12-2020

Did Public Organizations in Saudi Arabia Increase Openness When They Implemented New Public Management (NPM)?

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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Bader Alabdulkarim entitled "Did Public Organizations in Saudi Arabia Increase Openness When They Implemented New Public Management (NPM)?." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

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David H. Folz, David J. Houston, Khalid Alshibli

Accepted for the Council:

Dixie L. Thompson

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Did Public Organizations in Saudi Arabia Increase Openness When They Implemented New Public Management (NPM)?

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Bader Alabdulkarim
December 2020

Abstract

This dissertation investigates the impact of new public management (NPM) on Saudi ministries' openness. The study sample is three Saudi ministries: The Housing Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce. Moreover, this study creates the NPM Index to measure the ministries' NPM implementations. Furthermore, this research uses the Public Participation Spectrum (SSP) to measure openness. This dissertation collects data from the sample's annual reports for 2017, and the main finding is that implementing NPM did not increase ministries' openness. The ministries showed different NPM implementations levels with the same level of openness.

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Chapter One

Introduction

The public sector is suffering from fiscal and effectiveness obstacles in many countries around the world. For more than 30 years, public administration reformation has been discussed frequently at the meetings of OECD countries (Bruno, 2018). To guide reform efforts, governments have implemented new public management (NPM) and governance theories.

Numerous studies have investigated NPM and governance. Each of these theories either emphasizes or brings new principles and values into public administration. For example, both NPM and governance theories emphasize customer-oriented values (Klijin, 2012).

A customer orientation changes public administrators' traditional values: Instead of viewing the public as clients, administrators see them as customers, sovereign consumers (Bryson et al. 2014; Rodrigues & Pinho, 2012). As a result, customer orientation encourages public organizations to focus on achieving customer interests, needs, and expectations (Bruno, 2018), as well as delivering appropriate and personalized services.

The core customer-orientation values are openness and satisfaction, and openness includes responsiveness and transparency. Responsiveness refers to public participation in making public organization decisions. Public organizations must be responsive to both their employees and beneficiaries. Therefore, responsiveness requires empowered employees and the inclusion of beneficiaries in the planning and decision-making processes. Moreover, empowering beneficiaries requires public institutions to have regulations allowing the public to participate in decision making with a high level of transparency.

Transparency means the public has the right to access public organizations' documents and includes the dimensions of instruments and goals (Bugaric, 2004).

With full transparency, openness increases the satisfaction of both public employees and beneficiaries (Gadot & Meiri, 2007; Rodrigus & Pinho, 2012). Scholars have discussed that customer orientation incorporates democratic values (Balogun, 2001) because it encourages more public decision-making participation inside public organizations.

Scholars have identified two main types of democracy: representative and participatory (Leach & Wingfield, 1999). Moreover, scholars have divided participatory democracy into four categories: traditional, customer-oriented, consultation, and deliberation (Leach & Wingfield, 1999). Therefore, customer orientation is considered a type of participatory democracy. Moreover, scholars found that participatory democracy, such as customer-oriented, emphasizes representative democracy (Stewart, 1995).

Second, studies divide democracy into input and output democracy (Peters, 2010). Input democracy, also called liberal representative democracy, focuses on public participation in choosing their representatives in government. Output democracy, called participatory democracy, involves public participation in public organizations making decisions. Therefore, customer orientation is considered an output democracy.

Existing researches have focused on how NPM encourages democracy in democratic states but failed to explore if NPM motivates democratic values in non-democratic states. Therefore, this dissertation aims to extend this investigation area by focusing on NPM implementation in a non-democratic state. This aspect may explain a new reason for differences between states in NPM implementations and impacts. Furthermore, little is known about NPM in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this dissertation has a goal to fill this gap.

The testable hypothesis is that when a non-democratic state implements NPM, openness, or citizen participation will not increase. In this study, the independent variable is NPM implementation, and openness is the dependent variable. The primary method for testing this hypothesis is a case study of NPM implementation among ministries in Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi Arabia is a non-democratic country, this study predicts that government ministries will ignore the openness dimension of NPM.

The dissertation is a cross-sectional study because it focuses on one year, 2017. Furthermore, the study population is 25 ministries, but the sample is three ministries: the Housing Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce.

These three ministries were selected for two reasons. First, it focused on those ministries that provide essential services and goods for the public. For instance, the Housing Ministry is responsible for all real estate transactions and issues. Most citizens in Saudi Arabia do not own their shelter. In 2011, the housing shortage was 400,000 units (Al-Surf et al. 2014). Therefore, the expected housing shortage was around a million units (Opoku & Abdul-Muhmin, 2012). The Health Ministry is responsible for all health services in the country, and the Ministry of Commerce is responsible for state commerce and all products sold in the country (Almutairi et al. 2015). Secondly, resource limitations for the study limited the analysis to just three ministries. Finally, the dissertation's specific question becomes: In 2017, did the NPM implementations have a positive correlation with openness in the Housing Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce in Saudi Arabia?

Value-based reformation is an essential topic in public administration for many reasons. First, many scholars assert that values are essential to public administration. For instance, George Fredrickson believes that if public administration had a soul, it would be the values (Molina, 2009). Max Weber encouraged scholars to focus on substantive rationality, which includes values and ethics besides technical tools (Hogget, 2006). Scholars, as well as practitioners, believe that public organizations need to change their values to improve public services and goods (Gadot & Meiri, 2007). Furthermore, the study of democratic values in public administration can promote democracy throughout the government (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2001). Scholars assume that increasing focus on democratic values in public organizations will increase the effectiveness of public agencies (Bugaric, 2004).

This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter two provides a theoretical introduction to NPM, and the chapter has ten sections. The first section compares bureaucracy and NPM since scholars have argued whether NPM is a new movement or an old movement. Studies have found some NPM tools among ancient Greeks and from the 16th century in Europe. The third section details the origin of NPM. Scholars have discussed four theories that have shaped NPM: public choice theory, principal-agent theory, transaction cost theory, and institutional theory.

The next section discusses the reasons why NPM became a global movement. There are four main factors: economic, political, external inducement, and social. Additionally, NPM has seven doctrines: disaggregation, competition, private-sector tools, efficiency, hands-on management, standards, and output. Moreover, it has four main tools: public-private partnership (PPP), downsizing, performance measurement, and delegation. NPM also incorporates three central values: responsiveness, accountability, and transparency. After that, this chapter outlines the relationship between NPM and democracy. Next, studies have shown some weaknesses in NPM. As a result, scholars provided a new movement called post-NPM.

Chapter three considers the nature of public organizations in Saudi Arabia and has two main sections. The first section discusses the history of public organizations' reformation in Saudi Arabia. Local and international organizations have provided recommendations to improve the public sector in Saudi Arabia. In the second half of the 20th century, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the United Nations (UN) provided recommendations for the Saudi government to improve the public sector. Besides, the Saudi government established local public entities, such as the Institute of Public Administration (IPA), to improve the public sector.

The second section focuses on the three Saudi ministries: The Housing Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce. Scholars have divided the history of the housing issues in Saudi Arabia into three stages. For instance, the first stage was between 1953-1974. This stage had three features: no specific public agency for housing, a focus on employees, and limited cities. The second stage was between 1974-2011. The third stage is from 2011 to the present. In this most recent stage, the government created the Ministry of Housing. The Ministry of Housing has offered many programs to solve the housing problem, such as the free-land program.

The health system in Saudi Arabia is provided by both the public and private sectors. Moreover, there are three levels for the health system: primary, advance, and specialist. In 1950, the Saudi government established the Health Ministry (Almalki et al. 2011). Scholars discussed three main stages for the Health Ministry: curative, preventive, and regulative, and there is an overlap between these stages. Until 1978, the Health Ministry was focusing on curative activities.

In 1978, the Health Ministry established primary health care (PHC) centers. PHC centers support the Health Ministry to include preventive activities. The third stage aims to make the Health Ministry focusing on regulating the health system. In 1999, the government established the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance (CCHI) to expand health insurance for citizens.

The Ministry of Commerce was created in 1954 (Niblock, 2004). The Ministry of Commerce has a long history of combination with other ministries. For instance, in 2003, the Saudi government combined the Ministry of Commerce and Industry Ministry to became the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Moreover, in 2016, the ministry changed to be the Ministry of Commerce. In 2020, it became the Ministry of Commerce.

In chapter four, the NPM implementations and openness are qualitatively assessed. This dissertation's data comes from the digital annual report obtained from either the official website for each ministry or Opendata.org. The researcher created the NPM Index to measure the NPM implementations for each ministry. The NPM Index consists of three factors: Public-Private Participation (PPP), Performance Measurement (PM), and private-sector tools (PST).

The Public Participation Spectrum (PPS) was used to assess openness for the ministries. SSP has five levels: Inform, Consult, Involve, Collaborate, and Empower. The researcher designed a data collection instrument (DCI) to collect data.

In chapter five, the data were submitted to content analysis. Both the NPM Index and SSP scores calculate for each ministry. Then, the scores present in appendix. After that, a chart compares the ministries and shows a correlation between NPM and openness. Finally, the conclusion provides an overview of the dissertation’s limitations and recommendations for future studies.

Chapter Two

New Public Management (NPM)

Abstract

The research question has two main aspects: NPM and Saudi ministries. Therefore, this chapter discusses NPM, which is considered one of the newer theories in public administration. Much of the debate over NPM has revolved around six topics. The first topic discusses the historical issues with NPM, and it has three main issues. First, scholars have argued whether NPM is a novel theory or a rediscovered theory. Scholars have found some NPM implementations in ancient Greek society and the Middle Ages (Ma, 2003). The second issue discusses the relationship between NPM and bureaucracy. NPM drives to fix bureaucracy problems (Hood, 1991). Third, scholars have argued over the origin of NPM. Many studies discuss the main two theories that are considered the cornerstones of NPM: new institutional economics and business-type managerialism (Hood, 1995).

The second aspect discusses what NPM is. This topic is divided into three matters: NPM doctrine, tools, and values. Some scholars believe in one doctrine for NPM, such as accountability, while others expand the doctrine of NPM to seven doctrines (Hood, 1995). Moreover, NPM is associated with many tools. For example, NPM encourages public-private participation (Manzetti, 1994). Moreover, it emphasizes that governments use private-sector tools such as performance measurements. Furthermore, NPM brings new values to the public sector, such as customer orientation and accountability for results (Gadot & Meiri, 2008).

The third topic debates the rise of NPM. Scholars have argued four main reasons for NPM's emergence: economics, politics, external inducement, and social. The financial crisis and wars stressed governments to implement NPM tools such as privatization (Aberbach & Christensen, 2001). Moreover, rising the right-wing parties encouraged many governments, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, to

implement NPM (Ferlie, 2001). Also, external inducement, such as the World Bank and think tanks, persuaded governments to employ NPM (Burns, Krott, Sayadyan, & Giessen, 2017). Additionally, low public trust for public organizations motivated the public sector to perform NPM (Ferlie, 2017).

Fourth, many studies have discussed how NPM has affected democracy. NPM does not address democracy (Christensen & Laegreid, 2011). Therefore, scholars discussed the impact of NPM tools on democracy. As a result, some scholars have found evidence that NPM encourages democracy, while others oppose this view. Supporters assumed that NPM creates a new type of democracy called output, or participatory democracy (Dunn & Miller, 2007). Opponents believed that authority should be in the hand of elected officials (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Therefore, pubic participation damages democracy.

The fifth topic evaluates NPM, and it focuses on two issues: service quality and cost-cutting. NPM is assumed to increase service quality and decrease costs. Dixon and Hood (2016) found that after NPM implemented, public complaints increased about public service, which means that the service quality decreased. Furthermore, they found that the cost of public services, such as water distribution, increased because of NPM tools.

Finally, this chapter discusses post-NPM as an alternative to NPM. Post-NPM supports elected officials to have more power (Christensen, 2012). Furthermore, institutionalism and network theories are the cornerstones of post-NPM (Frederickson et al. 2015).

Historical Issues with NPM

This section discusses three historical aspects of NPM. First, some scholars assumed that NPM is an old theory. They provided two main pieces of evidence.

First, scholars found many NPM activities in Ancient Greece and Europe (Copland & Godley, 1993). Opponents assumed that these activities were limited. Second, some scholars suggested some NPM aspects to be implemented in the public sector, such as using private-sector tools. Opponents discussed that these suggestions were not implemented in the public sector.

New Public Management is a New or Rediscovered Theory

Some scholars have assumed that NPM is a new movement, while others have believed that NPM is a rediscovered movement. NPM is thought to be a rediscovered movement because scholars have found many professional practices and proposals that implement aspects of NPM since ancient Greece (Ma, 2003).

Ancient Greeks used tax farming to collect taxes (Adams, 2003). Tax farming is defined as a system that allows the highest bidder the right to collect taxes (Stella, 1993). The winning bidder pays the bid amount for the state and keeps any additional money as profit. In the 16th century, many modern countries, such as England, France, and Spain, implemented tax farming systems (Copland & Godley, 1993).

Ancient Greeks and other states used tax farming because tax farming is an efficient strategy. The government collected the taxes in advance at a low cost because they did not need to hire employees to collect taxes. Moreover, the states did not have experts in taxation. Therefore, using tax farming was the best available solution for governments.

Opponents found that tax farming was not an efficient strategy because the governments lost three things: money, decision making, and information. For instance, the government received just 24% of the collected taxes (Cizakca, 1996). The rest went to both the tax farmer and contract guarantors. Also, the government lost its authority to make tax decisions. Tax farmers increased their power and worked to influence tax decisions (Ma, 2003). In some cases, the tax farmers controlled the government by managing the tax amount. Third, the tax farmers preferred to keep the tax-collection information secret. Therefore, the government had a lack of information about taxes.

Besides, scholars have discussed power as the main disadvantage of tax farming. First, tax farming granted some authority to tax farmers. Some governments solved this problem by electing members of minority groups to be tax farmers. The minority groups were easy to replace because they did not have high power inside the state.

In 1832, Sir Henry Parnell published *On Financial Reform*. In the book, Parnell argued that if public agencies implemented a private-sector structure, they would save approximately one-third of their expenditure (Bowery et al., 2017). As an illustration, Parnell compared two dockyards: the naval dockyards and a private shipbuilder. The naval dockyards had 248 shipwrights, 18 clerks, six masters of trades, eight supervisors, eight measurers, and 11 cabin keepers. By contrast, the private dockyard had 250 shipwrights, two clerks, one foreman, one measurer, and ten laborers. Parnell found that the private dockyard was more efficient because it had a lower number of employees than the Naval dockyards. Similarly, in the 1830s, Samuel Bentham encouraged outsourcing because it increases the efficiency and effectiveness of public organizations.

In 1887, Woodrow Wilson explained that public administration was initially business administration, and that public administration should use private-sector applications. Moreover, scholars found that starting in 1905; there was a national movement in the US to empower bureaucrats to improve public organizations

(Riccucci, 2001). The accountability principle was an obstacle to implementing bureaucrats' empowerment.

Scholars have used the preceding evidence to emphasize that NPM is a rediscovered theory. These points are lacking for two reasons: First, the provided evidence is limited in both implementation and geography. For instance, privatization by the ancient Greeks was in a single public application: tax farming. Moreover, it was limited to one region in the world. Second, market-orientation recommendations were not implemented in the 19th century. Scholars discussed market orientation as a theory, but no government implemented it. As a result, most scholars look to the 1980s as the beginning of NPM.

NPM vs. Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy was created in the 1930s and 1940s (Osborne & Gaebier, 1992). It is defined as an administrative system designed to accomplish large-scale administrative tasks by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals (Olsen, 2006). Max Weber is considered the father of bureaucratic management theory, so it is also called Weberian. He looked to bureaucracy as an efficient mode of organizing public organizations (Ferlie, 2017).

Bureaucracy is based on public interest-oriented models. Bureaucrats work to achieve public interest rather than their self-interests. In response, bureaucrats have job security and social position. The proper administration of bureaucracy is defined as having two aspects: the rule of law and efficiency (Dixon & Hood, 2016). The rule-of-law aspect involves looking at bureaucrats as an instrument to implement the law (Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012). Bureaucrats must enforce law carefully, honestly, and consistently across the same cases. Efficient in bureaucratic terms means the least cost. Least cost does not mean spending less overall but spending the least amount of money on services.

Much previous work on bureaucracy has focused on four assumptions: self-sufficiency, hierarchy, accountability, and procedures (De Araújo, 2001). First, bureaucracy requires public organizations to have self-sufficiency. For instance, each public organization provides its services and goods by itself. Moreover, it hires required employees to accomplish its task. Second, bureaucracy assumes that the hierarchy structure is ideal for public organizations (Homburg, 2004). The hierarchy structure allows high management to control the organization. Third, accountability, in bureaucracy theory, is a top-down process (Hupe & Hill, 2007). Elected officials are responsible for low public services and goods. Finally, bureaucrats should focus on procedures more than results.

Scholars have discussed the many problems of bureaucracy, such as double-bind management (Dixon & Hood, 2016). Double-bind management happens when bureaucrats send contradictory messages to their employees. For instance, bureaucrats ask for high accuracy with less time. Scholars assume that high accuracy requires more time, and the opposite is exact. To solve this problem, scholars have introduced the target-setting homeostatic method. It encourages bureaucrats to balance contradictory goals.

Scholars who have discussed NPM within bureaucracy have determined that NPM should be used to correct bureaucracy failures (Hood, 1991). They have asserted that NPM is based on values that run counter to Weberian values or at least move away from Weberian values (Ferlie, 2017; Pollitt & Buckaert, 2011). For instance, public choice theory rejects public interest-oriented models. The public choice theory assumes that bureaucrats work to maximize their budgets and power. Therefore, bureaucrats are looking for new tools to increase their strength and achieve private interests.

Origin of NPM

In the 1980s, NPM appeared in Anglo-Saxon countries (Christensen & Fan, 2018). Contributions from many fields, such as political science and economics, created NPM (Lane, 2000). Scholars define NPM in many ways. First, NPM is the many techniques and strategies used to enhance public organizations' performance (Pfiffner, 2004). This definition rejects any theoretical basis for NPM (Dunn & Miller, 2007). Second, NPM has adopted market techniques that focus on increasing both effectiveness and efficiency (Liegl, 1998). Therefore, NPM is an umbrella term that describes different tools to increase the public sector's efficiency. This dissertation limited NPM to three main factors: public-private collaboration, private-sector tools, and performance measurements.

While NPM does not eliminate the old framework of public administration, it adds new approaches. Scholars believe that NPM rebalances some old public administration doctrine (Iacovino, Barsanti, & Cinquini, 2017). One representative example is NPM rebalancing accountability by increasing public accountability (Robinson, 2015).

Scholars have discussed many roots of NPM. At the same time, there is an overlap between them (Hood, 1995). Some scholars have argued that NPM was born out of a marriage between new institutional economics and business-type managerialism. For instance, the new institutional economics movement was built on three theories: public choice, transaction cost, and principal-agent (Hood, 1991). Furthermore, it had four doctrines: contestability or competition, user choice, transparency, and incentive structures (Hood, 1991).

Other scholars have shown that NPM came from four theoretical microeconomic frameworks: public choice theory, principal-agent theory, transaction cost theory, and institutional theory (Boston, 1991). The public choice theory, or public choice, is considered the basis of NPM (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Public choice focuses on the individual as the basic unit of analysis (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971). Therefore, it focuses on decision making. It has four assumptions: First, individuals are self-interested (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Self-interest assumes that each person has different preferences than others that affect his decisions. Second, individuals are rational. Rationality means that an individual can rank his preferences. The third assumption is about maximizing strategy. Each individual is looking for the option that provides the highest benefit. Finally, people make their choices based on the information that they have. These four assumptions were used to analyze bureaucrats' decision making.

The public choice theory has affected bureaucracy in many ways. First, bureaucrats focus on their self-interest over the public interest (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Self-interest encourages public organizations to be inefficient (Silvestre et al., 2020). For example, saving public money and decreasing taxation are not a priority for bureaucrats. Furthermore, self-interest opposes the central concept of bureaucracy that bureaucrats are neutral. Moreover, individuals prefer to act on their preferences and to have free choice. As a result, public choice recommends marketization and contracting out.

The second theory is the principal-agent theory, also called the agency theory. Agency theory produces an assumption of low trust between elected officials and bureaucrats (Ferlie, 2017). Namely, it assumes that the relationship between a principal (elected officials) and agents (bureaucrats) should be structured by a tight contract (Boston, 2011). For instance, elected officials and bureaucrats may have different assumptions. Therefore, bureaucrats may shirk their responsibilities because they are not always observable by elected officials.

Agency theory has two main implications in NPM: human resource management (HRM) systems and external oversight. For example, NPM encourages HRM to pay for performance, especially for senior managers. To renew a contract or raise a salary, managers need to achieve the key performance indicators (KPIs). A subcommittee on a public agency board makes the KPIs and manages contracts with public managers.

Furthermore, the principal-agent theory encourages external oversight for political decisions about public spending (Ferlie, 2017). For example, the UK government created the Office for Budgetary Responsibility. Its main goal is to review and comment on public expenditure plans that are introduced by elected officials. Furthermore, the Office for Budgetary Responsibility works as an expert and independent organization.

The third theory is the transaction cost theory. While choice theory encourages contracting out or privatization of public services and goods to reduce costs, the transaction cost theory highlights that there is a cost for each choice, so bureaucrats should calculate those before making their decisions (Hefetz & Warner, 2007). The transaction cost theory provides many ways to calculate public projects' costs (Tolofari, 2005). For instance, some scholars focus on the total cost of each strategy. Others focus on the total cost for each stage of public projects. Furthermore, transaction cost includes administration costs (Bel & Fageda, 2006). Administration costs occur because in any contracting out or privatization, there is incomplete information.

The fourth theory is the institutional theory. Scholars have discussed this theory’s many assumptions. Two assumptions are related to NPM: external environment and functionalism (Lammers & Garcia, 2017). First, each organization is influenced by and influences society (Hoque, 2005). This dynamic gives legitimacy and social acceptance of the institution (Lammers & Garcia, 2017). Second, organizations' internal rules affect employees' behavior (Newberry, 2003). These assumptions have significant impacts on NPM.

Institutional theory's assumptions encourage NPM to include public participation and implement private-sector tools. External environment assumptions encouraged the social contract between public organizations and the public. Moreover, the theory encourages public agencies to align their values, structures, and operation with their society (Lammers & Garcia, 2017). The functionalism assumption enables public organizations to focus on their internal functions. Moreover, it invites public organizations to implement private-sector tools in dealing with employees, such as incentives, because they are more efficient than public sector tools.

NPM Doctrine, Tools, and Values

Much of the debate over NPM has revolved around three topics: doctrine, tools, and values. For instance, Hood (1995) assumed that accountability is the doctrine of NPM. However, the work of Lorenz demonstrated that neoliberalism is the NPM doctrine (2012).

The doctrine of NPM

NPM aims to answer the question of how the government delivers services. Therefore, scholars do not have an agreement about a specific doctrine for NPM. For instance, some scholars have introduced one doctrine, while others have expanded NPM to encompass seven doctrines. For example, Hood (1995) discussed that NPM has one central doctrine: accountability. NPM focused on accountability based on results or outputs. To achieve this goal, NPM borrowed private sector tools.

Other scholars believe that neoliberalism is the doctrine of NPM (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; Lorenz, 2012). Neoliberalism has four factors: the free market, private industry, management, the consumer. The free market factor encourages the government to eliminate all limited legislation markets. When there is no restriction on the market, the competition will be high. As a result, high competition encourages efficiency. Private companies encourage all public services to be provided by the private sector. The third factor is management, which emphasizes efficiency. Efficiency requires the private sector to work without obstacles. Fourth, neoliberalism encourages high transparency. High transparency is vital for consumers to implement their purchasing power. Furthermore, high transparency requires well-informed consumers.

Other scholars have added managerialism. Managerialism brought about a new movement to replace administration by management in public administration (Aucoin, 1990). While the administration encourages bureaucracy to focus on process and procedure, management focuses on achieving goals. Furthermore, it promotes decentralization. Thereby, bureaucrats have more authority.

Some scholars have discussed three doctrines and called the set the three Ms: market, management, and measurement (Ferlie, 2017). The market principle creates a new type of relationship between each public organization and its governmental suppliers: a provider-purchaser relationship. A contract controls purchasers' and providers' relationships. In this situation, purchasers have the power to affect the efficiency of providers because they have an opportunity to change providers. The market does not mean just privatization but also quasi-markets. In some cases, public organizations have limited market entry. Therefore, they need time to have many market entries so they can transfer to the full market principle.

The second M is management. NPM’s slogan is that management must manage. The management principle aims to empower managers in public organizations. Scholars have advanced two main aspects: management capacity and management style. In management capacity, a public manager’s role shifts from the normal bureaucratic process to make changes. Many operational functions are transferred to an executive. The second aspect is the management style. Studies show that many management styles exist. Some public organizations implement corporate governance reform, which emphasizes that the public organization has a board. The board consists of members from outside the public organization—the board sets and monitors performance.

Furthermore, the board dominates the lower managerial level. This style is borrowed from the private sector to include all stakeholders. Each organization has internal and external stakeholders (Al-Surf et al., 2013). Internal stakeholders are bodies that execute the organization's regulations. External stakeholders are bodies that are affected by the organization's regulations.

The third M is measurement. To promote public organizations' performance, NPM emphasizes that performance should be measured, such as with total quality management (Vakkuri, 2010). The measurements in NPM focus on outputs.

Furthermore, measurements give an ability to internal and external groups to oversee public organizations. For instance, regulators and auditors oversee public organizations based on their measurements (Power, 1997). Scholars have determined two types of measurements: proactive and reactive measurements. Proactive measures aim to improve the quality of services and goods.

Conversely, reactive measurements are used to hide entity problems (Burgues & Matas, 2017). For example, some educational institutions focus on student satisfaction. At the same time, student satisfaction does not lead to the improvement of education (Dunn & Miller, 2007).

Donald Kettl (2005) discussed six doctrines for NPM. The first doctrine is productivity. Productivity focuses on how the government produces more services at less cost. The public puts pressure on governments to decrease tax. Therefore, governments should focus on providing services at the lowest cost.

The second doctrine is marketization. Kettl discussed two strategies for public organizations. First, public organizations sell their entities to the private sector, which is called privatization. Second, public organizations partner with nonpublic organizations to deliver services. Both strategies make changes in which bureaucrats behaviors mimic the private sector. Service orientation encourages public managers to include the public on improving public services and goods. Therefore, it provides bottom-to-top communication. Decentralization aims to increase both public responsiveness and effectiveness. Decentralization gives lower levels of government, such as local government or front-line managers, the power and authority to respond to the public, and improve public services and goods. The fifth doctrine is policy orientation. This doctrine is aimed at changing government strategy from a service provider model to a service purchaser mode. Finally, accountability for results drives public organizations to focus on outputs rather than procedures.

Other scholars have introduced seven doctrines: disaggregation, competition, private-sector tools, efficiency, hands-on management, standards, and output (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991; Lane, 2000). The first aspect is the disaggregation, which has two meanings. The first meaning is dividing each public organization into small units (Verschuere & Barbieri, 2009). The second meaning is decentralization (Yamamoto, 2003). The second aspect is the competition (Ferlie & Steane, 2002). NPM aims to increase competition, either between public organizations or between public organizations and the private sector. The third aspect is using private-sector tools. NPM emphasizes the use of proven private-sector practices in public organizations. The fourth aspect is efficiency. Scholars focus on cutting costs. This aspect emphasizes the bottom line in public organizations by increasing labor discipline and decreasing job security. The fifth aspect is visible, hands-on management. Employees in public organizations should have an exact assignment of responsibility. Therefore, accountability would focus on responsibility.

Furthermore, this aspect requires fewer procedural constraints to support employees' achievement of their responsibilities. The sixth aspect is measurable standards. Efficiency, based on this aspect, relates to the organization's goals. The sixth aspect is accountability. Scholars have discussed accountability in many ways. First, NPM empowers appointed managers and the public. Therefore, responsibility is shifted from elected officials to the public (Ferlie, 2001). Some scholars have argued that shifting does not affect elected officials' accountability; it just increases public accountability. Second, the private sector mechanism affects accountability in two ways: performance indicators and boards. First, the instrument requires clear goals with performance indicators for each public agency. As a result, accountability is linked to these goals. Second, market mechanisms motivate public agencies to have boards. Boards do oversight and have accountability roles. The seventh aspect is output. NPM requires public organizations to focus on results. One method to do that is using pay based on performance strategy. Implementation of NPM does not require the implementation of all these features (Wennstrom, 2015).

Scholars have described other features of NPM. First, it is a politically neutral theory (Common, 1998). Both conservatives and social democrats apply it. For instance, NPM does not suggest that the private sector provides services instead of the public sector, but it presents a new type of management of that provision. Second, NPM expands the contracting-out strategy to include new areas, such as education. Third, the NPM theory brings new terms from the private sector to use in the public sector. For example, the NPM theory explains the relationship between the government and its employees as a principal-agent relationship. Fourth, NPM is a mix of public choice theory and private management.

Governments have three types of tasks: providing goods and services, maintaining income, and regulating markets, and the private sector. In providing goods, NPM emphasizes contracting out. To do that, governments need to hire experts in negotiation, settlement, and execution of contracts. Therefore, the NPM requires that public managers look more like chief executive officers.

NPM Tools

This section discusses four NPM tools: PPP, PM, PST, and public participation.

Public-private partnership (PPP). Public organizations have two types of partnerships: public-private partnership and public-public partnership (Silvestre et al. 2020). This section focuses on public-private partnerships because it is a part of NPM and a cornerstone of this study. NPM focuses on steer, not row services (Bumgarner & Newswander, 2009; Dunn & Miller, 2007; Fornasier & Franklin, 2019).

Steering can happen through PPP by either privatization or contracting-out. Scholars have introduced many definitions for PPPs based on its aspects. For instance, some scholars minimized PPP to privatization (Savas, 2000). They excluded contracting out from PPP. Other scholars included any type of collaboration between public and private entities. For instance, Manzetti (1994) defined both as the private sector providing public services instead of public organizations. Some studies focused on the financial aspect, so they defined PPP as a way for public organizations to pass some financial restrictions.

PPP is different from traditional contracts in three main ways: bundle, risk, and structure. First, in PPP, the private sector runs all the project duties, so the private sector typically adopts PPP in the early stages of public projects (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014; Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). As a result, the private partner has a strong influence on the public project. Furthermore, PPP is more complicated, requiring high expertise (Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). Moreover, PPP takes a longer time than traditional contracts (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014). Second, in PPP, the private partner has a higher risk than in traditional partnerships because the private entity is sharing risk with the public agency (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014). Classic collaboration creates a high risk for public agencies, while PPP creates a high risk for private partners.

Third, PPP is a mutual relationship, so it rejects hierarchy (Boyer et al., 2015; Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012). For instance, PPP requires decision-making equity. As a result, PPP's decision-making process is a multiway approach. It combines top-down and bottom-up approaches. The multiway approach involves empowering all stakeholders through information and authority (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). Furthermore, it requires a more flexible system than bureaucracy. The partners have the same responsibilities and rights. PPP thus makes the public sector more complicated.

Scholars believe that PPPs have four essential elements: cooperation, clear objectives and goals, market mechanisms, and sharing of risk (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014; Muhammad et al. 2016). PPP is a cooperation between either for-profit or nonprofit entities and public agencies. At the same time, both of them work to achieve clear objectives and goals. Furthermore, they implement a market mechanism in dealing with consumers. Besides, they share the cooperation risk. Some scholars have included nonprofit organizations. Others exclude them. Therefore, NPM supports a particular collaboration model called the public-private partnership (PPP) (Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011).

Moreover, PPP is not a novel governmental strategy. Theories have been presented about PPP before the dissemination of public choice theory. In 1938, the U.S. federal government created a secondary market for home mortgages. Scholars have determined that this was the first application of PPP (Bovaird, 2004).

In the 1970s, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were adopted by governments in many states (Bovaird, 2004). Scholars vary in defining PPPs' parts. For instance, some studies include the nonprofit sector, while others exclude it. Other studies exclude for-profit organizations being a part of PPPs. Others have both nonprofit and for-profit organizations in PPPs.

The main difference is that in contracting-out, the public entity still owns the service assets, while in privatization, the private sector owns the service assets (Domberger & Jensen, 1997). Furthermore, in contracting out, public agencies can control services' performance because they can change the contractors when the contractors do not achieve the expected result.

PPP is considered a hybrid strategy (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014). For instance, PPP is a preferred strategy for two main reasons: downsizing and efficiency (Pack, 1987). The first reason is that PPP decreases the growth of the public sector, downsizing. For instance, downsizing begins with employees, and PPP supports public organizations to reduce their employees (Weikart, 2001). As a result, the expenditures of public organizations decrease. Finally, the government needs little money to work, which means low taxation.

Scholars found mixed results for the impact of PPP on the public workforce. The United Kingdom's government decreased its proportion of employees from 29% in 1979 to 23% in 1991 (Ferlie, 2001). In the United States, an evaluation found that contracting out affected 5% of federal employees (Fernandez & Smith, 2005). Stein supported the notion that PPP significantly reduced public workers (1990). Other scholars, such as Fernandez et al., found that PPP decreased full-time public employees, but it increased part-time public employees (2006). Donahue claimed that the impact of PPP on public workers small (2002).

The second reason is that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector. Therefore, privatization may increase efficiency in public goods and services. Privatization requires deregulation. Some scholars point out that market failure is a phenomenon that the government should be cautious about when it privatizes public goods and services (Manzetti, 1994).

Scholars found three types of reasons that encouraged the public sector to apply PPP. The first type of reason focuses on the government level. For instance, governments face complex issues that they cannot solve alone (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Therefore, PPP is a requirement to solve this kind of problem (Jacobs, 2000). Also, cost-saving becomes a priority for public organizations, and PPP is a strategy to achieve it (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014; Silvestre et al. 2020). The Second type is global institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, support and promotes PPPs (Jones, 1999). The global institutions encouraged the public sector to implement PPP.

The third type focused on the head of the public organizations. The leading theory in this type is the revolving door theory (Maillet et al. 2019). Revolving door refers to employees' changeover between the public and private sectors (Castellani & Dulitzky, 2017). The theory implies that the transition employees' between the two industries decreases the barriers.

Several scholars have openly questioned whether if the revolving door supported PPP. Mailler et al., in their study of the revolving door in Chile, found that the revolving door existed, but it did not affect the public managers (2019). The public managers were public-oriented. However, Castellani and Dulitzky studied public managers in Argentina (2018). They found that the revolving door supported privatization and private sector tools in public organizations.

There is a global movement to support PPP. Some governments have created public agencies to support PPP. In 2008, Canada started Public-Private Partnership Canada to advocate for public agencies to use more PPP (Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). PPP achieves some NPM goals, such as small government and deregulation

(Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012). For instance, PPP supports public agencies to do their tasks without hiring more staff or buying equipment.

Furthermore, PPP emphasizes governments to lower barriers to the private sector. Lower barriers support a government paying low prices to ensure that the private partner can achieve the contract's goals. The second goal is delegation. One of the main parts of NPM is decentralization. Therefore, the bureaucrats should have more authority. To have more control, politicians need to delegate most of their power to the bureaucrats to contract out the public service.

Unfortunately, scholars have found that PPP has a democratic deficit (Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). For instance, some PPPs require high confidentiality, which affects transparency. Therefore, some information is not available to the public. For example, the Freedom of Information Act allows PPPs to provide a lower amount of information to the public than traditional public agencies' projects (Bovaird, 2004). Also, PPP is a long-term contract, so the cost is divided across many budgets. As a result, the PPPs' actual cost is not exact for the public. Also, some public agencies use PPP to pass reasonable spending restrictions.

Furthermore, PPP decreases public responsiveness because some PPPs are not debatable with the public. Further, PPP does not have international accounting standards or comprehensive rules, which exacerbates PPP's democratic deficit (OECD, 2009 in Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). Besides, some researchers have found that leaders' opinions guide some PPPs' decisions (Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012).

Scholars have discussed some public agencies' disadvantages when using PPPs, such as the information disadvantage. The private sector has more information than public agencies, so it has more power in negotiation (Boyer et al., 2015). Public participation can resolve this disadvantage by offering more information for bureaucrats. A study found that the public provides essential information to public organizations, but this information does not solve PPPs' information disadvantage (Boyer et al. 2015). Moreover, PPP has a problem with accountability. For instance, if a public service is weak, the public does not know whom to blame (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019).

Saudi Arabia is no exception. For instance, public agencies implement PPPs because of financing limitations (Tahat, 2014). In 2011, the Saudi Crown Investment and Green IT Globe created a new company called DACENTEC Saudi Arabia (Tahat, 2014). DACENTEC has the goal of improving the collaboration between public entities and the private sector. Furthermore, public agencies prefer a particular type of PPP called build-operate-transfer (BOT). In BOT, the private partner makes the project design and builds it for a while. After that, the private partner transfers the project to the public agency.

Performance Measurements (PM). The public sector criticized because of inefficiency. Therefore, the public sector borrowed performance measurements from the private sector (Brignall & Modell, 2000). PM requires every public organization to have clear standards, and it has three significant impacts on the public sector: accountability, transparency, and efficiency. First, PM made a shift in public sector accountability (Kloot, 2009). For instance, bureaucracy focused on procedural accountability. Conversely, PM emphasized performance accountability.

Second, PM increased public sector transparency. Scholars discussed two types of transparency: internal and external. Internal transparency means that the performance measurement informs managers about their organization's activities and service costs (Bruijn, 2002). On the contrary, the external transparency is that performance measurement encouraged more stakeholders to participate in the accountability process (Modell, 2000). Scholars discussed that PM encouraged at least three stakeholder groups: financial support groups, professional employees inside the public organizations, and the service receiver (Wisniewski & Stewart, 2004). Third, PM increased public organizations' efficiency. For instance, each public organization can assess its performance based on these standards.

Scholars discussed many tools for PM, such as benchmarking. In 1979, the Xerox Corporation applied benchmarking for the first because of the competition with Canon (Jackson, 2001). Magd and Curry (2003) defined benchmarking as management practices designed to improve the organizations' performance in three main aspects: strategic, competitive, and useful tools to achieve the best value. Therefore, benchmarking requires comparison, either internal or external, public organizations (Kloot, 2009). For instance, public organizations can use benchmarking to compare their units or use it to measure up to other public organizations in the same sector. Moreover, benchmarking can use for processes, reports, and plans (Cassell et al. 2001).

Benchmarking has three main steps (Magd & Curry, 2003). The first step is to identify the best practice in the field. Then, public leaders monitor progress. Finally, they review their organization to make a plan to improve their organizations. Camp (1989) expanded benchmarking to five steps. The first step is planning. In this step, the public manager determines the functions to benchmark. Furthermore, he chooses the target benchmark. The organization then analyzes the gap between its functions and the target to include reporting gaps to the organization's goals. The fourth step is action. The public organization improves its process to achieve the goal. Finally, the best practice includes in the daily operation of the organization.

Many studies evaluated the benchmark, and the studies can be divided into two groups. The first studies group compared the public-sector and private-sector organizations. These studies found that the model was limited in the public sector (Magd & Curry, 2001). The second group discussed the impact of the benchmark on public organizations. They found mixed results. Ogden and Wilson investigated 12 national health services centers and found that the centers collected data about the field's best practices (2000). Unfortunately, This information did not convert to a plan to improve the centers. Another study examined the Inland Revenue Accounts Office in the United Kingdom in 1999. The benchmark increased customer satisfaction to be 7.8 out of 10 (Magd & Curry, 2001).

Scholars found many problems with PM in the public sector. The first problem is that the PM reports do not have enough information, allowing auditors to evaluate the public organization (Wisniewski & Stewart, 2004). In 1997, half of the local public entities in Scotland provided the PM reports, and half of these reports had incomplete information to assess managers.

The second problem is that PM aims to inform the stakeholders., but there are different groups of stakeholders (Brignall & Modell, 2000). Moreover, each group focuses on precise information. Therefore, most public organizations fail to provide appropriate information for each group (Mascarenhas, 1996).

In 2016, the Saudi government established The National Center for Performance Measurement (ADAA, an Arabic word means performance) (The National Center for Performance Measurement - Annual Report, 2018). In the same year, the government enforced ministries to include performance measurements for their annual reports. ADAA supported the ministries by offering training programs and workshops for ministries’ employees to train them about the performance measurements. In 2017, 2166 public employees participated in ADAA's training programs (The National Center for Performance Measurement - Annual Report, 2018).

Public participation. One of the main elements in NPM is being customer oriented. Customer orientation requires that public agencies respond to their consumers. Thus, the public becomes more involved and participatory with public organizations. The main goal for public participation is increasing effectiveness (Cheyne, 1999). Public involvement or participation has two types: direct and indirect involvement (Boyer, Slyke, & Rogers, 2015; Cheyne, 1999). Indirect involvement happens when the public involves selecting the elected officials. Conversely, direct involvement includes all public activities among public officials. This section discusses direct public participation because it is related to the dissertation question.

Scholars discussed that public participation has different perspectives based on the type of government. For instance, democratic countries are looking for public participation as apart of their political process (Linde & Karlsson, 2013). Therefore, there is no democracy without public participation. On the other hand, non-democratic regimes use public participation as a tool to improve their image as a modern regime in front of democratic regimes (Johnson & Kolko, 2010). Furthermore, non-democratic regimes do not allow public participation to make any kind of threat to the government. Therefore, public participation in non-democratic countries is not to respond to public opinions but to make international legitimacy.

Studies have shown four levels of public involvement. The first level is the informed level when a public agency provides information to the public (Rowe & Frewer, 2000). Second, some public agencies involve the public in consultation. Some governments, such as the USA, force public entities to include the public when they are affected by the new policy. For example, the USA has The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946. The APA requires most public agencies to ask for public comment through a notice of proposed policy published in the *Federal Register* (West, 2004). Third, a public agency includes the public to provide solutions for public issues. Finally, public agencies may consist of the public to exercise policy.

Scholars have asserted that direct public involvement is required because public organizations face massive problems and multidimensional concerns (Ianniello et al. 2019). Moreover, direct public involvement has advantages, such as increasing the decision quality and decreasing project time. Furthermore, some public policy needs the public to change their attitudes and behavior (Cheyne, 1999). However, direct public involvement has limitations because the public lacks knowledge in some cases.

Scholars have explained many advantages of direct public involvement. First, direct public involvement improves the quality of decisions (Ianniello et al., 2019). For instance, public involvement clarifies policy goals and objectives. In some cases, the public provides alternative solutions. Also, the public can provide important information to bureaucrats. Second, public involvement decreases the cost and time. Including the public increases decision-making time. However, it reduces implementation because it eliminates public resistance. Third, public involvement encourages reconciliation between citizens, groups, and parties. Fourth, public involvement maintains legitimacy for public agencies. Fifth, it makes a civil society.

Direct public involvement has limitations. First, the public lacks knowledge of some issues (Kathlene & Martin, 1991). Scholars have discussed ameliorating this limitation in two ways: training programs and reachable information. Public agencies can offer training programs to help the public learn the needed skills. In the 1980s, Chicago, Illinois, had a dysfunctional education system (Fung & Wright, 2001). In 1988, a reformation shifted power to the public by creating the Local School Council. The Local School Council had 11 members: six parents, two community members, two teachers, and a school principal. All members were elected every two years. Later, the public noticed a lack of knowledge and capacity in the Local School Council's members. In 1995, a new law required each Local School Council member to attend a training program for 20 hours. Some scholars have argued that training programs were not enough because experts have varied opinions on most public issues (Laird, 1993). Moreover, scholars have suggested that public organizations make relevant information merely reachable.

The second limitation is the difficulty of agreement. The public has varied opinions. Therefore, accepting one opinion is complicated. This limitation also occurs among experts (Laird, 1993). The third limitation is the expectations. In some cases, the public has a different expectation than bureaucrats. For instance, when bureaucrats involve the public by hearing from them, the public believes that the bureaucrats are implementing their suggestions (Cheyne, 1999). Different expectations may lead to public resistance.

Responsiveness increases public organizations' effectiveness, and responsiveness improves them (Aberbach & Christensen, 2005). When public agencies deal with the public as customers, they change from valuing collectivism to individualism. Some scholars believe that the new value is not because of NPM, but the public has already adopted it. There is a great deal of evidence for that, such as low voting rates and low public-party membership (Aberbach & Christensen, 2005).

In Saudi Arabia, studies have shown mixed findings of public participation in public agencies. Addas (2017) found low public participation. He analyzed the relationship between the municipal council and the public in Jeddah. Both councilors and people had a lack of understanding of public involvement.

Alshaikh (2019) assumed that the Arab Spring 2011 was vital for public participation in Saudi Arabia. The fear of revolution encourages public agencies to include the public in their public policy. The study analyzed the Labour Ministry. Based on the ministry's report, the government responded to public opinions on social media. Furthermore, each ministry created a participatory management department to allow the public to participate in available programs. Public participation has increased since 2011, but it is still not obligatory for public agencies (Alshaikh, 2019). Simultaneously, the study found that the public even does not think that they have a voice.

In another study in a different region of Saudi Arabia, the East, the researcher interviewed administrators on the civic, municipal council (Alsayel, 2016). The participants believed that the public should participate in decision making because the public is the beneficiary of public projects. At the same time, public workers showed some concerns about public participation. First, the public may assume that their opinions are mandatory for public employees to consider. Public employees are looking to the public as nonexperts, so public opinion is often ignorable. Second, some public officials think that public participation increases the period of projects. Furthermore, it increases the effort of public agencies. Conversely, some officials assume that public participation motivates wealthy beneficiaries to support public projects.

Alsaggaf (2012) studied using social media for public participation in disasters. The study focused on the Jeddah flood of 2009. The research found that the public expressed their opinions plainly on social media. Furthermore, public officials responded to public requests. Besides, the crowd was using social media to challenge the official comment on some situations.

NPM Values.

NPM has many fundamental values (Gadot & Meiri, 2008). For instance, NPM focuses on responsiveness to citizens as customers. Furthermore, NPM requires a high level of accountability and transparency. Moreover, NPM emphasizes innovation and renewal of old bureaucratic structure and processes. Finally, NPM stresses performance. Schein's ideas (1985) are considered the base of NPM. These changes called for reform of the public administration's assumptions, values, and norms regarding the public.

Scholars have compared traditional public administration values with NPM values. Person and Goldkuhl showed that NPM created a shift in traditional bureaucracy theory values (Rose & Persson, 2012). For instance, NPM changed legitimate authority to customer orientation. Furthermore, the rule of law became decentralized in NPM. NPM caused a shift away from complete adherence to rules toward mission and goals. Efficiency from the traditional bureaucracy changed to accountability for results. The effectiveness value became related to client needs. The equality value is transferred to focus on cost-efficiency. Legality shifted to focus on productivity. A focus on earning replaced the value of impartiality. The value of objectivity became less critical than market mechanisms. Transparency turned into more flexibility and discretion in NPM. Where traditional bureaucracy emphasized accountability in the process, NPM stresses the empowerment of street-level bureaucrats. The NPM pushed control from hierarchy to the community.

Hood (1991) introduced seven main points regarding NPM. NPM focuses on professional management. Furthermore, it has specific performance standards and measurements. NPM emphasizes output control. Also, NPM disaggregates public sector units. NPM emphasizes competition in the public sector and implements private sector styles of management practice. Finally, NPM has a high discipline for resource use. Hood's points show three main aspects of NPM: an attempt to reverse government growth, less spending and staffing through privatization, and information technology.

Osborne and Galber (1992) discussed NPM values as solutions for public sector problems. They introduced ten values that each government should implement. The first value is the catalytic government. Catalytic government focuses on leadership rather than service delivery. The second value is the community-owned government. Citizens should have power through public choice. The third value is a competitive government by making competition when providing services and products. The fourth value is mission-driven government. Mission-driven government is driven to improve communities instead of being driven by rules. The fifth value is the results-oriented government. The public sector should focus on results rather than on the budget. The sixth point is customer-driven government by focusing on achieving the needs of customers, not the public organization itself. The seventh value is the enterprising government that concentrates on earning more than spending. The eighth value is the anticipatory government. Public organizations need to focus on preventing more than curing. The ninth value is decentralized government, so governments need to transfer from the hierarchical structures to participation and teamwork structures (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). The ten value is market-oriented government.

Rise of NPM

Scholars assume that NPM is a general reformation (Hood, 1995). For instance, they have found NPM tools in most developed countries. There are four groups of factors contributing to the rise of NPM: economic, political, external inducement, and social.

Researchers have debated three economic factors: the size of government, financial scarcity, and the neoliberal movement. The welfare state created a vast government. Furthermore, governments faced fiscal problems gradually, so they were looking for solutions to implement. Fortunately, the neoliberal movement provided some solutions for governments.

Besides, political factors have encouraged governments to implement NPM. Elected officials have faced some obstacles in overseeing bureaucrats. Moreover, political scandals have decreased public trust in government and its branches. Therefore, the need for reformation was urgent. Also, political leaders in many states belonged to the right-wing.

Many external entities have played critical roles in the rise of NPM. For instance, global organizations and aid providers have encouraged developing countries to improve their public sector by implementing NPM. Moreover, think tanks and educational institutions have enlightened policymakers about NPM. In addition, public institutions have hired advisors with private sector backgrounds. They have recommended private-sector tools to implement in the public sector. Finally, technological inventions have expedited the public sector's implementation of NPM tools, such as decentralization and public participation.

Moreover, studies have discussed three social factors supporting NPM: commonalities, low public trust, and quiet performance. Scholars assume that commonalities, such as language, made NPM easy to expand globally. Furthermore, public organizations were facing two main social obstacles: low public trust and quiet performance. NPM was provided as a solution to these problems through public participation and private-sector tools.

Economic factors

The welfare state was the dominant government system (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). It encouraged high intervention in the economy by the government and the provision of services and goods (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). The welfare state emphasized the many problems of public organizations. The first problem was the size of the government. The economy was restricted by the large public sector (Bale & Dale, 1998). For example, U.S. government expenditures increased from $757 to $1,872 per capita between 1949 and 1974 (Pack, 1987). In the 1970s, public spending in the UK exceeded 40% of GDP (Ferlie, 2001). As a result, scholars were looking at the public sector as the problem, not the solution. Therefore, governments were forced to reform public agencies to develop the economy. For instance, there was a movement to reverse government growth (Dunsire & Hood, 1989; Pack, 1987).

Second, financial scarcity, such as economic crises and wars, encouraged governments to decrease expenditure (Aberbach & Christensen, 2001; Aucoin, 1990; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012). For example, the Vietnam war increased U.S. taxes on citizens because the government's spending was high (Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2016). In 1990, Sweden implemented NPM because of their financial crisis (Ferlie, 2017).

One of the main problems was budgetary. For instance, traditional line-item budgeting encourages bureaucracy to prioritize spending more than saving (Kelly & Wanna, 2000). The classic budget had many obstacles. First, it focused on inputs.

Second, it required bureaucracy to focus on rules. This problem was related to the classical system of public administration. The fiscal stresses were because of changes in the international economic system (Aucoin, 1990). Third, the budgetary pressures were a global problem. NPM introduced solutions for many of these problems. As a result, NPM tools were used in many countries. Besides, the fiscal stresses were in both local and federal governments. For example, some scholars assume that local governments in the United States contract out work because of budgetary pressure (Common, 1998). Supporters for the NPM movement have shown that NPM introduced tools to solve economic problems. For instance, NPM suggested downsizing the government through privatization (Aucoin, 1990). Furthermore, NPM focuses on cost-efficiency that encourages public organizations to either self-finance or make a profit (Lorenz, 2012).

Classic liberalism focused on the public sector, which has an autonomy that is protected by law (Lorenz, 2012). On the other hand, neoliberalism emphasizes a limited public sector with free-market principles. These principles are antibureaucracy (Coccia, 2009). Both the Reagan and Thatcher governments encouraged small states with big markets (Lorenz, 2012). Neoliberal ideology has four doctrines: free market, private industry, management, and consumer. The free market leads to competition. The competition will lead to high efficiency for consumers and the private sector. The state's role is to remove all obstacles to achieve a free market.

Furthermore, the relationship between the public and the government will be based on economic principles, not legal. For instance, citizens and the government are both shareholders. Private industry dogma encourages the private sector to provide all services. Management dogma focuses on efficiency. The state's job is to remove any obstacle that affects efficiency because the private sector is well-organized. Consumer dogma encourages a limited government. The role of the government is to remove barriers that influence consumers' purchasing power. The main factor is information.

Opponents assumed that if NPM was based on the performance of the economy, NPM would be developed in countries that had poor performance (Hood, 1995). Two studies tested the relationship between the government size and implementation of NPM. They found that this reason alone is not enough to explain the rise of NPM. Peters and Heisler (1983) analyzed OECD countries in the 1980s. They found that small governments, such as Japan and Turkey, showed a low rise in NPM. However, outsized governments showed a mixed rise of NPM. Therefore, there was no significant relationship between government size and the rising of NPM.

Political factors

Scholars have discussed four political reasons for the rise of NPM: accountability, power, scandal, and right-wing political control. The size and functions of public organizations were expanded. As a result, political accountability over bureaucracy became difficult. Therefore, the public reformation became required to create a new type of accountability (Wilenski, 1979). For instance, NPM added public accountability and accountability for results (Ferlie, 2001; Hoque, 2005).

Second, bureaucrats increased their power over elected officials (Aucoin, 1990). For instance, elected officials had limited tools to guide bureaucracy, such as the budget. Therefore, elected officials were looking for a reformation to decrease bureaucratic power. NPM decreased bureaucratic power by evolving. This issue was global, especially in democratic countries. For instance, many European countries that have parliaments had the same problem. The parliament lost a large degree of power to bureaucracy (Wilenski, 1979). Other scholars look at this aspect from another angle. They assume that bureaucrats were looking to eliminate political control (Hood, 1995). Therefore, they used NPM tools, such as contracts.

Third, scholars have concluded that governmental scandals, such as Watergate, created a negative public perception of bureaucracy (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; Light, 2001). As a result, governments have worked hard to implement reformation. After Watergate, U.S. Congress passed 30 laws to reform the government.

Some studies show that right-wing politics raise NPM globally (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). For example, both the US and the UK were under right-wing governments, under President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, respectively, that led the public sector reformation (Ferlie, 2001). Opponents have argued two pieces of evidence: First, Sweden was under left-wing politics, and it has seen a high impact of NPM. Second, Japan had a right-wing government, but it has a low NPM impact.

External inducement

External inducement happens when an external entity motivates a government to implement an idea or strategy (Goldman & Eliason, 2003). This factor includes the use of five tools: global entities, think tanks, advisors, emulation, educational materials, and information and communication technology (ICT).

Global organizations, such as the World Bank, promoted NPM in many countries by providing it as a tool to improve the public sector (Burns, Krott, Sayadyan, & Giessen, 2017; Ferlie, 2017). Furthermore, many global loans and aid donors, such as the IMF, require deprived states to develop their public sectors by implementing NPM (Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012; Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; Robinson, 2015). The goal of international agencies is to promote transparency and make good government.

Furthermore, many think tanks have supported public sector reformation (Ferlie, 2001). Besides, some governments have included advisors from the private sector. In the 1980s, the UK Prime Minister appointed advisors from the private sector, such as Sir Roy Griffiths, who was a director and deputy chairman of Sainsbury's (Ferlie, 2001). The second reason is emulation. Global changes in public administration attract policymakers. Therefore, they emulate successful reforms like NPM.

Additionally, an increase in books and academic articles discussing NPM has encouraged its implementation. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) in "Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature" show a fourth reason. When policymakers face a problem, they prefer to borrow the solution from countries that have already faced the same problem.

ICT made NPM easy to implement by providing tools that affected both the internal processes and external relationships of public organizations (Homburg, 2004). For instance, information technology encouraged decentralization, and it supported public organizations' efforts to be more flexible (Larbi, 1999; Pfiffner, 2004). Furthermore, information technology empowered the public with information and available choices (Tolofari, 2005). Moreover, ICT made NPM easy for the public around the world to notice. As a result, the public put pressure on policymakers to implement these reforms. For example, scholars have argued that elite universities and research institutions support the expansion of NPM by focusing on it (Ferlie et al., 2016).

Social factors

Social factors include three aspects: commonalities, low public trust, and quiet performance. Some studies have assumed that NPM is an Anglo-American movement

(Pollitt, 1993). Scholars have compared the implementations of NPM in English-speaking countries and non-English speaking countries. Their view has been that commonalities, such as language, could explain the expansion of public policy (Castles & Merrill, 1989). They found that English-speaking countries had high NPM implementations.

In contrast, non-English speaking countries had low NPM implementations. However, these studies ignored the NPM implementations in other countries, such as Hong Kong (Hood, 1995). In the 1980s, Hong Kong also implemented NPM (Lam, 1997). The second aspect is of low trust. The public has low confidence in public organizations (Ferlie, 2017). As a result, public organizations needed reformation to change public perspectives.

The performance of public organizations was a factor in the rise of NPM. For example, Christopher Hood (1989) in *Quo Vadis? Challenges of Public Administration* proffers that NPM was a response to public bureaucracy's failure and its moral bankruptcy (Common, 1998). For instance, bureaucracy assumed public managers' abilities to control workers to deliver public services quickly. Unfortunately, this assumption failed. Therefore, NPM encouraged decentralization and delegation (Pfiffner, 2004).

Some scholars disagree with the notion that NPM is an international paradigm for many reasons. First, NPM implementations do not eliminate bureaucracy. For instance, many countries around the world still use bureaucracy. Second, the reasons to implement NPM tools are varied. Studies have found that governments have different reasons to execute NPM. Third, NPM does not have a solid doctrine or form. Instead, NPM has doctrine with converse meanings. For example, empowerment has converse meanings (Hood, 1995). Empowerment denotes implementing the market form in public organizations, so individuals have the power to affect producers. Otherwise, empowerment means the transfer of political power to citizens, so the market form is not a part of this transformation.

Besides the converse meanings, NPM had used in many forms in different times and countries (Hood, 1995). For example, in the 1970s, NPM focused on bureaucrats' power. In the 1980s, NPM focused on customer power. Furthermore, the UK and Australia were driven by business-type managerialism, but New Zealand was driven by new institutional economics (Hood, 1991). Scholars assume that these converse meanings and forms have one common thing that all were against bureaucracy (Hood, 1995).

Public Administration and Democracy

This section discusses the relationship between democracy and both public administration and NPM. Public administration has an essential role to either promote or impede democracy (Box et al., 2001; Nabatchi, 2009). For instance, public administration has a role in educating citizens about government. Education maintains and promotes democracy in society. Second, bureaucracy participates in making the public less engaged. Third, the new movements in public administration, NPM, and post-NPM, require high public engagement.

Scholars believe that NPM does not address democratic values directly (Christensen & Laegreid, 2011). Therefore, scholars analyzed NPM in-depth to find the correlation between NPM and democratic values. Scholars have discussed three findings. First, NPM enhances democracy in two ways: output democracy and fire alarm. Studies have examined two types of democracy: input and output (also called participatory democracy). The input democratic model, also called representative democracy, assumes that the government is a united entity, and the public deregulate their authority to the elected officials (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Elected officials implement their roles to direct the bureaucracy.

Output democracy happens when there is a direct connection between the public and the bureaucracy. NPM makes a shift from input democracy to output democracy (Dunn & Miller, 2007). Moreover, the core of democracy is that the government is community-owned (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Therefore, empowering citizens encourages democracy.

Another evidence is that public involvement increases political accountability by working as a fire alarm (West, 2004). For instance, the public may play an overseeing role to ensure that bureaucrats are responsive to elected officials. Therefore, NPM provides a new tool of oversight for elected officials to control bureaucrats and maintain democracy.

Second, scholars believe that NPM threatens democracy through procedural accountability. Democracy requires political accountability; bureaucrats are responsible directly and indirectly to elected officials (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; West, 2004). NPM provides two types of accountability: procedural and outcomes accountability. Procedural accountability demands bureaucrats to address public comments in making public policy. At the same time, outcomes accountability emphasizes that a bureaucrat is accountable to the agency’s outcomes. Therefore, the market mechanism reduces responsibility to both the elected officials and the law (Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012; Kelly, 1998; Terry, 1998). Market mechanism transfers public servants' accountability from elected officials and law to the public.

NPM's Evaluation

Many studies have evaluated NPM values. NPM assumes that including citizens increases service quality. Scholars have criticized this assumption in many ways. First, this assumption requires informed citizens (Box et al., 2001). This requirement is impossible because citizens do not have enough knowledge on every public issue. Furthermore, they do not have enough resources, such as time. Besides, some studies have found that bureaucrats prefer to contract out rather than including citizens. They assume that contracting out makes quality high.

NPM also assumes an increase in the quality of public services. Therefore, Dixon and Hood (2016) theorized that public complaints would be lower if public service quality increased. So they analyzed public complaints about public services in the UK between 1975 and 2005. They found that public complaints had increased. Most complaints were about the fairness of rules and consistency of rules for the same cases. Some scholars criticized this study. They explained the rise occurred because complaint methods became more comfortable for the citizen to use. For example, new technology, such as the internet, made complaints easier. Therefore, the increase in complaints was not because of NPM. Dixon and Hood refuted this critique. The increase was not in all public organizations. Thus, the increase was not because of the ease of complaints but because of the decrease in public service quality.

Dixon and Hood further discussed cost-cutting in NPM. They analyzed the running cost for both the UK civil department and general administration costs for local governments between 1980 and 2011. Running cost included the organization's regular expenditure, such as human resources, utilities, and rent. In the UK, the running cost is considered an essential element of treasury control. They found this increased by almost double. They analyzed the increase and found that the number of public servants decreased by one third, but the wage expenditures were the same. Therefore, public servants' wages were increasing more than the rate of inflation. The increase involved two aspects: consultants and contracting out. Moreover, studies analyzed two public functions: water distribution and waste collection. They found there was not any cost-saving for these areas.

Post-New Public Management

Criticisms of the NPM theory include concerns over elements such as efficiency and the low quality of public service. As a result, scholars have supported a new reform called post-new public management. Critics maintain that the NPM has several limitations. First, NPM decreases the political control among bureaucrats (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000) and has said that high self-control or decentralization does not fit democratic practices. For instance, Zanetti and Adams (2000) believe that implementing market values in public organizations under a democratic regime would damage democracy and prevent market control. The result is fragmented public organizations that put more pressure on bureaucrats to manage and increase their capacity. Second, global issues, such as terrorism and economic crises, grew the desire to centralize a system for public organizations (Hammond, 2007; Ventriss, 2013).

Post-NPM has four associated doctrines. First, post-NPM increases political domination among bureaucrats. For instance, post-NPM increases the capacity at the top levels. The second doctrine is governance (Reiter & Klenk, 2018). Governance introduces a broad picture for the public sector by linking the public sector with all institutions that affect it, such as political and social environments (Kettl, 2002). The third doctrine emphasizes the relationship between public organizations and service to the public. The fourth doctrine is performance (Reiter & Klenk, 2018).

Two main theories have shaped post-NPM: institutionalism and networks (Frederickson, Kevin, Christ, & Licari, 2015). Institutionalism focuses on collective action by political and social organizations alongside public organizations. Therefore, these organizations work together with a mix of conflicts, interests, and competition. Network management has three main perspectives (Hwang & Moon, 2008). The first perspective is interest intermediation, which assumes that organizations can find a common goal when they work together. The second perspective is being a government tool, as network management supports the government in implementing policies. The third perspective is information; network management endorses the transfer of data between organizations.

Chapter Three

Public Organizations in Saudi Arabia

Abstract

This chapter discusses four main aspects. First, it discusses the reformation history of public organizations in Saudi Arabia. Local and global organizations have provided recommendations to improve the public sector in Saudi Arabia (Dobe, 2008). The other three aspects discuss the dissertation’s sample: the Housing Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Commerce Ministry.

The housing issue in Saudi Arabia has three stages. The first stage was between 1953-1974. This stage had two features. First, there was no agency responsible for housing. Second, public housing projects were focused on employees and in limited cities (Saleh, 1998). The second stage was between 1974 and 2011. The government established three agencies to accelerate the building of houses: the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF), the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH), and the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011). REDF provided free-interest loans for citizens to build their houses. MPWH offered ready units. MPMRA afforded free land to citizens (Alasmari, 2018).

The third stage has been from 2011 until the current day. In 2011, the government created the Housing Ministry (Kyriazis et al. 2018). The Housing Ministry provided many projects through collaboration with the private sector to support citizens in owning their homes.

In 1950, the Saudi government established the Health Ministry (Khaliq, 2012). Studies showed that the reformation of the Health Ministry happened through three stages. First, the Health Ministry was focusing on curative activities. In 1978, the Health Ministry created primary health care (PHC) centers (Sebai et al. 2001). PHC centers supported the Health Ministry to include preventive operations to the

ministry’s goals. In 1993, the Health Ministry worked to change its role from providing health care services to regulate it (Khaliq, 2012).

The Reformation of Public Organizations in Saudi Arabia

The government of Saudi Arabia works hard to improve public services. Therefore, the reformation of public administration has a long history in Saudi Arabia. The central aspect to discuss regarding the reformation of public organizations is whether the source is internal or external. For instance, the government of Saudi Arabia has created some public organizations to oversee and improve the public sector in Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) was designed to develop public organizations by training public employees. In the 1950s, the Saudi government faced a fiscal problem. It asked for financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF then provided restricted support to the Saudi government. The Saudi government was required to make economic development plans and increase revenue resources (Al-Harthi, 2001).

The first reformation plan occurred in July 1927 with the creation of the Commission on Inspection and Reform (Huyette, 1985). The primary goal for the commission was to review administrative systems and recommend reforms. This commission's outcomes focused on reforming the Consultative Council to have eight members and to meet twice weekly. Furthermore, the commission clearly defined the Consultative Council's tasks to include reviewing budgetary questions, new economic projects, expropriation of property for public utilities, enactment of laws and statutes, and employment of foreign nationals. In this period, the government's shape was not modern because there was no central body controlling public agencies (Dobe, 2008). In 1953, the government created the Council of Ministers (Harrington, 1958).

In the early stages, international organizations played an essential role in improving public organizations because Saudis lacked education and skills (Dobe, 2008). In 1957, the KSA faced a financial crisis, so it asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to study the situation and introduce some advice to solve the fiscal problems. The IMF made recommendations that many governments subsequently implemented. In 1960, the government of Saudi Arabia asked the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for help creating an economic plan to generate different resources of revenue instead of oil. The main recommendation was to establish a central public organization for planning, which had three primary goals: making and supervising development plans, rearranging public organizations, and localizing human resources. In the same year, the government of Saudi Arabia asked the United Nations (UN) to send a consultant to study the administrative situation within the country, and the expert introduced four recommendations. The recommendations included merging similar public organizations, improving the financial control system in public organizations, simplifying the administrative process—especially in the procurement system—and establishing a training center to educate public employees, which eventually became the Institute of Public Administration (IPA).

The History of the Housing Issue in Saudi Arabia

In 1938, oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia (Hitti & Abed, 1974). The discovery improved the country's economy. Furthermore, it encouraged the government to make a modern society by building modern cities. This section focuses on the history of housing solutions in Saudi Arabia. Scholars have discussed them occurring in three stages.

The first stage was between 1953-1974. This stage had three features: no specific public agency for housing, a focus on employees, and limited cities. The second stage was between 1974-2011. The third stage is from 2011 to the present. In this stage, the government created a ministry for housing. The government offered three ways to solve the housing problem: building houses, zero-interest loans, and free land.

The first stage (1953-1974)

The first stage was between 1953-1974. Two factors encouraged the government to intervene in housing issues: discovering oil and immigration to urban areas. Finding oil supported the economy. For instance, government revenue increased from $334 million in 1960 to $4.216 billion in 1973. Besides, there was a boost in populations of urban areas (Saleh, 1998). Between 1950 and 1974, Riyadh's population increased from 111,000 to 651,000.

This stage had two main housing projects: the Arabian American Oil Company's (ARAMCO) programs and the Al-Malaz Project. ARAMCO had a vast number of employees. For instance, in 1951, they numbered 22,395 (Fadan, 1983). The company faced a problem with shelter because the oil fields were far from the cities. Therefore, in 1953, the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) created three programs to support the housing sector (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011). The first program was the Home Ownership Program. The Home Ownership Program was a collaboration between the government and ARAMCO. The government provided free land for ARAMCO's employees (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011). At the same time, if any employee needed a loan, ARAMCO offered a Housing Loan Plan, which included zero-interest loans for its employees. The third program was the Guarantee Rental Plan. This program supported real estate companies. If any company failed to sell its houses, ARAMCO would pay the rent for up to five years. In 1952, ARAMCO encouraged contractors to build 300 homes (Fadan, 1983). ARAMCO programs focused on oil sites in the Eastern Province (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011).

In 1953, the Saudi government moved the ministries and offices from Jeddah to Riyadh. The government announced the Al-Malaz Project to build houses for public employees. This project had two goals. The first goal was to motivate public employees to transfer to Riyadh (Fadan, 1983). The second goal was to solve shelter scarcity. At the same time, there was no governmental agency for housing. Therefore, the Ministry of Finance and National Economy in cooperation created the general administration for housing that was responsible for this project (Mortada, 2008).

Consequently, they hired foreign experts to do the project. The project included 754 detached home units and three buildings that contained 180 apartment units. Also, the project provided public services.

The second stage (1974-2011)

The second stage was between 1974 and 2011. In this stage, the government created three public entities to support citizens to own their homes. As a result, house projects expanded to include all cities and villages in the country. Furthermore, government spending was high. For instance, between 1975 and 1980, the government allocated $24 billion to build 300,000 housing units (Mubarak, 1999). In 1974, the Saudi government created the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF; Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011; Alhubashi & Cladera, 2016). The REDF provided zero-interest loans for the public to build their own homes. In 1975, the government established the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) and the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA). MOMRA launched a program to provide free land for citizens (Alasmari, 2018).

In 1974, the Saudi government established the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF). It is a public agency that aims to provide interest-free loans for the public. It began with 250 million riyals, almost $70 million. In the same year, the government increased its initial capital to 9 billion riyals, or $2.4 billion. In 1990, the value of REDF was almost 74 billion riyals, or nearly $20 billion. The first program for REDF was to provide interest-free loans for citizens to build their private homes. Citizens would repay the loan over 25 years.

The REDF categorized the loan amounts in three levels. The first level was 300,000 riyals, $80,000 for major cities. The second level was 250,000 riyals, $66,667 for towns. The third level was 200,000 riyals, $53,333 for small villages. The REDF provided the loan in four installments. First, the borrower received 10% of the loan when he signed the agreement. Next, he/she received 40% when the concrete framework was done. The third installment was 40% when they finished all the masonry work. When the house was done, they would receive the last payment of 10%.

The REDF offered a 20% discount for borrowers who repaid the loan regularly. Furthermore, there was an additional 10% discount for borrowers who repaid the total loan at once. Until 1988, the REDF had supported the building of 440,446 houses. The commitment percentage of repayment was 93%.

In 1975, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) replaced the General Administration for Housing (Mortada, 2008). MPWH provided two types of projects: rush housing and regular housing. The ministry focused on nine major cities.

In the 1970s and 1980s, MPWH built rush public housing projects in three main cities: Riyadh, Dammam, and Jeddah (Mortada, 2008). These projects were high-rise towers. They had 4,752 units with an average area of 230 m^2 (2,475 ft^2).

These projects were ready in 1980 but remained unoccupied for eleven years. The citizens refused to live there because the housing options were not appropriate for Saudi families. For instance, the size of the housing units was small, and the average family size was big.

Furthermore, Saudi culture does not prefer living in apartments. In 1990-1991, Kuwaiti citizens used these projects as a shelter because of the Iraq War. After the war, the ministry gave these projects to REDF to provide them to qualified citizens.

Besides the rush housing, MPWH built regular housing. This type focused on low-rise apartments and separated houses (Mortada, 2008). For instance, they were on one floor. The regular housing projects provided 9,934 apartments and 10,516 homes. In 2001, the total units were 24,540, and MPWH was brought down.

The Third stage (2011-current)

The third stage is from 2011 until now. In 2011, King Abdullah decreed the Ministry of Housing (MoH). As a result, the MoH became responsible for residential shelter, and it included the REDF (Kyriazis et al. 2018).

The Ministry of Housing has 12 programs and initiatives. The main initiative is called Sakani, which means my home in English. This initiative aims to support citizens to have their own homes by providing many programs and paying entirely or partially the interest rate of real estate loans. It works through participation with financial institutions. It offers nine solutions.

The first solution is that citizens can buy their homes directly from the market. Until January 2019, the ministry accepted 25,731 such requests. The second solution is that the citizen can build his own home with financial support from the ministry. In January 2019, the ministry accepted 285,000 such requests. The third solution involves units under construction. The ministry agreed to 264,670 such demands until January 2019.

The fourth solution is the ministry's constructed units. The fifth solution is converting current real estate loans to supported loans. The sixth solution is free land. The ministry offers free lands in some cities. These free lands are restricted to be built on in one year, or the citizen loses them. The ministry distributed 207,296 lands. The seventh solution is an additional loan for the current military. Besides 500,000 SAR, current military members can have 20% of their real estate value up to 140,000 SAR. The eighth solution is an additional loan for citizens 50 years old and above. Besides 500,000 SAR, they can have 20% of their real estate value up to 140,000 SAR. The ninth solution is paying a value-added tax of up to 42,500 SAR.

The Health System in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has been provided with health care services since 1926 (Khaliq, 2012). In 1926, the government created the health directorate in Jeddah. The health care system was limited. It was just in Mecca and Jeddah. In 1927, the government changed the name to be the Directorate of General Health and Ambulances and expanded its authority to include the whole country (Khaliq, 2012; Ram, 2014). In 1950, it became the Ministry of Health. In 1970, the government announced the first five-years national health plan (Ram, 2014).

In 1997, the Saudi health care system ranked 26th (The World Health Organization, 2000; Al-Yousuf et al., 2002; Khaliq, 2012). Both the public and private sectors provide health care services. The public sector offers public health services directly and indirectly. Directly, the Health Ministry is responsible for the health care system. Besides, other governmental entities, such as the Education Ministry and National Guard health affairs, provide health care services for their employees and their families (Al-Yousuf et al., 2002). In emergency cases, these governmental entities expand their health care services to include all citizens (Mutfi, 2000).

The private sector provides health care services during private hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies (Al-Yousuf et al., 2002). Private health care services exist in big cities. The health system has three levels: primary, advance, and specialist (Almalki et al. 2011; Al-Yousuf et al. 2002). Primary health care (PHC) centers provide primary health care services. PHC system was created in 1978. If a patient needs advance retreatment, the doctor transferred the patient to an advanced hospital. Besides the advanced hospitals, there are specialized hospitals.

The Health Ministry

In 1950, the Saudi government created the Health Ministry to provide health care services directly to citizens (Almalki et al. 2011). The ministry provides vital health care services, approximately 60% (Al-Yousuf et al. 2002; Sebai et al. 2001; Ram, 2014). Furthermore, it has four other functions: making strategic health plans, formulating health policies, super health programs, and controlling all health activities (Al-Yousuf et al. 2002; Ram, 2014). The functions require a decentralized structure.

The ministry divides the country into twenty regions (Al-Yousuf et al. 2002). Each area has a health director who is responsible for the health care service in the region. Each area has many sections.

Scholars discussed three stages for the Health Ministry: curative, preventive, and regulative. The curative stage was between 1950 and 1978, and the ministry was focusing on therapeutic activities. There were limited preventive programs, such as a campaign against malaria in the eastern province in the 1950s (Al-Yousuf et al. 2002). This campaign was in collaboration between ARAMCO, WHO, and the Health

Ministry (Sebai et al. 2001). Curative is necessary, but without preventive, it costs highly.

In 1978, the ministry made plans to prevent diseases, such as malaria. Therefore, the ministry began to establish PHC centers. PHC has five main tasks. First, PHC is responsible for educating the public about three main issues: diseases, water, food. Diseases' knowledge includes conditions and reasons. Moreover, it informs how the public can avoid infections. Water education includes how safe water is essential. The food topic discusses proper nutrition. Second, PHC centers provide maternal and child health care.

Third, PHC works to increase the percent of the public who are vaccine. Fourth, PHC centers deal with regional pandemics. Finally, PHC provides treatment for common diseases.

At the end of the 1980s, 10% of PHC activities focused on preventing diseases (Sebai et al. 2001). Therefore, the strategic health plan, between 1990 and 1995, emphasized preventative actions. In the 1990s, the number of hospital patients decreased by up to 40% (Sebai et al. 2001; Khoja et al. 1997). In 2009, there were 1925 PHC centers in the country (Khaliq, 2012).

In 2009, the Health Ministry had 2037 PHC centers, and they received 82% of visitors for all health providers. PHC centers contribute that each citizen has a health record. The health record system reduced the health care cost because it prevents the duplication of consultation.

The Health Ministry budget is enormous. Between 2005 and 2009, the ministry's budget average was almost 6% of the country's budget. Therefore, the ministry is highly costly, and it provides free health care services for the public. Thus, the third stage's goal was to minimize the governmental health care services bill

(Khaliq, 2012). This stage emphasized three main steps: health insurance, privatization, and electronic health services.

In 1993, the government created the Saudi Commission for Health Specialties (SCHS) (Khaliq, 2012). SCHS is responsible for supervising, regulating, and accrediting all health training programs. Moreover, SCHS is responsible for issuing and renewing healthcare professionals' licenses (AlBaker et al. 2017).

The Health Ministry stressed the co-operative health insurance system (Sebai et al. 2001). In 1999, the government established the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance (CCHI). The council aims to create, regulate, and oversee health insurance strategies. The council recommended a plan to have health insurance for the public, which became the Cooperative Health Insurance Act of 2003 (Khaliq, 20120

The act has three stages of implementing health insurance for the public in the country. The first stage focused on employees in the private sector, and the employers pay the cost of health insurance. The council divided this stage into three phases. The first phase focused on the private sector, with more than 499 employees. Second, the Council included companies with more than one hundred employees. Finally, all employees in the private sector were insured. This stage was implemented completely. In 2010, CCHI reported that 8.4 million insured individuals (Khaliq, 2012).

The second stage expands the insured employees by including the public sector employees, and the government pays health insurance costs. The third stage aims to include other groups, such as tourism.

The ministry implemented privatization in two strategies, either sell or rent public hospitals, and both ways have advantages and disadvantages (Walston et al. 2008). The main benefits are financial and management. It decreased government expenditures on health care services. Moreover, the decision making is faster. Conversely, the private sector focuses on thriving cities, the main cities, so there is a concern about the rural areas.

The ministry implemented electronic health services to automate all health services and requirements. In 2008, the ministry announced a four-year plan to develop electronic health care services with a $1.1 billion budget (Bah et al. 2011). As a result, the ministry announced many electronic systems. The first system is the Health Information System (HIS) (Ram, 2014). The system is comprehensive, and it has two goals. First, each patient should have an electronic health file. Second, each hospital has an electronic system, and the system connects all hospitals. The second system is the Bed Management System (Ram, 2014). The system manages the capacity of each hospital to guide referral decisions.

Ministry of Commerce

In 1946, the government established the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce & Industry to administrate the commerce. Its goal was to protect local products. In 1954, the government created the Ministry of Commerce and expanded its tasks (Niblock, 2004). In 2003, the ministry became the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. In 2016, the ministry changed to be the Ministry of Commerce and Investment. In 2020, it became the Ministry of Commerce.

The ministry has many functions, but there are two main functions. First, it is accountable for checking the safety and quality of goods and products to ensure that they are safe for the public (Almutairi et al. 2015). Second, the ministry is responsible for protecting the public from fraud and deception (Almutairi et al. 2015). Some of the ministry functions are a collaboration with other public entities. For example,

Chapter Four

Methodology

Abstract

As established in the first chapter, this study aims to determine if governmental type affects New Public Management (NPM) implementation, especially when a government has controversial values. For instance, the literature found that NPM is reliant on democratic values, such as openness. At the same time, non-democratic governments do not believe in democratic values. Therefore, a conversion happens when a non-democratic government implements NPM. Ignoring the NPM democratic values limits the impact of NPM, especially with respect to openness. This study uses openness and public participation as synonyms.

As such, the testable hypothesis is that when a non-democratic state implements NPM, openness or citizen participation will not increase. There are three possible outcomes in the relationship between the NPM index and openness score: a positive relationship, a negative relationship, and no relationship. A positive relationship between the NPM Index and openness score would indicate that an increase in the NPM Index leads to an increase in openness. In this case, the hypothesis would be rejected. A negative relationship between the NPM Index and openness would indicate that an increase in the NPM Index leads to a decrease in openness. Should the results show no connection between the NPM Index and openness, the dissertation hypothesis would be accepted.

In this study, the independent variable is NPM implementations, and openness is the dependent variable. The primary method for testing this hypothesis is a case study of NPM implementation among ministries in Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi Arabia is a non-democratic country, this study predicts that government ministries will ignore the openness dimension of NPM.

The study population consists of 25 ministries in Saudi Arabia, and the unit of analysis the ministerial organizations. The study is cross-sectional and uses the ministries' most recent annual reports (2017) to count four things for each ministry: a total of public programs, PPP programs, performance measurements, and contracted employees. This study examines the efforts of 3 of the 25 ministries to implement NPM. They are the Ministry of Commerce, the Health Ministry, and the Housing Ministry.

The three agencies are the sample and were selected for two reasons. First, it focused on those ministries that provide essential services and goods for the public. For instance, the Ministry of Commerce is responsible for the state economy and all products sold in the country. The Health Ministry is responsible for all health services in the country, and the Housing Ministry is responsible for all real estate transactions and issues. Furthermore, these ministries provide various services so that the study may find various public participation. Secondly, resource limitations for the study limited the analysis to just three ministries. For instance, these ministries provide their annual reports on their websites.

The rest of this chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section explains the study's three variables: the NPM implementations, openness, and the government type. Moreover, it describes the measurements. The NPM implementations were measured by creating the NPM Index. Furthermore, this dissertation used PPS to measure openness. This study used the Political Regime Index dataset provided by *Our World in Data* to measure the type of government. The second section discusses the data collection instrument. The researcher created a form to gather data from the ministries' annual reports. Finally, the section shows the data analysis for each ministry and the score for the independent and dependent variables.

The Variables and Measurements

This dissertation has two main variables. The first variable is the NPM implementations, which is the independent variable. This variable was measured by the NPM Index, which focuses on three aspects: PPP, PM, and PST. The second variable is openness, which is the dependent variable. The researcher has permission from the international association for public participation to use its Public Participation Spectrum (PPS). The Political Regime Index was used to explain the kind of Saudi government.

The NPM Implementations

This study drew on three main qualities of NPM to create a new measure referred to as an NPM Index to measure the independent variable of NPM implementation. The first element of this index is the degree of collaboration between the public and private sectors, which is called Public-Private Participation (PPP). The second element is the degree of the shift to focus on performance measurements instead of procedures. In the study, this is called Performance Measurement (PM). The third element of the index is the degree to which a public agency implements private-sector tools (PST). This dissertation used an inductive approach to code the variable. For instance, the researcher read the annual reports for any word terms to PPP, such as collaboration. At the same time, the researcher went profoundly and read the details of each program to ensure if the program belongs to PPP or not. This index was used to measure NPM implementation for the three selected ministries. Each factor was given a score out of 100, and then the three scores were averaged. The next section describes this index in more detail.

The first component of the NPM Index is government collaboration with the private sector or public-private participation (PPP). There are two main types of PPP.

The first type occurs when the private sector collaborates with the public sector to provide goods or services. The second type is privatization. For this study, we are primarily concerned with the first type. The PPP score for each ministry is therefore based on the private-sector contribution to providing that ministry's primary service. There are three ways to measure the private-sector contribution: percentage of buildings, percentage of beneficiaries, and percentage of staff. The percentage of buildings calculates PPP based on the percentage of facilities that the private sector owns. The second two methods calculate PPP based on what percentage of beneficiaries the private sector serves and what percentage of the staff is the private sector, respectively.

For example, the Health Ministry’s primary task is to provide health services. In Saudi Arabia, there are two main types of hospitals: public and private. Therefore, the PPP score can be measured based on what percentage of all hospitals are private. Alternatively, the ratio of beds in private hospitals versus the number of hospital beds total is another way to measure the PPP score. The rate of total hospital staff working in private hospitals is yet another alternative for measuring the PPP score. This study uses the ratio of beneficiaries because this allows for a standard measurement across the selected ministries. Therefore the PPP equation used in this study is

$\frac{PPP\ programs}{total\ programs} * 100.$

The second NPM Index component is performance measurement (PM). Propper and Wilson (2003) have defined performance measurements in three ways: outputs, outcomes, or impacts, and results in linking resources and outcomes. The PM score for this study is based on the percentage of the organization’s programs that have performance measurements. The PM score was calculated by comparing the number of public programs with performance measurements to the total number of available programs: PM score = $\frac{total\ programs\ with\ PM}{total\ public\ programs} * 100$. This information can be found in government reports because, in 2015, the Saudi government created The National Center for Performance Measurement (ADAA) (ADAA is an Arabic word means performance by English). The main goal for the ADAA was to increase public sector efficiency by supporting the creation of performance measurements for public organizations. As of 2017, each ministry is required to work with ADAA and must include performance measurements in their annual reports.

The third NPM Index component measures the use of private-sector tools (PST) in public organizations. Scholars discussed many private-sector tools, such as job security and performance-related pay (Emery & Giauque, 2003). For instance, NPM encourages public organizations to implement the annual contract and reward system like the private sector. Both strategies cannot be implemented with the current merit system in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the first step is to have employees with an annual contract. Annual contract eliminates job security and allows the public sector to pay based on performance (Rasheed, 2018).

The private sector offers contracted jobs while the public sector often provides jobs for life (through the "merit system"). However, some Saudi ministries use both merit and contract systems in hiring public employees. The public contract system implements private-sector tools through the requirements and incentives for positions. The contract system allows public organizations to implement private-sector tools, which are emphasized by NPM. Therefore, this component is measured as $\frac{contracted\ employees}{total\ employees} * 100$.

Openness

This study examined openness, which is the stand-in for the dependent variable of democratic values in NPM. The Public Participation Spectrum (PPS) is used to quantify openness in each ministry. The International Association for Public Participation created this instrument, and it permitted the researcher to use it (See Appendix III). PPS has five levels of public participation: Inform, Consult, Involve, Collaborate, and Empower. Every level has more public participation than the previous level (Nelimarkka et al. 2014).

The first level, Inform, indicates that the ministry provides information to the public about its goods and services. The second level, Consult, means that the ministry actively seeks public feedback. The third level, Involve, indicates a ministry that involves the public in their work and considers the publics' concerns. The fourth level, Collaboration, marks a ministry that sees the public as a partner, working together at each step of decision-making. The highest level, Empowerment, indicates that the public has the right to make decisions instead of the ministry itself (Jami & Walsh, 2014).

The PPS was used to assign a value for each level. For instance, the lowest level, inform, was given 20 points, and 20 points were added for each higher level. The highest point value is 100 for the empower level. For example, if a ministry implemented a method categorized as being at the consult level, it counts 40 points. The researcher analyzed all ministries' strategies and ranked them to PPS levels based on each level's definition (See Appendix I).

In this study, a Ministry receives 20 points for each level of openness achieved. Appendix I shows some examples for assigned values. The total points were divided by the total number of examples to determine the PPS level average for each ministry. Finally, the total points for all levels were summed and divided by the number of methods to compute each ministry's openness score.

The Saudi Government type.

The Political Regime Index was used to establish the current state of democracy in Saudi Arable. The Political Regime Index is based on data from Wimmer and Min (2006) and the Center for Systemic Peace and was most recently updated in 2015. It measures the political regime of most countries on a scale from -10 to +10. A +10 score indicates an entirely democratic government, while a -10 score indicates an entirely non-democratic state. Saudi Arabia scored -10 on the political regime scale, classifying it as a non-democratic country. This study is focused on non-democratic governments. Therefore, the Political Regime Index provided evidence that Saudi Arabia is appropriate for this study.

Data Collection Instrument

The researcher designed a data collection instrument (DCI) to parse the large amount of information provided by each ministries' annual report, publicly available information on each ministry website. This instrument is contained in Appendix II. The DCI has two main parts: NPM Index information and PPS data. For the NPM Index section, five key data points were calculated for each ministry: the number of programs, PPP programs, programs with performance measurements, the total number of ministry employees, and the number of contracted employees. For the PPS data section, all methods the ministry used in 2017 to involve the public were recorded. Each method's type was then determined and scored. The DCI ignored any repetition in each technique. For instance, if a ministry used any technique more than once, it was counted as one instance in the DCI.

Data Analysis

This section shows the collected data for each Saudi ministry.

The Housing Ministry

In 2010, the Saudi government created the Housing Ministry to increase the percentage of citizens who own shelter. In 2017, four programs contributed toward this goal, making beneficiaries. First, the Ready Shelter program provides shelters built by the ministry, with reasonable prices and low monthly payments. In 2017, this program provided 10,255 housing units. Second, the Developmental Housing Program provides shelters for poor people. In 2017 this program provided 32 shelters. The ministry independently runs these two programs, meaning it offered 10,287 units without any collaboration with the private sector in 2017. The third program, the Off-Plan Sales Program, provides unbuilt shelters. This program allows future owners to choose their housing layout and location. This program provided 110,150 units in 2017.

Fourth, the Supported Loan Program allows citizens to obtain a real estate loan from any financial institution and have the ministry pay the interest rate. The amount of support provided is dependent on a family's size and monthly income. In 2017, this program supported 85,000 units. The private sector contributed to 195,150 units out of 205,437 total provided by the Ministry (95%) through these programs. The PPP score is 95 out of 100 (Appendix IV). Similar to the other two ministries, the annual report included the output of each program. Therefore, the PM score is 100 out of 100 (Appendix IV). The Housing Ministry hired both merit and contracted employees, with contracted employees making up 52% of the almost 2000 total employees in 2017. This gives a very high NPM Index score of 82 (Appendix IV).

As with the Ministry of Commerce, the annual report for the Housing Ministry divided the relationship between the Ministry and the public into three aspects: new media, traditional media, and call centers. First, the Ministry used social media and short videos to inform the public about ministry programs. The Ministry's social media accounts had 45,000 followers, and these accounts wrote more than 460,000 tweets and answers. The Ministry's social media videos were watched one million times. Additionally, the Ministry created a unique website, email, and contact form for each program. In terms of traditional media, the ministry's staff participated in 65 TV interviews and provided 15 workshops, which 2500 citizens participated in the workshops. Finally, the ministry's call center received 14,926 calls in 2017. As a result, the Housing Ministry has a low PPS score of 30 out of 100 (Appendix V). Based on PPS, the Housing Ministry obtained public feedback and consulted them.

The Health Ministry.

In determining the health ministry's NPM Index, PPP was established by examining the public and private percentages of hospital beneficiaries nationally. The hospital beneficiaries were calculated based on hospital beds. In 2017, the private sector made up 17,622 hospital beds out of 72,981 totals, or 24%. Similar to the Ministry of Commerce, the annual report shows the achievements of each department and program. Therefore, the PM score is 100. The Health Ministry uses a contract system called the Autonomous Recruitment system (AR). In 2017, the Ministry had 10,208 private contract employees out of 51,935 in the AR system, or about 20%. Averaging these three factors, the NPM Index score is $(\frac{24+100+20}{3})$ = 48 out of 100, or a medium level of NPM implementation (Appendix VI).

The Health Ministry's public involvement efforts are focused primarily on an informal level, such as its website. Further steps included various public campaigns, reports, information graphics, phone medical consultations, and short videos. In the consultation effort, the ministry distributed surveys and received public comments about its programs. Appendix I was used to calculate the PPS score. The Health Ministry scores low on the PPS: 26 out of 100, which means that the ministry included the public as consulters (Appendix VII). Furthermore, the ministry obtained public feedback on its programs.

The Ministry of Commerce

The Ministry of Commerce had 23 primary services and 52 total services (Annual Report, 2018). The ministry provides services for both citizens and the private sector. The annual ministry report did not show any collaboration with the private sector to deliver public services; the ministry provided all services independently. While the ministry did collaborate with financial institutions to change one regulation, this was not counted, as PPP focuses on the private sector providing services or support in lieu of the ministry.

The annual report discussed several instances of collaboration with other ministries or global organizations. However, there were no instances of local cooperation with either citizens or the private sector. Therefore, the PPP score for the Ministry of Commerce was zero (Appendix VIII).

As for performance measurements, the annual report included a section called "Achievements," which focused on the output of each program. Furthermore, the Annual report compared some results with the last ten years. Also, it included various tables and charts to simplify and summarize information for the public. Therefore, the ministry's score is 100% (Appendix VIII).

Based on the Annual Report, the Ministry of Commerce had 807 employees, all of whom were employed through the merit system, i.e., 0% contracted employees, leading to a PST of 0. The scores from each of these factors were averaged, resulting in the NPM Index for the Ministry of Commerce: $(\frac{0+100+0}{3})$ = 33% (Appendix VIII).

This score means that the ministry has a low NPM Index. A low NPM score means that, in 2017, the ministry implemented high bureaucracy activities and low NPM activities.

The Ministry of Commerce divides its relationship with the public into three components: new media, public relations, and marketing. In terms of new media, the Ministry completed 33 public campaigns on social media, served 20,000 beneficiaries through social media, and collaborated with 32 social media celebrities. Additionally, it created a YouTube channel to support deaf people. The ministry activities in this component were categorized as social media because these activities were based on social media, either Twitter or Youtube. Furthermore, these activities informed the public about ministry services.

The public relations arm of the Ministry of Commerce facilitated a variety of public participation programs. Moreover, these programs were either to inform the public or to consult them. For instance, representatives from the Ministry gave 115 TV and Radio interviews and published 144 newspaper comments, in addition to the 33 public campaigns and 164 newspaper articles put out by the Ministry. They also created a cellphone app for the Ministry, and its call center received and answered 1500 traditional phone calls. The marketing section of the Ministry contributed 619 infographics, nine motion graphics, and 19 videos. The previous programs provided information for the public.

The Ministry received feedback on its programs through an online feedback form on its main website, surveys, and email. Appendix I lists each public participation method that the Ministry offered. Furthermore, each technique scored based on SSP (Appendix I). The Ministry scored 27 out of 100, meaning it scored low on the public participation spectrum (Appendix IX). A low PPS implies that the ministry consulted the public and obtained general feedback on analysis, alternatives, and decisions.

Chapter Five

Results and Discussion

Abstract

This chapter has two primary purposes. First, it reports and discusses the results and the values of the variables. Second, it examines if there is a correlation between the variables. It also discusses the results relative to previous research.

Results and Discussion

Appendix X shows the ministries' PPP, PM, PST, and NPM Index. The appendix X shows a significant difference in PPP scores. For instance, the Housing ministry had 94 points, which means that the ministry frequently collaborates with the private sector. On the other hand, the Commerce Ministry had no collaboration with the private sector, with zero points. The Health Ministry had 24 points because the private sector partially provides health services.

Chapter two discussed three main reasons public organizations collaborate with the private sector: global institutions, governmental desire, and the revolving door. The first two reasons may provide a reasonable partial explanation for the sample because they should affect all ministries to collaborate with the private sector.

The revolving door theory provides the best explanation by focusing on the individual profile for the ministers. Based on the ministers' curriculum vitae, the Housing Minister had experience in the private sector, but other ministers did not.

Another element that may explain the PPP scores is the strength of the private sector. For instance, the Housing Ministry collaborated with the financial sector because the Saudi financial sector is strong. Unfortunately, the health services private sector in Saudi Arabia is still weak because there is limited public health insurance and because the government provides free health services. Therefore, even if the Health Ministry wanted to collaborate with the private sector, its choices would be limited.

Conversely, the PM scores for all ministries were 100. Since 2017, the Saudi government has required that all ministries include performance measurements in their annual reports. Furthermore, the Saudi government created (ADAA) to train public employees about performance measurements. (ADAA) does both workshops and training programs for public employees.

The PST scores varied: The Housing Ministry has the highest score of 52 points, the Commerce Ministry has the lowest score at zero points, and the Health Ministry had 20 points. There is no clear explanation for the difference in PST scores, but the appendix shows a correlation between the PST and PPP scores. Therefore, this dissertation assumes that increasing PPP may support public organizations to implement more PST. Another explanation is that novel ministries, such as the Housing Ministry, may need to implement the private-sector tools to attract employees.

The NPM Index scores varied significantly among the ministries, with the Ministry of Commerce scoring the lowest at 33 points, the Housing Ministry scoring the highest at 82 points, and the Health Ministry falling in between at 48 points. In 2017, the ministry of commerce implemented low NPM tools, implementing just PST, the tools required by the Saudi government. The Health Ministry, which had a medium level of NPM Index, implemented some NPM tools, but it needs to encourage the current tools and include missing tools. The Housing Ministry had a very high NPM Index score, having implemented most NPM tools. There is no apparent reason for the varied NPM Index score among the ministries but dealing with a daily base among the public may encourage the Housing Ministry to collaborate with the private sector and implement private-sector tools. The NPM Index showed decreasing based on dealing with the public.

In contrast, the openness scores were approximately the same for all ministries, tightly ranging between 25 and 30 on the PPS scale. The PPS scores were low, not very low. Low PPS means that the ministries provided enough information for the public. Furthermore, they asked for public feedback. At the same time, the ministries did not involve the public or collaborate with them.

Scholars have provided two main reasons for the slight improvement in PPS in Saudi Arabia: the Arab Spring and social media. Some studies showed more public access for the ministries after the Arab Spring. Other scholars linked PPS and social media. For instance, the ministries' annual reports showed that they focused on social media and called it the new media.

Correlation

The data in Appendix XI show that the implementation of NPM has had little or no impact on PPS in these ministries. For example, while the Ministry of Commerce has a low NPM Index score, it has the same PPS score as the Housing Ministry, which scored very high on the NPM Index. All ministries had low PPS.

Even though the selected ministries are a small number, the researcher still calculated a linear regression ($\hat{y} = 23.8165 + 0.07086X$). The coefficient is almost 0.07, indicating that NPM implementation did not correlate with PPS or openness.

The dissertation's finding is significant because it emphasizes that the type of government affects the NPM implementations. In monarchy governments, public opinion is not essential, so public entities show low public participation.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

The dissertation has discussed the impact of NPM on the openness of three ministries in Saudi Arabia. NPM reshapes public organizations in many aspects, such as public-private participation (PPP) and performance measurements (PM). This dissertation created an NPM Index to measure the NPM implementations of the three Saudi ministries. It also adopted SSP to measure ministries' openness and used their annual reports to collect data. The findings show no correlation between NPM implementations and openness. The results emphasized that the government type affects the public sector reformation theories, such as NPM.

This study has three main types of limitations: sample, measurements, and data. In Saudi Arabia, some ministries do not provide their annual reports to the public. Therefore, limited information affected the number of samples and how they were selected. First, there are 25 ministries in Saudi Arabia. This dissertation focused on three ministries, which is a small sample number. Second, the ministries were selected because they published their annual report to the public. Therefore, the study's result cannot be generalized.

Second, the researcher created the NPM index and adopted PPS. The NPM Index concentrates on three NPM activities: PPP, PST, and PM. These activities are essential, but these activities do not represent all NPM activities. Therefore, the NPM Index does not measure NPM implementations accurately. Additionally, the PPS focuses on one democratic value, openness, and did not calculate other democratic values, such as public accountability. The limited measurements minimize the findings.

Third, this dissertation collected data from the selected ministries' annual reports. The collected data focused on one year, 2017. Analyzing many years would better support the findings. Furthermore, the ministries have internal departments that prepare and publish the annual reports, which may bias the data.

Future research needs to include all ministries and appropriate measurements for both NPM implementations and values to achieve accurate and objective findings.

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Appendix

Appendix I

Public Participation Spectrum (PPS)

Public Participation Spectrum (PPS)

Level	Inform	Consult	Involve	Collaborate	Empower
Description	To provide the public with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities, and/or solutions.	To obtain public feedback on analysis, alternatives, and decisions.	To work directly with the public throughout the process to ensure that public concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and considered.	To partner with the public in each aspect of the decision, including the development of alternatives and the identification of the preferred solution.	To place final decision-making in the hands of the public.
Examples	Fact sheets (20). Websites (20). Open houses (20). Social media (20). Public campaign (20). Newspaper comments and articles (20).	Public comment (40). Focus groups (40). Surveys (40). Public meetings (40). TV & Radio Interview (40).	Workshops (60). Deliberative polling (60).	Citizen advisory (80). Committees (80). Consensus-loading (80). Participatory decision-making (80).	Citizen juries (100). Ballots (100). Delegated decisions (100).

	Cellphone Application (20). Call center (20). Information graphics (20). Short videos (20). Report (20). Phone medical consultation (20).	Online feedback form (40). Electronic mail (40).			
Score	0-20	21-40	41-60	61-80	81-100
	Very Low Openness	Low Openness	Medium Openness	High Openness	Very High Openness

Appendix II

Data Collecting Instrument

Data Collecting Instrument

Ministry’s Name:					
How many programs does the ministry have?					
How many programs use PPP strategies?					
How many programs have performance measurements?					
How many employees does the ministry have?					
How many contracted employees does the ministry have?					
The NPM Index					
First factor: Public-Private Participation (PPP)					
PPP’s score = $\frac{PPP\ programs}{total\ programs} * 100$					
Compute	0-20	21-40	41-60	61-80	81-100
	Very Low PPP	Low PPP	Medium PPP	High PPP	Very High PPP
	1	2	3	4	5
Second factor: Performance Measurement (PM)					
PM’s score= $\frac{total\ programs\ with\ PM}{total\ public\ programs} * 100$					
Compute	0-20	21-40	41-60	61-80	81-100
	Very Low PM	Low PM	Medium PM	High PM	Very High PM
	1	2	3	4	5
Third factor: Private-Sector Tools (PST)					
PST’s score= $\frac{contracted\ employees}{total\ employees} * 100$					
Compute	0-20	21-40	41-60	61-80	81-100
	Very Low PST	Low PST	Medium PST	High PST	Very High PST
	1	2	3	4	5
The NPM Index for the ministry= $\frac{PPP+PM+PST}{3}$					
Compute	0-20	21-40	41-60	61-80	81-100
	Very Low NPM	Low NPM	Medium NPM	High NPM	Very High NPM
	1	2	3	4	5
PPS (Lists)					
List	Method			Type	Score
1)					
2)					
3)					
4)					
5)					
6)					
7)					

Appendix III

A Permission to use PPS

A Permission to use PPS

Ref: Request for permission to copy, reproduce or publish IAP2 Federation copyrighted materials

Dear Bader,

Thank you for demonstrating your interest in the work and in the copyrighted materials of the IAP2 International Federation.

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We wish you success in your endeavours. Let me know if you need anything else.

Regards,
Ellen

Ellen Ernst
IAP2 Executive Manager
operations@iap2.org

Appendix IV

NPM Index score for the Saudi Housing Ministry

NPM Index score for the Saudi Housing Ministry.

List	NPM Index Factors	Score
1	PPP	94
2	PM	100
3	PST	52
The NPM Index score=	$\frac{94+100+52}{3} = 82$ out of 100.	

Appendix V

PPS score for the Saudi Housing Ministry

PPS score for the Saudi Housing Ministry

Number	Method	Level	Score
1)	Social media	Inform	20
2)	Call center	Inform	20
3)	Short videos	Inform	20
4)	Reports	Inform	20
5)	Interviews	Consult	40
6)	Workshops	Involve	60
Total			180
PPS Level= 180/6			30 out of 100

Appendix VI

NPM Index score for the Saudi Health Ministry

NPM Index score for the Saudi Health Ministry.

List	NPM Index Factors	Score
1	PPP	24
2	PM	100
3	PST	20
The NPM Index score=	$\frac{24+100+20}{3} = 48$ out of 100.	

Appendix VII

PPS score for the Saudi Health Ministry

PPS score for the Saudi Health Ministry

Number	Method	Level	Score
1	Public comments	Consult	40
2	Information graphics	Inform	20
3	Website	Inform	20
4	Short videos	Inform	20
5	Reports	Inform	20
6	Phone medical consultation	Inform	20
7	Survey	Consult	40
Total			180
PPS Level= 180/7			26 out of 100

Appendix VIII

NPM Index score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce

NPM Index score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce

List	NPM Index Factors	Score
1	PPP	0
2	PM	100
3	PST	0
The NPM Index score=	$\frac{0+100+0}{3} = 33$ out of 100.	

Appendix IX

PPS score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce

PPS score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce

Number	Method	Level	Score
1)	Social media	Inform	20
2)	TV & Radio interviews	Consult	40
3)	Public campaign	Inform	20
4)	Newspapers comments & articles	Inform	20
5)	Cellphone App	Inform	20
6)	Call center	Inform	20
7)	Information graphics	Inform	20
8)	Website	Inform	20
9)	Online feedback form	Consult	40
10)	Survey	Consult	40
11)	Electronic mail	Consult	40
Total			300
PPS Level= 300/11			27 out of 100

Appendix X

PPP, PM, PST, NPM Index, and PPS scores for the Selected Ministries

PPP, PM, PST, NPM Index, and PPS scores for the Selected Ministries

Ministry / Index	The Housing Ministry	The Health Ministry	The Ministry of Commerce
PPP	94	24	0
PM	100	100	100
PST	52	20	0
NPM Index	82 (Very High)	48 (Medium)	33 (Low)
PPS	30 (Low)	26 (Low)	27 (Low)

Appendix XI
NPM Index, and PPS scores for the Selected Ministries

NPM Index, and PPS scores for the Selected Ministries



Vita

Bader Alabdulkarim is from Saudi Arabia. He attended King Saud University in Saudi Arabia and received a bachelor's degree in Public Administration. In 2012, he participated at The California State University, Chico, and received a master's degree in Public Administration. In 2016, he attended the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, to pursue a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Political Science with a concentration in Public Administration and a cross-field concentration in Public Policy. After graduation, he will go back to Saudi Arabia to his new position as an assistant professor position at King Saud University.