house. If they discovered the situation, her parents could go to the police and demand that the boy be arrested because this action has major negative repercussions on their family honor. Because the perpetrator is a member of the community, any accusation that this had occurred would damage the integrity of the community and the Wakil. The Wakil had to arrest the boy to demonstrate to the people of the community that this action is forbidden. The policeman handcuffed the young man and took him to the checkpoint. Afterward, he was taken to the central jail.

The Wakil told the Elder, "You should take the girl to her home, and you should not tell anything to her family." If the girl's parents knew, then they would come to the area and create problems for this family and for the Wakil. They might have the boy's father arrested because the boy took this action because his father did not have control over his son's actions and the girl's parents might suspect the son had violated her in some way. At dusk, the elder took the girl to her home and left her at her house. No one saw him and he did not talk to anyone in that area about what had happened. She was only gone two hours, so maybe her parents never found out that any of this happened.

After the police, the boy, the girl and the elder left, the Wakil went behind the boy's house and told the people who had gathered there, "You should all go home." The people complied and the Wakil went into the boy's father's house to discuss this incident with him. If the father of the boy had not complied with the arrest of his son, then the Wakil might have had him arrested and the entire family thrown out of the community. This event was a great shame for the boy's father because the Wakil said, "You are not a good father because you cannot control your son and he made a problem for the community and for me." Now, all of the people in the community think the father is weak because he cannot control his son. People in the community said that the boy's father is not careful about what his son was doing in the community. They said he did not educate his son.⁴⁰²

This case provides an excellent example of a Wakil reaching out to the police to assist him in enforcing a rule. The police comply even though the enforcement ran directly counter to the laws of Afghanistan. The young man had not broken any laws by simply taking a girl to his parents' home and introducing her. From the perspective of the laws of Afghanistan, the arrest was a kind of human rights violation, but the police did what the Wakil asked anyway.

In some cases in which a person who is high ranking should be expelled from the community for breaking a rule, the Wakil does not have the coercive force to do so. The power of the Wakil to have someone arrested or expel him from the community varies based on the rule-breaking individual's access to wealth and power from outside the community. But, the Wakil can cause the people of the community to shun the rule breaker

⁴⁰² 110614 -Elder Actions-R3

and harass the family until they leave. The power of the Wakil to cause people to shun a member of the community by not greeting or helping him is often absolute.

For example, a judge at the Supreme Court of Afghanistan was standing in front of his home in one of the communities on the northeastern edge of Kabul City, talking with some of his neighbors, when his cell phone rang. He walked until he was out of earshot of the group and demanded a \$2,000 bribe from the person on the other end of the line. The Wakil of the area overheard the judge demanding a bribe, walked toward him and said, "You are not a government judge because you demanded a bribe from that person. Shame on you." The Wakil and the people of the area gathered around the judge and one of the men said, "We had faith in you because you are a government judge. You are breaking our trust." The judge was ashamed and went home. Since this incident, none of the people in the neighborhood have had a relationship with him. No one greets him or talks to him. To show they no longer consider him a neighbor, they will not participate in his happiness and sadness parties.⁴⁰³ When no one knew the attorney took bribes, he was considered by everyone in the community to be a good person. But now, the people and the Wakil are very disappointed in the judge. The judge attends Friday prayers in the community *mazjet* with the rest of the men from the community, but he wears a scarf over his face because he is ashamed. The Mullah found out about the bribes, so in his sermons since that day, he occasionally mentions that giving and taking bribes is forbidden in Islam in his sermons. He says that those people who give or take bribes will go to hell and that the giving and taking of bribes in the community is prohibited. Sometimes, he mentions that one person (referring to but not naming the judge) from our community did this and that he may or

⁴⁰³ This is a kind of shunning. Happiness parties celebrate the birth of children, their successes, marriages, etc. Sadness parties are associated with the death of relatives. The people of Kabul believe that participating in the happiness and sadness of their neighbors is incumbent upon them as Muslims. It is also important because helping a neighbor in their happiness and sadness makes it likely that neighbors will help you when you are in need.

may not take bribes now because we do not know about him anymore. The attorney just goes to work and comes back and no one talks to him. Before, he gave charity for the poor and helped the *mazjet* and cooperated with the community. But after the community shunned him, he gave no more charity because people will not accept his money because it is money from bribes and is therefore *haram*. Although the Wakil was unable to physically expel the attorney from the neighborhood, he socially excommunicated him and made his life miserable.⁴⁰⁴

Beyond maintaining internal order, the Wakil represents his community and individual members of it to outside organizations and individuals. By unifying the members of the community, the Wakil can wield them as a block. Their consensus gives him the power to negotiate on their behalf and even to represent individuals as members of the community.

Wakils serve as representatives of their communities to various armed groups: elements of the state, gangs, insurgents, militias, and foreign occupiers. Wakils have existed since before the Russians arrived and have never had their own standing coercive forces. In a land where power has been constantly violently contested for decades, the Wakil serves as a representative of the people to all of the parties fighting for power in Kabul. Alone, no single community of a hundred or even three hundred households could have enough force to resist the organizations that have battled for power during the last century (the Soviets, the militias during the Civil War, the Taliban, the International Security Assistance Force, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).

⁴⁰⁴ 110110 Rules in My Neighborhood-R7

The Wakil serves as a representative of his community to these competing powers. In so doing, he makes choices about the groups with whom his community is willing to cooperate or collaborate. A Wakil holds sway over a community's willingness to provide sanctuary to insurgents or government forces. To a varying extent, based on his authority in the community, he also controls the flow of information from his community to insurgents and government forces.

For instance, during the Russian period, one community on the edge of Kabul served as a base for *mujihadeen* fighting to overthrow the Russians. Some of the members of the community were *mujihadeen* fighters and the community provided support and sanctuary to them. The Wakil of this area allowed the *mujihadeen* fighters to stay in the area and allowed none of the residents to provide information about them to the Russians. At the same time, the Wakil publically had a good relationship with the Russians. The Russians provided him with economic aid and infrastructure development assistance. But, the Wakil in this community decided to provide sanctuary to the *mujihadeen* and ensured that everyone else in the community did so also. In effect, Wakils decide the behavior of the communities toward the various warring factions to the extent that he controls the behavior of the people of his community. However, the Wakil does not actively threaten the different coercive forces in the city of Kabul because the coercive force of his community is inconsequential relative to that of the warring factions.⁴⁰⁵

In a more contemporary incident in the same community, people were concerned about threats from the Taliban, so the Wakil requested police support. When the police proved to be more trouble than they were worth, he asked to have them removed. The

⁴⁰⁵ 110530-Wakil in the Time of the Russians-R2

community is a mixed Pashtun and Tajik farming community that is assailed by the Taliban. Surrounded on three sides by Pashtun farming communities that serve as bases for the Taliban and positioned on a strategic road into the capitol, in 2010 and 2011, Taliban patrols occurred often. Over a period of seven months, Taliban fighters slipped into the community at night beheaded two residents for working for Americans or the government; and were caught building suicide vests in a rented home in the community. Given the situation, the Wakil called a meeting of the villagers to discuss the problem with the Taliban.

The community asked the Wakil to ask the District Police Chief to assign police to live in a container in the village. Four police arrived and began living in the village. However, they did not attend prayers at the *mazjet* or greet the male residents. They began playing music, drinking alcohol and leering at women and girls. The Wakil held another meeting about the problems with the police and at the behest of the community, he asked the District Commander to remove the police. The Commander did so, but offered new police. These police behaved in the same manner as had their predecessors. They did not patrol or run proper watches and were asleep one night when the Taliban blew up the police checkpoint while the police, who were supposed to be providing security at night, inside. The Wakil held another meeting with his villagers and they all agreed that the police were not enhancing their security, but actually endangering them. The villagers agreed they would rather face the Taliban alone than live with the police causing disorder in the community. The Wakil approached the District Commander and asked to have the surviving police removed and the police were soon gone.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁶ 110302-Police Actions-R2

Wakils also represent their communities in negotiations with neighboring communities. For example, In the community in northwest Kabul, built illegally on government owned land, there are many girls who have to walk as far as half an hour to get to school. This situation is common throughout Kabul City and it is consistently problematic. The girls pass through areas, like markets and public squares, where there are no Wakils and where men and boys are therefore unaccountable for their actions. The boys hassle the girls. They try to touch them. They try to give them their cell phone numbers. They tell them they are beautiful. These men would never do this in their own communities because they would be beaten or even killed by the brothers, fathers, cousins or uncles of the girls or they might be turned over to the Wakil. This problem is generally compounded by the girls' fear that if they tell their fathers about the problem, the fathers will suspect their daughters are causing the problem or the fathers will be so concerned about their own honor that they will no longer allow their daughters to go to school. The problem of girls being harassed on the way to school is one of the major reasons why families in Afghanistan do not send their daughters to school.

During 2010, there was one community on the route from the community in question to the girls' school where boys waited to tease and harass them. The boys would try to touch them and say, "Oh, what a beautiful girl." The boys would try to take the girls' notebooks and write their cell phone numbers in them the hope the girls would call them. Everyday, the girls went home and told their families about the harassment from the boys of that area. Some of the fathers approached the Mullah about the problem with the boys teasing their daughters en route to school. They told the Mullah that they wanted to determine who these boys were who were teasing the daughters of the community. The Mullah said, "We should consult the Wakil about this bad action by people in that

community.” He cautioned the men not to independently take action against the boys or the people of the offending community until the Wakil could propose a way to solve the problem.

The fathers, the Wakil and the Mullah gathered at the community *mazjet* to discuss the problem and come up with a solution. The Wakil said, “As a community, we should not get into a fight with this community. We should not go directly to the boys to tell them not to do this and fight with them. We should go through their Mullah.” The Mullah replied, “Individuals should not try to solve this problem. The elders should solve this problem.”

The Wakil selected two boys from the community to follow the girls in order to identify the boys who were harassing them. The boys from the community were familiar with the area where the harassment was occurring, were relatively physically imposing and were trusted by the Wakil and the Mullah. The Wakil gave the boys instructions before they left: do not get into a fight, but identify the boys causing the problem. The two boys went and sat in a shop near the corner where the girls had said the boys harassed them. They waited and watched. When the girls left school, the watchers saw some boys walking up behind the girls. The watchers recognized the boys and knew their families. When they neared the girls and began harassing them, the watchers left the shop and said, “Come here.” The boys ran away.

The watchers returned to their community *mazjet* and told the Mullah, Wakil and elders the identity of the offending boys. They asked their leaders, “What should we do?” The Wakil, Mullah and some of the elders went to the *mazjet* of the area where the boys harassed the girls to meet their counterparts. They told the Mullah there, “The son of

Family A and the son of Family B⁴⁰⁷ are harassing the girls from our community whenever they walk to or from school. Is there any law in this community? Or is there law and everyone does whatever they want?” The Mullah from the offending community said, “This is a difficult case, so we need to call the elders and the Wakil to discuss it with you.” The Wakil of the offending community arrived, bringing some elders with him. He told his counterparts, “We have laws, but some people in the area do not listen or do not know the laws. Maybe some of these people are proud they can harass the girls. We will try as much as possible to prevent this from happening again.” The Wakil, Mullah and elders from the girls’ community departed. From that day forward, the daughters of their community were never harassed by the boys from the offending community again.⁴⁰⁸

Finally, Wakils represent their residents in negotiations with people outside of the community, as well as the government. For example, a young man from a poor neighborhood on the edge of Kabul City got in a car accident and accidentally killed someone from one of the wealthy communities in central Kabul City. In cases like this, the Wakil, elders and Mullah of the perpetrator will travel with any of his male family members to the home of the victim, carrying gifts with them. They attempt to negotiate forgiveness from the family of the victim. Often, in cases of accidental death, the government will reduce a prison sentence if representatives of the killer can obtain forgiveness from the family of the victim, but that reduction is dependent upon the willingness of the particular government person to accept the forgiveness the Wakil has negotiated.

⁴⁰⁷ These are code given in place of the family name of these young men. They were identified by family name to the Mullah and Wakil of their community.

⁴⁰⁸ 110119-Community Map-R3

Two brothers from a relatively wealthy neighborhood in downtown Kabul City were on a motorcycle. The elder brother was driving and the younger brother was on the back when they hit a speed bump going too fast and the motorcycle skidded. The younger brother fell off the motorcycle and skidded across the pavement, while the older brother remained on the motorcycle in the middle of the road. He could not move and the driver of a truck that had come up behind him was unable to stop in time and ran him over, killing him. The people who witnessed the accident took the younger brother to the hospital and gathered the dead body of the older brother. They called the police and turned the truck driver over to them. The father of the truck driver, the Wakil of the truck driver's area (which is a rural community on the southern edge of the city), the witnesses to the accident and the elders and Wakil from the victim's area went to the home of the father of the dead boy. The father of the truck driver and the Wakil from his area told the motorcycle driver's father that the accident was the motorcycle driver's fault because he did not see the speed bump and that there was nothing the truck driver could have done to prevent this terrible accident. The witnesses to the accident concurred that the accident was the fault of the motorcycle driver and that the truck driver could not have stopped in time. The father of the motorcycle driver said, "This was the will of Allah." He signed a forgiveness paper telling the government that he forgave the truck driver for accidentally killing his son. The father of the truck driver gave 200,000 Afghani and a sheep and some rice to the father of the motorcycle driver. The Wakil from the truck driver's neighborhood submitted the forgiveness to the police. The forgiveness paper reduced the possible sentence from 25 years to 5 years and allowed the family to be able to pay the government \$2,000 to reduce the sentence by a year. The government sentenced the truck driver to 3 years in jail, but the family paid money \$2,000 for every year to get him out of the prison immediately.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁹ These payments are legal, but only if the family of the victim has forgiven the accused. 110503-Wakil Action-

In this story, the Wakil from the area of the truck driver was able to serve the family of the truck driver by negotiating forgiveness for the accident with the family of the victim. The Wakil and elders from the area of the victim were there to ensure the interests of the victim's family were served. Together, these Wakils were able to resolve a dispute and ensure that the family of the victim received the apology of the perpetrator's family and that the family was given some compensation for their loss. They were further able to ensure that a young man did not go to jail for decades because of an accident.

The tools available to the Wakil are all built on the consensus of the community. He can identify problems because people agree to talk to him and his elders and Mullah about problems and they allow him access to their homes and the *mazjet*. He can solve problems by mobilizing resources from the community. Even his sanctions for rule breakers are based on his ability to access any home in the community, to organize the community to throw people out or shun them and to use the power he generates through consensus to ally himself with the police or the Taliban or any other armed group. In particular, the Wakil's ability to negotiate with other Wakils on behalf of his residents is dependent upon the unity and consensus among the heads of household in his community.

Strategy

The Wakils' strategy for reaching their goals is to build and nurture consensus among the residents of their communities. By building a unified set of beliefs about what is right and wrong, the Wakils generate agreement with the communities' rules. The agreement itself generates control when people comply with rules because they agree with

them. Agreement also allows the Wakils to leverage the personnel, money, information and sanctuary required to collect information about people who do not agree with the rules and therefore violate them. As part of leveraging this consensus-generated resource base, the Wakils reach out to other organizations, like the government or the Taliban, to ask for assistance. However, they accept assistance only with the consent of the residents, particularly when that consent impacts what residents are allowed to do in their home community.

Wakils can only raise the resources available from within their communities and often encounter organizations, like the government and Taliban, that have, or may in future have, significantly more resources that they can organize to generate more power than a Wakil can muster from his community. For that reason, Wakils often avoid open resistance to better-resourced organizations, favoring instead clandestine resistance, withholding resources, particularly information about people breaking the outside organizations' rules, from them, as in the story of the Wakil accepting aid from the Soviets while supporting the *mujihadeen*. The goal in this strategy is to avoid making the community, which only exists in a static form, a target of the more mobile organizations of the government and Taliban. There is little evidence that Wakils reach out to other Wakils to leverage one another's resources to defend against these better resourced organizations. It is unclear why Wakils remain atomized since they share interests in preventing external organizations from interfering in their communities.

Ends

The Wakils consistently seek to build communities where people obey the rules because they agree with and consent to them. They seek to build communities where residents work together to solve their problems. They work to build a corporate whole out of a set of families under the umbrella of an Islam that emphasizes uniform behavior, compassion, consensus and the promotion of the well being and prosperity of neighbors. Wakils seek to ensure that residents can expect that they will not be attacked, harassed, killed or robbed in their own communities, or have their honor impugned.

Ways

Wakils seek to achieve these ends in three ways: consultation, monitoring and sanctioning, and interaction with outside organizations. Through constant interaction and consultation with residents about their problems and their ideas about how to solve them, the Wakils generate consensus. Wakils and elders spend time walking around their communities, stopping to greet male residents and ask them how they are. This simple activity ensures members of the community know the Wakil and elders care about their problems, have information about those problems and access to ideas about solutions to those problems. Wakils, Mullahs and elders similarly interact with male residents several times per day at prayers at the *mazjet*, and spend additional time in the *mazjet*, making themselves available to anyone who wants their advice or assistance in solving a problem. When a Wakil identifies an important shared problem, he calls a meeting of the heads of his community's households to discuss potential solutions. The Wakil introduces the problem and sometimes potential solutions and then allows the heads of the households to debate. In the end, after much debate, he proposes solutions for their consent and they agree on a path forward.

The Wakil then uses the consensus he has built around his solutions, be they new rules or projects to repair the *mazjet* or other shared infrastructure or efforts to repel outsiders who threaten residents, to levy resources. At community meetings, the Wakil requests the personnel, services, information, money and goods he needs if he wants to mount patrols, spread gravel on a road, pay the Mullah, repair the *mazjet*, purchase and operate a community generator, or even bring in a private supply of water. The Wakil relies upon the consensus among the residents and their mutual aid and respect to compel them to provide the required resources.

The Wakil also uses his role as representative of his community, leveraging his internal resources, to lobby outside organizations to provide him with assistance in undertaking his tasks. The Wakil does so in order to implement projects to which his residents have consented and normally asks for outside support only with their consent, especially if acquiring outside resources will involve some change to life in the community. In the Wakil's strategy, consensus is paramount and outside resources are only acquired with consent.

Similarly, the Wakil uses the resources he has levied to enforce rules when people from inside or outside the community violate them. The Wakil and elders rely upon the sanctuary the community grants them to walk around in order to identify people breaking the rules. They also rely upon information from residents who agree that people should not violate the rules and agree with how the Wakil will sanction the violator. Without this information, Wakil's could not sanction people for breaking rules and therefore could not generate an expectation that breaking the rules would have negative consequences.

In order to maintain sanctuary and information about rule violations, Wakils pursue sanctions that can maintain consensus and provide people with the opportunity to correct their behavior. With exceptions for major violations, like murder, rape or incest, Wakils prefer to advise people not to violate the rules again before imposing sterner sanctions. Wakils visit the home of the violator and first attempt to convince the violator not to do what he has done again because it is wrong. Wakils normally admonish the violator that breaking this rule is against Islam, will upset or harm their neighbors and or bring shame upon the violators' family. The advice concludes with a warning that if the violator breaks the rule again, the Wakil will be compelled to bring the matter to the attention of the community in a meeting and that the people of the community will very likely expel the violator and perhaps his entire family from their home in the community.

In order to generate an expectation that breaking the rules will have negative consequences, Wakils must consistently apply sanctions when he has information about a violation. The Wakils consistently do so because they and their personnel, as members of their communities, they also agree with the goals, rules and sanctions to which the communities have consented. This will to act only breaks down when the Wakils face an outside organization attempting to impose its will upon members of the community that can organize a greater quantity of personnel, money, equipment, goods and other other resources than exists within a particular Wakil's community in order to motivate its personnel to patrol to identify rule breaking and sanction it. The Wakils must take into account the limited nature of their resource base. In order to protect their communities from retribution, Wakils often judge that either now or in the future these outside organizations will have enough power relative to the communities that the organizations

could severely damage or even destroy their communities. In these cases, the Wakils do not openly organize to repel the presence of the outside imposition organization as it moves through their communities, preferring the long term security of the community over eliminating short term incursions. In other cases, when Wakils assess they have more resources that they can organize into actions, they act to repel outside organizations openly each time they enter their communities.

Means

Wakils rely upon resources from within their communities that they generate through consensus on problems and solutions. Wakils use this consensus to generate money, goods and services for projects, infrastructure and wages. They use consensus about what people ought and ought not do in the community to generate information about rule violations. They use consensus about all of these things to acquire sanctuary in their communities that allows the Wakils to identify rule violations themselves. The Wakils use the consensus of the residents of their communities to generate coercive force to expel people from their communities.

However, these internal resources are fundamentally limited to those available from the households whom the Wakil represents. That situation only becomes difficult when an outside organization with more resources and an organization effective enough to convert resources into actions challenges the Wakil. In these situations, the Wakil may reach out to other organizations for external resources. But, he faces a conundrum because outside organizations may only be willing to assist him in return for some change in the behavior of the residents of his community. In these cases, the Wakil often opts in favor of the existing

consensus, and normally consults the residents on his decision because the primary source of the Wakil's power is the consent of his residents.

The limited nature of the resources generated by the consenting households using a single *mazjet* drives Wakils to evaluate their current and future resources relative to any imposition organization and then develop overt or covert means of resistance to them. Since the Wakils are aware they are static targets and may be relatively poorly resourced, they are loath to overtly make themselves into a target for a well-resourced organization's retribution.

In the case of organizations seeking to impose their wills across a set of communities that do not agree with its goals, rules or the actions and presence of its personnel, Wakils could band together to pool their resources to repel imposition organization efforts to control the behavior of their residents. This cooperation to solve a narrow set of shared problems could be very effective, but it does not occur often because there is no guarantor of the agreement between communities and therefore a lack of trust in the long term reliability of the agreement. This trust could have been developed during the surge by the government and its Coalition partners, but it was not.

Internal Organizational System

As with everything relating to Wakils, consensus is at the core of their efforts to convert resources into actions. Wakils and elders want the orderly, secure, reasonably prosperous, compassionate supportive communities that are their organizations' goals because they want this world for themselves and their families. Wakils and elders are drawn from the consenting population and therefore normally support that consensus about goals for the community in which they reside. They would be willing to risk a great deal for these goals because they believe in them and will benefit from efforts to reach them. Islam buttresses these Wakil and elder interest in achieving the goals of their communities' consensus. The Wakils and elders in the communities under study generally believe that Mohammad governed by consensus and through advice. They generally believe that on Doomsday, Allah will ask them why they did not try to achieve the goals of their communities if they fail to put in the effort to do so. In short, because the Wakils and elders are members of the communities they govern, they are willing to put in great effort and take many risks in pursuit of the goals of their organizations.

Mullahs are motivated to act on behalf of the Wakil because of their commitments to Islam. Wakils consistently select Mullahs who will reinforce their rule through an interpretation of Islam that emphasizes rule by consensus rather than the harsh imposition of Islamic law. This, however, is not a given with many of the Mullahs who have been trained at Islamic Universities in Pakistan, and for that reason Wakils are very careful to select Mullahs who are accountable to their Wakils. If a Mullah were to speak out against a Wakil or attempts to impose rules or sanctions that are not what the people of the community want, the Wakil could fire the Mullah. In almost every community under study, the Wakil selected a Mullah who was not a resident of the community so that the Mullah

was entirely dependent upon the Wakil for housing in the *mazjet*, food, services, security and his salary.

The small scale of the Wakil organizations and the communities in which they operate also facilitates internal discipline. Most everyone in the community knows what Wakils and elders do in their official capacities. And, if the Wakils and elders do something wrong, everyone knows. The communities can, through consensus, hold their Wakils, elders and Mullahs accountable for any failures or inappropriate behavior.

Wakil Accountability

As with most everything else regarding the Wakils, accountability revolves around consent. The people of a community can hold a meeting and remove the Wakil or elders by consensus if they fail to solve the problems of the people or if they do something inappropriate, like demanding bribes, embezzling funds, etc. It is particularly easy for the residents to hold Wakils accountable because of residents' access to information about problems and the actions of Wakil personnel. Additionally, the Wakils are beholden to the residents for their authority and not to any other organization. Finally, the sanction of removing a Wakil from his position is particularly grave because he not only loses his position, his family is shamed in their home community.

In three of the eleven communities under study, the Wakil was replaced between 2001 and 2011 because of corruption or incompetence. By way of example, there was a Wakil who was demanding bribes in one of the communities under study and he was replaced. The community is in central Kabul. It consists of largely lower middle class

residents from all different ethnic groups, including Tajik, Pashtun, Hazara and Hindu. During the Taliban time, the Wakil of the area had done his job effectively. Therefore, when the Taliban left, the people of the area decided to keep him as Wakil. However, over time, he stopped doing his job. When the Taliban was in charge, the fighters would come to communities in central Kabul and ask whether the Wakil was working to solve the problems of the people or not. If they found a Wakil who did not, they would beat him or take him to jail. Under the Taliban, the Wakil of this community had been very afraid that if the people complained to the Taliban about corruption or laziness, they might kill him.

But, after the Taliban left, he was no longer afraid. He stopped solving the problems of the people. He only worked for himself. In Kabul, the Wakils have authority from the Municipal Government to certify people as residents. Without this certification, legal employment is impossible. The Wakil in this community demanded bribes of 200-300 Afghani from people if they wanted him to stamp their paperwork. Everyone in the community was angry with him. The situation grew worse and worse, until, during 2009, the people of the area decided they no longer wanted him as their Wakil because he only did things that benefited himself, not things that benefited the people of the community.

One day, the elders of the area went to the mazjet and decided that they wanted to change the Wakil. In this community, everyone is allowed to speak his mind. So, the elders called a meeting and invited every male from the community, including young people without children, poor people, everyone. They selected a new Wakil for the area and the old Wakil and his family ran away.⁴¹⁰

⁴¹⁰ 110508-Wakil Description-R5

Wakils are accountable to the residents of their communities because the residents have access information about the Wakils' actions and performance and because they can replace him if they no longer consent to his rule. The accountability of Wakils to the residents of their communities is an important bulwark against laziness, inaction and corruption in the Wakil organization.

Conclusion

Wakils are an important organization that, despite their limited resources, maintains a high degree of control over the behavior of the residents of their communities. Wakils seek to bring the residents of their communities together into a corporate whole that strives to solve the problems of individuals, families and the community as a whole by harnessing the resources of all residents. Wakils ground their control in the unity they see as the basis for the way the Prophet Mohammad governed. The Islam the Wakils advocate is not cruel. It does not impose conformity or even a set of rules. It is an Islam that respects people as humans and advises them to obey the laws of Islam. The Wakils prefer that people demonstrate how happy and lucky Islam makes them in order to encourage people to obey them.

The Wakils' efforts to generate and nurture consensus among the people in their communities define this organization and its strategy. It is the consent of the residents to the goals, rules and actions of the Wakil that give him a large portion of his control. Ideally, he wants people to obey the rules of the community because they agree with the rules of the community.

Although these rules vary based on the consensus of each community, the Wakils generally have rules intended to promote unity. They mandate males attending prayers at the community *mazjet*, greeting one another and attending community meetings to solve problems. They also mandate people assisting one another in solving problems. The rules generally prohibit theft, fighting, killing, rape and other actions which could harm other residents. A related set of rules normally prohibits actions considered to be *haram*, like gambling, consuming alcohol or liquor, adultery, among other un-Islamic activities. Wakils generally have rules requiring residents to provide resources to the Wakils and to provide information about rule breaking and government and Taliban presence solely to the Wakil. Finally, Wakils have rules about how residents should interact with the government, Taliban and other armed organizations.

Wakils leverage the resources they gain from consent to enforce these rules when people violate them. Residents are willing to provide the Wakils with information about rule breaking not only because they agree with the rules, but because they know what the Wakil will do to sanction the violator. They expect the Wakil will implement the sanctions to which the community has consented and agreed, first advising the violator not to break the rule again, and if he breaks the rule again, throwing him out of the community, but only with the consent of the residents. Because most residents agree this is the correct approach to sanctioning a neighbor for violating a rule, they are willing to give the Wakil information about people violating the rules.

The effectiveness of the Wakils in acting in accordance with their strategies is striking. It results from the fact that the Wakils, as residents of their communities, are part of the consenting population. They agree in large measure with the goals and rules in their

communities and are happy to act to achieve or implement them. Wakils and elders are motivated by their personal interest in the success of the communities where they grew up and where they believe their children and grandchildren will live long into the future. Wakils, elders and Mullahs are motivated by their beliefs about Islam. They believe it is their duty to serve the residents of their communities by generating and acting upon consensus because they believe this is how Mohammad ruled.

The organizational effectiveness of the Wakils falters when they encounter organizations with greater resources that can translate them into actions to control the behavior of the people in the Wakils' communities. This is a fundamental trade off for a consensus organization. It can only raise the resources from the population that consents to its rule. In these cases, the resources come from communities of several hundred households. Although there are some examples of multiple Wakils coming together to solve shared problems, that is not the norm.

When faced with an organization with greater resources that it translates into actions, the Wakil often chooses not to organize resistance. The community resists passively, by simply continuing to violate this new, well-resourced organizations rules and agreeing among themselves not to provide that organization with information.

The Wakil faces a trade off resulting from the fact that his community is static and his organization is static within that community. The Wakil can control the behavior of the members of the community with greater ease because he is static and constantly present, identifying people's actions, including the violation of the rules of all the organizations. This greatly enhances the Wakils' ability to control the behavior of residents. The imposition

organizations that simply move through the community to observe behavior are at an information disadvantage, particularly if no one in the community will provide them with information. However, because the community is static, in a fixed location, outside organizations know where to attack if they are irked by the behavior of the Wakil or the residents, exposing the community and the Wakils to greater danger.

The second tradeoff faced by Wakils relates to their core differentiating characteristic, consent. Because they have the consent of residents to rules, the Wakils do not need to exert themselves to control behavior. People obey because they want to and if they do not, the people who do provide resources to compel the violator to obey. However, the requirement for consensus within the community limits the Wakils' ability to form alliances with outside organizations with greater resources than can be raised within the consenting population. Wakils are often unwilling to enter into alliances that threaten the consensus at the core of their power. Because the resources of Wakils are limited, they are often faced with organizations that threaten them, attempting to impose rules upon their communities applying greater outside resources.

**CHAPTER 8:
An Organizational Comparison
of the
Taliban, GIRoA and the Wakils**

Both the Taliban and GIRoA are organizations attempting to impose their vision of Afghan society upon Afghans. Neither organization's vision of the world arises from the people of Afghanistan. Each organization attempts to impose a new vision that will change Afghan society in a revolutionary way. The Taliban's vision of a perfect Islamic society based on their interpretation of the *sharia*, isolated from foreign cultures, was not generated by the Afghan people, but instead by the Taliban in its *madrassas* in Pakistan. It is the former students of these *madrassas* who believe it is their religious duty to violently sanction people who break a set of rules of which they have special knowledge.

Similarly, GIRoA's vision of a modern, prosperous, democratic society, linked to the outside world through transportation and communication, whose government protects individual freedoms and rules impartially through written laws and a western judicial system, was not generated by the Afghan people, but instead by the international community and a group of exiled militia leaders at a conference in Bonn, Germany.

Both of these organizations rely upon external resources, including funding, personnel, sanctuary and information in order to implement their strategies for changing the behavior of Afghans. Both of them experience challenges collecting information about people violating their rules because people in the communities whose behavior they seek to control seldom provide information to them, and they lack the resources required to be constantly present in every community, observing whether or not people obey their rules.

These two imposition organizations differ in one important respect. One of them, the Taliban, has a very effective organization, which translates these external resources into actions by its personnel. The other, GIRoA, is unable to cause its personnel to act to implement its strategy. While the Taliban have an impressive program of indoctrination, GIRoA has a set of goals and rules, even a vision, that is not of much interest to many of its personnel. Both organizations additionally have strong internal organizational structures for disciplining personnel who act against the organization's intent, but the government's personnel lack the motivation to employ them.

The Wakil represents an entirely different kind of organization, one based on consensus about goals, rules, sanctions and other activities in a community. A Wakil does not seek to impose an outside system upon residents of his community. Instead, as a member of that community, selected by his peers, he builds and nurtures consensus among residents of communities of between 100 and 300 households about how they can work together, leveraging their resources, to solve problems. The Wakil seeks to perpetuate a social world built on mutual aid within a framework of consensual Islamic unity among the fathers of families. The Wakil uses this consensus, this agreement about how people should behave and about what needs to be done, to generate not only compliance with rules, but also the resources he uses to sanction violators and to solve other problems in the community.

The Wakil acquires his funding, personnel, information and sanctuary from the community that consents to his rule. The Wakil has an information advantage over the organizations against whom he is competing. Many people in his community provide information to him about individuals violating community rules because they agree with

those rules and the sanctions the Wakil will apply to the violator. They are also likely to provide the Wakil with information about the presence and activities of the Taliban and government in the community. Further, the community provides the Wakil with sanctuary and he, his elders and Wakil are constantly statically present in the community, observing what goes on. As a result, they can also collect information about rule breaking and the presence of Taliban or government personnel. When the Wakil is unchallenged by outside organizations with external resources and he has the consent of the population, he does not need more resources than he has within the community to defend it. The Wakils and elders are motivated by their shared goal of solving the problems within the community where they and their families live and in passing Allah's test on Doomsday. These men agree that they want to take the actions their organizations intend. Their agreement is reinforced by an intrinsic accountability to the members of the community for their behavior. Since residents have considerable information about whether or not their Wakils, elders and Mullahs take the actions residents intend they take to solve problems, and can replace any Wakil, elder or Mullah if they do not do so, these men have a second reason to take the actions their residents intend. As a result, Wakils are often willing not only to work tirelessly, talking to people about problems in their community and trying to solve them, but also to put themselves in danger to run toward the sounds of danger and to intervene in an effort to protect their neighbors.

When Wakils face challenges from organizations like the Taliban, which has significant external resources and can translate them consistently into actions, the Wakils become less likely to act. Wakils evaluate whether taking actions to prevent insurgent or government personnel from moving through their community, taking actions. They do so

based on an analysis of whether taking the actions would endanger the community more in the long run than not taking them.

The very nature of the Wakils as consensus organizations makes it difficult for them to acquire resources outside their communities. Forming alliances is challenging for them because they rely upon the agreement of residents for everything. If an outside organization wants to change the way people in their community live in return for providing the Wakil with resources, then the basis of the Wakil's authority can be undermined. If, however, the outside organization did not want to change the community's rules, then the Wakil could safely acquire resources from them.

Although these three organizations' visions of the world are very different from one another, the organizations have two common sets of rules they want the population to obey. Each organization has a set of rules prohibiting actions that have negative externalities, such as theft, murder, rape, adultery, breaking contracts, bearing false witness, etc. Each organization also has a set of rules it uses to separate the population from its competitor organizations. These rules include restrictions on working for, providing information, sanctuary or other support to rival organizations.

The rules upon which these organizations differ are those surrounding human and individual rights on the government side and Islamic practices and behavior on the Taliban side and those surrounding paternal authority and unity among male residents for the Wakil. For example, while the Taliban wants women segregated from all men to whom they are not related by blood or marriage, confining them to their homes, the government wants women to make their own individual choices about leaving the home, education, work,

marriage, children, etc. The Wakil, taking a third approach, wants the fathers of families to determine how the women in their families behave. The differences between these rule sets provide points at which we can see the extent to which each organization is succeeding in gaining control, thereby reifying its vision of social life in Afghanistan.

So, who will win in this competition between an effective, under-resourced consensus organization (the Wakil); an effective imposition organization whose resources increased over time (the Taliban); and an imposition organization with enormous external resources whose effectiveness decreased over time (GIROA)?

Which Organization Wins and Why?

This section has provided a description of three organizations violently competing for control over the behavior of Afghans at the local level. It described how the organizations were created, how they conceive of the world they seek to engender, the rules each organization is attempting to apply to the behavior of the Afghan population, their methods of enforcement, the organizations' ideal personnel and the actions they would like their personnel to take, their strategies and their organizational structures for translating strategies into actions by personnel.

The ensuing chapters will use empirical data to describe the actions personnel from these organizations actually took in a set of communities in Afghanistan between 2010 and 2014 and the extent to which those actions caused them to have control over the behavior of populations and why. These chapters will attempt to answer the following questions: Did personnel take the actions their organization intended? Did the population react by

obeying their rules, thereby allowing the organization to achieve its political objective? If not, why not?

PART 3

Empirical Case Studies

The Kabul Market Community

&

War Returns to Kapisa

CHAPTER 9

Kabul Market Community

In Kabul's Old City sits an ancient market that has served, for as long as anyone can remember, as a place where farmers, artisans, importers and exporters from south of Kabul trade with the consumers of Afghanistan's capital city. Hundreds of vendors buy and sell agricultural products, construction materials, clothes and cheap electronics out of their own buildings, temporary shacks or trucks. Carts where poorer merchants sell cheap manufactured items, fruits and vegetables line the unpaved streets and alleyways of the market, where everything is coated in a brown-orange dust. Young men in jeans and tee shirts strut up and down the rock strewn streets, hocking cell phone cards and cases embroidered with sequins to passing merchants and customers. The market bustles with shoppers from throughout Kabul, day laborers, farmers bringing produce to market, truck drivers delivering goods, and shopkeepers.

Adjacent to this market stands a community that was destroyed by shelling by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's⁴¹¹ forces during the civil war in the 1990s. As a result of the shelling, many of the original occupants of the Kabul Market Community, most of whom were merchants whose families had owned and operated shops in the market for generations, fled to other parts of Kabul, other provinces in Afghanistan, and, in many cases, Iran or Pakistan. When the original residents of the Kabul Market Community began to return to Kabul in 2001, they settled in other parts of the city because their homes had been

⁴¹¹ Abdul Rasul Sayyaf is a Pashtun, former *mujihadeen* leader and is currently a member of parliament representing Istolaf (a rural, Pashtun region of Kabul Province) and has campaigned to be President of Afghanistan. He studied at Cairo's famous Al Azhar University and spent considerable time in Saudi Arabia. He absorbed and internalized Saudi interpretations of Islam, which were foreign and strange to Afghan Islam. During the war against the Soviets, Sayyaf founded an Islamic university in a Peshawar refugee camp called Dawat al Jihad ("convert to the struggle"). The university, adjacent to an Afghan refugee camp, became a training ground for Mullahs associated with the Afghan *mujihadeen* and international Islamic terrorist organizations. Sayyaf formed a political party and militia called the Islamic Union, which received aid from the United States and Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.

destroyed or damaged to the point where they were unlivable. The shelling had also destroyed all water, electricity and road infrastructure in the community. Many of the original residents of the merchant community never returned to reside in the Kabul Market Community, leaving space for new residents. Between 2001 and 2011, migrants from all over Afghanistan flocked to the capital in search of jobs in its aid-driven economy. The influx of people rebuilding homes (whether they were the original residents or new owners) in the Kabul Market Community began in earnest in 2004 and hit its apogee in 2008.⁴¹²

The result of this process was the creation of a new community, whose life is still affected by the tumult of the adjacent market, but which is less a traditional Kabul merchant community than it was in 1990.⁴¹³ The influx of new residents from all over Afghanistan challenged social order in the Kabul Market Community, as values, identities and norms clashed. New migrants, freed from their traditional social structures, often experimented with gambling, drinking and drug use. The new community is 87% Tajik, 10% Pashtun and 3% Hazara.⁴¹⁴ There are also a few Uzbek and Hindu⁴¹⁵ families residing in The Kabul Market Community.⁴¹⁶ About half of the Kabul Market Community's residents are natives of Kabul City and the other half originated in provinces throughout Afghanistan. Partially as a

⁴¹² 63% of the residents of the Kabul Market Community moved there between 2007 and 2009, with 40% of residents arriving in 2008. These statistics were developed based on the description of the year during which each of the members of a random sample of 21 of the roughly 250 families that reside in the Kabul Market Community moved to the community.

⁴¹³ Only 11% of the male residents work at the adjacent market.

⁴¹⁴ These statistics were developed based on the descriptions of the ethnic identities of the members of a random sample of 21 of the roughly 250 families that reside in the Kabul Market Community.

⁴¹⁵ For over a century, Kabul has been home to a Hindu minority. These Hindus migrated from India. There is a completely Hindu area in Kabul City where they make and sell natural medicines. Kabul's Hindus maintain their separate religious and cultural practices. They generally attempt to limit their interactions with Afghans, who generally do not want Hindu religious beliefs, wine drinking, music and dancing to impact their culture.

⁴¹⁶ These groups were not large enough to appear in the random sample, but were present in the ethnographic data.

result of the influx of young people seeking a future in the capital, the community is relatively young, with an average age of 26.3 years.⁴¹⁷

Daily life in this market community is defined by commerce and interaction with the rest of Kabul and with merchants and farmers from south of the city, making it more open to the outside world than the other communities under study. The Kabul Market's openness is both a boon to the community and a source of problems for its residents and leaders.

The market and its openness to the world around it are a great boon for the Kabul Market Community because many of the residents make their living off the market. Roughly 11% of the male residents of the Kabul Market Community own and operate shops in the market.⁴¹⁸ Perhaps because of this proximity to the market, the Kabul Market Community is relatively affluent, with an average monthly income of 8,441 Afs (\$152.48).⁴¹⁹ In addition to providing employment, the market provides Kabul Market Community residents with access to almost any type of product and to interaction with the many different types of people in the market.

Perhaps because of its proximity to the market and resultant constant interactions with outsiders, the Kabul Market Community is relatively culturally open and thirsts for knowledge of the world outside the community. The community expresses its interest in the outside world through a commitment to education in the public school system. Public

⁴¹⁷ These statistics were developed based on descriptions of the age of the members of a random sample of 21 of the roughly 250 families that reside in the Kabul Market Community.

⁴¹⁸ This is the percentage of the male members of a random sample 21 of the roughly 250 families that reside in the Kabul Market Community. The women of the Kabul Market Community, like the women of all of the communities under study, do not own or operate shops, since interaction with men to whom they are not related is considered inappropriate.

⁴¹⁹ Based on descriptions of the monthly income of the members of a random sample of 21 of the roughly 250 families that reside in the Kabul Market Community.

schools in Afghanistan emphasize science, math, engineering, Dari and even foreign languages (principally English) and serve as part of the government’s effort to connect Afghanistan to the outside world. Nearly all of the children, male or female, who reside in the Kabul Market Community, are in school and remain in school through the end of 12th grade and some of these continue on to study at Kabul University or one of the private universities that have sprung up in the capital since 2001. 100% of school aged girls who reside in the Kabul Market Community are students.⁴²⁰ The average number of years of education in the Kabul Market Community is relatively high, 8.3 years, and the literacy rate is very high for Afghanistan, 86.7%.⁴²¹

The most common occupation in the Kabul Market Community is student, partially because of the relative youth of the community’s residents and partially because the people of the Kabul Market Community value education.

Occupations Kabul Market Community	
Student	33.30%
Housewife	26.70%
Shopkeeper	14.40%
Unemployed	8.90%
Translator/Driver	
IC	4.40%
Teacher	3.30%
Mechanic	3.30%
Bank Worker	2.20%
Real Estate/Construction	1.10%
Government	1.10%

The second largest occupation is housewife, since almost every adult female is a housewife. The community is relatively liberal on the topic of women in society, allowing women to leave their homes frequently to run errands, go to school and in some cases, to work, without male relatives as escorts. Women in the Kabul Market Community leave their homes relatively frequently (an average

of 9.4 times per week) and there are no women who are confined to their homes. Women

⁴²⁰ Based on descriptions of the monthly income of the members of a random sample of 21 of the roughly 250 families that reside in the Kabul Market Community.

⁴²¹ Based on descriptions of the monthly income of the members of a random sample of 21 of the roughly 250 families that reside in the Kabul Market Community.

gather in each other's homes to discuss their problems, provide advice to one another and simply enjoy one another's company during the day. Almost all of the girls in the community attend school and some even continue on to study at university. Some women work outside the home as teachers and are respected for their roles as educators, including the wife of one of the elders.⁴²² However, the people of the Kabul Market Community believe that women should not interact with men to whom they are not related. Although all men in the community are required to greet one another in the street, it would be inappropriate for a male to greet a female in the street unless she was his mother, sister, wife or daughter. Additionally, all of the women in the Kabul Market Community cover their hair, arms and legs and wear modest clothing that does not show their waists. That said, there are very few women in the Kabul Market Community who cover their faces.

The remainder of the residents of the Kabul Market Community are employed in service and government jobs. 14.4% of the residents of the Kabul Market Community are shopkeepers. 4.4% of residents work as translators or drivers for the international community (USAID, NGOs, ISAF). 3.3% work as teachers in public schools. 3.3% are mechanics, 2.2% work in banks, of which there are several on the road between the market and the community, and 1.1% of the residents are in construction. Only 1.1% of the residents of the Kabul Market Community serve as government bureaucrats. The remaining 8.9% are unemployed. Many of these unemployed people are young men who have graduated from high school and are trying without success to find jobs.

The people of the Kabul Market Community enjoy discussing the outside world with one another. Unlike the residents of other communities under study, the people of the

⁴²² 110307-Family 2-R1, 110210-Elders-R1

Kabul Market Community are attentive to national and international issues regarding the Karzai government, the Taliban (as a national organization) and the US, Pakistan and India.⁴²³

While the market benefits the Kabul Market Community by producing wealth and knowledge through access to the outside world, it also destabilizes the Kabul Market Community. The market brings with it the downsides of the community's openness, exposure to the rest of the world and a relatively liberal value system. First, the market draws into the area many people who are unaccountable to the residents of the Kabul Market Community for their behavior. Some of these people steal, gamble, drink, take narcotics, harass women and get into fights in the Kabul Market Community. Second, the market is a place where people trade in illegal goods, like drugs, alcohol and pornography, or engage in illegal activities, like gambling.⁴²⁴ Not only does it provide a very proximate opportunity for people from the Kabul Market Community to engage in illegal and un-Islamic activities, it also draws people from all over Kabul who want to engage in them. For this reason, there is a group of drug addicts who live in a public park near the Kabul Market Community. The residents of the Kabul Market Community call them "Powderies", in reference to the opium powder they smoke. The "Powderies" commit petty crimes in the Kabul Market Community and the market in order to make enough money to purchase drugs in the market.⁴²⁵

The people of the Kabul Market Community established a system of social order to govern their interactions and represent them to outsiders by electing a Wakil in 2007, to

⁴²³ Based on Researcher 1's description of the topic the people of the Kabul Market Community discussed the most during each week between February 3 and June 30, 2011, the people discussed national or international level topics 68.4% of the time.

⁴²⁴ 110521-Community Narrative-R1

⁴²⁵ 110521-Community Narrative-R1

solve the problems of the community. The Wakil can identify problems and propose solutions to the people of the community for a vote. He can propose rules, projects, money collection and the expulsion of individuals and families from the community. The community discusses and votes on the proposals in meetings at the community *mazjet*. Three community elders assist the Wakil in the identification of problems and the enforcement of rules. Further, the Mullah of the Kabul Market Community supports the Wakil's efforts by advising people to obey the rules of Islam. He informs residents of the impact of their behavior on Allah's willingness to admit them to Paradise or consign them to the fires of Hell.

While the Wakil has authority over the majority of people who live in the Kabul Market Community, he has little authority over the vast market area, which falls under the purview of the police. The police, who are stationed at a checkpoint on the circle, or Chawk, which forms the border between the Kabul Market Community and the market, are susceptible to bribes and are inconsistent in their enforcement of laws. They cooperate on a case-by-case basis with the Wakil when he finds people not from the community breaking the rules within the Kabul Market Community or when he finds people in the market breaking the law. However, the policemen, who are young men from rural Afghanistan, are aloof and incommunicative with many Kabul Market Community residents, do not greet them, and never attend prayers at the *mazjet*. The police do not venture into the Kabul Market Community to patrol, but may come when called. The police often ignore illegal behavior related to organized crime or people who appear to be "high ranking" because

they fear retribution from their superiors or because they are getting a cut of profits from robberies and the sale of illegal goods.⁴²⁶

The Kabul Market Community is deeply affected by the way market is run, but its leaders have little control over the market. The residents of the Kabul Market Community generally associate the negative aspects of the market with government corruption and ineffectiveness. Government corruption and ineffectiveness was the topic the people in the Kabul Market Community discussed the most during the period under study.⁴²⁷ The Kabul Market Community's interest in education and the outside world reflects values more similar to the stated values and beliefs of the government than the other communities under study, but the residents are disappointed with their government.

Despite these challenges, the Kabul Market Community manages to maintain social order by protecting the person, property and honor of its residents. While there are many threats to that order, resulting from the presence of outsiders and illicit goods in the market, the people of the Kabul Market Community have a system for providing security to person and property. That system is besieged by thieves, young people who are drunk or high, outsiders harassing women, armed thieves and other threats, but it is robust.

At the heart of this system is a belief by most residents in the mutual provision of defense by neighbors. If there is a stranger in the area, a resident will approach him and ask

⁴²⁶ The description of each of the 375 people in the data set includes a description of who provides security for the person when he or she is outside of the Kabul Market Community. In many of these cases, the person only receives security from the police if the policeman thinks the person might be high ranking. The police determine whether they think the person is high ranking based on what he or she is wearing, his or her age and other factors.

⁴²⁷ The topics the people of the Kabul Market Community discussed most often during the period between February 3 and June 30, 2011 were diverse, ranging from Taliban attacks to local robberies, to ISAF killing civilians, to Parliamentary elections. In 90% of the cases, when the people talked about each story, they concluded that the government was corrupt and ineffective.

him what he is doing there.⁴²⁸ If someone from outside of the community gets into a fight with someone in the community, the people of the community will assist their neighbor in fighting that person without hesitation.⁴²⁹ If people in the area fight with one another, their neighbors will separate them and take them to the Wakil, who will try to solve the problem within the community.⁴³⁰ The residents generally believe the police in Kabul are weak and will only help them if it is in their interest to do so.⁴³¹ They are therefore very happy to have the Wakil solve problems within the community, instead of drawing the police into the equation.

The system of order in the Kabul Market Community is based upon shared expectations of how members of the community will behave. As a result of this system, the residents of the Kabul Market Community can generally expect that their neighbors will not threaten their person, property and honor. Kabul Market Community residents value the sense of security generated by this set of shared expectations about behavior.

⁴²⁸ 110423-Rule 5-R1 contains five examples of how the members of the Kabul Market Community worked together to keep strangers out of their community.

⁴²⁹ This happened several times in the Kabul Market Community during the period under study, particularly when the Father of Family 4 fought with the boyfriend of his daughter and when the Son of Family 3 fought with a boy who followed his sister home. Additionally, in the case of the Son of Family 7, he physically fought with a local teacher and they no longer speak to one another. However, if either one were attacked, the other would assist in defending him without question. The same is true of the Father of Family 1 and his neighbor, who also physically fought with one another and no longer speak to one another, but would assist one another if they were fighting with someone else. 110307-Family 4-R1, 110307-Family 3-R1, 110314-Family 7-R1, 110307-Family 1-R1.

⁴³⁰ This happened several times in the community under study during the period under study. One day, a boy from the Kabul Market Community was drunk and he began beating another man from the community. People saw what was happening, informed the Wakil, and he interceded in the fight, 110210-5 Important Rules-R1.

⁴³¹ The data set provides a description of a consistent set of characteristics of each person in each story. One of the characteristics is who the person in question would rely upon for his or her security inside and outside the Kabul Market Community. To a person, within the community, the people of the community provide security. For each person, Researcher 1 describes how likely it is that the police will provide security for the person outside of the Kabul Market Community. The police are unlikely to assist young men who do not appear to be "high ranking". Doing so requires effort and physical risk. It also potentially puts the police at odds with other people who could be "high ranking". Therefore, it is safer for the police to do nothing to assist these young men. The police often take the same approach to any older male who does not appear to be rich or powerful for the same reason. The police help people who appear to be rich or powerful. They also help people who work for the government because they fear the person could complain to his or her superiors. The police steer clear of intervening in situations involving organized criminals because they fear retribution from their superiors. The police often intervene when men who are not rich and powerful harass women. However, sometimes they harass these women themselves.

The Wakil, Mullah and elders of the Kabul Market Community organize and reinforce the patterned, unified behaviors of the people of the Kabul Market Community by informing people of the rules, attempting to convince them of the “rightness” of each rule, informing people of sanctions, collecting information about rule breaking and consistently executing sanctions. Their efforts underpin and perpetuate the set of shared expectations that generate the stability and predictability many people in the Kabul Market Community value. Without a Wakil, the mix of values and norms among the people who arrived in the Kabul Market Community from all over Afghanistan could have resulted in social disorder. However, the Wakil’s constant efforts to shape and maintain a shared community identity, values and system of norms and sanctions have resulted in an orderly community.

The Kabul Market Community is divided into three socially distinct geographic areas. In Area A, most residents are very poor and many of the homes remain partially destroyed. Many Area A residents make a living selling cheap merchandise from carts in and around the market. Because of the difficulties they face in making enough money to get by, the people of Area A are often not very involved in community political life. They obey the Wakil and elders and they attend the *mazjet* for prayers and meetings. However, they are very busy just trying to survive.⁴³²

⁴³² 110119-Community 1 Map Description-R1

Map of the Kabul Market Community⁴³³



Area B forms the social, political and geographic center of the Kabul Market Community. Area B is generally middle class, although some upper class and some lower class people live in Area B. Area B is home to all of the elders, the Wakil, the Mullah and the main Kabul Market Community *mazjet*, which sits at the intersection of Areas B and C.⁴³⁴

⁴³³ This map was drawn by a researcher who lives in the Kabul Market Community. The map was created as part of an ethnographic mapping effort and as the basis for a sampling plan. The houses marked in red are the randomly selected families from the Kabul Market Community. The houses marked in green are the homes of the elders. S marks shops on the main street. The Chawk is a busy traffic circle with a police checkpoint in its center (a containerized living unit where the police also reside). There is also a traffic police building on the circle and a number of shops. The Chawk forms the border of the market. To the left of Area A is a set of metal shops that are considered part of the Kabul Market Community and fall under control of its Wakil and elders. The men who rent the metal shops purchase old metal objects from people and sell the to Pakistani truckers who take them to Pakistan to be recycled.

⁴³⁴ Ibid

Area C consists of palatial residences that were built during the Karzai period by a developer on land where the homes were entirely destroyed by shelling during the 1990s. Residents Area C are very wealthy.⁴³⁵ Each Area C family bought its home for 2,750,000 Afs (\$49,853.76) or more.⁴³⁶ The average family income per month in the Kabul Market Community is only 37,849.5 Afs (\$686.16),⁴³⁷ so the price of these houses is a princely sum from the perspective of the average resident.

Many of the people of Area C returned to Afghanistan after decades living abroad and brought the trappings of Western culture back with them, much to the chagrin of the people of Areas A and B. The residents of Area C tend, in the eyes of the people of Areas A and B, to be “too free”. “Too free” is a catch-all phrase for wearing Western clothes, drinking or taking part in other *haram* activities,⁴³⁸ not respecting paternal or community authority, not treating other members of the community as equals, flaunting wealth and privilege, and not practicing Islam.

Additionally, many of the people who live in Area C are associated with the Afghan government, either as high-level leaders or as the holders of lucrative government contracts. Some of the people who live there are Tajik Panshiri Princes of the City who are related to *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* commanders Vice President Mohammad Fahim Khan

⁴³⁵ They have servants, private security guards and very expensive cars. Their children attend very expensive private schools.

⁴³⁶ 110119-Community 1 Map Description-R1

⁴³⁷ The average monthly income per family is an average of the monthly family income of a random sample of 21 of the roughly 250 families that reside in the Kabul Market Community.

⁴³⁸ Activities forbidden in Islam. For example, listening to loud music, drinking alcohol, wearing immodest clothing.

and General Din Mohammad Jurat⁴³⁹. The people of Area C do not need to obey the Wakil,⁴⁴⁰ the police or anyone else because they can bribe government personnel, use their connections, or even use their personal bodyguards to extricate themselves from any problem. The presence of these “high-ranking” individuals is threatening to the people of Areas A and B because the “high-ranking” can harass women, get into fights and even kill people without serious repercussions. They effectively lack accountability for their behavior and are therefore, from the perspective of the people of Areas A and B, dangerous. In general, they do not obey the rules of the Wakil and do not recognize his authority over them. The people of Areas A and B also believe the people of Area C are generally un-Islamic because they look down on people who are poorer than them, seldom attend prayers at their *mazjet*⁴⁴¹ and generally value money and power more than unity. As one resident aptly put it, “In Area C, everyone is his own Wakil.”⁴⁴²

Values of the Kabul Market Community: Islam and Honor

In the Kabul Market Community, the two countervailing value systems of Islam and honor clashed atop a rising tide of migration, money, proximity to power, connection to the world outside Afghanistan and the hope of improving one’s lot in this world.

⁴³⁹ General Din Mohammad Jurat is a *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* commander from Panshir Province. He continues to command a militia he uses to generate resources from organized crime, trafficking in emeralds, lapis lazuli, and opium. The militia was styled as a private security company for a time, but persists as a criminal organization protected by *Jamat e Islami* Ministry of Interior personnel.

⁴⁴⁰ 110119-Community 1 Map Description-R1

⁴⁴¹ Despite the fact that the people of Area C obviously have enough money to build their own *mazjet*, the Ministry of Hajj and Mosques built and maintains one for them and pays the salary of their Mullah. Perhaps this boon was a result of the relationship between the residents of Area C and VP Fahim. The residents of Areas A and B do not venture to Area C, let alone into its *mazjet*.

⁴⁴² 110119 Community 1 Map Description R1

Islam provided Kabul Market Community residents with a constant drum beat guiding unified behavior. Daily prayers among one's neighbors and constantly greeting, socializing and assisting them imbued social interaction with predictable security. It prescribed a set of behaviors designed to ensure individuals live up to their responsibilities to their families, neighbors, the poor and Allah. The rules of Islam guide people toward uniformity of clothing, grooming and behavior. They guide people to a shared path, a shared set of behaviors. As the Mullah told the men in the Kabul Market Community's *mazjet* during one of his sermons, even if a man has everything in this world, if he has no morality and fails to turn the other cheek when he is attacked, Allah will be angry with him and punish him on Doomsday.⁴⁴³ The enjoyment of asserting one's right to do whatever one wants, thereby demonstrating one's honor by showing one can, is anathema to what the Kabul Market Community values in Islam. Residents value the predictable security and mutual aid that results from a unified pattern of Islamic behavior, not individual deviations from it.⁴⁴⁴

Honor tugged residents of the Kabul Market Community in the other direction, toward raising themselves as individuals or families high above others and demonstrating their power. Men strove to be wealthier than their neighbors in this world. Some applied wealth to enjoying themselves and demonstrating to others that they could do as they pleased, enhancing their honor.

Within the Kabul Market Community, there are people, especially in Area C, who consider themselves better than the poorer, less powerful people of Areas A and B, do not

⁴⁴³ 110521 Mazjet Friday R1

⁴⁴⁴ 110307-Family 1-R1, 110307-Family 2-R1, 110307-Family 3-R1, 110307-Family 4-R1, 110307-Family 5-R1, 1103014-Family 7-R1, 110314-Family 8-R1, 1103014-Family 9-R1, 110314-Family 10-R1, 1103014-Family 11-R1, 110314-Family 12-R1, 110207-Elders-R1, 110614-Wakil-R1.

give charity or speak to people who are less wealthy and powerful than they are. They go to the gym to appear stronger and get into fights to prove they are. They drink and drive fast and gamble to demonstrate they can do whatever pleases them. These people appear to value their own power and its demonstration more than they value unity. They also provide an example of being “high ranking” and doing whatever one pleases, that some of the young men residing in Areas A and B aspire to. Being able to do so requires that these young men strive in this world for wealth and power and demonstrate their ascendancy in ways that break with the unified Islamic norms which are also valued in the Kabul Market Community.

Organizations Competing to Control the Kabul Market Community

There are three organizations competing for control over the behavior of the people of the Kabul Market Community: the Wakil, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban. Each of these organizations has a set of rules it wants the people of the Kabul Market Community to obey and each of them succeeds to a greater or lesser extent in causing people to follow their rules. The extent to which the people of the Kabul Market Community obey the rules of each organization is the extent to which that organization has control over their behavior.

The Wakil

In 2006, having worked for several years to earn enough money to begin rebuilding, the old residents of the Kabul Market Community began to return to their bombed out homes. Many, like R1’s family, lived in another community in Kabul and built or rebuilt one

room in their home in the Kabul Market Community, moved some of the family into it and slowly rebuilt the remainder of their home. Others sold their property to new residents, who began the same process. Some of the old residents, who owned the land where the luxuriant homes of Area C were built, lost their property to the government and the politically connected.

As problems in the community mounted, and residents worked to rebuild, maintain and find a Mullah for their *mazjet*, they decided to select a Wakil. The Old Wakil found a Mullah who would lead prayers and worked with residents to rebuild the *mazjet*. A sixty year old day laborer from Parwan was a Mullah had been attending prayers at the *mazjet* while staying in one of the long term hotels on the road to the market. The son of a traditional Mullah, this Mullah had trained with his father until the family fled to Pakistan when the Soviets began attacking villages in Parwan. As a young man, he had joined the *mujihadeen* and fought against the Soviets. He attended Sayyaf's Dawat al Jihad University in Peshawar, where he received a four year degree in theology. The Mullah befriended the Old Wakil, who selected him to be Mullah of the Kabul Market Community *mazjet* and he moved into a room there and began leading prayers and giving Friday sermons.

As the size of the area grew, the Old Wakil selected three elders. The first two were retired, long time residents of the Kabul Market Community who had sold their construction material stores in the market. Both had been on the Hajj, giving them enhanced Islamic knowledge. One of them holds a bachelor's degree in Literature from Kabul University, giving him knowledge from modern education. These two retirees spent their days in the *mazjet* or walking around the community, talking to and observing residents and visitors. The final elder was a man in his forties who holds a degree from the

Engineering Faculty at Kabul University and worked for a large construction company building the many multistory structures in the capital as part of the real estate boom that accompanied the surge in foreign aid. This elder provided additional knowledge about how to solve engineering and infrastructure problems in the community and was younger and more similar to some of the young men who had come to reside in the Kabul Market Community.

In 2010, the Old Wakil experienced medical problems and decided to move to India for treatment. He held a meeting in the *mazjet* and recommended the new Wakil, who was raised in Kabul, graduated from the Faculty of Literature of Kabul University and worked in the Ministry of Education until 1992, when he and his family fled first to Parwan and then to Pakistan due to the civil war and Taliban rule. The Old Wakil recommended him because he believed the Wakil knew how to solve the problems of the people, was a good Muslim and understood how to work with the government.

The Wakil aims to maintain unity, prevent people from harming residents or engaging in activities that are *haram* in the Kabul Market Community. The Wakil endeavors to ensure residents help one another solve their problems, and provide information, sanctuary, goods, services, personnel and funding to the Wakil to solve them as needed. Despite the fact that the residents of the Kabul Market Community hailed from throughout Afghanistan and worked in a wide variety of jobs outside of the community, the Wakil had a fairly high level of control over the behavior of people who resided in his community.

Like most Wakils, the Kabul Market Community Wakils emphasized the importance of unity, mutual aid among neighbors, helping the *mazjet* and solving community problems

together. The vast majority of people who lived in the Kabul Market Community comply with these rules. During 2010 and 2011, residents bought new carpets, a new roof, firewood for the winter and funeral supplies for the *mazjet*. Each family in Areas A and B contributed 500 Afs per month for the Mullah's salary and the upkeep of the *mazjet*.

A local resident who works for the Ministry of Water and Electricity, Father of Family 5, convinced the ministry to provide free electricity to the Kabul Market Community *mazjet*. Then, Father of Family 5 organized the community to request the city allow them, if they paid for their own pipes, pumps and installation, to install community pumps that provide free city water. To cap off these infrastructure actions, Father of Family 5 paid for all the food for at the celebration of Mohammad's birthday.

A female teacher and a male teacher gave free classes throughout the long winter vacation for the female and male children of residents, and a school supply seller from the community provided free school supplies for the effort. Young men helped old men carry their groceries. Residents secretly gave charity to poorer residents. When a resident got into a fistfight with a non-resident, their neighbors rushed to assist them without question. Men in the community greeted one another and gathered together in the *mazjet* on average 3 and a half times per day to pray together, to interact and to understand what was going on in and around the community. When they saw someone breaking a rule, they informed the Wakil and elders. When they had a problem, they asked the Wakil, Mullah or elders for their advice and assistance.

Most women complied with the Wakil and their families' rules regarding female behavior.⁴⁴⁵ Most women wear long robes and big shawls. They worked in their homes, preparing meals and cleaning, leaving only to run errands when necessary and not going other places for other purposes. When they were on the street, they did not look men to whom they were not related in the eye or speak with them. The exceptions to this rule are the Mother of Family 2 and the Wife of Elder 3, who were both teachers. They both complied with the rules of the Wakil, but they also had jobs outside the home, working with men. The Wakil understood they needed to do this to help their families.⁴⁴⁶

Most of the school aged girls also complied with the Wakil's rules. They gathered at the shop in the Kabul Market Community and walk together to school, trying not to attract attention. Many boys harass girls who are walking to and from school in Kabul, trying to give them their cell phone numbers and form a relationship with them. Most of the girls from the Kabul Market Community avoided eye contact and say, "My brother, do not harass me. I am not a girl like that." And continue on their way to or from school.⁴⁴⁷

Daughter 1 of Family 8, who was 14 years old at the time, encountered a particularly persistent suitor on her way home from school several times. Having attempted to handle the problem herself unsuccessfully, she approached her father for help. She told him that everyday, a young man waited for her to walk home from school. Father of Family 8 waited along his daughter's route home from school. When he saw the 19 year old boy, clad in modern clothes, following his daughter, attempting to engage her in conversation, he approached the boy, saying, "Oh, my son, why do you harass my daughter?" The boy,

⁴⁴⁵ 39 of the 41 females in the random sample of the Kabul Market Community residents comply with these rules. The two exceptions are Daughter of Family 4 and Daughter of Family 7, described below. 110307 Family Descriptions R1

⁴⁴⁶ 110307 Family Descriptions R1

⁴⁴⁷ 110304-Mazjet Friday-R1

concerned, lied, saying, “I am not harassing your daughter.” Father of Family 8 asked, “Then, why did you give your cell phone number to my daughter?” The boy became quiet. The Father of Family 8 told him, “Oh, my son, do not fear. I will not beat you. I just want to tell you that my daughter goes out of our house only to study and not for time passing or anything else. This time, I will not beat you. But, if you continue following my daughter, then it will be bad for you.” Father of Family 8 encouraged the boy to study instead of harassing girls. The boy understood his error and said, “ Yes, uncle, you are right. I made a mistake and I won’t follow your daughter again.” He never followed Daughter 1 of Family 8 again.⁴⁴⁸ Daughter 1 of Family 8 followed the Wakil’s rules and those of her family, as did her father, who approached the boy to attempt to solve the problem by advising him not to persist or there would be violent consequences.

However, a significant number of residents also broke the rules. Young men sometimes did not attend prayers. Some took drugs, drank and gambled, betting on kite fights⁴⁴⁹, pigeons,⁴⁵⁰ and dogfights. Others drove too fast through the community and got in fistfights. Some smoked or played loud music during Ramadan.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁸ 110307 Family 8 R1

⁴⁴⁹ Kite fighting is a traditional pastime in Afghanistan. Kite fliers cote the strings of their kites with glass and aim to cut the string of their adversaries’ kites in order to win. Kite fighters often get into fistfights and many people bet on the contests.

⁴⁵⁰ Playing pigeons is a traditional pastime in Afghanistan. People train flocks of pigeons to fly together and to return home together. One pigeon player will challenge another one to a match. Each pigeon player stands on his roof and releases his flock. The two flocks mingle and then they separate. The player whose pigeons separate from the competitor’s flock and come home most effectively wins. Often, people bet on the outcome. Many times, the pigeons do not all return home and end up as hostages of the opposing pigeon player. Traditionally, the loosing player pays a ransom for the pigeon, but in many cases, this leads to fights.

⁴⁵¹ Father of Family 1 was so depressed by what he perceived as inescapable poverty and despair, that he turned to taking narcotics as an escape, 110307-Family 1-R1. Son of Family 4 likes to drive fast, play loud music and get in fights when he is home from his duty as a translator for ISAF in Helmand Province, 110307-Family 4-R1. Daughter of Family 4 walked home holding her boyfriend’s hand, 110307-Family 4-R1. There is a mason who lives in the Kabul Market Community who likes to play Tajik mujihadeen music in his house, 110207-Elders-R1. The fruitseller drank wine to make himself feel powerful, 110207-Elders-R1. Son 1 of Family 12 drove too fast and another resident stopped him to advise him not to and Son 1 of Family 12 got in a fight with him. 110314-Family 12-R1. The son of Family 7 is a butcher and he likes to smoke cigarettes in his shop at the market, even during Ramadan, 110317-Family 7-R1. Daughter of Family 7 had her boyfriend visit her when her family was out of the house, 110317-Family 7-R1.

Young women from the community sometimes formed relationships with young men, in violation of the rules of the community and of their fathers. Young women are not allowed to choose whom they will marry. Wakils and their families believe it is their fathers who should choose and it is a sign of the weakness and shame of a family if a father cannot control his daughters. In the mildest incident, the 20 year old Daughter of Family 4 walked home from school holding her boyfriend's hand, to the consternation of her father. He worried that people might think that his daughter was trying to get boys to follow her or that she was a girl who has sex with boys before marriage. The Father of Family 4 slapped the boy and sent his daughter into the house. The Father of Family 4 shouted, "You were following my daughter?" As he punched the boy over and over, the boy did not punch back and kept saying, "I love your daughter and even if you kill me for loving her, I will be proud of loving her. Stop beating me. I only want to do good things for your daughter. I don't just pass time with this girl. I love her." This young man was trying to establish a relationship with the Father of Family 4, but the Father of Family 4 would not listen. Five or six people from the neighborhood heard the fight and gathered to watch the father beating this boy. When they arrived, both the father and the boy stopped talking because they knew that if the reason for the fight were known to her neighbors, it would bring great shame on the girl. The father did not want to bring shame on himself or possibly be thrown out of the neighborhood. The boy knew there would be shame on the family and that might ruin his chances to marry the girl. He knew the family might have to move if the people knew about the incident and suspected the girl had sex with him. The boy just kept saying, "Let me go." The Father of Family 4 stopped hitting the boy because the people of the area separated them and then the boy ran away and the father went home. The Daughter of Family 4 may have continued to see her boyfriend outside the Kabul Market Community because she

continued to go to school. After the fight, the Father of Family 4 decided to continue to allow her to go to school because if he had withdrawn her, people in the community would have understood the reason for the fight and they might have asked the Wakil to throw Family 4 out.⁴⁵²

The Daughter of Family 7 went further, sneaking her boyfriend into her family's home while the rest of the family was out. Father of Family 7 discovered what had happened and Daughter of Family 7, a 22 year old high school graduate, was no longer allowed to leave the house after this incident.⁴⁵³ The youngest daughter of the Pashtun Ragman ran away with her boyfriend to get married. The Wakil held a meeting with residents to address this violation of the rules. The residents decided to expel the Pashtun Ragman and his entire family because he was too weak to control his family, posing a danger to order in the community.

Residents broke these rules because they wanted to, because it made them feel free and powerful, like the high ranking people they saw elsewhere in Kabul. But, these violators consistently faced the Wakil's effective organization and the information it collected from their neighbors. The Wakil, elders and Mullah constantly patrolled and sought information from residents. When they had information, they sanctioned rule breakers, except when they found someone who had broken a rule could leverage the power of organized criminal gangs or the government to prevent the Wakil's sanction.

For example, Elder 2 was walking home from night prayers during Ramadan in August of 2010 with a group of neighbors, when they heard loud Bachabozi, or playboy,

⁴⁵² 110307 Family 4 R1

⁴⁵³ 110307 Family 7 R1

music. *Mujihadeen* commanders play this music and dance and pay dancing boys to demonstrate their power. It is *haram* to play music and it is against community rules to miss night prayers, especially during Ramadan. Elder 2 walked toward the house from which the music blared and knocked on the door. A 39 year old Tajik mason from Farah who had moved to the Kabul Market Community nine months earlier, but refused to come to prayers regularly, opened the door. His neighbors had advised him many times that he needed to come to prayers, greet his neighbors and attend their happiness and sadness parties. But, the mason had refused to listen because it would demonstrate in front of everyone that he had been wrong and that they were more powerful than he was. Elder 2, who had gone on the Hajj to Mecca, told him, "My brother, as you know, this is the Holy month of Ramadan. It is a month of worship. So, instead of worshiping you play loud music in your house."

The mason regretted his action. He accepted what the Hajji had told him because the Hajji had proof that the way the mason was behaving was wrong and he had special knowledge from Allah. The mason told the elder it would not happen again and that he would worship with his neighbors at the *mazjet* beginning the next day. The mason changed his behavior in the neighborhood after this incident. He gave charity. He attended prayers and the happiness and sadness parties of his neighbors. He became a good neighbor because of the elder and his Hajj.⁴⁵⁴

In other cases, people from the community told the Wakil, Mullah or elders someone had broken a rule. For example, two 13 year old boys got in a fight in the street. One was the son of a Tajik man who runs a shop for amputees in the market. The other was the son

⁴⁵⁴ 110207 Elders R1

of a Pashtun bicycle mechanic. The son of the bicycle mechanic beat the son of the amputee shop with a tree branch. The Wife of the Amputee Shop Owner saw what was happening. People in the community do not like this woman because she is always getting in fights. She works on the Chawk, selling bracelets. She took her son and the other boy to the home of the bicycle mechanic. The Wife of the Bicycle Mechanic came outside and the two women got into a fistfight. Soon, their sons, husbands and even nephews joined in. Neighbors from the surrounding houses ran to the *mazjet* to get help. The Mullah ran there and halted the fracas. He took the Amputee Shop Owner and the Bicycle Mechanic to the *mazjet* and advised them that fighting is wrong and if they were found fighting again, they would be expelled from their homes. He told them they had to forgive one another and treat one another as brothers and never do this again.⁴⁵⁵

In this case, the residents gave information to the Mullah because they knew he would solve the problem and that he would give their neighbors the opportunity to correct their behavior before expelling them from the community.

In 18 of the 22 cases described in the data in which the Wakil, Mullah or elders learned that someone had broken the rules in the Kabul Market Community, they took an action to sanction the rule breaker. In 5 cases, they advised the person to no longer break the rule. In two cases, they fined people who were from outside the community. In 9 of the cases, the Wakil took the rule breaker to the police, who arrested the rule breaker. In one case, the Wakil asked the police to arrest an entire family that was operating a prostitution ring, and remove their belongings from their home. In 2 cases, the Wakil called a meeting in

⁴⁵⁵ 110207 Elders R1

the *mazjet* in Area B and had the rule breaker and his or her family expelled from the community after a community vote.

The Wakil's control breaks down when residents do not provide him with information about people breaking community rules. For example, Son of Family 4 is a young translator for ISAF in Helmand Province. He comes home to the Kabul Market Community for several weeks at a time on vacation. He is not the same as he was before he started working in Helmand. He has a very short temper. He drives too fast and he listens to loud rap music in his car to show his power, his honor.

One evening, he was breaking the community rules, driving far too fast through its narrow streets when he nearly ran over a 38 year old high school teacher who also lives in the area. The teacher is a body builder and was walking home from the gym when he had to jump out of the path of Son of Family 4's speeding vehicle. Son of Family 4 stopped, got out and yelled at the teacher whom he had almost run over, "You are acting like a donkey standing in the middle of the road." He was insulting the teacher, saying he was like an animal and that he should get out of Son of Family 4's way because Son of Family 4 was more powerful than he was. The teacher responded, "Actually, you are the donkey. You drive carelessly on the streets of our community. And instead of apologizing to the person you nearly ran over, you use abusive words."

The teacher slapped Son of Family 4, saying, "You should not call me a donkey. I am a teacher." Son of Family 4 hit the teacher in the shoulder. The teacher is very strong and he beat Son of Family 4. He hit him over and over. When Son of Family 4 saw he could not win, he got in his car, locked the doors and sped off. The two young men no longer speak to

one another. The Wakil did not know of this incident because no one else saw it and the two young men are ashamed of themselves. The teacher was ashamed because he should have advised Son of Family 4 instead of getting in a fight. Son of Family 4 is just ashamed. But, both men continued to break the Wakil's rules, refusing to speak to one another and not telling the Wakil about their fistfight. Because the Wakil had no information, he could not advise them and maintain unity among the residents of the Kabul Market Community.⁴⁵⁶

The Wakil could protect residents from outsiders who come to the Kabul Market Community intending to violate the rules of the community by taking drugs, stealing, gambling or harassing girls. In order to do this, he needed either support from residents willing to throw the rule breaker out of the community or the support of the police in arresting the violator. In several different episodes, the Wakil, elders and Mullah found addicts taking narcotics in the community and took them to the police, who dutifully arrested them. Without the police, the Wakil would have had less control over the addicts because he would have no jail in which to keep them.

But, when the Wakil encountered someone with a tremendous amount of money and power, like the residents of Area C, he could not enforce the rules because the resources from Areas A and B are not large enough to challenge a person who could leverage the full power of the government through money or connections to the Vice President of Afghanistan. For example, the Wakil made a rule that no house in the Kabul Market Community could be more than three stories tall. This rule is important because residents were very concerned that no one else be able to look into the windows of their homes at

⁴⁵⁶ 110307 Family 4 R1

their female family members. The people of Area C broke this rule, building four and five story buildings and there was nothing the Wakil could do to stop them.

For the same reason, the Wakil had no control over outsiders who violated the rules and were high ranking because the people of Areas A and B have little power relative to a high ranking person who violates their rules, and it impossible for the police to help the Wakil in these cases. Even in cases where someone who was high ranking killed a resident, the Wakil could not sanction them. For example, a drunken 32 year old Pashtun policeman who had been stationed on the Chawk careened around one of the corners within the Kabul Market Community in a Police Ranger (vehicle), hitting a poor cobbler so hard that the man died instantly. Residents rushed to the scene with the Wakil, who arrested the drunk policeman, and, with members of the Kabul Market Community, escorted him to the police checkpoint at the market. The Wakil remained at the checkpoint to ensure justice was done. When the family of the cobbler arrived, they were extremely angry at the policeman and did not want to forgive him. In Afghanistan, when a person is accidentally killed, their family can sign something called a “forgiveness paper”, which will reduce the killer’s punishment. Normally, the perpetrator pays the victim’s family a sum of money to compensate them for their loss. In this case, even though the cobbler’s family was very poor and they were offered 80,000 Afs (well over 25 times the monthly salary of the cobbler), they refused to sign the forgiveness paper. However, the commander of the police station made them sign the paper against their will. The Wakil told the people at the *mazjet* what had transpired and said the police in Afghanistan are careless and demonic and they behave this way because they have relationships with people in high positions who protect them from the repercussions of their actions. Throughout the week, residents discussed the *haram* actions of the policeman and the commander, saying that most policemen in Afghanistan are

“careless people, demonic people,” who are uneducated. They said the death of the cobbler was the government’s fault because it gives police sport utility vehicles to irresponsible people and does not punish them even if they kill innocent people while drunk as long as they are related to high ranking people.⁴⁵⁷

The Wakil was unable to control the behavior of the police in the Kabul Market Community even when they violate their own laws and the rules of Islam because the resources available to the Wakil from Areas A and B are not sufficient to outweigh those of the government. The Wakil could not make the government punish the drunken policeman for killing the poor cobbler.

That said, the Wakil made the very most of the resources that existed in Areas A and B by assiduously working to build unity, agreement and consensus among residents. Unity among residents was his main goal and he, his elders and Mullah were tireless in its pursuit. It was his success in this endeavor that gave the Wakil the resources he translated into the control described above.

The Wakil, Mullah and elders worked to ensure every male resident over 15 years of age attended prayers as often as possible, failing only when a resident did not want to attend and could muster more resources to defend himself from sanction than the Wakil could to sanction him. They consistently visited people who failed to do so and advised them to come to prayers and warned them that if they persisted, they would face the possibility of being expelled from their homes.

⁴⁵⁷ 110324-Community Narrative-R1

For example, a young man and his wife moved into the Kabul Market Community. The young man was not attending prayers at the community *mazjet*, so the Wakil, Mullah and elders visited his home to ask him how they could help him solve whatever problems were preventing him from attending prayers at the *mazjet* in the Kabul Market Community. The young man responded that he did not want to leave his young wife alone early in the morning and late at night because he was concerned for her security. The Wakil, Mullah and elders informed him that there had been no problems with the security of the wives and children of the Kabul Market Community during prayer times. From that day forward, the young man attended prayers at the mosque three times per day.⁴⁵⁸

The Wakil, Mullah and elders greeted all male residents and asked them how they and their families were and if there were any way they could be of assistance. Because they consistently tried to help, people came to ask them for advice. Roughly fifteen people per day came to ask the Wakil, Mullah and elders for advice in solving a problem. These constant Wakil activities made residents feel they were part of a group which they could trust to help them when trouble descended upon them. It was in part this trust that made residents obey the Wakil's rules, even when they did not want to.

The Mullah was also very effective in reinforcing unity by explaining how helping ones neighbors, parents and children, as well as orphans and the poor would make Allah happy with you and how failing to do so would anger him. During his weekly sermons, he emphasized the importance of reinforcing unity and consensus within the community. For example, in the March of 2011, he told the men gathered at the *mazjet* for Friday prayers,

⁴⁵⁸110314-Family 10-R1

“The Prophet Mohammad said, ‘If a person carries his father and mother on his shoulders to the Hajj, and he serves his father and mother throughout his life, that person still has not repaid the rights of his father and mother. ... Paradise is under the feet of your father and mother.’ If you want to go to paradise, you must serve your parents and when they are happy with you, then you will think you are in paradise already. Your father and mother have the right to your service and you should bring them the things they need because they endured a lot of problems for you. ... All of the time, you should serve your father and mother. You will then not have paid off half of what you owe them.”

The Mullah also warned about lying, which he said is the worst sin because it creates disunity in what people in the community know has happened. He went further, giving a sermon advising people not to be subversive or to be friends with people who are. He defined subversives as those who lie, make promises but do not fulfill them and commit treason against their group. These behaviors obviously undermine the cohesion of a group and he decried them in the name of Allah, explaining that people who lie and are subversive will be consigned to Hell.

He also advocated Islamic practices that create conformity and therefore unity, such as praying in the *mazjet*, praying properly, greeting ones neighbors, following Mohammad’s grooming habits (beards, short hair, wearing sorma), etc. And, he warned against absorbing un-Islamic, foreign cultural norms from television, where he worried that young people would learn to think about “romance”. He further castigated the *mujihadeen* leaders and Karzai for bolstering their own honor, by showing that they can enrich and amuse themselves instead of helping the people. He described how Mohammad turned the other cheek when attacked, instead of demonstrating his honor. The Mullah drew from Islam to promote unity and undermine tendencies to promote one’s individual interest and honor at unity’s expense.

Beginning in 2006, the Wakils relentlessly brought problems to the attention of the people and proposed rules and sanctions for discussion and voting. The topics included, but were not been limited to: people harassing girls and women, people stealing, people drinking, people taking or selling narcotics, loitering, people gambling, dog fighting (form of gambling), pigeon playing (form of gambling), people not attending prayers regularly and people flying kites in the Kabul Market Community (as opposed to the adjacent park). The Wakils presented each of these rules to the males of the Kabul Market Community at special meetings in the *mazjet* in Area B. The Wakil, Mullah and Elders described the problems created by these actions, proposed a rule and sanction and asked the men to discuss the issue. At the end of the discussion, the men voted on the different proposed solutions, and a rule was often agreed.⁴⁵⁹ The heads of the households in the community thereby granted the Wakil authority to identify people breaking this rule and sanction them.

The Wakil was very effective in sanction residents who broke these rules, except when he was faced with someone who could leverage the power of the government to protect himself from being sanctioned. In 18 of the 22 cases described in the data in which the Wakil, Mullah or elders learned that someone had broken the rules in the Kabul Market Community, they took an action to sanction the rule breaker. In 5 cases, they advised the person to no longer break the rule. In two cases, they fined people who were from outside the community. In 9 of the cases, the Wakil took the rule breaker to the police, who arrested the rule breaker. In one case, the Wakil asked the police to arrest an entire family that was operating a prostitution ring, and remove their belongings from their home. In 2 cases, the Wakil called a meeting in the mosque in Area B and had the rule breaker and his or her family expelled from the community after a community vote.

⁴⁵⁹ 110423-Rule 1-R1, 110423-Rule 2-R1, 110423-Rule 3-R1, 110423-Rule 4-R1, 110423-Rule 5-R1, 110210-5 Rules-R1.

There are 4 cases in which the Wakil had information about rule breaking, but failed to take action. Three of these cases were instances of a policeman breaking a rule. The three instances were: a policeman running a resident over and killing him while drunk; the night-time theft of 750,000 Afs from a local store; and the armed robbery of a family in Area C in which the thieves took 6,200,000 Afs and stabbed one of the family's daughters. In these cases, the Wakil reported the rule breaking to the police, but the police did nothing about it because they were involved in the crime in question. The Wakil cannot throw the policemen out of the area because even if he organized all the military aged males in the Kabul Market Community to attempt to expel the police, he would not have enough power relative to the police and the government security forces as a whole to succeed. So, the Wakil has no choice but to allow the armed robbers to continue their activities without sanction in the Kabul Market Community.

The fourth instance of the Wakil not sanctioning someone for breaking a specific rule involved a resident of Area C building a house that was taller than five stories. This instance is emblematic of many examples of people in Area C breaking rules (by not attending prayers, by not attending greeting other members of the community, by wearing immodest clothing, by drinking wine, etc.)⁴⁶⁰ and the Wakil not taking action to sanction the behavior. The Wakil failed to execute his strategy in Area C because he knew that the residents of Area C had money and connections that would allow them to avoid the Wakil's sanctions. The Wakil, Mullah and elders feared that if they report rule breaking by a person from Area C to the police, then he would use his money and connections in the government to avoid being arrested or thrown out of the community and might even strike back at the

⁴⁶⁰ See description of Area C in the Community Description, p. 13-15 of this chapter.

Wakil. In general, the Wakil lacked the power to sanction the people of Area C and feared retribution from the people of Area C. For this reason, the Wakil often did not even try to take actions in Area C.⁴⁶¹ His organizational ineffectiveness resulted not from a lack of will or organization, but from a relative lack of resources.

The Wakil also consistently applied consensus based decision making to executing the Wakil's harshest sanction, expulsion from the community. In instances in which the Wakil identified a person who repeatedly broke a community rule despite being advised not to, he held a community meeting in the *mazjet* in Area B to discuss the problem with residents and decide whether or not to throw the family out of the community. These meetings occurred twice during the period under study.⁴⁶² There was only one instance in which the Wakil expelled someone from the Kabul Market Community without a vote. In this case, a Pashtun family with five daughters, aged 16 to 20, moved to the Kabul Market Community. Over a period of three months, neighbors noticed that the girls wore clothes that were immodest and that many men visited the family's home at night. People reported these activities to the Wakil, who decided to take this matter to the police without voting on it in the *mazjet*. The police arrested the family and removed their belongings from their home.⁴⁶³ Aside from this incident, the Wakil consistently sought a consensus from the residents of the Kabul Market Community before expelling residents from the community.

⁴⁶¹ 110119-Community 1 Map Description-R1

⁴⁶² Once, when a Pashtun Ragman's Daughter ran away with a boy, demonstrating that her father had no control over the behavior of his family and was therefore a threat to order in the Kabul Market Community. The males of the community voted to throw the family out of the community. The Wakil informed the family and they moved. 110602-Community Narrative-R1. The second time was when the community found out that a brother and his half sister had committed incest. The Wakil called a meeting and they voted to throw the family out of the community. The family heard what had happened and left. 110519-Kick Out of Community-R1.

⁴⁶³ 110519-Kick Out of Community-R1.

The Wakil also consulted the community and asked the male residents to vote on proposed projects. Whenever someone raised a possible solution to a community problem, that would require members of the community to provide funds or other support, such as the lack of clean drinking water or the lack of electricity at the *mazjet*, the Wakil held a meeting to discuss possible solutions and vote on them. If the people decided to go forward with the project, the Wakil appointed one of the elders to represent the community and work with the community member who proposed the solution to implement it to ensure the community's funds were spent appropriately. There were no cases in which the Wakil collected money for a project without first asking the community to vote on it during the period under study.

As a result, the Wakil was able to collect resources from Kabul Market Community residents in order to undertake the projects to which they agreed. Aside from the salary of the Wakil,⁴⁶⁴ residents collected their own money through the Wakil to solve their problems. The residents of Areas A and B of the Kabul Market Community provided 3,000 Afs per month for the Mullah's salary.⁴⁶⁵ Each family paid 500 Afs for the water pump project, and the Wakil and the Father of Family 5 paid 15,000 Afs each for the project.⁴⁶⁶ Community families provided meals for the Mullah on a rotating basis, while individuals provided him with clothes.⁴⁶⁷ In addition, people from Area B provided significant donations for the upkeep of the mosque in Area B, including, but not limited to new carpets,⁴⁶⁸ a new roof,⁴⁶⁹ new pumps for water for ablution,⁴⁷⁰ firewood,⁴⁷¹ furnaces,⁴⁷² and

⁴⁶⁴ Kabul Municipality paid the Wakil 20,000 Afs per month as a salary.

⁴⁶⁵ 110207-Elders-R1

⁴⁶⁶ 110307-Family 5-R1

⁴⁶⁷ 110207-Elders-R1

⁴⁶⁸ 110314-Family 9-R1

⁴⁶⁹ 110307-Family 2-R1

⁴⁷⁰ 110314-Family 9-R1

⁴⁷¹ 110314-Family 9-R1

funeral items.⁴⁷³ In short, the people of the Kabul Market Community provided significant financial resources to the Wakil both upon request and of their own volition.

The Wakil was extremely effective in acting to develop a unified consensus about how people in the community ought to behave and providing them positive incentives to do so. By gaining and reinforcing agreement from the people about what the Wakil organization should do, the Wakil was able to mobilize extensive resources from within the community. These resources included the information about rule breaking and the sanctuary required to collect information through observation. One thing that differentiated the Wakil from the government and Taliban was his static position, which facilitated his ability to collect information by simply observing, even without consent, resident's behavior. Because of the limited size of the area he was attempting to control and the concurrence with the rules he generated, the Wakil did not need more resources than he could levy from a consenting population in order to sanction people when they violated rules. The Wakil consistently sanctioned the small proportion of people from the community who violated the rules, applying the community's resources with their consent to these sanctions. The Wakil only failed to do so when these residents could reach out to someone high ranking to prevent the Wakil's sanctions. The Wakil, when faced with an organization that was better resourced and willing and able to translate those resources into actions, was not effective in sanctioning behavior. The unity the Wakil generated brought him all the resources, arising from the consent of the community, he needed to control the behavior of people. However, his resources were limited to those that existed in this community of 250 households.

⁴⁷² 110314-Family 12-R1

⁴⁷³ 110307-Family 2-R1

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

GIRoA sought to impose an alien social system onto the Kabul Market Community, one conceived in Western Europe and the United States, and enshrined in the Bonn Agreement, the Afghan Constitution and the various laws and regulations put in place by the government since 2001. This social system was rooted in the rule of law and the concept of individual rights guarded by an impartial state whose leaders are selected through national elections.

The Kabul Market Community's residents agreed with this system more than the residents of any other community under study. The Kabul Market Community was relatively open to the outside world and recognized that some of the human rights, social and economic development and other initiatives could be very positive. Particularly, the residents of Area C, many of whom had lived abroad, were relatively open to the system proposed by the government. The young people of the Kabul Market Community generally embraced the idea of increased individual freedom, including control over whom they would marry, what they will would wear, how often they would attend prayers at the *mazjet* and how much they had to obey their fathers and the Wakil.

However, like the residents of the other communities, Kabul Market Community residents had profound misgivings about the government's human rights agenda as it related to women's rights and to the freedom of religion.

The people of the Kabul Market Community are not in agreement with the government's views on women or on the government's implementation of policies that

affect the lives of women and the role of women in the family.⁴⁷⁴ Men in the community talked about how the Ministry of Women's Affairs would send the police to arrest a man who tried to force the women in his family to comply with his instructions, "because the human rights came a few years ago, ... people in the community say that men are not real Muslims or real men because they cannot control their wives. This is the fault of human rights. Women should respect the speech of their husbands."⁴⁷⁵ According to the people of the Kabul Market Community, girls were increasingly trying to independently choose their husbands. Men in the community said, "At the beginning of the Karzai era, this was called bad behavior. Now, it is just called democracy."⁴⁷⁶ When the daughter of the Pashtun ragman ran away with a boy to get married in 2011, the residents of the Kabul Market Community voted to expel the family from the community because a family that is that unable to control the behavior of its members will cause disorder. "The people of the Kabul Market Community said that the bad action of this girl brought shame on all of the members of her family in the eyes of the people of the Kabul Market Community. She showed her father is a powerless person. Residents talked about how the actions many girls like this are taking are based on training they receive on their rights from the Ministry of Women's Affairs."⁴⁷⁷

In the most gruesome episode surrounding this topic in the Kabul Market Community, the men of the community discussed their anger that the police had arrested a 27 year old butcher who resided in the Kabul Market Community with his 23 year old wife. The butcher had come home to find his wife having sex with another man. The butcher stabbed his wife and her lover to death and then turned himself in to the police at the

⁴⁷⁴ 110304-Family 4-R1, 110602-Community Narrative-R1, 110609-Community Narrative-R1

⁴⁷⁵ 110207-Elders-R1

⁴⁷⁶ 110307-Family 4-R1

⁴⁷⁷ 110602-Community Narrative-R1

Chawk. The police arrested him for murder, but the people of the Kabul Market Community believed they should not have done so because he was defending his honor and by arresting him, the government was encouraging other women to commit adultery. Also, they felt that since any man in the Kabul Market Community would have done the same thing, which was the right thing, he should not have been arrested.⁴⁷⁸

Fundamentally, the men of the Kabul Market Community disagreed with the application of international human rights standards to women in their families. They felt that too much freedom for women damaged the honor and order the people of the Kabul Market Community valued. There was clearly a conflict between the girls and their fathers and brothers about their right to decide whom they would marry. Clearly, Daughter of Family 7, Daughter of Family 4 and the Daughter of the Ragman agreed with the government that they should be free to choose, but their fathers and the other males in the community did not.

The fathers and brothers of these girls did, however, agree that girls and women should attend school. They did not agree that women should work anywhere they liked, particularly in places where they would interact with men. In May of 2011, the Mullah gave a sermon saying that no women from the community should work in NGO offices with foreign men or with any men because it is *haram* and so is the salary a woman would earn there. He said when Muslim women do this, it makes Islam seem like a weak religion. During this sermon, the Mullah asked everyone to stop women in their families from working outside their homes because that is only for men and the chores of the house and

⁴⁷⁸ 110609-Community Narrative-R1

caring for the children is the work of women and it occurs within the house.⁴⁷⁹ While everyone in the community did not completely agree with the Mullah, and there were several prominent families whose mothers were teachers or whose daughters were training to become doctors, it was highly unlikely that any family in the community wanted its daughters to work alongside men in a foreign NGO. There might have been some girls or young women who would have liked to do so, but their fathers certainly would not have approved.

Many in the community were also concerned that chaos would result if people were “too free”, like the people of Area C, to do whatever they individually wanted, driving fast, fighting, not talking to one another, not praying together in the *mazjet*. They worried that the government’s emphasis on individual freedom would undermine the order generated by patriarchs over their own family members and leveraged by the Wakil to build an expectation by all residents of security. While the government said it wanted person and property to be protected in Afghanistan and the residents of the Kabul Market Community strongly agreed with that goal, they feared the government’s other policies about individual freedom eroded the very system they relied upon to protect people and property in their community.

In addition, almost no one in the Kabul Market Community agreed with the government’s blanket prescription of freedom of religion. If anyone blasphemed against Islam or attempted to convert, residents might be driven to violence in defense of Islam. During May of 2011, a preacher in Texas burned a Koran, producing grave concern among residents that they would need to do something to defend Islam from this overt attack on

⁴⁷⁹ 110507 Mazjet Friday R1

the word of Allah. Throughout the week, as violent protests erupted throughout Afghanistan in response to the Koran burning, Kabul Market Community residents discussed their anger and their concern that if the government did not do something against the man who had attacked Islam, then anyone would believe he could do this at anytime and Muslims would not defend their religion.⁴⁸⁰ The Mullah dedicated his Friday sermon to the topic, saying,

“If the government does not react to the actions of the man who burned the Holy Koran, then we should demonstrate or protest. We are Muslim and we must protest and fight because this man burned the Holy Koran and he is American... If Allah wants, he will punish this man who burned the Koran. But, we are Muslim and we should not be calm in the face of this bad action. Why did our government not protest against this action? The protest in Kabul came from the university, not from the government. The government is being too calm. The person who burned the Koran must come in front of the United Nations and explain why he has denigrated Islam. It is our personality that we must protest in the face of the UN. The UN says no one can say anything bad about other people's religions, so why did they allow this person to do this?”⁴⁸¹

Residents lauded the Mullah's comments as they walked home, cursing the Texas man who burned the Holy Koran for challenging whether Islam was the one true religion and lamenting the frailty of their government in the face of that challenge.⁴⁸²

During their discussion of the Koran burning, the Mullah and the residents touched on the major theme of discussion among Kabul Market Community residents: their disagreement, their objection to the weakness, corruption and inaction of GIROA. Like a man who was weak and unable to control his family members, the people of the Kabul Market Community saw the government as a whole as weak and unable to function.

⁴⁸⁰ 110407 Community Narrative R1

⁴⁸¹ 110409 Mazjet Friday R1

⁴⁸² 110409 Mazjet Friday R1

Residents regularly discussed community, national or international events. Over a period of 20 weeks, Researcher 1 described the topic they discussed the most during each week. The topics varied from robberies and improper actions by people in the community to government corruption to attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan to international events. While the topics varied, the conclusions drawn in the discussions were fairly consistent. Residents concluded that the government was not functioning or did not have any authority in 16 of these 20 weeks.⁴⁸³

For example, in April 2011, an Afghan Major General donned a suicide vest and attempted to assassinate the Minister of Defense by blowing up a portion of the ministry. Although the general failed, he and two other gunmen were able to infiltrate the ministry, blow up their car inside the compound, kill several guards and very nearly succeeded in assassinating the minister. When Kabul Market Community residents discussed the attack on the Ministry of Defense, they talked about how the Army could not possibly defend the country if it could not even defend the Ministry building. They believed the Minister allowed the generals to pay for their positions and did not care who they were, resulting in incidents like this. Some people in the community even said that perhaps the Minister participated in the attack in order to build a relationship with the Pakistanis so he could get a powerful position in Afghanistan in the future.⁴⁸⁴

During the same month, Kabul Market Community residents discussed police participation in the paint store robbery, concluding again that the government has no

⁴⁸³ Based on weekly Community Narratives in which R1 described the topic discussed most during that week and what residents of the Kabul Market Community said about it.

⁴⁸⁴ 110421-Community Narrative-R1

authority.⁴⁸⁵ In June of 2011, the government executed a would-be suicide bomber who had participated in a suicide attack on policemen waiting to be paid at the Kabul Bank branch in Jalalabad. The government did not allow the public to witness the execution, so Kabul Market Community residents believed the government lied about having killed the man and actually returned him to the Pakistani government. Once again, the people of the Kabul Market Community concluded that the government had no authority because it was controlled by outside powers.⁴⁸⁶ Kabul Market Community residents repeatedly expressed their belief that the government was weak and unable to exert authority. A government that cannot exert its authority, just like the head of a household, has no honor and does not embody the values of the people of the Kabul Market Community.

The Kabul Market Community's disgust and concern about the government's weakness and corruption extended to the character of its personnel and stretched from the top, with President Karzai, to the bottom, with the police who had jurisdiction over the community.

When the Mullah gave his sermon about how Allah will punish subversive people, who lie, do not follow through on promises and commit treason against their own people, he directly referenced President Karzai as an example of a subversive person. The main source of news for the people of the Kabul Market Community, which they discuss constantly, is Tolo TV. A review of the top stories on Tolo TV news during this period presents a picture

⁴⁸⁵ 110428-Community Narrative-R1

⁴⁸⁶ 110623-Community Narrative-R1

of a President whose behavior was far out of step with the values of Kabul Market Community residents.⁴⁸⁷

According to Tolo TV, Karzai participated in electoral fraud both by disqualifying candidates before the elections, buying votes and attempting to use election fraud governance mechanisms to eliminate his rivals.⁴⁸⁸ He participated in serious corruption, selling appointed positions to the highest bidder.⁴⁸⁹ The people of the Kabul Market Community believed this behavior had resulted in a government that could not function because Karzai and all of his Ministers were thieves and traitors who bought their positions in order to steal. They believed the Karzai government therefore only had power over poor people.⁴⁹⁰ Additionally, President Karzai's two brothers, Mahmoud and Ahmed Wali, were widely reported to be involved in drug production and trafficking, which was both un-Islamic and a major source of disorder in the Kabul Market Community. Further, Mahmoud, was one of the four shareholders of Kabul Bank who stole \$950 million.⁴⁹¹ Mahmoud had not been arrested or forced to pay any of the money back. Several members of the Afghan Parliament alleged on ToloTV that the President used \$80 million from the Kabul Bank heist to fund his electoral campaign.⁴⁹² Theft, corruption and disorder very publically surround the Karzai family, running counter to the values of the people of the Kabul Market Community.

⁴⁸⁷ The data include a description of the most discussed topic in Community during each week in the period under study. These Community Narratives sometimes focus on stories from the news on ToloTV. There were 20 weeks of Community Narratives in the Kabul Market Community data. 15 Community Narratives focus on news topics, as opposed to events within the Kabul Market Community. Of those 15, 14 of the stories originated on ToloTV.

⁴⁸⁸ Tolo News Bulletins July 2010-September 2011. According to the Community Narrative data, the people of the Kabul Market Community get much of the news information they discuss with one another from ToloTV News.

⁴⁸⁹ ToloNews reported that President attempted to appoint a known drug dealer to be governor of opium-rich Helmand Province. 101205-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews

⁴⁹⁰ 110304-Community Narrative-R1, 110616-Community Narrative-R1

⁴⁹¹ The other shareholders included Vice President Fahim's brother and a man closely linked to Karzai's Presidential Campaign.

⁴⁹² Dexter Filkins. "The Afghan Bank Heist," *The New Yorker*. 14 February 2010.

In the view of many Kabul Market Community residents, Karzai's corruption also undermined something else they valued, Afghan unity against other nations. The Iranian government gave Karzai bags of cash in order to increase its influence over the Afghan government. During the months surrounding the discovery of the cash payments, Karzai traveled to Tehran to participate in several regional conferences about counter-terrorism and the future of Afghanistan, despite the fact that Iran was simultaneously supporting the Taliban, imprisoning Afghan refugees and blocking Afghan fuel imports.⁴⁹³ The people of the Kabul Market Community also believed Karzai lied about executing a suicide bomber who was captured during the Taliban's attack on Kabul Bank in Jalalabad because Karzai was paid or threatened by Pakistan and was an agent of a foreign power.⁴⁹⁴ The people of the Kabul Market Community believed that Karzai did not act in the interests of the Afghan people, but in the interests of foreign countries that paid him.⁴⁹⁵

Karzai also lied about his efforts to root out corruption. The corruption itself was un-Islamic, and the President compounded his sins by lying about trying to end it. During the period when Karzai engaged in the corruption described above, he announced that fighting corruption was his top priority.⁴⁹⁶ The people of the Kabul Market Community believed Karzai had gone as far as killing revered *mujihadeen* commanders, like famous Police General Daud Daud, in order to ensure these leaders would never publically ask what

⁴⁹³ 100805-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews, 101024-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews, 101211-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews, 101226-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews, 101230-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews, 110101-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews, 110212-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews, 110224-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews, 110326-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews, 110625-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews, 110725-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews.

⁴⁹⁴ 110623-Community Narrative-R1

⁴⁹⁵ 110210-Community Narrative-R1, 110224-Community Narrative-R1, 110304-Community Narrative-R1, 110407-Community Narrative-R1, 110421-Community Narrative-R1, 110505-Community Narrative-R1, 110519-Community Narrative-R1, 110616-Community Narrative-R1, 110623-Community Narrative-R1, 110630-Community Narrative-R1

⁴⁹⁶ 101022-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews

happened to the billions of dollars in international aid that had flowed into Afghanistan and had not resulted in improved living conditions or services.⁴⁹⁷ Finally, Kabul Market Community residents believed Karzai's corruption led to abuses of power by the government officials who "bought their chair" from President Karzai. President Karzai appointed Ministers, Provincial Governors and District Governors. The Mullah made an example of their abuse of power resulting from corruption the topic of a Friday sermon. He described how the brother of a District Governor in Herat, along with 5 men who worked for the District Governor, gang raped a 16 year old girl after killing her father. The Mullah reported that the men were never punished.⁴⁹⁸

Other people disrespected Karzai and attacked him and he could not fight back, demonstrating he had little honor. For example, Hamid Karzai's brother, Mahmoud, said in an interview on ToloTV that he was disappointed that he had supported his brother's presidential campaign because President Karzai preferred his own personal agendas and visions over improving the living standards of Afghans, which had in general worsened.⁴⁹⁹ The fact that President Karzai's own brother, who was protected from prosecution by Karzai for numerous illegal activities, including drug trafficking and embezzlement, would publically shame him indicated to Kabul Market Community residents that Karzai was weak and could not control his own family. This lack of honor did not embody the values of the people of the Kabul Market Community.

More than any other community, the Kabul Market Community wanted GIRoA to succeed in establishing order, rebuilding infrastructure, producing economic development,

⁴⁹⁷ 110505-Community Narrative-R1

⁴⁹⁸ 110204-Mosque Friday-R1

⁴⁹⁹ 110511-ToloNews Bulletin-ToloNews

connecting them to the outside world and protecting their individual rights. They agreed with vast majority of what the government wanted to do. However, they were angry and concerned about the government's inability to take actions, and the poor behavior and corruption of its leaders.

The police on the Chawk were the main face of the government in the Kabul Market Community and they did not embody the values of community residents either. First and foremost, the police in the Kabul Market Community did not value unity with residents. The police did not interact with the people of the Kabul Market Community like members of the community. They did not greet people or treat them like equals, undermining the unity of the Kabul Market Community. They did not attend prayers at the community *mazjet* or meetings there. As such, they appeared un-Islamic to the Kabul Market Community residents because they were not concerned with the well-being of other Muslims. Additionally, some of the police pursued their personal satisfaction (through mostly un-Islamic activities) that sometimes damaged the interests of the people of the Kabul Market Community.

In addition to drinking and corruption, Kabul Market Community residents believe that the police participated in organized crime in the community. These activities ran counter to the most important values of the members of the Kabul Market Community: Islam, order, unity and good behavior. There was a paint store in the community that sat 50 meters from a police container that served as a station and housing for four policemen. The policemen were supposed to patrol the area at night to protect the homes and businesses from gangs of armed thieves who plagued the area. One night, thieves noisily broke the front plate glass windows of the paint store and stole 750,000 Afs from the register. Kabul

Market Community residents believed the police participated in this robbery because there was no way they could have missed the event and because they made no effort to find the thieves afterward. When the Wakil complained to the District Police Chief, he moved the police who had been involved to another community, but warned the Wakil not to take his complaints any higher in the government.⁵⁰⁰

On another evening, six armed thieves broke into the home of a wealthy Uzbek medicine importer in Area C, holding the family at gunpoint and demanding all their money. When they had collected 6,200,000 Afs, the thieves stabbed one of the importer's daughters in order to create confusion to facilitate their escape. When this incident occurred, the people of the Kabul Market Community discussed it often, saying that the police had stolen this money and stabbed that girl. They said the police patrolled the area at night and they would have seen six armed thieves. So, if they did not arrest them, then they must have been working with them. One resident said, "The big problem of our community is insecurity and robberies. All of the police are thieves because they could not find the thieves. This incident demonstrates the weakness of the government. It is a shame on the police that they cannot maintain the security of an area. When they cannot maintain the security of an area like this, how can they maintain the security of the country? And how they can stand against enemies of that country?"⁵⁰¹ Corruption in the government made Kabul Market Community residents believe the government and the people in it were weak and lacked honor.

The people of the Kabul Market Community believed the police were extremely weak, corrupt and ineffective because many of them were boys who were thrown out of

⁵⁰⁰ 110428-Community Narrative-R1

⁵⁰¹ 110207-Community Narrative-R1

their homes elsewhere in Afghanistan by their families. As one resident of the community explained, “Many of the police act like animals. They kick and slap people and say, ‘Why did you do this?’ They are not educated. The police should serve the people justly and behave well. They should act like humans. They should advise people not to do bad actions. If I am fighting with someone, they decide who to support by deciding who has more power, rather than understanding what is going on and fairly judging the conflict.”⁵⁰² The police living in the checkpoints listened to loud music and yelled at people because they felt like demonstrating their dominance over others. The police did not embody the values of Kabul Market Community residents because they lacked honor, created disorder, behaved in un-Islamic ways and did not participate in the life of the community.

In short, government personnel, from national level leaders to the police who interacted with the residents of the Kabul Market Community daily, failed to embody the values those residents, of Islam, unity, order, good behavior and honor.

The weakness to which Kabul Market Community residents objected was not just a perception. When we evaluate the actions government personnel took within the community, we find that it is an organization that was ineffective in causing its personnel to act according to its intent. The government hovers above the community, seldom touching it. A review of police and other government personnel’s actions in the Kabul Market Community provides insight into the extent to which the government was effective in translating the enormous resources it received from the international community into actions by its personnel.

⁵⁰² 110421-Community Narrative-R1

The most important task of the government was to maintain security of person and property by preventing people from breaking the law. While the police on the Chawk should have been patrolling, talking to residents of the Kabul Market Community, shoppers and shopkeepers in the market, they seldom interacted with the population to identify people who were breaking the rules. The police did, however, often arrest people when the Wakil asked them to do so. Police assisted the Wakil on a case by case basis, based on an evaluation of whether they would endanger themselves by arresting a violator, and whether they would be losing something they might otherwise have had, like a bribe. As long as the action passed this test, the police were willing to arrest violators the Wakil brought to them and release residents he requested they release no matter whether they had broken a law or not. In that way, the police were assisting the Wakil, who was maintaining order according to the rules Kabul Market Community residents had created, but they were also not working toward the government's objective of establishing the rule of law.

In nine instances in the data set, the Wakil provided information to the police or brought someone to the police and the police arrested them for something they had done in the Kabul Market Community. The Mullah and elders arrested 4 Powderies who were using drugs inside the community, one in the *mazjet* bathroom.⁵⁰³ The other offenders were people who got in fights and people who harassed members of the community while drunk.⁵⁰⁴ In one instance, the Mullah identified a house of prostitution and asked the police to arrest the people living there and remove their belongings from the house and the police complied.⁵⁰⁵ In another instance, the Wakil asked to have a resident arrested for gambling and fighting and the person remained in jail for 20 days. When the Wakil requested he be

⁵⁰³ 110423-Rule 4-R1

⁵⁰⁴ 110210-5 Important Rules-R1

⁵⁰⁵ 110519-Kick Out of Community-R1

released, the police immediately released him.⁵⁰⁶ The police did not arrest people at the Wakil's request when the violators were policemen or high-ranking people.⁵⁰⁷ In cases involving high ranking people, the Wakil often did not even try to have them arrested for fear of retribution.

The police assisted the Wakil by arresting people selling selling alcohol, narcotics and pornography in the market when the Wakil provided them with information. Kabul Market Community residents informed the Wakil that a young man running a video and music shop in the market was also selling wine, hashish and pornography. The Wakil informed the police and they arrested the video store owner.⁵⁰⁸ The owner of a tea shop in the market was selling narcotics in his shop. Residents told the Wakil about the problem and he went to the shop to investigate. While there, the Wakil saw the tea seller give a baggie of narcotics to a customer in return for 50 Afs. The Wakil approached the police on the Chawk and informed them of the tea seller's activities. The police arrested the tea seller and closed his shop.⁵⁰⁹ There are no incidents in the data in which the Wakil provided information about these illegal activities to the police and they failed or refused to act.

However, there is no indication that the police took any action of their own accord to identify people who were selling narcotics, alcohol or other contraband. The data contained no descriptions of police arresting people for these activities unless the Wakil informed them. Since the consumption of narcotics and alcohol was so prevalent in and around the market, this inaction indicated a lack of will to ferret out people selling contraband in the market.

⁵⁰⁶ 110307-Family 1-R1

⁵⁰⁷ 110324-Community Narrative-R1, 110328-Five Government Actions-R1

⁵⁰⁸ 110118-5 Police Actions-R1

⁵⁰⁹ 110423-Rule 4-R1

The data showed the police conducted the occasional patrol through the Kabul Market Community because they occasionally arrest people who are breaking rules inside the community without Wakil involvement. There are 7 instances in the data set in which the police arrested someone inside the Kabul Market Community without the involvement of the Wakil. In three cases, the police arrested Powderies, as opposed to residents of the community. In two cases, addicts were smoking powder behind the apartment buildings that sit on the main street that forms a boundary between the market and the community when a police patrolman saw the person and arrested him.⁵¹⁰ In another incident, two addicts were walking through the Kabul Market Community, carrying shoes they had stolen from the *mazjet* in Area B when the police saw them and arrested them.⁵¹¹ In another case, a young man who was a resident of the Kabul Market Community was standing in front of a house in the community talking on his cell phone. A policeman saw him loitering there and arrested him.⁵¹² In another instance, two pigeon players from the Kabul Market Community were fighting in the street because one of them had stolen the other's pigeon. The policemen arrested both of them.⁵¹³ In another incident, there was a dogfight and people had gathered to bet on it in the park adjacent to the Kabul Market Community. The men whose dogs were fighting bet on them. One of them lost and the other refused to pay him and the two men got in a physical fight. Someone called the police and they arrested both men.⁵¹⁴ Finally, the police arrested the butcher who turned himself in for killing his wife and her lover after he caught them committing adultery.⁵¹⁵

⁵¹⁰ 110118-5 Police Actions-R1

⁵¹¹ Ibid

⁵¹² 110423-Rule 5-R1

⁵¹³ 110423-Rule 2-R1

⁵¹⁴ 110423-Rule 3-R1

⁵¹⁵ 110609-Community Narrative-R1

Police seldom patrolled the area and did not consistently arrest people engaged in wrongdoing. There were gangs of armed thieves who targeted the Kabul Market Community. There were two incidents, the paint store robbery⁵¹⁶ and the armed robbery of the Uzbek medicine merchant's home ⁵¹⁷, in which they committed robberies at night, but the police did not arrest anyone. In both cases, residents believed the police were involved in the robberies or were at least paid to look the other way.⁵¹⁸

In cases where a perpetrator had more coercive force or connections to high ranking people than do the police did, police never acted on reports of crime. This occurred even when the victim can identify the perpetrator, there were multiple witnesses and everyone knew where the perpetrator lived. For example, a Prince of the City, who is related to a powerful *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*, robbed a local merchant who had been carrying a sack of 200,000 Afs in cash from the market to one of the banks. The merchant went directly to the police with several witnesses and reported that the specific Prince of the City, who lives near the Kabul Market Community, had stolen 200,000 Afs from the merchant. The police told the man and the witnesses there was nothing they could do. It is unclear whether the police take bribes from the Prince of the City, or are just afraid his relatives might punish him or the Prince of the City might attack them without repercussion since no one is willing to arrest him.⁵¹⁹

It appears that the police were involved in at least some of these armed robberies. They either accepted bribes to look the other way, they participated or they were too scarred to act when they knew of crimes. Either way, these police actions are not an

⁵¹⁶ 110428-Community Narrative-R1

⁵¹⁷ 110207-Community Narrative-R1

⁵¹⁸ 110324-Community Narrative-R1, 110428-Community Narrative-R1

⁵¹⁹ 110328-Five Government Actions-R1

effective execution of the government's strategy for protecting person and property or enforcing the rule of law.

During the period under study, Kabul Market Community residents handled many instances of rule breaking themselves without the police, indicating the police do not patrol very often. The data show that in 11 of the 52 incidents in which someone broke a rule in the Kabul Market Community, the residents used their own coercive force to frighten or punish the rule breaker without police assistance. Incidents in which residents got in physical fights with people who harassed young women from the area, drunk residents and non-residents, Powderies taking narcotics or stealing things, young men not from the community loitering outside people's homes, etc. were common in the data. This fact indicates that the police did not patrol very often in the Kabul Market Community.

The police did arrest people who were not high ranking when they saw them violating a rule on the Chawk. In particular, they arrested several young men for harassing young women and young men on the Chawk. Normally, these young men were trying to start a sexual relationship with other young people, many of whom were walking home from high school, the university or work. In one case, a non-resident of the Kabul Market Community harassed a young female college student who lived in the Kabul Market Community. The police saw this incident on the Chawk and arrested him. In another incident, a boy from the Kabul Market Community was on the Chawk when he harassed a young female. The police arrested the young man and let the young lady head home.⁵²⁰ In another incident, a boy from the Kabul Market Community was walking home across the Chawk when an unfamiliar boy approached him to try to form a sexual relationship with

⁵²⁰ 110118-Police Actions-R1

him, saying he was very beautiful. Enraged, the boy from the Kabul Market Community hit the other boy and the two boys got in a fight. The police arrested both boys.⁵²¹

The police on the Chawk were not very effective in mediating disputes about property in the market. For example, Father of Family 10 got into a physical fight with another Kabul Market Community resident who sells dresses in the market. Father of Family 10 had rented a fancy dress for his wife to wear to a wedding. When he returned it, the dress seller noticed the item was ripped. The dress seller pointed out the problem. Father of Family 10 did not apologize or offer any money to the dress seller. Instead, he became indignant and insulted the dress seller. The two men came to blows and people in the market separated them. The police did not intervene and no one called them.⁵²² In another example, Son of Family 7 is a butcher in the market. A customer bought meat from him with a 500 Af note and was owed 300 Afs in return. The butcher did not give him change and when the customer returned, the two men shouted at one another. No one called the police and the police did not arrive. The butcher refused to give the change and the customer left angry.⁵²³ There are no examples in the data of the police mediating a dispute over property or arresting someone for stealing property in the market.

Separately, the police occasionally punish people for actions that are not illegal. For example, the Son of Family 7 smoked a cigarette inside his butcher shop during Ramadan. This is a violation of Islamic law and a sin, but is not illegal. One of the policemen on the Chawk saw the Son of Family 7 smoking and chastised him. He saw the Son of Family 7

⁵²¹ Ibid

⁵²² 110314-Family 10-R1

⁵²³ 1103014-Family 7-R1

smoking again during Ramadan. He entered the shop and slapped the butcher.⁵²⁴ Smoking during Ramadan is certainly something the Wakil would not tolerate in the Kabul Market Community and it is a sin, but this punishment was not an example of the effective application of the government's strategy for Islam, which involves not physically punishing people for actions that are un-Islamic, but not illegal. It was also a violation of the freedom of religion and does not further the government's goal of the rule of law. This incident indicates that the rules the police enforced were often not dictated by the government, but instead by their own sensibilities, which was not very effective for the organization.

On the whole, the police on the Chawk were inactive. They did not patrol regularly, seeking to deter or identify rule breakers. When someone brought them information about crimes, or someone broke the law in front of them, it was far from a sure thing that they would act upon the information by sanctioning the violator, as the government intended. As one Kabul Market Community resident put it, "It is always the choice of the police as to whether they would help or not. They might not choose to help in this case. They might think, 'Why would I help this person?' They would not get in trouble if they did not help an average 20 something guy."⁵²⁵

The police would only act if they thought the person who had a problem might be high ranking or know someone who was. In this case, they feared they might get in trouble if they did not help.⁵²⁶ It was difficult to discern who might be wealthy, well-connected or high ranking. As a result, the best choice for policemen was often inaction because even if a high ranking person committed a crime, a policeman could be punished for arresting him. These problems help explain why the police did not actively pursue criminals in the market

⁵²⁴ 110314-Family 7-R1

⁵²⁵ 110307-Family 2-R1

⁵²⁶ 110307-Family 5-R1

or patrol the community with more regularity. The problem may also have been rooted in the lack of a feeling of kinship and responsibility among the police for providing security in the Kabul Market Community. The fact the police did not greet residents and ask how they were or attend prayers in the *mazjet* indicated they were not treating residents with respect, like humans, whom they are responsible as Muslims to protect.

In the only incident in which the police on the Chawk fought the Taliban, they were able to prevent the Taliban from kidnapping their commander, repel the Taliban, who fled in their vehicle south on the road to Logar past dozens of government checkpoints. However, none of the police or soldiers in the checkpoints even fired at the Taliban vehicle, as it sped past with guns pointed out of the windows.

On a typical early spring afternoon in March of 2011, the market was bustling and the ten police who live in the container on the Chawk were watching shoppers, shopkeepers and travelers hurry past. Suddenly, a big, black sports utility vehicle sped onto the circle and hopped the curb onto the Chawk. Five Taliban fighters emerged with AK 47s and began firing at the police. The police returned fire and civilians, the police and the Taliban ran for cover from the exchange of automatic weapon fire. Realizing they had a limited time before the military quick reaction force arrived, the Taliban got back in their vehicle and fled, firing out of the windows with their AK47s. As they progressed south on the road to Logar, where the Taliban had a comfortable sanctuary 80 kilometers south of the capital, they encountered dozens of checkpoints. With their windows down and their AKs pointed at the soldiers and police manning the checkpoints, the Taliban fighters escaped unopposed after their assault on the Chawk, which left one civilian dead and one policeman severely

wounded.⁵²⁷ The police on the Chawk acquitted themselves well, returning fire against the Taliban and the Taliban were correct in fearing the government Quick Reaction Force would arrive, as it did five minutes after they left. This effectiveness by the police stands in stark contrast to the total ineffectiveness of the government checkpoints south of the city which first allowed the Taliban fighters into the city with AK47s and ammunition and then allowed them to flee unmolested after shooting up a major market in central Kabul.

Aside from its effort to establish the rule of law, the government also aimed to improve infrastructure as part of an effort to develop the economy and to win the support of the populace by assuaging grievances about poor infrastructure. Since the Kabul Market Community is in central Kabul on a main road and houses a large and important market, it is a good place to evaluate the extent to which the government applied the enormous external resources it received to repairing roads, providing electricity, water and other basic services.

The government undertook some infrastructure improvement projects in the Kabul Market Community, though not many. It paved the main roads around the Chawk as part of a large project to pave Kabul's main thoroughfares in 2010. Additionally, the government announced a project that would take one of the unpaved, small streets in the Kabul Market Community, pave it and turn it into a medium sized road. The project would connect the Kabul Market Community and the Chawk to a part of town that is currently very difficult to reach. Other than these projects, which no one in the Kabul Market Community requested, the government did not initiate and pay for any infrastructure improvements in the

⁵²⁷ 110503 Taliban Actions R1

community despite the many infrastructure problems in the community that result from shelling during the 1990s and remain unrepaired.

The government's implementation of projects was not very effective. The roads surrounding the Chawk began to disintegrate during early 2011, only six months after they had been paved. Large chunks of asphalt broke off of the road, snarling traffic. The road repairs may even have made the roads worse than they were prior to the re-paving project. The roads disintegrated because the contracting company, owned by Vice President Fahim's brother, used inferior building materials in order to make more money on the \$10 million contract for paving roads throughout the capital. The government did not detect the problem until the roads began disintegrating. When that happened, the government demanded the company repave the streets. According to the contract, the company was required to repave streets at its own expense if they disintegrated within 7 years of being paved. However, the company refused to do so unless the government paid half of the cost of the repaving (another \$5 million). The government did not have the power to enforce the terms of the contract and instead hired a second contractor to start the project over for \$10 million.⁵²⁸

A more telling aspect of the government's ineffectiveness in repairing the infrastructure was the fact that no one from the government attempted to ascertain what the infrastructure requirements were in the Kabul Market Community and that when the Wakil approached the government to ask for assistance, the government, despite enormous external infrastructure funds, claimed it lacked the resources to help. For example, the Kabul Market Community collected its own funds in order to install public water pumps and

⁵²⁸ Community Narrative R1

the pipes that would bring city water to the community after the government claimed it lacked the very small amount of funds that were required to do so. Residents could only convince the government to allow the community to undertake this project and access city water because Father of Family 5 lived in the Kabul Market Community and worked at the Ministry of Water and Electricity. It was only this personal relationship that allowed the government to even allow the community to pay for its own infrastructure improvement.⁵²⁹ Whatever the government was spending its infrastructure funds on was not emanating from requirements at the community level, it was emanating from bureaucrats and political leaders who often had financial interests in the execution of particular projects that would benefit them.

Part of the government's strategy was to promote the practice of Islam in Afghanistan. The government was not effective in taking actions to promote the practice of Islam in the Kabul Market Community. The people of Areas A and B were not wealthy, and yet they paid entirely for the reconstruction and upkeep of the *mazjet* in Area B. The people of Areas A and B also pay the salary of their Mullah. The only action that the government took to promote the practice of Islam in Areas A and B was when they began providing public electricity (which they should have been providing for several years) to the *mazjet* in Area B. This action resulted from the Father of Family 5, who works for the Municipality, using his connections to ensure it was provided. It was not part of a systematic government effort to ensure less well-endowed *mazjets* had electricity.⁵³⁰

While the Ministry of Hajj and Mosques did not assist the people of Areas A and B in reconstructing their bombed out mosque, it did pay for the construction of a new *mazjet* in

⁵²⁹ 110307 Family 5 R1

⁵³⁰ 110307 Family 5 R1

Area C, where the residents each had enough money to pay for a brand new house that cost in excess of 2,750,000 Afs. The residents of Area C were well-connected and high ranking, so they received assistance they did not need in building a new *mazjet*, which is arguably redundant with the one in Area B, and which they seldom used. But, the low and middle income residents of Areas A and B, who were far more numerous than the residents of Area C, received no assistance. The actions the government took in the Kabul Market Community to promote the practice of Islam were not aligned with government strategy for improving the practice of Islam by maintaining *mazjets*, providing utilities to mosques and paying the salaries of Mullahs.

The government has been very effective in taking actions to provide access to education to the school aged population of the Kabul Market Community, where all of the school aged children, both male and female attend school through the end of high school and often beyond. The government has built or rebuilt the schools they attend and hired teachers. However, the demand for education has far outstripped the government's number of teachers. As a result, all students attend classes for half the day at most schools.

The government has not followed its strategy for ensuring quality education by having *shuras*. The Ministry of Education described school *shuras* in its plans. The *shuras* were to be comprised of parents and community leaders, who could use them to hold teachers and administrators accountable. The data do not show any *shuras* occurring for any of the schools in the area surrounding the Kabul Market Community, or even the elementary school that is part of the community. In fact, the elementary school in the community did not even consult with the Wakil and elders. The government was effective in taking actions to include parents and communities in its activities.

A major factor causing government ineffectiveness in the Kabul Market Community was systemic corruption. Government personnel often took actions in order to achieve their own goals, as opposed to those of the government. Government personnel could choose not to take actions they have been directed to take for the government in return for money. Or, they could refuse to take those actions unless they are paid. As one resident described, "When you go to the municipality now, they just ask, 'How much will you pay me so I will do my work?'"⁵³¹

This problem is extremely common in the Kabul Market Community and in the interaction between residents and the government in the city. Researcher 1 was asked to describe five interactions with the government. In each interaction, a bribe was somehow involved. A high school teacher asked for a bribe in return for entry to Kabul University and was fired by the principal. A hospital guard allowed someone into the hospital after visiting hours in return for a bribe. A boy who was playing with a knife was stopped by a policeman and tried to bribe him. The policeman slapped him and arrested him. But, when the police checkpoint commander was alone with the boy, he asked for the bribe and released him. A shop owner was robbed by a Prince of the City who lives in the Kabul Market Community on his way to the bank in the community. The police refused to do anything about it because they receive bribes from the Prince of the City and are afraid of him. A boy was caught driving without a license by the Traffic Police on the Chawk, paid a bribe and was allowed to continue on his way.⁵³²

⁵³¹ 110307-Family 5-R1

⁵³² 110328-Five Government Actions-R1

Corruption was particularly rife in the market on and around the Chawk. “The shopkeepers all give money or goods and services to the police on the circle to ensure they will provide security. If someone said they would not provide money, goods or services to the police, then the police would not provide them with security. If the person who did not pay them got in a fight, then the police would say it was their fault. The police will come and beat the person who is fighting with you if you pay them. You will automatically be right and they will automatically be wrong.”⁵³³

Additionally, because people at higher levels of the government organization were involved in corruption, lower ranking personnel were often afraid that taking actions prescribed in the government’s strategies could get them in trouble. If a policeman arrested someone for breaking the law and that person bribed someone higher in the system, the policeman could be in trouble for arresting them. It was difficult for the police to judge when taking an action would get them in trouble and when it would not. The best choice in many cases was therefore to do nothing, making the government less effective.

Police also accepted bribes in return for protecting or not preventing organized criminal organizations from robbing stores and wealthy residents in the Kabul Market Community. In these incidents, the police were selling their authority to arrest people for violating rules forbidding armed robbery to people intent on committing it. The police were therefore not just ineffective in acting upon the government’s intent, they were going directly against the government’s intent, making it impossible for anyone to sanction armed organized criminal gangs.

⁵³³ 110403-Mazjet Friday-R1

On the whole, the government was ineffective as an organization in the Kabul Market Community, where its personnel more often than not failed to take the actions the government intended. The police seldom patrolled in order to deter or identify people breaking the law. When people broke the law in front of them, the police evaluated on a case by case basis whether or not to arrest the person, assessing the risk that the person might be “high ranking” and therefore able to punish them for doing so. Kabul Market Community residents suspected the police additionally abet organized crime in the community, facilitating actions they were supposed to deter and sanction. Further, the police were undisciplined, engaging in various illegal or un-Islamic activities, drinking, playing loud music, not praying or greeting people. The remainder of the government did not respond to requests for infrastructure development, and when it initiated infrastructure projects, failed to provide oversight, leading to very poor quality infrastructure.

The government’s ineffectiveness meant that even though it had enormous external resources, and Kabul Market Community residents were more likely than most people in Afghanistan to support the government’s goals and obey its rules, the government had little control over the behavior of people in the Kabul Market Community. On rules with which residents and or the Wakil disagreed, the government had little control in large part because of the inaction of its personnel.

So, while all female school-aged children from the Kabul Market Community attended school because residents and the Wakil want them to, every single wedding during this period involved the exchange of a brideprice. Not a single one of the girls reported this violation of the law and their rights to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs.⁵³⁴ And, the only

⁵³⁴ 110207-Elders-R1

female to choose her own husband was the daughter of the Pashtun Ragman. Her family was thrown out of the community because she exercised what the government would call her right to choose whom she would marry. If the Pashtun Ragman and his family had not fled in advance of being physically expelled, the police would likely have assisted the Wakil in expelling him.

The story of a fresh fruit seller who lost his daughter gambling provides an example of the extent to which women, even in a liberal, urban community like the Kabul Market Community, are still treated as property, despite the government's laws. During the winter of 2010, a Panshiri Tajik resident who owned a shop in the market began going to the homes of friends who also sold fruit in the market. The Panshiri fruit seller made about 40,000 Afs per month. The first time he gambled with his friends, he won 200,000 Afs. Emboldened, he gambled again, but this time he lost 300,000 Afs. He decided to gamble a third time, but this time he lost so much money that he had to give his daughter away as a bride for one of the gamblers to whom he had lost. The daughter of the Panshiri fruit seller was only 17 years old. She was a very good and dutiful daughter. She was the number one ranked student in her 10th grade class and taught the children about the Koran at the *mazjet* in Area B. Nine days after her father lost her to the gambler, she packed all of her belongings and moved to the gambler's home. She told her father, "I will never forgive you because you celebrated my wedding without my permission."⁵³⁵ The daughter of the Panshiri Fruit Seller did not approach the Ministry of Women's Affairs or the police about the fact that her father had gambled her away. She simply complied with her family's rules. The government had no control over whether the father gambled or whether he sold his daughter.

⁵³⁵ 110210-5 Important Rules -R1

Similarly, females in the Kabul Market Community were not allowed to leave their homes without the permission of a male relative. There was only one woman who is free of these rules in the community and that was because she is a widow with no male family members other than her son.⁵³⁶ Although the government encouraged them to do so, women in the community never approached the Ministry of Women's Affairs to complain about the restrictions on these choices.

Similarly, Kabul Market Community residents were not free to practice whatever religion they pleased as they pleased. They were, rather, forced by their Wakil to attend prayers and not allowed to play music, smoke or otherwise break the fast during Ramadan. While some residents would have liked to assert their religious freedoms, if they had complained to the police, the police would not have helped them.

The government had no control over the behavior of Kabul Market Community residents because of its ineffectiveness. In place of the government, the Wakil exerted his control and people obeyed his rules. The same thing was true for the rules on which the Wakil and government agreed, governing various illegal activities like theft, gambling, drinking, prostitution, taking or selling narcotics, etc. The Wakil acted to identify rule breaking and sanction it. Sometimes, he reached out to the police to ask for their assistance arresting and jailing someone, but this would not happen without the Wakil. And, it only happened sometimes because the government was often too ineffective to cause its personnel to act as it intended in cases that involved risk or the possibility of financial reward.

⁵³⁶ 110307-Family 2-R1

In fact, the government ineffectiveness occurred when police sell their authority to arrest people for armed robbery and other transgressions to the transgressor. If the police were not present, the Wakil would organize residents to provide their own security. But, because the police have been paid to specifically allow the armed robbery to occur, to facilitate that robbery, the Wakil cannot intervene. In these cases, the government was so ineffective in causing its police to identify crime and arrest criminals that it would have been better not to have police than to have them. At least in that case, the Wakil might have organized the residents to patrol and sanction. Since the police were protecting the criminals, the Wakil would have had to go against the police in order to enforce rules preventing armed robbery in the Kabul Market Community.

The Taliban

The Taliban are an organization seeking to impose an alien system of governance upon the people of the Kabul Market Community. The Taliban did not care that the goals of the Taliban were anathema to the values of the people of the Kabul Market Community or whether the residents agreed with their rules and sanctions.

None of the residents of the community agreed with the Taliban's intent to deploy its young fighters to violently sanction residents for violating a set of rules with which residents of the Kabul Market Community do not agree. Even those who might have agreed with a rule, like adult males should pray five times a day in the community *mazjet*, disagreed with the idea that those who violate the rule should be beaten.

While Kabul Market Community residents strongly valued Islam, they did not concur with the type of Islam the Taliban enforce. Community residents remembered the Taliban's enforcement of their vision of living as in the time of the Prophet Mohammad as harsh, puritanical and isolationist.⁵³⁷ ⁵³⁸ The Taliban believe that anything that could distract people from worshipping Allah is *haram* and should be violently punished. They believe that exposure to foreign cultures and modernity pollutes the pure form of Muslim life they generate through violently enforcing the rules of Islam.⁵³⁹ The Taliban believe that their interpretation of Islam is the only valid one and that it is their duty to violently enforce that interpretation on others in order to cleanse and purify Afghan society.⁵⁴⁰

Kabul Market Community residents made Islam an integral part of their daily lives, praying 3-5 times a day at the community mosque, giving charity and caring for the needs of their neighbors and community.⁵⁴¹ They saw their actions as either making Allah happy or making him unhappy. They believed Allah would be the judge of their actions when they died, making a tally of their good actions and their bad actions. They believed that tally would serve as the basis for his decision about whether to allow them into Paradise or cast

⁵³⁷ 110307-Family 2-R1, 110307-Family 5-R1

⁵³⁸ Antonio Giustozzi. *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. p. 12-3. Rashid, p. 21-25.

⁵³⁹ 110403-Mosque Friday-R1, 110503-Taliban Actions-R1, 110630-Community Narrative-R1. Antonio Giustozzi. *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. p. 12-3.

⁵⁴⁰ Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Second Edition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p.21-5.

⁵⁴¹ Males over the age of 10 attend prayers at the community mosque on average 2.8 times per day. The data set includes 259 actions that people took in the Kabul Market Community. Of those actions, 30 were charity or charity related. People gave charity to poor residents. They gave charity to the mosque. They provided services or goods to people in the community. During the period under study, the people of the Kabul Market Community donated money for new carpets, repairing the water system, a new roof, new funerary items, and wood and stoves. In addition, every family that is able gives money for the Mullah's salary every month and provides him with food and clothing. All of the males in the Kabul Market Community greet one another regularly, with the exception of the Father and Son of Family 7 (who are considered to be a bad family) and the Son of Family 4 (who is a translator for ISAF, is seldom in the area and when he is, he acts out). The Father of Family 1 used to not greet people, take narcotics and gamble. But, the Wakil, Mullah and elders advised him to change his behavior and now he greets everyone in the community.

them into Hell on Judgment Day.⁵⁴² The people of the Kabul Market Community believed it was not the role of Muslim believers to punish people for their un-Islamic actions. They believed that was the province of Allah.⁵⁴³ This more voluntary, Judgment Day focused form of Islamic belief and practice did not fit well with the Taliban's goals.

Kabul Market Community residents generally believed the Prophet Mohammad ruled the *umma* through consensus and they have applied those beliefs to the development of a system of order that is based on the identification of problems and solutions through community meetings, voting on rules, informing people of rules and sanctions, and voting on serious sanctions, like expelling people from the Kabul Market Community. This system fit well with the Islamic beliefs of the members of the Kabul Market Community. The Taliban's system of violently imposing rules only the Taliban determine, without informing people of the rules or advising them to change their behavior did not fit well.⁵⁴⁴ Further, the behavior of Taliban fighters did not fit with the concept of Islamic governance the people of the Kabul Market Community valued. Taliban fighters saw themselves as an outside force whose purpose was to bring their interpretation of Islamic order to a corrupt society of which they were fundamentally not a part. This aloofness did not fit with the unity the people of the Kabul Market Community valued.

Further, Kabul Market Community residents believed that when people try to force others to practice Islam, they harm Islam by making it a burden, thereby undermining true, heart-felt adherence to Islam. At the celebration of Mohammad's birthday, the men of the community discussed their disapproval of the Taliban's efforts to force people to practice

⁵⁴² 110311-Mosque Friday-R1, 110430-Mosque Friday-R1, 110514-Mosque Friday-R1

⁵⁴³ 110407-Community Narrative-R1

⁵⁴⁴ 110210-5 Important Rules-R1

Islam. The topic of their conversation was the Battle of Ahod, in which the Prophet fought pagans. The pagans beat the Prophet Mohammad and they cut out one of his teeth. Mohammad did not want to fight back against them, even though they had caused him great pain. He said he would not fight them and that he should love them even though they had hurt him. He said they were not bad and that they simply lacked knowledge of Islam. He said, "We are Muslims. We are not animals." The pagan men, boys and women stoned the Prophet and he bled from many wounds. But still, he was not angry. He was loving. He said that Allah would punish them and that it was not his place to do so. Kabul Market Community residents asserted that Islam could not be improved by forcing people to become Muslims. If people wanted to be Muslims, they would become Muslims. Residents believed that no person can force another person to become a Muslim. They recalled the Taliban's practice of forcing men to go pray at the *mazjet*. Taliban fighters would pull men out of their cars and beat them and take them to the *mazjet*. The Taliban claimed that they were good Muslims because they were making people pray. But, the Taliban fighters were not at the mosque praying. Kabul Market Community residents discussed their belief that you can make anyone else pray. You can make them go to the *mazjet*, but you cannot make them pray.⁵⁴⁵ People in the community expect that if the Taliban returns to power, they will once again decide how they believe people should behave and force them to behave in that way, placing their violent enforcement of unpopular restrictions under the banner of Islam, thereby harming the holy religion of Islam.⁵⁴⁶

Kabul Market Community residents held the most liberal views about the role of women in society of the residents of any of the communities under study. They believed women should be able to go to stores and interact with male merchants, within the confines

⁵⁴⁵ 110307-Family 5-R1

⁵⁴⁶ 110210 Important Rules R1

of the community. They believed women could and should have jobs as doctors or teachers, interacting with other females. And, they strongly believed it was incumbent on all parents to allow their daughters to attend school. However, Kabul Market Community residents continued, like nearly everyone else in Afghanistan, to believe that women should not be allowed to leave their homes without permission from their male relatives and should limit interaction with males to whom they are not related to a bare minimum. But, they certainly did not agree with the Taliban that women should be confined to homes in which the windows are painted black and only allowed to leave in case of emergency and then only clad in a *burkha* and accompanied by a male relative.

Most importantly, Kabul Market Community residents valued honor. They valued their ability to demonstrate that they could do as they pleased, whether that meant praying in the *mazjet* five times a day or listening to playboy music or in some cases drinking and gambling. They were strongly opposed to the idea that a group of young men would beat older men, young men, women and children in the street because these young men had decided they could do so. By beating people and deciding how they should behave, the Taliban were demonstrating their power and shaming the families of the individuals they beat. When a Taliban fighter beats someone in the street, he is shaming the family of that person by demonstrating that the family cannot defend its members from the Taliban and by demonstrating that the father of the family has no control over the behavior of its members. The method the Taliban chooses to use to enforce rules was anathema to the honor Kabul Market Community residents valued.⁵⁴⁷

However, Kabul Market Community residents respected the comportment of Taliban fighters as honorable because they demonstrated their dominance over others.

⁵⁴⁷ 110210-5 Important Rules-R1

They perceived the Taliban fighters as very effective fighters who “showed their power” when they easily overwhelmed Afghan military and police personnel. During the period under study, community residents discussed many attacks by the Taliban, including an attack on the police on the Chawk, a coordinated suicide attack and raid on the Ministry of Defense, three bombings in downtown Kabul, and a spectacular raid and multiple suicide bombing at the Intercontinental Hotel. In each one of these attacks, the Taliban proved to be effective fighters, demonstrating their dominance over Afghan security forces.⁵⁴⁸ As one resident of the Kabul Market Community described, “The Taliban have experience. The Taliban fighters fire with one hand. They can do everything with the weapon. It makes the people in the area afraid because maybe the Taliban will come back because they are successful in the fighting. It is clear the government is weak and they will lose.”⁵⁴⁹ The Taliban’s demonstrated “power” and ability to coerce people fit with the Kabul Market Community’s value of honor.

While residents of the Kabul Market Community disagreed with almost all of the Taliban’s goals, they agreed with the Taliban’s goal of establishing order. In the context of the chaos residents experienced emanating from the weakness and corruption of GIRoA into their community, some talked about how during Taliban rule, there were fewer thefts, fewer addicts, less gambling, less drinking, less fighting, less adultery, less pornography, less un-Islamic dress and less participation in “romance” in the Kabul Market Community. Some residents thought it would not be bad if the Taliban could return and provide order.⁵⁵⁰ Additionally, the Taliban did not tolerate government officials demanding or accepting

⁵⁴⁸ 110503-Taliban Actions-R1, 110210-Community Narrative-R1, 110421-Community Narrative-R1, 110630-Community Narrative-R1

⁵⁴⁹ 110421-Community Narrative-R1

⁵⁵⁰ 110307-Family 5-R1

bribes, or embezzling government funds.⁵⁵¹ The Taliban's ability to generate order in society is one of its main goals and the order they generated was something the people of the Kabul Market Community valued.

However, when the Taliban showed their power, their behavior did not fit with the Kabul Market Community's values of order, unity and good behavior. As one resident said of the Taliban fighters, "They are dangerous. They do not care that you are man or a woman; old or young. Whenever they see you, they want to hurt you. They are violent without reason, simply to show they have power."⁵⁵² When Taliban fighters attacked without reason, they undermined the order Kabul Market Community residents valued. Residents believed the Taliban's approach to ridding the country of its current government was to sow disorder and anarchy so that they could swoop in later and appear to be saviors.⁵⁵³ Kabul Market Community residents felt constantly threatened by the Taliban's suicide bombings and other attacks.⁵⁵⁴ These unpredictable events were common-place in central Kabul. During the period under study, there were five high profile suicide attacks and bombings in Central Kabul that frightened Kabul Market Community residents.

In addition, 5 Taliban fighters attacked the Chawk police station, killing one civilian, injuring many others and frightening every resident of the Kabul Market Community.⁵⁵⁵ The Taliban's efforts to collect money through kidnapping, extortion and toll collection on the roads outside of Kabul also did not fit with the residents' interest in predictable order. The Father of Family 4 drove a bus that travels from Kabul to Mazar i Sharif and back. His job was very dangerous because Taliban fighters attacked vehicles traveling this route in order

⁵⁵¹ 110307-Family 5-R1

⁵⁵² 110307-Family 4-R1

⁵⁵³ 110307-Family 4-R1

⁵⁵⁴ 110307-Family 5-R1

⁵⁵⁵ 110503-Taliban Actions-R1

to acquire resources. The Taliban attacked his bus or cars around his bus five or six times. Taliban fighters fired Kalashnikovs at the cars in order to stop them. Once they stopped the cars, they sometimes simply took all of the money and valuables from the people in the cars. At other times, they abducted the passengers or killed them. The Taliban tried to find people in the cars who were working with the United States or the Afghan government so they could kill them.⁵⁵⁶ Whenever Taliban fighters fired on his bus to make him stop, the Father of Family 4 accelerated to get away. Kabul Market Community residents valued order and saw these actions as undermining order.

Kabul Market Community residents also believed suicide attacks were un-Islamic. Additionally, residents believed the Taliban's suicide attacks are un-Islamic because they kill innocent people in the name of Islam. The people of the Kabul Market Community discussed the capture of a Mullah in central Kabul who had facilitated three suicide bombings. They said that the Mullah believed he had taken actions that would win rewards from Allah on Judgment Day, but that he was in fact wrong because he had sinned by killing innocent people. The people who discussed these incidents concurred that this Mullah actually did not understand Islam. Also, they said that a Mullah taking these actions makes Islam look like a bad religion.⁵⁵⁷

Kabul Market Community residents also viewed the Taliban's attacks on girls who attended school as un-Islamic because these were innocent little girls. When residents discussed Mullah Omar's announcement that the Taliban should no longer attack schools, Kabul Market Community residents discussed how they thought this was simply an effort to

⁵⁵⁶ 110307-Family 4-R1

⁵⁵⁷ 110210-Community Narrative-R1

create a false sense of security so that the Taliban could kill more children. Residents firmly believed these attacks were un-Islamic.⁵⁵⁸

Finally, the people of the Kabul Market Community believed the Taliban's use of the peaceful protests to ignite anti-government violence was un-Islamic. As mentioned earlier, in the spring of 2011, an evangelical preacher in Texas burned a copy of the Holy Koran. Many people in Afghanistan's cities marched in protest against this action in order to show their anger at this assault on their holy book. Some of these protests turned violent and resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians and UN workers. Residents discussed the Taliban's use of these protests as a means for violently attacking the UN and creating anarchy. They said this was un-Islamic because these were peaceful protests to show anger against the abuse of the Koran and they had used them to sow disorder and kill people.⁵⁵⁹

In order for the Taliban to control the behavior of the residents of the Kabul Market Community, they would need to constantly patrol to identify rule breaking and sanction the many violations of their rules in this community where people disagree with them. However, during this period, they did not do so. During 2010 and 2011, during the surge in Coalition resources and activities in Afghanistan, it was the Taliban's intent to wait out the foreign occupiers before leveraging its external resources, generated from the sale and taxation of opium and aid from foreign governments and individuals, across its more effective organization, to overthrow GIRoA. Because it lacked relative power, the Taliban were ineffective in taking actions to identify and sanction rule breaking in the Kabul Market Community.

⁵⁵⁸ 110331-Community Narrative-R1

⁵⁵⁹ 110407-Community Narrative-R1

During this period, the Taliban knew it lacked the resources, both from within Afghanistan and from foreign sources, to survive a force on force battle with ISAF and the ANSF. For that reason, it pursued a clandestine approach to its operations in Kabul. It sought to perform high profile attacks against major government targets, like the Ministry of Defense to present a picture of the weakness of GIRoA and the inevitability that once ISAF departed, the Taliban would crush GIRoA. The Taliban simultaneously attacked ISAF in order to increase the cost of their continued support to GIRoA. The Taliban was very effective in taking these actions, attacking the Coalition and government on the national level in Kabul.

During the period under study, the Taliban demonstrated their coercive dominance over the government through high profile attacks on the government and international community. Between the fourth of January 2011 and the tenth of February, a Mullah from a moderate, central Kabul community facilitated three high profile bombings, before being arrested. He helped suicide bombers attack ISAF headquarters, a store directly across the street from the Presidential Palace, and a grocery store frequented by foreigners and wealthy, westernized Afghans. When residents of the Kabul Market Community discussed the government's capture of the Mullah, they said that these bombings show that the government has no authority. They also said they believed the Mullah would be released because Pakistan would pressure the Afghan government, which has no power to stand up to Pakistan.⁵⁶⁰

In mid-April 2011, the Taliban then turned peaceful protests against the Koran burning by an evangelical preacher in the United States in Mazar i Sharif and Kandahar. On

⁵⁶⁰ 110210-Community Narrative-R1

the twenty-first of April, the Taliban executed a brazen insider attack against the Minister of Defense.⁵⁶¹ A Major General in the Afghan Army, accompanied by several suicide bombers, made their way into the Ministry of Defense, killed several soldiers, blew up their own vehicle and nearly assassinated the Minister of Defense, before being killed by Afghan soldiers. When the people of the Kabul Market Community discussed this incident, they wondered how the military could defend the country if they could not even defend the ministry building.⁵⁶²

In late May 2011, the Taliban assassinated very popular Police General Daud Daud, along with three other Afghan officials and two German soldiers, who were accompanying a German General to a meeting in the capitol of Takhar Province. The assassination of Daud Daud was a major blow to the former Tajik mujihadeen commanders. Daud Daud was one of their best fighters and had been Ahmed Shah Massud's bodyguard. His efficacy in fighting the Taliban and unwillingness to participate in corruption on behalf of the Karzai government made him a kind of anti-Taliban folk hero. The killing of Daud Daud was disheartening for people who opposed the Taliban, but it also exacerbated divisions between Karzai and the former *mujihadeen* leaders, who directly accused Karzai, on national television, of assassinating Daud Daud. The *mujihadeen* leaders, and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah in particular, claimed that Karzai had participated in the assassination because Daud Daud would have asked where the billions of dollars of international aid had gone, given that there had been little improvement in Afghanistan's economy, infrastructure or government services. The Taliban's high profile assassination of Daud Daud made the government look weak militarily, and publically exposed the divisions between the

⁵⁶¹ 110417-Community Narrative-R1

⁵⁶² 110421-Community Narrative-R1

government and the old *mujihadeen* leaders, making the government look weak politically.⁵⁶³

During June 2011, the Taliban conducted a very high profile attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. Eight Taliban fighters attacked the hotel starting in the evening. They retained control over the hotel for nearly 24 hours. Finally, an ISAF helicopter killed the last of the militants. This incident made the ANSF look weak relative to the Taliban. Kabul Market Community residents discussed the government's weakness, as well as their belief that this attack was perpetrated by the Pakistanis to make Afghanistan look bad. Once again, residents discussed the possibility that high ranking people in the Karzai government may have been involved. The estate of Vice President Fahim abutted the property of the Intercontinental Hotel. Since Fahim had a veritable army of bodyguards, who were renowned for their fighting skills, many people in the Kabul Market Community believed Fahim must have been involved in the attack.⁵⁶⁴

The Taliban was effective in conducting high profile attacks on the government, security forces and the international community. The attacks did have the effect of making the government look militarily weak. They also publically divided the government and the *mujihadeen* leaders, making the government look politically weak. Further, the attacks reinforced Kabul Market Community residents' distrust of Karzai and Fahim.

The Taliban was less effective in accurately targeting and killing government employees and people who work with the international community in Kabul Market Community. Although 8.8% of Kabul Market Community residents work for the

⁵⁶³ 110505-Community Narrative-R1

⁵⁶⁴ 110630-Community Narrative-R1

government or international community, the Taliban did not identify them, kill or attempt to kill them. These government workers were not afraid of being individually targeted as collaborators, but they are afraid of Taliban attacks on government buildings. For example, the Father of Family 5 worked in the Kabul Municipality building, which was attacked by suicide bombers in 2009 and he and his wife worried that he could be killed in an attack like that.⁵⁶⁵

Taliban fighters did pose threats to Kabul Market Community residents who travel on the roads outside of Kabul, like the Father of Family 4 in his bus to Mazar. The threat to people on these roads from the Taliban was indiscriminate and not part of the Taliban's strategy. When the Taliban attacked cars on the road to Mazar, the organization wanted to find people who are working with the government or the international community in order to kill or capture them and put them in Taliban jails. But, Taliban fighters also took money from the people in the cars. The Taliban fighters on the roads were dangerous. They did not care if you were a man or a woman, old or young. They just wanted to hurt you. They were violent without reason, simply to demonstrate that they had power.⁵⁶⁶ This type of brigandage did not fit with the Taliban's strategy of accurately targeting violence against people who work for the government or the international community.

The Taliban's most effective action against known government workers near the Kabul Market Community was the attack by 5 Taliban fighters on the police station on the Chawk during March of 2011. The Taliban fighters intended to abduct the commander of the police station on the Chawk. But, the police fought back. One of the policemen was wounded and one shopper was killed in the gun battle on the Chawk. The five Taliban

⁵⁶⁵ 110307-Family 5-R1

⁵⁶⁶ 110307-Family 4-R1

fighters fled south on the main road out of Kabul City. The police checkpoints on the road did not stop them. The government Quick Reaction Force arrived ten minutes after the Taliban fighters had fled. This attack had the combined effect of making the government look weak and attacking government forces.⁵⁶⁷

While the Taliban executed these high profile attacks very effectively despite the significant risk to its personnel, it was the Taliban's inaction patrolling and sanctioning rule breaking in the Kabul Market Community that caused it to have little control over the behavior of the residents. The Taliban's inaction in this regard was part of its strategy to preserve the personnel it has until ISAF withdrew, leaving GIRoA exposed to a better resourced and organized Taliban.

The people of the Kabul Market Community did not obey the rules of the Taliban during this period unless they wanted to do so or because the Wakil shared a rule with the Taliban and is able to exert control. Residents and visitors to this bustling, mercantile, relatively liberal, exuberant and often irreverent community, violated the Taliban's rules constantly.

In the Kabul Market Community, men did not pray five times per day in the community *mazjet* clad in Pashtun traditional clothes, turbans and medium length beards. Instead, clean shaven men prayed on average three times per day in the *mazjet* in Area B clad in Tajik traditional clothes and often without a hat. Not a single male in the random sample of residents of the Kabul Market Community wore a beard of sufficient length for the Taliban. The Mullah does, but he is the only person who complied with that rule in the Kabul Market Community.

⁵⁶⁷ 110503-Taliban Actions-R1

The male residents of the community wore long cotton shirts that stretch to the knees of their cotton drawstring pants, in traditional Tajik style. Some of them, though very few, wore hats, in another violation of the Taliban's rules of dress. Other men, heading to office jobs in the city, wore western business clothes. Many of the young men, when not wearing the black business pants and button up blue collared shirts that comprise the school uniform, wore jeans and tee shirts that display western logos, loudly colored sneakers in green or yellow, and the cotton *kafias* (neck scarves) worn throughout the Middle East and South Asia. Despite the Mullah's admonition that they should not wear these foreign, un-Islamic clothes, they persisted. They sported haircuts they call "American" or "English", using hair gel. These cigarette-smoking hipsters defied traditional Afghan norms and the Taliban's stringent rules, demonstrating their power to do whatever it is they liked and enhancing their honor.

In this relatively raucous community, many residents listened to playboy music and watch television. They held large wedding parties where people danced and played music. Some people drank alcohol or smoked hashish or opium.

The Kabul Market Community has always been a center for gambling because of its proximity to the market and the park. Men from all over Kabul gathered in the park to bet on dogfights, some of which were organized by residents of the community. Some people trained pigeons to compete in a Zoroastrian game in which one pigeon masters flock flies from his roof and mixes with the pigeons from a second pigeon master's flock. The pigeons then return to the rooves and each pigeon master counts how many of his adversary's pigeons defected and joined his flock. The Taliban do not like these games because they imply that the trainers of dogs or pigeons have skill that impacts the outcomes, trumping

the idea that Allah decides all outcomes. People also placed bets on the outcome, which is *haram*. Residents of Kabul also came to the Kabul Market Community to play cards and gamble in some of the homes.

Young men from the Kabul Market Community and from the rest of Kabul flocked to the park adjacent to the community to kite fight because of the proximity to the river and the large, open space of the park. There is a kite shop in the community, owned and operated by one of the residents, that supplied kites, string, glue and crushed glass each kite fighter used to prepare for a fight. The young men ran through the streets and parks, attempting to cut the strings of their rivals' kites. People also gambled on the outcome of these fights.

While most Kabul Market Community residents complied with the fast on Ramadan and refrained from *haram* activities during the holy month, others did not. Some broke the fast, smoking cigarettes during Ramadan. A significant number of people, the Powderies, addicted to smoking opium, lolled in the park, where they slept, and committed petty crimes to feed their habits.

Women in the Kabul Market Community left their houses on average 9.4 times per week alone, interacting in society in violation of the Taliban's *purdah* rules. The women of the community visited shops within the Kabul Market Community alone and transacted business and went to the market and other shops in Kabul with their male relatives. All of the community's school aged girls gathered and walked together, wearing the long black

robes and white headscarves of the public school uniform, to and from school.⁵⁶⁸ Some of the women, like Mother of Family 2 and Wife of Elder 3 donned teachers' uniforms and walked to work where they taught both male and female students.

Mother of Family 2 is a widow who has a grown son. She holds a bachelor's degree in Social Science from Kabul University and was a teacher at an all-girls public high school in Kabul. She was considered a pillar of the community because she was a teacher with a university degree. The wife of Elder 2 was also well respected because she was well-educated and a teacher. She holds a bachelor's degree in English Literature from Kabul University and taught 10th and 11th grade English to girls at a high school in Kabul. Her daughter was a medical student at Kabul University and was studying to become a Kori. The women of the Kabul Market Community respected these women in part because of their formal education and in part because they were teachers and doctors. They visited the homes of their neighbors, whose wives asked them for advice.⁵⁶⁹

Women congregated with one another regularly in the Kabul Market Community. They visited one another's homes during the day and congregated for happiness and sadness parties. Women in the Kabul Market Community were the only women in the data set who participated politically in their community. The wives of the elders collected information about the problems women faced and the solutions they proposed. They did so because their husbands, the elders, wanted to be able to solve women's problems more effectively.⁵⁷⁰

⁵⁶⁸ In Kabul, the government will not force people to send their children to school. The people of the Kabul Market Community still send all of their daughters to school. The random sample of residents included 13 school aged girls. They were all students or had graduated from high school.

⁵⁶⁹ 110207-Elders-R1

⁵⁷⁰ Wife of Elder 2 has a bachelor's degree in English Literature from Kabul University and is a teacher. Along with her daughter, who is a medical student and is training to be a Kori (closest a woman can come to being a

While all of the women of the Kabul Market Community wore some form of headscarf and covered their arms and legs completely, only 5% of them wore a *burka* and only 17% of them cover their faces.⁵⁷¹ *Burkas* are not only more extreme because they cover the face and even to some extent the eyes (with a mesh), they are also a symbol of rural, agricultural society in Afghanistan. They are a symbol of the Taliban's anti-international, anti-modern goals and do not fit with what most of the women of the Kabul Market Community wanted their society to be. So, even if they covered their faces, most of the women did not do so with a *burkha*. The vast majority of the women of the Kabul Market Community wore long black robes and headscarves of various colors as they walked freely with their faces uncovered through the community, visiting female friends, transacting business at the shops and going to work.

Only 4% of residents worked for the government, in violation of the Taliban's rules. Interestingly, none of them are members of the ANSF. They were all teachers or bureaucrats. An additional 5% worked as translators, drivers or security guards for international companies. The Taliban considered this to be as bad if not worse than working for the government. 2% also worked in the banks that line the street separating the community from the market. These young men were also in a profession frowned upon by the Taliban, who fear bankers engage in usury and other un-Islamic behavior.

People complied with the Wakil's rules regarding order and un-Islamic activities. These rules are included in the Taliban rules, but do not contain all of them. So, for instance, most people did not drink alcohol and when they did the Wakil advised them not to. But,

Mullah), visit the women of the community to discuss their problems, provide advice and identify possible solutions. They communicate problems and solutions to Elder 2 so that he can discuss implementing solutions with the other elders and Wakil. 110210-Elders-R1

⁵⁷¹ These percentages are drawn from an analysis of the data about what the women in the random sample of residents of the Kabul Market Community wear outside of the home.

people played music inside their own homes and flew kites in kite fights without being sanctioned because the Wakil disagreed with these rules and the Taliban did not sanction people who violated them.

During this period in the Kabul Market Community, the residents only obeyed Taliban rules if they were also shared by the Wakil and he had enough resources to enforce them. Residents resolutely disagreed with the remainder of the Taliban's rules and disobeyed them. The Taliban lacked the resources relative to the government to survive a force on force engagement with ISAF and the ANSF in the capital. The Taliban was therefore ineffective as an organization in patrolling to identify and sanction rule breaking in the Kabul Market Community. In combination with the residents disagreement with the Taliban's rules, the Taliban's lack of relative resources that it could translate into action by its personnel led to its lack of control.

What Causes the Wakil to Win in the Kabul Market Community? Agreement, Resources or Effectiveness?

In the Kabul Market Community, the Wakil had the greatest control over residents' behavior. His control resulted from the agreement of the majority of residents with the rules, sanctions and actions of the Wakil, his elders and Mullah. Agreement caused most residents to obey the Wakil's rules and provide him with resources in the form of information about people breaking rules, sanctuary, personnel, goods, services and funds. The Wakil relied upon those resources to control the behavior of those residents and visitors who did not agree with the Wakil's rules.

The government had enormous external resources it was attempting to apply to imposing a set of rules generated outside the Kabul Market Community, many of which are not to the liking of the residents. Residents did not comply with government rules that were not also Wakil rules because the government was organizationally ineffective. Government personnel did not collect information about people violating its rules and sanction them for it. The young policemen from elsewhere in Afghanistan ascribed little value to the security Kabul Market Community residents and often lacked the will to patrol or arrest people. Further, corruption not only undermined government organizational effectiveness, it caused personnel to act in direct opposition to the government's intent. Police feared people they arrested might be able to use higher ranking police, to whom they might be related or whom they might bribe, to punish them, leading to inaction. Further, some police accepted bribes from criminals in return for allowing them to break the law, particularly laws forbidding armed robbery. When this happened, government personnel were not just acting in ways that undermined the order the government sought to establish, they were actively attacking it.

The Wakil already had control over whether people stole in the Kabul Market Community and the police, due to their inaction, relied upon him to achieve that government goal. Aside from the fact Wakils were not impartial bureaucrats enforcing laws, when the police took a bribe in return for allowing theft, their actions undermined the Wakil's efforts to achieve the shared government and Wakil goal of maintaining order. The government could not control behavior inside the Kabul Market Community and even undermined its own control because it could not cause its personnel to act on government intent.

The people of the Kabul Market Community did not agree with the rules, sanctions or actions of the Taliban. And, the Taliban was not interested in their agreement. Intent upon imposing its rules on the community's residents, the Taliban failed because it lacked the external resources required to do so. For that reason, the Taliban chose not to act to identify people breaking its rules and sanction them. It was ineffective in taking these actions because it lacked the resources to do so in the context of the ANSF and ISAF.

Comparing these three organizations, one thing is clear. All the external resources in the world are for naught if an organization is too ineffective to translate them into personnel action. It would additionally be tempting to claim that an organization only controls the behavior of a population if it can get the agreement of that population. But, this is clearly not so since the Taliban controlled the behavior of people in the Kabul Market Community, despite their avowed disagreement, between 1996 and 2001. It would also be tempting to claim that external resources were irrelevant to control, but without significant external resources in between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban could not have controlled the behavior of the Kabul Market Community's residents. It is clear that no one of these factors can explain the variations in the levels of control of these organizations.

	Control	Agreement	Internal Resources	External Resources	Organizational Effectiveness
Wakil	High	High	High	Low	High
Government	Low	Low	Low	High	Low
Taliban	Low	Low	Low	Relatively Low	Low

Perhaps these factors are do not cause control except as they are applied to a process that results in control by an organization. An effort to identify a process organizations can apply to gain control may help elucidate why these relationships exist, how they function and under what conditions.

Is there a Process Organizations Apply that Results in Control?

The people of the Kabul Market Community were faced with choices about how they would behave in the context of three organizations competing to control their behavior. Will parents send their daughters to school? Will women leave their homes and interact freely with males and females in society? Will women be free to decide what they wear, whom they marry and whether they want to work outside the home? Will they steal? Will they take narcotics or drink alcohol? Will they get in fistfights? How many times per day will men pray in the *mazjet*? Will they work for the government or not? Will they work for the Taliban or not?

Together, what the residents' predilections, the things they wanted to do, and the actions of the Wakil, government and Taliban, determined how they behaved. A process is a series of actions an organization can take to achieve an objective. In this case, the objective of each of these organizations was control over people's behavior. What remains unclear is what actions each organization took that resulted in control and how and under what conditions the three large factors of agreement, resources from inside or outside the community, and organizational effectiveness related to those actions or control.

In order to determine if a causal process may exist and further illuminate its relationship to the factors, we will compare the actions of organizations in cases where individuals obeyed an organization's rule and cases in which they did not. We will examine rules with which some people complied and some people did not comply, rules that are contested. These contested rules provide the opportunity for comparison across people

who obeyed and disobeyed the rules of different organizations. We will examine what caused people to obey or not obey rules about prayers in the community *mazjet*, fistfights, the use of alcohol and narcotics, gambling and theft.

The Taliban wanted all males over the age of 10, without exception, to pray in the village *mazjet* five times per day. When the Taliban reigned in Kabul, they would beat any male over the age of 10 whom they found outside the *mazjet* at the time of prayers with a mule whip. Ideologically, the Taliban wants men to pray because they believe Allah made men to pray and it is the Taliban's duty, because they know this, to force them to do so.

The Wakil wanted all males over about 15 years of age to pray as many times per day as possible while still pursuing their educations and providing for their families. If a male over 15 years of age attended prayers less than three times per day, the Wakil and Mullah would visit him to discuss why he was failing to come to prayers as often as other villagers. If he had a good reason, like he had to go to school or work far from the community, the Wakil would understand and not sanction him. If, on the other hand, he did not have a good reason, the Wakil would advise him to attend prayers more often because Allah would be angry with him if he did not, and if he did not do so, the Wakil would throw the family out of the village. Ideologically, the Wakil concurs with the Taliban that Allah made men to pray, but believes Islam should be something that is easy for residents to practice and does not interfere with their responsibility to provide for their families. He believes the inflexibility and violence of the Taliban are a disservice to Islam because it makes people hate Islam. The Wakil also relied upon the regular gathering of the male villagers for prayer to reinforce their unity, upon which his control rested.

The government, on the other hand, did not require people to pray or to practice any religion and believed any effort to force them to do so was a violation of the person's individual human rights, his freedom of religion. If the Wakil expelled someone from his home, the government would consider that an assault and a violation of his freedom of religion.

The males of the Kabul Market Community attended prayers on average 3.2 times per day, with most of them complying with the Wakil's rule, but not the Taliban rule. A comparison of people who broke obeyed and disobeyed the rules of the different organizations elucidates how and why organizations succeeded or failed in controlling people's behavior.

The story of a wealthy resident of Area C who regularly attends prayers five times per day at the *mazjet* in Area B explains why people who cannot be compelled by any organization to attend prayers at the *mazjet* in Area B do so. The man was a 55 year old Tajik from Kapisa Province who had been living in the Kabul Market Community for six years. He imported new tires and sold them in Kabul. He earned approximately 150,000 Afs⁵⁷² per month, which is a huge amount, and lived in one of the palatial residences in Area C. He always prayed five times a day at the *mazjet* in Area B because he believed Allah made men to pray and it was his duty to do so. When the *mazjet* needed support, he paid to help the *mazjet* for the sake of Allah. Even though he resided in one of the palatial homes in Area C, he attended the *mazjet* in Area B because he loved the Mullah and *mazjet*. He treated all Kabul Market Community residents as though they are his equals and his friends, whether they were old or young, rich or poor. He showed great respect to everyone in the

⁵⁷² His monthly income is roughly \$2,250, which is much larger than the average monthly salary in the Kabul Market Community, which is 8,441 Afs \$153.

community, like a good Muslim.⁵⁷³ Like the other residents of Area C, this old man was not obliged to attend prayers at the *mazjet* in Area B because the Wakil could not punish him.⁵⁷⁴ His wealth and connections to high ranking people meant the Wakil could not throw him out of his home if he wanted to because the Wakil lacked the relative power to sanction the tire seller. While the Wakil was very effective in translating the resources he had into actions, the total number of armed residents he could have raised from the 250 houses of the Kabul Market Community was meager relative to those available to the government, which would have defended the wealthy merchant if it had been properly paid to do so. The wealthy tire merchant complied with the Wakil's rule about attending communal prayers in the *mazjet* in Area B because he believed it was the right thing to do and because he wanted to, not because he feared the Wakil would sanction him.

This case demonstrates why people attend prayers five times a day without pressure from the Wakil or Taliban. It elucidates how agreement with a rule causes people to obey organizations' rules. If a person agrees that he or she should behave in a way that meets the Wakil or the Taliban's requirement or if he or she values the outcome or implications of doing so, then he or she will comply. There may have been many others in the Kabul Market Community who attended prayers at the *mazjet* in Area B between 3 and 5 times per day because they believed Allah would be happy with them if they did so or because they believed prayer brought them closer to their neighbors.

There were some cases of adult male residents of Area B not attending prayers in the *mazjet* regularly. The first example is a resident who was 23 years old in 2010 and had been living in the Kabul Market Community for three months, but had not attended prayers

⁵⁷³ 110409-Mosque Friday-R1

⁵⁷⁴ 110119-Community 1 Map Description-R1

at the *mazjet* in Area B, even on Eid.⁵⁷⁵ This young Tajik, who grew up elsewhere in downtown Kabul, worked as a driver for an international community organization. His job had allowed him to earn enough money to move out of his father's house and live with his wife and baby daughter in a house in the Kabul Market Community.

The Wakil had near perfect information about who lived in each house in the community and how often they attended prayers, so he quickly realized this young man was breaking the Wakil's rule, thereby undermining the unity of the residents. One day, the Wakil, the Mullah and elders visited him to advise him. They asked him why he did not attend and whether there was some problem that was preventing him from attending that they could help him solve. They then informed the young man that regular attendance of prayers in the *mazjet* was a rule in the Kabul Market Community. They informed him that men who did not attend prayers would eventually be thrown out of the community with their families. The young man was embarrassed and promised the Wakil, Mullah and elders that he would attend prayers at the *mazjet* regularly from then on. From that day forward, the young man attended prayers at the *mazjet* in Area B three times per day on work days and five times every Friday.⁵⁷⁶

This young man initially did not attend prayers at the *mazjet* in Area B because he did not want to attend them. When the Wakil informed him that he would not be able to remain in the Kabul Market Community unless he began to attend prayers, he changed his behavior. The Wakil's advice made the young man expect that he would be thrown out of the community if he did not change his behavior. The young man knew the Wakil had and

⁵⁷⁵ Eid is an important holiday because it marks the end of Ramadan. It is a celebration of breaking the fasts and restrictions of the holy month of Ramadan. Every male in the Kabul Market Community attends communal prayers at the mosque in Area B on Eid.

⁵⁷⁶ 110210-5 Important Rules-R1

would continue to have information about his violation of the rule and had the resources and organization required to throw him out of his home. This threatened sanction, the loss of his home, was of great value to the young man, who lacked the ability to prevent the Wakil from throwing him out. He had no relationship to high ranking people who could stop the Wakil and the resources he could organize to defend himself were minimal relative to those the Wakil could organize.

In this instance, the Wakil broke one of the government's rules by threatening to physically remove someone from his home because he did not practice Islam. The constitution guarantees the freedom of religion and this Wakil rule clearly clashed with the government's rule. But, the government did not collect information about these violations, the young man did not report it and it is unlikely the government would have done anything if he did. The government was not effective in collecting information about violations of freedom of religion or sanctioning them.

This young man continued violating the rules of the Taliban, attending prayers only three times per day. But, the Taliban lacks the resources it would require to survive the force on force confrontation with ISAF that would surely have resulted if it began patrolling and sanctioning men in central Kabul for not being in the *mazjet* at the time of prayers.

The Wakil controlled this young man's behavior by creating an expectation of a sanction that was of great value to the young man. The government failed to control the Wakil's behavior because it was not effective enough to cause its personnel to collect information. The Taliban failed to control the behavior of the young man because it lacks the resources to survive force on force combat with ISAF and the ANSF in the capital and therefore chose not to act. This is another form of organizational ineffectiveness, but its

root is relative resource deficiency, not a lack of will. As a result of organizational ineffectiveness and a lack of resources, neither the government nor the Taliban could generate an expectation of sanction and therefore they had no control over the behavior of people who did not already want to do what the organizations wanted them to do.

There were also instances in which the Wakil did not sanction Kabul Market Community residents for refusing to attend prayers at the *mazjet* in Area B, even though he knew of the violation. These cases provide insight into things that caused the Wakil to fail to control behavior.

There was a “Prince of the City”⁵⁷⁷ who resided in Area B, but never attended prayers at the *mazjet*. This 30 year old Panshiri Tajik moved to the Kabul Market Community in 2008. He wore “Army clothes” with boots and has a gun and a relationship with the police on the Chawk and with high ranking people in the government from *Jamat e Islami*. As a result, he could commit any crime and not be arrested. The Wakil was aware that the Prince of the City did not attend prayers, but the Wakil, Mullah and elders did not visit his home to advise him and he was not thrown out of the community. The Wakil did not sanction the Prince of the City because he knew the police would not arrest the Prince of the City and the Prince of the City had his own weapons and could use them to resist any effort by the Wakil to control his behavior. The Wakil lacked the relative power to sanction the Prince of the City by expelling him. Similarly, the Taliban lacked the ability to sanction the Prince of the City for not attending prayers because it could not organize resources

⁵⁷⁷ Princes of the City are organized criminals who control particular territory in the city and are protected from government prosecution by their relationships within the police force or other portions of the executive branch. Princes of the City existed under the Taliban, during the Civil War, under the Russians and before the Russians. At times, they act like para-governments.

greater than those the government could organize to prevent Taliban personnel from entering community.

These three cases of people obeying or disobeying rules about males attending communal prayers provide us with the following insight into the process by which the competing organizations succeed or fail in controlling the behavior of Kabul Market Community residents. First, people obey an organization's rules if they already want to obey them, if they agree that they should behave in ways that comply with a rule (as in the case of the wealthy tire merchant). It is only when people disagree with a rule and do not want to obey it, that they decide to break it (as in the case of the new resident).

However, if an organization can produce the expectation of a sanction that will result from breaking the rule, it can control a person's behavior. In order to produce that expectation, the organization must inform the violator of the rule and sanction and it must have the relative power to apply the sanction.

The case of the Prince of the City refusing to pray demonstrates what happens when someone does not agree that he should obey a rule, and the Wakil knows he is breaking the rule, but lacks the power to sanction him in the context of the power the rule breaker can generate, either through his own resources or through those of another organization, like the government or *Jamat e Islami*. In this case, the Wakil does not act and the Prince of the City continues to break the rule. Perhaps organizational effectiveness is in some cases related to having the relative power to sanction. The power to sanction requires resources, like personnel and equipment, larger than those that can be organized by the subject. Then, it requires an organization that can motivate its personnel to act. In this case, the rule

breaker had resources originating outside the Kabul Market Community that were far greater than those the Wakil could marshal from within the community.

So, people obey the Wakil and Taliban's rules because they agree with them. But, if someone disagrees with the rule and disobey it, an organization can only control his behavior if it can generate an expectation that it can and will sanction him. That requires resources greater than those the rule breaker can organize to defend against the sanction. But, resources alone are not sufficient. The government cannot prevent the Wakil from impinging on the freedom of religion despite its significant external resources. The government's organizational effectiveness is diminished by a lack of will among its personnel.

In the case of the rule about attending communal prayers, the Wakil has near perfect information because he, the elders and the Mullah attend all five communal prayers nearly every day. However, in the case of most rules in the Kabul Market Community, the Wakil, Mullah and elders only know if someone is breaking the rules if they happen upon someone in the process of breaking a rule, or if members of the community provide the Wakil with information about violations. Without that information, the Wakil cannot sanction people for violating the rules.

In the Kabul Market Community, neighbors are not supposed to physically fight one another. If they do, they are expected to apologize to one another and become friends again. If they do not, it creates disunity. Since the Wakil's most important goal was unity, it was very important to the Wakil that people not violate this rule. While most people in the

community adhered to this rule most of the time, there were many instances of neighbors fighting with one another.

In cases where the Wakil does not have information about people breaking a rule, he cannot create an expectation that they might be sanctioned if they do not apologize to one another. For example, one of Family 1's neighbors was on his roof installing an antenna. Father of Family 1 saw him and became angry because he thought the man was looking at his wife from the neighboring roof. Father of Family 1 shouted at his neighbor, who came downstairs. The neighbor was angry and he told Father of Family 1 was gossiping about him and even about his own wife. The Father of Family 1 hit the neighbor and the neighbor hit him back. The Father of Family 1's neighbor is much bigger and stronger than the Father of Family 1 and he beat him very badly. Five or more people from the Kabul Market Community stopped and watched the two men fighting. The Father of Family 1 realized he was wrong, but he did not apologize. He just went back inside. The two men no longer speak to one another.

If the Wakil had known about this dispute, he would have bring both men to the *mazjet*, advised them not to fight in the community on pain of expulsion and made them apologize to one another. But, the Wakil did not know the men broke his rule about fighting or continued to break his rule about conversing with all male neighbors because none of the people who saw the fight told him. The fight and the subject of the fight were a great shame for both men. It was shameful for the neighbor because someone accused him of looking at his neighbor's wife. For the Father of Family 1, it was even more shameful because his actions demonstrated that he did not trust his wife, implying he was weak. He then started a fight with his neighbor and was badly beaten, implying, again, that he was weak. The people who saw the fight did not want the two men to lose honor, so they chose not to tell anyone

about the fight. They withheld the information because they did not want anyone to give information to the Wakil if there were an incident that damages their own honor. They stood in solidarity with Father of Family 1 and his neighbor, preserving the honor of both men at the expense of the Wakil's goal of unity.⁵⁷⁸

By contrast, when the Wakil had information about rule breaking, he (or his colleagues, the elders and Mullah) could change people's behavior by convincing them they should not break the rule because it is wrong to do so. One day, Elder 3 was walking through the community when he saw two boys fighting. An 18 year old unemployed graduate of a local high school was flying his kite on the roof of his father's home, when another kite cut his kite string. In Kabul, kite fliers coat the tops of their kite strings with glass so that they can cut the strings of other kites. Kite flying is a form of competition in Afghanistan in which the winner has the last kite flying, having cut everyone else's string. The 18 year old looked at the kite that had cut his string and identified the house over which it was flying. He went to the house and knocked on the door. The 16 year old high school student who had been flying his kite on the roof and cut his neighbor's kite string emerged from the house. The 18 year old was angry and the two boys began hitting one another when he came upon the two boys fighting. He told them to stop and separated them. He asked them why they were fighting and the 18 year old explained the problem. Elder 3 said it was against the rules of the community to fight with one's neighbor and told the boys that they must become friends again. The boys accepted that Elder 3 was right and that they should not fight because they are neighbors. They became friends and they never fought one another again.⁵⁷⁹

⁵⁷⁸ 110307-Family 1-R1

⁵⁷⁹ 110423-Rule 1-R1

In this case, both boys were aware of the rule about not fighting in the Kabul Market Community, but they chose to do so anyway because they valued honor more than they valued unity and obeying the rule. They may have thought no one would see them and they would not get caught, but the elder found them breaking the rule because, as a member of the community, he could walk through it. The elder was effective in conducting his patrols, collecting information about problems, like people violating community rules, and in immediately advising the boys to stop fighting. He then convinced them of the rightness of the rule and they never broke the rule again. In effect, Elder 3 convinced them that they should value the unity of the Kabul Market Community more than they valued their personal honor (which they had initially valued more). By advising the two boys, Elder 3 convinced them to value Islam more than honor, and that caused them to comply.

Without information, it was impossible for the Wakil or any other organization to control the behavior of people who do not want to obey their organization's rules. An organization could acquire information from through its own personnel, but they could never see all of the incidents of rule breaking in the community because they could not be everywhere all of the time. They therefore required information from Kabul Market Community residents. They could only acquire that information if the people who had the information agreed with the rule and with the sanction that would be applied using their information.

For example, another of the Wakil's rules governed residents drinking or taking narcotics. The Wakil, government and Taliban shared prohibitions against drinking and taking narcotics. Many Kabul Market Community residents believed they should not drink or take narcotics because it distracted them from worshipping Allah and because Allah will

never forgive someone for drinking or taking drugs, meaning they would not be admitted to Paradise on Judgment Day. Additionally, they believed drinking and taking drugs causes people to have difficulty distinguishing between right and wrong, thereby causing problems for other people in the community. Therefore, even those who might not have wanted the rule to apply to them often valued the rule as applied to others.

Some people in the Kabul Market Community, however, did drink alcohol and take narcotics. Some of them did so to distract themselves from the poverty and stress in their lives and others did it to demonstrate that they were powerful and could do whatever they wanted. When he found out people were taking drugs or drinking, the Wakil tried first to convince them not to do so because it is wrong and it is bad for them. Eventually, however, if the person was caught drinking or doing drugs multiple times, or if the violator harmed someone while drunk or high, the Wakil turned the violator over to the police. Drinking or taking narcotics are supposed to result in a six month stay in a government jail in Afghanistan.

The way the Wakil handled these problems, giving the person a chance to change their behavior and only then turning them over to the government, was a sanction that would solve the problem in the community either by changing the behavior or expelling the violator. For that reason, residents were often happy to give information to the Wakil about the rule breaking. People worried that if they told the police about this, the police would demand and or accept a bribe or cause some other problem. Also, their neighbor would not have a chance to change his behavior. He would either be jailed or released.

The example of the Father of Family 1 demonstrates the importance of community agreement with both the rule and the sanction in causing people to assist the Wakil in asserting control by providing him with information. The Father of Family 1 ran a metal shop in the Kabul Market. He bought scrap metal and sold it to truckers from Pakistan who transported it there to melt it down and resell it. He made only 3,000 Afs per month after he paid rent for his shop. Father of Family 1 was illiterate, from far-off rural Bamyan Province and was the sole breadwinner for his wife and young son. He was constantly in debt because the rent for his home consumed all of his monthly income and then he had nothing left with which he could buy food or clothes or pay for utilities. He became extremely depressed and started smoking powder during 2010. One day, a tailor from the community saw Father of Family 1 smoking opium powder in the empty space in Area B. The tailor walked to the Wakil's house and informed him of what he had seen. The tailor and the Wakil went to the empty space in Area B, arrested Father of Family 1 and took him to the Wakil's house.

The Wakil advised Father of Family 1 not to take narcotics, saying,

“When you take narcotics, all of the people of the area will hate you. They will think you are not a real human and that you are like an animal. They will think you are not a good neighbor. All of the people will cross the street to get away from you because you are an addict. You are ashamed now and you are bringing shame on your family. Eventually, you will go to jail if you keep doing this. The people will make me throw you out of the area.”

Because it was the first community rule Father of Family 1 had broken, the Wakil simply advised him to stop. Father of Family 1 never smoked powder again. Father of Family 1 broke the rule because he wanted to, because he disagreed that this rule should apply to him. The tailor agreed with the Wakil that no one should smoke powder in the

Kabul Market Community and he knew the Wakil would simply advise the young man to stop. So, he provided information to the Wakil without which the Wakil could not have stopped Father of Family 1 from breaking the rule. The Wakil was then able to convince Father of Family 1 that smoking powder was wrong and create an expectation that Father of Family 1 and his family would be thrown out of the community if he did it again.

The continuation of Father of Family 1's story also provides an example of the Wakil effectively convincing someone who had been violating many community rules, feeling stressed and alone, not only to behave according to all his rules, but also to contribute to the community because the community respects him and the Wakil takes care of his problems and treats him with compassion.

Having been caught smoking powder and accepted the Wakil's advice to stop doing that, Father of Family 1 broke another rule. Concerned about his persistent lack of funds, this naïve young man decided to try to win extra money by gambling. During the Soviet era and the subsequent civil war, there was a lot of gambling in the Kabul Market Community. People were bored, depressed and unemployed and they came to the market and the adjacent park to gamble. They played cards and dice. They also bet on dogfights and pigeon competitions. Gambling became part of the culture of the Kabul Market Community, but caused many problems. People fought and killed one another over winning and losing in gambling. When the Taliban came, there was no more gambling. However, when people began to return to the community at the beginning of the Karzai era, people from all over Kabul started coming to the market and to the Kabul Market Community to gamble again. Many people lost their money or their daughters. Other people fought with one another and killed each other. Gambling is also against the rules of Islam and the laws of Afghanistan. At

some point between 2008 and 2010, residents voted to make a rule prohibiting gambling in the community.

Having learned about the possibility to change his economic fortunes through gambling, one night, the Father of Family 1 invited two friends over to his home to gamble. Father of Family 1 won 20,000 Afs from one of the men, but the man did not have money to pay the Father of Family 1. The losing man tried to leave, refusing to pay Father of Family 1 his winnings and the men began arguing in the street in front of Family 1's house. While they were arguing, the Wakil happened to walk by. He asked them what the problem was and the Father of Family 1 explained. The Wakil then arrested all three men and took them to the police station. Gambling carried a sentence of six months in jail.

Mother of Family 1 was a young, illiterate woman from rural Bamyan Province. She was panicked because she was not sure how she and her ten year old son would have enough money to live while Father of Family 1 was in jail for six months. After two weeks of living of the charity of her neighbors, Mother of Family 1 went to see the Wakil and begged him to have her husband released from jail. She argued that the Wakil should only have advised her husband because he had only broken this rule once. The Wakil saw the problem she was having and imagined how bad the situation could get if he did not help her.⁵⁸⁰ He went to the Chawk and asked the police to release Father of Family 1. They did and when Father of Family 1 returned to the community, he was a changed man. He was kind and behaved well. He no longer took drugs or gambled. In the past, he had just said hello to one or two people in the area and now he greeted everyone and attended all of the happiness

⁵⁸⁰ This is the only instance in which a woman has approached a Wakil to discuss a problem. The Mother of Family 1 was showing her desperation because she had no choice but to approach a male to whom she was not related to solve a problem.

and sadness parties of his neighbors. He really seemed to care about what happened to every one of his neighbors. He said that the community accepted him by advising him instead of keeping him in jail. They did not just throw him out of the area and they got him out of jail. So, now he wanted to act like a good neighbor, like a relative with them. The community helped his wife even though he had broken two serious rules and he was grateful.⁵⁸¹

In this incident, Father of Family 1 gambled because he wanted to, because he did not think the prohibition should apply to him. The Wakil was walking through the community, as he often does, constantly identifying problems and developing solutions. He saw the argument that resulted from the gambling. The Wakil was able to gain the information because its personnel are part of the community, which provides the Wakil with the right to move freely through its streets. The Wakil, Mullah and elders are constantly present and this gives them an information advantage. The Wakil then effectively executed his sanction by arresting the gamblers. When the Wakil saw the problem that had resulted from the absence of Father of Family 1, he worked to solve the problem by changing its sanction. The Wakil advised Father of Family 1 never to gamble or break any of the other community rules again. Father of Family 1 changed his behavior because he felt like he was accepted as part of the Kabul Market Community. Since he felt a part of the community, he began to strive to reach the goals of the Wakil and never again gambled or took drugs again. He became a good member of the community. He greeted people. He even advised other residents not to break the rules as he had.

⁵⁸¹ 110503-Family 1-R1

Sometimes, a rule breaker did something so damaging to the residents of the community that the Wakil had no alternative but to have him immediately arrested by the police or expelled from the community by the residents. For example, a 20 year old Uzbek from Balkh Province who worked as a driver for a foreign company drank too much wine and he was out of his mind one day during 2011. He was walking up and down a street in the Kabul Market Community when he saw a 25 year old Tajik resident walking down the street talking on his cell phone. The drunk boy said, "Give me your phone and give me your money." The 25 year old refused and the drunk boy hit him in the head with a rock. To the drunk boy, it did not matter who the victim was. He would have done the same thing to anyone he saw on the street at that point. Some of his neighbors saw this altercation and informed the Wakil who hurried to the scene and immediately sent the injured man to hospital with the elders. The Wakil was very angry with the drunk boy and called the police. Two policemen arrived and took the drunk boy to the police station. The Wakil went to the drunk boy's house and explained to his father what his son had done. He told the boy's father that his son was being held by the police in the checkpoint on the Chawk. The father was sad and angry and told the Wakil, "My son did a bad action and I do not have relationship with my son anymore." In saying this, the father was disavowing his son and his behavior. He was also protecting the rest of his family from being thrown out of the community by throwing his son out of his family. The Wakil reported what the boy's father had said to the officials at the police station. The police sent the drunk boy to jail for six months and his father refused to visit him in jail.

In this case, the drunk boy believed he should be allowed to drink alcohol and show he was powerful and could do whatever he wanted. Most residents agreed with the Wakil that no one should drink alcohol and that they certainly should not attack other residents and injure them while trying to steal from them. They believed the Wakil would handle this

situation in an appropriate manner for the drunk boy, his family and the community. Because of this tight fit between the goals and methods of implementation and the values Kabul Market Community residents, people provided information to the Wakil. The Wakil was very effective in implementing its sanctions and in assisting the injured resident. The Wakil used the coercive force of the police to have the rule breaker thrown out of the community. The Wakil would probably have advised the young man not to drink instead of having him arrested if he had not attacked another resident and sent him to the hospital. The Wakil offered the father of the rule breaker the chance to conserve what was left of his honor and remain in the community. The Wakil was effective in executing its sanction and had the relative power to implement the sanction because the police cooperated with it. This incident also created an expectation that if a young man drank alcohol and lost control of himself and hurt other residents, he would be arrested and expelled from his own family.

Despite this harsh demonstration of the Wakil's control, there were some people in the Kabul Market Community who continued breaking this rule even though they knew they could not defend themselves against the sanction. They broke the rule because they valued breaking the rule more than they feared the sanction. There were roughly 1,000 opium addicts who lived in the park adjacent to the community. They lolled by the river there, entranced and seemingly unaware of the world around them. They had been thrown out of their homes and lived outdoors. To feed their habits, they committed petty robberies in the Kabul Market Community and the market. While the value of the items stolen was small, the scale of the thefts was not. If a resident of the Kabul Market Community left his or her door open or left anything outside, an addict would steal something. On average, ten homes per month were robbed in the community.⁵⁸² This number did not include thefts from the

⁵⁸² 110210-5 Important Rules-R1

mazjet, muggings and thefts from merchants. When the elders and residents of the Kabul Market Community saw these incidents of rule breaking, they consistently provided information to the Wakil and police. The Wakil, elders and Mullah consistently arrested addicts and took them to the police, who consistently arrested them.

However, these actions could not stem the seemingly endless tide of addicts, who were attracted to the Kabul Market Community because of its park and its proximity to the market. The addicts valued taking drugs more than they feared the sanction of being arrested. The Wakil and police lacked a sanction the addicts valued more than they value getting high and were therefore unable to change their behavior.

Additionally, the market provided an endless supply of narcotics to the addicts. The supply continued because of the ineffectiveness of the government in controlling the production of narcotics throughout Afghanistan, the transportation of narcotics to the market adjacent to the community, and narcotics sales there. The combination of the lack of a sanction of value to the addicts and the supply of narcotics available in the market made the problem of theft by addicts very hard for the Wakil to control, even with information about rule breaking and effective execution of sanctions by the Wakil. Because the addicts valued being high more than they valued their freedom and their ability to reside in the Kabul Market Community, the Wakil could not control their behavior.

The missing element across all of these cases of gambling and drug and alcohol use in the Kabul Market Community was police patrols. The police were simply inactive in the

community. They did not patrol, like the Wakil, elders and Mullah, identifying people who are breaking the rules. As a result, they could only sanction rule breakers when the Wakil called them to report a problem. Further, as demonstrated in the episode involving Father of Family 1, they were not impartially enforcing laws, which is the government's stated intent. Instead, they were simply arresting and releasing people upon the Wakil's request.

Finally, lax patrolling and arrests of people selling drugs and alcohol in the market was the root of the drug and alcohol problem in the Kabul Market Community. The availability of drugs and alcohol there was also the root of the problems with and Powderies violating these rules. But, the police lacked the will to do anything about it other than arrest addicts when the Wakil, Mullah or elders brought them to the station. When an organization does not make an effort to collect information about rule breaking, it cannot control behavior.

It is even harder for an organization to control behavior when its personnel sell the right to sanction to violators or are simply unwilling to act to sanction violators for fear of retribution. Kabul Market Community residents believed the police on the Chawk allowed armed robberies to occur in the community in return for bribes. They point to the robbery of the paint store 50 meters from a police checkpoint,⁵⁸³ and the armed robbery and assault against the Uzbek medicine importer in Area C.⁵⁸⁴ In these instances, the people of the Kabul Market Community believed there was no way the police could not have known the crime was in progress and did not intervene to stop the crime or to sanction the perpetrators. And, in the case where the Prince of the City robbed a merchant resident of the community of 200,000 Afs in cash in front of the bank on the large road that marks the

⁵⁸³ 110428-Community Narrative-R1

⁵⁸⁴ 110207-Community Narrative-R1

boundary between the market and the community, the police knew full well where the Prince of the City lived and that he had mugged the merchant, but they did nothing.⁵⁸⁵

This government inaction, its ineffectiveness, existed either because of fear or because of bribery, but it resulted from the government organization failing to provide its personnel incentives to impartially apply sanctions when it had information about violations of the law. This lack of organizational effectiveness was what differentiated the Wakil, who was very effective in executing sanctions, from the government. Despite the Wakil's relative lack of resources, when the Wakil organization was left to perform its tasks, it could prevent people from stealing in the Kabul Market Community. This story of a young resident stealing provides an excellent example of the Wakil changing an individual's behavior, while generating an expectation among the rest of the residents that they will be sanctioned if they violate this rule.

A Tajik family that moved to the Kabul Market Community from Farah Province in 2009 had a 25 year old son who was uneducated and unemployed. One day, when the neighboring family was out of town, the boy decided to steal their television. The boy climbed the wall, went into the neighbor's house, took the television and hoisted it up onto the wall. He was climbing over the neighbor's wall with the stolen television when his father saw him. The father asked his son what he was doing. The boy lied. He said he was trying to fix the television for the neighbor. The father said, "Why are you going into their house when their door is locked?" Then, the boy was ashamed and his father realized his son was trying to steal their neighbor's television. The father was very angry and he took his son to the Wakil's house. Because the father was a good person, he did not want to behave

⁵⁸⁵ 110328-Five Government Actions-R1

badly in front of the community by allowing his son to do this without repercussions. So, he told the Wakil that his son had stolen the television, adding, "I respect the rules of the community."

The Wakil went to the *mazjet* and announced that everyone should come to his house. Roughly 250 people went to the Wakil's house, where the Wakil and the boy's father blackened the boy's face with soot from the Wakil's stove. They showed the soot coated boy to the assembled residents. The Wakil announced the name of the thief and what had happened and the people yelled their displeasure. The boy was extremely embarrassed and apologized to the Wakil and the people who had gathered. Then, they made the boy carry the television around the neighborhood so everyone would see that he had tried to steal the television. Because the father had brought the problem to him, the Wakil did not call the police. If someone other than the father had seen the theft and informed the Wakil, the Wakil would have thrown the whole family out of the community. For about a month, people did not talk to the son. They liked the father even more than they did before because he obeyed the rules of the community. After a month, the people of the community began to forgive the son his transgression. The boy never stole again. His father realized that his son needed a job and sent him to train as a mechanic. The son is now a mechanic and the family is much happier.

In this incident, the boy believed he should be able to take his neighbor's property. He valued having a new television more than he feared the Wakil, the government or the Taliban's sanctions. His father had information that the boy had broken this rule and agreed that his son should not steal. He was also concerned that if he did not inform the Wakil about his son's violation of the rule, someone else might and the Wakil might throw

the family out of the community. The father of the thief knew that if he told the Wakil, the Wakil would not harm his son irreparably. If he had given information to the government about it, the boy would have been jailed for six months and it is unclear what damage might befall him. If he had given information to the Taliban about the theft, they would have wanted to cut the boy's hand off. Of course, his father did not agree with that punishment.

The father of the thief therefore provided the Wakil with the information he required to change the thief's behavior. The thief realized he did not want to be punished again, or expelled from the community. He now knew the Wakil had the relative power to punish him and that his father would not withhold information from the Wakil. Therefore, the thief changed his behavior and he never stole again. Additionally, the spectacle provided residents who were not high ranking with the expectation that if they stole something, this would happen to them. None of them wanted that outcome and they could now expect it if they stole from their neighbors.

Process by which Organizations Control the Behavior of Communities

By comparing across these cases of people obeying or disobeying the rules of each of the Wakil, government and Taliban in the Kabul Market Community, we can identify two reasons people obey the rules of an organization: because they already want to behave according to the organization's prescription, or because they expect the organization can sanction them in a way that will harm them.

When people do not want to obey an organization's rule, when they disagree with the rule, be it about working for their competitor or how often they pray in the *mazjet*, they

will only comply with it if they expect a punishment that threatens something they value upon breaking the rule.

A review of the cases of people violating or complying with the rules of the three organizations competing for control in the Kabul Market Community revealed the following. If an organization lacks information about people violating rules, it cannot sanction violators, and it fails to control behavior. If an organization lacks resources greater than those the violator can organize to defend against a sanction, it fails to control behavior. If an organization cannot cause its personnel to collect information or sanction violators, it fails to control behavior. And, if the violator does not care about the sanction, does not value what the organization could take from him, more than he values breaking the rule, the organization cannot control the violator's behavior.

Any organization that wants to control the behavior of a population must be able to convince those people who want to break its rules that if they break a rule, the organization will be able to collect information about their rule breaking and have the resources and personnel to be able to sanction the violation. Additionally, the organization must have a sanction that is of value to the rule breaker.

An organization can collect information in two ways. First, it can cause its personnel to patrol to collect information about rule breaking. But, it can only do so if it has the resources to defend against an attack by its competitor organizations, which may also be patrolling or may have people who will tip it off if the organization overtly moves through a community. Even if it has enough resources relative to its competitor organizations, allowing its personnel to move through the community, the organization must be able to

compel its personnel to do so and collect information about people violating the rules. Second, an organization can convince the population to provide it with information about people violating the rules. If it can do so, the organization increases its ability to identify rule violations.

There are two approaches organizations can take to the process of controlling the behavior of a population. The first is to attempt to impose rules upon the population without regard to whether or not they agree with those rules. This approach, which is that of the government and Taliban, requires both resources from outside the unconsenting community that are greater than those the community can organize either from within or through alliances with competing organizations; and an organization that is effective enough to cause its personnel to patrol to identify violations and sanction violators even though many people in the population may disagree with the rules the organization is attempting to impose or the way they are attempting to impose them.

It is possible to control people's behavior in this way, through imposition, but in this case, the organizations attempting to impose an entire set of rules, the government and the Taliban, fail. The government is unable to translate enormous external resources into control in the Kabul Market Community because it cannot motivate its personnel to collect information about rule violations or impartially sanction violators. The Taliban lacks the resources required to survive the fight with ISAF and the ANSF that would ensue if they began overtly patrolling and sanctioning residents of the capital. It therefore chooses not to patrol and sanction in this period. Both of these organizations are ineffective in causing their personnel to take the particular actions required to generate control, identifying rule violators and sanctioning them, but they are ineffective for different reasons.

The Wakil represents the second approach, consensus building. An organization that begins by asking people what the rules and sanctions ought to be has much less work to do in its effort to control the behavior of a population. First, most people agree with the rules and therefore comply with them. This organic compliance cuts down on the requirement to collect information about rule breaking and sanction it because there are fewer violations.

Second, since most people agree that people should not violate the rule and they agree with what the organization will do to the violator, they are more likely to give information about rule breaking to the organization. Third, since most people agree with the rules and sanctions of the organization, residents of the community allow its personnel to move through the community, allowing the organization to collect information about people violating rules. Fourth, a consenting community is more willing to give an organization all sorts of resources, not just the information about rule breaking and sanctuary mentioned above, but also personnel, services, goods and funds. When most people in a community agree with the goals, rules and actions of an organization, people in the community are far more willing to join the organization. Additionally, they are more likely to be motivated to act based on the intent of the organization because they are likely to agree with that intent. Further, since their family and neighbors want them to act on the behalf of the consensus, personnel from the community can take pride in acting on the intent of the organization. When the residents of a community share the goals of an organization and consent to its rules and sanctions, they are more likely to assist the organization when it asks for their labor and are more likely to provide goods and funds to it.

However, a consent organization's resources are limited to those it can raise from the consenting population. When a consent organization is challenged by outside organizations and those organizations can organize resources greater than those available from the consenting population, the consent organization fails to control behavior.

These two approaches to controlling the behavior of a population are really different strategies for applying the means at the disposal of each organization in terms of the agreement of the population, resources and an organization that can cause its personnel to act upon its intent.

The imposition organizations start from the proposition that they do not care whether or not the population agrees with the rules they want people to obey or with the actions of the organization. They rely upon extensive resources from outside the population they seek to control, and they require an organization that can translate those resources into actions by their personnel in the context of the risks posed by an unconsenting population and any competitor organizations.

A consensus organization, on the other hand, starts from the proposition that the population's agreements with the goals, rules and sanctions of the organization is the most important means it can apply to the process of controlling a population's behavior. It leverages resources from within the population based upon this consent to control the population's behavior, generating information, sanctuary, personnel, services, goods and funds. It generates action by personnel who are organic to the population based on their agreement with the goals of the organization and the actions it wants them to take. A consent organization, however, has resources that are limited to those available from the

consenting population. Those resources are sufficient when the organization is unchallenged by outside organization. However, when it encounters a well-resourced, and effective organization that disagrees with its rules, the consent organization fails to control the behavior of the population.

In the case of the Kabul Market Community, the consent organization, the Wakil, wins the competition for control because the other organizations lack either the will or the resources to cause their personnel to patrol to identify and sanction violations of their rules. The Kabul Market Community, however, is the case of one hand clapping because one imposition organization lacks resources and the other lacks will. In the next case study, we will see what happens as two imposition organizations with increased effectiveness and external resources, compete with the Wakil for control.

CHAPTER 10

War Returns to Kapisa

High in the mountains of Kapisa Province sits a village very like many of the villages in the mountains of northeastern Afghanistan. The village is the subject of a fierce competition between the Taliban, the local Wakil, and the Afghan government and its Coalition partners for control. This hamlet of 100 houses is nestled at the entrance of a valley at the base of a mountain that forms the border between the Tajiks and Pashtuns in northeastern Afghanistan in a district whose mountains serve as a sanctuary for insurgents seeking to attack the Afghan capital. The district also guards the gate to the Tajik stronghold of the Panshir Valley, where Ahmad Shah Massoud and his *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* based their successful resistance to the Soviets and the Taliban. In order to preserve the anonymity of the villagers, we will refer to the village as the Kapisa Mountain Village and the District as the Kapisa Mountain District. R3 is the researcher who described this village, where his family has lived for as long as anyone can remember.

By examining the actions and characteristics of personnel from the competing organizations and the reactions of villagers in the Kapisa Mountain Village, we can drill down to the level of the war in Afghanistan where organizations, like the Taliban, government and Wakil, succeed or fail in reaching their objective of controlling people's behavior. By examining this competition in detail at the micro level, we can see the interplay of actions by organizations and reactions by the population, the extent of control of any organization over the behavior of the population and the causes of that control. One cannot see the actions of the competing organizations and the reactions of the population at the district, provincial, national or international level because civil wars are fought by small units over a fragmented battlefield, and because whether people obey an organization's

rules or not and why cannot be seen except at the individual and small group level. Further, one of the major issues for insurgent and counterinsurgent organizations is whether or not they can cause their personnel to act according to the organization's intent instead of their own interests. Whether or not they do and to what effect can only be seen at the micro level.

This chapter is based on a detailed, accurate account of over 3,500 actions by over 460 people in and around the Kapisa Mountain Village. The data describe the interaction of a randomly selected set of people from the village with other villagers, their village elites, the government and the Taliban. The data provide a kind of directed telescope through which we can focus down to the village level in order to carefully compare twelve cases of organizations attempting to control the behavior of the residents of the Kapisa Mountain Village. The twelve cases consist of the actions and reactions of three different organizations (the Taliban, Afghan government and Wakil) across four different periods of time in which there were different amounts of resources flowing into each organization from outside the Kapisa Mountain District. The first period, prior to January 2010, is after the overthrow of the Taliban, but before the surge in Coalition and Government resources and actions in the district. The second period represents the surge in Coalition and Government resources and actions in the Kapisa Mountain District, between January 2010 and the withdrawal of French military forces from Kapisa Province at the end of 2012. The third period is between the French departure in November of 2012 and the snows of the winter of 2013. This period represents the wake of the surge in Coalition resources and actions. The fourth period, which begins as the snows melt in 2014, represents the surge in Pakistani Taliban resources and actions in the Kapisa Mountain District.

Across these four time periods, each of the three organizations had a different amount of control; villagers agreed with the goals, rules and actions of each organization to a varying extent; villagers provided each organization with different amounts of information, sanctuary, personnel and money goods and services; each organization received different amounts of the same resources from external sources; and each organization had different levels of effectiveness in causing its personnel to act in accord with its intent. This village case study provides twelve cases across which we can examine how and under what conditions these factors cause an organization to have control over the behavior of a population.

The data also allow us to examine a large set of individuals who followed or broke rules, why they did so, how different organizations responded and whether their actions caused the person in question to change his behavior or caused people in the community to change their behavior and why or why not. The Kapisa Mountain Village case study thereby offers us the opportunity to test whether the process we identified in the Kabul Market Community case study explains why people obey or break the rules in the Kapisa Mountain Village Case Study. The detailed data from the village case offer us the opportunity not only to test whether the process of collecting information about rule breaking and selectively sanctioning rule breakers causes control, but to also elaborate on the conditions under which it causes control.

The chapter will begin with a description of the two most important value systems in the Kapisa Mountain Village, Islam and honor. The description provides a basis for understanding how what the villagers want differs from what each of the organizations wants for their future. The chapter then proceeds to describe each organization's goals, and

their own particular combination of villager agreement with their goals, rules and sanctions, resources from within the village, resources external to the Kapisa Mountain Village, and organizational effectiveness across each of the periods under study. For each of these organizations, the chapter will describe their actions and how those actions did or did not cause people to obey the organization's rules.

What do the People of the Kapisa Mountain Village Value? Islam and Honor

A little more than an hour's drive from Kabul, in the southernmost stretches of the Hindu Kush mountains, sits a violently contested district of Kapisa Province, where mountain peaks stretch to 14,000 feet in elevation. Amid the rock-strewn valleys and streams of melted snow sit traditional agricultural villages where most families have lived together, worshipping in the same mosque, tending their families' wheat, corn, beans, walnut and blackberry trees, cows and chickens, for as many generations as anyone can remember. Economic activity in the district centers on traditional agriculture on plots that vary in size from half a kilometer to four square kilometers. The only other economic activity in the district is a *bazaar*, where the farmers can purchase processed goods, like clothes, carpets, tea, electric lights and cell phones. Life in the villages of this district revolves around a steady rhythm of planting crops, caring for them and harvesting them.

Life is hard in the mountains. Floods sweep down steep slopes without warning, filling narrow valleys with water, sweeping away trees, and destroying fields and the mud and plaster walls of homes and fields. Threats from too much water are coupled with threats from too little, and crops are under constant threat of drought. Families are traditionally dependent upon income from their crops and a fire or flood in a field could

ruin them economically. The high cost of processed goods leaves people with little savings in the event of such agricultural disasters. There are no banks to loan money to unfortunate farmers, nor is there any banking method for saving or investment. Villages have electricity only when their residents organize to buy generators, which are very expensive. Until the Karzai period, there was only one school in the district, in its capital, and that only had classes through the 6th grade and those were only for males, leaving huge portions of the population illiterate. To add to these challenges, local residents are plagued by myriad medical problems, particularly kidney, blood pressure and stomach ailments, as well as infant mortality and death in childbirth.

In this place, calamities and indigence are common, afflicting and difficult to guard against.⁵⁸⁶ People die of disease or natural disasters, die in childbirth, or are killed by fighters from armed political and or criminal organizations. In this context of uncertainty and pain, Islam provides villagers with hope that this world is only a test and that they will pass the test and enter Paradise. Seemingly random suffering and pain are simply a passing problem in this world, which is only a preparation for the next one. The Mullahs say that on Doomsday, people and even an individual's own hands, other body parts, or belongings, will testify to Allah in front of the assembled masses about an individual's good (*halal*) and bad (*haram*) actions in this world. Allah will then use this information to determine whether or not that person should be admitted to Paradise or consigned to Hell.⁵⁸⁷

For example, when discussing whether or not it was right for tractor and thresher

⁵⁸⁶ Wording paraphrased from the opening pages of the *Waning of the Middle Ages*, which describes life in medieval Europe, with its pervasive poverty, illness, violence and suffering and concomitant religiosity focused on life in the world hereafter, not life in this world. Johan Huizinga. *The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought, and Art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth Centuries* (1924 edition reprinted). Oxford: Benediction Classics of Oxford City Press, 2010. p. 1-4

⁵⁸⁷ 140308 Mazjet Friday R3

operators, who come to all the villages in the valley at whose mouth the Kapisa Mountain Village lies from a neighboring valley, to charge even the poorest villagers for their services in the summer of 2014, the village Mullah described Allah's test, saying,

"The thresher earns *halal* money. He does not take bribes from anyone or steal. It is a good job for him. On Doomsday, all of the thresher's money will be in front of him. The money will say to Allah, 'This man found me from *halal* actions.' When a person gets money from *haram* actions, on Doomsday, the money will come in front of him and say, 'This man is very bad and found me from *haram* actions.' Allah will punish him in front of all of the people. His family will be ashamed. Allah will order the angels to take a person who earns money from *haram* actions to put him in Hell. If someone finds *halal* money, Allah will tell the angels to put him in Paradise and make a good place for him. He will be relaxed. Allah will say, 'I promised the people who did not break my rules, who did not kill, steal, take bribes or do something bad in the world that I would make them a good place in Paradise.' Allah said, 'Those who did not remember me and obey my rules in this world, I will make a very bad place for them.' A lucky man obeys the rules of Allah and does good things in this world."⁵⁸⁸

At a funeral, a Mullah from another village in the Kapisa Mountain District described the torment that awaits those who fail Allah's test, saying,

"If someone dies, and that person has sins, his grave will be tight and it will press him. The soil does not want this person because he is a sinner. Snakes will come into his grave. Bad things will hit him and press him in his grave. He will scream a lot. Allah said that Hazrat Ali was across from the cemetery and he put his ear on the ground and he heard the screams of the sinners. He told Mohammad and Mohammad said that the angels and the *jins* can hear that sound. Maybe Allah made it so you [Hazrat Ali] could hear this. Ali told the people about this. He said, 'If you want to be a good Muslim, you have to guide people in the right way by advising them. You have to have good behavior even if the person you are interacting with is not a Muslim. You can only kill him if he attacks you. It is good to invite him to eat with you. Maybe he will become a Muslim. Do not do bad things against him because it is a very bad action.'⁵⁸⁹

Islam in the Kapisa Mountain Village is suffused with a belief in consensus, mutual aid and unity with one's neighbors. It is incumbent upon neighbors to greet one another, attend one another's parties and funerals and assist one another whenever requested. The

⁵⁸⁸ 141104 Community Narrative R3

⁵⁸⁹ 110503 Taliban Action 3 R3

Mullah admonishes his followers to respect and help one another. During 2014, every single randomly selected family in the Kapisa Mountain Village comes to the aid of one of its neighbors by assisting them in planting, watering or harvesting; by taking them to the district clinic if they are ill; by slaughtering livestock; by alerting them to a problem with their home and other property; or by helping maintain the village *mazjet*. The villagers help one another even when doing so comes at the expense of what the villager was already doing, costs him money, or even puts him in danger. When a villager assists one of their neighbors and the neighbor thanks him, the villager often replies, "It is my job. I have to do this." By this, the villager means Allah said helping ones neighbor is incumbent upon all Muslims.

The Wakil of the Kapisa Mountain Village, who was preparing for what he rightly feared would be an onslaught of Taliban attacks on the village and villagers in the spring of 2014, explained it best in a meeting he called to bolster the unity of his villagers. He said,

"We want all of you in the *mazjet* because we have to have unity in our village. We have to have unity with one another. We have to help one another. Unity starts in the home. It starts with unity with your spouse. A man has to get advice from his wife and she must get advice from her husband. A son has to have unity with his father. Also, a father must have unity with his daughter and his brother, his mother, his uncle, and his father. Then, that family will be a good family in the village.

"When we have unity, we know about the problems of this village and the problems of those surrounding it. Many times, I have told you in different meetings that I held, 'Peace comes from unity.' Also, development, respect, politeness, they all come from unity."

"Sometimes, when we have a meeting, some of the people do not come, men both young and old. A father sometimes sends his children and they do not understand what happened in the meeting. I have been very patient about these people. I have thought, maybe we could hold another meeting and they could attend that one. Unfortunately, some of these people do not come even to the second meeting."

“This place is only for worshipping. So, it is okay for me to talk about unity because Islam wants unity. Islam does not want us to talk about other topics, like fields or cows, here. But, in the *mazjet*, I want to announce to you that every father of a family has to come to meetings. I respectfully ask that everyone come to the meetings.”

“Also, at the meetings, I want your ideas and suggestions. I need your ideas and your advice. Maybe, some people have expertise that I do not have and I need your help. When you send your sons, your sons do not have experience and they do not have your ideas. I cannot solve all of the problems alone. I need you, your suggestions, your advice, your experience. You have to help me. When the head of a family doesn’t come to the meeting, it means there is no unity. He does not have unity at home. He does not want the people of this village to be relaxed and have a good life.”

“When we have unity in the village, at that time, we can help others in our village. If we have unity, we understand and know about a person who is sick in the village. If we can help the sick person and he becomes a little healthy, Allah will be happy. All humans are like brothers. Everyone has to live as brothers and sisters. We have to think that when a person in the neighborhood has any problem, we have to think his problem is my problem. If a person becomes sick in the village, we have to think he is my brother. He is a member of my family. If we are able, we should help the sick man. When we see sickness, at that time, we will worry about him and bless for him. We want help from Allah. When another person becomes sick, we have to bless him because, in sadness and happiness, everything happens from Allah because Allah wants happiness. All humans must help Allah. We have to try.”

“If you have any problems in the village, we have to attend to those problems. Together, we can solve the problems. One person cannot find the solution alone. One or two people cannot solve the problem. If you have more people, that is when we will be able to solve the problems. All humans need other humans. ... I want everyone to attend the meetings, especially, the heads of the families. If the head of any family is not at home, he must send his son. If he is at home, and he sends his son and I find out then, I will be very, very angry. I will remember that and I will never help him.”

The Mullah stood in front of the people, reinforcing the Wakil’s plea for unity,

“Thanks to the Wakil. He talks of unity. All villagers must accept his speech. Unity brings peace and relaxation and improvements to the village. Unity will make people want to attend one another’s happiness and sadness parties. Unity allows us to understand about our neighbor’s problems, his job and the kind of life he has.”

“I am 100% sure if you have unity in your village, the government cannot punish you and the Taliban cannot punish you. No one can do something against you. When the government harasses a person and all of the people

come and stand next to that person and help that person, the government cannot do anything. The people show their unity to the government. If the Taliban comes to harass you and all of the people stand against the Taliban, the Taliban will be afraid of you because the Taliban will understand that these people have unity.”

“When the people have unity and peace, Allah will be happy with them. Allah will accept the blessings of the people because Islam means peace. I want all of you to think that you are Islam. You have to obey the rules of Islam.

“If a person who comes in your house as a guest in your area and he is not Muslim, you have to have good behavior toward him and you have to help him. If that person is not a Muslim and he attacks or punishes or kills you, then you can defend yourself and attack him and it will be *jihad* because Allah said you have to defend yourself. Do not let anyone harass you or your family or the people. When Islam allows you, you have to do that. When it does not allow you, you should not do that. It will be a sin for you. I have nothing more to say.

“The prayer of evening is coming. I bless you so that everyone will be successful in his life and everyone will have unity in his life and in this village. Allah forgive your sins and bless and help you in your life and your job. Unfortunately, I understand the people of this area, especially those people in Dara 1, have a very bad situation. In some of the villages, the Taliban comes at night and the government comes in the day. Maybe, in the future, the people of these villages will flee their homes. They will go to other places. We want from Allah that he will bring peace in this entire district and that the people of this district have peace and unity.”⁵⁹⁰

In contrast to the teachings of the Taliban, the Mullah of the Kapisa Mountain Village teaches the people there that it is incumbent upon all Muslims to teach others about Islam, but that it is wrong to enforce Allah’s rules through coercion or force others to practice Islam. The Mullah says it is incumbent upon villagers to advise people that they should not break Allah’s rules, but whether they do or not is between the rule-breaker and Allah.⁵⁹¹ For example, one of the villagers refuses to come to prayers in the community *mazjet* and does not pray at all. The Wakil and Mullah advised him to pray, saying, “You have to come to the *mazjet* to pray. If you do not come, I cannot trust you. Prayers belong to

⁵⁹⁰ 140430 Wakil Actions R3

⁵⁹¹ 140704 Mazjet Friday R3

Allah. Allah will decide whether he punishes you or not. I am not the Taliban. I will not hit you with a whip.” If he does not go to the *mazjet* to pray, it is between him and Allah.⁵⁹²

Similarly, the Mullah saw boys from the village who were drunk, so he gave a sermon decrying the consumption of alcohol, hashish and opium because it makes people behave like animals. The Mullah maintained that animals, unlike humans, do not know how to behave, how to respect others, how to have patience. He said,

“If I do not tell you about this, the right things and the wrong things, I will be responsible to Allah. I will be ashamed in front of him on Doomsday. Allah will ask me, ‘Why did you not tell the people? You understood about Islam and why did you not tell the people?’ Allah will punish me. I do not want to be ashamed in front of the people and Allah on Doomsday. I do not want Allah to punish me. I am very afraid of Hell and its punishments. I want to tell you, if you do this, it will be better and if you do not do this, it will be bad for you.”

“After this, it belongs to you. After my speech, your father, your mother, the elders and the Wakil are responsible to the young people of the village to tell them not to do bad things. If a person uses wine and hashish and opium, you have to guide him first, then punish him if he does this again and then kill him if he continues. Otherwise, the person will give wine to other young people. Come on, you have to do this. All of the community will become bad if you do not. Also, your life will be very bad and your life will be destroyed. If you do not guide the young people, Allah will be angry with you. You have to tell the young people if someone does this, it is bad. Please do not do this.”⁵⁹³

In the Kapisa Mountain Village and the surrounding villages, Islam provides a framework for unity, mutual aid and rule by consensus. When this interpretation of the rules of Islam is obeyed by most people, it provides the residents of the Kapisa Mountain District with a safety net in this unpredictable and dangerous world and hope that if they simply obey the rules of Allah, they will be relaxed and happy in the next world.

⁵⁹² 140911 Characteristics Family 15 R3

⁵⁹³ 141121 Mazjet Friday R3

This Islamic value system is in near-constant conflict with another, pre-Islamic value system, centering on honor. Individuals make efforts to prove they are unassailable and powerful, honorable. In a social world characterized by near constant war, where families have often had to secure themselves and their property, demonstrating one's power deters thieves and other threats. In the Kapisa Mountain Village, despite Islam and the Wakil's admonitions regarding unity and solving problems through consensus, people get into fights to prove they are stronger or more powerful than someone else in the village. When someone shames someone else, that person feels obliged to prove he is more powerful than the person who shamed him through a demonstration of brute force.

For example, the electricity went off in Family 6's House. Son of Family 6 went outside to investigate and found that Family 13 had hooked his electrical line and was stealing his electricity. When Son of Family 6 confronted Son of Family 13 with this situation, Son of Family 13 lied about it. When Son of Family 6 showed him the hooked line and the line running from it to Family 13 House, Son of Family 13 did not apologize. Son of Family 6 was angry and hit Son of Family 13 and the two young men fought. Father of Family 13 separated them and Son of Family 6 went home. But, the next day, Son of Family 6 saw Son of Family 13 in front of the village shop and attacked him. Elder 2 separated the two boys, scolded Father of Family 13 and Son of Family 13 for stealing electricity and told Son of Family 6, "Please forget about this. It means you are helping your neighbor. Everyone understands this is the fault of Family 13. But, do not make a big problem from this. Do not make a problem, or I will hit you. You need to go home."

However, when the young men of the Kapisa Mountain Village gathered at the village shop discussed what had happened, they said it was very shameful for the Father

and Son 1 of Family 13 to steal electricity. They should have asked permission. They all agreed that Son of Family 6 was right to fight Son 1 of Family 13. In the view of the young villagers, Son of Family 6 had to defend his rights. If he had not showed his power, anyone would think they could take anything Family 6 has, including its women. Interestingly, Family 13 stole the electricity in an effort to demonstrate its honor. In order to provide hospitality to relatives of Family 13, who came as guests, Family 13 needed more electricity and that led them to steal electricity from Family 6. If Family 13 could not provide hospitality to its guests, it would have been shameful for them and damaged their honor.⁵⁹⁴

The conflict between Islam and honor can be very publically seen in the phenomenon of weddings in the Kapisa Mountain Village. There were several weddings in the Kapisa Mountain Village during the period under study. The family of the groom approaches the father of the intended bride and offers him a bride price in return for his daughter. The price is between 200,000 and 700,000 Afs in the Kapisa Mountain District, depending on the how much the bride's father demands and the groom's father is willing to pay. The father of the groom then hosts the wedding party attended by villagers and friends and extended families of the groom, as well as some people from the bride's family. The men and women celebrate separately, and, in most, but not all cases, the men celebrate by dancing to music played by a wedding singer. The men from the family of the groom celebrate their power to raise enough money to buy the groom a wife and they celebrate the prospect of the children whom they hope issue from the union, further enhancing the power, and therefore the honor, of their family. In this context, the members of the groom's family enjoy dancing, even though it is *haram*, because it shows they can do anything they want. They also enjoy demonstrating their power to make the wedding singer play

⁵⁹⁴ 141201 Family 6 Control Measures R3

whatever songs they want and showing everyone else their power and honor. The conflict between the consensus and mutual aid of the Islam practiced and valued in the Kapisa Mountain Village and the honor its residents seek at the expense of the honor of others is reified in these wedding celebrations.

Honor is directly negatively impacted when fathers cannot control the behavior of female family members and when other males are able to abduct them, run away with them or harass them. People in the Kapisa Mountain District define harassment as a male not from the village conversing or attempting to establish a relationship with a female to whom he is not related. These incidents publically demonstrate that the girl's family cannot protect itself or verify the paternity of its offspring or those of future spouses of its daughters.

Familial pursuit of honor holds such powerful sway over females in the Kapisa Mountain Village that not a single woman from the village has a job outside the home and all women need permission from their father, brother or husband whenever they want to leave their homes. Many families do not want their daughters to attend school because doing so opens the potential for shame to come to the entire family. After they graduate from the elementary school in the village, girls from the village have to walk 30 minutes or an hour to get to school. This journey provides ample opportunity for boys to harass girls and try to form a relationship with them that can result in the girl running away from home to get married, thereby bringing shame on her family and hurting them financially by reducing or eliminating the bride price their father will receive for them.⁵⁹⁵ After a series of incidents in

⁵⁹⁵ Brideprices are on average 350,000 Afs. This is a huge amount of money in a village where the average per capita income varied between 1,400 Afs and 7,000 Afs between 2010 and 2015. If a family has sons and

which girls brought cell phones to school and used them to coordinate meeting or running away with boys, parents took their girls out of school to avoid possible shame. Therefore, the Kapisa Mountain District Government declared that girls who brought cell phones to school would be expelled. At the entrance to girls' schools in the Kapisa Mountain District, female student guards search students as they enter school in order to identify girls who have brought phones or other contraband to the school.⁵⁹⁶

The government also deploys ALP to patrol the roads where groups of girls, one group from each village, walk to get to and from school. They do this not only to deter Taliban attacks on the girls, who are violating the Taliban's rules, but also to arrest boys who harass the girls. For example, in October of 2014, three boys in their late teens and early 20s waited at the Kapisa Mountain Village Shop at the time when they knew the girls from the village would return as a group from school. When they saw the girls, the boys told them they were beautiful and tried to give them their cell phone numbers. When the girls saw the boys, they covered their faces and the boys tried to grab their hands and touch them. One girl yelled,

"You don't have a mother and a sister that you would like to harass someone else's sister? It is very shameful for you. If you want to do something bad against us, instead of doing this to us, you should go harass your own mother and sister. Do this against your own family."⁵⁹⁷

The shopkeeper saw what was happening and called the ALP. As the ALP approached the shop, the boys tried to run away. But, the ALP called to them, "Don't run or I will shoot!" The boys stopped and the ALP arrested them. The ALP asked the shopkeeper, "Where is the Wakil? This action is in his village." The shopkeeper said, "I will call him." The

daughters, which most do, they rely upon the brideprices from the marriages of their daughters to pay the brideprices of their son's wives.

⁵⁹⁶ 140925 What Happened to Me R3

⁵⁹⁷ 141020 ALP Action 4 R3

ALP beat the boys severely in front of the Kapisa Mountain Village shop so everyone could see.

When the Wakil arrived and asked, "What happened? Why are you hitting these boys?" One of the ALP said, "When the girls were trying to go home, these boys harassed them and the girls were yelling and the shopkeeper here called me. We were in the next village and came very quickly and arrested them."

The Wakil went in front of each of the boys, slapped each one and then said,

"You don't have a sister or mother? That is why you want to harass the girls? These girls have fathers and brothers. You are bad people. You do not have anything else to do? You do not have a job? You do not go to school? You just waste your time teasing girls? These girls have brothers and fathers. If someone teased your sister, what do you want to do to those people?"

The boys apologized to the Wakil. They said, "I am sorry. It is my mistake. After this, I will never do this again." They begged the Wakil, "Please tell the ALP not to take us to the district police station. If they take us to the district station, they will put us in jail."

The ALP told the Wakil, "We have respect for you and we trust your judgment. We want to take these boys to the district police station, but we thought first we should call you before we do that because you are responsible for this area and we do not want you to become angry."

The Wakil said to the boys, "Do you want to promise me that you will never ever do this again or do you want me to send you to the district jail?" The boys said to the Wakil, "Everything you want, we will do. Do not send us to the district station." The Wakil said to the boys,

“You are thinking you are young and powerful, but I think you are very weak people. If I made the young people of this village understand what you had done, they would beat you very badly. But, I do not want to make a problem and make you ashamed in this village. You are criminals. This is a big crime that you did.”

The boys apologized to the Wakil and promised they would never do this again. The Wakil said to them,

“I was also young once. Now, you are young. I do not want young people to become ashamed in the Kapisa Mountain Village. You must promise me in front of the ALP in writing that you will not do this again. You must say you will never harass girls again in the entire district. If anyone sees you do this again, then no one will ask me and you will be sent to jail.”

The boys agreed and they wrote on the promise paper the Wakil prepared and each of them put a thumbprint and signature on it. An ALP told the Wakil, “You are a very patient man and patient with these boys.”

The Wakil said, “I have to have patience because I am the Wakil. I am a representative of the people and I do not want anyone to become angry with me. It is the first time I have seen these boys. If I see them do this again, I will put them in the jail.”

The Shopkeeper said to the Wakil, “You have to hit these boys and put them in jail. They did a big crime.” The Wakil told the Shopkeeper, “It belongs to me. I can decide what I should do against these boys.” The Wakil said to the boys, “You have to have patience and be careful. You promised me. If you do this again, it will be very dangerous for you.”

The Wakil told the ALP to release the boys and they did. The boys went back to the neighboring village to their family homes. The Wakil said to the ALP, “I thank you. You did your job very well. Thank you for respecting me.” The ALP said, “This is my job. First, I

thank the shopkeeper who called us.” The shopkeeper said, “It is my job. If I see anything bad, I have to call the police.”

The girls arrived home and complained to their fathers and six of the fathers went to see the Wakil. They said, “Where are the boys who did this?” The Wakil said, “The boys left here and the ALP arrested them and hit them. I got a promise paper, a warrant paper from them, saying they will not do this again in the entire district or they will go to jail.”

The fathers said, “If we came earlier, we would have beaten them badly and we might even have killed them because they harassed our girls.” The families of the girls were very, very angry and said, “Maybe the ALP got money from them. Why did you release them?” The Wakil said, “The ALP did not release them. I released them. I slapped each one of them.” The Shopkeeper told the assembled men, “I was present. The ALP beat these boys very badly and the Wakil slapped them.”

Kapisa Mountain Village residents said, “That is good that the ALP beat them and the Wakil slapped them. It means you will help us and these guys will never come back again and harass the girls.” The fathers of the girls said, “It belongs to the district to provide security for the girls. The government has to put these boys in jail.” The Wakil told them, “Please forget this. You have to think nothing happened in this area.”⁵⁹⁸

In the Kapisa Mountain Village, a man “is not a man” if he cannot protect his wife, sister or daughter from being harassed or raped. In discussing an incident where the

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid

Taliban tried to enter a house where a woman and her children were the only residents, only to be repelled by the woman and her AK 47, R3 explained,

“It is better the Taliban kill the family than rape someone. No one will ever forget it. ... If someone fights with a man whose wife has been raped, his opponent can say, ‘You have to care about your wife. You are not a man.’ For this man, it is better that he kills his wife or sister. He is not a man because he could not protect her. Everyone says it is better that she dies because otherwise his life will be bad.”

“People think she has to die because she is a very shameful person in the area after this. She became a bad person. She cannot go to weddings or visit her relatives’ homes because the old women would say the Taliban did something bad to her. It is better that she dies. A woman has to cover herself, protect herself. ... She has to cover her body. She is protecting herself.”

“The people will think the husband is not a good man because he did not care about his wife. He does not control her. No one will attend his happiness and sadness parties and no one will be his friend.”

“Women will say she is very bad. They will say she has to cover her whole body because Islam does not allow women to go out unless they cover their whole body.”

“Men see the women. When a man sees a woman, he has to turn his face. It is a big sin for both because they did not understand one another. Allah said in the Koran that no man can see the body of the woman. Women who want to show their bodies to men, commit a big sin. Humans are better than angels, but humans do something bad, like Bibi Hawa [who is the Islamic version of Eve].”

“If the Taliban went into a house where there were only women or women and children, then in the eyes of the villagers, they did rape her. People would talk about it and they would just say she just does not want to say, but that is obviously what happened. People would say to the woman’s husband or brother or father that you are not a powerful man. He would have to move to another province.”

“All of the men have to care about the women, not about themselves. It is the job of the man to take care of them. Allah said that you have to care about women because they are weak. If someone rapes your wife or daughter, it is better to kill her because of the shame for her and for the father.”⁵⁹⁹

⁵⁹⁹ 140926 What Happened To Me R3

Families with large numbers of strong, smart male children have more honor than those with less male children because the family is more of a threat to those that would like to make them submit to their will. Those with more female children are at more risk of shame because they have less men to protect the women. However, families with large numbers of male children face serious financial challenges because the amount of farm land the family has is limited and the more male children they have, the more the produce from that land must be divided. Additionally, the family must work to acquire enough money for each of its sons to pay a bride price. If there are equal numbers of sons and daughters, the bride price a father will accept for his daughter can finance the one he must pay for his son's wife. But, if there are more boys than girls, the father and his sons must figure out how to earn and save a minimum of 200,000 Afs, which is just under what an average family in the village makes in two years from the sale of its corn and wheat.

Projecting an image of power and the ability to defend and control one's women and belongings is essential to deterring attacks, but it is also essential to being a full and legitimate male member of society in the Kapisa Mountain District. Demonstrating one's individual power runs counter to the goals of unity and Islam in many situations. These two value systems, an Islam based on unity and the rewards of Paradise in the next world, and honor, which provides security and rewards in this world, underpin many of the social interactions in the Kapisa Mountain Village. Balancing these two value systems, Islam and familial honor, on behalf of the people of the village consumes much of the Wakil's time. But, this balancing act does not occur in a vacuum. It occurs in the context of violent competitions between organizations.

Kapisa Mountain Village residents find themselves in a violently contested area, characterized by poverty and lack of services and infrastructure. In this context of great danger and uncertainty, they rely upon an Islam grounded in unity and mutual aid to provide them with a safety net, while they rely on honor to deter people from attacking their families or stealing their belongings. They value a particular version of Islam and they value honor and these values drive the way they would behave in the absence of the competition between the government, the Taliban and the Wakil for control over their behavior.

The Strategic Context of the Kapisa Mountain Village

Due to its strategic location, war has been a near constant in the Kapisa Mountain District since the 1980's, as governments, armed groups and foreign powers have fought to possess the mountain sanctuary. Its lofty peaks and swift, deep river have provided a protected sanctuary for many armed groups bent on attacking the capital in Kabul and the supply lines that stretch to it from Pakistan through Torkham Gate during Afghanistan's many wars. The area also guards an entrance to the Panshir Valley, which served as the most important sanctuary for the Tajik *mujihadeen* during their fight against the Soviets and the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. In the Panshir Valley, Ahmed Shah Massoud and his *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* maintained control despite many attempts by the Soviets and Taliban to dislodge them. They built local governments, schools and health clinics in the Panshir Valley and were able to repel even the attacks of the Red Army. The northern border of the Kapisa Mountain District abuts the Panshir Valley, this great sanctuary and source of power for *Jamat e Islami*. During the war against the Soviets, much of the population of the district was displaced into refugee camps in nearby Peshawar and many of the men became *mujihadeen*. There were 6 *mujihadeen* commanders in the district. Some of the men fought

for *Jamat e Islami*, while others fought for *Hizbe Islami Gulbadin*, the competitor party to *Jamat e Islami*, run by Ghilzai Pashtun commander Gulbadin Hekmatyar.

During the war against the Soviets, some of the young men from the villages of the Kapisa Mountain District chose to join both of these *mujihadeen* factions. In so doing, they separated themselves from their traditional agricultural economies and village culture and authority systems. These young men immersed themselves in whichever armed political party they fought for. An individual young man who left his life as a farmer with at best a 6th grade education was exposed to a world much larger and more adventurous than that in his village. He became an active participant in what nearly everyone in Kapisa Province saw as a just cause, the struggle, or *jihad*, to expel the Soviets. He did so as a member of an armed political organization that provided him not only with food and a salary in greater abundance than he could previously have imagined, but also with honor.

As a member of an organization that provided him with the ability to exert coercive force individually, or better yet, with the support of his commanders and peers, a formerly indigent and powerless Afghan farmer was no longer beholden to his father, his elders, his Wakil or his village Mullah. He was empowered by his membership in the organization, reliant upon it for his continued augmented honor, wealth and comfort.

In this way, *Jamat e Islami* and *Hizbe Islami Gulbadin* separated their members from the grim, impoverished and monotonous toil of traditional agriculture and empowered them. Fighters in these groups were no longer simply suffering, scraping by and waiting for Doomsday, they were acting to reduce their daily suffering as a result of Soviet aggressions. But, these organizations could only do so on the basis of external resources flowing in from

US and allied aid to *Jamat e Islami* and *Hizbe Islami Gulbadin*. Seeking those external resources became the quest of each organization, which sought to reinforce its importance to its members. After the fighting with the Soviets ceased, many of these young men demobilized and simply returned to traditional agriculture.

Many of them mobilized again when Pashtun Taliban fighters from southern Afghanistan and Pakistan began beating male villagers for not attending prayers five times per day or female villagers for going to the fields to assist in running their families' farms. Some of these young men demobilized again in the wake of the Coalition's overthrow of the Taliban, while others maintained their connections to their fellow fighters, empowering themselves above those around them in perpetuity. Given the endemic poverty in the Kapisa Mountain District, the leaders of these organizations sought to resource that empowerment from external sources.

Violence in the district has also resulted from the fact it contains a stretch of the social border between the Pashtun and Tajik ethnic groups. Relations between these groups became very strained during rule by the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, their battle with Tajik-dominated *Jamat e Islami* and during the counterinsurgency efforts spearheaded by Tajik-dominated security forces. The current conflict in the district has taken on some of the characteristics of an ethnic civil war, as Pashtun-dominated Taliban find sanctuary in Pashtun communities and the provincial and district governments, ANP and ALP are dominated by Tajik *mujihadeen* political party *Jamat e Islami*.

In addition, there is a Parachi minority in the Kapisa Mountain District, living in villages among the Tajik and Pashtun populations. The Parachi are similar in language and

customs to the Pashtun, but they reject domination by the Pashtun. The Parachi are generally staunchly anti-Taliban.

As one drives up the mountains from Kabul toward the district, one passes through Kapisa's capital, and further through the district's capital with its mosque, *madrassa*, *bazaar* and district government center, arriving in a desert which houses an Afghan Army *kandak* base,⁶⁰⁰ a road and the Panshir River. Branching out from the desert are five mountain spines that divide the district into five *daras*, or mountain valleys, where villages cluster around mountain creeks that feed the Panshir River. The mountains grow higher as you move out from the desert and the ones that form the back of the district and the border with neighboring provinces reach the staggering elevation of 14,000 feet.

Dara 1 is almost entirely Pashtun, with a small Parachi minority. The Pashtun majority are traditional farmers, like their Tajik counterparts in Daras 2, 3, 4 and 5. Dara 1 is adjacent to the entirely Pashtun Area T, which is contiguous with a large swath of territory occupied by Pashtuns and not Tajiks that stretches down to Jalabad in the east and through the Sarobi desert to Kabul in the south. The border between Dara 1 and Dara 2, which is a mountain at whose foot sits the Kapisa Mountain Village, is a portion of the border between Tajiks and Pashtuns in Northeastern Afghanistan.

Pashtun culture differs from Tajik culture in several respects. The two groups speak distinct languages. The Tajiks speak Dari, which is closely related to Farsi, and the Pashtuns speak Pashtun. While males of both groups mostly wear traditional clothes, the clothes are

⁶⁰⁰ A *kandak* is a battalion equivalent and the one in the Kapisa Mountain District was comprised of roughly 600 ANA soldiers in 2014.

different. Tajik men wear a Shalwar kamise⁶⁰¹ and loose cotton pants, often with a waistcoat and a Pakul, which is a circular wool cap. Pashtun men wear trousers and shirts that are woolen and have wide pant legs and arms. In the winter, they wrap a wool blanket around themselves. Most Pashtun men also wear turbans. Additionally, women in the Pashtun areas seldom go outside without a male relative. When they go outside, even to the field, they wear a *burkha*. Pashtuns emphasize the importance of keeping women inside their homes in order to ensure the honor of their families remains intact. Pashtun brideprices, which vary between 700,000 and 1,500,000 Afs, are higher than Tajik brideprices, which vary between 300,000 and 400,000 Afs.⁶⁰² The size of Pashtun brideprices reinforces families' commitment to keeping girls and women inside, covered and constantly in the company of male relatives when they are outside their homes. It also means that if a family has more boys than girls, they will have large lump sums of capital they can apply to buying lucrative items like tractors and threshers. All tractors and threshers in the Kapisa Mountain District are owned by Pashtuns because they cost in excess of 1,000,000 Afs. Because of their higher brideprices, Pashtun daughters serve as a significant store of value in a society with no savings or loans.

Pashtun culture revolves around traditional agriculture and Islamic practice. Pashtuns are committed to the preservation of this traditional culture. For that reason, Pashtuns and Tajiks generally disagree about the value of interacting with foreign cultures. Pashtuns in the Kapisa Mountain District want to limit contact with foreign cultures in order to preserve the isolated perfection of their Islamic and Pashtun culture. This interpretation

⁶⁰¹ A Shalwar kamise is a long cotton shirt that stretches well below the waist to just above the knees, with long sleeves. It often buttons at the neck and has no collar.

⁶⁰² 140723 Wakil R3

of an isolationist Islam differs starkly from that of the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village, who embrace education and contact with the outside world within an Islamic framework.

For example, despite their traditional lifestyle, the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village decided to host computer and internet classes for the young men and boys. When discussing whether or not to do this in February of 2013, the Mullah of the Kapisa Mountain Village said,

“I am happy with the computer teacher because he is a good person who wants to help the people by teaching them about the computers and the internet. ... Internet and computers are new technology and everyone has to study technology because it can improve your life and your mind because you can find information about everything on the internet. There are so many things that are explained on the internet. If there is a book or a famous person that a person wants to understand or he wants to understand the Koran, he can get that from the internet. Everything is on the internet. It is a new technology.”

Son of Elder 1 said to the people, “I know some people do not know about computers and the internet, especially the old men. They think it is not useful because people should study the Koran and Islamic subjects instead of computers and the internet. But, everything is on the internet, both negative and positive. If someone wants to study, he can find things on the internet. The internet provides a good education for everyone. At first, I want everyone to learn how to recite the Koran. This is the order of Allah. First, learn to recite the Koran. Education is incumbent on women and men. One of the things I want to tell the young people studying the internet is to use only the positive things they find, not the negative things.”⁶⁰³

Many Pashtuns consider the presence of non-Muslims and non-Afghans to be a threat to their culture. Pashtuns generally believe that fighting against the Americans, the French and the government that has allied with them is *jihad* and that people who die fighting them will therefore be admitted to Paradise as *shahid* (martyrs) regardless of any *haram* actions they have taken in their lives.

⁶⁰³ 140911-Family 6-R3

For example, the Pashtun Tractor Man from Area T told R3 in May 2014, “The government took many bribes and America and the French helped them. Taliban are volunteers to help the people.”⁶⁰⁴

Also, in the Bazaar in late October 2014, a Pashtun Shopper saw Tajik ALP patrolling the bazaar and said to a Tajik Bazaar Shopkeeper from the Kapisa Mountain Village, “They are like American people. We are Muslim. They are not Muslim. We cannot work or talk with them.” The Tajik Bazaar Shopkeeper replied,

“You do not understand Islam. Mohammad talked with Muslims and non-Muslims because they are all humans. He said do not harass any human. If someone wants to help you, you have to talk to him. He is like your brother. If someone attacks you, you conduct *jihad* against him. Taliban are not conducting *jihad*.”⁶⁰⁵

Area T is almost entirely Pashtun and sits to the south of the Kapisa Mountain District. Its Pashtun population is contiguous with that of the Kapisa Mountain District’s Dara 1. In 2011, the Mullahs in Area T declared a *jihad* against non-Muslims and anyone who works or agrees with them. They told the Pashtun people of Area T that it will not be murder if someone kills non-Muslims or the people who work or agree with them and that people who die trying to kill them will be *shahid* (martyrs). Regardless of other wrongs they have committed in their lives, these *shahid* will be admitted to Paradise. The Mullahs of Area T also declared that all salaries from foreigners are *haram*. That means it is *haram* to knowingly accept money from those salaries even for the purchase of *halal* items.

The people of the Kapisa Mountain Village therefore find themselves in a very dangerous neighborhood. The mountains that ring their valley provide a natural sanctuary

⁶⁰⁴ 141104-Community Narrative-R3

⁶⁰⁵ 141106-Community Narrative-R3

for insurgents seeking to attack the capital. The Tajik *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* seek control over the district in order to defend their Panshiri power base. And, the Taliban seek to control it in order to attack that power base. The village sits at the front of the mountain that forms the border between the Tajiks and the Pashtuns in the Kapisa Mountain District. This village sits at the point where two great waves, that of the Taliban, and that of the Coalition and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan clash. As the external resources for each of these organizations surge and ebb and surge again, the Kapisa Mountain Village and its Wakil are obliged to surf the tides in an effort to survive and maintain the Islam and honor they value.

Organizations Competing to Control the Kapisa Mountain Village

There are three organizations competing to determine how the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village behave. This section will describe how each one wants to the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village to behave and the organization's strategy for changing villagers' behavior. The following section will describe the actions of each organization over four periods of time and the extent to which each organization succeeds.

The Wakil is an organization that builds and reinforces unity among villagers in order to govern based on their consensus about the problems facing the village and solutions to them. The Wakil focuses his efforts on maintaining agreement by villagers with the goals, rules, sanctions and other actions of the Wakil organization. Agreement by the villagers with the Wakil's rules means most people obey the Wakil because they agree people should obey the Wakil's rules, reducing the need for the Wakil to collect information about rule breaking and sanction it.

Because of their agreement with the Wakil's goals, rules and sanctions, the villagers provide the Wakil with personnel, in the form of the Wakil and two elders. These personnel are motivated by a combination of belief in consensus based community government as part and parcel of Islam, and by their strong interest in the Kapisa Mountain Village being a happy, prosperous, healthy, peaceful community for their families, which have always resided there and will likely always reside there. The Wakil and elders work tirelessly in addition to their duties running their family farms without pay because they are doing something for their community and their families' future. They are willing to do all they do because they value these things.

The villagers also provide the Wakil with information about rule breaking because they were involved in making the rules and designing the sanctions that will be administered to violators and therefore largely agree that people should not break the rules and that the Wakil should sanction those who do. Based on their consent to the goals, rules and sanctions of the Wakil, the villagers additionally provide the Wakil, elders and Mullah sanctuary in the village. The sanctuary the villagers provide allows the Wakil to collect information by sitting in the *mazjet* and walking around the village, interacting with the people. Finally, because they agree with the Wakil's goals, rules, sanctions and projects, they provide him with funds and services whenever he requests them as they are able. All of these resources are limited by the small size of the village, with its 100 households, and by the income and personnel they can generate.

In short, the Wakil's strategy is to rely upon the consensus he nurtures among villagers, their agreement with his goals, rules, sanctions and actions, to maintain control. Although the Wakil does reach out to external parties, including the French military, the

ANP, the ALP and the Afghan Taliban, to help him provide security for the village in the face of external threats, he does not do so except in consultation with the heads of household of the village. He requires their agreement in order to maintain control and keeping their agreement is his main objective. The maintenance of a system of patriarchal familism and Islam soaked unity funded through traditional family farming is not only the aim of the Wakil. It is the goals most of the residents of the Kapisa Mountain Village.

The Taliban, on the other hand, aims to apply external resources to violently imposing a set of rules upon the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village, whether the villagers agree with those rules or not. The Taliban seek to establish a social world that they believe mirrors the community of Muslims at the time of Mohammad and which differs greatly from the social world the villagers want to maintain. In this world, all males over the age of ten attend prayers in the community *mazjet* five times a day without exception. The Taliban believe that Allah made men to pray and they therefore seek to remove any distractions from prayer in the social world, including football and volleyball, music, dancing, but most importantly, women. The Taliban seek to seclude women in their homes, with the windows painted black and only allow them to leave their homes in cases of emergency and in the company of a male relative while wearing a *burkha* and attempting to call as little attention to themselves as possible, not speaking, not laughing, or moving too quickly or seductively. The Taliban seek to create a social world where males wear beards of sufficient length, as well as turbans and traditional clothes, and practice traditional trades, like farming and shopkeeping. The Taliban seek to insulate Afghan society from corrupting foreign influences, like television, movies, math, science, art and literature. The Taliban believe they must violently punish people who commit *haram* acts, which include everything from listening to music and dancing, to taking drugs, drinking and gambling to murder, assault, rape and theft. They do not advise people at the first offense not to commit

it again. They do not ask people how the violator should be punished. They simply execute the sanctions expressly without regard to popular agreement.

The Taliban seek to apply very violent, unforgiving and often arbitrary sanctions to the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village in order to cause them to obey the rules that would make the social world described above a reality. They believe violently applying these sanctions is their duty as members of a vanguard that will bring into being this Islamic renaissance. In these efforts, the Taliban aims to apply external personnel from southern Afghanistan and Pakistan, to sanctioning rule breakers in the Kapisa Mountain Village. The Taliban uses its external sanctuaries, largely in Quetta, to train and educate Pakistani Taliban fighters, to indoctrinate them with the belief that it is their religious duty to sanction people who break the Taliban's rules. This indoctrination process has been under way for many decades, since the 1980s, when a set of Afghan refugee boys from Kandahar became Taliban in Quetta during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Separated from their families and their traditional agricultural society, they became true believers, the vanguard of a *salafi jihadist* movement bent on making all Afghans obey their rules through a holy system of cleansing, violent sanctions.

By dint of their external origin and indoctrination, these "Pakistani"⁶⁰⁶ Taliban fighters have no allegiance to the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village or the Kapisa Mountain District and are therefore more willing to brutally execute sanctions against villagers for breaking rules with which the villagers disagree. If these Taliban fighters were related to the villagers, they might feel obligated to allow them to break rules by living in

⁶⁰⁶ I have placed Pakistani in quotation marks because many of the "Pakistani" Taliban are actually Afghans from southern Afghanistan who have been educated and trained in Taliban madrassas, most of which are in Pakistan. The residents of the Kapisa Mountain District use Pakistani Taliban to describe a particular Taliban group made up of southern Afghans and Pakistanis. When the residents of the Kapisa Mountain District say Afghan Taliban, they are referring to Taliban who are a separate organization whose members are from the District.

the same way they always had and in a way that the Taliban fighters might agree with. Further, if these Taliban fighters did the same thing in the villages from whence they came, they would risk dragging their entire family into a blood feud with the family of the rule breaker. The Taliban relies upon these external, well-indoctrinated personnel, to impose rules upon a population that does not agree with them. In order to do that, the Taliban also requires external money, equipment, services and sanctuary.⁶⁰⁷

But, the Pakistani Taliban is at a disadvantage in terms of collecting information about rule breaking in the Kapisa Mountain Village because people disagree with the Taliban's rules and sanctions and therefore will not voluntarily provide information to the Taliban on these topics. Members of the community have a great deal more information about rule breaking in the village than anyone else and by seeking to impose rules with which people disagree, the Taliban loses access to the trove of information it requires to control behavior. The Taliban therefore relies upon its ability to patrol through the village in order to identify rule breaking. It also relies upon intelligence collection to acquire this information from other sources, like government ministry databases on personnel, signals or human intelligence. Additionally, the Taliban abducts both village elders and tortures them in an effort to compel them to give information about rule breaking, especially participation in the ANSF.

The Taliban in the Kapisa Mountain District come in three varieties. The majority are Pakistani Taliban. There is a small group of Chichini or "Chechen" Taliban who are *salafi jihadist* fighters from the Former Soviet Union who are likely affiliated with Al Qaeda. The

⁶⁰⁷ Externally provided sanctuary, in this case, includes not only Quetta and other towns in Pakistan, but also the natural sanctuaries in the mountains of the Kapisa Mountain District, where the Taliban do not need any agreement or obedience from villagers in order to reside or move freely.

villagers in Dara 3 and throughout the Kapisa Mountain District refer to them as Taliban because they want people to obey the same rules as the Taliban and they want to enforce them through brutal violence. Then, there are the Afghan Taliban, who are from the district, mostly from Dara 1's Pashtun communities, but also from Dara 3's Parachi Village. The Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban are in constant conflict since the Afghan Taliban are loath to kill or brutally punish residents of the Kapisa Mountain District. This is both because they know, like and are related to some of those people and because they are concerned such actions might drag their families into blood feuds with the families of people they kill or maim. Additionally, the Afghan Taliban care about what the Wakils of the area think of them and there is a flow of information between the Afghan Taliban and the Wakils, but not between the Wakils and the Pakistani or Chichini Taliban. The rift between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban is so deep that they have openly fought one another in the Kapisa Mountain District. These three groups can be thought of as three different militias with similar ideologies, but different strategies and memberships. They are sometimes allied with one another and sometimes at odds with one another.

Whereas the Wakil focuses on generating agreement, which drives people to obey the Wakil's rules more often than not, and makes collecting information and executing sanctions less resource-intensive, the Taliban focus on generating external resources and honing the effectiveness of the Taliban organization in translating those resources into actions by Taliban personnel.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) also seeks to impose an alien social system on the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village, one conceived in Western Europe and the United States, and enshrined in the Bonn Agreement. This social

system is rooted in the concept of individual rights protected by an impartial state whose leaders are selected through national elections. This system is certainly not something the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village asked for or would create if given the opportunity to imagine a future social world in Afghanistan, the district, or the Kapisa Mountain Village. The system of individual freedoms and an impartial state runs directly counter to the traditional system of patriarchal familism and Islam in Afghanistan and in the Kapisa Mountain Village.

Conflicts over women's rights provide the most vivid example of the clash of values. While most Kapisa Mountain Village residents believe it is the responsibility of Muslims to educate all of their children, male and female, they do not agree that women should then go on to choose their own jobs, husbands or wardrobes. They do not believe females should leave the house without permission from a male relative or interact with males, even at the village shop, let alone in an office or the *bazaar*. The Old Mullah of the Kapisa Mountain Village expressed it best when he told the people that the Karzai regime had made life sinful by declaring and enforcing women's rights. The Old Mullah told the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village that women should stay in their homes as much as possible and men must bring the women the things they need from outside their homes. The Old Mullah said that whenever a man sees a woman, he sins. She is sinful and she makes everyone else sinful.⁶⁰⁸ But, the conflicts over individual human rights extend further than women's rights, especially regarding the freedom of speech and freedom of religion. Very few people in the Kapisa Mountain Village believe anyone should be allowed to blaspheme against Islam or convert from Islam to another religion at will or burn the Koran. While the Coalition assumes these individual rights and the society they are intended to generate are something that every Afghan would want if he or she had the opportunity to have them, they are not.

⁶⁰⁸ 110514 Mullah Civil War, Taliban Now

The Coalition aims to impose this system by providing significant external resources, in the form of funds and personnel. During the surge, Coalition military personnel performed many of the functions of the government, patrolling and engaging the enemy, building schools and clinics, road and bridges, and gradually transfer these responsibilities to newly minted Afghan soldiers, policemen and bureaucrats. It was the Coalition and Afghan government's aim that these personnel serve as impartial bureaucrats, executing tasks without regard to personal interests.

Like the Pakistani Taliban, the government wants external personnel to collect information and sanction rule breakers, to execute infrastructure, education and health care projects. However, unlike the Pakistani Taliban, the government is severely internally fragmented and lacks an ideology or indoctrination system that can generate sufficient will to cause its personnel to act as the government would like them to act. Initially, the government in the Kapisa Mountain District was comprised of a combination of a small contingent of US Special Forces and the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* who had been fighting the Taliban in the Kapisa Mountain District prior to 2001. These *mujihadeen* had separated themselves from their village social structures during the 1980s or 1990s to fight the Soviets, the Communists and the Taliban and sought to use external resources to finance the expansion of their wealth and power, not as members of the general population of the Kapisa Mountain District or their own particular villages, but as members of the *mujihadeen* group that paid them and freed them from the toil and poverty of traditional farming.

As the Coalition's focus on Afghanistan grew, it began building what it hoped would be an impartial bureaucracy of government workers recruited from throughout Afghanistan

and deployed to the Kapisa Mountain District to impartially apply laws and regulations. These personnel, whom the Coalition hoped would form the basis of an impartial bureaucracy, were layered over the existing *mujihadeen* government personnel of the Kapisa Mountain District during 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. During this period, the Coalition worked side by side with government personnel, assuming that if they established policies and routines together, once the Coalition left, the personnel would continue to perform them. However, this did not occur.

The lack of agreement by the police, soldiers and bureaucrats of the Afghan government with government rules has made them loath to act to enforce them. In deciding whether to act, these government personnel weigh the value of acting, which is slim even when they believe what they are considering doing might help people in the Kapisa Mountain District, to whom they are not related, against the possible cost to them of acting, either in the form of risk to their physical or economic security, or in the form of effort expended. The result is often organizational ineffectiveness, reified in the inaction of government personnel when people violate individual human rights or participate in the insurgency.

The government is, in short, an imposition organization, like the Taliban, with extensive external financial and personnel resources. However, it is relatively ineffective as an organization because its personnel do not act as the government intends, in large part because they do not agree with or value many of the government's goals in the Kapisa Mountain District. When Coalition personnel, who do believe in the goals laid out for the government, were present, government personnel were more effective in acting to counter the insurgency. After they departed, the government's organizational effectiveness plummeted.

Who Has Control and Why in the Kapisa Mountain Village?

These three organizations, with their different assets and strategies, are attempting to control the behavior of the population of the Kapisa Mountain Village. Whose rules do the villagers obey? Do they simply do what they want to do? Do they change their behavior when confronted by an organization whose personnel consistently execute tasks? How do villagers react as the external resources available to an organization increase? How does the villagers' provision of information, personnel, money and services, sanctuary effect villagers' compliance with the rules of an organization?

These three organizations, across four time periods, with their different amounts of agreement, internal resources, external resources and organizational effectiveness, and their varying amounts of control over the behavior of the Kapisa Mountain Village, provide twelve cases we can compare to determine if there is a relationship between any of these factors and control.

Who Has Control Over Villagers and Why before the Surge in Coalition and Government Resources and Actions?

Between 2001 and 2010, the Coalition and Afghan Government invested some resources, but little effort, in the Kapisa Mountain District, leaving its governance to the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* commanders who assisted the Coalition in expelling the Taliban from the district in 2001. In a display of the inherent internal disunity of the government and Coalition, these *mujihadeen* commanders were not interested in transforming society in the Kapisa Mountain District according to the vision described in the Bonn Agreement and

were focused instead on enhancing their own wealth and power in preparation for whatever conflict they faced next, be it with the Taliban or other political parties within the government. Given how poor the traditional farmers of the Kapisa Mountain District were, extracting wealth from them did not provide a reasonable target for the *Jamat e Islami* efforts at self-enrichment. The *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* focused instead on using resources from the international community to expand their wealth and power, skimming money off of road, school and health clinic projects, awarding contracts for these projects to *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*, demanding bribes from companies wanting to do business in the Kapisa Mountain District, selling goods provided as aid for the people of district on the black market, etc. They left the Wakils free to maintain order in the villages and took little interest in their activities or the rules the people of the villages obeyed.

The Taliban, both local Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, also invested few resources and little effort in the Kapisa Mountain District during this period, as the Taliban organization re-grouped itself and avoided direct conflict with the Coalition, lying in wait for their departure. By 2008 and 2009, the Taliban had returned from their exile in Pakistan and begun some minor operations in the Kapisa Mountain District, basing themselves on the mountain between Dara 1 and Dara 2 and at the end of Dara 3. But these operations did not seriously infringe on the Wakil's control over the behavior of the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village because of the limited manpower and actions of the Taliban in the Kapisa Mountain District during this period. This situation left the Wakil, Mullah and elders of the Kapisa Mountain Village as the only organization seriously attempting to control the behavior of its villagers.

After the Taliban departed the Kapisa Mountain Village in 2001, life in the Kapisa

Mountain Village quickly returned to normal. Farmers shed the turbans and heavy beards the Taliban had forced them to wear and continued their farming tasks, attending prayers at the village *mazjet* between three and five times per day and occasionally going to the *bazaar* in the District Capital. Women in the village re-emerged into society, walking freely, dressed in long robes and headscarves, their faces uncovered, to their families' fields to collect grass for the animals and perform other chores. They attended the happiness and sadness parties of their neighbors and traveled to visit their relatives and particularly their natal families, from whom the Taliban's restrictions had separated them.

The Old Wakil continued his duties, identifying and attempting to solve the problems of the village through a consensus of the heads of the households, as he had since he became Wakil during the Soviet period. The Old Wakil was a Tajik farmer from the Kapisa Mountain Village who was married to a woman from the Parachi Village at the End of Dara 3. He was a simple farmer very much like the rest of the village heads of household, except that he has a 6th grade education, and can therefore read and write. He is also more familiar with the world outside the village since he grew up traveling back and forth to the *bazaar* in the District Capital to attend the only school that existed in the Kapisa Mountain District before the Karzai period.

Two of his closest friends, Elder 1 and Elder 2 assisted the Old Wakil with his tasks beginning under the Soviets, throughout the Taliban's rule and this period before the surge. Elder 1 was born in 1969, has a 2nd grade education and can read and write a little. He left school when his father died to help his family with their farm. He has 3 square kilometer's of land from which he makes roughly 3,000 Afs per month by growing wheat, corn, blackberries and walnuts. He prays five times a day in the village *mazjet* and he lives in the

first farmhouse on the road from the Kapisa Mountain District Capital into the Kapisa Mountain Village and Dara 2.

Elder 1 is very clever and often finds novel solutions to problems facing the village. Elder 1 is also very funny and is always joking with villagers, the Wakil and the Mullah. He brings a bit of levity to otherwise stressful and frightening life in the Kapisa Mountain Village. For example, after the second time Elder 1 fell out of a tree while harvesting walnuts and had to be taken to Kabul for medical treatment, R3 visited him in the hospital. Elder 1 told R3 he had to tell Elder 2, who had only just arrived home from his own stay in the hospital after having been abducted and tortured by the Pakistani Taliban, that Elder 1 would be back in the village soon and that when he returned, he would wrestle Elder 2 to show Elder 2 he was bigger and more powerful than Elder 2. He is Elder 1!⁶⁰⁹

However, Elder 1 has a short temper and sometimes makes bad decisions when his own family's honor is involved.⁶¹⁰ Elder 1 described this aspect of himself to Father of Family 7, while they were carrying their wheat to the miller in the summer of 2014,

“Sometimes, I become angry enough that I slap someone. After that, when I am alone, I am very angry at myself because why did I slap him? I become ashamed of myself. I accept my mistake.”⁶¹¹

But, Elder 1 applies this understanding of his own obvious, human flaws to advising others, without an air of superiority,

“When I see someone do something bad, I see his mistake and become un-relaxed and angry. I wonder why does this person become un-relaxed and

⁶⁰⁹ 141127 Community Narrative R3

⁶¹⁰ The wedding of Son 1 of Elder 1 brought out the worst in Elder 1. He had a dispute with the father of the bride over the bride price and the size of the guest list that almost ended in the wedding being canceled. The Wakil had to intervene to mediate the dispute. Then, at the wedding, Elder 1 got into a fight with the wedding singer and Son 1 of Family 10 because the young people refused to stop dancing at the time of prayers and Elder 1 felt responsible for their sins.

⁶¹¹ 140911 Family 7 Actions R3

do bad actions? I do not want to let anyone do bad actions to the people around him. Every human makes mistakes in his life. His mistakes become an experience for him. Every human has to have experience about everything, about every subject. He has to advise other people based on his experience. Some young people do not know about everything. They do not have enough experience about everything and take bad actions.”⁶¹²

Elder 2 is less flamboyant than his colleague Elder 1, but he is no less committed to the welfare of the village than the Old Wakil and Elder 1. Elder 2 prays five times a day in the village *mazjet* and walks around the village talking to people about their problems and how to solve them. He owns a larger plot of land than almost anyone in the village, 4 square kilometers, where he grows wheat, corn, beans, walnuts and blackberries. He makes roughly 20,000 Afs per month from the sale of the produce, greatly exceeding the income of the other farms in the village. Elder 2 was born around 1960 and, unlike most of his peers, completed the 6th grade at the government school in the District Capital.

After the Taliban departed in 2001, together, the Old Wakil and the elders were able to ensure, now that the Taliban had left, that armed men could not enter the village and beat, arrest or even kill villagers. They re-asserted the fathers of the village families’ control over their wives, children and brothers and continued to hold the heads of the 100 households accountable for the behavior of each of their members. The era of the Taliban violently sanctioning individuals was over, not because the Wakil had overpowered them, but because the Coalition and *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* had and then they had left the Wakil and the villagers to their own devices.

After the Taliban left, the Old Mullah, whom the Old Wakil had selected as Mullah during the Taliban’s reign, gave a sermon telling the villagers it was wrong for the Taliban

⁶¹² 140911 Family 7 Actions R3

to use force to make people obey the rules of Islam. He said that if a person wants to wear a short beard or have no beard at all, or wear long hair, or jeans, you must not hit him. You must try to persuade him, teach him to obey the rules of Islam. The Old Mullah talked about how Allah will be happy with Muslims if they persuade fellow Muslims or others to obey the rules of Islam. He also said it was wrong for the Taliban to hit people to force them to obey the rules, even if they were the rules of Islam. He said Allah would be angry with people who tried to force others to obey Islam. The Old Mullah said a good Muslim behaves well and demonstrates to others that they should do so as well. He said this world is nothing and that money means nothing and the real world is on Doomsday, not today.⁶¹³

In the absence of competing armed organizations, the villagers reverted to their time honored system of self-governance through a consensus of patriarchs within the framework of Islam. They returned to their shared pattern of behavior, planting and harvesting corn and wheat, picking walnuts and blackberries, gathering firewood for heat. Women gathered grass for the animals, cooked meals and raised children. Men and women attended happiness and sadness parties. Families threw parties for their sons' weddings with huge numbers of guests and raucous music and dancing. This pattern was underpinned and reinforced by their shared agricultural occupation; the precariousness of their income, health and welfare; mutual aid; and the belief that if they simply follow Allah's rules, suffering seemingly random threats and challenges in this world, they will succeed in entering Paradise. This pattern of behavior, reliance upon one another and belief in the rules of Islam unified the Kapisa Mountain Village around a set of rules of behavior and sanctions that the Wakil was empowered, through the consensus of the community, to enforce. The traditional farmers of the Kapisa Mountain Village, largely uneducated and illiterate, did not have much contact with the world outside the village and there were no

⁶¹³ 110514 Mullah Civil War, Taliban Now

organizations attempting to change their behavior.

Because he built his rules and sanctions on the consensus of the family patriarchs of the village, the Wakil had very little work to do. There was little theft, for what was there to buy that people really needed in this world? What would be of such value that they would risk entry into Paradise? There was little use of narcotics or alcohol or gambling because where would people find the extra money for these costly activities from their family farms? And, why would they risk their future entry into Paradise for this worldly self-gratification? Other than the occasional fight among young men over football or volleyball, there were very few people who violated the Wakil's rules. When they did, the Wakil advised them not to do so again and warned them and their families of the sanctions that would follow if they did not comply.

Despite the general orderliness of the Kapisa Mountain Village in this period, the Wakil organization did not become complacent, and continued to assiduously execute tasks. Like a slow, steady drumbeat, the Wakil, Mullah and elders acted every day in the community, generating expectations among villagers that they would identify and attempt to solve problems; collect information about rule breaking and rule following and sanction it. When the Wakil, Mullah and elders noticed someone watering his neighbor's field, they thanked him in front of the people at the *mazjet* for fulfilling the rights of his neighbor and commented to the people gathered for prayers in the *mazjet* that Allah will be happy with him for having done so. They broke up fights between neighbors and ensured they make peace with one another. They settled land disputes. They held meetings to decide how to solve problems in the village. They organized projects to solve problems in the village. They organized threshers and tractors to come assist the farmers in planting and harvesting

crops and negotiated and enforced payment. They organized the village to pay for firewood for the *mazjet*, to maintain and repair it and the Mullah's room within it, to provide food and clothing for the Mullah, and even to provide him with security. They came running when they heard shooting, yelling or screaming, thrusting themselves into the middle of the fray with little regard for their own safety, to solve the problem. They walked around the community, constantly interacting, identifying problems, advising people, and sanctioning both rule breaking and rule following. Every Friday, the Mullah gave a sermon, underpinning the Wakil-generated unity with Islamic justification.

The Wakil was a very effective organization during this period. Its personnel took the many actions above, in large part because of the agreement by its personnel and the entire village about the validity of its work. Elder 1 described the reasons why he takes such pains to work to solve the problems of the village as he was carrying wheat to the miller one day with the Father of Family 7, saying,

“I want to be a good person. I want all of the children and young people to become happy with me. I don't know when I will die. No one understands about his death because it belongs to Allah. Allah, maybe he will cut my time in this world. Maybe in 1 year, 2 years or 10 years, I will die. When I die and people talk about me, maybe they will say good things about me. If the people are happy with me, then Allah will be happy with me and I will relax in Paradise.”⁶¹⁴

The Wakil and elders took the actions their organization intended because they had a strong interest in the success of the village where they have always resided and where their children and grandchildren will continue to reside after they are gone. They are also motivated by an adherence to Islam as they believe it was practiced by the Prophet Mohammad and by the hope that their service to their fellow villagers will earn them entry

⁶¹⁴ 140911 Family 7 Actions R3

into Paradise. The Old Wakil and elders undertake these tasks, not for a salary, but because they believe they should, because they believe it is the right thing to do.

The Wakil's organizational effectiveness in this period was bolstered by the fact that the organization was not challenged by any other organization. It leveraged village resources through consensus to control behavior in the village. The Wakil did not have to consider whether another organization would attempt to prevent him from undertaking the tasks required to do so.

During this pre-Coalition Surge period, the Wakil had a high level of control over villagers' behavior because their agreement with his goals, rules and sanctions was very high. The villagers were unified around their shared problems and were asked to develop and consent to shared solutions to them. The heads of household attended the meetings in the *mazjet* and provided resources for solutions because of their focused interest in how the problems they shared as farmers could be solved.

During this period, there was very little *haram* behavior or any opportunity for it, since almost every household relied upon their traditional farm for its income and had little extra money for gambling, consuming alcohol or opium or engaging in other *haram* activities. Since most of these are activities younger men might engage in and their fathers controlled all revenues from the farms, the people who might have expended money on these activities have no funds to do so. Aside from the occasional fistfight between villagers over volleyball, football or some personal slight, there is little rule breaking in the village.

When someone did break a rule, if people knew about it, they informed the Wakil because they agreed with both his rule and his sanction. The Wakil used this agreement to

easily raise the minimal resources he required to govern the village from within it. For personnel, he relied upon part time work from both elders, as well as himself. The only outside member of the Wakil organization was the Old Mullah, who is from a village in Dara 4. The Old Wakil organized the village to pay the Old Mullah portions of their harvests and to provide him with room and board in the Kapisa Mountain Village *mazjet*. The Wakil relied entirely upon the villagers for the resources he needed to implement projects, pay the Mullah and maintain the *mazjet* and other shared infrastructure.

But, even during this apogee of the Wakil's control in the Kapisa Mountain Village, the seeds of the decline in this organization's control had been planted and were beginning to grow. As the government began expanding educational opportunities, opening more schools, including the elementary school in the Kapisa Mountain Village, and a number of middle schools and high schools for both boys and girls, more children began attending school in addition to farming. Each family made its own decisions about which children should attend school and when they should begin. These decisions were normally based on the value they placed on education, which was not high for the purposes of traditional farming, but was high for the purposes of making Allah happy with them as parents. Parents who needed their children for labor put them in school less often and later and parents who were more concerned about honor, like Families 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9, who prevented their daughters from attending. Some parents had other reasons, such as a child's learning or developmental disabilities, for keeping them out of school. Other parents did not value education very highly in the context of a traditional agrarian society. But, for the most part, the families of the Kapisa Mountain Village, who had previously had an extremely limited education, sent this first generation of children to elementary, and later, high school. School attendance changed the social world for these children, who began to

leave the village to walk to school and began to read and study, opening the door to the world outside the Kapisa Mountain Village and creating aspirations in this world that were hitherto unheard of in the historically isolated and implacable poverty of the Kapisa Mountain Village.

At the same time, the government greatly increased employment opportunities, largely for young people with an education. During the period before 2010, this pool in the Kapisa Mountain Village remained very limited. However, the first several villagers to become government employees did so. Many of them moved away from the village and all of them began relying for their physical and economic security on people outside the Kapisa Mountain Village, undermining the unity of the village upon which its consensus rested. These government employees no longer needed only the village. They no longer completely shared the requirements for mutual aid imposed by poverty and unpredictable calamity ever just over the horizon. Their increasing ability to better their lives through jobs other than traditional agriculture freed these men from the psychological need for the belief that the ceaseless toil and myriad threats of life in the Kapisa Mountain Village are simply a test, that this world is not real and that the real world begins on Doomsday, when all their adherence to the rules of Islam will win them entry into Paradise. They were no longer passively suffering and waiting to be judged, but were instead acting to change their lives. Additionally, for young men who had been beholden entirely to their fathers for income from their labor on the farm, like Son 3 of Family 15, who became an ANP non-commissioned officer, receiving a salary empowered them to expend their own money on things they valued. The provision of salaries to these young men began to erode the paternal authority that the Wakil leveraged for control. These changes in location, sources of economic, physical and psychological security undermine the Wakil's control over the

new government employees. Two examples are described below.

In 2005, one of the most well educated villagers was a Mullah who had studied for 14 years at the government *madrassa* in the Kapisa Mountain District Capital. He worked at a *mazjet* in Dara 4, sleeping there, in the Mullah's room, most of the time and earning a small salary in the form of produce from the harvest. His family tended the farm in the Kapisa Mountain Village. In 2005, this Mullah, the Owner of Family 9 House, fell ill. He could no longer work as a Mullah and needed medical care, of which there was none in the Kapisa Mountain District. So, the family moved to Kabul. His health improved gradually and he applied for a position as an Islamic judge on the central government court. The Mullah was hired at a salary far greater than anything he could ever have earned in the Kapisa Mountain District, 30,000 Afs per month.

Similarly, Son 3 of Family 15, the first person in that family ever to attend school, beginning just after the Taliban withdrew in 2001, became aware that even though he had only completed 9th grade, he could become an NCO with the ANP in Mazar and make 16,000 Afs per month. So, he left school and joined the ANP, causing his family's income to triple. Such a thing would never have been possible in the absence of government education and employment. Now, the Mullah who owns Family 9 House and Son 3 of Family 15 live outside the traditional agricultural community, relying not upon the Wakil for their physical and economic security, but upon the government.

These men represent what was only the beginning of a trend that caused village unity to decline because of outside employment and education, thereby undermining the main source of the Wakil's control, unity, interdependence and consensus.

Before the surge in Coalition actions and resources in 2010, the government controlled only the behaviors governed by the rules it shared with the Wakil. People did not steal, gamble, take drugs or narcotics or murder or rape one another in the Kapisa Mountain Village, complying with the government's rules on these topics. But, these are the rules the government shares with the Wakil. The villagers disobeyed the government rules with which the Wakil does not agree, and with which the majority of the villagers do not agree.

Women's rights once again demonstrate the contrast between the government rules with which the Wakil and most of the villagers agree and those government rules with which they do not agree. The Wakil and most villagers agree that women should be allowed to go outside alone to the farm fields wearing a robe and a headscarf and during the period between the Taliban's flight from the district in 2001 and the beginning of the Coalition surge in resources and activities, the women did so. During this period, women in the Kapisa Mountain Village left their homes on average 3.1 times per day. However, they did so only with the permission of their father, brother or husband. They did not do so freely, as the Afghan government's laws on human and women's rights demand. Women did not go outside whenever and wherever they liked in the Kapisa Mountain Village. All of the decisions of females were made by the male head of her household. Women were not free to do as they pleased in the Kapisa Mountain Village and seldom left it.

The head of household decided whom a girl married and accepted a brideprice for her in the case of every girl from the Kapisa Mountain Village who was married off during this period, in contravention of the government's rules on women's rights. But, the right for a father to make these choices and accept a bride price for his daughter was something with

which both the Wakil and the heads of household in the village agreed. The government took no actions to change their behavior, even though its personnel were fully aware that every wedding in the area involved the payment of a bride price.

By January 2010, 58% of the school aged girls from the Kapisa Mountain Village attended school. While the Old Wakil believes it is the duty of Muslim parents to educate all of their children, it is not a Wakil rule that parents send their children to school. Once again, according to the Wakil, it is the choice of the male head of household, not the Wakil or the government or the Taliban, whether or not either girls or boys attend school. The Wakil concurs with the right of the head of household to make this decision. The government, on the other hand, says that girls have a right to an education, and a right to a job if they want one. But, none of the girls in the village attended school, even if they want to, without their father's permission. And, none of the females in the village sought a job outside their family farm or acquired one. And, though many of them would probably have liked to just pop down to the village shop to buy needed supplies, none of them did so. They always asked a male relative or neighbor to go for them and if they could not find someone to do this for them, they simply did without whatever it was they wanted to buy.

In regard to women's rights, the villagers obeyed the rules of the Wakil, some of which overlap with the rules of the government. But, when the government rules extended beyond what the Wakil organization and the supporting consensus of the heads of the households of the village, people stopped obeying. The only organization that was effective in controlling people's behavior in this period was the Wakil. The government failed to do so whenever the Wakil and the people did not agree with its rules.

During this period, the government had a high level of external resources. But, it lacked the organization required to translate those resources into actions by its personnel. The government organization lacked personnel who agreed with its rules or even believed in some of its goals. The *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* serving as the government's personnel focused on extracting resources from the Coalition for their own uses, not applying them to controlling the behavior of the population.

During the wars against the Soviets, the communists and the Taliban, these men had freed themselves, by leveraging external resources, from the shackles of traditional farming and their village social and authority structures in the Kapisa Mountain District. They had ensconced themselves in a new institution, *Jamat e Islami*, trading fatalism for action, for the belief that they could impact their own destiny in this world. Moving away from home, picking up a weapon, risking themselves for a worldly cause, these young men became a great corporate whole that valued risk, action and reward. They sought and obtained honor in this world by bending it to their will through coercive force. They also traded intractable poverty for constant room, board, wages and booty. The influx of resources from the US, Pakistan and other allies to the *mujihadeen* freed these men from their traditional authority structures and vastly increased their incomes. It changed their values, their understanding of their own place in the world and their relationship to the villages from which they came. In order to maintain that institution, they needed to constantly seek external resources, not for the villages from which they came, but for their fellow *mujihadeen*. Many *mujihadeen* could not bear to return to the passive, impoverished life of poor farmers grinding out an existence at the mercy of floods, droughts and Allah's will. But, in order to avoid returning to that life, the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* required resources greater than those available within their villages or even within the licit agricultural economy of Afghanistan. For that

reason, the *mujihadeen* saw the resources from the international community as a source of revenue for themselves, as opposed to a means for implementing government policies.

The leaders of the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* in the Kapisa Mountain District were its commanders in the district and in Dara 1 and Dara 2 during the wars against the Soviets, the communists and the Taliban. The leader of the group was a man born around 1965 in a Parachi Village in the majority Pashtun Dara 1 of the Kapisa Mountain District, who became a *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*, fighting the Soviets and then the Taliban in the district. He was the commander for the *Jamat e Islami* for the Kapisa Mountain District when his *mujihadeen*, backed by US airpower and Special Forces, drove the Taliban up over the mountains and out of the district in 2001. He then executed twelve Taliban in *bazaar* in the District Capital. At some point thereafter, he took a position at the Ministry of the Interior in Kabul, which was controlled by the national *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* organization. He parlayed his position there into enough funds to successfully run for the Kapisa Mountain District Representative to the *Wolesi Jirga*, the lower house of the Afghan Parliament, in the 2005 elections. Throughout the period between the Taliban's flight and the surge in Coalition resources, the most important subordinate to this commander, who served as *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* commander in Daras 1 and 2 during and before the expulsion of the Taliban in 2001, continued to operate the political party's militia in the district.

Prior to 2008, the government in the Kapisa Mountain District was really run by the Ministry of the Interior through a police commander. All of the police commanders of the district have been members of the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*. The government, such as it was, in the Kapisa Mountain District prior to 2010, was nothing more than the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* patronage network and it was focused on extracting wealth and power

from the international community for its own members.

In 2008, President Karzai, with advice from the Kapisa Mountain District Representative to the *Wolesi Jirga*, appointed one of the *Wolesi Jirga* Representative's relatives who is a Tajik from a village between the Daras and the District Capital to be Governor of the District. The District Governor makes a salary of 25,000 Afs per month, but he makes an additional 300,000 Afs or so per month from bribes. The District Governor uses his position for personal gain and to assist the Representative of the Kapisa Mountain District to the *Wolesi Jirga*. When the Governor of the Kapisa Mountain District wants to incarcerate someone or release someone from jail, he can do so. But, he will only do so if the Representative of the Kapisa Mountain District to the *Wolesi Jirga* agrees with his decision. If someone is caught stealing something in the District and he approaches the Kapisa Mountain District Governor and gives him a bribe, the Governor will release him the next day. No one can demand to know why the thief was released. No one can say anything about this because the District Governor is powerful because he is related to the Representative of the District to the *Wolesi Jirga* and the rest of *Jamat e Islami*.

Most of the incidents in which the Kapisa Mountain District Governor uses his position to his personal benefit and that of the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* do not touch the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village, but simply extract external resources. For example, in 2008, Roshan, which is a cell phone company with a large share of the market in Afghanistan, wanted to erect a cell phone tower on the mountain between Dara 1 and Dara 2. When a Roshan representative approached the District Governor, he granted them a license to build and operate the tower, in return for a substantial bribe. But, when the company asked for protection for the tower from the Taliban, who were living on the same

mountain, the Governor told the representative of Roshan that he did not have enough police to assist him. The Governor suggested Roshan recruit private security people from P1 Village to protect the tower. Roshan did so, but the Taliban issued a threat, saying that if the company did not pay the Taliban \$2,000, they would blow up the tower. The company informed the governor and refused to pay the ransom. A couple of weeks later, when all the security guards left the cell phone tower unguarded to attend a wedding in P1 Village, the Taliban blew up the cell phone tower. They then sent a note, demanding \$20,000 from Roshan or they would blow up the new tower. Roshan grudgingly agreed to pay the ransom.⁶¹⁵ In this incident, *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* earned money through its position without extracting it from the poor farmers of the Kapisa Mountain District and he allowed cell phone service to be provided. But, he also allowed the arming and organization of a militia in a pro-Taliban village instead of using his government authority to protect the cell phone tower. Additionally, he did nothing to stand in the way of the Taliban gaining \$20,000 in resources from Roshan.

The fact that the *mujihadeen* extracted resources from the Coalition does not mean that the resources never went to their intended purposes. The *mujihadeen* did build schools and roads in the district, but they did that through contracts with construction and security companies run by their fellow *mujihadeen*. They used these resources to bolster their power as a group and they applied them to some of the purposes the Coalition and government had intended.

For example, when the Kapisa Mountain District Representative to the *Loya Jirga* succeeded in acquiring funding for the construction, beginning in the spring of 2009, of a

⁶¹⁵ 110503 Taliban Action 5 R3

road from the capital of Kapisa to the Kapisa Mountain District Capital and then for a road through the desert from the District Capital to the Daras and then out into each one, the company given the contract for providing security was run by the leader of the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* militia in the Kapisa Mountain District. The road was constructed and the project was secured. But, the project also enhanced the power and wealth of the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* in the district by allowing it to serve its members by providing them with gainful employment and to allow it to continue to maintain the combat readiness of its militia.

During this period, government personnel did not come to the Kapisa Mountain Village often because there was little reason for them to do so. The Taliban had fled and did not return until 2008. The *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* were not particularly interested in daily life and behavior in the villages and knew the Wakils would control the behavior of villagers. The government therefore did not conduct patrols to identify people breaking government rules or sanction rule breaking. Additionally, the government did not ask the village for personnel, money, services, sanctuary or information during this period and the village did not give provide those resources to them. Aside from those rules which overlapped with the Wakil, the villagers did not agree with the rules the government wanted them to obey, so they had no reason to give information about people violating those rules to the government.

During the period prior to the 2010 surge in Coalition resources and activities, the villagers did not obey the government rules with which they did not agree. The government rules with which the villagers did agree were obeyed, not only because the villagers agreed with them, but because the Wakil was effective in identifying and sanctioning rule breaking.

Despite the significant resources the Coalition poured into the Kapisa Mountain District, the government had little effect on people's behavior in the Kapisa Mountain Village. Because government personnel did not act to enforce basic order or pursue government goals regarding individual human and women's rights, they had no effect on these behaviors.

An example of the *laissez faire* attitude of the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* prior to the surge in Coalition and government resources and actions in the Kapisa Mountain Village occurred outside the village, but it is instructive. During the summer of 2008, the Pakistani Taliban had begun to return to the Kapisa Mountain District, specifically to the mountain at the end of Dara 3. The village at the bottom of that mountain is comprised of roughly 1,000 households of Parachi. The wife of the Old Wakil is from a Parachi family from that village. Her eldest brother was working as a teacher in a government school. The Pakistani Taliban received a report that he was a government spy. They broke into his home and abducted him and tortured him. He told them that he was not a government spy, but they shot him and beheaded him anyway. They filmed the entire episode and left the recording with the body and a note saying the Taliban would kill any government spies. They then called Brother 2 of Wife of Old Wakil and told him where he could find his brother's body. Brother 2 of Wife of Old Wakil retrieved the body, saw the film and began to plot his revenge. He found the Pashtun Taliban from Laghman Province who had tortured and killed his brother in the video, shot him and took him to the Parachi Village at the End of Dara 3. He told the people there this was the man who had murdered Brother 1 of Wife of Old Wakil and the Parachi villagers beat him. Against the advice of his fellow villagers, the bereaved brother took the Taliban fighter to the cemetery to kill him next to his brother's grave, executing his vengeance and restoring his family's honor. In so doing, he committed a murder himself, violating the rules of Allah and the government, but not those of the Wakil

of that village. The next day, the District ANP Commander arrived in the village. He asked Brother 2 of Wife Old Wakil why the Taliban had kidnapped and killed his brother. Brother 2 told him he did not know. The Kapisa Mountain District ANP Commander told the brother of the dead man that he and his police would try to find the killer. When Brother 2 of Wife of Old Wakil told the commander that he had already found the murderer and killed him, the ANP Commander commended him, saying, "Oh, you are powerful, brave. I can't do that." The brother of the dead man said, "The man killed my brother. I had to do something." The District ANP Commander said to the villagers,

"We have to come here at night to protect you. If we see the Taliban, then we will kill them. They only come after we leave. So, we should be here more. If anyone sees something happen, call me and I will come quickly. If you want to have good security and a good life and a prosperous farm, you have to cut your relationship with the Taliban. You will be a Taliban spy and they will punish one of your neighbors. This killing by the Taliban was a very bad action. We cannot go over the mountain because we do not know which part of the mountain they are living on. You have to be careful and after 10 p.m., you should not go outside without a flashlight. If anyone is out without a flashlight and we see him, then we will kill him. It will be between people of this area. Otherwise, when the Taliban comes here and the Taliban fighters do not have flashlights, then we will shoot them."

The ANP conducted night patrols in and around the village for one week. The Taliban saw the police leave. Once the police had left, the Taliban went into the village to punish the people. Then, when the police came back, they left. Brother 2 of Wife of Old Wakil is now an ALP and he has a gun so he can protect himself from Taliban reprisals. The government's actions had no effect on the behavior of villagers in this incident and the people of the village continued live by the rules of honor, not the rule of law.⁶¹⁶

The government vastly expanded educational opportunities for both girls and boys and constructed roads and government buildings in the Kapisa Mountain District. These

⁶¹⁶ 110503-Taliban Action 3-R3

educational opportunities spurred parents to send children who would likely not have attended school to study at government schools. But, their education did not have an immediate and perceptible impact on government control in the Kapisa Mountain Village. People with vehicles, and also taxis, moved with greater ease throughout the district, but that does not appear to be related to Taliban, government or Wakil control.

In short, the government was unable, despite extensive external resources, to cause villagers to obey rules unless they already agreed with them or the Wakil was enforcing them. This lack of government effect on people's behavior resulted from the government's inability to cause its personnel to act to collect information about people breaking these rules and sanction them. The government's organizational ineffectiveness resulted from the fact that its personnel did not agree with the government's goals or the rules it would have liked them to enforce. Further, these personnel were pre-occupied with their efforts to leverage external resources for their personal and patronage group benefit.

During this period, the Taliban were not overtly present in the District for seven years, until their limited return during 2008. When they arrived, they ensconced themselves in the natural sanctuary provided by the mountains and sought sanctuary in Dara 1's Pashtun villages, including P1, the village directly just over the mountain from the Kapisa Mountain Village in Dara 1. In P1, the Wakil was the nephew of the District Governor under Taliban rule and many villagers had worked for and or supported the Taliban during their reign.

The Taliban did not during this or any other period have the agreement of the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village with their rules, sanctions, goals or actions. When the

Taliban returned to the Kapisa Mountain District, they once again relied upon natural sanctuary that did not require people's agreement with them, and upon outside resources of personnel, money, services, etc. for their operations. In this period, the Taliban lacked the resources to withstand a concentrated attack from ISAF or the nascent Afghan security forces in the district. Therefore, despite the fact that its organization could translate its intent into actions by its members, the Taliban chose to avoid direct, force on force conflict with the government by not engaging in extensive patrols or attacks on residents of the Kapisa Mountain Village or Daras 1 and 2.

The Taliban did, however, engage in some attempts to emplace IEDs at or near the District Government Center in 2009. The attempts were foiled by an NDS agent who grew up the son of a poor farmer in the Kapisa Mountain Village. This young man attended the government *madrassa* in the District Capital along with his closest friend, who is a Pashtun from Area T. After they graduated, the Tajik from the Kapisa Mountain Village farmed with his father before taking a job with the NDS. But, his friend traveled to Quetta, where he spent several years at one of the Taliban *madrassas*. When he returned to the Kapisa Mountain District with the Pakistani Taliban in 2008, he was one of the few Pakistani Taliban with any connections in the Kapisa Mountain District and he was assigned the position of Liaison between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. The NDS pays its agent thousands of dollars for each report about a possible Taliban attack or the location and identity of Taliban fighters and these two young men began working together in 2008, sharing the spoils and empowering one another. The NDS Double Agent from the Kapisa Mountain Village gained acclaim within the NDS when he reported in December 2008 that a suicide bomber begging in a *burqha* would try to blow up American soldiers in the District Capital. While the bomber was able to complete his attack and kill many people, it proved to

the government the Double Agent gave good information.⁶¹⁷

Additionally, during that year, the Taliban began to threaten elites who had been anti-Taliban and people working for the government. In Dara 3, the Taliban killed some government workers. However, these efforts were often foiled because the Taliban lacked the relative capacity to move freely and to sanction people because of its lack of personnel, equipment, money, etc. relative to villagers, the government and its Coalition partners.

Thus, at the end of the period before the surge in Coalition and government resources into the Kapisa Mountain District, which stretched from January 2010 until November of 2012, the Wakil was firmly in control of the behavior of the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village. He relied upon the agreement, consensus and unity of his villagers to control their behavior. The Wakil also had an effective organization, in which personnel from the village, who were committed to the village consensus based system for solving problems, implemented tasks to maintain control, including identifying instances of rule breaking and sanctioning them. The Wakil relied solely upon the personnel, money, services, sanctuary and information provided by villagers. Villagers gave these resources to the Wakil because they agreed with the Wakil's goals, rules, sanctions and other actions. The Wakil had control because of this agreement, resources from the villagers and the organization's effectiveness. But, the Wakil in this period did not face a challenge from an organization seeking to unseat his control over the behavior of villagers.

While the government had extensive external resources, it lacked personnel with the will to act to implement the vision the organization had laid out. The Taliban did not

⁶¹⁷ 140727 What Happened To Me R3

have the resources required to survive a battle with the Coalition, so it sought to maintain a low profile. Because of the inaction of both the government and the Taliban, the Wakil was left largely to his own devices and had unchallenged control in the Kapisa Mountain Village.

Who Has Control Over Villagers and Why during the Surge in Coalition and Government Resources and Actions?

During the period of the surge in Coalition and Government resources and actions, life in the Kapisa Mountain Village continued much as before, with its steady rhythm of crop planting, watering and harvesting, daily prayers, villagers attending one another's happiness and sadness parties, mutual aid, and village meetings to solve problems.

However, the erosion of the unified focus of the villagers on the village's traditional agricultural occupation and its related social and authority structures gathered steam. As more and more young men graduated from high school, they took jobs in the government, mostly in the security forces, moving away from the village, earning salaries four or more times as large as that their uneducated fathers earned from farming, and freeing themselves from the constraints of the Wakil's authority structures. By the end of 2012, 38% of families provided at least one member to the ANSF and 56% provided personnel to the government. The average income of a villager jumped between January 2010 and November of 2012 from 1,400 Afs per month to 3,600 Afs per month, buoyed by government salaries sent home by these young men. Men attended prayers in the village *mazjet* on average 3 times per day.

Women left their homes on average 3.5 times per day. The size of the group of girls who gathered every day at the village shop, clad in the black robes and white head scarves

of Afghan students, and walked to the girls' high school expanded. Management of farms began to fall to women whose husbands were away in the ANSF. These women were more autonomous than they had ever been before, since they needed to go outside more often and interact with male and female neighbors more often, working to solve the problems of their families and farms.

In a major first in the Kapisa Mountain Village, two sisters, each of whom is married to one of the Sons of Family 12, both of whom are ANP officers, ran a farm together. The women had no children over the age of six, so they sometimes went to the village shop to buy things themselves, interacting with the male shopkeeper. No other women had ever done this in Kapisa Mountain Village memory. They did not begin participating in decision making in the *mazjet*, but their engagement in commerce, even at a low level, indicates how the social world changed during this period, as military aged males moved all over Afghanistan as part of the ANSF in return for ample salaries.

These large salaries, access to and focus on the world outside the village eroded the unity of the village, making it more likely these men would want to break the Wakil's rules, while weakening the value of the Wakil's sanctions to them. Instances of fighting, gambling, drinking and other disorder increased.

Neither the internal resources available to the Wakil nor the effectiveness of his organization changed during the surge in Coalition resources and activities. But, the Wakil's control decreased because the villagers' agreement with his goals, rules and sanctions decreased, and because the value of those sanctions decreased due to the presence of another organization, the Afghan government, whose resources vastly outstripped those

that could be generated in the Kapisa Mountain Village.

The erosion of the Wakil's control resulted from the government's education and security force recruitment activities. Ironically, these actions eroded government control over the behavior of the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village. The government continued to be unable to motivate its personnel in the Kapisa Mountain District to enforce the rule of law by impartially collecting information about people violating laws and sanctioning them. This government organizational ineffectiveness meant that as the Wakil's control eroded, it was not replaced by government control. Villagers increasingly broke the rules both the government and Wakil wanted them to obey.

Another change in life in the Kapisa Mountain Village was the regular patrols, day and night, by French military units and their Afghan military and police partners. The people of the Kapisa Mountain Village happily provided them with sanctuary and Elder 1 hosted patrols as guests, providing them tea, sweets and fruit in his home, which is the first home on the road into the Kapisa Mountain Village from the desert. Kapisa Mountain Village residents were very happy with the Coalition and government patrols because their aim was to identify Taliban presence and engage the Taliban. These patrols deterred somewhat Taliban presence in the village, which had been growing slowly since the spring of 2008.⁶¹⁸

But, government efforts in this regard were neither based on particularly valid information about Taliban presence and location, nor were they sufficient to deter the Taliban from acting in the event the Taliban decided a villager needed to be sanctioned for

⁶¹⁸ 140723 Afghan Taliban Actions R3, 141106 Community Narrative R3

breaking their rules.

For example, the French military, acting on inaccurate information claiming the Kapisa Mountain Village was a Taliban village, planned to raid villagers' homes during the wheat harvest in July 2012, searching for Taliban fighters. One of Elder 2's relatives was a translator for the French. When the translator learned of the French raid, he warned Elder 2 that the French believed the Kapisa Mountain Village was a Taliban village, that they would be conducting a raid that night, and that if they found weapons in people's houses, the French would see the weapons as evidence that the villagers were Taliban fighters. Nearly every household in the Kapisa Mountain Village has a weapon, normally an AK 47. Elder 2 and the Wakil visited every home in the village to inform them of the raid, tell them to stash their weapons, and implore the villagers to behave politely toward the French. The Wakil, elders and Mullah reminded villagers that *jihad* is justified only when a foreigner comes to your village to enforce his own will upon you, not when they come to help by providing security, education, jobs and other good things. The French military arrived in the village after midnight and they searched every home. When the French found no illegal weapons and no Taliban, they provided rice and cooking oil to each of the families of the Kapisa Mountain Village.⁶¹⁹

After the raid, the Old Mullah gave a sermon saying it was wrong for the Taliban or any Muslim to harass or attack French soldiers because they did not harass or attack the people. He said it was not *jihad* to attack French soldiers or Afghan government troops because they did not come here to enforce their will upon the people, but to help them and provide them with security. He also said Pakistani Taliban had come to Afghanistan to

⁶¹⁹ 140723 Elder 2 Actions R3

attack the people, to perpetrate suicide bombings. He told the villagers that if a person fights against the Pakistani Taliban, it is *jihad* because they are invaders who came to Afghanistan to impose their will upon the people. He said the police must fight them and if they die, they are *shahid* or martyrs who will gain automatic entry to Paradise.

Someone in the Kapisa Mountain Village called the Pakistani Taliban and told them the Old Mullah had declared a *jihad* against them as invaders of Afghanistan. Despite ISAF joint patrols, the next night, a band of Pakistani Taliban came to the Kapisa Mountain Village *mazjet*, broke in and severely beat Old Mullah until he was unconscious. They left a letter on the Old Mullah's unconscious body, saying, "If any Mullah says anything bad about Pakistanis or if they disobey the rules of Pakistani Taliban, we will kill him. We did not kill this Mullah because this is the first time."

The next morning, before prayers, the elders found the Old Mullah lying unconscious and beaten in the yard of the *mazjet*. They took the Old Mullah to the clinic and the Old Mullah subsequently went home to Dara 4 to recover. When the Old Mullah returned several weeks later to the Kapisa Mountain Village *mazjet*, the Old Wakil told him,

"The Pakistani Taliban might come back. But, if you do not say anything about them, they will not come back. Teach and guide the people and relax. Do not say bad things about the Taliban and *jihad* and everything will be okay."

For several months, villagers took turns sleeping in the *mazjet* so that the Old Mullah would not be afraid. But, eventually, the people said that was enough and they were tired of doing this. The Old Mullah came to the village less and less after that because he

was afraid the Taliban would come back and harm him.⁶²⁰ During the winter of 2013, the Old Mullah told the Wakil that he needed to find a different Mullah because he was old and needed to retire.

The French had inaccurate information about which villages were pro-Taliban and which were not. They then inaccurately conflate gun ownership in the dangerous mountain valleys of the Kapisa Mountain District with membership in the Taliban. Finally, they have a translator who tips off a village about an upcoming raid. While the translator providing this tip to the Kapisa Mountain Village ensures the first two problems do not result in inaccurate sanctioning of people who are not in the Taliban for being in the Taliban, it also prevents the government from sanctioning people for illegally owning weapons, which is a government rule. The government as an organization in this case is ineffective.

The government was effective in executing patrols and raids in the Kapisa Mountain Village at this point, but those patrols were not dense enough to prevent the Taliban, living on the mountain that abuts the village, from coming into the village to sanction an important instance of rule breaking, a Mullah declaring *jihad* against them. The government lacked the constant, static presence in the Kapisa Mountain Village that would have deterred or prevented the Taliban from entering. The Taliban valued sanctioning the Old Mullah enough to take the risk required to conduct a discrete attack and its personnel were effective in executing their task. Since their action caused the Old Mullah to stop declaring *jihad* against them, this discrete, selective sanction had its intended effect on the behavior of the villagers despite the fact that the Taliban could not have engaged the Coalition and government together or even the villagers if they had organized themselves and emerged

⁶²⁰ 140723 Pakistani Taliban Actions R3

unscathed.

Part of the surge in Coalition resources and activities was a program to establish local police who could deter or prevent the Taliban from executing selective sanctions. Early successes in places like P1 (the Pashtun village just over the mountain from the Kapisa Mountain Village in Dara 1, which sits on the road to Taliban-controlled Area T) drove an attempt to establish a multi-layered system of security forces, including the existing centralized police and military forces, but establishing, through existing village authorities, village police forces. The program was eventually called the Afghan Local Police. The establishment of local police forces was often coupled with the provision of roads, electricity, other infrastructure, medical services and education.

In 2009, French military units and their ANA counterparts attacked the Taliban, which had moved in to live among the villagers in P1 Village. The Taliban fled the French military assault and villagers welcomed them. When French and Afghan military units left the village to return to their bases near the District Capital, the Taliban descended from the mountain and punished the young people of P1 Village who had welcomed the French. The people of P1 Village gathered the weapons they had in their homes and attacked the Taliban in retribution. The ANP heard the firefight that ensued and went to P1 Village, where they found the people of the village had expelled the Taliban.

The ANP Commander held a meeting in the P1 Village *mazjet* with the Wakil and villagers. The Wakil of P1 Village is a close relative of the District Governor of the Kapisa Mountain District during the Taliban regime. The people of the village told the ANP Commander that the Taliban had attacked the villagers and that because of the Taliban

presence, the government does not provide services to the village. The Wakil of P1 Village told the ANP Commander and his villagers,

“We will never allow the Taliban to come into the area because when they are here, it becomes dangerous. The Taliban attacks the government and the government attacks the Taliban and the people are caught in between and their homes are destroyed. The government should be here or the Taliban should be here.”

“The police now have responsibility for security in this area. We need a hospital and we need roads and the government can do these things and bring electricity to our village. We have big problems here. We want to help you kick the Taliban out of the area.”

The ANP Commander said, “It is bad here because of the fighting between the Taliban and the government. If you help us, together we will kick out the Taliban.” The Wakil of P1 Village told him, “We need to have special, village police in this area.” The Wakil had heard about ISAF efforts to pay villagers to act as police in their own villages. The French also trained these policemen so they could better defend their villages from Taliban assaults. The ANP Commander agreed to the Wakil of P1 Village’s suggestion, saying,

“We have to make village police here because sometimes the police come here and sometimes they do not because there are not enough police. You need your own police so they will be here when the Taliban attack and they can call us and we will come attack the Taliban with them.”

The Wakil told the ANP Commander that the village also needed a road and a health clinic. The commander said he would tell the French people what P1 needed.

A couple of days later, a French military officer came to P1 Village to talk to the people gathered in the *mazjet*. The French officer told them, “This village is dangerous. We came to Afghanistan to help you. We have no purpose in this area other than helping you. Please, can someone stand and tell me about the problems of the area.” The Wakil stood

and told the French Officer, “We need you to provide security, a hospital and we need roads and we need electricity.”

The French Officer replied, “We will help you build a hospital and roads and bring electricity to the village. You pick 10 or 20 young men to be the police in this village and we will pay their salary. That is fine.” The young men at the meeting all said they wanted to be village police. There were 25 volunteers and the French officer decided to make all of them village police. He wrote down their names and gave each of them a gun. Then, he said, “Next week, I want to start to work on a clinic, roads and buy an electrical generator for your area.” True to their word, the French began building a clinic. Later, they started to work on building roads into Dara 1 through local contractors. They also brought two generators that made electricity for P1 Village.

From that point forward, the Taliban continued to live on the mountain between Dara 1 and Dara 2 and periodically attacked P1 Village. By the fall of 2011, they attacked the village once or twice per week, and only at night, attempting to avoid direct, force on force conflict with the French military. When the Taliban attacked the village, the P1 Village police fought back and the ANP, and sometimes the ANA and French soldiers, would come and provide them with support. The Taliban would eventually go back up the mountain. People from P1 Village talked about how happy they were with the French, saying that they created village police and brought services and they did not attack the people.⁶²¹

While the government built an integrated system during this early period for preventing Taliban presence, with static village guards, roving ISAF and Afghan patrols and

⁶²¹ 110503 Taliban Action 2 R3

quick reaction forces, in P1 Village, when they moved to extend the program district wide, the Coalition and government failed. The Coalition and government lacked shared goals and therefore, instead of creating village guards, the ALP Program simply provided funding, training and equipment for the existing *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* in the Kapisa Mountain District. In 2011, the government selected the commander of the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* in Daras 1 and 2 as the Commander for the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in the Kapisa Mountain District. Instead of working with the Wakils of the villages to identify village police from the Kapisa Mountain Village, P1 Village, and other strategic villages in the District, the ALP Commander hired his existing *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* and expanded the membership of his militia using the ALP salaries. The ALP Commander then employed these men, who were intended to provide security in their own villages, reinforcing the authority of their Wakils and deterring the Taliban, as yet another mobile patrolling force.

The way in which the ALP were recruited, organized and employed reversed the gains the French had made in P1 and the Pashtun villages throughout Dara 1, pitting the Parachi minority, from which the head of the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* hailed, against its traditional enemies in the Pashtun villages of Dara 1. The ALP in the district hired from 2011 on were exclusively Parachi and Tajik fighters. The village police force in P1 Village withered as the government no longer paid their salaries and the Taliban began once again to move easily through and in P1 Village. The ALP Program resulted in increased wealth and power for the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* in the Kapisa Mountain District, but it did not result in an increase in government control over the behavior of the population of the Kapisa Mountain Village or the Wakil's ability to repel the Taliban from the village. This Coalition and government organizational ineffectiveness damaged government and Wakil ability to prevent the Taliban from entering villages, collecting information and harassing,

assaulting, abducting and killing villagers.

Simultaneously, the government expanded greatly the non-*Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* security in the Kapisa Mountain District. By the time they departed, the Coalition and Afghan government had staffed and trained an entire *kandak* of Afghan National Army, with roughly 600 soldiers, and built them a base in the desert between the District Capital and the Daras. They had built an ANP station and jail and staffed it with 200 ANP. These military and police personnel came from all over Afghanistan. When they arrived in the Kapisa Mountain District, they were housed in the District Capital, far from the mountains where the Taliban lived and the Daras, filled with the villages both the Taliban and the government sought to control.

The Ministries of Interior and Defense recruited these Afghan personnel from throughout Afghanistan and trained and equipped them before sending them to the unfamiliar territory of the Kapisa Mountain District. Stationed far from their homes, these personnel were not solely beholden to their units, the ANA and ANP, or the Afghan government, they were also beholden to their far off families. The families of ANA and ANP required not only their salaries, but also their safe return. Without these military age males, the families would experience losses in their honor and their ability to provide themselves physical and economic security, come what may, in the consistently uncertain Afghan future. The French military trained and mentored these soldiers and police and ANA and ANP accompanied their French military counterparts on patrols, both day and night, throughout the Kapisa Mountain District. By the time the French departed in November 2012, District ANA and ANP personnel were perfectly capable of patrolling and engaging the Taliban without French assistance.

The government and Coalition's approach to countering the insurgency was also intended to produce economic and social development they hoped would increase support for the government, thereby obviating the reason the Coalition believed people would provide resources to the Taliban insurgency. In the view of the Coalition, social and economic development required building and staffing a District Government which would contain a representative of each of the ministries in Kabul. These personnel were recruited from throughout Afghanistan and deployed to the District Center the Coalition and government built in the District Capital, where they ran the government's programs, developing roads, schools, clinics, etc.

During this period, the government and Coalition built roads and bridges throughout the District. They built and staffed over 40 schools. They built and staffed a medical clinic to provide residents with health care for the first time. They conducted several sets of elections.

There were very likely many economic and social development projects which made their way to the District Center. However, very few of them made their way to the Kapisa Mountain Village. The most important of these projects began in July 2011. One day, the Old Wakil asked the villagers to gather in the *mazjet* and reported to them that the Governor had told him they would give each village \$60,000 one time and allow them to decide how they would like to expend the money to solve problems in the village. The Old Wakil, elders and villagers discussed the issue and decided to use the money to great effect by buying a hydro-generator that could take the power of the creek running through the village and convert it to electricity for all of the houses in the village. The grant contained enough

money to purchase the generator. The Wakil organized the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village paid and worked to build shacks required to house the generator and electrical panels and then install the generator. In order to maintain the generator, each family in the village makes a monthly contribution to pay the salary of the Electricity Man, who maintains the generator and the electrical connections to the village houses. The hydrogenerator electrified the village, greatly improving life there. The hydrogenerator also had positive effects on villagers' ability to repel Taliban presence because it meant they could see more effectively outside at night, making them able to identify Taliban presence and report it to the Wakil or government if they so chose.⁶²²

One of the more surprising facts about the effect of economic and social development projects in the Kapisa Mountain Village was that they did not touch the main occupation in the village, traditional agriculture. Improvements to the irrigation systems, or the provision of agricultural fertilizers, or a system for saving and investment, or myriad other improvements could have impacted the income of villagers. So could the development of more lucrative markets for the produce of their traditional farms, through the improvement of trade relations with neighboring Afghanistan and or the establishment of food processing plants to serve the domestic market.⁶²³ But, despite enormous investments in economic and social development, the most important aspect of economic life in the Kapisa Mountain Village was not impacted by the surge in Coalition resources.

Even in the context of the increased government security forces, patrols, both night and day by these forces and their Coalition partners, the construction of roads and bridges,

⁶²² 140723-Pakistani Taliban Actions-R3

⁶²³ Food processing plants require more capital investment, electricity and other infrastructure than are currently available in Afghanistan. One of the major problems for the sale of agricultural produce from Afghanistan is the unpredictability of exportation to Pakistan, which often arbitrarily stops Afghan exports, holding them for days, as the produce rot.

the provision of education and health services, the provision of well-paid government jobs, and economic development programs, the Taliban continued, at the end of the Coalition and government surge in actions and activities, to be able to selectively sanction people in the Kapisa Mountain Village.

For example, the Taliban informed the Old Wakil in the summer of 2010 that people could not go outside after 10 p.m. This rule is part of the Taliban's effort to make it impossible for people to know when the Taliban come through the village so that the villagers cannot inform the police of the Taliban's presence. Despite this rule, every year, during the middle of July, people sleep in their fields to protect the ripe, un-harvested wheat from thieves. During July of 2012, one of the villagers hired an itinerate worker to sleep in his field and awoke one morning to find the man had been killed by the Taliban, who left a note on his body, explaining that they would kill anyone they found outside between 10 p.m. and dawn.

In another example, immediately after the departure of the French from the district, in late November of 2012, Pakistani Taliban fighters went to Elder 1's House to sanction him for hosting French patrols in his home. Five Taliban fighters surrounded the house and then cut the electrical wire. Shortly thereafter, Son of Elder 1, who happened to be the only person at home, emerged from the house to determine why the electricity was off. The Taliban surrounded him and dragged him to the yard of the *mazjet*, where they beat him severely, demanding to know why he had hosted French military patrols in his house. The Old Mullah heard them and called Old Wakil, who called Elder 2 and approached the Pakistani Taliban fighters. Placing themselves in grave peril, the Old Wakil and Elder 2 approached the five AK 47 and mule whip wielding Pakistani Taliban who where they were

beating Son of Elder 1 behind the *mazjet*.

The Old Wakil said, "Please, I am Wakil of this village. Why are you beating this boy? He is a student." The five Pakistani Taliban fighters pointed their weapons at the two old men and said, "Stay back or we will shoot you." The Old Wakil told the Taliban fighters, "Your report is wrong. He is a student. He is always busy with his books. His father is not at home. I am his father. You can kill me. You are powerful and the French are powerful. We cannot say anything against you or the French because the people are weak relative to both you and them." The Pakistani Taliban released Son of Elder 1 and told the Old Wakil they would kill anyone who hosted the French military or the Afghan government in their homes. The Old Wakil replied, "You are powerful and they are powerful and I do not know what we should do. I will tell the people what you said."

The five Pakistani Taliban fighters went back up the mountain and the Old Wakil and Elder 2 took Son of Elder 1 to the clinic at the District Capital. In the morning, when the two old men returned to the Kapisa Mountain Village, they called a meeting in the *mazjet* to discuss the problem with the Pakistani Taliban. They told the people not to help the Pakistani Taliban. The Old Wakil thought there must be someone in the village who provided information to the Pakistani Taliban about Elder 1 hosting the French military patrols for tea. He told the people, "If you find the spy, bring him to me. I will arrest him. He will be in jail for 10 years. If you are spying, it is dangerous for you. You should stop. The Taliban come in the night and punish people because of you."⁶²⁴ This example once again demonstrates that even in the presence of a well-resourced, effective organization that patrols and engages the enemy, an insurgent organization can slip into the Kapisa Mountain

⁶²⁴ 140723 Pakistani Taliban Actions R3

Village to selectively sanction people, making the requirement for village police clear.

During the period of the surge in Coalition and government resources, the government's increased resources and organizational effectiveness increased its control over Taliban presence in the Kapisa Mountain Village. But, the Coalition and government failure to properly implement the ALP program made it impossible to prevent Taliban presence because even at their most effective, motivated by their Coalition partners, the ANA and ANP patrols could not be everywhere all the time. The persistent lack of government personnel with the will to attempt to impose rules governing individual human rights meant it had no control over those behaviors. The government's control over issues of basic order also eroded somewhat, since it relied upon the Wakil to control issues of theft, drug use, gambling, fighting, etc. The Wakil's control over these behaviors eroded during this period as villagers became less dependent on the Wakil, traditional agriculture and Islam for the physical, economic and psychological security. As their income and experience, changed by employment in the security forces and by government education, became more diverse, the villagers' unity and agreement with the Wakil declined, as did the value of his sanctions to them.

The Taliban's control over people's behavior remained low during this period as it waited for the Coalition and government resources and actions to ebb, preserving its own resources for a more opportune moment to fight.

Who has Control and Why in the Wake of the ISAF Surge?

In the wake of ISAF's withdrawal from the Kapisa Mountain District, the largest

government security force, with 600 soldiers, stopped patrolling altogether.⁶²⁵ The Commander of this ANA *kandak* made it clear to the people of the district that the ANA would no longer conduct patrols or respond to calls from the ANP or ALP, let alone the population, for assistance. In contravention of the GIROA documents describing the role of the ANA, he declared that it is the mission of the ANA to defend Afghanistan from attack by foreign armies, not to provide security internally. The people of the Kapisa Mountain Village believe that after the departure of the French, the ANA were too frightened to patrol because they feared ambushes, and particularly nighttime ambushes.⁶²⁶

The Coalition assumed that if it could train, equip and pay a military force from outside the Kapisa Mountain District and mentor it until it mimicked the Coalition's actions in the Kapisa Mountain District, that military force would continue to mimic the Coalition once Coalition military forces departed. In the case of the ANA *kandak* in the District, that assumption proved false. The ANA unit in question was comprised of officers and soldiers from throughout Afghanistan, but it was consistently commanded by Pashtun officers from outside eastern Afghanistan not affiliated with *Jamat e Islami* or anyone else in the Kapisa Mountain District. Once the French military officers with whom they had been working departed, the unit lacked incentives to take the risk of patrolling in the context of threats from Taliban ambushes. No one punished them for not patrolling or answering calls for support from the ANP or ALP. All of the soldiers in the unit continued to receive their pay and send it home to their families and none of the people in the unit had to put themselves at risk of being attacked as long as they remained in their base. And so they did. During the period between the snow melt in the spring of 2013 and the snow fall in the winter of 2013, the ANA did not conduct a single patrol through the Kapisa Mountain Village or respond to

⁶²⁵ 141106 Community Narrative R3

⁶²⁶ 140831 What Happened To Me R3

ANP or ALP requests for support in fighting the growing Taliban activities there.

As the ANP, numbering only 200, and ALP, numbering only 150, lost the quick reaction force support of the 600 man military unit in the desert between the District Capital and the Daras, their willingness to patrol and respond to calls for help at night also declined precipitously.

In an exception that proved the rule, the ANP Commander responded to the Wakil's request to conduct night patrols in the Kapisa Mountain Village after the Taliban beat Son of Elder 1 for allowing French patrols to visit as guests. The ANP Commander came to a meeting at the Kapisa Mountain Village *mazjet* in which the villagers explained that they wanted the ANP to conduct patrols day and night through the village because they were concerned the Pakistani Taliban would attack the village in retribution for the people providing sanctuary and hospitality to the French military. The ANP Commander for the Kapisa Mountain District told the villagers they should not have provided sanctuary to the French military, but that he wanted to help them solve their problem. He assigned 5 of his 200 ANP to patrol the Kapisa Mountain Village and its surrounding area for two weeks, day and night. The 5 young ANP, all uneducated Tajiks in their 20's from Badhakshan or Parwan Province, came to the Kapisa Mountain Village and slept in the *mazjet* for two weeks. They were polite and respectful, praying five times a day in the village *mazjet* alongside the villagers. They conducted patrols day and night and the Taliban did not come to the village. The Wakil arranged for the people of the village to provide the police with meals and thank them for helping solve the problem with the Pakistani Taliban.

After two weeks, the ANP District Commander returned and met with the villagers

again in the *mazjet* and told them he needed his ANP to conduct operations elsewhere in the district and left with them. Just after midnight, on the evening after the ANP had left the village, 4 Pakistani Taliban conducted a patrol through the Kapisa Mountain Village. The ANP conducted one patrol per day through the Kapisa Mountain Village for the next two weeks and Pakistani Taliban conducted numerous night patrols. At the end of this month of augmented ANP presence, the ANP settled back into its routine, conducting no further night patrols and only sporadic daytime patrols.⁶²⁷ When the Wakil reached out to the ANP District Commander to inform him of the Taliban presence in the Kapisa Mountain Village, the District ANP Commander would only send ANP during the day to engage the Pakistani Taliban. At night, he would not send anyone because he feared Taliban ambushes and improvised explosive devices en route to the Kapisa Mountain Village.⁶²⁸ This proved to be the last set of night patrols by ANP or ALP during 2013 and the Taliban gradually increased their patrols, coming through the village several nights per week.

Realizing ISAF had departed Kapisa, leaving its mountain sanctuary unprotected, a group of *salafi jihadist* terrorists from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the rest of the Former Soviet Union built a hard stand fort with gun ports on the imposing mountain above the Parachi Village at the end of Dara 3. The locals call them the “Chichini” (Chechen) Taliban, but they are probably affiliated with Al Qaeda. The Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban living on the mountain above the Kapisa Mountain Village between Dara 1 and Dara 2 began regularly patrolling the village.

While the government was no longer available at night to assist the Kapisa Mountain Village in repelling the Taliban, government actions continued to cause the erosion of Wakil

⁶²⁷ 140723 ANP Actions R3

⁶²⁸ 140723 Pakistani Taliban Actions R3

control and people began to use government authority against the Wakil. Since the government relied upon the Wakil to provide order, government actions undermined Wakil control. The government was additionally ineffective when its personnel accepted bribes in return for not enforcing its rules. These actions were clearly the direct opposite of what the government intended.

For example, in March of 2013, one of the Kapisa Mountain villagers decided to grow opium, violating the rules of the Wakil and the laws of Afghanistan. The Wakil and elders became aware that the Opium Grower had planted this *haram* and illegal substance and went to his home to advise him not to grow opium. The Opium Grower refused to stop, so the Wakil told the Kapisa Mountain ANP District Commander and asked him to arrest the Opium Grower and rip out his crop. The District ANP Commander told the Wakil, "This is none of your business."

The Opium Grower makes six times what he would make for crops of wheat and corn from the sale of his opium. He may have paid a bribe to the Kapisa Mountain District ANP Commander or his superiors in return for them not arresting him and eradicating his opium crop. Or, the Opium Grower may be working directly with the District ANP Commander, who makes money from protecting the opium exported from the Panshir Valley to Pakistan by the Tajik *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* organized criminal network. In the absence of the ANP, the Wakil would have organized the villagers to destroy this *haram* crop, but the government has more power than he does and the Opium Grower has enough money and or relationships to leverage that power to prevent the Wakil from sanctioning him. The Wakil did send the District ANP Commander a written report about the Opium Grower, so that he would be on record as not participating in allowing this behavior, but he

was unable to do anything further.⁶²⁹ The increased relative power of the ANP to protect people from the Wakil's sanctions undermined his effectiveness in acting to eradicate the *haram* crop. The government's ineffectiveness in causing its personnel to act according to laws and regulations eroded its own control and that of the Wakil.

The general erosion of the Kapisa Mountain Village unity as a result of government employment and deployment of young men far outside the village further eroded the Wakil's control. During this period, the percentage of families providing at least one member to the ANSF grew to 44% and the percentage of villagers in the ANSF grew to 8%. Additionally, upon graduating from high school, the Son of the Opium Grower joined the Afghan National Army. And, a young man from the Kapisa Mountain Village, whose parents died, leaving him responsible for the costs of their medical care and funerals, as well as providing for his younger siblings, joined the Afghan Local Police. He began working four days a week living in the dangerous ALP Checkpoint in Dara 1 during 2013, where he joined the other two ALP from the village, including Son 1 of Family 15.

The impact of the decreased unity of the village, and the ability of residents to reach out to the government to avoid obeying the Wakil, impacted his control. The Opium Grower planted and harvested his valuable, illegal crop. Son 1 of Family 15 openly refused to attend prayers in the village *mazjet*. The Wakil advised him to do so, telling him that if he did not pray, the Wakil could not trust him. Son 1 of Family 15 told the Wakil he would not pray. The Wakil could do nothing about Son 1 of Family 15's refusal because he was an ALP, had a weapon at home and might be able to turn the ALP Commander or other ALP against the Wakil. These individuals were empowered by their relationships with the government to

⁶²⁹ 140911-Family 3-R3

disobey the Wakil. But, the government did not act to replace the control the Wakil had over basic order in his village because it could not compel its personnel to act.

In addition, government provision of basic services other than security, especially when they involved risk or effort, began to decline soon after ISAF's departure. The road into the Kapisa Mountain Village from the District Capital began to crack and became impassible for cars in the spring of 2013, but no one from the government would repair it. So, one day in the spring, the elderly Elder 2 purchased gravel and began repairing it himself. This was during the month of augmented patrols in the Kapisa Mountain District, so a group of ANP came to conduct a day patrol while Elder 2 was working. They asked him what he was doing and he told them that he was doing what the government should be doing, fixing the road. He asked them why they did not help him complete the task since they were from the government. The young ANP patrol leader told Elder 2 they could not, but that it was a very good thing that he was because Allah blesses anyone who helps build the roads. Elder 2 continued toiling as the ANP patrol moved on. The Wakil approached Elder 2 on foot, coming from the bazaar. He stopped and helped his compatriot and the two men completed the task. When they returned to the *mazjet*, the people thanked Elder 2 and the Wakil for repairing the road.

In June of 2013, facing mounting patrols from the Taliban and decreased capacity to sanction rule breakers or maintain village unity, old age and health problems, the Old Wakil of the Kapisa Mountain Village called a meeting and told the assembled villagers he wanted to retire. He recommended the new Wakil to the heads of the village households as his replacement. The Old Wakil thought the Wakil would be able to solve the problems of the people because he was a military officer prior to the Soviet invasion, up until the fall of the

government and Afghanistan's descent into civil war. The Old Wakil told the people that the Wakil understands the rules of life in Afghanistan and can help the people solve their problems. The people agreed to have the Wakil as their Wakil and the Old Wakil left with his son to move to Mazar where he could get medical treatment more easily.

The summer of 2013 also saw an increase in Taliban activities. The Taliban conducted night patrols they conducted through the Kapisa Mountain Village and the surrounding villages two or three times a week, sanctioning people as they found them breaking rules. In mid-July, they killed an itinerant harvest worker sleeping in one of the wheat fields to protect the un-harvested produce. The man was killed because he was outside at night and could therefore provide information to the government about Taliban presence in the Kapisa Mountain Village. The Taliban also shot some of the guests at a wedding party in a neighboring village where there was outdoor music, a wedding singer and dancing because these are *haram* activities. However, the Taliban did not have the resources to cause the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village to expect that if they held a wedding party with music, they would be attacked. When Elder 1 threw a wedding party for his son in July of 2013, he had a wedding singer there and the young men of the village danced. The Taliban did not attack this wedding party, making it obvious to villagers that they could not expect that every time they did something *haram*, the Taliban would know and sanction them.

As the Taliban realized the ANSF would not patrol in the daras after dark, they began setting up a temporary checkpoint in the desert between the ANA *kandak* base, from which soldiers seldom emerged, and an ANP checkpoint manned by 10 ANP at the mouth of the daras. The Taliban set up the checkpoint on the road between the District Capital and

the daras. This location allowed them to check each person traveling at night to determine if they worked for the government or not and it allowed them to access much of the commercial traffic in the area. In the summer of 2013, the checkpoint was still manned by small numbers of Afghan Taliban who were relatively ill-disciplined and sometimes engaged in brigandage.

The Wakil has a friend from Jalalabad who is a watermelon distributor. He buys watermelons in Jalalabad and transports them to district *bazaars* in areas where it is too cold to grow watermelons. When the Watermelon Seller comes to the Kapisa Mountain District *bazaar*, he stays at the Wakil's house as a guest. One Thursday evening, the Watermelon Seller, having left his produce at the *bazaar*, drove through the desert to the Kapisa Mountain Village and encountered a checkpoint run by two Afghan Taliban.

The Afghan Taliban knew this man sometimes sold watermelons at the *bazaar* and demanded that he give them three watermelons. The watermelon seller told the young men he did not have any watermelons in his car and it was very late and he needed to get to the Wakil's house in the Kapisa Mountain Village, where he was a guest. The Taliban fighters were angry with the man, so they slashed the tires on his car and beat him severely. The Watermelon Seller thought they would kill him, so he ran away and they shot at him, but they missed. The Watermelon Seller ran through the desert to the Kapisa Mountain Village. The Watermelon Seller told the Wakil that if they did not go back to the checkpoint, then the Afghan Taliban would light his car on fire, destroying the Watermelon Seller's method for transporting his goods. The Wakil and Watermelon Seller knew that even if the ANP went to the Afghan Taliban checkpoint, they would get in a firefight with the Afghan Taliban and likely destroy the Watermelon Seller's vehicle.

So, the Wakil and Elder 1 got on a motorcycle and road out to the checkpoint, where they found the two Afghan Taliban sleeping in the Watermelon Seller's car. As the Wakil and Elder 1 approached the car, the Taliban fighters woke up and yelled at the Wakil and Elder 1 to stop where they were and not come any closer. They did and the Wakil said, "I am the Wakil of this village and I want to talk about the problem between you and the owner of that car." One Taliban fighter said, "We wanted watermelons from him and he said he did not have any. If he wants to come on this road, he must bring us watermelons and he did not. I told him to go get some at the *bazaar* and he refused."

Elder 1 said, "This man is a poor man and he is my guest. You have no right to hurt this person." The Taliban told the Wakil, "You have to tell this person to bring a watermelon to take to my home."

The Wakil apologized to the Taliban. He said, "This man is poor. Do not hurt him. He is my guest." The Wakil told the Taliban fighters he would go to the *bazaar* and get them a watermelon from the storage area. The Taliban fighters agreed and told the Wakil not to tell the ANP where the fighters were. Elder 1 remained with the Taliban as an assurance that the Wakil would not return with the ANP. When the Wakil returned with watermelons, the Taliban left and went back up the mountain. The Wakil and Elder 1 returned to the Kapisa Mountain Village.

In the morning, the Watermelon Seller told the people at prayers in the village *mazjet*, "The Taliban is very bad here. This is a bad area. It is not secure. The Taliban attacked me and harassed me. They could have called me and I would have brought them a

watermelon. Why did they harass me? I did not do anything wrong.”

The Wakil asked his guest, “What should I do? I cannot fight the Taliban. All I could do was rescue you because the Taliban respect me enough for that.” The Mullah said, “Allah likes guests. We are supposed to bring them food and help them. This is not Islam to attack a guest.” The people agreed with the Mullah, so the Wakil asked the people, “Do we need to do something about the Taliban?” The villagers discussed the matter and concluded there was no way to solve the problem because the Taliban had more guns than the people of the village. They agreed they had to accept the Taliban’s rules and what they do because the Taliban are very dangerous and the villagers could not win in a fight against them.⁶³⁰

The Pakistani Taliban ad hoc checkpoint began to be present between the District Capital and the daras several nights per week during the summer of 2013. The Afghan National Army *kandak*, whose base was less than ten minutes by car from the area where the Taliban set up the checkpoint, could not have been unaware that it was there. The ANA could have deterred the checkpoint with simple patrols on this flatter, less ambush-friendly territory, but they did not. The ANP have a checkpoint with 10 policemen at the mouth of the daras and they also could not have been unaware of the presence of the Taliban checkpoint, but they also do not patrol or respond to reports of the checkpoint. The ANP checkpoint, sitting at the mount of the valleys, with only ten policemen, did not want to make itself a target of the ire of the hundreds of Taliban fighters who inhabited the mountains that stretched upward from the barren desert upon whose border the police made their home in a set of metal containers.

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The Taliban struck the ANP, ALP and District Government Center with a series of suicide attacks beginning in March 2013. But, their organizational effectiveness sometimes failed. For example, in mid-July 2013, the NDS Double Agent reported there were two suicide bombers planning to attack the Kapisa Mountain District Government Center. The ANP arrested these Pakistani men before they could complete their attack, greatly enhancing the Double Agent's profile. The information the Double Agent had almost certainly came from his friend from schoolboy days, the Pakistani Taliban Liaison to the Afghan Taliban.

During 2013, the Pakistani Taliban began a concerted effort to discourage girls from attending school and to prevent people from having wedding singers and dancing at wedding parties. In May of 2013, a group of Pakistani Taliban fighters brazenly attacked a group of girls from another village in Dara 2 as they walked toward the girls' high school in broad daylight. Girls gather at an appointed spot in each village and walk en masse to the high schools throughout the district. Since boys attend school in the morning and girls in the afternoon, the Taliban, as well as boys and men wishing to harass the girls, know exactly when and where girls attending the high school will be walking. For that reason, ALP guard the larger roads to the school at the times when the girls are walking. Despite these efforts, the Pakistani Taliban were able to attack a group of girls walking to school with acid. Their intent was for the brutal public sanction to deter girls from breaking Taliban rules by leaving their homes without a male relative and a *burkha* and for attending school. Despite this disincentive, girls from the Kapisa Mountain Village continue attending the high school, gathering at the village shop to walk to school and once again at their school to walk home, in defiance.

The Pakistani Taliban also attempted to set fire to the Kapisa Mountain Village elementary school. At lunchtime on a school day during late July of 2013, when none of the teachers or students were in the building, four Pakistani Taliban came down the mountain and doused the interior walls of the school with gasoline. They had intended to light the school on fire because the school had male and female teachers and students, in violation of the Taliban's rules regarding gender segregation. The Mullah saw the Pakistani Taliban fighters doing something inside the school and called the Wakil, who called the Kapisa Mountain District ANP Commander. The District ANP Commander came to the village very quickly and the Pakistani Taliban ran away up the mountain. The ANP Fire Unit used its water truck to wash the gasoline off the walls of the school and told the teachers, students and villagers to stay out of the building for several days. The day after the ANP Fire Unit put out the fire, the Taliban posted a letter on the door of the school, saying the teachers found letters from Taliban saying that no girls can go to school, just the boys, and that if girls continued to attend the school, the Taliban would come shoot some of the girls. When the Wakil raised the villagers' concerns that the Taliban might attack the school, the District ANP Commander agreed to assign three ALP, none of whom were from the Kapisa Mountain Village, to guard the school every school day in order to deter future Pakistani Taliban attacks on the school.⁶³¹ The Pakistani Taliban did not attempt to attack the school again during 2013 or 2014. Additionally, none of the village families withdrew their children, male or female, from the Kapisa Mountain Village School in the wake of these threats.

The Afghan Taliban also began to probe the possibilities for daytime operations in the Kapisa Mountain Village. On July 3rd, eight Afghan Taliban and their new commander, who had only recently quit his job as a math teacher in a local high school to join the

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Taliban, conducted a patrol through the village. One villager who saw them violated an import Wakil rule, not informing the Wakil of the presence of armed men from outside the village, but instead calling the ALP Commander. The Wakil's control was weakening since he could not be the sole manager of the information coming out of the village to the armed organizations. This decreased control caused the ALP to come to the Kapisa Mountain Village with damaging impact on the Wakil's ability to protect the villagers from threats from the Taliban or the government.

The ALP Commander and a group of 13 ALP, backed by 25 ANP soldiers, arrived in the Kapisa Mountain Village and engaged the Afghan Taliban in an hour long gun battle, ending in the Taliban running away up the mountain between Dara 2 and Dara 1.

When the battle began, Son 2 of the Wakil, who was home on break from Kapisa University, was outside the Wakil's yard and was therefore pinned down outside during the gun battle. After the battle was over, the ALP Commander and his soldiers beat Son 2 of Wakil and demanded to know why he had been outside and if he had been helping the Afghan Taliban.

The Wakil approached the ALP Commander, during their first interaction since he had become Wakil, and begged him to release his son. The ALP Commander refused and took Son 2 of Wakil with him toward ALP Commander's Village. En route, the ALP and Son 2 of the Wakil were ambushed by Afghan Taliban, the ALP Commander was injured and Son 2 of Wakil ran away, only to be captured by the ANP because he was running around with his hands cuffed behind him.

The Wakil was enraged because he thought the ALP or someone else might kill his son. The Afghan Taliban Commander returned to the village and apologized to the Wakil. He told the Wakil he was sorry about the firefight in the village and that he would help the Wakil find his son and that if his son had died, the Afghan Taliban Commander would give the Wakil his gun and the Wakil could kill him. The Afghan Taliban Commander consulted his network of informants and discovered the Wakil's son was imprisoned in the ANP District Jail. The Afghan Taliban Commander informed the Wakil of his son's disposition and told him that he had friends on the police force and that his son would be released that evening. This all came to pass and Son 2 of Wakil returned safe, though slightly rattled, to the village that night.

The people of the Kapisa Mountain Village talked to the Wakil after his son returned home. They told him he had to go make peace with the ALP Commander. Despite the fact that the ALP Commander had seriously shamed the Wakil by beating and then arresting his son in front of the Wakil and the villagers, the Wakil and Elder 1 went to the ALP Commander's House that evening to discuss what had happened. The Wakil was putting his honor on the line by visiting the man who had beaten and arrested his son in front of him. The fact that the Wakil approached the ALP Commander to make peace publically demonstrated that the ALP Commander was more honorable, had more power. Further, in Afghan culture, visiting someone's house as a guest also confers honor on the host, not the guest.

The Wakil asked the ALP Commander why he had arrested his son and whether he had intended to kill him or not. The ALP Commander told the Wakil that he had not intended to kill his son, but that he had thought the young man had shot at him on behalf of

the Taliban. Elder 1 told the ALP Commander that this was not true and that the ALP Commander should have told the Wakil and or elders that the ALP were coming to the village to engage the Taliban so that they could make sure everyone was inside. The ALP Commander acknowledged that he should have informed them, but that someone from the village had called him when he saw the eight Taliban who had come to the village during the day. In the end, the three men made peace.⁶³²

This incident demonstrates the Afghan Taliban's efforts to probe whether it could move freely through the Kapisa Mountain Village during the day or not and the Afghan Taliban Commander's interest in having a good relationship with the village Wakil. It also demonstrates the importance of information provision by villagers to armed groups for establishing control. The government has a rule that Taliban cannot be present in the Kapisa Mountain Village and the ALP would not have known eight Afghan Taliban were present in the village unless a villager had called them. Additionally, by giving information to an armed organization that had more coercive force than the Wakil, the villager was taking the Wakil's control over the presence of coercive forces in the village away. This incident also shows how ineffective the ANP are, even in relation to their fight against the Taliban. Not only does the Afghan Taliban Commander for the Kapisa Mountain District have spies in the jail, he has the ability to have people released from the jail. This incident demonstrates serious governmental organizational ineffectiveness.

Further, while the ANP and ALP responded to daytime calls for assistance in repelling Taliban presence and or attacks, it does not patrol at night to prevent the Taliban from entering villages and killing people for being outside. During the wheat harvest, when

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the Taliban killed another itinerate worker who was sleeping in the fields to protect the unharvested wheat, the ANP and ALP Commanders refused to patrol the Kapisa Mountain Village. They claimed it was because the ANP and ALP lacked the personnel to do so, but together with the 600 ANA soldiers, the 200 ANP and 150 ALP could certainly have patrolled as often as the several hundred Taliban during 2013. They did not do so because they lacked the will, not the personnel or equipment, to do so.

During the summer of 2013, the erosion of the Wakil's control over the behavior of young men in the village became increasingly evident. For example, Son 1 of Family 2 broke the fast during Ramadan by smoking a cigarette while taking a break from harvesting wheat in the middle of July. Additionally, during the summer of 2013, Father of Family 7 began smoking opium almost every night in the woods near the Kapisa Mountain Village with people from nearby villages. Father of Family 7, who is the uneducated head of a poor farming family that made only 6,000 Afs per month, but had five children. In 2013, the eldest son of Family 7 moved to Dubai to earn money in construction and now this poor, traditional agricultural family had money it never had, an additional 55,000 Afs per month. This income represents a huge increase for Family 7, which never had money to spare before 2013. Father of Family 7 spent some of that money on opium. He spent some of it on setting up businesses, including a shop in the bazaar that sold flowers and one in the Kapisa Mountain Village that attempted to compete with the existing Kapisa Mountain Village Shop. Both of these businesses failed, at least in part because Father of Family 7 spent some of his money on opium. Father of Family 7 is someone who would likely never have smoked opium if he did not have extra money and the opium were not available from opium sellers. Once again, the sources of large amounts of disposable income undermine order and the

Wakil's control in the Kapisa Mountain Village.⁶³³

Additionally, when Son 2 of Wakil and Son of Elder 1 got into a fistfight over whether or not one had scored a goal on the other in a football game, a villager once again violated the Wakil's rules and village unity by calling the ANP to come arrest the two boys for fighting instead of calling the Wakil or elders to solve the problem. Two ANP came to the village and arrested the boys for fighting and began walking with them toward the district jail. Elder 1 happened to be walking back from the *bazaar* and stopped the ANP. When the ANP reported why they had arrested the boys, Elder 1 told them he was an elder and he would handle the problem, saying,

“Thank you for your help, but we have a Wakil in our village and when you come to the village, you have to call to the Wakil. This is your fault. You did not talk to anyone in the village, but you went to the football field and arrested them. You did your job. But, now you should release these two boys.”

The police said to Elder 1, “This is my job, we have to not allow the people to drink wine or gamble or steal or fight. We are at the service of the people.” Elder 1 said, “Thank you. You did your job very well. I will guarantee they will not fight like this again.” The police said to the two young men, “If Elder 1 was not here, we would put you in jail for a day and then you would know the cost of fighting.”

As Elder 1 was walking back to the village with the two young men, they thanked him, saying, “Thank you for rescuing us from the police. It is better that you came along because maybe the police would have put us in jail. Maybe they would have hit us.”

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The villagers knew the ANP had arrested Son 2 of Wakil and Son of Elder 1. They asked Elder 1 whether he had just retrieved the two young men from the District jail. Elder 1 said, "No. I found them on the way. When I was walking here, I saw these two boys with blood on them and with the police. I discussed this with the police and I guaranteed to the police that they would not fight one another any more and I brought them back here with me."

Son of Family 2 told Elder 1, "The Wakil is not in the village. He went to Dara 4. When the Wakil is not in the village, you can do his job." Father of Family 5 said, "It is better you had these boys released. If the police had put these guys in jail, it would be very shameful for us." Elder 1 replied, "It is my job. When the Wakil is not here in the village, I have to do things for this village."

Elder 1 called the Wakil and told him, "The police arrested our sons because they were fighting one another and I rescued them." The Wakil said to Elder 1, "You have to slap both my son and your son. Do not worry about these guys." Elder 1 said, "No. I will never hit them, but I will advise them." Elder 1 said to the Wakil's son, "It is very shameful for you and it is very bad for humans to do this. Animals fight." The Wakil's son said, "I am sorry. I am very sorry." And Elder 1 said to his own son, "It is very shameful for you. You are a young person and you are the son of an elder and he is the son of the Wakil. You fought with one another." Son of Elder 1 apologized, saying, "I will never do this again." Elder 2 said to Elder 1, "They are young men. Don't shame in front of the people." Elder 2 said to the Wakil's son and Elder 1's son, you have to hug one another." Son 2 of Wakil said, "Yes. I have already forgotten the fight." Elder 1's son agreed and they hugged one another. The

Mullah said, “That is fine. I am very happy about these guys. They are like brothers. When something bad happens between two brothers, it is not important.”⁶³⁴

In this incident, someone from the village broke the Wakil’s rules and informed the ANP about rule breaking, instead of informing the Wakil. This action represents an effort by the villager in question, we do not know who, to use the ANP to sanction Son of Elder 1 and Son 2 of Wakil for fighting. The ANP responded to the information, but when Elder 1 told them to release the boys, who had broken a law, they did so. They were not averse to simply releasing the boys to someone claiming to be an elder. This action, while inconsequential, is an example of the police not impartially implementing the laws.

This example of the police only half heartedly implementing laws and regulations is part and parcel of the broader problem the government has in pursuing goals with which most of its personnel and the Wakil disagree. This lack of control over topics with which the Wakil disagrees persists in the wake of the ISAF surge. Although the number of girls attending school and children in school in general increased again, with 56% of school aged girls attended school, little else changed in terms of women’s rights. Women continued to hold the gains they had made in terms of running their farms and interacting with their male neighbors. However, none of the women except the sisters who are the wives of the sons of Family 12 go to the village shop and no female from the village goes to the shops in the *bazaar*. Also, during 2013, there were no weddings in the Kapisa Mountain Village in which the father of the groom did not pay the father of the bride a bride price, in direct violation of the law. The police are aware this is the case, but they make no effort to investigate it. Also, none of the young women who graduate from high school seek

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employment. While none of these women complained to the government, the government certainly did not seek information and even ignored what was common knowledge, that women could not do anything, even leave their own homes, without permission from a male relative.

In the wake of the withdrawal of French military forces from the Kapisa Mountain District and the rest of Kapisa, the organizational effectiveness of the government declined greatly, especially in regard to patrolling and engaging the Taliban at night. It also declined in regard to not enforcing restrictions on growing opium in return for bribes. At the same time, the unity of the Kapisa Mountain Village continued to decline in the face of continued expansion of government employment and education, undermining the Wakil's control. Men began more and more openly flouting the rules of the Wakil and providing information to the government instead of the Wakil. As the Wakil's control eroded, so did the government's control because it did not expand into the space by acting to generate order.

The Taliban's activities increased as the government's will to patrol and engage the Taliban decreased. During the day, the ANP and ALP responded to calls for assistance and the Taliban adapted by confining their activities in the Kapisa Mountain Village to the nighttime. Even at night, the Taliban's resources remained fairly constant and the Taliban was therefore unable to patrol enough to create an expectation that if people broke the Taliban's rules, they would be sanctioned.

Who Has Control and Why in the Kapisa Mountain Village During the Pakistani Taliban Surge?

As the snows melted in the spring of 2014, Pakistani Taliban activity in the Kapisa Mountain Village immediately escalated, fueled by a significant surge in personnel, money

and equipment flowing into the Kapisa Mountain District from Pakistan. These resources flowed through the effective Pakistani Taliban organization and resulted in the collection of information about the identity and location of residents who are ANSF personnel; a concerted and repeated effort to drive the government security forces out of Daras 1 and 2; and improvised explosive and suicide attacks on the commanders of the ANP and ALP. The increased resources from the Pakistani Taliban to the Afghan Taliban increased the effectiveness of the Taliban organization by reducing their autonomous and countervailing activities, though not entirely. At no point did the Taliban seek the agreement of the population with its goals or actions, nor did it rely upon the voluntary provision of resources to the organization by the population. The Taliban's control over particular rules, like villagers not going outside at night and not turning the lights on outside at night, increased. But, despite its consistent effectiveness in killing members of the ANSF when it identified them, the Taliban was unable to cause the Kapisa Mountain Village residents to quit the ANSF or even to stop young men from joining.

As the Taliban's operations accelerated and the Wakil sought to do as his villagers wished, repelling the Taliban's presence, let alone the social system it proposes, the Wakil suffered from the incongruously limited resources he could generate from within the small, traditional farming village. As the number of Taliban fighters grew to over 1,600, the threat of a concentrated attack by these fighters against the 100 households in the Kapisa Mountain Village, three quarters of whom had one or more military aged male deployed too far from home to help, it was increasingly apparent that armed opposition would result in annihilation. This inability to prevent the Taliban from moving freely through the village, harassing, abducting and killing residents, was compounded by ANA, ANP and ALP inaction to prevent the Taliban from doing so. Simultaneously, the village consensus that

underpinned the Wakil's control decreased still further in the face of changes resulting from increased education and the government's highly paid jobs far from the Kapisa Mountain Village. As a result of these changes, young people began to need the Wakil less and value their lives in the village less. These young people valued money, honor, action and the world outside the village more and the traditional agriculture and Islam in the Kapisa Mountain Village less. Their agreement with the goals and rules of the Wakil declined and they began to obey his rules less than they had before. These same people were increasingly free to break the Wakil's rules because of a combination of outside salaries and their ability to leverage the power of the government to insulate themselves from punishment by the Wakil. And, break them they did. Young men refused to pray in the village *mazjet*, broke the Ramadan fast, smoked cigarettes, hashish and opium, gambled, misspent bride prices entrusted to them by their brothers, harassed girls from other villages, grew opium, etc.

In the meantime, the government's control declined alongside that of the Wakil despite the significant external personnel, funding, equipment, and even aerial bombing support the organization received from the Coalition. The government did not prevent the Taliban from entering and moving through the Kapisa Mountain Village, harassing, abducting and killing residents. It was also failed to prevent the Taliban from overtly seizing control over Dara 1 and 2 twice. It was able to drive the Taliban back up into the mountains repeatedly, but was unable to hold the territory it recovered. The agreement of the people in the Kapisa Mountain Village with the government's goals and actions did not increase or decrease. The government's resources did not increase or decrease. The thing that changed was the government's organizational effectiveness, which declined as the Taliban's resources and organizational effectiveness increased. In the context of the lack of

affection for the goals of the government and the lack of disincentives for inaction, government personnel were not partial enough to the government's intent to take the risks required to act.

The Wakil's loss of control over whether the Taliban could move through the Kapisa Mountain Village, harassing, abducting and even killing local villagers resulted from his limited resources and the unwillingness of the ANA, ANP and ALP to assist him. Despite the fact that the villagers do not want the Taliban in their village, they agreed not to organize to attack the Taliban because they expect that if they did, the Taliban would focus their resources on making an example of their village. The Wakil's control over Taliban sanctions became so limited that five families moved to Kabul and the Parachi Village at the End of Dara 3. The Wakil had enough control to organize villagers to flee in advance of a Taliban onslaught. They returned two weeks later when the ANA, ANP and ALP had expelled the insurgents back into the mountains.

A description of the actions of the Taliban and the reactions of the government and Wakil from the villagers' perspective provides insight into how the Taliban was able to coerce the Wakil into allowing its fighters to move through the village unimpeded; why the Taliban were unable to establish control over other behaviors in the Kapisa Mountain Village; and how the Wakil's control continued to erode with village unity.

One morning in April, the Mullah emerged from the *mazjet* to perform ablution by the creek, making himself acceptable to Allah before offering his morning prayers. He saw that someone had broken the light outside the *mazjet*. When prayers were done, he replaced the broken bulb and the village went about its normal day. The next morning

around 2 am, there was a loud explosion and all of the electricity in the village went out. The Wakil, elders and Mullah went to the Electricity Room by the creek, where they discovered the Taliban had blown up the hydrogenerator with a rocket. The ANP Commander agreed to help the Wakil acquire another hydrogenerator from the United Nations. When the Pakistani Taliban learned the village would be getting a new generator, they left a note on the door of the *mazjet*, informing the villagers that if any home left lights on outside after 10 pm, the Taliban would blow up the hydrogenerator and the house with the lights. The Wakil visited the ANP Commander and asked him to conduct patrols through the village at night. But, the ANP Commander demurred, saying he did not have enough police to be able to patrol all of the villages all of the time. The ANP District Commander told Wakil he should tell the villagers not turn on the lights for fear of the Pakistani Taliban destroying the generator again. In essence, the ANP Commander conceded the right to patrol the Kapisa Mountain Village to the Pakistani Taliban by ensuring villagers could not see the Taliban and call the ANP to come engage them. The Wakil held a meeting to inform the villagers that the ANP would not be coming to the village to protect their ability to keep the lights on at night. The Wakil and villagers agreed that no one was allowed to turn on lights outside their homes after 2200.⁶³⁵ With this decision, it became increasingly clear to the Wakil and villagers that the ANP would not come to their aid at night, even if they called because the Taliban were attacking the village.

Several days later, despite the burgeoning threats to members of the ANP, ALP and ANA in the Kapisa Mountain District, and to the Kapisa Mountain Village as a whole, after graduating high school in the spring of 2014, Son 1 of Son of Family 2 and Son 1 of Son 1 of Family 15, drawn by the promise of high salaries, joined the ANA and began their training to

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become officers in Kabul.

When the spring rains came, the 3 meter mud wall of the Wakil's yard collapsed and Son of Family 2 and eleven other villagers spent the day helping him rebuild it. The rains swept down the mountain, felling the trees farmers grow on the side of the creek in the partially flooded fields and Son 1 of Family 15 assisted Father of Family 4, at great personal risk, in rescuing his valuable trees, which would otherwise have been swept away. These villagers obeyed Allah's rules and those of the Wakil by helping their neighbors.

Despite the peril they had caused, the spring rains and snow melts were not enough to supply the water the village needed for its crops. The Wakil called a meeting of the heads of the village households and told them there would not be enough water for the crops on all of the fields. He proposed that each family plant only 1 square kilometer of their land and that the village establish an irrigation schedule that would delimitate when each family could use the water for periods of four hours at a time. The villagers agreed and said the Wakil was a good Wakil because he solved this problem before it got worse. The elders, Wakil and villagers began observing one another to determine whether or not everyone was complying with the schedule.

The Wakil's concern about the looming Taliban threat and the government's inaction grew and he decided to hold a meeting with all of the village heads of households, imploring them to unify in solidarity against the approaching Taliban. He told them they had to help him solve the problems of the village and they had to unify their families and the village in order to protect it in these troubled times. Shortly after the Wakil's meeting, the reason the unity was required reared its ugly head. The Pakistani Taliban Checkpoint in the

desert was no longer an occasional fixture, but instead a constant presence, every Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday between dusk and dawn, constantly seeking government personnel traveling home or back to work to kill. Since ANA, ANP and other government personnel who were from the Daras of the Kapisa Mountain District had to travel to get home for a weekend (which start on Thursday nights), they had to pass through this checkpoint if they arrived after dusk. Despite the consistency and regularity of the checkpoint, neither the ANA on the District Capital side of the desert, nor the ANP at the mouth of the Daras conducted patrols or attacked the Pakistani Taliban checkpoint. This inaction was a perfect demonstration of the organizational ineffectiveness of the government security forces. The young men whose lives were under threat at the checkpoint were part of the very organizations that were not acting to protect them from being punished for being part of the organizations. In May, they succeeded in finding an NDS agent and killing him.

Two days later, four Pakistani Taliban, looking for food, came down the mountain and stopped at the home of an old widowed Kori⁶³⁶, her son and her new daughter in law. They knocked on the door, but the 28 year old son of the Kori did not want to open the door. The fighters kicked the door in, dragged the man outside and beat him savagely with the butts of their weapons. The Kori and her daughter in law came outside and began screaming and wailing, beseeching the fighters to stop. The Wakil and elders, hearing the women's cries, ran to the house and the Pakistani Taliban fighters fled up the hill, fearing the police might come, which they did not. The Kori cried to the Wakil, "Where were you

⁶³⁶ In Islam, there are no female Mullahs and in Afghanistan there is intense gender segregation. So, female Koris, women who can recite the Koran, are very important women in communities because they serve as people whom women can talk to about Islam.

when the Taliban came here and hurt my son? You only come here now. There is no government. It is a bad government. Bad police. No security. What should we do to live?"⁶³⁷

Despite the ongoing violence from the Taliban, the Wakil arranged for a tractor owned by a Pashutn from Area T to come to the Kapisa Mountain Village to plant the corn and Son of Family 1 threw a wedding party for his son. He paid a brideprice of 300,000 Afs for his daughter in law and threw a large party with music, even though several weeks earlier, the Pakistani Taliban, hearing music and dancing while on patrol, shot some of the guests at a wedding in a neighboring village. The young men of the Kapisa Mountain Village danced in celebration of the honor of Family 1 because they valued that more than the risk of a Taliban sanction.

The lack of will by the police to come when called at night was highlighted by an incident in late June of 2014 when the villagers caught a thief in the *mazjet*, but had to subdue him themselves and then detain him overnight because the ANP Commander was concerned about the danger of traveling to their village at night. Son of Family 1 was taking his turn sleeping in the *mazjet* while the Mullah was at home in Parwan, visiting his family. Family 1 had guests, so Son of Family 1 did not arrive at the *mazjet* until after midnight to go to sleep. When he arrived, he found a thief rolling up the carpets. Son of Family 1, who is a large, strong man, tackled the thief and began hitting him over the head with a rock to subdue him. Once the thief was unconscious, Son of Family 1 called the Wakil, who called the ANP Commander to ask him to come arrest the thief. The ANP Commander told the Wakil they would have to hold the thief overnight in the *mazjet* and that he would come arrest him in the morning. The Wakil and Son of Family 1 locked the badly beaten thief in

⁶³⁷ 140723 Pakistani Taliban Actions R3

the *mazjet* bathroom and both men stayed in the *mazjet*, taking turns sleeping, until the ANP Commander arrived in the morning. When the ANP Commander arrived, he told the Son of Family 1 he could have killed the thief and he should not have beaten him so badly. Son of Family 1 apologized, saying he had been very angry and not careful enough. The ANP Commander took the thief away to the jail and the villagers discussed the fact it was good that there was a district jail because if there were no government, they would have had to kill the thief.⁶³⁸

Fearing possible attacks by the Taliban in the context of an ANA and ANP refusing to come to the Kapisa Mountain Village at night, the Wakil made a concerted effort to form a friendship with the ALP Commander, despite the very rocky start to their relationship in 2013. In order to enhance the security of the Kapisa Mountain Village, the Wakil swallowed his pride regarding the ALP Commander arresting and seriously endangering his son. He offered the ALP Commander hospitality and had enhanced his honor by allowing him to solve a land dispute in the village.⁶³⁹

Ever focused on the importance of Islam and life in the next world, the Mullah gave a sermon on performing ablution before prayers. He told the villagers they must perform ablution before praying because otherwise Allah would not accept their prayers. During the next several weeks, the Mullah and Wakil organized the villagers to build an ablution house next to the creek by the *mazjet* so that male villagers would not be embarrassed to perform ablution when female villagers might walk by and see them. Villagers donated the land, materials and labor to build the ablution house.⁶⁴⁰

⁶³⁸ 140911-Family 1-R3

⁶³⁹ 140723 Afghan Taliban Actions R3

⁶⁴⁰ 140704 Mazjet Friday R3 and 140911 Family 5 R3

The Taliban's threats, patrols and assaults accelerated greatly throughout July and August, during the wheat harvest and Ramadan, which overlapped during 2014. A Pakistani Taliban suicide bomber attacked the Kapisa Mountain District Government Center. The attacker killed himself and one ANP, severely injured a second. On the first morning of Ramadan, Afghan Taliban came to morning prayers to tell the assembled men they must pray five times a day at the village *mazjet* during Ramadan. The Taliban remained for only half an hour (to ensure police would not have time to arrive even if someone called them) and departed back up the mountain.⁶⁴¹

Undaunted, the Mullah gave a sermon describing Ramadan. He told the people Ramadan is the holy month of Allah and he will accept those who fast during Ramadan into Paradise on Doomsday and will not accept those who do not fast. He said that Ramadan is a time of repentance for all Muslims and a time to be hungry so they can think about the hunger of the poor. They must all give wheat to the poor during Ramadan. The Mullah also said that fasting purifies the body, is good for Muslims and ensures they are prepared to meet Allah on Doomsday. He told the people Ramadan is the month during which Allah sent the Koran to the people to guide them in their lives. The Mullah told the people Allah will punish any violation of the rules of Allah during Ramadan very harshly.⁶⁴²

The next morning, before dawn, Elder 1 broke the Taliban's rules by going outside before dawn because his wife needed water from the creek to make the pre-dawn meal. Pakistani Taliban patrols had been increasing in frequency in the Kapisa Mountain Village at night and one of them spotted Elder 1, arrested him and took him up the mountain. When

⁶⁴¹ 140628 Mazjet Friday-R3

⁶⁴² 140628 Mazjet Friday R3

he found out Elder 1 had gone missing, the Wakil called the Afghan Taliban Commander and asked him, "What should we do? It is very bad that the Pakistani Taliban have taken this elder. They came to my village and kidnapped my elder and he is a good man and he never does anything bad."

The Afghan Taliban Commander called the Pakistani Taliban Commander and told him, "Elder 1 is my best friend. He is old. He is a good man. He goes to *mazjet* 5 times a day to pray. He is an advisor to the Wakil. He is a good man in the village. You have to release him." The Pakistani Taliban Commander told him it was impossible for him to release a man who had gone outside after 10 pm and before dawn. The Afghan Taliban Commander traveled from Dara 1 from Dara 3 at 0300 to visit the Pakistani Taliban Commander to plead with him to release Elder 1. The Afghan Taliban Commander told the Pakistani Taliban Commander, "What you did is bad. You have to call me before you go into these villages. My soldiers should be with your soldiers." The Pakistani Taliban Commander responded that it was Elder 1 who was walking around at night when there is a Taliban rule that he should not do so. Elder 1 told the two commanders, "I was just taking water to my home at night because it is Ramadan and we must eat before dawn."

The Pakistani Taliban Commander told the Afghan Taliban Commander, "You have to promise and guarantee this elder's behavior. What is he to you?" The Afghan Taliban Commander replied, "He is my best friend. I promise he will never walk outside at night again. He had to go out to get water that night because of Ramadan." The Pakistani Taliban Commander released Elder 1 and the Afghan Taliban Commander took him to the Wakil, who was waiting for them at the Afghan Taliban's mountain headquarters.⁶⁴³

⁶⁴³ 140723 Afghan Taliban Actions R3

The Ramadan fast was very hard for the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village during 2014 because it fell during the hot month of July, which was also the very busy farming month of the wheat harvest. The days, and therefore the fast, were long and full of manual labor in the heat without food or water. The long workdays were punctuated by prayers in the village *mazjet*. Villagers slept little because they could not eat until sunset and had to eat again before dawn during the longest days of the year. Also, they had to attend night prayers and recite the Koran in the *mazjet*.

One day, Pakistani Taliban on patrol saw someone taking a break to smoke in the fields, breaking the Ramadan fast, and left a night letter at the *mazjet* saying what they had seen and threatening to behead anyone whom they saw breaking the fast. The Wakil told the people what the Pakistani Taliban had said. The villagers sent a letter back to the Taliban, through the Afghan Taliban Commander, saying they wanted him to know that if Taliban came to the Kapisa Mountain Village and broke the fast, the villagers would stone them because Allah said they should. In response, the Afghan Taliban Commander sent a note to the Wakil saying he would be happy if the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village punished any Taliban, Afghan or Pakistani, who broke the fast in their village because Allah said we should do this.⁶⁴⁴

Several nights later, the Pakistani Taliban conducted a patrol and discovered an itinerant harvest worker from Uruzgan whom Elder 1 had hired to sleep in his field to protect the un-harvested wheat. The Taliban fighters began beating the man with a mule whip for breaking their rule by being outside after 10 pm. The Wakil and Elder 1 heard the man screaming and put themselves in harm's way by approaching the Taliban fighters, who

⁶⁴⁴ 140723 Afghan Taliban Actions R3

threatened to kill them and the harvest worker. The Wakil and elder convinced the fighters to release the man.

The next morning, the Wakil told the people what had happened. The people were very concerned because they needed to guard their unharvested wheat, but feared being killed by the Taliban and asked the Wakil to solve the problem. The Wakil, Mullah and elders sat in the *mazjet* after morning prayers discussing how to protect the villagers' ripe, un-harvested wheat from thieves given the fact the Pakistani Taliban would kill anyone who slept in the fields.⁶⁴⁵

Father of Family 4 interrupted the Wakil's discussion about the Taliban and the wheat harvest to point out the curtains for the *mazjet* needed to be replaced because it is the job of all of the villagers to care for the house of Allah. Father of Family 4 was more focused on the problem of the relationship of the village to Allah and his own hopes of getting into Paradise on Doomsday than on solving the immediate issue with the Taliban. Frustrated, Elder 1 said, "Be quiet. Do you want to buy the curtains or not? I do not like it when people speak out of turn."⁶⁴⁶

Having lost confidence that the ANP would conduct night patrols, the Wakil approached the Afghan Taliban Commander to ask him to ask the Pakistani Taliban to allow the villagers to sleep in the fields until harvest time so they could protect their crops. The Afghan Taliban Commander said he could not stop the Pakistani Taliban from punishing people for sleeping in the fields and that villagers should stay inside after 10 p.m. and not come out until dawn.

⁶⁴⁵ 140723 Afghan Taliban Actions R3

⁶⁴⁶ 140911 Family 4 R3

When the Afghan Taliban Commander would not help him, the Wakil went to the District Government Center and asked the District ANP Commander to conduct night patrols to deter Pakistani Taliban attacks on farmers sleeping in the fields. He told the ANP Commander, “The Pakistani Taliban come here and they want to enforce their rules in my village and you want to enforce your rules in my village. We are caught between two things.”

The Kapisa Mountain District ANP Commander told the Wakil, “We cannot come there because it is dangerous and the Taliban attack the soldiers and police. We cannot promise to be there every night because there are too many villages. The government has not sent enough guns and soldiers for us to be able to protect all of the villages.” The Wakil said, “I do not know what to do. I have to live in this situation. When I call you, please come.” The Wakil returned to the village *mazjet* and told the villagers what had happened and asked them not to go outside at night.⁶⁴⁷

Within a week, the Father of Family 4 had gone to Kabul and returned with the new blue and green curtains for the *mazjet*. He said, “I am happy and lucky. I can be at the service of Allah, who gave me a good body, sons, a good wife and daughters. I am so happy with Allah. It is my job to buy something for him. Everyone in this world is in Allah's test.”⁶⁴⁸

The Wife of Son of Family 2 fell very ill and needed to go to the clinic, but Son of Family 2 was not in the village. He called Son 1 of Family 15 and asked him to take his wife to the clinic. Son 1 of Family 15 did so and he stayed at the clinic when the Wife of Son of

⁶⁴⁷ 140723 Afghan Taliban Actions R3

⁶⁴⁸ 140911 Family 4 R3

Family 2 needed to be kept overnight in the clinic. In the morning, he brought her home to Family 2's house and they thanked him. Villagers became concerned about the Taliban refusing to allow people to take their sick to the clinic at night and maybe even harming the people who tried to do so. They asked the Wakil to try to solve the problem. The Wakil called the Afghan Taliban Commander and asked him to intervene with the Pakistani Taliban to allow the villagers to go to the clinic with their sick in the middle of the night. But, the Pakistani Taliban Commander refused. The Afghan Taliban Commander told the Kapisa Mountain Village Wakil that he was sorry he was unable to convince the Afghan Taliban Commander to allow villagers to go to the clinic at night. He told the Wakil there had been a change in his relationship with the Pakistani Taliban Commander because the Pakistani Taliban had a lot of money and many new fighters from Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban Commander told the Wakil that the Pakistani Taliban Commander now listened less to what the Afghan Taliban Commander had to say because the Pakistani Taliban were now paying the Afghan Taliban's salaries. The Wakil then approached the ANP Commander to ask for his assistance in clearing the road of Taliban when someone who was critically ill needed to be taken to the clinic at night. The ANP Commander apologized to the Wakil and told him he could not help him. The Wakil then approached the ALP Commander and asked for his assistance in the matter and he also apologized for not being able to help.

Despite the Pakistani Taliban's threat to behead anyone they saw smoking in the fields and the distinct possibility that they could be on patrol nearby and see him, Son 2 of Son of Family 2 smoked a cigarette while taking a break from harvesting his family's wheat. Son 2 of Son of Family 2 was exhausted from not sleeping enough, fasting, the heat and his labors and felt he needed the energy from a cigarette to complete his tasks. Neither the

Taliban nor the Wakil realized he had broken the Ramadan fast by smoking.⁶⁴⁹

On the next Friday morning, Son 1 of Son 2 of Family 3 tried to steal a hen from Family 1 in order to sell it and buy himself a cell phone. Son of Family 1 saw the young man trying to steal his hen and stopped him. He took the boy to his father and explained what the boy had done. Son 2 of Family 3 was very angry and he beat his son in front of Son of Family 1 until Son of Family 1 asked him to stop. Son 2 of Family 3 apologized to Son of Family 1 and demanded his son do so. The two men, who are both government workers, agreed they would not tell the Wakil about this incident as long as Son 1 of Son 2 of Family 3 never stole anything again. Son 1 of Son 2 of Family 3 broke the Wakil, government and Taliban's rules by stealing the hen. Son 2 of Family 3 and Son of Family 1 broke he Wakil's rules by not informing him of the violation.⁶⁵⁰ This incident demonstrated the continuing erosion of the Wakil's control over the behavior of villagers.

The villagers began to prepare for the wheat harvest. During the harvest, Wife of Son of Family 2 used propane to iron her family's clothes in their home. When she was done, she left the house to join the rest of her family working in Family 2's Field. She forgot to turn off the propane before leaving and while she was gone, the house burst into flames. Son 2 of Family 3 saw Family 2's house was on fire while walking home from his field. He kicked in the door to try to put out the fire and discover if there was anyone trapped inside. The fire was too hot for him to enter, so he called the Wakil, who called the ANP Commander. The ANP Fire Unit arrived quickly with its water truck and put out the fire. Son of Family 2 and the Wakil thanked the ANP Fire Unit for coming to help. If they had not come, the entire house and the barn with their produce would have been destroyed.⁶⁵¹

⁶⁴⁹ 141201 Family 2 Control Measures R3

⁶⁵⁰ 141201 Family 3 Control Measures R3

⁶⁵¹ 140911 Family 2 R3

After the wheat was harvested, the Wakil organized the village to bring a thresher to the village. The villagers agreed they would pay the thresher, who was a Pashtun from Dara 1, one bag of every ten bags he threshed. Villagers brought their wheat to the side of the road and the thresher began working through their wheat one by one. While he was threshing Family 2's wheat, the machine jammed and damaged some of Family 2's wheat. Son of Family 2 became very angry and refused to pay the thresher his share. The Wakil told Son of Family 2 his wheat would be fine if he simply washed it off and that he had to pay the thresher his due. After some grumbling, Son of Family 2 complied.⁶⁵²

After allowing his wheat to dry on the roof for several days on his roof, Elder 1 needed to carry it to the mill to grind it into flour in a nearby village. But, Elder 1 is old and he has a back problem. He asked Father of Family 7 to help him carry the wheat there and Father of Family 7 helped him. Father of Family 7 fulfilled the rights of his neighbors, obeying Allah's rules and the Wakil's rules.⁶⁵³

Someone in the Kapisa Mountain Village became suspicious that the Mullah might be a Pakistani Taliban spy because he graduated from a religious university in Peshawar. Taking advantage of the rift between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, this person reported the situation to the Afghan Taliban. One night in mid-July 2014, the Afghan Taliban Commander ordered two of his fighters to go to the Kapisa Mountain Village in the middle of the night to interrogate the Mullah. The fighters knocked on the door of the *mazjet*, but the Mullah was frightened and did not open it, so they broke down the door and grabbed the Mullah and slapped him, yelling, "You are a Mullah and are you a spy of Pakistan? You

⁶⁵² Ibid

⁶⁵³ 140911 Family 7 R3

are a teacher of Islam. What are you doing spying for Pakistan?" The Mullah said, "I am a guide of Islam for the people. Spying is a bad action in Islam. I am not a spy." The Taliban said, "We will kill you if the Wakil does not come here."

The Mullah called the Wakil and he came to the *mazjet*. The Taliban fighters demanded to know if he had brought a Pakistani spy to the village to serve as Mullah. The Wakil said, "He is a good man and he is a teacher of Islam." The Taliban fighter said, "He is a spy." The Wakil asked the Taliban fighter, "Do you understand this Mullah better than me? He is not a spy. These people who told you this Mullah is a spy for the Pakistani Taliban lied to you. In particular, he is not from the Pakistani Taliban. I know he graduated from a religious university in Peshawar, but he would never do something bad against you or the government."

The Taliban told the Wakil he must promise them that this Mullah will never spy for the Pakistani Taliban. The Afghan Taliban fighter told the Mullah, "You have to recite the Koran and then swear that you will never spy for the Pakistani Taliban." The Mullah did as he had been instructed.

The Mullah told the Afghan Taliban, "If anyone calls you to tell you I did something for the Pakistani Taliban, you should bring the person to me so they can say that in front of me. If what they say is true and I did something bad, you can kill me. But you must bring them here to me and the Wakil and so they can say that I did something wrong in front of the two of us." The Afghan Taliban fighters agreed to this. The Mullah said, "I will kill you if you do not do this and I know I will kill you or me." The Taliban fighter replied, "You will never kill me, but you can kill yourself." The Wakil told the Taliban fighters to apologize to

the Mullah. They did so and they said they had heard something wrong about the Mullah. The two Taliban fighters were Pashtuns from Dara 1.

The next day, after prayers, the Mullah told the people what had happened. He said, “Someone lied to the Afghan Taliban commander and two Afghan Taliban fighters beat me and I called the Wakil and he came and rescued me. I promised with Taliban I would never do something bad, which I have never done. It is not my job. It does not belong to me. I am not a spy.”⁶⁵⁴

Because of the Wakil’s effective outreach to him, the ALP Commander agreed to conduct occasional night patrols through the Kapisa Mountain Village. On one such evening, the Wakil invited the ALP Commander and seven of his men to dine with him before their patrol. The ALP accepted the hospitality and then began their patrol. But, while they were patrolling, the eight ALP, in an episode of indiscipline, stopped to relax and eat raspberries off the trees in the village. A Pakistani Taliban patrol happened upon them and ambushed the relaxing ALP, killing two of them. The ALP Commander called in support from the ANP Commander, who came swiftly to the rescue of his colleague. The two groups of police then pursued the Pakistani Taliban, firing up the mountain at them, in order to repair the honor of the ALP and its commander. In so doing, these two *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*, the ALP Commander and the ANP Commander, made the Kapisa Mountain Village into a target for the Pakistani Taliban and then went home. Son 1 of Family 12, who is an ANP in Kabul and whose brother is an ANP in Herat, told the ANP Commander and ALP Commander, “You have made a big problem for us.” And, he was correct. Several nights later, the Pakistani Taliban fired down the mountain at the Wakil’s house for a full hour. The Wakil called the

⁶⁵⁴ 140723 Afghan Taliban Actions R3

ANP Commander and he came to the Village and chased the Pakistani Taliban back up the mountain and patrolled the village with his ANP until morning. The Wakil of the Kapisa Mountain Village was luckier than his counterpart, the Wakil of the Parachi Village at the End of Dara 3, who was abducted the next night by the Chichini Taliban, who tortured him and held him captive for weeks. The Pakistani Taliban patrolled the Kapisa Mountain Village that night, demonstrating to the villagers that they could move freely and that the ANP would not always be there to help them.⁶⁵⁵

The next morning was Eid, the great celebration at the end of Ramadan and a respite for the besieged Kapisa Mountain Village. The villagers awoke and went to the *mazjet* to recite the Koran. Son 2 of Family 3 and Father of Family 5 slaughtered Family 3's cow and Son 2 of Family 3 gave each family a kilogram of meat for Eid. The villagers visited one another's homes and feasted together, celebrating Islam and village unity.⁶⁵⁶ Son of Family 2 had terrible stomach pain and Father of Family 11 took him to the clinic. The young men celebrated Eid together, naughtily playing eggs at the Village Shop and getting in fights. Each family gave the Mullah 5 sir (11 kilograms) of wheat as part of his salary, although Son 2 of Family 3 tried to argue that he should only give him half because of a small harvest. The Wakil and everyone else were very annoyed at Son 2 of Family 3. The Wakil congratulated the people, told them to celebrate Islam and unity. He asked the people whether anyone had a problem that he needed help from his neighbors to solve and Son of Family 2 said he needed help fixing his television antenna because he was worried about knowing what might be happening in Afghanistan, with the fighting between *Jamat e Islami* and Ashraf Ghani for the presidency in the undecided election. Father of Family 7 offered to help and repaired the antenna. The Mullah gave a sermon saying people should not join

⁶⁵⁵ 140717 ALP Actions R3

⁶⁵⁶ 140911 Family 3 R3

political parties because there are none in the Koran. He was referring both to *Jamat e Islami*, and the government, and to the Taliban. The ANP Commander came to the *mazjet* and congratulated the villagers on Eid. He promised to provide them with security and arrest the Taliban, but said that he could only do so if the villagers gave him information about their presence in the village.

The next day, several villagers were sitting in the yard of the *mazjet* talking and discussed how shameful it was that Son 2 of Family 3 tried to not pay the Mullah his due. Father of Family 4 reinforced the Wakil's authority and expressed his dislike for the Pakistani Taliban, saying,

“If a person wants to break the rules of the village, the people must not allow him to do that. Otherwise, people will do lots of unlawful things. They will think, he broke that rule. Now, I will break this rule. Then, the Wakil will not have control over people. Everyone will have his own rules. If only 1 or 2 people break rules, Wakil can handle that. If everyone broke rules at once, Wakil couldn't sanction all of them at once. Wakil is a good, intelligent man who knows how to control and talk to the people. It is difficult. He is very patient with villagers with different ideas. He works for all their ideas, for everything. Everyone is happy with him. Taliban makes big problems here. We are between the government and the Taliban. Wakil plays with his life. Maybe one day the Pakistani Taliban will arrest him. Maybe he will be tortured or killed. Afghan Taliban understand this Wakil. He is a just a Wakil. He is a representative of the people. Maybe the Pakistani Taliban think he is a government spy and will try to arrest and kill him. We should pray for this Wakil.”⁶⁵⁷

Father of Family 4's comments were prescient since the village's respite from the Taliban onslaught lasted but one day. The following day, the Afghan Taliban Commander called the Wakil and told him that villagers could no longer work for the government, and that, within the month, the Taliban would begin enforcing all of its rules in the Kapisa

⁶⁵⁷ 140911 Family 3 R3

Mountain Village. Afghan and Pakistani Taliban patrols through the village accelerated apace, occurring nightly.

Father of Family 9, who is a Parachi Mullah from the Village at the End of Dara 3 residing in the home of the owner of Family 9 House while he is Kabul as a judge, accepted 350,000 Afs as a brideprice for his oldest daughter. The family of the groom held a wedding party in the Parachi village and she moved in with his family there. She cannot leave the yard of their house for a year and will not see her natal family for a year. Several weeks later, the Father of Family 9 paid 350,000 Afs to the father of a bride for his eldest son. Son 1 of Family 9 had been living on the family farm in the Parachi Village at the End of Dara 3, rebuilding it and tending the fields there. The farm had been destroyed, along with that of Family 8, who are also temporary residents of the Kapisa Mountain Village, by the Taliban during their rule because Father of Family 8 was a *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* commander in the Kapisa Mountain District.⁶⁵⁸

Son 1 of Family 15 went to the woods near the village, where a group of young men go to play cards and gamble. He lost \$8,000 and had to use the bride price his youngest brother had spent three years earning doing construction work in Iran to repay his gambling debt. His brother, who had returned only a month earlier and was looking forward to getting married, left to return to Iran to start all over, earning a bride price. Son 1 of Family 15 broke the Wakil's rules several times in ways that would have caused Family 15 to be thrown out of the Kapisa Mountain Village, but for the fact that he is an ALP and the Wakil needs as much of the ALP Commander's help as he can get to defend the village against the Pakistani Taliban.

⁶⁵⁸ 140911 Family 8 R3 and 140911 Family 9 R3

Father of Family 7, a traditional farmer with extra money from his son's work in Dubai, continued to smoke opium in the woods, as was his habit, with some of the men from neighboring villages.⁶⁵⁹ Son of Family 1, who is a Dari teacher at the girls' high school and a traditional farmer, smoked hashish in the woods with some men from other villages.⁶⁶⁰

Elder 2 paid 400,000 Afs as a bride price for a bride from Kabul for his eldest son, who is in the ANP and lives in Kabul. Elder 2 also paid 700,000 Afs for a wedding at one of the glitzy wedding halls in Kabul.⁶⁶¹

The Afghan Taliban, demonstrating coordination with other nearby Taliban units, sought to respond to an increase in checkpoints and patrols in Area S by assassinating the NDS Commander of that district, who lives in the Kapisa Mountain District in a village before the daras. The Afghan Taliban paid a singer and dancing boy who was a friend and performer for the NDS Commander \$100,000 to assassinate him. The dancing boy attempted to assassinate the commander, but failed. He joined the Afghan Taliban because he could never go home again.⁶⁶²

Father of Family 4 bought a flour mill to earn his family extra, *halal*, money and provide a service to fellow villagers so they do not have to walk half an hour carrying wheat and flour to a mill.⁶⁶³

Family 6's cow wandered off and ate many of the vegetables in Family 7's garden. Mother of Family 7 was very angry and Mother of Family 6 argued. Mother of Family 6

⁶⁵⁹ 141210 Family 7 Control Measures R3

⁶⁶⁰ 141210 Family 1 Control Measures R3

⁶⁶¹ 140723 Elder 2 R3

⁶⁶² 140828 What Happened to Me R3

⁶⁶³ 141210 Family 4 Control Measures R3

offered to give Mother of Family 7 whatever vegetables she needed, but Mother of Family 7 refused and told her she had to control her cow.⁶⁶⁴

Son 2 of Son of Family 2 went to the river by the Kapisa Mountain Village to swim and relax with his friends from high school. The young men were playing cards and gambling by the river when the Wakil approached them. When the Wakil asked what they were doing, Son 2 of Family 2 lied to his Wakil, telling him they were playing cards, but not for money. The Wakil told the young man to be careful not to do this because people who saw him, including the Taliban, might think he was gambling and that would be very dangerous for him.⁶⁶⁵

The Mullah talked to the Wakil and elders about the problem of trash and reeds in the creeks in the village. The Mullah told them the water needed to be clean so that people could perform ablution that would be acceptable to Allah and so that they could have water that was safe and healthy to drink. The Wakil and Mullah organized the villagers to clean the reeds and trash out of the creeks and they spent five days doing so. In the end, the creeks were very clean and the people were happy with the Mullah and the Wakil. The Wakil went up the creeks into Dara 2 to talk to their Wakils about cleaning their creeks. The other Wakils cooperated and the quality of the water in the whole valley improved.⁶⁶⁶

Continuing his streak of disobedience, Son 2 of Family 2 waited outside the girls' high school and harassed the girls there, trying to give them his cell phone number and telling them they were beautiful. The girls covered their faces and tried to get away and he

⁶⁶⁴ 141210 Family 6 Control Measures R3

⁶⁶⁵ 141210 Family 2 Control Measures R3

⁶⁶⁶ 140826 Mullah Action 5 R3

tried to grab their arms. An ALP saw him doing this and arrested him. The young villager called R3 and asked him to come and help him. R3 went to the girls' high school and found that the ALP who had arrested Son 2 of Family 2 was a friend of R3's from high school. R3 told the thirty year old man he should release Son 2 of Family 2 on the proviso that he would never, ever do this again. R3 pleaded with his friend to remember what it was like for him when he was a young, unmarried man, how he had wanted to do this. R3 told his friend the ALP he should show mercy and that R3 would ensure Son 2 of Family 2 never did this again. The ALP released Son 2 of Family 2 to R3 and told him if he ever saw him do this again, he would arrest Son 2 of Family 2 and take him to jail.⁶⁶⁷

Several days later, the wives of Elder 1, Elder 2, the Wakil, Son of Family 1, Father of Family 7, Father of Family 8 and two other women from the village wanted to visit the shrine. The shrine is about 10 minutes away by taxi and it is the grave of a saint. Women cannot go to the *mazjet* to worship and some of them like to go to the shrine to pray and ask Allah to help them. The women are violating the Taliban's rules by going to pray at the grave of a saint and by leaving their homes without a male relative, and in some cases without a *burkha*. When the women were walking to the road to get a taxi, they saw Elder 1 and they asked him to get them a taxi. Elder 1 claimed he felt sick and asked Son 2 of Family 3, who happened to be walking by to do so and to take the women to the shrine and bring them back safely. Son 2 of Family 3 complied. The Mullah told the people in the *mazjet* that the women should not go to the shrine to pray because they do not know how to pray or behave in the shrine and it could be bad for them. But, he and the elders and Wakil thanked Son 2 of Family 3 for protecting the women by taking them to the shrine.⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁶⁷ 141210 Family 2 Control Measures R3

⁶⁶⁸ 140911 Family 3 Actions R3

On the 24th of August, a high level leader of the Pakistani Taliban arrived in the Kapisa Mountain District to preside over a meeting between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban to build a plan to take over the district. He brought fighters, money and equipment with him and used them to unify the two groups to begin a more concerted, well-resourced effort to take over the Kapisa Mountain District, first covertly, then overtly. They agreed to kill members of the ANSF (although the Afghan Taliban only wanted to kill ones operating in the district, as opposed to those home on leave); to plant improvised explosive devices; and attack ALP, ANP and ANA checkpoints. They developed plans to overtly take over at least Dara 1.⁶⁶⁹

Taliban night patrols in the Kapisa Mountain Village increased, occurring multiple times each night. Pakistani Taliban saw R3 outside at night and shot him in the thigh. He went to the clinic where he received a blood transfusion and pain medication. But, the clinic personnel failed to remove the shrapnel or provide antibiotics to R3. Within a week, R3's leg became seriously infected and he had to be treated by doctors in Kabul, proving that while there is a government clinic in the Kapisa Mountain District, it lacks personnel with the skills to provide basic health care.⁶⁷⁰

Several days after the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban meeting, R3 and five other passengers were stopped by the Pakistani Taliban at dusk in the desert between the the Kapisa Mountain District Capital and the Daras. The four Taliban fighters, who had mounted a 50 caliber machine gun on their vehicle, lined the men up on the bank of the river that flows out of the creeks of the mountain valleys and into the desert, and beat them with mule whips. They demanded to know whether the men worked for the government.

⁶⁶⁹ 140824 What Happened to Me R3

⁶⁷⁰ 140826 What Happened to Me R3

Because he was a young man, R3 came under special scrutiny. He told the Taliban he was an unemployed farmer, that he had finished high school, but could find no other job. The Taliban walked behind the taxi passengers, wielding their AK 47s and a rocket propelled grenade launcher, ominously mimicking ISIL behavior in Iraq and Syria, where militants shot whole lines of prisoners in the back and pushed them into rivers only that same week. Eventually, the Taliban released the passengers and allowed their taxi to leave. They admonished the passengers not to tell the police that the Taliban had stopped them, threatening to kill them if they did.⁶⁷¹

The passengers disobeyed the Taliban, stopping at the ANP Checkpoint ten minutes by car from the Pakistani Taliban checkpoint. The passengers were very angry with the ANP, who were fully aware that this checkpoint was there every evening at dusk. The driver and passengers got out of the car and R3 told the ANP who was on watch that the Pakistani Taliban had stopped them and beaten them and had been looking for people who worked for the government so they could kill them. The taxi driver yelled at the ANP, asking why they did not patrol the desert. He said, "You have to patrol. You have to provide security." The ANP who was on watch told the driver and passengers, "How can I know if the Taliban comes here? Only Allah can know where the Taliban will be. I cannot know where they are going to be." The driver, who was very angry, told the ANP to go arrest the Taliban. But, the ANP told him the Taliban would already be gone because they would realize the taxi would tell the ANP they were there. As the occupants of the taxi shouted at their colleague, the remaining 9 ANP in the checkpoint could be seen inside, eating dinner. They did not stop to find out what had happened or talk about what to do about it.

⁶⁷¹ 140826 What Happened to Me R3

As they drove away from the checkpoint toward the Kapisa Mountain Village at the mouth of Dara 2, the passengers complained that there was no government. They said the police just took their jobs to make money for themselves; and they did not think this money is to provide security for Afghans. The passengers said the police think it is okay that the Taliban want to kill us and injure us. They have 30 bullets in their weapons and they say that is not enough to fight the Taliban, but if they shot only two bullets, the Taliban would run away. Everyone in the Kapisa Mountain District knows the police at the checkpoint have a kind of tacit deal with the Taliban. The ANP do not patrol and the Taliban do not mass to attack the ANP checkpoint where they live. By August of 2014, R3 estimates there were 1,600 Taliban in the Kapisa Mountain District, most of whom were Pakistani, and therefore had no qualms about killing Afghans. If only 30 or 40 of these Pakistani Taliban coordinated, they could attack the ANP checkpoint in the desert and kill all the ANP who lived there. Some people think may the Taliban also pays the ANP not to patrol or engage them.⁶⁷²

Several days later, the NDS Double Agent from the Kapisa Mountain Village was arrested by the Pakistani Taliban at the same checkpoint in the desert between the ANA *kandak* base and the ANP checkpoint. The Pakistani Taliban found his government identification and beat him and took him up the mountain to a *sharia* court. He was released because his friend the Pakistani Taliban Liaison to the Afghan Taliban explained to the court that the Double Agent really worked for them. While the Double Agent survived, the Pakistani Taliban murdered a former translator for the US military, who had worked in

⁶⁷² 140826 What Happened To Me R3

Kandahar and had returned to his village at the remote end of Dara 2, along with his entire family, including his parents, brothers, sisters and wife.⁶⁷³

During September of 2014, five of the 16 randomly selected families in the village fled the chaos in the Kapisa Mountain Village for Kabul or the Parachi Village at the End of Dara 3.⁶⁷⁴ The families who left the village were those whose members were concerned the Taliban would attack and kill them who had enough money to leave. They included Family 7, in which Father of Family 7 had an opium smoking habit;⁶⁷⁵ Family 8, in which the father was a Parachi *mujihadeen* commander for *Jamat e Islami*;⁶⁷⁶ Family 9 are also Parachi and the father is the closest friend of the Father of Family 8;⁶⁷⁷ Family 14, in which three of the four sons are ANA officers.⁶⁷⁸ Family 16 also moved to Kabul, even though the father is just a traditional farmer, likely because his two sons are making money in construction in Iran and they can leave. When the sons return, they can make more money in the construction boom in Kabul than they could on the family farm.⁶⁷⁹

The Wakil was very concerned that the Taliban might take the empty houses over and use them as bases from which they could patrol the Kapisa Mountain Village to control the behavior of its residents. So, he proposed to the villagers that they replace the families who had departed with five families from Area G. Area G is a part of the district high up on a mountain which is famous for its blood feuds and its experienced and capable fighters. In Area G, no man, woman or child leaves the house without an AK 47 and a bandelero. People do not go to the *mazjet* to pray for fear of being shot. There is no school. People seldom

⁶⁷³ 140926 What Happened To Me R3

⁶⁷⁴ 140831 What Happened to Me R3

⁶⁷⁵ 140911 Family 7 R3 and 141210 Family 7 Control Measures R3

⁶⁷⁶ 140911 Family 8 R3

⁶⁷⁷ 140911 Family 9 R3

⁶⁷⁸ 140911 Family 14 R3

⁶⁷⁹ 140911 Family 16 R3

leave their homes at all and life is brutal and dangerous. Given the conditions in Area G, these five families were eager to leave and very experienced fighters. The Wakil hoped that these new families would fill the empty homes in the Kapisa Mountain Village and bolster the village's ability to defend itself from potential future Pakistani Taliban onslaughts. The new residents were poorer, less educated and less connected to the outside world than the people whom they replaced. As former residents of Area G, they value honor, which is the currency they spent their lives in Area G fighting for. The warlike nature of the new residents would be a double edged sword since they could cause havoc in the village. The Wakil makes this clear and leaves the decision to the villagers. When the families from Area G arrive, they speak to the villagers in the *mazjet*, stressing that they want to live in peace and according to the rules of the village because they are so happy not to have to live in Area G anymore. The villagers accept the new residents. They do so in front of the ANP Commander, who admonishes the new residents that they must follow the rules of the village. The new residents sign, or at least make their marks upon, contracts detailing the village rules they will obey and the fact that they will be thrown out of the village if they violate those rules. The ANP Commander attended so the new villagers will be aware that the ANP will assist the Wakil in removing the families from Area G if they violate the agreement.⁶⁸⁰

Residents of the Parachi Village at the End of Dara 3 also took their security into their own hands at the beginning of September 2014. The Parachi Village Wakil is an old and famous *mujihadeen* commander from the wars against the Soviets, communists and Taliban. He was abducted during Ramadan by the Chichini Taliban who had taken up residence on the mountain above his village. The Chichini Taliban beat him severely and

⁶⁸⁰ 140828 What Happened to Me R3 and 140831 What Happened to Me R3

told him that they would begin enforcing their rules in the Parachi Village. They left his body in front of his house. When the Wakil returned from an extended stay in the hospital, he found that the Chichini Taliban had also prevented two villagers from taking a third villager with an appendicitis to the clinic, allowing the man to die by the side of the road. The Wakil called the villagers to a meeting where they discussed the problem and they decided it was either the Taliban or them and that they would assault the Taliban on the mountain. The Parachi Wakil met with the ANP Commander and informed him that the villagers were going to assault the Chichini Taliban fort on the mountain above their village. He said he would appreciate some assistance, either in the form of additional ammunition or in the form of ANP to assistance during the assault. The next morning, 500 Parachi Villagers stormed up the mountain, followed by 25 ANP and 20 ALP. They attacked the Chichini Taliban and drove them out, killing two of them. The remaining Chichini Taliban fled over the top of the mountain. Two villagers were killed in the assault. The Wakil asked for ammunition so his villagers could maintain security in the village and on the mountain behind it and the ANP Commander agreed.⁶⁸¹

The Kapisa Mountain District ANP Commander, who is a *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen*, called a meeting in the district *mazjet*, which is part of the government *madrassa* at the *bazaar* in the District Capital in order to discuss the problems the people of the Kapisa Mountain District would like the government, which was about to be selected, based on the long contested election results. The ANP Commander, not the District Governor, appeared on behalf of the Kapisa Mountain District *Wolesi Jirga* Representative who was the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* commander who drove the Taliban out of the district with the backing of American Special Forces and aerial bombing in 2001. The ANP Commander was asking for

⁶⁸¹ 140905 What Happened to Me R3

this information on behalf of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who was one of the candidates for the disputed presidency of Afghanistan, and leader of *Jamat e Islami*. The Wakils, elders and Mullahs from every village in the district asked their villagers about the problems they would like the government to solve. Kapisa Mountain Villagers said they were concerned about the Pakistani Taliban, the lack of health care and roads. They also talked about the corruption of the Karzai government and their hope that Abdullah Abdullah would become President. They expressed their concern that Ashraf Ghani would not serve the people because they believe he is not a real Muslim and that he only came to Afghanistan to take the aid money to make himself rich. They questioned Ghani's commitment to Afghanistan because he was in America, relaxing, while the Soviets and then the Taliban abused its people, while Abdullah was fighting these people at the side of Ahmad Shah Massoud. The Dara 1 Wakil, who is a Pashtun, talked about the dire security situation in Dara 1 and the Pakistani Taliban harassing the population and the people being caught in the fighting between the government security forces and the Pakistani Taliban. Dara 1 Wakil said there is no government in Afghanistan because of the corruption of President Karzai. He said the ANP Commander is a good man who wants to provide security, but Karzai has not given him enough resources to do so. The Wakils of Dara 2 and 3 also talked about the government providing security from the threats from the Pakistani and Chichini Taliban. They also talked about problems with health care, roads, water and other infrastructure. The ANP Commander thanked the Wakils, elders and Mullahs for their input and said he would try to help them.⁶⁸²

As mentioned earlier, Son 1 of the Opium Grower joined the ANA during 2014 and moved to Kabul to participate in officer training. During that time, the young man lived in

⁶⁸² 140906 What Happened to Me R3

barracks in Kabul. Son 1 of Family 3, who had moved to Kabul to work in construction, invited Son 1 of Opium Grower for dinner at Family 3's house in Khair Khana to show hospitality to his neighbor from his home village. During these visits, Son 1 of Opium Grower formed a relationship with Daughter 1 of Son 1 of Family 3, who was a high school student in Kabul at the time. In September 2014, the two young people made a plan to run away and get married. They ran away to the Opium Growers house in the Kapisa Mountain Village and the Opium Grower agreed to allow them to marry. The Opium Grower paid 400,000 Afs to Son 1 of Family 3 in return for his daughter. However, Family 3 was very angry with their daughter and the Family of the Opium Grower for showing that they could not control their daughters. It was a great shame for Family 3.⁶⁸³

Son 2 of Family 3, like many people in the Kapisa Mountain Village, has a kidney ailment and was feeling ill when it was time to harvest the blackberries. So, he asked Son 1 of Family 10 to help him harvest them, which he did. Son 1 of Family 10 fulfilled the rights of his neighbor in so doing, obeying the rules of Allah and the Wakil.⁶⁸⁴

Daughter 1 of Family 10 broke the rules of her high school by bringing a cell phone to school. Girls are not allowed to bring cell phones to school because in the past, girls have used them to communicate with boys, form relationships, run away to get married or just meet them and lose their virginity. The government made a rule that girls cannot bring cell phones into the schools even though this rule goes against the individual freedoms the government advocates. Each girl is searched as she enters the school and the cell phone was found. The Principal of the Girls' High School punched Daughter 1 of Family 10, violating the government human rights laws, and expelled her from the school. Father of

⁶⁸³ 140911 Family 3 R3 and 141210 Family 3 Control Measures R3

⁶⁸⁴ 140911 Family 3 R3

Family 10 went to the school with his daughter to demand an apology and got in a fistfight with the Principal. The Wakil arrived and arranged for Daughter 1 of Family 10 to be re-admitted to the school in return for the Principal not being charged for hitting the girl. Despite the Wakil's solution, Father of Family 10 was still angry that the Principal had damaged the family's honor by hitting his daughter. He went to the ANP station to file charges against the Principal for violating his daughter's rights in an effort to use the government to repair his family's honor. The ANP Commander sent his ANP to arrest Daughter 1 of Family 10 and called the Wakil. He put the girl in jail for two hours and did not accept the charges against the Principal. The ANP Commander backed the Wakil's solution over the impartial application of Afghan law.⁶⁸⁵

The Wakil was in the bazaar, buying food and other supplies for his wife because they were expecting guests, when he received a call from the District Government Center that they needed him. He saw Son 1 of Family 14, who was home on leave from the ANP, and asked him to do him a favor by carrying his groceries back to the village. Son 1 of Family 14 agreed to do so to fulfill the rights of his neighbor and help his Wakil. On the way home, Elder 1 approached Son 1 of Family 14 and assisted him in carrying the groceries the remainder of the way to the village. The Wife of the Wakil thanked them both for their assistance.⁶⁸⁶

The Wakil had reinforced the Kapisa Mountain Village's population just in time, as well over 1,000 Pakistani Taliban massed on the ridge of the mountain between Dara 1 and Dara 2 on less than three weeks after the arrival of the families from Area G, preparing to assault Dara 1. On the night of September 24th, at around midnight, they began firing down

⁶⁸⁵ 140925 What Happened to Me R3

⁶⁸⁶ 140911 Family 14 R3

the mountain into P1 Village, made their way through it and assaulted the ALP Checkpoint in the Parachi Village, killing all eight of the ALP who were there. Simultaneously, they assaulted the ANA checkpoint at the mouth of Dara 1, killing two ANA soldiers and prompting the remaining eight ANA personnel to flee to the ANA base in the desert. On September 26, 2014, the ANA, ANP and ALP counterattacked, driving the Pakistani Taliban back up the mountain between Daras 1 and 2. When they were finished, the ANA returned to their base in the desert and remained there, not patrolling to ensure the Pakistani Taliban remained on the mountain.⁶⁸⁷

The Pakistani Taliban immediately recommenced night patrols and checkpoint operations. On the night of the 26th, the Pakistani Taliban sent text messages to members of the ANSF, whose cell phone numbers they must have been able to collect from the ministries for which they worked, threatening to kill them. This information about the identity and location of members of the ANSF was not from the population where the Taliban was attempting to enforce the rule, and was essential to the ability of the Pakistani Taliban to sanction residents of the Kapisa Mountain Village for breaking the Taliban's rule about not working for the government. That same evening, they killed an ANA soldier home on leave at the checkpoint in the desert.

In an effort to destroy the Pakistani Taliban base, on the night of the 27th of September, ISAF dropped a bomb on the mountain between Dara 1 and Dara 2. The bomb had little effect on Pakistani Taliban patrols or checkpoint operations.

⁶⁸⁷ 140924 What Happened to Me R3 and 140926 What Happened to Me R3

Angered by the increasing attacks on his men and on the Tajik population of his dara, the ALP Commander went to the *mazjet* in P1, the Pashtun Village just over the mountain from the Kapisa Mountain Village in Dara 1. The ALP Commander threatened the Wakil and Mullah there. He told them he knows the villagers of P1 provide sanctuary to the Taliban because when his ALP move through the village, Taliban fighters fire out of the windows of their houses. The Wakil and Mullah told the ALP Commander they are caught between the government and the Taliban and there is nothing they can do to stop either side. The ALP Commander told them that if the Taliban attack the ALP in Dara 1 or they harm the Tajik people of Dara 2, he would come and punish the villagers of P1 Village.⁶⁸⁸

Eid came to the Kapisa Mountain District and the villagers celebrated Islam in unison with their fellow Muslims around the world. Employers gave Eid money to employees. Parents gave it to their children. Everyone bought new clothes and food for their guests. Male villagers prayed together in the *mazjet* and recited the Koran. All of the villagers visited each home in the village and feasted together for three full days. The young men of the village gathered at the Village Shop and played eggs and walnuts. The people rejoiced and thanked Allah for Islam.⁶⁸⁹ There was nearly a fistfight between Son 1 of Family 4 and Son 2 of Family 11 when Son 1 of Family 4, who is a tailor in training, made new Pashtun traditional clothes for his fellow villager that were far too large. It was only a mistake, but it is very shameful for people not to have new clothes on Eid and Son 2 of Family 11 was very angry and yelled at Son 1 of Family 4. Father of Family 4 heard the yelling and went to solve the problem. He promised Son 1 of Family 4 would fix the mistake and that Son 2 of Family 11 would have his clothes in a couple of hours. Son 1 of Family 4 fulfilled the promise and crisis was averted through the honorable intervention of a family

⁶⁸⁸ 141004 What Happened to Me R3

⁶⁸⁹ 140927 What Happened to Me R3

patriarch.⁶⁹⁰ Unity served its ordering purpose for the village.

After the failure of their first effort to overtly takeover of Dara 1, the Pakistani Taliban augmented its efforts to kill ANSF home on leave in the Kapisa Mountain District. They continued to run the checkpoint in the desert. One night, an ANA soldier home on leave was traveling with his wife to visit their relatives. Because of the security situation, he brought his government handgun with him even though he was clad in traditional Tajik clothes. The Taliban discovered the weapon and were about to take him up the mountain to the *sharia* court when the man's wife attacked one of the Taliban. The Taliban shot and killed her and her husband at the checkpoint in the desert.⁶⁹¹ Kapisa Mountain Village residents who were or had been members of the ANA or ANP received text messages from the Pakistani Taliban threatening to kill them. The Double Agent showed R3 a list of 160 people in the Kapisa Mountain District the Pakistani Taliban was trying to find so they could kill them. R3 was on the list, as were the other ANSF personnel from the village, including sons of both elders and the Wakil. They had pictures and villages of origin for each person beside each name on the list, which appeared to be based on a computer database.⁶⁹²

The Taliban planted a remote-detonated improvised explosive device under the bridge on the road into Dara 1 in P1 Village. When the ALP supply truck drove onto the bridge, they detonated the device, blowing up the truck and killing both ALP inside. The

⁶⁹⁰ 141210 Family 4 Control Measures R3

⁶⁹¹ 140926 What Happened to Me R3

⁶⁹² 140926 What Happened to Me R3. The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense maintain databases with information that allows them to identify their personnel, locate them and pay them electronically. Perhaps the Taliban was able to acquire copies of these databases, thereby collecting information on ANSF personnel home addresses, cell phone numbers and photographs.

ALP Commander arrested the Wakil and Mullah of P1 for providing sanctuary to the Taliban.⁶⁹³

Several days later, Son 1 of Family 10 returned home from his job as an ANA NCO at the Kabul International Airport for vacation. Son 1 of Family 10 completed 12th grade in 2011 and joined the ANA because he wanted to make extra money and he liked the idea of being powerful, honorable because he could fight. He worked at the Kabul International Airport and came home nearly every weekend and for weeklong stretches of leave once a month. He made 12,000 Afs per month and had a wife and a baby boy who lived with his parents in the Kapisa Mountain Village. Son 1 of Family 10 joined the ANA in order to make extra money for the family. He believed he would not be at risk from attacks by the Taliban since he worked at the relatively secure Kabul airport and the Kapisa Mountain District was a safe place for ANSF when he joined the ANA. It is unclear how the Pakistani Taliban got the information that Son 1 of Family 10 was home on leave. But, they knew and waited in the dark between the *mazjet* and Family 10 House after night prayers and shot Son 1 of Family 10 while he was walking home.⁶⁹⁴ In so doing, the Taliban not only eliminated a member of the ANSF, they provided an example to people in the ANSF or considering joining the ANSF that if they did so, they could expect to be killed by the Taliban.

Family 10 and Family 5 were very, very saddened by the death of Son 1 of Family 10. He was the son of the Sister of the Father of Family 5 and he had married, two years prior, one of her sister's daughters who had grown up in Dara 5. They had a one year old son and the Wife of Son 1 of Family 10 was abjectly depressed. The people of the village

⁶⁹³ 141009 Explosions R3 District R3

⁶⁹⁴ 141106 Community Narrative R3

attended and assisted with the sadness parties for Son 1 of Family 10, washing his body and wrapping it in a white shroud, praying for him, reciting the Koran and burying him.⁶⁹⁵

The ALP Commander came to the Kapisa Mountain Village to attend the funeral. After prayers at the *mazjet*, he told the assembled villagers,

“I am a representative of the government. I want to talk about these problems. Everyone needs to listen. The government cannot make a plan to kick the Taliban out. Later, maybe the government will have a plan to kick them out. Unfortunately, we know some of the people of this village are spies, but we do not know who they are. They take money from the Taliban to give them information. Also, when some of the people come from their job in the government for a break, how does the Taliban know about these people? How does the Taliban know that they work for the government and will be home at this time? The Taliban came at night on patrol and harassed the people and killed people at night, like Son 1 of Family 10. These spies give reports to the Taliban.”

“We patrol during the day, but some nights, we cannot patrol here because there are not enough soldiers to do this in every village every night. We have a schedule and some nights we do this in this village and some nights in other villages. The villages have to take turns.”

“We understand the Taliban does not have a specific base. If it did, we would attack them and arrest all of them. We therefore need your help. You have to help us when the Taliban enters your village at night. If you see them, you have to call us. Then, we will come to your village and arrest and fight against the Taliban. We understand that this district has 5 Daras and every Dara has 100s of villages. How can we go in one night and patrol all of the villages in the whole Dara in each one? Also, we do not have enough bullets for the fighting that would happen if we patrolled more.”⁶⁹⁶

The Son of Family 1, who is a Dari teacher at the girls’ high school, was angry and said to the ALP Commander,

“You are responsible in this district and this Dara to provide security because you get a salary from the government for that. Unfortunately, you do not provide security in this Dara and especially not in this village. In this district, there are ANA, ALP, ANP, NDS, all of these people, and they cannot provide security in this district.”

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid

The ALP Commander responded to Son of Family 1's admonition that it was the job of the ALP Commander to provide security and that he was not providing it,

"I try to provide security in this Dara, and especially in your village because it is close to the mountain and it is easy for the Taliban to enter this village. You do not understand that every night I never sleep at all. I think about how we can provide security. We do not understand when the Taliban will come at night. If I understood that they would be coming one night, then I would kill all of the Taliban who come in your village. But, when the Taliban comes into this village and some of the people understand and know about them being there, unfortunately, they did not call us. If you do not call us, how can we know? If the Taliban comes in this village, you call us and at that time, if we do not take any actions against the Taliban, then it will be our fault."⁶⁹⁷

In this discussion of the problems with the Taliban, the ALP Commander very clearly describes why it is so hard for a force from outside the village, which does not share the risk and jeopardy of its residents, which does not have information simply from being in the village and which must patrol through many villages where it has little information, has in locating the enemy or preventing him from sanctioning villagers. Although Son of Family 1 does not know it, he is making the argument for village policing by pointing out the failure of the external patrolling force model for countering an insurgent organization. If the Kapisa Mountain Village residents were equipped and organized to provide security through a set of local police who resided in the village, they could secure the village, as long as neighboring villages did the same, ensuring the village would not be the only one to do so.

After the death of his elder brother, Son 2 of Family 10 went the *mazjet* and told his father, the Wakil, Mullah, elders and other men who happened to be there, that he wanted to join the ALP because he wanted to exact revenge on the specific Pakistani Taliban who

⁶⁹⁷ 141205 Community Narrative R3

had killed his brother. Son 2 of Family 10 is a Kori, who studied for many years at the *madrassa* to become one and was studying in the teachers' course in the District Capital so that he could become a teacher of Islam in one of the government schools in the Kapisa Mountain District. His father immediately told him he could not join the ALP because he and the Mother of Family 10 need him to help them. The Mullah told Son 2 of Family 10 it is incumbent on him to care for his parents as they get old. The Wakil told Son 2 of Family 10 he would go talk to the ALP Commander and tell him not to hire Son 2 of Family 10. Then, the Wakil said he understood why Son 2 of Family 10 felt he had to avenge his brother, but that this was not the way to do it. He told him to have patience and wait for the time to take his revenge. Then, the Wakil walked Son 2 of Family 10 back to Family 10 house so Mother of Family 10 could try to convince the young man not to put himself in harm's way. Mother of Family 10 begged her son not to do this and to stay with her and help her. Son 2 of Family 10 finally relented and did not attempt to join the ALP.⁶⁹⁸

The night after the assassination of Son 1 of Family 10, the Pakistani Taliban left a night letter in front of the Wakil's House, saying,

"If someone works in the government, we will beat him and kill him. If someone talks to the government, we will kill him. If someone gives food to the government, we will kill him. That person will be an enemy of the Taliban."⁶⁹⁹

The Wakil called a meeting and told the people about the letter and said,

"To the Pakistani Taliban, all of the people of Afghanistan are enemies. I am never afraid of the Taliban posting night letters and checking the houses in the village. But, I am afraid about the Taliban doing something bad to the women."

"I understand these actions are those of the Pakistani Taliban, not the Afghan Taliban. They would not do something like this. The Pakistani

⁶⁹⁸ 141201 Family 10 Control Measures R3

⁶⁹⁹ 141106 Community Narrative R3

Taliban has spies in this village and the district. When I see a spy, I will kill him with my own hands. I talked to the Afghan Taliban. They said they did not do these things. They said, 'We do not put the papers on people's homes.' The Afghan Taliban will fight the Pakistani Taliban if they see them doing this. The Afghan Taliban Commander told me, 'We do not have authority over the Pakistani Taliban when they come to the village because they pay the salaries of our Afghan Taliban.' Sometimes, in the past, the Pakistani Taliban came to the area, but they did not harass or kill anyone before now. The Pakistani Taliban, not the Afghan Taliban, kill the Afghan people."

"I went to talk to the District ANP Commander about our security problem. The commander told me, 'We will try to come and patrol your village during the day, but not at night, because everyone here understands there are too many Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. The situation is very bad in this area. We do not have enough guns and bullets and cars to stand against the Taliban patrolling at night. We have not found anyway to solve this problem.'"⁷⁰⁰

The people told the Wakil, "The government said this and the Taliban said that, but the government has to provide security and it cannot. So, they should leave this district and let the Taliban arrest all of the villages." Many villagers yelled at the same time, expressing anger and frustration. The Wakil said, "One person should stand and talk at a time. Everyone else should be quiet until he is done."⁷⁰¹

The Father of Family 5 said,

"I had a bad experience during the period of the Taliban. In Area T, the Taliban beat me and broke my hand because I wanted to bring rice and sugar to my house. The Taliban asked me where I was taking these things. I told them, 'It is for my wife and children.' The Taliban said, 'No. You are bringing this to the Massoud people.' I had a bad experience when they beat me and broke my hand. I never want the Taliban here, whether they are Afghan or Pakistani. I hate all of them. I am ready to get a gun and stand against them."⁷⁰²

The Son of Family 2 said,

⁷⁰⁰ 141106 Community Narrative R3

⁷⁰¹ Ibid

⁷⁰² Ibid

“It is easy to get a gun and go attack the Taliban. But, if you get guns and attack the Taliban, the patrols of Taliban will become very frequent in our area. The Taliban will shoot at my house because you shot at them. The government will be angry with us because it does not want everyone to buy a gun. The government will say that without government permission, you bought a gun and made a bad situation in this area. The government would say that you are making the security bad in the district because everyone has a gun and it is no longer clear who is Taliban. It is very difficult. It is better that we wait for the government to provide security.”⁷⁰³

The Son of Family 1 said to the people,

“Oh Brothers, we are poor people without authority. When the government suggests to us that we get guns, we will never get a gun unless the government also gives us a salary. I do not want to make security worse by getting a gun in this area. When I get a gun and the Taliban arrests me, they will behead me. We are farmers. We should occupy ourselves with that. I do not busy myself with politics. It is not the business of farmers.”

Having listened to everyone, the Wakil said to the people,

“I am happy to know your ideas. It is better. We are poor people. We cannot stand against the government or the Taliban. This is my idea, that you have to be careful for yourself. At night, no one can open the door. If someone knocks, you have to understand who that is. If it is your relations, you can open the door. If you see the Taliban, you cannot open the door. Everyone has to close his door after 8 pm. If someone is sick, you have to call me and then I will call the police and they will come to help us. Because of our approach, the Taliban will not come to this area to harass the people because the people will keep their doors closed. If anyone has any ideas about how to make security better, you have to tell me. I will talk to the commander. If no one has any other ideas, I will tell him what you have said. In two or three days, we should all talk to him in a meeting. I understand this area has a very bad situation.”⁷⁰⁴

In this incident, the Wakil addressed the threat from the Pakistani Taliban by reaching out to the ANP, the ALP and the Afghan Taliban Commanders, who all said they could not help him protect the villagers from the Pakistani Taliban. He then asked the people to help him come up with a solution. They proposed, but then decided against, attacking the Taliban patrols that came through the village. The people of the village

⁷⁰³ Ibid

⁷⁰⁴ 141106 Community Narrative R3

decided that it was more dangerous to make themselves a target of the Pakistani Taliban than it was for them to allow the Pakistani Taliban to move through the village attacking particular families. The one hundred households in the Kapisa Mountain Village could not raise and equip enough fighters to defeat the roughly 1,600 Pakistani Taliban ensconced in the mountains of the District if those fighters concentrated their ire on the Kapisa Mountain Village. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that one or more military aged males from three quarters of the families of the village were deployed far away as members of the ANSF in other parts of Afghanistan. In effect, the ANSF had defeated its own ability to defend its members.

The next day, the tractor came to plant the corn and wheat crops for the villagers. The Wakil had arranged for the farmers to pay the Pashtun tractor owner for his equipment and labor and the men worked to complete the tasks. While a group of men from the village were watching the tractor, Son 1 of Family 12 pointed out that it was wonderful that the Karzai Government had brought tractors to the Kapisa Mountain Village, but he wished they could bring security.⁷⁰⁵

After the crops were planted, matters swiftly went from bad to worse in the Kapisa Mountain District, as the Pakistani Taliban seized control of Dara 1 and Dara 2, resulting in the flight of all of the villagers from the Kapisa Mountain Village and their displacement from their homes for over two weeks. On the morning of the Taliban assault on Dara 1, the ALP Commander was walking toward the *mazjet* in the Kapisa Mountain Village to meet with the Wakil, elders and Mullah when the Pakistani Taliban remotely detonated an improvised explosive device they had placed underneath the little bridge on the creek in

⁷⁰⁵ 141104 Community Narrative R3

front of the village *mazjet*. Luckily for the ALP Commander, the bomber detonated the device too soon, destroying the bridge and injuring the ALP Commander, but not killing him.⁷⁰⁶ On the other side of the mountain, at the ALP Checkpoint in Dara 1, that same morning, the Pakistani Taliban remotely detonated an IED they had buried under the wall of checkpoint, killing the Commander of the ALP in Dara 1 and two ALP. Pakistani Taliban fighters poured down the mountain and began another push to overtly occupy Dara 1. The people of the Kapisa Mountain Village, cowering in their homes, heard the fighting going on all day.

At around midnight, the Afghan Taliban Commander called the Wakil to warn him the Taliban would come down the mountain within hours to attack the Kapisa Mountain Village. The Wakil called all of the people to the *mazjet* and organized them to evacuate the village in the middle of the night on foot on that cold mountain night. By the time the Taliban attacked the Kapisa Mountain Village, its residents had fled.⁷⁰⁷

The next morning, the ANA, ANP and ALP counter-attacked, driving the Pakistani Taliban back up the mountain. As they retreated, the Pakistani Taliban remotely detonate an IED on the mountain, killing eight of the ANA soldiers who were pursuing them. The next day, the ANA returned to their base in the desert and the Pakistani Taliban re-occupied the Kapisa Mountain Village, which remained empty of its residents, and Dara 1, which did not. Once again, the ANA attacked the Pakistani Taliban in Dara 1. It took them more than a week to drive the Pakistani Taliban out of Dara 1. Once the ANSF had driven the Pakistani Taliban out of Dara 1, most of the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village returned home. The ALP began patrolling the village at night and so did the Pakistani Taliban, resulting in

⁷⁰⁶ 141024 Explosions R3 District R3 and 141026 Explosions R3 District R3

⁷⁰⁷ 141122 Community Narrative R3

ambushes and counter-ambushes.⁷⁰⁸

After his return to the village, Son of Family 2 removed his daughter from school without explanation, in compliance with Taliban rules and violation of government rules.⁷⁰⁹

Several nights after the villagers' return, the Taliban ambushed an ANA, ANP and ALP patrol through the Kapisa Mountain Village and government forces drove the Taliban back up the mountain.⁷¹⁰

In the midst of the turmoil, Father of Family 6 paid a 200,000 Af brideprice for a wife for Son of Family 6 and hosted a large wedding party. Father of Family 6 hired a wedding singer and the villagers and guests danced. The Taliban did not attack the wedding, even though the music and dancing violated Taliban rules.⁷¹¹

Several nights later, the Pakistani Taliban went to Elder 2's house because they had a report that he was a government spy. They cut the electrical wire to Elder 2's house and when the elderly man went outside to examine why the electricity was off, they abducted him and took him to Area T. The Wife of Elder 2 screamed and cried and the Wakil ran to see what was the matter. The Wakil decided to call the Afghan Taliban Commander and asked him to determine whether the kidnappers had been Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban or just criminals. After 2 or 3 hours, the Afghan Taliban Commander called the Wakil and said the Pakistani Taliban had arrested Elder 2 and taken him to Area T. He told the Wakil that the Pakistani Taliban had a report that Elder 2 was a spy for the government and they

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid

⁷⁰⁹ 141201 Family 2 Control Measures R3

⁷¹⁰ 141122 Community Narrative R3

⁷¹¹ 141201 Family 6 Control Measures R3

would put him in front of a *sharia* court to determine whether the accusation was true or false. He told the Wakil that the Afghan Taliban could not go to Area T because the Pakistani Taliban might say they were spying for the government. He told the Wakil he had no power to go to Area T to try to bring Elder 2 back. The Wakil told the Afghan Taliban Commander that someone in the village must be spying for the Pakistani Taliban. The Wakil told the Afghan Taliban Commander that the Taliban should know this report was wrong because Elder 2 does not work for the government or America; he is a farmer. The Wakil asked the Afghan Taliban Commander to find out who the person was who gave them this wrong report and tell the Wakil who that was.⁷¹²

The villagers were very angry when they learned Elder 2 had been abducted by the Pakistani Taliban. Father of Family 10 asked the Wakil, “Why did you not call the government?” The Wakil replied, “If I had called the government, maybe the Taliban would have found out and the government could not do anything about this anyway.” The Mullah said, “If the Wakil had called the government, the Taliban would know we gave a report to them and they would kill Elder 2. It is better that the Wakil talked to the Afghan Taliban. There is a chance Elder 2 could be released because the Wakil did that. There would have been no chance otherwise.” Five days later, the Pakistani Taliban released Elder 2 after having interrogated him, beaten him and placed him in front of a *sharia* court which determined he was not a government spy.⁷¹³

Daughter 2 of Family 9 went to the river to fetch water. She waited to let a group of 8 boys from another village who were walking to play football on the Kapisa Mountain Village field pass. She covered her face and averted her eyes, but the boys saw her. One of

⁷¹² 141122 Community Narrative R3

⁷¹³ 141122 Community Narrative R3

them said, "This girls is very beautiful." Daughter 2 of Family 9 heard the boys from another village say she was beautiful. Angered, she told them, "You are bad people. Why do you talk like this? You must avert your eyes. When you see a woman, you are not supposed to see anything. Why do you look at me? You do not have good parents. They did not guide you." Electricity Man heard Daughter 2 of Family 9 yelling at the boys from another village. He approached the scene. He told the boys to go away. Electricity Man told Daughter 2 of Family 9, "Do not yell. It is very shameful for you. Even if the boys said something, you have to be quiet." Daughter 2 of Family 9 did not respond to the Electricity Man's criticism. She left with the water she had gotten from the river and went home. Several days later, Family 9 moved back to their village of origin, the Parachi Village at the End of Dara 3, where her older brother had repaired their home.⁷¹⁴

The Mullah saw two of the village boys drinking alcohol and gave a sermon explaining that it is *haram* to drink alcohol. He said that alcohol makes people forget what is *halal* and what is *haram*, and thereby become like animals. He said it is the responsibility of everyone in the village to advise people who drink alcohol not to do so. He told the people that if they did not advise drinkers not to drink, then they would be responsible to Allah. If they advise the young men not to do this and they drink it anyway, the drinkers alone are responsible to Allah.

On November 26th, the Pakistani Taliban left a night letter in front of the Wakil's house, threatening to kill any ANSF who live in the Kapisa Mountain Village. The Wakil called the ALP Commander and the two men discussed what to do. The ALP Commander came to the Kapisa Mountain Village with eight ALP and sent them out to immediately begin

⁷¹⁴ 141201 Family 9 Control Measures R3

patrolling. In the meantime, the ALP Commander and Wakil agreed the ALP should set up an ambush in the Kapisa Mountain Village because the Taliban would likely come there that evening, but that they should not tell the ANP Commander because they were concerned about Taliban spies in the ANP.⁷¹⁵ The eight ALP and their commander hid in the village in three groups, one at the entrance of the village, one in the middle of the village and one at the exit of the village. They began at 11 pm and they stayed there until eight Taliban fighters arrived just after midnight, walking past the first bunch of ALP soldiers, who remained silent until the Taliban reached the middle of the village on their way to someone in the village's home where they planned to attack and kill a member of the ANSF who was home on leave. When they reached the center of the village, the ALP opened fire on the Taliban fighters, enveloping them. The Taliban fighters returned fire, but were in disarray. They fled up the mountain, leaving two dead Taliban behind. When he heard the fighting, the ANP Commander came to the Kapisa Mountain Village to ask what was going on. The ALP Commander and Wakil told the ANP Commander the ALP had successfully ambushed the Taliban, killing two of them and driving them back up the mountain. The ANP Commander agreed it was better that only the Wakil and ALP Commander had known about the ambush beforehand because of their concern about spies. The next day, the ALP Commander met the Wakil in the Kapisa Mountain Village *mazjet* and talked about how the two men could work together to provide security. He said, "It is better you told me about the night letter. Maybe, if you did not tell me, the Pakistani Taliban would have come and arrested people in your village and killed them."⁷¹⁶

The Wakil agreed with the ALP Commander and thanked him for coming to protect the villagers from the Pakistani Taliban, saying, "You helped us and the Taliban understand

⁷¹⁵ 141127 ALP Action 1 R3

⁷¹⁶ Ibid

that maybe they should be scared of coming here. After this, we will tell you when we see the Taliban. Fortunately, none of the police were injured.” The next day, the Pakistani Taliban tried to kill some of the ALP patrolling in an adjacent village with an IED.⁷¹⁷

Several days later, Son 1 of Family 12 had a terrible pain in his abdomen and he screamed in pain. Son 2 of Family 3 heard him screaming and took him to the clinic. The nurses there said he had an appendicitis and they could not treat him. They told Son 2 of Family 3 to take Son 1 of Family 12 to the hospital in Kabul. Son 1 of Family 12 hurried to get his neighbor to Kabul, where the doctor performed an appendectomy, saving the life of Son 1 of Family 12. The doctor told Son 2 of Family 3 that if they had been one hour later, Son 1 of Family 12 would have died.⁷¹⁸ This incident again demonstrated that although there was a clinic in the Kapisa Mountain District and there were staff there, even the most basic medical problems confounded them and people could only be treated in Kabul.

The Pakistani Taliban made a second attempt to kill the NDS Commander for Area S, using a suicide bomber. The suicide bomber was a Kori who taught at the *madrassa* in the Kapisa Mountain District Capital. He tried to blow himself up with the NDS Commander from Area S, but he failed.⁷¹⁹

The Mullah gave a sermon decrying suicide bombing and killing people on behalf of the Taliban. He implored the villagers to provide information about suicide bombings to the authorities so they can prevent the deaths of innocent people. He said that the Pakistani Taliban told suicide bombers that no matter what else they had done in their lives, if they

⁷¹⁷ Ibid

⁷¹⁸ 141201 Family 3 Control Measures R3

⁷¹⁹ 141128 Explosions R3 District R3

committed a suicide attack, they would automatically enter Paradise as martyrs because government workers take money from non-Muslims. He told the villagers Pakistanis teach these people that they must kill non-Muslims; Pakistanis give these people a key and say it is to Paradise. But, the Mullah said, Paradise does not have a key and that the key to getting into Paradise is worshipping and doing good things in this world and respecting and behaving well toward other people, Muslim and non Muslim. The Mullah told the villagers Muslims must respect the rights of all humans, Muslim and non-Muslim and that a suicide bomber is like an animal because he does not think, I am human and it is very bad for me to kill another person. The Mullah told the villagers that the suicide bomber is ignorant because he thinks that he can kill innocent people in the market and make orphans of children and no one will ask him about this on Doomsday? Allah will ask him and he will tell the angels to take the suicide bomber to Hell.⁷²⁰

The 12th class graduated from high school in December of 2014 and despite the fact that the Taliban had assassinated Son 1 of Family 10 while he was home on leave, Son 2 of Family 1 joined the ANP.⁷²¹

Several nights later, four Pakistani Taliban went to R3 house in the middle of the night because R3 used to be an ANP and they think he still is an ANP. They searched the house, but R3 was in Kabul. They stole his sister's gold jewelry, but did not do anything else.⁷²²

The Pakistani Taliban then tried to kill Son 1 of Family 15 for being an ALP. But, Son

⁷²⁰ 141219 Mazjet Friday R3

⁷²¹ 141201 Family 1 Control Measures R3

⁷²² 141204 What Happened to Me R3

1 of Family 15 was not at home, nor were any adult males. Father of Family 15 died in 2011, Son 2 of Family 15 is a guard for an international company in Kabul, Son 3 of Family 15 is an ANP NCO in Mazar i Sharif and Son 4 of Family 15 moved to Iran in order to earn a bride price by doing construction there in 2012. Additionally, Son 1 of Son 1 of Family 15, who was 20 years old, had just graduated from high school and joined the ANA. As a result, the elderly Mother of Family 15, Wife of Son 1 of Family 15, and her three younger children were at home alone when the Taliban arrived just after midnight, demanding Son 1 of Family 15 come outside.⁷²³

Wife of Son 1 of Family 15 told the Pakistani Taliban fighters her husband was not home and asked them to please leave. The Pakistani Taliban told Wife of Son 1 of Family 15, “You are lying. You are hiding your husband. It is better if you tell him to come outside.” Wife of Son 1 of Family 15 responded, “Are you human or not? Are you Muslim or not? I am telling you my husband is not at home. I am alone with my children. Leave us alone.” The Pakistani Taliban told her, “I will attack your house and bring your husband out of there.”⁷²⁴

Wife of Son 1 of Family 15 realized the Taliban were about to break down the door. She was very concerned that people in the community would think the Taliban had done something bad to her and her 17 year old daughter, or worse, that they would kill everyone inside. So, she put a chair behind the door and sat in it with an AK 47. When Taliban kicked in the door, she started shooting to prevent them from coming inside. She shot two of them, leaving pools of blood in the doorway. All six Pakistani Taliban ran away up the mountain. Based on the amount of blood, she had severely injured two of them.⁷²⁵

⁷²³ 140911 Family 15 Characteristics, 141226 What Happened to Me R3

⁷²⁴ 141226 What Happened to Me R3

⁷²⁵ 141226 What Happened To Me R3

The Wife of Son 1 of Family 15 sat in her chair with her gun and the door open until the Wakil came because she was concerned the Taliban might come back. The Wakil and ALP Commander came to Family 15 House when they heard the shots. As the Wakil walked toward the House of Family 15, he saw Wife of Son 1 of Family 15 sitting on her chair with the gun, large pools of blood in the doorway, the broken door and the children behind their mother, crying. She said, "Are you the Taliban or the Wakil? How many people are you?" The Wakil said to the Wife of Son 1 of Family 15, "I am the Wakil. Please do not shoot me. ALP Commander came here with me to provide security for you." The Wife of Son 1 of Family 15 told Wakil, "You can come into the house, but you have to come alone. Taliban attacked my house and I defended myself with this gun." When the ALP Commander praised her bravery, the Wife of Son 1 of Family 15 told ALP Commander, "As long as there is blood in my body, I will defend myself and my family."⁷²⁶

As Wife of Son 1 of Family 15 clearly articulates, the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village are the group with the most motivation to defend it against the Taliban attacks. This incident also demonstrates the ease with which the Taliban could be repelled. One woman with an AK 47 can drive the Taliban back up the mountain. In a village where each of the 100 or so households has a gun, the Wakil could organize a defensive force in the village. The core of that defensive force should have been a set of ALP who were constantly in the village, waiting to strike if bands of between 4 and 10 Taliban fighters came through the village either on patrol or to punish a particular villager or his family. Imagine if all of the ANSF from the Kapisa Mountain Village, where half of the households have at least one member deployed somewhere else as part of the ANSF were in the village defending it. But,

⁷²⁶ 141226 What Happened to Me R3

to continue this counterfactual, the Wakil does not organize the village to resist the Taliban, even though he quite clearly could, because he and the villagers are concerned that if one village stood up alone, the Taliban could mass its 1,600 fighters and attack the village to make an example of it. If the village were to stand up, it would need to stand up alongside the villages that surround it, throughout its Dara. These villages would need a kind of mutual defense pact. If the ALP had been organized as planned, the ANP or the ALP Commander could have worked to aggregate them and ensure they did not fight one another.

Instead, in this incident with the Wife of Son 1 of Family 15, the ALP Commander and the ANP Commander came and told her, her husband and Wakil that she was very brave, that the Taliban were terrible people, and that they would kill them all if they knew where they were. As the ALP Commander said, “The Taliban come like thieves. ... Thieves want to enter the house and when someone sees them, they run away because they do not want to be seen. If the Taliban were here, we would arrest all of the Taliban.” The ANP District Commander expressed the same to the Wakil, “I am so sorry the Taliban came to your village and attacked Family 15. ... The Taliban are like animals. They are not human. They want to kill women and children and burn houses and schools. They cannot stand against us.”⁷²⁷

But, after these strong declarations of will to fight the Taliban, the ANP Commander demonstrated the problem with not having armed village police, saying,

“Now, I have to go back to the District Center because I am responsible for many villages. The Taliban makes a bad situation in the area and do not want Afghan people to have a good life. If you see Taliban in your village, you call me. I understand we are far from your village. ... When I arrest the Taliban, I will kill all of them in front of the people in the bazaar. The Taliban

⁷²⁷ 141226 What Happened To Me R3

wants to kill wives and children because their fathers and husbands work for government. They are cowards.”⁷²⁸

Despite the vociferous statements of the ANP and ALP Commanders, the villagers of the Kapisa Mountain Village were once again left to defend themselves on a case by case basis, as they were attacked by the Pakistani Taliban.

And, the Wakil’s control continued to erode. In late December 2014, one of the government workers in the Kapisa Mountain Village demonstrated his disobedience to the Wakil. Son 2 of Family 3, who is a traffic policeman in Kabul, got into a fistfight with the Electricity Man. The river was flooding and the generator broke, causing all of the electricity in the village to go out. The Electricity Man repaired the generator and turned the electricity back on in the village. When he did that, a fuse inside Family 3 House blew and Family 3’s electricity did not come back on. Electricity Man is not from the village and is paid by the villagers through the Wakil to keep the generator running and maintain the lines that connect to the houses. It is not the job of the Electricity Man to repair electricity inside villagers’ homes.

When the electricity did not come back on, Son 2 of Family 3 went to talk to Electricity Man to fix the problem. When Electricity Man refused to help Son 2 of Family 3, he did not call the Wakil to help him solve the problem. Instead, he attacked Electricity Man and they got into a fistfight. Son 2 of Family 3 broke Electricity Man’s nose and Electricity Man hit Son 2 of Family 3 over the head with a rock. The Wakil went to Electricity Room, broke up the fight and chastised both men for not bringing their problems to the Wakil and fighting with one another.

⁷²⁸ 141226 What Happened To Me R3

In the morning, Wakil called a meeting and rebuked Son 2 of Family 3 for fighting with Electricity Man and clarified the duties of Electricity Man in the Kapisa Mountain Village. Electricity Man threatened to quit. Elder 1, Father of Family 10, and Father of Family 5 criticized Son 2 of Family 3 for causing a problem and fighting with Electricity Man. Son 2 of Family 3 apologized to Electricity Man for fighting with him and demanding he do things that are not his job. Son 2 of Family 3 then hosted a breakfast for Wakil, Elder 1, Elder 2 and Electricity Man at his house at Elder 1's suggestion as an apology to Electricity Man.⁷²⁹

The story of the Kapisa Mountain Village during 2014 is one of burgeoning disorder driven by the erosion of the village consensus about what is important and how their lives should be ordered. But, it is also a story of an outside imposition organization that is well-resourced and organized inflicting damage and even selectively sanctioning villagers for breaking rules, but failing to establish control over people's behavior.

Despite the significant increase in the external resources of the Taliban, the improved organizational effectiveness of the Taliban and the unchanged lack of agreement of the population of the Kapisa Mountain Village with the goals and actions of the Taliban, Taliban control over villagers' behavior increased very little. Men prayed on average 2.9 times per day and 70% of male villagers over the age of 10 violated the Taliban's rule that they all pray five times per day in the village *mazjet*. Women went out of the house on average 3.2 times per day, violating the Taliban's rules nearly every time they did, as they walked to the fields to work on their farms and to the creek to carry water to their homes,

⁷²⁹ 141201 Family 3 Control Measures R3

clad in long robes and headscarves with their faces uncovered. During 2014, villagers broke the fast by smoking during Ramadan. Other villagers smoked opium and hashish and drank alcohol and gambled. 56% of men wore beards of insufficient length according to the Taliban's rules. 56% of girls of school age attended school. At every wedding party in the Kapisa Mountain Village, the father of the groom paid for music and the male villagers, especially the young ones, danced. In the case of every marriage that occurred, the bride price exceeded the 50,000 Af limit of the Taliban. Additionally, young men remain in ANSF and new ones join even after the Taliban kills Son 1 of Family 10 and many others in the Kapisa Mountain District. The Mullah and Wakil and villagers regularly denounce the Taliban publically. However, the villagers and Wakil do not act to prevent the Taliban from patrolling in the village at night by attacking them, nor do they leave the lights on outside after 10 p.m. The biggest impact the Taliban had on the behavior of people in the Kapisa Mountain Village was causing more than 30% of the families to move out of their homes in the village to either Kabul or the Parachi Village at the End of Dara 3.

The Wakil's control continued to decline, as he became unable to prevent the Taliban from moving through the village at night, harassing, abducting and even killing residents. The situation was so unsafe that the Wakil was forced to evacuate the entire village for more than two weeks in November. The situation became so dire that many people who were concerned about being selectively sanctioned by the Taliban for having family members in the ANSF or breaking some other Taliban rule chose to move out of the village. Compounding the decline in the Wakil's control, his control over the behavior of young village men also continued to erode. More and more of them broke the Wakil's rules by drinking alcohol, harassing girls (not from the village), gambling, stealing, fighting, smoking opium, hashish and cigarettes, not attending prayers and breaking the fast. But,

outside of Taliban actions and those of these young men, the Wakil's control remained fairly robust. People still came to village meetings and participated. While 33% of adult male villagers do not attend prayers as often as they should, 67% do. With only two exceptions, people obeyed the irrigation schedule and planted less of their land than they could have. All of the people evacuated when he ordered them to do so. The people paid the Mullah his salary and assisted in village projects.

To the extent that the Wakil's control over people's behavior declined, it declined apace with people's agreement with his goals and rules. This change in agreement resulted from the erosion of village unity generated by the gravitational pull of immensely larger incomes available to young men through government employment. The Wakil was not less effective as an organization, except when it encountered a villager who had enough relative power, leveraged from a relationship with the government, to be able to avoid the Wakil's sanction. The Wakil received no less personnel or money or goods or services or information or sanctuary from the villagers.

The Wakil's control over the Taliban's ability to act in the community was based on his inability to access external resources he had been able to access when the French were in the Kapisa Mountain District, in the form of the ANSF and the increase in the resources and effectiveness of the Taliban. No matter how fervently the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village agree with their Wakil that they do not want the Taliban in their village, the resources available from within the village are insufficient to fight the Taliban head on and win. They would need to be reinforced by the government, but that external resource is not available to the Wakil, so his ability to prevent the Taliban from harassing the villagers is limited.

In the case of the government, control over the behavior of the villagers decreased alongside the Wakil's control. Ironically, government control in the Kapisa Mountain Village decreased because of the government's employment of ANSF from the Kapisa Mountain Village outside the village. The government was not effective enough to cause its personnel to act in the Kapisa Mountain Village either to enforce any rules on the villagers or to prevent Taliban presence. As a result it relied upon the Wakil to enforce rules and then undermined his control by eroding the consensus of the villagers and the personnel available to defend the village by paying high salaries to ANSF and sending them elsewhere to serve. The government's resources did not decrease. Its organizational effectiveness did in the face of a relatively better resourced and organized enemy.

What Caused Control to Vary in the Kapisa Mountain Village?

Between 2001 and 2010, the Wakil had a high level of control because he constantly sought the agreement of villagers with his goals, rules, sanctions and projects, while nurturing a village consensus about what was important. The Wakil used this consensus to recruit and motivate personnel, to collect funds and recruit labor for projects in the village, to collect funds to pay the Mullah, to gather information about Taliban presence and other rule breaking, and to gain villagers' agreement on how the village should interact with the Pakistani Taliban, the government, ISAF, and any other armed group. Because people agreed with his goals, rules and sanctions, most people in the Kapisa Mountain Village obeyed the Wakil. Those who did not obey the rules had a high probability of being caught because of the constant presence of the Wakil, Mullah and elders; and because most people in the village would happily inform the Wakil if they saw someone violating a rule. When

the Wakil had information about rule violations, he consistently sanctioned the violators. And, there were no other organizations with enough resources and organizational effectiveness to enforce their rules in the Kapisa Mountain Village.

But, the Wakil's high level of control was not to last. First, the consensus that underpinned his power began to dissipate because younger villagers, influenced by education and well-paid jobs far from the Kapisa Mountain Village in the ANSF, no longer valued the same things their parents, who were illiterate traditional farmers with very limited exposure to the outside world, valued. This gradual erosion of Wakil control over villager behavior accelerated as people who had been children in 2001 graduated from high school and chose to move to Kabul to become officers in the ANSF and then work elsewhere in Afghanistan.

The Wakil's control in the village was worn down by an organization with tremendous external resources, the Coalition and Afghan government. This organization was able to educate and hire ANSF from the Kapisa Mountain District and deploy them elsewhere in Afghanistan, using external resources to influence them to leave their villages. It was able to educate and hire ANSF from throughout Afghanistan and deploy them to the Kapisa Mountain District using external resources. When the Coalition military was present in the District, it was able to cause ANSF personnel to patrol and engage the enemy. But, the organization was not able to motivate ANSF personnel to collect information about other rule breaking. The government policed whether the Taliban were present or not, but did not become involved in other matters, like theft, murder, taking illegal drugs, enforcing women's rights, freedom of religion or speech. These other matters were left to the Wakil, as the government's own machine of education and ANSF employment ate away at his

power. The government informally relied upon the Wakil's control while accidentally undermining it and not replacing it.

The government did not replace the Wakil's control with its own personnel who identified rule breakers and sanctioned them because its personnel lacked the motivation to do so. The government's intentionally impartial personnel were in fact not interested enough with order in the Kapisa Mountain District to either exert or risk themselves on these topics. When the Coalition military was still present and working with them in the Kapisa Mountain District, they were interested in keeping the Taliban at bay, but after the Coalition military departed and the threats from the Taliban grew, the government's personnel did not value that as much as they feared the threat to their safety that patrolling and engaging the enemy posed. As the Taliban's external resources grew in 2014, the willingness of government personnel to act against the Taliban dissipated further. It was organizational ineffectiveness, resulting from the dispassionate personnel model of the Afghan government, that led to the government's lack of control over anything outside of the Wakil's agreed upon rules and eventually the inability of the government to prevent the Taliban from moving through villages in the Kapisa Mountain District, harassing, abducting and killing residents.

The Wakil had relied upon the government to deter Taliban presence, but after the Coalition soldiers departed, he could no longer do so. The Wakil's control, in its eroded state, was then challenged by an organization with external resources and personnel who consistently acted upon the organization's intent by attempting to identify and sanction people who broke the rules that organization, and not the villagers, wanted the villagers to obey. The villagers did not want the Taliban to move through the Kapisa Mountain Village,

and yet, the Taliban was able to do so and increasingly so. The Wakil lost control over their presence. He and the villagers were forced to allow the Taliban sanctuary in their village even though the things the Taliban did there were anathema to the villagers' goals. This certainly did not occur because the villagers agreed with the Taliban. It occurred because the villagers could not raise resources from the 100 households in the village significant enough to survive a fight with the Taliban as its population of external personnel, motivated to fight any village who would fight them, grew above 1,600 people. It further occurred because the Wakil's alliance with the government to keep the Taliban at bay collapsed when ANA, ANP and ALP stopped lending their resources to the fight to keep the Taliban out of the Kapisa Mountain Village.

Despite the Taliban's overwhelming external resources, it could still not control behaviors other than people not attacking the Taliban, going outside at night or leaving the lights on outside at night. Women still went outside and worked in the fields without males or *burkhas*, girls attended school, people smoked opium and hashish and young men even continued to join the ANSF (despite the Taliban's effective campaign of targeted assassinations of ANSF home on leave).

One thing the Wakil has and the government and Taliban lack that could explain the difficulty both the government and the significantly more effective Taliban experience in attempting to control the behavior of the population of the Kapisa Mountain Village is a static presence in the village. Because they lack constant personnel presence in the village, even if their personnel patrol through the village to acquire information about rule breaking and consistently sanction people whom they know have broken the rule when they have information about their location, these organizations lack the ability to observe behavior

consistently enough to identify many instances of rule breaking. If a government patrol moves through the village at night and it wants to prevent the Taliban from doing so, the Taliban can simply wait until the government patrol has departed and enter the village. People can smoke opium in the woods without repercussions because the Taliban, government or Wakil are not constantly in the woods, observing their behavior.

It cannot be that agreement with an organization's goals, rules and sanctions always causes control. If it were, the Wakil would never lose control over whether the Taliban could enter the Kapisa Mountain Village and assassinate villagers. And, it cannot be that external resources always cause control. If it were, the government would have ensured that women in the Kapisa Mountain Village chose their own husbands and jobs. And, it cannot be that an effective organization, translating strategy into personnel action, always causes control. If it were, both the Taliban and the Wakil would have control and since their rules are diametrically opposed, that is an impossibility. While it is clear that these factors are related to control, we cannot say they cause it. We cannot say when and why and how the agreement of the population, internal resources, external resources and organizational effectiveness result in control.

For that reason, we must delve deeper, below these large scale, generalized factors, and examine the actions organizations take that result in either rule breaking or rule following. This comparison will help us determine how these factors relate to whether an organization can achieve its purpose by causing people to obey its rules.

Perhaps these larger factors are only relevant to the extent that they serve as inputs to villagers' actions and to the actions of organizations. If we examine whether there are

actions without which organizations cannot control people's behavior, then perhaps we can identify a process each organization could apply in order to control the behavior of the population. If we examine how that process, or set of actions by the organization, is enabled by the larger factors, we might generate insight into how, why and under what conditions the larger factors effect control.

We can determine if there is such a process by comparing cases in which villagers comply with rules with cases in which they do not comply with them. In each case, we can examine what the government, Wakil and Taliban organizations did and how that effects whether or not villagers obey their rules. We will examine rules with which some people comply and some people do not comply, rules that are contested. These contested rules provide the opportunity for comparison across people who obey and disobey the rules of different organizations and how their behavior changes over the four periods of time. We will examine what causes people to obey or not obey rules about attending prayers; joining the ANSF; sending daughters to school; and not taking drugs or gambling. The first three rules are topics over which the Wakil, Taliban and government organizations disagree. The last rule is one on which those three organizations unanimously agree. Finally, we will examine a rule that is not about individual, but is instead, village behavior, providing sanctuary to the Taliban.

Contested Rule 1: Prayers in the Village *Mazjet*

The Taliban wants all males over the age of 10, without exception, to pray in the village *mazjet* five times per day. When the Taliban reigned in the Kapisa Mountain Village, they would beat any male over the age of 10 whom they found outside the *mazjet* at the

time of prayers with a mule whip. Ideologically, the Taliban want men to pray because they believe Allah made men to pray and it is the Taliban's duty, because they know this, to force them to do so.

The Wakil wants all males over about 15 years of age to pray as many times per day as possible while still pursuing their educations and providing for their families. If a male over 15 years of age comes to prayers less than three times per day, the Wakil and Mullah will visit him to discuss why he is failing to come to prayers as often as other villagers. If he has a good reason, like he has to go to school, drive a taxi or operate a shop in the *bazaar*, the Wakil will understand and not sanction him. If, on the other hand, he does not have a good reason, the Wakil will advise him to attend prayers more often because Allah will be angry with him if he does not and the Wakil will not be able to trust him. If he does not comply, the Wakil informs him that the villagers will eventually force the Wakil to throw the family out of the village. Ideologically, the Wakil concurs that Allah made men to pray, but believes it is wrong to force people to practice Islam because they must choose to do so. Also, the Wakil relies upon the regular gathering of the male villagers for prayer to reinforce their unity, upon which his control relies.

The government, on the other hand, does not require people to pray or to practice any religion and believes any effort to force them to do so is a violation of the person's individual human right to freedom of religion. If the Wakil and villagers expelled someone from his home, the government would consider that an assault and a human rights violation.

The Wakil has near perfect information about people breaking this rule because he, the Mullah and the elders are in nearly every prayer in the village *mazjet* and can observe who comes to prayers and how often. His information results from the sanctuary he, the elders and Mullah have in the village *mazjet* as members of the village and the observable nature of compliance with or violation of the rule in question. The Wakil's access to information about people breaking this rule is constant across the time periods.

The Taliban could have excellent information about people breaking this rule if it could patrol during the time of prayers to identify people who are outside the *mazjet*, as they did during their reign. This is true because prayers are at specific times and in a specific location. Another way the Taliban could acquire information about men not complying with this rule is from villagers who attend prayers, but those villagers would either need to agree with the Taliban's rule and the sanction it would apply or would need an incentive to provide the Taliban with that information. But, because the Taliban are not constantly in place as members of the community, passively collecting information about rule breaking, they must have the resources to collect that information by other means and the organization to cause its personnel to do so. This information collection would take place in the context of other organizations, like the government and Wakil, attempting to prevent the Taliban from doing so. Therefore, the Taliban would need the external resources required to generate more capacity, as a combination of resources and organization, than its enemies, to move freely throughout the village to collect information and sanction rule breaking. Even with that relative capacity, the Taliban would never have more information than the Wakil unless it had personnel who were constantly in the village, attending prayers five times a day in order to identify rule breaking.

The government could acquire information about organizations forcing villagers to attend prayers at the *mazjet*, but not easily. The government would only know if people violated the civil rights of villagers if villagers gave them that information because the act of influencing people to pray, threatening them if they do not and even punishing people for not praying, is not easily observable, like attending prayers. Government personnel could talk to people while they were on patrol or they could rely upon villagers coming to the District Government Center to report human rights violations. The government would need to influence people to make them want to give them this information. The violation of the government's rule is much less easily observable in this case.

The organizations in question have different access to information about people breaking their different rules about praying the village *mazjet*, both because of the differing nature of their rules and because of the perspective from which their personnel can observe rule violations. The perspective from which the government and Taliban organizations can observe rule breaking is dependent upon their relative capacity to move through the village and that in turn is related to each organization's external resources and its ability to cause its personnel to act. This capacity is relative to the capacity of the organizations against which an organization competes to do the same.

People in the community have different reactions to the organizations' efforts to influence people to comply with their rules. A review of cases in which people pray in the *mazjet* five times per day and cases in which they do not elucidates why they obey or disobey the different organizations.

The Father of Family 8 prays in the Kapisa Mountain Village *mazjet* five times per day, obeying both the Wakil's rule and the Taliban's rule. Father of Family 8 is a Parachi Mullah who attended the government *madrassa* in the District Capital. He graduated sometime around 1986 and became a *mujihadeen* commander for *Jamat e Islami*, fighting the Soviet Union, fighting in the civil war that followed their withdrawal and fighting to overthrow the Taliban. Father of Family 8 does not work as a Mullah or a commander anymore. He is instead a traditional farmer, tending the field owned by the owner of Family 8's house. The owner of the house is in Kabul working as a municipal trash collector and the home of the Father of Family 8 in the Parachi Village at the End of Dara 3 was destroyed by the Taliban during their reign.⁷³⁰

The Father of Family 8 prays five times per day in the Kapisa Mountain Village *mazjet* because he believes he should, not because the Wakil or Taliban take any actions to convince him to do so. Also, because he is a traditional farmer who works in the village, it is not very difficult for him to comply with this rule.⁷³¹ This is also true of Son of Family 2,⁷³² Father of Family 4,⁷³³ Father of Family 5,⁷³⁴ Father of Family 7,⁷³⁵ Father of Family 9,⁷³⁶ Father of Family 10,⁷³⁷ Father of Family 11,⁷³⁸ Son 1 of Family 12,⁷³⁹ Father of Family 14,⁷⁴⁰ Son 1 of Family 14⁷⁴¹ and the Father of Family 16.⁷⁴²

⁷³⁰ 140911 Family 8 R3

⁷³¹ 140911 Family 8 R3 and 141201 Family 8 Control Measures R3

⁷³² 140911 Family 2 R3 and 141201 Family 2 Control Measures R3

⁷³³ 140911 Family 4 R3 and 141201 Family 4 Control Measures R3

⁷³⁴ 140911 Family 5 R3 and 141201 Family 5 Control Measures R3

⁷³⁵ 140911 Family 7 R3 and 141201 Family 7 Control Measures R3

⁷³⁶ 140911 Family 9 R3 and 141201 Family 9 Control Measures R3

⁷³⁷ 140911 Family 10 R3 and 141201 Family 10 Control Measures R3

⁷³⁸ 140911 Family 11 R3 and 141201 Family 11 Control Measures R3

⁷³⁹ 140911 Family 12 R3 and 141201 Family 12 Control Measures R3

⁷⁴⁰ 140911 Family 14 R3 and 141201 Family 14 Control Measures R3

⁷⁴¹ 140911 Family 14 R3 and 141201 Family 14 Control Measures R3

⁷⁴² 140911 Family 16 R3 and 141201 Family 16 Control Measures R3

Father of Family 11, on the other hand, prays in the village *mazjet* only two or three times per day. Family 11 has only a small plot of land, less than one square kilometer, from which Family 11 makes only 60,000 Afs per year. For the last 30 years, Family 11 has operated a shop in the *bazaar* that sells cookies, sweets and tea. Because his shop is in the *bazaar*, the Father of Family 11 is in the village for morning, evening and night prayers, but not the other two prayers. Everyone, including the Mullah and Wakil, understands that Father of Family 11 can only be in the Kapisa Mountain Village *mazjet* for 2 or 3 prayers per day. If he had to be there five times per day, he could not provide for his family. Therefore, the Wakil does not sanction him because he is complying with the village rule. Father of Family 11 does not pray in the *bazaar mazjet* at noon and in the afternoon. In the *bazaar*, it is dangerous to leave one's shop unattended during the time of prayers because thieves wait for shopkeepers to leave their shops unattended and strike at that time. The Taliban does not have information about Father of Family 11 violating its rule and even if it did, throughout the four periods under study, it lacked the relative power to sanction everyone who was breaking this particular rule in the *bazaar* because of its close proximity to the District ANP Base and the ANA *kandak* base.⁷⁴³

So, the Taliban lack the relative coercive force to sanction him and do not sanction Father of Family 11 for his rule breaking. The same pattern of rule compliance or failure to do so applies to Son of Family 1, who is a teacher in another village; Son 1 of Son of Family 1, who is an apprentice mechanic in the District Capital;⁷⁴⁴ Son of Family 2, who drives a taxi;⁷⁴⁵ and Father of Family 13, who runs a candy shop in the *bazaar*.⁷⁴⁶ These men cannot

⁷⁴³ 140911 Family 11 R3 and 141201 Family 11 Control Measures R3

⁷⁴⁴ 140911 Family 1 R3 and 141201 Family 1 Control Measures R3

⁷⁴⁵ 140911 Family 2 R3 and 141201 Family 2 Control Measures R3

⁷⁴⁶ 140911 Family 13 R3 and 141201 Family 13 Control Measures R3

pray five times per day in the village *mazjet* without damaging their family's economic situation.

By contrast, there are people who do not pray at all, breaking Wakil and Taliban rules. As described earlier, during the period under study, Son 1 of Family 15's compliance with the rules regarding prayers in the *mazjet* changed. In 2010, Son 1 of Family 15 complied with the Wakil's rules regarding prayers at the village *mazjet*. This younger man, living under his father's roof, assisting him in tending the family farm, prayed on average three times per day at the village *mazjet*. After his father died in 2011, Son 1 of Family 15 approached the ALP Commander and asked if he could become an ALP. The commander accepted and Son 1 of Family 15 began to receive a salary of 19,000 Afs per month, an AK 47 and ammunition. He began working at the ALP Checkpoint in the Parachi neighborhood of Dara 1, where he sleeps for three days at a time and then returns to the village for three days. After the death of his father and upon becoming an ALP, Son 1 of Family 15 stopped attending prayers entirely.

It is likely Son 1 of Family 15 did not agree that he should have to pray prior to his father's death and joining the ALP.⁷⁴⁷ He demonstrated his irreverence not only when he told the Wakil and his own elderly mother that he did not want to pray, but also while helping Elder 1 plant his corn. Villagers believe a crop will not survive if you do not perform ablution and ask Allah for a blessing before planting it. Son 1 of Family 15 did not perform ablution prior to planting the field and when Elder 1 asked if he had, he poked fun at Elder 1, telling him he had in fact also gone to the bathroom just prior to planting the corn seeds and had not performed ablution. This joke bordered on blasphemy. He more directly

⁷⁴⁷ 140911 Family 15 R3 and 141201 Family 15 Control Measures R3

demonstrates his beliefs about not wanting to pray when he does not pray in the *mazjet* at all when he is at home.⁷⁴⁸

When his father was alive, Son 1 of Family 15 probably prayed because his father would have told him he must. At that time, he would have been entirely dependant on his father for money, for the possibility to get married, for everything. All of his other brothers pray when they are home at least three times per day and his mother loves to listen to people read her the stories of the life of the Prophet Mohammad and prays five times per day, so it is likely his father, like most men of his generation in the Kapisa Mountain Village, was very religious.⁷⁴⁹

The Wakil was immediately very aware that Son 1 of Family 15 was no longer attending prayers. Soon after he noticed the lapse, the Old Wakil and Old Mullah went to Family 15 House and advised Son 1 of Family 15 that he should attend prayers in the Village *mazjet* as many times per day as he could. Son 1 of Family 15 did not comply in 2011, 2012 or 2013. In 2014, the Wakil told him, "You have to come to the *mazjet* to pray. If you do not come, I cannot trust you. Prayers belong to Allah. Allah will decide whether he punishes you or not. I am not the Taliban. I will not hit you with a whip." The Wakil knew they could not throw Son 1 of Family 15 out of the village because he is an ALP. Not only does he have a gun at home, he has friends from the ALP who might help him. Maybe the ALP Commander would be angry with the Wakil if he and the villagers tried to expel Son 1 of Family 15 from the village for not attending prayers. Even though the Wakil has information about Son 1 of Family 15's rule breaking, he cannot sanction him because the Wakil and villagers together lack the relative power (in this case because of the limited

⁷⁴⁸ 141201 Family 15 Control Measures R3

⁷⁴⁹ 140911 Family 15 R3

military aged personnel in the village relative to the number of ALP) to do so.⁷⁵⁰ It is this lack of relative power that makes the Wakil ineffective toward Son 1 of Family 15 and make it possible for Son 1 of Family 15 to persist in breaking the rules of the Wakil.

But, Son 1 of Family 15 prayed regularly enough before his Father's death. It is unlikely that he wanted to do this at the time. But, his father had the relative power to sanction him if he did not do so. This was true not only because he owned the farm and had three other sons, but because Son 1 of Family 15 had no outside resources he could use to resist. He was not an ALP. He did not have a salary that came from outside the village. He did not have a gun. He did not have friends who might help him resist.⁷⁵¹

By not attending prayers in the village *mazjet* five times per day, Son 1 of Family 15 is, of course, also breaking the Taliban's rules. However, the Taliban do not have information about how many times per day the men of the Kapisa Mountain Village pray in the *mazjet* because in the context of ISAF and the ANSF, they cannot patrol the village during the day. Even if they did, they would lack the relative power to sanction Son 1 of Family 15, whom they tried to kill several times after he stopped praying, both in the episode where Wife of Son 1 of Family 15 shot two Taliban fighters, and during the very frequent firefights between the ALP at the checkpoint in Dara 1 and Taliban fighters. They were trying to kill him for being a member of the ANSF, not for his refusal to pray, but they were also not successful.

By comparing the people who broke the Wakil and Taliban rules regarding daily prayers in the village *mazjet* and those that did not, we can see that people obey rules if they

⁷⁵⁰ 140911 Family 15 R3 and 141201 Family 15 Control Measures R3

⁷⁵¹ 140911 Family 15 R3

want to, if they agree they should, if they would do this without the intervention of an organization. It is only when they disagree that the organization must attempt to compel them to obey. In that case, they obey if and only if the organization whose rule the individual is breaking has information about the violation and the relative capacity to sanction the rule breaker. The relative capacity to sanction exists in the context of external resources the rule violator can leverage, like support from the ALP.

Contested Rule 2: Sending Daughters to School

The Taliban forbids girls from attending school or classes with the Mullah in the *mazjet*. Ideologically, the Taliban aims to separate the genders because women distract men from prayer. The government avers that parents must send all girls who wish to attend school to school. The government's ideology dictates that all Afghans, male and female, have a right to an education and if a parent choose to prevent a child from attending school, they are violating their individual human right to an education. The Wakil, on the other hand, defers to the heads of household to decide whether their daughters, and their sons, for that matter, attend school or not. While the Wakil believes these parents should ensure all of their children receive an education, he defers to the family patriarch to decide whether or not he will send his own children to school. However, the Wakil does require that all families send their daughters to study with the Mullah in the Kapisa Mountain Village *mazjet* because, as he said in 2014, he cannot trust a villager who does not ensure all of his children, male and female, learn how to practice Islam. During 2014, the new Mullah decided to combine the boys and girls Islam classes at the Kapisa Mountain Village *mazjet*, causing consternation among some of the villagers. The Mullah has the children of different

genders sit with their backs to one another, but some parents do not want their girls to attend any classes where there are boys.

Family 14 provides an example of a family that allows its girls to attend school. They do so because they believe it is incumbent on them as Muslims to provide their daughters with an education. Father of Family 14 is elderly and his eldest son, whose wife and three children reside on the family farm, is away most of the time working in Kabul as an ANA officer. The eldest child of Son 1 of Family 14 is a girl, who was 18 years old during 2014, and even though her family needed her labor on the family farm, she also attended school. In 2014, she was a student in the 10th class at the girls' high school. Her brother, who was 12 years old in 2014, was a student in the 4th class at the village school, along with Daughter 2 of Son 1 of Family 14 was only 9 years old during 2014 who was a student in the 2nd class. Family 14 sends its girls to school even though Daughter 1 faces the possibility of being harassed while walking to or from school, posing a threat to the family's honor. They do this even though she might meet a boy she likes while walking to or from school and do the family's honor even more damage by forming a relationship with him. Family 14, along with all the other families of girls attending school from the Kapisa Mountain Village, was undeterred even when the Pakistani Taliban attacked a group of girls from another village who were walking to high school with acid, severely burning them, in July of 2013. The Taliban knows girls from the Kapisa Mountain Village walk to the all girls' elementary school and the girls' high school at the same time each school day. They have information about the fact the girls, who walk in groups, wearing school uniforms, are breaking the Taliban's rules. When the Taliban attempted to attack the girls walking to school during 2013, the ALP and ANP responded immediately. When they tried to burn down the school in the Kapisa Mountain Village during 2013, the ANP responded immediately and then

posted ALP guards at the school. The Taliban knows it has relatively less coercive power than the ALP and the ANP who would back them up if the Taliban attacked the students and the ALP during the day, the Taliban chose to stop attempting to sanction the rule breaking by the female students. The Taliban is not effective in acting to sanction the rule breaking it has identified because it fears it does not have the relative coercive force to do so. As a result, Family 14 expects the Taliban will not attack Daughter 1 in transit to and from school and that the Taliban will not attack Daughter 2 at the Kapisa Mountain Village School.⁷⁵²

Son 2 of Family 3, who is a government employee, a traffic policeman in Kabul, breaks the government's rules by not allowing his two daughters, aged 17 and 14, to attend school. Son 2 of Family 3 is concerned the girls will form relationships with boys, exposing the family to shame and the possible loss of bride prices. The government does not collect information about families that do not allow their daughters to attend school. The government has information about the girls who attend school, but does not collect information about those who do not. It could acquire this information easily by requesting it from the village Wakils, but it does not. The government's strategy for collecting information about rule breaking is to wait for girls to go to the District Government Center to report that their families are violating their human rights by not allowing them to go to school. Since girls who do not attend school would be unlikely to be able to go to the District Center without a male relative, it is highly unlikely that any girl would ever file such a complaint. Although the government has the relative power required to sanction villagers for rule breaking, it lacks information about who is breaking the rule because its personnel lack the will to collect that information.

⁷⁵² 140911 Family 14 R3 and 141201 Family 14 Control Measures R3

Son 2 of Family 3 disobeys the government's rule because he disagrees with it. He expects that he will not be sanctioned for breaking it, even though the government could easily sanction him, particularly since it pays his salary. The government does not sanction Son 2 of Family 3 because it does not collect information about people breaking its rule. The government appears to lack the will to collect this information.⁷⁵³

During 2014, when the Mullah decided he only had the time to teach one class per day, for both boys and girls, at the Kapisa Mountain Village *mazjet*, Son 2 of Family 3 removed his youngest daughter, who was 14 years old, from her classes with the Mullah. He did this because he disagreed that a daughter of his should sit in the same room as boys and would prefer not to provide her an Islamic education, than to put his family's honor at risk by exposing her to the boys of the village. Honor is very important to Family 3, which moved from Area G during the Taliban period. Surviving blood feuds like those in Area G requires that a family have its honor intact so people will be afraid to attack them. This requirement is top of mind for Family 3 because in 2001, during the chaotic period immediately after the Taliban's departure, someone from Area G came to the Kapisa Mountain Village and killed Father of Family 3 as revenge in one of Area G's blood feuds. When the Mullah made his decision, he and the Wakil told the men gathered in the *mazjet*, the Wakil said, "If anyone does not agree with me and the Mullah about the need for all of the children to learn about Islam, he does not agree with Allah." The Wakil asked the villagers if a person did not send his children to the *mazjet* to learn Islam, do we want to have them live in the area?" The people said no. They thought it would make bad things happen in the area if someone like that lived here. So, if someone does not accept that he

⁷⁵³ 140911 Family 3 R3 and 141201 Family 3 Control Measures R3

must send his children, boys and girls, to the *mazjet* to study Islam, the villagers said they would throw that person out of the village.

The Mullah and Wakil visited Son 2 of Family 3 to advise him that he needed to send his daughter to study with the Mullah at the *mazjet*. They told him not to think bad things and to give his daughter the education in Islam that Allah required he give her. Son 2 of Family 3 relented after the Wakil informed him the family would be thrown out of the village unless his daughter returned to classes.⁷⁵⁴

Son 2 of Family 3 disagrees that his daughters should attend school if it exposes them to contact with males to whom they are not related by blood. This belief does not change in the case of the government or the Wakil. The difference is that the government is not an organization that is effective in collecting information about people, even its own school employees, preventing their daughters from attending school. Many government employees agree with Son 2 of Family 3 that girls should not attend school if it would risk their family's honor. Perhaps this is why they lack the motivation to collect information or sanction rule breaking. The Wakil, on the other hand, believes strongly that that all children in his village must receive an Islamic education. He collects information and then he very effectively sanctions Son 2 of Family 3 by advising him. The advice sanction informs Son 2 of Family 3 that if he continues to violate the Wakil's rule, the Wakil will throw his entire family out of the village. The difference between the government's failed attempt and the Wakil's successful attempt at control is the Wakil's effectiveness in collecting information and selectively sanctioning rule breakers. The Wakil generates an expectation that if Son 2

⁷⁵⁴ 140826 Mullah Action 1 R3

of Family 3 persists in breaking this rule, he will be expelled from the village with his entire family.⁷⁵⁵

Son 2 of Family 3 is obeying the Taliban's rules by not sending his daughters to school and he, in the end, disobeys their rules by sending his daughter to study with the Mullah. Son 2 of Family 3 obeys the Taliban's rules regarding the government school because he already wants to. The Taliban does not have to collect information and sanction him for breaking a rule because he is not breaking it. Son 2 of Family 3 breaks their rule about the girls studying with boys in the *mazjet* despite the fact he would like to comply with their rule. He only does so because an organization that has more capacity to sanction him for doing so, the Wakil, compels him to break the Taliban's rule.⁷⁵⁶

The comparison of these cases of villagers obeying or disobeying the rules of the different organizations allows us to state that villagers obey rules when they already want to comply with the rule, when they agree they should follow it. When they do not agree, an organization cannot control the behavior of a rule violator unless it has both information about the rule violator and the relative power to sanction him. That relative power includes both the resources required to implement the sanction (personnel, sanctuary, equipment, etc.) and the will by personnel to do so in the context of the resources and will the rule violator can muster to defend himself. The organization must have information about the rule violator's location and identity and be effective enough to sanction him. The organization must be able to generate an expectation that it will be able to sanction violators if they violate the rule or it cannot control behavior.

Contested Rule 3: Working for the Government

⁷⁵⁵ 140826 Mullah Action 1 R3

⁷⁵⁶ 140826 Mullah Action 1 R3

During the periods under study, the Taliban exerted most of its effort in the Kapisa Mountain Village trying to prevent villagers from joining or working for the ANA, ANP, ALP or NDS. They attempted to identify people who work for the ANSF either at the checkpoint in the desert en route home to the Kapisa Mountain Village or while they are at home and kill them. They left numerous night letters admonishing people not to join the ANSF, threatening to kill people who were members of the ANSF and offering to let them live and even recruit them to the Taliban if they quit. Over the four time periods in question, the Taliban's relative capacity to sanction rule breakers increased dramatically. The Taliban's access to information about the identity and location of people breaking their rule also increased in 2014 when it acquired the list of 160 ANA and ANP in the Kapisa Mountain District with pictures and villages. While people's expectation that the Taliban would sanction them increased over time, the Taliban's control over people joining the ANSF or remaining in it increased only very slightly. This is likely because the Taliban's efforts to change people's behavior happened within the context of another organization, the government, attempting to influence villagers to join the ANSF.

The government used the external resources provided to it by the Coalition to generate economic incentives to encourage people to join and remain in the ANSF. These external resources increased greatly between 2010 and the end of 2014, as the Coalition pumped external resources into building and expanding the ANSF. These economic incentives were of high value to the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village, since salaries for a single family member in the ANSF amounted to more than four times the average per family income of villagers from their traditional farms. This enormous economic incentive in the context of the persistent poverty and economic uncertainty of traditional farming in

the Kapisa Mountain Village was a strong inducement for people to join the ANSF and remain in it despite threats.

Additionally, the Coalition's organizational effectiveness and external resources in the Kapisa Mountain District during 2010, 2011 and 2012 provided the government with the relative capacity to prevent the Taliban from attacking ANSF travelling to or from the Kapisa Mountain Village, or home on leave in the village. But, as the ISAF surge ended and the Pakistani Taliban surge ramped up, the government, which still had extensive external resources, but had lost organizational effectiveness, no longer protected the members of the ANSF when they were home in the Kapisa Mountain Village on leave or travelling there or back. As Taliban night patrols ceased at the end of 2012, the Taliban began setting up their checkpoint in the desert, searching passengers for government identification with accelerating regularly. Additionally, during the surge in Pakistani Taliban resources and activities, the Pakistani Taliban gained increased access to external information in the form of lists of members of the ANSF, their cell phone numbers and photos. Most importantly, during the summer and fall of 2014, the number of Pakistani Taliban fighters in the Kapisa Mountain District grew to more than 1,600 and the organization translated those new personnel into increased patrols, checkpoints and attacks on villagers who were members of the ANSF or were outside at night.

Different villagers have different reactions to the efforts of these two organizations to control their provision of personnel to the ANSF. By 2014, the majority of families in the Kapisa Mountain Village had at least one member who was working for the ANSF, violating the Taliban's rule.

In the minority, there are families, like Family 4, in which no members join the ANSF or work for the government. Family 4 owns a store in Parwan, which Father of Family 4 used to operate. His wife, two sons and three daughters operated the family farm, making about 10,000 Afs per month, while all of the children attended school in the Kapisa Mountain District. The eldest child, Son 1 of Family 4, graduated from high school and took over his father's store in Parwan, transforming it from a produce store into a cell phone store, which garnered 50,000 Afs per month. When it came time for this young man to get married, the family had plenty of money for a bride price. The second son of Family 4 graduated from high school in 2014 and began working as a tailor's apprentice, earning small amounts of money making clothes for villagers on the side. Some day, he will have his own tailor's shop, probably in the *bazaar* in the Kapisa Mountain District. In order to generate additional income, the Father of Family 4 used some of the money they have earned from the shop in Parwan to buy a mill to turn wheat into flour. There was no mill in the village before and the family will make one bag of flour for every ten it mills, augmenting its income again. Through these three jobs and the farm, Family 4 makes *halal* money and it does not put family members at risk of being targeted by the Taliban either at home in the Kapisa Mountain District or while deployed. Further, the family has three daughters and stands to gain at least 200,000 Afs in bride price for each one over the next several years. Family 4 has had the good fortune not to desperately need the funds an ANSF salary brings, but it has also made choices to avoid exposure to Taliban threats.⁷⁵⁷

Father of Family 4 dislikes the Pakistani Taliban, but this is not a sufficient reason for his sons to join the ANSF. Father of Family 4 has openly expressed his disagreement with the Pakistani Taliban's aims and actions. In mid-December 2014, Mullah gave a

⁷⁵⁷ 140911 Family 4 R3 and 141201 Family 4 Control Measures R3

sermon saying that suicide attacks are wrong and that fighting against the government and ISAF is not *jihad* and that people who undertake suicide attacks will go to Hell, not Paradise.

As the villagers discussed the sermon, Father of Family 4 said,

“Mullah said something right about suicide attackers. Also, enemies of Afghanistan do not want Afghans to have a good life, economy and security. The way the Mullah said to help the people and government is good, by giving information about attackers. If you help the government, we will have good security. If you do not help them, the government cannot provide security.”⁷⁵⁸

In another example of Father of Family 4’s open disagreement with the Taliban, after Son 2 of Family 3 refused to pay the Mullah his full due in August of 2014, the Wakil, elders and other men from the village discussed the incident. Father of Family 4 reinforced the Wakil’s authority and expressed his dislike for the Pakistani Taliban, saying,

“If a person wants to break the rules of the village, the people must not allow him to do that. Otherwise, people will do lots of unlawful things. They will think, he broke that rule. Now, I will break this rule. Then, the Wakil will not have control over people. Everyone will have his own rules. If only 1 or 2 people break rules, Wakil can handle that. If everyone broke rules at once, Wakil couldn't sanction all of them at once. Wakil is a good, intelligent man who knows how to control and talk to the people. It is difficult. He is very patient with villagers with different ideas. He works for all their ideas, for everything. Everyone is happy with him.”

“Taliban makes big problems here. We are between the government and the Taliban. Wakil plays with his life. Maybe one day the Pakistani Taliban will arrest him. Maybe he will be tortured or killed. Afghan Taliban understand this Wakil. He is a just a Wakil. He is a representative of the people. Maybe the Pakistani Taliban think he is a government spy and will try to arrest and kill him. We should pray for this Wakil.”⁷⁵⁹

Father of Family 4 disagrees with the Pakistani Taliban, but is well aware of the threat to villagers from them. He developed a strategy to keep his sons safe, while contributing as he can to the Wakil’s efforts to keep the Taliban out of the village without making the village a target of their ire. The government has not provided him with

⁷⁵⁸ 141219 Mazjet Friday R3

⁷⁵⁹ 141114 Community Narrative R3

sufficient incentives for his sons to join the ANSF relative to the risk he and his family could expect to face if they did join. The relative power of the Taliban and its demonstrated willingness to harass and kill people have made Father of Family 4 unwilling to provide his sons as government personnel, even though Father of Family 4 is willing to help the government by giving them information about the Taliban.

Family 10 made very different decisions. After graduating from high school, the eldest son of the family became an ANA soldier in 2011, but was killed by the Taliban while home on leave in the village at the end of October in 2014. When his younger brother sought to join the ALP in order to exact revenge upon the specific Pakistani Taliban who had killed his brother, thereby repairing Family 10's honor, his parents and the Wakil refused to allow him to do so. During 2011, the Taliban failed to control the behavior of Son 1 of Family 10, who joined the ANA. But, in 2014, they controlled the behavior of Family 10, by eliminating the member of the family who broke their rule and then by creating an expectation that if their second son joined, he too would be killed. Because he was the only remaining son of the family, this would leave Family 10 without an heir and Father and Mother of Family 10 with no one to care for them in their old age.

Family 10 is a traditional farming family that has done very well because of the industriousness of Father and Mother of Family 10. Family 10 has only a half a square kilometer of land, which generates a paltry 20,000 Afs worth of produce per year. In order to earn more money, Father of Family 10 buys cows from people who cannot for some reason take them to the *bazaar* themselves. He buys the cows for 15,000 Afs and they sell for 20,000 Afs, so he makes about 5,000 Afs for each cow he buys and resells. The family made a good amount of money doing this, so Father of Family 10 now farms another field in

the Kapisa Mountain Village, in return for a 500,000 Af loan to the owner. Now, the family makes about 80,000 Afs per year from the sale of produce. The family had two sons and three daughters.

Son 1 of Family 10 completed 12th grade in 2011 and joined the ANA because he wanted to make extra money and he liked the idea of being powerful, honorable because he could fight. He worked at the Kabul International Airport and came home nearly every weekend and for weeklong stretches of leave once a month. He made 12,000 Afs per month and had a wife and a baby boy who lived with his parents in the Kapisa Mountain Village. Son 1 of Family 10 joined the ANA in order to make extra money for the family and because he liked the idea of being strong and powerful. He believed he would not be at risk from attacks by the Taliban since he worked at the relatively secure Kabul airport and the Kapisa Mountain District was a safe place for ANSF when he joined the ANA. It is unclear how the Pakistani Taliban got the information that Son 1 of Family 10 was home on leave at the end of October in 2014. But, they knew and waited in the dark between the *mazjet* and Family 10 House after night prayers and shot Son 1 of Family 10 while he was walking home. In so doing, the Taliban not only eliminated a member of the ANSF, they provided an example to people in the ANSF or considering joining the ANSF that if they did so, they could expect to be killed by the Taliban.

Son 2 of Family 10 attended the *madrassa* in the Kapisa Mountain District Capital and a school for Koris in Kabul. He has been helping his father with the farm and the cattle business and attending the teacher's course in the District Capital in the hope of becoming an Islam teacher in the public schools in the Kapisa Mountain District. This post would pay

only 9,000 Afs per month. Being a Kori does provide him with extra income since people pay him occasionally to recite the Koran.

When his brother was killed, even though the killing demonstrated that the Pakistani Taliban could and would kill villagers who worked for the ANSF, Son 2 of Family 10 approached his father, the Wakil, Mullah and elders to get permission to join the ALP. He specifically wanted to join the ALP in order to avenge his brother and thereby repair his family's honor by demonstrating that Family 10 would kill anyone who killed a member of Family 10. The ALP was his choice, not because of the salary, but because it offered him the ability to kill the specific Pakistani Taliban who had killed his brother. Son 2 of Family 10 was willing to risk being killed by them in order to repair his family's honor. But, when he asked permission of his father, his father begged him not to do this. If the family lost its only remaining son, there would be no one to take care of or protect Father and Mother of Family 10 as they grew old. Also, there would be no one to inherit their small farm and house. Father and Mother of Family 10 told their son he could not join the ALP. The Wakil then forbade him and told him he would talk to the ALP Commander to ensure he would not hire Son 2 of Family 10. Son 2 of Family 10 did not join the ALP.

Son 2 of Family 10 obeyed the Taliban's rule and disobeyed the government's rule because his family had learned that the Taliban could identify members of the ANSF and kill them. The Taliban created an expectation of a sanction that was of high value to Family 10. In order to do that, the Taliban required information about the location of Son 1 of Family 10 and the fact that he had broken the Taliban's rule by being in the ANA. They also needed enough external resources (in the form of personnel and equipment) to have the capacity relative to the government, Wakil and the individual villager in question, to sanction the

rule breaker. But, those external resources were only relevant to the extent the Taliban as an organization could translate them into actions by its personnel. And, that combination of external resources and organizational effectiveness were only relevant to the extent they outweighed the combination of those two factors to generate the capacity relative to organizations seeking to prevent the Taliban from sanctioning rule breakers.⁷⁶⁰

Family 14 provides an example of a family that broke Taliban rules by providing three of its sons as ANA officers. After the Pakistani Taliban assassinated Son 1 of Family 10, Son 1, Son 2, and Son 4 did not quit the ANA in order to protect their family. That would mean sacrificing 57,000 Afs in salaries per month and that does not include Eid or other bonuses. Instead, during October of 2014, Son 1 of Family 14 moved his elderly father, his wife and children out of the Kapisa Mountain Village and to Kabul, where his other brothers and their families already resided. The Taliban was unable to stop the sons of Family 14 from being part of the ANA, but it is able to prevent them from residing in the Kapisa Mountain Village while doing so. Without information about the location of the Sons of Family 14 and the relative capacity to go there to sanction those individuals, the Taliban became unable to stop Family 14 from providing personnel to the ANSF. Family 14 changed its location, making the information the Taliban had about them useless in the short run and moved to a location where the Taliban lacked the relative capacity to sanction the brothers for breaking the Taliban's rule about being ANA officers.⁷⁶¹

Family 15 also provides an example of a family that broke Taliban rules by providing multiple members to the ANSF, in violation of the Taliban's rules, but did not move. The sons of this family started joining the ANSF early, during 2009, when Son 3 of

⁷⁶⁰ 140911 Family 10, 141201 Family 10 and 141106 Community Narrative

⁷⁶¹ 140911 Family 14 R3 and 141201 Family 14 Control Measures R3

Family 15, the first in his family to attend school, left school after 9th grade to take a job with the ANP in Mazar, where is a non-commissioned officer. This job, with its lucrative salary of 16,000 Afs per month was very useful to the family, which makes only 65,000 Afs per year from the produce from their land, which is not very fertile because it is close to the mountain and does not get much sun. Working in Mazar was not risky at anytime under study because of its heavily Tajik and Uzbek population and lack of Taliban presence. Until 2011, Son 1, Son 2 and Son 4 continued to assist their father in tending the farm.⁷⁶²

In 2011, Father of Family 15 died from old age and the family splintered, in large part because the eldest son, Son 1 of Family 15, was not generating unity inside his family by treating his brothers well or looking after their interests. Son 2 of Family 15 moved to Kabul, where he found a job as a security company at one of the many international companies or organizations in Kabul. Just after his father's death, Son 1 of Family 15 approached the ALP Commander and asked if he could join. By joining the ALP, Son 1 of Family 15 gained an additional 19,000 Afs per month in badly needed income and augmented his own power relative to the Wakil by becoming part of a *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* militia. By joining the ALP in 2011, Son 1 of Family 15 put himself at only a moderate risk from the Taliban because during the surge in ISAF presence, the Taliban were not targeting ANSF homes and families or able to attack ALP patrols or checkpoints with impunity. After his father's death, the youngest son of Family 15, who was not able to learn in school and has a low grade developmental disorder, left to go to Iran to earn money working in construction there to pay for a bride price.⁷⁶³

⁷⁶² 140911 Family 15 R3

⁷⁶³ 140911 Family 15 R3 and 141201 Family 15 Control Measures R3

Family 15 continued to provide personnel to the ANSF even as Taliban attacks on ANSF home on leave ramped up in the Kapisa Mountain District. In April 2014, having just completed high school, Son 1 of Son 1 of Family 15 joined the ANA and enrolled in the year long officer's training course in Kabul. Neither he nor his father were at home when his mother, aunt, grandmother and younger siblings were attacked by the Taliban and managed to repel them during December of 2014. Despite this attack, which was an effort by the Taliban to influence the members of Family 15 to quit their jobs and to influence others in the village and district to quit or not to join the ANSF in the first place, Son 1, Son 3 and Son 1 of Son 1 of Family 15 did not quit the ANP, ALP or ANA. Family 15 also did not move out of the Kapisa Mountain Village to Kabul.⁷⁶⁴

Pakistani Taliban night letters, their assassination of Son 1 of Family 10 and their demonstrated ability to attack the entire village in November 2014 failed to deter Son 1 of Son of Family 2 from joining the ANA later in November of 2014. Prior to Son 1 of Son of Family 2 joining the ANA, Family 2 had provided no members to the ANSF. It was a poor family and Son of Family 2 managed to eke out a living for his family by farming and driving a taxi. Together, this provided the family of 6 with only 25,000 Afs per month to live on. When Son 1 of Son of Family 2 turned 18 and graduated from high school, joining the ANA as an officer provided a very good option for him because when he completes his course, he will make 19,000 Afs per month. He will need to make money quickly because his eldest sister is only 10 years old and he will therefore not be able to get married for seven or eight years unless he can find a way to make enough money for a brideprice. The ANA is therefore an excellent option for him. He and his family disregarded the demonstrated threat from the Taliban and their ability to get information about his rule breaking and

⁷⁶⁴ 140911 Family 15 R3 and 141201 Family 15 Control Measures R3

when he might be home so they could kill him. Just before his 18 year old son joined the ANA, Son of Family 2 demonstrated his understanding of the threats to families who provided personnel to the ANSF and to the village when he argued against organizing the villagers to prevent the Taliban from coming into the Kapisa Mountain Village. He said anyone could get a gun and attack the Taliban easily, but that this was very dangerous. He said it was dangerous because the Taliban could react to an attack by us by concentrating its forces to attacking our . He said the government might also be angry at the people of the village for attacking the Taliban. Despite his clear eyed understanding of the danger his son placed himself in by joining the ANA, Son of Family 2 allowed his son to do so. They broke the rule even though they knew the Taliban could get information and use it to target Son 1 of Son of Family 2 for breaking the rule.⁷⁶⁵ They complied with the government's effort to influence young men to join the ANA because of the lucrative salary. Perhaps the family gambles on the hope that the Taliban will not figure out their son is in the ANA or will not be able to determine when he is at home in order to attack or kill him.

Son 2 of Son of Family 1 also joined the ANP in November of 2014 despite the Taliban's night letters and their assassination of Son 1 of Family 10.⁷⁶⁶ Son of Family 1 and his younger son are very well aware of the threats from the Taliban to people who join the ANSF. At the meeting after the Pakistani Taliban killed Son 1 of Family 10 and left a night letter threatening to kill ANSF while they are home on leave, Son of Family 1 said,

“Oh Brothers, we are poor people without authority. When the government suggests to us that we get guns, we will never get a gun unless the government also gives us a salary. I do not want to make security worse by getting a gun in this area. When I get a gun and the Taliban arrests me, they

⁷⁶⁵ 140911 Family 2 R3 and 141201 Family 2 Control Measures R3

⁷⁶⁶ 141201 Family 1 Control Measures R3

will behead me. We are farmers. We should occupy ourselves with that. I do not busy myself with politics. It is not the business of farmers.”⁷⁶⁷

Family 1 has always been very poor since it has only a small and not very productive piece of land. To augment their paltry farming income of only 2,500 Afs per month, Son of Family 1 became a Dari teacher at the girls’ high school in 2009. He makes 9,000 Afs per month as a teacher. The family’s financial prospects should improve soon since Son 1 of Son of Family 1 began studying to be a mechanic after graduating from high school during 2013. He should begin getting a salary in the spring of 2015. Son 2 of Son of Family 1 completed high school in the spring of 2014, assisted his father in harvesting and planting and looked for a job throughout the summer and fall of 2014. In November 2014, he joined the ANP in November of 2014, shortly after his father’s statement above, as an officer, garnering 19,000 Afs per month in salary for his family.⁷⁶⁸

The significant monetary incentives provided by the government to people who join the ANSF were very effective in encouraging villagers to join even in the face of threats to their lives from the Taliban. The Taliban could only sanction people for violating this rule if it had information about who had broken the rule and where they were, along with the relative coercive force to be able to sanction them for breaking it. Some people, like Family 4, obeyed the Taliban’s rule despite the government’s inducements to join the ANSF, not because they agreed with the Taliban, but because they feared the Taliban’s sanctions. This was also true of Family 10 after Son 1 of Family 10 was killed by the Taliban as a sanction. The Taliban had created an expectation that was strong enough of a sanction that was valuable enough and that the families believed they could not resist.

⁷⁶⁷ 141106 Community Narrative R3

⁷⁶⁸ 140911 Family 1 R3 and 141201 Family 1 Control Measures R3

Others, however, like Family 15 or Family 1 or 2, continued to break the rule even after the Taliban repeatedly demonstrated its ability to acquire information about the identity and location of ANSF personnel and sanction them for their participation in the ANSF.

The difference in these cases may be a risk-reward calculation. For the Father of Family 4 and for his sons, who disagree with the rules of the Taliban and have developed reasonable methods for making additional money, the ANSF option is not a significant enough benefit to be worth the risk to their sons. For Son 1 of Family 15, who wanted to free himself from the rules of the Wakil and who had limited other options for making money, the ANSF is a greater benefit. He may also have a higher tolerance for risk. Similarly, Family 1 and Family 2's economic situations are far more precarious than that of Family 4, leading them to evaluate that the risk of allowing their sons to join the ANA and ANP may be outweighed by the relative impact of the monetary rewards for his doing so.

Over time in the Kapisa Mountain Village, the Taliban's ability to collect information and to sanction villagers increased as its resources and organizational effectiveness increased. The government's incentives for joining the ANSF remained constant, but its organizational effectiveness in providing security for ANSF while they were home declined significantly. Although the Taliban's control over people joining the ANSF increased somewhat, many still did and no one quit the ANSF.

The Taliban increased its control over the behavior by generating an expectation that it can acquire information and has the relative capacity to sanction rule breakers. However, its control is not absolute because its competitor organization is also influencing

people's behavior. Individuals and families conduct a risk-reward calculation to determine whether or not they should obey the Taliban or the government. The government offers enormous economic incentives and individuals try to determine how they will manage the risk that the Taliban will get information about their location and have the relative capacity to kill them. The Taliban's access to information about the identity and location of ANSF and its relative capacity to sanction rule breakers increased between 2012 and 2015, increasing the organization's control over people joining the ANSF. However, even in the context of the increasing likelihood that the Taliban would sanction them, people continued to join the ANSF and remain in it because the incentives provided by the government are significant and they think perhaps the Taliban will not be able to get information about their rule breaking and sanction them.

Contested Rule 4: Taking Drugs and Gambling

All three organizations want to influence villagers not to gamble, take drugs or drink alcohol. Although the punishments they threaten, and the will their personnel have to collect information or sanction rule breaking vary, their rules are the same.

During the periods under study, the amount of drug use, gambling and drinking increased greatly even though all of these organizations sought to prevent those activities. Unlike the rules governing praying in the village *mazjet*, or girls attending school, it is difficult for the Wakil, Taliban and government to identify rule breaking because the rule breakers conceal their activities at night in the woods.

The vast majority of residents of the Kapisa Mountain Village do not engage in these activities because they do not want to. Many people in the village would, for instance, never

consider smoking opium because they believe it would distract them from worshipping Allah, make them behave like animals, and because if they did, Allah would punish them on Doomsday. Additionally, it is very expensive, so families with very little money are deterred from these activities. The Wakil and Mullah work to generate agreement among villagers that they should not take drugs or gamble, giving sermons and advice on these topics, to convince people not to do these things because Allah will punish them, because it is bad for them and it is bad for their families and the village.

But, some villagers break these rules because they want to. In effect, the rule breakers disagree the rule should apply to them. One such person is the Father of Family 7, who is addicted to opium. He smokes it in the woods nightly with people from some of the surrounding villages. He smokes opium to reduce stress; because the Taliban and Wakil have no knowledge of him doing so and therefore do not sanction him for breaking this rule; and because he has enough money to do so. Father of Family 7 only began smoking opium in 2013 when his income greatly increased. Father of Family 7 has a son who moved to Dubai to earn money in construction and now this poor, traditional agricultural family has money it never had. Since 2013, Son 1 of Family 7 has sent around 55,000 Afs per month to his father, who makes only 6,000 Afs per month as a farmer. This income represents a huge increase for Family 7, which never had money to spare before 2013. Father of Family 7 spends some of that money on opium. He spent some of it on setting up businesses, including a shop in the bazaar that sold flowers and one in the Kapisa Mountain Village that attempted to compete with the Kapisa Mountain Village Shop. Both of these businesses failed, at least in part because Father of Family 7 spent some of his money on opium.⁷⁶⁹

⁷⁶⁹ 140911 Family 7 R3 and 141201 Family 7 Control Measures R3

Father of Family 7 is someone who would likely never have smoked opium if he did not have extra money and the opium were not available from opium sellers. He started smoking opium when there was little risk of getting caught doing so by the Taliban. Once he was addicted and the Taliban began patrolling the village more regularly during the summer and fall of 2014, the risk he was taking in doing so increased greatly. In the fall of 2014, Family 7 moved to Kabul with other families from the Kapisa Mountain Village not only because he smokes opium, but also because his daughters attend school, his brother is an ANP and the family has the money needed to move because of Son 1 of Family 7's remittances from Dubai.⁷⁷⁰

The Wakil, government and Taliban are unable to control Son 1 of Family 7's behavior because they lack information about it. Because Son 1 of Family 7 fears they might get that information and sanction him, he changes his location, moving out of the reach of the Wakil and Taliban in downtown Kabul. The government lacks the will and organization to arrest Father of Family 7 for smoking opium in the Kapisa Mountain Village or Kabul, where they neither seek information about these activities, nor regularly sanction people for them. Father of Family 7 breaks this rule because he wants to, because he does not agree that he should have to obey it. That does not vary over the four periods of time in question. What does increase is his expectation that the Taliban will discover his rule breaking and kill him for it. It increases because the number of patrols at night through the woods increases. That is because the Taliban's external resources (manpower, money and equipment) increase and the organization is effective enough to cause its personnel to patrol and consistently sanction people for taking opium. There is no question in Father of Family 7's mind that if the Taliban found him in the woods smoking opium, they would kill

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid

him. The Taliban is not able to stop Father of Family 7 from smoking opium, but they are able to cause him to move to Kabul.⁷⁷¹

Son of Family 1, the Dari teacher at the girls' high school, whose youngest son joined the ANP in November of 2014, provides an example of someone who occasionally takes drugs in the Kapisa Mountain Village. During August of 2014, he smoked hashish in the woods with ten or twelve people from the surrounding villages. It is unclear how often he does this, but he does it because he wants to, because he has the extra money to do so and because he is willing to take the risk that the Wakil and or Taliban might catch him and punish him. He is not punished because the Wakil and Taliban do not have information about him smoking hashish.⁷⁷²

There are cases in which organizations fail to stop people from breaking these rules even when they have information about the rule breaking. Everyone in the village knows that Son 1 of Family 15 gambled in the woods near the village in August 2014 and lost 500,000 Afs. As mentioned earlier, Son 4 of Family 15 moved to Iran to do construction for three years (2011-2014) in order to earn 500,000 Afs for a brideprice and the cost of a wedding party. He returned at harvest time and gave the money to his older brother, whose duty was to negotiate a marriage with this brideprice. But, instead, Son 1 of Family 15 had to use it to repay his gambling debt, which he acquired in August of 2014. Son 4 of Family 15 had to return to Iran to earn more money and therefore everyone knew what had happened. Despite the fact that gambling is against the Wakil's rules, as is failing as the head of a family to ensure your younger brothers get married, and the Wakil knows Son 1 of Family 15 broke the rules, the Wakil cannot control Son 1 of Family 15. He cannot do so

⁷⁷¹ Ibid

⁷⁷² 141201 Family 1 Control Measures R3

because Son 1 of Family 15 is a member of the ALP and therefore has the backing of a powerful militia. Additionally, the Wakil needs the external coercive force the ALP Commander can provide in order to defend the village and therefore does not want to have any conflicts with Son 1 of Family 15. The Wakil lacks the relative coercive force to sanction Son 1 of Family 15 because he can reach out the ALP Commander to protect him from the Wakil and villagers.⁷⁷³

The Taliban, on the other hand, may not have information about Son 1 of Family 15's gambling. They might have attempted to sanction him if they did, but as evinced in December 2014 in the battle between Wife of Son 1 of Family 15 and the Pakistani Taliban that ensued from Son 1 of Family 15 breaking the Taliban's rule prohibiting membership in the ALP, they would need to commit more resources if they want to sanction any member of Family 15. The Taliban would need more relative capacity to sanction Family 15 than it committed to killing Son 1 of Family 15 for being in the ALP in December 2014.

The government does not have information about one of its personnel gambling, which is illegal, because the government does not patrol and it waits for Wakils or other residents to call to report crimes. In this case, the Wakil would not do so because it is unlikely the police would arrest an ALP for the same reasons the Wakil would not report him.

In each of the cases where people violated these rules, they did so because they wanted to do so, because they disagreed that the rule should apply to them. When an organization failed to sanction the rule breakers, it was because it either lacked information

⁷⁷³ 140911 Family 15 R3 and 141201 Family 15 Control Measures R3

about their rule breaking, as in the case of Son of Family 1 or Father of Family 7, or they lacked the relative capacity to apply sanctions, as in the case of Son 1 of Family 15.

In the case of the people who were hiding their rule breaking, they were making a risk calculation to determine whether or not the value to them was worth the risk that their rule breaking would be identified by either organization. The risk that the organization would identify the rule breaking is directly related to the agreement of the population with the rules of the organization in question, as well as the resources and organizational effectiveness of that organization. The organization must either be able to acquire information from villagers who agree that the rule breaking should be sanctioned and how it should be sanctioned, or by conducting patrols. Conducting patrols requires organizational effectiveness. That is why even though it is illegal to take drugs or gamble, no one fears that the government will find out they are breaking the rule.

One strategy villagers employ when an organization has information or they fear the organization might get information about their rule breaking and the relative capacity to sanction them for it is to move to Kabul. Moving to Kabul makes the information the organization has about their location moot and none of the organizations in question have the relative capacity to sanction them in Kabul.

Village-Wide Contested Rule: Providing Sanctuary to the Taliban

The government wants residents of the Kapisa Mountain Village to give them information about Taliban presence and actions whenever the Taliban come to the village. The Taliban wants villagers to allow them to pass through the village and operate there.

The Taliban wants villagers not to provide information about their presence to the government because the Taliban fear the government might use that information to attack the Taliban in the Kapisa Mountain Village. If villagers were to comply with the wishes of the Taliban, they would be providing the Taliban with sanctuary.

The consensus among the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village is that they do not want to provide sanctuary to the Taliban and that they would like the government to attack the Taliban. The agreement among the villagers that they do not want the Taliban to be able to enter the village, move around or sanction people does not change across the four different periods under study. What does vary is the amount of external resources available to the government from ISAF, the amount of external resources available to the Pakistani Taliban and the effectiveness of both organizations. The resources available to the Wakil declined only slightly over the entire period. But, his relative capacity to sanction rule breakers who could leverage support from the better-resourced government and Taliban declined significantly.

The Kapisa Mountain Village does not provide sanctuary to the Taliban during the surge in Coalition resources and actions. When ISAF and ANSF soldiers are regularly patrolling the village and surrounding area, by both night and day, the villagers provide information to ISAF and the government about Taliban presence in the Kapisa Mountain Village in the hope that ISAF and the government will come sanction the Taliban for entering the village. In this case, the Wakil is reaching out to leverage external military resources to prevent the Taliban from attacking villagers. While the French remained in the Kapisa Mountain District, the government consistently responded to these calls, allowing the Wakil to work with the government to deny the Taliban sanctuary.

But, during 2013, when the Wakil gave the government information about Taliban presence, government personnel did not come to the Kapisa Mountain Village in order to prevent the Taliban from sanctioning people, demonstrating the decrease in the government's organizational ineffectiveness in the wake of the French withdrawal from Kapisa. Villagers became increasingly reticent to give information to the government about Taliban presence at night since the government was unlikely to come help them and in some cases, such as when the Taliban beat villagers or abducted elders, might make the situation worse. By contrast, villagers were willing to inform the government when the Taliban came to the village during the day because the government would respond by coming to drive the Taliban out.

During 2013, the Taliban blew up the hydrogenerator and then informed the villagers they could not have lights on outside at night so that villagers would not be able to collect information about the Taliban being present in the village. The villagers told the ANP and asked them to conduct patrols, but the ANP demurred, saying they could not conduct patrols in all of the villages all of the time. The ANP Commander told the Wakil that people should comply with the Taliban's rule and not leave their lights on at night. The Wakil could therefore no longer prevent the Taliban from entering the village by calling for external military resources. The Wakil and villagers therefore effectively provided sanctuary to the Taliban by not preventing them from entering the village. The villagers provided sanctuary not because they wanted the Taliban to be there, but because they lacked the relative capacity to repel the Taliban, with its increased external resources and effective organization. The villagers, who had lost the support of the increasingly ineffective government security forces, believed the resources they could organize from their village

would not be sufficient to repel the Taliban. Therefore, the village grudgingly provided sanctuary to the Taliban at night.

Throughout all of the periods under study, the Wakil did not organize the villagers to resist the Taliban's presence with coercive force. When the Taliban blew up the generator, abducted elders, beat villagers for being outside at night and assassinated or attempted to assassinate villagers for working for the government, the Wakil did not gather the hundreds of military aged males and the weapons each family kept in its home to conduct patrols and attack the Taliban themselves as the Taliban entered the village. Indeed, the Wakil asked the villagers whether they should do this to protect the majority of the families of the village, who all broke the Taliban's rules by providing at least one member of the family to the ANSF. Holding to his core strategic goal of maintaining the consent and unity of the village, the Wakil did not organize patrols or ambushes because the villagers did not want him to. The villagers decided not to rise up because they feared that if they did, the Taliban might mass its by then considerable fighting force of over 1600 men to assault the 100 houses in the Kapisa Mountain Village. As a community, they calculated that the individual households were at less risk if they simply defended themselves when they were attacked, as Family 15 had, than if they organized to overtly deny the Taliban access to the village, to deny it sanctuary.

Interestingly, this was true when there were significant external resources and when there were not. In effect, the village did not publically choose sides in the war, keeping a low profile, providing personnel to ANSF units that were far away, denouncing the Taliban's actions in sermons, and saying disparaging things about them, but never organizing to deny them sanctuary. The only mechanism they used to deny the Taliban

sanctuary was giving the government security forces information about Taliban presence or expected presence in the village. In this way, the village indirectly attacked the Taliban through the security forces. But, the village never directly attacked the Taliban for fear of retribution not just in the moment, but far into the divergent possible futures. In a number of these possible futures, the Taliban could return to power and smite villages that had openly resisted or attacked it.

During the surge in ISAF external resources, the Kapisa Mountain Village denied the Taliban sanctuary by providing information to ISAF regarding the presence of the Taliban. The Wakil used ISAF and its Afghan military and police partners to repel Taliban presence without revealing the village's participation in the ensuing threats to and attacks on the Taliban. After ISAF departed, the Wakil continued this practice, but to decreasing effect as the ANSF stopped patrolling or engaging the enemy at night. By 2014, the Wakil and villagers acquiesced to the presence and attacks by the Taliban on villagers. They provided sanctuary by not resisting the presence. Throughout these time periods, before the ISAF surge, during the ISAF surge, after it and during the Pakistani Taliban surge, the people of the Kapisa Mountain Village strongly disagreed with the Taliban's goals for the future, their means of achieving them and all their actions in the village. The disagreement of the village with the Taliban did not vary. What did change was the external resources and organizational effectiveness of the government and the Taliban. As those changed, the village went from not providing sanctuary to the Taliban to providing them sanctuary.

But, this did not have to be so. The Wakil could have organized the villagers to resist. There were hundreds of military aged males and each of the roughly one hundred households had a weapon. Almost to a man, the villagers did not want the Taliban to be

there. So, why did they not resist? They did not resist because they feared the Taliban would mass its fighters and punish any village that resisted them. They feared this vengeance not only in the present, but also in any distant future situations in which government forces were weaker and the Taliban were stronger. By not attacking the Taliban, the villagers did not expose themselves as a target. As they put it, they remained simple farmers, not involving themselves in politics.

Is there something the government could have done to provide them with the necessary incentives to organize against the Taliban? Yes, the villagers fear that they might be singled out for violating the Taliban's rule if they resist. If all of the villages were organized together, then this would not be a fear. If they were all organized and had agreements about mutual aid in the case of a Taliban attack on any one of them, then the villagers would not have feared these outcomes. In effect, a set of villages, bound together by an agreement to aid one another, each with its own set of police from the village patrolling and engaging the enemy, would have provided an incentive to which not only the Kapisa Mountain Village, but probably the other villages in Daras 2 and 3, as well as P1, would have responded. These incentives would have been reinforced if there were a quick reaction force from the security forces that would respond to large scale assaults by the Taliban. If the villagers of the Kapisa Mountain Village had been able to trust in these security guarantees over time, they would have been happy to organize to repel Taliban presence. But, without a way to survive the possibility of being singled out and attacked and finding oneself alone with relatively limited defensive resources, they would comply with the Taliban's insistence that they provide the organization sanctuary.

It is a particular form of government organizational ineffectiveness, then, that drove the Kapisa Mountain Village not to resist. The ALP Program was basically designed to do what was just described, provide village police resident in the village they patrolled across a set of villages and could call the ANP and ANA for backup when required. Under the program as it was designed, the Wakils of many of the villages would have been able to select ALP from among their own villagers and these ALP would have patrolled the village and engaged any Taliban. If ISAF and the government had organized the ALP to provide mutual aid and had guaranteed a response to contact in the event of attack by a Taliban force of substantial size, the villages of Dara 2 and 3 would likely have gladly denied the Taliban sanctuary in the Kapisa Mountain Village. Even P1 Village, in Dara 1, had already signed on to have village police and repel the Taliban, despite its pro-Taliban sentiments and history. In the context of the mismanagement of the ALP program such that it did not result in village guards, but instead a roving *Jamat e Islami*, expressly non-Pashtun militia that lacked the will to consistently patrol or come when villagers provided information about Taliban presence, the Kapisa Mountain Village had little incentive to deny the Taliban sanctuary. Doing so would have exposed the village to security threats it could not manage alone and the villagers might have been slaughtered for sticking their necks out.

In effect, the village complies with the Taliban rule and disobeys the government rule, not because it wants to, but because it expects a sanction if it does not comply with the Taliban. The village expects this sanction if and only if the Taliban has information about village non-compliance. For that reason, it provides information about Taliban presence to the Coalition and its Afghan government partners when it wants the Coalition to attack the Taliban. By giving information to the Coalition and government, the village is denying the Taliban sanctuary, but not allowing the Taliban to know they did so. Once the Coalition

departed and the ANSF refused to come at night, villagers lost the ability to prevent Taliban from entering the village without exposing the fact that it was the villagers who refused to comply with the rules of the Taliban. The village does not comply because it wants the Taliban there, it complies because it expects a sanction if it openly violates the Taliban's rule.

The government's organizational effectiveness, first in not properly constructing the ALP program and second in not patrolling or coming when called at night to engage the Taliban fail to provide the incentives required for the villagers to act to prevent the Taliban from having sanctuary in the Kapisa Mountain Village.

A Process for Controlling Behavior

By comparing the cases of people who broke the rules of the various organizations with the cases of people who complied with them, we can see there are two reasons people comply with an organization's rules. First, they do so because they want to, because they agree with the rule in the first place. But, second, because they expect a sanction that is of value to them if they do not comply with the rule. Based on the comparison of people breaking and following rules in the Kapisa Mountain Village, we can say people expect a sanction when they expect an organization is likely to acquire information about their violation of a rule and they expect the organization will act upon that information by sanctioning them. In order to generate that expectation, an organization must have resources that are large enough relative to those the rule breaker can muster to defend himself from the organization's sanction. The organization must be effective enough to cause its personnel to sanction the rule breaker. And, it must have resources and

effectiveness that generate a relative capacity to sanction that are greater than the capacity of the rule breaker and any organizations that are willing to defend him. Finally, the sanction must be something of value to the rule breaker or he will not care whether or not he is sanctioned, even if he expects a sanction.

The conditions under which people will obey a rule point to a process organizations can apply in order to generate control. That process appears to explain how organizations translate different combinations of the larger factors of popular agreement with their goals, rules and actions; internal resources; external resources; and organizational effectiveness into control.

If an organization can generate an expectation that it can collect information about rule breaking and translate personnel, funds and sanctuary into sanctions that are of value to rule breakers, it can control the behavior of a population.

Any organization and the people whose behavior it is attempting to control exist in a world where there are other organizations attempting to control the population's behavior. It is therefore not a question of an organization's absolute capacity to sanction rule breakers, but its capacity relative to all of the organizations attempting to control their behavior. Capacity is generated by a combination of resources, in the form of manpower, equipment, funds, goods and services, and the organization's ability to cause its personnel to apply those resources to action.

One strategy organizations can use that results in control is consensus building. The most important factor in this strategy is agreement. If an organization starts by establishing

rules with which people agree in the first place or if it can convince them they should obey a rule, then the organization need do nothing further to control their behavior. Since there is no social group in which everyone agrees with all of the rules all of the time, the organization would still need to generate an expectation of sanctions if people violated their rules. In order to generate that expectation, the organization must be able to generate an expectation that it will be able to acquire information and have the resources and effectiveness to sanction the violator in a way that is of value to him or her. To that end, the organization requires information, resources, and personnel willing and able to sanction the violator. It also requires that people acquiesce to the presence and activities of the organization by providing it sanctuary.

If most people in the community agree that people should not violate the rule in question and how violators should be punished, they are more willing to provide information about rule breaking when they see it to the organization. Because they agree with the goals, rules and sanctions of the organization, people in a population that consents to a set of rules are willing to provide the organization with personnel, funding, services, goods, and sanctuary. Having personnel who agree with the goals, rules and sanctions of an organization makes it easier for an organization to motivate its personnel to take the actions required to collect information and sanction people for rule breaking. Additionally, a population that agrees with the goals, rules and sanctions of an organization is more willing to give financial resources and sanctuary to assist in achieving those goals and enforcing those rules. Agreement by the population with the rules, in short, makes it easier to control the behavior of that population. But, when you add another organization with resources that are larger than those that the consent organization can raise from the population and that can translate those resources into actions, the consent organization

loses control over the behavior of the population. In other words, agreement is only relevant to control to the extent it results in resources and organization that are relatively more powerful than those of competitor organizations.

In the Kapisa Mountain Village case study, the Wakil is a consensus organization that can raise resources from 100 households and the meager produce from their traditional farms. Although most people in the village agree with the Wakil's goals, rules and sanctions, he is unable to enforce rules about the Taliban patrolling through the village, harassing, abducting and even killing villagers. The Wakil cannot control their presence or actions because the Taliban has both more resources and an effective organization that translates them into patrols and sanctions by Taliban personnel. The Taliban's ability to do so varies based on the organizational effectiveness of the government in patrolling and engaging the Taliban. When the government does so, the Taliban has less control and the Wakil has more. When the government stops patrolling and engaging the enemy, the Taliban has more control and the Wakil has less. The Wakil expects that if the Taliban has information about villagers organizing to prevent the Taliban from moving through or acting in the village, the Taliban will be able to mobilize its significantly larger resources to severely punish the villagers. For that reason, the Wakil is willing to provide information to the government to allow it to sanction the Taliban, but the Wakil and villagers are not willing to organize to fight the Taliban with their relatively limited resources. Once the government removes its resources, the villagers become unable to keep the Taliban at bay.

The second strategy for controlling the behavior of a population is an imposition strategy. An organization attempts to impose a set of rules on a population whether or not that population agrees with the goals, rules and sanctions of the organization. In the Kapisa

Mountain Village case study, both the Taliban and the government are imposition organizations. These organizations encounter people who do not want to obey their rules more often than consensus organizations do and therefore they must expend more resources generating expectations among people who would like to break their rules that if they do, they will be sanctioned.

Additionally, because these organizations do not have the agreement of the population, they cannot rely upon resources voluntarily provided by members of the population. They therefore require external resources that are greater than those that can be raised and translated into action by the local population. In short, imposing rules upon an unconsenting population is relatively resource intensive and those resources must often be generated elsewhere.

As evinced by the government in 2013 and 2014 in the Kapisa Mountain Village, all of the resources in the world do not result in control unless they can be converted into actions by personnel. Motivating personnel from outside a population, as in the case of the ANP and ANA, is challenging when the organization is requesting that they take actions requiring risk and effort. The difference between the Taliban's successful increase in control and the government's failed effort to increase its control lies not in the amount of external resources available to each organization, but in the Taliban's relative effectiveness in motivating its personnel to act by patrolling to identify rule breaking and sanction it.

Imposition organizations are not only relatively resource-intensive, they are also generally less effective in controlling behavior than consensus organizations. The key step in the process of control that is a perpetual challenge for imposition organizations is

acquiring information about rule breaking. Without this information, the organization cannot sanction rule breakers and cannot generate expectations that it will be able to do so. The people who have the most information about rule breaking are people within the community. But, if they do not agree with the goals, rules and sanctions of the organization, they are unlikely to give information to the organization about rule breaking. The organization must therefore patrol to attempt to identify rule breaking itself. But, patrols are time delimited and people can wait until they leave to violate the rules. The advantage of members of the community is that they are constantly present. That is why the lack of village police in the Kapisa Mountain Village is so crippling to government and Wakil efforts to repel the Taliban.

PART 4

Theoretical & Policy Findings

CHAPTER 11

Theoretical Findings

When and Why Do Men Obey⁷⁷⁴ during a Civil War?

So, which organization succeeds in controlling the population during a civil war? Is it the organization that emphasizes the population's agreement with its goals, rules and actions? Is it the organization that can levy personnel, services, goods, funds, information and sanctuary from the population? Is it the organization with the most significant external resources? Or, is it simply the organization that is the most effective in translating its resources into actions by its personnel? Why, in short, do men obey one competing organization or another during a civil war?

Do Agreement, Resources or Organizational Effectiveness Cause Control?

The comparison of the cases of competition between the Afghan government, Taliban and Wakils revealed that all of these factors (agreement, resources and organizational effectiveness) are related to control, but that none can consistently explain the outcomes. Outcomes result from an organization's application of these resources to executing a process that causes it to control the behavior of a population in the context of violent competition with rival organizations that are also attempting to execute that process.

⁷⁷⁴ This is one of the central questions of sociology and political science, raised by Max Weber in his January 1919 lecture, Max Weber. "Politics as a Vocation." Printed in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946. p. 78

In the Kabul Market Community and in the Kapisa Mountain Village during the period before the surge, the Wakils had control because their populations agree with the Wakils' rules. The Wakils asked people what the rules and sanctions should be, and most people therefore agreed with and obeyed most of the Wakils' rules. This concurrence with the rules provided the Wakils with large amounts of control without any further effort. It also provided the Wakils with resources from within their communities to address instances in which those who disagreed with a rule broke it. Residents provided information, sanctuary, personnel, services, goods and funds to the Wakil in support of his efforts to enforce the rules they agreed with in a manner that met with their approval. Finally, the Wakil's organizational effectiveness, the willingness of its personnel to take actions that match the Wakil's intent, was high. The Wakils' high level of organizational effectiveness was also in large part a result of the agreement of the residents of the community, including the elders and Wakil, with the goals, rules and actions of the organization.

What the Wakils lacked in these cases were significant external resources. Neither Wakil received a large amount of money, goods, services, personnel, information or sanctuary from outside the community it controlled. And yet, both Wakils had high levels of control.

It would be tempting given these outcomes to conclude that agreement causes control and that external resources are irrelevant to it. However, it turns out that these two cases, the Kabul Market Community in 2010 and 2011, and the Kapisa Mountain Village prior to 2010, are examples in which there was only one organization that was effective in causing its personnel to act. That organization was, of course, the Wakil.

In both of these cases, the government had enormous external resources relative to those available to either the Wakil or the Taliban. But, the government was too ineffective to convert resources into coherent actions by its personnel. When government personnel did act in these cases, it was not based on the government's intent that they impartially apply the government's laws. At best, government actions were directed toward the goal the government shared with the Wakil of maintaining order in the community in question. In these cases, the government assisted the Wakils by arresting people the Wakils identified as having broken the rules. Sometimes these rules were also laws, and sometimes they were not. This assistance for the Wakil was certainly not achieving the government's aim of establishing the rule of law, but at least it contributed to the government's goal of order. Far worse, many government personnel actions, particularly in the Kabul Market Community, actually facilitated people breaking the government's own laws in return for money or out of fear. Despite its enormous external resources, the government had almost no control over the behavior of the population because it was ineffective as an organization.

Also, in both of these cases, the Taliban lacked external resources in large enough quantities to allow it to survive a force on force conflict with the better resourced and organized ISAF troops who would have attacked them if they had attempted to move through either of these communities. In order to preserve its resources, particularly its personnel, the Taliban did not take significant actions in either of these places in these two cases. The Taliban was ineffective in taking actions in these cases because it lacked the relative resources to survive a conflict with its competitor organization.

When the Wakil faced effective organizations with external resources greater than could be accessed within the Wakil's community and those either government or insurgent organizations were effective in motivating their personnel to act, the Wakil's control decreased.

It would be tempting therefore to argue that external resources and organizational effectiveness together cause control. But, that does not explain the earlier outcome that indicates that agreement causes control. Additionally, while government and Taliban control increase and decrease based on external resources and organizational effectiveness, the control of neither of these organizations extends past the rules of insurgency, governing whether a community gives them or their enemy sanctuary, information, personnel, goods, money or services. In the cases of other rules, governing how often people pray, guaranteeing individual human rights, or even prohibiting theft, assault and other infringements on order, only the Wakil had a significant amount of control. While the Wakil's control erodes, its competitor organizations do not fill the void with their control.

Suffice it to say that no one factor alone, agreement, resources or organizational effectiveness, can explain why the Taliban, government and Wakil have different levels of control. But, all of these factors appear to be related to the changes in the levels of control of these organizations.

A Process of Selective Sanctions

Perhaps these factors are simply inputs to a process any organization can apply to control the behavior of a population. Maybe these organizations are simply applying

different strategies for implementing that process, with each organization emphasizing the particular inputs at its disposal in the context of the goals it seeks to reach.

A comparison of cases in which people complied with or violated the rules of any organization across all 15 cases demonstrates that people obey rules for two reasons: because they already want to behave according to the rules or because they do not, but expect a sanction if they violate the rule.

Organizations can sanction rule breakers if and only if they have information about their violation of the rule⁷⁷⁵ and the resources and will to sanction the violator in a way the violator values. If the organization lacks any one of these items, information, will or resources, it cannot selectively sanction the violator.⁷⁷⁶ If people who disagree with an organization's rules expect the organization will not be able to collect information about their violation or that the organization lacks the will or resources to sanction them, or the violator values breaking the rule more than he cares about being sanctioned, the organization cannot control his behavior.

In the context of the competition between armed organizations attempting to enforce differing sets of rules, if violators can ally themselves with an organization with the will and resources to prevent another organization from sanctioning them, they can make the organization wanting to sanction them expect that doing so will cost their organization

⁷⁷⁵ This finding support's Stathis Kalyvas' findings about the critical role of information in selective violence. He argues that people who give information to an armed political organization about an individual collaborating with their enemy are participating in the violence against the individual they accuse of collaboration. (p. 173) He describes how indiscriminate violence, without information to target it on select people who have collaborated with the enemy, increases collaboration with the enemy because it gives people no reason not to do so, while giving them every reason to assist that enemy in destroying the indiscriminately violent organization. Kalyvas, 2006, p. 144.

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid.

dearly. This problem of an organization that lacks the resources to survive a direct conflict with a competing organization contributes directly to inaction by personnel from the organization, or organizational ineffectiveness.

Two Roads Diverged in a Wood:⁷⁷⁷ Consensus and Imposition

The Wakil, Taliban and government have different goals and different assets. They therefore apply different strategies to the challenge of causing people to obey their rules. There are two basic approaches to the process of generating control: consensus and imposition. These approaches apply different combinations of the factors described in the first section (agreement, resources and organizational effectiveness) to the process of collecting information about rule violations and sanctioning them.⁷⁷⁸ Both of these strategies, consensus and imposition, can generate control over the behavior of a community. Consensus can do so more efficiently than imposition, but only if the consenting population has more resources than competing organizations can transform into action to prevent its control. Imposition organizations can also control the behavior of a population, even though people disagree with its rules, actions and goals. But, an imposition organization can only do so if it has both resources larger than its competitor organizations can bring to bear and personnel willing and able to risk their lives to move through communities. The greatest challenge for an imposition organization is to generate will

⁷⁷⁷ Robert Frost. "The Road Not Taken." In Edward Connery Lathem, ed. *The Poetry of Robert Frost*. New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1969. p. 105

⁷⁷⁸ This finding fits with Jeremy Weinstein's finding that insurgent organizations apply different combinations of what he calls social versus economic endowments to developing different strategies for recruiting rebels and motivating them to act. Weinstein, p. 100-126.

among its personnel to patrol to identify rule violators and sanction them in communities where many people disagree with their organization's goals, rules and actions.

Consensus Organizations

The goal of consensus organizations, like the Wakils, is to build and cultivate unity in order to generate consensus among members of the population about problems and their solutions. Consensus organizations start from the premise that there is no need to restrict an activity in which residents value partaking, unless a large portion of the population determines that it causes a problem for them. If residents identify a problem, the consensus organization holds a meeting to build consensus on whether and how the community should solve the problem.

In this way, a consensus organization generates a set of rules and sanctions with which most residents already agree. Since most residents do not want to violate the rules, the organization has much less work to do than if it autonomously conceived of a set of rules it wanted to impose upon people. Additionally, a consensus organization can access resources from residents who agree with its goals, rules and actions, including, crucially, information about people breaking rules. Because most residents agree with most rules and the sanctions the organization will apply to the violators, residents, like dispersed, ever-present sensors, are willing to collect information about people who break rules and provide it to a consensus organization. Additionally, because they agree with the rules and

sanctions the organization will impose, they are happy to allow consensus organization personnel to move freely through the community, collecting their own information. Finally, the consenting population is willing to provide other resources, including personnel, services, goods and funds to a consensus organization in order to solve the problems the community has identified and agreed to solve.⁷⁷⁹

The fact that the personnel come from the community where they are working and that community agrees to the goals, rules and actions of the organization means that the personnel are motivated by their own beliefs and those of their families and neighbors. The personnel receive positive sanctions for their actions in support of maintaining the consensus and executing it. This fact greatly enhances the effectiveness of consensus organizations.⁷⁸⁰

Consensus organizations, like the Wakil, spend most of their time and effort fostering unity. Their personnel continuously interact with residents, working together with them to cultivate a shared set of beliefs about what is right and what is wrong.⁷⁸¹ And, they work to establish a rhythm of behavior that is shared across the residents of the

⁷⁷⁹ This finding provides support for Elisabeth Jean Wood's assertion that people's beliefs matter in terms of outcomes in civil wars, not only instrumentally, but more wholistically. If leaders build organizations based on what people in their communities believe, they are more likely to control the behavior of the population. However, only under the condition that there is not a rival organization with more external resources and an effective organization that can act to counter the consensus organization. This second portion supports Stathis Kalyvas' conclusion that shifts in external resources cause changes in control, but only if the organization has more resources that it can organize into patrols and sanctions than can its consensus based competitor.

⁷⁸⁰ Jeremy Weinstein finds that insurgent organizations comprised of people from the communities where the organization is attempting to exert control are more disciplined and less violent because they are accountable to that population as members of it. It appears that the Wakil's accountability to and membership in the community he is attempting to control makes him more effective. However, this is only true for consensus organizations. For members of imposition organizations, like the Taliban, it appears it is more difficult for them to sanction people in their home communities for breaking rules to which their home communities have not consented.

⁷⁸¹ Clifford Geertz describes how man is an animal suspended in webs of meaning that he himself is constantly spinning, called culture. The Wakil labors fastidiously with the members of his community to spin a shared understanding of good and bad, right and wrong, *halal* and *haram*. Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture" *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books, 1973. p. 3-5.

community. In the case of the Wakil, people attend prayers together, greet one another, wear similar clothes, assist one another with problems, etc. The Wakil, Mullah and elders are constantly engaged in reinforcing not only these beliefs about right and wrong, and shared behaviors, but also in ensuring residents have shared perceptions of threats to the community, actions by outside organizations, problems and possible solutions. This ceaseless interaction and communication are embedded within a framework of membership in a community which endeavors to treat people as inherently of value to their neighbors, including the Wakil.

The effect of the Wakil's efforts is to create a unified corporate whole that will act together to face a shared set of problems with shared solutions. This unity is the underpinning of a consensus organization's control over the behavior of a community. Despite this unity, individuals will deviate from this dense normative structure. In order to control the behavior of people who want to break its rules, a consensus organization must convince them that if they do violate a rule, the organization can and will harm them in ways they would like to avoid. While a consensus organization must be able to collect information about rule breaking and sanction it, consent is their primary, and sanctions are only their secondary, method for generating control.

The success of this strategy for controlling the behavior of a population is, however, dependent on the quantity of the resources it can pool. A consensus organization can leverage the resources available from within the population consenting to its rule, but the organization's ability to leverage external resources is limited by the organization's primary need to maintain consensus. If a consensus organization, like a Wakil, trades some of its

control over what the rules are in its community to an outside organization, like the government, or the Taliban, then the consensus which underpins its control erodes.

Additionally, because consensus based organizations rest upon unity, societal changes that tug people away from unity undermine the control of the consensus organization.⁷⁸² As employment diversifies and people travel in and communicate more with the world outside their consensus community, the unity of the daily lives of residents dissipates, undermining the control by the consensus organization built upon it.⁷⁸³ But, unity can remain resilient and organized, allowing consensus organizations to make it impossible for what organizations outside the consenting community want to impose upon them.⁷⁸⁴

Consensus organizations are vulnerable to competitor organizations that have greater resources than can be raised from the consenting population. If a competitor can translate those resources into actions by its personnel, no matter how fervently the population agrees with what the consensus organization wants or disagrees with the competitor, it can defeat the consensus organization. But, that is no mean feat.

⁷⁸² Daniel Lerner describes how a traditional consensus leader, the Last Muhtar of Balgat, lost control over the behavior of his people as their occupations shifted from traditional farming to factory work because of increased transportation and communication between Balgat and the nearby Turkish capital of Ankara. Baglat's peasants lost consensus about the values that underpinned the Muhtar's leadership, obedience, courage and loyalty. The residents of Balgat, and even the Muhtar's own sons, began to value comfort and ease of living as they lost their shared farming occupation and the control the Muhtar had over it. Daniel Lerner. "The Grocer and the Chief: A Parable" in *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. London: Free Press, 1958. p. 19-42.

⁷⁸³ Perhaps the erosion of unity is a mechanism by which modernization leads to the political decay and eventually political disorder and instability Samuel Huntington described in *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Samuel P. Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

⁷⁸⁴ Joel Migdal describes what he calls "strong societies" whose "web-like structures" repel or even absorb but fundamentally warp the intent of programs by weak states to the "web-like structures" original intents. Perhaps consensus organizations are the basis of the web like structures he describes and they resist rules outside of those to which their populations consent. Joel S. Migdal. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Imposition Organizations

Imposition organizations, like the Taliban and GIRA, start from a completely different premise. They begin with a vision of the world they intend to superimpose onto the population whose behavior they want to alter, thereby reifying their vision.⁷⁸⁵ In order to generate the patterns of behavior that would make their vision a reality, imposition organizations seek to cause people to obey their rules, whether people agree with those rules or not. In order to do so, an imposition organization must generate expectations that if people who disagree with their rules violate them, the organization has the will and resources to sanction the violators in meaningful ways. In order to do so, imposition organizations require both externally generated resources in excess of those the unconsenting population can organize and an organization that can translate resources into actions. With imposition organizations, the combination of organizational effectiveness and external resources are primary and local agreement is of little import. This is the opposite of the mix of factors consensus organizations use to generate control.

Because they are attempting to impose a set of rules upon a population that does not agree with them, imposition organizations face a significant challenge in generating resources, including personnel, goods, services, funds, sanctuary and information. It is difficult for an imposition organization to generate these resources from the population it is attempting to control because that population does not agree with them. It is also difficult to motivate communities other than the ones the organization is attempting to control to

⁷⁸⁵ These organizations are revolutionary in the way Paul Berman describes the effort to totally change society so that people obey the organization's rules, creating a pattern of behavior the organization seeks in its vision of the society it seeks to create. But, they do not necessarily spring from the beliefs and desires of the societies where they occur.

provide valuable resources they could use at home to an organization seeking to control the behavior of people in another community.

It is challenging for imposition organizations to motivate their personnel to conduct patrols to identify people violating the organization's rules and sanction them. Implementing an imposition strategy involves actions that expose personnel to risk of attack from individuals in the unconsenting community, as well as competing armed political organizations. Further, personnel are taking these risks in order to alter the behavior of a community where they do not reside and where they may not know a single person. Providing an ideological justification, as the Taliban does and GIRA fails to do, for personnel to take these risks is a challenge an imposition organization must meet or it will fail to control the behavior of the community in question.⁷⁸⁶

But, all the ideological fervor in the world among the personnel of an imposition organization cannot generate control unless the imposition organization can also access large enough quantities of personnel, money and equipment to be able to sanction people in the community where people do not agree with them. An imposition organization must also be able to organize more resources than other organizations attempting to control the behavior of the community or it will not be able to move through the community to identify and sanction rule violations. It is the combination of will and resources that allows an imposition organization to control the behavior of a population.

The most difficult challenge for an imposition organization is its ability to collect information about people violating its rules from members of a community that disagrees

⁷⁸⁶ Once again, ideology matters, but in this case, not relative to the population the organization seeks to control, but instead to motivate its personnel.

with them.⁷⁸⁷ Many people in the community in question may disagree with this outside organization's rules and they may also disagree with the sanction the organization would apply to them. For example, if a hungry young child stole a loaf of bread in any of the communities under study, the residents would be unlikely to turn him over to the Taliban because they would not want someone to cut off the child's hand. They would rather someone advise the child not to do this again instead. Residents would withhold information about the violation of the Taliban's rules from the Taliban because they disagreed with the sanction the organization would inflict upon the violator.

Imposition organizations can collect information about rule breaking by purchasing it from residents or by coercing it out of them through torture. However, if the person in question does not agree with the rules or sanctions of the organization, they may either not provide information or provide misinformation to the imposition organization.

Given this lack of access to information about people obeying or disobeying the rules it is attempting to impose, an imposition organization must patrol in order to collect information about rule breaking and sanction it. But, these patrols would have to be very, very dense in order to equal the information collection capacity of the residents, who are like distributed sensors, constantly observing one another's behavior. Without information, no organization can sanction rule violations and this is therefore a very important resource for any organization seeking to control a population's behavior.

⁷⁸⁷ This affirms Kalyvas' findings about the primary role of information and selective sanctioning in civil war and that people providing or withholding information about insurgent personnel location is one way ideology or beliefs translate into control.

Imposition organizations can control the behavior of a population if they can generate external resources greater than those the unconsenting population can organize and translate them into personnel patrolling and sanctioning people who violate their rules. In order to do so, an imposition organization must motivate an external population to provide resources to it and then it must motivate its personnel to take risks by patrolling and sanctioning an unconsenting population.

Efficiency of Consensus Organizations

By building a consensus among members of a population about what people ought and ought not do in a community, consensus organizations reduce the amount of resources and organization they require to control residents' behavior. Having been asked what the rules should be, most people obey the rules because they agree they should. A consensus organization therefore has less work to do to make people comply with its rules.

By then asking the community what the organization should do in the event someone does break a rule, a consensus organization gains access to the resources it needs from the community to exert control. When residents agree people should not do something and that if they do, the consensus organization should sanction the violator in an agreed upon way, they are more willing to provide resources to support the consensus organization in that endeavor. Importantly, an organization that has rules and sanctions with which a community agrees gains access to information about people breaking the rules from their neighbors, friends and family members. Without information about rule breaking, no organization can generate control over the behavior of a community.

Community consent also provides the basis for recruiting the small number of personnel required to collect information and sanction the relatively small number of violations in a community that devises its own rules. Members of the community are happy and honored to work, even in their free time without pay, to assist in implementing the community's consensus decisions. By acting on behalf of their neighbors, they enhance their honor and can take pride in their actions. This motivation breeds an organic organizational effectiveness through a will to act on behalf of one's own community.

This consensus also motivates people to assist the formal personnel of a consensus organization by providing the organization with sanctuary, allowing personnel to move through the community unimpeded and by not providing information about the location of members of the consensus organization to competing organizations. Community agreement with rules, sanctions and actions also motivates residents to provide goods, services and funds to support the implementation of community decisions.

Imposition organizations are left with a much larger task in terms of the quantity of violations of the rules it is attempting to impose on a population that does not agree with them.

Residents who do not agree with the rules an imposition organization is attempting to enforce are unlikely to provide information to an imposition organization's personnel about people breaking its rules. The lack of freely provided information about rule violations creates a major challenge for an imposition organization that does not exist for a consensus organization. Generating control becomes much more difficult because without information about people violating the rules, no organization can control behavior.

An imposition organization must be able to cause its personnel to patrol with greater frequency than a consensus organization in order to fill its need for information because it lacks the distributed sensors provided by a consenting population. Patrolling through a community to identify instances of people violating rules with which neither they nor most of their neighbors agree can be very risky. If people in the community do not want imposition personnel moving through an area, they could attack them, organize a large group to attack them or call an organization that is a competitor to the imposition organization to inform them where the personnel are so that competitor can attack them. The last option is particularly difficult for the imposition organization to address since it is difficult to determine whether a competitor just happened through a community when the imposition organization was present or whether someone in the community notified them or who that person might have been.

In the context of community will to deny sanctuary to imposition organization personnel, the organization must determine how to motivate its personnel to take these risks. For that reason, an imposition organization must devise either an ideology or an alternative reward that will motivate its personnel to risk their lives. Establishing a reason why people from the community should go against their neighbors and relatives by joining an imposition organization and identifying and sanctioning violations of rules with which residents do not agree is very challenging. It is equally if not more challenging to establish a reason why outsiders should care enough to risk their lives to determine how people in a community where they do not reside should behave. This is true for both the Taliban and GIRoA, but not the Wakil.

An imposition organization faces difficulty not only collecting information and recruiting and motivating personnel from an unconsenting population, but also greater challenges in generating resources to provide pay, equipment, food, etc. to its personnel. The local population is unlikely to willingly give these resources to an organization attempting to impose rules with which it does not agree upon it. For that reason, an imposition organization must either coerce them into doing so, or must motivate some organization or population outside the community to fund the imposition of rules in a community where they do not reside.

All of these requirements for outside resources, for information and sanctuary, for personnel, for an ideology that can motivate personnel to risk life and limb, are obviated if an organization builds its rules and sanctions with the consent of the population it is attempting to control. Therefore, it is not just that the task is larger for an imposition organization, it is that the implementation is much more difficult. The most efficient approach to controlling the behavior of a population is to allow them to determine what the rules and sanctions will be in their own community.

Can Local Consensus Organizations Aggregate into Macro-Level Organizations?

While consensus organizations are more efficient mechanisms for controlling the behavior of local populations than imposition organizations, they often begin at the very local level and remain unaggregated. This tendency limits their ability to amass resources greater than outside organizations attempting to impose their rules on a small, consenting population. It is difficult for consensus organizations to ally themselves with imposition organizations because in order to compromise with an imposition organization, a consensus

organization might need to alter the rules to which its population has consented. Since the agreement of the population to these rules and sanctions is the basis of a consensus organization's ability to control the behavior of its population, alliances can endanger the organization.⁷⁸⁸

Similarly, especially in the context of a fragmented population, consensus organizations have difficulty aggregating themselves into larger units.⁷⁸⁹ However, in cases where consensus organizations can identify circumscribed, shared problems, they can collaborate. For example, in downtown Kabul, several Wakils came together to address the issue of young men harassing school girls while they were walking home. The Wakils agreed that if any boy from their areas who harassed a girl in any of their areas would be punished as though he had done so within his own community. Fearing punishment by their own Wakils and fathers, boys from these areas stopped harassing girls throughout all of these areas. This same group of Wakils then expanded their cooperation to include informing one another about organized criminal activities in their communities, where armed robberies had become common, and discussing possible solutions.⁷⁹⁰ It appears that if they focus on shared problems and consult their people about solutions, consensus organizations can ally with one another on a narrow basis without surrendering the consensus that serves as the basis for their control.

The Advantage of a Static Position

⁷⁸⁸ Hosham Dawood describes this conundrum in his chapter on Arab tribal groups. Traditionally, tribal groups were comprised of tribesmen who were equals who selected one from among their ranks to serve as *sheikh*. But, over time, as the state provided land rights that had belonged communally to the tribe to the *sheikh*, he relied less upon them and more upon the state. In the end, the *sheikh's* control over his tribesmen erodes because it is no longer based on consensus. Hosham Dawood. "Chapter 4: The 'State-ization' of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State" in Faleh A. Jabar & Hosham Dawood. *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*. London: Saqi Books, 2003. p. 111

⁷⁸⁹ Phillip Carl Salzman describes balanced opposition in Arab tribal systems. Small tribal groups compete for scarce resources and cannot collaborate except when attacked from the outside. Philip Carl Salzman. *Culture and Conflict in the Middle East*. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2008. p. 10

⁷⁹⁰ 110118 Community Map Description R3

One major advantage of a consensus organization is that it is rooted in the community it is competing to control. The personnel from a consensus organization live and work in the community they control. As a result, they often simply happen upon information about people violating rules and are then able to sanction the violation in full view of the rest of the community. While imposition organizations move through the communities in question, consensus organizations are deeply socially embedded in them. For that reason, their personnel have an advantage in one of the resources without which no organization can control the behavior of a population, information about rule breaking.

Imposition organizations can increase their effectiveness in this regard if they patrol as regularly as possible, increasing the frequency of their presence in the community whose behavior they are attempting to control. However, they are at an inherent disadvantage because they are not constantly present and are therefore bound to fail to notice instances of residents violating their rules.

One Process and Two Approaches

In conclusion, there are several approaches, or strategies, organizations can take that result in control over the behavior of populations. In a competition between organizations for control over a population, the organization that has the most external resources does not always win and it does not always lose. Similarly, the organization whose goals, rules and actions are most pleasing to the local population does not always win and does not always lose. Victory cannot be explained solely by its effectiveness as an

organization in causing its personnel to act. These larger, macro level factors are only relevant to the extent that they impact a process that does cause control.

Any organization that can generate the expectation that it can and will identify violations of its rules and sanction them can establish control over the behavior of a population. If the organization lacks either the ability to collect information, or the resources relative to its competitors to be able to sanction violators, or the ability to cause its personnel to collect information about violations and sanction violators, it will not be able to control a population's behavior.

There are two approaches organizations take to this process: consensus and imposition. Consensus organizations begin by working with the community to develop rules and sanctions for people who violate them, while imposition organizations impose a set of rules regardless of whether the population agrees with them.

Consensus organizations are significantly more efficient in controlling the behavior of populations. They have less work to do and they are able to do it using information, sanctuary, personnel, money, goods and services from within the population in question. Their personnel are highly motivated to act on behalf of the consensus they, their family, neighbors and friends have developed. They fail to do so when they face a competing organization which has more resources that it can organize to prevent the consensus organization sanctioning violators.

Imposition organizations experience greater challenges in controlling the behavior of a community because people violate the rules of an imposition organization more often

than they violate those of a consensus organization. Additionally, the imposition organization needs to be able to acquire resources greater than those available to the community it is attempting to control and cause its personnel to patrol to collect information about rule breaking and sanction it. This task is daunting since they must motivate people who are not from a community to give resources in order to impose rules in another community. An imposition organization also has to be able to motivate its personnel to take risks to patrol and sanction violations of rule with which a community does not concur, often in a community far from their own.

Imposition organizations are further challenged because they are not organically part of and statically present in the community in question. For that reason (and because residents disagree with them), they have difficulty collecting information about people violating their rules. Without that information, no organization can control the behavior of a population.

CHAPTER 12

Implications for US Policy

“Bottom Up or Top Down? We Choose Top Down and We Are Wrong”⁷⁹¹

“If there is one lesson we can take from these two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is that we need to understand the sources of influence at the local level as early as possible in the conflict. In Afghanistan, we never truly understood the local social fabric or the relationship between that and the national and provincial leaders with whom we worked. Had we better understood these factors, we could have better engineered our efforts building and connecting governance from the national level, down through the provinces and districts, right down to the local level. If we don't truly understand the nature of the social fabric of where we're headed, we're going to repeat these mistakes over and over.” GEN (Ret.) John R. Allen

Afghanistan provides simply the last in a long line of examples of attempts by the United States (US) to build governments that can defend themselves from insurgent organizations and establish control over their populations. In Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Somalia and Vietnam, among other countries, the US and its allies have attempted to impose a set of leaders, rules and institutions from the top down. And, in each case, the US has expended enormous sums of money and effort to little or no avail.

As it did in Afghanistan and Iraq, when confronted by a collapsed state or upon deciding to overthrow a government, the US normally seeks leaders to serve as Interim Presidents of a nascent state. The leaders it identifies often lack authority without US support. If it were not for the US, many of them would be unable to enter their own countries. Often, as in each of these cases, the US lacks an understanding of how the leaders it identifies and then backs with money and coercive force are related to the social structure of the population or to leaders who already have authority, particularly below the national

⁷⁹¹ GEN (Ret.) John R. Allen

level, inside the country in question. The choices the US makes in this regard often generate popular resistance that later coalesces into an insurgency as the leaders the US has identified deny that other competing leaders have authority when they clearly do.⁷⁹² In the worst cases, the newly installed leaders weaponize the US to attack other leaders inside the country who control large portions of the population whom the US might otherwise seek to bring into the government to bolster its legitimacy.

Seeking to establish a legal entity similar to itself, the US proposes an interim constitution based on a European model and ensures it enshrines elections and the UN Declaration on Human Rights. While many Americans intrinsically believe these to be universally valid institutions and rules, many people, particularly in Afghanistan, but also those in Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Somalia, among other places, do not agree.

The US then proposes that the state's leaders be selected through elections as soon as possible despite the lack of issues based political parties or any interest by the population in elections. The US touts elections to the population as a means for deciding how their country will be governed. But, in fact, a large number of the decisions about the rules people will obey and the institutions that will enforce them have already been decided by the US and the leaders whom it has selected.

⁷⁹² In Afghanistan, Gul Agha Shirzai, the chief of a lesser tribe, who had been unable to generate order when he reigned as Governor of Kandahar between 1992 and his overthrow by the Taliban in 1994, convinced the US not to ally with Mullah Naqib, the leader of the powerful Alikozai tribe and the most powerful *mujihadeen* commander in Kandahar. If the Coalition had allied itself with the Alikozai, their efforts to prevent the Taliban's return to Kandahar would have been far simpler. As if playing from the same songbook, Ahmed Chalabi, and then Ibrahim al Jaffari and Nouri al Maliki, explained to their American patrons that the most powerful leaders in Iraq were either terrorists or irrelevant "punks". The US therefore shunned the scion of one of the most popular figures among the Shia Arab majority in Iraq, Muqtada al Sadr. Similarly, on their word, they shunned all Baathists and separately the very popular chief of the Association of Muslim scholars, Harith al Dari, as terrorists. Countless lives could have been saved if these leaders had not become the targets of the Coalition, but instead their allies in building a sustainable Iraqi government.

The US and the leaders it has selected propose the construction of a highly centralized, bureaucratic state to govern a population that is normally fragmented and lacks organizations to translate the interests of the people to the government. The newly minted central government has a set of ministries, a judiciary, an elected parliament, and normally a national police force and army. This set of institutions intentionally mirrors western European institutions and is developed with little regard to the actions it would need to take in order to establish control or to the cost of maintaining such a structure in a country which is normally extremely poor.

There is a general pull toward hyper centralization because the international community starts at the center with the leaders whom it put has in place. It then encounters the lack of basic ministerial capacity, and its non-military personnel are often unequipped to deal with the austere and insecure conditions outside the capital. Often, the leaders the US has empowered would like to avoid allowing anyone else in their country to have access to the tremendous external resources the US provides to the central government. Leaders of the central government have strong financial and political incentives to isolate the international community in the capital, limiting their ability to see whether and how programs are being implemented and limiting their access to alternative leaders and points of view. This approach tends to generate partner nation governments whose primary motivation is the maintenance of outside resources for political and personal gain to the detriment of building a sustainable, functioning government.

The imposition of institutions does not stop with elections and ministries. The US normally deploys an army of bureaucrats to build ministries in the capital city and run economic development initiatives, along with soldiers and contractors to recruit, train,

equip, organize and mentor security forces. They develop an educational and medical system with training, education and salary systems to support them. They develop and implement plans for large electricity generation and road construction projects. They identify possible ways to increase economic growth and wages through industrialization, improved agricultural production, increased trade and investment. These international bureaucrats recruit indigenous personnel and train them to perform the same tasks they have been performing. While all of these activities seem on their face to be good, they are constructed at the center, not at the request of people in the population or with their input. They often cost a great deal of money, not only in start up costs, but also in the cost of sustainment.

In situations where the government is hyper-centralized, government development programs have little to do with what is going on at the local level, where people decide whether to obey insurgent or government organizations. There is an enormous amount of money and effort expended on these programs, but it is unclear whether in the end they have any impact on that decision.

The data from Kabul and Kapisa, even at the height of the surge, as billions of dollars flowed into Afghan government coffers, show poor communities asking the government for assistance with basic infrastructure projects, like the provision of clean water or electricity, being turned down, and raising their own funds and labor to implement the projects. Even if the government provided funding for these projects, there is no evidence that the improved standard of living would make it any more likely that people would resist the Taliban's presence or embrace government rule of law.

The data also describe the implementation of programs that no one in the communities asked for, like the construction of roads. Road construction occurred not because of the requirement by the population for roads above water and electricity, but because it benefited *Jamat e Islami*, and specifically its leader, Fahim Khan, who was then Vice President of Afghanistan. When the roads were built, they disintegrated because of the lack of oversight by the government over the company, owned by Fahim Khan's brother. The purpose of the contract was not building roads for the population. It was generating funds for the *Jamat e Islami mujihadeen* under the leadership of Vice President Fahim Khan. If these projects were intended to improve popular opinion about the government, they had the inverse effect, demonstrating the government's corruption and ineptitude.

This example highlights the key reason why starting at the top, picking leaders who have little relation to the population or have a relationship to only a narrow portion of it, results in a government that functions at a very suboptimal level. Government leaders are not dependent upon the population for their money, coercive force and authority. They are dependent on the US and its allies. And, they cannot trust that the US and its allies will continue to give them, as opposed to their competitors, those benefits in perpetuity. So, they use their positions to absorb as much of the bounty as they can to fortify themselves for the future. Fundamentally, the current top down method generates leaders whose interests differ, not only from the US and its allies, but also from the population.

The focus of US and allied efforts to build or reinforce government organizations in countries where insurgencies contest the government's right to rule is the security sector. The US and its allies pursue a centralized, top down approach that produces police and military organizations modeled on American and Western European organizations. The US

and its allies install centralized systems for recruiting, training and paying soldiers and police. The organizations at the center mirror those in the US and Western Europe. US training and doctrine are often simply translated into the local language and employed to train local forces and form the basis for their strategy and planning. Organizational structures for units and plans for their operations mirror those of their US and allied counterparts. Partner capabilities are developed less based upon the actions required to defeat the insurgency and more based upon an effort to generate a mirror image of US organizations. Little thought is given to the relationship between the values of the soldiers and police from different areas of the country and their resultant will to fight and kill and die on behalf of their organization.

While these organizations are being designed, trained and equipped, US and allied militaries conduct patrols, collect information about the presence of insurgents and attack them. To increase popular support for their efforts to counter the insurgency, US and allied military units also collect information about problems facing the communities and work with them to develop solutions. As partner nation troops from the center are deployed throughout the country, they are married up with their American and allied military counterparts and begin working alongside them, mimicking their operations. Over time, the American military presence is reduced and finally withdrawn. The American and allied military and civilian organizations assume the police and military at the local level will continue to perform the same patrols, engage the enemy and work with local leaders to identify and solve problems because they can and have done so.

In the Afghan case, this did not happen. After the withdrawal of American and allied military units, the security forces stopped operating, surrendering whole areas to the

Taliban. The manner in which the soldiers and police were recruited, trained and managed did not provide incentives to personnel to take actions that placed them at risk of being attacked by insurgents. Part of the problem was the deployment, far from their homes, of young men whose loyalties lay with their families and communities elsewhere, not with the communities where they were stationed. A second part of the problem was the general lack of agreement by government personnel with many of the goals of the government, which were imposed from the outside (e.g., religious freedom or women's rights). Since personnel did not value the goals of enforcing the UN's definition of individual human rights and the establishment of the impartial rule of law, they did not undertake tasks to meet these goals. The lack of goals in which government personnel were personally invested had a corrosive effect on their motivation to act that crippled the government. When leaders of the government sold their authority to sanction violations of the law by organized criminal organizations, it became impossible for police to know whether arresting someone for assault, theft, or even a traffic violation would cause them to lose their job or even be arrested themselves. Not undertaking tasks was easier and less risky than acting, and inaction was not punished.

In the end, the Afghan government recruits and pays young men from throughout the country a princely sum and deploys them, at great expense, to places where they know no one and have limited interest in the outcome of the conflict with the Taliban and where they certainly do not care whether people have the freedom of religion or the freedom to marry whomever they would like. The only thing these young men can do that will end their cushy arrangement is to impartially apply the law to people who are related to "high ranking" people in the government or to seek to engage the enemy at risk to their own lives.

These personnel, at a cost of \$4 billion annually, have questionable effect on the competition between the government and the Taliban for control over the behavior of the population.

Efforts to build a government that controls the behavior of the poor, fragmented Afghan population top down through a central government bureaucracy impartially applying laws and providing services failed. Efforts to build a security force that would patrol to deter and engage the enemy similarly failed.

When we compare the Taliban with GIRoA, we find that when the Taliban finally increased its control over the behavior of the population, it is not because that population agreed with them; and it is not because the Taliban had greater external resources than the government. The Taliban controlled the behavior of the population because it had a system for motivating its personnel to patrol and sanction people who violate its rules, even when those activities put its personnel at great risk. That is what GIRoA, after the departure of its ISAF mentors, lacked. When its ISAF mentors were there, the ANSF did perform these tasks despite the risk. But, after ISAF's departure, they ceased doing so.

Targeting a Process that Causes Control

The US needs to narrow its focus and start at the bottom in places where it is attempting to affect the competition between insurgent and government organizations for control over the behavior of the population. Instead of attempting to build a state in its own image and awkwardly perch it atop a socially fragmented and economically underdeveloped population that does not share the US-sponsored government's values or goals,

the US should focus its efforts on building organizations whose personnel can and will collect information about rule breaking and sanction it.

Instead of focusing on a broad plan for nation building that is neither feasible nor sustainable, the US should focus on what would be required within the existing social context to cause government personnel to undertake these specific tasks. The Afghan results show the current US approach fails to take into account who government personnel are, how they are related to the population and what would cause them to take the risks required to patrol to identify rule breaking and sanction it. The findings of this dissertation indicate that if a government organization cannot do this, it will not be able to control the behavior of the population or prevent an insurgent organization from doing so and it will therefore lose.

By starting from the objective of motivating personnel to patrol to identify rule breaking and sanction it and then identifying what kind of organization with what kind of personnel, equipment, ideology, indoctrination system, force structure, and other capabilities would be required to do so, the US and its allies can avoid building another intractably ineffective, costly, unsustainable partner nation organization. Any such plan would need to explain how the government organization is related to the population at the local level; how it determines what the rules are; whether and to what extent it relies on the local population to provide information about rule breaking to it (and why residents would do so); and how personnel are related to the population in their areas of operation. Programs to build security forces, produce economic growth, provide an education and health care system, electrical, water and transportation infrastructure, etc. should only be

implemented to the extent that they positively impact the government's ability to sustainably collect information about rule breaking and sanction it.

For instance, if the US is relying upon consensus leaders in a village to provide information about rule breaking and their population decides it wants to undertake a project to improve its irrigation system and approaches the US asking for funding and technical assistance, the US should consider how this will impact surrounding communities, and determine how best to assist the community and potentially surrounding communities, while maintaining a balance of power in the area. However, if no one has asked for improved irrigation, the US should not build a Ministry of Agriculture that devises a costly plan to improve irrigation throughout Afghanistan.

At the same time, the US and its allies should specifically target the factors and processes that allow an insurgent organization to collect information about rule breaking and sanction it. If external equipment supplies are causing the insurgent organization to have the ability to patrol and sanction rule breakers, the US should target those. But, if they find the insurgent organization is recruiting local personnel through its ideological appeals and they are bringing their own weapons and stealing ammunition from the government, the US should target those activities instead.

Current approaches to defeating insurgencies focus on factors the US assumes are causing the organization to have control, but which may not be the main cause of control. For example, the US focuses on attacking insurgent organization personnel, often solely the leadership. But, that may or may not be the most efficient way to prevent an insurgent organization from identifying rule violations in the population and sanctioning them.

Perhaps interfering with the ideological basis of what motivates personnel to take risks in order to patrol and sanction would be more effective.

These plans, both for increasing government control, and for decreasing insurgent control, should be constructed based on research about what each organization is doing, how the population is reacting to their actions and what enables them to act. Before the US decides to intervene, it should conduct research on who has control at the local level and what enables them to patrol to identify rule violations and sanction them. Research should serve as the basis for plans to attack the causes of enemy control and to identify possible allies at the local level and understand their interests. Research should continue over time so it can serve as an assessment of the effect of US actions on government and insurgent organization will and capability to collect information about rule breaking and sanction it.

Two Roads Diverged in a Wood:⁷⁹³ Consensus and Imposition

The US and its allies face a choice about the extent of the rules they want to impose upon the population in countries where they are attempting to affect the competition between government and insurgent organizations. If the US imposes fewer rules, it will require fewer resources and less organization to generate control. Since the US' main goals in many of the cases where it seeks to intervene are simply to defeat an insurgent organization or to convince an insurgent organization or government to expel an international terrorist organization, it could limit the rules it seeks to impose to those governing the provision of sanctuary, personnel, information, goods, services or money to the insurgent or terrorist organization. It could then allow the most local possible level of

⁷⁹³ Robert Frost. "The Road Not Taken." In Edward Connery Lathem, ed. *The Poetry of Robert Frost*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969. p. 105.

authority to determine what the remaining rules should be through a consensus process that is either extant or would need to be fostered.

There are two approaches organizations can take to establishing control over the behavior of a population -- consensus and imposition. Organizations that generate rules and sanctions through popular consensus expend less effort enforcing those rules because fewer people want to break them and more people want to provide information, personnel, sanctuary, money, goods and services to the organization so that it will enforce the rules residents want everyone to obey. However, consensus organizations, if not allied with an outside organization, have resources limited to those they can organize from their population. Consensus organizations experience difficulties in building alliances because their control is based on the consensus of people within their community, not the interests of their allies.

Imposition organizations, on the other hand, require significantly more resources and organization in order to control the behavior of a population because people do not agree with their goals, rules or actions. Residents break rules imposed upon them more often and are less willing to assist the organization in imposing rules on their neighbors. For that reason, imposition organizations must be able to generate resources, usually outside the community in question, in excess of those the community can organize to resist the consensus organization's presence and sanctions. An imposition organization must then build an organization that can motivate its members to patrol and sanction rule breaking, at personal risk, in an unconsenting community.

The US' current strategy is to impose a set of leaders, rules and institutions on the populations of the countries where it is attempting to counter insurgencies. In order to do so, it is expending resources and is required to build partner organizations and then motivate personnel to take actions in order to enforce its new rules and institutions. What the US needs to ask itself is whether its investment in imposed leaders and foreign ideas and institutions is worth it in terms of US interests.

If the US were to keep the rules it sought to impose down to a bare minimum, just concentrating on its main goal of countering an insurgent or terrorist organization control in a particular country, it could greatly reduce the resources required and the breadth of the organization required to enforce them. If, at the very local level, the US allowed communities to identify their own problems and determine what the solutions should be and generate resources for them, then it would not have to establish large, centralized policing systems. If the US encouraged them to raise shared problems, which usually involve organized theft, insurgency and people getting into conflicts with those outside their home community, it could use those shared problems to build a higher level authority structure that could work to solve those problems together.

Since the major challenge for consensus organizations is to gather more resources, in the form of personnel, equipment, money, goods and services, than are externally available to competitor organizations, the US holds a key to reinforcing consensus organizations' extant abilities to control the behavior of their populations. The US can provide the resources required to augment the existing control of consensus organizations. But, in order to do so without undermining the very basis of their allies' control, the US must suppress its impulse to impose leaders, rules and institutions on the local leaders.

In these efforts, the US can and should use its coercive force and power to provide resources to mediate between local communities who might otherwise use their increased resources and organization to fight one another. The US should make clear there are only two sets of rules it is imposing on the consensus based communities. The first is designed to prevent insurgents from patrolling to identify violations of its rules and sanction them and the second is designed to prevent communities from fighting one another. In this approach, the US would enable consensus communities to organize their own patrols and engage enemy fighters when they found them, while at the same time calling in US support to repel the insurgents' presence.

The US can work with sets of community leaders to identify shared problems, including providing mutual aid when insurgents attack, in order to organize local consensus into limited district-wide or province-wide or even nation-wide limited consensus. This limited consensus on how to solve a narrow set of shared problems can provide the basis for the organization of a central security force comprised of people selected by their own consensus leaders to serve in the central security force. This central security force would then work to replace US forces in their role as a quick reaction force, providing support in the case of large scale insurgent attacks on small communities, and deterring and sanctioning attacks by community security forces on one another.

Existing Authority Figures

In many weak and failed states, we find powerful local traditional or informal authority figures who already have control over the behavior of residents of their

communities. In Mali, there are *chefs du village*.⁷⁹⁴ In Iraq and Syria, there are *sheikhs*, *muhtars*, *mujtahids* and their *wukala* and Sufi prayer leaders.⁷⁹⁵ In Indonesia, there are *bapaks*.⁷⁹⁶ At very low cost, these consensus leaders, who already organically have information about people's behavior in their community, control the behavior of residents. They leverage resources from within the community for this purpose based on the consensus among residents that what the local leader is doing will be in their interest. The local leaders then apply those resources to sanctioning people who break the rules.

In Afghanistan, there were leaders at the local level who had been selected by and were accountable to the residents of their communities and who had control over the behavior of their communities. The Wakils were old men who based their authority on consensus about how people would behave and were naturally antagonistic to young Taliban fighters coming to their communities and violently imposing rules.

The US and its allies could have mediated between these local leaders to build a defensive mesh that could repel the Taliban. With just a little extra ammunition, the Wakils could have organized and commanded local village police patrols that could sense Taliban presence. The Wakil in question could then have called for support from surrounding villages through their Wakil and or called for US or central government quick reaction force support to repel any Taliban incursions. The US could have allowed the Wakils to have the rules to which their residents consented, with the addition of only a few rules related to fighting against the Taliban and not fighting one another.

⁷⁹⁴ Andrea Jackson field notes Bamako and Gao, Mali 2013.

⁷⁹⁵ Andrea Jackson. *Iraq's Ethnosectarian Groups and the State: What We Know and How We Know It*. Middle East Comprehensive Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 2009.

⁷⁹⁶ Karl D. Jackson. *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

The first rule would be: do not allow the Taliban to come to your community or stay in your community. The second would be: provide information about Taliban location and activities to the US and the central government. The third would be: do not provide any resources, including personnel, services, information, goods or funds, to the Taliban. Finally, the US would need to mandate that no one community could use its enhanced resources and organization to attack any of its neighboring communities. The US would need to be willing to punish communities that disobeyed any of these rules and build a government security force that would and could continue to do so after the US departed.

The US would have had to accept that these leaders did not want women's rights or unfettered freedom of religion or speech and that they would prioritize the problems they and their communities wanted solved, not those the US wanted them to solve. The important question is why the US would trade the efficient and sustainable defeat of the Taliban for goals and rules relating to individual freedoms that would be erased in the event of a Taliban victory.

Afghanistan: How Could This Have Worked?

In order to show how this could have worked, I will walk through how this could have been done in 2001 in Afghanistan. When the US backed the former *mujihadeen* commanders with money, satellite communications equipment, Special Forces soldiers and aerial bombing support, it knew that these same commanders had been unable to form a government in 1992, plunging the country into chaos. These were the same organizations that, between 1992 and 1996, had engaged in brigandage so brutal and random that many in the population initially welcomed the Taliban's draconian puritanicalism as a form of

violence that was at least more predictable.

If the US had known there were local leaders, the Wakils, with a high level of control, who were accountable to their populations through consensus-based decision making, but that they were only powerful at the level of 100 to 250 households, it could have taken a very different approach to overthrowing the Taliban and generating a government that could sustainably repel the Taliban and other *salafi jihadists'* presence.

In effect, Karzai's rebellion in Uruzgan and his work through Mullah Naqib were an effort to organize villages under Karzai's rule. He acted as an intermediary for the Special Forces, not in their interest or in the interest of establishing a functioning central government, but in his own narrow interest. The US allowed him to do so out of some deference to his sovereignty, but the US itself, not the people of Afghanistan, had granted that sovereignty. This pattern iterated itself with Fahim Khan, Sayyaf, Ishmael Khan, Shirzai, Dostum, Khalili, and all of the layers of the *mujihadeen* that lay beneath each of their organizations, which stretched down to the district level, but rarely touched life at the community level.

The *mujihadeen* and their leaders, dislocated over and over again by war from the populations of the areas to which they returned from exile (with the exception of *Jamat e Islami* in the Panshir Valley itself), had little connection to the populations from which they came. Freed from their impoverished, prayerful traditional agricultural lives, where unpredictable, unstoppable calamities and suffering were common, the *mujihadeen* embraced action, solidarity with their brothers in arms, and the salaries that came from membership in the militias that expelled the Soviets from Afghanistan. The *mujihadeen* and

their leaders did not seek, as the Wakils did, to solve the problems of the residents of their home villages, districts, provinces or nation. They sought to secure funds for the continuation of their wealth and freedom from the very communalism and consensus the Wakils sought. And, the *mujihadeen* were far from unitary. So, each group and sub-group used the positions it could acquire within the state to fight one another for wealth and power. It was in their interest to prevent the US from connecting the Wakils to the government because they would no longer be required as an intermediary.

Karzai and the other *mujihadeen* leaders did not attempt to connect the US to the people who could translate the interests of the population into a government that was functional, accountable and sustainable. The Wakils, empowered by their villagers to solve the problems of the people, could raise manpower to defend their village, expel people who violated the rules, propose rules and sanctions, collect taxes and execute projects. Underpinned by Islam's admonishment that Muslims help their neighbors and Mohammad's example of rule by consensus, the Wakils could have served as the basis for a powerful system of local government. If they had then been aggregated around problems that required a shared solution, and allowed to select representatives and vote regularly on problems and solutions according to their existing practices, the Wakils could have formed a powerful district government structure.

Further, that structure had an organically anti-Taliban orientation because the Taliban seeks to impose rules through young fighters, in violation of the authority of the Wakil and the consensus decisions he enforces. Even Wakils who agreed, along with the members of their communities, with the rules the Taliban sought to enforce, did not want strange young men patrolling and beating people in the street without consulting the Wakil

or the residents. For this reason, the Wakils provided a ready-made anti-Taliban force.

In this alternative approach, the US would have assembled a Special Forces element larger than the one they had used to drive the Taliban out of Afghanistan in 2001. The Special Forces teams would have moved into Afghanistan with fixers who might or might not have been *mujihadeen*. The teams would have organized villagers around their Wakils to expel the Taliban. The size of the US force would have needed to be large enough to remain in place at the district level throughout the country after the Taliban's departure.

In order to implement this plan, the US might have needed the support of some *mujihadeen* leaders, but not all of them. The US could have informed the *mujihadeen* leaders in advance that the Special Forces teams would remain in place and they would build village police forces and village, urban community and district governments and then a national government from the bottom up. These exiled *mujihadeen* could then decide to participate or not participate, perhaps in return for money, knowing that these would be the terms. The *mujihadeen* had spent the entire war against the Soviets competing with one another for resources and the US could have worked only with those groups who would have agreed to the plan. The others would then have been left out in the cold with no resources, so it is likely that some of the leaders, whether at the national level, or below, would have agreed to assist the US in this more limited way.

Since *Jamat e Islami* was already running a para-government in the Panshir Valley, with an effective, mobilized security force, they could have been granted autonomy. But, not empowered to rush down and take Kabul. Because of the presence of *Jamat e Islami*, the US would have needed to install a Division sized element in Kabul to take the city, deter

Fahim Khan and his *mujihadeen* from attempting to take it and then serve as the element that reached out to the Wakils to construct governments and a security force in the capital.

There were also existing regional leaders, like Mullah Naqib in Kandahar's Argandab, who had para-governmental, well-fortified social systems. If the US had understood his level of control, it could have worked directly with him to overthrow the Taliban there, rather than working through Karzai and Shirzai and finally alienating the most powerful leader in Kandahar, who then did not and could not stand in the way of the Taliban's re-emergence, particularly in its place of origin in the Panshwayi, Maiwand and Zahri Districts of Kandahar.

This approach would have ensured the *mujihadeen* did not insert themselves as an intermediary, collecting money from the US and its allies, but not governing, while preventing the Wakils from aggregating to repel the Taliban. In this scenario, the US would have maintained a direct, not a mediated, relationship with the Wakils and mediated between them to ensure they aggregated into a government that focused on solutions to the shared problems of their communities. Security forces for each village would have been organized and commanded by the Wakils to provide order and keep the Taliban from returning. Aid would have gone to the Wakils at their request based upon solving their problems. The Wakils would have selected a leader from among them for their district and also a representative to a national parliament. In this approach, ministries would have been organized to facilitate the activities communities requested through their Wakils. Ministries and their staffs would not simply exist because the international community wanted there to be ministries or because they felt they had to do something with the defunct shells of ministries that existed at the end of the Taliban's rule or because these were goodies to

hand out to *mujihadeen* leaders in return for quiescence. Through this approach, what the ministries did would be dictated by what the Wakils wanted, not what Karzai or Fahim Khan wanted.

All of this would have required a larger element of more savvy and linguistically capable Special Forces. But, there is no reason the US cannot develop such capabilities. It would also have required that the US knew the Wakils existed and had accountable control over local populations throughout the country. This would require that the US develop improved area studies capabilities, directed research capabilities and an ability to ingest knowledge of the under-studied countries in which we consistently intervene. A short list of places where there is a constant risk of state failure includes Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Somalia, the Magreb and the Sahel, but not too many others.

In this approach, the US would have built a small, centralized government security force out of personnel selected by their Wakils to represent their villages at the national level. These disparate personnel would have been brought together and forged into centralized military organization that could act as a quick reaction force to put down fighting between villages and to reinforce local forces faced with large concentrations of Taliban. The discipline system of this centralized force could have leveraged the accountability of community residents to the Wakil who appointed them to assist in solving problems he and other Wakils had agreed they shared. The job of patrolling and sanctioning Taliban presence and other violations of rules would be that of the village security forces organized under their Wakils and tied together through pacts of mutual aid.

If we think carefully about the reasons the US granted authority to Karzai, Fahim and others, it was because it needed their assistance in identifying allies who had authority at the local level. In return, the US allowed them to dominate its relationship with the local leaders who actually had control to the detriment of the local leaders and the US' ability to build a government organization that could sustainably defeat and repel the Taliban

insurgency. The US did so in order to keep only a small footprint, but in the end, because of the very predictable inability of the *mujihadeen* leaders to create a functioning government, the US and its allies had to put more than one hundred thousand troops in the country.

And, by that time, after we had empowered a government that sought simply to enhance the wealth and power of its leaders to decide with whom we could work to build local governments, it was too late. In reality, we should have been more deliberate and applied more force in the first place in order to add up the existing authorities from the local level to the national level. The goals should have been the establishment at the local level of a government that could and would collect information about Taliban presence and sanction it, while ensuring that local leaders did not fight one another.

Conclusion

The United States faces a persistent requirement to intervene in countries where insurgent and government organizations are engaged in pitched battles for control over the behavior of their populations. In Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia and Afghanistan, to name only a few countries, the US is currently engaged in efforts to increase or decrease government or insurgent organization control as part of its fight against the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated *salafi jihadist* organizations. But, we have proven over and over that we do not know how to do that efficiently or sustainably.

Afghanistan provides an example of an effort by the US to impose leaders, rules and institutions on a population from the top down that resulted in a costly failure. The Afghan government lost its battle with the Taliban not because the population agreed with the

Taliban more than the government. In fact, the population agreed more with their Wakils than anyone else, but over time, their control decreased in the face of competition from the government and then the Taliban. The Afghan government did not fail because it lacked adequate external resources, for it had them in abundance. It failed because it could not motivate its own personnel to take actions that would place them at risk. It failed because its personnel did not have shared goals or an agreement about what personnel ought and ought not do. While the Taliban had relatively limited external resources, the Taliban's ideology and discipline system motivated its personnel to patrol and sanction rule breaking despite the risk of attack by the ANSF.

It is not whether one organization or the other has massive external resources or can win hearts and minds or has an organization that consistently executes tasks that determines who wins or loses. It is in fact a process that translates these factors into control that determines the outcome at the local level and the aggregate of those local victories that determines it at the national level. The factors themselves are only relevant as inputs to an organization's ability to generate the expectation that if someone violates its rules, he or she will be sanctioned. In order to generate this expectation, the organization must execute a process by collecting information about rule breaking and sanctioning it. In order to do so, the organization must have enough resources and an effective enough organization relative to those available to prospective violators that they will be deterred.

Each organization decides upon a strategy based on its goals and the inputs at its disposal. There are two major approaches. Consensus organizations generate rules based on how the population believes people should behave and how the organization should enforce those rules, leveraging resources from within the community. Other organizations,

like the government and Taliban in Afghanistan, or the Islamic State, impose rules upon communities and act based on their organization's intent, rather than based on the preferences of the population. These organizations must have enough external resources relative to those the community and any competitor organizations can generate to defend themselves against the imposition organization in question. They must also be able to motivate their personnel to patrol to identify rule breaking and sanction it, putting themselves at risk, in communities where people disagree with their goals and actions. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the US failed to construct government organizations that could compel their personnel to patrol and sanction violators. If it is to succeed in such endeavors, the US requires an improved system of indoctrination at a minimum and potentially a different approach to leveraging existing values and authority figures to convince personnel to act.

Consensus organizations require fewer external resources and a smaller organization than imposition organizations, but they can only access the resources available from the population consenting to their rule. This fact limits their ability to have the relative resources necessary to control their population in the face of a well-organized imposition organization with significant external resources.

The US can achieve its goal of increasing allied organizations' control over the behavior of populations by building them from the bottom up, either bolstering existing or fostering new consensus organizations, and then mediating between them and aggregating them into a larger organization.

In order to do so, the US would need to start not at the top, but at the bottom. It

would also need to accept that it would not determine what rules the allied organizations would enforce upon people. The US would need to leave that decision to the consensus of local communities. In return for bolstering this consensus with resources and training, the US would demand only that communities not attack neighboring communities and that they attack the competitor organization whenever its personnel entered the community. In order to implement these tasks, the US would require more Special Forces, who were more knowledgeable and better equipped with languages and up to date information about countries where this might occur. The US could provide a quick reaction force to reinforce allied communities in the case of large scale assaults with conventional forces.

The key to success in this case for the US is either to determine how to build organizations that can motivate their personnel to patrol and sanction people who violate the rules; or to accept that it cannot impose a government structure and rules on a population during a civil war from the top down.

Accepting the second would mean the US would have to concede when communities restrict what women wear or whether they can freely choose to seek employment outside of the home. It might mean the US would have to accept that Muslim communities will not allow people to convert to religions other than Islam or blaspheme against it. It might mean there are no organized, western-style national elections or judicial systems. But, that would be a small price in return for a less costly and more sustainable method for expelling the Islamic State, Al Qaeda and the Taliban from Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia and Afghanistan.

Appendix 1: Community Case Study Data Set

In each community, a researcher who was a long-time resident was trained in the methods of participant observation and described the following factors without the inclusion of information about the specific name of the community or any personally identifying information (PII) regarding any of the subjects:

1. Description of a set of *randomly selected, anonymous families* and their three most recent public actions in the community. These descriptions provide the basis for a representative description of the social structure and demographic characteristics of the community. The extent to which each of the individuals obeys the rules of each organization provides a representative measure of the control that organization has over the people of each community.
2. Description of the *Wakil*⁷⁹⁷ and the five most recent actions by the Wakil. A history of the Wakils that includes a description of how the current Wakil was selected, the characteristics of each previous Wakil, how he was selected, and actions by Wakils in the community stretching back to the period before the Russians invaded. This section includes a description of why the Wakils were selected and the characteristics that make them appropriate to be Wakil.
3. Description of the *Mullah* and the most recent five actions by the Mullah. A history of the Mullahs that includes a description of how the current Mullah was selected, the characteristics of each previous Mullah, how he was selected, and actions by Mullahs in the community stretching back to the period before the Russians invaded.
4. Description of each of the *Elders* and the five most recent actions by each Elder in each community. This section includes a description of why the elders were selected and the characteristics that make them appropriate to be elders.
5. Description of the most recent cases of *Prince of the City*⁷⁹⁸ action in each community,

⁷⁹⁷ Wakils are leaders selected by consensus of the male heads of the household of a community in their local *mazjet* to solve the problems of the community. Wakils represent the people to the government and any outside political actors, including insurgent organizations. When problems arise in the community as a result of the behavior of the local population, the elders, the Wakil and the Mullah propose a new rule and associated sanctions to the community. The community then votes on the rule. The Wakil can enforce the rules by advising members of the local community who have broken the rule, by shaming them in front of the community at the *mazjet* or by having them thrown out of the community. The Wakil does not have organic coercive force.

⁷⁹⁸ Princes of the City are organized criminals who control particular territory in the city and are protected from government prosecution by their relationships within the police force or other portions of the executive branch. Princes of the City existed under the Taliban, during the Civil War, under the Russians and before the Russian invasion. At times, they act like para-governments.

and a history of Princes of the City that includes a description of the characteristics of each previous Prince and actions by him in the community stretching back to the period before the Russians invaded.

6. Description of the five most recent cases of **violence** in each community.
7. Description of the most recent cases of each community **throwing someone out**.
8. Description of the five most recent **Taliban actions** in each community.
9. Description of the five most recent **police actions** in each community.
10. Description of the five most recent **government actions** in each community.
11. The ten **most important rules** in each community and 5 examples of the enforcement of each rule.
12. **Most discussed event** for each week in each community and what people in the community said about it.
13. Description of what happened at the **mazjet on Friday**. The description includes the Mullah's weekly sermon and any political or other meetings at the mosque that day. It also includes a description of what people said about what happened at the *mazjet* that day.
14. Description of something that happened to the researcher each day, either inside his community or outside. These stories provide a rich, unconstrained set of descriptions of daily life in and outside the communities under study. They are entitled **What Happened to Me Today**.

For each person in the data set, the researcher created a unique code and provided information about as many of the following personal characteristics as possible:

Age, Gender, Ethnic Group, Qawm, Religion, Years of Education, Literacy, Occupation, Monthly Income, Place of Origin, Place of Residence, Year Moved to Community, Works in Community (yes or no), Prayers per Day at Community *Mazjet*, Prayerful (yes or no), Clothing at Home, Clothing at Work or School, Women's Clothing in the Street, Frequency of Woman Leaving the Home, Attends Classes at Mosque, Attends Shrine, Gives Charity at Home, Gives Charity in the Street, Length of Beard, Gives Charity at the Shrine, Level of Islamic Knowledge, Most Important Thing, Frequency of Seeing Researcher, Wakil (yes or no), Elder, (yes or no), Mullah (yes or no), Government Worker (yes or no), Policeman (yes or no), Member of the Taliban (yes or no), Prince of the City (yes or no), Hajji (yes or no), Kori (yes or no), Advises other Women (yes or no), Owns own Business (yes or no), Must Obey Wakil (yes or no), Must Obey Elders (yes or no), Must Obey Mullah (yes or no), Must Obey Father (yes or no), Must Obey Mother (yes or no), Must Obey Husband (yes or no), Must Obey Police (yes or no), Must Obey Boss at Work (yes or no).

These data were collected by an Afghan research institute that wished to remain anonymous. The research institute, as well as local leaders in Kabul, felt that anonymity of subjects and researchers was the best way to protect all involved in the data collection in the current unstable environment in Afghanistan.

For that reason, there is no personally identifying information in any of the data. No communities or people are named (except for public figures, such as President Hamid Karzai). The research design has been reviewed by a local Wakil and Mullah, as well as the senior clerical council of Kabul to ensure that they approved of the design and that they agreed that the research posed no greater threat to the subjects than they experienced in their daily lives.

The Johns Hopkins University Homewood Institutional Review Board (IRB) judged that the analysis of these data posed no threat to their subjects because they contain no Personally Identifying Information (PII).

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Abdul Awwal Zabolwal. "Taliban in Zabul: A Witnesses' Account." In Antonio Giustozzi, ed. *Decoding the New Taliban*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

Abdul Salam Zaef. *My Life with the Taliban*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy. *Islamist Networks: The Afghanistan-Pakistan Connection*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

ANDREA V. JACKSON

CURRICULUM VITAE

EDUCATION

Johns Hopkins University

Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)

Ph.D. International Relations, *Expected December 2017*

Dissertation: *When and Why Do Men Obey During a Civil War? A Study of Organizations Competing for Control in Afghan Communities*

Comprehensive Exams: International Relations Theory, Strategic Studies, Comparative Politics, Middle East Studies (with honors)

Johns Hopkins University

Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)

M.A. International Relations, 1998, concentration in Russian and Eastern European Area Studies & International Economics

Cornell University

B.A. Government and French Literature, 1996, concentration in International Relations

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Afghanistan 2010-2011, 2014-2015

Multi-sited participant observation research through local residents to describe the actions of Taliban, government and local elites, as well as those of members of 11 communities in Afghanistan. Served as the basis for describing and explaining the causes of control by each organization.

Mali 2012-2013

Multi-sited participant observation research through local residents to describe actions of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb, Tuareg and other insurgents, government personnel and local elites, as well as those of members of 4 communities in Mali.

Iraq, 2006

Semi-structured interviews (through Iraqi researchers) with members of the Mahdi Army, the Badr Brigade and the Sunni *Muqaoma* (Resistance) to describe their daily lives; income, age, education level and other demographic characteristics; religious and political beliefs; authority figures and obedience to authority.

Diyala Province, Iraq 2005-2006 Research in three cities (Muqtadiya, Baquba, Khanaqin) and one town, Baladrooz. Informal interviews with residents and leaders. Surveys, unstructured interviews, focus groups and participant observation research through Iraqi researchers. Described the major social groups in each city, their level and sources of security; their level and sources of income; their ethnic and sectarian identity; the narratives and symbols associated with each group's identity; the forms of communication they used; their authority figures and the interests of these leaders; the relationship of the group to the Government of Iraq; the relationship of the group to the insurgency and to other social groups.

Al Anbar Province, Iraq 2004-2006

Survey research (through Iraqi researchers) on security, services, grievances, ethnic identity, religious and political beliefs, voting behavior, support for political leaders and methods of communication.

Semi-structured interviews about violence, security, human rights, religious beliefs and institutions, ethnic and sectarian identity, insurgency, elections, and related topics.

Iraq, 2003-2004

Formal and informal interviews with US Army soldiers and commanders to identify their most common interactions with Iraqis and the most effective approaches they had found for doing so.

Formal and informal interviews with members of the Coalition Provisional Authority to understand their mission, strategy and policies for building an Iraqi government and security forces.

Informal interviews and participant observation research in Baghdad, Baquba and Erbil to understand the challenges Iraqis faced in their daily lives, their religious and political beliefs, their relationship to the various armed groups and the government.

Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000-2001

Informal and formal interviews in order to describe the challenges Bosnians faced in achieving physical and economic security, other grievances, ethnic nationalism, political and religious beliefs, ethnic nationalist symbols and narratives, informal and formal authority figures and organizations, the formal and illegal economy, the formal political system, the Dayton Accords and their implementation and the role of international organizations and the NATO-led Sustainment Force (SFOR). In Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Brcko, Bratunac, Foca, Mostar, Zenica, Bocinija Donja and Zepce.

Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996-1997

Unstructured interviews with Bosnians and international community personnel to describe how fiscal federalism and the payment bureau system functioned in the Cantons of the Federation and in Republika Srpska.

Informal interviews and participant observation research to understand ethnic nationalism and its relationship to the electoral success of Bosnia's three nationalist political parties.

POLICY AND STRATEGY ADVISOR

Operation Resolute Support, Afghanistan, 2017

Assisted Commander in developing concept for a local security force; a method for assessing Taliban control over the Afghan population; and a plan for reducing that control.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Task Force Business and Stability Operations, Afghanistan, 2014-2015

Conducted assessment of TFBSO's operations in Afghanistan and their impact on ISAF's efforts to achieve its campaign objectives.

Joint Staff J8, 2011-2014

Assisted in improving of methods of strategy, planning and assessment for countering violent extremist organizations. Reviewed country plans to identify theory of how actions would impact objectives and then built method for empirically assessing whether actions occurred and if they impacted the objectives or not.

International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, 2010-2011

Director of Assessment of Line of Operation 4 of ISAF Campaign Plan

Advisor to Commander, Coalition Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) *Shafafiyat* (counter-corruption task force)

Advisor to ISAF Chief of Plans

Member, Campaign Plan Management Working Group

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, 2006-2007
Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning

Multinational Corps, Iraq, 2005-2006
Senior Advisor to the Effects Coordinator

3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (forward in Diyala Province, Iraq), US Army, 2005-2006
Advisor to the Commander

II Marine Expeditionary Force (forward in Al Anbar Province, Iraq), US Marine Corps
Advisor to Deputy Commander, 2004-2005

PUBLICATIONS

The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition,
Military Review. November – December 2005

US Army Iraq Training Program, 2003 and 2004

XVIII Airborne Corps Kosovo Training Program, 2001

XVIII Airborne Corps Bosnia and Herzegovina Training Program, 2000 and 2001

INVITED LECTURES

- Yale Center for the Study of Order, Conflict and Violence, *Selective Sanctions: A Mechanism for Social Control? Case Studies from Afghanistan*
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Officer South Asia, *Who Has Control and Why? Empirical Community Case Studies in Kabul*.
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Officer Africa, *Who Has Control and Why? Empirical Community Case Studies in Mali*.
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Strategic Futures Office, *Islam, Social Structure and Power in the Middle East and North Africa*.
- International Security Assistance Force – Afghanistan. *Who Has Control and Why? Nine Empirical Community Case Studies*, Afghan Study Group, Afghan Stability Working Group, CJ5, DCOS Stability, Commander, CJIATF *Shafafiyat*, CJ5 Study Group and the Assistant Chief of Staff.
- NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, Deputy Commander – Police and Staff, *Who Has Control and Why? Nine Empirical Community Case Studies*.
- West Point Social Science Department and Cadets, *Who Has Control and Why? Empirical Community Case Studies in Kabul*.
- Defense Science Board on Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance for Counterinsurgency. *Applied Social Science in Counterinsurgency*.
- Director of National Intelligence Strategic Speakers Series, *Social Science Research and Analysis: A Tool to Build a US Government Knowledge Base for National Security Decision Making*.
- Foreign Service Institute: *Iraq's Ethnoreligious Groups*.
- 101st Airborne Division Leadership Conference, *Politics of Insurgency in Iraq*.
- National Defense University, *Politics of Insurgency in Iraq*.
- MNCI-Commanders Conference, *4 Political Tools of Counter-insurgency*.
- 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Commanders and Staff, *Diyala Province*.
- World Bank, Iraq Country Team, *Politics, Economic Aid and the Insurgency in Iraq*.

- II Marine Expeditionary Force, Command and Staff, *Political and Cultural Operations in Iraq*
- 4th Civil Affairs Group, US Marine Corps, *Political and Cultural Operations in Iraq*
- 5th Civil Affairs Group, US Marine Corps, *Political and Cultural Operations in Iraq*
- 42nd Infantry Division, *Politics in Iraq*
- White House, Department of State, Department of Defense -- Conference on Interagency Requirements for Regional Stability / Capacity Building Operations, *Stability Operations Requirements*
- Army Science Board – *Politics, Economics, Social Structure and Insurgency in Iraq*
- Office of Naval Research, International Conference on Adversary Cultural Knowledge and National Security – *Leveraging Iraq's Cultural System*
- Joint Information Operations Commanders Conference 2004 -- *Culture and Information Operations*

LANGUAGES: Advanced French; Intermediate German and Italian; Beginner Serbo-Croatian