

**SHARED HISTORY, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE DETERMINANTS OF A SOCIALLY
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY COMPARING THE UNITED KINGDOM TO THE UNITED
STATES**

by
Jennifer Stevens Thibodeau

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Abstract

This study seeks to demonstrate how the national histories of the United Kingdom and United States shape modern democratic practices in the areas of; 1) minimum income; 2) healthcare; and 3) higher education. Through the use of five testing methodologies, 1) social; 2) geographic; 3) economics; 4) history; and 5) modern day political structure, the following work attempts to more clearly frame questions surrounding democracy in the present perspective and upon a potentially predictive spectrum.

Seven distinct findings were brought forward through this study; 1) Federalism is fundamental; 2) Unique geographic variables provide specific direct outcomes to both the United Kingdom and the United States' sense of self and ensuing approaches to policy making; 3) A historical mentality of self-sufficiency and perceived ruggedness pervades United States political theory and policy making; 4) Cultural mores surrounding the manners and expectations of citizens to engage with governments directly interplay into the way policy is created, enacted, and regulated in an ongoing manner. Assumed and acted upon relationships matter. The American historical context leads to their citizens having more so; 5) Religiousness and a sense of philanthropic charity does not define nor does it indicate a society will trend towards socialism; 6) From a study of the two most prominent Anglo-Saxon governments. Clearly, inertia is inevitable; 7) The sense of 'Other' influences policy in both nations as much as the tangibility of citizen; 8) Parent to child relationship sharing continues but has morphed to alternate over the centuries; as from the start they are more alike than different.

Advisor: Dr. Kathy Wagner Hill

Oral Defense: Dr. Collin Paschall

Reviewer: Dr. Dorothea Wolfson

Reviewer: Dr. Alexander Rosenthal

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my husband Tommy and his unwavering support always, but especially through the course of my studies. All the airport lounges and airplanes that had strong enough Wi-Fi signal to support EBSCO Host and JSTOR. Altair for perspective on what is actually important. Supernatural and The Vampire Diaries for required escapism. And finally, my family and friends, who knew I could do it when I no longer thought I had it in me. Thank you.

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Introduction

The seminal works, *Democracy in America* by Alexis de Tocqueville and *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution* by Louis Hartz review the foundations of American democracy and liberalism. However, both texts are outdated and incomplete. This study enhances those conversations with a focus on the modern-day impact of social democratic practices in the United States and United Kingdom.

Through the use of primary and secondary sources, and analysis, this study seeks to demonstrate how the national histories of the United Kingdom and United States shape modern democratic practices in the areas of; 1) minimum income; 2) healthcare; and 3) higher education via the use of five testing methodologies; 1) social; 2) geographic; 3) economic; 4) historical; and 5) modern day political structure. The following work attempts to more clearly frame questions surrounding democracy in the present perspective and upon a potentially predictive spectrum.

Eight distinct findings were brought forward through this study; 1) Federalism is fundamental; 2) Unique geographic variables provide specific direct outcomes to both the United Kingdom and the United States' sense of self and ensuing approaches to policy making; 3) A historical mentality of self-sufficiency and perceived ruggedness pervades United States political theory and policy making; 4) Cultural mores surrounding the manners and expectations of citizens to engage with governments directly interplay into the way policy is created, enacted, and regulated in an ongoing manner. Assumed and acted upon relationships matter. The American historical context leads to their citizens having more so; 5) Religiousness and a sense of philanthropic

charity does not define nor does it indicate a society will trend towards socialism; 6) From a study of the two most prominent Anglo-Saxon governments. Clearly, inertia is inevitable; 7) The sense of ‘Other’ influences policy in both nations as much as the tangibility of citizen; 8) Parent to child relationship sharing continues but has morphed to alternate over the centuries; as from the start they are more alike than different.

This study is organized to serve the purpose of adequately outlining existing discussions, findings, and arguments through primary source material¹, secondary analysis, and observations and findings. The main contribution of this paper is an updated review of social democratic practices in the United States and United Kingdom through a subject specific lens. These results are important because many studies look to either discuss social democracy and opine upon its existence, or review outcomes of government and social systems to compare against the performance of policy outcomes (i.e. healthcare) – few do both.

Foundation for Study: Democracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville and The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution by Louis Hartz

In 1835, de Tocqueville stated, in relation to the democratic experiment in the United States, a “single glance suffices to detect its evil consequences, but its good qualities can only be discerned by long observation. The laws of the American democracy are frequently defective and incomplete...but even if they were good, the frequent changes which they undergo would be

¹ De Tocqueville, Katz

an evil...and the weaknesses of a democratic government may very readily be discovered; they are demonstrated by the most flagrant instances, whilst its beneficial influence is less perceptibly exercised.”² As a human observer, Tocqueville did not have the luxury of extended time for observation of the political and social processes in the new country. Yet he noticed one persistent American-ism, “in no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used, or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different objects than in America. Besides the permanent associations, which are established by law under the names of townships, cities, and counties, a vast number of others also formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals.”³ This adherence to associations drives the democratic experience in the United States, then and now, for good or for ill.

Tocqueville’s work also acts as the impetus for this study to directly consider geography as an important spectrum within the conversation surrounding outcomes of a political systems. While industries have grown, land has been repurposed, and population has increased the assertion that “the chief circumstance which has favoured the establishment and the maintenance of a democratic republic in the United States, is the nature of the territory which the Americans inhabit”⁴ remains. The French statesman adequately follows this seemingly benign callout with a unique connection back to the political functioning of the nation. This study looks to do the same with the addition of impact criteria. As Tocqueville takes the notion that “in the United States, not only is legislation democratic, but Nature herself favors the cause of the people.”⁵ Having the benefit of two-hundred years, Hartz, notes the same historical basis for the ‘American

² Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America translated by Henry Reeve*. Vol. 2, Saunders and Otley, 1835. *The Making of the Modern World*. 114.

³ *Ibid*, 31.

⁴ *Ibid*, 206.

⁵ *Ibid*.

democrat' as Tocqueville. Both discuss it "is one who believes in individual liberty, equality, and capitalism [and that this individual is highly endowed with the great] advantage of having arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution; and being born equal, instead of becoming so."⁶ A stark contrast to the paternalistic system to be reviewed within the context of the United Kingdom. The concept of paternalism in a broader sense is vital to the core of the conversation, as the United States uniquely represents a space founded by persons who fled the *anciens regimes* to escape oppressions of the Old World (in this case the United Kingdom), and thus they never had to experience the direct similarity of those oppressions. A perceived lack of a revolutionary genetic has led scholars of Tocqueville and Hartz to notice an indifference to moving the needle towards revolution, they have developed neither an aristocracy nor a revolutionary left.⁷ This lack of revolutionary inclination is reviewed in future detail as this paper discusses the potential adoption of revolutionary socialist measures for the United States, to be borrowed by pre-existing structures in the British context. Along the same theory one can see the potential for more revolutionary trends in the British context specifically with regards to socialism.

It is important to note, neither author finds the United Kingdom to be Europe proper, nor does this study. Thus, conversations often occur in three buckets when discussing the Western democracies; United States, United Kingdom, and Europe. While studies call out that "the United States is distinctive as against Europe, and its distinctiveness derives from the fact that the Mayflower left behind in Europe the experiences of class, revolution, and collectivism out of

⁶ Hartz, Louis, *The Liberal Tradition In America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966. 8

⁷ *Ibid.*

which the European socialist movement arose”⁸ ⁹ this study adds to Hartz that both the United Kingdom and the United States “represent liberal mechanisms of Europe functioning without [all of] the European social antagonisms.”¹⁰

Above many other findings, this study shows that history is important and the relationship between the United States and United Kingdom is a near penultimate in the evaluation and maintenance of a shared history. Tocqueville is clear in the connection between both in that “once the Americans have taken up an idea, whether it be well or ill founded, nothing is more difficult than to eradicate it from their minds. The same tenacity of opinion has been observed in England, where for the last century, greater freedom of conscience and more invincible prejudices have existed than in all the other countries of Europe. I attribute this consequence to a cause, which may at first sight appear to have a very opposite tendency, namely, to the liberty of the press.”¹¹ Going further back, the United States maintains a sense of the idealism that we not only find in modern day British politics but see as well in the “idealist thought in the Anglo-Saxon world¹² but that its political philosophy is in continuity with earlier liberalism.”¹³

While although Americans view the American experience often from 1776, the work of Tocqueville and Hartz reaffirms the pre-revolution works that impacted both the United States

⁸ Louis Hartz, "Reply," in *Failure of a Dream? Essays in the History of American Socialism*, ed. John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset (1974; rev. ed., 1984), 357-361.

⁹ Kloppenberg, James T. "In Retrospect: Louis Hartz's the Liberal Tradition in America." *Reviews in American History*, vol. 29, no. 3, Sept. 2001, p. 460. *EBSCOhost*, doi:10.1353/rah.2001.0047. 463

¹⁰ Hartz, Louis, *The Liberal Tradition In America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966. 16.

¹¹ Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America translated by Henry Reeve*. Vol. 2, Saunders and Otle, 1835. *The Making of the Modern World*. 28-29

¹² See J.H. Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy. Studies in the History of Idealism in England*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1931; and Frank M. TURNER, *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981.

¹³ Sweet, William. *Bosanquet and British Political Thought. Laval théologique et philosophique*, volume 55, numéro 1, February 1999, p. 103

and the United Kingdom. Particularly the outcomes from John Locke in *Two Treatises on Government*. These rights were embodied in documents and actions as tangible as those in Philadelphia, specifically the Act of Settlement (1688) and the Bill of Rights (1689) that established a monarchy constrained by the rights and privileges of Parliament.¹⁴ Thus, this study begins with the United Kingdom and United States to be viewed as equals, until discovered otherwise, on the social democratic spectrum. For both, before this study's evaluation of methodologies and case study outcomes,

*Fundamental was a belief in the right to representation (though not necessarily on a 'one-man, one-vote' basis) and a national government that incorporated the notion of 'balance' between the various branches of government (legislature, executive and judiciary). This fitted well with the concept, derived from the physics of Isaac Newton, that identified a natural equilibrium of forces in the universe. Liberalism similarly identified a number of political laws of nature: a 'balanced' society, the universalism of political laws and the consistency and predictability of human nature. Social harmony and social cohesion could, liberals averred, be achieved if individuals established their fundamentally common interest in holding society together.*¹⁵

¹⁴ Harrison, Kevin, and Tony Boyd. *Understanding political ideas and movements*, (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2018) accessed Aug 8, 2021.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Chapter 1

Literature Review and Tradition: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Paternalism

A litany of social democracies exists on the political stage today. However, this study focuses on the United States and United Kingdom. Neither nation is routinely discussed as having a distinct sense of socialism in their culture, past politics, and present functioning. From a human perspective equity is built into each of the nation's cultural genetics but has responded differently to the pressures of world history and functioning. At present the United Kingdom represents an operational social democracy most closely aligned to the cultural norms of the United States through a shared history, language, and religion along with consistent trade, and communication. For all of these similarities, the United States has also had unique historical epochs, societal norms, economic values, and location considerations, all ultimately concluding by the nature of its uniqueness that the country is unlikely to enter into a political system centered on social democratic principles.

The political systems of liberal democracy and social democracy are difficult to define. The terms transform over time and depend on country of adoption, societal mores of the day, and leadership, as well conceptual implementation. Each system is innately similar, committed to democracy, and adhere to a shared historical background. When studying the voting practices of a liberal democracy and a social democracy, there would be little difference. They each hold the same general functions of separate legislative chambers, a central executive, and belief in basic citizen rights. However, there was a period of history when social democracy sprang from liberal democracy. Thus, one cannot contrast the systems as opposites but variations on a theme.

For the purposes of this discussion the terms represent the truest sense of their idealized definitions which must be viewed in their historical context for present day discussion.

The conversation would seem to focus only on the variants of phrase which are attached to democracy – liberalism and socialism – making the distinctions purely economic. A liberal democracy in the history of classical liberalism focuses on economic freedoms of the type described by Adam Smith and the political mentality of John Locke. Social democracy, still a practice of democracy and functioning within the capitalist system, looks to transform the implementation of democracy through updated economic principles. We must note that time and practice have also transformed the definition of democracy in both systems. The tenants of ‘all citizens are created equal’ is foundational in both systems. However, a social democracy looks to adjust the economic distribution system to embolden citizens to actually be equal. Both systems dually embody sub-branches of democratic socialism and social liberalism, though this discussion will focus on the parental distinction versus the offspring.

Democracy itself is a form of government of direct representation. In addition to adoption of this Athenian principle, liberal democracy recognizes individual rights and freedoms. Principle documents such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man from the time of the French Revolution and the United States Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights, both recognize and embody principles of a liberal democracy. Neither comments heavily upon the specific form of economic functioning. However, with the individual rights each proscribes, comes the freedom of the individual citizen to pursue economic affairs independently, without heavy interference from the government. This outlook is not surprising, as both documents represent a departure from monarchies focused on economic exploitation through taxation. These themes were amended by

John Locke, Thomas Malthus, and Adam Smith during the late 19th century in response to the Industrial Revolution.

Social democracy stems from the same democratic principles as its liberal cousin. The appearance of social democracy in the early 20th century responds to the increasing exploitation, particularly of workers, throughout the century following the Industrial Revolution. As reviewed, the industrial revolution sets the foundation for socialism. Social democracy looks to the failures of capitalist concepts when they are applied without appropriate protections in place for citizens. Thus, social democracy seeks to expand the rights of the liberal democracies while transforming capitalism toward egalitarian outcomes focused on social reform. This brings forward an advanced concept of equality in democracy.

Francois- Marie-Charles Fourier, in France, and Robert Owen, in England, put forward the concept of socialism in the 1820s after failing to identify benefits for the lower classes from the French Revolution. Socialism at its heart is cooperative and collective.¹⁶ This would seem democratic. However, for many the concept of democracy, particularly in the American ethos, has also been identified with equality. When in fact the only equality is at the polls. Even then one may contend that voting (if it ever was) is no longer truly equal, with different forms of voter suppression, economic disenfranchisement, lack of access to appropriate education, and restrictions on transportation.

¹⁶ Dorrien, Gary. "The Birth of Social Democracy." *Commonweal* 146, no. 7 (2019): 19.

It would seem as though socialism would be the key to society. Yet there has been significant pushback to the concept of socialism in its entirety, ultimately manifested into communism. Communism has revealed a system where while everyone may have been ‘equal’, they had no say in that equality nor who dictated its means or results. Thus, the world, specifically Western Europe identified social democracy as the safe middle ground. A central building block in which the government is still controlled and accountable to the people and where the government actively works to engage in collective actions, most often after a tax has been procured from the same populace. For the proponents of social democracy in Europe, these are “societies in which health care and the rights of self-determination are universal for all citizens, elections and higher education are publicly financed, and grotesque levels of inequality are not tolerated.”¹⁷

Of a modern democracy, the enmeshment of democracy and socialism may be best expressed through the collectiveness of the Nordics. However, the United Kingdom represents a middle ground between the Nordic nations’ focus on collective community in government and the United States. In contrast to the depiction of a social democracy, in the “United States, health care depends on what you can afford, millions have no health coverage at all, voter suppression campaigns are routine, electoral politics is dominated by the donor class, students are buried in debt, and until recently, huge disparities in income and wealth were not even a subject of political debate.”¹⁸ The United States, originally sprung from the United Kingdom, has not trended to follow its former parent nation in all things. However, as the United Kingdom has moved towards more socialist aspects of government, will the United States eventually follow suit?

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Conventional wisdom on the topic of social democracy breaks the conversation into one of three main focus areas; economics, politics, or social issues. However, none can be truly separate in practice and the designations are found most often in the context of academic literature. While we will review the three most common realms in which academics discuss social democracy there is a more important goal. When identifying the propensity of the United States to trend towards becoming a social democracy, it is important to comprehend the extent to which the nation would have to reshape its existing sentiments and functioning. For, if one concept cannot be separated from the others, one may surmise it is impossible to have social democracy without distributive economics and without significant shifts in political structure.

The closest conversation to a potential formula to produce social democracy aligns with MacCulloch's work centering on income equality and the overturning of property rights as a cornerstone of market economics through revolution. By showing that people are found to prefer revolt when inequality in their nation is high, he surmises that implementing policies that reduce inequality can satiate those individuals with revolutionary preferences.¹⁹ This assumption crosses multiple boundaries. Most importantly, how one can move from discussing income equality to larger equality. This concept of "one in the same" is a consistent characteristic in those studies which focus on economics by identifying the market designation as the key factor which aligns all others. Economic equality with enormous social issues is one such example. The United States and United Kingdom are both capitalist economies wherein one operates as a liberal democracy while the other a social democracy. This formula aligns to Dorrien's assertion that "democratic socialism is a demand for economic democracy, extending the principles and

¹⁹ MacCulloch, Robert. "Income Inequality and the Taste for Revolution." *The Journal of Law & Economics* 48, no. 1 (2005): 93-123.

values of democracy into the economic realm.”²⁰ While Dorrien touches upon social and political concepts stating that “socialism was about organizing society as a cooperative community”²¹ the goal and focus of his study was entirely economic. In most conversations concentrated on an economic sense of social democracy there is a discussion of social democracy or market liberalism, with no middle way presented for contemplation. Offer contends that “both social democracy and market liberalism are currently in crisis.”²² He does so through a discussion of financial instability brought upon by the lateral transfer of financial assets through progressive taxation in the social democratic system and transfers of financial entitlement over time in market liberalism.²³ Lukes and Itoh follow with a comparison more in-depth than a review of social democracy and market capitalism. Both take the conversation to a level deeper. Lukes does this by looking towards earlier work by Tomasi.²⁴ These comparisons look to confirm Tomasi’s findings centered on the contrast between Manichean choice, Rawls work on regime types, and Hayekian beliefs on social democracies eventually leading to inevitable societal return to serfdom.²⁵ The notions of these comparisons begin to discuss a more social concept, one of fairness, however they still remain in the vein of economic predominance.²⁶ Similarly to Lukes, Itoh compares social democracy in the debate of socialism to market liberalism, in the form of neoliberalism, allowing for the beginning of a more political conversation where “we have to rethink anew notions of communism, socialism, anti-capitalism, anarchism, social democracy, and Keynesianism against neoliberalism.”²⁷ In all of this

²⁰ Dorrien, Gary. "The Birth of Social Democracy." *Commonweal* 146, no. 7 (2019): 19.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Offer, Avner. "The Market Turn: From Social Democracy to Market Liberalism." *Economic History Review* 70, no. 4 (2017): 1051.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Tomasi, John. *Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001.; Tomasi, John and ProQuest. *Free Market Fairness*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Lukes, Steven. "Social Democracy and Economic Liberty." *Res Publica* (13564765) 21, no. 4 (2015): 429.

²⁷ Itō, Makoto. *The Basic Theory of Capitalism: The Forms and Substance of the Capitalist Economy*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1988. 455

conventional wisdom there is either a direct statement or overt sense that economics drives the political and ultimately the social space of a nation.

We can begin to truly straddle the conversation between a purely economic or purely political outlook with the studies championed by Soifer²⁸ who relies heavily on the past work of Boix.²⁹ Specifically, looking at the “conventional wisdom in comparative politics claims that the origins of democracy and dictatorship are fundamentally economic.”³⁰ Supporting Boix’s assertion that “weak state contexts, the origins of democracy and dictatorship are not fundamentally economic...the effects of inequality on regime outcomes are contingent on the strength of state” Soifer goes a step further by ultimately concluding “that while “economic origins” theories are supported where the state is strong...[economic] inequality has no effect on regime outcomes.”³¹ Thus concluding that “elite support for an authoritarian solution (and mass commitment to democracy) should decline with state weakness just as Boix shows that it declines with asset mobility.”³²

The distinctions made by Soifer and Boix are valuable to break the silos of economic, political, and social factors which lead a state to social democracy. The concept cannot be ascribed to a purely economic catalyst or underlying sentiment. However, economics certainly plays a prominent role in the establishment of social democracy as a result of distributive properties.

This speaks to the conundrum of two democratic states, the United Kingdom and United States,

²⁸ Soifer, Hillel. "State Power and the Economic Origins of Democracy." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 48, no. 1 (2013).

²⁹ Boix, Carles. *Political Order and Inequality: Their Foundations and their Consequences for Human Welfare*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

³⁰ Soifer, Hillel. 2.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

both described as democracies, with similar economic structures, and yet divergent social systems.

The conversations based in political and social thought on the concepts of social democracy do tend to be slightly less siloed (with social democracy being the most so) than the economic focused discussions. Soifer and Boix make this connection with their work on the long-standing conventional wisdom between democracy and economic inequality and the expectation of economic elites that democratization will lead to economic redistribution.³³ Finding that even with an economic concern and outcome it is “state capacity [that] is necessary for redistribution, and...state capacity acts as a scope condition for the effect of inequality on regime outcomes.”³⁴

Using state capacity as their focus both determine that “theories of regime change call into question general claims about the “economic origins” of dictatorship and democracy.”³⁵³⁶

Sabry³⁷, Kamen³⁸, Scholz-Wäckerle³⁹ and Welsh⁴⁰ delve deeper into this methodology. Sabry investigates both the “socioeconomic and institutional [state] factors responsible for different societies’ ideological choices, with reference to Marxist socialism.”⁴¹ Here one sees the literature adjusting away from communism and creating a more inclusive and less jarring discussion by focusing on Marxist socialism. Sabry’s work is ultimately critical in his discussion

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Boix, Carles. *Political Order and Inequality : Their Foundations and their Consequences for Human Welfare*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

³⁶ Soifer, Hillel. 1

³⁷ Sabry, Mohamed Ismail. "Between Social Democracy and Communism: An Institutional and Socioeconomic Perspective." *International Journal of Sociology & Social Policy* 38, no. 9 (2018): 698.

³⁸ Kamen, Scott. "Rethinking Postwar Liberalism: The Americans for Democratic Action, Social Democracy, and the Struggle for Racial Equality." *The Sixties* 11, no. 1 (2018): 69-92

³⁹ Scholz-Wäckerle, Manuel. "Democracy Evolving: A Diversity of Institutional Contradictions Transforming Political Economy." *Journal of Economic Issues (Taylor & Francis Ltd)* 50, no. 4 (2016): 1003.

⁴⁰ Welsh, John. "Authoritarian Governmentality through the Global City: Contradictions in the Political Ecology of Historical Capitalism." *Contemporary Politics* 23, no. 4 (2017): 446-468.

⁴¹ Sabry, Mohamed Ismail.

on viability of social democracy in the United States as one examines the ideas of Marxism and lack of adoption in the United States due to political, social, regional, cultural, and economic factors. He “suggests that welfarism, public spending on education, social inclusion and democratization [as] remedies for radicalism, regardless of the ideological origins of such radicalism”⁴² Sabry sets the tone for a look at current practices in the United States. This follows along with a conversation of what is considered radical in each of our regional focus areas. Radicalism because of its unique definition in different structures may be a difficult point to focus on and Sabry provides a much clearer statement with which one can adequately work by stating that “inequality seemed also to have been a strong significant factor for raising the popularity of various socialist parties, especially when countries were long-established or created.”⁴³

In the United States, Marxism was identified early on as radical in contrast to the capitalist success experienced by the nation at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Following the Second World War, during which the United States collaborated with the preeminent communist nation, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there was a “postwar liberalism by the limitations placed upon it by a rigid anticommunist framework and an abandonment of the social democratic currents.”⁴⁴ The capitalist success of the United States and fear of a strong foreign power with a separate modicum of functioning during a time of expanded focus on land and resource acquisition permeated into the economic and cultural foundations of the nation. This foundation was preexisting in the liberalism of the founding fathers in which researchers such as

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Kamen, Scott. "Rethinking Postwar Liberalism: The Americans for Democratic Action, Social Democracy, and the Struggle for Racial Equality." *The Sixties* 11, no. 1 (2018): 69-92

Kamen found a social connection in the rejection of Marxist ideology at the political level. Emphasizing the “New Deal left it [the United States] with little more to stand on than a commitment to the piecemeal reforms of the Fair Deal and the enshrinement of civil and voting rights into law.”⁴⁵

Here one begins to see the gradient scales of democracy. The United States, vehemently opposed to Marxism and Communism, ultimately began to adopt socialist principles in the context of citizen rights and protections. In addition, as Kamen alludes to in his work, the stock market crash of 1929 and Great Depression that followed are uniquely catastrophic events which pushed the United States to implement socialist economic processes supported by the political institutions through the New Deal. One must take the time to consider if this application of essentially Marxist ideals in the economic space allowed for growth of a socialist conscious in other aspects of the nation, such as the Fair Deal. And if so, what is the spectrum of acceptance and rejection? Where does that spectrum align with liberal democracy and social democracy? Can one be present solely without the other or are they percentages with the largest majority determining the whole?

The case of the United Kingdom and the socialist leanings that we see in the United States today there is a major dialogue regarding a sliding scale of not only democracy but within the democratic experience itself. Scholz-Wäckerle looks at this by identifying “democracy as an evolving socio-historical process of autonomy, participative governance, social learning, and institutionalization” and in his own manner focuses on the innate “institutional

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

contradictions...ranging from protective versus developmental democracy, socialist versus capitalist democracy, transcendental versus comparative institutionalism, and utilitarian versus pragmatist democracy” ultimately confirming that...these contradictions “are inherent in the agonistic nature of democracy [and it is the]...dynamic aspects of democracy that enable and enhance social emancipation and transformation.”⁴⁶

Thus, we return to Soifer, who identifies each of these categories - the economic, political, and social - to segue from the conventional wisdom and past literature from a purely economic and political stance to one that somewhat adequately combines economic and political attributes of social democracy. Unfortunately, while he does allude to the concept, Soifer’s conversation still lacks an in-depth look at the social aspects leading one to ascertain that it may be a the three buckets are not necessary for social democracy and instead one must be focused on the more black and white discussion of potential for democracy versus authoritarian modicums of government.⁴⁷ Soifer’s statistical analysis supports his claim that “the relationship between inequality and democracy is conditional on the strength of the state: where the state is strong, inequality shapes the emergence and stability of democratic and authoritarian regimes in ways consonant with our theories”⁴⁸. This analysis however lacks a more comprehensive alignment to the reality of political systems which do not uniquely conform to democratic or authoritarian. The United States is undoubtedly a democracy, however, as a liberal democracy and accounting for the unique structure of the populace and institutional structure there exist aspects of governmental functioning that would most likely be considered authoritarian by the standards of

⁴⁶ Scholz-Wäckerle, Manuel, 1003.

⁴⁷ Soifer, Hillel

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

a more socially democratic nation. For example, the Patriot Act in a more socially democratic nation may be considered to be a complete overreach and undemocratic. However, does that make the United States less of a democracy or simply more of a liberal democracy?

Aside from the New Deal, we have most often seen signs of social democratic adoption in the United States represented in the social changes of national culture. Looking to these concepts in the larger scheme of comprehension is important. Reuss clarifies this divide between the social, political, and economic citing mid-20th leaders from the “social democratic, reformist left [who] envisioned a future “Social Europe.”” While the United States had yet to enact the Civil Rights Act, the 1961 European Social Charter adopted by the Council of Europe “promulgated a broad vision of including objectives like full employment, reduction of work hours, protection of workers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively, rights to social security and medical assistance, protection of the rights of migrants, and so on.”⁴⁹ Although the Council of Europe is not a legislative body, it does have the ability to enforce certain internal laws. More importantly, to the conversation point of social democracy as a national genetic identifier, no country has ever joined the European Union without first belonging to the Council of Europe. Therefore, the European Union carries the vital attributes of the Council of Europe, such as the European Court of Human Rights, which enforces the European Convention on Human Rights, into its political functioning.

In contrast, the United States relies upon the Constitution and Bill of Rights which apply only to United States citizens and those on United States soil. Far from being a consistent guidepost, the

⁴⁹ Reuss, Alejandro. "European Social Democracy and the Roots of the Eurozone Crisis." *Dollars & Sense* no. 327 (2016): 18.

United States Constitution has the trappings of a minimally edited three-hundred-year-old document, which was purposefully drafted to create conversation, debate, and conflict. There is enough internal difficulty in deciding various applications of the Constitution before even agreeing to all appropriate international doctrines. Tomasi defends “the proposed constitutional protection of ‘thick,’ market-based economic liberties, as favoring both individual self-authorship and fair equality of opportunity” in contrast to Rawls’ “social justice demands.”⁵⁰⁵¹ This comes up to the conversation of the “ever-expanding reach of the market across all social life” that counters Tomasi’s claims “of market fairness is neutral with respect to ways of life and that it specifies conditions under which individuals can live lives that are truly their own.”⁵³ In contrast, the European Social Charter and European Convention on Human Rights were drafted in response to the human rights abuses of the Second World War, something the United States did not directly experience. Nor has the United States experienced a war on its domestic soil in the past century. American experiences are different as is the nation’s historical and cultural past. In European understanding of democracy and in the United States, there appears an innate connection to socialism and the “principles, which are the corner-stones of democracy, that authority, to justify its title, must rest on consent; that power is tolerable only so far as it is accountable to the public; and that differences of character and capacity between human beings, however important on their own plane, are of minor significance compared with the capital fact of their common humanity.”⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. Rev ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. and Rawls, John. *Political Liberalism*. Columbia Classics in Philosophy. Expand ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.

⁵¹ Lukes, Steven. "Social Democracy and Economic Liberty." *Res Publica (13564765)* 21, no. 4 (2015): 429.

⁵² Tomasi, John. *Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001.; Tomasi, John and ProQuest. *Free Market Fairness*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

⁵³ Lukes, Steven. "Social Democracy and Economic Liberty." *Res Publica (13564765)* 21, no. 4 (2015): 429.

⁵⁴ Beech, Matt. "A Social Democratic Narrative of British Democracy." *Policy Studies* 33, no. 2 (2012): 133.

See: Tawney 1964, p. 197 in

Thus, this study seeks to demonstrate how the national histories of the United Kingdom and United States shape modern social democratic practices in the areas of; 1) minimum income; 2) healthcare; and 3) higher education. Through the use of five testing methodologies, 1) social; 2) geographic; 3) economics; 4) history; and 5) modern day political structure, the following work attempts to more clearly frame questions surrounding democracy in the present perspective and upon a potentially predictive spectrum

Chapter 2

Methodology

History and Heritage

Seminal events in a nation's history and length of history are cornerstones to understanding of a nation's modern day democracy and history is the penultimate perspective to look forward at both the present democratic functioning and predictive indicator of future opportunities in the society. Items such as whether or not a country was formerly a monarchy or tribal leadership based, noting if a nation was perpetually at war or in significant strife fiscally are key indicators of what's to come and why we can expect those outcomes. Additionally, observing the modern-day populations through a lens of immigration and noting if the country has the same makeup that it did when it became a democracy, looking to see how and why the nation became democratic in the first place, judging whether or not the nation moved through an upheaval or more of a steady progress over time, and ultimately concluding the historical flow of time for the state and commitment to that historical pace.

In many ways America, following the Revolution against Great Britain, simply adapted and expanded upon existing democratic principles found in their former oppressor's governmental system. The balance of the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate no doubt mirrors the House of Commons and House of Lords. Accountability in the American context flows from the Magna Carta era, specifically related to land ownership and individual rights. Even though these rights were granted far wider, their ideas were not new. Therefore, on the surface it may seem surprising that the United States has not followed suit towards social democracy. Ultimately "social democracy, is based on a different balance of values, on the role of different actors, and on the extension of liberal principles to different sites of struggle."⁵⁵ While recently social democratic topics have been popular news and Congressional fodder, the United States has not and is unlikely to bring the principles of social democracy into the fold of American government. Ultimately, liberal Democracy is a uniquely American institution and is not endangered, but has proven to be susceptible to changes towards more socialist ideologies after significant political and populist pressure.

When President Adams left the White House in 1801 to cede power to President Jefferson, it was the first time "in history that a head of state, defeated in a popular election, had peacefully ceded power to his opponent according to a constitutional document"⁵⁶ - this precedent for uniqueness is reiterated throughout history. Famously Alexis de Tocqueville used the word exceptional when discussing the manner, customs, and functioning of the United States. While he did so in comparison to his Euro-centric view, he was proven to be correct, particularly in that "still largely autocratic and aristocratic Europe would evolve toward America's democratic system,

⁵⁵ Ewing, K. D. "Jeremy Corbyn and the Law of Democracy." *King's Law Journal* 28, no. 2 (2017): 343-344.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

not the other way around.”⁵⁷ Similarly, to the distinctiveness of 1801, in “1864, the United States became the first nation ever to hold a national election in the middle of a great war, because that was what the Constitution called for. One hundred and fifty-four years later, it remains the only nation to have done so.”⁵⁸ This sense of exceptionalism was reiterated by Joseph Stalin who is credited with the first use of the phrase “American exceptionalism”. An important point to note, in the 1920s this exceptionalism was seen as a negative in the eyes of Stalin and a benefit in the eyes of American communists. A disconnect continuing to occur today, the American opinion of self at times differs radically and most often trends too positively around self when compared to peers’ and especially competitors’ conceptions.⁵⁹

While it could be assumed England and the United States would share a heritage, to a large extent this is not the case. During the time of the colonies England could not be bothered with the United States save for trade and tax revenue. An oft misremembered fact is those who left Britain to come to the colonies were in fact in an active search to devoid some, if not all, of their British history and heritage. One history that was kept, innate in its sense of self, was the ancient right set forth in complement to Western thought that the rights of the individual were important, partially because of their creation in the image of God. However, the British had long ago taken that one step further and one must see this as the base for the United States thought. In this “individuals, the English came to believe, were born with rights that no one, not even kings, could take away—for the king, like his subjects, was bound by the law.”⁶⁰ This sense of common allegiance to a set of political principles acted as the base for the American Revolution and furthered individual rights. In much the same way the English Bill of Rights (1689) included

⁵⁷ Gordon, John Steele. "What Makes America Exceptional." *Commentary* 147, no. 3 (2019): 13.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

all provisions but one focusing on the limitations of the power of the king and increased adherence to the importance and the viability of the Parliament, the American Bill of Rights followed suit by protecting the rights of individuals and limit the powers of the state in all but one provision.⁶¹

As a young nation with an approach focused on legalism and romantic idealism America has a propensity for immaturity.⁶² Historically in foreign affairs-the American penchant for absolutes, black-and-white judgments has led to a sense of how things “ought to be” versus the realities of the situation. While this may indicate a natural predilection for perfection and exemplary behavior the United States has disturbed the balanced its claims to maintain on numerous occasions. The nation’s only war, a war of ownership, was the Civil War and that did little to disrupt the rest of the world, save global trade and concern of political consistency. When the United States has entered other wars, the emphasis has been in savior mentality to prevent one single power (Asian or European) and “these steps are always described in idealistic terms (“saving the world for democracy”, etc.)”⁶³ There was a period of attempt to expand, in some early instances successfully; the acquisition of Louisiana, the Monroe Doctrine, the “Manifest Destiny” idea, the Spanish-American war and the acquisition of the Panama Canal, and the Philippines. Ultimately, America was ‘late to the game’ particularly compared to its mother nation. While one sees significant physical presence over the years in other territories, the

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Rousek, (J S.). "The Development of Political Geography and Geopolitics in the United States." *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 3, no. 2 (1958): 204.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

United States appears to be retreating to a time of a reestablishment of a worldwide system of alliances and aid agreements versus direct presence.⁶⁴

There is exceptionalism in the American ethos, real and imagined. Thoughts of blind supremacy in the past and today may have been and continue to be misplaced. Still, at its founding, “nobody had ever tried republicanism, democracy, liberalism, and constitutionalism at the same time”⁶⁵ and in that the nation remains exceptional. To think of the American experiment and the American Revolution not so much as a shift from monarchy to democracy but a shift from “any European-style notion of concentrated political sovereignty...America perpetuated a fusion of functions and a division of power, while Europe developed a differentiation of functions and a centralization of power.”⁶⁶

A base comparison, “America at its founding was republican, in the sense of having no king; democratic, in the sense of grounding all political power ultimately in the consent of the people; liberal, in the sense of protecting the individual, natural-law rights of the people; and constitutional, in the sense that political powers and rights were set down in a written instrument binding on the state.”⁶⁷ While the British embodies the sense of individual rights, it was not until the British Great Reform Act of 1832, when the House of Commons began to be a representative institution with districts of vaguely similar proportions. The House of Lords maintained

⁶⁴ See: recent departure from Afghanistan and the post-World War II behavior which also led to “Pactomania”; in 1955 the United States was committed to defend no less than 47 nations on five continents.)

⁶⁵ McLaughlin, Dan. "The Exceptional First American Century." *National Review* 72, no. 13 (2020): 16.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

significant political power into the early 20th century and “Britain maintained property qualifications until 1867 that prevented five out of six adult males from voting.”⁶⁸

Similar to the sense of American exceptionalism there remain deeply embedded imperial attitudes within Britain.⁶⁹ Unlike the United States, exceptional on its founding, Britain finds itself exceptional upon its past actions.⁷⁰ The sense of identity forged at the height of the British Empire is a romantic pinnacle in the same manner of American romantic liberalism.⁷¹

Understandably the British Empire is fresh in the minds of Britons and the global politic. It was less than a century ago that the Empire was at its territorial peak. Interestingly enough the Empire, maintained by a system of imperial preferences in trade that created a free-trade agreement between the United Kingdom, its colonies, and other commonwealth nations⁷² was in large part economically dismantled by the United States. In return for United States assistance during World War II Britain was forced to abolish imperial preference in trade. This led to a post-War Empire that no longer possessed a preferential network of partners through which it could exercise sufficient political, cultural, and economic pressure to keep independence and separatist movements at bay.⁷³

With regards to findings, in both nations one sees a deep-rooted sense of sovereign pride. In the United States there is a stronger sense of the exceptionalism in the individual and subsequent rights provided and earned in Britain there is a tenor and a sense of something lost. America

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ It is not incorrect in this instance to think of imperialism as exceptionalism.

⁷⁰ Being mindful this does not indicate all past actions, particularly those abhorrent in nature were exceptional. Simply the nation displayed exceptional qualities in the geopolitical sense discussed here.

⁷¹ Murphy, Joshua. *Populism and British Stories of Decline*. Vol. 78 2019.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*

shows to have a misguided sense of something won and is less inclined to find other ways of doing things even if they may be shown or proven to better the citizen or society. An increased discussion on the centralized versus decentralized nature provides radical indications for case studies.

Modern Day Political Structure

For our case studies it is important to understand the context of present policy creation specifically the evaluation of where on the democratic spectrum a nation may land. The present structure of government (Parliamentary etc.) and the manner votes are held in the country (direct, referendum, percentage etc.) along with party structures and societal response to government.

Debates over democratization—its causes and consequences, its successes and failures—are some of the most longstanding and significant debates in political science. Income, geography industrialization, and revolution are all factors that influence whether or not a nation adopts free and fair elections and representative institutions. Given the crisis of liberal democracy today, whereby democratic publics are losing faith in parties and politicians, it is obvious that voting rights alone are not enough to sustain democracy. Given that universal suffrage among white males was granted in each state during periods of significant social and economic change, including the industrial revolution, the colonization of new territories, and the expansion of global trade routes, it follows that many explanations of early democratization focus on class or revolutionary threat. In Britain, the 1832 reform act changed the property requirement to vote

and also reallocated seats from rural to urban areas. The act enfranchised hundreds of thousands of middle-class voters, but was not a universal franchise by any means.⁷⁴

For the framers of the U.S. Constitution, few issues were more important than that of federalism and the US Constitutional Convention immediately began with differing views over the powers to be delegated to the new central government. The antifederalists, the advocates for states' rights, toted that the new constitution was nothing but an excuse of a new monarchy. Ultimately, the Constitution, “provides support for each view, leaving to each political generation the task of engaging in an ongoing federalism debate: national powers are listed and limited (with powers not explicitly mentioned being reserved to the states), but national law is supreme and federal lawmakers are entitled to enact rules "necessary and proper" to the carrying out of the listed tasks.”⁷⁵ Soon after the convention the United States entered an era of dual federalism, in which federal and state officials operated relatively autonomously, with federal officials “primarily concerned with westward expansion, foreign relations, and national defense, and state policy makers focused on economic development, education, and infrastructure.”⁷⁶

While today the United States is a highly pluralistic society, whose citizens embrace a countless variety of class, religious, gender, sexual, regional, urban, rural, and other identities. The nation has seen no major new political party has since 1854.⁷⁷ Despite widespread and growing dissatisfaction with the existing parties, contemporary third parties continue to fare poorly, as do independents, even though more citizens identify as independent than as either Democrat or

⁷⁴ Kuo, Didi. "Democratization and the Franchise." *Comparative Politics* 52, no. 3 (2020): 515.

⁷⁵ Sparer, Michael S., George France, and Chelsea Clinton. *Inching Toward Incrementalism: Federalism, Devolution, and Health Policy in the United States and the United Kingdom*. Vol. 36 2011.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ When antislavery Whigs split off and formed the Republican Party.

Republican.⁷⁸ Increasingly, conservatives and liberals in the United States are isolated socially from one another, acquire their news within separate media spheres, and are prone to vote based on negative partisanship. Even though more citizens identify as independent than as either Democrat or Republican, this polarization corresponds with a consistent decline in party identification among American voters since the late 1930s.⁷⁹ Ultimately the politics industry remains the same as it did during the Constitutional Convention and “is driven by the same five forces that shape competition in any industry: the nature and intensity of rivalry, the power of buyers, the power of suppliers, the threat of new entrants, and the pressure from substitutes that compete in new ways.”⁸⁰

The “Founding Fathers were so obsessed with frustrating the tyranny of concentrated sovereignty that they - comfortable men of the propertied classes that they were - would probably have been willing to sacrifice the gains that the less privileged could make from a European-style state. To the present day, most Americans probably still agree. And that is why grievous problems of racism and poverty will likely remain festering dilemmas of American social provision for many years to come.”⁸¹ So, while widespread distribution of economic and social benefits in the 1800s, including Civil War pensions, the 1900s saw an “unevenly bureaucratized and democratized federal state discouraged class politics and placed severe limits on comprehensive provision for the poor and unemployed.”⁸² The American experiment remains ambivalent to concentrated political authority, in fact it simply has not been tried, save the Civil War.⁸³

⁷⁸ Gehl, Katherine M. and Michael E. Porter. "Fixing U.S. Politics." *Harvard Business Review* 98, no. 4 (Jul, 2020): 114-125.

⁷⁹ "The United States as a Plural Society: Towards a Consociational Solution?" *Swiss Political Science Review* 25, no. 4 (2019b): 476.

⁸⁰ Gehl, Katherine M. and Michael E. Porter. "Fixing U.S. Politics." *Harvard Business Review* 98, no. 4 (Jul, 2020): 114-125.

⁸¹ Skocpol, Theda. "A Society without a 'State' ? Political Organization, Social Conflict, and Welfare Provision in the United States." *Journal of Public Policy* 7, no. 4 (1987):

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*

In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution. Law comes from new acts of Parliament and informally through the acceptable judicial precedents. Although Parliament has the theoretical power to make or repeal any law tradition restrains arbitrary actions. (An interesting note, the United States simply does not trust 'tradition' to adequately restrain government action.) Executive power is figure headed in monarchy but in reality, is exercised by a committee among the members of the House of Commons and, to a lesser extent, the House of Lords.⁸⁴ Unlike in continental European countries, in the United Kingdom there is no difference between ordinary statutes and constitutional laws. Parliament can make constitutional reform simply by approving an ordinary law. At one time the government had intended to create elected regional assemblies in England that would have limited legislative powers. This proposal was resoundingly defeated in a popular referendum, the idea was aside, and currently there is no intention to reopen the question.

In the United Kingdom the concept of providing services as a staple of government functions lays squarely with Democrats. In fact, between the different democratic sects, the opinion of a welfare state changes. For example, the British Labour Party represents the Fabian desire for a capitalist society with socialist societal principles. In fact, The Fabian Society played no small part in the creation of the British Labour Party at the start of the 20th century. Still in existence, The Fabian Society epitomizes the desire for socialism within the existing democratic government.⁸⁵ However, to create such a united space would mean revolution - in this instance a continent-wide revolution. The Labour Party was able to stem this tide of revolution and the sense of individuals such as the working class as unable to confront capitalism through national

⁸⁴ *Background Note: United Kingdom*: Superintendent of Documents, 2006a.

⁸⁵ Reuss, Alejandro. "European Social Democracy and the Roots of the Eurozone Crisis." *Dollars & Sense* no. 327 (2016): 18.

political action.⁸⁶ Fabianism provided those who revered the British system of government with an opportunity to posture without losing everything.

Externally, or maybe one should say internally, ‘notion of the English as a people who do not require institutional and political recognition because of their deep affiliation with British institutions and patriotism’.⁸⁷ British identity may be weakening but it appears to show an underlying resilience. North Ireland, Scotland, and Wales represent unique spaces in the idea of formal devolution. A House of Commons committee recently declared that the "central purpose of devolution was to bring government closer to the people than had previously been the case under the centralized UK state" (House of Commons 2009). Legislation was approved by the U.K. Parliament in 1998, devolving power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland and creating elected assemblies for these countries. Under devolution, the national or United Kingdom government retains authority over constitutional matters, foreign policy, defense, and relations with the EU, macroeconomic policy and taxation, overseas trade, employment legislation, social security, and broadcasting.

The story of Brexit is in many ways uniquely English and yet touches upon significant American sensibilities. Exemplified in the 1978–1979 “Winter of Discontent,” after recently joining the European Economic Community. Surviving feelings of imperialist glory were pervasive in the United Kingdom, and the ensuing election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party in the 1979 general election stoked nationalist fires. Thatcher focused on her personal crusade:

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Clifford, Ben and Janice Morphet. "Afterword: The Scottish Referendum, the English Question and the Changing Constitutional Geography of the United Kingdom." *Geographical Journal* 181, no. 1 (2015): 57-60.

resistance to European integration. As Thatcher's premiership continued, the meaning of one-nation conservatism quickly morphed from being a single policy for all four "home nations" to a Conservative policy for England alone.⁸⁸ That drive was spearheaded again by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), founded in 1993. England remained the only "home nation" without a legislative body of its own. With many people already struggling against a globalized economy in which they could not compete BREXIT gave them something to be for.⁸⁹ The United Kingdom today needs a goal other than reactionary forms of nationalism that could serve as a symbol of unity. Reviving the Empire is not an option, but the simple idea of preserving the nation might serve as a rallying point.⁹⁰

Instead of a revived Empire, England has seen significant devolution which has manifested such that English national leaders make detailed policy for England while setting (or potentially setting) policy directives, goals, priorities, standards, and rules with United Kingdom. So far, the House of Commons, the House Health Select Committee, and the Department of Health have all been "Anglocentric". The end result is that, while the goals are broadly similar throughout the entire U.K. territory, policies differ between England and the devolved countries.⁹¹ Thus for the purposes of discussing the following case studies we will do so primarily in an English sense and when a nation other than England is being discussed it will be noted.

In findings, the modern-day political structures of the United Kingdom and United States are the same in that they are representatively democracy, allow for voter representation in the law-

⁸⁸ Murphy, Joshua. *Populism and British Stories of Decline*. Vol. 78 2019.

⁸⁹ Murphy, Joshua. *Populism and British Stories of Decline*. Vol. 78 2019.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Sparer, Michael S., George France, and Chelsea Clinton. *Inching Toward Incrementalism: Federalism, Devolution, and Health Policy in the United States and the United Kingdom*. Vol. 36 2011.

making process through universal suffrage, and both countries have a deep sense of ‘other’ – seen in the United States and Trump votes and BREXIT in the British context. Historically, both political systems have created cultures of those left behind by others who have become more successful leading to discontent against more successful individuals.

Social

A distinct focus on the presence of specific cultural mores and the diversity that may share and/or shape those factors leading to social scale policy creation. Within the assessment one will also look to shared language, ethnic background, the presence of cultural standards as applied to modern day living, and diversity. Additionally, how hard is it to ‘break into society’ by the examination of items such as expected standards and preconceived prejudices.

Let’s begin with religion. It is “perhaps because “so many of the early immigrants to the American colonies—the Puritans of New England, the Quakers of Pennsylvania, the Catholics of Maryland, the Huguenots of many colonies—came here in order to worship God in their own ways, this country has always been exceptionally religious.”⁹² External to the United States borders from its founding to the origins and application of Manifest Destiny to the War on Terror, religion has shaped collective American understandings of other states.⁹³ As one looks today, conservative beliefs today are modestly correlated with historical religiosity. While historical religious patterns may be responsible for the geographic diversity of views that we see

⁹² Gordon, John Steele. "What Makes America Exceptional." *Commentary* 147, no. 3 (2019): 13.

⁹³ Scanlon, Sandra. "Determining Cause and Effect: Religion in the Study of United States Foreign Relations." *Journal of American Studies* 51, no. 1 (2017): 226.

today, correlations are weaker than one might expect.⁹⁴ Even in the present decline of formal religious affiliation, the United States is exceptionally religious.

Religion has clearly played a distinctive, pivotal role in defining the character of the United States of America; such is true in relation to culture, politics, institutions, national identity, and social relations, and indeed with regard to Americans' relations with the outside world.⁹⁵

Socially, America is a country with remarkable geographic diversity in its habits and beliefs. The nation was originally founded by those seeking freedom of religious worship. However, as many other nations have become truly secular (and one should not think the United States has not moved towards secularization at all) yet, the nation reeks religiosity. At present citizens who go to church only a few times a year vote Republican only 43 percent of the time, but individuals who go to church once per week vote Republican 75 percent of the time.⁹⁶ American parties themselves organize around these cleavages for numerous reasons, ultimately, though these social organizations allow politicians to send targeted messages.⁹⁷ Additionally, political parties can use religious to send targeted messages, emotional charged citizens and get them into the voting booth.⁹⁸

This religiousness is tangibly decreasing as well. At present churches close across the country at a rate of 100-200 per week due to lack of attendance and a recent Gallup poll finds that the percentage of Americans reporting they belong to a church, synagogue, or mosque is at an all-

⁹⁴ Glaeser, Edward L. and Bryce A. Ward. "Myths and Realities of American Political Geography." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20, no. 2 (2006): A119-A2.

⁹⁵ Scanlon, Sandra.

⁹⁶ Glaeser, Edward L.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

time low at 50 percent in 2018.⁹⁹ Some researchers have conflated a loss in the sense of religious duty with a loss in the sense of civic duty as the closure of churches and rate of religiousness occurs at the same time 90% of older Americans say “voting is essential to citizenship,” only 56 percent of those in their 20s agree, according to 2018 Pew Research.¹⁰⁰ This correlation is one most likely found by the simplicity of declining numbers on either side and in fact is related to factors outside the scope of solely religiosity.

The social extent of the nation is not solely religious. However, social nuances are found often to cleave alongside regional lines. For instance, the nation has a unique sense of regional sensibilities. In a 2013 paper, it was shown “neuroticism appears to be highest in the Northeast and Southeast and lowest in the Midwest and West; Openness appears to be highest in the New England, Middle Atlantic, and Pacific regions and lower in the Great Plain, Midwest, and southeastern states; and Agreeableness is generally high in the Southern regions and low in the Northeast.”¹⁰¹ Social interests are also drawn across geographic lines and economic boundaries both to be further discussed. An unfortunate, yet critical aspect to the social structure of the United States lies in the racial sentiment that exist throughout the nation. The end of Jim Crow did not call an end to racism and racial segregation has continued to characterize American life to a remarkable degree. While rates of intermarriage have increased significantly since the 1980s,¹⁰² the majority within these groups continue to “marry in,” suggesting an important

⁹⁹ "Unchurched, Uncharitable: How "Losing our Religion" Will Devastate America's Generous Spirit." *American Conservative* 18, no. 6 (Nov, 2019): 8.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Rentfrow, Peter J., Samuel D. Gosling, Markus Jokela, David J. Stillwell, Michal Kosinski, and Jeff Potter. "Divided we Stand: Three Psychological Regions of the United States and their Political, Economic, Social, and Health Correlates." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 105, no. 6 (2013a): 996-1012.

¹⁰² Especially west of the Mississippi. In 2010, 15% of new marriages were interracial – specifically, 9% of whites, 17% of blacks, 26% of Hispanics, and 28% of Asians “married out” (Wang 2012).

degree of continued social separation.¹⁰³ Similar generalizations can be made about American churches. Racial constructs within the country have culminated in the realignment of the two-party system into one in which the Republican electorate is overwhelmingly white, while the Democrats are increasingly dependent on non-white voters. The thought of racism as a purely Southern issue is refuted by data from June 2017, 42 different Ku Klux Klan groups existed in 22 states, only 10 of which are Southern and symbols such as the Confederate flag are cherished by residents of states that were never part of the Confederacy.¹⁰⁴

The United Kingdom, albeit an incredibly different history, continues to see race as a defining factor in certain civil spaces. In both the American and English cases, the interests of minorities were not well served, and independent political action was forestalled. The possibility of variation in outcome makes the different contexts of England and the United States of real interest-similar outcomes are not preordained-as well as raising the issue of whether racial minorities are regularly tied to political systems in a manner different from other entrants.¹⁰⁵

Where it concerns voting cleavages remains similar for both Republicans and Democrats, as it does for Conservative and Labour. For the Conservative politicians there appears little incentive for providing benefits and expanding their social cleavages to groups such as immigrants; “immigrants in any great numbers wouldn’t vote for them in any case, and even if they did this might well offend many of their party’s own supporters. For Labour party politicians knew that some Labour party voters would be offended by party support of colored people and would

¹⁰³ Rentfrow, Peter J., Samuel D. Gosling, Markus Jokela, David J. Stillwell, Michal Kosinski, and Jeff Potter. "Divided we Stand: Three Psychological Regions of the United States and their Political, Economic, Social, and Health Correlates." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 105, no. 6 (2013a): 996-1012.

¹⁰⁴ "The United States as a Plural Society: Towards a Consociational Solution?" *Swiss Political Science Review* 25, no. 4 (2019b): 476.

¹⁰⁵ Elkin, Stephen L. "Political Structure, Political Organization, and Race." *Politics and Society* 8, no. 2 (1978): 225.

defect and that there would thus be some balancing out of supporters.”¹⁰⁶ In both systems the possible rewards of actual or potential competition between politicians for support of newcomers can vanish in the face of accommodating leaders and corrupt and collusive arrangements; without competition, few benefits are likely for the newcomers.¹⁰⁷

The separate identities of each of the United Kingdom's constituent parts is of unique conversation as the process of devolution is rapidly proceeding.¹⁰⁸ Regarding the mentality of social thought in the United Kingdom the concept of providing services as a staple of government functions lays squarely with Democrats. The British Labour Party represents the Fabian desire for a capitalist society with socialist societal principles. With the Fabian Society having played no small part in the creation of the British Labour Party at the start of the 20th century. Still in existence, The Fabian Society epitomizes the desire for socialism within the existing democratic government. Thus, preventing revolution. Fabianism’s establishment of the Labour Party was able to curb what Belgian Marxist economist and Trotskyist leader Ernest Mandel, advocated as a “United Socialist States of Europe.”¹⁰⁹ To create such a united space would mean revolution - in this instance a continent-wide revolution. The Labour Party was able to stem this tide of revolution and the sense of individuals who saw the working class as unable to confront capitalism through national political action.¹¹⁰ Much attention is currently focused on procedural changes within the UK Parliament to enhance the role of English Members on ‘English matters.’ Concern has already been expressed at the Political and Constitutional Select Committee, however, that this is too centralist as a solution. Notions of territorial identity are

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Background Note: United Kingdom:* Superintendent of Documents, 2006a.

¹⁰⁹ Reuss, Alejandro. "European Social Democracy and the Roots of the Eurozone Crisis." *Dollars & Sense* no. 327 (2016): 18.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

important here. Our identities may be shifting, hybrid and multiple, but place-based identity holds very real value in people's lives. The Scottish referendum showed the continued emotional power of nationalism.¹¹¹ This sense of nationalism led the Brexit movement. However, it began when conversations surrounding European integration started, shortly after the Second World War. Socially civil society groups that opposed European integration in the United Kingdom were made up of a divergence of specific interests (British interests) from opposition to the common fisheries policy (Save British Fish), the metric system of measurement (the British Weights and Measures Association), to general sovereigntist interests (the Freedom Association).¹¹² These groups were spurred to move with the threat of the single market to the European Union. However, each group are based on economically forged social cleavages and they focused their referendum was the focus of their campaign as they believed that only a plebiscite could decide the United Kingdom's EU policy given the lack of legitimacy of the political system.¹¹³

In findings, while Britain has a national religion, it is religiousness in the United States and the sense of freedom and pursuit of that lay the base for sense of community. Both nations have social senses of sovereignty and pride filled nationalism, mentalities of a strong individual versus a strong nation, with federalism we see the reinstatement of a strong sense of the individual. Both nations (albeit to different extents and factors) show trends of racism and historical social regionalism.

¹¹¹ Clifford, Ben and Janice Morphet. "Afterword: The Scottish Referendum, the English Question and the Changing Constitutional Geography of the United Kingdom." *Geographical Journal* 181, no. 1 (2015): 57-60..

¹¹² Fitzgibbon, John. *Citizens Against Europe? Civil Society and Eurosceptic Protest in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark*. Vol. 51 2013.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

Geographic

A nation's location is the penultimate item that shapes history. The United Kingdom is an island and therefore, while akin to European nations in many ways there is a distinct sense of separateness. Even more so with the United States across an ocean, with an enormous land mass, and incredibly varied terrain. Additional to size and location how each nation gathers resources (trading, heavy self-support etc.) directly speaks to their cooperative needs. Finally, climate and terrain play a pivotal role, whether or not the nation is easy to travel across or has enormous changes in climates can indicate the way in which citizens of the same nation may feel separate from one another and as a result express participation in the democratic process in a unique manner. A great deal of what is involved in the conduct and nature of elections within liberal, representative democracies is inherently geographical.¹¹⁴

If it wanted to truly isolate the United States needs to rely on no other nation for virtually anything. It has territory and resources, but is protected as if an island. It was in reality unable to be attacked until the advancement of missile technology developed in the mid-20th century. Additionally, it has unimpeded access to both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, placing it at the literal center of the world. This physical and self-styled isolationist mentality has led to a nation that seeks pursuing policies which stressed moral principles rather than geopolitics. All these steps were involved in Washington's switch from the idealistic aims of world co-operation to a policy of defensive containment. A defense policy only after the threat by missile technology became real to the United States. Britain and the United States, in many ways, passed the mantle

¹¹⁴ Johnston, Ron. "Anglo-American Electoral Geography: Same Roots and Same Goals, but Different Means and Ends?" *Professional Geographer* 57, no. 4 (2005): 580-587.

between themselves. The fear of missile technology and containment policies executed in the United States stand in contrast to a White Paper published in April 1957 in which Great Britain laid down its role as the mistress of the seven seas, as the policeman of the world, and in one step advanced into the nuclear age. Written in tones of resignation-to domestic economics and to the march of progress in atomic age weapon-this message to the world was a historic landmark in military history.¹¹⁵ Now, “given the hegemony of neoliberalism within the United States, distributional concerns are less apparent in these representations than are the perceived rights to individual liberty, automobility and material consumption, and the patriotic imperative to make productive use of the country’s vast store of resources to further these ends. In this context, the state’s primary role is as steward, assuring the wise use of resources and facilitating their availability for the national economy.”¹¹⁶

To broaden the scope of electoral geography in both the United Kingdom and the United States one must visualize the political character of states. Being able to do so and to subsequently map votes allows for examination of how social factors shape political preference. Political organizations in both nations are hyper-aware (as if their jobs depend on it – for they do) of these spatial relationships and both shape their activities in response and seek to manipulate them through campaigns, legal action, public expenditures, infrastructure development, and the like.¹¹⁷ The most recent and also the most seismic comparison of geographic differences influencing large scale election results can be seen with the Trump and Brexit votes. The votes of those who supposed they had been ‘left behind.’ In both votes’ degree-educated remains a principle

¹¹⁵ Roucek, (J S.). "The Development of Political Geography and Geopolitics in the United States." *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 3, no. 2 (1958): 204.

¹¹⁶ Koch, Natalie and Tom Perreault. "Resource Nationalism." *Progress in Human Geography* 43, no. 4 (2019): 611-631.

¹¹⁷ Johnston, Ron. "Anglo-American Electoral Geography: Same Roots and Same Goals, but Different Means and Ends?" *Professional Geographer* 57, no. 4 (2005): 580-587.

variable. As do industrial structures of regions (i.e. transport, trade & utilities), of course naturally and geographically determined at their outset. Areas with an increased sense of nationalism (or potentially more apt to say anti-other) for example, such as counties in the South East region of Britain (have previously been identified as containing political traits and historical associations with Euroscepticism). In both US and Britain this, the state-level models on shift-Trump mirror those of the Brexit vote.¹¹⁸ The same pattern exists for foreign-born and population density with the direction of effect aligned with expectations.¹¹⁹

In findings, geography is a vital factor for the United Kingdom and United States for world presence, interaction, and engagement but most importantly at for the spirit and sense of activities at home. While Great Britain lacks the resources and the breadth of the United States, it is uniquely situated in geographic space for unimpeded success.

Economics

The literature shows economics play a vital role in the functioning and structure of all political systems. In some instances (Communism) the political system exists to serve the economic system. In other spaces there is a deeper distinction and as a result conversation may have the opportunity to be discussed on two separate tracks, one political and one economic. With regards to democracy and specifically the structures of taxation economics play a vital role in how modern democratic practices are shaped.

¹¹⁸ Beecham, Roger, Nick Williams, and Alexis Comber. "Regionally-Structured Explanations Behind Area-Level Populism: An Update to Recent Ecological Analyses." *PloS One* 15, no. 3 (2020): e0229974.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

American parties are increasingly oriented around religion and culture rather than economics. This change has occurred since the 1970s. However, economics continues to play a critical role in the obvious functioning of society, tenor of resource conception, and identification of policies and politics. Energy economics is a particular example, for the political left energy dependence takes the form of calls for greater state investment in renewables such as solar and wind energy, and greater fuel efficiency.¹²⁰ On the political right the calls for energy independence are most often infused with nationalist fervor. Coal remains a fixture in the national imaginary (ie Trump's promise to 'make America great again'). Coal carries symbolic weight as representing US energy independence, and more than oil or natural gas, it has been historically tied to forms of US patriotism.¹²¹ Resources are not the only space where economics and nationalism come together, citizen experience, wants, desires, needs, and culture are all imbedded with fiduciary notions. Historically, industrial America assumed the form of a liberal state/society, excluding explicitly political practices from the workplace and working-class demands from the polity, and contributing thereby to the reproduction of the public/private dichotomy.¹²² The unique political structure of the United States has supported this for over three centuries. The early extension of franchise to white males prevented mass movements (see: economic impacting strikes) for individuals to secure the vote. In an already highly decentralized state apparatus, unique to the United States context in relation to Britain, there is further American working-class fragmentation, thus making class-based action extremely difficult.¹²³ Where there is class-based action, in the United States, economically seen in the sense of Unions one continues to see

¹²⁰ Koch, Natalie and Tom Perreault. "Resource Nationalism." *Progress in Human Geography* 43, no. 4 (2019): 611-631.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Rupert, Mark Edward. "Producing Hegemony: State/Society Relations and the Politics of Productivity in the United States." *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 4 (1990): 427.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

decline, with risk of strikes remaining low. Union membership remains much higher among public-sector workers (33.6% in 2019) than in the private sector (6.2%). Although in 2018 the Supreme Court case made it easier for public employees to refrain from paying union dues, which should slightly diminish the existing gap.¹²⁴ The explanation can be made as well that the mentality of the American public social provision, or lack thereof, potentially “underlines the relative weakness of US industrial unions and points to the complete absence of any”¹²⁵ labor-based political party in US democracy. Albeit weak, US “unions have frequently supported extensions of public social provision, while business groups have opposed them.”¹²⁶

Pre 20th century and the requirements placed upon the nation by the Great Depression, the income tax had barely even existed in the United States. It is clear looking back on history that Roosevelt was able to raise the tax in such a manner because there were not nearly enough individuals being taxed at that level to successfully oppose a change in the law. The tax did not stay. American individualism came on stronger than a sense of social responsibility and once a critical mass of individuals became economically sufficient enough to begin to pay taxes themselves, they realized those government benefits which saved them only years before now burned a hole in their pocket.¹²⁷ When the nation considered the Great Society under President Johnson, ultimately policies “that would enforce equality of income, wealth or condition” were rejected from the legislation. Instead the statutes focused on quantitative measures which are a tenant of social democracies, the architectures of these statutes homed in solely on qualitative

¹²⁴ *Country/Territory Report - United States*: IHS Markit Ltd, 2020b.


¹²⁵ Skocpol, Theda. "A Society without a 'State' ? Political Organization, Social Conflict, and Welfare Provision in the United States." *Journal of Public Policy* 7, no. 4 (1987):

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ Zeitz, Joshua. "What Everyone Gets Wrong about LBJ's Great Society." *Politico*, 2018.

<https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/28/lbj-great-society-josh-zeitz-book-216538>

measures. While these qualitative measures are also vital to social democracies, they can ring hollow without quantitative counterparts.¹²⁸ Politicians continue to push back on the qualitative parts of the Great Society and it remains unclear if American citizens would ever have supported releasing certain sects of citizens from the economic liberalism and rugged bootstrap mentality by instituting quantitative measures of support.¹²⁹



Historically struggles over social welfare in the United States have often involved regional, ethnic, and racial divisions. The “United States has never had a centralized bureaucratic state or programmatic parliamentary parties.”¹³⁰ The American mentality has provided recent positives as the growth of labor productivity has been slower in Europe than in the United States was due mostly to the higher taxation and excessive regulations in Europe than in the

United States.¹³¹ Within the United States, there too was an early 20th century push towards some social protective measures. While not feudal in the manner of other European nations, the United Kingdom was fiefdom and landed gentry based for a significant amount of time. There

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ "Secular Partisan Realignment in the United States: The Socioeconomic Reconfiguration of White Partisan Support since the New Deal Era." *Politics and Society* 47, no. 3 (2019a): 425.

¹³⁰ Skocpol, Theda.

¹³¹ Salvatore, Dominick. "Growth and Trade in the United States and the World Economy: Overview." *Journal of Policy Modeling* 42, no. 4 (2020): 750.

was a home care mentality in the spirit of the Common Law system and law-scale funding mechanisms at the federal level were not assumed. With the Industrial Revolution, movement from the landed areas to urban industrial spaces called for variations within economic system; including taxation structures, economic representation through Unions, workers' rights, and large-scale government spending.¹³²

Does this change the way wealth moves inside the two economies? Bryant and Süßmuth looked into this effect and correlations may be drawn to economic social systems each nation provides (see figure). The facts support the existing evidence that asset prices, income and country-specific institutions and policies are determinants of inequality. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the relationship was characterized by strong, significant positive correlations at the very top of the wealth distribution. These findings point towards institutional similarities, such as capital gains tax rates and income/wealth redistribution policies. Anglo-Saxon settler colonies (such as the U.S.) started out with much higher private homeownership rates in the first place. In the U.S., the share of the bottom 50 percent has fallen below zero, meaning that, as a whole, this cohort holds debts in excess of assets. The middle 40 percent also hold relatively low shares of wealth.¹³³ Thus, one may determine all other aspects considered the United States economic system speaks to a value of wealth increases wealth and lack of wealth decreases wealth both in personal and public expenditures. Ultimately the political system in the United States further dictates the economics than the political system in the British system. Economic disparity is real in both countries but the ends are far separate from one another in the United

¹³² Paparas, Dimitrios, Christian Richter, and Ioannis Kostakis. *The Validity of Wagner's Law in the United Kingdom during the Last Two Centuries*. Vol. 16 2019.

¹³³ Bryant, Connor and Bernd Süßmuth. "Is the Relationship of Wealth Inequality with the Real, Financial and Housing Cycle Country-Specific?" *Atlantic Economic Journal* 47, no. 3 (2019): 323.

States. It is not what a nation has to spend but what it decides to spend it on. Additionally, the fragmentation and disorganization of a federalist system cannot help.

With relation to government use of funds direct towards citizen betterment, it was the “World War I Britain enacted a full range of social protective measures, including workers' compensation (1906), old-age pensions (1908), and unemployment and health insurance (1911).” In the “aftermath of World War II, Great Britain rationalized a whole array of social services and social insurances around an explicit vision of 'the welfare state,' which would universally ensure a 'national minimum' of protection for all citizens against old age, disability and ill health, unemployment, and other causes of insufficient income.”¹³⁴ Roughly a decade later the “United States finally launched a kind of modern welfare state, including public assistance and social insurance measures.”¹³⁵ And unlike Great Britain which used the Second World War as a time to begin the institution of aspects of a full-employment welfare state, this same pivotal war “created new possibilities for congressionally mediated subsidies and tax expenditures but did not permanently enhance public instrumentalities for labor market intervention or executive capacities for coordinating social spending with macroeconomic management.”¹³⁶ This is not to say the United States had not successfully implemented mass social measures before, as the nation did between the end of the Civil War and the bureaucratization of the federal government. Once the United States began to professionalize the federal government, so too came to “light the elite perceptions of 'corruption' in the Civil War pension system discouraged US progressive

¹³⁴ Skocpol, Theda.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

liberals from imitating the pension and social insurance innovations of their English contemporaries.”¹³⁷

Chapter 3

Case Studies

Minimum Income

In many developed countries, including the United Kingdom and United States, the levels of income concentration experienced by current generations are as high as those experienced by their ancestors at the beginning of the 20th century.¹³⁸ Therefore, knowing citizens with higher income are less progressive on economic issues and higher education




Fig. 1 Poverty and low income, incidence and gap, UK (2008/09=100). Definitions: Low income gap= number of individuals in households below MIS times the average percentage they fall short. Poverty gap the same with respect to households below 60% median income after housing costs. Source: Author calculations from Family Resources Survey and MIS database

is associated with less support for progressive economic policies¹³⁹ we can establish a relative sense of stability in terms of ‘progressiveness.’ While this reality remains, it is also the case that

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ Neidhofer, Guido and Maximilian Stockhausen. *Dynastic Inequality Compared: Multigenerational Mobility in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany*. Vol. 65 2019.

¹³⁹ Secular Partisan Realignment in the United States: The Socioeconomic Reconfiguration of White Partisan Support since the New Deal Era." *Politics and Society* 47, no. 3 (2019a): 425.

in many high-income countries, governments seek to “help citizens reach socially acceptable living standards allowing full participation in society.”¹⁴⁰

The concept of meeting needs relating to the standards in one’s own society is oft emphasized from Adam Smith to Peter Townsend.¹⁴¹ Social welfare programs of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Britain and the mid-20th century in the United States, programs that made significant strides to wealth inequality, went into reverse from around the 1980s onwards. Noticing this trend, governments in both countries focused on those in the lowest income brackets who had not gained from economic growth. Termed in various ways by the two nations, the ‘lower class’ in the United States and the ‘squeezed middle’ or ‘just about managing’ in the United Kingdom.¹⁴² Tangibly the social senses shared by the two nations, including a shared history and political mentality, have led to surprising results in the recent elections of Donald Trump in the United States and the vote for Brexit in the United Kingdom.

In the United States minimum wage is a critical point of a minimum income discussion. Here federalism is a key distinguisher as there exist one federal and fifty state minimum wage structures throughout the nation. The federal rate was last changed in 2009 and can be changed only by an act of Congress. According to the U.S. Census the majority of minimum-wage workers are over the age of 20, disproportionately women, and those families with a minimum-wage worker rely on those minimum-wage earnings for nearly half of their income.¹⁴³ While a

¹⁴⁰ Zafirovski, Milan and SpringerLink. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Authoritarianism*. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2007.

¹⁴¹ Hirsch, Donald, Matt Padley, Juliet Stone, and Laura Valadez-Martinez. "The Low-Income Gap: A New Indicator Based on a Minimum Income Standard." *Social Indicators Research* 149, no. 1 (2020): 67.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ "A Bare Minimum Wage Persists in most States." *America* 206, no. 2 (2012): 6-7.

family may 'thrive' on minimum wage in one jurisdiction, there are fifty states. And while there is a federal minimum wage, which no state can legislate below, there are currently 43 states that have a minimum wage law. In most states, the economic consequences of state minimum wage policies are relatively muted. Since state minimum wages usually have little actual economic impact, they are, therefore, largely symbolic. In symbolic politics, political ideology naturally becomes a driving force.¹⁴⁴ Waltman, looking into public opinion polls pertaining to the federal minimum wage turned up evidence that self-described ideology and political party affiliation were the most important factors in predicting a person's support for federal minimum wage increases, with ideology especially important.¹⁴⁵ In a space that would seem to be steady, for the steadiness of wealth holdings aforementioned and the maintenance of higher education brackets, Waltman finds that welfare states grow as societal wealth grows, minimum wages should also reflect the relative liberalism or conservatism of a state's residents.¹⁴⁶ Thus in a federalist system, akin and unique to the United States, we can see the more often the Democratic Party controls the institutions of state government, the higher minimum wages should be.

In the United States a few of the states have instituted a minimum-wage cost of living indexing, which requires that the state minimum wage grow at the same rate as inflation and offers some measure of automatic protection to the real value of the wages of lowest-paid workers. Wage increases can and do have a real tangible impact on workers aside from simply 'money in pocket.' Increases in real minimum wages have been associated with slower growth in state suicide rates in recent years. Specifically, "a one-dollar increase in state minimum wage was

¹⁴⁴ Waltman, Jerold and Sarah Pittman. "The Determinants of State Minimum Wage Rates: A Public Policy Approach." *Journal of Labor Research* 23, no. 1 (2002a): 51-56.

¹⁴⁵ Florida, Richard and Charlotta Mellander. *The Geography of Inequality: Difference and Determinants of Wage and Income Inequality Across US Metros*. Vol. 50 2016.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

associated on average with a 1.9% decrease in the annual age-adjusted suicide rate. Such a decrease in the suicide rate during the study period would have resulted in roughly 8,000 fewer suicide deaths.”¹⁴⁷ This should not allow the assumption to fester that an increase of wages is constantly correlated to an increase in quality of life. For instance, with “health outcomes, minimum wage increases were associated with positive, negative and mixed impacts among white women, white men and Latino men, respectively.”¹⁴⁸ With respect to social mores in the United States it has been found the impact of income inequality is mediated by ethnic diversity. Specifically, ethnically homogeneous states relate to increases in income inequality are associated with higher state minimum wages. Inversely when states are highly ethnically heterogeneous, increases in income inequality are associated with lower state minimum wages. Overall, results suggest that the negative impact on state minimum wages in heterogeneous states could stem from rising income inequality, which increases the social distance between whites and other ethnic groups and weakens mass support for wage policies that are believed by the public to be beneficial to the poor.¹⁴⁹ Historically less discussed as ‘racist’ the United Kingdom is not too different. In the United Kingdom, the six groups with the highest rates of unemployment among both men and women are Muslims and blacks, with black Muslims experiencing the highest rate of unemployment (for men and women). Additional review into the metadata shows that groups are being sorted along the unemployment rate scale according to how dark they are (real or perceived darkness) and how compatible their culture is. Therefore, similarly to the disproportionate support of governmental to citizen related to income in the

¹⁴⁷ Gertner, Alex K., Jason S. Rotter, and Paul R. Shafer. "Association between State Minimum Wages and Suicide Rates in the U.S." *American Journal of Preventive Medicine* 56, no. 5 (2019): 648.

¹⁴⁸ Narain, Kimberly Danae Cauley and Frederick J. Zimmerman. "Examining the Association of Changes in Minimum Wage with Health Across Race/Ethnicity and Gender in the United States." *BMC Public Health* 19, no. 1 (2019): 1069.

¹⁴⁹ Foster, John, Luis J. Gonzalez, and Carlos Lopes. "Income Inequality, Ethnic Diversity, and State Minimum Wages." *Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell)* 100, no. 3 (2019): 825-837.

United States, we see ethnic penalties in the U.K. labor market are a proxy for other forms of penalties and that using the term “ethnicity” or “ethnic penalties” does not provide a good understanding of the dynamic of inequality or its nature.¹⁵⁰

Since minimum income and minimum wage cannot be standardized across the two countries to test various methodological factors. A shared, yet divergent model, of fiscal and income allocation present in both nations is a system of social security. Social security is truly the only fully socially democratic principle instituted within the United States. Since its inception in 1935, Social Security has been extended in scope to cover about 96 percent of the working population. Workers of all income levels participate, regardless of additional coverage from private pensions. Funding is entirely from earmarked employer and employee payroll contributions in equal amounts, without any government general revenue subsidies.¹⁵¹ Social security represents a leg on a three-prong stool of assumed retirement processes in the United States. Social Security provides a defined-benefit retirement pension with a replacement rate of about 40 percent for a worker with average wages throughout his/her working career. Employer-provided pension plans in this country are, therefore, generally designed to supplement rather than replace Social Security benefits.¹⁵² The system of Social Security in the United States has rejected specific premises of the current system in the United Kingdom 1) allowing higher earners to opt out and 2) relying on tax-financed means-tested programs to support the lowest fifth of earners in retirement. The U.K. model of social security, shows a radically altered U.S. system promising fiat-rate benefits as a floor of protection and privatizing the remainder of

¹⁵⁰ Khattab, Nabil and Tariq Modood. "Both Ethnic and Religious: Explaining Employment Penalties Across 14 Ethno-Religious Groups in the United Kingdom." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 54, no. 3 (2015a): 501-522.

¹⁵¹ Liu, Lillian. "Retirement Income Security in the United Kingdom." *Social Security Bulletin* 62, no. 1 (1999): 23.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

Social Security.¹⁵³ On the other side, the United Kingdom has shed its future unfunded public pension liability, built up massive pension assets in the private sector, and seen rapidly increasing retirement income for high earners. However, it now faces the prospect of increased dependency on tax-financed means-tested benefits by future pensioners with a history of lower earnings. Across the Atlantic, the U.S. Social Security program is confronted with the different issue of long-term actuarial imbalance.

Higher Education

When President Truman appointed the Commission on Education 1946, he charged the Commission members to examine ‘the functions of higher education in our democracy’. As the commission declared in the second paragraph of its report, while ‘the law of the land’ is ‘one instrument’ for ensuring equal opportunity for all, the ‘other instrument is education’.¹⁵⁴ In what may seem to be an altruistic political outcome, the US federal government passed the 1958 National Defense Education Act, which committed unprecedented amounts of monies to higher education. Interestingly enough in October 1957 the Soviet Union launched its first satellite into space thus the Education Act emphasizing science and technology was more a panicked response than a good-hearted nation to citizen behavior. The value assigned an educated citizenry by the Commission and post, continue to focus on fields that would presumably bring the United States back to international superiority.¹⁵⁵ The 1946 commission itself was based in the argument, post Second World War, that an educated citizenry provided the best national defense for a

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Commission on Higher Education, 1946

¹⁵⁵ Hutcheson, Philo. "Goals for United States Higher Education: From Democracy to Globalisation." *History of Education* 40, no. 1 (2011): 45-57.

democracy because those citizens would make wise choices, especially in the face of totalitarian threats. In the 1940s this was a clear physical threat with relation to totalitarianism. Within the 1970s this moved towards a focus on maintaining the nation's dominant role in the global economy. The commission stated: 'If we cannot reconcile conflicts of opinion and interest among diverse groups that make up our Nation, we are not likely to succeed in compromising the differences that divide nations.' The other two principal goals for higher education were education for international understanding and education for the solution of social problems and creating effective government, illustrating the emphasis on democracy internally and internationally.¹⁵⁶ "For nearly the entire 350-year history of higher education in the United States, nonprofit status has importantly defined colleges and universities. Rather than operating for private gain, higher education institutions were created to serve the public good. The two ways that institutions are funded in their service to society has been simply classified into either public or private higher education. Private sector institutions are primarily supported by nongovernmental dollars, including student tuition and fees, while public sector institutions are sponsored by the state through tax revenues."¹⁵⁷ "Recent polling by the Pew Research Center shows that most Americans do not believe higher education is headed in the right direction."¹⁵⁸ Still it was estimated that 65 percent of jobs will require postsecondary education in 2020, "compared to 28 percent in 1973. Furthermore, the income shares of those with a bachelor's degree or higher increased from 37 percent in 1991 to 50 percent in 2012."¹⁵⁹ However, the Higher Education Act, the law that encompasses the entire federal student loan system has not

¹⁵⁶ Hutcheson, Philo. "Goals for United States Higher Education: From Democracy to Globalisation." *History of Education* 40, no. 1 (2011): 45-57.

¹⁵⁷ Considering the Third Sector: The New Prominence of For-Profit Higher Education

¹⁵⁸ Agu, Chidi. "Higher Education Access: Filling in the Cracks Versus Rebuilding the Foundation." *Harvard Kennedy School Review* 19, (2019): 70-78.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

been updated in over a decade. If Congress repealed Title IV of the Higher Education Act during the Act's next reauthorization this would remove the provision responsible for financial aid. Title IV includes grants, loans, and work study.¹⁶⁰ Title IV provides the pathway for many students to attend a post-secondary institution, particularly those who are socially and economically underrepresented. However, whether or not it creates equity remains to be seen.¹⁶¹

Interestingly although the United States was formed after the original Universities of the United Kingdom (Oxford, Cambridge) the nature and identity of many higher education institutions in the United Kingdom has changed repeatedly throughout their history and the United States institutions have sprung up from different spaces, reasons, needs, requirements, and capabilities. For instance, in the post-war period, in the United Kingdom as in many other developed countries, witnessed a huge expansion in recruitment as the system has shifted from focusing on the narrow elite to serving the needs of the mass of the population. University status was granted to the polytechnics and some larger colleges in 1992, which then became widely referred to as the post-1992 universities. Institutional change is confined to United Kingdom higher education: as many other developed nations have seen their higher education systems move from elite to mass participation over the last few decades, they must also have experienced considerable institutional change.¹⁶²

Further, and non-government driven, over the past decade United Kingdom higher education has undergone significant changes, leading to a greater internationalization of the sector: the limit on

¹⁶⁰ Higher Education Act, Title IV

¹⁶¹ Johnson, Twinette L. "Going Back to the Drawing Board: Re-Entrenching the Higher Education Act to Restore its Historical Policy of Access." *University of Toledo Law Review* 45, no. 3 (2014): 545-578.

¹⁶² Tight, Malcolm. *Institutional Churn: Institutional Change in United Kingdom Higher Education*. Vol. 35 2013.

the number of home undergraduate students (those students eligible to pay university tuition fees at a lower rate than overseas students) that can be recruited by any particular university or college has seen the sector become increasingly dependent on the recruitment of overseas students, exempt from the student number cap. There are now more overseas students studying for UK degrees in their own countries than there are overseas students studying in the UK (HESA, 2013). Alongside this need to internationalize the curriculum to support the needs of overseas students, however, there has been an increasing focus on the need to enhance the skills and understanding of UK students so that they can live and work within a global, cultural context.¹⁶³ Similarly to those groups benefitted by higher education in the United States, the system is cyclical in the United Kingdom too. In 2004 Scottish Journal of Political Economy paper reported findings that educational inequality, as measured by the strength of the empirical connection between higher education participation or attainment and family income, rose significantly when comparing cohorts of young people who were of university age in the late 1970s, late 1980s and in the 1990s. This occurred in the context of a rapid rise in the numbers going to HE in the United Kingdom, from around 15 % of the first cohort to 33 % at the millennium. This study has showed that the United Kingdom expansion of higher education disproportionately benefitted children from richer backgrounds.¹⁶⁴ One of the areas this can be supported, low-income students to higher-education is the use of funds both governments, private, and public.

¹⁶³ Stevenson, Jacqueline. "Internationalisation and Religious Inclusion in United Kingdom Higher Education." *Higher Education Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (2014): 46-64.

¹⁶⁴ Blanden, Jo and Stephen Machin. *Educational Inequality and the Expansion of United Kingdom Higher Education*. Vol. 60 2013.

The historical, social, and economic driven funding mechanisms are the crux of the discussion here. The United Kingdom and the United States have cultural, historical, and legal differences that provide challenges to those who would import US educational philanthropy wholesale. Private colleges in the US, which comprise two-thirds of the sector, were largely formed by benefactions, and in their early years they were sustained by a mix of voluntary and government support. In *Dartmouth v. Woodward* (1819) the Supreme Court found that a government charter to operate as an institution of education did not in itself make that institution a government entity – specifically, that the state could not alter the composition of the board of trustees at will. This ruling removed the amount of control State and local governments could have in their funding of institutions. Therefore, we see the establishment of a binary system in which states funded and managed one set of institutions whereas ‘private’ institutions were self-funded. While commonplace in the United States, this divide is all but absent in the United Kingdom.

These fiscal finding requirements in the United States also necessitated unique funding mechanisms. Taken from techniques of the YMCA, the deep religiousness of the nation, and the sense of loyalty, life-long affiliation, and obligation to nation say sub for alma mater. Following the Second World War and the G.I. Bill, which led to an influx of returning servicemen, existing colleges boomed and new public colleges were born, along with their feelings of comradery with these new institutions and their communities too. This uniquely American sense of community was thus extended outside of the high-wealth private donor and to the average student, or individual beneficiary from the institute of higher education. While, although private support to higher education is stronger in the US than anywhere else in the world, its roots are in the UK. The United Kingdom however, has never taken the aspect of private to the extent of the

American context. Historically in the United Kingdom students paid fees, but these were not a significant source of income, this is distinct from the student experience in the United States. The significant sources of income for British institutions (landed gentry donations, actual land holdings of the institutions, trusts, etc.) dropped similar in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when attendance at University was desired and required, thus their requests for financial support became more frequent and urgent. In 1919, the University Grants Commission was established, and the national government formally accepted responsibility for the financing of Britain's universities and their colleges. This government support is at present unheard of and remains unthinkable in the United States and while the increases in spending was largely due to the massification of higher education, which occurred later in the UK than in the US. Under the Thatcher government, privatization came to education as it came to many other aspects of British government. Raising fees too high without additional financial aid would challenge the UK's stated commitment to opportunity for all students, but additional financial aid could negate much of the anticipated revenue from higher tuition. The decentralized structure of the United States political system, social understanding of importance of self, economic mentality of picking oneself up from one's bootstraps to earn a job and education, does not incline whatsoever with a social security like mentality of an institution adherent to government funded higher education.

Healthcare

A quick view and it is clear the healthcare systems in the United Kingdom (socialized) and the United States (single-payer) are in stark dichotomy to one another. While their differences are palpable, there were in fact three key historical moments leading to the "establishment and

evolution of these systems; “1) the foundation of the prototype for today’s systems of multi-payer “social insurance” by German chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the late 19th century; 2) the burst of policy development in the immediate aftermath of World War II; and 3) the reformist millennial period.”¹⁶⁵ Seemingly everywhere but the United States the most recent phase of this system is the formalization of universal coverage. A recent survey of “19 western European and Anglo-American countries with universal coverage showed public satisfaction with the availability of quality health care to be substantially higher on average in the 6 social insurance countries (with 86%–87% of respondents on average indicating satisfaction) than in the 13 countries with single-payer systems (75%– 76%).”¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, it appears the trend in both nations that is lawmakers no longer see a largely free market system or completely state controlled system as capable of solving health care regulation’s principal dilemma, controlling the cost of health while ensuring universal levels of coverage.¹⁶⁷ Herein the American and the British healthcare systems have ongoing internal and external evolution playing from one’s own capabilities and borrowing from others.

Both nation’s health care reforms can be divergent from their respective constitutions, in fact the health systems themselves can be constitutionally divergent pre-reform. The United States and the United Kingdom both have interpretative constitutions, focusing on regulatory input, without overly prescriptive statements for constituent services – by government or private sector.

Therefore, both nations create social legislation on the base of regulation and oftentimes the

¹⁶⁵ Tuohy, Carolyn Hughes. "Political Accommodations in Multipayer Health Care Systems: Implications for the United States." *American Journal of Public Health* 109, no. 11 (2019): 1501-1505.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ Fletcher, Jamie and Jane Marriott. "Beyond the Market: The Role of Constitutions in Health Care System Convergence in the United States of America and the United Kingdom." *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* 42, no. 4 (2014): 455-474.

reforms.¹⁶⁸ constitutional fit has been rationalized post-hoc, and that policymakers did not sufficiently consider constitutional mores when drafting reform legislation.¹⁶⁹

However, reforms are undoubtedly needed. At present “28 million Americans remain uninsured, and 44 million are underinsured, meaning they spend more than ten percent of their incomes on out-of-pocket health-care expenses.”¹⁷⁰ Cost spending aside, there are additional issues with the current concepts of cost prevention there is a real impact on those such as the uninsured who

TABLE 4 Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Increased Government Spending

	Liberals			Conservatives		
	Low Trust	High Trust	First Difference	Low Trust	High Trust	First Difference
Distributive Policies						
Social Security	0.62	0.51	-0.11*	0.38	0.54	0.16*
Environment	0.76	0.81	0.05	0.42	0.75	0.33*
Medicare	0.77	0.76	-0.01	0.52	0.69	0.17*
Defense	0.13	0.11	-0.02	0.03	0.06	0.03
Redistributive Policies						
Education	0.72	0.68	-0.04	0.38	0.69	0.31*
Health Care	0.74	0.80	0.06	0.42	0.74	0.32*
Medicaid	0.56	0.77	0.21*	0.36	0.60	0.24*
Aid to Mothers	0.47	0.62	0.15*	0.27	0.56	0.29*

Note: Table entries represent the predicted probability of supporting increased government spending at the minimum and maximum values of political trust for liberals and conservatives. All other explanatory variables were fixed at their mean or modal values.
*p < .05.

may “delay or even forgo treatment when they are ill, and their children often do not receive critical immunizations).”¹⁷¹

Lack of equality in the space of healthcare speaks to a further increasing inequality on average, where the top 25% of earners in the United States live ten years longer than those earnings in the bottom 25%.

Throughout the literature it is resoundingly reiterated that the biggest problem with the US fee-for-service system - aside from the fact that some do not have the fee to pay in the first place - is “the specific fees per service.” And as one team of researchers argued, “It’s the prices, stupid”.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁸ Reforms should not be taken as positive or negative here, more in line with change.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Hsiao, William C. "How to Fix American Health Care: What Other Countries can--and can't--Teach the United States." *Foreign Affairs* 99, no. 1 (January, 2020): 96-106.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² Gross, Tal and Miriam J. Laugesen. *The Price of Health Care: Why is the United States an Outlier?*. Vol. 43 2018.

While United States healthcare, especially when compared to the United Kingdom, seems to be ‘every man for himself’ it is surprising that in 2016, 17.2 percent of America’s gross domestic product (GDP) went to health care, versus 12.4 percent in Switzerland, and 10.6 percent in Canada (OECD2018).¹⁷³ Thus, not only citizens are burning money through their pocket, the government appears to be burning through money on healthcare related expenses as well. This system, oddly dually hatted comes at a time of increased citizen need of government support but decreased trust in the government’s propensity, desire, or ability to provide that protection. In the instance of spending tax dollars, citizen assumed trust and competency in government play a huge role, specifically for appearing altruistic actions which may not personally benefit the citizen. For instance, between 1964 and 2017, the percentage of Americans who trusted that the government in Washington would do what was right “most of the time” or “just about always” fell from 76% to 18%.¹⁷⁴ Lack of support by governments in health care spending reflects a long political tradition which considers it neither necessary nor suitable for the government to intervene in the health-care industry in order to guarantee the health and prosperity of its citizens.¹⁷⁵ This sentiment does not seem to compute with the United States GDP spend, until one finds that in “2017 Americans spent an average of \$10,224 per person on health care compared to \$5,280 among singularly wealthy countries.”¹⁷⁶ Yet despite spending almost twice as much “Americans suffer from lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality rates, and a higher prevalence of heart disease, lung disease, and sexually transmitted infections.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ Pew Research Center, 2017.

¹⁷⁵ Aitalieva, Nurgul R. and Sinyoung Park. "Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support in the United States for Government Spending on Health Care." *Null* 42, no. 9 (2019): 776-785.

¹⁷⁶ Hsiao, William C. "How to Fix American Health Care: What Other Countries can--and can'T--Teach the United States." *Foreign Affairs* 99, no. 1 (January, 2020): 96-106.

Experts estimate that around 30 percent of the money spent on health care in the United States—around \$1 trillion a year—is wasted on inefficiencies, excessive administrative expenses, the duplication of services, and fraud and abuse in insurance claims.”¹⁷⁷ The system in the United States was never meant to be trust based. At present “the amount spent in the United States on administrative expenses related to health care is three times as high as that in other advanced economies. The root of these problems is that as the United States became a prosperous, industrialized society in the early twentieth century, it chose to treat health care as a commercial product rather than as a social good, such as education.”¹⁷⁸ In broad terms, there are three cornerstones of the U.S. health care system. The first has its origins in the 1940s and 1950s, where tax subsidies for employer-based private health care insurance and an expanding economy led to a boom in this particular type of coverage, such that it soon became the predominant form of health insurance in the United States. The uninsured are mainly in low paid jobs where their employers do not offer health care benefits, yet are not poor enough to qualify for Medicaid, although there is a subsector of the uninsured who, though able to pay for insurance, opt out of paying, which negatively affects the risk pool. However, the uninsured are not left completely without health care "support." There are facilities, public and charitable, that provide a "safety net" for the uninsured, and in some circumstances, these provide very good services. In other cases, however, the services are unlikely to be so good, leaving the uninsured exposed to the lottery of care.¹⁷⁹ After the Second World War the United States did not follow European countries in establishing universal health insurance programs owing in part to institutional opposition from powerful special interests that took advantage of the politics of the early Cold


¹⁷⁷ Hsiao, William C. "How to Fix American Health Care: What Other Countries can--and can't--Teach the United States." *Foreign Affairs* 99, no. 1 (January, 2020): 96-106.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Oliver, Adam and Lawrence D. Brown. *Incentivizing Professionals and Patients: A Consideration in the Context of the United Kingdom and the United States*. Vol. 36 2011.

War period. Special interest groups such as the American Medical Association opposed the program, hoping to protect physicians' superior market power and professional autonomy. The AMA mobilized its nationwide network of county medical societies to stir up fear that the plan would lead to "socialized medicine." The AMA went so far as to call the plan "un-American" and deride the Truman administration as following "the Moscow party line."¹⁸⁰

With regards to the United Kingdom, the NHS was introduced in 1948 with the objective of creating equitable access to health care by making health services free at the point of use. This objective was restated in the NHS constitution of 2008 including, among other things, the right for citizens to access health care free of charge except for certain limited exceptions agreed on by Parliament (these are in the form of user charges for private treatment, prescription medications,



and dental care) and not to be unlawfully discriminated against on grounds of gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, or disability.¹⁸¹ In this way, England provides universal coverage of health services, financed mainly

through general taxation and national insurance contributions. and delivers its healthcare services through the NHS, where most care is free at the point of use for all citizens.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Hsiao, William C. "How to Fix American Health Care: What Other Countries can--and can'T--Teach the United States." *Foreign Affairs* 99, no. 1 (January, 2020): 96-106.

¹⁸¹ Department of Health 2010b.

¹⁸² Sampat, Bhaven and Michael Drummond. *Another Special Relationship? Interactions between Health Technology Policies and Health Care Systems in the United States and the United Kingdom*. Vol. 36 2011.

A place of observation where the two systems can find adequate points for comparison outside of the standard ‘single-payer’ versus socialized medicine binary is with the care of older citizens. Numerous findings show that though older persons have greater access to specialty care in the United States, there appears to be much better access to primary care in England.¹⁸³ Ultimately the sense of care for all has a shelf-life and the determination of who and how long they should receive care from a ‘communal service’ is up for debate. In the United States, the pay to play mentality (even if leading to financial distress) allows for the elderly to continue expensive, invasive, and resource intensive care until the end of life. This provides a unique perspective to the mirage of a healthcare system for all. However, it remains to be seen if the United States, as a, "can't say no" place with few to any limits on the health care technologies available to older persons, regardless of cost or evidence of effectiveness. For others within England there has




Figure 5 Avoidable Hospital Condition and Marker Condition Rates per 1,000 by Race and Age, United States, 2004–2006 Averages
 Sources: Department of Health 2010a; U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2010b

been a defensive age-based rationing of care as a sensible response to finite resources (and public resources) and have characterized the alternative as socially undesirable: "This attempt to wring the last drop of

medical benefit out of the system, no matter what the human and material costs, is not the hallmark of a humane society. In each of our lives there has to come a time when we accept the inevitability of death, and when we also accept that a reasonable limit has to be set on the

¹⁸³ Gusmano, Michael and Sara Allin. *Health Care for Older Persons in England and the United States: A Contrast of Systems and Values*. Vol. 36 2011.

demands we can properly make on our fellow citizens in order to keep us going a bit longer.”¹⁸⁴ Ultimately access to primary care appears to be significantly better among older residents of England. They are far less likely to be hospitalized for conditions that can be managed by primary care providers than are older persons in the United States. In contrast, similar hospitalization rates for marker conditions suggest that the country-level differences we observe are unlikely to be explained by differences in population health status or the use of hospitals.¹⁸⁵

Conclusion

The United States may have started as a British offshoot, yet its location, unique physical landscape and resources, and initial mentality of the exception into the nation of ‘otherness’ (not to be confused with integration) distinguished it from Western Europe. These factors in addition to others outside the scope of this conversation showcase an American ethos averse to the idea that the fruit of one’s labor should be redistributed. Simply put, there are aspects of United States culture which make it more resistant to social democratic ideas. Further, the economic liberalism of the country leads to citizens who are more comfortable with the idea that economic inequality will result from not pursuing such redistribution. Gary Dorrien smartly sums up this mentality: “In the United States it is also a protest against the claim that caring about economic inequality is un-American. The very name, “democratic socialism,” is a self-conscious marker that many kinds of socialism were and are democratic only in a tortured sense of the term, or in no sense at all.”¹⁸⁶ Additionally, this notion of "rugged individualism" and mistrust of government run deep

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ Dorrien, Gary. "The Birth of Social Democracy." *Commonweal* 146, no. 7 (2019): 19.

as a cultural matter leading to further difficulties enacting social democratic principles. It seems the nation is truly every man for himself.¹⁸⁷ It confirms that whenever one group achieves its goals of increased socialist behavior on the behalf of the United States government, they cease their quest and do not pursue additional socialist agenda items for themselves or other marginalized groups.¹⁸⁸

I. Federalism is fundamental

The fragmented nature of U.S. politics is old news. The founding fathers viewed such fragmentation as an institutional check on central government action. In recent years interactions among these multiple political actors have unexpectedly encouraged more government activity rather than less.

In a federalist nation, power is divided between different levels of government so that each level has certain independent powers over those living there. As U.S. federalism has evolved, so too have intergovernmental relations in the United Kingdom, a nation in which health policy has generally been more centralized. The United Kingdom was long considered one of the most centralized of the European nations. America may not be exceptional in all of its endeavors, however, there is a distinct reason historian, political scientists, and the average observer turn to look at the American experiment with wonder. Above all that interest is federalism and it pervades every aspect of citizen life within the nation, as well as engagement between the United

¹⁸⁷ Andrias, Kate. "An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act." *Yale Law Journal* 128, no. 3 (2019): 616.

¹⁸⁸ Canellos, Peter. "What FDR Understood About Socialism That Today's Democrats Do Not." *Politico*, 16 August 2019.

States and other countries. In the instances of healthcare, the context of US federalism, specifically the Affordable Care Act, butts head first into the concept of fractured authority in ways that has opened up the possibility of contestation and confusion. The United States institution ensures that “no reform—and certainly not one as significant as the ACA—has ever been self-implementing.”¹⁸⁹ It is simply not in the national bones of the land. In the specific instance of the Affordable Care Act, state-based single-payer proposals face a distinct set of obstacles, the need to obtain federal permission to repurpose federal dollars and to face the burden of state-only action in an interconnected 50-state economy.¹⁹⁰

In the United States individual states play a key role in every aspect of the health care system, but they do not do so pursuant to an overarching national health policy. Instead, the different levels of government have created a host of complicated intergovernmental partnerships that interact with numerous private-sector actors to create a decentralized, fragmented, and often irrational health care system. The United Kingdom, centralized in nature, has centralized authority that laid the basis for the creation in the late 1940s of the National Health Service (NHS). In the UK Perhaps surprisingly, however, before the twentieth century this generally centralized union had a rather decentralized approach to health and welfare, delegating to local communities and charitable organizations the task of aiding the deserving poor, either through almshouses or systems of outdoor relief. Over time, the Poor Law workhouses created sickness wards, which became infirmaries, and then separate institutions for the sick poor, and, finally, evolved into municipal hospitals. In the debate leading up to approval of the 1946 National

¹⁸⁹ Béland, Daniel, Philip Rocco, and Alex Waddan. "The Affordable Care Act in the States: Fragmented Politics, Unstable Policy." *Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law* 45, no. 4 (2020): 647.

¹⁹⁰ Sparer, Michael S. "States as Policy Laboratories: The Politics of State-Based Single-Payer Proposals." *American Journal of Public Health* 109, no. 11 (2019a): 1511-1514.

Health Service Act, there was strong support within the ruling Labour Party for a continued important role for local government in the health care system. However, key political figures involved in the design of the new institution, were committed to the supremacy of Parliament and the national government over local government and believed that local control over health care would perpetuate inequalities in service provision.¹⁹¹

There are some independent variables that may nudge the devolved U.K.'s intergovernmental system toward, or away from, the U.S. model. Three merit attention here: the constitutional rules setting out the allocation of powers between the central government and subcentral governments and procedures for amending this allocation; the nature of fiscal relations between the central and subcentral governments; and, finally, the character of the U.K. national government. Put simply, U.S. federalism and U.K. devolution are still very different political institutions producing fundamentally different health policy outcomes. Even so, the trends in both nations toward fragmentation, incrementalism, and policy variation are striking, and the possibility that such trends will catalyze a surprising set of policy outcomes remains intriguing and worth following.

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While not higher education, at the start, the federalist base for funding of education has led to significant gaps when students do approach university age. In the United States federal system at present “nearly half of funding for public K–12 schools are local, typically coming from property taxes.”¹⁹³ Therefore lower-income areas pay lower taxes and thus have lower funding for their

¹⁹¹ Sparer, Michael S., George France, and Chelsea Clinton. *Inching Toward Incrementalism: Federalism, Devolution, and Health Policy in the United States and the United Kingdom*. Vol. 36 2011.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ Agu, Chidi. "Higher Education Access: Filling in the Cracks Versus Rebuilding the Foundation." *Harvard Kennedy School Review* 19, (2019): 70-78.

school systems – creating a cyclical entanglement between low income, low education, low opportunity. When looking to “state funding— which is often the most equitable—makes up 47 percent, and federal funds are less than 10 percent.”¹⁹⁴ Even then the cost, spend, and percentages of state funding are not equitable throughout the state and certainly not throughout the nation. Hereby federalism allows “factors that students have no control over, like neighborhood property values and state budget cuts (which have significantly worsened since the Great Recession), result in increased class sizes, fewer support services, and delayed implementation of reforms that would improve college admission and persistence.”¹⁹⁵

In both instances, healthcare and education, federalism is inherently inequitable.

II. Unique geographic variables provide specific direct outcomes to both the United Kingdom and the United States’ sense of self and ensuing approaches to policy making

Island nation, geographically safe nation, independent, and with enormous capabilities of power projection. Both countries have geographic attributes that allow them to reign supreme (or to have reigned supreme). One of the greatest assets of all has been access to the sea. At present, the United States continues to reap the benefits of near full self-reliance, the United Kingdom does not. This sense of self-reliance in geographic terms, and specific to the sense of higher-education has existed since the start of the United States. After the Revolutionary War, the Northwest Territories Act of 1787 granted land to new states on the condition that the states establish “institutions of higher education.” These institutions would provide an education

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

geared toward the practical interests of the time—agriculture and mechanics. This indicates that higher-education was a reward for geographic advancement, essentially equating the importance of land acquisition to the importance of education. To grow the nation, to grow the mind, to grow the American ethos.

III. A historical mentality of self-sufficiency and perceived ruggedness pervades United States political theory and policy making

A nation established off of the individual pursuit of success, independence, and happiness. Many would say the United States has come to the point where creating personal wealth as well as institutional wealth is more important than ensuring participation in the democracy. And that creation of wealth, in arguments that only incompletely draw upon Enlightenment and utilitarian philosophers, sustains and furthers US attempts to be dominant in the global economy.¹⁹⁶ This sense of the creation of wealth for one's self leads to a lack of desire to 'share' this wealth in social manners. This notion of "rugged individualism" and mistrust of government run deep as a cultural matter leading to further difficulties enacting social democratic principles. Why should I pull myself up by my bootstraps and then turn to my fellow citizen to do the same? In this it seems the nation is truly every man for himself and American policy follows along with those similar provisions – even when looking to institute social reforms. The FLSA “demonstrates that, for longer than is typically recognized, the nation experimented with a form of administration that linked the substantive ends of empowering particular social and economic groups to procedural means that solicited and enabled those same groups' participation in governance (to

¹⁹⁶ Hutcheson, Philo. "Goals for United States Higher Education: From Democracy to Globalisation." *History of Education* 40, no. 1 (2011): 45-57.

the exclusion of other groups).”¹⁹⁷ Two key points of clarification here are the phrases “particular social and economic groups” and “to the exclusion of other groups.” Even when we work to implement these principles, we do so with a modicum of deserving individuals based on one arbitrary scale or another. Further, it confirms that whenever one group achieves its goals of increased socialist behavior on the behalf of the United States government, they cease their quest and do not pursue additional socialist agenda items for themselves or other marginalized groups.

There is a “persistent and aspirational narrative in the United States that no matter what circumstances one was born into, college can be the great equalizer of opportunity. The first is that the United States is a meritocracy where the cream will always rise to the top. The second is that education alone can serve as the panacea for social inequality. These narratives imagine that the higher education system will reward smart, hard-working students regardless of any history of poverty, racism, sexism, redlining, or other forms of prejudice and exclusion.”¹⁹⁸ On the one hand, the proponents of the welfare state believe that government should play a key role in protecting and promoting the social and economic well-being of its citizens. On the other hand, the concept of economic individualism assumes that each person is responsible for her or his own welfare and individual well-being is an outcome of hard work. According to this view, people are expected to do what they can to be economically self-sufficient. Liberals tend to believe in government action to guarantee the personal well-being of its citizens. In contrast,

¹⁹⁷ Andrias, Kate. "An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act." *Yale Law Journal* 128, no. 3 (2019): 616.

¹⁹⁸ Agu, Chidi. "Higher Education Access: Filling in the Cracks Versus Rebuilding the Foundation." *Harvard Kennedy School Review* 19, (2019): 70-78.

political conservatives tend to believe in limited government, with the notion that individuals should pursue their own goals and provide for themselves through the free-market economy.¹⁹⁹

For instance, in healthcare, nearly half of Americans disagreed that health care rationing was feasible, as did about 40 percent of Britons. Americans were more likely to believe that most people who fail have themselves to blame, rather than society; more committed to individualism; more likely to believe that economic competition is good; more comfortable with merit-based pay; more likely to believe that scientific advances will help rather than hurt humanity; and more skeptical about the role of government.

IV. Cultural mores surrounding the manners and exceptions of citizens to engage with governments directly interplay into the way policy is created, enacted, and regulated in an ongoing manner. Assumed and acted upon relationships matter. The American historical context leads to their citizens having more so.

Outside of the Revolutionary context, Americans and the British both have significant interaction with their government representatives. However, in the American context citizens truly created their government and thus, their participation is not only expected, it is innate. For instance, in higher education students have some influence in the rulemaking process may be a result of the actions of Congress: specific language in the Higher Education Act (2012) recommends that students and legal groups representing them should be consulted during negotiated rulemaking. Moreover, the Conference Report of the 1992 reauthorization specifically stated, “It is the intent

¹⁹⁹ Aitalieva, Nurgul R. and Sinyoung Park. "Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support in the United States for Government Spending on Health Care." *Null* 42, no. 9 (2019): 776-785.

of the conferees that the Secretary [of Education] should include students and student advocates from all sectors of postsecondary education in the negotiated rulemaking process, including the regional meetings” (U.S. House of Representatives, 1992, p. 516).²⁰⁰

This participation is good on many levels and specifically because in a nation long, based on skepticism of government and reliance on self, the United States shows that people are more likely to support an expansion of services, if government will deliver the services in question in a reasonable manner, i.e., the government is perceived as trustworthy. Studies show that trust is especially important when individuals are asked to sacrifice their own material or ideological interests for the advancement of political minorities. Even if a new government program requires perceived sacrifices. Beneficiaries of government programs do not have to trust government because they are not paying the costs.²⁰¹

V. Religiousness and a sense of philanthropic charity does not define nor does it indicate a society will trend towards socialism

The United States, while declining in religiosity, remains exceptionally religious. Religiousness has led to a variety of societal mores however, one that remains in the common culture (amount of religious adherents notwithstanding) is philanthropy and fundraising. With relation to charitable giving “in Britain is less than 1% of GDP, which is half of the US rate, and there is little corporate giving. The numbers are closer if religious giving is excluded. The definitions of

²⁰⁰ Natow, Rebecca S. "From Capitol Hill to Dupont Circle and Beyond: The Influence of Policy Actors in the Federal Higher Education Rulemaking Process." *Journal of Higher Education* 86, no. 3 (May, 2015): 360-386.

²⁰¹ Aitalieva, Nurgul R. and Sinyoung Park. "Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support in the United States for Government Spending on Health Care." *Null* 42, no. 9 (2019): 776-785.

the words ‘charity’ and ‘philanthropy’ are subtle and vary by nation. In the US, ‘charity’ has an old-fashioned, slightly negative connotation – hence, phrases like ‘I won’t take charity’.

‘Philanthropy’, on the other hand, is a positive term connoting modern, responsible giving. In the UK, the poles are reversed. Philanthropy is ‘elitist, patronizing, morally judgmental and ineffective, as well as old fashioned and out of date . . . an idea whose time came, was proved unworkable, and went’.”²⁰²

In fact, even the US tax laws encourage philanthropic giving to any other charitable organization regulated under section 501(c)3 of the revenue code. Whereas the UK has few tax incentives for giving, and as its tax system presently works it has little ability to implement new ones. Related to the conception of importance of religion in history and modernity in the United States and the present concept of presentation of one’s self, it is acceptable to give in the US to reduce one’s tax burden, and tax laws encourage this; UK donors do not find this an acceptable motivation.²⁰³

VI. From a study of the two most prominent Anglo-Saxon governments. Clearly, inertia is inevitable.

This is clear from any political study, save totalitarian regimes. However, because Britain and the United States represent spectrum systems it is important to note that inertia is inevitable.

For instance, while the Other’s health care system may be viewed as a “curiosity at best and an abomination at worst,” there are, in fact, fewer differences between the two than ever before.

Policymakers in the US and UK have proceeded to mix aspects of internal system evolution with

²⁰² Proper, Eve. *Bringing Educational Fundraising Back to Great Britain: A Comparison with the United States*. Vol. 31 2009.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

the inclusion of revolutionary concepts imported and adapted from the other's system. In search of health care equilibrium, they have introduced notions conventionally conceived as abrasive to their own constitutional order.²⁰⁴

A sense of inertia is found as both countries seek the "Holy Grail" of limiting spending both by government and the private sector by redesigning institutions that manifest inefficiency and contribute to inflationary pressures. For instance in healthcare both systems seek better measurement and management of "value," that is, the effects of health care on the length and quality of patients' lives. Both systems are permeated by organizational inertia and the defense of political values and self-interest.

VII. The sense of 'Other' influences policy in both nations as much as the tangibility of citizen

Similarly, to the time of the Constitution Convention, United States citizens are "quick to see the ills that government can inflict, and slow to perceive the good things that a responsible national state can do for all citizens. Comparative-historical studies of modern welfare states teach us that vulnerable groups do best when bureaucrats and national political parties have worked together to build universal systems of public social provision, stretching from the upper middle classes to the poor."²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴ Fletcher, Jamie and Jane Marriott. "Beyond the Market: The Role of Constitutions in Health Care System Convergence in the United States of America and the United Kingdom." *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* 42, no. 4 (2014): 455-474.

²⁰⁵ Skocpol, Theda. "A Society without a 'State' ? Political Organization, Social Conflict, and Welfare Provision in the United States." *Journal of Public Policy* 7, no. 4 (1987): 349.

True to the expectation, the Pew Research Center's survey (Gao, 2015) shows that Americans are more likely to believe that hard work is the path to prosperity. In 2014, the Pew Research Center surveyed people across 44 countries. The survey found that Americans' emphasis on individualism and work ethic stood out the most in comparison to individuals who reside in other countries. "Comparative-historical studies of modern welfare states teach us that vulnerable groups do best when bureaucrats and national political parties have worked together to build universal systems of public social provision, stretching from the upper middle classes to the poor. As we have seen, US state structures have rarely allowed such coalitions to shape social policies. Instead, from the nineteenth century to the present, American political arrangements have recurrently facilitated political efforts to provide generous social policies for those in the American majority who can help themselves - and strong doses of 'rugged individualism' for the minorities who cannot!"²⁰⁶ As society prospered again, those individuals receiving government benefits (African-American, single mothers, the uneducated etc.) became the 'other' and leeches upon society. Although called The Great Society the result was far more centrist than socialist. Rather than focusing on a bottom up approach, a top down approach was implemented. Ultimately in the "United States it is also a protest against the claim that caring about economic inequality is un-American. The very name, "democratic socialism," is a self-conscious marker that many kinds of socialism were and are democratic only in a tortured sense of the term, or in no sense at all."²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ Skocpol, Theda. "A Society without a 'State' ? Political Organization, Social Conflict, and Welfare Provision in the United States." *Journal of Public Policy* 7, no. 4 (1987):

²⁰⁷ Dorrien, Gary. "The Birth of Social Democracy." *Commonweal* 146, no. 7 (2019): 19.

VIII. Parent to child relationship sharing continues but has morphed to alternate over the centuries; as from the start they are more alike than different

Beginning from the same cloth, the United States and United Kingdom remain far more similar than they do different. Healthcare, education, and minimum income vary from each nation however, many fundamental similarities, those called Anglo-Saxon similarities remain. That being said, policy is different. The social, historical, geographical, economic, and modern-day political structures necessitate departures from one another. For both, when measured against fundamental political principles, as manifested by the constitution, some elements of the reforms have been confirmed as fitting within the constitutions' frameworks; others have not.²⁰⁸

Opportunities for Further Study

While this study covers two distinct nations, the findings are applicable and can be brought to other academic conversations. Distinct opportunities can be investigated using methodological and case study findings, as well as both. An example would be the study of other island (Britain) and/or uniquely protected nations (the United States) to compare whether or not the same sense of individual identity pervaded in the social mores and ultimately the policy making.

Additionally, an interesting area of future study could be the same discussion with a substitute for one of the countries discussed here. This study focused on two nations with a distinct and visible sense of self. However, taking a study of two nations that share some variables and clash on others such as the United State and Russia would be of interest. The work also allows the

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

opportunity to adjust the case studies used while adjusting the methodology and vice versa.

Thus, while this study acts as a one to one comparison, it has significant utility outside of a set space.

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