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Eric Denis

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Desert: from ghost towns to forbidden cities

Eric Denis

It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges subsist here and there, in the deserts which are no longer those of the Empire, but our own. The desert of the real itself.

– **Jean** Baudrillard, 1981 [1]

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The Two-Stage "Concrete-ization" of the Desert: From a Public to a Neoliberal Approach

Amr is back home: 6th of October City, Hay al-Muntaz, Stairwell C, 3rd floor, left door. The Ministry of Housing and New Communities bus has taken no more than an hour to reach his residential district, even though it is 35 kilometers from the planning office where he is in charge of monitoring the Greater Cairo master plan.

By moving to this flat in this residential district on the edge of the western desert, he has become far less marginal than when he lived in the crowded working-class communities of Giza, although they are much closer. Once it had reached the car bridges and crossed the ring boulevard without any major delay, racing due west, his bus drove above the intricate chaos of illegal constructions submerging the rare surviving irrigated market gardening activities—one of the Housing Ministry's nightmares: 4 million people live there, where only a little more than 700,000 lived when the ministry launched the 1970 master plan that was supposed, with its four new satellite cities, to put an end to the encroachment of agricultural land. The bus then reached the desert plateau of Giza, northwest of the three pyramids.

A decade ago, he could not have imagined moving so quickly into such a flat, which he was among the first to purchase, on plans, from the Engineers Syndicate**,** thanks to his connections among the Muslim Brotherhood that control it (or the corporation). The real-estate boom of the 1990s and the early 21st century changed everything. He and his colleagues at the Greater Cairo Physical Planning office did not see it coming at all. In less than 15 years, the urbanized area of Cairo has almost tripled in size, and roadway infrastructures, as well as the supply of transport—private rather than

public—has finally caught up, keeping pace with the projects of developers. Amr's residential district, built in 1991, remained stranded, an improbable juxtaposition of concrete and brick skeletons plunked down willy-nilly in the middle of the desert, for almost a decade, empty. It has just barely become accessible and viable, although **neighborhood** businesses remain rare. In the meantime, to the modernist, working-class cores, built by the state, of these new towns, more than 1,000 square **kilometers** of recreational and exclusive residential projects—gated communities, golf courses**,** and amusement parks, not to mention universities and private hospitals—have been added. Residential complexes with evocative names such as Utopia, Gardenia, New Garden City, Qatamiya Heights, **and** Dreamland have sprouted like mushrooms.

In less than a decade, a new urban world has been created at Cairo's gates. One thousand square **kilometers** outfitted with sewers and utilities, partially divided into plots and slightly inhabited, equal to twice the area of the Cairo urban agglomeration as it has existed for more than a millennium, which totaled some 13 million inhabitants in 2006,[2] compared to little more than 600,000 in the public-housing cores of the new towns and the adjoining private housing projects.

Amr works in an office on the roof of the ministry, an extra storey added on top of the 15th floor. The walls are made of planks and the roof of corrugated steel—not very legal. He registers the plots of land sold by the state and open to property development and records them on a map. Ever since the appointment of Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Soliman in 1993, Amr has been constantly covering his map with new areas devoted to grandiose projects that were never part of any previous plans. The desert fringes have become the new horizon for Cairo and for Egypt, the place to be, just as in the early **20th** century one absolutely had to move to the Baron Empain's oasis at Heliopolis, and in the 1880s, to the banks of the Nile, done up in Haussmann style.[3] These days, one has to be in Palm Hills or Beverly Hills. So many sites have been sold, most often by mutual agreement, without any public tender, that no one can figure out where the second beltway should now go. The housing ministry no longer makes plans; it just keeps records.

And yet the idea of crossing the desert plateaus was considered inconceivable by Amr's

father, who as a young engineer, right after independence in 1956, participated in the formulation of the first Greater Cairo master plan: **"**The limit of Urban Development: **o**n the west side the need for preserving the agricultural land whenever possible as green belt and protecting it against any further encroaching of the city … The **e**astern limit was determined by the Moquattam hills and the contour lines which make any development highly expensive.**"**[4] While the change in direction of the 1970 master plan **favoring** new towns, which was reaffirmed in the 1982 plan, opened the door for today's boom, it remained under the guidance of a progressive planning vision controlled exclusively by the state: **"**Massive opening of desert **l**and to urbanization especially **toward** the east which is easiest to develop with the creation of new settlements along the ring road and around the satellite cities.**"**[5] This was a continuation of the hygiene and reform discourses of the early **20th** century in Egypt, with model villages and the conquest of new lands—in order to expand agricultural land, of course, but also to generate the advent of a modern peasantry, and, with the new towns, to turn peasants into city dwellers.

From the early 1990s, the desert fringes, the immanent property of the state, were sold without restraint or any overall plan to private developers, and this transfer continues to this day, involving increasingly gigantic private **projects. This** political about-face is grounded in the practical implementation, in 1991, of the Egyptian government's adoption of liberal dogma, something to which it had hitherto merely paid lip service since the Camp David Accords (1978) that ended the conflict with Israel. At the Ministry of Housing and New Communities, this was manifested by the **end of** the era of the omnipotent minister Hassaballah el-Kafrawi **in 1993**. This champion of standardized, mass-produced public housing built on the desert fringes had been in command of the ministry of housing since 1978. A halt was therefore called to the mass production of *blockat*, "Kafrawi no. 4 or 5**"** or **"**Chinese**"**-type buildings that dominated the landscape, urban-design compositions plunked down at random in the middle of the desert.[6] In el-Kafrawi's view, what mattered was to establish a planned alternative to counter the expansion of working-class illegal housing into the fertile land of the Nile Valley, while creating a new urban society.

In 1991, immediately after the first Gulf War, Egypt signed a **program** of reform and economic liberalization with the IMF and the World Bank. The agreement was aimed at

reducing public spending, facilitating privatizations, and opening up to foreign direct investment. It was accompanied by a recalculation of foreign debt, following the partial reduction of this debt in return for the deployment of Egyptian troops in Kuwait alongside the international coalition that had repelled the Iraqi army.

After this agreement, the state could no longer give priority to public housing **programs**. In any event, the initial **program** of new towns intended for the working class had entirely failed to achieve its aims. The new towns remained ghost towns, pitiful and soulless concrete structures. Instead of the 1 to 2 million inhabitants they could and should have housed, given the completed housing on offer, a mere 30,000 unfortunates were living a difficult exile in them. The buildings, when they were inhabited, were becoming dilapidated at an incredible rate: bearing structures and foundations would crumble after the smallest leak—many even had to be demolished less than 10 years after they were built. Reform thus provided an opportunity to put an end to a plan that had generated surrealistic landscapes and that had been self-sustaining merely because of the need to support the construction suppliers and to reach the plan's quotas.

The sale of land resources was therefore also part of a **program** of privatization and of refilling the government's coffers. The transfer of real-estate development in the desert to the private sector signified the disengagement of the state from housing production and its devolution to the private sector.

The real-estate boom was underway and has maintained, ever since, a dynamic of producing new, exclusive, and restricted residential **neighborhoods**, even private cities. Better still, the ministry allocated lots in the desert to major building contractors, in exchange for public building projects for infrastructure, bridges, irrigation canals, etc. In the mid-1990s, the cabinet did attempt to impose a moratorium so that a global plan and regulatory instruments could be drawn up that might ensure the transparency needed for transactions, but the housing ministry paid little heed. Updates to the master plan consistently ratified the sale of building lots. New Cairo therefore developed on an area almost equal to the size of **the existing city; on pre-1990 maps this area had been** designated as a zone to be planted, where building would be prohibited.

The dynamic was maintained by a rise in revenues, an opening to foreign capital (from the Gulf in particular), market performances, and the devaluation of the Egyptian pound, which guaranteed ever-greater liquidity to holders of currency. These afforded them

profit margins far superior to inflation, which **fueled** a rise in real-estate prices. Investment in land and in real estate, in an apartment, sha'qa, or villa is something all sections of Egyptian society aspire to, in order to deal with the uncertainties, devaluations, and deficiencies of the banking system. It is the only investment (along with gold) that makes it possible to stockpile acquired wealth and to reduce the risks of exposure to the volatility and the lack of transparency of the markets, as well as to devaluations. The standard housing produced by the state and the corpora**te** syndicates in the new towns was entirely turned over to this speculative market, which explains why they never reached their working-class target.

Finally, one must not forget that Egypt is still undergoing significant demographic growth.[7] This means that demand, even if it is only partly solvable, does exist. Investment in construction and especially in land appropriation therefore entails minimum guarantees—prices will adjust to demand, but the money will not vanish like in a stock market crash. Land has been appropriated.

This unprecedented reversal, in which the desert became the focus of all investments and all social progress efforts, was not simply the product of a government reform in **favor** of the private sector. It was above all the private sector, in line with a logic of convergence, that gained access to government, under the guise of an opening to civil society. In the 1990s, having taken over the machinery of the National Democratic Party, entrepreneurs entered parliament, and subsequently became part of the government.

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Promoting H**ousing** O**utside** "**The Victorious City**"**[8]: The** F**light to the** D**esert**

The tourism angle of the exclusive housing sites of the gated-community type is fundamental. **A** stay in the tourist resorts of the Mediterranean or the Red Sea entailed a prime experience of the domestication of an alternative lifestyle, outside the city walls, for the wealthiest of Cairo's residents. The summer months spent among peers, far from the madding crowd, made it possible to conceive an alternative to city living in spatial proximity with the **rest** of society. Therefore, when the first gated-community **programs** appeared in the early 1990s, they immediately found a clientele that was convinced of the benefits of this new mode of living. These luxury tourist villages west of Alexandria are also where the elites have been reaffirming their contacts for several decades and

where the circles and alliances of business and political figures were formed. Those who are now carrying out liberal reforms used to meet there.

From this point of view, the elites played their pioneer and ferryman role perfectly, introducing, **at** the heart of social aspirations, a radical rupture from the "felahi∫wa madani ∫ **h** (peasant and city-dweller) model of settlement in Egypt. They literally fled the fertile river valley and disavowed a city model anchored in density, diversity**,** and the sharing of the same public space. By championing, with great publicity, the private cities on the front pages of newspapers and on television, they succeeded in promoting what had hitherto \given the poor people who were forcibly relocated, without means or recourse, **to** the first working-class residential districts of the new towns \seemed a terrible relegation, exposed to the threat of wild dogs and oblivion, far from the solidarity of loved ones. **They** became the territory of all successes, of empowerment.

The desire to follow the new trend has therefore spread throughout society, even if for the majority, the horizon of the super-density working-class suburbs surrounding Cairo remains the norm and will continue to do so. For it is unlikely, in a context of global economic competition, that a stable and expanded middle class can emerge, capable of borrowing from banks in order to gain access to housing in the new private communities in the desert. The market for the cities of the desert can only remain speculative, driven by the transnational market of villas for millionaires and other mansions with views of the golf courses and amusement parks or of the void of the preserved desert expanse that guarantees the exclusion of others.

This is in fact why the government has initiated a policy of legalizing illegal working-class housing around Cairo. It can no longer offer a public housing alternative, even if it continues to boast a **program** for housing young people, named after Madame Mubarak.

This pro-rich bias of the peripheral residential market is maintained by an Arab clientele, powered by oil revenues. Arab entrepreneurs and clients see in the stability of Egypt, in light of the disintegration of the rest of the Middle East, not to mention the regime of individual liberty it affords its guests, an investment environment without equal. Egypt, and Cairo in particular, is a place in which wealthy investors from the oil monarchies increasingly prefer to invest, now that Lebanon no longer offers any guarantees. Iraqi businessmen seeking to invest as well as to set up residence abroad also constitute a

choice clientele. Adapting to this new mode of housing also came by way of the Emirates, where many Egyptian graduates go to work: it is there that they experienced gated communities and decentralized urban forms disseminated across the desert.[9]

The second component of the entrepreneurial adoption of the model of private cities in the desert lies in the social and political rehabilitation, against the yardstick of neoliberal dogma, of the Egyptian liberal age, that is to say the whole of the early **20th** century before independence and Gamal Abdel Nasser's accession to power. This was a golden age for real-estate development, during which all the exclusive **neighborhoods** in Cairo were built up, and it is now used as a mirror to promote gated-community projects—New Garden City, New Heliopolis, or villas that, depending on their style, bear the name of various princes, khedives, or princesses of Egypt.

The heritage-based promotion of the ancient **center**, as well as the restorations of the villas on the banks of the Nile,[10] also carried out by the elites and the business community, contributed to promote exclusive projects in the desert and the development of a world of artifacts—going as far as to create a fake ancient city, complete with souk, in the middle of the desert: Khan al-Azizi.

Conversely, the socialist experience became the absolute abomination. It is seen as a phase of stagnation for Egyptian society during which individual or private initiative was crushed. Social, public, and collective housing, introduced in this period and the production of which would continue because of the inertia of public policies led by engineers trained under socialism and under a culture of modernist architecture, supporting the powerful semi-public building lobby, almost to this day, became its most virulently rejected avatar.[11] In the process, the reach of Egyptian national edification after the 1952 revolution, although it had been the core of the international non-alignment movement and pan-Arabism, has also been minimized.

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The Riverbank of the Dead Given Over to Skeletons

Until the authorities used them to house several thousand homeless survivors of the 1992 earthquake as well as the daily victims of the collapses of derelict buildings in the old city, the new towns of the 1980s were almost entirely deserted. In the Egyptian press they were described as "ghost towns" and in fact had the appearance of never-completed building sites, where no Cairo resident wanted to go and where those

unfortunate enough to be made to move there were constantly **clamoring** for basic services. The only things the authorities successfully relocated to the desert were the new cemeteries.[12]

Those unfortunate enough to be relegated to these new towns, at Qatamiya or in the "Chinese" tower blocks of 6th of October City, were issued flats lacking any finish**ed** work, **without** proper doors or windows, **and** not a single shop—most **neighborhood** plans did not stipulate any**, and** there was no funding for those that had been planned. Similarly, there was virtually no regular bus line to these ghost towns, and the rare modes of transport, given the distance from Cairo, were far too expensive for their residents. Meanwhile, there was running water only for a few hours a day and the brand-new sewers were overflowing.

Cemeteries and poorly finished skeletons (timber-frame structures filled in with bricks) shared the landscape with piles of rubble and oversized (but never completed) roadways, along with a few barracks. This was the standard landscape beyond the pyramids or along the road to Port Said from the 1980s until the mid-1990s.

To be exiled to the anonymous cities of the desert was all the more unpopular because to relocate outside the Nile Valley, in**to** the desert, signified a break with the anthropological foundation of Egyptian society. For the desert remains the realm of the dead—as the west bank of the Nile was in the religion of the time of the pharaohs—which is why it had remained off the market until now. The desert remains a place of initiation, of the experience of the void. It is also where monasteries were built. Therefore, turning the desert into a place that was not just acceptable, but attractive, even exclusive, as a living environment, would require a major adaptation of the myths guaranteeing the territorial structures of communal life, amidst density and diversity, on either side of the Nile.

To live in the desert means to transgress a fundamental, structural interdiction on settlement. The placing on the market and the real-estate conquest of a void where settlement has been forbidden (a vacuum), which assures the exclusive promotion of the river valley and the delta implies a powerful means of leverage carried out by private development and thus the creative destruction of a proscription. Naturally, as they are open to the world, elites are more suited to free themselves of these anthropological values and to domesticate this hostile environment. But such resources are not simply

material and financial. They also entail a conversion to a new myth: subscribing to the neoliberal dogma that offered a framework of justification for individual and private conquest, exclusively among peers—a rupture, therefore, from a tradition of living and participating in social diversity. Moving to gated communities outside the city walls means subscribing to this momentum of individualistic rupture, when a part of **society chooses** to abandon solidarity with those who lack the means for such mobility and for adaptation to the global scale.

Here, the devaluation of life within the traditional city of Cairo, as much as the promotion of this new mode of life, made it possible to initiate a trend to settle in desert areas, as soon as the government lifted an interdict on settlement that had held for several thousand years.

Devaluation: The End of the Defense of the Unified Urban Society in Favor of Privatized Democracy

The departure of the elites for these vast desert expanses was matched by a sense of a loss of control over their environment. The devaluation of Cairo was not a natural development. Until the early 1990s, the elites were in fact very active in defending the integrity of an idealized urban society against an invasion by peasants, against a ruralization that threatened Cairo's identity—even though residential migration to Cairo had been structurally declining since the 1980s (by now, little more than 10 percent of Cairo's inhabitants are not native to the city) and this invasion was therefore something of a phantasm. The issue of distinction played out among Cairo's residents, between the rich and the poor, but it remained coded in terms of geographic origin and therefore of legitimacy as a true city dweller. Master plans attempted to represent this desire to protect the integrity of the city against the invaders. The ring boulevard was thus conceived as a raised rampart demarcating the boundaries of the legal city, while the new towns were intended to house the plebeian populace as separate suburbs. Sadat even considered issuing a Cairo identity card to monitor the influx of migrants. This idea was proposed again by a governor in 1996, but by then no one believed in it. It was too late: the city was already totally compromised, lost, and overrun. The elites no longer felt at home. They could no longer move about the city without being confronted, in endless traffic jams, by a noisy mob. To escape, to flee in order to found a new city, became an

attractive prospect.

The traumas of the 1990s further established the opportunity opened up by real-estate promotion as a potential Eden: alternative housing along the desert fringe. The 1992 earthquake laid bare Cairo's fragility, a danger from which living in a villa would provide better protection than living in a block of flats. To say nothing of the fact that Islamic groups, in the wake of this humanitarian disaster, displayed an effectiveness that far outstripped that of the state, a sign that they had a significant presence in Cairo's working-class areas, precisely where the state had lost its grip. This evolved into increasingly violent confrontations with these organizations, which **signaled** a point of no return in modes of protest against the regime.[13] While Cairo remained one of the world's safest metropolises, in no way justifying a flight to gated communities according to the Californian or South African model, violent Islamic-based protest against the regime encouraged such flight. This protest did not so much represent a physical threat as a movement of structural dissent about values, which was gaining ground while imposing restrictive and orthodox moral standards on society as a whole. The gated communities model made it possible to escape this moralization of public space.

At the same time, the appropriation of the environmental discourse and increased attention to pollution—not only air pollution, but all the other blemishes that degrade the city, notably refuse and overflowing sewers—reinforced the sense of an irreversible degradation of living conditions. And according to a logic of naturalization, the poor, intrinsically carriers of dirt, became encroaching pollutants themselves, something to be fled. The exodus to the gated communities was thus part of a quest for a lost purity, in which the desert reclaim**ed** its status as a purifying space. It was a media-driven social construct of an **"ecology of fear"**[14] that made it possible to promote a commercial alternative and sell exclusivity and security.

In **these terms**, it is fascinating to see how promoters and buyers, as well as the government, package the development of villas surrounded by golf courses **or artificial** forests as the pursuit of the green revolution and the conquest of the deserts, or even as the creation of new nature areas for Egyptian society. This extremely exclusive and extremely costly way—particularly in terms of water resources—of turning the desert green has thus been turned into a legitimate effort for the progress of Egyptian society as a whole.

The theme of a class distinction loss has to be viewed within this context of the degradation of the identity of the city. There is no longer enough open space to stage this difference. Moreover, liberali**z**ation has created a *nouveau riche* class, to whom finding oneself, when picking up one's son at the gates of a private school, alongside one's butcher or a young **corn/cereals** or real-estate speculator [the original in French ran: "…ou un jeune spéculateur de farine ou de terrain"] **,** is unacceptable. The gated community is therefore understood as an opportunity to recreate a neighborhood of **"**people like us**"** who share the same values. This exclusivity is far removed **from**, in fact the very opposite of**,** the reforming ambitions that drove the protagonists of Egyptian independence. They saw the new towns as vectors that would facilitate adaptation to modern life, **and the** integration **in**to the city and its practices [the original text in French ran: "l'intégration à la ville et ses civilités des couches populaires"] **of** working-class inhabitants who came from rural areas.

"For the desert of the cities is equal to the desert of sands"[15]
So it is the actual city that has become a desert in which life is impossible. The buyers of villas in gated communities and other private cities see themselves as pioneers of a new society that erases and excludes the old society and recreates itself on the margins, based on a plan for a self-creating utopia.
Drawing from the experience of the clubs left behind by the British, into which one gains entry only thanks to co-option and in which selection, duly respected, entails major stakes, the gated communities developed archipelagos of private micro-democrac**ies**. This has to be understood as a relative alternative to the Egyptian political system, which is completely hermetic and offers no such democratic spaces—no credible elections, no real decentralization, to say nothing of corruption—in other words, economic liberalization without political liberalization.[16]
In its very geographic form, in the image of the world practi**c**ed by its elites, Cairo has become a constantly expanding universe, where the cent**er** of gravity of the locality, of Cairo as a cent**er**, is no longer particularly relevant in the face of the lures of the outside world, of the mobility potential expanded to a global scale and to the flows that connect the whole of the planet. Withdrawing to one's villa is, first and foremost, connecting to the world—satellite television, telephone, internet, etc. This represents a profound

revolution in global settlement, in which the desert fringe, invested and inhabited by these new nomads, is redefining the contours and the integration of Egyptian society. The public cores of the new towns built in the 1980s are also experiencing, as a result of the real-estate boom that surrounds them, localized forms of regeneration. Transport services finally link them to the metropolis, services are multiplying along with businesses, **and** sometimes even genuine commercial **centers**, like malls. People are increasingly moving to these areas, in particular the middle classes who have their own car. A diffusion of settlement is thus taking place that, through a new social mix, could bring nuance to the apparent exclusivity of the appropriation of the deserts. As for the **worst built** of the public housing projects, those pl**o**nked there in the 1980s and 1990s to satisfy statistical demands, they are falling into ruin, abandoned, or have been demolished because they spoiled the view from a luxury residential project**,** or because developers wanted to buy the sites they occupied.

Notes:

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[1]

J. [why full name here while in other references only initials appear ?] Baudrillard, *Simulacres et Simulation*, Galilée, Paris 1981, p. 10.

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[2]

17.6 million in the metropolitan area—total of the three provinces: Cairo, Giza**,** and Qaliyubiya. Census of Egypt, 2006.

[3]

R. Ilbert, *Heliopolis. 1905–1922, genèse d'une ville*, CNRS, Paris 19**9**1; J.-L. Arnaud, *Le Caire. Mise en place d'une ville moderne*, Sindbad/Actes Sud, Arles 1998.

[4]

S. El Sadr **(**ed.**)**, *Master Plan of Cairo,* Ministry of Municipal & Rural Affairs, Municipality of Cairo, Planning Commission, SOP Press, **Cairo 1956, p**. 45.

[5]

J.-E. Cornu, **"**Planning for Cairo's Future Environment,**"** *The Expanding Metropolis: Coping with the Urban Growth of Cairo*, **ed. Ahmet Evin**, Concept Media/The Aga Khan Award for Architecture, Singapore 1985**,** p. 191.

[6]

The labels for these standardized structures, the name of the housing minister followed by a number, refer to type according to the number of **stories** and therefore of housing units, while the other qualifier alludes to a cooperation with the Chinese government, which supplied buildings made of **pre-stressed** concrete that were remarkably ill-adapted to desert heat.

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14 million more inhabitants between 1996 and 2006, including 2.7 million in the Greater Cairo area alone.

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"Victorious City,**"** an allusion to the title of the 1971 reference work by J. Abu-Lughod and to the Arabic name of Cairo, *al-Qahira*, meaning **"**The Victorious.**"**
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[9]

Y. Elsheshtawy (ed.), *Planning Middle Eastern Cities: An Urban Kaleidoscope*, Routledge**,** London 2004**;** M. Davis, *Le stade Dubaï du capitalisme*, Les Prairies Ordinaires, Paris 2007**.**
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[10]

G. El Kadi, **"**La genèse du patrimoine en Egypte : du monument au centre historique,**"** *Regards croisés sur le patrimoine dans le monde à l'aube du XXIè siècle*, ed. Gravari-Barbas & Guichard-Angis**,** Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris 2003, p. 99–115.

[11]

O. El Shakry, 2006. "Cairo as Capital of Socialist Revolution?" in *Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Middle East*, edited by D. Singerman and P. Amar (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press), 2006

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[12]

Industry, **fueled** by joint ventures and foreign investment, also found highly advantageous, tax-free sites in the industrial zones of the new 6th of October City and 10th of Ramadan City. This made them the prime industrial employment areas in Egypt. Yet few of their workers took up residence in these cities: every day, company buses ferry their employees from Cairo's informal suburbs. Cf. E. Denis, & L. Vignal**, "**Cairo as Regional/Global Economic Capital?**"** *Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East*, **ed.** D. Singerman and P. Amar, American University in Cairo Press, Cairo/New York 2006, p. 99–152**.**

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[13]

P. Haenni, *L'ordre des caïds. Conjurer la dissidence urbaine au Caire*, Karthala, Paris 2005**.**

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[14]

M. Davis, *Ecology of Fear. Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster***,** Vintage, New York 1999.

[15]

J. Baudrillard, *Simulacres et Simulation*, p. 219.

[16]

E. Kienle, *A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt*, I.B. Tauris, London 2001**.**

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Demographic Development of New Towns in Egypt:

‼		1996	2006	variation 1996–2006	Target Population in Year 25
Burg al-Arab al-Gadid	Alexandria	7,051	41,351	34,300	400,000
Damiette al-Gadid	Delta coast	6,520	25,944	19,424	500,000
Salihiyya al-Gadid	Delta	8,140	18,968	10,828	100,000
Madina al-Sadat	Delta	95,191	142,032	46,841	500,000
Bani Suef al-Gadid	Upper Egypt	208	17,638	17,430	200,000
Fayoum al-Gadid	Upper Egypt	0	0	0	200,000
Minya al-Gadid	Upper Egypt	68	4,570	4,502	120,000
Asyout al-Gadid	Upper Egypt	0	1,761	1,761	200,000
Akhmîm al-Gadid	Upper Egypt	0	0	0	100,000
Assouan al-Gadid	Upper Egypt	0	0	0	200,000
Tushka al-Gadid	Upper Egypt	0	2,655	2,655	500,000
al-Qahira al-Gadida New Cairo	Greater Cairo	34,703	118,678	83,975	800,000
6th of October	Greater Cairo	35,354	157,135	121,781	500,000
Shaykh Zayed	Greater Cairo	0	29,553	29,553	300,000
10th of Ramadan	Greater Cairo	47,833	124,120	76,287	500,000
Badr	Greater Cairo	258	17,172	16,914	250,000
15th of May	Greater Cairo	65,560	90,324	24,764	100,000
Shorouk	Greater Cairo	0	20,983	20,983	250,000
al-Ubur	Greater Cairo	997	43,802	42,805	250,000
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New Towns Total in Egypt	‼	**301,883**	**835,703**	**533,820**	5,720,000
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Greater Cairo New Towns		**184,705**	**601,767**	**417,062**	2,950,000
Share of GCR New Towns in New Towns Total ‼		61.2%	68.4%	72.7%	51,6%
Greater Cairo (3 Regions Total)		14,887,332	17,608,574	2,721 242	‼
Metropolitan Agglomerate		11,632,794	12,969,602	1,336,808	‼
Share of GCR New Towns in 3 Regions Total		1.2%	3.1%	13.5%	‼

E. Denis, 2007; sources: Census of Population 1996 & 2006, CAPMAS; Greater Cairo Master Plan 1982 & 1997 revision

is E. Denis 2007 meant as a reference to a source? If so, a full reference should be given; If it is just an indication of the date of production of the survey, then perhaps we should make it into: "E. Denis, survey produced in 2007", in order to avoid misunderstanding
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