

Gigi Tevzadze

The Birth of the Georgian Nation. Identity and Ideology. Politetal and Societal Identities. Nationality and Religiosity.

Three theories about the birth of nations, which belong to Ernest Gellner¹, Benedict Anderson² and Anthony Smith³, can be spotted on the map of the 20th century thinking. On the one hand, these theories summarized an existing discussion⁴ but, on the other hand, they laid the foundation to a new discourse on the origin of nations and national consciousness.

According to these three theories the nationalism, or more precisely, the idea of a nation is an artifact and its emergence is connected with certain socio-political and cultural events in the history of the mankind. This is the point of agreement where these theories stop being similar and start diverging.

Gellner defined nationality as a political principle which holds that the political and national should be congruent. This is a completely new principle, which is characteristic for modernity. Prior to that the states were not organized by national features⁵.

Gellner distinguishes three stages in human history: the hunter-gatherer, the agro-literate and the industrial: nationalism appears in the transition from the agro-literate culture to the industrial stage. In the agro-literate stage, the ruling classes benefit from cultural diversity as in such a situation there is no challenge to their power.

In industrial societies, a high culture defines the whole of society and needs to be sustained by the polity. In industrial society, the changing nature of work demands cultural homogeneity. This means that there is a need for impersonal, context-free communication.

Moreover, an industrial society depends on perpetual growth in order to satisfy needs. Perpetual growth can only be achieved by perennial shifts in the occupational structure. The high level of technical skill required means that many positions must be filled meritocratically. This necessitates a kind of egalitarianism and at the same time, necessitates general training before specialized training, in order to allow exchanges and shifts in occupation.

Thus, **education** occupies an important place. Education starts to define the status of an individual, whereas in agro-literate societies **kinship** status was the defining factor.

The state, therefore, fuses the state and culture together. That is why there emerges a need to compete for overlapping cultural catchment areas, and nationalism is the only way of competing effectively for these areas.

Anderson's *Imagined Communities* was published in the same year as Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* (1983). The basic premise of Anderson's theory is that the **decline of religion** made it possible new conceptions of time, which in turn made it possible to imagine the nation.

Before nationalism, there existed the "great religiously imagined communities", such as, for example, Christendom, which was based on shared language (for e.g. Latin). Along with the spread/enhancement, Europeans came to realize that their conceptions of existence are not the only ones. Moreover, the factor of Latin, as of a shared language start declining and the so-called vernaculars start reviving.

Whilst Europe existed as the **great religiously imagined communities**, the conception of time was one in which history was fused together. The past, present and future were not linked causally, but through the will of the divine. Within such a conception of time, the word "meanwhile" can have no meaning. With the dissolution of such communities, it became possible to imagine a state in which there was no longer "simultaneity along time" but "homogenous, empty time". This type of time could be marked by clock and calendar, and was responsible for theoretically incidental coincidence.

Then an era of print capitalism "came". After a while, the monopoly was lost by Latin and new works were published in the vernacular. Protestantism and its emphasis on internal salvation was particularly important here. Books, newspapers and novels in vernacular languages gave the idea to their readers that there existed, simultaneously in time, a group of readers like them consuming cultural manufactures.

These manufactures gave the readers a sense of national consciousness in three ways:

1. They created unified fields of exchange between Latin and vernaculars;
2. They gave a new fixity to the language and thus helped give an idea of permanence to the nation;
3. They created languages of power different to the pre-existing language of Latin.

Anderson claims that nationalism is the result of the fusion between the secularization, human diversity, the development of capitalism and the technology of print.

Smith's theory is based on "ethno-symbolism". Smith was a student of Gellner and attempted to overcome those difficulties in Gellner's modernist perspective.

A key weakness of the modernist perspective is that it fails to account for the passions generated by nationalism: why people fight and die for their nation, when nationalism is only a tool created by the elites for the purpose of economic gain and economic cohesion?

Smith argues that nationalism draws on an attempt of a concrete "group" to fashion the history into a sense of common identity and shared history. This does not mean that the history should be academically valid or cogent - indeed, Smith asserts that many nationalisms are based on historically flawed interpretations and tend to entirely mythologize certain parts of own history.

Nationalism, according to Smith, does not require that members of a "nation" should all be alike, only that they should feel solidarity to the nation and other members of their nation. A sense of nationalism can be produced from whatever dominant ideology exists in a given locale. Nationalism builds on pre-existing kinship, religious and belief systems.

All these three theories consider the nationalism and the birth of a nation from three different perspectives: constructionist (Gellner), traditionalist (Smith) and reductionist (Anderson). All these three theories, however, have significant flaws - as Smith notes quite rightly none of the theories explains why people kill each other for the nation and national idea. Neither does Smith's theory, which says that the nationality, in its essence, is a sense of solidarity and the solidarity can be the feeling for which people may sacrifice themselves.

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We should here touch upon a mythology which originated in the 19th century and is linked to the development of the concept of unconscious. At that time, the concept of unconscious seemed to be the only explanation to the indignation and rebellion of masses. In his "Totem and Taboo", Freud wrote that the only explanation to the psychology of masses (people) is the existence of mass psyche and the accumulation of experience in mass psyche⁶. In order to explain the circumstances being of concern to intellectuals at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, it was necessary to acknowledge a common psychology in a nation, people, i.e., to acknowledge the existence of something common and irrational that somehow passes from fathers (or mothers) to children and further down to next generations and makes masses act as an

organism. Consequently, the 19th century mythology about nations says that there is something common with bits of it ingrained in people, which materializes when people get together. In the 19th century, intellectuals started to realize that apart from concrete individuals there are communities whose actions, under certain circumstances, may even have a demolishing effect. This was an entirely new social fact which for them. They had never before come upon any explanation to that fact in their education or experience. To find a “quick” explanation it was quite logical to view masses, people, as an organism and acknowledge the existence of psychic (conscious) as well as unconscious in this organism. The most influential thinkers of the 19th century - Freud, Wundt, Jung - dedicated themselves to the realization and description of this very scheme. Its popularity can also be explained by the fact that this was a simple and comprehensible answer to the question being a concern of intellectuals of that period (and the following period) - what makes people, when they are among the mass, act in one way and not the other?

I would not dwell on this indeed very interesting topic but only note that Smith's theory, which seeks the roots of understanding the nationality and nation in solidarity, is based on this explanatory recipe created in the 19-20th centuries. The solidarity is a name coined in the second half of the 20th century for what was called psychology of masses by Freud and Jung. To make it clearer, by acknowledging the solidarity as a basis of a nation and national consciousness we acknowledge that there is something in each of us, which determines this solidarity and makes people strive towards unities. This is a psychic and psychologistic explanation: it should also be taken into account that there is no experimental evidence proving that this feature can be separated either psychically or genetically. The only thing which is clear about individuals' unities is that an individual is the social being and cannot exist without the interaction with those who are alike. Solidarity is an important social construct but it is an entirely intelligible structure and is based on conscious decisions. Richard Rorty regards the citizens' solidarity to each other as the main safeguard of democratic and liberal values⁷. It is therefore doubtful that the correct answer to Anthony Smith's question could have been based on solidarity: a conscious decision cannot be a cause for rebellion and sacrifice. Such a thing is possible but in a smaller group of the people having received a solid training in decision making. To become a nation, these people need to live in a highly developed society and a state as to extend this training to the majority of people. Yet, nationalistic explosions happen in modern times though mainly developing countries too.

But how to deal with those medieval texts which are understood by readers today as the germ of the idea of nation and nationalism? The answer

to this question should be sought in the structure of a medieval society: in percentage terms, the educated and better-off people who were literate and did not struggle for a daily survival would probably be less than 5 percent in each society. Of course, they shared a common ideology which varied from group to group and principedom to principedom though always revolved around the independence of a political entity. It can be argued whether a modern concept of a nation could be found in these texts but it is for sure that a concept of a state and a common state ideology is in abundance there. This ideology, given its benefits and prospects of achieving personal success, generated solidarity around this goal⁸. Such solidarity could be seen among those nobility and royal families who were engaged in developing the ideology, which is today perceived as an initial version of a national consciousness. However, if analyzed from the political and not poetical standpoint, it will turn out that they needed this ideology to justify their expansionist politics and/or to secure greater autonomy from existing centers. A well-known phrase from a medieval Georgian work “The life of Grigol Khandzteli”, often quoted as a proof of the birth of a national consciousness (this phrase, in modern Georgian language, says that Georgia is everywhere where sermons and prayers are in Georgian), is nothing else but the justifications of a future expansionist politics by state ideologists. An indirect proof of it is that in the medieval ages, Georgians were actively engaged in building churches and monasteries in Middle East and Eastern Europe. It is difficult to assume any other reason for this action save the aspiration to build up a strong physical and moral support for the future expansion. This was also the case in spreading protestant ideas across central and northern Europe - Protestantism was the ideology used by local feudal lords and royal families to gain greater independence and autonomy. This is the only explanation to a political support to Luther by German nobles and the success of Protestantism. Otherwise, there should not have been any support from or potential to understand a new doctrine by “common people” since the basic population of the medieval Europe was primarily focused on everyday life and was illiterate.

Even this cursory overview illustrates that the concepts of nation and nationality (whatever this construct is called in different languages) in the medieval ages is applied as an ideology, or, employing Marx’s definition, inverted reflection of social reality⁹. Social reality in medieval ages is in fact inverted against a national idea: nothing binds the majority of those people who live in a state but the belongingness to their living place. The sense of such unity, however, is clearly seen among the elite. Moreover, members of the elite in a more or less stable (and even unstable) states or principedoms were brought up under this ideology¹⁰. In this case it is obvious that what

appeared to be a cornerstone of the upbringing and thinking of the medieval elite reflected the social reality in an inverted manner. Everything that represented a superstructure - attributing concrete governance over woods, valleys and common people and marking them with this sign - was considered the basis of all these. As a rule, this was enhanced with a religious argument - being the Lord's anointed. It was therefore possible for a state-nation ideological concept to emerge in the medieval ages, but the place of its emergence - the consciousness of an elite member - was incidental because of non-institutionalization of its spread among the elite itself. It may have worked as a construct in developing a personality of an elite member (provided that there was an established system of passing on the education/ideology at a concrete court), it also may have worked as a basis of solidarity and become such a construct which would determine the existence of a common political language and common goals among the elite. These two radically different situations could have possibly coexisted within one elite system. That means that the elite may have consisted of the people for whom the idea of the nation-state was a construct in developing their personality and also, of the people for whom this idea was the basis of solidarity alone. Since there was no such an established system of education in the medieval ages, which could have made this idea an institutionalized element for constructing a personality¹¹, it can be assumed that the people, who regarded the idea of nation/state as the basis of solidarity alone, were more numerous in the elite than the people who could hardly imagine themselves without the idea of nation/state¹². It will therefore be difficult to find a political elite in the medieval ages, which would not have an ideology suggesting different versions of state/nation and "Ein Volk, Ein Reich" concepts. Some of them would be too close to a modern concept of the nation, whilst others - too distant. But this closeness or distance is nothing else but the constructions determined by different historical conditions. Religion, of course, plays a central role in each of this constructs, especially where a religious practice in a country provides the ground for being distinguished. In this case it is not the type of religion which matters but the potential in a social environment for the elite to use the religion as a basis for its exclusivity or claims. At a glance, Orthodox Christianity and Protestantism are the religions which could represent the basis for such exclusivity; however, the case with Ireland suggests that Catholicism versus Protestantism could also serve as a basis of such an ideology for the elite. In modern understanding a nation has two components: the concept of a nation itself, the construct of an idea, and a group of people seeing themselves as an integral part of this nation. It is also implied that the members of the nation, as a rule, belong in the nation by birth and the number of these members

shall exceed the number of people connected with family or kinship bonds. In order to elaborate on this second sign we should say that a person who attributes herself to a certain nation, at the same time defines herself by means of the nation, i.e., identifies herself with a particular idea and history. Consequently, a person distinguishes herself from those people whose identity is associated with other idea and history.

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Therefore, when we talk about the birth of a nation, we should take a separate look at the birth of these two components: 1) the birth of a nation's ideology and 2) the birth of a nation's identity. Historically, the birth of a nation as of an ideology precedes the birth of a nation as of an identity. Any ideology, in order to become an identity, should be worked out as an ideology.

The division of a birth of a nation into the birth of an ideology and an identity will become clear after we consider the process of social life, which is called the creation of identities and the adoption of an identity by a concrete individual. Unfortunately, a uniform theory on identity, which would consider the identity as a social prescription and process, is not elaborated by the social science and therefore, a set of theoretical opinions provided below is the first attempt of doing this. An individual represents a complex of identities. Some of these identities are primary and they are acquired through social institutions (family), some are secondary, which are realized by a person by means of the involvement in various social institutions. Some identities are inevitably acquired in a concrete social structure (family, kinship, gender), others are acquired incidentally (professional, political and those, the acquisition of which depend on the institutionalization of certain tendencies in a concrete society, for example, identity of sexual minorities).

As noted above any particular identity is acquired in a variety of ways. In order to make clear what the acquisition of an identity means it is better to consider the process of acquiring (tacking up) identity by the example of our civilization and culture. It is necessary to identify ourselves with the family, or where we make our first conscious movements. The acquisition of this identity, i.e., the realization that you are a member of a particular family and define yourself as such for yourself as well as for others, starts from birth, i.e., a primary socialization. The following identity, which we acquire, is determined by the environment of my family. This means that whether or not we acquire a kinship identity, i.e., whether or not we stretch our own identity over the relatives of my family, depends on a concrete social environment. As a rule, however, a "next to family" identity is that of kinship. At the same time,

through the information and social links which we obtain, we acquire socio-biological identities (a socio-biological identity [child] and gender identity). The acquisition of following identities is connected with those social institutions through which we become involved in a social environment. In our culture such social institutions are educational and mass media institution (i.e. institutions engaged in spreading/passing information and education). At this point we start acquiring a national identity. This may happen before we start attending the school or at the time we start attending the school. It is obvious that we do not perceive the concept of a nation incidentally - we perceive it on the basis of those principles on which the system of education and spread of information are built. In Georgia these principles are developed consciously, for example, what a national curriculum or an editorial policy of a particular publisher or an electronic media should look like. After (or in parallel) we acquire this identity and define ourselves by it, we move to the stage of choosing professional, political or other (inclination) identities, which we choose, fit and if it does not suit us, change it and so on and so forth. The identities that always stay with us and are acquired without our decision are **family, kinship, socio-biological and national identities**. It is of course possible to change them too if a person decides so. The difference is that the acquisition of these four identities is not a matter of a decision. However, in certain cases, the place of a national identity can be occupied by an ethnical identity especially in cases of ethnically non-monolithic states. In such a case, a national identity will be a post ethnic identity, an upper structure in the formation of my personality.

Of these five identities (family, kinship, socio-biological, ethnic and national), the rule and the content of the acquisition of two identities (ethnic and national) depend, to a greater extent, on particular political decisions and strategic views existing in a society, whilst those of the remaining three identities (family, kinship, socio-biological) - on social structures existing in a concrete society¹³.

Consequently, our basic identities, i.e., the identities the selection or denial of which is not a normal rule of a social life, can be divided into two categories by their extent of dependence on social and political factors and can be named **societal and politetal identities**.

Looking at historical formation of identities, it could be said that societal identities are formed "naturally", that is, unities of individuals are just enough to form them. As regards politetal identities, the basis for their existence and acquisition are political decisions and formal and informal educational and mass media institutional structures¹⁴.

After a politetal identity emerges, an ideology becomes an identity, i.e., it turns over and stands onto feet again. When principles embedded in a national ideology are shared by large social groups, an idea construct is no longer an inverted reflection of a social reality (i.e., the ideas existing only among small elite groups are declared to be the property of larger social groups) but an adequate reflection of an existing social reality - when large social groups are indeed carriers of national identity whilst the elite ideology, which is based on a national identity, can represent the hyperbolization of the "situation existing in masses" (for example, fascism or modern terrorism) though still based on a real and not inverted premise - the fact of the existence of a national identity in the population.

If we look at a historical process of the formation of identities, we may develop a hypothesis that to that point in the past, which a historical eye of our culture can catch, societal identities have been perennial whilst politetal identities acquired. The reason of this is the means which strengthen and establish these identities. Family, socio-biological and clan identities do not need additional historical institutional bodies. These identities are established and acquired through the relationship between small groups of people whereas the establishment of national and ethnic identities and their acquisition by larger groups of people require complex institutional as well as technological systems. Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner described two modes of these systems - education system and mass media. It is precisely through these two means that national and ethnic ideology can become an identity, that is, through the means and instruments for a large part of the population to self-determine and self-identify and also to distinguish themselves and their own communities from others.

We can conclude from all the above said that the history of the mankind is at the same time the process of accumulating societal and politetal identities, or, in other words, it is the process of building up layers of identities, and the development of a person reflects a historical development. The accumulation of identities begins with the acquisition of a family identity and ends, in our environment, with the acquisition of a national identity. If the establishment and spread of politetal identity depends on the content embodied in formal and informal education system and mass media, the next, future identities must be regional, global and, perhaps, world identities. However, to establish the latter, irrespective of relevant existing information system, it will be necessary to prove the existence of extraterrestrials, i.e., of aliens to this identity.

Thus we can define an identity as **a complex of perceptions about ourselves, our past, culture and future and anything - person/event/artifact -**

falling beyond the reach/coverage of this area is unconditionally considered something alien.

As seen from the above, a national identity originates incidentally, that means that it does not bring about itself the means of spreading but applies means of dissemination created as a result of political and technological processes to turn an ideology into an identity.

It is also obvious that no large, i.e., politetal identity has existed before these means of dissemination were created. To be more precise, there existed only its content in the form of the elite ideology.

Therefore, before finalizing this hypothesis, we should answer one question: how necessary and irreversible it is, in historical as well as factual terms, in our environment to establish only a national identity as a politetal one. Is there anything else in our environment, which can become [or has already become and we are not aware of it] a large identity? Or is there any chance, even theoretical, for any construct to become a politetal identity?

The answer to this question lies on the surface - we were talking about nationality as of a possible ideology of medieval elite. But there was an ideology in the medieval ages, which unconditionally represented the ideology of all the elites (especially in medieval Europe). The medieval national ideology can be viewed as a particular case of that ideology. This ideology is religion. There is no doubt that the religion was the ideology of the elite and this is proved by numerous historical sources. But were the religiosity and religion a large identity at the same time?

Following the hypothesis which I am trying to develop, there were no conditions for a large identity to exist in the medieval ages. That means that there was no formalized or even informal but institutionalized system of education which would cover large groups of people, nor was mass media which would give birth to a sense of unity and one entity. Churches and a network of religious institutions served the purpose of the enhancement and sustainability of the elite and not the creation of a large identity, i.e., the role of the church was to spread the ideology among the elite rather than create a large identity.

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Since 1970-es, after Peter Berger denied his thesis about the decline of religiousness in the world, especially, in developed countries¹⁵, scholars have been studying more thoroughly the medieval ages and, especially, the role of the religion in this epoch¹⁶. The conclusion drawn from their studies clearly shows that an almost two-century-old opinion of scholars and philosophers

that the medieval ages was a religious epoch where people's identity was entirely determined by the religion was a mistake and the shift of parameters of our reality onto the medieval ages¹⁷. The search for the roots of this mistake will probably lead us to Voltaire and Hegel, to the constructs which they defined - by requiring to end the epoch of belief and begin the epoch of reason by the former and describing the steps of reasoning and establishing principal sameness of these steps by the latter. The most apparent victim of this mistake was Benedict Anderson who built a correct conclusion of his own theory upon a wrong basis - on the existence of a large religious identity in the medieval ages¹⁸.

However, this is the topic for another paper. What is interesting from this discourse is that the time when the religion developed into a large identity coincides with the epoch when the nationality becomes a large identity. The religion had just never had any other possibility to become a politetal identity. Various empirical studies¹⁹ also prove that if we want to discuss the religion as a politetal identity, this is possible only in our environment and not in any of the past - medieval or pre-medieval epochs.

Thus, with the coming of the epoch of the institutionalized system of education and global information means, we obtained the possibility of two politetal identities - national and religious. Why these two and not any other? The answer to this question is simple: there could be only two types of state ideology at that time as well as today, national and religious, which could have been spread through the education system and got formalized in mass media. That means that there were in total two ideologies that represented possible and actual identities of the elites. Accordingly, only two ideologies could have become a politietal, large identity. In some countries these two ideologies coincided whilst in others, contradicted each other and the elite had to make a conscious or spontaneous choice.

It should also be noted that there could be an ideology of the elite without nationality in the medieval ages but there was no and could not be a national ideology without religiosity.

Therefore, with the coming of the time for large identities, politicians started installing their own ideology into the education system and mass media. In case of some complex social systems (for example, empires) several ideologies could have spread simultaneously and in such a case the ideologies competed with each other to become an identity. It is therefore historically predetermined and inevitable that in some countries a politetal identity is religion whereas in others - national. That's why the transformation of a religion into a politetal identity is perceived as nationalism in some, for example, eastern countries. In fact this is nothing else but a politetal identity

which emerged in this social structure as a result of the installation of a formalized system of education and mass media caused by globalization or any other reason.

Therefore, globally as well as locally, the coming of the epoch of politetal identity does not automatically mean the arrival of the epoch of nationalism. In our environment, the nationalism among intellectual circles is very often acknowledged as a product of a developed society whilst religiosity - the outcome of the society of a so-called lower stage. As a survey conducted and the hypothesis developed by us suggest, this link is incidental. Moreover, the nationalism can be replaced by religiosity in a relatively brief period and vice versa if a corresponding political decision is taken and necessary human and material resources are available.

Moreover, the upsurge in religiosity in modern developed societies²⁰, which, at a glance, seems hard to explain, indicates about the change in politetal identity and the roots of this change should be sought in information means and formal and informal education systems of these societies²¹.

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In the light of all the above said it is clear when a Georgian large identity emerged. We can say with quite a high historical precision when this ideology, which was quite developed and established in the Georgian elite, started to transform into a large identity. I think that this identity started to emerge in the second half of the 19th century - at the time when first Georgian newspapers were published whilst the beginning of the transformation of an ideology into an identity is directly linked with the establishment of The Society for the Spreading of Literacy Among Georgians and the step-up of the Society's activity. Thus, The Society for the Spreading of Literacy Among Georgians was indeed "the school of the Georgian nation"²² but not in the sense that the majority of the Georgian nation studied there but in the sense that the Georgian nation came out of this school, i.e., the Georgian nation was born and brought up in The Society for the Spreading of Literacy Among Georgians.

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But an issue we are going to raise now is about the content of this large identity. During the times of the Russian empire and the Soviet rule, the nationality, as a large politetal identity, was spread and established as, perhaps, a specific ethnic identity, along with inflexible efforts to spread a Soviet na-

tional identity. Before the Soviet rule, it should be said in favour of the Russian empire, that the emerging Georgian identity was, in principle, in harmony with the Russian imperial identity – the Georgian elite was serene about the membership of the Russian empire – and was trying to transform its own ideology into an ethnical-politetal identity²³. The Soviet education system tried to do the same what the Russian empire did but due to various political or subjective reasons, the formation of an ethnical politetal identity, undertaken by Georgian enlighteners during the Soviet epoch because of the confrontation of a Georgian intellectual elite with the Soviet Union and also the incidental or deliberate weakness of the state control over the literature and history syllabuses in the education system, turned into the process of the formation of national identity with the demand of the creation of an own, national state. This demand had first become the elite ideology and then, from the early 1970-es, through the education system and mass media, a politetal identity. It can be said that in the late 1980-es the Soviet politetal identity was defeated once and for all in Georgia. At the same time, constructs of the criminal world started creeping into the construct of a national identity, which was linked to the cult of thieves in law, having developed over the years, and was the result of it.

It is quite difficult today to say anything about a national identity that was spread in the 1980-es in Georgia. However, some reconstruction is possible through the analysis of the press and other print editions. One thing is clear: by the end of 1980-es a religious component in the Georgian national ideology was completely subordinated to the national component due to an obvious links of clergy with the security services, on the one hand, and to a strict control of the religion and the church by the Soviet authorities, on the other. Besides, structurally the Soviet religious policy was ecumenist and was in principle against facilitating any religion to become a politetal identity.

The next issue is about our modern politetal identity. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the technology for establishing a politetal identity has become available. This means that in Georgia a religious ideology got access to the same means of spreading and becoming an identity that were available to a national ideology before. The survey of values of the Georgian society²⁴ conducted in 2006 suggested that out of studied 39 values and institutions²⁵ Christian Orthodox and religiosity values participate in an imagined construction of the 2/3 of the surveyed on an equal standing with the statehood and traditional values. We can consequently assume that the politetal identity of Georgians started to change in early 1990-es and the construction of this new form has not probably completed yet. Given the instruments available to the state and the church for installing the ideology and transforming it into

an identity, it would not be difficult to conclude that nowadays the church is winning in this competition and the nationality is being subordinated to religiosity. There are five signs of this in our environment:

1. The accord over the ideology among the majority in the church;
2. Undeveloped national ideology in the state authority;
3. The strength of instruments for the transformation of the ideology into an identity by the church (high prestige of churches, informal education conducted by churches, system of dissemination of spiritual publications);
4. The weakness of instruments for the transformation of the national ideology into an identity by the state (low prestige of schools and content of textbooks) and the involvement of the subjects engaged in this sphere (teachers) primarily in congregations;
5. Involvement of mass media representatives (journalists) in congregations and thus in churches, which is not the case with regard to the state authorities.

Thus we are at a very interesting stage of the history of our political identity. It is clear that in the competition for a large political identity the church has been gaining an upper hand so far and subordinating the national component. The time will show what will happen in the foreseeable future – will it be possible to strike a balance between national and religious ideologies or will the national ideology prevail again. This depends on many things, first and foremost, on social and educational policies pursued by the state.

Notes:

- 1 Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford 2004.
- 2 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London 2005.
- 3 Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Cambridge 2001.
- 4 See the works of Renan, Kedourie, Seton-Watson et al.
- 5 I do not discuss here Hobsbawm's theory (*Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge 1992, which is, in principle, a clarification of Gellner's theory.
- 6 A German original text and two translations, English and Russian, are interesting in a sense that the key word of this paragraph differs in the translations. The Russian translation is adequate to the original whereas in the

authorized English translation the phrase “nations’ (peoples’) psychology” is replaced by the name of a field of science - “social psychology”. This can be explained by misunderstanding of the English language context by Freud or by the fact that five years later of the German publication of *Totem and Taboo*, Freud grew stricter towards his method and regarded it as being only fit, save the room of a psychoanalyst, for analyzing approaches developed in cultures (for example, social psychology). It could however be the matter of a mere lack of attention. Especially given that the following sentence (“If psychic processes of one generation...”) is translated without an alteration.

“Allein eine weitere Erwaegung zeigt, das wir die Varaantwortlichkeit fuer solche Kuenheit nicht allein zu tragen haben. Ohne die Annahme einer Massenpsyche, einer Kontinuitaet in Gefuehlsleben der Menschen, welche gestattet, sich ueber die Unterbrechnungen der seelischer akte durch das Vergehen der Individuen hinwegzusetzen, kann die *Voelkerpsychologie* ueberhaupt nicht bestehen. Setzen sich durch die psychischen Prozesse der einen Generation nicht auf naechste fort, mueste jede ihre Einstellung zum Leben neu erwerben, so gaebe es auf diesem Gebiet keinen Frtschritt und keine Entwicklung.” in: Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo: Resemblances between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics*, trans. by A. A. Brill, New York, 1918, p. 260.

“But further consideration shows that we our selves do not have to carry the whole responsibility for such daring. Without the assumption of a mass psyche, or a continuity in the emotional life of mankind which permits us to disregard the interruptions of psychic acts through the transgression of individuals, *social psychology* could not exist at all. If psychic processes of one generation did not continue in the next, if each had to acquire its attitude towards life afresh! there would be no progress in this field and almost no development.” Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo: Resemblances between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics*, trans. by A. A. Brill, New York, 1918, p. 260. The Russian translation reads: “Однако, дальнейшие соображения показывают, что не нам одним приходится нести ответственность за подобную смелость. Без допущения массовой психики, непрерывности в жизни чувств людей, дающей возможность не обращать внимания на прерываемость душевных актов, вследствие гибели индивидов, *психология народов* вообще не может существовать. Если бы психические процессы одного поколения не находили бы своего продолжения в другом, если бы каждое поколение должно было заново приобретать свою направленность к жизни, то в этой области не было бы никакого прогресса и почти никакого развития”, trans. by M. Wolfe, see: http://www.pseudology.org/Psychology/Freid_TotemTaboo/index.htm.

- 7 Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, Cambridge 1995.
- 8 This solidarity, however, was easily abandoned if a chance of joining other, more beneficial solidarity cropped up.
- 9 Karl Marx, *The German Ideology, including Theses on Feuerbach*, Amherst, NY 1998.
- 10 Which verbally can be expressed as follows: this state is your homeland, place where you ancestors lived and your descendants will live, those people who live here are your people, and so on and so forth - or, **that** place - other state/princedom is an area which belonged to you because your ancestors lived there, etc.
- 11 i.e., there was no institution producing educators/teachers of the elite.
- 12 It was therefore an ordinary event in the medieval ages for members of the elite to change the basis of solidarity, or, by modern assessment, the betrayal.
- 13 It should also be noted that in a particular society, sources of identities, more heavily relying on social structures, may not be carriers of the similar names. For example, an equivalent to a family can be named a church or clan or something else the connotation of which is radically different to us.
- 14 Including ethnic identities as the acquisition of an ethnical identity needs an accord between certain groups of the society and the enhancement of this agreement by observing it for years, which requires, at least, an informal education system.
- 15 Rodney Stark, "Secularization. R.I.P. - rest in peace", in: *Sociology of Religion*, Fall 1999, p. 13.
- 16 David Martin, "Toward eliminating the concept of secularization", in: G.Harmondworth (ed.), *Penguin Survey of the Social Sciences*, London 1965.
- 17 William Swatos, "Secularization theory: the course of a concept", in: *Sociology of Religion*, Fall 1999, p. 2.
- 18 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London 1983.
- 19 William H. Swatos and Loftur Reimar Gissurarson, *Icelandic Spiritualism. Mediumship and Modernity in Iceland*, New Brunswick 1997.
- 20 Swatos, "Secularization theory"; Martin, "Toward eliminating the concept of secularization"; Stark, "Secularization".
- 21 This is though a topic for research too: we might be dealing with a larger politetal identity in the form of religiousness, which creates larger identity than a national one. In this case, it is possible to view a religious identity as a specific option of the future regional and world identities. However, I reiterate that this is a topic of a separate study and it might transpire that we are dealing with a "mere" replacement of a national identity with a religious

- one. It is also possible that religiosity is a new, yet unknown mode of a societal identity.
- 22 Oliver Reisner, *Die Schule der Georgischen Nation: Eine Soziohistorische Untersuchung der Nationalen Bewegung in Georgien am Beispiel der 'Gesellschaft zur Vorbereitung der Lese- und Schreibkunde unter den Georgiern' (1850-1917)*, Wiesbaden 2004.
- 23 Stephen Jones, *Socialism in Georgian Colors*, Cambridge 2005, pp.1-25.
- 24 *Values of the Georgian Society*, Tbilisi 2006 (in Georgian).
- 25 Government; kinship; family; parliament; patriotism; personal freedom; political parties; police; religiosity; fairness; dying for homeland; court system; penitentiary system; state; school; traditions; university; tradition of virginity; philanthropy; armed forces; tolerance; human rights; non-orthodox churches; modern technologies; protection of environment; education system; leisure/recreation opportunities; economic system; free associations/unions; sexual freedom; your job; legislation; law-abidance; private business; private property; collectivism; cultural diversity; Orthodox Christianity; institute of friendship.