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Constructing Security Policies in Southeast Asia

Historical and Social Dynamics

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Constructing Security Policies in Southeast Asia: Historical and Social Dynamics

Hafiizh Hashim

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Science and Law
School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies

2020

76,304 words

Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED.....Hafizh Hashim....

DATE:.....27/07/2020.....

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Abstract

This research sets out to analyse why security practices in Southeast Asian states vary. It critically explores by unpacking the origins and development of state structures to demonstrate why the region's military spending is consistent with the historical trends. This thesis identifies that the contemporary security challenges are inherited by its specific histories that shaped the state's threat perceptions in path dependent ways. Employing a comparative case analysis of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, the empirical findings demonstrate that the struggle for legitimacy during the initial formation of nation-state influences how the state institutional settings of governing elites influence the security policy outcomes.

This research identifies how security is a contested concept between social groups that inhabit the state. This research argues that security practices, and behaviours are socially inherited and shaped by social conflicts during the formation of the nation-state. To interrogate this puzzle, the thesis uses the Historical Institutional approach as an analytical framework through process tracing to examine a comparative analysis of the diverging state institutional structures which influence governing elites in security policy decision-making in Southeast Asian states. By unpacking the institutional variations across states in Southeast Asia and by drawing attention to the critical historical overview of the state structure, it helps explain how different socio-political groups are embedded in the political organisation and state institutions.

One of the key findings of this research is that, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, security is a historical by-product of contestation between actors in Southeast Asia which arises principally, if not exclusively, from its own social and institutional legacies and the changes of the political environment of individual states. The institutional legacies also influence how national political elites address its security concerns in order to uphold and reinforce its political legitimacy. The primacy of historical legacies on institutional arrangements need to be acknowledged in explaining security behaviour as it affects how it facilitates or constrains national policymakers on its security policy outcomes.

Abbreviations

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
ADMM	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting
ADMM Plus	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AMDA	Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement
APSC	ASEAN Political-Security Community
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nation
BN	Barisan Nasional
CPP	Communist Party Philippines
DOM	Daerah Operasi Militer
DPM	Deputy Prime Minister
DPM	Deputy Prime Minister
DRB-HICOM	Diversified Resources Berhad Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia
EAS	East Asian Summit
EDCA	Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EPU	Economic Planning Unit
ESSCOM	Eastern Sabah Security Command
FPDA	Five Power Defence Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLC	Government Linked Companies
GOLKAR	Golongan Karya
GPC	Government Parliamentary Committee
GST	General Service Tax
HI	Historical Institutionalism
ISA	Internal Security Act
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
MCA	Malaysian Chinese Association
MCP	Malaysia Communist Part
MIC	Malaysian Indian Congress
MILF	Mindanao Islamic Liberation Front
MITI	Ministry of Industry and Trade
MMEA	Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency
MN	Malaysian Navy
MNLF	Mindanao National Liberation Front
NADI	National Defence Aerospace Industry
NASAKOM	Nationalism, Religion, Communism
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEP	New Economic Policy
NPA	The New People's Army
NPA	New People's Army
OPV	Offshore Patrol Vessels
PAP	People's Action Party

PCIJ	Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism
PDAF	Priority Development Assistance Fund
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia
PKP	Partido Komunista Ng Philipinas
PM	Prime Minister
PNI	Partai Nasionalis Indonesia
RMAF	Royal Malaysian Armed Forces
RMAirF	Royal Malaysian Air Forces
RMN	Royal Malaysian Navy
SAF	Singapore Armed Forces
SLOC	Sea Lane of Communications
TNI	Tentera Nasional Indonesia
UMNO	United Malay National Organization
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US	The United States
WWII	World War Two
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership

Dedications

I praise Allah S.W.T the creator for his blessings, his guidance and his wisdom in this laborious journey. To my amazing family, I dedicate this thesis to you the backbone of my academic ambition. You have always reminded me to be patient and pray to Allah S.W.T in hardship or ease. To my loving parents, I will forever be indebted to your love, hardships and sacrifices that you have made for me to pursue my dream. To my partner, Syuhaidah, your endless support and love have been the key motivating factors for me to complete this project.

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Chapter 1:

Constructing Security Policies in Southeast Asia: Historical and Social Dynamics

1.1 Introduction

This research analyses why, despite the changes in the balance of power, (specifically the rise of China and its South China Sea assertiveness) security policy responses and practices in Southeast Asia vary, and that military spending in Southeast Asian countries has remained relatively modest, and indeed, consistent with its longer term trends. It seeks explanations by examining the relationship between historical legacies and the transformation of statehood and how these seem to have influenced the security policies of the states in question. In pursuit of this goal, this research undertakes a comparative analysis of four Southeast Asian states, namely, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippine and Indonesia, in relation to how they approach the formulation and implementation of national security policies. It demonstrates that the determinants of national security policies are far more complex than what is conventionally presented. The historical studies of the Southeast Asian states would also provide a powerful analysis on the continuing relevance of security to political life and in the contemporary context (Hobden, 1998). It shows how the presence of institutional differences in Southeast Asian states during the critical junctures influence how security policies are formulated to produce divergent outcomes. With an in-depth analysis of the region's historical experiences, this research suggests Southeast Asian security behaviour is inherited by its specific histories that shaped the state's threat perceptions in path dependent ways.

In recent decades, Southeast Asia has moved from the periphery to the centre of international relations and security studies. The post-Cold War has been marked by a regional power shift in East Asia between the two superpowers U.S. and China. Over the last 25 years, the region also witnessed a substantial increase

in military spending in Southeast Asia. Given these significant changes, security analysts are concerned with how the changes in balance of powers will affect regional security (Liff and Ikenberry, 2014). Realists argue that the strategic uncertainties inevitably forced states to build their military to achieve security in the anarchic international system (Mearsheimer, 2006). Contrary to the traditional expectations regarding the great power politics and their preponderance in regional security, this study argues that pre-existing indigenous internal threats in these states are also critical in influencing how the ruling elites formulate security policies in Southeast Asia.

Despite the voluminous commentary on this phenomenon, this thesis seeks to contribute to knowledge by looking into domestic politics, social controls, institutions and interest that drive the highly varied national security priorities as a particular security behaviour in selected individual Association of Southeast East Asian Nations (ASEAN) states. For many states in the region, security is no longer conceived as defence against other states to be the prime drivers of security practices. It requires us to broaden the security spectrum that other endogenous issues such as class, clashes between ethnics, cultures and religions would also present similar security problems to the states (Acharya and Tan, 2004). This thesis aims to supplement the literature by conducting a critical investigation of the dynamics of security policies from the domestic views on how states have responded to the changing nature of its security environment. Scholars and policymakers have often overlooked the domestic drivers such as elite politics, ideologies, and state institutional arrangements which provides a more fortuitous explanation why different states adopt different security strategies.

The central focus of this research is to explore and identify the differences in national security practices in Southeast Asian states and the policy making processes at the state institutional level. As we shall see, ideas about security remains unique in Southeast Asia which have important consequences for security practice in the region. As Krasner (1999) writes, ruling elites wants to

stay in power and promote the security, values and prosperity of their constituents in order to achieve sovereignty over the state. Building on this argument, Jones (2012a) further elaborates that sovereignty is constantly contested between the social forces and that the ordering of state power is determined by the dominant political forces. It is within this puzzle that this research traces the historical process of the development of national security. This research draws influence from the Constructivist and the Critical Theory approach in security studies and employs a Historical Institutional approach to understand how a particular configuration of state-society relationship that emerged in Southeast Asian states influences its security practices. The analysis of historical conditions of the state provides a better articulation on why certain security policies continue to be of relevance for policymakers, which helps us understand the diverging trajectories of security behaviours.

1.2 Rationale of the Study

This research aims to explore the politics of security in Southeast Asia by focusing on interest and contestations within the domestic politics of the respective states. The general objective of this research is to contribute a better understanding of how local actors respond to security challenges. Conducting a comparative historical analysis of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, this thesis argues that the state structures of governing elites influence its security outcomes. This research emphasises that the capacity for Southeast Asian states to meet its security challenges depends on the level of elite cohesion in the domestic. Less attention has been placed on the ‘second image’ i.e. the states and the domestic factors in influencing the policy decision-making (Moravcsik, 1997). By unpacking the state, this research aims to emphasize that contemporary security policies in each state have been historically and socially constructed: that they are the products of historical legacies, a product of

competing social forces interests and conflicts that have accumulated over considerable periods of time. This is achieved by analysing ways about the origins, evolution and consequences of politics of security in Southeast Asia.

Research on security practices tend to be dominated by the realist perceptions, that states are assumed to be unitary actors who makes security decisions based on their position to maximise their power in the international system (Schweller, 1994). The mainstream of security studies, especially that of neorealism and neoliberalism has been susceptible to ahistoricism, that 'that history only exists in so much as it reflects present conditions, and as such denies novelty and change (Hobson, 2002; Mabee, 2003). Acharya (2011) argues that the regional studies are often considered as 'atheoretical'. Despite that such a claim is contested, it nevertheless highlights that the region is under-theorised (Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2003).

As Muthiah Alagappa (2003, p. 11) argues, "Viewed through the ahistorical realist lens, the contemporary security challenges could indeed suggest that Asia is a dangerous place. But a comprehensive historical view would suggest otherwise. Although Asia still faces serious internal and international challenges, there are fewer challenges than before and most of the region's disputes and conflicts have stabilised." To that extent, the realist perspective only provides a partial explanation as the study of security is too narrowly focused on the military security of states, negating that smaller states policies in international politics also matter on how states respond to insecurity (Kuik, 2008; Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009). The existing literature suggest security as traditionally defined through the anarchic systemic structure that are fixed, and that it is limited to the defence of territorial integrity by military means which are linked with weapons purchase and sovereignty (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2006). However, this does not necessarily correlate with all the dimensions of the security of people and an overemphasis upon statist security (Thakur and Newman, 2003, p. 2).

This research argues that the role of history and the politics on security policies needs to be described in depth. To understand the different trajectories in security policies, practices, and behaviours in the region, it is important to show how security is part of a complex historical process of dealing with violence and order in modern political and social life (Krause and Williams, 2018). The fundamental purpose of a state is to provide security and welfare to its people and in return, the states achieve sovereignty as the organising principle (Krasner, 1999). Hence, analysing the origins of social constitution of state power is vital to our understanding of Southeast Asian security practices. It also shows how state institutions can either enhance or constrain in which political actors choose to formulate their policies depending on the specific institutional arrangements (Thelen, 1999).

In short, the central argument that this thesis sets out to advance is that it is domestic politics and social change that drives the highly varied increase of military spending as a particular security behaviour in selected individual ASEAN states. Accordingly, several key research questions are posed to help this study analyse and understand the determinants of Southeast Asian security.

The key research questions are:

1. Why, despite the changes in balance of power, do security practices and security policy respond varies in Southeast Asia?
2. What explains the differences in national security policies in each state in Southeast Asia?
3. To what extent do domestic institutions influence political actors on security policy behaviours?
4. To what extent do historical antecedents influence state actors' perceptions on policy decision-making?

Various possible explanations can be derived from numerous strands of theoretical and empirical literature on Southeast Asian studies and international politics. As the process of security practices is highly complex in each case study which is driven by political, socioeconomic, norms, culture and strategic factors, focusing on a single paradigmatic approach cannot fully explain the empirical puzzles that this research pose on the study of security in Southeast Asia. To address these questions, this research will use the Historical institutionalist (HI) approach to contribute to the study on security. HI pays attention to the different historical experiences in these states that impacts on its domestic political institutions and its perceptions on security threats. As shall be explained in greater detail in the next chapter, the aim is to analyse states behaviour by unpacking the state to understand how the conception of security originates in a given polity. As the state structures were intensely contested between social forces during the formation of states, this helps us to understand why security practices are conditioned by their history, prevailing interests, conflicts and ideologies that helped shape states' threat perceptions. This analytical framework is inter-disciplinary which allows the connection between the study of international politics and domestic politics (Hall, 2010; Fioretos 2011; Thelen, 1999). It is noteworthy that little research has been dedicated to the use of HI as an analytical approach to address the differences in security practices in Southeast Asian states.

Grounded in a constructivist perspective, HI draws on the complexity of the nature of policy decision-making, which argues that the historical legacies of timing and sequences shaped security policy outcomes (Pierson, 2000; Lantis, 2002). In particular, it explores the concepts of temporal context sequencing, the practice of institutional layering and the role of ideas which can either constrain or enhance state actors to explain the differences in policy outcomes (Hall, 2010; Peters, Pierre, and King, 2005). Using a path dependency model allows us to identify why certain dominant ideas are formulated and implemented over others.

This would also provide us the analytical tools for policy changes during specific critical junctures in various case studies to understand the power dynamics that cause states to react differently.

As a starting point, HI subscribes that security is socially constructed (Haglund, 2014). Security is defined by ‘the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within states, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them’ (Lipschutz, 1995, p. 8). Security practices emerge from the contestation between social forces to gain the distribution of power and push the policy agenda that best suits their own interest. Political issues become securitised when political actors identify them as a security threat (Buzan, et al., 1998). Sharing similar insights with the constructivist approach, the meaning of security is not considered as given that is fixed across time. It conceived that security is a fluid construction by which its meaning changes in different temporal contexts (McDonald, 2008). It challenges the dominant paradigm of realism that often view security as a result of material capabilities, international anarchy and the distribution of power portrayed by rational actors (Waltz, 1979). As shown in our subsequent chapters, Southeast Asia’s late capitalist development has produced highly distinctive forms of state and regime, different modes of political controls, institutions and interests that would explain the divergences in the conceptions of security practices. If we accept that states are not simply similar units but are necessarily shaped by the historical conditions in which they develop, the distinctive nature of state power must find its logic on how the state shaped its policy outcomes (Jones, 2010).

For the purpose of this research, using HI as a theoretical framework allows us to explore and analyse the mechanism reinforces or undermines the development path for regime states in Southeast Asia. This helps us explain why states respond differently to threats. Investigation of this kind may focus on greater details on the presence or absence of different reinforcement mechanism such as perceptions, domestic politics, the role of elites, and corruption to help

understand the military dynamics in Southeast Asia (Taliaferro, 2000; Rathbun, 2008; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009; Kaarbo. 2015).

1.3 Thesis Structure

Structurally, this thesis comprises of seven chapters. While Chapter 1 provides the introduction, this chapter will also discuss the methodology as a research tool for the subsequent empirical chapters. Chapter 2 focuses on the existing literature on how different theoretical approaches on security practices in greater details. It first problematizes the concept of security from different IR perspectives and operationalizes this concept for measurement of security in Southeast Asia. The referent object for this study is then developed from the HI as an analytical tool in order to demonstrate its applicability differences in Southeast Asia.

Chapters 3 to 6 are empirical chapters to investigate the security practices of four Southeast Asian states: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The empirical chapters are organised chronologically so as to highlight the ongoing interactive and cumulative dialogues on how security policies in Southeast Asia have evolved over time. Doing so, helps us to identify the persistent themes on the differences in states behaviours in different states; it reveals how certain ideas are more dominant than others which helps explain the path dependence on how political actors choose to formulate and implement its security policies.

In Chapter 3, this thesis examines the social origins of security conflict in these particular cases. It aims to explore the early roots of social conflict in Southeast Asia during the period of colonialism and World War II to help us provide a historical picture on the different trajectories on state formation. While the history of Southeast Asia will be familiar to many scholars, the chapter serves a number of important purposes. First, to explain the origin and evolution of

Southeast Asian security practices, we have to engage how its specific histories reveal the nation-states struggle to achieve its independence with varying degrees of political contestation between social forces. The variations in the degree of integration or intervention by the colonial powers during this period influence the levels of political contestations in the domestic politics during the make-up of the nation-state is very apparent. Second, this chapter will also reveal that the historical origins which shaped threat perceptions and state-society coalitions in a powerful path dependent effects they have to the formulation of security policies in Southeast Asia.

Chapter 4 aims to analyse the emergence of newly independent nation-states in Southeast Asia and explore the different levels of political institutions constructed during the decolonisation. It analyses that the differences in social cleavages present in the region gave rise to the specific dominant actors that shape the state. It helps us determine the differences in regime types that emerged and the levels of state capacity. The differences in competition for social forces in the state would also differ in political institutional arrangements. Chapter 5 analyses the role of regime transition in the post-Cold War. It compares how the different types of regimes responded in the Cold War period and the levels of domestic institutional changes but in various types. This will also highlight the differences in institutional resilience present in each state which determines how states shape their security policies. It examines how the changes can determine the trajectory of how states pursue their security perceptions, which may act as a catalyst towards the path dependence of security policies in Southeast Asia.

Chapter 6 discusses the variances of security policies adopted by different regimes in Southeast Asia. It considers the possible impact of regional security problems, in terms of material impact on the states and their responses to manage these threats as a consequence. It provides a comparative analysis on how each country different regimes perceive different security priorities that are endogenous to their historical formation. Chapter 7 concludes the chapter by

summarizing the findings on this study and presents its contribution to the existing literature.

1.4 Research Methodology

This section discusses the methodology framework employed in the research and data collected. To identify the different levels of power relations in state institutions and analyse their differences in generating its security policies, this study focuses on the qualitative method to explore the socio-political processes on national security. This research employs a historical-comparative case study method as a tool to assess the variations of security policies in the region. The comparative case study method is the most appropriate methodology for this research to help explain the research design in order identify the causal claims and generate new knowledge on the phenomenon (Burnham et al. 2008). The aim of the methodology is to analyse the core questions: Why, despite the changes in balance of power do military spending and acquisitions remained stable in Southeast Asia consistent with historical trends? Why do national security policies in each state in Southeast Asia different? To what extent do domestic institutions influence political actors on security policy behaviours? To what extent do historical antecedents influence state actors' perceptions on policy decision-making?

In order to provide a critical analysis on the variations of national security in Southeast Asia, it is therefore beneficial for this research to use a comparative method to disconfirm the conventional logic. In classifying the variations in policy outcomes, it is necessary to adopt a cross-comparative research on how institutions in the states can have causal sequences in which their historical events affect how security policies vary in Southeast Asia. To do so, it is therefore appropriate for this research to explore the state from a historical perspective as a methodological value toward theorising how the temporal processes matter in

the state's national security (Thelen, Steinmo and Lange, 1992; Fioretos, 2011). Policymaking processes are inherently influenced by the political institutional arrangements, out of which the capacity of the state varies. For HI, it focuses on the origins, evolutions and consequences of political institutions from the domestic to international level (Fioretos, Falleti and Sheingate, 2016).

To examine the policy differences, it is important to analyse how domestic power relations between institutions and the rules of the game at a given time influence the policy outcomes (Mahoney, 2000). Using the right methodological approach is essential to the theme of the research in order to address the historical development of the political institutions in the given case studies. In order to analyse and examine the existing political institutional arrangements, this thesis employs the comparative sequential method (Falleti, 2010; Falleti and Mahoney, 2015). The comparative sequential method “constitutes a theoretically guided application of the method of process-tracing that uncovers and specifies the causal mechanisms that link the main events of the processes under study and compares the resulting sequences across cases to explain the sources of variance in the outcomes of interest (Falleti, 2010).” The comparative cross-case study method allows for comparing institutional practices between states in the region and the variations of the institutional arrangements on how it influences the policy outcomes (Pennington, 2009).

The methodology is important for this study as the political realities for each state differ, causing the policy responses to vary (Slater and Ziblatt, 2013). By comparing the sequences, it provides the methodological tool to identify key events that are sequential in the initial period of the state that created the path dependence that dictates a state's behaviour. Further, by incorporating process-tracing provides an inductive analysis on the macro-social comparative historical method and individual level decisions to study how policies are formulated for policy outcomes (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 263). More concretely, process-tracing attempts to uncover how power relations in the state and political actors

behave in various institutional arrangements before and after the critical juncture. HI seeks to differentiate how the different stages or events influence the state which either hinder or enhance the policies often with enduring consequences (Amenta and Ramsey, 2010). A historical-comparative analysis method enables this study to analyse the background conditions on how state formulates its policy decisions (Ragin 2000; Della Porta and Keating 2008). Because political actors are influenced by different causal mechanisms, it provides a distinctive feature to understand how political actors behave when confronted with institutional imperatives. Depending on its timing and sequences, history matters in the study of institutions as earlier events provide the sequential processes that influence how ruling elites formulate policies (Steinmo, 2008). Once the relevant antecedents have been identified, this research consider the preference of political actors to the types of national security policies being proposed.

By using a controlled comparison of a small-N research, it allows for rich referencing on policy narratives and process tracing through space and time (Slater and Ziblatt, 2013). The methodological consideration is both necessary and vital to the study of Southeast Asian politics as it provides a closer look at processes and the variations in institutions in diverse cases to explain the particular phenomena by using theories and causal mechanism (Bennett, 2004). In order to advance the study on the development of domestic institutions, using process-tracing in a small-N research can identify key events and through some specific causal factors, how these events are connected to processes and sequences (Falleti and Mahoney, 2015). Furthermore, the study of small-N research, as opposed to the large-N research is a more context-bound method which provides detailed analysis allowing for more variable explanations rather than a single generic variable that influences a state's national security concepts (Hopkins, 2010).

This thesis has chosen Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines for comparative study due to their particular historical experiences and the ways

these have impacted their particular political processes. They were not subject, for instance, to the same form of colonialism (but to Dutch, British, Spanish and U.S. colonialisms depending on the particular country); their civilian authorities have different capacities in exerting authority in the state; and they have different cultural formations with a variety of ethnic communities and religions (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008). That said, there are several commonalities, which together with their differences, make these countries particularly suitable for comparison to understand the complexity of political processes (Croissant and Lorenz, 2018). By selecting a small number of case studies, it provides greater research details on the process of national security decision-making in the region.

The remarkable historical depth that Southeast Asia provides makes it unique to analytically fill the literature gap, by critically investigating the various political regime types and power relations between domestic institutions. Selecting the small-N case study in this perspective avoids selection biases as each of these case studies has different institutional arrangements, allowing this research to gain in-depth knowledge on the state's national security concept (Della Porta and Keating, 2008).

First, Indonesia and the Philippines are archipelagic states, which somewhat share similar security concerns due to its geographical proximity. Singapore, on the other hand, is a city-state which makes its perceptions on security different from the three other case studies. Meanwhile, Malaysia is a federated state with some of its territories located in Borneo, separated by the South China Sea. Second, Malaysia and Singapore share similar parliamentary political systems while, Indonesia and the Philippines, on the other hand are presidential systems allowing for control for the main argument. Third, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are claimants of the South China Sea which share similar maritime concerns over their territorial water sovereignties. Though the only commonalities between these cases are that they are claimants over the disputed

water, their historical background, colonial experiences and domestic struggles are vastly different.

This research considers Singapore because it has good relations with all major regional states such as Australia, China, Japan, the U.S., and South Korea. Additionally, it has the highest military spending in comparison to the other Southeast Asian countries; effective military organisation as well as strong diplomatic relations with ASEAN counterparts; and it has the strongest economy of the four. The Philippines is also important as they are one of the key countries that are in conflict with China, especially in recent times with the arbitration tribunal over the South China Sea dispute and a major ally of the U.S. Selecting the Philippines enables better understanding in this research. Methodologically, historical comparative case studies allow the development of more sophisticated variants of concepts (Bennett and Elman, 2007). Hence, by choosing these case studies, it allows us to explore the reasons for variant factors of security concerns on the diverging national security concept.

1.5 Data Analysis

1.51 Primary and Secondary Data Resources

To explore the divergent security policies in Southeast Asia, this research proposes a combination of primary data and secondary research data as research tools to understand a state's national security concept. A detailed compilation of statistical data was provided by two authoritative bodies: the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Military Balance published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). These two bodies provide primary data for initial analyses on military spending in military procurements, arms sales as well as military inventories to determine the military dynamics in Southeast Asia. For analytical purposes the primary data provided

by these two authoritative bodies is sufficiently accurate. It is important to analyse the military expenditure as it provides a relative assessment of government priorities between military and non-military sectors showing the economic burden of a state to fund the cost of its military (Omitoogun and Skons, 2006). It also illustrates a general trend of military acquisitions and awareness of states' military trajectories and capabilities in the region. It is noteworthy as the Military Balance mostly records the military acquisitions for states but does not provide the economic data such as the military expenditure as a GDP percentage. To overcome the limitation of data, this research instead supplemented it with the SIPRI figures as part of the raw data. However, primary statistical data is only limited to its raw data without any qualitative analysis in assessing states' military capabilities. This is because when it comes to assessing the capabilities it is about how a state is able to exploit its resources (Biddle, 2004).

As such, official public documents, memoirs, policy statements, government reports, official speeches, congressional reports, defence white papers, the state's constitution, and archives, as well as data from the World Bank were analysed as one of the most essential data resources for this research. To gain data from the public documents, this research mainly focused on policy-making organisations in different states but also on the statements from various government institutions (for instance Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance to name a few) public statements and public reports. Because this study employs a qualitative approach, it is therefore necessary to gather the relevant data as documents provide the relevant narratives for the state's policy choices (Vromen, 2010). The primary data collected provides the historical context of states' policy process which offers a holistic picture of the political and social behaviour (Steinmo, 2008). To gain more information, this research focuses on information on the historical backgrounds of states in Southeast Asia, particularly on the members of ASEAN comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore to trace the process of its policy decision-making. These sources are obtained from the web

pages of the states' prime minister's office, the ASEAN webpage, the Shang-ri la dialogue, the national governments and newspaper articles. The data analysis employed in this research helps to lay down the thought processes and outcomes of policymaking in each case as well as to infer the normative contexts of policymaking from their statements.

Information Data Resources

Information	Sources
National Security and Security Policies in Southeast Asia	Journal articles, policy documents, official speeches, books, government reports
Politics and Political Security of Southeast Asia	Journals, newspapers, relevant blogs, internet news portals and books
Defence White Papers and Security related policies in Southeast Asia	Policy documents, official speeches, books, journal articles, magazines, news portals
Process of Policy Making in Southeast Asia	Policy documents, journal articles
Policy Debates and Statements in Southeast Asia	Newspapers, internet news portals, journals, relevant blogs

Table 1.1

To supplement the primary data due to accessibility, secondary data is also used extensively, derived from institutions' working papers, journal articles, published books from both local and international sources, defence magazines as well as news articles in English and Malay. To be able to access these documents, the research relied on extensive use of internet search engines, as well as think tank institutions' websites and organisations, and visiting the relevant libraries that hold extensive collections of Southeast Asian studies and military studies. In order to handle these data sources, these documents will be rigorously analysed with John Scott's control criteria of *Authenticity, Credibility, Representativeness and Meaning* (Scott, 1990). Specifically, by using John Scott's four criteria the documentary research is authentic where the origin of the source is reliable and dependable; is credible where the documents are free from error and distortion, providing an accurate account of the chosen standpoint; is representative where the documents gathered are typical of their kind; and is clear in meaning where

the documents provide clear, comprehensible and significant data (Mogalakwe 2009). Employing these criteria will provide a strict adherence to quality control in order to meet the required standards.

The second method of sourcing is the existing literature focusing on the relationship of states in the region as well as the dynamics of military changes which are valuable sources of information for the research. Existing analytical writing provides several possible explanations on the reasons behind the military acquisitions in Southeast Asia and the possible changes in national policies. Furthermore, they provide a methodological cue for this research to challenge the understanding the political processes for the national security concept in Southeast Asia. Analysing the existing literature also provides much information about the selected countries. As a secondary source, defence magazines and news outlets are additional methods that provide rich information about the changes in foreign policymaking. Thus, in order to narrate the context of the public statements, this research employed academic scholarship of investigative journalism and journalistic investigations to understand what contributes to the dynamics of military relationships in Southeast Asia. The use of media outlets and blogs is also substantially employed as the media are on occasion inherently biased to its patrons. Some news outlets are owned by the government or the oppositions which provides a useful tool to cross-reference the information available. The third method of sourcing is working papers and institutional think-tank writings. The main purpose of using these sources is to provide a clear background of the dynamics of Southeast Asia that contribute to the context of changes in foreign policymaking. Expert analysis is a valuable source for understanding the regional dynamics with inside local knowledge provided. More importantly, the data gathered was used as part of the key sources to understand the policy processes in these case studies. This research used the collected data to identify the policy patterns in the given state which provides meaning to political actors thought processes.

1.5.2 Interviews

This research also employed interviews to supplement the data gathered from the documentary research to understand the empirical puzzle. This research conducted interviews with influential local academic scholars and analysts with the knowledge on the national security policies as well as some officials in various countries involved in the policy process (Hochschild, 2009). Generally, the interviewees consist of local academic experts, mid-level ranking bureaucrats that are either involved in the military acquisitions in their respective countries, retired government officials and high-level ranking officials who are influential and directly involved in policymaking. Interviews are a method that provides favourable opportunities to gain rich information to explain the phenomena (Rubin and Rubin, 1995).

Interviews were undertaken for six months in Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and the UK. Due to the limited financial resources, I was unable to conduct interviews in the Philippines and Indonesia. However, to attain the best available substitutes, interviews were conducted both in Singapore and Brunei. With the help of local intermediaries and personal relations with some ex-Brunei high ranking officials, I was able to gain audiences with some of the mid-level and high-ranking individuals during their visits to Brunei for both official and personal trips. During my visit to Singapore, I was able to gain access to the local think-tank experts and was fortunate to be introduced to the region's experts with vast knowledge on the case studies. To supplement, I also was fortunately able to secure online interviews with local Indonesian and the Filipino scholars to gain insights on their perspectives on the subject of national security practices. Meanwhile, in the UK, I was able to attend workshops and seminars to obtain some connections with the embassies of respective countries to gain local insights. They helped me organise for interviews with the relevant individuals who have insights on the respective country's security practices.

Overall, there were 28 interviews gathered out of which some of them are interviewed under the Chatham House rules, due to the sensitive nature of the research. As such, some of the interviews were not recorded as requested by the interviewees. Moreover, due to financial limitations, this research could only cover two of the countries (Singapore and Malaysia). However, because Singapore hosts one of the most influential think tanks in the region (ISEAS and RSIS), most country experts reside in Singapore. It is notwithstanding that I had difficulties accessing the interviewees involved in policymaking in other Southeast Asian countries (other than Brunei), especially with high-ranking officials. Therefore, this research used local intermediaries such as interviewing local academics and local think tank analysts in the specific countries chosen who will be useful for the purpose of this research. Often, local think tank respondents worked closely with the government policy makers who have direct access to government institutions as well as being consultants to policy formulations. Their opinions on the security policies also carry weight due to their expertise on the subject matter.

The interviews were conducted via emails and face-to-face interviews to gain access to these individuals. It provided insights into the interviewee's thoughts on the policymaking process. These interviewees were carefully selected based on their backgrounds, positions and knowledge of national security (Berg, 2004). This study used a semi-structured interview, as it is the most appropriate method for gaining information especially when it comes to sensitive research topic. The semi-structured interview provides in-depth detail on the insider's perspective (Leech, 2002). This interview method allowed this research to be flexible with open-ended questions, limiting the likelihood of the interviewees feeling restricted while at the same time without straying off topic (Mikecz, 2012). Additionally, it enables me to gain a rapport with the interviewees to make them feel at ease during the interview and in turn, gain their trust and confidence so that the information provided would be more constructive

(Leech, 2002). From the qualitative data, this research aims to gain a deeper understanding of the political actors through their interpretation of the political phenomena.

Chapter 2:

Theoretical Explanations on Security Practices in Southeast Asia

2.1 Introduction

An investigation of Southeast Asian security practice assumes greater urgency with regards to the growing dynamics in the regional affairs. This chapter sets to construct an analytical framework as a precursor to the subsequent empirical chapters. It aims to problematise the current dominant explanation on security practices and its policies. This chapter rejects the realist position that the states are ‘black box’, that it fails to examine the complex structure of states and the dynamic relations between the state and society. This chapter aims to show that the study of security practices is more fruitful from the domestic lens, which provides a different picture to understand how political contestations and its different historical conditions influence the process of policy decision-making. It employs a historical-comparative approach championed by the Historical Institutional (HI) framework to understand the state institutional arrangements in the formulation of state’s national security concept. This would provide the analytical tool in explaining the divergence of security policies in the region.

The study of security practices in Southeast Asia constitutes an excellent case for institutional comparative study. It aims to contribute by providing a richer historical analysis and its specific institutional arrangements and highlights how different state structures contribute to the variations of security policies. It provides a qualitative analysis through process tracing which includes the critical analytical components such as critical antecedents, critical junctures, path dependence, and the reproduction of institutions to understand divergence of national security policies (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Slater and Simmons, 2010; Capoccia, 2015).

It is important to note that political contestation over power in the domestic level plays an important role in the discourse of formulating security policies. This chapter aims to show that HI offers a finer tuned and historically rooted conception than generally founded in the constructivist approach. With the principle concept of institutions such as regime legitimacy, state structures, domestic power relations, nationalism and suchlike, HI sets out detailed criteria with which to provide comparative details to differentiate how Southeast Asian states are structured differently. This would also explain the divergent pathways centres on the critical juncture that the different levels of social conflict have profound consequences for allocations of resources and policy outcomes.

By doing so, it provides a systematic framework on how security issues are viewed from the domestic level in which different society perceived security differently which explains the differences in security policy outcomes. In the following sections, this thesis will explain HI as an analytical tool and to grasp how the understanding of power relations and historical legacies shape the conceptualisation of national security policies. It provides a research design that is able to determine the causal effect of institutions on state policy. In other words, the study on institutions provides the links on how security issues are viewed from the state-society level view security differs across countries.

The primary research questions of the thesis are fundamental in the study of security in Southeast Asia: why, despite the changes in security context have military spending and acquisitions remained stable in Southeast Asia, consistent with historical trends? What explains the differences in national security policies in each state in Southeast Asia? To what extent do historical antecedents influence state actors' perceptions on policy decision-making? How do the state institutional settings influence the formulation of national security concept and implementation of security policy? In order to fully grasp the study on national security, we need to illustrate what are the important theoretical and conceptual

elements that explain the continuity and change in national security in Southeast Asia.

This chapter proceeds in two main sections. The first section critically reviews and examines prominent IR theories; realist, constructivist and the critical theory approaches to national security and its security policy behaviours. It first analyses how the rise of China, the changing balance of power, and the South China Sea dispute are explained from the realist approach which inherently affects the Southeast Asian states security policies as a response to the regional power structure. The second part aims to examine the role of regional institution viewed from the constructivist approach vis-à-vis ASEAN as a regional framework for countries to be unitary actors working within the scope of its norms. The third part discusses the Neo-Gramsci critical theory that is fundamentally domestic oriented and puts on political contestation in security policies.

In the second section, this chapter aims to provide an alternative explanation for the variations on security policy behaviours by looking into the bottom-up approach to understand broadly the determinants in the state's security behaviours. It employs a historical-comparative approach by incorporating the Constructivist and the Critical theory with HI framework to understand how the state institutional arrangements in the formulation of the state's national security concept. It aims to clarify the linkages by conceptualising how historical legacies and domestic state's institutional arrangements influence national security behaviours. State's national security concept should be understood from the institutional analysis by 'bringing the states back in' to explain the variation in state foreign policies on national security (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008; Chambers, 2014). Thus, the national security concept emerges from the bargaining process in politics between political elites to secure their power in the domestic politics as well as maintaining state sovereignty in the international domain (Knight, 1992; Narine, 2004).

The remainder of this chapter will then proceed to introduce the domestic variants form of analysis on states political institutions that would greatly benefit the study of security behaviours in Southeast Asia. Using key concepts from the historical institutionalist approach, that is the critical antecedent and the study on the origin of institutions, it offers a more nuanced explanation. Using HI as an analytical framework allows this thesis to explain three characteristics that are necessary as a prelude to understanding the differences in behaviour of states in Southeast Asia. They are: 1. political contestation, 2. state institutional order; and 3. the historical legacies. The emergence of a state is a result of intense political contestation between the social force in the given polity. It provides an analysis on the relations of state-society which encompasses the role of power, norms and domestic social struggle in defining its foreign political interest and national security priorities in the region. If we choose to accept that individual states have different historical trajectories, this helps us explain how different state capacities effect how a state choose to pursue its security.

2.2 Literature Review

Different Theoretical Approaches on Explaining Security Practices in Southeast Asia

For a long time, Southeast Asian security was understood from the realist lens. For nearly seven decades, the U.S. presence in the region has brought some form of regional order and security which especially benefitted the capitalist states (Beeson, 2004). Under the umbrella of the U.S. hub-and-spoke alliance, it provided an opportunity for the client states to prosper during the Cold War, while they were willing to tolerate illiberal political and economic practices (Beeson, 2003). However, after the Cold War, the strategic environment for the Southeast Asia has reached a juncture: an increasingly emerging U.S.-China rivalry, driven

by the rise of China and the gradual change in the balance of power, and the territorial issues stemming from the colonial legacy (Liff and Ikenberry, 2014; Fu *et al.*, 2015).

There is a great consensus that it is the rise of China that has fundamentally changed the structural power in the regional and global international system. Numerous literatures have discussed that the military build-up in Southeast Asia is a response to the rise of China, the changing balance of power, and the U.S.-China strategic competition (Buszynski, 2010; Majid, 2012; Ahmad and Mohd Sani, 2017; Murphy, 2017). They offer different theoretically informed accounts on the reactions of Southeast Asia's security policies. Despite this, the realist approach is still considered by some as the most influential theory in security studies.

Realist scholarship argues that the rise of China is the most important challenge to the balance of power and has led to intense security competition with the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific and possibly an all-out war (Mearsheimer 2006). Some also argue that the rise of China has changed the status quo and that could potentially become a hegemon replacing the U.S. (Leifer, 2005; Mearsheimer, 2010). This is followed by China's increasing military capabilities, becoming the second largest military spender in the world, solidifying its position as a rising power that can potentially challenge the current hegemon. As China's economic capabilities continue to expand, its growing spending on military modernisation is seen as an intent to deter the U.S. involvement in the region (*Summary of the 2018 US National Defense Strategy*, 2018). As a hegemonic power, the U.S. continues to play an important role in the region. It is widely accepted that historically in the post-World War II, the U.S. is seen as the guarantor of regional security in the Asia-Pacific and is deeply entrenched in military, economic, political and culture in Southeast Asia with its military presence for maintaining global and regional order (Chong, 2017). However, due to China's economic

pull, some argue that the U.S. must accommodate China's growth in order to avoid military clashes (Kang, 2017).

The U.S. as a regional and global hegemon is now increasingly locked in a strategic competition with China for influences, that extends to geostrategic, economic, military, geopolitical and other main domains (Shambaugh, 2018). To some, Southeast Asia is at the epicentre of the great power struggles competing for autonomy and order, at the expense of other smaller states (Patalano, 2013). As regional states are growing uncertain of U.S. commitments as a security guarantor, some scholars argued that smaller states appear to be hedging with the U.S. and China while at the same time engaging in military build-ups (Liff and Ikenberry, 2014; Glaser, 2015). Yet, the discourse of anxiety about the rise of China has exacerbated with the ASEAN states involved in the clash between the two superpowers: China vis-à-vis the U.S.

For small and middle power states in Southeast Asia, great power politics play a great significant role in the making of their security policies. For some, states either perceive this as a threat or as an opportunity to develop relations with these great powers (Murphy, 2017). Not to mention, at the epicentre of this great power rivalry, the South China Sea dispute plays a significant role on how they behave. One of the most influential scholars from the realist camp, Robert Kaplan (2014), pointed that the South China Sea is quickly turning into a strategic flashpoint for the great power politics for influence in international order. For Kaplan, China's rapid military development has fuelled tension in the South China Sea, causing an action-reaction on military build-ups. Kaplan also argues that as China's borders are more secure than in the past and provides Chinese rulers to increase its presence in the South China Sea. In recent years, satellite images also showed that China is militarising the South China Sea islets with military hardware and communications as well as helipads (O'Connor and Hardy, 2015a; 2015b). This forces other littoral claimants to further develop their own naval capacities (Kaplan, 2011).

Scholars argued that the destabilising of uncertainty has warranted the U.S. and its allies, particularly Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines to rebalance in order to maintain the regional order through the containment of China (Cruz De Castro 2015; Lee 2015; Swaine 2015; Zhang 2016). Drawing upon this logic, scholars and observers argued that great power competition between China and the U.S. may lead to conflict based on the historical logic of the *Thucydides trap* over the changes in distributional power and international order (Mearsheimer, 2006; Allison, 2015). As the relative power continues to shift to China, the probability of war is likely as the geostrategic challenges as its continued ascendance will have an impact on the U.S.-led international order (Allison, 2017). For Western scholars, the absence of international institutions and regimes capable of constraining the aggressors poses a greater likelihood of security dilemma amongst these great powers that can have a spill-over effect towards the region (Mearshimer, 2006).

Realist perspective assumes that all states security interests are depicted as material which invariably assume that national interest is analogous, though only differ in its relative material capabilities under the condition of anarchic international system (Waltz, 1979). Due to the nature of the international system that is of self-help, states are driven to strengthen their defence capabilities through military modernisation to meet the strategic challenges. For Western scholars, state actors are highly autonomous and unitary which its behaviours are greatly influenced by the international structure (Mearsheimer, 2006). Mearsheimer (2006) contends that the rise of China may be a destabilising force to the regional order. It is especially true for realist scholars that while security policies may be open to input from political elites, the systemic level may restrain domestic social forces in security issues in order to survive and maintain sovereignty.

Prominent scholars located in the region such as Emmers (2012), Tan (2014), and Khoo (2014) found that the continuing existence of great power

politics, the territorial disputes and the aggressive military modernisation reinforce the relevance of realist perspective. Khoo (2004) suggests that only great power politics can provide regional stability while the role of regional institutions such as ASEAN is fairly limited in managing conflict. Questions have also been raised about the U.S.'s strategic commitments in the region especially with the Trump administration when he decided to withdraw the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Instead of reassuring their commitments to the region, Trump repositioned the U.S.'s commitment to the region by replacing it with the American first policies making allies bear a large share of defence commitments to its strategic allies which are at odds with the regional elites perceptions (Townshend, 2017). Regional institutions such as ASEAN and the ARF were created to reinforce the relevance of the self-help system and to a larger extent, the study of Southeast Asian security because they perceive that it is largely asymmetrical and unstable especially in great power politics (Khoo, Smith and Shambaugh, 2005). Such a realist account, however, has been criticised by other scholars on its inadequacy in explaining the contribution of regional order by the small and medium states in ASEAN (Goh, 2007).

For ASEAN states, balancing and bandwagoning are not the only most appropriate strategic considerations on how smaller states respond to great power politics and the changes in the balance of power (Kang, 2003). In the post-Cold War, smaller and medium states in the region have been pursuing a hedging strategy vis-à-vis China and the U.S. which is a mixed method approach to accommodate and address the security challenges that the region is facing (Kuik, 2008; Goh 2005; Jackson, 2014). For ASEAN states, they prefer to adopt pragmatic accommodation and economic interaction with China while maintaining U.S. presence benefitting its security presence in the region and preserving its political autonomy in the great power competition between China and the U.S. which represent its distinctive security strategy (Lim and Cooper, 2015). Perhaps, this logic also carries some weight as the region is dominated by

weak, underdeveloped states with uneven levels of economic development (Ba, 2009).

Although the realist logic is still widely perceived as useful to help frame the policy behaviours in the region, the security policy behaviours in the region are more multi-layered and complex than realist might suggest. Realist has a tendency to 'black box' the state - that is, to put aside the domestic politics as unimportant in defining the state's security behaviours. While the similar states like unit formulation carries some truth, it does not reflect that other primary institutions such as the regime types, non-intervention and sovereignty are subject of contestation that need to be problematised in thinking about the logic of security in Southeast Asia (Acharya, 2012a). To assume that states behave in similar ways because of structural constraints ignores the actual conditions that state do not always conform to the systemic pressures (Acharya, 2005; Wendt, 1999). The emphasis on the balance of power logic limits the realist approach to look beyond the materialist condition that other non-material factors can also play a proprietary role in explaining why the region has remained stable.

Rather, the actual historical make-up of Southeast Asian states are diverse, with big variations in ethnicity, culture and identities which influence how states determine their security priorities and its practices (Acharya, 2014). For instance, the Philippines is confronted with internal securities stemming from its historical make-up of a nation-state, originating from its colonial policies with countless counter-insurgencies and endemic poverty which limit the government projection capacity in building its military for conventional warfare (Cruz De Castro, 2014). On the other hand, Singapore's history with its neighbouring countries vis-à-vis Malaysia and Indonesia has consistently driven its policymakers to maintain high defence spending to maintain security (Huxley, 2008; Ang, 2013).




Figure 2.1

Source: (SIPRI 2019)

Perhaps, if we follow the neorealist logic that is based on the perceived threats, ASEAN should be engaging in an arms race. However, ASEAN states are aware that they could not compete in tit-for-tat with China in terms of military spending (Ball, 2003). Even as China becomes a security concern for the region, aggregate spending by ASEAN has been low, consistent with its historical trend as shown in figure 2.1. One of the issues which arises from this discussion, then, is the extent of military build-up in the region. Acharya (1994) and Ball (2010) assessed that there is a military build-up in Southeast Asia, though, both noted that it is much more complex and multifaceted than has been suggested. Acharya (2014) argued that the definition of an arms race that was central to the two world superpowers during the Cold War in the struggle for supremacy is not applicable in the context of Southeast Asia.

The findings of some qualitative studies on the variations of security policies in Southeast Asia suggest otherwise (Bitzinger, 2010). Many scholars' analyses on Southeast Asia that procurement policies in Southeast Asia are driven by non-

traditional security threats. For instance, Tan (2004) argues that the force modernisation in Southeast Asia is driven by prestige, corruption, economic growth and domestic factors. A good example is Malaysia. In recent years, Malaysia has revealed a modernisation plan to equip its military with newer emerging challenges, which its security doctrine was previously directed at internal threats. The 2013 Sabah incursion and the 2014 clash with China in the South China Sea displayed a deep sense that its military faced several challenges in securing its sovereignty (Vuving, 2017). However, the plan to modernise its military were either cancelled or delayed following the weak commodity prices, which saw a decline in its defence expenditure. More so, the Malaysian government has also been under scrutiny over the 1MDB scandal, intensifying ethnic tensions in the state which sparked mass protest. These political developments forced the government to shift its priorities to the domestic by increasing the distribution of patronages in order to maintain political stability (Case, 2017). Such measurements clearly demonstrate that the government was more concerned about its economic development and political legitimacy over strategic ones. Not surprisingly, realist theory falls short to provide sufficient analytical explanation without giving appropriate considerations of the domestic views that security policies are politically contested between the social forces in the state. Its heavy bias towards the logic of balance of power offers partial explanation about the how the region has enduring peace or why the existence of institutional cooperation among East Asian states despite the heterogeneity of types of states in the region (Stubbs, 2014).

By contrast, another influential approach in the study of Southeast Asia is the constructivist camp, which seeks to transcend from the realist approach. They challenged the realist assumption material capabilities logic in explaining a holistic picture on security as they ignored the inter-state cultural differences, norms, values and cognition in explaining the variations of national security policies (Acharya, 2014; Stubbs, 2014). Instead, they argue that security is

socially constructed out of the meanings that social actors interact with other states on the structures of the international system (Wendt, 1999). They posit that security perceptions are not epiphenomena of unitary states acting under anarchy and material power but are independent of these structures influenced by both normative and domestic structures (Johnston, 1999).

In the post-Cold War, constructivists argue that the traditional realist of great power balancing and bandwagoning are not the only form of responses to power and relative capabilities (Kang, 2003; Ross, 2006; Chan, 2012). They emphasise that the socialisation process that constitute as norms and culture rather than ideology provides a more comprehensive understanding on security behaviours (Hobson, 2000). They argue that regional states have managed to transcend from the realpolitik by forging a regional identity through the ideational structures via a process of socialisation to create a nascent security community (Acharya, 2014).

Constructivists explained that the formation of Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) is perhaps the most significant regional institution that has exerted a dominant ideational influence over its members (Stubbs, 2014; Mahbuhani and Sng, 2017). They explained that the regional security order is enunciated by the norms of interstate conduct that have socialised its ASEAN members and even external powers, transforming their interests and identities (Hopf, 1998; Ba, 2009). Constructivists argue that the relative peace in Southeast Asia is achieved because the regional states have had an influence on the institutionalisation of the principles of non-interference and non-intervention, which is often called the 'ASEAN Way' (Haacke, 2003). Some also perceived that the rise of China has not prompted fear amongst the smaller regional states, as its identities from its history has shown that it is a peaceful country (Kang, 2007; Shambaugh, 2005). Kang (2007) argues that the rise of China provides both strategic and economic opportunities rather than threats for the region.

In recent times, as a regional multilateral institution, ASEAN has acted as a buffer for the U.S.-China rivalry in managing the dynamics of power the two major powers through a wider security architecture that is centred on ASEAN (Stubbs, 2014; Tan, 2018). The practice of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) by ASEAN members has helped maintain peace between members as well as other major states by providing normative regional platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), ASEAN+3 for participants to work on understanding security issues (Ba, 2009). ASEAN's prominence is largely successful through negotiations based on its capabilities as an entrepreneurial leadership and a regional conductor in managing regional order while maintaining its neutrality and unity (Stubbs, 2014; Yates, 2017).

Despite ASEAN achievements as an institution in maintaining peace and security in the region, however, its role as a security community and success in managing conflicts have been challenged in recent times (Khoo, 2014, 2015). Increasingly, questions have been raised in recent years on ASEAN unity, with other members of ASEAN divided with their opinions on certain aspects of the institutions policies on China (Khoo, 2016). For the first time in its forty-five years of history, ASEAN failed to agree on its joint communique in 2012 to agree on a diplomatic stance on the South China Sea dispute. Constructivists argue that the norm of non-interference in member states' affairs explain the lack of substantive regional cooperation (Acharya, 2014).

Further, mistrust between members still persists which affects its effectiveness in managing conflicts (Emmers, 2017). Historical animosities between members of ASEAN states remain with ASEAN contemporary borders stems from the decolonisation period in the aftermath of World War II. The limits of the colonial administration carved during pre-war became the new international borders for the independent countries. The overlapping territorial claims amongst the newly independent countries continue to be the perennial

issue in the region (Jenne, 2017). Spats over territorial disputes have provided strong incentives for states to increase its defence expenditure in order to protect its national security. States such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore have procured sophisticated military equipment that has high offensive capabilities such as submarines to assert their sovereignty claims over rival claimants (Bateman 2011; Einhorn 2015).

Both the neorealist and constructivist suffer similar logical pitfalls which focuses on structural forces of the international system- power and norms, ignoring the context of agencies and the state structure (Beeson, 2017a). Constructivist (Wendt, 1999) and neorealist (Waltz, 1979) treats states as coherent and unitary, which largely neglect states' internal reconfigurations (Hameiri and Jones, 2016). Although the realist logic focuses on the principal source of security threat is external, the historical realities in the nation-state show otherwise (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008). On the other hand, constructivist logic is also criticised for its inability to explain how the ASEAN way values have been violated by members of states in order to maintain state sovereignty (Narine, 2006). If all states were of similar type with the same shared perceptions, there would be no divergence in security policies. In reality, Southeast Asian states have different historical legacies, domestic institutions and different objectives on how they deal with security threats. While acknowledging that the socialisation of normative regional order of ASEAN has contributed to our understanding on security studies, constructivists have only fleetingly explained state preferences are endogenous as domestic politics shape how state behaves (Jones, 2011).

A case can therefore be made that by analysing the historical antecedents as opposed to great power projection, it provides a better explanation on why some countries in the region have divergent security policies despite the changes in the balance of power between great powers in the international system (Croissant and Kuehn, 2009). Southeast Asian states have used the norms of ASEAN way as a

strategy for policymakers as a political tool dressed in nationalist sentiments for its domestic politics (Emmers, 2017). This is where the constructivist logic appears to be lacking as the normative argument should eliminate any mistrust between members of states. According to Jones (2010), the norms of non-interference have been violated by members of states on countless occasions to further domestic interests in Southeast Asian states. Adherence to norms and sovereignty have been selective rather than uniform. The inability to address these security issues multilaterally implies that the nature of the problems comes from different vested interest between states that limits itself to cooperate on the multilateral level (Beeson, 2017b). The disjuncture between the adherence to the ASEAN norms and the variations in how state leaders actually respond to its security challenges can be explained via the nature of political contestations between social forces in the state.

On the other hand, critical theory provides an alternative explanation by unpacking the state. They seek to analyse the security architecture in Southeast Asia from the domestic approach. Critical theorists have done so by providing comparative institutional studies about the state-society relations on security which have been championed by the political economy theories such as the ‘Murdoch School’ of Social Conflict Theory (Rodan, 2006; Hameiri, 2007). Sharing the same ontology as the constructivist theory, critical theory argues that security is socially constructed (Jones, 2010). The social conflict theory perceives the political institutions as organised and shaped by the powerful political agencies in which they are exercised. It argues that the political institutions and outcomes derived from social conflict where power relations over the control on state resources are conditioned by the struggle between class in the given state (Hamieri, 2011). To be more specific, social conflict analyses from the domestic which focuses on the struggle between political interest between classes or coalition societal groups existing in a power dynamic relationship over access to state resources and state power (Rodan et.al, 2006; pp.6-7). In this view, states

do not have the autonomy as state is an institutional space for political actors to wield its political influences to implement its political interest (Decanio, 2000).

For the social conflict approach, institutions exist because political agencies shaped them, and they are subjected to manipulation to serve their political interest. Put differently, they view the state as a source of power rather than as a set of agents and institutions that bind political agents to behave in a certain manner (Jones, 2010). For instance, according to the critical theory, Abdullah (2018) argues that Singapore's high military spending is not entirely determined by its geographical position, sandwiched between two Malay states, but it is also determined by the hegemonic ideology of the PAP that has been institutionalised in the state to maintain its regime legitimacy. Perhaps, in the case of Indonesia, despite its transition to a democracy albeit now being formally under the Ministry of Defence, the military is still highly politicised with the formulation and operational control in the fields of security remains largely in the prerogatives of the TNI (Heiduk, 2015). Thus, it can be said that the concept of security is often interpreted and emphasized from the domestic roots as it focuses on the power struggles between groups in a nation-state that defines the overall national security (Bloomfield, 2012).

Based on the social conflict logic, ASEAN was formed through cooperation of dominant forces in the capitalist states to maintain domestic social order from the growing class-based challenges to their domination (Jones, 2010). Although it managed to reduced intra-conflict, however, as Jones puts it, "to permit ruling elites to consolidate their own grip over society and achieve the economic growth necessary to undercut the appeal of communism, within an international context of waning Western guarantees to defend anti-communist regimes from opposition forces within their own societies" (Jones, 2012a, p. 39). During the period where the Western powers were waning, ASEAN was first introduced in 1967 by the original members of ASEAN Five- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand - to promote its national sovereignty while sharing

similar domestic problems in dealing with Communism and to maintain its domestic dominance (Solingen; 2004; 2005). The states converging interest to collaborate and engage in the institutional network was a preference for the states to maintain sovereignty and state autonomy (Solingen, 2010). For ASEAN states, state autonomy is an important composition that constitutes how it should react towards the big powers (Kuik, 2008). This is because the historical realities of these ASEAN states are different which the constructivists have overstated ASEAN's principle function as an institution. The existence of ASEAN is a symbolic stature for ruling elites as a platform and as a reassurance vehicle for states to pursue their own national interest (Khoo, 2004; Davies, 2018).

Our discussion so far has revealed that there is a causal relation on how domestic conflict influences how states formulate security policies. Dominant political actors deriving from class influences and ideas play an important role in shaping the national interest due to its influences over state capacity and agendas which explains the divergence in security policies in the region (Jones, 2011). It is accepted that the social conflict approach has been fruitful in providing explanations on the state's security practices. This thesis agrees with Hameiri and Jones statement (2014, p.5) that "to understand political institutions and outcomes as being shaped by social conflict". This research builds on from the existing findings of critical theory, which seek to explore other different dominant forces that hold on to state power aside from class. Although the study on class has provided influential explanations on why states' security practices diverge, there has been little considerations on how other social forces such as race, ethnicity, religion, clan, tribes and region may be equally resonant other than class (Slater, 2010a; Clarke, 2017). It also lacks the analysis how certain institutional structures can produce long-term effects which can occasionally constrain or benefit certain social groups from participating in the security policy (Pion-Berlin, 2011).

This research therefore sees a gap in the literature that the study of security should be analysed beyond class boundaries by looking into the historical context

to understand how the relations between states and society influence the different trajectories in security practices. In the contemporary Southeast Asian security, threats come increasingly from within the states themselves defecting from the existing state systems. Historical legacies and the state institutions can also act autonomously due to institutional constraints created by timing and sequencing mechanisms. Such arrangements were developed through path dependent processes that are necessary for state-institutional development and stability in affecting political behaviours (Steinmo, 2008). To understand why security policy varies in Southeast Asia, the contemporary security practices is best understood as a continuum of a long process that began during the colonial period. As Lipschutz (1995, p.8) argues, security is “the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within states, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them”.

By exploring certain domestic institutional arrangements such as norms, rules, ideologies, and identities, this helps us in explaining the differences in security policies and the state behaviours in the region (Lantis, 2002, 2014). This research shares the constructivist position that security is socially constructed. Once these norms are created, it takes a path dependent process which makes it difficult to change even though it is not the optimal policy decision. Although the creation of ASEAN provides a regional security culture that shape states context on the cost and benefit of particular actions, however, it does not determine a state’s national interest and the security policy (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008, p. 47).

They argue that the state as a superstructure that serves the dominant social groups interest while reducing the function of the state to act autonomously (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). Because the creation of state develops some provisions of institutional stability political actors, military actors and civilian elites also have some form of influence in state preferences in security policies.

In spite of this, the societal role and the dominant social groups can also be influenced by the societal structure depending on the degree of institutional arrangements created in the given states (Slater and Fenner, 2011).

As Beeson (2017a, p.6) puts it, “it is not necessary to be a Marxist or to adopt a ‘critical’ perspective to appreciate the dialectical nature of this process, or the possibility that there may be other forces other than class relations at work in determining social outcomes.” It is important that the engagement between IR theories provide contributions to knowledge in explaining the national security concept. Some important insights emerge from the exchanges between the international relations theory- realism, constructivism and critical theories which can be fruitfully brought together. The study on power, prevailing norms and the material structure of capitalist system has brought together to explain the divergence of security policies and the stability of these policies once implemented in the states.

As will be elaborated further detail in the next section, this research aims to introduce Historical Institutionalism as an analytical framework to explore how the origin and development of specific state structures helped either constrain or enhances certain specific institutions such as norms, rules, ideologies and organisations once it materialises. Providing a systematic analysis on the study of security in Southeast Asia requires us to adopt the key tenets of these theories as a method to investigate why states behave differently through opening up the black box of the state in connecting the security policies to domestic interests (Kapstein, 1995; Bell, 2011). This thesis aims to add into the academic debate by analysing from the endogenous perspectives which focus on state-society relations and their impact towards the concept of security and security policies. Although the literature discusses the importance of great power politics, the regional institutions and the conflict of power have contributed to the debate on security practices in Southeast Asia, this thesis aims to add to the discussion by using the historical institutionalist approach by providing a comparative analysis

from the different domestic perspective on why security policies vary and how they evolve over time. Historical Institutionalism provides an alternative explanation, which explores the logic of path dependence influenced by its history on domestic struggles in each individual state which can shape or constrain its policy preferences (Peters, Pierre and King, 2005).

2.3 Historical Institutionalism as an Analytical approach on National Security

To move beyond the realist tradition in explaining the state's security behaviours, the contemporary security challenges that Southeast Asia faced by today are presented to be more complex and multi-layered (Collins, 2003). If we are to assess the impact of historical contingencies on the nation-state, we must first identify the principal mechanisms on how security practices are implemented. To analyse and understand the different trajectories of security policies and its practices, it is commonly claimed, especially in Southeast Asia, that the security policies derive from the coalition of political elites within the states (Collins, 2003; Ganesan, 2005; Slater, 2010a). The concept of national security is defined based on the perspectives of political actors in a given state to identify its strategic principles and priorities guiding the principles of the states in formulating its national security goals to maintain state sovereignty (Collins, 2003, p. 3). As Ayoob (1995) points out, different experiences of state formation determine the differences in the primary security orientations.

Thus, to examine the variances of state behaviours, we need to take historical divergences into consideration which provide a compelling explanation on the different trajectories in security policies in the region (Beeson, 2014). As Bloomfield (2012) argues, the differences in subcultures within a strategic culture may help us explain why certain security policies are institutionalised over others. Historical Institutionalism (HI) is best understood as an ontologically open

analytical approach with a set of concepts that are foreground to temporality (Mahoney and Thelen, 2015). The central assumption of HI is that political actors are subjected to the context of rules structured by the winning coalition of political groups, which gradually strengthened the rules to be institutionalised over time (Sanders, 2006). The institutional model usually derive from political concessions established from the existing political group to include or exclude of its members to create a stable state (Bertrand, 2004). Political contestations between the social forces often influence how state shapes security perceptions.

Institutional analysis matters because it allows us to examine the relationship between political actors as agents of history, as they can shape policy choices, behaviour, interests and identities of agents (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Lowndes, 2010). Institutions can be in the form of formal (rules, regulations, organisational structures, state) and informal (ideas, norms, identities) that influences policy choices and govern political actors within a specific outcome (Steinmo, 2008). Whether formal or informal, institutions are important for domestic politics because institutions can not only enhance or constrain political actors in the decision-making, they are also the outcome of deliberate political strategies which influence how the state behaves (Steinmo, 2008).

The chief contribution of analysing state institutions is that the state is a historically contingent social and political system that is captured by certain social groups' interest claiming control over given territories (Skocpol, 1997). Krasner (1999) argues that state sovereignty is 'organised hypocrisy' that is maintained by the powerful actors within the polity maintained for their own interests. Jessop (2008) argues that the state may privilege some actors, identities, and strategies over others. As the state distribute power and resources, the political representatives of these social groups often compete to capture the state institutions in order to enhance their agenda. Depending on the specific institutional arrangements, power relations can influence whose ideas would be incorporated in the security policy, which helps explain the principle of specific

political actors in coordinating the state policies. Once the institutions are established, key political actors formed political structures such as parties, bureaucratic organisations as well as business organisations to structure interests that can shape or constrain political choices. Such a political outcome is also a product of political contestations between social forces, which explains the trajectory, scope and sustainability of these institutions (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992; Peters, Pierre and King, 2005; Steinmo, 2008).

Because HI is focused on the impact of institutions on actor motivations in policies, it is able to subsume other approaches to explain the policy preferences (Thelen, 1999). In consequence, security policy is a product of historically contingent structures and processes of struggles for power within states between the social groups and their political interest that besiege them (Lipschutz, 1995, p.8). The influence of HI as an analytical framework exemplifies that history matters in the study of IR and comparative politics because the ideological framework and the institutional practices in the given polity are radically different due to its antecedent condition that structured politics across time (Hall, 2016).

HI also focuses on the analysis of institutions whereby policy choices are also linked by existing and past arrangements (Thoenig, 2011). By analysing the state's history, elements such as timing, sequencing, critical junctures, path dependency, change and continuity helps as a building block in understanding the narrative of policy choices (Pierson, 2004). Thus, by tracing history and the allocation of power as a starting point, it provides the analytical tool to understand the origin of institutional arrangements on how historical episodes in which institutions are created or reshaped (Capoccia and Ziblatt, 2010).

Once the rules of the games are institutionalised, it creates a long period of stability. The established legacy of historical conditions on security has a powerful effect in dictating actors' behaviours termed as path dependence, because once these rules, norms and ideas are institutionalised, political actors create policies and reinforce the systemic logic that reflects the institutional

settings (Thelen, 1999). Pierson (2004, p. 37) demonstrated that because power asymmetries are uneven, it creates a powerful positive feedback that the agenda control and ideological manipulation can transform into an unlevel playing field, making open conflict to be unnecessary. Pierson (2000) argues that the institutional arrangements are typically hard to change as political actors are bound by past institutional choices making them hard to manoeuvre policies. The allocation of power and authority resides on the key political actors as a source of political feedback (Pierson, 2004, p. 36).

Sewell (1996, p.262) posits that the ‘what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence events occurring at a later time’. In this sense, institutions are created by human actions and interactions that are linked to certain historical legacies which may shape the rules, norms, the capacity of state, and the institutional arrangements that are designed to privilege particular interests (Suffian, 2019). Over time, social and political power are used to consolidate political advantage at the expense of other political forces (Pierson, 2004, p. 37). North (1990) posits this as ‘institutional locked-in’ which limits the institutional changes as certain political groups benefit over others from the institutional settings that constrain institutional changes. Such positive reinforcement to specific political groups enables these institutions to persist for a long period of time. This is because even though the institutional changes can lead to new policies or system of governance to be formally introduced, changes may be incremental as it may not necessarily undermine informal institutions that was previously created in limiting powerful actors in the previous institutions (Suffian, 2019).

2.4 Explaining Institutional Changes in Historical Institutionalism

However, HI is under criticism whereby the ‘stickiness’ approach is parsimonious, which cannot explain the institutional changes effectively with

critics claiming that agents are highly constrained by the institutional environments (Schmidt, 2008; Libel, 2016). Critics claim that HI is invariant whereby political actors are seen as rational without taking into account of how dominant ideas can change the institutional structure in the study of politics (Hameiri, 2007; Schmidt, 2008; Hameiri and Jones, 2014; Libel, 2018).

Thus, for critics, the study of institutions, at the very least from HI perspectives is limited in explaining in the changes in institutions from an exogenous shock that views this framework as monolithic (Jessop, 1990). Despite this, HI also offers a second strand which argues that rather than ideas, critical antecedents provide a more convincing approach in explaining how change occurs in the study of institutions and their outcomes (Mahoney, 2001; Slater and Simmons, 2010). Though these criticisms are not new in HI, analysing the political agency has been focal for HI to understand policy outcomes. For HI, the state preferences in policies are not just limited to exogenous shocks, but also endogenous processes which pay attention to critical junctures as well as critical historical antecedents in the contest for power (Pierson, 2004; Slater, 2010a). Earlier works on HI provide a strong background on the analysis of agents that institutions and the understanding of institutional arrangements on political actors (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996). Depending on the specific period and sequences, institutions may be punctuated with a brief period of instability termed as ‘critical junctures’ where changes are possible (Capoccia and Kelleman, 2007). During a critical juncture, there is a moment of open contestation in which one political group has substantial advantage over others (Pierson, 2015). During this period, the winners will get to exercise the political authority over the losers to create a mechanism for reproduction to guarantee their access to power (Thelen, 1999).

Thelen (2002) argues that not all political institutional changes can cause destabilization that will lead to institutional breakdown. The change of the rules of the game can be incremental as new rules or governance can be formally

introduced but may not necessarily undermine the informal institutions and powerful actors in the old institutions (Suffian, 2019). For Streeck and Thelen (2005), they theorized that such institutional changes can occur in -1. 'displacement'- when an institution is displaced over another; 2. 'layering'- when an institution adopts new elements on top of the existing institutions; 3. 'drift'- when the condition in which the institution exists for changes, but the institution do not adapt to these changes; 4. 'conversion'- when an existing institution adopt new purposes attached to the existing structure. Depending on the level of political contestation, the institutional change can be evolutionary whereby the powerful political actors can distribute access to state power to be more inclusive to the non-beneficiaries (Thelen, 1999).

This helps explain the disjuncture between ASEAN states on their divergence on the security policies and responses to the regional challenges. Any attempt to understand Southeast Asian politics on political actors decision-making process should be grounded from the analysis of institutions. Significant political outcome is best understood as a result of both rule following and interest maximising (Steinmo, 2008). By analysing how policy is embedded from the national standpoint provides a better guideline on how to understand state behaviours. For instance, China's increasing assertiveness in recent years especially during Aquino III administration, has forced the Philippine government to promote policy layering to include the South China Sea dispute as part of its national security concern (Department of National Defence Republic of the Philippines, 2012). Despite its attempt to expand its security policy, the enduring influence of the elite clans in policy decision-making demonstrate that the Philippines politics becomes a huge obstacle for the government to divert state resources to acquire credible defence system (Cruz De Castro, 2005; 2014). Such path dependence subsequently encouraged the Philippine government to support alternative form of changes such as policy layering and policy drifts. Perhaps, the continuous internal threats in Mindanao, renewed Communist insurgency, and

the comprehensive defence agreement signed with the U.S. provide little incentive for the Philippine politicians to build the institutional framework to formulate security policies to modernize its military for external defence. The recurring political conflict on religious and class-based fractions poses how the Philippines ruling elites determine its policy outcomes based on its political capacities that can either mobilise or refrain the actors to state resources to formulate and implement its security policies (Cruz De Castro, 2014).

This remark points to the reason why exploring security policy from the HI approach can be beneficial to the security studies. It does not give primacy to agents, institutions, structures or ideas, but rather each analysis is dialectically held in a mutually constitutive manner (Marsh, 2009). Rather than the primary institutions such as the international system as international constraints, this variant of HI approach on institution provides a deeper and subtler context where the rules of the games typically need to be negotiated between the political actors (Bell, 2011). Instead, agency and structure shape one another over time, which invariably shapes political processes (Fioretos, 2011). By adopting the HI approach, it provides a comparative historical perspective that is a bottom-up state-society driven process concerned with causal analysis through the examination of process over time and the use of systematic and contextualised comparison (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 10).

In relation to this thesis, using HI to the study of security practices in Southeast Asia provides context on how security policies are generated by the collective actions of influential elites in the state. This also underpins the strength of the state and regime institutions especially when there is an absence of political conflict between the political elites (Slater, 2010a). The HI approach focuses on the study of institutions of governments within the state that influence and shape security policy as a by-product of the emergence of particular institutional arrangement deriving from political contestation between social forces. Consequently, security policy is best understood as a product of historically

contingent structures and processes of struggle for power within states between the social groups and their political interest that besiege them (Lipschutz, 1995, p.8). Political outcomes are not necessarily limited by its influences of behaviours from exogenous shock, rather endogenous changes such as dominant social groups or divergence in political elites coalitions also play an important role in affecting the security policy outcomes which has been produced by historically divergent outcomes (Peters, Pierre and King, 2005; Slater, 2010a; Capoccia, 2015).

Further, to understand how power is organised, using HI as an analytical tool identifies the key linkages between actors and state institutions which confront actors with constitutive rules that can either constrain or enable them, which becomes diffused and consolidated that shaped their behaviour (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Adler, 1997; Bell, 2011). This is because institutions are not just constitutive of ideas created by agents but are also sets of rules and norms that needed to be negotiated by agents over time (Archer, 2003). Rather, certain agents are able to take advantage of, and to some extent shape, the social context in the given structure, but with finite material limits that constrain as well as enable (Beeson, 2017a, p.6).

As mentioned, security policy is based on the analysis of domestic collective elites that have the authority to make policy decision-making which becomes the dominant ideology. Due to threat perceptions are politically produced by the winning coalition, this allows the dominant elites to formulate and facilitate the state's discourse on strategic principles to respond to security threats that would be implemented into the state's security policies (McDonald, 2008). It is a shared beliefs, attitudes, and norms that are institutionalised in a given polity with key political actors in the state (Krebs, 2018). Once created, the national security concept will be institutionalised over time creating a path dependence that is difficult to change. The resulting institutional arrangements translate into political legacies that shape actors behaviours over time and the degree of institutional

capacities with which the state emerges (Pierson, 2015). However, the path dependence can be ruptured during a critical juncture that causes the institutional changes or policy outcomes (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter problematised the existing literature, dominated by the realist approach that typically depicts how security threats are based on material capabilities and the resultant insecurity arises from the uneven power capabilities. It critiques that the realist account on the security studies fails to take into account that the complex structure of states and the dynamic relations between the state and society that are crucial in explaining the different trajectories in security practices. On the other hand, constructivist offers a normative approach whereby the ideational references determine how states formulate security policies. They emphasise that the socialisation process that constitutes as norms and culture rather than ideology provides a more comprehensive understanding on security behaviours. Yet, it also shares a similar logical pitfall as it focuses on the norms rather than the states which explain the different trajectories in security policies in Southeast Asia. By contrast, critical theory decouples the structural centric implicit in traditional security studies which in turn allows for discussion of an expanded analysis of security by unpacking the state. In doing so, critical theory provides a measurable concept that the politics of security is a contested subject between the social forces.

This chapter sets to construct an analytical framework as a precursor to the subsequent empirical chapters. It proposes a HI framework for understanding how the formulation of security policies and their interactions with relevant domestic institutions over time. It argues that a state's national security concept is conditioned itself with the particularities of certain institutional arrangements that are unique to the states, shaped by historical legacies. The formulation of

national security concept is dependent on how the power relations between social groups perception to protect their own interest and the bargaining process to mobilise state resources to implement the policy outcomes.

Drawing on HI analytical logic of institutional change, path dependence, and the timing and sequences, it provides us the analytical tool on how state formulate its' security policy. This allows for the distinction to understand how the adoption of security policies and their interactions as the process for state's security behaviour over time. Further, with this conception, this thesis can establish a link on how political actors perceive their interest with the variant factors such as security-threats; economic development; nation-building; and military modernisation, and the domestic political institutions in Southeast Asia. The state's conception on national security is structured by the existing political institution, and because of this institutional structure, the state's perception on security is guided by the expectation derived from the governing institution. By unpacking the state in this way, depending on the institutional designs, it provides us with a methodological tool on how certain security factors are more influential in a given state than others at a given period of time.

The next chapter illustrates the argument further through the analytical tools of HI to examine the interest and influence of the state elites' interests. It also seeks to provide empiric analysis on how domestic institutional structures in the state perceive the factors influencing the security policies which led to the differences in policy agenda for different states.

Chapter 3:

Social Conflict in Southeast Asia: Legacies of Colonialism and the World War II

3.1 Introduction

While the rise of states security concerns in Southeast Asia has been discussed by scholars (Lantis, 2014; Koga, 2018), less attention has been paid to the trajectories of these security policies that originated from its historical past. National security is a sharply contested concept that should be traced from its colonial legacies as the emergence of sovereign state and how ruling actors perceived security are informed by its history (Alagappa, 1998, p. 65). The main purpose of this chapter is to unpack how historical conditions determine foreign and security policy paths. More importantly, reading on the history of Southeast Asia through the prism of HI leads us to understand how state structures are influenced by the different types of political contestations, socio-economic conditions, as well as identifying the different social groups that emerged in the period of decolonisation.

Drawing from the institutional analysis, it is also helpful in explaining how the influence of ideas, norms, rules and regulations become a useful template in security matters. The fact that the region was mostly a subject of colonialism is an indication of how Western powers have a profound impact on the domestic political institution in Southeast Asia. This chapter assesses the nature and significance of colonialism on how different types of political contestations constitute the dominant narratives of national security in Southeast Asian states. It also attempts to assess how social conflicts and power struggles are linked to the social construction of its national security as well as how its security practices are closely linked to its colonial legacies.

Political institutions and security policies are a confluence of colonial legacies on how it helped shape domestic political institutions and the birth of sovereign states. Countries differ in their security concepts due to their different institutional make-ups, the rules of how security is perceived, and the incentives that motivate the people. The experience of colonialism has profound effects on the political, economic, and social impacts on security. This chapter proceeds by discussing how political contestations in the polity helped create the state's institutional order in Southeast Asia. It discusses how political contestations in the given polity during the early period provide context on how security policies are formulated. It then continues by examining and briefly tracing the process of colonial heritage before World War II. Specifically, it aims to examine how the different historical conditions that states experienced have a huge consequence on the institutional structures. The enduring differences in each state influence the outcomes on how states mobilise its resources to protect its infrastructural power from other competing interests.

Before World War II, Malaysia and Singapore were colonised by the British Empire. Indonesia, on the other hand, was colonised by the Dutch. The Philippines, meanwhile, were colonised by the Spaniards, and subsequently the U.S. after Spain signed the Treaty of Paris in 1898, giving concessions to its colonial territories to the U.S. By focusing on the colonial impact before the decolonisation process, this chapter aims to provide fresh insights on how power struggles caused institutional changes leading to the emergence of the nation-state contribute to their perception on security and its practices are a path dependent process during the decolonisation period in the case studies. Next, this chapter argues that the Japanese invasion in Southeast Asia served as a transformative period for states which set motion to the critical juncture wherein countries achieved independence. It is important to note that the level of political contestation depends on the historical trajectories that set motion within the polities. Although there are subtle variations in how local elites responded in post

war, however, the contentious politics that occur have a lasting effect on the institutions for political order.

As will be shown in this chapter, despite their common yet different historical experiences before independence, the concept of security of Southeast Asian post-colonial states saw different types of social conflicts in the region. The colonial period resulted in fundamental changes in the political and socio-economic structures through varying degrees which provided a framework for the intensification of the political contestations in the post-colonial era. In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, the inherited British colonial policies forged sharp ethnic cleavages that was usually expressed along the class line, thereby shaping what would become a pluralist society. In the case of Indonesia, the Dutch policy created a sharp cleavage over class, ethnicity, and religion, which allowed the local elites to politically mobilise the peasantry to challenge the colonial power.

On the other hand, the colonial experiences suffered by the Philippines resulted in the deep cleavages over religion and class, which also helped shape its security concerns in the post-colonial era. To complicate matters further, the claim for statehood during its decolonisation saw different levels of elite cohesion. In both Malaysia and Singapore, the legacy of British ruling to recruit local elites as part of its administration saw limited elite competition for secession during its independence. Meanwhile, in both Indonesia and the Philippines, the limited integration of the local elites in the colonial administrations by the Dutch and Spanish and subsequently the U.S. increased the likelihood for armed rebellion against the national project to claim for separate statehood within these states (Kingsbury, 2017).

3.2 Political Contestation and the State Institutional Order: The origin of Security Concept in Southeast Asia

So far, this thesis has argued that part of the initial appeal of using HI as an analytical framework is that, it offers a historical analysis on the national security practices and the formulation of security policies. This section aims to discuss why divergence occurs in Southeast Asia by unpacking the black box of the states. This helps us explain how the origins of social conflict helped shape its security policies.

To understand the state's nature and how it shaped its national security policies, it requires us to examine the role of agencies in the political structures on how different coalitions of elites perceive threats, evaluate and push for policies based on their own interests (Pierson, 2016). The study of agential power in the institution from HI perspective is largely a historical process that is deeply rooted and highly consequential to the power structures (Lipschutz, 1995). The political transition took form when political contestation widened the cleavages between social forces in the state. In the colonial era, the condition of political struggles between the colonial powers and local social groups plays an important part in structuring the political dynamics in producing long-term path divergence in the state (Kuhonta, 2011; Slater, 2010a; Vu, 2010). Social forces formed coalitions to challenge the function and design of existing institutions in order to gain access to power and resources (Jones, 2011).

The long struggles with the colonial rule and the short-term triggers of gaining its independence is an example of critical juncture. During the critical juncture, the winning coalitions of political elites typically seek to institutionalise their advantageous positions in the state by changing the rules of the games both formally and informally to strengthen its position in the political arena (Pierson, 2016). During this period, gaining access on the state's resources depends on the negotiation between political actors in the domestic setup that are instrumental in

how state resources are allocated, and whose security policies are being implemented (Alden and Aran, 2016; Beeson and Bellamy, 2008; Robison, 2012). Because the level of political contestation between political groups differs in each state, specific institutional arrangements can have durable effects to particular social actors by altering resources and incentives to the winning coalition (Pierson, 2016). The level of political influences that these elites hold in the state vary. Social groups also have various interest, ideologies, socio-economic power and access to the state's power (Steinmo, 2008; Jones, 2011). State institutional capacities and its distributional political power amongst the ruling elites varies. This is due to the level of political power contestation in states generates different political coalitions between the social groups. In other words, to protect its interests, the coalitions of elites construct or reconstruct the institutional arrangements to strengthen the state institutions (Slater, 2010a).

Hence, the adoption of security concept and security policies require us to connect these choices to the level of coalitions of political elites to its specific domestic interests that takes into account how social, political and economic interests can constrain or enable their power through the implementation of policies (Case, 2002). During critical junctures, winning coalition groups shape the choices and changes that emerges from the power struggle. Winning social groups inherently produces divergent policy outcomes (Jones, 2011). The most important institutional distinction to emerge between the Southeast Asian states during the critical juncture lies primarily between the civilian ruling party and those in which the military is the dominant actor in capturing the state power (Slater, 2010a).

The fundamental issue of contesting political power lies in the examination of civil-military relations as to how we measure the level of civilian control and military influences in the state. It is truism that the regional norms fulfil an important part in shaping a state's civil-military relations. The western concept of civil-military relations emphasised that the civilian groups have the authority

to control and dictate the security decision-making through the subordination of the military as a professional institution. According to Huntington (1995), it is the accepted norm that the role of the military is to professionally serve their duty when called upon by the civilian government. The primary role of the military is to defend the state against external threats while the civilian controls the strategic and political implications regarding the implementations of security policies. However, Huntington's model of civil-military relations is brought into question in the case of Southeast Asia as it appears to be more complex (Kuehn and Lorenz, 2011). In post-colonial states such as those in Southeast Asia, militaries often play other roles that are beyond the definition of western models of civil-military relations (Katsumata, 2011). The extensive roles of the militaries in the region involved in nation and state-building, economic developments and regime transition increased the military's capabilities in influencing the institutional arrangements in the states changes the dynamics of power relations between civilian elites and the military on how security is perceived (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008; Pion-Berlin and Martinez, 2017).

According to Croissant et. al (2011), at the broadest level, the factions of elites comprise of two different groups- 1. Civilian elites, and 2. The military as shown in figure 3.1. In this regard, the term 'civilian elites' encompass from top political executives in all organisations including the bureaucrats from the top to mid-level officials of the states. The military is referred to as an organisation established by the constitutional law, enjoys a monopoly over certain weapons and other equipment that is responsible to uphold the security of the state with constrained application use of force (Edmonds, 1988; p. 26). In the face of security threats both internally and externally, social groups respond to these vulnerabilities by creating strong states with high capacity to mobilise resources to face these challenges (Larsson, 2013). Thus, this emphasises that political contestation in the state produces civil-military relations that covariates because the military roles in a given political space varies (Croissant, 2011).

Political Actors Ordering Power




Figure 3. 1

Source: (Croissant et. al, 2011) and author

How do social groups organise their interests? To understand how social groups organise specific institutional order to extract power we must examine how specific domestic interests and specific political forces can enable or constrain security policies. Political agencies use domestic institutions such as the state, parties, organisations, formal rules and regulations to centralise decision-making power to the state (Pion-Berlin, 1997). The differences in social groups in the state entail how different institutional arrangements are being organised to advance the interest of political coalitions as its security policies. Because national interest derives from the winning social groups perspectives,

the implementation of national security policies can be examined through the level of influences of the social groups in the state (Lantis, 2002, 2014). During the critical juncture, the path of institutional development depends on the winning coalition groups that will shape its national interest that is channelled through the security organisation to formulate security policies to protect its domestic interest (Hill, 2013).

The structural conditions expressed in the domestic politics and the degree of political contestation between groups vary in the society, which invariably shape the civil-military relations. By looking into how power is organised, it potentially exposes different mechanisms of reproduction for power that are likely to be disrupted or enhanced depending on how the institutional order is set up in the state (Thelen and Conran, 2016). The role of the state in each country differs depending on their capacities and the degree of political autonomy that are uniformly unique to its own (Larsson, 2013). The variations of state capacity affect how states behave depending on the existing capacity within the institution. The degree of the elites' capacity to mobilise and shape defence policies vary due to the divergence from historical antecedents that exert a different political institutional arrangements during the critical juncture (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).

The differences in the institutional order create various types of political regime capacities. Because of the historical antecedents, mobilising state resources depends on the power relations between the civilian and the military which differs in each state (Kuehn and Lorenz, 2011). States that have a strong capacity to mobilise state resources have powerful unitary ruling elites which are usually the executive figure (Prime Minister or President), along with a small cadre of senior politicians and elite bureaucrats. They tend to have less restriction over policymaking, thus have a strong capacity to mobilise resources as opposed to states with a weaker capacity (Leftwich, 1995). To pursue their goals, elites typically used a strategy of combination of mobilisation through ideologies, legal,

and material resources to craft institutions that serve their interest (Crone, 1988; Kuhonta, 2011). The capacity of the state is uniquely designed to each state where it is shaped and manifested by the domestic institutions that allow or hinder them to mobilise the resources for national defence (Crone, 1988). In particular, examining the capacity of the states provides the mechanism to understand the power relations between state institutions (Skocpol, 1997). Once created, the institution can reproduce and persist over time by the mechanism of increasing return (Thelen, 1999).

To mobilise state resources for defence, the ruling elites may use a variety of methods that are politically driven such as threats, nation-building, economic developments, ethnicities and ideologies so as to privilege particular interest or influence decision-making, formally or informally (Leftwich, 1995). At the same time, society can also play a role in the decision making whether or not it has the capacity to constrain decisions in foreign policies (Breuning, 2011). Countries such as Singapore and Malaysia have high political capacity, with military spending used as part of a political tool for nation building to mobilise the state resources to legitimise the PAP and BN in political autonomy to the general public, meaning that national strategic deterrence is required for both external threats and gaining internal political legitimacy (Lam, 2015; Vasu and Loo, 2016). On the other hand, countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia have different political institutional arrangements (Banlaoi, 2009; Laksmana, 2019) as both countries have experienced regime changes, thus affecting the capacity of the state to mobilise the resources such as for military procurement or other areas in the security policies.

In other words, due to the differences in political institutional arrangements, the capacity to extract and mobilise the resources also varies in states depending on which political groups in the state possesses firm or fragmented and fragile social cohesion (Fukuyama, 2004). The coalition between the ruling elites, the bureaucrats, the parties and the military are essential in supporting the policies

because it dictates the efficacy of the states in providing the public goods (Slater, 2010a). Depending on the level of cohesion between these political institutions, the implementation and formulation of policies vary as the support of the state determines its capacity. Consequently, the strength of the states' determines whether the regimes would build a powerful apparatus to mobilise the resources (Slater and Fenner, 2011).

In sum, different political contestations initiate different pathways which produce different types of regimes and the content of security policies in each state. The level of civil-military relations varies in a state with some military institutions appears to be more influential in the national security concept while others may have stronger civilian elites that dictate the national security concept. The political contestation between the ruling elites plays an indicator on how the state shapes its policies and its practices which may diverge from other states.

3.3 The role of historical legacies as pathways to National Security Concept

It is generally agreed amongst scholars that there is a degree of political diversity within the Southeast Asian region where political institutional arrangements vary in each state (Alagappa, 1998; Beeson and Bellamy, 2008; Slater, 2010a). Other than the geographic location and colonised states, they have less in common between them. But how can we observe why different social groups possess more political power especially in national security policies? For HI, the core assumption is that historical legacies play an important role on how they helped shape the institutional arrangements in a given polity, which rules and practices are consequential in states' actions (Thelen, 1999). Alagappa (1998) argued that states security perceptions are often shaped by the historical context of the state building. While the material factors such as power politics matter in security, historical legacies play a critical factor in shaping states' threat

perceptions on matters such as geographical proximity, social cleavages, ideology and ethnicity (Wendt, 1992; 1995; Waeber, 1995, Jackson, 2017).

Early choices during the critical juncture become institutionalised in the form of organisations, power-sharing agreements and prerogatives (Pion-Berlin, 2011). As mentioned in the previous section, the role of political contestation as a critical antecedent provides a pre-requisite to the state institutional order which creates a path dependent effect to the winning political coalition groups (Slater and Simmons, 2010). It determines the state national interest and formulate security policies designed to protect its interest. In Southeast Asia, the lasting footprint of the colonisation preceding the nation-state making creates a sharp divergence of the political development and its institutional order (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008; Slater, 2010a). The historical conjuncture derived from the aftermath of World War II and the inauguration of a post-colonial state derived from the social cleavages in Southeast Asia which serve as a critical juncture during the decolonisation period created a long-term path divergent that is politically consequential in states perception on security policies (Slater, 2010a; Ganesan, 2013).

Although the political institution over time created a path dependence that trajected institutional stability, however, it also revealed the source of institutional change (Capoccia, 2015; Thelen and Conran, 2016). Political institutions are not homogenous, as different states constitute different institutional setups that are bound based on its own formal and informal rules that are constructed nationally (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Because the institutional design involves the exercise of power and the dominance of the winning coalition groups over others, the evolution of power between groups may lead to non-compliance to other non-power social groups which can lead to shifts in social coalitions, causing to renegotiate in institutional changes in the state over time (Mahoney, 2000). While institutional design may change over time due to political contestation, certain structural factors persist which can limit political

agencies to act certain ways (Croissant *et al.*, 2011). The concentration of power may not be static as some social groups during the power struggle can gain power over time (Slater, 2010a, p. 20). For instance, the institutional structure led by the oligarchic politics and the level of military influences in politics in the Philippines changed over time especially during the Marcos regime from 1965-1986 (Kushida, 2003). However, due to the changes in power relations and interest, Marcos regime was ousted in the 1986 regime coup organised by strong political oppositions, mass public movements with a section of the military backup that marked a critical juncture which paved way to the re-emergence of democratic regime driven by the oligarchs (Quimpo, 2005). The analysis of critical antecedents plays an important role in supporting a critical juncture explanation. This is because certain antecedent condition can help to explain the critical juncture that plays a role in directing an outcome (Mahoney *et. al*, 2016).

Depending on the burden of its historical struggles, different social groups that are in power produce various types of regime states and security policy preferences which entail different political implications and impacts (Jones, 2011; Pierson, 2016). Primarily, it is through the crafting of new political institutions that the political order in the state can gain their autonomy over time creating a path dependent trajectory towards its concept of interest (Slater, 2010a, p. 18). The behaviour of state, attitude, and strategic choice take place in the context of political, economic and social at a specific time have important consequences to the state national security policy outcomes (Steinmo, 2008). It is because political institutions such as the state determines how and to what end a society is governed (Munck, 1996). States that gain independence through peaceful negotiations with their colonial masters may have different institutional arrangements than states that gain independence through political conflict. The institutional order depends on the level of involvement of the military in the struggle for state autonomy as the differences in political dynamics shape the role

of the military during the decolonisation period (Alagappa, 2001; Croissant, 2011).

Contentious politics through social cleavages in the state may be caused by an endemic threat to the societal elites prior to the critical juncture that produces long term path divergent outcomes to the institutional arrangement (Capoccia, 2015). For instance, the aftermath of Japanese occupation of Malaysia left an intensifying ethnoreligious problem that divided the society between the dominant Malay majority with the ethnic minorities such as the Chinese and Indian communities that left a path dependent effect in post-independence from the British colony with implications on how security policies are formulated are based on racial issues (Nathan, 1990; Stockwell, 2006). The point is that each state has its own historical makeup deriving from the antecedent condition that influences the institutional setup during the critical juncture in the process of decolonisation, making its path for policy decision-making continuous over time.

Political dispute becomes far more contentious during the historical antecedents between the coalition of groups in the polity which may at times undergo major events that reorder political structure and forms (Ganesan, 2013). By analysing the historical experiences, it provides the context on the different paths of security policies as a causal factor in explaining the political contestation that led to change or stability in the institutional order (Pierson, 2016). Not only that, the narrative of threats perceived by the winning coalition creates a dominant ideology which provides a set of beliefs that shape a society's understanding of security (Moon, 1998; McDonald, 2008). Hence, this is why understanding the context through history matters as it provides a different path in each state that influences the divergence on the context of security (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008).

Historical conditions create specific institutional arrangements which enhance or limit actor choices. Military behaviour is subjected to institutional order embedded in the state. However, militaries in the region are often involved in non-military roles such as nation-building, regime protection and economic

development out of which these roles are usually under the purview of civilians (Croissant, 2018). By analysing the historical legacies, it allows us to distinguish how organisational and individual behaviours are shaped. Historical sequences that set motions in a state have deterministic properties on how institutions design power that can influence how individuals behave (Mahoney, 2000). For instance, in some states the military has more influence in the security decision-making realm over the civilian institutions. This is because in some states the involvement of the military historically in the policy process invariably set a path dependent that makes the military more educated in the implementations of the security policies (Gibson and Snider, 1999).

On the other hand, a strong civilian elites cohesion with the military as a support and assistance in the political leadership in exercising and organising its political power can result in a strong state with the civilian coordinating the security policies, with the military's role in advancing and operationalising these security concept to policies (Croissant and Kuehn, 2009). In other words, the diversity in political powers amongst social groups in the making of nation-states produces different political institutional arrangements which causes the divergence of state power and access to state resources in formulating national security policies (Croissant, Eschenauer and Kamerling, 2017). This is due to the political process which involved the elites prior to the critical juncture is what Slater (2010a) defined as critical antecedents which affects the institutional order changing the rules of the game. Put differently, the historical antecedents on political contestations between social forces in the state can have a detrimental role in the institutional structure which can dictate how the state pursue its national security policies.

Postcolonial states are more often involved in the modernisation of a state, which itself is considered nation-building to gain internal legitimacy (Berger, 2003). The process of decolonisation of the nation-state in the post-world war era meant that the historical context of states in Southeast Asia has developed its own

perception of a security concept (Berger, 2003). States such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines were part of the colonial territories of the Dutch, the British Empire, Spanish and the U.S. Instead of limiting the scope of security to threats and survival, these states perceived that military security as part of nation building in legitimising itself as a sovereign state (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). The ruling elites perceived that security is a part of the national strategic objectives to achieve modernity and legitimise the statehood. Historical settings contextualise the narratives on how the civil-military relations play a role in each case study and how it explains the military expenditure in Southeast Asia (Bates et. al, 1998). Thus, the concept of securitisation differs in states where their perception of security is constructed by the history, ideologies and culture that are manifested and influenced towards its understanding on national security (Waever, 1995).

States that emerged from decolonisation perceive that the military is an essential form of legitimising its sovereignty in a given territorial space that has been carved out (Alagappa, 1998: p. 613). However, the divergence in the state path trajectory depends on which group emerges influential during the decolonisation process. States that suffers from military struggles such as Indonesia during the decolonisation process have more political influences than states that managed to gain independence through peace via civilian elites (Croissant *et al.*, 2011). Historical sequences help our understanding on the role of institutions in policy decision-making where aberrant states' behaviours seem to be likely in particular settings. The differences in the institutional practice arise from the historical antecedents, which created the sets of institutional arrangements during the critical juncture in the power relations between key state actors which plays an important role in the policy decision-making (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008; Slater and Simmons, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).

Conceptual Framework for Explaining National Security Concept in Southeast Asia




Figure 3.2
Source: (Croissant *et al.*, 2011) and Author

These historical antecedents shaped how political institutional arrangements dominate over states' policy decision-making and assert the preferences of security policies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The critical importance of the pre-existence of social forces in the state explains why there are divergence in security policies. In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, the pre-existence of social cleavages before the making of the nation-state explains the uneven level of power politics between the ruling parties and other institutions (Heiduk, 2017). The importance of understanding the state structure is crucial, as the institutional arrangements provide a locus of the negotiation between the state and the society (Risse-Kappen, 1991). In the case of security, often the state's institutional arrangement dictates how factors such as threats, military modernisation, nation-building and economic development can produce different

outcomes in different states. It is undeniable that decision makers are influenced both from the external and internal factors and the degree of influences that each factor imposed towards the decision makers vary depending on political settings of states (Hudson, 2005). The domestic structure deals with how states respond to the demands of the domestic society as well as to understand the degree of centralization of power in a state's political system (Katzenstein, 1978; Gourevitch, 1986).

These factors are unique to the states as historical experiences and domestic setups are distinctive to its own state-making, which invariably dictates the security policy outcome. In other words, state national security concept is defined by their own institutional arrangements that are mediated by its historical context. States such as Malaysia and Singapore share similar political institutional setups; a one-party state political system that is dominant with cohesive coalition process between the institutions which makes these countries be considered as states with strong civilian political institutions (Risse-Kappen, 1991; Lee, 2008; Slater, 2010a).

However, their interpretation of security varies due to the historical divergences which will be explained in the empirical chapters in greater detail. On the other hand, in the case of the Philippines, the political institutions are fragmented and fragile which causes the state to be considered as weak state (Kuhonta, Slater and Vu, 2008; Slater, 2010a). Meanwhile, Indonesia displays an intermediate state, party, and military institutional in capacity and cohesion (Slater, 2010b).

The strength of the state is coordinated and institutionalised under the formal institutions such as rules or informally norms and values which provide political actors to either dominate the political institutions or refrain from the national policy decision-making (Mahoney, 2000; Peters, Pierre and King, 2005). It is precisely because of this process that we perceive states security policy outcomes differs. This is because the institutional arrangements were negotiated

after the critical juncture that preceded by the critical antecedents conditions (Slater and Simmons, 2010). The importance of the states' structure resides as a particular framework for domestic actors to formulate its security policies (Risse-Kappen, 1991). Because security is intensely contested between the social forces, this will invariably influence how states choose to distribute its power and resources in a specific institutional setting to further their own political agenda (Hollingsworth, 2000).

The political institutions play an important role in security policy outcomes especially when it comes to understanding the level of influences that the state has over the nation. The dynamics of the domestic setup help us to understand how the relationship between the political institutions determine the policy processes. It is important that the nation-state is still the most dominant platform for the pursuit of the political agenda and the government remains the central decision makers in both international and domestic politics (Carlsneas, 2016). Political institutions such as the state organisations, agencies, rules, norms and ideas are shaped by historical experiences creating a path dependent that is reinforced over time (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Fioretos, 2011; Capoccia, 2015). Historical conjuncture contextualises the narratives of how institutional arrangements exert a long-lasting influence on states' security behaviours as the institutional setup may restrict or enhances the military expenditure in Southeast Asia (Bates et. al, 1998). The outcome of the events during the critical juncture are shaped by the historical conditions as the existing political and economic institutions shape the balance of power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Political contestations between social groups in a given polity before the founding of state exhibit path dependent effects on how political structures are arranged in the aftermath of the power struggle (Slater, 2010a, p. 19). In other words, the critical antecedents as well as the timing and sequence were important causal factor on how social groups choose to proceed with its security concept. Thus, the structure of institutional arrangements either allow or avoid domestic actors to exercise its

influences through their capabilities of mobilising its political resources that orient states foreign policy choices (Alden and Aran, 2016, p.64).

In the case of Southeast Asia, state actors remain the most dominant decision makers through the representation of government in policy decision-making (Alagappa, 1998). Though it will be explained in greater detail in the subsequent empirical chapters, the main point is that different historical trajectories that are embedded in state's institutional arrangements either strengthened or weakened the political actors depending on how the political institutions are set up in the state to influence policy decision-making. The institutional making of a state-society is a result of political contestation between the political elites (Peters, Pierre, and King, 2005).

Historical institutionalist approach has generated important insights on the understanding of policies that can be conceptualized as a political process. The study of historical conjunctures in tracing the policy formulation is nothing new in the study of comparative politics (Thelen, 1999; Steinmo, 2008). In the case of Southeast Asia, it is widely acknowledged that each country has different domestic setups in its views on security practices that are unique to the state. The social cleavages in a state particularly a political contest between social groups can help define the security issues as social groups evaluate issues and push for policies that are beneficial to their own ideologies (Jones, 2010).

3.3 The Origins of Social Conflict in Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, all countries (aside from Thailand) were colonies of Western powers. Although different states were colonized by different Western powers, it nevertheless conditioned the territorial borders of the modern nation-state, its political institutional setup, and institutional arrangements in Southeast Asia (Cribb and Narangoa, 2004). This, however, cannot be undertaken satisfactorily without understanding their historical conditions of the more salient

features of their environment and how it influenced state's security policies. By examining the colonial influences in these states, it provides a comparative opportunity on the dynamics of colonial relationship that shaped the development of the modern nation-states which is vastly distinctive. Different colonial experiences generated unique sets of security challenges faced by the colonialist as well as the subsequent decolonisation. This section analyses the different impacts on how colonial powers with specific references to the Dutch colonial in Indonesia, the British in Malaysia and Singapore, and the Spanish and subsequently the U.S. in the Philippines had constructed the existing institutional arrangements and social cleavages before the decolonisation period. To better understand how each state leader perceives security concept, it is worth briefly tracing how colonial legacies provide institutional structures and processes and the struggle for power. This section seeks to expose the consequence of the colonial impact on the trajectory of its distinct political institutional arrangements.

The existence of nation-states in Southeast Asia today are far from unitary. The colonial experiences in Southeast Asia have precarious paths towards the formation of how modern nation-states shaped its national security concept. The national security concept to a large degree is a by-product of the historical experiences of the nation-state and political actors' perception are constituted to draw the structural reality in determining the laws and policies (Mihăilă, 2015). During the pre-colonial period maritime states such as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines were much more fragmented and organised by a patrimonial system ruled by a few local monarchs and chieftains, comprising of mostly Muslim and Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms (Acharya, 2012b, p. 7). Differences in culture, language, religion, and politics brought different ethnic identities in the makeup of modern nation-states (Cribbs, 2018). The advent of European imperial powers in Southeast Asia changed the political dynamics which largely defines the genesis of the political conflict that persist in the nation-states in the region

today. During the colonial expansionism, the British, Dutch, Portuguese and the Spanish were competing for geographical areas in Southeast Asia for control on trade with China and the rest of Europe. However, the effects of colonial legacies are still present today as the temporal process and events during these periods influence the society in governing its political and economic relations.

Political environments in the archipelagic states such as Indonesia and the Philippines were not homogenous during pre-colonial era. Political organisations in both archipelagic states constitute of plural societies inhabited by ethnicities, cultures, languages and religions. During the precolonial period, the Philippines comprised of several thousand islands which were loosely ruled by local *barangays* grouping of villages, *datos* (chieftains) and some Muslim Sultans, similar to Indonesia which was ruled by smaller kingdoms across parts of the islands that were often tied by kinship (Ricklefs, 2001; Abinales, 2005). However, the arrival of colonial powers changed the institutional features through integrative and administrative changes that would lead to the emergence of modern states.

3.3.1 Indonesia

The origin of social and political struggles that exist in Indonesia today were largely inherited during the Dutch colonisation which changed the social composition in the state. The Dutch had established its power since the 17th century following its colonial conquest under the Dutch East India Company, competing with other major European powers during this period. Encouraged by the Dutch monarchy, the Dutch East India Company monopolised the colony's economy and its commodities were exported to the Europe (Israel, 1998). The Dutch presence was initially focused on the economic values to gain access to spices and trade routes (Ricklefs, 2001). However, the bankruptcy of the Dutch

East India Company forced the Dutch state to take over in administering the Dutch East Indies.

In 1824, the colonial territory in Southeast Asia between the British and the Dutch were redefined under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, which was to settle conflict between the two colonial powers. The treaty was important to the boundaries of modern Indonesia and Malaysia as the two colonial powers cooperate in the Malay Archipelago in avoiding the French colonial expansion in Southeast Asia (Ricklefs, 2001). However, the Industrial Revolution in Europe saw greater demands for world commodity exports which had unintended consequences to the Dutch East Indies. After the Napoleonic War, Belgium successfully fought for independence, which caused the Dutch to emerge weak and impoverished. The Dutch began to concentrate on the Dutch East Indies to extend their rule and began taking control of the outer Island of Sumatra, Borneo and Sulawesi. The Dutch began its colonial adventurism by engaging in two major wars- the Padri War in Sumatra and Java War, both of which it emerged victorious. By the early twentieth century, the Dutch also overcame the Muslim dominant part of Sumatra, Aceh as part of its colonial territory. These colonial territories were becoming more essential to the Dutch empire as most of its economic activities for agricultural export as well as oil occurred in the outer island, primarily in Sumatra (Barlow, 1989). It would also have a significant effect to its contemporary security problems as Dutch interventions attempted to consolidate these islands with different ethnics and religion produced tensions in massive proportions.

The Dutch colony introduced an interventionist policy under the cultivation system which sought to profit from its colonies (Tarling, 2004). Under this policy, the local farmers were obligated to pay taxes to the administration in the form of land, labour and products. Local farmers were forced to cultivate export-oriented crops such as coffee, sugarcane, and tobacco on their rice-land. To administer the colonial territory, the Dutch overlaid the pre-colonial

institutional arrangement through a system of informal ruling by utilising patron-client relations with the local elites known as the *priyayi*, that claimed part of the labour power of the peasants in Java as well as in the outer islands (Van Zanden and Marks, 2013). The colonial state incorporated the *priyayi* to act as local intermediaries for the Dutch into an even more centralised authority in Batavia, now known as Jakarta (Anderson, 1983). The increased intervention of the colony saw the emergence of a new capitalist class that benefitted from the Dutch system. The increase in landless peasants, endemic poverty and the rural social structures were crucial to the social tension during the post-independence.

The colonial empire did little to strengthen and institutionalise the linkages between various islands and community in the archipelagic state (Brown, 2003, p.118). To protect their interest in the Dutch East Indies (later known as Indonesia), the local elites provided local military support deriving from the KNIL (Royal Indies Army) mostly from the Javanese conscript natives with the Dutch backings to fend off any resistance from external and internal struggles (Anderson, 1983). Such assimilation of the local indigenous natives in the military created deep grievances between the different ethnics in modern Indonesia. In light of the colonial conquest of the outer island, proponents of the Dutch liberal colonialism wanted to put an end to its exploitation in the Dutch East Indies.

By the early twentieth century, the Dutch introduced the Ethical Policy which was equally consequential to the earlier cultivation system. In an attempt to garner legitimacy among the indigenous, the ethical policy was conceived as a developmental aid for the natives to be compensated with higher living standards and infused with western values (Weber et. al, 2003). Although it was intended to break from the colonial past, the ethical policy was also an extension of the state apparatus to intervene in the indigenous population's livelihood primarily on education, health, infrastructure, and religion (Anderson, 1983). While the rise of capitalism seems to have contributed to migrations of Chinese merchants and

Javanese labours to the outer island for agricultural and manufacturing projects, it may also have had a deleterious effect to its contemporary security problems. Migrant groups formed informal relationships with the local political elites who were loyal to the Dutch rulings to suppress the local populations which created ethnic disharmony especially in the post-colonial era (Vickers, 2013).

In other circumstances, the ethical policy did create new opportunities for the local elites. The Dutch legacy shaped the social hierarchy that segregated the indigenous population from the business savvy Chinese merchants as well as the Dutch upper echelons (Ricklefs, 2001). Although the education reform saw greater educational opportunities, it also produced a dissatisfied group of elites and aristocrats against the colonial Dutch. These local aristocrats tied to the traditional society created the nationalist movement through language and the identity of 'Indonesia' which spread across the archipelago (Ricklefs, 2001; Drakely, 2005). On the other hand, the peasant continued their traditional life with agriculture and other economic activities especially in the rural areas (Christano and Cummings, 2007). Perhaps, another major consequence of the Dutch Ethical policy to change the existing social order was the spread of Christianity. The Dutch's intentions to replace the predominant religions of Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism through education had a political effect which caused tension between social forces in the archipelagic state (Benda, 1962). Muslim clerical leaders were often brutally suppressed especially in Sumatra and other parts of the Dutch Indies as they had the political capacity to mobilise the nation-state (Drakely, 2005).

Despite its attempts to provide welfare especially in the earlier twentieth century, the majority of the indigenous population were largely uneducated. The unintended consequences gave opportunities for the *priyayi* to mobilise the mass for anti-colonialist movement during the critical juncture (Robison, 2009). In some senses, the legacies of the Dutch colonialism left a pluralisation of class structure with economic activities that are skewed towards agriculture, religious

tensions and ethnic resentment which define the socio-political struggles faced by Indonesia today. The absence of developing indigenous large landowning elites and powerful bourgeoisie led to the coalition of local elites which generated resistance in the form of communism, Islamism, and nationalism (Mortimer, 1969; Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Although such institutional changes in Indonesia appear to be incremental, it nevertheless produced a path dependent effect to help shape how security logic is constructed in the post-colonial period.

3.3.2 Philippines

Parallel to Indonesia, colonisation in the Philippines also changed the social composition of the state-society relations. However, what separates the Philippines from other case studies is that it suffered from two different colonial conquests. The colonisation of Spain (1521-1898) and then subsequently the U.S. (1898-1946), left problematic legacies that constitute its social structure and political institutional arrangements which conceptualized its security concerns today. The origins of security concerns in the Philippines derived from the Spanish ruling resulted from the development of social and geographic delineations of religious identities and class structure (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008, p. 155). During its 333 years of colonialism, the Spanish authority mainly focused on the islands of Luzon and Visayas for trade and implemented Catholicism as an institutional structure in the surrounding islands which consequently made it the hub for religion widespread (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005).

In order to exercise its power, the Spanish authority in the Philippines was mediated through the church that was inseparably linked, and civil servants, local elites and priests collaborated for state administration (McCoy and de Jesus, 1982; Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p. 67). However, as Spanish powers were limited, this further incapacitated the colony to consolidate the whole archipelagic to be converted to Catholicism. Despite their attempts to diffuse

political power in the predominantly Muslim South, it was met with continued resistance by the sultanate of Sulu and Mindanao. Because the Spanish never fully controlled the Southern part, the Muslim state building proceed and would become rival states to the Spanish (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005). As the Spanish lacked the ability to take over the South, the Spanish was mainly focused on Manila as the entrepôt for Spanish trading with China. This severely highlighted the fragmentation in the state-society relations as the Spanish delineated the archipelagic state as they created the social structure which delineate the Muslims from the South. The different religious identity left enduring legacies which added to another layer of complexity for conflict and security concerns in post-colonial period (Hedman and Sidel, 2000; Simbulan, 2005).

On the other hand, the Spanish legacy also provided the foundation of a patrimonial state in which the state is captured by strong social forces of oligarchic interest (Hutchcroft, 1991). Although the Dutch were more interventionist in the Dutch East Indies under the cultivation system, Spanish colonial administration especially outside of Manila was decentralised. Members of the elite were given the chance to compete in the municipal election, which allowed them to exercise and control vast power and economy to a small but powerful group of the caciques (Hutchcroft, 1991). They were vested with the Spanish authority to maintain social order and to collect taxes and tributes which further diluted the power of the central state (Doronilla, 1994). The predatory behaviour of the strong landed capitalist elites is privileged from a weak centralised political structure of the Philippines which also weakened elite cohesion (Anderson, 1988). Under the Spanish ruling, they divided the archipelagic state into provinces ruled by strong local municipals who were the local chieftains who collaborated with the church to form a clerical-secular state with its own private armies (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p. 67). The Spanish reliance on the patronage system allowed for the local elites to increase their political capacity to be intertwined with the power structure in the Philippines

(Morada, 1998, p. 551). Similar to the Dutch East Indies, the competition to control economic trade in Southeast Asia saw the Spanish transform the common land into private properties. This led to the creation and growth of Chinese and Spanish *mestizo* strata elite families of landholders who had access to higher education to consolidate political and economic influences in the provinces (Simbulan, 2005; Querubin, 2016). At the turn of the twentieth century, the increasing number of wealthy and landowners in the Philippine began to challenge the Spanish control. As the socioeconomic condition yielded more local elites to be more educated, political dissatisfaction grew with the Church's vast economic power and their political repression. Local elites began to organise and assert themselves into challenging the Spanish authority for reforms and subsequently for independence (Caoili, 2006).

Although the Spanish initially provide the genesis for political conflict in the Philippines, it was during the U.S. era that is especially important in understanding the modern Philippines on how its political structure contributed towards the security problems which persist today. Hedman and Sidel (2000, p.7) argued, "the broad contours of recent Philippine history are best understood not against the backdrop of "traditional" Filipino culture of Hispanicised society, but rather in the context of the state structures erected and imposed in the course of the American colonial era". In the aftermath of Spanish-American war in 1898, the Philippines fell into the control of the U.S. under the Treaty of Paris. Resistance for anti-colonialism driven by nationalistic concept of 'Filipino' was driven by small groups of elites to declare independence from the Spanish (Banlaoi, 2004). However, due to the superiority of the U.S. armies and lack of support from other elites, the rebel groups were successfully suppressed in 1901.

Not to mention, whereas the Spanish power was concentrated in the Central part of Luzon, the southern part of the Philippines, Mindanao, dominated by the Muslims was left to its own accords under the Spanish Treaty of Peace 1878. Succeeding the Spanish territory, the U.S. initially compromised with the Sulu

sultanate as a sovereign ruler under the Bates treaty of 1899, while they concentrated in subduing the rebellions in the North (Tarling, 2004). However, by 1905, the U.S. used its superior military to subdue the local Moro leaders in Mindanao and Sulu by integrating and the pacification of the Muslim to Manila (Tan, 1995).

To dismantle the Spanish influence, the U.S. organised a constitutional structure through political and economic reforms which separated the power of the church and the state to provide and prepare them for self-rule and political order closely modelled to the U.S. (Philippine Organic Act, 1902; The Constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth, 1935). To limit the power of the church, land owned by the friars were bought from the Vatican and sold to the mestizos in order to discourage the indigenous from further revolutionary movements (New York Times, 1903). This changed the political economy whereby the mestizos would accumulate massive land properties which became the dominant economic elites and eventually consolidating the political power in the archipelagic state at the expense of the larger population (CIA Report ORE, 1950). Further, in order to keep the mestizos loyal to the new colonial power, many of these agrarian based landowners were exempted from the U.S. tariffs which provided more opportunities to export their product to the U.S. (Hillier, 2015). However, this created social unrest amongst the agrarian peasants as the patron-client relationship between the landowners and farmers became less paternalistic and arrangements became more impersonal (Quimpo, 2014).

The unintended consequences on the annexation of the Philippines created an important institutional legacy. The colonial master established a similar institutional structure to the U.S. Congress-style bicameral legislature, which decentralized power to the municipals and provinces in the Philippines rather than creating a centralized state (Sidel, 1999). The local elites quickly learned that the Congress provided political power to pursue policies for their own self-interest. Because political contestation seats in Congress were limited to the few educated

elites, it meant that the elected representatives were accommodated largely by local elites to gain access to the Congressional purse (Anderson, 1988). It provided a political arena for political contestation through formal channels for political elites to capitalise on state resources for rent-seeking activities dominated by the mestizos to give economic opportunities to political allies, families and friends in a legalistic manner (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003).

Moreover, the introduction of the pork barrel policy in 1922 is one of the most important U.S. legacy tutelages in the Philippines (Teehankee, 2012). The pork barrel policy provided a budgetary spending allocated to benefit certain social groups to extract state resources to fund programs they see fit to develop its own provinces in return for their political supports (Coronel, 1998). Coupled with the pork barrel policy, this also meant that to attain power, patronage alliances needed to be formed with the wealthy landowners' families, who had amassed their wealth during the Spanish and U.S. colonisation (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p. 168). It was also during this period that the wealthy political elites also expanded their landholdings to the south in Mindanao and encouraged transmigration of Christian-Filipino and did nothing to stop from Christian elite landlords and their goons to forcibly seizing the Muslim's ancestral land (Hedman and Sidel, 2000, p. 72).

This created a weak state with a political system that was controlled by a small group of oligarchic mestizos in which powerful social forces extract state resources from a weak bureaucracy through patronage (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). The Congress would be a useful social ground for the local elites to gather and exchange ideas on how to pursue and protect their economic interest in the hacienda-based provinces (Anderson, 1988). The policy legacy left by the U.S. colony created an unlevel playing field as these institutional arrangements privilege the ruling elites in the political domain to exploit the economic resources which exclude the political participation of the mass. As such, political actors build and maintained a large network of patronage from

municipal to provincial and national levels which is controlled by the few. Because the government functions were highly monopolized by the strict access that benefits the wealthy elites, state apparatus were used in order to preserve their economic interest at the expense of improving the social status of the larger population (Putzel, 1992). However, such institutional arrangements have unequal implications for resource allocations which are intended to benefit certain social groups over others (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). This led to the creation of a weak state, out of which extracting state budget for developmental projects was manipulated by the dominant social groups for their own benefit rather than for alleviating poverty (Hedman and Sidel, 2000; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; Quimpo, 2009).

What happened to the Dutch East Indies bore some resemblance in the Philippines. The state institutional arrangements between the U.S. and the strong cacique elites created a large number of landless peasants which led to social unrest especially in the 1920's and 1930's. The growing communist ideas in Southeast Asia and social struggles led to the creation of the Labour unions and Leftist party, which mobilised the masses in retaliation against the dominant elites (Putzel, 1992). This would be the genesis of its security problems as social inequality and pervasive poverty caused social unrest which generated a growing consensus to the need for institutional change (Banlaoi, 2009; Cruz De Castro, 2014). The institutional design of the Philippines created a concept of security designed for the protection of the small influential group of elites to maintain their access to political and economic interest. To further reinforce their position, the U.S. also established the Philippine Constabulary, made available for the elected mestizos to be utilised for maintaining social order to suppress the local peasants (Pobre, 2000). Rather than creating an effective bureaucratic law enforcement in the Constabulary, appointments, promotions and reassignments became the prerogative of the politicians (Sidel, 1999). From its inception, the functions of the law enforcements were politicised as the local politicians had

discretionary powers to use the coercive apparatus of the state to serve their own parochial interest. Lack of diverse political representations in the Congress meant that the dominant Filipino social class enjoyed relative autonomy in defining how security is conceptualized.

By 1935, the Philippines became a commonwealth nation which allowed an elected Filipino president became the head of state with the Congress being dominated by the oligarchic mestizos. Due to the prominence of the nature of the patron-client network, the executive branch has vast influence over the legislation and legislative to allocate national budgetary (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). Uneven power distribution to the provinces and municipals controlled by the oligarchic elites from Manila reduced its economic dependency from the colonial administration (Hillier, 2015). The lack of transformation in nation-building and consolidation efforts in the Philippines gave rise to a patronage system to certain political elites, superimposing the structure of a weak state with uneven levels of economic development (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005). In short, the U.S. created a premature state with a democratic institution and weak bureaucratic structure that formalised its source of power through the institutional arrangement. Further, it consolidated the economic and political system that benefits a relatively small social group of wealthy elites prone to corruption, cronyism, and patronage (CIA Report ORE, 1950; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). The trajectory of the oligarchic political elites, however, created a path dependence where the power structure is concentrated within the local elites excluding the peasants from economic activities and the room for political penetration within the institutional framework. Limited political representation created grievances between the social classes which would forge a security paradigm that persisted in the post-colonial era (Kramer, 2006).

3.3.3 Malaysia and Singapore

Today's Malaysia and Singapore were no less of a product of colonial conquest. Similar to its European rivals, the British colonisation of Malaya (later known as Malaysia) took form though in a slightly different manner. The British began to expand its influence in Malaya from the 19th century making it a centralised territory via the annexation of the Malay sultanates in the 1870s. After the opening of Suez Canal and trade with China and Japan grew in importance, a secure maritime passage (the Melaka Strait) was needed to connect the East and South China Seas to the Indian Ocean (Shamsul, 1998). Under the British divide and rule policy in the earlier twentieth century, the British territories in Malaya began to expand which were divided into three parts in the form of direct control of administrative system in the Strait Settlements which comprised the coastal areas of Melaka, Penang and Singapore became the most important strategic territory for the British, while imposing the Resident system in the Federated States- Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, and Selangor. On the other hand, the British had indirect control in The Unfederated States through separate treaties- Johor, Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Terengganu (Stockwell, 1979).

Where the Dutch East Indies saw direct intervention by Dutch colonies, in both the Federated and Unfederated states, the British practised indirect rules in some settings, while also successfully forging positive relations with the local Sultans. The Malay rulers were given sovereignty to maintain political order, although the latter group of states enjoyed greater autonomy. Although both territories were still under the direct supervision from the Empire over all political and economic matters, the Sultan maintained autonomy on cultural and religious matters (Andaya and Andaya, 2001). Under the British administration, the colonial empire separated the local Malay aristocrats from the peasants out of which they enjoyed certain privileged status in civil service, land ownership and education (CO877/25/7/27265/7, 1942; cited in Stockwell, 1995). To administer

the colonies, the British made Singapore its administrative city-state that was highly bureaucratic where key policy decision-making took place in Singapore.

But the most profound legacy that Malaya inherited from the British was the presence of immigrants and the colonial division of labour in the Malayan Peninsular and the Western Borneo, which became evident to its current security problems (Henderson and Phillips, 2007). Above all, the key institutional changes were the construction of a plural society which led to the hardening of the ethnic paradigm that gave rise to the social cleavages in contemporary Malaya (Abdul Khalid, 2014). As demands for imports on tin, rubber, and plantations became imperative to British industrialisation, the British led a large-scale migration policy that saw an influx of workforce from China and India. The British colonial implemented policy of segregation whereby the Chinese and Indians were mostly populated in the mines and plantations. The colonial division of labour saw the increase in Chinese capitalist to exploit its natural resources in tin mining, rubber, timber and rice had resulted in the shift of its demography into a plurally diverse society (CO537/3746, 1948, cited in Stockwell, 1995; Brown, 2003). Economic inequalities between the local indigenous and migrants soon began to develop as the local Malay chieftains and the Chinese merchants saw the increasing competition for economic access between the social groups (Khoo, 1972). This would also inevitably create class division that takes root across the ethnic communities, which provided the contextual origin for its contemporary security challenges.

In order to protect the Malay ruling interest, the local elites exerted political pressure to the British to implement the Malay Regiment Bill in 1933. This policy led to the formation of a native armed forces which exclusively reserved to the Malays conscription, partly to satisfy the demands from the Sultans. The Malay Regiment became a symbol of Malay culture and to promote loyalty amongst the natives both to the British officers as well as to preserve Malay feudal system (Ramli, 1965). Even during wartime, there were legitimate concerns in the British

Colonial office that the Malay rulers were in fear of non-Malays over its position in the state. Since the British did not attempt to emphasise the integration of the Malays with non-Malays, the weakness of identification especially in the post war would become more politically contentious between communal. As such, post war planning led the Colonial Office to attempt to increase the efficiency of the Malays, which the colonies were to provide the necessary knowledge to fill the civil services in their own territories in hopes that the Malays would not be left out from the proficiency of the Chinese and to a lesser extent the Indians in Malaya (CO825/35/4, 1942, cited in Stockwell, 1995).

The colonial policy did little to integrate the racial diversity for a peaceful community as the segregation further aggravated the Malays as indigenous people were mostly left out of the economic wealth gained from its native natural resources (Wade, 2009). Though before the conquest of colonial powers in the region, there were few differences between the Southeast Asian states of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines in terms of ethnicity. Despite their commonalities, the colonial conquests were consequential towards the institutional setup which produced a divergent path in the post-independence state. The colonial antecedents were the causal factors on how political actors shape their security policy after the critical juncture. The trajectory of security issues during colonial policies conditioned the political affairs in these states which evolved during World War II. The political trajectories during this period were significantly different from what existed within these territories which defined the social cleavages and were exploited during the Japanese occupation producing divergent state outcomes (Slater and Simmons, 2010).

In all of these states, the extent of colonial influences in the domestic politics consequently have different effects on the trajectory of political structures. Not only did the western colonialism impact the political structure, it also affected the economic conditions that are different from each other. Nevertheless, one of the principal legacies left by the colonial powers was the

development of ethnic hierarchies which intensified their domestic problems and national security concerns suffered by these nation-states (Brown, 1994). Economic exploitations had left pervasive poverty which would also become the main security problems in these states as the ethnic hierarchies led to the concentration of power to the few ruling classes that collaborated with its colonies.

These social conditions were significant towards the long-term factors on the political order and its national security concept. Similar to Indonesia and the Philippines, the colonial presence created a path dependent process on how post independent states define its national security struggles and its security policy options in the decolonisation period. Not only that, the carving of territorial borders became the source of power struggles between social forces in the society both domestically and regionally (Cribb, 2018). The incremental changes introduced by the colonial powers primed the nuance for political conflicts in these states. The colonial legacies also explained the path dependence of political strength that these nation-states enjoy in post-colonial period. It became a catalyst towards social cleavages in the society and how power structures were rearranged towards the dominant social groups which enforced their perception to the state's strategic concept and security policies in the making of a nation-state (Slater, 2010a, p. 57). However, as will be shown in the next section, the occupation of Japan in Southeast Asia was pivotal since the colonial system was destroyed, which provoked the security challenges in these states during the post-colonial era.

3.4 The Japanese Occupation and the Intensification of Social Cleavages

If the principal legacies of these colonial powers were the creation of class struggles, racial tensions and an underdeveloped economy that was skewed towards agriculture, then the main impact of the Japanese occupation during the

World War II triggered social conflicts in the region. With the onset of World War II, Southeast Asia suddenly became one of the most contested regions for the Allies and the Axis for control. While the colonial antecedents provide the pre-existing conditions of political contestation, the Japanese occupation exacerbates the social cleavages in the region. World War II demolished the institutional structures placed by the western colonies in these states which provided temporary space for open contestation between social groups for a new form of mass politics (Slater, 2010a, p. 57).

By mid 1942, Southeast Asia had fell into the Japanese occupation. However, the short period of Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia during the World War II as harbingers of change was crucial to the structural changes on the political and economic institutions in the colonial territories in the region (Times, 1943). The Japanese presence in the region triggered a series of events, creating divergent paths in the institutional arrangements in the nation-states in the aftermath of war. The lack of strong attachment to the existing institutional order and the Japanese propaganda had worsened the political situation which aggravated domestic conflict in these states during the nation building phase.

In the case of Dutch East Indies, the Japanese arrival had a profound impact on the social cleavages and the institutional structure that was created by the Dutch. As the indigenous people perceived Dutch colonialism as exploiting its raw material resources to support the Dutch economy, the Indonesian economy remained poor (Ricklefs, 2001). Although nationalist movement had existed even before the war, resentment towards Dutch economic policies fuelled nationalist sentiment over independence from the colonial power (Feith, 2007). In contrast with Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, the indigenous population in Indonesia saw the arrival of Japanese troops in 1942 during the World War II initially seen as liberators from the oppression of the Dutch colonies (Drakely, 2005). In many ways, the Japanese destroyed the existing institutional order that the Dutch had built. One of the principal legacies during the short period of

Japanese occupation brought to Indonesia was the appeal towards economic autonomy that was previously absent during the Dutch (Aziz, 1955).

The Japanese encouraged the peasants to be more involved in the economic activities, especially agrarian to supply to the Japanese forces. The Japanese also separated political administration which was previously held in Batavia (Jakarta) island of Java to three territories-Sumatra, Java and Eastern Indonesia as part of its administration (Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003). Where previously only certain indigenous people were allowed to work in the bureaucracy, the Japanese changed the institutional structure by including Islamic leaders, nationalist advocates and local chieftains as part of its administrative team to maintain its power over the locals (Reid, 1975). Moreover, the Japanese also created a local indigenous military (PETA) which recruited young, Islamist and nationalist locals to provide support to the Japanese administration to control the society and for external defence (Lubis, 2005). Nevertheless, the military organisation would be the foundation which grew politically relevant for the revolutionary political group in the aftermath of the WWII and became the political machinery to claim independence.

During the Japanese occupation, the military's role was divided into two governmental roles, both military and civil which would be the evolving principles of the 'dwifungsi' dual government (Kingsbury, 2003). This marks the difference whereby the Japanese arrival gave some impetus towards politicising new groups which mobilised local elites and secularist Muslim leaders through cross-class coalitions for nationalist movements led by Sukarno and Hatta for an independent Indonesia (Abeyasekere, 1976). The indoctrination of the military by the Japanese and its continued support for the nationalist movement were aimed to legitimise the Japanese war efforts to pushback Western powers in the region (Times, 1943; Vickers, 2013). The Japanese legacy in organising the coalesce of local elites for independence which would be detrimental to the Dutch attempt to recolonize the nation-state in the post WWII.

Although the Japanese surrendered in the aftermath of WWII, their occupation accelerated the process for independence by gearing the nationalist movement with faction of armies armed with weapons around the archipelagic state (Zed, 2005; Monfries, 2014).

As in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore would also be the subject of ruling change from the British colonial to the Japanese conquest in Asia. The Japanese Occupation in Malaysia and Singapore also had similar far-reaching consequences on the political and socio-economic changes, overturning the existing order set by the British (Hirschman, 1986). However, when the Japanese occupied Malaysia, they were confronted by a deeply divided society. To put into perspective, the racial intensity on the encroachment of the Chinese population in Malaysia in 1947 were 49.5% Malay, 38.4% Chinese, 10.8% Indian, out of which the majority of the population in poverty were from the Malays (Chandler, 1975)¹. The Japanese forces entered Malaya with little resistance from the colonial army in 1942, toppling the Western imperial state which surrendered after Singapore fell to the Japanese (W.P., 42, 177, 1942). As the British colonial power were responsible for Malaya's external security, Malay local elites did not feel compelled to provide support in resisting the Japanese invasion (Soh, 1998).

In an effort to fend off the Japanese from the Malay peninsula, the British officials collaborated with the Chinese mainly from the Strait Settlements to fight in Singapore. The lasting effect of the Japanese Occupation in Malaysia and Singapore exacerbated social tensions between indigenous and the migrants which already pre-existed during the British ruling. During the 1930s economic depression the local Malays began to culminate resentment over the immigrants fearing that they would become minorities and lose their land rights to the foreigners (Nadaraja, 2016). The Japanese policies in Malaysia fomented racial

¹ Now, Malaysia is a heterogeneous society where the Bumiputera (Malays) constitute 67 percent, Chinese 25 percent, Indians 7% with others making up of the remaining population (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2011)

tensions whereby the Chinese were forced out of their land and being discriminated by the Japanese, while the Malays were working as civil servants and recruited in the police during the Japanese administration (Cheah, 2012).

The Japanese propaganda were intended to win the indigenous support had worsened ethnic tension (Times, 1942a). For the Malays, their lack of economic involvements in the more progressive economic activities such as mining, and rubber fuelled their resentments over the Chinese (Abdul Khalid, 2014). Moreover, the increasing surge of migrant population limits the Malays participation in the economy. Although this was largely under the British policy, the Japanese were exploiting the already fragile racial tension. However, resistance in Malaya came from the Malay Communist Party (MCP) which formed the resistance movement known as the Malayan People Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) that was based in Singapore (Tan and Quah, 1996). As part of the Strait Settlement during the British era, the general population was overwhelmingly Chinese. Because the Chinese were sojourners in Malaya, sympathy towards China had led to the MCP which originated in Singapore sanctioned by the British Ministry of Information to cooperate with the Allied troops (Times, 1942a). They would also became the main victims of Japanese occupation largely because of their support against Japanese policies in China (Singh, 2001).

During the Japanese Occupation, it provided the MCP the political capacity to mobilised its resources through coalitions with the Chinese which received military guerrilla warfare training from the British to provide resistance in Singapore and Malaysia (Soh, 1998). On the other hand, the policies by the Japanese were generally favourable towards the indigenous population. To legitimise its occupation, the Japanese sought to recruit the Malays in the security sector as they believed that they would be more loyal to the Sultans as opposed to the Chinese and the Indians (Milner, 1995). In order to suppress the communist in the jungles, the Japanese also used the police force largely from the Malays

against the Chinese dominated MPAJA (Abdul Wahid, 1970). Although the Japanese Occupation was short-lived, its policy of segregation nevertheless was essential backdrop for political contestations between the communal that had long-term threats and consequences confronting Malaysia's security policies.

Similar to other nation-states, the Philippines was also occupied by the Japanese in 1941-1945. Given that much of the Philippines state was run by the local mestizos, the highly stratified society was disrupted by the Japanese. As the bulk of mestizos supported the Japanese, they were happy to assume their power with limited interruptions from the invaders (Hillier, 2015). Local officials were keen to collaborate with the new Japanese to operate in the Philippines under a puppet government (FRUS, 1943). In order to put down the social unrest of the local population, the Japanese deployed the local Police Constabulary to engage with guerrilla insurgencies. Japanese policies to mobilise the state machinery to deal with social unrest however aggravated further tension between state and society (Ladwig, 2013).

However, the Japanese invasion gave solidarity to the peasants to organise and mobilised the masses in central Luzon to fight the war (Kerkvliet, 2002). The timing provided the mass the political capacity that was long dominated by the mestizos to change the political structure to benefit the mass. This led to the rise of the Communist resistance which legitimised its position amongst the peasants the (Hukbalahaps) which challenged the Japanese authority and the collaborators in the Philippines. With the U.S. support on munition and training, the Huk began their insurgencies in many parts of the islands (Lapham and Norling, 1996, 128-9). The Huks took this wartime period the opportunity to seize some of the lands previously held by the mestizos as they were seen as collaborators to the Japanese (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). However, this would also become the cause of further tension in the state-society relationship in the aftermath of the World War as the mestizos were left unpunished by the U.S. (Anderson, 1988).

3.5 Decolonisation and Divergence of the Nation-States in Southeast Asia

Although the modern Southeast Asian is now composed of independent nation-states, it is important to note that most states achieved independence through a series of political opposition and coalition of elites from the former colonial powers. Power struggles between political forces often awarded new political institutions to the winners during critical junctures (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). It created new institutional arrangements which benefitted certain group of actors within the given polity to organise the main security challenges that the state faced (Hacker and Pierson, 2014). The importance of the social construction of states as institutions in Southeast Asia is causally linked to the historical trajectory of the nation-states.

Throughout Southeast Asia, the most enduring consequence of the state institutions came from its historical legacies and political trajectories which impacted each state's domestic political legitimacy. To reinforce the major theme of this thesis, despite World War II bringing the sort of shock that led to the institutional changes, it is a consequence directly resulted from the endogenous process of political contestation that had been generated during the western imperialism that shaped the discourse on national security. One of the most important facets of the processes of national security in Southeast Asia was the aftermath of WWII. The Japanese occupation fragmented the Western colonial empires which gave the idea of national independence to locals in Southeast Asia. However, the Japanese occupation set the motion for a contentious politics which created a critical juncture in the post-war. It allows the ability of certain social groups to play a decisive role within the state in setting an institution and the interest that besiege them (Capoccia, 2015).

This section seeks to explain how intense social cleavages were exacerbated during Japanese occupation set motion to the initial paths for institutional changes and the policy decisions during the period of decolonisation

that shaped the development of the state's national security concept over time (Pierson, 2004; Beeson and Bellamy, 2008, p. 64-8). The region saw the reoccupation of the Western colonial powers in order to establish political order left by the Japanese invasion. However, the rules changed dramatically at the end of World War II as the establishment of the United Nation led to the universalisation of the nation-state system (Berger and Weber, 2009).

The period of the post-war saw intense contestation among social group because of the distribution of power and resources left by the Japanese which created distinctive types of contentious politics within Southeast Asia. It provided powerful actors to exploit the period of uncertainty to manipulate the preference of certain social groups through the promotion of institutional change (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). The attempts of colonial powers to exert its authority in Southeast Asia, however, were met with nationalist struggles for independence. The remnants of the Japanese interregnum dislodged the colonial institutional arrangements, puncturing the socio-political structure in the region. It allowed the local political elites to shape their strategic preference with the ideological capacity of national identities such as languages, religions and ethnicities which unites the indigenous population towards the movement for independence. The political order previously established by the colonial powers was destroyed in the post war (Cribb, 2018).

The Japanese occupation created revolutionary movements in all states out of which large numbers of local populations were more politically conscious than ever before with more political tools at their disposal. Ethnic, class and religions were institutionalised as norms, views and practices which provided the worldviews and shape how actors perceive national security (Alagappa, 1998; Acharya, 2014). These national identities led to an institutional inertia which accelerated the process of decolonisation. However, the terms, period and processes for decolonisation varies in these states.

The unintended consequences of the Japanese occupation left an institutional void for political contestation in the domestic arena. For the first time, the Japanese occupation led to the organisation and mobilisation of certain social groups associated with the communist ideology to compete for an independent state. As Pierson and Skocpol (2002, p. 701) argued, “increasing returns processes occurring during particular periods generate irreversibilities, essentially removing certain options from the subsequent menu of political possibilities.” Nonetheless, this brought consequences on open political contestation between social groups in the domestic on how state is formed and how it shaped their discourse on national security. Such political contestation between the social groups in the domestic before the decolonisation exhibits effects on the national security concept. It organises the political actors in certain ways at the outset of a new political dispensation to protect their dominant views and interest in the form of state security.

3.6 Social Conflict and Elite Organisation in Malaysia and Singapore: How British Weakness after WWII provided institutional changes

In Malaysia and Singapore, the initial paths for state formation after the post war were politically contentious along the communal and racial lines. The post war policy saw the urgency to create and restructure the administrative and constitutional arrangements sought to provide the capacity of politically stable states that would protect their strategic, and economic interest after the eventual transfer of power. According to a memo of the Colonial Office (CO 825/35/4, 1942: cited in Stockwell, 1995), “Owing to the development by foreign capital (British, Chinese, American etc.) of the valuable natural resources of the states, it has fallen to the British to develop the local administrative systems to build up the social services and to ensure law and order.” The British saw great importance in safeguarding its interest in Malaya as resources were vital in the reconstruction

of its economy in the post-War (Darwin, 1984: 197; Stockwell 1984: 68-9). To that end, the British introduced the Malaya Union in 1946 which seceded the Malay Rulers from its independent position to the British Crown. The British perceived that it was under its obligation to develop all the Malay states except Singapore (due to its strategic importance) to be united as a single colony for administrative efficiency (CO825/35/6, 1943: cited in Stockwell, 1995). Moreover, the inclusion of Singapore would further complicate the political condition in Malaya as it is due to the overwhelmingly Chinese majority, challenging the predominance of the Malay demographics (Yeo, 1973). Although the partition of race did not persist, however, it highlighted the precedent that the path to sovereignty was largely designed to benefit certain racial classes. The proposal for Malaya Union inadvertently helped consolidate communal identity (Harper, 1999).

The British did not anticipate the level of resistance from the locals towards the constitutional proposal (CAB129/7, 1946: cited in Stockwell, 1995). The proposal for the constitution of Malayan Union received strong resistance from the general population, the local aristocrats and the Malay rulers which beset Malay's identity, political and economic position (Cheah, 2002). The institutionalisation of the ethnic identity of 'Malaya for Malays' was greatly embedded during the Japanese occupation that the indigenous holds the birth rights to rule Malaya over other races (Wade, 2009).

As the Malay political elites maintained good relations with the British colony, this gave the political actors the advantage by inculcating their own ideational views to further strengthen their position in the society. Within the local elites, Tunku Abdul Rahman, a prince from Kedah and Dato Onn Jaafar, son of the former Johor chieftain was amongst the most vocal advocates against the Malaya Union. Out of anxiety on the Malaya Union, the local elites formed a political party called the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) to mobilise the Malay population to challenge the rights for equal citizenship, driven

by concerns over Malay survival (Singh, 2004). They also feared that under the Malaya Union, reducing the Sultan's authoritative position threatens the Malays Islamic values as it was essential towards preserving the Malays political capital in the Peninsular (CO537/1548/66, 1946: cited in Stockwell, 1995). For UMNO, the re-emergence of armed communist MCP as victors from fighting the Japanese further complicated the political situation. With its credentials, the MCP was a legitimate force to challenge the British and UMNO negotiation for a nation-state with its political capacity to mobilise the Chinese population and the Malay radicals.

To this end, the All Malaya Council for Joint Action (PUTERA-AMCJA) supported by the MCP was formed along the communal racial lines challenging the Malaya Union on the basis subsequent self-government (CO537/2174/1, 1947: cited in Stockwell, 1995). The strategic effect of establishing a strong federal state led by UMNO consequently fostered the Malay position and brokered a compromised deal British for a Malaya Federation in 1948. Under the Malaya Federation, the political arrangements privileged the Malays to have special rights as an indigenous population in economics and education, while the Chinese and Indian immigrants were granted with restrictive equal citizenship (Tadin, 1960; Balasubramaniam, 2007; Lemiere, 2014). Though the grand bargain was agreed upon between the Malaysia and British, the negotiation process was only preserved between the elites. Political grievances between the elites and the mass grew as a result of the political arrangements. Against this backdrop, the MCP came to challenge the Malaya Federation through violence.

However, this political contestation would be the conjuncture for the political elites to develop its security that are based on racial lines. Animosity between the Malay and Chinese strained the communal relations as the Chinese were commonly associated with the Communist for severing their belief and culture during wartime. The Colonial review described that the views of the Malays towards the MCP during wartime conducted: A. Compulsory

subscription; B. Taxing of Malay produce; C. Demanding mosques to be made their meeting places; D. Demanding Malay girls to work for them in the jungles; E. Abducting and killing Malays and destroying their houses and property (CO537/1581/14/15/16, 1946: cited in Stockwell, 1995). However, this had a long-lasting repercussion on the attitude of the Malay leaders and their perception towards communal partition.

For the British, the growing presence of Chinese Communists in the Peninsular present a security threat which weakened its position in Southeast Asia (CAB 21/1954, 1946: cited in Stockwell, 1995). The British feared that the growing influence of the Communist inspired Chinese would challenge its authority and the political arrangements to create a political stable government in the economically devastated country (CO537/1529/110, 1946: cited in Stockwell, 1995). The British were sympathetic of the Malays standpoint as they were unable from compete both politically and economically in equal rights to citizenship (CO 537/1529/110, 1946; cited in Stockwell, 1995). In many ways, the re-emergence of the MCP as a racial threat to the Malays deliberately reinforced the perception of the local Malay population that was already threatened by the economically superiority Chinese (Abdul Khalid, 2014). This gave the UMNO elites the nationalist credential as the protector of the community (Singh, 2004). In order to counter Malaya from communism, the British ceded with the pro-British Malays to form a government that could guarantee access to the Malaysia's natural rubber and tin to generate the construction of British economy that was destroyed in World War II (CO825/35/4, 1942: cited in Stockwell, 1995; Wade, 2009).

It was within this framework that ethnic animosity between the Malays and Chinese led to a racial clash in Malaysia (Heng, 2017). The MCP managed to infiltrate trade unions in Malaysia and Singapore to overthrow the feudal aristocratic system by replacing it with a Soviet Union style political institution at the expense of Malay dominance as they saw the physical presence of Chinese

was at stake (Short, 1970). As large members of the MCP were Chinese squatters living outside of the Malaysia society after the Japanese occupation, conflict between the government and the MCP led to the declaration of State of Emergency in 1948 to 1960 (Cheah, 1981; Singh, 2004). The struggle by the Malay leaders and the British counterpart to quell the Communist provided the institutional capacity to the government through using draconian methods for counter-insurgency (Hack, 2009).

With the support of the British, UMNO elites had the political capacity legitimated by the Emergency to mobilise the Malay Regiment (later reformed as the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces (RMAF)) with intelligence support from the Police Special Branch led by British to use force against the communist in the jungle while the British were tasked with providing external security (Nathan, 1998; Loh, 2002; Wade, 2009). Armed by the British, the RMAF was created which was largely conscripted by the Malays to deter communism (Crouch, 1992). This also provide avenue where the Malays could dominate the political arena and further exclude the Chinese from the Malaysian political process. Through coercive power, it firmly established the Malayan leaders by empowering a particular set of actors to allocate authority over the security agenda (Pierson, 2016).

As a precondition by the British to self-governance, power sharing was necessary to prevent communal conflict in Malaysia. Recognising that the Malaysian government were out of touch and the already strained relationship between the Malays and the Chinese, the British and the Malay rulers encouraged Chinese leaders to form a political party called the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) to counter against the ideological appeal of the Communist MCP in 1949 to maintain political order in Malaysia (CO537/4242/5, 1949: cited in Stockwell, 1995). Shared perception amongst the Malay elites and the conservative Chinese elites on the political threats towards workers revolt in the Chinese community led to the UMNO-MCA Alliance. The MCA appealed to the Chinese community

through rapprochement with the middle class by appealing to fight for Chinese right within the government (Kua, 2007). A noteworthy of the Alliance was that the MCA was aware of the special position of the Malay rulers in the colonial set-up, and the predominance of Malays in the electorates (Kua, 2007). After The UMNO-MCA alliance dominated in the municipal election in 1952, the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) also joined the Alliance which led to the formation of Barisan Nasional (BN) which won 51 of the 52 seats in the 1955 Legislative Election with Tunku Abdul Rahman as Chief Minister to form the first Malayan government. The UMNO-MCA alliance government led a delegation to London in 1956 to negotiate with the British for the drafting of Malaysia's Constitution under the Reid Commission for a handover for self-government (Wade, 2009). The broad coalition of the elites unified by support from the general population led to the formation of a unitary state (Slater, 2012). Such collaboration between elites gave a pathway for a strong political structure along the racial lines and how national security would be conceived in Malaysia. Given the dominance of BN alliance during the process of state formation, the concept of security policies was determined by the postcolonial order shaped to protect their political survival and its interest.

Political contestation between social groups in Singapore also played a big role in its formative years. However, this is where the path began to diverge during the genesis of the institution. Where Malaysia used the new institutional apparatus to manage ethnic cleavages, the principal struggle in Singapore pitted against the predominantly Chinese chauvinist leaning to the left (Thum, 2019, p. 50). High unemployment, dilapidated housing and discrepant education system was a fertile ground for social conflict (United Nations, 1961). At the same time, the British asserted control over public discourse by limiting discourse to English in a Chinese dominant language which caused political unrest amongst the Chinese speaking population (Thum, 2019). The frustration about the systemic bias initiated the communal Chinese to be indoctrinated with the Communist

ideologies through education and trade unions because of the oppressive measures that the British policies were implemented to the large part of the Chinese population in Singapore (Turnbull, 2009, p. 252).

In the case of Singapore, although it was established as a separate colony with its own constitution, many security policies pursued in Malaysia overlapped with Singapore. Much like Malaysia, in Singapore, the aftermath of Japanese occupation led to a rising national consciousness by the people for self-governance. From the period of 1946 to 1948, social conflict grew out of the mass mobilisation organised by the MCP with various parties and trade unions to challenge the colonial government for independence (Yeo, 1973, p.22). However, as the eventual Malaya Federation becoming inevitable, the MCP was declared illegal and sought for unconstitutional political measures through violent measures in both the Peninsular and Singapore (Marshall, 1974).

The Emergency brought political order to both Singapore and Malaysia which would also give path to its independence. The Emergency also established a precedent for an authoritarian regime in both Malaysia and Singapore which provided a strong state apparatus in implementing its views on security policies. However, the British colony realised that in order to fight communism in Singapore, local allies were to be defeated through an elected government backed by the British government (CAB128/86, 1957: cited in Stokes, 1995). As a small city-state, the close association of Singapore to the Malayan Federation was vital to its survival as the French defeat in the battle of Dien Bien Phu risked a domino effect of Communist influence throughout Southeast Asia (CO1030/93/1, 1954: cited in Stockwell, 1995). However, as a precondition for Singapore's independence, Singapore's internal security remained under the Internal Security Council, with joint responsibility between Singapore, Malaya and the British. Likewise, these new institutional arrangement not only facilitate changes in the power dynamics, it also benefit certain social groups during the power struggles at the expense of other groups (Mahoney, 2000).

Similar to Malaysia, the State of Emergency in Singapore was also declared in 1948. The British Colonial office expanded the government's authorities with the introduction of draconian laws such as Internal Security Act, Sedition Act and the Criminal Law Act that gave unrestricted power to the governments to maintain political autonomy at the expense of individual liberty (Harper, 2001). Thus, these newfound institutional arrangements became central to the local leaders which provided the political capacity to govern and protect their interest (Cortell and Peterson, 1996). Despite measures were taken to partially restored order with the arrest of students and trade unions, the precarious situation for a new state combined with the growing nationalist movement for independence was ripe for social conflict. Realising that developing a democracy in Singapore was imperative to prepare for its eventual decolonisation process, the British was forced to appoint a commission in 1953 called the Rendel Commission to study the changes in the constitution for a partial self-government. With surmounting pressure from the local elites, the Rendel Constitution led to the allocations for culminating in the election of 25 seats in the 32-legislative assembly as a first step towards self-governance (Rendel, 1957).

Under the provision of this constitution, Singapore retained internal self-governance while external matters such as defence and internal security would be reserved by the Security Council represented by the British, Singapore and the Malayan Federation (Marshall, 1974). In 1955, the first election took place in Singapore to govern the domestic affairs which saw the Labour Front led by David Marshall winning the largest number of seats and formed the first elected Singapore government as the First Singapore Chief Minister (Chan, 2001). On the other hand, these circumstances also led to the formation of PAP in 1954 to contest in the election. The political marriage between the progressive leftist with strong support from students and pro-communist groups led by Lim Chin Siong, and the Western educated middle-class moderate nationalist led by Lee Kuan

Yew formed the People's Action Party (PAP) was formed out of the struggle for independence and won 4 out of 5 seats in the legislative (Fong, 1979; Sim, 2006).

After replacing the Rendel Constitution in 1955, two more constitutional conferences were held in 1957 and 1958 as a preparation for independence in 1959. However, political conflict erupted in 1956 when the labour movement led by the left-wing destabilised Singapore's domestic politics that cast doubts on the survival capabilities if it was granted full independence (Chan, 2001, p. 90). With the domestic problems ripened threatening to destabilise the city-state, David Marshall and other members of the parliament went to London to discuss for a grant for full independence. However, due to disagreement between the colonial power, David Marshall resigned in 1956 due to his disinclination towards British precondition on security matters towards self-governance. This gave path to Lim Yew Hock to take over the helm to become the New Chief Minister of Singapore (Marshall, 1974). As a precondition by the British for Singapore to achieve independence, Lim Yew Hock was pressured by the colonial government to maintain political order (Thum, 2013). As Singapore was still at the period of State of Emergency, from 1955 to 1957, prominent leaders such as Lim Chin Siong and other subversive faction of the PAP Executive Committee, trade union leaders, students, businessmen were arrested without trials as protest erupted. The arrest of these prominent figures of the Left leaning leaders were politically orchestrated by the British, Singapore and the Malaysian Federation as part of their efforts at crippling the Communist activities (Ramakrishna, 2015).

This was possible because after the 1955 election the PAP became a political juggernaut. Despite only winning few seats in the legislative, the PAP's constituents drew large support from the grassroot that was vastly superior to other party organisation as it had large appeal to the Chinese population that was mainland oriented (CIA Report CREST, 1955; CIA Report CREST, 1956; Ang, 2018). However, in order to retain control and secure Singapore's independence under the condition of merger with the Malayan Federation, Lee Kuan Yew and

the Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock had to politically engineer an arrest of the PAP left wing faction that would allow him to contest in the election with the support of the British (National Australian Archive, TS/383/5/3, 1957). This provided the political opportunity for Lee Kuan Yew to reform the party structure and subsequently commanded a majority in the 1959 election. The PAP contested all 55 of the available seats and won 43 seats available which constituted the majority of the first Singapore government after independence. This set precedent for the PAP to capture the state apparatuses and deploy them instrumentally to shape and contour the specific security policies.

The preceding analysis has traced the political origin of Malaysia and Singapore's state provided strength through constitutional laws, promoted by the British in order to deal with social conflict in the 1940's to 1950's. The contours of the political upheaval in both states have exhibited how security perceptions are shaped. The path to state formation was politically contentious in both countries. Social cleavages were overlapping with race and class. Not to mention, with communism looming in both states, this provided the opportunity for strategic actors the capacity of shifting the contextual condition to dictate preferred policies that are favourable to their own political position (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992). Although communism was an international threat, it also influenced the domestic events which triggered changes. Thus, counter-revolutionary collaboration between the British and local elites in Malaysia and Singapore formed a strong state (Slater, 2012). The causal role of social conflict expanded the opportunity for local leaders with the institutional capacity to implement preferred strategic policies designed to protect their power.

3.7 Rescinding Sovereignty in the Philippines

Similar to Malaysia and Singapore, the Philippines was also subjected to the Japanese overlord during the World War. However, how the Philippines

emerged with independence was in stark contrast to other case studies. In the absence of nationalist struggle, the Philippines achieved independence through a gradual phase of decolonisation from the U.S. ruling which began before World War II, only to be interrupted during the Japanese occupation. After the Japanese surrender, the task for the Philippines elites and the U.S. colony was to revive the government from the strong Communist anti-Japanese resistance of the Huks. The attempts to reoccupy the Philippine by the elites and the U.S. was different from Malaysia. In contrast to Malaysia, the U.S. troops were already present before the liberation where approximately 100,000 troops were already in the archipelagic state shortly before the Japanese invasion (Constantino and Constantino, 1978).

The World War II briefly opened up political contestation for institutional changes in the Philippines. During wartime, the peasant-led group called the Huks played a huge role in the Japanese resistance. This was possible through collaboration with some of the U.S. troops in coordinating assaults towards the Japanese forces (Ladwig, 2013; Hillier, 2015). This empowered the mass mobilisation which gained momentum in the post war to push for reform on the political institution for broader political participation. Moreover, the peasants were seeking agrarian reform against the landed elites that as the social inequality continued to plague the Philippines. However, the task for political reform was challenging for the peasant group. Although the Huks and the U.S. joined hands battling against the common enemy, the presence of U.S. troops throughout the war in the Philippines meant that any political movements designed to change the institutional arrangements were limited (Goodno, 1991). In the post war, the Huks were treated suspiciously by the Philippines government and the U.S. fearing social uprising as the Huks were armed and could challenge the political order (Castillo, Taruc and Roxas, 1946). Not to mention, the Huks struggled to maintain coalition beyond the wartime due to divided opinions. The Huks alliance only saw that the purpose for unification against the oppression of the Japanese and its

collaborators, failing to consider the U.S. and pro-American elites as part of their enemy (CIA Report CREST, 1951).

According to Kerkvliet (2002), the urban penetration of the Huk based party remained weak against the politically resourceful elites. Political and economic elites collaborated using private armies and the Constabulary to suppress the Huks and pacify the nation favouring to install the pre-war political structure (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; Quimpo, 2009). For the oligarchs, any changes in the previous institutional design limits their access to political power and state resources. This can be seen largely from the history sequencing of the American colony where it gave rise to the wealthy land elites for private accumulation of power (Kuhonta, 2011). Not only that, the elites who collaborated with the Japanese administration were reasserted in the position of authority and pardoned (FRUS, 1945b). The oligarchs were concerned that the peasant unity and capability to mobilise the mass would threaten their political power (Kerkvliet, 2002, p. 143-155). As the oligarchs enjoyed a wider array of political mechanism at their disposal in the pre-war, their aim was to maintain and expand its political power through which private interest would dominate rather than for public interest (Sidel, 2013).

The U.S. could have used this period to strengthen the institution as a basis for broader political participation. Instead, with close personal and business relations, the U.S. led by Commander General MacArthur sought to protect the local elites through the deployment of U.S. military force to combat the peasant-led movements (FRUS, 1945a; Constantino and Constantino, 1978; Manchester, 1978). With the U.S. staunch support, the Liberal party candidate Manuel Roxas, who was a member of the Japanese puppet government and a close friend of General MacArthur, was elected as the President in the post-war against the Nacionalista Party Sergio Osmeña (Manchester, 1978, p. 1150). For the U.S., having a friendly regime to lead the Philippines such as Roxas was critical to its security interest. Guaranteed access to the naval base and airbase was important

for the U.S. to maintain presence in the region, while the oligarch the guaranteed access to the U.S. market (Anderson, 1988, p.14).

Political and social grievances between the elites and the mass grew as the latter group were left bitter that the collaborators during the Japanese occupation were left unpunished (FRUS, 1945c). Nevertheless, the Huks attempted to push for institutional reform agenda through the ballot box by backing the candidates from the Democratic Alliance (DA), though was unsuccessful. The DA candidates who won seats in the lower house were barred from participating in the Congress (Quimpo, 2014, p. 140). Instead, the Congress was dominated by two major parties the Nacionalistas and the Liberal party which both represented the wealthy landowning elites and the interest of the big business interest (Teehankee, 2012). Consequently, the opportunity to progress reformist agenda to address the problem of land reform, social inequality and pervasive poverty through formal institutions were limited (Rodan, 2015).

This is a stark contrast to the British in Malaysia on how they responded to mass mobilisation. The British presence assisted the orchestration of a strong administrative structure in the form of federal state with a more broad-based political parties to facilitate a more collective elite coalition along the racial lines. However, this would seal the fate of the Philippines and its enduring security problems in the post-war. By contrast, rather than creating a strong state with a coalition of elites, the post war Philippines was a weak bureaucratic state with divided political elites, bequeathing the state system to be monopolised and manipulated by the oligarchic interest (Kang, 2002). It created a political vacuum that substantiated the clientele politics to enjoy a degree of political autonomy and decentralised power away from the central government. Political choices made during the defining years were embedded in the permissive condition that drove the leftist and mass peasant movement. With the DA being abstained from Congress, the formation of institutional arrangements that was set forth for self-

governance was mutually exclusive between the oligarchic elites and the U.S., at the expense of broader political representation.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the Philippines became a Commonwealth that was modelled on that of the U.S. political system. The President had the authority to make appointments to critical departments while the Congress holds the rights to approve the cabinet candidates. This created an unlevel playing field as the wealthy local elites consolidated the institutional arrangements that would greatly benefit its political and economic position in the polity (Hall, 2016). The formation of security concept was ultimately shaped by the particular constellation of power and interest that underpins the state (Jones, 2012b). After achieving its independence from the U.S., the national security interest was ultimately formalised and intertwined with the oligarchic interest (Morada and Collier, 1998, p. 551). With a weakened state structure, and the power resides in the periphery, the culture of clientele politics to extract resources became the norm for political actors to access state resources.

After self-governance was granted, the oligarchs declared an all-out war against the Huks. Fearing that the Huks might threaten the newly independent regime, Roxas demanded Taruc, the Huk leader to surrender their weapons (Taruc, 1953). The peasants who occupied the land during wartime were forcefully removed as landowners started to reclaim their properties often through coercion of the private militia and state security force in the post war (Kreuzer, 2009). The decentralisation of security forces to the municipals and the provincial elites created an uneven level playing field with security through private armies and arming the police further entrenched the power of the local bosses (McCoy, 1993, p.14; Kreuzer, 2009). As Anderson (1988, p.31) puts it, “their very dispersion and localism show how confident the caciques are, and how little they feel the need to crawl together under the apron of the military”. This severely weakened the central government to implement a cohesive security policy to combat Communism where political violence was concentrated largely in the

rural areas (Morada and Collier, 1998, p. 551). Because the leftist did not present a challenge to the political arrangements, the cacique felt little pressure for institutional reform (Slater, 2010a, p. 99).

With growing violence against the mass enforced by the private armies and the Police Constabulary, the Huks effectively took an informal approach in pursuing the institutional reform. The rearming of the peasant movement became the military wing of the Partido Komunista Ng Philipinas (PKP) which launched a series of campaigns against the government from 1946 to 1954 (Kerkvliet, 2002). Moreover, the Philippines economic condition worsened with income inequality growing larger than during the pre-war due to the lack of agrarian reform that sparked peasant discontent on how the landlords were treating them and how the state was defaulting to the cultures of patron-client (FRUS, 1950). Violence in central Luzon grew in 1949 when the Quirino administration won the election that took hold in the same year was charged with fraud (FRUS, 1951). Emboldened by the population discontent, it provided the Huks the opportunity to carry out more frequent attacks in Manila declaring to overthrow the corrupt regime which further weakened the state to assure internal security (CIA-NIE, 1954).

The U.S. blamed that the widespread corruption in the Quirino administration were catalyst to civil unrest and made the U.S. officials suspicious that the local elites were capitalizing the financial aid to the Philippines for private interest (Ladwig, 2017). With significant pressure for institutional reform from the U.S., the Philippines reluctantly receded security enforcement by absorbing the Police Constabulary to the Army. This gave back political power to the central state, thereby weakening the patron-client relations in the provincial elites (Hall, 2018). This would promote a dependent path to the military to play a more significant role in internal security problems. In order to control the internal insurgencies, the U.S. reorganised the Constabulary, absorbed and trained the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to be an effective counterinsurgency force

(Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p. 175). The Philippines security approach took an institutional turn when President Magsaysay took office in 1953. In many ways, this was a window of opportunity that might have shaken up the institutional lethargy of clientele politics (Kuhonta, 2011). With his broad popular support and lacking in cacique origin, he took a different approach from that of the oligarchs (Cullather, 1993). Under his tenure, Magsaysay introduced several reform programs to improve efficiency in the bureaucracy, rural economic development and agrarian reform which saw a substantial growth in the economy as well as living condition (CIA-NIE, 1957). With U.S. aid, Magsaysay improved the corrupt bureaucratic system through higher wages and providing the political power to the local forces in the municipal the authority to remove unqualified armed personnel (Ladwig, 2017). At the same time, with the CIA support, the Philippines expanded the military's role by deploying them in various communist prone with nation-building projects and counterintelligence (Berlin, 2008, p.42-78). Such institutional programs were necessary to levelling the uneven level playing field that was dominated by the oligarchs in the Congress. It substantially improved the state-society relations as abusive security personnel were removed and built the public image that the security forces were present for community building projects by using the aids to build bridges, wells and roads (Danguilan, 1999). Shortly after the surrender of Huk leader Luis Taruc, the Huk rebellions collapsed while some of the rebels were absorbed back to society through Magsaysay's social program (Ladwig, 2017).

Magsaysay's security policies would have a lasting impact on the patronage-clientele politics with the subsequent expansion of military's role in the polity. Because of Magsaysay's modest reformist programs, the military occupied several civilian posts which weakened the patron-client relationship of the oligarchs (Croissant, Kuehn and Lorenz, 2012). However, the interim period of Magsaysay's centralised state would be undone after his untimely tragic death. With political contestation waning between the mass and U.S.'s other security

commitments in Vietnam, the institutional reform set by Magsaysay would be undone by his successors. Land reforms initiated during his presidency would become obsolete as the oligarchs regained control of the Presidency with the support of the oligarchy dominant Congress, reverting back to its previous institutional arrangements (Putzel, 1992). In many ways, the causal connection between the social conflict and the centralisation of power to the state intensified the power to the President to conduct a more broad-based security policy (Arugay, 2012). However, while Magsaysay's approach was touted to be progressive to the development of state-society relations, the significance of these changes appeared to be temporary which gave path to the return of class contentious politics in the 1960s. These successes have been counterbalanced by the oligarchs for further institutional reform that undermined many of their institutional privileges. There was strong resistance driven by the oligarchs to revert power back to the municipals (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). This is largely because the social unrest did not contribute to the elites to create a coalition pact and build a stronger bureaucratic state (Slater, 2010a). Instead, despite pressure from the U.S., the oligarchs still maintained its political presence in the Congress with little competition from the mass population. Such historical legacy can be difficult to undone as a fragmented state which is open to demands and pressures limits the capacity of coordination for a centralised policy (Bell, 2002).

Despite this, the unintended consequences of institutionalising the practice of deploying the military in the civilian roles would also set path for the AFP to acquire much larger roles during Marcos's era. The involvement of the military in nation building categorically altered the role of the military to be an apolitical institution (Huntington, 1995). It developed a special civilian-military relation by forming a patronage links with the civilian institutions that are dominated by the oligarchs through a "partnership" between the civilian government and the AFP, although the AFP was subjugated as the junior partner for coercive tactics and

offered economic development to maintain the ruling regime (Arugay, 2012). This would however become the unintended sequencing as the power of the oligarchs could be curtailed through the strengthening of the bureaucrats (Crisol, 1980). By privileging the military to take up the role for nation building projects, this gave a blueprint for Marcos to use the military institution in creating an autocratic state.

3.8 The Struggle for Independence and Territorial Cleavages in Indonesia

Thus far, this chapter has shown that the aftermath of the World War II saw the return of colonial powers shortly before they were granted self-governance. Although achieving self-governance was relatively smooth in Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines without necessarily resorting to military to maintain political order, Indonesia appeared to be on the other end of the spectrum. By contrast, the path to self-governance in Indonesia was more complex, pitted with struggle against colonialism and fragmentations around their claimed chain of islands (Van Klinken, 2001). The magnitude of violence in the aftermath of World War II sparked a revolutionary struggle against the colonial power which would be the primary concern for Indonesia's security concept.

Similar to Malaysia, the idea for Indonesian independence had been greatly strengthened during the Japanese occupation and had significant political impacts to the locals (Aspinall, 2016). However, departing from Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore, the nationalist movement gained momentum during the Japanese war with its leaders returning from exile and were well positioned in the Japanese administration to rally support and mobilise the population (Sidel, 2013). Shortly after the war, the Japanese surrender created a power vacuum that gave the opportunity for nationalist leaders such as Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir to quickly declare independence (Ricklefs, 2001). By late 1945, the British military began to arrive to reoccupy Indonesia to install political order on behalf of the Dutch

government (FRUS, 1945d). Rich in natural resources and a strategic point of entry for trade, Indonesia was vital for the Dutch to rebuild its collapsed state that was occupied earlier in the war by the German forces. However, when the British troops arrived in Indonesia, the Republic administration had already existed and were fully functioning in Java and Sumatra (Cribb and Kahin, 2004). Armed with Japanese weaponry, the British operation to reclaim these territories were met with fierce resistance from the locals (Kahin, 1952).

In an effort to rally the population against the colonial troops, local leaders used the nationalist ideology of the *Perjuangan* (struggle) to mobilise the mass across various islands that are ethnically diverse to fight for independence (Ricklefs, 2001; Drakely, 2005; Vickers, 2013). Whereas in Malaysia saw the need for elites to collaborate from different racial lines, by contrast the struggle for political autonomy led to the coalition of cross-class elites deriving from the nationalist party (PNI), the communist party (PKI), the Muslim and the military to fend off from the Dutch to reclaim Indonesia (Bertrand, 2004). This was largely because the returning Dutch gave common grounds for the elites to collaborate to protect themselves from a much stronger political force (Kingsbury, 2003). In contrast to the Philippines, the struggle for class would not be applicable to Indonesia as they were lacking in bourgeoisie class that controlled the economy which further pushed the leftist to work with a more practical cause of liberating Indonesia from Dutch control (Gouda and Zaalberg, 2002).

To further consolidate the idea of a federal system, Sukarno released his five guided principles called the Pancasila as a preamble to the constitution that was drawn by a major compromised by the elites in an effort for unity that served a basis for an Indonesian state (Drakely, 2005, p. 73). However, the struggle for maintaining an Indonesian Republic faced several challenges both internally and externally as some leaders disagreed with the Constitution (Bertrand, 2004, p. 32). Shortly after the Dutch arrival in Indonesia, Eastern Indonesia was being occupied by the Australian troops while parts of Sumatra and Java were re-

occupied by the British-Dutch troops (Ricklefs, 2001). By 1948, the Republic was facing armed struggles both internally and externally that severely fragmented the elite coalitions. The Republic was facing challenges from its claimed territories with a faction of PKI waging war for self-autonomy especially in Madiun, killing the Republic government officials (CIA Report CREST, 1948a). Despite that, due to the strength of Republic's military, Hatta initiated a military campaign in Madiun against the PKI that was quickly won by the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI).

On the other hand, due to frustrations from the Dutch over failed negotiations with the Republic, the Dutch initiated the 'Police Action' which saw the Republic leaders being captured by Dutch forces, weakening the revolutionary government. This caused fragmentation between the civilian elites and the military as the Republic government's political legitimacy to claim for a unitary state especially after the war (Mietzner, 2008, p. 38-42). This gave the opportunity for the military to consolidate its position as national heroes in the revolutionary struggle while civilian leadership was regarded as weak and frail (Kingsbury, 2003; Bertrand, 2004; McGregor, 2007; Mietzner, 2008). While the historiography of Indonesia was severely distorted by the dominant narratives during Suharto's era, which will be discussed in the next chapter, it was in fact the international pressure led by the U.S. that forced the Dutch to cede Indonesia (CIA Report CREST, 1948b). The Dutch 'Police Actions' however was a fatal mistake by the colonial side as the Dutch forcefully took over the Republican territory, including its capital Yogyakarta that could potentially destabilize the already frail region. For the UN, the Dutch 'Police Actions' would pave way for the PKI to consolidate power from the pro-U.S. elites, allowing the Soviet Union to influence its power beyond China to control the vast natural resources in Indonesia that was vital for the economic recovery for the U.S. and its Allies (CIA Report, ORE 26-48, 1948). Inevitably, with the U.S. intervention forced the Dutch to withdraw from Indonesia while maintained its presence in the West New

Guinea until the 1960s contributing to the internal rebellions and consistent political unrest in the postcolonial era.

The revolution left behind a legacy towards the political order in Indonesia. Although the Dutch finally agreed to an independent Indonesia, its strategy of divide and conquer in Indonesia had left a fractious politics with a fragmented society that privileged the leaders from the periphery (Bertrand, 2004, p. 32). They promoted the establishment of independent states based on major ethnic groups which polarize the society and created further disunity in Indonesia. It provided the local leaders in these areas to have ambitions for local political autonomy and a strong distaste for the Javanese leaders on how the political order would be constructed after independence (Slater, 2010a, p. 108). On the upshot, except for the Communist Party, the revolutionary created a levelling effect for the political actors to achieve a similar path towards shaping the socio-political system that emphasized all parties to cooperate in achieving a stable polity (Kahin, 1952, p. 146).

3.9 Parliamentary Democracy and Fragmentation in Indonesia

If the principal struggle for independence was a revolutionary struggle against colonialism, the period of 1950s to the 1960s was marked with internal conflicts. After Indonesia achieved its independence in 1949, the task for the political elites in Jakarta was to incorporate these areas into a functional centralized state and its political actors that were mobilised during World War II (Sidel, 2013, p. 478). However, the postcolonial idea of a nation-state was deeply fragmented in various parts of Indonesia. With the absence of Dutch power, it was difficult to facilitate the need for elite coalitions, which devoid the need for a strong state. This was especially apparent in the areas controlled by the Dutch for a dissolution of their individual states (Bertrand, 2004). With a frail coalition of political groups, no particular group that dominated power existed as was the

case in Malaysia after its independence in search for a common political order (Slater, 2010a, p. 108).

Conversely, in the aftermath of formal independence, the period of Indonesia parliamentary democracy was facing an institutional crisis as a number of conflicts erupted that were often short and episodic. The transition for a parliamentary system did not offer contending political forces for immediate path to power. Intense party politicking were rampant in the 1950s. Political parties used the parliamentary platform as a tool for assembling coalitions concerned with the allocation of power and resources rather than impose distinctive policy agendas and improving the economic condition (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Thus, from its inception, the process of state formation was poised with a political struggle that was left by a legacy of Dutch policy of amalgamation that transcended to political contestation within Indonesia, triggering elite contestations, ethnic conflict, and tensions from religion, severely dividing these elites on the composition of the nation-state (Drakely, 2005, p. 86). These conflicts were mainly about the reconfiguration on how Indonesia as a nation-state should look like in postcolonialism. Pressure from the Dutch retreat increased tensions around its regional islands. Although the decision to absorb these areas were widely accepted in Java, however, it threatened the non-Javanese elites that led to armed revolts. The process for regime legitimacy was arduous for political elites to present to the mass on the need for a central state to increase ethnic cohesion rather than an invasion of Javanese identity as an imposition of imperialism towards different ethnic backgrounds (Vickers, 2013).

Between the 1950s and 1960s, several conflicts outburst in various parts of Indonesia that were intertwined with the frustrations in the parliament: conflicts between the secular political elites and Islamic parties over the Constitution, and a Darul Islam movement that took hold in Aceh, Kalimantan, Western Java and Sulawesi (Brown, 1994); separation from centre-periphery conflicts were manifested against the Republic for an independent state that occurred in Ambon,

Sumatra and Sulawesi (Bertrand, 2004); to class conflict that was reflected by the growth of membership in the PKI (Aspinall, 2014). These political contestations around the Indonesian region had a serious impact on the efficacy of the centralized government. Fearing that it created a chain of dissolution of the Indonesian national boundaries, the parliament often relied on the military that were loyal to the central state to suppress and maintain their territorial integrity (Tarling, 2004).

Whereas in other case studies, the absence of military struggles meant that civilian elites were the principal actors during independence, in Indonesia it appears otherwise. The military's role in Indonesia during independence gave the impression that it should be politically involved during the process of nation-building (Lee, 2000). Whereas the Malay Regiment in Malaysia remained loyal to the Malay rulers, the military in Indonesia was formed with militia units in different parts of its islands principally to fight during the struggle for independence. This complicates Indonesia's path for political autonomy as the political elites in the Republic maintained little authority over the military in the vast web of territorial units which stretches from the centre to the periphery level (Mietzner, 2011).

In the post-war, the military as an organisation was also deeply factionalised with no institutional or ideological cohesion that binds the military, which splintered their allegiances instead to their local commanders that were oriented in party politics (Mietzner, 2008). This was problematic for Sukarno's PNI to unify a broad elite coalition as the division between the military, as well as rivalry for economic and political control between the military and central government had politically fragmented the newly independent state. To increase the military's professionalism, reducing factionalism, and subduing any intervention of military affairs in the parliament, the army Chief of Staff, Brigadier General A.H. Nasution proposed for a reform in the military to reduce the number of personnel (Crouch, 2007). However, the decision to centralise the

army and reduce its forces by half created deep division amongst the regional forces against the central military technocratic group (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 298).

The parliamentary opposition in support of the regional army dissidents were regarded as unwarranted interferences in the military affair that led to the 17 October Affair in 1952. The protestors led by Nasution demanded Sukarno that the parliamentary to be dissolve and support its plan for military reform, however, with no success that resulted in the purged of Nasution and his accomplices (Lee, 2000; Crouch, 2007). With a weak decentralised parliamentary government, military had to resort to unorthodox methods to support its upkeep of military operability, through involvement such as racketeering, private security and other methods (Honna, 2017). The deep factionalised military increased its vulnerability for the military to be exposed to civil interference and party politicking that weakened its position in Indonesian politics (Mietzner, 2008).

With growing frustrations over the effectiveness of the central state, it gestated suspicions between the non-Javanese elites and Javanese elites. As the economy was still suffering from remnants of the war, the politicians perceived that the economic policies were often lopsided to benefit Java at the expense of other non-Java territories (Anwar, 1998, p. 480-482). Rather than political solidarity, the frequent failure by the parliamentary democracy in solving the nation's economic problems and internal rebellions gave the military the opportunity to intervene in Indonesian politics (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 315-317). Nasution criticised that during the parliamentary democracy, the TNI was heavily politicised by the party politics creating factions within the military (Nasution, 1963). The frequent eruptions of internal conflict would recede the political legitimacy and usher in the collapse of democracy in Indonesia in the late 1950's, which cemented the military's political power in Indonesia.

The upsurge of rebellions would hasten the conviction to create a unitary state that required a strong central government to be more effective to avoid from territorial cleavages. With its successes in the military operations in almost all of

these internal rebellions, the military was constantly deployed in these areas in order to suppress these internal rebellions (Kingsbury, 2003). Pitted with economic problems, military disunity, political party rivalries in the parliamentary, internal unrest, and finally the Dutch refusal to transfer West Papua, the fate of these rebellions would be sealed in the late 1950s. In 1957, Sukarno dissolved the parliament and declared a martial law with the support of A.H. Nasution. With the support of the army, Sukarno had established political access to control over the state power and established new institutional arrangements which he termed as the 'Guided Democracy' (Ricklefs, 2001). The transition from a liberal parliamentary democracy to the new authoritarian rule saw the consolidation of power to the president, while the army also grew stronger steadily in Indonesian politics (Bertrand, 2004). In his attempt to end the contentious politics, Sukarno took this opportunity to formulate the state ideology of NASAKOM-(nationalism, religion, communism) in an attempt to unite these social forces with a balanced stream to create a strong political order (Cribb, 2001). Meanwhile, under this new institutional arrangement, it gave the military access to state capacity to eliminate their inter-service rivalry and further consolidate its power within army that had been deeply fractionalised (Anderson, 1983).

Paradoxically, pressure from the increasing Communist and the "solidarity makers" also saw the increase in military cohesion that would change the civil-military relations to the TNI to challenge the PKI/PNI forces for political authority (Anwar, 1998, p.481). This would play a major factor over the long-term consequences on the civil-military relations. It provided the army branch the political edge and the institutional capacity as a coercive strength in maintaining and diffusing territorial conflicts (Mietzner, 2006). It expanded the army's roles in the field of politics with military personnel being appointed in the bureaucracy, cabinet, and the regional governors (Crouch, 1979). Further, in order to maintain balance between major political forces, Sukarno distributed the ministerial

position to political parties while also accommodating the military in the civilian politics (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2019). However, Sukarno's precarious efforts to balance the political force in reducing tension were met with limited success as the elites were ideologically divided between the PKI/PNI communist forces and the TNI with other parties that had limited access to state power (Kingsbury, 2003).

However, by late 1950s the security perception shifted from internal stability to a resurgence view of Western Imperialism. In contrast to other case studies, the post-war parliamentarism saw the involvement of the leftist slowly creeping in the government and closely associating it with Sukarno (Ricklefs, 2001). Moreover, Sukarno's perception over the West intervention strengthened when the Malaysia Federation was created fearing that it was aimed at containing Indonesia (Anwar, 1998). By 1955, the U.S. and its Allies were increasingly concerned with Sukarno's cabinet that saw the leftist increasing its presence under the guise of the nationalist support. In 1958, a rebellion movement broke out in Sumatra and Sulawesi which were supported by Jakarta based politicians from the Socialist Party (PSI) and the Muslim, Masyumi party that was led by the local military commanders (Kahin and Kahin, 1995). In part, the rebellion was significantly influenced by the increasing PKI presence in Indonesia politics which supported Sukarno's political vision for completing national revolution (Aspinall and Berger, 2010). The suspicions over Western intervention were confirmed when the U.S. and its Allies fighter plane was shot down and the pilot captured which saw the deterioration relationship with the U.S. (FRUS, 1958a). From the U.S. point of view, it was a strategic move as part of its deterrence policy during the Cold War against Communist movement. The 1958 rebellion would however seal the fate for Indonesia's security perception on the basis of nationalist struggle against imperialism (Anwar, 1998, p.481). The perception of Western intervention in Indonesia's domestic politics led to the re-alignment of its security policy that was focused on the anti-colonialist struggle.

On the international front, the failure of the consolidation of West Irian between Indonesia and the Netherlands and their failed bid in the United Nations General Assembly in 1957, it strengthened the position of the nationalist movement for solidarity on the Dutch territories (Anwar, 1998, p.481). Subsequently, Sukarno formulated a policy that saw the nationalization of foreign companies by seizing foreign businesses to be taken control under the management of the locals that was administrated by the military (White, 2012). On the other hand, as the Cold War continued to grow in Southeast Asia, the US covert operation and the military support for regional rebellions in 1957-1959 had seriously threatened Indonesia's national sovereignty. Western intervention created deep mistrust in Sukarno's worldview, pushing his administration for international support from the Soviet Union and China, backed by the PKI under the guise of nationalism (Drakely, 2005).

3.10 Conclusion- Comparison of the rise of Social Forces in Southeast Asia

This chapter has set the stage for the subsequent chapters on how the conceptualisation of security in Southeast Asia is determined by its past legacies, between social forces that inhabit the states that were shaped during the colonial period. It has laid the comparative groundwork by measuring the power relations between the social groups before and after the decolonisation process in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore and the degree of change experienced in each state. This chapter argued understanding the way in which states deal with the origin of the conceptualization of security is impossible without exploring their historical conditions and the levels of social conflict that unfolded during the post-colonial era. A proper analysis of the historical antecedent provides us the narrative to understand the variations of social cleavages during pre-war that were essential in shaping the forms of conflict that

erupted in Southeast Asia. Different political interest between different social forces lead them to different conceptualisation of security and thus potentially provide divergent security responses. Many contemporary security problems that occurred in Southeast Asia are due to the obdurate social conflicts in the domestic that took root during the colonial period. This would also explain why state formation and its security practices diverge.

In all case studies, political contestation between social groups had already existed during pre-war, only to be exacerbated during the relatively short tenure of the Japanese was consequential to the state-society relationship. As Pierson (2004, p.45) argued, ““Small” events early on may have a big impact, while “large” events at later stages may be less consequential”. The colonial legacies and Japanese occupation punctured the equilibrium which set motion to a critical juncture that changed the power structure in Southeast Asia in the post-war. In all case studies, national elites sought to establish new states after World War II, however with varying degrees. Whereas previously the colonial powers gave privileges to certain social groups which contributed to ethnic, racial, religious and class diversity, the Japanese policies towards Southeast Asia aggravated political contestation between the colonial powers and local elites, as the Japanese aimed to wipe out the Western influences. However, the nature of its policies varied across the states which set path dependence unique to each polity, with different political consequences during the course of independence. As Mahoney (2000, p.507) explained, the logic of path dependence refers to “those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties”.

Radical groups and nationalist sentiments were mobilised by both the Japanese and the Allies during the World War II. Such historical events triggered the power struggles which provided opportunities for political actors to collaborate to challenge the pre-existing institutional arrangements prior to the war (Slater, 2010a). Although the nationalist sentiment pre-existed in all case

studies, however, the Japanese occupation rooted a reactive sequence which spurred the local elites for institutional change that led to the decolonisation. The causal influence on the security concept was similar in all cases as the power struggles were indigenous in nature but exacerbated during the Japanese occupation. The Japanese propaganda provided the institutional capacity on the ideology for independence in the indigenous population during its short occupation. It created new avenues for mass mobilisation in the colonized states which eventually led to independent states. This has helped shaped the divergences of security problems that exist in the post-independence where these social cleavages provided certain social groups to exploit for institutional changes during the end of WWII.

By tracing the origins of political conflict that shape state, it provided an institutional context on how power relations exist in the society and how security policy originates from these domestic concerns. The upsurge on contentious politics in the post-war saw the process of institutional changes, a new nation-state, which took course differently in these states. The particular nature of the socio-economic development has created dominant political forces to that were able to organise themselves to create a state designed to pursue their interest. In the case of Malaysia, the colonial legacy of creating a multiracial society led to a series of contentious politics between classes that exacerbated to ethnic tensions between the Malays and the Chinese. The mobilisation of the leftist movement influenced by the Chinese communalism in response saw the configuration of a new nation-state and party coalition to maintain the mass from revolt. Nevertheless, it created an institutional foundation to legitimise the regime protection under the guise of Malay interest. Political contestation in the case of the Philippines in contrast did not exhibit the need for creating a strong state as was the case in Malaysia. Although the Huk rebellion represented a threat to the establishment, however, it lacked the coerciveness to create an elite cohesion as opposed to Malaysia. Not only that, because the threat around Manila was

manageable, it lacked the necessity to create a political militarisation as presented in Indonesia. On the other hand, the political situation in Indonesia was more contentious than in any other case studies with outbreaks from regional islands for autonomy, ethnicity, religious and class which saw the military slowly elevating its position into power. The long process of political contestation saw the need for the elites for the politicisation of the military in order for the maintain regime legitimacy rather than the gain of support from the parties in the Indonesian parliament. Finally, in the case of Singapore, although it was still under the British protection, the increasing influences of the leftist movement for anti-colonialism saw the need for the creation of a moderate party-state in order to centralized power before its merger with Malaysia.

Chapter 4:

Reforming the State and the Divergences in National Security Concept

4.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter have explored how the historical antecedents have largely influenced the domestic problems and mass mobilisation in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. The aftermath of decolonisation in the Southeast Asia saw the reconfiguring of state's political and economic order. However, contentious politics reached its zenith in the 1960s following the Cold War in Southeast Asia. The looming threats internally as well as externally have forced the ruling elites to use coercive tools both legally and militarily to maintain political order. Tension over the control of state power was politically contentious especially in the domestic between the social forces which principally derived from ethnic, class, and ideological differences seeking to advance their preferred interest on the state's political and social order. However, the severity of the regime threats would however lead to a different path dependence for structure of these states.

This chapter examines how the conceptualisation of security is politically contingent that took form in a particular historical context, which becomes institutionalised in Southeast Asia. To do so, it would require us to analyse how the different types of political contestation between social forces in the Southeast Asian states that took place helped shape the distinct state institutional structures. Whose preferences prevail in security policies depend largely which social groups that captured the state power. Certain social, political and economic conditions can enable or constrain particular security policies. This would in turn help us understand how different social forces interest, perceptions and preferences lead them to adopt different security strategy and may potentially help push for different security responses. From this perspective, it provides us

the necessary context that security policies are products of historical processes of struggles between the social forces that besiege within the state (Lipschutz, 1995, p. 8). This chapter begins each section by analysing the level of domestic threats that occurred in each state. By determining the severity of the domestic threats, this chapter argue that it would affect the levels of elite coalitions. This would in turn influence how power is organised in relation to the domestic threats and the process of history endogenised the institutional designs to maintain the regime survival.

4.2 Malaysia- Class Conflict and Ethnic Problems as a National Security Concern

Malaysia's path to independence in 1957 was a relatively peaceful negotiation for self-governance rather than a revolutionary struggle between the UMNO led Alliance party (which was later renamed Barisan Nasional (BN))-constituted from UMNO, MIC and MCA and the British. The outcome of the Alliance government winning the election was an important juncture for the state and the society which gained popular support from the rural Malays and urban Chinese (Wade, 2009). From its inception, the nature and configuration of Malaysian institutional structure is communal politics (Crouch, 1996).

The coalition would however inherit three colonial legacies namely, a pluralist society that was frail with ethnic friction; an economy that was designed for the primary commodity export; and a rapid rural-urban mobilisation (Abdul Khalid, 2014, p. 73). As part of the genesis of the coalition party, consociationalism politics manifested itself on the proposed composition of an institutional configuration of power sharing between inter-communal elites. For the indigenous, recognition of the Malays as having a special status in the nation-state in exchange for a concession of citizenship for the Chinese and Indians with the assurance for a laissez fair economic system in which the majority of the

ethnic Chinese owned large share of domestic owned capitals (Haji Ahmad, 1978; Mauzy, 2006). In this sense, Malaysia's politics is described as consociational politics whereby the ordering power are shared along the ethnic lines are represented in access to state power (Lijphart, 1977). With the social contract being born out of the sacrosanct between the ethnicities, the elite bargains allowed the formation of certain institutional arrangements which UMNO candidates would assume the executive power to be Prime Minister while the ministerial positions were distributed amongst the elite coalitions (Ong, 2015). Through power sharing agreement between ethnics, the elites would be able to set the rules of the games so that the institutional structure would foster cooperation between ethnics (Means, 1991).

However, such obscurity downplays the domestic struggles that was about to unfold in Malaysia. The political arrangements gained during the 'Great Bargains' was ripe for social conflict, which heightened income and wealth differences between classes (Nathan, 1998, p. 516-517). Although the coalition bargain appeared to be appropriate at the time for independence, it was unsustainable in the long-term as the Malay ethnic grievances began to be heightened over the uneven economic development. The Alliance elites suffered immense pressure to hold their coalitions together as political pressure began to mount from the party hardliners. Between 1957 to 1969, there was growing mass discontent between UMNO's elites and the Malay rural constituents over the grand coalition. Although initially the English educated Chinese held control over the economy, over time, they had yielded more state power and control over the cultural symbols over UMNO (Case, 1996). Further, increasing demand for civic political participations by the Chinese and the Indians and their strong protest movements over the institutional arrangements began to fractionalise the elite bargain coalitions.

Power struggles between the Malay elites began to intensify as the UMNO elites grew distant from the rural Malay constituents over the glaring absence of

economic growth especially in the rural. On the other hand, the constitutional bargain also began to crack as the looming crisis between the ruling elites emphasised import substitution and urban infrastructure over rural development and agricultural spilled over ethnic tension. The political and economic issue once again become intertwined between managing ethnic and class issues (Gomez, 2004). Despite the government's efforts to address the predicament of the Malays, the majority of the Malays in the rural areas remained poor. The uneven economic distribution and limited access to markets caused growing discontent over the uneven political and economic development (Kuhonta, 2011). As Jomo aptly puts it "With different ethnic representation in these classes, reinforced by ethnic differences in educational levels and location (urban-rural), as well as cultural preferences and prejudice, it is not surprising that economic competition has been at the core of inter-ethnic disharmony" (Jomo, 1989, p.37).

4.3 Ordering Power of the BN: Institutional Change, Malay Domination and Path Dependency

By the 1960's, social cleavages started to grow in Malaysia as the distribution of wealth and power began to widen. Hoping that Singapore's removal from the federation would improve the growing ethnic resentment, the political order achieved during the 1957 grand coalition bargain quickly declined. Relations between the ruling elites, the sub-elites and the opposing elites hastened the deterioration of ethnic relations with the Malays emboldened and demanded that only the Malay language to be used in the state transaction (Case, 1996). The dissatisfied middle class instead formed new parties such as the Chinese dominated Democratic Alliance Party (DAP) and the more radical Malay Muslim party such as Party Islam (PAS) to challenge the pre-existing political arrangement (Kua, 2007). The right factions of the Malays were discontented with the power-sharing arrangements between UMNO's tolerance for the laissez

faire system and skewed distributions voted for PAS. On the other hand, the growing middle-class Chinese was resentful with their 'second class' citizenship, disgruntled by the *Bumiputra* policy especially on education inequality and the role of Malay language which became the national language (Case, 2015, p. 41). Social cleavages, modernisation, rising ethnic tension and socio-economic changes threatened to destabilise the elites power arrangements that were achieved during independence (Jomo, 1989).

The rising tension culminated during the 1969 election that saw the ruling alliance lose its two-third majority to the opposition parties DAP and PAS. The ruling coalition failure symbolised the loss of the Malay dominance in politics and was a critical juncture for the May 13 incident in 1969 (Slater, 2010a; Kuhonta, 2011). With the ruling elites severely weakened, the Alliance supporters clashed with the opposition forces which became a racial conflict that led to casualties, with most of the victims being the Chinese (Crouch, 1996, p. 24). As Slater (2010a) argues, because the social conflict was unmanageable, it forced the ruling elites to restructure for institutional reforms.

Because the rules of the game were becoming increasingly suboptimal to provide the allocation and exercise of political power for the dominant social group, institutions can change during the critical juncture (Thelen, 1999). The racial riot gave a window of opportunity for the ruling elites with unfettered power to institutional reform that would consolidate its power. Subsequently, the ruling elites declared a State of Emergency and suspended the parliamentary. In an effort to wind out the racial riot the National Operation Council (NOC) was set up. With Tun Abdul Razak swept into power, the NOC effectively centralised and expanded its institutional capacity to exercise state power in pursuit of political order. However, the outcome of the formation of the NOC was seen as a purge against Tunku Abdul Rahman's regime until it was lifted in 1971 (Case, 2015, p.41). Tun Abdul Razak began a series of organisational structure reform to centralise power and institutionalised the party and the bureaucratic procedures

to ensure that UMNO stood above other parties to make the final decisions (Kuhonta, 2011, p.83). As power within the new regime spread beyond its institutional origins, the ruling elites began to use coercive apparatus to quash the racial riots through deployment of the military and police to maintain political order. Their implementation to marginalise rival elites were possible with the support of the state bureaucrats as they inherited from the British colonies that were largely dominated by the Malays. With the support of the bureaucrats, UMNO were able to consolidate its political power to implement policies.

With the security forces predominantly Malays, the informal linkages between UMNO as Malay dominant party and the security forces saw the use of state repression. Consequently, the violent repression of state were indiscriminately aimed against the Chinese to dissuade the ethnic minority from challenging the regime (Kua, 2007). Further, under the state of emergency, the government used repressive legal measures such as the existing ISA, the Official Secrets Act and the Sedition Act to intimidate and silence political oppositions which left them immobilised (Pepinsky, 2007). The May 13 incident ostensibly gave UMNO an uncontested power to replace the existing institutions that saw the Malay party strengthening its position to capture the state apparatus (Nathan and Govindasamy, 2001). With the Alliance being dissolved, a new coalition party called BN was introduced with almost all opposition parties co-opted into the coalition that centralized power (Mauzy, 1983). The initiative to institutional reform changed the rules of the game as UMNO attempt to solidify its position as the political foundation for the Malays to represent their interest in the political system. Subsequently, the UMNO led regime intensified and implemented its redistributive policies to improve socio-economic condition to refurbish its influences in the Malay community (Jomo, 2002).

4.3.1 Institutionalising UMNO as a Party State

To further institutionalise the primacy of UMNO as the Malay champions, the ruling regime pursued a radical legislative reform of the Constitution in 1971 and incorporated as the Malay position in both political and economic structure, the principle guideline in the formulation of policies and institutions (Mauzy, 1983). In particular, the Constitution restricts any discussion that are seen as sensitive matters such as restricting public speeches, citizenship issues, Malay special rights in education, public jobs, subsidies, as well as the issue of national languages that are still applicable to date (Malaysia Federal Constitution, 2010). Further, the Internal Security Act (ISA) enacted in 1960 gave the Malay ruling elites a powerful political tool to coerce any political opposition, which was previously used as a tool to deter communalist activities through political detention to limit civilian engagements (Barraclough, 1985).

In order to secure the Malays support, Tun Razak appeared at the UMNO Mother's and Youth Movement meeting in 1971 to appeal to the sub-elites. Tun Razak justified that the growing autocratic regime was necessary to guarantee the Malay rights to firmly change the public's attitude in dealing with the socio-economic problems (Hussein, 1971a). To ensure Malay dominance, the NOC increased the bureaucratic position that was promised to be allocated to the Malay in the previous Alliance grand bargain to be enacted, giving the ruling coalition the capacity to dominate and set policy agenda to secure Malay's position in Malaysia's politics (Doner, Ritchie and Slater, 2005). With a centralised party state, the NOC implemented a state-led development plan called the New Economic Policy (NEP) (1970-1990) plan to redistribute resources and spur economic growth. During its post-mortem of the riot, the ruling BN government perceived that the ethnic divisions which led to the racial riot were caused by economic inequalities (Economic Planning Unit, 1971). The institutionalisation of the NEP was not only aimed to redistribute resources to benefit certain

ethnicity, it also becomes a form of domination for the BN's state power (Jomo and Wee, 2014).

In order to appeal to Chinese constituents, Tun Abdul Razak delivered a speech at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. He highlighted that the NEP with the objectives of “the eradication of poverty among our people irrespective of their racial origin, and, secondly, to rectify the social and economic imbalance among the various races to ensure and attain real national unity” (Hussein, 1971b). Tun Razak considered that economic development is essential to maintain the civil security from falling to communism and communalism (Wahab et al., 2015). The ruling elites perceived that by improving the economic conditions of the Malays, it would reduce racial sentiments as well integrate the divided society. Further, these would reduce the classification of race inherited by the colonies to restructure the Malaysian social fabrics (Jesudason, 1989).

Thus, the intense political upheaval allowed the BN ruling government to create an unlevel playing field. By adjusting the rules of the game, it gave UMNO significant advantages in implementing security policy while limiting the opposing parties to challenge. Although the nature of conflict was initially between a dissatisfied middle class and the upper class, it nevertheless reinforced the BN's narratives that the cause of conflict was along the communal line. In consequence, one of the critical legacies of the May 13 riot is that ethnic politics had become the centrepiece of its security practices. The BN government institutionalised Malaysia's national security that is premised under ethnic politics in Malaysia's politics (Singh, 2004). The overpowering might of the BN government complicates later attempts to replace security practices beyond the ethnic paradigm.

With the BN party coalition, it set the scene for UMNO to achieve hegemonic position in the domestic, taking centre stage in the policy agenda setting with all the key ministerial positions while other parties such as the MCA ceding its position in the Ministry of Finance where it traditionally held this

position. Policy formulation was presided over by the UMNO-led coalition party in charting over the affairs of Malaysia aided by the bureaucrats (Suffian, 2019). With the concept of national security seen as the prerogative of state party, the ruling elites were conditioned to produce certain institutional arrangements to create linkages between advancing their domestic concerns in its foreign policy objectives (Haji Ahmad, 1999). Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, Malaysia was focused on diversifying its economy by increasing the Malay capitalist class. As part of Tun Razak's initiative to improve the socio-economic condition and redistributive program, the ruling elites distributed resources through patronages that were close to the regime. Such dramatic transformation of its economy in terms of expanding its manufacturing sector. In order for policymakers to have a grasp on policy implantation, the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) was set up as a core special branch under the Prime Minister's office to create direct linkages between ministries and agencies.

However, in the early 1970's, Malaysia would face a major blow to its external security. With pressure mounting domestically, the British Labour government formally withdraw its military in Malaysia and Singapore due to budget constraints (Longinotti, 2015). As the regional uncertainties mounted during the Cold War, the Malaysia ruling elites were compelled to build their own military capabilities (Storey et. al, 2011). This also forced the ruling elites to embark on intense diplomatic relations to maintain economic and strategic partnership with the great powers. Malaysia emphasized the need to be self-reliant and pragmatic in its foreign relations in meeting these strategic concerns (Jeshurun, 1980; Ministry of Defence Malaysia, 2010). At the time, Malaysia's military capabilities were still focused on the communist insurgencies, while also facing the regional challenges following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam creating security uncertainties to the region. Despite this, the U.S. still maintained its bases in the Philippines and Thailand which provided a security layer in the region. By 1968, Malaysia-Philippines relations would also stabilise after

pressure from Suharto on Marcos to drop the case for ASEAN solidarity (Yuen, 1997).

To sum up this section, even though Malaysia inherited a strong state after the institutional reform in the 1970's, intra-party elites remain a subject for political contestation for state power. The deep fractions would not only affect the capacity of the ruling elites to implement their policy agenda, but it also re-energises the communal tension fracturing the state-society relations. Such fractions allowed the winning ruling elites to create a powerful state apparatus that captured the hegemonic power of the state to implement their policy agenda. By using the legal and coercive apparatus, it scaffolded the trajectory of a single coalition party dominance while at the same time limiting competition to challenge the state to capture its scarce resources.

In the subsequent chapters, we will explore in more detail Mahathir's policy on military modernisation, the intra-party elite division and the implication on Malaysia's national security policy. What requires attention here is the renewed communalism saw the ruling elites heavily invested to promote the NEP, the government pursued to converge the national state policy to create linkages between its domestic problems and its foreign policy objectives (Singh, 2004). Reformist projects began to intensify in the 1980's under Mahathir in a dual-pronged approach on the grounds of sovereignty in modernising its military, but also to bolster efforts in public investment to create a credible defence industry capability (Matthews and Balakrishnan, 2009).

In conjunction with the NEP, the Malaysian government attempted to diversify its economy that is historically focused on rubber and tin industry. Consequently, under the NEP, the government was firmly invested in technologically advanced manufacturing industry by introducing the National Defence Production Policy in 1982 which provided a guideline towards Malaysia's defence industrial planning (Balakrishnan, 2008). The ruling elites perceived that creating an industrialised country could transcend the Malaysian

economy from an import-substitute country to export-oriented, which would enhance the UMNO legitimacy as a ruling party-state (Jomo, 2002).

In sum, these unprecedented events provided a path dependence process that shaped the institutional arrangements focused on accommodating internal issues to maintain political order and subsequently the regime legitimacy. Primarily, the uneven economic distribution would dominate Malaysia's social, economic and political discourse leading up to the 1969 riot. However, with the social unrest becoming more unmanageable, such political conditions would also see the elite coalescence into creating an authoritarian regime (Slater, 2010a). With a powerful coercive tool, it provided the ruling elites with high degree of political autonomy for institutional reform designed to strengthen UMNO's position as well as appeasing the Malay population in the already ethnically fragmented society.

By institutionalising the Malay rights in the Constitution, the ISA as a political tool, as well as the implementation of the NEP, further consolidated the BN party coalition political power in the government. It also empowers the political elites to implement policies that are ethnically driven to reduce ethnic cleavages through socio-economic policies. The spate of political outcomes after the riots determined how political elites formulate policy in the future to maintain political legitimacy. As such, it has allowed the coalition regime to focus on tackling ethnic cleavages with economic policies rather than through military (Izzuddin, 2017). In short, Malaysia's historical legacies led to the unintended consequences in Malaysia politics which fomented its policy preferences that are driven by ethnic cleavages. The colonial legacies provided the political autonomy to the civilian political elites subjugating the military which invariably allowed the political elites to dictate policy decision-making. It also created internal linkages with the military to provide political order to ensure Malay dominance.

4.4 Singapore- Institutional Change, the PAP's Survival Singapore's National Security Policy

Singapore's path to legitimacy in the face of political challenges during its critical juncture exhibits astonishing stability on its path to centralize the party state. Similar to Malaysia, what appears to be a manifest sense of political legitimacy in the case of Singapore showcases a durable party state. Lacking in historical identity, Singapore was a by-product of colonial city that inherited with sojourners from the British empire. Singapore's political legitimacy was severely tested after the untimely exit from Malaysia and threats from Indonesia influenced PAP's security perception.

In examining Singapore's path to legitimacy, it is therefore important to understand the political condition that gave the PAP the authority to govern. Singapore's nation building process was constructed on what appears to be the institutionalisation process that manifest from PAP's perception. For the PAP, its legitimacy rests on its ability to provide security and economic prosperity for the population. Such legitimacy sought the need to create a militarised population to establish a strong relationship between the state and society. Building on this, the ruling elites were determined to institutionalise through articulating the ideology of survival and the profound sense of vulnerability of security that is manifested by a sense of citizen's duty to defend the nation-state. With a strong party and elite cohesion that are organised and well structured, the consolidation of PAP as a state party granted an unfettered access to state power in mobilising state resources. This is where Singapore departs from the rest of the case studies. Whereas in Malaysia the path was to secure the Malay position in the development of Malays in the socio-economic domain, Singapore's perception was to focus on the securitisation of the society for its regime legitimacy.

4.4.1 Singapore's Merger with Malaysia

From the outset, Singapore's path to security share the same historical legacies with Malaysia. Threats from the MCP largely subsided and the Emergency was lifted in the 1960s, communal tension was still rampant in that period. The possibility for Singapore and the North Borneo was touted by Tunku Abdul Rahman (Times, 1961). For the British and the PAP, the merger of Singapore and its northern part of Borneo territories were vital to maintain the broader regional security, fearing that its foreign base in Singapore would be jeopardised in the hands of the left wing government (Ball, 1999). Despite its reluctance, the Malay elites in the Federal Malaysia feared that Singapore which is predominantly Chinese would fall to the MCP and convert the city-state as a base to contest the Malaysian government that would cause ethnic unrest in Federal state (Thum, 2017).

For Singapore, the merger with Malaysia was crucial for the ruling party PAP's Lee Kuan Yew's political survival as the economic condition deteriorated and was institutionally constrained due to elite fractions in the party on the terms for merger (Thum, 2013). Although it was granted formal independence in 1959, the British continued its presence for internal and external security with the MCP remaining a dominant force. In 1961, disagreements between the moderate faction led by Lee Kuan Yew and the left-wing faction of the PAP led by Lim Chin Siong began to emerge. However, the inevitable occurred when the latter group split from the party and formed the Barisan Socialist Party. The elite polarisation severely weakened the PAP position to negotiate for a merger with Malaysia (Wade, 2013). With its strong staunch support from the grassroots, the Barisan Socialist provided a legitimate political challenge towards Lee Kuan Yew's regime (Thum, 2013). Given their large base of support deriving from the working class, Malaysian elites were concerned that the Barisan Socialist would contest for power through class uprising in Malaysia (Wade, 2013).

On the other hand, during the negotiations between the British, Malaysia and Singapore, Tunku Abdul Rahman expressed his concerns that the Barisan Socialis Assemblymen would pose a security threat to the Federation (National Australian Archives, TS 682/22/5/1, 1963, p. 176). As a predominantly Chinese state, Tunku Abdul Rahman feared that Singapore would be converted into 'Cuba' as a base for political offensive that would rally the Chinese in the Peninsular (Thum, 2013, p.37). The Brunei Revolt was a politically decisive moment for the PAP. With British and Malaysian support, the PAP leader commanded the use of state instrument and launched the Operation Cold Store to suppress the opposition in 1963 that saw the arrest of Barisan Socialis leaders Lim Chin Siong and other party executives, trade union leaders and members associated with the Communist (Thum, 2013). With a weakened opposition, Lee Kuan Yew's PAP emerged victorious in the election that gave the mandate for the PAP to negotiate for merger (Pang, 1971, p. 17). In the aftermath of the Operation Cold Store, Singapore was formally annexed to the Federation of Malaysia. With the oppositions severely weakened in Singapore, this would pave way for the ruling PAP to dictate the city-state's security perception unopposed. For Lee Kuan Yew, the annexation to the Federation was important to Singapore's political and economic survival as it does not have any natural resources (Lee, 1961). Though the caveat of the annexation also meant that defence and internal security would fall under the jurisdiction of the Federation (Thum, 2013).

Despite being initially welcomed, the Singapore merger would have a significant impact on the communal tension in the Federation and the city-state. As a predominantly Chinese population, Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew was actively engaged in challenging the dominant ideology of Malaysia's ethnocracy (Wade, 2009). However, challenging the existing political order would not only affect the power relations, but also the institutional arrangements of ethnic bargains which were previously agreed between the UMNO-MCA Alliance (Rahim,

1999). The contentious politics between the Alliance and the PAP on communal caused elite conflict exacerbated ethnic tension in both Malaysia and Singapore between 1963 and 1965 (Lau, 2003). In the 1964 election in Malaysia, Lee Kuan Yew mobilised the Chinese voters in the Peninsular to openly contest with the Alliance party that ruptured the relations between Malaysian and Singapore elites. Lee's political insensitivity towards the Malay survival was championing for a meritocratic based system with equalities to all ethnicities, a "Malaysian Malaysia" as opposed to "Malay Malaysia" challenging the institutional arrangements under the Constitution that would weaken the Malay's political capacity (Mauzy and Milne, 2002). By directly challenging the primacy of UMNO, whose support derived from the rural areas, the abolishment of the Malay's special rights would erode any chance for the Malay's survival who were both economically and educationally disadvantaged to non-Malays (Abdul Khalid, 2014). The decision by the PAP to contest in Malaysia's politics in 1964 fractionalised the elite coalitions which invariably exacerbated the ethnic tension that led to the racial riot in 1964 in Singapore (Barr, 1997). However, Lee Kuan Yew's open contestation with UMNO led to the eventual separation of Singapore in 1965. The separation from Malaysia plays an important historical juncture to Singapore that impacted upon its ideologies and foreign policies, which continues to date (Singh, 2003). The unintended consequences of the expulsion from Malaysia, coupled with the strategic uncertainties from the Vietnam War further exacerbated the state's vulnerabilities.

4.4.2 The Foundation of Singapore's National Security

At its onset, Singapore's authoritarian regime rested upon the PAP ruling elites to create state's perception on vulnerabilities threats from the its separation. Informed by its recent history, the perception on the need to create a strong state was to restore its legitimacy and political order. The period may be characterised

as a time for national crisis for the ruling elites. On the one hand, concerns to Singapore's security were that other bigger states would interfere in its domestic politics against the predominantly Chinese state. As the then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (2000, p. 3) stated in his memoir on the eve of the separation, "we faced tremendous odds with an improbable chance of survival". This was an important backdrop to understand Singapore's transformative years because his worldview forced how the city-state shaped its security policy. As Leiffer (2000) explained, due to its underlying structural tension with its neighbours, it is a deep-seated concern in Singapore that they have never fully come to terms with its separate sovereignty.

The untimely exit has critically compounded its security perceptions and its relations with foreign policy behaviours (Ganesan, 1998; Singh, 2017). The transition process after its departure from Malaysia was occupied with uncertainty, facing many challenges. Even before its formal separation, almost all political parties in Singapore conformed that the key to Singapore's survival was dependent on access to Malaysia's military and economic access such as raw materials and fresh water (Thum, 2019). Nevertheless, the ideological clash between Lee Kuan Yew and Tengku Abdul Rahman and racial tension in Malaysia led to Singapore's eventual departure from the Federation.

Singapore was perpetually facing considerable uncertainty especially on its relations between neighbours. For the PAP, Singapore's biggest problems was its geostrategic location as it is sandwiched between the Malay-dominant states of Malaysia and Indonesia (Mauzy and Milne, 2002). During that period, internal security was still largely under the prerogative of the Federal Malaysia (Ang, 2016). The issue on the initial refusal of withdrawal of the Malaysian troops in Singapore was noted by Singapore's First Defence Minister Dr. Goh Keng Swee in his speech in the parliament. Dr. Goh stated that "all property which before Malaysia belonged to Singapore reverted to Singapore once again" (Goh, 1966). For Singapore, the continued presence of the Malaysian troops in the city-state at

the expense of its own troops would jeopardise the regime's legitimacy and its sovereignty.

On the other hand, historical animosities with Indonesia also influenced the ruling elites' perception on Singapore's siege mentality of survival and vulnerability. As part of Sukarno's adventurism of the Konfrontasi (Confrontation) policy to protest Malaysia, the ideological battle was at the expense of Singapore's security. Sukarno blamed the formation of the federation as part of the colonial west to preserve their power in Southeast Asia (Omar, 2008). As a form of protest, Indonesia began targeting Singapore aimed at disrupting its economic and trade (Ali, 2015). The turbulent and violent condition in the region would devastate its economy that is dependent on international trade through its port. In particular, the bombing of Macdonald House on 10 March 1965 left a devastating effect on the bilateral relationship between Singapore and Indonesia, which resulted in 3 deaths and 33 suffering injuries (Hamid & Saparudi, 2014). Though the confrontation was never a full-scale war with the British and U.S. presence barring from regional instability, it genuinely reminded the ruling elites that foreign intervention can cause serious domestic instability.

After adjusting to the unanticipated exit, and the Cold War heightened in the region, Lee Kuan Yew saw the urgency to build Singapore's indigenous military capability in order to maintain its sovereignty (Huxley, 2000; Ganesan 2005). Thus, the concept of security during its formative years was largely concentrated by the ruling elites' worldviews (Ganesan, 2005; Loo, 2012; Ang, 2016). Singapore's security concept was reiterated during Lee Kuan Yew's interview, stating that "*But some things are not negotiable. My survival and how I design my security is not negotiable. This is something fundamental. We may be small but we are sovereign, and we decide how we ensure our own security*" (Lee, 1966a).

The ruling government was also facing intense domestic pressure to political order. Trade exports plunged as Malaysia erected trade barriers after the separation (Winters, 2011). With no natural resources, high unemployment and a multi-ethnic society, the PAP's regime was vulnerable for social conflict (Acharya, 2008). In the domestic context, the PAP government believe that its legitimacy lay securely by anchoring its economic development and social reform. For Singapore, its society was vulnerable for regional tension that would inherently affect its domestic legitimacy. Singapore shared similar fate of communal tension in 1969 as a result of spill-over from Malaysia's racial riot. It demonstrated the linkages that Singapore's society was vulnerable to communal uprising.

Perhaps, the catalyst for Singapore's vulnerabilities was the decision by the British to withdraw its troops from Malaysia and Singapore in 1968 formally leaving the city-state in 1971. The fierce competition between the capitalist states and the communist bloc would be unsustainable after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam creating security uncertainties to the region. Under this AMDA, the British, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore provided a nexus of security as it became the security umbrella for Malaysia (Chin, 1983).

The ruling elites saw the urgency to build a credible deterrent military capability to fill the security gap left by the British. Economically, the British base was also a source of employment which employed 40,000 locals and accounted for 33 percent of Singapore's GNP (Time, 1965). In his speech to the Parliament in 1965, Dr. Goh stated: "*It is no use pretending that without the British military presence in Singapore today, the island cannot be easily overrun by any neighbouring country within a radius of 1,000 miles, if any of them cared to do so*" (Goh, 1965).

4.4.3 Institutionalising the PAP as a Party State

Nonetheless Singapore's disadvantages as a small city-state would also be politically beneficial to the ruling elites. Due to its geographic size, it enabled the ruling elites to rally the population on the basis of state's perpetual vulnerability of the city-state from foreign powers (Mutalib, 2000). Crucially, though, Singapore's political institutions after its independence was inherited by the British colonies. Parallel to UMNO, the PAP came to power as a result of its cooperation with the British, politically engineering its dominance in domestic politics. With its departure from Malaysia, Singapore was virtually left in the hands of the PAP in a hegemonic position, creating an unlevel playing field. However, the consolidation of power by the PAP did not emerge in a vacuum. With the tightening of power under the PAP as a result of the Operation Cold Store in 1963, political opposition was marginalised with little chance for the opposition to capture the state power (Jones, 2000). This was crystallised with the colonial repressive institutional tools such as the ISA which expanded the concentration of arbitrary power to the ruling elites after its independence (Thum, 2019, p. 59). It gave the PAP ruling elites a window of opportunity to create Singapore's path to shape the political institutions that would ensure the regime's security (Acharya, 2008).

Meanwhile, a social contract was formed between the state and the society to ensure its turbulent politics and economy into a strong stable state. In return for their loyalty, the population was expected to suppress its democratic demands to support the ruling elites to bring about economic prosperity and political stability (Ortmann, 2009). Since its independence, the PAP government was determined that rapid economic growth is tied to alliance with FDI's with foreign capital and multinational companies set up to ensure its political legitimacy (Wong and Huang, 2010). On the security realm, Singapore's strategic perception was devolved to the ruling elites. As its transfer of sovereignty from Malaysia

was abrupt, the PAP swiftly took measures to further secure its position in governance. The PAP took considerable measures which transformed the relationship between the party and the public bureaucracy (Rodan, 2006). Inherited during the British era, top echelon English educated bureaucrats were more sympathetic with the PAP's views. The PAP further politicised the bureaucrats by exploiting new appointments loyal to the ruling party to entrench their network of power in policymaking. To ensure that policy formation is centred around the state party, the PAP ruling government rapidly transformed policy process to be preserved around the small team of PAP executives in consultation with the civil servants (Barr, 2016). Over time, the nexus between state bureaucrats and the party became institutionalised as the top echelon civil servants became the dominant route for political leadership (Worthington, 2003). In effect, it gave an avenue for PAP ruling elites power to shape the political institutions to structure the power relations among them that would privilege the state party while disadvantaging others (Wong and Huang, 2010).

On the other hand, the rival parties' access for policy formation in the parliament was completely removed. Instead, the process of merging the state and the PAP changed the institutional arrangements where policy formation became preserves of the PAP and the senior bureaucrats (Rodan and Jayasuriya, 2009). To prevent any challenges from the civil society and the opposing party, the state media was constantly used to push its political agenda to the society while opposing party's access to media was controlled (Rodan, 2004). In 1967, the PAP passed another piece of legislation called the Societies Act in refinement of its inheritance during the British rule. This now restrict any unregistered organisations from political participation. With the process of depoliticisation in Singapore now may have led to new sets of power between the ruling party and the state machinery, it provided the PAP the opportunity to institutionalise a particular style of regime that stabilize its legitimacy. It bolstered the public support for PAP to implement its security perception. In the absence of checks

and balances on the executive power, the scope of the state power widened considerably which gave the government greater capacity to shape their policy agenda.

4.4.4 Militarising the Civilians

Recognising the need to an uncertain political future would avail to political struggle, it facilitated a policy agenda rooted in a perception of security policy augmented by the image of Singapore's proneness to external interventions and communalism (Trocki, 2006). The PAP ruling elite created a social contract with the population with economic growth and security over political autonomy. To this end, Singapore established the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and the National Service (NS), overseen by the Ministry of Defence as a core tool of the state for nation-building (Chong and Chan, 2017). As a multi-ethnic society that is predominantly Chinese and Indian sojourners inherited by the colonial legacy, Singapore had no embryonic notion of nationhood (Barr and Skrbis, 2008, p. 40). The ruling elites were cognizant of Singapore's lack of identity appeals on the possibility of traditional divine rights to rule that was present in Malaysia or the nationalist struggle for independence in Indonesia (Brown, 2003; p.85). With a weak stratum of nationhood among the public, the dilemma that emerged then was the ruling elites gestating an ideology of survival premised upon the Singapore's supposed vulnerabilities by establishing a militarised civilian (Vasu and Loo, p. 26).

Though the SAF remained rudimentary and defensive in posture, Lee Kuan Yew described the deterrence that was sometimes referred to as the analogy of 'poisonous shrimp' (Lee, 1966b). Given the limited resources and the cultural difficulties in recruiting the predominantly Chinese conscript, Lee Kuan Yew needed societal compliance over the requirement of the public to defend its regime. Using the informal approach of analogy, it would enhance its appeal of

strategic vulnerabilities to the public to its rationale for survival. For the ruling elites, the SAF and the NS had two important implications. The SAF, bolstered by the introduction mandatory conscript under the NS amendment Bill played an integral part by linking the state's security to the regime source of legitimacy (Tan, 2015). As it was difficult to gain large conscripts especially from the Chinese ethnicity, mandatory of male conscript would solve Singapore's problems of being undermanned in defending the small-state city (Huxley, 2000). To further institutionalise the conscript, harsh legal proceedings such as fines and penalties were also implemented that structure the individual's behaviour to serve the state.

Perhaps, more significantly, there is another dimension to Singapore's defence effort in nation-building. Although the ultimate aim of NS is to produce a conscription population capable of defending the city-state, its other purpose was also for mass socialisation among ethnics from different class background to further enhance the integration of the nation, thereby nurturing the Singapore national identity among the population (Velayutham, 2007). According to Goh Keng Swee "nothing creates loyalty and national consciousness more speedily and more thoroughly than participation in defence and membership of the armed forces ... The nation-building aspect of defence will be more significant if the participation is spread over all strata of society..." (Goh, 1967). In many ways, militarising the population would informally institutionalise the PAP's own interest to create a multicultural society. By breeding the siege mentality in the NS during their service, it would also invoke the functional need to create a collective defence of the regime to structure the society's behaviour. To attract the brightest young minds, the SAF also distribute a series of prestigious scholarships as a recruiting tool. This is beneficial for the ruling elites as the NS men are able to gain transferable managerial skills that would be useful in the civilian economy and maintain high quality personnel for Singapore's defence (Da Cunha, 1999).

To further consolidate the state-society relations in the collective defence, Lee Kuan Yew promoted the state's perception by linking economic prosperity to defence. In the view of the ruling elites, the Minister of Defence Lim Kin San who replaced Goh Keng Swee in 1968, he mentioned that "without this defence build-up, there may come a time when all the economic growth in the world will not stand us in good stead, because we would be captured and it would be too late to regret that we should have given priority to our defence build-up first (Lim, 1968)". With the common perception for collective defence by the state and the society, the mutual reinforcement becomes institutionalised in Singapore's security policy.

However, the gloomy prospect for Singapore's survival saw a different fate as the regime changed in Southeast Asia. Faced with their own growing domestic problems, the inception of ASEAN in 1967 provided an institutional framework for other members to refrain from interference in members domestic affairs (Acharya, 2014). Through elite concessions, ASEAN provided the institutional platform for the state elites to promote their interest of maintaining regime security as its national interest (Jones, 2010). As Acharya (2008) stated, for Singapore ASEAN provided a layer of security within the region as it acted as vital mediums for its neighbouring countries for socialisation through bilateral and multilateral means to overcome strategic dilemma. To further consolidate its security, the regional security architecture such as FPDA consisting of Australia, New Zealand, UK, and Malaysia enhanced Singapore's security while it strengthened its defence bilateral ties with the U.S. (Emmers, 2010). On the other hand, the decision by the eventual withdrawal of major powers such as the British to withdraw its troops from Asia in 1971 and the U.S. in 1975 from Vietnam intensified the need for an institutional guideline. This has prompted Malaysia and Singapore to equip their own military to be able to defend from external threats.

The creation of these institutions invariably allowed the PAP to organise and facilitate the institutional arrangements through agenda control, so as to systematically favour the party's interests. As Slater (2012) notes, once state power is constructed, it would become a stable source for political stability. With the bureaucracy heavily politicised, political institutions such as SAF and NS are all linked to the Prime Minister's Office became avenues for agenda control that support for the ruling party's ideology could be fostered and disseminated (Rodan, 2006). As Lee Kuan Yew (2000, p. 19) pointed out, the civilian government should have complete autonomy over defensive matters especially on the security policy to maintain military control and professionalism.

In sum, through various political manoeuvres, the PAP's unfettered access to state power has allowed it to expand its power through the creation of various institutions to maintain the state's sovereignty and regime legitimacy. Similar to Malaysia, ruling elites in Singapore inherited a coercive tool institutionalised during the British legacy to be deployed in order to strengthen its grip on the state power. The shocking events of communal tension in the 1960s and the outbreak of leftist unrest ushered into a new nation-building effort in both countries. With little political contestation from other parties, however, the ruling elites in Singapore took a divergent security policy. By ushering a strong ideology of survival to the population, the ruling elites created various security institutions designed to support and enhance their ideology in the spatial territory in order to reinforce the PAP's regime.

4.5 Indonesia- Konfrontasi and Regime Change: The Institutionalisation of the Military's Dominance

In the 1960s, the Cold War reached its peak in Southeast Asia which exacerbated the fragility of the ruling regimes and the competing forces over the control of the state. In the international front, state elites would also be divided

over which ideal social and political order should form in the region (Narine, 2004). Uncertainties over regional politics, Southeast Asia was ripe for political conflict. In 1963, Indonesia strenuously protested against the Malaysia Federation and launched the Konfrontasi (Confrontation) War fearing that Malaysia would be a neo-colonial state (Rahman, 1963: cited in the Malay Mail, 2013). As Sukarno perceived it, the covert operation conducted by the U.S. and its Allies to interfere in Indonesia's politics in the 1957-58 internal rebellion saw that the creation of Federal Malaysia was an extension effort by the Western powers to penetrate Indonesia's sovereignty (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 330). Moreover, Sukarno had a vision that the ideal postcolonial order in Southeast Asia should be a political unification of a Malay Nusantara as a geopolitical concept, free from colonial influences politically and economically (Ariffin, 2015). The Philippines on the other hand also protested against the Federation, claiming that Sabah as part of its territory based on its historical links of the Sultan of Sulu (Noble, 1976). Such uncertainties in Southeast Asian politics would disrupt the political order in Southeast Asia. The U.S. and its Allies were alarmed with the growing influence of the PKI and its grassroots appeals with 20 million members that would pose a serious threat to the regional political order (Anderson, 1983). For the Western powers, Sukarno's gradual radicalization towards the left saw the greater urgency in backing up the non-communist political forces (Mietzner, 2008).

On the other hand, the policy of Konfrontasi launched by Sukarno as a cast to mobilise the social forces while simultaneously creating check and balance against the military's power. As Indonesia's politics were increasingly contentious, the ideological clash between the leftist/nationalist and the TNI and the deepening politicisation of the military, concomitantly heightened tension between the social forces (Anwar, 1998, p. 482). The struggle for political autonomy would eventually transcend to into international struggles between states for regional order. In order to avoid a political pitfall that was teetering on

the brink of clash between social forces, the Konfrontasi was adopted as a rally around the flag to provide a nationalist common ground to unite the political elites in an anti-colonial struggle in the international domain (Anwar, 1998). However, with limited support from the military, Indonesia only launched small-scale military skirmishes as Sukarno was concerned that the major powers would openly intervene in the fight against his regime (Mackie, 1974).

As Pierson (2004) posits, when power relations are levelled between social forces, it opens up a contentious political space for social forces to gain authority, termed as 'critical juncture' for an institutional change. By the 1960's, power relations were levelled in Indonesia as the PKI managed to gain political influences in the public power and its popularity with the support of Sukarno to appeal to the masses as an alternative vision for Indonesia (Bertrand, 2004, p.37). However, the most threatening to the military was the PKI's attempt to penetrate in the already factionalised military fuelled antagonism which would create a precondition to the 30 September movement (Robinson, 2018). The creation of the 'fifth force' authorised by Sukarno in arming the PKI militias which made up of peasants and armed workers infuriated the military leadership as this would give the PKI coercive capacity to challenge the army (Roosa, 2006).

However, it was the PKI's attempt for land reform to redistribute to the landless peasant which threatened the military's economic position that drove the tension between the social forces (Melvin, 2018). After declaring the martial law in 1957, the military's influences in the domestic politics vastly increased the prerogatives of the TNI. The subsequent nationalisation of the economy institutionalised the military's role in the economy and in national development as it took control by appointing some of the high-ranking military officers in these various foreign-owned companies that could pose as a challenge Sukarno's power (White, 2012). This would also be an important source for a network of patronage as the military used these economic resources as a source of income and an informal form to support the military in the deteriorating economic climate

(McCulloch, 2003). Moreover, the growth in population, mismanagement of government resources, and the U.S. economic sanctions hampered the economic condition in Indonesia causing strenuous relations between the state and the society (Drakely, 2005). This would not only limit the military's income, but also create tensions between the PKI and the local rural elites who feared that the land reform would lead to the loss of their assets.

4.5.1 The New Order- The Institutionalisation of the Military

Political conflict between these powerful social forces erupted in 1965 in Indonesia. The coup attempt instigated by the PKI in the *Gerakan 30 September* (G30S/PKI) 30 September movement saw the murders of Council of Generals (CIA-RSS, 1968). This would serve another critical juncture that saw an institutional change in Indonesia's politics, which aspired the military to grab the political power from the civilians. Although the G30S has been contentiously debated among historians as to whether it was instigated by the PKI or a faction of the military (Anderson, 1983; Cribb, 2001; Rinakit, 2005; Roosa, 2006; Melvin, 2018; Robinson, 2018), nevertheless the coup attempt saw a counter-coup in October 1 by the military led by General Suharto that led the military rise to prominence. Sanctioned by the U.S. and the Western powers, and a coalition of political allies from major political parties, students and rural elites, the TNI conducted a massive violence through the mobilisation of paramilitary Muslim organisation across Indonesia (FRUS, 1958b; FRUS, 1964). The brutal crackdown saw the purge of PKI and its members between 1965-66 which turned into one of the bloodiest Communist campaigns in Southeast Asia's history (Roosa, 2006). Suharto's effort to sweep into power was welcomed by the Western investors in favour of the left-leaning Sukarno regime. Amid the political decay, it provided the political opportunity for the military to ascend as the de-

facto power that saw Sukarno formally ceding his power to Suharto in 1968 (Rinakit, 2005).

The displacement of the existing institutional arrangements saw the removal of democracy. The consolidation of the state power saw the forged relations between the conservative elites and the military, although the latter became the most dominant social force. With the military in power, state's security policies are organised to systematically favour them while they exercised full control over the coercive apparatus over their political opponents (Croissant, Kuehn and Lorenz, 2012). In order to ensure stability and the legitimacy of a military ruling, the New Order guided with the Democracy Pancasila was implemented by the military as the new state ideology, replacing Sukarno's Guided democracy (Vickers, 2013). More importantly, it also saw the military be formally involved in the civilian politics thereby extending their political functions as 'dwifungsi' dual functions of the military. In 1969, the election Bill saw the institutionalisation of the military to formally participate in the economic activities (Suryadinata, 1987).

Under this doctrine, the military would not only play an active role in defence, but it also institutionalised their functions that privileged access to policymaking responsible for socio-economic development (Anderson, 1983). Under Suharto, the regime cleared the radical populism and would pave way for financial aids and economic investments to open up the market capitalisation in Indonesia (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). As Mietzner (2008) writes, the long duration of economic decline, political cleavages and social tension saw that the ascending military rule was accepted by the public as the entrenching praetorian rule. As Robison and Hadiz (2004, p.40) argued, "the re-engagement with global capitalism was the means by which he replaced the former ramshackle and bankrupted regime with a more efficient and centralised form of authoritarian rule and extended the foundations of that vast system of state capitalism, constructed by Soekarno but never consolidated."

This would also shift the military's role from regional expansionism in Sukarno's era to instead focus on internal stability (Anwar, 1998). Under Suharto, political participations were restricted while the military became the integral part of the New Order, providing security and controlling the society through surveillance and coercion (Aspinall, 2005). Consequently, the deepening political process of the military as a guarantor for political stability as well as an economic player institutionalised the military's political power. As a result of Suharto's economic policy, foreign investment increased in the period to encourage income opportunity for the military to create state-owned enterprises to supplement the state's expenditure to support the military's operations. The regional commanders were encouraged to forge business alliances with business elites to provide extractive contributions to the state (Mietzner, 2009, p.53). With the newfound authority, it did not only impact the military's institutional standing, but also provided the military's growing incentives to explore their influences in business activities with unfettered access from other social forces (Lee, 2008). "Political order and economic development", writes Schwarz (2000, p. 29) "were two side of the same coins".

With a strong centralised political figure and a military loyal to the regime, it allowed Suharto to further absorbed the national unity coercively as well as financially through patronage. Having gained control of the state power, Suharto and his inner circle did not feel the need to share power for formulating policies with the civilians in return for acquiescence as the military had dominated every aspect of the government (Crouch, 2007). Suharto and his cronies began to slowly assert their power to marginalised rival military factions by revising the political system. Closest allies were given important cabinet roles by Suharto to control the administration as the Head of state and the government, while the key cabinet positions such as Ministry of Defence and Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs and the State Secretariat (Mietzner, 2008, p. 52). More importantly, the military imposed control over internal security matters through

the Kopkamtib (Operational Control to Restore Security and Order) which allowed them to detain regime opponents. The practice of distributing patronage came to be institutionalised as routine practice for the ruling elites.

Territorial military units often relied on the off-budget activities in business activities to maintain the upkeep of the military instead of relying on state resources (Aspinall and Klinken, 2011). As the military has massive personnel and under-equipped, they were encouraged to raise their own funds to ensure they can maintain their operations especially in remote areas (Made and Supriatma, 2013). Business contracts were distributed from Central Jakarta for developmental budgets to local governments, which then allocated these funds to various projects (Anderson, 1983). Politically, this gave Suharto effective control of the military which provided access to state power to influence the allocation of state contracts, mining and fishery rights, and forestry concessions (Robison, 2009, p. 251-270). Further, Suharto also employed a military promotion system and patronage politics through the divide and conquer rule to keep the military internally divided while his power slowly grew (Croissant, Kuehn and Lorenz, 2012). Favoured military close to Suharto were also appointed as governors and leaders in the regional territory. This gave him the opportunity to maintain the regional military's loyalty as patrons in return granting access to rent-seeking economic activities.



Source: SIPRI Military Index, 2019

Figure 4.1

To ensure that the territorial military and business groups maintained their loyalty to his regime, they were instructed to affiliate with Golkar, which strengthened Suharto's political machinery (Honna, 2006). According to Ward (1974, p. 83), by early 1970s Golkar would become "the greatest source of patronage, greatest provider of facilities, greatest distributor of offices, greatest procurer and supplier of finance". This can be seen from figure 5.1 that the military expenditure began to slowly descend as Suharto consolidate more power in the military before the fall of Suharto in 1998. With this intricate network of influence, Suharto institutionalised the arrangements on networks of power from the military, business elites as well as the bureaucrats to attain access to state resources. With the military being in power in the local provincials and territories, crackdown on opposition movements and counter-insurgencies that were deemed as threats were often carried out under Suharto's supervision, often using excessive coercive force to maintain political order (Crouch, 1979).

To marginalise the influence of the militants and incorporate civilian supporters, Suharto infrastructurally revised the election system, political parties

and the parliaments in such a way that other political forces could not compete with the executive office for power (Schwarz, 2000, p. 30). Suharto and his allies introduced the Golkar party, organised from a functional group of military personnel into a pro-regime party, which all civil servants were required to join. Golkar would be an important political vehicle for Suharto as a quasi-party with an institutional structure dominated by the military rather than upstaging them, while providing an outlet for non-military supporters (Tomsa, 2008). Opposing parties were forced to fuse into two government sponsored bodies, with the existing Islamic groups to join the PPP (United Development Party), while the nationalist groups were pushed to join the new nationalist party, the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) with the military overseeing their activities that prohibits them from establishing below the district level (Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003). Though the institutionalisation of these parties were limited, it would also allow for communal elites to manoeuvre as the New Order gradually weakened.

Nevertheless, instead of consolidating into a strong party institution that was present in Malaysia and Singapore, it saw three separate institutions in the executive, party and the military for power. According to Slater (2010b), this institutional bifurcation of the civilian and military support was fragile as the New Order did not enjoy steadfast coalitional backing that was present in Malaysia or Singapore. Instead of trusting the military and the party institution to create a strong state institution, the military and the elites were treated as potential rivals (Aspinall, 2005). This would gradually weaken his coalition as the elites gradually fragmented focused on purveying patronages to maintain faction considerations.

4.5.2 *Konfrontasi and ASEAN as a Protection Pact for Regime*

As the Konfrontasi was a strategic bifurcation in light of the ideological battle during the Cold War for influence in the region. With the fall of Sukarno,

Indonesia abandoned the Konfrontasi policy during Suharto sought for the normalisation of its relationship with Malaysia. Through a series of concession, the three states namely Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines signed the Manila Accord in 1963 to prevent from interference in the domestic politics which would later institutionalised under ASEAN in 1967 (Acharya, 2014). Amid great uncertainty in the region and Sukarno's fall from power, the new military regime led by Suharto saw the shift in Indonesia's political expansionism to focus on internal stability (Lee, 2009). ASEAN formally provided an institutional framework for the original signatories (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines) which saw the regional elites to form a protection pact that allowed the newly independent region to develop the logic of security in the region (Narine, 2004). Through the recognition of sovereignty as the principle core of this framework, it provided a non-binding legal institution that authenticates a political order in the region for state to not intervene in each other's territorial space. This allowed the dominant ruling elites to exercise their autonomy to focus on nation-building to solidify their ruling in the domestic to maintain legitimacy. One of the main principles was to maintain their sovereignty in the existing political order was the principle of non-interference which Acharya (2014, p.56-7) writes "can only be understood in the context of the domestic security concerns of the ASEAN states".

With the support of the Western powers, the founding of ASEAN was seen by member states as an effort to protect the states ruling elites from managing its domestic order. According to Ayoob (1995), states insecurity emanates from its contestation in the domestic as different groups compete for autonomy. Moreover, the inception of ASEAN was an expression of collective actions to the survival of its capitalist regimes to defend the prevailing social order from interferences within members (Jones, 2010). With the common goals of containment of Communist from the capitalist states, the aim of ASEAN was to reduce the spill-over effect of domestic conflicts especially ethnic, political and

ideological that would pose challenge to regime legitimacy (Acharya, 2014). This would also allow the dominant political forces in the ASEAN to continue dominating its ruling give rise to the authoritarian regimes to consolidate their power in the domestic politics often through coercive force. In his memoir, Singapore's then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew explained about ASEAN:

“The unspoken objective was to gain strength through solidarity ahead of the power vacuum that would come with an impending British and later a possible U.S. withdrawal . . . We had a common enemy – the communist threat in guerrilla insurgencies, backed by North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union. We needed stability and growth to counter and deny the communists the social and economic conditions for revolutions.” (Lee, 2000, p. 329-330).

For Suharto, ASEAN played an integral role to his regime as the principle of non-intervention allowed Indonesia to use coercive forces to maintain political order. With relations normalised between Indonesia and Malaysia, Suharto quickly consolidated the regional territory through populist mobilisation and coercive integration by emphasising order and stability as the necessary precondition for Indonesia's economic growth (Honna, 2005). However, recurring secessionist movements began to challenge Suharto's regime legitimacy. According to Anwar (1998), these secessionist movements in Aceh, West Papua and East Timor were viewed as a threat to the idea of Indonesia as a nation-state as well as to its territorial integrity. Military crackdowns and counter-insurgencies were deployed in these areas, strengthening the need to maintain the needs for non-interference from other states in its domestic affairs (Narine, 2007).

For Indonesia, as its history suggests in Chapter 3, these regional territories were vital to the ruling elites as these territories have historically been exploited by the colonial powers of its vast natural resources. In the case of Aceh, the GAM (Aceh Free Movement) was formed by a separationist group after the disagreement between the central state over religious laws in 1976. Though Aceh

became a special regional status similar to Yogyakarta, this arrangement was revoked by the central government when Suharto came into power.

More pertinently, Aceh became a critical value to Indonesia's political economy when the new discovery of gas reserves in 1971 by Exxon-Mobil. To exploit these reserves, Exxon-Mobil entered a joint concession with Pertamina, the military run state-owned enterprise for a joint operation that would generate U.S. \$2-\$3 billion revenue yearly (Dawood and Sjafrizal, 1989). Political grievances grew among the Acehnese elites when royalties were paid to the central government as opposed to the local government (Ross, 2005). However, with the Western powers support for regional stability, it allowed the military regime to consolidate these regional territories which are made up of different ethnic to be absorbed into a centralized state under the control of Jakarta (Bertrand, 2004). For the political elites who have established themselves in power, these intense economic interests over these resources certainly carried a political motivation in maintaining its control.

On the other hand, the annexation of East Timor to Indonesia was important to both domestic and international players. The ASEAN bloc sanctioned Indonesia's military intervention in East Timor following the decolonisation of Portugal in 1975. East Timor began its decolonisation process in 1974 when Portugal's fascist regime was overthrown by the leftist military coup. Fearing that East Timor would fall into the Communist bloc which would pose a threat to Suharto's New Order which could potentially destabilised the region, Indonesia's military began infiltrating the territory led by General Moerdani and eventually invaded which saw the annexation of this territory in 1976 (Bertrand, 2004). For Suharto, the annexation of East Timor was critical to Indonesia's domestic politics due to its vast oil reserves, as it was rocked by economic mismanagement, bad foreign debts and the near bankruptcy of Pertamina (state-owned oil company). As the regime relied on steady stream of patronages to maintain social order, the oil shock in 1973 would smoothen the state to provide basic

infrastructure in the rural but at the same time to provide state funded projects to reduce animosity among the middle class (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). For the military, the East Timor operation was critical to its military budget as it relied on the U.S. military assistance to supply military equipment to modernize and provide defence in its territory (Crouch, 2007).

For Indonesia, the end of Konfrontasi was integral to its foreign policies as its regional problems were also a source of management against domestic problems, causing a spill-over to its foreign relations. With the meteoric rise of the PKI, it inevitably exacerbated the communal tension in Indonesia. Though, this provided a regime favoured by the Western powers, it also inevitably created an opportunity for an illiberal military regime to intervene and formally institutionalise its power in the domestic politics. What appeared to be a territorial sovereignty only insofar as to manage the domestic social conflict from these states to fall from the growing communal tension, which saw the rise in authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia (Jones, 2012a). The formation of ASEAN was perceived as an institutional framework designed to protect from other members from interfering in its domestic politics. It also was designed as a protection pact for the elites to deal with the social cleavages that was commonly related with communist clash in their own societies.

4.6 Philippines- The martial law and Regime Change: The Institutionalisation of the Military

Democratic governance from 1946 to 1972 marked the period of the Philippines oligarchic democracy, which did not lead to any significant changes to policy reforms and institutional changes. The oligarchs faced no serious challenges as the leftist rebellion was largely quelled in the 1950's. For the population, the Nacionalista and Liberal parties were virtually indistinguishable as both parties served as machines to distribute patronages in which kinship and

personal ties were used to access state resources (Lee, 2014). However, it was the election of Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 that played a significant role in the Philippines politics. When Marcos bid for a second term in 1969, there was a growing discontent in the society over the political system that was dominated by the clientelist oligarchs (Putzel, 1999). Marcos faced multiple domestic unrest that was consequential to Philippine politics.

In order to appease the social anxiety on the economic condition, Marcos took a similar approach of Magsaysay and initiated several rural programs centred on developing the infrastructure and civic programs that was financed from foreign borrowings (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p.197). During this period, the AFP was primarily controlled by the Congress, the President and the local oligarchs with the military appointments used as part of a bargaining chip for their own self-interest (Anderson, 1998, p.213). Even though the military was deployed during Magsaysay's administration that initiated the deployment for civic programs, their access to power was limited after his Presidency. Nonetheless, it was under Marcos that saw the expansion of military's activities by assuming a greater role in the civilian sector as part of its nation-building efforts (Hernandez, 1985). Inevitably, this would also be laid as a groundwork for further military involvement that is parallel to Indonesia.

On the economic side, the Philippines was hit by high inflation and unemployment. To reduce its reliance on rice imports, Marcos introduced farming programs as part of his land reform program to increase smaller farmers' rice and corn production to meet the growing population needs (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p.197). On the other hand, despite the promotion of new crops, smaller farmers that harvested corn and rice were affected as a result of the fluctuation on commodity prices while landed elites continued to produce for the narrow base of agricultural products as a consequence to meet the higher international demand for sugar, coconut and forestry products (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p. 197). The rising cost of imports and the inability of smaller

farmers to meet the demand affected the economic progress. However, the Philippines economy had suffered from decline as a result of heavy financial burden from foreign borrowings at the assumption that debts could be repaid by export earnings (Putzel, 1992, p. 120).

At the same time, it became clear that after the Huk rebellion that land reform was one of the priority concerns. However, even though land reforms were introduced in 1955 and 1963, the law was riddled with loopholes, allowing landowners to retain their land from being redistributed to the farmers (Putzel, 1992). With the institutional arrangements largely designed for the benefits of the oligarchs, it also possessed the coercive tool as well the economic capacity to maintain this political order (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005). After a period of chronic corruption hampered by the oligarchic politics, it aggravated the class tension which led to a new leftist movement inspired by the Maoist Communist group called the New People's Army (NPA) emerged (Quimpo, 2014, p. 124). Whereas previously the Huk rebellion were only focused at the periphery of Luzon, the NPA protest was an urban uprising (Timberman, 1991). At the same time, the Marcos administration also faced an armed separatist of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the South of the Philippines, Mindanao where the Muslim secessionist during the 1970s MNLF waged war to gain autonomy of the island from the Christian ruled government (Hedmann, 2001). The MNLF also had an estimate of around 30,000 men ready to challenge the northern government (Molloy, 1985). Although it was never fully proven, the Marcos government claimed that the MNLF and the NPA formed an alliance that would threaten the stability and governance of the Philippines, which was a precondition for Marcos to declare a martial law in 1972 (Molloy, 1985).

On top of the urban unrest and the rise of second wave Communist uprising, it was the intra-elite polarisation that would exacerbate the political condition. The 1969 election between Marcos and the Nacionalista party against Osmeña and the Liberal party would unleash a wave of political turmoil between

elites until it was abated with the arrest of the Liberal Party leaders during the martial law (Lieberman, 2015, p. 63). The traditional power of the landed elites was already waning as a result of post-war economic policy to increase the manufacturing industry in its effort to shift the economy from agricultural economy (Doronilla, 1992, p.94). However, with Marcos attempt to further diversify the economy, it also gave prominence to new technocratic oligarchs (Hutchcroft, 1991). In an effort to consolidate both economic and political power, both party elites depended on the patronage that were passed down to their clients in an effort to gather votes(Quimpo, 2005). This would determine the control of local and provincial offices, with the local elites firm grip on the workforce as well as its own private armies (Hedman and Sidel, 2000). The intense political rivalries between the elites caused further fractions between the society and state.

4.6.1 Institutionalising the AFP for Nation-State Building

With intense political competition and partisan politicking between the elites, combined with the endemic domestic unrest from below, gave the window of opportunity for acquiescence for Marcos to initiate an institutional change. As competition for resource grew intense, Marcos chose the path of militarisation. In order to retain power beyond his second term, Marcos declared a martial law in 1972 with the support of his elite cronies and a faction of the military to subdue the opposition elites under the pretext of rising communist insurgency that serves as a critical juncture in Philippine politics (Quimpo, 2008, p. 55). During an interview, Senator Jose Enrile who was the Defence Secretary in 1972, ceded that the martial law “in the initial stages, we must emasculate all the leaders in order to control the situation... and afterwards, when we have quieted the society, we started releasing them (Enrile, cited in Romero, 2018).” Whereas previously power resided in the local politics, the martial law led to the consolidation of power to central Manila (Kang, 2002).

To further enhance his regime legitimacy, Marcos used the legal apparatus by introducing the 1973 Constitution Law to institutionalise the Presidential power, while the Senate was abolished denying any civilian oversight for policy processes (Hernandez, 2006). With the Constitution greatly augmented his power resources, it provided Marcos with the legal basis to centralise the networks of patronages to the military and his close oligarchic elites by redistributing the state power and the economy (Hutchcroft, 1991, p.443). In addition, whereas the pork barrel was often used by officeholders to create a patronage-client network, Marcos also used other institutionalised channels to circumvent the oligarchs' power in Congress by introducing other institutional platforms such as the Barrio Funds and the Presidential Arm for Community Development (Doronilla, 1992, p.123-149). This power shift gave the institutional imperatives for Marcos to consolidate and establish his control in the government (Hedman and Sidel, 2000). With the legal and coercive apparatus firmly gripped by Marcos that was similar to Indonesia's Suharto, it changed the dynamics of civilian-military relations while restraining the democratic values of civilian oversight towards the military (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008, p. 159).

Above all, it also marked the destruction of fractious elite democracy to authoritarianism, shifting the security policy to domestic security with the AFP support as an organisational weaponry to subdue his political opponents in order to maintain political autonomy (Hernandez, 2006). The power symmetry of the military was at its peak during the Marcos administration which defined the civil-military relations in the Philippines (Cruz, 2011). Marcos set an institutional arrangement with the military to secure his position while the military gained access to state power. After 1972, the military replaced politicians as chief executives of local government as well as the civilian positions making the AFP partners to the regime and as distributors of patronage with the prerogative of the President's Office in implementing agrarian programs and community development (Kang, 2002). Put differently, the new group of patronages under

Marcos not only challenged the old political order, it also enhanced the President with absolute control to dictate the state's budget to be redistributed to his own cronies.

On the security realm, the strength of internal insurgencies also grew in strength whereby the combination of the two main groups, the CPP-NPA and the MNLF increased from 2,300 personnel to 15,978 by the end of 1985 were further conducive to the justification in maintaining the martial law (Office of the Minister of National Defence 1986; *cited in* Miranda and Ciron, 1987). The declaration of martial law convinced the MNLF that a peace settlement was no longer possible as they perceived that the Marcos program in creating a new society was a form of repression (Mercado, 1984). Whereas previously the bureaucracy was subordinated to the Senate, the lack of veto from the martial law provided the AFP the political autonomy to advance a particular policy agenda. This provided the military with the political prerogatives to formulate security policies with no civilian oversight to provide check and balance especially which saw the increase in defence spending (Hernandez, 1990; p. 125). This resulted in the increase in military personnel from the integration of the Philippine Constabulary, which is now part of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to around 200,00 personnel in 1984 (Military Balance, 1985). It further expanded the military's role as a coercive apparatus to quell on the elites with their private armies from interfering in Philippine politics.

Coupled with domestic threats looming in the Philippines, the AFP saw its military spending to be some of the highest during the period of Marcos administration. The early part of the martial law also marked the regime's attempt to improve the AFP defence capabilities to project and enhanced defence posture (Cruz de Castro, 2005). Based on the SIPRI military index data, the Philippines military expenditure grew exponentially between 1972 until 1986 when the

martial law was partially lifted although shown in figure 4.1². Indeed, Marcos compensated the military's support by allowing his military cronies to graft state funds for their personal interest. This was apparent which saw high ranking AFP officials bought multimillion pesos houses in Manila, as well as holding positions in state-owned enterprises despite their earning salaries of 5000 pesos or less (Aquino, 1987, p. 25). To maintain the support of the military and his cronies, the state's foreign debt also increased from 1.6 billion pesos in 1972 to 6.2 billion pesos in 1976 (Wurfel, 1977).




Figure 4.2 Source: SIPRI Military Index 2019

On the other hand, the U.S. support would also further legitimise the martial law. In a memorandum of conversation between President Richard Nixon and Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo, with the President of the U.S. discussing on the situation in the Philippines quoting “I told the people here we are not going to lecture you. You can't have anarchy.” (FRUS, 1973). For the U.S. counterpart, the outbreak of Muslim secessionist rebellion in Mindanao and the

² The SIPRI Military Index data does not include 1975 as the data was only available to the highest-ranking government.

resurgence of Communist in the urban Manila could potentially disrupt its economic interest and the regional order (Celoza, 1997). Rather, the U.S. provided military aid and military finance sale which further strengthened the Marcos administration to increase the military budget. However, with no civilian oversight, the financial aid provided by the U.S. was syphoned by Marcos to support his military and business cronies as a form of regime maintenance (Chambers, 2014). With Marcos security guaranteeing to protect the U.S. interest in the land as well as the U.S. needing The Philippines for the Subic and Clark bases, the U.S. further funded the Philippines with military aid costing around US\$180 million between 1970-1975, which was a substantial amount to the AFP (Goodno 1991, p. 68). Subsequently, the U.S. reduced its efforts to push for democratic land reforms that have benefitted both the local elites and the Americans (You, 2015, p. 79). With the power reside over Marcos and his cronies, this limits the access for other group of elites to extract state resources.

In sum, the condition of Philippines domestic politics ignited a regime change to be an authoritarian state. With the elites increasingly polarised and the continued growth of domestic unrest, the Philippines political opposition was severely weakened and through his skilful manipulation of using state coercive power to initiate a regime change, which saw the breaking down of Philippines democracy (Anderson, 1988). Much like Indonesia, the military in the Philippines played an important role during the critical juncture that limit civilian oversight in containing the military influence in the politics. This would also give the political autonomy to influence its security policy. With the consolidation of power in the central, Marcos disrupted the network for power of the old oligarchy, which also gave rise to the new technocratic elites that were in support of Marcos.

4.7 Conclusion

To recapitulate, this chapter shows how that the different trajectories of security threats saw a similar yet different forms of regime changes in Southeast Asia. Consistent with the findings, we observe that in all case studies, at the apex of Cold War, power struggles between the domestic social forces saw an institutional change. Though, the magnitude of domestic problems varies and the differences in political rationalities in each state, on closer inspection, these security problems imposed upon societies in Southeast Asia were a product of its historical structures. In all of the case studies, the source of security threats was based on the breakdown of elite cohesion which reflected how conflicts between social forces inhabit states and how it besieges them. This period would also mark a critical juncture for Southeast Asia which saw the changes in power relations between the social forces in the states. One common denominator that would appear in Southeast Asia was the rise of authoritarian regimes that set a path dependence for a transformation of institutional arrangements that led to the consolidation of state power to certain elite groups. Through these insecurities, the regimes focused on building political stability within its territorial space to maintain legitimacy. This is where the similarities depart in all these cases. Though with differing conclusion, this chapter therefore find that the trajectory of authoritarian regimes led to different security priorities. Different forms of authoritarian rules were created that saw the different segment of society supporting the institutional arrangements.

To maintain domestic order, dominant social forces used different state apparatus to stabilize and strengthen its political position by implementing their ideas, shaping specific institutional arrangements to gain regime legitimacy. This chapter reiterates that the changes in power dynamics between political forces allowed the dominant forces to shape the state's overall contour of the security policy into specific policy outcomes. This gave access to the winning dominant

social forces the political capacity to formulate the policy agenda designed to protect its power from other domestic social forces. With the specific dominant political forces in power, a state's national security concept conditioned itself with the particularities of certain institutional arrangements that are unique to the states, shaped by its historical legacies. The formulation of national security concept is dependent on how the power relations between political forces perceive to protect their own interest and the bargaining process to mobilise state resources to implement the policy outcomes.

Though power relations between the civilian and military vary to a different degree in each state, a pattern emerges in the case of Indonesia and the Philippines. Specifically, under Suharto and Marcos, the military plays a huge role in maintaining internal security operations. On the other hand, in Singapore and Malaysia, the civilian elites continue to dominate the national security policy agenda with the military subordinated to the political regime. However, this is where the path diverges. In the case of Malaysia, with threats deriving from communal tension and elite division, the institutional arrangements revealed that the politics of security in Malaysia was established to improve the Malay condition.

This would also lead to the rise in the elite driven regime to focus on its regime legitimacy. In the case of both Malaysia and Singapore, ethnic anxieties, fracture among the class line, and the poor economic condition left by the burdens of the British colonial policy saw the institutionalisation of a one-party state regime that was crucial to control the policy agenda. In both Malaysia and Singapore, the civilian government managed to consolidate power while military in both states were subordinated to the government, acting as a tool for the ruling elites. This gave precedence for the civilian elites to control the agenda setting to produce a security policy designed to protect specific social forces that was defined during the cleavages.

In Malaysia, the presence of domestic problems lies along the class which transcend into ethnic animosities due to the increasing class gap between ethnics. The 1969 riot saw for a change in regime which allowed the consolidation of the Malay dominated UMNO party to access state power, focusing on developing the security of the Malays socio-economic condition. Malaysia's security policy was designed to enhance the regime legitimacy as well as to further institutionalise UMNO as a party state by providing security to protect the Malay position both politically and economically. The institutional depth provided the ruling elites to maintain its policy agenda in reducing domestic conflict along the racial and class lines. This would also increase the nation-building effort in Malaysia by creating specific linkages between the government's economic policy to the security policy.

In the case of Singapore, the PAP enjoyed political autonomy within the polity after its breakup with Malaysia allowed the ruling elites to formulate its security policy designed to strengthen the PAP ruling. With the PAP in power, it had unfettered access to link its security policy on nation-state building efforts to further consolidate the fragmented society. The PAP's decision to militarising the civilians through the mandated NS conscript which further institutionalised the perception of a small city-state for survival. This allowed for the PAP to link its security policy to enhance national unity against foreign and domestic threats. As the state survival is dependent upon the regime survival, the ruling government focused on integrating the state ideology that is embedded in the society.

In contrast, in the case of Indonesia, the rising conflict between the political elites and the military elites and the ideological clash initiated for the military to intervene and formally institutionalise its position in the politics. With the military historically as an autonomous institution, the GS30 movement provided the window of opportunity for the military to intervene which led to the shift in security objectives of maintaining domestic stability and to reduce the rise of social forces conflict along the class line. Whereas the civilian elites dominated

the politics in Malaysia and Singapore, the military was in the position of dominance. The policy decision-making was concentrated in the military which gave them control over security policy designed to protect its own political interest. The ideological function of the military for civilian oversight and for security inevitably increase its role in the nation-state building efforts, further justifying its role in the politics.

Whereas Malaysia and Singapore saw the rise of party dominance controlling the formulation of security policies, in the case of Indonesia it gave rise to a personalistic regime which saw Suharto creating his own political cronies that saw the destruction of democratic regime. Moreover, in the height of the Cold War, the U.S. support for a more friendly regime gave the military the permission to respond the domestic challenges especially on quelling the communist threats with brutal crackdowns. Similarly, the Philippines on the other hand saw the growth of personalistic regime which gave rise to a strong president with the support of the military. This would also lead to the divergence in the state's perception conceptualized in its security policies. The increasing political contestation between the elites and the society in the Philippines saw the breakdown of a democratic regime. However, this is where the Philippines departs from Indonesia. In Indonesia, the regime change was driven by the rise in domestic unrest caused by the elite polarization along ethnic and class unrest. With a strong support from the military, the ruling elites declared a martial law and used coercive acts to suppress opposing parties. Indonesia formally diverted its attention on security in maintaining domestic order while limiting the involvement of the opposing oligarchs. In the Philippines on the other hand, the intense domestic unrest was caused by the lack of elite cohesion. Although the communist movement remained large in the archipelagic state, it was the vigorous electoral competition between the two main parties led to the rise of Marcos authoritarian regime.

Despite this, there are some similarities in the formation of authoritarianism in both Indonesia and the Philippines. In both states, the military became major players in the politics. With their roles expanded during Marcos regime, the military became an influential partner in supporting his regime as a coercive apparatus, which institutionalised the military in the policy decision-making process. Sharing the same purview with Indonesia, the U.S. decision to allow its regional ally to declare a martial law and the use of military for crackdowns on communism strengthened Marcos's regime legitimacy.

On the external front, the formation of ASEAN also saw the institutionalisation of a regional order on the basis of non-interference, which provided the regional elites a protection pact which would allow the elites to consolidate its power in the domestic to maintain political order to boost its economic development while it provide regional stability. More so, the importance of regime legitimacy resides on the collaboration of a protection pact which enhances the principal of non-interferences.

Chapter 5:

The Transition of Political Regimes and the Impact on National Security Policies in Southeast Asia

5.1 Introduction

The period of 1980's and 1990's was a period of transformative government in Southeast Asia. While the end of the Cold War saw a dramatic rise of a capitalist state, it also brought new challenges to the political legitimacy of these authoritarian regimes in various forms. For Southeast Asia, security policy expands beyond the protection from invasion, but also to protect from opposing groups on access to state power. As these early security policies were successful in maintaining political order, historical legacies pave the way for certain institutions (civilian or military) to sink deep roots. It would also become its source of insecurity as globalisation promoted waves of democratisation, challenging the legitimacy of the regimes in Southeast Asia. To differing extent, as states become the provider of security to its citizens, conflictual interest would also develop in the domestic, ethnic makeups and class divisions that were brought forth from their legacies on how they implement their policies would also become contested.

In light of the context, it is helpful for us to recall and link together the points made in previous chapters. In the last two chapters, we analysed how Southeast Asia showcases a tremendous diversity on the social conflict and the development of political institutions. States came to emerge from the struggle for political autonomy contested by different social forces in the domestic for order. While the dust of elite conflicts settled, these enduring power struggles for legitimacy between social forces saw the formation of states informed by their historical antecedents. In the previous chapter, we also saw that the rise of

dominant social forces that controls the policy agenda for national security. It would also give rise to highly distinctive forms of regime.

To this end, this chapter aims to reiterate that the central theme of the thesis that security policy is constructed, pursued, and legitimated by powerful social forces. The purpose of this chapter is to explain how domestic institutions distribute power, and how actors exercise their power within the institutional context. This chapter will analyse and explore the differences in the role of civilian and military institutions and its impact towards national security policies. This chapter extends the arguments that state formation is crucial to explaining the set preferences and shape perceptions in policy decision-making that is path dependent to its institutional legacies. In every case, it illustrates how past institutional choices conferring power on some actors provide justification for different sets of institutional arrangements for winning group to promote their interest to the protection of nation-state. Debates, negotiations, conflict over power and resource allocations that are determined by the state reflect on the past model as a tool for legitimation to implement national security policies.

This chapter poses to answer the main question of the thesis: how do domestic institutions influence political actors with regards to security policy behaviours? This question helps bring to the fore the inherent tensions on how states attempt to securitise certain issues vary and the processes involved becomes more complex. Supported by previous chapters, this chapter aims to pinpoint how the underlying sources of diverging trajectories of institutional set up during the critical junctures distributes power to political actors, and how it reinforces each other. It examines how security policy in Southeast Asia is subjected to the dominant social forces and how they impose their will to protect their source of power. This chapter puts to test on the institutional capacity to withstand the multi-faceted challenges in security. One of the main objectives of this chapter is to examine how domestic politics continues to play a major role in the development of its security policies which have been central for the creation

of a stable state. In all states, economic development has often been portrayed as a case for securitisation by dominant actors.

The first section will discuss how the historical context of Malaysia and Singapore paved the way for a dramatic transformation of the states and their formulation of security policies. This section pays close attention to the specific domestic makeups on how dominant political parties present in both states emerged to dominate their domestic power structures, both states began to institutionalise their political perceptions to protect their political legitimacy. The second section will discuss the case of Indonesia and the Philippines in a similar manner. It shows how the presence of different social forces for power highlights the state's inability to provide security and public goods. In discussing these selected case studies, the chapter identifies how the existent of divergent domestic interest put forward by dominant social forces would create long-term repercussions of these institutional arrangements and how it affects the relations between the state and society.

In what follows, this chapter will ultimately enhance the core of the thesis that state autonomy is defined by different historical legacies which influences how actors and state institutions shaped security policies. Political institutions determine the constraints and incentives of political actors to determine state's security policies.

5.2 Malaysia and Singapore: The Dominance of the Party State in Security Policy

By the 1980's, both Malaysia and Singapore enjoyed economic development while remaining autocratic, dominated by the seemingly strong ruling party. These strong regimes emerged from the historical conditions by broader processes of geopolitical and economic development inherited by the British colonies. Despite the similarity in state power and actors' capacities,

different sets of actors' exercise power in different ways. In the case of Malaysia, the abandonment of consociationalism in favour of an authoritarian regime after 1969 riot saw the consolidation of political power of UMNO within the ruling coalition by co-opting most opposition parties, thereby transforming the Alliance into a dominant party state of BN (Crouch, 1996). Whereas in Singapore, the PAP managed to consolidate its power over the state by introducing the Total Defence Concept that was essential to the unity of the ethnically diverse society.

5.2.1 Conversion: The Heavy Industry Policy as a Security Policy in Malaysia

In Malaysia, the introduction of the NEP in 1971 by the BN government legitimises its political authority as a response to the social upheaval. The NEP was a restructuring of the society by ensuring that the Malay interest is represented, and that poverty is reduced across inter-ethnics. The implementation of this policy not only strengthened Malaysia's nation-state building efforts along the ethnic lines, it also firmly institutionalised their policy agenda which solidify their mass-based support of the regime. The rise of Mahathir to power is critical to understanding Malaysia's national security. Mahathir's approach to the national security concept was deeply intertwined with social domestic issues of the Bumiputera. Continuing the policy legacy of his predecessors, Mahathir inherited an interventionist party-state that provided the institutional capacity to expand the national domestic project to further accelerate to dismantle class structure based on ethnic division of labour (Felker, 2015). With the reinforcement of the Bumiputera rights in the Constitution in the 1970's, the ruling elites were able to generate effective policy agenda to provide their constituents a crucial presence for ethnic solidarity especially within the elite coalitions (Nathan, 2014).

Despite its economic success, economic disparity gaps between ethnicities still persisted with the majority of the poorest ethnic groups still predominantly

with the Malays (Abdul Khalid, 2014). The economic needs for diversification drove Malaysia to reinforce its desire to modernise its industry to address the social cleavages. To deepen Malaysia's economic growth and extend the economic infrastructure, Mahathir took this opportunity with Malaysia's security policy to create linkages in coordination with his Heavy Industry Policy. He carefully bind Malaysia's industrialisation program with military modernisation as an offset to create a highly advanced manufacturing industry to forge a path for economic success and social stability (Matthews and Balakrishnan, 2009). Mahathir forged state-business corporatism to collaborate with multi-national companies in his domestic industrial policy (Jomo, 2002). To do so, Malaysia introduced its National Defence Policy in 1982 which saw the need to increase the privatisation of the defence industry as a policy process of self-reliance in small munitions and fire-arms but at the same time to diversify the economy (Balakrishnan, 2008). As these new security threats could potentially undermine the BN regime legitimacy, the BN government sought to modernise its military capabilities in facing these threats (Bitzinger, 2010).

Although the National Security Council provided the security policy objectives, policy decision-making remained the premise of the ruling elites. As policy ideas are confined to the executive branch and their political allies, the parliament would be a rubber stamp for executive decision (Suffian, 2019). In this regard, Mahathir played a central role in providing the broad direction and formulating Malaysia's security and economic policy. Policy decision-making with regards to security especially on military acquisition were often manipulated as a political incentive for both the state and personal purposes (Hellmann-Rajanayagam, 2000). In order to carry out the security and economic policy agenda, the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) was created as the principal agency under the Prime Minister's office to configure Malaysia's national policies (Embong, 2012).

Despite the traditional role of the military is to protect national sovereignty, it is also a major sector for employment. With the majority of the military derived from Malay conscript, the RMAF remained an important institution for the ruling party as a political instrument to be recruited in the BN patronage network especially in the top position (Searle, 1999). To maintain the military's morale and their loyalty, the ruling government took efforts to enlarge the military's role on external defence. In order to further integrate the military with other domestic stakeholders, the government, businesses, and the society, the total defence concept approach called 'HANRUH' was introduced in 1986 (Keling, Mohamad and Abdul Batau, 2016).

While top military leaders were often handpicked by the ruling elites, they also lent their support to the ruling elites' policies in military acquisitions and other security matters. As these military leaders are patronages of the party-state, their main policy agenda was to support the ruling party, to further consolidate the ruling regime's grip on power (Mak, 1997). Retired high-ranking military officials were often employed into Malaysia's GLC related to defence owing to their connections in the BN regime (Balakrishnan, 2020). Due to their loyalty to the party-state, these military leaders hold the power to coerce the low-ranking to participate for voting during elections (Weiss, 2000).

In principle, the military is linked to civilian sectors whereby the military power depends on the strength of the economy and vice versa. With these principal guidelines, the ruling elites created large state-owned enterprises as part of the beneficiaries of offset programs to develop the economy (Gomez, 2017). These state-owned enterprises were responsible for the production of defence items in an attempt to create linkages to redistribute wealth by providing rents to private Bumiputera companies such as licenses, contracts and employment to the Malays to produce non-defence products aimed to protect from competition while at the same time increase the Malay bourgeoisie (Matthews and Balakrishnan, 2009). This cemented the political patronages between the ruling party and the

Malay capitalist class to gain support and maintain loyalty to the UMNO regime. with the government’s effort to increase defence offset in order to increase the technological transfer for its commercial initiatives (Balakrishnan, 2008). This can be supported with the data extracted SIPRI and World Bank in figure 5.1 and 5.2. A strong correlation has shown that the increase in military spending during the 1980’s was parallel with the manufacturing sector.




Figure 5.1- Malaysia’ Military Spending as a Share of GDP Percentage
 Source: Military SIPRI Index 2019




Figure 5.2 (Source: World Bank Data, 2019)

However, Malaysia suffered some institutional setbacks as the world commodity shock hit the country in 1980s. Declining oil revenues which account for one third of its national economy would severely weaken the state to divert state resources, delaying the defence project during the mid 1980's (Balakrishnan, 2008). Further, the decision to delay military modernisation was part of the government's effort to maintain the defence expenditure on sustaining military personnel.

The economic decline also saw the manifestation of elite fractions which affected the government's capacity to dispense patronages to key elites (Wain, 2009). In 1987, UMNO was split between two factions competing for UMNO presidency during the party poll with Mahathir claiming victory. With the elites fractionalised, they resorted to communal politics in the contest for power. Severe tensions among the ruling elites in the party erupted and would also fracture the coalition over education and language, affecting the state-society relation causing communal tension (Collins, 2005). This would have a lasting impact towards elite

relations as the deep factions throughout the 1980's affected the power relations that weakened Mahathir's capacity to implement his policy (Mauzy, 2002).

Fear of the repeat on 1969 riot, in 1987 the ruling elites culminated in the launching of 'Operation Lalang'. The government initiated a political crackdown with the full assistance of the police empowered by the ISA which led to the arrest of opposition members and the civil society, while some newspapers were temporarily banned (Weiss, 2006). These changes evoked elements of institutional layering with new institutions added to the existing institutions (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). In doing so, his efforts were to marginalise a rival faction of the UMNO party with the support in branches at the state level bureaucracy that had expanded over the years to administer the NEP program (Felker, 2015).

The net effect of these developments saw Mahathir consolidate the executive power through the amendment of the Constitution by removing the judiciary powers to the Parliament dominated by his political allies. This expanded the infrastructural power of the executive to facilitate the concentration of effective power (Slater, 2003). As the political condition continued to settle, the political elites would repledge back their loyalty to Mahathir, fearing loss of their patronage networks (Crouch, 1992: p.33). Such a political move by Mahathir saw the personalisation of power that was highly effective over policy decision-making and the cronyism that emerged from the weakened institutional apparatus for check and balance (Slater, 2003).

5.2.2 Singapore: The PAP Dominance and The Hegemonic Ideology of National Defence

Similar to Malaysia, Singapore's conception of security has been the preserves to the ruling elites. As a single party state, Singapore also enjoyed strict civilian control over the military which closely resembles to Malaysia. However,

this is where the similarity departs with Malaysia. In contrast to Malaysia, Singapore has been extremely effective in mobilising its state capacity to focus on its defence (Khong,1995). The cornerstone of the PAP's institutional power has been its dominant ideology constructed by the ruling party and its hegemonic position in the domestic politics which has successfully institutionalised its security perception of vulnerability. Further, to prevent such vulnerabilities from occurring, key security institutions such as SAF and NS were developed as a crucial component of Singapore's security. With its impressive economic growth, the state has successfully shielded the society with its form of security in defeating communalism and communism. The thrust of institutionalising the militarisation of the civilians has been central to maintaining social order and the PAP's legitimacy.

By the 1980's, Singapore was one of the fastest growing economies emerging as one of the newly industrialised countries in the region. It would also see a growing educated middle-income in Singapore. Moreover, the structural condition in Southeast Asia has been more stable than in the past, favouring Singapore to continue to grow economically while strengthening its relations with its neighbours and ASEAN members. During the process of nation-state building, the PAP also successfully institutionalised as a party-state, symbolising its leaders to be closely tied to national development and state security (Ortmann, 2009). The PAP dominated the parliamentary seats between 1968 and 1980, while oppositions and trade unions were suppressed through the extensive use of legal repression and coercion, creating an unlevel playing field.

However, the ruling elites were also growing anxious of the changes in civil society and the possible challenges it would present to its political autonomy. The growing educated middle-income purported the political implication that the societal changes might demand for more political freedom and social pluralism (Khong, 1995). Not to mention, the PAP leadership was progressively being replaced by the second-generation technocratic leaders, often

lacking in political skills or charisma present in the first generation (Rodan, 2006). Political developments seemed to indicate the popular shift in demand. In 1981 the PAP finally lost its monopoly in the Parliament seat to the Worker's Party in the by-election, and PAP popularity fell from 77.75% to 64.8% in 1984, with two opposition parties returned to the Parliament (Nohlen, et al., 2001). Though the seats lost did not represent threats to the PAP dominance, nevertheless, in the words of Goh Chok Tong, "It was a loss of the perception of PAP's invincibility" (Peh, 2018). It did raise concerns amongst the ruling elites that the political pressure that was beginning to emerge might propel the future policy processes (Khong, 1995).

This presented a challenge to its fragile social contract as economic growth had been achieved at the price of political freedom. With the growing social and economic stability and the declining communist threats, the new generation of middle-income did not share the experience of the turbulent economic and security condition that the city-state had to endure in the 1950s and 1960s (Slater, 2010a). As the locus of the PAP's government power has been the promotion of their desired national image of survival and vulnerability, such changes would weaken the PAP's power to control the society. Despite the growing resentment from the middle-class against the PAP preoccupation on defence with the restriction of political participation, the PAP-led regime institutional advantage over the opposition remains enormous (Barr and Skrbis, 2008).

5.2.3 Singapore: The Total Defence

In order to pre-empt any of these dynamics into genuine political pressure that could challenge its political hegemony, the PAP embarked on a series of institutional initiatives meant to steer Singapore's path to political co-option (Rodan, 2006). With a strong administrative institution, in 1984, the PAP government introduced the concept of 'Total Defence' as part of the national

security doctrine. The total defence concept conceived a broader concept of security that extended beyond the military and the government to include GLCs, businesses, and the society as stakeholders to be a collective responsible to defend the nation (Matthews and Yan, 2007). The broader prospect of the total defence expands to several non-military instruments, such as psychological defence, economic defence, and social defence augmented military deterrence and defensive capabilities are part of the national security (Acharya, 2008). As the SAF and the NS have been successful in incorporating the state's ideology, the PAP further extended its perceived interest by institutionalising their ideologies to other sectors.

It must be understood that the Total Defence concept is an institutional exertion of the PAP to mobilise the society to expand their ordering power, rather than simply a security paradigm. As the attitude of the population gradually shifted to western values, the elites favoured a conversion of Singapore's security policy for a more expansive defence approach. This was an innovative approach for the ruling elites to maintain their state power, and to make sure that the society remains compliant with mandatory contribution to the state's security (Chong, 2004). By incorporating the middle class into Singapore's security, the ruling elites renewed its social contract to further expand Singapore's macroeconomic goals to deliver high standard of living and a secure environment for the future generations. The depoliticisation of the middle class may have led to the elimination of choice in the political arena. As security policy decision-making is confined within the ruling elites, the Total Defence policy was designed for the regime to be more inclusive by consciously embedding their ideology to insulate with the society as civic identity and nationalism (Khong, 1995).

To further limit from Parliamentary seats losses, the PAP elites resorted to legal coercive tools to suppress opposing parties such as defamation and lawsuits. This creates an unlevel playing field as the power relations reside in the hands of the strong ruling elites to formulate security policy under the national ideology

of defending Singapore’s vulnerabilities (Ang, 2016). With the increase in civilian participation in defence, Singapore also expanded its defence by modernising the SAF to accommodate the Total Defence Concept. To accommodate the expansion of the security concept, the SAF began to modernise its military by upgrading and increasing its military capabilities, that was termed by Lee Hsien Loong as ‘porcupine’ (1984). This can be shown in figure 5.3 that Singapore’s military defence spending saw an increase after 1980 and continued to upgrade its military to date. The reason for this is the need for legitimacy to protect its vulnerability against any foreign intervention to ensure its economic growth by upgrading its military to be one of the most technologically advanced in the region.




Figure 5.3 (Source: SIPRI, 2019)

On the economic side, the PAP government restructured its economy by upgrading its manufacturing industry to expand beyond oil refinery into high-technology manufacturing industry and increase FDI (Rigg, 1988). Singapore also used this as an opportunity to expand its indigenous defence industry, Singapore Technology (ST) through spin-offs in order to further integrate the

business with its web of defence. Similar to Malaysia, the defence industry was used to support the SAF with capable technology base especially in the provision of training, maintenance and repairs as well as achieving the goals of self-sufficiency in supply (Bitzinger 2017, p. 117-120).

5.2.4 Singapore's Security Policy: Source of Network for Elite Cohesion

The PAP managed to retain tight control of the security policy through the Total Defence Concept. However, despite its impressive economic growth and its ability to provide security, the disparity between ethnics on socio-economic condition continued to be marginalised relative to the Chinese dominant communities (Rahim, 1998). This has generated new political challenges for the PAP's dominance seeking to advance their interest in the domestic politics, as established institutions and ideology of political representation in Singapore is increasingly under political scrutiny by the opposing parties (Rodan, 2019). Even though it maintains that Singapore is the biggest defence spender in the region, its defence spending saw a steady slow decline in recent years. Between 2006 and 2011, the PAP suffered a combined loss of 15 percent of its support concerning rising inequalities and high cost of living, declining social mobility, immigration and lack of public infrastructure (Tan and Lee, 2011).

Similar to Malaysia, access to state power in Singapore has been monopolised by party institutions rather than the military. Moreover, similar to Malaysia, Singapore's Prime Minister always led by the PAP's Secretary General and his cabinet always comprised leading figures from the SAF. For Singapore, the historical patterns of contentious politics have helped shape elite cohesion and a strong robust institution. They also lent support to build a stronger party-state institution, consolidating power to the PAP regime (Slater, 2010a). Specifically, we saw in Chapter 4 that the unmanageable threats from the Chinese speaking Singaporeans inspired the local-English speaking Chinese elites the construction

of a strong state before its merger with Malaysia. This initial nation-state building process was compounded and accelerated in the 1970's to 1980's that saw the regime expand its security sector.

Through powerful coercive apparatuses as well as the capacity to extract state resources, the PAP formed a strong security institution by combining the administration of the civilians into the military through institutions such as the NS and the SAF to maintain resource for power control, increasing the PAP's government capacity and legitimacy (Barr and Skrbis, 2008). The obligatory of the NS for male conscript provides a symbiotic relationship between the society and the appreciation of the defence establishment to gain appreciation of the security needs that it serves to defend. These institutional arrangements structure the permissible scope of participation and representation in deliberations and decisions over which the ruling elites makes the policy decision-making (Rodan, 2019).

Concurrently, the SAF and NS are critical institutions to maintain social order as these institutions became the political ground for elites coalition (Walsh, 2007). Although these institutions were initially created to provide social cohesion and nation-building purposes in the multicultural society, the institutional functions of the SAF and NS evolved over time. With popular politics being eliminated, Singapore is governed by the uncontested elites which span their interest beyond public and private (Hamilton-Hart, 2000). To further strengthen the PAP's regime support, the PAP government needed to produce elites that can perpetuate itself on institutional means in preserving the regime's interest, strengthening its elite collective actions. To recruit some of the brightest elites in the city-state, the PAP ruling elites created new interpretations of the security sector to advance their power and interest. The SAF became a recruiting ground for the regime through the provision of prestigious education scholarship to lure these elites as a prospective career path (Walsh, 2007).

According to Barr, the education system was designed to privileged the middle Chinese class and the upper class (Barr, 2014). By assimilating these social classes, it provided an unlevel playing field for the PAP to control defection that occurred in other case studies to maintain the policy agenda. These SAF scholars who became officers were often groomed to prominence in the military. Vasu and Loo (2016) elucidates that with their education credentials and their leadership skills, these military elites are then absorbed into the regime by recruiting them into the civilian sector to further their career path into politics, business or civil service after their military service. Over time, this institutional arrangement became a normalised path for the society to access to state power. The public-sector provides lucrative salaries that are competitive with the private sector. To give a perspective, the Prime Minister along with his Cabinet are currently some of the highest paid leaders in the world, comparable to CEO earnings.

But beyond the meritocracy of academic performance and ability, the security institution is also the epicentre for access to networks of power of small but influential elites for patronages to the party-state (Barr and Skrbis, 2008). According to Barr (2014) the defence is regarded as particularly important for the ruling elites to build their own base of political network that are highly personal designed to strengthen their position in the state institution. The SAF became fertile ground for political socialisation to forge informal links with young elites in supporting the PAP's regime. This mechanism was institutionalised by Lee Kuan Yew as an informal practise that was preserved by successive leaders such as Goh Chock Tong and Lee Hsien Loong to reinforce the party's ideology over the social forces to protect the PAP's political power and interest. These institutional arrangements not only eliminates contest between party members for leadership in the PAP, but also provide reinforcement for the ruling elites to indoctrinate these newer generation of elites to the PAP's hegemonic ideology (Abdullah, 2018). Walsh (2007) argued that the Singapore model resembles the

Western concept of aristocratic family supplying sons in both politics and the military. This allows for the PAP regime to create a massive security network and institutional structure that centres around the party-state to maintain the national security framework to mitigate their preferred policy agenda.

By the early 1990's, new generations of leaders in the PAP replaced some of the older generations by intermeshing of educated elites from the bureaucracy, military and the GLC in the Cabinet. Most cabinet members derived from the prestigious scholars awarded by the military as part of the prospect to further their career in the civilian (Da Cunha, 1999). Currently, Cabinet Minister comprise of five members who had a military background, including the Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong. Aside from the Ministers, the Permanent Secretary and GLC's often draw their leadership from the military. Though this does not represent a military takeover as presented in Indonesia and the Philippines, Singapore's military is an integral form of administrative structure to operate within the framework of the dominant party perceptions (Tan, 2012).

With a strong institutional design, Singapore's security has been largely intact against assault by pressure from other opposing parties. Even with the growing competitiveness in Singapore's politics, the PAP's main opposition party The Workers' Party (2011) conceded in their manifesto that Singapore needs a powerful and credible military to provide credible deterrence from external threats and to maintain sovereignty. This conformity of the PAP's perception strengthened the legitimacy of their security policy that other parties could vindicate with their superior performance (Ortmann, 2015).

5.3 Indonesia and the Philippines: Regime Breakdown and Institutional Changes

In the last section, we saw the resilience of state institutions guided by its historical roots shaped state actors' perceptions in security policies. We also saw

that not all security perceptions were created equal, for political institutions gave rise to different social forces and channel its security preferences. The changes in the relationship between state and society would also influence the institutional capacity that affected its security policies. With newer conflicts and development especially in the post-Cold War, it changed the context of security perception. Though contest for state power remains in the civilian, it also meant that the historical legacies gave rise to strong party-state institutions to control the state apparatus to expand its security policy to protect the population as opposed to the military as an institution.

In contrast to Malaysia and Singapore, in both Indonesia and the Philippines, the control over state power and the implication for security policy are different. In both states, the balance of state power rest with the military as opposed to the civilian elites (Aspinall, 1995; Chambers, 2012). Though with the support of civilians initially, the military consolidated its power by creating a small network of military and bureaucratic elites that bind the regime stability. For Indonesia, the organisational and security logic surrounding the ruling elites reflect around its geographical structure and historical context. An important consequence of its specific history was the emergence of military domination in the late 1960's saw that the ruling elites were preoccupied with internal security in the context of nation building and economic development. To a certain extent, the Philippines also show similar traits whereby the weakness of the political institution allowed the military to control policy decision-making.

This section aims to analyse Indonesia and the Philippines by addressing the changes in relationship between the state-society and their political outcomes when a society is undergoing major socioeconomic changes. It briefly discusses how elite contestation evolved and how its security context unfolds on the basis of internal security prior to the end of the Cold War. The contestation for power between the elites would also lead to political violence that would cause further insecurity in Indonesia and the Philippines.

5.3.1 Indonesia: Contest for State Power and Internal Security

In many respects, Indonesia's concept of security is not particularly new. As noted in the previous chapter, since the birth of the New Order regime, the concept of national security was focused on internal threats. To maintain political order in the vastly diverse society, the New Order government introduced a single national interest embodied in the corporatist and populist ideals bounded by the national ideology of Pancasila (Elson, 2001). The national ideology would become a successful tool for the New Order government to effectively quash power struggles emphasising on nationalism while suppressing other alternative ideologies. With the military capturing the state power as opposed to the civilians, it created a path dependence for an authoritarian rule with the military to exercise full control of security apparatus and defence policies to maintain social cohesion under the guidance of the national ideology. The New Order also expanded the military's role to maintain political stability as a pre-requisite to Indonesia's economic development, that legitimises the military's role in the position of power to be an active player in nation-state building.

In the 1980's, the appeal towards the New Order and the legitimacy of ABRI saw a gradual decline as competition for political power intensified between elites. As the Communist threats began to recede, the military's legitimacy in power began to brittle as Suharto's government derived solely based on the coalitional pact of these endemic threats (Anderson, 1978). Suharto's campaign against the PKI played a central role to his regime legitimacy as he commanded wide support from the society as well as the military. However, institutional fragmentation began to emerge between state and society. The rise of new social forces, Muslim and other nationalist organisations were enraged over Suharto's monopolisation of power which led to violent eruptions and student protests in the Malari Incident in 1974 (Vu, 2010).

Although the New Order began to erode with the regime losing its popular appeal in the population, Suharto managed to position itself at the apex of the regime with the support in the middle-class as well as the selected business elites between 1970's and 1980's (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Shaken by the crisis, Suharto began to use coercive forces to repress the social mobilisation. In turn, Indonesia during this period became a personalised regime which closely resembled Marcos in the Philippines. Yet, despite its similarity, urban movements in the 1970's and 1980's in the Philippines led to the downfall of Marcos where the powerful elites threw their weights to challenge the regime (Thompson, 1995). Indonesia, on the other hand posed a different picture. The effectiveness of patronage distribution and firm control of repressive apparatus by the regime successfully quelled urban movements before these riots fully materialise. Suharto instead turned to a personalised regime by replacing the military to close knit elites as part of the extension of power, which provided the capacity for the President to prepare and control legislation (Winters, 2011). Suharto was also able to maintain elite cohesion, by creating a complex political system that was reliant on elite loyalists. Through the distribution of rent generated from the booming oil revenue as well as timber and mining through easy lines of credit, business contracts in petroleum industry as well as timber concession to cronies close to the regime with decision-making power concentrated in the hands of the President (Aspinall, 2014).

Thus, to increase economic activities, efforts in extracting natural resources especially in the periphery territories began to intensify while resources were devoted to providing security to protect these facilities (Human Rights Watch, 2006). The involvement of the military is especially prevalent in the more isolated and lucrative areas such as Aceh, Papua and East Timor by classifying it as military operating provinces DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer) were closely guarded by the military as part of its role to maintain political unity and for its own enrichment (Kingsbury, 2003). The military's role in the territorial structure

became the key institutional linkage through which wealth is distributed within the institution. Yet, the major potential for conflict outburst was located at the periphery territory of the nation-state. As the periphery territories were forced to subversion during the New Order, it did not share the same narratives of struggles in Central Java. It failed to resonate with the perception of nation building that felt that Indonesian presence was a form of foreign invasion (Ross, 2005). Local elites constructed the perception of grievances towards the central government that the local communities were excluded from the development projects (Aspinall, 2007). However, as these territories were essential to Indonesia's development, the application of excessive security force were often applied to contain further secessionist movements, but at the cost of exacerbating political grievances and political alienation with the government's policies (Aspinall and Berger, 2010).

5.3.2 *The Downfall of New Order and the Reorganisation of State Power*

By the end of the Cold War, Indonesia's New Order under Suharto saw a dramatic rise to the state's infrastructural power, unprecedented in previous regime. It led to the consolidation of power within all the institutions, creating a strong personalised regime. The diversion from the initial institutional condition from the New Order also led to the increasing political marginalisation of the elites in the 1980's and 1990's. More pertinently, even though there was a positive trajectory on its economic growth and towards greater industrialisation under the New Order government, Suharto's ruling was increasingly compromised. This was reflected by the growing political dissatisfaction between the state and society which would become an impending source of the regime's insecurity. The legitimacy of New Order was facing multitude of challenges as it created opportunities for elites movement of *keterbukaan* (openness),

democratisation, human rights abuse and pressure from the civil society (Honna, 2005).

However, it was the severe intra-conflict within the military that became a source of political instability. With the military increasingly compromised by Suharto's attempt to reconstruct the President-ABRI relationship, a dispute soon emerged. Suharto's excessive patron-client networks to promote military personnel close to the Palace promoted a vigorous discontent within the professional military (Mietzner, 2008). In many ways, the practice of patronage politics was a consequence of historical legacy that helped shaped the regime. Even before the series of events that contributed to the regime's downfall, the politicking and the creation of political centres of influence was often present but with met with force with the support of the military. However, the changes in power relations especially between the executive and the security force create opportunities for opposition forces to challenge the regime. It was the appointment of Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law to lead the Kopassus that led to schism in the military. The rise of new leaders such as General Wiranto, were disenchanted over Suharto's decision to interfere with the military appointments through patronage rather than which created factions in the military.

Moreover, the increasing personalised economic policy limited the opportunity for the military's access in economic activities became a source of social tension. Disgruntled military elites formed an influential group called the Petition 50 that challenged the President during the *keterbukaan* movement. Social issues such as endemic corruption and the monopoly of Chinese businesses conglomerates that have close personal links to the President were targeted by the military faction, using the Parliament to undermine the legitimacy of the regime calling for political reform (Honna, 2005). The existence of intra-regime friction encouraged the mobilisation of the social forces seemingly guided by the military (Vatikiotis, 1998). Suharto sought to counter the military cleavage by increasing the defence budget to maintain steady stream of patronages to establish a loyal

military. Between 1993 to 1997 the defence expenditure increased as shown in figure 5.4.




Figure 5.4

Source: World Bank 2019

Analysts seemed to suggest that riots and violence were instigated by the elites to discredit both the regime and the rival military factions (Sidel, 1998; Aspinall, 2005). As mentioned in the last section, these riots often were met with excessive use of force to maintain political order. This would however lead to further insecurity in Indonesia as the use of force was often excessive, creating social grievances targeted towards the regime. The intrusions of modern economic policies in the guise of economic development especially in the periphery created social grievances over the state. Growing resentments gradually began to strengthen from the civil society towards forced land acquisitions to pave way for private businesses and government projects (Human Rights Watch, 2006). The presence of industries and new bourgeoisie capitalist mostly from central Jakarta that have close political ties to the regime and foreign investment

were often expressed by the civil society of its economic insecurity and felt that it was an invasion of their land rights (Bertrand, 2004).

However, the growing political uncertainty and trajectory of internal instability would lead to the regime breakdown. One of the main catalysts for the weakening regime's legitimacy was the 97/98 financial crisis. Ethnic tension would also become prevalent as the economic disparity gap in Indonesia worsened due to Suharto's economic policies creating deep resentment over the regime (Bertrand, 2004). Chinese conglomerates who benefitted from Suharto's economic policies and cronies were subject of ethnic targets have turned to ABRI to seek physical protection from the riot, abandoning the regime (Pepinsky, 2009, p. 184). More importantly, it was the loss of protection pact from the elites to maintain the regime stability that led to the breakdown. As Robison and Hadiz (2004, p. 166) explained, Suharto became a liability to the social order that he helped build, consolidate, and protect.

Whereas the elites in Malaysia still maintained a strong coalitional support from other ethnic elites to withstand endemic pressure in the 97/98 financial crisis, Suharto's regime was abandoned by the oligarchs that he chose to side-line from state power. As a by-product of creating deep division in ABRI, the reformist military elites led by General Wiranto were willing to desert Suharto, weakening his position to coordinate an effective coercive apparatus to maintain internal stability (US State Department, 1998). The Trisakti event had huge political consequences. There were many factions of security forces that were present with different security interest to quell on the Trisakti protest, which resulted in open fire, killing four students (Department of Intelligence Agency U.S, 1998). Peaceful protests turned into violent riots in the city and across the archipelago to pressure Suharto for his resignation and to initiate political and economic reformation (Pepinsky, 2009). Such dynamic situations not only caused the elites to distance themselves from the New Order regime, but also increasingly provided the opportunity for disgruntled elites that were left out from

the regime to support democratic transition. However, it was General Wiranto who was appointed as ABRI leader that was crucial in managing and facilitating the resignation of Suharto that would best serve his interest (Honna, 2005). The New Order government fell after 32 years when Suharto finally resigned as President in 1998 ruling and transferred power to his Vice President B.J. Habibie (1998-1999).

5.3.3 Indonesia: Institutional Displacement and the Reorganisation of the Military Institution under the New Paradigm

Similar to the Philippines in 1986, the sequence of Asian financial crisis and mass uprising laid foundation for institutional changes in Indonesia. The fragile social structure which overlapped with deep social cleavages and elite polarisation led to an institutional displacement saw Indonesia's path to democratisation and the decentralisation of power from the President. Since the demise of Suharto, it created a power vacuum both in the centre and the periphery. As a young post-authoritarian state, Indonesian politics were ripe for internal conflict. With fall of the New Order, it gave empowerments to the legislature, reflecting the societal demands for broad-based politics. A host of new parties competed for presidency rather than the return to prominence of Golkar (Tomsa, 2008). According to Robison and Hadiz (2004) the regime breakdown provided the opportunity for the oligarchs to reorganise their economic and political position in the face of new political order. In many respects, the post-Suharto order was reminiscent of the 1950's clientelist democracy especially in the tendency to develop a coalition of political system. Whereas patronage politics during the New Order regime was centralised by the executive, in the post-Suharto patronage system were institutionally shifted to the legislature which shares similarity to the Philippines (Aspinall and Klinken, 2011).

Between 1998 and 2019, Indonesia went through five presidential changes from B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), Yudhoyono (2004-2014) and Jokowi (2014-present) through parliamentary and electoral means without any necessary military coup or political repression present in the Philippines during its transition. However, the political economy of Indonesia is weighted against the full democratic transition that they are often in alliance with the military. Due to limited state resources, it forces the military to develop close ties between the political and economic elites to resist for equitable political reform.

However, the new arrangements of political order would also affect the military's access to state power. Public expressions over the regime and the military's roles of *dwifungsi* were raised for scrutiny for its coercion and repressive measures on internal security, beset by a spate of corruption at the local level (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Military businesses raised special concerns because of its potential for conflict and abuse of power as human rights were often violated for its own economic interest which increased social tension. This was especially prevalent in the periphery as the military in these areas are autonomous and independent to conduct military repression (Mietzner, 2006).

Under immense pressure from the civil society for its roles during the New Order on human rights abuse and the changes in domestic dynamics, many expected that ABRI would undergo for a transition to civilian control. Whereas the military initially strongly resisted for institutional reform in the Philippines, the TNI (subsequently changed from ABRI) succeeded in initiating institutional changes. In response, the military adapted itself by initiating its commitments for reform to reform-minded generals at the institutional level and the policy level. This was only possible after Wiranto purged officers who were loyal to Suharto, Prabowo and his factions known as *de-Prabowo-isation*. With the military faction close to the previous regime weakened, the institution achieved greater unity as

the military realised that the patronage for career promotion depended on their loyalty to Wiranto (Sebastian and Iisgindarsah, 2012).

It was from within this novel that the military abandoned its *dwifungsi* role and adopted the 'New Paradigm' which stated its support for democratic transition (Crouch, 1999). Led by Wiranto, the adoption of this concept would subsequently allow the military as a guiding principle to forfeit its formal position in Indonesia's politics. The military relinquished its role of *dwifungsi*, and its guaranteed seats in the Parliament. Many officers within Wiranto's faction believed that the military had to make institutional adjustments in order to maintain its political presence in the new democratic regime (Wiranto, 2000, cited in Mietzner, 2006, p. 26).

Perhaps the most significant institutional change is the degree of civilian control of decision-making in national security agenda. Between 2000 and 2001, the military had defied President Wahid's orders from excessive repression against secessionist movements, which caused inconsistencies against the government's policies to launch crackdowns on the rebels and their sympathizers (Mietzner, 2006). On the other hand, there have been speculations that the military had orchestrated protests against the government's policy with Aceh for Peace accord in 2003 by actively challenging and launching a full-scale military operation (Editors, 2005). Similar accounts were also recorded in other parts of the territory where the military launched its own independent operations to defend its own economic interest which resulted in further social tension (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

Since President Yudhoyono, the executive has managed to establish some degree of institutional authority over the national security agenda. Yudhoyono appointed Juwono Sudarsono as a second stint as the Minister of Defence, to strengthen the civilian oversight of the military by relinquishing its traditional roles of internal security during the New Order government, with the police separated from the military to assume the role as law enforcement under the

civilian control. It allowed the civilian institution to define boundaries of the military's institutional autonomy to monitor and sanction military's operations. With this arrangement, the civilian political elites with the new roles would disengage the military from Indonesian politics and the increase its professionalism with regards to external defence matters (Honna, 2005). Meanwhile, peace agreement was achieved after the natural disaster hit the region in 2004 between central Jakarta and Aceh, giving special autonomy to the local government.

Given the constant pressure from the civil society, the TNI incrementally stepped up to further initiate further its security reform. Some of the military businesses were forced to liquidate or transfer to the state which institutionally weakened the military (Aspinall and Klinken, 2011). This was enforced by the Armed Forces Bill in 2004 under paragraph 76, under President Yudhoyono which legally bound the government to take over all the military business by 2009. As a result, the TNI involvement in business enterprises were greatly reduced (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

However, in practice the ability of the government for further institutional reform will hinge upon its ability to make-up the gap in funding as it has historically relied on these enterprises to generate the upkeep of the military. Despite this, it is worth acknowledging that the civilian authority has asserted some form of autonomy towards the TNI which managed to reinstitute some form of professionalism within the establishment. Through frequent pressure from the civil society and the strong leadership, the TNI were able to absorb the relevant policy ideas to strengthen their image as a protector of the country.

5.3.4 Philippines: The People's Revolt and The Return of Oligarch

Prior to the fall of Marcos regime in 1986, the Philippines was mired with internal instability. The political regime was increasingly centralised, with the

military's political involvement extended its institutional as junior partner in his ruling coalition. This would also expand the military's roles beyond security policy. Communist threats from the CPP-NPA and the secessionist movement of the Bangsamoro caused by religious fragmentation in Mindanao persist, undermining the regime's legitimacy. Marcos's intolerance to political opposition over political protest by the civil society created severe political grievances as excessive use of force often practised by the security sector led to human rights abuse (Timberman, 1991) Perhaps, what is more endearing is that high levels of inequality and poverty continued to persist across the archipelago during the authoritarian rule despite his promises for economic development during the martial law.

However, what added grist to the intense political tension was the competition for state power between the elite groups which became a crisis of regime legitimacy. Marcos increasingly personalised regime shared similarities with Suharto plundered the state resources and economic policies for the benefit of his cronies and new technocratic elites, while the old elites were excluded from the political machine (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005). In contrast to Indonesia whereby Suharto held a significant power advantage over the opposing forces at the onset of the New Order, the oligarchs power base was more independent in the Philippines owing to the historical legacy of the state structure before the martial law. According to Winters (2011), "their challenges to Marcos were open and frontal, and the instruments of attack they employed included engaging their private material power resources to fund resistance, using their armed paramilitaries in the provinces to render Marcos' control of certain regions highly contingent, organising and backing political parties to contest elections."

Hence, when the government spiralled into crisis, Marcos had to completely rely on the military to preserve the regime (Slater, 2010a). The state structure would also create factions in the military as the promotion of loyal but inept military that excluded many junior ranks from the political leadership. In

1986, the formation of a de-facto group called the Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM) led by Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Vice Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos attempted a coup. However, the coup failed but catalysed the People Power Revolt led by Corazon Aquino with the support of the opposing elites and the US that brought down the regime and transition to democracy (Thompson, 1995).

The fall of Marcos saw the restoration of democracy in 1986, with the Aquino administration replacing the 1973 Constitution with the 1987 Constitution. This would provide safeguards for effective democratic control, including the establishment of Ombudsman and Commission of Human Rights, the separation of the military and the police, and the re-establishment of the Congressional oversight for check and balance, and the banning of private armed groups. To a certain extent, the institutionalisation of the Constitution formally reasserted the prerogatives of civilian authority over the military with the legislative as the political oversight of the military's budget as well as confirmation of military promotions and appointments (Hernandez and Kraft, 2010, p. 131).

Despite the restoration of democracy, the People's revolt has not been matched to significant changes on elite hegemony in the Philippines politics. In reality, the return of electoral democracy saw the return of clientele politics that was inherited from the previous structural-historical legacy experienced during Marcos. Further, the Philippines saw a remarkable continuity especially on the level of political contestation between the social forces in the archipelagic state (Regilme Jr, 2016). On closer examination, rather than a programmatic party system, the Philippines saw the return of clan politics which institutionalised the use of mobilised electoral support and implement central government policy, further fragmenting the already weak state (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; Kuhonta, 2011).

The reorganisation of the state structure saw the attenuation of state power to the local and municipal levels that were dominated by the political clans in the pre-martial law. The 1987-88 Congress saw the empowerment of the political business elites to the state apparatus that were ousted from power in the authoritarian era, as well as former pro-Marcos elites who had managed to repackage themselves as advocates of democracy. The military meanwhile also asserted its claims for control over state power (Gutierrez, et al., 1992; Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre, 2013). Drawing from Hutchcroft (1998), Sidel (1999) and Franco (2001), they concluded that the post-authoritarian system in the Philippines instead saw the return of patron-clientele system with the political bosses to dominate the state, which entrenched political corruption and violence, to protect their wealth under the guise of national interest. It was ripe for open contestation from the social forces, pressure from the civil society, military coups, internal insurgencies and socio-economic problems (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003).

More pertinent, the Marcos regime left a legacy by institutionalising the politicisation of the military to challenge the regime legitimacy. The civilian institutions, it is to be remembered were significantly demolished, and the military were highly politicised and factionalised meant that the it became an institutionalised part the policy decision-making (Chambers, 2012). It is thus unsurprising that even when the AFP abandoned its formal powers to the civilian, some of the factions in the AFP sought to maintain its position as the return of clientelist politics would effectively reduce its formal influences in the domestic politics and access to state resources. Whereas Indonesia saw the success of internal military putsch to reposition itself to accommodate changes in the political order, in the Philippines, the factions that supported Marcos were resistant to rescind their power and roles in nation-building to the civilian authorities (Hernandez, 2006). Even so, a faction of the military from the RAM that took down Marcos initiated coup attempts during Cory Aquino's regime and

was again involved in the Oakwood Mutiny in 2003 and 2006 were effectively absorbed into the political system (Lee, 2008).

According to the fact-finding commission, the military discontent was motivated by the weakness of the state and the capacity in addressing socio-economic problems, insurgencies, the endemic corruption and graft, and the low wages to support maintain the upkeep of the bloating army (Davide Commission, 1990). Based on the analysis by Croissant et. al (2013), in order to uphold the civilian authority over the military, control over policy decision-making powers must retain with the civilians. Instead, to appease the military Aquino prompted further concession by including some of the top echelons in the administration while the military reform came to a halt. Simultaneously, Aquino practiced acquiescence in deploying the military to support their preferred policy of repression against insurgents in the affected areas (Quilop, 2005).

This would also set a path dependence to ensure the survival of successive regimes, as military elites to be included in the administration to represent their interest (Hutchcroft, 2008). The fragile political legitimacy, weak civilian oversight institution and poor socio-economic condition provided the foundation for the military to increase its involvement in security policy (Arugay, 2012). This would also become the base for continuity in political struggles and security threats in the Philippines as the absence of political will to initiate further institutional reform to stem from corrupt practices beset Philippines' socio-economic problems.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter highlights the transformation of Southeast Asia influence of outcomes have largely been established by its specific political institutional arrangements to respond to specific threats to the states. This chapter found that the levels of elite coalitions in the region varied markedly, contributing to the

levels of state capacity in nation-state building process. Differences in the way political leaders are organised and come to power lend themselves to create various sources of societal tensions among the different domestic actors competing for power for a particular agenda. To make sense of this discordance, this chapter found that it is useful to revisit the notion of distribution of power in Southeast Asia is profoundly shaped by its colonial legacies that are distinct and complementary.

On the whole, Southeast Asia in the post-colonial era poses two different spectrums of power asymmetry and institutions. Ultimately, this chapter aimed to specify that the variation of types of regimes have different impact on the power relations that dictates the state's security policy. This chapter also illuminates the importance of new critical junctures and learning mechanisms for states to change even when its security perception is heavily burdened by the logic of path dependence.

Thus, the period of the 1980's and 1990's also saw the evolution of political regimes moving towards democratisation, which threatened the regimes in Southeast Asia. The increasing political contestation and the permissive conditions would create an opening for an institutional change. Whereas in Indonesia and the Philippines saw a democratic transition after an institutional failure that protects certain political and economic elites, Malaysia and Singapore increase their grip on state power where the political actors were able to organise state function to maintain security. What emerges in this chapter is that the political institutions that were entrenched by the colonies can either constrain or enhance political actors within the given context to provide security and welfare, which is the core of security threats. Within the specific system of states, the constellation of social power given to the actors by the institutional arrangements operate as practical constraints to the security policy.

Conversely, strong states were able to grab hold of the state's capacity to provide order and economic development. To a certain extent in Malaysia, but

more so in Singapore, that political institutions managed to maintain elite cohesion to provide security towards the regime. For Malaysia and Singapore, the ability of state actors to control over the coercive forces effectively allowed them to extract state resources and to formulate security policy to promote its economic as well as ideological for regime legitimacy. Singapore's durability in commanding both the capacity of the state and the robustness of its elite cohesion has been the key to the PAP's resilience in maintaining its highly expansive security policy.

On the other hand, in the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, although during the authoritarian regimes, they managed to capture some form of political integration, however, the institutional design was weak in comparison to the former cases where the elite cohesion in these states were fragile. Crucially, both of these states simply do not have the sufficient capacity to deal with the scale of security threats they face. The institutional arrangements in these states operate as a constraint on policy because social forces have the capacity to restrain the implementation of policy for their own interest. The lack of political legitimacy present in both states was reflected in the excessive use of force. Unlike in Malaysia and Singapore, the power relations presented an unlevel playing field in both Indonesia and the Philippines as other political institutions such as the military play a dominant role in politics.

Although all state institutions provide patronages, however, the unequal distribution of wealth owing to the nature of its political institution create radical fractions between classes. These states failed to provide societal security that are present in Malaysia and Singapore. Starting from the Philippines and subsequently in Indonesia, both states saw the fall of regimes which opened up political contestation. The structural factors of internal threat environment have offered different state actors to retain control over the state apparatus. In both states, the military plays a larger role in dictating its security policy which resulted in weak civilian control. The strong military institutions acted as a

constraint to political order and an object of political conflict that exist in these two states. The potential use of excessive coercive force for state repression as a consequence to maintain political order.

Chapter 6:

The Variances of Security Policies in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War

6.1 Introduction

The effects of globalisation after the end of the Cold War finds the region confronting newer emerging security issues. But even as the region deals with new challenges, existing security problems persist and becoming more complex. While the Cold War was central to the developmental success for states in Southeast Asia, the intensification of globalisation imposes intense political crises engulfing the countries with the challenges of nation-state building and sustaining economic development. For Southeast Asia, the potential source of security threats appears to be dominated in the long-running violent conflicts between social forces that are domestic in nature competing for state power and economic resources. As highlighted thus far, Chapter 5 shows that the temporality and downstream effects of the state's diverging historical experiences influenced how states securitise certain issues as threats. It would also display how security practice in Southeast Asia is a product interest of specific social groups that are embedded as necessary to gain legitimacy.

The contention in what follows in this chapter explores how the state's security agenda is historically contingent. It aims to show why the conceptualisation of security policies in Southeast Asian states are constructed in different contexts, and how specific security policies coincide with the state power as a means to an end for dominant social forces to advance their particular perceptions of values and scope to claim legitimacy. It shows that security practices in Southeast Asian states are a product of historical structure and process that are shaped by the particular constellation of dominant social forces. With the help of the historical institutionalist explanatory factors, this chapter

shows why certain issues have been securitised using the logic of path dependence. What emerges in practice reflects how the political contestations between the social forces explored in the previous chapters continue to find its logic in the contemporary security policy in the name of national interest.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section gives consideration to how Southeast Asia identifies some of the contemporary security challenges in the region. It follows by discussing how the problems arises in the process of securitising these issues at both the domestic and regional levels. It looks into how external security helped frame some of the challenges that ASEAN member states face today. It also analyses how the perennial conundrum of internal instabilities facing the state forces its security policy behaviours to be constrained by a prevailing strategic concern, which focuses on maintaining regime legitimacy.

The second section proceeds by examining the logic of continuity and change in state's security culture. It aims to show that the particular constellations of power between social forces to define what constitute as a security problem. By using a comparative approach, this chapter critically analyse the differences in dominant forces shaped how states implement their security policy outcomes. As the most pressing security threats is internal in origins, Southeast Asia continues to securitise issues that have been framed over extended periods of time by certain dominant actors in the name of national interest. This section claims that security perception and governance is contextualised by its history.

6.2 ASEAN and Regional Challenges

A critical feature of Southeast Asia has been the existence of domestic coalition to construct ASEAN as a regional institution that showed remarkable durability. By the end of the Cold War, dominant elites would also effectively seize the opportunity to consolidate their own political position in the domestic

while weakening other social groups. For the original five ASEAN members, the achievement for avoiding conflict was predicated towards the success of maintaining sovereignty and the commitment to economic cooperation that was an essential precondition to achieve domestic stability and political legitimacy.

Until the late 1990's, ASEAN had successfully maintained peaceful relations, solidifying its intra-regional relations that are immensely diverse. Intra-conflict between ASEAN would also be substantially reduced as a result of Paris Peace Agreement on the resolution of Cambodia conflict (Acharya, 2014). With the positive feedback from its role as a regional stabiliser, ASEAN was confident of its role and expanded its membership to include the Indo-China states to increase regional cooperation. The range of cooperation expanded significantly between members and extra-regional powers with engagements deeper with economic and political commitments to address newer security challenges.

Conversely, with a strong commitment to a shared perception of creating a unitary state mentality ASEAN began expanding its institutional role through layering in response to demands to address post-Cold War security issues through layering to manage great power relations. Through the principles of 'ASEAN values' of non-interference, ASEAN successfully facilitated dialogues between members and great powers such as the U.S. and China through regional forums such as the ARF, which strengthened their diplomatic relations that enhanced the regional political stability (Mahbubani and Sng, 2017). This made ASEAN a pivotal actor in managing security issues and deepening political cooperation between external powers (Yates, 2017). Unlike traditional alliances that exist in the West, ASEAN-led institutions focus on promoting non-traditional security issues for regional stakeholders as a focal point to promote confidence building and actual defence cooperation that would better prepare ASEAN to address more complex security issues (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010).

Yet, some things appear to be the same. More importantly, the continuing commitments that are dependent upon the traditional approach of non-

interference is the result of contingent complex interaction in the flow of the domestic and international that ASEAN members find itself in. In the post-Cold War, the new hegemonic position that the US and its allies have acquired become strident in their promotion of liberal democracy and were more critical of the authoritarian regimes in the region. The changes in the international condition saw greater urgency to strengthen the regional identity, which members shared the mutual desire to protect sovereignty and the geo-political rivalries between great powers (Acharya, 2014).

Lacking unconditional legitimacy for the states and its illiberal regimes, the ruling elites in ASEAN had a basic interest in safeguarding their political autonomy (Ba, 2014). With the rise of capitalist market paving the way for a dramatic transformation for ASEAN economies, states were vulnerable to domestic unrest facing new competition from different actors (Jones, 2012a). Most members found that the principle guidelines of the 'ASEAN Way' had two key consequences. First, the institutionalisation of state-centric approach on the principle of non-intervention reassured members that their sovereign rights would not be imperilled. Second, the regional diplomatic relations of every member by advocating to perform unity is predicated with security and economic problems that is critical to the regional security order. As states in the region were developing its economy often through state-led development, persistent patronage has produced illiberal ideology with lower orders to secure their interest (Rodan et. al, 2006).

However, the principles of non-intervention were tested during the Asian financial crisis that exposed the fragility of the institution. Initially starting from Thailand, the crisis quickly spread and affected all states causing severe security instability to the region with currency collapsing, and national economies driven into recession. Thus, as the political order in Southeast Asia began to weaken, it would also exacerbate pre-existing social cleavages in member states that were brought in its wake to violent dissatisfaction towards the elitist regimes, erupting

social unrest cutting across different social forces (Sukma, 1999). These conflicts, in turn, would fracture domestic elite coalitions further intensifying the regimes instability across the region. This opens up the fundamental concept that security that is domestic in nature can also become a regional issue.

ASEAN was criticised by analysts and Western policymakers for its inadequacy to provide economic and political security (Khoo, 2004). Thus, the changes in domestic politics and its impact between state-society relations would have a salient effect on ASEAN. After the financial crisis, there is also a growing trend on non-traditional security issues that are non-military in nature (Caballery-Anthony, 2004). The financial crisis was a critical juncture to ASEAN security which revealed that the national security had a spill-over effect towards the destabilization of the authoritarian regimes that generated domestic instability across the region.

Triggered by these events, the consequences saw several institutional changes occurred within ASEAN. In order to safeguard from regional instability, ASEAN has expanded its institutions such as the ASEAN Charter, EAS, APSC, and the ADMM to name a few, attempted to ensure its member states' security interest, prevention of political marginalisation and maintain political autonomy from great powers (Koga, 2015). ASEAN sought to increase its institutional capacity through hosting meetings and consultations in order to increase confidence buildings in an effort to reduce frictions between members. In the process of greater unity, the emerging theme for the institutional framework within which ASEAN chose to label was of centrality which ASEAN would play a key role to the provision of Asia-Pacific's security (Acharya, 2017). To be sure, these reforms were not simply designed by the member states to appease the emerging security challenges. As Jones (2012, p. 116) notes, "dominant social forces needed to adopt new forms of governance and ideology in order to retain or regain their hegemony".

Not surprisingly, the institutionalisation of ASEAN principles would also become its source of political constraint to securitise at the regional level. Intra-ASEAN consultation and consensus can be difficult to sustain as the member states are consumed with domestic political crises that are often economically related (Ba, 2014; Acharya, 2017). More importantly, these security challenges also re-affirmed the close nexus between security and economics. It reinforced the perception that political legitimacy can only be achieved if the region's economy is stable (Ravenhill, 2013). To be sure, the current dynamics highlights the justification for the priority to be accorded to old security issues still persevering- maintaining regime legitimacy.

Although the region has witnessed a relative decline towards inter-state war, ASEAN members continue to contest on how regional security is reinterpreted in order to serve their own national priorities. In Jones' assessment, ASEAN's behaviour has not been consistently compliant with the norms as member states have intervened in states domestic politics in the past to protect their own regime legitimacy (Jones, 2016). As Nesadurai (2008, p. 227) explained, ASEAN members sometimes choose to deviate from ASEAN sovereignty norms and practice if it could undermine their interest. Jessop (2008) argues, states are never neutral apparatus as it is consistently contested by the social groups in order to maintain power. Yet, the important point is that the existence of ASEAN has not only provided security in the region, it also generated wealth, which benefitted the state leaders to provide gain popular support in the domestic politics (Stubbs and Mitrea, 2017). This has helped ASEAN to maintain a good deal of continuity as it has been a very important source of power for the dominant social forces (Jones, 2012a, p. 218).

6.2.1 The South China Sea Dispute

We have seen this on the impact of South China Sea that exacerbate internal tensions within ASEAN. An indicator of this is the more recent trend for regional challenges is the rise of China and its increasing assertiveness in Southeast Asia with regards to the South China Sea dispute and maritime borders further informed the complexity of the security practise in the region (Chinyong Liow and Emmers, 2006). While claimants of the South China Sea dispute may support multilateral efforts, the prospective losers will likely resist. For instance, tensions rose during Cambodia's Chairmanship in 2012 generated by its increasingly close relationship with China. The decision by Cambodia to block the statement was at the behest of China that include references that critique its assertiveness in the South China Sea. For Cambodia, as a non-claimant, the decision to challenge China would be both politically and economically devastating to the state as China is increasingly becoming an important source of its ambition to maintain regime legitimacy (Ravenhill, 2016).

I make two claims here. First, despite its challenges to further institutionalise the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, these institutional frameworks have also enabled member states to deepen ties with great powers by profiting from economic deals rather than to challenge them (Emmerson, 2016). Through ASEAN framework, meetings and consultations have allowed for claimants to increase their social interactions to increase inter-state cooperation. While much has been written about China's ambitions towards its aggressive posture over the South China Sea, there have been significant improvements in terms of economic deals between claimants.

My second claim is that the politicisation of Chinese assertiveness varies in terms of strength and its perceptions in the domestic arena. For states in Southeast Asia, dominant ideologies over the ability to rule the state have been challenged in recent times. The politicisation of the South China Sea in claimant

states provoked certain institutional elements in the society which can either enhance or constrain its ability to find alternative solutions in managing the dispute. A more concrete sense of how these dynamics emerge in practice requires analysis on the domestic conflicts underpinning the key states. The key is to identify how these dominant social forces are at work and how they exercise their interest in practice.

For instance, policymakers in Malaysia argue that aggressive responses towards China are ineffective as they see China as an economic opportunity to be exploited (Parameswaran, 2015). Rather than dealing with China forcefully as a security threat, constructive engagement with China enables Malaysia to construct a relationship to further expand its domestic political agenda. As part of China's rapprochement with Malaysia, a defence contract was signed as a joint venture between the Boustead Naval Shipyard and China Shipbuilding & Offshore International Co Ltd. as part of the deal to commissioned four littoral mission ships from China with the first two naval ships to be built in China while the remaining two littoral ships will be built in Malaysia as part of the offset program (Parameswaran, 2017). For Malaysia, the economic-security deal with China was viewed as a response to strengthen the new economic development to bolster its regime legitimacy (Felker, 2015). On the regional level, Malaysia's actions in engaging with China has also contributed to the development of cooperation between ASEAN members (Kuik, 2015).

Similarly, in the Philippines, security priority to territorial defence took a slight shift from this trajectory when Duterte (2016-present) came into power. Instead of continuing Aquino's legacies to maintain pressure against China, the Philippines saw a shift by deepening ties with China while they would become the most vocal critics on the US (Heydarian, 2018). There seems to be signs to suggest that the Duterte administration has recalibrated its security policy approach similar to Arroyo's administration. Duterte's strategy attempts to find alternatives for the Philippines strategic partnership by rekindling relations

towards China with the prospect of large infrastructural investments included in China's Belt and Road Initiatives while gravitating away from the US dependence to appease China (Heydarian, 2017). Perhaps, similar to other cases, Duterte's appear to be hedging towards China with the waning of US dominance in the region by avoiding the larger political tension that the two major superpower poses (Quintos, 2018). Under the current Duterte administration, he has put internal security and economic development as the centrepiece of his policy agenda, especially in the poverty ridden in the Southern of Philippines.

Indonesia is somewhat different to the other claimants. Although China is indirectly a threat Indonesia, in recent years, its small claim on the South China Sea has been a subject of territorial contestation with the emerging power. However, under the current Jokowi administration, the increasing polarising domestic audience in Indonesia has forced the state actors to take a more aggressive response on China. For Indonesia, illegal fishing conducted by Chinese trawlers could be potentially devastating to the Indonesian livelihood as it is an important source of revenue for the local market (Sulaiman, 2019). Even as Jokowi displayed a strong show of force against China, Indonesia also desperately needed Chinese investments to support Jokowi's development projects because of the economic slowdown that depressed Indonesia's commodity exports (OECD, 2016)

Despite this, the logic continuity of ASEAN derives from its institutional purpose of its ability to defend certain domestic actors to maintain power over the domestic. As a regional body, the institution may act as an institutional arena in which states struggle for influences or may actively intervene in the domestic interest. These procedures have been ritualised and act as a symbol for the elites to justify their rulings especially in the domestic arena (Davies, 2018). Thus, it is sometimes difficult to gain policy coherences from ASEAN as different states are ruled by different social groups, naturally these dominant actors advanced their own interest in order to preserve their own autonomy.

While external security helped to frame some of the challenges that ASEAN member states face today, the perennial conundrum of internal instabilities continues to be plagued in their domestic that challenge the legitimacy of the state (Chalk, 2001). Yet, as we have seen, the sequence of historical conflict has the potential to profoundly shape institutional solutions, constrained by a prevailing strategic concern which forces its security policy behaviours to be. As such, in the highly globalised world, internal security challenges remained significant whereby the contemporary strategic context in the past still informs the present (Beeson, 2014).

In sum, the core of security perception in Southeast Asia continue to reflect that the levels of economic development are necessary step to maintain political legitimacy. It is therefore relatively necessary for member states to securitize their economy (Caballero-Anthony, 2008). As previously noted, the answer lies in the diversity of ASEAN states. If we choose to accept that different states are being dominated by different dominant powers, it provides us the analytical tools to analyse how specific actors choose to respond to threat perceptions to advance their interest. Because state formation varies and states are captured by different social forces, they have often used regional institutions such as ASEAN to protect and ensure that dominant oligarchs interest can be realised in the regional context (Jayasuriya, 2004).

6.3 The Continuing tension in Domestic and Regime Legitimacy:

Political Crisis and its Significance towards Security Policy in Southeast Asia

Since the post-Cold War, there have not been any major wars between states in Southeast Asia. Relations between Indochina and ASEAN members have begun to normalise devoid of contention that could escalate to full-scale war. On the surface, it appears that the defeat of communism in Southeast Asia paved the way for a dramatic transformation of ASEAN economies and politics.

Further, two of the case studies have transitioned from authoritarian to democratisation (Indonesia and the Philippines), while Malaysia and Singapore maintained authoritarian regimes.

According to Hamilton-Hart (2013), cases of domestic insecurity in Southeast Asia from secession movements, communal tensions to terrorism, and other mass outbreak of violence have shown that economic motives appear to be the trigger for conflict that can create a spill-over effect to the regional security. One would also note that while economic security has long been securitised by the states, it was not until the 97/98 financial crisis that economic security gained more urgency in the region (Caballero-Anthony, 2008).

For Southeast Asia, the significant source of legitimacy continues to favour economic development to achieve sovereignty. However, the rise of these capitalist states in the post-Cold War would also become the key to domestic contention as relations between social forces create unequal level access to state power and resources. As previous chapters have shown, the class relations and social cleavages can often be intertwined that can become a subject of political contestation. As the institutionalisation of certain norms, rules and organisation have created a path dependent effect, these institutions can become contested when certain sequences such as the financial crisis weakened their legitimacy. Thus, the trajectory of internal tension is a product of struggle between contesting social forces (Jayasuriya, 2004). This would provide us the context on why certain security policy continue to persist in the region.

6.3.1 Malaysia: Increasingly Contentious

In Malaysia, one could cite that its economy has been primarily the dominant security logic to guarantee regime legitimacy. Prior to the 97/98 crisis, Malaysia's nation-state building program of the NEP was completed and

successful in building the Bumiputera capitalist. Malaysia also emerged as one of the fastest growing countries in the region, creating a large pool of Malay in the middle-income. Yet, the target for the wealth accumulation of the Malays set by the NEP was not met (Abdul Khalid, 2014). To this end, Mahathir introduced his development strategies which arose from his own complex visions to replace and restructure the NEP with the Vision 2020 with a similar policy of pattern through layering and the recalibration of state interventionism (Felker, 2015). With the institutionalisation of the NEP as a guiding principle, the Vision 2020 was a policy layering framed around the basic contours of the nation-state building project, to enhance Bumiputra's economy (Case, 2001). This would also set the path for his successors as a policy structure designed to promote the ethnic redistribution programs.

To reduce the state's burden, government increased privatisation and government linked companies (GLC) to increase the distributional policy and expand the Bumiputera class. With Mahathir's ideological and political ambitions moulded by an improving economic condition and the consolidation of power, Mahathir sought to further industrialise the economy with highly technological manufacturing industry through FDI with domestic linkages. However, Mahathir would also face a dilemma to meet the growing needs to provide security. Since the military was ill-equipped, Malaysia was compelled to modernise its military in order to overcome its insecurity (Singh, 2004). Hence, rather than simply promoting Malaysia's security, Mahathir sought to create linkages between economic development and security. As a political maverick, Mahathir leverages the FDI as a new source of externally driven growth part of his political agenda to increase the push for domestic and economic restructuring that was married to his domestic national goals (Jomo, 2002). Mahathir launched a security policy of military procurement as leverage for weapon manufacturing states to accept offset programs to upgrade Malaysia's economy to meet his redistributive national policies as part of the military deal. Mahathir explained that implicitly

military modernisation is often a subject of politicisation if further economic prospects can be achieved during the process of military procurement which can contribute to other civilian industry (Mahathir, 2016).

The ruling elites used state-led initiative policies to maintain their intimate relations with business elites through distribution of patronages (Tan, 2015a). With the elites sharing the common perceptions informed by their history legacies, Brownlee (2017, p. 203) argued that the combination of ideological Malay agenda and the steady stream of patronages binds together the fractious elites in a durable coalition that would enable individual advancement amid collective security. The desire to increase the national capabilities and industrial skills in the national workforce allowed the ruling elites to pioneer the policy of military acquisitions to intertwine with the national development goals that is intrinsic to Bumiputera policy. High skilled industries such as the aerospace, naval, and the automotive industries were given top priority on military modernisation project as these are often sub-sectors of the defence industry.




Figure 6.1 (Source: World Bank Data, 2019).

This saw the increase in state-owned enterprises to facilitate growth of the Bumiputera capitalist often maintaining close ties with the regime as shown in figure 6.1. In an interview, according to Mahathir, the establishment of Malaysia's own defence industry served the purpose of raising the employment level both in the military and civilian as well as government's strategy to improve the standard of industrial development growth, and a fresh source of revenue for the government (Mahathir, 2016). Mahathir used Malaysia's security policy to create new avenues for Malay capitalists to grow so as to relate his perception on domestic issues. Mahathir made use of extensive complex offset programs to nurture the Malay economy in order to increase the participation of the Malays in the technological sector. To achieve his vision, Mahathir used various institutions such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry to create a local chain supply of these advanced technological industry through the collaboration of international companies to develop the Malay's competency.

In this telling, Malaysia initiated the use of military acquisition programs as an opportunity to use its security policy to strengthen ties with major powers who are also defence producing countries for external security as well as to meet their national redistributive policies. As military purchases are often sanctioned by the government of weapon producing states, Malaysia began to expand its foreign relations by purchasing military equipment with countries such as the U.S., Russia and the UK as part of its trade policies to strengthen bilateral ties while at the same time providing Malaysia with the military capabilities to enhance its security. The best example came from the acquisition for the upgrade of the Royal Malaysian Airforce. Malaysia bought 18 Mig-29 fighter jets worth US\$600 million with a counter-trade deal with Russia. As part of the trade, US\$95 million worth of Bumiputera produced palm oil and other palm oil products were bought by Russia (Abdul Ghani, 2011).

However, policies associated with the securitisation of the economy causes tension between the state and society. Rather than providing security to the state,

military procurements are often subjected to patronages at the expense of Malaysia's security (M.A.1, 2017; M.B.1, 2017). In the crucible of the 1997/98 financial crisis Malaysia's domestic politics began to fracture as the economic crisis followed by the fall of Malaysian currency saw a deep fragment between the state and society. The Asian financial crisis has devastated the Malaysian economy. Malaysia imposed a state led intervention to bail out well-connected business elites to prevent from the economic collapse (Gomez, 2004).

Reflecting on the fall of Suharto in Indonesia, this emboldened Anwar and his supporters to the call for political reform to sweep Mahathir's regime for chronic corruption, cronyism and nepotism (Felker, 1999). In the 1999 election, Anwar set a political platform for other alternative parties to contest in the general election. Although BN managed to maintain its institutional resilience, it severely weakened elite coalitions of the ruling party. The financial crisis would also set the path for more competition between merging forces to challenge the dominance of UMNO. As more educated Malay middle-class emerge, it is organic that they would demand for more political freedom, transparency and public goods (Gomez, 2016). Fearing that ethnic tension would erupt, it was a routine agenda for the political elites that resources allocated for military modernization in Malaysia to be subjected to diversion for distribution (Noor and Qistina, 2017).

The most forceful attempt to challenge the BN government came during Najib Razak's administration (2009-2018). The sequence of problems such as the rising cost of living, the implementation of the General Service Tax (GST), excessive corruption revolving around the 1MDB scandal, disgruntled Malay middle class and low oil prices eventually deepened elite fragmentation. Led by Mahathir, Muhyiddin and other political giants in UMNO defected from the party to join the opposition. This severely affected Malaysia's military modernisation as the BN party diverted its resources to respond to the domestic unrest. The BN regime would again resort to patronages by heavily distributing rents that favours

ethnic Malay constituents in the rural and public sectors involving Malay rights. Though Malaysia's defence posture in recent years have come to its shelf life and is in need to modernise the military, economic condition severely affected Malaysia's military expenditure with the ruling government cutting the defence expenditure (Lockman, 2019). It forced its policy agenda to shift towards short term distribution policy to maintain the regime status quo at the expense of long-term goals (Gomez, 2016; Case, 2017).

The economic and political crisis also evoked the pre-existing cleavages which challenged BN's legitimacy in a context where they perceived the institutional arrangement as a problem of institutional decay. Najib made an appeal to UMNO Supreme Council members and division chiefs as a foundation of UMNO's power and the legitimation of protectors of the Malay rights to increase their loyalty to the party (Case, 2017). Recently, the new Pakatan Harapan regime led by Mahathir released Malaysia's 2019 Defence White Paper as a guideline for the nation's security concerns and its policy guidelines, replacing the 2010 Defence White Paper that was put forth by the previous regime. Despite the regime change, Malaysia's national security priority saw little changes that shared similar path to the previous regime to focus on nation-building involving the development of Malays (Noor, 2017).

6.3.2 Indonesia: Persistent Domestic Security Threats and the Institutional Legacy of New Order

What accounts for the striking continuity in Indonesia's security concept spanning from the authoritarian regime to the democratic regime? I make two arguments here. Though the institutional reforms in the wake of Asian financial crisis can be measured with relative success, the course of democratisation has not been a smooth consolidation of democratic regime (Jayasuriya and Rodan, 2007). As the intense political contestation demonstrates, the path towards

military depoliticisation in Indonesia was resisted, owing to its past roles in maintaining political order. Secondly, the devolution of power from the centre would also create political instability in the periphery which challenges Indonesia's regime legitimacy.

In spite of Indonesia institutional changes after the fall of Suharto, on closer inspection, these reforms were thus only partially successful. Instead, the institutional reforms concerned a reassertion of control between political players over its internal affairs (Honna, 2005; Mietzner, 2006). Yet, it did not sufficiently guarantee that the military would be subservient to civilian authority. During the early period of the post-authoritarian transition, the successful military reform was initiated by the top military echelons from the winning military faction to get ahead of the curve rather than risking in political convulsion. The institutional drift creates opportunities for the military to pursue their goals that are favourable to the military while working within a set of complex situations (Greenlees, 2011). The military had an incentive to negotiate with the civilian leaders to protect their political and economic interest without significantly affect its access to state power. Most significantly, the military continues to maintain its hegemonic position in the territorial command structure especially in the security decision-making (Croissant *et al.*, 2013).

Clearly, the fall of the New Order had an impact to the institutional changes that would also create political instability. The military institutional reform was halted after Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) was ousted from the Presidential position and was replaced by his more conservative nationalist vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Part of the increasing security problems was the transition to a pluralist politics, which highlighted the deep fragmentation in the civilian politics that forced the governments to form a coalition of political parties with different interest (Bünthe and Ufen, 2009).

Indeed, the changes in the ordering power provided the space for competing groups between the centre and the periphery to mobilise and change

the status quo in the distribution of power and economic resources (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). As the oligarchs were reorganising their power in the central Jakarta in the post-Suharto, there were conflicting views among civilian policymakers on whether to rely on the military to maintain political order. The intertwining of security policymaking with the struggle for domestic political struggles forced its security concept to a more domestic which began during the Megawati presidency (Aspinall, 2014).

Perhaps, what strengthens the legitimacy of the military presence in Indonesia was the myriads of security issues, limiting the central government to implement its widespread reform within the military. The government routinely mobilised their extensive security apparatuses to suppress the periphery territories exacerbated the state-society relations. These insecurities are often interwoven with the political corruption and violence that were inflicted during Suharto which exacerbated political grievances amongst the local against the central government. Between 1999 to 2004, uneven economic development heightened tension in the periphery saw the rise in secessionist movement especially in resource rich areas in Aceh, Kalimantan, Papua, and Sulawesi (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). The fall of New Order also saw generated religious movements in Maluku (van Klinken, 2000), the war on terrorism after the Bali bombing in 2002, Jakarta bombing in 2009, illegal fishing, and the increasing resentment from communal and ethnic violence in the post New Order (Sukma, 2011). As Hadiz (2018) notes, the increase in religious and separatist movements was symptomatic of the capitalist disengagement between the state and the society, frustrated by the endemic oligarchic corruption.

However, the impetus of Indonesia's security policy was the mounting internal security challenges and the risk of possible national disintegration within the periphery. The independence of East Timor in 1999 under President Habibie was a catalyst for the policymakers, which created resentment among the conservative military that the civilian authority was weak in preventing the

territorial loss (US State Department, 1999). The military perceived that the civilian lack in the state capacity to keep the territorial integrity that they sought to build during the New Order. In fact, active duty officers were promoted to civilian Ministries, increasing the participation of the military (Laksmana, 2019). More importantly, the loss of East Timor also meant the loss of economic revenues for the military as it holds vast amount of businesses in the territory (Aditjondro, 1999). The political elites recognised that addressing the social grievances in the periphery remains a priority to its nation-state building.

Civilian leaders soon realised that the police as a civilian security force was incapable of managing political violence. It is in this logic that the escalating internal security gave the military the opportunity to set a new political arrangement with the oligarchs to include the military in the policy decision-making to maintain its sovereignty. Given the embedded nature of the military's place in economy and the importance of the economic interest in financing the military's upkeep, it is likely that the military will collaborate and continue to play a prominent role in security decision-making (Beeson, 2006). The coalition pact mobilised a powerful discourse of 'security-as-part-of-defence', which embedded a nationalist claim of NKRI of national unity and political stability (Honna, 2009). Importantly, the discourse has effectively justified the military to maintain its strong presence in the conflict prone territories and in security decision-making for nation-state building and to defend the oligarchic economic interest.

Furthermore, regaining its position in the internal security has been vital to support the national interest as well as the military's economic interest. The TNI was concerned that the territorial command structure would be subject for reform which could weaken its capability to extract economic resources (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Despite the legal reform in 2004, the military still retains subsequent amount of businesses across the territorial region to support a slim budget to maintain the upkeep of the military (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

According to (Honna, 2017), regaining its role in internal security was crucial for maintaining the size of the military. Between 2001 and 2018, the Indonesian military grew in strength from 297,000 personnel to 395,000 personnel (Military Balance, 2001; 2018).

According to Aspinall (2016), the military legitimises its position as an important player through mutual dependence on the basis of nationalist rhetoric that was shaped by its historical roots. To further institutionalise the military's role in the post-Suharto era, the TNI released a Defence White Paper 'The Role of TNI in the 21st Century' which asserted its commitment of military professionalism to support the national ideology of Pancasila on territorial unity and to defend the national interest (Pertahanan, 2003). Since then, the military has released two more White Papers, reiterating the military's position in security. The TNI claimed that its roles have shifted from the traditional threats to include non-traditional threats such as terrorism, separatist movement, illegal fishing and armed rebellions.

The issue on the South China Sea with illegal fishing has been an increasingly contentious issue that often overlaps with the foreign threats (Laksmna, 2018). It is the persistence of internal threats and a few external threats that enhanced the military prerogatives over the legitimacy of its roles to defend Indonesia's economic interest that is often closely linked to the national security (Laksmna, 2018). In response, the TNI initiated calculated measures to increase its capacity to deter external threats while at the same time reassert its effectiveness in the counterterrorism and to safeguard from territorial disintegration. Under Yudhoyono and Jokowi, military expenditure saw a significant increase. This was further updated in the most recent Defence White Paper in 2015 which outlined the seamless role of the TNI in its commitment to preserve the military and non-military defence (Pertahanan, 2015). In this perspective, the integration of the military in the security decision-making would create a stronger nation-state to ensure the integrity of the state. Such a

phenomena suggests a trade-off whereby the military remained a key component to uphold the regime coalition in order to muster a coherent policy to deal with the political insecurity.

Under the current Jokowi administration, there seems little to suggest that there is a major shift in the security perceptions as the internal security continue to be the most pressing agenda in Indonesia. For Jokowi, national integration and economic development as opposed to strengthening the civilian institution remains the key priority to his presidency (Diprose and Azca, 2019). The aforementioned analysis on the regime breakdown heightened the tension for distribution of power between centre and periphery have escalated in recent years. In 2015, the re-emergence of inter-religious and communal conflict as a result of economic disproportional growth during the New Order regime in Poso, Sulawesi highlighted the relevance of the military form maintaining political order (Nasrum, 2016). To ensure that the security policies remain within the purview of the military, retired military leaders have held important positions in the Cabinet with security portfolios. Specifically, the position of Coordinating Minister for Political, Security, Legal and Security Affairs that oversees security related ministries have been historically dominated by the military. High ranking military officials have especially vested interest in preservation of its roles in security policymaking as they could then continue their foothold in the military and economic interest in the archipelago (Honna, 2017).

Consistent with the theme of the thesis as part of an overall assessment over Indonesia, the significance of the rising levels of armed violence in the periphery continue to demonstrate that internal security presents a significant challenge to the government. The institutional legacies of its authoritarian past seem to matter over the nature of state structure that shaped the nation's security priorities. This section has shown that the recent trajectory of security crises in Indonesia derived from the development trajectory that span over several decades over the endemic internal conflict. One of the critical remarks that the endemic

internal security conflict was the breakdown of elite coalition in the penultimate of the New Order regime displayed political instability in the archipelago which raises serious security tensions.

Although the New Order regime was effective in maintaining order, this was achieved by leveraging the military subservient to the executive as patronage politics was prevalent especially in the security policy. However, the practice of patronage politics would also create severe tension between elites over access to state resources. Whereas in the case of Malaysia and Singapore saw a strong party-state to requisite a degree of national identity and social cohesion to distribute patronage, in the case of Indonesia, the inability to successfully monopolise the use of coercion to achieve social cohesion showcases its lack of civilian institutional strength to legitimize political order. Instead, the civilian authorities continued reliance on coercion in ordering power suggest that the regime lacked a significant capacity of national unity led to further insecurity.

6.3.3 *Persistent Internal Insurgency in the Philippines*

Since the fall of Marcos, the Philippines has made an inroad path to democratisation, creating a legal mechanism that saw the institutionalisation of the civilian authority to oversight the military. The closure of US base seems to force the AFP that there would be a doctrinal shift from the internal to external defence. Perhaps, an important issue to shape the trajectory of the Philippine security policy is its continued path dependence on the preferences for alliance with the US. After the US military withdrawal in 1992, the Philippines realised that it needed to rely on the US patronage for external security in addition to maintaining domestic political order (Morada and Collier, 1998). As the AFP were predominantly preoccupied with the burden of internal insurgencies, the cost of military modernization to build a credible external defence force would overwhelm the government's dire fiscal position that the AFP had to undertake.

The significance of the U.S. military presence cannot be understated as it was deemed a strategic deterrence against Chinese activism and any external threats. The U.S. military base was also an important economic source for the Philippines as the US pays US\$180 million to the government yearly to fund its military (Press, 1988). Even before the War on Terror in 2001, the loss of access to US military equipment and technologies confronting the Philippines forced the revival of its alliance with the US under the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1997. This would facilitate the US to enter the Philippine territory for bilateral exercise under the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (Cruz De Castro, 2014).

The Philippines began an ambitious modernisation program to transform the military to a conventional role. According to Croissant et.al (2013), the law would further institutionalise the military to civilian authority, thus giving greater control in security policy decision-making. This would also provide Ramos the opportunity to create Huntington's (1995) description of a professionalised military, diverting its role from internal security. Through the civilian constitution, Ramos pushed for military reform by shifting its roles to external security on territorial and maritime defence while subsequently reducing its roles in internal affairs, which gave the institutional power for the police in counter-insurgency (Hall, 2007).

Although Ramos' advocacy for military reform appeared to be strong, however, the barrier to Philippines military modernisation program was hampered by delays in the Congress (Cruz De Castro, 2005). Given that the weak economic development has a direct impact on the stability of the state, it lacked the capacity to modernize the military and to provide credible deterrence to the encroaching Chinese presence. The fact that the modernisation program took so long to be implemented highlights the security priorities for the Philippines: the economic condition and the continued U.S. presence. The consequence of the oligarchic return to power limits the access for executive and the military to finite

state resources to develop a credible defence posture. More pertinent is that political elites in the Congress were also reluctant to fund the AFP because of the political violence under the Marcos regime coercing these powerful political elites (Roces, 2000). Due to the 1997/98 financial crisis, the oligarchs in the Senate used the power of the purse to micromanage and delay the modernization program citing more domestic structural concerns over the financial meltdown and economic downturn (Cruz De Castro, 2014). Even though the issue on the South China Sea were serious and involved in the stand-off, instead, the Philippines resorted to ASEAN for regional diplomacy by issuing its diplomatic support to resolve their differences in a peaceful manner (Zha and Valencia, 2001).

And yet, parallel to Indonesia, the Philippines security continues to demonstrate its focus on internal as persistent domestic security are detriment to affect its abilities to shift its security concept to territorial defence. This is because, the inherent nature of Philippine state institution set a path dependence that culminate its strategic culture to focus on its internal insecurities. For the Philippines, the most fundamental source of security challenges emanates from its internal crises. Although the regime transition from authoritarianism to democracy would have reduced political contestation, as with Indonesia, the Philippines continues to face serious social conflict towards the concept of its Filipino identity through the persistent of ideologically or religiously inspired armed rebellions especially concentrated in the resource-rich but impoverished South (Banlaoi, 2009). Though there have been various peace agreements and negotiations between the state, the Moro rebels, and the Communist rebels, however, it has yet to bring about sustainable peace to the region. Due to its failure to consolidate the different religion and culture in its nation-building efforts, the lingering effects of power struggles for political autonomy have profoundly influenced the path dependence on how the state develop its national security.

By the end of the Cold War, relations between the civilian and military have stabilised especially during the Ramos administration. After serving as Secretary of Defence under Cory Aquino's administration, Ramos was in position to effectively reduce military defection through his association by relying on military support, appointing retired military to his cabinet to enhance his regime legitimacy (Chambers, 2014). Moreover, The Philippines managed to contain communist threats with the restoration of democracy with its membership declining. Due to internal rifts within the top echelons, it weakened their ideological influences throughout the archipelago (Quimpo, 2009). On the other hand, Moro insurgency also declined as a result of Ramos approach to appeal to the MNLF over a peace agreement signed in Indonesia in 1996. The peace agreement saw the development of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), devolving power from the state which allowed the territory to be ruled by Moro people (Cagoco-Guiam, 2006). The establishment of the ARMM would also saw the appointment of Nur Misuari, leader of the MNLF as its first governor. Perhaps, more significantly is that the peace agreement signalled a transformation of the MNLF from an insurgent group into a formal political organisation representing the Moro people.

With a persistent internal instability, the political outcomes have led the Philippine government to focus on state resources to quash the internal threats often with excessive use of force. Crucially, despite achieving peace agreement with the MNLF in 1996 during Ramos administration, sporadic violence continued to be carried out by the breakaway secessionist group MILF and other MNLF factions. According to Quimpo (2016), the fragility of the ARMM peace agreement failed to address critical matters of land, governance and control over the Moro. At one level, the reason for the failure to reach an effective peace agreement can be traced by its failure to include other rebellion groups during the peace negotiations, creating deeper political grievances. Similar to the national politics, Mindanao constitutes different political clans and families to compete

over access to state resources in the economically deprived territory (Lara Jr & Champain, 2009). At another level, the exacerbation of its insecurity remains on the uneven level of control of power resources and economic opportunities that are concentrated among the Christians as a consequence of its history (Gutierrez and Borrás Jr, 2004). As such, the ARMM region continues to be the poorest region in the Philippines, neglected by the state from the benefits of national economic growth have prolong the regional conflict.

However, a further concern towards the social disorder would also breed more aggressive groups of anti-establishment in the Philippines. The failure by the state to adequately resolve the political violence gave rise to extremism in Mindanao, which is seen as an expression of political discontent towards the state (Quilala, 2018). By the 2000s, it was engaged in the global War on terror with an extremist Moro separatist group, the Abu Sayyaf group that is linked to the Al-Qaeda emerged terrorising the Philippines, adding to its host of internal security challenges (Kraft, 2011). Though by 2006, the military success in the operation to neutralise Abu Sayyaf was followed by the killing of its chieftain Khadaffy Janjalani, meaning that the group would turn into disarray. More recently, since assuming presidency, Duterte was faced with internal insurgency in 2017 in Marawi led by the alliance of Maute group and the Abu Sayyaf group that pledge its allegiance to ISIS. Prior to the Marawi siege, MILF leaders had warned that the rise of extremism would complicate the process for peaceful conflict (Unson, 2015).

Whereas in other case studies saw the effective repression against the Communist insurgencies, the Philippines CPP continues its armed struggles to overthrow the state in the post-Cold War. Although there was a decrease of its membership and scattered all over the archipelago, the CPP-NPA remains a deadly nuisance that harasses wealthy businesses through extortions and disrupts business productions that refuses to pay revolutionary taxes (Holden and Jacobson, 2007). Owing largely to the oligarchic stranglehold of the political

system and the state resources, the CPP insurgents have managed to gather enough support to continue waging war against the state (Quilop, 2005; Quimpo, 2014).

The communist insurgency would also remain a security problem as the local commanders of the NPA have the autonomy to conduct insurgencies over social discontent particularly on endemic poverty and inequality in land-owning peasants. For instance, the killing of mining activists has become more rampant since the enactment of Mining Act in 1995, which saw the displacement of indigenous communities and the destruction of the environment in place of economic development left bitter contestation between the locals and the state (Holden, 2013). In 2016, Duterte declared that he was willing to pardon the communist leaders to end the 50-year conflict. Yet, despite promising talks about resolution, the communist insurgents have been actively operating within these areas where the local governments and military leaders have great autonomy in the security policy.

Taking from the cue above, the Philippines primary concerns have been the containment of social unrest of armed rebellions and ideological conflicts that dominate its national security agenda caused by its constrained economic development (Morada, 2011). Successive regimes since Marcos recognised that economic development and poverty as an inherent source of internal conflict. According to Duterte's Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, the ongoing campaign has slowed down the efforts to modernise its military as the internal security operations has displaced the state's capacity to effectively divert resources for territorial defence (Priam, 2018).

Despite Duterte's acerbic rhetoric and his combination of unorthodox methods with the U.S., the Philippines did not completely abandon its bilateral relations. Perhaps, not surprisingly, the disjuncture in the Philippines relations have typically involved a selective policy layering of new ones on top of the old ones. The U.S. presence has been successfully institutionalised to the Philippines

security as the AFP as the military elites have interlocking interest with the US (P.B2, 2019). The Visiting Force Agreement has been especially important for the AFP as it allows for U.S. forces to assist on counter-insurgency operations while it also advances the military's corporate interest, allowing for the funding and doubling of its military's salary.

In 2016, the U.S. helped inaugurate Duterte's 'War on Drug' by providing sum of US\$32 million to the police for training, equipment and rule of law (Anon., 2016). Thus, even though Chinese assertiveness triggered initial actions to prioritise the AFP to a more conventional role, the U.S. presence establishes its roles for Philippine policymakers that the responsibility for its external security falls over the former colony. The U.S. remains an extremely influential actor to its economic and security which is not limited to the intensification of Chinese growing presence, but also its preoccupation on domestic conditions to support military operations on intelligence and reports in Mindanao as well as providing fund to the AFP's military modernisation program (Ba, 2017). As Ba (2017) notes, though there appears to be a downgrading of U.S.-Philippine, both states also expressed opportunities to expand different types of security ties that are less confrontational to China.

Recently, despite the variance of security behaviour under Duterte, it presents a rationale for continuing trajectory that focuses on the pervasive poverty and inequality perpetrated against the Mindanao (Philippines National Security Council, 2017). Due to pre-existing divisions, the lack of autonomy in the Muslim dominated territory creates a contentious environment as they continue to challenge the ruling elites. This was evident especially in its National Security Policy whereby the 2011-2016 policy under the Aquino administration and the 2017-2022 policy under Duterte administration highlighted that territorial disintegration, economic development and security are intertwined which hampered the nation-state (Philippine National Security Council, 2011; 2017). In this regard, the politics of policy-making institutions in the Philippines present an

unlevel playing field as the ruling elites often securitised the problem of territorial disintegration as routinised practiced through security actions to manage threats.

Two key problems remain as hindrances towards a more equitable conflict resolution in the post-authoritarian Marcos regimes: weak state and a politicised military. The systemic persistence of armed conflicts are all reflective of the weak predatory state that is incapable of solving material inequalities in areas that were deprived of public goods due to the unlevel power in Manila and Christian dominated region in the country (Regilme Jr, 2016). Unlike more established states such as Malaysia and Singapore, the Philippines remains unconsolidated in the post-authoritarian and is still engaged in nation-building especially in the Muslim South. The apparent lack of ideational roots in the return of electoral politics with a legal framework provided by the constitution, followed by a weak bureaucracy rendered to advance the narrow interest of the oligarchs (Quimpo, 2009).

If it is to be remembered, the legacies of institutional dysfunction in the return of electoral democracy saw the dominance of the oligarchic social forces to control the rules of the game who are more concerned in the accumulation of private wealth as opposed to national interest (Banlaoi, 2009). The oligarch operates as a constraint on the official policy for peaceful resolution because these groups have the capacity to restrain or overturn the implementation of national policies in defence of their own interest. Owing largely to the consequence of weak state institutions and elite polarisation, it lacked the capacity to provide the resources in managing its internal security threats (Putzel, 2018). For instance, during the 1996 peace agreement between MNLF and the state, Christian politicians and landlords stridently campaigned against the resolution fearing the loss over their land access, stirring up anti-Muslim sentiments which escalated into conflict (Gutierrez, 1999). Perhaps, similar case would present itself in 2008 under Arroyo when the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between MILF and the state were denounced by some Christian

politicians in the Congress by whipping up some anti-Moro sentiments. Politicians claimed that the deal made by Arroyo was done without the consultation and transparency which would lead to an eventual territorial disintegration and declaration of MILF independence (Romero, 2008).

Up until recently, the MILF signed a peace agreement with the government under the Aquino administration in 2014 which was mediated by Malaysia. The agreement was seen as a major legacy for Aquino's administration as the MILF would renounce its main objective of separatism, and the Bangsamoro would be provided with greater autonomy under the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). Since then, the Duterte administration has followed similar steps set by his predecessor to improve the current conditions in the Southern territory. However, it remains to be seen whether the Duterte administration can uphold the ceasefire as some ex-combatant from the MILF faction continue to oppose the peace agreement (Maitem & Gallardo, 2019).

On the other hand, similar to Indonesia, the problems of civilian control and the subordination of military in the Philippines especially in internal insurgency operations would also present two insightful analysis that shape the state's insecurity. Even when the civilian authorities have initiated peace efforts to find a political solution with communist leaders and Muslim separatist, they struggle to control the military institutions and its instruments of violence that would lead to military intervention in its domestic politics (Espesor, 2019). This was illustrative in the Duterte administration when the CPP peace talk in 2017 began to unravel as both sides accused each other of taking advantage of the ceasefire (Ocampo, 2019). Consequently, the oligarchic political behaviours have led to severe internal political tension and conflict in the society, engendering the military attempts at mutiny and coups, and civil society movement (Quimpo, 2014).

To maintain power relations between the civilian authorities and the military, succeeding regimes utilised the informal institutional arrangements by

appointing members of the high echelon in the military replacing some politicians in the local government units, national level and even holding positions in the executive branch. That served as a political patronage to the powerful political families with the prerogatives of the office of the president in implementing agrarian reform and national development (Hernandez, 2007). Military officers that were loyal to the administration were appointed to various positions in civilian governance, including in big revenue generating departments such as Department of Transportation and Communication and the Bureau of Customs. This trend continued under the Aquino administration (2010-2016) where retired generals under the AFP and the PNP are appointed into the cabinet ministers. Recently, under the Duterte Administration (2016-present) 59 retired generals in the security sector of the PNP and AFP were appointed as cabinet as well as other government owned corporations (Zamora and Tubeza, 2017).

Not surprisingly, the detrimental effects of a politicised military inherited during the Marcos era to dominate security policy is an institutional problem that remained unresolved. This is due to the lack of professionalism especially in the abusive coercive apparatus that would aggravate internal security threats. For the AFP, the need to preserve its presence and in politics in conflict-prone areas to safeguard the nation is difficult for civilian authorities to overcome (Hall, 2017). The scale of political contestation and the inability by the state to provide order especially in the South often leads to excessive use of force for repression (Human Rights Watch, 2015). In retrospect, the internal security challenges amid the return of democracy seem inevitable. While the security policy in the Philippines saw a trajectory shift to external defence, the persistence of internal challenges has rendered the nation-state to be focused on defending its political legitimacy.

6.3.4 Singapore's Security Policy: Renewing Security Vulnerability in the Post-Cold War

Singapore is perhaps a significant exception. Foreign relations began to normalise among the ASEAN members as well as with other major powers. The US became a major security and economic partner for Singapore, while relations with China became the largest trading partner for Singapore. As war in the region appears to be more unlikely between neighbours largely due to the complex security web of various regional institutions, it makes it more costly to go to war with each other (Stubbs, 2014). Similar to all cases, the increase in democratisation and liberalisation in other parts of the world also influence the social transformation through individualism and the atomisation of family (Ortmann, 2009). The increase in middle class formed by the rapid economic development that is state driven was also dependent on the capability of state to provide economic growth and security in the society. The possibility of changes within the population's views to be more democratic appears to be more appealing as democratisation is taking place on the other side of the world. With the regional order appearing to be more stable and Singapore achieving domestic stability, it was against this backdrop that the ruling elites adjusted its ideology to accommodate the situational shift.

Whereas war between state seems to be unlikely during peacetime, non-traditional security challenges such as secularism, terrorism and increasing opposition party have been the main challenges for the PAP regime. Yet, with a strong party-state institution by the end of the Cold War, the PAP shared similar institutional capacity in UMNO Malaysia to order power. In 1991, the government released a White Paper on "Shared Values" headed by Lee Hsien Loong (the current Prime Minister) to develop further Singapore's identity based on 'Asian values' of "nation before community and society", "family as the basic unit of society", "community support" and "respect for individual, consensus, not

conflict” and “racial and religious harmony” (Singapore Government, 1991). Above all, the emphasis of the values resides on the nation implies that these values could be implicated through other purposes (Khong, 1995).

The shared values further supplemented its security concept as it attempts to bridge the ruling elites with the population (Ortmann, 2009). Even though these values may then provide the ruling elites to implement narrow-based policies, nevertheless, it has empowered dominant actors to identify the policy that is seemingly for national interest through the emphasis of security through unity (Khong, 1995). These values were also used to justify the ruling elites’ policy agenda in the changes in regional or global context. Between 1990-2002 Goh Chok Tong and other ASEAN leaders advocated the termed as ‘Asian values’ in order to convince the domestic that development overrides Western style democracy (Thompson, 2001).

Singapore’s national identity suffered setbacks in the 97/98 financial crisis. The Asian values were often associated with corruption which poses a challenge to its political legitimacy (Acharya, 2008). The crisis saw elite contestation in Malaysia and the downfall of Suharto’s regime, yet, in Singapore, the ruling elites cohesion remains strong despite the growing dissatisfaction in the middle class (Thompson, 2001). Unlike in Malaysia, which saw the government slash its military budget to accommodate its economic policy, Singapore was heavily dependent on its high defence spending that served as an important legacy to boost its legitimacy. More significantly, Singapore’s hegemonic ideology of extreme vulnerability surrounded by the Malay states encouraged the PAP to further entrench itself in defence. After decades of uninterrupted PAP dominance, fixed routines, loyalties and patterns of interactions transcend any political individuals from deviating about the proper political order (Slater, 2012).

After the 97/98 crisis, there were no other alternative parties that resembles the PAP’s track record in providing security and economic development despite the crisis (Tan, 2015). With its expansive state capacity, the PAP government

published a Defence White Paper titled *Defending Singapore in the 21st Century* (Ministry of Defence Singapore, 2000), outlining that each year the government is committed to spending 6% of the GDP each year to maintain operational readiness of the SAF. The ruling elites have justified that Singapore's military expenditure to the public that it was committed to invest in the military to support the national security concept.

Since 9/11, terrorism and the sporadic outburst relations between its neighbours demonstrates that internal and external threats have conflated through the elites' perceptions of security to the city-state. Globalisation has been fundamental in reconfiguring the power and interest of the local elites that undermines the state capacity to underwrite policy frameworks upon which such constellation of power is dependent for the regime legitimacy (Beeson, 2003). The global terrorist threats have further strengthened the PAP's rhetoric of vulnerability and the need to enforce its security policy designed to protect both domestic and abroad. Local Jemaah Islamiyah's plot to attack critical sites in 2002 has certainly affected the political legitimacy of the PAP government that threats were from within its multicultural fabrics (Vasu, 2008). Though these threats were swiftly countered through ISA, however, it highlighted that Singapore's structural nature of its multiculturalism (Rodan, 2009).




Figure 6.2 Source: (World Bank, 2019)

In recent years, the PAP is increasingly facing resistance from the domestic on its relatively high military spending. Similar to Malaysia, growing opposing parties such as Singapore’s Democratic Party have questioned the government’s military spending challenging the legitimacy of the party state. This forces Singapore to shift its policies to focus on welfare, while it retains high military expenditure as presented in figure 6.2. Despite this, there is an overwhelming acceptance that the PAP’s ideology of vulnerability was endorsed by the population. The ideological hegemony and its incorporation of other sectors that were institutionally exerted into defence has given the PAP to order power (Abdullah, 2018). As Bilahari Kausikan, Singapore’s Ambassador-at-large (2015) explained the national narrative of the party-state, the 2015 election posit that the general population has given the overwhelming mandate to the government of its endorsement of the strategic perception of vulnerability.

At various times, the ruling elites had referred to the possibilities that such threats would threaten its national interest. The ruling elites were quick to frame

that Singapore's uncertain strategic environment legitimises the state to increase to be more vigilant (Chong and Chang, 2016). With the combination of the PAP's ideology, coercive institutional tools and elite cohesion, this gave the PAP the institutional strength to implement its security policy. With the media under its firm grip, the state was heavily promoting its national ideology in the state-controlled media further mobilised for support of the policy agenda (Vasu and Loo, 2016). To further extend Singapore's validity of existential security threats, military equipment is also used as part of Singapore's national symbol to strengthen and reaffirm its needs to militarise the state. Often, advanced military weapons were deployed during Singapore's national day as a display of power and national pride to create sense of awe, wonderment and admiration within the population with the government's capabilities in providing security (Ortmann, 2009). Though, highly technological weapons such as the F-16 and main battle tanks provide security to the state, these weapons also represent a national symbol to rally the population (Suchman and Eyre, 1992).

Even though the identification of Singapore's threats shifted in various times, nevertheless, Singapore's national security remains firmly rooted in its historical legacies. In sum, in Singapore the infrastructural power to strengthen its security policy to further justify the PAP's ideology that are politically contingent for ensuring continued commitment towards Singapore's vulnerability and survivability. The state's success was predicated on the state capacity to command compliance from middle-class, elites, bureaucrats and business elites to participate in contributing to Singapore's defence. The main beneficiary has been the PAP regime who controls the state.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has revealed the variations on why Southeast Asian states behave differently. A careful analysis of security policies in Southeast Asian states shows that security is viewed as a means of power for the dominant actors to gain legitimacy. The above cases also bring attention that different state formation perceive different values as to what issues are considered as security threats. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the continuing security problems are intractable because they are historically rooted in the nature of political contestations that are path dependent within the state. This helps us to understand why security practices in Southeast Asia present greater continuity rather than discontinuity in the region's security practices. Regional elites often reflected on their own historical experiences and transformed discourse into negotiated reality.

Thus, it is necessary for us to understand that states pursue certain security policies over spatial and time because it has built some biases to protect the dominant forces. State structure may also operate as an enabler or a constraint on security policy as political groups within the state may have the capacity to enhance or overturn policy to protect their own interest. In the case of Southeast Asia, security policies continue to be practised in a way to enhance regime security and state development. Because the state is usually captured by the dominant social groups, the state may privilege certain actors, ideologies and strategies over others. It has also given particular attention on contemporary security policies are best understood in the nature of domestic forces that shape state power and policy decision-making. The particular nature of the state structure formed in Southeast Asia has created dominant actors who are able to impose their will to organise or refrain other competing forces to suit their interest.

As noted above, national security in Southeast Asia is best understood in the domestic, and the levels of conflict between social groups that shape policy. The above cases highlight that the logic of security forces us to bring attention to the domestic condition over state's political resources and institutions. The particular nature of insecurity is the products of historical structures in which the dominant forces capture the state to implement policies that serve their own interest.

This also highlights why ASEAN as an institution is confined to serve dominant actors in relevant states to maintain their power without interfering in their domestic politics. This in turn would reflect the dilemma in how states aim to securitise certain issues. This would also be the subject for contestation as these actors negotiate with each other over the shared interpretation of norms that may not present other's interest. This chapter nevertheless reinforces this research that security is socially constructed. The institutional order laid by its historical specificities has a huge impact in the states on how the principal actor in securitising certain issues in Southeast Asia. As dominant social forces control state resources and capacity, it plays a role in securitising which issues that could be seen as threats to the regime.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This thesis has analysed the development of national security in Southeast Asia during the colonisation period to the present day. Drawing on the empirical data and insights from the preceding chapters, this thesis has shown how security policies in Southeast Asia is a politically contested issue. The various political, historical, cultural and social differences present in each case show that it is rather difficult to yield a straightforward generalisation in the region. Yet, a comparative approach nevertheless provided an important insight on the relative importance of history and political structures to determine how states undertake security implementation.

This research has three key findings that highlight the key similarities and differences in Southeast Asia and the relation to national security policy. First, *Southeast Asia's security behaviour is socially inherited shaped by social conflicts during the formation of state after the post-World War*. The origin of security in Southeast Asia was historically shaped by the levels of conflict during the eras of state formation with a powerful path dependent effect. By process tracing, this research found that the distinctive causal effects on the levels of conflict have a salient influence towards the fostering of national security concept. The formulation of national security concept is dependent on how the power relations between political forces perceive to protect their own interest and the bargaining processes to mobilise state resources to implement the policy outcomes. Despite the differences in all states, this research found that there are some similarities in the causes of insecurity in Southeast Asia. Through process tracing, this research found that these social cleavages derive from class and ethnic cleavages, which continues to be the main determinant source of security concerns for Southeast Asian states.

As we saw in Chapter 3, the colonial powers primed the nuances for intense political conflicts in Southeast Asia. Though the levels of conflict vary in all states, the legacies of colonial policies put forth during this period helped intensify the social cleavages and how the ordering powers was rearranged during the decolonisation.

In Chapter 4 we saw that the sequences occur preceding the critical juncture was endemic political conflict in Southeast Asia. As the social forces were on a level playing field during the period of decolonisation, contest for state power became more intense between the social forces. The intervention of former colonial powers during the negotiation for state autonomy played a critical role in dictating how certain dominant groups benefitted during in formulating their security policies. Moreover, the intense cleavages from the Communist Left in all cases further reinforced the state in securitising certain issues. Thus, in all case studies, economic development became the prime goal for these regimes. As Ba (2014) argue, in Southeast Asia, economic development was a necessary step in order to gain sovereignty. This research also found that the intensity of political contestation that overlapped between ethnic and class produced a greater bargain for more economic development. This was present in both Malaysia and Singapore where both party-state introduced powerful security policies to enhance ethnic harmony and wealth creation in order to gain sovereignty.

In Chapter 5, we saw how these security policies in Southeast Asia shifted which either constrained or strengthened the state power. The changes in the level of power dynamics before the end of the Cold War saw a policy shift in all cases. Whereas the threats from the Left have largely subsided in most cases aside from the Philippines, new threats emerge that would challenge the dominance of the ruling elites. The low commodity prices in the 1980's challenged the legitimacy of these authoritarian states which led to the downfall of Marcos in the Philippines. Such events forced the dominant actors to strengthen their policies

in order to maintain power. Similarly, in Chapter 6, it is clear that from the published national security documents that there has been a broadening of the national security concept. Although security issues become more multifaceted and complex especially on the issue of South China Sea, what emerges in practice highlight that security policy in practice is a subject of political contest between different social groups.

The second finding is that *the institutional settings of state power is historically determinant during the critical juncture, which is consequential to how the political behaviours and identities are shaped. Once established, these political institutions can either constrain or facilitate future policy decision-making which resulted in different trajectories on state capacity.* The socio-historical analysis of the institutions is especially important in temporal as it provides the context for the state to define its political priorities, identities, and values when formulating and implementing security policies. Treating security as historically contingent in itself allows us to understand which actors in the state have the authority to make the policy decision-making during the critical juncture. For this reason, institutional choices made during the initial conditions can have a diverging effect on the levels of political contestation, depending on the degree of political centralisation in the centre. The differences in institutionalisation in these case studies showcased the different trajectories of state capacity. This presents that security policies and practices are mediated as a product of struggles between social groups which can be dealt through state actions.

Whereas in Malaysia and Singapore focused on the economy and the building of its military as a necessary step towards nation-state building and elite cohesion, in the Philippines and Indonesia, the lack in response towards nation-state building saw the path to civilianisation. This would also highlight how the different variations of regime types have different impacts on how states can

facilitate certain security policies. Evidence also shows that the democratic transition at least in the short run can increase insecurity. Both Indonesia and the Philippines saw the rise in predatory regimes which contribute to its insecurity. In both Indonesia and the Philippines, the historical conditions of a diverse multi-ethnic, cultures, religions and the geographic proximity increase the complexity of security threats. In both states, they relied on the patronage politics to maintain elite cohesion.

The differences in institutions would also lead to the differences in state formation that exist in the post-WWII. As we saw in Chapter 4, the different levels of political contestations during the colonial period gave rise to different political system in all four cases. It revealed that the levels of conflict during the Cold War gave different trajectories to the authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia. To that extent, the levels of political conflict will determine how states organised themselves. In the case of both Malaysia and Singapore, ethnic anxieties, fracture among the class line, and the poor economic condition left by the burdens of the British colonial policy saw the institutionalisation of a one-party state regime that was crucial to control the policy agenda. At the height of the Cold War, political contestations between the social forces shape choices about institutional development which have long-term effects. While the trajectory of state formation saw the path to authoritarian regimes in all four ASEAN states in the mid 1960's, however, there would also be a diverging trajectory of authoritarianism. In the case of both Malaysia and Singapore, the effect of social cleavages led to a strong elite cohesion and the institutionalisation of strong party-states, which dominate the agenda settings. On the other hand, in both Indonesia and the Philippines, the intense social cleavages and the severe elite fractions saw the state trajectory to the path of militarisation.

In the case of Singapore and Malaysia, while both are authoritarian regimes, the differences in the security priorities would also show. Both states

share similar historical legacies as both were part of the British colonies, therefore sharing similar political system. In the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, the elites were severely fragmented which provided the military to play a bigger role in development of state. Whereas in Singapore and Malaysia focused on economic development and ethnic harmony to maintain regime legitimacy, in both the Philippines and Indonesia relied on excessive coercive use of force to maintain order especially in the periphery.

Institutions would also become a subject of political conflict. In most case studies, institutionalising a security concept may only benefit certain social groups. Over time, the institutionalisation of the security concept as a result of the contingent outcome of struggle for power and control may either constrain or enable other actors to challenge the dominant actors for access to state power. For instance, as seen in Chapter 5, the policy conversion of the Total Defence Concept and the NEP in Malaysia played a critical role in enmeshing the ethnically diverse community to further promote nation-state building. On the other hand, in the Philippines and Indonesia, the rise of a personalistic regime became contentious especially between the elites as both Marcos and Suharto regime controlled the access to state resources and rents. In both states, there would also be a dramatic transformation on the institution which saw the democratization. As the political conflict becomes unbearable, it weakened the state which gave rise to other political actors while displacing the dominant actors.

Perhaps, one common perception shared in these four cases was the institutionalisation of ASEAN during the Cold War. States have begun to organise themselves in order to promote the shared norms of sovereignty and non-intervention. Growing economic and security concerns has compelled for ASEAN to expand its institutional role to deal with newer challenges. Despite this, because the domestic actors have their own strategic interest, it would also limit its institutional capacity as newer members might see this as pressure for

liberalisation. This in turn helps us to explain why it is often difficult for states to meet their obligations in certain institutional framework. For instance, the issue on South China Sea is increasingly acknowledge as a regional issue. However, the actual implementation of the policies adopted were filtered by the dominant interest.

The third key finding is that *there is a degree of continuity rather than discontinuity on security policies in Southeast Asia*. Security concepts can have a path dependent effect that can be difficult to overcome leading to an institutional lock-in. The continuity of security concept is linked to its history and institution as certain dominant interest rely on this perspective. Despite the purpose of security policy is to provide safety, however, the process of institutionalising the security culture may involve other actors to reinforce the implementation. In the case of Malaysia, economic security continues to be its main priority because of the historical presence of ethnic cleavages. Due to the dominance of the party-state, its ability to control the bureaucrats produces an interlocking path-dependence. Whereas in Singapore, security policy is not only to enhance its nation-state building, but it also become its recruiting ground for elites. Despite being a small state, the legitimacy of the PAP historically has been to provide security and economic development that are intertwined. In the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, such continuity of security policies focused on achieving unity. Because it lacks the process of nation-state building that were present in Singapore and Malaysia, secessionist and terrorist activities continue to plague both Indonesia and the Philippines. Perhaps, at another level, the institutional arrangements would also become a source of political violence which increases the logic of continuity rather than discontinuity. Even though both Indonesia and the Philippines have successfully democratized, the military still possess institutional autonomy in formulation of security policy in both Indonesia and the Philippines can create a cycle of conflict.

What lessons can we draw from this study? This research finds that by using HI as an analytical framework, it provides a richer contextual account on the analysis of security in Southeast Asia. The analytical design also complements with the Constructivist approach which can widen the lens of analytical purposes. Whereas the mainstream has been susceptible to ahistoricism, in reality different states have its own historical specificities. Thus, by incorporating the study of history, it offers an immensely valuable perspective for understanding the politics of security in Southeast Asia and that it brings critical attention to the role of the state in understanding the variances in security policies in Southeast Asia.

By exploring its history, timing and sequences, this research successfully unpacked the policy processes to provide an alternative context on why security behaviours vary in the region. It illuminates the importance of temporality and sequences in earlier choices matters. The comparative research presents that in order to better understand on security policies in the region, we also need to consider that the politics of security is not exclusively systemic bound. By analysing both the actors and the institution, HI provides a holistic explanation not only on Southeast Asia politics but also in the field of Security Studies. Utilising HI as an analytical approach allows us for an examination of the deeper political and normative implications as a security discourse which provides us with constitutive understanding of why particular security practices are implemented.

This research also finds that security analysis is much more multifaceted and complex that requires the analysis of history to trace its origin, evolution and consequences towards the state and society. If we choose to accept that states are not ahistorical, HI can provide a powerful tool to understand the study of security and International Relations. To complement the HI, by employing the small-N research, it provides thicker details on the states institutions and what influences the states actors, which the realist paradigm lacks. More importantly, this research

can encourage future studies to include the historical analysis in understanding the security behaviours in states.

Appendix-

Table 1 Interviewees: Politicians/Bureaucrats/Academics

Interviewee	Positions
Malaysia	
Mahathir Mohammed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the Former Prime Minister for Malaysia (2016)
Dr. Mustafa Izzuddin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ISEAS Singapore (2017)
M.A.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analyst from CSIS Malaysia (Chatham House Rules) (2017)
Kuik Cheng-Chwee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UKM Malaysia (2017)
M.B 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid-Level Bureaucrat officer (Chatham House Rules) (2017)
Dato Rahim Zin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ex-CEO of Labuan Shipyard (2019)
Dr. Kogila	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Former Undersecretary of the Defence Industry Division at the Ministry of Defence Malaysia (2019)
Balakrishnan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> University Utara Malaysia (2019)
Dr. Faisol Keling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSIS Malaysia (2019)
Shahriman Lockman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> New York University (2018)
Dr. Meredith Weiss	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High Ranking Military Officer (2019)
M.G.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High Ranking Military Officer (2019)
M.G.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High Ranking Military Officer (2019)
Philippines	
Malcolm Cook	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ISEAS Singapore (2016)
James Putzel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LSE (2018)
P.P.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Former Cabinet Minister of the Philippines (Chatham House Rules) (2017)
P.B 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid Ranking Army Officer (Chatham House Rules) (2016)
P.B 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid Ranking Army Officer (Chatham House Rules) (2019)
P.G.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High Ranking Military Officer (2019)
Singapore	
Bernard Loo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RSIS Singapore (2016)
Collin Koh Swee Lean	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RSIS Singapore (2016)
Ian Storey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ISEAS Singapore (2016)
Richard Bitzinger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RSIS Singapore (2016)
Ang Cheng Guan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RSIS Singapore (2016)
Brunei Defence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MINDEF (2019)
Attache to Singapore	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid Ranking Military Officer (Chatham House Rules) (2019)
S.B.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High Ranking Military Officer (2019)
S.G.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High Ranking Military Officer (2019)
Indonesia	
Evan Laksmana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSIS, Indonesia (2019)
I.G.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Former High-Ranking Military Officer, Interview in Brunei (Chatham House Rules) (2019)
I.B.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview in Brunei (Chatham House Rules) (2019)
I.B.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview in Brunei (2019)
Rizal Sukma	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Foreign Affairs Brunei (2019)
Marcus Mietzner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Email Interview (2019)
Brunei Defence Attache to Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview (2019)

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