

## **Blame It on Disappointment: A Problem for Skepticism about Angry Blame**

Leonhard Menges

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Blame skeptics argue that we have strong reason to revise our blame practices because humans do not fulfill all the conditions for it being appropriate to blame them. This paper presents a new challenge for this view. Many have objected that blame plays valuable roles such that we have strong reason to hold on to our blame practices. Skeptics typically reply that non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, like forms of disappointment, can serve the positive functions of blame. The new challenge is that skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or less inappropriate) to respond with this kind of disappointment to people's conduct if it is inappropriate to respond with blame. The paper argues that current blame-skeptical views fail to meet this challenge.

### **I. Introduction**

Imagine that you ask your partner to buy your favorite chocolate when they go to the grocery store, and they promise to do so and then come home with some fresh fruit instead of chocolate, telling you that you wanted to lose weight anyway. This is not a matter of life and death, but when you realize what happened, it seems likely and—from the perspective of everyday life—

appropriate for you to blame your partner in an angry way.

Many authors contend that there is something morally problematic about responding with angry blame to the conduct of other people. Most prominently, skeptics about free will claim that your blame response would be inappropriate--in the sense of unfair, unjust, or undeserved--because humans do not have the kind of control that is necessary for it being fair, just, or deserved to blame them. Others contend that humans do not have the kind of knowledge that is necessary for it being fair, deserved, or just to blame them. Typically, authors who accept one of these positions conclude that we have strong reasons, grounded in fairness, desert, or justice, to abandon our blame practice or that we should actually do so.<sup>1</sup> I will call this position blame skepticism.<sup>2</sup>

A prominent line of reasoning inspired by Peter Strawson<sup>3</sup> objects to blame skepticism that a life without angry blame would be bad and that this is a very strong reason to hold on to our blame practices.<sup>4</sup> Many blame skeptics reply that it is possible to have a good life without blame. In particular, they claim that there are non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, such as a certain kind of disappointment, that play all the positive roles that blame plays. The aim of this paper is to critically discuss this position.

I will first present and defend the view that disappointment can play the positive roles of blame (sections II and III). Then, I will argue that its proponents are confronted with an overlooked challenge. Blame skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or at least less inappropriate) in the sense of fairness, desert, or justice to respond with this kind of disappointment to what agents do, even if it would be inappropriate to blame them (section IV). I will argue that showing this is much harder than one might think (sections V and VI).

One note of caution is in order. There are many versions of blame skepticism and different skeptics suggest different alternatives to blame. I will not be able to do justice to all of them. My goal is much more specific. I will focus on the blame-skeptical proposal that we have strong reason--grounded in fairness, desert, or justice--to replace blame with disappointment, and I will present and discuss a problem for this view. I will point out in the final section how some of the things I say about disappointment can be adopted for other possible alternatives to blame, such as sadness or regret. But my focus will be on angry blame and disappointment because many skeptics seem to think that disappointment is especially well-suited to play the positive roles of blame.

## **II. Blame and Its Valuable Roles**

Can there be a good life without blame? In order to answer this question, we need a better understanding of blame and its positive roles. As the notion of blame is highly contested, however, I will focus on what appears to be the or at least one standard account of blame.<sup>5</sup>

According to a popular picture, to blame another person is to be angry at her in a certain way.<sup>6</sup> First, anger emotions are typically thought of as partly consisting in or as being closely associated with certain feelings, especially a certain kind of heat and tension that supervene on an increased heart rate and skin temperature. Second, emotions are typically taken to partly consist in or to be closely associated with certain representations. On one view, to blame a person in an angry way involves or is associated with representing her as lacking goodwill.<sup>7</sup> Others say that blame involves or is typically accompanied by the representation that the blamee deserves to be the target of anger.<sup>8</sup> Third, angry blame is closely associated with or involves hostility and the

tendency to retaliate, attack, take revenge on, or aggressively confront the blamee.<sup>9</sup> Very often, this kind of angry blame is identified with the paradigmatic Strawsonian reactive attitudes, resentment and indignation.<sup>10</sup>

It is widely assumed and plausible that to angrily blame a person typically has a sting in the sense that it sets back the interests of the blamee.<sup>11</sup> We typically care about whether or not our friends, family, colleagues, and neighbors angrily blame us or our loved ones. We hope that they do not feel and think this way, we fear that they do, and we feel bad when we learn that they do. We typically have good reason to avoid being the target of these attitudes, and to explain, excuse, or justify ourselves when we are blamed. Similarly, two people who are identical with the only difference being that the friends, family, and colleagues of the second blame her seem to differ with regard to how good their lives are, even if the second never realizes that she is being blamed. Thus, it seems plausible that blaming people is, typically, bad for them. In what follows, I will only be concerned with blame that sets back its targets' interests in one of these or relevantly similar ways.

It is natural to think that the harm of blame explains why it is morally inappropriate in the sense of unfair, undeserved, or unjust to stingingly blame random people (more on this in section 5). Agents must fulfill certain conditions, most prominently some control and knowledge conditions, for it to be appropriate to blame them. Blame skeptics add that humans do not fulfill them. Therefore, they conclude, blame is always unfair, undeserved, or unjust.

Now, one may take the blame skeptic to claim that we should get rid of our emotional involvement as much as we can and cultivate cold and "rational" responses, sometimes called the objective attitude.<sup>12</sup> However, many defenders of blame argue that angry blame also plays

important and valuable roles such that we would lose something important and valuable if we completely stopped blaming. They contend that we have, therefore, much stronger reason to hold on to our blame practices.

First, some argue that blame is itself communicative, or motivates us in an especially suitable way to communicate to others that we morally disapprove of and do not accept their behavior or quality of will.<sup>13</sup> And a life without blame would, then, lack this important kind of communication or it would at least be much harder to communicate in this way.<sup>14</sup>

Second, some blame defenders suggest that we are unable or that it would be extremely hard to take other agents seriously if we completely got rid of our tendency to blame them. Roughly, part of what it is to take a person seriously, the idea goes, is to be disposed to respond with certain emotions to their slighting of us. Thus, without such a disposition, we would not take people seriously. And, for the same reason, it would almost be impossible to form close relationships with them.<sup>15</sup>

Third, some authors contend that getting rid of blame would necessarily have the consequence that we would lose an especially apt way of taking to heart moral values and norms. Again, part of what it is to care about something is to be ready to have negative emotions when it is disrespected, violated, and so on. Thus, not being disposed in this way when moral values are disrespected and moral norms violated would be an expression of not caring about morality.<sup>16</sup> And, plausibly, not caring about morality would be a bad thing.

Blame may play other positive roles as well,<sup>17</sup> but in what follows I will focus on these three because they seem to be the most famous ones, and it seems very plausible that blame really fulfills these valuable functions. How can blame skeptics reply?

### III. Disappointment and Its Valuable Roles

Many blame skeptics claim that a life without blame can be good. They could try to argue that the functions of blame presented above are not as important as defenders of blame want us to believe. But in what follows I will put this response aside. Rather, I will focus on a skeptical view that accepts that blame plays these positive roles. The view, then, argues for what I will call the replacement thesis.<sup>18</sup> for each positive role that blame plays, there is a non-blaming response or mix of responses that plays this role sufficiently well. If the replacement thesis is true, then there can be a good life without blame. In this section I will present and defend the replacement thesis.

Prominent skeptics contend that emotions such as disappointment, regret, sadness, or grief, perhaps in combination with certain desires or other attitudes, are apt to play the positive roles of angry blame. As noted in the introduction, I will focus on disappointment as the paradigmatic replacement for blame. Derk Pereboom, for example, says:

One might note that expressions of resentment and indignation play an important communicative role in our personal and societal relationships, and object that if we were to strive to modify or eliminate them, such relationships might well be worse off. But when someone is mistreated in a relationship there are other emotions typically present whose expressions are not threatened by the skeptical view, and can also communicate the relevant information. These emotions include feeling disappointed [ . . .].<sup>19</sup>

The idea is that your current tendency to blame your partner when they break their promises should not be replaced by a tendency to respond in an unemotional, detached fashion. Rather, you should cultivate the tendency to respond with disappointment.

Blame defenders can reply that it is implausible that any garden-variety of disappointment could play the valuable roles that blame plays.<sup>20</sup> Note, for example, that you can be disappointed when your favorite team loses even though the players gave their very best and played as well as they could. But responding in such a way to your partner not buying chocolate is not an adequate replacement for blame. This kind of disappointment does not communicate disapproval of what they did because you do not disapprove of anyone's behavior when you are disappointed about the loss of your favorite team if they played as well as they could. Being disappointed about the loss of your team also does not express non-acceptance of the team's quality of will, and it does not express a commitment to morality. You know that they gave their best, did not lack goodwill, and that they did not do anything morally problematic. Thus, blame defenders conclude, this form of disappointment is too different from blame. If you are disappointed about not getting chocolate in the same way in which you are disappointed about the loss of your team, then this is not a way of taking your partner and the norm to not break promises seriously; it merely expresses that you take having chocolate seriously. This suggests that garden-variety disappointment does not play the positive roles of blame sufficiently well.

Again, skeptics could reply that there is nothing especially good about responding to an agent performing objectionable actions in a directed, communicative way that expresses a commitment to morality and non-acceptance of the agent's quality of will. But, again, I will leave this option aside. First, it seems plausible that a response that has these features is valuable.

A close friendship or partnership, for example, in which one never responds to objectionable conduct in directed, communicative, and expressive ways that reflect commitment to moral values and norms, like the norm to keep promises, does not look very attractive. Second, and importantly, skeptics can and in fact do accept that responding in such a way is valuable. For example, Pereboom defends the replacement thesis by depicting a non-blaming practice of responding to objectionable conduct, which involves directed, communicative, and protesting responses to an agent expressing a lack of goodwill.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, in order to flesh out the replacement thesis, blame skeptics should not propose just any kind of disappointment as an alternative to blame because many forms of disappointment cannot play the valuable roles of angry blame sufficiently well. A more promising blame-skeptical account says that the relevant kind of disappointment must be shaped in such a way that it responds to agents, their lack of goodwill, their disrespect for moral values, or their violation of moral norms—just as resentment is typically thought of as a kind of anger that is shaped in this way.<sup>22</sup> In what follows I will call the shaped kind of disappointment agential disappointment.<sup>23</sup>

Here is a picture of disappointment. Disappointment is associated with or partly consists in feeling empty, being abandoned, or powerless.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, disappointment represents or is closely associated with the representation that a desire has unexpectedly not been fulfilled or that what one has hoped for does not obtain.<sup>25</sup> The shaped kind of disappointment that could replace angry blame would then represent an agent as not having the goodwill one has desired and expected her to have or that one has hoped for. Alternatively, agential disappointment could also involve or be typically accompanied by the representation that the targeted agent deserves to be



the target of one's disappointment. Finally, agential disappointment involves or is closely associated with withdrawal. More precisely, agential disappointment is associated with the "tendency to get away from the situation, to ignore and to avoid the other person [ . . . and to] want to be far away from the person."<sup>26</sup>

Skeptics should argue that a suitably shaped kind of agential disappointment, perhaps in combination with certain desires or other attitudes that one should also cultivate, communicates or expresses that you do not accept the blamee's conduct or quality of will. It expresses your taking her and what she does seriously, and it is an expression of your apt commitment to the values and norms of morality. Thus, skeptics should say, a shaped kind of disappointment—perhaps together with other attitudes—plays the valuable roles that blame plays in our lives to a sufficient degree. Therefore, skeptics conclude, we can get rid of our tendency to blame without necessarily losing anything essential for a good life. We can replace angry blame with agential disappointment.

To sum up, many defenders of blame object to blame skepticism by claiming that a life without blame cannot be good. Against this, I have argued for the replacement thesis: for every positive role played by blame, there is a non-blaming alternative attitude or a mix of attitudes that plays this role sufficiently well. One plausible candidate is a kind of disappointment that is shaped, similar to the way in which resentment is a shaped kind of anger.

#### **IV. A New Challenge for Blame Skepticism**

So far, I have argued that a blame-free life can be good if we replace blame by agential disappointment, perhaps in combination with other attitudes. Now, assume that it would be

unfair, undeserved, or unjust to blame your partner for breaking their promise to buy chocolate. Would it then be fair, deserved, or just—or at least less unfair, undeserved, or unjust—to respond with agential disappointment to what they did? Blame-skeptical proponents of the replacement thesis that I have developed so far need to contend that it would be. But is this plausible?

Imagine situations in which others are disappointed with you. For example, your vegan friend is disappointed with you when she sees you eating a hamburger. Or imagine that your sibling turns away from you when you make one of the hurtful remarks that sometimes slip off your tongue. Or imagine that your partner is disappointed with you when you tell them that you are canceling a family weekend trip or when you forget to buy a birthday present. Or imagine that your parents tell you that you have disappointed them as their child.

If we vividly imagine situations of this kind, we should realize that being the target of agential disappointment has a sting in the sense that it sets back the target's interests. We typically care about whether or not our friends, family, colleagues, and neighbors are agentially disappointed with us or our loved ones. We hope that they do not feel and think this way, we fear that they do, and we feel bad when we learn that they do. Moreover, we typically have good reason to avoid being the target of agential disappointment, and to explain, excuse, or justify ourselves when we are. Two people who are identical with the only difference being that the friends, family, and colleagues of the second are agentially disappointed with her seem to differ with regard to how good their lives are, even if the second never realizes that she is the target of this kind of disappointment. Thus, when we imagine situations of this kind, we should realize that agential disappointment often has a sting in the sense that it sets back the interests of its target. Others being agentially disappointed with us, especially in close relationships, can be a

heavy burden.<sup>27</sup>

As I have suggested in section II, the same is true for angry blame. Blame can be and typically is bad for the blamee. And because of blame's badness, it is morally inappropriate to blame any random person. It is unfair, unjust, or undeserved to expose someone to the burden of blame unless she fulfills certain conditions.

Once it is clear that agential disappointment and blame both have a sting in the sense that they tend to set back the interests of their targets, a natural question arises for the skeptic: if it is morally inappropriate to expose people to blame's sting because they do not fulfill the control or knowledge condition for appropriate blame, why should it then be more appropriate to expose them to agential disappointment's sting? More precisely, the challenge for the blame skeptic is to show that blaming a person has a feature that is such that it is inappropriate to blame people when they do not fulfill certain control or knowledge conditions, and that agential disappointment does not have this or a sufficiently similar feature.

This is an important challenge. Imagine for a moment that no human has free will such that blame is always inappropriate. Imagine also that blame and agential disappointment are identical in all respects that are relevant for fairness, desert, or justice. Finally, imagine that only angry blame and agential disappointment play the positive roles depicted in the previous sections. Then, responding with agential disappointment would be as unfair, unjust, or undeserved as responding with blame, and we would be in a trap. Either we prioritize fairness, desert, or justice, and try to get rid of our tendencies toward blame and agential disappointment and, thereby, sacrifice an important part of a good life--or we prioritize a good life and opt for a practice that involves unfair, undeserved, or unjust responses, namely, blame or agential

disappointment. This is a highly unattractive position. Moreover, we would have no reason grounded in fairness, desert, or justice to replace blame with agential disappointment in such a world. Admittedly, blame would be inappropriate in this sense. But since agential disappointment would be just as inappropriate as blame, it would be pointless to replace the latter with the former.

In fact, however, blame skeptics claim that we have good reason grounded in fairness, desert, or justice to replace blame with non-blaming alternatives like agential disappointment, especially if no human has free will. In order to justify this position, blame skeptics need to develop an account of blame and the non-blaming alternative that explains why it should be appropriate (or at least less inappropriate) to respond with this alternative even if it is inappropriate to blame. This is a largely overlooked and, as I will show in the remainder of the paper, difficult task.

## **V. Why Agential Disappointment Is Not More Appropriate Than Blame**

In what follows, I will discuss and reject three attempts to argue for the claim that blame has a feature that is such that it is inappropriate to blame people when they do not fulfill certain control or knowledge conditions and that agential disappointment does not have this or a sufficiently similar feature. One argument will be based on the action tendency, and the other two will be based on the representational dimension of the two responses.

Consider, first, the action tendency of angry blame, which is to retaliate, attack, take revenge on, or aggressively confront the blamee. In light of these angry blame-typical forms of behavior, the skeptic may contend that the requirements that an agent must fulfill for it to be

morally appropriate to angrily blame her are more demanding than the requirements that she has to fulfill for it to be morally appropriate to be agentially disappointed with her. The action tendency of angry blame, she may say, is much worse for the target. And, correspondingly, the appropriateness requirements are more demanding.

But is the action tendency of angry blame really worse? Compare some everyday examples of behavior that is expressive of agential disappointment and angry blame. Your partner gives you a cold goodnight kiss or aggressively turns off the light; your colleague does not greet you in the hallway or slams the door; your sibling sighs disappointedly or gives you a confrontational look; your parents whisper disappointedly or yell angrily.

If it is true that the actions associated with angry blame are worse than those associated with disappointment, then we should have a preference for being the target of the disappointment responses rather than the angry blame responses. But I find this far from clear. Indeed, it even seems plausible to have a preference for the angry blame responses. Disappointed withdrawal has the flavor of writing someone off that is not part of anger. The former seems to express that the target is a hopeless case.<sup>28</sup> This is a very stinging response. And, therefore, it seems easier to cool down hot anger than to heat up cold disappointment.

Perhaps the flavor of writing someone off is not an essential element of behavior that expresses agential disappointment. Then, the skeptic could suggest that we should cultivate a kind of agential disappointment that does not have it. But what would the resulting form of agential disappointment look like? What would its action tendency be if not withdrawal? And would the resulting response be able to serve the valuable functions that blame serves? So far, I have not seen a skeptic-friendly account of agential disappointment that answers these questions.

And, therefore, I have not seen an account of the action tendency of blame and disappointment that helps the skeptic to show that blame has a feature that explains blame's inappropriateness when people lack a kind of knowledge or control and that is such that agential disappointment does not have this feature.

Second, some may try to meet the challenge by focusing on the representational dimensions of angry blame and agential disappointment. Pereboom, for example, says about the paradigmatic instances of blame:

[T]he attitudes of moral resentment and indignation include the following two components: anger targeted at an agent because of what he's done or failed to do, and a belief that the agent deserves to be the target of that very anger just because of what he has done or failed to do.<sup>29</sup>

Skeptics add that humans do not have the kind of control or knowledge that is necessary for it being the case that they deserve angry blame. If this is true, then the belief component of blame is always false. By contrast, being agentially disappointed with others surely does not involve the representation that they deserve blame. Therefore, these skeptics conclude that agential disappointment can be representationally correct, while blame always involves a false belief.

The problem with this line of thinking is that it does not even address the challenge at issue. Recall that the challenge for skeptics is to show that blaming a person has a feature that is such that it is unfair, undeserved, or unjust to blame people because they do not fulfill certain control or knowledge conditions and that agential disappointment does not have this or a

sufficiently similar feature. The account of the representational dimension of blame that I have just sketched does not help the skeptic to meet this challenge. It assumes that blame is undeserved if the target of blame lacks a certain kind of control or knowledge. But it does not say what it is about blame that makes it undeserved in such a case. Yet, this is what the skeptic needs. To put it differently, the skeptical view under consideration says that blame involves the belief that blaming the target is deserved. Therefore, the belief is false if the agent does not fulfill a necessary condition for deserved blame. But this does not answer the question of what it is about blame that makes it undeserved if the target does not fulfill this condition. And this is the question that is at issue.

Perhaps, the representational dimension of blame and agential disappointment points to a third way for the skeptic to meet the challenge. So far, I have presented the skeptic as saying that blame involves the belief that blaming the blamee is deserved and that this belief is false. One may try to develop a slightly different picture. One could say that blame involves representing the blamee as having a property that she does not have—such as free will or a kind of knowledge—and that incorrectly representing agents in this way is unfair, undeserved, or unjust. The skeptic could add that agential disappointment does not involve an incorrect representation and is, therefore, not inappropriate in this sense.

A proponent of this view would have to show more clearly how representing a person as having a property that she does not have can be unfair, undeserved, or unjust in addition to being representationally incorrect. But let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that this is so. The problem for this blame-skeptical reply is, then, that it seems implausible that this aspect of blame makes blaming people problematic in the way skeptics claim it to be. To see this, assume that we

are skeptics and are trying to reshape our responsibility practices in order to make them more appropriate in the sense of fairness, desert, or justice. The view under consideration says that if humans lack free will or a certain kind of knowledge, then blaming humans is inappropriate because it involves the incorrect representation that they have free will or this kind of knowledge. According to this picture, we could make our practice appropriate by getting rid of the representational element of blame. Thus, our whole practice could stay exactly as it is—aggressive, confrontational, hostile, demanding, and so on—with the only difference being that we do not represent the targets of our responses as having the relevant property. There would be no need to replace anger with disappointment. We would just need to develop a form of anger with a slightly different representational content.

I find this implausible. If our blame practice is morally inappropriate because we lack free will or a certain kind of knowledge, then our practice does not become appropriate simply by not representing agents as having free will or this kind of knowledge. If our blame practice is unfair, undeserved, or unjust, then, from the perspective of fairness, desert, or justice, some more radical reform is called-for.

To sum up, the skeptic who proposes agential disappointment (perhaps in combination with other attitudes) as an alternative to blame is confronted with the question of why it should be appropriate (or at least less inappropriate) to respond with agential disappointment to people's conduct if it is inappropriate to respond with blame. I have discussed three skeptical replies, and I have argued that they are not convincing.

## **VI. The Blame Skeptic's Task**



Skeptics may respond to the line of thinking presented above by proposing to replace blame with a less stinging response, such as a basic kind of sadness or regret, similar to the sadness or regret that you experience when your favorite team loses. It is plausible that these responses do not have the sting that angry blame and agential disappointment have because they do not express moral disapproval and non-acceptance of a poor quality of will, and they do not necessarily express that one takes an agent's misconduct seriously. As these things—disapproval, non-acceptance of quality of will, taking a misconduct seriously—are typically stinging, it may be morally appropriate to respond with, for example, a basic kind of sadness or regret even if it is unfair, undeserved, or unjust to respond with angry blame and agential disappointment.

However, there are good reasons to think that basic sadness and regret are unable to play the valuable roles of blame to a sufficient degree. As I have just said, they do not express moral disapproval, non-acceptance of the targets' quality of will, or that one takes a misconduct seriously. These aspects of blame are not only stinging; blame defenders have argued convincingly that they are also important for a good life (see sections II and III).

Skeptics may propose that we should develop a shaped kind of sadness or regret that plays these positive roles or that basic sadness or regret should be accompanied by other responses that play them. However, now the danger lurks that the resulting response or mix of responses will become as stinging as blame and agential disappointment.

The skeptic's task is to show that this is false by developing an account of non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct that make a good life possible without being as stinging as angry blame. It should be clear by now that doing this is not easy.

To sum up, there are good reasons to believe that life without angry blame can be good.

Thus, you and your partner would not necessarily lose something valuable if you develop the tendency to respond to the other's objectionable conduct with a certain kind of disappointment rather than blame. However, the paper has also presented good reasons to believe that if blame would be unfair, unjust, or undeserved, then responding with this kind of disappointment would be equally unfair, unjust, or undeserved. Therefore, we should reject the blame-skeptical claim that we have reasons--grounded in fairness, desert, or justice--to replace angry blame with this kind of disappointment. Whether other non-blaming alternatives fare better in this respect is an open question. But the arguments presented in this paper raise doubts that they do and put a burden on blame skeptics to show that some alternative would fare better.

### University of Salzburg

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<sup>1</sup> For free will skepticism, see, e.g., Levy, Hard Luck; Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life; for an overview, see Caruso, “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.” For skepticism about the knowledge condition, see, e.g., Zimmerman, “Moral Responsibility and Ignorance”; Rosen, “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility”; for an overview, see Rudy-Hiller, “The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility.” Two notes are appropriate here. First, some skeptics argue that we cannot be sufficiently sure that humans fulfill the conditions for its being appropriate to blame them, rather than argue that humans in fact do not fulfill these conditions; see, e.g., Rosen, “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility.” What I will say is relevant for both forms of skepticism. However, in order to keep things simple, I will stick to the version which says that humans in fact do not fulfill the conditions. Second, spelling out how to understand fairness, desert, or justice in this context is a difficult task; see, e.g., McKenna, “The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert”; Nelkin, “Desert, Free Will, and Our Moral Responsibility Practices”; Pereboom, “What Makes the Free Will Debate Substantive?”. Luckily, the main points of this paper do not depend on attending to this task. The basic skeptical idea is that blaming humans is inappropriate in a way similar to the way in which it is inappropriate to punish the innocent.

<sup>2</sup> Sometimes, the view is called “abolitionism”; see, e.g., Milam, “Reactive Attitudes and Personal Relationships.”

<sup>3</sup> Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment.”

<sup>4</sup> Another important Strawsonian idea is that it is part of human nature to blame people in the sense of having reactive attitudes towards them. In this paper, I will leave this issue aside.

<sup>5</sup> See Tognazzini and Coates, “Blame” for an overview.

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, chaps. 2–3; Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium”; Wolf, “Blame, Italian Style”; Pickard, “Irrational Blame”; Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, chap. intro.; Menges, “The Emotion Account of Blame”.

<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., McKenna, Conversation and Responsibility, 64–74; Shoemaker, Responsibility



from the Margins, 91–103.

<sup>8</sup> See Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, 127–30; see also Pickard, “Irrational Blame”; Rosen, “The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility.”

<sup>9</sup> See, e.g., Shoemaker, Responsibility from the Margins, 90–91; Bagley, “Properly Proleptic Blame.”

<sup>10</sup> For an exception, see Shoemaker, Responsibility from the Margins, chap. 3.

<sup>11</sup> See, e.g., McKenna, “Directed Blame and Conversation”; Pickard, “Irrational Blame”; and Carlsson, “Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt” for the sting of self-blame; I discuss some of the following points in more detail elsewhere.

<sup>12</sup> But see Sommers, “The Objective Attitude” for a much more nuanced account.

<sup>13</sup> See, e.g., Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil”; Watson, “The Trouble With Psychopaths”; McKenna, Conversation and Responsibility, chap. 4; McGeer, “Civilizing Blame”; Shoemaker, Responsibility from the Margins, chap. 3; Macnamara, “Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities.”

<sup>14</sup> See esp. Shoemaker, Responsibility from the Margins, 103–12.

<sup>15</sup> See, e.g., Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment”; Shabo, “Incompatibilism and Personal Relationships”; Shabo, “Where Love and Resentment Meet”; Coates, “Hard Incompatibilism and the Participant Attitude.”

<sup>16</sup> See, e.g., Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium”; Franklin, “Valuing Blame.”

<sup>17</sup> See, e.g., Nichols, “After Incompatibilism”; McGeer, “Scaffolding Agency.”

<sup>18</sup> See also Menges Moralische Vorwürfe, chap. 4.2.

<sup>19</sup> Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, 146. Here are other expressions of the same idea: “While still demanding that the racist be tolerant and good willed, my resentment might be replaced by [ . . . ] disappointment at the racist’s ill will” Goldman, “Modification of the Reactive Attitudes,” 10. “In particular, I argue that this objection exaggerates the role of reactive attitudes

and underestimates the importance of non-reactive emotions, like disappointment [ . . . ], in the formation and maintenance of close relationships” Milam, “Reactive Attitudes and Personal Relationships,” 103. See also Sommers “The Objective Attitude.”

<sup>20</sup> See, e.g., Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium.”

<sup>21</sup> “Responsibility, Regret, and Protest,” secs. 3, 4.

<sup>22</sup> I discuss this proposal in Menges, “How Not to Defend Moral Blame” and Moralische Vorwürfe, chap. 4.2.2. See also Goldman, “Modification of the Reactive Attitudes”; Milam, “Reactive Attitudes and Personal Relationships.”

<sup>23</sup> I adopt the “agential” from Shoemaker, Responsibility from the Margins, chap. 2 whose account of disappointment differs, however, from the one presented here in important respects.

<sup>24</sup> See Dijk and Zeelenberg, “What Do We Talk about When We Talk about Disappointment?,” 800; Martinez, Zeelenberg, and Rijsman, “Behavioural Consequences of Regret and Disappointment in Social Bargaining Games,” 352.

<sup>25</sup> See Draper, “Disappointment, Sadness, and Death,” 392–93; Dijk and Zeelenberg, “What Do We Talk about When We Talk about Disappointment?,” 788, 800; Brady, “Disappointment,” secs. II–III; Martinez, Zeelenberg, and Rijsman, “Behavioural Consequences of Regret and Disappointment in Social Bargaining Games,” 352.

<sup>26</sup> Dijk and Zeelenberg, “What Do We Talk about When We Talk about Disappointment?,” 800; see also Martinez, Zeelenberg, and Rijsman, “Behavioural Consequences of Regret and Disappointment in Social Bargaining Games,” 353.

<sup>27</sup> This fits well with the empirical finding that others’ disappointment tends to elicit concession on our side ; see, e.g., Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead, “Supplication and Appeasement in Conflict and Negotiation.”

<sup>28</sup> See Bagley, “Properly Proleptic Blame,” sec. 1.

<sup>29</sup> Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, 128; see also Pickard, “Irrational

Blame”; Rosen, “The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility.”