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The End of an Empire: Pizarro's Conquest of Peru

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Christopher Columbus started a chain reaction of exploration and conquest when he landed in the New World in 1492. He and conquistadors, Hernán Cortés and Francisco Pizarro, were vastly outnumbered by the native population, yet their small armies subdued millions of subjects in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Peru. Whereas, Columbus conquered the Arawaks in the 1490s, Cortés conquered the Aztecs in the 1520s, and Pizarro conquered the Incas in the 1530s. In the latter case, just before the Spanish arrived, the strong, united Inca Empire was divided into a bloody civil war. The weakened state of the empire helped Pizarro gain control. Pizarro did this by manipulating existing conditions, and using the knowledge he had of Hernan Cortés and his conquest of the Aztecs. The tensions within the empire and Pizarro's manipulations were not the only reasons for Pizarro's success. Other factors, such as Spanish superiority in weaponry and tactics of warfare, Spanish diseases that weakened the Indians, Spanish alliances with the native population, and the use of horses, all contributed to Spanish success. Yet, Francisco Pizarro's manipulations of the rifts that the civil war caused within the Inca Empire, and his employment of the methods he had learned from Hernan Cortés, in his conquest of Mexico, provided the greatest aid to the Spanish during their conquest of Peru.

In order to understand how Pizarro exploited the various factions and divisions within the Inca empire, it is useful to see how this state itself was the product of a series of conquests. The Incas as a people can be dated back to 1200 A.D. in the vicinity of

Cuzco, located in the central Andean highlands. The Incas were a relatively small group, and they found themselves surrounded by militaristic chiefdoms and kingdoms. They were forced to adapt themselves to this competitive situation; otherwise they would have vanished.¹ The first eight kings, called Incas, began to conquer areas around Cuzco. They further began to expand their empire around 1438 and over the next 100 years, they defeated many of their neighbors. The empire reached its full extent under the rule of Huayna Capac in 1525.²

The Incas called their empire *Tahuantinsuyu* meaning, “Land of the Four Quarters,” in reflection of the vast area of land it covered.³ The ninth Inca, Pachacuti Inca Yupanqui, built an extraordinary network of roads and bridges to unite the empire. The establishment of a “postal system,” which was maintained by a series of messengers, was the fastest method of communication in the world at that time. This system enabled the Incas to keep a firm grip on both political and military aspects of the empire.⁴ New territories were drawn into the empire by diplomacy or conquest. Administrative programs began in Cuzco to impose a common religion and the Inca language, Quechua, throughout the empire.⁵

The Incas ruled by fear. Historian Sarmiento de Gamboa believed they ruled without the consent of their subjects. “Pachacuti Inca held people in such terror that for fear of being devoured by wild animals (in the Inca prisons in Cuzco), or burnt or cruelly

¹ Geoffrey W. Conrad and Arthur A. Demarest, *Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of Aztec and Inca Expansionism*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 106.

² Refer to Appendix A.

³ Michael A. Malpass, *Daily Life in the Inca Empire*, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 1.

⁴ Richard Berg, “Conquistador: Pizarro and the Conquest of Peru, 1524-33,” *Strategy and Tactics* no. 58 (1976): 5.

⁵ Charles Gibson, *The Inca Concept of Sovereignty and the Spanish Administration in Peru*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 10.

tortured, they surrendered to him and obeyed.”⁶ The conquistadors would later exploit this fear and hatred of Inca rule.

The Inca state became the largest empire ever formed by a native society in the Americas. Despite its size, the army that brought it down contained only a few hundred men. The empire endured only for a century, largely due to the weaknesses of its government. One aspect of this weakness was that there was no set rule for succession.⁷ The Inca named as his successor the son who he judged most capable of governing. Just before Pizarro arrived in Peru the issue of succession caused a feud between Atahualpa and Huascar, the Inca’s two sons. Ultimately, this feud divided the empire in a civil war.

As Huayna Capac lay dying of smallpox he named his son, Ninan Cuyuche, his heir. Although Ninan Cuyuche was the favorable choice, this act resolved nothing, because the same epidemic that had struck Huayna Capac also killed Ninan Cuyuche. Huascar was next in line, but there was a twist. Huayna Capac’s favorite son was Atahualpa, who being born of a mother from Quito, a non-Inca, was not considered a legitimate successor. Huayna Capac wished to make provisions for Atahualpa’s future, and called Huascar to him. Inca practice dictated that the entire empire fell to the heir, but since he wished see Atahualpa provided for, he asked that Huascar allow Atahualpa to inherit Quito, “which belonged to his maternal ancestors.”⁸ Huascar agreed to this, but he soon grew distrustful of Atahualpa. Huayna Capac died the same day the Spanish arrived in Peru in 1527. They didn’t stay long, but their presence made quite a stir throughout the empire.

⁶ Sabine MacCormack, “The Fall of the Incas: A Historiographical Dilemma,” *History of European Ideas* 6, no. 4 (1985): 429.

⁷ Gibson, 15.

⁸ Edward Hyams and George Ordish, *The Last of the Incas: The Rise and Fall of an American Empire*, (New York: Dorset Press, 1963), 126.

After Huayna Capac's death, Atahualpa remained in Quito and even though he swore his allegiance to Huascar, Huascar demanded that Atahualpa come to Cuzco. Huascar warned him that if he did not come, he would regard him as an enemy and attack. Atahualpa consulted his two generals, Quizquiz and Chalcuchima, who advised him to strike first.⁹ So began the civil war.

The feud between Atahualpa and Huascar was not the first conflict over succession. Although it showed the weakness of the Inca system, in this case, it had even greater consequences than in past cases for it coincided with the arrival of the Spanish.¹⁰ When the Spanish returned in 1532, their conquest began the same day, as they found the Incas divided by civil war. John Hemming believes that Pizarro was fortunate to have arrived during this "war of dynastic succession," for when he learned of the civil war he hoped that, like Hernan Cortés, he could manipulate rival factions.¹¹ Pizarro learned of the civil war when he reached the town of Tumbez and found it in ruins – a victim of the civil war. As Pedro Pizarro wrote, they then moved on to Pohechos, where they received news that Atahualpa was waging war on Huascar, who was the natural lord.¹²

The Spanish arrived just as Atahualpa's strike on Cuzco succeeded in taking Huascar captive. Immediately, Atahualpa proclaimed himself Inca. Atahualpa knew his claim to the throne was weak, so he ordered the massacre of Huascar's heirs – anyone who had legitimate claim to the throne. But he kept Huascar alive. This eventually posed another threat to Atahualpa, but in the meantime, he used it to lure other members of

⁹ Augustín de Zárate, *The Discovery and Conquest of Peru*, trans. J.M. Cohen (England: Penguin Books, 1968), 59-60.

¹⁰ Gibson, 16.

¹¹ John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas*, (London: Macmillan, 1970), 28, 30.


¹² Pedro Pizarro. *Relation of the Discovery and Conquest of the Kingdoms of Peru*, trans. Philip Ainsworth Means (New York: The Cortes Society, 1921), 1:165.

Huascar's faction into the open.¹³ Atahualpa was on his way to victory, but he had not yet consolidated his success by the time of Spanish arrival.¹⁴ According to historians Geoffrey Conrad and Arthur Demarest, the civil war left the empire "shattered and all the Spaniards had to do was pick up the pieces."¹⁵ The Spanish would be the true victors of the civil war.

After his army captured Huascar, Atahualpa was in Cajamarca making plans to leave for Cuzco, where he expected to be crowned. Just as he was about to leave, he heard of the arrival of the Spaniards. He decided to put off his departure, and wait for them to come to him.¹⁶ This proved to be his fatal mistake.



Huascar as prisoner of Atahualpa
(Juan de Betanzos, *The Narrative of the Incas*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 240.)



The arrival of Spanish Ships
(Huamán Poma, *Letter to a King*, (New York: Dutton, 1978), 106.)

¹³ Hyams, 189.
¹⁴ J.H. Elliot, "The Spanish Conquest and Settlement of America," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. 1, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 184.
¹⁵ Conrad, 138.
¹⁶ Hyams, 190-191.

The civil war deprived the empire of the leadership and unity it so desperately needed at the time of the Spaniards' arrival. Pedro Pizarro illustrated this point.

Had Huayna Capac been alive when we Spaniards entered this land it would have been impossible to win it, for he was so greatly loved by his subjects . . . Also, if the land had not been divided by the wars of Huascar and Atahualpa, we could not have entered or conquered it unless over a thousand Spaniards come simultaneously.¹⁷

Francisco Pizarro saw how the civil war and the unexpectedness of their arrival could be exploited.¹⁸ Pizarro saw the advantages in choosing sides, and trying to create alliances. At first Pizarro told native peoples that he favored Huascar, because as Pedro Pizarro wrote, the Spaniards believed Huascar to be “the natural Lord of the kingdom.”¹⁹ But after he heard that Atahualpa had captured Huascar, he shifted his alliance to Atahualpa, because after all, “legitimacy” is not important when it comes to strategy.²⁰

When Pizarro learned that Atahualpa was in Cajamarca, he decided to go there, but not without waiting for reinforcements. His reinforcements came with Sebastian de Benalcazar and Hernando de Soto. In the meantime, he had established the first permanent Spanish settlement in Peru, San Miguel de Piura. On September 24, 1532, Pizarro left San Miguel with 106 foot soldiers, 62 horsemen, and 4 cannon. They were on their way to meet Atahualpa in Cajamarca.

Atahualpa heard about the Spanish and sent an envoy to meet them. They arrived at Cajas the same time as the Spaniards. They extended an invitation to Pizarro to meet with Atahualpa.²¹ Along the way, Pizarro and his men had established peaceful relations with the Indians. According to Francisco de Jerez (Pizarro's secretary), before Pizarro's

¹⁷ Hemming, 55.

¹⁸ MacCormack, “The Fall of the Incas”, 422.

¹⁹ Pizarro, 171. Pizarro refers to Huascar as “the natural Lord of the kingdom.”

²⁰ Gibson, 62.

²¹ Berg, 10.

arrival at Cajamarca, he had learned that Atahualpa was preparing for war. He heard from a village chief that “Atahualpa was waiting in great pride and that he had heard him boast that every Christian would be killed.”²² This left Pizarro with the impression that he must strike first.

Atahualpa’s intentions were unclear. However, he allowed the Spaniards to make their way to Cajamarca. By doing so, he severely misjudged them, because he thought a group of 168 men could do nothing against his army. Richard Berg believes this decision was the first of many miscalculations that led to Spanish victory. If Atahualpa’s army had attacked while the Spaniards were on the narrow mountain passes, their horses and artillery would have been ineffective and Pizarro’s army would most likely have been slaughtered on the spot.²³

When the Spaniards reach Cajamarca, they encountered an Inca army of 40,000 men. Pizarro sent a party led by Hernando de Soto to seek an audience with Atahualpa. When they met the Inca, he showed no interest in de Soto, but he perked up when Hernando Pizarro began to speak to him, as he realized he was Francisco Pizarro’s brother. Atahualpa agreed to meet with Pizarro the next day.


Pizarro began to make his plans. He knew by Cortés’ example that the element of surprise would work to his advantage. He had to strike first, for if Atahualpa decided to make the first move, his army was doomed.²⁴ Pizarro used the large buildings in the square at Cajamarca to hide his cavalry and foot soldiers, which were ready to move at his command. Pizarro himself hid, along with some of his men, with the objective of

²² Zárate, 81.

²³ Berg, 11.

²⁴ Berg, 11.

ambushing the Incas and grabbing Atahualpa. Pizarro remembered the reaction of the Aztecs to Montezuma's capture, and felt that a similar strategy would work.²⁵



(Edward Hyams and George Ordish, *The Last of the Incas*, (New York: Dorset Press, 1963), 208.)

While the Spaniards waited in Cajamarca, Atahualpa appeared to be in no hurry to meet them. The Spaniards began to fear that a night attack was planned. To this, they had no defense. Pizarro sent a messenger inviting Atahualpa for dinner and told him that he had nothing to fear. They meant him no harm. Atahualpa agreed to this, and he left the majority of his army outside and entered the square with 5000 men armed only with ceremonial axes. When he reached the square, he was surprised to find it empty.²⁶ Atahualpa's concern was magnified when a lone figure emerged from a building and walked towards him. It was Fray Vincente de Valverde. He began to explain the Christian religion and demand that the Incas convert. Fray Vincente was reading from the *requierimiento*, a formal document that the Spaniards read before hostilities began.

²⁵ Berg, 11.

²⁶ Berg, 11.

This document gave the enemy the chance to embrace Christianity and Spanish rule, rather than submit in battle.²⁷ Fray Vicente then presented Atahualpa with the *breviary*. Atahualpa ultimately rejected this holy book. The Spanish government considered that by this action, a war of conquest was justified.²⁸ The Inca, Garcilaso de la Vega believed that Fray Vicente's speech was harsh before the presentation of the breviary, and the translation made it worse.²⁹ When Atahualpa took the *breviary*, he "turned over the leaves from end to end, saying that it said nothing to him. In fact it did not speak at all. And he threw it on the ground."³⁰ This was the cue for the Spaniards to come out and fight.



Sebastian de Benalcazar and Hernando Pizarro's meeting with Atahualpa (Juan de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Incas*, (Austin: Univ. of Texas, 1996), 257.)



Fray Valverde presenting the *breviary* (Edward Hyams and George Ordish, *The Last of the Incas*, (New York: Dorset Press, 1963), 220.)

²⁷ Berg, 11.

²⁸ Sara Castro-Klaren, "May We Not Perish': The Incas and Spain," *Wilson Quarterly* 4, no. 3 (1981), 169.

²⁹ Zarate, 102.

³⁰ Zarate, 104.

Although armed and numerically superior, the Incas in the square died without raising a hand. The appearance of the horses seemed critical. The horses were wearing large rattles, and the sight and sound of them charging amidst booming cannon and flashing muskets was too much.³¹ Many of these men fled. Those who stayed died. Atahualpa had been carried in on a litter. As the Spaniards were trying to get to Atahualpa, they had to strike down the men who were supporting him. Since it was the retainers' job to protect their Inca, as one man was struck down, another one took his place. Finally, the litter tumbled. Just as one Spanish soldier was about to strike Atahualpa, Pizarro reached out and stopped the blow. He wanted the Inca alive. Pizarro grabbed Atahualpa and took him into one of the buildings.

The Spanish did not stop their assault with the capture of Atahualpa. The cavalry charged out into the rest of the army that was waiting outside of Cajamarca. Here, the Spanish met little resistance; massacring the men they found there. Historian Richard Berg estimates that 7000 of Atahualpa's soldiers were killed during the course of two to three hours. The only Spanish casualty was the damage to Pizarro's hand when he was protecting Atahualpa.³² This event marked the beginning of the end of the Inca empire. As Huamán Poma saw it, with Atahualpa's capture "our Indians lost all sense of direction ... forgot their gods and missed the authority of their rulers."³³

Pizarro wondered why Atahualpa had not realized this was a trap. Atahualpa had underestimated them, and his plan had backfired – he had hoped to capture Pizarro.³⁴ When Atahualpa was questioned on his strategy, Captain Cristobal de Mena reports that

³¹ Berg, 11.

³² Berg, 14.

³³ Castro-Klaren, "May We Not Perish", 170.

³⁴ Hemming, 44-45.

“[Atahualpa] answered half smiling ... that he had intended to capture the Governor but the reverse had happened.”³⁵ Atahualpa was reluctant to accept his fate. He believed that his main problem, while in custody, was not the Spanish and he directed his attention to the end of the civil war. Pizarro allowed him to rule from captivity, which maintained the fiction that Atahualpa was in control. Pizarro had learned from Cortés that by keeping Atahualpa in confinement, he was continuing the pretense of his leadership. This gave Atahualpa the impression that the Spanish presence was only temporary.³⁶



The Inca Atahualpa as a prisoner of the Spaniards
(Juan de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Incas*, (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1996), 265.)

Even though they had Atahualpa in their custody, the Spanish still feared attack by the remainder of Atahualpa’s armies. Atahualpa had three large armies stationed around the empire, under the leadership of his most powerful generals. General Quizquiz had 30,000 troops in Cuzco. Chalcuchima was in Jauja with 35,000 troops. In Quito,

³⁵ Hemming, 45.

³⁶ Berg, 14-15.

Ruminavi was there with a third army. Richard Berg suggests they were reluctant to move out of fear of relinquishing newly won territories. They were after all, still fighting the civil war.³⁷

In the meantime, Atahualpa was still optimistic that Spanish presence was only temporary. He noticed the Spaniards interest in gold, and delivered Pizarro an amazing proposition. Atahualpa offered to fill a room full of gold, on the condition that when this ransom was fulfilled, he would be released. Atahualpa believed that if the Spaniards got what they wanted, they would leave.³⁸ Atahualpa's ransom proved to be a blessing for Pizarro, for he never intended on letting him go.³⁹ It merely served as a chance to buy more time. Pizarro realized that in the time it took to fulfill this bargain, he could wait for Diego de Almagro to come to Cajamarca with reinforcements.⁴⁰ He began to send his own men out in search of treasure.

While Pizarro remained in Cajamarca waiting for the collection of the ransom, the Spaniards began to grow apprehensive about Atahualpa's intent. Considering that Atahualpa had three armies, and a native population the Spaniards had no control over, they began to imagine plots for their overthrow. Pizarro remained confident, in light of his knowledge of the Aztecs, that the Incas would do nothing unless provoked.⁴¹ Meanwhile, Hernando Pizarro was in Jauja trying to collect treasure there, but he left with a much more valuable prize. While in Jauja, Hernando convinced Atahualpa's general, Chalcuchima to return to Cajamarca with him. With Chalcuchima in custody, the Spanish could relax. With the loss of this commander, the Inca army was at a loss,

³⁷ Berg, 14.

³⁸ Berg, 15.

³⁹ Hemming, 48.

⁴⁰ Berg, 15.

⁴¹ Berg, 16.

for, as historian John Hemming believes, he was the only one who could bridge the rift between the two factions that the civil war had caused.⁴²

Hernando Pizarro returned to Cajamarca with Chalcuchima in tow. The Spaniards held the belief that the Incas were withholding treasure from them. They tried to gain information from Chalcuchima, and even though he protested he knew nothing, they tried to torture a confession out of him by burning him. The Spaniards had burned his arms and legs before they finally believed in his innocence. They then put Chalcuchima under guard, for fear of an uprising. Their treatment of Chalcuchima was a reflection of the fear they felt towards the risk of being attacked.⁴³

While Atahualpa was in custody, there was still the matter of Huascar's whereabouts. Since he was still alive, his faction also posed a threat. Pizarro inquired to Atahualpa about Huascar and learned that he was in custody of Atahualpa's men. He ordered that Huascar be brought to Cajamarca. By Agustín de Zárate's account, Huascar was on his way to Cajamarca when he met up with some Spanish soldiers, whom he promised gold if they would bring him to Pizarro and have the conquistador settle the case between the two brothers. Apparently, when Atahualpa heard of this, it made him nervous. He plotted Huascar's death out of fear he would lose his kingdom.⁴⁴ Atahualpa was tricky in the way he gained "permission" for Huascar's murder. When Pizarro went to visit him one day, he found Atahualpa crying. He told Pizarro that his men had killed Huascar when he had given them explicit orders not to harm him. He remembered how Pizarro had threatened him with death if his brother was not brought to Cajamarca alive, and he did not want to be blamed for this. Pizarro consoled him and did not hold him

⁴² Hemming, 67.

⁴³ Berg, 16.

⁴⁴ Zárate, 107-109.

accountable. Since Huascar was still alive, Atahualpa ordered his summary murder, so it would appear his story to Pizarro was accurate. Atahualpa had Huascar killed in the hope of giving himself an advantage. He was still confident in his release and could not afford to lose his war with Huascar.⁴⁵ But, this plot proved to be his undoing.

With the death of Huascar, some of the Spaniards began to fear that Atahualpa would gain control of the empire, and they were afraid of an uprising. When Pizarro first came to Cajamarca, he could act as arbitrator and hold out hope to both factions. However, with the death of Huascar, the threat of a revolt created new tensions among them.⁴⁶ The Spaniards knew they could never release Atahualpa, because there would always be the danger of attack. They concluded that if he were dead, they would be in less danger. Miguel de Estete wrote in regards to Atahualpa's fate, "With his death it would all cease and the land would be calmed."⁴⁷ The Spanish needed to act quickly, however, because they had collected the ransom, yet failed to release Atahualpa.

In mid-April 1533, Pizarro's much needed reinforcements arrived. Almagro arrived with 150 men and horses. Up until then, Atahualpa had been optimistic about his fate, but with these new arrivals, he began to see his situation differently and began to fear that he was going to die.⁴⁸ Since these new arrivals had not fought in the original battle, they had a great fear of the Inca army. In addition, Pizarro had been waiting for these men so they could begin their march to Cuzco. Many of them feared that

⁴⁵ Hemming, 53-54.

⁴⁶ Gibson, 60-61.

⁴⁷ Hemming, 76.

⁴⁸ Berg, 16.

Atahualpa's presence would draw the army to them.⁴⁹ Atahualpa's fate was thus determined.

Not everyone in the Spanish camp was in agreement about the situation. There were those who supported Atahualpa, thinking it foolish to kill him when his presence assured peace within the empire. Hernando de Soto felt that they were honor-bound to release him. It was Almagro's men who saw little need in releasing him.⁵⁰ In order to sort out their differences, the men set up a trial, but the cards were stacked against Atahualpa from the onset. A number of false charges were brought out against him, but the only charges with some sort of merit were those that stated he had usurped Huascar's rightful sovereignty of Cuzco, and that he had later killed him. He was also charged with the act of plotting against the Spaniards. Historian Phillip Ainsworth Means attests that those were the only "sane" charges.⁵¹ The men sentenced Atahualpa to death. This was especially hard on Pizarro, as he had grown quite fond of the Inca.⁵² The death of Atahualpa was a sacrifice Pizarro had to make, for, as historian John Hemming states, this act brought relief to the local natives who felt his rule was "oppression by the Quitan victors of the civil war."⁵³

The forces of Pizarro and Almagro would soon leave Cajamarca to push their conquest into the heart of the Inca Empire. They began to prepare for their march to Cuzco. Atahualpa's death had placed Pizarro in the good graces of the Huascar faction, and as he marched to Cuzco, he wished to appear as their liberator.⁵⁴ Pizarro may have

⁴⁹ Hemming, 84-85.

⁵⁰ Berg, 16.

⁵¹ Philip Ainsworth Means, *Fall of the Inca Empire and the Spanish Rule in Peru, 1530-1780*, (New York: Gordian Press, 1964), 43.

⁵² Berg, 16.

⁵³ Hemming, 86.

⁵⁴ Hemming, 86.

delivered the Incas from Atahualpa's rule, but he needed to find a suitable replacement, as the Incas were not yet ready to accept Spanish rule.



The execution of Atahualpa (Huaman Poma, *Letter to a King*, (New York: Dutton, 1978), 112.)

As soon as Atahualpa was buried, Pizarro, in the words of Pedro Sancho, “immediately ordered all the caciques and chiefs who were residing in the city in the court of the dead ruler ... to assemble in the main square so that he could give them another ruler who would govern in the name of His Majesty.”⁵⁵ They all found Tupac Hualpa acceptable.

Tupac Hualpa was the perfect choice, as historian Charles Gibson has pointed out. He was the son of Huayna Capac, yet he had remained friendly with Atahualpa to avoid the fate of Huascar's family, and had moreover professed friendship to the Spaniards. He was also of the legitimate line of Cuzco.⁵⁶ Pizarro appointed him with the intent of

⁵⁵ Hemming, 87.

⁵⁶ Gibson, 65.

making him his puppet ruler, and hoped he could unite the entire empire under his rule. This was strategically important, as “peaceful unity was preferable to division and conflict.”⁵⁷ Pizarro watched the natives’ reaction to this appointment, and he would have picked a new leader had he sensed any dissatisfaction. The natives made it clear, however, that they would support Pizarro’s decision.⁵⁸

There were three plots by natives to appoint another leader. One of these plots was lead by the general Chalcuchima. Even though he was still in custody, he still had the power to foil Pizarro’s plans. His machinations began to take shape during the Spaniards march to Cuzco. According to historian John Hemming, when the men left Cajamarca on 11 August 1533,

They were attempting one of the most staggering invasions in history. Without supplies, communications or reinforcements, this tiny contingent was trying to force its way into the heart of an enormous, hostile empire, to seize its capital city.⁵⁹

The Spaniards felt they had the protection of having Tupac Hualpa with them, but word soon reached them that Chalcuchima’s army was preparing to resist. The Spaniards met his army at Jauja. They used their horses to their advantage. They used a tactic that was effective in the conquest of Mexico. They immediately charged at the native soldiers, and as more horsemen entered the city, the native troops were pushed back. Some of these soldiers fled, but the ones who stayed were killed. The Spanish struck fast, and used the element of surprise to their advantage. They won the city of Jauja, and this defeat must have demoralized the army. The Inca leaders tried to join

⁵⁷ Gibson, 65-66.

⁵⁸ Gibson, 65.

⁵⁹ Hemming, 90.

the forces of Quizquiz, but the Spaniards quickly cut them off. The Inca army put up a fight, but the Spaniards were ruthless.⁶⁰

The Spanish alone cannot take credit for their victory. Pizarro had already begun the work creating alliances with native peoples. The civil war and Atahualpa's capture had weakened the Inca Empire. A lot of the newly conquered tribes had not been fully assimilated into the empire. This accounts for the hostility the Jauja Huancas showed towards the Inca army, for they had taken the side of the Spaniards. According to historian John Hemming,

Regionalism and tribalism became increasingly important with the melting away of recently imposed Inca systems of government. It was invaluable to Spanish invaders – just as useful as the dynastic schism of the civil war, and the indifference of the native masses to the fate of the upper classes of Inca society.⁶¹

Chalcuchima was still trying to find a way to usurp Spanish authority. His plan was to discredit Tupac Hualpa. According to Pedro Pizarro, he encouraged the disobedience of native groups along the way, and presented this as evidence that as Inca, Tupac Hualpa was not respected.⁶² Tupac Hualpa was poisoned soon after. Chalcuchima was the most likely suspect for Tupac Hualpa's murder, but Francisco Pizarro did not connect him with the crime until it later. Chalcuchima was offered the regency of the whole land until a suitable replacement could be made. His disloyalty to the Spaniards continued, until they discovered him and subsequently burned him alive.⁶³

For his next puppet ruler, Pizarro decided it would be in his best interests to continue his alliance with Cuzco and the Huascar faction. By restoring the Huascar line,

⁶⁰ Hemming, 95.

⁶¹ Hemming, 97-98.

⁶² Gibson, 67.

⁶³ Gibson, 67.

he hoped he would be able to employ the Cuzco forces against the armies of Quito.⁶⁴ Manco Inca presented himself to Pizarro as a legitimate candidate. Pizarro decided to crown Manco and rule the native population through him. His appointment as Inca achieved local unity. Historian Philip Ainsworth Means recognized the importance of this decision, but he believes that Pizarro “was doing with the Inca Manco what he ought to have done with Atahualpa while the latter was still supreme in the land.”⁶⁵ Manco appeared to be the perfect puppet ruler, for during his early reign, he showed favor towards the Spaniards, and tried to maintain goodwill. By the end of 1533, it looked as though Spanish victory was virtually complete. But Pizarro had one more obstacle to face.

After he had captured Cuzco and appointed Manco as Inca, he made the mistake of moving the capital to Lima. He should have taken his cue from Cortés, who preserved political continuity by building his new capital of Mexico City over the ruins of the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan. The move to Lima, historian J.H. Elliot believes, made the Spanish vulnerable to Manco’s revolt.⁶⁶

Manco had remained in Cuzco to begin his rule as Inca. He was content with his position for about two years, but then he grew dissatisfied. Perhaps, as historian Phillip Ainsworth Means has suggested, the “Inca had hoped, from the beginning of his pseudo-reign, that his ancestors’ power would eventually be restored to him in full.”⁶⁷ After Manco realized he would always be a Spanish puppet, and as his discontent grew, he began to make his plans to revolt. Meanwhile, in August 1535, Francisco and Hernando

⁶⁴ Gibson, 61.

⁶⁵ Means, 47.

⁶⁶ Elliot, 184-185.

⁶⁷ Means, 59.

Pizarro were meeting in Lima. Pizarro decided to send his brother to Cuzco to act as lieutenant governor. Soon after Hernando Pizarro arrived in Cuzco, in February 1536, Manco Inca tricked him into letting him leave the city. Manco promised that he would return with “a man made of gold.”⁶⁸ Instead, in March 1536, he revolted and laid siege to Cuzco.

Before beginning the attack on Cuzco, Manco’s followers also attacked Lima, so as to pin down Francisco Pizarro and his men there. That left a Spanish army of 196 men in Cuzco, under the leadership of Hernando, Juan, and Gonzalo Pizarro, to fight an Inca army that numbered at least 100,000 men.⁶⁹ The Spanish only had eighty horses, and the responsibility of fighting fell on the cavalry, for the Spanish infantry was inferior to that of the natives, who were more accustomed to the high altitude of Cuzco.⁷⁰ Although the Spanish were outnumbered, they did have the advantage of occupying the city center. The Incas, however, occupied the fortress of Sacsahuamán. This gave the Incas the initial advantage in the battle, but once the Spanish captured the fortress, at the cost of losing Juan Pizarro’s life, they regained the upper hand. This made Manco’s army more vulnerable to horsemen.⁷¹ The narrow streets increased the effectiveness of their horses, by allowing small numbers of men to attack in any given area. Once the Spaniards captured Sacsahuamán, they were able to beat back the Incas. On the outskirts of the city, the horse was the Spaniards best weapon. The Spaniards soon learned of some information that gave them another advantage. Religious celebrations at every new moon

⁶⁸ Means, 60.

⁶⁹ Robert Himmerich Y Valencia, “The 1536 Siege of Cuzco: An Analysis of Inca and Spanish Warfare,” *Colonial Latin American Historical Review* 7, no.4 (1998): 387.

⁷⁰ Hemming, 191.

⁷¹ Valencia, 399.

brought an end to native fighting. During this time, the Spanish were able to regroup, and prepare for the next attack.⁷²

The Spaniards at Cuzco were growing weary after a year of fighting, and feared that no relief was coming. The natives ambushed any reinforcements that Francisco Pizarro tried to send. Pizarro began to appeal for help outside of Peru. He wrote the following plea to Pedro de Alvarado, the Governor of Guatemala:

The Inca has the city of Cuzco besieged, and for five months I have heard nothing about the Spaniards in it. The country is so badly damaged that no native chiefs now serve us, and they have won many victories against us. It causes me such great sorrow that it is consuming my entire life.⁷³

Reinforcements from the outside began to arrive in Lima near the end of 1536. Pizarro now had the manpower to help him reconquer Peru. Pizarro sent out his own relief to Cuzco, but at the same time, another Spanish army was heading towards Cuzco. Diego de Almagro's expedition was returning from Chile. He had left Cuzco twenty months earlier, and learned of the siege of Cuzco upon his return to Peru. Almagro's army arrived at Cuzco in April 1537. His arrival at Cuzco brought the siege to an end. Manco retreated into the highlands of the Vilcabamba valley. The siege at Lima ended a few days later, and Spanish control was restored.⁷⁴

After this revolt had been suppressed, there were other minor revolts throughout the years, yet Spanish control was never again threatened in this manner. With the end the siege of Cuzco, Pizarro had regained control of the empire – the Spaniards had won.

Now that the background of the conquest has been presented, I want to focus on the factors that led to Francisco Pizarro's success. Pizarro used his knowledge of Cortés'

⁷² Hemming, 203.

⁷³ Hemming, 209.

⁷⁴ Malpass, 123.

conquest of the Aztecs to his advantage. Pizarro had met Cortés while he was in Spain and heard the details of his conquest.⁷⁵ Pizarro's experience in Peru had some interesting parallels to that of Cortés in Mexico. Within a few days of Cortés' arrival, he learned of Montezuma, who was a powerful ruler. Historian J.H. Elliot believes that this piece of information suggested a natural strategy. "A ruler who himself had dominion over many peoples must himself be brought, by force or trickery, to acknowledge a yet higher lordship, that of the king of Spain."⁷⁶ Cortés and his men were ultimately welcomed into the capital, Tenochtitlan, and were given the opportunity to follow through with Cortés strategy. Montezuma was taken into their custody and made to accept the sovereignty of the king of Spain. Cortés was able to exploit his authority, by keeping him as a puppet ruler.⁷⁷ However, the captivity of Montezuma upset the natives, and they revolted. Montezuma was subsequently murdered; however there are differing accounts. The Spanish account blames Montezuma's death on a fatal stone that was thrown by one of his subjects. The Indians claim that the Spaniards strangled Montezuma. Pizarro recognized the parallels between Montezuma and Atahualpa when he was formulating his plan.⁷⁸

Historian J.H. Elliot believes that the capture of Montezuma allowed the Spanish to use the existing administrative system to their advantage. They were able to transfer Montezuma's authority into Spanish hands.⁷⁹ Pizarro hoped to do the same with Atahualpa. A pre-existing factor that helped in the usurpation of power was that the Aztecs and Incas were centrally organized societies that were dependent on the authority

⁷⁵ Hyams, 143.

⁷⁶ Elliot, 180.

⁷⁷ Elliot, 181-182.

⁷⁸ Hyams, 145-146.

⁷⁹ Elliot, 184.

of a single ruler. This contributed greatly to Spanish success.⁸⁰ By capturing the leader, there was little hope that the rest of the population could organize a successful rebellion.

Historian William H. Prescott recognized that Pizarro planned on imitating the events of Mexico, but he believed that Pizarro's methods fell short of what Cortés had accomplished. Prescott wrote:

When Pizarro landed in the country, he found it distracted by a contest for the crown. It would seem to have been for his interest to play off one party against the other, throwing his own weight into the scale that suited him. Instead of this, he resorted to an act of audacious violence which crushed them both at a blow. His subsequent career afforded no scope for the profound policy displayed by Cortés, when he gathered conflicting nations under his banner, and directed them against a common foe ... Cortés conducted his military operations on the scientific principles of a great captain at the head of a powerful host. Pizarro appears only as an adventurer, a fortunate knight-errant. By one bold stroke, he broke the spell which had so long held the land under the dominion of the Incas ... This was good fortune, rather than the result of policy.⁸¹

Prescott fails to give Pizarro any credit for his accomplishments. He believed that it was the luck of finding the Incas involved in a civil war that aided Pizarro in his conquest. He failed to recognize that Pizarro himself formed alliances and that the capture of Atahualpa had required strategy. Pizarro's success was not just the result of good fortune, as Prescott has suggested.

Pizarro had greater opportunities for manipulating alliances than Cortés. The civil war offered him the chance to widen the rift that already existed. In the case of Cortés, the native rivalry existed in peaceful groups. The civil war in Peru allowed the Spaniards

⁸⁰ Elliot, 185.

⁸¹ William H. Prescott, *History of the Conquest of Peru*, (New York: The Modern Library, 1936), 1094.

to shift their allegiance a number of times.⁸² In this manner, Pizarro was able to play one faction against the other.

Pizarro was aided in this game by the alliances he made with native tribes. In this respect, Pizarro also took his cue from Cortés. The conquest of Mexico demonstrated the strategic advantages of creating alliances between native peoples, and keeping native chiefs under Spanish authority. It was under this system that these chiefs also became puppet rulers. This system was useful in maintaining native strife. Historian Charles Gibson wrote, “The practice was, for Spain, transitional and strategic; it permitted small Spanish armies to subdue numerically superior native forces, pending the introduction of permanent colonial government.”⁸³ Cortés was aided in his quest to recruit “allies,” because the domination of the Aztecs over other peoples led to hatred and resentment. Cortés appeared as a liberator.⁸⁴ Pizarro was able to channel the resentment of the natives as well.

The character of the Aztec and Inca empires was that competing tribes had been brought together under a central rule that was resented. Historian J.H. Elliot believes that this allowed the Spanish to play one tribal grouping against another and turn subjugated peoples against their masters. Once the central power had been overthrown, the Spanish were in control of peoples accustomed to some level of subservience.⁸⁵ Since the Incas were more tightly organized than the Aztecs, it served to multiply internal strains. For example, in Quito, the subject population was especially resentful of Inca rule, where it

⁸² Gibson, 60.

⁸³ Gibson, 59.

⁸⁴ Elliot, 181.

⁸⁵ Elliot, 174.

had appeared relatively recently. This left the empire vulnerable to the threat of civil war, in which Atahualpa's main goal may have been to free Quito from Inca domination.

Author Michael A. Malpass attributes the willingness of the natives to help the Spanish to the fact that they had been newly conquered themselves. Their lives had just been changed, and they probably feared and hated the Incas.⁸⁶ Certain groups saw their chance to escape from Inca domination. In fact, the natives themselves provided Cortés and Pizarro with the bulk of their conquering armies, a point that has been pointed out by historian Nathan Wachtel.⁸⁷ The Spaniards were quick to exploit the civil war in Peru, but they would have found native allies regardless, since most groups had been conquered within the last three or four generations. The Spanish could rely on these groups for logistical support, auxiliary troops, and local intelligence. They were, however, unable to intercept communications between Atahualpa and his armies, as these were secure.⁸⁸ Thus, the Spanish were unable to discover the plans Atahualpa may have been making with his army. As a result, the Spanish could never rid themselves of the fear that Atahualpa was planning a revolt.

Local Andean societies had good reason to ally themselves with the Spanish conquest – they were impressed by their military prowess. Historian Steve J. Stern also holds the view that peasant societies are sensitive to changes in power balance. They were quick to recognize the Spanish as their new masters. These local societies saw that

⁸⁶ Malpass, 73.

⁸⁷ Nathan Wachtel, "The Indian and Spanish Conquest", in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. 1, 210.

⁸⁸ John F. Guilmartin, Jr., "The Cutting Edge: An Analysis of the Spanish Invasion and Overthrow of the Inca Empire, 1532-1539," in *Transatlantic Encounters: Europeans and Andeans in the Sixteenth Century*, ed. Kenneth J. Andrien and Rolena Adorno (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 47.

through the benefits of a Spanish alliance “they could break the yoke of Inca rule.”⁸⁹ Pizarro was able to exploit the divisions caused by the civil war and create alliances to create further tensions within the empire. The willingness of his native allies to turn on their former rulers demonstrates the weaknesses that existed within the structure of the Incan government. While the civil war and Pizarro’s imitation of Cortés’ methods can explain Spanish success, there were other contributing factors.

The impact of disease certainly had its role as well. Historian J.H. Elliot writes,

The inhabitants of the New World would have to pay a heavy price for their centuries of isolation. The conquest of America was a conquest by microbes as well as men, sometime running ahead of the main Spanish contingents, at others following in their wake.⁹⁰

Among the virgin soil epidemics that devastated the native population were smallpox, measles, ‘influenza’, and ‘plague’. Since they had been separated from the rest of humanity for thousands of years, they had no defense.⁹¹ In 1519, the Aztecs were weakened by a smallpox epidemic. This must have spread throughout Central and South America, because in 1524 this disease afflicted the Inca Empire, causing the death of thousands.⁹² Historian Michael Malpass believes that “this dramatic loss by disease probably did more than the Spanish horses and guns to contribute to the Incas’ conquest.”⁹³

Huayna Capac himself succumbed to the smallpox epidemic. His successor also died, which opened the way for the dynastic struggles that facilitated Pizarro’s

⁸⁹ Steve J. Stern, *Peru’s Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 29-30.

⁹⁰ Elliot, 182.

⁹¹ Wachtel, “The Indians and Spanish Conquest”, 213.

⁹² Wachtel, “The Indians and Spanish Conquest”, 213.

⁹³ Malpass, 120.

conquest.⁹⁴ In this way, the Spanish unknowingly insured their defeat of the Incas long before their arrival. Since Spanish diseases had reached the Incas, Huayna Capac's death helped to assure their victory. As Pedro Pizarro stated, if Huayna Capac had been alive when Pizarro and his men arrived, they would not have been victorious.

Another aspect that worked in the Spaniards' favor was their possession of horses. These horses shocked the native population. Cortés, as well as Pizarro, used horses to intimidate the native peoples. Whether this tactic was planned or not, it worked. The horse gave the Spanish some advantages, such as striking power and speed, but the main advantage they provided was that they were psychologically intimidating.⁹⁵ When confronted with the animals for the first time, the Incas simply did not know what to make of them. This was further compounded by the rumor that horses lost all their strength at night. This explains why Atahualpa did not arrive to meet Pizarro at Cajamarca until nightfall. His strategy backfired.⁹⁶

When combined with the shock of first seeing men on horses, the arrival of the Spanish themselves provided the natives with even more confusion. When confronted with the site of men sitting atop horses, the Incas did not know what to make of these beasts. At first, they mistakenly believed them to be gods. Juan de Betanzos writes, "Since the Spaniards appeared as very strange beings ... every one of the Spaniards were called 'viracocha' (god)."⁹⁷ At the arrival of the Spaniards, Atahualpa's messengers, when reporting on the white men's landing, referred to them as 'gods'. When he inquired

⁹⁴ Nathan Wachtel, *The Vision of the Vanquished: The Spanish Conquest of Peru through Indian Eyes, 1530-1570*, trans. Ben and Siân Reynolds (Hassocks, England: Harvester Press, 1977), 94-95.

⁹⁵ Guilmartin, 53.

⁹⁶ Wachtel, *Vision*, 22-23.

⁹⁷ Juan de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Incas*, trans. Roland Hamilton and Dana Buchanan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 72.

why they were calling them that, he received this answer: “In the olden times Contiti Viracocha made the people. When he had finished, he entered that ocean ahead. He had not returned.”⁹⁸ Since the Spanish had arrived by sea, the Incas believed they were Viracochas returning. However, historian Nathan Wachtel believes, these illusions were soon shattered by greed and brutality of the Spaniards.⁹⁹ There is little evidence, however, that their initial belief contributed much to their defeat.

Another belief is that the Incas may have submitted to Inca rule due to the feeling that defeat was their fate. According to Inca legend, the Inca Viracocha was the first to foresee the coming of the Spaniards. He had dreamt that “one day unknown bearded men would land in Peru and overthrow both the religion and the Empire of the Incas.”¹⁰⁰ Author Sara Castro-Klarén explains that the Incas interpreted the Spanish conquest as a “Pachacuti” – a cyclical destruction and restoration of the world.¹⁰¹ This appears to be justification after the fact, and seems to have played little, or no, part in the conquest of the Incas.

There is no question that the Spanish were militarily superior. The Incas had the numerical advantage, but lacked sufficient weaponry to fight against the Spanish. There was an estimated 100,000 armed Inca soldiers in the spring of 1532, yet they were defeated. There were 5000 men in Atahualpa’s bodyguard when he met Pizarro in Cajamarca, and 168 men defeated them.¹⁰² The Incas were exceptional soldiers themselves, demonstrated by their conquest of neighboring peoples. But, those battles

⁹⁸ Betanzos, 235.

⁹⁹ Wachtel, *Vision*, 22.

¹⁰⁰ Alain Gheerbrant, ed., *The Incas: the Royal Commentaries of the Inca, Garcilaso de la Vega, 1539-1616*, trans. Maria Jolas (New York: Orion Press, 1961), 147.

¹⁰¹ Sara Castro-Klarén, “Dancing and the Sacred in the Andes: From the Taqui-Oncoy to Rasu-Niti,” in *New World Encounters*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 159.

¹⁰² Guilmartin, 46.

were carried out on an even playing field.¹⁰³ The Incas were relatively defenseless against Spanish weaponry.

Moreover, Spanish methods of warfare underwent a transformation during the first part of the sixteenth century. The Spanish had the advantage in weaponry. Offensively, with their armor and steel helmets, they were virtually invulnerable against Inca weaponry. They also had the advantage of the crossbow and gunpowder weapons, although most soldiers preferred to use their swords, in which the slender blades of steel were most effective on the Incas who lacked effective protection.¹⁰⁴ These weapons could slash right through their cotton armor. The Incas possessed no weapon that could match them. They relied on weapons of stone and wood, as they themselves did not possess the knowledge of steel. Their most effective weapons were their clubs, axes, and slings, but they lacked slashing weapons. These were crushing weapons, which tended only to wound their victims, rather than deliver a fatal blow. Even if they were to inflict a blow, it would not usually prove to be fatal, as these weapons could not pierce the skin. The Spanish had the advantage of lighter weapons. Swordplay was the most effective means of combat. Although Pizarro himself was a skilled horseman, he preferred to fight on foot armed only with a sword.¹⁰⁵

Historian J.H. Elliot recognizes that although the native societies were accustomed to large-scale warfare, their style differed from the Spanish. He believes that the Incas “in spite of their vast numerical superiority, had little hope of overwhelming a combined Spanish force of cavalry and infantry of as few as 50 men, unless they could

¹⁰³ Malpass, xxvi-xxvii.

¹⁰⁴ Guilmartin, 50-51.

¹⁰⁵ Guilmartin, 52-53.

succeed in reducing them to exhaustion.”¹⁰⁶ The Spanish used the element of surprise, however, to their advantage. Upon their arrival at Cajamarca, the Incas were not expecting an ambush, and they were not prepared. The massacre that followed may not be solely contributed to the superiority of Spanish weaponry or warfare.




Warfare in the Andes was fought with spears, clubs, slings and shields. (Michael A. Malpass, *Daily Life in the Inca Empire*, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 32.)

Another element that contributed to Spanish success on the battlefield was their cohesion. They worked together and acted as a group. This solidarity gave them more strength as a unit. Pizarro displayed his skills in leadership by keeping his men together. At Cajamarca, it was a highly organized group of vastly outnumbered soldiers who defeated an army of 40,000 men, and captured their leader. This cohesion, however, disintegrated after the Incas were subdued. After Manco’s siege of Cuzco had been

¹⁰⁶ Elliot, 175-176.

suppressed, a feud between Pizarro and Diego de Almagro caused the Spanish themselves to break into rival factions and engage in their own civil war.



Francisco Pizarro and Diego de Almagro

(Both pictures courtesy of Huamán Poma, *Letter to a King*, (New York: Dutton, 1978), 106, 103.)



Spanish Conquistador

The Spanish were ruthless in their methods of conquest of the Incas. The death count was staggering and their means of execution were savage. Historians have raised many moral objections to their actions. It is unrealistic, however, to defend Pizarro or pass judgments on him in terms of the standards of today. Pizarro clearly reflects the Spanish military mentality of the sixteenth century. Most of the men who took part in the conquest had taken part in the *reconquista*. Pizarro himself was a veteran of Granada. Spain had just emerged from the *reconquista*, in which the Spanish successfully drove the Moors out of Spain in 1492. This event has an interesting parallel with another event that occurred that same year – the discovery of the New World. Historian Sabine MacCormack sees how its participants can perceive the conquest as an extension of the

reconquista.¹⁰⁷ Although the *reconquista* was a movement for the Spanish to reclaim the lands of the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors, it was also a war for territorial expansion. The explorers carried that conquest mentality with them to the New World.

The Spanish arrival in the New World was a tragic experience for the native populations, but for them, conquest was not a foreign concept. The Incas had created their empire by the domination of their neighbors. Author Robert Royal says that the Spanish should not be chastised for looking to the New World for opportunities, because the Indians themselves “were no strangers to need and conquest.”¹⁰⁸ It was a tragedy that so many natives died, but the Spanish mentality was no different from the Incas. This paper has preferred to avoid passing judgment on the actions of Pizarro or his followers, but to explain how this conquest occurred.


When Pizarro arrived in Peru, he was fortunate to learn that the Incas were involved in a civil war. He realized the advantages he could gain by exploiting the rifts that existed between the two factions. Furthermore, he succeeded in capturing the Inca Atahualpa, which gave the Incas the experience of psychological defeat. The supporting role of other factors cannot be overlooked. Superior Spanish weaponry did provide the Spanish with an advantage on the battlefield. The formation of alliances with the native population provided the Spanish with inside information, and extra help in times of combat. Spanish possession of horses first provided an element of fear within the native population, but once the natives became accustomed to these beasts, they provided a military advantage to the Spanish, especially during the siege of Cuzco. These factors, and the impact of diseases that weakened the indigenous population prior to their arrival,

¹⁰⁷ MacCormack, 423.

¹⁰⁸ Robert Royal, *1492 And All That*, (Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1992), 109.

definitely contributed to Spanish success, yet it was the civil war and the employment of Cortés' political methods that contributed most to the Spanish cause. Pizarro dealt with Inca succession, rival factions, and Inca rebellion with a mentality that compensated for the inferior size of his army.


Appendix A



Inca imperial expansion showing the empire's final extent and the territories conquered by individual rulers

Source: Geoffrey W. Conrad and Arthur A. Demarest, *Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of Aztec and Inca Expansionism*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 85.


Appendix B



European penetration of Latin America up to 1532

Source: Edward Hyams and George Ordish, *The Last of the Incas: The Rise and Fall of an American Empire*, (New York: Dorset Press, 1963), 10.


Appendix C



Map of the Central Andes

Source: Thomas Carl Patterson, *The Inca Empire: The Formation and Disintegration of a Pre-capitalist State*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 170.

Appendix D



Source: Edward Hyams and George Ordish, *The Last of the Incas: The Rise and Fall of an American Empire*, (New York: Dorset Press, 1963), 192.

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