



This is a repository copy of *The impact of monetary policy on M&A outcomes*.

White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:

<https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/178119/>

Version: Accepted Version

Article:

Adra, S. orcid.org/0000-0002-0187-2607, Barbopoulos, L.G. and Saunders, A. (2020) The impact of monetary policy on M&A outcomes. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 62. 101529. ISSN 0929-1199

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101529>

© 2019 Elsevier B.V. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in *Journal of Corporate Finance*. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>).

Reuse

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long as you credit the authors, but you can't change the article in any way or use it commercially. More information and the full terms of the licence here: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/>

Takedown

If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.



eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
<https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/>

The Impact of Monetary Policy on M&A Outcomes*

Samer Adra^a
University of Birmingham

Leonidas Barbopoulos^{b,x}
University of Edinburgh

Anthony Saunders^c
New York University

Abstract

Monetary policy influences a wide range of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) outcomes. First, an increase in the federal funds rate predicts a negative market reaction to M&A announcements, an increase in the likelihood of deal withdrawal, and significant financing challenges for the acquirer in the post-acquisition phase. Second, M&As announced during periods of high monetary policy uncertainty are associated with significant declines in acquirer value. This negative market reaction reflects a unique discount to compensate for the high riskiness of M&As in an uncertain monetary environment. Finally, we show that monetary contraction, rather than monetary policy uncertainty, is a key contributor to the decline in aggregate M&A activity.

Keywords: Federal funds rate; Expected financing cost; Monetary policy uncertainty; Real options; Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As); Acquirer abnormal returns; M&A completions.

JEL classification: G12; G34; E52.

* We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Douglas Cumming (the editor), two anonymous reviewers, and the participants of the IFABS 2018 Chile Conference on Financial Decisions in a Changing Global Environment, Chile, Santiago, December 2018, the 15th INFINITI Conference on International Finance, Valencia, Spain, June 2017, and the 6th Paris Financial Management Conference, Paris, France, December 2018. The authors are also grateful for comments and suggestions offered by Yakov Amihud, Patricia Chelley-Steeley, Giogo Sertsios, and Jeffrey Wurgler. We also thank Professor David Denis and Professor Antonio Macias for generously sharing with us their Material Adverse Change Clauses dataset. Any remaining errors are ours.

^a Samer is from the University of Birmingham, Birmingham Business School, Edgbaston, UK, B15 2TY, UK. Email: s.adra@bham.ac.uk.

^b Leonidas is from University of Edinburgh, Business School, 29 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh EH8 9JS, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 131 650 8344. Email: leonidas.barbopoulos@ed.ac.uk.

^c Anthony is from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Kaufman Management Center, 44 West Fourth Street, New York, NY 10012. Email: asaunder@stern.nyu.edu.

^x Corresponding author.

1. Introduction

Monetary policy is widely understood to affect the cost of financing (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Jiménez et al., 2012) and the informational content of asset prices (Beaudry et al., 2001; Tommasi, 1994). In influencing the direction of the economy, monetary policymakers generally operate under few constraints and have a far-reaching impact compared to other policymakers (Taylor, 2000). For example, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, central banks engaged in unprecedented monetary expansions, significantly expanded their balance sheets, and lowered short term interest rates to zero for a considerable period of time, with very limited political resistance (Maggio and Kacperczyk, 2017). In addition, monetary policy can complicate resource allocation decisions, encourage risk-taking, and build hidden sources of risk that eventually raise financing challenges for investors (Beaudry et al., 2001; Jiménez et al., 2014; Maggio and Kacperczyk, 2017; Tommasi, 1994). Moreover, the decisions of monetary policymakers have different effects across regions (Carlino and DeFina, 1998) and sectors (Jansen et al., 2013), leading to significant consequences on the investment and financing opportunities available to firms.

As a result, monetary policy is unlikely to be ignored when corporate managers assess new investment opportunities and, in particular, when considering their involvement in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) transactions. Undoubtedly, M&As represent a major form of corporate investment, expansion, and restructuring that is valuation-complex, financially demanding, and informationally intense (Eckbo, 2009). Moreover, the synergies of M&As are highly dependent on the prevailing state of the overall economy, which is heavily influenced by monetary policy decisions (Galí and Gambetti, 2015; Summers, 2014).

Recent studies suggest that policy uncertainty incentivizes acquirers to be more prudent when designing M&As (Bonaime et al., 2018; Nguyen and Phan, 2017). Nevertheless, the direct impact of monetary policy conditions on (a) equity investors' assessment of the value potential of M&As, (b) the riskiness of such value potential, (c) the likelihood of M&A completion, and (d) the overall M&A synergies, remains to be thoroughly studied. Based on the analysis of a comprehensive sample covering 12,350 domestic U.S. public, private, and subsidiary target M&As announced between January 1986 and December 2017 – a period of considerable variation in monetary policy in the U.S. – we uncover two channels through which variations in monetary policy can influence M&A outcomes.

Our first channel is the “expected financing cost” channel. A well-established result in the monetary policy literature suggests that monetary tightening increases the cost of financing and reduces the viability of corporate investments (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Bougheas et al., 2006; Jiménez et al., 2012). Therefore, our “expected financing cost” channel predicts that tight monetary policy at the time of M&A announcements poses future financing challenges for merging firms (Beck et al., 2008; Ozkan, 2001). Given that M&As exhaust significant financial resources (Moeller et al., 2005), post-acquisition financing of future business operations becomes highly dependent on access to external financing. We therefore predict that, in a contractionary monetary environment, M&A announcements tend to be negatively perceived by equity investors, especially when acquirers are financially constrained at the time of M&A announcements. We also predict that acquirers investing significant resources in M&As during contractionary monetary periods experience an increase in their post-acquisition financing costs, a reduction in their cash reserves and an overall decline in their shareholder wealth.

We use two proxies to reflect the impact of monetary policy via the “expected financing cost” channel: (a) the level of federal funds rate (FFR), and (b) the deviation of FFR from the natural interest rate – as estimated by Laubach and Williams (2003).¹ Our tests show a negative relation between the FFR at the time of the M&A announcement and acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). More specifically, a one percentage point increase in FFR (or in the deviation of FFR from the natural rate) in the quarter preceding the deal’s announcement is, on average, associated with a 0.20% decrease in the acquirer CAR. We show that the FFR effect on acquirer CAR remains statistically and economically significant after controlling for the effects of financial market uncertainty using the VIX index as in Bhagwat et al. (2016) and overall uncertainty in the economy using the composite leading index estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. This negative market reaction is particularly driven by investors’ concerns about a rise in future financing costs that the acquirer will potentially face in a contractionary monetary environment. Supporting this explanation, we find that the negative relationship between the level of FFR and the acquirer CAR is particularly evident in deals that are announced by highly leveraged acquirers as well as those having low cash ratios.

Furthermore, we show that the rise in FFR is a key predictor of the deterioration in the acquirer’s post-acquisition performance: a one percentage point increase in FFR is associated with a 1.5% reduction in the acquirer’s post-acquisition Return on Assets (RoA). A rise in FFR is also associated with an increase in the acquirer’s indebtedness, a reduction in its cash (to assets) ratio and a rise in its cost of debt. We also show that deals announced during periods of monetary contraction are associated with a significant decline in the acquirer’s post-acquisition Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR).

¹ The measures are updated frequently on John Williams’s Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco webpage. This measure is derived from a frequently updated state space model in which the natural rate of interest is the state variable ensuring that the realized output is equal to its potential level while preserving price stability.

Our second monetary policy channel is a “real options” channel which assesses the impact of monetary policy uncertainty (MPU) on a wide range of M&A outcomes. The “real options” framework considers irreversible investments as equivalent to financial call options that can be either exercised or delayed at any point in time (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Kellogg, 2014). As long as the investment is not undertaken, the firm holds a “wait and see” option as it awaits the arrival of new information to adjust its investment plans (Kelly, 1991). As in the case of financial option valuation, a rise in market uncertainty increases the value of the option to “wait and see”. Other things being equal, rising MPU should encourage firms to delay major investments such as M&As (Bhagwat et al., 2016; Bonaime et al., 2018). This is especially due to the far-reaching influence of monetary policy on the economic environment in which merging firms aim to realize their synergies (Carlino and DeFina, 1998; Summers, 2014).²

Along these lines, acquirers that abandon the option to “wait and see” and proceed with an acquisition face significant business risk, and equity investors should demand a significant discount for holding the acquirers’ shares. Our results support this proposition. We find that an increase in the MPU index developed by Baker et al. (2016) (hereafter BBD index) at the time of the deal’s announcement is a significant predictor of the decrease in the acquirer CAR. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the news-based MPU index of Baker et al. (2016) at the time of the deal’s announcement is, on average, associated with a 0.40% decline in the acquirer CAR. We also find that deals announced under high MPU tend to cause higher volatility in the acquirer returns than

² Beaudry et al. (2001) and Tommasi (1994) argue that price instability adversely affects the allocation of investments through a depreciating effect on the informational content of asset prices. High MPU is expected to distort price signals in asset markets, make investment opportunities difficult to forecast, and ultimately lead to misallocation of investments (similarly to Beaudry et al., 2001). This is also likely to defer investments at a future date. We embed this result in the market for corporate control. We argue that price instability triggered by high MPU limits the acquirer’s ability to accurately forecast and evaluate takeover synergies and, hence, M&As announced within high MPU environments should be value-destroying for acquirers, at least in the short run.

deals announced under low MPU. Nevertheless, in line with the traditional risk-return paradigm, we find that acquirers manage to overcome these challenges to deliver significant gains in the post-acquisition period. This result supports the view that MPU and its related risks are short-lived (Byrne and Davis, 2004) and do not deter companies from attempting to engage in value-enhancing investment (Kang et al., 2014).

We also investigate the extent to which monetary policy considerations influence both the premium and the choice of contractual tools used in M&As. Specifically, we find that high MPU reduces the bargaining power of the acquirer and consequently results in an increase in the takeover premium. Moreover, high MPU during the due diligence period reduces the target's commitment to the deal, as evidenced by the limited inclusion of target termination fee provisions. This result is aligned with the influential body of literature suggesting that the inclusion (absence) of a termination fee provision reflects a weak (strong) bargaining position for the target firm (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Boone and Mulherin, 2007; Officer, 2003).³ Our results further show that a tight monetary policy – because it raises concerns about the acquirer's future financing and liquidity positions – reduces the likelihood of the use of deferred (or earnout) payments (Barbopoulos and Adra, 2016; Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000).

Our results highlighting the significant impact of FFR on M&A outcomes are highly consequential from the perspectives of both policymakers and scholars interested in the monetary policy's transmission channels. A growing strand of studies examines how monetary transmission mechanisms can operate via the corporate financing and investment decisions (Bolton and Freixas, 2006; Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2018). Our M&A-based findings add a new corporate channel via which monetary

³ It is worth noting that the literature focused on the wealth effects of termination fee provisions in M&As does not examine the influence of policy uncertainty on the use of such contractual tools.

policy influences economic activity. Given that the size of the recent merger wave is equivalent to almost 15% of the annual U.S. Gross Domestic Product (Alexandridis et al., 2017), the direct impact of monetary policy decisions on the market for corporate control should not be overlooked by monetary policymakers. Another direct implication of our “expected financing cost” channel is that corporations, especially those in disadvantageous leverage and liquidity positions, must display prudence when engaging in M&As in a contractionary monetary environment.

To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first direct examination of the link between MPU at the time of the deal announcement and the wealth effects of M&As. It is worth noting that the size of the MPU discount is generally unique: there is no equivalent discount associated with the uncertainties related to fiscal, regulatory, and trade policies, among others. This uniqueness emphasizes the relevance of MPU as a distinctive and influential source of corporate risk, beyond the challenges posed by general policy concerns.

Prior studies provide alternative conclusions. Bonaime et al. (2018) report a univariate analysis suggesting that the acquirer announcement period CAR does not differ between high and low policy uncertainty periods. By contrast, Nguyen and Phan (2017) report multivariate evidence suggesting that high policy uncertainty in the period leading to the acquisition announcement incentivizes acquirers to proceed with only value-enhancing acquisitions. In their online appendix, they also show that part of the BBD index that is based on the level of disagreement in the forecasts of government spending and Consumer Price Index (CPI), which Baker et al. (2016) attribute to the uncertainty surrounding fiscal and monetary policies, is a significant predictor of the rise in the acquirer CAR.

Our paper differs from Nguyen and Phan (2017) in two key aspects. First, instead of focusing on the aggregate BBD index that combines fiscal and monetary uncertainties, our empirical analysis focuses on the news-based index that exclusively reflects monetary policy concerns. This direct approach is relevant as Boero et al. (2008) – and subsequently Rich and Tracy (2010) – cast doubts on the usefulness of CPI forecast disagreements in reflecting MPU.

Second, our analysis separates MPU during the period leading to the deal's announcement from the level of MPU prevailing at the time of this announcement. Our findings add a new dimension by showing that, despite the acquirers' prudence in assessing their deals' prospects in the face of uncertainty, the prevalence of MPU at the time of the deal's announcement makes equity investors highly cautious in assessing the M&A prospects. This finding testifies to the relevant and unique influence of monetary policy.

The final part of the paper applies a time series analysis of the impact of monetary policy on the aggregate M&A activity. Both Kang et al. (2014) and Gulen and Ion (2016) find no effect of the BBD index component that combines monetary and fiscal uncertainties on corporate investment. Our results support these findings in the realm of M&A by showing that it is general policy uncertainty, rather than MPU per se, that contributes to the decline in M&A activity. Nevertheless, a tight monetary policy – by increasing the cost of investment financing (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Jiménez et al., 2012; Kashyap et al., 1993) and reducing the aggregate economic output (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Romer and Romer, 1989) – reduces the value prospect of M&As. Our VAR model shows that FFR is a significant contributor to the decline in aggregate M&A activity after controlling for the prevailing level of MPU and a wide range of economic factors. Moreover, the impulse response analysis suggests that a

rise in FFR predicts a decline in the aggregate value of announced M&As for the following five quarters.

This result has direct implications for the body of research that focuses on the determinants of aggregate M&A activity (Harford, 2005; Maksimovic et al., 2013; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). While prior research focuses on the role of stock market valuations, technological shocks, and regulatory factors in influencing M&A activity, our results are the first to emphasize the influential role of the variation of FFR. In so doing, our results establish a novel link between two rich – yet mostly non-overlapping – areas of study that focus on M&As and monetary policy, respectively.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the M&A dataset, as well as the proxies we use to capture the stance of the monetary policy; Section 3 presents our results from the univariate and multivariate tests; Section 4 presents results from our time series analysis; and finally, Section 5 provides a conclusion.

2. Data and Descriptive Statistics

2.1. The M&A dataset

Our M&A dataset covers 12,350 U.S. public, private, and subsidiary target acquisitions announced by U.S. public companies between January 1, 1986 and December 31, 2017, and recorded by the Thomson ONE Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. As in Adra and Barbopoulos (2018), our analysis is executed on domestic deals in order to ensure that both merging firms operate within the same economic, legal, and institutional frameworks. Leveraged buyouts, government-funded takeovers, acquisitions of government entities, going-private deals, spinoffs, privatizations, self-tenders, and reverse takeovers are excluded from the sample. As in prior studies

(Alexandridis et al., 2013; Barbopoulos et al., 2018), we require the acquirer to own less than 10% of the target shares before the acquisition announcement and to aim to control more than 50% of the target shares after the deal's completion. We keep only deals with transaction values, excluding fees, in excess of \$1m, as well as acquirers with market capitalization (available from COMPUSTAT and CRSP) in excess of \$1m. We also exclude deals announced by the same acquirer within a five-day window. Finally, we impose the restriction that the method of payment (stock, cash, a combo of cash and stock, or alternative payment arrangements) is available in SDC.

Table 1 presents the annual distribution of all M&As, which is further divided according to the target firm's listing status, deal's completion status, and deal's payment method, as well as acquirer and target industry relatedness. The overall M&A activity follows a pro-cyclical pattern, with notable peaks in the late 1980s and late 1990s, as well as in the mid-2000s, in addition to significant declines in the aftermath of the dotcom bubble and the 2008 financial crisis. In our sample, 12% of the deals are withdrawn, which is comparable to the corresponding statistics reported in prior studies (Kau et al., 2008; Luo, 2005). More than half of our deals are private target acquisitions, with the remaining ones evenly split between public and subsidiary targets. Moreover, 41% of the deals are settled in mixed payments of cash and stock, while the deals fully settled in cash and in stock represent 32% and 27% of the sample, respectively. Sector-wise, untabulated statistics show that the hi-tech sector has the biggest share of deals (21%), while the real estate sector represents only 1% of all M&As. Finally, 37% (63%) of the deals are industry diversifying (focused).

(Insert Table 1 about here)

2.2. The interest rate dataset

We use two proxies to reflect the impact of monetary policy on M&A outcomes via the expected financing cost channel: (a) the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) and (b) the deviation of FFR from the “natural rate of interest” – as measured by Laubach and Williams (2003).

Building on the seminal work by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), FFR has become the most widely used measure of monetary policy’s stance. We follow the convention of treating variations in the policy-set funds rate as an indicator of the variation in the monetary policy’s stance. For each deal, the level of the FFR in the quarter preceding the deal’s announcement is used as a proxy for the monetary policy’s direction.

We use the interest rate variable developed by Laubach and Williams (2003) as a proxy for the natural interest rate. The method used in estimating this variable is based on the traditional view of Wicksell that “there is a certain rate of interest on loans which is neutral in respect to commodity prices, and tends neither to raise nor to lower them” (Wicksell, 1936, p.36). Accordingly, the estimates of the natural rate in Laubach and Williams (2003) are the result of a simple – yet robust – state space model in which the deviation of the policy-set rate from the natural rate is a key contributor to the variation in the output gap. Laubach and Williams (2003) model the dynamics of inflation and output within a restricted VAR by jointly estimating an “unobservable” natural interest rate, potential output, and trend growth rate series. Their model explains the variations in the output gap and the inflation rate in terms of the lagged effects of these state variables using both the Kalman filter and the Stock and Watson (1998) median-unbiased estimator. The advantage of their methodology is that it does not involve a priori theoretical models or structural equations while, at the same time, allowing for a time-varying natural rate which can be used in the assessment of policy rules. The authors

provide both one-sided and two-sided estimates of the natural rate. The one-sided estimates at time t are based solely on information available at time t without using data from subsequent periods. The two-sided estimates, however, are generated by a two-sided filter that uses data from both before and after time t to compute expected values of the natural rate.

Figure 1 shows the variation in the policy-set FFR and the two-sided smoothed estimate of the natural interest rate. For the period between 1961 and the end of 2001, the graph depicts the same variations discussed in Laubach and Williams (2003). This graph highlights key periods of relatively easy monetary policy in the early 1960s, monetary tightening to combat inflationary pressures in the 1970s and early 1980s, and limited monetary easing in the mid-1990s. Figure 1 also depicts a considerable degree of monetary easing in the early 2000s, which is in line with the widely held view that monetary policy was excessively loose after the burst of the dotcom bubble.

(Insert Figure 1 about here)

Moreover, Figure 1 shows that both the natural and the policy-set rates have been downward sloping up to the point where they have converged at substantially low rates. This noticeable decline is treated as an indicator of a dramatic change in macroeconomic environment, as a zero lower bound prevents monetary policy from achieving its objectives and raises the necessity for demand-driven policies. Furthermore, low interest rates with low inflation incentivize investors to take riskier and more financially destabilizing positions (Summers, 2014).

In our analysis, we use the difference between FFR and the two-sided smoothed natural interest rate as a measure of the monetary policy's stance. This approach provides a new interpretation for monetary shocks. A positive (negative) difference indicates the presence of an excessively expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy.

2.3. Monetary policy uncertainty (MPU)

In estimating the impact of policy uncertainty on investment decisions, previous research (Bonaime et al., 2018; Gulen and Ion, 2016; Kang et al., 2014; Nguyen and Phan, 2017) employs the BBD index developed by Baker et al. (2016). This index is the normalized weighted average of three components: (a) a scaled news-based factor constructed using the number of news articles containing uncertainty-related keywords (such as “uncertain,” “White House,” “Congress,” and “Regulation”), (b) a measure based on the discounted value of the revenue impacts associated with tax provisions set to expire in the near future, and (c) an estimate of the dispersion in economic forecasts related to government spending and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Baker et al. (2016) attribute the variation in the latter component to the uncertainty driven by concerns related to fiscal and monetary policies.⁴

Baker et al. (2016) also construct a rich set of news-based indices that directly quantify the level of uncertainty associated with each policy category. For instance, the categorical index used as a direct proxy for MPU is based on the frequency of keywords such as “federal reserve,” “the fed,” “open market operations,” and “quantitative easing” used in the Access World News database, which covers over 2,000 U.S. newspapers. Similarly, the categorical news-based index used as a direct proxy of fiscal policy uncertainty is constructed by tracking the mentions of terms such as “government spending,” “federal budget,” “budget battle,” “balanced budget,” and “fiscal stimulus.” In addition to monetary and fiscal policy uncertainty subcategories, Baker et al. (2016) construct news-based indices for taxes/government spending, healthcare, national security, entitlement programs, regulation, financial regulation, trade policy, sovereign

⁴ In calculating the aggregate policy uncertainty index, the first component is assigned a weight of 1/2, the second component is assigned a weight of 1/6, and the third component is assigned a weight of 1/3.

debt, and currency crises. Each categorical series is normalized to have a mean of 100. The reader can consult Baker et al. (2016) and the website (<http://www.policyuncertainty.com/>) for a detailed description of the construction of each of these indices.

Figure 2 presents the time variation in the general policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) and the news-based monetary policy index, both available on the webpage (www.policyuncertainty.com). Despite the predictable positive correlation between these two indices, Figure 2 shows that MPU experienced a significant spike compared to general policy uncertainty during the period following the October 1987 stock market crash. Closer patterns are also present in the aftermath of the dot com bubble. Moreover, while MPU stabilized between 2011 and 2013 as the Federal Reserve clarified its response to the financial crisis, general policy uncertainty reached an all-time high. Baker et al. (2016) attribute the spike in the latter uncertainty to events such as the fiscal cliff dispute, the debt ceiling debate, and the U.S. government shutdown.

(Insert Figure 2 about here)

In assessing the impact of policy uncertainty on M&A outcomes, previous research uses the policy uncertainty levels for an extended period preceding an acquisition's announcement. In their analysis of the effect of policy uncertainty on the acquirer CAR, Nguyen and Phan (2017) use the average level of the BBD index for the three calendar months at the end of the calendar year preceding the announcement of the M&A. In their robustness checks, they also include the average level of the policy uncertainty index for the three months preceding an acquisition's announcement. However, it is important to note that the level of MPU varies significantly in the short term (Byrne and Davis, 2004).

Given that our analysis aims to uncover the impact of MPU at the time of the deal's announcement on M&A outcomes - including the acquirer announcement period CAR -

we construct the variable “Announcement MPU”. If the deal is announced after (before) the 15th of a given calendar month, the “Announcement MPU” variable is assigned the value of the BBD news-based MPU index for the same (previous) calendar month. This approach ensures that our analysis controls for the effect of MPU on the market’s reaction to a deal’s announcement in a timely fashion. It is worth noting that our results do not change qualitatively or quantitatively if either the 10th or 20th day of the month is used as the cut-off date.

To ensure that our analysis controls for the effect of the MPU on the design and structuring of the deal, we also construct the variable “Pre-Announcement MPU” which is the average level of the news-based MPU index from 12 to 2 months before the acquisition announcement.

2.4. Descriptive statistics

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables entering our cross-sectional tests. Appendix 1 provides a detailed description of each of the variables. We report the mean and median levels for each of the variables, as well as their 25th and 75th percentiles. Moreover, we report the mean level for each variable during periods of high MPU and low MPU, as well as differentials between both means. We consider deals to be subject to high (low) MPU when the level of the variable “Announcement MPU” is higher (lower) than its median level in our sample. Similarly, given that the median annual change in FFR in our sample is zero, we consider deals announced at a time when this variable is higher (lower) than this median to be subject to monetary contraction (expansion).

(Insert Table 2 about here)

The results provide several key insights. First, acquirers in deals announced during periods of high MPU are smaller and have higher book-to-market valuation compared to acquirers of deals announced during periods of low MPU. Second, deals announced under high MPU are considerably smaller than deals announced under low MPU. Interestingly, equivalent differences in both acquirer and deal size are present between deals announced under monetary contraction versus monetary expansion. Moreover, in the spirit of Bonaime et al. (2018), this result supports the notion that acquirers with high market valuations, and hence more takeover opportunities, limit their involvement in the takeover market to relatively small deals during periods of high MPU.

The descriptive statistics also suggest that acquirers differ between periods of monetary contraction and monetary expansion in terms of their cash and leverage ratios. More specifically, acquirers in periods of monetary contraction have lower indebtedness and higher cash ratios than acquirers in periods of monetary expansion. Additionally, acquirers under monetary expansion seem to experience noticeable relative declines in the level of net interest payment to total liabilities. This result provides some support to the view that monetary policy directly affects the acquirer's cost of financing in the post-acquisition period.

In our multivariate tests later in the paper, we put more emphasis on the role of the acquirer's pre-acquisition financial position in influencing various M&A outcomes. Moreover, the changes in deal- and firm-specific characteristics between periods of high and low MPU – and periods of monetary contraction and expansion – raise the requirement to apply a matching-based strategy to ensure that the differences in observable factors do not affect our inferences.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1. Univariate tests

Table 3 presents results from our univariate tests on acquirer CAR. We group deals according to the change of FFR (contractionary as a positive change of FFR in the current quarter relative to the previous quarter vs. expansionary as a negative change of FFR during the same period) and the extent of MPU (low when the MPU is below the median level vs. high when the MPU is above the median level). For each of the days in the five-day window ($t - 2$ to $t + 2$) surrounding the M&A announcement day ($t = 0$), we estimate the abnormal returns as:

$$AR_{i,t} = R_{i,t} - E(R_{i,t}) \quad (1)$$

where: $AR_{i,t}$, is the abnormal return to acquirer i at day t , $R_{i,t}$ is the stock return of acquirer i , and $E(R_{i,t})$ is the expected return of acquiring firm i on the same day. The expected returns are estimated using the Fama and French (1996) three-factor model (3FF) as in Equation (2) below:

$$E(R_{i,t}) = (1 - \hat{\beta}_i)R_{f,t} + \hat{\beta}_i E(R_{m,t}) + \hat{\beta}_i^{smb} E(SMB_t) + \hat{\beta}_i^{hml} E(HML_t) \quad (2)$$

The parameters $\hat{\beta}_i$, $\hat{\beta}_i^{smb}$, and $\hat{\beta}_i^{hml}$ are estimated over days $t - 250$ to $t - 20$.

$$(R_i - R_f)_t = \alpha + \beta_i(R_m - R_f)_t + \beta_i^{smb} SMB_t + \beta_i^{hml} HML_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (3)$$

The announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR_i) for acquirer i is estimated as the sum of the risk-adjusted returns over the five-day window ($t - 2$ to $t + 2$) surrounding the M&A announcement day ($t = 0$), as outlined in Equation (4) below:

$$CAR_i = \sum_{t=-2}^{t+2} AR_{i,t} \quad (4)$$

Panel A reports the effect of expansionary vs. contractionary monetary policy on the acquirer CAR. Acquirers in deals announced in the aftermath of monetary contractions

(i.e. an increase in FFR from the previous year) are associated with CAR that is 0.79% lower than the equivalent CAR in deals announced in the aftermath of monetary expansion (i.e. a decrease in FFR from the previous year). Unreported results show that this decline in acquirer CAR is driven by acquisitions of private (difference of -0.62%) and subsidiary target firms (difference of -1.81%) rather than by acquisitions of public target firms (difference of -0.15%). Previous research emphasizes the valuation difficulties associated with unlisted (private and subsidiary) target M&As due to the target firm's opaque financial environment (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers and Ang, 2001). This result provides initial support to the view that equity investors consider deals announced under monetary contraction to be poorly timed with significant valuation difficulties. Further multivariate analysis will examine how both acquirer CAR and various post-acquisition performance- and financing-related variables are influenced by the monetary policy's stance.⁵

(Insert Table 3 about here)

Equally important evidence is presented in support of the “real options” channel. Panel B provides results from univariate tests of the acquirer CAR in periods of low vs. high MPU. Deals announced during a month where the MPU is higher (lower) than the median announcement period MPU in our sample are classified in the high (low) MPU group. Our results show that M&As announced during periods of high MPU reduce value creation in the short run. In particular, acquirers in deals announced during periods of high MPU experience 0.49% significantly lower CAR relative to deals announced during

⁵ Unreported results further show that the lower acquirer CAR from M&As announced during contractionary monetary policy periods, relative to expansionary ones, is driven by mixed-settled acquisitions (difference of -1.08%). We justify this based on results uncovering a strong association between monetary tightening and acquirer CAR, which is more pronounced in relatively large acquisitions. Equity investors are cautious in their assessment of relatively large deals, which are documented by Boone et al. (2014) to be highly likely to be settled in mixed payments during periods of monetary tightening. Overall, the “expected financing cost” channel is supported through our univariate tests, suggesting that M&As announced during periods of contractionary monetary policy tend to be value-destroying (significant at the 1% level), relative to M&As announced during periods of expansionary monetary policy.

periods of low MPU. In the following subsection, we refine this initial univariate evidence by examining how MPU influences the likelihood of deal withdrawal, the riskiness of the acquirer's returns, and the post-acquisition shareholder value.

3.2. Multivariate analysis

3.2.1. The "expected financing cost" channel

The key prediction of the "expected financing cost" channel is that a rise in the policy-set interest rate predicts significant future financing challenges for the acquirer. These concerns manifest in a negative market reaction to the acquirer CAR upon the deal's announcement. To assess the impact of the monetary policy's direction on the acquirer's CAR, we report eight models in Table 4. We include the FFR and the deviation of FFR from the natural rate as separate proxies for the direction of monetary policy. The models have different specifications and are estimated on samples of different sizes. Models (1) and (2) are baseline specifications in which we exclusively control for firm- and deal-specific factors in addition to industry effects. Model (3) controls for the effect of the overall market volatility, as in Bhagwat et al. (2016), and the overall uncertainty related to the economic activity, which is represented by the value of the U.S. leading index. The latter variable is estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia via a Vector Autoregression model that predicts the future values of the U.S. coincident indicators. The VAR model includes variables such as state-level housing permits (1 to 4 units), state initial unemployment insurance claims, delivery times from the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread between the 10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill. The sample in this model is limited to the post-1990 period to ensure the availability of the VIX index values. Model (4) is a more comprehensive specification as it includes variables reflecting the acquirer pre-

acquisition performance, leverage, and cash ratios. Appendix 1 provides a detailed description of all variables.

Models (1) to (4) in Table 4 show that the annual rise in FFR in the quarter preceding the acquisition's announcement predicts a decline in acquirer CAR. Put simply, a one percentage point increase in FFR is, on average, associated with around a 0.15% decline in acquirer CAR. Similarly, a one percentage point increase in the deviation of FFR from its natural rate is, on average, associated with a 0.25% decline in acquirer CAR. Models (5) to (8) further show that the impact of FFR on acquirer CAR is more pronounced in M&As announced during periods of monetary contraction, rather than monetary expansion. Moreover, despite the deviation of FFR from its natural rate being significant in both periods, it is worth noting that the negative effect during monetary contraction is twice as large as its equivalent under monetary expansion.⁶

(Insert Table 4 about here)

To support the proposition that the negative effect of FFR on acquirer CAR is driven by concerns about financing and liquidity challenges, we examine how the relation between FFR and CAR varies under different leverage and liquidity regimes. We expect the negative influence of monetary tightening on acquirer CAR to be more pronounced in M&As where the acquirer has a (a) high level of leverage, and (b) low cash ratio, before the acquisition. Evidence from Table 5 supports this prediction. More specifically, the effects of FFR and the deviations of FFR from the natural rate are statistically significant

⁶ An anonymous reviewer highlighted the importance of controlling for the impact of financial advisors in the deal. We re-estimate our models on the subsample of deals for which advisor information is available in SDC (4,832 observations) and control for the presence of a top-tier advisor in the deal. The key additional independent variable is assigned the value of 1 if the acquirer's advisors include any of the following companies: Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch (now Bank of America Merrill Lynch), Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Citi/Salomon Smith Barney, Credit Suisse First Boston, Lehman Brothers (now Barclays Capital), and Lazard, and 0 otherwise. The advisors are labelled as Top-Tier by Golubov et al. (2012) based on their market share of takeover deals. We find that the presence of these advisors adds, on average, 1.30% additional acquirer CAR. More importantly, our results related to the effect of monetary policy on the acquirer CAR remain unchanged.

only for companies that are highly leveraged (in Models (1) and (2) compared to Models (3) and (4)). When we divide the deals according to the acquirer's pre-acquisition cash ratios, we also find that the effects of FFR and its deviation from the natural rate on the acquirer CAR are statistically significant only for acquirers with low pre-acquisition cash ratios (Models (5) and (6) compared to Models (7) and (8)). It is also worth noting that our results are consistent if the top (bottom) 30% of deals are used to classify acquirers under high (low) debt and cash ratios.⁷

(Insert Table 5 about here)

We provide further support to our proposition that the negative effect of FFR on acquirer CAR reflects the market's view about the acquirer's post-acquisition financing and liquidity challenges. We examine the effects of FFR (and its deviation from the natural rate) on a wide range of post-acquisition outcomes in Table 6. According to the "expected financing cost" channel, M&As announced under high levels of FFR should lead to a deterioration in the acquirer's post-acquisition performance, a rise in stock riskiness, an increase in indebtedness, a reduction in cash reserves, and an increase in the cost of servicing debts. All these propositions are strongly supported in the models reported in Table 6.

(Insert Table 6 about here)

In particular, evidence from Models (1) and (2) (Panel A) suggests that a one percentage point increase in FFR or its deviation from the natural rate is, on average, associated with a 1.30% to 1.70% decline in the rate of change in the acquirer's RoA in the year following the acquisition's announcement. The evidence from Models (3) and (4)

⁷ The comments raised by an anonymous reviewer help us provide a complementary explanation for this result. In particular, hedging against interest rate movements is costly for acquirers that are highly leveraged and/or in weak liquidity positions. These constraints to hedging against interest rate risk intensify the market's concerns about the deal's prospects and are consequently reflected in lower announcement period acquirer CAR.

(Panel A), in turn, suggests that the rise in FFR and its deviation from the natural rate increase the difference in the level of acquirer indebtedness to total assets after the acquisition. To highlight the economic magnitude of this effect, it is worth noting that M&As announced during periods where FFR is at its 90th percentile in our sample are associated with a 4% increase in their debt ratios compared to deals in the 10th percentile of FFR. Unreported results also suggest that this effect is larger (6%) for deals in which the deal value is more than half of the acquirer's pre-acquisition market valuation.

Models (5) and (6) (Panel A) successfully highlight the significant negative impact of monetary contraction on the acquirer's cash ratios. More precisely, the decline in the acquirer's cash ratio in response to M&As announced during periods where FFR is at its 90th percentile in our sample is 25% larger than the decline in the acquirer's cash ratio for deals announced when FFR is at its 10th percentile. Models (7) and (8) (Panel A) further support the view that monetary tightening increases the acquirer's cost of financing in the post-acquisition phase. Specifically, both FFR and its deviation from the natural rate are significant predictors of the increases in the difference between the value of net interest payments to total debt after the acquisition's announcement compared to its level in the calendar year preceding the acquisition. Models (9) and (10) (Panel A) (Table 6) further highlight the contribution of monetary tightening to the increases in the level of risk that the acquirer faces in the post-acquisition period.

Put together, the deterioration in accounting performance, rise in debt and its cost, deterioration in liquidity, and the increased level of risk testify to the highly consequential impact of the monetary policy's direction on the outcomes in the market for corporate control. Given the considerable size of the M&A market and its consequential impact on employment, technological innovations, and financial markets,

our findings highlight an important monetary transmission channel that policymakers need to be cognizant of.

Results reported in Panels B and C (Table 6) show that the deterioration in RoA and the increase in debt and stock riskiness can be avoided by acquirers who ensure an early cancellation of the deal. In particular, the negative impact of FFR on RoA and the positive effects of FFR on the change in the debt levels and stock riskiness become insignificant in cases when the deal is withdrawn within less than a quarter after its announcement (Panel B). In contrast, these effects are highly significant in cases when the deal is either completed or cancelled in later stages.

The evidence reported in Table 7 reflects the impact of FFR and its deviation from the natural rate on a deal's likelihood of withdrawal. In a nutshell, our results suggest that the challenges arising from a contractionary monetary policy incentivize acquirers to withdraw the deal. In particular, the rise in both FFR (Models (1) and (3)) and the deviation of FFR from the natural rate (Models (2) and (4)) significantly predict a higher likelihood of deal withdrawal. This predictive effect holds after controlling for a wide range of firm- and deal-related factors, in addition to the levels of overall economic and financial market uncertainties using the value of the Leading Index and the VIX, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, these results are the first to extend the literature on the determinants of deal withdrawal (Kau et al., 2008; Luo, 2005) by focusing on the critical role of monetary policy.

(Insert Table 7 about here)

3.2.2. The “real options” channel

The “real options” channel predicts that acquirers engaging in M&As during periods of high MPU, and thus exercising the “wait and see” option, expose themselves to an

additional source of risk, at least in the short run. The evidence reported in Table 4 (Models (1) to (4)) supports this key prediction: a one standard deviation increase in the news-based MPU index of Baker et al. (2016) at the time of the deal's announcement is, on average, associated with a 0.40% decline in the acquirer CAR.⁸ As discussed in Section 1, this evidence is quite distinct from the results reported in previous studies (Bonaime et al., 2018; Nguyen and Phan, 2017), mainly because the MPU index that we use is (a) news-based rather than driven by CPI and government spending projections, and (b) focused on the month of the deal's announcement independently from the extended period of pre-acquisition due diligence.

Interestingly, evidence from Models (5) to (8) (Table 4) suggests that the negative effect of MPU on acquirer CAR is particularly focused in periods of monetary expansion rather than monetary contraction. The exclusive presence of the MPU discount under monetary expansion, to a large extent, complements the results of Maggio and Kacperczyk (2017). Given that expansionary monetary policy incentivizes companies to invest in highly risky projects that are likely to cause significant losses if interest rates increase (Maggio and Kacperczyk, 2017), equity investors seem to display high caution in reacting to M&As in an uncertain monetary environment in which interest rates might increase in the near future.

The overall evidence from Tables 6 and 7 supports the general view that the challenges arising from MPU are relatively manageable by acquirers. In line with the risk-based explanation, the evidence reported in Models (9) and (10) (Table 6) suggests that a rise in the announcement period MPU increases the average riskiness of the acquirer's

⁸ An anonymous reviewer recommended further detailed examination of the direction in MPU rather than the level of the MPU index. Hence, in alternative estimations, we include the change in the MPU (Δ MPU) as an independent variable. This variable is estimated as the difference between "Announcement MPU" and "Pre-Announcement MPU". The effect of this variable on the acquirer CAR is found to be negative, statistically significant, and economically close to the negative effect of the "Announcement MPU" on the acquirer CAR. These results are available from the authors upon request. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

shares in the period following the acquisition's announcement compared to the level of pre-acquisition risk. When it comes to the influence of MPU on the likelihood of deal withdrawal, Table 7 provides initial evidence (Models (1) and (2)) suggesting that the rise in MPU predicts an increase in the likelihood of deal withdrawal. However, this effect fades after controlling for the levels of financial market uncertainty using the VIX index and the level of overall economic uncertainty (Models (3) and (4)).

3.2.3. Propensity score matching and buy-and-hold returns

We apply the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985, 1984; Smith and Todd, 2005) to examine whether our results related to the wealth effects of the monetary policy's stance are driven by observable characteristics. In the spirit of Alexandridis et al. (2017), we use the propensity scores estimated via a Logit model to produce close matches of deals announced under monetary contraction to deals announced under monetary expansion.⁹ On the matched sample, we estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (*ATT*).

In Table 8, we present the results of our PSM analysis. The dependent variable in our Logit model (Panel A) is assigned the value of one if FFR increased on a yearly basis in the quarter preceding the acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise. We use the propensity score estimates from the Logit model to match treated observations (deals under monetary contraction) to control ones using a caliper of 0.001. In line with Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we allow each control observation to be used more than once.

The *ATT* estimated from Panel B (Table 8) is negative (-0.50%) and significant at the 5% level. Acquirers announcing deals under monetary contraction realize, on average,

⁹ It is essential to note that, in the context of this investigation, PSM is not used as a treatment predictor but rather as a balancing mechanism to ensure that the deals on the matched sample are relatively comparable in terms of observable covariates.

0.50% lower announcement period CAR than acquirers announcing their deals under monetary expansion. This treatment effect is relatively close to the effect reported earlier in our univariate analysis in Table 3 (Panel A).

We also assess the effect of monetary contraction on the acquirer's post-acquisition shareholder gains. For each matched pair of deals, we estimate the Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHAR) as the difference between the acquirer's cumulative shareholder gains under monetary contraction compared to the gains in a matched deal under monetary expansion during the 12-month period following the deal's announcement, as described in Equation (5):

$$\begin{aligned}
 & BHAR_{i,Monetary\ Contraction} \\
 &= \prod_{t=1}^{t=12} (1 + R_{Monetary\ Contraction,t}) - \prod_{t=1}^{t=12} (1 + R_{Monetary\ Expansion,t}) \quad (5)
 \end{aligned}$$

The evidence presented in Panel B (Table 8) suggests the deals announced under monetary contraction experience a significant negative post-acquisition drift in returns compared to deals announced under monetary expansion. In particular, acquirers involved in deals in the former group realize, on average, 4% lower post-acquisition returns than acquirers in the latter group. These findings highlight the significant challenges that acquirers face under monetary contraction as they fail to provide gains to their shareholders as a compensation for the increased riskiness in the business environment.

Panel C (Table 8) highlights the success of the matching exercise in balancing both the propensity score estimates and the key observable variables between the treated and the control groups. More specifically, none of the differences between the observable covariates in the treated and control groups is statistically significant at the 10% level on the matched sample.

(Insert Table 8 about here)

In Table 9, we re-apply our PSM analysis to the comparison between the acquirer CAR in deals announced under high and low MPU. The dependent variable in the Logit model of Panel A is assigned the value of one if the variable “Announcement MPU” exceeds its median level in our sample, and zero otherwise. The results of the matching analysis (Panel B) are also consistent with our univariate analysis of the acquirer CAR: acquirers announcing deals under high MPU realize, on average, 0.81% less acquirer CAR than acquirers announcing their deals under low MPU.¹⁰

(Insert Table 9 about here)

For the acquirer’s post-acquisition gains, our matching-based findings suggest that acquirers under high MPU experience a positive drift in their returns compared to acquirers under low MPU. In the 12-month period that follows the acquisition’s announcement, acquirers under high MPU manage to realize 3% higher cumulative gains relative to acquirers in comparable deals under low MPU. This result supports the view that equity investors’ concerns about the timing of the M&A under the “real options” channel are short term phenomena (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001). During the post-acquisition period, acquirers seem to be able to deliver significant gains to their shareholders.¹¹

Overall, our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between the direction of monetary policy on the one hand, and the degree of uncertainty surrounding this

¹⁰ Panel C (Table 9) also highlights the success of matching in balancing the key observable covariates. Put together, the evidence from Tables 8 and 9 shows that our results are not influenced by observable differences in firm- or deal-related characteristics.

¹¹ We further examine how the positive effect of the announcement period MPU on the acquirer’s post-acquisition BHAR varies with the acquirer’s size. In untabulated results, we find that this positive effect is stronger in the acquisitions announced by small acquirers. This positive effect gradually declines as the acquirer’s size increases. To a large extent, these results are aligned with the findings of Moeller et al. (2004) suggesting that acquisitions announced by small companies are not hubris-driven and hence are better designed to increase the acquirer’s shareholder value. In the context of our study, this result implies that, once the temporary uncertainty associated with monetary policy is resolved, M&As designed by small acquirers are better suited to increase shareholder wealth compared to M&As designed by larger acquirers.

policy, on the other. While a contractionary monetary policy has a negative impact on the acquirer's shareholder returns in both the short and medium terms, MPU tends to have a temporary negative effect on the acquirer's shareholder wealth only in the short term.

3.2.4. Is the effect of MPU unique?

Our emphasis at the beginning of Section 1 is on the uniqueness of the challenges posed by MPU. We attribute this uniqueness to the far-reaching impact of monetary policy decisions on both the economy and financial markets (Maggio and Kacperczyk, 2017). We also emphasize the limited constraints that monetary policy decision-makers face (Taylor, 2000). This makes monetary policy decisions, and the uncertainty associated with such decisions, highly consequential for (a) companies considering new investments and (b) equity investors assessing the economic prospects of such investments. In this section, we provide an empirical examination of our proposition on the uniqueness of monetary policy challenges. In particular, we examine whether other news-based uncertainties related to the subcategories discussed by Baker et al. (2016) affect various M&A outcomes in similar ways to those of MPU.

In Table 10 (Panel A), we re-report the previously estimated coefficient of MPU on the acquirer CAR. We also estimate the effects of ten policy uncertainty indices on the same M&A outcome. These news-based policy uncertainty indices are related to general fiscal policy (taxes or spending), taxes, spending, healthcare, national security, entitlement programs, regulation, financial regulation, trade policy, and finally sovereign debt/currency crises. Each of these indices is based on the frequency of mentions of policy-specific terms in the Access World News database. For instance, the index associated with trade policy uncertainty is positively correlated with mentions of terms

like “import tariffs,” “import duty,” “import barrier,” “government subsidies,” “government subsidy,” and “wto,” among others.

The coefficients reported in Panel A (Table 10) suggest that, after controlling for the effect of MPU, none of the alternative news-based policy uncertainty indices has an effect on the acquirer CAR that is equivalent to the effect of MPU. General fiscal policy uncertainty and the specific uncertainties related to taxes, spending, national security, regulations, and financial regulations are not associated with significant declines in the acquirer CAR. Moreover, contrary to the case of MPU, equity investors do not require significant discounts when facing uncertainties related to healthcare and entitlement. These investors rather put their trust in the acquirers’ ability to navigate such challenges, which leads to a rise in the announcement period CAR. This result supports Nguyen and Phan’s (2017) conjecture that a rise in policy uncertainty incentivizes acquirers to be highly prudent in the design of their acquisitions.

(Insert Table 10 about here)

The only exception reported in Panel A is the case of the uncertainty associated with sovereign debt and currency crises. Specifically, equity investors seem to require a discount in response to a rise in such uncertainty. Two aspects of these effects are worth noting. First, the magnitude of the uncertainty discount in the case of sovereign debt and currency crises is considerably smaller than the case of MPU. The coefficient associated with the former uncertainty category (-0.0009) is considerably smaller than the coefficient associated with MPU (-0.006). Second, concerns about sovereign debt and currency crises are not necessarily independent from the actions of monetary authorities. Hence, a reasonable explanation for the small uncertainty discount associated with sovereign debt and currency crises is that this negative market reaction is, to some extent, an extension of equity investors’ concerns about monetary uncertainty on a global scale.

In Panel B (Table 10) we expand our multivariate analysis by including the first principal component of the remaining policy categories (*PC1 Others*) as an additional regressor in examining the variation in the acquirer CAR. The construction of this principal component is described in Appendix 1. After controlling for the significant negative effect of MPU, the general inference from the four reported models is that neither *PC1 Others* nor its interactions with MPU have any significant influence on the acquirer's announcement period CAR. Put together, these results support our main conjecture that the effect of MPU on the acquirer CAR is not necessarily moderated by uncertainties associated with other policy categories.

3.2.5. Calendar year fixed effects

The next step in our cross-sectional tests aims to examine whether the wealth effects associated with the variables referring to the stance of the monetary policy are conflated by calendar year fixed effects. We address this issue in Table 11, where we present two models that combine monetary policy variables and calendar year fixed effects. To examine the additional effects associated with monetary policy variables, we run a Wald test. In each model we impose the restriction that all the coefficients associated with the variables related to the stance of the monetary policy are jointly equal to zero. This restriction is decisively rejected in the two reported models. We also impose the restriction that all the calendar year fixed effects are jointly equal to zero. Interestingly, this restriction is not easily rejected. The corresponding p-values in Models (1) and (2) are 0.08 and 0.11, respectively. Overall, our results show that the stance of the monetary

policy at the time of the deal’s announcement are highly relevant, and their effects are not captured by simple calendar year controls.¹²

(Insert Table 11 about here)

3.2.6. The effect of monetary policy on the premium and contractual provisions

We extend our analysis by examining how monetary policy influences the variation in both the premium paid and the choice of contractual tools. With regards to the premium, Bonaime et al. (2018) find that high general policy uncertainty increases the bargaining power of the target firms and allows them to extract high takeover premia. The evidence that we report in Table 12 (Models (1) and (2)) shows that MPU has a qualitatively similar influence on the takeover premium. In particular, the rise in MPU, both in the period covering due diligence (i.e., “Pre-Announcement MPU”) and the period covering the announcement (i.e., “Announcement MPU”), predicts a rise in the takeover premium. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the “Pre-Announcement MPU” predicts a 6% rise in the takeover premium. Moreover, the short term rise in MPU at the time of the deal’s settlement also predicts a rise in the premium, yet a smaller one. A one standard deviation rise in MPU at the time of the deal’s announcement predicts a 1% increase in the takeover premium.

An established array of studies investigates the use of the target termination fee provision in the acquisition deal (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Chapple et al., 2007; Coates, 2009; Coates and Subramanian, 2000; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Officer, 2003). This provision requires a target deciding not to proceed with the deal to pay a pre-specified sum (a fee) to the acquirer (Bates and Lemmon, 2003). In the realm of M&A, Bonaime et

¹² Our monetary policy’s effects reported across the paper do not change if we include calendar year fixed effects in the models.

al. (2018) report that a rise in general policy uncertainty reduces the likelihood of using termination fee provisions. They interpret their result as evidence that high policy uncertainty increases the bargaining power of target firms and limits their requirement to commit to a deal. Our MPU-based results support this interpretation: Logit Models (3) and (4) show that the rise in the MPU during the due diligence phase reduces the likelihood of the presence of termination fee provision in the deal.

Models (5) and (6) (Table 12) extend our analysis to study whether the choice of deferred (earnout) payments by merging firms is affected by the monetary policy's stance. By including an earnout provision in the deal, the acquirer defers a part of the deal payment and links its settlement to the target firm meeting certain pre-determined performance-based goals (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers and Ang, 2000; Reuer et al., 2004). Earnout provisions are usually used by financially constrained acquirers trying to overcome the valuation and information asymmetry challenges in their deals (Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000).

Accordingly, earnouts might be an effective tool for acquirers in a contractionary monetary environment. However, a contractionary monetary policy can tighten the acquirer's financing constraints and might limit their ability to commit to deferred payments. Hence, target firms can reject the deferral of a significant part of the payment, and might prefer that their deal payment be fully settled at the time of the deal's announcement. Our results are consistent with this interpretation. Specifically, a rise in both FFR (Model 5) and the deviation of FFR from the natural rate (Model 6) significantly reduce the likelihood of using deferred payments. These findings enhance the rich body of literature that focuses on the determinants of the inclusion of earnout provisions. While this literature mainly focuses on the role of firm- and deal-specific factors in predicting the use of earnouts (Barbopoulos et al., 2012, 2018; Barbopoulos and Adra,

2016; Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009), our results add a new dimension by emphasizing the critical role of the monetary environment as a key predictor of earnout inclusion in M&As.¹³

(Insert Table 12 about here)

4. Time Series Analysis of Monetary Policy Effects on M&As

In this section, we extend our analysis to examine the time variation in the aggregate M&A activity. In particular, we examine whether the two monetary-policy-related channels that significantly influence the riskiness and wealth effects of M&A (discussed in Section 3) also affect the variation in the aggregate M&A activity over time. We assess the effect of MPU on the aggregate M&A activity in the context of the “real options” channel via which highly irreversible investments are equivalent to financial call options that can be either exercised or delayed at any point in time (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Kellog, 2014). Accordingly, we test whether the rise in MPU is significant to the point where the option to “wait and see” becomes highly valuable to deter companies from engaging in M&As. Furthermore, building on our robust cross-sectional evidence highlighting the negative effect of monetary contraction on the acquirer gains in both the short and long run, we test in a time series context whether monetary contraction is a key contributor to the decline in the M&A activity.

¹³ An anonymous reviewer recommended that we examine the impact of monetary policy on the structure of Material Adverse Change (MAC) clauses. A MAC clause provides explicit conditions under which the acquirer can walk away from the deal (Denis and Macias, 2013). We thank Professor David Denis and Professor Antonio Macias who agreed to share with us their dataset that covers deals with MAC clauses between 1998 and 2005. Our analysis shows that monetary tightening reduces the number of MAC clauses. As MAC clauses make the acquirer’s otherwise easy abandonment option void under specified circumstances (Bonaime et al., 2018), a tight monetary policy might raise the acquirer’s concerns about future financing challenges and hence limits its commitment to the inclusion of MAC clauses. We also find that MPU during the pre-announcement period reduces the number of signed MAC clauses in the deal. Potentially, the concerns about future financing challenges when negotiating a deal incentivizes acquirers, who have already agreed to pay significantly high premia, to limit their commitment to MAC clauses.

Our time series analysis is based on a comprehensive sample covering the quarterly levels of M&As in addition to a wide range of economic variables over the period between 1986 and 2017. We present the level of M&A activity as the natural logarithm of the quarterly dollar sum of domestic M&As that satisfy the criteria presented in Section 2. Furthermore, in addition to controlling for the level of general economic policy uncertainty using the Baker et al. (2016) news-based index, our VAR model includes the quarterly level monetary policy news-based index. This variable is assigned the value of the BBD news-based index that is reported for the second month of each quarter. To assess the impact of monetary contraction/expansion on the aggregate M&A activity, our analysis also includes the quarterly level of FFR. As a proxy for general economic expectations, we use the leading index that is reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Following Bonaime et al. (2018), we include Robert Shiller's Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings ratio (first difference) in our estimations. Finally, we control for the effect of aggregate economic conditions via the quarterly level of GDP growth. The variables used in estimating the VAR model are fully defined in Appendix 2.

We estimate a VAR model that combines the variables mentioned above with a one-quarter lag. In Table 13, we report the VAR model equation that explains the variation in the aggregate M&A activity. First, in line with Bonaime et al.'s (2018) results that are based on monthly data, we find that general policy uncertainty is a significant predictor of the decline in the M&A activity. However, our results show that the level of MPU does not influence the M&A activity. Kang et al. (2014) report a qualitatively similar result in their analysis of the impact of MPU on aggregate corporate investment activity. One explanation that they provide for their result is that MPU, and the risks associated with it, tend to be perceived by corporate managers as temporary, hence not requiring them to delay or cancel large investments. Along similar lines, it seems that potential acquirers

are not deterred by the high riskiness associated with MPU when engaging in takeovers. To a large extent, these results are aligned with our cross-sectional evidence from Section 4, whereby acquirers manage to overcome the riskiness associated with MPU to deliver significant post-acquisition gains to their shareholders.

(Insert Table 13 about here)

Second, we find that the rise in FFR is a significant predictor of the decline in M&A activity. The impulse response results presented in Figure 3 support this view by depicting how one Cholesky standard deviation shock in the FFR significantly reduces M&A activity. This aggregate activity takes up to five quarters before starting to recover from the downturn driven by monetary contraction.

Our findings establish a new link between monetary policy and the market for corporate control. In particular, the insignificant impact of MPU on M&A levels does not imply that monetary policy should not be considered an influential factor in the analysis of the variation in M&As. On the contrary, monetary contraction – through its influence on the financing conditions discussed in Section 3 – has a significant and far-reaching negative influence on aggregate M&A value.

Two non-mutually exclusive explanations can be provided for this result. First, monetary contraction tightens the financing constraints of companies (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Jiménez et al., 2012; Kashyap et al., 1993) and leads them to reassess the feasibility of expansionary investments such as M&As. Second, monetary contraction predicts future declines in aggregate output (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Romer and Romer, 1989), which reduces the value creation prospects of potential acquisitions and hence limits engagement in M&As.

(Insert Figure 3 about here)

5. Conclusion

We provide a direct empirical examination of the relationship between monetary policy and the outcomes associated with Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). Such outcomes include the acquirer gains within a small window surrounding the M&A's announcement date, M&A completion rates, and post-acquisition variation in the acquirer's debt, liquidity, and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). Our results suggest that monetary policy influences M&A outcomes via two distinctive channels. First, via the "expected financing cost" channel, we show that deals announced during periods of monetary contraction tend to reduce acquirers' risk-adjusted returns. We show that this reduction in acquirers' risk-adjusted returns reflects the market's concerns about the leverage and liquidity positions in the aftermath of the acquisition. Second, we show that, in the context of the "real options" view of investments, equity investors require a significant discount for holding the shares of companies that engage in acquisitions during periods of high monetary policy uncertainty (MPU). This discount reflects the high riskiness that acquirers face in an uncertain monetary environment: such deals increase the variation in acquirers' post-acquisition returns. Nevertheless, we show that acquirers, on average, manage to overcome the short term challenges associated with high MPU and eventually manage to realize significant post-acquisition gains.

Our time series evidence emphasizes the relevant role of monetary policy in predicting aggregate M&A activity. Our results show that the federal funds rate, rather than monetary policy uncertainty, is the main monetary-policy-related factor influencing the variation in M&As. Evidence from our impulse response analysis suggests that monetary tightening drives a significant reduction in M&A activity for up to five quarters.

Overall, our emphasis on the distinctive impact of monetary policy on a wide range of M&A outcomes provides a novel link between the monetary policy literature and the field of M&A. Further investigation is required to examine the influence of monetary policy and its related uncertainty on a wider range of corporate actions.

Appendix 1 Variables definitions

| Variable | Definition | Source |
|---|--|--|
| CAR (%) | The acquirer's 5-day (-2, 2) announcement period cumulative abnormal returns. The abnormal return in each day is the difference between the acquiring firm's actual returns and the acquiring firm's expected returns estimated using the 3-factor FF (1996) model. | CRSP & Kenneth French Webpage & Authors' Estimations |
| Announcement MPU | The value of the news-based monetary policy uncertainty index at the time of the deal's announcement. If the deal is announced before (after) the 15 th day of the month, the value of the news-based monetary policy index in the previous (same) calendar month is assigned to this variable. | http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ |
| Acquirer Market Value | The acquirer's market value 43 days before the acquisition's announcement. | Compustat |
| Acquirer RoA | The acquirer's return on assets in the calendar year preceding the acquisition's announcement. | Compustat |
| Federal Funds Rate (<i>FFR</i>) | The level of the federal funds rate in the quarter preceding the acquisition's announcement. | Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis |
| Deviation of <i>FFR</i> from Natural Rate | The difference between the federal funds rate and the natural interest rate estimated using the Laubach and Williams (2003) method in the quarter preceding the acquisition's announcement. | Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco |
| Acquirer Book-to-Market | The acquirer's book-to-market value 43 days before the acquisition's announcement. | Compustat |
| Deal Value | The total dollar value of the deal. | SDC |
| Relative Deal Size | The total deal value divided by the acquirer's pre-acquisition market valuation. | SDC |
| Stock Percentage | The percentage of the deal payment that is settled in stock. | SDC |
| Acquirer Toehold | The percentage of the target shares held by the acquirer six months before the acquisition. | SDC |
| PC1 Other | The first principal component of the uncertainties associated with alternative policy subcategories. This principal component has the following loading on the policy subcategories: 0.46 (Fiscal Policy), 0.43 (Healthcare), 0.29 (National Security), 0.42 (Entitlement), 0.35 (Regulation), 0.44 (Financial regulation), 0.08 (trade), and 0.08 (Sovereign Debt), | http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ & Authors' Estimations |
| Pre-Announcement MPU | The average monthly level of the news-based monetary policy uncertainty index between the twelfth and the second month preceding the acquisition's announcement (inclusive). | http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ |
| Acquirer Cash | The acquirer's cash ratio in the calendar year preceding the acquisition. | Compustat |
| Acquirer Debt | The acquirer's debt ratio in the calendar year preceding the acquisition. | Compustat |
| VIX | The monthly value of the VIX index at the time of the deal's announcement. The assignment of the VIX values to the month of the deal announcement follows the same rule that is used in constructing the variable "Announcement MPU". | Bloomberg |

Continued

Continued (Appendix 1 Variables definitions)

| Variable | Definition | Source |
|------------------------------------|--|---|
| Leading Index | The monthly value of the leading index for the U.S. economy at the time of the deal's announcement. This index is the composite of the predicted levels of coincident economic indicators for each state using a VAR model that includes variables related to housing, interest rates, manufacturing, and unemployment. The assignment of the Leading Index values to the month of the deal announcement follows the same rule that is used in constructing the variable "Announcement MPU". | Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Database |
| Private | Dummy=1 if the target is a private firm, and 0 otherwise. | SDC |
| Public | Dummy=1 if the target is a public firm, and 0 otherwise. | SDC |
| Subsidiary | Dummy=1 if the target is a subsidiary firm, and 0 otherwise. | SDC |
| Withdrawn | Dummy=1 if the deal is withdrawn, and 0 otherwise. | SDC |
| Full Cash | Dummy=1 if the deal payment is fully settled in cash, and 0 otherwise. | SDC |
| Full Stock | Dummy=1 if the deal payment is fully settled in stock, and 0 otherwise. | SDC |
| Mixed/Other | Dummy=1 if the deal payment is settled using a mix of cash and stock (or any alternative payment method), and 0 otherwise. | SDC |
| Premium | The difference between the deal value and the target's market value, divided by the latter variable and multiplied by 100. | SDC |
| Diversified | Dummy=1 if the acquirer and the target have different two-digit SIC codes, and 0 otherwise [Focused]. | SDC |
| Δ Acquirer Sigma | The difference between the standard deviation of the errors from the FF 3-factor regression using the acquirer's daily returns in the year following the acquisition and its equivalent level in the year preceding the announcement. | Compustat |
| Δ Acquirer Cash | The difference between the acquirer's cash ratio in the year that follows the acquisition and the corresponding level in the year preceding the acquisition. | Compustat |
| Δ Acquirer Debt | The difference between the acquirer's debt ratio in the year that follows the acquisition and the corresponding level in the year preceding the acquisition. | Compustat |
| Δ Acquirer Interest-to-Debt | The difference between the value of net interest payment as a percentage to total liabilities in the year following the announcement from the equivalent level in the year preceding the announcement. | Compustat |
| Δ Acquirer RoA | The difference between the acquirer's return on assets (RoA) in the year that follows the acquisition and the corresponding level in the year preceding the acquisition. | Compustat |
| Target Termination Fee | Dummy=1 if the deal includes a target termination fee agreement, and 0 otherwise. | SDC |
| Earnout | Dummy=1 if the deal includes a deferred payment, and 0 otherwise. | SDC |

Appendix 2 Time series variables

| Variable | Definition | Source |
|--------------------|---|---|
| Q_FFR | The quarterly level of the federal funds rate. | Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Database |
| Q_MPU | The level of news-based monetary policy uncertainty index at the end of each quarter. | http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ |
| Q_Leading Index | An index estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia via a Vector Autoregression model that predicts the future values of the U.S. coincident indicators. The VAR model includes variables such as state-level housing permits (1 to 4 units), state initial unemployment insurance claims, delivery times from the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread between the 10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill. | Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Database |
| GDP Growth | The quarterly growth in real Gross Domestic Product. | Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Database |
| Δ CAPE | The difference in the level of the Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings ratio between the month at the end of each quarter and the corresponding level of this ratio in the previous quarter. | Professor Robert Shiller's website |
| Policy Uncertainty | The level of the aggregated BBD policy uncertainty index at the end of each quarter. | http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ |
| M&A Value | The dollar value of the total number of M&As announced by public acquirers in each quarter. | SDC |

References

- Abadie, A., Imbens, G.W., 2006. Large Sample Properties of Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects. *Econometrica* 74, 235–267. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00655.x
- Adra, S., Barbopoulos, L.G., 2018. The Valuation Effects of Investor Attention in Stock-Financed Acquisitions. *J. Empir. Financ.* 45, 108–125.
- Alexandridis, G., Antypas, N., Travlos, N., 2017. Value Creation from M&As: New Evidence. *J. Corp. Financ.* 45, 632–650.
- Alexandridis, G., Fuller, K.P., Terhaar, L., Travlos, N.G., 2013. Deal Size, Acquisition Premia and Shareholder Gains. *J. Corp. Financ.* 20, 1–13. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.10.006
- Baker, S.R., Bloom, N., Davis, S.J., 2016. Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty. *Q. J. Econ.* 131, 1593–1636.
- Barbopoulos, L., Adra, S., 2016. The Earnout Structure Matters: Takeover Premia and Acquirer Gains in Earnout Financed M&As. *Int. Rev. Financ. Anal.* 45, 283–294. doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2016.04.007
- Barbopoulos, L., Paudyal, K., Pescetto, G., 2012. Legal Systems and Gains from Cross-Border Acquisitions. *J. Bus. Res.* 65, 1301–1312. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2011.10.029
- Barbopoulos, L., Sudarsanam, S., 2012. Determinants of Earnout as Acquisition Payment Currency and Bidder's Value Gains. *J. Bank. Financ.* 36, 678–694. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.10.007
- Barbopoulos, L.G., Danbolt, J., Alexakis, D., 2018. The Role of Earnout Financing on the Valuation Effects of Global Diversification. *J. Int. Bus. Stud.* 49, 523–551.
- Bates, T.W., Lemmon, M.L., 2003. Breaking up is hard to do? an analysis of termination fee provisions and merger outcomes. *J. financ. econ.* 69, 469–504. doi:10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00120-X
- Beaudry, P., Caglayan, M., Schiantarelli, F., 2001. Monetary Instability, the Predictability of Prices, and the Allocation of Investment: An Empirical Investigation Using U.K. Panel Data. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 91, 648–662.
- Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Maksimovic, V., 2008. Financing Patterns Around the World: Are Small Firms Different? *J. Financ. Econ.* 89, 467–487.
- Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., 1995. Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission. *J. Econ. Perspect.* 9, 27–48.
- Bernanke, B.S., Blinder, A.S., 1992. The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary Transmission. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 82, 901–921.
- Bhagwat, V., Dam, R., Harford, J., 2016. The Real Effects of Uncertainty on Merger Activity. *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 29, 3000–3034.
- Boero, G., Smith, J., Wallis, K.F., 2008. Uncertainty and Disagreement in Economic

- Prediction: The Bank of England Survey of External Forecasters. *Econ. J.* 118, 1107–1127.
- Bolton, P., Freixas, X., 2006. Corporate Finance and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism. *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 19, 829–870.
- Bonaime, A.A., Gulen, H., Ion, M., 2018. Does Policy Uncertainty Affect Mergers and Acquisitions? *J. financ. econ.* 129, 531–558.
- Boone, A.L., Lie, E., Liu, Y., 2014. Time Trends and Determinants of the Method of Payment in M&As. *J. Corp. Financ.* 27, 296–304.
- Boone, A.L., Mulherin, J.H., 2007. Do termination provisions truncate the takeover bidding process? *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 20, 461–489. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl009
- Bougheas, S., Mizen, P., Yalcin, C., 2006. Access to External Finance: Theory and Evidence on the Impact of Monetary Policy and Firm-Specific Characteristics. *J. Bank. Financ.* 30, 199–227.
- Byrne, J.P., Davis, E.P., 2004. Permanent and Temporary Inflation Uncertainty and Investment in the United States. *Econ. Lett.* 85, 271–277.
- Carlino, G., DeFina, R., 1998. The Differential Regional Effects of Monetary Policy. *Rev. Econ. Stat.* 80, 572–587.
- Chapple, L., Christensen, B., Clarkson, P.M., 2007. Termination fees in a 'bright line' jurisdiction. *Account. Financ.* 47, 643–665. doi:10.1111/j.1467-629X.2007.00228.x
- Coates, J.C., 2009. M&A break fees: U.S. litigation versus UK regulation. Harvard Public Law Work. Pap.
- Coates, J.C., Subramanian, G., 2000. A buy-side model of M&A lockups: theory and evidence. *Stanford Law Rev.* 53, 307–396.
- Datar, S., Frankel, R., Wolfson, M., 2001. Earnouts: the effects of adverse selection and agency costs on acquisition techniques. *J. Law, Econ. Organ.* 17, 201–238. doi:10.1093/jleo/17.1.201
- Dehejia, R.H., Wahba, S., 2002. Propensity score matching methods for nonexperimental causal studies. *Rev. Econ. Stat.* 84, 151–161. doi:10.1162/003465302317331982
- Denis, D.J., Macias, A.J., 2013. Material Adverse Change Clauses and Acquisition Dynamics. *J. Financ. Quant. Anal.* 48, 819–847.
- Dixit, A.K., Pindyck, R.S., 1994. *Investment Under Uncertainty*. Princeton University Press.
- Draper, P., Paudyal, K., 2006. Acquisitions: Private versus Public. *Eur. Financ. Manag.* 12, 57–80. doi:10.1111/j.1354-7798.2006.00310.x
- Eckbo, B.E., 2009. Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A Review. *J. Corp. Financ.* 15, 149–178. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.016
- Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 1996. Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies. *J.*

Finance 51, 55–84.

- Galí, J., Gambetti, L., 2015. The Effects of Monetary Policy on Stock Market Bubbles: Some Evidence. *Am. Econ. J. Macroecon.* 7, 233–257.
- Golubov, A., Petmezas, D., Travlos, N.G., 2012. When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker: New Evidence on the role of Financial Advisors in M&As. *J. Finance* 67, 271–311.
- Grosse-Rueschkamp, B., Steffen, S., Streit, D., 2019. A Capital Structure Channel of Monetary Policy. *J. financ. econ.* 133, 357–378.
- Gulen, H., Ion, M., 2016. Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Investment. *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 29, 523–564.
- Harford, J., 2005. What Drives Merger Waves? *J. financ. econ.* 77, 529–560.
- Jansen, D.W., Kishan, R.P., Vacaflor, D.E., 2013. Sectoral Effects of Monetary Policy: The Evidence from Publicly Traded Firms. *South. Econ. J.* 79, 946–970.
- Jeon, J.Q., Ligon, J.A., 2011. How much is reasonable? The size of termination fees in mergers and acquisitions. *J. Corp. Financ.* 17, 959–981.
doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.013
- Jiménez, G., Ongena, S., Peydró, J.-L., Sa, J., 2014. Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking? *Econometrica* 82, 463–505.
- Jiménez, G., Ongena, S., Peydró, J.-L., Saurina, J., 2012. Credit Supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying the Bank Balance-Sheet Channel with Loan Applications. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 102, 2301–2326.
- Kang, W., Lee, K., Ratti, R.A., 2014. Economic Policy Uncertainty and Firm-Level Investment. *J. Macroecon.* 39, 42–53.
- Kashyap, A.K., Stein, J.C., Wilcox, D.W., 1993. Monetary Policy and Credit Conditions: Evidence from the Composition of External Finance. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 83, 78–98.
- Kau, J.B., Linck, J.S., Rubin, P.H., 2008. Do Managers Listen to the Market? *J. Corp. Financ.* 14, 347–362.
- Kellogg, R., 2014. The Effect of Uncertainty on Investment: Evidence from Texas Oil Drilling. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 104, 1698–1734.
- Kelly, M., 1991. The Value of the Option to ‘Wait and See’. *Econ. Lett.* 36, 147–151.
- Kohers, N., Ang, J., 2001. The Take-over Market for Privately Held Companies: the US Experience. *Cambridge J. Econ.* 25, 723–748. doi:10.1093/cje/25.6.723
- Kohers, N., Ang, J., 2000. Earnouts in mergers: agreeing to disagree and agreeing to stay. *J. Bus.* 73, 445–476.
- Laubach, T., Williams, J.C., 2003. Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest. *Rev. Econ. Stat.* 85, 1063–1070. doi:10.1162/003465303772815934

- Liu, Q., Pan, X., Tian, G.G., 2018. To What Extent Did the Economic Stimulus Package Influence Bank Lending and Corporate Investment Decisions? Evidence from China. *J. Bank. Financ.* 86, 177–193.
- Luo, Y., 2005. Do Insiders Learn from Outsiders? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions. *J. Finance* 60, 1951–1982.
- Maggio, M. Di, Kacperczyk, M., 2017. The Unintended Consequences of the Zero Lower Bound Policy. *J. financ. econ.* 123, 80.
- Maksimovic, V., Phillips, G., Yang, L., 2013. Private and Public Merger Waves. *J. Finance* 68, 2177–2217.
- Mitchell, M., Pulvino, T., 2001. Characteristics of Risk and Return in Risk Arbitrage. *J. Finance* 56, 2135–2175.
- Moeller, S., Schlingemann, F., Stulz, R., 2004. Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisitions. *J. financ. econ.* 73, 201–228.
- Moeller, S.B., Schlingemann, F.P., Stulz, R.M., 2005. Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave. *J. Finance* 60, 757–782.
- Nguyen, N.H., Phan, H. V., 2017. Policy Uncertainty and Mergers and Acquisitions. *J. Financ. Quant. Anal.* 52, 613–644.
- Officer, M.S., 2003. Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions. *J. financ. econ.* 69, 431–467. doi:10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00119-3
- Ozkan, A., 2001. Determinants of Capital Structure and Adjustment to Long Run Target: Evidence from UK Company Panel Data. *J. Bus. Financ. Account.* 28, 175–198.
- Ragozzino, R., Reuer, J.J., 2009. Contingent earnouts in acquisitions of privately held targets. *J. Manage.* 35, 857–879. doi:10.1177/0149206308328503
- Reuer, J.J., Shenkar, O., Ragozzino, R., 2004. Mitigating Risk in International Mergers and Acquisitions: the role of Contingent Payouts. *J. Int. Bus. Stud.* 35, 19–32. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400053
- Rhodes-Kropf, M., Viswanathan, S., 2004. Market Valuation and Merger Waves. *J. Finance* 59, 2685–2718.
- Rich, R., Tracy, J., 2010. The Relationships among Expected Inflation, Disagreement, and Uncertainty: Evidence from Matched Point and Density Forecasts. *Rev. Econ. Stat.* 92, 200–207.
- Romer, C., Romer, D., 1989. Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz. *NBER Macroecon. Annu.* 4, 121–170.
- Rosenbaum, P., Rubin, D., 1985. Constructing a Control Group Using Multivariate Matched Sampling Methods that Incorporate the Propensity Score. *Am. Stat.* 39, 33–38.
- Rosenbaum, P., Rubin, D., 1984. Reducing bias in observational studies using

- subclassification on the propensity score. *J. Am. Stat. Assoc.* 79, 516–524.
doi:10.1080/01621459.1984.10478078
- Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 2003. Stock Market Driven Acquisitions. *J. financ. econ.* 70, 295–311.
- Smith, J., Todd, P., 2005. Does Matching Overcome LaLonde’s Critique of Nonexperimental Estimators? *J. Econom.* 125, 305–353.
doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2004.04.011
- Summers, L.H., 2014. U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the Zero Lower Bound. *Bus. Econ.* 49, 65–73.
- Taylor, J.B., 2000. Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy. *J. Econ. Perspect.* 14, 21–36.
- Tommasi, M., 1994. The Consequences of Price Instability on Search Markets: Toward Understanding the Effects of Inflation. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 84, 1385–1396.
- White, H., 1980. A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity. *Econometrica* 3, 216–227.
- Wicksell, K., 1936. *Interest and Prices*. Macmillan, London.

Table 1 Annual distribution of the sample

| Year | All | Public | Private | Subsidiary | Withdrawn | Full Cash | Full Stock | Mixed/ Other | Diversified |
|----------|--------|--------|---------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------------|-------------|
| 1986 | 174 | 77 | 65 | 32 | 39 | 60 | 64 | 50 | 59 |
| 1987 | 197 | 85 | 77 | 35 | 41 | 63 | 77 | 57 | 74 |
| 1988 | 179 | 95 | 42 | 42 | 42 | 82 | 44 | 53 | 69 |
| 1989 | 281 | 98 | 104 | 79 | 66 | 92 | 109 | 80 | 111 |
| 1990 | 215 | 63 | 85 | 67 | 44 | 67 | 72 | 76 | 92 |
| 1991 | 247 | 62 | 117 | 68 | 35 | 49 | 95 | 103 | 91 |
| 1992 | 396 | 84 | 213 | 99 | 55 | 84 | 162 | 150 | 145 |
| 1993 | 533 | 109 | 285 | 139 | 57 | 131 | 203 | 199 | 204 |
| 1994 | 684 | 154 | 376 | 154 | 76 | 170 | 235 | 279 | 266 |
| 1995 | 714 | 177 | 366 | 171 | 79 | 181 | 270 | 263 | 260 |
| 1996 | 726 | 144 | 420 | 162 | 77 | 170 | 295 | 261 | 295 |
| 1997 | 922 | 207 | 495 | 220 | 102 | 214 | 348 | 360 | 361 |
| 1998 | 832 | 201 | 469 | 162 | 100 | 188 | 296 | 348 | 323 |
| 1999 | 664 | 170 | 374 | 120 | 67 | 149 | 258 | 257 | 249 |
| 2000 | 518 | 115 | 318 | 85 | 72 | 96 | 224 | 198 | 190 |
| 2001 | 278 | 85 | 124 | 69 | 30 | 76 | 92 | 110 | 113 |
| 2002 | 236 | 39 | 127 | 70 | 23 | 88 | 38 | 110 | 81 |
| 2003 | 189 | 49 | 91 | 49 | 14 | 52 | 38 | 99 | 63 |
| 2004 | 265 | 62 | 141 | 62 | 19 | 123 | 39 | 103 | 76 |
| 2005 | 373 | 65 | 204 | 104 | 27 | 176 | 35 | 162 | 126 |
| 2006 | 390 | 66 | 214 | 110 | 31 | 203 | 24 | 163 | 163 |
| 2007 | 403 | 89 | 222 | 92 | 55 | 188 | 36 | 179 | 139 |
| 2008 | 319 | 58 | 175 | 86 | 55 | 158 | 25 | 136 | 116 |
| 2009 | 213 | 57 | 97 | 59 | 27 | 101 | 33 | 79 | 67 |
| 2010 | 247 | 54 | 117 | 76 | 25 | 149 | 15 | 83 | 82 |
| 2011 | 246 | 46 | 133 | 67 | 20 | 123 | 19 | 104 | 82 |
| 2012 | 270 | 57 | 133 | 80 | 17 | 139 | 23 | 108 | 87 |
| 2013 | 238 | 49 | 116 | 73 | 51 | 125 | 25 | 88 | 62 |
| 2014 | 368 | 76 | 210 | 82 | 31 | 160 | 46 | 162 | 101 |
| 2015 | 378 | 89 | 186 | 103 | 34 | 104 | 31 | 243 | 135 |
| 2016 | 296 | 73 | 126 | 97 | 79 | 75 | 22 | 199 | 108 |
| 2017 | 359 | 64 | 187 | 108 | 47 | 75 | 31 | 253 | 129 |
| <i>N</i> | 12,350 | 2,919 | 6,409 | 3,022 | 1,537 | 3,911 | 3,324 | 5,115 | 4,519 |
| % | 100 | 23.64 | 51.89 | 24.47 | 12.45 | 31.67 | 26.91 | 41.42 | 36.59 |

The table presents the annual distribution of our sample of domestic M&As announced by U.S. public acquirers between 1 January 1986 and 31 December 2017. The targets covered in the sample are public, private, and subsidiary firms. The annual distribution of the sample, which depicts the sum of the annual M&A activity, is presented according to the target firm's listing status, the deal's completion profile (withdrawn/completed), the payment method used (full cash, full stock, mix of cash and stock, or other method), and the scope of industrial diversification in the deal (diversified/focused).

Table 2 Descriptive statistics

| Variable | <i>N</i> | Mean (1) | Median (2) | 25 th Percentile (3) | 75 th Percentile (4) | Mean Under High MPU (5) | Mean Under Low MPU (6) | (5)-(6) | Mean Under Monetary Expansion (7) | Mean Under Monetary Contraction (8) | (7)-(8) |
|-----------------------------|----------|-------------|---------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------|---|---|--------------|
| Acquirer Market Value | 12,350 | 3,406.20 | 325.81 | 80.01 | 1,273.24 | 2,650.62 | 4,201.47 | -1,550.85*** | 2,673.08 | 4,132.95 | -1,459.87*** |
| Acquirer Book-to-Market | 9,561 | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.23 | 0.65 | 0.56 | 0.46 | 0.10*** | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.05*** |
| Deal Value | 12,350 | 415.46 | 31.00 | 9.75 | 124.89 | 296.87 | 540.30 | -243.43*** | 356.85 | 473.58 | -107.73* |
| Relative Deal Size | 12,350 | 0.45 | 0.12 | 0.04 | 0.34 | 0.45 | 0.46 | -0.01 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.02 |
| Stock Percentage | 12,350 | 38.86 | 6.67 | 0.00 | 100.00 | 39.32 | 38.39 | 0.93 | 41.06 | 36.69 | 4.37*** |
| Acquirer Toehold | 12,350 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.21 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02* | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Pre-Announcement MPU | 12,350 | 86.81 | 82.33 | 66.57 | 106.48 | 93.04 | 80.26 | 12.78*** | 98.61 | 75.11 | 23.50*** |
| Acquirer Cash | 10,941 | 13.57 | 6.44 | 2.22 | 18.20 | 13.67 | 13.46 | 0.21 | 14.16 | 12.99 | 1.17*** |
| Acquirer Debt | 11,197 | 53.59 | 52.67 | 30.41 | 74.53 | 53.31 | 53.88 | -0.57 | 52.66 | 54.50 | -1.84*** |
| VIX | 11,519 | 18.89 | 17.19 | 13.37 | 23.26 | 20.44 | 17.32 | 3.12*** | 20.73 | 17.01 | -3.72*** |
| Leading Index | 12,350 | 1.39 | 1.56 | 1.15 | 1.81 | 1.25 | 1.52 | -0.27*** | 1.27 | 1.50 | -1.23*** |
| Acquirer RoA | 9,659 | -3.46 | 3.33 | -2.13 | 7.33 | -4.03 | -2.85 | -1.18* | -3.99 | -2.97 | -1.02 |
| Premium | 2,361 | 49.95 | 37.00 | 20.00 | 62.00 | 53.89 | 45.99 | 7.9*** | 53.40 | 46.50 | 6.9*** |
| Δ Acquirer Interest-to-Debt | 6,634 | -0.19 | -0.01 | -0.92 | 0.95 | -0.24 | 0.14 | 0.10 | -0.37 | -0.04 | -0.33*** |
| Δ Acquirer Debt | 9,771 | 6.57 | 1.66 | -2.53 | 12.01 | 6.39 | 6.76 | -0.37 | 5.73 | 7.33 | -1.60** |
| Δ Acquirer Cash | 9,517 | -3.98 | -0.63 | -25.48 | 4.72 | -3.79 | -4.18 | 1.01 | -4.43 | -3.58 | -0.85*** |
| Δ Acquirer RoA | 8,370 | -9.13 | -1.35 | -5.19 | 0.94 | -9.41 | -8.82 | -0.59 | -5.70 | -12.25 | 6.55** |
| Δ Acquirer Sigma | 12,242 | 0.09 | -0.04 | -0.06 | 0.30 | 0.08 | 0.10 | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.14 | 0.11*** |

The table presents the key descriptive statistics of the empirical variables used in the analysis. For each variable, we report the number of available observations, the mean, and the median in addition to the 25th and 75th percentiles. Additionally, we report the mean level of each variable under high and low monetary policy uncertainty (MPU), in addition to the difference between these two levels and its significance. Deals are classified in the high (low) MPU group if the value of the “Announcement MPU” variable is above (below) the median level in our sample. We follow the same approach in analyzing the means of the deals announced under monetary expansion and monetary contraction. The classification of deals into groups defined by monetary expansion and contraction is based on the level of the annual change in the level of the federal funds rate in the quarter preceding the deal’s announcement. The median level of this change in our sample is 0, which allows us to split the sample into two equal groups of deals under monetary expansion and deals under monetary contraction. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.

Table 3 Univariate analysis of acquirer CAR under different monetary regimes

| Panel A: Monetary policy stance | | | | |
|--|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------------------------|
| Statistic\Group | All Deals | Contraction | Expansion | Contraction minus Expansion |
| Mean | 2.23*** | 1.84*** | 2.63*** | -0.79*** |
| N | 12,350 | 6,175 | 6,175 | |
| Panel B: Announcement MPU | | | | |
| Statistic\Group | All Deals | High | Low | High minus Low |
| Mean | 2.23*** | 1.99*** | 2.48*** | -0.49** |
| N | 12,350 | 6,175 | 6,175 | |

The table presents the univariate analysis of the acquirer's CAR under monetary contraction and expansion (Panel A) and under high and low monetary policy uncertainty (Panel B). In Panel A, we report the average acquirer CAR in the overall sample, the average level under monetary contraction, and its equivalent under monetary expansion, in addition to the difference between these two levels and its level of significance. We also report the number of observations in each group. We follow a similar approach in Panel B, where we report the average acquirer CAR in the overall sample, the average level under high monetary policy uncertainty, and its equivalent under low monetary policy uncertainty, in addition to the difference between these two levels and its level of significance. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.

Table 4 Multivariate analysis on acquirer CAR

| Model | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Period | All | All | All | All | Monetary Contraction | Monetary Contraction | Monetary Expansion | Monetary Expansion |
| Dependent Variable/Explanatory Variable | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR |
| Federal Funds Rate (<i>FFR</i>) | -0.175*** (0.052) | | -0.139*** (0.060) | -0.143** (0.074) | -0.174*** (0.063) | | -0.113 (0.093) | |
| Deviation of <i>FFR</i> from Natural Rate | | -0.205*** (0.068) | | | | -0.199** (0.086) | | -0.010*** (0.003) |
| Announcement MPU | -0.006*** (0.002) | -0.007*** (0.002) | -0.006** (0.003) | -0.005* (0.003) | -0.001 (0.004) | -0.002 (0.004) | -0.010*** (0.003) | -0.010*** (0.003) |
| Pre-Announcement MPU | 0.009** (0.004) | 0.007* (0.005) | 0.003 (0.006) | 0.005 (0.007) | -0.002 (0.007) | -0.004 (0.007) | 0.012** (0.006) | 0.012* (0.006) |
| Full Cash | -0.382 (0.326) | -0.317 (0.323) | -0.384 (0.331) | -0.312 (0.412) | -0.022 (0.378) | 0.113 (0.377) | -0.699 (0.526) | -0.693 (0.523) |
| Full Stock | 0.793* (0.414) | 0.679* (0.408) | 0.893** (0.437) | 1.275** (0.619) | 1.078 (0.560) | 0.905* (0.553) | 0.491 (0.607) | 0.467 (0.596) |
| Diversified | 0.565** (0.293) | 0.692*** (0.272) | 0.621** (0.311) | 0.523 (0.364) | -0.044 (0.354) | 0.246 (0.338) | 1.086** (0.464) | 1.047*** (0.424) |
| ln(Acquirer Market Value) | -1.768*** (0.150) | -1.769*** (0.147) | -1.779*** (0.159) | -1.952*** (0.188) | -1.400*** (0.161) | -1.414*** (0.159) | -2.135*** (0.249) | -2.126*** (0.246) |
| ln(Deal Value) | 1.177*** (0.163) | 1.199*** (0.162) | 1.256*** (0.178) | 1.375*** (0.208) | 0.867*** (0.142) | 0.901*** (0.141) | 1.493*** (0.295) | 1.501*** (0.295) |
| Private | 3.582*** (0.358) | 3.743*** (0.346) | 3.938*** (0.392) | 4.089*** (0.546) | 3.005*** (0.469) | 3.373*** (0.455) | 4.119*** (0.543) | 4.076*** (0.521) |
| Subsidiary | 4.550*** (0.468) | 4.705*** (0.456) | 4.875*** (0.510) | 5.039*** (0.606) | 3.347*** (0.465) | 3.670*** (0.449) | 5.788*** (0.831) | 5.744*** (0.806) |
| Acquirer Toehold | 0.138 (0.172) | 0.137 (0.173) | 0.171 (0.226) | 0.282 (0.265) | 0.054 (0.247) | 0.060 (0.250) | 0.257 (0.239) | 1.047*** (0.424) |
| VIX | | | -0.088*** (0.234) | -0.072*** (0.027) | | | | |
| Leading Index | | | -0.153 (0.027) | -0.384 (0.282) | | | | |
| Acquirer Book-To-Market | | | | -0.672 (0.649) | | | | |
| Acquirer Cash | | | | -0.003 (0.014) | | | | |
| Acquirer Debt | | | | -0.006 (0.008) | | | | |
| Acquirer RoA | | | | -0.017* (0.009) | | | | |
| Intercept | 5.544*** (0.953) | 4.900*** (0.812) | 5.692*** (1.889) | 8.083*** (1.647) | 5.647*** (1.258) | 4.616*** (1.091) | 5.491*** (1.461) | 5.241*** (1.248) |
| Industry Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| N | 12,350 | 12,350 | 11,506 | 7,934 | 6,175 | 6,175 | 6,175 | 6,175 |
| Adjusted R-Squared | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.06 |

The table presents eight models explaining the variation in the acquirer's announcement period CAR. Models (1) and (2) are estimated on the initial sample. Model (3) controls for the effects of the leading index and the level of the VIX at the time of the deal's announcement on the subsample starting from the year 1990, the first year for which the VIX data is publicly available. Model (4) expands the analysis to cover acquirer-specific pre-acquisition financial variables. Models (5) and (6) are estimated on the sample of deals announced in the aftermath of monetary contraction, i.e. annual rise in the federal funds rate (FFR). Models (7) to (8) are estimated on the sample of deals announced in the aftermath of monetary expansion. White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.

Table 5 The monetary policy effect on CAR under different debt and liquidity regimes

| Model | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Group of deals | High Acquirer Debt | High Acquirer Debt | Low Acquirer Debt | Low Acquirer Debt | High Acquirer Cash Ratio | High Acquirer Cash Ratio | Low Acquirer Cash Ratio | Low Acquirer Cash Ratio |
| Dependent Variable/Explanatory Variable | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR |
| Federal Funds Rate (<i>FFR</i>) | -0.226*** (0.084) | | -0.082 (0.090) | | -0.071 (0.090) | | -0.276*** (0.088) | |
| Deviation of <i>FFR</i> from Natural Rate | | -0.328*** (0.107) | | -0.093 (0.125) | | -0.042 (0.126) | | -0.415*** (0.105) |
| Announcement MPU | -0.007* (0.004) | -0.007* (0.004) | -0.010* (0.006) | -0.010* (0.006) | -0.010** (0.005) | -0.010** (0.005) | -0.007* (0.004) | -0.007* (0.004) |
| Intercept | 6.123*** (1.281) | 6.069*** (1.236) | 8.977*** (1.840) | 8.856*** (1.804) | 7.812*** (1.618) | 7.606*** (1.573) | 6.655*** (1.477) | 6.603*** (1.434) |
| Control Factors | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Industry Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| <i>N</i> | 5,282 | 5,282 | 5,282 | 5,282 | 4,990 | 4,990 | 4,990 | 4,990 |
| Adjusted R-Squared | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.06 |

The table presents eight models explaining the variation in the acquirer's CAR under different leverage and liquidity regimes. The control variables are the same as those used in Model (3) in Table 4. Models (1) and (2) are estimated on the sample of deals in which the acquirer's debt ratio exceeds the median level in the sample. Models (3) and (4) are estimated on the sample of deals in which the acquirer's debt ratio is below the median level in the sample. Models (5) and (6) are estimated on the sample of deals in which the acquirer's cash ratio exceeds the median level in the sample. Models (7) and (8) are estimated on the sample of deals in which the acquirer's cash ratio is below the median level in the sample. For each pair of models, the level of the federal funds rate (*FFR*) in the quarter preceding the announcement is used as proxy for the stance of monetary policy in the first model. The difference between *FFR* and the corresponding natural rate of interest estimated using the Laubach and Williams (2003) method is used in the second model. White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.

Table 6 Multivariate analysis of additional post-acquisition outcomes

| Dependent Variable/ Explanatory Variable | Δ Acquirer RoA | Δ Acquirer RoA | Δ Acquirer Debt | Δ Acquirer Debt | Δ Acquirer Cash | Δ Acquirer Cash | Δ Acquirer Interest-to- Debt | Δ Acquirer Interest-to- Debt | Δ Acquirer Sigma | Δ Acquirer Sigma |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Model | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Panel A: All Deals | | | | | | | | | | |
| Federal Funds Rate (<i>FFR</i>) | -1.371*** (0.380) | | 0.464*** (0.122) | | -0.226*** (0.040) | | 0.178*** (0.011) | | 0.100*** (0.007) | |
| Deviation of <i>FFR</i> from Natural Rate | | -1.773*** (0.604) | | 0.660*** (0.226) | | -0.196*** (0.055) | | 0.231*** (0.018) | | 0.121*** (0.010) |
| Announcement MPU | 0.006 (0.019) | 0.006 (0.019) | -0.006 (0.008) | -0.006 (0.008) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | -0.0008 (0.0006) | -0.0009 (0.0006) | 0.0008** (0.0004) | 0.0009** (0.0004) |
| Intercept | -20.724* (10.927) | -22.962** (10.623) | 19.204*** (3.137) | 19.654*** (3.015) | 1.945*** (0.645) | 1.274** (0.631) | 2.989*** (0.194) | 3.253*** (0.200) | 3.804*** (0.367) | 3.954*** (0.378) |
| Control Factors | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Industry Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| <i>N</i> | 8,370 | 8,370 | 9,771 | 9,771 | 9,517 | 9,517 | 6,634 | 6,634 | 12,342 | 12,342 |
| R-Squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.53 | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.32 | 0.32 |
| Panel B: Deals with Early Withdrawal | | | | | | | | | | |
| Federal Funds Rate (<i>FFR</i>) | 0.820 (0.909) | | 0.385 (0.587) | | -0.927*** (0.275) | | 0.202*** (0.063) | | -0.040 (0.053) | |
| Deviation of <i>FFR</i> from Natural Rate | | 1.434 (1.182) | | 0.515 (0.717) | | -0.898*** (0.348) | | 0.202** (0.083) | | -0.089 (0.067) |
| Announcement MPU | 0.012 (0.043) | 0.013 (0.044) | -0.030 (0.023) | -0.030 (0.023) | -0.006 (0.011) | -0.007 (0.012) | -0.003 (0.004) | -0.003 (0.004) | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.003) |
| Intercept | -19.725 (12.293) | -13.737 (12.319) | 18.546** (7.727) | 18.962*** (7.507) | 1.274 (3.755) | -0.850 (3.761) | 3.718*** (1.004) | 4.158*** (1.011) | 8.702*** (0.989) | 8.755*** (0.965) |
| Control Factors | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Industry Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| <i>N</i> | 305 | 305 | 342 | 342 | 337 | 337 | 225 | 225 | 476 | 476 |
| R-Squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.56 | 0.55 | 0.69 | 0.69 |
| Panel C: Completed Deals/Deals with Late Withdrawal | | | | | | | | | | |
| Federal Funds Rate (<i>FFR</i>) | -1.337*** (0.485) | | 0.593*** (0.133) | | -0.262*** (0.041) | | 0.210*** (0.015) | | 0.092*** (0.007) | |
| Deviation of <i>FFR</i> from Natural Rate | | -1.744*** (0.666) | | 0.840*** (0.248) | | -0.249*** (0.056) | | 0.267*** (0.022) | | 0.114*** (0.009) |
| Announcement MPU | 0.007 (0.024) | 0.007 (0.024) | -0.005 (0.008) | -0.005 (0.008) | 0.004** (0.002) | 0.004* (0.002) | -0.0009 (0.0006) | -0.0009 (0.0006) | 0.0006* (0.0004) | 0.0007* (0.0004) |
| Intercept | -30.270*** (7.880) | -32.410*** (7.644) | 36.471*** (4.129) | 37.079*** (3.991) | 4.001*** (0.625) | 3.308*** (0.614) | 2.857*** (0.232) | 3.221*** (0.237) | 3.454*** (0.256) | 3.5844*** (0.268) |
| Control Factors | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Industry Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| <i>N</i> | 8,065 | 8,065 | 9,429 | 9,429 | 9,180 | 9,180 | 6,409 | 6,409 | 11,866 | 11,866 |
| R-Squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.53 | 0.53 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.23 | 0.23 |

The table presents ten models which represent the variation in five post-acquisition outcomes. Models (1) and (2) explain the variation in the change in the acquirer's Return on Assets (RoA) between the year that follows the acquisition and the year that precedes it. Models (3) and (4) explain the variation in the acquirer's debt ratio over the same period. Models (5) and (6) apply an equivalent analysis to the change in the acquirer's cash ratio. Models (7) and (8) analyze the difference in the percentage of the acquirer's net interest payments relative to total debt. Models (9) and (10) analyze the difference in the sigma of the acquirer's daily returns before and after the acquisition's announcement. The control variables in each model are the same as those reported in Table 6. Moreover, in each model, we include the lagged level of the independent variable as an additional regressor. Panel A reports the analysis for the overall sample. Panel B limits the analysis to the deals that are withdrawn within one

quarter of the announcement. Panel C applies the analysis to completed deals and the deals that are cancelled after one quarter of the announcement. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.

Table 7 The likelihood of deal withdrawal

| Model | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Dependent Variable/ Explanatory Variable | Withdrawn=1 Otherwise=0 | Withdrawn=1 Otherwise=0 | Withdrawn=1 Otherwise=0 | Withdrawn=1 Otherwise=0 |
| Federal Funds Rate (<i>FFR</i>) | 0.096*** (0.017) | | 0.086*** (0.020) | |
| Deviation of <i>FFR</i> from Natural Rate | | 0.129*** (0.020) | | 0.118*** (0.027) |
| Announcement MPU | 0.001* (0.0006) | 0.001* (0.0006) | 0.0004 (0.0009) | 0.0004 (0.0009) |
| Pre-Announcement MPU | 0.004*** (0.001) | 0.005*** (0.001) | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) |
| Full Cash | -0.041 (0.106) | -0.043 (0.103) | -0.095 (0.114) | -0.099 (0.114) |
| Full Stock | 0.294*** (0.102) | 0.315*** (0.101) | 0.324*** (0.106) | 0.335*** (0.106) |
| Diversified | 0.155* (0.084) | 0.155** (0.081) | 0.207** (0.089) | 0.209** (0.088) |
| ln(Acquirer Market Value) | -0.452*** (0.029) | -0.454*** (0.028) | -0.498*** (0.033) | -0.500*** (0.033) |
| ln(Deal Value) | 0.436*** (0.031) | 0.432*** (0.030) | 0.468*** (0.035) | 0.467*** (0.035) |
| Private | -1.370*** (0.102) | -1.372*** (0.099) | -1.287*** (0.112) | -1.291*** (0.112) |
| Subsidiary | -1.262*** (0.119) | -1.279*** (0.115) | -1.196*** (0.134) | -1.199*** (0.134) |
| Acquirer Toehold | 0.135*** (0.051) | 0.136*** (0.055) | 0.164*** (0.063) | 0.166*** (0.063) |
| VIX | | | 0.010* (0.006) | 0.013** (0.006) |
| Leading Index | | | -0.218*** (0.070) | -0.157** (0.071) |
| Intercept | -1.878*** (0.278) | -1.998*** (0.227) | -1.646*** (0.347) | -1.762*** (0.356) |
| Industry Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| <i>N</i> | 12,350 | 12,350 | 11,506 | 11,506 |
| Pseudo R-Squared | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.16 |

The table presents four Logit models predicting the likelihood of deal withdrawal. The dependent variable (Withdrawn) is assigned the value of 1 if the deal is withdrawn, and 0 otherwise. In Models (1) and (3), the stance of monetary policy is presented by the level of the federal funds rate in the quarter preceding the announcement. In Models (2) and (4), this stance is presented by the difference between the federal funds rate and the Laubach and Williams (2003) natural rate of interest. Models (3) and (4) control for two additional factors: the VIX index and the Leading Economic index for the United States. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.

Table 8 PSM analysis under monetary policy stance (contraction vs. expansion)

| Panel A: Logit model | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|----------|
| Intercept | Full Cash | Full Stock | Diversified | ln(Acquirer Market Value) | ln(Deal Value) | Private | Subsidiary | Acquirer Toehold | <i>N</i> |
| 0.350** (0.020) | 0.024** (0.012) | -0.017 (0.013) | 0.015* (0.009) | 0.020*** (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.019 (0.012) | 0.005 (0.014) | -0.016 (0.011) | 12,350 |
| Panel B: Matching Results for CAR | | | | | | | | | |
| Matching Algorithm | | | | | Caliper=0.001 with replacement | | | | |
| Matched Observations per Treated Deal | | | | | 1:1 | | | | |
| Number of Treated Observations | | | | | 5,529 | | | | |
| Number of Control Observations | | | | | 5,529 | | | | |
| CAR <i>ATT</i> (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors) | | | | | -0.50** (0.25) | | | | |
| BHAR <i>ATT</i> (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors) | | | | | -4.37*** (1.15) | | | | |
| Panel C: Covariates' Balancing | | | | | | | | | |
| Sample | Before Matching | | | After Matching | | | | | |
| Variable | Treatment Group | Control Group | <i>p</i> -value | Treatment Group | Control Group | <i>p</i> -value | | | |
| Propensity Score | 0.51 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.59 | | | |
| Full Cash | 0.51 | 0.47 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.53 | | | |
| Full Stock | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.76 | | | |
| Diversified | 0.37 | 0.36 | 0.30 | 0.36 | 0.37 | 0.40 | | | |
| ln(Acquirer Market Value) | 5.99 | 5.60 | 0.00 | 5.83 | 5.83 | 0.80 | | | |
| ln(Deal Value) | 3.75 | 3.52 | 0.00 | 3.64 | 3.63 | 0.66 | | | |
| Private | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.62 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.70 | | | |
| Subsidiary | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.41 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.50 | | | |
| Acquirer Toehold | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.02 | 0.11 | | | |

The table presents the outcome of the propensity score matching analysis with emphasis on the effect of monetary contraction on the acquirer's CAR and its post-acquisition buy-and-hold returns. The treatment variable is assigned the value of 1 if the federal funds rate increased on a yearly basis in the quarter preceding the acquisition announcement, and 0 otherwise. Panel A presents the logit model used to assign the deal into a contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy periods. Panel B presents the outcome of the matching algorithm with replacement and a caliper of 0.001. We report the number of matched observations to each treated one and the number of treated and control observations on the matched sample, in addition to the estimated *ATTs* with Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors. In Panel C, we report the mean of each variable in the treated group and the control group, in addition to the bootstrapped *p*-value from the *t*-test of the null hypothesis that the difference is statistically equal to 0, both before and after matching. The Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard deviation is reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.

Table 9 PSM analysis on high vs. low MPU

| Panel A: Logit model | | | | | | | | | |
|--|------------------|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------|
| Intercept | Full Cash | Full Stock | Diversified | ln(Acquirer Market Value) | ln(Deal Value) | Private | Subsidiary | Acquirer Toehold | <i>N</i> |
| 0.670*** (0.020) | 0.015 (0.012) | 0.013 (0.013) | -0.007 (0.009) | -0.012*** (0.003) | -0.016*** (0.007) | -0.051*** (0.012) | -0.043*** (0.014) | 0.019* (0.011) | 12,350 |
| Panel B: Matching Results for CAR | | | | | | | | | |
| Matching Algorithm | | | | | Caliper=0.001 with replacement | | | | |
| Matched Observations per Treated Deal | | | | | 1:1 | | | | |
| Number of Treated Observations | | | | | 5,712 | | | | |
| Number of Control Observations | | | | | 5,712 | | | | |
| CAR <i>ATT</i> (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors) | | | | | -0.81*** (0.27) | | | | |
| BHAR <i>ATT</i> (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors) | | | | | 2.91***(1.21) | | | | |
| Panel C: Covariates' Balancing | | | | | | | | | |
| Sample | Before Matching | | | After Matching | | | | | |
| Variable | Treatment Group | Control Group | <i>p</i> -value | Treatment Group | Control Group | <i>p</i> -value | | | |
| Propensity Score | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.00 | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0.11 | | | |
| Full Cash | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.92 | | | |
| Full Stock | 0.28 | 0.26 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.63 | | | |
| Diversified | 0.37 | 0.36 | 0.53 | 0.36 | 0.37 | 0.62 | | | |
| ln(Acquirer Market Value) | 5.63 | 5.96 | 0.00 | 5.65 | 5.65 | 0.97 | | | |
| ln(Deal Value) | 3.49 | 3.79 | 0.00 | 3.46 | 3.47 | 0.67 | | | |
| Private | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.93 | 0.53 | 0.53 | 0.83 | | | |
| Subsidiary | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.92 | | | |
| Acquirer Toehold | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.63 | | | |

The table presents the outcome of the propensity score matching analysis with emphasis on the effect of monetary policy uncertainty on the acquirer's CAR and its post-acquisition buy-and-hold returns. The main treatment variable is assigned the value of 1 if the variable "Announcement MPU" exceeds its median level in our sample, and 0 otherwise. Panel A presents the logit model used to assign the deal into high (low) MPU periods. Panel B presents the outcome of the matching algorithm with replacement and a caliper of 0.001. We report the number of matched observations to each treated one and the number of treated and control observations on the matched sample, in addition to the estimated *ATT*s with Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors. In Panel C, we report the mean of each variable in the treated group and the control group, in addition to the bootstrapped *p*-value from the *t*-test of the null hypothesis that the difference is statistically equal to 0, both before and after matching. The Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard deviation is reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.

Table 10 The effects of the alternative policy uncertainty subcategories on the acquirer CAR

Panel A: The individual wealth effects of different policy subcategories

| Type of Policy Uncertainty | Announcement MPU | Fiscal (General) | Taxes | Spending | Healthcare | National Security | Entitlement | Regulation | Financial Regulation | Trade | Sovereign Debt/Currency |
|----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| Effect on CAR | -0.006*** (0.002) | 0.00005 (0.002) | 0.0005 (0.002) | 0.0005 (0.001) | 0.0027* (0.0016) | -0.0002 (0.003) | 0.004** (0.002) | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.0004 (0.0013) | 0.0006 (0.001) | -0.0009* (0.0005) |

Panel B: The wealth effects based on the principal component of the other policy categories

| Model | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Dependent Variable/Explanatory Variable | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR |
| Federal Funds Rate (<i>FFR</i>) | -0.141*** (0.058) | -0.149*** (0.057) | | |
| Deviation of <i>FFR</i> from Natural Rate | | | -0.179*** (0.073) | -0.188*** (0.072) |
| Announcement MPU | -0.008*** (0.003) | -0.009*** (0.003) | -0.008*** (0.003) | -0.010*** (0.003) |
| PC1 Other | 0.051 (0.081) | -0.092 (0.122) | 0.069 (0.079) | -0.070 (0.122) |
| PC1 Other × Announcement MPU | | 0.001 (0.001) | | 0.001 (0.001) |
| Intercept | 5.912*** (0.716) | 6.008*** (0.714) | 5.646*** (0.662) | 5.726*** (0.662) |
| Control Factors | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Industry Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| <i>N</i> | 12,350 | 12,350 | 12,350 | 12,350 |
| Adjusted R-Squared | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 |

The table assesses the uniqueness of the wealth effects associated with MPU relative to other policy categories. Panel A presents the effects of each policy subcategory on the acquirer CAR. In assessing the wealth impact of MPU in Panel A, we report the coefficient associated with “Announcement MPU” from Model (1) (Table 4). For the wealth effects of the remaining policy categories, we control for the effects of MPU and the other variables in Model (1) (Table 4). In Panel B, we report four models including both MPU and the first principal component of the remaining policy categories (PC1 Other). Models (1) and (3) do not include the interactive relationship between MPU and the principle component of the remaining policies while Models (2) and (4) control for this interactive effect. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.

Table 11 The calendar-year effects on CAR

| Model | (1) | (2) |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|
| Dependent Variable | CAR | CAR |
| Federal Funds Rate (<i>FFR</i>) | -0.239*** (0.087) | |
| Deviation of <i>FFR</i> from Natural Rate | | -0.305*** (0.122) |
| Announcement period MPU | -0.006** (0.003) | -0.006*** (0.002) |
| Pre-Announcement period MPU | 0.003 (0.010) | -0.004 (0.009) |
| Full Cash | -0.319 (0.324) | -0.319 (0.324) |
| Full Stock | 0.815* (0.427) | 0.803* (0.429) |
| Diversified | 0.532* (0.293) | 0.522* (0.292) |
| ln(Acquirer Market Value) | -1.773*** (0.152) | -1.762*** (0.151) |
| ln(Deal Value) | 1.182*** (0.161) | 1.175*** (0.160) |
| Private | 3.533*** (3.539) | 3.576*** (0.376) |
| Subsidiary | 4.486*** (0.469) | 4.515*** (0.471) |
| Acquirer Toehold | 0.132 (0.176) | 0.152 (0.172) |
| Intercept | 6.358*** (1.832) | 6.685*** (1.737) |
| <i>p</i> -value (H_0 : No Calendar Year Effects) | 0.08 | 0.11 |
| <i>p</i> -value (H_0 : No Monetary Policy Effect) | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Calendar Year Effects | YES | YES |
| Industry Effects | YES | YES |
| <i>N</i> | 12,350 | 12,350 |
| Adjusted R-Squared | 0.05 | 0.05 |

The table presents two models explaining the variation in the acquirer's CAR while controlling for calendar year fixed effects. For each model, we report the *p*-value from the Wald restriction that the calendar year effects are jointly equal to 0. We also report the *p*-value from the restriction that the effects of monetary policy-related variables (the coefficients of Federal Funds Rate (*FFR*) and Announcement period MPU) in Model (1) and the coefficients of Deviation of *FFR* from Natural Rate and Announcement period MPU) in Model (2)) are jointly equal to 0. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.

Table 12 The impact of monetary policy on the use of target termination fees and earnouts

| Model | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Model Type | OLS | OLS | Logit | Logit | Logit | Logit |
| Dependent Variable/Explanatory Variables | Premium | Premium | Target Term Fee=1 Otherwise=0 | Target Term Fee=1 Otherwise=0 | Earnout=1 Otherwise=0 | Earnout=1 Otherwise=0 |
| Federal Funds Rate (<i>FFR</i>) | -0.453 (0.415) | | -0.163*** (0.014) | | -0.125*** (0.014) | |
| Deviation of <i>FFR</i> from Natural Rate | | -0.381 (0.597) | | -0.229*** (0.020) | | -0.138*** (0.021) |
| Announcement period MPU | 0.046** (0.021) | 0.045** (0.022) | -0.0004 (0.0007) | -0.0005 (0.0007) | 0.0009 (0.0007) | 0.0008 (0.0007) |
| Pre-Announcement period MPU | 0.211** (0.041) | 0.208*** (0.040) | -0.006*** (0.001) | -0.007*** (0.001) | 0.0001 (0.0007) | -0.0009 (0.001) |
| Full Cash | 1.833 (2.712) | 1.885 (1.722) | -0.672*** (0.088) | -0.646*** (0.088) | | |
| Full Stock | 1.736 (3.078) | 1.506 (3.077) | -0.344*** (0.096) | -0.385*** (0.096) | | |
| Diversified | 2.663 (2.188) | 2.655 (2.188) | -0.117 (0.075) | -0.121 (0.075) | 0.218*** (0.070) | 0.218*** (0.070) |
| ln(Acquirer Market Value) | -1.143** (0.534) | -1.065** (0.526) | 0.046** (0.023) | 0.053** (0.024) | -0.052*** (0.021) | -0.036* (0.020) |
| ln(Deal Value) | | | 0.212*** (0.027) | 0.216*** (0.027) | 0.048** (0.024) | 0.057** (0.024) |
| Private | 0.800 (2.683) | 0.889 (2.687) | -2.990*** (0.105) | -2.969*** (0.104) | 2.952*** (0.246) | 2.990*** (0.246) |
| Subsidiary | 2.368 (2.193) | 2.403 (3.196) | -3.892*** (0.171) | -3.868*** (0.170) | 2.455*** (0.250) | 2.497*** (0.250) |
| Acquirer Toehold | -4.048*** (1.197) | -4.090*** (1.200) | -0.286*** (0.080) | -0.288*** (0.081) | -0.099 (0.167) | -0.107 (0.169) |
| Intercept | 36.386** (15.481) | 35.134** (15.424) | -1.022** (0.509) | -1.176** (0.503) | -4.964*** (0.528) | -5.254*** (0.526) |
| Number of Target Termination Fees | 311 | 311 | 1,579 | 1,579 | 1,579 | 1,579 |
| Number of Earnouts | 182 | 182 | 1,062 | 1,062 | 1,062 | 1,062 |
| Industry Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| <i>N</i> | 2,361 | 2,361 | 12,350 | 12,350 | 12,350 | 12,350 |
| Adjusted (Pseudo) R-Squared | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.39 | 0.39 | 0.11 | 0.10 |


The table presents two OLS regressions explaining the variation in the premium and four logit models predicting the choice of contractual arrangements in the M&As. Models (1) and (2) explain the variation in the takeover premium in public target acquisitions. This premium is estimated as in Officer (2003). Models (3) and (4) predict the use of target termination fee agreements. The dependent variable in these models is assigned the value of 1 if a target termination fee agreement is present in the deal, and 0 otherwise. Models (5) and (6) predict the inclusion of deferred payments (earnout) contracts. The dependent variable is assigned the value of 1 if an earnout is present in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.

Table 13 VAR Model

| Dependent Variable | $\ln(M\&A\ Value)_t$ |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|
| Explanatory Variable\Model | (1) |
| Q_FFR _{t-1} | -0.076*** (0.033) |
| Q_MPU _{t-1} | 0.003 (0.002) |
| Q_Leading Index _{t-1} | 0.090 (0.137) |
| GDP Growth _{t-1} | -0.046 (0.182) |
| Δ CAPE _{t-1} | 0.028 (0.052) |
| Policy Uncertainty _{t-1} | -0.007** (0.003) |
| $\ln(M\&A\ Value)_{t-1}$ | 0.567*** (0.081) |
| Intercept | 4.982*** (1.050) |
| <i>N</i> | 127 |
| Adjusted R-Squared | 0.41 |


The table presents the equation that explains the variation in the natural logarithm of the M&A dollar value. This equation is part of a 7-variable VAR model with one-quarter lags. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 2 for an accurate description of the variables.

Figure 1 The federal funds rate and the natural rate of interest




The figure presents the variation in both the federal funds rate and the natural interest level (two-sided) estimated by Laubach and Williams (2003) from 1961 to 2017.

Figure 2 Time variation in both general and monetary policy uncertainties



The figure presents the 12-month rolling averages of the general policy uncertainty and the news-based monetary policy uncertainty proxies developed by Baker et al. (2016) from 1986 to 2017. Both proxies are adjusted to have a mean level of 100. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of these proxies.

Figure 3 Response of the M&A activity to the innovation in the federal funds rate



The figure presents the response of the natural logarithm of the dollar value of the quarterly M&A activity to one cholesey innovation in the federal funds rate from the VAR model presented in Section 4. The impulse response has the following ordering of the variables: Fed, Δ CAPE, Leading Index, MPU, Policy Uncertainty, GDP, and $\ln(\text{M\&A Value})$. It is worth noting that the pattern of the impulse response is invariant to the ordering of the variables.