

THE RISKS AND REWARDS OF INVESTING IN ECONOMIC  
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN A POST CONFLICT  
ENVIRONMENT

by  
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## Abstract

The goal of this paper is to identify the role economic infrastructure development plays in stability operations and potential vulnerabilities that arise in the implementation of these projects that an insurgency can exploit. The questions I attempt to answer in my research are: What overall trends lead to the failure of economic infrastructure projects? What are the sources of these failures? How do failures in these projects create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an insurgency and pose a risk to the US while conducting stability operations? I hypothesized that infrastructure projects do create vulnerabilities which can be exploited by the insurgency and will have an effect on the mission of the United States. Evidence shows that these vulnerabilities are caused by the host nation, the social environment that is being worked in, and the US Government. The first chapter focuses on the sustainability of economic development projects in terms of the capacity of the government.

Research concluded that if the agency or contractor implementing the project does not take into consideration the capacity of the host nation government to sustain the project, whether it is due to lack of funds to maintain the project, or lack of expertise, then the project will likely fail. The second chapter questions US oversight of economic development projects. It was found that consequences for lack of oversight on a project include the failure to adhere to the project plan, failure to quickly identify problems or mistakes, and/or failure to remedy mistakes in a

timely manner. Projects without proper oversight failed either in the sense that they cost the US government more money or that they had no beneficial effect on the surrounding region. The third chapter analyzes the extent to which US agencies hold contractors accountable for their projects. It was determined that if contractors are not held accountable for their projects, they are likely to build low quality structures, exceed the designated budget, or need additional time to complete the project. In the fourth chapter, an assessment is made on the effect these failures have on the perception and behavior of the local population and the legitimacy of the host nation government and US / Allied forces operating in the area.

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## **Table of Contents**

Abstract .....	ii
Acknowledgements .....	iv
Introduction .....	1
<i>Stability Operations</i> .....	3
<i>Economic Infrastructure Development</i> .....	7
<i>Literature Review</i> .....	9
<i>Methodology</i> .....	18
<i>Results</i> .....	19
Chapter 1: Host Nation Capacity .....	22
Chapter 2: Oversight.....	35
<i>Project Management</i> .....	43
Chapter 3: Accountability .....	51
Chapter 4: The Importance of the Success of Economic Development Projects .60	
<i>Perception</i> .....	60
<i>Legitimacy</i> .....	63
<i>Behavior</i> .....	68
<i>Other Sources of Vulnerabilities Found in the Study</i> .....	70
Conclusion .....	78
Bibliography.....	83
Curriculum Vitae .....	93

## **List of Figures**

Figure 1 Top Influences in Project Phases.....	2
Figure 2 Breakdown of Oversight.....	35
Figure 3 Effects of Development Project Failure .....	60

## Introduction

*“For the United States, supporting international development is more than just an expression of our compassion. It is a vital investment in the free, prosperous, and peaceful international order that fundamentally serves our national interest.”*

-Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

US conflicts today are more likely to be unconventional in nature and often include counterinsurgency operations aimed at non-state actors who violently oppose the host nation government. Legitimacy is often used as one determinant of success. To support that government, the US conducts stability operations to address the drivers of conflict. These operations include economic infrastructure development projects which are designed to stabilize local and national economies and provide employment opportunities for the population. However, when these development projects are implemented during an active insurgency, any deficiencies in the projects are often exploited by the insurgent group to illustrate the deficiencies of the government. This study analyzes stability operations, concentrating on economic infrastructure development projects, which are conducted in support of counterinsurgency operations in a post-conflict environment.

*Research Question*

What overall trends lead to the failure of economic infrastructure projects? What are the sources of these failures? How do failures in these projects create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an insurgency and pose a risk to the US while conducting stability operations?

### *Variables*

This study discusses two dependent variables: success of economic infrastructure development projects and legitimacy of the host nation government. The independent variables tested in relationship to economic infrastructure development projects are capacity, accountability, and oversight. In any economic development project, host nation capacity,

oversight, and accountability are three key

factors affecting the

potential for success. The relationship between these variables is based on their influence at different stages of the implementation of the project. Host nation capacity must be considered at the design phase to ensure sustainability. Oversight is conducted while the project is being constructed to ensure that it stays within the allotted budget and time and ensures effectiveness in a dynamic environment. Accountability is exercised upon the project's completion to recognize and correct



Figure 1 Top Influences in Project Phases

mistakes from the implementation phase and allow for the issuance of reprimands where necessary. The second dependent variable is the legitimacy of the host nation government, and the independent variable is the success or failure of economic development projects.

### *Stability Operations*

Stability operations have been conducted by the United States as a method to eliminate the drivers of conflict while simultaneously building the capabilities of the host nation to manage and govern. In Army Field Manual 3-07, a stability operation is defined as a “process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability.”<sup>1</sup> This goal is accomplished by improving the capacity of host nation institutions in an effort to promote sustainable peace and prevent conflicts from reemerging.<sup>2</sup> Due to the diversity of issues which need to be addressed, stability operations require a “Whole of Government” approach in which the United States relies on the expertise of its different executive offices (Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, etc.) to address sources of instability. This approach was instituted by President Bill Clinton in 1997 with the Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD/NSC-44) and by President George W. Bush in 2005 with the National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44). In a more mission focused

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<sup>1</sup> *Stability*. Vol. FM 3-07. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2014.

<sup>2</sup> *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.



mentality, the Whole of Government approach coincides with a “Unity of Effort,” meaning that all actors located in an area of operation, whether government or nonprofit, are coordinating with each other to complete the objectives required to stabilize the country.<sup>3</sup> For the purpose of this paper, stability operations are referred to in the context of counterinsurgency operations in a post conflict environment.

Stability operations are important because they serve the strategic interests of the United States. Insurgent warfare is becoming a menacing issue all over the world. In the Middle East, the Islamic State has taken over portions of both Syria and Iraq, and Al Qaeda has destabilized Yemen. In Africa, Boko Haram has taken massive amounts of territory from various countries and slaughtered thousands. In Ukraine, rebels have taken over eastern portions of the country, forcing the government to respond militarily. Conflict has a devastating effect on the local and regional economies, forcing people to rely on subsistence farming and humanitarian aid and displacing large portions of the population.<sup>4</sup> With stability operations, the US can address the underlying causes of the insurgencies and strengthen the host nation, enabling it to better support its population by providing the public services needed to govern a country and improving the economy. Achieving these goals uplift portions of the population who are susceptible to recruitment from

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Crane, Keith. *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2009.

insurgencies and improves the overall economic and social wellbeing of the country. Economic improvement is promoted by infrastructure development, which enhances economic opportunity, increases support for the host nation government, and eliminates some of the strongest sources of conflict.<sup>5</sup> The goal of economic development is to establish a sustainable economy that is predictable, regulated, and produces employment.<sup>6</sup>

This paper will focus on stability operations in countries with ongoing counterinsurgency missions, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan. The stability operations in a counterinsurgency context are described by the United States Army in Field Manual 3-07 as a struggle for legitimacy and influence.<sup>7</sup> Legitimacy is the degree to which the local population supports the host nation government, the mission of the assisting force, and the mandate in which the government or assisting force has gained its power.<sup>8</sup> There are three phases to stability operations in a post conflict environment. The first phase requires the military to deliver basic government functions, such as providing access to clean water and sanitation. The second phase requires the military to return the responsibility of governance to civilian authorities, such as the US State Department or the host nation government. The third phase has a full

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<sup>5</sup> Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. *Winning Hearts and Minds through Development?* World Bank, 2012.

<sup>6</sup> *ADP 3-07: Stability*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2012.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

transfer of all responsibility of government to the host nation.<sup>9</sup> In counterinsurgency environments, the host nations often do not have the capacity to defeat an insurgency.<sup>10</sup> The size of the assisting military force and the scope of the mission are dependent on the host nation's capacity to handle its security situation. Consequently, the more unstable and unpredictable the environment, the more resources needed and the more broadened the scope of the mission.<sup>11</sup>

When conducting these operations, it is important that actions taken at the local level be consistent with the goals at the national level.<sup>12</sup> It would be counterproductive to pursue goals at the local level that clash with the goals of the rest of the country. It is also necessary to complete activities that complement and reinforce other related activities in neighboring areas for a regional holistic approach. Additionally, setting realistic expectations and demands for the host nation is necessary when creating development goals. The host nation government is often severely limited in capacity; therefore any timetable that is too short will result in the project not being completed or being rushed to completion at the expense of quality.

In a post conflict environment, the lack of resources fuels instability. For example, the lack of access to clean drinking water can cause more harm

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<sup>9</sup> *Stability*. Vol. FM 3-07. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2014.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

to civilians, through the spreading of disease, than violence. Competition for scarce resources can contribute to more violence or even large scale civil conflict.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, the restoration of public services is needed from the outset to allow people to return to their normal daily lives. The conflict is dependent on the perceptions of the citizens.<sup>14</sup> Stability operations attempt to transform the conflict so that the host nation is able to reach a level of self-sufficiency, whereby it can address the sources of conflict without the assistance of outside partners. The overall goal is to instill stable governance. Stability occurs when the government is able to provide public goods, can hold itself accountable, has established its own form of rule of law, has freedom of press, and includes all members of society within its government.<sup>15</sup>

### *Economic Infrastructure Development*

Economic infrastructure development garners support for the host nation government by removing sources of instability that often fuel an insurgency.<sup>16</sup> <sup>17</sup> Infrastructure development is vital in raising a country out of poverty and into a self-sustaining economy by providing public goods such as roads, seaports, and airports which are needed to move

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. *Winning Hearts and Minds through Development?* World Bank, 2012.

<sup>15</sup> *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

<sup>16</sup> Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. *Winning Hearts and Minds through Development?* World Bank, 2012.

<sup>17</sup> Crane, Keith. *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2009.

goods within and outside a country. It is also necessary for increasing employment, improving access to markets, and advancing business opportunities. If a business does not have the electricity to power its factories or the rail or roadways to send its goods to the market, it will not be prosperous. Even with an agriculturally based economy, improved water infrastructure allows for more efficient irrigation, cutting down on waste and assisting countries that are often affected by drought.<sup>18</sup>

Economic development is also needed to infuse important revenue and capital into local economies. A bolstered economy benefits local government through increased tax revenue on items such as income and property.<sup>19</sup> There is a downside to this influx of capital, however; it usually attracts more people into the area, which the local infrastructure might not be able to handle, thereby decreasing the quality of life in the area. There is a period of time during when tax revenue will not meet the demands of the increased population. Over time, however, as infrastructure development catches up to the population influx, spending will decrease and available revenue will increase.

In a counterinsurgency environment, quick impact development projects are essential to keeping individuals employed and improving quality of life. These projects, which include drilling wells to provide water,

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<sup>18</sup> Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

<sup>19</sup> Morgan, Jonathan. "Analyzing the Benefits and Costs of Economic Development Projects." Community and Economic Development Bulletin, no. 7 (2010).

constructing schools for education, and building health clinics to tend to the medical needs of the local population, are especially necessary in areas where the host nation lacks legitimacy and needs immediate support from the local population.<sup>20</sup> A side effect of these public works projects is creating cohesion through mutual interest. All parties tend to receive some level of benefit through the development of these projects, whether it's the government gaining legitimacy or the local population receiving a health clinic. Either way, it is in the interest of all parties involved to cooperate with each other in order to build lasting relationships.<sup>21</sup>

As a side note, there is extensive debate as to whether foreign aid is beneficial to the stability and economic improvement of a host nation. For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that economic development projects sponsored by outside donors are somewhat beneficial to the host nation government.

### *Literature Review*

Most donor countries implement projects without considering the long term costs which must be borne by the host nation once the donor nation has left. The relationship that presents itself here is between the capacity of a host nation and the sustainability of a development project.

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<sup>20</sup> Franke, Volker. "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 2 (2006).

<sup>21</sup> *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

This relationship constitutes a major issue in Afghanistan, especially pertaining to their road network. The United States has built so many roads in Afghanistan that the Deputy Minister of Public Works recommended that the US halt the construction of roads because their government does not have the resources to maintain their current road network.<sup>22</sup> This lack of capacity to sustain a project presents a significant problem for countries with active insurgencies or new governments because it damages their legitimacy as a government and fuels the public perception of their weakness in handling hostile actors.

There is a strong correlation between lack of oversight and failure of projects. Poor oversight of projects provides a greater opportunity for diversion from the original plan or cutting corners to save money and increase profit. The result is a project that either needs to be repaired or completely redone. If repairs are not made, most likely the project will be operating in an insufficient manner or operations will cease altogether. In many instances, no one is held accountable for the failed project, resulting in more exploitation of donor funds.

Another reoccurring relationship is the failure of development projects and the lack of specialized labor found in underdeveloped and developing countries. Without specialized or technical labor, host nations do not have the expertise and knowledge needed to sustain complicated

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<sup>22</sup> "Fiscal Year 2011 Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Projects Are Behind Schedule and Lack Adequate Sustainment Plans." Office of the Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Accessed March 2, 2014.

projects, such as hospitals and power plants. One theory that attempts to explain the lack of skilled labor in underdeveloped countries is the *Brain Drain Theory*, in which non-government organizations (NGOs) operating in a host nation attract the highly qualified workers with substantially higher pay, who leave the public sector and take their expertise with them.<sup>23</sup>

There is a parallel between the desire for people to learn a general skill and the lack of specialized skill in a host nation's labor pool. General skill training, such as construction, allows individuals in a highly volatile labor market to easily move between unemployed to employed status due to their skills being applicable to many different jobs.<sup>24</sup> Another cause of the shortage of skilled labor is the lack of an educational infrastructure, which itself is a development project. If the education infrastructure is not in place already, creating one can be extremely expensive and a strain on the already limited amount of skilled labor.<sup>25</sup>

There is extensive literature written on development projects and the reasons for their success. Many authors have assessed the outcome of development projects specifically pertaining to US government agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

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<sup>23</sup> Buss, Terry, and Adam Gardner. National Academy of Public Administration, "Why Foreign Aid to Haiti Failed." Last modified 2006. Accessed March 2, 2014.

<sup>24</sup> Ianchovichina, Elena, Antonio Estache, Renaud Foucart, Gregoire Garsous, and Tito Yepes. World Development, "Job Creation through Infrastructure Investment in the Middle East and North Africa." Last modified 2012. Accessed March 2, 2014.

<sup>25</sup> Drummond, Jane, and Pavao Stefanovic. "Transfer of High Technology to Developing Countries." International Institute for Aerospace Survey and Earth Sciences. . Accessed March 2, 2014.



and the Department of Defense (DoD), while other authors have analyzed development projects in general (including projects from US agencies, international organizations, and nonprofits) and how the management of these projects effected the outcome. Sheryl Lewis, in her article "Capacity Development - The Pathway to Self-Reliance for Host Nations," contends that capacity development plays such an important role in US assistance that it is currently being addressed by both the State Department and DoD.<sup>26</sup> She uses the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as an example of an agency that has historically focused on capacity improvement to address private and public sector management and argues its necessity in sustaining development projects. Andrew Natsios suggests in "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development" that the roles of the State Department, USAID, and DoD, since the attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, have become more in sync with each other due to the security implications development has on the theatres of operation the US finds itself in today.<sup>27</sup> He argues that one agency cannot do its job without the coordination of the others, indicating the importance of development in today's environment. Both authors emphasize the significance of development for US national security and the necessity for focusing on capacity building as a way to sustain development operations.

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<sup>26</sup> Lewis, Sheryl. 2011. "Capacity Development -- The Pathway to Self-Reliance for Host Nations." *Engineer* 41, no. 1: 61. Accessed October 6, 2014.

<sup>27</sup> Natsios, Andrew. "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development." *Strategic Studies Institute*. January 1, 2005. Accessed October 4, 2014.

Authors Khang Do Ba and Moe Tun Lin in their article, "Success Criteria and Factors for International Development Projects: A Life-Cycle-Based Framework," identify a lack of data on the completion of the “not-for-profit” development project.<sup>28</sup> The authors address the stages in the development project, which are conceptualizing, planning, implementing, and closing or completing. They also claim that there are three problems regarding development projects: a knowledge gap between donors and recipients; the lack of efficient management; and the lack of financial accountability. In the article "Project Management for Development in Africa: Why Projects Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It," Lavagnon Ika identifies various “traps” into which international development projects can fall.<sup>29</sup> These traps include the one-size-fits-all technical trap, the accountability-for-results trap, the lack-of-project-management-capacity trap, and the cultural trap. Ika suggests that to overcome these traps, focus needs to be placed on solutions establishing the managing of objectives for long term results, increasing supervision efforts, and tailoring projects to the culture of the host nation.

Tango International, a company that provides technical assistance to non-government organizations, emphasizes in its publication, “Sustainability of Rural Development Projects,” the importance of

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<sup>28</sup> Do Ba, Khang, and Moe Tun Lin. 2008. "Success Criteria and Factors for International Development Projects: A Life-Cycle-Based Framework." *Project Management Journal* 39, no. 1: 72-84. Accessed October 6, 2014.

<sup>29</sup> Ika, Lavagnon A. 2012. "Project Management for Development in Africa: Why Projects Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It." *Project Management Journal* 43, no. 4: 27-41. Business Source Complete. Accessed October 6, 2014.

assessing the environment of the host nation government to determine what type of project needs to be completed.<sup>30</sup> The company states that often there is a lack of consideration for issues such as infrastructure and financial services. Community involvement is also important for the sustainability of a project in an area that lacks infrastructure, since the residents will be the only ones responsible for maintaining the project once it is completed. Zachery Patterson, in "The Reality of Development: A Critique of the Current International Development Policies," supports Tango International's argument by stating that the US needs to focus less on "macro" policies and more on policies that address specific issues related to development such as cultural and social realities.<sup>31</sup> He claims that "macro approaches ignore micro issues."

Micro policies can be reduced to the project management aspect of a development project. Young Hoon, in the "Critical Success Factors in International Development Project Management," contends that the political landscape, legal institutions, and culture need to be considered in the project planning phase of a development project, or problems can arise during the implementation that could have been prevented.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> "Sustainability of Rural Development Projects." IFAD. Accessed November 5, 2014.

<sup>31</sup> Patterson, Zachary. "The Reality of Development: A Critique of the Current International Development Policies." IPAA 2009 International Public Affairs Conference. January 1, 2010. Accessed October 4, 2014.

<sup>32</sup> Hoon Kwak, Young. "Critical Success Factors in International Development Project Management." George Washington University. Accessed October 4, 2014.

Kamrul Ahsan and Indra Gunawan assert in an “Analysis of Cost and Schedule Performance of International Development Projects” that delays in the completion of a project constitute one of the biggest setbacks for a development project.<sup>33</sup> Lavagnon A. Ika, Amadou Diallo, and Denis Thuillier, in their article “Critical Success Factors for World Bank Projects: An Empirical Investigation,” attempt to identify factors that prevent the delays that Ahsan and Gunawan have acknowledged.<sup>34</sup> These factors include monitoring, coordination, design, training, and institutional environment, with an emphasis on monitoring and design.

Amadou Diallo and Denis Thuillier in their piece “The Success of International Development Projects, Trust and Communication: An African Perspective,” provide a more narrow approach to project management, looking at the people rather than the project. They determined that good communication, referred to as the flow of information between actors, at all levels of the project leads to success. In “The Success Dimensions of International Development Projects: The Perceptions of African Project Coordinators,” these same authors contend that evaluating the success of a project is dependent upon the definition

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<sup>33</sup> Kamrul Ahsan, Indra Gunawan, Analysis of cost and schedule performance of international development projects, *International Journal of Project Management*, Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 68-78, ISSN 0263-7863.

<sup>34</sup> Lavagnon A. Ika, Amadou Diallo, Denis Thuillier, Critical Success Factors for World Bank Projects: An Empirical Investigation, *International Journal of Project Management*, Volume 30, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 105-116, ISSN 0263-7863.

of success and the individual conducting the evaluation.<sup>35</sup> They argue that it is important to determine the goals of the project early in the planning phase, thereby establishing the achievements that constitute the successful completion of the project.

Legitimacy is often needed as the basis for authority in a nation and as a principled requirement for inclusion in the international community. The Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has broken down legitimacy into two models: The Western Model and the non-Western Model. With the Western Model, the state has control over population and territory, is responsible for providing services, and has international recognition. The state and the citizenry cooperate, and legitimacy is obtained through social interaction. Citizens provide capital for the state to run its affairs. In the non-Western Model, relations stem from personal relations, family, and community. Public goods are distributed to particular groups rather than to everyone and political and economic rights rely on personal ties rather than economic competition.<sup>36</sup> In this theory, Iraq and Afghanistan are considered hybrid states, in which the states have a historical foundation of providing legitimacy through the non-Western Model but currently are acquiring legitimacy through the Western Model.

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<sup>35</sup> Diallo, Amadou, and Denis Thuillier. "The Success Dimensions of International Development Projects: The Perceptions of African Project Coordinators." *International Journal of Project Management* 22, no. 1 (2003): 19-31.

<sup>36</sup> Conflict and Fragility the State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations : Unpacking Complexity. Paris: OECD, 2010.

Max Weber, a German political economist, describes three types of authority. The first is the “legal” method, which occurs when institutional norms generate the leader and regime of a nation. Norms are crafted by the legal institutions, and legitimacy is derived from legal-rational norms. The second is the “traditional” method, in which customary norms generate the leader and legitimacy rests upon traditional customs. The third is the “charismatic” method, which, unlike the legal and traditional methods, is not bound by any social norms. This method creates new norms based on the attitudes of the leader, from which legitimacy is derived.<sup>37</sup> For the two case studies in this paper, both countries have a democracy governing the state; therefore, they gain their legitimacy through a mix of legal and charismatic methods, having citizens vote (legal) on which leader appeals to them the most (charismatic).

The goal of this study is to analyze different economic infrastructure development projects in a security context. Most military field manuals identify what needs to be carried out to stabilize an area, where most literature analyzes infrastructure development projects in the context of improving standards of living. There is a gap in the information military field manuals provides for stability operations and real world examples. This writing intends to fill the void by discussing specific examples that are analyzed in the literature in the context of military doctrine.

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<sup>37</sup> Spencer, Martin. "Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority." *The British Journal of Sociology* 21, no. 2 (1970): 123-34.

## *Methodology*

USAID and DoD both have investigative bodies that are led by an inspector general who reviews his/her respective organizations as a whole to look for waste and illicit activities. These investigations include development operations and are delegated to areas of operations. For example, DoD has an inspector general for the entire department and another for Afghan reconstruction. I will use the reports from the Inspector Generals of USAID and DoD to research the outcome of development projects abroad, thereby allowing me to assess the shortcomings of the US government and their effect on stability operations as a whole. I will also use academic literature to reinforce and expand upon the problems that were identified in the government reports. I will then relate these shortcomings to military doctrine and the effect these inadequacies have on the goals of stability and counterinsurgency operations.

The research will focus on Afghanistan and Iraq since each is categorized as an underdeveloped country by the UN and has recently experienced events causing massive instability due to military action and insurgency. In addition, these two selected countries provided the most information on development projects that fit the criteria for inclusion in my research. Afghanistan has a history that is ravaged by war. The United States invaded in 2001 to topple the Taliban regime and defeat Al-Qaeda. It is

now one of the largest recipients of US development projects, receiving funding from both DoD and the Department of State. Iraq has a history of dictatorship and constant conflict with neighboring countries. It was invaded by a US led coalition and experienced sectarian violence that evolved into a civil war.

### *Hypothesis*

I predict that economic infrastructure development projects create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the insurgency and negatively affect the mission of the US. These vulnerabilities are caused by the host nation, the local social environment, and the US Government.

### *Results*

The relationship between capacity of the host nation government and the sustainability of the economic development project in the planning phase of development is outlined in chapter one. Andrew Natsios, in his article, *The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development*, refers to capacity as the “ability to retain, absorb, and facilitate economic investment, whether from donor assistance or from private sources of foreign direct investment (FDI).”<sup>38</sup> If capacity is not considered in the planning stages of the project, then the project is unlikely to be sustained due to the lack

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<sup>38</sup> Natsios, Andrew. "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development." Strategic Studies Institute. January 1, 2005. Accessed October 4, 2014.



of available resources to maintain economic infrastructure development projects.<sup>39</sup>

Chapter two identifies oversight as a variable that affects the outcome of an economic infrastructure development project during the execution phase. Oversight refers to the monitoring by the US government of the development project through its duration to ensure a successful outcome. Oversight takes into account all factors of the project's execution and can be flexible or rigid depending upon the type of project. When a project has a lack of oversight, it is more likely to end in failure due to factors such as lack of impact on the surrounding community, the project not being built to quality, or not abiding by the original plans . Proper oversight is necessary for a project to be successful. In this writing, success is defined by the completion of a development project that is sustainable without the assistance of an outside nation, is built on time and on budget, and has a beneficial effect on the surrounding community.

Chapter three focuses on the accountability of companies and development agencies that are contracted by the US to implement economic development projects. Accountability refers to holding the contractor responsible for its actions and failures of the project. This usually happens after the project has been completed, or, if the situation is bad enough, when the project is halted due to deficiencies. If the

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

contractor does not follow the original plan, that contractor may be punished either financially or with the unavailability of future contracts from the US government. If contractors have little incentive to abide by the contracts, they are less likely to follow through with the original plan, the results of which may include sub-standard construction, budget overruns, and delays. If these flaws in accountability are reoccurring, it could pose a problem in the ongoing inefficiencies of subcontractors who believe they can take advantage of US development funds.

The goal of chapter four is to determine what effect project failure has on meeting stability operations objectives. A review of the literature revealed that failure of development projects can fuel negative perception of the US and host nation governments. This negative perception can be contagious among the local population, affecting the legitimacy of the host nation government. This, in turn, can change the behavior of the population in two ways. First, the local population may use less public services, such as schools and roadways. Second, the insurgency often gains support and legitimacy, using the project failure as a recruiting method to strengthen their position.

## Chapter 1: Host Nation Capacity

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once stated, “the capabilities of the United States’ allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.”<sup>40</sup> Primary goals for all international development projects are sustainability once assistance is no longer available and acceptance of responsibility for the project by the host nation government. Unfortunately, most countries where development projects are implemented have weak governments, with feeble policies, that often lack the ability to lead their own economic and social development. Even the most well designed project has the potential to fail due to the poor institutional environment. Consequently, it is very important to take into consideration the capacity of the host nation government in the planning and execution stages of a project. Since infrastructure plays an important role in stability operations, weaknesses may create vulnerabilities that put counterinsurgency missions at risk. A major vulnerability arises when the host nation government does not have the capacity to keep up with increased demand for public services while sustaining economic infrastructure development.

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<sup>40</sup> Gates, Robert. "A Balanced Strategy." *Foreign Affairs*. January 1, 2009. Accessed March 29, 2015.

After the US led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, much of the scarce yet critical infrastructure was destroyed by the initial invasion. In Iraq's case, much was damaged by post invasion looting. When developing infrastructure, one factor that is often not taken into account is the effect displaced populations would have on urban areas, the primary places to which people flock in times of conflict. Displaced civilians are likely to turn to cities to take advantage of the increased security provided by the public and the military, which is often stationed there to protect the already high concentration of population.<sup>41</sup> This influx of people puts a strain on the already fragile infrastructure, limiting the amount of residents it can service and limiting access to such things as water and sanitation.

The other cause for an increase in the demand for public goods is the pace at which the economy develops. If the pace at which infrastructure is developing cannot keep up with the speed at which the economy is growing, the infrastructure can be strained to the point that it constricts economic progress.<sup>42</sup> An example is the electricity availability in Iraq. Iraq has often been plagued with gaps in the provision of electricity despite its great energy resources, due to the local population paying artificially low prices for electricity, creating no incentive for consumers to use less electricity. As a result of increased economic activity, more

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<sup>41</sup> Crane, Keith. *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2009.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

and more Iraqis were buying electrical appliances, such as air conditioners. The greater the amount of electrical products in a household and increased use put greater the strain on the electrical grid, causing gaps in the availability of electricity.<sup>43</sup> As of 2010, Iraq was generating twice the amount of electricity it had before the invasion but was still experiencing limitations due to this increased consumption.<sup>44</sup> Any movements to increase the price have been met with resistance from society for fear that economic growth will be stunted and runs risk of slowing down the growth in the economy.<sup>45</sup> This consumption is projected to increase 6.5 percent every year on average.<sup>46</sup> With no foreseeable change to price or capacity, Iraqi citizens will continue to experience energy shortages despite its resources.

Similarly, in Afghanistan, a rapid increase in the use of electricity per household occurred as it became more readily available. The already weak infrastructure was unable to keep up with the consumption of the Afghan households, commercial businesses, and industry. Consumption skyrocketed, as evidenced by the increase in connections from approximately 75,000 in 2009 to approximately 1.05 million in 2013.<sup>47</sup>

Despite the efforts by the US and Afghan government, the development of

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Recknagel, Charles. "Power Hungry: Iraqis Ask 'Where Is The Electricity?'" Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. August 29, 2010. Accessed March 24, 2015.

<sup>45</sup> Gunter, Frank. "Challenges Facing the Reconstruction of Iraq's Infrastructure." Lehigh University. October 28, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2015.

<sup>46</sup> *Iraq Energy Outlook*. Paris: International Energy Agency, 2012.

<sup>47</sup> Amin, Mohsin. "Power to the People: How to Extend Afghans' Access to Electricity." February 3, 2015. Accessed March 24, 2015.

the electrical infrastructure were not able to keep pace with usage of electricity. The Ministry of Energy and Water admitted that they underestimated the future demand for electricity and built an infrastructure with lower capacity than was ultimately needed to handle the increased use. For example, 220 kilovolt power lines were used instead of 500 kilovolt lines that would have allowed longer distance to be covered when transferring electricity to different regions.<sup>48</sup>

Restoring essential services is one of the most important initiatives to reinforcing the legitimacy of the host nation government.<sup>49</sup> The problem that often occurs with aid and development organizations is that they often want to show something tangible so that success is easily measured rather than emphasizing the project's effect on the population.<sup>50</sup> These projects, although initially very successful, are either built in areas in which they are not effective or do not have methods in place to sustain the project, providing things such as regular maintenance or funding.

This inability to provide services to the population creates expectation gaps within the population. An expectation gap is when the population expects the host nation government to provide public goods that it has promised but is unable to deliver. It is a double edged sword. On one

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<sup>48</sup> *Iraq Energy Outlook*. Paris: International Energy Agency, 2012.

<sup>49</sup> *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

<sup>50</sup> Crane, Keith. *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2009.

side, the host nation's legitimacy is weakened due to the appearance of being unable to provide for its own people, on the other side, it creates an opportunity for the insurgency to fill these gaps and gain legitimacy among the population, enhancing their influence.

When implementing an economic infrastructure development project, sustainability is often overlooked. A project, once completed, could have immediate positive effects on the surrounding area; however, if there aren't systems in place to maintain, staff, and finance the project once US forces leave the area, the benefits the project has on the local population will not last. The US government has often invested in economic infrastructure development while conducting stability operations but did not consider the sustainability of the project; turning it over to the host nation government who fails to maintain the project in the end.

Due to the nature of stability operations, host nation security is included as a factor in economic development. Security is essential in maintaining a safe and stable environment. It lays the foundation for development projects, especially in places with an active insurgency such as Iraq or Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, with the pullout of the majority of US forces, many forward operating bases (FOBs) are vital for the Afghan government to govern remote parts of its territory. Many of these FOBs, when handed over to the Afghan National Army, have fallen into

disrepair, with some projects that were established inside the bases becoming unsustainable once the US forces pulled out.

At FOB Salerno in Khowst Province, Afghanistan, due to a lack of sanitation infrastructure, incinerators were needed to remove waste that accumulated over time. The USACE awarded a \$5.4 million contract to have the incinerators constructed. The contract included the development of two 8 ton capacity incinerators, which were constructed according to plan, properly sized for the base's daily solid waste and could operate 24 hours a day.<sup>51</sup> However, what was not considered was the \$1 million annual cost to operate the incinerator. This combined with its limited use led officials at FOB Salerno not to use the facilities. Due to lack of maintenance the incinerators eventually fell into disrepair.<sup>52</sup>

Though this one project does not seem like a big loss, it hurts the image of the host nation government, making it appear as if they are not able to provide for their security forces. It also could have negative implications on the morale of the military personnel stationed there, making them less effective and giving the insurgency the upper hand in the area.

The USACE has been working on building partner capacity to improve a nation's self-reliance for decades. Self-reliance results in people's lives being improved, the host nation's reliance on external aid being reduced, and long term success being more likely, which ultimately leads to a

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<sup>51</sup> The Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." Accessed April 10, 2014.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.



better return on investment for the United States.<sup>53</sup> Development projects must be selected with consideration of the availability of local financial, human, and material resources during the construction of the project and its operation.<sup>54</sup> This ensures that the project will be built in a timely, cost effective manner and will continue to benefit society once aid is pulled. Also, attention must be given to the education and skill level of the local population. There is often a knowledge gap between the donors and the recipients of the project.<sup>55</sup> Even with a quality built project, for which the host nation has allocated sufficient funds and manpower, if there is a lack of knowledge on how to operate and maintain it, the sustainability is affected. Authors Do Ba Khang and Tun Lin Moe, in their article *Success Criteria and Factors for International Development Projects: A Life-Cycle-Based Framework*, found that the “sustainability of project results has a larger bearing on the perceived success judgment than other success criteria.”<sup>56</sup> In other words, sustainability is the largest factor in considering the success of a project.

Many US government projects have included consideration of current capacity and capacity improvement when implementing projects. The USACE Gulf Region District in Iraq set out to improve the human

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<sup>53</sup> Lewis, Sheryl. 2011. "Capacity Development -- The Pathway to self-Reliance For Host Nations." *Engineer* 41, no. 1: 61. Accessed October 6, 2014.

<sup>54</sup> Hoon Kwak, Young. "Critical Success Factors in International Development Project Management." George Washington University. Accessed October 4, 2014.

<sup>55</sup> Do Ba, Khang, and Moe Tun Lin. 2008. "Success Criteria and Factors for International Development Projects: A Life-Cycle-Based Framework." *Project Management Journal* 39, no. 1: 72-84. Accessed October 6, 2014.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

capacity of workers at public facilities. The Corps established training programs for city workers to maintain the water services, sewage systems, and transportation infrastructure, thereby enabling them to maintain projects once the US pulled out and increasing the sustainability of each project.<sup>57</sup> USACE assisted in modernizing Al Anbar University's Engineering College which can now provide on-the-job training for students, giving them a better understanding of how to improve their own infrastructure.<sup>58</sup> USACE also constructed a training facility for Iraqi corrections officers to better operate Iraqi prisons, keeping them current with medical and rehabilitation services that will assist in implementing Iraqi rule of law.<sup>59</sup>

In Afghanistan, similar steps were taken to improve the capacity of the government. USAID considers Afghanistan's education institutions as "building blocks" that will maintain current US technical projects.<sup>60</sup>

USAID has been supporting Afghanistan's Ministry of Education through the University Support and Workforce Development Program by providing technical and management advisors, assisting with their curriculums, and advising on textbook printing.<sup>61</sup> <sup>62</sup> This assistance is

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<sup>57</sup> Lewis, Sheryl. 2011. "Capacity Development -- The Pathway to Self-Reliance For Host Nations." *Engineer* 41, no. 1: 61. Accessed October 6, 2014.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Harris, Scott. "USACE Gulf Region District Builds Training Facility for Iraqi Corrections Officers." U.S. Army. February 4, 2010.

<sup>60</sup> Natsios, Andrew. "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development." Strategic Studies Institute. January 1, 2005. Accessed October 4, 2014.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> "Education." USAID. December 2, 2014. Accessed November 6, 2014.

needed due to the increase in public university attendance from 7,800 students in 2001 to 123,000 in 2013. USAID also supported the Information Technology associates degree at Kabul Polytechnic University, which links students to a growing IT industry in Afghanistan.

<sup>63</sup> This assistance will culminate in current projects being sustained, by having the subject matter expertise in place to maintain them, and by enabling Afghans to start development projects on their own.

Although the aforementioned example showcases an instance in which there is initiative being taken to educate the population to sustain the economy and economic infrastructure development projects, there are many other examples of projects that have failed because capacity was not considered in the planning stages of a project. The Sheberghan School in Jowzjan Province, Afghanistan, was a project funded by USAID and USACE in May 2008, to educate Afghan youth. A SIGAR quarterly report found that the building was being used for its intended function, but it was still not completed four years after the start of construction. The investigation found that there was no heat, running water, or electricity for the building. There was a generator, but it was not working. Even if the generator was working, the staff said that they would need the US government to subsidize the \$50,000 monthly fuel costs. The Afghan government refused to pay these costs because

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

ownership of the school had not yet been transferred to them.<sup>64</sup> The school was unsustainable by both the local population and the host nation government. Even though the building was being used for education, its efficiency was severely limited since teachers and students lacked access to basic necessities required to operate.

Energy is an important factor that leads to successful industry within a country. It also leads to better quality of life for the population, providing things such as air conditioning and refrigeration. The Kajaki Dam serves as an example of a project that was able to be sustained despite going through transitions in power and lack of finances. The dam was built in 1953 with assistance from the US Export Import Bank. It was eventually upgraded in 1975 with USAID assistance to provide increased power to the region. USAID withdrew their aid once the Soviet Union invaded, cutting off a vital financial pipeline to the project. Despite the dam's original source of financing being dried up, the dam continued to operate, providing continuous electricity and irrigation in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces through the Soviet occupation, the civil war, and during the Taliban rule. This success can be attributed to the extensive engineering training that was provided early on as well as the willingness of the local Afghan population to keep the dam operational.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> The Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." July 30th, 2013. Accessed April 10, 2014.

<sup>65</sup> Natsios, Andrew. "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development." Strategic Studies Institute. January 1, 2005. Accessed October 4, 2014.

The project had addressed important issues regarding sustainability, such as keeping the local population educated about the technical aspect of maintaining the dam and having the Afghans take responsibility for their own project.

Although the Kajaki Dam was sustainable, the energy sector in Afghanistan in general has proven to be unsustainable without the help of the US government. Kandahar province had one of the largest electrical development projects in Afghanistan; however, the private electric power companies lacked the capacity to maintain a profitable business. The Afghan government has relied on these private companies to maintain their electrical grid network, carrying out functions such as repairs and revenue collection. The Afghan power utility in Kandahar, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), had a limited capacity to collect revenue through billing, which hinders its ability to maintain its own infrastructure, even to the extent that it could not refuel its own generators.<sup>66</sup> As a result, the DABS is highly dependent on the US and Afghan government to subsidize its shortcomings.

To reduce power shortages, the United States government increased power availability in Kandahar City by 25-27 megawatts (MW), resulting in a 61 percent increase in energy use. Since the Afghan government does not have the financial wherewithal to maintain the energy sector in

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<sup>66</sup> "Fiscal Year 2011 Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Projects Are behind Schedule and Lack Adequate Sustainment Plans." Office of the Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Accessed March 2, 2014.

Kandahar, the US government still supplies the funding and diesel fuel. If this support were to be stopped before more sustainable solutions are found, electric usage would drop to 12 MW.<sup>67</sup> <sup>68</sup> One sustainable solution to the power problem was the building of a hydroelectric dam. Once completed however, the project is expected to provide less power than the current diesel generators maintained by the US.<sup>69</sup> Without a steady supply of electricity, businesses are unable to be successful, leading to unemployment among the local population. Insurgencies are able to take advantage of the high unemployment rate by paying locals to carry out duties for them such as planting improvised explosive devices or gathering intelligence.

Host nation capacity is the most important factor to consider while implementing a development project. If the host nation government is not providing to the local populations the public goods they are expecting, the opportunity arises for insurgent groups to step in and fill that gap, garnering more legitimacy while eroding the legitimacy of both the host nation government and US forces. The US has a mixed record with development project sustainability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although numerous projects were not sustainable, there has been significant investment made to increase the capacity of the host nation government through education. Ensuring that a country has the human capital to

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. "U.S. Construction Projects in Afghanistan Challenged by Inspector General's Report." Washington Post. Accessed March 17, 2014.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

maintain development projects is important in sustaining development projects funded by the US.

## Chapter 2: Oversight

Upon completion of the planning phase, during which the host nation capacity is the most important consideration, the project moves to the execution phase. During this phase, oversight plays a primary role in determining the success of project




Figure 2 Breakdown of Oversight

construction. Throughout the literature discussing the shortcomings of infrastructure development projects, a recurring issue that arises is the failure of either the contractor or the aid agency to properly oversee the implementation of the development project. Oversight is necessary to ensure quality construction in the allotted time and within the allocated budget. Oversight is also necessary for fast problem identification and quick problem resolution. The sooner the problem is identified, the quicker it can be resolved and the lesser the effect it will have on the outcome of the project. There are three types of oversight discussed in this paper: (1) aid agency oversight, whereby aid agencies oversee the contracting agencies they hire to complete a project; (2) contractor oversight, in which contracting agencies oversee their employees and subcontractors; and (3) project management oversight whereby project teams directly oversee the implementation of the project.



Security is an important aspect both in making the environment stable for the development of an economy and in reinforcing the legitimacy of the host nation government. It is important that a government has an efficient and effective military force to combat threats. In Afghanistan, at FOB Sharana, located in the Paktika Province, the USACE determined that an incinerator was needed to deal with the garbage accumulation. They awarded a contract worth \$5.6 million to construct a solid waste management facility.<sup>70</sup> The project was officially completed in December 2012, but was not operational during a site survey that was conducted in May 2013. The delays in operation were due to electrical deficiencies that limited operability which led to limitations in operability. The USACE, as the contract overseer, had the responsibility to inspect and test the electrical systems of the FOB, but the inspection and testing were never completed.<sup>71</sup> If the inspection had occurred during the last stages of project implementation, the problems would have been found and corrected.

Another FOB, Camp Zafar, which is located outside of Herat, experienced similar problems to the projects at Camp Shaheen. Projects were delayed due to poor contractor performance relating to cost and schedule management. The result was a cost overrun of \$1.68 million. The Special

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<sup>70</sup> Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. "Forward Operating Base Sharana: Poor Planning and Construction Resulted in \$5.4 Million Spent for Inoperable Incinerators and Continued Use of Open-Air Burn Pits." Accessed April 24, 2014.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) found that the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) contracting officer failed to provide adequate oversight of the contractor at the base in Herat.<sup>72</sup> The responsibility of the contracting officer is to monitor contractor performance and hold contractors accountable for their actions. Despite concerns about contractor performance, the AFCEC contracting officer approved \$5 million in funding increases for the project at Camp Zafar and failed to follow up on previous requests for the contracting company to institute corrective actions.<sup>73</sup> Due to this lack of oversight, the project was poorly managed financially.

Lack of oversight was also evident during the development of Afghanistan's education system, which is necessary for preparing the population for technical jobs that are created by development projects. The Bathkhak School project in Kabul, Afghanistan was awarded to the Emaar Emarat Construction Company by US Forces-Afghanistan (USFORA) for \$260,000 to build a ten classroom addition to an existing school.<sup>74</sup> The project ended with the school addition being unsustainable for a variety of reasons. The contractor failed to follow the original plans delineated in the contract. The Emaar Emarat Construction Company built two small buildings rather than the one addition that was planned.

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<sup>72</sup> Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. "ANA Facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat Generally Met Construction Requirements, But Contractor Oversight Should Be Strengthened." Accessed April 6, 2014.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> The Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." Accessed April 10, 2014.

They used brick rather than concrete blocks for the walls and wood rather than vinyl-framed windows, and they installed a concrete-slab roof instead of the required wood-truss for the roof. Since the school was located in an earthquake prone zone and due to the type of construction, there was a heightened risk for collapse. Inspectors stated it was a “disaster waiting to happen.”<sup>75</sup> This school had the potential to educate an entire region and keep children away from the influence of the insurgency, but due to the lack of oversight by USFORA, the school remained unusable, having a detrimental effect on the education access for people in that area. If better oversight was performed, the problems that stemmed from the site location and building materials could have been avoided, resulting in a higher likelihood of success for the project.

In Iraq, lack of oversight resulted in the failure to curb overcharging on specific contracts; thereby leaving the US government to foot the bill. A report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) found that the subcontractor Anham, which was responsible for \$3.9 billion worth of contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, was significantly overcharging the US government for supplies. Overcharges included \$900 for a control switch that costs around \$7, \$3,000 for a circuit breaker that costs around \$95, and \$4,500 for another circuit breaker that was valued at \$180. The failure of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to review the estimating system used by Anham provided

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

the opportunity for overcharging, of which Anham took full advantage.<sup>76</sup> Although this lack of oversight did not have an effect on the completion and operation of the projects, the funds that were unnecessarily paid out could have been used to finance other development projects or even enhanced security around existing projects.

The Rusafa Political District in Iraq provides additional examples of the impact of the lack of oversight on the success of a project. In that city, the US Army, the USACE, and the USAID conducted various projects in the areas of education, electricity and security.<sup>77</sup> Many personnel operating in the area believed that the money that was spent on schools could have been better used on projects that had more of an immediate impact. In addition to problems staffing the schools, the quality of the work done for the education projects was so low that some projects were rejected by the Ministry of Education.<sup>78</sup> There was also limited coordination between the three US government agencies working in the area of operation. Lack of oversight and coordination resulted in the ineffectiveness of the school projects. Better coordination among the US agencies working in the area and more stringent requirements in selecting contracting agencies could have produced better results.

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<sup>76</sup> "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress." *Report to Congress*, 2011, 1-11.

<sup>77</sup> "Special Report Number 3: Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Iraq: A Case Study of the Rusafa Political District." 2013.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

In situations where oversight was conducted properly, the projects experienced significantly better coordination, communication, and implementation, which usually resulted in success. One aspect of effective oversight is the requirement that project planners and contractors customize each project so that it fits the local environment. If the local culture is not addressed in the design of the project, the sustainability of the project could be jeopardized. If the local population rejects the project, maintaining it would be much more difficult. It is important that the local community sense ownership of the project. This goal can be achieved by integrating the needs of the community with the project.<sup>79</sup> Andrew Natsios, who served as administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and was a US Special Envoy to Sudan, argues that a “country must drive its own development needs.”<sup>80</sup> To enhance ownership, people need to understand that the project is there to meet the needs of their community and not drive the agenda of the donor nation. They also need to take an active role in the implementation of the project, making the community feel that they had a hand in the project. Different initiatives must meet the country’s needs in order to build credibility, trust, and consensus among the local population, which, in turn, will lead the community to “defend, maintain,

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<sup>79</sup> "Successful Integrated Rural Development in Madagascar. July 1, 2009. Accessed October 20, 2014.

<sup>80</sup> Natsios, Andrew. "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development." Strategic Studies Institute. January 1, 2005. Accessed October 4, 2014.

and expand” the project, thereby sustaining it once the donor country leaves.<sup>81</sup>

An example of incorporating the local community in project implementation is USAID’s work with media programs and radio broadcasters in Afghanistan. Radio is an important commodity in Afghanistan, where the majority of the population cannot read and are located in areas that are hard to reach. To improve the flow of information, USAID provided capital to 32 radio stations in a project called the Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP).<sup>82</sup> Instead of operating the stations themselves, they reached out to the local Afghan community to find strong local partners to execute their programming. Additionally, instead of targeting a broad base of the Afghan population, they targeted 15 – 40 year olds, the age group that would have the largest impact on the future of Afghanistan.<sup>83</sup> The information they wanted to send was often on the progress of reconstruction in their country as well as the new democratic political process.<sup>84</sup> They also trained local Afghans in journalism and created a “Diploma in Media” at the Nai Media Institute. Integrating local Afghans into the project and training them so they could be proficient in their tasks. The result was a sustainable project that was tailored to a specific

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> "New Media and Development » Afghan Radio Network." University of Columbia. Accessed November 7, 2014.

population. The success of the project opened the lines of proficient communication between the government and hard to reach populations, and expanded access to information regarding development projects occurring in the region.

In Iraq, Mercy Corps was given a contract to complete a variety of projects under the direction of Community Action Groups (CAGs). These 900 projects included small infrastructure improvements that focused on water, sanitation, electricity, and transportation as well as the construction of bridges and schools. Mercy Corps focused on the inclusion of local residents to represent their needs and adapted each project to the community where they were being constructed. Not only did these projects end in success, but they also increased trust between communities and the local government by increasing communication, allowing Mercy Corps to identify the development needs of the local population more efficiently.<sup>85</sup>

Oversight in the construction of an economic infrastructure development project is essential to making sure that the project is carried out in an efficient manner and has a positive effect on the local population. If oversight is lacking, the project runs the risk of going over budget, experiencing delays, or not producing the intended results. With the failure of economic infrastructure development projects, either during the

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<sup>85</sup> Eltayeb, Ali, and Dalia Emara. "USAID / Iraq Community Action Program Final Report." USAID. Accessed March 24, 2015.

construction phase or in the aftermath, the host nation government as well as US forces seem to be disconnected from the needs of the local population. When a government is insensitive to the interests of the population, legitimacy of authority is questioned, potentially hindering counterinsurgency efforts by US forces. Thus, effective oversight in the implementation of development projects is necessary to ensure that the projects are executed in a manner that fosters success and strengthens the mission of the US in stability operations.

### *Project Management*

Aid agency oversight and contractor oversight are generally large-scale forms of oversight. Project management, on the other hand, is a form of oversight that is more directly involved in the implementation of a specific project. Proper project management is crucial for the success of development projects, preventing wrongdoing at the organizational level. Successful project management occurs when a development project is completed within the allotted time and within the established parameters while ensuring quality and staying within the appropriated budget.<sup>86</sup> It is important to note that successful project management does not always result in success. There are many outside variables that can affect the outcome of a project itself; however, in construction projects, effective

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<sup>86</sup> Kamrul Ahsan, Indra Gunawan, Analysis of Cost and Schedule Performance of International Development Projects, International Journal of Project Management, Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 68-78, ISSN 0263-7863.



project management and success are closely related.<sup>87</sup> Project planners on occasion have trouble finding a solution to problems encountered in project implementation. Failing to formulate, prepare, and execute development projects will impede the infusion of much needed capital into underdeveloped countries.<sup>88</sup>

The oversight of a development project is a wide ranging function that is necessary in the planning and implementation phases. Most often, members of higher level leadership in an agency or organization are not involved in the day-to-day activities of a project; they usually are updated at the completion of each phase of a project. The two lowest levels of project planning and implementation are the project coordinator and the task manager. The coordinator has to ask the task manager for approval on large transactions, which the task manager may reject if the transactions do not fit into the original plan. The task manager also is responsible for ensuring that the project is adhering to the established guidelines of the original project.<sup>89</sup> For this oversight process to work, communication is essential, and for effective communication to occur there needs to be trust between the two actors.<sup>90</sup> This idea can also be

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<sup>87</sup> Amadou Diallo, Denis Thuillier, The Success of International Development Projects, Trust and Communication: An African Perspective, International Journal of Project Management, Volume 23, Issue 3, April 2005, Pages 237-252, ISSN 0263-7863.

<sup>88</sup> Ika, Lavagnon A. 2012. "Project Management for Development in Africa: Why Projects Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It." Project Management Journal 43, no. 4: 27-41. Accessed October 6, 2014.

<sup>89</sup> Amadou Diallo, Denis Thuillier, The Success of International Development Projects, Trust and Communication: An African Perspective, International Journal of Project Management, Volume 23, Issue 3, April 2005, Pg. 237-252, ISSN 0263-7863.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

applied to government oversight of its contractors. If there is reciprocal trust between the US government and its contractors, project development becomes more efficient and the quality of the project is improved, adding to its sustainability.

There are often common faults found within project management.

Lavagnon A. Ika, professor of Project Management at the Telfer School of Management at the University of Ottawa, identified three common problems that are experienced when carrying out a development project.

These problems include the “one size fits all” trap, the “managing for results” dilemma, and the lack of capacity of project managers. The “One Size Fits All” problem occurs when a project is planned with a preconceived set of objectives and methods to obtain certain goals.

Having the same objectives and methods for all projects prevents each individual project from being tailored to the environment, as discussed in the previous chapter. This not only makes the project less likely to be accepted by the local population but does not address other factors such as security or environment when implementing the project.<sup>91</sup>

The “Managing for Results” dilemma arises when data, collected for the purpose of improving the performance of a team or their project, is not relayed back to the team but instead is given to outside stakeholders.<sup>92</sup>

The team has no way of knowing what problems exist and therefore

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

cannot attempt to fix the issues. The only individuals who get the information have no immediate effect on the project. Without the information, the team is prevented from choosing a different course of action.

The lack of capacity of project managers means that development projects do not have enough trained personnel to be implemented well.<sup>93</sup> Even with sufficient resources being devoted to a development project, the lack of trained personnel to perform the necessary tasks can cause serious problems, such as exceeding the time allotted, surpassing the agreed upon funding, and failing to provide adequate oversight.

Keeping within the proposed time frame is an important aspect of project implementation and can have a direct effect on the budget in that the longer it takes to build, the more expensive the project will be. It is important for project managers to keep the project on time by providing adequate oversight, which is achieved through a project cycle that includes project identification, preparation, appraisal, implementation, and evaluation.<sup>94</sup> If these steps are clearly defined in the planning phase, it is more likely that the project will finish on time and be built to quality. The evaluation is most important, for it determines whether the approach to the project was effective or not, and can be used to ensure

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Kamrul Ahsan, Indra Gunawan, Analysis of Cost and Schedule Performance of International Development Projects, *International Journal of Project Management*, Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 68-78, ISSN 0263-7863, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2009.03.005>.

accountability. Some of the primary causes for delay involve lengthy contract negotiations, procurement postponement, drawn-out land acquisition transactions, and consultant recruitment delay.<sup>95</sup>

Keeping within budget is another important aspect of project management. Budgeting is used for planning, monitoring, and for controlling the money that goes into a project as well as providing a foundation for accountability, since most errors involve finances. As mentioned before, staying within the allocated budget is directly related to the timeliness of project completion; projects that take longer than the allocated time cost more than the allotted budget.<sup>96</sup> In the planning phase, it is important to develop a budget that incorporates every aspect of the project, and designates certain funds for any unforeseen expenses that may arise. Flexibility in the budget is a necessity in development projects due to the unstable environment in which they are constructed.

The scope or design of the project is the plan of execution and includes the goals, phases, time frame, budget, target audience, and any other aspect necessary for the development of a successful project. One study, the “Critical Success Factors for World Bank Projects,” conducted by the University of Quebec, surveyed World Bank project supervisors regarding the most important factor in project success. The consensus was that design constitutes the most critical component for success. More

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

specifically, design needs to address the long term effects and the sustainability of a project.<sup>97</sup>

Team cohesion is also important in project development, when team members work together the efficiency of project implementation increases. In a project team, there are different roles and responsibilities. The task manager is located in the headquarters of the development agency and supervises project implementation. The national project coordinator in a project team is the person in charge of the daily activities and leads the team.<sup>98</sup> The project team is responsible for all of the inputs that are needed to complete a project including the supervision of engineering firms, consultants, and subcontractors, as well as overseeing procurement and organization.<sup>99</sup> All of these levels of control need cohesion in order to successfully complete a development project. It is important to note that these exact position titles might not be used in every project, but every project has positions that handle these responsibilities.

The Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) goals in Afghanistan are to "improve food security and nutrition" as well as to "promote

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<sup>97</sup> Lavagnon A. Ika, Amadou Diallo, Denis Thuillier, Critical Success Factors For World Bank Projects: An Empirical Investigation, *International Journal of Project Management*, Volume 30, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 105-116, ISSN 0263-7863.

<sup>98</sup> Amadou Diallo, Denis Thuillier, The Success of International Development Projects, Trust and Communication: An African Perspective, *International Journal of Project Management*, Volume 23, Issue 3, April 2005, Pages 237-252, ISSN 0263-7863.

<sup>99</sup> Ika, Lavagnon A. 2012. "Project Management for Development in Africa: Why Projects Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It." *Project Management Journal* 43, no. 4: 27-41. Business Source Complete. Accessed October 6, 2014.

sustainable agriculture” and to “build capacity in the agricultural sector at the national and local levels.”<sup>100</sup> These goals are especially important in Afghanistan, since agriculture represents over half of its gross domestic product (GDP).<sup>101</sup> The FAO sought to improve agriculture in Afghanistan through various projects addressing irrigation. One of these projects was the Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP), which was started in June 2004, and implemented by the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) with the support of FAO. This project sought to improve irrigation water for farmers to increase agricultural productivity. The outcome of the EIRP was a success, exceeding the target goal of rehabilitation of agricultural land.<sup>102</sup> Not only did it reduce rural poverty and increase land value, it also reduced conflicts over water and promoted cohesion in the community. Effective cohesion between the project team and the local populace allowed for efficient maintenance of the irrigation canal. The FAO staff included the local population in the implementation of the project and trained them to maintain the canal so that it would be sustained once FAO left the area.<sup>103</sup>

The study conducted by the University of Quebec mentioned previously also assessed the impact of trust and communication on the success of development projects. Based on questionnaires completed by project

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<sup>100</sup> "Afghanistan and FAO Achievements and Success Stories." Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. May 1, 2011. Accessed November 8, 2014.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

coordinators of development projects, the data indicated that trust is the dominant factor that improves team cohesion and improves communication between coordinators and task managers.<sup>104</sup> The study also found that intervention of a higher authority into a lower authority's work may result in a power struggle and often leads to project failure.<sup>105</sup>

Different levels of oversight are essential to carry out development projects. Oversight on the US agency level and developmental organization level have different implications compared to the project management level. Though it is important to have oversight at higher levels to keep within the given budget and time table, oversight at the project management level has the strongest influence on the outcome of a project. Project level oversight facilitates adaption of the project to the local environment and resolution of any problems that arise, improving the chances of implementing a successful project. Economic infrastructure development projects, if handled correctly, enhance the local community's sense of ownership, increase community involvement, and promote sustainability.

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<sup>104</sup> Amadou Diallo, Denis Thuillier, The success of international development projects, trust and communication: an African perspective, *International Journal of Project Management*, Volume 23, Issue 3, April 2005, Pages 237-252, ISSN 0263-7863.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

### **Chapter 3: Accountability**

Upon completion of the execution phase of an economic development project, the post-completion phase begins. Accountability is the cornerstone of this phase. Accountability ensures that the project was built to standard and that there was no improper conduct by the contracting company or development agency during the execution phase. Proper oversight ensures project deficiencies are recognized and resolved; accountability ensures that deficiencies within the contractor's execution of a project are not repeated. Through the taking of accountability measures, the donor nation can minimize the opportunities for exploitation of their generosity and money from the contracting company. With regard to many failed development projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, many of the contractors were not held accountable for their actions. Contractors need to have incentive and consequences to ensure completion of the development project as specified in the contract. This penance can be in the form of fines, cancellation of contracts, or the banning of the contractor from future contracts. A lack of financial accountability was the most common deficiency in failed development projects aside from oversight. Contractors were constructing poor quality projects or did not construct the project according to plan, but were paid in full nonetheless.



In a country with high levels of corruption, it is important to make sure that the money is being spent on project necessities and not being pocketed by government officials or contracting personnel. The strength of a host nation's rule of law is at stake. If contractors are able to get away with breaking the law and profit therefrom, more contracting companies will break the law. In addition, it is important to make sure that contractors do not sacrifice quality, such as buying cheaper building supplies, to provide greater profits, thereby jeopardizing the performance and safety of the project.

For the failed incinerator project at FOB Sharana, the contract indicated that the capacity of the waste management system needed to be 24 tons of waste per day, but the contractor instead installed two 40 ton incinerators.<sup>106</sup> Due to the size of the two incinerators, there was little space available for motorized equipment to move around the incinerator, forcing the personnel there to have to load the incinerator manually. This manual loading decreased the operational ability down to 80 percent.<sup>107</sup>

In October 2013, the base was transferred to the Afghan National Army (ANA) who allegedly had the incinerators deconstructed. Due to the contractor not following the original plans, the project could not serve its intended purpose. Despite the fact that the contractor failed to follow the original plans, complete the project on time, and properly construct the

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

waste management system, the contractor was paid in full.<sup>108</sup> USACE did not hold the contractor accountable for the flaws in the work, costing more in the long run in repairs and eventually resulting in the incinerators being scrapped altogether.

The contract for the Sheberghan School in Jowzjan Province, Afghanistan, was awarded to the Iraqi firm, Mercury Development. They were to construct a two story, 10 classroom building that included a library and an administrative office. The project experienced construction delays and cost increases that surged the total price to \$3.4 million.<sup>109</sup> The USACE knew of the performance issues with the contractor and sent 62 letters to Mercury Development voicing concerns over the project. However, even though the USACE knew of the deficiencies, they marked the contract as complete, releasing Mercury Development from any further legal responsibility.<sup>110</sup> The USACE then contracted the Zafarkhaliq Construction Company for \$153,000 to complete the work left undone by Mercury Development in the time frame of 30 days. Eight months later, the work was still not completed. The USACE terminated the contract but had already paid Zafarkhaliq \$130,000, only \$23,000 short of the original value of the contract.<sup>111</sup> Again, the contractor was nearly paid in full despite not meeting the established deadlines or

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> The Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." Accessed April 10, 2014.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

completing the project. Consequently, such lack of accountability provides no incentive to fulfill contractual obligations.

In Iraq, a series of workshops to identify areas where improvement was needed to reach the various Millennium Development goals were organized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in partnership with the Ministry of Planning for Iraq and Kurdistan. The participants found that accountability through transparency was the most important issue that Iraq needed to improve.<sup>112</sup> One area that needed improvement was the education sector; educators were not required to meet expectations outlined by the Iraqi government, resulting in lower performance. The UNDP report stated that schools have “outdated teaching methods, inadequate and unsafe infrastructure, lack of capacity to serve special needs, or lack of servers to provide nutritious meals to children in need.”<sup>113</sup> The Iraqi government did have standards for education, but enforcement of these standards was lacking. Parents did not have communication avenues to complain about the dire situation in the school systems, and thus become discouraged from keeping their children in school. The lack of accountability instills mistrust in the education institutions and erodes development efforts to increase the effectiveness of education institutions, making the

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<sup>112</sup> "The Post-2015 Development Agenda National Consultations in Iraq." United Nations Development Program. December 1, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2015.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

government look ineffective in providing important public goods such as education.

In the Rusafa Political District, there were also accountability issues when selecting contractors to implement development projects intended to stabilize the area. When the US was awarding projects, there were few procedures in place to keep track of the contractors that were hired.<sup>114</sup> In the beginning of the reconstruction effort, the US was awarding contracts to anyone who would accept them, without any background checks on the companies. This lax method of selecting contractors led to widespread corruption, and interfered with the mission of the US agencies. There was also a lack of transparency when the reconstruction effort first began that made it difficult for the US to identify potential problems with specific contractors and to detect the areas where corruption was occurring.<sup>115</sup>

The United States has various systems in place to ensure accountability and to protect its funds from misuse. These systems are based upon the Federal Acquisition Rules, which sets guidelines for agencies' tracking of acquisitions, including both products and labor.<sup>116</sup> In continuance of these rules, USAID has limited the number of primary contracts for development in Afghanistan. They have contracted with major

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<sup>114</sup> "Special Report Number 3: Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Iraq: A Case Study of the Rusafa Political District." 2013.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Natsios, Andrew. "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development." Strategic Studies Institute. January 1, 2005. Accessed October 4, 2014.

international development firms, which then subcontract to Afghan construction firms. This practice allows the US government to consolidate their oversight to fewer organizations and to enforce accountability more efficiently.<sup>117</sup> They have also supported the Afghan Ministry of Finance in starting anti-corruption programs to battle corruption in government.

Executing economic development projects in Iraq and Afghanistan requires a lot of moving parts and a massive amount of cash exchanging hands. To account for this cash, the US government created two agencies, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR). These two agencies review development projects, their effect on the surrounding environment, and any mishandling of funds. They conduct these assessments through investigations, audits, and thorough interviews by a staff that works on the ground in theatre. They have prosecuted military and civilian personnel for bribery and overcharging, and have provided recommendations to both the State Department and the Defense Department on how to improve development projects. These agencies, which report to Congress, provide accountability, saving the US government millions of dollars and ensuring that a quality project is produced.

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

USAID has not had the best track record of holding small contracting firms accountable for their actions on projects, but has had success in investigating major development firms that did not fulfill their contractual obligations. One of these companies was the Academy of Educational Development (AED). AED managed nearly \$500 million worth of development projects annually, employing 2,700 people, making them one of the larger development organizations.<sup>118</sup> In 2009, the USAID Inspector General launched an investigation into AED's projects, finding that many were mismanaged and overcharged the US government by nearly \$1 million under the leadership of Stephen Moseley. It was also found that AED as a whole was not fully cooperating with USAID's investigation. The results were devastating for the company. It was stripped of any future contracts from the federal government due to "evidence of serious corporate misconduct, mismanagement," and "serious concerns of corporate integrity."<sup>119</sup> The loss of revenue forced the company to dissolve. This decision from USAID not only allowed it to recoup its money but also made the development community aware of the consequences of mismanaging projects.

Another example of accountability was USAID and the Lewis Berger Group (LBG). LBG has been involved in numerous projects all over Iraq and Afghanistan involving the construction of roads, schools, and

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<sup>118</sup> Beam, Christopher. "USAID AED Suspension: Why Did USAID Suspend One of Its Biggest Contractors without Any Explanation?" Slate Magazine. March 31, 2011.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

electrical plants.<sup>120</sup> USAID found that the company intentionally overcharged the government a total of \$15-20 million total on various projects. The consequences for LBG were \$18.7 million in criminal penalties and \$50.6 million in civil penalties. In addition, two former company officials were charged with fraud, pleaded guilty, and were sent to prison.<sup>121</sup> USAID thus made an example of LBG, showing that taking advantage of government contracts will not be taken lightly.

Accountability depends on available incentives that the US provides for their contractors. The most important positive incentive is already in place, which is receiving the contract and being able to obtain other contracts in the future. However, the US does not have many negative incentives, such as fines or even jail time, in place to motivate contractors to pursue their project according to the original plan.

Contractors in many cases would be paid in full even though the project did not meet the required standards and would not be penalized when failing to adhere to the original plan. Providing and enforcing repercussions for such failures would create an incentive for them to complete the project on time, within budget, and to standard.

Accountability is essential, especially if oversight is lacking on a project.

Accountability enables the US or host nation government to enforce the

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<sup>120</sup> Recknagel, Charles. "Power Hungry: Iraqis Ask 'Where Is The Electricity?'" Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. August 29, 2010. Accessed March 24, 2015.

<sup>121</sup> Beam, Christopher. "USAID AED Suspension: Why Did USAID Suspend One of Its Biggest Contractors without Any Explanation?" Slate Magazine. March 31, 2011.

contractual provisions, ensuring successful project completion or obtaining compensation for non-compliance and losses suffered. Accountability keeps contractors in check. If accountability is not exercised, the host nation government and US agencies appear to be weak and easily taken advantage of. Holding these contracting agencies accountable for their actions also reinforces the rule of law for both the host nation government and US overseas operations.



## Chapter 4: The Importance of the Success of Economic Development Projects

If host nation capacity is not considered, efficient oversight is not performed, and accountability is not enforced, there is a good chance that the development project will fail. The consequences of one failed development project may be minimal, but a continuous stream of failed development projects will hinder US stability operations. The chief goal in stability operations, especially in a counterinsurgency context, is to improve the people's perception of the host nation government, thereby increasing its public support and legitimacy.

### *Perception*

The host nation population's perception is one of the most important factors to consider when conducting stability operations. To change or reinforce the perception of the host nation government, military and development planners

need to establish trust. Trust promotes collaboration and provides open



Figure 3 Effects of Development Project Failure

communication channels to determine whether the US forces, the host nation government, and the local population share the same objective.<sup>122</sup> The effectiveness of development projects is dependent on how the host nation perceives its intended benefits since they rely on infrastructure to meet the needs for their survival.<sup>123</sup> <sup>124</sup> Local populations will support any group that meets their needs, whether it is the host nation or an insurgent group.<sup>125</sup>

The deficiencies outlined in the previous chapters all have an effect on the public's perception of the host nation government, which in turn affects the government's legitimacy. Psychologically, an individual's perceptions are often shaped by the perceptions of others. American psychologist Solomon Asch substantiated this idea in his study in which volunteers were asked to select a line from a choice of three that closely matched a separate fourth line. When they were asked to match the lines on their own, they correctly identified the two similar lines. However, when placed in a group setting with people that uniformly agreed on the wrong lines, 30 percent of the time the volunteers doubted their original answer and switched it to conform to the rest of the group.<sup>126</sup> This finding was further reinforced by psychologists John Darley and Bibb

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<sup>122</sup> *Stability*. Vol. FM 3-07. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2014.

<sup>123</sup> Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. *Winning Hearts and Minds through Development?* World Bank, 2012.

<sup>124</sup> Crane, Keith. *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2009.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>126</sup> Brooks, Rosa. *Lessons from Social Psychology for Complex Operations*. Georgetown University Law Center, 2012.

Latane who found that perception can also be shaped on a larger scale in societal context.<sup>127</sup> These conclusions occur in social settings as well with regard to perception. The higher the percentage of the population that views a scenario to be positive or negative, the more likely people with opposing or uncertain views will conform to the rest of the population. This could be beneficial or detrimental for the host nation government, depending on the views of the majority of the population. Furthermore, once individuals who have similar views are grouped together, those views tend to get more extreme. This effect is called group polarization.<sup>128</sup> People tend to reinforce the opinions of others when they agree. Studies have found that after a discussion has taken place on a specific topic with individuals who share similar views, the attitudes pertaining to that particular subject intensify. In the context of stability operations, if a large portion of the population believes that the host nation government is not the legitimate authority, then, according to the conformity theory, a portion of the population that has opposing views will conform to the rest of the population and view the government as illegitimate. When a greater portion of the population views the government as illegitimate, according to the group polarization theory, some will move towards the more extreme side and could start supporting or participating in the insurgency.

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

Given these findings, economic infrastructure development plays a crucial role in changing the perception of a population. A World Bank Study found that local residents in communities that have had development projects implemented successfully are likely to view their economic situation more positively than in communities that didn't have these projects. Also, populations in these areas were more supportive of the government. In areas which had moderate levels of violence, studies showed a decrease in the levels of violence, making the area more safe for residents and non-government organizations (NGOs) operating in the area as well as for US forces.<sup>129</sup>

### *Legitimacy*

In basic terms, legitimacy is the government's right to rule and plays an important role for the stability of a nation.<sup>130</sup> The Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an organization that promotes economic policies in order to increase "social well-being of people around the world," has stated that a "lack of legitimacy is a major contributor to state fragility because it undermines state authority, and therefore capacity".<sup>131</sup> Positive perception is needed for citizens to willingly involve themselves with the state. In order to create positive

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<sup>129</sup> Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. *Winning Hearts and Minds through Development?* World Bank, 2012.

<sup>130</sup> Coicaud, Jean-Marc. *Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2002.

<sup>131</sup> *Conflict and Fragility the State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity*. Paris: OECD, 2010.

perception, the state acts as a promoter of public goods and social services, among other things.<sup>132</sup> In order for society to thrive, states are obligated to provide public goods when the average citizen alone cannot afford it and the market cannot provide it.<sup>133</sup> If states are unable fulfil this, foreign aid is a common solution. Susan L. Woodward, author of “Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation” expresses the importance of public goods to legitimacy when she states, “The provision of services such as garbage collection, sewage, electricity, power plants, and sufficient, clean water are not only basic to health but also the best way to build confidence in the government.”<sup>134</sup>

The OECD organized the sources of legitimacy into four categories. The first is input legitimacy, which is derived from rules and procedures that comprise the rule of law and are formulated by the government. The second is output legitimacy, which focuses on the government’s ability to effectively provide quality public goods. The third is shared beliefs in which legitimacy is formed through a sense of community, whether it is on a traditional, religious, or political level. The fourth is international legitimacy, or being recognized by the international community. OECD argues that a state does not rely on a single source of legitimacy, and while there may be two or even three sources, sometimes these sources

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> Klosko, George. “The Limits of Government. An Essay on the Public Goods Argument by David Schmitz.” *Political Theory*. 20. No.1 (1992): 164-167.

<sup>134</sup> Woodward, Susan L. "Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation." In *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002.

conflict with each other.<sup>135</sup> OECD has also stated that security is the foundation of output legitimacy. It allows for other contributors to legitimacy, such as economic development, to be produced. This paper concentrates on the discussion of output legitimacy.

Author Jean-Marc Coicaud, author of “Legitimacy and Politics” describes governance as an act of reciprocity with its citizens. Political legitimacy is derived from “the relationship between the individuals who command and those who obey.”<sup>136</sup> The political institutions which govern a population guarantee public space and mitigate anything that threatens the social norms, whether emanating from domestic or foreign sources. When the population no longer consents to having a regime govern them, it is a sign that the legitimacy of the government has been lost.

Legitimacy is based upon, to a large extent, public perception and plays an important role in the host nation’s authority in governing a country. The process of obtaining legitimacy sometimes is viewed as a transaction: the government provides public goods to the citizenry in return for their support and confidence.<sup>137</sup> To be seen as legitimate, the state needs to be perceived as the “most reliable provider of basic public goods”<sup>138</sup> and a provider of an “environment for the population to maintain predictable

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<sup>135</sup> Conflict and Fragility the State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations : Unpacking Complexity. Paris: OECD, 2010.

<sup>136</sup> Coicaud, Jean-Marc. Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2002.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Bayer Tygesen, Christian, and Kristian Knus Larsen. "The Horizon Framework." *The Small Wars Journal*, 2013.

and tolerable living conditions.”<sup>139</sup> The level of legitimacy also indicates the extent to which the population accepts the authority and decisions of the government. Legitimacy also encompasses the trust that a citizen places in their government to handle security, and to perform economic, political, and social actions.<sup>140</sup>

In a counterinsurgency environment, insurgent groups can exploit areas where the host nation government has failed to provide social goods and services such as schools or roadways, and gain legitimacy in the process. For instance, as reported by TIME magazine, in early 2007, the Afghan government was having trouble protecting teachers and schools in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. The Taliban had burned down 180 schools and forced another 396 to close, preventing many children from attending school. Due to Afghan and US forces not being able to provide protection, the Taliban decided to take advantage of the situation and provide the social service themselves.<sup>141</sup> The Taliban announced plans to start a \$1 million education program to build schools in those regions where it had the most influence to give an “Islamically correct” education.<sup>142</sup> The education program benefited the Taliban in two ways. First, it provided social services to the surrounding areas, enabling the Taliban to compete with the host nation government. Second, it created a

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<sup>139</sup> *Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency*. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>140</sup> *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

<sup>141</sup> Baker/Kabul, Aryn. "The Taliban: Friend to Education?" Time. January 22, 2007. Accessed April 27, 2015.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

new tool for recruiting, enhancing their troop strength. This program thwarts the mission of the US and Afghan government of eradicating the Taliban presence from Afghanistan.

The US military's Joint Publication 3-24 states that a government's legitimacy is based on five factors: mandate, manner, support, consent, and expectations.<sup>143</sup> Mandate refers to the process by which the state gained authority over the population, such as through universal suffrage, a caste system, a coup, etc. The manner in which the government and leaders meet the expectations of the population also matters. Does the government listen to the population and provide for their needs? Are their methods corrupt? The state also needs public support and popular consent, in that the people must be willing to obey the government and abide by the rules established by the government. The population also needs to expect that the government will work for the people and not against them.<sup>144</sup>

As important as legitimacy is for a host nation government, it is equally vital for foreign forces and personnel that are intervening in or assisting a country. How US forces are perceived in a country is an important consideration when planning for operations.<sup>145</sup> If the transition is conducted improperly or is poorly timed, the result could be the failure of the host nation to sustain the project, giving the appearance of the

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<sup>143</sup> Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> ADP 3-07: Stability. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2012.



inability of the host nation to function independently. It could also lead to negative opinions of the US, jeopardizing the security of future projects and working counter to the objective of regional security. Thus, project success has a strong influence on legitimacy.<sup>146</sup>

When legitimacy is absent and political processes break down, intrastate violence has the potential to occur. Authority structures that were designed to establish stability in the region are no longer viewed as an authoritative presence.<sup>147</sup> Rule of law collapses in this instance, leading to instability in the form of a failed government, civil war, or an insurgency.

### *Behavior*

Perception of legitimacy has a direct effect on the behavior of the population. If the people support the government and view the government as the sole authoritative presence in the country then a stable society should ensue. An unsupportive population, however, may engage in actions against the government, such as protests, and support for and/or participation in an insurgency. The only way peace can be obtained in an unstable country is if the population is committed to peace.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

The goal of all counterinsurgency operations is to change the behavior of the majority of the population so that they will either break away from the insurgency or stop supporting it.<sup>149</sup> Behavior can be a key indicator of the effectiveness of economic infrastructure development, which can be seen by calculating the number of businesses in the area. Starting a business, especially in an underdeveloped or war torn country, requires a significant amount of investment with the belief that a breakeven point, where revenue meets expenses, will be reached in the near future. The willingness of people to invest money and start a business requires trust in the government to maintain stability in the area and improve the economic markets within the country. A rise in the number of businesses indicates a positive outlook on the future of the country, with a decline showing the opposite.<sup>150</sup>

Another example of how perception changes the behavior of a population is school attendance. A high rate of school attendance reveals both public trust and improvement in household income. If parents are willing to send their children to school, they must trust the government and school officials to provide a safe environment for travel to and from school and a safe environment for education. If parents are willing to send their children to school, they also must not need their children to work to augment family income. Other behavioral indicators include

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<sup>149</sup> Bayer Tygesen, Christian, and Kristian Knus Larsen. "The Horizon Framework." *The Small Wars Journal*, 2013.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

public service employment, military enrollment (which forces an individual to choose a side in a conflict), and support for the insurgency.

### *Other Sources of Vulnerabilities Found in the Study*

Economic infrastructure development projects create other vulnerabilities to stability operations. The difference between these threats and the threats outlined in the previous chapters are where they arise from. The previous vulnerabilities outlined in this writing identified problems within the internal dynamics of the US and host nation government. These next vulnerabilities are external, where the insurgency has a direct role in creating a threat against the implementation of development projects.

### *New Targets*

A SIGIR special report on the casualties endured during the implementation of development projects while in a combat zone concluded that “reconstruction or stabilization operations conducted in combat zones present potentially lethal threats to all participants, including military personnel, contractors, US government civilians, third-country nationals, and host country citizens. Planning for such operations must anticipate this threat.”<sup>151</sup> When an insurgency group attacks a project, they do it with the intent of preventing the host nation

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<sup>151</sup> "SIGIR Special Report Number 2 | The Human Toll of Reconstruction or Stabilization Operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom." 2012.

from providing services to its population.<sup>152</sup> To prevent such attacks from happening, the host nation improves their “civil security” which is defined as “the provision of security for state entities (including infrastructure) and the population, including protection from internal and external threats.”<sup>153</sup> If protection for these projects is not adequately provided and the project is eventually attacked, not only will the public not be able to take advantage of the services but also tensions in the region may be inflamed.<sup>154</sup>

Insurgents attack these projects in order to shift the balance of power in their favor and away from the host nation government. Frequently these attacks occur before the projects are even completed, so that the population never experiences the positive effects.<sup>155</sup> If the attacks were to happen after the project was completed, the insurgency would be viewed as the group that took away badly needed public goods. Attacking at the construction phase also makes the government appear incapable of following through on their promises, and indicates that the government is unable to meet public expectations. A report from the Council on Foreign Relations in 2006 identified sabotage as the main reason why the Iraqi and US government were unable to supply the population with a

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<sup>152</sup> *Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency*. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>153</sup> *Stability*. Vol. FM 3-07. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2014.

<sup>154</sup> *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

<sup>155</sup> Benjamin Crost and Patrick B. Johnston, “Aid Under Fire, Development Projects and Civil Conflict,” Belfer Center Discussion Paper, No. 2010-18, Harvard Kennedy School, November 2010.

constant flow of electricity. Insurgent attacks on projects made the electrical grid at the time less reliable than it was during the Saddam era. Sabotage was also the reason for low oil production and fuel availability, which led to an increased usage of the black market.<sup>156</sup>

Another aspect of these attacks is their effect on the contracting agency's actions. Insurgents targeting specific areas, rather than projects, can lead to contractors being hesitant to work in those areas due to their concerns about the safety of the workers and the successful implementation of the project.<sup>157</sup> Contractors are vital for project implementation and economic growth, especially if the contractors are from the host nation. If a contracting company views a project as risky or unprofitable, it is likely that they will not pursue it, preventing the project from being implemented.

One example of this is road construction in Afghanistan, which has been an essential part of NATO's counterinsurgency effort. Karl Eikenberry, the former Ambassador to Afghanistan, has confirmed himself that "where the road ends, the Taliban begins."<sup>158</sup> Road construction sites have been a constant target for the Taliban due to their prevalence in

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<sup>156</sup> Beehner, Lionel. "Iraq's Faltering Infrastructure." Council on Foreign Relations. June 22, 2006. Accessed March 23, 2015.

<sup>157</sup> Crane, Keith. Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2009.

<sup>158</sup> Wiseman, Paul. "The Perils of Carving a Path to the Taliban's Front Door - USATODAY.com." The Perils of Carving a Path to the Taliban's Front Door - USATODAY.com. June 20, 2007. Accessed March 24, 2015.

Afghanistan.<sup>159</sup> Although attacks have destroyed many project sites, the destruction of construction vehicles and the kidnapping of workers have proven to be more damaging. These attacks hinder the contractor's ability to complete current and future projects. Not only is the progress of the current project slowed, but future projects are also jeopardized. The dangerousness of the environment may discourage individuals from working in that location. The limited availability of specialized labor in the area reduces the ability of the contractor to hire qualified personnel, to provide the necessary logistics, and to procure the required building material.<sup>160</sup>

Unsecure roads were exploited not only by the insurgency but also by criminal elements. Often, criminal elements used these roads to set up tolls for drivers using them. They collect an illegal tax that benefited neither the host nation government nor the development agencies. Also, they took advantage of the limited security available on the road and robbed travelers.<sup>161</sup> The people who are targeted for this realize that the government does not have a grip on security and cannot enforce rule of law, again hurting the legitimacy of their government.

In Iraq, attacks on projects thwart successful completion of development projects and consequently deny benefits to the people. Because of the

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<sup>159</sup> Amiri, Mohammad Abid. "Road Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Afghanistan: A Cure or a Curse?" *International Affairs Review* XXI, no. 2 (2013).

<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

attacks on projects, funding that normally went to development projects had to be diverted to improve the security in the area. Due to the diversion of funds and the attacks on projects, the scope of many development projects was reduced. For instance, in March 2005, USAID was forced to cancel to development projects that would have increased the power generation in southern Baghdad. These projects, which totaled around \$15 million, were cancelled to help cover increased security costs in the region.<sup>162</sup> In this case, the insurgents succeeded at preventing the project from being implemented, which had a negative effect on both US forces and the Iraqi government's ongoing development mission. It negatively affected the local population in the region as well by preventing much needed development projects from being constructed. The insurgent threat drove away contractors, whose workers deemed the environment too dangerous. This type of action resulted in a wastewater plant that was intended to help the people in central Iraq to be delayed for nearly two months in 2005.<sup>163</sup>

*Economic Infrastructure Projects Becoming a Source of Income for the Insurgency*

Non-state actors such as insurgents, militias, and criminal groups often use infrastructure development projects as a source of revenue to fund their establishment, by requiring contracting companies to pay fees for

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<sup>162</sup> Christoff, Joseph A. *Rebuilding Iraq | Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges*. United States Government Accountability Office, 2006.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

protection so that they will not get attacked.<sup>164</sup> This activity is a well-known problem; even by the staff at the American Embassy. Money that is supposed to be going to development projects is finding its way to the Taliban. Protection money in Afghanistan has become such a problem that in the higher levels of the Afghan government, there is an official office that handles these types of transactions and negotiations. On average, around 20% of the total value of contracts issued by the US is dedicated to paying off the Taliban. If this fee is not paid, the contractor risks having their employees killed or projects destroyed.<sup>165</sup> Ghulam Arafat, a local war lord in Khost Province Afghanistan was found to be spending nearly \$1 million a year on protection fees.<sup>166</sup> A local Afghan contractor described this process when he was hired to construct a bridge stating: "The local Taliban commander called and said 'don't build a bridge there, we'll have to blow it up.' I asked him to let me finish the bridge, collect the money — then they could blow it up whenever they wanted. We agreed, and I completed my project."<sup>167</sup> Although the contractor did not pay a protection fee, it outlines the influence the Taliban has on local contractors who work for the US government. This makes cost estimates for infrastructure development projects increase

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<sup>164</sup> Crane, Keith. *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2009.

<sup>165</sup> MacKenzie, Jean. "Funding the Afghan Taliban." *Global Post*. August 7, 2009. Accessed March 23, 2015.

<sup>166</sup> Amiri, Mohammad Abid. "Road Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Afghanistan: A Cure or a Curse?" *International Affairs Review* XXI, no. 2 (2013).

<sup>167</sup> Gusterson, Hugh. "Why the War in Afghanistan Cannot Be Won." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. September 21, 2009. Accessed May 22, 2015.



due to contractors including it in their budget. It also strengthens the insurgency the US coalition is trying to stop, giving them a steady source of revenue from the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

In Iraq, insurgents would often extort from 5-20 percent of the value of contracts that were issued by the US government. Also, in a non-monetary value form, much of the fuel that was supposed to be exported from Iraq was siphoned off into the black market, depriving the Iraqi government of desperately needed revenue that could have been used for providing public services and reducing their reliance on US funding and personnel.<sup>168</sup> Iraqi officer Col. Yaseen Taha Rajeeb was assigned to the refinery and attempted to halt the ongoing theft. However, the corruption was so ingrained that the colonel stopped receiving paychecks and was soon fired for his actions.<sup>169</sup> This shows that there are sources within the Iraqi government as well who are using public goods as a resource for their own personal income.

Economic infrastructure development has an important effect on the missions of both the host nation government and of the US forces operating in the region. Short term development goals lay the foundation for long term development.<sup>170</sup> If short term goals are not achieved, then long term goals are less likely to be achieved. The longer it takes to

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<sup>168</sup> Oppel, Richard. "Iraq's Insurgency Runs on Stolen Oil Profits." The New York Times. March 15, 2008. Accessed March 24, 2015.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

secure objectives, the longer it will take for the mission to be considered a success or failure.

## Conclusion

The United States finds itself participating in stability operations and counterinsurgency operations not only in the Middle East, but also all over the world. Understanding infrastructure's role in economic development is vital to the success of the mission. Economic infrastructure development is a must, and therefore a valiant effort must be made to address the vulnerabilities infrastructure development creates so that the stability of a country is ensured, economic expansion is created, and the legitimacy of a host nation government is improved so as to benefit the entire population.

US policy for international development is very idealistic and tends to ignore reality. It seeks to simply transfer capital and technical expertise to other countries, expecting economic growth to follow.<sup>171</sup> US policy does not take into account the responsibility for overseeing the projects which includes holding contractors accountable for their contracts and ensuring the capacity of the host nation government to sustain the projects once the US pulls out of the area. There are many problems stemming from the agency level of management that have had direct effects on the lower level implementation of a project. It is important for the US to take these factors into account when conducting counterinsurgency, disaster response, or development operations if they

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<sup>171</sup> Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, Carlos Lopes, and Khalid Malik. "Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems (Full Text)." UNDP. Accessed April 6, 2014.

seek to transfer responsibility of maintaining the projects and improve the capacity of the host country. Also, in a counterinsurgency context, it is important to address these issues so that an insurgency cannot exploit them and use it to their advantage by either gaining support or hurting the image of the host nation government. In a time when the US is getting more involved in unstable countries as well as responding to more and more major crises, it is critical that the US identify faults within its policies now, before the next major conflict or disaster hits.

This study sought to identify factors that lead to successful development project implementation from the macro and micro levels of a project in an underdeveloped area. It also outlined the effects successful project implementation has on the behavior of the local population and the legitimacy of both the host nation government and US forces carrying out stability operations. The study also looked at the feasibility of a project. If the host nation country does not have the capacity to maintain a development project, due to local factors such as location or size of the project, then the project should either be adapted to fit the conditions under which the host nation can sustain the project or be done away with all together. If the project is feasible, proper oversight should be implemented so as to ensure that the local environment of the project site is considered, the local community is incorporated into the planning, and execution stages, and flexibility is maintained to adapt to a changing environment and changing circumstances. Most oversight is conducted

on the project management level, involving project teams who work on the ground. Once the project is completed, the contracting agency should be held accountable for the actions they have taken. If the project was conducted improperly, due to such things as cost overruns, delayed completion, or faulty construction, the contractor should be held accountable through heavy fines or the loss of future contracts. Each of these consequences affects the revenue of the contracting company and will deter that company as well as other companies from poor performance in the future.

My hypothesis was proven in that infrastructure projects do create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the insurgency. What I did not expect, however, was that most of these vulnerabilities are preventable by the host nation government or the US. If these vulnerabilities are not addressed, the host nation government and US are hurting their mission and empowering the insurgency.

Sustainability is an important factor that needs to be addressed in the project planning stages. Sustainability is achieved by appropriately matching projects with the capacity of the host nation and should direct the scope of a project. For example, a development organization or government agency wouldn't want to build a hospital in an area where there is little to no road access, a condition that would make building the hospital difficult and resupplying it unsustainable.

This study found that oversight is an important aspect of development project implementation; specifically, efficient oversight on the project level has a greater impact on the success of a project than the agency or organizational level due to the project management teams having more influence over decisions regarding the project and the environment it is being constructed in. The team is able to make quicker decisions to solve problems regarding the project that could potentially derail any progress made. They also are able to better incorporate the community in project implementation so that local residents are trained to maintain the project and feel a sense of ownership. In some cases, when the community directed the projects, they proved to be more successful due to their knowledge on what areas needed to be developed. These findings are important to US policy as they will make development projects in counterinsurgency environments more effective and sustainable. Also, it will help boost the stability of allied nations that have gone through a transition in government.

The findings of this study are essential to current and future stability operations that the US seeks to implement. If the findings are adapted, it could lead to more cost beneficial economic development projects and increased effectiveness and impact on the local population. This could prevent non-state actors such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda from gaining strength and empower nations with ongoing insurgencies to handle their own security, thereby reinforcing US strategic interests.

The scope of this issue is immense and more research needs to be done. This paper looked at two countries in which the US is conducting stability operations with active insurgencies. However, there are many other countries where the US is conducting stability operations that are outside the counterinsurgency scope. Haiti is a major area where stability operations are being conducted for humanitarian assistance. South Sudan is another area where the US is investing in capacity building for the government. There has been research conducted outside the scope of this paper that identifies issues similar to the ones reviewed in this paper. It would be interesting to see if these problems have the same effect on those governments.

The United States is finding itself more and more involved in conflicts that involve non-state actors. Although some of these conflicts require direct military action, most often, the solution is the enhancement of host nation government capacity through feasible development projects that benefit the local populace, thereby legitimizing the host nation government and diminishing support for the insurgency. To ensure that our national security needs are met, the US needs to develop an effective and efficient method to deal with non-state actors while increasing the economic vitality of underdeveloped countries.

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## Curriculum Vitae

### **EXPERIENCE**

#### Association of American Law Schools (AALS)

*Student Assistant: October 2014 – Present*

- Participated in the preparation and execution of AALS' three day long Annual Conference that consisted of one hundred separate sessions with two thousand attendees
- Computed data collected from events that led the organization to identify better methods in outreach for events

#### *National Defense University, Center for Applied Strategic Learning (CASL)*

*Wargaming Division Intern / Research Assistant: September 2014 - Present*

- Assisted with research for a Middle East security wargame on Jordan, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) graduate students, handling event execution logistics
- Contributed to the design and research of a multi-college war game scenario on The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and U.S. Government actors involved in overseeing foreign acquisition
- Aided in facilitating exercises involving foreign military sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) for the Reserve Components National Security Course (RCNSC)
- Briefed information to scenarios developed for University to team personnel and senior officers

#### Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, Middle East

*Israeli Policy Intern: February - June 2014*

- Developed talking points on Israeli defense relations for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for a series of regional security meetings with Israeli Military Defense Attachés
- Prepared a presentation on Department of Defense engagement with Egypt for the Assistant Secretary of Defense of Policy
- Assisted Chief of Staff with outreach efforts to Joint Staff and Central Command to gather input on new policy decisions
- Managed logistics for meetings with Defense Attachés from several Middle Eastern Embassies

## Truman National Security Project | Center for National Policy

*Syrian Policy Intern: September - December 2013*

- Researched daily updates to the Syrian conflict for Policy Department staff talking points
- Prepared detailed accounts of rebel groups involved in the Syria conflict, including Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIL, and the FSA
- Drafted the Syria section of the annual report highlighting global security threats, including actors, chemical weapons, refugees, and other key issues
- Performed outreach to congressional staff on the Truman Congressional Security Scholars Program on National Security
- Briefed Policy Department staff on Civilian-Military operations in conflict and post-conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa

## Office of Senator Christopher Coons (D-DE)

*Intern: September 2012 - December 2012*

- Prepared weekly current events briefings focused on African regional organizations, terrorist groups and foreign influence
- Examined effects of the sequester on the Department of Defense in terms of research and development, staffing, and acquisition
- Researched the U.S. response to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and challenges the U.S. forces faced in completing their mission
- Wrote informational briefings for the Senator on African countries including Zambia, Morocco, and Senegal

## American Islamic Congress (AIC)

*Legislative Assistant: October 2011 - December 2012*

- Supervised five interns on campaigns for the Northern Pakistani Kalash population and human rights violations in Saudi Arabia
- Edited and revamped a Political Action Kit to encourage populations in post-Arab Spring to get involved in their democratic process
- Conducted extensive research on the history of Afghanistan, the opposition in Syria, and the outcome of the Libyan intervention
- Liaised with the Department of Justice to develop ways of combating Islamic extremism without profiling moderate Muslims
- Coordinated efforts between AIC, the State Department, and the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom to develop solutions to issues pertaining to international religious freedom, the persecution of Christian Ethiopians in Saudi Arabia and detained personnel in the Middle East due to blasphemy laws

## Fort Delaware State Park

*Volunteer Coordinator, Firearms / Artillery Supervisor: June 2009 – October 2011*

- Oversaw a joint volunteer effort by Bank of America and Wal-Mart that saved the Park thousands of dollars in labor costs
- Ran educational programs that included weapon demonstrations for the public and instructed new volunteers to the program
- Performed extensive research on the role of Fort Delaware and Fort DuPont in the defense of the Delaware River

## **MILITARY**

U.S. Army Reserve (E5 – Sergeant)

*Civil Affairs Specialist (38B): November 2012 – Present*

- Direct commission officer candidate
- Active secret security clearance
- Train to assist in the coordination of civilian / military development projects
- Liaise with local government, non-profit and relief agencies to coordinate disaster response strategy
- Trained extensively in negotiation and the gathering of information through human sources
- Gained external training expertise in disaster response to both domestic and foreign countries

Horizontal Construction Engineer (12N): January 2011 – November 2012

- Skilled in the operation of heavy construction equipment needed in infrastructure development projects
- Attended the Non-Commissioned Officer Academy focusing on leadership

## **VOLUNTEER SERVICE**

Fort Delaware State Park

*AmeriCorps Volunteer: 2009*

- Assisted in historical preservation of the park
- Gained public speaking skills through teaching classes to the public

University of Delaware

*Student Advisor: 2007 - 2008*

- Coordinated groups of upper class students to speak to incoming students
- Spoke to large groups of students about campus life and studying habits

## **EDUCATION**

Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC

M.A. in Global Security - May 2015

*Thesis: The Risks and Rewards of Investing in Economic Infrastructure Development in a Post Conflict Environment.*

University of Delaware, Newark, DE

B.A. in History - September 2010