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JURNAL SOSIOLOGI AGAMA

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MENUJU SOSIOLOGI BERAGAMA:
Paradigma Keilmuan dan Tantangan Kontemporer Kajian Sosiologi Agama di Indonesia
Moh Soehadha

**ANALYSING NIGERIA-BOKO HARAM CONFLICT
THROUGH THE PRISM OF MARX'S THEORY OF ECONOMIC DETERMINISM**
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PROGRAM STUDI SOSIOLOGI AGAMA
FAKULTAS USHULUDDIN DAN PEMIKIRAN ISLAM, UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA

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ANALYSING NIGERIA-BOKO HARAM CONFLICT THROUGH THE PRISM OF MARX'S THEORY OF ECONOMIC DETERMINISM

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Abstract

This work analyzes the conflict between Nigeria and Boko Haram from the perspective of Karl Marx's theory of Economic Determinism. By using a qualitative approach based on literature data, the author tries to find an idea that can be used as a conflict resolution analysis. He argues that the main factor responsible for the unresolvable nature of the conflict is the material benefits that political elites derive from its extension. The authors use the theory of Economic Determinism to show in detail how the ruling oligarchy in Nigeria has thwarted any attempt to resolve the conflict. The work shows a specific example between 2009 and 2019 where the ruling oligarchy in Nigeria acted actively for any efforts made to resolve the conflict between Nigeria and Boko Haram because their desire to have was not limited to finances. These include, but are not limited to, the 2010 Shaldag contract scandal, the 2013 Dasukigate scandal and the 2014 arms procurement scandal. In conclusion, the year argues that Nigeria should incorporate ideas and concepts such as transparency, control and monitoring, and community inclusiveness into its conflict process. if you hope to defeat the Boko Haram group.

Keywords: terrorism, economic determinism, oligarchs, blueprint, Nigeria

Abstrak

Karya ini menganalisis konflik antara Nigeria dan Boko Haram dari perspektif teori Determinisme Ekonomi Karl Marx. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif

berdasarkan data kepustakaan, penulis mencoba mencari ide yang dapat digunakan sebagai analisis resolusi konflik. Dia berpendapat bahwa faktor utama yang bertanggung jawab atas sifat konflik yang tidak dapat diselesaikan adalah manfaat material yang diperoleh elit politik dari perluasannya. Para penulis menggunakan teori Determinisme Ekonomi untuk menunjukkan secara rinci bagaimana oligarki yang berkuasa di Nigeria telah memperingatkan setiap upaya untuk menyelesaikan konflik. Karya tersebut menunjukkan contoh spesifik antara 2009 dan 2019 di mana oligarki yang berkuasa di Nigeria bertindak aktif untuk setiap upaya yang dilakukan untuk menyelesaikan konflik antara Nigeria dan Boko Haram karena keinginan mereka untuk tidak terbatas pada keuangan. Ini termasuk, namun tidak terbatas pada, skandal kontrak Shaldag 2010, skandal Dasukigate 2013, dan skandal pengadaan senjata 2014. Sebagai kesimpulan, tahun ini berpendapat bahwa Nigeria harus memasukkan ide dan konsep seperti transparansi, kontrol dan pemantauan, dan inklusivitas masyarakat ke dalam proses konfliknya. jika Anda berharap untuk mengalahkan kelompok Boko Haram.

Kata Kunci: terorisme, determinisme ekonomi, oligarki, cetak biru, Nigeria



Introduction

It is quite shocking to note, that for well over a decade, the north eastern part of Nigeria has known no peace, as the region remains perpetually engulfed in terrorist activities. Despite the huge financial and human resources invested in the region, Nigeria has not succeeded in creating a stable and viable political, economic and social environment. The more the government sounds its successes, the more the marauding terrorists wax stronger and unleash terror within the region. Though, it is erroneous to assert that the Nigerian Army has not made some gains in their counter-terrorism stance, emerging optimisms of winning the war and recorded successes are, in most cases, relegated to the background by the sect's persistent attacks and/or destruction of lives and properties (Assanvo, Abatan & Sawadogo, 2016).

Several literature and discourses on the causes of Boko Haram terrorism have identify issues such as religion, bad government, poverty and underdevelopment, as underlining factors for the conflict. Little or no attention has been paid to the economic interests of the ruling oligarchic elites, who, instead of defeating terrorism, had turned the conflict into a business venture. The perspective of self-aggrandizement of these corrupt leaders, who promote terrorism by trading off peace and security, is yet to be adequately perused and documented. Against this backdrop, this paper engages Karl Marx's theory of economic determinism in explaining the protracted nature of Boko Haram terrorism and counter-terrorism. This paper examines the nexus between Boko Haram terrorism and economic determinism in Nigeria. It elucidates on the selfish expressive undertakings of corrupt elites and how these promote terrorism in Nigeria. It discusses the implications of the exploitative tendencies of the corrupt ruling class. This paper concludes by proffering blueprints for peace and sustainable security.

Methods

The author uses qualitative methods in the study of religious conflict resolution. Where the author uses a literature study approach. Overall, the data sources for this study came from two sources, primary data and secondary data. Primary data sources are all data obtained based on library activities. In addition, the library sources used are derived from a number of previous research results, both from books and articles in journals.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Corrupt Ruling Elites

The political landscape in Nigeria is dominated by a distinct continuity of personalities from successive military administrations, especially from the Abacha government through Obasanjo to Yar'Adua, Jonathan and into the current Buhari administration (Amundsen, 2012). These group of people which thus become the ruling elites comprises influential civilians, politicians, military officers and retired personnel, who directly or indirectly determine the affairs of the Nigerian state. This class was established through the fusion of elites similar to practices elsewhere around Africa. The formation of Nigeria's ruling class takes place through the fusion of elites, with the military dominating political and economic power, and expressing self-aggrandizement through various mechanisms of economic extraction (Amundsen, 2012). Under this formation pattern, traditional and religious leaders, modern nationalists and members of the upper strata of the state bureaucracy and the military, amalgamate into a new ruling elite. In the Nigerian context, the merged elites are dominated by the military and/or ex-military officers, a situation made possible through coups, military rule and the Biafran war (Campbell, 2011). In addition, elite formation can also take the form of consolidation through numerous instruments of power diversification (Amundsen, 2006). The process here is that political power is transformed to economic power through the appropriation of economic advantages made possible by political position.

This trend explains why military officers, legislators, governors, and other high profile public office holders, wield significant influence on contracts and subsidies, and the reasons for their involvement in political corruption. Political corruption among the ruling class is well captured under the principal-agent theory (Groenendijk, 1997). This model posits that the agents – political leaders, military personnel and public officials, serve to safeguard the expressive interests of the principal – government, power brokers within the military circle, legislators and ministers. Besides, the agents in some cases engage in corrupt transactions, to secure their personal interests to the detriment of the benefits of the principal (Groenendijk, 1997). This model is quite significant to this study, not only because it explains the formation of ruling elites and the realpolitik of corruption, but also based on the fact that it provides fundamental mechanisms to curb corrupt practices among the criminally minded group, which in a way, will foster peace and security. It explains the politico-economic power trajectory of corrupt ruling elites in Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

Marx's Economic Determinism

This is a socio-economic theory that uses economic power as a basis for the explanation of societal and political activities in the society. It posits that economic relationships such as ownership of means of production or capitalist, or being a worker or proletarian, control, shape, underpin, and

define political, social, cultural, intellectual and technological aspects of human existence (Coleman, 1960). Karl Marx (1818-1883), a German philosopher, sociologist and economist, is the most prominent theorist of economic determinism (Coleman, 1960). To him, human society is embedded with perpetual struggle among divided groups whose relative political power is determined by the nature of the economic system. Specifically, Karl Marx stresses the deplorable condition of the proletariats who are locked down in a class struggle with the exploitative capitalist class. In the ensuing struggle, the subjugated workers are abused, exploited and used as tools to achieve capitalist's goal.

Having being used by the capitalists, the proletariats become poor, impoverish and vulnerable to harsh socio-economic realities. A proletariat's poverty, according to this model, is not natural or exquisitely designed but rather, a direct corollary of capitalism and the dominance of the means of production by a few corrupt elites (Fleischer, 1973). The capitalist is in a race for perpetual accumulation of material effects, to the detriment of the proletariats, who are, by obligation, trapped in the service of the former. This theory is relevant to the study because it emphasizes the selfish expressive interests of a few corrupt ruling elites, who choose to demean and exploit their workers, and destabilize the society through corrupt practices, instead of fostering peace and stability. The next section will focus on the relationship between economic determinism and the intractability of Boko Haram terrorism.

Intractability of Boko Haram Terrorism: An Economic Determinism Perspective

In the north eastern part of Nigeria, there is no violent group, which has created more socio-economic disruptions than the Boko Haram terrorist's organization. Since July 2009, when a bloody violent clash between the Nigerian Police and the sect erupted, and the subsequent capture and extra-judicial killing of Yusuf Mohammed, the leader of the sect, the region has known no peace (Crisis Group, 2014). In 2015, according to the Global Terrorism Index (2016), Boko Haram was the deadliest terrorist group before it was overtaken by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Till date, the insurgents have unleashed systematic campaigns of bombings, kidnappings and drive-by shootings on several government and civilian targets. The group is one of the four deadliest terrorist organizations (others being ISIL, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda) responsible for 72 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2015 (Global Terrorism Index, 2016). In fact, within ten years of violent activities, the jihadi group had destroyed thousands of human lives and properties, and displaced more than two million persons (Assanvo, Abatan & Sawadogo, 2016). In 2018, a study carried out by Shehu Musa Yar'Adua Foundation shows that over 1,639 violent attacks have been perpetrated by the Boko Haram group, with 14,436 fatalities, 6,051 injured victims and 2,063 hostages across the northeast region of the country (Shehu Musa, 2018).

The above worrisome situation of the Nigerian state, in terms of wanton killings, kidnapping, and the elusiveness of peace and security, significantly drew foreign attention. In 2012, in the wake of the trans-nationalization of Boko Haram terrorism, the scope of the Multinational Joint Task Force which comprises Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger, was enhanced to combat the terrorism activities of the group (Falode, 2016; Willibroad, 2018). In addition to this West African counterterrorism initiatives, the United States of America, United Kingdom, France, China and Colombia have, at different times, assisted the Nigerian Army in combating terrorism. In 2014, after the abduction of Chibok schoolgirls, the U.S. supplied the Nigerian Army with trucks and equipment for rescue mission (Embassy, 2014). Freeing the Chibok girls yet was another difficult task as cooperation seems

to be lacking, due to mutual distrust and the infiltration of the military by Boko Haram. The U.S., on its part, became wary of sharing raw intelligence data, while the Nigeria Army failed to provide useful information that might assist U.S. drone flights in locating the abducted girls (Schmidt, 2014). While it is glaring that there was poor synchronization of ideas and information between the U.S. and the Nigeria Army, the former, continue to maintain extensive security relationship with the latter. In September 20, 2015, America announced a military utility package of up to \$45 million, for training and other support, for the states within the Sahel (Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad), which were involved in the fight against Boko Haram (Reuters, 2015).

Like the U.S., France and the United Kingdom had a similar disposition in assisting in the war against the insurgents. They both sent trainers and material assistance to support the cause of counterterrorism in Nigeria. France deployed 3,000 troops in the region for combating the terrorists (Haaretz, 2014), while the United Kingdom provided a five-year emergency assistance package of \$259 million (Robertson, 2017). Besides the technical and emergency (financial) packages from the international community given to the Nigerian government and/or the military, in order to wage a successful counterterrorism against terrorism in the north east, military budget has spiked exponentially. It is patent to astute observers that there is a significant increase in funds mapped out for combating insurgents.

For example, defence budget was \$1.99 billion in 2010, \$2.38 billion in 2011, \$2.32 billion in 2012, \$2.42 billion in 2013, and \$2.36 billion in 2014 (Central Bank of Nigeria, n.a.). In 2015 and 2016, the allocations dropped to \$2.07 billion and \$1.72 billion respectively. In 2017 the budget was \$1.62 billion, chalked to \$2.04 in 2018, in 2019, it rose to \$2.15 billion, and in 2020 it was about \$2.20 billion (Blueprint, 2019). In spite of these huge funds available for marshalling counterterrorism in Nigeria, the war continues to protract or appears to be an unending debacle. Although, the military has enough weapons and ammunition, and financial capability to pursue the war, studies have shown that the Nigerian soldiers are poorly equipped compared to Boko Haram terrorists, who are said to be parading a more sophisticated weaponry (Franklin, 2019).

In addition, according to research the Nigerian soldiers are not adequately maintained and fed. Public opinion in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa and beyond seems to focus on “deliberate act of corrupt elites” as the underlining factor for the intractability of Boko Haram terrorism. Being abreast with the fact that other factors such as religion, ethnicity and bad governance, which already have been examined in extant literature, this study, based on the unfolding corrupt practices within the rank and file of the Nigeria Army, particularly on matters of procurement of arms and other necessary modern gadgets of war, will further the cause of knowledge on this subject by engaging business perspective or economic interpretation in understanding the seemingly unending nature of Boko Haram terrorism.

Having shown in the preceding paragraphs of this section, that the war against Boko Haram is not over, and that the several financial packages and initiatives of the international community, and the massive military budget, have not translated to the defeat of insurgency, the remaining part will focus on the analysis of the role of economic theory of history in the elongation of Boko Haram terrorism. It will provide the indices of economic forces embedded in the war against insurgents and how this affect counterterrorism. Over a decade, the Nigeria military has not been able to successfully win the war against terrorism. A more plausible factor for the explanation of this protracted entanglement between the Nigerian troop and insurgents is the capitalist exploitative structure being sustained

by a group of corrupt elites, who rather than pursuing national interests of the country, in terms of peace and security, are, in a brazened disposition, using entrusted power for private gain. This trend could be traced back to the several years of military rule in Nigeria which created the foundation for this anti-development phenomenon (Crisis Group, 2016). The emerged coup leaders, during their administration, exploited political offices and instituted a culture of plunder. They created a notion that officers are interested only in plunder, and subsequently promoted the abuse of fundamental human rights and repression as a means of alienating the public (Said, 2001).

Counterterrorism has become a business venture or a money-making machine for a few corrupt persons. The arms industry and/or procurement section under the Ministry of Defence are fields that are prone to corruption (Barry, 1997). Corruption in these sectors cut across both developed and developing states of the world. Since arms trade, like any other form of exchange of goods, is a matter of demand and supply, both the seller and the buyer are embedded in corruption. The western nations where most of the arms are being produced are involved in bribery for increased patronage from buyers in developing states, while the latter who are recipients of arms, inflates funds and even purchase inadequate and inferior equipment during procurement processes in order to earn personal gain, at the expense of peace and security (Henriksson, 2007). Arms trade and/or procurement of arms are businesses of conspiracy, which in some cases have the support of the government (Henriksson, 2007). In 2002, Donald Rumsfeld, America's Secretary of Defence, gave a noteworthy example of corruption and self-aggrandizement of officials in charge of arms, when he said, "according to some estimates we cannot track \$2.3 trillion in transactions, ... \$2.3 trillion – that is \$8,000 for every man, woman and child in America (CBS News, 2002)."

In Africa, the arms sector is widely bedeviled with corruption. Bribery, inflation of invoice and procurement of below standard commodities are phenomenal in everyday situations, from the bottom up to the highest offices (Transparency International, 2002). According to Statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, approximately 50 per cent of all bribes worldwide are issued in the defence sector (Transparency International, 2002). The African continent made up an estimate of 11 per cent between 1998 and 2001 and 4.4 per cent during 2002-2005 (Congressional Research Service, 2006). An estimated 10 % of the value of arms procurement of deals is a bribe, which sometimes makes up as much as 30-50 per cent worth of the arms deals (Transparency International, 2002). According to Henriksson Emma (2007), if corruption is evident in most of African arms transactions, the financial value of bribes for the period 1998-2005 would have been up to \$1.375 million. The value of bribes involved in arms procurement is capable of not just achieving the goal of counterterrorism but also lifting millions of Africans out of poverty (Henriksson, 2007).

In Nigeria, arms procurement and security votes fuel corruption, as they provide corrupt officials with an easy-to-use and entirely hidden slush fund (Vanguard, 2018). Corrupt practices in the Ministry of Defence have shown that economic determinism plays a major role in the unending war against insurgency. Since the sector is very vital and must be well funded in order to attain peace and security in the nation, corrupt officials and other criminally-minded elites, see it as conduit circuit to accumulate wealth and established their hegemony in the country's political terrain. According to Transparency International (2018), a networking of corrupt elites comprising of politicians, military chiefs and contractors work together to embezzle more than 3.1 billion naira through arms procurement contracts between 2008 and 2017.

Cases of Contract Scandals in Nigeria

Several examples of contract scandals on arms procurement and Nigerian military generals facing trials for corruption, abound in the Nigerian Defence Ministry. These instances are discussed below:

- a. *Progress Limited "Gift" Scandal*: In April 25, 2005 to October 19, 2010, the Ministry of Defence awarded two purchase contracts to Progress Limited. The company supplied 42 units of BTR-3U Armoured Carriers, and spare parts for the Nigeria Army. This transaction has no agreement between the firm and the military, and was not documented by the ministry. The two parties did not have any form of negotiation. Surprisingly, two years later, 26 used APCs were supplied. These "tokunbo" or fairly used APCs had fault almost immediately after they were deployed for peacekeeping operation in Sudan (Vanguard, 2018).
- b. *The Amit Sade Contracts*: In October 6, 2008, an Israeli contractor, a non-arms dealer was awarded supply contracts to the tune of 5.2 billion naira. Two supplies were to be made to the Nigeria military. First, the company was to supply "assorted ammunition" which cost 2.1 billion naira, while the second was to deliver 20 units of K-38 twin hull boats, at the cost of 3.1 billion naira. In respect to the ammunition, the dealer was paid 95 per cent but he only brought a 63 per cent worth, while for the K-38 hull boats, Amit Sade received cash of 80 per cent upfront but supplied only 40 per cent. Within the last decade, Amit Sade had received about six heavy-weight military contracts worth 6.721 billion naira. Shockingly, the contractor did not make delivery on any of these contracts. And there is no evidence of refund of cash whatsoever (Vanguard, 2018).
- c. *The Shaldag Contracts Scandal of 2010*: Although the above aforementioned scandals revealed the messy dealings of the Nigeria Army in the fight against terrorism, the shaldag scandal gave rise to a regime of kleptocracy in the Nigerian Defence sector, and the emergence of a criminal gang that has grown to be more powerful than elected regimes. In 2010, an Israeli ship builder Israeli Shipyards, won a \$25 million contract to deliver two fast assault boats to the Nigerian Navy. The actual market value of each boat was approximately \$5 million, which implies that two boats will cost \$10 million. Unfortunately, Nigeria lost a huge sum of \$15 million to a gang. According to the Israeli Police, Amit Sade, the middleman, got a share of \$1.47 million as brokerage fee, while three persons faced trial in Israel over the fraudulent transaction (Ogala, 2018).
- d. *Dasukigate Scandal of 2013*: Sambo Dasuki, the National Security Adviser to President Goodluck Jonathan was the lynchpin in the phantom arms scandal, involving the theft of USD 2.1 billion meant for the procurement of arms or equipment for operation Boyona, aimed at dislodging terrorists' camps along the borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The fund which was specifically designated for the purchase of 12 helicopters, 4 fighter jets and ammunition, later developed wings and flew away. Like other arms deals, Dasuki controlled the procurement with no supervision and virtually no input from the Defence Headquarters. Report from investigation carried out by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) show that the two companies, with previous record of non-performance, in-charge of the delivery never supplied any weapon. The EFCC report shows that beneficiaries of the arms scandal included a large number of senior military officers, politicians, government officials and businessmen, and their families (Transparency International, 2018).

- d. *South African Arms Procurement Scandal*: In September 5, 2014, a huge sum of \$9.3 million belonging to the Nigeria government was seized by South African border authorities from two Nigerians and an Israeli who arrived in a private jet of one of the richest Nigerian pastors, Ayo Oritsjafor. The Nigerian government did not distance itself from deal but rather admitted that the fund was for the acquisition of black market arms for the Nigerian military. The question is, is Oritsjafor's private jet being used by the government for commercial purpose or is the pastor an agent, working for the government? This shows the secrecy of arms deal and the nature of operation of the syndicate involved in arms procurement in Nigeria (Ogala, 2018).
- e. *Cash in Bullion Vans for Special Services*: Between November 2014 and February 2015, President Goodluck Jonathan authorized the withdrawal N67.2 billion in cash from the Central Bank of Nigeria for "special services" in connection to defence and security operations. According to investigation embarked upon by EFCC under the Buhari administration in 2016, the funds could not be accounted for (Ogala, 2018).
- f. *Missing N7 billion Boko Haram Fund*: In January 2015, Nurudeen Mohammed, the then Minister of State Foreign Affairs, requested N7 billion to support counterterrorism. Basically, the fund was needed to urgently promote the operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin. The said money was released to the National Security Adviser, however, it remains unclear how the cash was used. Infact, most of the funds were traced to companies that had no business with the task force. After the withdrawal of N1.5 billion in cash, the remaining N5.5 billion, according to report disappeared, and was only tagged missing (Transparency International, 2018).
- g. *Santa NIMASA Scandal*: This arms procurement scandal took place between September 3, 2014 and April 30, 2015. During this period, the leadership of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) and some other corrupt persons were involved in the theft of N8.3 billion. NIMASA paid out the sum of N8.3 billion to the Joint Task Force Operation Pulo Shield – the military unit combating insurgency in the Niger Delta. While over 70 per cent of the funds (N6 billion) were converted to US dollars and handed over to an unknown "private citizen", the remaining, a balance of N2.3 billion could not be accounted for (Transparency International, 2018).
- h. *Ikoyi Scandal*: In April 12, 2017, \$43.4 million was found in the Defence Chief's wife's apartment in Ikoyi, Lagos. The defence chief claimed the cash was meant for undisclosed special security and defence projects. Granted that the cash was actually for special security matters, the motive for lodging same in Ikoyi apartment remains unclear and indicative of the theft of government funds primarily meant for arms procurement (Transparency International, 2018). Against the backdrop of the above scandals, several arrests of actors such as Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirika, Lt. General Kenneth Minimah, Air Vice Marshal Alex Badeh, Major General Atewe Emmanuel, and many other politicians and businessmen, who were directly or indirectly involved have been carried out by the Buhari's administration. Although his government has also been vilified for similar scandals, he has, through his anti-corruption campaign, investigated the theft and other travesties within the Ministry of Defence, and also demonstrated that self-aggrandizement and personal expressive interests had, for over the years, affect counterterrorism and by extension made peace and security elusive (Transparency International, 2018). Besides, in 2016, President Muhammadu Buhari instituted an

investigating panel. The committee found out that of the 513 contracts awarded at the of USD 8,356,525,184,32 (2,189,265,724,404,55 naira) and EUR 54,000,00; Fifty-three (53) were failed contracts (contracts with no goods or services delivered) which amounted to a loss of USD 2,378,939,066,27 and 13,729,342,329,87 naira respectively, and that these failed contracts occurred between 2007 and 2015 (Fasan, 2016).

It could be deduced from the above that military officers in-charge of arms procurement signed several contracts and allocated funds without detailing tenders, agreements, proper accounting, or indeed any actual acquisitions to show for the contracts. The prevailing culture has been that of free flow of funds without the formality of contracts, and the disbursement of such funds between the lynchpins and other officers, politicians, heads of real or fake companies to whom contracts were awarded. This phenomenal criminality has been a major factor for the repeated failures of the Nigerian army in combating terrorism. Though senior military officers, initially denied that Boko Haram insurgents outgunned federal troops and/or severely under-equipped, it was later agreed by these officers the Nigerian troops lacked basic equipment. For example, Sambo Dasuki, in his statement when responding to questions from journalists, admittedly said, “we bought equipment, but alas, it is still on the high seas (Jimoh, 2016).”

Implications of Exploitative Dispositions of Corrupt Elites

Selfish interests and the ensued corrupt practices within the ruling elites have inestimably undermined the desired peace and stability and/or security in the north eastern part of Nigeria. The capitalist structure and exploitative tendencies of the ruling cabal will continue to affect the search for peace. As fear and uncertainty engulf the region, socio-economic activities continue to dwindle, as both local and international investments find the region to be a dangerous terrain for successful undertakings. In addition, this group of people, through mindless exploitation of financial resources, have impaired development process within the region. Not only is the area being underdeveloped and stricken with poverty and despair, it is highly dreaded and being avoided for its volatility. That still, the nefarious activities of these few corrupt officers have colossal consequences of Nigeria's budding democracy. Their inanities infringe on democratic principles of fundamental human rights, accountability, responsiveness and good governance.

Blueprints for Peace and Sustainable Security

For a successful counterterrorism which will invariably translate to a peaceful and secure society especially in the north east, and thus stimulate growth and development, the state must embark on massive socio-economic and infrastructural development of the region. Unemployment and an austere economic terrain have been major drivers of the conflict. In fact, Boko Haram has leveraged on these to delegitimize the government and provide alternative source of livelihood to the people of the region. It has even been shown that Boko Haram provides small-scale loans to families of its members and the surrounding communities where it established itself before being displaced in 2016. Other measures that the state must introduce into its counterinsurgency programme includes:

- a. *Integrity*: This has to do with observance of ethical standards and moral values of uprightness, professionalism and justice, which are cornerstones of successful counterterrorism and development. The veracity of actors in-charge of arms procurement may play a significant role

in ameliorating selfish expressive interests and/or corrupt practices. There is the need for the application of national integrity standards for all public officials through by-law or a generic code of conduct outlining the standards and expectations for good behavior of civil servants (OECD, 2013). The national government should be involved in the process of developing, updating and diffusing the code of conduct, and also provide tailored advice, supervision, concrete models of supporting the execution of the code and monitoring outcomes.

- b. *Transparency*: For a levelling playing field business and any other form of transaction, there is the need for transparency, basically because it stimulates accountability and guarantees access to data. Government should ensure that adequate and timely information about upcoming contracts as well as agreement notices and information about the status of ongoing procurement process are made known to the public. Information such as average procurement duration, justification of exceptions and specific overview records by type of request procedure should be made available for scrutiny by external bodies (OECD, 2015).
- c. *Stakeholder Participation*: To significantly fix corruption in the Ministry of Defence, government should adopt an open system of participation in procurement process. A large range of concerned institutions or shareholders such as anti-corruption agencies, private sector, the media, civil society and the general public should be involved in procurement procedures. In addition, there is the need for open and regular dialogue with suppliers and business associations in order to reinforce mutual understanding of factors shaping public markets (OECD, 2015).
- d. *Digitalized Procurement*: To reduce theft of funds, and at the same time promote transparency and accountability, government should deploy Information and Communication Technology during arms procurement process. E-procurement has the capability to lessen direct interface between procurement executives and firms and enable easy detection of anomalies and fraud. This approach will strengthen internal anti-corruption control system, detect integrity breaches and provide audit services trials that may facilitate investigation process (OECD, 2015).
- e. *Control and Monitoring*: Apart from supporting accountability and promoting integrity, control and monitoring provide access to valuable evidence on the performance and efficiency of the procurement cycle. Government should monitor and control procurement cycle so as to have insights on new and emerging risks or red flags. In addition to this, administering certain sanctions, following the discovery of illicit behavior may become an effective tool for deterrent.

CONCLUSION

Deduced from the above, we submit that the intractability of Boko Haram terrorism, is largely a function of economic theory of history. And that peace and security in north eastern part of the country are elusive majorly due to economic forces which manifest in form of unbridled corrupt practices including but not limited to: inadequate procurement of equipment/weapons, sabotage/espionage activities within the rank and file of the Nigeria Army and embezzlement of funds meant for the implementation of war. Therefore, defeating Boko Haram insurgents, and more importantly restoring peace, security and stable environment for development projects in the region, require an overhauling of the procurement department defence ministry. There is the need for a rethink of leadership disposition on issues such as integrity, information management, transparency, proactive stance, accountability and openness of procurement dealings, digitalization of arms procurement and oversight and control.



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