Black Power, Inc.: Global American Business and the Post-Apartheid City

By
Jessica Ann Levy

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Abstract

Black Power, Inc.: Global American Business and the Post-Apartheid City explains the rise of black empowerment in the United States and southern Africa during the late twentieth-century. Black empowerment, defined as private and government programs promoting job-training, community development, and black entrepreneurship, flourished in the late 1960s and 1970s as a popular response to social unrest in black neighborhoods from North Philadelphia to Soweto. "Black Power, Inc." analyzes the intellectual and financial investments made by American businesspeople, government bureaucrats, and black entrepreneurs in transforming black dissidents into "productive citizens" in an economic and civic sense. As these efforts spread, the transnational discourse of black empowerment intersected and appropriated a global Black Power politics. My project draws attention to the contestations between Black Power and black empowerment advocates across the diaspora. Drawing on corporate and "movement" records from the United States and South Africa, I reveal the connections between black internationalism and the post-war globalization of American capitalism in ways too often obscured by the separation of Business History and Global Black Studies. By prioritizing private capital, I furthermore explain Black Power's demise in a way that reveals the seeds of political conservatism that blossomed within the global black freedom struggle.

Readers: N.D.B. Connolly, Angus Burgin, Sara Berry, Vesla Weaver, Robert Trent Vinson

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This has truly been an experience in crowdsourcing. The words are mine and I take full responsibility for any factual or grammatical mistakes found in this dissertation. Yet, every aspect of this project from conception to copy-editing was made possible through the tremendous support I have received from mentors, colleagues, friends, and family. Words alone cannot express my deep gratitude to those whose names I have listed below and the many others who I have surely forgotten to mention.

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Introduction

A new phrase entered the English lexicon in the late 1960s amidst growing calls for "community control" and reparations for slavery. In 1969, the United Methodist Board of Missions announced a $1.3 million grant supporting what they termed "black empowerment."[1] The board's announcement followed closely on the heels of the Black Economic Development Conference (BEDC)'s publication of the "Black Manifesto." Drafted by Black Panther activist James Forman, the Black Manifesto demanded, among other things, white churches and synagogues pay $500 million in reparations for the slave trade. These reparations would be used by the BEDC to support several projects, including several black publishing houses, a national black audio-visual network, and a southern land bank to assist those evicted "from their homes because they have dared to defy the white racism of this country."[2] Side-stepping the question of reparations, the Methodists responded six months later by announcing their program for black empowerment, which included donations to several black, Mexican-American, and Indian-American religious and civil rights organizations, along with $550,000 to black colleges.[3]

At the time, few paid attention to what was, in effect, a re-appropriation of Black Power.[4] Over the next three decades, black empowerment became an increasingly popular way for religious leaders, businesspeople, politicians, and government bureaucrats to describe the

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[1] "Methodist Grant Disappointing," *Bay State Banner,* October 30, 1969: 14.
[2] Black Economic Development Conference, "Black Manifesto," April 26, 1969, https://www.episcopalarchives.org/Afro-Anglican_history/exhibit/pdf/blackmanifesto.pdf.
[3] "Methodist Grant Disappointing," *Bay State Banner,* October 30, 1969: 14.
[4] The phrase "Black Power" was popularized by SNCC activists Stokely Carmichael (later known as Kwame Ture) and Willie Ricks (later known as Mukasa Dada), and Charles Hamilton during the late 1960s. See Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967); See also, Hasan Kwame Jeffries, *Bloody Lowndes: Civil Rights and Black Power in Alabama's Black Belt* (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 187; Peniel E. Joseph, *The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 1.

proliferation of public and private initiatives promoting black entrepreneurship, managerial-training, and other kinds of commercial activity in urban areas across the United States. In time, black empowerment also appeared in other black communities outside the United States, most notably on the African continent. Building on their work promoting black economic development projects elsewhere on the continent, American corporate executives deployed black empowerment with particular success in the context of the international struggle against South African Apartheid.

Figure 1: This table shows the results of a ProQuest search for the term "black empowerment." The blue shaded areas represent those instances where the phrase was mentioned in relation to South Africa. A vast majority of the other references (orange shaded areas) relate to the United States with the exception that, during the 1990s and 2000s, black empowerment also showed up in relation to other countries in the Caribbean and Africa.

Black empowerment represented more than a discourse. The term describes a politics forged by businessmen and other kinds of institutional actors in response to anti-imperialist and anti-apartheid activism in the United States and Africa. Drawing on corporate and "movement" records, "Black Power, Inc." traces the rise of black empowerment across urban areas from

North Philadelphia to Soweto during the late twentieth-century. In doing so, it argues that black entrepreneurs, multinational corporate executives, and government officials made intellectual, moral, and financial investments in black empowerment as part of a broader effort to re-make the image of American capitalism and sell black people on an emancipatory free enterprise politics both at home and abroad. Moving forward in time from the post-war era to the late twentieth-century and across the United States and Africa, "Black Power, Inc." furthermore explains how black empowerment politics created and reinforced distinctions around "productive" versus "unproductive" black labor; gender in the household and, by extension, the economy; and acceptable and unacceptable mechanisms of redistribution (i.e. charity vs. reparations). Despite the revolutionary fervor that accompanied the end of Jim Crow, European colonialism, and Apartheid, American corporations and black entrepreneurs forged partnerships that worked to mediate the most radical aspects of the global black freedom struggle, while also extending American corporate and financial power in black communities in the United States and Africa.

As suggested by the term itself, black empowerment shared much in common with its root: Black Power. Eschewing calls for moderation and espousing a nationalist rhetoric, the Black Power movement gained momentum in the 1960s and 1970s in response to the failures of civil rights liberalism and government-driven capital flight, both of which left black people on the losing end of post-war metropolitan growth.[5] First popularized by black activists in the

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[5] Donna Jean Murch, *Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Matthew J. Countryman, *Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Robert O. Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Rhonda Y. Williams, *The Politics of Public Housing: Black Women's Struggles against Urban Inequality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

United States, Black Power spread quickly, appearing at the head of self-proclaimed black movements in places as far away as Africa and the Middle East.[6]

Among those who helped to give credence to Black Power and espouse its transnational dimensions were Malcolm X and Robert F. Williams. Drawing parallels between Jim Crow and European colonialism, as well as U.S. military intervention abroad, Malcolm and Williams took aim at American imperialism and capitalism with their radical articulation of Black Power. Hitherto, historians have portrayed these kinds of anti-imperial and anti-capitalist views as emblematic of the Black Power movement.[7] In doing so, they have tended to overlook others another dimension of the movement; namely those promoting Black Power alongside U.S. political and commercial power.

Responding to inquisitive journalists eager to know his views on the controversial phrase gaining traction in black communities, prominent civil rights activist and black entrepreneur Reverend Leon Howard Sullivan stated: "I am black power—six feet, five inches of black power. I believe in the ability of the black man to do what any other man can do. But I also believe that black power and white power must put their strength together to build American power."[8]

[6] Anne-Marie Angelo, *Global Freedom Struggle: The Black Panthers of Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming); Nico Slate, ed., *Black Power beyond Borders: The Global Dimensions of the Black Power Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Daniel R. Magaziner, *The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968-1977* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2010); Peniel E. Joseph, *Waiting 'til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America* (New York: Henry Holt, 2006); Nikhil Pal Singh, *Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Timothy B. Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

[7] Jane Rhodes, *Framing the Black Panthers: The Spectacular Rise of a Black Power Icon* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007); Cynthia Young, *Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism, and the Making of a U.S. Third World Left* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams, eds., *In Search of the Black Panther Party: New Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Singh, *Black is a Country;* Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie;* Joseph, *Waiting 'Til the Midnight Hour*; Cynthia Young, "Havana Up in Harlem: LeRoi Jones, Harold Cruse and the making of a Cultural Revolution," *Science and Society,* 65 (Spring 2001): 12-38.

[8] Audrey Weaver, "The Self-Help Story: Chicagoans See Progress in OIC's" *Chicago Daily Defender*, August 22, 1970: 12.

Sullivan's trajectory, moving forward in time from the 1960s to the 1990s, and traversing the Atlantic Ocean, exemplifies the transformation from Black Power to black empowerment. Following a brief interlude as the leading spokesman for the Selective Patronage Movement boycotting racially discriminatory businesses in Philadelphia, Sullivan, along with many of his fellow black ministers, increasingly abandoned direct action protests in favor of promoting ventures oriented towards economic production and black entrepreneurship.[9] Profits, not protests, these ministers argued, were the real measure Black Power.

Building on work by Marcia Chatelain and others on the commercial dimensions of Black Power activism, this dissertation analyzes black empowerment's ascension in the context of American business efforts to deal with social unrest in black communities in the United States and Africa.[10] In doing so, it makes clear the contributions made by the global Black Power movement to American corporate politics, and vice versa, in ways too often elided by the separation of Black Studies and Business History. Using "black archives," including personal correspondence, board meeting minutes, financial records, and periodicals from black business organizations in the United States and South Africa, "Black Power, Inc." reveals the conversations between American business leaders and black entrepreneurs like Sullivan and Samuel Motsuenyane, president of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce

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[9] In doing so, Sullivan echoed calls of black activists like Bayard Rustin with regards to the transition from protest to politics. Bayard Rustin, "From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement," in *To Redeem A Nation: A History and Anthology of the Civil Rights Movement* edited by Thomas R. West (New York: Brandywine Press, 1993), 232-235; Matthew Countryman, "'From Protest to Politics': Community Control and Black Independent Politics in Philadelphia, 1965-1984," *Journal of Urban History* 32, issue 6 (September 2006): 813-861; Rather than electoral office, black empowerment advocates sought to control private institutions, including banks, non-profit community organizations, and businesses.

[10] Marcia Chatelain, "The Miracle of the Golden Arches: Race and Fast Food in Los Angeles," *Pacific Historical Review* 85, no. 3 (August 2016): 325-353; See also Joshua Clark Davis, *From Head Shops to Whole Foods: The Rise and Fall of Activist Entrepreneurs* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); Karen Ferguson, *Top Down: The Ford Foundation, Black Power and the Reinvention of Racial Liberalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Laura Warren Hill and Julia Rabig, eds. *The Business of Black Power: Community Development, Capitalism, and Corporate Responsibility in Postwar America* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2012).

(Nafcoc). Rather than distinct sets of actors, this dissertation contends that black entrepreneurs and American corporate executives found common cause in promoting black empowerment at home and abroad. In doing so, it furthermore illuminates the conjoining of anti-apartheid—in the broadest sense of the term—and free market politics amidst various movements to remake the post-war world order.[11]

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Inspired by the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent events such as *Citizens United vs. the Federal Election Commission* case, historians have inquired into the relationship between American business and politics with renewed energy and rigor. Thus, for example, revising popular narratives of a mid-century accord with labor, historians have chronicled American businesses' decades-long effort to restrict, if not overthrow, New Deal liberalism through corporate lobbying and efforts aimed at using government funding to spur private development.[12] Meanwhile, others have revealed twentieth-century business leaders' efforts to forge coalitions with Christian evangelicals and conservatives promoting anti-regulatory, free market policies.[13]

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[11] My argument builds on recent work that complicates the simple conflation of free market ideology and conservative politics by revealing the multiple and often contradictory ends pursued by advocates of the "free market." See, Joshua Clark Davis, *From Head Shops to Whole Foods;* Angus Burgin, *The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015)*; Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

[12] Mark R. Wilson, *Destructive Creation: American Business and the Winning of World War II* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); Kim Phillips-Fein and Julian E. Zelizer, "Introduction," in *What's Good for Business: Business and American Politics since World War II,* edited by Kim Phillips-Fein and Julian E. Zelizer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 10-11; Dominique A. Tobbell, "Pharmaceutical Politics and Regulatory Reform in Postwar America," in in *What's Good for Business: Business and American Politics since World War II,* edited by Kim Phillips-Fein and Julian E. Zelizer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 123-139; Kim Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands: The Businessmen's Crusade Against the New Deal* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009); Jennifer Klein, For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America's Public Private Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994); For work that follows business lobbying into the late twentieth-century, see Benjamin C. Waterhouse, *Lobbying America The Politics of Business from Nixon to NAFTA* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

[13] Kevin M. Kruse, *One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America* (New York: Basic Books, 2015); Darren Dochuk, *From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012); Bethany Moreton, *To Serve God and Wal-Mart*.

For the most part, the driving forces in these narratives of corporate politics, including the New Deal and the rise of the New Right, have been policies and movements led by white Americans.[14] "Black Power, Inc.," by contrast, outlines a trajectory for twentieth-century American business politics routed through the global Black Power struggle. In doing so, it depicts black businesspeople—actors often relegated to black business history—as central actors within the history of post-war American corporate politics.[15] Time and again, black entrepreneurs and managers acted as mediators, negotiating the terms of Black Power with white corporate executives and other business professionals amidst widespread protests demanding reparations and calling for white-owned businesses to leave black communities. Unable or uninterested in pursuing these and other proposals promoted by black leftists, black businessmen repeatedly advanced black empowerment, including black commercial ventures pursued in partnership with American corporations, as the vehicle for achieving black economic power.

Far from a static set of ideas and institutions, black empowerment proved highly adaptable, modified by proponents to fit the particularities of the moment and place. Building on and updating a century-old discourse of racial uplift and self-help, black American ministers like

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[14] N.D.B. Connolly, "A White Story," in Forum on Daniel Rodgers, "The Uses and Abuses of 'Neoliberalism'", *Dissent* (Winter 2018), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/neoliberalism-forum-ndb-connolly.

[15] Building on iconic work of scholars like Juliet E.K. Walker and Walter Weare, Black Business History has blossomed into a vibrant subfield. See Robert E. Weems and Jason P. Chambers, eds., *Building The Black Metropolis: African American Entrepreneurship in Chicago* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017); Quincy T. Mills, *Cutting Along the Color Line: Black Barbers and Barber Shops in America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Tiffany Gill, *Beauty Shop Politics: African American Women's Activism in the Beauty Industry* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010); Adam Green, *Selling the Race: Culture, Community, and Black Chicago, 1940-1955* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007); Juliet E.K. Walker, *The History of Black Business in America* (New York, NY: MacMillan, 1998); Robert Weems, *Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumerism in the Twentieth Century* (New York,: New York University Press, 1998); John Sibley Butler, *Entrepreneurship and Self-Help Among Black Americans* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); Walter Weare, *Black Business in the New South*: *A Social History of the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); The aforementioned scholarship notwithstanding, business historians have too often neglected black businesspeople in the history of American business. Neither black business nor race appear, for example, in Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M.G. Raff, and Peter Temin's "Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History," which appeared in *The American Historical Review* 108, no. 2 (April 2003): 404-433.

Sullivan touted black empowerment to combat what they perceived as both a spiritual and economic crisis plaguing post-war black communities in American cities overflowing with black migrants, including a growing number of working black mothers and unemployed youth. Juxtaposing his response with those calling for government welfare, Sullivan and other black empowerment advocates touted vocational training and black entrepreneurship as crucial to making "productive" black men capable of providing for their families, envisioned by Sullivan, as conforming to the patriarchal and heteronormative norms of Christian society.

Mirroring the work of black American missionaries and Pan-Africanists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Sullivan and others also strove to bring black empowerment to their "brothers and sisters" in Africa.[16] Black American-led black empowerment programs in Africa took the form of small-scale development projects that combined American capital and technological expertise with ceremonies paying tribute to African "tradition."[17] For U.S. government officials and corporate executives, who supported these programs, black empowerment in a post-colonial context functioned as a means of countering charges of neocolonialism while simultaneously smoothing the way for the expansion of American economic power.

By examining the transnational spread of black empowerment alongside American business expansion in Africa, "Black Power, Inc." likewise contributes to a growing body of

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[16]Sullivan quoted in Ibok Esema, "Rev. Leon Sullivan's OIC Mission Gets Warm Welcome in Nigeria," *Philadelphia Tribune*, August 11, 1970: 13.

[17] Scholars have aptly shown that what is widely popularly referenced as traditional or customary in Africa has been widely contested by Africans, particularly in response to European colonial powers and local elites, who have often deployed the concept to further particular political agendas. See, for example, Janine M. Ubink and Kojo S. Amanor, eds., *Contesting Land and Custom in Ghana: State, Chief, and the Citizen* (Amsterdam: Leiden University Press, 2008); Dorothy Hodgson, *Once Intrepid Warriors, Gender, Ethnicity and the Cultural Politics of Maasai Development* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001); Sara S. Berry, *Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896-1996* (Porstmouth, Oxford, Cape Town: Heinemann, James Currey, David Philip, 2001); Martin Chanock, L*aw, Custom, and Social Order, the Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia,* African Studies Series 45 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

scholarship on American corporate imperialism.[18] Recent decades have witnessed an

augmentation of scholarship examining American business post-war global expansion in search

of new markets and (human and material) resources.[19] Africa, in this regard, has remained

largely in the shadows.[20] Capitalizing on post-war trade liberalization brought on by the end of

European colonialism, the U.S. Department of Commerce led the charge for American corporate

imperialism, declaring the continent the next "frontier" for American business expansion.[21]

Announcing the first of a series of trade missions led by the department, its representatives

proclaimed in May of 1960, "United States exports have greater prospects for expansion than at

any time in the past."[22]

Far from universally welcomed, American corporations encountered significant criticism

from black nationalists and socialists who decried U.S. commercial expansion on the continent

as a form of neocolonialism.[23] With time, criticism of American corporations grew particularly

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[18] While drawing on the analytical contributions of previous scholars of corporate imperialism like Norman Girvan, *Corporate Imperialism: Conflict and Expropriation: Transnational Corporations and Economic Nationalism in the Third World* (Monthly Review Press, 1976); C.K. Prahalad and Kenneth Lieberthal, *The End of Corporate Imperialism* (Harvard Business Review Classics, Cambridge: Harvard Business School, 2008), my use of the term American corporate imperialism more aptly fits with a small, yet growing body of scholarship on the mechanisms of U.S. corporate expansion and control in the post-war era. See Jenifer Van Vleck, *Empire of Air: Aviation and the American Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); Betsy Beasley, *Expert Capital: Houston and the Making of a Service Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

[19] Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Reinhold Wagleitner, Coca-Colonization of the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1994); Jefferson Cowie, *Capital Moves: RCA's Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor* (The New Press, 2001); Bethany Moreton, *To Serve God and Wal-Mart;* Betsy Beasley, "Service Learning: Oil, International Education, and Texas's Corporate Cold War," *Diplomatic History,* 2017, dhx053.doi: 10.1093/dh/dhx053.

[20] James Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

[21] U.S. Department of Commerce, *Africa: Sales Frontier for U.S. Business,* Superintendent of Documents (1963).

[22] Brendan M. Jones, "2 Trade Missions Emphasize Africa: Exceptional Opportunities are Detailed for Eastern and Western Areas," *New York Times,* May 29, 1960: F1.

[23] One of the most widely-read neocolonial critiques of European and American capitalism in Africa came from Ghana's first president and Pan-Africanist leader Kwame Nkrumah in his 1965 book, *Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons). In the book, Nkrumah blamed the United States for the setbacks experienced by African socialists and labelled Western aid programs "neocolonialist traps" intended to "exploit" Africa and forestall its economic development; Nkrumah's comments echoed Soviet propaganda, which sought to win over Africans and other Third World people by emphasizing the U.S. mistreatment of black Americans, which they claimed was "indicative of its policies toward peoples of color through the world." Memo, Thomas L. Hughes to The Secretary, Re: Soviet Media Coverage of Current US Racial Crisis, June 14, 1963, Papers

acute with regards to U.S. business support for South African Apartheid.[24] Initial activism in the

United States calling attention to the South African policy of Apartheid, which literally translates

to separateness in Afrikaans, was led by black American activists in conjunction with South

African exiles as early as the late 1940s.[25] Most Americans, however, remained oblivious, at

best, or indifferent, at worst, to the growing authoritarianism that accompanied the rise of

Apartheid. Indeed, the United States remained silent while the South African government began

suppressing dissent, including, notably, following the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre during which

three hundred armed policemen opened fire on a crowd of unarmed protesters, killing at least

sixty-nine people, and imprisoning large numbers of political activists, Instead, U.S. government

officials and financial institutions continued to supply aid to the South African government,

mirroring U.S. support for white minority regimes in Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe) and

South West Africa (present day Namibia). Ostensibly justified by the United States' Cold War

prerogative of containing communism, U.S. policy towards southern Africa also displayed

blatant racism.[26]

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of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National Security Files, Civil Rights: General, June 1963: 11-14. John F.
Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

[24] Drawing on work by scholars like Winston A. Grady-Willis and others, I use the term apartheid broadly to refer to
the practice of institutionalized racism, including state policies promoting racialized segregation and inequality.
While most visible in the case of South African Apartheid (capitalized here and through the dissertation to refer to
the particular set of policies enacted by the South African government between 1948 and 1991), and Jim Crow in the
United States, apartheid has appeared in various forms across time and space. Patrick Bond, *South Africa and
Global Apartheid: Continental and International Policies and Politics* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2004);
Winston A. Grady-Willis, *Challenging U.S. Apartheid: Atlanta and Black Struggles for Human rights, 1960-1977*
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid:
Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Jerry Pillay,
"Apartheid in the Holy Land: Theological Reflections on the Israel and/or Palestine Situation from a South African
Perspective," *H*TS *Teologies Studies/Theological Studies* 72, no. 4 (November 2016),
https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v72i4.3434; Adekeye Adebajo, et. al., *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa
and the United Nations* (Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009); Uri Davis, *Apartheid Israel:
Possibilities for the Struggle Within* (New York, Pretoria: Zed Books, Media Review Network, 2003).

[25] Francis Njubi Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2004); Carol Anderson, *Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American
Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 86-8.

[26] Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena*
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United*

Unable to alter government policy, anti-apartheid activists had more success with U.S. corporations and institutional investors. Building on earlier demands for sanctions against South Africa originating at the 1958 All African Peoples' Conference in Accra, calls for sanctions and divestment appeared in the United States, first by churches and other investor responsibility organizations at corporate shareholder meetings in the 1970s. This first wave of sanctions and divestment activism was followed by widespread protests at college and university campuses, culminating in widespread divestment at the national, state, and local level in the 1980s.[27]

Extensively chronicled by historians, the sanctions and divestment movement has occupied a central role in scholarly accounts and popular memory of the U.S. anti-apartheid struggle.[28] Meanwhile, scholars have yet to fully analyze how business fought back against sanctions and divestment. Rather than a simple story of resistance, this dissertation shows how corporate executives, together with black American and black South African entrepreneurs, increasingly constructed their own strategy centered on promoting corporate social responsibility and black empowerment in response to sanctions and divestment activists. Building on earlier corporate diplomacy on the continent, black American executives led the way promoting

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States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Christopher Coker, *The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement and Its Critics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986); Thomas J. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985).

[27] While the *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986*, Public Law 99-440, Statute 100 (1986): 1086-1116 passed by the United States Congress in 1986 remains the most well-known example, numerous other institutions passed legislation banning investment and/or adopting sanctions against South Africa. The most comprehensive study on the subject matter cites the total number of educational institutions fully or partially divesting from South Africa as one hundred and fifty-five in 1988, as well as 26 states, 22 counties, and over 90 cities as having taken some form of "binding economic action against companies doing business in South Africa" by 1989. Richard Knight, "Sanctions, Divestment, and U.S. Corporations in South Africa," in *Sanctioning Apartheid,* ed. Robert E. Edgar (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1990).

[28] Eric J. Morgan, "Into the Struggle: Confronting Apartheid in the United States and South Africa," (Phd dissertation, University of Colorado, 2009); David L. Hostetter, *Movement Matters: American Antiapartheid Activism and the Rise of Multicultural Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Francis Njubi Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions;* Donald R. Culverson, *Contesting Apartheid: U.S. Activism, 1960-1987* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999); Robert Kinloch Massie, *Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years* (New York: Nan A. Talese, 1997); Les de Villiers, *In Sight of Surrender: The U.S. Sanctions Campaign against South Africa, 1946-1993* (Westport: Prager, 1995).

affirmative action and black entrepreneurship programs in South Africa. Vice President of Corporate Affairs at Johnson & Johnson, former executive secretary to Sargent Shriver in the Office of Economic Opportunity and interim president of the National Urban League Harold Sims articulated it best when he told the South African health secretary: who better to assist Africans in making the transition from white-rule than Americans, who had recently "pass[ed] through [their] own apartheid and achieve[d] miracles in overcoming its limitations."[29]

Sims use of the term "miracles" to describe the end of American apartheid was apt given the religious rhetoric deployed by proponents of black empowerment. Positioning themselves in opposition to the revolutionary politics embodied by black militants, proselytizers of black empowerment exhibited a faith-like devotion to private enterprise and the free market in their efforts to eradicate racism, at home and abroad. Echoing Sims, Sullivan told his congregants, "watch closely to see what God [will] do" to solve the problem of South African Apartheid.[30] Sullivan's sermon, delivered just days after his return from a trip to South Africa co-sponsored by General Motors and the U.S. State Department, subsequently proceeded to outline what would ultimately become the basis for the Sullivan Principles, a voluntary code of conduct for corporations operating in South Africa promoting desegregation, corporate social responsibility, and black empowerment. By the early-1980s, over one hundred and fifty American companies had signed the Sullivan Principles, making them one of the largest single private initiatives focused on a single issue, and an international issue at that, in modern American history.[31]

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[29] Correspondence Harold R. Sims, Vice President Corporate Affairs, Johnson & Johnson, to Dr. J. DeBeer, Secretary of Health, Republic of South Africa, May 2, 1977, Box 11, Harold R. Sims Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.

[30] Leon Sullivan, *Moving Mountains: The Principles and Purposes of Leon Sullivan* (Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1998), 48; Sullivan's intertwining of faith and business as a vehicle for racial uplift mirrored earlier efforts by black Christians in the nineteenth century establishing commercial ventures in the black church. See, Weare, *Black Business in the New South;* Walker, *The History of Black Business in America*.

[31] Most collective business lobbying organizations, mirroring professional associations, originated around particular industries, such as the National Association of Manufacturers or the National Association of Real Estate Brokers,

Both the Sullivan Principles and other American business-led initiatives promoting black empowerment in South Africa contribute to a new understanding of the role U.S. corporations have played with regards to U.S.-Africa relations in the post-war era. Despite growing attention to the role of non-state actors, including private industry, in the context of cross-cultural and trans-national encounters involving Americans, historians have often continued to portray American corporations as secondary agents, participating, yet never leading the way with regards to American international diplomacy.[32] In the case of South Africa, American corporations, not the U.S. government, ultimately headed the charge that saw a growing number of American companies, universities, and other institutions, including, ultimately the U.S. government itself, promoting black empowerment.

Expanding on their earlier work promoting black empowerment in the United States and other parts of Africa, American corporations in collaboration with black American and black South African entrepreneurs promoted black empowerment as a means of reconciling anti-

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"class" interests, such as the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) and the National Small Business Association, or otherwise focused more broadly on a wide range of policy issues, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable, both of which claimed to represent business more broadly. See, Paige Glotzer, *Building Suburban Power: The Business of Exclusionary Housing Markets, 1890-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019); Waterhouse, *Lobbying America;* Delton, *Racial Integration in Corporate America*; Jeffrey M. Hornstein, *A Nation of Realtors: A Cultural History of the Twentieth-Century American Middle Class* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988); the Sullivan Principles' signatory companies, by contrast, mobilized around a single issue, namely how to respond to the movement for sanctions and divestment against Apartheid South Africa.

[32] A prime example of this is the literature on American business involvement in U.S.-led development initiatives in the Third World. See Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). While highlighting the centrality of public-private partnerships within U.S. model of development, both Cullather and Ekbladh tend to place more weight on U.S. government officials, social scientists, and other kinds of international organizations; See also, Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War*, translated by Diana Wolf (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Despite the somewhat misleading title, Wagnleitner focuses primarily on "the government of the United States" as the prime mover in promoting American culture in Europe after World War II; Jenifer Van Vleck's *Empire of the Air,* by contrast, provides a rare example of corporate-led American imperialism by showing how Pan-American Airways altered how Americans saw the world and themselves in it differently.

apartheid and free market politics. Building on decades-old networks between the two countries, black American and black South African entrepreneurs collaborated in recruiting U.S. capital and technical expertise to support black economic development in South Africa. In doing so, these international black businessmen likewise created a space to dialogue with white American and other business professionals regarding the role of private enterprise in the anti-apartheid movement, and, later, with regards to constructing a post-Apartheid South Africa. In time, these corporate executives and black entrepreneurs were successful in persuading others, including, most significantly, African National Congress (ANC) party leader and future South African president Nelson Mandela, of the utility of black empowerment as middle ground between left-wing socialism and white monopoly capitalism.

By the 1990s, black empowerment had been accepted by a large number of government officials, business leaders, and other black leaders as a suitable alternative to socialist revolution, paving Americans and South Africans to begin placing the past behind them and move forward in constructing a post-Apartheid order with the help of American capital. This new international order was perhaps best captured in a photograph published by *Jet Magazine.* In the photograph, Nelson Mandela, less than a month after becoming the first democratically-elected president of South Africa, shakes hands with Coca-Cola Vice President Carl Ware, symbolizing the friendship forged by the ANC and American multinational corporations. Similar partnerships proved commonplace in the wake of the end of apartheid. Having dispensed with any friction caused by *de jure* segregation, corporate executives and various black elites found common cause promoting black empowerment in spite of limited evidence that it helped in facilitating the broad redistribution of wealth needed to support racial equality. Rather, as a testament to the

coalescing of corporate and black politics, proponents of black empowerment measured progress in terms of profits delivered to black entrepreneurs, managers, and shareholders.

Chapter Outline

"Black Power, Inc." traces black empowerment's rise over time, moving from the post-war era to the mid-1990s, and across space, from urban America to the corporate boardroom, and culminating in the international struggle against South African Apartheid. Chapter one, "Booker T's Ghost: Leon Sullivan and the Rise of Black Empowerment," begins with an examination of black empowerment's roots amidst America's so-called post-war urban crisis.[33] This chapter introduces a major proponent of black empowerment and one of the central players in the transformation of Black Power into black empowerment: Reverend Leon H. Sullivan. Born in 1922 in West Virginia, Sullivan began his career as a civil rights activist in New York City in the 1940s. Alongside people like Bayard Rustin and Ralph Abernathy he helped organize a number of protests, including the 1941 March on Washington Movement (MOWM). He, like many of his peers, became increasingly concerned with what he saw as the economic and moral decline of the black community symbolized by rising unemployment rates and juvenile delinquency.

This chapter also shows how white and black urban elites worked together to address the perceived challenges posed by black migration, de-industrialization, and black militancy. In 1964, Sullivan founded Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC), a self-help and community economic development program launched in an abandoned police station in North Philadelphia, which Sullivan leased from the City of Philadelphia for the bargain price of one dollar a year. Over the next few years, and with significant support from the federal government,

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[33] On the urban crisis, see Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

OIC expanded into a national organization with chapters in over seventy cities across the country. As it grew, OIC forged new partnerships with American corporations, including General Motors (GM) and Gulf Oil, which embraced black empowerment as a bulwark against further social unrest and government regulation. By juxtaposing Sullivan's earlier career combatting juvenile delinquency with the birth of OIC, this chapter reveals the roots of business-community partnerships within the decades-old tradition of Jim Crow governance, while also explaining how black empowerment emerged in the late sixties and early seventies in response to the demands of Black Power protest.

Chapter two, "Empowering Africa: Black Ambassadors for Corporate America," traces OIC's expansion to Africa amidst rapidly changing political, social, and economic conditions. In 1969, a Nigerian physician visiting Philadelphia approached Sullivan about bringing his job-training and community development program to Africa. Evoking and repurposing an earlier generation of black internationalists and commercial ambassadors like Booker T. Washington and Marcus Garvey, Sullivan and his supporters capitalized—figuratively and literally—on both Pan-Africanist networks and U.S. business interest in Africa to generate support for their black empowerment program. In doing so, this chapter argues that Sullivan and other black entrepreneurs functioned as ambassadors of American corporate imperialism, smoothing the way for American business expansion on the continent. By tracing OICI's expansion into Africa, this chapter builds on and revises previous narratives regarding U.S. Cold War diplomacy toward Africa by revealing the financial, as well as political, investments made by the U.S. government and American business in black empowerment as a vehicle for American capitalism.[34]

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[34] Nancy Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016); Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*; Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,

Chapter three, "Incorporating Struggle: The Sullivan Principles, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Black Empowerment during the Anti-Apartheid Movement," shifts contexts again, this time from post-independence Africa to the multinational corporate board room. In 1971, GM appointed Sullivan to its board of directors; the first of several major appointments of black corporate directors and managers. Once appointed, Sullivan and other black Americans took advantage of their new platform to reform corporate policies domestically, and, increasingly, globally. Building on themes of black ambassadorship developed in the previous chapter, "Incorporating Struggle" highlights the role black directors and managers like Sullivan played in persuading American businesses to join the struggle against South African Apartheid. During the 1970s and 1980s, the international sanctions and divestment campaign increasingly threatened significant American (and other foreign) business interests in South Africa, whose Apartheid system produced some of the highest rates of return on investment in the world. Initially advocating for sanctions, Sullivan shifted his stance to one that advocated for a strategy of social investment via the Sullivan Principles, a corporate code of conduct signed by over 150 American companies promoting equal opportunity and black empowerment in South Africa. Moving beyond the narrow criticisms of Sullivan as a "sell-out" found in the press, this chapter analyzes the complex negotiations that occurred behind closed doors, using private correspondence, meeting minutes, and various internal memos from Sullivan and other black executives. This chapter builds on recent work on the political involvement of American corporations, while extending that line of inquiry into the realm of international relations. Pressured by activists to demonstrate greater social responsibility with regard to racism, locally

1996)*; Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

and globally, American corporations capitalized on the opportunity of the anti-apartheid movement to assert a new role for themselves as custodians of black empowerment.[35]

Chapter four, "Apartheid's Entrepreneurs: American Business, the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc) and Black Empowerment in South Africa," picks up the story of black empowerment from the perspective of black business in South Africa. Thousands of miles and seemingly another world from General Motors' headquarters in Detroit, a young Tswana man named Samuel Motsuenyane formed the foundation, along with fellow black South African businessmen in the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc), for what would become the movement for black economic empowerment in South Africa. Modeled on other black business organizations in the United States and southern Africa, Nafcoc emerged in the mid-1960s as a trade association and business lobbying organization advocating against Apartheid policies that discriminated against black entrepreneurs and thwarted black economic development. Drawing on newsletters, annual reports, and personal testimonies from Nafcoc members, this chapter highlights the difficulties Nafcoc faced amidst the harsh Apartheid environment, while simultaneously revealing how black South African entrepreneurs forged networks with American business in order to lay claim to new forms of citizenship rooted in a transnational politics of black empowerment and free enterprise. In doing so, this chapter builds on and complicates existing narratives regarding U.S-South African

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[35] Benjamin C. Waterhouse, *Lobbying America: The Politics of Business from Nixon to NAFTA* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Meg Jacobs, "The Politics of Environmental Regulation: Business-Government Relations in the 1970s and Beyond," in *What's Good for Business: Business and American Politics since World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 212-232; Darren Dochuk, *From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism* (Norton, 2011); Bethany Moreton, *To Serve God and Wal-Mart*; Jennifer Delton's *Racial Integration in Corporate America, 1940-1990* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Kim Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2009).

relations during this period by highlighting the work of black entrepreneurs and American

corporate executives blending free market politics and anti-apartheid activism.[36]

In the final chapter, the stories of OIC, the Sullivan Principles, and Nafcoc converge to

reveal how local and international business shaped South Africa's transition away from

Apartheid and towards democracy, and revolutionary Black Power's eventual supplanting by

black empowerment politics promoting black entrepreneurism. Increasingly prohibited from

investing directly in South Africa due to sanctions, this chapter reveals how American companies

continued accumulating profits via a wide range of non-equity partnerships, including licensing,

franchising, and other third-party transactions. As in previous decades, American corporations

relied on networks with Nafcoc and other black South African businessmen, who sought to

capitalize on divestment by entering into agreements with departing companies. At the same

time, American business also forged new partnerships, including, most notably, with South

Africa's black liberation party, the African National Congress (ANC), which reemerged on the

international scene in the 1980s as the heir apparent of a democratic South Africa. The chapter

concludes with an analysis of black empowerment's effects on U.S.-South Africa relations. In

1994, while on his first official State visit to Washington D.C., South Africa's first

democratically-elected president, Nelson Mandela, joined U.S. president Bill Clinton to

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[36] This literature is divided into several subfields. The first focusing on the United States' Cold War alliance with Apartheid South Africa, see, Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 1993), Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line;* Richard W. Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa: Historical Dimensions of Engagement and Disengagement* (New York University Press, 1990), 213-217, 250, 255-261; Elizabeth Schmidt, *Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business Support for Apartheid* (Washington D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980). Mirroring this portrayal of U.S. support for Apartheid, other scholars have demonstrated African American resistance to Apartheid. Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions;* Culverson, *Contesting Apartheid.* By examining transnational networks of American corporate executives and black entrepreneurs, this chapter blurs the lines between official U.S. support for Apartheid and black resistance, while situating the history of black business in South Africa in a transnational, rather than national framework. Roger Southall, *South Africa's Transkei: The Political Economy of an "Independent" Bantustan* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983) remains one of the few studies that focuses on African business. It does so, however, in the context of South Africa's Bantustans—rural "native" reserves—while ignoring the development of black business in the urban areas.

announce the establishment of the Southern Africa Enterprise Fund (SAEF). Often viewed at the time and since by scholars and pundits as evidence of South Africa's post-Apartheid "neoliberal turn," SAEF and other black economic development ventures like it more accurately reflect the decades-long renegotiation of U.S.-South Africa relations led by American business and black entrepreneurs promoting black empowerment.

Taken together, these five chapters illuminate the understudied efforts promoting black empowerment, including black entrepreneurship, vocational training, and other kinds of black commercial activity, amidst the various challenges posed by desegregation and decolonization. Faced with demands for community control, reparations, and economic justice, American corporate executives, government bureaucrats, and black entrepreneurs forged partnerships promoting black economic empowerment over alternative formulations of Black Power. Rather than the popular call for black liberation, "Black Power, Inc." shows why and how black communities across the United States and Africa experienced the expansion of American corporate imperialism at the end of the twentieth-century.

Chapter 1

Booker T's Ghost: Leon Sullivan, Opportunities Industrialization Centers, and the Rise of Black Empowerment

If you walk down North Broad Street in North Philadelphia, just south of Temple University, you will come across a shopping center bearing the name Progress Plaza. Occupied by a collection of familiar tenants, including a pharmacy, Payless ShoeSource, and a RadioShack, the center appears similar to many others one sees dotted across the landscape of urban America. Looking closer, you will see a seven-foot blue plaque standing next to the center. The plaque honors Progress Plaza as the "first shopping center in the U.S. built, owned, and operated by African Americans."[37] Established in 1968, Progress Plaza is just one of hundreds of black-owned and operated businesses and job-training centers that remains scattered across the United States, Africa, and the Caribbean as a testament to the legacy of Leon Howard Sullivan and black empowerment.[38]

Figure 2: Reverend Leon Sullivan in front of Progress Plaza, circa 1969.

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[37] Ayana Jones, "Sullivan Progress Plaza receives historical marker," *The Philadelphia Tribune,* September 16, 2016, http://www.phillytrib.com/news/sullivan-progress-plaza-receives-historical-marker/article_5da2d920-9829-565a-b22a-a48024b2454c.html.
[38] "Our History," http://www.progressplaza.com/about-us/history/.

Sullivan's black enterprises sprang up within the 1960s urban landscape alongside hundreds of similar ventures, which together provided an institutional foundation for an emergent black empowerment politics.[39] Addressing supporters gathered to celebrate the launch of Opportunities Industrialization Centers, Inc. (OIC), the vocational training and job-placement component of Sullivan's black commercial empire, Sullivan announced, "the day has come when we must do more than protest—we must now also PREPARE and PRODUCE!"[40] Emphasizing production and self-help, black empowerment advocates like Sullivan shared much in common with an earlier generation of post-Reconstruction era black intellectuals. These included Booker T. Washington, who famously called on black Americans to take up "agriculture, mechanics…commerce…domestic service, and…the professions" in a speech delivered to the 1895 Cotton States and International Exposition in Atlanta, Georgia.[41] Indeed, contemporaries

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[39] Recent scholarship on the black freedom struggle has brought to light hundreds of black-owned and/or co-managed ventures that emerged during the late 1960s and 1970s as part of an effort to harness the power of private capital to serve black Americans. Laura Warren Hill and Julia Rabig, eds. *The Business of Black Power: Community Development, Capitalism, and Corporate Responsibility in Postwar America* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2012); Karen Ferguson, *Top Down: The Ford Foundation, Black Power and the Reinvention of Racial Liberalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Marcia Chatelain, "The Miracle of the Golden Arches: Race and Fast Food in Los Angeles," *Pacific Historical Review* 85, no. 3 (August 2016): 325-353; Devin Fergus, *Liberalism, Black Power, and the Making of American Politics, 1965-1980* (Athens: University of Georgia Press/Politics and Culture in the Twentieth-Century South, 2009), see, in particular, "Federally Subsidized Black Nationalism: Soul City, Statist Liberalism, and the Rise of the New Right, 1968-1980," Chap. 6; Rather than focus on a singular type of venture, I, building on this work, find it useful to analyze a wide range of enterprise, including cooperatively-owned black businesses, an vocational training and job placement program, as well as corporate-community partnerships, together as indicative and illustrative of black empowerment politics.
[40] Mark Bricklin, "8,000 Jam N. Phila. Training Center Opening Sunday: Speakers Cite Benefits of New Jobs Approach: All Segments of Community Will Profit They Say," *Philadelphia Tribune,* January 28, 1964: 1; Jason T. Bartlett, "Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC)," in *The Encyclopedia of Greater Philadelphia,* http://philadelphiaencyclopedia.org/archive/oic/.
[41] Booker T. Washington's "Atlanta Compromise" Speech, September 18, 1895, in *The Booker T. Washington Papers,* edited by Louis R. Harlan, Vol. 3 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974): 583-587; Long disparaged as an "accommodationist," acceding to the demands of white supremacists, recent scholarship has portrayed Washington as a complex intellectual and politician, while simultaneously revising earlier work that drew a sharp dichotomy between Washington and his contemporaries, including people like W.E.B. Du Bois. See Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, The German Empire, and The Globalization of the New South* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Pero Gaglo Dagbovie, "Exploring a Century of Historical Scholarship on Booker T. Washington," *The Journal of African American History* 92, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 239-264; Wilson Jeremiah Moses, *Creative Conflict in African American Thought: Frederick Douglass, Alexander Crummell, Booker T. Washington, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Marcus Garvey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); W. Fitzhugh Brundage, ed., *Booker T. Washington and Black Progress: Up From Slavery, 100 Years Later*

were often explicit about such similarities, frequently referring to Sullivan as a modern Booker T. Washington.[42]

While bearing a resemblance in form and substance to an earlier self-help racial uplift politics, most closely associated with Booker T. Washington and his Tuskegee Institute, OIC and other black economic development initiatives emerged out of the post-war urban metropolis and war-time mobilization for jobs and civil rights in ways that made them less like the politics of the post-Reconstruction era and more like the contemporaneous movement for Black Power.[43] Broadly linked by a commitment to "community control," Black Power, as recent scholarship demonstrates, encompassed a wide range of demands from calls for anti-imperialism to inclusion within a liberal American system of welfare and rights.[44] Yet, with a few exceptions, scholars

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(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2003); Kevern Verney, *The Art of the Possible: Booker T. Washington and Black Leadership in the United States, 1881-1925* (London: Routledge, 2001); Kevin K. Gaines, *Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

[42] See Nathanial Wright, Jr., "Black Empowerment; Leon Sullivan: Ultimate Humanitarian," *Washington Informer* 14, Issue 42 (July 1980): 14; Rotan Edward Lee, "Growing up at the Lion of Zion's knee, I learned about true greatness," *Philadelphia Tribune,* April 27, 2001: 3B.

[43] Robyn C. Spencer, *The Revolution Has Come: Black Power, Gender, and the Black Panther Party in Oakland* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); Jakobi Williams, *From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Illinois Chapter of The Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Donna Jean Murch, *Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); David Goldberg and Trevor Griffey, ed., *Black Power at Work: Community Control, Affirmative Action, and the Construction Industry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); Devin Fergus, *Liberalism, Black Power, and the making of American Politics, 1965-1980* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009); Matthew J. Countryman, *Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Robert O. Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); For an alternative narrative that locates the origins of Black Power politics in the rural South, see Hasan Kwame Jeffries, *Bloody Lowndes: Civil Rights and Black Power in Alabama's Black Belt* (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Timothy B. Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

[44] Five decades after the initial coining of the term, Black Power continues to occupy a unique position within Black Studies scholarship as a source of debate, including with regards to the origins, parameters, and meanings of the term. On the origins of Black Power, see James E. Jackson, "The Meaning of 'Black Power,'" *Political Affairs* 47 (February 1969): 1-97; Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton. *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967); For a sense of the range of meanings and scope of Black Power, see Nico Slate, ed., *Black Power beyond Borders: The Global Dimensions of the Black Power Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Jeffries, *Bloody Lowndes;* Murch, *Living for the City;* Countryman, *Up South;* Peniel E. Joseph, *Waiting 'Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006); Komazi Woodward, *A Nation within a Nation: Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) & Black Power Politics* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie;* Timothy B. Tyson,

have overlooked the conservative, free-market politics that blossomed within the Black Power movement.[45]

   "I am black power—six feet, five inches of black power. I believe in the ability of the black man to do what any other man can do," stated Sullivan in a defense of the phrase Black Power, which he regularly used to describe his various job-training and economic development programs. "But I also believe that black power and white power must put their strength together to build American power."[46] Far from a call for the development of a separate black economy, Sullivan saw American capitalism as central to the advancement of black Americans and black people globally. Nor was he alone. During the 1960s and 1970s, dozens of black power organizations partnered with businesses, philanthropies, and government institutions to fund black empowerment programs providing educational and technical assistance to black Americans struggling to cope with the effects of de-industrialization and growing poverty.[47] Reporting on the opening of Sullivan's OIC, local media touted the merits of black empowerment as offering

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Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999); James H. Cone, *Black Theology and Black Power* (New York: Orbis, 1997); In *Liberalism, Black Power, and the Making of American Politics, 1965-1980* (Athens: University of Georgia Press/Politics and Culture in the Twentieth-Century South, 2009), Devin Fergus comes closest to my argument by revealing Black Power's engagement with and ultimate taming under liberalism. Yet, Fergus' remains focused on Black Power's engagement with Politics with a capital "P," including legal system and electoral politics. Rather than being absorbed by American liberalism, as Fergus contends, I argue that the Black Power movement contributed to its transformation by lending credence to market solutions to dealing with political and social issues and through its embrace of self-help.

[45] For work that sees conservativism and capitalism as central drivers of late 1960s and 1970s black politics, see Danielle Wiggins, "Crime, Capital, and the Politics of Atlanta's Black Middle Class in the Post-Civil Rights Era," PhD Dissertation, Emory University, 2018.

[46] Audrey Weaver, "The Self-Help Story: Chicagoans See Progress in OIC's" *Chicago Daily Defender,* August 22, 1970: 12.

[47] Laura Warren Hill and Julia Rabig, eds., *The Business of Black Power: Community Development, Capitalism, and Corporate Responsibility in Postwar America* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2012); Marcia Chatelain, "The Miracle of the Golden Arches: Race and Fast Food in Los Angeles," *Pacific Historical Review* 85, no. 3 (August 2016): 326; Ferguson, *Top Down*; On the links between black politics and de-industrialization, see Robert Self, *American Babylon*; Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

"untold number of workers" an opportunity in "this age of automation."[48] Despite the promise of radical democratic politics embedded in the call for "community control," the history of black empowerment reveals some of the fissures within the black power struggle over the form of post-Jim Crow citizenship.

Frustrated with the pace of reform occurring under mid-century civil rights liberalism, black Americans of all genders and class and regional backgrounds revolted against the system of Jim Crow, giving rise to one of the largest mass rebellions in United States history.[49] More than laws, these protests, which ranged from peaceful sit-ins to riots, challenged the paternalist order that privileged white male property-ownership, while de-valuing the lives and labors of property-less men and women of color.[50] While supporting some of these efforts, including those calling for an end to racial discrimination, civil rights leaders like Sullivan drew a line when it came to contesting private property and patriarchal authority. Rather than completely upending the social order, black empowerment posited a way for black men to reclaim their masculinity through the market.[51]

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[48] Priscill Penn, "Leading Citizens Extoll Merits of Newly Opened N. Phila. Opportunities Center," *Philadelphia Tribune,* February 4, 1964: 7.

[49] Peter B. Levy, *The Great Uprising: Race Riots in Urban America during the 1960s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[50] The past two decades has produced some outstanding scholarship on the gendered dimensions of the black freedom struggle. For a sampling of this work, see Jeanne Theoharis, *The Rebellious Life of Mrs. Rosa Parks* (New York: Beacon Press, 2013); Danielle L. McGuire, *At the Dark End of the Street: Black Women, Rape, and Resistance—a New History of the Civil Rights Movement from Rosa Parks to the Rise of Black Power* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011); Barbara Ransby, *Ella Baker & the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Belinda Robnett, *How Long? How Long? African American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Deborah Gray White, *Too Heavy a Load: Black Women in Defense of Themselves, 1894-1994* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999); For a longer history of black women's activism vis-à-vis the patriarchal family, see Bart Landry, *Black Working Wives: Pioneers of the American Family Revolution* (Chapel Hill: The University North Carolina Press, 2002); On the connection between property and Jim Crow, see Cheryl I. Harris, "Whiteness as Property," *Harvard Law Review,* Vol. 106, No. 8 (June 1993): 1707-1791, N.D.B. Connolly, *A World More Concrete: Real and the Remaking of Jim Crow South Florida* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2014).

[51] My argument builds on scholarship on the centrality of the family to the rise of free-market politics in post-war America, while extending this line of inquiry with regards to black politics. See, for example, Bethany Moreton, *To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010);

Biography of a Subject—Racial Uplift in the Time of Black Power

Leon Sullivan's biography is one familiar to historians of the U.S. civil rights movement.[52] Born in 1922 in Charleston, West Virginia, to Charles and Helen Sullivan, Leon Sullivan, as a young man, joined the thousands of black Americans who migrated North during World War II in search of opportunity and better life. Sullivan's own journey began shortly after his graduation from West Virginia State College, where he received a scholarship to play basketball and football. At the time, Sullivan, who had since taken on the additional responsibility of serving as a lay preacher, received a visit from a young Adam Clayton Powell Jr. The famous Harlemite Powell, whose mother hailed from West Virginia, was himself a man with ambitions of becoming a pastor and community leader like his father, Adam Clayton Powell, Sr. Impressed with Sullivan's oratory skills, Powell Jr. invited him to come to New York City.[53]

Robert O. Self, *All in the Family: The Realignment of American Democracy since the 1960s* (New York: MacMillan, 2012).

[52] I owe my appreciation for the role that biography has played in Black Freedom Struggle Studies to a graduate seminar I took my second semester at Hopkins taught by Professor N.D.B. Connolly. Spurned by revisionist scholars committed to dynamic and complex accounts of the movement beyond those captured in biographies of iconic figures like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcom X, biography, in recent years, has witnessed a resurgence by scholars exemplifying the best the genre has to offer, while avoiding many of its various pitfalls. Kate Masur, "Patronage and Protest in Kate Brown's Washington," *Journal of American History,* 99 (March 2013): 1047-1071; Diane C. Fujino, *Samurai Among the Panthers: Richard Aoki on Race, Resistance, and a Paradoxical Life* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Manning Marable, *Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention* (Viking Press, 2011); John D'Emilio, *Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Timothy B. Tyson, "Robert F. Williams and the Promise of Southern Biography," *Southern Cultures,* 8, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 38-55; David Levering Lewis, *W.E.B. Du Bois, 1919-1963: The Fight for Equality and the American Century* (1993; repr., New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001); While not a biography, this dissertation draws on insights from this recent scholarship through its use of Leon Sullivan and others to address questions about the history of black politics.

[53] Leon Howard Sullivan, *Moving Mountains: The Principles and Purposes of Leon Sullivan* (Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1998), 2-3.

Mid-twentieth century Harlem, like many black metropoles, was bursting with political activity.[54] As described by one leading historian, "the New York civil rights movement [in the 1940s] was a 'Negro People's Front,' or Black Popular Front, in that it brought together ideologically diverse groups—such as the Elks, fraternities, women's clubs, churches, and the Urban league, on the one hand, and left-wing Black activists, trade unionists, and politicians, on the other."[55] Upon his arrival, Sullivan joined the organizing committee for the 1941 March on Washington Movement.[56] Years later, Sullivan testified to the impact the March had on him as a young activist, including the tutelage he received from labor organizer and civil rights leader A. Phillip Randolph, who "tutored [Sullivan] as a father would, in movement tactics and philosophy…[as well as] the art of massive community organization."[57]

But there were other aspects of Sullivan's experience in Harlem that disturbed him.

With the coming of the Second World War the problem of the 'latchkey children' became acute in Harlem. These were the little children with keys about their necks who let themselves out in the morning and let themselves in at night. Daddy was off to the war, or working on staggered shifts, and Mama was working too—or if not working, often out somewhere anyway.[58]

This description of Harlem's social landscape is revealing with regards to what Sullivan and other Christian-educated black Americans perceived as the decline of the black family. Raised to revere the ideals of the heteronormative, patriarchal, nuclear family, Sullivan grew increasingly concerned with the number of working black mothers and unsupervised children, whose modes

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[54] My use of the term "black metropoles" draws on St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton's classic study of black urban life. *Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City* (1945, repri. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015).

[55] Martha Biondi, *To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 6.

[56] Leon Sullivan, *Build Brother Build: From Poverty to Economic Power* (Philadelphia: Macrae Smith Co, 1969), 46.

[57] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 46.

[58] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 48.

of survival clashed with those held in esteem by better off black residents.[59] Drawing on well-established discourses that associated black delinquency and criminality, Sullivan complained: "There were large numbers of boys and girls in the neighborhood…many of them were really tough. Gangs had begun to form, and they were terrorizing the community."[60]

Fearful of the threat posed by unsupervised black youth, Sullivan made it his mission to bring these lost souls back into the church. Sullivan attended church regularly with his grandmother back in West Virginia. There, he imbibed the lessons of a social gospel that linked "faith" and "material" conditions. "If a man had a religion to believe in and a faith to hold on to, then, somehow, in spite of the most crippling and oppressive circumstances, he [would] overcome," Sullivan claimed.[61] Later, working as a minister, Sullivan continued to preach this lesson to all of those that would listen. During his early days as a minister, Sullivan often patrolled the sidewalks of the streets around his church with a basketball in hand, "a relic of [his] college days" at West Virginia State College, striking up conversations with young boys he found "hanging about a street corner," and encouraging them attend services.[62] At one point, Sullivan went so far as to found a youth basketball league run out of the church as a means of encouraging black male youth to come in off the streets and into the church.

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[59] Donna Murch discusses the differences in pre- and post-war migration, including a memory of Southern life, that contributed to the rise of Black Power in the 1960s, see *Living for the City*, 42-49; See also Davarian Baldwin, *Chicago's New Negroes: Modernity, the Great Migration, and Black Urban Life* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 18-19, 33-35.

[60] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 48; On the connections between blackness and criminality, see Khalil Gibran Muhammad's *The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

[61] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 33-37.

[62] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 59; For more on the intersections between athletics, youth development, and racial uplift, see Amira Rose Davis, "Watch What We Do:" The Politics and Possibilities of Black Women's Athletics, 1910-1970," (PhD dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2016).

Historians of the civil rights movement have long observed the role black churches played as sites of political mobilization.[63] A disciple of Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Sr., Sullivan organized many protests from the pulpit. More often, however, Sullivan and other ministers used the church to promote their vision of racial uplift.[64] Well into the post-war period, black churches and other private institutions continued to bear the burden of social provision for black communities excluded from New Deal programs.[65] Indeed, far from an invention of the late twentieth-century, propertied politics, including public-private partnerships between black landlords and white elected officials, was the norm, rather than the exception, of Jim Crow governance.[66]

Arriving in Harlem in 1943, Sullivan quickly caught the attention of New York City's Jim Crow governing coalition through his work in the community.[67] It was a sermon entitled "What Harlem Must Do About Juvenile Delinquency," in particular, that caught the attention of Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia, who subsequently invited Sullivan to join a special committee dealing with the perceived rise in crime.[68] Drawing on popular stereotypes that equated

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[63] James T. Campbell, *Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States and South Africa* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, *Righteous Discontent: The Women's Movement in the Black Baptist Church, 1880-1920* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); Walter B. Weare, *Black Business in the New South: A Social History of the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973).

[64] On racial uplift politics, see Kevin K. Gaines, *Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

[65] On the bifurcation of the New Deal welfare state between deserving and undeserving, often African American and other racialized people, see Michael B. Katz, *The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); See also, David M.P. Freund, *Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Robert C. Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 279.

[66] N.D.B. Connolly, *A World More Concrete;* _____, "A White Story," *Dissent,* January 22, 2018, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/neoliberalism-forum-ndb-connolly; On Jim Crow governing coalitions, see also Countryman, *Up South*; Clarence Stone, *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989).

[67] On Jim Crow in the North, see Countryman, *Up South,* 10, 142.

[68] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build*, 48-49.

blackness with deviance and sexual predation, white New Yorkers, in an early invocation of law and order politics, called on LaGuardia to "take all the steps necessary to prevent the lawlessness" they claimed was destroying the city. They likewise demanded an expansion of the NYPD's ongoing crack down on poolrooms, dancehalls, clubs, and playgrounds." Many of these institutions were not coincidentally located in black and Hispanic neighborhoods.[69]

Sullivan and other black civic leaders, for their part, capitalized on the public attention given the issue to advocate for their own solution in the form of "community policing." Part of a broader discourse on "community control," community policing appealed to a broad coalition of government officials, black professionals, and local residents as a vehicle for crime prevention, as well as job creation.[70] Given approval from Mayor LaGuardia, local media hailed Sullivan's request to appoint "a hundred colored men" to the NYPD, stationing them in Harlem. Sullivan later claimed the campaign preceded a significant decline in crime in the area.[71]

Sullivan's time in Harlem elevated his stature from small town pastor to urban professional. With Powell's help, Sullivan developed an elite network of government and business leaders, which he continued to draw on for decades to come. By 1945, however, it was time for a change. Following a brief stint in South Orange, New Jersey, where Sullivan pastored at the First Baptist Church, he left the New York area to take up a position as head pastor at the prestigious Zion Baptist Church in North Philadelphia.

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[69] Luis Alvarez, *The Power of the Zoot: Youth Culture and Resistance during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 56-65; On the policing and criminalization of black bodies in mid-century America, see Elizabeth Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016)*;* Khalil Gibran Muhammad, *The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); Murch, *Living for the City,* 38-39, 48, 58-61.
[70] "Capt. Kline Moves to Check Harlem Juvenile Delinquency," *The Chicago Defender,* February 22, 1947: 7; "Delinquency Curb is Goal: Negro Police Captain Getting Data on Problem in Harlem," *New York Times,* February 10, 1947: 44; For more on "community policing" as a relatively popular response among black Americans, see N.D.B. Connolly, *A World More Concrete,* 124-128.
[71] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 49.

First memorialized in W. E. B. Du Bois's famous study, *The Philadelphia Negro,* black

Philadelphia proved the perfect launching pad for Sullivan, who used Zion Baptist Church to

found a series of community and economic development programs that were later replicated in

cities across the nation. The first of these programs, the Citizen's Committee on Juvenile

Delinquency (CCJD) extended Sullivan's earlier work promoting community policing.

Comprised of dozens of local black professionals, including "P.T.A officers and members,

doctors, lawyers, school teachers, ministers, and government workers," many of whom attended

Zion Baptist or other black churches in the city, CCJD relied on private initiative to combat what

they perceived as the social unraveling of the black community.[72] Working in small teams, CCJD

members patrolled the community, identifying and investigating physical decay of properties,

including "crowded housing" blocks viewed by members as "fostering juvenile delinquency."[73]

CCJD's policies reflected a broader social discourse espoused by people like Dr. George

Schermer, who explained "that better and cleaner neighborhoods encourage children and helps to

inspire them" to stay out of trouble.[74]

Like in Harlem, Sullivan's work combatting juvenile delinquency in North Philadelphia

through the CCJD garnered attention from white business leaders, who praised his self-help

approach. In 1955, Sullivan received the first of many awards presented to him by business

leaders when the United States Junior Chamber of Commerce honored Sullivan with the

organization's prestigious Outstanding Young Man of the Year Award.[75] Sullivan accepted the

award with a speech emphasizing the power of faith in the face of adversity. "I am overwhelmed.

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[72] "Practical Program to Fight Youth Crime Planned Here," *Philadelphia Tribune,* March 24, 1953:1.
[73] Ibid.
[74] "FIGHT GOES ON: Enthusiastic Meeting Vows No Let-Up In Fight Against New Area Taprooms," *Philadelphia Tribune,* February 2, 1954: 3; Alice O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 28-40, 64
[75] "Young Man of 1955 Award to Rev. Leon H. Sullivan," *Philadelphia Tribune,* June 10, 1956: 1; Rev. Sullivan Presented 'Outstanding' Award," *Atlanta Daily World*, February 8, 1956: 2.

I appreciate the award particularly from the standpoint of what it means to the Christian church and to the persons of color in the United States. It will point out to them that although at times it appears that what we do is not appreciated, if we work hard enough and fearlessly and without any desire for rewards, we find that compensation comes."[76]

In June 1958, the CCJD announced a three-day jobs workshop. The workshop, which included presentations on jobs "in the scientific and technological fields" was the first indication that Sullivan and others in CCJD were conscious that long-practiced modes of local governance were under threat from a new generation of activists critical of the limitations of racial uplift.[77] Despite Sullivan and the CCJD's efforts, unemployment and poverty rates continued to rise among black Philadelphians, belying those that claimed fresh paint would bring prosperity. Between 1950 and 1965, Philadelphia lost 90,000 industrial jobs. At the same time, the city's black population continued to grow, over 40 percent in the decade following World War II. According to one survey conducted in 1956, thirty-seven percent of black workers surveyed in North Philadelphia reported being unemployed, while another forty-two percent reported suffering from irregular employment.[78]

The failure of local governing coalitions to address the growing economic crisis in black communities coupled with the expansion of racialized policing fueled a new wave of mass protests challenging the system of Jim Crow in cities and towns across the country during the 1960s. Moving beyond respectability politics, protesters increasingly demanded radical change. Working class black women and young activists, in particular, were responsible for a number of protests demanding decent public housing, better childcare, and other forms of social welfare

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[76] "Young Man of 1955 Award to Rev. Leon H. Sullivan," *Philadelphia Tribune,* June 10, 1956: 1.
[77] Donald J. Porter, "Zion Baptist to Seat 3rd Binnial Grass Roots Assembly: National Body to Stress Need for More Interest in Science," *Philadelphia Tribune,* June 14, 1958: 10.
[78] Countryman, *Up South,* 50-51.

that bolstered support systems, which, in reality, diverged sharply from the heteronormative, patriarchal family promoted by organizations like CCJD.[79] Occurring alongside and in dialogue with other civil rights activism, these protests remained a constant reminder, threatening to undermine Sullivan and others' authority.

"We Believed in Free Enterprise!"—Civil Rights Capitalism

In February 1960, the *Philadelphia Tribune* reported on a new wave of student protests in Greensboro, North Carolina.[80] Within weeks of the sit-in in Greensboro, a group of eighty-five students from Temple University, the University of Pennsylvania, Lincoln University, Drexel Institute, Swarthmore College, and several area high schools organized their own picket of two Woolworth stores in West Philadelphia, halting business activity in both stores. At the pickets, students carried signs calling for solidarity with the sit-ins in the South.[81] Building on earlier consumer and labor boycotts, the sit-in movement has hereinto been cited by historians as an indication of an ascendant Black Power politics.[82] While, in some instances, Black Power fueled communitarian projects geared towards democratizing black communities and supporting people regardless of class or gender—such as the Black Panther's Free Breakfast Program—at other

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[79] Keisha N. Blain, *Set the World on Fire: Black Nationalist Women and the Global Struggle for Freedom* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018); McGuire, *At the Dark End of the Street;* Annelise Orleck, *Storming Caesar's Palace: How Black Mothers Fought Their Own War on Poverty* (Boston: Beacon, 2005); Rhonda Y. Williams, *The Politics of Public Housing: Black Women's Struggles against Urban Inequality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Ransby, *Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement.*.

[80] "Student Sit-Down Strike Spreads to Segregation Demonstrations Go Into Second Week," *Philadelphia Tribune,* February 13, 1960: 1.

[81] "Boycott Spreads Here: Movement Gains Supporters: Pickets Empty Stores at 52nd and Market, 40th and Lancaster," *Philadelphia Tribune,* March 1, 1960: 1.

[82] Countryman, *Up South;* Biondi, *To Stand and Fight;* Hasan Kwame Jeffries, *Bloody Lowndes: Civil Rights and Black Power in Alabama's Black Belt* (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 188; Peniel E. Joseph, *Waiting 'Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006); David Goldberg and Trevor Griffey, ed., *Black Power at Work: Community Control, Affirmative Action, and the Construction Industry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

times, Black Power coalesced with a free market politics directed towards the reproduction of Christian, patriarchal black families.

Sullivan wasted little time in using the sit-ins to assert his leadership. Following a brief declaration in support of the students, Sullivan launched his own boycott, the Selective Patronage Movement, which soon subsumed local organizing protesting businesses that discriminated against black employees. Led by a group of black male ministers, who called themselves the "400 ministers," Selective Patronage reinvigorated the city's black churches by turning them into the center of civil rights organizing in Philadelphia.[83] For three and half years during the campaign, the ministers met on a weekly basis to strategize. Reflecting the anti-democratic culture prominent among male-led civil rights organizations, these strategy meetings remained closed to the public.[84] Instead, the ministers met privately to determine which companies to protest.

Profits proved to be the guiding logic undergirding the "400 ministers" campaign strategy. "Nothing influences a company's attitudes or changes its directions more than losing money," claimed Sullivan. "In order to hit prejudice where it hurts most, hit it in the pocketbook!"[85] When deciding which companies to protest, the ministers considered several factors, including the number of black people the company employed, what positions they were employed in, and, perhaps most importantly, how dependent the company was on black consumers.

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[83] Countryman, *Up South,* 98-110.
[84] Barbara Ransby, *Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, *Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and the Long History of the Civil Rights Movement* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[85] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 79.

Figure 3: Reverend Leon H. Sullivan delivering a sermon at Zion Baptist Church in North Philadelphia.

The ministers' ability to influence the decisions of black consumers, many of whom were women, proved crucial to the success of the Selective Patronage Movement. Once the "400 ministers" had decided on a store or company to target, the call went out across the network of black ministers across the city. These ministers then communicated the group's decision to their congregations, usually during Sunday mass. The strategy proved effective. According to the ministers, Selective Patronage opened up an estimated 2,000 new skilled jobs for black Philadelphians.[86] While much attention was given to the boycotts themselves, beginning with the 400 ministers' first boycott against Tasty Kake Baking Company, much of the actual negotiating for jobs took place in corporate board rooms and behind closed doors. Indeed, of 300 total firms approached by the ministers, boycotts were only used against twenty-nine firms. In the majority of cases, businesses managed to avoid a highly-public showdown through negotiations with the ministers.[87] In the case of Gulf Oil Company, for example, the ministers called off a boycott after

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[86] Guian A. McKee, *The Problem of Jobs: Liberalism, Race, and Deindustrialization in Philadelphia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 121; Countryman, *Up South,* 101-110, 117-119.
[87] McKee, *The Problem of Jobs,* 122-3.

company representatives agreed to implement a policy of "fair job distribution" and hire a dozen or so skilled black employees, including a black accountant, a black sales representative, and several black oil truck drivers.[88] The dozen or so jobs promised by Gulf paled in comparison to the hundreds of white workers employed in the company's $400 million petrochemical facility just south of Philadelphia.[89] Still, Sullivan and the other ministers declared their efforts a victory:

> It was not [our] intention to destroy a business, but only to awaken it and to get it on the right road as far as the employment of black Americans was concerned. We believed in free enterprise! We had no desire to destroy it; we wanted to strengthen it. But we wanted it strong for everybody, so that instead of the black man's getting the crumbs all the time, he would start baking some of the bread.[90]

As Sullivan's description demonstrates, the image of black male producers undergirded much of the Selective Patronage Campaign. Whereas black women activists tended to advocate for expanded social welfare to support their efforts to gain economic independence, Sullivan and other black ministers advocated for economic opportunities that empowered "black [men]" to "start baking some of the bread"—a metaphor for earning money. Following the victories of the Selective Patronage Movement, Sullivan received invitations to speak to other civil rights organizations across the country, including the Atlanta chapter of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, whose president, Rev. John Middleton praised Sullivan's work "providing new job opportunities for our people."[91] Subsequently, SCLC launched its own program, Operation Breadbasket, modeled on the Selective Patronage Struggle.[92]

While Sullivan and his colleagues placed their faith in private enterprise to deliver black Americans to the promised land, business leaders failed, at least initially, to return the favor,

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[88] "Ministers Win Drive Against Gulf Oil. Co.," *New York Amsterdam News,* February 4, 1961: 30.
[89] "Gulf Oil Plans to Boost Capital Expenditures in 1961 to $400 Million," *Wall Street Journal,* February 13, 1961: 14.
[90] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 78.
[91] "Dr. Sullivan to Address Mass Meet," *Atlanta Daily World,* October 28, 1962: 5.
[92] Ibid; "Operation Breadbasket, 1962-1972," Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Global Freedom Struggle, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_operation_breadbasket/.

hesitating to initiate widespread reforms to address the widespread practice of racial discrimination.[93] Many businessmen, including the owners of Tasty Kake Baking Company, denied discriminating against black people altogether, calling the whole thing "a misunderstanding."[94] Others claimed black people lacked the skills necessary for higher-paying positions.[95] Years later, when Sullivan explained why he abandoned the Selective Patronage Movement to launch his next venture, a job-training program, he made a similar argument. "As important as opening the jobs [was] and still [would] be for a long, long time, integration without preparation [was] frustration."[96]

"We Help Ourselves"—The Birth of Opportunities Industrialization Centers, Inc.

Black frustrations soon boiled over in Philadelphia, leading to rebellion on October 29, 1963. Just days before the mayoral elections, a group of black Philadelphians began looting stores and throwing bricks at police in North Philadelphia's Susquehanna Avenue business district. The incident followed news that police had shot and killed a twenty-four-year-old black man, named Willie Philyaw. At the time, Philyaw was suspected of stealing a watch from a local drugstore. Police claim Philyaw lunged at an officer with a knife. Witnesses, however, report that Philyaw, who had a leg injury, struggled to hobble away from the police after ignoring their orders for him to stop.[97] Philyaw's death at the hands of police thus served as the final straw for

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[93] "Zion Baptist Pastor Leaves for 1-Month Tour of Germany: Rev. Sullivan Will Speak on Problems of Youth in 12 Cities," *Philadelphia Tribune,* June 13, 1961: 1.

[94] William Daniels, "Tasty Baking Co. Officials Denies Job Bias Charge: Admits There Are No Negro Clerical Worker, Salesmen," *Philadelphia Tribune,* July 5, 1960: 8.

[95] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 86; Jennifer Delton, *Racial Integration in Corporate America, 1940-1990* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 232-234.

[96] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 86.

[97] Countryman, *Up South,* 154.

black Philadelphians living under the weight of an increasingly militarized police state.[98] The

October revolt proved just a precursor to the wave of urban rebellions that rocked the country the

following summer.

The summer of 1964 has hereinto functioned in historical scholarship and popular

memory as an important turning point, initiating a dramatic expansion and militarization of local

law enforcement that has resulted in the United States having the highest rate of incarceration in

the world.[99] Mirroring events in other cities, including New York, Rochester, and Jersey City,

the 1964 Philadelphia uprising ultimately left 339 people injured and cost the city and local

businesses an estimated $3 million in property damages.[100] Following the uprising, Philadelphia

police, under the management of Deputy Commissioner Frank Rizzo, ramped up their war on

black militants, including launching an intensive surveillance and harassment campaign against

the local SNCC chapter. By the end of 1966, SNCC's Philadelphia campaign was all but dead

with one of its leaders in prison and the others in hiding.[101]

While Rizzo represents the carceral state's violent proclivity to surveille and punish black

and brown people into submission, even going so far as to dispose of them if necessary, Sullivan

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[98]Countryman, *Up South,* 166; Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*; During the 1950s, the City of Philadelphia embarked on an expansion of local law enforcement in black and brown neighborhoods. As part of these efforts, in 1953, the city constructed a new multi-story station at the corner of 17th Street and Montgomery Avenue to accommodate a combined force of 500 policemen and 60 detectives. These efforts elicited heavy criticism from the NAACP and other local civil rights organizations. "Numbers Suspect Feels Law's Fist," *Philadelphia Tribune,* October 27, 1953: 14; The campaign elicited multiple complaints of police abuse from local residents. "Accuse Policeman of Beating Man Without Cause," *Philadelphia Tribune,* April 7, 1953: 3; Capt. Joseph Bonner, "North Philly Beat" *Philadelphia Tribune,* August 15, 1959: 5; "Clearing Site of 2-District Police Station," *Philadelphia Tribune,* October 10, 1959.
[99] Heather Ann Thompson, "Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History," *Journal of American History,* 97, issue 3 (December 2010): 730-731; Hinton, 56.
[100] Countryman, 154-174; Laura Warren Hill, *Strike the Hammer While the Iron is Hot: The Black Freedom Struggle in Rochester, NY, 1940-1970* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming); Hasan Kwame Jeffries, *Bloody Lowndes: Civil Rights and Black Power in Alabama's Black Belt* (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Peter B. Levy, *Civil War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2003); Peter B. Levy, *The Great Uprising: Race Riots in Urban America during the 1960s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
[101] Countryman, *Up South,* 214-220.

and his colleagues sought to empower them. Emerging alongside and in conversation with the carceral state, black empowerment represented white and black elites' investment in making black people "productive citizens" by appealing to those aspects of 1960s black politics that abetted, rather than resisted, market logics.

The politics of the carceral state and black empowerment converged quite literally in the landscape of the post-industrial black metropolis. On August 24, 1963, City Councilman Thomas McIntosh, representing the fifth district, including North Philadelphia, raised the issue of black unemployment, which in some parts of the city reached over sixty-percent, at a city council meeting.[102] By 1960, Philadelphia, like many former industrial cities, faced a crisis as a result of federal and state policies that facilitated the relocation of large employers out of urban areas and to new sprawling metropolis in the South and West. As many white Americans left the city, taking advantage of federal subsidies to purchase new homes in white-only suburbs, black and other non-white Americans were left to deal with the crumbling infrastructure and declining employment opportunities resulting from post-war de-industrialization.[103]

Making matters worse for black residents, local government responded to growing black unemployment with law and order. Beginning in the 1950s, the City of Philadelphia, under Mayor Richardson Dilworth, drastically increased their police presence in North Philadelphia, including building a new multi-story police station at the corner of 17th Street and Montgomery Avenue to accommodate an expanded police force of upwards of 500 policemen and 60 detectives.[104] As a result, the former station at 19th and Oxford was abandoned. Though he

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[102] Countryman, *Up South,* 158.

[103] Countryman, *Up South,* 48-79; Self, *American Babylon;* Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis*.

[104] "Numbers Suspect Feels Law's Fist," *Philadelphia Tribune,* October 27, 1953: 14; The campaign elicited multiple complaints of police abuse from local residents. "Accuse Policeman of Beating Man Without Cause," *Philadelphia Tribune,* April 7, 1953: 3; Capt. Joseph Bonner, "North Philly Beat" *Philadelphia Tribune,* August 15, 1959: 5; "Clearing Site of 2-District Police Station," *Philadelphia Tribune,* October 10, 1959.

previously objected to these policing efforts, McIntosh saw an opportunity and petitioned the

City to have the old station on the corner of 19th and Oxford Streets repurposed as the home for a

new job-training and economic development program headed by Sullivan. Shortly thereafter,

local newspapers reported that the first Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), Inc. would

open in January 1964, renting the station for the bargain price of one dollar a year.[105]

First announced publicly in August 1963, OIC represented the product of years of

conversations between Sullivan and local business leaders concerning the issue of job training

and black economic advancement. Sullivan and others tapped into existing networks linking

local white business and black churches in order to persuade a handful of businessmen to support

this latest venture.[106] On September 25th, Sullivan announced publicly that he had received

$50,000 from an anonymous donor to aid with the revitalization of the former police station.

Sullivan's announcement preceded a series of contributions, including $11,000 from the

Philadelphia Foundation; $5,000 from the Smith, Kline, and French Foundation; $2,500 from

Scott Paper Company; and nearly $80,000 worth of machinery, equipment, and furnishing from

dozens of local businesses, including the Philco Corporation, General Electric, Bell Telephone,

the Sharpless Corporation and International Business Machine.[107] OIC officially opened its doors

in the spring of 1964.

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[105] Lou Potter, "Old 19th & Oxford Police Station Sought for School: McIntosh to Support Plan of Rev. Sullivan: Program is Geared to Retrain Negro for Job Openings," *Philadelphia Tribune;* August 24, 1963: 4.
[106] Among the black Philadelphia ministers who aided Sullivan was Second Macedonia Baptist Church Pastor Rev. Thomas Ritter. During the late fifties and sixties, Ritter led a successful fundraising campaign to support the revitalization of his church, including initiating an evening bible study, a daycare, and a new building. In addition to contributions from his congregation, money for the campaign came from local businesses, including Gino's Pizza Chain, which gifted the church $25,000 of Gino's stock. By the mid-sixties, Ritter had raised over $150,000 from local businesses and foundations, including The Glenmede Trust, Girard Bank, Acme Markets, and the Philadelphia National Bank. "Our History," Second Macedonia Baptist Church, http://www.smbapt.org/about-us/our-history.html; Ayana Jones, "Obituary: Frederick Miller, 92, community leader," *Philadelphia Tribune*, January 26, 2014, http://www.phillytrib.com/obituaries/frederick-miller-community-leader/article_7da11256-efd3-587e-8aee-85d7c0117f4f.html; Sullivan later recruited Ritter to serve as OIC's first Executive Director.
[107] "Rev. Sullivan Given $19,000 More for Training Program: Expect N. Phila. Center to Open on December 15: Application from Over 100 In: Classes Jan 1," *Philadelphia Tribune,* November 23, 1963: 4.

Touring the site in September 1965, *Christian Science Monitor* journalist Paul Friggens painted a stirring picture of a former jail turned empowerment center. "Where once police had booked drunks, dope addicts, and muggers, I entered a spick-and-span [room], cheerful with canary-yellow walls, colorful curtains, and modern furnishings," he noted.[108] The only thing that did not shine with new paint was one jail cell, which Sullivan intentionally left untouched, claiming, "I want our trainees to know what it was like—and do better with their lives."[109] Years later, when an OIC chapter opened in Chicago, Sullivan reiterated this anti-crime aspect of the program, noting "more OICs could be part of the answer to Chicago's gang problem.'"[110]

In hindsight, Sullivan's faith in the ability of black Americans to control whether or not they went to jail appears naïve in the face of a growing body of scholarship on the rise of mass incarceration. Far from an appropriate response to rising crime rates, scholars have shown that the increase in federal and local policies promoting racialized policing and mandatory sentencing was nothing short of a new Jim Crow.[111] At the time, Sullivan and other OIC staff failed to see the severe consequences these policies would have on black communities. Instead, they insisted in their ability to solve the problems faced with proper training and faith. "[B]lack people…do not really want…[government] relief," Sullivan told a crowd of over eight thousand local residents, government officials, business leaders, and reporters, who withstood the freezing

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[108] Paul Friggens, "Toward self-help in Philadelphia: Opportunity to learn," *Christian Science Monitor,* September 15, 1965: 13.

[109] Sullivan quoted in Paul Friggens, "Toward self-help in Philadelphia: Opportunity to learn," *Christian Science Monitor,* September 15, 1965: 13.

[110] Audrey Weaver, "The Self-Help Story: Chicagoans See Progress in OIC's" *Chicago Daily Defender*, August 22, 1970: 12.

[111] Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (New York: The New Press, 2010); Heather Ann Thompson, "Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History," *Journal of American History* 97, issue 3, (December 2010): 70-734.

January temperatures to attend the official launch of OIC. "In the future…Negroes intend to help themselves."[112]

The re-emergence of self-help politics in the late 1960s coincided with and helped reinforce a burgeoning anti-welfare politics.[113] Countering the claims of black, mostly women, welfare activists, Sullivan told supporters, "[B]lack people…do not really want…[government] relief," but rather an opportunity to compete. Sullivan's comments, delivered in front of a crowd of over eight thousand local residents, government officials, business leaders, and reporters, who withstood the freezing January temperatures to attend the official launch of OIC, were echoed by Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce Vice President W. Thatcher Longstreth, who stated, "Either we give the Negro tools to compete, or we must resign ourselves to perpetual handouts and unconscionable welfare problems."[114] Tapping into a long-standing racialized and gendered discourse that equated welfare with dependence and laziness, Sullivan and his colleagues promoted self-help as the true path to freedom.[115]

Bearing the motto "We help ourselves," OIC officially began offering classes in the spring of 1964. Within two weeks, the program had received over 2,000 applications from black and other Philadelphia residents eager for any kind of economic assistance.[116] Before they could enroll in OIC's vocational classes and job-placement services, however, all OIC trainees had to

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[112] Sullivan quoted in "Unique Negro training Center to Open Jan. 26: 1000 Applications Already Received, $250,000 in Equipment Ready-Waiting," *Philadelphia Tribune,* January 14, 1964: 2.

[113] See Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, *Getting Tough: Welfare and Imprisonment in 1970s America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

[114] Paul Friggens, "Toward self-help in Philadelphia: Opportunity to learn," *The Christian Science Monitor,* September 15, 1965: 13.

[115] On the racialized and gendered discourse of welfare, see Katz, *The Price of Citizenship,* 4; Orleck, *Storming Caesar's Palace,* 101, 136, 147, 171; This discourse further had roots dating back to plantation slavery that labelled black women as lazy. See Jacqueline Jones, *Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work and the Family, from Slavery to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 48-60.

[116] Mark Bricklin, "Testing of 2500 Applicants Now in Full Swing: 1500 Have Applied in Past 2 Weeks," *Philadelphia Tribune,* February 15, 1964: 5.

complete OIC's hallmark Feeder Program. For too long, "[b]lack people had been brainwashed into inferiority," stated Sullivan, echoing popular social scientific interpretations of the psychological effects of racism.[117] "The feeling had gotten into the crevices of their minds, so that they believed it without saying anything about it."[118] Described as a course in attitudinal transformation, the Feeder Program aimed to counteract this sense of inferiority and help trainees regain their "ambition…[their] attitude…[their] self-respect," all crucial, according to OIC, to "find[ing them] a job." [119]

The question of how to incentivize labor is one that has plagued social theorists for centuries.[120] During the first half of the twentieth century, U.S. corporations mostly offered white workers a growing number of material incentives in the form of healthcare, housing, and retirement programs—all of which focused on employees' and their families' physical needs— and paid for through an ever-expanding private and government-subsidized welfare apparatus. This changed after World War II. Pushing back on the New Deal welfare state, as well as social movements demanding greater access for people of color and women, American corporations increasingly invested in the burgeoning field of human relations to address the social aspects that affected employer-employee relations.[121]

Human relations, as Jennifer Delton has shown, emerged in the 1960s alongside calls for racial integration. A surprising number of human relations professionals had a background in the

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[117] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 98; Daryl Michael Scott, *Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black Psyche, 1880-1996* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (Grove Press, 1952); _____, "North African Syndrome," *Esprit* (1952).
[118] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 98; The argument that black Americans had sustained psychological damages from over two centuries of white supremacy was further employed by used by black lawyers and anti-poverty officials during the 1950s and 1960s to promote civil rights reform. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, *Courage to Dissent,* 24, 83.
[119] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 99; Alex Poinsett, "OIC: Tutor of the Unemployed: Teaching job skills is the forte of Opportunities Industrialization Centers," *Ebony* (June 1974): 43-48.
[120] Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Wordly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers* (1953; repri. New York: Penguin Books, 1991).
[121] Delton, *Racial Integration in Corporate America,* 99-105.

study of race relations. Drawing on race relations theory, human relations experts increasingly made the argument to corporate executives that racially discriminatory policies functioned as an impediment to economic growth and industrial relations. Instead, they began to advocate for racial integration. In doing so, however, they maintained a commitment to white norms in the workplace, arguing that "blacks…should curb their identity to fit in."[122]

Trained in the black church, Sullivan and his colleagues offered a somewhat different approach to employee relations. In addition to "company loyalty and responsibility" and "tips on good grooming," both of which, according to Sullivan, helped foster positive employer-employee relations, OIC embraced black pride as a motivational tool, rather than a hindrance.[123] "If Black Power is the motivational force to cause one to rise above the social, economic, and educational constraints imposed by society, then it is a factor to be lauded rather than degraded," claimed Samuel L. Woodward, a black educator who helped to lead the charge to include more "Afro-American history and culture" in Philadelphia schools during the late 1960s.[124] Similarly, OIC's Feeder Program employed "a heavy dose of minority history" in their training model.[125] Reflecting on their time at OIC, one trainee noted, "Here, they show you what other Negroes have done." Another added, "For the first time, they make you realize that you are somebody."[126]

In particular, Sullivan and the other OIC executives framed black pride as a motivational tool, inspiring trainees to work harder and display a positive attitude. In doing so, they convinced a growing number of white business leaders and government officials that black pride, in the

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[122] Delton, *Racial Integration in Corporate America,* 108-114, 119.
[123] Alex Poinsett, "OIC: Tutor of the Unemployed: Teaching job skills is the forte of Opportunities Industrialization Centers," *Ebony* (June 1974): 43-48.
[124] Samuel L. Woodward, "Black Power and Achievement Motivation," *The Clearing House,* 44, no. 2 (October 1969): 74.
[125] Alex Poinsett, "OIC: Tutor of the Unemployed: Teaching job skills is the forte of Opportunities Industrialization Centers," *Ebony* (June 1974): 43-48; See also, Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 99.
[126] OIC trainees quoted in Paul Friggens, "Toward self-help in Philadelphia: Opportunity to learn," *Christian Science Monitor,* September 15, 1965: 13.

hands of practiced black professionals and black teachers, was something to be embraced rather than feared. Reflecting on Sullivan's program in the fall of 1965, Pennsylvania State Superior Court Judge J. Sydney Hoffman called OIC "the most significant program in the city today." Echoing the judge's enthusiasm, Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce executive director W. Thatcher Longstreth pledged his support when he told local media, "we couldn't afford to let OIC fail."[127]

Confronted with black militancy on one side and the threat of government regulation on the other, American businesses in Philadelphia and across the country increasingly embraced OIC and black empowerment programs like it as a form of social insurance.[128] Within months of OIC's founding, the organization received over $250,000 in equipment and cash donations from local companies, including Bell Telephone, Scott Paper, IBM, and General Electric.[129] As the next section demonstrates, the government also saw value in Sullivan's artful blending of black pride and self-help, granting millions in federal dollars for OIC's programs in subsequent decades. Throughout OIC's rapid rise from a small job-training and economic development center operating out of an abandoned police station into the largest program of its kind, Longstreth's question regarding OIC's financial value—and who, exactly, would pay for it—remained ever-present.

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[127] Hoffman and Longstreth quoted in Paul Friggens, "Toward self-help in Philadelphia: Opportunity to learn," *Christian Science Monitor,* September 15, 1965: 13.
[128] Chatelain, "The Miracle of the Golden Arches," 326; Ferguson, *Top Down*; Hill and Rabig, *The Business of Black Power.*.
[129] McKee, *The Problem of Jobs,* 129.

Community Control?

In June 1965, nearly a year since the Philadelphia riot and eighteen months since OIC's

official launch, local media reported on a $1.7 million grant, the first of several multi-million

dollar grants awarded by the federal government to expand OIC's program.[130] By 1967, OIC

operated in thirty cities across the country, including Menlo Park, California; Little Rock,

Arkansas; Roanoke, Virginia; and Washington D.C, and had another thirty-six in

development.[131] This expansion was made possible by substantial grants from the Office of

Economic Opportunity (OEO), recently created to administer President Lyndon B. Johnson's

War on Poverty.

First announced by President Johnson in his 1964 State of the Union address, the War on

Poverty exists in popular memory and scholarship as a paragon of American liberalism prior to

the onslaught of free-market politics.[132] Responding to Johnson's call for "maximum feasible

participation," community activists, many of them women, engaged with federal anti-poverty

programs to advocate for expanded healthcare, affordable housing, and other resources as part of

one of the largest mass movements in American history.[133] In spite of the democratizing force

generated by the civil rights and black power struggle, the Johnson administration devised ways

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[130] "OIC Gets $1,756,163 in Gov't grant: Feeder Program Given War on Poverty Funds," *Philadelphia Tribune,* June 26, 1965: 6, Countryman, *Up South,* 115.

[131] McKee, *The Problem of Jobs,* 168.

[132] This view of Johnson's Great Society programs has recently come under criticism from scholars emphasizing the administration's simultaneous endorsement of anti-black policing, see Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime;* Still, more work examining the entanglements between anti-poverty and market-oriented policies under the Johnson administration, see Brent Cebul, *The American Way of Growth: Business, Poverty, and Development in the American Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming).

[133] Orleck, *Storming Caesar's Palace;* Williams, *The Politics of Public Housing;* Gordon K. Mantler, *Power to the Poor: Black-Brown Coalition & the Fight for Economic Justice, 1960-1974* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).

to curtail black radicalism through granting anti-democratic, private institutions control of anti-poverty programs in black communities.[134]

In 1962, shortly before the launch of OIC, Sullivan announced the launch of the 10-36 program, named according to the mechanism by which the initiative generated revenue. Each week, members, many of whom were drawn from Sullivan's and other black ministers' congregations, contributed ten dollars to the program. This ten dollar contribution was repeated for thirty-six weeks with the pooled funds going towards a variety of educational and for-profit ventures, including a shopping center, a garment factory, a commercial electronics division, and, most astonishing of all, the first black-owned aerospace company, Progress Aerospace Enterprises (PAE). PAE later won contracts with General Electric and the United States military.[135]

Closely resembling black savings clubs, first popularized in the nineteenth century in response to slavery and Jim Crow, Sullivan's 10-36 program and others like it gained new significance in the context of grassroots politics of "community control." Demands for "community control," as Matthew Countryman has shown, emerged as part of a broader set of discussions that gave meaning to the phrase Black Power.[136] Echoing Stokely Carmichael, who called on black people to "pool their resources to buy out white-owned ghetto businesses," black

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[134] Unlike the New Deal, Johnson's War on Poverty downplayed wealth redistribution and did not seek to create public jobs. Instead, following the logic of racial liberalism, Johnson relied on the private sector to fund the program, including incentivizing corporations "to create new jobs and new markets" with tax cuts to industry. President Lyndon B. Johnson's Annual message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1964, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64*, Volume I, entry 91 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1965): 112-118; Sylvie Laurent, "The Unknown Story of a Counter War on Poverty: Martin Luther King Jr.'s Poor People's Campaign," Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, Working Paper (January 2015), https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/media/_media/working_papers/laurent_king-war-on-poverty.pdf.

[135] Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America Records, Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Libraries, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as OIC Papers); Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 161-179.

[136] Countryman, *Up South,* 3.

activists pursued a range of programs ranging from community bookstores to black-owned

McDonald's franchises in an effort to promote economic development and "community

control."[137] In the best case scenarios, these initiatives redistributed political and economic

capital to those with the fewest resources in the community.[138] In the case of the 10-36 program

and his other initiatives, Sullivan's claim that support came from "within our own ranks"—

referring to the black community—elided class and gender divisions embedded in these

organizations.[139]

By 1968, Sullivan's 10-36 program had raised over $230,000 dollars. At $360 a share,

shareholder status remained largely limited to Philadelphia's black professional class, many of

whom were members of Sullivan's congregation.[140] Structured along class and gender lines, the

10-36 program mirrored other black empowerment initiatives in that it reaffirmed the ideal

nuclear family model by providing a vehicle—share-ownership—for black men to provide for

their families. The image of the black male as producer/provider was further reinforced in

Sullivan's other ventures, including OIC.[141] Within the OIC Feeder Program, "Male Orientation"

courses socialized young black men, challenging them to "improve their earning capacities and

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[137] Carmichael quoted in Countryman, *Up South,* 205; Hill and Rabig, *The Business of Black Power;* Joshua Clark Davis, *From Headshops to Whole Foods: Activist Entrepreneurs since the 1960s* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2018); Chatelain, "The Miracle of the Golden Arches," 326.

[138] See, for example, the work of FIGHTON, a collaboration between black activists and Xerox in Rochester, New York, that generated "an estimated $2 million in income per year to the ghetto." Laura Warren Hill, "FIGHTing for the Soul of Black Capitalism: Struggles for Black Economic Development in Postrebellion Rochester," in *The Business of Black Power: Community Development, Capitalism, and Corporate Responsibility in Postwar America* edited by Laura Warren Hill and Julia Rabig (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2012), 55.

[139] Sullivan quoted in Mark Bricklin, "8,000 Jam N. Phila. Training Center Opening Sunday: Speakers Cite Benefits of New Jobs Approach: All Segments of Community Will Profit They Say," *Philadelphia Tribune,* January 28, 1964: 1.

[140] "Dr. Leon Sullivan Hits 'Front Man' Charge in Progress Plaza Speech: Fronts for No One But God, Minister Says," *Philadelphia Tribune,* October 29, 1968: 1.

[141] "Rev. Sullivan Outlines OIC to Miami Meeting," *Philadelphia Tribune,* December 21, 1968: 36.

to assert their masculinity as family breadwinners."[142] Sullivan once told a young man enrolled

in the OIC Feeder program to "sit up straight, [and]...stick it out," as a lesson in learning the

Figure 4: Sullivan speaking with male trainees enrolled in OIC's training program

values of hard work and sacrifice Sullivan believed were necessary for black men to earn a sense

of dignity.[143] While elsewhere critical of Sullivan and other OIC administrators for what he

described as authoritarian control exerted by the central OIC office over other chapters, Phoenix

OIC Executive Director Herb Boyer nevertheless expressed his gratitude to "Sullivan and the

OIC movement for returning something to me that had been taken away by white folk," namely

his "manhood." [144]

　　　Women, on the other hand, were encouraged to take on roles that mirrored the ideal black

mother. In the photograph below, a female OIC trainee is pictured receiving instruction while

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[142] Eric Augenbraun, "'Stand on Your feet, Black Boy!": Leon Sullivan, Black Power, Job Training, and the War on Poverty," 2009-2010 *Penn Humanities Forum on Connection* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2010), 45-46.

[143] Sullivan quoted in Paul Friggens, "Toward self-help in Philadelphia: Opportunity to learn," *Christian Science Monitor,* September 15, 1965: 13.

[144] Letter from Herb Boyer to Fred Miller, September 6, 1972, Box 4, Folder 15, OIC Papers.

serving Sullivan a meal, likely as part of a program training OIC trainees for food service.

Meanwhile, on the left, an OIC trainee sews clothes in Progress Garment Manufacturing plant.

Figure 4: A female OIC graduate sews clothing in the Progress Garment Factory (Left). Dr. Sullivan and Mrs. Ruth Duca, center, instruct a female OIC trainee in food service (Right).

While all OIC trainees engaged in unpaid labor as part of the training program, women

performed additional unpaid labor as volunteers. During the months following OIC's opening,

female volunteers went door-to-door throughout North Philadelphia, ultimately collecting some

nine hundred small donations of approximately $10 each from local residents toward OIC's job-

training program.[145] Despite their active involvement, women rarely, if ever, were given

leadership positions in OIC and other black empowerment programs.

Sullivan, for his part, elided the class and gender divisions embedded in 10-36, OIC, and

other black empowerment programs when he declared, these ventures "belong to the people."[146]

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[145] Paul Friggens, "Toward self-help in Philadelphia: Opportunity to learn," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 15, 1965: 13.

[146] "Meet the Press: Rev. Leon H. Sullivan," Sunday, March 7, 1971, OICA Papers, Box 1, Folder 14; Sullivan quoted in Mark Bricklin, "8,000 Jam N. Phila. Training Center Opening Sunday: Speakers Cite Benefits of New Jobs Approach All Segments of Community Will Profit they Say," *Philadelphia Tribune,* January 28, 1964: 1; Sullivan, *Build Brother Build,* 181.

The late 1960s gave rise to a popular discourse advocating for "community control" and Black Power. Often associated with struggles for democracy, "community control," at times, obscured competing social visions. Thus, whereas welfare activists and other black women activists deployed "community control" to advocate for novel social relations often structured around a politics of care, Sullivan and other black ministers deployed black empowerment to support the reproduction of patriarchal, nuclear black families.

Governing the Black Power City

In December 1967, national media reported on a new joint venture between OIC and the Gulf Oil Company. Located in an abandoned three-bay Gulf station at 25th and Poplar streets in North Philadelphia, the new joint Gulf-OIC center provided training in the "fundamentals of service station operation and maintenance," including how to pump gas; change oil and lubricate automobiles; change and repair tires; test, charge and replace batteries; figure sales tax on purchases; and handle pump island procedures.[147] Far from unique, the Gulf-OIC venture appeared as part of a growing number of partnerships between American corporations and black community organizations during the late 1960s and early 1970s.[148] Using public and private capital, these joint ventures inscribed private capital—literally and symbolically—onto the landscape of the post-Jim Crow black metropolis.

Like OIC's other job training programs, Gulf executives touted job training as a helpful, if not necessary, solution to what Gulf and others described as the problem of "hard core unemploy[ment]…in ghetto areas."[149] Unlike "normal" unemployed people, "hard core

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[147] "OIC, Gulf Form New Partnership," *Philadelphia Tribune,* December 12, 1967: 5.
[148] Hill and Rabig, *The Business of Black Power;* Chatelain, "The Miracle of the Golden Arches."
[149] "Gulf Oil Corporation Promotes Hiring in Areas Very Vital to City's Economy," *Philadelphia Tribune,* July 23, 1968: 4.

unemployed," which as Gulf's phrasing suggests referred primarily to black "ghetto" residents, connoted a sense of personal failing. The "hard core unemployed," by this logic, lacked the ability to adapt to changing economic conditions and required the intervention of (white-owned) corporations. Along these lines, Gulf Vice President E.F. Jacobs touted the company's partnership with OIC as evidence of the company's good work "helping to make productive citizens [as part of our] duty and responsibility [as] citizen[s] in Philadelphia."[150] Jacob's comments were echoed by Sullivan himself, who lauded the Gulf-OIC venture as an example of what was possible when "industry and the masses…joined hands for the good of the community."[151]

Black empowerment programs like the Gulf-OIC venture thus formed a crucial component in corporations' efforts to improve their public image amidst boycotts and accusations of racial discrimination.[152] In June 1968, just months after the partnership with OIC was announced, Gulf officials chose to spotlight the OIC-Gulf station at the *Tribune* Home Service Fair in Chicago. The exhibit featured a replica of the Gulf Oil-OIC service station staffed by a team of black employees, including Donald A. Young, Dealer Development Instructor in Washington and Baltimore and a former longtime Philadelphia resident; Paul W. Bennett of the Philadelphia marketing District, and Lawrence Edgerson from the Trenton District, both sales representatives and residents of Philadelphia; and Mrs. Olive Richardson, an accounting clerk in Gulf's Eastern Marketing Region office. On display alongside the station was what the

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[150] Jacob quoted in "OIC, Gulf Oil Corp. Enter Partnership for Training," *New Pittsburgh Courier,* December 23, 1967: 13.

[151] Sullivan quoted in "OIC, Gulf Oil Corp. Enter Partnership for Training," *New Pittsburgh Courier,* December 23, 1967: 13.

[152] For more on the connections between civil rights and the development of new state and commercial media strategies, see Brenna Greer, "Image Matters: Representation Politics, Capitalism, and Civil Rights Work in the Mid-Twentieth Century United States," (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2011); Robert E. Weems, *Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumerism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 1998).

Philadelphia Tribune described as "an unusual back-lighted panel box showing all of Gulf's 16 Negro dealers in Philadelphia" accompanied by "a small board depicting the grand opening ceremonies of the Gulf-Oil station."[153] Giving credence to Gulf's re-branding as a purveyor of black empowerment, the *Wall Street Journal,* among several major newspapers that covered the fair, praised Gulf for their "help in the civil rights effort."[154]

Meanwhile, back in the city, black empowerment programs fostered an entrepreneurial ethos among program participants. In place of legal and electoral victories, black empowerment measured social progress in terms of dollars. Following the successful launch of the first Gulf-OIC center in Philadelphia, OIC authorized the expansion of the program to other cities, including Harrisburg and Los Angeles.[155] Within a year, Los Angeles OIC Director of Administrative Services Charles Maxey reported that their Gulf station at "Broadway…[had] grossed 300-400 thousand dollars." Reflecting his optimism, Maxey further stated that he expected a second station in the works to earn even more, "1/2 million dollars a year" to be specific.[156] After factoring in the costs of operation, the total net profit was more likely closer to $6,000 to $12,000, on average with other black-operated Gulf stations nationally, resulting in a

[153] "Gulf Oil Planning New OIC Service Station Exhibit for Tribune Show," *Philadelphia Tribune,* June 15, 1968: 2.
[154] "The Big Companies Venture Their to Help in the Civil Rights Effort: An Occasional Stockholder Gripes about Civil Rights," *Wall Street Journal,* June, 14, 1968: 20.
[155] "OIC, Gulf Oil Corp. Enter Partnership for Training," *New Pittsburgh Courier,* December 23, 1967: 13.
[156] Charles Maxey quoted in Chuck Porter, "L.A. Self Help Concept Is A Winner: Many Faceted: Program Bridges Gap of Needy With Self Help Training to Solve Problems," *Los Angeles Sentinel,* February 15, 1968: A1; One of the ironies of the sixties was that as integration intensified, many traditional black businesses, including hotels, food stores, and even beauty companies found themselves having to compete with white corporations, which increasingly became aware of the profitability of the black consumer market. See Juliet E.K. Walker, *The History of Black Business in America* (New York: MacMillan, 1998), 225-263; 295-331; Robert Weems, *Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumerism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 1998); In this context, franchising came to be seen by many black entrepreneurs as a relatively easy way to acquire capital and technology with limited resources. Marcia Chatelain, "The Miracle of the Golden Arches," 327, 332.

2.5% return on investment.[157] Subsequently, OIC launched a number of similar joint ventures, including with General Motors, Steinman Lumber, and Pfizer Pharmaceuticals[158]

OIC's partnership with American corporations became institutionalized with the creation of the National Industry Advisory Council (NIAC). Comprised of representatives from leading firms across the country, the NIAC only further blurred the distinction between community organization and business. Based on the recommendation of the NIAC, OIC employed a computerized Management Information System (MIS) to track expenditures and savings. Using the MIS, OIC director Frederick E. Miller determined that OIC spent "$1,000.00 or less per trainee…compared to other manpower agencies."[159] Subsequently, OIC's leadership touted the program's cost-saving measures, including the use of volunteer staff, to garner public support. "If we can we will do it with half a person. We will use as many volunteers as we can…so [we can keep] the costs…down" Sullivan boasted in an interview with *Meet the Press.*[160]

For the most part, OIC trainees accepted the cost-saving logic that undergirded the program. Unlike government manpower programs, OIC trainees did not receive a stipend while they were enrolled, and many worked other jobs to help pay the bills while they were enrolled. Thomas Marshall, a father of three children and an OIC trainee in Los Angeles, noted that "it [was] a tight squeeze working and going to school, but I figure with 3 or 4 months' training, I can get a better job."[161] Others turned to the government. A 1974 article in *Ebony* magazine, for example, reported that "about a third [of OIC trainees were] on public welfare or [were]

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[157] "Gulf Oil Has 622 Negro-Operated Dealerships Throughout America: Gov't Cites Oil Industry for Dealings with Race," *Philadelphia Tribune,* March 27, 1965: 5.

[158] "Mr Marvin Hannah: Opportunities Industrialization center of Greater Milwaukee (OIC-GM)" *Milwaukee Star,* February 24, 1968: 7, "Pfizer Co. Makes Grant to OIC," *Milwaukee Star,* September 21, 1968: 11.

[159] National OIC Executive Board of Directors meeting minutes, April 23, 1969, OIC Papers, Box 1, Folder 2.

[160] Transcript Leon Sullivan on Meet the Press, March 7, 1971, OICA Papers, Box 1, Folder 14.

[161] Thomas Marshall quoted in Chuck Porter, "L.A. Self Help Concept Is A Winner: Many Faceted: Program Bridges Gap of Needy With Self Help Training to Solve Problems," *Los Angeles Sentinel,* February 15, 1968: A1.

receiving unemployment pay or veteran's benefits."[162] A select few benefited from the OIC's

Brotherhood fund. This special fund provided carfare, lunch, and tools for OIC trainees

otherwise unable to participate. OIC leaders made clear that even these benefits were only

intended to help trainees get on their feet. Those who hoped to succeed in the program, stated

Sullivan, should be "highly motivated," accepting the hard work that it took to complete

a training program that pays no allowances" in exchange for the reward that graduating from

OIC would surely bring.[163]

By 1969, OIC had established chapters in over seventy cities across the country. As it

grew, the organization continued to place greater and greater emphasis on cost-saving, an

attribute not lost on OIC's primary funders in the federal government and corporate America. At

the recommendation of the NIAC, OIC organized a special three-month training course on

management, which became required material for all OIC directors and board members. In the

course, designed by Dr. D. L. Reddick, who taught the Economics of the Ghetto at Temple

University, along with business professionals from the Wharton School of Finance, OIC staffers

learned the ins and outs of contemporary management philosophy, including general

management, finance, and manpower.[164] Confronted by OIC's National Executive board

member Reverend Charles N. Atkins, who expressed concern regarding the effects of OIC's

growing "preoccupation [with] funds…upon [the] program," OIC Extensions Services Director

and close associate to Sullivan Elton Jolly noted that indeed "financial capability" had "very

serious" implications for OIC, reflecting the priority given to cost-saving and "good

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[162] Sullivan quoted in Alex Poinsett, "OIC: Tutor of the Unemployed: Teaching job skills is the forte of Opportunities Industrialization Centers," *Ebony* (June 1974): 43-48.
[163] Sullivan quoted in Alex Poinsett, "OIC: Tutor of the Unemployed: Teaching job skills is the forte of Opportunities Industrialization Centers," *Ebony* (June 1974): 43-48.
[164] "OIC Brain Trust Gathers in Germantown: Top Executives Get Expert Tips in Management," *Philadelphia Tribune,* January 11, 1969: 4, "OIC's Need for Board Training," [circa June 20, 1972], OIC Papers, Box 1, Folder 15; OIC National Board of Directors Meeting, minutes, October 23, 1969, OIC Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.

management" within the organization.[165] In other words, OIC must operate like a business if it hoped to survive.

Conclusion

On October 29, 1968, Sullivan unveiled his latest "black power venture," Progress Plaza shopping center. The Plaza was located on the corner of Broad and Oxford Streets, not far from the abandoned police station where OIC launched . Standing on a wooden platform, dressed in a grey suit and tie, and surrounded by images of prominent black Americans, including Frederick Douglass, Benjamin Banneker, and Crispus Attucks, Sullivan appeared as a living symbol of the ideology he advanced. With faith, hard-work, the right attitude, and a bit of help from private industry, the black man could achieve anything, including opening the first black-owned and operated shopping center in the nation. Speaking to the crowd gathered around him, Sullivan proclaimed, "All of this…all of these buildings are owned by negroes." The "A & P Supermarket" and other companies, which had signed contracts to lease space at the Plaza, "all of these corporations and chain stores will be paying rent to black people."[166]

Building on and refashioning a decades-old self-help ideology, black empowerment captured the imaginations of working-class and middle-class black Americans across the country, many of whom contributed money and labor to building OIC and other similar programs. Years later, Celes King, chair of CORE California and one of the first board members of OIC-Los Angeles claimed Sullivan's "exceptional vision to mobilize black America so

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[165] National OIC Executive Board of Directors meeting minutes, April 23, 1969, OIC Papers, Box 1, Folder 2; See also OIC National Board of Director Meeting Minutes, October 23, 1969, OIC Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.
[166] "Dr. Leon Sullivan Hits 'Front Man' Charge in Progress Plaza Speech: Fronts for No One But God, Minister Says," *Philadelphia Tribune,* October 29, 1968: 1.

everyone would be a productive citizen" set him apart from other black leaders.[167] Faith in God and the market, in this regard, played a significant role drawing Christian-educated black urban elite to Sullivan's various programs. Meanwhile, many others found inspiration in black empowerment's positing of black pride as a motivational tool, inspiring a strong work-ethic and self-discipline.

By far the most important factor contributing to the proliferation of black empowerment, however, was the support that Sullivan and others like him received from War on Poverty programs and American corporations. Concerned by the seeming rise in black militancy, government officials invested in black empowerment as a means of mitigating social unrest. Rather than direct government aid, which remained an important source of financing through the 1970s, the state increasingly encouraged corporate involvement through tax incentives designed to further private sector involvement in the black community. Moving forward, this pattern of corporate-black community partnerships continued to provide an institutional foundation for the expansion of black empowerment in the United States and Africa.

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[167] King quoted in F. Finley McRae, "World, U.S. Leaders Eulogize Rev. Leon Sullivan," *Los Angeles Sentinel,* May 3, 2001: A1.

Chapter 2

Empowering Africa: Black Ambassadors for Corporate America

In August 1976, Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC) celebrated its twelfth annual convocation ceremonies in Philadelphia. Thousands of OIC trainees, as well as OIC staff and program supporters convened in the Philadelphia Convention Center, where they listened to an "impressive list of guest speakers," including Pennsylvania Governor Milton Shapp and NAACP director Roy Wilkins, pay tribute to what was, in the words of OIC's founder, Leon Sullivan, "perhaps, the most effective manpower training effort in the nation."[168] Top on the list of speakers was U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was there to acknowledge OIC's recent success promoting black empowerment in Africa. Indeed, in just twelve short years, OIC had grown from a small training program based in a North Philadelphia jailhouse into an international self-help organization with programs in approximately 140 communities, including in Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya.[169]

Meanwhile, outside of the convention center, convocation attendees confronted a group of activists carrying signs that read "Kissinger's Africa Policy is Racist" picketing the festivities. "We know Kissinger is connected with the Rockefellers who provide funding for the U.S. corporations who support the minority regimes that have robbed us of our land and resources," stated Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) spokesperson Tapson Mawere, one of several leaders of the Patrice Lumumba Coalition (PLC), named in honor of the former Democratic Republic of Conco president widely suspected of being murdered with CIA assistance. Echoing

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[168] "Building for the Future: Statement From Dr. Leon H. Sullivan," *Philadelphia Tribune,* August 31, 1976: 12.
[169] "Impressive List of Guests, Participants," *Philadelphia Tribune,* August 31, 1976: 12; "Economic Growth, a Major Concern of OIC, To Be Discussed at Civic Center Symposium," *Philadelphia Tribune,* August 31, 1976: 9; "Any Program Dealing with Jobs is Important to Black Americans," *Philadelphia Tribune,* July 3, 1976: 4.

Mawere, Rev. Muhammad Kenyatta noted, "Blacks [like Sullivan] who support Kissinger's African policy" were nothing more than sell-outs, "repaying debts for white corporate financial support."[170]

The PLC's critique of U.S. foreign policy in Africa is a familiar one. Forging coalitions of self-identified black activists from across the globe, the PLC and other organizations formed part of a global black power movement during the 1960s and 1970s that spanned the Americas, Europe, Africa, and even parts of Asia.[171] Yet, one must be careful not to equate all Pan-African politics as anti-American.[172] Rather than antithetical to black advancement, OIC and other black empowerment programs promoted American capitalism as a means to fostering Pan-Africanism.[173] "No matter where—in the United States, Africa or Latin America—a man needs a skill in order to earn a wage to support his family with dignity. OIC endeavors to do just that," stated Sullivan just before boarding a plane at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York on route to the continent as part of a USAID-funded tour promoting OICI's expansion.[174] By 1976, with help from USAID and the organization's corporate sponsors, OIC touted successful operations in Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Belize, and had established contact with interests groups in Togo, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Lesotho, Botswana, Liberia, and Haiti.[175]

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[170] Linn Washington, "OIC Refuses to Withdraw Invitation to Kissinger," *Philadelphia Tribune,* August 31, 1976: 1.
[171] On the global black power movement, see Anne-Marie Angelo, *Global Freedom Struggle: The Black Panthers of Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming); Nico Slate, ed., *Black Power beyond Borders: The Global Dimensions of the Black Power Movement* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Nikhil Pal Singh, *Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (Harvard University Press, 2005); Gail M. Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
[172] Kevin K. Gaines, *Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era: American Africans in Ghana* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006) remains a model with regards to its attentiveness to the multiplicity of visions contained under the umbrella of pan-Africanism.
[173] Pan-Africanism was, at some level, always commercial in that it involved the creation of economic, as well as social and cultural, ties between various people of African descent throughout the diaspora. Frank Guridy, *Forging Diaspora: Afro-Cubans and African Americans in a World of Empire and Jim Crow* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
[174] "Rev Sullivan and 40 Specialists in Africa to Launch OIC Units," *Philadelphia Tribune,* July 14, 1970: 14.
[175] "Any Program Dealing with Jobs is Important to Black Americans," *Philadelphia Tribune,* July 3, 1976: 4.

In a reversal of PLC's logic, Sullivan and other OIC officials contended that U.S.

government and corporate support for black empowerment provided evidence that American

capitalism differed from the exploitative relations enacted by the European colonial powers.

Heretofore, historians have cited American technology, financiers, and consumer culture to

explain the rise of the United States' post-war market empire.[176] As important as these were, they

were not enough to sell Africans on the benefits American capitalism. Instead, as this chapter

argues, American businessmen relied on black empowerment politics. By deploying black

American managers and funding the expansion of black-led job-training and economic

development initiatives, they countered criticism of the United States as a neocolonial power and

established political capital with newly empowered African governments.[177]

Building on earlier efforts by philanthropic organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation

and the Phelps-Stokes Fund, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced a series of trade

missions to Africa, calling the continent the next "frontier" for American business.[178] Between

1965 and 1968, American exports to Africa grew at a rate of seven-to-eight-percent annually,

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[176] Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Cyrus Veeser, *A World Safe for Capitalism: Dollar Diplomacy and America's Rise to Global Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Emily Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

[177] My argument here builds on work on the U.S. State Department's use of black ambassadors in Africa. See, Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Mary Dudziak, *Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall's African Journey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

[178] In the 1950s, the Rockefeller Brother's Fund launched an initiative encouraging American private investment in Nigeria, Ghana, and Liberia in response to calls by African governments to improve local manufacturing and diversify the local economy, and coincided with the United States' governments effort to take a more proactive stance in exercising economic and political world leadership. John Andrew III, "Cracks in the Consensus: The Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project and Eisenhower's America," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 3, Going Global: The Presidency in the International Arena (Summer, 1998): 535-552; Ebere Nwaubani, *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960* (Rochester: Rochester University Press, 2001); I would likewise like to thank Lauren Klaffke for providing me with details pertaining to the Rockefeller Brothers Fund's West Africa Project.

surpassing the $2.3 billion mark in 1968.[179] Meanwhile American direct investment likewise increased. In Nigeria alone, American investment rose from little or nothing in 1960 to ₦250 million in 1966, reaching over $1 billion in 1974, making the United States the country's second largest foreign investor after the United Kingdom.[180]

Alongside new technology and consumer goods, American corporations promoted a vision of black empowerment. In 1971, Sullivan wrote the Nigerian Head of State General Yakubu Gowon regarding General Motors' proposal to open a plant in Nigeria, thus enabling the company to enter the rapidly growing West African market. Rather than automobiles or jobs, Sullivan chose to cite the company's record of black empowerment as reason for the proposal's "favorable consideration." Reminding the General of General Motor's commitment to black empowerment by electing him "the first Afro-American [on] the General Motors Corporation's Board of Directors," Sullivan testified to the "positive far reaching ramifications" a GM plant would have for Nigerians.[181]

More than words, supporters of black empowerment used performance and spectacle to generate domestic and international support for their programs.[182] Borrowing from African custom, Christian rituals, and Western diplomatic customs, these ceremonies varied to suit the needs of particular audiences. At OIC's 1976 convocation in Philadelphia, for example, ministers from more than 100 Philadelphia area churches delivered sermons dressed in ministerial robes in recognition of the role the black church played in OIC in the United States; a noticeable

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[179] George Dolgin, "American Interests in Africa Expanding," *New York Times,* January 24, 1969: 61.

[180] James Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy," *African Affairs* 75, no. 300 (July 1976): 323; See also Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa,* 247-255.

[181] Correspondence, Leon H. Sullivan to General Yakubu Gowon, April 28, 1971, Opportunities Industrialization Centers International Records, Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Libraries, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as OICI papers), Box 9, Folder 1.

[182] Scholars have long acknowledged the role of spectacle in the rise of Western capitalism. Vanessa Schwartz, *Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in fin-de-siecle Paris* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), Guy Debord, *La Société du Spectacle* [The Society of the Spectacle], (Paris: Buchet-Chastel, 1967).

difference from the traditional garb worn by Sullivan at the launch of OIC in Nigeria. Whether ministerial robes or a dashiki, the message was one of black empowerment.

"Not since the days of Marcus Garvey"—The Internationalization of OIC

March 16, 1969, was a typical Sunday at Zion Baptist Church in North Philadelphia. There, as he had for nearly two decades, Sullivan delivered his weekly sermon in a sanctuary filled to capacity with 1500 people, while another 200 loyal congregation members watched the services over a closed-circuit television in the lower auditorium.[183] In his sermon, Sullivan touted OIC's progress, which by 1969 had expanded into over seventy cities across the United States. Despite OIC's dramatic success, Sullivan told his followers, there was more work still to be done: "Africans and black Americans had been separated for too long…but we cannot be a people apart or divided at this time or any day to come, for we are Black brothers" and as such, "[we] must pull together."[184] Black empowerment, in other words, did not stop at the boundaries of the United States, but must extend to Africa.

According to OIC folklore, the initial inspiration for Opportunities Industrial Centers International (OICI), the name given to the new organization established to oversee the program's internationalization, came from a Nigerian physician named Dr. Folorunsho Salawu. According to OICI records, Salawu visited Philadelphia in January 1969 seeking medical treatment. Having heard of OIC's successful job-training and entrepreneurship program, Salawu requested a meeting with Sullivan, where he inquired about expanding OIC to his home country.

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[183] Anna J.W. James, "Dr. Sullivan Hailed by Church Members After African Tour," *Philadelphia Tribune,* March 18, 1969: 1.
[184] Sullivan quoted in Anna J.W. James, "Dr. Sullivan Hailed by Church Members After African Tour," *Philadelphia Tribune,* March 18, 1969: 1.

A few months later, Sullivan announced the launch of a two-month exploratory expedition to study the possibility of expanding OIC to Africa.

Sullivan's recounting of the meeting with Salawu provided a powerful foundational myth that situated OICI as the heir to a long line of Pan-African ventures linking black Americans and black Africans. Arriving at Ikeja Airport in Lagos Nigeria, Sullivan and his entourage were greeted by "hundreds of Africans [who] waited in the heat of the sun at the airport [holding] a banner welcoming the Rev. Leon H. Sullivan" and the representatives from forty OICs in the United States who accompanied him. As they walked across the tarmac, one member of the group knelt to kiss the earth, remarking as he did, "Africa, the cradle of my great grandparents, the myth of my fathers and the hope of the Black man."[185]

Sullivan's reference to Africa as "the cradle of [his great grandparents]" evoked familiar narratives of Africa as homeland for millions of descendants of Africans stolen from the continent and forced to labor as slaves in the Americas. As early as the early nineteenth-century, white and black Americans, looking for a solution to the problem slavery posed to the new republic, cultivated the image of Africa as the proper homeland for former and present slaves, ultimately giving rise to the Back-to-Africa movement and the establishment of Liberia, with the help of the American Colonization Society.[186] Prominent black thinkers and leaders from W.E.B. Du Bois to Marcus Garvey continued to fuel the development of diasporic politics that

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[185] Ibok Esema, "Rev. Leon Sullivan's OIC Mission Gets Warm Welcome in Nigeria," *Philadelphia Tribune*, August 11, 1970: 13.

[186] James T. Campbell, *Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States and South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Robert S. Levine, ed. *Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); See also, Kendra Field and Ebony Coletu, "The Chief Sam Movement, A Century Later: Public Histories, Private Stories, and the African Diaspora," *Transition Magazine,* Issue 114 (July 2014).

emphasized the shared bonds connecting Africans and their descendants with various appeals to biology, culture, and history.[187]

In his remarks delivered in Lagos, Sullivan, for his part, cast a wide net, appealing to ancestry, shared culture, and even a sense of religious fellowship. "We have come home…not as masters or colonialists, not as agents of imperialism, but as your brothers and sisters, as Afro-Americans…[as] your *soul* brothers in deeds [emphasis added]," he stated.[188] Sullivan further ingratiated himself with local elite by paying homage to the people and places symbolizing Nigerian proficiency. While in Nigeria, Sullivan and his entourage toured the Oba's Palace on Lagos Island. Converted into an administrative center by Nigeria's first Prime Minister Abubaker Tafawa Balewa, the palace had once served as the home to Yoruba chiefs who ruled the island prior to European arrival. Sullivan likewise visited the town of Ikare to scope out possible sites for an OICI center providing training in commercial agriculture. With remarks that surely please the Oba of Ikare, Sullivan remarked, "[I am] proud to be in a town that had a thriving culture and civilization 2,000 years before the white man had his magna Carta."[189]

Returning to Philadelphia, Sullivan's message to his congregants evoked somewhat different connotations, reflecting OIC's situatedness as an American institution. "Not since the days of Marcus Garvey, one of the great patrons of Africanism, not since the great efforts of W.E.B. Du Bois, has a sensibility been pointed to Africa from [this] country," boasted a hopeful Sullivan eager to share the benefits black Americans had acquired by nature of living in the

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[187] Michael West, William Martin, and Fanon Che Wilkins, eds., *From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International Since the Age of Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 72-106; David Levering Lewis, "Du Bois and Garvey: Two 'Pan-Africas' in *W.E.B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and The American Century, 1919-1963* (Owl Books, 2000), 37-84; Adam Ewing, *The Age of Garvey: How a Jamaican Activist Created a Mass Movement and Changed Global Black Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
[188] Sullivan quoted in Ibok Esema, "Rev. Leon Sullivan's OIC Mission Gets Warm Welcome in Nigeria," *Philadelphia Tribune*, August 11, 1970: 13.
[189] "Rev. Sullivan Hailed in Africa," *Philadelphia Tribune,* July 21, 1970: 22; "Rev. Sullivan urges Nixon to back OIC," *Bay State Banner,* July 30, 1970: 3.

United States. "A bridge is being built between African and the Afro-American that will bring to pass a new era of communication and cooperation between the two continents," declared Sullivan at a rally held at Progress Plaza to generate support for OICI.[190]

Sullivan's reference to bridges and communication technology was in line with contemporary development theory. Formulated by academics and professionals working in the emergent social science disciplines and embraced by colonial and post-independence governments alike, development, broadly speaking, articulated a commitment to using new technologies and economic tools, rather than politics, to address social problems.[191] Along these lines, Valo Jordan, appointed Executive Director of OICI by Sullivan, elicited a call for black Americans to go to Africa to assist with the development of OICI. These persons, Jordan stated, should "have education and experience in at least one of the following areas…auto mechanics, building trades, electronics, secretarial science [and/or] management training."[192]

For Sullivan and other black empowerment advocates, technical skills were only part of the equation. Rather, real development required and engendered a sense of faith in oneself and

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[190] "Rev. Sullivan urges Nixon to back OIC," *Bay State Banner,* July 30, 1970: 3.

[191] There is an extensive literature on development in the post-war period, including the rise of development economics and international organizations devoted to promoting development in the "Third World." Gerald M. Meier, *Biography of a Subject: An Evolution of Development Economics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Frederick Cooper & Randall Packard, *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge (*Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Patrick Allan Sharma, *Robert McNamara's Other War: The World Bank and International Development* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017); Much of the scholarship written by historians of Africa on the subject is critical of large-scale development programs, which gave little regard to African ways of living and often had deleterious consequences for African people and the environment. See for example, Gabrielle Hecht, *Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade* (Boston: The MIT Press, 2012), 17-19; Allan F. Isaacman and Barbara S. Isaacman, *Dams, Displacement, and the Delusion of Development: Cahora Bassa and Its Legacies in Mozambique, 1965-2007* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2013); David Gordon, *Nachitutu's Gift: Economy, Society, and Environment in Central Africa* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005); Despite these and other consequences, Africans, as James Ferguson reminds us, remained committed to a vision of development. *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

[192] "OIC Program for Africa Is Launched by Rev. Sullivan: Trainees Coming from Ghana and Nigeria in '70," *Philadelphia Tribune,* November 18, 1969: 3.

the divine. Addressing his congregation, Sullivan noted that it was God, not "the U.S. government," that had blessed their mission. When the United States government called him to request his support expanding OIC to Africa, he "[made] it clear…[he] could not go representing the Government. [He] had to go representing God" and his people.[193]

Like earlier generations of black American missionaries and Garveyites, OICI fashioned itself a savior, come home to deliver Africans from poverty to the promised land of opportunity. In doing so, Sullivan and other OICI leaders eschewed calls for state-provisioned welfare. Faith and hard work were the lessons OIC preached as the tools necessary to "acquire gainful employment, and a good life in accordance with man's dignity."[194] In the years following, OIC's market gospel appeared like a self-fulfilling prophesy, attracting substantial capital from USAID and American corporations eager to undermine the critiques of black militants and African socialists by showing how American capitalism could be made to work for black economic advancement.

Corporate Diplomacy

First published as a one-hundred and twenty-one page supplement to the 1963 International Commerce bulletin, "Africa: Sales frontier for U.S. business" marked one of the first of several publications released by the U.S. Department of Commerce touting the opening of Africa to American business.[195] Whereas under European colonialism American corporations

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[193] Report, Gary Robinson, "African Development and Manpower Training Presentation to the Sub-Committee on Africa," September 14, 1977," OICI Papers, Box 21, Folder 1.
[194] Ibid.
[195] U.S. Department of Commerce, *Africa: Sales Frontier for U.S. Business,* Superintendent of Documents (1963); In addition to embellished descriptions intended to appeal to investor's sense of adventure, the pamphlet, which subsequently went through several updates and re-prints, provided American businessmen and financers with information on market conditions and regulations affecting private investment in Africa; See also, "Investment Opportunities: American Team of Business Experts Issues Report on Ghana's Economy," *Pittsburgh Courier,* March 9, 1957: 22.

found themselves largely excluded from taking full advantage of the continent's rich mineral and human resources due to tariffs and trade restrictions that channeled the bulk of colonialism's profits to the European powers, U.S. Department of Commerce officials reported "this is now changing radically." "United States exports have greater prospects for expansion than at any time in the past owning to the substantial removal of dollar import restrictions…and the rapid increase in the level of consumption by both private and public sectors in all countries."[196]

Joining their European counterparts, American corporations increasingly looked to take advantage of economic opportunities created by African independence.[197] Echoing the positive projections of the Department of Commerce, U.S. Bureau of International Commerce Africa Division Director George Dolgin described a heightened "tempo of economic activity" with regards to "this overseas frontier for United States businessmen." Playing to Western stereotypes of Africa and its inhabitants, Dolgin encouraged American businesses to act quickly, warning that "those who ignore the drumbeat of Africa's vast marketplace will be missing out on exciting trade and investment opportunities."[198]

Americans' initial excitement regarding the investment opportunities available to them in Africa quickly dissipated with growing talk of African nationalism. Echoing arguments made by anti-imperial and left-wing thinkers elsewhere, African nationalists criticized European and

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[196] Brendan M. Jones, "2 Trade Missions Emphasize Africa: Exceptional Opportunities are Detailed for Eastern and Western Areas," *New York Times,* May 29, 1960: F1, "Urge U.S. to Export; Trade More in Africa," *Chicago Daily Defender,* February 9, 1961: 15; Despite verbal and written commitments to an "open door" policy at the Berlin Conference (1884-5) and the Algeciras Congress (1906), the majority of European colonial regimes maintained official and unofficial preferences for businesses from their home country. William Smith Culberston, "The 'Open Door' and Colonial Policy," *The American Economic Review* 9, no. 1, Supplement, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (March, 1919): 325-340; See also , Robert L. Tignor, *Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 14, 196-200; P.T. Bauer, *West African Trade* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954); D. K. Fieldhouse, *Merchant Capital and Economic Decolonisation: The United Africa Company, 1929-1987* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
[197] Stephanie Decker, "Building Up Goodwill: British Business, Development and Economic Nationalism in Ghana and Nigeria, 1945-1977," *Enterprise & Society* 9, Issue 4 (December 2008): 602-613.
[198] U.S. Department of Commerce, *Africa: Sales Frontier for U.S. Business,* Superintendent of Documents (1963).

American capitalist expansion in Africa, giving rise to growing calls for nationalization and African-led development.[199] Leading the charge was Ghanaian president and devout Pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah. In November 1965, an embattled yet still influential Nkrumah published a damning attack on the United States and other European powers in a book titled *Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. In the book, Nkrumah blamed the United States for the setbacks experienced by African socialists and labelled Western aid programs "neocolonialist traps" intended to "exploit" Africa and forestall its economic development.[200]

Rather than try to address these criticisms on their own, white American executives increasingly employed black Americans to help them improve their image. American corporations began initiatives employing black Americans in marketing in the United States. During the post-war decades, several American corporations, including Pepsi and Esso Standard Oil, experimented with using black salesman to tap what many perceived as a growing consumer market comprised of black American consumers flush with war-time wages.[201] Social unrest, including boycotts and urban riots, later provided further reason for American corporations to promote black Americans. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the first black American directors and executives were appointed in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a direct consequence of shareholder and other kinds of activism.[202] In 1972, following the lead of companies like General Motors, pharmaceutical company Johnson & Johnson named Harold R. Sims director of the company's newly created Corporate Affairs department. Having previously served as executive

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[199] Robert L. Tignor, *Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire*; In parts of East Africa, the discourse of nationalism led to the seizure of properties of Indian and Arab residents, as well as Europeans. See James Brennan, *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2012).
[200] Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1965).
[201] Robert E. Weems, *Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumerism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 1998).
[202] Marcia Chatelain, in particular, argues that McDonald's began to use black managers in their urban franchises as a form of social insurance against riots. "The Miracle of the Golden Arches: Race and Fast Food in Los Angeles," *Pacific Historical Review* 85, no. 3 (August 2016): 325-353.

secretary to Sargent Shriver in the Office of Economic Opportunity and interim president of the National Urban League, Sims was well-placed, in the company's view, to "represent Johnson & Johnson [to] the minority communities."[203] Internal memos further reveal the company's motivation in appointing Sims to oversee a series of new affirmative action programs aimed at "identify and grooming capable" black men and women for management positions, as well as benefits programs providing education and affordable housing for non-white and other female employees. Company executives hoped these efforts would reduce chances for "disquiet, company dissension and inflammatory situations as experienced at AT&T, Polaroid, Sears, and MacMillan and Company, to name but a few."[204]

Less than three years after joining the company, Johnson & Johnson promoted Sims to the position of Vice President of Corporate Affairs.[205] Alongside the new title came new responsibilities, namely aiding the company's expansion into Africa. Building on the company's successful marketing of its products in Latin America, Sims put together a team of researchers to explore areas for expansion in Africa, which by 1975 included operations in South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia. One researcher who joined Sims was Robert A. Obudho, a Kenyan native and graduate student at Rutgers Business School located in New Brunswick, where Johnson & Johnson was headquartered. Building on Johnson & Johnson's existing operations, Obudho stressed the growing importance of "[black] African markets."[206] Despite economic instability, which Obudho attributed to Africa's dependence on exports of "raw materials…[and]

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[203] Memo, Vice President Corporate Affairs, Corporate Staff, [circa 1972] Box 11, Harold R. Sims Papers, Rutgers University, Special Collections and University Archives. (Hereafter cited as Sims Papers)

[204] Memo, "Consideration of Women's Discussion Groups and periodic Steering Committee meetings with upper management," September 27, 1974, Sims Papers, Box 1; Meeting Minutes, Special Meeting of the Council of Personnel Directors, November 20, 1972, Sims Papers, Box 11

[205] "Johnson & Johnson Names H.R. Sims Vice-President," *Jet,* December 11, 1975: 6.

[206] R.A. Obudho, "A Comparative Study of the Political, Cultural, and Socio-Economic History of Africa and Latin America: Towards An Investment Strategy for Johnson & Johnson in Africa" (November 1975), Sims Papers, Box 10.

foreign aid, alongside "general poverty," Obudho advised his superiors that Africa was ripe for business expansion. Rapid urbanization, increased development assistance by international and local governments, a growing African middle class, and bountiful natural resources, all pointed to a promising future.[207]

As with racial integration in American businesses domestically, American company executives looked to Sims and his department to provide particular expertise, including knowledge related to the "political and economic uncertainties on the continent," which executives used as coded language to refer to African nationalism and other kinds of racial tensions.[208] Among the suggestions made by Obudho in his report to company executives was the importance of "avoid[ing] looking foreign," adding that "under no circumstances should our distribution be a foreign company or a company managed, directed, or owned by non-Black Africans…All distribution of our products MUST be done by Africa-owned and managed local companies;" within ten years, the local plant should be "fully manned by able Africans."[209]

Corporate efforts to combat neocolonial critiques went beyond hiring black salespeople and managers to increasingly involve the deployment of corporate social responsibility programs that engaged local communities. During the early 1970s, Johnson & Johnson unfurled a series of programs supporting adult education and job-training in areas on the continent where the company had a presence.[210] Reporting on these programs, Sims noted that company's efforts "to

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[207] Among the statistics cited by Obudho was the fact that between 1967 and 1972, the annual flow of direct assistance from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (D.A.C.), an organization representing thirty-member states and international development organizations, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to Africa increased by 31 percent from $586 million in 1967-68 to $768 million in 1971-72. R.A. Obudho, "A Comparative Study of the Political, Cultural, and Socio-Economic History of Africa and Latin America: Towards An Investment Strategy for Johnson & Johnson in Africa" (November 1975), Sims Papers, Box 10.
[208] Ibid.
[209] Ibid.
[210] Ibid.

develop the social responsibility component to [their African strategy]….continue[d] with increasing success," including the cultivation of local African managers and a conference on corporate social responsibility in Africa.[211]

Many of these corporate outreach efforts furthermore directly benefited black empowerment organizations managed by and/or with ties to black American businessmen like Sims. Reporting on Johnson & Johnson's operations on the continent, Sims praised their work with the African-American Institute (AAI), a non-profit organization founded by Lincoln University president Horace Mann Bond and Howard University president William Leo Hansberry to provide academic and professional training for Africans. "AAI has been invaluable to me" with regards to Johnson & Johnson's operations in Zambia, Sims noted. "I am confident that they will be of ever greater value to me and to Johnson & Johnson…as we get more deeply involved in business opportunities and strategies on the African continent."[212]

In 1971, Sullivan joined General Motors (GM)'s board of directors. As explained in Chapter Three, the circumstances underlying Sullivan's appointment had more to do with domestic than international politics. Yet, like Sims, Sullivan quickly found himself serving as a corporate diplomat representing GM's interests in Africa. Alluding to his involvement with regards to GM's Africa program, Sullivan reported on General Motors plans to set up "plants…in several African countries—*Black* African countries. I can't go any further on this, but it will happen. When it does, I will want to see General Motors get more involved in the communities where their plants are located in terms of housing or educational systems and

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[211] Summary Report of Major Accomplishments Against 1975 Stated Goals as of Oct. 15, 1975, Sims Papers, Box 14; Johnson & Johnson additionally sent Sims to represent the company at the meetings of various international organizations, including the African American Institute, Nigerian-American Friendship Society United Nations. Memo, Harold Sims to John H. Heldrich, Subject: Bob Obudho, December 1, 1977; Memo Harold Sims to John H. Heldrich, May 30, 1978, Sims Papers, Box 14.

[212] Support of Special Fund Request from the African-American Institute, March 24, 1976, Sims Papers, Box 10.

opportunities, even beyond the public educational systems."[213] Having previously operated

assembly plants in South Africa and Egypt since the 1910s, GM executives saw an opportunity

to grow their operations in post-independence East Africa in the 1970s. Located at the center of

East Africa's rapidly expanding economy and closely allied with the United States, company

officials selected Kenya as the ideal site for a new assembly plant.[214] Shortly after joining GM's

board, Sullivan met with Kenyan Finance Minister Mwai Kibaki and several other members of

the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, where he raised the possibility of General

Motors establishing a plant outside of Nairobi.[215]

Following prolonged discussions between GM and the Kenyan government that took

place over several years, Sullivan, acting on behalf of the company, signed an agreement in June

1975 establishing a joint venture, General Motors Kenya Limited. In line with local concerns

regarding foreign influence, ownership of the joint venture was split, with fifty-one percent

owned by the government-owned Kenyan Industrial Commercial Development Corporation and

the remaining forty-nine owned by GM.[216] Initial projections estimated the 100,000 square-foot

plant, built to assemble "light, medium, and heavy-duty…commercial vehicles" would have "the

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[213] "Churchism is Dead! Jim McGraw interview Dr. Leon Sullivan founder of Opportunities Industrialization Centers," *Christianity and Crisis: A Christian Journal of Opinion* XXXI, no. 23, January 10, 1972, LHS Papers, Box 25, Folder Kenya OIC.

[214] During the mid-1970s, Kenya was considered by many Western observers to be one of Africa's most stable and prosperous countries, and had close ties to the United States. By 1977, over one hundred American companies, with a total investment of $185 million, were doing business in Kenya, including Firestone, Esso, and IBM, all of them having moved there since independence. Roger Mann, "Washington's Close Ally in Africa: 'Kenya Is Doing things the Way we Like to See Them Done," *Washington Post,* August 17, 1977: A20.

[215] Correspondence, Valfoulaye Diallo to Hon. Mwai Kibaki, Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, June 22, 1971, OICI Papers, Box 7, Folder 27; Correspondence Valfoulaye Diallo to Mr. H.E. Mbiyu Koinange, June 22, 1971, OICI Papers, box 7, Folder 27.

[216] Scope of Work for the OICI Kenya/General Motors Corporation Project, OICI Papers, Box 4; Elsewhere, others have claimed GM's holding in the company GM Kenya Ltd. were at 57.7% with the Kenyan government holding 38.5%, which was later apportioned out to the Industrial and Commercial Development Corp. (20%) and Centrum Investment Co. Ltd. (17.8%) with Itochu KK having the remainder (4.5%). Louis F. Fourie, *On a Global Mission: The Automobiles of General Motors International: Volume 3: GM Worldwide Review, North American Specifications and Executive Listings* (Victoria: Friesen Press, 2016), 1150-1151.

capacity to build 6,000 vehicles a year…[and] employ 400 people," out-performing competitors British Leyland and Volkswagen, which announced plans to construct a $2.3 million assembly plant capable of producing 3,650 automobiles a year.[217]

For Sullivan, the plant itself was only one source of black empowerment. In exchange for his help negotiating with the Kenyan government, GM agreed to directly partner with OICI to provide training. First launched in 1971 to great acclaim, OIC-Kenya had struggled to gain local support and thus fulfil its mission of weaning off USAID funding.[218] Despite promises by the Minister of Finance, the Kenyan government hesitated in granting OICI tax-exempt status following the program's launch in 1971. Among the reasons stated, the Kenyan government expressed their concerns that OICI could provide the U.S. government an excuse to redirect aid promised to Kenya to the U.S.-based non-governmental organization. This suspicion on the part of the Kenyan government continued despite OICI's best attempts to assure the government they were there to "[compliment] existing [government] technical institutes," not replace them.[219]

Lacking government support and on the brink of losing its USAID funding, Sullivan turned to American corporations to provide the boost OIC-Kenya needed to remain afloat. In particular, Sullivan tapped his network of American corporate executives, many of whom were members of OIC's National Industry Advisory Council in the United States, for assistance in the form of money, equipment, and technical expertise for OIC-Kenya. Among the companies solicited were General Electric Company, Coca-Cola, Pfizer, McGraw-Hill, Inc., Firestone Tire

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[217] "GM, Kenya Set Plant Near Nairobi to Make Commercial Vehicles," *Wall Street Journal,* June 11, 1975: 2, "G.M. is Planning Projects Abroad of $26.5-Million," *New York Times,* June 11, 1975: 59.
[218] News clipping, "Centres Will Train Technical Manpower," *Daily Nation* [Nairobi, Kenya] August 26, 1971, OICI Papers, Box 7, Folder 27, OIC-Kenya Files; "Black Americans to train Kenyans," *East African Standard* [Nairobi, Kenya] September 20, 1971, "U.S. Expert Will Help Kenya in Jobs Programme," *Daily Nation* [Nairobi, Kenya] September 19, 1971, OICI Papers, Box 8, Folder 27; OIC-Kenya Files
[219] Correspondence, Walter J. Clarke to Valfoulaye Diallo, Re: New Proposed Program – A Response, December 19, 1972, LHS Papers, Box 25, Folder Kenya OIC

and Rubber Company, Esso International, Inc., IBM, PepsiCo, Chrysler, and Crown Cork.[220] In making his appeal to American executives, Sullivan deployed the critique of neocolonialism to his advantage, noting, if American business "want to continue their dealings in Africa on a positive basis," they needed to do away with the "colonial concept." In Sullivan's terms, this meant "American businessmen," needed to "put more than they take out" by investing in black empowerment programs like OICI, led by black people.[221]

With Sullivan serving on the company's board of directors, it was no surprise that General Motors agreed to send a representative to serve on the Industrial Advisory Committee for OIC-Kenya.[222] GM's support for black empowerment went further, however. As part of the agreement negotiated by Sullivan and GM with regards to the company's Nairobi plant, GM agreed to use the services of OIC Kenya to assist in training a local labor force in collaboration with "local manpower institutions" run by the government.[223] This pattern was repeated with other OIC operations across the continent. In Ghana, for example, OIC reached an agreement with Texaco Oil to provide materials and the training facility for an OIC training program for auto mechanics. Echoing the Christian savior logic embedded in Sullivan's own rhetoric, Texaco Manager W.K. McNulty noted, "We are convinced that the OICG is doing a good job, providing hope for the otherwise hopeless."[224].

Often touted as vehicles for empowering black Americans and black Africans— engendering dignity, in Sullivan's terms—these various joint partnerships with American

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[220] Correspondence, LHS Papers, Box 25, Folder Kenya OIC.
[221] Sullivan quoted in James Cassell, "Money Now, Liberation Later, African Says at OIC Meeting," *Philadelphia Tribune,* September 11, 1973: 24, "OIC's Rev. Sullivan Appeals for More Aid," *New York Amsterdam News,* August 8, 1970: 22.
[222] Correspondence, Walter J. Clark, Program Planning Officer, OICI, to General Motors Overseas Distributors Corporation, M. Kolodi, May 10, 1972, LHS Papers, Box 25, Folder Kenya OIC.
[223] Scope of Work for the OICI Kenya/General Motors Corporation Project, OICI Papers, Box 4
[224] Texaco News, January-March, 1974, OICI Papers, Box 21.

corporations did not always live up to that ideal. Indeed, in some instances, they performed

almost the opposite function, serving as training grounds for a new class of white American

managers. Following the initial fanfare around the construction of General Motors' plant in

Nairobi, little news regarding the facility appeared in Western media for nearly a decade. When

the *Toronto Star* published an article on the occasion of the plant's ten-year anniversary, the

picture appeared somewhat different from initial projections. In place of a high-tech facility,

bringing Kenyans all the best modern business had to offer, the *Star* journalist found a "low-tech

factory on the outskirts of Nairobi… [that was] small and simple compared with the highly

automated…plants in America, Japan and Europe." Where in every other GM factory "dozens of

robots…[and] motorized conveyor belts [moved] vehicles from station to station, the Kenya

plant workers push cars and trucks by hand on tracks to complete each assembly."[225] Further

belying the company's promise of empowering local Africans, the plant functioned as a "unique

training ground for [white American] GM executives." Elaborating on the appeal Africa held for

white American employees, Ed White, who headed GM Kenya's manufacturing division, noted:

"When I was in Detroit, I was just head of one team of engineers and could have been lost in the

ranks of white-collar managers. But here, I'm involved in every part of the business and deal

directly with everybody, from the men on the factory floor to the finance people and the director

of marketing and sales."[226] White's description of his time Kenya gives further meaning to the

promotional materials describing Africa as the next "frontier" for American business. Far from a

trivial choice of words, frontier, evoked, for many Americans, a particular historical relationship

in which white Americans made their fortunes through expropriating the lands and labor of

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[225] "'Low-tech' GM factory marks 10 Years in Kenya: [SA2 Edition]," *Toronto Star,* April 25, 1987: G9.
[226] "'Low-tech' GM factory marks 10 Years in Kenya: [SA2 Edition]," *Toronto Star,* April 25, 1987: G9.

native peoples. Deployed in reference to Africa, it likewise represented the aspirations of business empire managed by white American executives and managers.

Spectacle and Power

As a minister, Sullivan was well-known as a powerful orator. Yet even he knew words alone were insufficient compared to the power of spectacle. Looking back, it is notable to observe the investment OIC officials put into displaying their program to potential supporters in government and business, both in the United States and Africa. These visual performances proved crucial with regards to building and reaffirming patron ties and inculcating a sense of local pride in the work performed by OIC.

OIC's self-help program was on full display in a series of high stakes visits from government officials in the spring and summer of 1975. Spring 1975 found OICI staff and trainees working "diligently," in the words of OICI-Accra director Ofori-Atta to prepare for the official visit of Ghanaian Head of State Colonel I.K. Acheampong's visit. During the weeks preceding Acheampong's visit, regular training classes were put on hold to make time for more pressing matters, including repairing all windows and doors, installing new locks and latches, constructing shelves for storage and applying a fresh coat of paint to the building. The final touch, the construction of a window on the building was left for the Head of State's visit itself as a demonstration for the colonel. "This," referring to the act of window construction, Ofori-Atta stated, "was a special plus for the organization as a whole in that it was evidence of the fact that we are practicing the philosophy, 'we help ourselves,' and at the same time it was letting everyone know that our trainees can perform up to professional standard."[227]

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[227] OIC Ghana, Monthly Report, April 1975, OICI Papers, Box 7, Folder 1.

Spectacles like the one associated with Acheampong's visit assumed a central role in the expansion of OIC in Africa, performing what program participants envisioned as an ideal model of black empowerment to an audience comprised of OIC's American investors and African hosts. Referring to the Head of State's visit, Ofori-Atta described the event, which he and his staff spent weeks preparing, as the "most scintillating experience."[228] In addition to the modifications made to the building, OIC participants performed cultural labor that contributed to the showiness of the event. Following a tour of the center, the Colonel and his entourage were treated to a song performed by OIC trainees and a presentation of book-ends made by trainees. The added touch of the cultural performance solidified in the eyes of local leaders the utility of the OIC program, which harnessed local labor and craftmanship to produce a distinctly African model of development that likewise could be appreciated by Western visitors. Following a series of speeches from OIC board members and trainees, the Colonel himself announced his acceptance of an invitation to serve as OIC's chief patron followed by a call for OIC centers to be established in all regions of the country.[229] Similar celebrations accompanied Sullivan's visit several months later, at which time, the Asantehene (Monarch of the Kingdom of Ashanti) presented a cash gift of c1,000.00 to the OIC Kumasi in a gesture, described by one local OIC official, that proved a "lasting inspiration" and "left a mark of confidence in the staff [and] trainees."[230]

Africans, on their part, imbibed their own meanings from these ritualistic performances. Whereas OIC officials saw the aforementioned ceremonies as confirmation of local support for their vision, many participants, including instructors, viewed these exchanges as indicative of

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[228] Ibid.
[229] Ibid.
[230] Combined Monthly Report, July 1977, OIC Ghana, OICI Papers, Box 7, Folder 4.

social obligations owed them as newfound clients within OIC's patronage network.[231] In July 1977, the director of OICI Ghana in Accra wrote his superiors in Philadelphia informing them of an issue regarding two instructors recently hired to assist with the Feeder Program. The first sign of trouble appeared when "[t]he two instructresses, Miss M. Kwarteng and Mrs. A. Howsam, did not attend the staff development course; Miss Kwarteng, because of indisposition; Mrs. Howsam, because she and her husband were dissatisfied with transport arrangements." The complaints from Mrs. Howsam and her husband persisted in subsequent months, with Mrs. Howsam going so far as to threaten to quit if "a new bed was not provided for them [and] accommodation closer to the Centre [of town] was not found." As a result, local staff were forced to have another teacher fill in and cover Mrs. Howsam's classes, leading OICI administers in Philadelphia to contemplate finding a permanent replacement if the situation did not resolve itself.[232] Viewed by OICI administrators as a potentially "disruptive element in the smooth running of the center," the Howsams provide an example of Africans' efforts to imbue American-sponsored black empowerment programs with notions of social obligations owed them as loyal members of OICI.

Rather than meet the Howsam's requests, which officials claimed would only "cause dissension with the other staff," OIC administrators blamed the problems the organization encountered on local mismanagement.[233] Reporting on their chapters' failure to meet previously established goals of placing nineteen trainees each month, OIC Ghana chairman G.Y. Odoi blamed the problem on the lack of foresight on the part of local staff. The issue, according to

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[231] For more on social obligations embedded in economic transactions see, Parker Shipton, "Luo Entrustment: Foreign Finance and the Soil of the Spirits in Kenya," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 65, no. 2 (1995): 165-196.

[232] Combined Monthly Report, July 1977, OIC Ghana, OICI Papers, Box 7, Folder. 4.

[233] Monthly Report Response – August, 1977, Gary Robinson to Albert T. Jacobs, OIC Ghana, OICI Papers, Box 7, Folder 4.

Odoi, was not a lack of jobs. Indeed, recently eight jobs had become available in carpentry and five in masonry, yet "neither of these areas [had] trainees who [were]…job ready." Rather, Odoi, placing the blame firmly on local staff, concluded that "[i]t is obvious that Job Developers are not spending enough time in developing jobs for the trainees who are near job ready status."[234]

During the mid-1970s, these and other failings to meet the goals laid out in OICI's contract with USAID gave fodder to growing criticism of OICI in Washington. With the initial USAID grant approaching expiration, Chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee Senator Hubert Humphrey introduced legislation calling for $3 million in additional funding for OICI in the form of an amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act in 1976.[235] Unlike initial support for OICI's Africa program, which had met little opposition, Humphrey's bill provoked widespread criticism from government bureaucrats and politicians related to OICI's efficacy. Indeed, officials from the U.S. General Accounting Office on Appropriations singled out OICI for failing to meet expectations in a special report on USAID funding for private voluntary organizations presented to Congress. OICI, opponents noted disapprovingly, had continued to receive "budgetary support…despite the fact that its record of performance on prior contracts had been evaluated by AID and the Department of State Inspector General for Foreign Assistance as inadequate."[236] According to the author of the report, in April 1975, "a former OICI employee…made 78 different—but interrelated—allegations of mismanagement and improper practice." These allegations were later validated by an AID

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[234] OIC Ghana, Monthly Program Report for January, 1975, OICI Papers, Box 7, Folder 1.
[235] Harry Amana, "Billions for Vietnam, While OIC and Africa Fight for $3 Million," *Philadelphia Tribune,* February 15, 1975: 1; Dan Morgan, "Humphrey Criticized on Aid Funding," *Washington Post,* February 13, 1975: A1, An Act to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act, and for other purposes, H.R. 13680, 94th Cong. (1976).
[236] Report of United States General Accounting Office on Appropriations re: Agency for International Development programs to channel foreign assistance funds to developing countries through private and voluntary organizations, April 20, 1976, OICI Papers, Box 3, Folder 28.

Auditor General investigation, which found "that poor management was exercised over funds and people…[and] instances where it appeared the facts were misrepresented on per diem claims, personal effects were shipped at U.S. Government expense, personnel performance evaluation reports were misused to terminate employees."[237] The report concluded by casting doubt on "the viability of OICI's programs" and recommended that Congress reconsider funding the organization.[238]

Despite Sullivan's assertion, one could not ignore the fact that the bulk of OICI funding continued to flow from the U.S. government. With time, this relationship raised questions regarding the organization's claim to represent a new model of development. In particular, Congress' debate over whether to continue funding OICI served as an audible reminder of the power of the U.S. government to dictate the terms of black empowerment despite whatever claims the organization might make with regards to self-help. Shifting tactics, an enraged Sullivan reminded Americans of the moral capital his organization offered in the face of anti-imperialist activists critical of the United States' involvement in Southeast Asia. "The government will spend billions of dollars in South Vietnam, Cambodia, South Korea and the Far East, but quarrel about a measly $3 million for Africa," Sullivan told the *Philadelphia Tribune*.[239] Moreover, Sullivan claimed, implying that failure to support OIC amounted to an endorsement of racism, "this is the first time in Black or African history that a Black group has a record of success in trying to help our own people on the continent."[240]

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[237] Ibid.
[238] Ibid.
[239] Sullivan quoted in Harry Amana, "Billions for Vietnam, While OIC and Africa Fight for $3 Million," *Philadelphia Tribune,* February 15, 1975: 1.
[240] Ibid.

Ultimately, the pressure worked. Subsequently, Congress voted to renew its support for

OICI, approving funds to expand the Africa program to three additional countries—Sierra Leone,

Togo, and Zambia. Meanwhile, the U.S. government granted an additional $3.2 million to enact

Phase II of OICI's Ghana project.[241] Survival proved conditional, however. While publicly, OICI

maintained its appearance as "an independent organization…not…controlled by anyone," this

image was increasingly contested by black activists critical of OICI and other black

empowerment programs relationship with the U.S. government.[242]

Contracted Aid

During the late 1970s, OICI continued to expand its Africa program, including launching

new chapters in Zambia and Lesotho. In doing so, it joined other non-governmental

organizations engaged in a renegotiation of power and patronage on the continent.[243]

Independent in name, many of these non-governmental organizations or private voluntary

organizations (PVO), as they were called, remained contractually obligated to a new, yet rapidly

expanding entity, namely the USAID.

Founded in 1961, USAID was the brainchild of John F. Kennedy, who created the agency

to carry out, in words reminiscent of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United States' "moral

obligations as a wise leader and good neighbor in the interdependent community of free

nations…and [the] political obligations as the single largest counter to the adversaries of

freedom."[244] Kennedy's comments, echoed by other government officials, went part and parcel

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[241] Ibid.

[242] Harry Amana, "Billions for Vietnam, While OIC and Africa Fight for $3 Million," *Philadelphia Tribune,* February 15, 1975: 1.

[243] Gregory Mann, *From Empires to NGOs in the West African Sahel* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[244] John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Foreign, March 22, 1961, *The American Presidency Project,* http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8545.

with a broader effort to portray American globalism as distinct from European colonialism. As part of this effort, Kennedy imbued USAID with a mission to support American foreign policy "through partnerships" enacted with *autonomous* foreign governments and *non-governmental* institutions.[245] In theory, the autonomy of each party was protected by the contract, which, in accordance with liberal ideology, each party entered into freely. As we shall see, however, in practice the autonomy of grantees proved more constrained.

"It is the policy of the United States that all Federal agencies, Government contractors and subcontractors use U.S. flag carriers for international air transportation of personnel and cargo. (A similar policy applies to ocean shipments)."[246] These instructions appeared in a letter from Chief Overhead and Special Costs Branch at the State Department F.J. Moncada to OICI director Gary Robinson alongside a list of requested revisions of OICI policies ranging from job classifications, salaries, vacation, and insurance coverage. Couched in the benign language of cost-saving measures intended to improve organizational efficiency, Moncada's memo likewise reinforced what OICI officials knew and yet were often reluctant to acknowledge: that their contract with the USAID ensured that their organization, despite claims otherwise, was legally accountable to the U.S. government.

During the 1970s, USAID's role as an independent agency came under growing criticism, however, from grantees claiming their autonomy was being threatened. In a memo to USAID's Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation Director Thomas H. Fox, AID representatives noted that a number of programs had criticized "AID's role in respect to evaluation of PVO [private

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[245] David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
[246] Correspondence F.J. Moncada, Chief, Overhead and Special Costs Branch, Office of Contract Management, Department of State, to Gary Robinson, International Director, OICI, OICI Papers, Box 20.

voluntary organization]…as too directed."[247] In response to a surge of complaints from AID

grantees, USAID officials convened a two-day workshop on AID-PVO relations during which

Fox stressed USAID's interest in support[ing] PVOs: "We [at USAID] are anxious to help along

a process which improves projects and yields data and management tools of importance to all of

us and support of PVOs' programs."[248] Less than three months following the conference,

however, AID officials again found themselves facing criticism regarding the relationship with

grantees, including OICI. In a memorandum from AID officer Ross Bigelow to Fox, Bigelow

raised concerns regarding Liberia AID director Remo Ray Garufi's recent comments to OICI

staff that "the project was viewed as an integral part of the mission bilateral program." This, as

Bigelow told Fox, implied OICI "was the responsibility of USAID to manage," resulting in

serious dispute as to the exact nature of the relationship between USAID and OICI. Bigelow,

perhaps, summarized the issue best, when he raised the question to his superiors: "who manages

the project, USAID or the [private voluntary organization]?"[249]

The exact nature of OICI and other black empowerment programs' relationship with the

U.S. government likewise provoked questions among black activists engaged in the international

struggle against white-rule in southern Africa. With the triumph of various movements for

African independence across much of the north, eastern, and western parts of Africa, many

Africans and their descendants in the diaspora turned their focus to ongoing anti-colonial and

anti-apartheid struggles in southern Africa, including those in Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique,

and South Africa. Using their newly-acquired seats in Congress and the power of the media,

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[247] Memo, Thomas H. Fox, Director, Office of Private Voluntary Organizations, Department of State, August 8, 1979, OICI Papers, Box 4.
[248] Ibid.
[249] Memorandum Ross E. Bigelow to Thomas H. Fox, October 23, 1979, OICI Papers, Box 4.

black Americans and white radicals brought the situation in southern Africa to the attention of Americans.[250]

The expansion of armed conflicts in Angola and Rhodesia caused significant problems for the United States government, which had previously refrained from speaking out with regards to black independence struggles in the region (while silently funneling support for white-minority regimes).[251] Confronted by African leaders and black Americans concerned about growing Soviet and Cuban involvement in the region, the Ford Administration decided it was necessary to shift tactics. In a 1976 tour of the continent, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger broke with the U.S. government's silence on the subject by announcing a new U.S. policy toward southern Africa that included supporting majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, while evading the more contentious issue of South African Apartheid.[252] Almost immediately, Kissinger's speech sparked controversy at home. Despite the shift in Kissinger's rhetoric, anti-imperialist activists like those in the PLC claimed little had changed; U.S. policy towards southern Africa remained racist.[253] Among the evidence provided by activists to support their claims was the United States'

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[250] Francis Njubi Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Robert Kinloch Massie, *Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years* (New York: Nan A. Talese/Doubleday, 1997); Nancy Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Stanford: Stanford University Press), 133.

[251] Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter in Africa;* See also, Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

[252] Kissinger's "new era in American policy" was later outlined in a speech delivered in Lusaka before an emotional Kenneth Kuanda, who, according to observers, shed tears in response to Kissinger's declaration that "black and white people" must work together to bring about a new era of peace, well-being, and human dignity," and embraced the U.S. Secretary of State. Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter in Africa,* 37-57; "Secretary Kissinger's Speech of April 27, 1976," Appendix to U.S. Policy Toward Africa, Report by the Committee on Foreign Relations, No. 94-780, May 5, 1976.

[253] Linn Washington, "OIC Refuses to Withdraw Invitation to Kissinger," *Philadelphia Tribune,* August 31, 1976: 1; See also, Hal Baron and Prexy Nesbitt, "Working Paper for an Alternative to Kissinger's Southern Africa Policy," Amilcar Cabral Collective, Campaign for a Democratic Foreign Policy, [Undated, late 1976 or early 1977], Kenneth K. Martin Southern Africa Collection, Michigan State University Libraries Special Collections.

refusal to recognize Angola's new government led by the People's Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and to take a stronger stand against Apartheid in South Africa.[254]

Kissinger, on his part, used the occasion of OIC's 12th Annual Convocation in Philadelphia to defend his policies. At a press conference following his keynote address, Kissinger, accompanied by Sullivan, tapped into Cold War fears of communism to justify the government's position on Angola: "Our concern is with the influence and existence of a large Cuban force," which had supported the MPLA defeat U.S.-backed UNITA. Moreover, Kissinger stressed patience and "moderati[on]" with regards to the region. Condemning black militants, the Secretary stated, "violence will only escalate bloodshed and lengthen, rather than shorten, the road" to majority rule.[255]

Echoing Kissinger, Sullivan likewise counselled moderation. Addressing picketers protesting Kissinger's keynote address, Sullivan noted that the demonstrators "[had] the right to picket. They have the right to express their views." Seeking common ground, Sullivan then reminded protesters that he himself was an activist: "I used to be on the picket line myself." Times had changed, however, and OIC's "convocation [was] not designed for debate, but to have people in government position express their views and policies to the community." [256] For Sullivan, the time for protest was over and black Americans needed to work with the U.S. government, which funded programs like OIC at home and abroad.[257] It was a small sacrifice to support the larger goal of black empowerment.

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[254] Ibid.

[255] Linn Washington, "Kissinger Maintains Hardline on Angola; Side Steps Mozambique," *Philadelphia Tribune,* September 4, 1976: 9.

[256] Sullivan quoted in Linn Washington, "OIC Refuses to Withdraw Invitation to Kissinger," *Philadelphia Tribune,* August 31, 1976: 1.

[257] On the move from protest to institutional consolidation of Black Power, see Matthew J. Countryman, "From Protest to Politics Community Control and black Independent Politics in Philadelphia, 1965-1984," *Journal of Urban History* 32, issue 6 (September 2006): 813-861; Bayard Rustin, "From Protest to Politics: The Future of the

Subsequently, the question of southern Africa took on increasing significance within American politics. Angered by what they perceived the U.S. government's yielding to black revolutionaries, locally and in Africa, a growing number of white Americans turned to a conservative Hollywood actor turned politician named Ronald Reagan to articulate their frustrations.[258] In a fiery speech to the 1976 Republican National Convention that utilized coded language to address the threat posed by black militants, Reagan called on Americans to confront the challenges facing the "erosion of freedom…and] the invasion of private rights." In a call to arms, Reagan concluded his speech by noting the time for negotiating was over. "We've got to quit talking to each other…and go out and communicate [our] message…There is no substitute for victory."[259]

With the turn to southern Africa and Reagan's rise, the earlier optimism that had accompanied American investment on the continent faded. Hesitancy on the part of the U.S. government to condemn white rule in southern Africa, a consequence many associated with the growing wave of conservatism, had, according to U.S. media, endangered the goodwill previously established between the United and African countries over the previous decade and a half. As an example, national media cited Nigeria's rejection of a visit by Kissinger coinciding with a 7.5 percent decline in American investment in "Black Africa's wealthiest country…from $238 million to $220 million."[260]

Civil Rights Movement," in *Looking Forward,* No. 1 in a Series of Occasional Papers (New York: League for Industrial Democracy, reprinted from Commentary, February 1965).

[258]Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009); Jefferson Cowie, *Stayin' Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class* (New York: The New Press, 2010), 366-372.

[259] Ronald Reagan Address to the Republican National Convention, August 19, 1976, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/reference/8.19.76.html; Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter in Africa,* Chapter 3: "Southern Africa Matters."

[260] T.E. Brown, Jr., "Is America Changing Its Africa Policy?" *Sun Reporter;* June 5, 1976: 38.

Growing uncertainty with regards to southern Africa caused problems for OIC. Despite Sullivan's dream of a self-sustaining black commercial empire that extended from Los Angeles to Nairobi, OIC's reality mirrored that of many other non-governmental organizations dependent on U.S. government aid and corporate philanthropy for its survival. Following the burst of initial optimism in the 1960s, U.S. investors increasingly expressed hesitancy with regards to the continent's future growth in the late 1970s. In many instances, fears of political instability infused economic projections. In 1980, OIC was compelled to acknowledge the failure of its chapters in Lesotho and Zambia due to lack of support.[261] Located in regions heavily impacted by the ongoing independence struggle in neighboring Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South West Africa (Namibia), and South Africa, OIC's difficulties in southern Africa shed light on a broader challenge black empowerment programs faced when confronted with a resurgent black militancy, represented here by the various armed struggles for independence.

Conclusion

In May 1976, the *New York Times* published a multi-page spread on American private investment Africa. In a just a little over a decade and a half since the U.S. Department of Commerce declared Africa the next "frontier," U.S. private investment on the continent had grown to over $3.7 billion.[262] Of particular interest, the article noted the growing rate of investment and trade with Black Africa: that is Africa outside of white-ruled South Africa and Rhodesia. Despite concerns stemming from the partial nationalization of oil companies in

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[261] OICI Draft Audit, Grant No. AID/pha-G-1125, OICI Papers, Box 20.
[262] Specific country data with regard to Africa is difficult to come by in this period. As of 1976, the United States Department of Commerce quantified U.S. direct investment in only four African countries, South Africa ($1.5 billion), Libya ($542 million), Nigeria ($238 million), and Liberia ($258 million). Paul Lewis, "Billion-Dollar Stakes in Africa: Billions at Stake in Africa," *New York Times,* May 9, 1976: 99.

Nigeria, American companies retained more than $2.2 billion or sixty-percent of their total assets and conducted more trade with countries other than South Africa and Rhodesia, a dramatic change from prior decades.[263]

No doubt, this growth was due, at least in part, to the United States' embrace of black empowerment. Testifying to the adoption of black empowerment at the highest levels of U.S. foreign policy, Secretary Kissinger announced plans for a new international bank to spur American investment "in the developing parts of the continent," including measures for "production-sharing and arrangements by investors to help develop the managerial, technological and marketing capabilities of the host country." [264] Echoing Sullivan's rhetoric with regards to American corporate-sponsored black empowerment, Kissinger pointed to these measures as "guarantee[s]" of the benefits for "both [American] investor[s] and [Africa] host-nation[s]."[265]

Yet, whereas black empowerment proved an easy sell to American corporate executives and government officials, who saw it as a relatively cheap expenditure that smoothed relations on the continent, the sentiment surrounding black American-led organizations like OIC was decidedly more ambivalent. What began as a small job-training and black economic development center in North Philadelphia in 1964 had by the mid-1970s, with generous assistance from USAID and American corporations, grown into an international organization with chapters in over one-hundred and forty communities across the United States and Africa. As they expanded their program, Sullivan and his colleagues situated their efforts in the context of decades-old project reaching towards a Pan-Africanist, Christian utopia in which all would prosper. "The future of the Black man in America is tied to the future of the Black man in Africa.

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[263] Ibid.
[264] Kissinger quoted in Ibid.
[265] Kissinger quoted in Ibid.

Africa's freedom is our freedom. Africa's prosperity is our prosperity," stated an optimistic

Sullivan at OIC Africa's inaugural celebrations in 1969.[266] Just a few years later OIC found itself

under attack, both from conservatives in Congress questioning the organization's effectiveness

and from activists accusing Sullivan and his peers of collusion with U.S. government officials

and American corporations reaping profits from Apartheid South Africa. Rather than heed the

warnings of conservatives and anti-imperial, left-wing activists and abandon their program,

however, black American entrepreneurs like Sullivan doubled down on promoting black

empowerment in Africa.

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[266] Anna J.W. James, "Dr. Sullivan Hailed by Church Members After African Tour," *Philadelphia Tribune,* March 18, 1969: 1.

Chapter 3

Incorporating Struggle: The Sullivan Principles, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Black Empowerment during the Anti-Apartheid Movement

On the morning of March 1, 1971, Rev. Leon Sullivan dressed in a "new white shirt and black suit," put on his "light gray tie," and prepared to walk over from his room at the Plaza Hotel in New York City to the corporate offices of General Motors (GM).[267] Meeting with corporate executives was nothing new for Sullivan, who spent much of the previous decades forging partnerships with government and industry leaders to promote his job-training and community development program, Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC). By 1970, OIC had chapters in over seventy cities across the United States. Moreover, Sullivan had recently signed a contract with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to expand OIC to six cities in Africa, including Lagos and Nairobi. The morning of March 1, 1971, however, would be the first time Sullivan entered a corporate office as a board member, at the world's largest corporation no less.

Sullivan's appointment to GM's board of directors represented a shift in the struggle for black empowerment. Previously, concentrated on community development, including job-training and black entrepreneurship programs at the neighborhood-level, corporate executives and black businessmen like Sullivan increasingly deployed the politics of black empowerment in response to civil rights activism, as well as an emergent corporate social responsibility movement, which sought to democratize the corporation through shareholder activism and other challenges to corporate management. Corporate executives hoped that their support of black empowerment initiatives, including the appointment of black executives like Sullivan, would

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[267] Leon Sullivan, *Moving Mountains: The Principles and Purposes of Leon Sullivan* (Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1998), 1.

serve as a bulwark against government regulation and popular protests, both of which threatened to undermine businesses' positive image.

Sullivan's appointment to GM's board of directors proved only the tip of the iceberg. Whereas in 1969 there had been only one black American on the board of a *Fortune* 500 company, by mid-1971 there were at least a dozen. By the end of 1972, there were fifty-four black directors in *Fortune* 500 companies.[268] The rapid entry of black executives into the highest chambers of U.S. corporate management presented new opportunities and challenges for the black power movement and the broader global black freedom struggle. Never one to shy away from the spotlight, Sullivan took advantage of his new platform to promote his own agenda advocating for black economic empowerment. Speaking to reporters shortly after his first board meeting, Sullivan declared, "[I want] to see blacks in executive jobs, and…blacks on the ladder going up."[269]

Contrary to the expectations of many left-wing activists and critics, many American corporate executives cooperated with black executives on black empowerment programs aimed at improving opportunities for black Americans, including, but not limited to, black employees and their families. Responding to Sullivan's call for more black Americans in skilled positions, General Motors partnered with OIC on a program training black auto dealers and mechanics.[270] GM's support for OIC reflected a broader shift among U.S. corporate executives supporting civil rights legislation and equal opportunity programs in the United States after the mid-1960s.[271]

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[268] Richard L. Zweigenhaft and G. William Domhoff, *Diversity in the Power Elite: How it Happened, Why It Matters* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 91-93, 99.
[269] "Rev. Leon Sullivan to Push for More Black Representation in General Motors Co." *Philadelphia Tribune,* March 9, 1971: 3.
[270] "Rev. Sullivan: Pushing Hard for Black Economic Progress," *Sacramento Observer,* May 18, 1972: F-9.
[271] For more on the shift within corporate America with regards to the public disavowal of racial discrimination, see Jennifer Delton, *Racial Integration in Corporate America, 1940-1990* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

When it came to advocating for racial equality beyond the borders of the United States, however, American executives drew the line. Such action, they argued, would be perceived as interfering with the sovereign affairs of a foreign country.

Debates over the internationalization of corporate social responsibility and black empowerment came to a head during the international struggle to end Apartheid in South Africa. South Africa's oppressive Apartheid regime worked to extract vast stores of diamonds, gold, and other mineral resources; thus, the country emerged in the post-war era as a center of international investment and trade.[272]

Taking advantage of newly acquired access city councils, university campuses, and shareholder meetings, black activists increasingly used these venues to pressure American corporations and financial institutions to divest from South Africa as part of a growing international anti-apartheid movement.[273] Yet, here, sanctions and divestment activists encountered a surprising obstacle to their efforts, namely newly appointed black executives and directors, many of whom supported American corporations continued presence in South Africa on the condition that they promote black empowerment and corporate social responsibility.

Unlike black neighborhoods (Chapter One) and post-colonial African cities (Chapter Two), the corporate boardroom is a less obvious choice for understanding the transformations that ultimately shaped the post-apartheid/post-colonial black metropoles. Yet, as recent literature on business lobbying demonstrates, American corporations played an active role in shaping post-

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[272] Richard W. Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa: Historical Dimensions of Engagement and Disengagement* (New York University Press, 1990), 250.
[273] On the international sanctions and divestment movement in the United States, see Francis Njubi Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004); Eric J. Morgan, "Into the Struggle: Confronting Apartheid in the United States and South Africa," (PhD dissertation, University of Colorado-Boulder, 2009); Robert Kinloch Massie, *Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years* (New York: Nan A. Talese, 1997); Donald Culverson, *Contesting Apartheid: U.S. Activism, 1960-1987* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999).

war American politics.[274] Building on and expanding this line of inquiry, this chapter details American corporations' efforts deploying a black empowerment politics forged in the context of the post-war urban crisis, the Black Power movement in response to calls for sanctions and divestment against South Africa. Drafted with the help of Leon Sullivan, the Sullivan Principles, a corporate code of conduct signed by over one-hundred and fifty U.S. companies promoting corporate social responsibility and black empowerment in South Africa, marked a new chapter in American business involvement in international relations.[275]

Scholarship on the international anti-apartheid movement has emphasized the significance of sanctions and divestment. Drawing parallels between Jim Crow and Apartheid, black Americans and other anti-apartheid activists tapped into Cold War rhetoric around democracy and racial equality to highlight the hypocrisy of the United States' support for South Africa's white supremacist regime. Following years of grassroots organizing, including boycotts organized across university campuses, city councils, companies, the U.S. Congress, and the United Nations, activists ultimately succeeded in passing sanctions and divestment prohibitions

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[274] Darren Dochuk, *From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011); Bethany Moreton, *To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Kim Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2009); Benjamin C. Waterhouse, *Lobbying America: The Politics of Business from Nixon to NAFTA* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Meg Jacobs, "The Politics of Environmental Regulation: Business-Government Relations in the 1970s and Beyond," in *What's Good for Business: Business and American Politics since World War II,* edited by Kim Phillips-Fein and Julian E. Zelizer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 212-232; Jennifer Delton, *Racial Integration in Corporate America, 1940-1990* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
[275] The business literature examining corporate social responsibility often cites the Sullivan Principles as the first example of American companies joining together to participate in a CSR program in a foreign country. See, S. Prakesh Sethi, *Setting Global Standards: Guidelines for Creating Codes of Conduct in Multinational Corporations* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 95-109; S. Prakesh Sethi and Oliver F. Williams, *Economic Imperatives and Ethical Values in Global Business: The South African Experience and International Codes Today* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000).

that played an important role in the ultimate collapse of South African Apartheid in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[276]

While a significant factor in mobilizing popular support for the anti-apartheid struggle, the international sanctions and divestment movement alone cannot explain the shifts in U.S. policy towards South Africa and southern Africa more broadly, including U.S. business' continued support for black empowerment in South Africa even after the country's transition to democracy. Drafted by the first black director of GM, Leon Sullivan, and signed by over one-hundred and fifty corporations, the Sullivan Principles reveal the intellectual and financial investments made by dozens of corporate executives, government officials, university presidents, and other black businessmen in re-conceptualizing the role of American business in South Africa, and the world more broadly. Evading criticism of American corporations as complicit actors in the perpetuation of Apartheid through their adherence to South Africa's legal regime and taxes paid to the South African government, the Sullivan signatory companies crafted their own narrative emphasizing American businesses' contributions to black empowerment in the United States and South Africa.

Black Power and Corporate Responsibility at General Motors

Sullivan's appointment to General Motor (GM)'s board of directors followed nearly a year of direct activism targeting the company for exhibiting poor ethical behavior with regards to a number of issues, including racial equality. The Project for Corporate Responsibility (PCR) spearheaded the bulk of these campaigns. Founded in early 1970 by four Washington-based

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[276] Massie, *Loosing the Bonds;* Thomas Borstelmann, *The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Nancy Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2016).

lawyers, the PCR quickly became a leader in the emerging movement for corporate social responsibility. Borrowing from both the consumer and labor movements, corporate social responsibility activists pursued several reforms addressing issues such as consumer safety, environmental degradation, and discrimination in the corporation.[277] Unlike previous twentieth-century social movements, the corporate social responsibility movement included a new protest tool, namely shareholder activism.

In early 1970, PCR organizers took the unconventional step of purchasing shares in General Motors. At the time, for social activists to strategically invest in a company was quite new. While a significant number of Americans began purchasing stocks in the 1930s as part of a business-led movement to counter widespread anti-corporate sentiment during the Depression, shareholder involvement focused on the business-side of corporate affairs until the late 1960s.[278] Drawing on this popular view of the shareholders' role, GM management rejected PCR's proposition of a shareholder resolution. Management accused PCR of inserting what company officials called 'social issues' into the agenda for the company's annual shareholders meetings. Here, however, GM faced opposition from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which overruled GM's petition to block the PCR resolution. This opened the door to further shareholder activism on a range of social issues throughout the 1970s and 1980s.[279] With the

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[277] For more on the history of consumer activism as it relates to the struggle for greater corporate accountability and transparency, see Lawrence Glickman, *Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003).

[278] Julia C. Ott, *When Wall Street Met Main Street: The Question for an Investors' Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); Heidi J. Welsh, "Shareholder Activism," *Corporate Ethics* 9, no. 12 (December 1988): http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1988/12/mm1288_06.html; Stuart L. Gillan and Laura t. Starks, "A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence," *Contemporary Finance Digest* (Autumn 1998), 3, 4, 10-34.

[279] Following the Project for Corporate Responsibility decision, the average number of social issue resolutions filed in the United States per year increased from just under 100 in 1973 to approximately 275 in 1989. Katherine Glac, "The Influence of Shareholders on Corporate Social Responsibility," (working paper No. 2, History of Corporate Responsibility Project, Center for Ethical Business Cultures, University of St. Thomas, Minneapolis, MN, 2010); Heidi J. Welsh, "Shareholder Activism," *Corporate Ethics* 9, No. 12 (December 1988): 9-11; Stuart L. Gillan and

SEC's approval, PCR launched "Campaign GM," targeting a range of issues at the world's largest corporation. Campaign planks included a shareholder resolution demanding GM restrict operations "detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of [American] citizens" and alter the company's management structure to include greater representation from union members, professors, scientists, and, notably, the black community.[280]

PCR's inclusion of a black director in their list of demands opened the door for collaboration with black activists and politicians, who linked the campaign at GM to the movement's demand for 'community control' and Black Power.[281] Speaking at a press conference for Campaign GM, Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm (D-NY) stated that American companies like GM had failed to respond "to the needs of black Americans" for too long.[282] Her comments were echoed by Congressman Louis Stokes (D-OH), brother of Cleveland's first black mayor Carl Stokes. The Congressman called for more black managers and black directors to wield real "decision-making [power] in American corporations."[283]

Laura t. Starks, "A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence," *Contemporary Finance Digest* (Autumn 1998), 3, 4, 10-34; "Campaign GM Group Plans a Second Joust at Firm's Annual Meeting; 3 Proposals Set," *Wall Street Journal,* November 20, 1970: 5.

[280] Eileen Shanahan, "13 in House Back Drive to Put Public Members on G.M. Board," *The New York Times,* May 1, 1970: 13; "'What's good for U.S.' posed at GM annual meeting," *The Christian Science Monitor,* May 25, 1970: 14; Barbara Gold, "New Protest: General Motors Undemocratic?" *The Sun*, May 17, 1970: D1.

[281] The significance of Black Power to the emergence of the modern corporate social responsibility movement has often been overshadowed by a focus on environmentalism and consumer rights. See for example, Waterhouse, 38; Michael Pertschuk, *Revolt against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Mark V. Nadel, *The Politics of Consumer Protection* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); A notable exception to this trend is Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003): 347-387; See also, Archie B. Carroll, Kenneth J. Lipartito, James E. Post, and Patricia H. Wehane, *Corporate Responsibility: The American Experience* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). This book in particular makes the connection between corporate responsibility and the civil rights movement, although focuses primarily civil rights legislation and the relationship between business and government rather than analyzing the struggle over the meaning of Black Power *within* corporations.

[282] Shirley Chisholm quoted in Barbara Gold, "New Protest: GM Undemocratic?" *The Sun*, May 17, 1970: D1.

[283] Louis Stokes quoted in Morton Mintz, "GM Responds to Charges of Job Discrimination," *The Washington Post*, May 2, 1970: A5.

Responding to pressure from PCR and members of the newly formed Congressional Black Caucus, including Chisholm and Stokes, GM announced in January 1971 that they were appointing civil rights leader and black businessman Leon Sullivan to the company's board of directors.[284] In doing so, GM became the first major Fortune 500 company to appoint a black director. A few days later, the New York Federal Reserve Bank and W.T. Grant Co. made similar announcements appointing National Urban League President Whitney Young and former North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company executive Asa Spaulding to their respective boards.[285] Other major American companies and financial institutions followed suit. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of black men holding executive, administrative, or managerial jobs increased each year at twice the rate of white men.[286] Nearly all black directors appointed to corporate boards in the 1970s were men. Black women, on the other hand, who faced the double-burden of sexism and racism, were far slower in obtaining managerial positions).[287]

In many instances, black managers and board members occupied "racialized jobs" overseeing newly created company departments. Going by a range of different names, including Urban Affairs, Public Affairs, and Community Relations, these departments shared a common goal of improving corporations' image on race and other social issues.[288] In 1972, former president of the National Urban League Harold R. Sims joined Johnson & Johnson as Vice President for Corporate Affairs. In an internal memo outlining his duties, Sims described his role

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[284] "Dr. Leon Sullivan is Elected to G.M. Board," *The Arizona Republic, Human Events,* 31.6 (February 6, 1971): 10; "Rev. Sullivan has big plans for his GM job," *Chicago Daily Defender,* January 13, 1971: 11.

[285] Louis Spade, "Blacks winning top posts in big business," *Chicago Daily Defender*, January 9, 1971: 4.

[286] Reynolds Farley and Walter R. Allen, The Color Line and the Quality of Life in America (New York: Russell Sage, 1987); Sharon M. Collins, "Black Mobility in White Corporations: Up the Corporate Ladder but on a Limb," Social Problems 44, no. 1 (Feb. 1997): 55-67.

[287] The first black woman to join a board of a Fortune 500 company was Patricia Robert Harris, former ambassador to Luxembourg. Harris joined the board of Scott Paper and IBM in 1971, and Chase Manhattan in 1972. Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, *Diversity in the Power Elite,* 96.

[288] Collins, "Black Mobility in White Corporations: Up the Corporate Ladder But Out on a Limb," 55-67; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, *Diversity in the Power Elite,* 90-115.

as "represent[ing] Johnson & Johnson [to] the minority communities."[289] Johnson & Johnson

executives later told Sims that they hoped his actions as a VP, which included recruiting African

Americans and women managers into the company, would reduce chances for "disquiet,

company dissension and inflammatory situations as experienced at AT&T, Polaroid, Sears, and

MacMillan and Company," all of which had recently experienced heavy criticism from student

activists and disgruntled black employees charging racial discrimination.[290] Similarly, GM

Chairman James Roche praised Sullivan's "distinguished record of service to his community,"

including his work with OIC, and noted that Sullivan would "bring to [the company's] board the

benefit of his knowledge and expertise in areas of public concern."[291] In other words, Sullivan, in

the eyes of his fellow board members, who appointed him, promised to improve corporate-

community relations, which had suffered in recent years due to various labor disputes and

discrimination suits brought against the company.[292]

Black executives, for their part, were not naïve regarding the political motivations

undergirding their appointments. Eager to demonstrate to black Americans that he would not be

a ploy in a corporate public relations campaign, Sullivan told the black newspaper, the *Chicago

Daily Defender*, "I know General Motors is going to use me as a symbol and sample of how

liberal it has become, but I am going to use them…I'll be one voice out of 23…but I'm going to

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[289] Memo, Vice President Corporate Affairs, Corporate Staff, [circa 1972], Box 11, Harold R. Sims Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University (hereafter cited as Sims Papers).

[290] Memo, "Consideration of Women's Discussion Groups and periodic Steering Committee meetings with upper management," September 27, 1974; Meeting Minutes, Special Meeting of the Council of Personnel Directors, November 20, 1972, Sims Papers, Box 11.

[291] Roche quoted in "General Motors Names a Negro to Board, First Such Appointment in Auto Industry," *The Wall Street Journal,* January 5, 1971: 6.

[292] Heather Ann Thompson has demonstrated that worker activism in Detroit's auto-manufacturers during the late 1960s and 1970s was an out-growth of the ongoing struggle for "community control" in the city. *Whose Detroit? Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American City* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 103-127; "General Motors hit on 2 job bias counts," *Afro-American,* November 14, 1970: 6.

do all I can to help my people—black people, brown people, underprivileged people."[293] Sullivan had good reason to be optimistic about his ability to pressure GM to eliminate corporate discrimination, having previously led one of the most well-known campaigns to desegregate local business in the city of Philadelphia called the Selective Patronage Campaign. Channeling a similar tone of defiance in the face of business discrimination, Sullivan announced on NBC's "Meet the Press," "I want to see blacks in executive jobs, and I want to see blacks on the ladder going up," including as managers and other decision-making positions.[294]

Not everyone shared Sullivan's optimism for top down corporate reform. Environmental and consumer activist Ralph Nader, for one, commented that "after deep reflection, [he could] only conclude that the changes [made by GM] are purely cosmetic and that the company is going through a hardening stage so that it can increase its ability to resist any fundamental changes in its product policies."[295] Nader's comments echoed a broader sense of disappointment among many corporate social responsibility activists following GM's refusal to open up company management for direct participation from shop-floor-level employees and dealers. Responding to the news of Sullivan's appointment, PCR told journalists that while they were "encouraged by the appointment of a black man to General Motors' board of directors…[they] nevertheless deplore[d] the fact that the process by which GM's directors are nominated and elected remains an entirely closed affair."[296]

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[293] "Rev. Sullivan has big plans for his GM job," *Chicago Daily Defender,* January 13, 1971: 11; Sullivan's optimism echoed the reflections of other black executives and managers appointed at this time. Sharon M. Collins, *Black Corporate Executives: The Making and Breaking of a Black Middle Class* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 60.

[294] "Rev. Leon Sullivan to Push for More Black Representation in General Motors Co.," *Philadelphia Tribune,* March 9, 1971: 3.

[295] Ralph Nader quoted in Norman Pearlstine, "GM and Its Critics: Auto Maker Resists Any Radical Overhaul But Heeds Some Pleas: Board Names Black Director, Listens to Outsiders, Too; Market Aims Stay Intact," *The Wall Street Journal,* March 24, 1971: 1, 3.

[296] "General Motors Names a Negro to Board, First Such Appointment in Auto Industry," *The Wall Street Journal,* January 5, 1971: 6.

In response to public criticism, GM officials doubled-down on their support for Sullivan and his program of black empowerment. Just weeks after Sullivan's appointment, the company announced a new partnership with OIC to train black auto mechanics and dealers.[297] By May 1972, less than seventeen months after Sullivan's appointment, the program had trained 100 black dealers and mechanics with projections to train another 250 in 1973.[298] GM executives were supported in their efforts championing Sullivan by the black press, which described Sullivan as someone "generally acclaimed by blacks who have a great regard for his efforts to develop black enterprise and manpower through his Opportunity Industrial Centers."[299] In contrast to Campaign GM's emphasis on process and institutional structure, black journalist Louis Martin highlighted Sullivan's individual prowess. In an article for the *Pittsburgh Courier,* Martin described Sullivan as standing six feet and five inches tall; a model of strong, black masculinity, ready to "[tackle]" the titans of corporate America through his performance of "raw black manpower."[300] In doing so, Martin played up those aspects of Sullivan's appearance that linked him to a masculinist black nationalism presently witnessing a resurgence in black communities across the U.S. and Africa.[301] Comparing Sullivan to black revolutionaries in Africa, Martin furthermore framed Sullivan's appointment as analogous to the movement for decolonization in Africa, noting: "The winds of change are blowing across America" as they had

[297] James Mateja, "G.M. Offers Blacks Job Aid," *Chicago Tribune,* September 23, 1971: E7; "Black Director of General Motors Makes Big Difference," *Oakland Post,* November 18, 1971: 24; Norman Pearlstine, "GM and Its Critics: Auto Maker Resists Any Radical Overhaul But Heeds Some Pleas: Board Names Black Director, Listens to Outsiders, Too; Market Aims Stay Intact," *The Wall Street Journal,* March 24, 1971: 1, 3.

[298] "Rev. Sullivan: Pushing Hard for Black Economic Progress," *Sacramento Observer,* May 18, 1972: F-9.

[299] Louis Spade, "Blacks winning top posts in big business," *Chicago Daily Defender,* January 9, 1971: 4.

[300] Louis Martin, "The Big Parade: Rev. Sullivan tackles GM Giants," *New Pittsburgh Courier,* January 23, 1971: 12, 36;

[301] Numerous works have drawn attention to the masculinist values embedded in black nationalist movements during the 1960s and 1970s, including Thembisa Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation in South Africa* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), Nikhil Singh, *Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Nico Slate ed., *Black Power beyond Borders: The Global Dimensions of the Black Power Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

been for quite some time in places like "Ghana…Nigeria," and across the former "vast colonies

[of] West and East Africa."[302] If "the establishment, as represented by General Motors, is…smart

enough to take a hint…" they "[will] move toward true equality of opportunity for all in all areas,

including jobs and housing, or we [will] move toward unending, violent, civil strife. This is a

simple statement of fact."[303] During the 1970s, this black internationalism, which previously had

animated support for decolonization during the fifties and sixties, increasingly found a focal

point in the struggles for black liberation in southern Africa and the movement against South

African Apartheid.[304]

American Apartheid

Situated at the intersection of Atlantic and Indian Ocean trading networks, South Africa

first became a site of American commerce in the seventeenth century with the slave trade.[305]

Sustained American investment in South Africa only came in the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries, however, with the arrival of American oil companies, including companies

like Standard Oil and The Texas Company (Texaco), which sought to capitalize on South

Africa's wealth of mineral resources.[306] These companies were followed by auto-manufacturers,

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[302] Louis Martin, "The Big Parade: Rev. Sullivan tackles GM Giants," *New Pittsburgh Courier,* January 23, 1971: 12, 36.

[303] Louis Martin, "The Big Parade: Rev. Sullivan tackles GM Giants," *New Pittsburgh Courier,* January 23, 1971: 12, 36.

[304] On black internationalism in the post-war era see, Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Carol Anderson, *Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP and the Struggle for Colonial Liberation, 1941-1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Nikhil Singh, *Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Nico Slate ed., *Black Power beyond Borders: The Global Dimensions of the Black Power Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).

[305] Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa,* 2.

[306] In the early decades of the twentieth century nearly all of South Africa's petroleum was sourced by firms owned or controlled by Americans and refined in the United States. Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa,* 123-4.

including the Ford Motor Company and GM, which established a wholly-owned subsidiary in South Africa's burgeoning auto-manufacturing center in Port Elizabeth during the 1920s.[307]

Like other companies, U.S. corporations in South African profited from colonialism, including government actions that dispossessed Africans of their land and created large pools of cheap labor to work in the country's mines and urban areas starting in the late nineteenth century.[308] Profits continued to accrue to white-owned companies with the implementation of Apartheid, the legal system of segregation and white supremacy implemented by South Africa's Nationalist Party beginning in 1948. By the mid-1960s, American investors were averaging a 20.6 percent rate of return, the highest rate in the world. (By comparison, the next highest country, Japan, had a 12 percent average return on investment).[309]

Record high profits gained through discrimination and exploitation of Africans did not go unnoticed, however. In the United States, black Americans led the charge condemning South African Apartheid alongside other efforts to bring about an end to white rule in southern Africa, including Rhodesia.[310] Throughout the post-war decades multiple civil rights organizations, including the NAACP, the National Negro Congress, and the American Committee on Africa, raised the issue of South African Apartheid with politicians in the U.S. Congress and the United

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[307] Some of the other American companies that established plants in South Africa, included agricultural equipment manufacturer International Harvester, pharmaceutical manufacturer Merck, as well as Colgate-Palmolive Company and Gillette Company, Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa,* 138-140.
[308] See, for example, William Beinart, Peter Delius, and Stanley Trapido, eds., *Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa 1850-1930* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1986), Colin Bundy, *The Rise & Fall of the South African Peasantry* (Suffolk: James Currey, 1988); John Higginson, *Collective Violence and the Agrarian Origins of South African Apartheid, 1900-1948* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Charles H. Feinstein, *An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, Discrimination, and Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[309] Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa,* 250.
[310] George Fredrickson, *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study of American and South African History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

Nations (UN).[311] In 1962, the UN General Assembly called on member states to break all diplomatic and economic ties with South Africa in response to the government's actions in Sharpeville. In tandem, domestic protests multiplied against government discrimination and oppression of non-white South Africans, many of which were concentrated in urban areas. At the height of tensions, local police opened fire into a crowd of several thousand demonstrators in the black township of Sharpeville, killing at least sixty-nine people. Shortly following the Sharpeville massacre, the South African government launched a violent assault on black townships, which included banning the country's two largest black political organizations, the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and the African National Congress (ANC).[312] Sharpeville henceforth served as an important turning point in the anti-apartheid struggle, eliciting international sympathy for the plight of black and other non-white South Africans.

Meanwhile, just months after Sullivan's appointment to GM's board of directors, the Polaroid corporation became the first major U.S. company called out specifically to account for its operations in South Africa. In 1971, local employees at the company's Boston manufacturing plant discovered that Polaroid was selling photography equipment used by the South African government in their widely despised pass system used to police the movement of black South

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[311] The literature on the anti-apartheid movement is extensive, although weighted towards the 1950s and 1960s. See, Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions;* Morgan, "Into the Struggle: Confronting Apartheid in the United States and South Africa"; Massie, *Loosing the Bonds;* Culverson, *Contesting Apartheid.*

[312] Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945* (London: Longman, 1983); Noor Nieftagodien, "Popular Movements, Contentious Spaces and the ANC, 1943-1956," in One Hundred Years of the ANC Debating Liberation Histories Today eds. Arianna Lissoni, Jon Soske, Natasha Erlank, Noor Nieftagodien and Omar Badsha (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012); This initial assault on black activism carried out by the South African police and military was subsequently followed by a series of state programs aimed at containing black radicalism in the townships, including the model township program, which several scholars have cited as justification for the absence of large-scale civil disobedience in South Africa during much of the 1960s and early 1970s. Natasha Vally, "The 'Model Township' of Sharpeville: The Absence of Political Action and Organization, 1960-1984: M.A. research report, University of the Witwatersrand, 2009; Ivan Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997)*,* 169, 205; Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Africans.[313] Other companies soon began to feel the heat of sanctions and divestment activists. In early 1971, John Elbridge Hines, president of the Episcopal Church of the United States sent a letter to GM Chairman Roche condemning Apartheid in South Africa as immoral. Following in the strategy pursued by the Project for Corporate Responsibility, the Church, which owned 12,574 shares of GM stock submitted a shareholder resolution demanding GM proceed with "an orderly winding up of its present manufacturing operations in the Republic of South Africa."[314] Not long after, Leon Sullivan, after only a month on the job, joined the campaign for sanctions by voicing his support for the Church resolution.[315]

Coming on the heels of the company's battle with PCR activists the previous year, Sullivan's public declaration in support of divestment was a public relations nightmare for company executives. One reporter, who covered the GM's annual shareholder meeting, described Sullivan's outburst at the meeting as "the first public disagreement within memory on the 23-member G.M. board."[316] GM Chairman James Roche attempted to downplay the controversy while speaking to the press. In an interview with the *New York Times,* Roche noted that Sullivan, "always an outspoken man…wouldn't be expected to change just by becoming a General Motors director."[317] Behind closed doors, however, company executives struck a slightly different tone with their lone black board member. Chairman of the Board John A. Mayer wrote Sullivan in a private letter, "I am disturbed by some of the rhetoric attributed to you in the press

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[313] Morgan, "Into the Struggle."

[314] Douglas Robinson, "Episcopal Church Urges G.M. to Close Plants in South Africa," *New York Times,* February 2, 1971: 1.

[315] "Rev. Leon Sullivan calls for Business Boycott," *Sun Reporter,* March 20, 1971: 4.

[316] Jerry M. Flint, "A Black Director of G.M. Will Vote Against the Board: Black General Motors Director Plans to Vote Against Board," *The New York Times,* April 9, 1971:45; Sullivan further ruffled the feathers of GM executives by testifying before the House of Representatives Sub-committee on Africa, where he called for "a total economic, political and social disassociation with South Africa." "Dr. Leon Sullivan Calls for Boycott of S. Africa Before Sub-Committee," *Sun Reporter,* May 29, 1971: 11.

[317] Jerry M. Flint, "A Black Director of G.M. Will Vote Against the Board: Black General Motors Director Plans to Vote Against Board," *The New York Times,* April 9, 1971:45.

[and] feel that it will eventually damage your ability to be an important influence on the G.M. Board, as indeed it would on any other board that I can think of."[318] The issue, according to Mayer, had less to do with Sullivan's personal views on Apartheid, which Mayer noted were "agree[able]," if not to be "admire[d]." Rather, Mayer framed the problem as one of public relations. "As a director you [should]…confine your comments to Board meetings where they will be properly considered. *Public* [emphasis added] comments elsewhere [were]", otherwise considered "inappropriate."[319]

Mayer's comments to Sullivan reflected a particular kind of pressure exerted on black executives by white executives to represent themselves, and, more importantly, their corporations favorably in public. To be sure, all employees contended with expectations regarding avoiding statements that might damage a company's image. As hyper-visible members of the corporation occupying roles specifically designed to mitigate tensions with the community, however, black executives bore a particular responsibility for upholding a positive corporate image.[320] Indeed, elsewhere in the letter Mayer noted that Sullivan's appointment had perhaps led to more media attention than any in the history of corporate boards.[321] Other black executives spoke of similar experiences working in leading American corporations and financial institutions during the 1970s. One black vice president and company director at a major bank in Chicago recalled that his task was "to promote the visibility and good name" of his bank to the

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[318] Letter from John A. Mayer, Chairman of Mellon National Bank and Trust Company to Leon Sullivan, February 22, 1971, Leon Howard Sullivan papers, Stuart A. Rose Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia (hereafter cited as LHS Papers), Box 1, Folder 4.
[319] Ibid.
[320] Corporate concern for the role played by prominent African Americans in regards to corporate image continues through the present as demonstrated by recent revelations regarding a number of American companies paying Reverend Al Sharpton to refrain from speaking about racism at their companies. Isabel Vincent and Melissa Klein, "How Sharpton gets paid to not cry 'racism' at corporations" *New York Post,* January 4, 2015, http://nypost.com/2015/01/04/how-sharpton-gets-paid-to-not-cry-racism-at-corporations/.
[321] Letter from John A. Mayer, Chairman of Mellon National Bank and Trust Company to Leon Sullivan, February 22, 1971, LHS Papers, Box 1, Folder 4.

black community.[322] Another black director of urban affairs noted that his role was to "make [the company] look good."[323] At times, this hypervisibility could translate into a sense of "paranoia," according to some black executives, who complained about the pressure put on them by white executives. "You feel as though you're constantly being observed. Your actions are constantly being monitored," noted one black bank manager.[324] Another black bank manager noted:

> Unless a black comes 360 degrees full circle and bends over backwards to prostitute other blacks and minorities to their satisfaction, they're not going to feel comfortable with you. In other words, you have to do the things that they would like to see. You have to make them aware that you are in total allegiance to and with them and against other blacks.[325]

Despite experiences of explicit and implicit racism, many black executives retained a great sense of optimism associated with feeling like they had a purpose working within corporate and financial institutions to eliminate barriers to black advancement. Harold Sims, for example, noted that he "turned down several offers of equal or greater financial remuneration" in order to take position of Director of Social Concerns at Johnson & Johnson. Sims attributed his decision to accept the appointment to the excitement he felt regarding the possibility of assisting one of the world's largest companies "become the corporate leader in multi-racial employment, upgrading and management development at all levels, regardless of sex."[326] Fellow GM director John Mayer likewise used a similar justification in his appeal to Sullivan to abandon his call for divestment. "I am sure that your service on the Board of this great company can be one of the

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[322] Black banking executive quoted in Collins, *Black Corporate Executives,* 58.
[323] Ibid, 62.
[324] Anonymous black bank manager quoted in Edward D. Irons and Gilbert W. Moore, *Black Managers: The Case of the Banking Industry* (New York: Praeger, 1985), 82.
[325] Anonymous black bank manager quoted in Irons and Moore, *Black Managers,* 53.
[326] Correspondence, Harold R. Sims to John Heldrich, Corporate Vice President for Administration, Johnson & Johnson, January 28, 1972, Sims Papers, Box 11.

most rewarding experiences of your life, as well as productive of help to the company," said

Mayer. "If you make a success, your people will surely benefit."[327]

In the months following Sullivan's public statement supporting the call for sanctions, GM

executives did their best to convince Sullivan of this prophecy, including demonstrating the

company's commitment "to upgrade[ing their] Colored and African employees in South Africa"

as they had done with "black employees in the United States."[328] As Mayer informed Sullivan,

GM already had a number of "positive programs…in South Africa," including training programs

for black and other non-white employees, as well as education and housing assistance for black

employees and their families. Thus, while GM executives could not deny the existence of racial

inequalities in South Africa—reporting that white wages in South Africa were on average 643

percent higher than their African counterparts in 1971—company officials made the case that

"considerable progress has been made."[329]

Following GM's lead, a small, but vocal group of American companies began pressuring

the South African government to reform some of its policies related to racial discrimination in

the workplace. In doing so, these American executives drew on the history of Jim Crow in the

United States to gain the trust of their South African counterparts, while also asserting their

leadership with regards to civil rights. In a letter to South African Secretary of Health Dr. J.

DeBeer, Johnson & Johnson Vice President of Corporate Affairs Harold Sims, noted that

American multinational corporations having recently "pass[ed] through [their] own apartheid and

achieve[d] miracles in overcoming its limitations" had much to contribute to the transformation

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[327] Letter from John A. Mayer, Chairman of Mellon National Bank and Trust Company to Leon Sullivan, February 22, 1971, LHS Papers, Box 1, Folder 4.
[328] "General Motors and South Africa," October 16, 1972, Presentation by Mr. E.M. Estes at the "Council on Religion and International Affairs" Seminar, LHS Papers, Box 51, Folder 9.
[329] Ibid.

of South African society.[330] One merely need look at "what Ford Motor Company is doing in the rebuilding of Detroit, Michigan; what the Life Insurance industry is doing in the rebuilding of Hartford, Connecticut; and [Johnson & Johnsons] involvement in the revitalization of New Brunswick, N.J." to see that "American multinationals are capable of making a…contribution to the social, political and economic development of its own employees in [South Africa]," claimed Sims.[331] More than resolving racial tensions in the workplace, these American executives made the case that reform fostered economic growth.

Sims, like Sullivan was one of a number of well-known civil rights leaders turned corporate executive who during the 1970s began to articulate an alternative path for American business to aid in the struggle against Apartheid.[332] Responding to renewed calls by the Episcopal Church for sanctions at GM's annual shareholder meeting in May 1972, Sullivan informed his fellow board members that he would abstain from speaking on the topic.[333] The meeting itself took a slightly different turn. Anti-apartheid activists launched a barrage of questions, including one South African exile who grew up a mile from GM's Port Elizabeth plant and testified to the company's abuses there. In response, Sullivan made an impromptu speech condemning South African Apartheid. His words only created further confusion as to his position on sanctions, however. At the meeting, Sullivan stated, "Get out so they can change the system. Stay if being there changes the system. But of all things change the system." Later, Sullivan told the press, "I didn't want to make a show…the company is trying to cooperate with me. They're

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[330] Correspondence Harold R. Sims, Vice President Corporate Affairs, Johnson & Johnson, to Dr. J. DeBeer, Secretary of Health, Republic of South Africa, May 2, 1977. Sims Papers, Box 11.
[331] Ibid.
[332] Among the other well-known figures included in this group were Vernon Jordan and Andrew Young. "Black executives visiting South Africa," *Afro-American,* July 24, 1976: 20; DeWayne Wickham, "American corporations and South Africa's blacks," *The Sun*, January 9, 1977: K2.
[333] Charles B. Camp and Walter Mossberg, "GM Meeting is Tepid Despite Ingredients for Epic Confrontation with Reformers," *The Wall Street Journal,* May 22, 1972: 4.

trying to help. And I'm trying to do the best I can from the inside. But the issue here is to stop [A]partheid."[334] Sullivan's claim to be "[doing] the best [he could] from the inside" revealed the transformation his appointment as a director had engendered. Subsequently, Sullivan further retreated from publicly criticizing GM in order to solicit corporate support for his strategy of fighting Apartheid by promoting black empowerment in South Africa.

Fighting Apartheid "From the Inside"

In 1975, Leon Sullivan made his first of several trips to South Africa on a mission jointly sponsored by the U.S. State Department and GM.[335] During his visit, Sullivan met with various government representatives and South African businessmen, who echoed the reports of American business leaders regarding the positive changes taking place in the country.[336] South African GM Director Alan de Kock told Sullivan, for example, that just recently "the South African Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. R. F. Botha…announced to the Security Council…that 'we shall do everything in our power to move away from discrimination based on race or colour.'"[337] Countering these proclamations, the South Africa Sullivan observed on his travels left much to be desired. Recounting his first visit to South Africa years later, Sullivan wrote "being" in South Africa in 1975, was like "being [in] Mississippi" under Jim Crow. Walking the streets of Johannesburg and Soweto, "every black person I saw…had a large bulge in his or her right pocket," a sign of the hated "passbooks" that served as the physical

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[334] Sullivan quoted in Charles B. Camp and Walter Mossberg, "GM Meeting is Tepid Despite Ingredients for Epic Confrontation with Reformers," *The Wall Street Journal,* May 22, 1972: 4.
[335] Correspondence, Oliver S. Crosby, Director Southern African Affairs, Department of State, to Leon Sullivan, Itinerary for South Africa Trip, October 13, 1972, LHS Papers, Box 1, Folder 1; Sullivan, *Moving Mountains,* 32.
[336] Correspondence, Oliver S. Crosby, Director Southern African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Leon H. Sullivan, October 13, 1972, LHS Papers, Box 1, Folder 7; For South Africa's attempts to sell Americans on Apartheid, see Ron Nixon, *Selling Apartheid: South Africa's Global Propaganda War* (Auckland Park, Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2015).
[337] Correspondence, Alan de Kock to Leon H. Sullivan, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 2.

manifestations of Apartheid's restrictive logic. In contrast to Botha's pronouncements, Sullivan

described a society deeply divided by race. He wrote, "[I witnessed] black workers sweeping and

mopping floors, emptying the trash, and carrying things," while white South Africans lived and

worked in a state of luxury. "Black [South Africans remained] the have-nots in a land of plenty,"

Sullivan concluded.[338]

Sullivan's observations garnered validation from the various black South Africans he met

while there, many of whom complained about the "gross inequities" that persisted in their

country. Rather than sanctions, however, Sullivan testified to the support for greater involvement

by American business in the process of reform and black empowerment in South Africa.[339]

Testifying before the International Chamber of Commerce in Madrid, Spain, Samuel

Motsuenyane, president of the Johannesburg-based National African Federated Chamber of

Commerce (Nafcoc), for one, proclaimed. "The future of the White man would certainly be in

jeopardy if he would not share his power; his comfort; his wealth and his know-how on more

equitable terms with the rest of the people of [South Africa]," declared Motsuenyane. Further

testifying to the rise in black consciousness, both within South Africa and across the diaspora,

Motsuenyane continued, "Africans [are] becoming proud of being Black. Blackness [can] no

more be accepted as a tag of inferiority."[340] Like Sullivan and others, however, Motsuenyane did

not support the call for sanctions. Rather, "African[s]" Motsuenyane advised must be

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[338] Sullivan, *Moving Mountains,* 41.
[339] Several surveys of black South Africans found that popular opinion regarding sanctions and divestment varied. To be sure, many black South Africans continued to support the ANC's call for sanctions secretly. (Supporting sanctions publicly was dangerous, if not illegal, during Apartheid). Other South Africans, however, contended that foreign companies *could* function as a positive source of reform. One anonymous South African, for example, noted in a survey of black South African attitudes towards the United States that "American companies can pay a little bit of a living wage and South African companies do not." Many also voiced fears regarding the consequences accompanying a large-scale withdrawal of American capital. David Hirschmann, *Changing Attitudes of Black South Africans toward the United States* (Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1989): 117-118.
[340] "NAFCOC President Tells Overseas Business…Disinvestment No Good for Black Progress," *African Business* (April 1974), National Library of South Africa-Cape Town.

"[encouraged]…to become creative...contributors to the overall [economic] development of the country."[341] Black South Africans, according to Motsuenyane and others, desired black empowerment, including support for black businesses like the ones involved with Nafcoc.[342]

Shortly following his return to the United States in June 1975, Sullivan delivered a sermon entitled, "The Walls Must Come Down." He spoke at Zion Baptist Church, located in the heart of Philadelphia's black community in North Philadelphia, Sullivan's sermons, according to his friends and colleagues, were often "soul stirring" occasions that "could shake your soul till you shouted, 'Hallelujah.'"[343] On this particular occasion, Sullivan sought to instill sense of urgency regarding the situation in southern Africa. "[I] fear that South Africa [will] be thrown into a terrible, bloody, racial war unless something [is] done to end the atrocious racist conditions that [prevail]" in that country, an animated Sullivan preached.[344] Sullivan's warning of a "bloody, racial war" echoed the concerns of other American religious, government, and business leaders, who increasingly drew a connection between the situation in southern Africa and the urban rebellions recently experienced by dozens of cities in the United States.[345] In a letter to his superiors providing rationalization for a joint venture between Johnson & Johnson, Rutgers University School of Business Administration, and Nafcoc modeled on a similar program in Newark and promoting black business development in South Africa, Harold Sims

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[341] Ibid.

[342] Echoing Motsuenyane's view regarding sanctions, Sullivan met with a representative from the Garment Workers Union of South Africa, who advised the GM director, "rather than encourage the withdrawal of American capital from South Africa," he should "take a positive stance and call for American companies in South Africa to recognize the same working conditions they employ in America.'" Sethi and Williams, *Economic Imperatives and Ethical Values in Global Business,* 8

[343] Leon Taylor, "Lion of Zion lauded on eve of his memorial service in Phoenix, the Rev. Leon Sullivan's life is recalled by friends, colleagues and those he mentored," *Philadelphia Daily News,* May 1, 2001: 6.

[344] Sullivan, *Moving Mountains,* 50.

[345] Memo, United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program, Inc., United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program (USSALEP), 1955-2003, Historical Papers, The Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa (hereafter cited as USSALEP Papers Wits University, Historical Papers; Correspondence, Harold R. Sims to Dr. J. DeBeer, May 2, 1977, Sims Papers, Box 10, Follow-up.

emphasized the importance of taking proactive measures to counteract the radical politics spreading through the townships. If American businesses were not careful, "the fragile winds of certain change in South Africa" will soon come and wreak havoc on American companies in South Africa as they had in the United States. Rather than wait for history to take its course, Sims encouraged Johnson & Johnson to consider the "long-term impact" of programs promoting the "development of a [black] commercial constituency and…leadership…experienced and committed to freedom as we aspire for it," by which Sims meant the free enterprise system. American corporate-sponsored black empowerment, according to black executives like Sims and Sullivan, was potentially "as revolutionary" as the ongoing political transformation occurring throughout Africa, "but without drastic loss of…skills and capital."[346]

Invigorated by his recent trip to South Africa and inspired by a sense of divine purpose, Sullivan outlined the foundation of his plan to combat Apartheid in a sermon, entitled "Principles of Equal Rights for United States Firms in the Republic of South Africa," later re-named the Sullivan Principles.[347] Drawing on existing policy adopted by government and private institutions in the United States, the Principles included a series of directives for American corporations operating in South Africa, including desegregated work facilities, equal pay to white and black workers, and the appointment and training of black managers.

One week later, Sullivan met with members of GM's board of directors in an attempt to persuade them to adopt the Principles. At first, Sullivan met with strong reticence from his fellow GM directors. Instead, GM executives touted the popular corporate line on South Africa, which contended that Apartheid was a domestic policy of the South African government and any

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[346]Correspondence, Harold R. Sims to Dr. J. DeBeer, May 2, 1977, Rutgers University Special Collections, Harold R. Sims Papers, Box 10, Follow-up; Report on South Africa Trip – 1976, March 7, 1977, Rutgers University Special Collections, Harold R. Sims Papers, Box 10, Follow-up.
[347] Sullivan, *Moving Mountains,* 48.

comments on the part of American corporations on the issue would be a breach of sovereignty.[348]

Having failed through moral persuasion to convince his fellow board members, Sullivan shifted

tactics, threatening to leave the board if they did not support the Principles.[349] This placed GM

executives in awkward position. On one hand, they feared the consequences, including

retribution from the South African government and backlash from white investors, many of

whom objected to company interference on the issue of Apartheid, if they took a public stand on

the issue. On the other hand, GM executives were weary of further negative publicity coming

from anti-racist activists, which would inevitably result if Sullivan resigned. After considerable

back and forth weighing the issue, GM Chairman James Roche notified Sullivan that the

company would support the initiative on one condition. Sullivan must secure a critical mass of

other corporations willing to join the initiative.

International Business Machines (IBM) Chairman Frank Cary, who had long served on

OIC's Industrial Advisory Council, soon emerged as Sullivan's ally in the latter's campaign to

recruit other companies to the Principles' program. In the spring of 1976, Cary informed Sullivan

of his willingness to help arrange a meeting with eighteen executives representing fifteen leading

American companies, all with operations in South Africa, where Sullivan could present his case

for the Principles. The companies included American Cyanamid, Burroughs Corporation, Caltex

Petroleum Corporation, Citicorp, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation, IBM

Corporation, International Harvester Company, Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company,

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[348] Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa,* 280; J.M. Cornely of Firestone Rubber Company expressed similar sentiments when he told Leon Sullivan that the Principles would be "interfering with [the] sovereign rights" of the South African government. Correspondence J.M. Cornely to Leon H. Sullivan, February 21, 1977, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 6.
[349] Sullivan, *Moving Mountains,* 48-49.

Mobil Corporation, Otis Elevator, and Motorola.[350] Reflecting his complicity in corporate efforts

to move debate on the issue of Apartheid out of the streets and public shareholder meetings and

into the private sphere of the board room, Sullivan agreed to hold the meeting in a remote IBM

training facility in Sands Point, Long Island "out of the way" and "free of public attention."

Sullivan justified the location, stating, he could "communicate [his] ideas as clearly as possible

outside the gaze of public scrutiny."[351]

　　In addition to serving as a bulwark against public engagement with the Principles during

the initial planning stage, the privacy of Sands Point meeting furthermore served to hide

disagreement among the various corporate executives, who later presented a united front behind

the Sullivan Principles. This was far from the truth. At the Sands Point meeting, several business

leaders expressed strong concerns about the Principles. James W. Wilcock, Chairman and Chief

Executive of Joy Manufacturing Company, who was unable to attend the meeting, but sent his

remarks in a letter to Sullivan, stated, "I positively refuse to follow the track of too many other

Americans by always sticking my nose into the business of other countries."[352] Supporters of the

Principles, on the other hand countered reticence by emphasizing the changing international

climate. Inspired by the rise of the global Black Power movement, student and local activists led

a number of protests against apartheid in the United States and South Africa during the early

1970s.[353] And this wave of activism was spreading. Initially confined to university campuses, the

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[350] Correspondence, Leon H. Sullivan to Mt. T. J. Barlow, President and Chief Executive Officer, Anderson Clayton & Company, March 26, 1076, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 3; Sethi and Williams, *Economic Imperatives and Ethical Values in Global Business,* 3.

[351] Sullivan, *Moving Mountains,* 49. Harry Amana, "Rev. Sullivan, U.S. Firms Hold Secret Meeting on S. Africa's Racist Policies," *Philadelphia Tribune,* March 13, 1976: 1.

[352] Correspondence, James W. Wilcock, Chairman and Chief Executive Joy Manufacturing Company to Leon H. Sullivan, January 3, 1977, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 6.

[353] Martha Biondi, *The Black Revolution on Campus* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 235-240; Nico Slate ed., *Black Power beyond Borders: The Global Dimensions of the Black Power Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Daniel Magaziner, *The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in Southern Africa,*

sanctions movement witnessed an increase in legislative victories linked to the rise of black

political power in urban areas. IBM's Frank Cary informed his fellow executives that the City of

Gary, Indiana, had recently instituted sanctions against companies with operations in South

Africa.[354] The Gary resolution signaled a turning point in the national debate on sanctions. In

addition to the Gary resolution, Cary warned his fellow executives that members of the newly

formed Congressional Black Caucus had introduced sanctions legislation in the United States

Congress.[355] Cary's conclusion: if American corporations did not do something to demonstrate

their disapproval for apartheid, they might be forced out of business in South Africa.

The other key area of disagreement that emerged during the private meetings held

between Sullivan and the Principles signatory companies related to the governing structure for

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The Sullivan Principles
1.   Nonsegregation of the races in all eating, comfort and work facilities.
2.   Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
3.   Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time.
4.   Initiation and development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other nonwhites for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs.
5.   Increasing the number of blacks and other nonwhites in management and supervisory positions.
6.   Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health facilities.

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Figure 8: The original Sullivan Principles, published March 2, 1977.

the program. Signatory company executives rejected a crucial clause, proposed by Sullivan that

would have made adherence to the Principles a prerequisite for any future investment by a

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1968-1977 (Ohio University Press, 2010), 3; Gail M. Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

[354] Correspondence, Frank T. Cary to Leon Sullivan, November 19, 1975, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 2.
[355] Ibid.

signatory company in South Africa.[356] The clause failed to appear in the final document.

Signatory company officials likewise worked to ensure that the Principles would remain a

private initiative, foreclosing the possibility of government oversight. William (Bill)

Tavoulareas, President of Mobil Corporation, justified this decision by noting that official

government support for the Principles effort "[would only] impair our [effort]" by "invit[ing]

government-to-government confrontation" with the South African government, which surely

would interpret the Principles as an act of foreign interference.[357] Tavoulareas' caution regarding

offending the South African government was echoed by Honeywell Chairman Stephen Keating,

who argued that the language of the Principles must be worded so as to ensure that "American-

based firms" would not be seen as being "in direct contravention [with] the laws of [South

Africa]."[358] Both the *private* nature of the Principles program, which granted ultimate oversight

to the signatory companies themselves, and the signatory companies' insistence that the

Principles adhere to South African law, ultimately limited the effectiveness of the Sullivan

Principles to affect radical change in South Africa.

Soweto—Urban Rebellion and American Business' 'Principled' Response

As the months wore on, Sullivan continued to face resistance from corporate executives

regarding signing and implementing the Principles. Some, like Firestone executive J.M. Cornely,

echoing the words of James W. Wilcock, voiced their disagreement in terms of a refusal to

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[356] Sethi and Williams, *Economic Imperatives and Ethical Values in Global Business,* 10.

[357] Correspondence William Tavolareas, President Mobil Oil Corporation to Leon Sullivan, February 18, 1977, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 6; Correspondence J.M. Cornely to Leon H. Sullivan, February 21, 1977, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 6; Tavoulareas' comments were echoed by several other white executives present, including Citibank Vice President Robert E. Terkhorn, who noted that the Sullivan Principles should "remain [a] private initiative" outside the realm of government oversight. Correspondence, Robert E. Terkhorn, Vice President Citibank, to Leon Sullivan, February 22, 1977, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 6.

[358] Correspondence Stephen F. Keating, Chairman of the Board Honeywell, January 7, 1977, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 7.

"interfere with [the] sovereign rights" of another nation.[359] Resistance, quickly gave way to support, however, following the 1976 Soweto Uprising.

In June 1976, the world gasped in horror at the images of South African police opening fire on high school students protesting in the black township of Soweto outside Johannesburg. Footage of the uprising, including a photograph of a young Mbuyisa Makhubo carrying the lifeless body of Hector Pieterson alongside Hector's visibly distraught sister Antoinette Sithole, electrified liberal and progressive audiences around the world, reigniting calls for sanctions against South Africa. In addition to the international condemnation that the uprising provoked, South African government and business leaders had to contend with successive labor strikes and social unrest that continued in the months, even years after the initial rebellion.[360]

In the months following the Soweto uprising, support for the Sullivan Principles grew tremendously. When the program was officially launched in March 1977, twelve of the original eighteen corporations had signed the Principles, including General Motors, Ford, and IBM. In contrast to the behind-the-scenes management of the Principles by the signatory companies, Leon Sullivan took on a central role in the publicizing of the Principles. At the press conference announcing the public launch of Sullivan Principles held in Washington D.C., Sullivan stood front and center at a podium flanked by GM Chairman Thomas A. Murphy and IBM. Chairman Frank Cary. Sullivan's position at the podium was symbolic of his transformation from a fiery activist, who represented a thorn in the side of GM and other American companies with operations in South Africa, to a spokesperson *on behalf of* the signatory companies. In this role, Sullivan received encouragement from signatory company executives like T. J. Barlow,

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[359] Correspondence J.M. Cornely to Leon H. Sullivan, February 21, 1977, Box 54, Folder 6, LHS Papers.
[360] Helena Pohlandt-McCormick, *"I Saw a Nightmare,"* Essay, "Beer Halls and Bottle Stores." http://www.gutenberg-e.org/pohlandt-mccormick/pmh03e.html#txt1.

President and Chief Executive Officer of Anderson Clayton & Company, who told Sullivan that "increased communications…[were] necessary" in order to inform the American public regarding "the [full] scope of the efforts [by American companies] on behalf of their non-white employees in South Africa."[361] The issue here, in Barlow's view, was not one of corporate behavior, but public relations. Sullivan, on his part, promised to assist the signatory companies "promote a better understanding and awareness of what is being accomplished and what is possible," in terms of the efforts of American companies "on behalf of…non-white workers" in South Africa.[362]

Sullivan's announcement of the Principles' program garnered widespread attention from the U.S. media, which touted the program as an example of the positive work being done by American corporations in South Africa. *The Washington Post*, for example, hailed the signatory companies for their courage in going beyond the Carter administrations' more timid response to the issue and taking a moral stance on Apartheid, which they perceived as a "[complex] and [volatile]…problem."[363] Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC) President Roy Wilkins expressed similar optimism when he praised the Sullivan Principles as an important step

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[361] Correspondence, Leon H. Sullivan to Mt. T. J. Barlow, President and Chief Executive Officer, Anderson Clayton & Company, March 26, 1976, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 3; On the trend of American business participating in self-advocacy or lobbying during this period, see Waterhouse, *Lobbying America,* 93.

[362] Correspondence, Leon H. Sullivan to Mt. T. J. Barlow, President and Chief Executive Officer, Anderson Clayton & Company, March 26, 1076, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 3; The Sullivan signatory campaign reflected and extended America's post-war globalization during which the world witnessed an increase in American corporate intervention in foreign markets. In this regard, American corporations lobbied U.S. and foreign government officials to secure conditions beneficial to American investment and trade. See for example, Jennifer Van Vleck, *Empire of the Air: Aviation and the American Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); Reinhold Wagleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

[363] "A Business Response to Apartheid," *The Washington Post,* March 5, 1977: A16; Similar praise appeared in other major American newspapers. Thomas E. Mullaney, "12 Big U.S. Concerns in South Africa Set Equality in Plants: End of Segregation Supported Philadelphia Clergyman, a Member of G.M. Board, Wins Adoption of 6 Rules After 18 Months," *The New York Times,* March 2, 1977: 71.; "11 Large U.S. Companies Planning Reforms in S. Africa Operations," *Los Angeles Times,* March 2, 1977: 8; Wayne Green, "Racially Neutral Policies in South Africa in Jobs Promised by 12 Major U.S. Firms," *The Wall Street Journal* , March 3, 1977: 7; "12 Companies Sign S. Africa Rights Pact," *Sun Reporter*, March 10, 1977: 4.

"foreshadow[ing]…an end to segregation in South African life."[364] During the late seventies and early eighties, Leon Sullivan traveled the country promoting the Principles on dozens of radio stations, at private clubs, and in other public forums.[365] In 1978, Sullivan visited Europe, where he held a series of meetings with religious and business leaders in the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, The Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark and earned many admirers.[366] Sullivan found many admirers on these trips. Business leaders, government officials, and non-governmental organization leaders saw the Principles as offering a "constructive" solution to the problems of South African Apartheid. In 1977, Ivorian politician Dramane Ouattara, writing on behalf of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), wrote Sullivan expressing his "total support" for Sullivan and the Principles. Let me "assure you," Ouattara wrote, "of our readiness to contribute to your effort in whatever way you will find appropriate."[367]

Unlike Sullivan's previous ventures promoting job-training and black entrepreneurship, the Sullivan Principles also garnered severe criticism, especially from activists on the left, who charged Sullivan with serving as an apologist for American business. "It seems most questionable that the Rev. Leon Sullivan should spend a year negotiating a 'Statement of Principles' which only seeks to 'curb bias' in a country guilty of some of the most atrocious racial crimes in this age," noted one anonymous reader in a letter to the editor in the Baltimore

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[364] Roy Wilkins, "Wilkins Speaks: Sullivan's S. Africa coup," *Afro-American,* March 26, 2977: 4.
[365] Correspondence Virginia B. Smith, President Vassar College, to Leon Sullivan, February 16, 1978, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 7; Correspondence, to Leon Sullivan, November 18, 1986, LHS Papers, Box 4, Folder 1; Correspondence Valerie Reilly, Program Director, Los Angeles World Affairs Council, to Leon H. Sullivan, June 12, 1987; Correspondence Michael J. Brassington, Executive Director, The Commonwealth Club of California, to Leon Sullivan, August 6, 1987, LHS Papers, Box 4, Folder 6; Congressman Carl Pursell, Excerpts from the Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 97th Congress, Vol. 127, Washington, Wednesday, March 18, 1981," LHS Papers, Box 2, Folder 7.
[366] Correspondence E. Lockwood, Chairman European Advisory council, General Motors, to Mr. Mogens Pagh, Chairman, The East Asiatic Co. Ltd. June 15, 1977, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 6; Press Release, "Sullivan Calls London Conference of World's Multi-National Companies to Pressure Changes Against Apartheid in South Africa," November 20, 1980, LHS Papers, Box 55, Folder 9.
[367] Correspondence Dramane Ouattera, Ambassador, Executive Secretary of the OAU, to Leon Sullivan, February 10, 1977, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 6.

Afro-American. "Have we learned nothing from our own struggles for civil rights? How long will those blacks in positions of influence continue to promote ambiguous or half-way solutions to the intolerable problems of racism and bigotry, not to mention apartheid?"[368] Chicago activist Prexy Nesbit, formerly with the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), also voiced skepticism about the Sullivan Principles. Addressing a forum on South Africa in Boston, Nesbit stated, "I have a great deal of trouble as a black American in this country believing that corporations can help bring about social change [when] these same multinationals have abandoned the United States."[369] As a result of these and other criticisms, Sullivan felt compelled to publicly acknowledge the limitations of the Principles. In a letter to Tim Smith, Director of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, a corporate responsibility watchdog organization comprised of faith institutions, labor unions, and other socially-conscious investors, Sullivan explained that the Principles were only a start. "Much more will come out of the Statement of Principles in the longer run." In the meantime, however, he advised patience and understanding as he worked "to see how far [he] could go," with the signatory companies.[370] Patience, on the part of anti-apartheid activists, however, was wearing thin. Mirroring growing labor and social unrest in South Africa itself, anti-apartheid activists in the United States increasingly demanded measurable results from the Principles signatory companies.

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[368] J. R. Humphrey, "Our Readers Say Firms help South Africa," *Afro-American*, April 2, 1977: 4.
[369] Prexy Nesbit quoted in Cheryl Devall, "Universities continue focus on South Africa," *Bay State Banner,* April 19, 1979: 10.
[370] Correspondence Leon H. Sullivan to Tim Smith, Director Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, April 11, 1977, LHS Papers, Box 54, Folder 6.

Measuring Success

By the end of 1978, the number of signatory companies had risen to sixty-one from just twelve the year before.[371] By 1980, that number would reach well over one hundred and fifty. Testifying to their prominence, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose said of the Principles, "I think it fair to say that no single initiative to date has had the impact of that launched by Rev. Sullivan." Moose continued, "The best course of action for the United States [government] is to give our strong support to Rev. Sullivan's efforts, and to urge that others do the same."[372] Moose's endorsement added the U.S. government to the list of institutions supporting the Principles. In addition to the State Department, by the late 1970s, the Principles had amassed a number of institutional supporters, including dozens of universities, churches, and, of course, corporations. One might go as far to say that the Principles represented the United States' unofficial foreign policy towards South Africa given the number and size of organizations that pledged support for the program. With increased publicity, however, came increased scrutiny, including from anti-apartheid activists. A number of these critics raised questions about the extent to which American corporations could be relied on to voluntarily promote desegregation and black empowerment in a country where Apartheid remained the official law. Rather, critics of the Principles argued that sanctions and divestment was the only sure way to secure the end of Apartheid.

For much of the 1960s and early 1970s, the issue of sanctions remained largely confined to relatively small anti-apartheid organizations and the occasional bill proposed by the minority lobby represented by the Congressional Black Caucus. The marginal threat posed by sanctions and divestment is further evidenced by the relatively little attention paid to the campaign by

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[371] Internal Memo, Marshal Murrell to Sullivan, February 14, 1978, LHS papers, Box 54, Folder 7.
[372] "State Dept. endorses 'Sullivan Principles,'" *New York Amsterdam News,* June 2, 1979: 14.

business leaders prior to 1976. This status quo shifted following Soweto and the international outrage it provoked reflected in the growing number of protests in cities and on university and college campuses across the United States.[373] In 1977, Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts became the first institution of higher education to completely divest from South Africa, followed by nearby Smith College, which sold nearly $700,000 in stock in companies operating in South Africa. (Complete divestment at Smith did not occur until 1986). The real shock came two years later, however, when Michigan State University (MSU) in East Lansing announced their intention to divest from South Africa.

In nearly all instances, divestment occurred after university administrations had endured months, if not years, of pressure from anti-apartheid activists. In the case of MSU, student, faculty, and community members joined together to form the Southern African Liberation Committee (SALC). In January 1978, following a successful campaign to get the City of East Lansing to adopt a selective purchasing policy targeting companies with operations in South Africa, SALC directed their attention at securing a commitment for divestment from Michigan State. During the spring semester, SALC held multiple events on to raise awareness about South African Apartheid, including a screening of *Last Grave at Dimbaza* (1973), a documentary film depicting the gruesome inequality and oppression of Apartheid. In response to SALC, the Board of Regents at the University of Michigan declared it would divest all university holdings from American companies that refused to sign the Sullivan Principles.[374] The administration refused, however, to honor SALC's request for complete divestment. University officials instead used the

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[373] Edward B. Fiske, "South Africa is New Social Issue for College Activists," *New York Times,* March 15, 1978: A22. In her recent book on *The Black Revolution on Campus* (Los Angeles/Berkeley, University of California Press, 2012), Martha Biondi shows how the growing presence of black students on American university campuses contributed to the rise of anticolonial and anti-racist movements linking the United States and Africa, 250-251.
[374] Eric Morgan, "Into the Struggle," especially Chapter Two.

Sullivan Principles to claim the moral high ground, while, in their view, still abiding by the principles of reasonable financial responsibility. (Michigan State administrators, like many institutions heavily invested in South Africa, argued that complete divestment would constitute financial recklessness). Despite the university's decision, SALC activists refused to quit. After several more months of protests, the Board of Trustees yielded to pressure and announced the sale of $7.2 million in stocks from companies operating in South Africa, making Michigan State the first research university in the country to completely divest from the country.[375]

University presidents and boards of trustees at other institutions followed the events at Michigan State with increasing trepidation. With Sullivan's encouragement, several dozen university presidents decided to take measures to forestall anti-apartheid activism on their campuses. In October 1977, the presidents of the University of Minnesota, Columbia University, and fifty other elite institutions drafted a letter to American companies urging them to adopt the Sullivan Principles. "Nearly all American corporations profess abhorrence for the apartheid system, but they seem to be fearful of being caught in the middle of an ideological conflict." In response to corporate ambivalence, the universities expressed their willingness to use their "influence as ethical investors in order to overcome such hesitation quickly."[376]

Coming on the heels of the Soweto uprising and successful divestment campaigns in places like Michigan, the letter provided the additional boost needed to strengthen the Principles program.[377] Sullivan wrote Vice President of Finance Donald Brown at the University of Minnesota, noting, "up to the time of [the letter]…response from companies to sign the

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[375] Ibid; For more on the campus anti-apartheid movement, see Massie, *Loosing the Bonds,* 324-330, 439-441.
[376] Correspondence Anne Rutledge, Assistant to the VP of Finance and Staff Assistant to the Committee on Social Responsibility in Investments, to Sullivan, October 25, 1977, Box 54, Folder 6; Open Letter from Ad Hoc Committee on the Sullivan Six Principles, Box 54, Folder 7, LHS papers.
[377] "University May Sell Stock as a Gesture for Human Rights: Ohio State Wants Three Firms to Support the Sullivan Principles in South Africa," *Wall Street Journal,* November 13, 1978: 18.

Statement of Principles and to promise implementation was not too encouraging. After[wards]…

however… we now have 107 American companies that have signed the Principles."[378] Beyond

convincing executives to sign the program, the involvement of university administrations and

various other institutional investors contributed to the growing pressure on the signatory

companies to implement some of the changes outlined in the Principles.

Prior to the university campaign, the signatory companies had given little thought to the

issue of monitoring. Indeed, many corporations had joined the program with the understanding

that the Sullivan Principles would, in the words of Citibank Vice President Robert E. Terkhorn,

"remain [a] private initiative" outside the realm of public oversight.[379] With the emergence of the

campus divestment movement, though, the signatory companies were suddenly confronted with

a range of investor responsibility committees and student groups, which expressed their own

criteria for assessing the Principles. In December 1978, Sullivan received a letter from Peter

Fortune, an Assistant Professor of Economics at Tulane University and a member of Tulane's

Committee on University Investments.[380] In the letter, Fortune expressed his concern that "the

six principles do not incorporate trade union rights for black workers; and… that we know of no

mechanism for monitoring the progress of firms and determining whether adherence is real."[381]

Other university groups voiced similar concerns. In February 1978, President F. B. O'Mara, Vice

President of Union Carbide, whose company had been one of the founding signatories of the

Principles, wrote Sullivan to express concern about the mounting criticism coming from

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[378] Correspondence, Leon H. Sullivan to Donald Brown, Vice President of Finance at the University of Minnesota, December 28, 1978, Box 54, Folder 9, LHS papers.
[379] Correspondence, Robert E. Terkhorn, Vice President Citibank, to Sullivan, February 22, 1977, Box 54, Folder 6, LHS papers.
[380] John G. Simon, Charles W. Powers, Jon P. Gunnemann, *The Ethical Investor: Universities and Corporate Responsibility* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972)
[381] Correspondence, Peter Fortune to Leon H. Sullivan, December 18, 1978, Box 54, Folder 9, LHS papers.

university campuses. Unless the signatory companies could show that progress was being made, O'Mara warned, the Principles would ultimately lose legitimacy.[382]

Growing pressure on the signatory companies to demonstrate the tangible benefits of the Principles accrued to black South Africans led to the creation of the Industry Support Unit, Inc. (ISU), a sub-organization comprised of representatives from several dozen signatory companies. As part of its commitment to improving the monitoring and implementation of the Principles, the ISU agreed to fund a "small administrative" staff to assist Sullivan and hired international consulting firm Arthur D. Little Inc. to oversee a semi-annual report on the signatory companies.[383] The ISU also established a total of sixteen task forces in the United States and South Africa, each comprised of representatives from the signatory companies, and charged with monitoring progress on the Principles, including company hiring practices, employee pay, skills-training and management development programs, and employee benefits.[384]

All of these committees and personnel, not least Sullivan himself, were intended to convey a sense of legitimacy and silence the Principles' critics. Yet, almost the minute it was launched the new monitoring apparatus faced challenges from activists, who criticized the program for failing to include outside oversight, and from the signatory companies themselves, which viewed the reporting initiative as interfering with what they saw as corporate autonomy. In his dealings with the signatory companies, D. Reid Weedon Jr., the chief accountant from Arthur D. Little Inc., encountered serious resistance from signatory companies, which complained that "the complex and detailed questionnaire[s]" required as part of the Principles' reporting program "[were] a distraction from [normal] business." Others protested that the

[382] F.B. O'Mara, Executive Vice President, Union Carbide Corporation, to Sullivan, February 22, 1978, Box 54, Folder 7, LHS papers.
[383] Statement of Principles Industry Support Unit Inc., August 8, 1979, Box 55, Folder 1, LHS papers.
[384] Sethi and Williams, *Economic Imperatives and Ethical Values,* 69.

questionnaire sent out by Weedon "stand[s] in the way of" the signatory companies, whose own efforts "to improve the conditions for our employees" would be effective if only Weedon and other outside monitors would leave the companies alone to implement the Principles as they saw fit.[385] Indeed, the controversy over the signatory company report reveals how the desire by executives to maintain corporate autonomy could, in some instances, fuel the decision of business leaders to support the Principles, while, in other cases, such as when the Principles introduced increased monitoring requirements, serve as a bulwark against corporate support for the program.[386]

Even with growing criticism, Sullivan remained hopeful that he could pressure the corporations to implement the Principles. Sullivan's optimism regarding the capacity of American business to change was shared by much of the first generation of black executives.[387] Faith in the program likewise was shared by Sullivan's network of black ministers, who rallied behind Sullivan and the Principles. Together, they formed the International Council of Equal Opportunity Principles (ICEOP), an independent monitoring organization for the Principles. Decades of experience fighting for affirmative action and equal opportunity in the United States taught the ministers in ICEOP that "companies [will] only do as much as they are forced to do."[388] In an effort to force the hands of the signatory companies, ICEOP launched a fact-finding mission to observe corporate operations in South Africa. The trip was funded with a thirty thousand dollar grant from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation of New York and led by

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[385] Anonymous chief executive quoted in Correspondence D. Reid Weedon, Jr. to James W. Rawlings, Vice Chairman, Union carbide Africa and Middle East Inc., March 15, 1979, Box 54, Folder 12, LHS papers.
[386] Resistance by the signatory companies to monitoring continued to plague the Principles effort throughout the 1970s and 1980s, until the program was officially disbanded just over a decade after their founding, with many companies refusing to complete the questionnaire and participate in the task forces.
[387] Collins, *Black Corporate Executives,* 60.
[388] Board Meeting Minutes, International Council for Equality of Opportunity Principles, December 10, 1979, quoted in Sethi and Williams, 100.

Sullivan's longtime friends and colleagues Rev. Gus Roman and Daniel Purnell. D. Reid

Weedon from Little, Inc. also accompanied the ministers on their visit to South Africa.[389] The

visit included a tour of twenty-four signatory companies and culminated in a report by ICEOP in

1979. Using only a few pleasantries, so as to remain within the bounds of professionalism, the

report lambasted the practice of self-monitoring and joined other organizations, such as the

Institute for Policy Studies, criticizing the signatory companies for "[failing] to fulfill their stated

purpose" and reducing the program to mere public relations campaign.[390]

Speaking for his own company, Henry Ford II, Chairman of the Board of Ford Motor

Company, responded to this criticism by emphasizing the investment made by American

business in racial uplift. In a letter to Sullivan, Ford noted that his own company had designated

$1.1 million for "training and development programs for blacks and colored employees" in South

Africa. This represented an increase of over 150 percent from 1976 levels.[391] Ford's observations

were confirmed by the first official report released by Andrew D. Little Inc. in 1978, which

touted the progress that was being made as a result of the Principles. According to the survey

results, three-fourths of the reporting companies had integrated facilities (principle 1), while

fifty-five out of seventy-eight companies (70.5 percent) reported having common benefit plans in

place.[392] Many other companies had instituted training programs for black and other non-white

employees. Motorola Company, for example, claimed to have recently appointed "a black

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[389] Sethi and Williams, *Economic Imperatives and Ethical values,* 106-108.
[390] Sethi and Williams, 88; Elizabeth Schmidt, *Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business Support for Apartheid* (Washington D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980).
[391] Correspondence Henry Ford II to Hon. Charles Diggs, Jr., February 13, 1978, Box 54, Folder 7, LHS papers.
[392] Arthur D. Little Inc., Report on the signatory companies to the Sullivan Principles, Vol. 1, (Cambridge: Arthur D. Little, 1978), African Studies Collection, University of Cape Town.

personnel officer" tasked with "implement[ing] a broad series of programs involving selection, training and upgrading of factory personnel."[393]

Over the next several years, various business leaders, reporting organizations, media outlets, and activist groups debated the effectiveness of the Sullivan Principles.[394] In a surprising turn of events, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) Deputy Director Terry Myers, whose organization had previously expressed skepticism about the Principles, revised his previous assessment and voiced optimism about the progress he witnessed. Myers recounted a recent trip to South Africa in a letter to Sullivan, noting that "companies have made substantial financial commitments to revamping existing eating, toilet or locker facilities to achieve desegregation." Myers juxtaposed this progress with previous resistance on the part of South African subsidiaries, which "told me [in years prior] that desegregation of certain facilities could not be accomplished" due to high costs of "new designs and construction."[395] Myers' comments were echoed by Weedon, who encouraged Sullivan to view the "the cup [as] half full." The point, according to Weedon, was not whether the signatory companies had met all the goals laid out by the Principles, but rather the positive "the direction of change."[396]

As the late 1970s gave way to the 1980s, however, Weedon increasingly found himself in the minority. In response to the positive reports released by Andrew D. Little Inc., critics of the Principles crafted a counter-narrative, which revealed the shortcomings of the Sullivan Principles and corporate social responsibility more broadly. Criticism of the signatory companies began with the reports themselves. While many of the signatory companies claimed great improvement

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[393] Correspondence Robert W. Galvin, Chairman of the Board, Motorola Corporation, to Sullivan, February 27, 1976, LHS papers, Box 54, Folder 3.
[394] "Study Shows 'Sullivan Principles' Working: U.S. Firms Making Progress Against S. Africa Apartheid," *Atlanta Daily World,* October 26, 1979: 1; "'Sullivan Principles' Are Working" *Sun Reporter,* November 1, 1979: 2.
[395] Correspondence Terry Myers to Sullivan, November 22, 1978, LHS papers, Box 54, Folder 9.
[396] Report on the signatory companies to the Sullivan Principles, Vol. 1, (Cambridge: Arthur D. Little, 1978), African Studies Collection, University of Cape Town.

in the hiring of non-white employees, critics noted that the use of the term non-white, instead of

black or African, obscured the fact that most of the increases in wages and benefits were accrued

by Indian and colored South Africans—the latter of which referred to a broad group of mixed-

origins, including the descendants of Malay slaves, and who were designated by the Apartheid

government as a separate race distinct from native Africans.[397] In an audit conducted by the

South African Institute for Race Relations at Ford Motors, for example, auditors discovered that

the company's claim to have increased the percentage of non-white salaried staff by 187 percent

in three years was largely due to the hiring of colored workers, who were seen by the company

as more dependable and hard-working than black Africans. Of the one hundred and sixty-five

new employees hired by Ford, one hundred and eight were colored compared to only fifty-seven

black new employees.[398] Meanwhile, other activists attacked the Principles for failing to include

what they deemed a central component of component of black liberation, namely labor rights. In

a report on the Sullivan Principles conducted by the Institute for Policy Studies, for example, it

was revealed that "only two companies, Ford and Kellogg, had recognized black trade unions,

and only Kellogg had actually signed a contract." The report further noted that due to restrictions

by the South African government on labor activism, companies had a relatively easy time getting

around union contracts. Failing to challenge South African law itself, the Sullivan Principles, the

report contended, left non-white workers subject to abuse by industry and the Apartheid

government.[399]

  Voicing his frustration with the failure of the signatory companies to commit fully to

ending Apartheid, Sullivan told black American journalist Carl Rowan, "[I am] not wedded to

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[397] Internal Memo, From Marshae Murrell to Sullivan, February 14, 1978, LHS papers, Box 54, Folder 7.
[398] M.C. Roux, W.L. Nkuhlu, W.H. Thomas, C.W. Manona, M.G. Whisson, *The Sullivan Principles at Ford: Audit 2* (Johannesburg: South African Institute for Race Relations, February 1981).
[399] Schmidt, 25-26.

the six principles." He also noted his concern that "[the] program [was] being used as a copout for firms which don't have the guts to do what is right."[400] The interview provoked a firestorm amongst the signatory companies. In a letter to Sullivan, Sims, who had been promoted to Vice President of Corporate Affairs at Johnson & Johnson, expressed his offense at the "accus[ation] directly, or indirectly, of being [called] a 'copout shelter for corporations which don't have their hearts in fighting bigotry, either in South Africa or the U.S.'"[401] In an attempt to pressure Sullivan to retract his statement, Sims emphasized the consequences of failing to tow the narrative of progress outlined by the signatory companies. As a result of Sullivan's actions putting the company in a bad light, Sims warned, "it may be extremely difficult for me to gain the support and flexibility I need to be a greater help to you in South Africa."[402] In other words, Sullivan needed to fall in line or risk losing Johnson & Johnson's support.

By the late 1970s, however, these strong-arm tactics and the lack of substantial changes in company policy increasingly proved ineffective in buying Sullivan's cooperation. Instead, Sullivan became bolder in his public criticism of the signatory companies. While on a trip to Johannesburg in 1980, Sullivan claimed that he was "going to turn the screws on [the signatory companies] … I will reach into corporation board rooms and take the cover off your companies… you American businessmen in South Africa and other parts of Africa had better get yourselves together."[403] The speech was later reprinted in the South African *Rand Daily Mail*

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[400] Sullivan quoted in Carl Rowan, "Students lead drive against U.S. firms in South Africa," [circa June 1978], Sims Papers.
[401] Correspondence Harold R. Sims to Leon H. Sullivan, June 15, 1978, Sims Papers.
[402] Ibid.
[403] Sullivan quoted in "Tough talk on Blacks," *Philadelphia Daily News,* Friday, September 5, 1980: 16.

alongside a quote from Sullivan threatening "Any U.S. company which does not do its part has no moral justification for being in this country. They should pack up and get out."[404]

Sullivan's comments that companies "should pack up and get out," a clear reference to divestment, provide a brief glimpse of doubts the Principles' central architect held about his own program. Sullivan elaborated on these doubts in a letter to his friend Bishop Donald George Ming of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in Cape Town, where Sullivan conveyed his belief that "[he was indeed] having some success [with the Principles], but [he] really [did not] know for sure." "If you think the Statement of Principles… is having an effect in South Africa please let me know. It would be helpful to know if I am wasting my time."[405] Despite his doubts, ultimately, Sullivan chose to remain faithful to the Principles well into the 1980s.[406]

Conclusion

Leon Sullivan's foray into the corporate management and the Sullivan Principles proved the beginning of the end of Sullivan's career as a global ambassador of black empowerment. While Sullivan went on to participate in several other ventures, including the Leon H. Sullivan Summits and the Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility, both launched in the 1990s, he never again achieved the same level of prominence as he did serving as the spokesperson for the signatory companies, fighting Apartheid in South Africa.

Similarly, a number of other black American executives slowly turned away from and/or decreased their efforts pursuing black empowerment through the institution of the multinational

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[404] Sullivan quoted in Simon Willson, "US firms get labour code ultimatum," *Rand Daily Mail,* Friday, September 5, 1980. Box 12, Folder 7, Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America Records, Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Libraries, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

[405] Correspondence Leon H. Sullivan to Bishop Donald George Ming of AME Church in Cape Town, May 24, 1978; Box 54, Folder 8, LHS papers.

[406] B. Feder, "Sullivan asks end of business links with South Africa," *The New York Times,* June 4, 1987: A1, D6.

corporation. In contrast to the optimism surrounding the initial wave of black corporate

appointments at the beginning of the decade, one civil rights lawyer and prominent figure in

black politics in Chicago noted in an interview with the *New York Times* in 1978, "corporations

will always put profit before people… and, given this… it is better for blacks not to go into

board rooms rather than be used to create an optical illusion." Merely adding black board

members and executives without fundamentally altering the structure of American capitalism

"[represented] the illusion [but not reality] of progress and change."[407]

On the other hand, it would be a mistake to simply dismiss the work done by black

executives like Sullivan to transform American corporations and business culture more broadly.

Responding to pressure from left-leaning activists demanding greater corporate transparency and

accountability, American corporations appointed black entrepreneurs like Sullivan to

management positions in unprecedented levels during the early seventies. Aided by shareholder

activists, black politicians, and government regulators, all of whom pressured corporations to

take action to address racial inequalities in the workplace and the broader society, black

executives succeeded in implementing various corporate social responsibility programs,

including affirmative action hiring initiatives, corporate-sponsored training and economic

development programs, and minority contract programs that benefited black and other

marginalized businesspeople.

Perhaps the most noticeable shift in corporate behavior related to the appointments of

people like Sullivan and Harold Sims was the work these black executives did developing a

platform that highlighted American business' contributions to black advancement abroad,

including in Apartheid South Africa. Responding to growing calls for sanctions and divestment,

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[407] Thomas N. Todd quoted in Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., "Rights Leaders at Odds on Whether Corporate Seats Pose a Conflict," *New York Times*, July 4, 1978: 6.

American corporate executives joined forces with Sullivan and each other to formulate the

largest corporate social responsibility program undertaken in a foreign country: the Sullivan

Principles. In doing so, they laid the foundation for a renegotiation of U.S.-South Africa

relations, moving away from *dejure segregation* towards a new political order centered on the

"free market" and black entrepreneurship.

Chapter 4

Apartheid's Entrepreneurs: International Business, the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Free Enterprise in South Africa

In 1974, a young black South African by the name of Samuel ("Sam") Motsuenyane addressed a gathering of American and European business leaders attending a meeting of the International Chamber of Commerce in Madrid, Spain. "The future of the White man would certainly be in jeopardy if he would not share his power; his comfort; his wealth and his know-how on more equitable terms with the rest of the people of [South Africa]," declared Motsuenyane. Alluding to the recent rise in black consciousness in the United States and Africa, Motsuenyane continued, "Africans [are] becoming proud of being Black. Blackness [can] no more be accepted as a tag of inferiority."[408] Yet, revolution—communist or otherwise—was not Motsuenyane's end goal. Indeed, he and the other black businessmen he represented as president of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc), wanted to avoid going the way of other African nations, including neighboring Rhodesia, currently embroiled in a bloody war involving the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and the Rhodesian government led by white nationalist Ian Smith. In order to avoid revolution in South Africa, "the African," Motsuenyane advised, must be "[encouraged]…to become creative...contributors to the overall [economic] development of the country."[409] In other words, South Africans demanded black empowerment.

Despite his best attempts to blend in, wearing a dark grey suit and tie, standard business attire of the day, Sam Motsuenyane drew attention as one of the few people of color in a crowd

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[408] "NAFCOC President Tells Overseas Business…Disinvestment No Good for Black Progress," *African Business* (April 1974), National Library of South Africa-Cape Town (hereafter cited as *African Business*).
[409] Ibid.

comprised primarily of white corporate executives and financiers. As explained in the previous

chapter, American corporations during the 1970s looked to black entrepreneurs and managers to

help them navigate the challenges posed by the global Black Power movement.[410] The

intensifying international anti-apartheid movement encouraged American capitalists to double-

down on these efforts by partnering with Motsuenyane and Nafcoc to promote black

empowerment in South Africa. Beginning in the mid-1970s and increasing after the 1976 Soweto

uprising, which gave further fodder to advocates of sanctions and divestment, American and

other foreign companies lent financial and technical assistance to Nafcoc in an effort to stave off

sanctions and forestall further social unrest. By the early 1980s, Nafcoc claimed over one-

thousand members and dozens of corporate sponsors, including industry leaders such as Ford

Motor Company, IBM, and General Motors.[411]

Nafcoc's alliance with American private capital built on and attempted to transform the

decades-old history of U.S.-South Africa relations centered on a shared pattern of racial

segregation and discrimination.[412] Nearly a century before the official beginning of Apartheid,

black American minstrels in the Virginia Jubilee Singers visited South Africa on a *fin de siècle*

tour promoting Christianity and good will between the U.S. and the British Empire. While on

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[410] On the global dimensions of the civil rights and black power movements, see Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Carol Anderson, *Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP and the Struggle for Colonial Liberation, 1941-1960* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Nikhil Singh, *Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Nico Slate ed., *Black Power beyond Borders: The Global Dimensions of the Black Power Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
[411] Sheila Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business Into the South African Economy with Specific Reference to the Initiatives of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce in the 1970s" (MA thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1981), 156, 248-250.
[412] George Frederickson's *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981) remains the classic study of race and racism in the two countries. See also Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 1993).

tour, troupe leader Orpheus McAdoo and the other black Americans forged relationships with

black South Africans.[413] This dialogue did not dissipate with the Jubilee Singers' departure.

Rather, black Americans and black South Africans sustained a vibrant transnational exchange

during the first half of the twentieth-century, during which they increasingly came to see their

separate struggles as linked to, if not part of, a global movement against colonialism,

segregation, and white supremacy.[414]

The rise the Nationalist Party in South Africa, coinciding with the escalation of the Cold

War, brought a screeching halt to this first chapter in black internationalism.[415] During the

immediate post-war years, black American activists struggled to gain support for sanctions to

thwart the Nationalist Party's Apartheid policies, which served to the benefit of American

capitalists. By the mid-1960s, American investors in South Africa were averaging a 20.6 percent

rate of return. (By comparison, the next highest country, Japan, had a 12 percent average return

on investment).[416] While justifiably garnering the attention of scholars as a moral and ultimately

successful effort to thwart Apartheid, the international sanctions and divestment movement

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[413] Veit Erlmann, "'A Feeling of Prejudice': Orepheus M. McAdoo and the Virginia Jubilee Singers in South Africa, 1890-1898," *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 14, No. 3 (April 1988): 331-350.

[414] Robert Trent Vinson, *The Americans Are Coming: Dreams of African American Liberation in Segregationist South Africa* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2012); James T. Campbell, *Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States and South Africa* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); George M. Fredrickson, *Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[415] On the United States' Cold War alliance with Apartheid South Africa, see Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 1993); Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race relations in the Global Arena* (Harvard University Press, 2009); Richard W. Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa: Historical Dimensions of Engagement and Disengagement* (New York University Press, 1990), 213-217, 250, 255-261; Elizabeth Schmidt, *Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business Support for Apartheid* (Washington D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980).

[416] Francis Njubi Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions: African Americans Against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Donald Culverson, *Contesting Apartheid: U.S. Activism, 1960-1987* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999); Robert Kinloch Massie, *Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years* (New York, 1997).

represented only one strand of anti-apartheid activism. Corporate-sponsored black empowerment denoted another.

Nafcoc's rise, aided by American and foreign capital, likewise created new dynamics within South Africa's political landscape. Scholarship on Apartheid South Africa has paid little attention to black business.[417] Shaped by the exigencies of the anti-apartheid struggle and South Africa's post-Apartheid transition, the history of late twentieth-century black politics in South Africa has tended to prioritize civil disobedience and popular resistance to Apartheid starting with the with the 1950s anti-pass campaign. This first wave of anti-apartheid resistance in South Africa met with harsh government reprisals, including the Sharpeville Massacre, during which South African police opened fire into a crowd of several thousand demonstrators, killing at least sixty-nine people. Following Sharpeville, the South African government launched a violent assault on black townships and banned the country's two largest black political organizations, the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and the African National Congress (ANC).[418] After that, the resistance struggle was largely forced underground or abroad, only reemerging in the 1970s with the rise of black consciousness and the youth movement protesting racial inequality in the education system.[419]

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[417] Roger Southall, *South Africa's Transkei: The Political Economy of an "Independent" Bantustan* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983) remains one of the few studies that focuses on African business. It does so, however, in the context of South Africa's Bantustans—rural "native" reserves—while ignoring the development of black business in the urban areas.

[418] Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945* (London: Longman, 1983); Noor Nieftagodien, "Popular Movements, Contentious Spaces and the ANC, 1943-1956," in *One Hundred Years of the ANC: Debating Liberation Histories Today* eds. Arianna Lissoni, Jon Soske, Natasha Erlank, Noor Nieftagodien and Omar Badsha (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012).

[419] The near absence of resistance in the townships during the 1960s has been attributed to the massive state-building efforts, including the construction of the model townships which discouraged civil disobedience. Natasha Vally, "The 'Model Township' of Sharpeville: The Absence of Political Action and Organisation, 1960-1984: M.A. research report, University of the Witwatersrand, 2009); Ivan Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race,* 169, 205; Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Building on and complicating these narratives, this chapter explores the vibrant

transnational discourse forged by American businessmen and Nafcoc members during the 1970s.

Blending "traditional" notions of African masculinity, Christian respectability, and racial uplift,

Nafcoc, like other black business organizations, celebrated black business as the key to black

liberation.[420] Yet, Nafcoc did more than promote black economic empowerment. With the help

of multinational corporations and black American business, Nafcoc established the infrastructure

for American capital to renegotiate its relationship to South Africa, downplaying America's

history of white supremacy and elevating the ties connecting American free enterprise and black

empowerment.

Forestalled Dreams

Living in Johannesburg during the 1950s, Sam Motsuenyane struggled to imagine a

future beyond the daily toils associated with his job at a white-owned sewing company, African

Sewing Machines, in Johannesburg. Despite earning a relatively generous salary of 2.10 South

African pounds a week, Sam Motsuenyane's status as an "office boy/messenger" did not make

him immune to the suspicions/accusations leveled against many black South Africans. One

morning, following a postal delivery, Motsuenyane returned to the office to find several police

officers waiting for him. His boss, Mr. Goëler, had accused him of stealing a pair of pinking

shears. Despite Motsuenyane's protests, including his insistence that he did not even know what

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[420] See Walter Weare, *Black Business in the New South*: *A Social History of the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 51-81; John Sibley Butler, *Entrepreneurship and Self-Help Among Black Americans* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). Nafcoc's leadership, if not necessarily the organization's membership, grew out of the "New African" movement, which flourished in urban Africa during the early decades of the twentieth century. The term "New African" "refer[red] to an individual with a Christian mission education, cosmopolitan interests, and a sense of racial consciousness…was [likewise] connected to the visions of a 'New Negro'" promulgated by African American intellectuals like Alain Locke and others. Meghan Healy-Clancy, "The Politics of New African Marriage in Segregationist South Africa," *African Studies Review* 57, no. 2, "ASR Forum: The Politics of Marriage in South Africa" (September 2014): 9.

the shears looked like, he was escorted by the officers to his residence in Alexandra. There, he

suffered the embarrassment of having the police search his room, while his cousin-in-law, Neriah

Motsepe—wife of prominent Sowetan Nathanial Motsepe, in whose home Sam was then

residing—looked on in horror. Despite the absence of any evidence connecting him to the theft,

Motsuenyane was fired from his job.[421]

Born and raised on the Highveld, Sam Motsuenyane came of age in a period of profound

transformation in South Africa. Across the country, colonialism and segregation provoked some

of the first attempts to organize black South Africans on a national basis. Disillusioned with

British rule and the "civilizing" efforts of white missionaries, Pixley Seme and John Dube—both

recently returned from their studies in the U.S., where the latter became enamored with Booker

T. Washington and his model of industrial education for black Americans—founded the South

African Native National Congress (later re-named the African National Congress) in January

1912 in Bloemfontein.[422] Together, the ANC, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of

South Africa (ICU), and the South African Communist Party (SACP) helped to lead a series of

actions combining African nationalism, labor militancy, and Christian millenarianism that

shocked the South African colony beginning in 1913 and continuing through World War II.[423]

As a child growing up on the Highveld, the son of sharecroppers, Sam Motsuenyane

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[421] Motsuenyane, *A Testament of Hope: The Autobiography of Dr. Sam Motsuenyane* (Johannesburg: KMM Review Publishing, 2011), 21-22.

[422] Vinson, *The Americans Are Coming,* 36-45. In addition to Booker T. Washington, whose influence on South African politics has long been acknowledged by scholars like R. Hunt Davis Jr., "John L. Dube: A South African Exponent of Booker T. Washington," *Journal of African Studies,* 1, no. 2 (1975): 497-528, and W. Manning Marable, "African Nationalist: The Life of John Langalibalele Dube" (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1976); Robert Trent Vinson emphasizes the lasting impact of Marcus Garvey and his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) on black South Africans, who viewed Garvey through the lens of Christian millenarianism that saw African Americans as liberators of black South Africans.

[423] For an alternative perspective on African politics in South Africa at this time that emphasizes continuity with pre-colonial ways of conceptualizing power and politics, see Clifton Crais, *The Politics of Evil: Magic, State Power, and the Political Imagination in South Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

experienced first-hand the exploitative force of the colonial state that deprived his family of their land.[424] As a young adult, Sam gained acceptance to the prestigious AME-sponsored Wilberforce Institute.[425] Founded as an industrial education and teachers-training college, Wilberforce earned a reputation as an important site for the training of a multi-ethnic South African Christian African elite.[426] As a student at Wilberforce, Motsuenyane walked the halls and ate meals with some of South Africa's leading political actors, including Charlotte Maxeke, who helped found the school and later the African National Congress Women's League, and Jacob Nhlapo, a prominent organizer of the ICU and principal at Wilberforce.[427]

In 1946, Sam Motsuenyane left Wilberforce after earning his junior certificate. He subsequently joined his peers migrating to Johannesburg to pursue careers in professions such as medicine, law, and social work.[428] The growth of a new class of black South African professionals, in many ways, mirrored developments elsewhere on the continent. Educated in missionary schools and universities administered by the colonial state, a sizeable number of these African elite went on to occupy positions in the post-colonial governments that emerged in the wake of decolonization.[429] South Africa's 1948 election in which the National (Afrikaner) Party captured a combined total of seventy-nine seats in the House of Assembly compared to the

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[424] On land dispossession in colonial South Africa, see William Beinart, Peter Delius, and Stanley Trapido, eds., *Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa 1850-1930* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1986); Colin Bundy, *The Rise & Fall of the South African Peasantry* (Suffolk: James Currey, 1988).
[425] Campbell, *Songs of Zion,* 178.
[426] Samuel M. Motsuenyane, "A Tswana Growing Up With Afrikaners," *Munger Africana Library Notes* Issue 47 (February 1979): 5-7; Campbell, *Songs of Zion,* 255-6, 275-294. Meaghan Healy-Clancy has shown the important role that elite Christian schools like Wilberforce played as sites for the forging of cross-ethnic friendships and the formation of an expansive African nationalism. "The Politics of New African Marriage in Segregationist South Africa," in *African Studies Review,* Volume 57, Number 2, "ASR Forum: The Politics of Marriage in South Africa" (September 2014): 7-28.
[427] Campbell, *Songs of Zion*, 178.
[428] Motsuenyane, *A Testament of Hope*, 24-26.
[429] Heather H. Sharkey, *Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Andrew Ivaska, *Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar Es Salaam* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961, repr. New York: Grove Press, 2005).

seventy-four seats won by the United Party in coalition with the Labour Party. The new National

government subsequently implemented a system of Apartheid (segregation), putting a damper on

the ambitions of South Africa's aspiring black professional elite.[430]

In accordance with Apartheid ideologies of separate development, the South African

government encouraged Africans to pursue opportunities for economic, social, and political

advancement in the Bantustans or black homelands, which divided Africans into ten fragmented

territories, each corresponding to a different ethnic group.[431] Seeing an opportunity for

professional and political advancement, Sam Motsuenyane joined the African National Soil

Conservation Association (ANSCA) in 1951, an organization which promoted conservation and

agricultural modernization in the reserves as part of the government's Betterment program

administered by the Department of Bantu Affairs. In doing so, Motsuenyane, who served as

president of ANSCA, put himself in the center of a mounting battle between Africans and the

Apartheid state, subsistence versus commercial agriculture, and traditional versus modern forms

of living, especially as they concerned property ownership.

Betterment proved a highly contentious and ultimately unsuccessful program.[432] Building

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[430] Major pieces of Apartheid legislation included the 1950 Population Registration Act, the 1950 Group Areas Act, and the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act. While benefiting the Afrikaaner commercial class, the Apartheid regime's tendency towards authoritarian control and state intervention was, according to Ivan Evans, "[hostile] to the market" and certainly curtailed opportunities for African economic advancement. *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 64-65.

[431] Bantuization built on the policies of the British colonial and segregationist South African governments, which established "native reserves" in 1913 and 1936. Ivan Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race,* 169, 205; Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 7, 27, 29, 72; Revising an older literature that saw Bantuization as creating two distinct classes of Africans—one rural and one urban—recent scholarship emphasizes the connections maintained by Africans across space and different kinds of social and economic worlds. Thembisa Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation in South Africa* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004).

[432] Colin Bundy, *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Chris de Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart: Betterment Planning and Villagisation in a South African Homeland* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1995); and Laurine Platzky and Cherryl Walker for the Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985); *Environmental History* Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 1997): 439-459; William Beinart, The Rise of Conservation in South Africa-Settlers, Livestock, and the Environment 1770-1950 (Oxford University Press, 2003), particularly Chapter 10: "Debating Conservation in the African Areas of the Cape, 1920-1950."

on previous conservation programs carried out by the South African government in white areas, Betterment had as its central goal the reorganization of rural African communities to better conserve resources and support the development of commercial agriculture. As an organization, ANSCA embraced the goal of betterment. While objecting to certain parts of the betterment program, including the government's practice of cattle-culling, ANSCA's black leadership saw in betterment an opportunity to pursue new land claims based on freehold tenure. At the organization's inaugural conference, delegates "unanimously concurred that the reserve would be saved by the encouragement of freehold landownership." Traditional forms of organizing African society along communal tenure had, in these Christian-educated Africans' views, hindered agricultural development. "Pride of ownership" was needed to motivate "proper land utilization" according to ANSCA.[433]

Despite garnering support from a select group of Christian-educated African elite, betterment proved a failure. Widespread resistance to the government's practice of cattle culling and displacement culminated in the Pondoland revolts.[434] Meanwhile, the government, which had never fully committed to agricultural modernization in the "native reserves," used the revolts as an excuse to dispense with betterment. In June 1959, ANSCA received word that its request for further government funding had been denied. By November of that year, the organization was all but defunct.[435]

With the failure of the betterment program, ANSCA largely abandoned the dream of freehold tenure in the rural areas. In 1959, Sam Motsuenyane returned to Johannesburg, where

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[433] ANSCA representatives quoted in Farieda Khan, "Soil Wars: The Role of the African National Soil Conservation Association in South Africa, 1953-1959," *Environmental History* Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 1997): 445-6.
[434] T. Kepe and Lungisile Ntsebeza, *Rural Resistance in South Africa: the Mpondo Revolts after Fifty years* (Boston: Brill Publishers, 2011).
[435] Khan, "Soil Wars," 452.

he joined Sowetan businessman Bigvai Masekela in founding a cartage company, Bampa Syndicate.[436] The company was one of many small businesses established by African traders during a period of rapid township expansion. The name Bampa Syndicate revealed something about Motsuenyane and Masekela's aspirations for something more than the small spaza shops, constructed quickly with wood and scraps of metal. At its height, the syndicate owned six trucks, which they used to haul bricks, sand, cement, and other materials used in the construction of Soweto.[437]

An American (Ad)venture

For one half of the Bampa Syndicate, Sam Motsuenyane, the journey into the world of modern business was not so far away as it might have seemed at the time. Shortly after returning to Johannesburg, Sam Motsuenyane was contacted by the United States-South African Leadership Exchange Program (USSALEP).[438] Founded in 1955 with the help of the American Friends Service Committee and the African American Institute, USSALEP represented, in some respects, a holdover from the pre-Apartheid era, when white liberal reformers crisscrossed the Atlantic, spreading Christianity and educating Africans to become civilized members of society.[439] Severely curtailed by the Apartheid regime and transformed by the Cold War, these transnational liberal networks nevertheless persisted into the post-war era, taking on the

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[436] Motsuenyane, *A Testament of Hope,* 51-52.
[437] Ibid.
[438] Motsuenyane, *A Testament of Hope,* 53.
[439] Much of this transnational "civilizing" work was carried out by American missionaries, which played a significant role in educating black South Africans during the first half of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries. Richard Elphick and Rodney Davenport, eds., *Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social, and Cultural History* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1997), 90-91, 105, 354; Norman Etherington, "An American Errand into the South African Wilderness" *Church History* 39 (1970): 62-71; During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions controlled more land than any other mission in Natal. See Heather Hughes, "'A Lighthouse for African Womanhood': Inanda Seminar, 1869-1945'," in *Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945, ed. Cherryl Walker* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1990), 200.

responsibility of promoting American liberalism and ensuring Apartheid South Africa remain part of the "civilized" world.[440] Accordingly, a late 1950s memo outlining USSALEP's mission noted that the organization facilitated exchanges between "like-minded" South Africans and Americans with the goal of maintaining South Africa's position in the "mainstream contemporary" world with regards to technology, industry, culture, and social relations.[441]

Founded in the wake of *Brown v. Board* and with support from the African-American Institute, an organization dedicated to aiding the development of Africans, USSALEP leaders endeavored to foster cross-racial dialogues involving Americans and South Africans in light of growing concerns that South Africa was slipping towards racial extremism. In 1959, USSALEP selected Sam Motsuenyane as the program's first African exchange, perhaps taking interest in Motsuenyane's stated interest in learning more about "Negro business."[442] At the time of Motsuenyane's selection, USSALEP had recently undergone an internal review during which organization directors expressed interest in prioritizing exchanges to help in "solving the urban problems in both nations."[443] This included focusing on issues such as "family life and youth…Christian education…literacy…[and] the development of small businesses…including those in the non-white population."[444] In addition to Motsuenyane, USSALEP selected several other prominent black South African businessmen, including S.Z. Conco, S.P. Kutumela, F.S.M. Mncube, and black American banker, John Wheeler, president of the American Farmers and

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[440] American liberalism in Africa coincided with U.S. Cold War policy combatting the spread of communism. See, Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*; Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).
[441] Memo, United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program, Inc., USSALEP Papers, Wits University, Historical Papers.
[442] "Curriculum Vitae of Mr. and Mrs. Sam M. Motsuenyane," February 27, 1960, USSALEP Papers, Historical Papers, The Library, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa, Individual Files-Sam Motsuenyane (hereafter cited as USSALEP Papers).
[443] Memo, United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program, Inc., USSALEP Papers, Wits University, Historical Papers.
[444] Ibid.

Mechanics Bank, to participate in the exchange.[445] During the late 1960s, USSALEP's interest in black business led to the establishment of the Small Business project, which provided monetary and technological assistance to small-scale traders to help them overcome the challenges created by competition with large white-owned companies.[446]

The journey to the U.S. proved transformative. Sam Motsuenyane and his wife Jocelyn arrived in New York City in late January 1960 amidst "the worst snow storm the country had seen in eleven years."[447] Following a short stay in New York, where Sam was detained by immigrant officials on the suspicion that he might have tuberculosis, the Motsuenyanes settled into their new home in Durham, North Carolina, where Sam enrolled in an agricultural development program at North Carolina State College.[448] According to Sam Motsuenyane, living in North Carolina in the early 1960s was not unlike living in South Africa. While traveling in Kentucky, Motsuenyane experienced racism when he was denied a seat in a restaurant and forced to "sit on soap boxes and to have our meal that way."[449] For many years, Motsuenyane remembered the experience as an important moment in terms of his understanding of the U.S..

"[I] realized that what we were seeing and experiencing was no different from what we experienced back home in spite of the enlightened, non-racial constitution of the American people."[450] In both cases, Motsuenyane noted, "The problem [was] essentially not a Negro or Native problem as is often alleged, but one of human selfishness on the part of those people who

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[445] Pamphlet, USSALEP Papers, Wits University, Historical papers.
[446] "Assistance to Small Traders in Community and Economic Development," USSALEP Papers, Wits University, Historical Papers, Box H6.
[447] "My General Impressions and Observations on My Visit to the United States as an Exchangee of the United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program," June 1, 1960, University of the Witwatersrand, Historical papers, USSALEP Records, Individuals-Motsuenyane; Motsuenyane, *A Testament of Hope,* 54.
[448] Letter Sam Motsuenyane to Dr. F. Loescher, November 18, 1959, USSALEP Records.
[449] Motsuenyane, *A Testament of Hope,* 57.
[450] Ibid.

desire to keep out and dominate the Negro for all time and in all spheres of life."[451]

Yet, it was precisely the similarities he observed in the systematic discrimination of black people that left Motsuenyane amazed by the achievements of black American business.[452] Living in Durham, Motsuenyane witnessed black American businesses unlike those he had seen in his home country. Birth place to a number of black-owned businesses and financial institutions, including North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance and the Mechanics and Farmers Bank, Durham garnered a reputation as the "Black Wall Street of America" during the early 1900s.[453] By the early 1960s, the city's black business district had lost much of its initial sparkle, as some of the key institutions followed the black migration to new centers of black entrepreneurship that sprouted up in Detroit, Chicago, and Oakland.[454] Even so, the city retained a certain appeal for the young Motsuenyane, who befriended several of Durham's most prominent black American businessmen, including John Wheeler and Berkley Burrel, President of the National Negro Business League. These men impressed Motsuenyane with their level of "sophisticat[ion]," in his words, and helped to spark his interest in establishing an African financial institution along the lines of Durham's famous North Carolina Mutual Insurance Company.[455]

It is perhaps unsurprising that Motsuenyane found much to admire in the "New South" model of racial governance, which created opportunities for alliances between white liberals,

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[451] "My General Impressions and Observations on My Visit to the United States as an Exchangee of the United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program," June 1, 1960, University of the Witwatersrand, Historical papers, USSALEP Records, Individuals-Motsuenyane.

[452] "Mr. Motsuenyane in the U.S.A." *African Business* (March 1977).

[453] Quincy T. Mills, *Cutting Along the Color Line: Black Barbers and Barber Shops in America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 99; Quincy T. Mills, "Black Wall Street," in *Encyclopedia of African American Business History,* ed. Juliet E.K. Walker, (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 1999), 81-82; Weare, *Black Business in the New South,* 51-81; John Sibley Butler, *Entrepreneurship and Self-Help Among Black Americans* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); W.E.B. Du Bois, "The Upbuilding of Black Durham," *World's Work* 23 (January 1912); Booker T. Washington, "Durham, North Carolina, a City of Negro Enterprises," *Independent* 70 (March 30, 1911).

[454] Weare, *Black Business in the New South,* 268-269; 278.

[455] Motsuenyane, *A Testament of Hope*, 69.

corporate executives, and black businessmen in the name of economic growth.[456] In Atlanta, for example, Motsuenyane met with members of the Southern Regional Council, a multi-racial organization that promoted racial harmony and economic development. Among those counted as active participants of the Council were the Chairman of the local NAACP and "several Negro business executives." This encounter led Motsuenyane to conclude that "in the United States segregation and colour discrimination are on their way out." Seeing blacks and whites governing the New South city—a place with a history not unlike his home country—furthermore led Motsuenyane to conclude that a similar kind of "interracial" economic development program could be implemented in South Africa. Indeed, he noted in his report to USSALEP directors: "One wishes [the Council's] work could be multiplied a thousand-fold."[457]

Domesticating Black Empowerment

Sam Motsuenyane's time in the United States was cut short in 1962 by an illness, prompting him to return to South Africa, where he completed his degree remotely.[458] Whatever sadness Motsuenyane might have harbored about having to leave the U.S. early was quickly overcome by Motsuenyane's discovery of local efforts to organize black business in South Africa. Black South African traders faced numerous challenges in their attempts to establish and grow their commercial endeavors. With the implementation of Apartheid, Africans, particularly those in the urban areas, faced a range of new restrictions, including on the licenses needed to operate a business. One of the biggest challenges facing black businesses were the prohibitions

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[456] For more on "New South" politics, see Clarence Stone, *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989); Paul Gaston, *The New South Creed: A Study in Southern Mythmaking* (New York: Knopf 1970).
[457] "My General Impressions and Observations on My Visit to the United States as an Exchangee of the United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program," June 1, 1960, University of the Witwatersrand, Historical papers, USSALEP Records, Individuals-Motsuenyane.
[458] Motsuenyane, *A Testament of Hope,* 58-59.

on African property ownership outside of the native reserves, which made it difficult for Africans to acquire credit on terms comparable to whites.[459] In response to these conditions, a group of prominent African traders, including Motsuenyane's old business partner, Bigvai Masekela, and prominent Sowetan businessman Richard Maponya founded the National African Chamber of Commerce to represent the interests of black businessmen in Soweto. The organization was later re-constituted as the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc). The organization's founding conference in Soweto drew over one-hundred African traders from across the country.

Despite claims by some of the organization's founders to the contrary, Nafcoc, from the beginning, engaged in more than mere economics. Comprised of prominent black businessman from the Transvaal and other urban areas across the country, Nafcoc expounded a respectability politics that had long flourished among South Africa's Christian-educated black elite.[460] During the early decades of the twentieth-century, when Africans first built permanent residences in Johannesburg and the surrounding area, Christian-educated black South Africans founded a series of organizations promoting the social, moral, and economic uplift of Africans. Among those to lead these early endeavors for racial uplift was John Langalibalele Dube. Educated at Oberlin College, Dube was inspired by Booker T. Washington and his model of industrial education and self-help. Returning to South Africa, Dube helped to found several organizations, including the Bantu Business League, the first organization representing black business in South Africa,[461] and the South African National Negro Congress, later re-named the African National

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[459] Roger Southall, *South Africa's Transkei: The Political Economy of an "Independent" Bantustan* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 186-190.

[460] Vivian Bickford-Smith, *Ethnic Pride and Racial Prejudice in Victorian Cape Town* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 39, 203; B. Willan, *Sol Plaatje: South African Nationalist 1876-1932* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[461] Sheila Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business Into The South African Economy with Specific Reference to the Initiatives of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce in the 1970s" (MA thesis, University of the

Congress).[462] For the most part, the efforts of Dube and other Christian-educated African elite to promote racial uplift were confined to the urban areas and missionary outposts. Meanwhile, the majority of Africans remained in rural areas under the influence of traditional leaders and customary systems of belief.[463]

The situation changed however with the rise of urbanization. Like in the U.S., World War II portended a series of changes for black South Africans, who migrated to the city in growing numbers. By 1951, the number of Africans living in urban areas had increased to 2.3 million from 1.1 million in 1936.[464] Urbanization—which continued despite the colonial and Apartheid regime's pass law system—created new opportunities and challenges for the country's aspiring black businessmen. On one hand, urbanization provided new opportunities for commerce. Black business activity in the Johannesburg area increased by nearly twenty percent per year between 1938 and 1955 and thirty-five per cent per annum in the three years following.[465] Many Africans took advantage of the rise in post-war wages to go into business selling food goods, as well as other everyday goods and services to black and white residents living in the city. Upon his return to South Africa, Sam Motsuenyane opened a shop selling flowers, entering a trade previously dominated by Johannesburg's Indian merchants.[466]

At the same time, some, including black businessmen, worried that the process of

Witwatersrand, 1981), 4; For more on the history of black business organizations in South Africa, see Kwandiwe Kondlo, *A Legacy of Perseverance: NAFCOC: 50 years of Leadership in Business* (Sandton: KMM Review Publishing Company, 2014), 7-12.

[462] Heather Hughes, *The First President: A Life of John L. Dube, Founding President of the ANC* (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2011); For more on the role of Christianity in the early ANC, see James Campbell, *Songs of Zion;* Natasha Erlank, "Christianity and African Nationalism in South Africa in the First Half of the Twentieth Century," in *One Hundred Years of the ANC: Debating Liberation Histories Today*, eds. Arianna Lissoni, Jon Soske, Natasha Erlank, Noor Nieftagodien, and Omar Badsha (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012).

[463] Crais, *The Politics of Evil*.

[464] *South African Statistics,* Department of Statistics, 1980, 17.

[465] Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business," 6; Southall, *South Africa Transkei,* 186.

[466] Ruth Tomaselli, "Indian Flower Sellers of Johannesburg: A History of People on the Street," in *Town and Countryside in the Transvaal: Capitalist Penetration and Popular Response,* ed. Belinda Bozzoli (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1983), 215-239.

urbanization contributed to a loss of autonomy and sense of self on the part of black South Africans. Addressing Nafcoc members at the organization's annual conference in 1972, Sam Motsuenyane, who had since assumed the position of president—a position he maintained for nearly three decades—bemoaned the lack of "sacrifice; dedication and commitment" on the part of black South Africans.[467] Africans, Motsuenyane elaborated, had become dependent on the government, including the Bantu Affairs Department, charged by the Apartheid government with administering the African population. "What our black nation really requires is the motivation for SELF HELP. The African businessman must learn to stand on his own feet, to work together with his fellow Black businessman and to take the bulk of his development on his own shoulders."[468]

Rhetoric emphasizing self-help and respectability permeated Nafcoc's early years, fusing the profit-motive with members' aspirations for freedom. Thus, for example, "A Business Guide for African Shopkeepers" published in 1972 and distributed with the help of Nafcoc's magazine *African Business*, instructed readers that with proper management and behavior appropriate to "the respectability of business," they could "maintain independence."[469] As in the U.S., black newspapers proved central sites for black engagement with modernity and the "rework[ing]" of black culture.[470] Sam Motsuenyane launched *African Business* in 1972 with the help of Keeble-Prins Publishing Group, a white publisher based in Johannesburg. The sale of the magazine to non-members brought in a small amount of revenue, R29.00 in 1974.[471] Members received

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[467] *African Business* (October/November 1972).
[468] In particular, Motsuenyane bemoaned the "Bantu Investment Corporation which, despite some wonderful work, is rather top heavy with white executives at the policy making level." *African Business* (December/January 1973).
[469] "Commercial Courses and Careers: In-House Training," *African Business* (February 1978): 33.
[470] Adam Green, *Selling the Race: Culture, Community, and Black Chicago, 1940-1955* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 6-7; Derek R. Peterson, Emma Hunter, and Stephanie Newell, *African Print Cultures: Newspapers and Their Publics in the Twentieth Century* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016).
[471] *African Business* (June 1975).

copies of the magazine as part of their membership. Additional financing for the magazine came from the proceeds from the sale of the Annual Conference program and the publishers themselves. Approximately 4,000 copies of the magazine's conference issue, published annually, were donated by J.W. Keeble.[472]

Like other contemporary African newspapers, the pages of *African Business* were filled with talk about independence, and its analog, self-determination, a reflection of a resurgent African nationalism permeating South Africa and the continent.[473] Nafcoc members proved quite receptive to these nationalist sentiments, inviting black nationalist Robert M. Sobukwe, president of the Pan-African Congress (PAC), to speak at the organization's annual conference in August of 1959.[474] Formed in April 1959 in Soweto, the PAC espoused a militant black nationalism that its members felt had been abandoned by the seemingly more moderate African National Congress (ANC). [475] The PAC's emphasis on race consciousness and self-determination resonated with many Nafcoc members, including Sam Motsuenyane, who called on "African businessman…[to] learn to stand on his own feet."[476]

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[472] Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business," 168.

[473] The literature on African nationalism is quite extensive. For examples Heather J. Sharkey, *Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); James R. Brennan, *Taifa: Making Nation an Race in Urban Tanzania* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012); Jay Straker, *Youth Nationalism, and the Guinean Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); Elizabeth Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939-1958* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2005). Many scholars have noted that African nationalism emerged on the continent in tandem with other competing ethnic and racial identities that sometimes led to violent conflict between Africans. See for example, Jonathan Glassman, *War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); Jean Marie Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[474] Keeble, "Building Black Business," 16.

[475] Raymond Suttner, "African Nationalism" in *Intellectual Traditions in South Africa: Ideas, Individuals and Institutions* eds. Peter Vale, Lawrence Hamilton and Estelle H. Prinsloo (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2014), 138-140. Among the objections held by PAC members towards the ANC was the latter's relationship to the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), whose leadership was white.

[476] Sam Motsuenyane quoted in *African Business* (December/January 1973).

Less than a year after PAC's founding and Sobukwe's address to Nafcoc, PAC gained national and international attention for their campaign protesting the government's pass laws. The African National Congress (ANC) subsequently called for their own anti-pass protest. On March 21, 1960, PAC led thousands of Sowetans on a peaceful protest through the township during which protesters chanted slogans, including "Awaphele amapasti (down with the pass)," and "Forward to Independence, Tomorrow the United States of Africa." The march culminated at the Sharpeville police station, where protesters encountered 300 armed policemen. The moments immediately preceding the gunfire remain hotly contested. According to local police, protesters began throwing stones leading several policemen to fear for their life. In a moment of self-described panic, one police officer, who was standing on top of an armored car, opened fire on the crowd, initiating a torrent of gunfire from the police into the unarmed crowd. Within minutes of the initial shots, sixty-nine protesters lay dead and over 180 seriously wounded.[477]

The Sharpeville massacre initiated a violent and prolonged government crack-down on anti-apartheid organizing. In the wake of the anti-pass campaign, hundreds of activists were imprisoned and the ANC and PAC—the two organizations with the largest support base—were banned and forced into exile. Subsequently, Nafcoc's leaders pursued a pragmatic politics, abandoning the more militant rhetoric associated with the ANC and PAC. In a speech delivered before Nafcoc, Sam Motsuenyane stressed that "[the chamber] should stay outside of party politics if they were to be effective as instruments of development."[478] In place of militant slogans and militant demonstrations, Nafcoc's leaders doubled-down on the politics of black respectability, emphasizing the importance of conservative values central to Apartheid's logic of

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[477] "Sharpeville Massacre, 21 March 1960," *South African History Online: towards a people's history,* http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960.
[478] "Presidential Policy Statement 1979: Chambers Should Stay Out of Party Politics Motsuenyane Stresses Role of Black Business in the Southern African Economy," *African Business* (June 1979): 5.

maintaining social control.

Among the values promoted by Nafcoc was the importance of Christian family. First introduced in the Cape by European missionaries in the late eighteenth century, Christianity became a marker, dividing Africans who sought opportunities for education and prestige in European-occupied territory from those who maintained a more traditional lifestyle. Many of the early black nationalist organizations incorporated Christian values into their political platform, including the ANC, many of whose members came from missionary-educated families and viewed segregation through the lens of Christian immorality.[479] Likewise, Nafcoc's leaders included men belonging to an elite network of Christian families living in Soweto. Within these families, Christian marriage (as opposed to more traditional polygamous unions) played an important role in marking one's ascendance from childhood into adulthood.[480] Sam Motsuenyane met his wife Jocelyn Nomqgibelo Mashinini at the Methodist church in Alexandra. Their wedding, which took place at the Alexandra Methodist church, symbolized the union of two prominent Sowetan families, the Motsuenyanes and the Mashininis. Following the ceremony, Sam and Joceylyn moved into the Mashinini residence at No. 133, 13th Avenue Alexandra Township before finding their own house, a rented four-room municipal house at No. 625 Dube Village.[481]

While the church provided Christian Africans like the Motsuenyanes with social capital, it could not entirely replace the social institutions that helped maintain traditional African society. The history of colonialism and Apartheid are full of examples of changing social,

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[479] Campbell, *Songs of Zion;* Natasha Erlank, "Christianity and African Nationalism in South Africa in the First Half of the Twentieth Century."

[480] Meghan Healy-Clancy, "The Politics of New African Marriage in Segregationist South Africa," in *African Studies Review,* Volume 57, Number 2, "ASR Forum: The Politics of Marriage in South Africa" (September 2014): 14.

[481] Motsuenyane, *A Testament of Hope,* 30-36.

cultural, and economic norms, which, over time, undermined the control African patriarchs held over land and familial labor.[482] Deprived of traditional patrilineal patronage networks, many Africans working in the wage economy aspired to earn enough to return to purchase land and cattle in the rural areas and purchase cattle (necessary for bride wealth). In many instances, however, the meager wages paid black laborers were insufficient to purchase even the made it difficult for them to obtain even the smallest bride wealth.[483]

Other scholars have documented how the transition from rural to urban living gave rise to a series of new militant masculinities that took the place of traditional identities associated with African men as warriors and patriarchs.[484] Beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, South African townships witnessed the rise of youth gangs, which substituted for traditional rituals led by elders in the community and marking the transition from youth to manhood.[485] Rejecting their parents' authority and their views on the respectability of work, gang members embraced a lifestyle of bootlegging and gambling as a means of accumulating capital and status.[486]

As members of a Christian urban elite, Nafcoc's leaders observed the proliferation of youth gangs with trepidation. Perceiving these new forms of black militancy as a negative

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[482] Thembisa Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors,* 40-43; Cherryl Walker, "Gender and Development of the Migrant Labour System, c. 1850-1930," in *Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945,* ed. Cherryl Walker (David Philip, 1990): 168-96; Jeff Guy, "The Destruction and Reconstruction of Zulu Society," in *Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa: Class Formation, Culture, and Consciousness, 1870-1930,* eds. Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone (London: Longman, 1982): 167-94; Anne Mager *Gender and the Making of a South African Bantustan: A Social History of the Ciskei, 1945-59* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999); Belinda Bozzoli, *Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy, and Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-1983* (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1991), 235.
[483] Natasha Erlank, "Gender and Masculinity in South African Nationalist Discourse, 1912-1950," *Feminist Studies,* Vol. 29, Issue 3 (Fall 2003): 653-671.
[484] Susanne Maria Klausen, *Abortion Under Apartheid: Nationalism, Sexuality, and Women's Reproductive Rights in South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 192-3; Helen Bradford, "Not a Nongqawuse Story: An anti-Heroine in Historical Perspective," in *Basus'iimbokodo, bawel'imilambo/They Remove Boulders and Cross Rivers: Women in South African History,* ed. Nomboniso Gasa (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council, 2007), 47; Robert Morrell, "Of Boys and Men: Masculinity and Gender in Southern African Studies," *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 24, no. 4 (1998): 607;
[485] Clive Glaser, *Bo-Tsotsi: The Youth Gangs of Soweto, 1935-1976* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2000).
[486] Glaser, *Bo-Tsotsi*, 7.

consequence of urbanization, Nafcoc projected formalized black business as an alternative path toward achieving patriarchal authority. Dressed in grey and black business suites with matching ties and pocket squares, drinking out of glasses, Nafcoc's conference attendees represented the pinnacle of modern manhood. To complete the uniform, Nafcoc sold badges, cuff-links and ties.[487]

Even with the sea of business attire, Nafcoc's conferences were not entirely devoid of references to African tradition. Indeed, interspersed amidst the speeches and toasts made by Nafcoc executives (and, in later years, white businessmen and professionals), Nafcoc's conferences featured traditional warrior dances associated with the transition to manhood. In addition to their function appealing to some of the organization's rural constituency, many of whom maintained a stronger allegiance to traditional values, these performances affirmed the connection between business and black male authority.

Black women, on the other hand, appeared in ways that complimented the masculinity of Nafcoc's entrepreneurs. A number of African women attended the conferences as wives, dressed in their Sunday best. Nafcoc wives did more than sit prettily besides their husbands. They played a central role in the production of Nafcoc entrepreneurs and their families. In his autobiography, Sam Motsuenyane elaborated on the important role that his wife Jocelyn played ensuring that his clothes were ironed and their home, in the elite subsection of Dube, properly cared for.[488] This emphasis on African women as wives and caretakers was further bolstered by calls from some Nafcoc executives for African women to perform reproductive labor in service of the race. Responding to deputy minister of Bantu administration M.C. Botha's call for white married women to produce babies in the much discussed "Botha Babies" campaign, Nafcoc president

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[487] Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business," 172.
[488] Motsuenyane, *A Testament of Hope,* 35.

Richard Mapomya called on "[African women to] join in 'the battle of the babies,'…our people should step up production."[489]

Whereas Nafcoc's leaders willingly acknowledged African women's contributions in regards to household and reproductive labor, they viewed African women's engagement with the market with more suspicion. African women found numerous opportunities to participate in trade and industry working as hawkers, beer brewers, sex workers, and laundresses in urban areas.[490] Yet, African women rarely appeared in discussions as businesswomen at Nafcoc prior to the mid-1980s.[491] While ignoring African women entrepreneurs, Nafcoc, at times, interpreted African women consumers as hostile to the organization's interests. In an article appearing in Nafcoc's *African Business,* the authors warned readers about a perceived increase in "consumer resistance" from women's "consumer protection organisations hell bent on confrontation with any retailer or manufacturer guilty of 'unfair' profits and bad service."[492] In language evocative of fears regarding the loss of African patriarchal authority, Nafcoc members complained about the "trend for black customers to take their [business] to white stores," and bemoaning: "Gone are the days of the captive consumer."[493]

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[489] Mapomya quoted in Klausen, *Abortion Under Apartheid*, 194.

[490] Klausen, *Abortion Under Apartheid*, 191; Deborah Gaitskell, "'Christian Compounds for Girls': Church Hostels for African Women in Johannesburg, 1907-1970," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (October 1979), 48.

[491] The first article on women entrepreneurs appeared in *African Business* in 1982. "Special report: Women as Entrepreneurs," *African Business* (August 1982): 11. After that women were gradually incorporated into the discourse surrounding black business and Nafcoc.

[492] "From the Desk: Consumers are on the warpath" *African Business* (July 1977): 29.

[493] Ibid; "Recapturing Customers" *African Business* (August 1977). Discussions about household spending and consumption were often heavily filtered through societal obligations between husbands and wives. Broadly speaking, men were expected to provide for the family, although in reality women held jobs in the informal economy as well. Women, on the other hand, performed a majority of the household purchasing, including home furnishings. This gendered division of labor had consequences for the spending and saving habits of black township residents. Sometimes, male laborers hid their wages in bank accounts in an attempt to circumvent their familial obligations. Women often accused husbands of being wasteful spenders and adopted various mechanisms, including organizing savings clubs, in an effort to save money while conforming to gendered notions of thriftiness associated with respectability. Deborah James, *Money from Nothing: Indebtedness and Aspiration in South Africa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 101, 106-110, 125-127; Deborah Posel, "Races to consume: Revisiting South Africa's history of race, consumption and the struggle for freedom," *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 33:2 (2010): 157-175.

Nafcoc's derision of consumer infidelity was itself informed by the organization's own attempt to reassert patriarchal authority through an imagined binary that associated black women with consumption and black male with entrepreneurism. African women appeared alongside consumer goods and as objects to be consumed themselves in Nafcoc's popular beauty contest. The beauty contest drew contestants from approximately a dozen Nafcoc chapters from around the country. Many participated in local and/or regional contests prior to being selected for the national conference. During the contest, the contestants paraded on stage in bathing suits with their faces done up with makeup, prompting one Nafcoc member to proclaim that Nafcoc's beauties "[are] up to the highest international standards."[494] If Nafcoc's all-male leadership saw the contests as an opportunity to police African femininity, including reserving the right to take "disciplining measures…against those who displayed unbecoming behavior," the beauty contestants themselves used the contests as a space of experimentation.[495]

The contest competition engendered by the beauty pageant translated into highly lucrative venture for the organization and the businesses that sponsored the contest. In 1974, Nafcoc reported a total of R367 in revenue from the beauty contest. (By comparison, Nafcoc only earned R29.00 from the sale of its magazine that year).[496] Following the conference, beauty contestant winners were featured in an annual Beauty Queen calendar published by *African Business.*[497] Several Nafcoc beauty queens appeared in advertisements for African and white businesses. In 1979, cosmetic and beauty care company Elida Gibbs took over as the primary sponsor for the beauty contest in a successful bid to increase the company's market share among

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[494] "Bophuthatswana Beauty," *African Business* (April 1979): 19.
[495] Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business," 168; See also Lynn M. Thomas, "The Modern Girl and Racial Respectability in 1930s South Africa," *Journal of African History* 47 (2006):461-90.
[496] *African Business* (June 1975).
[497] "Beauties on Parade," *African Business* (July 1979): 1.

black female consumers.[498] In the process, Elida Gibbs brought Nafcoc into the world of high fashion, providing access to experts and beauty industry professionals from Paris, Milan, and the United States.[499]

Meanwhile, Nafcoc sought to stimulate a similar competitive drive among its membership, which, by the mid-1970s, had grown to over one thousand members with some estimating the number of members as high as four thousand.[500] One way the organization did this was through the Black Businessman of the Year contest. Established in 1976 with the help of Gilbey Distillers and USSALEP, the contest facilitated a friendly rivalry between Nafcoc's various ethnic affiliates. The conflict between these varied factions rarely amassed to more than a snide remark or boast at the organization's conference or in the pages of *African Business.* In this regard, Professor Ngcobo remarked on the "clever and shrewd" business skills of "the Xhosa people of the Transkei," whose region had produced five winners of Nafcoc's annual Black Businessman of the Year contest. Alluding to the tribal wars of the previous century, Ngobo added, "I am sure, however, that black businessmen from other parts of this country will seek to challenge and dethrone businessmen from the Transkei."[501]

Friendly competition between members, contained by the rules of the contest and confined by the unifying structure of Nafcoc itself, seems to have produced only benefits for Nafcoc. A more serious issue, however, was the government's policy of Bantuization. Bantuization built on policies established by the colonial and segregationist governments, dividing Africans along ethnic lines and assigned each group a homeland. Africans in the

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[498] "Cover Story: Grooming Those Beauties," *African Business* (May 1982): 26.
[499] Ibid.
[500] The divergent membership numbers were a consequence of the wide discrepancy between paid members and the number of delegates that attended the regional and national conferences. In nearly all cases, the latter far outpaced the former. Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business," 156.
[501] "Best of both worlds," *African Business* (March 1978): 10.

Bantustans received certain benefits, including access to the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC), denied to Africans in the urban areas.[502] By and large, Nafcoc members rejected the government's policy of Bantuization. In response to a letter sent by Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development P.J. Koornhof to Sam Motsuenyane requesting Nafcoc to reorganize along tribal lines, Nafcoc members declared the practice of ethnicization "outmoded" and unfair to Africans. "Commerce was indivisible; it was strange that Africans were expected to run their Chamber of Commerce on tribal lines," while "white businessmen in the country were attempting to club themselves into one group to improve the industrial and commercial life of the country."[503] After much discussion, Nafcoc settled on a compromise, which saw the organization re-constituted as a federation with each chapter divided into sub-regions.[504]

Nafcoc's dispute with the government over Bantuization within its organizational structure highlights Nafcoc's tenuous place within Apartheid South Africa. While supporting the development of African business in the "native reserves," the South African government placed numerous restrictions on black business that prevented them from participating in more modern forms of business, including new kinds of industry and finance associated with urbanization. As a result, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Nafcoc members increasingly perceived their goals to be at odds with government intervention and more in line with the values of the market. Addressing Nafcoc members, Samuel Motsuenyane stated that black businessmen "do not want

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[502] Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race,* 242-244.
[503] "'Koornhof's suggestion rejected," *Rand Daily Mail,* June 4, 1969, quoted in Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business," 69.
[504] Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business," 66; Nafcoc leaders reasserted their critique of Bantuization following the Transkei's declaration of independence in October 1976, a development widely criticized by anti-apartheid activists and world leaders. In response, Sam Motsuenyane reiterated Nafcoc's commitment to "the cultivation of brotherly affinity which [has] enabled us to work together so harmoniously for so long despite our ethnic and regional diversity." Presidential Address Delivered at the Fourteenth Annual Conference, Held in Elangeni Hotel, Durban, 6th July 1978, Harold Sims Papers, Rutgers University Special Collections, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Box 22 (hereafter cited as Sims Papers).

another Bantu Investment Corporation which, despite some wonderful work, is rather top heavy with white executives at the policy making level."[505] Rather, Nafcoc increasingly looked outside of South Africa, including to the U.S., for the financial and technical resources needed to expand black business in South Africa.

Internationalizing African Business

Addressing an audience of American and European business leaders at the 1974 International Chamber of Commerce meeting in Madrid, Sam Motsuenyane warned his audience about the "Black consciousness" movement sweeping South Africa. "Africans," Motsuenyane stated, "[were] becoming proud of being Black. Blackness [can] no more be accepted as a tag of inferiority."[506] Dressed in business attire and accompanied by the president of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, Motsuenyane was clear to distinguish his comments from those of black militants, who called for a complete reconfiguration of society to eliminate the scourge of white supremacy.[507] International business, according to Motsuenyane, should "[encourage] the African…to become creative...contributors to the overall [economic] development of the country."[508] Capitalism, which created opportunities for black entrepreneurs, in Nafcoc's view, was the way forward for South Africa, not revolution.

Despite Motsuenyane's plea, foreign companies did not immediately come out in support of an extensive black empowerment program in South Africa. Indeed, as seen in the previous chapter, corporate executives required some significant persuading to publicly deviate from the

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[505] S.M. Motsuenyane, *African Business* (December/January 1973).
[506] "NAFCOC President Tells Overseas Business…Disinvestment No Good for Black Progress," *African Business* (April 1974).
[507] Daniel Magaziner, *The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in Southern Africa, 1968-1977* (Ohio University Press, 2010), 1-14.
[508] Ibid.

South African government's policy of Apartheid. Writing in response to civil rights leader and GM board member Leon Sullivan, who recently had requested American companies operating in South Africa sign onto a corporate code of conduct that included eliminating segregation and supporting racial integration in business known as the Sullivan Principles, Firestone executive J.M. Cornely expressed strong disdain at the idea of American companies "interfer[ing] with [the] sovereign rights" of another nation.[509]

The consensus among American business leaders regarding their refusal to condemn Apartheid and publicly support black advancement began to break down, however, following the 1976 Soweto uprising. In June 1976, the world gasped in horror at the images of South African police opening fire on high school students protesting the introduction of Afrikaans in their schools. Footage of the uprising, including a photograph of a young Mbuyisa Makhubo carrying the lifeless body of Hector Pieterson alongside Hector's visibly distraught sister Antoinette Sithole, electrified liberal and progressive audiences around the world, reigniting calls for sanctions against South Africa. In addition to the international condemnation that the uprising provoked, government and business leaders had to contend with successive labor strikes and social unrest that continued in the years after the Soweto uprising.[510]

Meanwhile, in South Africa, Nafcoc executives condemned the violence that occurred in the townships. While sympathetic to the students protesting the continued "deni[al of] basic and fundamental civil rights," Sam Motsuenyane lamented the damage done to black businesses during the riots. "At times of unrest the black businessman was the most vulnerable...least protected from all forms of criminal onslaught, exploitation and victimization," stated

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[509] Correspondence J.M. Cornely to Leon H. Sullivan, February 21, 1977, Box 54, Folder 6, Leon Howard Sullivan papers, Stuart A. Rose Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia.
[510] Helena Pohlandt-McCormick, *"I Saw a Nightmare,"* Essay, "Beer Halls and Bottle Stores." http://www.gutenberg-e.org/pohlandt-mccormick/pmh03e.html#txt1.

Motsuenyane at Nafcoc's 1977 annual meeting," the first conference to take place following the uprising.[511] According to Don A.S. Mmesi, who owned a small supermarket in Roodepoort, just north of Soweto, the "township unrest cost [him] over R100 000 in stock losses" and temporarily forced him to close his business.[512] In total, Nafcoc estimated the cost of the damages accrued during the "riot…a staggering figure of…R1,043,000."[513]

Concern regarding the ongoing social unrest and what it might mean for South Africa's economy drove American and European business leaders to approach Nafcoc, which, as South Africa's largest black business organization, stood poised to benefit from the growing support for black empowerment.[514] Reporting on Nafcoc's 13th Annual Conference in Cape Town one year following the Soweto uprising, *African Business* stated, "never before ha[d] a NAFCOC conference witnessed such solidarity of opinion from business leaders of all race groups."[515] During the conference, dozens of white executives and business professionals declared their support for Nafcoc and called on black business to take a leading role combatting the township unrest.[516] Nafcoc's engagement with U.S. and European companies increased significantly following the Soweto uprising. Between February 1976 and February 1977, Nafcoc witnessed a

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[511] Sam Motsuenyane quoted in "Black businessmen suffer most during riots: Presidential Policy Statement 1977," *African Business* (June 1977); The riots contributed to a drop in Nafcoc membership as actual and fear of violence led many traders to stop paying membership fees. Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business," 157.
[512] "Two win top business titles," *African Business* (February 1978): 7-8.
[513] Ibid; Part of the cost to businesses derived from the practice—which was also common in the United States—whereby township residents destroyed customer records used by business managers to track consumer credit during the unrest. James, *Money from Nothing,* 104; David Graeber, *Debt: The First 5,000 Years* (New York: Melville House, 2011), 257.
[514] In this regard, Leon Sullivan strategically told a group of American businessmen about a rail line "being built by the Chinese from Tanzania to Zambia." This railway, Sullivan elaborated, when completed, would serve as "a perfect passageway for Communist soldiers from China, who would unquestionably use it in support of South African blacks. Such a conflict," if not thwarted by American corporations taking a greater stand on behalf of the black people of southern Africa, "would likely draw in the entire Western World…All of Africa along with Russia would join in…[and] Western companies would in all probability lose everything they had." Leon Howard Sullivan, *Moving Mountains: The Principles and Purposes of Leon Sullivan* (Valley Forge, Pa: Judson Press, 1998), 50.
[515] "Businessmen want co-operation but no true partnership without policy change" *African Business* (July 1977).
[516] "Presidential Policy Statement 1979" *African Business* (June 1979): 5; Dr. G.M.E. Leistner, "The Road Ahead for Black Business: Keynote speech on black business in the 1980s given at the 1979 NAFCOC Conference by Dr. G.M.E. Leistner," *African Business* (June 1979): 27.

thirteen percent increase in income from R56,870 to R64,511 with the bulk of the additional

capital coming from white-owned corporations.[517] In 1977, Nafcoc leaders decided to formalize

their relationship with multinational companies by creating the category of associate

membership.[518] In exchange for official recognition from Nafcoc, associate members were

required to pay annual fees one-third higher than regular Nafcoc members. As justification for

this policy, Nafcoc leaders cited the significantly greater access to capital that large, white-

owned companies had compared to African traders.[519] By the end of 1978, Nafcoc boasted over

eighty associate members, including industry giants like Coca-Cola, Mobil Oil, and the Anglo-

American Corporation.[520]

 Increased support for Nafcoc on the part of U.S. companies coincided with the continued

American investment in South Africa.[521] Responding to anti-apartheid activists, this investment

increasingly was accompanied by proclamations of corporate social responsibility. Following the

launch of the 1977 Sullivan Principles campaign directed at American companies in South

Africa, signatory companies received several memos encouraging them to "become an Associate

member of NAFCOC." American business, according to Union Carbide Vice Chairman and

signatory member James W. Rawlings, would do well to support the development of black

business in South Africa by assisting in "efforts to eliminate bureaucratic red-tape and the lifting

of commercial discrimination." Subsequently, signatory companies were further asked to

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[517] "NAFCOC Auditors Report for the Year Ended February 1977," *African Business* (June 1977)
[518] In addition to associate membership at the national level, NAFCOC also established associate membership at the regional level. The first branch to accept associate members was the NAFCOC Inyanda Chamber of Commerce. Kondlo, *A Legacy of Perseverance,* 44.
[519] "Financial Report—S.P. Kutumela," *African Business* (July 1980): 17.
[520] "Nafcoc News: Meeting with Associates," *African Business* (December 1978): 17.
[521] Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa,* 314.

"deposit R50,000 to R100,000 in the African Bank…and [contribute to the] NAFCOC student bursary programme."[522]

The relationship between Nafcoc and the Sullivan signatories produced a number of joint ventures that relied on American capital and technological expertise to expand black entrepreneurship in South Africa. In 1978, Sam Motsuenyane traveled to the U.S., where he met with Leon Sullivan and Johnson & Johnson Vice President Harold R. Sims to discuss plans to establish a South African Small Business Development Centre to provide financial support and training to black business outside of the "native reserves."[523] Subsequently, Johnson & Johnson commissioned academics at Rutgers University School of Business Administration, including Professor Horace de Podwin, to undertake a feasibility study for the center. During 1978 and early 1979, Nafcoc executives and Rutgers University met several times to finalize plans for the project and obtain government support. Following-up on a recent visit to South Africa, Harold Simms elaborated on the important role American companies could play in the "uplifting of the South African population" in a letter to South African Secretary of Health J. DeBeer. "There is no other country of potentially greater value to South Africa, whatever direction it takes ultimately or now, than the U.S. Because no other country in the world has had to pass through its own apartheid and achieve miracles in overcoming its limitations a mere generation ago. [sic]" In addition to improving conditions for their employees, Sims impressed upon DeBeer the importance of "develop[ing] a [black] commercial constituency and a leadership—able, experienced and committed to freedom as we aspire for it."[524] In a subsequent internal report

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[522] Correspondence, James W. Rawlings, Vice Chairman, Union Carbide, to Leon Sullivan, October 23, 1979, LHS Papers, Box 55, Folder 2; Leon Sullivan quoted in "Oh man, you better change your ways faster…!!" *African Business* (October 1980): 30.
[523] Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business," 248-250.
[524] Correspondence, Harold R. Sims to Dr. J. DeBeer, May 2, 1977, Sims Papers, Box 10, Follow-up.

submitted to company executives, Sims rationalized the company's support for such program with reference to "the fragile winds of certain change in South Africa" following the Soweto uprising. Rather than wait for history to take its course—as it had in the U.S.—Sims encouraged his superiors to consider that the "long-term impact on black African advance and participation may be just as revolutionary [as the ongoing political transformation] but without drastic loss of South African skills and capital."[525] Black empowerment, in this regard, was viewed as a means for American companies to gain the upper-hand in what was widely perceived to be an inevitable move away from *dejure* segregation.

The center was accordingly modeled on an entrepreneurial development program initiated by Rutgers University Graduate School of Business Administration following the 1967 riots in Newark, New Jersey.[526] Its stated aim: "to develop and expand African entrepreneurial activities and improve the success rate of African small business." Along these lines, the program developers encouraged multinational corporations to become involved in economic development in Africa. "Africa," as the proposal described, "[was] a vast, complex continent with enormous potentials for human and natural development. In the process of realizatton Africa will need all the assistance it can get from the world's multinational corporations," like Johnson & Johnson, which stood to benefit from the "recognition at home and abroad for their contributions to" black empowerment.[527]

Government approval for the project was obtained in late 1978. Subsequently, Sam Motsuenyane and Harold Sims—race ambassadors from different sides of the Atlantic—solicited financial contributions from the Sullivan signatory companies, including Chase Manhattan Bank,

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[525] Report on South Africa Trip – 1976, March 7, 1977, Sims Papers, Box 10, Follow-up.
[526] "Proposal for Participation in African Small Business Development Center," Sims Papers, Box 13.
[527] Ibid.

Ford Motor Company, IBM, and General Motors. Final registration for the center occurred in early 1980.[528] In what may have appeared to Nafcoc as a snub, Mrs. Constance Ntshona was chosen to help oversee the center.[529] Having previous managed a department store in a shopping plaza in Soweto, Ntshona served on the boards of several community and political institutions, including the South African Institute of Race Relations, the Black Sash, the Soweto Urban Bantu Council, and the Soweto Traders Association, giving her access local government and business leaders.[530] In correspondence between Sims and Johnson & Johnson's local distributors in South Africa, Sims expressed optimism concerning Mrs. Ntshona's ability to "help [Johnson & Johnson] explore in depth…our business opportunities with the black community of South Africa [including the company's] marketing strategy towards the black woman" involved in the "health care [and] pharmaceutical business."[531]

With the flow of African migrants into the city, combined with the steady rise in wages, white business in South Africa took greater notice of the African consumer.[532] Starting in the 1970s, a growing number of companies began employing black managers and salespeople to assist their companies break into what was increasingly perceived as a lucrative black market.[533] During the late 1970s and early 1980s, *African Business* ran a series of articles on Kodak's Black Market Development program marketing cameras and other photographic equipment to black residents in Soweto. As part of the program, Kodak hired Ishmael Maumakwe and Arthur Mbambo as sales representatives responsible for training black retailers in sales and

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[528] Keeble, "The Expansion of Black Business," 248-250.
[529] Memo, Maximizing the Performance of U.S. base Multinationals in South Africa in the Development of a Non-European Business Leadership Class in South Africa, Johnson & Johnson, September 2, 1977, Sims Papers, Box 13.
[530] Letters of Endorsement for Constance Ntshona, Sims Papers, Box 22.
[531] Memo, Harold R. Sims to Mr. Lester Gagnon, Ethnor (PTY.) Ltd, May 27, 1977, Sims Papers, Box 22.
[532] Anne Mager, "The First Decade of 'European Beer' in Apartheid South Africa: The State, the Brewers and the Drinking Public, 1962-1972," *The Journal of African History,* Vol. 40, No. 3. (November 1999): 367-388.
[533] "Changing trade trends in the motor industry," *African Business* (January 1978): 28.

photographic development. Ramsay Ramushu, one of thirty-seven black businessmen

participating in the program, noted that the program had exceeded his expectations. "This type of

diversification can only help the Black businessman."[534] In exchange for providing black

businessmen with products previously available only in white-owned stores, Kodak, a Sullivan

signatory company, garnered a reputation as a friend of black business.[535]

The expansion of American corporations into black townships was likewise accompanied

by the creation of new opportunities for black South African businessmen to study in the United

States. In 1977, Tom Molete, who managed a Barclays bank branch in Soweto, spent several

weeks in the U.S. as part of a program funded by the United States Department of Information,

where he studied finance with a "particular emphasis on the development of small businesses and

education in money management techniques."[536] Molete later returned to South Africa, where he

became an advocate for micro-financing and other programs supporting black business

development. South Africa, Molete noted, must avoid the "dismal failure of the rest of Africa [,]

who have gained their political freedom [and yet remain] depend[ent] on foreign aid." American

programs supporting black business development, according to Molete, offered "a suitable

model" in this regard.[537]

Molete's favorable impressions were echoed by other Nafcoc members, who described

their time in the United States as "a real eye opener."[538] In a speech reprinted in *African

Business,* Hudson Ntsanwisi, who traveled to the U.S. as part of a delegation representing

Gazankula (a Tsonga Bantustan), expounded on the "particular importance" of "America…to

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[534] "Trading in Photography," *African Business* (September 1978): 13.
[535] "Kodak's call to black businessmen," *African Business* (October 1981):9.
[536] "Tom Molete-manager," *African Business* (March 1977).
[537] "Speakout: The alternative push by Tom Molete," *African Business* (November 1986).
[538] "Your Business and You—S. Nyamakazi," *African Business* (March 1978): 20-21.

black businessmen." "In America," Ntsanwisi explained, "one comes into contact with hard-nosed businessmen schooled and nurtured in good business management." More than any one skill or industry, Ntsanwisi lauded the spirit of entrepreneurship that seemed to permeate American society. "The black businessmen of the future must travel, learn, think, imagine and dream and then make their dreams a reality."[539]

Increased communication between Nafcoc and American corporations helped to pave the way for an emergent discourse about the liberating potential of the free enterprise system in South Africa. Speaking at Nafcoc's 1977 annual convention, Dr. J.J. Fouché, whose company Gilbey Distillers co-sponsored the Businessman of the Year competition alongside USSALEP, told black businessman that "free enterprise…[was] the only system in which initiative, efficiency, drive, ability and dedication received their maximum rewards…irrespective of race, colour or creed."[540] That same year, Nafcoc leaders informed the government that "the strengthening of the free enterprising system [was] one of Nafcoc's major principles."[541]

Addressing Nafcoc's annual convention, South African professor of business George Marais warned Nafcoc members that the free enterprise system was under attack from multiple fronts. Elsewhere, "in the Third World an elite group of very nationalistic orientated politicians" had fallen prey to the evil forces of communism, Marais noted. These leaders, Marais explained, had led their countries "away from an economically rational approach towards a more nationalistic oriented approach," which had led to "a decline in industrialization." "If NAFCOC decided to follow an independent road away from the attraction of the homeland government," they would "need to become well-organised and their members need to be well-trained." The

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[539] "One Economy for All—Ntsanwisi," *African Business* (March 1977).
[540] Dr. J. J. Fouché, "Free Enterprise—Equal Opportunity for All—J.J. Fouché," *African Business* (February 1977).
[541] "Meeting with the Minister," *African Business* (September 1977): 8.

removal of racial barriers was, according to Marais and other white business professionals, only one step of the process, black South Africans also had to be taught "to be competitive…efficient…and responsible" businessmen like their white counterparts.[542]

If communist sympathizers and homeland bureaucrats represented external threats to free enterprise, both Nafcoc leaders and their corporate allies likewise worried about the internal threat posed by black militant youth. In a call circulated among readers of *African Business,* Nafcoc leaders urged black "businessmen to demonstrate to young people the advantages and incentives of a free enterprise system [made] free for all race groups."[543] Black youth, especially those living in the townships, were widely perceived as responsible for the social unrest that permeated South African society in the wake of Soweto.[544] Elsewhere, Sam Motsuenyane expressed his concerns that black militants were damaging South Africa's reputation. Addressing a gathering of American and European businessmen at a meeting of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICOC), Motsuenyane boasted that "violence and disinvestment in South Africa would not furnish a positive answer to the country's…problems."[545] Rather, Motsuenyane and others demanded South Africa embrace black empowerment. In a series of resolutions passed by the organization, Nafcoc members declared that "the free enterprise system in South Africa would need to become free for all race groups." Only then would "businessmen [be able to] demonstrate to young people the advantages and incentives of a free enterprise system."[546]

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[542] "Strategy for Successful Black Business Community—Keynote Address by Prof. George Marais, Director, School of Business Leadership, University of South Africa," *African Business* (June 1978): 25.
[543] "Open white trading areas to black businessmen," *African Business* (November 1977): 10.
[544] Belinda Bozzoli, *Theaters of Struggle and the End of Apartheid* (London: Edinburgh University Press for the International African Institute, 2004), 114-116.
[545] "NAFCOC President Tells Overseas Business…Disinvestment No Good for Black Progress," *African Business* (April 1974).
[546] "Conference resolutions," *African Business* (November 1977): 8.

Conclusion

Responding to the various restrictions imposed by the Apartheid government and pressure from international and local activists, Nafcoc and multinational corporations forged an international dialogue that linked free enterprise and black empowerment. In doing so, businessmen capitalized on African aspirations of economic independence, as well as nostalgia for "traditional" patriarchal authority. As the international anti-apartheid movement gained momentum, promoters of free enterprise faced challenges from black militants and other activists, who succeeded in passing comprehensive sanctions against South Africa.[547] Even so, multinational corporations and Nafcoc persisted in their efforts to forge international partnerships between white and black businessmen. Their success, symbolized by the inclusion of Nafcoc and American corporate executives in the negotiations surrounding South Africa's transition to democracy, speak to the importance of this earlier chapter in the development of a multicultural free enterprise discourse.

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[547] Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986).

Chapter 5

From Black Power to Black Empowerment

On July 11, 1994, *Jet Magazine* published a photograph of Coca-Cola Africa Group President Carl Ware shaking hands with celebrated freedom fighter and head of the African National Congress (ANC) Nelson Mandela.[548] Taken one month following the latter's historic inauguration as president of South Africa, and less than five years since Mandela's release from prison, the photograph captured the sense of collective accomplishment felt by people around the world at the sight of Mandela in the executive offices. Decades of struggle against a white supremacist regime had finally paid dividends, opening the doors for a "New South Africa."[549]

But, wait. Was this, a Coca-Cola executive shaking hands with a former revolutionary fighter and self-declared communist, the new beginning dreamed of by South Africans and others from around the world who had dedicated their lives to the struggle? Had not Coca-Cola supported Apartheid? Indeed, just a few years prior, anti-apartheid activists, acting on the directives of the ANC, had led a national boycott of Coca-Cola, which continued to sell its products in South Africa despite divestment efforts. Building on the groundwork laid by veteran civil rights activist Rev. Jesse Jackson and Operation PUSH, which organized a nationwide boycott of Coca-Cola in 1981 for failing to employ black bottlers and appoint a black director,[550] anti-apartheid activists made Coca-Cola a symbol of corporate complicity in the Apartheid project.[551] Adding to the complexity of the narrative, Nelson Mandela famously refused to drink

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[548] *Jet Magazine,* July 11, 1994, 33.

[549] The phrase a "New South Africa" gained popularity in the early 1990s in reference to an imagined post-Apartheid South Africa following South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994, including appearing in the publicity material for a series of concerts by black American singer Whitney Houston, aptly titled "Whitney—The Concert for a New South Africa," performed in South Africa in November 1994.

[550] "Accord Ends Coke Boycott," *The New York Times*, August 11, 1981.

[551] "Ending apartheid in South Africa: Grassroots pressure helps produce change," http://peaceworks.afsc.org/ending-apartheid-south-africa (accessed December 9, 2017); Paul Bilodeau, "Boycott

Coca-Cola, reportedly ordering all Coke products be removed from his hotel room during his much anticipated first visit to the United States in 1990.[552] Yet, here he was, four years later, welcoming Coca-Cola back into South Africa. More than a simple photo-op, the photograph of Mandela and Ware shaking hands blessed the transnational rise of black empowerment politics and private entrepreneurship as a path to liberation.[553]

Historians of the anti-apartheid struggle have often glossed over the seemingly paradoxical partnerships forged by U.S. corporations and the ANC—of which there were many—in favor of traditional forms of activism.[554] Building on the victories won by past generations, students, labor unions, and other interest groups took up the call for sanctions and divestment with mounting success. These efforts resulted in a growing number of legislative victories at the local and national-level. In 1986, the U.S. Congress famously passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act banning further U.S. investment in South Africa, including new bank loans and expanded prohibitions on trade between the two countries. With enough votes to override President Ronald Reagan's veto, signaling the first major defeat for the president on foreign policy, many have interpreted the Act as a death blow to "constructive engagement."[555] But as we shall see, many American corporations discovered mechanisms to

South Africa, Tutu Urges," *Toronto Star,* June 1, 1986: A1; Connie Green, "Coke Getting Out of South Africa," *Atlanta Journal,* September 17, 1986, A1; John Kirby Spivey, "Coke vs. Pepsi: The Cola Wars in South Africa during The Anti-Apartheid Era," (Thesis, Georgia State University, 2009), 28-37, http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_theses/35.

[552] "Coke Can't Cash In On Mandela Visit," *New Pittsburgh Courier,* June 30, 1990: 5; Sid Holmes, "Coming to America: Mandela rejects soda company's airplane offer," *Philadelphia Tribune,* June 19, 1990: 1A; Spivey, "Coke vs. Pepsi," 40-41; Michael Blanding, *The Coke Machine: The Dirty Truth Behind the World's Favorite Soft Drink* (New York: Avery, 2011).

[553] Alistair Thomson, "Mandela 'brand' second only to Coca-Cola," *The Namibian,* April 23, 2004, https://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=3181&page=archive-read.

[554] Tracy Wilkinson, "Fund-Raising is Important Part of Mandela Visit," *Los Angeles Times.* June 18, 1990: A1.

[555] Eric Morgan, "Into the struggle: Confronting Apartheid in the United States and South Africa*,*" (PhD dissertation, University of Colorado-Boulder, 2009); Francis Njubi Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions: African Americans Against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Robert Kinloch Massie, *Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years* (New York: Nan A. Talese, 1997).

bypass sanctions and divestment, including through the adoption of increasingly popular non-equity arrangements that enabled U.S. corporations to deflect responsibility with regards to their overseas operations, while continuing to turn a profit.[556]

Divestment was only part of the story. Concurrent with the expansion of sanctions and divestment, and corporate efforts to evade those efforts, South African politics underwent its own transformation during the 1980s. Neither reducible to external pressures initiated by the winding down of the Cold War and growing American support for the liberation struggle, nor entirely removed from them, South Africa's oldest and most well-known liberation organization, the ANC, increasingly pursued American partnerships with an eye towards the political and financial profits such ties could produce. Rather than seeing these partnerships as a break with the ANC's revolutionary past, supporters saw the party's new relationship with private business as a vehicle for black economic empowerment.[557]

Expanding on and revising the history of divestment and the ANC's return from exile, this chapter reveals the work American and South African corporate executives, black entrepreneurs, university administrators, and anti-apartheid activists did to link visions of post-Apartheid South Africa with multinational (American) capital. Building on previous efforts by people like Leon Sullivan and Nafcoc's Sam Motsuenyane, corporate executives, university

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[556] By and large, most divestment legislation passed in the United States, including at the local, state, and national level, defined divestment in terms of direct investment. This enabled many American businesses to continue doing business through licensing agreements, trademarking, and other kinds of non-equity arrangements.

[557] Okechukwu C. Iheduru, "Black Economic Power and Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42, no. 1 (March 2004): 1-40; Omano Emma Edigheji, "The evolution of 'Black Economic Empowerment' in South Africa: From the lenses of business, the tripartite alliance, community groups, and the apartheid and post-apartheid governments, 1985-1999" (Johannesburg: National Labour & Economic Development Institute, 2000); Gill Marchus ed., *Visions of Black Economic Empowerment* (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2007).

administrators, churches, and others thus joined the chorus calling for black empowerment, which reached its broadest articulation to date in the 1980s.[558]

One of the most surprising figures to join Americans in opposing sanctions was Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. Widely considered a controversial figure in the United States and South Africa, Buthelezi, Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Bantustan and a member of the Zulu royal family, garnered national and international attention during the 1980s for his work collaborating with American multinationals to "liberate" Africans from the tyranny of the Apartheid government. Operating in the absence of central government support for social services, Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party partnered with corporations like Mobil Oil and IBM to upgrade education facilities and offer technical training not included in the government's Bantu Education.[559] Far from an anomaly, Buthelezi proved emblematic of a certain strain of "tribal politics" that married ethnicity and private enterprise to cope with growing political and economic instability.[560]

Growing support for black empowerment initiatives like Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party within South Africa, combined with mixed signals from the ANC's partners in Moscow, put pressure on the ANC to seek out new alliances with black and white American businesspeople. Long considered to be a communist-front and placed by President Ronald Reagan on the United States' list of terrorist organizations, the ANC's tactical shift to solicit support from American capital is indeed perhaps one of the most surprising developments of the late twentieth-century. While previous scholars have often looked to the post-1994 period to

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[558] A ProQuest search for the term "black empowerment" produces sixty-seven hits in 1980, increasing to two-hundred and seventy-three by 1994, simultaneous with a shift in the location of the publication from the United States to South Africa.

[559] Doug Tilton, "Creating an 'Educated Workforce': Inkatha, Big Business, and Educational Reform" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 1, Special Issue: Social History of Resistance in South Africa (March 1992): 166-189.

[560] John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, *Ethnicity, Inc.* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009).

explain the ANC's seemingly sudden embrace of pro-business policies, including South Africa's landmark Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) legislation, I argue that the terms of South Africa's post-Apartheid settlement were, in many ways, set by multinational businessmen, black entrepreneurs, and ANC leaders working together to navigate the challenges posed by mass activism and state repression in the 1980s. Unable or unwilling to continue fighting a military battle against the Apartheid regime, the ANC, following in the footsteps of black American and African leaders before them, embraced black empowerment as a way of reconciling their anti-racism with their faith in capitalism.

Business-as-Usual

Even with the progress engendered by black empowerment, corporate America, on a whole, remained decidedly white nearly a decade after the launch of programs like OIC. Perhaps no company better illustrated this than Coca-Cola, the world's leading soft drink company. Originally conceived by Colonel John Pemberton as a potential substitute for morphine to treat Confederate war veterans, Coca-Cola's fortunes expanded in lockstep with the system of Jim Crow. Recalling his childhood growing up in West Virginia, Leon Sullivan described the racial privilege associated with the consumption of Coca-Cola in soda fountains.

> [While] visiting [my mother in downtown Charleston], I had often noticed a drugstore across the street, with a large, lighted Coca-Cola sign. I had always thought that one day I would walk across that street and buy myself a Coca-Cola, so one Saturday afternoon, when I'd got hold of a nickel, I decided I would have that Coca-Cola. I crossed the street, opened the door, walked in, went up to the counter, and sat down on the stool. A large white man with his neck red and his face tense and eyes burning said to me, 'Black boy, stand on your feet, You can't sit down here.'[561]

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[561] Sullivan, *Build Brother Build* (Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969), 34.

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The association between whiteness and Coca-Cola was reinforced through the company's

marketing strategy, which predominately used white people in company advertisements well into

the post-war era. Meanwhile, Pepsi distinguished itself by employing black sales representatives

to tap into the black American market starting in the late 1940s.[562]

Coca-Cola's association with whiteness continued with the company's global expansion.

Hitching the company's bandwagon to American imperialism, Coca-Cola executives developed

a network of sixty-four bottling plants worldwide in order to distribute over 5 billion bottles of

Coca-Cola to servicemen and women during World War II.[563] By 1959, Coca-Cola had

expanded its distribution network to include 1,700 bottlers, operating in over 100 countries.[564]

Despite gestures to cosmopolitanism, including increasing depictions of foreigners and foreign

places in Coca-Cola advertisements, the company remained under the control of all white, male

managers well into the 1970s.[565] Thus, Coca-Cola only appointed the company's first black

American Vice President, Carl Ware, in 1979, nearly a decade after Leon Sullivan and Harold

Sims joined General Motors and Johnson & Johnson, respectively.

Corporate reticence with regards to the shifting political and social climate came with a

price. Beginning in the late 1970s and 1980s, Coca-Cola faced a series of protests that led

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[562] Adam Clark Estes, "A Brief History of Racist Soft Drinks," *The Atlantic,* January 28, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/01/brief-history-racist-soft-drinks/318929/.

[563] Phil Mooney, "Coke and the U.S. troops," November 11, 2008, http://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/coke-and-the-us; For more on the history of American business and World War II production, see James Sparrow, *Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[564] "125 years of sharing happiness: A Short History of The Coca-Cola Company," http://www.coca-colacompany.com/content/dam/journey/us/en/private/fileassets/pdf/2011/05/Coca-Cola_125_years_booklet.pdf; Global expansion continued in later decades. Two of Coca-Cola's CEOs during the late twentieth-century, Robert Goizueta and Donald Keough, repeatedly noted that "Americans accounted for less than 5 percent of the world's population. The other 95 percent remained a largely untapped market." Mark Pendergrast, *For God, Country, and Coca-Cola: The Unauthorized History of the Great American Soft Drink and the Company that Makes It* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 375.

[565] Laura A. Hymson, "The Company that Taught the World to Sing: Coca-Cola, Globalization, and the Cultural Politics of Branding in the Twentieth Century" (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 2011).

corporate executives to reevaluate corporate strategy and, ultimately, embrace black empowerment. Building on earlier waves of corporate activism at Polaroid and General Motors (see Chapter Three), the Sisters of Providence, acting at the behest of labor activists in Guatemala, used their two hundred shares of Coca-Cola stock to introduce a stockholder resolution at Coca-Cola's annual meeting in 1978. First emerging in 1970, shareholder activism had, by the late 1970s, become a regular feature of corporate politics, pitting religious and other social progressives against corporate executives with regards to business ethics. In their proposal, the Sisters called for the removal of Houston businessman John Trotter, whose racist and abusive tactics in a Guatemalan bottling operation had resulted in the death of several union leaders.[566] Far from an isolated incident, the Sisters framed Trotter's behavior as part of a broader set of corporate abuses, including paying Mexican bottling plant workers in Laredo, Texas, a measly $2.40 per hour (less than half the national average of $5.66 per hour) and the use of black prison labor, paid only 25 cents a day, in a Coke franchise in Apartheid South Africa.[567] Decrying the inequality of these and other practices, the Sisters called on Coca-Cola to adopt a shared set of labor standards among all company bottlers worldwide.[568]

The Sisters' protest proved just the beginning of the company's troubles. Less than a year after the controversy regarding labor abuse in Coca-Cola bottling plants in Guatemala, Jesse Jackson's Operation PUSH's Selective Patronage Council—named after Sullivan's Selective Patronage Campaign—put Coca-Cola front and center in its campaign to pressure American

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[566] Julio E. Moreno, "Coca-Cola, U.S. Diplomacy, and the Cold War in America's Backyard," in *Beyond the Eagle's Shadow: New Histories of Latin America's Cold War,* eds. Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio E. Moreno (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013), 36-39; Pendergrast, *For God, Country, and Coca-Cola,* 321.
[567] http://www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data_Set_Group_Id=773&count=all; Pendergrast, *For God, Country, and Coca-Cola,* 321.
[568] Moreno, "Coca-Cola, U.S. Diplomacy, and the Cold War in America's Backyard," 39.

businesses to take "concrete measures to deal with" persistent racism.[569] Despite consuming over

$300 million worth of Coke products in 1980, black Americans remained heavily

underrepresented within Coca-Cola's network of 550 bottler franchises nationwide and on the

company's 11-member board of directors, neither of which included a single black member.

Citing these and other statistics, Jackson's PUSH called for a nationwide boycott of Coca-Cola at

the organization's annual convention on July 11, 1981, which included the theme, "Don't choke

on Coke."[570]

The combination of shareholder activism and a boycott led by former aide to Martin

Luther King, Jr., Jesse Jackson, spurred Coca-Cola executives into action. Less than a month

following Jackson's announcement, Coca-Cola executives and Jackson reached an agreement in

which the latter agreed to call off the boycott in exchange for a series of promises from company

leaders to support black empowerment at the company. Speaking together at a joint press

conference, Jackson and Coca-Cola President Donald Keough announced the company's

decision to appoint thirty-two black-owned distributors within the next year and appoint a black

man or woman to the company's board of directors.[571] The company also pledged to "channel

$30 million into black businesses," including black-owned newspapers and magazines.[572]

Similar changes were made by Coca-Cola executives with regards to the company's

overseas operations. Rejecting the Sisters' proposal for global labor standards, Coca-Cola CEO

Paul Austin announced the company's plans to sell their local franchise to a group of mostly

[569] Kendall Wilson, "PUSH-ing for Coke boycott," *Philadelphia Tribune,* July 24, 1981: 1; Johnnie L. Roberts, "Minority Voice: Threatening Boycotts, Jesse Jackson's PUSH Wins Gains for Blacks," *Wall Street Journal,* July 21, 1982: 1.

[570] "Blacks and Coke," *The Skanner,* July 29, 1981: 4.

[571] "Coke to Help Blacks as Jackson Drops Boycott," *Los Angeles Times,* August 11, 1981: E2.

[572] "PUSH Finds Things Go Better with Coke, Ends Its Boycott," *Los Angeles Times,* August 10, 1981: A2.

Guatemalan investors led by John Kirby, who, according to Austin, had "an excellent background of good labor relations" as a Coca-Cola bottler in Mexico.

The biggest change, however, came with regards to South Africa. Under pressure from activists, Austin announced Coca-Cola's plans to join the Sullivan Principles, marking a change from the company's prior stance of avoiding public criticism of Apartheid.[573] Anti-apartheid activism likewise affected the company's decision with regards to replacing J. Lucian Smith, who surprised many when he announced in August 1979 that he was stepping down as president of the company, effective immediately, and taking an early retirement.[574] More shocking, however, was the news that Cuban-American Robert Goizueta would replace Smith. At the time of Smith's retirement, Ian Wilson, a long-time friend and protégé of company Chairman J. Paul Austin, was widely considered the front-runner for the position to succeed Smith. But Wilson's white South African nationality, as well as his reputation within the company for making racist remarks, proved a liability for the board, which awarded the position to Goizueta, who later announced a $10 million Equal Opportunity Fund investing in education, housing, and small-business training in South Africa.[575]

Coca-Cola's response to shareholder and other forms of activism was typical of American corporations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Building on the work of Sullivan and the signatory companies, American corporations increasingly promoted black empowerment as a solution to the problem of Apartheid in South Africa. Taking advantage of tax concessions implemented by the South African government following the Soweto Uprising that encouraged

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[573] John Huey, "Coca Cola, at Unusual Annual Meeting, Reports 8.1% Profit Rise for 1st Quarter," *Wall Street Journal*, May 6, 1980: 17.
[574] "An Early Exit for Smith as Coca-Cola's President," *New York Times*, August 23, 1979: 2.
[575] Aaron Segal, "The United States and South Africa: Human Investment," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 16, no. 1 (1987): 27.

employers to invest in black education, the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa announced its plans to open a new commercial high school in Jabulini in Soweto.[576] PACE commercial high school officially opened its doors in February 1982. Some 70 American companies helped to fund the cost of 600 students at $1,400 per year in tuition.[577]

Encouraged by the growing support for black empowerment in South Africa shown by American corporate executives, Sullivan likewise launched an investigation into the possibility of opening a job-training and placement center in Soweto outside Johannesburg. Aided by a grant from the South African liberal philanthropic Urban Foundation, Sullivan contracted with U.S. technology firm Control Data (Pty) Limited to lead the feasibility study.[578] Over the course of nineteen days in October 1980, the team, led by Control Data Manager of Public Affairs John Brett, met with community leaders at several industries in and around the Johannesburg area, including Metal Box (Pty) Ltd., Barlow Rand, Citibank, Siemans, Anglo Transvaal, Scaw Metals, and Barclays National Bank.[579] The group's pitch was a familiar one. In need of skilled workers to meet the labor demands of a growing economy and lacking "public sector financial support for community-based skills training programs," private sector leaders were being asked to fund this new training program as part of a broader effort to meet the demands of South Africa's changing political and economic landscape.

Christened the Opportunities Center for Manpower Training and Development, the new Soweto-based venture had all the makings of an OIC center, including a "multi-purpose

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[576] Kevin Danaher, *In Whose Interest? A Guide to U.S.-South Africa Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1984), 163; Progress Ventures International Program Proposal, Submitted to: The Urban Foundation, Johannesburg, R.S.A., Opportunities Industrialization Centers International Records, Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Libraries, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as OICI papers), Box 3, Folder 26.
[577] Kevin Danaher, *In Whose Interest? A Guide to U.S.-South Africa Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1984), 163.
[578] Correspondence, Gary Robinson to John Brett, November 12, 1980, OICI Papers, Box 3, Folder 25.
[579] Progress Ventures International Program Proposal, Submitted to: The Urban Foundation, Johannesburg, R.S.A., OICI Papers, Box 3, Folder 26.

community service component offering career guidance, job finding and placement…[and] evening literacy classes [alongside OIC's signature] Feeder component emphasizing pre-vocational exposure and adult basic skills development."[580] At the last minute, however, Sullivan refused to grant South Africans the rights to the OIC name.[581] Eager to assure the South Africans of his continued interest in the center, Sullivan explained his decision had less to do with the venture itself than protecting the OIC (and by association Sullivan) brand. Given the situation in South Africa, Sullivan noted that his organization must proceed with caution lest their activities in South Africa damage the "reputation" of OIC's elsewhere.[582]

Sullivan was right to worry about his brand. Echoing earlier criticism of the Sullivan Principles, the Institute for Policy Studies released a report in 1980 decrying the program as mere "camouflage" intended to obscure U.S. "corporate collusion with apartheid."[583] The U.S.-authored report was soon followed by yet another critical evaluation from the South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR), which found numerous instances of corporate obfuscation and failure to meet the targets for black advancement in an audit conducted of Principles' signatory company Ford Motors. In particular, SAIRR discovered that the Ford's claim to have witnessed a 187 percent increase in the percentage of non-white salaried staff between 1977 and 1980 was largely due to the hiring of colored workers. This category, which included both Indians, mixed-race, and Malay-descended South Africans, were perceived by white executives as more dependable and hard-working than black Africans. Of the one-hundred and sixty-five

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[580] Progress Ventures International Program Proposal, Submitted to: The Urban Foundation, Johannesburg, R.S.A., OICI Papers, Box 3, Folder 26.

[581] Minutes of the COC Natal/Zululand Steering Committee, February 10, 1982, OICI Papers, Box 12, Folder 3.

[582] Correspondence John L.K. Brett, Career Opportunities Center, to Kura Abedje, Deputy Director OIC International, December 21, 1981, OICI Papers, Box 12, Folder 3.

[583] Elizabeth Schmidt, *Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business Support for Apartheid* (Washington D.C., Institute for Policy Studies, 1980).

new employees hired by Ford, one-hundred and eight were colored compared to only fifty-seven black new employees.[584]

During the early 1980s, growing reports of signatory company abuse lent energy to anti-apartheid activists, who argued that divestment and sanctions were needed. Longtime Chicago activist and Pan-Africanist Prexy Nesbitt, for one, told the black newspaper, the *Bay State Banner,* that he had deep reservations regarding corporations' ability to "help bring about social change"[585] Critics of the Principles likewise drew ammunition by framing the program as part of "the Reagan administration['s]…abdication in its responsibility to advance the cause of Black America."[586] During his rise to national prominence, Reagan distinguished himself from other Republican candidates through his opposition to affirmative action and minority set-asides, and he made clear his hostility to black Americans through his appointment of black conservative Clarence Thomas as chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and his effective dismantling of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.[587] This hostility likewise carried into the realm of foreign policy, where Reagan called for "constructive engagement" with the Apartheid government. Previously touted by American corporate executives with regards to the Sullivan Principles, "constructive engagement" took on a new meaning under Reagan, associated with military aid to the South Africans and white supremacy disguised as conservative politics.

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[584] M.C. Roux, W.L. Nkuhlu, W.H. Thomas, C.W. Manona, M.G. Whisson, *The Sullivan Principles at Ford: Audit 2* (Johannesburg: South African Institute for Race Relations, February 1981).
[585] Prexy Nesbit quoted in Cheryl Devall, "Universities continue focus on South Africa," *Bay State Banner*, April 19, 1979: 10.
[586] Ibid.
[587] Manning Marable, *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems in Race, Political Economy, and Society* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 31-36.

Boardroom Politics

Giving sanction to white supremacists in the United States and South Africa, Reagan's election further exposed and sharpened existing fault lines between divestment and sanctions activists, on one hand, and those in favor of black empowerment on the other. Perhaps more so than anywhere else, this divide was made clear in the New South capital city of Atlanta. Long hailed as "the city too busy to hate," a reference to the civil rights liberalism promoted by Atlanta's multi-racial governing coalition, Atlanta emerged as a central site of anti-apartheid activism in the mid-to-late-1980s in ways that challenged the city's black leadership.[588] Mirroring anti-apartheid activism elsewhere, calls for divestment and sanctions began with students attending Atlanta University Center, a consortium representing several historically black college and universities, including Morehouse, Clark Atlanta and Spellman. Led by graduate students and faculty in the Political Science department, Atlanta University students worked throughout the 1970s and 1980s to bring attention to the issue of South African apartheid, including meeting with Joseph Lowery and Coretta Scott King, two leaders in the local community, to discuss the presence of Coca Cola and M&M, a black-American owned hair-care company, products in South Africa.[589] In August 1985, a joint protest by AUC students and representatives from SCLC and the Young Democrats was attended by over two-thousand students.[590] Linking American corporate support for Apartheid with unemployment in the United States, SCLC member Rev. Timothy McDonald told students: "There are miners in Alabama who are unemployed because U.S. companies are buying cheaper coal from South Africa. And

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[588] For more on the contested nature of black politics in post-civil rights Atlanta, see Danielle Wiggins, "Crime, Capital, and the Politics of Atlanta's Black Middle Class in the Post-Civil Rights Era," (PhD dissertation, Emory University, 2018); Jessica Ann Levy, "Selling Atlanta: Black Mayoral Politics from Protest to Entrepreneurism, 1973 to 1990," *Journal of Urban History* 41, no. 3 (May 2015): 420-443.

[589] Lauren E. Moran, "South to Freedom? Anti-Apartheid Activism and Politics in Atlanta, 1976-1990," Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2014, http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_diss/42, 36.

[590] Ibid, 37.

imagine the jobs that would be available for American workers if companies like GM, Coca Cola, Ford and others would close their South African plants."[591] Left out of McDonald's proposition was what would happen to South African workers if these and other American companies left. Elsewhere, however, divestment activists campaigned for these facilities to be transferred to South African workers.

Far from anomalous, McDonald and Picard's linking of domestic and international labor echoed that of anti-apartheid activists elsewhere. Addressing an audience of several hundred union workers in attendance at a meeting of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees in March 1985, John Banovic declared, "When we help our brothers and sisters in South Africa, we help ourselves." Banovic then told his audience about the California-based Fluor Corporation. This company, Banovic explained, which had contracts worth more than $4.5 billion to build and maintain coal-to-oil conversion plants for the South African government, was involved in an effort to recruit scabs to replace over 6,000 Sasol chemical company employees fired following a strike the previous November. At the same time, Fluor was simultaneously involved through its stake in A.T. Massey Coal Company in an effort to break the ongoing United Mine Workers strike in the U.S. "The fight against Fluor and A.T. Massey is all one fight," stated Banovic. "Where do you think Massey gets the money to withstand long strikes? Profits from South Africa," where, Mashinini added, South African workers were "doing first world work and getting Third World wages."[592]

Campus activism contributed to a wave of college and university divestments during the early-to-mid 1980s, placing further pressure on proponents of black empowerment. By October

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[591]"AUC Students to Begin SCLC Chapter," *The Atlanta Inquirer*, July 27, 1985: 2, quoted in Moran, "South to Freedom?," 37.

[592] Emily DeNitto, "N.Y. labor vows to fight apartheid," *Daily World*, Tuesday, March 5, 1985: 4-D; A. Philip Randolph Education Fund, David Jessup Papers, Emory University, Box 18, Folder South Africa Unions.

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1985, twenty-four major colleges and universities had announced their intention to divest themselves of stocks in companies doing business in South Africa.[593] According to at least one scholar, over one-hundred and fifty U.S. universities and colleges had at least partially divested by February 1987.[594]

Still, many university administrations resisted full-scale divestment. In October 1986, The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, announced their decision, approved unanimously by the university's 60-member governing board, to maintain their $75 million investment—equivalent to fifteen percent of the university's $500 million endowment—in companies with operations in South Africa that signed the Sullivan Principles. While slightly on the higher end, Hopkins' investment in companies operating in South Africa mirrored that of other universities, including Michigan State University, Tufts, and Harvard.[595] Given the size of Hopkins' investment, complete divestment "would not represent a responsible, prudent course of action," board chairman George Radcliffe told a room of "jeering students." Furthermore, Radcliffe noted, "There is no consensus that divestment will, in fact, have any positive impact on the eradication of apartheid."[596]

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[593] Richard W. Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa: Historical Dimensions of Engagement and Disengagement* (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 330.

[594] Richard Knight, "Sanctions, Divestment, and U.S. Corporations in South Africa," in *Sanctioning Apartheid,* ed. Robert E. Edgar (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1990), 69.

[595] The following provides a sampling of U.S. university and college investments in South Africa between 1978 and 1988, for which comprehensive statistics are difficult to come by. In 1978, the University of Wisconsin divested $10.2 million in stocks and bonds from companies operating in South Africa, while Michigan State University sold $8.5 million worth of stock—roughly 45 percent of the school's $8.5 million portfolio. In 1979, Boston University sold $6.6 million—roughly 4.65 percent of the school's $142 million portfolio, while Tufts University divested itself of $6.4 million—roughly 20 percent of the school's $31 million endowment. In 1987, Harvard sold $230 million—approximately 6 percent of its $3.85 billion endowment—worth of stock and bonds in companies with operations in South Africa. Danaher, 130-144; Mebane T. Faber and Eric W. Richardson, *The Ivy Portfolio: How to Invest Like the Top endowments and Avoid Bear Markets* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009), 7; Michael C. George and David W. Kaufman, "Students Protest Investment in Apartheid South Africa," *The Harvard Crimson,* May 23, 2012, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2012/5/23/Protest-Divestment-Apartheid/.

[596] Amy Goldstein, "Hopkins rejects total divestment: Board votes to keep S. Africa holdings," *The Sun*, October 28, 1986: 1A.

Unpersuaded by Radcliffe's explanation, members of Hopkins' Coalition for a Free South Africa, led by philosophy graduate student Paul Genest, expressed their exasperation with administrator's calls for "more debate." "We've lost the battle for the hearts and minds of these businessmen," Genest told the *Baltimore Sun.* "They've had all the time they need. They've had all the pertinent information…We've busted our butts, frankly, and I don't see it is likely they're going to decide" differently any time soon.[597] Tensions on Hopkins' campus reached a fever pitch when three white fraternity brothers from Delta Upsilon set fire to a shanty, constructed by divestment protesters to symbolize the oppression against black South Africans, occupied by several graduate students, Kevin Archer, Jane Gray, and Patrick Bond, the latter of whom went on to serve South Africa's post-Apartheid government and teach at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.[598]

Eager to prevent similar confrontations in their hometown of Atlanta, Coca-Cola executives took action to further instill support for black empowerment approach in private institutions where they held influence. In particular, Coca-Cola executives worked with administrators at the predominately white Emory University, located across town from the AUC, in developing a range of privately-funded education programs for and about Africans. Founded in 1836 by a small group of Methodists in Oxford, Georgia, Emory's trajectory changed dramatically in 1915, when Asa Griggs Candler, the founder of The Coca-Cola Company, endowed the school with one million dollars and a gift of 75 acres of land in the newly emergent suburb of Druid Hills, outside of Atlanta.[599] At that time, Asa's brother, Methodist bishop

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[597] Amy Goldstein, "Hopkins rejects total divestment: Board votes to keep S. Africa holdings," *The Sun*, October 28, 1986: 1A.

[598] Joe Tropea "The Case of Kevin Archer," *underbelly: From the Deepest Corners of the Maryland Historical Society Library,* November 16, 2017, http://www.mdhs.org/underbelly/2017/11/16/the-case-of-kevin-archer/; The author would further like to credit Andrew Holter with bringing this incident at The Johns Hopkins University to her attention.

[599] Gary S. Hauk, *A Legacy of Heart and Mind: Emory since 1836* (Atlanta: Bookhouse Group, Inc., 1999).

Warren Candler was already an alumnus and former president of the College and returned to

serve as its first chancellor on the new campus just outside of Atlanta. Subsequent decades

witnessed the university's fortune improve alongside the company's transformation from a

regional soft drink manufacturer into the world's most recognizable brand.[600] In November 1979,

company heirs, Robert and George Woodruff, solidified the relationship by donating $105

million in Coca-Cola Company stock to Emory University, what was at the time the single

largest donation to a school, and appointed the university president James T. Laney to the

company's board of directors.[601]

Appointed as the school's 17th president in 1977, Laney played a crucial role in securing

the Coca-Cola gift to help fund his dreams of transforming Emory from a relatively unknown

regional institution into a world-renowned university.[602] Here, the anti-apartheid struggle

presented both a challenge and an opportunity. Responding to protests in Emory's Candler

School of Theology, Laney wrote to Candler professor and a fellow Yale University alum Jon

Gunneman in September 1985:

> Perhaps nowhere in the world today are we faced with a clearer example of the
> poisonous harvest reaped from policies of racial intolerance than in the Union of South
> Africa…many at Emory feel compelled to do something—not because we aren't also
> concerned with flagrant abuses of human rights and liberties in other parts of the world,
> but because as Americans we carry in ourselves a deep sensitivity to the kind of starkly
> racial injustice so clearly evident in South Africa today. Part of our claim to being a
> university must lie in our being able to address an issue of this magnitude with great
> reason and imagination. Emory has a long tradition of preparing men and women for

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[600] For more on the history of Coca-Cola see Bartow J. Elmore, *Citizen Coke: The Making of Coca-Cola Capitalism* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2014); Hymson, "The Company that Taught the World to Sing"; Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Pendergrast, *For God, Country, and Coca-Cola*.

[601] F. Stuart Gulley, *The Academic President as Moral Leader: James T. Laney at Emory University, 1977-1993* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2001), 3.

[602] F. Stuart Gulley, *The Academic President as Moral Leader: James T. Laney at Emory University, 1977-1993* (Macon, G.A.: Mercer University Press, 2001); Gary S. Hauk, *A Legacy of Heart and Mind*.

lives dedicated to relieving suffering and bringing greater justice and light into the world.[603]

Seeking an alternative path for Emory vis-à-vis the divestment question, Laney asked Gunnemann to chair an Advisory Committee on South Africa.

Gunnemann proved an apt choice to chair the committee. In addition to being former classmates, Gunnemann, like Laney, thought institutions like Emory could play a positive role in South Africa if they remained invested. While a graduate student at Yale University, Gunnemann co-founded a South African study group comprised of students and faculty from economics, biology, religious studies, political science, and law. The primary aim of the group, to "explore the thicket of issues…pertinent to [the] investment responsibility" of institutions like Yale.[604] In 1972, the group published *The Ethical Investor: Universities and Corporate Responsibility.* An early contributor to the nascent field of business ethics, concluded that corporations had a responsibility not to engage in conduct defined as socially injurious and that individual and institutional shareholders, including universities, had a moral duty as "owners" to influence corporations to the best of their ability with regards to meeting this responsibility.

Building on his previous work and Laney's instructions, Gunnemann set out to develop a set of guidelines for ethical investment rather divestment. Framing the committee's work in terms of constructive engagement, Laney stated:

> It is, not our province as a university to engage in a foreign policy. But we at Emory are equipped to engage difficult issues in ways that the federal government in Washington cannot—by applying our scholarly expertise in a variety of fields to bring light to the matter, by bringing in speakers from outside the university to help explore the full range of issues, by exchanging students and faculty with universities there, and by

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[603] Correspondence, James T. Laney to Jon Gunneman, Re: Advisory Committee on South Africa, September 10, 1985, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.
[604] John G. Simon, Charles W. Powers, and Jon P. Gunnemann, *The Ethical Investor: Universities and Corporate Responsibility* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), vii.

strengthening our connections with the prominent and largely black South African Methodist Church and with other organizations in South Africa.[605]

Much like the initial meeting of the Sullivan signatory companies, held in a remote residence in Sands Point, Long Island, the first meeting of the President's Advisory Committee on South Africa took the form of a private dinner held at Lullwater House on the evening of Wednesday, September 18, 1985.[606] Built to serve as the residence of Walter T. Candler, son of Coca-Cola founder Asa Griggs Candler, the Tudor-Gothic mansion was repurposed as the president's house after Emory acquired the land the house was on in 1958. Situated on 185 acres of bucolic forest, somewhat separated from the main campus, Lullwater House provided the committee with the privacy needed to begin their sensitive discussions regarding Emory's relationship with Apartheid South Africa.

If much of the committee work itself took place behind closed doors, its focus lay well beyond campus borders. Mirroring trends at other college and university campuses, Emory administrators and faculty took advantage of public interest in the anti-apartheid struggle to launch and/or bolster ties with the continent. As part of these efforts, President Laney participated in a week-long visit to South Africa in January 1986 along with other educational, church, political, and business leaders.[607] While in South Africa, Laney met with representatives from the University of Cape Town to discuss establishing an exchange program for faculty and students from their respective institutions, including scholarships for black South Africans.[608]

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[605] Correspondence, James T. Laney to Jon Gunneman, Re: Advisory Committee on South Africa, September 10, 1985, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.
[606] Correspondence, James T. Laney to Jon Gunneman, Re: Advisory Committee on South Africa, September 10, 1985, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.
[607] "DRAFT'" Memo, Jon Gunnemann to Members of South African Advisory Committee, January 16, 1986, Emory University, Office of the President, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.
[608] F. Stuart Gulley, *The Academic President as Moral Leader: James T. Laney at Emory University, 1977-1993* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2001), 178; Dr. James Moulder, Director: UCT Foundation, "Bursary Requirements for Black Students at the University of Cape Town: 1986-1990," October 31, 1985, Emory

The exchange program later was included in Emory's official committee report on the South Africa issue, alongside recommendations to commit more institutional resources to African Studies at Emory.[609]

A leading proponent of African Studies, committee member and historian Kristen Mann, expressed her agreement with recommendations to devote more institutional resources to the study of Africa in a letter to Gunnemann. "You and the President can count on me to cooperate fully in any effort to strengthen African studies on this campus." This focus, Mann continued, however, should not distract from ongoing efforts "addressing the problems of blacks at home."[610]

Racism at home, including on Emory's campus, thus informed Mann and others support for sanctions and divestment. Echoing Mann, religious studies professor Jacqueline Irvine, the only black member of the committee, noted her objection to the committee's decision to forego divestment. "As an Afro-American and a tenured member of this faculty, I know that commitments go unfulfilled and interests waiver and disappear as the majority culture gets bored with old causes." Irvine then cited a lack of notable progress on "increase[ing] the presence of

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University, Office of the President, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.

[609] Report of the President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Emory University, May 1986, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1; Emory's actions mirrored those at other colleges and universities, including Michigan State University, where members of the African Studies Center held a conference in November 1986 that drew representatives from more than 100 U.S. colleges and universities, as well as 25 educational leaders from southern Africa, including a representative from the African National Congress. Aaron Segal, "The United States and South Africa: Human Investment," 26; These efforts expanded on the existing South Africa Education Program initiated by the Institute of International Education in 1979, which offered university scholarships to non-white South Africans. Between 1980 and 1990, the program provided over $40 million to over thirteen hundred South African students in scholarships and tuition waivers to pursue education and training programs in the United States and South Africa. Princeton N. Lyman, *Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa's Transition to Democracy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002), 39.

[610] Memo, Kristen Mann to Jon Gunnemann, Re: South Africa Review Committee, September 22, 1985, Emory University, Office of the President, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.

Afro-Americans on [Emory's] campus [alongside] evidence that the study of Afro-Americans [was] a valued and respected field of study," as support for his position advocating divestment as the only ethical response with regards to South Africa.[611] Despite Mann and Irvine's objections, the committee ultimately voted to maintain their investments in companies operating in South Africa. Following a path pursued by several elite institutions, including Yale, Harvard, and Stanford, Emory's Advisory Committee opted for what they called "social investment" over divestment.[612]

University politics, in this case, meshed with corporate politics and privileged investment over divestment. Between October and December 1985, the committee received regular updates from Trusco Capital Management, which reported that Emory had over $222 million in bonds and equity in twenty-five companies operating in South Africa, all of which had signed the Sullivan Principles.[613] Based on this information, the committee members voted to retain shares in corporations that signed the Sullivan Principles. Recognizing the limitations of the self-governing Sullivan Principles program, however, the committee further proposed that Emory serve as an additional overseer, monitoring corporate behavior. Thus, the committee proposed "the establishment of a Committee on Investment Responsibility" to monitor the university's

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[611] Memorandum, From Jackie Irvine to Jon Gunneman, Re: Report of the Subcommittee on Emory's Economic Ties, Report of the President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Emory University, May 1986, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.

[612] Memo, Tom Bertrand to Advisory Committee on South Africa, Subcommittee on Emory/South Africa Economic Ties, October 22, 1985, Emory University, Office of the President, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1; Report of the President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Emory University, May 1986, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.

[613] Emory University Consolidated Portfolio, October 1985, Trusco Capital Management, Correspondence V. Jere Koser, Group Vice President to Bradley Currey, Emory University, November 4, 1985, Emory University, Office of the President, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.

investments, including those in South Africa and engage in discussions with individual corporations should the committee see fit.[614]

Conceived of as a distinct entity, outside of both the board of trustees and the university's economic advisors, the committee, much like the Sullivan Principles' signatory organization, claimed legitimacy through its ability to make decisions based on *ethical*, rather than financial, responsibilities. Close communication between the advisory committee, Emory's board of trustees, and the university's primary investor, Coca-Cola, however, reveal the persistent interjection of the profit-motive in conversations about social investment. Throughout discussions concerning Emory's relationship with South Africa, the president's advisory committee relied on materials provided to them by Emory's board of trustees, including a document "Policy on Investment Responsibility," which the committee then incorporated into the guidelines drafted for President Laney. [615] Committee members also met periodically with representatives from Coca-Cola, including Vice President Carl Ware.[616] In these meetings, Ware

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[614] Report of the President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Emory University, May 1986, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1; Elsewhere, building on existing notions of "social injury" included in the trustees "Policy on Investment Responsibility," committee members encouraged the university administration to "clarify and broaden their criteria for determining what constitutes 'substantial social injury' in the case of South Africa." This included evaluating "the nature and use of a company's products and services with respect to all the structures of apartheid…as well as direct corporate involvement with the maintenance of enforcement of apartheid laws." Emory University, Office of the President, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.
[615] Memo, Tom Bertrand to Advisory Committee on South Africa, Subcommittee on Emory/South Africa Economic Ties, October 22, 1985, Emory University, Office of the President, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1; Report of the President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Emory University, May 1986, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.
[616] Correspondence, Tom Bertrand to Gunnemann et al., November 6, 1985, Emory University, Office of the President, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1; Another noteworthy attendee was Monhle Gcabashe, a black South African completing her bachelor's degree at the university. Gcabashe later went on to become a major player in South African business, including serving as chief executive officer and executive chairman for several financial institutions, including Blue IQ Investment Holdings, One Stone Securities (Pty) Limited, and One Stone Capital.

informed the committee of Coca-Cola's black empowerment initiatives in South Africa.[617]

Ultimately, Coca-Cola and Emory were able to come to an agreement, whereby the university

agreed to remain silent on the company's continued business dealings with South Africa.

Others remained skeptical of Coca-Cola's dealings with South Africa. In May 1986,

Atlanta hosted Coke's centennial celebration. As one company historian described it, "For four

days, Coca-Cola literally painted Atlanta red for its $23 million centennial bash." Inside the

celebrations at the Omni hotel, miniature Coke trucks zipped up and down the aisles, while

scantily clad dancers twirled to loud music, all there to impress the 12,500 bottlers, who

appeared to provide proof of Coke executives' claims to have "infiltrate[d]…the minds and

hearts and lives of everyone everywhere." Outside the Omni, however, protesters carrying anti-

apartheid placards reading "Get Coke Out of South Africa," told a somewhat different story.[618]

Despite the company's investments in black empowerment, Coca-Cola and other U.S. companies

faced increasing pressure from activists to leave South Africa. Moving forward, American

businesses were compelled to be creative with the institutional partnerships they forged to

sustain the image that American business was indeed an ally of black South Africans.

Divestment?

International anti-apartheid activism combined with growing political and social unrest in

South Africa triggered the largest wave of divestment to date. Beginning in 1984, large

American banks began taking measures to reduce their exposure in South Africa by selling their

loans to smaller U.S. and Japanese banks. By March 1985, overall lending by U.S. banks to

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[617] Memo, Jon Gunnemann to Members of South African Advisory Committee, January 16, 1986, Emory University, Office of the President, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.

[618] Pendergrast, *For God, Country, and Coca-Cola,* 373.

South Africa dropped 16 percent to $4.2 billion, while the net capital flow from U.S. corporations to their South African subsidiaries fell from a $71 million positive flow into South Africa to a net outflow of $17 million.[619] Bank divestment accompanied a new round of corporate pull outs. In 1985, a struggling Pan American Airlines announced its discontinuation of flights to South Africa after nearly forty years of continuous service.[620] Other companies to divest from South Africa included Singer Sewing Company, Motorola, Apple Computer, General Foods, and Philbro-Salomon. In the case of the latter, the news of Philbro-Salomon "peddl[ing] its commodities trading unit in South Africa…came after the city of Los Angeles barred Salomon Brothers from competing for a $200 million waste treatment center" for its failure to comply with the city's divestment policy.[621]

In some cases, support for divestment represented an explicit rejection of the Sullivan Principles. In 1985, the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) published a scathing report criticizing the Principles, and, implicitly, other corporate social responsibility programs more broadly. Citing testimony from black workers at Ford Motor Company's plant outside Pretoria, the report described the Principles as a "toothless package," "[a] piece-meal reform that allows this cruel system of apartheid to survive" through helping to "modernize" it.[622]

Leon Sullivan, on his part, fired back, defending his position and program. In a statement intended to reaffirm Sullivan's activist credentials, Sullivan announced, "If in 24 months

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[619] Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa,* 325-328.

[620] Pan American Airways decision to cease service to South Africa followed a decision by corporate executives to sell major assets following financial difficulties. Following discontinuation of service on several non-profitable routes, including Delhi, Bangkok and Hong Kong, Pan Am CEO C. Edward Acker shocked many when he sold the airline's entire Pacific network, including routes, airport bases, offices, and equipment, to United Airlines in April 1985. Jennifer Van Vleck in *Empire of the Air: Aviation and the American Ascendancy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 285-286.

[621] Milton Moskowitz, "U.S. Firms Feel the Head of Apartheid," *San Francisco Chronicle* [San Francisco, CA] November 1, 1985: 44.

[622] "South Africa: Questions and Answers on Divestment," American Committee on Africa, [circa November 1985], 073/0779/14, Oliver Tambo Papers, University of Fort Hare, Alice, South Africa. (Hereafter cited as OTP)

statutory apartheid had not been abolished, and there was not a clear commitment of the vote for Blacks," Sullivan declared, "he would call for the [signatory] companies' withdrawal, and an Embargo against South Africa."[623] Even as Sullivan endeavored to put even more pressure on the signatory companies, revising them to require signatory companies to "use their lobbying power and other means to work for the end of influx control, forced removals, passbook requirements and detention without trial, and for full black citizenship rights," he also continued to express his faith in the Principles. "The Sullivan are working," Sullivan wrote in *The Washington Post,* and indeed had "started a revolution in industrial race relations across South Africa…become[ing] a platform for many in South Africa arguing for equal rights in government and other places."[624]

The tide in favor of divestment and sanctions was turning, however. On July 20, 1985, in response to growing civil and political unrest, which had continued despite government efforts to curtail domestic opposition, the South African government declared a State of Emergency. Initially confined to the Eastern Cape and the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal, including Johannesburg, the order was eventually expanded to cover the entire country.

For many, the State of Emergency proved the last straw. By January 1986, at least thirty-nine major American firms had sold ownership of operations in South Africa, up from only seven the previous year.[625] American public opinion likewise moved decidedly against "constructive engagement" and towards increased sanctions. Following several previous failed attempts to implement national sanctions legislation, the United States Congress passed H.R. 4868, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in the summer of 1986. The Act, which promised to extend sanctions, including banning new bank loans and prohibiting the

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[623] "Reverend Leon Sullivan's Statement on the Republic of South Africa," Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.
[624] Leon H. Sullivan, "Give the Sullivan Principles Two More Years," *The Washington Post*, May 28, 1985: A17.
[625] Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa,* 337-338.

importation of South African steel, iron, coal, uranium, agricultural products and food, hit a momentary stumbling block when, true to earlier promises, President Reagan vetoed the bill.[626] In a statement released by the White House on September 26, 1986, Reagan reaffirmed his support for "constructive engagement." "This administration has no quarrel with the declared purpose of [the bill in question]. Indeed, we share that purpose: To send a clear signal to the South African government that the American people view with abhorrence its codified system of racial segregation." Sanctions, according to the President's statement, however, would only "contribute directly and measurably to the misery of people who have suffered enough."[627]

Breaking with the president, Senator Richard Lugar, a Republican from Indiana and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, subsequently issued a strongly worded statement calling for an override of the president's veto. His statement was accompanied by others, including Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who told *Newsday,* it was "sad that the president persists in locking himself into a failed and lonely policy that has put America on the side of racism in South Africa."[628] Supporters of the bill received further validation when Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a leading voice for black South Africans on the international stage, decried Reagan's speech as equivalent to a death sentence. Speaking from Cape Town, Tutu told Cable News Network (CNN), "I'd much rather people came out more firmly and more clearly and more honestly and said blacks are expendable, and not give us all this wonderful gas about their being concerned that blacks are going to suffer, as if, at the moment we are living in clover" meaning luxury.[629] Three days later, on September 29th, the House voted to override the

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[626] *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986*, Public Law 99-440, Statute 100 (1986): 1086-1116.
[627] Reagan quoted in Dennis Bell, "Reagan Vetoes Sanctions Bill: Attempt at Override Planned," *Newsday,* September 1986: 5.
[628] Kennedy quoted in Dennis Bell, "Reagan Vetoes Sanctions Bill: Attempt at Override Planned," *Newsday*, September 1986: 5.
[629] Tutu quoted in Dennis Bell, "Reagan Vetoes Sanctions Bill: Attempt at Override Planned," *Newsday*, September 1986: 5.

president's veto. The Senate followed suit shortly thereafter, voting 78 to 21 in favor of the bill. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act marked the first time since the Vietnam War that congress had overridden a presidential veto on foreign policy.

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 has hereinto been celebrated by many activists and scholars as a major victory for the anti-apartheid movement.[630] Indeed it was. As a testament to the changed political climate and public support for divestment, Sullivan, true to his word, announced in June 1987 his withdrawal from the Principles program. Addressing American media outside the Dupont Plaza Hotel in Washington D.C., Sullivan called for the withdrawal of all American companies, from South Africa, to begin immediately and be completed within the next nine months, returning only when "statutory apartheid" had been eliminated and black South Africans were given "a clear commitment for equal political rights."[631]

American corporations, however, did not give in to public and political pressure so easily. In a press conference organized by the 12-member steering committee representing the one-hundred and four remaining signatory companies, reasserted their commitment to pursuing a path of black empowerment, as opposed to divestment, in South Africa. It is with "profound regret" committee co-chairman Colgate Palmolive CEO Reuben Mark, W. Michael Blumenthal of Unisys, and Mobil CEO William Tavoulareas told reporters from a platform that we receive the news of Sullivan's abandonment of the Principles program. "We owe a great debt to Leon Sullivan…but we will now have to carry out the Sullivan Principles without Sullivan." The signatory companies refused, however to give up, what they called the "tried and true" approach

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[630] Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions,* 124; Massie, *Loosing the Bonds*, 620-622.
[631] "Reverend Leon Sullivan's Statement on the Republic of South Africa," Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.

of the Principles. Rather, the committee spokesmen encouraged all "signatory

companies…*renew* and *increase* their efforts to end the apartheid system (emphasis added)"

Echoing the calls of many anti-apartheid activists themselves, Tavoulareas added, "[We, the

signatory companies, believe] the decisive arena of this historic struggle is inside South Africa

itself" as justification for the continued presence of U.S. corporations there, where their

"resources [could] be most effectively brought to bear" on bringing about change.[632]

Divestment, at least as it was defined by the U.S. government, rather than halting U.S.

business activity, encouraged some companies to develop non-equity ties, which, in many ways

proved more favorable, in the sense that they allowed corporations to deflect responsibility for

their overseas operations, while continuing to reap a profit. Case in point was Coca-Cola. Under

fire from anti-apartheid activists, Coca-Cola announced its plans to divest from South Africa in

September 1986. Rather than abandon its operations entirely, the company sold its bottling plant

to a multiracial group of local investors.[633] In doing so, Coca-Cola followed a pattern practiced

by many American companies in response to divestment, in which the U.S. parent company

distanced itself from its South African operations, while simultaneously claiming credit for

promoting social progress, in the case of Coca-Cola by handing over the reins to a group of

multiracial South African investors. Engineered by Senior Vice President Carl Ware, who cut his

political chops as a president of the Atlanta City Council in the late 1970s before becoming the

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[632]Press Release, "U.S. Company Signatories Pledge Increased Effort on Behalf of Sullivan Principles in South Africa," June 3, 1987, Emory University Archives, Office of the President: President's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Box 1.

[633] Connie Green, "Coke Getting Out of South Africa," *Atlanta Journal*, September 17, 1986, A1; John Kirby Spivey, "Coke vs. Pepsi: The Cola Wars in South Africa during The Anti-Apartheid Era," Thesis, Georgia State University, 2009, http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_theses/35, 32-33; Bill Sing, "Coca-Cola Acts to Cut All Ties with S. Africa," *Los Angeles Times*, September 18, 1986; Coca-Cola's actions mirrored a broader pattern pursued by the company globally around this time. Responding to increased dollar valuations, Coca-Cola divested itself of majority-ownership in bottling plants, while retaining ownership of the less-expensive syrup production operations. Big Coca-Cola then sold the syrup to the bottling franchisees at a profit. Pendergrast, *For God, Country, and Coca-Cola,* 377-378.

senior-most black executive at Coca-Cola, the sale was accompanied by the relocation of the company's syrup plant from Durban to the neighboring Kingdom of Swaziland.[634] The nearby location of Coca-Cola's syrup plant, just over the border, combined with the creation of a new company, the National Beverages Services Ltd., to "monitor quality and use of the Coca-Cola trademark," assured that Coca-Cola continued to reap profits from the sale of its product in South Africa long after the company had "divested."[635]

Few of the details of Coca-Cola's "divestment" reached the American public until a *New York Times* journalist by the name of John D. Battersby reported them in an article on the continued presence of U.S. goods in South Africa despite divestment and sanctions months later.[636] Instead, mainstream U.S. media, when not covering Coca-Cola's divestment, praised the company's commitment to black empowerment through their announcement of a new $10 million Equal Opportunity Fund (EOF) administered by Nobel Peace Prize winner Desmond Tutu and Reverend Allan Boesak, among others. Months after leading anti-apartheid activists in a picket of Coca-Cola's Centennial Celebration, civil rights activist and Atlanta minister Joseph Lowery lavished praise on Coca-Cola for its "strong moral statement" in the face of Apartheid. Meanwhile, Atlanta Mayor and former aide to Martin Luther King, Jr. Andrew Young, described the fund "a bold and significant step in the battle against apartheid." Only Tandi Gcabashe, the daughter of former ANC president Albert Luthuli, who lived in Atlanta, spoke up against the fund, as "an insult, a drop in the bucket."[637]

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[634] John D. Battersby, "U.S. Goods in South Africa," *The New York Times*, July 27, 1987; Constance L. Hays, *The Real Thing: Truth and Power at the Coca-Cola Company* (New York: Random House Publishing, 2004), 202.
[635] John D. Battersby, "U.S. Goods in South Africa," *The New York Times*, July 27, 1987.
[636] Ibid.
[637] Pendergrast, *For God, Country, and Coca-Cola,* 378-379.

Rather than an aberration, Coca-Cola's response to sanctions and divestment activism revealed a trend among American businesses. Responding to the push by post-colonial governments promoting local ownership, as well as other financial incentives to reduce their foreign direct investments, American corporations during the 1980s increasingly came to prefer non-equity partnerships that enabled them to continue making a profit, while simultaneously minimizing their exposure to risk in foreign countries where they had less influence over local politics.[638] In addition to bypassing divestment legislation, companies that maintained non-equity links, including licensing contracts, distribution networks that did not require direct ownership by the parent company, technology use agreements, as well as trade mark and patent royalties, derived further benefit from their ability to conduct transactions using the higher valued South African commercial rand as opposed to the financial rand. [639] Profits derived through the latter were subject to repatriation limitations imposed by the South African government and intended to restrict the outflow of profits derived through manufacturing. In some cases, U.S. companies set up a local trust to purchase the company from parent company. The sale of the trust was financed by the parent company and the latter held onto the debt until the trust could pay back the initial loan. Many trusts never paid back the debt, but rather were simply repurchased after sanctions were lifted in the nineties and American companies returned to South Africa.[640]

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[638] Betsy A. Beasley, "Service Learning: Oil, International Education, and Texas's Corporate Cold War," *Diplomatic History,* (2017), doi:10.1093/dh/dhx053; Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa,* 338; The link between American business globalism and U.S. extra-territorial imperialism is beautifully demonstrated by Jennifer Van Vleck in *Empire of the Air: Aviation and the American Ascendancy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); See also, Bethany Moreton, *To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 251-252.
[639] John D. Battersby, "U.S. Goods in South Africa," *The New York Times*, July 27, 1987; By 1989, only one university and two municipalities—Los Angeles and San Francisco—had expanded its divestment policy to include non-equity ties. Kenneth A. Rodman, *Sanctions beyond Borders: Multinational Corporations and U.S. Economic Statecraft* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 213.
[640] Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa,* 346.

According to one estimate, in 1990, 290 American firms remained doing business with South Africa, 176, or 61 percent, through indirect ties.[641]

For retail companies like General Motors and IBM, both of which maintained non-equity ties with distributors in South Africa, divestment threatened not just access to resources, but also decades of work expanding consumer markets in the region. Rather than stop doing business entirely, these and other companies shifted tactics, doubling down on efforts involving black South African partners, who provided a level of legitimacy to their efforts. Following the lead of its primary competitor, Pepsi-Cola announced its plans in February 1988 to sell its Cape Town plant to a group of local investors. Unlike Coca-Cola, the local partners, the Soweto Investment Company Ltd. was comprised entirely by "a group of black [South African] businessmen."[642] By partnering with black South African investors, some of whom were affiliated with Nafcoc, Pepsi executives deployed a strategy pursued in the United States, namely branding their company as socially progressive on issues of race. Borrowing from Pepsi's successful marketing campaign featuring the "King of Pop" Michael Jackson launched in 1983, former record company owner turned CEO of the Soweto Investment Company Stan Nkosi declared, "Pepsi is at the heart of a whole 'new generation'—a generation of new attitudes, ambitions, rhythms and styles."[643]

Clever marketing failed as a replacement for finance, however. By the mid-1980s, various events in and outside of South Africa had conspired to limit the amount of capital

[641] Rodman, *Sanctions beyond Borders,* 215.

[642] "News Desk: Plan to Revive Pepsi Plant," *African Business* (February 1988), 12; "News Desk: Pepsi Cola," *African Business* (March, 1988), 23.

[643] "News Desk: Pepsi Cola," *African Business* (March 1988): 23; Charles Thurman Moses and Donald Vest, "Coca-Cola and PepsiCo in South Africa: A Landmark Case in Corporate Social Responsibility, Ethical Dilemmas, and the Challenges of International Business," *Journal of African Business,* 11 (2010): 235-251; Dennis McDougal, "The Thriller of 'Victory': Snatching Profit from the Agony of the Biggest, Splashiest and Most Troubled Rock Concert Tour in History," *Los Angeles Times*, January 6, 1985: 3.

available for large business ventures like Pepsi's manufacturing plant.[644] In April 1988, less than a year after the initial purchase of the Pepsi plant by the Soweto Investment Company, First National Bank announced it was withdrawing its initial promise to loan R1.8-million to the black business venture.[645] With no other capital injections forthcoming, the company was forced to declare bankruptcy. In April 1990, Pepsi announced the sale of its "the franchised bottler's assets, including bottles and bottling equipment…to a South African Coca-Cola franchisee."[646]

Coca-Cola, on the other hand, pursued a different approach, tapping into informal distribution networks in order to keep Coca-Cola flowing into the hands of black South Africans. Long part of Africa's commercial networks, informal hawking (street-selling) came to play a growing role, along with spaza shops (convenience stores), in the context of South Africa's struggling economy in the late 1980s.[647] Unlike the "complex and costly ventures such as Pepsi," which black South African businessmen increasingly viewed "[as] untimely and unwise" investments, Coca-Cola's reliance on hawkers, while still maintaining a certain degree of control over manufacturing enabled the company to not only maintain, but expand, its market share during the height of divestment.[648] In 1990, Coca-Cola held 70 percent of the market share compared to Pepsi's 1.7 percent.[649]

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[644] The refusal of several international banks to loans to South Africa due to pressure from activism led to a dramatic shortage of liquid capital in South Africa during the late 1980s. Between 1985 and 1988, South Africa witnessed a net capital outflow of almost $10 billion. In 1988, the South African government, in an effort to halt the declining value of the South African rand, further imposed consumer credit restrictions, including raising interest rates for loans to banks from 12.5 percent to 14.5 percent. John D. Battersby, "Sanctions Squeeze South Africa," *New York Times*, November 1, 1988: 3.

[645] "The Pepsi Problem Fizzes on Flat Broke?" *African Business* (April 1988): 31.

[646] Anthony Ramierz, "Pepsico Out of South Africa Following Failure of Bottler," *New York Times*, April 12, 1990.

[647] C.M. Rogerson, "The Absorptive Capacity of the Informal Sector in the South African City," in *The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa,* ed. David M. Smith (London: Routledge, 1992): 161-172; C.M. Rogerson and D.M. Hart, "The Struggle for the Streets: Deregulation and Hawking in South Africa's Major Urban Areas," *Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies* 15, issue 1 (1989): 29-45.

[648] "The Pepsi Problem Fizzes on Flat Broke?" *African Business* (April 1988): 31.

[649] Spivey, "Coke vs. Pepsi," 40.

Return from Exile

Throughout the 1980s, the specter of South Africa's revolutionary African National Congress (ANC) loomed large amidst debates about divestment and the future of South Africa. Barred from South Africa along with other anti-apartheid organizations in 1960, the ANC's return from exile has long occupied a central place in histories of this period.[650] Many factors, including the reemergence of widespread internal resistance in the form of the Mass Democratic Movement and the trade union struggle, contributed to the ANC's ability to re-establish a presence within the country. One of the most surprising turn of events, for all involved, was the role that black American entrepreneurs and U.S. corporations played in facilitating the transfer of power to the ANC, a transfer that coincided with the return of American business as partners in the construction of a New South Africa.[651]

Long allied with the South African Communist Party, which, among other things, helped to facilitate military and other forms of technical support to the exiled ANC from the Soviet Union, the ANC earned the ire of many Western governments and others, who considered the group a communist front. In 1986, President Reagan, following the lead of the South African government, claimed the ANC engaged in "calculated terror."[652] What many then and now failed

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[650] For classic narrative of the ANC's triumphant anti-apartheid campaign, see Peter Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress, 1912-1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); More recent work, most notably that featured in Arianna Lissoni, et. al, eds., *One Hundred Years of the ANC: Debating Liberation Histories Today* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012) complicates this narrative by situating the ANC within contingent histories of South Africa and Africa more broadly.

[651] The phrase a "New South Africa" gained popularity in the early 1990s in reference to an imagined post-Apartheid South Africa following South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994, and was used by black American singer Whitney Houston in the title for three concerts, "Whitney—The Concert for a New South Africa," performed in South Africa in November 1994.

[652] The ANC was officially added to the U.S. State Department's list of "organizations that engage in terrorism" in August of 1988. Robert Windrem, "U.S. government considered Nelson Mandela a terrorist until 2008," *NBC News,* November 2, 2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-government-considered-nelson-mandela-terrorist-until-2008-flna2D11708787; Rodman, *Sanctions beyond Borders,* 230-233; Among scholars, the primary proponent

to realize was that the ANC was a large and complex organization, capable of containing a multiplicity of views. The group's "broad tent" ultimately created space for some within the ANC to advocate for private enterprise, including multinationals like Coca-Cola, as a vehicle for liberation.

Far from pre-ordained, the ANC's transformation from an organization allied with the Soviet Union to one with extensive links with the West emerged as a consequence of the organizational transformation that began over a decade earlier in the late 1970s. As part of the ANC's efforts to expand the non-military aspects of the movement, the ANC Economic Research Unit was created in 1982. Headed by Selebano Mathlape, who studied economics in Yugoslavia, East Germany, and England, the ANC Economic Research Unit was part of an emergent network of social scientists from and working on the continent engaged in a project studying and theorizing alternative solutions to the problem of development in the "Third World."[653] For years, ANC leaders complained, "the USA and other Western Countries" had dominated the field of development studies, "pouring millions of dollars into projects that are

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of the notion that the ANC was a communist front, for many years, remained Stephen Ellis, *External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[653] There is an extensive literature on development in the post-war period, including the rise of development economics and international organizations devoted to promoting development in the "Third World." Gerald M. Meier, *Biography of a Subject: An Evolution of Development Economics* (2005); Frederick Cooper & Randall Packard, *International development and the social sciences: essays on the history and politics of knowledge (*Berkeley: University of California Press 1997); Patrick Allan Sharma, *Robert McNamara's Other War: The World Bank and International Development* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017);
Much of the scholarship written by historians of Africa on the subject is critical of large-scale development programs, which gave little regard to African ways of living and often had deleterious consequences for African people and the environment. See for example, Gabrielle Hecht, *Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade* (Boston: The MIT Press, 2012), 17-19; Allan F. Isaacman and Barbara S. Isaacman, *Dams, Displacement, and the Delusion of Development: Cahora Bassa and Its Legacies in Mozambique, 1965-2007* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2013); David Gordon, *Nachitutu's Gift: Economy, Society, and Environment in Central Africa* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005); Meanwhile, anthropologist James Ferguson reminds scholars, despite the tragedies of these programs, development ideology succeeded with regards to permeating African political and cultural imaginaries as a vision of a future yet to come. *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); See also, Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

designed to create that type of manpower that will promote and protect their interests in South Africa," mirroring their disproportionate role within the South African economy.[654] Taking their cue from Africans elsewhere on the continent, including the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), the ANC Economic Research Unit set as its mission to craft "an alternative development path for Southern Africa."[655]

From the beginning, creativity and inter-disciplinarity defined the ANC Economic Research Unit. "Cross-fertilisation of ideas and experiences," Mathlape stated in a letter to fellow ANC comrade Dumela Ntate, were to play a crucial role if the ANC hoped to avoid the narrow didacticism of other liberation movements and develop a sophisticated economic policy.[656] Among those initially brought to work at the unit were Barney Pitso, Jacob Chiloane, S. Matlape, Conny Dlingea, Tony Seedat, S. Mfenyana, S. Signxashe, M. Medupe, P. Magapatona, M. Sisulu, S. Makana, M. Mbongwa, Mavivi Manzini, Manala Manzini, and Thabo Mbeki, each of whom had received their training under "diverse systems" in and outside of South Africa.[657]

Like the training received by the ANC economists, financing for the unit and ANC development projects more broadly came from a variety of international sources. Unwilling to finance the ANC's military campaign, Western governments and other international bodies allied with the West proved more willing to support the ANC's experiments in economic development. Coinciding with his appointment as director of the ANC Economic Research Unit, Mathlape established the South African Economic Research and Training Project (SAERT). SAERT's

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[654] Memorandum on Training of Manpower, OTP/052/0483/3; Draft, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Project Submission Data for Assistance by the United Nations Development Programme, OTP/0029/0349/4.
[655] South African Monopoly Capitalism, Social Deprivation and Social Emancipation, Paper presented by Victor Matlou on behalf of the ANC Research Unit at the Codesria Conference on Another Development for Southern Africa, Lusaka, 3-7 September 1979, OTP/039/0349/2
[656] Correspondence, Matlhape to Dumela Ntate, April 3, 1987, OTP/040/0356/5.
[657] Memo, The A.N.C. Economic Unit, February 1983, OTP/039/0349/3.

status as a distinct organization based in the Netherlands allowed him to funnel donations from

Western funders, who preferred to avoid the stigma of giving directly to the ANC.[658] The ANC

likewise received funding from the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation

(UNIDO) for a series of projects promoting small-scale industrial projects "in the areas of

construction, agricultural production, vocational training, garment factory, leather works and

other related activities" based in ANC camps in the "independent states in Southern Africa."[659]

Mthlape's work developing the ANC Economic Research Unit coincided with a broader

effort within the ANC to rethink the organization's relationship with the West. Treated with deep

suspicion by many within the organization, ANC National Executive Committee member, Thabo

Mbeki, acting with ANC President Oliver Tambo's approval, helped lead a campaign to

transform the ANC's image from a terrorist cell into a government in waiting.[660] Chief among

those Mbeki hoped to persuade was the United States.[661]

For years, the ANC lacked a significant presence in the United States, choosing to base

its operations in a series of offices located on the continent with another office in London.[662]

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[658] http://www.anc.org.za/content/anc-pays-tribute-selebano-matlhape; Among those which contributed funds to SAERT was the Transnational Institute (TNI), a left-leaning organization, which helped fund a number of anti-apartheid organizations, including the Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLSA). "South African Bank Loans," *Information Digest,* August 10, 1979, A. Philip Randolph Education Fund, David Jessup Papers, Emory University, Box 1, Folder African National Congress;

[659] Report on the 18th Session of the Industrial Development Board (IDB) of the U.N. Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) 2-18 May, 1984 – Vienna. OTP/0029/0349; Agenda Item 18: PM Session 383, African National Congress, Statement of the ANC Observer Delegate to the 19th Session of the IDB (13-31 May 1985) on Technical Assistance to the South African Liberation Movements. OTP/039/0352/5; UNIDO likewise provided funding to the Pan-African Congress for a similar project. Report on the 18th Session of the Industrial Development Board (IDB) of the U.N. Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) 2-18 May, 1984 – Vienna. OTP/0029/0349

[660] Mark Gevisser, *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2007), 169-170.

[661] Specifically, Princeton Lyman has stated that Mbeki launched a campaign during the early 1980s to "broaden support for the ANC and its objectives beyond the civil rights and trade union activists in the United States, specifically beyond members and supporters of the Democratic Party. Throughout the 1980s, the ANC worked to enlist understanding from Republican senators such as Richard Lugar and Nancy Kassebaum and representatives such as Amo Houghton, and to reach out to the American business community." "This support," according to Lyman "prove[d] crucial in the passage of sanctions legislation in 1986 and in overriding Reagan's veto." Lyman, *Partner to History,* 53.

[662] Scott Thomas, *The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress since 1960* (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 173-197; The few speaking tours on the part of the ANC, many of

First established in 1972, the ANC mission in New York City remained consistently underfunded and concentrated what little resources it did have on lobbying the United Nations. Describing a visit he once had there, Secretary-General of the ANC in Dar-es-Salaam K.W. Kgositsile noted, "there is very seldom ever anyone in the office, there is no one even to answer the telephone or see anyone who might drop by the office."[663]

Minimal resources and support-staff were just some of the problems the ANC faced recruiting supporters in the United States. Politics likewise played a role. Recalling his first years living in New York City, ANC ambassador to the United Nations Johnny Makatini recounted the skepticism he encountered from black Americans, who Makatini thought would "constitute a natural ally" for the ANC. One night in 1974, following an evening of lobbying at the UN, Makatini hailed a cab driven by a black American. "The cabby," Makatini later recounted in an interview with the *Daily World*, quickly "realized his passenger wasn't from the U.S., and asked where he was from." An elated Makatini began exclaiming about the ANC's recent victory to expel South Africa from the UN. The cabby, however, interrupted him, saying, "No, I don't agree with the communists," referring to the ANC.[664]

Anti-communism mixed with racism featured prominently during the Cold War.[665] Targeted by government and liberal civil rights organizations during the 1940s and 1950s, many

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which were led by low-level members, to trade unions, shareholder meetings, churches, and college and university campuses are described in Morgan, "Into the Struggle," 92-93, 139; See also, Shirli Gilbert, "Singing Against Apartheid: ANC Cultural Groups and the International Anti-Apartheid Struggle," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 33, no. 2 (June 2007): 421-441.

[663] Kgositsile quoted in Morgan, "Into the Struggle," 298.

[664] "While His ANC Counterpart Draws Lessons," [Undated], *Daily World*, Tuesday, March 5, 1985: 4-D, A. Philip Randolph Education Fund, David Jessup Papers, Emory University, Box 20, Folder African National Congress

[665] Carol Anderson, *Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Gaines, *Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era;* Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*; Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996)*;* Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

left-leaning black Americans turned away from communism and toward black nationalism.[666]

Let down by white leftists' failure to internalize an anti-racist critique of capitalism, many black Americans, according to Makatini, remained perplexed, if not hostile, towards the ANC's "position that whites should also participate in the liberation struggle," preferring to throw their support behind ANC rival Pan-African Congress, whose black nationalist politics found resonance with an American audience raised within the Black Power movement.[667] The irony of the situation, whereby black nationalists in the United States rejected the ANC in favor of the PAC, was that, in some ways, it created the space for liberal civil rights organizations and black American entrepreneurs to claim the mantle of serving as the ANC's primary intermediaries in the United States. They increasingly embraced this role as the international anti-apartheid struggle took center stage in the context of late 1980's domestic and international politics.

Greatly hindered by the Cold War and the ANC's exile, the decades-long links between the ANC and civil rights organizations, which began prior to the organization's founding, nevertheless persisted through the post-war decades.[668] Taking on the role previously occupied

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[666] Cedric Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Transition,* Second Edition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), Michael C. Dawson, *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political ideologies* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001).

[667] "While His ANC Counterpart Draws Lessons," [Undated], *Daily World*, March 5, 1985: 4-D; A. Philip Randolph Education Fund, David Jessup Papers, Emory University, Box 20, Folder African National Congress; David Everatt, *The Origins of Non-racialism: White opposition to apartheid in the 1950s* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2010); Jon Soske, "Unravelling the 1947 'Doctors' Pact'": Race, Metonymy and the Evasions of Nationalist History in *One Hundred years of the ANC: Debating Liberation Histories Today,* eds. Arianna Lissoni, Jon Soske, Natasha Erland, Noor Nieftagodien and Omar Badsha (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012); Jon Soske, *Internal Frontiers: African Nationalism and the Indian Diaspora in Twentieth-Century South Africa* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2017); African American preference for the PAC echoed African nationalist sentiment on the continent, where many criticized the ANC's links with white communists. Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (New York: Back Bay Books, 1995), 369; Ellis, *External Mission,* 33, 41.

[668] During the late 19th and early 20th century, a handful of Christian-educated black South Africans received opportunities to study in the United States. Two such beneficiaries, Pixley Seme and John Dube, were impressed by what they observed among educated black Americans, including those involved in efforts to organize the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) that they returned to South Africa and formed the South African Native National Congress (later re-named the African National Congress), mirroring the charter of the former. South Africa NAACP Historical Involvement, 1911-1985. Pamphlet. Baltimore: NAACP [1985], NAACP Records, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (143.00.00) Courtesy of the NAACP [Digital ID #na0143p1];

by the NAACP and the Congressional Black Caucus, both of which advocated to the United

Nations and the United States Congress, respectively, on behalf of the ANC, organizations like

TransAfrica and the Africa Fund took up the baton of serving as key emissaries for the ANC in

the 1980s.[669] This alliance, in turn, proved quite profitable, not least because of the access

TransAfrica and Africa Fund were able to provide in terms of boosting the ANC's image in the

media.

For years, the South African government funded a propaganda campaign in the United

States that demonized the ANC and other liberation organizations, while portraying Apartheid as

a benign policy meant to foster racial autonomy.[670] Taking on the role of the organization chief

public relations advisor, as deputy to Duma Nokwe in the Department of Information and

Propaganda (DIP), later renamed the Department of Information and Publicity under Mbeki's

leadership, Thabo Mbeki launched a counter campaign using the organization's contacts in

Hollywood. Having previously collaborated with American television network CBS on a

documentary about the ANC called" *The Battle for South Africa* in 1978, Mbeki and Tambo

greenlighted a series of films and shows on the ANC's struggle and the organization's chief hero

figure, political prisoner Nelson Mandela, starring black American entertainers.[671] Eager to meet

the American public's growing interest in South Africa, Nelson and Winnie Mandela became

Hollywood sensations; responsible for launching a number of black American entertainers

careers throughout the 1980s and 1990s.[672] The first actor to play Nelson Mandela was Danny

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Mary-Louise Hooper to Oliver Tambo, May 3, 1960, OTP/011/0080/4, Correspondence, Oliver Tambo, October 19, 1964, OTP/ 009/0066/2.

[669] Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions.*

[670] Ron Nixon, *Selling Apartheid: South Africa's Global Propaganda War* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016).

[671] Oliver Tambo to Sidney Poitier, June 5, 1987, OTP/010/0074/7, Lyman, *Partner to History,* 43; Gevisser, *Thabo Mbeki,* 169-170, Morgan, "Into the Struggle," 98-152.

[672] Howard Rosenberg, "TV Review: A Timely Apartheid Docudrama," *Los Angeles Times*, June 18, 1987 12; "Hollywood is Hot for Mandela Saga," *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 2, 1986: 20.

Glover in the 1987 film "Mandela." Glover's Emmy-nominated performance was even more remarkable given that the real Mandela was still in prison.[673]

Hollywood stardom, in turn, translated into direct earnings for the ANC and its leaders. In 1987, for example, Camille Cosby paid Winnie Mandela an undisclosed sum for the rights to produce a movie about her life.[674] Meanwhile, Camille's husband, Bill used his fame to raise thousands for the "Unlock Apartheid's Jail" campaign organized by the Africa Fund. Dramatizing the Apartheid state's "unlimited [police] powers," including the ability of police "to seize whomever they chose and to hold them indefinitely, without trial, without charge and without any rights of access to lawyers, family or friends," the campaign collected thousands of keys from churches, synagogues, and other community institutions, which were then delivered to the South African consulate in Washington. Within weeks of Cosby's endorsement, over 2,000 churches, synagogues and civil rights and community organizations had joined the campaign."[675] Months later, when ANC President Oliver Tambo required hospitalization in London following a severe stroke, from which he never fully recovered, Cosby again came to the ANC's aid, helping to pay for Tambo's medical expenses.[676] Black investment paid twofold in this regard. Whereas black Americans traded fundraising and media networks for privileged access to the ANC, often bolstering their own careers in the process, the ANC profited from its investment in black

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[673] In *Starring Mandela and Cosby: Media and the End(s) of Apartheid* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), Ron Krabill argues Mandela's absence from the public sphere due to his imprisonment coupled with his portrayal in the media as an icon helped reconfigure Mandela from a dangerous militant to a known and sympathetic hero.

[674] "Rights gained for Film about Winnie Mandela," *New York Times*, August 19, 1986: C13; "Personalities," *The Washington Post*, August 19, 1986, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1986/08/19/personalities/3600fc4d-e333-4898-a77d-5a82cfbcf2b0/?utm_term=.98ab425b0c6c.

[675] "Breaking the Barrier of Silence: Thousands Join Campaign to Unlock Apartheid's Jail," American Committee on Africa Action Newsletter, Number 24 (Winter 1987-88), OTP/073/0779/3.

[676] Correspondence from Dali Tambo to Camille Cosby, OTP/010/0077/1; Ron Krabill, *Starring Mandela and Cosby: Media and the End(s) of Apartheid* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010).

Americans in the form of much needed capital and sympathetic publicity. Both of which came in handy as the party entered its final chapter as post-Apartheid South Africa's presumed government-in-waiting.

The Art of the Deal

By the late 1980s, internal unrest within South Africa combined with the refusal of international lenders to aid the country's debt problem had left the South African government with fewer and fewer options against the growing tide of anti-apartheid activism. In this regard, the decision by President de Klerk to meet with the imprisoned ANC leadership was, in many ways, driven by a desire to preserve order within the country, rather than an explicit rejection of Apartheid. Following a series of meetings between government officials and imprisoned ANC leaders, which remained secret even from many of de Klerk's own party, South African President FW de Klerk shocked the world with his announcement on February 10, 1990, that Nelson Mandela would be released from prison following twenty-seven years of incarceration. News of Mandela's release was accompanied by the unbanning of a list of anti-apartheid organizations, including the ANC, PAC, and the South African Communist Party. Greeted with cheers from anti-apartheid supporters around the world, Mandela's release was only the beginning in the ANC's four-year struggle for control of the country.[677]

Having struck a definitive blow to the policy of Apartheid, the ANC still had a long way to go in 1990 to garner the political and financial support it needed to bring the South African

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[677] Vivienne Walt, "Nelson Mandela is Freed After Decades in Prison: Leader's release scheduled for Today," *Newsday,* February 11, 1990, "Mandela Freed—Says to Fight On/He Spent 27 Years in Prison," *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 12, 1990: A1, "Nelson Mandela released," *The Times of India* [Mumbai, India] February 12, 1990: 1, "Man-de-la! Man-de-la!: Nelson Mandela is free…Breyten Breytenbach on how the word will have been received far and wide," *The Guardian*, February 12, 1990: 19, Richard Gwyn, "Blacks achieve dignity with freeing of their leader," *Toronto Star*, February 11, 1990: H1.

government party to the bargaining table and win a national election. As part of their strategy to gain the upper hand in negotiations, Mandela, less than five months after his release, headed on a tour of the United States. Stepping off the plane in New York, Mandela and his entourage were greeted by "record-breaking crowds." Standing on the steps of City Hall, Mayor David Dinkins presented Mandela with the keys to the city, followed by a parade. During the parade, Mandela rode side by side with Dinkins and New York Governor Mario Cuomo up Broadway, while millions of attendees strained to get a peak of the man viewed by many as the chief architect of the ANC's fight against Apartheid. The parade culminated in Yankee Stadium with a rally coordinated by American Committee on Africa in Rally and ANC Women's League, led by Winnie Mandela."[678]

In contrast to the hero's welcome he received in New York, Mandela's arrival in Miami, Florida, met with hostility from Cuban-Americans, who came to protest Mandela's defense of Cuban President Fidel Castro. Descending onto the tarmac, Mandela found himself greeted by the Metro-Dade police SWAT team, who arrived armed with M-16 rifles. (A far cry from the cheers of adoring fans in New York.) Heavy police presence likewise accompanied Mandela's arrival in the booming capital of the "New South" in Atlanta, Georgia. Outside of Georgia Tech's Bobby Dodd Stadium, where Mandela spoke, making numerous references to hometown civil rights hero Martin Luther King, Jr., police threatened to arrest a group of white supremacists, including David W. Holland, former head of the Southern White Knights, a Ku Klux Klan faction. Police caught Holland and others attempting to burn an African National Congress flag outside of the stadium.

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[678] "A Hero's Welcome," American Committee on Africa, *Action News*, Number 30 (Fall 1990), OTP/073/0779/5.

Testifying to widespread views of Mandela and the ANC as communist, Holland responded to police by noting, "It's OK to burn the American flag, but not a Communist flag."[679]

Meanwhile, Mandela's tour elicited criticism from some supporters, as well. Eager to conserve Mandela's energy, those charged with coordinating the visit, including Harry Belafonte, limited Mandela's public appearances to those deemed most beneficial to their aim of increasing U.S. political and financial support for the ANC.[680] A last minute scheduling change to allow Mandela to speak at Morehouse College in Atlanta, for example, delayed Mandela's arrival at the stadium for over an hour, leaving attendees to swelter in the hot sun. While some delays were inevitable given the tour's timing just months following Mandela's release, other aspects of the tour irked some as deliberate. Excluded from participating in the local organizing committee, Williams complained that the $5 ticket price to see Mandela meant that "Mandela was not allowed to speak to the poorest of the poor," while those close to Mandela toured the country in luxury.[681] Williams' comments were echoed by Chicago activist Prexy Nesbitt, who expressed qualms regarding the exclusionary tendencies of those organizations charged with organizing the tour.[682]

Weeks before Mandela's planned arrival in the United States, organizers confronted the difficulties associated with abiding by their own policy of sanctions and divestment. With stadiums booked and tickets sold, the ANC had yet to secure a plane to transport Mandela and his entourage on their eleven-city fundraising tour. After several failed requests to the U.S. State

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[679] Ron Taylor, Joseph Albright, "Atlanta opens heart to Mandela: 50,000 cheer ANC leader at stadium," *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution,* June 28, 1990 (republished, June 27, 2013), http://www.ajc.com/news/national/atlanta-opens-heart-mandela-000-cheer-anc-leader-stadium/Zd2WIY1K0CkGpspTCaIaUO/

[680] Harry Belafonte, *My Song: A Memoir* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011), 395.

[681] Williams quoted in C.W. Griffin III, "Hosea Williams Arrested at Mandela Rally Here," *Atlanta Daily World,* July 1990: 2.

[682] David L. Hostetter, *Movement Matters: American Antiapartheid Activism and the Rise of Multicultural Politics,* Studies in African American History and Culture (New York: Routledge, 2006), 90.

Department and several other private charter operations—the former agreeing only to provide Mandela with an armored limousine for parts of the tour—Mandela's team struck a deal with real estate billionaire Donald Trump. Under pressure from creditors for losses incurred on several real estate holdings and facing rising oil costs, Trump granted use of one of Trump Shuttles' 727 jets to the ANC for the sum of $130,000.[683] The ANC's choice of business partners surprised many, particularly considering the Trumps' reputation for earning millions discriminating against black and other people of color in New York City.[684] Yet, Christine Dolan, who handled the arrangements, told the *Los Angeles Times* only that "the Mandela Welcoming Committee is very thankful to Donald Trump."[685]

The ANC's booking of the Trump jet was just one of the many transactions made in conjunction with Mandela's 1990 visit, which raised an estimated $7 million for the ANC.[686] In addition to Reebok and Vantage Group, which supported the tour, ANC leaders met with various American business leaders, including executives from The Coca-Cola Company.[687] Mandela's willingness to do business with Coca-Cola came as somewhat of a surprise to anti-apartheid activists, who spent the 1980s protesting Coca-Cola's continued sale of its products in South Africa.[688]

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[683] Sheila Poole and Ernie Suggs, "'Welcome Home:' Mandela's 1990 visit to Atlanta rained adoration," *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution,* December 5, 2013; Neil Barsky and Asra Q. Nomani, "NWA in Talks to Operate, Buy Trump Shuttle," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 8, 1991: A3; Matt Viser, "Donald Trump's airline went from opulence in the air to crash landing," *Boston Globe,* May 27, 2016; "Special Friday Flashback: When Trump Ran 'The Shuttle," *Airways Magazine,* January 20, 2017, https://airwaysmag.com/airchive/donald-ran-shuttle/.

[684] Nicholas Kaplan, "Major Landlord Accused of Antiblack Bias in City," *The New York Times*, October 16, 1973: 1.

[685] Tracy Wilkinson, "Trump Takes Mandela Under His Wing," *Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 1990.

[686] "Mandela's U.S. Tour Raised Estimated $7 Million for ANC: Police Protection Cost Taxpayers Millions More," *The Washington Post*, July 4, 1990: A2.

[687] Diane E. Lewis, "Mandela to visit Boston During a tour of US," *Boston Globe*, May 23, 1990: 33; At least one scholar has reported that Coca-Cola executive Carl Ware "was the first American businessman whom Mandela agreed to meet following the latter's release from prison in 1990." Jessie Carney Smith, ed, *Encyclopedia of African American Business* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006), 807.

[688] Spivey, "Coke vs. Pepsi," 23-29.

Changes within the company, which also included the appointment of black American executive Carl Ware as Senior Vice President, led to a somewhat bizarre situation whereby activists, encouraged by the ANC, continued to boycott Coca-Cola, while ANC officials met with Coca-Cola executives behind closed doors to negotiate the company's return to South Africa.[689] During Mandela's 1990 visit to Atlanta—birthplace and headquarters of The Coca-Cola Company—rally attendees chanted derogatory epithets at the company and refused to buy Coke products sold throughout the event.[690] Meanwhile, Coca-Cola executives continued conversations previously initiated by Ware with anti-apartheid leaders, including Desmond Tutu. With Ware's help, Coca-Cola Senior Vice President Neville Isdell met with Nelson Mandela in Johannesburg, along with Thabo Mbeki and Yusuf Surtee. In addition to serving as a trustee of the Coca-Cola Foundation since 1986, Surtee had previously served as Isdell's tailor, when the former managed Coca-Cola's bottling plant in Johannesburg.[691] The group ultimately struck a deal whereby Coca-Cola agreed to sponsor Mandela's second U.S. fundraising tour in 1993 on the eve of his historic 1994 presidential election campaign.[692] Far from an anomaly, Coca-Cola's partnership with the ANC mirrored similar deals with other U.S. businesses during the early 1990s.[693]

[689] "Ending apartheid in South Africa: Grassroots pressure helps produce change," http://peaceworks.afsc.org/ending-apartheid-south-africa; Spivey, "Coke vs. Pepsi," 36-37.

[690] Ron Taylor and Joseph Albright, "Atlanta opens heart to Mandela: 50,000 cheer ANC leader at stadium" *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, June 28, 1990; Art Harris, "Mandela Notebook; In Atlanta, Standing in the Shadow of King," *The Washington Post,* June 28, 1990.

[691] Neville Isdell with David Beasley, *Inside Coca-Cola: A CEO's Life Story of Building the World's Most Popular Brand* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011), 115, 141-2.

[692] Sheila Poole and Ernie Suggs, "'Welcome Home:' Mandela's 1990 visit to Atlanta rained adoration," *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution,* December 5, 2013; Carl Ware Papers. Archives Research Center. Atlanta University Center, Robert W. Woodruff Library, Box 30, Mandela, Nelson's visit to Atlanta 1993.

[693] Hostetter, *Movement Matters,* 91; Cathy Connors, "U.S. firms link with South African partners," *New York Amsterdam News,* October 9, 1993: 2; "ANC approaches large businesses for financial help," *Orange County Register*, October 18, 1990: A24.

Conclusion

American businesses' successful transformation from Apartheid profiteers into partners in the construction of a "New South Africa" was further reinforced in a popular Coke commercial, which aired in South Africa immediately following the country's first democratic elections in 1994. In the commercial, young African men appeared emerging from ulwaluko, a ritualistic ceremony marking the transition from boyhood to manhood, before the scene changes and the audience sees one of the male characters dressed as a Coca-Cola salesman. Rather than a complete rejection of the past, the commercial recognized the ways in which black empowerment politics blended "traditional" African masculinity with black entrepreneurship.[694] Here and elsewhere, black empowerment enabled black South Africans to embrace an African identity, while simultaneously joining the world of international business as members of a multinational corporation.

Subsequently, the United States government joined American businesses in reinforcing this notion of American capitalism as helping to eradicate racial inequality at the international and local level through the financing of black empowerment programs. Shortly after becoming president, Nelson Mandela returned to the United States on his first official visit to meet with President Bill Clinton. At a joint press conference, which took place during the visit, on the South Lawn of the White House, the two presidents joined together to announce a $600 million trade and investment package between the two countries. "Americans have always invested, and will invest more, in private capital in South Africa to help that country's economy grow," stated

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[694] Alistair Thomson, "Mandela 'brand' second only to Coca-Cola," *The Namibian,* April 23, 2004, https://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=3181&page=archive-read, Moses and Vest, 247.

Clinton. Reinforcing his assertion that this investment would "help heal the legacies of apartheid," rather than reinforce racial inequality, Clinton further stated that the United States government had established a South Africa Enterprise Development Fund dedicated specifically to "promot[ing] small to medium sized business enterprises throughout the region [as] tangible evidence" of the United States' commitment to support African development in the region.[695]

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[695] William J. Clinton: "The President's News Conference With President Nelson Mandela of South Africa," October 5, 1994. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project,* http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49233.

Conclusion

Leon H. Sullivan died on April 26, 2001, at the age of 78 following a multiple year battle with leukemia. At the time, he lived in Scottsdale, Arizona, where he retired after nearly four decades as head minister at Zion Baptist Church in North Philadelphia. Hundreds of people attended the funeral at First Institutional Baptist Church, which lasted over three hours and heard messages from representatives from President George Bush, Jr., the United Nations, twenty African nations, and multiple corporations.[696] Among those who delivered accolades was Celes King, chair of CORE California and one of the first board members of OIC-Los Angeles, who claimed that Sullivan's "exceptional vision to mobilize black America so everyone would be a productive citizen" set him apart from other black leaders.[697] Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, unable to attend the funeral, issued a statement from Nigeria expressing his "great sadness" and describing Sullivan as someone "known and respected throughout the world for the bold and innovative role he played in the global campaign to dismantle the system of apartheid in South Africa."[698]

"A tremendous source of hope and vitality and moral authority," according to Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sullivan's legacy extended beyond the accolades given by friends and colleagues at his funeral.[699] Many of the black empowerment ventures he helped found continued long after his death, including Opportunities Industrialization Centers, Inc. (OIC), the job-training and black economic development program founded by Sullivan in 1964. At the time of his death, OIC

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[696] F. Finley McRae, "World, U.S. Leaders Eulogize Rev. Leon Sullivan," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, May 3, 2001: A1.
[697] King quoted in F. Finley McRae, "World, U.S. Leaders Eulogize Rev. Leon Sullivan," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, May 3, 2001: A1.
[698] Annan quoted in Kendall Wilson, "Dr. Leon H. Sullivan Built a Legacy," *Philadelphia Tribune*, April 27, 2001: B2.
[699] Jackson quoted in Kendall Wilson, "Dr. Leon H. Sullivan Built a Legacy," *Philadelphia Tribune*, April 27, 2001: B2.

operated in over seventy-five communities and eighteen countries in North America, Africa, Europe, and South America.[700] Following his departure from the Sullivan Principles program in 1987, Sullivan diverted his attention to organizing the Leon H. Summit, a semi-annual event bringing together leaders in government, business, and national and international civic organizations involved in economic and social development work in Africa. Following her father's death, Sullivan's daughter Hope, along with civil rights veteran and former U.N. ambassador and former mayor of Atlanta Andrew Young, launched the Leon H. Sullivan Foundation to continue the work of the summits, which continued on a biennial basis until the organization fell on hard times in 2012.[701]

At the same time, the Sullivan Principles, previously discredited during the height of sanctions and divestment movement, re-emerged in the late 1990s, providing evidence of black empowerment's continued resonance among those involved in multinational corporate governance. In November 1999, at a special meeting of the United Nations, Sullivan and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan unveiled the Global Sullivan Principles. Under fire from protesters, some of whom made their discontent with free trade policies and global business heard at the meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that same month, international business leaders approached Sullivan about reviving the program as a means of providing a transnationally accepted set of business ethics to legitimize global business. Re-writing history, including eschewing the program's issues regarding monitoring and criticism from activists, business leaders touted the original Sullivan Principles as playing a crucial role overcoming Apartheid. Corporate leaders, joined by Sullivan and Annan, then endorsed a similar approach

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[700] Kendall Wilson, "Dr. Leon H. Sullivan Built a Legacy," *Philadelphia Tribune*, April 27, 2001: B2.
[701] Chad Bouchard, "Leon H. Sullivan Foundation: The Implosion of a Legacy," *The Washington Post*, July 25, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/leon-h-sullivan-foundation-the-implosion-of-a-legacy/2013/07/18/fe042654-d9ba-11e2-a9f2-42ee3912ae0e_story.html?utm_term=.81519612f867.

with regards to tackling moral dilemmas facing business in the twenty-first century, including environmental degradation and human rights.[702]

By the 1990s, corporate-community initiatives promoting vocational training managed by non-governmental organizations, black entrepreneurship, and other forms of community economic development had become a mainstay of American society. With little acknowledgement of the connection to earlier black empowerment programs, President Bill Clinton signed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 into law, including authorization for the Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Cities (EZ/EC) Program. One year later, in December 1994, the president announced one-hundred and four empowerment zones and enterprise communities. As an indication of the program's roots in earlier era, the majority of empowerment zones and enterprise communities appeared in what Vice President Albert Gore called the "decaying cores of [the country's] inner-cities."[703]

The connections were even more explicit in the case of South Africa, where black empowerment became a pre-requisite for business transactions involving multinational corporations and the post-Apartheid state. Reporting on a series of mergers and acquisitions involving the transfer of shares from white-owned companies to newly formed trusts owned by black South Africans, the *African News Service* noted a "155-percent growth in black economic empowerment activity in South Africa" between 1998 and 1999. "Black empowerment deals have become so commonplace that they scarcely require a separate genre."[704] One of the most anticipated and widely publicized black economic empowerment deals of the decade involved

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[702] S. Prakash Sethi and Oliver Williams, "Creating and Implementing Global Codes of Conduct: An Assessment of the Sullivan Principles as a Role Model for Developing International Codes of Conduct—Lessons Learned and Unlearned," *Business and Society Review,* Vol. 105, No. 2 (2000): 169-200.

[703] Sarah F. Liebschutz, "Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities: Reinventing Federalism for Distressed Communities," *Publius,* Vol. 25, No. 3, The State of American Federalism, 1994-1995 (Summer, 1995): 117-118.

[704] "Huge Increase in Black Empowerment Deals," *African News Service*, March 30, 1999: 1, Mark Ashurst, "Black Empowerment: New Rush into Business," *Financial Times*, March 24, 1998: 3.

former General Secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and former Secretary

General of the African National Congress (ANC) Cyril Ramaphosa. Narrowly losing the bid to

replace Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa to Thabo Mbeki, Ramaphosa, a self-

declared socialist, Ramaphosa left politics in 1996 to form New Africa Investments Limited,

which was behind several major black economic empowerment deals in the mining,

communications, and tourism industries. A significant portion of the capital for these deals came

from pension funds of labor unions, which Ramaphosa, as the former General Secretary of NUM

was well positioned to influence. A number of these transactions involved Ramaphosa himself

being named to executive and non-executive management positions. By the mid-2000s,

Ramaphosa held management role in no fewer than nineteen investment organizations, including

Vancut Diamond Works, Standard Bank Group, Ltd., and Pan African Resources, PLC.[705] All of

these left Ramaphosa well-situated to make a political comeback in the 2010s, succeeding Jacob

Zuma as South Africa's fifth president in February 2018.

Still, there are many who have raised serious questions with regard to black

empowerment's effectiveness in bringing about social change on a broad scale. Citing qualitative

and quantitative data, these critics highlight the exceptionality of people like Ramaphosa and

Oprah Winfrey, who, in 2007, invested $40 million to launch the Oprah Winfrey Leadership

Academy for Girls in Guateng Province in South Africa.[706] Individual success stories like those

of Ramaphosa and Winfrey notwithstanding, the vast majority of black people remain only

slightly better off financially, while others are worse off, than they were at the end of apartheid.

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[705] "How Cyril Ramaphosa obtained his wealth," *News24,* July 13, 2015
https://www.news24.com/MyNews24/How-Cyril-Ramaphosa-obtained-his-wealth-20150713 (Accessed April 18, 2018).

[706] "Oprah Winfrey, The Tycoon: Contextualizing the Economics of Race, Class, Gender in Black Business History in Post-Civil Rights America" in *Black Business and Economic Power,* edited by Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola, (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2002), 484-525; A. Samuels, "Oprah goes to School," *Newsweek,* January 8, 2007.

Despite contrary claims, white South Africans continue to hold a disproportionate share of wealth two decades after the end of Apartheid. Reports from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) assessing the impact of BEE programs promoting black stockownership in 2013, for example, revealed that black South Africans comprised less than twenty-five percent of all equity ownership on the JSE.[707] Meanwhile, the racial wealth gap in the United States persists with equal, if not, greater intensity. According to a study released by the Institute for Policy Studies, the wealth of the median black household declined by seventy-five percent (from $6,800 to $1,700 between 1983 and 2013 at the same time that the wealth for the median white household increased by fourteen percent (from $102,000 to $116,800).[708] Numerous factors have contributed to the persistence of racial inequality in the United States and Africa. The fact that black empowerment remains a powerful discourse, however, have led critics to question the motives of government and business leaders who continue to tout its success, while giving little consideration to alternatives programs such as government-provided welfare and reparations.[709]

Notwithstanding these criticisms, black empowerment has remained a powerful discourse

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[707] Mohammad Amir Anwar, "White people in South Africa still hold the lion's share of all forms of capital," *The Conversation,* http://theconversation.com/white-people-in-south-africa-still-hold-the-lions-share-of-all-forms-of-capital-75510 (Accessed April 20, 2018).

[708] Dedrick Asante-Muhammad, Chuck Collins, Josh Hoxie, and Emanuel Nieves, "The Road to Zero Wealth: How the Racial Wealth Divide is Hollowing Out America's Middle Class," Institute for Policy Studies (September 2017), https://prosperitynow.org/files/PDFs/road_to_zero_wealth.pdf.

[709] See for example, Stefano Ponte, Simon Roberts, Lance Van Sittert, "'Black Economic Empowerment', Business and the State in South Africa, *Development and Change* [International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, November 15, 2007), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00440.x; Georgina Murray, "Black Empowerment in South Africa: 'Patriotic Capitalism' or a Corporate Black Wash?" *Critical Sociology,* Vol. 26, Issue 3 (2000): 183-204; Sharon M. Collins, "Black Mobility in White Corporations: Up the Corporate Ladder But Out on a Limb," *Social Problems,* Vol. 44, No. 1 (February 1997): 55-67.

well into the twenty-first century. Black empowerment's political utility, as we have seen, stems


Figure 5: The above graph shows the results of a Proquest search for the term "black empowerment" between 1990 and 2014. The highest peak (754 hits) occurred in 2007.

from the way corporate executives, government officials, black entrepreneurs, and others have

used it to appropriate aspects of various movements, including the global Black Power struggle,

African nationalism, and anti-apartheid protests, while forging transnational coalitions in support

of free enterprise and corporate citizenship. In response to activist demands for reparations and

government-provided welfare, black empowerment advocates emphasized those aspects of Black

Power that focused on "community control" and economic development. In doing so, they drew

heavily on paternalist and patriarchal structures developed in the black church. In response to

Black Power's radical vision, black empowerment's proselytizers promoted a pro-capitalist

politics intended to support the reproduction of respectable, patriarchal, Christian black families.

First appearing in the de-industrializing black metropoli of the United States, black

empowerment proved adaptable, appearing in places as far away as Nairobi and Johannesburg.

Building on and re-appropriating earlier Pan-Africanist politics, black entrepreneurs, business

leaders, and politicians deployed black empowerment alongside American commercial

expansion in Africa. Eschewing criticism that decried American corporate and financial power as

neocolonial and racist, black empowerment's advocates touted U.S. support for black entrepreneurship, vocational training, and other kinds of black-led economic development programs on the continent to make the case for the compatibility between American capitalism and Africans' aspirations for political independence and economic development.

No where was the case for black empowerment made more forcefully and more consistently than in the context of the international struggle against South African Apartheid. Here, American business leaders and black American entrepreneurs like Leon Sullivan and Howard Sims forged broad coalitions with other corporate executives, black South African businessmen, university administrators, and, ultimately, African revolutionaries, in favor of pro-business approaches to overcoming Apartheid. These advocates of black empowerment argue that private investment, including corporate social responsibility programs and black business enterprises, rather than strategies that seek to limit business activity, such as sanctions and divestment, provides the best vehicle for advancing Black Power.

Heretofore the history of the global black freedom struggle and the rise of free market politics have appeared as two of the most significant events in post-war American history. Rather than distinct phenomena, "Black Power, Inc." contends that black politics *and* corporate politics developed together. Building on and appropriating aspects of Christian uplift, Black Power, Pan-Africanism, and post-war development economics, American business leaders and black entrepreneurs in the U.S. and Africa articulated their own anti-apartheid politics centered on black empowerment. Far from the province a small group of elites, market politics has had broad appeal as demonstrated by the transnational rise of black empowerment. Black empowerment inspired black people across the diaspora to strive for a freedom undergirded by private capital.

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Curriculum Vitae

Jessica Ann Levy was born on November 2, 1986 in New York, New York. Levy holds a B.A. in History from Emory University and an M.A. in Social Science from The University of Chicago. Before attending Hopkins, she worked at the nation's largest African American video oral history project, *The HistoryMakers,* in Chicago, Illinois. She is the recipient of numerous awards and fellowships, including the Jefferson Scholars/Hagley Library Fellowship in Business and Politics, the German Historical Institute Doctoral Fellowship in International Business History, the Johns Hopkins University Dean's Teaching Fellowship, the George and Sylvia Kagan Fellowship, the Program for the Study of Women, Gender, and Sexuality Summer Research Fellowship, and grants from multiple research libraries. Her writing has appeared in the *Journal of Urban History*, *The Washington Post*, *Black Perspectives,* and *Public Seminar*. She has presented her work in many venues, including the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, the Business History Conference, the Association for the Study of African American Life and History, as well as at the Hagley Library, the German Historical Institute, and the Centre for African Studies at The University of Cape Town. Levy has previously taught courses on the history of modern America, the African diaspora, and race and capitalism in the city. In September 2018, Levy will join the Department of African American Studies at Princeton University as a Postdoctoral Research Associate.