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Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion

1. Introduction

It has become popular to conceive of emotions as epistemically valuable. According to a widely held view, emotions provide epistemic access to the normative significance of objects and events in our surroundings.¹ Roughly, the proposal is that, in favourable circumstances, feeling fear or contempt towards x conveys that x has a certain negative import, while feeling admiration or pride towards x conveys that x is positively significant in some respect. I will refer to this view of emotion as the Epistemic View.

The Epistemic View is taken to articulate a strong pre-theoretical intuition. In particular, many of its proponents suppose that ordinary emotional experience is aptly characterized in terms of the apprehension of specific normative properties.² Moreover, the view holds theoretical appeal for those interested in developing a non-mysterious, quasi-empiricist epistemology of the normative. If the view is correct, there is no need to posit a special faculty of intuition to explain how it is possible to detect normative properties. Rather, this role is fulfilled by a familiar and non-mysterious class of psychological phenomena. If we are careful to avoid certain traditional rationalist prejudices, emotions can be recognized as providing access to normative properties much like sensory perceptions detect sensory properties.³

My concern in this paper is with one particularly prominent version of the Epistemic View. On this version, the normative properties to which emotions allegedly provide access are *response-dependent*. Proponents of this version claim that the fearsome (contemptible) character of something or someone is detected in episodes of fear (contempt), while admirability (prideworthiness) is registered in experiences of admiration (pride). As suggested by the terms we use to pick out these properties, they are essentially related to a particular emotion. Thus, it is essential to something's being fearsome (contemptible) that it stands in a

specific relation to fear (contempt). Because of their essential connection to emotions, I shall refer to these properties as *affective properties*. To distinguish the claim that emotions provide epistemic access to affective properties from other variants of the Epistemic View on which they register response-independent values, I shall refer to the former as the Response-Dependence View.

While defended across the analytic-continental divide, the earliest appearances of the Response-Dependence View can be traced to main figureheads of the late phenomenological tradition. In particular, it has been argued to be a core aspect of Heidegger's views on affectivity that emotions reveal corresponding response-dependent properties.⁴ Though perhaps more controversial, Sartre's claims about the intentionality of emotion invite a similar interpretation.⁵ In contemporary analytic philosophy, the grounds for the view have famously been prepared by McDowell, who puts forward the idea of value experiences which are relevantly similar to sensory experiences of secondary qualities.⁶ McDowell considers emotions like fear and admiration to be candidates for value experiences, thus pointing towards a view on which emotions provide epistemic access to corresponding response-dependent properties (fearsomeness, admirability). On this proposal, emotional experience constitutes a sensitivity to the way things evaluatively are which importantly complements our sense-perceptual access to colour.⁷

In this paper, I put some pressure on the Response-Dependence View. My charge will focus on the nature of the essential link between affective properties and the corresponding emotional responses. I will argue that the Response-Dependence View is at odds with the most common, normative conception of this connection.⁸ I begin a few additional clarificatory remarks on this view and its motivation (section 2). Then I go on to specify the normative character of affective properties (section 3) and show how it conflicts with the Response-Dependence View (section 4).

I should note that the argument I provide in this paper is negative. I argue that a popular account of the epistemic significance of emotion is unsuccessful. In doing so, I do not mean to cast doubt on the very concern to develop an epistemology of affective properties, but only to rule out one option that has come to seem attractive to many. While I do not go on to construct an alternative picture, I nonetheless hope to lay some foundations for the development of more adequate view of our epistemic access to them by highlighting the normative character of affective properties and the difficulty it raises for the Response-Dependency view.

2. The Response-Dependence View

Affective properties seem to be quite plausible candidates for properties that are epistemically accessible through emotion. If there is an experience that is apt to convey the fearsomeness of some object, it seems *prima facie* compelling to suppose that it is fear. A helpful way to make sense of the plausibility of this claim is by relating it to a specific conception of the link between colour and sensory experience. It is very common to suppose that colours are response-dependent and as such essentially tied to sensory experiences of them. In conceiving of redness as a secondary quality we take it as essential to something's being red that it stands in a specific relation to the corresponding colour impression. At the same time, colour impressions also plausibly constitute our primary epistemic access to colour. In light of this, it is tempting to model the connection between emotions and affective properties along similar lines. If affective properties, too, are response-dependent, it is not far-fetched to suppose that episodes of fear are apt to detect fearsomeness just as impressions of red and blue detect redness and blueness, respectively.⁹

While proponents of the Response-Dependence View characteristically model emotional access to response-dependent properties directly on sensory access to colour, my

understanding of the view will be slightly more liberal. As stated above, the view claims that emotions convey to their subjects exemplifications of affective properties. I will take it that the exemplification of a property may be conveyed to an individual by being *presented* to her by some mental state of hers, where ‘present’ refers to the specific, direct manner in which material objects and their sensory properties are detected in sensory perception. I shall not suppose, however, that exemplifications of properties can be conveyed only in this presentational manner. I do not wish to rule out that this can be achieved also by mental events or states that *represent* property exemplifications without presenting them.¹⁰ This construal of the Response-Dependence View accommodates for variants of the view which do not assume that emotions involve some kind of quasi-perceptual impression or appearance.¹¹ Proponents of such variants still suppose that there is an important epistemic analogy with the perceptual detection of sensory properties, though. That is, as I understand the Response-Dependence View, all of its versions are committed to an analogy with the perception of secondary qualities in that emotions are seen as affording our primary epistemic access to affective properties. I take it that this epistemic analogy is crucial to the appeal of the view as a candidate for a quasi-empiricist epistemology of normative properties.

To conceive of emotions as our primary access to affective properties is to suppose that we normally depend on the former for our awareness of the latter. Just as we standardly rely on sensory impressions of red to detect redness, we standardly rely on experiences of fear to detect fearsomeness. This is, of course, compatible with the existence of other types of access to them. We may be told that some event or situation is fearsome just as we may be told the colour of some object without enjoying the corresponding emotional or visual experience ourselves. Proponents of the Response-Dependence View ought to allow that, in favourable circumstances, testimony, too, can afford epistemic access to affective properties. Yet, in maintaining the epistemic analogy with perception of sensory properties, they are

committed to a different view of how normally detect them. On the Response-Dependence View, we more routinely become aware of affective properties through the corresponding emotion.

With these clarificatory remarks in place, I now turn to the normative character of affective properties and how it conflicts with this view.

3. The Practical Import of Affective Properties

In thinking of colours as response-dependent properties, we conceive of them as dispositions to produce corresponding colour impressions. By contrast, the response-dependence of affective properties is not normally cashed out in mere dispositional terms. Instead of supposing that affective properties are dispositions to produce certain emotions, it is much more common to think of their essential link to emotions as *deontic*. More specifically, on the standard, deontic view of affective properties, x is fearsome (contemptible, admirable...) if and only if x requires, merits or gives reason for being feared (despised, admired...). As this explication suggests, the term 'deontic' is here to be understood in a broad sense which covers forms of prescriptive import that fall short of genuine obligations or oughts. If for x to be fearsome is for x to give reason for being feared, it does not follow that one ought to be afraid of x . Perhaps there are better reasons not to be. It still seems plausible to conceive of fearsomeness as having prescriptive force on this view. This is because, if x gives one reason to fear x , one is doing something wrong not to fear x unless there is adequate countervailing justification. The property has prescriptive force insofar as there is a need for adequate justification to do other than what it gives one reason to do.

The deontic view of affective properties is most prominently exemplified by neo-sentimentalism. Neo-sentimentalists conceive of affective properties as axiological properties whose normativity is to be reductively analysed in deontic terms.¹² It is worth stressing,

though, that the deontic view of them is not specific to neo-sentimentalism. Various theorists conceive of affective properties as deontic from the outset, proposing that they are deontic as opposed to or over and above being axiological.¹³ In contrast to the former, these latter views assume a deontic conception of them independently of any aspiration to reduce the axiological to the deontic.¹⁴

If we assume (as I will) the standard, deontic view of affective properties, this has important consequences for our understanding of their role in our emotional lives. That is, we thereby recognize affective properties as practically significant vis à vis the corresponding emotion. This practical significance is captured in part by the idea that they prescribe a certain emotion. But there is a further aspect to it. It is a familiar and natural thought that deontic entities – entities which give directions on how to conduct – must be such that they can make a difference to our actual conduct by providing *guidance* on how to act (feel, think). That is to say that it must in general be possible to heed their directions in order to bring ourselves to do what they solicit: we must be able to come to act (feel, think) as solicited by deontic entities *on account of* their solicitations. Intuitively, if deontic entities did not allow for this possibility, this would seem to undermine their very point or purpose.

I will refer to this requirement on deontic entities as the Guidance Constraint. Applied to the case of affective properties, it requires that they guide the formation of the corresponding emotional attitude: if the property of being fearsome has prescriptive force, then it must in general be possible for us to come to feel fear towards fearsome things on account of their fearsomeness. The Guidance Constraint thus specifies an additional respect in which affective properties are practically significant. As prescriptions they must be able to make an actual difference to our emotional lives.

Though perhaps not beyond dispute, the Guidance Constraint is very widely accepted. For the purpose of this paper, I will assume it is true. Given this assumption, I take it to be a

natural requirement on an adequate epistemology of the deontic that it is sensitive to this constraint. That is, an adequate account of our epistemic access to deontic entities should allow for them to guide our conduct. Yet it seems that the Response-Dependence View fails on this count. Let me explain.

4. The Response-Dependence View and the Practical Import of Affective Properties

According to the Response-Dependence View, our primary access to affective properties is provided by the very emotion they prescribe. Its proponents hold that the fearsome (admirable) character of things is typically registered in episodes of fear (admiration). This means that the Guidance Constraint is systematically violated. It seems that no guidance can be had from a prescription that one comes to be aware of by doing what it prescribes. If x prescribes fear of x , and this prescription is detected precisely by fearing x , then any guidance one might expect to receive from this prescription on what to feel towards x comes too late.¹⁵ It seems uncontroversial that for prescriptions to provide any guidance they have to be within our ken. It is impossible for us to comply with a prescription that has not registered with us. Yet if the prescription to fear x is brought within our ken by the very feeling whose formation it is supposed to guide, then it can no longer guide its formation. In order to come to feel as prescribed by an affective property on account of that property, some *prior* grasp of it is needed.

To get a clearer grasp of the problem, consider a structurally analogous scenario. Imagine a cardboard box with a flap at the top. There is an instruction on the flap, which says “Please tear open”, but it is written on its back. Thus, to read the instruction you must tear open the flap. In this case, for you to know what you are supposed to do you must already do that exact thing. But this means that the instruction on the flap can no longer provide any guidance. For you to tear the flap open on account of the instruction, you must be aware of

this instruction before tearing it open. As long as your access to it is provided by the action prescribed, the instruction is practically otiose.

Of course, this analogy is not perfect. This scenario concerns a specific action rather than emotion. Moreover, while the Response-Dependence View concerns a well-known class of deontic properties, it is not clear that there is any familiar deontic property corresponding to the instruction to tear open the flap. However, what matters for my purposes is the structural similarity between the detection of affective properties, as conceived by adherents of the Response-Dependence View, and the detection of the instruction. In both cases, our access to what is demanded of us inherently precludes the demand from making any difference to our conduct. If we access the prescription via the very conduct prescribed, it can no longer help us conform our conduct accordingly. Since this what the Guidance Constraint requires of affective properties, it conflicts with the claim that we gain awareness of them through the corresponding emotion.

Faced with this charge, proponents of the Response-Dependence View might insist that they are not committed to emotions providing our sole access to affective properties. They might maintain that it is possible to come to know affective properties by other means, and only subsequently feel the corresponding emotion. Thus, it is possible to learn that some object is fearsome via testimony and, as a result of this, be afraid of it. In this case, access to the prescription to fear that object is available prior to feeling afraid so that the prescription can guide us in forming the emotion.

However, acknowledging this possibility helps little to alleviate the charge. After all, proponents of the Response-Dependence View are committed to emotions providing our primary access to affective properties and thus suppose that we standardly depend on our emotions for our awareness of them. If most exemplifications of affective properties in our surroundings are detected emotionally rather than by emotion-independent means, there will

be comparatively few of them whose directions we can heed. True, on the picture proposed by the Response-Dependence View, exemplifications of these properties can guide us in forming the corresponding emotion on those occasions when we come to be aware of them by emotion-independent means. But these will be the exception rather than the rule. If it were true that we normally rely on our emotions to detect affective properties, then, for the most part, they would be precluded from offering guidance since our access to them would be provided by the very attitude prescribed. Yet according to the Guidance Constraint, affective properties should generally be able to make a difference to how we feel, not only in rare cases. It seems that the Response-Dependence View cannot accommodate for this.

Perhaps adherents of the view will instead attempt to rebut the charge by questioning that affective properties cannot afford any guidance when emotionally detected. More specifically, they might concede that affective properties registered by means of the corresponding emotion fail to guide its formation but insist that it does not follow that no guidance is available in such cases at all. As they might propose, when we emotionally detect an affective property, we are solicited to *preserve* our emotion.¹⁶ The idea would be that the directions given by affective properties are contingent upon our present mental state. That is, their deontic character should be analysed in terms of a conditional prescription, which tells us to feel the corresponding emotion, if we do not already feel it, and to preserve feeling it, if we do. On this picture, we can bring our conduct in conformity with the prescriptions of affective properties that we register emotionally by continuing to feel as we do.

Unfortunately, though, this response is a non-starter. The prescriptions associated with affective properties do not have this complex conditional structure. The demands imposed by the fearsome or admirable are unconditional and do not concern what to feel in the future. Assuming that proponents of the Response-Dependence View wish to remain faithful to the

actual deontic character of affective properties, the problem I raised thus remains untouched by this response.

What has been said so far suggests that adherents of the Response-Dependence View face a serious difficulty in that they are unable to respect the Guidance Constraint. While this constitutes my main charge against the view, it seems worth adding some observations that help bring out more clearly its peculiar conception of the epistemic contribution of emotion. On this conception, subjects of emotion find themselves in a rather strange normative situation. The Response-Dependence View implies that emotions convey to us prescriptions which we already conform with the very instant we apprehend them. It thus leaves us in the undignified position of being systematically confronted with normative pressure that seem misplaced: the deliverances of emotions systematically call upon us to do what we are at that very moment already doing. This pressure is inappropriate precisely because prescriptions are supposed to afford guidance. There is no room left to adjust our conduct so as to conform with what is emotionally conveyed.

To further illuminate this odd consequence of the view, it is helpful to return to the above analogy. As the cardboard box is constructed, you come to be aware of the instruction to tear open the flap by tearing it open. At the time you are reading it, the instruction is thus inappropriate: you are asked to tear open the flap when this is what you are already doing. Since this instruction is supposed to afford guidance but there is no room to adjust your conduct accordingly, it seems misplaced. The Response-Dependence View represents the deliverances of emotions as unfitting in this exact same sense: practically speaking, what is emotionally conveyed makes no sense.

These remarks further expose the strange disconnect between the epistemic role which adherents of the view accord to emotions and the practical significance of affective properties. To be fair, supporters of the Response-Dependence View may want to dispute that this

consequence causes much additional trouble for them. Perhaps the mismatch between what is emotionally conveyed and our actual conduct will not be deemed worrisome over and above reflecting the already exposed tension between their view and the Guidance Constraint. However, making explicit how the view conceives of the epistemic yield of emotion does have some dialectical import not least because it casts doubt on the view's larger motivation. Theorists espousing this or other versions of the Epistemic View are usually concerned to show that emotions make an epistemic contribution that is important or valuable. If the supposed contribution is ultimately a matter of conveying misplaced demands, this somewhat hampers their ambition. What emotions tell us on the Response-Dependence View is at best confusing. If the view were true, we would do much better to ignore them.

5. Conclusion

Many theorists hold that our primary epistemic access to affective properties is provided by the corresponding emotion. I have argued that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I have argued that proponents of this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary access to them cannot be provided by that same emotion. This is because this emotional access leaves no room to adjust our conduct so as to conform to what they prescribe. A more adequate epistemology of affective properties must allow for our primary access to them to be available to us prior to feeling the prescribed emotion. It is only if this access is available in advance of feeling this emotion that affective properties can guide its formation.

Notes

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1. See e.g. C. Tappolet, *Émotions et valeurs* (Paris: Presses Universitaires France 2000); S. Döring *Gründe und Gefühle: Zur Lösung „des“ Problems der Moral* (Habilitation, Duisburg-Essen University 2004); R. Roberts, *Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) and *Emotions in the Moral Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013); J. Slaby, *Gefühl und Weltbezug: Die menschliche Affektivität im Kontext eine neo-existenzialistischen Konzeption von Personalität* (Paderborn: Mentis 2008); J. Slaby & P. Wüschner, „Emotions and Agency,“ in Roeser, S. & Todd, C. eds., *Emotion and Value* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 212-228; J. Deonna & F. Teroni, “In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?”, in S. Roeser & C. Todd, eds., *Emotion and Value* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 15-31. For the origins of the view, see A. Meinong, *On Emotional Presentation*, tr. M.-L. Schubert Kalsi (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1972), and E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy—Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, tr. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1989).
 2. This intuition is clearly articulated by Husserl, op. cit, p. 196. See also B. Helm, “Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 39(1) (2002), p. 196 as well as Deonna & Teroni, op. cit., p. 16.
 3. The perceptual analogy is not endorsed by all proponents of the Epistemic View. For exceptions, see Deonna & Teroni, op. cit., and Slaby & Wüschner, op. cit. Here, I focus on the more common understanding of the Epistemic View which is driven by this analogy.
 4. See M. Heidegger, *Being & Time*, tr John Macquarie & Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row 1962), esp. §27. This reading is defended by D. Weberman, “Heidegger and the Disclosive Character of the Emotions”. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 34(3), (1996): 379–410. See also Slaby, op. cit., ch. 5.

5. See J. P. Sartre, “Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology,” tr. J. P. Fell, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 1(2) (1970): 4-5. Some of what Sartre says in his subsequent work on emotion invokes a peculiar form of projectivism which is sometimes thought to conflict with this reading. See J. P. Sartre, *Sketch of a Theory of the Emotions* (London: Methuen 1962). For discussion, see D. Weberman, “Sartre, Emotions, and Wallowing”. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 33(4) (1996): 393-407.

⁶ See J. McDowell, “Values and Secondary Qualities,” in T. Hondrich, ed., *Morality and Objectivity* (London: Routledge 1985), 110–129.

7. McDowell himself does not actually endorse this model, though he can be read as offering the basis of a possible argument for it. See, e.g., E. Düringer, *Evaluating Emotions* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2014), ch. 2. In some places, Wiggins comes close to the view, too. See D. Wiggins, “A Sensible Subjectivism,” in *Needs, Values, Truth* (Oxford: Blackwell 1987), 185-214. The claim that emotions are perceptions or quasi-perceptual impressions of response-dependent properties also surfaces in J. D’Arms & D. Jacobson, “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotion,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61(1) (2000): 65-90. D’Arms and Jacobson take themselves to record a common view when writing that “(m)ost recent accounts of the structure of emotion, despite their differences, agree that emotions (somehow) present the world to us as having certain value-laden features.” (ibid., 66) As they suggest, these value-laden features are response-dependent properties. In this context, the idea of evaluative presentation can be read as alluding to the type of direct access afforded by sensory experiences. See also J. Dokic & S. Lemaire, “Are Emotions Perceptions of Value?”, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 43(2) (2013): 227-247.

8. Dokic & Lemaire, op. cit., have attacked versions of the Response-Dependence View, on which emotions are closely assimilated to sensory impressions. They similarly focus on the

normative character of affective properties, but their charge is substantially different. Some objections that have been raised against perceptual models of emotion can be read as targeting both versions on which emotions provide access to affective properties as well as other versions on which they detect response-independent values. See M. Salmela, “Can Emotion be Modelled on Perception?”, *Dialectica* 65(1) (2011): 1-29; D. Whiting, “Are Emotions Perceptual Experiences of Value?”, *Ratio* 25(1) (2012): 93-107. See also K. Mulligan, “Intentionality, Knowledge and Formal Objects,” *Disputatio* 23(2) (2007): 205-228, and “Emotions and Values,” in P. Goldie, ed., *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Emotion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 475-500, as well as J. M. Müller (2017), “How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes”, *Dialectica* 71(2), 281-308. Rather than assess the extant literature in this area, in this paper I present a new set of considerations which specifically targets the Response-Dependence View.

9. I take this the line of thought to be congenial to McDowell’s considerations on the experience of secondary qualities, though it is not explicitly put forward by him in this way.

To be fair, there seems to be no explicit comparison between emotion and the perception of colour in Heidegger, *op. cit.*, or Sartre, *ops. cit.* That said, Weberman compares them in order to defend the objectivity of affective properties in reconstructing Heidegger’s view of emotion. See Weberman, “Heidegger and the Disclosive Character of the Emotions”, p. 399.

10. It is controversial whether presentation is a form of representation. See, e.g., B. Brewer, “Perception and Content,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 14(2) (2006): 165-181; Brewer, *Perception and Its Objects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011). In contrast, it is uncontroversial that representation need not be presentational. Judgments and beliefs have representational content, but they do not present what they represent. On this issue, see also Dokic & Lemaire, *op. cit.*

11. It seems to me that Sartre's view of emotion may be a plausible candidate for this reading. See Sartre, "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology". Dokic & Lemaire, *op. cit.*, argue that versions of the view on which emotions represent, but do not present, affective properties fail to support a substantive epistemic analogy with perception. As they suppose, this analogy is undermined by the fact that such views will have to assume that the normative aspect of their representational content is supplied independently of emotion. There are several issues here, including how to precisely conceive of this normative enrichment. I am not sure that the proposal is incompatible with a substantive analogy in terms of primary access to response-dependent properties (see below), but I will here have to set this question aside. The objection I will develop puts pressure on the idea of a primary emotional access to affective properties from a different angle.

12. See, e.g., McDowell, *op. cit.*; Wiggins, *op. cit.*; J. D'Arms & D. Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value," *Ethics* 110 (2000): 722-748; D'Arms & Jacobson, *op. cit.*; W. Rabinowicz & T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, "The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value," *Ethics* 114 (2004): 391-423.

13. For the view that they are deontic as opposed to axiological, see D. von Hildebrand, *Christian Ethics* (New York: McKay 1953), ch. 18 and Mulligan, "Emotions and Values", p. 480. For the view that they are deontic over and above being axiological, see J. Hartland-Swann, *An Analysis of Morals* (London: Allen & Unwin 1960).

14. On an alternative, but less common, view, affective properties have permissive rather than prescriptive force. See, e.g., Mulligan, "Emotions and Values", p. 480. In keeping with mainstream meta-ethics, I will here assume the common, prescriptivist conception of their deontic force. However, my main charge against the Response-Dependence View applies also on a permissivist conception.

15. There is a certain parallel here with the ‘no guidance’ argument against doxastic normativism. See K. Glüer & A. Wikforss, “Against Content Normativity,” *Mind* 118 (2009): 31-70; Glüer & Wikforss, “The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich-Petersen,” *Mind* 119 (2010): 757-761.

16. This response is inspired by a reply to Glüer & Wikforss’ ‘no guidance’-argument against doxastic normativism. See P. Steglich-Petersen, “The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Glüer and Wikforss,” *Mind* 119 (2010): 749-755. My rejoinder parallels Glüer & Wikforss’ rejoinder. See Glüer & Wikforss, “The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich-Petersen.”