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The Sensibility of Turning Community-Oriented Policing into a Force of Civility and Democracy

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We want to revive the idea of community policing but for a modern world.

–Tony Blair, Former Prime Minister, UK

Overview

Much has been written about the role of Community-Oriented Policing and its impact on the development of communities, cities, nations, and the police departments themselves (Innes, 2005b; Kelling, 1987; Klinger, 1997; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988; Weitzer, 2000). No wonder the 1980s and 1990s were labeled the age of Community-Oriented Policing. The original philosophy of Community-Oriented Policing was considered by foreign countries as the latest in American police thinking. As such, many developing countries have copied this novel model and used it under different titles, including Neighborhood-Oriented Policing, Intelligent-Led Policing, Reassurance Policing (Fielding & Innes, 2006) as well as “Third Party Policing” (Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005), “Fixing Broken Windows,” and “Zero Tolerance Theory.” (Fielding & Innes, 2006). Yet, we disagree with Fielding and Innes’s view that “there is not an agreed upon definition of Community-Oriented Policing” (p. 1). Their commentary seemed incoherent in light of the doctrine “If you cannot define it, you cannot understand it,” let alone teach it. It should be easy, I presume, that grouping the words “Community” and “Oriented,” when added to the word “Policing” can be sensible enough to craft a fairly coherent definition of the term.

Moreover, attempts to mask the mission of Community-Oriented Policing under labels as those mentioned earlier may not be helpful to understanding the intended mission of community policing in addition to being redundant or divergent. Take for instance the title “Zero Tolerance.” Despite its journalistic use, it is almost impossible to implement because it denies the capacity of discretion which is arguably the core characteristic of Community-Oriented Policing theory. In a sense, if discretion were to be debunked, Community-Oriented Policing would have insignificant distinctions from the duties of regular patrol officers. Also, *Zero Based* policing is a hyperbolic term since, in the human course of events, the principle of congeniality would most likely prevent one from giving a traffic ticket for a minor violation to one’s own colleague, let alone one’s boss. On the other hand, Fielding and Innes (2006) should be applauded for identifying Community-Oriented Policing as a “surrogate trust mechanism in an era when trust in police institutions is declining” (p. 291). Having said that, the proposed “Scene of Thought” should be carefully examined from two aspects: (1) the strategic and (2) the practical. The confluence of these two variables can naturally cause a shift in the practice of Community-Oriented Policing. As to the skeptics who fear such

a shift, they may be better served if they observed O'Toole's (1995) subtitle to his book: "Overcoming the Ideology of Comfort and the Tyranny of Custom."

This "Scene of Thought" suggests that establishing or promoting civility in the neighborhood can better serve that neighborhood with a more enlightened populace and a more attractive environment, all while crime rates would progressively drop. In this context, COP officers should, *in addition to accomplishing their statutory functions*, be tasked with promoting civility and enhancing democracy. Kelling (1987) states, "it is always necessary to nudge the evolutionary process of any system as long as there are higher peaks to be reached" (p. 194). As such, we further predict that Community-Oriented Policing, in the near future, can peak to the level of acting as an "environmental police force"—a noncoercive assignment that can further monitor climate control and global warming, thus protecting communities from a possibly dooming hazard. The approach here proposed may well be fairly affordable since all that it really needs is cross-training current COP officers in the new tasks they may be called upon to execute.

To put it succinctly, Community-Oriented Policing is far too valuable to be left so negligently and aimlessly when the nation is buzzing with calls for civility without which *true* democracies can neither survive or prosper. It is also imperative that this proposition is not an agenda to put people to work or take them from work. It is a progressive means to couple human and national interests with human and national abilities. The only danger inherent in this proposition is making it a political matter, treating it indifferently, or denigrating it before it is carefully examined. If such a case were to occur, the only alternative should be reassigning COP officers to their old Peelian beat model with all its bureaucratic missteps.

From Aristotle's *Polis* to Goldstein's Policing

Goldstein's (1979, 1990) breakthrough introducing Community-Oriented Policing was not new in the history of humankind. Aristotle (384-322 BCE) had previously advocated the concept of *polis* (the ideal district) 2,500 years before and urged Athenians to *sustain the integrity of their polis*. In Aristotle's *Politics*, the *polis* (the ideal community) was far from being territorial; it was also cultural, cooperative, ascetical and politically pure (Aristotle, 1979, p. 255). Indeed, if Aristotle was in charge of a COP unit today, he most likely would have *required* officers to live in their districts; supervise municipal elections every year; ensure that the roads are open, clean, and unobstructed; as well as promoted training young boys in daily gymnastics, among other rituals. In this context, it might be interesting to mention that Singaporean COP officers today prohibit anyone from chewing gum on the streets or in public places for fear of soiling the image of their sparkling city with wrappers and human spit (personal observations, June 2009). What is even more intriguing is that Singaporean residents had gotten used to warning their visitors before they embarrass themselves by committing such transgressions.

In 1979, Goldstein published his vision of preserving the modern *polis* by redesigning the traditional Peelian role along functional lines: territorial, cooperative, and enlightened. Soon after, many police authors were enthralled by Goldstein's concept of "Problem-Oriented Policing" and its humanitarian advantages. The high crime rates in the 1980s might have driven the young academics (Cordner, 1995; Laycock, 2002; Taylor, Fritsch, & Caeti, 1998; Wilson, 1983) to interpret Goldstein's

vision in their own images. While the Goldsteinian model was Aristotelian in origin, it could not free the officers from the grip of the *structural trap*. Police officers found themselves still required to fill out time sheets, prepare flow charts, write lengthy incident reports, and attend court rather than treating the roots of criminal behavior. COP officers used education, role modeling, and mentoring to others (including the would-be criminals) to avoid crime and act civilly. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic tradition continued untouched. The organizational culture of patrol officers may have dimmed the luster of Community-Oriented Policing by distorting the lines of communication between patrol officers and COP forces, thus, perhaps, diminishing the value of both.

It might also be necessary to point out that COP forces in the U.S. normally receive no more training than that required for regular police officers—a situation that, in a sense, tarnished the original philosophy of Community-Oriented Policing which was more humanitarian and through which COP officers were trained as problem solvers. Yet, critics among COP officers resented playing second fiddles to “beat officers” whom they thought of as traditionalists who misunderstood the new role of “soft policing.” COP officers, nevertheless, continued to use reasoning, justice, problem solving, and compassion as new means to *sustain the integrity of their polis*.

The Civility of Nations

Aristotle defined civility as “a partnership for a better living” (Souryal, 2007, p 141). He advocated that “if citizens are to survive, they must live in close cooperative association with each other, and toward this end, the *polis* (ideal city) should be actively involved in promoting civility” (Souryal, 2011, p. 455). Shils (1997) defined civility as “a virtue expressed in action on behalf of the good of all society” (p. 4). Rouner (2000) defined civility as “sacrificing to help others to achieve the common good; to be seriously concerned for order, beauty, and good housekeeping” (p. 25). McClellan (2000) defined civility as “a recognition of the full humanness of both oneself and the others; an awareness of one’s interdependence with others; and a desire to make common cause with one another” (p. 78). In a more practical sense, Souryal (2011) defined civility as “a stage in human development which is characterized by reasoning, justice, equality, and compassion” (p. 466).

Civility is a virtuous human condition that can exist even in some of the most cruel conditions (i.e., the Holocaust was no exception). For instance, in the highly civilized monarchy of Bhutan in the Himalayas, acts of incivility are extremely rare (as witnessed by the author during a visit in 1994). Also, consider the Islamic North African oasis of Siwa (a community of 17,000), where acts of incivility (let alone criminal acts) were almost nonexistent. Siwans, who had lived in the oasis since 2500 BC, had no police, no courts, no judges, no jails, and no prisons, yet no acts of incivility were ever apparent. The long habit of civility in Siwa was begun due to the role of tribal elders who maintained justice, harmony, pride, and mutual respect. For example, residents pleasantly sweep the portion of the road in front of their dwellings, irrigate their land acreage on time, keep the markets quiet, respect the elderly (especially the women), and raise their children as well-deserving Siwans (Souryal, 2011).

On the other hand, any act that violates the principles of civility can constitute an act of *incivility*. While such acts may be more common, Rouner (2000) defined them “as acting dishonorably, using unnecessary force, abusing authority and, not infrequently, shipping off democracy” (p. 34). Therefore, for those who want to see a pictorial image of uncivil acts, it would be wise for them to compare the daily course of events in Norway, Sweden, or Austria with those in Nigeria, Zambia, or Rwanda.

The Natural Connection Between Police, Civility, and Democracy

Political scientists argue that true democracy cannot emerge or survive without political systems and parliamentary rules (Carter, 1998; Moyers, 2004). Criminologists argue that the same *cannot* emerge and survive without national stability and collective responsibility. Yet, measuring the level of civility among nations can be exhaustingly hard; it is not impossible because such a quantitative process inevitably encompasses numerous variables that can change in response to ever-changing conditions such as crime, accidents, diseases, education, national crises, financial recourses, among other variables (Nationmaster.com, 2005; Transparency International reports, 1993-2005). Therefore, to ascertain the civility of a community or nation, it may be done intuitively by comparing the civility of one set of countries to another. Such a comparison can be based on a series of variables, including national stability, standards of living, and the quality of life in such countries (e.g., NationMaster.com, 2005).

Yet, one factor that may be the most detrimental to promoting civility is the behavior of police, especially at the municipal level, in terms of their level of professionalism, integrity, education, organizational culture, self-discipline, and their compliance with human rights prescriptions. While incivility, as a practice, is naturally disturbing, nowhere can it be more abusive than when innocent citizens are mishandled by police. In a recent U.S. study by the U.S. Department of Justice (1996), findings showed that trust in police recorded the largest drop between the years 1980 and 1995 and that the rank order of policing in the U.S. has dropped from the 5th to the 10th place on a scale of 12 occupations. Equally disturbing, it appears, is the fact that although there are no significant differences between men and women respondents, a significant difference existed between African-American and White respondents. It should be safe, then, to assume that the operational model of policing in any country or district can over time infuriate enough citizens, causing them to give up hope on promoting civility and strengthening democracy as goals worth pursuing. No wonder, then, that Souryal (2011) proposes that “the civility of nations is measured by the civility of their police” (p. 130). Hence, it also seems logical, especially in the U.S., to consider recasting COP officers in the role of promoters of civility and defenders of democracy (*USA Today*, 2009).

A critical question may yet be “Why, despite the latest improvements in police recruitment, training, technology, and deployment, does American policing continue to receive low civility ratings?” In response, there are three reasons. First, in a free society, the public is assumed to be free to behave as they wish as long as they do not harm others or violate any rules. This puts the onus on the police to act professionally and with intended restraint. The rationale for this is that, unlike the rest of public servants, police officers are supposed to be well-selected, well-trained, well-supervised, well-led, and possibly well-paid. Subsequently, in a civil society, the police must be more restrained and demonstrate to the public that they

are fully committed to acting democratically. Second, the public may rightfully be fed up with police promises that have not been met. By so doing, the public might rightfully conclude that the police are really disinterested in “respecting the Constitutional rights of *all* men to liberty, equality, and justice,” or seriously acting as “exemplary in obeying the laws of the land and the regulations of their department” (*The Police Code of Ethics*, 2009). While it may be erroneous to suggest that all police fall into this category, a minority may act with disrespect, and/or indifference. That is more reason, perhaps, to reeducate COP officers in topics of liberal arts and simple logic. Third, expecting Community-Oriented Policing to fight crime *as well as* promote civility is a win-win proposition. The veracity of this assertion is clear: civil policing provides citizens with more satisfaction, which, in turn, dissuades the public from acting illegitimately as long as access to legal means is available, open, and unobstructed. The considerably lower crime rates in Scandinavian countries may be a clear case in point (see Kleinig, 1996; NationMaster.com, 2005) as well as Article 2 of *The United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials*, 1971).

Why Community-Oriented Policing?

Ideally, all police officers should be trained as community-oriented agents since their designation is serving the community. Furthermore, the concept of Community-Oriented Policing is a philosophy rather than a procedure (Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988). However, to escape the tall and complex bureaucratic structure, and to ensure that all aspects of government are adequately secure, police agencies opted to devote special squads to focus directly on the needs and aspirations of identified communities. That was basically the reason why Community-Oriented Policing was created. Nevertheless, two overriding stipulations in the process were the agency’s suitability to produce measurable results as well as its freedom to innovate new methods to achieve the “common good” even if such methods were not consistent with the agency’s statutory missions.

As to the reasons why Community-Oriented Policing is deemed the most suitable group to meet the new challenges, there are eight arguments: (1) COP officers are already ubiquitous and cover the entire community without the need for any additional human or financial resources; (2) by virtue of their humanistic mission, COP officers provide the best fit to undertake the new tasks. They would be more susceptible to accommodate the needs and aspirations of community members and, at the same time, most protective of the community interests against any attempts to exploit the community by unscrupulous elements (i.e., law breakers); (3) by virtue of the relative youth of COP officers, they may be more capable of cross-training, which can help them to learn new techniques that prepare them to handle more complex situations more humanely; (4) by virtue of COP officers’ closeness to the community, they are better able to mentor the citizens in innovative techniques to solve their problems (i.e., no other institution can be so effective: no home, no family, no church, no army, no school, and obviously no laws); (5) because COP officers are generally better educated, they might be more motivated to use modern technologies such as communication systems, computer systems, GPS systems, among other new techniques; (6) because of COP officers’ disassociation with their former departments, they may be better insulated from old police cultures and beliefs; (7) because COP officers will be assigned to more patriotic and honorable

missions, their motivation would, most likely, be considerably higher than regular street COP officers; and (8) the cost of cross-training new COP officers is much more affordable than most other police training programs.

Having stated that, the potential success of COP officers in completing their new tasks may be one of the most rewarding police projects. If Kelling and Coles (1996) are correct, the expected dividends these COP officers can receive may have already occurred. The two authors state that “many cities across America are now adopting the Broken Windows Prescription subsequently, as a result, the number of murders, robberies, and other felonies has plummeted” (p. 1). Also, data posted on the NationMaster.com website, under the Map & Graph section, published as *Countries by Crime: Total Crimes* (posted September 14, 2005) seemed to strongly reinforce Kelling and Coles’ findings.

The rationale behind these potential successes are fairly clear, if not self-evident: First, when civility becomes a culture, the would-be law breakers will have little incentive (if any) to act illegitimately and, therefore, may change their criminal plans (Souryal, 2011). Second, forming partnerships between citizens and COP officers allows the latter to claim real ownership of their districts while, at the same time, embolden COP officers to intervene in broader and more complex communal projects (i.e., natural crises, patriotic celebrations, athletic events, caring for the aged, teaching in schools, and role-modeling to community citizens. For instance, if a COP officer showed friendliness during a scheduled visit to a household, the entire community would more likely know and applaud their civil engagement. Third, as COP officers socialize more and more with citizens, they would open more channels of communication with all concerned, be better able to advise them to keep up their homes, instill security alarms, and turn the lights on at night. In time, citizens in the district may be motivated to do the same. Fourth, due to partnerships with community elders, the COP officers’ morale would be enhanced as they find themselves leading tourist groups, and accompanying dignitaries and influential politicians. Fifth, as COP officers cement their partnerships with citizens, they can be emboldened to negotiate with City Hall, school districts, religious centers, and large enterprises (e.g., Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Target, etc.). In summary, COP officers will be experts in two specific areas: (1) procedural justice and (2) aesthetic justice. The former can reduce crime rates, minimize acts of racial profiling, end gang activities, and settle differences between schools and parents of schoolchildren. The latter underscores community aesthetic activities, including keeping the streets clean, removing debris and abandoned vehicles, as well as organizing cabs in neat columns for patrons to call upon as well as reducing loud noises around hospitals, schools, and churches and assisting elderly individuals in procuring their medical or basic needs.

An Illustration from the UK

The author of this article recently visited the UK and had several interviews with members of the British Police-Community Support Officers (PCSO). They are police officers and have the authority to make an arrest (as a matter of last resort). From a structural perspective, they closely resemble Community-Oriented Policing in the United States except for being unarmed, always on foot, dressed in light blue uniforms, wearing blue soft hats, and hooked to their dispatchers through a small microphone fastened to their shirts’ epaulets. PCSOs do *not*

replace the Bobbies. They only enforce the law in two basic ways: (1) by handling “minor” law violations such as jay walking, turning car horns high, and running a red light, thus affording the Bobbies more opportunity to handle more serious cases; and (2) by providing the Bobbies with in-real-time suspected behaviors before any such behavior becomes rough enough to require intervention by the Bobbies. PCSOs modestly walk the old neighborhoods and blighted areas, display their presence in narrow lanes, conduct house-to-house enquiries, issue fixed fines to disorderly citizens, and assist the public in whatever they might legitimately need (*The Home Office Circular*, 2007).

There are two main differences between the British PCSOs and the American COP officers: (1) specific training and (2) a mild and comforting demeanor. For the first of these, PCSOs go through a short, yet intensive, training period for about three months depending on the financial resources of their own departments. The *essence* of this training is a culmination of what this article is about. Although they do not exactly use the word civility, they use other similar words such as public order, discipline, or propriety. On the second issue, PCSOs fight crime by displaying a more comforting and unthreatening demeanor which, in fact, exhibits *democratic values* and, in the absence of a British written constitution, it is not too different from democratic values as known in any true democracy. In talking with PCSOs, they stressed that the more civilly the police treat the citizens, the more the citizens obey their local police and get accustomed to living in a free, peaceful, and responsible culture. Because the PCSOs display laxity, yet confidence, the public normally responds with respect and gratitude. This, in turn, motivates the PCSOs to practice civic engagement with a great sense of responsibility.

In the U.S., COP officers normally do not receive any more training than regular patrol officers. Thus, while they may receive a longer term of training, their training is far from being consistent with their mission as COP officers. From a behavioral perspective, while COP officers in the U.S. are trained as police generalists, PCSOs are, perhaps, trained more as “modest gentle persons.” Another symbolic, yet significant, difference between the behavior of these two groups of professionals is that while the COP officers would rather be left alone unless called upon to act, PCSOs seem to be actively awaiting involvement with citizens. They also seem more familiar with understanding human behavior, social communication, as well as having an academic knowledge of moral philosophy. Also, by showing off their level of gregariousness, they seem to be more willing to serve. To quote a female PCSO, “Our unspoken weapon is treating the public with dignity, patience, and a sense of humor” (personal conversation, March 9, 2010). The PCSO’s goal is not necessarily fighting crime (this is left for the Bobbies), but, rather, it is convincing the public to portray themselves as fine “ladies and gentlemen,” which is consistent with acting civilly (Wilson, 1993). This type of behavior, PCSOs argued, can accomplish four specific goals: *normalcy*, without which abnormalities could be more easily spotted and addressed; *justification*, without which police decisions would be either random or arbitrary; *discretion*, without which innocent citizens would be protected; and *logic*, without which none of the before-mentioned goals would make any sense. One lesson to be gleaned from this discussion, perhaps, is that it might be necessary for COP officers to consider adopting a similar approach—*not* by copying the British model but by adapting their own attitude while, perhaps, displaying a more comforting and truthful willingness to serve and protect.

Hard and Soft Policing

Innes (2005a) of Britain marks a significant division between the Bobbies whom he calls “hard policing,” a force that is founded on “direct implementation of coercive power, hierarchal forms of organizations and subscribing closely to crime control theory,” and PCSOs whom he calls “soft policing” (Hopkins Burke, 2004). These two groups of police officers have been so characterized because their *Original Condition* (Hume’s term) is basically different. The former group acts formally and authoritatively, while the second acts sociologically human. In the U.S., there seems to be no radical difference between “hard or soft” policing since both corps are enacted concurrently—a condition that suggests that law and order cannot be wholly based upon hard policing, nor is it wholly based on soft policing. Innes (2005b), nevertheless, regrets the curvilinear distance between “street cops” (namely the Bobbies) and PCSOs who are the counterparts of American COP officers. Subsequently, Innes observed that Bobbies tend to treat PCSOs with disdain (Reiner, 2000), a behavior which is not too different from the case in the U.S. wherein COP officers are often perceived as a reserve police force (Fielding & Innes, 2006).

Innes (2005b) adds rather regretfully that “street cops,” almost all over the world, seem unable or unwilling to change their old Peelian (after Sir Robert Peel) mode of policing since it has been the only model they grew up with and totally relied upon (O’Toole, 1995). This state of dissonance might have caused consternation among American COP officers who subtly resent playing “second fiddle” to the “real cops.” Critics among them may also believe that they, COP officers, have been so organized for no other reason than appeasing the politicians who wanted to boast about increasing the number of police officers on the street or making their administrators look good (Souryal, 2007). Nevertheless, with the advent of new technologies (e.g., street cameras, fast computers, electronic communication, GPS technology, among other tools), the practical value of COP officers seemed to be rapidly slipping away.

Having said all that, it may be intriguing to note that numerous foreign countries (both developed and developing) continue to copy the American model unbeknownst to them that their native (village style) methods of crime control might be more effective in maintaining law and order and keeping crime rates low (e.g., Botswana, Kuwait, Bahrain, New Zealand, Baton, and to some extent, Israel). Moreover, in some developing countries, the American model of Community-Oriented Policing may have been adopted as a matter of propaganda, simply to demonstrate modernity and equivalence with more advanced countries. For instance, in a recent visit to two African countries, both of their Police Commissioners proudly stated, “As in your country, we also use Community-Oriented Policing.” After some friendly discussions, they mildly admitted that they really believed that their “village type” of policing is indeed more effective, as well as much more affordable (Quinn, 1999). It may also be surprising to know that after 9/11 events, no American police theorists or practitioners recommended that COP officers be assigned to guard and assist in the huge disaster that ensued in a manner akin to the “Special Police Force” activated during the London Blitz in 1941-1942. However, it should be noted that a few COP officers participated in mentoring Muslim citizens to avoid extremism and helped victims of violence to relocate after those disastrous events.

Cultivating True Democracies

The basic assumptions in this article are clear, if not self-evident. They are (1) with the exception of Cuba, North Korea, and China, the vast majority of countries claim to be democratic while, in reality, they *are not*. Defective democracies, if left unaddressed, can be dangerous to societies because they can be misleading or self-deceptive. Skeptics should only remember that Hitler (not unlike many other dictators) named his regime a *social democracy* and Qaddafi of Libya called his regime *Ghamaheria*, which literally meant a super democracy; (2) while *true* democracies are fairly rare, they basically survive on the backs of enlightened institutions and individuals who are devoted to keeping them alive and prospering. It may also be worth remembering that after adjourning the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, when Benjamin Franklin was asked by citizens which type of government should they expect, he replied, “a Democracy, if you can keep it”; (3) for *true* democracies to survive, nations might have to fight wars in order to achieve peace (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan). Skeptics who may doubt this comment should consider travelling in Central Africa, Central America, or Arab countries to see the disastrous consequences of incivility and phony democracies; (4) it would be contradictory (and rather deceptive) if a country were to claim its government as democratic yet that its police *were not*. Any such claim can demolish the integrity of the country in question; and (5) nowhere is the sentiment of civility as necessary as in the procedures of the criminal justice system wherein a small forgery or even a lie can condemn an innocent person to death. Sadly, it might be true that “the civility of nations is measured by the civility of their police” (Souryal, 2007, p. 130).

To underscore these assumptions, it might be more assuring to learn what Ian Johnston, President of the Police Superintendents’ Association in England in 2005 stated when he described the hidden side of the British police system:

[We] must learn to provide better service. . . . [O]ver half of the complaints against the police were about rudeness and incivility . . . [a] problem that has been exacerbated by officers having to spend all their time pursuing people for trivial offences in order to meet Home Office targets.” (Allen, 2008)

Johnston further added,

We [the police] cannot get away from the fact that national poll after national poll says that despite our record on crime levels, confidence is decreasing. So somewhere we are going wrong. (*The Telegraph*, 2002)

Ten Words of Caution

This article examines how communities can smartly reduce crime rates while, at the same time, maximize civility and reinforce democracy. These are two overriding goals that have threatened developed and developing societies for generations. One may envision four expectations that can make this goal a reality. First, in light of the huge financial investment in Community-Oriented Policing in the U.S. (and other countries), it seems imperative that governments take the first step in trying to change the way police theorists and practitioners think. Second, to achieve the reality, COP officers should become masters of reasoning, so they can capture the truth of the matter before taking any action based on opinion,

beliefs, sentiments, or hearsay. Third, to help develop *true* democracies as those in Scandinavian countries (or even Hong Kong or Singapore), countries should revisit the role of their COP officers and establish a small number of identifiable, honorable, and worthy missions. For such missions to truly succeed, they must pass the test of legal and moral legitimacy and be seriously taught to the officers in charge. If the missions are truly legitimate and necessary, COP leadership should consider innovative methods for accomplishing these few missions. Everyone at this planning stage should acknowledge and remember that “while all nations have crime, only civil nations can offer justice” (Souryal, 2011, p. 443). Fourth, COP leaders should take the issue of justice seriously since it is a key factor in the sociological equation. At this point, it should be acknowledged that a crime includes an act of injustice; therefore, the more justice is offered and preserved, the less crimes are contemplated or committed. Fifth, for *true* democracies to prosper and endure, there must already be a *robust foundation of civility* otherwise democracies will be stillborn. The reader should also realize that a bad democracy may be a worse option than no democracy at all. Sixth, civil police can create civil societies, which, in turn, enhance the emergence of civil democracies. Seventh, highlighting justice reinforces the chances for developing civil cultures, while, at the same time, lower crime rates accordingly. Eighth, if Community-Oriented Policing is to be so recasted, it would likely be one of the smartest plans to effectively utilize the police since Robert Peel passed “A Bill for Improving the Police In and Near the Metropolis” in 1829 (Souryal, 1977). Ninth, nothing other than that has worked in the past, or is likely to work in the future.

Structural-Functional Concerns

The structure and mission of Community-Oriented Policing in the U.S. have for a long time been treated rather randomly, if not haphazardly. By way of analogy, officers were made to believe that if they accomplished three specific functions, a *miracle prophecy* will automatically follow. These three functions were (1) exercising formal or informal (depending on the situation) control measures without inciting riots or stirring up violence, (2) ensuring people’s safety in their homes and for their effects without invading anyone’s privacy, and (3) creating a “civic trust” relationship between the police and the public whereas each side can count on the other. As for the *miracle prophecy*, it seems to have been lost.

Yet, while the structure of Community-Oriented Policing in the U.S. is theoretically laudatory, its application seemed hypothetical. To paraphrase a famous quote from an old movie, “if these objectives are attained, the miracle will occur.” As in most social transformations (e.g., democracy in Iraq, peace with Israel, non-nuclear Iran), there is no assurance that any miracles (in our case) will follow, let alone automatically. For one reason or another, the structural-functional aspects of Community-Oriented Policing seem hindered by complacency and lack of imagination (Taylor et al., 1998). It should be added that since its inception, Community-Oriented Policing came under scrutiny not from police chiefs or city administrators (who stood to gain both professionally and personally), but from seasoned patrol officers and supervisors, those who walk the beat so to speak. While, on the one hand, officers and supervisors kept awaiting the *miracle prophecy to materialize*, the prophecy seemed blunted because of the absence of clarity in their mission.

In Innes' (2005b) article, "Why Soft Policing Is Hard," he called attention to the inexplicable oscillation between "hard policing" by patrol officers and "soft policing" by COP officers. While Innes argues that while Community-Oriented Policing may under some circumstances succeed, in reality, that would be the exception rather than the rule (Oliver, 2008). Foremost among those who shared Innes's doubts are not the high-ranking officers but the lower-level, "seasoned supervisors" (Oliver, 2008). Disappointed, yet not wanting to risk their careers, these officers have little hope that Community-Oriented Policing can ever be productive. Second, due to their long experiences in policing, seasoned COP officers accuse their departments of being hypocritical: While their departments claim to encourage discretion and transparency, they, on the other hand, become alarmed when the officers make a bold discretionary choice. Such a contradictory state seems more consistent with Goldstein's (1979) comment, "purely structural arrangements for achieving accountability do not, on their own, reach the problems citizens most want to reach" (p. 301). And, if this is accurate, it would be necessary to change the entire structural-functional body of Community-Oriented Policing. And, if this is plausible, it would be necessary to reform the structural-functional combination of Community-Oriented Policing both conceptually and practically if the entire system is to survive. The most adequate solution to this quandary might perhaps be learning from the PCSOs. Only when COP officers are sufficiently re-educated both conceptually and temperamentally will there be enough hope that they can succeed, and only then can Aristotle's (1979) four attributes of the *polis* be met (Preface). In sum, Community-Oriented Policing should consider moving from the traditional prescriptive model to the logical model.

The Traditional Perspective: Police Is Primary

Writers on the Community-Oriented Policing model have been partially oblivious to the need for an ethical dimension to support a humanity-based style of policing. Although many seasoned officers continue to argue that "policing is policing is policing," there are four arguments against that view. First, this view portrays COP officers as mere messengers rather than role models, mediators, and protectors of the peace. Continuing this trend can further embolden would-be criminals to commit more criminal acts without risking being caught. Second, requiring more education for COP officers can suggest they are a preferred group of officers who, once educated, will deserve and demand higher pay. Third, some regular police departments may harbor the wrong assumption that once they declare themselves members of the Community-Oriented Policing Club and perhaps accredited, they deserve a *prima facie* higher status than officers in noncertified police agencies. This belief—despite the best intentions of its supporters—can create a serious illusion not much different from when the FBI claimed it had totally "prevented all" terroristic attacks in the United States, which was untrue. Fourth, police departments that practice Community-Oriented Policing are understaffed to such a point that it makes little impact in the broader equation. This can make the more efficient COP officers "lose heart," abstain from making partnerships with citizens in their districts, or doubt the ability of their supervisors, and, as a result, take their jobs less seriously than is required. If this occurs, Community-Oriented Policing may be ineffectual and lose its claim to legitimacy and give credence to the bureaucracy they were accustomed to for years.

The Original Perspective: Community Is First

Since the times of Thomas Jefferson, the U.S. followed Aristotle's views on the supremacy of the idea of the independent *polis* (i.e., community) which, in Aristotle's view, was far superior to any other institution in his time. Yet, in previous policing experiments (i.e., team policing, problem-oriented policing, Zero Tolerance policing, Fixing Windows Policing, among other theories), the significance of the independent *community* was central to designing local administration. Indeed, the original design of police had little to do with crime and more to do with promoting civil and harmonious communities (Aristotle, 1979). Moreover, the *polis* idea was more about the state's ability to promote an independent civil Community that can resolve its own conflicts, pass its own constitutions, and try its own law violators. In a sense, this idea minimized the impact of crime, prevented violence, and promoted civility. Although harmonious communities could function under a repressive police style (i.e., Jewish ghettos in Poland and the Inquisition System), no amount of advanced policing could function independently from the sovereignty of community interests and community welfare. As suggested before, when civility rises, there would be a far better chance for democracy to emerge, at least in the image of human rights.

Without civility, and regardless of the best intentions of COP agencies, true democracy will have no chance to "hatch" (Taylor et al., 1998). Hegel called this phenomenon of hatching "organicism" (Lavine, 1984, p. 264). He considered it essential to the *gradual evolution* of the civil state since it allows a natural interdependence among all the parts essential to sustaining the whole (Lavine, 1984). On the other hand, implementing Community-Oriented Policing in third-world countries where civility is low will, under no circumstances, foster a *true* democracy. (Arab countries have been trying that for a long time but failed.) Indeed, we reason that without treating the community with justice; dignity; honesty; and the interconnectedness between professional policing, civil communities, and constitutional restraints, *true* democracy would have no chance to emerge anywhere (Taylor et al., 1998).

Toward Recasting Community-Oriented Policing

Transparency International records (1993-2003) show that the more civil the community, the more democratic it is. The same source also shows that the ten most democratic countries in the world (N = 192) have considerably lower crime rates than any rich—but less civil—countries. The more likely conclusion, then, is that unless the public is community-schooled in the arts of civility and complies with such arts, principle countries can hardly achieve democracy.

The logistics of recasting Community-Oriented Policing requires *internal* and *external* intervention combined with a standard knowledge in human sanctions. External intervention is initially learned under the tutelage of parents, teachers, preachers, and role models. Examples include principles such as "first come, first served," "no littering in the streets," "accepting and respecting justice," "treating all people equally," and "expressing compassion to the poor and the needy." These sanctions are usually learned at home and then reinforced in lower schools, high schools, as well as colleges. In time, such principles become one's "second skin" and are internalized in the deepest cells of one's brain. Consider, for instance, the

cultural habit of Muslim households to slaughter a sheep inside the house or on the street to celebrate a religious event. In most cases, patrol officers ignore such practices as a weird cultural habit endorsed by many clerics. This is certainly a morbid example, yet the practice could be aborted with the intervention of a brave police-community officer who could convince family members of the incivility involved in this practice. In time, the entire neighborhood would hear about the incident and abstain from practicing the old way and accept the contribution of the concerned COP officer. Yet, for this to work, COP officers should be humble enough and eloquent enough to analytically convince community members instead of offering personal opinions, bias, or whims. Further, four subsequent ideas are presented here to articulate what a reformed COP agency can do to cement the relationship between the police and the community, and, in turn, democracy:

1. *Community-Oriented Policing is a culturally based philosophy.* Regardless of how it operates, its main advantage is being flexible by making the community civil enough and ready to appreciate democracy. Obviously, the factors behind this equation include the community's level of literacy, sophistication, available funds, and docility. In other words, while COP programs should be guided by certain rules and regulations, such rules and regulations should be allowed to vary from one community to another, and one situation to another. As mentioned earlier, it is hoped that, in the future, community members would be swayed to get involved in attractive projects such as respecting the trees, lowering global warming, encouraging musical festivals, or displaying murals in central locations. As an example of flexibility, during the First World War, the French soldiers and the German soldiers were fighting a trench war against each other (1914-1918), yet both armies decided to stop fighting on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day because they considered fighting during Christmas a seriously uncivil act in practicing Christianity.
2. *Community-Oriented Policing should not pander for the purpose of looking good.* For example, many public agencies are used to pandering to endear the police to the community. Examples include standing almost still at athletics stadiums or in front of synagogues and churches on Saturday or Sunday, basically to impress the community members. Alternatively, humble acts of civility can more effectively capture the "hearts and minds" of communities by motivating their constituents to honor nobility, including police nobility (Wilson, 1983).
3. *Police Chiefs Should Make House Calls.* This idea might reflect one of the most civil practices in community affairs—police chiefs and COP supervisors adopting a habit of making random house calls (obviously at the invitation of the household). This idea, if adopted, can certainly have a great impact on the community when neighbors next day realize how far the police are personally reaching out to their community.
4. *For Community-Oriented Policing to succeed, they should be serious.* COP agencies should be keen to select intelligent officers (preferably with 30 credit hours of college education) who are personally and intelligently dedicated to serving the "public good." Such qualifications are essential. Yet, while such candidates may be rare, there are likely a number of individuals who are willing to volunteer and, at the same time, fit the profile. What makes recruitment of such officers rather difficult might be the old skepticism of police officers regarding their

leaders' desire to hire who they want rather than who would be best for the common good (Denhardt, 1987; Herzberg, 1976; Hummel, 1994; Kleinig, 1996; Souryal, 2007). Whatever the case might be, it seems safe to suggest that many police departments can find "good individuals" to hire.

Can It Work?

Cordner (1995) discusses four dimensions of Community-Oriented Policing: (1) philosophical, (2) strategic, (3) tactical, and (4) organizational. While his discussion is informative, it stops short of answering a number of important questions. For instance, what evidence supports the view that these four dimensions are the *only* qualifying dimensions applicable to COP agencies? Might there not be smaller departments, rural departments, and more or less affluent departments where Cordner's views may not fit? Also, what good are these four dimensions if the officers (the agents themselves) are misinformed or mistreated, therefore, unwilling to comply? Also, how much cooperation should exist between Community-Oriented Policing and the mother police department as well as the regional institution? Summarily, the question to Cordner should be "Is that all we can offer?"

By contrast, Morris (1997), in addressing business and bureaucratic institutions, presents another set of four dimensions that naturally encompass the soul of Community-Oriented Policing: (1) the *intellectual* dimension that seeks the truth, (2) the *moral* dimension that seeks goodness, (3) the *spiritual* dimension that seeks unity, and (4) the *aesthetic* dimension that seeks *temperance*. While a comparison between Cordner's work and Morris's may be irrelevant in this article, the integration of both works can be empirically useful to both models. Furthermore, COP officers should naturally be interested in serving individuals as well as communities. Such officers should be more than willing to act as partners in the social connection between the governors and the governed. Furthermore, in a democracy, sovereignty should unquestionably be in the people's domain and not in the hands of the police. Moreover, officers must be of the opinion that if communities are worth serving, they should be served well. Finally, communities would sincerely appreciate it if the police succeeded in resolving their problems rather than the problems being ignored, forgotten, or left for the communities to resolve.

Most importantly, COP officers should be analytically alert and not accept cheap managerial slogans such as "the ends justify the means," which is only true if the means are legitimate. Any other interpretation would be foolish. Finally, for Community-Oriented Policing to be honorable and noble, the officers themselves must act as democratic role models who are duty bound to serve the "common good" and only in "good faith." This might give credence to the statement, "Good faith is the only virtue that can make all other virtues possible" (Souryal, 2007, p. 274).

The Enlightenment Challenge

Consistent with the previous reservations and the imperative to instill a moral dimension in Community-Oriented Policing, the following are global propositions that can be grouped under the rubric of *instilling civility*. They constitute a single body of virtue for all concerned. The following four concepts should be applied

together; if one is missing, then the whole template is flawed: (1) reasoning, (2) justice, (3) good faith, and (4) discretion.

Reasoning

Reasoning is a fundamental human capacity that separates human beings from all other creatures. Other creatures may instinctively think in short flashes, but they are unable to reason. Reasoning can be defined as a “pure method of thinking by which proper conclusions are reached through abstract thought processes” (Souryal, 2007, p. 12). Among Plato’s famous four levels of knowledge—opinion, belief, science, and reasoning—reasoning is the paramount talent. It basically commands one’s brain to dialectically debate (within itself) all aspects of the subject being questioned, examining all points of view, and selecting the best option without bias, favoritism, or personal gain. By the same token, the out-product of reasoning is *logic*, the art of proof by confronting one’s agonist with self-evident facts that cannot be denied.

In Community-Oriented Policing, it is essential that officers understand how to reason and how to use logic rather than acting upon opinion or belief. Without the reasoning process, COP officers will be compelled to make decisions based on their personal opinions, experiences, religious faiths, family traditions, or fable stereotypes. On the other hand, the absence of reasoning can ruin the integrity of an arrest, lead to contrived evidence, or make a mockery of the virtue of justice.

Justice Above All

COP officers should understand that, consistent with the rule of antonyms, crime is an act of injustice. Hence, the logical lesson is to train community officers to think, first and foremost, of the primacy of justice. Stated differently, if there is no standard of justice, there cannot be a standard of crime. As such, COP officers should more actively function as agents of justice if they want to effectively reduce crime. St. Augustine stated “when there is no justice, then what is the role of the state but a band of robbers expanded?” (Souryal, 2007, p. 151).

While justice has been defined differently by many philosophers (see Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant, Locke, Rawls, and Nozick), they all, in essence, identify the practice of *giving each what he or she deserves* (Solomon & Murphy, 2000). Hence, the critical task of Community-Oriented Policing is to honestly and accurately determine “Who deserves what and why?” Responding to this question can be critical to COP officers as long as the question remains unexplained. According to Aristotle (1979), justice is the middle ground between two extremes—one is *excessiveness* and the other is *insufficiency*. The ideal practice of justice therefore—short of scientific standards—is selecting the middle ground between the two extremes, provided the officer is acting in good faith without bias or malice.

Injustice, on the other hand, is not necessarily the opposite of justice since, according to the rule of contrarians, the opposite of justice is *not* injustice but the *absence of justice*, and the opposite of injustice is not justice but the *absence of injustice*. This distinction is critical to COP officers since (unless there are other incriminating factors) the officers must treat citizens with equal standards.

Good Faith Action

Acting in good faith is another condition required of all police, especially COP officers. Accordingly, unless justified (as in keeping classified information), COP officers should not voluntarily lie, cheat, or steal. Acting in good faith literally means acting justly to all; telling the truth; or making decisions based only on the merits of the situation while upholding the moral standards of honesty, fidelity, and obligation. Given the different culture in Britain, the PCSOs like to advocate that if they treated the public in good faith, the public would almost certainly, reciprocate, a belief which obviously cannot be interpreted universally. Regardless of differences in culture, however, the British belief may be thought of as a natural law. Even if the constituents do not reciprocate, PCSOs argue, it would be more likely that community members would look up to the PCSOs and appreciate their role as “ladies and gentlemen.”

Justified Discretion

Discretion is the practice of focusing one’s attention on the most sensible option available at the time, among a variety of other options. It can be defined as the *officers’ ability to use their independent judgement in blurred situations when there is no readily available advice from a supervisor or a partner at the time*. Discretion is necessary for all public or private servants, yet it may be most essential to police officers, and even more so to COP officers since they normally work alone without close supervision. As such, making accurate discretionary decisions requires much more profound reasoning, higher moral justification, and responsible judgment. It requires the application of new professional skills to particular problems or incidents. A guiding formula for police discretion is presented in Souryal’s (2011) work. The formula is $E=PJ^2$ in which E (the ethical decision) equals P (the ethical principle involved) times J (the degree of justification observed), and the square power of 2 refers to possible exegesis for the officer to determine how justifiable is the discretion selected earlier. For instance, violating the speed limit to take a dying child to the hospital is by far more important than speeding to catch a plane, to attend a class, or to eat lunch. Ethical discretion represents the epitome of the justification process since the power of P is constant, while the power of J can be a changing variable. An application of this formula has been recently adopted by the New Haven Police Department (1996). The policy explains police discretion via this more mathematical approach.

Summarily, the global lessons to be learned from the concept of justified discretion are preventing crime, reducing citizen fear, facilitating public discourse, creating an atmosphere of civility, and improving the quality of life in the neighborhood. As such, COP officers should be most keen to intervene at the following three levels: (1) educating the offenders by teaching them the rules of civility and the consequences of incivility; (2) informing the offenders of the consequences of incivility; and (3) if the reply is negative, then arresting the offender without an apology. The New Haven policy also presented six possible levels of justification: (1) the gravity of the crime, (2) the time of the crime, (3) the location of the crime, (4) the condition of the offender(s), (5) the condition of the victim(s), and (6) the number of suspects involved. According to this policy, officers can more accurately evaluate the justification of their discretion in a specific situation and calculate whether it warrants either accentuating or mitigating factors that can modify the charges to be pressed.

Summary and Recommendations

Since the 1990s and the early 2000s, the effectiveness of Community-Oriented Policing in the United States has been progressively weaker, and its reputation (as well as its performance) has been diminished. Especially after the 9/11 events, it became almost obsolete. It seemed to suffer from the absence of a sound set of missions or a clear declaration of what the officers' assignments were. In essence, there seemed to be a structure that was unable to support what the required functions needed.

This article is not designed to criticize Community-Oriented Policing but to applaud what they have been doing as well as what they can do in the future. The discussions herein examined the ways and means available to revitalize the system in the U.S. as well as in countries that use different models of community policing. The purpose of this article is to help transform the institution of Community-Oriented Policing into a robust yet humanistic modern model, one that is supported by new organizational missions, a better educated line of officers, and a more diversified leadership style. The purpose of this transformation is to turn the institution into a modern factory designed for promoting civility as the foundation for reinforcing democracy. The model appears like a win-win scheme since any increase in civility would translate to a drop in crime rates. The proposed transformation should be based on humanity, justice, and dignity for the community residents. This, in itself, can raise the morale of COP officers coupled with far more effective propositions to upgrade the welfare of the communities involved and maximize the COP officers' motivation to create a new and improved structural-functional relationship—all while lowering the motivation of would-be criminals to commit crime since the paths of justice and dignity would be available, open, and unthreatening.

This article recommends redesigning Community-Oriented Policing nationwide by forging a scientific balance between police demands for law and order and the human rights' demands for an honest and open system of government. For these reforms to occur, however, officers should be re-educated; missions must be redesigned; and communities need to be partners that can share decisionmaking, management techniques, and a united motivation to establish a worthy, yet effectual, system of higher levels of civility and organization with highly advanced technologies that can serve state and national needs. Subsequently, a new democratic system will likely emerge, one that can exercise social control both formally as well as informally without inciting violence; ensure people's safety without violating their privacy; and enhance the civic trust between the police and the community to the extent that each side would be eagerly willing to aid the other. These developments will emerge and survive at a most affordable cost. As is the case in the UK and in other advanced countries, the new Community-Oriented Policing system will require an intensive educational program in soft philosophy, elementary justice, ethics and decency, and dignity and etiquette—all mixed with a display of pleasantness, compassion, and humility. Furthermore, like members of the Peace Corps, COP officers should be selected wisely on the basis of merit, education, and a lot of passion to serve their communities faithfully yet efficiently.

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