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**THE VIEW OF LANGUAGE IN THE
THEOLOGY OF RUDOLF BULTMANN**

**A Thesis Presented to the Faculty
of Concordia Seminary, St. Louis,
Department of Systematic Theology
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for Course
S-505, Research Elective**

by

John B. Groh

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Advisor

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CHAPTER I

THE THEOLOGY AND LANGUAGE OF RUDOLF BULTMANN

Chapter I shall serve as a summary for this paper. I take the liberty of speaking in the first person in order to specify what my concern has been, and to summarize the conclusions I have reached. In this study I have attempted to determine what influence Rudolf Bultmann's theology has had upon his usage of language. This attempt has led, simultaneously, to the characterization of his view of language. Finally, I have attempted a critical evaluation of his theology, and with it a concurrent evaluation of the view of language which finds its genesis within that theology.

My purpose has been twofold. I have set as an objective a more intimate knowledge of Bultmann's theology. In addition, I have had as a purpose to demonstrate that a theologian's view of language and its usage are determined largely by the theology developed. For Bultmann's attempt to theologize not only exemplifies his view of language in action; it also fashions and constructs the view of language which is mirrored in such an expression.

It was a difficult matter to determine what the exact boundaries of the study should be. Almost immediately I discovered that a study of Bultmann's theology was necessary if I wished to investigate his view of language. But such a study of theology was to be a means to an end, and not the end itself. On the other hand, the theology of Bultmann is so cohesive that the task, once begun, had to be carried through to completion. Throughout the study, the explication of his

theology was carried on solely to determine what view of language was his. In a similar vein, the critique and analysis of that theology was to serve the purpose of demonstrating the positive and negative aspects of his view of language.

Within the boundaries described, I attempted to reach a description of Bultmann's "view of language." When this term is used, it refers to the philosophy overarching the use of symbolic forms. I began with the presupposition that language in some way utilizes man's ability to symbolize. For man is able to symbolize his own thought-processes, objects outside of himself, and the relation between these two. A view of language, then, is the overarching principle or rule one adopts in his process of symbolizing. It follows necessarily that one's interpretation of man (and hence of his thought-process), the objects outside of him, and the relation between—such a group of interpretations will vitally affect one's view of language. Bultmann's theology, his interpretation of these factors and their inter-relation, was held to be the key to his view of language.

I began the study with a consideration of Bultmann's theology as it affected his view of language. Looking first at his major presuppositions, I advanced to a consideration of existential analysis and the existentiell moment, the process of demythologizing as a consequent of his methodological approach, the kerygma as judgment and grace, and faith as immune from either proof or disproof. I then turned to the view of theological language which had emerged. After considering the theological presuppositions of his language and discussing a tentative definition of "language" for him, I examined

one of his sermons to determine if his view of language was exemplified there. In the last chapter of the paper, I evaluated his theology (and the resultant view of language) from within his own system, and then from vantage points outside of the system.

In this study I have found that a view of language does indeed emerge from the theology of Rudolf Bultmann. For it becomes apparent that Bultmann's transference of Heidegger's categories of existentialia into his own system is an eventful step in the process of constructing a frame for language. These existentialia serve as categories of existential being mirrored in the archetypes of language. In addition, just as there are existentiell moments which either authenticate or inauthenticate the existential possibilities (existentialia), so it appears that there are referents for the linguistic archetypes which give these archetypes the ring of either authenticity or unauthenticity. As a result, language for Bultmann is the process of attributing authentic referents to archetypes, simultaneously displacing the unauthentic referents and the unauthentic archetypes which have been created by such referents. It is this view of language which suffers under criticism of his theology. For there are aspects of his frame of thought which demonstrate inconsistency even within the system. In addition, when his system is evaluated from without, some glaring inadequacies quickly appear. For Bultmann has committed to phenomenological existential analysis the question of ultimate Being. He has dismissed the usage of objective language as meaningless. The application of criticism to these

inadequacies shakes the very bedrock of his view of language. His theology suffers a double blow: it must recognize its own shortcomings; and it must concede that its support for a view of language has been weakened.

The major sources utilized in this study were primarily from Bultmann's own hand. The two translated volumes of Kerygma and Myth; his Essays, Philosophical and Theological; the recently translated volume of monographs entitled Existence and Faith; the sermonic compendium, This World and Beyond; and his apologetic work, Jesus Christ and Mythology—these works were the major sources. Utilized in the evaluative and interpretative task were John Macquarrie's The Scope of Demythologizing, and Leopold Malevez' The Christian Message and Myth. In an attempt at objectivity, I allowed the authors to speak in their own words whenever possible.

While there is a good deal of writing which concerns itself with Bultmann's theology, both commendatory and critical, I have found no examination of the view of language which Bultmann holds. It seems that no lines of communication between the modern philosophy of analysis and the realm of existential theology have been constructed. For there is little concern for Bultmann's view of language among his critics, even though the world of philosophy is alive with linguistic analysis.

This research project has allowed me to advance to some depth in the theology of a modern thinker, although admittedly the depths have not been plumbed. In addition, I have been permitted to see

both the importance and the validity of the question of meaning which the advanced logical positivists are asking also of the theologians of our modern era. For in final analysis, the study of language is the study of meaning; from such a study theologians and their works are not exempt.

CHAPTER II

THE THEOLOGY OF RUDOLF BULTMANN

Theological Factors in His View of Language

One can assume that the theology of Rudolf Bultmann will have a very definite influence upon any theory of language which he might espouse, either consciously or unconsciously. For if Bultmann's theology deals with ultimate truth, then certainly the spoken truth, as well as the method utilized in forming that spoken truth, will be a reflection of that ultimate truth. If there is a metaphysic to be found in the theology of Rudolf Bultmann, then it can be assumed that the method employed to speak of such a metaphysic will surely be selected with care. Bultmann's use of analogy in the construction of theology is not an unconscious selection. His theology definitely influences the way in which he speaks. It is necessary, therefore, if we wish to determine what Bultmann's view of language is, for us to review the basic tenets of his theology. With that purpose in mind, we now turn to a consideration of his theology, desiring thereby to isolate those aspects of the same which play a significant role in his view of language, either consciously or unconsciously.

Any review of the theology of Rudolf Bultmann must begin of necessity with the basic assumptions which he selects. The success which we have in isolating such assumptions will determine, to a large degree, the success we shall have in reviewing his theology as a whole.

The first and most influential presupposition which is Bultmann's is that all theology is to be expressed in terms of man's existence. Putting this assumption conversely, one could say that for Bultmann all theology is nothing more, nor less, than an attempt to clarify man's self-understanding. It is possible, therefore, to speak of God only insofar as He impinges upon man's self-understanding. As a consequence, it is totally irrelevant to speak of God as He is "in Himself":

The incomprehensibility of God lies not in the sphere of theoretical thought but in the sphere of personal existence. Not what God is in Himself, but how he acts with men, is the mystery in which faith is interested. This is a mystery not to theoretical thought, but to the natural wills and desires of men.¹

Bultmann reminds us of the logical positivists in his method of stipulating what areas of thought are meaningful when one wishes to discuss God. "Only such statements about God are legitimate as express the existential relation between God and man."² His emphasis upon the existential relation between God and man is reminiscent of his contemporary, Martin Buber.³

Since his discussion about God must be correlated with God's relation to man, Bultmann is not interested in investigating, within theological research, "existence within faith," but rather the "natural man."⁴ His approach to the Bible is also made in terms of this natural man, even when this approach is made within the Church itself: "I think I may take for granted that the right question to frame with regard to the Bible—at any rate within the Church—is the question of human existence."⁵

Bultmann's major assumption, that theology is possible only in terms of man's existence, is a commitment to carry on all theological

endeavor for the advancement of man's self-understanding. For behind the assumption that all theology must be relative to man's existence is the assumption that self-understanding is the most important aspect of man's existence. He argues, then, that all theologizing must be carried on with the goal of nurturing self-understanding within existence. In discussing what benefits Christianity as an oriental religion brought to the west, he isolates the "new possibilities for the understanding of human existence,"⁶ as the most important and influential gift transliterated by Christianity. In attempting to filter out Bultmann's presuppositions, Barth suggests that "prior understanding," the fact that all understanding is concerned in one way or another with man's understanding of himself, is the primary ground rule of Bultmann's thought.⁷ Bultmann's concern with theology as it relates to man's existential situation, his self-understanding, is no afterthought. Rather, it is a primary assumption which will have ramifications throughout his theology. "Die Begriff der Selbstverständnis bei Bultmann hat nun weittragende theologische Konsequenzen, denen man nicht ohne weiteres zustimmen muss und kann."⁸

Bultmann's primary assumption will not only have effects upon his whole theology; it will also grossly affect any attempt at delineating his view of language. If it is true that all theological language can be uttered only from within the existence of man, the logical question to be asked is, What are the determinative rules of such a language? This procedure of subsuming all theology and all theological language to an aspect of self-understanding will affect language in many ways. There will be no room for "objective" language

of any sort or kind. All valid and meaningful language will by its nature have referents within the sphere of human existence and self-understanding. Finally, since self-understanding is a condition of the "moment," a situation only of the present, all language can deal only with the present situation if it is to be valid and meaningful. All of these overarching rules of language flow from this one major assumption; these particular aspects of Bultmann's linguistic view will become more clear as we proceed.

The second major methodological assumption of Bultmann flows from the first. We consider it as a separate presupposition for the sake of clarity. This assumption is that no theological formulations are to be constructed in a subject-object form. While the first assumption dealt with theology as a whole, the second deals specifically with theological formulations. Bultmann is in revolt against those who desire to place God in the sphere of natural reality, and make Him only quantitatively different. He is offended by those who would speak of God as Another among many. For him, God is qualitatively different, and any formulation "about" Him must take a qualitatively different form. Again we notice a close affinity with Buber in this regard; for Buber distinguishes between the world of I-IT and I-THOU, and they are qualitatively different.⁹ Bultmann, like Buber, is ready to admit the validity and propriety of subject-object formulations in the field of science, where man looks at his environment. But he denies the validity of such a procedure when man looks at himself.¹⁰ Even when man looks about himself within the objects of creation, and

makes the somewhat scientific statement that the nature and history within which his life takes place are ruled by God's action, even such a statement as this can only be made as a confession; it can never be expressed as a general truth.¹¹

This second major assumption flows from the first. But it is not any less important when an attempt is made to formulate Bultmann's view of language. For his rejection of subject-object formulations will have repercussions throughout his view of language. True theological language will never again be able to deal with God as an "object" in the sense that the natural sciences differentiate between objects quantitatively. Theological language will have to be qualitatively different because it deals with God, who is never an object, but qualitatively different from all else.

Having considered Bultmann's presuppositions as they apply to his language, we shall now turn to his theology proper. One might be tempted to suggest that we turn to Bultmann's existential analysis rather than to his theology, for they seem to be so closely intertwined so as to be almost inseparable. The first major aspect of his theology which we shall consider with a view towards deciphering his language-form is his reliance upon this existential analysis and its relation to the existentiell moment. While it is easily said that Bultmann is a "Christian existentialist," it is not quite as easily determined how he can be called by that name. It would take much effort to attempt a definition of existentialism, or "Christian existentialism." The "Christian existentialist" would simultaneously complain

that any such attempt at definition would be a "dis-heartening" of his system. Nevertheless, it remains for us to attempt to describe the impact that existential analysis has made upon Bultmann's theology, and his view of language. We shall begin by demonstrating his reliance upon Heidegger's philosophy. We shall then turn to a description of existential analysis. We shall conclude by demonstrating the importance of the existentiell moment in his theology and language-view.

It is, without doubt, advantageous to investigate Bultmann's reliance upon Heidegger in any attempt to account for the influence of existential analysis within his theology. Bultmann claims that all he owes to the philosophy of Heidegger is that he has learned from it to look at the phenomena themselves. His theology has learned from this philosophy to let itself be taught solely by the phenomena, by man, whose structure philosophy seeks to disclose.¹² Brown reminds us that Heidegger owes much to his teacher, Husserl.¹³ Insofar as phenomenology attempts to determine the objects which it grasps, it is dependent upon Kantian idealism, Bultmann's objection notwithstanding. In delineating more specifically Bultmann's reliance upon Heidegger, Malevez suggests that Bultmann expects two indispensable services from Heidegger: (1) Heidegger's philosophy, in its understanding of the desperate condition of Dasein (distress), provides an existential analysis which will give understanding to the aversio a deo; (2) the ontology of Heidegger is able to provide us with the categories appropriate for the correct expression of a divine saving-event, wrought in Christ, while our free acceptance of such an event will assure our

authenticity.¹⁴ In regard to the second service rendered by Heidegger, it is interesting to take notice of the apparent similarity between Heidegger's "call" and Bultmann's kerygma: Heidegger describes man as "listening" in the moment of decision, for being (Dasein) hears itself call.¹⁵

Bultmann's reliance upon Heidegger will have at least two immediate effects upon any view of language he might uphold. First, the fact that philosophy will provide theological language with the existential frames necessary to understand the aversio a deo presupposes that this part of language may be misused and mishandled by those who do not have the true knowledge of the aversio even though they have the framing equipment. This point will be further exemplified at a later section of the paper. The second effect of Heidegger's philosophy upon Bultmann's view of language will be more direct. For Heidegger has his own view of language, and we can look for its influence within Bultmann. Heidegger is quick to reject any consideration of a "thinking subject" as the starting-point of philosophy:

If one thing is clear in Heidegger, it is that he decisively rejects the thinking subject as the starting-point of philosophy. Existence is always the concrete situation of the self's involvement with the world and with other selves.¹⁶

Heidegger must conclude that language too cannot arise from a "thinking subject," but must find its origin within the self's involvement with the world and other selves. As such, it can be postulated that for Bultmann language must originate not within the "thinking self," but within the environment of man's existence. Such a view of language

will have its problems, as we shall note later.

Now we take up the task of describing existential analysis as it plays a role in Bultmann's theology. The reference just made to the origin of language within existence is a good beginning for an understanding of existential analysis. Bultmann asserts that the origin of concepts (and hence, of language) lies in actual life:

If I do not know friendship itself, then I also can never understand the concept of friendship. For the origin of concepts is not isolated thinking in and by itself, but rather the actual life to which thinking belongs.¹⁷

If life, "actual life to which thinking belongs," is the source of concepts, then surely it is worthy of further examination. Bultmann has reminded us above that he learned from Heidegger to look at the phenomena of life in and of themselves. Existential analysis is the process of investigating man as he lives within existence. Bultmann recognizes that the philosophy of existentialism has attempted just such an examination. He is willing to listen to Heidegger's report, following his investigation of the pure phenomena of man. Heidegger has concluded that man, within his concrete being, can become aware of his relatedness to Being as such, whether it is thereby affirmed or rejected. This condition of awareness Heidegger calls "existence" (as differentiated from Dasein).¹⁸ Heidegger argues that if one would question Being itself, he must approach a human being to do so.¹⁹ The process of questioning Dasein, in order to relate it to Being itself, is existential analysis.

While it is not necessary here for us to summarize all that Heidegger has found when thus addressing the human being, we must

note that the possibilities of human existence ("existence" in Heidegger's specific sense) can be fairly well established. These possibilities within human existence, these "potentialities" which are capable of being "actualized," are called by Bultmann existentialia. Bultmann is speaking of such existentialia when he says, "Every ontic experience (as an experience of man) has the ontological conditions of its possibility in the human structure and can therefore be understood as possible on the basis of this structure."²⁰ He refers to the "ontological conditions" as part of the "given" of human structure. It is just these "ontological conditions," the existentialia, that existential analysis commits to the theologian for his use as a framework in the questioning of Being itself.

The influence of this group of existentialia upon Bultmann's view of language is profound. Bultmann quotes Jacob Burckhardt's view of language with approval:

At the peak of culture stands a spiritual miracle: the languages whose origin lies in the soul independently of an individual people and its individual language.²¹

He then goes on to say of himself:

To be sure, I can know what light and life are even when it is dark and I do not see anything. Even the blind man knows what light is...yet I do not really know it. For the blind man also only really knows what light is when he sees, and the person who is friendless and unloved only really knows what friendship and love are when he finds a friend and is given love.²²

From these references, it is safe to say that Bultmann speaks of some kind of archetypal symbols that are present in each man (mirrors of the existentialia discovered by existential analysis) which allow him to develop concepts, and hence language. Nevertheless, Bultmann argues

that man can not really know these archetypes to be valid until he has verified them through existential experience. It is apparent, then, that the existentialia discovered through existential analysis (such as freedom, decision, possibility of existence) are transferred into the sphere of language as symbolic archetypes. But these archetypes are not real until they have been experienced as part of true human existence; a verbal reference to the archetypes is not real until the archetypes have been "lived through."

Bultmann is prepared to suggest that the existentialia (and hence the archetypes of language) discovered by existential analysis through investigation of the phenomena of man are the tools with which the Christian theologian must work. For the basic Christian concepts are nothing other than these very same existentialia:

All of the basic Christian concepts have a content that can be determined ontologically prior to faith and in a purely rational way. All theological concepts contain the understanding of being that belongs to man as such and by himself insofar as he exists at all.²³

In order to appreciate Bultmann's transference of such existentialia into the realm of Christian theology, it would be helpful for us to compare how both he and Heidegger utilize the ontological condition (existentialia) "self-understanding." Commenting on Heidegger's and Bultmann's "Selbstverständnis," Ittel suggests that Heidegger can speak of self-understanding only as Dasein recognizing the existential possibility of Being within Dasein itself. Bultmann, meanwhile, admits this as a formal definition (an existentialia), and can speak of a self-understanding of sorts outside of faith; but he also speaks of faith itself as self-understanding.²⁴ We readily see how Bultmann

takes over these existentialia, utilizes them as a formal category of man's existence, and then goes on to fill them up with kerygmatic meaning.

Bultmann is ready to admit that a similar transference occurs in his utilization of Heidegger's "authentic possibility of being":

If Kuhlmann(sic) asks me, then, "Is the term 'future' as Bultmann's theology understands it identical with what the philosopher Heidegger discovers as 'authentic possibility of being'?", then I reply, Yes indeed!—namely, in a formal or ontological sense.²⁵

Here Bultmann refers to the existentialia as "formal."

Bultmann is prepared to utilize existential interpretation, "the systematizing of the self-understanding of existence involved in existence itself,"²⁶ because it will enable him to accomplish his goal of addressing Being from within the sphere of existence. He must utilize existential analysis if he hopes to remain true to his commitment to carry on theology only in terms of man's existence. Bultmann goes to the length of asserting that it is God's involvement with man which gives to the existentialia such great significance. In this regard, Malevez, the Jesuit, argues that for Bultmann the complete existential analysis of Dasein is preparation for the kerygma. For the kerygma would be meaningless if man did not have some "knowledge" of God beforehand. If God were not secretly troubling our existence, never "would man recognize God as God in any revelation of God" (as Bultmann himself says in Essays, p. 257).²⁷

Bultmann's usage of the existential analysis plays a dominant role in the shaping of any view of language he might have. For it appears that the existentialia are the very archetypes of language;

they are the possibilities of authentic existence as they have been characterized symbolically from the phenomena of existential analysis. These archetypes are part of man's existence as it has been analyzed by existential interpretation. They are of the nature of potentials, awaiting the actualization of the concrete moment of speech. And just as the concrete moment will either affirm or deny the existentialia, so also it appears that any reference to the symbols of the existentialia, the archetypes, will automatically be either an authentic or an unauthentic reference. It is impossible to speak of such archetypes without one or the other reference. We now turn to the moment, the existentiell, as it assumes a role of importance in the existential analysis.

Bultmann himself explains the difference between existential possibility and existentiell:

Philosophical analysis shows what existence in the abstract means. By contrast, existential, personal self-understanding does not say what existence means in the abstract, but points to my life as a concrete person in the here and now. It is an act of understanding in which my very self and the relationships in which I am involved are understood together.²⁸

Bultmann's differentiation between existentiell and existential possibilities is important. All existentiell possibilities must lie within the horizon of existential possibilities; but there may be existential possibilities which are not existentiell possibilities for a given individual at a given time.²⁹ For existentiell possibilities occur only in the moment of concrete life, while existential possibilities are the existentialia common to all human beings. Malevez reminds us that in order to understand the existentiell "moment" in Bultmann's

usage, one must make the differentiation which Bultmann (from Heidegger) makes between historisch and geschichtlich. Historisch belongs to the sphere which sets forth and expounds objects in the same way as it does nature. There is a different kind of history, Geschichte, with which we are to be concerned in Dasein. Since it has nothing to do with nature, a given, ready-made thing, it exists only by creating itself in a free decision. "This decision is taken in confrontation of the Being which encounters the human Being existentielly." It is in such existentiell encounters, moments, that man personalizes himself as apart from the objective.³⁰

Bultmann's own words, in Kerygma and Myth, are: "We possess the present through encounter, and encounter imposes the necessity of decision."³¹ It is evident that in Bultmann's "now," the past as well as the future are subsumed. There is no meaning for either of them when contrasted with the present moment.³² The existentiell, then, is the actualization of the potential inherent in existentialia possibilities. The moment of concrete decision within existence gives either an authentic or an unauthentic ring to the existential possibility. The moment actually compresses the past and the future in a decisive concrete situation.

Bultmann's discussion of "decision now" can perhaps throw some light onto his circle of language. He suggests that decision rests "in what at any given time I already am." As natural man, a man is a sinner; that is, he is tied down more and more to what he already is. Bultmann further argues that the past is constantly called into

question by the future in every meeting of the "now." A Christian can make himself receptive to the future, "which is making itself accessible in what confronts me 'now'."³³ Is it unfair to suggest that the language which arises in the moment of self-understanding will be language with authentic referents for the archetype under consideration existentially? Any other referents will be unauthentic. With any other procedure, the "moment" will not be the moment of truth in which a Christian makes himself receptive to the future. If the moment-decision proves itself unauthentic, that is, if man will not face being within existence; then such a decision (or lack of decision), failing to provide self-understanding, will itself provide the archetype (existential) with unauthentic referents from the context of the concrete situation. For Bultmann has commented in reply to Jaspers that when the "objectivity of what is said and the subjectivity of the speaker" coincide, it is not due or attributable to the "Encompassing," as Jaspers would argue; instead, it is due to the Encounter and Summons which come to man in the historicity of human existence, the "moment."³⁴ Is this saying other than that the archetype is attributed with authentic referents from within the surrounding concrete situation in the momentary decision?

Bultmann has enumerated some of the characteristics of that "moment" which bestow true belief in God. The moment cannot be derived from anything; its potentialities for the future lie open; its character and demand call for decision; it is rich in possibilities for joy and gratitude, pain and repentance, duty and love; it is rich in "decision" possibilities, and in such decisions man either

loses or gains his real existence.³⁵ Now we are at liberty to discuss the word "God" as it comes to light in the moment. For if the moment provides insight and self-understanding, if it allows man to "gain his real existence," then the archetype "being" will receive authentic referents; the resultant word will be uttered: "God"—nothing more nor less than the archetype being with authentic referents at the moment. For Bultmann defines truth as

the reality of God, and the knowledge of it as the knowledge of God...knowledge of "the moment," the "moment" in coming into contact with which God's gift and God's demand, his judgment and his grace meet us both as a call to action and as a call to the acceptance of our destiny.³⁶

Belief in God does not come as a result of insight from observation, but it is born in truth from surrender to the claims of the moment. "To belief, God is the incomprehensible, enigmatic power that surges through my concrete life and sets limits to it."³⁷ The moment alone provides the opportunity for a proper detachment from things; the moment alone provides authentic referents from the sphere of concrete life for the archetype "being," achieving, according to Bultmann, a submission and acknowledgement that life is not "what I will, but what thou wilt."³⁸ This is to believe in God.

Existential analysis, then, provides a most interesting insight into Bultmann's view of language. It would be incorrect for us to assume that Bultmann's view of language will be formed without recourse to the process of existential analysis with its existentialia and existentiell. The archetypes of language correspond to the existentialia of human existence uncovered by existential analysis. Just as these existentialia can be either authenticated or not authenticated

by the moment of existentiell possibility, so it seems proper to suggest that the symbolic archetypes will be given either authentic or unauthentic referents, depending upon the decisive action of the human being within the moment of the concrete situation. Either consciously or unconsciously, Bultmann is beginning to provide us with his own view of authentic language as it arises from within the sphere of authentic existence. We must now turn to the question of demythologizing as part of Bultmann's theology in order to see what facets of his view of language this process will provide us.

"Demythologizing" and "Bultmann" have been synonymous terms ever since the appearance of "New Testament and Mythology" in 1941. It is evident at the slightest study that demythologizing follows necessarily for Bultmann. But he did not begin his work with demythologizing, and proceed from that point. Rather, assuming the presuppositions mentioned above, Bultmann arrived at the process of demythologizing as a natural consequent. In this brief survey of the process of demythologizing, we shall look firstly at the modern world and modern man as they provide the "concrete moment" for the process; then we shall turn to the meaning of myth for Bultmann; finally we shall see that demythologizing demonstrates that meaningful language may deal only with authentic being, in Bultmann's thought.

Bultmann finds within the order of modern man an ex post facto rationalization for the process of demythologizing. He characterized modernity in the way that he did in order to make the process of demythologizing more palatable to the preachers and the theologians

who were to read "New Testament and Mythology;" and understand it as Bultmann's first attempt at anything like demythologizing. For in that essay, although not within his system with its presuppositions, demythologizing begins with modern man. Modern man's advance in science has really been an advance in self-understanding related to the world of things. It would be foolish, Bultmann suggests, to ask man to backtrack and visualize himself in the same crude way as the New Testament man considered himself related to the world in which he lived. Bultmann criticizes the New Testament world-view from the position of modern science. How much sense does a three-tiered universe, the presence of spirits, and the contradictions inherent in the New Testament, make to the modern mind?³⁹ He calls attention to the contradictory features of the New Testament, especially its assertion that human life is controlled by cosmic forces, and at the same time challenged to decision.⁴⁰ Speaking of the death and resurrection of Christ (which under gnostic influence were transformed from isolated facts which concerned Christ alone into a cosmic event involving all), he remarks that

It is only with effort that modern man can think himself back into such an intellectual atmosphere, and even then he could never accept it himself, because it regards man's essential being as nature, and redemption as a process of nature.⁴¹

Meanwhile, modern man's self-understanding has overstepped its bounds. It has tripped over the husk of myth in the New Testament, and shown no concern for the real stumbling-block, the kernel of the kerygma which is in the New Testament. For man's self-understanding has advanced to the idolatrous level of thinking of itself as

self-enclosed, self-subsistent. ("Modern man always makes use of technical means which are the result of science...Nobody reckons with direct intervention by transcendent powers."⁴²) But there still is hope; at least the ideas of God's transcendence and of evil are significant in the modern world, if only partially:

These mythological conceptions of heaven and hell are no longer acceptable for modern men since for scientific thinking to speak of "above" or "below" in the universe has lost all meaning, but the idea of the transcendence of God and of evil is still significant.⁴³

The concern of the theologian who wants to make contact with modern man and the modern world must center upon the entry of a transcendent God.

The only relevant question for the theologian is the basic assumption on which the adoption of a biological as of every other Weltanschauung rests, and that assumption is the view of the world which has been moulded by modern science and the modern conception of human nature as a self-subsistent unity immune from the interference of supernatural powers.⁴⁴

God's entrance into the world is the stumbling-block over which modern man should fall, and not the cosmological and mythical features of the New Testament as they attempt to describe God's entrance into man's world of existence.

With this introduction to modern man, we get a prelude of Bultmann's demythologizing. We cannot forget that he has committed himself to speak of God only in terms of man's existence. His concern for demythologizing is a consequent of his existential interest rather than a preliminary for it. For even before he begins his demythologizing, we know that he will never speak of the transcendent God in and of Himself.

In order to understand demythologizing, it is advisable for us to determine what Bultmann means by the word "myth." It is not easy to perform such a task, for Bultmann has at least two meanings for the word myth. At one time he defines myth and "mythological" as a view of the world which uses imagery "to express the other-worldly in terms of this world, and the divine in terms of human life, the other side in terms of this side."⁴⁵ This definition of myth seems to be the one generally employed among scholars of world religions, even in the study of the Old Testament. At another occasion, Bultmann refers to myth as a view which leaves room for extra and supermundane interventions, in contrast to the modern world view which postulates a closed system of cause and effect.⁴⁶ These two definitions are at variance. While the first defines myth in terms of its content, the second attempts the definition with the intention of myth as its primary consideration. The first definition is exemplified in Bultmann's delineation between "myth" and "legend": myth refers to the central Christian story of incarnation, atonement, resurrection, and exaltation represented as a cosmic drama of redemption (this is the content of myth); legend is used to refer to peripheral stories and anecdotes which serve to illustrate aspects of the central myth (that is, aspects of its content).⁴⁷ Bultmann is prepared to retain myth if it is defined in the second method above; but he asserts that the purpose of myth in the New Testament (that is, its attempt to speak of the transcendent God's intervention in human existence) has been impeded by the terms of the myth: "The real purpose of myth is to speak of a transcendent power which controls the world and man, but that purpose is

impeded and obscured by the terms in which it is expressed."⁴⁸ Bultmann will not quarrel with the true intention of myth; he quarrels with myth when it attempts to picture the world: "The real purpose of myth is not to present an objective picture of the world as it is, but to express man's understanding of himself in the world in which he lives."⁴⁹ There is reason, then, for the charges which have been brought against Bultmann, suggesting that his definition of myth is incoherent. Hepburn suggests that Bultmann's definition is wide enough to include all pictorial, analogical, and symbolical speech; H.P. Owen says that Bultmann has selected this term to designate a very heterogeneous collection of items in the New Testament, "meaningless elements," but items that are very unlike each other.⁵⁰ Lohmeyer argues that Bultmann's definition of "myth" is too narrow; for myth revolves around the wealth of relations between God and the world no less than between God and man, and in such a context, demythologizing is impossible.⁵¹ These charges of inconsistency in Bultmann's definition of "myth" stem from a failure to grasp Bultmann's differentiation between the outward form and content of myth, and the intention of myth.

The attempt to define "myth" is for Bultmann an exercise in authentic language. For he argues that there is a proper myth when its intention is to express man's understanding of himself in the world in which he lives, just as there is an improper (unauthentic?) myth when myth assumes as its purpose to present an objective picture of the world as it is. Myth in its proper sense, then, is to be equated with the linguistic archetype of self-understanding.

Myth in its improper sense is the process of attributing to this archetype referents which are unauthentic, and therefore of a subject-object form. With these definitions at hand, we turn to the actual process of demythologizing.

It is apparent that Bultmann's process of demythologizing emerges from his existential analysis. If it is assumed that all thought in the New Testament must serve self-understanding, then any other material will be myth in the improper sense; it is unnecessary baggage.

He (Bultmann) says explicitly that only the existential elements in the New Testament can be accepted. Yet they are claimed to be the fulfilment of our natural self-knowledge; it must be clear that they correspond to a latent possibility in the human Dasein. But why? Because, if one of these existential elements, revealed by the analysis of existential philosophy, fails to meet a human situation, then these existential elements in the New Testament must rightly be called "mythical," an irruption of the divine into the human realm, which is inadmissible, it is a violent rupture—like that of a miracle—of the conditions of our existence; then, fundamentally they themselves would no longer be existential.⁵²

For Bultmann, the process of demythologizing is less a method of depleting the text than it is a hermeneutical method.

This method of interpretation of the New Testament which tries to recover the deeper meaning behind the mythological conceptions I call de-mythologizing—an unsatisfactory word, to be sure. Its aim is not to eliminate the mythological statements but to interpret them. It is a method of hermeneutics.⁵³

Utilizing the view of language which so far has emerged from Bultmann's theology, we suggest that demythologizing is the process of providing the archetype "self-understanding" with the maximum number of lucidly authentic referents. For any concept which fails to verify authentically this self-understanding can certainly not be

the Word of God:

The touchstone of a Christian concept's authenticity will be its correspondence with some existential structure of Dasein; any concept devoid of correspondence is certainly not the Word of God, not that Word which, since it calls upon man, can only concern in him what constitutes him existentially.⁵⁴

In working with the Word of God, it is the purpose of the exegete to "discover whether the New Testament offers man an understanding of himself which will challenge him to a genuine existential decision."⁵⁵ Whatever does not contribute to that challenge is not an authentic referent to the archetype "self-understanding," and hence must be called unauthentic and valueless. Self-understanding, is authentically verified in the New Testament by belief in Christ, and this is proper myth; but belief in Christ "does not mean considering the miracle stories of the New Testament to be true,"⁵⁶ for that is improper myth, unauthentic reference, unnecessary baggage.

Mythological language is not distasteful to Bultmann because it speaks of God obliquely; mythical statements are rejected because they are constructed so as to have the grammatical and logical form of scientific statements, and as a consequence are open to scientific criticism. Instead of preserving the "infinite qualitative difference" between God and the world, myth so represents God that He seems to be one more item within the world.⁵⁷ If improper myth pictures God as quantitatively rather than qualitatively different from the world, then a failure to demythologize is no less a sin than asserting unauthentic referents for the archetype "self-understanding." In essence, to demythologize is to carry on the same task as did Luther in the Reformation:

Demythologizing is the radical application of the doctrine of justification by faith to the sphere of knowledge and thought. Like the doctrine of justification, demythologizing destroys every longing for security. There is no difference between security based on good works and security built on objectifying knowledge.⁵⁸

Demythologizing provides us with a microscopic view of Bultmann's view of language. He does not aim to demythologize when myth is understood properly as self-understanding expressing itself. Just as it is his purpose not to eliminate proper mythological statements, but to interpret them through a valid hermeneutics; so it is his purpose not to eliminate the symbolic archetype "self-understanding," but to attribute to it authentic referents in the moment of decision. Just as he will retain in the process of demythologizing any statement which will throw light upon self-understanding (such as freedom, decision, forgetting the past); so also he will retain as valuable within his language those archetypes which, though subsumed to the major archetype of self-understanding, are contributory towards a more excellent self-understanding. The parallelism between one aspect of Bultmann's view of language as it has thus far emerged (archetypes modified and validated by authentic referents) and his definition of a proper myth; and between the other aspect of his view of language (archetypes deprived of any possible meaning by unauthentic referents, objective in form) and his definition of an improper myth as an attempt at describing the world objectively—this parallelism is more than a mere co-incidence. For the process of demythologizing demonstrates that for him language can have only the proper function of attributing authentic instead on unauthentic referents to the archetypal forms.

Demythologizing is carried on in order to reach that Word of the New Testament which produces the greatest amount of self-understanding. The kerygma is that element which provides the maximum of self-understanding and self-realization in man. As such it is composed of two segments: self-understanding of one's past (with consequent judgment of the past), and self-realization for the future (through grace and revelation). In essence, then, the language of kerygma is taking the archetype "self-understanding" (discovered as one of the existentialia by existential analysis) and amplifying it two ways: it is eliminating the unauthentic referents; it is accomplishing this task by contrasting them with authentic referents. The first is judgment in Bultmann's theology; the second is grace. To the kerygma in these two aspects we now turn.

Utilizing the view of language which has thus far emerged, we may suggest that sin is the ascription of the unauthentic referents of self-subsistence, complete self-assertion, and unwillingness to surrender, to the symbolic archetype of self-understanding. Bultmann says that sin is self-assertion.⁵⁹ He calls sin "the claim of man to seek to exist in his own right, to be his own master, and to take his life into his own hands."⁶⁰ Looking at sin in its relation to self-understanding, we note that Bultmann's conception of sin is really a lack of self-realization, just as salvation is self-realization.⁶¹ Bultmann utilizes the existential term Angst to clarify the crux of sin: "What is it, if sin is unresponsiveness towards the future? It is dread, the dread of the man who is unwilling to surrender to what is a mystery to him...It is dread of God and so revolt against God."⁶²

It would be meaningless for Bultmann to describe the Fall as an objective fact of history; the Fall is actually sin in its durative aspect. "The only reasonable attitude for man to adopt apart from Christ is one of despair, to despair of the possibility of his ever achieving authentic Being."⁶³ This is a basic definition of the Fall for Bultmann. Nonetheless, there is a difference between Bultmann's interpretation of the Fall and the approach of the philosophy of existentialism. Malevez notes that although existential analysis does not ignore the Fall, it does not appreciate its depth. Existentialism trusts that its knowledge of authentic existence brings with it the ability to accomplish this existence (so-called Socratic fallacy). But the New Testament argues that man cannot attain such authentic existence, according to Bultmann; man has lost all power to do so. In fact, the New Testament blames man for insisting upon his ability to reach the authentic life; what he needs to do is to surrender.⁶⁴ The surrender of the kerygma is our next item of consideration.

Grace and revelation are the two constitutive elements of the kerygma. The event, when viewed as grace, is conceived as bringing man to his authentic existence; when viewed as revelation, it is the impartation of some kind of knowledge or understanding.⁶⁵ From the linguistic angle, when the event is viewed as grace, the archetype is authentic existence; when the event is viewed as revelation or knowledge, the archetype is complete self-understanding and total self-realization. In any event, although the archetype "authentic

existence" is intelligible to existential analysis, it remains to be seen whether or not man can attain such authentic existence by himself.

Macquarrie remarks,

Fallen man, just because he is still man, has an existential possibility of authenticity, but this may not be an existentiell possibility for any given individual in a particular situation. It may require a gracious act from beyond himself to make the possibility one which he can choose.⁶⁶

Malevez notes that Bultmann is not without witness in this matter. For Bultmann asserts that while philosophy can become aware of authentic nature, it cannot achieve the same. Malevez interprets Bultmann's thought as follows:

Philosophy retains the conviction that once man becomes aware of his "authentic" nature, he will be able to realize it; in short, philosophy is convinced that it alone can disentangle the true being of man and thus set it free to make the act of surrender...From the New Testament point of view an act of divine love alone can save us; indeed, it is not too much to say that the Christian message is not primarily a doctrine of the nature of our "authentic existence," but the proclamation of the saving act, the saving event, which is accomplished in Christ.⁶⁷

This is an essential difference between Bultmann and the philosophy of existential analysis. John Macquarrie summarizes Bultmann's differences with existentialism succinctly:

Bultmann feels himself obliged to part company with the philosopher and to take a different path. He maintains that the fallen nature of man alienates him so radically from his authentic existence that though he may conceive it, he cannot of himself attain it. Only an act of grace from beyond man himself can put the possibility of his true life within his grasp; and Bultmann, of course, claims that Christian faith does know of such a gracious act. This act lies beyond the horizons of existential analysis. It is God's decisive act in Christ, as proclaimed in the kerygma.⁶⁸

Ittel speaks of Bultmann's differences with the existentialists by referring to the concept of guilt as common ground for both; he shows

how Bultmann and Heidegger disagree in interpreting this human factor:

Wie bei Heidegger, so zeigt auch bei Bultmann der Ruf die Schuld des Menschen auf. Nur ist eben der Unterscheid der, dass bei Heidegger der Mensch diese seine Schuld in Entschlossenheit auf sich nehmen muss, da ihn seine radikale Eigenmächtigkeit blind macht gegenüber der Tatsache, dass er seine Existenz als Geschenk betrachten kann. Dies aber tut der Mensch des Neuen Testaments und erlangt somit Vergebung seiner Sünde als Befreiung von seiner Eigenmächtigkeit.⁶⁹

If it is true that Bultmann's man, as distinguished from the philosophers', does not have the grace to reach authentic existence in and of himself, then it will take a Word from God for such a procedure. In a real sense the kerygma, as God's gracious Word, attributes to the archetype "self-understanding" authentic referents which are the act of God. In spite of Bultmann's attempt to speak of all of theology in terms of man's existence, it appears that these authenticating referents are human referents more to the degree that they formulate a possibility for man than to the degree that they describe a pre-existent authentic referent in man's capacity and nature.

While Bultmann does not hesitate to speak of grace as the event which brings authentic existence, he prefers to view the kerygma as the encountering revelation which imparts complete self-understanding of the past and future within the present moment. This is in keeping with his announced intention of relating all theology to the self-understanding of man. It is to the kerygma as it encounters man's self-understanding with enlightening revelation that we now turn.

Bultmann asserts that to become a Christian is to pass judgment on one's past, and to see the future as endless possibility: The

man who becomes a Christian "experiences an encounter which presents him with the possibility of decision against his old self and in favor of his new self. He does experience this encounter in hearing the Word of divine grace."⁷⁰ The revealing grace of the kerygma shows man that he is bound to himself. Authentic life and complete self-understanding will result only when man is delivered from himself. "It is the claim of the New Testament that this is exactly what has happened. This is precisely the meaning of what was wrought in Christ."⁷¹ Forgiveness of sins has a rather familiar and orthodox ring when we hear Bultmann define it as "simply the obliteration of man's past, and taking him to be what he is not—the man of the future; it means relieving him of dread and thereby making him free for the future."⁷² But any hint at orthodoxy vanishes when he goes on to describe how the forgiveness of sins was accomplished. The cross, it is true, "has created a new and permanent situation in history."⁷³ But the cross is not the cross of the Creed. For the cross really means "to make the cross our own, to undergo crucifixion with him."⁷⁴ And the preaching of the cross is called the event of redemption: "The preaching of the cross as the event of redemption challenges all who hear it to appropriate this significance for themselves, to be willing to be crucified with Christ."⁷⁵ Malevez summarizes Bultmann's teaching on the cross thus: "In the cross of Jesus, in some way, within time, God achieved the liberating judgment which He passes ab aeterno upon our existence...The cross...lifts us to the plane of authentic existence."⁷⁶ Man now has complete self-understanding in the moment. Man's understanding of existence

at that moment, Bultmann reminds us, need not be conscious; nevertheless, it makes its effect known. "It permeates and controls imperceptibly all anxiety and resolve, all the joy and dread, and is called in question at every encounter."⁷⁷

If we view this segment of the kerygma from a linguistic angle, and attempt to visualize how the self-understanding which comes through the Word of the cross is related to Bultmann's view of language, we shall find some interesting developments. For now the archetype "self-understanding" (or, viewed another way, "authentic existence") has kerygmatic acts-of-God as authentic referents; included among these referents is man's deliverance from Himself through God's gracious act of the cross (through obliteration of man's past) for future freedom in which man is no longer conditioned by past decisions. In a real sense, then, God takes active part in attributing authentic referents gleaned from man's concrete situation to the archetype "self-understanding." Is it so odd that this process should be anything other than God's "Word"? God's procedure in authenticating the existence of man is called an "act"; but the vehicle nearest the act, which is selected to make these acts meaningful to man, is God's Word. The fact that Bultmann makes no differentiation between God's act in Christ, and the Word of that act preached today, demonstrates a metaphysical affinity between the action of God and language as it is viewed by Bultmann. The Word which speaks, and the action about which it speaks, are inseparable; in fact, they are one and the same for Bultmann. We shall examine this aspect in greater detail shortly.

At present, we shall determine how Bultmann handles the resurrection in his theology of the kerygma. "But what of the resurrection? ...Obviously it is not an event of past history with self-evident meaning."⁷⁸ What then is the resurrection? The story of the resurrection is the first witness to the power of Christ's crucifixion to bestow authentic existence. The resurrection, preached by the first apostles, was God's way of saying that the cross of Christ was the empowering medium to authentic existence. Thus understood, the resurrection was not formally a part of the Christ-event; neither was it one of the authentic referents, one of the acts of God. Rather, the resurrection as preached was witness to the validity of God's process of attributing authentic referents to the archetype "authentic existence." The resurrection, as preached, was the validating word for all that had happened before it. "The faith of Easter is just this—faith in the word of preaching."⁷⁹ Malevez clears the air in describing the resurrection as a "mythical story" when he summarizes Bultmann's teaching of the resurrection:

God created the belief in the Resurrection in the minds of the disciples...in the guise of a mythical story, the true divine content which God poured into their hearts was, quite simply, the knowledge of the triumphant value of the Cross, the discovery of its saving significance, the grasp of its liberating aspect.⁸⁰

This discussion of the resurrection as the first kerygmatic proclamation leads us into a consideration of proclamation within the moment as the very "act of God." For if the cross of Christ, and all of God's acts as well, are understood linguistically as God attributing authentic referents to the archetype "self-understanding," we may conclude that only an act of God can attribute authentic referents to

such an archetype. If this is the case, then all proclamation will have to be an act of God; the kerygma will be God acting. For He alone can attribute the authentic referents. All preaching, if it is the act of God, will have as its purpose the actualization of the archetype "self-understanding." For according to Bultmann, proclamation does not communicate something that happened in a certain place and at a certain time, "but rather says what has occurred to the person being addressed."⁸¹ If preaching is the actualization of self-understanding, as an act of God, "the preaching is itself revelation and does not merely speak about it, so that it mediates a content that one can understand or to which he can relate himself through knowledge and thereby 'have' the revelation."⁸²

In addition, all preaching will be momentous and concrete; that is, it will consider decisive possibilities within man in the concrete existential situation. God's active referents to the archetype "self-understanding" will confront me within my present situation. Existential timing is an important factor in making a "Word" relevant. For example, a word yesterday may have been meaningless until it becomes a decisive word for me now, in my present situation.⁸³ Such a momentous proclamation can be considered as part and parcel of God's gracious revelational act of salvation: "As the preaching itself belongs to the fact of salvation, so also is this fact not what it is without preaching."⁸⁴

It is within the proclamation of the kerygma that man receives the full revelation of self-understanding. It is within the proclamation

of the kerygma that man can see authentic existence. And just as the existentialist philosophers claim to be able to address and question existence and thereby come into contact with being itself, so the momentous kerygmatic proclamation will enable Christian man to appropriate the proper authentic referents to the archetype "being itself." For the kerygma will bring to self-realization man's self-understanding as it is related to the transcendent, acting God, who speaks the Word. Bultmann's theology runs from the kerygmatic word, to Christology, to God Himself. Bultmann first associates Christ and the word of revelation in a concise manner: "Christ is revelation, and...revelation is the word; for these two are one and the same."⁸⁵ Then Bultmann asserts that theology can only be sketched in terms of Christology.⁸⁶ We ask why, and surmise the answer: Christ is God's meaningful Word spoken to man in terms that he can understand. For that reason we are to construct a theology through Christology. In spite of himself, Bultmann agrees to discuss some of the "attributes" of God, never failing to relate them to man's existence in some way (and thereby abiding by his intention to arrive at theology only through kerygmatic Christology). Bultmann describes God's transcendence in terms nearly unacceptable to his own system of thought:

God's transcendence is rather his constant futurity, his absolute freedom, which...excludes every laying hold on God by man, every constraining on or obligation on the part of God by the fulfillment of conditions which men can perform, every claim upon God...every rational comprehensibility of the divine action.⁸⁷

In another place, he proceeds to describe God's transcendence in terms more palatable to one who would make all theology dependent upon man's existence. For God's transcendence is not that into which the soul is absorbed as it soars above the world in devotion, abstraction and ecstasy. Rather, His transcendence is apprehended by the believer as the "preservation of detachment in the actual concrete situations of life—a detachment which makes decisions and actions of real import, because in it man thinks and acts as a free agent."⁸⁸ The attribute of God's omnipotence is taken seriously in the Word of divine grace, which Word (kerygma) liberates man from himself, with power.⁸⁹ God's judgment is taken seriously in the Word of divine grace (His holiness), when man's finitude is seen "with all its logical implications as sin." It unmask the "dignity of man as self-deception."⁹⁰ God's eternity is taken seriously in the Word of God, for this is a Word of forgiveness. "As the man whom God has forgiven...man is in his real being, his existence is no longer a transient one...That is shown in the cessation of all self-glorification."⁹¹

Returning to our consideration of the kerygmatic proclamation, it is well for us to note that the kerygma draws the past and the future into the eschatological present. For the kerygma is the "once-for-all eschatological event, which is continually re-enacted in the word of proclamation."⁹² In other words, the apostolic preaching which originated in the event of Easter Day is itself a part of the eschatological event of redemption.⁹³ It is apparent that Bultmann has collapsed the kerygmatic act into the eschatological present so as to retain his existential emphasis upon decision in the moment.

Another important service rendered by contemporary kerygmatic proclamation is its bracketing function. For Bultmann correlates its role with that of "death" within existentialism. He asserts that in the system of existential analysis, the phenomenon of death serves the following purposes: (A) death provides terms by which existential analysis can understand man in his totality; (B) death limits man from the outside (a limitation which man himself is not capable of providing); (C) death prevents man from idle speculation about "something outside of man"; (D) death constitutes man as a totality within his existence. Bultmann then goes on to state that theology "gives this function to the proclamation that is encountered in existence."⁹⁴ Just as death within existential analysis clarifies the ontological structure, thereby adjusting the existentialia, so now proclamation is given the task of adjusting these same existentialia in a range of value, demonstrating their inherent dependence upon self-understanding and authentic existence. Since our interest is Bultmann's view of language, we must ask the rhetorical question here: Does not preaching also adjust the archetypes of language in proclamation? Does it not fit the archetypes in their relation to the major archetypes of self-understanding and authentic existence? Does it not simultaneously reject unauthentic referents, and postulate God-act referents?

It is self-evident that within Bultmann's system there can be no revelation of God outside of the kerygma. For revelation is actually God's attributing of authentic referents to the archetype of self-understanding. With such a limited definition, Bultmann has delimited all revelation to the kerygma. For the kerygma accomplishes

what man in self-assertive sin did not accomplish, although it was within the will of God when He created the world:

Man learns to understand himself in the light of the revelation of redemption not a bit differently than he always already should understand himself in the face of the revelation in creation and law—namely, as God's creature who is limited by God and stands under God's claim...If the revelation in Jesus means salvation as an understanding of oneself in him, then the revelation in creation meant nothing other than this understanding of oneself in God in the knowledge of one's own creatureliness.⁹⁵

Any talking "about" God that lies outside of the kerygma is merely the ascription of unauthentic referents to the archetypes of self-understanding and authentic existence; we recall that only these two (really one and the same) archetypes are able to burst forth into the light of being itself. Bultmann asserts that before we can begin to discuss the validity of natural revelation, we must arrive at the authenticity of the word "God."⁹⁶ A Christian who believes solely in revelation through Christ cannot stand idly by while others assert that "God" manifests himself in natural revelation. "We must adhere to the view that the criterion for the critical investigation of any knowledge of God allegedly gained elsewhere is the knowledge of God which belongs to the Christian faith."⁹⁷ For the Christian, revelation means recognizing his own authenticity:

The meaning of revelation consists in its being the means whereby we achieve our own authenticity, which we cannot achieve by our own resources. Therefore, to know about revelation means to know about our own authenticity—and at the same time, thereby to know our own limitation.⁹⁸

But it is precisely this limitation which those who espouse natural revelation will not admit. They have failed to perceive the things that can be known about God in their existence. Instead, Bultmann

argues that they have turned the "negatives" collected into positive statements about the ontological God.⁹⁹ Is it incorrect for us to assert that the "negatives" which the supporters of natural revelation transform into positive statements about the ontological God are other than unauthentic referents to the archetype "authentic existence" summarized in objective statements? Such "revelation" is thus unauthentic language, just as it is also sin for Bultmann.

Having dealt with Bultmann's theology insofar as it concerns itself with presuppositions, existential analysis, demythologizing, and the exclusive kerygma, we shall turn to one final area of his theology in our attempt to discern what view of language emerges. We shall consider faith as it is immune from proof and disproof. Bultmann is concerned with removing faith from the sphere of objective knowledge. He asserts that "it is precisely its immunity from proof which secures the Christian proclamation from the charge of being mythological" (in the improper sense).¹⁰⁰ He remembers vividly those times in the Church's history when faith was shattered because it had been improperly based upon the tenets of a fluctuating knowledge of science. Faith needs to be emancipated from its association with a world of objective terms.¹⁰¹ If the acts of God are not susceptible to the justifiable criticisms of science,¹⁰² then faith too must lie beyond their reach.¹⁰³

Bultmann's definition of faith is interested primarily in the future. "This is what is meant by 'faith': to open ourselves to the future...turning our backs on self and abandoning all security...surrendering all our self-confidence."¹⁰⁴ Belief is response to that gift of God in which all of the future is bestowed upon man in

anticipation, and the acceptance of which makes man free again to accept any destiny: "Belief means, as the anticipation of every possible future, that taking of man out of the world, and his ingrafting into eschatological existence."¹⁰⁵ If faith is such an eschatological ingrafting, it is not a quality which inheres in a believer, but rather a possibility that must constantly be laid hold of anew—as this is the only way that man exists.¹⁰⁶

The repeated proclamations of the kerygma necessary to nurture faith preserve it from falling into the sphere of objective knowledge. Faith cannot be proven. When it is spoken about, the kerygma itself is spoken and proclaimed. Just as the historian Bultmann can "only discover various instances of faith in revelation, never (instances) of the revelation itself,"¹⁰⁷ so also the theologian Bultmann is never able to discover in the present moment faith in and of itself, but only the revelation of the kerygma. Faith, then, is inseparable from the kerygma that gives it life. It is momentous, and its concern for possibilities in the future flows from its decisive authenticity in the present. It is beyond proof, for it deals with a God who is qualitatively different from the objective world. Faith is self-understanding with the authentic referents "possible future of freedom" and "obliteration of past sins" attributed to it.

CHAPTER III

BULTMANN'S VIEW OF THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

Language as a Process of Authentic Existence

In this chapter we propose to tie together those aspects of language which have come to the fore in our consideration of Bultmann's theology. We shall first examine the constructs of a view of language which have emerged from his theology. Then we shall formulate a working definition of language as it can be described for Bultmann. Finally, we shall exhibit his view of language as evidenced in a sermon preached in 1943.

Bultmann's view of language must be filtered from his theology. For he provides us with no clear and concise statements as to what language is, or how it works, or where it connects with theology. In our theological consideration above, we discussed the undergirding assumptions of his thought; we attempted to catch the spirit of existential analysis, both in its existentiale and existentiell moments; we have seen the process of demythologizing as a sequential aspect of Bultmann's theology; we have characterized the kerygmatic proclamation as God's act of affirming man's existence in true authenticity. All through the investigation we caught glimpses of an emerging view of language and the presuppositions which undergird it. Now we shall isolate those presuppositions of Bultmann's view of language. These assumptions need to be considered when the time comes to formulate Bultmann's view of language. There are six basic assumptions.

The first assumption for Bultmann's view of language derives from one of his basic theological assumptions. Only that is meaningful (linguistically) which increases self-understanding. If the bedrock of Bultmann's theology is the assumption that all theological endeavor is carried on in terms of man's existence (i.e. self-understanding), then this basic assumption must be considered as a correlative aspect of his view of language. Every linguistic expression (theological) will aid, in some way or another, man's self-understanding. This assumption already alerts us to the usage of the archetypes suggested in existential analysis, and the authentic referents as well.

The second assumption deals with the process of existential analysis. If existential analysis is granted the privilege of determining the existentialia which are to be actualized in the existentiell moment, then any theory of language will take into consideration this same existential analysis, as well as the results it provides. It is safe to assert that the process of existential analysis provides "neutral" archetypes of a symbolic nature. All meaningful language will be connected in some way or another with these archetypes and with their referents.

In considering the third major assumption of Bultmann's view of language as it issues from his theology, it is necessary for us to recognize again the affiliation of Bultmann and Heidegger. The proximity of their approach to language should not be overlooked. Even though Bultmann has remained hesitant, it is a valid procedure

to utilize what Heidegger has provided as suggestive of Bultmann's approach. Macquarrie notes that Heidegger's view of language is set aside by the modern logical positivists. In describing their rejection, he gives us a glimpse of Heidegger's view of language, especially his view of the origin of language:

Certainly there is little tendency to accept Heidegger's view that language is to be understood primarily in terms of man as the being who has the existential possibility of discourse... Yet there are other kinds of language in which man expresses himself—and religious language is surely among them—where the relation between what is said and the person who says it is so close that any linguistic analysis would need to be correlated with an existential analysis.¹

Bultmann approximates such a position himself when he says, "Language is a mirror of the mode of thinking."² Language is not from the "thinking subject," but from the mode of thinking. Language results from the self's involvement with the world and with other selves. To speak precisely, our third assumption is that language must be an act of authentic existence in Bultmann's thought, if it is to be meaningful. Language must at least pattern itself after the whole kerygmatic process, the process which brings self-understanding and authentic existence to realization.

It is not improper to draw a parallel between Bultmann's hermeneutics and his theory of language in this consideration. His hermeneutics suggest that the question of God and the question of myself are identical. This is the "receptive" side of theology. On the "expressive" side, language about God and language about myself are also identical. Any language of the "expressive" type arises from within the authentic existence which it attempts to portray. For Bultmann, there is one

basic presupposition underlying all interpretation: "The presupposition for understanding is the interpreter's relationship in his life to the subject which is directly or indirectly expressed in the text."³

Surely this principle of interpretation must underlie any attempt at the symbolic interpretation of authentic existence as one seeks to portray it. Language is an act of authentic existence, just as interpretation depends upon the authentic relation one has with the subject he is attempting to interpret.

Connected with the assumption that language finds its origin in authentic existence is a consideration of the function of language. Language can never serve the subject-object function of formulation for Bultmann if it is to remain meaningful. Speech will never be for speech's sake. If it is authentic language, it will be kerygmatic, and hence a form of summons. In considering the intention of theological statements for Bultmann, Ogden submits that their function "is to present a certain possibility for understanding human existence, and directly or indirectly to summon their hearers to realize this possibility."⁴

Noting the prominence which the kerygma plays in Bultmann's theology, we do not overstate the case in asserting the fourth assumption to be that the kerygma serves as primary example of meaningful language. Our analysis of the kerygma, insofar as it is God's act proclaimed and God's act in proclaiming, will hold us in good stead when it comes to evaluating theological discourse. For it will provide us with a measuring stick.

The fifth assumption deals with the role of demythologizing in Bultmann's view of language. Demythologizing plays only a subsequent role in Bultmann's view of language, just as it has in his theology. Demythologizing cannot serve as anything other than an example of meaningless language in the process of receiving meaning. Once again it would be well for us to notice the similarity between Heidegger and Bultmann. Karsten Harries has analyzed Heidegger's usage of language as follows: Heidegger attempts to diminish the danger of seeing Sein as another Seinedes by using a language which is devoid of pictures. For pictures belong to the realm of finite objects and can block our vision of the ontological. But finally, such an attempt cannot prove satisfactory. If we strive to reach Being, we must find a language which is able to single out its own inadequacy.⁵ It is apparent that Bultmann has followed nearly the same process in his demythologizing. In his grasp for being, he has begun with a language which he thinks is able to point out its own inadequacy, the language of existential analysis. Starting from that point, he has proceeded to subtract those pictures of New Testament language which, to his eye, describe Sein as another Seinedes. But the important factor to be noted is that Bultmann begins first with the language of being as the proper expression of truth; from there he proceeds to demythologize. In his view of language, demythologizing follows, but does not give genesis to, man's symbolic expression of encounter with being.

The sixth assumption deals with Bultmann's disapproval of any subject-object formulations. He terms such subject-object formulations "meaningless." The sixth assumption is that an objective

formulation, linguistically, is nothing less than the positing of unauthentic referents. Such unauthentic referents conceal the real nature of Sein because they objectivize it. To objectivize is to place one among many; this is the same process as positing unauthentic referents for an archetype, thereby objectivizing it and removing it from the sphere of authentic existence. Heidegger calls language "der Güter Gefährlichstes" for precisely the same reason.⁶

With these assumptions in mind, it now becomes our privilege to formulate concisely the view of language which has issued from our consideration of Bultmann's theology. For Bultmann, language is the "momentous" process of providing the symbolic archetypes with authentic referents. We shall discuss this statement in some detail, and then turn our attention upon language in the operation of a sermon.

Our definition has suggested that language is a "momentous" process. It is momentous because language cannot be uttered by a thinking subject. For Bultmann, language arises out of the momentary decisions of concrete existence, in the relations one has with other persons. For if language is an act of authentic existence, it must arise in the moment. At the same time, language is a process, or better still, an "act." It appears to be an act patterned after the act of God manifest in the kerygma. Just as the act of God has provided, within the kerygma, authentic referents for the archetypal existentiale "self-understanding," so also language is an act involving archetypes and referents. Language appears to take on the characteristics of kerygma whenever it is authentic language.

The "symbolic archetypes" mentioned in our definition are those which have been provided by existential analysis. These archetypes are symbolic representatives of the existentialia. They are man's method of symbolizing existence and being. The symbolic archetypes furnished by analysis are either neutral in regards to existence; or they are modified by unauthentic referents (and thus unauthentic themselves); or they are modified by some, but not enough, authentic referents (for the kerygma alone, and not existential analysis, can provide all the necessary authentic referents). We must now consider what is meant by "authentic" and "unauthentic" archetypes in greater detail.

Authentic archetypes are those symbolized existentialia which have enough authentic referents, even without the kerygma, to have an air of authenticity, of being-within-existence, about them. We recall Bultmann's admission that existential analysis is able to grasp the possibility of true authenticity even apart from the kerygma. Disregarding for the moment a consideration of the authentic referents which Bultmann would admit outside of the kerygma (such as might be found in authentic, though somewhat incomplete, existentialism), let us consider the authentic referents of the kerygma as they modify or validate the archetype "authentic existence." These authentic referents of such an authentic archetype fall into two categories divisible only for analysis, and not in existence itself. Where there is one type, there will automatically be the other. While in essence (or shall we say existence?) there is only one type of authentic referent, namely any human, personal, concrete decision (made through God's

gracious action) by which a man decides for the future in the present while forgetting the past, in our analysis of this authentic referent we can differentiate and find two categories: (1) An authentic referent is an act of God authenticating the archetype "self-understanding" (here referring to the Cross); (2) an authentic referent is any other personal, momentous, decisive act whereby man is able to forget his past and decide for the future in freedom.

Authentic archetypes, however, can become mutilated. "Unauthentic" archetypes are those which have been mutated from authentic by the attachment of unauthentic referents. For example, we recall Bultmann's reference to the archetype "being" or "God." For those who think that there is such a thing as natural revelation apart from the kerygma, this archetype is actually an unauthentic archetype in that it does not convey any meaning for the understanding of existence and Being Itself. Thus, "God" objectivized has been transformed into an unauthentic archetype, although it is still an archetype of sorts. Such an unauthentic archetype can be re-transformed into an authentic archetype through the proper attachment of authentic referents, that is, by the kerygma.

The unauthentic referents which transform authentic into unauthentic archetypes are closely related to the objectivizing process which Bultmann deprecates so vehemently. For it appears that unauthentic referents are formulations of the rational mind which attempt to give meaning to the archetypes of man's existence by postulating objective referents connected only logically to these archetypes (that is, by a superficial division into subject-object), thereby assuming to give

meaning to those archetypes even when no self-understanding has resulted. Unauthentic referents are modifiers which amplify the existential archetypes as if they were part of the objective world around man rather than constitutive of man. Unauthentic referents treat man as an object; they deal with the existentialia as if they were part of the logical, natural, closed world of science. As a result, the symbolic archetypes of such existentialia are mutated into unauthentic archetypes by the process of receiving unauthentic referents as attributes.

As a final consideration in our formulation of Bultmann's view of language, we give thought to the place of the kerygma. Is the kerygma merely an example? Is the kerygma the only expression of true and meaningful language as this view of language has emerged from his theology? We have seen that the kerygma has proved itself a clear manifestation of Bultmann's view of language. Now it remains for us to determine if the kerygma is the only such theologically meaningful language. Insofar as some factors of existential analysis contribute to the self-understanding and authentic existence of man, there is truly "meaningful" language apart from the kerygma. On the other hand, Bultmann carefully postulates that only through the kerygma, that is through proclamation (which is really God's act), is man enabled to reach the pure self-realization and self-understanding which may be called complete "authentic existence." In this sense, then, it would not be presumptuous to argue that for Bultmann only the kerygma, only the act of proclamation, is authentic and meaningful language, theological language in the most precise sense. For

the kerygma entails the unmasking of the unauthentic referents of distorted archetypes just as it entails the ascription of authentic referents to these same archetypes. Proclamation is the very act of God carrying out this process. In sum, Bultmann's definition of the kerygma is sufficiently encompassing to include all of the language which is uttered in authentic self-understanding. Without reservation we can assert that for Bultmann the kerygma is the most excellent example, and the only instance, of authentic language. Such an assertion is tempered by Bultmann's eschatological outlook in which every proclamation of the Word of God is at one and the same time the past, the present, and the future rolled up into one Word.

While one could not expect every aspect of Bultmann's view of language to be demonstrable from a single literary piece, we might well expect one of his sermons to exemplify at least the major components of this view. We turn now to a sermon preached May 30, 1943, with John 16:22-33 as the text. The sermon is recorded in This World and Beyond.⁷ Appendix A of this paper contains an annotated outline of the sermon. In the following summary, we shall select specifics from that sermon which demonstrate Bultmann's view of language as it has been outlined above. We shall make reference to the specific archetypes therein contained; to the referents, both authentic and unauthentic; and to the overall process of thought which Bultmann follows as it sheds light on his view of language.

Bultmann's concern in the sermon is communication with God through prayer. The existential form in question is existence,

the possibility of relation to being. Existence comes only through self-understanding in the concrete, or, in the words of the sermon, only when "all oppressive problems are solved and there is only pure joy." Bultmann is prepared to provide authentic referents for this symbolic archetype, "self-understanding," or pure joy. He does so by replacing the unauthentic referents "threatened by the world," "temporal," "has objects" (whose archetype is actually an unauthentic one of supposed joy, created by objectivizing self-understanding into essence within the world), with authentic referents. Self-understanding within the concrete situation sees beyond itself ("lies beyond the world"), has no fear of extinction ("no threat of removal"), does not objectivize anything, reaches a point of self-realization and self-explanation, and creates itself through freedom.

Bultmann has progressed to the point of discussing freedom as it relates to self-understanding. The archetype symbolized by the word "freedom" is undoubtedly "the decision for existence in the moment." While it is not necessary to enumerate all the authentic referents here (see Appendix), or the unauthentic referents as they are displaced (which unauthentic referents have unauthentic "anxiety" as an archetype), one should note especially the first authentic referent, "freedom from ourselves." This referent connects its archetype to the one above, "self-understanding." In addition, one should note the last referent of the section, the fact that such freedom "comes only from being alone in the presence of God." This referent, in turn, becomes the new archetype. While in existential analysis this new archetype symbolizes death, Bultmann has ascribed

the function of the death-archetype, together with anxiety, to the archetype of proclamation, or encounter with God, or kerygma.⁸

So now we are concerned with referents which provide the authentic verification for the archetype "encounter," or proclamation. First we note that the unauthentic referents include "clinging to something," "covered by rags," "trying to hide." These referents provide unauthentic modification of the unauthentic archetype "God" when this archetype symbolizes the God who has been separated from existent man through objective, rational processes. The most decisive authentic referent for this archetype, "encounter," is Bultmann's statement, "possible only through the cross." One of the authentic referents, "understanding ourselves," seems to be almost tautologous with the archetype it modifies. The two referents "confronted by God alone" and "understanding ourselves" are actually one. Here Bultmann reaches the kerygma. God's act of attributing referents is at the same time both an act of linguistic process (hence called "proclamation") and also God's performing what is spoken in the proclamation: encountering man to bring him total self-understanding. Hence, the kerygma is sui generis. It can be called God's "act" on two accounts: God acts in man's realm to attribute to man's self-understanding those referents which are fitting; God acts in His own realm to accomplish the archetype in the very process of attributing authentic referents to it (that is, by confronting man). These two are always inseparable. It is equally interesting to note how Bultmann sweeps away the unauthentic referents of the archetype "encounter." The unauthentic referents he attributes to the unauthentic archetype "anxiety," which, if

authenticated, will incorporate the judgmental aspect of the kerygma. The final referent of consequence for the archetype "encounter" is "proved in the openness to encounters of life." This is the archetype "concrete moment." Actual proclamation can occur only in openness to encounters of life, in the moment. We note that the authentic referents attributed to this archetype are, at least formally, tautologous with it. However, they are more than tautologies; they are authentic referents enlightening the self-understanding in the moment by attributing to the moment characteristics descriptive of authentic existence.

Bultmann has run his course in this sermon. He began by saying that true existence (prayer, relation to being), is possible only when all oppressive problems are solved, when there is complete self-understanding in the concrete. He proceeded to proclaim that such self-understanding is possible only by freedom, by decision for existence; this decision comes from being in the presence of God (through the kerygma) in the cross. Such cross-confrontation arises in the openness to encounters of life. Once again we are back at the theme of self-understanding in the concrete.

In this sermon Bultmann has demonstrated theological language in use. From within his own authentic existence we have followed him—in the concrete moment of the sermon—attributing authentic referents to archetypes, thereby displacing the unauthentic referents. His sermon is nothing more nor less than the process of attributing authentic referents to the basic archetype "self-understanding." His sermon is pure kerygma. It is an act of God, just as it is God

acting immediately upon the hearers. God unites the authentic referents and the archetype; only He can do that. When one proclaims the kerygma, God deigns to accomplish His action through that person. Just as Bultmann has been involved in proclamation of the kerygma, in putting into linguistic expression the Word of everlasting being, he has been engaged in the "momentous" process of providing the symbolic archetypes of existence with authentic referents, concurrently displacing unauthentic referents and unauthentic archetypes. The sermon is kerygma. As kerygma, it exemplifies, demonstrates, and incorporates all of the meaningful language that can be spoken by man "about" God.

In this chapter we have concerned ourselves with formulating precisely the view of language which is Bultmann's. We have enumerated those basic presuppositions which issue from his theology and affect his view of language. We have characterized his view of language as the "momentous" process of providing the symbolic archetypes (of existence) with authentic referents. We have exemplified this view of language with reference to one of his sermons. In an attempt to remain as objective as possible, we have withheld any evaluation until the final chapter. There we shall have the opportunity to evaluate, appreciatively and critically, Bultmann's view of language and the theology from which it stems.

CHAPTER IV

APPRECIATION AND CRITIQUE OF THEOLOGY AND VIEW OF LANGUAGE

Theology and View of Language Investigated from Within and Without

It is now our privilege to express appreciation of the work of Rudolf Bultmann in theology and language, and to analyze critically his system of thought and its emergent language-view both from within and from without. Since it has been demonstrated above that Bultmann's view of language issues unmistakably from his theology, we cannot concern ourselves only with his view of language. On the other hand, neither can our concern rest only with his theology. In this chapter we shall approve those aspects of his theology and language-view which are valuable, and bring to light those aspects of both theology and language which appear to be untenable. After acknowledging the valuable factors, we shall turn our attention to difficulties encountered within the system itself. Then we shall question the system from without.

Christians find little difficulty in appreciating Bultmann's emphasis upon preaching the Word of God. In this day and age, with words tumbling upon men in a continuous barrage, it is necessary for the Word to enter men's hearing. The importance of preaching is assumed in Bultmann's theology and language-view as well, and he has made a valuable contribution in emphasizing the importance of preaching. Scripture has not hesitated to speak of the Christ as God's last Word to men.¹ Throughout the Old Testament too we find a constant

emphasis upon the piercing Word as it comes into men's hearts through their ears. For preaching has always been an essential part of the Church's mission. St. Paul refuses to separate the reconciliation of Christ from the minister who preaches that reconciliation.² The Lutheran Confessions unhesitatingly make preaching of the Gospel one of the marks of the Church:

Es wird auch gelehret, dass alle Zeit müsse ein heilige christliche Kirche sein und bleiben, welche ist die Versammlung aller Glaubigen, bei welchen das Evangelium rein gepredigt und die heiligen Sakrament lauts des Evangelii gereicht werden.³

There is little doubt in the minds of evangelical catholic Christians that preaching is no less important in the modern world than it has been in the past ages of the Church.

Bultmann also suggests correctly that preaching is to be done with meaning. That is the preacher's task week after week. Merely to repeat words is not to give accurate denotation to them. One would never preach a German sermon to an English congregation. In like manner, the task of preaching to modern man is difficult; Bultmann has alerted the Church to the problem of preaching with meaning, and attempted to deal with it as well. We must credit him with endeavoring to reach man where he is today with a message much too deep for his activist life. Bultmann, as a chaplain, confronted troops in the trenches of the first World War; preachers confront men in the pews of modern churches week after week. But their task is one and the same: to preach with meaning. To preach with meaning, at least two requirements must be filled: the preacher must understand the

message to be preached in all of its ramifications; in addition, the preacher must be well enough acquainted with the hearer's world to relate the message to it. Bultmann has attempted to meet both of these qualifications.

Preaching with meaning entails confronting the hearer with the person of Jesus Christ. In this respect Bultmann is to be commended for emphasizing the importance of the personal encounter of faith. Cahill notes that Bultmann's stress on intersubjectivity "makes clear that there are areas of religious truth which are grasped and understood only through personal living, personal conviction, the entire moral and intellectual being of the subject."⁴ In a similar spirit, the Lutheran Confessions are not slow to condemn the suggestion that the objective knowledge of facts comprises the totality of faith:

Es geschicht auch Unterricht, dass man hie nicht von solchen Glauben redet, den auch die Teufel und Gottlosen haben, die auch die Historien glauben, dass Christus gelitten hab und auferstanden sei von Toten, sonder man redet von wahren Glauben, der da glaubet, dass wir durch Christum Gnad und Vergebung der Sunde erlangen. Und der nu weiss, dass er ein gnädigen Gott durch Christum hat, kennet also Gott, rufet ihn an und ist nicht ohn Gott wie die Heiden. Dann Teufel und Gottlosen glauben diesen Artikel, Vergebung der Sunde, nicht; darum seind sie Gott feind, können ihne nicht anrufen, nichts Guts von ihme hoffen.⁵

We can appreciate Bultmann's concern for confrontation as part of the task of meaningful preaching. Just as it is the task of the modern preacher to make his speech meaningful to men, so it is his task to answer the request of his hearers when they plead, "We would see Jesus."

There are other aspects of Bultmann's thought which are worthy of commendation, but we proceed with an analysis of his thought critically evaluated at once. While later we shall examine his position

over and against other theologies, we first take him to task within his own frame of thought. Having understood his theology and his language-view as best we can, we are now in a position to ask him questions from within his own frame of reference. While it will not always be possible to evaluate completely the ramifications which adjustments in his theology effect upon his language-view, it is to be understood that we approach his theology from a critical angle solely to demonstrate the weaknesses in the view of language which has emerged from it.

The first difficulty within the system of thought is that Bultmann's presuppositions are unsupported. Some might assert that presuppositions are assumptions, and they need not be examined. Others might argue that examining the presuppositions of a system is a simultaneous comparison of one system to another. On the other hand, presuppositions within a system dare never go unexamined, even within the system they serve. It is part of critical thinking to examine one's presuppositions from within the structure built upon them in order to determine (1) whether the system follows conclusively from the assumptions; (2) whether all of the stated assumptions are necessary; (3) whether any assumptions are contradictory; (4) whether there are other assumptions which have emerged unnoticed, and have not been recognized as prior assumptions.

There is one basic assumption which runs throughout Bultmann's thought, but is neither expressed nor defended as such. Bultmann does not demonstrate why man ought to strive to become an authentic being in the first place. That is a not to be asked. Nevertheless, it is

this basic assumption which underlies the whole of his thought, even though it is unexpressed. Since Bultmann refuses either to recognize it as an assumption, or to defend it as such (to do so would take him squarely into the forbidden realm of metaphysics), his entire system immediately assumes the air of persuasion as we shall note later.

A second difficulty encountered in consideration of the assumptions is the rather imprecise formulation of the assumption dealing with modern man and the modern world. It is true that Bultmann's concept of revelation suits the modern personalistic, subjective climate.⁶ And yet, the charge has been leveled, and not without validity, that Bultmann's assumptions about the modern scientific world are imprecise and dated. Malevez agrees with Jaspers when Jaspers complains,

Everything suggests that, like most of the rest of us, he (Bultmann) either ignores or does not understand its (science's) fundamental statements. If there is something of which we can be quite certain, for us all, it is this, that in the form which it has assumed during recent decades, science has given up the attempt to make any picture of the world at all, because it knows that such a picture cannot possibly be created.⁷

Macquarrie becomes more specific when he charges Bultmann with speaking about the modern world picture (the totality of what we have learned from science) when he means to speak of the average self-understanding of modern man (which is not scientific, is secular, and takes man as the ultimate). In the same account, Macquarrie recalls an occasion when he reminded Bultmann of the fact that thousands of people go to Lourdes every year, and there seemed to be nothing unacceptable in this practice to many modern

minds. Bultmann's six words in reply spoke a volume: "But these are not modern men."⁸ Macquarrie goes on to suggest that Bultmann has made concessions to the modern man's self-understanding, not always to the benefit of the kerygma; such concessions arose in his confusion of the conception of modernity:

Bultmann's own position is needlessly ambiguous. In some passages he makes concessions to the modern secularized self-understanding as well as to the modern world-picture. His position would have been greatly strengthened if he had shown less deference to modernity and criticized its assumptions more thoroughly. The concessions which he makes do not represent (p. 240) his own typical view, which holds firmly to the kerygma, but arises from the confusions in his conception of modernity.⁹

If the above statements are true, then Bultmann has failed to be specific in his assumption dealing with modern man. At one time he refers to the modern world as it is described by science.¹⁰ At other times he has in mind the closed thought-world of modern self-understanding, which will allow for no such an idea as a transcending power interfering with life.¹¹ These two pictures of modernity are quite different, and are not to be mixed together with verbal manipulation. If his assumption about the modern world deals specifically with the scientific outlook prevalent in it, then he should be willing to admit with the scientists (as Jaspers says) that science has give up any attempt to picture the world. On the other hand, if his assumption about the incomprehensibility of the New Testament world to modern man is based upon a consideration of modern man's self-understanding, then he should be more explicit about the makeup of this self-understanding, and less anxious to condemn the myths of the New Testament as wholly unintelligible to modern man. From this brief

consideration it is apparent that Bultmann has homework to do in describing modernity. This basic assumption is beclouded with all manner of side issues, and seems to be more a "catch-all" than a precise formulation of "prior understanding."

The second major difficulty within the system does not deal specifically with presuppositions, but with the system as developed upon the presuppositions. The difficulty lies in Bultmann's insistence that only the kerygma can perform the act of self-realization for man, bestowing the grace to forget the past and face the possible future. Is the kerygma really necessary? Is it not the last remnant of the myth that Bultmann has set out to eliminate? While Bultmann has argued that the mythical view of the world must be accepted or rejected in its entirety,¹² his usage of the word "demythologizing" points to the fact that he considers the primary language of religion to be myth.¹³ It is not difficult to demonstrate that the kerygma fits into one of the definitions of myth which Bultmann has given. Is it necessary, then, to retain the kerygma? Bultmann has removed the actual significance of Christ, and made His birth, death, and resurrection but a symbol within us.

That a person was born, crucified, arose, if affirmed at all (and it certainly cannot be affirmed in the case of the resurrection), is affirmed only incidentally and as a possibility or probability, certainly not as a constitutive element of saving event.¹⁴

The question arises, if Christ is but a symbol (symbols are interchangeable and not exclusive), how could He be unique?¹⁵ Bultmann answers this charge by saying that this is exactly the scandal of the action of God perceived only by faith, where the foundation and

object of faith are one. This is an insufficient answer to so destructive a charge. Ogden has followed Bultmann's course through to the finish, and he demonstrates the truthfulness of the charge. He finds no room for the Bultmannian act of God.¹⁶

Any system of theology which is as deeply indebted to philosophy as Bultmann's is to Heidegger's does indeed find it difficult to sever itself from that system. Given the Heideggerian Dasein, it does not seem necessary to import the kerygma unless one has a prior disposition towards it and must make room for it. For Bultmann has allowed that existential analysis is able to apprehend the existential "authentic existence" (and its symbolic archetype as well), but not attain it. From another point of view, he has empowered Dasein even to achieve authentic existence by the method in which he has ripped the kerygma from its historical foundation. Jacques Cuttat wastes no words when he argues that Bultmann's reduction of Christ's historicity to a mere occasion for self-understanding is actually a mythical inner movement towards Christ,

transforming into terms which are outwardly Christian a spiritual attitude which is...Hindu...He reduces the Christian message to a mere verbal and historical symbol, to a mirror which reflects rather than opens the way for our salvation. In other words, it is all a Christianized myth.¹⁷

It is apparent that Bultmann's insistence upon the kerygma as the only gracious means to self-understanding and self-realization is an insistence born of dogmatic compulsion, and not an attitude resulting from the fact that the kerygma is an integral unity in his existential analysis and theology. Since the kerygma is a loosely connected "Christianized myth," it too is vulnerable to the knife of demythology.

Another difficulty within Bultmann's system is his unwillingness to carry on an exhaustive process of argumentation. At times Bultmann is unwilling to pursue inimical arguments which could prove to be just as valid as those which he takes to be his own, though both come from the same initial stem. The sullen, almost monotonous rigidity of his language may be a symptom of such an unwillingness to examine other arguments as possible avenues for thought. Speaking of Bultmann's style of language, Jaspers says,

He shrouds the splendours of the Bible with an enveloping layer of dry, objective language. His style is neither ponderous nor light, but conveys an atmosphere of sullen rigidity.¹⁸

This style of prose demonstrates Bultmann's tendency to reject any argument not in consort with his own thought. His constant plea that he "does not understand" may indicate something more than a difficulty in grasping symbols; it may indicate an unwillingness. Hepburn has isolated specific cases in which Bultmann has proved himself unwilling to admit evidence that would be detrimental or disastrous to his position, even though such evidence proceeds from a line of argument which Bultmann himself at one time or another proposes to follow:

1. The antinomies in the New Testament are construed so as to allow him to conclude, "Rise, therefore, above the mythological." Other conclusions are possible.
2. Bultmann says that removal of Christianity from the sphere of myth upgrades it in value. He goes on to argue that removal from the realm of proof must also raise it in value. But he has failed to argue for a valid proposition inimical to his position, namely, that the absence of evidence does not disqualify a religion from being acceptable by reasoned men.
3. Absence of proof is commended by Bultmann; he argues that if faith were provable, it would reduce God to the status of one item among others in the furniture of the universe, "and only in that realm (are we) justified in demanding proof." This latter sentence begs the question. It assumes that we already know there are two realms; this tenet should surely appear as part of the end product, not the initial presupposition of a theology.

Hepburn, an English empiricist, concludes with the suggestion that Bultmann's failure to admit evidence detrimental to his position, or even to examine such evidence willingly, is made more glaring by the fact that he will not support this as a crucial tenet, even though it is such.¹⁹

Another charge which has been leveled against the system of Bultmann deals specifically with the character of language which he employs. In our consideration of his view of language, we concluded that all theological language is for Bultmann kerygmatic. As such, it has as its function the summoning of man to authentic existence. All true theological language will have about it the air of persuasion. It is specifically this persuasive tenor which proves to be a thorn for some critics. Bultmann has been classed with the existentialist thinkers, and he falls under the same linguistic criticism they do. The persuasive air of their language derives from the usage of metaphor and suggestion. While logical empiricists are charged with being content "to elaborate the subtleties of formal analysis...the existentialists, determined to grapple with the real problems, find no formal analysis that is adequate to the task. They are constrained to quit the beaten track, to wallow in metaphor and suggestion."²⁰ There is no room for "neutral" language either in existentialism or in Bultmann's theology. Ferre' charges existentialists and existential theology with intentionally loading terms with evaluative assumptions: "I hold, in brief, that many of the key utterances of existentialism may be recognized...as covert evaluation depending upon persuasive definitions of crucial terms."²¹ With persuasive definitions, the thinkers

set out to alter the name which is ordinarily used. Existence now can be either "authentic" or "unauthentic." Such a procedure makes the whole of Bultmann's language persuasive in tenor, and prohibits a concise evaluation of his language as language. Zuurdeeg's suggestion that logical positivism will help the language of theology, as a language of conviction, by setting it off from the language of fact is perhaps a valuable suggestion.²² And yet, the problem of relating the language of convictional theology to the language of fact remains; when theologians like Bultmann refuse to speak a language of theology which is meaningful to those who understand only the language of fact, the cause of the Gospel has not been advanced. A complete reliance upon persuasive language will in the end be viewed as the utterance of a spirit divorced from the modern world, closed to the truths which the language of fact has to offer. For persuasive language has the inherent possibility of overwhelming and overtaking the very truths about which it is persuaded. Tillich argues that religious symbols can never be viewed solely as symbols of persuasion, lest they become idols displacing the God whom they were to serve:

Religious symbols point symbolically to that which transcends all of them. But since, as symbols, they participate in that to which they point, they always have the tendency (in the human mind, of course) to replace that to which they are supposed to point, and to become ultimate in themselves. And in the moment in which they do this, they become idols.²³

It is in this situation that theological language which is persuasive is apt to find itself. Such a situation presents a difficulty for Bultmann, a difficulty not easily overcome when one considers that his language-view is so intimately related to his theology.

The final factor with which we are concerned within Bultmann's system is his overzealous reference to God's "action," and with it, his embracing of the analogical method of theological language. As noted earlier in the paper, Bultmann insists that theological statements must be concerned directly with human life. He reminds us, "I am interpreting theological affirmations as assertions about human life."²⁴ He is certain that if man speaks of God's action in terms of physical categories, or compared with natural force—even if His action is not supposed to manifest its divine character in such an event—God's action will be understood in the categories of essence and will escape man in his existence.²⁵ This assumption of Bultmann's brings with it a host of difficulties, not the least of which is a complete reliance upon the process of analogy in all theological language. All statements about God are analogical statements based on man-to-man relations. Bultmann unashamedly affirms the same when he says, "Such happenings between man and man are a pattern of what happens between God and man. But what happens between man and man never embraces the whole of our existence."²⁶ Already the difficulty appears. Analogical statements made about God will be based entirely on what happens between man and man, even though such happenings "never embrace(s) the whole of our existence." Christ's birth, death, and resurrection can be referred to only insofar as they are analogous to acts of man in some way or another.

By this assumption, Bultmann is forced to speak of God in terms of man. That aspect of man which is most "real" or existential for him is man's decisive action, action in the present. So, he is content

to speak of "God's act"; that is all that he is allowed, by analogy with relations between men, to say about God. All that the New Testament says, and all that faith knows, is the act of God through which man becomes capable of self-commitment, capable of love and faith, and capable of authentic life.²⁷ This aspect of Bultmann's theology is so important that we shall quote at length his discussion of language as it deals with the act of God. We notice especially his suggestion that to refer to God otherwise is to speak about an idea of God, but not about God Himself:

When we speak of God as acting, we mean that we are confronted with God, addressed, asked, judged, or blessed by God. Therefore, to speak in this manner is not to speak in symbols or images, but to speak analogically. For when we speak in this manner of God as acting, we conceive God's action as an analogue to the actions taking place between men. Moreover, we conceive the communion between God and man as an analogue to the communion between man and man. It is in this analogical sense that we speak of God's love and (p. 69) care for men, of His demands and of His wrath, of His promise and grace, and it is in this analogical sense that we call Him Father. We are not only justified in speaking thus, but we must do so, since now we are not speaking of an idea about God, but of God Himself. Thus, God's love and care, etc., are not images or symbols; these conceptions mean real experience of God as acting here and now... As applied to God the physical import of the term father has disappeared completely; it expresses a purely personal relationship. It is in this analogical sense that we speak of God as Father.²⁸

Bultmann's use of analogical statements about the "act" of God is a kind of demythologizing in the sense that the naïve relation to the symbol which characterizes myth is replaced by a conscious awareness that symbol is symbol. Bultmann has chosen to speak about "a transcendent God present and active in history,"²⁹ and to talk about such a transcendent God "even if it is expressed in language drawn from human existence, carries a reference which points to a

reality beyond the confines of any existential analysis."³⁰

Bultmann has resorted to speaking of acts of God in the place of mythical statements because of his overriding interest in existential analysis. Nevertheless, his dealing with a "transcendent God" indicates that some symbolism will need to be employed, even if it is analogous symbolism.

Bultmann is torn between his intention to posit every theological statement in terms of human existence, and the knowledge that the same is impossible when speaking of a transcendent God. He says that if language about God "is to have any real meaning at all, it must denote an act in a real, objective sense, and not just a symbolical or pictorial expression."³¹ But he quickly adds a corrective:

On the other hand, if the action of God is not to be conceived as a worldly phenomenon capable of being apprehended apart from its existential reference, it can only be spoken of by speaking simultaneously of myself as the person who is existentially concerned.³²

The gap can be bridged by speaking of God in terms of the acts of man. For language that talks about the act of God "is ...neither symbolical nor pictorial, though it is certainly analogical, for it assumes an analogy between the activity of God and that of man, and between the fellowship of God and man and that of man with man."³³

While Bultmann's intention in the process of demythologizing was to translate all mythical statements into existential statements, he has been forced to leave room for analogical statements as well. For there is a great difference in a statement about human existence, and a statement in terms of human existence which is supposed to refer analogously to God (as in his talk of an "act of God"). Macquarrie

reminds Bultmann,

Either we must say that here there is a limit to demythologizing, or else we must redefine the aim of demythologizing, and say that it intends to translate myth into existential statements plus analogical statements or into consciously symbolic statements, in which the immediacy of the myth has been "broken."³⁴

Bultmann is insistent in refusing to admit that talk about an "act of God" is mythological. "Anyone who asserts that to speak of an act of God at all is mythological language is bound to regard the idea of an act of God in Christ as a myth."³⁵ In refusing to admit that to speak of God as acting is to speak in mythological terms, Bultmann argues that God's act is hidden to the world, but revealed to faith and hence not mythological. God's action is not an act which happens between worldly events, but it is to be construed

as happening within them...Only so-called natural, secular (worldly) events are visible to every man and capable of proof. It is within them that God's hidden action is taking place.³⁶

God's action then is not to be construed mythologically, but analogically. For it is analogous to the action which occurs within the sphere of man's relation to man.

Since Bultmann has accepted the use of analogy as a valid means of symbolizing the transcendent God, we must examine the linguistic tool of analogy to determine if Bultmann can speak analogically and concurrently refuse to be concerned with God's essence apart from a confrontation with man. We shall use an analysis of the process of analogy made by Frederick Ferre' in Language, Logic, and God. Ferre' differentiates between two types of analogy, the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proportionality.³⁷ In analogy of attribution,

the prime analogate possesses the characteristic in question in a wholly proper (univocal) and actual sense, while the other analogate has predicated of it a "like" characteristic in a relative or derivative sense. In order for this analogy to function properly, there must be some prior relation between the two analogates by which the common attribution is made possible. Usually in theological language, God is the creative cause of the finite analogate, and his causal creativity serves as the prior relation. In sum, the characteristic in question can be attributed to the second analogate in a derived sense, based on a prior real relation. The problem with analogy of attribution, according to Ferre¹, is that it is far too permissive; based on the prior relation, anything may be said of the second analogate in a "derived" sense even though it may not be the case.

At first glance, Bultmann's use of the analogy of "act" (action) does not appear to be an analogy of attribution. If it is an analogy of attribution, that is, if statements about God's action are made in a derived sense from the univocal sense of man's action, then a prior relation between God and man is necessary. In an ordinary analogy of attribution within theology, this relation is one of a causal nature; this cannot be the case in Bultmann's analogy. If "being" is assumed by Bultmann to be the prior relation (although this is impossible, for man has no truly authentic being apart from God, and hence no analogis entis), then we would be permitted to say that God's act was like (in a derived sense) man's. But we would still have no knowledge of the formal or proper character of the analogate "God." We are left with a "virtual" similarity between

God's and man's actions. In addition, this type of analogy is far too permissive. It would allow too many predicates to be applied analogously to God in a derived sense, or at least more than action alone.

It appears that Bultmann's reference to God's action as analogous to man's is an analogy of proportionality, the second type of analogy examined by Ferré. In the analogy of proportionality, only one of the two analogates deserves to have predicated of it the common analogue in a formal sense. Both of the analogates can have the analogue attributed in the literal or unmetaphorical sense, but each possesses the analogue proportionately to the nature of the analogate concerned (e.g. "blue" eyes and "blue" sky). Ferré suggests that the problem with this type of analogy is that each of the analogates stipulates in which way it agrees with the formal sense of the analogue. In doing so, we move an even greater distance from the desired equality of the analogy. A more serious objection is that there are actually two unknowns, not one. For although we may have a rather precise characterization of one unknown (e.g. "love" in man if we are making an analogical statement about God's love), we must try to understand God's nature by postulating another entirely different unknown; hence we are even farther from the analogy than when we began.

If it is true that Bultmann's analogy of God's action is an analogy of proportionality, then it is equally true that Bultmann does not protect himself from the necessity of practicing "essential" theology, try as he may. For Bultmann, man acts in the formal sense, God and man both in the literal or unmetaphorical sense. It is the

task of existential analysis to describe what the "act" of man entails, and Bultmann is able to define what an action of man is. One "unknown" is cared for. But the other remains. To define what "action" for God means, it will be necessary to postulate another "unknown" of God by which we are able to delineate in what way God's action agrees with the formal sense of the analogue "action" of man. For Bultmann, this is impossible. He refuses to speak of any aspect of God's nature apart from the "act" of God; and yet, in an analogy of proportionality, it is necessary to postulate such "givens" of the second analogate in order that the analogue may be delimited precisely. If Bultmann wishes to speak of God's action as analogous to man's, then he is forced by the logic of analogy to proceed to a full theology at once. Bultmann is prepared to utilize the process of analogy, but he is unprepared to abide by the laws of its usage. To the degree that his use of analogy falls short of the logic of analogy, it is no less mythological than the New Testament texts which he has attempted to demythologize.

Passing beyond Bultmann's rather haphazard handling of the tool of analogy, we must turn an eye to his analogical statement as it stands. It is to be questioned if Bultmann's analogy of the God who "acts" does not carry with it an inherent metaphysic. We take John Macmurray seriously when he suggests that if action is stripped of its intentional character, then it is a mere process of events; if, on the other hand, it retains this intentional character, it is more than a mere process of events.³⁸ If Bultmann's God who "acts" acts without intention, then a mere process of events results.

If, on the other hand, Bultmann's God who "acts" acts intentionally, then Bultmann is committed to a full metaphysical explanation of the intention which God has; he is committed to a metaphysic of God. Bultmann may assert that the analogy is from man to God. If this is the case, then either man must be credited with all of the "intentional" and directional aspects of action (both God's and man's), or there must be a complete absence of "intention" in the action of both God and man.

A final disturbing aspect of Bultmann's use of analogy is his insistence that all analogy must begin with man, and proceed from there to God. Even the kerygma is put in terms of God's act as it mirrors the action of man. The Scripture is not so anxious to admit that all analogy finds its source in man's action. The Scripture asserts that some human speech about God finds its origin in qualities of God which have been taken over into human language by the process of analogy from God to man. A strong case can be made for the suggestion that a man's love for his wife should be analogous to Christ's love for the Church, and not the other way around.³⁹ In a similar manner, the families of the earth are named after the Father of heaven, not the other way around.⁴⁰ God, as Sovereign King, had named man "adam"; man, sensing an analogous sovereignty over the animals, gave each of them a name.⁴¹ It is possible to see many of man's actions in the Old Testament (resting on Sabbath, praying, sacrificing, obeying the law) as actions performed in imitation of his God,⁴² analogous from God rather than towards Him. If God is the source of some analogy, then the use of analogy is properly considered to be objectification;

in that sense, it is not the height of unbelief, but the most sincere appreciation and worship of that God who bestows even such gifts to be used in His praise.

We have concluded our investigation of difficulties within Bultmann's theological system. While it is sufficient to realize that any criticism of his theology is inferentially a criticism of his view of language, we wish to pinpoint more explicitly those areas of his language-view affected. It is evident that Bultmann's failure to provide clarification for what certainly is a basic assumption (namely that man ought to strive to become an authentic being in the first place), and his rather imprecise handling of another assumption dealing with modernity—both alike affect his view of language at the ground level. For his view of language will be affected directly by the precision or imprecision with which he handles his assumptions. Perhaps his inconclusive view of modernity eliminated a segment of language that is valuable and valid. His failure, on the other hand, to integrate the kerygma as an essential element of his system rather than a contiguous accessory will have ruinous effects upon a language-view which visualizes the kerygma as the primary example and sum total of meaningful language. His unwillingness to carry on an exhaustive process of argumentation manifests the unstable foundation that underlies his view of language. His excessive usage of persuasive language demonstrates the telescopic approach which his limited language-view makes its own. This exclusive use of persuasive language has isolated Bultmann from the very world of fact to which he had hoped to address the kerygma. Finally, his utilization of the analogy of "act" is

feeble; his view of language (as well as his theology) must begin with a discussion of God "in Himself," or else it can make no reference (even analogically) to the transcendent God who deigns to invade the universe.

We have reached the point where we can examine Bultmann's theology, as well as his language-view, from the vantage-point of other theologies and philosophies. While our previous analysis of Bultmann's thought has been made from within its own frame of reference, we now turn to an analysis from without. The major question is whether or not the determinative theology (as well as the resultant language-view) which Bultmann has selected is a complete and proper theology. We shall approach this problem by examining the deficiencies of existential analysis as a theology. Then we shall turn to "essential" theology as a counter-proposal. Finally we shall see what light the Holy Scriptures cast upon the selection of a determinative theology.

The question at hand is basically this one: Can existential analysis provide a sufficient base upon which to construct the totality of a theological system? Existential analysis begins with the knower and analyzes what it is that he knows. The Neo-Thomists of our day have called just such a procedure the "subjectivism" of modern man. Neo-Thomism is willing to argue that man suffers from the "Cartesian blight." Ever since Descartes philosophy has begun with epistemology, with a consideration of how the knower gets to know, and what it is that he knows. Neo-Thomistic philosophy asks the appropriate question: Is this the proper procedural method? Bultmann, too, begins with what Bonhoeffer calls "man come of age." Such a man is atheistic. And

Bultmann suggests that it is the Church's task to make men once again aware of God, for men have dispossessed Him. Bultmann seems to be suggesting that the Church is to plead with men to let God back into their minds. The Church must begin with man, and then go to God. But there is another side to the story. It is possible-probable-that God has not been put out; He has abandoned the world, and left it. He has withdrawn, and all that remains is the "empty bench" of Arthur Miller's "After the Fall." He has left only His wrath. He has given to the Church not the task of pleading with man, starting first with man's mind as the knowing subject and then proceeding from there. He has given the task of proclaiming His transcendence, His wrath, and His love.

Existential analysis provides no basis for a theology in the light of the Cartesian blight. For existential analysis is dependent upon its predecessor, phenomenology, and phenomenology is a vivid example of the Cartesian blight. Brown correctly criticizes Bultmann's selection of existential analysis as his determinative theology when he says:

Is phenomenology the proper context in which to assess the ultimate significance (if one hesitates over the word "metaphysical") of such concepts as "love," the "Thou" (with its ethical implication), and "genuine history"?⁴³

Existential analysis prohibits any consideration of God in and of Himself, apart from a confrontation with man. Such a procedure is dangerous, for it threatens to eliminate any consideration of the wrathful God who has judged His creatures and found them guilty. Although there is a remnant of law-judgment in Bultmann's kerygma, his

insistence upon God as the God-of-confrontation is dangerously close to Robinson's God as that "segment" of Being which is gracious, and only that segment.⁴⁴ "For God to be God, He must be only gracious," is the dangerous prior assumption of this argument.

The anthropology which existential analysis provides is an incomplete one. Bultmann ignores any suggestion that there is a substantial self. But his constant concern for man in the decisions of life betray the existence of some sort of "self" beyond the mere empirical. The essence of man for Bultmann is his will, for man becomes what he chooses and desires. Therefore, in the kerygma, God confronts man's will, for He comes with His demanding and saving revelation in a person-to-person relationship.⁴⁵ Bultmann's description of man as will, and his refusal to speak of a substantial self, have repercussions throughout his theology since he has chosen to speak of God only in terms of man's existence.

Some have accused Bultmann's theology with the words, "It has taken away my Lord, and I know not where it has laid Him." These words are somewhat sacrilege and overly emotional, and yet they sum up the poverty of Bultmann's Christian existential analysis. Malevez has accurately described it as reduced to preaching, with no worship and no sacrament. The preaching itself is reduced to this mediocre theme: you are forgiven sinners in your decisions. There are no firm prospects for the future. There is no foundation in history for the act of God. The knowledge which is offered to man prolongs and completes a certain "natural" knowledge which is immanent in existence itself. Bultmann believes it is in the interest of reason to

demythologize the message; how then can he impose silence when this same reason asks for the least light on the foundation of belief?⁴⁶

Bultmann's theology (and resultant language-view) is incomplete not only insofar as it relies upon existential analysis alone; it also fails to speak of God in any way divorced from man's existence, in and of Himself. Bultmann has eliminated any "essential" theology both in his dealings with history and in his consideration of natural revelation and the Scripture. Bultmann has no room for historical facts per se; neither can he speak of a natural revelation of God apart from the kerygma. In both of these areas, the theology of "essence" to which the Church has committed itself for centuries is offered up as a sacrifice to an imprecise picture of modernity. We shall now consider the inadequacy of Bultmann's theology as it deals with history and natural revelation while disregarding any theology of "essence."

Bultmann deals with history non-dimensionally. The threefold dimension of history—past, present, future—has been collapsed to the non-dimensional present realized in the act of proclaiming the kerygma here and now.⁴⁷ Bultmann can say that the event which takes place in Christ, when demythologized, has no recognizable objective (historical) reality. Malevez has accurately suggested that two interpretations of this statement may be made: (1) The divine event has an objective reality, but it is unrecognizable to man as such, but apprehended by faith (for although God has done something in Christ apart from us, we cannot see this "something" or "object," nor can we prove it). (2) The divine event has done nothing outside

the believer, for the reality of the divine act consists solely and wholly in intimate approach to the soul through the preaching of the Word.⁴⁸ Malevez proceeds to argue that an objective (historical) interpretation of Bultmann's Christ-event is possible:

Such an interpretation consists in making Bultmann say, in spite of his desire for radical demythologizing, that in the divine act of salvation there is a certain objectivity manifested within history (the saving event has in some way taken place outside of man's sphere) or rather, it reconciles objectivity and absolute demythologizing, for however objective the event may be, still it no less absolutely excludes "myth" in the strict sense of the word.⁴⁹

He then protects Bultmann from those who would interpret Bultmann's Christ-event only subjectively; such people, in interpreting Bultmann, say that Christ's death is an indispensable inspiration for the existentiell decision.

But why is it necessary to refer to the cross? If, in order to receive my salvation, I am obliged to refer to Christ as the great example, must that not be because God Himself has expressed the type of my authentic existence in the death of Christ? If God saves me in attaching me in some way to the cross of Jesus, is it not because He Himself has spoken to me from the cross? Then on Calvary there must have been an objective divine manifestation of the elements of salvation.⁵⁰

Malevez tries valiantly to make Bultmann palatable both to those who think he cannot accept objective history and to those who think he need not accept objective history. But Malevez fails in his attempt to attribute objectivity (historicity) to the saving event of Christ as Bultmann views this event. He says that to accomplish an objective interpretation, he must "make Bultmann say"; that is precisely the problem. If one follows Bultmann's thought from beginning to end, one can see that he is unwilling to speak of any objective historical event, or of a God considered objectively in the Christ-event.

Malevez has put words in Bultmann's mouth. His suggestion that a subjective interpretation of Bultmann's Christ-event is actually grounded in an objective interpretation is a suggestion which Bultmann could never accept and still remain true to existential analysis and his presuppositions.

The problem is that Bultmann is unprepared to speak of any history other than present realized history. He has not totally dissociated himself from the older liberalism. It would be easier for Bultmann to make the statement, "God is loving," than for him to confess, "God acted once for all on Calvary when the blood of His Son dropped to the ground for man's sake." For while the first statement is tautologous, an axiomatic deduction, the second is a statement grounded in historical fact. Malevez suggests that Bultmann is willing to make the second statement, while he is hesitant to make even the first.

This is the point at which the modern linguistic analysts may be of some value for us in this discussion. They are not interested in discussing the truth or falsehood of a statement; rather, they are concerned about the prior meaning of a statement. They want to know what difference it makes—what a statement means—before they will progress into a discussion of its falsity or truth.

Bultmann is concerned to say what the Christ-event means for modern man. His whole process of demythologizing he has carried on in the hope of making the kerygma more meaningful. But at this point there is difficulty. Instead of anchoring the kerygma in history, he has put it into the realized eschatology of the present. The Gospel

he is trying to make meaningful within the historical lives of men is a Gospel not of historical fact, not anchored in God's act within time, but a Gospel which is tautologous—a transcendent statement bearing close resemblance to the statement "God is loving."⁵¹

We have said above that the logical analysts are asking the question, What does it mean? They have the right to know what difference a proposition or a word makes within man's existence. They have the privilege of asking theologians to demonstrate what the word "God" means. Theologians such as Bultmann have taken up this challenge. But Bultmann and other theologians like him who fail to give objectivity to the historical facts of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, are unable to demonstrate the meaning of "God" in the Christian faith precisely because of their failure to begin with an historical base. A theology which is to have meaning within the historical lives of men today cannot be a theology based on a transcendental axiom of God's love. It will prove meaningless, regardless of extensive existential analysis and demythologizing. Bultmann's failure to admit of historical objectivity in the life, death, and resurrection of Christ is disastrous. The archetypes of his language which symbolize the existentialia may sound modern, but in the end they are meaningless to historical man because they are unhistorical.

Bultmann fails to recognize the validity of essential theology not only in his rejection of objectivity in history; he also disregards essential theology in his dealings with natural revelation. As we have seen above, Bultmann asserts that man knows nothing of God apart

from the kerygma. He follows this course to refrain from any theological reference apart from the kerygmatic confrontation. But his effort to remain aloof from such essential theology seems to be for naught. For it appears that the whole of existential analysis is a revelation of God apart from the kerygma. Man's recognition of the existentialia, unattainable though they are by man's power, is a knowledge of God apart from the kerygma. Bultmann himself seems to speak of natural revelation, in an Augustinian thought-pattern, when he asserts that man has a relation to God even before revelation:

He has a relation to God in his search for God, conscious or unconscious. Man's life is moved by the search for God because it is always moved, consciously or unconsciously, by the question about his own personal existence. The question of God and the question of myself are identical.⁵²

Bultmann will not admit that this "search for God" is natural revelation because to do so would place him under obligation to speak of this God apart from the kerygma. And yet, he is not unwilling to speak of such a search. If man searches for God, he must be endowed with some prior knowledge of the God for whom he searches; the question of his own personal existence, if it is identical with the question of God, demonstrates some prior knowledge of God. Bultmann is under obligation to discuss in greater detail the essential theology inherent in this natural revelation which he has unwittingly admitted as existent. His failure to do so is not only unfair to his own system of thought; it is also a rejection of the Christian Church's doctrine of God's partial revelation of His essence prior to and apart from the Gospel.

A consideration of Bultmann's rejection of essential theology involves also a brief consideration of his relation to the Scriptures. Just as Paul's statement, "If Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins,"⁵³ is a statement of indisputable history, and so of "essential" theology, so also Paul's statement belongs to the Scripture. Bultmann, as a knowledgeable exegete, handles the Scripture with care. But already in his selection of those sections of Scripture to be examined we begin to suspect a deviate at work. He is a re-incarnated Marcion, concentrating almost exclusively upon the writings of St. Paul, and selecting as his Gospel the Word of John. The Old Testament, historical and un-kerygmatic as he sees it, is of little value for the Christian exegete.

Whatever else may be said of Bultmann's handling of the Scripture, it is safe to say that his initial approach to it is more Lutheran than Reformed in nature. To that degree his approach is actually more evangelical than some others'. For Barth's criticism of Bultmann's hermeneutics in Kerygma and Myth begins with the presupposition of the sovereignty of God as its prime consideration.⁵⁴ It seems apparent, even in the way that Barth gets ruffled, that Bultmann's approach to the Scripture bears a closer similarity to the Confessional Law-Gospel (problem-solution) character of Scriptures than does Barth's. Bultmann's hermeneutics considers as primary in one's encounter with Scripture the malady of man and the grace of God, although both are distorted; he does not first hand us the Scripture, and then proceed to swing it about like the sword of the Sovereign King. Under the surface Bultmann still retains some of his Lutheran upbringing.⁵⁵ But his approach to Scripture is but half the story.

One cannot agree with Bultmann when he attempts to replace the concepts of the New Testament with scientific substitutes gleaned from existential analysis. Although Tillich is not completely correct when he says that the myths of the New Testament should be broken and recognized as myths, while at the same time "maintained in their symbolic form and not replaced by scientific substitutes,"⁵⁶ he is closer to a correct working method than is Bultmann, with his fashioned replacements.

Bultmann's collapsed eschatology also affects his approach to the Scripture. He feels that the kairos of the New Testament can be best explained in terms of the present moment. Such an eschatological approach necessitates the use of the scientific substitutional forms to which Tillich refers. Thieliicke takes Bultmann to task in this regard, warning that it is impossible to translate the mythology of the New Testament into the language of contemporary myth by substituting the abstract, monistic, immanent philosophy of existence for a kerygma anchored in history. He proceeds to an even more telling argument (admitting his reliance upon Roman Catholic theologians in this matter), suggesting that perhaps with some degree of wisdom God specifically chose the time and the mythology of the New Testament "fulness" in order to preserve, in the myth of the three-storied universe, the idea of transcendence. "That is what made it peculiarly fitted to express the otherness of God and his intervention in salvation history."⁵⁷ Perhaps it was in view of the modern world of subjectivism, the world suffering from Cartesian blight, that God chose the time of the New Testament to reveal Himself most dramatically as

the Transcendent in the flesh, as God become man in Christ. Perhaps the pictures are not to be replaced with scientific substitutes from eschatological existential analysis.

As a final comment on Bultmann's usage of the Scripture, we must consider the role of the christocentric approach to Scripture.

Bultmann has said that no exegesis is presuppositionless. Lutherans have agreed, suggesting that all Scripture is to be considered in the light of the Gospel-presupposition. The Gospel itself is the Good News of the unique union of God and man in the God-man Jesus Christ, come to redeem from the law. A christocentric approach to the Scripture is an approach which takes into serious consideration the union of divine and human in Jesus Christ. It is not improper, then, to argue that Jesus Christ provides the proper hermeneutic for study of the Scriptures. We certainly must

refresh ourselves at the deep wells of Reformation theology, with its insistence that the hypostatic union of the divine and human in Jesus Christ is the archetypus of theological speech, and that the new humanity of the risen Lord provides us with a kind of third dimension beyond our abortive antinomies and dichotomies of thought...For this divine-human event not only circumscribes theological language, but positively directs its line of analogical inference.⁵⁸

While we might not accept all of the doctrinal implications of this Reformed statement (e.g. "new" humanity), its major thrust is certainly valid. For if theologians take seriously in their approach to Scripture the God-man Jesus Christ, anchored in history, they will be preserved from an exegesis with presuppositions grounded solely in man's predicament and existence. Bultmann's approach to Scripture lacks both a serious consideration of Jesus as God-man, and an acknowledgement of His historicity. His approach is not christocentric as such.

Our analysis and critique of Bultmann's selected theology has led us from a consideration of existential analysis as an incomplete theology to a consideration of his rejection of "essential" theology. While we have neither the obligation nor the space to demonstrate specifically how the critique of his theology affects the language-view issuing from it, we shall indicate some areas in which further study of the effects could be made. If his theology has given birth to a specific view of language, a critique of that theology will call for a revision of such a language-view. And so, if existential analysis has demonstrated itself to be an incomplete basis upon which to construct a full-blown theology; if it fails to do justice to an evaluation of the wrath of God; if it partakes in the Cartesian blight upon modern man; if it has not the tools with which to handle the metaphysical questions and problems of life; and if it prohibits any consideration of God in and of Himself; then surely it is a poorly constructed foundation upon which to build one's view of language. For it fails to consider those aspects of language which arise from within the existence of man, but are ruled invalid by prior axiom. Bultmann's theology refuses to deal with God "in essence"; it has a built-in protection against the affirmations of history. His language-view too refuses to deal with the "essence" of God even though some sort of substantial self is talking, and even though this self is seeking for an essential God within existence. The denial of historical objectivity denies such a view of language the very historical force it needs to make the transcendent God "meaningful" within the course of man's contemporary history. In

addition, Bultmann's view of language has a definite parallel in his hermeneutics. Insofar as the Christian Church can accuse him validly of an approach to the Scripture made with utter disregard for the historical union of God and man in the Lord Jesus Christ, with equal validity the Christian Church can accuse his language-view of never speaking about the Transcendent God in any event (the kerygma notwithstanding), but speaking and referring only to and about man. Such a charge is both serious and straightforward, but it is nevertheless accurate and specific.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

¹Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 43.

²Ibid., p. 69.

³"Meeting with God does not come to man in order that he may concern himself with God, but in order that he may confirm that there is meaning in the world. All revelation is summons and sending," Martin Buber, I-Thou, tr. by Ronald Gregor Smith (Second edition; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 115.

⁴Bultmann, "The Historicity of Man and Faith," Existence and Faith, tr. by Schubert M. Ogden (New York: Meridian Books, 1960), p. 92.

⁵Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, ed. by Hans Werner Bartsch, tr. by Reginald Fuller (London: S.P.C.K., 1953), I, 191-192. Kerygma and Myth hereafter cited as K & M.

⁶Bultmann, "Christianity as East and West Religion," Essays, Philosophical and Theological, tr. by James C.G. Grieg (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 220.

⁷Karl Barth, "Bultmann—An Attempt to Understand Him," K & M, II, 114.

⁸Gerhard Ittel, "Der Einfluss der Philosophie Heideggers auf die Theologie Rudolf Bultmanns," Kerygma und Dogma, II (April 1956), 97.

⁹"Thus God becomes an object of faith. At first faith, set in time, completes the acts of relation, but gradually it replaces them. Resting in belief in an IT takes the place of the continually renewed movement of the being towards concentration and going out to relation," (p. 113). Again, "But again and again man brings about, instead of realization, a reflexion to Him who reveals: he wishes to concern himself with God instead of with the world. Only, in such a reflexion, he is no longer confronted with a THOU, he can do nothing but establish an IT-God in the realm of things, believe that he knows of God as an IT, and so speak about him," Buber, I-Thou, p. 115.

¹⁰Bultmann, "On the Problem of Demythologizing," Journal of Religion, XLII (1962), 96.

¹¹Ibid., p. 101.

¹²Bultmann, "The Historicity of Man and Faith," Existence and Faith, p. 96.

¹³James Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955), p. 88.

¹⁴Leopold Malevez, The Christian Message and Myth, tr. by Olive Wyon (London: SCM Press, 1958), pp. 37-38.

¹⁵Gustaf Wingren, Theology in Conflict, tr. by Eric H. Wahlstrom (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958), p. 58.

¹⁶John Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing (London: SCM Press, 1960), p. 55.

¹⁷Bultmann, "The Concept of Revelation in the New Testament," Existence and Faith, p. 61.

¹⁸Brich Dinkler, "Martin Heidegger," Christianity and the Existentialists, ed. by Carl Michalson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), p. 103.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 105.

²⁰Bultmann, "Historicity of Man and Faith," Existence and Faith, p. 101. Although Bultmann himself does not use the term existentialia, it is apparent that he is not inimical to it. John Macquarrie, in Scope of Demythologizing (p. 191), says that Heidegger uses the term existentialia to describe the basic possible ways in which man exists (Sein und Zeit, pp. 160 ff.). In Macquarrie's work Twentieth Century Religious Thought, he states that Bultmann has made use of the Heideggerian existentialia (p. 352). Jaspers, in "Myth and Religion" (K & M, II, 137-138), speaks of Heidegger's existentialia (analogous to the Kantian categories) as a list of existentialist concepts arrived at in the earnest questioning of a hopeless situation; he charges that Bultmann has misunderstood this process of Heidegger's, and made of the existentialia objective terms or doctrine, with a scientific, objective, "scholastic" air about them. In his reply to Jaspers, Bultmann does not use the word existentialia as such; nevertheless, what is denoted by the word is what he means when he argues that even those who utilize Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of empirical existence, accepting it as "doctrine" (as Bultmann himself), are not thereby excluded from the existential venture. ("Case for Demythologizing," K & M, II, 188). It is not incorrect, therefore, to use the Heideggerian term existentialia for what Bultmann here refers to as "ontological conditions."

²¹Bultmann, "Revelation in the New Testament," Existence and Faith, p. 62, where he quotes Burkhardt's Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen (Kröner Edition), p. 62.

- ²²Bultmann, "Revelation in the New Testament," Existence and Faith, p. 62.
- ²³Bultmann, "The Historicity of Man and Faith," Existence and Faith, p. 96.
- ²⁴Ittel, p. 97.
- ²⁵Bultmann, "The Historicity of Man and Faith," Existence and Faith, p. 96.
- ²⁶Bultmann, K & M, I, 194.
- ²⁷Malevez, p. 177.
- ²⁸Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 74.
- ²⁹Macquarrie, p. 149.
- ³⁰Malevez, p. 188.
- ³¹Bultmann, K & M, I, 116.
- ³²Wingren, pp. 130-131.
- ³³Bultmann, "Understanding of Man," Essays, p. 80.
- ³⁴Bultmann, K & M, II, 189.
- ³⁵Bultmann, "Crisis in Belief," Essays, p. 17.
- ³⁶Bultmann, "Humanism and Christianity," Essays, pp. 154-155.
- ³⁷Bultmann, "Crisis in Belief," Essays, p. 8.
- ³⁸Ibid., p. 7.
- ³⁹Bultmann, K & M, I, 4.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., I, 11.
- ⁴¹Ibid., I, 8.
- ⁴²Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 36.
- ⁴³Ibid., p. 20.
- ⁴⁴Bultmann, K & M, I, 7.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., I, 10, n.2.

- ⁴⁶Ibid., I, 3-4.
- ⁴⁷Macquarrie, pp. 209-210, referring to K & M, I, 38.
- ⁴⁸Bultmann, K & M, I, 11.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., I, 10.
- ⁵⁰Macquarrie, pp. 209-210.
- ⁵¹Ernest Lohmeyer, "Right Interpretation of the Mythological," K & M, II, 128.
- ⁵²Malevez, p. 34.
- ⁵³Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 18.
- ⁵⁴Malevez, p. 186.
- ⁵⁵Bultmann, K & M, I, 16.
- ⁵⁶Bultmann, This World and Beyond, tr. by Harold Knight (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), p. 157.
- ⁵⁷S.M. Ogden, "What Sense Does it Make to Say, 'God Acts in History'?", Journal of Religion, XLII (January 1963), 3.
- ⁵⁸Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 84.
- ⁵⁹Bultmann, K & M, I, 30.
- ⁶⁰Bultmann, "Crisis in Belief," Essays, p. 12.
- ⁶¹Wingren, p. 131.
- ⁶²Bultmann, "The Understanding of Man," Essays, p. 81.
- ⁶³Bultmann, K & M, I, 30.
- ⁶⁴Malevez, p. 60.
- ⁶⁵Macquarrie, p. 24.
- ⁶⁶Ibid., p. 149.
- ⁶⁷Malevez, p. 58.
- ⁶⁸Macquarrie, p. 142.
- ⁶⁹Ittel, p. 101.

- ⁷⁰Bultmann, "Freedom and Western Civilization," Essays, p. 309.
- ⁷¹Bultmann, K & M, I, 31. Bultmann refers to what God accomplished in Christ as Tun rather than Tat (Kerygma und Mythos, ed. by Hans Werner Bartsch; Hamburg: Herbert Reich Verlag, 1954; I, 48). For this reason we feel justified in referring to God's "act" rather than God's "action" when making reference to Bultmann's interpretation.
- ⁷²Bultmann, "The Understanding of Man," Essays, p. 85.
- ⁷³Bultmann, K & M, I, 37.
- ⁷⁴Ibid., I, 36.
- ⁷⁵Ibid., I, 37.
- ⁷⁶Malevez, p. 84.
- ⁷⁷Bultmann, K & M, I, 203.
- ⁷⁸Ibid., I, 38.
- ⁷⁹Ibid., I, 41.
- ⁸⁰Malevez, p. 85.
- ⁸¹Bultmann, "Revelation in the New Testament," Existence and Faith, p. 86.
- ⁸²Ibid., p. 78.
- ⁸³Bultmann, K & M, I, 207, n.1.
- ⁸⁴Bultmann, "Revelation in the New Testament," Existence and Faith, p. 79.
- ⁸⁵Ibid., p. 87.
- ⁸⁶Bultmann, "The Christological Confession," Essays, p. 288.
- ⁸⁷Bultmann, "Significance of Jewish Old Testament Tradition for the Christian West," Essays, p. 271.
- ⁸⁸Bultmann, "The Crisis of Belief," Essays, p. 9.
- ⁸⁹Bultmann, "The Question of Natural Revelation," Essays, pp. 109 to 110.
- ⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Bultmann, K & M, I, 209.

⁹³Ibid., I, 42.

⁹⁴Bultmann, "The Historicity of Man and Faith," Existence and Faith, p. 109.

⁹⁵Bultmann, "Revelation in the New Testament," Existence and Faith, p. 86.

⁹⁶Bultmann, "The Question of Natural Revelation," Essays, p. 90.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Bultmann, "Revelation in the New Testament," Existence and Faith, p. 62.

⁹⁹Bultmann, "Question of Natural Revelation," Essays, p. 113.

¹⁰⁰Bultmann, K & M, I, 44.

¹⁰¹Ibid., I, 210.

¹⁰²Ibid., I, 199.

¹⁰³Malevez suggests that Bultmann's insistence upon faith as out of the reach of science is not only due to his view of the modern world. "There is certainly another motif here, which is specifically Protestant: sinful man is wholly separated from God; therefore his justification remains relatively extrinsic; there is no spiritual union between him and God, no mystical communion in one life, since such a communion would impinge upon the holiness and purity of God," (The Christian Message and Myth, pp. 151-152).

¹⁰⁴Bultmann, K & M, I, 19.

¹⁰⁵Bultmann, "Understanding of Man," Essays, p. 86.

¹⁰⁶Bultmann, "H historicity of Man and Faith," Existence and Faith, p. 96; Buber speaks similarly when he says, "Man can do justice to the relation with God in which he has come to share only if he realizes God anew in the world according to his strength and to the measure of each day," (I-Thou, p. 114).

¹⁰⁷Bultmann, K & M, II, 191-192.

Chapter III

¹John Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing (London: SCM Press, 1960), p. 197.

²Rudolf Bultmann, "Christianity as East and West Religion," Essays, Philosophical and Theological, tr. by James C.G. Grieg (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 212.

³Bultmann, "The Problem of Hermeneutics," Essays, p. 241.

⁴S.M. Ogden, "What Sense Does it Make to Say, 'God Acts in History'?", Journal of Religion, XLIII (January 1963), 5.

⁵Karsten Harries, "Heidegger and Hölderlin: The Limits of Language," The Personalist, XLIV, No. 1 (January 1963), 12.

⁶Heidegger speaks of language as the House of Being, and also the most dangerous of human possessions. In language, the finite threatens the infinite. The object posited by language is in danger of becoming an opaque object by losing its roots in the infinite. Language is in danger because it can conceal Sein to the extent that its absence is no longer noted. See Harries, pp. 9-10.

⁷Bultmann, This World and Beyond, Marburg Sermons, tr. by Harold Knight (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), pp. 189-200.

⁸See above, Chapter II, 38.

Chapter IV

- ¹John 1.
- ²II Corinthians 5:18ff.
- ³Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, fourth revised edition, ed. by Hans Lietzmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1952), p. 61 (AC XVII:1).
- ⁴P. J. Cahill, "Rudolf Bultmann's Concept of Revelation," Catholic Biblical Quarterly, XXIV (July 1962), 303.
- ⁵Bekenntnisschriften, p. 79 (AC XX 23,24).
- ⁶Cahill, p. 301
- ⁷Leopold Malevez, The Christian Message and Myth, tr. by Olive Wyon (London: SCM Press, 1958), p. 127.
- ⁸John Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing (London: SCM Press, 1960), pp. 233-236.
- ⁹Ibid., pp. 239-240.
- ¹⁰Supra, pp. 22-23.
- ¹¹Ibid.
- ¹²Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," Kerygma and Myth, ed. by Hans Werner Bartsch, tr. by Reginald H. Fuller (London: S.P.C.K., 1953), I, 9.
- ¹³Macquarrie, p. 197.
- ¹⁴Cahill, p. 304.
- ¹⁵Ibid., p. 305.
- ¹⁶J. B. Cobb, "Post-Bultmannian Trend," Journal of Bible and Religion, XXX (January 1962), 8.
- ¹⁷Jacques Cuttat, "The Religious Encounters of East and West," Thought, XXXIII (1958-1959), 131, 494-495.
- ¹⁸Karl Jaspers, "Myth and Religion," K & M, II, 178.
- ¹⁹Ronald W. Hepburn, "Demythologizing and the Problem of Validity," New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. by Antony Garrard Newton Flew (New York: Macmillan, c. 1955), pp. 230-234.

²⁰John Macmurray, The Self as Agent, pp. 27-28, quoted in Macquarrie, Scope of Demythologizing, p. 188.

²¹Frederick Ferre', "Existentialism and Persuasion," Philosophical Quarterly, XII, 47 (April 1962), 153.

²²Willem F. Zuurdeeg, "Nature of Theological Language," Journal of Religion, XL (January 1960), 6.

²³Paul Tillich, "Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God," Christian Scholar, XXXVIII, 3 (September 1955), 193.

²⁴Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," K & M., I, 107.

²⁵Malevez, p. 41.

²⁶Bultmann, "Grace and Freedom," Essays, Philosophical and Theological, tr. by James C.G. Grieg (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 179.

²⁷Bultmann, K & M, I, 33.

²⁸Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 68-69.

²⁹Bultmann, K & M, I, 44.

³⁰Macquarrie, p. 226.

³¹Bultmann, K & M, I, 196.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid., I, 197.

³⁴Macquarrie, p. 215.

³⁵Bultmann, K & M, I, 33-34.

³⁶Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 62.

³⁷Frederick Ferre', Language, Logic, and God (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), pp. 70-76.

³⁸John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 206.

³⁹Ephesians 5:25.

⁴⁰Ephesians 3:14, 15.

⁴¹Genesis 2:7, 19, 20.

⁴²Edmond Jacob, Theology of the Old Testament, tr. by Arthur Heethcote and Philip Allcock (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 173-177.

⁴³James Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955), p. 104.

⁴⁴J. A. T. Robinson, "Debate Continues," The Honest To God Debate, ed. by David L. Edwards (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), p. 260.

⁴⁵Cahill, p. 302.

⁴⁶Malevez, pp. 155-156.

⁴⁷Carl E. Braaten, Kerygma and History, selected, translated, and edited by Braaten and Roy A. Harrisville (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), p. 15.

⁴⁸Malevez, p. 67.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 105.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 116.

⁵¹The suggestion that modern logical analysis speaks to the problem of historicity in theology was offered by Professor Robert Bertram at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, Missouri, on October 29, 1964.

⁵²Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp. 52-53.

⁵³I Corinthians 15:17.

⁵⁴Karl Barth, "Bultmann—An Attempt to Understand Him," K & M, II, 83-132.

⁵⁵Thomas C. Oden, "Bultmann as Lutheran Existentialist," Dialog, III (Summer 1964), 207-214.

⁵⁶Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, first edition, ed. by Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), p. 51.

⁵⁷Helmut Thielicke, "Restatement of New Testament Mythology," K & M, I, 169.

⁵⁸J. C. McLelland, "Mythology and Theological Language," Scottish Journal of Theology, XI (March 1958), 19.

APPENDIX A

Outline of Sermon of May 30, 1943

(This sermon of Bultmann's was preached on the text of John 16:22-33. It is taken from This World and Beyond, pp. 189-200. The existential, symbolic archetypes are underlined two times. The authentic referents are on the right, the unauthentic on the left.)

Communication with God-Prayer (existence; possibility of relation to being)

↓
possible only "on that day," at the terminal point of the age, when

↓
all oppressive problems are solved; pure joy (self-understanding in the concrete; authentic being)

threatened by the world
temporal
changes to anxious care
has objects of joy

no threat of removal
lies beyond the world
no object of joy
all becomes clear for us
self-explanatory

brought on by freedom (decision for existence in the moment)

bound by ourselves from
such freedom
self-will
seek freedom from en-
counter of life

freedom from ourselves
open to all encounters of life
love frees from inner burdens
no object
freed from unendurable situation
past gone
freed from fear and dismay
comes only from being alone in presence of God
(death; replaced by encounter)

● Unauthentic archetype
"anxiety"

clinging to something
covered by rags
trying to hide
power of death therein

confronted by God alone
world fades away
ready to bare to God
to understand ourselves
relationships loosened
possible only through the cross

Kerygma

●
self-surrender to God
proved in openness to encounters of life (moment)

ultimate solitude of man before God
surrenders wishes to will of God

continued at this point on next page

proved in openness to encounters of life (moment)

return to life (true sacrifice)

task in life threat-
ened, ruined
wretched from loved
ones

open and free
ready to resign to sacrifice
without fear
leads to genuine encounter with God
entails pain

secret joy of the Christian spirit
shining cross of Christ
in solitariness before God
brings on expression of faith

quick, impulsive

solid faith grows in expression



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