

Social Organization in South China, 1911–1949

**THE CASE OF KUAN LINEAGE IN
K'AI-P'ING COUNTY**

Yuen-fong Woon

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS*

Bridging the collapse of the Confucian state and the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the period 1911-49 is particularly fascinating to historians, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists. Unfortunately, it is also a very confusing period, full of shifts and changes in economic, social, and political organizations. The social implications of these changes, and the relationships between officials on the subdistrict level, the unofficial leaders, and the bulk of the peasantry remain inadequately known. South China, which nurtured the Communist Party in its formative years, is a particularly interesting case. In this study I use the Kuan lineage of K'ai-p'ing as a case study to show the effects of demographic, economic, administrative, and educational changes after the Treaty of Nanking (1842) on patrilineal kinship as a principle of social organization in South China.

Since Freedman (1958, 1966) published his two monographs on lineage and society in South China, there has been a growing body of literature on localized lineages. However, most of the fieldwork was done either in the New Territories of Hong Kong (Baker, 1968; Brim, 1969; Hayes, 1964; Johnson, 1971; Nelson, 1969; Potter, 1968; Pratt, 1960; Watson, 1975) or in Taiwan (Gallin, 1966; Pasternak, 1968). Studies done on South Chinese villages on the mainland (e.g., H. S. Ch'en, 1936; T. Ch'en, 1940; Kulp, 1925; H. T. Liu, 1936; Makino, 1948; Ssu-t'u, 1951; C. K. Yang, 1959) lack historical depth. None of them set village life in a wider social or political context, nor have they dealt in great detail with the effect on lineages of social change during the critical period from 1911 to 1949. Information on the lineage during this period is now available only through interviews with informants who were alive at the time. In this book I shall try to reconstruct a segment of prerevolutionary Chinese society, to map out the ethnographic profile and historical development of the Kuan lineage under the impact of rapid social change, and to construct, as systematically as my data allow, some generalizations about social organization and change in this part of China.

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In recent years there has appeared a growing body of literature that attempts to explain the causes of "development of underdevelopment" in Third World countries. Scholars have provided conflicting theories to account for rural impoverishment and class conflict in China between 1911 and 1949 in an attempt to understand (and sometimes consciously or unconsciously to blame or justify) the rise of the People's Republic of China. It is hoped that the case of the Kuan lineage of K'ai-p'ing County can throw light on the validity of these theories as they apply to South China in general and to emigrant communities in particular.

The Kuan lineage was one of the most important emigrant communities in K'ai-p'ing County, one that sent thousands of sons to North America between the 1860s and 1923. This ethnography also examines the relationship between Overseas Chinese in North America and their home communities in South China and the implications of North American public policies such as the Oriental Exclusion Act for that relationship. For example, immigration policies resulted in certain donation and investment patterns among the Overseas Chinese, patterns which, in turn, contributed to the economic modernization of market towns in China and the preservation of the Confucian mode of social organization in the form of lineages in rural areas. It is hoped that this study will make a contribution not only to the study of emigrant communities in South China but to ethnic studies in North America.

In a study based mainly on the limited power of informants' memories, extraordinary care had to be taken to ensure validity and reliability. A detailed description of the methodology employed is found in appendix 5. This book is a revised and updated version of a Ph.D. dissertation of the same title, submitted to the Department of Anthropology/Sociology, University of British Columbia, in the summer of 1975. It is the result of a nine-month period of in-depth interviews with sixteen people who had direct knowledge of the Kuan lineage. In the course of this study I have been assisted by many people whose contributions have been invaluable. Only a few names can be mentioned here.

First, I would like to thank Dr. Graham E. Johnson, chair of the dissertation committee, whose continued interest and intellectual stimulation have carried me through the research project, the writing of the dissertation, and subsequent revisions of the work. I am greatly indebted to Dr. E. Wickberg whose comments on the dissertation widened my intellectual horizons. Profound gratitude must be expressed to Professor W. E. Willmott, my former teacher at U.B.C., who, as a visiting scholar to the Centre for Pacific and Oriental Studies in the spring of 1980, re-read my manuscript and suggested invaluable modifications to the structure of the first draft of this present version. Dr. J. L. Watson, the external examiner, made detailed comments on the dissertation and provided encouragement and important guidelines that allowed the thesis to be revised into publishable form. Dr. Y. T. Lai read the

first draft of the revised version in great detail and provided valuable insights and the perspective of an intelligent outside reader. To her and to Dr. Watson, I express my heartfelt thanks.

In addition to the above individuals, I also owe an intellectual debt to the anonymous readers who, at the request of the Social Science Federation of Canada, the U.B.C. Press, and the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of Michigan, labored through the manuscript and provided the invaluable comments and constructive criticism which widened the theoretical perspective and sharpened the focus of my study.

Thanks also go to all the Kuan in Victoria and Vancouver, especially Mr. F. F. Kuan and Mr. Y. F. Kuan, without whose cooperation and patience this book would not exist. I must thank Mr. T. H. Lee, Mr. C. Chen, Mr. S. Y. Lau, and Dr. Charles Sedgewick for introducing these members of the Kuan lineage to me.

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While I am indebted to all these individuals and institutions for any merits of this work, I accept sole responsibility for the errors and omissions.

Y. F. W.

Victoria, December 1983

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CHAPTER 1

Social Organization in South China

Scholarship on pre-1949 South China has delineated three major principles of social organization in that area, namely, patrilineal kinship, particularly in the form of lineages; ethnicity; and socioeconomic class.¹ There have been debates over the relative significance of these three principles after 1840. It is the aim of this chapter to outline the positions taken on this question so as to set the stage for the case study that follows: the Kuan lineage of K'ai-p'ing County in Kwangtung Province.

There is little argument that before 1840, patrilineal kinship was the major principle of social organization in South China, as it was in the rest of the country. The major reason for this was that both the national and local bureaucracy actively promoted patrilineal kinship legally and ideologically. The Confucian state and the Confucian minds that ran it believed that patrilineal kinship was the fundamental principle of society and the only sound way to train submissive subjects.

In addition to their active promotion by the state, lineages were important in China because they filled the power vacuum in the local administrative system. Many scholars have pointed out that there was a correspondence in traditional China between a weak local government and strong lineage organizations.² A relatively large administrative unit made up of hundreds of villages, the *hsien* (county) was controlled by the magistrate and a small staff of less than ten officials who were responsible mainly for the collection of taxes and the prevention of rebellion. Except for a few minor posts such as private secretaries, clerks, and runners, none of the magistrate's staff was a native of the place or had any local roots, since it was the policy to transfer such personnel every three years.³

Apart from a few futile attempts to establish the *pao-chia* (mutual responsibility) system, the *hsien* government usually dealt with the individual through unofficial village elites.⁴ It did not interfere with village affairs or with the judicial decisions of these leaders. The latter, for their part, often discouraged villagers from any form of contact with the bureaucracy.

The lineage elites were often elders or gentry members of the local community. The gentry were products of the traditional examination system, scholars or retired officials who lived in their native districts.⁵ They spoke the

same official language as the magistrate and often served as a bridge between the people and the government. While it is true that the prestige of local scholars and retired officials derived primarily from their successful performance on the examinations, lineage channels were also used to enhance power and influence before official status was achieved or after retirement.

Because of the potential influence of these gentry members, a lineage often directed its resources toward producing scholars and officials and toward assuring their allegiance to the interests of the lineage. Gentry members were given distinguished parts in the conduct of ancestral rites; they were offered extra shares of the ritual pork; their ancestral tablets were placed in more distinguished positions in the ancestral halls; and they were entitled to collect benefits from the lineage's education landholdings.⁶

In order to enhance his power and prestige, a scholar-official could donate some property, build an ancestral hall, and become the founder of a new branch (*fang*) of the lineage. He might also set aside property as education land to encourage his descendants to become scholars for the glory of the branch. In turn, the direct descendants of a powerful lineage branch not only controlled corporate property of that branch, but were often selected as managers of lineage property due to their illustrious ancestry. It was for the sake of such prestige and benefits that scholars and officials in traditional China were willing to stay in the countryside or nearby market towns and serve as champions of their more humble lineage members.

In traditional China, landownership and scholarship were the two most important channels to power and prestige. Merchants, however rich, had little political or social status and were not allowed a voice in government policies. To bridge the gap between wealth, on the one hand, and prestige and power on the other, merchants often purchased degrees to join the ranks of the scholar-gentry class. They donated some of their profits to the building or restoration of ancestral halls. They were also eager to pay to have their ancestral tablets placed in distinguished positions in the ancestral halls. Hence, for them, as for the scholar-officials, the lineage provided an important channel for both the acquisition and recognition of prestige, status, and power.

Lineage organizations also benefited the poor. The official defense system was weak. Garrison soldiers were never numerous in any particular *hsien*. Their presence was more to prevent antigovernment uprisings than to protect the lives and property of the individual. Thus, at times when official protection from lawlessness in the countryside was inadequate, poorer members often had to rely upon the lineage as a means for the organization of defense.

Local government officials usually followed the principle of *laissez-faire* with respect to lineage functions, since official policy was designed to discourage direct contact between the population and government bureaucracy. A lineage which could govern its own members facilitated this type of policy.

Moreover, as the law courts were often brutal and runners and clerks merciless in blackmailing and exploiting the villagers, and the burdens of taxation and labor services were heavy, poor members of a lineage, on their part, were eager to have their differences settled by the lineage elites. They depended upon elite members to keep the bureaucracy at arm's length. It was not unusual for powerful lineage elites to protect their own members or smaller lineages in the neighborhood or to soften the government's tax demands on their protégés. It was also common practice for gentry members of powerful lineages to act as mediators in quarrels among villagers of less powerful lineages.

Besides obtaining protection from both bandit attacks and government exploitation, the poor found it economically expedient to maintain close ties with their lineages. For example, they were often given preference in renting corporate land from their lineages, rental deposits were sometimes waived for lineage members, and the penalties for rental default might be less severe. In some lineages, proceeds from corporate property were shared among the members; in others, the proceeds were used to finance low-interest lineage loans, lineage granaries, and other charity and relief measures.⁷ In addition, patri-lineal kinship ties were often used to advantage by those seeking jobs in market towns.

Freedman believes that localized lineages in China ranged along a continuum, from an undifferentiated lineage, which he terms type "A," to an extremely differentiated one, which he terms type "Z."⁸ An A-type lineage was numerically small and had no written genealogy. Its members were primarily peasants among whom there was little socioeconomic difference. Village elders usually served as both ritual and political leaders. The A-type lineage had little or no ancestral property and was not rich enough to provide for a vigorous ritual life.⁹ A differentiated lineage, or Z-type, usually had a large amount of corporate property. Its members varied greatly in terms of socioeconomic class. There were two types of leaders in a differentiated lineage: ritual and political. The elders, typically resident farmer-owners, usually served in the former capacity. The political leaders were rich and powerful landlords and/or scholar-officials. This type of lineage usually persisted longer than A-type lineages for three reasons: (1) the elites brought connections, prestige, political status, and protection to the ordinary members; (2) elites donated land to the lineage, which allowed the poor members to improve their living standards; and (3) sheer force of numbers.

Because of these initial advantages, a large lineage was generally able to defeat a small one in litigation or actual conflict. Moreover, it was often able to dominate the market town in its vicinity or to find another one to suit its own interests. It would become richer through the collection of levies and dues from minor lineages attending the same market town.

While the foregoing description was true of China as a whole before 1949, empirical evidence shows that lineages were more developed in South China than in the rest of the country. Although type Z lineages existed in the North, they were far more predominant in the South, where as much as 35 percent of the land was corporately owned by lineages and where interlineage feuds and hostilities were common.¹⁰

Several reasons can be given to explain why lineages were most powerful in traditional South China. (1) South China was a region of late settlement by the Han.¹¹ As bearers of Confucian ideology, the pioneers organized themselves into lineages for defense against the aborigines, bandits, and pirates of this area. (2) South China lies within the double-cropping rice area.¹² Although the land is fertile and the climate favorable for growing wet rice, the region is hilly and susceptible to typhoons. Its hydraulic system also requires constant attention. Lacking dependable assistance from the state, lineages often had to pool their resources in order to combat such problems as flood and drought, the silting of rivers and streams, and the salination of coastal strips and delta areas. They had to construct and maintain embankments and irrigation channels (more than 50 percent of the farmland in South China was irrigated) as well as undertake such tasks as terracing hillsides and reclaiming land. Because of the fertility of the area, once land was reclaimed and irrigated it served as an important basis for collective functions such as ancestor worship. (3) South China, with its favorable climatic conditions, is less affected by the natural calamities which forced the migration of peasants in search of food and shelter in North China and resulted in considerable disruption of village organizations there. Moreover, being farther away from the traditional seat of government, South China was less affected by dynastic struggles than North China and hence was more capable of maintaining a stable, semi-independent existence characterized by lineage. (4) Since commerce and overseas emigration were more prevalent in South China, and since merchants and overseas emigrants lacked prestige and influence in traditional China, much of the mercantile capital was reinvested in land.¹³ Merchants commonly donated a portion of their wealth as ancestral land, thereby increasing the wealth and power of the lineage.

Besides patrilineal kinship, there were two other commonly recognized principles of social organization in traditional South China: socioeconomic class and ethnicity. Socioeconomic class was an important principle of social organization, because large differentiated lineages incorporated both rich and poor members. Lineage elites were in a position to exploit poor members economically and politically since they were landlords as well as unofficial representatives to the local government. Moreover, corruption was prevalent in many of these differentiated lineages. As membership grew, lineage property, which was supposed to be everyone's business, became the concern of the lineage managers alone. Wealthy members of the lineage therefore were drawn together by common interest in manipulating lineage property for their benefit.

At the same time, the poor might form ties across lineages to develop support mechanisms not satisfactorily provided by any lineage. One group formed through such connections was the Triad secret society, which became influential in rural South China around the turn of the nineteenth century. The aim of the Triads was political—to restore the nativist Ming dynasty. However, the society also had socioeconomic appeal: membership in the Triads offered a source of mutual aid which cut across lineage boundaries. Hence it had the potential to unite the poor in the differentiated lineages with members of small lineages in the vicinity. It could also unite the rural poor with the urban unemployed. Besides the rural and urban poor, merchants, smugglers, government runners, Taoist priests, and even local literati served as leaders, but members of the upper gentry class shunned such associations.

Depending on the members' degree of geographical mobility, the Triad can be divided into the outer Triads and the inner Triads.¹⁴ The outer Triads were made up of the mobile and marginal sections of the Chinese population—members of disbanded armies, unemployed porters, dock-workers, and coolies, as well as pirates and bandits. Many lived in the wooded and mountainous areas along the section of the border shared by Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Hunan provinces. They formed brotherhoods and were tightly organized. The inner Triads, on the other hand, were made up of ordinary peasants; they were immobile but discontented. These were local bare-sticks (men without families), unmarried males, and village outcasts. These people were torn between lineage affiliation and secret society allegiance.

Despite the presence of the Triads in South China, and the fact that they sometimes united the poor across lineage lines, secret societies were never successful in replacing lineages as a means of social organization. One of the Triads' weaknesses was that they were broken up into various lodges. These lodges shared common rituals and a sense of brotherhood; they exchanged information and favors, but there was no truly centralized organization. The lodges formed *ad hoc* confederations to attack walled cities and then quarrelled among themselves as to how to divide the booty.

Moreover, the united front of the inner and outer Triads was tenuous. The outer Triads would not participate in attacks on cities unless they were sure of potential allies among the peasants; and the inner Triads could not hope to challenge the hegemony of the gentry without outside help. Ordinarily, peasants did not join the Triads. They preferred to pay "protection fees" or "harvest taxes" to the outer Triads to keep them away. When they did become members, it was usually because they were coerced into doing so by, for example, having their land taken away or their children kidnapped by the outer Triads. Only during times of widespread disaster would they willingly join the society, in order to obtain assistance through Triad membership, and even when they joined of their own accord, their participation generally lasted only as long

as extremely poor economic conditions or excessive official and landlord exploitation endured.

In addition to these internal differences, secret societies faced constant persecution from without. The Confucian state was more anxious about secret societies than about lineages, as lineages were based on the officially most approved form of human associations—kinship. Therefore, although it occasionally took action against a lineage claiming that it had members dispersed over a wide territory or that it had descended from high ancestry, the state often vigorously suppressed secret societies and religious sects. The peasants, in their quest for security, refrained from joining the Triads as long as the gentry and lineage leaders could represent their interests effectively to official circles.

Finally, the Triads did not always represent the interests of the peasantry. Although the targets of Triad activities were sometimes the rich and powerful, they would also, if the need arose, live off the peasants in settled villages. Some Triad lodges were in fact connected with or manipulated by rich landlords and peasant exploiters. Instead of helping the poor lineages or poor members of rich lineages, they became an arm of powerful lineage elites who aspired to control the marketing community or to settle their scores with neighboring lineages.¹⁵

Hence, unlike the peasant movements of twentieth-century China, secret societies were both chronic and sporadic. On the one hand, it was impossible to completely wipe out the outer Triads or to remove the periodic crises faced by the peasants in settled villages so long as the traditional socioeconomic system remained unchanged. On the other hand, secret society uprisings were difficult to sustain because secret society membership never amounted to more than an active minority dissociated from the rest of the rural population. A crisis might temporarily swell their numbers, but membership generally dissipated afterwards. Hence, secret society leaders had to rebuild their strength after each isolated (and usually very brief) crisis had passed.

The decade after the Opium War marked the climax of Triad activities in South China. The Opium War itself and the subsequent opening of Shanghai as a treaty port led to a crisis situation for the inhabitants of the Pearl River delta. The porters, dock-workers, and boatmen were driven out of their jobs as a result of the shifting of the tea and silk trade from Canton to Shanghai. Militiamen who were disbanded after the Opium War became increasingly unruly; pirates in the Pearl River delta were driven upstream by the British navy. These men increased the membership of Triad brotherhoods in the wooded interior of western Kwangtung, where an active opium smuggling business had already been in place for quite some time. By 1843, the outer Triads were actively recruiting members in the settled villages around Canton. In some cases, entire villages joined voluntarily because their

inhabitants were faced with an economic crisis: the cottage weaving industry had declined, taxes had increased dramatically, and 1848-50 and 1852 were years of poor harvests. The Red Turbans (a Triad lodge) attacked several cities in the vicinity of Canton in 1854 and then set to quarrelling among themselves later in the same year.¹⁶

In spite of the problems and suppression encountered by secret societies, they were considered a threat by lineage organizations because they developed ties across lineage groups. To counter secret society activities, lineages joined together to form leagues, bureaus, and central bureaus which trained and paid militiamen.¹⁷ The Triads were defeated. The outer Triads marched back to the mountains, the pirates went downstream, and the inner Triads dissociated themselves from the outer Triads. "White terror" followed—many villagers suspected of Red Turban affiliation were arrested in 1855.¹⁸

From the 1860s to the beginning of the twentieth century, secret society activities waned. After many years of trying to curb the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64), the state was particularly vigilant against religious sects and secret societies. The Triads shifted their center to Southeast Asia.¹⁹ Until the early twentieth century, there were no large-scale uprisings led by Triad members in South China.²⁰ The core of the outer Triad members still remained, but these isolated brotherhoods were incapable of replacing lineages as a principle of social organization in South China.

Ethnic differences were less significant in the formation of systems of social organization than either lineage or socioeconomic class differences. In South China, ethnic differences were perceived as a matter of cultural rather than racial attributes, for, at least by the eighteenth century, inhabitants of South China were predominantly Han. Native tribes accounted for only 2 percent of the whole population in South China. After the massive migration of the Han into South China, most of the aboriginal groups (such as the Li and the Yao) either went across the border into mainland Southeast Asia, lived in remote areas in southwestern China, or were assimilated by the Han. Nonetheless, South China was culturally more heterogeneous than North China. While the North China plain served as a melting pot, South China was the recipient of successive waves of migration from the north. It is also more hilly and hence conducive to the isolation of one social group from another. Hence, as late as the nineteenth century, the Han people in South China still divided themselves into various subgroups based on such differences as recency of settlement and provincial origin of their ancestors or cultural differences such as customs, habits, and dialects. In Kwangtung Province, for example, the Chinese inhabitants categorized themselves as Punti (*pen-ti*, "locals") which included the Cantonese and the people of Ch'ao-chou; Hakka (*k'o-chia*, "guests"); Hoklo; or Tanka ("boat people").²¹

Ethnicity had been important in South China before the twentieth century. Conflict between ethnic groups, for example, was responsible for at least one major local war in the area—the Hakka-Punti War (1856-67), which affected many *hsien* in western Kwangtung and claimed more than one hundred thousand lives. The origin of the war dates back to the seventeenth century. In 1662, the Ch'ing dynasty was apprehensive about the Ming loyalists who occupied Taiwan as a base for anti-Manchu resistance, so the emperor ordered the evacuation of settlements along the Chinese coast. By 1683, with the remnants of resistance on Taiwan removed, the Ch'ing emperor reopened the coastal areas for farming and settlement. The Hakka were encouraged to develop the land in the Pearl River delta area. But as land in this area had already been claimed by the Punti lineages (even though the property was still uncultivated after the evacuation), the Hakka were forced to live interspersed among the Punti either as farm laborers or as tenant farmers. There were no Hakka villages or ancestral halls.

The symbiotic relationship between the Hakka tenants and farm laborers and the Punti landlords was upset during the mid-nineteenth century. Because of the rapid increase of population, the Hakka peasants made efforts to secure rent-free land to farm. This move united the Punti tenants and the Punti landlords against the Hakka: the Punti tenants were in competition with the Hakka for land, and the Punti landlords were alarmed at Hakka assertiveness. Hence, Punti and Hakka were increasingly divided into two hostile camps. Ethnicity—not socioeconomic class—thus served as the major criterion of social organization in the counties west of the Pearl River delta.²²

In 1854, the Hakka banded together in fortified villages. A number of these fortified villages then formed leagues and bureaus which trained Hakka militiamen to fight first the Red Turbans and the Punti. The Punti did likewise. The conflict soon escalated, ultimately affecting almost all the counties in western Kwangtung. The government tried at first to be neutral but was later persuaded by Punti leaders to side with them. Many Hakka, embittered, began to join the Taiping forces and followed the latter movement into Kwangsi.

The Hakka-Punti War ended in 1867. By government order, Ch'ih-hsi *t'ing* was formed out of a portion of T'ai-shan County. The Punti were to give up land in the Ch'ih-hsi area to the Hakka and, in return, to receive Hakka land in T'ai-shan County. As Ch'ih-hsi *t'ing* was too small to hold all the Hakka, many went on to the extreme southwest, to Hainan Island and the Lei-chou Peninsula. They were instrumental in developing these hitherto underpopulated areas. Many Hakka also emigrated overseas. In 1906, Hakka representatives appealed to the governor of Kwangtung Province to let them come back to their original villages in western Kwangtung, but their request was turned down. The governor was apprehensive about the possibility of further ethnic feuds in that area.²³

Since the Hakka-Punti conflict of the mid-nineteenth century, there have been no recorded cases of large-scale conflict between the Hakka and the Punti. But the presence of the Hakka has become an established fact in Kwangtung Province as a whole.²⁴ Of the ninety-seven *hsien* in Kwangtung, fifteen were inhabited almost solely by Hakka people and fifty had a mixed Punti-Hakka population. On the whole, the Hakka lived in the hilly areas and occupied the less arable land while the Punti occupied the more arable and accessible parts of Kwangtung. But even in counties where Hakka and Punti coexisted, they seldom lived in the same villages. For example, a survey done in the New Territories of Hong Kong in 1900 showed that of the 423 villages, only 7 were mixed Hakka-Punti villages.²⁵

The Punti-Hakka relationship was cordial in Hong Kong's New Territories. The fact that the Man, a Punti lineage, enlisted the help of Hakka lineages in its struggle against the T'ang, another Punti lineage, is proof that by the end of the nineteenth century, local alignments by no means depended solely on ethnic solidarity.²⁶ Studies of mixed communities of Hong Kong have noted only one instance of Hakka-Punti quarrels.²⁷ In 1867, there was fighting between Hakka and Punti in the Tsimshatsui area of Hong Kong. This occurred because migrants from western Kwangtung carried the bitter memories of the Hakka-Punti War from the mainland to Hong Kong. Apart from this single incident, members of mixed communities in the rural New Territories such as Shek-pik, Pui-O, Cheungshawan, Clearwater Bay, and Sai-kung were on the best of terms for at least three hundred years. Much intermarriage occurred, the flow of brides going both to the Hakka and to the Punti lineages. The villagers were fluent in both dialects. They established schools jointly and participated together in relief activities after each typhoon and in fighting off pirates and robbers.

The studies mentioned above show that as time went on, "Punti" and "Hakka" increasingly became cultural labels and not the basis of social organization. And even as cultural labels they have not been very accurate, for, culturally, Hakka, Cantonese, and Ch'ao-chou peoples were not themselves homogeneous. As Skinner points out, each rural market in precommunist China was the focus of interaction by peasants from about eighteen villages in the vicinity. As villagers who attended the same market town both created and adopted cultural idiosyncrasies typical of the area, each marketing community was in fact the bearer of "little tradition" which cut across the ethnic identities of the inhabitants in South China.²⁸

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that except for the Red Turban uprising of 1854 and the Punti-Hakka conflict of 1856-67, patrilineal kinship was a more important principle of social organization in South China than either socioeconomic class or ethnicity. For the rich and the poor of any ethnic group, the lineage served as an effective vehicle for expressing their own

socioeconomic interests. On the one hand, local scholars, retired officials, and successful merchants often found in the lineage a convenient channel for enhancing their power and influence. On the other, poor members of a lineage often depended upon their elite members to keep the national bureaucracy at bay and to lighten their burden of taxation and labor services. They also relied upon the lineage as a unit for defense and upon lineage property to improve their livelihood. It was this interdependence of the peasant and gentry members of the same lineage that made the lineage so valuable to the inhabitants of South China; no organization built along socioeconomic or ethnic lines could legitimately or effectively have served these functions.

Due to the growth of population and the increasing contact with the West after the Treaty of Nanking (1842), developments of a new kind began around the middle of the nineteenth century in South China. For the purposes of this study, these developments are summarized under four headings below: (1) the growth of population and the onset of massive overseas emigration; (2) the development of trade and industry; (3) the changing administrative structure; and (4) the changing educational system.

The Growth of Population and Massive Overseas Emigration

Despite the fertile soil, reliable rainfall, and warm climate which allow for the double-cropping of rice, precommunist South China was one of the most rice-deficient areas of China since only 13 percent of the land was cultivable.²⁹ Before the eighteenth century, rural South China was able to sustain itself largely on the basis of such food crops as sweet potatoes and peanuts and such cash crops as mulberries for the silk industry, sugarcane, tea, oranges, and tobacco. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the increasing population made life more and more difficult for the peasants.³⁰

Though there are no accurate census data, studies in interregional migration in China show that by the beginning of the nineteenth century many peasants from South China were forced to migrate to other parts of the country in order to survive.³¹ After 1812, the rate of delta land reclamation could not match the rate of increase in population in South China.³² The Hakka-Punti War in the middle of the nineteenth century marked the climax of the struggle for land that resulted from increasing population pressures in western Kwangtung. These pressures did not ease after the conflict, despite the immense number of casualties, and had reached a near-saturation point in the early 1930s. Buck's investigation, for example, shows that the double-cropping rice area in South China ranked second in terms of population density among the eight agricultural regions of China.³³ There were 2,027 people per square mile of cropped area, and the average farm size was extremely small. The rapid growth of population, unaccompanied by improvements in agricultural

technology, meant that it was increasingly difficult for peasants in this area to depend on the soil alone for a decent livelihood. To support themselves they had to turn to overseas emigration and migration to urban centers, and to nonfarm work in the villages.

Following the path of the traditional junk trade, overseas emigration was common in southern Fukien and eastern Kwangtung in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but it did not spread to the rest of Kwangtung until the nineteenth century. In the 1860s, when the European powers were initiating mining and plantation projects in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands, and when the American continent was building transcontinental railways, China became a popular source for labor recruitment. This coincided with the period when population pressure was beginning to be felt intensely in South China, and Central China had already become overpopulated by the end of the eighteenth century. The excess population began to move overseas. The high points of overseas emigration came between 1899 and 1903 and between 1919 and 1921. McNair has estimated that there were some 8.6 million Overseas Chinese by 1931, 90 percent of whom came from Fukien and Kwangtung.³⁴

The Development of Trade and Industry

Between 1757 and 1842, South China, and particularly the city of Canton, experienced tremendous growth in both trade and industry as the Ch'ing government confined all foreign trade to Canton. In addition to acting as middlemen between Chinese and European traders and handling such trade goods as silk and tea, Canton and its vicinity were also the major center for cotton spinning and weaving, the silk industry, iron works, gold and silver working, and numerous handicraft workshops.

The Treaty of Nanking in 1842, which stipulated the establishment of treaty ports along the coast of China and along the Yangtze basin, broke the Canton monopoly. Trade routes were diverted to such cities as Ningpo and Shanghai, and South China suffered a process of deindustrialization. After 1842, Canton was no longer a recipient of any substantial foreign investment, which went either to Shanghai or Hong Kong. Hence, while Shanghai became a center for large communications and industrial enterprises, Canton evolved into a city of small traders and craftsmen.³⁵

After 1911, Kwangtung began to undergo a new period of rapid economic development, partly because of government sponsorship and partly because of overseas remittances and investment by returned emigrants. From 1911 to 1936, Kwangtung was semi-independent. Warlords were divided as to whether to use this province as a base for the political unification of China or to make Kwangtung completely independent of the central government. Adherents of both of these views were nonetheless eager to improve the economy in order to

further their respective political goals. In this effort they were helped by the increasing amount of overseas remittances to South China, which by the First World War had already grown to 120 million *yüan* annually.³⁶

With Europe at war from 1914 to 1918, native capital was invested in various commercial and industrial concerns as well as in municipal development projects. The growth of nationalism in the 1920s among Chinese in the South was manifested in a boycott of Japanese and British goods. In fact, foreign trade fell sharply after 1925 and never regained its preboycott peak. South China, unlike North and Central China, enjoyed an excess of exports over imports in foreign trade.³⁷

Trade and industry grew in South China even in the midst of world depression, partly because of the dramatic increase in overseas remittances between 1928 and 1931.³⁸ The Three-Year Plan, which aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in Kwangtung, began in 1933. Ch'en Chi-t'ang, provincial governor at that time, concentrated on the founding of modern textile factories, hemp factories, paper mills, oil-pressing factories, cement factories, and match factories.³⁹ Side by side with the development of trade and industry went projects to modernize cities and market towns in the hinterland and to improve the system of transport and communication. Local merchants and Overseas Chinese were encouraged to finance the building of roads, the construction of railways, and the founding of bus and steamboat companies. They were also urged to help improve existing markets and to found new ones. As a result of their investment, merchants and returned emigrants grew in social status.

In traditional China, merchants were low in political and social status. Their guilds could fix prices and control the behavior of the members, but they were not powerful enough to have a voice in government policies. Their strongest means of protest was to close their shops. This situation persisted until the latter half of the nineteenth century, when merchants were allowed to join the scholars and retired officials for discussions with the government. Together, this group was known as the gentry merchants (*shen-shang*). But the merchants were still under the domination of the scholars and failed to form an independent power base. It was not until after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, that the Manchu government, out of concern for the economic future of the country, reevaluated the role of the merchants. In 1904, the imperial court called for the creation of chambers of commerce in all cities of China.⁴⁰ These citywide merchant associations were to coordinate the guilds and locality and clan associations which had previously divided the business community. The chambers of commerce functioned to arbitrate disputes and to overcome parochialism, linking guilds not only in a single city but throughout the country. It was hoped that this would promote commerce and industrial development and thereby improve China's position vis-à-vis foreign interests.

In Kwangtung Province, the General Chamber of Commerce was founded in Canton in July 1905. Merchants in other cities and market towns were encouraged to form branch chambers. Although leaders of these new associations were selected according to talent, the leaders of old institutions such as the guilds, locality and clan associations did not relinquish any former positions or ties even when they were selected to lead the chambers of commerce. In addition, the hiring procedures of the shops remained particularistic. Because of the turmoil of the early twentieth century, employers had to recruit workers on the basis of personal ties so as to prevent desertion or betrayal.

Nonetheless, the General Chamber of Commerce in Kwangtung became increasingly politicized and participated actively in the constitutional movement. Merchants were disappointed with the Ch'ing government because the voting requirement for the provincial assembly, specified in the constitution of 1908, effectively limited voting rights to gentry members and a very few wealthy merchants. In addition, their request to form a merchant corps as a counterpart to the gentry-led militia was turned down. Hence, it is not surprising that the merchants voted to declare the independence of Kwangtung in 1911.

Although the 1911 Revolution was by no means a bourgeois revolution, it did break the hold of the gentry over the politics of the province. The successive governments that were formed in Kwangtung after 1911 were all far more responsive to merchants than the Ch'ing government had been. They were now able to establish legally a merchant corps and sit in the provincial assembly. They also dominated the consultative councils of minor cities and market towns in the province.⁴¹

During the Ch'ing dynasty, Overseas Chinese were regarded as even lower than the merchants in legal and social status. Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, Ch'ing law had prohibited their return to China. They were the objects of blackmail and extortion by local officials and their underlings. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, with the legalization of emigration, Overseas Chinese began to play a more important economic role in their local communities. Their remittances helped to balance the trade deficit China had suffered since the 1920s. The emigrants also took an active part in the revolutionary movement of Sun Yat-sen in the early twentieth century and made substantial donations to China's war chest during World War II. South China benefited most from overseas remittances since some 90 percent of the Overseas Chinese came from this part of the country. Returned emigrants acquired prestige because of their economic power and political participation. They came to rival modern scholars and local merchants in social status.

The modernization of cities and market towns, the building of roads and railways, and the improvement of steamboat and bus services in the vicinity of treaty ports were to a large extent responsible for the growth of cooperation

among the Overseas Chinese and the local merchants. They jointly participated in all kinds of projects, recognizing the need to form organizations for the purpose of protecting their interests in times of political uncertainty. They became an independent class, supporting the bureaucrats when the latter served their purposes but protesting when the policies of the bureaucrats displeased them.

The Changing Administrative Structure


Because of increasing military and economic pressure from the Western powers and Japan, the Ch'ing government finally decided, by the beginning of the twentieth century, to carry out a series of administrative reforms, but the program remained on paper. Between 1911 and 1927, the local administrative structure of China was in a state of flux. Both North and South China were in political turmoil after the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty. Concrete steps toward reforming the local government system were only taken two years after Chiang Kai-shek had succeeded in reuniting China under the Kuomintang (KMT). In 1929, the Hsien Organization Act was passed, creating several levels of government below the *hsien*.⁴²

In rural areas, the *pao-chia* system of mutual responsibility, which had lost its functions after the eighteenth century, was reintroduced. Ten families were to form one *chia*, and ten *chia* were to form one *pao*, which often coincided with the size of a natural village. Several *pao* constituted one *hsiang* (rural subdistrict). In major market towns, residents were not organized according to the *pao-chia* system. Instead, the Department of Public Security was responsible for peace and security. Police corps were stationed in these towns. For administrative purposes, a market town (*chen*) government was created for the first time. Both the *hsiang* and the market town governments were under the direction of the newly created district (*ch'ü*) government. At the top of this hierarchy was the *hsien* government.

All of these new organs were to be staffed by local talent, which included the following categories: (1) those who had passed the civil service examinations; (2) those who had served the Kuomintang; (3) those who were graduates of middle schools or higher-level educational institutions; and (4) those who had a record of service in the *hsien* government (which included monetary donations). At each level of government there was a chief assisted by a small consultative council. Below the level of the *ch'ü*, the chief and the council members were chosen by a general assembly made up of residents within their jurisdiction. But these officials were not responsible to the assembly members; they were answerable instead to their superiors in the administrative hierarchy. At the *ch'ü* level and above, chiefs were nominated by the provincial government. Below the chief (*hsien-chang*) were a number of executive

departments: the Education Department, the Public Works Department, the Finance Department, the Civil Affairs Department, and the Department of Public Security. The members of all of these departments were nominated. At the same time, a centralized police force was introduced to enforce law and order in the *hsien*. It was to be trained and controlled by the provincial government.

TABLE 1
System of Local Government, 1930-49



Source: Drawn up by the author based on a description by T. S. Ch'ien, *The Government and Politics of China, 1912-1949* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 226.

As can be seen from the brief description above, the enactment of the Hsien Organization Act did not result in the increase of political participation by ordinary people. It is true that natives had a greater part to play than was the case during the Ch'ing period, when only a few served in the capacity of private secretaries, yamen clerks, or runners. But the government after 1929 still remained an oligarchy. Landlords, wealthy merchants, and traditional and modern scholars dominated the general assemblies and the consultative councils. They were usually nominated or chosen to serve as chiefs in all levels of government. They were responsible to the organs above and not to the electorate below. The positions of *hsien* chief and heads of the Finance Department and the Department of Public Security were usually filled by provincial appointees. The KMT Party Office, established in 1924, supervised the whole *hsien* administration, and the garrison soldiers under the military governor were agents of the provincial government as well.

Ostensibly to finance the various new local government organs and the new police force, as well as to provide funding for government schools and road building projects, there was a substantial increase in land taxes in the late 1920s. In addition, a host of local surtaxes was instituted in the 1930s. In 1933, Kwangtung was delegated the task of exterminating the Communists in the Kiangsi Soviet. Various additional surtaxes were collected to finance this effort. In some cases, tax bureaus were set up to collect taxes. In other cases, the tax-farming system was adopted. Under this system, tax collection was open to annual public bidding. The company which could pay the highest deposit was allowed to collect taxes on behalf of the government. These contracting companies collected as much as ten times the government quota. In addition, warlords and soldiers extracted whatever they could from the peasants and merchants.⁴³ These harsh policies, enforced by local ruffians, bullies, police, and soldiers stationed in market towns, inflicted considerable hardship on the people.

The Changing Educational System

The traditional examination system was abolished in 1905 as a direct result of the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the twentieth century. This created a need for modern schools in order to produce enough civil servants to staff the enlarged government bureaucracy. Educational development in Kwangtung was more intense than in the rest of China. As has been described, between 1911 and 1936 there were two power blocs: those who wanted to use the province as a base to reunite China and those who wanted to keep it independent. Both of these factions saw the need to staff the Kwangtung administration with local talent. They were reluctant to recruit civil servants from outside.

Apart from political reasons, the rapid development of trade and processing industries in Kwangtung and the growth of overseas business interests among the emigrants in the twentieth century created a need for more book-keepers and accountants as well as other technical personnel. These positions could not be filled by the graduates of missionary schools alone. Thus, commercial circles and Overseas Chinese joined hands with the government to build more schools and to systematize the curriculum. As a result, Kwangtung achieved the highest degree of literacy in the whole of China. By 1934 about 1 percent of Canton's residents had a university education and some 8 percent had middle school education.⁴⁴

In Kwangtung, as in all parts of China, graduates of modern schools were recruited to staff the local administrative organs. Students who returned from abroad and those who graduated from local high schools or higher-level educational institutions usually filled government posts in the provincial government as well as in various *hsien* government organs. The first modern civil service examinations were given in 1916. These were of two types: special examinations to recruit for the highest administrative posts, for which only university graduates or the equivalent were eligible; and ordinary examinations to screen for civil service positions of lower ranks, for which graduates of senior middle schools were eligible. After 1939, candidates to the *hsiang*, *chen*, *ch'ü*, *hsien*, and provincial councils had to undergo an additional examination.⁴⁵ Thus, as in the traditional period, during the Min-kuo period (1911-49) formal education was still regarded as the channel for social and political advancement. Unlike the scholar-officials of old, however, these new graduates served in the *local* government organs.

Some scholars studying developments in post-Opium War China have concluded that patrilineal kinship declined in importance in rural China. Their arguments can be summarized in terms of two different theories: the theory of social erosion and the theory of class antagonism.

The chief proponent of the theory of social erosion is H. T. Fei.⁴⁶ This theory holds that because of the rapid development of urban centers after the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, people began to settle in port cities and large towns. Treaty-port living and foreign imports introduced a strong desire for material comforts. Returned emigrants, rich landlords, and modern scholars either moved out of their home communities and became absentee landlords or sold their land to city merchants. They took up residence in the cities, occasionally going back to their home villages to attend ancestral rites but otherwise taking little or no part in village affairs. Hence, the rich and the talented deserted the countryside instead of staying in the villages or nearby market towns to use their prestige and connections for the benefit of the home community, as the traditional scholar-gentry had done. In addition, because of the influx of western products, traditional crafts were ruined. Large numbers of

peasants, both male and female, finding rural conditions increasingly intolerable, were consequently leaving the countryside to look for work in the cities. Thus, lineages in the countryside came to suffer more and more from "social erosion."

Other scholars believe that lineages were weakened by the growth of political and economic antagonism among lineage members. A typical example is the work of H. S. Ch'en who emphasizes the increasing exploitation of the peasantry by their own lineage managers in the 1930s in the form of bribes, handling fees, high rental deposits, high rents for lineage property, and high interest rates for lineage loans.⁴⁷ Lineage managers either became partners with or rented lineage property to outside merchants who in turn squeezed the tenants. The agricultural surplus, siphoned off in this fashion, was used to finance the increasingly luxurious life-style of the lineage managers and their few protégés. After 1930, the tenants had no way to seek redress since the lineage managers had become officials of local government organs. On the contrary, as local officials these lineage managers were empowered to collect taxes, which further increased their opportunities for personal gain at the expense of their own lineage members. In addition to exploitation by lineage managers, peasants in South China suffered from exploitation by private landlords from their own lineages who charged increasingly higher rents but provided no assistance to the tenant farmers. Instead, landlords often acted as moneylenders and pawnshop owners, continuing to siphon off any farm surplus. Violence was common in rent and tax collection. Landlords (both private and corporate) and tax collectors employed ruffians who extracted as much as they could from the peasants. As a result of increasing political and economic exploitation, the countryside became polarized in the 1930s. Land became increasingly concentrated in a few hands, and the vast majority of the peasants became tenants and farm laborers in their own lineages. This led to the deterioration of social relationships between people of the same lineage. Class antagonism took the place of lineage cohesion.

Based on the theory of social erosion and the theory of class antagonism, Fei and Ch'en argue that although patrilineal kinship was traditionally more important than socioeconomic class as a principle of social organization, this was no longer true from the late Ch'ing period onwards. Because of important demographic, economic, administrative, and educational changes, there was increasing rural-urban migration and class conflict in the rural hinterlands. As a result, socioeconomic class replaced patrilineal kinship in importance by the beginning of the twentieth century.

These assertions will be examined through the following in-depth study of a lineage in South China between 1911 and 1949. Specifically, the major questions are: (1) Did intensive competition for limited resources as a result of population pressures weaken the lineage? (2) Did the increased reliance on

commercial and industrial activities for livelihood as a result of developments in transportation, marketing, and commerce weaken the lineage? (3) Did individual members lose their lineage consciousness when the size of lineages grew too large and lineage organization became too complex? (4) Did massive emigration of the members as a result of population pressures weaken lineage cohesion? (5) Did changes in the educational system and the increased participation of elites in local government organs lead to the weakening of the lineage as a form of social organization? (6) Did the increase in the prestige and power of merchants, returned emigrants, and modern scholars in the lineage lead to class antagonism between them and the poor and powerless peasants and laborers?

CHAPTER 2
The Kuan Lineage of T'uo-fu

The seat of K'ai-p'ing County is 104 miles southwest of Canton. It is one of the four adjacent *hsien* lying to the west of the Pearl River delta, a region that has sent thousands of its residents to North America. The inhabitants of these four counties, or Ssu-yi (T'ai-shan, K'ai-p'ing, En-p'ing, and Hs'in-hui), speak the same dialect and believe that they share the same subculture. In geographic terms, however, Ssu-yi partakes of the same features as the rest of western Kwangtung, one of the most agriculturally unproductive areas of the province. Only 5 percent of Kwangtung's arable land is located here.¹ Apart from the Lei-chou Peninsula and parts of coastal Hainan Island, the topography is rugged and the soil is poor. Double-cropping of rice is not common, with cereals and sweet potatoes being the staple crops. Only one-quarter of the food supply is grown locally. The raising of cattle, goats, and pigs as well as fishing are major activities, and the chief exports include peanuts, fish, meat, animal hides, hemp, clothing, grass sacks, grass mats, tobacco, and tea. Because of its climate, Lei-chou and Hainan Island are suitable for growing such tropical crops as bananas, mangos, pineapples, coconuts, rubber, oil palms, coffee, and cocoa. Up until the twentieth century, however, only 4 percent of the arable land was devoted to these crops.²

The reason for the underdevelopment of this part of Kwangtung is geographical. Before the development of communication by sea and the improvement of harbors along the coast, western and southern Kwangtung were cut off from the rest of the province. While the Pearl River and its tributaries (the North, West, and East rivers) form a network of navigable waters, there is no such river system in western Kwangtung. There the rivers are short, and each enters the sea separately. Land transportation through the narrow mountain passes is difficult.³

There are only three relatively navigable rivers in western Kwangtung: the Lien, Yang, and T'an. Of these, the T'an River is of the greatest commercial significance because it links western Kwangtung with the West River system at the port of Chiang-men. Goods from southern and western Kwangtung are transported by land, loaded onto small boats going down the T'an River to San-fu (a collective term for the market towns of Ch'ang-sha, Hsin-ch'ang, and Ti-hai), and then moved by means of tugboats and steamboats to Chiang-men,

from which point they are distributed throughout the Pearl River delta and along the West River. Imports such as rice and cotton goods are sent up the T'an River from Canton through Chiang-men.⁴

K'ai-p'ing County is landlocked and, like the rest of western Kwangtung, has a hilly topography. Some 70 percent of its land is barren and unproductive. It is, however, somewhat more fortunate than other counties outside of Ssu-yi, for the T'an River and some of its tributaries flow through K'ai-p'ing on the way to the important port of Chiang-men. Most of K'ai-p'ing's arable land is found in the valleys along the T'an and its tributaries, where the bulk of K'ai-p'ing's cash crops are cultivated. These include peanuts grown at Hsien-kang, tea and tobacco grown at Shui-k'ou, and garlic grown at Sha-kang.⁵ In addition, the banks of the T'an are the site of much of the commercial and processing activity in K'ai-p'ing, including the leather goods industries, the making of iron stoves and equipment, hemp weaving, the making of bamboo utensils, the extraction of peanut oil, the making of peanut cake for fertilizers, and the processing of tea and tobacco leaves.⁶ Thus, it is not surprising that before 1949 about 70 percent of the people of K'ai-p'ing lived along the T'an River. As in other counties of Kwangtung, corporate property was traditionally a predominant feature in the local economy of K'ai-p'ing. H. S. Ch'en estimated that as late as the 1930s some 40 percent of the land of K'ai-p'ing was held corporately.⁷ Most of the prominent lineages had their headquarters along the lower and middle courses of the T'an River.⁸

The Kuan was a lineage of the lower T'an River. It had four major segments, each corresponding to one of the four *hsiang*: Wu-jung, Chung-miao, Lu-yang, and Ling-yüan. These four *hsiang* were known locally as the T'uo-fu area, comprising some forty natural villages.⁹ The ritual center of the T'uo-fu Kuan was Kuang-yü *t'ang* (ancestral hall) at Ch'ih-k'an. Each of the major segments had its own ancestral hall and corporate property to sustain its rituals. The Wu-jung *t'ang* was attended by the elders of Wu-jung *hsiang*, the Lu-yang *t'ang* by the elders of Lu-yang *hsiang*, the Ling-yüan *t'ang* by the elders of Ling-yüan *hsiang*, and the Chung-miao *t'ang* by the elders of Chung-miao *hsiang*. Within each component village of the four *hsiang* were numerous other ancestral halls, each with corporate property to finance the Spring and Autumn Rites for the founder (see appendix 1).

From about the end of the eighteenth century, an unofficial alliance, known as the League of the Four Hsiang (Ssu-hsiang kung-yüeh) was established among the gentry members representing the four *hsiang* of T'uo-fu. It was attached to the Kuang-yü *t'ang*. As the center for regulating league affairs as well as organizing ancestral rites, the Kuang-yü *t'ang* at Upper Chih-k'an eventually became the building in which the gentry members from Lu-yang, Wu-jung, Chung-miao, and Ling-yüan *hsiang* met to manage all lineage affairs. It served as a diplomatic center between the Kuan and all other lineages.

Ancestral property of the four *hsiang* was managed from this center. It was also the unofficial court of appeals that regulated violent conflicts among lineage members.

Kuan B, who had seen a copy of the genealogy of the Kuan while he was still in K'ai-p'ing, said that the Kuan of T'uo-fu came from Shensi Province. From there, a branch went to Fukien Province. This was led by Kuan Ching-ch'i who became a metropolitan graduate (*chin-shih*) during the reign of Sung T'ai-tsu (960-75). As an official he lost favor with the emperor because of an ill-timed piece of advice and was subsequently exiled to Hsin-hui County of Kwangtung Province. Six generations after Kuan Ching-ch'i, Kuan Yung was the first Kuan to come to K'ai-p'ing. He settled in the T'uo-fu area around 1230, and his brother settled in Nan-hai County, Kwangtung Province. By 1940, the Kuan of T'uo-fu had been established there for about thirty generations.

During the Ch'ing dynasty, the Kuan was one of the most powerful lineages in K'ai-p'ing in terms of membership, scholarly prestige, corporate property, and commercial wealth. According to my informants, the Kuan of T'uo-fu numbered some 20,000 by 1930. Judging from the population census of that year, which gives a breakdown of the number of people by *ch'ü*, it was among the largest lineages in K'ai-p'ing (see table 2). T'uo-fu was part of the fourth *ch'ü*, one of the most populous in the *hsien*. The Kuan accounted for almost a third of the people in that district. In fact, this lineage could be counted among the largest in South China in view of Hsiao's statement that "clans in Kwangtung and Fukien were large, some boast[ing] a membership of 10,000."¹⁰ The Kuan had twice this number.

TABLE 2
Population of K'ai-p'ing, 1930

<u>Ch'ü</u>	<u>No. of People</u>
First	39,690
Second	46,616
Third	47,204
Fourth	65,388
Fifth	30,391
Sixth	26,149
Seventh	30,347
Eighth	45,423
Ninth	38,647
Tenth	78,408

Source: *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih* (Hong Kong, 1933), p. 90.

The numerical strength of the Kuan at T'uo-fu was matched by its political influence. Among the Kuan were numerous scholars, including those who had passed the traditional examinations and those who had bought degrees.¹¹ As can be seen from tables 3 and 4, the lineage captured many scholarly titles throughout the Ch'ing dynasty, especially from the Tao-kuang period onwards (1821-50). Of the sixty Kuan who acquired scholarly titles during the whole Ch'ing era, fourteen became officials. Of these, five performed great services to the state and were so highly valued that their fathers, grandfathers, and paternal uncles were granted posthumous honors by the government.¹² The highest office holder was Kuan Ch'ao-tsung, who became a provincial graduate (*chü-jen*) during the Hsien-feng period (1851-61) and a metropolitan graduate (*chin-shih*) during the T'ung-chih period (1862-74). He was made a member of the Hanlin Academy and served in the Foreign Office.¹³ All of my informants mentioned him as the glory of the Kuan in K'ai-p'ing. Besides these fourteen officials, there were also five Kuan who had no scholarly titles but served as petty officials outside K'ai-p'ing.¹⁴

The Kuan owned all the land in T'uo-fu. Although the land along this part of the T'an River is not particularly fertile and does not yield any cash crops, it is at least arable and produced enough food to sustain the lineage members until the end of the nineteenth century. Outside T'uo-fu, the lineage also had corporate property in the second and the sixth *ch'ü*. Informants were unable to say exactly how much land there was, but all noted that it was quite extensive. This was Hakka land seized after the termination of the Hakka-Punti War in 1867. Most of it was in the Chin-chi area on the border between K'ai-p'ing and En-p'ing.

TABLE 3
Number of Regular Scholars in K'ai-p'ing, 1644-1911*

<u>Surname</u>	<u>Total No. of Titled Scholars</u>
Chang	128
Ssu-t'u	65
Kuan	60
T'an	35
Chou	27
Liu	26
Liang	26
K'uang	26
Ho	24
Yü	20

*Including metropolitan graduate (*chin-shih*), provincial graduate (*chü-jen*), and imperial student (*kung-sheng*).

Source: *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, pp. 217-31.

TABLE 4
Number of Irregular Scholars in K'ai-p'ing, 1644-1911*

<u>Surname</u>	<u>Total No. of Degrees Purchased</u>
Kuan	87
Chang	73
T'an	71
Ssu-t'u	50
Chou	37
Hsieh	24
Teng	23
Li	19
Ho	18
Huang	17

*Imperial student by purchase (*li-kung-sheng*).

Source: *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, pp. 232-34.

The Kuan had servile households (*hsia-fu*) in their midst, maintaining semifeudal subservience towards the Kuan.¹⁵ My informants said that in Chang-ts'un there were ten servile households surnamed Liu; in Hsia-ts'un there were also ten such families surnamed Li, Liang, and Fan; in Sha-ti village there were three or four families surnamed Tseng and Huang; and in Hsia-pien there were four families surnamed Luo. These were much more symbols of the affluence of the lineage than the servile households residing in the New Territories of Hong Kong. Unlike the latter, the servile households among the Kuan were said to be owned by the ancestral halls and not by individual families within the villages.¹⁶ They carried sedan chairs in wedding ceremonies, coffins during funerals, and presents between families on all ceremonial occasions. They did all the cooking during the Spring and Autumn Rites and other festivities. They also took part in cutting up and dividing the ritual meat. The Kuan themselves had an aversion to such jobs. In Na-lo, for instance, where there were no servile households, the villagers employed a group of outsiders to serve during ceremonial and festive occasions. Members of servile households had a particular way of addressing their masters. Like their counterparts in P'ing-shan, in the New Territories of Hong Kong, they addressed the Kuan as a daughter-in-law would address her husband and in-laws.¹⁷ The Kuan themselves, however, called members of servile households by their names plus the suffix *nu*, meaning "slave." The presence of these servile households is a good indication of the power and prestige of the Kuan, for at some point in the history of the lineage they must have been powerful enough to subjugate several minor lineages in the vicinity and reduce them to this status.

The Kuan lineage was wealthy because of its position on the T'an River and because of the proximity of Ch'ih-k'an, its market town, to the important port of Chiang-men at the Pearl River delta. According to Skinner, it is possible to distinguish three types of periodic rural market towns in traditional China: the standard market town, the intermediate market town, and the central market town.¹⁸ Whereas a standard market town served the needs of peasant households from about eighteen surrounding villages, the intermediate market town catered to a much wider geographical area. It served the exclusive needs of the elites from about six standard market towns in the vicinity and acted as a site for consultation among gentry members themselves and between gentry members and merchants. The central market town was normally at a commercially strategic site and was often the seat of administration in traditional China.

Ch'ih-k'an was only one of the most important intermediate market towns of K'ai-p'ing. It was a major ferry center along the T'an River (see table 5). The *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih* emphasizes the commercial importance of Ch'ih-k'an: "Although it was founded later than Ch'ang-sha and Shui-k'ou, its marketing area is wider. Goods from Lei-chou, Lien-chou, Kao-chou [Mao-ming County], and Yang-chiang, such as sugar, livestock, and peanut oil, and salt from Na-fu [in T'ai-shan] were transported to Shui-k'ou, Chiang-men, and Canton through Ch'ih-k'an."¹⁹

TABLE 5
Number of Ferries at the Market Towns of
K'ai-p'ing, 1911-31

<u>Name of Port</u>	<u>To Places outside K'ai-p'ing</u>	<u>To Places in K'ai-p'ing</u>
Ts'ang-ch'eng	0	3
Ch'ih-k'an	40	23
Ch'ang-sha	23	14
Chin-shan	6	1
Shui-k'ou	15	5

Source: *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, pp. 81-83.

Ch'ih-k'an was established at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Market days were held in the town on a three-eight schedule.²⁰ It was separated into Upper and Lower Ch'ih-k'an after 1845 as a result of a conflict between the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u lineages.²¹ From that time on, the Kuan established sole control over Upper Ch'ih-k'an. According to the people I talked with, they owned over half of the shops there and had extensive business connections with Hong Kong and Canton through Chiang-men. There was a Kuan's

pier in Upper Ch'ih-k'an. A private company used this pier to operate a ferry service, carrying goods from Canton to Ch'ih-k'an. The Kuan gentry members were allowed to ride the ferry free of charge. The lineage grew in prosperity with the growth of Ch'ih-k'an through its right to collect fees and unofficial levies of all kinds. Moreover, the control of this town gave the Kuan a commanding voice in the surrounding standard markets.²² Hence, it can be said that the Kuan was one of the most powerful lineages in K'ai-p'ing.

The Kuan were separated from the rest of the world by the Ssu-chiu River (local term: *Ni-hai*, "muddy sea") to the north and the T'an River to the south and east. To the west of T'uo-fu was Ch'ih-k'an. T'ang-ti Street in Ch'ih-k'an had been the line of demarcation between the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u since 1845. Within this boundary, land was owned by the Kuan either privately or corporately.

There were very few people living permanently in T'uo-fu who were not of the Kuan lineage. The few who did owned no land and had no say in village affairs. In some houses, there were relatives staying temporarily, usually old women staying with their sons-in-law. In the early 1900s, when villages at T'uo-fu started to run private schools, the teacher was usually not a Kuan. Scholars among the Kuan generally taught elsewhere, and the T'uo-fu villagers employed outsiders to teach there. The teacher usually lived in the ancestral hall behind the school for which he paid no rent. He did not play any part in the village administration except when called upon to write invitation cards or lucky couplets on ceremonial occasions.²³ Other professionals also visited from outside. Ironsmiths, for example, came frequently to the villages. Once or twice a year, three or four of them came from Ch'ih-k'an to repair or make farm equipment for the villagers. They usually stayed for several days, either staying in the ancestral halls or setting up tents on empty lots. After they had done their work, they would return to Ch'ih-k'an. A doctor, too, might come when needed, but he would leave as soon as the case was over. Every year, a company of ten to twenty people would be invited to perform puppet shows during the Chinese New Year. Again, they either lived in the ancestral halls or in tents next to the stage. Occasionally, two or three Buddhist nuns would come from Ts'ang-ch'eng to ask for donations of money or rice. They usually stayed as house guests of wealthy believers.

In at least one aspect of rural life, the Kuan lineage was more exclusive than lineages in other parts of South China. Despite the presence of shop-owners in Ch'ih-k'an who were not Kuan, no outsiders operated permanent stores in the villages of T'uo-fu.²⁴ In Na-lo, there was one grocery store owned by a Kuan; in Chang-ts'un, there were two drugstores and one grocery, all owned by Kuan lineage members. In Hsia-ts'un, the few grocery stores were also owned by villagers surnamed Kuan. They had private boats to go to Ch'ih-k'an to stock up on supplies. These stores were very popular and prosperous.

The corporate property of Kuang-yu *t'ang* included both land at Upper Ch'ih-k'an as well as land outside of T'uo-fu, in the second and sixth *ch'ü* of K'ai-p'ing. This land outside the home territory (*wai chai-t'ien*) was seized from the Hakka in the middle of the nineteenth century. All of this corporate property was held in common for the whole lineage. Below this level of land-ownership was *hsiang* land owned individually by each of the four *hsiang*, Ling-yüan, Lu-yang, Chung-miao, and Wu-jung. Further down the hierarchy was lineage branch land owned by ancestral halls in the various villages of T'uo-fu. At the lowest level was the land trust (*hsiao-ya-kung-t'ien*) that was owned by a few families in the village. The proceeds of this property were not used to support any ancestral halls.²⁵

The Kuan were very cautious about keeping their territories intact. Land in T'uo-fu, whether privately or corporately held, was regarded as sacred.²⁶ Before World War II, practically no *hsiang* corporate property had been sold. Because every *hsiang* representative had to give his approval in writing before any such property could be sold, it was very difficult to reach a decision to do so. The same applied to the corporate land belonging to the village ancestral halls. There were several pieces of land in the villages known as "perpetually inherited land" (*kung-fen-t'ien*) that could never be sold. They were handed down by the early founders to be kept in perpetuity. They might be mortgaged in case of emergency, but they had to be redeemed without paying interest.

On the other hand, the land trust could, in theory, be sold. The co-proprietors were few in number, and the land was not attached to any ancestral halls. Its sale could be initiated by whoever was taking care of the accounts. All adult males (over eighteen) among the co-proprietors had a right to authorize sales and share in the benefits. But informants emphasized that this was seldom done, and even if land had to be sold in the case of dire emergency, the owners tried their best to sell to their fellow Kuan living in the same village.

Lineage opinion was also insistent that private land must be offered first to a Kuan before it could be sold to outsiders. There was at least one feud between the Fang in T'ang-k'ou and the Kuan in Lang-hsia-ts'un (Chung-miao *hsiang*) which was caused by the sale of private property. This particular incident took place in the 1920s. A Kuan had secretly sold a piece of land to a Fang. His villagers did not like the thought of the Fang intruding into their territories, so there was a feud between the two lineages that lasted several weeks. It was finally settled when the garrison soldiers moved in to restore order.

In China, the allocation of corporate land by lineages took one of four forms: (1) every member farming a portion of the ancestral property; (2) every member farming the land on a rotation basis; (3) lineage managers allocating land to whoever they deemed suitable; and (4) renting land to the highest bidder.²⁷ Of these four methods, the first two were equitable to the average

lineage member. The third method varied in its benefits to members according to how judicious the lineage managers were. The fourth method was definitely disadvantageous to poor members of the lineage. It was this method that the Kuan at T'uo-fu adopted.

The Kuan adopted the bidding system in choosing tenants to farm their corporate property. Land outside the home territory was rented to people outside the lineage. It was not rented to any lineage in particular but to the highest bidder (that is, to whoever could pay the highest rental deposit). *Hsiang* land within the T'uo-fu area was rented to those within the lineage who could pay the highest deposit, which was also the case with the corporate land and fish ponds in the village precinct that were owned by the various village ancestral halls.²⁸ The frequency of land bidding ranged from annually to every ten years. It varied from village to village and, within the same village, from ancestral hall to ancestral hall. But three years seems to have been the norm. The right to bid for land was not confined to members of one particular ancestral hall, but there was a definite rule of preference: *fang* members had the first preference, then members of the village, and then Kuan from other villages.

The rule of preferences was sometimes not followed, however. Those who were influential might pay bribes to the managers to be given the right to farm the land, thereby depriving those who would normally have had first priority of their right. In addition, in the case of rent default, managers of ancestral land might repossess land from the tenant and put the land up for bids again before the specified period was up. But this, from what the informants told me, seldom happened. Tenants renting corporate land of their own lineage were generally treated leniently in these circumstances.

Nevertheless, it is to be expected that the system of bidding for land did not benefit the poor farmers. This was particularly true with respect to *hsiang* land. They had little chance of bidding successfully. This was not only because favoritism and bribery were involved in the process but also because the *hsiang* consisted of numerous villages. There was too much competition and consequently the bidding price was high. Of course, every member of the *hsiang* ancestral hall was theoretically entitled to take part. In addition, once a lineage member had made a successful bid, he could not be as easily evicted for rent default as the nonmember bidder on land outside the home territory.²⁹ This might have comforted the poor Kuan and given him a sense of superiority and security vis-à-vis the member of a poor lineage nearby. However, being a member of the Kuan lineage did not, in fact, give him much tangible benefit. The Kuan bidder on corporate property in T'uo-fu paid as high a rental deposit as the non-Kuan bidder outside T'uo-fu.

The chances of successfully bidding on land were higher in the case of village corporate property because there were fewer competitors. Far more

profitable to the individual farmer was the land trust. This was owned corporately and was farmed in turn by the members. At the end of the year, proceeds from the land were divided among the members.

Theoretically, the rents collected by lineage managers could be used for the following purposes: (1) to finance ritual activities such as the Spring and Autumn Rites and the sweeping of the graves of the ancestral hall founders; (2) to finance poor scholars, reward degree winners, or build schools and study halls; (3) to finance public works such as land reclamation, and the building and maintenance of irrigation and drainage channels; and (4) to help the poor in the form of low-interest lineage loans, lineage granaries, and other forms of charity and relief. As far as the Kuan lineage was concerned, however, the proceeds of their corporate land were generally used only for ritual purposes.

Unlike lineages in other parts of South China, the Kuan at T'uo-fu were not involved collectively in the organization of waterworks.³⁰ In the memory of my informants, floods and droughts had never been a serious problem in T'uo-fu. No drainage channels had ever been constructed by the villagers. Flooding seldom occurred, but when it did, the people just went away for several days until the water subsided; no relief was organized. The farmers usually relied on wells or nearby streams for irrigating their land, carrying water to the fields in buckets. From the foregoing description, it is clear that the reclaiming of land and the building and up-keep of irrigation and drainage channels were not important elements in keeping the Kuan lineage members together, and no corporate funds were used for these purposes.

Nor were the proceeds from ancestral land used for charity or relief purposes. None of the ancestral halls in T'uo-fu provided low-interest loans for those who wanted to borrow or helped those who were widowed, stranded, or simply poor; nor did they run lineage granaries, charity halls, free funeral homes, or cemeteries for the poor. A public granary was established in Ch'ih-k'an in 1928 under the auspices of the K'ai-p'ing government, based partly on donations from merchants and other rich households and partly on government funds.³¹ But, according to my informants, this granary was abandoned in 1936 when the Nationalists regained control of Kwangtung. There was also a charity hall in Ch'ih-k'an itself run by merchants and gentry members of a former age, but it was no longer functioning. Much of the relief and charity work was done by churches, but it was not very helpful. According to informant C, "There was no help at all for those without property or money. All they could do was beg for food."

Possibly owing to the fact that the ancestral halls did not cater to relief and charity work, the villagers themselves had to form voluntary self-help associations. Pig clubs, for example, were popular in T'uo-fu. Usually four families would join together, each feeding the pig for one week in rotation. When all agreed, they would slaughter it and divide the meat. In addition to the

pig clubs, there were also the "long-life" clubs, in which a group of villagers joined together to pool their resources in order to pay for the coffin of each member.³²

Up until the early twentieth century, some of the land outside the home territory was used as lineage education land. According to the people I talked with, only those who had the government student (*sheng-yüan*) degrees or higher could collect the proceeds of the property. Thus, the education land was used by the ancestral halls of the four *hsiang* to encourage successful scholars to win further prestige for the lineage during the Ch'ing period. It only benefited the powerful families, since those with government student degrees usually came from these households and so it was of no help to the poor but talented students who tried to start their career.

As noted above, the major use of corporate land was to finance elaborate Spring and Autumn rites to demonstrate the prestige of the Kuan lineage and that of its past and present elites. In each ancestral hall in T'uo-fu, there was an image of the Sentry God to the left of the inner door. In the middle of the hall was an altar. Under it was the Earth God statue. Above was a huge wooden board with the name of the hall. Below this board were two large ancestral tablets dedicated to the founder and his wife. On the altar itself were numerous tablets which were placed according to the genealogical hierarchy. These could be admitted at any time into the ancestral hall without a fee. But during the inauguration of a new ancestral hall or when there was a major repair or enlargement of the existing hall, a fund-raising campaign was held and any member who wanted tablets to be admitted ahead of the genealogical position would have to pay about five *yüan* per tablet. During the Ch'ing dynasty, some even put their own tablets, known as "long-life tablets," there. The more one paid, the more prominently one's parents' or one's own tablet was placed. Thus, the placement of these tablets distinguished the rich from the poor irrespective of generation hierarchy.

The rituals during the Ch'ing period were very elaborate. Those with scholarly titles wore their official garments. During the Min-kuo period, clothing was less formal. Spring and Autumn Rites were conducted by a "leader," a "deputy," and a "master of ceremonies." Each of these had two "followers": one leading the way and another following behind. In addition to these participants, another person was required to read a speech dedicated to the founder of the ancestral hall during the ceremony.

In most villages, the eldest son of the first lineage branch was the leader and whoever held the highest scholarly title was the deputy. In other villages, however, the reverse was true: the best scholar was the leader and the eldest son of the first lineage branch served as deputy. In the *hsiang* ancestral halls (Ling-yüan, Lu-yang, Wu-jung, and Chung-miao), as well as in the ancestral hall of the whole lineage (Kuang-yü *t'ang*), it was the scholar with the highest title

who led the ceremony and the scholar with the second highest honor who served as deputy. Although the elders attended the ceremony, they did not take part as either leader or deputy. The master of ceremonies, the reader of the annual speech, and the followers were all gentry members.

The Spring and Autumn Rites at the ancestral halls were supposed to be attended by all male members of the lineage. In practice, however, the attendance of the heads of households and their sons was optional. The attendance of the elders and gentry members was compulsory, and those over sixty were invited as guests of honor. The *kowtow* and the three prostrations were executed in the following order: government officials (if any) first, then gentry members, elders, and whoever else happened to be there.

The whole ceremony was full of pomp and noise. After it was over, a feast was provided in the empty spaces of the ancestral hall. Meat was divided into shares of about three to four catties. The elders and those over sixty received two shares of meat. Those who had held or were then holding posts in the government of K'ai-p'ing or elsewhere were given four shares. The members of the servile households did the cutting of the meat.

Another ritual event among the Kuan financed by proceeds from the corporate property was the sweeping of the graves of their founders during the Ch'ing-ming or Double Nine festivals. The graves of the founders of the *hsiang* ancestral halls and the Kuang-yü *t'ang* were not swept every year; the performance of this ritual hinged on the financial situation of any given year. When it did take place, it was considered a very important occasion. The graves of the founders were outside T'uo-fu for the most part. Boats had to be chartered, and the gentry leaders and the elders urged all members to attend. The sweeping of the graves was regarded as an occasion to display the power and prestige of the Kuan lineage. Lion dances were performed and firecrackers were lit as the procession passed through non-Kuan territories. The young members carried their weapons along, ready to fight with anyone who interfered with the procession. When the event was over, the ritual meat was again divided among the lineage members.

One informant argued that if there were no corporate property, there would be no rituals and thus no lineage organization, which would mean that the gentry would have no authority over fellow lineage members. My own research contradicts the first part of his argument. Some small lineages in South China, for instance, had no corporate property yet did have a ritual life together. They adopted a system of rotation of duties. The cost was borne by contributions from every male in the group. However, I think my informant was accurate in saying that ritual ceremony sustained by corporate property was not only an expression of the solidarity of the Kuan lineage as a whole but also an expression of the power and authority of the gentry members over nongentry members. This was particularly true with regard to the rites of the *hsiang*

ancestral halls and the ancestral hall of the whole lineage. The Spring and Autumn Rites and the sweeping of the graves were in fact ceremonies conducted for the powerful and prestigious of the present generation out of respect for venerated members of the past generations. The meat-dividing rituals were an index of social differentiation. The women who married into the Kuan lineage and the daughters among the Kuan had no share. The average male member did not have as much meat as those over sixty or those who were gentry members, elders, or government officials.

Nevertheless, there were other aspects of the ceremonial life at T'uo-fu which neither reflect the pomp of the powerful nor serve as indices of social differentiation. These were not paid for by ancestral halls or organized by the gentry members or the elders but were instead arranged by volunteers in the village. For example, it was customary for the inhabitants of each village to buy a statue of either Kuan Kung or the Goddess of Heaven and place it in the *hsiang* temple. Inhabitants in the vicinity of Ch'ih-k'an put their statues in the Shang Temple. Those living in Chung-miao *hsiang* put theirs in the Chung Temple. Those from Ling-yuan *hsiang* put their Kuan Kung statues in the T'an Temple and their Goddess of Heaven statues in the Sheng-mu Temple next door. These temples were exclusively for Kuan worshippers. They were rich and had temple land as well as attendants who were also members of the Kuan lineage. The statues were known as moving images (*hsing-hsiang*). When it was the birthday of Kuan Kung or the Goddess of Heaven, each village would send some representatives to the *hsiang* temple to fetch its own statue and carry it around the village precinct in a procession. Whenever an epidemic occurred, the statue would again be taken from the *hsiang* temple and placed in the village ancestral hall for worship.

The moving images were also used on happier occasions. The most important was the lamp lighting (*k'ai-teng*) ceremony, which was also popular in many other parts of South China.³³ In each village of T'uo-fu, there was a bamboo hut known as the lamp hut (*teng-liao*). Inside it was a beautiful lantern, which symbolized life for all the villagers. On the second day of the New Year, representatives would go to the *hsiang* temple to take their statue to the lamp hut. Those to whom a son had been born that year would buy a lamp and hang it there. The number of lamps thus represented the number of new additions to the village community. If a villager's lamp had not been lit at the hut during the year of his birth, he would not have the right to receive ritual pork later.³⁴ The Kuan in Chang-ts'un even lit a lamp the year they adopted a son. This tradition, however, was not observed in other villages of T'uo-fu.

The lantern would remain lit until the fifteenth day of the first lunar month. On that day, representatives of the village would light a whole chain of beautifully decorated rockets and then send the god statue (Kuan Kung or the Goddess of Heaven) back to the temple, where it would remain until the next

year. The belief was that whoever caught the first rocket falling down would have all the luck for the year, hence everyone struggled to catch it. Fights often occurred in the attempt. This was known as the flower rocket (*hua-p'ao*) event. It was observed in Chang-ts'un, Hsia-p'ien, and Hsia-ts'un. In Na-lo, however, it was dying out in the 1940s, although the lamp lighting ceremony was still practiced.

The lamp lighting ceremony was the cause of one intervillage quarrel. In Lu-yang *hsiang*, the inhabitants of two villages used to share a statue of the Goddess of Heaven, since they had originally been members of the same village. One year, both sides tried to invite the goddess on the same day. They were ready to fight and proceeded to collect men and weapons until their elders stopped them. It was finally decided that each village should send one leader to kneel before the statue and draw lots to decide who was going to take it first. After that year, each village had its own statue made and the statue in contention was abandoned.

Quarreling was by no means an isolated event between members of different villages among the Kuan. In fact, each village in T'uo-fu was a separate entity and members had very strong in-group feelings even though they all belonged to the Kuan lineage. Each village was surrounded by thick bamboo groves, which served as a boundary to ward off the nonmember, whether Kuan or outsider. In the case of Chang-ts'un, there was, in addition, a stream surrounding the village precinct which formed a moat for protection. A narrow footpath was built at the back of most of the villages to lead to the next one. For defense, some villages had high towers or "fortresses" (*tiao-lou*) built with concrete walls, iron doors, and windows overlooking the countryside. From there, the watchmen could see who was approaching. If anything happened, the villagers would hide in the tower itself. In Chang-ts'un, the village watch was employed to maintain law and order. In addition, sixteen villagers were responsible for watching crops as they ripened.³⁵ This village, I was told, was on the whole very peaceful: there were very few cases of stealing crops or water. Like Chang-ts'un, Hsia-ts'un and Na-lo also employed professional watchmen in the 1920s and 1930s, but after that, the villagers themselves took turns acting as watchmen. These volunteers were not paid, but if they had solved a case of theft successfully, they would be paid handsomely by the original owner.

Villages in T'uo-fu occasionally quarrelled over market spaces in Ch'ih-k'an, and these quarrels were mediated by the elders. Sometimes the quarrels were over territorial rights. These were more difficult to settle. Below are some examples.

Members of village A and village B (both within Wu-jung *hsiang*) came from the same branch of the lineage, but they were not on good terms. One year in the 1940s, on the fourth day of the New Year festivities while they were celebrating the lamp lighting ceremony together, they parted in anger on the

question of how to divide the proceeds of a piece of rice field held by their common ancestral hall. This quarrel was never resolved. Finally, their corporate property was divided up and their joint hall demolished. Each village set up its own hall, and the two sides became sworn enemies.

A similar quarrel occurred between village C and village D of Chung-miao *hsiang*, which also shared a piece of corporate property. Both sides wanted to divide the land. The youths of village D claimed that two-thirds should belong to them, but the village C elders claimed that it should be divided equally. Both sides were prepared to fight for their claims. They began to gather men and weapons. Finally, the *hsiang* gentry of Chung-miao had to mediate. They reprimanded the people of village D and divided the piece of corporate property equally between the two villages. From that day on, members of the two villages never spoke to one another. One day, a group of bandits raided village C. The villagers signalled for help by beating the gong for an hour, but members of village D did not come.

Conclusion

Fei and H. C. W. Liu argue that only the gentry members were interested in organizing lineages, not the peasants.³⁶ This, according to them, was because the poor did not gain much economically by being members. The description of the functions of the Kuan lineage in this chapter seems to bear this out. Moreover, it seems obvious that if any material benefits were to be derived, the individual Kuan at T'uo-fu would get more from his own village than from the lineage as a whole. For one thing, no important public or charity work was paid for by the proceeds of the ancestral halls of the four *hsiang* or the Kuang-yü *t'ang*. For another, the individual usually received more pork from his lineage branch hall than he would get from the *hsiang* halls or the Kuang-yü *t'ang*. He had a better chance of success when bidding for land belonging to the lineage branch than when competing for the *hsiang* estates. Moreover, if he was a member of the land trust in his village, he would have substantial dividends each year.

Probably for these reasons and also because of the large size of the Kuan lineage at T'uo-fu, the individual member often lost touch with the lineage organization as a whole. He was more concerned with the people and affairs of his own village, which was more tightly organized and more meaningful to his daily life. The material benefits he could get there were often reinforced by ties to groups like the long-life and pig clubs, as well as by such events as the lamp lighting and the flower rocket ceremonies. The strong in-group feeling of the villagers was reflected in the frequency of intervillage quarrels, some of which have been outlined in this chapter.

This does not mean, however, that the Kuan lineage as an entity was falling apart. None of the villages wanted to break away. Despite Fei's arguments, the peasants among the Kuan had an interest in keeping their membership in the lineage organization, probably because of the prestige and social advantage of belonging to a powerful lineage. Through the ceremonies of the annual rites and the sweeping of the graves, even the peasant members derived much satisfaction by being able to show off their numbers and the present and past glory of their lineage. This "showing off" was more than psychological satisfaction. Even in the 1940s, members of a powerful lineage had a great deal of influence over members of a weak one because of their higher social position in the eyes of the *hsien* government and public opinion. Moreover, if the lineage had a great deal of corporate property, in cases of confrontation with another lineage, (whether expressed through litigation or actual fighting), the members of a powerful lineage had a great advantage over their opponents. Thus, the divisiveness of the component villages among the Kuan did not tear the lineage apart.

In fact, like many large kinship groups in South China, the Kuan lineage had what Makino calls an "upper structure" and a "lower structure."³⁷ The T'uo-fu Kuan lineage as a whole, with its headquarters in Ch'ih-k'an, was the upper structure, and the various villages formed the lower structure. In matters of daily life, the scope of unity was generally limited to the single village (i.e., the lower structure); it was rare for such unity to extend to the lineage outside the village. But this does not mean that upper structure had no significance: the lineage rituals at Kuang-yü *t'ang*, the lineage leadership at the League of the Four Hsiang, and the lineage genealogy and rules gave a sense of identity and security to the lives of the members. Moreover, because the lineage as a whole controlled Upper Ch'ih-k'an, one of the most prosperous market towns of K'ai-p'ing, the individual Kuan could seek commercial advantages and job opportunities by remaining a member. Thus, despite the fact that he did not gain very much from the corporate property of his lineage, there were motives enough for even the most deviant member to stay within the fold of the lineage structure.

CHAPTER 3

The T'uo-fu Kuan and Their Neighbors

The Ssu-t'u lineage matched the Kuan in importance, and shared the Ch'ih-k'an Market with them. According to its genealogy, the Ssu-t'u moved from Nan-hsiung to Canton during the Sung dynasty; from there they moved to En-p'ing, Yang-chiang, and to K'ai-p'ing's Chiao-t'i area. Chiao-t'i covers an area of four miles from east to west and three miles from north to south. It is an island in the middle of the T'an River. The members of the Ssu-t'u lineage were famous as interprovincial traders. The lineage also produced some of the scholars and spokesmen of K'ai-p'ing. Like the Kuan, the Ssu-t'u lineage had education land in the sixth *ch'ü* as a result of victorious campaigns during the Hakka-Punti War. In Ch'ih-k'an, this lineage had owned the land at "Lower" or "Eastern" Ch'ih-k'an since 1845.¹

The Kuan had a history of both feuds and cooperation with the Ssu-t'u dating back to at least the fourteenth century. I have heard two versions of the origin of the outbreak of hostilities 550 years ago between the Kuan in Chang-ts'un and the Ssu-t'u in Chiao-t'i. The founder of Chang-ts'un married his daughter to a Ssu-t'u and gave her a piece of land as a dowry. According to one version, she visited her natal home on the sixth day of the sixth lunar month, when all the registered deeds to the land traditionally were laid out in the sun to air and dry. She complained that the Ssu-t'u had stolen her land deeds. According to another version, however, she actually stole some land deeds from her natal home. Whatever the source of the conflict, an outbreak of hostilities soon followed between the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u over land titles. It was settled not so much by the officials as by the mediation of other lineages. A line of demarcation was officially drawn between the two lineages at Ling-yüan *hsiang*.

There were at least two feuds between the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u for the control of Ch'ih-k'an, one in 1816 and another in 1845. The magistrate eventually divided the market town into Upper and Lower Ch'ih-k'an, using T'ang-ti Street as the boundary, in order to put an end to the struggle. The two lineages were closely matched: the leaders of both had scholarly titles and personal ties with the bureaucracy at the *hsien* government, but they were willing to accept local mediation instead of appealing to higher authorities.²

The Kuan and the Ssu-t'u were at war again in 1886. Although the causes of this outbreak are unclear, there is little doubt that it was a fierce battle: mercenaries were employed, and guns and cannons were used. A stone inscription was set up by the magistrate denouncing the incident. A marriage ban was imposed soon afterwards. All my informants knew about the existence of the ban at the turn of the century, but they could not agree on whether it had been strictly enforced. One informant, for example, said, "Of course not, my mother was a Ssu-t'u." According to other informants, however, this marriage ban was effective at least until the 1920s. Another quarrel arose in 1930. The Kuan of Hsia-ts'un and Chang-ts'un and the Ssu-t'u were rivals for a piece of reclaimed land. The quarrel lasted for two years but did not break into a large-scale feud, owing to government mediation.

In its conflict with the Ssu-t'u, the Kuan could claim as potential allies three clans in Ssu-yi--the Liu, the Chang, and the Chao. This claim was derived from a legend that a Liu, a Kuan, a Chang, and a Chao were blood brothers during the period of the Three Kingdoms in Chinese history (A.D. 220-80). The symbol of such an alliance was the Lung-kang Ancient Temple, founded by the gentry members of the four clans about three hundred years ago in Shui-k'ou, on the border of Hsin-hui, T'ai-shan, and K'ai-p'ing counties. According to my elderly informants, Spring and Autumn Rites used to be performed annually in honor of the four heroes of the Three Kingdoms.³

There was at least one incident recalled by an informant in which the Liu, the Kuan, the Chang, and the Chao lineages actually helped one another. It was during the War of 1886 between the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u of K'ai-p'ing. The Kuan called upon the Chang of Sha-kang (K'ai-p'ing), the Chao of San-chiang, and the Liu of Lung-ch'üan (Hsin-hui), while the Ssu-t'u called upon the help of the Hsüeh lineage from Hsin-hui. This war has been described by Hu.⁴ She writes:

The Ssu-t'u often showed aggression towards . . . the Kuan. So the latter combined with the Chang lineage that lived at the junction of the tributary river and the main stream, and thus was in a good position to control shipping that went down to the sea. By allying themselves the Kuan obtained the help of the Chang in damaging the boats of the Ssu-t'u. If the latter tried to bully their neighbors, and the Chang should find themselves threatened, they could rely on the Kuan to bring relief.

The cooperation between the Kuan and the Chang in K'ai-p'ing is not surprising. The Chang lineage at Sha-kang was among the earliest to settle in K'ai-p'ing. It was at least as powerful as the Kuan at T'uo-fu. Sha-kang was a fertile area, producing the most important cash crop of K'ai-p'ing--garlic--as well as sugarcane, melons, and turnips. Moreover, the Chin-shan Market, controlled by the Sha-kang Chang, was an important ferry port on the T'an River and a center for iron works.⁵ The fact that the Chang and the Kuan were

far apart and were both powerful lineages and masters of their own vicinities meant that both could be made stronger by the Lung-kang Alliance.

However, after the war between the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u in 1886, this alliance became less tightly organized. The Lung-kang Ancient Temple eventually lost its splendor. None of my younger informants had heard of the alliance associated with this temple. In the 1940s, when the Chao of San-chiang and the Liu of Lung-ch'üan in Hsin-hui were at war, both lineages claimed the allegiance of the Kuan and the Chang. Besides the call of blood ties, money and opium were offered to enlist their help as mercenaries. But the Lung-kang Alliance had become so weak by this time that the elites of T'uo-fu and Sha-kang chose not to become involved in the conflict.⁶

The weakness of the link between the Kuan, the Chang, the Chao, and the Liu in the 1940s was perhaps a result of the improvement of relationships between the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u in Ch'ih-k'an and between the Chang and other lineages at Chin-shan after 1930. As will be described in chapter 5, increasing cooperation among the merchants trading in the same market towns might well have resulted in better relationships across lineage lines and a weakening of alliances based on fictitious blood ties.

Besides the Lung-kang allies, the Kuan had also formed an alliance with twenty-four minor lineages in the vicinity of Ch'ih-k'an, including the Chi, the Hsü, and the Ch'en. This bureau was known as the Lian-pao *t'ang*. It included both the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u, who were the actual leaders. The headquarters of the Lian-pao *t'ang* was at the K'ang-lo Study Hall, built in 1853.⁷ The formation of this study hall was no isolated incident in K'ai-p'ing; there were at least four similar study halls in K'ai-p'ing established between 1846 and 1885.⁸ These were headquarters of interlineage alliances. In some cases, clinics also became centers for regulating interlineage affairs.⁹

These alliances were quite unusual. According to H. T. Liu, Freedman, and Baker, in South China only small lineages joined to form alliances to resist the exploitation of a powerful lineage.¹⁰ Strong lineages did not join these alliances. Nor did they form alliances with other strong lineages in the same vicinity. They tended to have few relationships in their immediate neighborhood but many outside it. My own findings seem to contradict these assertions. In K'ai-p'ing, dominant lineages sharing the same market town did ally with one another. In Ch'ih-k'an, for instance, both the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u were members of the Lian-pao *t'ang*. The Liang and the T'an were allies at Ch'ang-sha, as were the K'uang and the T'an at Shui-k'ou.¹¹ These alliances were not used as instruments through which weaker lineages fought against dominant lineages in the vicinity.

According to Hayes, there were two kinds of interlineage alliances in South China: those set up by the government or formed under its auspices; and those set up voluntarily by the lineages themselves, independent of and sometimes even in opposition to government intentions.¹² The interlineage alliances in

K'ai-p'ing were of the first kind. Because of the danger first posed by the Red Turban uprising in 1854 and then by the Hakka Confederation in 1856, and because of the tacit government support of the Punti cause, the Punti lineages were willing to forget their differences temporarily and form alliances which lasted through the crisis period of 1854-67 (see table 6). The Kuan and the Ssu-t'u, for example, became allies in 1853 under the leadership of the local scholars and retired officials. They shared an interest in fighting the Red Turbans and the Hakkas, since the area on the border between En-p'ing and Tai-shan was important for the continuation of trade in Ch'ih-k'an. The same thing occurred with other rival lineages at Ch'ang-sha and Shui-k'ou. In 1863, the various bureaus joined hands to establish several district bureaus. A central bureau was established at Ts'ang-ch'eng to coordinate all these Punti efforts against the Hakka.¹³


After their victory in 1867, the Chou, the Wu, the Kuan, the Chang, the Ssu-t'u, the Fang, and the T'an seized the land left by the defeated Hakka, which was located mostly in the sixth and second *ch'ü* of K'ai-p'ing.¹⁴ The confederation of the Punti lineages, however, lapsed soon after the Hakka-Punti War. Because of the silting of the T'an River from the end of the nineteenth century on, lineages were at loggerheads once again over control of the ferries in the market towns and water rights in the rural area.¹⁵ As the T'an River was the life blood of K'ai-p'ing, each powerful lineage was eager to dominate the trade route from western Kwangtung into K'ai-p'ing.

Outside of the T'uo-fu area, there was another Kuan settlement in K'ai-p'ing County. This was at Kou-p'i-ch'ung in Feng-wan *hsiang* on the En-p'ing-K'ai-p'ing border, some eleven miles from T'uo-fu. Before 1890, the Kuan occupied only four of the twenty villages in this *hsiang*. By 1930, however, seven villages were inhabited by the Kuan there. Still, it was a rather small settlement compared to the T'uo-fu Kuan. While there were about twenty thousand Kuan at T'uo-fu in 1930, there were only about three to four hundred Kuan in Kou-p'i-ch'ung (see table 6, p. 41).

According to the lineage genealogy recited to me by Kuan B, this segment of the family moved to Kou-p'i-chung around 1260, one generation after Kuan Yung settled at T'uo-fu. Kuan Yung had three sons: Yuan-san, Yuan-liu, and Yuan-chiu. Kuan Yuan-san went to Yang-chiang *hsien*; Yuan-liu moved to the Kou-p'i-ch'ung area of K'ai-p'ing, and Yuan-chiu remained in T'uo-fu. Following the founding of the Kou-p'i-ch'ung branch, some Kuan from Lu-yang *hsiang* also moved there.

About 450 years ago, there was another wave of migration out of T'uo-fu which had again become overpopulated. A segment of the lineage from Chung-miao *hsiang* moved to the Sung-lang area and founded six or seven villages, followed by others from Ling-yüan *hsiang*. This area was geographically separated from T'uo-fu by the Hu, the Chao, and the Huang lineages. It was about a two-hour walk from T'uo-fu.

TABLE 6
 The Punti Confederation in K'ai-p'ing, 1854-67
 Ch'üan-sheng Central Bureau
 (Ts'ang-ch'eng)



Source: *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih* (Hong Kong, 1933), pp. 171-74, 287-93, 354.

Besides these three major areas—T'uo-fu, Kou-p'i-ch'ung, and Sung-lang—there were also pockets of villages inhabited by the Kuan in the midst of other prominent lineages. For example, my informants mentioned that there were two Kuan villages known as Niu-lan-ti and Ch'i-sheng-li in Yang-lu *hsiang* on the K'ai-p'ing-T'ai-shan border, an area dominated by the Huang and the Ma lineages. These two villages had been established for six or seven generations (see table 7, p. 43).

Patrilineal kin groups in South China can be categorized as "localized lineages," "dispersed lineages," "higher-order lineages," and "clans."¹⁶ A "localized lineage" denotes a group of agnates who live together in the same geographical area and claim to be descended from a common founder. They usually have an ancestral hall in which they practice ancestor worship together. A "dispersed lineage" denotes two or more groups of agnates with the same surname that are separated geographically, in which one group is considered to be the parent settlement which ancestors of the other groups left at some point. Members of all of the groups practice ancestor worship in the ancestral hall of the parent settlement and do not have separate halls. A "higher-order lineage" also denotes two or more groups of agnates with the same surname that are separated geographically but believe they are descended from the same founder. Unlike the "dispersed lineage," in this case each group has an ancestral hall of its own, but also shares a common hall open to all members for the shared performance of ancestral worship. A "clan" is a loose term that denotes people with the same surname. The members do not claim to be descended from a common founder. Thus, they may or may not enter into some form of association, although in large cities of China or overseas, people of diverse origins bearing the same surname sometimes come together to form clan associations for recreational and self-help purposes. Spring and Autumn Rites may be performed at these clan halls.¹⁷

According to Freedman, a nonlocalized lineage was formed when some members of a localized lineage moved away and settled somewhere in the vicinity.¹⁸ In other words, higher-order and dispersed lineages were formed by a process of "segmentation," usually after the localized lineage had been in existence for a considerable span of time.

Freedman's theory is disputed by two scholars. Skinner's study of market communities in traditional China raises some doubts as to the viability of dispersed and higher-order lineages as forms of social organization. He argues that bonds between localized lineages attending different standard market towns tended to erode over time until members completely lost contact with one another.¹⁹

Pasternak argues against Freedman's theory of the origin of nonlocalized lineages.²⁰ He believes that a higher-order or a dispersed lineage was initially formed, not by the process of segmentation, but by that of "fusion" or "aggregation." The need for defense and irrigation among the Han pioneers moving

TABLE 7
A Summary of the Genealogy of the Kuan in Kwangtung

Generation Depth	Record of Segmentation
1st Generation	Kuan Ching-ch'i (Hsin-hui County ca. 1080)
6th Generation	Kuan Jung (Nan-hai County, ca. 1230) (K'ai-p'ing T'uo-fu area, ca. 1230)
7th Generation	Kuan Yüan-liu (K'uo-p'i-ch'ung, ca. 1260) Kuan Yüan-chiu (T'uo-fu, ca. 1260) Kuan Yüan-san (Yuan-chiang County, ca. 1260)
10th Generation	Lu-yang <i>hsiang</i> (ca. 1350) Chung-miao <i>hsiang</i> (ca. 1350) Wu-jung <i>hsiang</i> (1350) Ling-yüan <i>hsiang</i> (ca. 1350)
15th Generation	Kou-p'i-ch'ung Lu-yüan <i>hsiang</i> (ca. 1500) Sung-lang Chung-miao (ca. 1500) Sung-lang Ling-yüan (ca. 1500)

Source: Personal communications.

into South China led to the formation of nonlocalized lineages. When two or more groups of people bearing the same surname decided to come together for common defense or joint public works projects, they built an ancestral hall to commemorate the event. Hence, according to Pasternak's evolutionary scheme, higher-order and dispersed lineages preceded localized lineages. It was only after the frontier had been pacified and land opened up that increasing population pressures led to the formation of localized lineages. Then a further growth of population led in turn to the formation of higher-order lineages by "segmentation." Schematically, Pasternak's evolutionary scheme of lineages could be presented as: higher-order lineage by fusion--localized lineages--higher-order lineages by segmentation.

I think the controversy between Freedman and Pasternak on the origin of nonlocalized lineages is in essence a "chicken-and-egg" problem. Nonlocalized lineages could have been formed before or after localized lineages. They could have been formed by a process of fusion or of segmentation. The evolutionary approach is too rigid. The pattern of development probably varied from locality to locality and from lineage to lineage in South China.²¹ Moreover, it is difficult to substantiate either Freedman's or Pasternak's version of the origin of nonlocalized lineages. Much of the mystery lies in our inability to confirm the authenticity of genealogies. As Eberhard and Meskill have maintained, genealogies are sometimes retrospective constructions.²² A lineage may have its genealogy rewritten to emphasize connections with its more powerful brethren in order to enhance its prestige or membership or because of a need to form effective social relationships for protection from the bureaucracy. Given the uncertain reliability of such genealogies, a more valid approach is to examine the ritual structure of a lineage in detail to see if the various branches own a common ancestral hall and share the benefits and obligations flowing from the common estates attached to the hall.

On the basis of the ritual practices described in the preceding chapter, there is little doubt that the Kuan at T'uo-fu formed a localized lineage with Kuang-yü *t'ang* at Ch'ih-k'an as its ritual center; and that the Lu-yang, Chung-miao, Wu-jung, and Ling-yüan *hsiang* were its four major segments.

The seven villages inhabited by the Kuan in Kou-p'i-ch'ung also made up a "localized lineage" among themselves. There was a common ancestral hall, built at the Kou-p'i-ch'ung Market, to honor its founder, Kuan Yüan-liu. This hall had corporate property to sustain its rituals. In addition, the elders from this area, besides attending the Yüan-liu Ancestral Hall, also went to Lu-yang *hsiang* and to Kuang-yü *t'ang* at Ch'ih-k'an to perform the Spring and Autumn Rites. However, they had no right to receive ritual meat there, or any other claim to the corporate property of Lu-yang *hsiang* or of the Kuang-yü *t'ang*. Moreover, no one from the T'uo-fu area went to Kou-p'i-ch'ung to perform rites at the Yüan-liu Ancestral Hall. From such tenuous ritual links, the relationship

between the T'uo-fu Kuan and the Kou-p'i-ch'ung Kuan can be defined as that of a "higher-order lineage" formed by what Pasternak termed "aggregation." These two groups of Kuan claimed that they were descended from the same ancestors and produced a common genealogy, linking themselves historically. Yet this link was not expressed by the establishment of any joint property.

By contrast, the Sung-lang Kuan had a close ritual connection with the T'uo-fu Kuan. None of the seven villages occupied by the Kuan at Sung-lang *hsiang* had an ancestral hall. They went to T'uo-fu to attend the Spring and Autumn Rites and share the ritual meat. Their gentry and elders attended rites at Kuang-yü *t'ang* in Ch'ih-k'an and were entitled to the ritual meat. From their ritual pattern, the relationship between the Sung-lang Kuan and the T'uo-fu Kuan can be classified as that of a "dispersed lineage."

The relationship between the Yang-lu Kuan and the T'uo-fu Kuan is harder to classify. As in the case of Sung-lang, the members of the two Kuan villages at Yang-lu had no common ancestral hall. They went back to T'uo-fu to attend the rites. Their village elders went to Kuang-yü *t'ang* to take part in the worship. However, unlike the Kuan of Sung-lang, the Kuan at Yang-lu had no right to claim ritual meat in Ling-yüan *hsiang* or at the Kuang-yü *t'ang*. None of my informants knew why the Yang-lu people were not treated as full members at T'uo-fu. But similar cases have been noted by Hu and H. C. W. Liu.²³ According to the former, some members of the Ch'en lineage of Hupei Province had moved away and lost their genealogy for two hundred years. Then the main branch of the Ch'en readmitted them to the ancestral rites but excluded them from any benefits from ritual or education lands. Judging from the example of the Ch'en lineage, I think the relationship between the T'uo-fu Kuan and the Yang-lu Kuan agrees with what Freedman termed a "dispersed lineage."²⁴

From the above account of the ritual behavior of the Kuan residing in different parts of K'ai-p'ing County, it is clear that the Kuan lineage of T'uo-fu exerted an influence far beyond its home base. The reasons for this, I believe, were its size, wealth, prestige, and power. As can be seen from the account given in chapter 2, the T'uo-fu Kuan captured all the scholarly titles won by the Kuan in K'ai-p'ing during the Ch'ing era. It also outnumbered the Kuan at Kou-p'i-ch'ung, Sung-lang, and Yang-lu at least fifty times over. Its corporate property was much more extensive than that of the other branches, and it was in control of the prosperous market town of Ch'ih-k'an, which was an important trading and communication center in western Kwangtung. Its elites had connections with the *hsien* government. Because of its importance, its main ancestral halls attracted the allegiance of the Kuan settling in other parts of K'ai-p'ing County.

The case of the Kuan also shows that nonlocalized lineages may not be as ephemeral as Skinner suggests. Members maintained their ritual relationship even though they attended different standard market towns.²⁵ In fact, military

cooperation between the Kuan at Kou-p'i-ch'ung and T'uo-fu shows that this higher-order lineage was strengthened in the face of secret society activities and ethnic rivalries. During the critical years of the Red Turban uprising and the Hakka-Punti War, for example, the League of the Four Hsiang was the coordinating center for the Kuan at T'uo-fu; it was the military headquarters of the four militia formed by the inhabitants of Wu-jung, Chung-miao, Lu-yang, and Ling-yüan *hsiang*. The leaders of the League of the Four Hsiang also allied with the Ssu-t'u to organize the Lian-pao *t'ang* at Ch'ih-k'an to fight the Red Turbans and then the Hakka. At about the same time, in Kou-p'i-ch'ung, the Kuan formed a Wan-ch'üan bureau with the Li at Chin-hu, their traditional enemy. This bureau cooperated militarily with the Lian-pao *t'ang* at Ch'ih-k'an. When fighting with the Hakka was at its peak, Kuan Wei-ch'eng, a member of the T'uo-fu gentry, started a central bureau in the Chin-chi Market and stayed for five years (1856-61) to coordinate the efforts of both the Lian-pao *t'ang* and the Wan-ch'üan bureau (see table 8, p. 47).²⁶ In addition to efforts of the Kuan, similar forms of military cooperation existed between the Ssu-t'u, the Chang, and the T'an settling in different parts of K'ai-p'ing.²⁷ Thus, as a result of the Red Turban uprising and the Hakka-Punti War, the relationship between geographically separated surname groups in K'ai-p'ing was strengthened.²⁸


Unlike interlineage alliances, this relationship was not weakened after the Hakka-Punti War. In the early twentieth century, instead of being at loggerheads with one another over the silting of the T'an River, groups with the same surname cooperated in capturing the trade routes from Yang-chiang, En-p'ing, Hsin-hsing, and T'ai-shan into K'ai-p'ing.²⁹

Conclusion

In his local history of South China between 1839 and 1861, Wakeman argues that rural militarization against the Red Turbans between 1854 and 1856 and during the Hakka-Punti War between 1856 and 1867 resulted in the polarization of society in South China.³⁰ The establishment of various leagues and bureaus by gentry leaders resulted in increasing cooperation between elite members across lineage lines. This was followed by the formation of compact political organizations among them. The rural corps no longer served as devices of lineage defense, but became the private army of the gentry. These rich and powerful gentry members utilized their militia to terrorize the poor peasants and extract rent and interest from tenant farmers in their own lineages. The peasants responded by joining secret societies.

Kuhn, however, believes that local militarization in the mid-nineteenth century did not lead to the rise of class organizations among the gentry members, but rather that it strengthened kinship links.³¹ During the period when

TABLE 8
Local Militarization of the Kuan in K'ai-ping, 1854-67



Source: *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih* (Hong Kong, 1933), pp. 172-73.

secret society lodges were actively recruiting poor peasants, the lineage elites were consciously competing with the secret societies for the allegiance of poor members within their own lineages. Gentry-led militia provided employment to the rural unemployed; the gentry leaders rewarded the warriors and took care of the widows and children of fallen militiamen. They also diverted intra-lineage aggression outward against neighboring lineages and members of another ethnic group. There was economic exploitation but primarily in the form of large lineages exploiting poor lineages or another ethnic group in the same neighborhood. The gentry leaders organized campaigns to accomplish these ends and increased the resources of large lineages, which indirectly benefited the poor members of those lineages. Hence, up until the twentieth century, lineage interests were still compelling enough to offset intralineage struggles.

The pattern of local militarization and interlineage cooperation in the T'uo-fu-Ch'ih-k'an area supports Kuhn's arguments. Like other lineages in South China, the T'uo-fu Kuan engaged in hostilities and formed alliances with other lineages in K'ai-p'ing, particularly with those in the vicinity of Ch'ih-k'an. But while alliances between the Kuan at T'uo-fu and other lineages were intermittent, the pattern of cooperation with the Kuan in other parts of K'ai-p'ing was consistent and growing in importance. This was also true of other lineages in K'ai-p'ing. To solve problems and to improve the prospects of trade along the T'an River, lineages preferred cooperation with groups bearing the same surname. It is clear that patrilineal kinship was an important principle of social organization even in the twentieth century.

CHAPTER 4

Rise of the New Gentry Class

The late Ch'ing and early Min-kuo period witnessed the rise of the new gentry class among the Kuan in T'uo-fu.¹ The major components of the new gentry class were (a) emigrant families; (b) the local rich merchants; and (c) graduates of modern schools. The origin of this class can be traced back to the 1880s, when members of the Kuan lineage started to emigrate overseas as a result of the increasing land pressure and civil disorder in this area during the Red Turban uprising, the Hakka-Punti War, and the White Terror afterwards.²

The history of one informant's family shows how population pressure and the partition of land affected both rich and poor Kuan and forced them to emigrate overseas by 1880:

My great-great-grandfather, Kuan Yü-jen, owned over ten acres of land. He was responsible for building the Ch'ing-fen Ancestral Hall in our village. My great-grandfather (ca. 1830) had sold some of the farmland because farming was getting less profitable. When he died, the land was divided into five parts; each son had a portion. My grandfather, Kuan Ting-yao, was the second son. During his lifetime, the portion of land he inherited was not enough to sustain the livelihood of his family, neither were the portions of his brothers. Thus my grandfather ran a dyeing enterprise in Ch'ih-k'an, and two of my granduncles had to go to Southeast Asia as traders; the third one was adopted into another lineage branch, and the fourth one went to Mexico or Cuba. My father and my uncle had even less land. My father continued to operate my grandfather's shop while my uncle went to Canada as a cook for the Canadian Pacific Railway Company around 1880.

Overseas emigration among the Kuan, as with the rest of K'ai-p'ing, became prevalent during the Kuang-hsi period (1874-1908), when some indentured laborers were able to establish themselves abroad and encouraged others to go overseas.³ Life stories of my informants (see appendix 2) show that the Kuan lineage as a whole did not play any prominent part in organizing emigration. The ancestral hall leaders did not directly locate jobs for prospective emigrants. It was fellow villagers who helped the emigrants. Most of my informants came to Canada because they were sponsored by their patrilineal kin. They received letters from their relatives regarding job opportunities and

other attractions of the country. From the answers of my informants, it is clear that the same kinship links were in operation in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Southeast Asia.

Because of the importance of these links in the initial stage of immigration, the Kuan formed a closely knit community while overseas. They lived and worked with their patrilineal kin and rarely entered into the life of the foreign community. In case of trouble, they usually relied upon their relatives for help. As one informant put it, "The relatives of any Kuan in Victoria who was sick and in need of medical help, or who was dead and in need of coffin money, would start a campaign to ask other Chinese for contributions. It was usually the individual Chinese who donated money voluntarily for his stranded kinsmen to go home."

From accounts given by my informants, it is also clear that emigrants from T'uo-fu kept in close contact with their home villages. Even the more successful Kuan in Southeast Asia remitted money and went home when trouble occurred. The reasons for maintaining ties with the home community were twofold. First, the uncertainties of emigrant life in a hostile environment meant that many could not afford to forego their homeland as a possible refuge in case of discrimination and in times of economic dislocation. In this sense, the overseas emigrants were much like the rural-urban migrants in China, except that the former had an even greater sense of insecurity, as they lived in an entirely alien and sometimes unpredictable sociopolitical milieu. In Southeast Asia, only the most successful Chinese and those living in a congenial host society could afford to neglect their ties with China.⁴ In Canada it was only after 1949, when the social atmosphere was more favorable and it was no longer possible to retire in China, that the Chinese immigrants decided to give up their ties with the homeland completely.

Second, many emigrants wanted to return to their home communities, where they would experience a substantial increase in prestige compared to their status before they emigrated and their status in the host societies. Because of the discrimination and prejudice they suffered as a result of their pursuit of economic betterment overseas, they took their home community as their reference group, waiting for the day when they would receive gratification in the form of status and prestige during their visits home and in their retirement years.

From the information I gathered while interviewing the Kuan in Victoria, it is clear that during the Min-kuo period returned emigrants could indeed improve their family status, regardless of whether they were rich or poor before emigration. The case of C was typical. Before going to Canada, he earned only two and a half *yüan* (Chinese dollars) per year as an apprentice cook in Pai-sha Market. His income increased tremendously overseas. While working as a resident doctor at an herbalist's store in Victoria, he earned as

much as thirty dollars (Canadian) per year. Eventually he was able to save enough to buy his wife and children three-fifths of an acre of land and build them a foreign-style house. A few of the more successful among the overseas Kuan bought some land and became landlords, while the great majority invested in shop-spaces in Ch'ih-k'an. They loaned money to their lineage mates and employed lineage women as domestic servants. So, very often, the returned emigrants were either the creditors or the employers of the less fortunate villagers who did not emigrate.

The returned emigrants were not the only *nouveaux riches* in the T'uo-fu area in the early twentieth century. The development of trade in western Kwangtung also led to the increasing prosperity of Ch'ih-k'an and hence the enrichment of the local merchant class. This rapid economic growth was a result of events overseas as well as circumstances at home. The passing of the Oriental Exclusion Acts in the United States in 1882 and in Canada in 1923 effectively prohibited Overseas Chinese from sponsoring their families to live in North America.⁵ Economic discrimination suffered by the Chinese in North America in the first three decades of the twentieth century provided further impetus for the increase of overseas remittances from North America to western Kwangtung.⁶

Political developments in western Kwangtung also led to the growth of trade and processing industries. The various warlords who controlled the area Kwangtung after 1911 wanted to develop it economically either to maintain their political independence or to use it as a base for further aggrandizement. Hence, under government auspices, the irrigation system of Lei-chou was improved. The production of rice and mixed cereals increased as a result. A tropical crop experimental station was set up in Hsu-wen in 1928 to improve the quality of tropical fruits. Coconuts and their by-products (used for fertilizers and animal feed) began to fetch a good price in markets in Chiang-men, Macau, and Hong Kong.⁷ The P'u-sheng Company was established in Sui-hsi County by a group of returned emigrants from America in 1929 for running an extensive livestock pasture. It also experimented with cash crops such as hemp as a sideline interest, and did good business with the Canton delta.⁸

At the other end of the trade route, Chiang-men grew tremendously in the 1920s. Although it had been a treaty port since 1896 as a result of the China-Burma Treaty, its development was very closely linked with that of its hinterland. Imports such as dried fruits and groceries from Hong Kong and Canton were stored in warehouses at Chiang-men to be transported to western Kwangtung. Rural products from western Kwangtung were gathered at Chiang-men to be transported by railway to Kwangsi, Kiangsi, and Hunan, or to be exported to Hong Kong, Canton, Macao, and overseas. By 1930, Chiang-men became a booming city of eighty thousand people. It had paper mills, mat and match factories, and cement works, as well as other plants to process raw materials from its rural hinterland for export to Canton and other coastal cities in the delta.⁹

The increase in trade between Chiang-men and western Kwangtung benefited K'ai-p'ing lineages situated near the lower and middle courses of the T'an River. To coordinate trading activities and to further the economic development of the market towns, chambers of commerce were founded in this area.¹⁰ Ch'ih-k'an, as an important river port, reaped tremendous economic benefits. With the development of processing industries and businesses in that market town, class advancement became more and more attainable through urban channels rather than landholding. Merchants emerged as prominent figures in the Kuan lineage.

As in the rest of K'ai-p'ing, the returned emigrants and the rich merchants in the T'uo-fu area were eager to found modern schools.¹¹ In order to enhance their economic success and social status in the local community, they would send their children to modern schools in T'uo-fu or elsewhere, so that their progeny would become the new scholar-gentry class. An emphasis on modern education for their descendants was particularly prevalent among overseas emigrants, as shown in the remarks of two of my informants, one from Southeast Asia and the other from Canada.

Kuan H, who had emigrated to Medan as a young man, told me that:

All my children were born in Medan. I sent them back for their education and asked my father to look after them until they were old enough to join me overseas. It was a common practice then. In Medan, there were several dialect schools which sons of the Chinese could attend. These were finally combined to form a united school in 1930, using Mandarin as the teaching medium. The rich emigrant families usually sent their sons to continue high school in Mainland China after graduation from school in Medan.

According to Kuan G, born in Victoria and now in his late seventies:

My father wanted us to go back to China to study because he believed it was hard for a Chinese to find work here even if he had graduated from a Canadian university. In accordance with his last wishes, my eldest brother and I attended Ling-nan University in Canton. They had a class catering especially to the sons of Overseas Chinese. It was common during my father's day, as well as during my time, to send sons back to China to study. Some were even sent as far as Shanghai and Peking universities to continue their educations.

Because of this wish to obtain prestige for their sons, the merchants and emigrants among the Kuan were the most eager to donate to the building of modern schools. Their contributions were all the more valuable because by 1920 the education land once owned by ancestral halls at T'uo-fu had reverted to ritual land.¹² The lineage did not sponsor any member studying abroad or in Canton. Most of the talented students either paid their way themselves or borrowed from rich relatives.

In the early 1900s, the Ch'ing period, the ancestral halls of T'uo-fu villages started to run traditional schools for their own members. After 1920, they began to run more "modern" ones. These were not free. Most of them were poorly equipped, with a curriculum not much different from that of the Ch'ing period. According to one informant, they were more eager to collect fees than to teach. Of the truly modern schools in rural T'uo-fu, informants estimated that nine out of ten had connections with Overseas Chinese and with merchants. Schools such as the Kuang-yüan Primary School, the Liang-yüeh Primary School, and Chang-hsi Primary School in Chang-ts'un, as well as the T'u-ch'iang Primary School in Hsia-ts'un, were partly funded by emigrants.

Ch'ih-k'an, which was becoming a modern town, had the best schools after 1920. The Kuang-yi Primary School and the Kuang-yü Primary School were completely supported by the emigrants and merchants, although the lineage managers ran the schools and controlled the employment of teachers. Besides these, there were high schools in Ch'ih-k'an teaching English, science, and other subjects. The first to be established was the First High School of K'ai-p'ing, built in 1930. Although run by the government, it was largely based on emigrant and merchant funds.

A report in the *Ssu-yi ch'iao-pao* shows that in the 1940s the emigrants and merchants were still active in building and repairing high schools in Ch'ih-k'an:

In 1945, there was a project to build a Kuang-yü High School next to the Kuan Lineage Library. Contributions came mostly from the Canadian and American K'ai-p'ing emigrants and local merchants. Some donations also came from the emigrants in Southeast Asia, Cuba, Mexico, and Hong Kong. In 1946, the Ch'ih-k'an inhabitants were starting a donation campaign for the establishment of a Nan-lou High School in honor of the seven martyrs who died during World War II in defense of the Chen-nan Fortress. Response from overseas was tremendous. Within a few months, enough was collected to start the building project.¹³

Modern schools in Ch'ih-k'an had two common features. They were based on the Canton model and did not offer vocational training. The curriculum emphasized academic subjects and aimed at preparing students to become civil servants of the *hsien* or provincial government.¹⁴ In addition, these schools were built with donations from emigrants belonging to many lineages besides the Kuan. They were open to students of all surnames.

Nonetheless, in view of the eagerness of the emigrants and merchants among the Kuan to donate funds for the establishment of schools, it is not surprising that the Kuan lineage, which had always been a leader in the number of traditional scholar-gentry members it produced, was once again leading in the number of high school and postsecondary graduates (see table 9, p. 54). Between 1920 and 1930, seventy Kuan graduated from universities and

postsecondary colleges outside K'ai-p'ing. Of these, twenty-nine graduated from colleges in Canton, twenty-six in Peking, seven in the United States, three in Japan, two in France, and one each in England, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. Among them, eleven became officials outside and five served in K'ai-p'ing.¹⁵

TABLE 9

Number of University and Postsecondary College
Graduates in K'ai-p'ing, 1911-32

<u>Surname</u>	<u>No. of Graduates</u>
Ssu-t'u	74
Kuan	70
Chou	62
Chang	58
T'an	41
Wu	33
Hu	31
Huang	27
Hsieh	26
Li	17

Source: *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih* (Hong Kong, 1933), pp. 139-43.

Incidents connected with the building of the K'ai-ch'iao High School and the First High School of K'ai-p'ing show that lineage conflicts sometimes emerged in the promotion of modern education. There was latent hostility between the Kuan from T'uo-fu and the Wu at Lou-kang in the twentieth century. In 1918, Wu Ting-hsin, representing the Hong Kong K'ai-p'ing Chamber of Commerce, came to Canada to ask for donations to build the K'ai-ch'iao High School. He also asked the emigrants to invest in Hai-hsin-chou (an area between Lou-kang and Ch'ang-sha) for the establishment of a "model village." According to my informants, the Kuan were deliberately excluded from this project. In 1927, when the K'ai-ch'iao High School was built, the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u were indignant because it was built in Hai-hsin-chou and not in Ch'ih-k'an. Moreover, neither the Kuan nor the Ssu-t'u were chosen as executives. Together, they started a donation campaign in North America, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Canton, and K'ai-p'ing. Finally, another school was built, known as the First High School of K'ai-p'ing, this time in Ch'ih-k'an itself and run by the government with Kuan Chun as the acting principal.¹⁶

Lineage consciousness played an important part in other projects at Ch'ih-k'an. The Kuan Lineage Library, for example, was built in 1929 by lineage members with a deliberate desire not to allow their library to be outshone by

the Ssu-t'u Lineage Library and the Chou Lineage Library.¹⁷ It was funded by donations from emigrants in the name of the lineage, was built on a piece of corporate property belonging to the Kuang-yü Ancestral Hall, and was administered by lineage managers.

Like other emigrants, the Kuan in Canada showed great concern for lineage affairs, particularly after a major crisis. For example, after World War II the Kuan in Victoria donated funds for the repair of roads and the Kuan Lineage Library. They also donated money to organize a memorial service for the fifteen Kuan who had died defending the T'uo-fu area. The returned emigrants played an even more active part in the affairs of T'uo-fu: they paid for public works projects such as the construction and repair of village footpaths. Moreover, they initiated the establishment of reading rooms in the villages and acted as middlemen in all donation campaigns in Ch'ih-k'an and overseas. Although the returned emigrants were eager to help their lineage, they also tried to show off their newly won wealth through an elaborate life-style, as did the merchants and modern school graduates.

According to the people I interviewed, in T'uo-fu, during the traditional period trade was seen as secondary to private or corporate landownership as a source of wealth. As in other parts of rural China, class differences at that time were less obvious than they later became because all land suffered from population pressure, partition, and weather hazards.¹⁸ There was less tendency for the rich to exhibit a different style of living, except during ceremonial occasions. With the rise of overseas emigration and the development of Ch'ih-k'an, the population of T'uo-fu began to exhibit greater social distinctions. My elderly informants all remarked that there was not much class difference in their villages during the Ch'ing period, but that after the first decade of the twentieth century there were marked differences between rich and poor in housing, dress, and even eating habits. The rich were either those who had businesses in Ch'ih-k'an or the families of successful emigrants.

From the second decade of the twentieth century onward, new villages (*hsin-ts'un*) were founded by the rich emigrants from North America as residential areas for their families. These were adjacent to the original villages in T'uo-fu. Once built, they also became the abodes of local rich merchants and modern scholars, while the old village was a place reserved for poor farmers, laborers, and unsuccessful emigrant families.¹⁹ In Chang-ts'un there were six new villages, each with about thirty houses, grouped around the village precinct. In Hsia-ts'un, the new village was called Yao-hua-fang. It held fifteen houses in the 1930s but expanded to thirty houses in the 1940s. In Hsia-p'ien, the new village was known as Fu-ho-li. It also contained about thirty houses. The inhabitants of each new village were originally natives of the parent village, but they cut across lineage branch lines in their pattern of settlement and excluded some members. Na-luo was occupied by the Hu and the Kuan, but the

new village—Jen-ho-li—built in 1902 by the emigrants and the merchants of Nalu village, was a Kuan settlement exclusively.

The buildings of the new villages were foreign-style houses (*yang-lou*), two or three storeys in height, with gardens and large living quarters.²⁰ The houses were well supplied with electricity, lighting, and flush toilets. Very few of them had farmland. Around the little garden was a thick wall with an iron gate. Some had a watch tower to guard against intruders. Many families had firearms for protection since they were often the objects of blackmail, kidnapping, extortion, and bandit raids. Most of the inhabitants were women, old men (retired emigrants or fathers left at home), and children under sixteen. Some rich local merchants worked in Ch'ih-k'an in the daytime and went back to the new villages to sleep at night.

The people in the new villages had a higher standard of living, which set them apart from the people of the old villages. They spent lavishly on weddings, funerals, housewarming parties, retirement parties, birth-of-son parties, and generally on entertaining the villagers from both the old and the new villages to demonstrate their wealth. They competed by displaying their jewelry, furniture, and other possessions, wore western-style clothing, and spoke a few words of English every now and then.²¹ This flaunting of wealth and affluence became such a habit in T'uo-fu that less successful emigrants preferred buying land and houses and adopting sons to going home themselves. Returning for visits had become too expensive, since those who came home were expected to invite all the village folk to various feasts and distribute lucky money in American and Canadian dollars.

Asked about the relationship between the old and new villages, all informants assured me that moving to a new village did not mean the individual was breaking away from his lineage or village membership. New gentry members living there were still regarded, and regarded themselves, as members of their old ancestral halls. As the new villages did not have ancestral halls or corporate property, the new gentry living there returned to the old villages for ritual observations and ritual pork. In fact, people in a new village cared a great deal about the opinions of the inhabitants of the old village. In 1946, for example, a returned emigrant built a foreign-style house in Fu-ho-li, a new village. The folk in Hsia-p'ien believed that the new house would destroy their geomantic advantages. They deprived the returned emigrant of his ancestral hall membership. Only after he formally apologized to all the elders in the ancestral hall was he readmitted to membership. This shows the importance attached by the new gentry to their lineage membership.

Conclusion

T. Ch'en believes that emigrants who returned from Southeast Asia were a progressive force in the villages and that their behavior pattern led to the

breakdown of the traditional family system.²² Hsü argues that the family remained unaffected by the returned emigrants.²³ For example, returned emigrants continued to submit to arranged marriages and rarely brought back foreign-born wives to produce changes in the pattern of authority within the households. He argues further that emigrants' emphasis on housing and learning were traditional concerns. Hsü concludes, "The returned Southseas emigrants and their families had not forgotten the traditional conception of life and behavior. . . . Wealth acquired through emigration had in most cases merely added oil to the lamp of age-old tradition." However, he adds, "I believe that Chinese emigrants to other parts of the world, for example, Europe and especially America, showed a much higher degree of departure from the Chinese tradition."²⁴

My fieldwork indicates that, in T'uo-fu, even returned emigrants from North America strengthened rather than weakened the social structure. In fact, contrary to Hsü's belief, they were even more conservative than the emigrants in the Fukien-Ch'ao-chou area. For example, the development of new villages was not found in that region, and many of the successful emigrants from Southeast Asia did not retire to their home villages. Instead, they created residential areas within port cities such as Amoy and Swatow and acted as absentee landlords.²⁵ This was not true of the Kuan. The emigrants who returned to T'uo-fu did not upset the sociopolitical structure of the lineage. There were no reasons for doing so. Discriminated against abroad, they were welcomed back. The paths of social, political, and economic advancement were wide open to them. They donated to the educational and cultural activities of T'uo-fu as well as to postwar reconstruction projects to better their chances of becoming community leaders and retain ties to their powerful lineage. The lineage benefited from these donations, especially in the building of modern schools, which could help produce spokesmen for the benefit of the lineage as a whole.²⁶

CHAPTER 5
Local Militarization, Economic Development,
and the Kuan of K'ai-p'ing, 1911-30

Between 1911 and 1930, K'ai-p'ing faced two major crises--the silting of the T'an River and the breakdown of civil order. The new gentry class played an important role in the solution of both problems. In the early twentieth century, the T'an River became silted from Kou-p'i-ch'ung to the Hsien-kang-Ch'ih-k'an area. The situation worsened as years passed, so that by the 1940s parts of the river at Ch'ih-k'an had become so shallow that one could wade across. Boats could come down easily, but they had difficulty going up. This gradually lessened the amount of trade along this river route. The people of the neighboring county of T'ai-shan were the first to be affected, and in 1912 the T'ai-shan emigrants financed construction of the Hsin-ning Railway, which successfully captured the river trade between Chiang-men, eastern T'ai-shan, and parts of En-p'ing.¹ This railway had a negative impact on K'ai-p'ing, since it bypassed most of the middle and lower T'an River basin. Goods from En-p'ing no longer moved through K'ai-p'ing on their way to Chiang-men.

At the same time, communication by sea improved in the 1920s. Shui-tung and Mei-lu became ports of call for western Kwangtung on one hand and Canton on the other. Yang-chiang and the Lei-chou Peninsula, which had formerly procured imported goods from Chiang-men, now obtained them directly from Hong Kong and Macau by steamboat using Shui-tung and Mei-lu as entrepôts. The T'an River route was increasingly bypassed.² The initial response of the K'ai-p'ing lineages was to compete among themselves for ferry and water rights. Eventually, however, the merchants began to cooperate with each other and with the government to combat their common economic problem. Several joint projects were undertaken.

The first was the improvement of river transportation. Shallow-bottomed steamboats and tugboats were introduced to supplement traditional sailing junks as a means of transportation between Hsien-kang and Shui-k'ou.³ Apparently, this did not help on the upper course of the T'an River. The second project was another railway. The emigrants of En-p'ing and K'ai-p'ing planned to build a P'ing-yang Railway to rival the Hsin-ning Railway. But this attempt was dropped because the T'ai-shan emigrants appealed to the court in Canton and won their case.⁴ The third project was the building of modern roads to

supplement the T'an River route. It was directed by nine bus companies formed by the local gentry, businessmen, and Overseas Chinese. This attempt was largely successful. During the years 1928-31, twenty-two new roads were built in K'ai-p'ing. New cement bridges were constructed and old ones repaired to facilitate public transportation.⁵ In general, the building of new roads did help to reopen the route from western Kwangtung to Chiang-men. After the old roads were modernized and new ones constructed in the 1920s and 1930s, less reliance was placed on the rivers and sea as means of transportation.⁶

Attempts by the new gentry class in K'ai-p'ing to keep trade routes open between western Kwangtung and the Pearl River delta took more than ten years to succeed because these projects were complicated and were sometimes frustrated by the breakdown of civil order between 1911 and 1928, which led to the cessation of junk traffic and obstruction of the road-building process.

Due to its strategic location, K'ai-p'ing suffered greatly after the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty, as warlord armies traversed the area and battled in it. In 1911, for example, when the revolutionaries in Canton declared the independence of Kwangtung, the "People's Armies" occupied Ts'ang-ch'eng and the major market towns of K'ai-p'ing. Secret society members and soldiers took advantage of the situation to loot these places. In March 1913, K'ai-p'ing was a battleground when Sun Yat-sen organized the Second Revolution against Yüan Shih-k'ai. Again, late in 1917, K'ai-p'ing was a battlefield when Sun organized the Constitution Protection Movement against Tuan Ch'i-jui, the latter's protégés tried to capture Canton from western Kwangtung. There was fighting on the lower T'an River, including Chiang-men. When, in 1920, there was a movement against the Kwangsi warlord who had been the military governor of Canton since 1917, the Kwangtung forces marched through Ch'ang-sha and Shui-k'ou and attacked the Kwangsi forces in Chiang-men. The remnants of the Kwangsi forces escaped to Shui-k'ou and looted the populace so severely that from 1920 to 1923 it was a dead city. In 1923, fighting in K'ai-p'ing resulted from quarrels between the Yunnan and Kwangsi warlords at Canton. Ts'ang-ch'eng was attacked, and Ch'ih-k'an, Ch'ang-sha, and Shui-k'ou all became battlegrounds in turn. In 1924-25, during Chiang K'ai-shek's expedition against Ch'en Chiung-ming, battles were again fought in K'ai-p'ing at Ts'ang-ch'eng and the major market towns.⁷

Civil disorder resulted from these military struggles. Secret society members, bandits, and pirates took advantage of the situation. Disbanded and defeated troops took their arms with them and either joined the local trouble-makers or sold arms to them. The forces of various warlords in Canton were unable to restore order even in the delta areas, not to mention interior K'ai-p'ing with its forests and intricate mountain passes. It was the need for the protection of life and property during these unruly years that led to the reemergence of the first unofficial military organizations since the Red Turban

uprising and the Hakka-Punti War. In the countryside, the inhabitants of each *hsiang* reorganized themselves into militia. In market towns such as Shui-k'ou, Ch'ih-k'an, and Ch'ang-sha, the chambers of commerce organized merchants' militia for defense, with each shop contributing funds and manpower.

Several bureaus were organized by the local elites, merchants and gentry leaders residing in Hong Kong and Canton to coordinate the *hsiang* and merchants' militias. In 1911, the K'ai-p'ing Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong contributed money to establish a central bureau with a private defense corps to maintain law and order. This central bureau was established at Ts'ang-ch'eng and was led by the elites of prominent lineages. In 1918, when Ts'ang-ch'eng was attacked, Wu Ting-hsin, a Lou-kang native residing in Canton, went to North America to collect funds for the establishment of another central bureau. This organization was established at Ch'ang-sha. It was led by the Chang, the Kuan, and the Wu. Donations overseas were so generous that the central bureau at Ch'ang-sha was able to employ mercenaries to maintain peace.⁸

These unofficial efforts to restore peace and order were thwarted by the Canton Commune Incident in December 1927 (see appendix 1). In that winter, the Communists, taking advantage of the power vacuum in Canton, seized the city and established a commune government. They were defeated in early 1928 and many of the participants fled to the T'u-t'ang area of K'ai-p'ing.⁹ This alarmed the *hsien* chief, and he called on the private corps to cooperate with garrison troops to launch an all-out attack on T'u-t'ang. The merchants' and *hsiang* militias of the most powerful lineages in K'ai-p'ing responded favorably. The K'ai-p'ing Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong donated ammunition and money to this joint effort. The K'ai-p'ing Association of Canada organized a fundraising drive and sent donations through Hong Kong to help the campaign. They also donated to the building of Chen-nan-lou, a strong defensive fortress next to T'u-t'ang. Some members came from Canada to Ch'ang-sha to discuss the defense matters of K'ai-p'ing with the local elite. Because of this joint official-private military effort, the campaign was successful.¹⁰

With the 1911-28 crisis coming to an end, K'ai-p'ing was ready for a reorganization of its local administrative system in 1930.¹¹ It was to be officially divided into 10 *ch'ü*, 103 *hsiang*, 35 *chen*, 947 *pao*, 4,205 *chia*, and 97,653 *hu* (households). Similar to the rest of Kwangtung, consultative councils, general assemblies and various government bureaus, offices, and departments were established in K'ai-p'ing. The *hsiang* and merchants' militias were to be converted into a police corps controlled by the Department of Public Security.¹²

The various lineage and merchant leaders in K'ai-p'ing, with their powerful private defense corps, were ready to bargain with the government. A series of meetings was held in which the local elite agreed to disband their militia,

believing that a united police corps would be in a better position to maintain law and order and protect their property, since members of the *hsiang* militia and the merchants' militia were poorly coordinated and refused to fight outside their own communities. Overseas leaders supported the decision, contributing a total of seventy-seven pistols to the government for the establishment of a centralized police corps in 1929-30.¹³ In return for this support, the chambers of commerce were given semigovernmental functions such as safekeeping of the bounty established by the *hsien* government as a reward for apprehending the T'u-t'ang bandits still at large. Their leaders were to play a major role in the Education Land Titles Clarification Committee, established to investigate the titles of education land in K'ai-p'ing. When the Reclaimed Land (*sha-t'ien*) Titles Clarification Bureau was established in 1930, the representatives of all eleven chambers of commerce were to be part of the bureau to check if the present owners of the reclaimed land along the T'an River had land deeds to validate their titles.¹⁴ In rural areas, the formal administrative structure was to be reconciled with the informal power structure. Lineage leaders who had taken part in the 1911-28 crisis were to become official members of the various *hsiang* offices (*hsiang kung-so*). They were empowered to direct not only the internal affairs of the lineages but also to perform additional administrative functions.¹⁵ On the *hsien* level, some of the leaders of the central bureau, representatives of the K'ai-p'ing Scholar-gentry Circle in Canton, and the Hong Kong K'ai-p'ing Chamber of Commerce were to be given posts in the various branches of the K'ai-p'ing government.¹⁶

Thus, local militarization in K'ai-p'ing led to increasing cooperation across lineage lines. It also strengthened the bargaining position of local elites with the *hsien* government. Administrative changes after 1930 created two types of local leaders: (a) official leaders at the *ch'ü*, *hsiang*, *chen*, and village levels of government; and (b) unofficial leaders who served as spokesmen for K'ai-p'ing's citizens to the government.¹⁷

The events in K'ai-p'ing between 1911 and 1930 show that the goals of new gentry members were different from those of the traditional scholar-gentry class. While members of the old gentry aimed at strengthening their individual lineages against the *hsien* government and other lineages, the new gentry were more civic-minded and cooperative. Through years of joint effort in combatting the economic and political crises of K'ai-p'ing, modern scholars, overseas emigrants, and local merchants were willing to cooperate with any government that guaranteed the peace and order towards which they had contributed so much since 1911. They hoped that, after 1928, trade routes could be reopened and conditions would once again be favorable to commerce and the processing industry. They even supported the establishment of a centralized police corps to replace the lineage-based *hsiang* militia, believing that their interests could only be guaranteed by improved government forces. This,

however, did not mean that they were subservient to the *hsien* government, for they occasionally protested and acted as spokesmen for *hsien* inhabitants if certain policies were detrimental to their economic interests or if soldiers and police disturbed commercial establishments in the market towns.¹⁸ This function assumed growing importance in the 1930s, when taxes and surtaxes collected by the K'ai-p'ing government greatly increased both in variety and in amount. Land taxes, taxes on house deeds, slaughter taxes, sugar and salt taxes, rice taxes, commodity taxes, license taxes, and so on, took up an increasing part of the budget of merchants and landowners as well as peasants. Tax farmers, soldiers, and police were continually collecting taxes, levies, surcharges, and contributions of all kinds.¹⁹ It was obvious that the people urgently needed local leaders to negotiate with the government.

The new gentry members among the Kuan, be they modern school graduates, returned emigrants, or local merchants, collaborated with one another and with old gentry leaders in combatting problems arising from the silting of the T'an River, the breakdown of civil order as a result of the 1911 Revolution, and subsequent struggles for control of Kwangtung Province. New gentry members among the Kuan also tried to capitalize on the growing economic prosperity of western Kwangtung in the 1920s. All these activities not only had direct implications for rural T'uo-fu and the market town of Ch'ih-k'an, but also for the T'uo-fu Kuan's relationship with their brethren in other parts of K'ai-p'ing, such as the Kou-p'i-ch'ung, Sung-lang and Yang-lu areas. Being a prominent lineage, the Kuan played an important part in the changing administrative structure of K'ai-p'ing. They sat in the various *hsien* consultative councils and tax bureaus. For example, the first and second *hsien* consultative councils were both chaired by a Kuan. Of the eight members of the third council, one was a Kuan; of the eight members working in the Hsien Mortgage and Property Tax Bureau, two were Kuan; of the six members working in the Bureau for the Management of Hsien Finance, one was a Kuan, and he was the chairman.²⁰ Among the Kuan also were spokesmen for the people of K'ai-p'ing against the government. Kuan Wen-yuan, a student of Peking University, for example, sued the *hsien* chief, Ch'en Wei-to, over his mishandling of a murder case at Ch'ih-k'an. Ch'en was relieved of his duties soon afterwards. Kuan Shih-yüan, a traditional scholar, cooperated with the Hong Kong K'ai-p'ing traders to take a petition to Canton against the *hsien* chief, Liu Ch'ien, for misgovernment. Liu was soon relieved of duty.²¹

As in the period of the Red Turban uprising and the Hakka-Punti War of the mid-nineteenth century, members of the Kuan lineage were active as defense leaders during the 1911-28 crisis. Kuan Shih-lien, a traditional scholar, was vice-president of the Central Bureau in Ch'ang-sha. Kuan Chu-yao, another traditional scholar, was among the leaders of the Central Bureau at Ts'ang-ch'eng, which cooperated with Hong Kong and Canton in military action

against unruly elements.²² In T'uo-fu, each of the four *hsiang* maintained a militia. Those who volunteered for service received a double share of ritual meat. The militia was partly paid for by the proceeds of *hsiang* corporate property and partly by the subscriptions of individual members. The elders of each village collected money from the households to buy ammunition and weapons. The four militia were under the direction of the League of the Four Hsiang.

There was not as much cooperation between the T'uo-fu Kuan and the Kuan elsewhere during the 1911-28 crisis, as had been the case during the Hakka-Punti War. In Sung-lang, for example, the Kuan militiamen were not under the direction of the gentry from T'uo-fu. They formed the Sung-lang militia with other lineages there. Likewise, the Yang-lu militia had no connections with T'uo-fu: it was led by the Chü, the Chang, and the Ssu-t'u at Sha-chou Market. In Kou-p'i-ch'ung, the Kuan formed the *Heng-shan* militia, which was independent in all its actions.

Thus, the form of militarization among the Kuan in K'ai-p'ing in the period between 1911 and 1928 shows that higher-order and dispersed lineages were not used as units of militarization. Instead, *hsiang* militia were formed on a territorial basis, uniting lineages of different surnames. One possible reason is that social disturbances were affecting the whole *hsien* during the twentieth century, whereas the Hakka-Punti War merely affected the K'ai-p'ing-En-p'ing-T'ai-shan border areas, leaving the middle and lower courses of the T'an River untouched. The widespread disturbances between 1911 and 1928 must have led to the formation of regional, multisurname associations, and thus contributed to the strengthening of ties among the elites of lineages sharing the same geographical area. However, negotiations between the *hsien* chief and T'uo-fu leaders after the 1911-28 crisis led to the strengthening, rather than weakening, of relationships among the Kuan in various parts of K'ai-p'ing.

In return for dissolving the militia, the League of the Four Hsiang was transformed into the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang (Ssu-hsiang Kung-so) in 1930. The leaders were given both administrative and fiscal power in areas under their jurisdiction. They had to take an oath of allegiance to the *hsien* government and report to the KMT Party Office once a month.²³ They were given the power to seek out criminals and those who misbehaved, to conscript soldiers with the help of the police corps, to transmit government regulations, and to sign papers for the sale of any kind of property, as well as papers concerning adoption. They were responsible for taking the census of various villages, acting as a sort of marriage, death, and birth registration office. They were also empowered to speak up for a *hsiang* member whose honesty and integrity might be in doubt in the eyes of the *hsien* government. In addition to administrative functions, they had other fiscal powers. They were to allocate empty land, confiscate land without land deeds, and collect head and land taxes on both private and corporate property.

Besides increasing control over the inhabitants of T'uo-fu, the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang was given certain powers over the Kuan in other parts of K'ai-p'ing. This office could claim jurisdiction over the Kuan whose ancestors had migrated from T'uo-fu to Yang-lu *hsiang* or Sung-lang *hsiang*. Such administrative arrangements were at times beneficial to the individual Kuan. It is not known how much tax immunity the elite in the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang or their underlings enjoyed compared to ordinary members. But, from the data gathered in my fieldwork, it is quite certain that the average Kuan was in a more favorable position than his neighbors as far as tax payment was concerned. For example, I was told that villages in T'uo-fu seldom had to pay head taxes. This benefit was also extended to the Kuan at Sung-lang and Yang-lu *hsiang*. For example, in Sung-lang no head taxes were ever paid to the government because of the influence of three powerful local leaders who lived in Ch'ih-k'an and who had "certain relationships" with the government through the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang. The relationship between the T'uo-fu and the Kou-p'i-ch'ung Kuan was not as intimate. The Kou-p'i-ch'ung Kuan had a *hsiang* office of their own, and the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang could not claim jurisdiction there. But, in important matters, the gentry of Kou-p'i-ch'ung would go to Ch'ih-k'an for discussion. A plausible reason for this is that Ch'ih-k'an had important administrative functions for the whole of K'ai-p'ing. There was a branch office of the Department of Public Security. It was also the site of the Reclaimed Land Titles Clarification Bureau, the Education Department, the Hsien Land Registration Office, the Fortress Tax Bureau, and the KMT Party Office.²⁴ The Kou-p'i-ch'ung, Yang-lu, and Sung-lang *hsiang* therefore could not compare with T'uo-fu in power or prestige. Moreover, the Kuan of T'uo-fu also served in various government organs such as the *hsien* consultative councils, the KMT Party Office, and the Hsien Mortgage and Property Tax Bureaus.

Hence, the power and prestige of the T'uo-fu leaders as well as the political importance of Ch'ih-k'an were among the factors that attracted the Kuan from other parts of K'ai-p'ing. For political reasons, the elders from Kou-p'i-ch'ung, Sung-lang, and Yang-lu came to the Kuang-yü *t'ang* for ritual ceremonies and to the Administrative Office for consultation. But what attracted the nonelites of Kou-p'i-ch'ung, Sung-lang, and Yang-lu was not the political importance of Ch'ih-k'an but its economic significance, for 1911-30 was also a period of rapid economic development in that part of K'ai-p'ing.

Being a commercially oriented lineage, the Kuan took an active part in the program to modernize K'ai-p'ing's road system, especially after 1926 when Kuan T'ing-ta became the director of the Public Works Department of K'ai-p'ing. T'uo-fu was responsible for the building of the T'uo-fu Public Road, while Kou-p'i-ch'ung was responsible for the Ch'i-hsien-t'ung and Niu-hsien-t'ung public roads.²⁵ According to my informants, the merchants and emigrants among the

Kuan also invested heavily in the P'ing-p'ing Public Road, the Pai-ch'ih-mao Public Road, the Na-t'ung Public Road, the Ch'ih-chiu Public Road, the Sha-yen-pai Public Road, and the Ch'ih-fu Public Road. According to a visiting officer from Canton in 1931, of all the roads built in K'ai-p'ing, the best were the Pai-ch'ih-mao Public Road, the T'uo-fu Public Road, and the Na-t'ung Public Road. This shows how vigorous merchants among the Kuan were in their attempts to revitalize the commercial sphere of Ch'ih-k'an.

However, in its initial stages, the building of roads had actually aroused the opposition of the rural inhabitants. The T'uo-fu Bus Company was trying to buy up any agricultural land lying within its route. Some landowners raised so much opposition that the K'ai-p'ing government had to send soldiers to the area to survey the road. One informant was particularly bitter about the whole project. He said, "It was the bullies and scoundrels who were organizers of the T'uo-fu Bus Company. Even bicycles passing over the roads had to pay tolls, no matter whether they were owned by a Kuan or a non-Kuan." He added, "The same thing happened to the P'ing-p'ing Public Road built by the Hu and the Pai-ch'ih-mao Public Road built by the Chou. In fact, the bus companies were so unpopular that when the Communists controlled K'ai-p'ing, the scoundrels who controlled the P'ing-p'ing Bus Company had to face the firing squad."

It is beyond doubt that some individuals suffered and that the project enriched the bus companies more than the rural inhabitants.²⁶ The very fact that some of the landowners among the Kuan quarrelled with the T'uo-fu Bus Company shows that individual interests more than collective sentiments were often at stake in the whole process of road building and modernization. The main purpose of these modern roads was to benefit local merchants and returned emigrants who had interests in the further development of trade between western Kwangtung and the cities of the Pearl River delta, a development which would have been frustrated by the silting of the T'an River had modern roads not been built to ease the transit of goods.

Besides investing in the building of modern roads, returned emigrants also had an interest in the founding of new market towns. According to my informants, the Ta-t'ung Market in Kou-p'i-ch'ung was founded by members of the Kuan lineage residing in Canada. The whole project was organized by various partners of Kuang-yü-lung, a grocery store in Vancouver. The owner of that store gave the name "Ta-t'ung" to this newly founded market town in 1923. The initial motive was to facilitate the remittance business from Vancouver to the Kou-p'i-ch'ung area via Hong Kong. Local merchants among the Kuan who found that the project would also strengthen trade between Ch'ih-k'an and western Kwangtung joined in.

Ta-t'ung was next to Chin-hu, the market town of the Li, who had not been on good terms with the Kuan at Kou-p'i-ch'ung except during the period of the Red Turban uprising and the Hakka-Punti War. Both lineages were rivals for

control of the cow trade moving from Yang-chiang and the salt trade with Nafu in T'ai-shan. According to Kuan O, when the Ta-t'ung Market project was proposed, it was opposed by the Li. The Kuan at Kou-p'i-ch'ung used their influence in the *hsien* government and won the case. Allied with the Huang, the Chao, and the Hu, they held the market on the same days (the fifth and the tenth) as the Li at Chin-hu. They and the Kuan at Ch'ih-k'an cooperated in building the Niu-hsien-t'ung and Ch'i-hsien-t'ung public roads to direct the cow and salt trade routes to their advantage. Just outside Ta-t'ung was the Ta-yüan Dam. It also was built with capital of the Kuan in Vancouver as well as that of local merchants. The purpose was to improve the water level on that part of the T'an River which had become too shallow for boats to sail. Machines were used to remove sediment from the river. After the building of Ta-t'ung Market, two roads, and the Ta-yüan Dam, many Kuan from both Southeast Asia and North America returned to invest in the shops there.

Much emigrant capital was also invested in old, established, market town businesses. When asked why returned emigrants among the Kuan were less interested in port cities such as Chiang-men and Canton than in Ch'ih-k'an, my informants gave the following reasons: (a) land at T'uo-fu was not very fertile, urban pursuits were more lucrative, and Ch'ih-k'an was within their sphere of influence; and (b) Ch'ih-k'an was one of the most important ports of embarkation for both K'ai-p'ing and En-p'ing emigrants. It was also the center for receiving checks from overseas.²⁷ Whatever the reason, my informants estimated that by 1930 about nine out of ten shops in Ch'ih-k'an were operated by emigrants or their family members.²⁸ In addition to their commercial interests, emigrants also speculated in government bonds and took part in entrepreneurial enterprises such as brokerage firms. They also invested in businesses related to entertainment and the comforts of life, such as leather shops, jewelry shops, cake shops, hotels, restaurants, tea houses, and theaters. The more popular concerns run by them or their families were shops dealing in imported grocery items and clothing. They usually had a branch of the same nature in Hong Kong or Canton. In addition to these, emigrants also invested in municipal development projects such as electric lighting works, telephone companies, bus companies, and steamboat services.

In the 1930s, many returned emigrants started their own remittance businesses with branches in Southeast Asia and North America, as well as in the market towns of the emigrants.²⁹ While waiting for remittances to accumulate they profitted from making short-term loans to peasants or from engaging in import/export businesses.³⁰ There were ten such firms in Ch'ih-k'an, all located along Fu-hsing Road. The height of their business activities occurred between 1930 and 1932 and between 1943 and 1946. During these periods the emigrants remitted almost all of their savings home, due either to discrimination or economic dislocation abroad.

The Kuan from North America were particularly successful in running remittance firms. They dealt with remittances not only in the T'uo-fu area but in Kou-p'i-ch'ung, other parts of K'ai-p'ing, and En-p'ing. Before the war, grocery stores and drugstores such as Wan-yü-t'ang and Yü-lun in Victoria and Kuang-yü-lung in Vancouver were centers handling remittances for the K'ai-p'ing emigrants in Victoria, Vancouver, and other small towns in British Columbia. Together they owned two branches in Hong Kong: Yü-feng-ho and Wan-yu-lung. The checks received in British Columbia were sent to Hong Kong to be changed into Chinese currency. A messenger would take the money to Hui-hua-yüan (a remittance firm) and Wan-ning-t'ang (a drugstore) in Ch'ih-k'an, both of which were run by the Kuan of T'uo-fu. Family members of the emigrants would go to either the Hui-hua-yuan or the Wan-ning-t'ang on market days to ask whether there were any letters or remittances for them. If the recipient did not turn up, a messenger would go to the village concerned and ask the recipient to go to Ch'ih-k'an for the money.

Kuang-yü-lung operated on a larger scale than Wan-yü-t'ang or Yü-lun. Its receipts could be found all over Ssu-yi. Remittances collected by this grocery store were sent through Hong Kong and Ch'ih-k'an to the remittance firms in Ta-t'ung Market in the Kou-p'i-ch'ung area. Thus, from British Columbia to Ch'ih-k'an and Ta-t'ung, the remittances of K'ai-p'ing emigrants were handled by firms owned by the Kuan from T'uo-fu and Kou-p'i-ch'ung.

From the description of the activities of the Kuan who emigrated to Canada, it is clear that their pattern of investment was very different from that of the Chinese who moved from eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien to Southeast Asia. The latter usually invested in port cities such as Swatow and Amoy. Moreover, their business activities in those ports were sporadic rather than continuous. Political disorder, excessive taxation, fluctuation in the price of silver, insecurity in China, changes in tariffs and currency, or even improvements in conditions in Southeast Asia sometimes turned them away from investing in China.³¹ One of the reasons for this difference was the fact that those who had emigrated to North America had no alternatives. Opportunities were limited in their host countries. In addition, the emigrants could not sponsor their families, so most of them aimed at building a good economic foundation at home before retiring to their native land.

As a result of investment from the emigrants, life in Ch'ih-k'an after 1930 was not too different from that of port cities such as Canton and Chiang-men. There was good bus service. The houses were modern, two-story buildings with balconies. There were telephones, post offices, modern banks, and electric lighting. There were newspapers, magazines, and modern schools. The construction industry was booming. Concerns selling building materials and furniture were thriving.

As an important port of embarkation and the center for receiving checks from overseas, Ch'ih-k'an became a center of luxury. Returned emigrants and rich emigrant families demanded both locally-made luxury goods and imported commodities. There were two western-style movie theaters and many restaurants, tea houses and opera houses for their entertainment. Ch'ih-k'an was known as "little Canton." One informant was impressed by a gambling casino that sponsored a Chinese opera every year to celebrate the birthday of Confucius. Singers came from as far as Hong Kong. Besides this casino, there were numerous opium dens and other casinos to satisfy the needs of visiting or retired emigrants and their families. However, despite all these entertainments and luxuries, Ch'ih-k'an was not solely a center of consumption. Many inhabitants engaged in productive work as well as spending their time in gambling houses, opium dens, and tea houses.

As a result of the building of modern roads and the investments of emigrants, Ch'ih-k'an trade grew tremendously in the 1920s. By the late 1930s, when the depression was over, Ch'ih-k'an had more than regained its former vitality and prosperity. Many processing industries and handicraft trades developed, such as rice milling, the making of bamboo utensils, fish salting, the making of leather bags and shoes, and the butchering of livestock. By the 1930s there were about one thousand shops.³²

Skinner believes that a market town undergoing "modern changes" usually exhibits: (a) an increase in the total volume of trade carried on in the town; (b) an increase in the number of market hours per week; (c) an increase in the proportion of permanent to mobile firms; and (d) an increase in the degree of economic specialization.³³ There is little doubt that Ch'ih-k'an was undergoing "modern changes." By 1930 this town exhibited at least three of the four characteristics outlined by Skinner, although it was not open every day. Many of the stores were permanent establishments. They did good business and were open all day during market days. There were many businesses specializing in rice, cows, pigs, chickens, oil, and salt.³⁴

As Ch'ih-k'an became modernized, its market area widened. The Hu, the Huang, the Chou, the Hsieh, the Wu, the Fang, and the Yü, as well as people from Yang-chiang and En-p'ing, not only attended the market every third and eighth day of the lunar month, but set up permanent businesses. Ch'ih-k'an gradually evolved from a strictly Kuan-Ssu-t'u sphere of influence to an open-to-all town. Nevertheless, because numerous traders, in T'uo-fu and overseas, were interested in renting or buying shop spaces, a majority of the businesses in Upper Ch'ih-k'an remained in the hands of the Kuan, even in the 1940s.

Side by side with this development, cooperation increased between the merchants of the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u. The marriage ban between the two lineages, which dated from the late nineteenth century, did not keep their merchant members from cooperating in the market town. Kuan Ch'ung-yao and

Ssu-t'u Yi-feng, for example, jointly founded the Ch'ih-k'an Chamber of Commerce in 1907 which, significantly enough, was situated at T'ang-ti Street, their boundary since 1845. The Ch'ih-k'an Chamber of Commerce was founded when a group of merchants of different surnames joined together for recreational purposes and to employ tutors to teach their children. Eventually, it came to incorporate all the shopowners at Ch'ih-k'an. Theoretically, it was run by leading citizens from the market town itself and not dominated by the Kuan or the Ssu-t'u. However, a Kuan or a Ssu-t'u often acted as chairman by virtue of the fact that these two lineages had the largest number of shops.

Every year, the shopowners met to elect a standing committee of twelve members to act as middlemen in disputes. When two shopowners quarrelled, they would appeal to the committee for mediation before the case was reported to the law court. The committee members also served as spokesmen in case of a confrontation with contractors, the Public Security Department, or the garrison soldiers. One informant, the son of a former chairman of the Ch'ih-k'an Chamber of Commerce, concluded that, unlike the merchants' guilds, this organization did not fix prices or standardize the quality of goods, but, like the guilds, it did act as arbiter and organizer of strikes and protests.³⁵

The first quarrel between the chamber of commerce and the authorities occurred in October 1914. Subordinates of the Ch'ih-k'an garrison commander, Su T'ing-yu, massacred an innocent audience at a theater because the gamblers' racket that had organized the opera had not paid protection fees. The leaders of the chamber of commerce went to Canton to complain. All the shops in the market town were closed until action was taken. In the end, Su T'ing-yu was relieved of duty, and his subordinates were executed.³⁶

In 1925 there was another strike. The K'ai-p'ing government sent Kuo Hsi-ho, a tax farmer, to estimate how much land in Ch'ih-k'an was "reclaimed." He reported that all the land there was subject to heavy taxes, since the landlords could not produce evidence to prove that they were not reclaimed. The chairman of the chamber of commerce then headed a delegation to protest. The merchants closed their shops for five days. The finance department in Canton mediated the affair. Finally, Ch'ih-k'an paid a lump sum of seven thousand Chinese dollars for the "reclaimed land" and Kuo Hsi-ho was relieved of duty.³⁷

Besides acting as spokesman for all the merchants in Ch'ih-k'an, the chamber of commerce organized for the defense of merchants' property in the market town. During the 1911-28 crisis, the Kuan and the Ssu-t'u bought an old fortress and used it for the maintenance of peace and order. In 1917, the Ch'ih-k'an Chamber of Commerce, led by its chairman, Kuan Tsu-ming, and vice-chairman, Ssu-t'u Chin, formed a merchants' militia to cooperate with Ch'ang-sha, Hong Kong, and Canton in military actions against warlord armies, disbanded soldiers, secret society forces, and bandits.³⁸ This was abolished in

1930, but revived again after the World War II to defend shop owners and peddlers against raids by policemen and soldiers, and against criminals who might threaten the lives and property of the members. Thus, economic development and the need for defense increased interlineage cooperation between the Kuan, the Ssu-t'u, and other shop owners in Ch'ih-k'an.

At the same time, however, the growth of Ch'ih-k'an and the development of modern roads drew the Kuan at Kou-p'i-ch'ung, Yang-lu, and Sung-lang closer to the Kuan at T'uo-fu. The Kuan at Sung-lang traditionally used the T'ien-hsin Market as their standard market, only occasionally attending Ch'ih-k'an. Now they did business more often in Ch'ih-k'an. They not only bought and sold, but collected overseas remittances there. The fact that it was developing into a wholesale center with permanent establishments induced the peasants and small shop owners in Sung-lang to go where they could usually buy a greater variety of consumer goods at a lower price and sell their farm produce at a higher price. The building of the Niu-hsien-t'ung Public Road allowed travel to Ch'ih-k'an by bus in less than half an hour.

The inhabitants of Kou-p'i-ch'ung traditionally attended Kou-p'i-ch'ung Market as their standard market and Chin-chi (En-p'ing) as their intermediate market. Before 1920, the Kuan there did not invest, buy, or sell in Ch'ih-k'an. However, after Ta-t'ung Market was founded, Kou-p'i-ch'ung Market dissolved itself and the Kuan at Kou-pei-ch'ung moved their shops to Ta-t'ung. From then on, they monopolized the transport of cows from Yang-chiang and En-p'ing and salt from Na-fu (T'ai-shan) to Ch'ih-k'an. This, together with the building of two major roads—Niu-hsien-t'ung and Ch'i-hsien-t'ung—led to very close economic links between the Kuan at T'uo-fu and the Kuan at Kou-p'i-ch'ung.

The Kuan at Yang-lu were more than three miles from Ch'ih-k'an. They traditionally attended the Sha-chou Market as their standard market and the Pai-sha Market (T'ai-shan) as their intermediate market. They did not invest, buy or sell at Ch'ih-k'an. Overseas remittances sent to the Kuan at Yang-lu *hsiang* went through Pai-sha Market. However, they too attended Ch'ih-k'an more frequently after the construction of the Sha-yen-pai Public Road in the 1920s. They were attracted by all the luxury items and entertainment offered there.

From the above data, it is clear that Skinner's belief that bonds between localized lineages attending different market towns tend to erode with time does not apply to the Kuan in K'ai-p'ing.³⁹ The Kuan at Sung-lang and Kou-p'i-ch'ung had increasingly strong ties with their brethren at T'uo-fu, although they belonged to different marketing communities and were geographically separated from T'uo-fu. The reason that Skinner's theory does not apply here is perhaps the importance of trade to the economic life of the lineages in K'ai-p'ing. The Kuan at Ch'ih-k'an could not ignore the Kuan at Kou-p'i-ch'ung and Sung-lang since the latter two branches commanded the trade route from

T'ai-shan, Yang-chiang, and En-p'ing. It was necessary for the Kuan of T'uo-fu to expand their commercial horizon to survive, since corporate land alone was not enough to maintain their prominence in the twentieth century. At the same time, the Kuan at Sung-lang and Kou-p'i-ch'ung were attracted to the central economic position of Ch'ih-k'an, which became more beneficial to them as Ch'ih-k'an became more modernized. This was one of the most important reasons why the Kuan at T'uo-fu, Sung-lang, Yang-lu, and Kou-p'i-ch'ung maintained their ritual ties despite geographical separation.

Conclusion

Activities of the emigrants and local merchants among the Kuan between 1911 and 1930 indicate that there was essentially no conflict between the ambition of the new gentry and the growth of the Kuan lineage. The economic and political activities of the new gentry between 1911 and 1930 show that they were sometimes self-seeking in their economic and political goals. They cooperated with the government in the defense of K'ai-p'ing and agreed to the dissolution of the *hsiang* militia. Despite resentment from rural members of their lineage, they organized bus companies to build public roads for their own economic interests. However, the investments of the new gentry members indirectly revitalized trade between Ch'ih-k'an and western Kwangtung. The remittance business and the building of modern roads, as well as the founding of the Ta-t'ung Market by the emigrants and merchants strengthened the relationship between the Kuan in T'uo-fu and the Kuan in Kou-p'i-ch'ung and helped to capture the cow and salt trade routes from the Li at Chin-hu. The increased volume of trade at Ch'ih-k'an, as well as the modernization of the town itself, in turn increased the revenue of the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang. Rent from the peddlers' stands using the valuable corporate property of the Kuang-yü *t'ang* in Ch'ih-k'an enriched the Kuan lineage as a whole. In addition, the direct investment of Kuan emigrants and the enterprises they stimulated, reinforced the hold of the T'uo-fu Kuan on Upper Ch'ih-k'an.

CHAPTER 6

Power and Leadership in T'uo-fu After 1930

Following the pattern of Kwangtung and K'ai-p'ing, new administrative organizations were introduced into the T'uo-fu-Ch'ih-k'an area after 1930. Three levels of administration were in operation there. On the *hsiang* level was the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang, located in Ch'ih-k'an. This office was made up of four *hsiang* chiefs representing the four *hsiang* of T'uo-fu. They were to be advised by a number of officials who served on the Hsiang Consultative Council. The four *hsiang* chiefs and their council members were chosen by the members of the Hsiang General Assembly who were unofficial representatives of the inhabitants of T'uo-fu.

Under the *hsiang* government was the village government, which was responsible for official matters in each village in T'uo-fu. Some of these villages were divided into residential units known as *pao* and *chia*, each headed by a chief who was a resident of the village. These official members were supposed to be periodically elected by the heads of households serving in an unofficial capacity in the Village General Assembly.

In Ch'ih-k'an, there was the *chen* office, headed by a chief and his official advisers in the Chen Consultative Council. They were to be chosen by the members of the Chen General Assembly, an unofficial body representing all the residents of Ch'ih-k'an. This body had far less actual power than its counterpart in the *hsiang* government, and did not even have the power to collect taxes. This function was performed by tax farmers. Real power was in the hands of the Public Security Department centered in Ch'ih-k'an. This department was an offshoot of the K'ai-p'ing government. The Police Corps was under its jurisdiction. Towering above the *hsiang*, *chen* and village governments was the garrison commander with his garrison soldiers, who were agents of the provincial government in Kwangtung.¹

From the latter part of the 1930s onwards, bureaucratic pressure was on the increase. In Ch'ih-k'an, tax farmers were to collect taxes for electricity, telephones, and other public utilities, as well as all kinds of commercial taxes for the government. Before 1936, they were nominated by the K'ai-p'ing government, but after that date public bidding was held. Whoever could pay the most was to be the tax farmer for that particular kind of tax.² According to all sources, these tax farmers were among the worst oppressors. In addition,

the police and garrison soldiers became uncontrollable in the 1940s, as reports of the *Ssu-yi ch'iao-pao* show:

After 1946 . . . the government forbade the use of American and Hong Kong dollars. This was enforced by the policemen and soldiers. They wore ordinary clothing and spied on anyone using foreign currencies. Many of the emigrant families either had to pay "black money" or be imprisoned. Those who used Chinese currency in business transactions soon went bankrupt because the *yüan* became "wet firewood" overnight.³

In 1948, the Public Security Department began to insist that everyone carry identity cards ready for inspection. The police imposed curfews on Ch'ih-k'an frequently and used this as an excuse for extorting money from citizens and merchants as well as peddlers who carried beef and mutton to sell. The soldiers went to the villages at T'uo-fu to "hunt for Communists." They seized the jewelry of the wives of emigrants and rich merchants. They then operated a stand to sell the booty at Ch'ih-k'an. They even forced the *chen* chief, Kuan Jui-hsiang, to give them six hundred catties of rice for rations. Many people dared not attend Ch'ih-k'an on market days.⁴

The ordinary inhabitants of the T'uo-fu and Ch'ih-k'an area could find little relief from all this bureaucratic pressure and the misdeeds of the police and soldiery from the *hsiang*, *chen*, or official village representatives they had chosen; in fact, the introduction of this new system of administration resulted in the alienation of official members of the Kuan lineage from the nonofficials in the *hsiang*, the villages, and market towns. The main reason was that members of the newly established organs did not have to rely on the goodwill of the local inhabitants for their power. They were elected but were not responsible to the people. Moreover, because the government offered more concrete economic and social advantages to them, they became supportive of its policies. From then on, they lost their effectiveness as community leaders and were regarded simply as agents of the state.

This was especially true of the *hsiang* government. The four *hsiang* chiefs and the council members in the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang were usually modern scholars and merchants. Since they were nominated by the K'ai-p'ing government from candidates put forward by the Hsiang General Assembly, they should have served the interests of both the assembly and the government. But evidence shows that this was not the case. They were not merely transmitters of orders to the people, but were also potential exploiters with the power to allocate land, collect taxes, conscript laborers and soldiers, and bail members from the law courts. After World War II, the Self-defense Corps was established under the control of the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang. In the opinion of my informants, this was entirely different from the *hsiang* militia of 1911-28. Instead of protecting the local inhabitants, it

was an instrument used against the peasants. Thus, by the 1940s, individuals avoided contact with the Administrative Office, preferring to speak with the elders of their own villages on minor judicial and fiscal matters and looking to the Hsiang General Assembly on matters concerning the whole lineage. The General Assembly was also an oligarchy. It was made up of members of the new gentry who served in an unofficial capacity. Its members had more prestige than those in the Administrative Office, but less power to influence government policies. They were regarded as spokesmen for the Kuan who had no part to play in the administrative organs and, insofar as they fulfilled this function, they were regarded as the "real" leaders and were treated with as much respect as the traditional scholar-gentry before 1911.

The General Assembly did try to pose as a champion of local people against the officials, but they were often ineffective in their attempts. For example, in the 1940s, one *hsiang* chief was involved in extortion and bribery. Some members of the General Assembly signed a petition to sue him in the Ts'ang-ch'eng law court. The *hsien* government ordered another election to be held. However, this particular *hsiang* chief was still reelected because he paid \$200 (Hong Kong) for each vote he got. There were factors other than bribery which made the General Assembly politically ineffective. The assembly itself was chaired by *hsiang* officials who could refuse to sign their names for any candidate for *hsiang* chief unacceptable to them. Once they vetoed a certain candidate, it was impossible for him to stand for "election" again.

Apart from quarrels between members of the Administrative Office and the Hsiang General Assembly, there were also conflicts between *hsiang* officials and another group of new gentry--the emigrant families. From the start, the Overseas Chinese did not have a high opinion of these officials who, as one informant put it, "were not steeped in the Confucian code of morality." A story told to me as an illustration concerns a retired emigrant who was cheated out of sixty thousand Chinese dollars by the *pao* chief in his own village. His relative took him to the Administrative Office to appeal, but he dared not speak for fear that the officials would be biased in favor of the *pao* chief whom they had appointed. So, he did not get his money back.

Because of their distrust of the Administrative Office, it is not surprising that neither the emigrants nor the merchants were interested in augmenting lineage land belonging to the Kuang-yü Ancestral Hall or the ancestral halls of the four *hsiang*. For one thing, the benefits derived by their immediate descendants were minimal; for another, corporate property at this level was controlled by the Administrative Office. In fact, it was hinted more than once during the interviews that much of the income from *hsiang* corporate land was embezzled. One informant, after telling me that he did not know whether the Kuang-yü *t'ang* had any land added, "If it had any, we did not have a share." Another said. "Certainly Ling-yüan *hsiang* had some corporate property outside

T'uo-fu, but I had no idea where it was—could have been at Yang-chiang, En-p'ing, or T'ai-shan. Only people at the Administrative Office knew."

For their part, *hsiang* officials tried to exclude the emigrants from lineage decisions. For example, when the question of the sale of ancestral land arose in the 1940s, only members residing in the villages could sign their names. People working in Canton or Hong Kong, if they were powerful enough, were consulted and given some benefits. The average emigrant was left out.

In the 1940s, they were even beginning to lose their rights to the ritual pork. In 1948, new rules were set up by the Administrative Office. Male members who were living outside K'ai-p'ing, whether in business or as soldiers, would not be given any benefits of the corporate property unless every year their families sent their names, ages, and photographs to the ancestral hall to prove they were still part of the family.

Emigrants returning for visits were sometimes oppressed by *hsiang* officials. According to a notice in the Bureau of Overseas Chinese Affairs, those who were home for a period of less than six months were not supposed to be conscripted, while retired emigrants or their family members were to be conscripted last. But *hsiang* officials asked the *pao* chiefs to include all of them in the army quota. If they refused to be conscripted, the heads of their households would go to prison and their property confiscated. The *Ssu-yi ch'iao-pao* (1946-49) reported similar incidents of oppression. The Self-defense Corps intimidated the families of emigrants and, in order to obtain bribes, frightened them with conscription and accused them of smoking opium and gambling. The *hsiang* officials also used their power to enrich themselves by extracting "tea money" from prospective emigrants. Below is a translation of a typical article in the *Ssu-yi ch'iao-pao*.

A regulation in 1945 stated that whoever was applying to go to America had to get three copies of his birth certificate stamped by the K'ai-p'ing government. The wife of an emigrant who was applying to go abroad had to get a marriage certificate. *Hsiang* officials, instead of helping the emigrants, exploited them, since they were the only agencies dealing with birth and marriage certificates. An emigrant usually had to pay \$50 to \$100 (Hong Kong) to the *hsiang* chief and his secretary. Those between twenty and twenty-five years of age were liable to be conscripted, so they had to pay \$100 to \$350 (Hong Kong) to have their age changed to under eighteen. From our [the reporter's] investigation, in the past three years very few were successful in applying to go abroad because they could not afford the tea money which sometimes ran as high as \$500. That was why the emigrants were very dissatisfied with their own *hsiang* officials.⁵

Unlike the *hsiang* government, the village government shared its power with unofficial leaders. As can be seen from informants' accounts of the power structure of some of the villages (see appendix 3), the *pao-chia* system was not

universally adopted in T'uo-fu. Some villages had no officials; instead, a host of unofficial leaders controlled village affairs. In fact, despite administrative changes, these unofficial leaders performed functions similar to those in traditional times. They took care of ancestral rites and village corporate property of the village ancestral halls and were responsible for renting corporate property and paying taxes to the Administrative Office. They were responsible for village affairs in general such as organizing village defense and public works, and arranging for the repair and reconstruction of ancestral halls and footpaths on the outskirts of the village. Even though a new system of law courts was introduced by the government in 1927, and even though the *hsien* government usually did not interfere with the judicial decisions of the Administrative Office and was willing to accept the opinion of the *hsiang* chief on the integrity of members within his jurisdiction, villagers still relied on their unofficial leaders to mediate quarrels ranging from minor family problems and disputes between members of the same village concerning money to more serious inter-village feuds.⁶ In cases other than homicide, they seldom appealed to the law courts or the Administrative Office. As in traditional times, they were afraid of exposing themselves to government institutions.⁷

In the case of villages in T'uo-fu where official leaders were present, informants told me that the *pao* and *chia* chiefs were neither influential nor popular in the 1930s.⁸ They were chosen and controlled by the unofficial leaders. In the 1940s, their power increased because they were responsible for conscription and for collecting army rations, but they were often under the control of the Police Corps, the Self-defense Corps, and the soldiers. These groups were not supposed to enter the villages in search of criminals unless the *hsiang* or *pao* chief permitted it. But, in fact, village officials could not control them. They illegally searched the villagers' homes for food and money, bullied the people, and conscripted those who could not pay "black money." Thus, although all my informants emphasized the peacefulness of the countryside of T'uo-fu because it was free from bandit attacks, they did complain about occasional raids by the Self-defense Corps, soldiers, and the Police Corps, and these in turn were blamed on the *pao* and *chia* chiefs. Hence, even when the *pao-chia* system was in operation in some villages in T'uo-fu, the *pao* and *chia* chiefs never acquired the influence and prestige of the unofficial local leaders.

From accounts given to me by my informants, it is clear that real leadership in the villages of T'uo-fu was exercised by a mixed group of old and new elements. The persistence of traditional schools in the villages ensured that Confucian ethics and the traditional system of values continued to prevail. Official leaders such as elders, representatives of ancestral halls, and descendants of traditional scholars retained their status and prestige in the 1940s.

There were two types of unofficial leaders in rural T'uo-fu: ritual leaders and political leaders. Elders, generally small landowners residing in the village,

usually served in the former capacity. As in other parts of South China, they had very little actual power in the twentieth century.⁹ Though willing enough to be spokesmen of village interests, they were no longer able to do so when the well-to-do merchants developed their own political power. However, this does not mean that the elders had no function at all. In villages such as Hsia-ts'un, where merchants were busy with business in Ch'ih-k'an and elsewhere, the elders performed many political and judicial functions. In fact, they were regarded with much more affection than the merchant leaders because they were not part of the power elite. Respected because of age and seniority, not because of economic or political trappings, their only means of gaining prestige and status was through the genuine help they provided the villagers.

Descent was also important in determining status. The descendants of the founders of village corporate land or the representatives of a large branch of the lineage often won claims to be managers and accountants of village ancestral property. The reason was that a populous branch usually had a lot of land and had in former times produced a substantial number of degree holders. When the traditional examination system was abolished, these lineage branches no longer supported scholar-officials. However, they still held the ancestral land, and past accomplishments allowed the large branches and their representatives to retain prestige in the village.

Some members of the new gentry—the modern scholars, merchants and returned emigrants—served as unofficial political leaders in the villages as they did in the *hsiang* government. Studying rural villages in other parts of China, Fei believes that modern scholars and merchants tried to establish careers in the cities and left the countryside leaderless.¹⁰ From accounts given to me by my informants, this did not apply to the new gentry members in T'uo-fu. A sufficient number stayed in the villages to become unofficial leaders. Even those who lived in Ch'ih-k'an went back to take care of general affairs in T'uo-fu. They administered accounts of corporate property belonging to the village, ancestral halls, paid taxes to the Administrative Office, mediated intervillage quarrels, nominated the *pao* chief, and were in charge of other general affairs. They, in fact, stepped into the shoes of the traditional scholars.

Before 1920, according to an elderly informant, traditional scholars held most of the power, status, and prestige in the villages. They, together with the elders, effectively controlled village affairs. Gradually, the power of the new gentry members began to expand. Many of them quarrelled with old gentry members, trying to control the accounts of ancestral land. After 1920, it was new gentry members who approached the government authorities on behalf of the villagers. By 1930, they had completely replaced the power of the old scholar-gentry.

This development took place so gradually that it was almost imperceptible to the peasants. The new gentry members, although different in nature, still

commanded respect as long as they remained out of office and posed as champions of the people. In fact, the difference between *new* gentry members and *old* gentry members had little meaning to the peasants. To them, the distinction between *good* and *bad* gentry members was perhaps more relevant. A leader, whether steeped in Confucianism, modern knowledge, or no knowledge at all, was good if he acted as spokesman for the peasants. A leader was bad if he embezzled lineage funds, bullied peasants, or was coopted by the government.

Conclusion

It is clear that administrative changes in K'ai-p'ing after 1930 did not change the local power structure in rural T'uo-fu. While the introduction of a local self-government system had opened up a new avenue for power in the form of the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang, the Hsiang Consultative Council, the Chen Office, the Chen Consultative Council, and the *pao-chia* system, villagers tried to have as little to do with these official organizations as possible. They still looked to their unofficial leaders for guidance. Civil servants were regarded as part of the oppressive bureaucratic system whose interests were in direct opposition to those of local inhabitants. Embedded in this distrust of official leaders was the traditional peasant attitude in South China that local elites should remain out of office and protect the interests of ordinary people. Otherwise they would be regarded as potential traitors whether they were working for the people's benefit or not. That was the reason why leaders of the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang were hated, even though they shielded the Kuan from payment of head taxes.

Those with the most prestige in T'uo-fu were therefore not officeholders, but merchants, modern graduates, and returned emigrants who remained out of office. These were the people who, with the passing away of the old gentry class, had enough education or outside connections to organize protests or bring complaints to the *hsien* and provincial governments to fight against harsh taxation, corrupt *hsiang* officials, and ruthless soldiers and policemen. In traditional China, contributing to ancestral halls and ritual land were regarded as necessary to achieve high status.¹¹ But, in an age of increasing bureaucratic pressure unofficial leaders might be chosen even if they did not donate land to increase lineage corporate property as such, as long as they could shield the people from the encroachment of government.

CHAPTER 7
Agrarian Problems and Class Relations
in T'uo-fu After 1930

The soil in T'uo-fu was neither very rich nor very poor, producing two crops of rice, some sweet potatoes, yams, melons, and a few vegetables. No other food or cash crops were grown and landholdings were extremely small. The average size of a plot was about 2.5 acres. From the 1920s on, many villages suffered from the conversion of farmland into houselots. Harvests diminished as a result. In the words of one informant, these villages became "more of an emigrant community than a farming village."¹ Harvests diminished still further.

Most of the land in T'uo-fu was owned by the ancestral halls. In Chang-ts'un, for example, corporate property accounted for more than half the landholdings in the village. In Hsia-ts'un, roughly 60 percent of the land was corporately owned. Land for rent, whether private or corporate, was thrown open to bidding. The lease period varied in individual cases, but averaged three years. There were no written contracts specifying the duration or conditions of the lease. Usually, the tenant paid a deposit and half the harvest to the landlord as rent. He used his own tools and fertilizer. The landlord's sole responsibility was to pay land taxes to the government.

While private landlords were a purely rentier class, the collective landlords of T'uo-fu were the peasants' worst enemy. From the testimony of the informants described in chapters 2 and 6, it seems that the officials at the Administrative Office embezzled much of the rent they collected instead of putting it to general use. Moreover, no ancestral hall in T'uo-fu offered charity, relief, or low-interest loans.

In addition to corrupt lineage leaders, peasants of T'uo-fu also suffered from greedy tax farmers, soldiers, police, and the Self-defense Corps. As described in the preceding chapter, although the Administrative Office shielded rural inhabitants from head taxes, the peasants of T'uo-fu still paid numerous surtaxes when they tried to sell their produce. Moreover, soldiers, police, and the Self-defense Corps collected levies at will and terrorized the villagers.

There were few side-occupations in the villages. Owing to the fact that many of the emigrant households and rich local merchants bought foreign clothing, homespun cloth no longer fetched a good price, although peasant

women still wove it for use at home. Some villagers did raise fresh fish to sell at the market, but the ponds were owned by ancestral halls and only the highest bidders could rent them.

However, informants did mention two important side-occupations. The first was oyster culture, a lucrative business, since fresh oysters could be sold in the markets and shells could be ground for fertilizer. But that occupation was confined to the more enterprising farmers. The second important side-occupation was the making of ritual money (*pao-tzu*) for ceremonial purposes, used, for example, during funerals and the Ch'ing-ming and Double-nine festivals. In K'ai-p'ing, bringing the ritual money into a house was considered bad luck, but the industry commanded a good market in En-p'ing, Ma-kang (in K'ai-p'ing), and T'ai-shan, particularly after public roads linked T'uo-fu with these counties. En-p'ing people liked to purchase ritual money because the name is a homonym for the term meaning "to keep one's family tree flourishing." They bought it for all occasions--weddings, birthdays, the birth of sons, or funerals. Funds obtained by selling ritual money were a substantial addition to the income of families in T'uo-fu, since the rich emigrant families in En-p'ing and T'ai-shan usually spent generously for ceremonial purposes.

With many of its members overseas, and with the development of trade and processing industries in Ch'ih-k'an, the Kuan had some opportunities to earn nonfarm income. According to my informants, from the twentieth century on, young men and boys over twelve years old worked outside, leaving the women and old men to do the farming. Instead of working as farm laborers in other villages, these young men usually worked in Ch'ih-k'an or overseas. Even after 1923, when it was no longer possible to go to North America, many Kuan still found nonfarm jobs. The processing and construction industries, municipal development and road-building projects, the entertainment business, and remittance firms provided opportunities for rural households. Because the Kuan owned a majority of the shops and controlled the rice-milling concerns, it was easier for inhabitants of T'uo-fu to find jobs by using their lineage connections. Kuan I, for example, was an apprentice in an automobile and steamboat bodyshop owned by a fellow villager. His job was obtained for him by Kuan H's brother in Ch'ih-k'an. "Because of this, I did not have to pay anything to become an apprentice." It was, according to him, common to employ or form partnerships with one's fellow villagers in business concerns.

Job opportunities overseas and in Ch'ih-k'an led to a shortage of farm labor in T'uo-fu, reversing the unfavorable man/land ratio there. This led in turn to an increase in the hiring of long-term laborers, most of whom were migrants from another *hsien*. They came from their places of origin to Ch'ih-k'an, where they gathered on street corners behind the cow market. Farmers and land-owners would go there to interview them. According to one informant, this tradition of employing long-term laborers from Yang-chiang, Ho-shan, and

Hsin-yi was not confined to the Kuan. It was, in fact, practiced widely in Ssu-yi. The people from these *hsien* were poor, and wages were relatively high in the Ssu-yi area due to overseas emigration and the shortage of farm laborers. Migrant farmers were willing to accept lower wages than Ssu-yi natives, and the landowners were saved the embarrassment of bargaining over wages with their own agnates. Three or four families in Sha-ti employed long-term laborers from Ho-shan to work their land. These boys were eleven to twelve years old when they came. They lived in the employers' homes and only returned to their native place during Chinese New Year. One informant and his nine brothers, who were the only notable absentee landlords in Na-luo, provided evidence that laborers from Ho-shan were employed in that village as well.

Many of the long-term laborers were eventually absorbed into the households of their employers who were usually rich farmers themselves. The few laborers in Chang-ts'un were natives of Yang-kang. Most of them had been there for a long time. One even changed his surname, was adopted into the family of his employer, and inherited some property when the latter died without issue.

Another result of the labor shortage in T'uo-fu was a rise in the number of women farmers in the 1920s. According to Kuan B:

In 1935, when I returned home for a visit, I was surprised to find that three-quarters of the people attending Ch'ih-k'an on market day were women. They did all the coolie and farm work. I never knew until then that they could load a hundred catties [133 lbs.] of unhusked rice on their shoulders. To my amazement, I saw that some men even stayed home to watch the children while women worked as peddlers in the market town and as laborers in the fields. I think it must have been because the women ousted men from the job market [since they asked for lower wages] that the men had to go overseas.

Kuan B must have confused cause with effect. Most probably, the women obtained all the work because of the mass emigration of men from Tuo-fu. Judging from what other informants told me, it is quite certain that women played an increasingly important economic role after 1930. However, this did not give them many economic rights. They could purchase land only in the name of their fathers or sons. In case of economic difficulties, girls of about ten could be sold as female domestic slaves, usually to rich emigrant families. In the villages in T'uo-fu, these were usually affinal or maternal relatives, although they could be complete strangers, and occasionally they were members of the Kuan. These girls could be abused by their owners without much interference from others.

There was a small minority of rich peasants in T'uo-fu. My informants called them the "big farming households" (*ta-keng-hu*). There were about twenty such households in Chang-ts'un and thirty-six in Hsia-ts'un. They

specialized in farming and had no members working outside. They usually farmed more than one acre of their own land and rented the remainder for growing vegetables and raising chickens and pigs for sale. They owned farm equipment for deep ploughing and for bringing water from the river. They sometimes rented these to other villagers for a fee. These rich peasants could take full advantage of the shortage of farm labor arising from overseas emigration and the development of trade and processing industries in Ch'ih-k'an. With improvement in the transportation system in the vicinity of Ch'ih-k'an, such agricultural produce as rice, vegetables, and eggs could secure a wider market. Rich peasants, with their initial capital accumulated through years of careful saving, could afford a high deposit to obtain more land, to bid for fish ponds, or to engage in poultry and pig raising. Many peasants earned a good living during the depression years, when vegetables and chickens fetched a better price, and during and immediately after the war when rice from Thailand could not be imported. They could afford long-term laborers and were in a good position to extend loans to the poorer farmers in the villages.

Despite their socially debased conditions, servile households (see chapter 2) did as well as, if not better than, the rich peasants. Because of the shortage of farm laborers, the servile households whose members concentrated on farming at home also took advantage of price changes during wartime and depression in China to improve their economic standing. Moreover, while members of servile households were nonmigrants, they benefited from the wealth being ploughed back into the villages. In fact, my informants were emphatic on the point that they were financially much better off than the tenant farmers among the Kuan. Returned emigrants who threw housewarming, birth-of-son, or retirement parties usually invited all the village folk. On such occasions members of the servile households received many tips for their services. The Kuan tenants received none of these benefits.² Probably because of the economic advantage they gained in T'uo-fu, there were only a few cases in which members of this group attempted to leave the area. While it is true that one escaped to Ch'ang-sha and cheated the people there by pretending to be a Kuan, another went to Southeast Asia and took his father away, and a third left the village and started a store in Ch'ih-k'an, there is no evidence that others tried to abandon their position. This was perhaps owing to the fact that the economic benefit obtained by remaining in T'uo-fu outweighed their feelings of social inferiority.

Until the eve of the Communist takeover, the Kuan lineage kept its land-holdings in T'uo-fu intact. One reason was that Administrative Office leaders had the power to approve each land and house transaction and could formally prohibit alienation of property to any non-Kuan. This was seldom necessary, since by this time there were as many as twenty thousand Kuan in the T'uo-fu area. Corporate or private property for sale usually found a buyer among them. In addition, *hsien* government regulations further discouraged the sale of

ancestral property. In 1927, a rule was passed prohibiting the use of lineage land as security for loans. It stated that (a) the individual could not use the property of his ancestral hall as security for borrowing money unless he had obtained the formal approval of all the members; (b) unless all gentry and elder members signed their names, corporate land transactions were null and void; and (c) in case of quarrels between a debtor and creditor belonging to different ancestral halls, it was only the leaders of these halls who could represent the individual's case in the law courts.³ Such stipulations must have prevented the dismantling of corporate property among lineages in K'ai-p'ing.

Formal land sales were rare before World War II. But land in T'uo-fu, whether private or corporate, changed hands very quickly during the war. Three and one-half acres belonging to the Ling-yüan *hsiang*, two acres belonging to the main ancestral hall in Hsia-ts'un, some corporate property of the Yü-ch'en *t'ang* in Sha-ti village, and numerous private estates were sold. The proceeds were used for defense against the Japanese who invaded South China during this time.⁴ Fortunately, immediately after the war the provincial government and the Supreme Court at Canton ruled that property sold during the Japanese Occupation could be redeemed by the original owner. The leaders among the Kuan, together with the rich merchants and overseas emigrants, made full use of this law. The families of many emigrants had, in fact, sold their private plots when remittances stopped during wartime. These they redeemed quickly. In 1945 they also organized a Corporate Property Reorganization Committee, collected donations, and redeemed ancestral land sold during wartime.

From the above it is clear that in ordinary times the Kuan, as a powerful lineage occupying arable land in T'uo-fu and controlling the rich market of Ch'ih-k'an, had never been so short of money that they needed to sell their corporate property. However, during wartime even they had to sell some of their land. It was precisely at this point that government regulations helped to uphold the territorial integrity of the Kuan at T'uo-fu. As long as corporate property was kept intact, ritual life could go on as elaborately as before, and the T'uo-fu area was not invaded by non-Kuan merchants investing in land.

The fact that the Kuan were eager to keep their landholdings intact did not mean that each member of the lineage actively tried to acquire a large tract of land and rent it out for profit. In fact, my informants emphasized that in the 1930s the rate of tenancy was relatively low in the T'uo-fu area. About two-fifths to one-sixth of the villagers were tenants. These were usually servile households, the poor Kuan, or the women of poor emigrant families. They owned either no land or less than four-fifths of an acre. At the same time, their livelihood was not supplemented by remittances from Ch'ih-k'an, Hong Kong, Canton, or overseas. They either had no members working outside the villages or their family members were not very successful in urban or overseas adventures.

The most important landlords were still the ancestral hall managers, in addition to the few very rich emigrant and merchant families. In Sha-ti, a village of 200 families, only 14 with businesses in Ch'ih-k'an, Canton, and Southeast Asia were landlords. Each had over three acres of land, and rented part of their property to the poorer village residents. In Hsia-ts'un, of 400 families, only 8 had more than two acres of land, and only 3 had four and one-half acres. These were the notable landlords, renting most of their land to poorer lineage members in the village. In Na-luo, of 160 families, only 1 was an absentee landlord. Its members ran a rice mill in Ch'ih-k'an and a tea shop in Chin-chi (En-p'ing). This family had over ten acres passed down by their ancestors. They rented some of it and employed natives of En-p'ing to farm the rest. When the Communists came, this family was the only victim of the antilandlord campaign.

The low rate of tenancy resulted mainly from the infertility of the land in T'uo-fu, compared to that in Sha-kang or the Shui-k'ou area. People retired to T'uo-fu because Ch'ih-k'an had commercial opportunities. Hence, the rich emigrants and local merchants seldom bought land for the sake of investment. In fact, about half of them did not even bother to acquire farmland. If they bought any property, it was only one-tenth to two-fifths of an acre to be converted into residential lots for the establishment of new villages where they would stay and invest their money in business concerns in Ch'ih-k'an. Those emigrants who did acquire farmland in the village bought only a very small piece, about three-tenths to four-fifths of an acre, for the upkeep of the remaining members of the family residing in T'uo-fu.⁵ It was usually not rented to others, for most emigrant families did their own farming. Only a few of the more successful emigrant families rented land to the poor Kuan and lived in the new villages nearby.

Hence, the concentration of land in the hands of a few absentee merchant-landlords was not a feature in this area. Landowners merely had a small piece for the use of their families. None obtained a large tract to rent out for growing cash crops. The few rich families who rented their farmland were not merchant investors from Canton, Hong Kong, or Chiang-men. They were the rich Kuan who were original members of the village. Most of them or their families lived in the village itself or in the new villages nearby and collected rent from their tenants in person.

In K'ai-p'ing, after 1926, farmland was divided into five grades for tax purposes.⁶ The landlords at T'uo-fu should theoretically have collected different amounts of rent for the different grades of land to meet the tax quota. However, in order to avoid complicated calculations, as well as protests and arguments from the tenants, landlords did not make the adjustments. They continued to charge 50 percent of the crop as rent. This was a low rate, for the Kwangtung average was 50 to 80 percent, and the rates for the Han River and Pearl River deltas were over 75 percent.⁷

Despite the growing insecurity of tenancy elsewhere in China after 1935, informants from T'uo-fu insist that the owner usually kept the original tenant, whom he felt he could trust, except in cases of serious rent default.⁸ Sometimes a tenant could even insist on paying less rent or refuse to give up the land after the contract expired, saying that he had improved it and he alone had the right to use it. These facts indicate that tenants at T'uo-fu were perhaps more fortunate than those in other parts of China.

The degree of rural indebtedness varied from village to village, depending on the success of various families in earning nonfarm income, getting overseas remittances, and acquiring income from side-occupations. In Chang-ts'un, for example, very few had to borrow to pay for rent, food, and seeds. A minority of villagers in T'uo-fu organized loan associations. Where there were such associations, only small sums of money were involved. As there were no co-operatives or low-interest loans offered by government institutions or ancestral halls, most of the needy borrowed from friends, relatives, or rich households in the village if a small amount was involved. Often no interest was charged, nor was security such as house or land papers needed, because in the villages everyone was well known. The wives or parents of some emigrants loaned money occasionally to poorer farmers in the village, but they did not ask for high interest. Other emigrant families did not engage in moneylending. They preferred hoarding American dollars, Hong Kong dollars, and gold bars to lending them out.

There were professional moneylenders and pawnbrokers in Ch'ih-k'an. These were usually owners or part-owners of remittance firms. The moneylenders asked for land and houses as security for loans, but they only charged 20 percent annual interest. This was low when compared to other parts of Kwangtung where the annual rate ranged from 30 to 100 percent.⁹ The comparatively low rate was probably due to the high availability of capital for moneylending in the Ch'ih-k'an-T'uo-fu area, with its commercial assets and overseas remittances.

During and after the war against the Japanese, 1937-45, rural life in T'uo-fu deteriorated. The emigrant families had suffered during the war, and had to sell all their valuable belongings, jewelry, and clothing to live. They then realized the importance of farming. After the war, when remittances from overseas resumed, emigrant families wanted to buy or rent land for fear of another war. As a result, prices soared. Those who rented land had to pay an even higher deposit. At the same time, the price of farmland continued to escalate. According to one informant, the price of one *tou* (approximately one-tenth of an acre) rose from fifty-three to one thousand Hong Kong dollars during this period. This was not because it was an important source of income, but because emigrant families wanted to be insured against future troubles. After 1947, however, farmland again lost its value. According to my

informants, many sold rather than bought land because they feared the coming of the Communists.

Discussion

Different theories have been put forward by scholars seeking to explain rural impoverishment in pre-1949 China. These can be broadly classified into the technologist and the distributionist schools of thought.¹⁰ The technologists believe that rural China suffered because of an increasingly unfavorable man/land ratio and a stagnant farm technology.¹¹ The distributionists maintain that rural China had an economic surplus, but that this was siphoned off by nonproducers for nonproductive uses.¹²

Of direct relevance to South China and representing the distributionist school of thought is the work of H. S. Ch'en, who studied rural conditions of Kwangtung between 1928 and 1936. According to him, Kwangtung exhibited symptoms of extreme rural impoverishment during these years. The province had the highest tenancy rate in China. The price of land was high. Peasants paid high rent to their landlords, numerous types of surtaxes to tax farmers, and high interest to usurers. Productivity in agriculture declined rapidly in the 1930s as the peasants had neither the capital nor the incentive to improve the land. There was increasing land concentration in the hands of absentee landlords on one hand, and increasing proletarianization of the peasantry on the other. Since 50 to 75 percent of the peasants were in debt, many lost their right to till the soil and became farm laborers. With the fall of farm wages, the exodus from rural areas increased, with peasants swelling the ranks of the urban unemployed.

Ch'en offers several explanations to account for rural impoverishment in Kwangtung. The first was exploitation by government forces. The tax burden trebled between 1931 and 1936. Local surtaxes were collected to finance anti-Communist campaigns, rural self-government organs, police forces, and modern schools, as well as road building. Warlords and tax farmers used force to collect as much as they could. Able-bodied males were conscripted to build roads and carry supplies for soldiers. Police and military personnel joined local gangsters and bandits to demand levies of all kinds.

The second reason was economic exploitation. Because Kwangtung was not well developed industrially, excess capital (overseas remittances, interest collected by usurers, commercial assets, etc.) was invested in farmland. This was particularly true between 1928 and 1931 when the exchange rate was favorable for overseas remittances to China. As a result, the price of land rose dramatically, and with it came high rent. When an increasing number of emigrants returned home between 1933 and 1934, remittances dropped, and there was intensive competition among returned emigrants for renting or buying

farmland. In addition to investment by returned emigrants, city merchant-industrialists extended loans to orange growers and sugarcane farmers in the form of fertilizer and seedlings. They then monopolized the marketing of these products. Other private landlords merely collected rent and were not interested in managing their farms. They ran pawnshops and moneylending concerns to extract interest from the peasants. Private landlords, whether resident or absentee, became increasingly harsh to the tenants in the 1930s, and local bullies were employed to collect rent in advance. The government had no plan to reduce rent, since officials relied upon the landlords for political and economic support.

Collective landlordism was particularly important in Kwangtung, as 35 percent of the land was held corporately, compared to only 8 percent in Central China. In the 1930s, lineages no longer offered low-interest loans to members. High rent deposits were charged for those renting corporate property. Lineage land was so manipulated by the managers that it became a modified form of private property. Only a few favorites were given the right to rent land or to enjoy the proceeds from the rent. Poor farmers had no means of legal redress since the lineage managers became officials of local government organs after 1930. They were responsible for collecting taxes not only from corporate property, but from private property as well. They could threaten higher tax assessment or even confiscation of the peasants' land. The Pearl River delta suffered most from economic exploitation. Lineages owned about two-thirds of the land there, and rented it to merchants, who in turn sublet the land. As a result of this system of rack renting, tillers of the soil paid more than 75 percent of the harvest as rent. Since these outside merchants were not lineage members, they squeezed the tenant farmer without being hampered by any relationship to him.¹³

Ch'en held that world capitalism also contributed to the rural impoverishment of Kwangtung. First, while foreign trade flourished, there was a lack of foreign industrial investment in Kwangtung, as compared to Chekiang and Kiangsu. Hence, cities in South China could not provide outlets for the excessive capital of the merchants or jobs for the impoverished from rural areas. This led to increasing land concentration and to the prevalence of absentee landlordism in the countryside, as well as to increasing rural proletarianization.

Second, the import of foreign manufactures and foreign agricultural products, which competed against Chinese cash crops and rural handicrafts, resulted in widespread misery among the peasants. This was particularly true during the Great Depression of 1928-34, when local textiles were replaced by foreign textiles, the Chinese silk market collapsed in the face of competition from the Japanese, and Chinese sugar could not compete with Javanese and Taiwanese sugar.

Finally, Western capitalism was responsible for rural impoverishment because treaty-port living and foreign goods created a demand for luxuries and imports among the rich, leading to a steep rise in rent and interest rates in rural areas. Lineage managers used proceeds of corporate land for personal luxuries, further intensifying class divisions.

Despite the brilliance of his work, there is other evidence on South China which casts doubt on the accuracy of Ch'en's dismal picture of this part of China. Buck, whose data was collected about the same time as Ch'en's, divided China into eight agricultural regions. His statistics for the double-cropping rice area (which included Kwangtung Province and southern Fukien) show that conditions of rural life in South China were much better than in the rest of China. The double-cropping rice area had the highest percentage of farmers reporting savings. Farm wages were also highest in the double-cropping rice area while the interest rate was only 2 percent per month—the lowest in all of China. The percentage of rural laborers, which Ch'en took as an index of rural proletarianization, was also the lowest. Reliance upon rural handicrafts for livelihood, which Ch'en believes was damaged by the influx of foreign manufactures, was also lowest in the double-cropping rice area.¹⁴

It is possible that Ch'en's study was not representative of the general rural conditions in South China. Most of the data he presents were from "ten representative villages of P'an-yü County," and he concentrated his investigation on the cash-crop growing areas of Kwangtung. Moreover, the role of foreign trade and the evils of treaty ports in South China were also exaggerated by Ch'en. In fact, foreign trade declined sharply after 1925, and Chinese business interests dominated South China right up to World War II. Overseas Chinese contributed capital and technological and management expertise to South China. Hence, workshops in market towns as well as in the cities mushroomed.¹⁵ Cities in South China underwent tremendous commercial and industrial expansion in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Hence, not all commercial capital was absorbed in land as Ch'en alleged. Except in areas where cash crops were profitable, Overseas Chinese and city merchants were not interested in buying large tracts of land.¹⁶ Therefore, in most villages in South China, there were no big absentee landlords, usurers, or merchant-industrialists from large cities to exploit peasants.¹⁷ Moreover, because of the availability of commercial capital and overseas remittances, interest rates in Kwangtung were low compared to the rest of China.

To a great extent, the high rate of tenancy was a result of land hunger. Only 13 percent of the total area in the double-cropping rice area is arable, the lowest of all eight regions in China, and population had reached its saturation point in Fukien and Kwangtung by 1933.¹⁸ However, it can also be argued that the high rate of tenancy in South China may not be a sign of increasing rural impoverishment. This was particularly true of villages in the vicinity of cities

and treaty ports. When there was a good market for vegetables, eggs, chicken, and pork, when fertilizers were cheaper and more readily available, and when family income could be supplemented by sending extra sons and daughters to work in the cities, farmers had both the incentive and the means to rent extra pieces of land to further improve their income.¹⁹ Buck's statistics, for example, show that although the tenancy rate in the double-cropping rice area was high compared to other parts of China, the prevalence of "part-owners, part-tenants" was also a notable feature of the area, reflecting the higher commercial orientations of the peasants.²⁰

From the above analysis it is clear that the technologists' explanation of rural impoverishment in South China is more valid than that of the distributionists. However, parts of Ch'en's argument remain true, for in general, South China did suffer from collective landlordism as managers were exploitative of the peasantry.²¹ Moreover, peasant surpluses were siphoned off by ruthless tax farmers, soldiers, policemen, and bandits.

Rural conditions in emigrant communities in the Ssu-yi area were better than those in the rest of Kwangtung, as can be seen even from data presented by Ch'en himself. First, in terms of tenancy rate, the Ssu-yi area was lower than the rest of Kwangtung. For K'ai-p'ing County as a whole, 50 percent of the peasants were owner-farmers, 35.7 percent were tenants, and only 2.3 percent were farm laborers. This compared favorably with the Kwangtung average, according to which 32.6 percent of the rural population were owner-farmers, 57.2 percent were tenant farmers, and 10.2 percent were farm laborers. The tenancy rate in Ssu-yi seemed even lower compared with the Pearl River delta, where the tenancy rate ranged from 77 to 90 percent.²² Second, the interest rate in Ssu-yi was below the Kwangtung average, since this area was the recipient of large amounts of overseas remittances. In T'ai-shan, for example, the interest rates ranged from less than 1 percent to 2 percent per month. Third, in terms of farm wages, the Ssu-yi area, with its prevalence of overseas emigration, offered the highest farm wages in Kwangtung Province.²³ My data shows that T'uo-fu, being an emigrant community in Ssu-yi, did not suffer as much from rural impoverishment as did the rest of Kwangtung. Land in T'uo-fu was not fertile enough to produce cash crops of any economic significance. Therefore, few outside merchant-industrialists or returned emigrants were interested in exploiting the area. Moreover, since the Kuan was a large and powerful lineage, the members could easily prevent outsiders from buying land in their territories, so that T'uo-fu remained a land of numerous small resident landlords and a large number of part-owners. The amount of rent paid to the landlords remained low, although, as in the rest of Kwangtung, rural surpluses were siphoned off by corrupt officials, as well as by soldiers, police, the self-defense corps, and bandits.

In addition, although there was increasing population pressure on land from the 1920s onwards (when overseas emigration to Canada and the United States stopped and much farmland was converted into new villages), at that time Ch'ih-k'an was undergoing rapid economic development. The Oriental Exclusion Acts and other measures of economic discrimination in Canada and the United States meant that Overseas Chinese could not invest or bring their families to North America. Hence, much of the overseas remittance income in T'uo-fu was invested in Ch'ih-k'an (since land in T'uo-fu was not very productive). Investment reached record levels between 1928 and 1931 when the exchange rate was favorable. Many Overseas Chinese also returned home in 1933-34 as world depression deepened in North America. Ch'ih-k'an flourished as a result. Many Kuan in rural T'uo-fu were able to use lineage connections to find nonfarm jobs in Ch'ih-k'an. This led to a reversal of the unfavorable man/land ratio in T'uo-fu. There was a shortage of labor, so much so that long-term laborers were hired from adjacent counties in western Kwangtung.

Finally, although farmers and craftsmen in T'uo-fu suffered from the influx of foreign goods such as kerosene, textiles, and cigarettes, and from the fact that emigrant families and rich local merchants preferred to buy these imports, the modernization program of Ch'ih-k'an and the influx of capital from Overseas Chinese produced a building boom in this market town as well as an increasing demand for locally made, refined, handicraft items. Hence, brick manufacture for construction purposes, as well as the making of fine silverware, jewelry, furniture, household utensils, leather products, ritual money, and other ceremonial items provided employment for many Kuan in this area.²⁴ Changing life-styles among emigrant households and rich merchant families also resulted in increasing demand for fresh fish, fruits, oysters, vegetables, pork, eggs, and chicken. This benefited the peasants in the T'uo-fu area. As the interest rate in T'uo-fu was comparatively low, owing to the abundant supply of capital for moneylending purposes, enterprising rich peasants were able to borrow to improve their farm businesses.

Conclusion

From the above it is clear that T'uo-fu did not suffer as much from rural impoverishment as the rest of Kwangtung outside Ssu-yi because: (a) there was capital being ploughed back from overseas; (b) T'uo-fu was not a cash-crop area; and (c) lineage members dominated businesses, processing industries, and fine handicraft workshops in Ch'ih-k'an, and could provide their fellow villagers with markets for their farm produce and nonfarm job opportunities.²⁵

Thus, it is not surprising that after 1930, when it was no longer possible to emigrate to North America, control of Ch'ih-k'an was the strongest binding force of the lineage on the loyalty of the peasants, merchants, and emigrants.

From this market town people at T'uo-fu obtained most of the jobs that supplemented and enriched their livelihood at a time when land pressure was worsening and the renting of farmland was becoming extremely competitive. Ancestral corporate property was less important because most could not afford to bid for it, and because they did not receive dividends from the rent collected by ancestral hall managers. It was in the market town of Ch'ih-k'an that the personal advancement of the new gentry, improvement in the livelihood of poor peasants, and enhancement of the power of the Kuan lineage coincided. One set of interests reinforced the others, binding individuals to the lineage in a time of demographic and economic change.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

Fei and H. S. Ch'en argue that demographic, economic, administrative, and educational changes in China after 1842 led to social erosion and the growth of class antagonism in the rural hinterlands of urban centers and that these led in turn to the breakdown of traditional rural organizations. The purpose of this book has been to submit these hypotheses to a critical examination. Did social class become more important than patrilineal kinship as a result of changes after the Treaty of Nanking? In the case of the Kuan lineage of K'ai-p'ing during the period 1911-49, I am convinced that this did not happen.

Data from K'ai-p'ing suggest that segments of the lineage may still keep in contact with the parent settlement in spite of geographical separation. The Kuan in Sung-lang, Yang-lu, and K'ou-p'i-ch'ung were closely linked with their brethren in T'uo-fu ritually, economically, and administratively. They claimed to be connected genealogically and participated actively in the rituals of the Kuang-yü *t'ang*. They cooperated in the Hakka-Punti War of 1856-67 and in attempts to divert the cow and salt trade routes to the advantage of the Kuan in all parts of K'ai-p'ing. Under the impact of economic and administrative changes in the twentieth century, the various groups of Kuan continued to cooperate. Their ritual ties were sustained by the protective umbrella of the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang and by the reciprocal economic relationship between Ch'ih-k'an and the Kou-p'i-ch'ung area. The Kuan outside K'ai-p'ing, in Yang-chiang, Nan-hai, and Hsin-hui, had no ritual connections with T'uo-fu, not only because of geographical separation, but because their connections were not sustained by economic and administrative ties.

Population pressure effected the Kuan by the end of the nineteenth century, when there was no more Hakka land to seize. Many had to work elsewhere. But no large-scale social erosion took place as a result. The poorer farmers or their family members usually worked part-time in Ch'ih-k'an and in the fields; the richer shopowners worked full-time, and returned to the village to sleep. Those working overseas in North America and Southeast Asia, in Canton, Hong Kong, or Shanghai usually had family members staying at home. In this respect, there were no differences between the behavior patterns of the rural-to-urban migrants and those of the emigrants.

One of the reasons why most of the Kuan who had gone to North America returned home was that immigration restrictions prevented them from bringing their families overseas. Another is that, owing to social discrimination they had very few chances to invest in North America. Thus, most of them sent money home and planned to retire there. Because the lineage controlled the very important market town of Ch'ih-k'an, there was much scope for development. So, despite the lack of concern among the leaders of the Administrative Office and the extortion of the police and the Self-defense Corps, most emigrants returned home to retire in the new villages. They also contributed to the building of modern schools and sent their children to China for education, enhancing the social prestige of their sons and themselves. By these means they sought compensation for years of social and political discrimination suffered abroad.

Because most of the emigrants ultimately returned to T'uo-fu, the numerical power of the Kuan was not weakened. On the contrary, the lineage was strengthened by the activities of returned emigrants. They helped to redeem lineage land sold during wartime, invested in road-building projects, helped modernize Ch'ih-k'an, and initiated the founding of the Ta-t'ung Market. These activities enriched the lineage and helped to lessen the adverse effects of the silting of the T'an River. Their activities also strengthened the relationship between the Kuan at T'uo-fu and the Kuan at Kou-p'i-ch'ung, Sung-lang, and Yang-lu.

Hence, the Kuan lineage did not show signs of social erosion in the twentieth century in the manner described by Fei in his studies. Nonetheless, my investigation does show more evidence of the growth of class differences after 1930. First, with the increase in the size of the lineage, the average member was even more remote from the higher levels of the lineage hierarchy than had been the case during the traditional period. He seldom had any knowledge of or control over the management of *hsiang* corporate property. Neither was he interested in augmenting lineage land, as this would not benefit him or his direct descendants. The system of bidding practiced by the Kuan was not conducive to unity. With the growth of population, the conversion of farmland into residential areas after 1920, and the increased participation of emigrant families in bidding after the war, competition for rental land became so intense that bribery was often involved. This further weakened lineage cohesion. After 1930, some powerful members were given official status. They served in *hsien*, *ch'ü*, *chen*, and *hsiang* government organs. To the peasants, the Hsiang Administrative Office was an awesome place and the Self-defense Corps, created after 1945, was an instrument of exploitation and extortion rather than protection. Finally, because of changes in the educational system, the development of processing industries in town, and massive emigration, the new gentry members became an important power-elite. They were more concerned with

their own family and local interests than with the power and wealth of the lineage. They were willing to cooperate with one another across surname lines and with government authorities in defense measures and road building, despite the opposition of their fellow lineage members. The new gentry members followed a luxurious life-style. Those from the same village associated with one another by living in the same neighborhood, apart from their poorer and less prestigious fellow villagers.

However, the growth of class differences did not produce class antagonism. The new gentry did not invest in farmland at T'uo-fu; most of them lived in the new villages and participated in business enterprises at Ch'ih-k'an. Economic exploitation was limited because the soil was not fertile enough for growing cash crops. Politically, they served the local administration in three capacities: one group acted as officials in *hsiang* and *chen* government organs, another acted as unofficial leaders in the countryside, and a third acted as pressure-group leaders in Ch'ih-k'an.

Thus, while some of the new gentry members became civil servants, losing status in the lineage, others stayed outside the government, trying to gain prestige, status, and power by using both lineage and nonlineage channels. They posed as champions of the poor when their own interests were also threatened. This redirected the antagonism of the peasants and laborers towards government personnel and government policies instead of towards the entire upper class of the Kuan.

The lack of social erosion and class antagonism among the Kuan can be attributed to three factors: (a) the initial power of the Kuan lineage; (b) the commercial orientation of the Kuan lineage; and (c) the interest in preserving lineage structure shown by the government of K'ai-p'ing County. According to Freedman and Makino, a lineage persisted because of its ability to retain the loyalty of prominent leaders and migrant members and to sustain its corporate holdings.¹ The Kuan lineage at T'uo-fu was able to do so even up to the 1940s because it was initially a very powerful lineage. It was numerically large, economically rich, socially prestigious, and politically powerful before the onset of demographic, economic, educational, and administrative changes in the middle of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Hence, its elites were able to bring protection, prestige, and connections to ordinary members and to dominate smaller lineages and market towns in the vicinity. The ancestral halls of the Kuan lineage were able to derive much revenue from the frequent bidding on rural land at T'uo-fu and elsewhere and from fees collected from peddlers and shopowners using the valuable corporate property at Upper Ch'ih-k'an. Because of the numerical concentration of the lineage, the individual landowner or shopowner could always find a buyer among the Kuan, should he want to sell his property. As a result, the lineage retained its territorial dominance of the Ch'ih-k'an-T'uo-fu area down to 1949. Moreover, because of

its social prestige and political power, the Kuan lineage of T'uo-fu was able to serve as a frame of reference for members who were working in cities and overseas and for segments of the lineage that had moved to other rural settlements. It was able to attract the ambitious, who tried to use the lineage to achieve power and status. Because it controlled Ch'ih-k'an, the rich and the poor members of the lineage all tended to return to share the prosperity of the market town. They kept their families in the home village and eventually retired there.

In addition to the initial strength of the Kuan lineage, it can also be argued that reliance upon trade, industrial activities, and overseas emigration, instead of farming, as the main source of income accounted for the persistence of the Kuan lineage in the twentieth century. Since individual members, as well as the lineage as a whole, relied upon trade between Ch'ih-k'an and western Kwangtung for sustenance, it was necessary for T'uo-fu to cooperate with Sung-lang, Yang-lu, and Kou-p'i-ch'ung in building roads and finding markets. This tended to strengthen the higher order and dispersed lineages of the Kuan. The opportunities offered in Ch'ih-k'an for investment by the *nouveaux riches*, combined with the inability to raise cash crops at T'uo-fu, reduced class exploitation in the rural area. Merchants and returned emigrants either bought a small piece of farmland and became small resident landlords or bought land to build houses. No one invested in large tracts and rented them out.

Because the economy was based on nonfarm activities, the rich became richer, but the poor did not become poorer—all members were able to share in the overseas emigration movement and the modernization of Ch'ih-k'an.² Municipal development programs and the growth of commerce and processing industries in that market town produced an economic boom. The farmers' produce and handicrafts fetched a good price. The poor Kuan found jobs easily by using kinship ties, or went overseas to work, assisted by other lineage members already abroad. Because all its members shared in the general prosperity in urban centers and overseas, there was little class antagonism endangering the cohesion of the Kuan lineage. Thus, it was able to maintain itself until 1949.

The persistence of the Kuan lineage can also be attributed to the attitude and policies of the *hsien* government. Administrative changes after 1930 strengthened the political links between T'uo-fu, Kou-p'i-ch'ung, Yang-lu, and Sung-lang. The leaders of the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang were given jurisdiction over lineage members even when they resided outside T'uo-fu. The Kuan in all parts of K'ai-p'ing looked to these leaders for tax immunities, as well as for other possible forms of political and economic advantage, using lineage ties and ritual participation to claim membership. This strengthened the higher order and dispersed lineages of the Kuan. The localized Kuan lineage at T'uo-fu was also strengthened as a result of the

conservative policy of the *hsien* government towards lineages. Administrative changes in K'ai-p'ing affected the market town and the *hsiang* more than the villages. The unofficial lineage leaders in the villages still served as mediators in quarrels and took care of all important affairs as in traditional times. In addition, the *hsien* government actively preserved the property of the lineage. It formulated rules to prevent the use of corporate property as security for loans, required the *hsiang* chief to sign papers recording any transfer of land, and helped emigrants who attempted to redeem corporate property sold during wartime. Thus, the policy of the government towards the rural power-structure was one factor accounting for the persistence of the Kuan lineage until 1949.

Can the experience of the Kuan of T'uo-fu be generalized to include other lineages in South China? Did small and undifferentiated lineages persist along with the large and differentiated ones? Did lineages persist if their primary income base was neither overseas remittances nor commercial and industrial assets? Have lineages survived the change from the Nationalist regime to the People's Republic in 1949? Owing to the lack of detailed studies of lineages in South China, it is difficult to give complete answers to these questions. However, from more general sources on South China, trends can be observed and partial answers found.

To study the impact of economic, administrative, educational and demographic changes on the social organization of South China, one must come to grips with the issue of change versus continuity. The following question is problematic. Have scholars such as Fei and H. S. Ch'en overemphasized the extent of social erosion and class antagonism in post-1842 China? To darken the picture of China in the early twentieth century, did these scholars brighten the past?

If one looks at the social history of China, it is clear that migration of the rich and talented to the cities did not start with the establishment of treaty ports as Fei has alleged. The lure of a more luxurious life-style always attracted rich, educated, and powerful people to the traditional cities. According to Lippit, between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, many members of the upper gentry moved to the cities and became absentee landlords.³ Like the landlords of the 1930s described by Fei, they were divorced from productive activities and uninterested in improving farm technology. The lower gentry, however, remained rooted in the countryside where they collected taxes, handled legal affairs, managed irrigation channels, and ran the village militia, much like the new gentry in the T'uo-fu area in the 1930s.

Fei exaggerated the amount of rural exodus from 1842 to 1949. There is no reason to assume that the percentage of the population living in the cities grew between 1840 and 1950 in China as a whole. The sample survey of two hundred thousand Chinese in 1936, cited by Elvin and Skinner, shows that annual city-to-farm migration was 1.1 percent, whereas annual farm-to-city migration

was only 0.9 percent.⁴ It is true that from the nineteenth century onwards, when land was no longer available in South China, lineage members began to move to cities and overseas, but until 1949 urban dwellers still amounted to only a small minority of the inhabitants of the area. Kwangtung and southern Fukien had the highest percentage of men and women in cities, yet the farming population was still 71 percent of the total.⁵ In P'an-yü, which was highly urbanized, the rural population amounted to 77 percent in the 1930s.⁶ In K'ai-p'ing only 5 percent of the people lived in towns.⁷

The theory of social erosion ignores the considerable extent of return migration. Many studies show that those who migrated to the cities or overseas usually returned to their home communities. Commenting on the process of economic development in China as a whole, Dernberger holds that many Chinese entrepreneurs learned their industrial techniques and management skills in the cities and returned to the countryside to invest in industrial activities in rural market towns, rather than abandoning the countryside for an urban life as owner-operators of modern industrial plants.⁸ Because of a lack of foreign investment in South China, it can be argued that South Chinese entrepreneurs had more scope to develop local workshops in the market towns of their own communities. As Vogel points out, rich peasants and resident landlords were heavily involved with commercial and small-scale industries in nearby market towns.⁹

Even those in business in the cities or overseas did not cut their connections with their own lineages. In Nan-ching, according to C. K. Yang, families who lived in Canton and Hong Kong had concubines and young children watch over their village houses.¹⁰ According to Hu, families that moved away still retained their allegiance to the ancestral hall for many generations.¹¹ Their loyalty encouraged the flow of money and wealth from the city to the country. The same phenomenon was noted by social scientists studying rural life in North China.¹² In the modern period, research in the New Territories of Hong Kong shows that those working overseas all planned to retire at home and even left their children to be looked after by their parents.¹³ Even those who married non-Chinese kept their links with the lineage. In Tsuen-wan and P'ing-shan, those working in Kowloon still lived in their villages.¹⁴

Thus, all evidence argues against Fei's theory, particularly his assertion that urban centers drained wealth and talent from the hinterland. His picture is far too simplistic. Wealth and talent probably moved both ways, and the rural area was not completely impoverished, since many migrants remained attached to their villages. Because of their feeling of insecurity, both emigrants and rural-to-urban migrants needed the home community for psychological relief. They also needed a rural base for economic security in case of bad fortune in towns or overseas. Discrimination, depression, and war drove many of them home. According to Kulp, as the success rate of the emigrants was

low, most of them still relied on their families for support in case of difficulties.¹⁵ Only a few exceptionally successful ones in Southeast Asia could sever their rural links.

Not only has the extent of social erosion between 1840 and 1949 been exaggerated, scholars such as H. S. Ch'en have also overemphasized class antagonism in the post-Opium War era. Studies by Freedman and Kuhn show that exploitation of the peasantry did not start in 1840.¹⁶ Gentry members, whether they belonged to the old, traditional, scholar-gentry class or the new gentry class of the modern era, were equally exploitative. Unequal access to the benefits of lineage property was as much a feature of large-scale lineage organizations in South China in the traditional past as it was in the 1930s. Despite the harsh treatment they received, peasants in the past maintained ties with their lineages because the elites shielded them from excessive taxation, gave them priority in renting lineage land, and would not evict them as readily as they would evict outside tenants. Officials of the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang, established in 1930, followed the same practices as the lineage elites of traditional times. They shielded the Kuan of T'uo-fu, Sung-lang, and Yang-lu from head taxes, gave them first preference in renting land within the T'uo-fu area, and would not evict them as readily as they would evict non-Kuan tenants renting the land outside the home territory. At the same time, gentry of the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang used the Self-defense Corps to terrorize their fellow lineage members, embezzled lineage funds, and received bribes in much the same way as corrupt lineage managers had done in the pre-1840 period.

In fact, the Hsien Organization Act of 1929 had very little impact on rural South China. Lineage organizations and corporate property were left untouched. Although some members became officials on the *hsiang* level of government, there were still unofficial elites in the rural areas who undertook the traditional role of buffer against government interference. They helped settle judicial disputes among villagers, conducted village rituals, and took care of village property. Because the lineage was a useful tool in pursuing upward mobility, these leaders were still willing to act as champions of poorer and less educated lineage members and to increase the political and economic strength of the lineage as a whole.

The amount of class antagonism in K'ai-p'ing before 1949 can perhaps be measured indirectly through an examination of the extent and degree of involvement of K'ai-p'ing natives in the communist-inspired peasant movement of the 1920s, and through an examination of the process of class struggle during the land-reform period of the early 1950s. Gruetter's account shows that there was a lack of involvement by K'ai-p'ing people in the peasant movement of the 1920s, even when it was tolerated by the Kuomintang government.¹⁷ No K'ai-p'ing native studied in the Peasant Training Institute, and none were killed or

wounded during the rural uprisings in the West River area. The only evidence of involvement is the T'u-t'ang "bandits" who came to K'ai-p'ing as a result of political struggle in Canton itself in 1927-28. After 1930, there is no mention of any peasant movement in K'ai-p'ing.

Issues of the *Nan-fang jih-pao* between 1949 and 1952 and studies made by Ssu-t'u comment on the lack of class antagonism in K'ai-p'ing County during the land-reform period.¹⁸ These sources note that K'ai-p'ing was one of the "later liberated areas"; there was no strong guerrilla base before 1949. Hence, of all the counties in western Kwangtung, K'ai-p'ing was one of the slowest to carry out class struggle against the landlords, local bullies, and counter-revolutionaries. "Elements of feudalism," according to these reports, were very strong, and the lower-middle and poor peasants had difficulty distinguishing friends from class enemies. Even in the Sha-kang and Ch'ang-sha areas, where peasants who raised garlic were supposedly most exploited by lineage managers, landlords, merchants, and usurers, "antibully" and "speak bitterness" sessions were not at all well-attended. As local cadres lacked enthusiasm in conducting class struggle, work teams consisting of outside cadres had to be sent in to educate the lower-middle and poor peasants and farm laborers in class conflict. When these efforts failed to produce dramatic results, the work team finally took over the entire land reform campaign.

The experience at K'ai-p'ing was by no means unique. Describing conditions in Nanching Village before 1949, C. K. Yang observed that, while conflict occurred between the rich and poor in that village, it took the form of individual friction rather than organized conflict between classes.¹⁹ There was no mass resentment against the rich in general. Some rich families donated land to the schools, while other rich families collected rent harshly. As a class, the rich were not identified as the source of the misery of the poor. In fact, the kinship system restrained and resolved conflict between members of the same lineage with different class status. The poor were proud to have wealthy members in their lineage. During the land-reform period, Yang notes that peasants were unenthusiastic about "speak bitterness" sessions, and in many cases refused to speak against previous landlords or put class labels on fellow villagers.²⁰ Most refunding of rent and rent deposits occurred through a process of compromise, not struggle. There were no mass trials, and no mass executions of landlords, local bullies, or counterrevolutionaries. Most decisions were made by cadres from the nearby city.

Several reasons are cited by Vogel to explain the inertia of the peasants in struggling against their landlords.²¹ First, the land-reform campaign progressed more slowly in Kwangtung than in other parts of China because it was the last province to be liberated. Between 1927 and 1949, there were no peasant movements in Kwangtung apart from the small bases in the East River area, Ho-shan County in western Kwangtung, and Hai-nan Island in southern

Kwangtung, where anti-Japanese guerrilla bases were established after 1938.²² Even at these bases, local guerrilla activities were directed mainly against the Japanese. Peasants were reluctant to carry out land reform.²³

Second, the 1949-53 period was officially designated as the "Period of New Democracy." The government was to maintain a "hard line" on landlords, but a "soft line" on rich peasants and the bourgeoisie. Since many rich peasants and landlords in the countryside of Kwangtung were involved in commerce and small-scale industries in the nearby market towns, to persecute them as "landlords" and not treat them as "bourgeoisie" would disrupt the market town economy.

Third, the official policy was also soft on emigrant families during the "Period of New Democracy." Emigrant families owned about one-fifth of all land in Kwangtung. The government was reluctant to attack them because it hoped to attract Overseas Chinese capital and educated young people back to China. Hence, the property of most emigrant families was left untouched, which made it extremely difficult to set up the criteria for attacking rich peasants and small landlords.²⁴

Fourth, the standard of living of many small landlords and part-owners was not very different from that of most tenant farmers. These small landlords rented land only because there was a lack of male members in the families concerned. Technically they were landlords, but they were in fact very poor.²⁵

Fifth, over 35 percent of Kwangtung's farmland was held corporately by ancestral halls. It was not easy to equate lineage managers with landlords. Besides ancestral hall property, there were smaller-scale land-trusts held by a few families in the same village. So, it was difficult to label individual shareholders as landlords.²⁶

Finally and most importantly, in Kwangtung lineage loyalty was too strong for class struggle to be carried out enthusiastically. Peasants were reluctant to struggle against their former lineage managers or private landlords. Some landlords even persuaded poor friendly kinsmen to take temporary ownership of the land to avoid condemnation by the work team. Local cadres were reluctant to carry out land reform since they had relatives who were landlords and, even if they decided to cut their lineage ties and denounce their kinsmen, they might lose mass support in their village. In fact, during the period of land reform, most local cadres tried to protect people of the same lineage, so much so that they underwent reeducation or were purged.²⁷ Because of lineage loyalty and the endemic interlineage feuds in Kwangtung, it was in fact easier to instigate struggles of poor lineages against rich lineages than to promote struggles of tenants and farm laborers against their landlords and employers. In addition, interlineage suspicion was so strong that poor and lower-middle peasants and farm laborers from various lineages were extremely reluctant to cooperate with each other.²⁸ In September 1951, a large number of militiamen and PLA

members were brought to Kwangtung to see that land-reform policy was carried out. Nevertheless, reform took longer in Kwangtung than elsewhere in China.²⁹

The above examination of the period of land reform in Kwangtung shows that Ch'en is mistaken in believing that before 1949 the countryside in South China was polarized between a small number of very large landlords on the one hand, and a large number of poor or landless peasants on the other. In fact, the divisions between "landlord", "part-owner," and "tenant-farmer" were so blurred that it was difficult to assign any class labels without doing an injustice to a large number of households. Moreover, the difficulties involved in the execution of the land-reform policy indicate not only the absence of latent class antagonism between landlords, tenants, and landless laborers, but also the strength of lineage loyalty and kin ties. The question remains, however, whether patrilineal kinship as a principle of social organization was weakened after the period of land reform which in its later stages had turned violent and required the intervention of outside cadres.

Freedman, writing in the 1960s, believed that lineages in South China were tremendously weakened after the land reform period.³⁰ The government had confiscated and redistributed the corporate property of large lineages in favor of small ones. It had persecuted many lineage managers and dissolved ancestral hall associations. The local government had taken over the political, judicial, educational, public works, and fiscal functions of the lineages, and the exploitation of small lineages by large ones was no longer possible. Higher-order and dispersed lineages had disappeared.

Parish and Whyte, however, in a study of rural South China in the late 1970s, conclude that large localized lineages were even more inward-looking than before 1949.³¹ After the period of collectivization in the mid-1950s, large lineages became the de facto base for the production team. Corporate property, which before 1949 functioned as a modified form of private property for corrupt lineage managers, was placed under a more democratic system of collective management in the 1970s. As private plots account for a mere 5 to 7 percent of total team holdings, the amount of corporate land in fact increased over this period. With the very rich landlords purged or in disgrace, each lineage-cum-production team has become more egalitarian in social composition than was the case before 1949. Up until the late 1970s, the whole team's production interests were tied to the communal plot.³² Members took pride in being superior to the next production team, cooperating well and trusting their leaders. Conflicts still occurred between lineage-cum-production teams over water, land, and animals. The large lineages were still more quarrelsome, since less-powerful lineages took the lead in attacking them and obtained some of the large lineages' land during the period of land reform.

Lineage members became less mobile and more inward-looking than they were in prerevolutionary times for a number of reasons. Up until the late 1970s, there was far less marketing activity in South China than in the pre-1949 period so that people traveled less frequently to other villages. Members of the same lineage can now be legally married, keeping the community more closed. Hence, the marketing community which Skinner describes as the bearer of "the little tradition" in pre-1949 China, has now become less of a focal point for the socioeconomic life of the rural populace. In the 1970s more primary schools were placed in the production team than before. State policy has stipulated that rural students who have graduated from high schools in urban areas must return to their native villages. Hence, there was less chance of rural exodus of the educated than was the case before 1949. Moreover, migration of peasants from rural areas to the city and from one production team to another was strictly controlled.

The perpetual struggle between village leadership and outside leadership continued throughout the 1970s. Local leaders' roots and allegiances have remained primarily tied to kinship, as was the case with the gentry class before 1949. Leaders do not readily enforce unpopular government programs that would harm their lineage-cum-production team. This situation survived at least through the 1970s. The responsibility system, inaugurated in the 1980s, has the potential of undermining the solidarity of the production team and hence of the lineage. Therefore it is unclear how much longer the lineage will survive as a strong social unit.

This study shows that lineages in South China remained intact despite demographic, economic, educational and administrative changes between 1842 and 1930. Their status as the basis of rural social organization survived even the more drastic changes introduced in the People's Republic, a society founded on the idea that class struggle is the motivating force in history—a premise which is the polar opposite of the Confucian ideal on which lineages were based for hundreds of years.

APPENDIX 1
Ritual Patterns of Five Villages at T'uo-fu

Chang-ts'un

This village was founded by the tenth Kuan ancestor (ca. 1350). The Ling-yüan ancestral hall was established in his honor. Segmentation in Chang-ts'un did not begin until the sixteenth century. At that time the first, second, and sixth branches (*fang*) of the lineage established their own ancestral halls. In the nineteenth generation (ca. 1620), the Ch'u-han Ancestral Hall, which was built in honor of the first branch, split into two parts. They were known as the Hsin-so Ancestral Hall and the Tui-so Ancestral Hall. In the twenty-third generation (ca. 1740), the Hsin-so was further split into the Liang-yüeh and Hsin-so Ancestral Halls while in the twenty-fifth generation (ca. 1880), the Tui-so was split into the Ch'ing-fen and Tui-so Ancestral Halls (see table 10, p.108).

According to one informant, there were no ancestral halls in honor of the third, fourth, and fifth branches of the fifteenth generation because the entire third branch had moved to Yang-chiang while the majority of the fourth branch had moved to Hsia-ts'un next to Chang-ts'un. The three remaining families of the fourth branch went to Hsia-ts'un to perform ancestral rites.

The fifth branch of the group had died off, and their tablets were put into a *yi-tz'u* attached to the Ch'u-han Ancestral Hall. This was the usual practice in all the villages among the Kuan. As in other parts of China, whenever one branch had no descendants and failed to adopt sons, the tablets would be attached to the ancestral hall of the most prominent branch so that their departed souls could be worshipped too.¹

Hsia-ts'un


In Hsia-ts'un, there were three ancestral halls and four study rooms (*shu-shih*).² Of the three ancestral halls, one was attended by the whole village, the other two by people of the two major lineage branches. The four study rooms were attended by sub-branches of the two main branches.

People from Sha-ti, Hsia-p'ien, and Yüan-ts'un also came to attend the rites of the main ancestral hall in Hsia-ts'un. The people of Hsia-ts'un, on the other hand, went to Chang-ts'un to attend the Ling-yüan Ancestral Hall. This practice was followed because Chang-ts'un was established earlier than Hsia-ts'un, and the people of Sha-ti, Hsia-p'ien, and Yüan-ts'un originally came from Hsia-ts'un.

Sha-ti

There were two ancestral halls in Sha-ti, known as Ch'i-wen and Yü-ch'en. The Ch'i-wen hall conducted Spring Rites on the sixth day of the New Year and represented the senior branch of the lineage in the village. This ancestral hall was very big and Kuan from villages as far away as Yang-lu also went there for the rites. The Yü-ch'en hall conducted Spring Rites on the second day of the New Year. It was founded by the junior branch. Those who attended this ancestral hall also went to Hsia-ts'un to attend the Spring Rites.

TABLE 10
Segmentation in Chang-ts'un



Source: Personal Communications.

The village elders of Sha-ti village all went to the Kuang-yü Ancestral Hall in Ch'ih-k'an on the fourteenth day of the New Year to attend the rites. Since Sha-ti was only a five-minute walk from Ch'ih-k'an, it was heterogeneous in population, although the residents were all surnamed Kuan. The village included those originally from Ling-yüan *hsiang*, Wu-jung *hsiang*, Lu-yang *hsiang* and Chung-miao *hsiang*. Thus, people from this village not only attended the Yü-ch'en or the Ch'i-wen Ancestral Hall, but also went elsewhere for their Spring and Autumn Rites.

Hsia-p'ien

Hsia-p'ien had two ancestral halls, each representing a different lineage segment in the village. The villagers returned to Hsia-ts'un to attend Spring Rites because their branch of the lineage originated in that village.

Na-luo

There were two surname groups in Na-luo--the Hu and the Kuan. The Kuan occupied ten lanes in the village and the Hu occupied six. There were two ancestral halls in the village: the smaller one for the Hu and the larger for the Kuan. Besides attending the rites in their own village, the Kuan of Na-luo also attended the ancestral rites in other villages, while the elders members went to Kuan-yü Ancestral Hall to take part in the rites there. No Kuan from other villages went to Na-luo to attend their ancestral hall since it was a relatively recent settlement.

One can deduce from the above data that, in T'uo-fu, ancestral halls did not restrict their membership to people of one village. The ritual hierarchy was complicated and interlocking. Those whose ancestors had migrated to another village went back to their villages of origin to attend the rites. If this pattern held true for all the villages in the area, the relative generation depth and migration history of each village could be determined by investigating the membership of ancestral halls there.³

APPENDIX 2
The Kuan Overseas

Unlike the inhabitants of the Fukien-Ch'ao-chou area, the Kuan generally emigrated to North America. According to one informant, about 70 percent went to North America, and only 30 percent went to Southeast Asia. They went either as indentured laborers or as free agents.

Among my informants, Kuan H was a long-time resident at Medan, Indonesia, before he emigrated to Canada. Here is his description of life in Southeast Asia.

Kuan H (native of Na-luo Village):

Not all Chinese who went to Medan were free immigrants. Many went there as "pigs" [indentured laborers].¹ The centers of the "pig trade" were Hong Kong, Canton, and Macau. In Southeast Asia, a plantation owner, usually a Westerner, would ask a Chinese contractor to recruit people to work for a number of years. In Ch'ih-k'an, the contractor's agents were very active. Some of the people volunteered to go, some were cheated into it at the gambling table.

However, of those Kuan who went to Southeast Asia, only a few were "pigs." Most of them went as voluntary emigrants. The "pigs" I met on the boat to Medan were mostly people from Ch'ao-chou, Lei-chou, and Lien-chou. This, I think, was because people from Ssu-yi were richer and did not have to become indentured laborers. Only a few rootless and poor people were lured into selling themselves as "pigs."

I had been in Indonesia for many years before I immigrated here. I can probably tell you more about Southeast Asia than I can tell you about Canada. It was a popular practice for the Chinese there to write their families to look for prospective employees in the home village or villages nearby. It was also popular to join in partnership with or employ someone from the same village who was already abroad. At least his place of origin was known and one could get in touch with his family members in case of trouble.

I left K'ai-p'ing for Indonesia in 1927 when I was sixteen years old. I went to Medan as an apprentice to help a Mr. Kuan from Chang-ts'un in his jewelry shop. Actually, I would not have left if my father had not so insisted. We were rich enough to have stayed in Ch'ih-k'an.

My passage was paid by my elder brother. A *shui-k'e* who was a Chang-ts'un native helped me with all of the red tape and took care of me on the boat.² There were only two *shui-k'e* in the T'uo-fu area—one in Chang-ts'un and another in Hsia-ts'un. They brought emigrants from Ch'ih-k'an to Chi'ang-men and then to Southeast Asia.

When I first worked in Medan, I lived in my employer's shop—a very popular practice then. After five years, I sponsored my wife. One of my younger brothers also came to work in the store, since I had become a manager there.

I went back to Ch'ih-k'an in 1948. In 1955, I went to Hong Kong, trying to go back to Medan, but without success. So I joined another brother in P'ing-shan in the New Territories of Hong Kong. I was not afraid of having nowhere to go because I had nine brothers: two in Ch'ih-k'an, two in Canton, two in Hong Kong, two in San Francisco, and my youngest brother in Indonesia.

The earliest emigrants among the Kuan came to Canada between the 1880s, when the Pacific Railway Company was recruiting laborers, and 1923, when the Oriental Exclusion Act

was passed. As one seventy-eight-year-old informant told me, "Many of the early emigrants here were railway workers. I called that 'semi pig-trade'. They signed contracts with the agents at Ch'ih-k'an who paid for their passage."

Little is known about the conditions of life among the first generation of emigrants. The informants I had a chance to interview came to Canada either between 1906 and 1921 or after 1947. A short review of their individual histories should indicate the lineage links involved in the emigration process from 1906 onward.

Kuan B (native of Chang-ts'un):

I heard of Canada from the letters my paternal uncle wrote home. He was a camp cook at the Canadian Pacific Railway Company and was the founder of a drugstore in Victoria. Later, he retired to Hong Kong. Together with the capital supplied by the partners of another Chinese grocery store in Vancouver, he started an import/export concern in Hong Kong. His son, my cousin, stayed on in Victoria to manage the drugstore.

My father encouraged me to emigrate since my own family was getting poorer and conditions in Victoria were attractive. My cousin was then doing a good business. So, in 1920 I decided to leave. I took a boat from Ch'ih-k'an to Chiang-men and then to Hong Kong. My uncle there helped me fill out the immigration papers. His son picked me up when I landed in Victoria. I had to pay \$500 (Canadian) head tax, although I was traveling on a student visa. I borrowed this sum and my passage fare from a rich man in our village. I did not have to pay interest on the money I borrowed. I paid it back later in small installments from the salary I earned in Victoria.

Before the war I lived in the dormitory for single men (*fang-k'ou*) upstairs from the drugstore.³ Other Kuan employees also stayed there. There were other such dormitories in Victoria. Those who worked for Westerners as servants also lived together. The occupants were usually people with the same surname.

I became a co-owner of the store after working for five years. We had six owners: myself, my cousin, three Kuan from Hsia-ts'un, and a Li who was the brother-in-law of one of the partners.

Asked whether it was a common practice among the Chinese to employ or form partnerships with people of their own lineage, Kuan B gave a definite affirmative answer. He said:

It was usually through patrilineal kinship links that new immigrants could find jobs. That was why in Victoria the Kuan were either in grocery and greenhouse businesses or worked in lumber mills. After the Oriental Exclusion Act in 1923, the Chinese here could not sponsor people from their home villages to work. But the Kuan still joined in partnership with members of their own lineage who were already here. This happened in our drugstore, Kuan G's grocery store in Victoria, and Kuan O's grocery store in Vancouver.

Of course, some Chinese immigrants came without a job and had to look for one in Victoria through the Chinese employment agency operated by a Tseng-ch'eng native. This was a private concern; jobs were found for the Chinese who desired to be servants of Westerners, but they had to pay 10 percent of their first month's salary to the agency as a commission. This happened to people who emigrated here without any relatives. As far as I know, the Kuan seldom had to do this.

The Chinese residents here usually sponsored sons instead of daughters. An emigrant with a pregnant wife would tell the Immigration Office on his return to Canada that she had given birth to a son. If later the baby turned out to be a girl, he would sell or exchange her for a boy, usually a nephew or a close patrilineal kin, and then sponsor him as a son. That was how many Chinese were sponsored as dependents to Victoria before 1923 and after World War II. Patrilineal kinship links were also important outside Canada. Take my case as an example. In the 1930s, when Victoria was suffering from the depression, I lived and worked in my paternal uncle's concern in Hong Kong for four years. If it were not for him, my savings would have been used up here.

Kuan D (native of Hsia-ts'un):

I left K'ai-p'ing in 1936 and worked in a textile factory in Shanghai. This was owned by Kuan G's brother. But my paternal granduncle also had some shares in the concern. Kuan A's brother was also one of the employees there. In fact, out of the 130 employees in that factory, over half were members of the Kuan lineage from K'ai-p'ing. There was another concern in Shanghai—a pen-making factory employing over 30 people. It was also managed by a Kuan. The other owners were all Kuan from K'ai-p'ing. Very close to ours and this pen-making factory was another textile factory which was run by the Huang from Hsien-kang (K'ai-p'ing). They employed over 100 people. The employees of these concerns made up my circle of friends in Shanghai.

In 1937, when I was in Hong Kong, I was the accountant for a drugstore and a grocery store. Both of these were owned by members of the Kuan lineage of K'ai-p'ing. The capital came mostly from the partners of my father's drugstore in Victoria and two other concerns in the Victoria-Vancouver area. The employees were mostly natives of Hsia-ts'un, Chang-ts'un, and Kou-p'i-ch'ung.

I visited my native village during World War II. I went back to Hong Kong again in 1955. At that time, both stores were closed down. My purpose in coming to Hong Kong was to emigrate to Canada. But, my mother's younger brother asked me to stay and help him start a textile factory in Kowloon, so I did. In 1959, I came to Victoria to help my father manage the drugstore with B. My father paid for my passage. I did not live in the store because the dormitory upstairs was no longer in operation after the war.

Kuan G (Victoria-born; son of a Na-luo native):

I was born in Victoria, but my father emigrated from K'ai-p'ing. He did not have any money to pay for the passage. In those days, no one was interested in lending money to a poor emigrant. It was not popular to emigrate during his generation. In the end he was so desperate that he had to sell his sister to get enough passage money to come over. He worked at various odd jobs in Victoria—selling incense, working as a farm hand, etc., until he had saved enough to start a grocery store.

Most of the employees of this store were sponsored by my father. On his various trips home to the village he usually brought back one or two villagers he knew he could trust to come over to work in Canada. So he was very popular in his native village. This was a common practice among the successful Chinese in Victoria in his time.

Upstairs from our store was a dormitory for single men. The occupants were not necessarily relatives, but it had become a usual practice for anyone from K'ai-p'ing to stay in our store for a while before they moved on to work in other parts of British Columbia. You see, Victoria was the center of recreation and a port of arrival and departure for the Chinese immigrants working on Vancouver Island and in the interior of British Columbia.

After I inherited the store from my father, I continued to keep the dormitory upstairs. I have worked here for I do not remember how long. My nine brothers are now all in Edmonton; they are in the restaurant business.

Kuan I (native of Na-luo Village):

I was only distantly related to Kuan G, although I came from the same village as his father. However, it was his father who sponsored my father to work in their store, while he sponsored me in 1963. Kuan G's family members were regarded as benefactors of our village. I heard that they had sponsored twenty villagers to work in their grocery store in Victoria and their restaurant in Edmonton.

My passage was paid by Kuan G and his brothers. I worked in the store for ten years, and I paid them back with my salary. Perhaps I worked there too long; I do not know a single word of English even now.

My father is not with us at present. He is living in a dormitory upstairs from the Lung-kang kung-so in Victoria with other Kuan of his age. He says he likes it better there.

I still have a mother and a sister in Mainland China. My father did not sponsor them because it was the usual practice only to sponsor one's sons and not daughters. In our case, my father was too poor to sponsor me. I have heard that some Chinese sponsored a nephew or a grandson as a son to Canada after 1947.

The Kuan in Victoria usually maintained very close ties with their home villages. The same happened to the less successful Kuan in Southeast Asia. Among those who were more successful, the tendency was to neglect their native villages. Very few, however, would sever their ties with home completely. In case of trouble abroad, such as discrimination or war, even the latter group of Chinese immigrants would return home.

The stories of Kuan B and Kuan C in Victoria and that of Kuan H in Medan illustrate this pattern. Kuan B said:

I left K'ai-p'ing as a single man at the age of eighteen. When I was twenty-six I had saved enough to go home to get married. The second time I went back was when my father died. The third time was in 1932. I stayed in Hong Kong for four years and then in my native village for another three years. This was because business was bad in Victoria during the depression years. I went home again during wartime and stayed there until 1947. I was well informed about happenings in our village while in Canada because I received letters from home frequently. In addition, the employees and partners of our store every now and then went back and brought news from home. I had intended to retire to T'uo-fu because all my family members were there. The Canadian government at that time did not allow the Chinese to bring their families over. We did not know when we would be kicked out of the country altogether. I changed my mind after 1947 when I saw how unruly my native village had become. Moreover, the Canadian immigration restrictions had loosened up, and we could sponsor our families. In 1956 I sponsored my mother. Like me, a lot of the Chinese here sponsored their dependents. Many young men came, and that is why you find that in Chinatown after 1947 the Chinese were either very old or very young.

Kuan C:

In my time, nearly all the emigrants from our village went home to get married. The go-between prepared a list of prospective brides, and the parents chose a girl and arranged for the marriage ceremony. The returned emigrant usually accepted the bride because he had no time to hunt for another one. He usually stayed home for not more than three months every time he visited for fear that his visa would be cancelled by the Canadian Immigration Office if he stayed any longer. As for myself, I went home to get married in 1920. I remitted money home four times a year and went home every five to six years. In 1949 I sponsored my wife and children.

Kuan H:

It is, I think, on the whole true that those Kuan in Medan who aimed at returning home for retirement were poorer. They were usually the peddlers and laborers who had parents, wives, and children in the village. They remitted money and visited home frequently, especially during the Chinese New Year, the Ch'ing-ming Festival and on special occasions such as birthdays, funerals, and weddings. When they had saved enough, they usually sent money to buy land and houses to support their family members and for their own future retirement, since there was no pension or any form of security while working abroad.

However, the more successful Kuan in Medan seldom visited home because their savings were used for reinvestment abroad, and they were usually too busy with their businesses. Many dared not visit because they had heard rumors that Ssu-yi was infested with bandits. Some of them made use of the loose immigration regulations and sponsored their families.⁴ As a result, there were so many Ssu-yi people in Medan by the 1930s that one did not

feel socially deprived even living away from home. Others—and we called them "amphibians"—already had a second wife there. She usually did not visit her husband's home village. Who would like to smell the stinking toilet at home? She would never get used to the climate and the living conditions.⁵ So, many of the rich Chinese residents did not plan to retire to their native villages.

However, the lucky thing was that they still sent some spare money home to support the remaining members of the family in the village. They did not like to face the censure of their kinsmen at Medan, and they did not like to burn their own boats. Even they had to go home when there was a crisis overseas. Take my case as an example—I would not have gone back to Ch'ih-k'an if it had not been for the anti-Chinese policy of the Medan government in the late 1940s. My business was going well. . . . God knows how eager I was to apply to return to Medan in 1948. I was so used to life there.

APPENDIX 3

Power Structure of Five Villages in T'uo-fu After 1930

Sha-ti Village (as described by Kuan A):

There was an unofficial headman in our village. He was about sixty and had held the post for ten years. His position was honorary. He settled family quarrels whenever requested to do so. There were fourteen powerful merchant families who took care of the accounts of their particular ancestral halls. They were the ones who initiated land sales during wartime.

The *pao* chief was about fifty years old. He had held this position for a long time since nobody else liked to take the post. He was responsible for appointing a corps of village watchmen. He collected unhusked rice from each family as salary for himself and his staff. The householders chose the *pao* chief. The *hsiang* chief simply confirmed the post. This matter was of no concern to the K'ai-p'ing government at all.

Neither the *pao* chief nor the unofficial headman was powerful. At one time, two sons of an emigrant were apprehended by the Police Corps. Both the *pao* chief and the headman wanted to guarantee their good behavior, but the Department of Public Security refused to release them until their family paid \$2,000 (Hong Kong) each. The police robbed the village more than once with guns in their hands, and Sha-ti, being so near Ch'ih-k'an, often suffered from these occasional raids.

Chang-ts'un (as described by Kuan B):

The unofficial headman in the village was over seventy years old. He led the Spring and Autumn Rites in one of the ancestral halls and was regarded with affection by the villagers. Besides him there were about four or five elders—men over sixty whose opinions were well respected.

Neither the headman nor the elders had much control over the accounts of the ancestral halls. The resident merchants and modern graduates were the powerful people. They collected rent from the corporate land and paid taxes to the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang.

Most of these leaders were educated—they were at least high-school graduates—except one, who was an illiterate rascal. He was neither rich nor educated but a bully. Because the people of Chang-ts'un were timid, he succeeded in intimidating them. He was the leader of the Ch'u-han Ancestral Hall which has the most land and people. The founder of this ancestral hall, Kuan Chung, had been an official in Hunan Province, so his descendants usually had the most power in the village.

Some of our unofficial leaders stayed in Ch'ih-k'an where they, together with the elders and resident merchants, met once a year in the Ling-yuan Ancestral Hall to discuss village affairs. In general, the elders were responsible for matters pertaining to the inhabitants of Chang-ts'un, such as mediating quarrels between the villagers. The scholars and merchants residing in the village usually dealt with quarrels between Chang-ts'un and other villages. Matters of defense and public works were the joint responsibility of all the leaders, whether residing in the village or not. Together, they employed the watchmen and arranged for the repair or reconstruction of ancestral halls and footpaths in the village outskirts.

The *pao-chia* system was just a list of the names of householders. It was only a piece of paper kept by the so-called *pao* chief, who had no other functions. During and just after the war, however, he was responsible for enforcing the details of collecting army rations and conscripting people, helped by the Self-defense Corps. All the conscripted soldiers were like prisoners. They were forced to stay in the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang until further notice.

Hsia-ts'un (as described by Kuan C and Kuan D):

There was no headman in the village. General village affairs were run by a group of unofficial leaders, most of whom were merchants. They had big businesses in Ch'ih-k'an such as real estate and remittance firms. Some even operated gambling houses. Many of them did not live in Hsia-ts'un—neither did they own land there. Only once a year did they go back to discuss affairs with the elders living in the village. That was why most of the judicial functions and day-to-day affairs were performed by the elders.

The merchant leaders were bullies who claimed that they were descendants of famous officials during the Ch'ing dynasty and that they should take care of the ancestral land. They were only interested in their own wealth and prestige and did nothing good for the village. In the 1940s, one of the elders went to the lawcourt at Ts'ang-ch'eng to sue the accountant of the main hall for corruption. The Police Corps arrested the accountant. Everyone was happy. But, unfortunately, the most powerful merchant leaders were left untouched.

I had not heard of the *pao-chia* system before the war. But it was in full operation during wartime. Hsia-ts'un was then divided into three *chia*; each had a *chia* chief. Above them was a *pao* chief. They were nominated by the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang from the names suggested by the merchant leaders. That was why the latter were consulted each time the *pao* or *chia* chief had to do something in the village.

The work of the *pao* and *chia* chiefs was to use the household registers for conscripting soldiers and for collecting army rations. They also informed the people of government rules and regulations. Their position was a difficult one. In about 1943, the garrison commander stationed soldiers and policemen in the main ancestral hall in Hsia-ts'un to ensure that people were conscripted and army rations collected. If the *pao* and *chia* chiefs failed to conscript soldiers, they had to join the army themselves.

Hsia-p'ien (as described by Kuan E):

There was no headman in Hsia-p'ien. The more powerful merchants, scholars, and elders were responsible for all unofficial matters in the village. Of these three types of leaders, the first were the most influential. In fact, while the scholars were often sons of reputed merchant families, most of the other leaders had businesses in Ch'ih-k'an or elsewhere, although they lived in the village itself. While the elders were conductors of rituals in the ancestral halls, the other leaders collected rent for the corporate property of their own ancestral halls.

The *pao-chia* was only in operation for five or six years in the 1930s. The whole of Hsia-p'ien was one *pao*. Our *pao* chief was recommended by the unofficial leaders to the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang to be appointed and was, therefore, under their influence. He came from the senior segment of the lineage and was a small landowner, owning about one acre of land.

While the *pao-chia* system was in operation, there was a division of functions. The unofficial leaders regulated civil matters such as struggles for inheritance and money quarrels between the villagers. The *pao* chief was responsible for taking criminals to the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang and other public duties. However, after 1936, the post was cancelled because the villagers felt that the *pao* chief was too impotent, being just the messenger of the powerful leaders in the village.

Na-luo (as described by Kuan H, Kuan I and Kuan J):

There was no village headman. The elders, the most popular merchants, and the scholars took care of public affairs in Na-luo. There was no way of choosing these unofficial leaders, as everyone knew who they were.

The elders (five to seven of them) were men over sixty years old. They led the Spring and Autumn Rites in the village. They acted as arbiters in family quarrels and other disputes. The merchants had more power. Many lived in the village itself. Among them was a group called the "managers" who took care of general village affairs in turn. They were mostly businessmen who had connections in Ch'ih-k'an and elsewhere.

As far as collecting taxes was concerned, we had a rotation system. Every household head took his turn handling rent collected from corporate land and paying taxes to the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang for a year. We did this to avoid the control of the powerful leaders in our village.

Every year the merchants and elders met in the Village General Assembly to elect a *pao* chief. The *pao* chief was paid from contributions of the inhabitants in proportion to the amount of land held, so he usually favored the larger landowners. He mediated between the authorities and the villagers. His work was to report the births, marriages, and movements of people, as well as any major crimes and suspicious characters to the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang. He was also responsible for conscription.

We disliked the *pao* chief because he only accepted orders from above and assisted the government. Moreover, he often collected black money. When he failed to get what he wanted, he would report the case to the Administrative Office of the Four Hsiang, who would put the Self-defense Corps into action.

A native of Na-luo went to Thailand. He had a brick house in the village which was locked up for many years. One day, a scoundrel wanted to demolish the house. Someone told the *pao* chief, who went to mediate. The scoundrel did not listen and refused to pay black money, so the *pao* chief asked the Self-defense Corps to help apprehend him. This created an uproar because members of the Self-defense Corps were notorious. They robbed rather than aided the villagers and protected the opium and gamblers' rackets in town. Asking them for help meant asking for trouble. So, the next year, the merchants and elders banded together to have this notorious *pao* chief removed.

APPENDIX 4
Migration History and Social Origins of Informants

TABLE 11
Migration History and Social Origins of Informants

Name	Birth Date	Place of Origin	Year Left K'ai-p'ing	Year Entered Canada
A	1929	Sha-ti (Chung-miao <i>hsiang</i>)	1945-52 (Hong Kong)	1952
B	1903	Chang-ts'un (Ling-yüan <i>hsiang</i>)	1920-21	1920-21
C	1897	Hsia-ts'un (Ling-yüan <i>hsiang</i>)	1915	1915
D	1918	Hsia-ts'un (Ling-yüan <i>hsiang</i>)	1936-37 (Shanghai) 1937-41 (Hong Kong) 1941-55 (K'ai-p'ing) 1955-59 (Hong Kong)	1959
E	1910	Hsia-p'ien (Ling-yüan <i>hsiang</i>)	1921-32 (Canton) 1932-36 (Hong Kong) 1941-43 (K'ai-p'ing) 1943-45 (T'ai-shan) 1945-63 (Hong Kong)	1963
F	1902	Na-luo (Lu-yang <i>hsiang</i>)	1915	1915
G	1907	Victoria (father from Nan-luo <i>ts'un</i>)	—	—
H	1911	Nan-luo (Lu-yang <i>hsiang</i>)	1927-28 (Medan— Indonesia)	1964
I	1932	Nan-luo (Lu-yang <i>hsiang</i>)	1953	1953
J	1941	Nan-luo (Lu-yang <i>hsiang</i>)	1951-57 (Canton) 1957-59 (Ch'ih-k'an) 1959-72 (Hong Kong)	1972
K	1903	Lung-chi-she (Sung-lang <i>hsiang</i>)	1920	1920
L	1937	Lung-chi-she (Sung-lang <i>hsiang</i>)	1949-60 (Hong Kong)	1960
M	1933	Sung-hsing-she (Sung-lang <i>hsiang</i>)	1949	1949
N	1937	Ch'i-sheng-li (Yang-lu <i>hsiang</i>)	1951	1951
O	1886	Nan-ho-li (Feng-wan <i>hsiang</i>)	1906	1906

TABLE 12
Social Origin of Informants

Name	Education	Father's Occupation	Occupation in K'ai-p'ing	Occupation Elsewhere
A	Studied in a private school run by ancestral hall.	A Canadian immigrant who worked as cook, sailor, etc.	Did not work; relied on remittances.	<i>Hong Kong</i> : journalist. <i>Canada</i> : odd jobs—greenhouse farm hand, servant in a Westerner's home, etc. At present, works as a cook.
B	Attended a private school and a school at Ch'ih-k'an.	Shopowner at Ch'ih-k'an.	Did not work.	<i>Canada</i> : came as student. Worked in a drugstore in Victoria. At present part-owner of the above and owner of a noodle company in Vancouver.
C	Studied for six years in a private school run by ancestral hall.	A cloth merchant at Ch'ih-k'an who went bankrupt and died young.	Worked as an apprentice in a drugstore in Ch'ih-k'an.	<i>P'ai-sha (T'ai-shan)</i> : worked as an apprentice, 1910-15. <i>Canada</i> : worked in a drugstore as resident Chinese doctor for ten years. Then, as employee of greenhouse in Central Saanich. Eventually became part-owner of the same. Now retired.
D	Studied in a private school run by ancestral hall in Hsia-ts'un; when in Hong Kong attended an evening school.	A Canadian immigrant, part-owner of a drugstore.	Did not work; relied on remittances.	<i>Shanghai</i> : worked in a textile company owned by Kuan G's brother. <i>Hong Kong</i> : worked in uncle's drugstore, 1937-41. In 1955 helped maternal uncle start cloth factory. <i>Canada</i> : part-owner of drugstore with Kuan B.
E	A graduate of Chung-shan University.	A <i>sheng-yian</i> who became a merchant at Ch'ih-k'an; chairman of Ch'ih-k'an Chamber of Commerce for ten years.	Did not work.	<i>Canton</i> : taught at Chung-shan University for two years. <i>T'ai-shan</i> : worked in a diesel oil company and later in a rice-grinding business. <i>Hong Kong</i> : worked in a leather goods company. <i>Victoria</i> : owner of a grocery store.
F	Primary school in ancestral hall.	A Canadian immigrant.	Did not work; relied on remittances.	Not known.

Name	Education	Father's Occupation	Occupation in K'ai-p'ing	Occupation Elsewhere
G	Studied in Victoria; studied in Ling-nan University for a year.	A Canadian immigrant who started a grocery store in Victoria.	Not known.	<i>Canada</i> : owner of a grocery store.
H	Studied in Ch'ih-k'an, 1920-27.	Landowner at Na-luo; owner of a rice-milling concern at Ch'ih-k'an.	Helped father to operate rice-milling concern at Ch'ih-k'an.	<i>Medan (Indonesia)</i> : worked as an apprentice in a jewelry store, later manager of the same. <i>Hong Kong</i> : odd jobs--salesman at a bicycle store; helped brother in farm work in P'ing-shan; worked in grocery store in Yuen-long. <i>Canada</i> : owner of a grocery store in Victoria.
I	Studied in a primary school run by ancestral hall.	A Canadian immigrant who worked in a grocery store for Kuan G's father. Now retired.	Worked in Ch'ih-k'an as a mechanic in Kuan H's family rice-milling concern for six years.	<i>Canada</i> : worked in a grocery store for ten years. At present, as employee of a lumber concern in Victoria.
J	Studied in Canton, 1951-53.	Brother of Kuan H; owned same rice-milling concern at Ch'ih-k'an; a landowner in Na-luo but lived in Canton since sixteen.	Did not work.	<i>Canton</i> : worked in a laundry operated by a cousin, then worked in a dentist's office. <i>Hong Kong</i> : shopkeeper. <i>Canada</i> : worked in a lumber mill in Victoria.
K	Studied in a private school run by ancestral hall.	A Canadian immigrant; worked at B. C. Railway Company.	Did not work; relied on remittances.	<i>Canada</i> : worked in a grocery store and then ran a greenhouse. Now retired.
L	Studied in a modern school at Hsien-kang until 1949.	A Canadian immigrant.	Did not work; relied on remittances.	<i>Hong Kong</i> : salesman. <i>Canada</i> : worked in a lumber company in Victoria.
M	Studied in a modern school in Hsien-kang for six years.	A Canadian immigrant; owner of a wholesale/retail outlet and greenhouse in Saanich, Victoria.	Did not work; relied on remittances.	<i>Canada</i> : worked in a wholesale/retail outlet.
N	Studied six years in a private school.	Farmer.	Unknown.	<i>Canada</i> : cook.
O	Studied in an ancestral hall school.	Owned a small store in Kou-p'i-chung.	Helped father to run store.	<i>Canada</i> : cook and domestic servant; then started a grocery store in Vancouver with partners. Now retired.

APPENDIX 5
Methodological Note

After a survey of the existing literature on traditional Chinese social structure, I was impressed by the prevalence of both lineages and overseas emigration in South China and decided to explore the relationship between them further. I wanted to discover the ways socio-political changes affected patrilineal kinship in the twentieth century and the extent to which Overseas Chinese played a role in social change in South China.

Since this was a transitional period in China's social history and there were no comprehensive ethnographic data on lineages covering the entire period from 1911 to 1949, the picture remained only in the memories of those who had lived through that period of time. I decided to conduct in-depth interviews with Chinese informants who lived in Victoria, since this was the city where pre-World War II Chinese immigrants first landed and where Chinese sojourners in interior British Columbia harbored for the winter. I was surprised to learn that a significant number of elderly Chinese—the survivors of the heroic age—had retired to Victoria, and I hoped they would be interested in talking about their unforgettable past; this would be my chance to tap a rich source before it passed out of history.

At the same time, I realized that a study based on emigrant interviews would have serious drawbacks. Informants might hold biases that would have to be detected. Knowledge of their lineage might be limited, since many left their villages in their youth and had only returned for occasional short visits. Informants' memories might be incomplete or distorted, since the study called for detailed recollection of events which occurred more than forty years ago.

Written documents from the same period were clearly necessary to ensure reliability of the data. As a majority of the emigrants from China to Canada before World War II came from Ssu-yi (K'ai-p'ing, T'ai-shan, Hsin-hui, and En-p'ing counties), it was crucial for the purpose of this study to locate primary sources from this area during the period 1911-49.

One invaluable source was the *Ssu-yi ch'iao-pao*, a collection of newspapers circulated among the Ssu-yi emigrants, reporting news items which concerned the emigrants and their home village communities and market towns. It was first published after World War II and discontinued after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Of the local gazetteers published in the four counties in Ssu-yi, only the *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, published in 1933, covers a portion of the period under study. It includes a list of the districts, *hsiang*, and villages of K'ai-p'ing during the Min-kuo period; a list of modern roads built in the 1920s and 1930s; a list of modern schools and lineage libraries built after 1905; a list of new and old market towns; a list of chambers of commerce; a chronicle of important events in the *hsien* from the Ch'ing dynasty to 1933; a name list of scholar-officials in K'ai-p'ing from the Ch'ing dynasty to 1933; biographies of local notables; and a collection of genealogies and epitaphs.

The contributions of K'ai-p'ing overseas emigrants were carefully recorded throughout the gazetteer because emigration was very important to K'ai-p'ing and because the compilation was published under the auspices of the K'ai-p'ing District Association in Hong Kong.

I was also able to locate a publication issued by the K'ai-p'ing District Association in Vancouver in 1947, the *Chu-yün ch'üan-chia K'ai-p'ing tsung-hui-kuan t'e-k'an*. This pamphlet includes an account of the contributions of K'ai-p'ing emigrants in Canada to their home villages before World War II. This, together with the *Ssu-yi ch'iao-pao*, provides sufficient documentation of events in K'ai-p'ing in the 1940s.

Only with these sources in hand did I finally choose K'ai-p'ing as my field of investigation. It happened that Dr. Charles Sedgewick, then a graduate student in the Anthropology Department of the University of Victoria, was doing research on Chinatown in Victoria at that time.

He provided me with a list of the names of Chinese residents in Victoria and their places of origin. I selected the names of those who came from K'ai-p'ing and examined the *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih* in great detail, noting the last names of all the notables, scholars, and officials that were listed there. I learned that a considerable number of Kuan from K'ai-p'ing reside in Victoria and that the Kuan was recorded as a prominent lineage in this document. I therefore decided to make them the focus of my research.

I contacted three resource persons in Victoria's Chinatown: (1) Mr. T. H. Li, author of *A History of Chinese in Canada*; (2) Mr. C. Ch'en, principal of the Chinese Public School of Victoria; and (3) Mr. S. Y. Liu, president of the Lung-kang Association in Victoria, which includes as members the Kuan, the Chang, the Chao, and the Liu from the Ssu-yi area. From them I obtained the names of some elderly members of the Kuan lineage in K'ai-p'ing still residing in Victoria. The first person I interviewed was Mr. Kuan B, a gentleman in his late seventies who was extremely helpful and provided the names of other K'ai-p'ing Kuan living in Victoria. Through snowball sampling I was able to conduct interviews with sixteen informants who had intimate knowledge of the Kuan lineage of K'ai-p'ing.

Of these informants, one was a non-Kuan (Mr. Li, author of *A History of Chinese in Canada*) who taught in Ch'ih-k'an in 1946-47. Another was a Kuan who was born in Victoria, but had close connections with his father's village in K'ai-p'ing. The other fourteen came from various parts of K'ai-p'ing—ten from five villages in T'uo-fu (Chang-ts'un, Hsia-ts'un, Na-luo, Hsia-p'ien, and Sha-ti) and the rest from villages outside T'uo-fu (Sung-lang *hsiang*, Yang-lu *hsiang*, and Feng-wan *hsiang*). Their dates of departure from K'ai-p'ing ranged from 1906 to 1953, and they had visited their native places at different times. Some had lived in Indonesia, Hong Kong, Canton, or Shanghai before they immigrated to Canada (see appendix 4).

Some of the interviews took place in the evening at the home of the informant; some took place at coffee shops in Chinatown; others were held at the informant's place of work. This last was only possible with some elderly informants who owned but did not take care of their shops. They were retired, but went to their shops to keep in touch with the outside world and as a favorite pastime. It was particularly difficult to find an opportunity to interview the Kuan who were working with the British Columbia Ferry Corporation. The fieldwork period lasted nine months, from January to September of 1973.

Topics Discussed and Informants' Responses

On the average, six two-hour sessions were spent with each informant, covering the following topics: (1) the informant's family tree, his experience as an overseas emigrant, and his knowledge of the activities of other Kuan emigrants from K'ai-p'ing; (2) the Kuan lineage in K'ai-p'ing and its relationships with the non-Kuan; (3) the administrative structure of his *hsiang* and his village; (4) corporate land management and village economy; (5) social and ceremonial life in the village; and (6) businesses, social life, and the setting of the market towns he had attended in K'ai-p'ing.

Although each of the fourteen informants from K'ai-p'ing was asked to discuss similar topics, their responses differed widely. In general, those who came to Canada before 1923 were more aware of the difficulties encountered by Chinese emigrants, the contributions of Overseas Chinese to the lineage, and the nature of the Chinese community in Canada. They knew more about lineage genealogy, migration patterns, ritual structure, and the Kuan's relationship with the non-Kuan. Those who came after 1947 were more aware of the administrative structure of the *hsiang* and their native villages, of the changing village economy, and of the development of their market towns.

Some areas of discussion varied with the background of the informant. Because Mr. Kuan G was born in Victoria, I did not ask him about villages and market towns in K'ai-p'ing. My interviews with him mainly concerned his knowledge of his father's life in China, the history of his father's emigration to Canada, the contributions of his family to the home village, the life of the Kuan in Victoria, the remittance business between Victoria and K'ai-p'ing, and the role of Canada's K'ai-p'ing District Association in the affairs of K'ai-p'ing before World War II. Mr. Kuan H, a long-time resident of Indonesia, was asked to describe the "pig trade" in Medan and

the connection of the Kuan there with their home communities, in addition to the usual questions. Finally, Mr. Li, who had been a teacher in Ch'ih-k'an, was asked to provide information concerning the market town and the position of the Kuan there and to evaluate the schools built by the Kuan and the prestige of the Kuan lineage from an outsider's point of view.

Although not all respondents could provide complete answers to the questions I raised during the interviews, the omissions of some were usually covered by others. Throughout the study, the *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, the *Ssu-yi ch'iao-pao*, and the *Chu-yün ch'üan-chia K'ai-p'ing tsung-hui-kuan t'e-k'an* provided background and confirmed the reliability of data obtained through the interviews.

Techniques Employed

(1) Each informant was asked to describe the schooling and occupation of members of his family back to the third generation, as well as the experience of each overseas member of his family. This technique gave the study crucial historical depth.

(2) Each informant was asked to describe his life experience in great detail. This provided insights about the schools, ancestral halls, and market towns he had attended, about the means of obtaining employment in market towns, and his life in China. Activities of the chamber of commerce could be elicited if the informant happened to be a member. Tracing his life-story also yielded important information about conditions overseas, his ways of remitting money, and his marriage, donation, and investment patterns. In addition, information about social change and the power structure of the area was obtained through the informant's description of changes observed during each visit home and encounters with the authorities in his area. Following his life through such crises as the depression and World War II also yielded considerable insight. Asking the informant's aspirations for his children and his retirement plans led to some knowledge of his perception of life in his home community. Asking the informant about his acquaintances' experiences widened the scope of the data.

(3) With the interviewer's help, the informant constructed a sketch-map of his village. This technique put the informant in the proper context and ensured reliability and validity of the data. An enormous number of subjects could be discussed by referring to the sketch-map, for example, occupation of members of each household in the village; the relationship of each household to the land; how each household weathered crises such as the depression and the war; comparison of households in terms of standard of living; the lending and borrowing of money and farm equipment; households that formed voluntary associations or owned land trusts (*hsiao-a-kung* land); employment in the market town; households with members overseas and where those members had gone; households with concubines, domestic servants, or farm laborers; servile households; households from which the *chia* and *pao* chiefs, the elders, and gentry members had come; Christian households; households where school teachers lived; locations of stores and the households that ran them; locations of ancestral halls and the households that attended them, etc.

(4) Informants were presented with a list of materials from the *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih* to remind them of specific names of traditional and modern scholar-officials, villages (old and new), *hsiang* market towns, schools, churches, roads, etc. Each was asked to describe those in his vicinity or concerned with his lineage.

(5) The interviewer mentioned some events or customs recorded in the primary sources on *K'ai-p'ing* or in ethnographic accounts of other parts of South China and asked the informant for more details if these events and customs applied to his village or lineage. This was a useful technique to start the informant talking about customs he had taken for granted, e.g., servile households, or the lamp-lighting and the fire-rocket ceremonies. It was also useful in introducing sensitive or complicated topics such as the Model Village project and the building of the First High School of *K'ai-p'ing*, the Lineage Library, the *Hsiang* Office, the *hsiang* and the merchants' militia, the *pao-chia* system, the Self-defense Corps, and the conscription of soldiers.

NOTES

Chapter 1

1. A "lineage" is a rural-based patrilineal kinship group. Members of the group believe they are descended from a common ancestor and practice ancestral rites together on a regular basis. See ch. 4 for the distinction between different types of lineages.
2. Freedman, *Lineage Organization*, 63, 137; Hsiao, *Rural China*, 318-70; Ch'u, *Local Government*, 9-10, 122, 173, 184.
3. Clerks helped in all aspects of local administration. They were especially powerful in matters of tax collection, since they had local information and were in a good position to manipulate land-tax receipts and even warrants for the arrest of delinquent taxpayers (Ch'u, *Local Government*, 49-50). Private secretaries were usually former clerks, petty scholars, or retired low-ranking officials. They were familiar with law and precedents in the locality. They advised the magistrate on legal matters, prepared the list of delinquent taxpayers and sometimes even read examination papers of local scholars (*ibid.*, 110-11). The runners conveyed the magistrate's orders to the rural districts, conscripted laborers, collected taxes, and arrested suspects.
4. On paper, the *pao-chia* system in the traditional period worked as follows: households were organized into units of ten households (*p'ai*), 100 households (*chia*), and 1,000 households (*pao*), each with a chosen leader. These chiefs were to report on any religious heresies and secret societies formed among the local residents, keep an eye on suspicious strangers, and organize the village watch system (Ch'u, *Local Government*, 40-43, 150-51; Freedman, *Lineage Organization*, 15; Hsiao, *Rural China*, 43-83).
5. These included both scholars who had passed state examinations and rich landlords and merchants who had bought official degrees. The former were known as "regular gentry" and the latter as "irregular gentry." Members of the regular gentry can be further subdivided into upper and lower gentry. Upper gentry were holders of *chin-shih* (metropolitan graduate) and *chu-jen* (provincial graduate) degrees. The lower gentry were holders of *kung-sheng* (imperial students) and *sheng-yüan* (government student) degrees. They were not as powerful as the upper gentry, being merely leaders of the commoners.
Irregular gentry were those who bought degrees. They were usually given titles such as *li-kung-sheng* or *li-chien-sheng*. They did not enjoy as much prestige as the regular gentry in official eyes (Chang, *The Chinese Gentry*, 247). But on the local scene, the *sheng-yüan* and *kung-sheng*, as well as the *li-kung-sheng* and *li-chien-sheng* were very powerful in the eyes of their lineage mates and in the local social structure. They had a high status, which included exemptions from labor duties, head taxes, and corporal punishment. Moreover, they were usually rich and able to pursue a gentlemanly way of life (Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society*, 69).
6. Education landholding was corporate property set aside specifically to fund the educational needs of lineage members. The land was rented out and proceeds were in some cases used to support prospective scholars while they were studying for the civil service examinations or traveling to take their examinations in urban centers. More often, however, proceeds from the education land were used to reward successful examination candidates.

7. The welfare benefits that derived from lineage corporate property must not be exaggerated. Liu (*Chinese Clan Rules*), who studied 116 genealogies and sets of lineage rules, showed that only twelve lineages had charity estates, only eleven offered free burial grounds for the poor, and only six had lineage granaries for the relief of poor members. Hu (*The Common Descent Group*) studied 56 genealogies and sets of lineage rules. She states that, while some of the lineages had charity estates, the general tone of the rules of these lineages did not favor regular (as opposed to occasional) relief to poor lineage members on the principle that such relief would make them lazy.

It is difficult to judge how representative these rules and genealogies were of actual conditions in China. Lineages with genealogies and detailed lineage rules were the richest and the most prestigious groups in the area. Moreover, there remains the possibility of a gap between the rules passed down from the founding fathers of the lineages and the practice of the lineage administration at the time. Above all, studies of genealogies and lineage rules in Central China, where only 8 percent of the land was corporately owned, tells one very little about lineages in Kwangtung where as much as 35 percent of the land was corporate property (Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant*, 29-30). However, Hsiao believes that lineages in Chekiang and Kiangsu were noted for their benevolence to poor lineage members, while lineages in Kwangtung had an uneven record (*Rural China*, 156-57). According to Hsiao, in South China only a minority of the lineages had welfare land or offered low interest loans to the poor. On the contrary, in many lineages there was serious corruption and embezzlement by lineage managers so that resources set aside for the relief of the poor were depleted (*ibid.*, 148, 239, 250-51, 336-41).

8. Freedman, *Lineage Organization*, 131-33.
9. Even where there was corporate property, it was usually so insignificant that it was simply allocated to members to be farmed in turn (Gamble, *Ting Hsien*, 383-84).
10. Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 35.
11. Archaeological findings and local chronicles indicate that South China has been part of the Chinese Empire since the second century B.C. and that it received two waves of migration from North China, one in the fourth century and the other in the tenth century A.D. However, only the Canton area and the east coast of South China were affected during these two periods. In fact, the major parts of Kwangtung and Fukien were not opened until the middle of the thirteenth century when the Han people, pushed by the Mongols in the north, migrated to South China, in turn pushing the aboriginal people towards the uninhabited border areas between Kwangtung, Hunan, and Kwangsi provinces, as well as the central part of Hainan Island (Ch'en, *Kuang-tung*, 6, 49-61, 69-72, 141-220, 229-38).
12. Buck, *Land Utilization in China*, 82-86.
13. Trade between Arab and South Chinese merchants began as early as the third century. Local chronicles of the seventh century indicate that numerous Persians and Arabs resided in Canton for purposes of trade. By the beginning of the fifteenth century, the junk trade with Southeast Asia was prevalent among the South Chinese living on the eastern seaboard. Trade with European merchants began in the middle of the sixteenth century. The coming of the Portuguese was followed by that of the Spanish, Dutch, English, and French. In 1757, the Ch'ing Emperor ordered the border closed to foreign trade. From that date until the Treaty of Nanking (1842), Canton was the only port officially handling foreign trade for the whole of China (Ch'en, *Kuang-tung*, 6-7, 54-62, 152, 199, 204). There were three major emigrant areas in South China: (1) southern Fukien and eastern Kwangtung; (2) the western part of the Pearl River delta and Ssu-yi (collective term for the four hsien: K'ai-p'ing, En-p'ing, Hsin-hui, and T'ai-shan); and (3) northeastern Hainan Island. People from the first area were the first to emigrate because of the junk trade with Southeast Asia (*ibid.*, 68; Ch'en, *Emigrant Communities in South China*, 16, 29-38, 49-50; Freedman, *Lineage Organizations*, 10).

14. Chesneaux, *Secret Societies in China*, 189; Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate*, 122; "The Secret Societies of Kwangtung," 33.
15. Wakeman, "The Secret Societies of Kwangtung," 39-40; Chesneaux, *Secret Societies in China*, 73-74, 140, 190; Lust, "Secret Societies," 199.
16. Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate*, 127, 139-44; "The Secret Societies of Kwangtung," 37, 41.
17. Local militarization in South China in the second half of the nineteenth century was a highly complex and hierarchical system. Although a variety of terminologies was used in specific localities in China, Kuhn (*Rebellion and Its Enemies*) and Wakeman (*Strangers at the Gate*) believe that there were basically three levels. The bottom rung was the "league," sometimes known as *hsiao-t'uan* or *yiih*. It was usually led by lower gentry members and was independent of bureaucratic control. The local militiamen were not mercenaries, and they did not operate outside their home base. League membership was usually composed of either one powerful lineage or one powerful lineage and several poorer and smaller villages in the vicinity. A league served a variety of purposes in addition to defense, including mediation of lineage feuds and organization of charity and welfare activities.

The second level was the "bureau", known as *t'ang*, *chu*, *she*, or *ta-t'uan*, depending on the locality. Kuhn translated all these terms as "multiple *t'uan*." The bureau was led by higher gentry members and was approved by the bureaucracy. It usually controlled a regular militia—i.e., a corps whose members were detached from their local community and stationed in a market town.

The third level was the "central bureau" or "extended multiplex *t'uan*" known in Chinese as *tsung-chu* or *tsung-she*. It was headed by higher gentry members and usually located in an imperial market town or a *hsien* seat. It served as the center of a federation of various bureaus and very often had a permanent militia, the members of which were detached from their local communities to act as mercenary forces supplementing local defense efforts.

In Kwangtung province, local militarization reached a climax between the Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion. With tacit government support, the local inhabitants organized themselves into leagues, bureaus and head bureaus to fight against the Triads.
18. Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate*, 144-50.
19. Freedman, *Lineage Organization*, 119-20.
20. The beginning of the twentieth century marked a brief revival of Triad activities in rural South China. It was much harder to suppress these Triad forces during and immediately after the 1911 Revolution, as they were early supporters of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary movement against the Ch'ing government. Many of them carried the banner of the "People's Army" and created disturbances in rural areas and market towns (*K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 186-96; see also ch. 6).

After 1911 in the urban areas of South China, their efforts to restore the Ming dynasty having failed, the Triads degenerated into gangs engaged in illegal activities such as smuggling, protection of gambling, opium smoking, and prostitution (Chesneaux, *Secret Societies in China*, 191; Lust, "Secret Societies," 200).
21. The Punti were the earliest Han people to settle in South China. They migrated to the area during the tenth century along the North River route. A large majority lived in the Pearl River delta, along the West River, and in western Kwangtung. The Hoklo came to South China during the thirteenth century from Fukien Province. They settled in the Han River drainage, particularly in the area of Ch'ao-chou. At a later point in history, some Hoklo migrated to parts of Hainan Island. The Hakka came from North China during the seventeenth century. They settled in the watersheds of the Han, the East, and the North rivers. The Tanka were exiles during the Yuan Dynasty (1289-1368), when they were so discriminated against by local people that they had to live on boats. They were also excluded from taking the civil service examination (Ch'en, *Kuang-tung*, 68-69, 141, 205, 2n., 229; Vogel, *Canton under Communism*, 22-23).

22. Cohen, "The Hakka or Guest People," 258-59, 263.
23. K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih, 176; Cohen, "The Hakka or Guest People," 278; Ho, *Studies on the Population of China*, 168.
24. According to the Japanese census done during World War II, of 32 million people in Kwangtung, there were 25 million Han (Cantonese and Ch'ao-chou), 4 million Hakka, 3 million Tanka, 200,000 Li, and 100,000 Yao (Vogel, *Canton under Communism*, 23).
25. Cohen, "The Hakka or Guest People," 166.
26. Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society*, 83-85.
27. Hayes, "The Settlement and Development of a Multi-clan Village," 13; "A Mixed Community of Cantonese and Hakka on Lantau Island," 23-24; "Old Ways of Life in Kowloon," 163-68; *The Hong Kong Region*, 29-30.
28. Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure," pt. 1, 3-43; Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society*, 90-95, 102, 195.
29. Buck, *Land Utilization*, 35-37, 83-85, 112, 118; Cressey, *China's Geographical Foundation*, 341-43; Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China*, 144-48.
30. Ho, *Studies on the Population of China*, 157, 174, 185-87, 203.
31. Population growth in Kwangtung was rapid in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (*Kanton chi*, 354-57; *Minami shina sōran*, 561-80), but the rate of growth is difficult to measure. This is not only due to the problems of evasion and local resistance to the taking of the census, but also because the census had been recorded in terms of *ting-k'ou* since the seventeenth century (Ho, *Studies on the Population of China*, 13, 22, 28, 33-35, 45, 52; Perkins, *Agricultural Development*, 206). These were not valid statistics for the actual population. *Ting-k'ou* were merely tax units: *ting* was a labor-levy unit and *k'ou* was a salt-gabelle assessment unit. As only adult males from sixteen to sixty were liable for labor service and the salt gabelle, the records from 1651 to 1711 were only enumerations of the adult males of K'ai-p'ing, not of the entire population of that hsien (*K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 89-90).
 The numbers of *ting-k'ou* after 1711 were even more remote from a population enumeration because of two facts: (a) after 1711 the quota for *ting* services was fixed for each locality; and (b) after 1722, the collection of *ting* levies was merged with land taxes (Ho, *Studies on the Population of China*, 24, 28, 33-35). Thus, although it is obvious that there was an increase in population between 1819 and the 1930s, it is difficult to estimate the exact rate of increase, let alone measure fluctuations within these hundred-odd years.
32. Ho, *Studies on the Population of China*, 149-53, 163-67; Perkins, *Agricultural Development*, 185; Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate*, 179-80.
33. Buck, *Land Utilization*, 268, 361-63.
34. McNair, *The Chinese Abroad*, 31.
35. Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 1-2; Dernberger, "The Role of the Foreigners," 32; Elvin, "Introduction," 100; Vogel, *Canton under Communism*, 21.
36. The value of Overseas Chinese remittances between 1900 and 1933 was considerable, particularly between the years 1929 and 1931, owing to the favorable exchange rates between the Chinese *yüan* and foreign currency (Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 67-68, 111; Dernberger, "The Role of the Foreigners," 33; Nathan, "Imperialism's Effect on China," 5). Most of these remittances flowed into South China, so much so that between 1912 and 1931 South China, unlike North and Central China, had considerable inflow of capital.

Below is a breakdown of the amount of Overseas Chinese remittances into China:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Million Yuan</u> <u>(Annual Average)</u>
1902-13	150
1914-20	120
1921-30	200

Source: Remer, *Foreign Investment in China*, 187-89. Another set of statistics shows the dramatic increase of remittances into China from the Overseas Chinese during the depression years.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Million Yuan</u>
1928	250.6
1929	280.7
1930	316.3

Source: Remer, *Foreign Investment in China*, 184.

37. Vogel, *Canton under Communism*, 28-29; Lee, *Modern Canton*, 122.
38. Remer, *Foreign Investment in China*, 184; Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 67-68, 111.
39. Liang, *Kuang-tung ching-chi ti-li*, 9-10, 12; *Minami shina sōran*, 772-84; Negishi, *Minami shina nōgyō*, 176-78, 283.
40. The chamber of commerce movement grew rapidly between the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty and 1920. One survey shows that Kwangtung province had the greatest number of chambers of commerce in the whole of China (Rhoads, "Merchant Associations in Canton," 7).
41. *Ibid.*, 111-16.
42. Gamble, *Ting Hsien*, 4, 40; Kuhn, *Rebellion and its Enemies*, 211-23; Ch'ien, *The Government and Politics of China*, 226n.
Although Kwangtung was still semi-independent of the Nationalist government when the Hsien Organization Act was passed, Ch'en Chi-t'ang followed its directives. He introduced a similar form of local government to Kwangtung in 1930 (*Ch'en Chi-t'ang chi-nien-chi*, 7, 22, 48-52; Tseng, *Kuang-tung ts'ai-cheng chi-yao*, 14-18).
43. Negishi, *Minami shina nōgyō*, 286-87; Tseng, *Kuang-tung ts'ai-cheng chi-yao*, 4-5; Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 68-75, 79-83.
44. Lee, *Modern Canton*, 115.
45. Ch'ien, *The Government and Politics of China*, 236.
46. Fei, *China's Gentry*; Fei and Chang, *Earthbound China*.
47. Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*.

Chapter 2

1. Ch'en, *Kuang-tung*, 3-4, 31, 65, 79n., 127n., 155n., 241n.
2. Liang, *Kuang-tung*, 21-24, 78-79.
3. *Ibid.*, 75; Ogawa, *Shina chobetsu zenshi*, 1:304.
4. Liang, *Kuang-tung*, 82; Ch'en, *Kuang-tung*, 54; Ogawa, *Shina chobetsu zenshi*, 591-92.

5. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 56-62.
6. *Ibid.*, 61-64; Ogawa, *Shina chobetsu zenshi*, 591-92.
7. Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 34.
8. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 64, 90.
9. The *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih* (21-30) lists ten villages under Wu-jung *hsiang*, eleven villages under Chung-miao *hsiang*, eleven villages under Lu-yuan *hsiang*, and eight villages under Ling-yuan *hsiang*.
10. Hsiao, *Rural China*, 330.
11. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 180, 185, 217-34, 285, 291.
12. For the importance of canonization on lineage prestige, see Topley, "Chinese Religion," 15, 37.
13. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 175-76, 256, 288.
14. *Ibid.*, 250-51.
15. The *hsia-fu* were servile households in the villages of a powerful lineage, members of which inherited their position. They stayed in houses provided by their masters and served without wages. Servile households were present among the most powerful Punti lineages in South China. In Ssu-yi, these were known as *hsi-tzu*, literally meaning "little slaves" (*ibid.*, 53). Freedman (*Chinese Lineage and Society*, 9-10); Baker (*A Chinese Lineage Village*, 155-61); and Watson ("Chattel Slavery," 361-62, 366-67, 371-73) believe that control over such households was a symbol of wealth and power in traditional China.
 The best known Chinese source on servile households is Wang's article ("Kuang-tung i-ke nung-ts'un," 43-49). He compares them with slaves of the Roman Empire but believes that the servile households were much better off because they had more freedom.
 Watson, ("Chattel Slavery," 367) also compares them with slaves but believes that, unlike slaves elsewhere, they did not serve economic or defense purposes but were purely status symbols. According to him, the servile households in South China have been free since 1912. My data do not support this latter assertion, but it is true that in T'uo-fu, despite their social stigma, the servile households did not have a hard time. Although they owned no property—the land they farmed belonged to the ancestral halls—they could do what they pleased with their masters' land. The crops they grew, the subsidiary occupations they had, and extra land they rented were of no concern to the ancestral halls. Like ordinary tenants, they paid 50 percent of their products as rent. Unlike the Kuan, they were not allowed to buy land or houses in the village, but they did not pay rent for the houses they occupied.
16. Watson, "Chattel Slavery," 314; Baker, *A Chinese Lineage Village*, 155-61.
17. Potter, *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*, 21.
18. Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure," pt. 1, 3-43; Masui, "Kanton no kyoshi," 263-77.
19. See *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 186.
20. In other words, Ch'ih-k'an was open on days in the lunar month that contained a three or an eight, i.e., the third, eighth, thirteenth, eighteenth, twenty-third, and twenty-eighth day of each lunar month. See *Ibid.*, 348.
21. *Ibid.*, 22, 86.
22. According to Fei and Chang (*Earthbound China*, 159-60), the most numerous lineage was not always the richest. As land was limited, a numerically large lineage would eventually suffer from an unfavorable population/land ratio. The Kuan lineage was powerful because it had commercial wealth in addition to its land and its numerical strength.
23. While traditional schools did not admit outsiders, the modern ones in T'uo-fu were open to students of all surnames, any of whom could board in the building. In about 1930, for example, non-Kuan students were admitted into the modern primary schools in Chang-

ts'un. Na-luo village was occupied by both the Kuan and the Hu. The modern school, built by the Kuan, admitted the Hu in the village as well as other non-Kuan students from outside. But these had no impact on the pattern of association. The students among the Kuan still kept to themselves.

24. The case of the Kuan was unusual. In San-t'in, Yuen-long, and Sheung-shui in the New Territories of Hong Kong as well as in the Ch'ao-chou area of eastern Kwangtung, lineages allowed outsiders to operate shops in their villages. The same was true in North China (Gamble, *North China Villages*, 136, 142). Anthropologists have given various explanations of this phenomenon. Kulp (*Country Life in South China*, 29-31, 99), for example, believes this was due to the attitude of avoidance towards business transactions among agnates. According to Potter (*Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*, 121-30), the villagers patronized outsiders' stores because they were jealous of the success of their own lineage-mates. One wonders why there were no outside shop owners in rural T'uo-fu. One possible explanation might be found in the "commercial orientation" of the Kuan: agnates felt little embarrassment in dealing with one another in business; they were not jealous of their brothers owning stores in the villages.
25. This is similar to the "land trusts" described by Freedman (*Chinese Lineage and Society*, 33) and Baker (*A Chinese Lineage Village*, 117).
26. This was common among lineages in South China. In other parts of China, however, lineage land was usually regarded as sacred, while the sale of private land was permissible (Fei and Chang, *Earthbound China*, 58, 126, 148, 160, 294; Gamble, *North China Villages*, 193-94; Gamble, *Ting Hsien*, 460; Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy*, 55, 71, 81, 119-20). For this reason, villages in South China had more distinct territorial boundaries than their counterparts in the rest of China.
27. Negishi, *Mīnami shina nōgyō*, 222-23; Topley, "Chinese Religion," 12; Freedman, *Lineage Organization*, 12-13, 73-74; Makino, "Kanton no gozokushi," 92.
28. The reluctance to rent land in the village precinct to outsiders was typical of South China. It was partly for this reason that village boundaries were very distinct. This was not the case in other parts of China where villagers rented land to and from outsiders (Fei and Chang, *Earthbound China*, 148; Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy*, 71, 88; Gamble, *North China Villages*, 193-94).
 However, in both North and South China there was a tendency for outlying corporate property to be rented to outsiders. Hu (*The Common Descent Group*, 199) suggests this was due to the feeling that "strangers can be dealt with more easily in collecting rent." Baker (*A Chinese Lineage Village*, 171) offers another explanation. He believes that lineages tended to rent distant holdings to nonmembers as a means of subjugating them.
 Both Hu and Baker's arguments are difficult to validate or refute. My informants simply explained that it was inconvenient for a Kuan to farm land far away from his home village.
29. As in the rest of China, it was less likely for lineage managers to evict members in case of rent default. The same leniency was often not shown towards nonmember tenants (Fei and Chang, *Earthbound China*, 3-4, 78-79, 226). Thus, some lineage rules even advised that land should not be rented to members (Eberhard, *Social Mobility*, 224; Liu, *Chinese Clan Rules*, 111-12).
30. C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 9, 24n.; Baker, *A Chinese Lineage Village*, 83-86; Hsiao, *Rural China*, 340.
31. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 111-13.
32. The *fu-mu hui* among villagers in eastern Kwangtung, parts of Taiwan, and Shantung, was similar in intention to the Long Life Club. The only difference was that the former was intended to provide funeral services for the parents of members, while the latter was intended to provide coffins for the members themselves (Gallin, *Hsin Hsing*, 26, 221-22; Smith, *Village Life*, 141-42).

33. Brim, "Traditional Temples," 5-7; Baker, *A Chinese Lineage Village*, 48-50; Pasternak, *Kinship and Community*, 111.
34. The importance of the lamp-lighting (*k'ai-teng*) ceremony to village membership in T'uofu can be seen in the treatment of Christians among the Kuan. According to my informants, there were four Protestants in Sha-ti, three in Chang-ts'un, and five in Hsia-p'ien. While they did not perform ancestor worship, they did not suffer socially. The villagers left them alone during the Spring and Autumn Rites. As long as their parents had performed the lamp-lighting ceremony when they were born, these Christians were given ritual pork. The two Catholics in Hsia-p'ien were given nicknames: one was "convert number three" and the other "convert number six." There was no other indication that anyone cared whether they performed ancestor worship.
35. Crop-watching associations were uncommon in North China until 1930, when they were formed by government orders (Gamble, *Ting Hsien*, 214; Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy*, 60-62, 85, 97, 100, 119, 125, 260-61). This was one factor in the increase of village consciousness among the residents there. In South China, because of the predominance of lineage organizations, village consciousness had been very strong from traditional times. Crop-watching associations were formed spontaneously by the villagers themselves without government directives.
36. Fei, "Peasantry and Gentry," 3-6; Liu, *Chinese Clan Rules*, 126-27.
37. Makino, "Kanton no gōzokushi," 95.

Chapter 3

1. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 22, 46, 76, 82, 261, 266, 317. According to my informants, the Ssu-t'u called their section "Eastern Ch'ih-k'an" because they did not like the term "lower," which implied that they were inferior to the Kuan who occupied "upper" Ch'ih-k'an.
2. *Ibid.*, 22, 86, 261.
3. This is an example of the "alliance temples" discussed by Brim ("Traditional Temples," 18-24). He describes alliance temples as centers for organizing interlineage feuds as well as for defense against bandits.
Despite Freedman's assertion that bans on marriage extended to lineages allied with one another (*Lineage Organization*, 5), marriage between the Liu, the Kuan, the Chang, and the Chao was permissible. One informant explained that this was because the Kuan of K'ai-p'ing were not directly descended from Kuan Kung, one of the four blood brothers.
4. Hu, *The Common Descent Group*, 50-51.
5. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 266, 336-40, 355-56.
6. *Ssu-yi ch'iao-pao*, September 1947, 15-16.
7. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 66, 352.
8. There were the Pu-lu Study Hall in Ch'ang-sha; the Yueh-shan Study Hall in Yueh-shan *hsiang*, built by thirteen lineages there; the Tun-lun Study Hall in Pai-ho Market, built by six lineages; and the Tzu-shan Study Hall in Shui-k'ou Market, built by four lineages (*ibid.*, 66).
9. For example, the San-pao Clinic in Sha-chou Market mediated differences between lineages in Yang-lu *hsiang* of K'ai-p'ing, New Pai-sha *hsiang*, and Old Pai-sha *hsiang* of T'ai-shan (*ibid.*).
10. Liu, *Fu-chien ti hsieh-tsu tsu-chih*, 35-46. Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society*, 86, 92-94; Baker, *A Chinese Lineage Village*, 157.

11. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 171-74, 287-93, 354.
12. Hayes, *A Mixed Community*, 25, 7n.
13. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 171-74, 287-93, 354.
14. *Ibid.*, 173-76.
15. The Kuan and Ssu-t'u, for example, were at war again in 1886. The Lau and the Yang of Ch'eng-tung *hsiang* fought intermittently for more than ten years (1896-1910). In 1900, the Fang and the T'an struggled for water rights at Tung-shan. So did the Ch'en and the Hsieh at T'an-pi in 1902, and the Yü and the Liang at Heng-shih *hsiang* in 1924. In 1928, in the seventh *ch'ü*, the Yü and the T'an feuded for control of a ferry, as did the Chu of Yang-lu *hsiang* (in K'ai-p'ing) and the lineages at Pai-sha *hsiang* (in T'ai-shan) (*ibid.*, 170, 177, 190, 197, 261-62).
16. Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society*, 19n.
17. Makino, "Kanton no gōzokushi," 90, 109.
18. Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society*, 37.
19. Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure," pt. 1, 33-41.
20. Pasternak, "The Role of the Frontier," 553-61; *Kinship and Community*, 135-56.
21. See Woon, "The Non-localized Descent Group," 17-29.
22. Eberhard, *Social Mobility*, 206-8, 212; Meskill, "The Chinese Genealogy," 146.
23. Hu, *The Common Descent Group*, 45; Liu, *Chinese Clan Rules*, 110.
24. The Kuan at Yang-chiang, Nan-hai, and Hsin-hui counties were linked genealogically with the Kuan at T'uo-fu, but they did not attend the Kuang-yü *t'ang* at all. According to one of my informants, there was a building in Canton known as the Ch'i-an Study Hall that was one of the remaining relics of Kuan Ching-ch'i, the first of the Kuan to settle in Kwangtung Province. It was a place reserved for the residence of all the Kuan in the province who went to Canton to take their examinations or board temporarily. Spring and Autumn Rites were performed by members of the Kuan gentry of Kwangtung who happened to be there. The ceremony was very simple, and as the hall owned no corporate property, no ritual meat was distributed. Judging from this ritual organization, it is certain that the Ch'i-an Study Hall was the center of the Kuan "clan" in Kwangtung, made up of the Kuan from K'ai-p'ing, Nan-hai, Hsin-hui, and Yang-chiang counties.
25. For ritual links between members of nonlocalized lineages in other parts of China, see also Fei and Chang, *Earthbound China*, 179; Smith, *Village Life*, 191-92; Gallin, *Hsin Hsing*, 24-25, 132-33; Hu, *The Common Descent Group*, 10; M. C. Yang, *A Chinese Village: Taitou*, 13, 70, 161-63.
26. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 172-73, 288.
27. For example, there was military cooperation between the Ssu-t'u at Chiao-t'i and the Ssu-t'u at Ch'ih-shui; the Chang at Sha-kang and the Chang at Ssu-chiu; the T'an at Ch'ang-sha and the T'an at Ch'ih-shui and Tung-shan; and the Liang at Ch'ang-sha and the Liang at Ma-kang (*ibid.*, 171-76, 288).
28. I use the term "surname groups" instead of "clans" or "lineages" because in these cases I am not certain whether people with the same surname are in fact members of a localized lineage, a dispersed village, a higher-order lineage, or a clan.
29. For example, the Kou-p'i-ch'ung Kuan served as an outpost for the T'uo-fu Kuan; the Ch'ih-shui Ssu-t'u served as an outpost for the Chiao-t'i Ssu-t'u; and the Chang-ch'iao Chang and the Ssu-chiu Chang served as outposts for the Sha-kang Chang.
30. Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate*, 67-68, 115.
31. Kuhn, *Rebellion and its Enemies*, 60-61, 78-79, 159-60, 207-10.

Chapter 4

1. Scholars of Chinese society have offered two definitions of the term "gentry." To Chang (*The Chinese Gentry*, xviii), it denotes the scholar-official class. According to Fei (*China's Gentry*, 6, 17), it denotes a particular socioeconomic class—those rich enough to pursue a gentlemanly way of life. He distinguished "gentry" (*shen*) from "literatus" (*shih*), the latter denoting scholars who might or might not have been wealthy enough to support an elite life-style.

It can be argued that the different definitions reflect the historical evolution of the term. Before 1905, while the traditional examination system was still functioning, "gentry" definitely meant scholar-officials with a particular legal status who were exempt from labor duties, head taxes, and corporal punishment (Ch'u, *Local Government*, 168n.). Landowners and merchants did not attain this status, however rich they were, unless they passed the examinations or bought degrees (Eberhard, *Social Mobility*, 12, 15, 23-24).

When the traditional examination system was abolished in 1905, the term "gentry" lost its original meaning. The graduates of modern schools, including university graduates, did not have the legal status of the old scholar-officials, but they still had a great deal of social prestige. Many lineages in South and Central China regarded those who graduated from high schools or post-secondary institutions as gentry members and invited them to join ancestral hall associations. This was because the new civil service examination accepted high school, university, and post-secondary college graduates as candidates (Freedman, *Lineage Organization*, 50, 52, 61-62; Liu, *Chinese Clan Rules*, 186; Gamble, *North China Villages*, 52; Ch'ien, *The Government and Politics of China*, 236). At the same time, those who pursued a life-style similar to that of the traditional scholar-officials, be they landowners, merchants, civil servants, or overseas emigrants, were also regarded with high esteem. Both categories of people—the high-school graduates and the *nouveaux riches*—were termed "new gentry" (*hsin shen-shih*), and were distinguished from the traditional scholar-officials (see also Liu, *Chinese Clan Rules*, 186).

2. K'ai-p'ing is one of the most densely populated *hsien* in Kwangtung. According to the census results released by the Kwangtung Provincial Government in 1934, there were 74,435 households and 442,892 inhabitants in K'ai-p'ing. Its population density was 378 people per square mile (*Kanton chi*, 11-12).

In Kwangtung, only Shun-te, Teng-hai, Ch'ao-yang, Nan-hai, Ch'ai-an, Tung-kuan, P'an-yü, Tseng-ch'eng, P'u-ning, Chung-shan, and Hsin-hui had population densities greater than that of K'ai-p'ing (*ibid.*). These eleven *hsien* are situated in the most fertile areas of the province, in the Pearl River and the Han River deltas, while 70 percent of the land in K'ai-p'ing is barren (*K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 56-61; Negishi, *Minami shina nōgyō*, 76-79). Thus K'ai-p'ing suffers from a very unfavorable population/land ratio. The density of its population is all the more apparent when one compares its figure of 378 people per square mile in 1934 with some parts of western and southern Kwangtung, none of which had a population density of more than 200 people per square mile (*Kanton chi*, 11-13).

The pressure of this population upon limited agricultural land led to the migration of the rural poor to work in towns or overseas. According to the figures given by Feng (*Chung-kuo nung-ts'un*, 772-73), by 1930 about one-tenth of the *hsien* population had emigrated overseas (see also Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 109). However, according to the people I interviewed, the urge to emigrate was not evenly felt in all parts of K'ai-p'ing. In fact, it was confined to lineages situated in the more densely populated areas of the middle and lower courses of the T'an River: the Hsieh, the Chou, the Hu, the Huang, the Kuan, and the Ssu-t'u.

3. K'ai-p'ing *hsien-chih*, 30-46.
4. Ch'en, *Emigrant Communities in South China*, 53, 124-25, 142-43, 257n.; Kulp, *Country Life in South China*, 1:52-53, 342-43.

5. In 1885, the immigration office in Canada began to collect a head tax of \$50 from every Chinese emigrant. In 1905, the head tax was increased to \$500. Still the Chinese continued to come in large numbers. The year of the highest immigration to Canada was 1911-12, right after the Revolution of 1911 in China. In 1923, the government of Canada thought it wise to prohibit Chinese immigration altogether. The ban was lifted in 1947.
6. Davis and Krauter, *The Other Canadians*, 55-72.
7. Negishi, *Minami shina nōgyō*, 73-74, 160, 176-78, 383-86.
8. *Ibid.*, 68, 73-74.
9. Liang, *Kuang-tung*, 13, 63, 80-81; *Minami shina sōran*, 893; *Kanton chi*, 388.
10. The chamber of commerce movement in K'ai-p'ing started around 1907-08. The first was established at Ch'ih-k'an. By 1931, there were eleven chambers of commerce in K'ai-p'ing (*K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 88). It is interesting to note that the first one was not located in Ch'ang-sha, a central market town. This may have reflected the growing importance of Ch'ih-k'an vis-à-vis Ch'ang-sha.

As market towns differed in nature and magnitude from coastal cities and treaty ports, the chambers of commerce of the market towns of K'ai-p'ing differed from those in large cities such as Swatow and Canton. First, there were no big merchant houses, prominent guilds, locality or clan associations founded by merchants or gentry residing in interior market towns. Second, there was no foreign enclave in these market towns equivalent to that of the Sha-mien area of Canton. Finally, there was no large underclass of proletarians who had migrated to the cities from different parts of China.

According to the people I interviewed, a chamber of commerce in K'ai-p'ing was more like a coordinating body, joining merchants of dominant lineages in one particular market town. It was similar to the league or study-hall associations that joined gentry members of different surnames in the nineteenth century, except that the functions of the chamber of commerce were to promote industry, commercial activities, and cooperation across surname lines for mutual economic benefit. Like a supra-guild of larger cities, the chamber of commerce arbitrated disputes between shopowners of different lineages and represented all shopowners to the government.

11. The government of K'ai-p'ing did not play an important part in the establishment of modern schools. Education in that *hsien* was largely dependent on local initiative and voluntary donations. Of a total of 201 schools, only 5 were run by the government. The following table shows the distribution of private schools for the ten districts of K'ai-p'ing.

Private Schools in K'ai-p'ing by Ch'ü (District), 1911-31

<u>Ch'ü</u>	<u>Number of Schools</u>
First	8
Second	13
Third	27
Fourth	37
Fifth	29
Sixth	15
Seventh	16
Eighth	22
Ninth	9
Tenth	21

Source: *ibid.*, 67-71.

From the above table, it should be clear that the Fourth *ch'ü* had the largest number of private schools, followed by the Fifth, the Third, the Eighth, and the Tenth. In these districts lineages were strong, commercial and industrial activities were intense, and overseas emigration was heavy. This leads to the conclusion that the merchants, both overseas and at home, were more eager than the landowners for their offspring to advance through the modern schools into the civil service or to a level of literacy sufficient to gain family prestige as an adjunct to their economic success. In fact, the sudden growth of enthusiasm in private circles to establish schools in the 1920s may have been both a reflection of the growth of trade and commerce in K'ai-p'ing in this period and a consequence of the discrimination suffered by overseas emigrants in North America (*ibid.*, 20, 138-40, 189, 200, 207).

12. In K'ai-p'ing, as in the rest of Kwangtung, there were two types of education land: state-owned and privately owned (Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 26, 74). The government-owned education land was used for financing rites at the Confucian temples in the cities, subsidizing poor aspiring scholars, and maintaining public schools for the poor in the county. Privately owned education land was usually administered corporately by lineages, merchant associations, or other associations. The proceeds of the land were used to assist the scholarly pursuits of the members and for awards to successful scholars of their own group (*ibid.*, 24-26).

In K'ai-p'ing, most of the lineage-held education land was in fact Hakka land seized by the Punti lineages in the 1860s. The Punti lineages had no deeds to prove their ownership (*K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 202-3). In 1919, in K'ai-p'ing as in other counties, the *hsien* government decided to confiscate the merchant associations' education land in order to finance the building of public schools (Feng, *Chung-kuo nung-ts'un*, 440). The *hsien* government also tried to investigate land titles and to engage a tax farmer to collect taxes from lineage-owned education land. To forestall government action, various merchant associations sold their education land and divided the proceeds among the members; the lineages quickly converted their education land to ritual land (*K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 87, 140). Hence, modern schools run by the lineages were not financed by corporate property but by donations from private individuals, particularly rich local merchants and emigrant families.

13. *Ssu-yi ch'iao-pao*, May 1948, 15, 17.
14. The emigrants from the Fukien-Ch'ao-chou area to Southeast Asia were equally if not more enthusiastic about promoting education in eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien (Ch'en, *Emigrant Communities in South China*, 149-61, 275-80). Like emigrants in North America, they wished to send their children to attend schools in China because the latter could not enter the civil service in the colonial governments of Southeast Asia. In addition, the Chinese there were interested in training bookkeepers, shop assistants, and others to help in their businesses overseas. This last motive was not present among the emigrants to North America since they were not allowed to sponsor anyone after 1923. Thus, the type of vocational schools in the Fukien-Ch'ao-chou area that provided apprenticeship in Southeast Asia were not present in the T'uo-fu area where the richest emigrants from North America donated the most money for educational purposes (*K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 30). In the San-t'ün area of Hong Kong's New Territories, the emigrants were so successful abroad that the sons of the Man lineage did not see any reason for going to school. Enthusiasm for education was entirely lacking there (Watson, *Emigration and the Chinese Lineage*, 193-95).
15. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 250-53.
16. *Ibid.*, 87-88.
17. *Ibid.*, 30, 64, 139, 187-89.
18. Fei and Chang, *Earthbound China*, 247; Fei, *Peasant Life in China*, 118; M. C. Yang, *A Chinese Village: Taitou*, 30, 33-34, 132, 157.

19. Not all the emigrant households were rich enough to live in new villages. In fact, only about one in every five or six was able to do so (informant's estimation). The rest did not live very differently from their fellow villagers. Kuan I's family exemplified the above situation. His father had emigrated to Canada many years before, but he and his mother still lived in the old village. He worked as an apprentice in Ch'ih-k'an while his mother farmed. His father remitted only ten dollars (Canadian) a year and seldom saved enough to return home.

Ssu-t'u (*Yüeh-chung ch'iao-hsiang t'u-kai*, 51-52) estimates that about 80 percent of the emigrants in Ssu-yi were very poor, 15 percent had just enough to maintain themselves, and only 5 percent were rich. These became merchants and landlords as they invested in land and businesses (see also C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 142; Mei, "Socio-economic Origins of Emigration," 463-501).

20. The eagerness to build houses was traditional in the sense that members of nonemigrant villages, such as Sheung-ts'uen in the New Territories, were also concerned with houses. Villagers usually felt that it was much more prestigious to own one's house, however shabby, than to rent it (Nelson, "The Chinese Descent System," 113-23). This tradition was manifested more in emigrant communities where many foreign-style houses were built (Kulp, *Country Life in South China*, 1:52-53; Ch'en, *Emigrant Communities in South China*, 109; Watson, *Emigration and the Chinese Lineage*, 155-65). Not only was it a symbol of prestige to own a house, but the insecurity of life abroad created a need for secure investment at home.
21. Accounts given by the *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih* (31, 46-48, 50-51, 54-55) and Ssu-t'u (*Yüeh-chung ch'iao-hsiang t'u-kai*, 51-52, 59-63) show that the life-style of the new gentry among the Kuan was similar to that of the new gentry in other parts of K'ai-p'ing and Ssu-yi.

According to the above sources, during the Kuang-hsi period (1875-1908) emigrant families were still very frugal, but by the Hsüan-t'ung period (1908-11) some families had become rich from overseas remittances. They flaunted their status, and the rich merchants copied them.

These *nouveaux riches* no longer wore homespun clothing; they wore imported, western-style clothing and leather shoes. They ate with knives and forks; they bowed instead of kowtowing during the Spring and Autumn Rites at the ancestral halls. They had chicken and pork and all the best food regardless of famine conditions in their local community. They spoke a few words of English and urged their children to learn English. They smoked imported cigarettes. Many were addicted to opium and patronized gambling and prostitution houses. They held elaborate wedding ceremonies. When a daughter married, they gave her an extremely handsome dowry; when they took in a daughter-in-law, they paid a high bride-price and held a wedding feast so elaborate that it lasted for five days.

Instead of wearing mourning garments during the period of mourning for the dead or while sweeping the graves of their ancestors, the new gentry members put on their best attire and gave parties. However, they strongly believed in the principle of geomancy. They dug up their deceased parents' bones after two years of initial burial (in some cases, even after a year) to rebury them in good geomantic sites. They would rebury their parents' and grandparents' bones every time they believed they had found a better site.

The style of housing in the new villages where the new gentry lived was very different from that of the old villages. While houses in the old villages faced different directions and were very stuffy, since there were windows on only one side, houses in the new villages faced the same direction and had windows on all sides. They were made of concrete and were "castle-like," being at least three storeys high. Since the new gentry houses were often objects of burglary and bandit attacks, they were very secure, with iron bars across the windows and iron gates at the entrances.

22. Ch'en, *Emigrant Communities in South China*, 116-17, 128-30, 145n., 178n., 191n., 206n.
23. Hsü, "Influence of Southseas Emigration," 48-50, 55-56.

24. *Ibid.*, 57.
25. Ch'en, *Emigrant Communities in South China*, 20, 202-5.
26. The conservatism of the returned emigrants among the Kuan is by no means unique. In a study of an emigrant community in the New Territories of Hong Kong (the Man lineage of San-t'in), Watson found that the members of the Man lineage who are engaged in restaurant work in Britain and Western Europe were strongly motivated to uphold the honor and prestige of the lineage. Even in the 1970s, remittances to the lineage were spent on elaborate ancestral rites, the renovation of ancestral halls, and other traditional celebrations. This has resulted in the preservation of a life-style in San-t'in which is fast disappearing in the rest of the New Territories (Watson, *Emigration and the Chinese Lineage*, 199-206).

In a study of villages in South China, Parish and Whyte (*Village and Family*, 280, 295-96) also found that villages dependent on remittances show a tendency to continue engaging in elaborate traditional rites and festivals and sweeping the graves of the ancestors, even when the villages concerned are too poor to afford these activities. Village tradition is continued in these villages not only because Overseas Chinese have sent money, but also because the emigrants have returned to perform the ceremonies. Because of the influence and wealth of overseas relatives, officials in these villages are reluctant to prohibit such activities.

Chapter 5

1. *Kanton chōsha sho*, 16-17.
2. Liang, *Kuang-tung*, 48-51, 80-81.
3. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 82, 84.
4. *Ibid.*, 87-88.
5. *Ibid.*, 77-78, 82, 84, 86, 206.
6. *Kanton chōsha sho*, 7; Liang, *Kuang-tung*, 49, 82.
7. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 182-99.
8. *Ibid.*, 185-87, 190, 196.
9. *Ibid.*, 198-99.
10. *Ibid.*, 190; *Chu Yün ch'üan-chia*, 5, 80.
11. The first significant attempt in K'ai-p'ing to depart from a traditional form of administration was in 1906 when the magistrate asked gentry members to meet at Ts'ang-ch'eng to establish a bureau to investigate the possibility of self-government. However, no concrete action was taken (*K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 181).

Between 1911 and 1930, K'ai-p'ing was in a state of flux. Between the collapse of the traditional system in 1911 and the Hsien Organization Act of 1929, there was no enduring administrative structure. A number of official bureaus were established for specific purposes and were dissolved once the special tasks were over (*ibid.*, pp. 182-208).

In 1924, for example, the Hsien Mortgage and Property Tax Bureau was established. Eight K'ai-p'ing natives were nominated to work there. Anyone selling land or a house had to bring the deeds to the government at Ts'ang-ch'eng to be sealed. Members of the bureau received no salary but were allowed to take 5 percent from the fees collected. In the same year, the Reclaimed Land (*sha-t'ien*) Titles Clarification Bureau was established in Ch'ih-k'an. *Sha-t'ien*, literally meaning "field formed by sand deposits," was a special term referring to reclaimed land at the Pearl River delta. As some of the land deeds to the delta land had been lost, the *hsien* government nominated some K'ai-p'ing natives to work in this bureau. They were to examine all land titles along the T'an River and collect taxes on recently reclaimed land. If landowners did not have land papers, their acreage would be confiscated.

In 1930, four local people were chosen to work in the newly established Bureau for the Management of Hsien Finance. The landowners and the ancestral hall representatives were to pay both land taxes and head taxes to this body. The bureau was dissolved in September 1930 when it proved unworkable. In the same year, the Hsien Land Registration Office was established. Local inhabitants were chosen to map the boundaries of every plot of land, to clarify land titles, and to decide on the amount of taxes to be collected. This was the final attempt of the *hsien* government to clarify land records, some of which were lost after the Hakka-Punti War. The attempt failed, as the local populace did not cooperate in reporting the amount and exact location of the land they owned. The Land Registration Office was dissolved in June 1931.

Besides these bureaus, there were four attempts to establish *hsien* consultative councils. But, again, each was dissolved. Because political struggles in Canton caused chaos in K'ai-p'ing, available funds had to be diverted to the maintenance of social order (*ibid.*, 143, 184, 189, 200, 207).

12. *Ibid.*, 140, 200, 202, 215-16; *Ch'en Chi-t'ang chi-nien-chi*, 22, 48-49; Tseng, *Kuang-tung ts'ai-cheng*, 72-73.
 13. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 145-46.
 14. For a description of the functions of the Education Land Titles Clarification Committee and the *Sha-t'ien* Titles Clarification Bureau, see 11n.
 15. Tseng, *Kuang-tung ts'ai-cheng*, 30.
 16. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 198, 252-53.
 17. For example, in 1929, when the government designated the notorious Yung-an Company as the tax farmer, local leaders protested and won the case. Again in 1930-31, they sent a petition to Canton complaining about the *hsien* chief's handling of the budget. He was relieved of duty (*ibid.*, 199, 205-6). A notoriously corrupt *hsien* chief, Lin Kuang-yüan, was removed in 1947 because K'ai-p'ing local leaders collected evidence of corruption and extortion and brought him to trial at the Supreme Court in Canton. He was relieved of duty and imprisoned (*Ssu-yi ch'iao-pao*, 1947, 3).
- Leaders of the K'ai-p'ing Scholar-gentry Circle at Canton and the Hong Kong K'ai-p'ing Chamber of Commerce also exerted considerable pressure in the resolution of various social and political issues of the *hsien*. In 1929, when Huang Han-kuang advised the Civil Affairs Department to stop opera performances on the grounds that they were organized by the gamblers' rackets and were likely to cause civil disorder, he was unanimously supported. In 1927, Wu Ting-hsin suggested that the *hsien* chief prohibit lineage members from borrowing without the signature and agreement of their elders and gentry leaders. His advice was followed and regulations were passed to that effect (*K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 204). In the 1940s, the Hong Kong K'ai-p'ing Scholar-gentry Circle and Chamber of Commerce in Canton joined in protesting against the *hsien* chief, Ma Pei-kung, because his policemen and soldiers often raided the villagers for rations and other property. Again they won the case.
18. The same role was performed by new gentry members in other parts of Kwangtung. Owing to the rapid development of the modern education system, many new graduates entered local government as civil servants but, as there were more graduates than the government could absorb, a substantial number remained outside the bureaucracy. They often formed pressure groups and professional associations such as teachers', lawyers', doctors', and engineers' associations. They were watchful of government policies. Although they would not identify themselves with the interests of peasants or workers, they were willing and able to organize public opinion to exert pressure on the government through such organs as the Hsiang General Assembly, the Chen General Assembly, or the press, if they felt that their own interests were threatened (Lee, *Modern Canton*, 126, 201; Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, 26-30).

19. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 104-5, 110-11, 178-79.
20. *Ibid.*, 182-208, 217-34, 252-53.
21. *Ibid.*, 182-99.
22. *Ibid.*, 190.
23. *Ibid.*, 130.
24. *Ibid.*, 182-208.
25. *Ibid.*, 206, 252.
26. See also Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, 30-31; Lee, *Modern Canton*, 18-19; Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 75, 111.
27. See also Yao, *Kuang-tung-sheng*, 10-11, 15, 22.
28. According to my informants, before the Ch'en Chi-t'ang period, no emigrant dared return to Ssu-yi where he might be kidnapped or subjected to extortion. Hence, most emigrants merely sent money to buy shop spaces and rented them to local shopowners. Only after 1930 were many concerns actually run by returned emigrants.
29. In Ch'ih-k'an there was the Provincial Bank of Kwangtung, the Ta-t'ung Bank, the Bank of China, and a post office that handled remittances. Most people did not make use of these services because high commission rates were charged. Moreover, as in other parts of South China checks had to be cashed on the same day they were received (Yao, *Kuang-tung-sheng*, 8, 10, 16n.; *Minami shina sōran*, 638-49). Guarantors were compulsory.
30. See also Yao, *Kuang-tung-sheng*, 10-11, 15, 22; Ch'en, *Emigrant Communities in South China*, 149-50, 206n.
31. Ch'en, *Emigrant Communities in South China*, 20-21, 74-75, 201.
32. To demonstrate the comparatively large size of Ch'ih-k'an one need only consider Shunchun Market which served the New Territories of Hong Kong until 1949. It contained only 61 large shops and 323 medium shops, yet it was regarded as an important intermediate market town (Brim, "An Outline," 1-4). Ch'ih-k'an had 1,000 shops, so it must have been much larger than other market towns in South China. By 1930 it was more like a miniature town than a rural market.
33. Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure," pt. 2, 201.
34. These were called *lan* (wholesale firms dealing in foodstuffs). Small dealers bought goods from them to retail in their own standard market towns (Masui, "Kanton no kyoshi," 278, 280).
The modernization of Ch'ih-k'an was even implied in the way informants described that town. Kuan B, for example, called Ch'ih-k'an a *hsü*. Kuan A called Ch'ih-k'an a *shih*, while Kuan J (the last of my informants to leave K'ai-p'ing) corrected me twice by saying that it was a *fu*, not a *hsü* or a *shih*. This change in terminology necessarily bespeaks the modernization of Ch'ih-k'an, since the term *hsü* means a meeting place for itinerant peddlers; the term *shih* indicates the presence of permanent commercial establishments in the market, and *fu* means a center of commerce where the selling of commonly used goods was concentrated (*ibid.*, 277-81).
35. For a description of the guilds in premodern China, see Morse, *The Guilds of China*, 4-6, 15n., 19, 57.
36. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 85.
37. *Ibid.*, 196.
38. *Ibid.*, 88.
39. Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure," 37-41.

Chapter 6

1. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 90, 130-31, 208, 215-16.
2. Ts'eng, *Kuang-tung ts'ai-cheng*, 40, 60.
3. *Ssu-yi ch'iao-pao*, September 1948, 17.
4. *Ibid.*, October 1949, 49.
5. *Ibid.*, September 1948, 11.
6. Along with other administrative reforms, the judicial system in K'ai-p'ing during the Min-kuo period was reorganized. In 1927 there was a district court at Ts'ang-ch'eng with trial by jury (*K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 142).
7. North China underwent judicial changes, but formal lawsuits were discouraged. Under government auspices, an antiligation society was formed to settle affairs before they reached the law courts (Gamble, *Ting Hsien*, 1, 126, 165, 257). This was similar to the function of the "peace talkers" in traditional China (Smith, *Village Life*, 216-17). However, in North China, where lineages were weak, the unofficial judicial power of the lineage leaders was never as comprehensive as that of the Kuan in T'uo-fu (M. C. Yang, *A Chinese Village: Taitou*, 141, 149-50; Gamble, *Ting Hsien*, 136).
8. In North China, where the unofficial power structure of the villages was loosely organized, *pao* and *chia* chiefs were much more powerful than their counterparts in South China (M. C. Yang, *A Chinese Village: Taitou*, 142, 186, 240-41, 245; Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy*, 258).
9. Kulp, *Country Life in South China*, 1:106-11; Freedman, *Lineage Organization*, 37; Baker, *A Chinese Lineage Village*, 133n.
10. Fei, *China's Gentry*, 8, 133-39.
11. Hsiao, *Rural China*, 335.

Chapter 7

1. A *ch'iao-hsiang* is a residential neighborhood in the countryside for emigrant families. The members rely mainly on overseas remittances and only to a small extent on farming for a livelihood. This term is similar to what Ch'en (*Emigrant Communities in South China*, 4, 3n.) called "an emigrant community." Of course, that a village was a *ch'iao-hsiang* or an emigrant community did not mean that all its male members had gone overseas. In Chung-pui, a village in the New Territories, only 17 out of 201 people had gone overseas. It was considered an emigrant community because villagers were dependent on overseas remittances (Watson, *Emigration and the Chinese Lineage*, 83).
2. The improved economic position of the servile households in the 1930s was not confined to rural T'uo-fu. It was also true of the servile households in Wang's village (Wang, *Kuang-tung i-ke nung-ts'un*, 48-49). These two places had one thing in common: both were emigrant communities. While the servile households were nonemigrants, they must have benefited from the wealth being ploughed back into the villages. The generous tips mentioned by my informants are a case in point. There were other reasons. Because of the prevalence of emigration among their members, the fortunes of the elite lineages fluctuated. During certain periods the emigrants were more successful, while in other periods some went bankrupt. If Kulp's statistics are reliable, an average of only 10 percent of the emigrants returned rich (Kulp, *Country Life in South China*, 1:50-55). The servile households were on the whole more stable economically, and they benefited from the labor shortage created by overseas emigration. The improvement of the position of servile households was also observed by Potter and Baker in the New Territories of Hong Kong in the 1960s. In Sheung-shui, some improved themselves economically and founded a new settlement a few miles away (Baker, *A Chinese Lineage Village*, 15-16, 61). In

P'ing-shan, the servile households shared the general prosperity of the villages and purchased houses from the Tang (Potter, *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*, 21, 98, 136) because they were able to take advantage of the vegetable revolution in the New Territories.

3. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 195, 204.
4. See also Hu, *The Common Descent Group*, 67.
5. The behavior of my informants was typical of the area. Kuan H did not send money home to purchase land; neither did Kuan I or his father (who was also an emigrant). Kuan B did not remit money to buy land: he merely rebuilt his old house in the village. Kuan C purchased about three-fifths of an acre for his wife, who did all the farming. Kuan D's father bought very little land in the village—just enough to support the family members. Kuan D himself bought only one-tenth of an acre in 1942 for transplanting. Kuan A's father added only one-quarter acre to their family property; his mother did all the farming. Because of this reluctance to invest in the countryside, it was the price of house lots, and not farmland, that was high after the 1920s. The only exceptions occurred during the period immediately after World War II.
6. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 193.
7. Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 22-30; Feng, *Chung-kuo nung-ts'un*, 236, 252-53.
8. Freedman, *Lineage Organization*, 15; Feuerwerker, *The Chinese Economy*, 35; Feng, *Chung-kuo nung-ts'un*, 505, 912; C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 48, 67.
9. Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 81-94.
10. Riskin, "Surplus and Stagnation," 56-60; Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy*, 14-15.
11. For example, Perkins, *Agricultural Development*; Buck, *Land Utilization*; Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*.
12. The distributionist school can be further broken down into two groups. One group of scholars believes that rural poverty in China was caused by internal factors (see, for example, Lippit, "The Development of Underdevelopment in China"). Peasants were exploited by landlords (including resident landlords, absentee landlords, and collective landlords), usurers, middlemen, merchant-industrialists, government officials, soldiers, bandits, and gangsters.

The second group of scholars (notably Esherick, *Harvard in China*; Fei, *China's Gentry*; Fei and Chang, *Earthbound China*; and Frank, "Development of Underdevelopment or Underdevelopment of Development in China") argues that rural poverty was caused by foreign intrusions after 1842, when gunboats forced open the gates and unequal treaties took away China's ability to fix her own tariffs. Increasing foreign trade in the subsequent period exposed the Chinese rural economy unfavorably to the vagaries of the world market. Much of China's wealth was siphoned off in the form of indemnities, interest on loans, and capital gains by foreigners. Treaty ports attracted rural capital and talent, but did not offer new rural technology or enough industrial jobs to absorb the rural migrants who lost their land to the merchant-industrialist exploiters.

The impact of imperialism on Chinese villages has been hotly debated. Some scholars, opposing the distributionist school, argue that foreign intrusion after 1842 provided an exogenous shock that lifted China from the higher-level equilibrium trap, and that treaty ports and foreign trade helped alleviate peasant misery by providing markets for farm produce and handicrafts, and creating nonfarm job opportunities. (Dernberger, *The Role of the Foreigners*; Fairbank, Eckstein, and Yang, "Economic Change in Early Modern China"; Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy*; and Potter, *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*). Other scholars simply argue that the foreign impact on China was so minimal that it had little or no effect on the domestic economic scene. (Hou, *Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China*; Murphey, "The Treaty Ports and China's Economic Modernization"; and Feuerwerker, *The Foreign Establishment in China in the Twentieth Century*).

13. Ssu-t'u (*Yüeh-chung ch'iao-hsiang t'u-kai*, 17, 27, 36-37, 40, 53-56), in his account of emigrant communities in western Kwangtung, also holds that the worst form of economic exploitation suffered by the peasantry occurred in cash-crop growing areas such as the tobacco land of Ho-shan and the garlic fields of Sha-kang in K'ai-p'ing. In these cash-crop growing areas, the interests of small industrialists, usurers, and merchants merged with those of lineage managers.
14. Buck, *Land Utilization*, 37-39, 289, 461-67; Potter, *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*, 187, 193; C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 36, 64.
15. Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, 20-21, 28-29; Lee, *Modern Canton*, 120-22.
16. Profits from land ownership in China were low in terms of the capital invested. In 1922, for example, landlords received a 2.5 percent return on land, whereas the return for commerce and moneylending was 10 to 20 percent. Speculation in bonds, commodities, foreign exchange, and urban real estate was more lucrative than buying farmland (Feuerwerker, *The Chinese Economy*, 18; Perkins, *Agricultural Development*, 13-15).
 Thus it is clear that rural investment was unpopular unless it occurred in a high profit area such as the Pearl River delta or the Yangtze delta. These were precisely the areas that suffered most from increasing land concentration and a high percentage of tenancy.
17. Ssu-t'u, *Yüeh-chung ch'iao-hsiang t'u-kai*, 16, 25, 58-59, 61-63, 86; C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 44-45, 71-76.
18. Buck, *Land Utilization*, 36, 83, 86; Perkins, *Agricultural Development*, 227.
19. Potter, *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*, 194, 202; C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 46, 123-26.
20. Buck, *Land Utilization*, 196; Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, 395.
21. Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 50-53, 56; C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 48.
22. Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 22-23, 115-16; Negishi, *Minami shina nōgyō*, 252.
23. *Ibid.*, 91, 104-5.
24. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 58-63.
25. In Chu hsien, where kinship links were unimportant, individuals were less secure in all aspects of urban life than were the Kuan of K'ai-p'ing (Fried, *Fabric of Chinese Society*, 121-25, 186-91, 224). In the New Territories, it was precisely the lack of kinship ties that prevented some villagers from investing in market towns or finding jobs there (Watson, *Emigration and the Chinese Lineage*, 58, 81; Aijmer, "Expansion and Extension in Hakka Society," 51-53).

Chapter 8

1. Freedman, *Lineage Organization*, 126n.; Makino, "Kanton no gōzokushi," 105.
2. Other studies of South Chinese villages support the argument that the economic base of a lineage effected class conflict. According to C. K. Yang (*A Chinese Village*, 123-26) and Potter (*Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*, 182), nonfarm opportunities increase the chance of upward mobility for lineage members. Moreover, class conflict is lessened because the city acts as a safety valve for both rich and poor in the rural hinterland.
3. Lippit, "The Development of Underdevelopment in China," 258, 300, 304-5, 317.
4. Elvin, "Introduction," 8.
5. Buck, *Land Utilization*, 290, 365; Liang, *Kuang-tung*, 13, 16; C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 5.
6. Ch'en, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, 2-3; Feng, *Chung-kuo nung-ts'un*, 427.
7. *K'ai-p'ing hsien-chih*, 89-90.

8. Dernberger, "The Role of the Foreigners," 39-40.
9. Vogel, "Land Reform in Kwangtung," 27-62.
10. C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 7, 73-75.
11. Hu, *The Common Descent Group*, 10.
12. Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy*, 110; Smith, *Village Life*, 147-48, 241, 243; M. C. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 13, 26, 229; Gamble, *North China Villages*, 193.
13. Aijmer, "Expansion and Extension," 60-62, 66-69.
14. Johnson, "Leaders and Leadership," 33; Potter, *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*, 161-62, 168-80.
15. Kulp, *Country Life in South China*, 50-53.
16. Freedman, *Lineage Organization*, 74-76; Kuhn, *Rebellion and its Enemies*, 60-61.
17. Gruetter, "The Peasant Movement," 60-73, 84-85.
18. *Nan-fang jih-pao*, 3 December 1949; 10 January 1950; 24 February 1950; 7 July 1950; 11 August 1950; 11 September 1950; 5 December 1950; 12 January 1951; 5 May 1951; 29 May 1951. See also Ssu-t'u, *Yüeh-chung ch'iao-hsiang t'u-kai*, 9-10.
19. C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 121.
20. *Ibid.*, 136-42, 179.
21. Vogel, "Land Reform in Kwangtung," 29-40.
22. See also Ssu-t'u, *Yüeh-chung ch'iao-hsiang t'u-kai*, 12.
23. See also Parish and Whyte, *Village and Family*, 28.
24. The official line argued that Overseas Chinese had been poor peasants and landless laborers before they emigrated and were members of the proletariat class overseas. Family members at home were subjected to "feudalistic exploitation" (see *Nan-fang jih-pao*, 16 January 1951, 6), so the policy opposed confiscation of their money, houses, or personal belongings. They also were allowed to keep their land even if they had more than the middle peasants in the village, but emigrant family members were required to work to earn their living. They also had to choose between offering low-interest loans to peasants seeking to improve production or depositing their savings in the People's Bank. It was mandatory that they contribute to relief efforts and buy government bonds. If they had more than one house, they were required to donate it to the peasant's association for redistribution (Ssu-t'u, *Yueh-chung ch'iao-hsiang t'u-kai*, 58, 60-62).
25. See also C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 137, 155.
26. See also *ibid.*, 141-42.
27. See also Parish and Whyte, *Village and Family*, 100; Ssu-t'u, *Yüeh-chung ch'iao-hsiang t'u-kai*, 13; C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 138-40; *Nan-fang jih-pao*, 3 February 1952.
28. C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 148; Vogel, "Land Reform in Kwangtung," 37, 40-41.
29. Vogel, "Land Reform in Kwangtung," 49-51.
30. Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society*, 173n.
31. Parish and Whyte, *Village and Family*, 58, 114, 302-5, 308-12.
32. In the early 1980s, the government of the People's Republic has made several organizational changes in their rural economic policies, such as inauguration of the "responsibility system," enlargement of private plots, establishment of a freer marketing system, and partial abandonment of the workpoint system in favor of production quotas for production teams, subteams, and even individual households. It is too early to assess the impact of these policies on the solidarity of the lineage-cum-production teams in rural South China. See Lippit, "The People's Commune and China's New Development Strategy"; Nolan and White, "Distribution and Development in China"; and Domes, "New Policies in the Commune," for a critical account of these new developments.

Appendix 1

1. Liu, *Chinese Clan Rules*, 77.
2. According to my informants, a study room (*shu-shih*) was the same as an ancestral hall, only smaller and attended by fewer people. Watson (*Emigration and the Chinese Lineage*, 22) also found some study rooms in San-t'in in the New Territories of Hong Kong. These were set up by the lower segments of the Man lineage, but there were no ancestral tablets. According to Makino (*Kanton no gōzokushi*, 98), a study room was built by the donor for himself during his lifetime. It would be known as an ancestral hall (*tz'u-t'ang*) once the donor was dead, and his descendants began to worship him there.

While these various descriptions of the study room need not be exclusive of one another, it is difficult to arrive at an exact definition of the term, the connotation of which varies from locality to locality in Kwangtung.

3. The returned emigrants who lived in the new villages followed the same pattern of going back to their village of origin for Spring and Autumn Rites. It is in fact not an unusual practice in China to have patrilineal kin return every year from great distances to participate in rituals of the ancestral village (Fei and Chang, *Earthbound China*, 179; Smith, *Village Life*, 191-92; Gallin, *Hsin Hsing*, 24-25, 132-33; M. C. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, 13, 70, 161-63).

Appendix 2

1. "Pigs" were victims of the indentured-labor system operated by mid-nineteenth-century Europeans in their colonial possessions in Southeast Asia, Central and South America, and the Pacific islands. Chinese laborers were recruited to work in plantations or mining camps in these areas under a contract, which provided them with passage money, residence, and a living allowance binding them to work for a certain period of time.
2. *Shui-k'e* were messengers who traveled between Overseas Chinese communities and their home villages, bringing letters, remittances, and goods for their clients (Yao, *Kuang-tung-sheng*, 27).
3. A *fang-k'ou* is a communal residence for Chinese emigrants found only in North America. It usually houses single men from the same lineage who cook together and help one another. Only on rare occasions would a *fang-k'ou* house people of the same occupation. They are not found in Hong Kong, Canton, or Southeast Asia because shops there are so constructed that employees live with the shop owners' families (T. H. Lee, personal communication).
4. According to Ch'en (*Landlord and Peasant in China*, 111-12), it was not until 1934 that female emigration reached its height, owing to the encouragement of the colonial powers such as the British in Malaya and the Dutch in Indonesia. This was also a period of considerable family emigration.
5. The plural-wife system was very common among the Chinese in Southeast Asia (Ch'en, *Emigrant Communities in South China*, 121, 134-35). It differed from concubinage since the second wife had equal social and legal standing with the first wife. The only part of China that also had a plural-wife system was Yunnan (Osgood, *Village Life*, 272-73, 285-86, 322).

This statement of Kuan H confirms Hsu's argument ("Influence of South Seas Emigration," 50) that foreign-born wives could not be agents of social change in emigrant communities in South China since so few of them visited their husbands' native villages.

GLOSSARY

Chang 張	fu-mu hui 父母會
Chao 趙	han-lin 翰林
ch'en 陳	Ho 何
chen 鎮	hsi-tzu 細仔
chen-chang 鎮長	hsia-fu 下伙
chen kung-so 鎮公所	hsiang 鄉
Ch'i 戚	hsiang-chang 鄉長
chia 甲	hsiang kung-so 鄉公所
chia-chang 甲長	hsiang-t'uan 鄉團
ch'iao-hsiang 僑鄉	hsiao-ya-kung-t'ien
chin-shih 進士	小亞公田
Chou 周	hsieh 謝
Chu 朱	hsien 縣
chü 局	hsien-chang 縣長
ch'ü 區	hsing-hsiang 行像
ch'ü-chang 區長	hsin shen-shih 新紳士
chü-jen 舉人	hsin-ts'un 新村
Fan 范	hsiu-ts'ai 秀才
fang 房	hsü 墟
Fang 方	Hsü 許
fang-k'ou 房口	Hsüeh 薛
fu 埠	hu 戶

Hu 胡
hua-p'ao 花炮
Huang 黃
k'ai-teng 開燈
Kuan 關
K'uang 廣
kung-fen-t'ien 公分田
kung-sheng 貢生
lan 欄
Lau 勞
Li 李
Li 黎
li 里
li-kung-sheng 例貢生
Liang 梁
Liu 劉
Luo 羅
Ma 馬
nu 奴
nung-ts'un 農村
pao 保
pao-chang 保長
pao-chia 保甲
pao-tzu 寶仔
pao-tzu 保仔
sha-t'ien 沙田
shen-shang 紳商

shen-shih 紳士
shih 市
shu-shih 書室
shui-k'e 水客
Ssu-t'u 司徒
Su 蘇
ta-keng-hu 大耕戶
T'an 譚
Teng 登
teng-liao 燈寮
tiao-lou 厝樓
ting-k'ou 丁口
Tseng 曾
tz'u-t'ang 祠堂
wai-chai-t'ien 外宅田
Wu 吳
Yang 楊
yang-lou 洋樓
Yeh 葉
yi-tz'u 義祠

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