Locally Identified Solutions and Practices: a critical realist investigation into the processes of social innovation in the context of neighbourhood policing

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Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

Abstract

The purpose of the research was to establish by what mechanisms and in what contexts does the methodology called Locally Identified Solutions and Practices (LISP) applied to neighbourhood policing work as a socially innovative community engagement process in neighbourhood policing?'

The research used a critical realist & systems analysis approach, utilising Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) to investigate 8 projects implementing the Handbook to construct context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) chains to demonstrate what mechanisms contribute to what outcomes in which contexts.

Twenty-seven mechanisms were found to be active, 6 unique to this study, which provide a high-resolution insight into the processes of social innovation, removed from the personal characteristics of the social innovator. This establishes that there are clear, consistent and repeatable processes at play in social innovation, which suggests that the currently hegemonic postmodernist concept of 'social bricolage' requires further revision or rejection.

This study has demonstrated that the LISP Handbook is effective in neighbourhood policing for engaging with high risk vulnerable neighbourhoods. Moreover, the Handbook, allied to an understanding of the underlying mechanisms, has been demonstrated to be an effective, consistent and repeatable methodology for engaging intensively in vulnerable communities affected by severe crime.

The study has demonstrated the use of SSM as a method of case study analysis and comparison, and to create new insights within a CMO analysis. The research is the first to use SSM or CMO analyses in social innovation research or practice. Police officers & researchers will be interested in the LISP Handbook and how the projects were implemented. Social innovation practitioners and theorists will be interested in the CMO framework, and how mechanisms can guide the design, and implementation, of social innovations.

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Acknowledgements

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ACRONYMS

ACORN: consumer classification that segments the UK population.

ACPO: Association of Chief Police Officers, replaced by the National Police Chiefs' Council in 2015

ASB: Anti-Social Behaviour

CAPS: Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy

CATWOE: customers, actors, transformation process, worldview, owners and environmental constraints.

CDP: Community Development Projects

CMO: Context-Mechanism-Outcome

CR: Critical Realism

CSP: Community Safety Partnership

CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility

EU: European Union

EVA: Environmental Visual Audit

HMIC: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, from 2017, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services

LIPS: Locally Identified Priorities

LISP: Locally Identified Solutions and Practices

MI: Motivational Interviewing

NDM: National Decision-making Model

NHS: National Health Service

NRPP: National Reassurance Policing Programme

ODPM: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister

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PCC: Police and Crime Commissioner

PCT: Primary Care Trust

PSCO: Police and Community Support Officer

SAC: Serious Acquisitive Crime

SARA: Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment decision making model

SSM: Soft Systems Methodology

VLI: Vulnerable Localities Index

CHAPTER. 1.   INTRODUCTION

The Locally Identified Solutions and Practices (LISP) approach to neighbourhood policing was developed in 2011/12 with Police and Community Support Officers (PCSOs) and BA Social & Community Development students at the University of Northampton, bringing together elements of community organising (Alinsky 1971), critical community practice (Ledwith, 2011), asset-based community development (McKnight and Kretzmann 1993) and modified soft-systems analysis (Checkland and Scholes, 1999) into a street-level set of police officer catalysed activities.

The development of this PhD arose out of a pragmatic request by a serving senior police officer to 'do community engagement better', and has developed into a decade long partnership between an academic and that police officer, long after his retirement from active service. The requirement was more than just engage with the community about crime, but, in the context of an unprecedented reduction in policing resources, to work with key community members to create innovative solutions to reduce crime and improve confidence in policing. A specification emerged over time to develop a process that could enable police officers and their associated partners in local authorities to work in a large number of neighbourhoods concurrently to identify what the local problems were and create interventions to sustainably resolve those problems, thereby reducing the demand for reactive police service.

The initial response to this specification wasn't a part of the PhD research. A rapid appraisal of the situation led to a co-created training workshop with Police and Community Support Officers and a Locally Identified Solutions and Practices (LISP) Handbook being written with an intern. This PhD research is forensic, post-hoc investigation into the application of those workshops and the Handbook to 8 projects to understand how they were implemented. This was in response to the frequent question 'does LISP work?' being posed, or the more nuanced 'does LISP work for this, or that, type of policing or in this type of neighbourhood? It also begins to address a wider question of developing innovative responses to social problems, and whether those processes are a matter of individual skills and talents (and thereby luck that the right people come together at the right place and at

the right time) or whether a set of processes can be consistently and repeatably applied, and therefore trained.

As well as seeking to understand the contribution of the theoretical aspects of the processes and strategies contained in the LISP Handbook and related training workshops, it was also considered important to understand the practicalities of implementing the LISP procedures, with ordinary police officers, police and community support officers and other volunteers. These team members, whilst often dedicated and enthusiastic, were not specialist community workers or social innovators, and significant operational and institutional barriers meant that their implementation projects were not perfect examples of social innovation in practice. Only a few of the projects achieved what was dubbed 'the royal flush' of conditions which maximised their chances of success.

The LISP Handbook had already introduced the neighbourhood policing teams to the idea of 'wicked issues' where the complexity and open-ended nature of the mix of problems in a given locality are such that the participants in the problem can't agree on the nature of the problem, let alone the solution. This also described the research problem, in that the projects to implement the LISP Handbook and training themselves were very complex. The methodology that was designed specifically to cope with such complex systems seemed most appropriate as a research methodology, so Checkland's (Checkland and Scholes, 1999) Soft Systems Methodology was selected as the methodology for collecting and systemically analysing the rich data available for each of the LISP projects, centred around the core 'proforma' documentation provided by the police teams, interviews with them and naturally occurring data to verify and cross check the observations.

Soft Systems Methodology is a well-established analytical process with 40 years of applications across hundreds of different contexts (Checkland, 2000), although only one (it seems) in policing (Rowe, 2000). Its two modes of analysis allow for each individual project to be understood in its real-world context. The theoretical context for LISP lies in the 'intellectual antecedents' of the LISP Handbook. These too are a complex mix of business, social entrepreneurship, community development, psychological and social innovation theories. How they are actualised in the real-world projects by team members who may have read the

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LISP Handbook summaries and attended the training course, but not necessarily grasped all of the theoretical nuances adds to the research challenge.

Mingers (2015) makes the case that systems thinking is a critical realist epistemology. Checkland doesn't make this case for Soft Systems Methodology, but this research argues that SSM is a more critical realist endeavour than Checkland suggests. This is further reinforced by adding to the SSM approach with the clearly critical realist work of Pawson and Tilley (1997). Tilley's contribution is firmly placed in policing- he goes on to create the Tilley Awards in 1999 for problem-oriented policing projects. Pawson goes on to develop work in realistic evaluation (2006, 2013) across a wide range of non-policing public policy interventions, and draws up a list of key ingredients that make such interventions work regardless of the quality of the idea, or the team that implements the idea. The key to this, argues Pawson, is understanding the different contexts within which the intervention is being implemented (regardless of how much the intervention is supposed to remain the same in each different location) and the extent to which expected outcomes in each project also differ. He then posits, using critical realist theorising (Bhaskar, 2010) that the patterns of successes and failures one encounters in public policy interventions, and therefore social innovations, is less to do with the skills, characteristics of the agents involved, but in the mechanisms at play in the interventions- and whether those mechanisms connect the contexts to the expected outcomes.

Bringing these two approaches together, in what may be a completely unique manner, allows for SSM to be used to collate and systemically analyse the very different LISP implementation projects, taking into account their different contexts, actors and institutional situations, but bringing them together into what Pawson and Tilley (1997) call a 'cumulative evaluation'. This can then be subjected to a critical realist 'context-mechanisms-outcomes' analysis. This takes each of the 8 neighbourhoods as different contexts, and aligns them with three policing outcomes (performance, effectiveness and legitimacy) and traces 27 mechanisms that connect the context to the outcome. The mechanisms are selected from the intellectual antecedents in the literature, what is already known to work in neighbourhood policing literature and Pawson's own research on public policy interventions. In this way, what works in social innovation, in each of the contexts, can be shown to trigger a mixture of broad theoretical influences of the LISP

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Handbook, the specific policing contexts and a wider range of public policy intervention mechanisms- not necessarily generalisable, but certainly broad-based evidence for the efficacy of the LISP Handbook and the processes contained therein.

Each mechanism is tested in turn. It would have been highly desirable to have included a wider range of outcomes, especially non-policing ones, but the ethical boundaries of the research prevented direct involvement of the general public partners in the research, limiting this research to police outcomes. This wasn't the case in real life, or subsequent work. Nevertheless, each mechanism is tested against a context-mechanism-outcome configuration and a statement is made from the evidence provided in the SSM analyses as to the extent to which the mechanism was triggered in each configuration. A nominal score is given to each test, which allows for each configuration to be distinguished. This scoring could have been done by the LISP team, but it was not possible in this study. It has been done more collaboratively in subsequent LISP projects.

Finally, the scoring of the context-mechanism-outcomes configurations allows for the 27 mechanisms to be separated out into those that are more readily triggered across the majority of the LISP projects (regardless of how successfully implemented the projects were) and those mechanisms that required significant effort to trigger, and where less well implemented projects failed. These insights allow those implementing LISP projects in the future to identify where their implementations are progressing satisfactorily, and which aspects will be the most difficult to implement. The 27 mechanisms will also form the basis for a benchmark against which future projects can also be evaluated. This provides a response to the initial specification for a consistent and repeatable process for developing socially innovative interventions. Removing the neighbourhood policing context leaves the antecedent theoretical literature and the public policy interventions, till providing an empirically evidenced social innovation process that does not rely on the characteristics of the individual social entrepreneur or the serendipity of social bricolage 'freeplay' (Derrida, 1970)

The research considers the theoretical themes developed in the LISP handbook and workshops in Chapter. 2 which are developed in more detail in Chapter. 3, and then summarised into a number of underlying mechanisms derived from the

community literature, including social innovation and neighbourhood policing evidence, and from the two stage Soft Systems Methodology analyses in and Chapter. 6. The reference back to the literature is provided through the context-mechanism-outcome configuration procedure in Chapter. 7. Each of the LISP projects are presented in turn, analysed, and the mechanisms to be considered in Chapter. 7 are justified according to the data presented by the LISP project. This first chapter establishes the background and rationale to the research and begins to elicit the theoretical background to the development of the methodology (and the Handbook document that records that). The theoretical antecedents are important because the research is an investigation of a pre-existing (albeit pilot phase) Handbook for designing socially innovative interventions, and the ontological and epistemological assumptions of each of those theoretical antecedents sets the scene for the type of research evidence needed to explore and propose refinements to the Handbook. The overall philosophical approach of the research is critical realism, and the research methodology is soft systems methodology.

Chapter Two describes the Locally Identified Solutions and Practices Handbook, and its associated workshops, how it was developed and its key themes.

Chapter Three addresses the antecedent literature to the Handbook, by which is meant the long term thinking and experience that came together to influence the form and shape of the Handbook in seeking to develop a consistent and repeatable process out of the best of the observed community engagement practice. The literature, from organisational development, through community development, psychology, neighbourhood policing to social entrepreneurship and social innovation provide the context for the mechanisms that become the theoretical core of the work in Chapter. 7. Building out of Bellman's (1992) threefold configuration of 'purpose, power and persuasion', these diverse strands of literature come together in the neighbourhood, in the places and processes of organising community interactions, often where interactions between people and between communities have failed. This situates the different strands of literature within the field of social innovation making the case that social innovation is more than 'bricolage' (Derrida, 1970, Di Domenico, Haugh, and Tracey, 2010) an eclectic mysterious craft of innovation that relies on the skills and characteristics of the social entrepreneur, but instead a systematic, consistent and repeatable

process. In order to empirically defend this thesis, it is necessary to present a series of examples, the LISP projects, and analyse them thoroughly to establish what works within those projects, and why.

Chapter Four provides a justification for the methodology for that empirical evidence and analysis. It asserts that Soft Systems Methodology is consistent with critical realist epistemology (Bhaskar 2010, Pawson 2006), and that such an epistemological stance, intuitively selected by the author during the development of the LISP approach, is consistent with the methodological considerations about what constitutes evidence within the projects. The method of investigating and developing a 'thick description' (Geertz, 1973) of the projects demonstrates the detailed use of Checkland and Scholes' (1999) Mode 1 and Mode 2 Soft Systems Methodology.

The neighbourhood policing 'task' (Innes, 2004) is therefore conceptualised as a complex system (Ackoff, 1974), (also known as 'wicked issue', Conklin 2006) identifying the contexts within which Police and Community Support Officer (PCSOs) (as primary agents), police officers and citizens act in complex ways picking out the components, connections, relationships and processes that are active in the case-study contexts, re-describing these projects in a meaningful way that captures the complexity of the events such that the explanatory mechanisms are uncovered. The evidence is further sifted to identify the triggers for these underlying mechanisms on the basis that mechanisms may exist in all the projects but are only triggered in a few. These mechanisms, drawn from the LISP Handbook in Chapter. 2 and theoretically reinforced by the literature in Chapter. 3 are then explored in the empirical evidence presented in Chapter. 5 and Chapter. 6

Chapter Five describes four of the eight projects from pilots conducted in Northamptonshire Police during 2011-12 in forensic detail using the first part of the two step Soft Systems Methodology. The projects involved PCSOs developing a community engagement training course, and Handbook based on a research and theoretical antecedents established in the academic literature, as well as professional experience. The pilots experienced different levels of implementation, so none are claimed to be fully 'successful', but 27 mechanisms identified from the literature are explored through the Mode 1 SSM analysis to establish what

aspects of the pilots can account for the successes and challenges within the pilots. Chapter Five presents the evidence of the projects in a 'rich description' style, using a wide variety of evidential sources, from contemporaneous internal and public documents including a proforma reporting document that each project presented, triangulated by post-hoc interviews from some of the police officers and Police & Community Support Officers involved, exploring their experiences of the implementation of the LISP projects. The observations and insights from the empiricial evidence is taken forward to Chapter Seven for the theory building stage.

Chapter Six also presents a Mode 2 Soft Systems Methodology evaluation of the projects, and at a meta-level, considers the norms, roles and power dynamics at play in the development and piloting of LISP as an implementation of Intensive Engagement. There are clear limitations to the piloting of LISP. None of the pilots received thorough, unequivocal support with endless resources within which to achieve a perfect 'dose' of LISP. A few achieved what was dubbed at the time as 'the royal flush' of conditions which maximised their chances of success. All of them satisficed at various levels, sometimes in the skills, experience and dedication of the PCSOs, in the time allowed them, in luck in finding the right community contacts within the timeframe of the research, and in gaining the right support and guidance at each step of the process.

Chapter Seven is the theory building step. At this point, the analysis of the evidence created by the Soft Systems Methodology analytical process is reviewed using, in the first instance Pawson and Tilley's (1997 and 2001) realistic evaluation approach, specifically starting with the list of success/failure factors that they derive from a meta-analysis of public sector innovations. The research projects then suggest further factors to form a list of 27 important factors. These are then expressed as Context-Mechanism-Outcome analyses. The study establishes three possible context statements within which LISP is being evaluated: (C1) Vulnerable locality or area of significant multiple deprivation, the presence of (C2) Long-term chronic crime patterns and (C3) Complex, publicly contested crime types including antisocial behaviour (ASB) and serious acquisitive crime (SAC). Four projects (Projects 1 to 4) are the strongest to meet the three context criteria, accompanied by Case 8, where no LISP occurred. The other projects were particularly weak with

respect to long-term chronic crime rates, despite the complexity of the problem situations.

Social outcomes, for the police, are more complex than merely reducing reported crime rates. Further, the desired outcomes of the residents and users of a given neighbourhood would equally be complex- perception and fear of crime is not connected directly to actual crime rates, so improved feelings of safety and confidence may be as important as actual crime rates, Nevertheless, these are both important measures of police performance and are used as the Outcomes in the Context-Mechanism-Outcome (CMO) chains developed in Pawson and Tilley (2001). This chapter also returns to compare the observations made in the empirical work to build on Bellman's (1992) 'purpose, power and persuasion' model.

In Chapter Eight, the study finds that certain most readily activated mechanisms play a significant role in the LISP Handbook and how that is implemented. Less active mechanisms are also present, but these are more difficult to activate during implementation, rather than are less important. The combinations of these mechanisms in different contexts form a framework for future social innovators to consider when designing and implementing social innovations. The final chapter recaps the findings of the investigation and presents the contributions to theory and practice, as well as the strengths, limitations and directions for future research in this field. This work is unique in the field of social innovation to work within the epistemology of critical realism, and to use the domain knowledge of neighbourhood policing as a field of study for socially innovative projects (although not unique in considering crime). It is also the first study of its kind to apply soft systems methodology in social innovation, and only the second study in policing research to use Soft Systems Methodology. The research was limited by excluding the voice and experience of the general public, and is limited to projects arising in Northamptonshire, but in subsequent work, (by 2021 reaching 16 projects) these limitations are being addressed.

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1.1. BACKGROUND/ RATIONALE

In 2011, in response to a request from a senior officer of Northamptonshire Police to learn how to 'do intensive engagement better[1]', the author rapidly developed a Handbook of activities, a consistent and repeatable set of tasks for Police and Community Support Officers (PCSOs) and their supporting team to gather a group of interested and engaged members of the public, understand the crime and contributing social problems and develop sustainable interventions to improve public safety. This Handbook (Curtis and Bowkett, 2014) was developed over six months with a small team of PCSOs and subsequently all PCSOs in the county were given a day's training in its use. Thereafter, the PCSOs were given the opportunity to field test the Handbook in a variety of situations in the county. These field tests formed the basis of the projects considered in this research.

The purpose of this PhD research is to develop knowledge to refine the Handbook, from being rapidly 'cobbled together' from professional experience, to a more substantive and authoritative method of social innovation through:

- Investigating the background of development of the tool, working back into the theoretical antecedents of the work
- Investigating the pilots of the Handbook that were developed, and thereby
- Establishing what mechanisms that contribute to what outcomes in which contexts

such that the mechanisms might form a purposive tool to accompany the design element of the LISP Handbook.

The primary focus of social innovation theory and literature seems to be the evaluation of the social innovation, with limited work undertaken on developing 'theories of change' and 'design-thinking'. In social policy too, it seems that most of the focus of academic research and professional consulting is on the evaluation of the social policy intervention rather than the design of the intervention itself. An outcome of this research could be to flip the evaluation of this Handbook for police officers into a Handbook for the design of social innovation design, and into supporting improvements in the design of public policy interventions. The

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[1] Pers Comm Superintendent Richard James 7 Dec 2012

generalizability of this Handbook, designed and tested in the community safety environment, could be extended to the design of any social intervention, from a social enterprise, to an international development project to a public policy.

At a time when local authorities, health trusts and development agencies, who are partners to the Police in any given locality, have experienced severe spending cuts, the complexity of reducing crime and the causes of crime become ever more 'wicked' (Rittel and Webber, 1973). The introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners and Panels in 2012 as elected representatives in policing at a regional level also highlighted the challenges of providing locally sensitive police services.

This is important for a number of reasons that benefit multiple individuals, groups and communities. Firstly, police forces, Police and Crime Commissioners and Local Resilience Fora will benefit from this research project, as it informs the specific skills that are required to successfully engage with the community in order to effectively reduce crime in the locality. Furthermore, it benefits local authorities such as councils, social workers and local businesses as this combined effort to improve the local community has a direct impact on their individual interests. Lastly and perhaps most importantly this project primarily aims to benefit the local residents as this research focuses on a community-centred approach in order for local residents to be at the heart of the research process, working alongside the police to tackle crime vulnerability.

It is becoming increasingly clear that community citizens themselves are a crucial part in reducing crime (Myhill and Quinton, 2011). Garland (1996) recognises that preventing and controlling crime is difficult for the government alone, instead others must be made more aware that they also hold the responsibilities in order to persuade people to change their behaviour and practices, with what he calls the 'responsibilization' strategy. To realise this would involve a comprehensive process of community engagement with the local residents of the area.

Over the past decade or so, entrepreneurship has been conflated with policing, with the term 'entrepreneurial policing' being coined and researched in Scotland (Smith, 2009), building on Toch's seminal article, "Police Officers as Change Agents in Police Reform" in *Policing and Society* (2008), which positioned American police officers as self-directed change agents. From the start, a naïve

adoption of business entrepreneurship principles has been resisted by active police officers and academics. Yet, in a context of decreasing public funding for policing (Barton and Barton, 2011; HMIC, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014b) the majority of Police Force initiatives in response have focused on internal cost efficiencies in bureaucracy, rather than considering the efficiency of the policing activities with regard to law and order (and therefore, social) outcomes. With budgets being cut by 20% and all forces working on reducing force numbers and back office cost efficiencies, all forces claimed to be able to reduce crime at the same time, without evidence of strategies to address demand. No force reported attempts to secure new resources or lever external resources for the benefit of policing outcomes. In the face of these austerity measures (and in the midst of the LISP project), the Policy Exchange mooted the founding of Citizen Police Academies (Boyd, 2012) as third sector organisations to train the public – using a mixture of police officers and voluntary groups with relevant expertise – on how to play their part in the fight against crime.

Whilst a PCSO or police officer might act as an entrepreneur, they still remain employees of the police,[2] and must therefore stay within the conceptual framework of public service, rather than match the conceptualisation of 'social entrepreneurship' as inclusive of a trading organisational form. Instead, intrapreneurship might provide a stronger framework for understanding the roles of the PCSOs, police officers and other agents and stakeholders involved in LISPs. Consideration was therefore given to the interplay between the PCSOs as 'hero entrepreneurs' [or entredonneurs] and the police forces themselves acting as social enterprises. Nevertheless, in the context of the challenges of PCSOs being 'boundary spanners' with low institutional power, at the edges of the police force, it seemed important to ensure that they were equipped with skills to influence and persuade as much as to invent new solutions, which required a focus on MI as a skill set, and social innovation as a process of problem analysis.

Ledwith (2011) suggests that practitioners are attempting community engagement, but they still have little understanding of why they are doing it and how to do this effectively. Thus, a Handbook was devised that contained a step-by-step guide along with definitions and analysis that explains the way through

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[2] In some circumstances they are funded by local authorities and even businesses, but they are still employees.

each process individually. This Handbook outlines a set of activities that can be led by PCSOs to shift away from collecting data on locally identified priorities to developing, in collaboration with community members, Locally Identified Solutions and Practices (LISPs). This approach is a response to the observation that there continues to be a mismatch between the community's perceptions of crime, and actual crime incidents. It also further reinforces the Peelian principle that the police are citizens in uniform and therefore their decision-making processes within localities should be made with all groupings of residents, rather than 'on behalf of'. The activities outlined in the Handbook are designed to help the police investigate and thoroughly analyse problems in the locality, with the active involvement of residents and other community stakeholders, in order to arrive at mutually agreed solutions and practices that reduce the conditions for crime.

The objective of the Handbook was to equip PCSOs and members of the public to work together towards mutual solutions. It is not a process owned by the police, but rather a way for the police to help organise other stakeholders to help achieve their goals. It is built around a core strategy of 'rich picturing', (Checkland and Scholes, 1999) which allows communities of which PCSOs are a part to explore how each perceive a community problem and develop joint solutions for the challenges each neighbourhood experiences.

1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question for this investigation is 'By what mechanisms (why), and in what contexts (how) does LISP work as a socially innovative community engagement process in neighbourhood policing?

The secondary aims are to:

- Investigate the background of development of the tool, working back into the theoretical antecedents of the work
- Investigate the pilots of the Handbook that were developed, and thereby
- Establish what mechanisms that contribute to what outcomes in which contexts?

These questions were developed in the context of many stakeholders asking of the LISP Handbook 'does it work?'. The response to this was always difficult to

elicit because the success of the outcomes of the LISP process depended on the quality of the implementation process. The efficacy of the process, therefore, depended on context. Instead, the challenge of understanding in what context, and under what conditions, does the Handbook work best, led to the discovery of Pawson's critical realist approach to evaluation. Marrying this to Checkland's Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) as a data gathering and analytical process enabled a consistency between the research field, the data collected, the analytical techniques and the complex nature of the pilot projects.

The format of the research was therefore to establish the intellectual antecedents to the Handbook, to better and more thoroughly understand the strands of research and philosophy that contributed to the Handbook, placing it in the context of social entrepreneurship and social innovation. The next step was to dissect the Handbook to explain the process and the functioning of the Handbook, as designed. The third step was to forensically analyse all the pilots using the two stages of Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), and to evaluate the pilots to identify in what contexts and under what conditions of implementation LISP works best. This enabled the 27 mechanisms of success, and failure, that were identified first in the literature to be ranked in order of difficulty to implement; to parse out their relative contribution to the implementation of the Handbook in each context.

CHAPTER. 2.   THE LISP HANDBOOK & TRAINING

This chapter describes first the key themes that are active within the Handbook, and then provides a commentary on the format, process and content of the Handbook. The key themes described below are those that were in mind during the development of the Handbook in the first place.

The purpose of the research in subsequent chapters is to test those themes and to identify existing and previously unidentified mechanisms that connect the individual contexts within which the LISP projects were implemented to the outcomes identified in those case-studies, following the pattern of Pawson's context-mechanism-outcomes configuration. At this point, however, the themes serve only to illustrate the concerns of the researcher and the Police collaborators at the time of the development of the LISP Handbook.

Intensive Community Engagement, using the LISP Handbook, is a process of developing 'locally identified solutions and practices' (Curtis & Bowkett, 2014, p4) to address the conditions that lead to high levels of chronic crime that affects the public. It is particularly designed for use in areas where there are hotspots of crime (real and perceived) and anti-social behaviour, which have been problematic for a sustained period. It is an 8-step process (Figure 2.1) that is shared with the neighbourhood that is the focus of the Police problem. Each of the 8 steps is a collection of techniques, tips and approaches that help the PCSO, and/or a community policing team 1) explain why the LISP is needed, 2) find what is already available in the locality to work with, 3) establish who could be involved and their networks, 4) make sure the police and the community understand the different aspects of, and perspectives on the problem(s), 5) pull together a working group, 6) only then develop suggested solutions and planning, 7) take actions that include immediate solutions and ongoing practices, whilst knowing how to 8) escalate the plan to the right level to get action.

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Figure 2.1 LISP 8 Step process

Intensive Engagement 8 Steps

Step 1.   Justification
Step 2.   Assets and Capabilities
Step 3.   Stakeholders and Networks
Step 4.   Problem Rich Pictures
Step 5.   Form a Working Group
Step 6.   Solution Rich Pictures
Step 7.   Interventions & Evaluation
Step 8.   Escalation and Exit

The processes and activities that are described in the LISP Handbook and communicated to PCSOs and police officers through a training process, are an approach to intensive community engagement designed to tackle some of the observed weaknesses and limitations of community or neighbourhood policing from the USA and operated in the UK in the 21st century. The terms community policing and neighbourhood policing are used interchangeably in this chapter, as they are used as such in different police forces. Most scholars have generally agreed that communities can be characterized by three factors: geography, interaction and identity (Lee and Newby, 2012; Bowen, Newenham-Kahindi, & Herremans, 2010) whereas neighbourhood generally refers to the spaces within which such communities exist (Kearns and Parkinson, 2001).

The Handbook itself was written rapidly over a period of a few months in 2012, by the author and a graduate intern[3] in response to a request by a senior officer in Northamptonshire Police to assist them with improving the quality of their community engagement. The Handbook was designed on the basis of a rapid appraisal in one operational team of their approaches to community engagement (gleaned from interviews based around the rich picturing technique) and co-produced with a cohort of PCSOs in the first round of training, and first published in Nov 2012 as a Briefing Note on Community Resilience Strategy Handbook, then and refined for use in Locally Identified Solutions and Practices through Intensive

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[3] Amy Bowkett

Engagement Handbook (Curtis & Bowkett, 2014) after 15 iterations and amendments up to the 27th January 2014. The development of the Handbook was informed by the professional and academic experience of the author in the fields of social innovation and community development, applied for the first time to the topic of neighbourhood policing.

Much of what the LISP Handbook seeks to address in neighbourhood policing is the 'where, whom and how' of engagement. Legislation has placed a duty on the police to engage with and involve the community in police governance but leaves open the modalities of that involvement. There is a danger that the most vulnerable locations are left out of that involvement process and that the processes of engagement are ill-designed, or ill-executed, and result in vulnerable communities being excluded from the processes. Finally, the processes of problem solving can also be technocratic and exclude those most affected by the problems.

2.1. THEMES REFLECTED IN THE LISP HANDBOOK

ENGAGING WITH THE PUBLIC

Section 34 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (c. 13)[4] sets out a duty for the chief officer of police to obtain the views of persons within a given neighbourhood, about the crime and disorder in that area.

> *"34 Engagement with local people*
>
> *(1) A chief officer of police must make arrangements for obtaining the views of persons within each neighbourhood in the relevant police area about crime and disorder in that neighbourhood.*
>
> *(2) A chief officer of police must make arrangements for providing persons within each neighbourhood in the relevant police area with information about policing in that neighbourhood (including information about how policing in that neighbourhood is aimed at dealing with crime and disorder there).*

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[4] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/13/pdfs/ukpga_20110013_en.pdf [Accessed 9th October 2015]

> *(3) Arrangements under this section must provide for, or include arrangements for, the holding in each neighbourhood of regular meetings between—*
>
> *(a) persons within that neighbourhood, and*
>
> *(b) police officers with responsibility for supervising or carrying out policing in that neighbourhood.*
>
> *(4) It is for a chief officer of police to determine what the neighbourhoods are in the relevant police area.*

In the explanatory notes for the Bill before Parliament, more details are provided as to the intent of the section, particularly the means by which those views are captured, through community beat meetings and *other forms of engagement*.

> *"Clause 34 requires a chief officer to make arrangements for engaging with people in each neighbourhood in the police area, in order to obtain their views about crime and disorder and provide information about policing. These arrangements should include regular community beat meetings and other forms of engagement which allow all groups in an area to give their views on policing and hold their local police to account. Information could include statistical or other information relating to policing, crime and disorder. "[5]*

This becomes implemented at the local level, for example, by Safer Community Teams undertaking community panel meetings:

> *"The Safer Community Teams also take part in community panel meetings. These are public meetings held at local venues every three months. These meetings help the Team to:*
>
> *Find out what really matters to local people*
>
> *Allows the police the opportunity to provide an update on previously identified priorities*

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[5] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmbills/116/en/2011116en.htm Accessed 9th October 2015

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> *Decide what the locally identified policing priorities should be*
>
> *And is also an opportunity for you to have your say about what we should be doing."* [6]

What is interesting about these documents, from national policy through to the street level, is that the intent to engage meaningfully with the public seems to be clear in the policy, but the purpose of that engagement is not clear. The chief officer has to receive (and provide) information from the public, but the policy does not state what the chief officer should do with that information. In the East Northamptonshire local document, the Police commit to "….listen to every complaint, look at individual circumstances, and respond to it in a fair and reasonable way"[7]. Firstly, the notion of the public only having a complaint is flawed, but also operationally; listening to and dealing with every) seems to be a wasted use of resources if there is no clear plan as to what to do with the results. The local document does hint at a purpose - on Page 3 the police say "We work on the principle that 'prevention is better than cure' but also commit to deal with every complaint regardless of its veracity or relative importance". In community development terms, it seems an unusual method for communities to 'hold their local police to account'- only those with a complaint are listened to, no assessment is made of the extent to which the complainant is cognisant of policing activities or performance, and no attempt is required to ensure that hard to reach or hard to hear communities are also able to communicate their thoughts or experience. This would be especially important in vulnerable localities.

The role of the PCSO in engaging with the public and collecting information on local policing priorities was significant in Northamptonshire Police, as identified in a public letter in 2012 by a senior Police officer, stating "Identifying local priorities – Local priorities change every three months, and these are agreed by asking members of the public what they want their local Safer Community Team to concentrate on. PCSOs complete a short survey ('interaction') with people they

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[6]Looking after East Northamptonshire https://www.east-northamptonshire.gov.uk/info/200217/crime_safety_and_emergencies/43/safer_community_teams Accessed 9th October 2015
[7]Looking after East Northamptonshire https://www.east-northamptonshire.gov.uk/info/200217/crime_safety_and_emergencies/43/safer_community_teams Accessed 9th October 2015 p2

meet, asking them what issues or concerns they have in their area. These are then fed back and are used to set the priorities.[8]".

The way these locally identified priorities were explained in the rapid appraisal at the start of the LISP project was that they were initially collected at community meetings, but this was then automated into a defined set of categories that could be collected via a mobile device. PCSOs were then abstracted from other duties to collect this data, at any location or at any time of day, in order to fulfil a quota of interactions. The PCSOs were then tasked to deal with those priorities, regardless of the actual reported crime patterns in a given location. This had the effect of separating neighbourhood public safety concerns from the patterns of reported crime. PCSOs were tasked to deal with complaints, regardless of whether the complainant's grasp of the problem was informed, whilst uniformed officers tackled reported crimes (often in a different crime type). This situation became clear in the rapid appraisal when an Inspector in charge of a team explained that the priority for the locality was anti-social behaviour (on the basis of complaints) when police officers and PCSOs were reporting that Serious Acquisitive Crime was the category that was most reported in the same location. These disjunctures between a) who gets consulted with and b) what the knowledge of the consultees is about the extent and nature of crime in a given neighbourhood was the starting point for developing the new approach to intensive community engagement. The third strand was to develop a sense of purpose for which the intensive engagement might be undertaken, beyond merely asking the public for their opinions. This prompted a flip (a pun) from Locally Identified Priorities (LIPS) into Locally Identified Solutions- asking the community to suggest solutions to problems rather than merely presenting problems.

2.1.1. IDENTIFY

A starting point for the LISP process is to ensure that 'intensive' community engagement does not occur across every neighbourhood in a given police force, because that would be 'extensive' community engagement and hugely expensive. Extensive community engagement already occurs, with Police forces working with specialist Community Engagement teams with force-wide initiatives. The intent of

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[8] http://www.ringsteadpc.org.uk/uploads/article712/PCSO%20Role%20Letter.pdf Accessed 9th October 2015

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LISP is to focus in on very specific locations that require intensive investment of resources to make changes that impact back on police performance criteria permanently (or as permanently as possible). Choosing those locations, and thereby choosing not to act in such an intensive manner in other locations is a delicate political decision, but one that is being made every day in police forces as some locations are selected for 'weeks of action' or operations and others not. The starting point of the LISP process is designed to be as robust as possible to identify the key locations within a given force that warranted such intensive focus.

In Northamptonshire, the Vulnerable Localities Index (referred to as the VLI) (Chainey, 2008) was identified as a primary method to screen which locations in the county are more likely to benefit from intensive engagement. The Index is a method which can help to identify residential neighbourhoods that require prioritised attention for community safety. As part of the 'community cohesion' agenda in the UK (Robinson, 2005) the police were given a new responsibility to identify areas with community tension and respond to them accordingly. This required a method to be devised which helped policing agencies to systematically classify communities into prioritised areas. Since then, the VLI has become a popular strategic analytical tool to assist the targeting of community safety work.

The VLI integrates a bundle of data collected at the neighbourhood level to form an overall composite index value of vulnerability for a locality. It is calculated using six variables. The variables (measured at the same geographical units) are as follows:

- Counts of burglary dwelling
- Counts of criminal damage to a dwelling
- Income deprivation score
- Employment deprivation score
- Count of 15-24-year olds
- Educational attainment

This Index works in a manner similar to the Indices of Multiple Deprivation, in that it recognises the multi-factorial nature of crime issues in given localities, and the extent to which they are linked to other sociological vulnerabilities, such as income or educational attainment. The work derives directly from the Ritchie report from the Oldham riots in 2001 which considered the multifactorial influences that led to

the riots, specifically immigration & cohesion, racism, housing, education, economy, health, community interaction, media and the governance of the neighbourhoods. It is important to note that the VLI's primary weakness is that it utilises pre-existing data sets, covering employment, the numbers of young people and their educational attainment, but does not use factors relating to health outcomes or democratic governance or non-data driven factors like racism. Nevertheless, Northamptonshire Police adopted this data set as a starting point for identifying which localities are of most importance in local policing, with the publication of 9 Priority Area reports (which are used in the case-study analysis later).

Some forces assess the vulnerability neighbourhoods in partnership with local authorities (Derbyshire and West Midlands) whereas others have used the Vulnerable Localities Index (VLI) methodology developed by the Jill Dando Institute (Hampshire and Cleveland) (Tompson, 2012). Most forces that have adopted this approach have modified the concept to suit their requirements and priorities (Cumbria, Wiltshire Warwickshire, West Mercia, Hertfordshire, Lancashire, Merseyside, Cheshire, North Wales, Staffordshire, Leicestershire, Dorset and Durham).

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

In recognition of the value of community engagement the *Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011* requires Chief Officers to:

> *"Make arrangements for obtaining the views of persons within each neighbourhood in the relevant police area about crime and disorder in that neighbourhood… Arrangements under this section must provide for, or include arrangements for, the holding in each neighbourhood of regular meetings between— (a) persons within that neighbourhood, and (b) police officers with responsibility for supervising or carrying out policing in that neighbourhood"[9].*

Despite that, formal meetings have already been shown to be ineffective in terms of representation, independence and impact (Myhill and Rudat, 2006). National

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[9] Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill, 2011, s.34

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Reassurance Policing Programme findings showed engagement activities failed to influence public perceptions of the police. In four out of ten sites, the public questioned the effort the police put into finding out what people think; in five sites the public thought they were ineffective at working with the local community; and in eight sites that the police were perceived as unwilling to respond to the public's views (Morris, 2006). The evaluation concluded that the method of canvassing residents' views needed to be more robust and officers needed to improve their consultative and communication skills. These conclusions were echoed by the College of Policing which identified engagement as an area where improvements could be made:

"…engagement and consultation with their communities was predominantly focused on public meetings, local priorities were based on the concerns of a small and unrepresentative part of the community, and some hard-to-reach groups in these areas reported that neighbourhood teams did not engage with them" (Anon, 2015, p20).

A review of the research in this area by the Police Foundation found that informal rather than formal contacts work best, and recommended that police officers should prioritise the identification and engagement of individuals and groups who do not get consulted and whose needs might be ignored (Lloyd and Foster 2009). Younger people, for example, have expressed an interest in contacting the police online, which clearly constitutes one way of connecting with members of the community who might otherwise be disinterested or antagonistic (Knibbs, 2013).

Social media allows neighbourhood policing teams to build a new space for communication and engagement, based not on geography but on virtual communities. Studies have shown open communication can improve the levels of trust citizens have in their forces (Ruddell and Jones, 2013) and an interactive online presence can create a personal connection with users and promote positive attitudes (Briones et al, 2011).

PROBLEM SOLVING

Problem solving has been identified as key to the delivery of neighbourhood policing (Tuffin et al, 2006) and reducing crime. Problem Orientated Policing (POP) (Leigh et al, 1996) recognises that 'fire-brigade' policing is inefficient as officers

keep returning to the same scene and see the same victims as the underlying problems have not been resolved. An analysis of the problem supports the development of a more comprehensive and sophisticated approach that offers an alternative to multiple individual responses to repeat calls for service.

A 2012 systematic review found crime prevention strategies derived from analysis of repeat victim situations reduced crime and provided a means of allocating crime prevention resources in a more efficient and informed manner. The report concluded future prevention efforts should be focussed upon the most victimised and vulnerable super targets (Grove et al 2012). Similarly, research into evidence-based policing experiments has demonstrated problem solving and crime prevention initiatives are most effective when police efforts are directed at tightly defined locations as opposed to just individuals[10].

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) have emphasised the importance of focusing action on crime and antisocial behaviour hotspots, repeat victims, and prolific or high-volume offenders as an effective means of allocating crime reduction resources[11]. In *Core Business,* the Inspectorate recognised the importance of preventing crime at the earliest opportunity to reduce demand and free up resources recommending that by 31 March 2015:

> *every force that does not have an adequate, force-wide database should develop and start making use of one, to record, monitor and manage its neighbourhood cases[12].*

> *all forces should ensure they are using their databases to track the progress and evaluate the success of actions taken in relation to each neighbourhood case recorded on the database[13].*

> *each force should ensure that it is able to disseminate information and share good practice from its database throughout the force, as well as to local*

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[10] http://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/the-matrix/ [Accessed 21 April 2019]

[11] People and Places, How Resources can be targeted, HMIC, 2014, http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/what-works-people-and-places-how-resources-can-be-targeted.pdf [Accessed 21 April 2019]

[12] HMIC, 2014, Recommendation 3

[13] HMIC, 2014 Recommendation 4

> *authorities and other relevant organisations involved in community-based preventive policing or crime prevention[14].*

> *all forces should ensure that their records clearly establish whether victims of crime and anti-social behaviour fall within the applicable definition of 'repeat victim', and that appropriate steps are taken to ensure that when repeat victims call the police, the force's call-handlers have the means to establish immediately that the caller is a repeat victim[15].*

RESILIENCE AND SELF-POLICING

An emphasis on the role of formal policing (underpinned by a consumerist ethos that views the public as customers rather than as citizens (Thomas, 2013)) has stifled the recognition of the importance of more informal social approaches to policing. It has created an impression where the professional police service, with partner agencies, are there to solve all local crime and disorder problems as 'service providers'. However, informal sanctions have been shown to reduce the likelihood of an individual reoffending and early interventions within communities, families and institutions are generally more effective, less intrusive and cause less unintended harm than formal policing interventions[16].

There are two different approaches to developing community resilience, a term primarily used in disaster response literature (Berkes and Ross, 2013). The first is to recruit volunteer citizens to support formal policing (e.g. Special Constabulary, Police Support Volunteers, Volunteer Police Cadets and Neighbourhood Watch). This form of volunteering is supported by the College of Policing's "Citizens in Policing" agenda. The second approach reverses the emphasis and is more about the police supporting citizens and communities as facilitators of social change with the objective of increasing the numbers of active citizens and volunteers operating within the community. This model is referred to as "building social capital" (see further Section 3.5.3). These two approaches are

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[14] HMIC, 2014, Recommendation 5
[15] *Core Business*, HMIC, 2014, Recommendation 7
[16] The People are the Police? Transforming 21st Century Policing through New Partnerships and Engagement, O. Gower, 30th Cumberland Lodge Police Conference, 2011 https://www.cumberlandlodge.ac.uk/sites/default/files/public/People%20are%20the%20Police%20Conference%20Report.pdf [Accessed 21 April 2019]

complimentary and could be combined to improve community resilience (Simmonds, 2013).

OBJECTIVES

The objective of the LISP Handbook was to equip PCSOs and members of the public to work together towards mutual solutions, the 'co-production' (Innes and Roberts, 2008) of community safety, a mid-point between the two approaches mentioned above. It is not a process owned by the Police, but rather a way for the Police to help organise other stakeholders to help achieve their goals. It is built around a core strategy of 'rich picturing', which allows communities of which PCSOs are a part to explore how each other perceive a community problem and develop joint solutions for the challenges neighbourhoods experience.

The whole LISP process, often led by a single PCSO or delivered as a LISP team led by a sergeant and a local inspector, is an enhancement of the well-known scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (SARA) process of problem solving, which became the official 'National Decision Model[17]. LISP does not replace NDM, but extends the generic decision-making framework into complex social issues and provides a Handbook for making NDM real during intensive community engagement and community policing. In particular, LISP incorporates the idea of 'co-producing' community safety. The diagram below (Figure 2.2) shows how the NDM becomes 'LISPed' by the techniques used in this Handbook.

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[17] http://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/national-decision-model/

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Figure 2.2 National Decision Model LISPed

The NDM/SARA frameworks were designed for problems that straightforward (although technically difficult), whereas LISP is designed to think about, and consult with the public on situations where all 'nobody agrees on what the problem is, let alone the solution'. This is known as a 'super-complex problem' or wicked problem (Webber and Rittel, 1973). LISP is also a way of getting the general public and community organisations actively involved in solving the problems in their neighbourhood. SARA is a process owned by the Police, whereas LISP is a process shared with the community. Doing a LISP guides intensive community engagement into establishing networks of capable people working together on a specific problem situation and devising sustainable practices and behaviours that contribute to community wellbeing and a reduction in crime. These practices and behaviours are collated in an agreed plan -the LISP proforma- where all parties agreed to sustain a set of solutions and practices. This could be a pre-cursor to a full-fledged Neighbourhood Plan (Sturzaker and Shaw, 2015).

THE LISP PROFORMA

The proforma acts a place to record the investigations and share information with community partners (an early example of a real but redacted proforma is provided in Section 9.10). It should contain enough information that it can be passed on to colleagues and superiors so that they understand the issues, and expressed in

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Plain English so that members of the public can read it. It should only contain public information. This was devised in 2013 (and updated several times to reflect the constant development of the Handbook through each project) to support the PCSOs to develop and record the LISP pilots described in Chapter. 5, and the core of the case study evidence is drawn from the proformas that were produced.

REASON FOR THE LISP

Not all crimes are conducive to community-based problem solving. Reactive policing will still be required in situations between a few individuals and in emergencies, nevertheless, there are situations, often in vulnerable neighbourhoods, where a complex mix of crimes and antisocial behaviour has been on-going for a significant period of time and the Police find themselves being reactive rather than proactive. The starting point of the LISP Handbook is therefore to decide on which locations to start a LISP activity.

Deciding which issues to LISP will depend on the following considerations:

Screening using VLI to select key areas: The Vulnerable Localities Index (referred to as the VLI) is a method which can help to identify residential neighbourhoods that require prioritised attention for community safety.

Crime statistics: the Police-led activity should focus on neighbourhoods that have been subject to long-term high levels of reported crime or anti-social behaviour, or in situations where PCSOs predict (with appropriate evidence) that crime patterns will increase in a given location due to external factors.

Complexity of the problem: crime patterns that involve a number of different stakeholders, victims or perpetrators are sufficiently complex to warrant a LISP process within the localities identified in steps 1 and 2. Different stakeholders may have different opinions regarding the causes of the problem; or significant amounts of the problem are not under the direct influence or control of the Police

It is also important to establish a baseline of the current patterns of recorded crimes and antisocial behaviour at the outset.

2.1.1.   SCAN

Having identified a suitable location, the PCSOs (latterly it is considered that a whole team approach is more suitable, but still led by a PCSO or community safety officer) would establish what was already known about that location, and what was already working to make the locality safe. The Vulnerable Localities Index would identify an area of interest, and hotspot analysis might identify centre points of specific concern, but the PCSOs were briefed to 'follow the boundaries of the problem situation' rather than be limited to patrol areas or electoral wards. In other words, the boundaries and points identified in the screening data in the sections above would only define an outline of a problem situation. The PCSOs, when engaging using the rich picturing process (described below) could be led by the residents' and businesses' perceptions of the problem, and ignore ward boundaries and operational unit boundaries, which are all effectively 'imagined boundaries'. What matters is who is affected by the crime problems, wherever that might occur. The PCSOs are also briefed to note that the crimes that might be most prominent in the screening process are only the starting point. Their task in the LISP process is to consider all the crime types that might be part of the 'rich picture' of the problem situation.

COMMUNITY ASSETS AND VULNERABILITIES

The first step of the scanning activity is to rapidly appraise the neighbourhood where the issue has been identified, i.e. the problem situation. The officer will be looking for assets as well as deficits- not looking for what is wrong with a neighbourhood but also what is good or great about the place so that these things can be invested in to make the community more successful.

STAKEHOLDERS

The next step is to seek out key stakeholders. These are any people or groups that may have an interest in the problem that the LISP team have been tasked with. There will always be 'known individuals' and community leaders in contact with the Police, but the critical difference with LISP that that team are tasked to find new stakeholders, particularly 'grass-roots' connections (see below).

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GRASSROOTS AND GRASS-TIPS COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

The LISP Handbook reinforces a message to readers that community involvement is often disregarded either as a nuisance or ineffectively addressed. This mostly comes from poor preparation, but it also is partly due to a failure to engage with the right parts of the community. Police forces are often 'captured' by people who seem to be community leaders and representatives, but don't interrogate the legitimacy of such people in representing the neighbourhood. The PCSOs are trained to recognise the difference between 'Grass-tips' consultees who are only partly connected to their community and not well informed about community politics, or 'Grass-roots' consultees who are closely connected to their community but who are not well informed about the interests of the organisation consulting (the police, in this case).

MAPPING OUT NETWORKS

The above activities of identifying community assets, and stakeholders, are to be captured in a simple network diagram (Figure 2.3) that shows who has been identified and who they know. Mapping the connections in this way allows the LISP team to see who is very connected to other people (the yellow dot in the middle), where there are clusters of connections and who are not connected very well. The LISP team are tasked to make this network much more connected to each other. Individuals outside the community, but whose activities impact upon the neighbourhood should also be mapped, but shown outside a boundary, showing the amount of bridging capital, and through whom that capital is bridged. The purpose is to create community cohesion by the LISP team and its stakeholders acting as the bridging capital (Woolcock, 2001) to fill structural holes (Burt, 2004). Once this has been completed the team can then map out 'weak link' networks.

Figure 2.3 Social network diagram

PERSPECTIVES OF STAKEHOLDERS ON PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS.

Having identified the main community assets, the features of the problem locality that are already making it 'mostly safe', and having identified a range of stakeholders who could be involved in the LISP process, the LISP team then begins to investigate the problem situation itself, with the stakeholders. The LISP team suspends all their existing understanding with respect to the problem and allows the community members to elicit the problems they experience in the community, and the part played by the problems identified by the police.

ENRICHING THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM

Instead of creating more data about local policing priorities, what is required is a richer understanding of the causes of crime in the neighbourhood, and how it is perceived by different people and interest groups in the given locality. This can be done through a process of 'rich picturing'. Rich pictures were particularly developed as part of Peter Checkland's (Checkland, 1981) Soft Systems Methodology for gathering information about a complex situation. Rich Pictures

provide a mechanism for learning about complex or ill-defined problems by drawing detailed ("rich") representations of them.

The LISP team captures their first engagement with a neighbourhood problem situation in the manner described above. Then they undertake repeat of the street-walking with the key stakeholder to visualise and identify community vulnerabilities and assets. The key stakeholders are then invited to develop their own rich picture. This involves repeating the processes that the LISP team went through in their own rich pictures. This can be done as a single group event, although getting lots of different stakeholders together is very difficult. A different option is to get the stakeholders to do this in their own context- in their home or in their shop, rather than inviting them to a town hall event. This allows the information and perceptions that they put on the rich picture to be more contextualised and less abstract. The LISP team can then explore the multiple rich pictures that have been developed, and with the help of the stakeholders, develop a composite rich picture that contains information from all the stakeholders. This can be a continuous process.

WORKING GROUP

Having established the assets and capabilities of the neighbourhood, and identified the range of stakeholders present in the neighbourhood, and having gone through several iterations of rich picturing to map the complexity of the problem situation, and identifying and ranking the priority issues, the LISP team progress to identify a smaller group who are willing and capable to begin addressing the issues that have been identified. The term 'working group' was selected as a neutral term, and may be comprised of existing configurations of individuals representing other organisations, or no organisation at all. The test in the training for selecting the best members of the working group was that they are 'highly connected and highly capable'.

Having come up with a clearly defined and agreed description of the key features of the problem, the next step is to convene a working group around delivering the key features of the successful solution.

Selecting the working group from the wider set of stakeholders is one of the hardest tasks in this LISP process. Grassroots volunteers have to be identified and

motivated to get involved, overcoming apathy, re-arranging very busy lives to get involved in a project. Just because this stage is hard doesn't mean that it shouldn't be done.

This working group may also involve working within an existing group, like an active Joint Action Group (although these often act as closed, agency led-meetings), or a Community Safety Partnership (also only involving public agencies), but only insofar as this group is dedicated to the problem situation. The working group may contain members from other groups like Neighbourhood Watch or a residents' association, but the LISP team are reminded that their primary reason to exist is not to deliver a successful solution to the problem situation being considered in the LISP, so it is essential that the right people are selected from the wider stakeholder group, based on their social capital- their ability to get things done with the least amount of resources.

Having selected the stakeholders according to their social capital, the LISP team have to persuade them to get involved. This is done by a) understanding and meeting their self-interest and b) developing their intrinsic motivation for change.

2.1.2.   ANALYSE

WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNT FROM THE SCANNING?

This section serves to summarise the intensive engagement processes that the LISP team has undertaken so far. The LISP team might develop a rich picture drawing together all the information gathered to date. This is known as the Problem Rich Picture, and may also be the composite Rich Picture described above.

Figure 2.4 A detailed example of a problem Rich Picture showing the deficits and problems

Figure 2.4 shows a full detailed example of a problem rich picture (courtesy of the professional illustrator Laura Brodrick, created for the printed Handbook), illustrating all the negative points of a neighbourhood. This rich picture is heavily influenced by the problems of the built environment, but also shows some of the social problems involved in the neighbourhood.

Creating a composite rich picture of the problem can also be complemented by an 'asset-based' appreciation of the same locality. Figure 2.5 shows exactly the same rich picture, but with all the positive aspects highlighted, and with the assets and capabilities that could be built on by the LISP practitioner.

Figure 2.5 A rich picture of the assets and capabilities in the same neighbourhood

The image below (Figure 2.6) shows a PCSO working with a colleague to summarise the different rich pictures that had been collected. Three different community engagement events and dozens of individual interactions are summarised in one flipchart. In this project, the summary sheet was taken back to the community groups to verify that the PCSOs correctly understood the issues, from which a set of activities were recorded.

Figure 2.6 Learning from the scanning process

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE & WHY?

In this step, the LISP team works systematically around the summary or composite Problem Rich Picture, making sure that all the aspects of the neighbourhood that contribute to the problems, and the assets and skills that can be employed and record a long-list of suggestions have been considered. Not all of them will be taken forward for implementation but it is important to keep a record of all the ideas, and how they might help to resolve the problems in the area. If the issues/solutions are numerous and complicated, it might help to prioritise them.

2.1.3.   RESPOND

SOLUTION RICH PICTURE

The working group should discuss & record which solutions look the most viable/possible options. For this part, the LISP practitioner works with the working group to create a rich picture of the neighbourhood and problems situation in

hand, in its finished or desired state. The first step is to begin to think about the desired endpoint. This is known as 'future state visioning' (Stewart, 1993) and is known within the LISP Handbook as the Solution Rich Picture. Figure 2.7 shows the same neighbourhood again, but instead envisioning a future in which all the problems were solved, and in which the neighbourhood is hugely successful. This neighbourhood was a much-neglected location near a town centre which had lost the footfall of pedestrians, a decline in residents and the tourist visitors disappeared, and therefore had no 'purpose'.

Figure 2.7 Solutions Rich Picture - a 'future vision

The LISP practitioner asks the working group "what would the community look like when it is successful?" This involves looking carefully at what the working group and wider stakeholder group believe to be the desired/ successful community and how these priorities fit in it. The practitioner asks questions during the rich picture process such as "How will they work?" and "what will happen if thischanges?" "who will this effect and how?". It is also important to consider how the future vision might be achieved through nudging pro-social behaviour. The solution rich picture should include thinking about the assets that have been previously identified so

that the practitioner can show how they contribute to the finished/ desired result. This includes looking at what assets (with investment) will contribute to the desired end point. The practitioner then captures a list of 'interventions' that will contribute to achieving this future vision, in the grid shown below with details of who is going to progress what. This is essential for the escalation process at the end of the LISP document.

SOLUTIONS – One off events, projects or facilities					
What?	Why? (What is the intended effect?)	With whom?	How?	By when?	Measures of success
PRACTICES – ongoing behaviours or activities to sustain success					
What?	Why? (What is the intend effect?)	With whom?	How?	By when?	Measures of success

2.1.4.   ASSESS

EVALUATION

The LISP team lists what factors will indicate ongoing success from the stakeholders' perspective into the 'measures for success' box, noting how these indicators will be measured. This section, for the LISP team, connects back to the crime statistics at the start of the LISP process. It is important to establish what success will look like and agree with the working group how that success should be measured. For a PCSO, success will include a reduction in calls to the Police related to the area, but it could also include an increase in the numbers of residents and businesses actively involved in improving the neighbourhood.

If the practitioner is successfully meeting the self-interests of the individuals in the working group, they should also be recording outcomes for them-environmental wardens might want to reduce the amount of litter in the area, the

businesses might want to increase their trade, mums walking to school might want to feel safer.

ESCALATION

The final, but critical, part of the LISP process is to make sure that the initiatives and interventions don't get 'stuck' with partner agencies. The final step is to plan what to do when the LISP begins to struggle. This escalation strategy recognises the fact that a lot of community-based problem-solving required decisions to be made much higher up in an organisation than the LISP practitioner and often out of reach of the resident- it is essential that these plans can be circulated to the right decision-making level for action.

There are two routes to escalate the LISP, internally and externally. All LISPS are subject to regular review by Police sector commanders. Sector commanders ought to be tasked with reviewing that the LISPs in their command are appropriately resourced and continue to meet long-term priorities. Sector commanders will be able to report issues to Community Safety Partnerships and other partnership meetings to request assistance. LISPs can also be referred to the Police and Crime Commissioners office for high level consideration.

2.2. **THE LISP TRAINING**

The Intensive Engagement training takes place over a 40 to 50 day period, beginning with a day briefing in the locality chosen for intensive engagement. The LISP team are introduced to the bare LISP process, and then supported by a coach as they implement each step, and return to verify the quality of their implementation. In this way, the skills and experiences of the trainees are verified in real-world implementation rather than just in a classroom.

The PCSO[18] participants are restricted in number to groups of no more than 15. Under the instruction from an experienced senior lecturer the trainees are introduced to the 8-step approach. The input is structured so that it describes the purpose and process of engagement, participation and problem solving that will be applied to develop a LISP plan in a neighbourhood setting. Each training session

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[18] In the first training sessions, the participants were only PCSOs. Later this was extended to neighbourhood police constables, and latterly to community safety partnership nominees and community members

is opened and endorsed by a member of the respective area Senior Management team. The training is delivered by a subject matter expert- experienced in community development and police engagement implementation. The training includes small group discussions, case studies and question and answer sessions. A notable component of the training is the 'walk-through' of a local neighbourhood setting where the instructor facilitates the taught elements of the training into a real-world scenario through the 'class' being transported to a nearby location in order to experience and participate 'first-hand'. Participants begin to identify potential stakeholders and networks, identify local issues and highlight potential resources whilst patrolling 'on-foot'. The learning is consolidated in an end of day session where the components of the training are de-briefed.

The trainees are subsequently awarded certificates based on whether they have participated in the whole training and implementation process, or whether they so actively were involved that they could implement a new LISP project either with or without the ongoing assistance of more experienced practitioners.

2.3. SUMMARY

This chapter has provided a short introduction to the creation and structure of the LISP Handbook. The 8 steps that were developed in collaboration with the Police and Community Support officers, and became core to the Handbook are reiterated in Figure 2.8. Firstly, the choice of location for the LISP location has to be carefully established, justifying the investment in one particular location, rather any other candidate location, based on crime and social demographic data. This has to be a strategically driven and informed process, as will be seen in Step 8, because the statutory authorities and major institutions that have key roles in affecting significant change have to commit to aligning resource to the outcomes of the intensive engagement process. Having made a clear choice to base an intensive engagement implementation in a given neighbourhood, the team, in Step 2 seek to carefully understand the pre-existing human and institutional assets, to tackle a natural deficit mentality and discover what is already making the neighbourhood in question mostly successful.

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Figure 2.8 Summary of LISP Steps

Step 1. Justification
    Clear rationale for choice of location

Step 2. Assets and Capabilities
    Understand place and existing human and institutional assets

Step 3. Stakeholders and Networks
    understand people and how they connect together

Step 4. Problem Rich Pictures
    Clarifying the problems(s) under consideration, and their dynamics

Step 5. Form a Working Group
    Community based leadership

Step 6. Solution Rich Pictures
    Tailored & targeted action tackling root causes

Step 7. Interventions & Evaluation
    Implementation phase, assessing and learning

Step 8. Escalation and Exit
    Aligning strategy & leadership to resources

The third step draws on the results of Step 2 by identifying those people who are interested and engaged with the problems identified in Step 1, but with particular attention paid to identifying those who are highly connected and highly capable (regardless of who they are at this stage), and also mapping how they connect to other stakeholders relevant to the neighbourhood. All of these stakeholders then become sources of Problem Rich Pictures in Step 4, either providing rich pictures themselves and/or using their networks to ensure that different perspectives and experiences from as wide a range of the communities in the neighbourhood are collected for evaluation and consideration by the Working Group who emerge from Step 3 and Step 4. Equipped with the justification data from Step 1 (refreshed if necessary based on the insights in Step 4), and the insights gained at Step 4, the Working Group seek to develop a number of Solution Rich Pictures at Step 6, culminating in a composite Solution Rich Picture, representing a 'vision for the future' which forms the basis for action in Step 7.

Step 7 is a project management stage, with several different interventions, integrated and aligned to contribute to the overall strategic vision, with clear statements of who on the Working Group, i.e. who of the highly connected and highly capable stakeholders is going to deliver the interventions, and how the success of the intervention is to be measured. Step 8 is less of a final step, but more of a cross cutting opportunity to ensure that issues and problems are escalated to the right level of authority within the institutions involved- ensuring

that strategic resource is reconfigured where needed to deliver the interventions required, and therefore the outcomes needed to address the issues identified by Step 1. This LISP process, how it works, what mechanisms that underpin its development and implementation is the focus of the remainder of this investigation.

The statutory reasons for public authorities, like the police, to engage with the public have been established and the purpose of enhanced problem-solving skills and resilience are given as further rationale to the study. The research question posed in this study, therefore, is how this Handbook came about in the format it did, and what elements of it make the Handbook 'work', i.e. the underpinning mechanisms. The Handbook has been piloted in several very different neighbourhood contexts, giving a rich opportunity, and challenge, to establish what features of the Handbook work best, and which require closer attention when being implemented. The next chapter provides an opportunity to explore the theoretical heritage of the LISP Handbook, demonstrating that it has been built on diverse but firm theoretical and evidential foundations.

CHAPTER. 3.   THE ANTECEDENTS OF LISP IN THE LITERATURE

3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter is primarily an exploration of the antecedents of the Locally Identified Solutions and Practices (LISP) approach, exploring the philosophical and theoretical roots of the work and the influences that led to the Handbook being devised the way it was, as an applied example of social innovation processes. The Handbook arose out of decades of practice that was informed by a thread of highly influential literature. This chapter traces that thread through 25 years of practice. It is therefore, necessarily, an ideographic, personal journey and as such, is reported in the first person in the first instance.

As a junior environmental law consultant working for government agencies and large commercial companies in the mid-1990s, I interpreted emerging environmental law obligations and helped organisations translate that into action, designing and helping them implement new procedures and practices to prevent harm to the environment and improve environmental efficiency. Environmental efficiency is one of the main tools used to promote a transformation from unsustainable development to sustainable development. It is based on the concept of creating more goods and services while using fewer resources and creating less waste and pollution (Elkington, 1998, pp.37-51) and required the application of significant levels of innovation.

The life of a consultant is one of little power but great influence. One can advise but one cannot implement, not being an employee or manager of the organisation that requires change. The conundrum of attempting to change an organisation without being in charge (Wilkins and Patterson, 1985; Handy, 1995; Collins, 2005; Todnem, 2005) was very clear early in my career, and these sources informed much of my thinking at the time. Indeed, the first book that I remember reading on this topic, and continue to refer to regularly, is Geoffrey M. Bellman's *Getting things done when you are not in charge* (1992) (see further Section 3.2 below). Although this is a non-academic text, it is full of practical wisdom, outlining strategies and techniques that have resonance today. In subsequent literature, I have found a more theoretical underpinning for the techniques detailed in this text.

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By the early 2000s, I was invited to work as an Associate Lecturer for the Open University (1999-2005) on the T860 Environmental Decision-making Masters programme through which I encountered systems thinking, in particular Checkland's soft systems methodology (Checkland, 1981; Checkland, 2000) Applying this approach (Blackmore and Morris, 2001) with hundreds of students over 6 years, I found myself exploring with those students how to effect systemic change in their work organisations across diverse contexts, from US State Defence departments tackling international terrorism through to waste-water processing plants.

The focal point of 'intervention', first as a consultant and then as a tutor, shifted from being an outsider influencing systems and procedures within existing organisations to working directly with insiders also trying to shift the behaviour of large organisations. Merely writing environmental policy documents and getting senior management buy-in did not seem to have the expected effects (Scott and Carter (2019). While working with a timber processing company being prosecuted for contaminating a river with preservative, for example, the gap between what management understood about the organisation, and thought was happening, was a long way removed from the daily actions and sense-making of vitally influential but low paid and barely-trained plant operatives. This major gap between what the organisation thought was happening (the plan) and what was actually happening (the real world) led to tiny but environmentally lethal amounts of benzalkonium chloride being tracked by forklift trucks into a yard and thence into a nearby river (Müller, 2019). This case became the basis of many training courses for environmental professionals being trained in the United Arab Emirates.

A further shift in my understanding of the focal point of intervention occurred sometime during 2003 whilst I was attending an environmental conference. Another conference was being held in the same building, concerning a new (to me) phenomenon called 'social enterprise'; thoroughly explained by Bull and Ridley-Duff (2019). Whilst social enterprise focused on social problems and used very different terms to the environmental innovation experience I had developed to this point, the underlying terminology of intervention and impact was very similar. However, rather than trying to change existing organisations and organisational configurations, the world of social enterprise was oriented towards creating new or 'hybrid' (Doherty et al., 2014, p218) organisational forms to

address social problems. This led to my work in the East Midlands on the EU funded BEST Procurement project (Curtis, 2006, 2017) which was influenced by systems thinking in seeking to establish a procurement marketplace that supported and encouraged social enterprises (Muñoz and Tinsley, 2008). Isomorphism, the extent to which such social enterprises (especially those created by governmental agencies) mimic existing forms and structures (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999), became the focal point of further research in the South East of England Development Agency (Curtis, Minto, et al. (2007) Cultural Shift project, resulting in a reflective journal paper in which I argued that failure should be considered as the catalyst for innovation rather than mature market places (Curtis, 2008). Further, I found in work with Polish colleagues that a currency of trust encourages innovation (Curtis et at., 2010) much like a political economy of trust (Korczynski, 2000). Breaking out of the iron cage of organisational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to create truly innovative interventions soon became much more important to me than devising business models and marketplaces for start-up social enterprises (Curtis, 2004) or in public procurement (Curtis 2006).

Shifting the focal point from that of outsider to partial insider (and the object of scrutiny from policies and procedures to creating new organisations and organisational forms (like Community Interest Companies and Charitable Incorporated Organisations) and marketplaces) changed again in 2008 creating an opportunity to experience the change of an organisation from within (a university committed to becoming Number 1 for Social Enterprise) and explore the change of individuals (students). Teaching social enterprise and community development, as well as spending some time coaching for the Academy for Sustainable Communities (Academy for Sustainable Communities, 2007) prompted an interest in shifting people's motivations to change (Rollnick and Miller, 1995), and an encounter with the Motivational Interviewing literature of Miller and Rollnick encouraged a deepening appreciation of community organising (Alinsky, 1971), critical community practice (Ledwith, 2015), asset-based community development (McKnight and Kretzman, 1993). The challenges of influencing a university's strategic development from the relatively powerless position of being a senior lecturer also gave significant further insight into the lessons of Bellman (1992).

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In 2010, I defined the processes of social entrepreneurship as 'a process whereby an individual working within a network of individuals and resources reconfigures those existing resources within the rules and norms of capitalism, typically by starting a trading business, to a) address a social problem or issue of social justice, b) to operate the business in a specifically ethical manner and/or c) reconfigure the rules and norms of capitalism' (Curtis, 2010), displaying an evident bias towards the business model of the organisational innovation. In the following years, as the University of Northampton worked to remodel its strategy from 'Number 1 for Social Enterprise' to a Changemaker Campus in learning and teaching (Alden Rivers et al., 2015) and employability (Maxwell, Irwin et al, 2015), innovation came to the fore, with the processes of innovation taking centre stage: social entrepreneurship became organisational innovation with a view to achieving a social purpose, and understanding the motivations of the people (c.f human actants (Latour, 2004)) involved, viewing them as assets rather than merely the causes of deficits and appreciating the dynamics of power', more closely capturing the influences of the literature mentioned so far.

It is also necessary to set this research in the context of that field of theory and practice, within the debates between the institution of 'social enterprise', the agent of 'social entrepreneur' and the processes of 'entrepreneurship'. This research emerges on the side of social innovation, the processes of 'organising of positive social change' as context-rich community and locality focused innovation. In this specific research, the problem situations are that of public safety and crime, considered towards the end of the chapter in Section 3.7

The first phase of the literature review reflects on the **management of organisational change** book by Bellman (1992) and thereafter, literature on Motivational Interviewing which, whilst directly influential, are representative of a wider literature on the management and influencing of the processes of organising. This relates to the LISP Handbook development because the communities and stakeholders involved in the public safety aspects of Neighbourhood Policing are not organisations in the classical business management sense, but are still organisational forms, albeit amorphous and fluid ones, centred around the idea of creating sustainable public safety. In this context, public safety is achieved through the police, not through command and control techniques of reassurance and arrest, but by influence and persuasion. The

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'organisation' in this context, becomes 'organising' of people, institutions and actants (specifically technologies and spaces of control and persuasion) for the purpose of improving public safety, and with a secondary purpose of improving or sustaining the legitimacy of the process of policing; managing the consent to police. Managing consent to influence change is also about persuading others to make changes, the need for which they are both unaware of and, often, actively resist. The literature on Motivational Interviewing helps to understand the dynamics of managing and manufacturing ambivalent change.

The second phase of the literature explores the '**social enterprise to social innovation' movement**, which sets the conditions, having managed consent, by which the police and its stakeholders are able to identify and develop novel and effective interventions to achieve the objectives of (legitimised) public safety. Whilst the literature on social enterprise begins in the realms of the trading organisational form of a specialised hybridised social enterprise, the underpinning notions of entrepreneurship and innovation for social purpose, as well as the management and legitimation of hybrid and fluid assemblages of people, resources and technology, effectively attempts to achieve the same goal as the literature on mind-set and motivating management.

From there, the review shifts to consider the **management of the group,** i.e. the organising of community or communities, and the asset-based approaches that represent the forefront of community development. This recognises that the management of change within a neighbourhood is not merely a case of persuading a few people, but influencing the very social networks that are present (or absent) in that neighbourhood.

Finally, the literature review explores how the complexity of change management, social innovation and community development can be expressed together through a systems-thinking model of contemplation and action.

3.2. GETTING THINGS DONE WHEN YOU ARE NOT IN CONTROL

The following three tables are a collection of key quotes from Bellman (1992). They have been sorted and coded using deductive thematic analysis (Guest et al, 2011) according to three recurring themes throughout the book, with respect to purpose, power and persuasion. The themes are explored through the quotes, and

linked to the literature and the lessons learnt during the formation of the LISP Handbook.

Table 3.1 provides illustrative quotes from Bellman (1992) regarding the development of a vision or purpose. He does not categorise them as such, but they relate to both the development of a personal purpose and organisational visions. He speaks of the change agent developing a goal that is beyond the organisation for which the changemaker currently works. In the context of a police officer or police community support officer (PCSO), the changemaker may have a personal vision for social change that is distinct from the particular police force they work for. Alternatively, the wider Peelian principles (especially Principle 7, which concerns the nature of the relationship between police officers and the public) may act as a personal as well as an organisational goal. This alignment of personal purpose with organisational vision is sometimes known as 'spiritual leadership' (Fry, 2003, p693). Bellman does not use this term; however, he is clearly interested in the whole person. He speaks (in Quote 1) of developing a life game, a change in the world that is personally driven, and beyond the immediate goals of the employing organisation, knowing (Quote 11) and defining oneself (Quote 2) as a precursor to organisational loyalty, and acting on that long-term goal without requiring permission (Quote 8). That personal self-awareness establishes an integrity (Quote 13) that cannot be easily affected by the shifting priorities within the organisation.

In the context of Neighbourhood Policing, the change agent must navigate and negotiate across the boundaries of the police organisation, understanding and balancing not just the needs of the police force, but also the (often conflicting) needs of the communities and the priorities of partner agencies like local authorities. The personal integrity of the officer, aware of their own personal 'super goals' causes them to take responsibility for the current reality (Quote 3); eliciting their wants (Quote 4), as well as eliciting the wants of the other stakeholders.[19] Rich picturing and thinking about stakeholders and their management becomes an important feature within the LISP process in response to this need on the part of the police officer to (literally) make visible the needs and wants of the complex

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[19] It is important to note that the stakeholder theory of the organisation emerges in academic literature around the same time as Bellman's work, and the formative period of this research (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).

mix of stakeholders vying for attention in a given locality. These stakeholders need to agree on the problem situation as it is (Quote 5) before they are ready to move to a new future. Carefully, and thoroughly defining that problem situation (Quote 6) appears as a key step in Soft Systems Methodology with the root definition. Quote 7 establishes a key situation in which change can happen, where an organisation (or set of individual and organisational stakeholders in a locality) have yet to decide on the nature of the problem situation. Where stakeholders have already determined for themselves what the problem is, change becomes impossible. This LISP Handbook instructs the officers to suspend their own interpretation of what they think is causing the problems in the vulnerable locality, and let the stakeholders guide them in that definition. Quotes 9 and 10 point the change agent towards identifying the gaps and contradictions within the organisation of the locality (the rich pictures allow for these gaps and clashes to be identified), i.e. spaces and places where the 'organisation' of the locality has not yet 'declared itself' beyond the boundaries (Quote 12) of each of the stakeholders.

Table 3.1 Quotes related to Purpose (Bellman, 1992)

Purpose	1	Personal	'Create your life game…without this larger more important life game you will end up playing the rules of the work game or reacting against them with no clear purpose' (p.3)
	2	Personal	'Define yourself, define your wants, and make the organisation game a subset of your life game' (p.17)
	3	Org	'Change takes place when people take responsibility for the current reality and help move it towards their wants' (p.19)
	4	Org	'Helping people express what they want, together, is often easier than getting them to agree on what they've got' (p.34)
	5	Org	'we first have to agree upon what is really happening before we can move forward together' (p.33)
	6	Org	'one of the primary reasons people cannot solve their problems is because they have incorrectly described what is going on now…80% of the time, people are working on a misdiagnosed problem' (p.42)
	7	Org	'Successful change makers often capitalise on the organisation that has yet to declare its direction' (p.55)

	8	Personal	'Do not wait: initiate!...you cannot wait to be called on if you are to be effective' (pp.93-4)
	9	Org	'test the limits of the organisation; push it for what you need to succeed, for them and for yourself' (p.94)
	10	Org	'see the contradictions, the paradoxes, the self-deception, the excuses and the rationalisations we use to keep doing what we are doing, and avoid doing what we want to do' (p.104)
	11	Personal	'knowledge of myself is more important than the techniques and methods I have accumulated' (p.105)
	12	Org	'Help.. yourself and others step outside familiar boundaries' (p.107)
	13	Personal	'do not initiate change that requires you to pretend to be someone you are not' (p.137)

The next table (Table 3.2) explores Bellman's theories of power. Again, they are drawn from across the whole book—there is no point at which power itself is considered as a coherent whole, but Bellman's own experience within organisations and as a change consultant to organisations makes him especially sensitive to the dynamics of the informal organisational structure (Chan, 2002)

Bellman's theory seems to be structured around distinguishing formal (positional authority) power from informal structures and power bases, as well as considering the gaming that goes on in and across organisations to achieve power as well as to use power to achieve defined ends. Gaming (Quotes 15, 16, 19, 22 and 24) derives from the independent purpose of the change agent developed in the previous section. With that organisational and ethical autonomy, the agent can 'play a game' and 'play the game', subverting rules and norms, whilst at the same time reinforcing useful rules through compliance and respecting (Quote 23) those with positional authority. Rolling with resistance and amplifying ambivalence (in 0) from Motivational Interviewing, informed by understanding the 'white spaces' (Quote 17) through rich picturing, allows the actor to understand the rules of the formal and informal games within organisations, as well as across the space of the locality.

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Table 3.2 Quotes related to Power (Bellman, 1992)

Power	14	Informal	'It is too easy for us to attribute power to a position we have yet to hold, or that others hold, and to diminish the power we already have' (p.2)
	15	Game	'Your ultimate power in the work game comes from choosing to play here, and knowing you make that choice daily' (p.3)
	16	Game	'if you want to change the system, you had better know how it works' (p.49)
	17	Informal	'politics fills the white spaces around the jobs on an organisation chart…this is where you decide, where you are influences, build trust, take risks and reveal who you really are' (p.50)
	18	Formal	'accept that politics are a legitimate organisational force and seek to understand them' (p.50)
	19	Game	'Power and powerlessness begin in our personal needs and assumptions and then play out in our actions' (p.58)
	20	Formal	'resistance to change demonstrates the power of the organisation; that power needs to be understood and respected' (p.131)
	21	Formal	'Formal power, authority gets an inordinate amount of attention in most organisations' (p.58)
	22	Game	'Most of the power management has exists because we give it to them; we see them as powerful…when others think you are powerful, you are' (p.58)
	23	Formal	'One of the greatest mistakes we can make is to demonise the decision-makers in our organisations' (p.89)
	24	Game	'build a pattern of small accomplishments and a small, solid reputation for success' (p.75)
	25	Informal	'You don't have to be in charge of the world, or the department, to take charge of your life and your role in organisations' (p.99)
	26	Game	'do not expect your ideas to be accepted first time round… you cannot control what others will do when they receive your idea' (p.131)

	27	Informal	'expect a slow pace of change, and it will help you gauge the speed and intensity of the efforts you undertake' (p.135)

The third way that Bellman's material can be categorised is that of persuasion. His central thesis is to change organisations, but without utilising the formal positional power that governs most change programmes. He seeks to understand the motivations (Quote 28) of powerful people, but also making it clear to them that you understand their motivations (Quote 29). This is why Motivational Interviewing (see Section 3.3) is so compelling in this respect, because it is explicitly about making people aware of their own motivations and interests. Rich picturing from Soft Systems Methodology makes these motivations and self-interests visible to the other stakeholders in a non-threatening way (Quote 36). Tackling ambivalence and resistance (Quote 29 and 30) is only achieved through building a network (Quote 33), addressing the empathy issues within that network (Quote 31) and building a partnership out of a common vision (Quote 34). The LISP steps that implement these strategies are the empathy building that comes from asset-led thinking, and rich picturing between stakeholders so that they understand each other's lived experience and the social capital (see Section 3.5.3) building activities within the working group.

Table 3.3 Quotes related to Persuasion (Bellman, 1992)

Persuasion	28		When you want people[20] to move from their current reality, you need to appeal to the whys behind their goals[21]
	29		'it is not enough to know what they want; they must know that you know. When they do, they are ready to move forward. When others think you do not understand what they want, they will move only with great reluctance. The frustration caused by a problem- or enthusiasm generated by an opportunity- releases energy and allows people to lean into action. When you propose action steps before these feelings are expressed, you are likely to get resistance.' (p.30)

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[20] Thinking of people as assets or capital resources.
[21] Understanding their self-interest.

	30		'we become uncomfortable with what is going on right now; we sense there is a difference between what is happening and what we want' (p.34)
	31		'increase empathy and sympathy for people caught in the situation; we know at a deeper level what is going on' (p.44)
	32		Set up opportunities where disagreeing parties can recognise their shared goals (pp.51-2)
	33		'if we do not keep our web of relationships in shape it will not be there when we need it' (p.66)
	34		'form partnerships in anticipation of success…if we are successful doing this together; what would our results look like?' (p.71)
	35		'help others learn about what you have done. Don't expect them to find out' (p.76)
	36		'Key decision-makers often lack the deep knowledge and appreciation of your work that you would like them to have-especially if their role is quite different to yours' (p.92)
	37		'The need for change must be compelling' (p.129)
	38		'leading change is demanding…habits, norms, rules, values, procedures, history and culture expect us to fall into their established patterns' (p.129)
	39		'the easy, energising, exciting part is coming up with ideas for change, gaining support, getting approval. The hard part is what happens after the launch, after the excitement of starting fresh' (p.133)

Unstructured as it was, the Bellman text formed a strong basis for the development of a coherent theory of change that structured the LISP Handbook. Whilst not in chronological order, the motivation of people to make changes that they do not necessarily agree with has been a recurrent theme in the shift from working on environmental policy through social entrepreneurship to current police organisational capacity development.

The very notion of 'not being in charge' is a powerful metaphor for many of the individuals involved in the projects described in Chapter. 5, whilst getting things done is a strong indicator of both policing culture exemplified by the focus on the PEEL outcomes criteria (described in Section 7.1.3) and what social entrepreneurs are expected to achieve (Section 3.6.1). The three themes of purpose, power and

persuasion, although not explicit in the LISP Handbook, are echoed throughout the projects. As will be explored in this literature review, and then in the empirical evidence, Bellman's work is strongly oriented towards the skills and talents of the individual. There is no structured process here, no procedure or checklist, just a series of aphorisms and advice, lending weight to an idea that 'getting things done when not in charge' is a matter of skill, talent or personal genius. This research will interrogate that idea and establish the processes and mechanisms that underpin such change.

3.3. MOTIVATING PEOPLE TO MAKE CHANGE

A major strand within the LISP Handbook, as an underlying 'way of thinking and doing', rather than as an explicit step or task, is the use of Motivational Interviewing (MI) as a strategy. Many community and neighbourhood policing tasks are based around either informing the public of issues or of using directive and authority-based techniques, like arrest or anti-social behaviour orders, to govern the behaviour of citizens within a given neighbourhood (Innes, 2005). In teaching community development, building on the work of Saul Alinsky in 'community organising' (Alinsky, 1971), Motivational Interviewing emerged as a useful set of principles that could be applied to a whole neighbourhood rather than just to the individual. The principle of helping a group of people to understand and recruit their own intrinsic motivation to act in concert with policing objectives, rather than having to be forced to act by extrinsic motivators, is a compelling idea. There is no known literature on group or community level application of Motivational Interviewing[22], with the primary practice focus being the individual, but the principles are useful in the context of LISP, where the police officers and PCSOs attempt to not use any statutory powers they have, but instead seek to access and motivate community action- reiterating Bellman's (1992) theme of persuasion.

Motivational Interviewing (MI) is rooted in the work of Carl Rogers' person-centred therapy (1951). It focuses on the understanding of an individuals' central frame of reference in the present and concentrates on the discrepancies between values and behaviour (Arkowitz and Westra, 2009) as an aid to changing behaviour.

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[22] MI literature doesn't seem to cross reference community education like Paolo Freire or Jack Meizrow's Transformative Learning Theory

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Using specific methods and techniques in conjunction with the 'spirit' which is specific to MI, an individual is motivated to make changes in their lifestyle, life choice, habits or addictions.

Motivational Interviewing emerged from the treatment of alcoholism and was first described by Bill Miller in 1983 (Miller and Baca, 1983). The primary proponents and practitioners of Motivational Interviewing define the approach as 'a client-centred directive method for enhancing intrinsic motivation to change by exploring and resolving ambivalence' (Miller and Rollnick, 2012, p.25). The spirit of MI is collaborative, evocative and careful to honour individual autonomy (Rollnick, et al., 2008). The approach is client-centred in that it does not require a process, procedure or specific technique (which would make it 'process-centred'), but unlike other Rogerian strategies, it is directive, in that change is a clear expectation throughout. The 'spirit' of MI is to work with a client to enhance and protect autonomy, and identify where intrinsic resources can be re-directed towards the desired end-goal. These counter the problem of 'empowerment' which involved the lending of a person's power and authority (like a police officer's) to a person who has no power (a community member). Whilst this may be necessary where a police officer might exercise power on behalf of a community member to deal with a situation, the wider ethos of community/police relations can be shifted towards 'doing with' rather than 'doing for' by recognising the motivation, power and resources (or assets) that the community already has but may not be exercising.

To use the methods of MI without the governing spirit would not be authentic MI, therefore the LISP Handbook contains various notes and ideas taken from MI literature and practice. Specific principles and methods (explained below) are used to elicit change talk and reduce ambivalence towards change, but it is the specificity of goals that sets MI apart from other person-centred counselling techniques. The goals of MI are to increase intrinsic motivation and the reduction of ambivalence, therefore increasing the probability of change (Arkowitz and Westra, 2009). This method is therefore person centred, rather than problem or process centred, with a distinct lack of theoretical foundation (Miller and Rose, 2009). Hettema et al. further elucidate; 'MI was not derived from theory, but rather it arose from specification of principles underlying intuitive clinical practice' (2005, p.106). Rather than a stand-alone therapy designed for the

accomplishment of change behaviour, MI is a 'way of being with people' (Miller and Rollnick, 2012, p.34), laid upon a foundation of principles derived from social psychology, coupled with counselling strategies consistent with Rogerian client-centred therapy (Miller, 1983).

Person-centred approach techniques such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy and Motivational Interviewing, have been used both together and separately in different settings to successfully change behaviour (Naar-King and Suarez, 2011). The therapist then takes the lead in choosing the skills appropriate for the client (Naar-King and Suarez, 2011). Motivational Interviewing, on the other hand, does not teach the client new skills but elicits existing 'internal motivation and strengths by resolving the clients' ambivalences (Naar-King and Suarez, 2011, p.6). In this intervention, the client is encouraged to take the lead (Miller and Rollnick, 2012) and set up attainable goals. Motivational Interviewing can be incorporated in situations such as dealing with highly addictive behaviours where abstinence from drugs would be detrimental to the clients' health (Miller and Rollnick, 2012).

The four principles of Motivational Interviewing assist in the resolving of ambivalence that is experienced by the client (Miller and Rollnick, 2013; Gold and Kokotailo, 2007). The first principle 'expressing empathy' involves accepting the beliefs and behaviour of the client (Gold and Kokotailo, 2007) is best demonstrated when the interviewer reflects on what he hears and sees (non-verbal gestures) from the client (Fuller and Taylor, 2008; Ledwith and Springett, 2010). The use of Motivational Interviewing skills helps to show accurate empathy towards the client (Naar-King and Suarez, 2011) which leads to further exploration of the topic. By demonstrating empathy in practice, the client is able to trust the practitioner and share more (Miller, 1999; Miller and Rollnick, 2013). This helps in the assessment as the practitioner can gauge the level of support the client needs (Wahab, 2005).

The second principle, 'rolling with resistance', requires the interviewer to employ reflective listening and identify the ambivalences that the client shows in order to help the client in resolving them (Gold and Kokotailo, 2007). The interviewer needs to recognize that ambivalence is normal and also that the client might not be ready for a change (Gold and Kokotailo, 2007). An accurate response that minimises the resistance is required, as confronting the client only exacerbates

resistance (Miller and Rollnick, 2012). How the interviewer responds determines the next stage in the change process.

In order to understand the client, the practitioner needs to identify with the sense of 'self' so that the therapeutic relationship established with the client is not foreign but that of friendship (Prochaska and Di Clemente, 1986). Sociologists suggest that identities are formed through primary and secondary socializations (Haralambos and Holborn, 2008), however Goffman (1959) argued that, though we perform various roles in society, there exists a 'self' behind that role. People perform different roles and can identify themselves in those roles. This means that the authentic 'self' is identified in the various roles one performs. In role playing, therefore, the interviewer and the interviewee need to reflect and identify themselves in the characters they perform (other) and link it to the 'self'. Giddens, on the other hand, suggested that the 'self' is an ongoing process of reflexivity where the transformations that take place in the world can change us (Giddens, 1991). This can then be translated in Motivational Interviewing that change is not impossible to achieve. Additionally, Blumer (1969) suggests that individuals act according to the meaning they give to people or their social interaction, emphasizing that these meanings can change with time, meaning that the 'self' is not rigid but continuous. Though the role playing in Motivational Interviewing constitutes an element of performativity, in the real-world interviewers must accept the clients' way of being, even if it conflicts with that of the interviewer, for pro-social change to take place.

Change is a potential consequence of uncertainty, however, as change rarely just 'happens'. A drive, or motivation, to want to change is a necessary accompaniment to achieve change. The original theory of self-determination towards development and motivation places autonomy as a central concept (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Autonomy, which is literally regulation by the self, has been questioned as an authentic construct in addition to will, choice and volition. The validity of these constructs has been questioned due to the possible influence of gender or culture (Ryan and Deci, 2006). However, autonomy, competence and relatedness can be argued to be the most volitional contributors to motivation (Ryan et al., 2008). Self-determination theory is central to motivation and maintenance of change. However, it is important that autonomy is understood as a significant motivational force.

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Autonomy is choosing to do something rather than having to do something. Motivation is etymologically derived from the Latin word 'movere', to 'move' or be 'moved'. To achieve movement, energy and direction is required (Deci and Ryan, 2000). Movement, energy, direction and motivation are inextricably linked by goal orientation. Ambivalence is a natural human condition. When faced with a dilemma, ambivalence is the resultant state, which literally means the simultaneous occurrence of two conflicting emotions. Ambivalence is often experienced as a lack of motivation as it is frequently associated with a state of indecision or inaction (Fuller and Taylor, 2008). The resolution of the ambivalent state contributes to decision making and change. There are clear echoes here of Bellman's (1992) concerns for persuasion, but also a nuanced concern for power- who is yielding it and how it is used. In MI, the power to change is owned by the client, or in the case of LISP, by the community-based Working Group, rather than by the traditionally powerful Police Officers.

The following are five principles of MI that have been built into the LISP Handbook:

EXPRESS EMPATHY

Skilled helpers are sensitive to diversity but are not consumed or overwhelmed by it (Egan, 1975, Egan and Reese, 2018). The suspension of personal values to actively listen to another empathically is difficult. To be truly genuine, there must be an acceptance of the person despite the presence of personally unacceptable behaviour (Thwaites and Bennett-Levy 2007). The ability to successfully accomplish this is a skill. Genuine empathetic dialogue enables an individual to almost 'think out loud'. To be listened to in a non-judgemental, focused and open-minded way may be a new experience for some and taking part in this activity can enable internal arguments to be heard externally (Hohman, 2015). Expressing empathy is a pre-requisite in the Handbook. The building of trust is considered to be a cross-cultural prerequisite or foundational 'pillar' of community policing (Bayerl, et al 2016), and is also considered to be a 'currency' of the social economy (Laville and Nyssens, 2001; Curtis et al., 2010). The building of trust within a community is not an automatic result of police presence or visibility, indeed it can mitigate against trust (Bradford et al., 2009). MI therefore provides useful strategies for LISP practitioners to build trust through the expression of empathy in their talk and actions. Vitally, this may also require expressing empathy with

people whose life choices or behaviours are antithetical to good order or (formal) policing objectives, but empathy is still expressed with a view to achieving a wider goal. Empathy is not merely expressed, and such life choices and behaviours are not left unchallenged, but the discrepancy between the current situation and desired futures are exacerbated to provoke action in an Alinsky style provocation and agitation (Langhout, 2016). Expressing empathy was primarily built in through the rich picturing tactics, but the also the asset-based community development approach, also described later, also ensured that the LISP practitioner started with a basic empathetic mindset.

DEVELOPING DISCREPANCY

Discrepancy is the disparity between behaviours and core values. Developing discrepancy can engender movement towards restoring consistency between individual behaviour and core values. Indicators of potential discrepancy can be easily missed—a throwaway remark or dismissive comment can provide insight into meaningful feelings that may be pivotal towards the change process. Contradictions between espoused values and actions can be examined and discussed to develop and enhance the awareness of the discrepancy. However, the development of discrepancy must be examined carefully. It is not used to identify an individual's 'Achilles heel', to elicit guilt by finding something that is lacking due to that person's unhealthy behaviour. Although the idea is to elicit change, to make a person feel guilty to elicit change, then for that person to be unable to make the change merely leaves that person with ambivalence *and* guilt. If autonomous regulation is not present within the individual, introjected regulation, (where they pressurize themselves into change), is more likely to become internalized, which hinders the aim of internal harmony (Markland et al., 2005). At a neighbourhood level, the community can also internalise introjected regulation, becoming dependent on police action and activity, and internalising the stigma of police judgements of a neighbourhood (Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004). Developing discrepancy is instead focused on eliciting what the community understands to be wrong, rather than on what the police consider to be wrong, and building towards a vision that returns the values of that community to alignment with the behaviour that occurs in that locality.

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ROLLING WITH RESISTANCE AND AMPLIFYING AMBIVALENCE

Individuals and communities resist change. Rolling with resistance is necessary when oppositional/ambivalent behaviour is identified, reflected upon and then used as a resource to proceed. Community groups and activists resist change actively when solutions are not developed within the community, but further, community members passively resist (often identified and confused with 'apathy') when police interests, or the interests of a vocal minority, are being privileged over that of the rest of the community. MI appears to be useful when individuals are cognitively 'stuck'. This 'stuckness' is synonymous with resistance. The term resistance implies negative connotations where resistance to change is considered to be wilfully chosen, however this is mostly not the case (Arkowitz et al., 2008). Resolution to the assumed ambivalence to change felt by those seeking MI is achieved by enhancing motivation and focussing on the expressed possible futures. Examining the issue in terms of ambivalence (Feldstein et al, 2011) rather than resistance, leads to careful discussion of the many dimensions of ambivalence and the inter-relation of each. This terminology replaces the 'in-denial' phrase previously used in addiction situations. Ambivalence is a natural human state that provides scope to explore options. It is the space between decision and indecision, action and inaction. Ambivalence can be examined in the context of 'change talk' which leads to changed behaviour. The framing of MI, from expressing empathy, through developing discrepancy to rolling with subsequent resistance, ends with supporting self-efficacy, allowing for the practitioner to clearly develop an exit strategy and not be locked into ongoing support and intervention.

SUPPORTING SELF-EFFICACY

Self-efficacy is based upon ability and is the conviction that an individual can successfully make a positive change to accomplish what they set out to do (Bandura, 1994). To increase and support an individual's self-efficacy, a number of obstacles must be overcome. Firstly, there is little point merely reassuring a person, or a community of people of their ability if the skills required for success are absent. Although skills are often present within an individual, they can be dormant due to a lack of confidence, practice or experience (Egan, 1975). Often the one obstacle preventing movement forwards is fear, anxiety and a lack of

belief in a person's ability (Egan and Reese, 2018) or in the ability of the group to make the changes expected of them. The belief that change can be achieved is therefore reinforced in many ways. Past successful achievement suggests that self-efficacy will be high, as, if a task can be successful once, it follows that it can be successful again (DiClemente and Velasquez 2002).

Lack of self-efficacy is a barrier encountered by professionals working with behaviour change, as without self-efficacy an individual or group do not feel as though they can make a change, and therefore have no motivation to do so. Belief in the inability to successfully achieve change can lead to cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance occurs when behaviour/cognitions become inconsistent with core values. The discomfort this evokes motivates the individual to restore balance and achieve consistency (Festinger, 1962). Cognitive dissonance was originally believed to motivate an individual to change by the examination of the discrepancy between these factors (Miller, 1985), however, the importance of cognitive dissonance within the theory of MI has reduced to the point of being discarded. Instead, the discrepancy between the actual state and the desired state of an individual was believed to be sufficient motivation for change (Miller and Rollnick, 1995; Miller and Rollnick, 2002).

For the LISP practitioner, supporting self-efficacy reinforces the expression of empathy at the beginning of the MI-infused encounter. The intrinsic motivation, and the recognition and celebration of internal resources that comes from the asset-based community development ethos allows for a given neighbourhood to develop actions that can be delivered and sustained without direct police intervention.

Having established the early influences on this work by Bellman (1992) and looked more closely at the underpinning thinking on the motivation of the agents within the organisation (or process of 'organising') using the theoretical base of Motivational Interviewing, this review turns to the wider context of community development, and then social entrepreneurship and innovation. Within this, the notion of the 'social organisation' of outcomes by social enterprises (as distinct vehicles of organisation), the processes of social entrepreneurship and latterly 'social innovation' set the LISP Handbook, and the challenges of neighbourhood policing, in the context of social innovation.

3.4. ORGANISING COMMUNITIES TO CHANGE

Before considering social entrepreneurship, social enterprise and the shift to social innovation, the next aspect to consider is the communities within which both the police and the erstwhile social innovator wishes to practice their craft. This is a crowded field. Whilst the criminals are busy (and this is not a criminology PhD), the community development worker is also busy in the same neighbourhoods overcoming poverty and deprivation, tackling some of the same problems that result in outcomes dealt with by the police. Later on, in Section 3.7, we will find that some of the influences on both social entrepreneurship and community development and organising are now being reflected in contemporary neighbourhood policing practice. The LISP Handbook picks out the influence of, in particular, that of Saul Alinsky and Paolo Freire from the following brief history of the practice of community development.

Saul David Alinsky (1909-1972) was both a committed organizer and activist (founding the Industrial Areas Foundation in Chicago) and an influential writer. His books *Reveille for Radicals* (1946) and *Rules for Radicals* (1971) were, and remain, important statements of community organizing. Alinsky's ideas have a continuing relevance for those whose role involves trying to effect change in communities. They are particularly useful for those who have to engage with power structures (much more politicised than Bellman's (1992) conceptualisation, but the connections are still evident), as well as workers who wish to engage alienated or disparate communities and seek common cause between them.

The use of Alinsky's style community organising in the LISP Toolkit came about as an antidote to the teaching of community development techniques, in the context of the National Reassurance Policing programme (Innes, 2004; Innes and Roberts, 2008). Although the techniques of the programme were not directly about reassuring and placating the public, the ethos of the strategy, and subsequent use of the term by police officers in the Northamptonshire context, was to reassure the public that the police were in control, and that they were there to solve problems on the behalf of citizens. Although the national programme was evaluated to have been successful by Innes and others, there seemed to be a contradiction between reassuring the public that the police would solve the problems of crime in neighbourhoods, and the desire to co-produce public safety

with the citizens. This prompted further exploration of Alinsky to establish why some communities would be seen by police officers as apathetic towards their attempts at community engagement, and whether strategies to placate and calm the public, like initiatives that would come to be known as 'super cocooning' (Johnson et al., 2017) would be counterproductive to recruiting the public into neighbourhood policing. This was particularly inspired by the work of Margaret Ledwith, former visiting lecturer at the University of Northampton and author of a core textbook for undergraduates in Community Development (Ledwith, 2001, 2011).

Mayo (1975) suggests that community development was a deliberate post-war strategy to develop and settle post-colonial communities into the UK. A 1944 report, *Mass Education in the Colonies,* placed an emphasis on literacy training and advocated the promotion of agriculture, health and other social services through local self-help (Midgley et al., 1986, p.17). Smith and Frank (2006) cites a British Colonial Office document that stressed 'active participation, and if possible on the initiative of the community, but if this initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, by the use of techniques for arousing and stimulating it in order to achieve its active and enthusiastic response to the movement' (Colonial Office, 1958, p.2). It seems, however, that the UN had already been using the term to describe an organisation of local communities—less overtly colonial in tone. One might characterise the UN's preoccupation in 1946-8 with the post-war settlement in the colonies as Community Development, as this drive was defined as 'a process designed to create conditions of economic and social progress for the whole community with its active participation and fullest possible reliance upon the community's initiative' (United Nations cited in Head, 1979, p.101). By 1946, the UN definition had shifted to 'a generic term used to describe the processes by which <u>local</u> communities can raise <u>their own</u> standard of living. These processes include the provision of services, e.g. for social welfare, health protection, education, improvement of agriculture, development of small scale industries' (United Nations, 1956).

The text goes on to question the veracity of this definition, exploring the problematic meaning of the term 'development' and the slippage of meaning between 'community development' and 'social and economic development'. A similar problem is highlighted in environmentalist literature, which marks a

slippage in meaning between 'sustainable development' as development that can be sustained within the ecological limits of a given system (Brundtland et al, 1987) and 'development that is sustainable', meaning development that can sustain unlimited economic growth (Bromley, 2008).

The inherent contradiction that binds these efforts together, identified by Smith (2013), is the idea that the local community should be primarily concerned with its own development, but that the state would utilise certain techniques to create the conditions for that development, if not create the development itself. From its very roots, development of communities is directed by the state, and is therefore subject to state interests. The community cannot choose not to develop. This echoes the more moralistic overtones of the roots of social work. The dynamic of power and persuasion are clear here (Bellman, 1992) but in the context of community development often the purpose is ambivalent, as paternalistic, moralistic or colonialist.

Despite the placing of community development in the context of post-colonial state action by prominent theorists in the field, such as Midgley and Mayo, a longer view of the antecedents of the term indicates that its co-option reflects the wider post-war attempt at state sponsored social welfare, in the post-war settlement and the creation of the welfare state. Before the second world war, community development adopted several strategies and initiatives, such as Victorian philanthropy and autonomist self-help, and brought them together into one post-war term.

Table 3.4 Some antecedents to 'community development'

Primary originator	Period	Summary	Strategy
Jane Adams	1860s to WW1	Adams introduced and developed the idea of the settlement house to the United States (founding Hull House with Ellen Starr in 1889), campaigned for better social conditions and led investigations into various areas of health and welfare.	Informal education

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Primary originator	Period	Summary	Strategy
Mary Carpenter	1807-1877	Established, researched and developed the principles on which reformatory schools should operate to reduce delinquency. Carpenter made a profound contribution to the development of more humane and enlightened treatment for young offenders.	Education to reduce crime
Thomas Barnado	1845-1905	Established children's homes, a ragged school, an employment agency and a mission church. He had acquired more than a dozen properties in east London, including a children's magazine publisher.	Housing
Alexander Paterson	1884-1947	Prison reformer, as well as a key figure in the establishment of Toc H and an influential figure in boys' club work. Paterson's *book Across the Bridges* (1911) was an important exploration of poverty and social conditions in the dockland districts of South London.	Youth Work
Ellen Ranyard	1809-1879	Ranyard was among the first group of paid social workers in England and pioneered the first district nursing programme in London.	Social work
Octavia Hill	1838-1912	Innovations in housing and championship of and organizing around the need for public open space. Hill was involved in the establishment of the National Trust. She was strongly opposed to any large-scale intervention by the state (national or local) in welfare.	Public spaces
Solly and Hawkesley	1869-	The Charity Organization Society came into being in large part as a response to	Infrastructure body

Primary originator	Period	Summary	Strategy
		the competition and overlap occurring between the various charities and agencies in many parts of Britain and Ireland. The general lack of cooperation between organizations not only led to duplication, it also involved what was seen at the time as indiscriminate giving. Not enough detailed attention was given to examining the claims and needs of potential clients.	

The limited number of initiatives represented above illustrate that the antecedents of community development in Victorian Britain were primarily funded through middle-class philanthropy and were generally averse to the efforts of the state to make provision for the poor (Wohl, 2017). Admittedly, they looked to the 'moral turpitude' of the poor more than they understood the structural conditions that created poverty, but nonetheless, these pioneers represent a 'non-state' strand of social radicalism. They represented anarchist and libertarian philosophers who opposed the concept of the state. In *Statism and Anarchy*, Mikhail Bakunin (1990) identified a statist tendency within the socialist movement, which led to the development of state socialism after the world wars, despite the libertarian and anarchist leanings of the early pioneering work.

After this shift in focus, the new concerns of state welfare and the end of Empire began to dominate the community development agenda. The emerging field drew heavily on the extensive American literature of community organization (Lindeman, 1921; Steiner, 1930; Alinsky, 1946) as well as various discourses arising specifically out of the experiences of developing countries, for example, Batten's (1957) classic textbook, *Communities and their Development.*

The post-war welfare state essentially nationalised community development, although there had been a substantial series of debates around the significance and importance of people's participation in various aspects of government activity - perhaps the best known being the Skeffington Report on planning (Skeffington,

1969). During this period, public involvement occurred in gesture only, involving the 'usual suspects', already familiar with the planning process and how to participate in it. At a time of slum clearances, town centre redevelopments and major road building programmes, this resulted in poor community involvement and the emergence of a number of protest groups.

The term 'community development' was re-adopted by many UK endeavours that focused on working with local neighbourhood groups to identify and meet their own needs. The changes were exemplified by two initiatives—the setting up of a study group by the Gulbenkian Foundation in 1966 (the first report appeared in 1968 and was chaired by Younghusband (1959), an experienced and influential social worker) to look at the nature and future of community work in the UK; and the development of the Community Development Projects by the Home Office. While the latter was ostensibly part of an anti-poverty strategy, in reality it was more deeply motivated by concerns over crime and governmentality through 'community control' (CDP, 1977, p.46) and the 'social ferment lying beneath' (Ibid., p.51).

As far back as the 1950s and 60s, the same debates we hear now were being rehearsed: 'This community work function should be a recognised part of the professional practice of teachers, social workers, the clergy, health workers, architects, planners, administrators and others. In the modern conditions of social change, it is also a necessary full time professional task' (Gulbenkian Study Group, 1968, p.149). The police are omitted from this list, but the focus on the skills of the (increasingly) professionalised community worker is also prefigured in the Egan Review on sustainable communities (Egan, 2004). Whilst social work in this period did not embrace community and group work, focusing instead on family and the individual as the unit of intervention, community moves away from education into radical action, peculiarly from a position of state funded intervention in the Community Development Projects (CDPs) of the 1970s:

> *This will be a neighbourhood-based experiment aimed at finding new ways of meeting the needs of people living in areas of high social deprivation; by bringing together the work of all the social services under the leadership of a special project team and also by tapping resources of self-help and mutual help which may exist among the people in the neighbourhoods.*

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(Home Office Press Release, 1969, in CDP, 1977)

The CDP's insistent attempts to redefine the scope of the projects into wider, more structural issues of poverty (highlighting, significantly for asset-based community development in the future, the pathologising of the communities under scrutiny (CDP, 1977, p.54)) replaced the process-orientated 'non-directiveness' of Batten and Batten (1967) with a commitment to organizing and a readiness to take up oppositional positions (Baldock, 1977). The near impossibility of connecting local issues to structural questions led to a split in the community work profession.

The former focused on the community as a social unit or organism, and was concerned with so called 'soft' issues such as social disorganisation and the need to build up networks and resources. The 'political action tradition' identified the community as a political unit, and emphasised 'hard' issues such as oppression and powerlessness. People associated themselves with each tradition, and each was thought to have its own organising styles and methods ('consensual' and 'conflict') (Thomas, 1983, p.93).

This fissure between 'community work' and 'community organising', which is much more explicitly informed by Alinsky and represents a more liberal, autonomist politics rather than the radical statist politics of the 1970s, still exists today. The 1980s continued these themes, but picking up threads of a collapse in the existence of society (as Margaret Thatcher asserted (Mitchell, 1995) and more globalised conflicts, community work adds a new theme: that of communal coherence (Thomas, 1983, p.102). This did not just root community work in given localities, but reflected a new shift to communities of association or affiliation, and experience, with the emergence of single issue groups and greater communication between localities to create larger groupings of individuals connected by experience.

The 1990s saw a 'hollowing out' of the profession as community workers disappeared in various public expenditure cuts and other public service professionals began to review their commitment to community involvement in public decision-making, most notably marked by the Egan Review's (2004) expectation that a whole range of urban regeneration professionals should take on the work of the community worker in order to create 'sustainable communities'. This 'urban settlement' take on community work continues today, with housing

associations and other tenant management organisations (ODPM, 2002) taking the fore, supported by the New Deal for Communities, with Single Regeneration Budgets and Sure Start centres plugging communitarian gaps in the New Labour project. However, ignoring the lessons of the 1970s Community Development Projects, the complexity of the issues being tackled turned out to be too much for the politicians, and those involved in the 'sustainable communities' programme of the Office for the Deputy Prime Minister struggled to truly embed themselves into the communities, often resulting in an industry of consultants and partnership organisations that delivered on behalf of rather than with the very communities they were meant to serve: 'Community development takes time. Disadvantaged communities have to be persuaded to participate, and their natural suspicion leads them to hang back until there is something to show. The 'Sustainable Communities' policy gave way to the rise, and fall, of the Big Society (Fenwick and Gibbon 2017, Mason and Moran, 2018) but the skill set for the professionals and workers in these areas stayed the same, but re-emerge in tackling adverse childhood experiences (Freeze, 2019) and public health approaches to crime prevention (Miller and Blumstein, 2020).

3.4.1. CULTURES OF SILENCED APATHY

One of the most important concepts of Paolo Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed is a theme, or 'culture of silence' (1996, p.72). The oppressors overwhelm the oppressed with their taken-for-granted values and norms, which effectively silences people. By pressure from those in power, the oppressed internalise myths about the inevitability of their situation, which Freire identifies as lies, because they have been purposefully and knowingly imposed upon the people without taking their reality into consideration. This impacts on who speaks, acts and is heard in community engagement activities. Certain communities and groups within neighbourhoods opt out of engagement processes and become silenced, or written off as 'apathetic'.

The oppressed people are made to feel ignorant and they become dependent on the culture of the oppressors, the so-called experts or specialists in society. The needs of the oppressed and the knowledge gained from their own experience is not regarded as important; they are ignored, devalued and considered to be inferior. Further, the oppressed, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves

to become oppressors, or sub-oppressors, reinforcing the social norms of the oppressors, on behalf of the oppressors. This silencing results in inactivity, a lassitude on the part of the citizen, criticised by those in power as apathy (Alinsky, 1957; Dean, 1960; Reisig and Giacomazzi, 1998; Lumb and Breazeale, 2002). Freire develops his ideas on resistance to this 'silencing' of the poorest people in society through teaching and consciousness raising as 'cultural action for freedom' (Freire, 1970, p.86).

In the traditional method of community and social work (Horton and Freire, 1990) and to a certain extent in community policing (Wallace, 2013, p.127) participants are divided into subjects and objects. The subjects, the individuals with specialised knowledge such as social workers, teachers and community workers, traditionally shape the objects, or the individuals without specialised knowledge, such as clients, students, pupils or other individuals in the community. A policing strategy is written by experts, and then that is used to engage with a limited segment of the public, who are then policed on the basis of that engagement. This is the patronising side of welfare work and education (Fritze, 2010). It does not encourage people to speak for themselves, therefore people will stay silent, particularly with regards to community engagement in policing.

In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Paulo Freire explores the 'banking style' (1996, p.66) of education, in which the teacher/group leader deposits (or imposes) predetermined information or interpretation which is fed into the object, the members of the group. There is no two-way dialogue, no recognition of the reality of the women, for example, in the group. Education, in a neighbourhood context, extends beyond the classroom to the ways in which police inform, reassure and educate the public in public safety. The policing strategy consultation document, for example, serves first to inform and educate the public. It shapes and constrains the public discourse before the engagement. According to Freire, consciousness making (Freire, 1973), i.e. imposing information without consideration of the ideas and reality of the group members, is an authoritarian strategy. In such cases the group leader designates themselves as the expert, the owner of all existing knowledge, and the group members as having little or no useful knowledge. Freire says: 'Narration (with the teacher as narrator) leads the students to memorise mechanically the narrated content. Worse still, it turns them into "containers", into receptacles to be filled by the teacher. The more completely he fills the

receptacles, the better a teacher he is. The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are (Freire, 1996, p.45).

The problems posed by Freire of the silencing of underrepresented groups, and the patronising way in which solutions developed by experts overlook the lived experience of the poorest communities, is well known in critical community development and social work literature and practice (Hare, 2004; Sakamoto and Pitner, 2005; Ledwith, 2011) but has barely been mentioned in neighbourhood or community policing literature (at least not in the terms expressed by Freire). This is hardly surprising, as policing is not conceptualised in terms of education or community work. Even the creation of the Police and Community Support officer (PCSO) did not recast police as community workers (Paskell, 2007; Savage, 2007; Merritt, 2010) but rather as 'plastic police', reinvented avuncular 'bobbies' and 'junior enforcers'. This confusion has allowed all those roles to thrive, with little notion of how the police family's most community-oriented staff ought to act. With the added focus on problem-oriented policing (Engel and Worden, 2003) the technocratic (Schneider, 1998) mixes with the avuncular enforcer to become oppressor. Thus, the PCSO inadvertently becomes the 'problem solver', while the community remains the 'problem to be solved'.

3.4.2.   PROBLEM POSING, PROBLEM SITUATIONS

Counterpoising this authoritarian method of education, Freire proposes the alternative method of 'problem-posing' (Nixon-Ponder,1995 p.10). This method of community work/education through problem analysis and problem solving starts from the life situation and reality of the individuals' lived experience (Ellis and Flaherty, 1992). Their life situation is made into a problem posing situation (much like the 'problem situation' in Soft Systems Methodology (Tsouvalis and Checkland, 1996). The method concentrates on showing people that they have the right to ask questions and fully understand the influences on their lives. An important aspect of this method is dialogue (Shor and Freire, 1987). Dialogue means that the relationship between group leader and group members is horizontal, even interchangeable. Using dialogue, the leader learns from group members as much as group members learn from the leader. They relate to each other as subjects, as opposed to the authoritarian method of learning where the relationship of group leader to member is clearly vertical. With the problem

posing/solving method, leader and group member encounter one another on an equal basis. The main goal of the encounter is to discover reality together, to unmesh the false myths with which we have all been brought up. This joint enquiry into our life experiences by means of dialogue is also an exchange of information between group leader and group members, teacher and students. As a result of this process, a general problem facing the group, also called "theme", can easily come to the surface, which then becomes the focus of the problem solving, rather than any concept of the problem imposed from above.

Freire was a philosopher and educationalist, and his work is more focused on understanding the problem of power dynamics in community education settings. His theorisation of silencing and apathy within communities can be combined with the work of Saul Alinsky to establish an approach to overcoming that apathy.

Whilst Freire was focused on dialogue and emancipation, Alinsky, working in the urban deprivation of Chicago, paid more attention to organising- the-action rather than dialogue with the silenced, oppressed communities. His ethnographic work in the mafia had taught him that power only responds to power, rather than dialogue (Schutz and Sandy, 2011, p.56), and appealing to the self-interest of those powerful blocs. Although he operated in the 1950s, it was not until his 1971 book, *Rules for Radicals*, that Alinsky warned against doing things for people that they were unable to do for themselves (Pyles, 2013, p.13). Although his techniques aimed at destabilising society, Alinsky concern about instability was genuine. His approach was to exacerbate a problem situation, raising awareness and anger with respect to the problem, to the point that the citizens were willing to act on that problem themselves (Alinsky, 1946). His tactics were somewhat Machiavellian, but of this he was quite aware. He begins his book: 'The Prince was written by Machiavelli for the Haves on how to hold power. *Rules for Radicals* is written for the Have-Nots on how to take it away' (Alinsky, 1971).

The connection between community engagement and social entrepreneurship has been made by a number of authors, particularly around the notion of the social economy (Mandrysz, 2020) and the creation of community based social enterprises and social entrepreneurs (as community development workers (Peredo and Chrisman, 2006, Duarte, Kok & O'Brien (2019). These overlaps between community development, community organising and emancipation also

connect to theories of social capital (Stephenson 2001, Petro 2001, Knoke 2009, Ricciardell and Manfredi 2020).

3.4.3.   ENGAGEMENT TO PARTICIPATION

The notions of placation and apathy, in response to Freire's theory of silencing and Alinsky's notions of power, find their way into the LISP Handbook and training material primarily in the shape of Arnstein's ladder of participation (1969), as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3.1 Illustration of Arnstein's Ladder of Participation, from Curtis, T and Bowkett, L (2014)

The bottom rungs of the ladder are (1) Manipulation and (2) Therapy. These two rungs describe levels of non-participation that have been contrived by some to substitute for genuine participation. Their real objective is not to enable people to participate in planning or conducting programs, but to enable powerholders to educate or cure the participants (Arnstein, 1969). The next few rungs progress to levels of tokenism that allow the have-nots to hear and to have a voice: (3) Informing and (4) Consultation. When they are proffered by powerholders as the total extent of participation, citizens may indeed hear and be heard, but under

these conditions they lack the power to ensure that their views will be heeded by the powerful. When participation is restricted to these levels, there is no follow-through and hence no assurance of changing the status quo. Rung (5) Placation is simply a higher-level tokenism, as the ground rules allow have-nots to advise, but the powerholders retain the right to decide.

Further up the ladder are levels of citizen power with increasing degrees of decision-making clout. Citizens can enter into a (6) Partnership that enables them to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional power holders. At the topmost rungs, (7) Delegated Power and (8) Citizen Control, have-not citizens obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power. Obviously, the eight-rung ladder is a simplification, but it helps to illustrate the point that so many have missed—that there are significant gradations of citizen participation.

Arnstein's conceptualisation has been thoroughly tested and critiqued for over 40 years. Even the systems expert and proponent of complexity at the Open University, Ray Ison, uses it as a jumping off point (Collins and Ison, 2006 and 2009), rightly pointing out that, because no single group can pinpoint with confidence the nature of the problem and its solution, systems analysis and complexity theory needs to be the direction in which practitioners jump off the ladder. Arnstein presents the starting point for most debates on citizen participation and is a central concern for many approaches to social innovation (Ricciardelli and Manfredi 2020).

3.5.   SOFT SYSTEMS

Innovation does not just happen on its own - it needs investigation, knowledge and organising. Managing the way in which a problem or social issue is conceptualised is a critical skill for a social entrepreneur, particularly because the way in which the problem is conceptualised affects the way in which solutions are developed. Developing an open, transparent and inclusive approach to the formulation or construction of a social problem is a core objective. Entrepreneurs often construct their perception of a social problem in their own mind, develop a solution to it, and then seek to implement it. This means that the problem has not necessarily been opened up and considered from a variety of angles—the project becomes convergent on a single solution rather than divergent to a number of

different possible solutions. In developing the LISP Handbook with PCSOs, it became clear that they had been briefed about the use of the national decision-making model (College of Policing, 2014), which was designed to govern the ethics of police decision making, as well as a problem-oriented policing model called SARA (Braga, 2008, p.14). These two models display a lot of conflation, a problem noted among internet commentators such as Veryard (2014[23]) and 'Juliet Bravo' (2012[24]).

Accounts surrounding the use of the SARA model also tended to describe well bounded police problems, in which the terms of the problem were well understood or taken for granted. The decision-makers were assuming that everyone involved agreed on the nature of the problems being considered, and therefore should all fall behind the decisions of the police officers involved in solving the problem. This was particularly evident in anti-social behaviour (ASB) cases, wherein police officers assumed that the perpetrators of the ASB all agreed that their behaviour was truly anti-social. This is not always the case in, for example, in the case of graffiti which is a highly contested as a crime type, and is even considered to be a pro-social behaviour in some circumstances, drawing attention to deprivation that has already been allowed to occur by institutional actors, rather than created by the graffiti artists (Ferrel, 1993; McAuliffe and Iveson, 2011; Ley and Cybriwsky, 1974). The nature of such debates over crime types, and the conflation between the National Decision Model and SARA as frames for decision-making, suggested that the notion of complex problem solving should be considered within the package of the Handbook.

Using Soft Systems thinking, therefore provides a structure around which to frame the less tangible aspects of Freire's and Alinsky's ways of thinking, as well as incorporating the MI principles, by reframing certain problems as a different category of issue, to be tackled differently; as 'wicked issues' using different decision-making tactics. Soft systems thinking is a way of describing and analysing the real world, or a part of it, so as to understand and change the way in which that part of the real world operates (Checkland, 1981). That process of thinking about and describing the real world in parts is understood as 'general systems

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[23] https://demandingchange.blogspot.co.uk/2014/05/national-decision-model.html [Accessed 18/05/018]

[24] https://inspjulietbravo.wordpress.com/2012/04/09/the-ndm-and-decision-making-whats-the-reality/ [Accessed 18/05/18]

theory' (von Bertalanffy 1950). Conventional systems thinking assumes that the parts of the system of interest are clearly defined and separate, and that the system that has a clear purpose and well-defined goals and is useful for designing solutions that achieve those goals. This represents a model which has precise objective and these objectives can be expressed in quantitative terms allowing the development of mathematical models. A soft system is characterized by having no agreement about the precise objectives of the system; qualitative rather than quantitative objectives; no single solution, but a range of equally valid alternative solutions; and a need for involvement of all those affected by the system (Kirk, 1995), allowing the analyst to account for what are known as 'wicked issues'.

3.5.1.   WICKED ISSUES

A 'wicked issue' (Camillus, 2008, p.98) is a social problem in which the various stakeholders can barely agree on what the definition of the problem should be, let alone on what the solution is. Social issues and problems are intrinsically wicked issues (Webber and Rittel, 1973) or messy problems (Mitroff and Mason, 1980), and it is very dangerous for them to be treated as though they were 'tame' (Lach et al., 2005) or 'benign'. Real world social problems have no definitive formulation and no point at which they are definitely solved. Furthermore, solutions are not true or false—there is no test for a solution, and every solution contributes to a further social problem. Wicked problems are unique, in that they are symptomatic of other problems; they do not have simple causes and have numerous possible explanations, which in turn frame different policy responses. The people acting to intervene in the problem are not allowed by virtue of public censure to fail in their attempts to solve wicked problems (Rittel and Webber, 1973).

These wicked issues therefore require different tactics to understand their true nature, and the direct involvement of those experiencing the problem in solving the problem. This is in marked contrast to 'expert based' decision systems where disinterested external experts are deemed better able to apply expert knowledge to a problem situation. Their supposed 'critical distance' becomes a disadvantage in these types of problems, and the need to express empathy becomes an important decision-making tactic.

3.5.2.   ENRICHING THE SOCIAL PROBLEM SITUATION

One process that the social innovator can use to analyse a situation with numerous stakeholders and ensure that an issue is 'kept wicked' is employing rich pictures. Rich pictures were developed as part of Peter Checkland's Soft Systems Methodology for gathering information about a complex situation (Checkland, 1981). Soft Systems Methodology as a research methodology is dealt with in detail in Section 4.5.1. This section introduces the specific techniques of rich picturing as it is deployed in the LISP Handbook. Rich pictures are a graphical means of representing a situation which draws on the whole individual in a group situation to represent as creatively as possible the various factors, actors and relationships that act upon a particular social situation.

The rich picture (RP) is an established tool used to gain multiple perspective understanding within a messy or complex situation (Bronte-Stewart, 1999). It is an unstructured way of capturing information flows, communication and human activity (Berg and Pooley, 2013). It supports dialogue and the empathy building aspects of sharing and communicating different experiences of a common problem situation. It can be used to highlight the concerns of individuals, potential conflicts and political issues (Avison and Woodharper, 1991, p.99). If a wicked issue is a system of resources, flows, and experiences, then modelling that system as accurately as possible provides clues as to the highly influential factors that sustain the wickedness of the problem situation. Rich picturing does just this, allowing stakeholders to consider the implications of interventions at various points in the system of interest. The process of rich picturing slows down the decision-making process to ensure that the stakeholders make sense of the problem situation and only then decide what the situation is, before moving on to decide what 'the problem' is (Bronte Stewart, 1999, p.102).

The process of developing a rich picture is more important than the rich picture itself (Ragsdell, 2000, p.110) because it is a group process rather than individual one. The authors use of rich picturing has been groups based because each member of the group seeks to represent their view of the situation in question in a graphical manner through several iterations of the picture drawing process. These pictures are then compared with those produced by other members of the group (and even people who are not members of the group could be encouraged

to represent what they see of the same situation). The comparison process is based around discussing what is similar in the pictures and exploring why the pictures differ, to understand each other's world view and develop a sense of the commonality among the various worldviews without necessarily choosing one picture as the definitive representation. Dependencies on other related situations can be explored, the boundaries of the issue can be (tentatively) negotiated and established and scenarios can be built that address the multiple facets of the issue. In this way, rich picturing keeps the problem wicked and avoids taming it.

Rich picturing is multifaceted in its usefulness and is the core of a Mode 1 Soft Systems Methodology Analysis (SSM) (conducted in Chapter. 5 for four of the eight projects to demonstrate the presentation of the SSM process). This tool has the powerful capacity to recreate in the present what has happened in the past, represent the now and offer insight into the future (Berg and Pooley, 2013) and therefore the technique appears in two rounds in LISP, both as a 'problem rich pictures' process and as a 'solution rich pictures' process, as stakeholders draw out visions for the problem situation with the problems 'solved'.

3.5.3.   SOCIAL CAPITAL

A question posed by Checkland's (2000) Mode 3 Analysis (conducted in Section 6.1.3) is 'what you have to do to influence people, to cause things to happen' was asked many times during this project. The LISP Handbook encouraged the practitioners to seek out '"highly connected and highly capable people' (Curtis and Bowkett, 2012, p14) and social capital was identified as a resource or asset to be discovered in the process of identifying how the key people are connected together in the neighbourhood.

In terms of Soft Systems Methodology, Checkland is as terse about his use of the term 'power' as he is with 'roles, norms and values' in Mode 2 analyses (conducted in Section 6.1.2). Again, Stowell (2014) is utilised within Checkland's Systems Thinking, Systems Practice to explain 'commodities which embody power' (Checkland 2000, p322). For Stowell, the term commodity is a metaphor that provides organisation members, or in this study, participants in 'the organising of a safe community', with "a practical means of addressing power" and "how people intend to use and maintain these 'commodities" (Champion and Stowell, 2001,

p7). He acknowledges "Giddens' view that speech and language provide us with useful clues as to how to conceptualise processes of social production and reproduction" (Checkland, 2000:322). Without developing a more detailed theory of power, the implications for Stowell (who seems to have introduced this Mode 2 Analysis of power to Checkland) are to conceptualise power as a commodity, a useful or valuable *thing*, a real object, but that which is mediated, produced and reproduced through speech and language acts. This is extraordinarily similar to the concept of social capital, although Checkland does not seem to make the connection.

Social capital has received an increased attention in research since the 1990s and has been studied at multiple levels, including the individual (Burt 1992), organizational (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998), and societal (Putnam 1993, Serageldin and Dasgupta 2001). The central proposition in the social capital literature is that networks of relationships between people, and organisational units constitute, or lead to, resources, and flows of such 'resources' (cf 'commodities') that can be used for the good of the individual or the collective. First, at the individual level, social capital has been defined as the resources embedded in one's relationships with others. Second, at the organizational level, social capital has been defined as the value to an organization in terms of the relationships formed by its members for the purpose of engaging in collective action (Freel, 2000). Third, the role of social capital has also been examined on a more macro-level in terms of its impact on the well-being of regions or societies (Bourdieu 2018, Coleman 1990). Where human capital refers to individual ability (Becker, 1964), social capital refers to collective abilities derived from social networks (for a detailed review of the concept of social capital see Huysman and Wulf, 2004).

Social capital isn't a unitary force or flow of power. It can be conceptualised as creating both bridging and bonding effects within the networks of social relations. Bridging refers to the linking out of a given network, or concentration within a network to other networks, often that possess greater social (or financial or cultural capital). This could be where a nascent street gang member can access people outside their immediate peer group for help, advice and validation and thereby avoid being drawn into the street gang (Hesketh and Box, 2020). Bridging social capital can bridge a community that lacks certain types of social capital

(access to a particularly solution or resource) to another community that possesses the required capital, often through highly connected individuals or institutions. Bonding social capital, on the other hand, is the network of social relations that binds the community together, that ensures that social (and other) capitals flow through and into a given community. An economically poor neighbourhood can be rich in bonding social capital if everyone knows everyone else, and are willing to do each other favours. An economically rich neighbourhood can be poor in social capital if relations between neighbours are limited and transactional. Bonding capital, like all capital, is not always positive, and can operate to hide or reinforce criminal behaviour (Ganapathy, 2020) as gangs and criminals exploit bonding (and bridging) social capital as well.

In the context of this work, however, social capital is not a neutral, passive resource. The LISP practitioner is charged with identifying assets (in the mode of Asset Based Community Development) and asset holders (highly capable and highly connected individuals) and establishing whether (and how they are connected together) and if they are not connected, making sure that they are connected. These demonstrate specific strategies of creating bonding (trust networks) and bridging social capital that have been identified in a number of other studies (Petro, 2001, Stephenson, 2001, Knoke, 2009). This has further relevance in the discussion on bricolage and process in Section 3.6.2 below.

3.6. EXPLORING SOCIAL INNOVATION

This section establishes the field within which the notion of 'social innovation' has developed. It maps the emergence of, and definitional debates around, the use of the terms 'social enterprise' and 'social entrepreneurship' but argues that, ultimately, a wider concept of 'social innovation' better encapsulates the processes, actors and organisations involved in creating sustainable positive social change. Ultimately, this relates back to the challenge of social innovation in neighbourhood policing representing the 'organising' of social change, rather than focussing on the organisations that are involved in social change. Initially this research emerged out of attempts by the author to transition from a practice experience of environmental innovation to a better understanding of 'the social' in that innovation, expressed (at the time) as 'social enterprise'. This culminated in a special edition of a journal, in which the challenges of the terms being used were

explored (Bull, 2008). This section is inspired by, and builds on, the work of the author reported in part in Curtis (2010).

There are ongoing conceptual and ideological confusions about the nature of both the entrepreneurial paradigm and 'the social', which fundamentally affect individual academic attitudes (Defourney and Nyssens, 2007; Arthur et al., 2006; Bull, 2008; Curtis, 2010; Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2019; Mautner, 2005) to say nothing of the baggy monster (Kendal and Knapp, 1995) of the portmanteau concept of social entrepreneurship and its derivations, social enterprise, social innovation, social change and changemaking. This confusion is not resolved in this research. However, the complexity of the concepts, and their correlates in the real world, demonstrate the complexity of stimulating social change.

This context sets the scene for considering the organisations and people in the LISP projects within the context of the fields of social economy, enterprises, and as social entrepreneurs and the processes they engage in to access and organise resources to create social innovation. These terms help to place both the term, and mechanisms, of social innovation in wider literature and practice referred to variously by these names, but also indicates that the objects of study for these field are the institutions and agents, rather than the processes of social innovation which is the specific focus of this investigation.

3.6.1. SOCIAL ECONOMY, ENTREPRENEURS, ENTERPRISES AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Precisely how one conceptualises social enterprise in relation to the wider economy and the third sector—that which is, broadly speaking 'not-the-public-sector' and 'not-the-private-sector'—has caused significant controversy (Defourney et al., 2017). The term 'social economy' is a fairly recent import into UK terminology from mainland Europe and is still not widely used, except perhaps in Scotland, where the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations (SCVO) would place the social enterprise inside the 'social economy' which includes non-trading voluntary organisations (Alcock, 2012). Terms such as 'third sector', 'not-for-private-profit' (Ridley-Duff, 2008), 'voluntary sector' (Pharoah et al., 2004), 'co-operative sector' (Ridley-Duff, 2010), are all, to differing degrees, in more common usage and cover

some similar ground in the UK, distinct from the state or private sector provision of policing (Ransley andMazerolle, 2017).

The assets, resources and skills held by third sector, or voluntary sector organisations, as distinct to the public sector and private business organisations, and the flows of those resources between the organisations, is what is referred to here as the social economy. This is distinct, although not entirely separate from the public or private economies, but complements and broadens the scope of what is considers to be a resource or asset available to the public servant or social entrepreneur seeking secure such resources in order to tackle a social problem. Within the social economy, therefore, exists a distinct institution, the social enterprise. The challenge of defining a social enterprise has been posed in many documents, mostly resulting in rather arid debate (Bell, 2000) about the features of social enterprises and their distinct legal structures (Curtis, 2011) in the field of the social economy. The dominant discourse on SE emphasises its hybrid organisational form, or forms, blending social mission and business-oriented logics (Bull and Ridley-Duff 2019). This idea of social enterprises being hybrid organisations that serve two or more organisational imperatives appears throughout a significant proportion of the literature from the 1990s through to the emergence of the specific term 'hybrid' (Dees, 1998, Nyssens, 2006, Martin & Osberg, 2007, Billis, 2010, Teasdale, 2012, Hjorth, 2013, Doherty, et al, 2014, Mason & Doherty, 2015, Mair et al, 2015, Defourny and Nyssens, 2017).) in contrast to the supposed dominant imperative of the private sector logic of only maximising shareholder value, the so-called Friedman doctrine which is regularly rejected in environmental sustainability and corporate social responsibility literature (Kaplan, 2020, Hu, 2020, Kumar et al, 2020).

These distinct institutions can take the form of existing legal companies, like private sector companies, or traditional charities, but regardless of their diverse organisational forms and hybridity, constitute the formalised organisational form of the social entrepreneur engaging in processes of social entrepreneurship.

Within these hybrid social enterprise organisations are social entrepreneurs drawing on and organising resources from the social economy (see Section 3.6.1) as well as private and public resource. Drawing on a cultural hero since the early 1980s (Carr and Beaver, 2002; Ogbor, 2000) discourse surrounding

entrepreneurs drew initially on Joseph Schumpeter's classic The Theory of Economic Development (1934) in which the entrepreneur is positioned against what he considered to be traditional formulations of economic growth or development. The social entrepreneur experiences the same cultural (Canestrino et al, 2020, Pathak, 2020) and moral (Chliova et al, 2020) hybridity or ambidexterity (Zheng, 2020, Attar et al. 2020) as does the organisations in which he or she inhabits and spans (van Meerkerk and Edelenbos, 2020). This notion of spanning the organisational boundaries (Tushman and Scanlan, 1981, Fleming and Waguespack, 2007) has also created a number of other designations such as the public entrepreneur for those who innovate with the state sector (Klein et al, 2010) and "transform the systems that control government effectiveness and efficiency" (Bernier and Hafsi, 2007, p288), and the entredonneur (Curtis et al, 2008) who stays within the public sector organisation but donates resources and trust (Curtis et al, 2010) to create new innovations and organisations in other parts of the economy.

These three concepts of social economy, social enterprise and social entrepreneur, come together into various process models of social entrepreneurship. Initially, social entrepreneurship was associated with the practices of an individual combining "passion of a social mission with an image of business-like discipline, innovation, and determination" (Dees, 1998, p54), but later emerging as both a set of distinct processes, plus effectuation (Servantie and Rispal 2018, Owusu and Jansen, 2013, Nelson and Lima, 2019) and bricolage (Desa and Basu, 2013, Di Domenico et al, 2010, Janssen et al, 2018). Both effectuation and bricolage are described in these references as ad hoc or unstructured strategies of resource identification and collation and signal a postmodern twist to theorising, which will come up again at the end of Section 3.6.2.

3.6.2. SOCIAL INNOVATION[25]

The previous sections have considered the field of social economy, the institutions and agents of the social economy, the social enterprise and social entrepreneurs. The final element to consider in understanding the context within which PCSOs,

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[25] This section first appeared in and is modified from Curtis, T. (2010) The challenges and risks of innovation in social entrepreneurship. I: Gunn, R. & Durkin, C. (eds.) *Social Entrepreneurship: A skills approach*. Bristol: Policy Press, p.83-98

police officers and other stakeholders achieve socially positive change, is to consider the processes of their actions; that of social innovation

In *Archaeology of Scientific Reason*, M. Foucault asked "comment se fait-il que tel concept soit apparu et nul autre à sa place?", (Gutting 2010, pp.39-40) that is, "under what conditions does a word come to mean what it signifies for us today?" This section considers the development of the term 'innovation' and its connection to the idea of social innovation.

Innovation is key for social enterprises. It is deemed to be the feature that distinguishes them most clearly from charities. Indeed, the Social Enterprise Coalition, in its response to the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills' Science and Innovation Strategy Consultation, claimed that social enterprise is an inherently innovative business model. Innovation was the subject of a series of Office of the Third Sector position papers by Leadbeater (2007), Nicholls, A (2007), Nicholls, J. (2007), Aiken (2007) and Westall (2007). The National Endowment for Science and Technology (Parker, 2009) and the Young Foundation (Mulgan et al., 2007) have also engaged in this field with significant reviews of the literature and exhortations to all sectors of society to realise the implicit value of innovation to society. Christopher Freeman even went so far as to say, 'not to innovate is to die' (Brusoni et al, 2006) in his famous study of economics of innovation.

Innovation has been connected to macro-economics by what Joseph Schumpeter (1942) calls waves of destructive (and presumably constructive) economic development whereas later work explored how firms behave differently to others and manage this difference in the search for competitive advantage (Woodward, 1965). Trott points out that many of the early studies treat innovation as an artefact that is somehow detached from knowledge and skills and not embedded within the know-how of the organisation, which leads to a simplified understanding (Trott, 2002) and a belief that innovation can be achieved, purchased or implemented by leadership will alone.

Entrepreneurship and innovation is also closely associated with uncontrollable mavericks (Taylor and Labarre, 2006) or deviant (non-conformist) personality traits (Vries, 1977). Other authors have focussed on innovation in the public sector (Newman, Raine et al., 2001; Mulgan and Albury, 2003; Albury, 2005), but few

have explicitly considered innovation in social enterprises, except by separating social enterprises as organisations from social entrepreneurship as a process of innovation (Leadbeater 2007). By separating the enterprise from the entrepreneur, Leadbeater allows innovation to be considered as an individual behaviour rather than an organisational process, such that innovation is promoted heroically by the talented individuals and only restrained by personal ethics rather than governance. Fewer authors have explicitly considered the ethics of innovation (Glor, 2002; Hanekamp, 2005; Fuglsang and Mattsson, 2009). Whereas in the private sector innovation can often be an end in itself, for Hartley, in public services innovation is justifiable only where it increases public value in the quality, efficiency or fitness for purpose of governance or services (Hartley, 2005). For others, public sector innovation becomes necessary to keep pace with, in the words of Will Baumol, 'the free market innovation machine' (Baumol, 2002, p.xiii).

Innovation brings change and risk, both of which can be in conflict with public service principles of consistency, or equity, and accountability. Naturally, the question arises—how can a social enterprise be innovative without harming these principles? This question reveals some important differences between public and private sector innovation. Innovation in the latter is driven primarily by competitive advantage—this tends to restrict the sharing of good practice to strategic partners. By contrast, the drivers for social enterprises are required to achieve widespread improvements in governance and service delivery, including efficiencies, in order to increase public value (Moore, 1995). The key to unpicking these differences is for the social entrepreneur to understand what, in society, will change through the social enterprise activity, and how that change will occur. This means going beyond the assumption that adopting a given legal structure (such as a company limited by guarantee or co-operative) will result in a certain social change.

Mulgan et al. state that 'At its simplest, social innovation can be seen as "new ideas that address unmet social needs—and that work"' (2007, p.2). The challenge of simple definitions is that the breadth and generality of the concept is so broad as to invite critique and clarification. Mulgan's (admittedly non-academic) definition implies that social innovation comprises only ideas (rather than the implementation of the ideas) and that the ideas must be new. This definition leaves unclear what a 'social need' might be, as opposed to a social problem, and

also does not define for whom (or how many or how much) such a new idea might work, just that it works.

The term 'social innovation' emerged in Dealey and Ward's 1905 textbook, *A Text-Book of Sociology* and again in Bogardus' 1922 textbook, *A History of Social Thought*. In both textbooks, the term appears in the context of social change and the conservativism of some, for whom social innovation might 'upset their comfortable existence' (Bogardus' p.416). Frequency of the use of the idea peaked in the 1950s, then in 1973 and in 1988, remerging from 1994 (Google Ngram Viewer, 2020[26]). More recently, web searches for the terms has grown steadily from January 2004 to a high point in October 2013, after which it falls (Google Trends, 20120[27]). Mulgan's definition represents an early definition in what one might term the 'modern' period of use, in the context of a greater governmental policy focus in the USA, UK and EU first on social enterprise, then social entrepreneurship, and finally widening the scope of the policy emphasis to social innovation, culminating in the rapid decline of similar policies like 'Big Society' during the 2010-2015 Conservative—Liberal Democrat coalition government in the UK.

Definitions after Mulgan's seek to clarify and systematise some of the more ambiguous terms within the concept. Nicholls et al. (2015) open out the notion of social innovation from 'idea' to include 'form of specific ideas, actions, frames, models, systems, processes, services, rules and regulations as well as new organisational forms.' (Nicholls et al., 2015, p.2), finding that it comprises 'two interlinked conceptualisations of social innovation, focused on either new social *processes* or new social outputs and *outcomes*' [my emphasis]. More than just a new idea, social innovation becomes a composite of social processes and outcomes. Mumford also includes the making and reforming of relationships in this, exploring 'how people should organize interpersonal activities, or social interactions, to meet one or more common goals' (2002, p.253). Westley and Antadze deepen the impact of the changed nature of the social relationships to 'profoundly change the basic routines, resource and authority flows, or beliefs of the social system' (2010, p.2).

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[26] https://books.google.com/ngrams/info Google Ngram viewer [27 July 2020]
[27] https://trends.google.co.uk/trends/explore?date=all&q=%22social%20innovation%22

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

Social innovation has become increasingly influential in both scholarship and policy. It, and its sister concepts social enterprise and entrepreneurship, are the conceptual foundation for community organisations (Gerometta et al, 2005), think tanks like the Young Foundation (Pol and Ville, 2009), Demos (Mulgan, 2006), REDF (Dees et al, 2002) and the Skoll Centre (Dearlove, 2004), policy makers (Leadbeater, 2007), business school management programmes (Maskell, 2000) and government funding programmes (Westley and Antadze, 2010) in almost every continent, in recognition of past failures in public policy, weaknesses in philanthropy investment and even in giving focus to corporate social responsibility (Kanter, 1999). It is utilised across social movements, community associations and 'bottom-up' policy making. Social innovation has gained a home in the USA in the Whitehouse's Office for Social Innovation and Civic Participation (2009-2017), in the EU's Innovation Policy programmes (Sabato et al., 2015) and in a social enterprise unit within the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2001-04), which later became part of the Office of the Third Sector (OTS) (2008-2010), and subsequently fell within the remit of the UK Cabinet Office Minister for Civil Society and Sport (2010-present). Social enterprise and innovation are now the go-to terms for the slump in interest in CSR (Doane and Abasta-Vilaplana, 2005).

Moulaert et al summarised this as a response to the legitimacy crisis in public administration, resulting in a swathe of policy to generate policy and government intervention from the bottom-up, stating it was 'a governance change with more bottom up participation, [and] protection of the rights of common citizens and collective decision-making' (2013, p.1). They went on to say that 'Social innovation has a deep and complex conceptual heritage' (Moulaert et al., 2013, p.4), often constructed as 'new' in its own right (Curtis, 2011, p.198) and contrasted with technological innovation. This comparison often implies that the concept of social innovation has appeared recently as a corrective to the negative implications of technology, or as a corrective to technology itself (Mesthene, 1969; Mulgan et al, 2007). Godin argues, however, that social innovation is a centuries old term, but that its positive modern use is a corrective to a long history of its use as a pejorative: 'If social innovation dates from the nineteenth century, the recent use or explosion of the category in the literature (its 'newness') is only a resurrection' (Godin, 2012, p.6) (Figure 3.2).

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
Figure 3.2 Google Ngram of the term 'social innovation'

MacCallum and Moulaert (2019) characterise the emerging literature into two: an Anglo-American literature focused on design, implementation and diffusion of "new ideas practical with rather than understanding the structural causes and conflicts underlying the problems in need of solving (Fougère et al. 2017), contrasted with a Euro-Canadian literature more explicitly political message that foregrounds empowerment, solidarity and the generation of critical alternatives (including spaces and territories and neighbourhoods (Moulaeart et al 2010)) to neoliberalism. (Klein et al. 2014; MacCallum et al. 2009; Moulaert and Nussbaumer 2005).This is no more than the Anglo-American versus European split in the social entrepreneurship literature rehearsed in the previous section, and reflects ongoing concerns with both functionalism and critical analysis, and also a structure/agency split that is discussed further in the section on critical realism in Chapter. 4.

Van der Have et al (2016), however, provides a four-fold conceptual model of the contemporary literature, based on a bibliometric analysis of the relationships between the researchers. They find four communities of researcher separated and joined thus:

- A community psychology literature which is quite process-oriented focused on investigating the introduction of change in social systems that is grounded in scientific evidence of effectiveness (Hazel and Onaga, 2003).
- A group centred on the creative process of innovation in science and technology including, since the publication of the cluster's key article by Mumford (2002) generation and implementation of social innovations

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- A social challenges group, with an emphasis on the sustainability of climate, environment and health provisions, centred value co-production by Ramirez (1999) and Voss et al.'s (2009) paper on socio-technical transition
- A neighbourhoods group, including participation, inclusion or empowerment of citizens and social cohesion dominated by Swyngedouw (2005) and Moulaert et al. (2005),

The second two groups were closely connected in cross-citations and collaborations but what seems distinct, in the context of this study, is that the second two groups are less focused on the processes of developing and implementing social innovation, whereas the first two groups tend not to focus on the co-production of that process with citizens in specific localities or neighbourhoods. The paper did not report on any publications that was a member of more than two of the above communities, but even the process of dividing publications into different camps is a contested process because Hazel and Onaga's paper defines 'experimental social innovation and dissemination' (ESID) as an "action-oriented approach to social problems, requiring the active manipulation of structural variables and social processes through the design and implementation of alternative social models in community settings…. a function of the participants and the internal and external social situation processes operative at that time"" (2003, p286), a definition which seems to cover all four communities.

Apart from the ESID community psychology literature exemplified by Hazel and Onaga (2003), the other three communities are, however, marked (van de Have et al 2016 assert) by a greater focus on outcome rather than process. In entrepreneurship research, bricolage has emerged as one of the central concepts to understand entrepreneurs' complex behavior and strategies in resource development and utilization in the past decade (Kikcul, 2018). Servantie and Rispal (2018) claims that most social entrepreneurship literature uses one or the other concept. Mair and Marti (2009) and Desa and Basu (2013) suggest that bricolage is appropriate in social entrepreneurship.

3.6.3. SOCIAL INNOVATION AS BRICOLAGE OR PROCESS?

Di Domenico, Haugh, and Tracey (2010) recognize 'social bricolage' as a distinct concept. They extend the constructs of bricolage to define social bricolage as a set of six processes: (a) the making do, (b) the refusal to be constrained by limitations, (c) the improvisation, (d) the social value creation, (e) the stakeholder participation and (f) the persuasion of significant actors.

Both concepts relate to the decision-making processes of the agent (entrepreneur, social entrepreneur, innovator, or social innovator) in 'making do' by associating resources at hand to solve new problems and grasp new opportunities (Baker and Nelson, 2005). Baker and Nelson note that Levi-Strauss' concept of bricolage is eminently flexible in that he didn't offer any specific definition of the concept itself apart from 'making to with whatever is at hand'. Nevertheless, their grounded theory work did elicit some detail that "bricolage often draws on degraded, fallow, and otherwise undeveloped resources" (2005, p360). Levi-Strauss himself applied the term more specifically to the "creation of mythical thought" (Johnson, 2012) and the concept requires both the bricoleur (the agent) and the bricolage (the activity) to be considered. If Derrida's (1970) critique is also to be considered, then neither the bricoleur or the bricolage is entirely 'freeplay'.

Kickul et al conclude "too high a level of bricolage may hamper the development of innovative ways to attract untraditional resources or enter neglected markets and scale (2018, p418) and none of the authors cited manage to adequately describe the bricolage process; it is essentially a craft process, idiopathic, context specific and unrepeatable. This sets up the challenge for social innovation in general, and for the PCSO and police officer specifically in this research: how to go about the design of social innovation in different contexts in different neighbourhoods, with different personnel, but in a consistent and repeatable manner? This bricoleur/bricolage challenge contrasts strongly with what seems to be a forgotten or neglected tradition of community psychology and its contribution to social innovation, and this may have been because of a post-modern turn in social entrepreneurship theorising (Steyaert and Dey 2010, Dey and Steyaert, 2018) where it seems that only one person is publishing in a specific critical realist modality in entrepreneurship research (Hu, 2018, Hu et al, 2019).

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The setting of this investigation, therefore, becomes where Bellman's (1992) business-based change management literature in Section 3.2, was mixed with psychology and psychotherapeutic Motivational Interviewing literature (Section 3.3) which is focused more on individual change. The necessity to go beyond the individual, and effect community based change draws on community development and community organising literature (Section 3.4) mixed with a concern to understand the contextual and structural issues surrounding the people in the community, through soft systems (Section 3.5). This literature all are the antecedents for the creation of the LISP Handbook. They are the intellectual threads that came together in one document that represented a process of social innovation. Section 3.6.2 maps out concept of social innovation in its wider field of social entrepreneurship, and identifies that the field of social innovation literature is primarily concerned with the concept of bricolage (which lacks process), which contrasts with this research which is seeks to identify and establish what works in the process laid out in the LISP Handbook.

Going back to Bellman (1992) there is, at least, an implicit model of 'purpose, power and persuasion' underpinning his conception of social and organisational change, whereas the 'bricolage' movement seems to reject any notion of process. This is not to reject the concept of bricolage, at least in the form identified by Di Domenico (2010) above, but rather to suggest that the improvisation is not a 'freeplay', as the theorists might suggest or wish for, and that bricolage can be consistently applied and is repeatable.

To achieve this, it is necessary to establish what is known to work, in research literature, in neighbourhood policing interventions, and how that too has been reflected in the design of the LISP Handbook.

3.7. WHAT WORKS IN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING

Having developed an overview of the key literature and concepts that created the primary material for the LISP Handbook, the remainder of the literature review comprises an introduction to the context within which this LISP Handbook for social innovation was devised. The context of neighbourhood policing, in terms of language and examples in the Handbook, is strong even though the primary

strategies and techniques could likely be applied to any form of social problem or wicked problem.

The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) identified Neighbourhood Policing and the Peelian Principles as 'the heart and soul of the British model (ACPO, 2012), while HMIC described it as 'the cornerstone of British Policing' (HMIC, 2014b, p.36). Neighbourhood Policing is the aspect of policing most people relate to, and the visibility of local officers has been linked to public confidence in, and legitimacy of, the police (ACPO, 2012, p.2). The long-standing philosophy of British policing is summarised by Robert Peel's nine Principles of Policing issued to every new police officer since 1829 (Figure 3.3):

1. The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder
2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions
3. Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public
4. The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force
5. Police seek and preserve public favour not by pandering to public opinion but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law
6. Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient
7. Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence
8. Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary
9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it

Figure 3.3 The Peelian Principles (in Loader, 2016 p.429)

The UK Peelian principles present an approach to policing that derive 'not from fear but almost exclusively from public co-operation with the police, induced by them designedly by behaviour which secures and maintains for them the approval, respect and affection of the public' (Reith, 1956). Although the UK has a long tradition of consensus policing, as encapsulated by the Peelian Principles, the concept of neighbourhood policing specifically evolved from the Community Policing concept which emerged in the late 1970s, focusing on police-community relations, legitimacy and community capacity building. John Alderson, a former Chief Constable, argued strongly that policing should evolve from being traditional

and 'authoritarian' to an organisation which aspires to the greater involvement of the community (Tilley, 2008). Some of the influences on neighbourhood policing theory and practice draw on US research, from a context which doesn't have that primary Peelian foundation of policing by consent, and therefore its basic premise often different to that of UK policing strategy.

The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) has become a body of international research on the effectiveness of community policing, which has influenced the development of neighbourhood policing in the UK (Skogan and Steiner, 2004). CAPS is based on the premise that to reduce local crime concerns the police need to work with partners to address issues identified by community members (Quinton and Morris, 2008).

In the United Kingdom, the development of neighbourhood policing can be traced back, in part, to the CAPS programme, but also to domestic events, particularly the Scarman Report, following the 1980 Brixton disorders. The report exposed shortcomings in police-community relations, identifying police failure in responding to and communicating with the community. Policing was described as 'police-oriented' rather than 'community-oriented' and the report identified a requirement for policing to shift towards a service ethos (Savage, 2007). Community policing has since become increasingly prominent in England and Wales, first in the form of reassurance policing and subsequently as neighbourhood policing (Fielding, 2009).

Reassurance policing, intended to bridge the 'reassurance gap' between falling crime and the public's perception of crime as still rising (Jansson, 2007, p.20), was trialled in the early 2000s by Surrey Police and underpinned by the concept of 'signal crime' (Innes, 2004, p.162). The Signal Crimes Perspective contended that fear of crime and people's risk perceptions were linked to certain crimes, deviant behaviours or the residual signs of these activities (Innes and Fielding, 2002). The Signal Crimes approach emphasised the need for police to understand local problems and prioritise issues with the highest signal values to improve local security (Innes, 2004). The National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) developed from the Surrey pilot and was implemented across 16 wards from January 2004 (Tuffin et al, 2006) and focused on three delivery mechanisms:

- Engagement with communities to identify local concerns and priorities

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- Targeting police resources at tackling these concerns
- Create a visible and accessible police presence.

(Tuffin et al., 2006)

Evaluation of the NRPP found that by combining foot patrol, community engagement and problem solving, it met its aims, at least in the short term (Quinton and Tuffin, 2007, p.159). The three-year National Neighbourhood Policing Programme, focusing on visibility, problem solving and community engagement, was subsequently implemented to deliver the model across 43 pathfinder police command areas during 2005/06 (Innes, 2004). In 2008, HMIC found all forces had achieved the basic standard of making Neighbourhood Policing a core part of policing work (HMIC, 2008).

Myhill's (2006/2012) systematic review of community policing literature identifies the impact that community engagement has on policing outcomes:

- Reducing crime—weak positive evidence: some positive findings, some neutral, no negative.
- Reducing disorder and anti-social behaviour—fairly strong positive evidence: mostly positive findings, some neutral, no negative.
- Increasing feelings of safety—fairly strong positive evidence: mostly positive findings, some neutral, no negative.
- Improving police community relations and community perceptions-strong positive evidence: almost all positive findings, minimal neutral, no negative.
- Increasing community capacity—unknown: this is a gap in the evidence.
- Changing police officers' attitudes and behaviour—fairly strong positive evidence on attitudes: mixed evidence on behaviour.

These outcomes indicate that community engagement improves policing outcomes, although detailed and robust evidence is still sparse. Part of the modest outcomes are driven by a lack of understanding and consistency across a range of topics (Myhill, 2006/2012, p.4) with respect to implementation. In general, the police are not in control of a significant proportion of community outcomes, and the processes and approaches to community engagement are vaguely reported, making it difficult to establish how the initiatives achieved better outcomes. The 2003 consultation on making communities safer (Home Office, 2003) contained a

section on 'increasing community engagement' but it neither defined community engagement nor established how it could be increased. Similarly, the 2004 White Paper 'Building Communities, Beating Crime' called for 'a constructive and lasting engagement with members of their community'.

Engagement itself as a term seems to indicate an awareness of the need to hear the voice of the neighbourhood, but is constructed within a wider frame of 'customer service' focus and therefore engagement is limited to understanding 'need' rather than capability. Myhill's definition of engagement involved 'enabling citizens and communities to participate by sharing power with them' (2006/2012, p.17) which pushes the Police further up the Arnstein ladder of participation. Arnstein's original 1969 work, however, did not include a theory of co-production, switching from 'delegated power' to 'citizen control'. In policing terms, this could represent a loss of control, so a midpoint of producing safety in collaboration with the neighbourhood in question is needed. Myhill proposes the following definition of engagement: 'The process of enabling the participation of citizens and communities in policing at their chosen level, ranging from providing information and reassurance, to empowering them to identify and implement solutions to local problems and influence strategic priorities and decisions' (Myhill, 2006/2012, p.19), without defining what the process should be. The challenge for the LISP project was to develop a consistent and repeatable process of intensive engagement, whilst allowing for the uniqueness of each neighbourhood.

3.8. HOW THE LISP HANDBOOK IMPLEMENTS THE LITERATURE

There have been several reviews of community policing and community engagement in policing since the 1980s. Rix et al. (2009) provide a very thorough account of these reviews, organising evidence in terms of 'what is known' and 'what is promising', based on the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods championed by Sherman et al. (1997) to determine the methodological quality of police intervention studies. Whilst there is a bias (unjustified according to Pawson and Tilley, 1997) in the Maryland scale towards randomised control trial (i.e. positivistic and quantitative) standards of proof, the distinction between 'proven', 'being proven' and unsubstantiated claim is useful in categorising the studies reviewed here. 'Evidence', in this case, is therefore based on the terms set out by Sherman et al (1997).

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Quinton and Morris' (2008) Home Office evaluation of the National Reassurance Policing Programme identifies that community engagement and problem solving has greater impact on public confidence than visibility from foot patrols. This study meets the highest level of the Maryland Scale and is the starting point for any claim that Intensive Engagement through LISP works, despite the observation that the participating Forces 'had not yet implemented in full and that effective community engagement and problem-solving were not yet in place' (Quinton and Morris 2008 p.IV). The basic idea, that being involved with the community being policed and involving the community in problem solving is more tangibly effective than the mere presence of police officers, is a fundamental starting point for the use of Intensive Engagement in neighbourhood policing.

There seem to be limits, however, to the response of the community to such attempts at engagement. Innes and Roberts (2008) identify that in lower crime areas, the process of engaging community members and taking their concerns seriously is sufficient to improve perceptions of the area and confidence in the police. In high crime areas, a focus on signal crimes and disorders seemed more effective than community involvement. Nevertheless, responding to an in-depth understanding of the places and their problems is crucial in both contexts.

The 'dose rate', or the extent to which community engagement has taken place, and the depth to which problems have been tackled, is also an important factor. Quinton and Morris (2008) and Mason (2009) both encountered different effects on perceptions of policing between the two community engagement programmes they report on (as Pawson predicts) and conclude that neighbourhood policing has not been implemented fully or consistently. A sense of 'how much' and 'what quality' of community engagement is as important as the activities of engagement. Implementing effective problem-solving has also been problematic for many interventions, as the mechanisms are not delivered in sufficiently large doses (HMIC, 2008, cited in Mason, 2009).

It may also take time to achieve sufficient quality of implementation—Chicago, for instance, took 8 years to implement its community policing programme, which requires high levels of training, supervision, analysis and organisation wide-commitment (Lombardo et al, 2010). Clearly, quality of community engagement is more important than quantity (Quinton and Morris, 2008). Pate et al. (1986)

identify the benefits of pro-active contact with victims: establishing a group of residents who identify what can be done to solve the problem (rather than simply identify the problem, as was the case with Locally Identified Priorities); proactive foot patrol (contradicted by Quinton and Morris later in 2008) to improve familiarity and accessibility, and; feedback (newsletters in that instance, but any kind). These are all identified as mechanisms that work. It should be noted that foot patrol is not intrinsically as effective as community engagement, but foot patrol with the purpose of improving familiarity is. For groups where there has been little prior engagement with the police, as the most vulnerable and socially excluded spaces often are, intensive engagement results in a dip in satisfaction with the police. Dalgliesh and Myhill (2004) suggest that this is because of a shift from perception to the reality of interacting with the police. Communities may become more aware of the crime in their neighbourhood but also begin to see that such crime rates need not be normal.

Bennett (1991) introduced a prescriptive, quantity-driven, process-based approach to neighbourhood policing (one officer patrol, one adult contact per day, problems collected from the public but police-led problem solving). The strategy did not reduce the fear of crime but improved confidence in the police. Providing information proactively improved confidence, regardless of format, if delivered in person, with real life accessible examples, fair use of data and openness to failure not just success (Wunsch and Hohl, K 2008; Singer and Cooper, 2008). These strands are picked up by the experiments in predictive policing in Trafford (Chainey, 2012).

Rukus et al conclude from their statistical work in the USA something quite surprising, that "collective efficacy appears to have the most impact where it is needed least—in low crime communities" (2018, p1877). In these communities, collective efficacy is correlated with increased safety perception, community participation, and youth services, but in high crime areas neighbourhood policing doesn't seem to have the same levels of effect that it does in the suburbs, particularly on the development of youth services, and the sense of collective safety. The research does note that statistical correlation does not denote causation, leaving the question of what type of neighbourhood policing was being applied in each of the urban, suburban and rural neighbourhoods open to query, and the question of what works more relevant.

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3.8.1.   NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING MECHANISMS

In the category of 'what works', the evidence clearly demonstrates that community engagement and problem solving combined has positive effects on crime patterns, perceptions of policing and fear of crime, so long as the following mechanisms are present in a fully implemented package of intensive engagement:

- In-depth understanding of people, place and problems
- Full and consistent application of interventions
- Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time
- Proactive contact
- A group of residents
- Joint problem solving

With respect to what 'looks promising', Rix et al. (2009) review further studies that do not meet the gold-plated randomised control trial standard[28] required by Sherman et al (1997), but nevertheless demonstrated some practical basis to consider its potential to bring about the changes claimed.

West Yorkshire Police et al (2008) also developed a process-based reassurance mapping methodology, which involved identifying hotspots, engaging and consulting, agreeing and delivering evaluated action. Identifying and recruiting key individuals in the community has been a widespread practice in terms of clearly defined activities, such as Neighbourhood Watch, but attention has not been given to ensuring that these groups represent the whole community. Innes and Roberts (2008) suggest that highly connected individuals are key, although these are often confused with 'community leaders' who are visible (i.e. religious leaders and community activists).

Scholars agree that officers must be adequately prepared for the role (Haarr, 2001; Skogan et al. 1999; Saad and Grinc, 1994), however these studies do not necessarily cover the skilled support needed from senior officers and commanders to escalate problem solving to the appropriate levels. Multi-agency working has become popular and widespread, but it does not tackle situations where statutory partners themselves are ineffective or not engaging with the public. Environmental Visual Audits have also become popular and can direct attention to physical

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[28] One evaluation of the intervention being rated at 3 or above on the Maryland Scale

improvements based on the 'broken window theory' (Innes and Roberts, 2008; Dalgliesh and Myhill, 2004; Innes, 2004; Wilson and Kelling, 1982) but can distract from understanding the non-tangible networks and flows of issues, tensions, inequalities and conflict that underlie physical neglect and deprivation.

Dubois and Hartnett (2002) suggest that community support has to be won rather than assumed. Investment of police resources in the community must be sustained, even if the problems are not immediately solved. Furthermore, residents must have their expectations managed and their interests incorporated into the solution design, so they can easily identify success that is meaningful to them.

Saad and Grinc (1994) also suggested that where community organisations do not exist, the police ought to foster them. Training, in the formal sense, however, is predominantly taken up by white, middle class citizens and not the most excluded community members (Skogan et al., 1999). Innes and Roberts explored what highly connected and capable citizens can do to improve perceptions of policing by passing on positive messages (Innes and Roberts, 2008), while other studies focused on individuals who are attuned to community dynamics (Innes et al, 2009) but have not suggested recruiting those capable citizens to problem solve, instead relegating them to 'guardianship' roles (Cohen and Felson, 1979).

The officers themselves do not have a clear understanding of the purpose or principles of community policing (Saad and Grinc, 1994; Long et al., 2002) and delivering on the tacit skills of intensive engagement is rare (Myhill, 2012, p.30-5). Training officers and PCSOs is often the primary target, but Skogan et al. (1999) indicate that sergeants, and implicitly any commanding officer, are crucial to the successful implementation of community policing. This is critical in allowing citizens and PCSOs to access the higher levels of power with the force and its statutory partners (Baron et al, 2000; Coulthard et al., 2002) who are represented on joint action groups and community safety partnerships, and their variants. Officers also have systematically greater perceived social distance from minority communities which directly impinges on their support for community policing, and consequently policing for ethnic minorities and new communities (Kearns, 2017 p1225). This is inevitably mixed up with the 'dirty' (de Camargo, 2019) and deeply

gendered (de Camargo, 2016) nature of neighbourhood policing at a time that Innes et all think is the end of neighbourhood policing (Innes et al, 2020).

The nature of the engagement with the community also requires scrutiny. Beyond the patrol, the common engagement technique has been the Police and Community Meeting (PACT) meeting, variously known as NAGs (Rolfe, 2018) and JAGs[29]. PACT meetings are open to all, but, as other researchers have pointed out, the level of attendance at these meetings is low and they fail to engage a broad cross-section of community residents (Brunger 2011, Bullock and Sindall 2014). Gasper and Davies (2018) found that police were focused on 'quick hits' and short-term solutions, presenting 'good news' stories and dictating the role and positioning of others within the meetings, leaving little space for 'experience based lay knowledge' and community expertise. However, Gasper and Davies conclude that it is too simplistic to view "community members as passive and powerless when confronted by professional elites, while recognizing how their influence over service delivery may be limited" (2018, p238).

Myhill et al. (2003) warn of failures within multi-agency partnerships where a variety of barriers prevent a solution-focused approach. Targeted partnerships with statutory agencies control over solutions that have been identified and developed by the communities themselves seem to provide a focus for limiting the scope and burden of such partnerships, such as alleviating physical vulnerabilities to crime and focused re-evaluation of street lamp switch-off policies.

Research suggests the implementation of a range of strategies to encourage community participation in Neighbourhood Policing is more effective than relying on a single method, such as public meetings (Fyfe, 1992), although single strategies like a single instance of positive contact with a uniformed police officer can substantially improve public attitudes toward police, including legitimacy and willingness to cooperate (Peyton et al, 2019). Although programmes have achieved positive results in relation to public confidence in the police, feelings of safety, problem solving, and police visibility, they have tended to have little effect on the mobilisation of social capacity (Skogan, 1992). Neighbourhood Policing studies have identified beneficial effects on police attitudes (Lord and Friday,

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[29] http://politics.leics.gov.uk/documents/s77532/E%20-%20Appendix%201%20JAG%20ToR.pdf   [Accessed 20/11/2020]

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2008). In the right context, confidence in and support for Neighbourhood Policing can be high among community officers, but are less supported by other officers who retain a preference for motorised patrols and response-oriented methods (Skogan, 2006).

This review of the published research within community policing literature suggests a number of mechanisms that make LISP work within the contexts it does, and to provide the outcomes it does (Table 3.5). The next steps of the research will explore these mechanisms through detailed evaluation of case studies to identify which mechanisms were being triggered, whether new mechanisms were being triggered, and in what contexts, and with what outcomes, these mechanisms were triggered.

Table 3.5 Possible mechanisms that make community policing work

What works	What is promising
In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	A consistent process
Full and consistent application of interventions	Highly connected individuals
Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time	Support is won
Proactive contact	Attuned to community dynamics
A group of residents	Tacit skills
Joint problem solving	Not reliant on multi-agency delivery

This process of mining the existing evidence base for mechanisms that make community engagement and problem-solving work has identified 12 key factors or mechanisms that, if activated, stand a significant chance of making an intervention (solution accompanied by practices) that is chosen by the community within a LISP process work. Table 3.6 shows how the LISP Handbook implements these factors drawn from research evidence.

Table 3.6 How LISP implements evidence

Community Policing Research Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement
In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	In-depth investigation of the police crime problem in the context of the other problems experienced in the locality
Full and consistent application of interventions	The training and subsequent evaluation of the quality of LISP work, and standard proforma

Community Policing Research Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement
Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time	Success, i.e. depth of understanding of the problem and success of the interventions is determined by the working group rather than police timeframes
Proactive contact	Deliberate choices are made at the screening stage about the importance of the locality to policing outcomes. Process requires identification of all potential stakeholder groups, including hard to reach.
A group of residents	Where community organisations appropriate to the problems don't exist, the LISP process creates the social capital and networks to allow this to happen
Joint problem solving	Co-production of the problem analysis and solving stages is central
Highly connected individuals	The LISP working group is made up of highly connected and highly capable people,
Support is won	Working group members elicit a clearly understood self-interest that underpins expected successes to secure and 'win' support
Attuned to community dynamics	The rich picturing processes develop a nuanced and empathetic understanding of the community and the issues and tensions within it.
Tacit skills	Training, with the aid of the publicly available handbook, briefings to senior officers and a process of identifying the best implementations of LISP and mentoring of officers ensure that police skills are embedded and propagated across the force
Not reliant on multi-agency delivery	Where statutory partners are actively engaged, LISP provides a clear and discrete method for limited involvement. Where statutory agencies are not engaged, LISP provides a clear evidence base for Police and community to hold statutory agencies to account.

3.8.2.   PUBLIC POLICY MECHANISMS

Moving out of the policing literature into the wider public policy arena, Pawson (2013), in his review of hundreds of innovations and evaluations in the public sector concludes that the following ingredients (Table 3.7) are critical factors (or in his terminology, hidden mechanisms) that create successful interventions and crucially support the mainstreaming and scaling of such interventions into organisational and cultural change. It is important to note that Intensive Engagement is not really an intervention itself, but a way of going about designing and delivering interventions that are more robust and resilient. This allows the question of Evidence Based Policing to shift from 'what works' to 'how do we make it work better?' (Sherman et al, 1997). It is clear from Pawson's list below that the mechanisms he has identified from a meta-study have not been identified

within the evaluation evidence from the research literature. Both practice-based evidence and theoretical underpinnings are essential to devise a system that works. An intervention that truly works is one that begins to transform the underlying structures that create the conditions being addressed. This is *praxis*: reflection and action directed at the structures to be transformed (Freire, 1970, p.126).

Table 3.7 Mapping Hidden Mechanisms to LISP activities

Pawson's Hidden Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement
Recruit the stakeholders with care	Looking for the most highly connected, capable and motivated individuals, whose self-interest and motivation to contribute to public safety is understood.
Create expectations of change	Intensive Engagement is oriented towards collaboratively deciding on what change is needed, to design Solutions and Practices.
Demand effort from stakeholders	The LISP approach is designed to flip the Police response from 'what can we do?' to 'what solutions do you have?'
Offer encouragement and feedback	The process is designed to recognise existing assets and capabilities within the community, with the help of the Police, that can be enhanced to support Police outcomes (Kretzman and McKnight, 1993).
Build trust and resilience	Long-term locally based relationships are key to developing mature LISP informed interventions.
Make accommodations for set-backs	The embedding of the Motivational Interviewing 'stages of change model' (Prochaska and DiClemente, 1984; Miller and Rollnick, 2002; 2012) accounts for set-backs within the process of engagement.
Explain the theory of change	The theory of change for LISP is described as follows: collaboratively designed solutions and co-produced practices are more robust than short-term projects and limited engagement
Share execution and control of the intervention	The whole LISP model is built on recruiting capable and connected decision-makers and resources to the support of Police outcomes, and an attempt to 'loosen the reins' of Police controlled design and implementation.
Ensure onward external continuation	The purpose of the community designing and delivering the interventions that are unique to a locality is to ensure that the Police have a 'step-back and sustain' (rather than an exit) strategy, freeing resources up to tackle other localities and problems, and leaving a self-sustaining legacy.

As part of an ongoing process of research and communication (Curtis, 2015; Curtis and James, 2015; Curtis and James, 2013; Curtis and James, 2014), published evidence for what works and what is promising in terms of community engagement and problem solving in neighbourhood policing in the UK has been reviewed. The outcomes that are identified in these studies vary from reduction in crime, improved perception and legitimacy of the police, and improved perceptions of the neighbourhoods that have hosted these initiatives. These studies do not identify, however, 'more citizens actively participating in

challenging and shaping police services' or 'more citizens taking power and responsibility for identifying, defining and solving local problems' (Simmonds, 2013, p.5).

3.9. FINDINGS FROM THE ANTECEDENT LITERATURE

This chapter has addressed the first research question through an exploration of the antecedents of the Locally Identified Solutions and Practices (LISP) approach, exploring the philosophical and theoretical roots of the work and the influences that led to the Handbook being devised the way it was, as an applied example of social innovation processes. The 'organisation' in this context, has been established as the 'organising' of people, institutions and actants (specifically technologies and spaces of control and persuasion) in order to improve public safety, and with a secondary purpose of improving or sustaining the legitimacy of the process of policing; managing the consent to police. This recognises that the management of change within a neighbourhood is not merely a case of persuading a few people, but influencing the very social networks that are present (or absent) in that neighbourhood. In this way, strands of management experience and motivational interviewing and their experience of influence without power, weave together through the warp and weft of debates over what exactly distinguishes social enterprises and social entrepreneurs from their habitus in the social economy from other forms social organising, and places all of this messiness in the real lives of communities experiencing crime and anti-social behaviour.

Contemporary research in neighbourhood policing spearheading by College of Policing staff like Andy Myhill's draw in similar external influences which result in a definition of community engagement like 'enabling citizens and communities to participate by sharing power with them', and conclude that in lower crime areas, the process of engaging community members and taking their concerns seriously is sufficient to improve perceptions of the area and confidence in the police. In high crime areas, however a focus on signal crimes and disorders seemed more effective than community involvement. Nevertheless, responding to an in-depth understanding of the places and their problems is crucial in both contexts. A detailed review of 'what works' by Ray Pawson (deeply involved in policing research, and also a critical realist evaluator) in neighbourhood policing research enabled this research to derive a putative framework to begin to compare the LISP

case studies against what seemed to be working in the LISP Handbook. The next chapter sets out the methodology of the research, the epistemological position of the research and the implications for the data gathering and analysis techniques used, as well as reports on the ethics and procedures of the research as undertaken.

CHAPTER. 4.   METHODOLOGY AND METHOD

This chapter considers the conflation of ontology and epistemology in common approaches to constructionist and positivist philosophical approaches. It begins to connect, through the work of Mingers (2014), critical realism as an epistemological and ontological position, to Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) as a distinct methodology, focusing in on the questions of systems boundaries (where the topic of concern begins and ends) and the relationship between the observer and truth in the construction of knowledge. The chapter considers the interplay between method and knowledge, to establish a coherent selection of research methods and evidence gathering and analysis. The Chapter concludes that SSM is a structured process of enquiry within which certain (but not all) that is appropriate to this form of critical realist investigation allied with ordering and presenting complex evidence so as to establish the mechanisms and outcomes in each case study. This chapter also, through adbductive reasoning, shuttles back and forth between the implicit ontological position and epistemological decisions made at the time of the creation of the LISP Handbook, to the research and analysis made in this document, establishing a consistency and coherence between the research subject and object, in particular the core methodology employed by the LISP Handbook and in the research analysis itself.

Critical realism is a source of some confusion as theorists grapple with what they know about positivism and social constructionism, and then seek to describe critical realism as some form of pragmatic middle way between the two poles of methodology. One conceptualisation of epistemologies and methodologies is that they are spectra, with essentialism and realism at one end of the dichotomy, and social constructionism and interpretivism at the other. Morgan and Smircich (1980) do not assess Critical Realism in their review, but the fact that their paper has been cited 3556 times[30] indicates how pervasive the spectrum symbolism is. This suppresses the subtlety of both essentialism and constructionism, but further reduces critical realism to a caricature of itself.

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[30]

https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Morgan+and+Smircich+%281980%29+The+Case+for+Qualitative+Research&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5 [Accessed 20/07/2020]

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Critical Realism (CR) emerged as a philosophy (Bhaskar 1975, 1979, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1994) that has developed and been debated for over 40 years creating many varieties and versions of realism that are not entirely consistent with one another (Archer and Archer 1996, Archer 1995, Archer et al 2013, Keat and Urry 1975). Critical realism parses the difference between ontology and epistemology, whereas positivism and social constructivism conflate[31] the two (Johnson and Duberley 2003). CR asserts the existence of reality[32] (Greek: ὄντος ontos) independent of human experience about which we can acquire justified knowledge (Greek ἐπιστήμη episteme) whilst recognising the inevitability of the knowledge being limited, contextual and contingent[33]. Where positivism posits that there is an ultimate reality, and it is reliably analogous to our perceived (epistemological) empirical reality, social constructionism (in its post-modernist extreme) claims there is nothing real except the surface, nothing real behind the hyperrealism of what we perceive and experience (Eco 1986, 1995 and Baudrillard, in Poster 1998[34], Baudrillard, 1994) - the only thing that is real is what we think about the real[35]; reality is merely constructed. The ontological is confused or conflated with the empirical in both these positions. If they are separated out (as in Table 4.), so that ontology is not implicitly driven by epistemology or vice versa, critical realism allows for a reality that is independent from human knowledge (but perhaps not as simply permanent and unchanging as a positivistic naïve realism?[36]) and our knowledge of that reality is (sufficiently) reliable, but contingent on the limitations of human perception[37] and the impermanence of reality, ontologically.

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[31] Bhaskar's epistemic fallacy

[32] Although constructionism is typically applied to the social realm, at an epistemological level it also applies to physical reality. Solipsism denies that there is even a physical reality beyond the personal identity experiencing a sense perception. Solipsism was first recorded by the Greek presocratic sophist, Gorgias (c. 483–375 BC) who is quoted by the Roman skeptic Sextus Empiricus as having stated:1) Nothing exists. 2)Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it. 3) Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others.

[33] I use the word contingent in its philosophical context. Aristotle. Rhetoric. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. New York: Random House, 1954

[34] "The simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth—it is the truth which conceals that there is none. The simulacrum is true".

[35] René Descartes

[36] For example, non-physical reality like the existence of capitalism is not a permanent phenomenon, but its existence is stable and knowable

[37] So, fallible, but not all episteme is equally fallible

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Table 4.1 Summary of epistemologies and ontologies

	Ontology (Reality)	Epistemology (Knowledge)
Positivism	Independent and permanent	Certain and reliable
Critical realism	Independent and enduring	Reliable but contingent
Social constructionism	Dependent and fluid[38]	Unreliable and relativist

Summarising the work of Bhaskar, Elder-Vass notes that: 'the empirical domain includes those events that we actually observe, or experience, and the actual is the domain of material existence, comprising things and the events they undergo. The real also includes 'structures and mechanisms' that generate those events' (Elder-Vass, 2010, p 44).

One's philosophical position with respect to reality and whether it is possible to know it, drives methodological assumptions and decisions about what constitutes valid empirical evidence. Critical realism, if it is treated as a middle ground between positivism and constructionism, can become an expedient 'mixed methods' experimentation (Zachariadis et al, 2010; Pawson and Tilley, 2001; Creswell, 2003; Johnstone, 2004). Alternatively, some consideration should be given to the consistency between the ontological/epistemological layering and how it impacts on methodological assumptions and the nature of evidence. By separating ontology from epistemology, critical realism runs the risk of implying that any combination is valid, that interpretative interview data can be collected alongside quantitative data and that any theory or insight derived from the data can be treated as relatively equivalent. This can lead to claims, for example, that 'x number of interviewees said this about a certain topic', and therefore it is real, as opposed to concluding that their collective experience is perceived as real. On the other hand, it can lead to a researcher concluding that because 41% of a survey group held one set of beliefs about a phenomenon and 59% held different beliefs, that neither belief is true. To avoid such fallacies, it is important to seek

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[38] Paraphrasing Bauman (2013)

out methodologies and research methods that can gather evidence(s) that are consistent with, and grounded in, critical realism. This was the challenge set by Yeung (1997) in the 1990s when Cloke et al (1991, p134) considered critical realism to be merely a philosophy and Keeble (1980) merely a method. In 1982, Keat and Urry complained that 'we have no clear indications of how this [critical realism] can be done in practice' (Keat and Urry 1982, p229) and not much has changed with contemporary manuals on critical realism also dancing around the methods and evidence question (Elder-Vass 2010, Sayer 1992, Danermark et al 2019). This chapter will return to method and evidence in critical realism after having established soft systems methodology as a critical and emancipatory methodology.

4.1. CRITICALITY IN REALISM

The author has long been committed to a critical and emancipatory project in academic and real-world research (Curtis 2008, 2011). In engaging with critical realism, from a prior commitment to critical theory, the "realism" part of the label is straightforward, but its criticality is less clear. The idea of "critical" realism does not appear at all in Bhaskar's first major book, A Realist Theory of Science (1975). The idea of critical philosophy is important and prominent in his second book, The Possibility of Naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary human sciences (1979). Post-'post-modernist' thought doesn't have to be critical in the Marxist sense, because its main project is to resolve the impasse created by post-modernism. Nevertheless, Little (2013), although not providing a systematic exposition of what a "critical" realist philosophy is, offer the three following features that make critical realism truly critical:

Critical thinking as emancipatory. In the Marxist tradition, the word "critical" has a specific meaning-"The philosophers have sought to understand the world; the point, however, is to change it."(Marx, 1938). The theorist Max Horkheimer described a theory as critical insofar as it seeks "to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them" (1982:244). Critical realism is critical because it is the foundation for engaged and emancipatory science. Critical science is committed to constructing bodies of knowledge that have substantial impact on the long term best interests of humanity.

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Critique as illusion-destroying. Another dimension of the idea of criticism in the Marxist tradition is the idea of 'critique': focused intellectual effort to uncover the implicit (and misleading) assumptions of various schemes of thought and policy. This brings in the idea of laying bare the implicit (often dominating) assumptions of various systems of thought. Laying bare the partisan assumptions underlying ideology and false consciousness is an exercise of critique.

Critique as self-creation. Finally, there is a third connotation of "critical" that pertains to its use in the social sciences: the constant reminder that the social world is not independent and separate from "us". This involves the feature of "reflexivity[39]" that obtains in the social world. We constitute the social world, for better or worse. And the forms of knowing that we gain through the social sciences also give rise to forms of creating of new social forms - again, for better or worse. So, it is crucial to pay attention to the plasticity of the social relations in which we live, and the innovations we create in those relations through our own processes of knowing and doing. Margaret Archer refers to this fundamental aspect of the relationship between actors and the social world as "morphogenesis" (Archer, 1995).

This extended quote from Little forms the basis of the foundations of CR as a critical project, as opposed to a functionalist science. Indeed, Habermas (2015, p375) states that a critical philosophy should be "critical both of contemporary social sciences and of the social reality they are supposed to grasp". Critical theory is considered to be a school of thought featuring five Frankfurt School theoreticians: Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, and Erich Fromm. Modern critical theory has additionally been influenced by György Lukács and Antonio Gramsci and Jürgen Habermas (1985), amongst others. Among them, those most closely associated with human culture and political consciousness present ideas that particularly resonate with CR. Whether it is through universal pragmatic principles through which mutual understanding is achieved (Habermas, 1985), or the semiotic rules or regularities by which objects obtain symbolic meanings (Barthes), the notion of *episteme* that underlies our cognitive formations (Foucault, 1980, p197[40]) strongly correlates

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[39] Little uses the less frequently used phrase 'reflexiveness'

[40] Foucault's notion of episteme is similar to, but much wider than Kuhn's paradigm, which is limited to scientific thought constructs. An Episteme encapsulates a whole societal set of assumptions and presumptions.

with hidden structures and mechanisms of Pawson and Tilley (1997). Identifying and making visible those structures to the people are what Freire meant by conscientization (Freire 1970, 2005), although it (and SSM itself, as shown later) can be somewhat vanguardist (Lenin, 1902) in its insistence on the enlightened intellectual elite to identify the hidden mechanisms and to create solutions (cf revolution) on behalf of those experiencing the social problem. Morrow and Brown (1994) conclude the critical realism is 'largely compatible" with critical theory. Wikgren (2005, p13) says "Critical realists argue for a shift from prediction to explanation, the use of abstraction, and reliance on interpretive forms of investigation", and this commitment to science for social change is critical enough. CR, it seems, covers both the exploring of the communicative acts of the society (Habermas 1985), and exposing of the assumptions and worldviews (weltanschauung[41]) that comprise the whole "orderly 'unconscious' structures" (episteme) (Foucault 1970) of each society, making critical realism critical in the traditions of Habermas and Foucault.

4.2. CRITICAL METHODOLOGY

Choosing a methodology within this study, and therefore deciding on what constitutes evidence within that methodology, could start with interrogating the epistemology of the LISP methodology itself. If this epistemological stance, intuitively selected by the author during the development of the LISP approach, is consistent with critical realism, then the methodological strategies will also be consistent and decisions about what constitutes evidence will also become clear. In a way, this entails both a 'looking back' to the development of the LISP, its intellectual antecedents, and its ontological and epistemological assumptions, and a 'looking forward' through the development of the LISP Handbook to its implementation to identify consistent threads that not only demonstrates how LISP works (what mechanisms are activated) but also gathering evidence through which those mechanisms might be identified in a similarly consistent manner. This form of abductive reasoning allows a shuttling backwards and forwards between the 'how did LISP come about' historical question and 'how does it work to create

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[41] The idea that language and worldview are inextricable, from Kant and Humboldt, and used by Checkland in his CATWOE formulation in Soft Systems Methodology.

social impact' forward looking question, using the same epistemological assumptions.

Chapter. 2 reviewed the intellectual antecedents of LISP. It investigates the text of the LISP document to establish key themes of clearly identifiable influence. The text itself is clear in the first instance. It states, for example:

"The LISP approach brings together elements of community organising (Alinsky 1971), critical community practice (Ledwith, 2011), asset-based community development (Kretzman and McKnight 1993) and modified soft-systems analysis[sic] (Checkland and Scholes, 1999) into a street-level set of PCSO catalysed activities."

A priori, it is not clear that community organising, critical community practice, asset-based community development and Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) (Checkland, 1981) are consistent with one another or with a CR philosophical position. The next part of this chapter deals with the details of that problem. Nonetheless, the mention (or misquote) of Soft Systems Methodology, or some modified form of it, suggests a potential methodological assumption, and therefore an epistemological and ontological one.

4.3. CRITICAL REALISM AND SOFT SYSTEMS METHODOLOGY

Cybernetics, or the study of self-ordering mechanisms, gave rise in the 1940s to two key insights: that systems or collections of phenomena or objects in complex relationships control themselves autonomously through the transmission of information within feed-back loops[42]. This developed into 'second order cybernetics' in which the process of observing a system was also recognised to be part of the system. The system that constructs itself, and its observance of itself, is considered to be *autopoetic* - self creating or able to sustain itself. Such systems are more than a closed biological system, but an open one, that responds to changes in its environment and in which new information drawn over its (now somewhat porous or fuzzy) boundaries further informs and modifies the relationships between the phenomena within the system. Further recognition in systems design in organisations and complex constructions like oil refineries (Hall

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[42] One sees here a natural progression from thinking of passive objects being operated within a system to objects becoming agents (non-human ones), a leap made by Latour in conceptualising 'actants' Latour (2004).

1962) recognised that when applied to human systems, even the advanced computational systems could not predict human behaviour. People, through self-reflection and communication, have the ability to conceptualise themselves and the systems of which they are a part. The systems exist objectively but enable and constrain behaviour, but their conceptualisation of the system is constructed by the system itself and their agency makes reflexivity important in critical realist research.

These led to an alternative systemic approach to problem solving in organisations-what became known as 'soft systems thinking' as opposed to 'hard systems'. Checkland (1981, Checkland and Poulter 2006; Checkland and Scholes 1999) fully articulated this as Soft Systems Methodology, which, he argued, was based on Husserl's phenomenological social theory, i.e. the way in which humans perceive the reality about them, particularly the invariant features. SSM is also influenced by the insights of system dynamics by the Club of Rome (Meadows 1972) and complexity theory (Lewin 1999 and Stacey 1996).

Mingers is the foremost theorist of the links between critical realism (CR) and Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) (Mingers, 2014). He traces the development of both CR and SSM to the crisis in Cartesian reductionism, citing *gestalt* theory with respect to the extent to which we perceive and think in wholes (Ritter, 1919), Haekel's notion of *umwelt* or environment, and Heisenberg's (1985) principle of uncertainty as key ingredients in Bhaskar's eventual theories of relationships, emergence, hierarchy[43] and boundaries, and Elder-Vass' (2005) emergent powers or properties. These ideas cover the *structural* elements of systems. The *process* elements are also eclectically influenced. Von Bertalanffy's (1950,1971) concept of open systems is highly influential here; that some systems in question are not statically structured but are in a state of dynamic equilibrium or self-regulation-later developed into the idea of homeostasis (Cannon, 1926). The work of Peter Senge (1990) in Qualitative System Dynamics and Stermann (2000) takes these concepts into organisation studies, but a paradigm shift happens with Checkland's SSM – "we need to remind ourselves [he says] that we have no access to what the world is, only to descriptions of the world… that is to say epistemology…it

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[43] Mingers points out that this is not a simple hierarchy like a ladder, but more like Russian dolls nesting inside one another (Mingers, 2014:30)

transfers systemicity from the world to the process of enquiry" (Checkland, 1983, p61).

This seems to leave Checkland as a phenomenological social constructionist, unable to picture reality, only to describe our perceptions of the world, but Mingers traces a different route - from critical realism towards soft systems methodology. In the introduction to 'A Realist Theory of Science', Bhaskar (1975) outlines the fundamental concepts on which CR is built. The world consists (for Bhaskar) of *structures* and *mechanisms* that have *powers* and *liabilities* to generate the events they create. Bhaskar's work is not specifically influenced by the systems discipline but Mingers maps the connections between his work and SSM. Table 4.2 provides a summary of those common concepts. Although both sources do not explicitly cite each other, it is clear that the concepts, and how they are used, have a strong affinity, with only boundaries being an SSM concept that does not have a corollary in CR; even though a boundary is a fundamental part of defining what a 'structure' might entail and what mechanisms or things a totality might contain.

Table 4.2 A comparison of CR and SSM concepts (modified from Mingers, 2014, p37)

Critical realist concepts	Soft Systems concepts
Structures, mechanisms, things, totality, parts, wholes	Systems, parts, wholes
Powers, liabilities, tendencies, holistic causality	Emergent properties
Internal relationships	Relationships
Open and closed systems	Open and closed systems
Emergent properties	Emergent properties
Intransitive and transitive domains	The observed and the observer
Mechanisms generate events	Structure generates behaviour or process
Tensed rhythmic spatial processes	Process, dynamics
Autopoesis	Autopoesis
Transformative agency	Soft systems, second order cybernetics
	Boundaries

4.3.1. BOUNDARIES

A system boundary[44] is a fundamental theoretical principle in SSM. Defining a system in respect of its components and their relations seems to effectively delineate its boundary. Or one might take a different strategy; to define a system one must define the boundary first, and then identify the components within that

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[44] Whilst Elinor Ostrom's body of work shares many similarities with the discipline of systems thinking, it seems that her citations indicate little or no awareness of the key theorists in this field, even though her work derives from ecological systems Ostrom, (1990)

boundary. A priori, physical boundaries such as coastlines or fences, are relatively easy to identify. Mingers (2014, p117) calls these Type 1 and Type 2 edges - from the most primitive transition from one surface to another (pond water to sand on the edge) to those that demarcate the boundary and have some components that delineate the edge - like the fence itself. Type 3 boundaries are demarcations - relating to systems that do not occupy the same physical space - like a central heating system which processes components around a system (including information about the temperature) in an extended manner. Mingers' categorisation of different boundaries serves to demonstrate that systems-thinking requires more than simply recognising the individual components (in a realist sense) or simply understanding how people think or emote about the system (in a purely social constructionist sense). It "requires a degree of conceptualisation, rather than mere perception, to characterise an appropriate system in terms of components, relations and boundary" (Mingers, 2014, p120). A distinction between what is relevant to a system, and what is not, is made by the perceiver. This is not arbitrary, or wholly a construction of the observer. Indeed, the way different observers make different distinctions is also critically important. Whether a police officer considers a welfare officer to be a part of the system of interest in a crime critically affects the outcomes of such a situation for all the agents in that system - different systems may have multiple and overlapping boundaries[45]. Identifying those who have power to decide boundaries, and thereby outcomes, is a vital part of systems thinking. Further, boundaries, and boundary setting, is also an exercise in language – the basic social act is communication (Luhmann, 1986). One can readily see the importance of the insights of semiotic linguists such as de Saussure (1983) and Derrida (1978).

4.3.2.   THE OBSERVER

A system is not 'something that is given in nature but [is] something defined by intelligence' (Beer 1966, p242-243); it is a social construct, but one that is rooted in real world objects and flows. That they are constructed by observers, use language and are fallible, does not mean that they do not exist. Ontologically,

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[45] Indeed, this importance is highlighted in the use of soft systems thinking in the safeguarding serious case review undertake by Munro
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/175391/Munro-Review.pdf
[Accessed 16 Nov 2015]

boundaries objectively exist[46], but epistemologically our means of establishing the boundaries are fallible and constructed. The scientist is forced to consider not just the fallibility of their knowledge of the objects and components within the system but also of the actors defining and acting on the system (and acting as if the system exists). So, the police officer makes mental decisions about which issues to consider in her decision-making (which is an exercise in power in the first place) and thereby determines the components and resources within that system. The choice of boundaries reveals those decisions, and the decision-makers themselves reveal the boundaries. The boundaries exist independently of the observer, although it is always the observer who chooses to observe them. In picking out certain boundaries relative to others, observers (and agents within the system[47]) do not simply *perceive* systems but *conceive* them (Mingers, 2014, p144).

4.3.3. TRUTH

The most common conceptualisation of truth is 'justified, true belief' (JTB) from Plato's Theaetetus. To validly assert 'I know that *p*' implies a sincerity of belief, justifiable grounds, evidence or explanation and *p* must indeed, be true[48] . Sincere belief in a proposition does not render it actually true, even if one has justifiable grounds for believing so. For correspondence theorists (Popper, Wittgenstein, Russell) the proposition must correspond to the way the world is, without clearly addressing the problem of actually knowing what the world really is like - the correspondence is assumed. Coherence theorists (Bradley, Putnam, Quine) require that the proposition be coherent with other accepted propositions - that scientific truth builds in authority as more and more coherent propositions are made. If the foundational propositions, however, are not true; the whole edifice collapses. Pragmatists, like Rorty, take the view that a proposition that is true is more likely to be useful and powerful. Habermas (1984) instead sets out that truth arises from a process of enquiry resulting in consensus developed under conditions of ideal speech. This is somewhat similar to coherence, but there has to be a

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[46] Perhaps in the way in which water is captured by a watershed, so too is information captured by a conceptual system?
[47] Mingers doesn't explicitly deal with boundary conception by actors or actants (Latour, 2004) within systems being observed.
[48] Despite this seemingly being a tautology

process of deliberative democracy whereby coherence is achieved, rather than it emerging serendipitously.

4.3.4.   KNOWLEDGE

For Mingers' (2014), knowledge occurs in a personal sense, following Polyani (1958) in terms of an individual, what they know consciously or not. Extra-personal knowledge can be embedded in objects, books, websites organisation practices and procedures etc, but the agent still knows 'about' these objects. The objects themselves don't 'know', cannot perceive, and therefore form empirical extensions of Gidden's (1984) structuration to which the agent responds. For Bhaskar (1978), all knowledge must be *knowledge* of something, there must be an *object of knowledge*, although it need not be a physical object. The object itself, for Bhaskar (from a ball to a social structure like a social enterprise) is *intransitive*, whereas the discourses and theories we have about those objects are *transitive.*

Bhaskar then divides the intransitive dimension into three: the real, the actual, and the empirical (Figure 4.4). The real refers to those objects, structures, and powers which exist; the actual refers to the activated powers of the real; the empirical refers to that which is experienced and consequently is contingent upon the real and the actual.

Figure 4.4 Bhaskar's real, actual and empirical distinctions

Mingers (2014) further divides knowledge into propositional, experiential, performative and epistemological, and connects these forms of knowledge to particular ways of knowing, but stops short of explaining what evidence might be collected to establish what is known in each of these areas.

Table 4.3 Forms of knowledge and truth (modified from Mingers 2014, p162)

Type of knowledge	Object of knowledge	Source of knowledge	Form of representation
Propositional	I know it's raining	Direct perception	Explicit or tacit speaking or acting (as if)
Experiential	I know the feeling	Personal experience, empathy	Memories
Performative	I know how to	Learning and experience	Embodied
Epistemological	To know why	Discovery, theory building	Discursive

The process of establishing the link between ways of knowing and ways of collecting that which is to be known is the primary task of methodology.

4.4. METHODOLOGY

Methodology, as a term, is used in a variety of circumstances. At one level it is the study of the links between the philosophical considerations and methods of gathering, and analysis, empirical evidence in a research project. It is also used in the context of a thesis about research in evaluating and choosing which methods to deploy in a given situation. Finally, a particular set of methods become so well established, or belong to a given epistemological position, that they constitute a 'methodology' in their own right[49]. So, in this situation, Soft Systems Methodology, is both an epistemology (because it privileges certain types of knowing over others) and is a methodology in that is contains a clear set of techniques that makes up the body of knowledge related to 'soft systems'.   Traditionally, epistemologies are closely linked to a given set of methods- so empiricist or positivist positions are generally associated with quantitative methods and

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[49] This threefold interpretation is inspired by both Brannen (2005) and Mingers (2015, p171)

statistical analysis, whereas the interpretative or constructionist paradigm adopts qualitative methods like interviews, discourse analysis or participant observation. Critical approaches to both basic paradigms adopt particular positions on the purpose and outcome of the methods in terms of emancipation or anti-oppression. The post-modern *turn* in the 1980s and 1990s led to scepticism and a deep questioning of all forms of method (Feyerabend 1978), and indeed about what knowledge or truth was possible. This led to an abandonment of the epistemological deadlock by pragmatic research (Creswell 2003, Mertens 2014) and the development of critical realism. The contention here is that critical realism is not pragmatic in the sense that any research method is valid, or equally viable, but that critical realism encourages philosophically informed and logically consistent choices about the selection of methods used.

4.4.1.   RESEARCH METHODS

This next section briefly reviews the role of quantitative and qualitative research methods in systems research, with a view to establishing which research methods appertain to soft systems.   Pidd et al (1996, p15) provides a robust definition of a model in the positivist paradigm: "a model is any external and explicit representation of part of reality as seen by the people who wish to use that model to understand, to change, to manage and to control that part of reality"[50]. This is still limited, as Mitchell (1993, p113) understands models to be a) simply devices for predicting outputs from the inputs – without any need for the model to represent the real system in any form or b) a model being a statement of beliefs held about reality by those involved. A positivist might limit the purpose of a model to prediction or control, whereas a constructionist may be more interested in how a model provides explanation and understanding.

The limitations of data-only models, however, means that their predictive accuracy will always be very poor in anything other than well-defined and largely closed (mechanical or physical) systems. In real world systems, the open boundaries and the complexities of feedback loops make the predictions open to significant critique (Turner and Baker, 2019). The debates around the modelling of global climate change are a good example of this (Foley 2010). This does not

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[50] Note that the creator or user of the model is deemed to have no or neutral effect on the model itself

mean that modelling is useless or impossible, just difficult. It also requires that many stakeholders are involved in making the model as robust as possible.

Quantitative methods are those that generate data that are measurable in form and are amenable to some kind of statistical or mathematical analysis. Statistical analysis has two roles: descriptive and inferential (van den Besselaar, 2003). Descriptive statistical modelling in systems analysis is not controversial. Such analysis provides insights into general patterns within a dataset, highlights patterns or anomalies that may not be immediately obvious, but the patterns do not necessarily reflect an underlying reality. Critical realism recognises that the *process* of observation imposes patterns on the results rather than 'just discovering' those patterns (Tsang and Kwan, 1999). Inferential statistics, on the other hand, is more problematic in that it is limited to making predictions about a defined population based only on measurable data. It cannot place those predictions in the messier reality of multifactorial systems, or adequately account for non-measurable patterns and processes (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, Sayer 1992).

The limitation of empiricist statistical modelling is that it does not go beyond the surface to explain the mechanisms that give rise to the patterns. Indeed, it embodies a view of causation that is *successionist* rather than *generative* (Mingers 2004), it understands patterns and events arise because of their conjunction rather than understanding what generates the connection. So, A causes B because B happens after A (in succession); without clearly stating how or why A causes B. In an experiment where a light switch (A) results in a light bulb (B) lighting up, a successionist would just note the fact that the light bulb lights up after the switch is touched. A generative theory is required, however, that establishes that electricity along the wire connects the two. This requires a different experiment to demonstrate the generative power of the electricity. No amount of statistically significant data from constantly switching on and off the switch will result in proving that the switch causes the lightbulb to illuminate - it can only imply association. Critical realism demands a theory of causation, rather than association. (Danermark et al, 2019). It proceeds by inferring unknown mechanisms from limited observations and experiences. The utility of statistically valid empirical evidence for critical realists, then, is to provide those 'limited

observations' from which to infer mechanisms, which require testing in a different manner.

The limitations of the quantitative approach also impact significantly on the boundaries of the system in question, or at least, how the boundaries are conceived and described in the research process. The notion of *extrinsic closure* (Karlsson, 2011) assumes that those factors included in the model of the system will not change, or will not have a substantive impact on the dynamics of the model if they do. In practice, these dynamics are not tested, but rather are excluded from the model through processes of simplification. This happens because the data is not available, or the factors are not measurable or because a factor is not operative at that point (even if it may become operative under different conditions). Social systems are never closed but are always open to change over time. Further, modelling in quantitative science usually arises out of the data collection and analysis process. Available data is collected and then a model is created on the basis of that available data. The data, therefore, determines the nature of the model. Systems analysis seeks to derive a model of the system first (Whitten and Bentley 1997), and then identify what data can be captured to verify whether the model is accurate.

Qualitative methods are those that generate information of a non-measurable nature, says Mingers (2014, p181). This includes traditional methods such as interviews, ethnography, hermeneutics, participant observation and also systems methods such as cognitive mapping, action research, viable systems modelling (Beer, 1966) etc. From an interpretivist philosophical assumption, these strategies emphasise the meaningful nature of social processes and the need to understand how the agents within a system construct meaning (and misunderstanding) within and about a system. These approaches diverge from critical realism, however, where they adopt a strongly anti-realist position in that there is no reality beyond the individual meanings of the agents, or that there is no difference between those viewpoints (judgemental relativity) (Mingers, 2006). In a sense, strongly anti-realist interpretivist approaches are just as individualist as the empiricist hermeneutic - there is nothing beyond the individual and their experience (Patomäki and Wight 2000).

The two research strategies most closely linked with systems analysis are cognitive mapping and soft systems methodology. Cognitive mapping is a diagramming technique for depicting the ways in which an individual may think about their experience (Bryson et al. 2004). It is based on Kelly's (1991) psychological theory of constructs and is a subjectivist strategy. When different people compare and contrast their personal constructs (their cognitive maps) and create composite diagrams from their common experiences of the same real-world system the process becomes less subjective and more substantive. Real objects can be mapped into the diagrams, as can propositional objects (like policies or procedures that direct or limit behaviour).

Soft systems methodology employs this strategy for moving from the merely individualistic to the common experience. Checkland (2000, Checkland and Holwell 1998, Checkland and Poulter 2006, Checkland and Scholes 1999) aligned his work with phenomenology: "[We} need to remind ourselves that we have no access to what the world *is*, to ontology, only to descriptions of the world,…. that is to say, epistemology. …Thus, systems thinking is only an epistemology, a particular way of describing the world. It does not tell us what the world *is"*. (Checkland 1983, p671).

4.5. METHOD

Having established Soft Systems Methodology within the epistemological and ontological considerations of Critical Realism, the next step is to consider the data collection and interpretation implications of SSM. Critical realism, as a philosophical stance can be used to think carefully about any method, from quantitative techniques to qualitative.

Once ideas and opinions are expressed, they are no longer wholly subjective- they become intransitive and subject to investigation and debate by others (Mingers, 2004). Nevertheless, they are still just ideas and opinions about other objects- they are only true with reference to themselves, rather than (simply) the objects to which they refer. An example might be interviewing people about the social impacts of social enterprises; the interviews, and the opinions expressed therein are real, and really are the opinions of the interviewees (if research bias has not influenced them to be less than truthful). Their opinions about the social impact

of social enterprises are not, however, really the social impact of the enterprises - they are still just opinions. The actual social impact of the social enterprise is not being established by these interviews. But when a person's experience of crime and perception of policy is the very social outcome being sought by the social entrepreneurship, a very different research method is necessary. Researching the processes by which the police officers go about understanding the crimes, the experiences of the crimes and developing responses to the crimes requires a different method again.

CR recognises the existence of a whole range of entities - material objects and forces (Patomäki, 2010), connections and networks (Buch‑Hansen, 2014), social structures and practices (Peters et al, 2013), languages, feelings (Fairclough, 2005), beliefs and reasons (Archer et al, 2013). They are real in that they have causal efficacy, even though they may be difficult to observe or perceive. These entities are not all equal, however, because they differ in their causal efficacy. Values and feelings may be more difficult to access epistemologically (Hanly and Fitzpatrick Hanly, 2001), requiring hermeneutic or phenomenological research, but they may be more significant in terms of causal mechanisms. If the purpose of research is explanation, rather than mere description, a research method must be adequate to go beyond the empirical surface to elicit the causal mechanisms that might generate the data, despite the assertion by Mingers that critical realism does not "recognise the primacy of any particular type or approach" to method (2015, p189). This reluctance to be limited to at least a limited set of principles of research method seems to stem from the fact that critical realism is still relatively new; and perhaps from an underlying relativism. Nevertheless, there seems to be at least a 'process' of research, even if this doesn't exclude any particular method from the process. The principles underpinning the process for applied CR research (Bhaskar 2010, 2013) involve resolution of complex phenomena into components, redescription in a meaningful way, retroduction of potential hypothetical explanatory mechanisms and retrodiction of potential antecedent causal events (that trigger the mechanisms[51]), elimination of alternative competing

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[51] Pawson (2013, p35) also suggests the investigation of 'implementation chains' which lead into the events (in his case, the programme being evaluated, and in this case the development and piloting of the LISP Handbook)

explanations, and identification of causally efficacious mechanisms which leads to a correction of earlier findings or theories.

These processes of critical realist research would involve conceptualising the neighbourhood policing 'task' as a complex system, identifying the contexts within which PCSOs police officers and citizens act in complex ways (in this research the 'projects' represent different contexts within which neighbourhood policing occurs), picking out the components, connections relationships and processes that are active in the case-study contexts as the various actors seek to apply the common 8-step LISP social innovation process, (Mingers clearly suggests systems analysis for this stage (2015, p190), re-describing these projects in a meaningful way that captures the complexity and laminar nature of the events (Bhaskar, 2010) such that the explanatory mechanisms are uncovered[52]. The evidence is further sifted to identify the triggers for these underlying mechanisms- on the basis that mechanisms may exist in all the projects but are only triggered in a few. This allows for a refinement of the existing evidence regarding the success (or otherwise) of neighbourhood policing from prior research.

At its core, SSM (Checkland 1981) contains a seven step process: the researcher is immersed in the problem situation; the problem systems and their immediate context are defined; root definitions of the relevant systems (comprising the essence of the systems) are defined; conceptual models of the systems, intended as improvements, are developed; the conceptual models are compared to reality; feasible and desirable changes are identified; action is taken to improve the situation. This is primarily an analytical process; such that the evidence used to define and describe the problem situation is not clearly elaborated in Checkland's early work, nor in his collaboration with Scholes (1999). Nevertheless, it seems that the processes of analysis (especially where that analysis is undertaken by the stakeholders involved in the case-study context) itself becomes evidence that is conducive to research and evaluation. By which is meant, that although standard evidence collecting strategies like interviews, surveys, etc are taken for granted in SSM, the artefacts that arise from the agents undertaking their own research are also evidence that can be used in this investigation.

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[52] In the way theory arises from grounded theory, this still seems to be a mysterious process of intuition and re-conceptualisation through abstraction which can be (but is not often) systematised by various forms of coding procedures.

Although, mixed method research strategies are becoming ever popular (Brannen, 2005), and as noted above, it is even supported by CR theorists like Mingers[53] (2014), the popular texts (like Bryman 2016 and the more realist Robson 2002) are quite limited in what they consider to be research evidence, and hence what are legitimate mixed method research strategies. These comprise of surveys of, and interviews[54] with agents involved in the system of interest, discourse analysis (Blommaert, 2005) of the texts or communicative acts created by the agents, or by those who influence the agents, focus groups (Kitzinger, 1994) that might elicit some of the opinions of the agents with respect to their interactions, ethnomethodology (Garfinkel,1984) to investigate such interactions in detail, participant/observant ethnographic (Geertz, 1973) accounts to deepen such accounts from a single-observer perspective.

Action-research (Lewin, 1946, Argyris, 1994 and Senge, 1990), on the other hand, comprises all the aforementioned techniques, but with the feature of those (individuals and group) benefiting from the research being involved in gathering and making sense of the evidence generated. The challenge in integrating these methods into a form of participatory research is that although the primary 'author/researcher' is now clearly involved and implicated in the research, as well as the primary stakeholders (if the action research is undertaken by a group in some organisational form like a community group), in the contexts where LISP was designed to occur, the author/researcher is not at the centre of the action, and the actors within the system of interest vary, and thirdly (and most importantly) the sense-making of those involved in the real-world activity but who are not participants in the research are theoretically infinite or at least un-researchable, because of the fuzzy or contested boundaries (Jasanoff, 1987) of the projects being investigated.

SSM, instead, operates as a process of structured enquiry utilising, at different times, different research strategies to provide sufficient and appropriate evidence to inform and deepen the process of organisational sense-making (Weick, 2012).

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[53] Partly because Mingers has previous experience in multi-methods research
[54] Structured, unstructured and semi-structured

4.5.1.   SSM AS A STRUCTURED ENQUIRY

The initial question a researcher should ask is not 'which methodology?' but 'what do I need to know and why?'. This then informs the best way to collect that information and what to do with it. Methodology is more often a case of systematically reviewing all the types of research method, and seeking to establish its fit with either a paradigm of methodology (qualitative or quantitative) or on the basis of a priori expectations as to the validity or authenticity of the data produced. Whilst triangulation[55] (Denzin, 2017) is vital in terms of data, method and those undertaking the analysis, so too is coherency of the methods across the process of structured enquiry. The types and genres of data required to explore a complex problems situation is probably as complex as the situation itself. Mingers and Brockelsby illustrate this with a model developed from Habermas (1984) and Searle (1995), which demonstrates that the material objects that exist in each Intensive Engagement/LISP case (documents, LISP proformas) interact with our social world (the crimes and antisocial behaviour) as well as the personal worlds of the agents involved (prior experience and opinions about the artefacts and interactions (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5 Three dimensions of problems situations (from Mingers and Brockelsby 1997, p493)

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[55] *Investigator triangulation:* involves multiple researchers in an investigation
Theory triangulation: involves using more than one theoretical scheme in the interpretation of the phenomenon
Methodological triangulation: involves using more than one method to gather data, such as interviews, observations, questionnaires, and documents.

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Mingers and Brockelsby go on to explore the problem of evidence in more detail, drawing on the work of Giddens, Bhaskar, and Habermas to create a framework for mapping multiple methodologies (Figure 4.6) across these domains of interest, in four phases of an investigation: appreciation, assessment, analysis and action; to identify which methodology might be of assistance in each part of the grid. Rowe (2000) also deploys this technique in his PhD, one of very few that use soft systems analysis in policing research.

	Appreciation of	Analysis of	Assessment of	Action to
Social	social practices, power relations	distortions, conflicts, interests	ways of altering existing structures	generate empowerment and enlightenment
Personal	individual beliefs, meanings, emotions	differing perceptions and personal rationality	alternative conceptualizations and constructions	generate accommodation and consensus
Material	physical circumstances	underlying causal structure	alternative physical and structural arrangements	select and implement best alternatives

Figure 4.6 A framework for mapping methodologies (from Mingers and Brockelsby 1997, p501)

Rowe then reports that a detailed analysis of research methods has been undertaken, and maps them to the Mingers and Brockelsby framework (Figure 4.7). Rowe's work is limited in that a) there is no record of the mapping process and what informed it and b) that the methods suggested are somewhat limited to observation, survey, interview and archival data. Case study and SSM are not methods; they are structured processes of data analysis. Nevertheless, the process is useful.

	Appreciation of	Analysis of	Exploration of	Action to
Social Evidence	Social practices & power relations	Distortions, conflicts interests	Ways of altering existing structures	Generate empowerment and enlightenment

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

	Appreciation of	Analysis of	Exploration of	Action to
Method	SSM, observation, case study	Archive Observation case study	Archive Observation case study Questionnaire	Archive Case study Interview
Personal Evidence	Individual beliefs, meanings emotions	Differing perceptions and personal rationality	Alternative conceptualisations and constructions	Generate accommodation and consensus
Method	SSM Interview Questionnaire	SSM Interview Questionnaire	SSM Interview Questionnaire	SSM
Material Evidence	Physical circumstances	Underlying causal structure	Alternative physical and structural arrangements	Select and implement best alternatives
Method	Archive Observation case study	Archive Interview Questionnaire	Interview Questionnaire	SSM Interview Case study

Figure 4.7 Mapping methods to Mingers & Brockelsby's framework (from Rowe, 2000)

To develop this further, it is necessary to unpack SSM into its constituent methods; rich pictures, Analyses 1, 2 and 3, CATWOE, root definitions and conceptual

modelling. In the context of this study, a 'case-study' is the collation of all the evidences and analytical products relevant to a specific context (i.e. a given vulnerable locality) and is not a case-study in the sense of that established by Yin (1981). Checkland uses the terms 'case' and 'case-study' throughout all of his SSM work to refer to different projects and examples, but he does not utilise the case-study methodologies developed over the decades of research (Yin, 2013).

The framework is then strengthened by drawing on Kolb's (2014) experiential learning cycle (Figure 4.8).

Figure 4.8 Kolb's experiential learning cycle (2014)

Table 4.4 below gives a sense of the empirical work of analysing documents, interviewing participants, investigating population statistics, analysing photographs, participants' rich pictures and the LISP proformas, and physical street walking (down the Concrete Experience column) gives way to reflective observation (the writing of the case-study material and development of personal rich pictures of the projects) and the development of the Root Definition, utilising the CATWOE (or its derivation BATWOE) acronym, through to more conceptual modelling to elicit the underlying structures and develop insights into the requirements to change those structures. The order of the rows have been changed to better reflect the movement from the material world, through the personal experience of the participants to the social world of the whole system.

Table 4.4 Mapping of systems methodologies framework (derived from Mingers and Brockelsby 1997 and Rowe 2000)

Kolb	Concrete experience	Reflective observation	Abstract Experimentation	Active Experimentation

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

Mingers & Brockelsby	Appreciation of	Analysis of	Exploration of	Action to
Material Evidence	*Physical circumstances*	*Underlying causal structure*	*Alternative physical and structural arrangements*	*Select and implement best alternatives*
Method	Statistics Documentary records Photos Street observation	Rich pictures	Conceptual modelling	Intervention Analysis
Personal Evidence	*Individual beliefs, meanings emotions*	*Differing perceptions and personal rationality*	*Alternative conceptualisations and constructions*	*Generate accommodation and consensus*
Method	Interview Questionnaire	Root definition Case writing	Conceptual modelling	Rich picturing
Social Evidence	*Social practices & power relations*	*Distortions, conflicts interests*	*Ways of altering existing structures*	*Generate empowerment and enlightenment*

Method	Documents Participant observation	Interviews Rich Pictures CATWOE	Conceptual modelling	Social Analysis 2 Political Analysis 3 Discourse Analysis

4.5.2.   RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION

In terms of identifying case-studies from which to collect evidence, a self-evaluation rubric was devised by the author and Superintendent Richard James of Northamptonshire Police based on ongoing work developing the Handbook and in consultation with officers and PCSOs delivering LISP. The criteria were based on the key stages of LISP implementation (as detailed in the LISP Handbook), and key factors highlighted by Pawson (2006) that influence the implementation and success of policy interventions. The rubric was structured with three levels of statements that Police officers could select, representing three levels of implementation; beginning, intermediate and full implementation. The survey was sent to all community policing teams in Northamptonshire in January 2015, with a two-week window for completion. The researchers received 22 responses, representing 11 distinct locations in the county.

The was followed by semi-structured interviews with 15 individual officers and PCSOs over the period 17th Feb to 17th March 2015, supplemented with a roundtable meeting of PCSOs recorded Feb 2014. (The information sheets and consent forms are replicated in Section 9.9). No interviews with the general public or citizens involved in the LISP projects were undertaken due to ethical approval not being confirmed by the University for these interviews to take place. The locations involved in the research include Blackthorn, Spencer Haven, Holy Sepulchre, and Spencer in Northampton, All Saints in Kettering, Towcester retail area, Daventry town centre. Interviews were also held with officers from Daventry and Wellingborough where no LISP activity has been attempted. These interviews were recorded electronically and transcribed. The quotations used in the projects

described in the Soft Systems Methodology Mode 1 analyses in Chapter. 5 were created by manual open coding to the researcher's research diary.

Coding of interviews involves marking up of the interview transcripts by identifying concepts (codes) that are common, and different across a series of interviews (or texts). Open coding is achieved by segmenting the interview transcript data into meaningful expressions and describing them in single word to short sequence of words. Further, relevant annotations and concepts are then attached to these expressions. This allows for themes or thematic ideas across a large body of different texts to be systematically identified. The codes can be linked to a line, a sentence, a paragraph or wholesome text (protocol, case, etc.). The application of the alternatives depends on the research question, on the relevant data, personal style of analyst and the stage of research.

The intent of the coding in SSM is not to derive theory (theory building is done in Chapter. 7) but to provide relevant evidence in the Soft Systems Methodology Mode 1 analyses, which derive observations on possible mechanisms only, at the end of each section. Interview coding is not a central concern within Soft Systems Methodology- the interviews are only one source amongst dozens of different types of evidence that are presented in Chapter. 5, so the coding done here is to process the raw interviews and provide meaningful source material for the Mode 1 and Mode 2 SSM analyses, rather than an analytical process in its own right. The choice to code the interview data does not signal a shift to an interpretivist epistemology here, but rather a fair and systematic means of parsing the interview data, rather than cherry picking quotes to fit any a priori assumptions ready for use within the SSM framework, which ultimately is built into the Context-Mechanism-Outcome analysis in Chapter. 7.

Thus, the research procedure developed in this manner:

1. Data preparation and gathering
   a. Researcher trained the research participants in the LISP Handbook processes and strategies
   b. Research participants enter the field to implement the LISP Handbook principles as and when they are able to, reporting to the researcher that they are attempting a LISP project

c. Researcher collects naturally occurring evidence on each project, asking for reports, data, and sourcing external data (such as from www.police.uk and neighbourhood statistics relevant to the neighbourhoods in question

d. Participants participate in a review, which is recorded as a focus group, informing the Mode 2 analysis (in Section 6.1.2)

e. Participants provide 'pro-forma' evidence of their work (example at Section 9.10)

f. Participants provide self-evaluation survey to inform summary in Section 5.2

g. Participants provide interviews

h. Researcher exits field of research

2. Data collation and presentation

a. Collation of naturally occurring evidence

b. Coding of interview data for SSM

c. Collation of rich pictures provided by the PSCOs from the field projects ready for SSM Mode 1 analysis

d. Creation of CATWOE statements (see Table 9.1 as an example)

e. Formulate root definition (See Appendix Section 9)

f. Build conceptual model (see Figure 9.2 as an example)

g. Repeat for main projects and derive observations of possible mechanisms and evidence to support mechanisms from Table 3.6

h. Enter Mode 2 analysis using naturally occurring evidence, and audio of workshop from 1.d above

i. Derive list of mechanisms from existing 'what works' literature and from observations arising from SSM Mode 1 and 2 analysis (reported in Table 7.2)

j. Confirm evidence and conduct nominal ranking of mechanisms (reported in Figure 7.5)

k. Conduct Context-Mechanisms-Outcomes logic statement tests linking the different neighbourhood contexts to the policing outcomes, with the identified mechanisms (reported in Section 7.1.4)

l. Draw conclusions (reported in Section 7.1.9 and findings (in Section 8.3)

All the PCSOs involved were dedicated and hardworking, even if they did not always agree with the approach or understand the nuances of the approach, given the limitations of one day of training. The types of problem situations that arose in the pilots were such that even 18 months of work on them full time would not have allowed the PCSOs to fully implement the LISP stages. Instead, PCSOs regularly reported 'on tape' and off the record that they were being abstracted from neighbourhood duties by reactive calls for service, especially because the centralised response 'control room' was not concerned with the existing workload of PCSOs but was tasked to handle and pass on calls as rapidly as possible. This meant that PCSOs were having to respond to all the calls that the centralised control room passed on to them, regardless of what else they had to do, or wanted to do. Finding and securing meetings with the right people in the community at the right time is hard, and doing so on an irregular shift pattern was even more difficult. These and many other factors beyond the control of the PCSOs and the police force prevented full implementation of all the stages of LISP. None of the pilots got to the stage of evaluating their interventions according to 'what success looks like for the stakeholders', and only a few got as far as even eliciting what that success would look like for themselves, beyond their own police-centric crime rate reduction targets.

4.5.3. RESEARCH ETHICS

The research proposal initially submitted to the University of Northampton Research Ethics Committee included a request to interview members of the public. This would have allowed the perspective of the non-police partners involved in each of the LISP projects to be included in the SSM evidence presented in Chapter. 5. It was not possible to provide assurances to the Research Ethics Committee that people involved in the study would not be involved in illegal activities or would not be under the age of 18. The research was undertaken according to the University of Northampton's Research Ethics Codes and Procedures[56].

Whilst further safeguarding arrangements would have made it possible to include these respondents in the research, the extra time required would have meant that

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[56] https://www.northampton.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/research-ethics-code-and-procedures.pdf

the police officers, who were the primary focus of the training in the first instance, would no longer be made available for the interviews.

It was important, in a study like this, to ensure that the participants in the research were able to make informed decision about their decision to participate in the research. This LISP projects were public projects and were proceeding regardless of whether this research was conducted or not. It was not possible to exclude people under the age of 18 or potential criminal activity from the study if members of the public were involved, so the decision to proceed without the public as participants limited the scope to police officers. Because they had been commanded by senior officers to conduct the LISP pilots, they hadn't freely consented to participate in the field experiment, however, when invited to provide interviews, each was given a clear written and spoken briefing that the research was disconnected from their day-to-day duties and they were free to speak as they wishes, free to withdraw from the interviews if they wished, and each was asked to suggest their own pseudonym, so that they were clear that what they were saying was being treated as anonymised and confidential. This was also captured as the audio recording was running, so that they could see that the dialogue with respect to informed consent, right to withdraw and anonymity, and their verbal assent, was being recorded, accompanying their written consent.

The interview recordings were kept on a password secured hard drive on files that were coded with a date and location of recording. The research notebook then recorded the pseudonyms written on the research information sheets and consent forms (Section 9.9) connecting the pseudonym to the recording on paper only.

Although I was embedded in the development of the LISP Handbook, and the delivery of the training of the PCSOs in 2011/12, by the time the interviews and collation of the SSM Mode 1 and Mode 2 data came about in 2015/6, sufficient time had elapsed to have withdrawn from the field. The police officers had been implementing the LISP Handbook unaided for 2 years. In the cases of the PCSOs, I had already built up a rapport, and had no reason to doubt their reportage. For the more senior officers, some of whom I was meeting for the first time, I was more doubtful about the veracity of the evidence, but the nature of the SSM Mode 1 analysis in particular is that it triangulates interview data with a wide range of naturally occurring material, not least the contemporaneous LISP proformas (an

example of which is replicated in Section 9.10). The subjective data in the interviews is primarily used, therefore, as illustration and triangulation of objective data, rather than the core of this investigation. The purpose of Chapter. 5 is intrinsically descriptive, rather than theory building, deriving only observations at the end of each section. Theory building proper starts only in Chapter. 7, as the observations derived in Chapter. 5 and Chapter. 6 are subjected to the Context-Mechanism-Outcome process, separating the researcher from the data.

4.5.4.   LIMITATIONS OF DATA

The survey was the first stage of a three-step investigation to inform the ongoing improvement of the LISP Handbook, so is limited in scope to the self-reporting of officers. The review reflects the views of PCSOs engaged in the delivery/use of LISP, rather than the views of those participating with/benefiting from LISP. It was not possible to gain ethical approval to survey or interview the public within the timeframe of the study. The self-assessment statements are subjective and, although carefully written, are still open to some breadth of interpretation. Words like 'Detailed' and 'full perspective-taking' may be detailed and full as compared to current policing practice, but might be less than detailed and full compared to the expectations of the citizens or the Handbook authors.

The number of self-evaluation responses was too low to draw statistical inferences from, but should be seen in the context of the number of LISP locations that were originally expected in the pilot phase of the LISP (5) but also the number of PCSOs trained in 2012/13 to develop LISP-based interventions, which was 130. It should not be expected or desirable that 130 individual intensive engagement interventions should be running[57], and 11 distinct locations[58] where LISP is being implemented is a good sign of the value given to the approach by individual officers and teams.

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[57] Because the number of areas that meet the LISP Selection criteria (see Handbook) are unlikely to be that numerous, and the force only identified 5 Priority action areas in 2012
[58] More than 5 'pilot' LISPs were undertaken as PCSOs and local teams decided to 'practice' their LISP skills on locally important issues

4.5.5.   CONCLUSIONS

The research question sets out the challenge to investigate the pilots that were instrumental in the development of the LISP Handbook, to collate and analyse the data created during the pilot implementation of those case studies to understand the mechanisms at play within the Handbook. The case studies were, essentially, naturally occurring. Their research being done after the factor is a structured analysis of events that occurred in the past. The author was directly involved in those events as the developer of the LISP Handbook but was not at the 'centre of events'. The PCSOs, having co-developed the bare bones of the Handbook implemented the Handbook to the best of their abilities within the resources available to them at the time. None of the pilots were perfectly implemented in that regard. This was not due to any failure, just a reflection of the reality of real world research and programme implementation.

Selecting an approach to collect evidence, sift, structure and analyse the evidence to make sense of that evidence to address the third research question, that of the mechanisms at play, required consistency and coherence in ontology and epistemology between the Handbook itself and this post-hoc analytic and reflective phase. This methodology chapter has identified soft systems methodology as a golden thread joining the antecedent literature to the methodological approach of the research. Soft systems methodology acts as both epistemology by privileging certain types of collective knowing over others and as a structured process of enquiry. Although Checkland doesn't place SSM in a critical realist epistemological space, Mingers clearly does, and Rowe's policing PhD also makes a similar case.

It therefore seems consistent and coherent that because soft systems methodology appears as a core tactic within the LISP Handbook, there is also a strong case to adopt it as a data organising, structuring and analytical frame in Chapters Five and Six, and then to widen it to the analytical strategy of Pawson's critical realist context-mechanism-outcome framework in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER. 5.   THE LISP PROJECTS

This chapter reviews the LISP projects that form the empirical evidence of this investigation. Over a period of three years, PCSOs in Northamptonshire Police, having received training and follow-up support from the LISP Handbook, were asked to find opportunities to experiment with this alternative approach to neighbourhood policing. They had the support of the Chief Constable, but sergeants and inspectors were not necessarily aware or supportive to the PCSOs in going about this work. One reason for these pilots being run without direct and specific support from middle leaders was to establish what could be done without significant structural changes to policing patterns and to identify the conditions under which supportive middle leadership emerged. Eight projects are presented in this review (of which four are subjected to a detailed Soft Systems Methodology investigation), with varying features to allow for a detailed understanding of the mechanisms that lead to perceptions of success or failure of the LISP intervention strategies.

The purpose of this chapter is not to 'prove' that LISP works, but to: a) provide a rich or thick description (Geertz, 1973) of the initiatives, b) compare with neighbourhood policing evidence and public policy intervention mechanisms and c) establish any previous unknown mechanisms, in other words, to understand the mechanisms by which the LISP interventions work, as examples of social innovation in the field of neighbourhood policing. Identifying and understanding these mechanisms, even though they appear in neighbourhood policing examples, will help with the wider purpose of understand how one might design and implement better social innovation. The literature review on social innovation identified that the current understanding of social innovation is that it is an eclectic craft called 'bricolage', whereas the contention of Pawson (2013) in public policy interventions is that these mechanisms structure and order the process of innovation.

The purpose of a Geertzian (1973) thick description is not just to describe human behaviour, in this case examples of social innovation in neighbourhood policing, but to provide an account of its context as well, such that the behaviour becomes meaningful to an outsider. In his use of Ryle's (1949) concept of thick description, Geertz establishes that two identical acts (in that case winking) have two different

intentions and impacts, depending on the wider context. In the descriptions of these projects, the context of the intentions and actions of the PCSOs is critical in establishing both the intentionality of the PCSOs in achieving what they did (or did the outcomes occur by mistake or luck) and in that the physical and cultural environments within which the case studies occur also impact on the opportunities and constraints on the PCSOs and other actors and stakeholders.

This study, however, is not strictly speaking ethnography, nor is it embedded in a social constructivist epistemology (as other work derived from Geertz might be), but a critical realist one using the structured and systemic 'Soft Systems Methodology' descriptive and analytical process. So, the writing of the case studies is neither an ethnographic or subjective interpretivist account, nor is it an objective description of a naïve reality. Thick description, in Geertz (1973), tends to be emergent; wherein theoretical concepts emerge and are woven, and rewoven, from the text of the ethnographer. Critical realism demands the parsing out of interpretation from description. Soft systems methodology allows for this separation because Checkland calls for a simple 'describe the case study problem situation' and then the SSM steps are subsequently implemented to analyse the case study, reworking the evidence from a 'thick description' to a 'rich picture'. This chapter follows this strategy. Each case is 'simply' described in order to set the context. The framing of the LISP proforma is used, not as an analytical tool, but as a structure to ensure enough evidence or description is provided of the whole case study from which rich pictures can then be developed as part of the Soft Systems Methodology.

This section utilises soft systems methodology to analyse the case study in a structured manner. All of the evidence provided in the thick description is used as material to undertake an SSM Mode 1 Analysis of the problem situation. It presents the data 'as is' with no theorising on the literature from Chapter. 3. Instead, as per the processes indicated in Dalkin et al (2018) for realist research, the connections with the theoretical bases developed in the LISP handbook and workshops (Chapter. 2) is expounded in more detail in Chapter. 3, and then summarised into a number of mechanisms derived from the literature and from the following SSM analyses and presented in Chapter. 7. The reference back to the literature is provided through the context-mechanism-outcome configuration procedure in Chapter. 7. Each of the LISP projects are presented in turn, analysed,

and the mechanisms to be considered in Chapter. 7 are justified according to the data presented by the LISP project.

5.1. MODE 1 SSM ANALYSES

Figure 5. is Checkland's (1981) seven stage overview, which has come to be known as 'Mode 1' SSM[59]. The diagram maps out the SSM investigative procedure[60], making a clear distinction between things which happen in, or which express the real world, and systems thinking, which is conceptual. The problem situation is often expressed in the form of a rich picture (2). Root definitions are then derived (3) - textual statements (somewhat like mission statements) which describe potential relevant systems to be considered. These may be a primary task (which model basic, long term functions such as the operation of a production department) or issue based (which deal with transient, or more abstract concerns, such as the re-organisation of an office, or a system to implement total quality management). Conceptual models are activity models of these potential systems (4). A root definition and a conceptual model are two expressions, one descriptive, the other diagrammatic, of the same potential system. They should always justify and explain each other. There are various (normally straightforward) ways of comparing these models with what is actually happening in the world (5). This comparison should lead to suggestions for improvements (which will be desirable according to the systems way of thinking of the world, but should also be feasible in the culture of the organisation considered) (6). Lastly, there should be action based on those suggestions (7).

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[59] By the 1990's Checkland had modified his position: "SSM is no longer perceived as a seven-stage problem-solving methodology" but "is now seen as one option in a more general approach" (Checkland & Scholes,1999 p. xiv)
[60] Variously used as a procedure or a 'way of thinking'

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
Figure 5.1 Checkland's Mode 1 SSM Analysis

5.2. THE LISP PROJECTS

Case No.	Location	Origin	Priority Area	Crime	Confidence	Stable team	Mgt involved	LISP Quality
1	Spencer/Asian Gold	Pilot	yes	down	up	yes	yes	Gold
2	Spencer Haven	Pilot	yes	down	up	yes	yes	Gold
3	Holy Sepulchre	Pilot	no	steady	steady	no	no	Silver
4	All Saints Kettering	Pilot	yes	steady	steady	no	no	Silver
5	Daventry Skatepark	Pilot	no	low	up	yes	no	Gold
6	Towcester	Self generated	no	down	up	no	yes	Bronze
7	Daventry no LISP	N/A	no	steady	steady	yes	no	None
8	Wellingborough no LISP	N/A	no	up	down	no	no	None

Figure 5.2 Summary of LISP project data

Figure 5.2 above shows a summary of the key features of the LISP initiatives arising from the programme of experimenting with LISP strategies between 2012 and 2014, and which form the raw material for this investigation. They have not been selected because of any a priori theoretical features, from which to draw conclusions, but stand as the eight projects where an experimental LISP project was implemented, or attempted during the period of the pilot. Five achieved the status of 'pilot' in the reporting of the project back to Northamptonshire Police, and hence appear in the Figure above as 'pilot' but all the projects considered involved police officers and police & community support officers that had been involved in developing the LISP Handbook and had been given the opportunity to develop a LISP pilot. The descriptions of the projects given below explain why some didn't progress.

The first column of Figure 5.2 indicates the locations in Northamptonshire covered by the LISP projects. The second column **[Origin]** reports on whether the LISP project had been generated as part of the original 2012-13 round of pilot projects

or had been self-generated by teams after, and independent from, the pilots. The third column **[Priority Area]** indicates whether the location was informed by a Priority Area report produced by Northamptonshire Police in May to August 2013. This Priority Area reporting provided detailed crime hotspot data and were provided to 5 high priority areas[61] for Northamptonshire Police. The fourth column **[Crime]** indicates whether the officers interviewed indicated that crime in their LISP project areas was low throughout, had increased, stayed steady or reduced during and after the main LISP activities. The interviewer did not ask this question directly, so as not to lead the interviewees in their observations. The fifth column **[Confidence]** reports whether the interviewees indicated whether confidence in the police had improved, reduced or stayed similar. Again, the interviewer did not lead the specific question. The sixth column **[Stable Team]** indicates whether the PCSOs (as leaders in the LISP pilot activities) had been stable throughout the LISP process, whether PCSOs were new to the locality or whether other team members had been replaced. This gives an indication of the consistency with which the LISP leaders were able to maintain the LISP activities over an extended period. The seventh column **[Mgt involved]** indicates whether the interviewees reported significant levels of sergeant or inspector oversight, guidance or support during the LISP process. This indicates the extent to which the LISP project was embedded within the policing team's priorities and activities and the ability of those involved in the LISP project to affect the senior levels of the force. The eighth column [**LISP Quality]** reports on the score achieved by the teams in submitting their LISP project information in the form of a proforma document for evaluation by the researcher. The scores (bronze, silver and gold) were evaluated against a common set of criteria to establish the 'quality' of the intensive engagement effort. These criteria included: extent of social capital accessed; ability to analyse the complexity of the issues; ability to use ambiguous or incomplete data to be creative; ability to address the root causes of a problem rather than symptoms and; evidence of reflecting and evaluating feedback.

In the LISP areas where all the features in Figure 5.2 were 'in-line' with each other [the Asian Gold project centred in Spencer ward (Case 1) and the Spencer Haven burglary project (Case 2)] the interviewees indicated greater satisfaction that the

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[61] It is understood that no high-level review of demographics, crime patterns or vulnerabilities across the whole force was used to inform the choice of 'priority areas'.

LISP projects had been successful in the terms that the LISP documentation identified. These are entirely based on the reported impressions of the interviewees who are Police Officers and Police & Community Support Officers. It was not possible, within the scope of this project, to establish whether the citizens involved agreed. Subsequent evaluations, outside the scope of this PhD, have specifically included members of the public involved in the LISP project in the scoring process mentioned in Figure 7.3 in response to this limitation.

5.3. PROJECT 1- SPENCER 'ASIAN GOLD'

This case study starts as a locality within Northampton (Northampton 017C), and two PCSOs (Wimsey and Bunter[62]) at the heart of their community, but soon extends to a specific ethnic community within the East Midlands subjected to a unique crime type due to their faith and beliefs, so shifts from a 'community of geography' to a 'community of experience'. The PCSOs were amongst the first cohort of trainees and contributed significantly to the thinking behind the Handbook and its messaging across the police force. This was a partnership between two PCSOs who had been allocated to the estate for several years and had a good working relationship with the wider community in this neighbourhood. Spencer ward (often referred to in the case study materials as Dallington St James) is a mixed suburb, urban extension of the west of Northampton, built around older villages into what is effectively a sixties council housing estate with significant, but incomplete, private ownership through right-to-buy. It is a significantly Asian community, with 10% of the population reporting as Asian and 13.7% of the population stating that they were Muslim in 2011[63], compared to a 4.2% overall Muslim population in Northampton. Forty percent of the population have no formal qualifications but just short of 40% of the working population are in full time work.

The presenting problem situation for the PCSOs was a spate of burglaries of jewellery from private residences in the neighbourhood. In the space of one month, (July 2012) there were 36 serious acquisitive crime (SAC) reports, two

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[62] pseudonyms

[63]
http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadTableView.do?a=7&b=6275190&c=NN5+7BZ&
e=13&g=6452153&i=1001x1012x1013x1003x1004&j=6309090&m=1&p=-
1&q=1&r=0&s=1453121622672&enc=1&dsFamilyId=2477 [Accessed 15 Aug 2017]

thefts from vehicles, 9 burglaries, and 2 robberies. This became 51 burglaries in September and November 2012. The PCSOs identified at the start of the LISP initiative in 2013 that the community affected were predominantly Bangladeshi, and that the burglaries were occurring during the Haj pilgrimage period. They were anticipating in 2013 that there would be a repeat pattern, further eroding the relationships within the neighbourhood.

5.3.1.   DEMOGRAPHICS

The locality lies within the Super Output Area (SOA) of Northampton 017C covering the wards of Spencer/Kings Heath as well as Dallington and St James. In this case, the area of interest is larger than the nearest SOA, spreading into Northampton 018, but also the community of Asian's itself spreads across the whole region. The Vulnerable Localities index-based risk assessment undertaken in 2012 (Figure 5.3) show that the 7 nearby wards (Trinity, Semilong, Spencer, St James, Delapre & Briar Hill, Rushmills, Castle and Abington) accounted for 25.7% of all crime combined. Figure 5.3 shows that the area covered includes the 4th, the 6th and the 12th most vulnerable areas in the Strategic Assessment of 2011[64]

Ward	Burglary	Criminal Damage	Education	Young People	Domestic	Probation	Fires	Drug Users	Health	Employment	IMD	Final Score
Castle	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4.80
Talavera	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	3.5	4.5	5	4.80
Brookside	5	5	4	5	5	4	4	5	4	4.5	5	4.78
Kings Heath	3	4	5	5	5	4	2	5	5	5	5	4.65
Semilong	4	4	5	2	4	5	4	5	5	5	5	4.65
Spencer	4	4	5	5	5	5	3	5	3.5	4	4.5	4.43
Delapre & Briar Hill	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	3	4	4	4	4.20
Eastfields	3	4	4	4	4	4	1	4	4	4.5	4.5	4.08
St Davids	1	5	3	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	4.5	4.00
Riverside	4	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3.5	4	4.5	3.93
Billing	5	5	2	4	4	4	5	3	3	3	3.5	3.65
St James	2	3	4	3	5	5	5	4	3	3	3.5	3.60
Headlands	3	3	5	4	4	3	1	2	3	3	3.5	3.30
Abington	5	4	3	3	4	5	5	3	3.5	3	2.5	3.18

Figure 5.3 Community Safety Partnership risk assessment

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[64]   Anon (2011) Northampton Community Safety Partnership Strategic Assessment 2011/12 NCSP_Strategic_Assessment_2011_12.pdf
https://www.northampton.gov.uk/downloads/download/2331/northampton_community_safety_partnership [Accessed 4 March 2016]

5.3.2.   CRIME RATES

The crime statistics are taken from the official crime database Police UK, with a polygon drawn around the district identified by the PCSOs involved in the LISP pilot as being their primary area of interest.

Figure 5.4 Area from which 'Spencer ward' crime statistics are drawn

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Table 5.1 Summary of Crime Statistics in Dallington St James[65]

	All Crime	Burglaries	ASB	Criminal Damage	Vehicle Crime	Violent crime
Mar 2011	98	6	43	20	6	14
Sept 2011	97	5	50	11	11	6
Oct 2011	116	6	59	6	8	14
Nov 2011	99	9	47	11	10	5
Mar 2012	116	12	48	10	8	15
Sept 2012	117	11	50	16	7	7
Oct 2012	117	11	63	14	8	3
Nov 2012	115	9	38	11	16	21
Mar 2013	79	10	33	8	10	9
Sept 2013	95	9	34	10	7	14
Oct 2013	99	15	29	10	3	15
Nov 2013	90	9	25	8	2	10
Mar 2014	115	4	43	19	7	17
Sept 2014	93	8	46	7	0	11
Oct 2014	86	5	35	7	3	15

The statistics from Police UK's website show a marked difference to the analysis give to, and by, the PCSOs. The narrative around the crime stats in the LISP proforma were about a spike in the number of burglaries in 2011 and a dramatic

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[65] Source: www.police.uk Accessed 4 Mar 2016. Months marked with ** are the approximate timing of Hajj in that year.

fall since. The overall pattern (Figure 5.5) however, shows a small rise in 2011, a peak through 2012, and a modest drop through 2013 to 2015. What is also notable is the relatively small impact that Hajj (the month of Hajj is marked with a double **) actually has on the burglary patterns - September 2012 shows the same rate of burglaries as the month of March[66] 2012 in which hajj occurred. Furthermore, the LISP documentation does not mention the persistently high violent (including domestic violence) crime rates (10-15 per month over five years).

Figure 5.5 Summary of 'all crime' statistics Mar 2011 to Nov 2015

5.3.3.   LOCALLY IDENTIFIED PRIORITIES (LIPS)

Prior to 2012, Northamptonshire Police, in response to the duty[67] imposed upon them under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to consult with the general public on policing priorities by collecting data on what was termed

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[66] March is selected as a clearly 'out of hajj season' comparison. The 'total crimes' column is not a total of all the other columns because other crime categories are reported by the police, but not recorded here, for clarity
[67] Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011
Section 1(8) e – police and crime commissioners (PCCs) – the chief constable is accountable for the effectiveness and efficiency of engagement with local people.
Section 14 – arrangements for obtaining the views of the community on policing (amends s 96 of the Police Act 1996) – states that the views of the people in the police area are to be sought in particular circumstances, namely before a police and crime commissioner or the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime issues a police and crime plan or precept.
Section 17 – duties when carrying out functions – an elected local policing body must have regard to the views of people in the body's area about policing in that area.
Section 34 – engagement with local people – a chief officer must make arrangements for obtaining the views of people within each neighbourhood about crime and disorder and make arrangements for providing such people with information about policing in that neighbourhood.

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Locally Identified Priorities (LIPS[68]). The basis on which the LIPS data was collected is unclear, but anecdotal evidence from PCSOs suggested that it was first collected as open questions at parish council and joint action group type meetings, and later formalised into a 23-category survey tool that was deployed using mobile devices. PCSOs were tasked to collect data in their engagement with the public, but often led to bursts of data collecting activity without regard to ensuring that the sample was representative of the population. A single database was made available to the research project containing over 26,590 data points, covering the command area of Northamptonshire Police between December 2009 and Jul 2012. This data was being used to (partially) determine police activities and direct neighbourhood policing resources. The LIPS data was communicated back to joint action groups and other interested parties as local policing priorities. This set the scene for the manner in which PCSOs were being tasked and the basis on which they were communicating or collaborating with the public. There was also no apparent geographical strategy - the PCSOs may have collected data from where they patrolled most, or where there were most crime reports, or where they were directed by a senior officer. The geographical representativeness of the data is therefore unknown.

This section reviews the influence of the relevant Locally Identified Priorities data on the LISP pilot. The provenance and caveats regarding this data has already been covered in the previous section. The dataset that covers the primary area of the Asian Gold LISP pilot includes 1603 data points between February 2010 and July 2012. The LISP pilot began in May 2013, so this data should have informed the screening and assessment process but the LISP proforma does not mention it.

The representative nature of this LIPS data is of significant concern in this LISP pilot area. Table 5.2 compares the ethnicity of the LIPS respondents to the ethnic mix of the population of Spencer (Ward 017B) in the national Census of 2011. There would be expected to be some variation, not least because the Census 2011 does not identify any eastern European residents of the neighbourhood. Nevertheless, one would not expect the Bangladeshi community, which comprises about 7% of the local population to be only represented by 2.3% (n=37) of the

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[68] The Intensive Engagement approach to Neighbourhood Policing piloted in this research flipped the acronym LIPs, as a pun, to LISP, Locally Identified Solutions and Practices, to signal a shift from what PCSOs identified as 'asking the public about their problems' to asking them about solutions.

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LIPS surveys. Black Africans are also underrepresented, comprising almost 7% of the population as well, but only 0.7% (n=11) of the LIPS respondents surveyed were black. On the other hand, the white population comprises 57% of the neighbourhood, and yet were surveyed 80% (n=1282) of the time (illustrated in Figure 5.6). This disparity has massive implications for the exclusion of ethnic minorities in influencing policing priorities, and it is even more startling when the focus of the crime prevention initiative was the Asian community. The police officers all stated that they did not know enough about the community being subjected to these burglaries, but the flaws in the LIPS data collection process further compounded that problem. In this context, it is rather surprising that 58% (n=926) of all the LIPS respondents in Spencer were female, and 69% (n=42) of the Asian population surveyed were women.

Table 5.2 Ethnicity of LIPS respondents, Spencer 2012

Ethnicity of LIPS respondents, Spencer July 2012	Police data		Census 2011	
A1 Indian	17	1.1%	27	1.5%
A2 Pakistani	4	0.2%	13	0.7%
A3 Bangladeshi	37	2.3%	121	6.9%
A9 Other Asian	3	0.2%	36	2.1%
B1 Caribbean	10	0.6%	33	1.9%
B2 African	11	0.7%	118	6.7%
B9 Other Black	8	0.5%	13	0.7%
M1 - White and Black Caribbean	21	1.3%	43	2.5%
M2 - White and Black African	12	0.7%	19	1.1%
M3 - White and Asian	24	1.5%	22	1.3%
M9 - Any other mixed background	10	0.6%	34	1.9%
NS - Not stated	11	0.7%	10	0.6%
O9 - Any other ethnic group	9	0.6%	10	0.6%
W1 - British	1282	80.0%	1004	57.3%
W2 - Irish	23	1.4%	15	0.9%
W5 - East European	89	5.6%	0	0.0%
W9 - Any other White background	31	1.9%	233	13.3%
Total	**1602**		**1751**	

Figure 5.6 The disparity between respondents to LIPS survey and census population

Table 5.3 provides the data arising from the LIPS surveys in Spencer. What is notable here is that the patterns of respondents are very close to the rest of Northampton, with only motorcycle nuisance (4% worse) and people causing a nuisance in the street (9% worse) being significantly more important to local residents than Northampton as a whole. Twelve per cent less people in Spencer thought that there were no problems. Looking at the reason why this LISP pilot was initiated, only 1.3% more people in Spencer in the years leading up to 2013 thought that burglaries would be a priority problem. Like the Holy Sepulchre pilot (Section 5.5), there are significant differences between what the public think should be policing priorities, and what the police were actually experiencing in terms of call-for-service or crime reports.

Table 5.3 Locally Identified Priorities data collected by Northants Police July 2012 Asian Gold/Spencer area

	Spencer	% of Spencer	Northampton	% of Northampton
Burglary of homes	49	3.1%	96	1.8%
Burglary of premises other than homes	6	0.4%	21	0.4%
Cold calling	0	0.0%	5	0.1%
Community tension	5	0.3%	10	0.2%
Cycling on the pavements/pedestrian areas	12	0.7%	103	1.9%

Dog fouling	23	1.4%	59	1.1%
Lack of things to do	26	1.6%	119	2.2%
Litter	90	5.6%	262	4.9%
Motorcycle nuisance	98	6.1%	124	2.3%
No Problems	429	26.8%	2079	39.0%
Noisy neighbours/ loud parties	98	6.1%	231	4.3%
Parking problems	65	4.1%	271	5.1%
People being drunk or rowdy	91	5.7%	414	7.8%
People causing a nuisance in the street	322	20.1%	606	11.4%
People dealing/using drugs	54	3.4%	176	3.3%
Poor or broken street lighting	35	2.2%	77	1.4%
Prostitution	1	0.1%	9	0.2%
Purse/bag thefts	0	0.0%	13	0.2%
Retail crime	2	0.1%	34	0.6%
Speeding vehicles	63	3.9%	273	5.1%
Vandalism, graffiti and other deliberate damage	61	3.8%	153	2.9%
Vehicle Crime	64	4.0%	149	2.8%
Violent crime	9	0.6%	50	0.9%
Total	**1603**		**5334**	

PRIORITY AREA REPORT 3

The Spencer/Asian Gold LISP pilot began in May 2013, by August the same year Priority Area 3 was published (Parker, 2013b), so that the PA3 document was not able to directly influence the development and start-up of the LISP document. Nevertheless, the report immediately recognises the ethnic diversity of the locality:

> *"PA3 is ethnically diverse, Bangladeshi (4.8%), Eastern European (10.5%), Other Muslim (4.7%) and Somali (0.6%) groups are all over represented in PA3. The biggest proportion of the population in PA3 is English (51.5%)"* (Parker, 2013b p2).

It also notes, from the commercial neighbourhood profiling data, that unemployment is high, and that the location has significant levels of multiple deprivation. It makes statements about the housing which are primarily incorrect (predominantly flatted, whereas the majority of the neighbourhood is Victorian terraced or post-war semi-detached) and focuses in on the parking in the area,

noting the apparent disparity between low car ownership in the neighbourhood but high levels of reports regarding parking (even though the LIPS data in Table 5.3 indicates that it is no more of a community priority than the rest of the town).

The executive summary sets the priority of the document, Serious Acquisitive Crime (SAC) which was also confirmed to be the operational priority of the area by all the interviewees in the LISP pilot below:

> "SAC [serious acquisitive crime has shown an increase of 67% over the last 3 years in PA3 and in May 2013 it was at its highest level for the entire period. Vehicle crime is the most common form of SAC with TFMV [theft from a motor vehicle], TOMV [theft of a motor vehicle] and TWOC [taking without consent] accounting for three quarters of the total. Seasonal SAC peaks occur throughout the year; May-August and November-December. TFMV is the largest contributor and the most common MO [modus operandi] is by forcing entry via smashing windows or using a variety of instruments. Particular streets are repeatedly targeted, with 11 streets accounting for nearly 60% of all SAC." (Parker, 2013b p5)

The breakdown of crime data (Figure 5.7) presented by the PA3 reinforces the prioritisation of SAC.

Table 5: PA3 SAC Breakdown

Crime Type	No. of Crimes	Proportion
Theft from Motor Vehicle (TFMV)	94	50.3%
Burglary Dwelling	39	20.9%
Theft of Motor Vehicle (TOMV)	26	13.9%
Robbery	21	11.2%
Attempted Burglary Dwelling	4	2.1%
Distraction Burglary in a Dwelling	1	0.5%
Aggravated TWOC	1	0.5%

Figure 5.7 Prioritisation of crime in PA3 (Parker, 2013b p.13)

There were more thefts from motor vehicles in the district but burglary from dwellings (the focus of the LISP pilot) constituted 20% of all crime in the neighbourhood. Thereafter, the document is peculiarly quiet about burglary, covering other standard data such as anti-social behaviour and drug supply and drug use hotspots in the south of the neighbourhood. Instead, burglary from a dwelling gets lumped in with theft from and of motor vehicles. The hotspot analysis

(Figure 5.8), therefore, is not helpful as the hotspot covers the majority of the neighbourhood but the streets marked in blue indicate those most affected by the burglaries.

Figure 5.8 Hotspot analysis of serious acquisitive crime (Parker, 2013b p14)

There are hints in the PA3 document of the focus of the LISP pilot on burglaries (bearing in mind that this report did emerge after the LISP pilot had commenced) but the focus on theft of and from motor vehicles, and use/supply of drugs in the PA3 document are significantly different from the expressed concerns of the people who participated in the LIPS surveys, whose priorities were motorcycle nuisance (not mentioned in the PA3) and people making a nuisance in the streets. The Police analysis at this point, does not support the concerns of the community in the neighbourhood, or the choice of LISP pilots.

Although there is a lot of data above, the observation here is that the data that the team were able to access, and use, was incorrect and partial. It didn't provide them with an in-depth understanding of the people or the places (Fitzpatrick, 2003). Although a Priority Area report became available, that was after the LISP project had been started, so hotspot analyses above were not available to inform the team at the point at which they were meeting with the public.

5.3.4.   THE LISP PILOT

Case No.	Location	Origin	Priority Area	Crime	Confidence	Stable team	Mgt involved	LISP Quality
1	Spencer/Asian Gold	Pilot	yes	down	up	yes	yes	Gold

Figure 5.9 Detail from Figure 5.2 regarding Spencer Ward LISP

The Spencer Ward LISP pilot also arose directly out of the training initiative in 2012. PCSOs "Wimsey[69]" and his colleague "Bunter" (who was unavailable for interview) were both were under the direction of Sgt "Isabella" and then later Sgt "Morse". The team also experienced a change of inspectors during the LISP pilot. Sergeants and Inspectors had not been briefed at this point, and the Handbook was not available in its published form. This was selected as a pilot before Priority Areas had been established in June/July 2013. The categorisation shown in Figure 5.9 above indicates that crime was considered by the interviews to have dropped and confidence in the police had improved. The PCSO team for the area were stable, in that they had both been PCSOs for over 10 years and PCSO Wimsey had been allocated to that area for over 6 years (and were still on the same beat in early 2016). This stability of the team was important for their performance (Ahmed et al, 2019), but also their understanding of the people involved. Although the management had received no more than a one hour briefing on what LISP was designed to do and how to manage it[70], the sergeants were particularly involved in the process and extremely supportive. The LISP documentation submitted in July 2014 was deemed to be of gold quality against a standard quality rubric.

The LISP documentation was commenced in May 2013 even though the PCSOs had identified the issues in 2012, and had been trained on the first round of LISP intensive engagement in Feb 2013, to "offer assistance to the Asian community in relations to their concerns" when leaving their properties unattended during Hajj, also to "create a greater visual improvement of the area" (LISP Proforma 2013). The purpose stated suggests a level of post-hoc rationalisation on the part of the reporting PCSOs because it contains a solution "greater visual improvement" and an implied community – the Asian community. The accounts of the PCSOs and sergeants in interview did not confirm that the burglaries were targeted at the

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[69] Pseudonyms.
[70] These briefings are captured in the chapter in the LISP handbook referring to 'managing a LISP'

Asian community, but, by virtue of their predominance in the beat of the PCSOs, they were the predominant victims.

Vulnerable Localities Index data was not available to the Police when this LISP was created, but the data presented in 5.3.1 above indicates a level of vulnerability which is confirmed by the Community Safety Partnership (see Figure 5.3). The crime statistics (reviewed in Section 5.3.2) shows that the area was vulnerable to high levels of historic crime. The final criterion is a more professional view of the complexity of the issues in the neighbourhood. The 'presenting problem' was burglaries from Asian households, which can be identified readily as a social issue with sufficiently complex causal patterns - the vulnerability of the houses, the disengagement of the Asian community from the police, the vulnerability of householders left in the houses during burglaries and the common experience communicated to the victims in describing the problem as 'Asian gold thefts'. The variety of stakeholders and their differing concerns also confirm this.

5.3.5.   IMPLEMENTATION

As well as meeting the screening criteria (which were developed in detail after this LISP pilot commenced), the rationale for PCSOs Wimsey and Bunter was clear:

> *"Tensions rose in the Asian Communities due to what they believed was a lack of response from the police. The majority of the tensions occurred within the Bangladeshi Community in the Spencer area of Northampton. In 2013 a trigger plan was recommended in order to prepare for a possible increase in Asian Burglaries for the autumn. Trigger plan including providing General reassurance and advice to the Northampton Asian community"* (LISP Proforma 2014).

The term 'reassurance and advice' references a body of work (Johnson and Bowers 2004, Bowers and Johnson 2005, Fielding and Jones 2012) collectively known as the Trafford model of 'super-cocooning' designed to identify hot spots of crime in a given district and create awareness of the problem around the victims houses by PCSOs and officers visiting unaffected houses around the victim to provide advice on target hardening, and to create a deterrence effect for the burglar. Although this targeted deterrence approach to policing has been developing for over 10 years, super-cocooning became the subject of many conversations in

meetings and training courses throughout 2012 -2014, as the techniques were folded into Operation Guardian which had been operating since 2009[71]. During this pilot, super-cocooning was deemed to represent 'normal policing' because it focuses on increased (but targeted) police presence and activity to divert or suppress the criminal behaviour, rather than tackling the complexity of the root causes, or improving the resilience of the community.

The PCSOs initially undertook reassurance visits and super cocooning, but after the training saw the opportunity to do something different, particularly as they had experience of the Asian community reacting on their own to the burglaries: "they (the Asian community) were disillusioned by the Police…doing their own patrols with vigilante groups etc" (Wimsey interview 3rd July 2014. Timestamp: 4:58) and that "some intervention was needed that was different from the past (Wimsey, 2014 Timestamp 5:15)

Firstly, they engage in proactive innovation behaviour (Gong et al, 2012) by calling a public meeting in the offices of a charity in the Spencer ward. This was attended by 15 males (a few women did arrive at the door, but because they were not married and did not have chaperones, they did not come in; this lack of women's voice was a significant omission (see Section 3.4.1) but was tackled in a different way later). The group of males comprised mid-30s restauranteurs and 50+ taxi drivers. Rather than starting by talking about the Asian burglaries, the PCSOs adopted an open approach to the initial rich picture activity. The attendees were given flip chart paper and pens and asked to talk in groups and draw pictures of the crime and social problems that they encountered. It is important to note that this exercise was done before the PCSOs had undertaken an analysis of the potential stakeholders. Instead, they drew on long term experience of working in the locality and invited everyone they had already been in contact with (usual suspects), with a single evening of contact time.

The attendees drew two pictures. Figure 5.10 shows that drawn by the taxi drivers. The shape of their picture shows the predominant experience of road traffic, street shapes and parking issues, no mention being made of the gold burglaries. There was evidence of problem solving activities, however, as the participants talked

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[71] Finn, W (2012) Northampton Community Safety Partnership Strategic Assessment 2011/12 Northampton Community Safety Partnership https://www.northampton.gov.uk/download/downloads/id/5086/northampton-community-safety-partnership-strategic-assessment-2011-12.pdf [Accessed 6 April 2016]

about the alleyway at the top of the picture. They had raised funds to get gates fixed at either end of the alley way to reduce anti-social behaviour, but planning permission had been refused, but they did not know what to do next.

Figure 5.10 Rich picture drawn by taxi drivers

The second picture drawn by a group of younger men (Figure 5.11) shows a more complex appreciation of the community within which they have grown up. The main street bisecting the ward (Dallington Rd) is seen in the centre of the image and the two main parks at either end of the community are depicted, labelled 'drugs and booze' and 'gang fights'. The gang fights denoted the continued activity of what they called 'the aldi gang', even though intensive police activity a few years before was supposed to have solved that problem (this might account for some of the sustained levels of violent crime reported in Table 12). In the centre is a conflict over the use of pavement space between a school and a car repair workshop.

Figure 5.11 Rich picture drawn by restauranteurs

What is most notable from these first rich pictures is that 'the community' are not at all focussed on gold or burglaries, demonstrating a significant gap between what the police understood to be a priority, and what (even usual suspect consultees) the community are experiencing as a priority. This is even more marked by the third rich picture in this event drawn by Emren, aged 9, who came to the meeting with his father.

Figure 5.12 Rich picture by Emren Aged 9

Emren was asked merely to draw his walk to school, as a way of giving him something to do whilst the adults discussed their rich pictures, but his rich picture was the most significant of the three, for the community members and for the PCSOs. He draws himself in the middle left of his picture, about to climb a tree. Above his house are the activities he enjoys, but along the bottom is his walk to school. Reading left to right and upwards, it is clear that his experience (unprompted) of walking to school is grumpy and angry people, knives, bars and gates, empty bottle, zippo lighters, hypodermic needles and dog & cat faeces. His description of this experience galvanised the community members to do something about the problem, and demonstrated to the PCSOs that anyone could be a viable consultee using rich pictures. This event in January 2013 (observed by the author) formed the basis of the approach the PCSOs would take in the rest of the case study.

The PCSOs recognised a) that women were not part of the consultation and also b) that the people at this consultation were not the most influential to help get 'a

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foot in that community' (Wimsey, 2014 Timestamp 6:07). The PSCOs demonstrated the value of the stability of the team in that they already had highly influential connections within the Asian community (again, proactive contact, but also attuned to community dynamics (Mandel and Steelman, 2003)), even though the wider police had poor relations. They identify in the LISP proforma five key people, one of whom was the finance director of the largest community association in the county representing the Asian community, and were in touch with a youth group, a mosque and a radio station. The connections represent "bonding social capital" (Aldrich, 2012) but also Roger's innovation diffusion theory (Charalabidis, 2014) and is important for the PCSOs to pass messages on as well as extract knowledge about the lived experience of the community. The PCSOs also demonstrate bridging capital in the extent to which they also refer to connections to other statutory organisations and senior leaders. They refer in the LISP proforma to winning support (Robinson et al, 2014) from borough council warden, county council housing officer, the council contractors and the local councillor for the area as additional stakeholders whom they bring to bear on what is, at this stage, a burglary issue.

An earlier version of the LISP Proforma (dated May 2013 v1) is much more rudimentary when it comes to community links: "RESIDENTIAL, THREE LOCAL SHOPS, COMMUNITY CENTRE X 2, TWO LOCAL SCHOOLS, A CHURCH.TRANSPORT LINKS". They also expressed doubt at the process "EXTREMELY SLOW START, LOCAL PCSO'S HAD TO PUSH AND LEAD ON THE RICH PICTURE SESSION, WE FEEL OF THE ASIAN COMMUNITY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE PROCESSS, POSSIBLE DUE TO A COMMUNICATION BARRIER." The response of the author at the time on the LISP proforma document (May 2013 v2) was "Actually, you have had a pretty good start to access a very closed community - two well attended meetings and made connection to grass roots leaders. Need to bring them together for more detailed meetings."

A second public event occurred in the community centre of a different part of Northampton, but, in following the links of their key contacts, the headquarters of the largest community association representing the community affected, the PCSOs invited themselves into an English class for elderly ladies from the community. Five months after the first rich picture session (illustrating the amount of time it takes PCSOs to achieve these events amongst the other activities that

they are required to deliver on), Figure 5.13 shows the meeting with the ladies. Only one of them had ever spoken to a PCSO, and most of them were wary of speaking to men, most did not speak English fluently. The PCSOs asked the group not to speak to the PCSOs directly but at their tables to talk about their experiences of the burglaries, what they had heard or experienced first-hand.

Figure 5.13 Rich picturing session in community centre May 2013

Out of these pictures, the PCSOs were able to grasp the physical environment of the houses being burgled in relation to the streets and provided one to one advice on 'target hardening' - making their homes safer. This was then turned into a feedback session a month later to those people and the male stakeholders previously identified (Wimsey, 2014 timestamp 11:47) and a six point plan (Figure 5.14) which covered the usual points of door, gates, security, windows and alarms, but, uniquely, also hedgerows.

Figure 5.14 PSCOs' six-point plan June 2013

The observations recorded in the LISP Proforma indicate the level at which the PCSOs were listening to the community experience: "Victims of previous Asian Gold Breaks have highlighted that neighbouring houses may have provided cover for offenders. One victim has been broken into three times; their neighbour has unkempt bushes that could have provided cover for any potential offender. In removing these barriers this can assist in gaining a 'Community Feel' with members of the public reporting suspicious activity" (LISP Proforma 2014, p12-13). This insight gave rise to the key innovative community response 'I see you!' (Figure 5.15).

Figure 5.15 The 'I see you' community initiative July 2013

This initiative was both an activity for the community to get involved with and also an outcome measure that community members could understand and communicate. Hedgerows in the neighbourhood had been allowed to seriously over grow, giving burglars ample opportunity to hide out of sight whilst checking a house for the other potential vulnerabilities. The community association committed to circulating the message that if neighbours could not see each other, their houses were vulnerable to crime. This was also escalated to the contractors for the local authority housing to change their specifications to match the new community-based outcome measure. This ensured that local authority owned housing did not stand out as being especially vulnerable from the privately- owned housing. This was supported by 8 other measures, including the sergeant brokering funding directly from the Police and Crime Commissioner for culturally appropriate leaflets for distribution.

The pictures below show the reality of what is required and how aesthetically pleasing it is when properties are kept to a good standard.

Figure 5.16 Extract from LISP proforma showing overgrown hedgerows

5.3.6.   RESULTS OF THE LISP PILOT

Notwithstanding the conflicting crime data in the analysis above (Section 5.3.2), the Police claim a significant improvement from this activity. It is not entirely clear what criteria were used to mark a burglary or theft or other serious acquisitive crime (presumably from a vehicle rather than of a vehicle) but the LISP proforma (Figure 5.17) reports a significant drop across all types. Burglaries peaked at 4 in the neighbourhood in 2012, and 55 in the same year across the whole of Northampton, and dropped to 1 in the neighbourhood and 22 across the whole town. Serious acquisitive crime showed the highest number of 266 incidents in 2012; up from 131 in 2009 and dropping to a new low of 44 in 2014. It is not clear whether these figures are averages per month or total figures. The official crime data (Figure 5.5 above) suggests that they are close to the average number of incidents per month.

On the other hand, low numbers of incidents are reported in the Crime Impact Survey (May 2014) by selecting a much smaller area in which the PCSOs were operating in order to claim "In 2011 there were 2 [cases of burglaries where Asian Gold was taken], in 2012 there were 4, in 2013 and in 2014 there was 1 per year. Between 2012 and 2014 there has been a 75% decrease in Asian Gold Burglaries within the Spencer LISP Area". The Police analyst was, however, able to conclude that "This is a much bigger improvement when compared to the rest of Northampton which has seen a 60% decrease in Asian Gold Burglaries."

Northamptonshire Police (2014)[72]. One might wish to conclude from this that the LISP Intensive Community Engagement techniques are 15% more effective than standard policing, but random effects, small data samples and other confounding factors would prevent such bold claims.

Figure 5.17 Extract from LISP Proforma on outcomes of pilot

 The Mode 1 Soft Systems Analysis for this case is provided in the Appendix in Section 9.1, which provides the researchers detailed analytical process which led to the following observations on the mechanisms, including identifying possible new mechanisms.

5.3.7.   OBSERVATIONS ON MECHANISMS

The premises being investigated in this section are twofold a) do the features of the 'Asian Gold' LISP implement the key mechanisms at work in both successful neighbourhood policing (Table 5.4) and Pawson's public policy interventions? (Table 5.5), and b) are there other mechanisms at play that could be added to the model (Table 5.6). This approach allows both the efficacy of the LISP Handbook

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[72] Northamptonshire Police (2014) Crime Impact Statement Asian Gold LISP 22nd May 2014. Unpublished report.

itself to be tested against how it was used in the field, and to use the field experiments to inform the development of the following checklists of mechanisms.

Table 5.4 Case 1: Neighbourhood Policing evidence

	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of 'Asian Gold' LISP case
	What works		
1.	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	In-depth investigation of the police crime problem in the context of the other problems experienced in the locality	The LISP proforma suggests that the PCSOs did not have an in-depth understanding of the burglaries- there are significant discrepancies between their reports and the published crime patterns, but their long-term engagement with the community meant that they fully understood the context of other problems.
2.	Full and consistent application of interventions	The training (and subsequent evaluation of the quality of LISP work), and standard proforma	This LISP was seen through to the implementation of the chosen interventions and to the evaluation of the impact on policing outcomes by the force analyst.
3.	Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time	Success, i.e. depth of understanding of the problem and success of the interventions is determined by the working group rather than police timeframes	The 'dose' in this LISP was more significant than any other case study. Significant community assets were recruited, and the issue escalated by the sergeants to secure additional resources.
4.	Proactive contact	Deliberate choices are made at the screening stage about the importance of the locality to policing outcomes.	The PCSOs did experience the limitations of contacting 'usual suspects' in the first meeting, but the 'unusual suspect' Imren opened up the possibilities of the LISP approach for them, and accessing the NBA community association provided

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of 'Asian Gold' LISP case
		Process requires identification of all potential stakeholder groups, including hard to reach.	access to women who would not otherwise be consultees, but lent legitimacy to subsequent actions
5.	A group of residents	Where community organisations appropriate to the problems don't exist, the LISP process creates the social capital and networks to allow this to happen	The PCSOs were accessing some community contacts from prior experience in the area, but had not considered recruiting the NBA community association (whose HQ is technically outside their territory). The PCSOs accessed and recruited that pre-existing bonding social capital and bridged that capital into the LISP project.
6.	Joint problem solving	Co-production of the problem analysis and solving stages is central	The PCSOs certainly considered that they had co-produced the solution, but the mix of interventions (although a unique mix) were still police-led or police-instigated initiatives. The list of interventions in the LISP were well distributed to community activists and statutory agencies.
	What is promising		
7.	Highly connected individuals	The LISP working group is made up of highly connected and highly capable people,	The PCSOs and the Sergeants in this case were highly connected and capable individuals- connecting outwards into the community, and upwards to inspectors and through them to the Police & Crime Commissioner.
8.	Support is won	Working group members elicit a clearly understood	The PCSOs won the support of a community association whose self-

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	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of 'Asian Gold' LISP case
		self-interest that underpins expected successes to secure and 'win' support	interest was also aligned to be seen to be useful to its members. The self-interest of other partners (like the local authority) was less clear- this may affect long-term sustainability of local authority actions.
9.	Attuned to community dynamics	The rich picturing processes develop a nuanced and empathetic understanding of the community and the issues and tensions within it.	The rich picturing process was used extensively by the PCSOs to investigate the problem although they focussed on the mechanics of the problem, rather than any wider context with respect to issues or tensions
10	Tacit skills	Training, with the aid of the publicly available Handbook, briefings to senior officers and a process of identifying the best implementations of LISP and mentoring of officers ensure that police skills are embedded and propagated across the force	The PCSOs didn't benefit from a fully developed training course, as this was being developed by them. They did participate in several workshops where issues in implementation were debated and from one-to-one sessions. The sergeants had received a short briefing, but implicitly supported the PCSOs efforts. The inspectors scored their LISP implementation more highly than the PCSOs (26 & 30 out of 33, compared to the PCSOs 26 out of 33)
11	Not reliant on multi-agency delivery	Where statutory partners are actively engaged, LISP provides a clear and discrete method for limited involvement. Where statutory agencies are not engaged, LISP provides a clear evidence base for Police and community to	The statutory partners were recruited to provide supplementary support to the LISP interventions, to cut council residents' hedgerows to the correct height. The involvement was clear and discrete but was an open ended rather than limited involvement. Sustaining this involvement after the primary symptoms

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of 'Asian Gold' LISP case
		hold statutory agencies to account.	of the problem has waned will be difficult.

Table 5.5 Case 2: Pawson's Public Policy 'hidden' mechanisms

	Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of 'Asian Gold' LISP case
1.	Recruit the stakeholders with care	Looking for the most highly connected, capable, and motivated: whose self-interest and motivation to contribute to public safety is understood	See point 5 in previous table
2.	Create expectations of change	Intensive Engagement is oriented towards collaboratively deciding on what change is needed, to design Solutions & Practices	There were high levels of 'change talk'' in the partnership with PCSOs extending their networks and community association engaging positively for the first time
3.	Demand effort from stakeholders	The LISP approach is designed to flip the Police response from 'what can we do?' to 'What solutions have you got?' for the Police.	The residents and victims were acting to safeguard their own property, but allowed the police to direct and legitimate their involvement

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	Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of 'Asian Gold' LISP case
4.	Offer encouragement and feedback	The process is designed to recognise existing assets and capabilities that the community, with the help of the Police, that can be enhanced to support Police outcomes	The clear 'six elements of responsibility' was communicated verbally and in letters & posters. Delivering the 'six points' secured smart water and other 'benefits' for 14 households in the LISP period, but was rather one sided- the police commitment with very modest compared to community expectations. Responding to feedback on the gold burglary awareness poster showed the citizens that their feedback was taken seriously.
5.	Build trust and resilience	Long-term, locally based relationships are key to developing mature LISP informed interventions	The two PCSOs at the centre of the LISP had been assigned to the district for a number of years, and remain in the same location several years later (2015). There were two sergeants in the year of the LISP interventions, although they both responded positively to the autonomy of the PCSOs' plan.
6.	Make accommodations for set-backs	The embedding of the Motivational Interviewing 'stages of change model'	The LISP report explicitly includes an escalation action to clean-up (presumably to cut hedges) some local authority

	Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of 'Asian Gold' LISP case
		accounts for set-backs within the process of engagement	houses in the area without a clear justification as to how this will be achieved. The LISP documents do not consider the factors that would cause failure and there is no plan to tackle such factors.
7.	Explain the theory of change	The theory of change for LISP is described as "collaboratively designed solutions and co-produced practices are more robust than short-term projects and limited engagement"	The theory of change was to establish a link between the residents acting together to secure their houses and the receipt of police 'rewards'. Smartwater and CCTV have often been given away by the Police for free, whereas this LISP established a 'value' for such items, and a value for the attention of the Police.
8.	Share execution and control of the intervention	The whole LISP model is built on recruiting capable and connected decision-makers and resources to the support of Police outcomes, and an attempt to 'loosen the reins' of Police controlled design and implementation	The PCSO strategy in the first instance was to share execution, but it takes a long time to wean community groups off the power wielded by state institutions like the Police. The initiative took a significant dip in success after the PCSOs were removed, indicating a level of dependency.

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	Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of 'Asian Gold' LISP case
9.	Ensure onward external continuation	The purpose of the community designing and delivering the interventions that are unique to a locality is to ensure that the Police have a 'step-back and sustain' (rather than an exit) strategy freeing resource up to tackle other localities and problems, leaving a self-sustaining legacy	The use of smart-water, posters and street-watch rewards suggests that the intrinsic motivation of the citizens was not activated- but rather their extrinsic motivation. Step-back and sustain was clearly a part of the LISP strategy and worked in the medium-term.

Table 5.6 Additional insights from case study

	Additional insights from case study	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement
1.	Stable team	**Inspectors** ought to be clear about the resource implications of choosing to undertake a LISP, in terms of long-term commitment (against a backdrop of 'weeks of action' and three month-long 'operations'). Outcomes based resource planning is required within LISPs rather than activity based. Sergeants need to decide with Inspectors on the justification to LISP. The decision was made by the PCSOs to undertake the LISP, but in this, the decision was aligned to the sergeants' interests in managing the high-profile performance issues. This was sustained through a change of sergeant, but only after significant progress had been made on the LISP process. The long-term stability of the PCSOs allowed significant connections

	Additional insights from case study	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement
		to a marginalised and hard-to-reach community to be made within the attention span of the senior officers.
2.	Responsibilisation	This LISP hinged around a form of *responsibilisation*, a quid pro quo where the attention of the police shifted from being visible through patrols to being the distributor of socially valuable goods- the smartwater etc. Rather than this being devalued though being given away, the LISP established a 'transaction value' – being required to complete the 6 points of action before receiving enhanced 'attention' through the distribution of freebies and receiving funding from the PCC.

5.4. PROJECT 2: SPENCER HAVEN

Case No.	Location	Origin	Priority Area	Crime	Confidence	Stable team	Mgt involved	LISP Quality
2	Spencer Haven	Self generated	yes	down	up	yes	yes	Gold

This case study was not a planned pilot but emerged in May 2014 at a progress seminar demonstrating high levels of engagement with the concept of LISP. The instigator, PCSO "Vera[73]" had attended the first LISP training and design workshops but had not indicated any enthusiasm for this type of community engagement. Her sergeants "Morse" and "Isabella" and Inspector "Regan" were also interviewed. The LISP was undertaken within a policing Priority Area, although the background document for this was not available to the researcher. The police interviewed deemed this a successful LISP in that their perception was that crime reduced and confidence in policing was improved. There was a single primary PCSO operating throughout the duration of the LISP project, and a stable and involved management team. The LISP Proforma (Anon, 2014[74]) had been deemed a gold standard against the evaluation rubrics established by the research team.

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[73] pseudonym
[74] Anon (2014) Spencer Haven final LISP.pdf

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

The presentation at the progress seminar set the context:

> *"Spencer Haven is essentially, a geographical cluster of Sheltered Housing, where vulnerable people live. This includes the elderly, hard of hearing or deaf, people with learning difficulties or mental health problems. Some of these residents are house bound or suffer with dementia/ Alzheimer's. Some of these have fallen victim to those Burglaries" LISP Progress Seminar powerpoint, 27/05/2016*

The initial presentation gave the rationale for the intervention - that the residents of the neighbourhood were vulnerable and that it had been subject to repeated burglaries and 'inconsiderate behaviour'. A regular, 'supercocooning[75]' advice letter (Figure 5.18) had been distributed, but the closely printed two-page letter did not have the expected effect.

Figure 5.18 Standard advice letter for supercocooning activities

5.4.1.   SCREENING CRITERIA

Spencer Haven is a collection of Sheltered Housing in the Spencer ward (017B) of Northampton. The neighbourhood statistics for 017B ward, however, give no clue

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[75] "super cocooning" (Fielding and Jones, 2012) - that is, target hardening in the previous target and neighbouring houses, along with awareness raising along the street in question.

as to the specifics of this case because they operate at too large a scale. The wider neighbourhood does score[76] poorly on education, crime health and living environment deprivation. Full time work is predominant but significantly above average proportion in 'elementary occupations'[77] with 27% of the population with no formal education.

The Haven in question comprises a square of 24 detached buildings with approximately 64 residents, distributed around a small central roundabout, with a community centre and a mix of single person dwellings and small flatted accommodation. The boundaries of the haven are porous in that there are no gates on the road, and there are extensive gaps in the perimeter hedgerows. It is surrounded by post-war housing, much of the same style as that of concern in the Asian Gold case. The properties are owned and operated by an arms-length management organisation that manages over 12,000 other homes on behalf of Northampton Borough Council. In the Community Safety Partnership vulnerability report of the time[78], Spencer ward is mentioned several times as being vulnerable to domestic abuse, hate crimes, and serious acquisitive crime (which includes burglary of homes; of concern in the LISP proforma).

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[76]

http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/NeighbourhoodProfile.do?a=7&b=6275190&c=NN5
+7EE&g=6452156&i=1001x1012x1013&j=6309089&m=1&p=2&q=1&r=0&s=1465219891625&enc=1&tab=9
[Accessed 6 June 2016]
[77] Percentage of population in elementary occupations: ward 24.7%, Northampton 14.9%, national 11.1%
http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/NeighbourhoodSummary.do?a=7&b=6275190&c=N
N5+7EE&g=6452156&i=1001x1012x1013&j=6309089&m=1&p=9&q=1&r=0&s=1465219903812&enc=1&tab
=1&inWales=false [Accessed 6 June 2016]
[78]   Anon   (2011)   Northampton   Community   Safety   Partnership   Strategic   Assessment   2011/12
NCSP_Strategic_Assessment_2011_12.pdf

5.4.2.   CRIME RATES

The PCSO LISP progress seminar presentation gave details of the crime rates (**Figure 5.19**) at the time. These are repeated in the LISP proforma.

HO Group	HO Classification	CountCrime
BURGLARY DWELLING	ATTEMPTED BURGLARY IN A DWELLING	4
BURGLARY DWELLING	BURGLARY IN A DWELLING	5
BURGLARY OTHER	BURGLARY IN A BUILDING (NOT DWELLING)	1
CRIMINAL DAMAGE	CRIM DAMAGE TO DWELLINGS	1
CRIMINAL DAMAGE	CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO VEHS	6
OTHER OFFENCES	ROWDY/INCONSIDERATE BEHAVIOUR	20
	TOTAL	**37**

Figure 5.19 PCSO view of crime in Spencer Haven last six months of 2013 (source unknown)

Looking more closely at the official reported data (Figure 5.21), the pattern becomes more complex. According to the official crime statistics, there were only 11 crimes reported with locations in Spencer Haven itself in the last six months of 2013. Looking more widely, there are a greater number of crimes being reported on Monmouth Road, one of the boundary roads. Over a three-year period spanning 2012 there are twice as many reports for Monmouth Road as there are for Spencer Haven. This raises the question of why Spencer Haven was selected for LISP intervention rather than Monmouth Road. Figure 5.20 helps to explain one factor - the porosity of the boundary between Spencer Haven and Monmouth Rd - on the bottom edge of the image, and on the right-hand side, are open walkways linking the Haven to the adjacent road. This is repeated all-round the Haven. It is likely that the crime reported is geotagged to Monmouth Road, regardless of where in the immediate vicinity the crime actually occurred, because of the accessibility of Monmouth Road to police vehicles.

Figure 5.20 Google map image of the boundary of Spencer Haven and Monmouth Rd

Figure 5.21 Reported Crimes in the vicinity of Spencer Haven 2012 to 2014 (from www.police.uk 8 June 2016[79])

A three-month rolling trend line (in bold) on Figure 5.21 shows the trend of crimes in the neighbourhood. By the time the LISP is recorded to have started, the crime rate seems to be already falling, masked by significant spikes in August 2012 and January 2013 for Monmouth Road. Nevertheless, there is a discernible pattern of elevated crime reports in Spencer Haven in January, May and July 2012, peaking in March 2013 before falling significantly until September 2013. The number of

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[79] The data presented here ends in 2014, when the LISP proforma was submitted for evaluation, one year shorter than the data presented in the other projects. When it came to updating the data from the www.police.uk website in 2021, the functionality of that website has been significantly reduced, providing only 3 years of the most recent data, and no longer allowing postcode specific data.

reports of crime climbs steadily thereafter, a point that will be returned to in evaluating the outcomes of the LISP.

5.4.3. LOCALLY IDENTIFIED PRIORITIES LIPS

The Locally Identified Priorities data for this LISP pilot area is exactly the same as that for the Asian Gold pilot (5.3), and the background to the data, and the conclusions are exactly the same as provided in 5.3.3 above. The problems with respect to the ethnicity of the respondents in the Asian Gold pilot extend to this Spencer Haven pilot in that, because of their difficulty with communications and possibly largely housebound circumstances, it is extremely unlikely that the LIPS surveys included the residents of the Haven. This is not to say that PCSOs might have collected data from them at a reassurance visit or a residents' association meeting, but at this even more micro-level of analysis (a few streets rather than the larger proportion of the Spencer neighbourhood, which was the scope of the Asian Gold pilot), the LIPS data provides the PCSOs with even less decision-making support.

5.4.4. PRIORITY AREA REPORTS

Like Section 5.4.4, the Priority Area 3 document (Parker, 2013b) also applies to this LISP pilot.

The main 'problem-solving' map (Figure 5.22) highlights problem areas all around the immediate vicinity of Spencer Haven (marked 'Haven' in the top right quarter) but does not identify either Spencer Haven or surrounding streets as a problem, although a subsequent hotspot map for serious acquisitive crime (already presented in Figure 5.8 above) does mark Tintern Avenue and Countess Road as locations that have experienced 10 or more crimes along their length (Parker, 2013b,p14). No further analysis of the vulnerabilities, or assets, in the neighbourhood or in the vicinity of these hotspots is presented in PA3.

Figure 5.22 Selection of PA3 'problem-solving map' (Park, 2013b p8)

5.4.5.   IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LISP INITIATIVE

The PCSO involved in this LISP, 'Vera', had been working on this issue for a period of time before the LISP was initiated - there had been a spate of burglaries and an area deemed as vulnerable, and the police officers had implemented the 'Trafford model super-cocooning' tactic which involves meeting with the victim but also informing the 45 nearest houses that the burglaries had occurred and providing target hardening advice. The Vera identified that the recipients of the super-cocooning visits were not responding as expected:

> *"the information we were providing, in black and white [i.e. the letter in Figure 5.18] they were not acknowledging….and also the way the paper was folded in, it gets mixed up in your average…leaflet drop, so it wasn't easily identified that it was something that needed to be looked at" (Vera[80] Timestamp 5:07)*

With further investigation she established that there were a number of barriers to the use of the super-cocooning advice on the part of the residents of the Haven: communication with the Police; difficulties in reporting to the Police via telephone; the approach of the police officers when they responded to the calls; residents unable to understand what the police were saying verbally, or in the letters;

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[80] Personally Conducted Interview: Vera Voice 010_BressinghamGardens_10032015 10th March 2015

residents feeling "very isolated, feeling very terrorised, fearful" and that "police jargon goes over their heads" (Vera Timestamp 6:12).

> *"[in the] Trafford model we are obligated to visit 45 houses that surround the target. The target generally gets what we call 'care and repair' where they will check the doors, windows, the gates, sheds and things like that, and they will offer advice…whereas in this area we couldn't provide that partially because the house is not theirs, it comes under the Council, secondly they don't have the money, so even if someone suggested 'oh put an alarm there' there is no way they can do that"* (Vera. 16:50)

Although for the PCSO, the implementation of the Trafford model was a confounding factor, the senior officers were more positive: "myself having the PA3, it's all interlinking, and the Trafford model came in, it was perfect for me, for all the patrols were in my area…everything worked together, it was a perfect network of how it was to be done" (Isabella Timestamp 32:50) so that LISP based intensive engagement built on and enhanced the impact of the Trafford model style super-cocooning.

The Haven LISP was not mentioned by Vera's sergeants (Morse and Isabella) who were more focussed on the Asian Gold project, which suggests that the LISP was either retrofitted by Vera based on her own work, or that Vera was working on her own initiative with little line management oversight. Her inspector 'Regan' did however report doubts about whether the project met the LISP criteria ("to be honest fit what a LISP should be?, is it so complex that it wasn't able to be resolved by conventional means?" Regan Timestamp 20:37) but also suggested that the focus on the Haven would not have been identified by the preceding screening method of Locally Identified Priorities "asking the public what is important to them; speeding, littering and dog fouling…it always comes to the same issue in the same location. Burglaries in sheltered accommodation would not have been a LIPS priority" (Regan. Timestamp 27:12). There was a significant disjuncture between community expectations and police priorities. Regan was "talking as officers about serious acquisitive crime, theft from vehicles, so your priorities, reported crime, was significantly different from what the community were expecting you to resource? Yes" (Regan responding to interviewer's question, Timestamp 28:17).

Nevertheless, progress on the initiative (whether it was strictly a LISP or not[81]) was advantaged by strategic alignment. Serious acquisitive crime was a sectoral priority for the inspector, a 'Priority Area 3' document[82] had been circulated providing details on crime patterns, and the burglaries in the Haven fit those criteria, but the inspector also had an eye on factors wider than the reported crime rates: "PA3 didn't come with any additional resources…prioritise the existing resources…PA is about the bulk of reported crime, not harm, legitimacy…or how people are feeling" (Regan: Timestamp 30:27).

Vera did not use the rich picturing technique, in common with many of the pilots, "it was difficult to explain to a deaf person the purpose of a picture, and [contradiction here] it would cost too much to get an interpreter to do that….so we jotted down what everyone identified as issues" (Vera: Timestamp 6:45). The systems thinking deployed by Vera, however, appears in her use of a different systems strategy: the systems 'spray diagram' (Buzan 1974).

In the progress seminar in May 2014, Vera presented the two following diagrams (Figure 5.23 and Figure 5.24) highlighting the significantly different worldviews of the police compared to the residents. This exercise in perspective taking was unique amongst the pilots and led to the use of a long list of interventions. What was innovative here was not the individual interventions, but the complex mix tailored to the specific situation, in sharp contrast to the centralised, standardised letter (Figure 5.18) which assumes the reader is: a standard English reader, that they are the home owner and that they have means and resources to implement the care and repair recommendations.

Despite the implicit support and strategic alignment of this pilot to policing priorities, Vera seems to have been somewhat isolated: "when I initially explained what I was doing, they (senior leaders) couldn't understand what the purpose of it was…..it's getting them to see that, whereas at times they only see black and white, there no theft and that the end of the issue…. People will have more trust" (Vera, Timestamp 37:59). This was echoed in the sergeant's expectation, even some time after implementation, that there would be a definitive stopping point:

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[81] The screening criteria for LISPs were not developed at this stage, and the PCSOs had been brief after their training to have a go at something they thought warranted the intensive approach.
[82] Parker, L (2013b) PROBLEM PROFILE Priority Area 3 (PA3). Northamptonshire Police 22/08/2013 Unpublished Report

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"and I'm just mindful with that scheme there has to be a point in time where we disengage" (Morse Timestamp 11:09). In this, she was developing a complex but clear 'theory of change' (Mayne 2017).

Figure 5.23 Issues mentioned by residents of Spencer Haven

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Figure 5.24 How the Police saw the Spencer Haven problem

After an initial walkabout so the officers could "get a feel as to how the residents felt" (Timestamp 22:32) the empathetic perspective-taking of the PCSO Vera enabled the following mix of interventions to be deployed (Vera 9:33 onwards and 26:41 onwards). These have been listed in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7 Spencer Haven mix of interventions

	Intervention	Standard or innovative	Comment
1.	Week of action	Standard	Very common police response, criticised by Inspector Regan above
2.	Two 'weeks of action' in the space of a year	Innovative	Keeping the problem on the agenda
3.	Trees paths and bushes were cleared	Standard	Environmental visual audit, environmental warden duty
4.	Emphasise problems again	Innovative	Alinsky style community organising
5.	Deliberately went out at night	Innovative	PSCOs are often on a day shift and not available on the location after 7pm
6.	After 6-7 in the winter "this is what they (the residents) see	Innovative	Building empathy and trust through perspective taking
7.	Pushed and pushed to get lights switched back on	Innovative	Innovative in that it was escalated via Inspector Regan
8.	Accessed active community associations.	Innovative	Regan confirmed that the multiagency Joint Action Group was too high level (town level) and not focused on this issue
9.	Escalated the maintenance of the Haven to Council	Innovative	Achieved what councillor and environmental warden were unable to achieve
10.	Recruited a wider stakeholder group	Innovative	The houses around the Haven were super-cocooned but the PCSO recruited their frustration that nothing was being done
11.	Ensured residents knew about prioritisation of the district by the Police	Innovative	Beyond reassurance and information provision- higher up Arnstein's ladder of participation
12.	Concentrated on the boundary	Innovative	Super-cocooning is focused on the centre of the crime problem, but attention to the boundary of the system of interest
13.	Recruiting the participation of the residents	Innovative	Co-production (Gallouj, 2018) of the understanding of the problem, as well as implementing the solutions (in this case, probably not the co-design of the solutions)
14.	Communicated to the council the cost of reactive repairs of property	Innovative	Understanding self-interest of the stakeholders, and recruiting that self-interest as a solution

	compared to pro-active maintenance		
15.	Officers visiting location carry information cards to help with communications	Innovative	Changing the communication methods to suit the community
16.	Increased the visit time slots	Innovative	Allowing more time to communicate in a non-standard community
17.	Asking the residents what could be done to secure their house	Innovative	Perspective taking to understand why the standard security measures were not being employed
18.	Street lighting switched on	Standard	Not innovative, but escalation was innovatively used to secure the change
19.	Bushes and hedges cut back	Innovative	Innovative for the police to ensure this, but also innovative for environmental wardens to have public safety as their role.
20.	Environmental wardens include the Haven in their fixed route	Innovative	Police affecting the operational priorities of other agencies
21.	No cold calling zone	Standard	
22.	No cold calling zone extended beyond the border of the problem area	Innovative	Recruiting a 'safeguarding zone' around the vulnerable locality
23.	Secured funding	Innovative	Police officers and PCSOs are not rewarded according to the amount of additional resources attracted to tackle a police problem
24.	'Message in a bottle' in everyone's fridge to communicate the contact details and special needs of the resident	Innovative	A solution that is relevant to other emergency services
25.	Convened small groups to discuss use of personal alarms	Innovative	Developing social cohesion through sharing the solutions, rather than sharing the problem (as super-cocooning does)
26.	Cards designed with the deaf community	Innovative	The cards were made small to carry in a wallet so that the deaf users were not publicly identifiable, but Police officers are instructed to check a wallet of a distressed person

Most of the interventions have a police-led or police-designed character, so the pilot did not extend to co-design, but many of the strategies required co-production of the solution and were of a complex and interwoven nature important for tackling marginalisation (Molnár and Havas 2019). Whilst the resident's association was dominated by agencies (the councillor, the neighbourhood warden, the independent living advisor, and a member of a charity supporting deaf people, the PCSO did however have the advantage of 'highly capable and

highly connected' contact - a resident and chair of the resident's association who is a retired police officer.

The Mode 1 Soft Systems Analysis for this case is provided in the Appendix in Section 9.2 which provides the researcher's detailed analytical process which led to the following observations on the mechanisms, including identifying possible new mechanisms.

5.4.6.   OBSERVATIONS ON MECHANISMS

The premises being investigated in this section are, again, twofold a) how do the features of the 'Spencer Haven' LISP implement the key mechanisms at work in both successful neighbourhood policing (Table 5.8) and Pawson's public policy interventions? (Table 5.9), and b) are there other mechanisms at play that could be added to the model (Table 5.10).

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Table 5.8 Spencer Haven Neighbourhood Policing evidence

	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of 'Spencer Haven' LISP case
	What works		
1.	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	In-depth investigation of the police crime problem in the context of the other problems experienced in the locality	The PCSO had been assigned to the district for some years, although reported not have engaged with the Haven in great detail in the past.
2.	Full and consistent application of interventions	The training (and subsequent evaluation of the quality of LISP work), and standard proforma	The PCSO had attended the initial training and LISP design workshops, and at the time (2012) been critical and unconvinced of the approach. Nevertheless, in identifying the problem, a wide range of interventions were developed and implemented fully
3.	Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time	Success, i.e. depth of understanding of the problem and success of the interventions is determined by the working group rather than police timeframes	The differences between the Police and residents' mid-maps were the key to understanding the different worlds views for the PCSO. The working group was still primarily led by advocates and carers of the residents, rather than the residents themselves

4.	Proactive contact	Deliberate choices are made at the screening stage about the importance of the locality to policing outcomes. Process requires identification of all potential stakeholder groups, including hard to reach.	The records don't indicate when contact was made by the PCSO, but despite the fact that higher crime rates around the Haven, the PCSO and Inspector identified that the vulnerability of the residents required proactive responses
5.	A group of residents	Where community organisations appropriate to the problems don't exist, the LISP process creates the social capital and networks to allow this to happen	The residents were clearly identifiable as a group, and a locality, within the Haven. They were represented by a residents' association, with pre-existing support from the Council and relevant charities. Social capital for the residents was high and social networks were dense
6.	Joint problem solving	Co-production of the problem analysis and solving stages is central	There are high levels of evidence of co-production of the problem analysis stage, with detailed concept maps being developed from interviews and discussions. The interventions tend towards standard policing responses, but in a bespoke mix, as well as initiatives developed by the residents' advocates and carers.
	What is promising		
7.	A consistent process	As above	As above

8.	Highly connected individuals	The LISP working group is made up of highly connected and highly capable people,	The active and engaged residents' association was repurposed by the PCSO and focused on problem analysis and solving tasks. The high social capital of the group led to innovative ideas being drawn from other contexts and unique solutions being created
9.	Support is won	Working group members elicit a clearly understood self-interest that underpins expected successes to secure and 'win' support	The working group clearly understood their self-interest. It was limited to the Haven residents and carers, and neighbouring households seemed to have been excluded. Their inclusion may have diluted to the self-interest and focus.
10	Attuned to community dynamics	The rich picturing processes develop a nuanced and empathetic understanding of the community and the issues and tensions within it.	Although a rich picture per se was not created, there is strong evidence that the PCSO had developed a rich and nuanced picture of the problem situation
11	Tacit skills	Training, with the aid of the publicly available Handbook, briefings to senior officers and a process of identifying the best implementations of LISP and mentoring of officers ensure that police skills are embedded and propagated across the force	The senior officers understood the intent, if not the detail, of the strategy and the PCSO built on the early stages of the LISP approach to reinforce her own commitment to innovative work.

| 12 | Not reliant on multi-agency delivery | Where statutory partners are actively engaged, LISP provides a clear and discrete method for limited involvement. Where statutory agencies are not engaged, LISP provides a clear evidence base for Police and community to hold statutory agencies to account. | Statutory partners were drawn into the process, but a long standing and stable community group in the form of a residents' association ensured the longevity of the initiatives. |

Table 5.9 Spencer Haven: Pawson's Public Policy 'hidden' mechanisms

	Pawson's Public policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of 'Spencer Haven' LISP case
1.	Recruit the stakeholders with care	Looking for the most highly connected, capable, and motivated: whose self-interest and motivation to contribute to public safety is understood	The residents themselves were directly involved in the problem analysis stages, as were the residents' advocates and carers, who communicated a depth of understanding, and a track record of capability
2.	Create expectations of change	Intensive Engagement is oriented towards collaboratively deciding on what change is needed, to design Solutions & Practices	As per point 1 above
3.	Demand effort from stakeholders	The LISP approach is designed to flip the Police response from 'what can we	The residents and victims were acting to safeguard their own property, but allowed the police to direct

	Pawson's Public policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	**Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement**	**Features of 'Spencer Haven' LISP case**
		do?' to 'What solutions have you got?' for the Police.	and legitimate their involvement
4.	Offer encouragement and feedback	The process is designed to recognise existing assets and capabilities that the community, with the help of the Police, that can be enhanced to support Police outcomes	The lived experience of the residents and their carers was clearly recognised, and reflected in the concept diagrams, as well as the design of the interventions
5.	Build trust and resilience	Long-term, locally based relationships are key to developing mature LISP informed interventions	The PCSO at the centre of the LISP had been assigned to the district for a number of years, and remain in the same location several years later (2015). The inspector was able to appreciate that the amount of crime was less important than the vulnerability of the residents
6.	Make accommodations for set-backs	The embedding of the Motivational Interviewing 'stages of change model' accounts for set-backs within the process of engagement	There was no evidence of the use of MI techniques or strategies. Set-backs were not planned for.
7.	Explain the theory of change	The theory of change for LISP is described as "collaboratively designed solutions and co-produced practices are more robust than short-term projects and limited engagement"	The two concept maps create the conditions for the theory of change, bridging the gap between the assumed world view of the police, and the lived experience of the residents.
8.	Share execution and control of the intervention	The whole LISP model is built on recruiting capable and connected decision-	The PCSO recruited an existing community group and shared the problem

	Pawson's Public policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of 'Spencer Haven' LISP case
		makers and resources to the support of Police outcomes, and an attempt to 'loosen the reins' of Police controlled design and implementation	analysis and problem-solving stages with them
9.	Ensure onward external continuation	The purpose of the community designing and delivering the interventions that are unique to a locality is to ensure that the Police have a 'step-back and sustain' (rather than an exit) strategy freeing resource up to tackle other localities and problems, leaving a self-sustaining legacy	Although the interventions are primarily short-term, and some police-led, the whole mix of interventions, in the context of the active residents' association creates the conditions for the residents to take over the initiative.

Table 5.10 Spencer Haven: additional insights from case study

	Additional insights from case study	Mechanism Ingredients in Spencer Haven LISP Intensive Engagement
	A mix of 'contingent' interventions	The PCSO was clear that a number of different strategies, that could be introduced at different times, and with drawn if they don't work, would strengthen the initiative. The six-point action plan developed in the Asian Gold burglaries case is insufficient here, and over 20 different initiatives are used, including those that are existing successful practices

5.5. PROJECT 3. HOLY SEPULCHRE

The Holy Sepulchre case study became the worked case study for the LISP Handbook. Although it was not the most successful, due to operational changes, the district itself is a good example of a 'wicked location', hosting a variety of wicked issues. It was used for much of the training of Northamptonshire Police and Community Support officers because it was close to a Police station (Campbell Square) and provided for a short walk around for the training day. The case study material was illustrated by Laura Brodick, a professional illustrator of consultation events. This case study also utilised PCSOs rich pictures, as well as those created by Laura to illustrate a number of points.

> *"There is a small neighbourhood in an East Midlands town in the UK that centres on an ancient church and graveyard. Within a few hundred metres are a sex shop, a pharmacy that supplies methadone to many of the town's drug users, homeless shelter, a massage parlour, a pawn shop, three workingmen's clubs, a night club, two pubs and a children's nursery. It is a perfect storm of anti-social behaviour and street drinking. Further, it is one of those hotspots of crime that has been frustrating the local police force for years, distracting PCSOs and officers alike from tackling serious acquisitive crime.*
>
> *Dozens of strategies have been used over the years, from high visibility patrols to designated public place orders to prevent public drinking with little visible effect. To make it even more embarrassing, this neighbourhood is just round the corner from the police station and the magistrates court, with very high police visibility"* (Curtis, 2014)[83].

The Huffington Post article of April 2014 sets the scene of Holy Sepulchre district of Northampton in a rather lurid manner, but it is not inaccurate. It was slightly fictionalised for the purpose of training the PCSOs, but the shops described, and the initial strategy of the Police are accurate.

5.5.1. DEMOGRAPHICS

The locality lies within the Super Output Area (SOA) of Northampton 021C84 but comprises perhaps less than 10% of the geographical area of that SOA which

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[83] http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/tim-curtis/community-policing_b_4746171.html

[84]

http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/NeighbourhoodSummary.do?width=1366&a=7&r=1
&i=1001&m=0&s=1442353226859&enc=1&profileSearchText=NN1+3NL&searchProfiles= [Accessed 29/11/15]

extends north from the town centre area towards the Semilong district, but skirts round another deprived area of Castle (also referred to as Spring Boroughs) (covered by SOA Northampton 21E). There are about 2-3% more people in the 021C SOA that report bad health than the national average, and 13% more people working in 'elementary occupations' with 23% of population with no formal qualifications in the 2011 census. In the census, the majority of the population reported as being white British, but the most significant minority were 'White, Other White' most likely to be of eastern European extraction. The next largest minority are 'Black/African/Caribbean/Black British; African'[85], the majority 'not living in a couple'[86] in mostly privately rented accommodation[87].

This census data does not show the whole picture because the data is aggregated at too high a level, and the district is a small part of the whole super output area. The core of the district is the Holy Sepulchre church, a 10th Century foundation with an almost unique 'barrel' shaped nave. The church inhabits a church yard which is adopted by the council, and has large church halls, including the kindergarten which becomes important later in the story. The locality has very little housing – primarily Latymer Court and Sussex Court on the south corner of the church yard. The businesses in the district can be broadly divided into local suppliers and offices for businesses with a wider impact. The businesses supplying local needs include the 'run' of shops along the Sheep Street front – the pharmacy, the white goods shop, the sex shop, the mental health charity, the pub, the pawn brokers, a burnt-out property and working men's clubs. The other businesses tend to house commuters to the location - the revenue office, various offices to rent and the Roadmender night club are examples.

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[85]
http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadTableView.do?a=7&b=13696009&c=NN1+3NL&d=14&e=61&g=6451705&i=1001x1003x1032x1004&m=0&p=1&q=1&r=0&s=1442354115339&enc=1&dsFamilyId=2575 [Accessed 29/11/15]

[86]
http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadTableView.do?a=7&b=13696009&c=NN1+3NL&d=14&e=61&g=6451705&i=1001x1003x1032x1004&m=0&p=1&q=1&r=0&s=1442354115339&enc=1&dsFamilyId=2559 [Accessed 29/11/15]

[87]http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadTableView.do?a=7&b=13696009&c=NN1+3NL&d=14&e=61&g=6451705&i=1001x1003x1032x1004&m=0&p=1&q=1&r=0&s=1442354115339&enc=1&dsFamilyId=2505 [Accessed 29/11/15]

Figure 5.25 The shop fronts on Sheep Street (2012)

Across Campbell road (on the north boundary) is the other significant stakeholder organisation - the OASIS House/HOPE homeless centre. The entire building encompasses the services of several charities and the Borough Council, primarily Oasis House, which is a housing facility opened during 2012 in the centre of Northampton. It has 48 beds available for the single homeless population. This includes 39 self-contained apartments plus nine emergency units[88] and the OASIS centre on the ground floor which provides care services[89]. Directly adjacent to the homeless centre is a residential centre for elderly people.

Since September 2009, Northamptonshire Police have led the partnership in 'Operation Guardian,' a countywide crackdown on SAC, resulting in several thousand arrests and the custodial sentencing of two prolific offenders from Northampton. Key activities under Operation Guardian included target hardening of vulnerable properties and streets in hot spot locations, provision of Smart Water and environmental improvements to improve defensible space in hot spot locations. Northampton Care and Repair target hardened 518 properties to reduce vulnerability of burglary during 2010/11, the main areas the partnership focussed on (but not exclusively) were streets in Delapre & Briar Hill ward, Spencer ward (area which is now Kings Heath ward) and St Katherine's Court in Castle ward. Care and repair in 2011/12 to date has been focussed on Billing/Westone wards as per police strategic analysis.

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[88] http://naash.co.uk/oasis-house/ [Accessed 17th Sept 2015]
[89] http://www.northamptonhopecentre.org.uk/ [Accessed 17th Sept 2015]

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> *"Youth work was one of the main focuses when tackling ASB during 2010/11 with a variety of diversionary schemes targeting young people at risk of offending continuing and being introduced, primarily in hot spot locations….. In terms of enforcement, the ASB Unit at NBC managed 106 referrals of ASB during 2010/11 from various sources. They served 5 Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), 3 Criminal Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (CRASBOs) and 13 Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABCs). Additionally, the ASB Unit appointed an officer to Victim Support Worker to work in a more victim-focussed approach when resolving ASB cases, since June 2011 providing support to 73 victims and witnesses (Oct 2011)….. NBC have also updated byelaws which now provide police and wardens with an additional tool to tackle minor ASB such as urinating in the street, touting and nuisance skateboarding. A DPPO across the entire town remains in place and is regularly utilised by police to reduce alcohol-related ASB. During the past 12 months the DPPO has been utilised 631 times to confiscate alcohol in relation to ASB.[90]*

The Community Safety Partnership risk assessment undertaken in 2012 (Figure 5.26) shows Castle ward as the most vulnerable ward, with Semilong in 5th place. As discussed above, the Holy Sepulchre district is in Semilong, but is also directly adjacent to Castle ward- the scene of significant Police activity during this period from Operation Guardian regarding serious acquisitive crime and partnership work tackling street prostitution and cruising.

Ward	Burglary	Criminal Damage	Education	Young People	Domestic	Probation	Fires	Drug Users	Health	Employment	IMD	Final Score
Castle	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4.80
Talavera	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	3.5	4.5	5	4.80
Brookside	5	5	4	5	5	4	4	5	4	4.5	5	4.78
Kings Heath	3	4	5	5	5	4	2	5	5	5	5	4.65
Semilong	4	4	5	2	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	4.65
Spencer	4	4	5	5	5	5	3	5	3.5	4	4.5	4.43
Delapre & Briar Hill	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	3	4	4	4	4.20
Eastfields	3	4	4	4	4	4	1	4	4	4.5	4.5	4.08
St Davids	1	5	3	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	4.5	4.00
Riverside	4	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3.5	4	4.5	3.93
Billing	5	5	2	4	4	4	5	3	3	3	3.5	3.65
St James	2	3	4	3	5	5	5	4	3	3	3.5	3.60
Headlands	3	3	5	4	4	3	1	3	3	3	3.5	3.30

Figure 5.26 Community Safety Partnership risk assessment[91]

[90] Finn, W (2012) Northampton Community Safety Partnership Strategic Assessment 2011-12
[91] Anon (2011) Northampton Community Safety Partnership Strategic Assessment 2011/12 NCSP_Strategic_Assessment_2011_12.pdf

5.5.2.   CRIME RATES

Figure 5.27 below illustrates the format of the reported crime data that is made public in the UK. The user can zoom in on each month's data to provide more information on the crime type. The majority of crimes reported in this neighbourhood are anti-social behaviour. Figure 5.28 shows the same data over the time series 2011-2015. The main locations at which crime reported are geo-located is not accurate so that individual events cannot be identified, but in this locality, it seems that four primary locations are chosen: at the end of the Holy Sepulchre church yard, at the carpark to the north east of the church yard, along Campbell Square outside the OASIS homeless centre, and significant amount of reported crimes in the vicinity of Latymer Court, near the NHS mental health facilities. The actual reported location may be some distance from the report location, and none are reported to be located directly within the church yard, but there is a clear indication from the choice of reporting location that activity is centred around Sheep St to the west, Campbell Street to the North-east and Latymer Court to the south east.

Figure 5.27 Example of UK Crime Statistics

Figure 5.28 shows the raw data taken from the public Police UK website, providing data from December 2011 to July 2015. The historical figures are more important at this stage, given that the LISP activity began in this district during, and a little before, April 2013. The reported crimes, by far the most frequently ASB, start at

a peak of 82 in January of 2011, one might assume that a good proportion of this might be street drinking. The bulk of the remaining reports seem to occur primarily in the June to October period which facilitates drinking and loitering in the warm weather which would be expected to be less in the colder months.

Reported crime in Holy Sepulchre area - all crime types

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
January	82	10	17	9	22
February	64	6	29	13	13
March	70	6	24	8	24
April	69	6	17	17	19
May	50	4	10	14	8
June	81	12	19	23	11
July	52	15	22	25	14
August	39	34	19	16	
September	49	16	10	20	
October	48	17	15	25	
November	57	20	20	10	
December	6	8	14	12	

Source: Police UK https://www.police.uk/northamptonshire/SCT162/crime/2011-10/
Accessed 16th Sept 2015

Figure 5.28 Reported crimes in Holy Sepulchre district 2011-2015

Figure 5.29 Monthly pattern of crime data

Bearing in mind that this location was selected by the PCSOs involved because it was considered to be a) a performance issue for the team and b) conducive to a pilot LISP, it seems clear looking back that the crime rates throughout 2011 were very high (Figure 5.29), and that rates had dropped significantly before the LISP itself took place. When we look closely we see that Latymer Court was contributing significant levels of activity (Figure 5.30), which decreases significantly by 2015.

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

Figure 5.30 Contribution of Latymer Court to the situation

5.5.3.   LOCALLY IDENTIFIED PRIORITIES (LIPS)

The LIPS data relevant to this pilot is tagged as 'Castle' in the database. Castle is a ward within Northampton town, but the policing area known as Castle extends beyond that ward, covering the north of the town centre. There was one retail crime related priority data point for Sheep Street, so the dataset was widened to any street on the boundaries of the Holy Sepulchre area, yielding 146 data points shown in Table 5.11.

Table 5.11 Locally Identified Priorities data collected by Northants Police July 2012 Holy Sepulchre area

Holy Sepulchre Area	Holy Sepulchre area	% of HS area	Northampton	% of Northampton
Burglary of homes	1	0.7%	96	0.0%
Burglary of premises other than homes	0	0.0%	21	0.4%
Cold calling	0	0.0%	5	0.1%
Community tension	0	0.0%	10	0.2%
Cycling on the pavements/pedestrian areas	10	6.8%	103	1.9%
Dog fouling	0	0.0%	59	1.1%
Lack of things to do	9	6.2%	119	2.2%
Litter	4	2.7%	262	4.9%
Motorcycle nuisance	0	0.0%	124	2.3%

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Holy Sepulchre Area	Holy Sepulchre area	% of HS area	Northampton	% of Northampton
No Problems	43	29.5%	2079	39.0%
Noisy neighbours/ loud parties	2	1.4%	231	4.3%
Parking problems	34	23.3%	271	5.1%
People being drunk or rowdy	11	7.5%	414	7.8%
People causing a nuisance in the street	6	4.1%	606	11.4%
People dealing/using drugs	5	3.4%	176	3.3%
Poor or broken street lighting	1	0.7%	77	1.4%
Prostitution	0	0.0%	9	0.2%
Purse/bag thefts	11	7.5%	13	0.2%
Retail crime	6	4.1%	34	0.6%
Speeding vehicles	2	1.4%	273	5.1%
Vandalism, graffiti and other deliberate damage	1	0.7%	153	2.9%
Vehicle Crime	0	0.0%	149	2.8%
Violent crime	0	0.0%	50	0.9%
Total	**146**		**5334**	

In terms of managing the priorities of policing effort in the town of Northampton, this location contributes a tiny proportion (146 out of 5334 surveys, 2.7%) of the expressed concerns of the general public. 29% of the responses (n=43) indicated that there were no problems in the area (that fit the predetermined categories, at least). The most frequent priority was parking problems (23% of responses, n=34), quite significantly higher than the 5% of responses about parking across the whole of Northampton. Homeless people or street drinking does not appear as a category on its own, so the most relevant categories (People being drunk or rowdy, People causing a nuisance in the street and People dealing/using drugs) accounts for 15.1% of the responses (n=22), still the largest category of citizen identified priority.

This indicates that the priority for this precise location was appropriate to the focus of the PCSOs in the LISP pilot. This reflected the whole town centre data as well, over 22% of the responses identified the same issues, but regardless of the issue(s) being a priority, it is difficult to justify why this location was selected as a priority area - the LIPS data is too scarce in this location to pin-point the Holy Sepulchre area as a target of priority action.

5.5.4.   PRIORITY AREA REPORT

The Holy Sepulchre pilot LISP activity commenced in April 2013. In September 2013, Northants Police published a Priority Area Problem Analysis report[92] presenting data analysis based on crimes recorded on the Northamptonshire Police Crime Recording System between May 2012 and April 2013. It focusses primarily on Spring Boroughs and Semilong neighbourhoods, using commercial data sources based on ACORN data to predict the type of population. The report provides details of the top-ranking streets (Figure 5.31).

Table 1: PA1 Top Ranking Streets

Street Name	Overall Rank	All Crime	SAC	Stealing Other	Criminal Damage	Violence	Drugs	ASB	PSW
Marefair	1	2	5	2	2	3	7	2	6
Semilong Road	2	3	1	7	4	6	3	7	5
Castle Street	2	5	2	10	4	1	5	7	2
Ladys Lane	3	1		1	7	3	7	4	9
Barrack Road	4	4	6	3	3	4	2		
Upper Mounts	4	10		4	5	3	7	3	1
Campbell Street	5	9	9	8	4	4	7	1	4
Sheep Street	6	6	10	5	2	4	5	4	
Alliston Gardens	7	7			1	7	1		3
Grafton Street	8	8	10	8	3	3	6		
Horsemarket	9		8	7	6	6	5		
Lower Hester Street	9		7		2	10	6		7
Military Road	10		4		6	8	5		
Regent Square	10		9	9	4	5	7		
St. Andrews Road	11		6		5	8	5		

Figure 5.31 Top ranking streets for crime (Parker, 2013a p8)

Sheep Street, the core location for Holy Sepulchre is ranked 6 on the list, in the middle of the top 10, but by no means a high priority, although it is number 2 for criminal damage. The report does not explain how these rankings were derived.

It does provide a 'problem solving map' (Figure 5.32) which does not specifically identify the Holy Sepulchre area (indicated by the PW in the middle of the image) but does identify some of the contributing factors - low income housing in the Castle housing estate, the Oasis House homelessness shelter on Campbell Street, and the Roadmender night club.

It also provides some very early evidence of hotspot analysis. Area 3 of the hotspot map (Figure 5.33) shows the area around Holy Sepulchre church, the cross roads

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[92] Parker, L (2013a) Problem Profile Priority Area 1 (PA1). Northamptonshire Police. 04/09/2013 Unpublished Report.

to the north of the LISP area, and the document specifically mentions Oasis House for the homeless.

Figure 5.32 A problem solving map from PA3 report (Parker, 2013a p9)

Figure 5.33 Hotspot analysis of all crime in PA3 (Parker, 2013a,p13) original indistinct

PA3 goes on to analyse in more detail the various categories of crime, identifying the LISP pilot area again with respect to non-domestic violence (Figure 5.34), again targeting Oasis House as the source or centre of this violence. Oasis House comes up again as a drugs intelligence hotspot (Parker 2013a, p28) and an Anti-social Behaviour hotspot (Parker 2013a, p30) but identifying the soup kitchen that

had been operating in Ash Street as the source of this, even though it notes later that Ash Street is not a high-scoring 'repeat street' for ASB, whereas 25% of ASB repeat calls come from the Sheep Street area (the first time Sheep Street is singled out) (Parker 2013a, p31)

Non-Domestic Violence

1. Roadmender and flats around Sol Central.

2. Regent Square in close locality to Oasis House

3. Residential area behind and encompassing Campbell Square Police station

4. Area encompassing; Stanley Street, Gordon Street, Salisbury Street all close to the junction with Semilong Road.

Figure 5.34 Non-domestic violence hotspot identified in PA3 (Parker, 2013a p23)

The Sheep Street area is not highlighted specifically as a hotspot of crime reports (and Holy Sepulchre church grounds are not mentioned at all), nor is it identified as a priority location in the LIPS data (5.5.3), it does seem that the crime types and issues in the Holy Sepulchre are closely associated with the priority crime types that the police were encountering. There is a significant mismatch, however, between what the citizens were reporting as police priority issues in the LIPS survey and what the police were actually encountering in terms of calls-for-service and crime reports.

The report also provides suggestions for actions by the police based on the desktop data analysis. This provides an insight into the thinking of the analysts at the time, and the approach to problem solving within Northamptonshire Police at the time. Here are those most relevant to the problems experienced in the Holy Sepulchre pilot:

> *"A. Cohesive community interaction and engagement is very important in such ethnically diverse areas. Liaising with the public involvement team around current engagement initiatives and developing an understanding of new techniques/strategies to improve public involvement is recommended…*

> *..D. Drugs are perceived to be a large problem in PA1 by local residents; intelligence suggests drug activity is occurring. There has been minimal success with regards to recorded offences in relation to drugs in the area. Turning intelligence into positive frontline action to either detect more crime or generate better quality actionable intelligence is required to have a more beneficial impact upon drugs in PA3 (sic)….*

> *…E. All crime in PA1 is increasing, yet force wide figures show crime levels are reducing. This highlights that this area has a higher crime problem in comparison to much of the rest of Northampton….*

> *..F. By tackling other crime types there is good potential to see an natural reduction in criminal damage….*

> *…I. NTE [Night Time Economy] violence is likely to continue to reduce as a result of proactive policing in the NTE. There is a force wide need to focus on domestic violence as it is by far the greatest contributor to all violence, not only in PA1 but county wide. Liaising and organising meetings with the relevant partners in order to brainstorm some prevention and enforcement ideas would be beneficial and an appropriate starting point." ….*

> *…L More support from the police and local partner agencies might help to reduce the number of calls received regarding ASB at Oasis House [the nearby homeless shelter]." (Parker, 2013, various pages)*

What is evident here is that the Police were beginning to get to grips with the location of crime for the first time through hotspot analysis, and had extensive (if inconsistent and not collected in a rigorous manner) data on the perceptions of the citizens with regard to police priorities, but the data about where the crime hotspots were was not being connected to any information or data about the vulnerability of the localities to crime, or in enough resolution to provide a detailed appreciation of the issues at a street level. This is where the LISP investigations begin to fill in the missing detail regarding the nature of the problem. The problem-solving suggestions in PA3 are still rudimentary and generic, suggesting more "Cohesive community interaction and engagement", "liaising and organising meetings", as well as more policing activity (in the context of austerity politics and significant budget cuts to Policing resources) in the form of "prevention and enforcement ideas".

5.5.5.   THE LISP PILOT

Location	Origin	Priority Area	Crime	Confidence	Stable team	Mgt involved	LISP proforma
Holy Sepulchre	Pilot	no	steady	steady	no	no	Silver

Figure 5.35 Detail from Figure 5.2 regarding Holy Sepulchre LISP

The Holy Sepulchre case study arose as a pilot after the first training exercise in 2012. Two PCSOs "Cagney" and "Lacey" identified this location as part of their beat as conducive to an experimental LISP. Sergeants and Inspectors had not been briefed at this point, and the Handbook was not available in its current form. This was selected before Priority Areas had been established in June/July 2013. In summary, the key conditions were that the crime rate remained steady, as did confidence in policing. There was not a stable team- although Cagney and Lacey had been on this beat for several years, they were removed in 2014 during the implementation of the LISP. The sergeant 'Kojak' was aware of the LISP activity and attended briefing sessions, but had not read the Handbook or been involved in completing the proforma, or managing the proforma directly. When the proforma was submitted to the author in July 2014, the PCSOs had left the project area, but the documentation was judged to be Silver in quality.

5.5.6.   SCREENING CRITERIA

Vulnerable Localities Index data was not available to the Police when this LISP was created, but the data presented in above indicates a level of vulnerability which is confirmed by the Community Safety Partnership (see Figure 5.26). The crime statistics (reviewed in Section 5.5.2) show that the area was vulnerable to high levels of historic crime, although publicly available data does not extend beyond two years from the start date of the LISP. More recent reduction in crime could be considered to be a short-term pattern, but with a cycle that is longer than seasonal anti-social behaviour. The final criterion is a more professional view of the complexity of the issues in the neighbourhood. The 'presenting problem' was street drinking, which can be identified readily as a social issue with sufficiently complex causal patterns - the supply of people inclined to this behaviour, the supply of cheap alcohol, the locations for drinking, the low levels of public surveillance in the location all point to a complex issue. The variety of stakeholders and their differing concerns also confirm this.

5.5.7.   IMPLEMENTATION

The Northamptonshire Police had not undertaken detailed analysis of crime data by April 2013 when the LISP was initiated, although it had identified priority crime types in certain areas, in this location ASB in the PA3 document reviewed in Section 5.5.4 above. The written rationale expressed by the PCSOs at that point was that an AO1 had been raised, and neither LIPS data nor PA3 data were cited. An AO1 is a flagging system within the Northamptonshire Police data system that identifies when a caller has reported the same incident or situation more than three times, especially with respect to anti-social behaviour. The PCSOs are then tasked with investigating the problem and developing solutions such that the AO1 flag is removed. The PCSOs flagged the AO1 for this area, but also reported (in the LISP report[93]) on preceding crime reports known to them in the town centre. It is noteworthy that St Katherine's Garden of Rest contributed greater reports than Holy Sepulchre, but 22 incidents were reported for June/July 2012 to April 2013. In the official data in Figure 5.5 above 209 reported incidents were reported in that period – this is significantly more problematic than the PCSOs understood.

The first actions of the PCSOs involved were to involve the 'usual suspects'. They met in the church halls of Holy Sepulchre:

> "Friday 31st May 2013 – This was the first meeting we held with the community members at The Holy Sepulchre Church Rooms. Those present were the local police, businesses from Sheep Street, Bailiff Street and Campbell Street. We started with an introduction to the meeting and spoke about the police's stance in dealing with issues relating to Anti-social street drinking within the area itself and then we allowed for an open forum where they could discuss the issues they are experiencing. The issues mentioned included, drug and alcohol abuse within The Holy Sepulchre church yard, the nursery discussed having a fenced off area for the children to use as part of their learning environment. Businesses talked about how overgrown the area is therefore attracting street drinkers and drug users to the area and how people cant use it anymore. The police approach was linked to the dispersal order and supporting letters so it bides us a bit of time to try and link the community together with the Intense Community Engagement work. The next meeting set was for Friday 5th July 2013 at Oasis House" (LISP Proforma July 2014).

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[93] T[] and N[] marked LISP.pdf 11/07/2014

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The approach was intended to be community led. The PCSOs involved had been on the initial LISP training event (at this point the LISP Handbook had not been developed, so the main principles were what the PCSOs were working) and were finding time to undertake the LISP pilot in their own time. The initial response to the issues in the area was to implement a dispersal order, empowering the PCSOs to remove drink from people in the area, and them from the area if they refused. This necessitated more police activity, rather than less. The PSCOs rationalised this as creating some time in which to allow the stakeholders to engage:

> *"The police approach was linked to the dispersal order and supporting letters so it bides us a bit of time to try and link the community together"* *(LISP Proforma July 2014)*

The initial contact took two months to be followed up, with the next meeting taking place in July 2013, demonstrating two significant weaknesses of the LISP - two months to repeat a meeting was not what was in mind when the term 'intensive engagement' was coined and the stakeholder attendance shifted significantly, from businesses to statutory partners:

> *"Those present were the nursery, the church officials, Midland Heart, NAASH, Oasis House residents and some officials from Northampton Borough Council, namely DM from Community Safety, CM and PM[94] (Neighbourhood Wardens). We started with an introduction due to persons missing the first meeting and we gave an overview of the previous meeting dated 31st May 2013"* *(LISP Proforma July 2014)*

The meeting was primarily focussed on enforcement, meeting the expectations of those involved:

> *"We talked about any relevant incidents that have been called into force control room and we reiterated that incidents still need to be phoned in to support the dispersal order."* *(LISP Proforma July 2014)*

At some point in this process, the plan to tackle the patch of ground outside the front of Holy Sepulchre church came together. The Kindergarten in the Holy Sepulchre church halls had no external play space and wanted to take over some of the grounds (not owned by the parish but adopted by Northampton Borough Council) and this idea was connected to the staff and clients of the Hope Centre who, as homeless and often alcoholics were major frequenters of the churchyard.

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[94] Names have been removed by author.

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The Police adopted a standard 'day of action' approach to the initiative, after consultation with the Borough Council and their contractors with respect to what could be cleared from the church yard.

> *"Wednesday 17th July 2013, NAASH, Hope Enterprise, the church officials, the nursery staff, volunteers from Nationwide Building Society, workers from NBC and the local police came together to start work on the church yard. The work started at 9:30 in the morning, prior to this radio interviews were conducted by BBC Radio Northampton and the Chronicle and Echo were there to take pictures of the partnership group"* (LISP Proforma July 2014)

All foliage was completely stripped away leaving a blank canvas for the nursery staff to take ownership of and to create their working area for pupils.

By August 2013, planning permission[95] was put in by the Borough Council contractors for tree work to be carried out in the summer. This was delayed due to the timings through the Borough Council processes for such work, therefore the tree work carried out by an external contactor did not take place until November 2013. In January 2014, another meeting was had with the same person from the Borough Council contractor, to request more work to be carried out in March 2014 because it was missed in November 2013[96].

The PCSOs were aware of the vulnerability of the initiative in being sustained. In their LISP proforma, they indicated that the key factor to indicate ongoing success was the enthusiasm of the group made up of the Kindergarten manager, the Hope centre manager and the parish council:

> "Enthusiasm of working partnership to take ownership of the issues as per the work carried out to date. There is still a level of anti-social street drinking within the locations discussed, however; with the continuation of the working partnership the changes that are to be made then success will be met slowly but surely". (LISP Proforma July 2014)

The PCSOs did not think that the initiative needed escalating within the Police force, although they had, without realising it, escalated it within the Borough

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[95] An instance of bridging social capital being deployed……………..
[96] Delays by statutory authorities reduce the efficacy of local initiatives

Council to get planning permission and action to deal with trees covered by a preservation order.

> "At this stage of the Intensive Community Engagement process, both myself and my colleague N[] feel that it doesn't need to be escalated. We know how to escalate the process if and when we come to that stage." (LISP Proforma July 2014)

The final note in the LISP proforma, submitted in July 2014 effectively shuts down the Police involvement:

> "This has now been taken over by the key stakeholders and they have taken full ownership. No further updates needed." (LISP Proforma July 2014)

This closing down of the LISP was reported differently by the sergeant responsible for the two PCSOs:

> *"I'm conscious, because of the [sigh] change in demographic of the police, because I have lost both of my, I've lost N[] she's on the town centre now and I've lost T[]" (Lines 12-14 Transcript of Kojak Sept 2015[97]) and*

> *""but the problem I've got is resources and these times where there is cut backs here there and everywhere, I'm having to juggle staff and move staff where the need.." T[] joined the regulars, so I'm depleted in PCSOs numbers, …..this month alone I've lost T[], I've lost M[] and… [indistinct] 3 PCSOs out of the 8 I had " (op cit. Lines 32-35) and*

> *"and they got pulled more and more to spring boroughs because we were tackling other issues in spring boroughs so the drive, the driving force, the emphasis shifted and so because of that I think it is a lack of, not motivation, erm, a lack of impetus really from the people there" (op cit. lines 37-40)*

No evaluation of the LISP was recorded in the proforma. Section 4.1 of the LISP proforma prompted the PCSOs for measures of success. They state that crime rates would be monitored, but they are not recorded. Nor do they record success factors for the stakeholders.

The PCSOs had undertaken some rich picturing activities but had not done this as an explicit community building or information/perspectives gathering exercise. The first rich picture (Figure 5.36) provided shows the Holy Sepulchre church in the centre of the image, with Sheep Street at the bottom of the picture. There is elementary placement of main stakeholder institutions, and their buildings,

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[97] Personally Conducted Interview: Kojak Voice 016_UnitedKingdom_12032015 Kojak.m4a 12th March 2015

marked around the site. It is interesting to note the presence of the mosque in the Castle ward even though most of the issues in this area were drinking related. The HOPE centre and the sheltered housing complex are clearly identified to the left of the picture but the main institutions servicing the drink culture (the pharmacy, the off licence, the pawn brokers and the pub) are not marked - they are opposite the (incorrectly located) HMRC offices, from the corner of Barrack Rd into Sheep Street. The picture does not draw links between the stakeholders and is only in sufficient detail to be an exploratory map rather than a systemic investigation.

Figure 5.36 One of the PCSO rich pictures for Holy Sepulchre circa Sept 2013

The second PCSO rich picture (Figure 5.37) is similarly an early exploratory rich picture[98]. Holy Sepulchre church is in the centre of the picture (as were all the

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[98] bear in mind that Laura Brodrick's fine exemplars of developed rich picturing were not available at this stage, so the PCSOs had not seen a fully detailed example. It was more important at this stage to see what the PCSOs were confident in doing and at what level of detail their analysis was being undertaken

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PCSO drafted rich pictures of those trained in this location). In this one, more analytical details are present – marked up in pink. The main stakeholder institutions are there – as well as the key shops missing off the first one. The pink comments mark-up street lighting, litter bins etc, showing thoughts about the complex of issues across this district rather than a focus on just the community garden. The park bench is present, as are little stick men sleeping round the left-hand side of the church building, linked to the location by paths around the church. The picture notes the potential use of the working men's club as well as the church community rooms as spaces for community gatherings.

Figure 5.37 Second PCSO drafted rich picture circa Sept 2013

5.5.8.   THE RESULTS OF THE LISP PILOT

CRIME RATES

As already identified in Figure 5.29 above, the monthly rates of reported crime had already dropped markedly around January 2012, and the remainder rates suggest an on-going steady state in terms of crime report.

Figure 5.38 illustrates this significant fall, modest rise and steady state by mapping annual average reporting rates over the monthly reporting. Even if significant levels of activity in the nearby Latymer Rd residential are taken out of the 2011 figures, the 2014-2015 figures show no appreciable further drop in reported crime.

Figure 5.38 All crime types in the area by monthly and annual average

The explicit reason for starting the LISP was to address an A01 rather than reduce the crime rate, but one might assume that the two are connected. Another possibility is that the crime types have shifted, but the data for January 2015 shows that the bulk of the reports were still ASB, situated at or near the homeless centre. This shows that the source of ASB has not been eliminated, as one might expect - the homeless shelter is still needed and operating.

Figure 5.39 Detail of reported crime in January 2015[99]

The Mode 1 Soft Systems Analysis for this case is provided in the Appendix in Section 9.3 which provides the researchers detailed analytical process which led to the following observations on the mechanisms, including identifying possible new mechanisms.

5.5.9.   OBSERVATIONS ON MECHANISMS

The premises being tested here are twofold a) do the features of the Holy Sepulchre LISP implement the key mechanisms at work in both successful neighbourhood policing (Table 5.12) and Pawson's public policy interventions? (Table 5.13), and b) are there other mechanisms at play that could be added to the model (Table 5.14). This approach allows both the efficacy of the LISP Handbook itself to be tested against how it was used in the field, and to use the field experiments to inform the development of the following checklists of mechanisms.

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[99] https://www.police.uk/northamptonshire/SCT162/crime/2015-01/ Accessed 17th Sept 2015

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Table 5.12 Holy Sepulchre: Neighbourhood Policing evidence

	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of Holy Sepulchre LISP case
	What works		
1.	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	In-depth investigation of the police crime problem in the context of the other problems experienced in the locality	The LISP got a good start because the PCSOs had been working in this district for some time, but the analysis in the LISP documentation, and the choice of intervention was simplistic, indicating that the PCSOs and their senior officers had limited local knowledge
2.	Full and consistent application of interventions	The training of PSCOs (and subsequent evaluation of the quality of their LISP work), and standard proforma to capture the progression of the intensive engagement	The intervention chosen, the community garden, was not seen through to full implementation.
3.	Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time	Success, i.e. depth of understanding of the problem and success of the interventions is determined by the working group rather than police timeframes	The time allocated to the PCSOs was insufficient for a critical mass to be sustained – meetings every two months isn't 'intensive' enough to build full rapport in order to identify a range of consistent interventions. The PCSOs jumped to a solution suggested by a small group, without having the time to work round all the other stakeholders. Therefore, the intervention(s) suggested were not sufficiently broad based

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	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of Holy Sepulchre LISP case
4.	Proactive contact	Deliberate choices are made at the screening stage about the importance of the locality to policing outcomes. Process requires identification of all potential stakeholder groups, including hard to reach.	The PCSOs were creating proactive contact. The working group they established all had a clear involvement and self interest in progress being made. The 'perpetrators' were not included and there was not systematic attempt to ensure that all types of people had the opportunity to engage in the process- i.e. the elderly people from the Bailiff St care home.
5.	A group of residents	Where community organisations appropriate to the problems don't exist, the LISP process creates the social capital and networks to allow this to happen	In this situation, very few people were 'residents' but commuters, employers and other users of the space, such as drinkers and homeless constituted a community of place. Internal bonding social capital was very low- very little communication between people groups. Externally focussed bridging capital was mediated primarily through the PCSOs rather than any other professionals in the neighbourhood
6.	Joint problem solving	Co-production of the problem analysis and solving stages is central	Where the problem analysis was not co-produced, the chosen intervention (solution) was going to be co-produced. The kindergarten has provided the demand and the funds and OASIS house staff and clients provided the means to deliver the project. The project itself, however did not address the root causes of the

	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of Holy Sepulchre LISP case
			problems, just one of the symptoms. External volunteers were brought in, where more effort could have raised more volunteers from within the commuter and resident community in the neighbourhood.
	What is promising		
7.	Highly connected individuals	The LISP working group is made up of highly connected and highly capable people,	The small working group were highly connected and capable people, running a kindergarten and a homeless charitable service. Few other people were recruited to the working group, so support wasn't immediately available
8.	Support is won	Working group members elicit a clearly understood self-interest that underpins expected successes to secure and 'win' support	It wasn't obvious from the documentation that the two key community members were clear about them supporting each other's self-interest. Success was not mapped out, nor was a vision rich picture developed, so the project foundered without the implicit vision of the PCSOs
9.	Attuned to community dynamics	The rich picturing processes develop a nuanced and empathetic understanding of the community and the issues and tensions within it.	There was no evidence that the working group, or the wider stakeholder group participated in anything other than working meetings. The rich picture process acts as an empathy building and perspectives taking tool, but this wasn't utilised. The films suggest that empathy was

	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of Holy Sepulchre LISP case
			already a feature of the kindergarten team.
10.	Tacit skills	Training, with the aid of the publicly available Handbook, briefings to senior officers and a process of identifying the best implementations of LISP and mentoring of officers ensure that police skills are embedded and propagated across the force	The PCSOs didn't benefit from a fully developed training course, as this was being developed by them. They did participate in several workshops where issues in implementation were debated and from one-to-one sessions. The inspector (Kojak) only scored 2 (out of three) in most of the areas of the Self Evaluation of the LISP project, scoring 3 with "Senior officers and senior members of partner agencies have reviewed the plan and committed to addressing potential blocks to success" but it seems clear that the inspector wasn't clear on what
11.	Not reliant on multi-agency delivery	Where statutory partners are actively engaged, LISP provides a clear and discrete method for limited involvement. Where statutory agencies are not engaged, LISP provides a clear evidence base for Police and community to hold statutory agencies to account.	The team started off without statutory partner involvement, but it became evident that couldn't proceed without them. The PCSOs bridged the working group to the Borough Council and their contractors, but the Council's self-interest (community safety? And/or reduction in maintenance costs with community taking charge?) was not factored in, so delays contributed to the loss of momentum

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Table 5.13 Holy Sepulchre: Pawson's Public Policy 'hidden' mechanisms

	Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of Holy Sepulchre LISP case
1.	Recruit the stakeholders with care	Looking for the most highly connected, capable, and motivated: whose self-interest and motivation to contribute to public safety is understood	See point 5 in previous tables
2.	Create expectations of change	Intensive Engagement is oriented towards collaboratively deciding on what change is needed, to design Solutions & Practices	The PCSOs switched the first meeting with the community representatives from 'what are the police going to do' towards a change agenda. They attempted to implement Solutions and Practices discipline in the solution with the Kindergarten taking ownership of the community garden
3.	Demand effort from stakeholders	The LISP approach is designed to flip the Police response from 'what can we do?' to 'What solutions have you got?' for the Police.	As above
4.	Offer encouragement and feedback	The process is designed to recognise existing assets and capabilities that the community, with the help of the Police, that can be enhanced to support Police outcomes	The PCSOs connected two groups who had assets to offer, and helped by connecting them to the Council for help and permission to cut back the undergrowth

	Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of Holy Sepulchre LISP case
5.	Build trust and resilience	Long-term, locally based relationships are key to developing mature LISP informed interventions	Increasingly constrained resources, and a lack of wider commitment, meant that the long-term relationship (before and during the LISP) was severed as one PCSO became a regular and another was deployed to another ward. New PCSOs were not managed proactively into the LISP
6.	Make accommodations for set-backs	The embedding of the Motivational Interviewing 'stages of change model' accounts for set-backs within the process of engagement	The use of the proforma didn't get to the stage of planning for set-backs. Although the PCSOs seemed to implicitly deploy the MI strategies, they couldn't plan for being removed from the district itself
7.	Explain the theory of change	The theory of change for LISP is described as "collaboratively designed solutions and co-produced practices are more robust than short-term projects and limited engagement"	The theory of change was to disrupt the street drinkers by increasing the presence of people, especially young people, in the church yard-making it busier and therefore less conducive to isolated drinkers. It was only one amongst many potential interventions and only really tackled the most visible street drinking, and not the drug taking or rough sleeping behind the church or in the alleyway

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	Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of Holy Sepulchre LISP case
			next to the mental health charity.
8.	Share execution and control of the intervention	The whole LISP model is built on recruiting capable and connected decision-makers and resources to the support of Police outcomes, and an attempt to 'loosen the reins' of Police controlled design and implementation	The PCSO strategy in the first instance was to share execution, but it takes a long time to wean community groups off the power wielded by state institutions like the Police. The initiative took a significant dip in success after the PCSOs were removed, indicating a level of dependency.
9.	Ensure onward external continuation	The purpose of the community designing and delivering the interventions that are unique to a locality is to ensure that the Police have a 'step-back and sustain' (rather than an exit) strategy freeing resource up to tackle other localities and problems, leaving a self-sustaining legacy	There seems to have been little follow up by the Police to establish whether the community groups met their success criteria or felt satisfied with the LISP process, after the departure of the PCSOs

Table 5.14 Additional insights from Holy Sepulchre case study

	Additional insights from case study	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement
1.	Stable team	**Inspectors** ought to be clear about the resource implications of choosing to undertake a LISP, in terms of long-term commitment

	Additional insights from case study	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement
		(against a backdrop of 'weeks of action' and three-month long 'operations'). Outcomes based resource planning is required within LISPs rather than activity based.
		Sergeants need to decide with Inspectors on the justification to LISP. This was done by PCSOs as part of the trial, but a lack of understanding of the process and a lack of commitment to achieving the success determined by the LISP working group meant that as soon as crime rates appeared to dip, PCSOs were removed and not replaced through a planned transition process.
2.	Perspective taking	A cognitive shift required to think of all the different stakeholders in a given problem situation, and systematically think through their interest and investment in the status quo in that context. The needs to be a deliberate attempt to this, at the point of evaluating the potential stakeholder group. The interests (and perhaps importantly, the self-interest) of the stakeholders need to be considered, as does the lived experience of those stakeholders (empathy).

5.6. PROJECT 4: ALL SAINTS KETTERING

Case No.	Location	Origin	Priority Area	Crime	Confidence	Stable team	Mgt involved	LISP Quality
5	All Saints Kettering	Pilot	yes	steady	steady	no	no	Silver

Figure 4.40 Detail from Figure 5.2 regarding All Saints Kettering

The All Saints' Kettering LISP pilot began in 2011, a short time before the Intensive Engagement activities in Northamptonshire Police began in 2012. The choice of date for the commencement of the pilot is based on the date of an application to extend the boundaries of a Designated Public Place Orders (DPPO) from the town centre night-time economy area to the All Saints church district of Kettering. The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (CJPA) gave local authorities the power to designate public areas through the introduction of a Designated Public Place Order (DPPO). Designated Public Places Orders (DPPOs) help local authorities deal with the problems of alcohol related anti-social behaviour in public places. This order is not a total ban on drinking alcohol in public places but makes it an offence to carry on drinking when asked to stop by a constable or authorised officer. This application for a DPPO was approved by Kettering Borough Council in Dec 2012[100], coinciding with the training of the PCSO 'Nikita[101]' in the first cohort of LISP trainees. By April 2013, the system of flagging persistent anti-social behaviour for extended attention by PCSOs (the 'AO1 flag') had been triggered (AOI NP/5823/13- (Anti-Social Behaviour Crime)). The designation of the area as a DPPO as a response to complaints of street drinking and associated anti-social behaviour required significant additional policing resources to be deployed, particularly because PCSOs are not on shift during the late evenings and weekends, necessitating that uniformed PCs were deployed from the 'Nightsafe[102]' patrol activities from the town centre. The Nightsafe operation is a result of a Joint Action Group populated by Councillors, Community Safety Manager, Licensing

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[100] www.kettering.gov.uk/download/meetings/id/10061/a1_appendix_d [Accessed 11 Nov 2016] and www.kettering.gov.uk/download/meetings/id/10482/a1_-_appendix_d [Accessed 11 Nov 2016]

[101] A pseudonym. Nikita was not available for interview during the research period, but the LISP proforma and her replacement PCSO 'Jon Snow' (also a pseudonym) was not involved in the implementation of the LISP. Jon Snow did provide an interview verifying the facts but did not provide evidence regarding the the experience of the implementation process. See further Appendix Section 9.4

[102]

https://cmis.northamptonshire.gov.uk/cmis5live/Document.ashx?czJKcaeAi5tUFL1DTL2UE4zNRBcoShgo=TY73J GyDxo4KMl5dNL1phZKDFUajjpUIhxR2B3xDiLG4HYuqeryAeA%3D%3D&rUzwRPf%2BZ3zd4E7Ikn8Lyw%3D%3D =pwRE6AGJFLDNlh225F5QMaQWCtPHwdhUfCZ%2FLUQzgA2uL5jNRG4jdQ%3D%3D&mCTIbCubSFfXsDGW9IXnl g%3D%3D=hFflUdN3100%3D%3D&kCx1AnS9%2FpWZQ40DXFvdEw%3D%3D=hFflUdN3100%3D%3D&uJovDxwdjMPoY v%2BAJvYtyA%3D%3D=ctNJFf55vVA%3D%3D&FgPliEJYlotS%2BYGoBi5olA%3D%3D=NHdURQburHA%3D%3D&d9Qjj0a g1Pd993jsyOJqFvmyB7X0CSQK=ctNJFf55vVA%3D%3D&WGewmoAfeNR9xqBux0r1Q8Za60lavYmz=ctNJFf55vVA%3 D&WGewmoAfeNQ16B2MHuCpMRKZMwaG1PaO=ctNJFf55vVA%3D [Accessed 11 Nov 2016]

Manager from Kettering Borough, Council, Kettering Police, NHS/PCT, Chair of the Kettering Pubwatch, Kettering Taxi-drivers Association and the local Trade and Commerce[103].

The row of shops along the Rockingham Road location near All Saint's church in Kettering comprises a mix of local small shops on one side, and a Sainsbury's and petrol station on the other. The mix of independent shops, including hairdressers, restaurants, cafes and two licensed premises branded as 'eastern European' shops, despite being owned and operated by two different Asian men.

5.6.1.   DEMOGRAPHICS

The area of concern is within the Kettering 006A ward, an area in which 41% of the population are unskilled labour[104], with 22% of the population having no formal qualifications. The 2016 deprivation indices indicate that out of over 32,000 wards in the UK, this ward is in the lowest 5,000, and in crime terms ranks within the bottom 400 wards (372 out of 32,844). The living environment index also ranks this ward in the bottom 1,500 in the UK. Although the population are generally economically active in terms of age, the percentage accessing Jobseekers allowance were double the Kettering rate in August 2010. A total of 36% of the households in the area are one-person households, in high density 'houses of multiple occupancy'. The police officers involved reported that these are predominantly rooms to let within the Victorian tenement housing and converted factories behind Rockingham Road. Only 9% of the housing in Kettering is local authority owned, so there is a strong likelihood that this housing is all privately owned-to-let.

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[103]

https://cmis.northamptonshire.gov.uk/cmis5live/Document.ashx?czJKcaeAi5tUFL1DTL2UE4zNRBcoShgo=FXKX
BPe7Qnw8yJbs5iaiosrimvBkRYM3rd%2B3xZzunP0GSjWaDEiYfQ%3D%3D&rUzwRPf%2BZ3zd4E7Ikn8Lyw%3D
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9IXnIg%3D%3D=hFflUdN3100%3D%3D&kCx1AnS9%2FpWZQ40DXFvdEw%3D%3D=hFflUdN3100%3D%3D&uJovDxwdj
MPoYv%2BAJvYtyA%3D%3D=ctNJFf55vVA%3D%3D&FgPlIEJYlotS%2BYGoBi5olA%3D%3D=NHdURQburHA%3D%3D&d9
Qjj0ag1Pd993jsyOJqFvmyB7X0CSQK=ctNJFf55vVA%3D%3D&WGewmoAfeNR9xqBux0r1Q8Za60lavYmz=ctNJFf55vV
A%3D%3D&WGewmoAfeNQ16B2MHuCpMRKZMwaG1PaO=ctNJFf55vVA%3D [Accessed 11 Nov 2016]

[104]

http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/NeighbourhoodSummary.do?width=1366&a=7&r=1
&i=1001&m=0&s=1478873165366&enc=1&profileSearchText=NN16+8JS&searchProfiles= [Accessed 11 Nov
2016]

5.6.2. CRIME DATA

Figure 5.41 shows the area from which the public crime data are selected. The reported 'catchment' of the LISP was the shop fronts along Rockingham road, particularly the gardens at the front of St Andrews Church at the end of the Lindsay Street cul-de-sac, up to the junction of Regent street, but the whole block around Wellington Street was considered by the PCSO Nikita to be part of the problem situation (see rich pictures later). The Sainsbury's shop and fuel station on Rockingham road has been included, but distinguished in the data below, as a comparator, as one would expect reasonably high levels of crime activity at a fuel station due to thefts from the shop and driving away without paying for fuel.

Figure 5.41 Kettering LISP Crime data area December 2012[105]

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[105] https://www.police.uk/northamptonshire/SCT122/crime/2012-12/+NhKTAT/ [accessed 2nd Dec 2016]

Monthly Reported Crime data for Kettering LISP Jan 2012 to Dec 2015

Figure 5.42 Monthly Reported Crime data for Kettering LISP Jan 2012 to Dec 2015, from Police.uk data

Figure 5.42 shows the collated monthly reported crime figures for the Kettering LISP area, compared to those reported for the Sainsbury's location. Figure 5.43 shows the same data, annualised. Both data sets have a linear trend-line superimposed. The trend lines confirm that the levels of crime have dropped very slightly for the Kettering LISP location, whereas the levels of reported crime for Sainsbury's location have increased over the same period. Indeed, the implementation of the DPPO in April 2013 seems to coincide with a rise in reported crime, to a peak in Sept/Oct 2013 where both Sainsbury's and the LISP location experiences the highest reported crime rate. ASB dropped off in November 2013, only to rise to 2012 levels in January 2014. It is possible to surmise that the amount of disorder did not increase in this period, but the increased deployment of officers to this location due to the DPPO may have resulted in more crimes being reported or recorded than when this location was not the focus of police attention.

Figure 5.43 Annual Reported Crime data for Kettering LISP 2012-2015, from Police.uk data

Figure 5.43 also shows the reported crime data for the Kettering LISP broken down into crime types, with a focus on the incidence of anti-social behaviour (ASB) and street violence. Other crime types were bundled into the Other category, but were primarily limited to associated street disorder categories like violence, theft from vehicle, public disorder and 'criminal damage and arson'. The last category is likely to be primarily associated with people sleeping rough in the area around and behind the church. This is confirmed by the regular incidence of this crime type being associated with a reporting location on Lindsay Street[106]. Another common reporting location was on the junction of Princes Street and Wellington Street, and a little further down Wellington Street. What was interesting was that the majority of the ASB reports were located in Crown Street behind Rockingham Road, rather than on Rockingham Road itself. The reason for reporting the crimes at this location by the PCSOs and Police officers is unknown, but the location coincides with the yard behind the two shops that are at the heart of the street drinking. The yard is open and insecure at night, and as the picture shows in Figure 5.44, open to the street. This may have resulted in the majority of the incidents being dealt with on the Rockingham Road side, but also being reported behind the main shops on Crown Street. The Chinese take-away on Wellington Street may also

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[106] The actual locations of reported crimes are not made publicly available, so these locations are indicative of where the crime was reported, rather than specifically where the crime was committed.

account for some of the crimes being reported there. The other location for these reported crimes was Lindsay Street which is a small open cul-de-sac adjacent to the Church. The violent crime category for this LISP location falls steadily over the four years of data, as does the 'other' category of crimes, but anti-social behaviour increases, despite the various efforts of the police in this location.

Figure 5.44 Picture of Kettering LISP location from Crown Street

The average number of crimes reported in the Sainsbury's location rose from 3.3 crimes per month in 2012 to 4.3 crimes per month in 2015, (a 30% increase), whereas ASB in the LISP location rose 17% from 6.3 crimes reported per month to 7.3 crimes per month.

5.6.3.   LOCALLY IDENTIFIED PRIORITIES

Figure 5.45 shows the summary data on Locally Identified Priorities collected by Northamptonshire Police between 2009 and 2012, just before the commencement of the LISP pilots. In Kettering, the Police collected 4,904 responses over the 3-year period, 53% (n=2,304) of which reported no problems in their area. This is a better figure than the Holy Sepulchre figure of 29% (Table 5.11). Thereafter, the top three most reported concerns were related to anti-social behaviour and parking in narrow streets (Table 5.15). Nuisance in the street and people being drunk or rowdy were significantly more of a problem for those in Kettering, than

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Northampton, (Nuisance in the Street: n=499 19.2% in Kettering, and 11% of Northampton. People being drunk: n= 357, 13.7% in Kettering and 8% in Northampton).

LIPS for Kettering

No problems	2304
Nuisance in the street	499
People being drunk or rowdy	357
Parking problems	351
Vandalism/graffiti	223
Vehicle crime	212
Drug dealing/use	179
Noisy neighbours	147
Speeding vehicles	140
Dog fouling	120
Street lighting broken	92
Litter	89
Burglary of Homes	71
Lack of things to do	39
Violent crime	20
Motor cycle nuisance	19
Retail crime	13
Community tension	12
Cycling on pavements	10
Cold calling	4
Purse/bag theft	2
Prostitution	1

Data range
13-Dec-09
15-Jul-12

Figure 5.45 LIPS data for the whole of Kettering 2009-2012

Table 5.15 Top Locally Identified Priorities in Kettering as a whole

Issue	Number	% of Total	Northampton
No problems	2304	47.0%	nd
Nuisance in the street	499	10.2%	11%
People being drunk or rowdy	357	7.3%	8%
Parking problems	351	7.2%	5%
Vandalism/graffiti	223	4.5%	3%
Vehicle crime	212	4.3%	3%
Drug dealing/use	179	3.7%	3%
Noisy neighbours	147	3.0%	4%
Speeding vehicles	140	2.9%	5%
Dog fouling	120	2.4%	1%
Street lighting broken	92	1.9%	1%

811 LIPS data points were collected in the Kettering LISP location. These were collected from Rockingham Road, Regent Street, King Street, Crown Street, Wellington Road and Lindsay Road which border the LISP project location.

Table 5.16 Top five locally identified priorities in LISP Project location

LIPS issue	Number	% of LISP location	% of Kettering
No problems	324	66.5%	47.0%
People being drunk or rowdy	89	18.3%	7.3%
Parking problems	79	16.2%	7.2%
Vehicle Crime	61	12.5%	4.3%
People causing a nuisance in the street	54	11.1%	10.2%
Vandalism, graffiti and other deliberate damage	53	10.9%	4.5%

Table 5.16 compares the locally identified priorities from survey respondents located within the LISP project area, compared to Kettering as a whole. It shows that although a greater proportion of the respondents think that there are no problems in the district (66% are not concerned, compared to 47% across Kettering), the sorts of behaviours that contribute to this being a LISP project, anti-social behaviour, are also significantly greater than Kettering as a whole. People being drunk and rowdy and people causing a nuisance in the street are 9 and 10 points higher than the rest of Kettering, respectively. The respondents to the LIPS surveys were less aware of the violent crime (0.4% of respondents noted this as a problem) or retail crime (0.2% of respondents) despite the high incidence of reported crimes of these types in this neighbourhood, further reinforcing the problem that publicly collected data on community priorities are out of step with known crime problems.

5.6.4. PRIORITY AREA REPORT

This district of Kettering became subject to a Priority Area (PA6) analysis in April 2014. It should be noted that this data was not available to the LISP-practicing

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PCSO 'Nikita' during the duration of her work, whose LISP Proforma report was completed in July 2014. It is necessary to consider this information as part of this systems review of the data because it covers the sort of data that might have been made available to the PCSO in preparation for her intensive community engagement. This will be reviewed, in order to contrast with her grasp of the problem situation that will be investigated in Section 5.6.5 below, especially as the Priority Area Reports are desk-top studies using proxy data and the PCSOs intensive investigations are based on street level research.

This priority area report (in two Parts: McKenzie, 2014 and McKenzie & Curtis, 2015[107]) opens with commentary about the population being "fairly transient with high numbers of rental properties and a significant shift in the daytime demographic within the priority area" (McKenzie, 2014:4[108]). The area covered by PA6 is significantly larger than the LISP Pilot (covering the All Saints ward which was the focus of the LISP, but also Avondale Grange, Northfield, Pipers Hill and William Knibb wards). The report was influenced, however, by the LISP pilot. Figure 5.46 shows the catchment of the PA6 analysis, but also notes the boundary of the LISP project area[109].

The report notes the incidence of multiple deprivation and the problem of short term letting of properties, which are also indicators that the analysis of the PCSO was impacting on the attention of the PA6 analyst. Page 23 of the PA6 report also notes that a LISP had been developed in 2011, and that a hotspot caused by alcohol related violence coincides with the LISP area.

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[107] McKenzie, S and Curtis, L (2014) Problem Profile: Priority Area 6 (PA6) Part 2. Northamptonshire Police 01/07/14
[108] McKenzie, S (2014) Problem Profile: Priority Area 6 (PA6) Part 1. Northamptonshire Police 16/04/2014
[109] The notion of a boundary to the LISP area demonstrated the bounded view of the analyst, who may not be aware that the LISP pilot had a 'centre of interest' but no boundary. The PCSOs were briefed to 'follow the problem' so that all of the key issues and factors were included. This becomes evident later in PCSO Nikita's LISP Proforma Report

Figure components: LISP area; Peak repeat premises Co-op Extra; Hotspot for all crime, SAC, Violence, criminal damage to dwellings; Mill Road: Top ranked street in repeat street matrix; Hotspot for damage to vehicle 2013 - 2014

Figure 5.46 Map of PA6 Kettering Priority Area analysis

On Page 7, the report identifies the priority streets, the top being Mill Street, some distance from the centre of the LISP area (see also Figure 5.46), Regent Street, King Street and Rockingham Rd which feature in the LISP area, are connected to each other in a distinct district and therefore present a coherent neighbourhood. Bath Road is ranked as equal first, but it is a 2-mile long road, and no analysis is presented as to whether there is a concentration of activity within that length.

Hotspot analysis (Figure 5.47) for 'all crimes' seems to exclude ASB but confirms two areas around the LISP pilot area, 1 Wellington Street/Tresham Street and Regent/Rockingham Streets. Hotspots 3,4 and 5 seem to relate primarily to burglaries, domestic violence and repeat offenders and victims who are profiled in detail in pages 16-18 of the PA6 report. The report also flags a community centre as being a location particularly vulnerable to repeat reports of incidences by virtue of the nature of the services it provides (page 15) as well as a specific location "repeatedly targeted and has been broken into on 7 occasions" (McKenzie, 2014, p30)

Figure 4.3 – All crime hotspots 2013 - 2014

The hotspot areas featured are located as follows:
1. Wellington Street/Tresham Street
2. Regent Street/Rockingham Road
3. Montagu Street/Barnwell Street
4. Mill Road/Thorngate Street/Gordon Street
5. Mill Road/Edmund Street

Figure 5.47 Hotspot analysis for PA6 Kettering (McKenzie, 2014, p14)

Anti-social behaviour is dealt with in the second part of the report (McKenzie and Curtis, 2015), and Figure 5.48 illustrates the analysis which concludes "Whilst Montagu Street and Wellington Street feature heavily in the top streets affected by ASB, the majority of hotspot one is focused around Club Street, which covers a far smaller area." The redacted report seems to indicate that one location only in Club Street accounts for the hotspot there, but the ASB problem situation seems to extend beyond the block of streets dealt with in the reported crime analysis in Section 5.6.2 above. Nevertheless, the thinking of the PCSO who developed the LISP project seemed to have the spread of ASB issues from the Rockingham Street shops through the multiple occupancy accommodation in the hinterland of hotspot 2 below.

Figure 8 – A01 Incidents March 13 to February 14

The highest concentration of ASB incidents can be found in the following locations;
1. Club Street/Wellington Street/Montagu Street
2. Crown Street
3. Crossing of Edmund Street and Mill Road

Figure 5.48 Hotspot Analysis for Antisocial Behaviour (McKenzie and Curtis, 2014, p14)

The report also highlighted a difficulty with the system of flagging repeat ASB problems (the 'AO1 system) pointing out "a distinct difference in where ASB incidents are occurring and where the A01's are occurring and being recorded" (McKenzie and Curtis, 2014, p15). The report surmises "The discrepancy between where ASB incidents and A01's are occurring may be due to certain ASB incidents missing the repeat incident threshold, therefore the highest concentration of incidents does not correlate to the highest concentration of A01's" (McKenzie and Curtis, 2014, p15) but this is again picked up by the scope of the problem suggested by the PCSO involved in the LISP pilot; those reporting or experiencing a crime problem may not be located in the immediate vicinity of the actual commissioning of the crime or the recording of the crime by the police officer. This discrepancy makes hotspot analysis from secondary data alone quite vulnerable to error, and the 'ground truthing (Pickles, 1995, p179)' of the PCSO engaged in intensive engagement is vital.

The report also covers domestic violence, child protect, child exploitation and drug misuse crime patterns, all confirming that the core LISP area contributed to more than just ASB. ASB could be said to be the visible aspect of the social problems in this neighbourhood. The report extends its analysis well beyond the remit of the

previous PA reports, noting food bank usage and truancy rates in the local schools, placing each school in either the 4th or lowest quintile of all schools in England (McKenzie and Curtis, 2014, p24) reflecting a more sophisticated appreciation of the conditions that lead to crime, rather than just noting the patterns of crime.

The PA6 report is also quite distinct from the other Priority Area reports in being more focused on the vulnerability of the location, identifying repeat offenders and victims (reflective of another strand of development work going on in the Northamptonshire Police at the time) and identifying buildings rather than just hotspot streets. It also provides a suite of complex recommendations for action (McKenzie, 2014, p5,6 and McKenzie & Curtis, 2014, p5,6) which will be compared with those proposed by the PCSO 'Nikita'. The report also provided a partial report on community associations and buildings present in the locality "as a means to provide crime prevention advice, alongside partner agencies offering support with domestic abuse and mental health related issues". This partially addresses the 'asset-based community development' strategy developed in the LISP project (McKenzie and Curtis, 2014, p26).

5.6.5.   THE KETTERING LISP PILOT

The LISP pilot developed by PCSO 'Nikita' was reported on in May 2013 (and updated in July 2014, which will be discussed below) in a standard LISP proforma. In conceptualising the problem, 'Nikita' focussed immediately on the language barriers implicit in the street drinking problem. The photo (Figure 5.49) in the first page highlighted that Polish and Russian speaking people were the primary source of the problem, and that drinking was being facilitated from the back of the shops. The introduction of the LISP report states "Crown Street compound is an off road "secure site" that is used as rear access to a number of shops, including Kettering Food and Wine Centre. Persons were purchasing alcohol through the rear doors, sold to staff members, and then sitting in the area drinking through the night." (Kettering LISP Proforma May 2013). Nevertheless, 'Nikita' demonstrated an awareness of the problem being more widespread than the immediate locale, noting similar behaviour in neighbouring streets. She also noted "Initial engagement and education of persons caught in DPPO area has not yielded a reduction in self-generated police incidents. Prolific offenders are taking no notice." (Kettering LISP Proforma May 2013).

Figure 5.49 Polish and Russian sign on Kettering sign

Despite conceptualising the problem in a sophisticated manner using rich pictures the activity on the ground did not yield the focus on identifying and recruiting stakeholders that was anticipated, with 'Nikita' reporting:

> "I have no stakeholders wiling (sic) to take part in a working group at the moment due to on-going personal issues. At some point I will re-evaluate this issue but for now it is purely a police based working group." (Kettering LISP Proforma May 2013).

Whilst she was able to elicit a police-centred vision "Success would be (as indicated on original RP) for no hotspots to remain in the DPPO – although sporadic and seasonal issues could be expected from time to time", it is clear from her frustration at recruiting community stakeholders, that the early stages of the LISP experiment did not attract community engagement, and her colleagues resorted to a police-led set of actions- the Solutions and Practices section of the proforma offered no solutions but three police-led practices including more patrolling and enforcement.

By July 2014, however, marked progress had been reported in an updated LISP proforma. In a year, PCSO Nikita had developed the scope and detail of her LISP pilot with evidence of more rich-picture based problem analysis from a wider range of stakeholders (Kettering LISP Proforma July 2014), with a few more active

stakeholders, including widening their scope to landlords and employers of the street drinkers. This is an important strategic shift, as the analysis shifts away from the direct symptomatic behaviour to seeking to intervene in the conditions that give rise to the behaviour (their living conditions) and patterns of cultural expectations exacerbated by the short-term employment and living arrangements. Although the connections with the employers were at a low level (they accepted to brief their workers and provide posters) Nikita had indicated in an un-recorded conversation that her aim to change the employers' recruitment policy to reduce the number of single, male and short-term workers, and also change the letting policies of the landlords to lengthen the minimum stay of the residents, thereby increasing their investment in civic behaviours. In the meantime, more focussed enforcement action was taken against the shops supplying the alcohol, with the participation of other public-sector partners. This resulted in one shop's owner losing his operating licence and a range of other statutory enforcement measures being instigated.

A wider range of interventions were also being instigated; facilitated by two Environmental Visual Audits (EVA) (Millie and Herrington 2005). EVA were used in a number of police interventions under the rubric of reassurance policing, where local statutory agencies conduct a walk around an area of concern with a view to tackling low level issues. The weaknesses of the EVA are that they rely on the analytical and problem-solving capabilities of those on the walk, they do not systematically consider root causes of crime rather than symptoms and there is no structured system for ensuring that all agencies fund and deliver the proposed solutions. Although PCSO Nikita reports again that there are no 'community groups' to get involved, she is clearly thinking of individuals, rather than a community of organisations. Nevertheless, she reports beginning to have meetings with employers, landlords and owners of non-residential property, which are a different type of community, of organisations rather than individuals.

The Mode 1 Soft Systems Analysis for this case is provided in the Appendix in Section 9.4, which provides the researchers detailed analytical process which led to the following observations on the mechanisms, including identifying possible new mechanisms.

5.6.6. OBSERVATIONS ON MECHANISMS

Table 5.17 Kettering: Neighbourhood Policing evidence

	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of Kettering LISP pilot
	What works		
1.	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	In-depth investigation of the police crime problem in the context of the other problems experienced in the locality	The LISP got a good start because the PCSOs had been working in this district for some time, but was redeployed before the LISP initiative had been completed
2.	Full and consistent application of interventions	The training of PSCOs (and subsequent evaluation of the quality of their LISP work), and standard proforma, to capture the progression of the intensive engagement	The LISP initiative was not completed. The proforma did not report on solutions, some practices were identified, but no evaluation criteria were identified
3.	Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time	Success, i.e. depth of understanding of the problem and success of the interventions is determined by the working group rather than police timeframes	The time allocated to the PCSO was insufficient for a critical mass to be sustained. The PCSO was working on her own for the majority of the time, and had to deal with being abstracted for other tasks. The replacement officer (Jon Snow) indicated that the work was not entirely lost because of the institutional memory of the LISP proforma
4.	Proactive contact	Deliberate choices are made at the screening	The PCSO was creating proactive contact. The 'perpetrators' were not

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	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of Kettering LISP pilot
		stage about the importance of the locality to policing outcomes. Process requires identification of all potential stakeholder groups, including hard to reach.	included and there was not systematic attempt to ensure that all types of people had the opportunity to engage in the process 'a process of othering'. The working group of landlords, employers and licensing team was never convened
5.	A group of residents	Where community organisations appropriate to the problems don't exist, the LISP process creates the social capital and networks to allow this to happen	In this situation, residents were only marginally involved, but it was intended that a community of businesses, landlords etc were to be pulled together to improve social capital
6.	Joint problem solving	Co-production of the problem analysis and solving stages is central	There was evidence of the problem analysis being shared with agency partners, but not community members, residents or the perpetrators of the problems.
	What is promising		
7.	A consistent process	As above	The primary PCSO was redeployed mid-LISP, despite having been on the neighbourhood for several years and having made significant progress already
8.	Highly connected individuals	The LISP working group is made up of highly	The LISP did not achieve a regular working group meeting. The police

	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of Kettering LISP pilot
		connected and highly capable people,	officer indicated that multiple bi-lateral discussions were taking place
9.	Support is won	Working group members elicit a clearly understood self-interest that underpins expected successes to secure and 'win' support	Success was not mapped out, nor was a vision rich picture developed, so the project foundered without the implicit vision and continued involvement of the PCSO
10	Attuned to community dynamics	The rich picturing processes develop a nuanced and empathetic understanding of the community and the issues and tensions within it.	The proforma indicated that the PCSO was attuned and empathetic to a wide range of views and perspective, but this wasn't carried through into the new personnel.
11	Tacit skills	Training, with the aid of the publicly available Handbook, briefings to senior officers and a process of identifying the best implementations of LISP and mentoring of officers ensure that police skills are embedded and propagated across the force	This PCSO didn't benefit from a fully developed training course, as this was being developed by her. She did participate in several workshops where issues in implementation were debated and from one-to-one sessions. Long experience in the neighbourhood and a personal orientation towards community involvement seemed to be the driving factor

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	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Features of Kettering LISP pilot
12	Not reliant on multi-agency delivery	Where statutory partners are actively engaged, LISP provides a clear and discrete method for limited involvement. Where statutory agencies are not engaged, LISP provides a clear evidence base for Police and community to hold statutory agencies to account.	The team started off without statutory partner involvement, but extended the CPP with the local authority, addressed the off-licenses behaviour through Licensing and were beginning to address the enforcement of houses of multiple occupancy standards with the housing department.

Table 5.18 Kettering: Pawson's Public Policy 'hidden' mechanisms

	Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of Kettering LISP case
1.	Recruit the stakeholders with care	Looking for the most highly connected, capable, and motivated: whose self-interest and motivation to contribute to public safety is understood	The initial street level engagements focussed solely on the immediate perpetrators and victims, but as the Intensive Engagement progressed more strategic influencers were identified, although it doesn't seem as if highly connected community influencers were identified. There was an

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	Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of Kettering LISP case
			emphasis on statutory agency action.
2.	Create expectations of change	Intensive Engagement is oriented towards collaboratively deciding on what change is needed, to design Solutions & Practices	The collaborative elements developed very slowly, first with a local business, and then with landlords, estate agents and licensing. There seems to be no evidence that a meeting of all the stakeholders at the same time was convened
3.	Demand effort from stakeholders	The LISP approach is designed to flip the Police response from 'what can we do?' to 'What solutions have you got?' for the Police.	There was an emerging responsibilisation of estate agents and landlord, and licensing were tasked to increase enforcement actions
4.	Offer encouragement and feedback	The process is designed to recognise existing assets and capabilities that the community, with the help of the Police, that can be enhanced to support Police outcomes	The existing assets of the community were not systematically and deeply investigated, or recruited. Local businesses and community organisations were not organised together into a collaborative group
5.	Build trust and resilience	Long-term, locally based relationships are key to developing mature LISP informed interventions	Local businesses and community organisations were not organised together into a collaborative group
6.	Make accommodations for set-backs	The embedding of the Motivational Interviewing 'stages of change model'	MI skills were not explicitly engaged in this process. Set-backs here were caused by an

	Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of Kettering LISP case
		accounts for set-backs within the process of engagement	"unknown unknown" redeployment and restructuring of the local policing team in favour for another innovation strategy. 'Know unknowns' were not recorded.
7.	Explain the theory of change	The theory of change for LISP is described as "collaboratively designed solutions and co-produced practices are more robust than short-term projects and limited engagement"	The theory of change emerged slowly, and focussed on changing the policy environment with respect to employment conditions and letting arrangements, alongside direct enforcement of a couple of off-licenses.
8.	Share execution and control of the intervention	The whole LISP model is built on recruiting capable and connected decision-makers and resources to the support of Police outcomes, and an attempt to 'loosen the reins' of Police controlled design and implementation	There seemed to be no clear attempt to devolve power from the police and statutory authorities, even in the team that took over from PCSO Nikita. The team that took over were officers who had not been trained in LISP.
9.	Ensure onward external continuation	The purpose of the community designing and delivering the interventions that are unique to a locality is to ensure that the Police have a 'step-back and sustain' (rather than an exit) strategy freeing resource up to tackle other localities and problems,	The LISP pilot was still a predominantly internal or statutory agency focussed process, rather than truly community based, so once the statutory agents and police have moved on in terms of personnel or workload, the community will

Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement	Features of Kettering LISP case
	leaving a self-sustaining legacy	have very little cohesion on which to continue collaboration

Table 5.19 Additional insights from the Kettering case study

	Additional insights from case study	Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement
1.	Hidden community	Attention should be paid to the less obvious communities of interest. Whilst there was a strong sense in which the street drinking was being driven by transient workers and off-licenses exploiting the immediate situation, the more powerful communities of interest were the estate agents, landlords and employers, whose interests in the features of the problem situation were significant but invisible. When doing the scanning stage in the early part of the LISP process, there needs to be a more specific attention given to the owners or operators of buildings and consider them as a part of the community of interest
2.	Connecting communities	The briefing in the LISP documentation regarding the stakeholders is to ask whether they can be connected to together. This is too oblique. This case indicates strongly that vulnerability localities suffer from low bonding social capital (especially when the residents are transient) and social cohesion is low. Bringing eastern European workers together may be a part of the solution, but also bringing together business interests (who might not understand their responsibility to a given neighbourhood) like landlord and employers of specific segments of the population (bridging social capital). This requires much harder work bringing together and motivating stakeholders who might consider their contribution to a neighbourhood to be even more minimal than the transient residents.

5.7. REMAINING PROJECTS

In this chapter, detailed Mode 1 Soft Systems Analyses were undertaken for four of the eight projects. These were analysed based on a range of criteria, indicated in Figure 5.50. All bar 3 projects were part of the piloting of LISP, i.e. initiated by PCSOs that were part of the development of the LISP Handbook, or trained in a subsequent training event. Three of the four projects were also subsequently identified by Northamptonshire Police as within Priority Area, part of a wider focus on five of the most vulnerable areas in the force. The participants in the four projects that were investigated in detail reported a reduction or steady crime rate (regardless of what the reported Police UK statistics might indicate after the fact), and that confidence of the public in the police service had risen or remained steady. Two of the projects (1 and 2) had a stable PCSO team and the involvement of management in the LISP process, and the proforma produced were graded as Gold in a standard rubric. The other two (3 and 4) did not have a stable team or significant management involvement, but still achieved a Silver standard in the implementation of the LISP, as reported in the proforma. These have been investigated in detail as representing 'successful' LISP pilots even if crime rates were not directly affected.

Case No.	Location	Origin	Priority Area	Crime	Confidence	Stable team	Mgt involved	LISP Quality
1	Spencer/Asian Gold	Pilot	yes	down	up	yes	yes	Gold
2	Spencer Haven	Self generated	yes	down	up	yes	yes	Gold
3	Holy Sepulchre	Pilot	no	steady	steady	no	no	Silver
4	All Saints Kettering	Pilot	yes	steady	steady	no	no	Silver
5	Daventry Skatepark	Pilot	no	low	up	yes	no	Gold
6	Towcester	Self generated	no	down	up	no	yes	Bronze
7	Daventry no LISP	N/A	no	steady	steady	yes	no	None
8	Wellingborough no LISP	N/A	no	up	down	no	no	None

Figure 5.50 Selection criteria for LISP case-studies

The remaining four projects available in this research did not achieve these criteria and are therefore analysed by summary and contrast with the successful LISP pilots. Case 5, the Daventry skate park was a pilot, but not in a Priority Area (Kettering was the only part of the force outside Northampton town that was selected as a Priority Area). It achieved only a steadying of crime rates and confidence, in the view of the interviewees, but did not enjoy significant management involvement despite having a consistent team throughout the period. The LISP proforma, however, was judged a Gold standard, primarily

because it was able to access significant levels of existing social capital in the neighbourhood (discussed later). The Towcester case, a retail centre example, was generated by a PCSO who had been trained but in a county town that was not considered to be a Priority Area for the force. Although management were involved, the team was not stable, but was deemed successful in terms of crime rates and confidence, but the LISP proforma submitted was graded as Bronze. The final two projects are where interviews were able to be secured with PCSOs with LISP training, but where no LISP pilot or proforma was forthcoming. The 'failure' of these projects are useful to contrast with those deemed more successful. These projects are detailed in the Appendix.

5.8. OBSERVATIONS FROM THE DATA

This chapter has reported on four of the eight projects in a lot of detail, first providing a naturalistic rich description of the case with evidence from a wide range of sources, from street observations and internet based demographic data, and then structuring this analysis using a Soft Systems Methodology Mode 1 framework. The review of each case study then covers the implementation phases of the LISP, based on the LISP proforma submitted by the lead PCSO in each situation, supported by post-hoc interview data from the PCSOs and colleagues.

The projects then were evaluated using a standard Mode 1 soft systems analysis (detailed in the Appendix), in particular, aimed at producing conceptual models of each of the problem situations, based on the CATWOE analyses and rich pictures developed by those involved in the LISP problem situation. These are then taken forward to a Mode 2 SSM analysis in the next chapter.

The final task for each case study was to establish (in the Observations on Mechanisms sections) whether the known mechanisms within policing community engagement literature, and Pawson's own policy intervention mechanisms, were being triggered in each of the projects. Finally, each case yielded possible new mechanisms that have to be in place, that had not already been covered by the known police or Pawson mechanisms.

The detailed investigation of these projects establishes that the LISP framework for Intensive Engagement in neighbourhood policing consistently reflects 'what works' and 'what is promising' in neighbourhood policing literature (Table 3.5 and

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Table 3.6), as well as the Pawson mechanisms (Table 3.7) in Chapter. 3. On the whole, none of the projects comprehensively implemented the whole LISP framework, especially omitting the latter evaluative components. Regardless of this, it is still possible to establish what works, and in what contexts, because of the mechanisms that underlie the implementation processes.

The Priority Area documentation that was made available to some of the projects significantly aided the screening and planning stages of the LISP framework, but the use of desktop datasets meant that the information was inaccurate compared to real life. Further, the officers' understanding of the crime rates in their areas was restricted to short-term patterns, and were very different to the published rates. Cumulative and long-term patterns were not routinely used to aid risk analysis.

The police-collected 'public priorities' data (LIPS) was demographically biased, underrepresenting ethnic minorities, and were statistically spurious, but yet were used to inform resourcing decisions. Further, public expectations of police priorities were vastly different from the actual crime patterns in any given area. There is a gulf of misunderstanding on the part of the public with respect to crime priorities. The perpetrators of the crime patterns were rarely, if ever, involved in understanding the problem situation, let alone helping to develop solutions.

Police teams found it hard to respond to setback. They needed a lot of encouragement to persist with Intensive Engagement, especially in the early stages of engagement. They were easily put off by language or cultural barriers to access. Further, other hard to reach minorities like the elderly and those with learning disabilities, are left out of generic police interventions and communications.

Raising awareness of crime without establishing a framework to respond to the crime increases anxiety and lowers to legitimacy of the police. Asking the public for help in 'solving the problem', however, can improve legitimacy if prior trust has been established. Developing a complex mix of 'contingent interventions' led to the most robust IE results; but the effects of standard NP interventions are very transient. A rapid turnover of stakeholders (no longer a rare occurrence) culminates in short-term gains only.

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The CATWOE and rich picture analyses of the projects confirmed the overall 'what works' and Pawson mechanisms present in some or all of the more successful projects. New insights were developed with respect to the influence of 'liminal' or contestation of space in the projects. Where bonding and bridging social capital is low, and where public spaces that have no clear and uniform expectations of behaviour, contestation between the settled users of the space and new (or hidden) users leads to an 'othering' of the 'perpetrators'. The politicised 'naming' of anti-social behaviour by the police and more powerful (with high bridging social capital) seems to result in a contest for control of the space. Where private space is invaded (as in the burglaries) the liminal spaces that facilitate the commission of the crimes (like the streetscapes) are rarely considered as part of the neighbourhood policing process, except where a focus on 'broken windows' draws attention. Where 'broken windows' are not so obvious, attention to the spatial aspects of the crime patterns is rarely considered, in preference for 'thematic attention' through 'weeks of action' focussed on one crime type only. Such liminal and contested spaces are not entirely empty of meaning, and the LISP process allows for the stratified and laminar experiences and meanings of the reality to become more manifest.

Overall, the LISPs seem to falter on the ability to genuinely build social capital between residents, the police and the perpetrators of the anti-social behaviour and the other types of crime. There are several points at which the 'capital' is difficult to 'build' or collate. Referring back to Section 3.6.1, the social entrepreneur (in these cases the social entrepreneur is not necessarily the PCSO, it could be any of the agents involved in the LISP projects) brings together resources (capital) and configures them in new ways (networks), even when they are not directly under their control. As argued in Section 3.6.3, this organising of both social capital resources and the networks through which they flow, is not solely a matter of the skills, experience or talent of the social entrepreneur, but requires a process. The extent to which none of the projects here fully implemented all aspects of the process involved in the LISP Handbook seems relevant.

Each of the projects have provided different evidence to underpin the mechanisms presented by the policing, community and public policy intervention literature presented in Section 3.8. These mechanisms go beyond the theme of building or

organising of social capital, per se, to cover the way in which the social problems themselves are conceptualised, experienced and shared, through to the modes of the delivery of the community engagement itself. Some of the projects contributed new insights that had not already been identified in the existing literature. The Asian Gold project success highlighted the need for a long-term stable team of LISP practitioners and well as exploring the dynamics of the quid pro quo relationship between the community groups and the police in delivering on the expected outcomes. The Spencer Haven project highlighted the need for a mix of interventions, something that the Asian Gold project also implicitly included. The Kettering project highlighted the need to consider and carefully involve hidden communities, something shared with the 'aunties' of the Asian Gold project and the deaf community of the Spencer Haven project. The last of the additional insights does, however, return to an implicit theme of bridging social capital, of connecting communities together who may live in the same locality and use the same spaces but don't share the same cultural and civil spaces. These insights are taken forward to Chapter. 7 for more rigorous testing and theory building.

The next section of this chapter reviews the remaining case-studies that were not as well developed and undertakes the Mode II SSM analysis, that is, examining the LISP framework for Intensive Engagement (and this research) as an intervention in its own right, and examining the situation as a 'social system' and a 'political system'. This further addresses (in Chapter. 6) the second research question; the investigation of the pilots of the Handbook; and the third question; having identified the mechanisms at play within the pilots, the next step will be to test (in Chapter. 7) the context-mechanism-outcome chains.

CHAPTER. 6.   SSM MODE 2 ANALYSIS

The previous chapters have addressed the intellectual antecedents of the LISP Handbook, setting out the foundations and heritage of the Handbook both in theory and practice. Its diverse roots in psychotherapy, community development, organisational change management, neighbourhood policing and social innovation have been brought together into a consistent and repeatable 8 step process of engagement with communities. This Handbook was trialled in 8 different contexts, five of which have been considered in detail using Checkland's Soft Systems Methodology as an analytical framework, and the remaining four described by exception. The detailed project analyses have used a wide range of naturally occurring, interview and observational data to derive a series of observations regarding the presence of mechanisms operating within each of the projects, derived from the literature on what works in neighbourhood policing (which in turn is based on what works in community development and social innovation literature) and also from Pawson's own research on what works in public policy interventions. The analysis also proposes some mechanisms that are derived directly from the projects themselves. Before moving on to testing these mechanisms, Soft Systems Methodology requires a Mode 2 analysis of the whole project, stepping back from the detail of each of the projects to consider the wider context.

According to Jackson (2000) and Checkland and Scholes (1999), there are two modes of SSM, with Mode 1 concerned with the practical SSM application in a real-world step by step while Mode 2 deals with the use of SSM to learn about the situation itself (and that includes the intervention itself).

Mode 2 Soft Systems Analysis consists of "three examinations of the problem situation. The first examines the intervention itself, since this will inevitably itself effect some change in the problem situation. The second examines the situation as a 'social system', the third as a 'political system'. In both cases the phrases within inverted commas are used as in everyday language, rather than as technical terms. And in the case of all three 'cultural' enquiries, general models are used which relate respectively to problem solving, the social process and the power-based aspects of human affairs". (Checkland,1981 p. 30)

- **Analysis 1** - analysis of the intervention itself, recognises that intervening in a problem situation is itself a problem! It clarifies the roles of client (the person who commissioned the study, problem solver(s), and problem owner(s)).

- **Analysis 2** - 'social system' analysis which examines the culture of the situation studied in terms of roles (the social position of people in the problem situation), norms (their expected behaviours) and values (beliefs about the merit of those behaviours of role holders).

- **Analysis 3** - 'political system' analysis which examines power and how it is expressed and exercised in the problem situation

Analysis 1 and 2 are undertaken together in the following analysis, whereas Analysis 3 will be considered when all the projects have been analysed.

The social system analysis is influenced by the work of Sir Geoffrey Vickers and the appreciative system model (Checkland and Scholes, 1999, p.48). Checkland argues that three things interact with each other, these are: roles, norms and values. Each continually defines, redefines and is itself defined by the other two (Checkland and Scholes, 1999, p.49). It is a continuous process, out of which the analyst can successfully create a mental picture of norms, roles and values in the organisation[110].

6.1.1.   MODE 2 ANALYSIS 1: THE INTERVENTION ITSELF

The LISP framework for Intensive Engagement in neighbourhood policing is itself an intervention, an intervention in the police teams themselves, rather than into the communities that were the focus of the projects. The LISP 'project' reported here involved a large number of PCSOs and police officer teams in Northamptonshire Police, over a period of 2012 to 2015, a single police force, with a distinctive identity and demographic. It is a force area that covers 913 sq miles of predominantly rural and small-town territory, with a population of 0.7 million, a small force by UK standards. It has 3.1 police officers per 1,000 residents, lower than the UK average of 3.6 officers per 1,000. Since 2010, through the period of this study, the force reduced in size by 18%[111]. In 2013, Her Majesty's

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[110] In this context 'organisation' is not an entity, but the processes of organising within the LISP pilots
[111] Data from http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/northamptonshire/#neighbourhood=SCT162 [Accessed 05 June 2017]

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Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC[112]), in a series of 'PEEL' investigations and reports, expected that due to the withdrawal of external partner-funded police community support officers (PCSOs) posts, the number of PCSOs would reduce by 32% (HMIC 2013, p4).

In September 2014, HMIC also published an investigation into crime prevention across the UK, noting in a letter (HMIC 2014:2[113]) to Northamptonshire Police that it "found evidence of some neighbourhood preventive activity taking place; however, the force does not have a means of evaluating this work or sharing good practice easily". The force had provided some training to officers and staff, in particular to specialist officers in areas such as public protection. However formal crime prevention training has not been delivered to all staff who frequently deal with victims of crime and anti-social behaviour. Contrary to many other police forces' policy, Northamptonshire decided which crimes it will attend on the basis of the "threat, risk and harm to the victim, caller or community". Most other forces operated a 'all crimes attended" policy. HMIC considered this to be a good strategy, but operationally meant that a great deal of police time was wasted in attending reports rather than 'triaging' the reports at the point of receiving the call. The Police Inspector with whom this research collaborated was in command of the call receipt and logging process during part of the research period, and reflected many times that the PCSOs were being 'abstracted' to attend calls for service that could have been better triaged by experienced officers in the control room.

HMIC also concluded that "the force has a limited understanding of demand and how its resources are best deployed. The force would benefit from taking further steps to build a more detailed assessment of demand, including analysis of incidents and policing activity" (HMIC, 2014, p3). This reflected a national picture "During its inspection, HMIC identified two main obstacles that were preventing forces from taking advantage effectively of opportunities to advise the public: first,

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[112] HMIC (2013) Northamptonshire Police's response to the funding challenge July 2013 http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/northamptonshire-response-to-the-funding-challenge.pdf [Accessed 5 June 2017]
[113] HMIC (2014) Core business: An inspection of crime prevention, police attendance and use of police time. A letter to the Chief Constable 3 September 2014 http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/northamptonshire-core-business-letter.pdf [Accessed 5 June 2017]

the attitude of officers and staff to crime prevention, and secondly, their lack of crime prevention training." (HMIC, 2014a, p54[114])

This context of oversight and influence from HMIC can also be seen in the light of the 2011 Policy Exchange report Policing 2020 (Boyd and Skelton, 2011) that refocused police forces on the Peelian principles[115], and set the scene for the subsequent HMIC PEEL reports mentioned above. The report suggested that existing community policing teams should be "should be recast as Crime Prevention Officers (CPOs) ….that would be expected to ….garner strong working relationships with police partners and build trusting relationships with local communities through working for many years in the same area" (Boyd, 2012, p10). Amongst other suggested initiatives the report promoted the creation of "Citizen Police Academies[116] should be set up to generate a more participative policing model and to engage with the public on policing and crime" (Boyd and Skelton, 2012 p12).

Although the policy background seemed very supportive, with substantial direct advice from HMIC and innovative thinking from organisations like the Policy Exchange, the reality of the engagement with the police force in 2012-2014 was that such policy environment barely figured below Inspector level. The Inspector who instigated the engagement with the research (RJ) was at the start of the research a county commander, with responsibility for directing all police activity outside the town of Northampton. He, and the civilian officer supporting him (RD) were well versed in the changing political landscape and the operational challenges. The equivalent commander in the town did not share RJs concerns, and did not drive the emerging LISP framework in his command. Nevertheless, the despite the different operational responses, most of the self-emerging LISPs began in the town where the operational challenges were more obvious. Later, RJ was reshuffled to take command of the Control Centre, within which he was better able to affect the triaging of calls for service, and identify better the demand for

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[114] HMIC (2014a) Core business: An inspection into crime prevention, police attendance and the use of police time. http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/core-business.pdf [Accessed 5 June 2017]

[115] The Peelian principles present a unique approach to policing that derive "not from fear but almost exclusively from public co-operation with the police, induced by them designedly by behaviour which secures and maintains for them the approval, respect and affection of the public." Reith, C. New Study of Police History,1956

[116] Never implemented, but the threads of which were established in the UK Citizens in Policing work http://www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Support/Citizens/Pages/default.aspx [Accessed 5 June 2017]

service on the force, and subsequently the abstraction of PCSOs from crime prevention to basic responses to calls.

In this wider context the Inspector RJ was the problem holder, and communicated across a variety of forums about the nature of the policing problem, especially the loss of confidence in the purpose of neighbourhood policing in the face of severe cuts to police numbers. For RJ, this would result in a reactive police force, focussing only on responding after crimes have occurred, and a loss of effective community and preventative policing. The need for something like LISP would secure a clear and structured purpose for neighbourhood policing. This reflected concerns that had been raised by HMIC regarding the loss of Neighbourhood Policing capacity in forces where response and investigative responsibilities have "crowded out" community-based activity focused on prevention, building public confidence and crime reduction.

By late 2015, RJ had moved to a neighbouring police force, for a period of two years, during which a further full-scale pilot in one city was undertaken including training 50 PCSOs and measuring the impact of the training on their self-efficacy. Attempts to roll out to two other locations were also made, with vertically integrated training involving a whole neighbourhood team rather than just PCSOs. Latterly, RJ has retired from active policing and is focussed on working with other police forces to adopt the Intensive Engagement framework.

6.1.2.   MODE 2 ANALYSIS 2: SOCIAL ROLES, NORMS AND VALUES

Frank Stowell, a PhD of Checkland's department in Lancaster University defines roles/norms/values as 'commodities which embody power' (Stowell, 2014 and Stowell, 2009). This strange term 'commodity' is also used by Checkland (2000), but is described by him as 'what you have to do to influence people, to cause things to happen' (Checkland, 2000, p322) and "what you have to possess to be powerful in this group…knowledge, a particular role, skills, charisma, experience, clubbability, impudence, commitment, insouciance etc" (Checkland, 2000, p334).

This description is extraordinarily close to the concept of 'social capital' (but perhaps operates at a deeper level, as indicated by the connection made with motivational interviewing and other notions of deliberate 'organising') and the

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'highly connected, highly capable' people that the PCSOs were asked to identify in the LISP process. Checkland, however, refers to Percy Cohen (1968) to unpick the 'roles/norms/values' triumvirate, a group of concepts also used by organisational psychologists Katz and Khan a decade later (1978). Checkland cites Cohen thus: Norms are "specific prescriptions and proscriptions of standardised practice" (Checkland, 2000, p.468), and is used in two senses: 'that which occurs regularly' and 'what members of society have a right to expect'. This ignores the problem, however, where certain powerful groups (cf 'elites' Foucault, 1982) in any given 'society' or social locality have different views on what to expect (in terms of public behaviour) and wield different levels over their ability to realise their expectations.

Values, says Cohen via Checkland are "express preferences, priorities or desirable states of affairs" (Checkland, 2000, p468) and that we 'evolve values that limit the range of norms we are willing to adopt or reject'. The notion that values evolve is important for this study, in social localities where norms and roles are contested in a liminal space, and suggests that values are malleable, changing and developing when in contact with other values (even those that are rejected).

Roles are given less attention and are described by Checkland as a theatrical analogy, but also in terms of that which persons are appointed to, or assume. In this study, different groups (police, 'law abiding' public, criminals etc) have different roles appointed to them by each other, and assume different roles based on reactions to those 'appointed' roles. For example, PCSOs have the public safety role by virtue of their statutory definition, but have 'reassurance roles' appointed to them by senior police officers, but some assume 'community confidant' or advocate roles, or in some cases assume a 'mini-police officer' role.

The cultural norms and behaviours of police officers are very strong (Paoline, 2004). There is a strong practical ethos of 'doing the job' without reflecting deeply on the effectiveness. Many PCSOs and officers reported that 'all initiatives are successful'. This is reinforced by a promotional structure that results in ambitious officers inventing a new thing, implementing it rapidly and then being promoted (in less than two years) out of the situation within which the innovation was introduced. There is a strong expectation from those who are not being promoted (or PCSOs who cannot be promoted) that a new manager will come along rapidly, with another new idea, to be implemented. This was identified during the research,

during which 'super cocooning', and 'Trafford model' and then 'the Policing the Future' project were all initiatives and 'commands' that were implemented with minimal planning or training and no subsequent evaluation. The 'Policing the Future' project became a catch-all for dozens of experiments, from 'blue light service' integration, co-location of services, community hubs, mobile policing, redeployment of PCSOs to rural areas, focusing of officers on urban areas, the naming of certain officers as 'problem solvers' and Horse Watch[117] as well as cadets and volunteers were all experimented on without any ability to establish a counterfactual against which to measure success, or any ability to tease apart which interventions were having any effect on which performance measures. This churn of promotions and innovations without any overarching evaluative framework (beyond weekly crime rate reports) as well as substantial unmonitored personal freedom for officers (a point made by HMIC 2014) creates an environment where initiatives are partially implemented, significant levels of task performativity occur, and often plain subversion of the initiative are entertained, in the name of 'getting on with the job'. Although police visibility is causally linked to increased confidence and reductions in crime and disorder (Povey 2001), HMIC recognised in 2014, that "many forces do not have a comprehensive or reliable understanding of where their officers and staff are and how they spend their time" (HMIC 2013). Ostensibly, policing is a 'command and control' procedurally just environment, but this level of performativity and autonomy is in strict contrast to the community stakeholders.

Although senior leadership was supportive, and PCSOs (on the edges of the institution) were keen, the attitudes of middle ranking police officers was less clear. A review workshop with all the initially trained PCSOs (in 2013) after the initial training[118] uncovered a litany of struggles and challenges for the PCSOs experimenting with the LISPs. This audio track provided valuable triangulated data to the projects, providing context to the case specific interviews as they talked amongst themselves about wider issues and their workload on these projects. The 'community contacts' were not willing to 'come in' to engage with problem-solving, citing a lack of time to get involved, and seeing the PCSOs as 'doing' public safety and anti-theft measures on their behalf. Challenges around town centres being

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[117] A police initiative to recruit horse riders into community policing activities
[118] Audio of multiple PCSOs at review meeting rec_20130419-1036 19/04/2013

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'fluid communities' (coined by a PCSO at timestamp 06:04) and being instrumentally consumed by everyone apart from the business community, confusion between 'solving the problem' (definitively) implied by their police-imposed role as 'problem-solvers' rather than communities coming together to understand the root causes of a problem situation. PCSOs found themselves being directed to thematic 'problems', like shoplifting or car theft, rather than 'problem situations' i.e. localities that are especially vulnerable demographically and suffering chronic crime. PCSOs jumped forward to the rich picturing process while speaking to the 'wrong people' (same audio, timestamp 12:20) who were not engaged and not seeing themselves as part of a solution. This prompted a rethink about the 'usual suspects' involved in existing police contacts, and a longer-term return to refreshing the community contacts that the police teams had in their target localities. This refined the Kettering pilot from being located in the 'fluid' town centre to the out-of-centre 'All Saints' LISP pilot. It also prompted better focus on 'why' the LISP was being used in any given location, and not trying to make it applicable to every situation. Discussions were also raised around clearly distinguishing between what was a police responsibility, and what could or ought to be passed on to other agencies (timestamp 15:51), with PCSOs acting as a local source of 'bridging social capital' (Agger and Jensen, 2015), so that LISP principles were beginning to inform the wider principles and methods of PCSO practice rather than just limited to intensive LISP engagement techniques. Another principle that came up in the workshop was the need to build a sense of community rather than assume its presence, and understanding the 'self-interest' of the community members to being involved in the problem-understanding process. This indicates a culture of anxiety within the police force around 'policing the boundaries of policing'. Because of a focus on the legitimacy of policing, PCSOs found it difficult to direct the onus of the 'problem' back to the owners of the problem. They were under pressure to deal with everything that came along, and not say no to any member of the public, even if the interaction was not about a primary policing problem. This led to the police being out of control of their own agenda. The skewed LIPS data, and 'you said we did' cycles of individualised 'customer feedback' meant that those who complained loudest were being responded to, to the detriment of less vocal minorities. Even the 'AO1' process was being manipulated by some who knew that three calls to the police on the same topic would gain special attention. The PCSOs and officers then become

overwhelmed by tackling every call for service, whilst those calling for the service have no financial penalty for doing so. An anecdote from another police force illustrates this, where a PCSO explained that she had spent half a day tracking down poor-quality CCTV footage to try and build a case against a 'bilking', driving off without paying for petrol, with the grand value of £7. At no point was there a suggestion that the national chain of petrol suppliers co-produce a solution with the police to prevent drive-offs. These issues are all noted here in the analysis in order to triangulate and contextualise the challenges that the projects experienced, rather than to present new data at this point.

Another norm to tackle was conflation between the commonly used problem-solving method SARA model (Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment) and the National Decision Model (NDM). SARA was developed as part of the problem-oriented policing strategies of the early years of neighbourhood policing (Goldstein, 1990), but is described by Home Office evaluation of the National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) (Tuffin at al, 2006) as being appropriate where there is one clear victim, or a clearly defined problem (i.e. not a messy problem or wicked issue). The very basic SARA model also suffered from regularly losing the Assessment element, as police interventions were rarely evaluated. This was regularly conflated with the National Decision-making Model (NDM). A Conflict Management model was used before the NDM and it proved highly effective but the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) has replaced it with the more modern and updated National Decision Model in 2011/2012 (finalised in Oct 2013[119]), conflicting directly with the introduction of LISP. This was promoted as being applicable to ALL decisions, regardless of type, but is more of a risk assessment framework rather than a problem-understanding process. This prompted a mapping of the principles of LISP on to the SARA model (Figure 6.) and NDM model (Figure 6.2) in an attempt to clarify the approach. The PCSOs had been originally trained to use the SARA model, and the cultural power of ACPO promoting the NDM through the Chief Police officers in Northamptonshire made it difficult to draw clear distinctions for the LISP practitioners

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[119] https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/national-decision-model/the-national-decision-model/ [Accessed 9 June 2017]

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Figure 6.1 LISP superimposed over the SARA model

Figure 6.2 LISP superimposed over the NDM model

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At this point too, the challenge of escalation emerged[120]; where PCSOs reported making some progress with engagement activities but were getting blocked by not having sufficient authority and authorisation to continue. ASB issues with a national chain of retail outlets were stuck at the regional manager. The above mention petrol selling retailer and other national retail outlets were doing nothing to prevent theft, but instructing staff to phone the police to report the theft of every bottle of spirits that would be written off anyway. The PCSOs did not have the capability or authority[121] to escalate the right problems to the right level, to be dealt with by strategic partners rather than at a street level (Timestamp 24:53). This is illustrated in an anecdote that came up in a number of discussions in briefing sessions and workshops about topics like catalytic converter thefts, in which PCSOs were being tasked to eliminate the theft of such items from 4x4 vehicles in remote rural areas. Although a natural community of farmers, rural insurers and garages could have made some progress in reducing the possibility of such thefts, the problem is a matter of European organised crime (Whiteacre et al, 2015 and Bennet 2008) and the whole car manufacturing sector to tackle, not a lone PCSO in a county town, but where PCSOs had used (implicitly) the LISP strategies to escalate problems to an Inspector, they had been successful in reducing ASB[122] (Timestamp 25:00).

The role of PCSOs being a "visible presence on the street deterring crime" rather than a community-embedded problem solver or facilitator of co-production (timestamp 30:34) was also a strong norm within parts of the PCSO cohort. The PCSO is often seen operationally as an hourly paid shift worker, with no clear remit but to complete tasks as directed by the control room, or as additional source of labour for police officers[123], despite research that already confirms their value in building social capital (O'Neill, 2014b and Cosgrove & Ramshaw, 2015). PCSOs

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[120] rec_20130419-1036 19/04/2013
[121] O'Neill, 2014a confirms that "PCSOs are in effect leaderless. While they have a line manager (a sergeant), and in some cases a 'supervisor' (a police constable), there are no PCSOs in positions of authority in the organisation." p26
[122] Perversely in the case cited here, the provision of security at a retail food outlet increased the incidence of ASB.
[123] My own observations confirm those of O'Neill (2014a): PCSOs were increasingly being used to 'plug gaps' which existed elsewhere in a neighbourhood area. PCSOs were often tasked with patrolling 'hot spots': areas identified by crime analysts as being likely future targets for crimes. PCSOs would be required to patrol very small areas of a beat, often not their own, for hours at a time, or spending days in an 'anti-social behaviour van' driving around looking for ASB

are also navigating two conflictual roles (both imposed and adopted) - "one as community supporter and one as police intelligence gatherer", navigating a "traditional police occupational culture which values action over 'social work'" (O'Neill, 2014a, p6). Further, according to the detailed and nuanced PhD research of Cosgrove "the pursuit of reassurance is secondary to the demands of crime control" (2011, p3), in police culture. The pull of the performance culture and high levels of public demand for service cause PCSOs to become increasingly utilised as a reactive resource and to be deployed in tasks falling outside their remit. This is reflected in that a mere 14% of PCSO time is spent on community engagement, whereas they are directed to spend 40% to over 63% of their time being visible (regardless of the outcome) (Mason and Dale, 2008).

6.1.3.   MODE 2 ANALYSIS 3: THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND POWER

Analysis 3 - 'political system' analysis which examines power and how it is expressed and exercised in the problem situation

It concerns the motivation to share knowledge, by means of speech and language acts, based on socially attributed characteristics of the relationship, such as trust, mutual respect and generalized reciprocity (Putnam, 2000). Trust is an important aspect of social capital. It is generally accepted that mutual trust positively influences the possibility of knowledge transfer. Trust is needed to safeguard against opportunism and obstruction of sharing knowledge. Trust is also needed because a large dimension of the knowledge that is to be shared is of a tacit nature. Completing the circle, concepts such as Granovetter's (1983) "social embeddedness" and "social capital" theorised by Bourdieu (1977) and popularised by Putnam (2000) relate to the extent to which individuals trust one another, and in what configurations (Curtis et al, 2010).

For the PCSOs undertaking the LISP activities, the question of power was framed in finding the 'highly connected, highly capable' people able to affect change in their localities. This summarises the notion of 'social capital' (Putnam, 1995 and specifically for community resilience; Poortinga, 2012) in particular the role of bonding capital connecting different groups within a given locality together, and bridging capital being the ability of those groups to bridge to sources of power and

resource outside their locality. The LISP project within the Police force in question, however, struggled to establish bonding social capital. Whilst the Chief Constable was fully supportive (Engagement Planning meeting, 2013[124]), the split in command between county and town meant that the two commanding Inspectors (one being the research collaborator RJ) could forge different strategies according to different performance meetings. The notion of Priority Areas took a long time to gain ground, and at the time, there was no resource within the force to provide such data. There had been a COMPaSS (Community Profiling and Shared Solutions) unit established in 2001 to provide community profile data, but this had disappeared sometime around 2011. Any community profiles that existed from that time were not being actively used by any PCSO to inform their work. The Priority Areas were chosen in 2012 (but on professional experience rather than a robust screening process) and the detailed reports did not appear until 2013, leaving the PCSOs throughout the whole of 2012 without a detailed report of the crime patterns. The choice of places to undertake the LISP pilots, therefore, were driven by immediate (and near-term) issues rather than a systematic review of the most vulnerable localities in the priority areas. As soon as short-term success was identified, many of the LISP efforts were abandoned as 'job done' by commanders used to roles and norms based around 'days of action' and 'a street a week' operations.

This section has completed the Mode 2 aspects of the SSM analysis of the projects, and at a meta-level, considered the norms, roles and power dynamics at play in the development and piloting of LISP as an implementation of Intensive Engagement. There are clear limitations to the piloting of LISP. None of the pilots received thorough, unequivocal support with sufficient resources to achieve a perfect 'dose' of LISP. A few achieved what was dubbed 'the royal flush' of conditions which maximised their chances of success. All of them satisficed at various levels, sometimes in the skills, experience and dedication of the PCSOs, in the time allowed them, in luck in finding the right community contacts within the timeframe of the research, and in gaining the right support and guidance at each step of the process. It would be dangerous to conclude that because LISP was not perfectly implemented that it does not work. The final step in the analysis

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[124] Recording_0002 3/4/2013

is to return to Pawson's evaluative framework in order to ask the question "how does IE (in the form of LISP) work, and in what contexts?"

CHAPTER. 7.   CONTEXT-MECHANISM-OUTCOMES ANALYSIS

The previous chapter concluded the Soft Systems Methodology approach to collating and presenting the evidence, and developing conceptual models of the LISP interventions in the pilots. The final, theory-building, step is to return to a critical realist evaluation of that evidence, specifically Pawson's context-mechanism-outcomes (CMO) chains, and to posit triggers that may have activated those CMO chains. The final step will be to draw that together into a soft systems conceptual model for the entire project, drawing together the similarities across all the pilots.

Pawson (2013), in his review of hundreds of innovations and evaluations in the public sector concludes that the following ingredients are critical factors (in his terminology, hidden mechanisms) that create successful interventions, and crucially support the mainstreaming and scaling of such interventions into organisational and cultural change. These mechanisms can be compared with the main ingredients in the Intensive Engagement approach. It is important to note, however, that Intensive Engagement using the LISP Handbook is not really an intervention itself, but a way of going about designing and delivering interventions (social innovations) that are more robust and resilient - the question of evidence-based policing shifts from 'what works' to 'how do we make it work better?'

This is also what Pawson and Tilley (1997) refer to as 'cumulative evaluation', building on their meta-study evaluation, rejecting the Guba and Lincoln (1989:49) assertion that all situations are unique and that problems or solutions cannot be generalised from one context to another, whilst at the same time also rejecting the notion that different contexts can be stripped of their value and outcomes parsed down to mere numbers and statistical relationships. Where Pawson and Tilley (ibid) draw comparisons across a wide range of different interventions and projects to identify regularities, and therefore to propose context-mechanism-outcome relationships, this study has looked across a number of different interventions, in different neighbourhoods, regarding different crime types and developing different solutions but (at least in theory) applies the same *means* of developing the interventions. The unit of investigation is not the contents or results of the LISP pilots, but the approach to developing the interventions themselves: the LISP Handbook. Developing CMO relationships across a range of

pilot interventions will help to understand what makes the LISP Handbook work, and under what circumstances.

7.1.1. CONTEXTS

Figure 7.1 restates the 8 projects where a LISP Handbook was used, to differing degrees, to structure intensive engagement by the Police with eight different localities in Northamptonshire. All of these contexts are demographically different, and have different 'target' crime types. The only thing that links them together is that the PCSOs were part of the LISP training process and that some attempt at implementing LISP was considered or used.

Case No.	Location	Origin	Priority Area	Crime	Confidence	Stable team	Mgt involved	LISP Quality
1	Spencer/Asian Gold	Pilot	yes	down	up	yes	yes	Gold
2	Spencer Haven	Pilot	yes	down	up	yes	yes	Gold
3	Holy Sepulchre	Pilot	no	steady	steady	no	no	Silver
4	All Saints Kettering	Pilot	yes	steady	steady	no	no	Silver
5	Daventry Skatepark	Pilot	no	low	up	yes	no	Gold
6	Towcester	Self generated	no	down	up	no	yes	Bronze
7	Daventry no LISP	N/A	no	steady	steady	yes	no	None
8	Wellingborough no LISP	N/A	no	up	down	no	no	None

Figure 7.1 The LISP projects

According to the LISP protocol, each proposed LISP process is initiated by a screening process, to establish whether the locality is an area of significant demographic deprivation or vulnerability and that there was a pattern of long-term, chronic crime. The Priority Area process implemented by Northamptonshire Police reinforced this screening process, such that three of the projects were clearly localities that were similar in that regard. The Priority Areas approach was not, however, designed to identify ALL of the vulnerable, high crime localities in Northamptonshire; but were designed to identify the top five (at least with respect to police priorities). Nevertheless, the detailed analysis of the five LISP pilots in Chapter. 5, and the summaries provided of the remaining projects in Section 5.7, all demonstrate that all of the localities were vulnerable and suffered chronic patterns of crime, albeit in most cases the LISP was initiated because of short-term crime data.

There was significant debate throughout the development of LISP, and after the pilot studies, as to what constituted a 'LISPable' project. Implicitly throughout was the notion that the crime types had to be 'sufficiently public' to be conducive to the community-based intervention process. Clearly there are 'private' crimes that

would not be appropriate contexts for a LISP process, including domestic violence, person-to-person abuse or negligence or even inter-neighbour disputes, or crimes types hidden from public view, such as drug or human trafficking. A much later initiative using LISP, in a different Police force, was considering community responses to the cultures that propagate Female Genital Mutilation, but the project did not proceed. Another project also considered the theft of catalytic convertors from vehicles as part of an international organised crime network, so 'hard crime' could be included, but this project was limited to PCSOs as the primary agents of change, not detectives or serious crime officers, so the boundaries of how 'public' a crime type ought to be has not yet been tested, and cannot be exhaustively tested here. Instead, a broad notion of 'sufficiently public' has to be retained (at least for the purposes of this study) where by the crime types to be tackled are not merely a matter of private dispute between two people, or such that the solutions could not be developed or implemented by members of the public or public institutions. Therefore, we can arrive at three possible context statements:

Table 7.1 Contexts: Any district or locality in Northamptonshire, selected by pre-set screening criteria

C1	**Vulnerable** locality or area of significant multiple deprivation, and
C2	Long-term **chronic crime** patterns
C3	**Complex**, publicly contested crime types inc ASB, SAC

The projects can now be compared, using these 'contexts' as a frame, as shown in Figure 7.2. The numbers in the columns to the right of each text are merely a numerical impression of the extent to which the case meets the context criteria (1 being lowest and 5 being highest relative to the other projects)

	Context	Case 1: 'Asian Gold'	Case 2: 'Spencer Haven'	Case 3: Holy Sepulchre	Case 4 Kettering 'All Saints'	Case 5: Daventry skatepark	Case 6: Towcester Retail	Case 7: Daventry No LISP	Case 8: Wellingborough no LISP
C1	Vulnerable locality or area of significant multiple deprivation	5 — Highly vulnerable locality, high on indices of multiple deprivation, excluded minorities being targeted	5 — Very vulnerable group of residents, with learning difficulties etc. relatively deprived locality	5 — No real residents involved, vulnerable group of perpetrators, homeless and substance abusers. Neglected & underutilised district with multiple vulnerabilities	5 — Area of multiple deprivation, significantly high short-term rental, transient population mixed with long-term elderly residents	2 — Not a residential area, no significant deprivation.	1 — Prosperous retail environment, not a location with multiple deprivation	2 — ASB from nearby residential areas, not especially identified with multiple deprivation	5 — Very deprived locations, very poor engagement with policing, transient population
C2	Long-term chronic crime patterns	5 — Short-term spike in crime raised attention, but long term crime patterns high	5 — Short-term spike in crime raised attention, but long term crime patterns high	5 — Short-term spike in crime raised attention, but long term crime patterns high	5 — Wider context of nearby night-time economy disturbance, extending to street outside and yard behind shops. Rough sleeping and litter affecting church users	4 — Public disorder disturbances typical of town centre public sports and retail locations, anti-social behaviour hotspot	1 — No evidence of elevated crime patterns compared to other retail environments	2 — Short-term seasonable pattern of ASB	5 — Long-term crime patterns in whole town are higher than equivalent populations
C3	Complex, publicly contested crime types inc ASB, SAC	5 — Burglaries might suggest individualised weaknesses, but community 'problem situation' was actually the tackling the problem, rather than the crime itself	4 — Burglaries were ostensibly private, but families, carers and advocate groups made the problem situation public	5 — Street drinking, drug taking and sleeping rough witnessed by office and church users	4 — Business owners were the 'community', residents were only involved if interacting with the shops or church	3 — Public space, sports grounds outside shops, bus stop and police station. Relatively limited number of stakeholders	2 — Primarily thefts from properties. Community expressed as 'retailers' collaborating rather than customers or residents	2 — ASB, motorcycles along a disused railway track	4 — Wide range of public and private crime types. Insufficiently defined to one or more themes
		15	14	15	14	9	4	6	14

Figure 7.2 Summary of all projects with respect to 'contexts'

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The analysis shows that the four detailed projects (Projects 1 to 4) are the strongest to meet the three context criteria, accompanied by Case 8, where no LISP occurred. The other projects were particularly weak with respect to long-term chronic crime rates, despite the complexity of the problem situations.

7.1.2. MECHANISMS

Section 3.7 reviewed the existing evidence from policing literature on 'what works' and 'what is promising'. Widening beyond just the body of evidence from policing intervention, Pawson (2013) identifies (in his terminology) 'hidden mechanisms' that create successful interventions, and crucially support the mainstreaming and scaling of such interventions into organisational and cultural change. Having analysed the projects in turn, the research has proposed a further set of possible mechanisms that had not already been identified in the police literature or by Pawson. These three sets of factors have been brought together into Table 7.2. A commentary has been provided as to the features of LISP that connect to the proposed mechanism. These could be the 'triggers' that are essential to activate the mechanisms to create the outcomes

Table 7.2 Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement

No.	Proposed Mechanism	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement
	Neighbourhood Policing Evidence: What works	
M 1	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	In-depth investigation of the police crime problem in the context of the other problems experienced in the locality
M2	Full and consistent application of interventions	The training (and subsequent evaluation of the quality of LISP work), and standard proforma
M3	Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time	Success, i.e. depth of understanding of the problem and success of the interventions is determined by the working group rather than police timeframes

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No.	Proposed Mechanism	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement
M4	Proactive contact	Deliberate choices are made at the screening stage about the importance of the locality to policing outcomes. Process requires identification of all potential stakeholder groups, including hard to reach.
M5	A group of residents	Where community organisations appropriate to the problems do not exist, the LISP process creates the social capital and networks to allow this to happen
M6	Joint problem solving	Co-production of the problem analysis and solving stages is central
	What is promising	
M7	Highly connected individuals	The LISP working group is made up of 'highly connected and highly capable people'
M8	Support is won	Working group members elicit a clearly understood self-interest that underpins expected successes to secure and 'win' support
M9	Attuned to community dynamics	The rich picturing processes develop a nuanced and empathetic understanding of the community and the issues and tensions within it.
M10	Tacit skills	Training, with the aid of the publicly available Handbook, briefings to senior officers and a process of identifying the best implementations of LISP and mentoring of officers ensure that police skills are embedded and propagated across the force
M11	Not reliant on multi-agency delivery	Where statutory partners are actively engaged, LISP provides a clear and discrete method for limited involvement. Where statutory agencies are not engaged, LISP provides a clear evidence base for Police and community to hold statutory agencies to account.

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No.	Proposed Mechanism	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement
	Pawson's Public Policy 'Hidden' Mechanisms	
M13	Recruit the stakeholders with care	Looking for the most highly connected, capable, and motivated: whose self-interest and motivation to contribute to public safety is understood
M14	Create expectations of change	Intensive Engagement is oriented towards collaboratively deciding on what change is needed, to design Solutions & Practices
M15	Demand effort from stakeholders	The LISP approach is designed to flip the Police response from 'what can we do?' to 'What solutions have you got?' for the Police.
M15	Offer encouragement and feedback	The process is designed to recognise existing assets and capabilities that the community, with the help of the Police, that can be enhanced to support Police outcomes
M17	Build trust and resilience	Long-term, locally based relationships are key to developing mature LISP informed interventions
M18	Make accommodations for set-backs	The embedding of the Motivational Interviewing 'stages of change model' accounts for set-backs within the process of engagement
M19	Explain the theory of change	The theory of change for LISP is described as "collaboratively designed solutions and co-produced practices are more robust than short-term projects and limited engagement"
M20	Share execution and control of the intervention	The whole LISP model is built on recruiting capable and connected decision-makers and resources to the support of Police outcomes, and an attempt to 'loosen the reins' of Police controlled design and implementation
M21	Ensure onward external continuation	The purpose of the community designing and delivering the interventions that are unique to a locality is to ensure that the Police have a 'step-back and sustain' (rather than an exit) strategy

No.	Proposed Mechanism	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement
		freeing resource up to tackle other localities and problems, leaving a self-sustaining legacy
	Additional insights from case study	**Mechanism Ingredients in LISP Intensive Engagement**
M22	Stable team	Inspectors ought to be clear about the resource implications of choosing to undertake a LISP, in terms of long-term commitment (against a backdrop of 'weeks of action' and three-month long 'operations'). Outcomes based resource planning is required within LISPs rather than activity based.

Sergeants need to decide with Inspectors on the justification to LISP. The decision was made by the PCSOs to undertake the LISP, but in this, the decision was aligned to the sergeants' interests in managing the high-profile performance issues. This was sustained through a change of sergeant, but only after significant progress had been made on the LISP process. The long-term stability of the PCSOs allowed significant connections to a marginalised and hard-to-reach community to be made within the attention span of the senior officers. |
| M23 | Responsibilisation | This LISP hinged around a form of responsibilisation, a quid pro quo where the attention of the police shifted from being visible through patrols to being the distributor of socially valuable goods - the smartwater etc. Rather than this being devalued through being given away, the LISP established a 'transaction value' – being required to complete the 6 points of action before receiving enhanced 'attention' through the distribution of freebies and receiving funding from the PCC. |
| M24 | A mix of 'contingent' interventions | The PCSO was clear that a number of different strategies that could be introduced at different times, and withdrawn if they do not work, would strengthen the initiative. The six-point action plan developed in the Asian Gold burglaries case |

No.	Proposed Mechanism	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement
		is insufficient here, and over 20 different initiatives are used, including those that are existing successful practices.
M25	Perspective taking	A cognitive shift required to think of all the different stakeholders in a given problem situation, and systematically think through their interest and investment in the status quo in that context. There needs to be a deliberate attempt to this, at the point of evaluating the potential stakeholder group. The interests (and perhaps importantly, the self-interest) of the stakeholders need to be considered, as does the lived experience of those stakeholders (empathy).
M26	Hidden community	Attention be paid to the less obvious communities of interest. Whilst there was a strong sense in which the street drinking was being driven by transient workers and off-licenses exploiting the immediate situation, the more powerful communities of interest were the estate agents, landlords and employers, whose interests in the features of the problem situation were significant but invisible. When doing the scanning stage in the early part of the LISP process, there needs to be a more specific attention given to the owners or operators of buildings and consider them as a part of the community of interest
M27	Connecting communities	The briefing in the LISP documentation regarding the stakeholders is to ask whether they can be connected to together. This is too oblique. This case indicates strongly that vulnerability localities suffer from low bonding social capital (especially when the residents are transient) and social cohesion is low. Bringing eastern European workers together may be a part of the solution, but also bringing together business interests (who might not understand their responsibility to a given neighbourhood) like landlord and employers of specific segments of the population

No.	Proposed Mechanism	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement
		(bridging social capital). This requires much harder work bringing together and motivating stakeholders who might consider their contribution to a neighbourhood to be even more minimal than the transient residents.

The mechanisms can then be evaluated. Figure 7.3 shows a part of that process. In each case, the mechanism (M1) 'In-depth understanding of people, place and problems' is drawn from the literature of what works in policing research. The features of the LISP Handbook that are designed to enact or trigger that mechanism are also given - in the case of M1, the in-depth investigation of the crime problem situation is a vital part of the LISP guidance, and the first stage of the LISP proforma. Then each case has been evaluated to establish the extent to which this mechanism has been enacted in the case. This is done both qualitatively, with a value statement, and semi-quantitatively with a nominal score from 1 (poor implementation) to 5 (thorough implementation)[125].

So, in the snippet in Figure 7.3 below, we can see that the Holy Sepulchre street drinking and Daventry skate park projects (Projects 3 & 5) dealt with the mechanism of 'understanding people, place and problems' in depth, using a variety of investigative tools such as rich picturing. The Asian Gold and Spencer Haven projects (1&2) on the other hand were less thorough in their investigations, particularly at the start of the project, although the Spencer Haven project was very innovative in the systems diagrams that had been developed.

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[125] This nominal valuation has been done by the researcher. A subsequent step could be to undertake a 'pair-wise ranking' exercise with various stakeholders in the research project to derive a more robust and agreed valuation. This had been mentioned in the first outline of the LISP Handbook "Proposed procedure for Community Resilience Strategy Handbook" dated 30/10/1012 Section 14 (from page 52) of the 14th edition of the LISP Handbook dealt with this procedure in some detail, but was dropped in the final version for being too advanced.

Neighbourhood Policing Evidence	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Case 1: 'Asian Gold'	Score	Case 2: 'Spencer Haven'	Score	Case 3: Holy Sepulchre	Score	Case 4 Kettering 'All Saints'	Score	Case 5: Daventry skatepark	Score	Case 6: Towcester Retail	Score	Case 7: Daventry No LISP	Score	Case 8: Wellingborough no LISP	Score
What works																	
M1 In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	In-depth investigation of the police crime problem in the context of the other problems experienced in the locality	The LISP proforma suggests that the PCSOs did not have an in-depth understanding of the burglaries- there are significant discrepancies between their reports and the published crime patterns, but their engagement with the community meant that they fully understood the context of other problems.	2	The PCSO had been assigned to the district for some years, although reported not have engaged with the Haven in great detail in the past.	2	The LISP got a good start because the PCSOs had been working in this district for some time, but the analysis in the LISP documentation, and the choice of intervention was simplistic, indicating that the PCSOs and their senior officers had limited local knowledge	2	The LISP got a good start because the PCSOs had been working in this district for some time, but was redeployed before the LISP initiative had been completed	3	Project was developed before LISP approach was developed, but PCSO had undertaken a detailed investigation, including with young people	3	The understanding of the needs of the retailers was detailed, but didn't extend beyond a small stakeholder group	3	The problem situation extended along a disused railway, with very transient users and no 'community' knows engagement with users was undertaken	1	No engagement with multiple stakeholders was undertaken, apart from standard policing techniques. The Officer (former PCSO) indicated that there was a loss of understanding of the community, only one of 9 PCSOs still working the same beat. The officer had been named a 'problem-solver' with no additional training	1
M2 Full and consistent application of interventions	The training (and subsequent evaluation of quality of LISP work), and standard proforma	This LISP was seen through to the implementation of the interventions chosen and to the evaluation of the impact on policing outcomes by the force analyst.	4	The PCSO had attended the initial training and LISP design workshops, and at the time (2012) been critical and unconvinced of the approach. Nevertheless, in identifying the problem, a wide range of interventions were developed and implemented fully	3	The intervention chosen, the community garden, was not seen through to full implementation.	3	The LISP initiative was not completed. The proforma did not report on solutions, some practices were identified, but no evaluation criteria were identified. The primary PCSO was redeployed mid-LISP, despite having been on the neighbourhood for several years and having made significant progress already	2	The LISP proforma was completed in its entirety, with a lot of detail although with weak suggestions for evaluations	4	A detailed LISP proforma was completed, with a strong sense of the evaluation criteria. A further guided iteration to avoid the focus solely on retailers would have further enhanced the work.	4	No LISP process was undertaken	1	No LISP process was undertaken	1
M3 Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time	Success, i.e. depth of understanding of the problem and success of the interventions is determined by the working group	The 'dose' in this LISP was more significant than any other case study. Significant community assets were recruited and	4	The differences between the Police and residents' mid-maps were the key to understanding the	3	The time allocated to the PCSOs was insufficient for a critical mass to be sustained – meetings every two months isn't 'intensive'	3	The time allocated to the PCSO was insufficient for a critical mass to be sustained. The PCSO was working on her own for the	2	Critical mass was sustained throughout the initiative. Significant community assets were identified,	2	The PCSO used the LISP process as a guide to her first engagement with a new locality, and therefore the work was still in the	3	No LISP process was undertaken	1	No LISP process was undertaken. The officer had been tasked to review a short-term pattern of previously unconnected crime	1

Figure 7.3 Example of the evaluation of the Neighbourhood Policing Evidence mechanisms

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Further to the right of this large spreadsheet of analysis is the commentary on the performance of the projects that were summarised in the previous chapter. Figure 7.4 shows that the Daventry and Wellingborough projects (projects 7 & 8) did not implement Mechanism 1, and were therefore given the lowest value.

Case 3: Holy Sepulchre	Score	Case 4 Kettering 'All Saints'	Score	Case 5: Daventry skatepark	Score	Case 6: Towcester Retail	Score	Case 7: Daventry No LISP	Score	Case 8: Wellingborough no LISP	Score
The LISP got a good start because the PCSOs had been working in this district for some time, but the analysis in the LISP documentation, and the choice of intervention was simplistic, indicating that the PCSOs and their senior officers had limited local knowledge	4	The LISP got a good start because the PCSOs had been working in this district for some time, but was redeployed before the LISP initiative had been completed	3	Project was developed before LISP approach was developed, but PCSO had undertaken a detailed investigation, including with young people	4	The understanding of the needs of the retailers was detailed, but didn't extend beyond a small stakeholder group	3	The problem situation extended along a disused railway, with very transient users and no knows 'community of interest'. But no engagement with users was undertaken	1	No engagement with multiple stakeholders was undertaken, apart from standard policing techniques. The Officer (former PCSO) indicated that there was a loss of understanding of the community, only one of 9 PCSOs still working the same beat. The officer had been named a 'problem-solver' with no additional training	1
The intervention chosen, the community garden, was not seen through to full implementation.	2	The LISP initiative was not completed. The proforma did not report on solutions, some practices were identified, but no evaluation criteria were identified	2	The LISP proforma was completed in its entirety, with a lot of detail although with weak suggestions for evaluations	4	A detailed LISP proforma was completed, with a strong sense of the evaluation criteria. A further guided iteration to avoid the focus solely on retailers would	4	No LISP process was undertaken	1	No LISP process was undertaken	1

Figure 7.4 Further detail of the evaluation of the Neighbourhood Policing Evidence mechanisms

This process is continued across all the mechanisms, those from the neighbourhood policing literature, and from Pawson's hidden mechanism list. The nominal scores for each of the 27 mechanisms across all the 8 projects can be brought together to provide an indication of the strongest and weakest mechanisms at work across the projects, as illustrated in Figure 7.5.

	Mechanism	Features of LISP based Intensive Engagement	Case 1: 'Asian Gold'	Case 2: 'Spencer Haven'	Case 3: Holy Sepulchre	Case 4: Kettering 'All Saints'	Case 5: Daventry skatepark	Case 6: Towcester Retail	Case 7: Daventry No LISP	Case 8: Wellingboro sgh no LISP	Total Score across Mechanisms	Rank
M1	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	In-depth investigation of the police crime problem in the context of the other problems experienced in the locality	2	2	4	3	4	3	1	1	20	8
M2	Full and consistent application of intervention	The training (and subsequent evaluation of the quality of LISP work), and standard proforma	4	3	2	2	4	4	1	1	21	7
M3	Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time	Success, i.e. depth of understanding of the problem and success of the intervention is determined by the working group rather than police timeframes	4	3	2	2	4	3	1	1	20	8
M4	Proactive contact	Deliberate choices are made at the screening stage about the importance of the locality to policing outcomes.	5	3	5	3	2	5	1	1	25	4
M5	A group of residents	Where community organisations appropriate to the problems don't exist, the LISP process creates the social capital and networks to allow this to happen	3	4	3	2	3	6	1	1	23	5
M6	Joint problem solving	Co-production of the problem analysis and solving stages is central	3	4	3	2	5	4	1	1	23	5
M7	Highly connected individuals	The LISP working group is made up of highly connected and highly capable people.	5	5	4	2	5	5	1	1	28	2
M8	Support is won	Working group members elicit a clearly understood self-interest that underpins expected successes to secure and 'win' support	5	4	2	1	5	3	1	1	22	6
M9	Attuned to community dynamics	The rich picturing processes develop a nuanced and empathetic understanding of the community and the issues and tensions within it.	5	5	4	4	5	3	1	1	28	2
M10	Tacit skills	Training, with the aid of the publicly available handbook, briefings to senior officers and a process of identifying the best implementations of LISP and mentoring of officers ensure that police skills are embedded and propagated across the force	4	4	4	4	5	5	1	1	28	2
M11	Not reliant on multi-agency delivery	Where statutory partners are actively engaged, LISP provides a clear and discrete method for limited involvement. Where statutory agencies are not engaged, LISP provides a clear evidence base for Police and community to hold statutory agencies to account.	4	5	2	2	5	5	1	1	25	4
M12	Recruit the stakeholders with care	Looking for the most highly connected, capable, and motivated: whose self-interest and motivation to contribute to public safety is understood	2	4	2	2	5	5	1	1	22	6
M13	Create expectations of change	Intensive Engagement is oriented towards collaboratively deciding on what change is needed, to design Solutions & Practices	5	4	2		4	5	1	1	20	8
M14	Demand effort from stakeholders	The LISP approach is designed to flip the Police response from 'what can we do?' to 'What solutions have you got?' for the Police.	5	5	4	3	5	5	1	1	29	1
M15	Offer encouragement and feedback	The process is designed to recognise existing assets and capabilities that the community, with the help of the Police, that can be enhanced to support Police outcomes (Kretzmann and McKnight, 1993)	3	4	3	2	4	5	1	1	23	5
M16	Build trust and resilience	Long-term, locally based relationships are key to developing mature LISP informed interventions	5	5	3	1	5	5	1	1	26	3
M17	Make accommodations for set-backs	The embedding of the Motivational Interviewing 'stages of change model' (Prochaska and DiClemente, 1984; Rollnick and Miller, 1995, Miller and Rollnick, 2012) accounts for set-backs within the process of engagement	4	1	1	1	4	3	1	1	16	9
M18	Explain the theory of change	The theory of change for LISP is described as "collaboratively designed solutions and co-produced practices are more robust than short-term projects and limited engagement"	4	4	2	2	3	3	1	1	20	8
M19	Share execution and control of the intervention	The whole LISP model is built on recruiting capable and connected decision-makers and resources to the support of Police outcomes; and an attempt to 'loosen the reins' of Police controlled design and implementation	3	3	3	0	5	4	1	1	20	8
M20	Ensure onward external continuation	The purpose of the community designing and delivering the interventions that are unique to a locality is to ensure that the Police have a 'step-back and sustain' (rather than an exit) strategy freeing resource up to tackle other localities and problems, leaving a self-sustaining legacy	4	4	2	2	4	5	1	1	23	5
		Total score across cases	79	76	55	40	86	86	20	20		
		Ranking by most 'successful' case	2	3	4	5	1	1	6	6		

Figure 7.5 Nominal ranking of mechanisms across projects

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If the nominal scores for each mechanism/case are ranked, as in the rightmost column of Figure 7.5, it is possible to establish which of the mechanisms across all the projects were most strongly or weakly enacted. It appears that not all the mechanisms are triggered to the same extent. The idea of a trigger suggests that it is a one-off instant 'hair trigger' moment that fires a mechanism, like a gun. But if the mechanisms have differently weighted 'triggers' (light or heavy), using the same weight of pressure on the trigger might mean that some mechanisms do not fire even when we want them to.

This idea of the 'pressure' that needs to be borne on a mechanism for it to be trigged can be used to modify the basic C-M-O model developed by Pawson (shown in Figure 7.6) into a more developed model shown in Figure 7.7.

Figure 7.6 Pawson context-mechanism-outcome model

Figure 7.7 Pawson CMO model modified to show the role of 'pressure'

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The rows coloured green in Figure 7.5 are the highest ranking mechanism, i,e, with the greatest nominal scores across all of the projects, and are singled out in Figure 7.8.

M7	Highly connected individuals	The LISP working group is made up of highly connected and highly capable people,
M9	Attuned to community dynamics	The rich picturing processes develop a nuanced and empathetic understanding of the community and the issues and tensions within it.
M10	Tacit skills	Training, with the aid of the publicly available handbook, briefings to senior officers and a process of identifying the best implementations of LISP and mentoring of officers ensure that police skills are embedded and propagated across the force
M14	Demand effort from stakeholders	The LISP approach is designed to flip the Police response from 'what can we do?' to 'What solutions have you got?' for the Police.
M16	Build trust and resilience	Long-term, locally based relationships are key to developing mature LISP informed interventions

Figure 7.8 The most active mechanisms across all projects

It is interesting to note that these five mechanisms relate quite closely to a number of discussions across the project about which parts of the LISP process were most important. It certainly seems here that finding the right people, understanding and empathising with the community, reinforcing the tacit skills of the PCSO (so that LISP is not a tick box process), flipping the conversation with the public but in a context of trust and long-term resilience are the most important mechanisms at this point. This suggests that these are the mechanisms that were most readily engaged with by the PCSOs in a few months after their initial training.

It is useful here to seek to relate these outcomes back to Bellman's (1992) observations. Although Bellman wasn't seeking to identify mechanisms (in a critical realist sense) per se, the three-fold 'purpose, power, persuasion' ingredients of his advice is evident in the most active mechanisms above, most especially Quote 16 from Table 2 "if you want to change the system, you had better know how it works" connects closely with mechanisms M9- the need to be closely attuned to community dynamics and M7- knowing the highly connected individuals. Mechanism M16 connects closely to Quote 17 "build trust, take risks and reveal who you really area". There doesn't seem to be a direct corollary to M14, demanding effort from the stakeholders, but Quotes 28 "you need to appeal

to the whys behind their goals" and 29 "the frustration caused by a problem..releases energy" from Table 3 are close, especially when Bellman says "When you propose action steps before these feelings are expressed, you are likely to get resistance" (1992, p30)

Figure 7.9 below shows the mechanisms that were least active across the projects.

M1	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	In-depth investigation of the police crime problem in the context of the other problems experienced in the locality
M3	Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time	Success, i.e. depth of understanding of the problem and success of the interventions is determined by the working group rather than police timeframes
M17	Make accommodations for set-backs	The embedding of the Motivational Interviewing 'stages of change model' (Prochaska and DiClemente, 1994; Rollnick and Miller, 1995; Miller and Rollnick, 2012) accounts for set-backs within the process of engagement
M18	Explain the theory of change	The theory of change for LISP is described as "collaboratively designed solutions and co-produced practices are more robust than short-term projects and limited engagement"
M19	Share execution and control of the intervention	The whole LISP model is built on recruiting capable and connected decision-makers and resources to the support of Police outcomes, and an attempt to 'loosen the reins' of Police controlled design and implementation

Figure 7.9 The least active mechanisms across all projects

Intuitively, these also accord with the experiences and conversations across the whole project. These mechanisms represent those that have been the hardest to implement. Mechanism 1, the in-depth investigation into the problem, with the depth and breadth necessary was rarely done at the PCSO level, and was only significantly improved when the Priority Area work was published[126]. The 'dose' was also problematic, because PCSOs were being constantly abstracted for additional police tasks, so it required a very determined and dedicated sergeant/inspector team to defend the use of the PCSOs time on LISP activities. The police culture is such that time for relationships, trust and resilience is rarely given, with very short timescales across all of policing. This also meant that little attention was given to planning for set-backs. Instead, where a set-back failed, or took too long to happen, the PCSO was taken 'off the task'. This was illustrated in

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[126] Prompting a shift of this task from PCSO to Sergeant and Inspector in future versions of the Handbook

the time that it took the PCSO in the All Saints Kettering case to access the landlords and employers, or the PCSOs in the Holy Sepulchre case being moved on to other tasks just before critical mass could have been achieved. This is also related to the two last mechanisms, in that the police found it difficult to elicit how they thought the world ought to change for crime (and calls for service) to reduce. They also struggled with the idea of co-creating solutions and sharing control over resources, even when those resources were not their own.

Mechanism M18, explaining the theory of change relates closely to Bellman's Quote 6 from Table 1, in which he explains "one of the primary reasons people cannot solve their problems is because they have incorrectly described wwhat is going on" (1992, p42). Bellman stops at the point of correctly diagnosing the problem, whereas M18 requires that the stakeholders also carefully describe the and share the means of responding to the correctly diagnosed problem. Mechanism M3 also develops Bellman's insight in Quote 26 in Table 2 "do not expect your ideas to be accepted first time round…" (1992, p131), but Bellman's work doesn't make any accommodation for deliberate sharing of the execution of the intervention (Mechanism M19) despite his concern for power.

Ultimately, a perfectly implemented LISP project ought to trigger all of these mechanisms equally across the lifetime of an intensive engagement process, but this process of identifying the least and most engaged mechanisms allows a few of the 180-possible context-mechanism-outcome configurations to be narrowed down to testing the veracity of just a few rather than all of the mechanisms.

7.1.3.   OUTCOMES

Desirable outcomes of neighbourhood policing would be incredibly diverse, and impossible to track. Pawson's approach to outcomes is to derive them from 'regularities', patterns of behaviour that he identifies from the policy interventions he is studying. Each of the LISP pilots established (or were supposed to) their own expected outcomes for each project. None of the pilots robustly measured whether the planned outcomes were achieved. All that the detailed analyses in Chapter. 5 could do is observe whether the wider crime rates were improving or not, but not posit whether the actions within the LISP were designed to achieve those improved outcomes.

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Throughout the interviews, the PCSOs, and in some cases the sergeants identified that reducing crime was not the only desirable outcome. Thus, the outcomes, for the police are more complex than merely reducing reported crime rates. Further, the desired outcomes of the residents and users of a given neighbourhood would equally be complex - perception and fear of crime is not connected directly to actual crime rates, so improved feelings of safety and confidence may be as important as actual crime rates, Nevertheless, these are both important measures of police **performance**.

The **effectiveness** of a Police force, based on the 'Peelian principles' and expressed in the HMIC PEEL programme, is assessed in relation to how it carries out its responsibilities including cutting crime, protecting the vulnerable, tackling anti-social behaviour, and dealing with emergencies and other calls for service. Its **efficiency** is assessed in relation to how it provides value for money[127], and its **legitimacy** is assessed in relation to whether the force operates fairly, ethically and within the law.

Clearly, there is plenty of potential outcomes for the community stakeholders that could also be considered in this process. These could have been derived directly from the projects themselves, from the outcomes expected by each of the LISP projects. But, the projects were significantly less clear about the measures for success of the community stakeholders than anticipated, so there is no comparability across the projects. Had the research been able to cover the whole lifecycle of all the LISP projects, and all the LISP projects had decided on and measures progress against a basket of outcomes measures, as the Handbook requires, it would be possible to extend the CMO configuration exercise to cover non-police outcomes. Nevertheless, undertaking the exercise only with police-based outcomes still demonstrates the use of the concept.

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[127] Financial arrangements and cost efficiencies were not part of the scope of this study, but a Thames Valley review of neighbourhood policing and efficiency (Metcalfe 2015) is relevant here

Table 7.3 Outcomes from LISP activity

Code	For whom	Outcome
PO1	Police	**Performance**. Reduced demand, lower crime rates, less enforcement activity
PO2		**Effectiveness/Efficiency** Reduced activity per outcome. Greater focus on prevention than patrolling. Other statutory partners participating fully. Skills and assets levered from community to support crime reduction
PO3		Improved **legitimacy** and/or confidence in policing

The next steps are to build a 'logic chain' between contexts-mechanisms-outcomes.

7.1.4.   CONTEXT-MECHANISM-OUTCOME CONFIGURATIONS

Whilst there are 27 Mechanisms at work in this investigation, plus three Outcomes, the previous section provided a framework by which the most 'important' mechanisms are explored in depth. This section will then develop logic statements for the top four mechanisms (as shown in Table 7.4) to illustrate the process of analysing the CMO configurations

Table 7.4 'Logic chain' between contexts-mechanisms-outcomes

Contexts		Mechanisms		Outcomes	
C1	deprivation	M1	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	O1	Performance. /Efficiency
C2	chronic	M7	Highly connected individuals	O2	Effectiveness
C3	complex	M9	Attuned to community dynamics	O3	Legitimacy
		M10	Tacit skills		

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Table 7.5 reviews the CMO configurations for the three contexts, with just Mechanism 1 and Outcome 1, focussed on improved performance. It would seem that deprived areas do not necessarily create performance problems for the police, regardless of the experiences of the people living in these deprived areas. It may be that this would have an impact on the legitimacy of the police, but certainly the different configurations have little impact on the outcomes. Nevertheless, the design of the screening and scoping stages of LISP had already dealt with this issue, because for a locality to be selected for LISP intensive engagement, it would have to be suffering significant deprivation, be a chronic crime performance problem for the police and the nature of the problems involved had to be sufficiently complex that a new approach to problem solving was necessary.

Table 7.5 CMO Configurations: testing contexts

Context		Mechanism		Outcome			CMO Statement	
C1	Deprivation	M1	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	O1	Performance	C1+M1>O1	A highly deprived locality, if understood in detail with respect to people, place and problems will result in reduction in demand and less activity	There is no immediate logic here- not all deprived areas have high crime, or complex problem situations
C2	Chronic	M1	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	O1	Performance	C2+M1>O1	If an area with chronic crime problems, a detailed understanding of the people, places and problems will result in reduction in demand and less activity	Yes, there is a logic here- an in-depth understanding of chronic crime problems would allow police to direct and target action at the causes of the problems rather than just policing the symptoms
C3	Complex	M1	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	O1	Performance	C3+M1>01	A highly complex problem situation, if understood in detail with respect to	Typically, complex problems are avoided by standard policing because they

Context		Mechanism		Outcome		CMO Statement	
						people, place and problems will result in reduction in demand and less activity	require concentrated effort to understand.

In this respect, therefore, the context of the LISP process has already been strongly defined, such that all three contexts (C1, C2 and C3) have to be present before a LISP was instigated in the first place. All of the case study locations met all of these requirements, hence their inclusion in the pilots and the research. Therefore, there is no real need to test every mechanism-outcome configuration against each of these contexts- they can be taken as one single context, C1/3. Indeed, it would require an entirely new research project to explore the different contexts within policing to establish whether the Mechanism-Outcome relationships used within the LISP process also stand for entirely different contexts such as domestic violence or drug trafficking.

7.1.5.   PEOPLE, PLACE AND PROBLEMS

Proceeding on the basis of a combined context (Contexts 1-3 combined), the first mechanism (M1) can be tested, as shown in Table 7.6.

*CMO statement **C1/3+M1>O1** states that an in-depth understanding (M1) of a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in reduced demand, lower crime rates, less enforcement activity (O1).* In-depth understanding requires greater effort than in standard policing, but may not automatically result in reduced demand. The officers involved would have to either build on long-term existing knowledge, or invest heavily in a priority vulnerable area to gain sufficient knowledge about the opportunities to reduce demand and enforcement activity. Without an orientation towards this type of performance, officers could drift towards 'business as usual' responses such as greater patrolling, visibility and reassurance without focusing on the endpoint of reduced police activity. This was demonstrated in the Holy Sepulchre and Kettering projects where the initial strategy was to increase enforcement activity without an outcome of that activity being reduced demand. In-depth understanding has to be oriented towards the outcome of reduced demand to be useful here.

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*CMO Statement **C1/3+M1>O2** states that an in-depth understanding (M1) of a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in better performance (O2)* such as reduced activity per outcome, greater focus on prevention than patrolling, other statutory partners participating fully, and skills and assets levered from community to support crime reduction. There is a stronger relationship here than the first CMO configuration, in that an in-depth understanding (in the terms outlined in the LISP Handbook oriented towards seeking out the community assets rather than deficits) will result in a better understanding of the skills and capabilities of the key stakeholders in the neighbourhood in question, understanding their motivations for being involved, and therefore (as the community begin to co-produce the safer community) the outcomes per unit of police activity will reduce, if the knowledge and understanding gained is used for that purpose.

*CMO Statement **C1/3+M1>O3** states that an in-depth understanding (M1) of a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in better legitimacy (O3) and confidence in policing.* If this process of developing an in-depth understanding of a vulnerable locality is co-created with the key stakeholders in an open and transparent manner, then confidence that the police understand the dynamics of the neighbourhood and know they are using their policing experience to tackle the root causes of the right problems, that matter to the community. Officers own sense of legitimacy will also improve.

Table 7.6 Testing Mechanism One

Context		Mechanism		Outcome		CMO configuration	Caveats
C1/3	High deprivation, chronic crime, & complex problem situation (vulnerable locality)	M1	In-depth understanding of people, place and problems	O1	Performance: Reduced demand, lower crime rates, less enforcement activity	C1/3+M1>O1	If oriented towards less enforcement as an outcome
				O2	Effectiveness/Efficiency: Reduced activity per outcome. Greater focus on prevention than patrolling. Other statutory partners participating fully. Skills and assets levered from community to support crime reduction	C1/3+M1>O2	If understanding gained is used focussed on identifying skills and assets to contribute to reduction in crime

Context		Mechanism		Outcome		CMO configuration	Caveats
				O3	Legitimacy: Improved legitimacy and/or confidence in policing	C1/3+M1>O3	If co-created with the stakeholders

7.1.6. HIGHLY CONNECTED INDIVIDUALS

Whilst two decades of neighbourhood policing has developed a strong track record of engagement with the public, and involvement of the public in policing, little attention has been paid to the nature of those people and how they contribute to policing outcomes. Careful choices regarding the type of people involved in neighbourhood policing are designed into the LISP process to support crime reduction. The purpose of recruiting highly connected and capable individuals is so that they can be involved in 'capable guardianship', that they may be able to effect changes in the neighbourhood (structure and behaviours) to reduce the need for active uniformed police and PCSO presence. These stakeholders will be able to demonstrate demand for action to reduce the conditions of crime with statutory partners, like local authorities. In the Asian Gold burglary case, the stakeholders had to persuade the local authority to direct their contractors to maintain the hedges in the affected streets to the same standard as the non-council houses to achieve the common community outcome of being able to see each other's houses.

CMO Statement **C1/3+M7>O1** states that identifying and recruiting of highly connected and capable stakeholders (M7) in a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in improved performance: reduced demand, lower crime rates, less enforcement activity (O1). Whilst the involvement of lots of different types of community members in policing is important, a focus on recruiting the right people who have the skills and connections (social capital) to co-produce the required outcomes with the police is more helpful. Some community members might be unable or unwilling to contribute materially to the proposed outcomes, others might require greater effort on the part of the police (as consumers of a public service) rather than being active citizens.

CMO Statement **C1/3+M7>O2** states that the identifying and recruiting of highly connected and capable stakeholders (M7) in a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result

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in better performance (O2) such as reduced activity per outcome, greater focus on prevention than patrolling, other statutory partners participating fully, and skills and assets levered from community to support crime reduction. The purpose of recruiting highly connected and capable individuals is so that they can be involved in 'capable guardianship', that they may be able to effect changes in the neighbourhood (structure and behaviours) to reduce the need for active uniformed police and PCSO presence. These stakeholders will be able to demonstrate demand for action to reduce the conditions of crime with statutory partners, like local authorities. In the Asian Gold burglary case, the stakeholders had to persuade the local authority to direct their contractors to maintain the hedges in the affected streets to the same standard as the non-council houses to achieve the common community outcome of being able to see each other's houses.

*CMO Statement **C1/3+M7>O3** states that the identifying and recruiting of highly connected and capable stakeholders (M7) of a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in better legitimacy (O3) and confidence in policing.* There is a strong link here. If the police are seen to be working with highly respected and capable people in the neighbourhood, rather than just those 'professional consultees' or those who stand to gain most from police attention, then the legitimacy of the police will improve. This has to be allied to ensuring that all communities within the neighbourhood are being identified and involved, otherwise those with the highest bridging social capital might capture the policing attention to the detriment of those who are less able to bridge to the processes and procedures of neighbourhood policing, thereby substantially reducing the legitimacy of the police in the minds of the excluded communities

Table 7.7 Testing Mechanism Seven

Context		Mechanism		Outcome		CMO configuration	Caveats
C1/3	High deprivation, chronic crime, & complex problem situation (vulnerable locality)	M7	Highly connected individuals	O1	Performance: Reduced demand, lower crime rates, less enforcement activity	C1/3+M7>O1	The individuals in question need also to desire the same outcome (O1) as the police
				O2	Effectiveness/Efficiency: Reduced activity per outcome. Greater focus	C1/3+M7>O2	The connectedness and capability

Context		Mechanism		Outcome		CMO configuration	Caveats
					on prevention than patrolling. Other statutory partners participating fully. Skills and assets levered from community to support crime reduction		needs to be oriented to community & policing outcomes
				O3	Legitimacy: Improved legitimacy and/or confidence in policing	C1/3+M7>O3	The high connected and capable stakeholders should be seen to represent all the communities in a given vulnerable neighbourhood

7.1.7.   ATTUNED TO COMMUNITY DYNAMICS

This mechanism is highly related to the two previous mechanisms, in that an in-depth knowledge and understanding of the assets and skills within a vulnerable neighbourhood and the deliberate identification and recruiting of highly capable and highly connected community stakeholders will contribute to sensitivity towards the on-going dynamics of a community. This is especially true in that neighbourhoods are not static entities: the populations within a given neighbourhood will change, sometimes rapidly, and different issues and challenges will arise and fall quite quickly. Where a neighbourhood policing team might engage with a vulnerable neighbourhood because of one major problematic crime type, the other issues and challenges that might dominate the self-identity of a community may not be related to that crime type at all. An understanding that all problems in a community are not always police problems is important here. Being attuned, therefore, means being aware of how a community is changing within a neighbourhood.

*CMO Statement **C1/3+M9>O1** states that being attuned to community dynamics (M9) in a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in improved performance: reduced demand, lower crime rates, less enforcement activity (O1).* Certainly, lower enforcement activity will result from a dynamic sensitivity to changes within a community. Crime patterns tend to fluctuate for reasons unknown and unrelated

to policing activity, and therefore high police activity may continue long after the underlying causes of a community problem has disappeared (moved on or grown up). Even the solutions and practices developed within a LISP engagement with a community may become irrelevant as the dynamics change, as conditions within the neighbourhood change.

*CMO Statement **C1/3+M9>O2** states that being attuned to community dynamics (M9) in a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in better performance (O2)* such as reduced activity per outcome, greater focus on prevention than patrolling, other statutory partners participating fully, and skills and assets levered from community to support crime reduction. This is identical to the previous statement, differing only in that the stakeholders that are involved in delivering the solutions and practices that are the community chosen interventions may move on or experience a change in circumstances, and therefore their contribution ceases completely or less effective.

Being attuned to community dynamics (M9) of a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in better legitimacy (O3) and confidence in policing. A sensitivity to the local dynamics is vitally important for the legitimacy of the police and confidence in their ability to police effectively. The legitimacy of the community stakeholders, and their effectiveness in delivering community-based outcomes reflects directly on the police. Where policing teams continue to involve community stakeholders who have fallen out of favour, or have not delivered on promised, the police will also suffer a consequent fall in legitimacy and confidence. It will result in better legitimacy and confidence in policing. A sensitivity to the local dynamics is vitally important for the legitimacy of the police and confidence in their ability to police effectively. The legitimacy of the community stakeholders, and their effectiveness in delivering community-based outcomes reflects directly on the police

Table 7.8 Testing Mechanism 9

Context		Mechanism		Outcome		CMO configuration	Caveats
C1/3	High deprivation, chronic crime, & complex problem situation	M9	Attuned to community dynamics	O1	Performance: Reduced demand, lower crime rates, less enforcement activity	C1/3+M9>O1	The police activity has to be responsive to the changed dynamics. Solutions and practices do

Context		Mechanism		Outcome		CMO configuration	Caveats
	(vulnerable locality)						not remain valid for all time.
				O2	Effectiveness/Efficiency: Reduced activity per outcome. Greater focus on prevention than patrolling. Other statutory partners participating fully. Skills and assets levered from community to support crime reduction	C1/3+M9>O2	LISP is not a one-off, it is a process of engagement
				O3	Legitimacy: Improved legitimacy and/or confidence in policing	C1/3+M9>03	The legitimacy and confidence in the community stakeholders reflects directly on police standing.

7.1.8.   TACIT SKILLS

Whilst LISP is a set of 8 steps, or a procedure, as established above, it is a mechanism whereby an in-depth understanding of a vulnerable neighbourhood may be gained, attuned to the dynamics and rapid changes within that neighbourhood, and co-producing solutions and practices within that neighbourhood with highly connected and highly capable stakeholders to reduce crime and reduce police activity whilst improving the legitimacy of the policing activities. Undertaking the LISP process as an explicit procedure is somewhat different to using LISP as a framework or a way of thinking, a structure for the tacit skills of the neighbourhood policing team.

Tacit knowledge is also an unwritten, unspoken, and vast hidden storehouse of knowledge held within a community. Using the techniques of LISP in a tacit rather than explicit way is important, but even more so is the access the police might have to the tacit skills and experience of the community. The inclusion of the ethos' of Asset-based Community Development and Motivational Interviewing are a deliberate strategy to make that tacit knowledge visible. The Rich Picturing

process is also designed to make tacit understanding and emotions visible in a constructive and solution-oriented manner.

*CMO Statement **C1/3+M10>O1** states that identifying and using tacit skills (M10) in a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in improved performance: reduced demand, lower crime rates, less enforcement activity (O1).* The skills and capabilities that exist within a community to reduce or prevent crime are rarely a feature of police engagement with a neighbourhood. Using the rich picturing technique, in the context of the range of engagement strategies within LISP, will enable these capabilities to become evident and available to the neighbourhood.

*CMO Statement **C1/3+M10>O2** states that identifying and using tacit skills (M10) in a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in better performance (O2)* such as reduced activity per outcome, greater focus on prevention than patrolling, other statutory partners participating fully, and skills and assets levered from community to support crime reduction. If accessing existing skills and capabilities within the community is oriented towards the outcomes of co-produced community safety will then statutory partners also be able to participate appropriately in community safety partnerships that are not just limited to statutory partnerships

*CMO Statement **C1/3+M10>O3** states that identifying and using tacit skills (M10) of a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in better legitimacy (O3) and confidence in policing.* Drawing on and utilising the skills and capabilities of the community stakeholders would increase their assent towards interventions delivered by the police. Where those tacit skills are recognised, the stakeholders begin to appreciate the tacit skills that the police officers elicit

Table 7.9 Testing Mechanism 10

Context		Mechanism		Outcome		CMO configuration	Caveats
C1/3	High deprivation, chronic crime, & complex problem situation (vulnerable locality)	M10	Tacit skills	O1	Performance: Reduced demand, lower crime rates, less enforcement activity	C1/3+M10>O1	Rich picturing allows for tacit knowledge and skills be to be identified in their context

Context		Mechanism		Outcome		CMO configuration	Caveats
				O2	Effectiveness/Efficiency: Reduced activity per outcome. Greater focus on prevention than patrolling. Other statutory partners participating fully. Skills and assets levered from community to support crime reduction	C1/3+M10>O2	If community stakeholders co-produce outcomes, statutory partners can be more proactively involved
				O3	Legitimacy: Improved legitimacy and/or confidence in policing	C1/3+M10>03	Co-recognition of tacit skills builds understanding and trust

7.1.9.   CONCLUSIONS

The above analysis demonstrates that within the four most active mechanisms operating in the LISP Handbook, strong CMO configurations can readily be constructed between the context of a 'vulnerable locality', i.e. that it is an area of high deprivation, chronic levels of crime and a complex problem situation. This does not mean that all other types of areas (low deprivation/high crime or low deprivation/low crime or low deprivation/low crime) LISP does not work, but, in the terms mentioned above, less 'pressure' would be necessary on different mechanisms. This was discussed extensively during the project, which gave rise to a 'strategising with LISP' white paper and the use of the CMO configurations as a tool to design innovative interventions. Rather than using CMOs to analyse, post hoc, an intervention, one could start with the context, and desired outcomes, or start with context and mechanisms to predict outcomes. It would also be possible to start with a project idea, understand the mechanisms and desired outcomes, to work back to identify appropriate contexts.

This chapter also relates back to Bellman's (1992) insights into organisational change, showing where the most significant mechanisms highlights from the research relate, or do not relate. What is important to note here is that although there is some relationship, and some important omissions, Bellman's work does not demonstrate the relationships between the mechanisms, and the contexts and outcomes. Whilst Bellman's insights are important (and may be added to by Pawson's mechanisms), the compendium would be incomplete without the context-mechanism-outcome connection. The mechanisms have to be connected to outcomes, and have to be contextualised in specific contexts. This chapter has

demonstrated that the mechanisms 'work' in the context localities specifically explored in significant depth in this research to produce the specific outcomes outlined. Many other context-based criteria could be used, but haven't been here. Many other outcomes could be possible, but haven't been tested. Neverthless, mechanisms on their own are insufficient, either in theory or for the practitioner.

LISP was designed to be used in neighbourhoods identified using the Jill Dando Institute Vulnerable Localities Index, and in which complex chronic crime patterns are a part of wider complex social problems. Four of the pilot projects have been investigated in detail, using Soft Systems Methodology as a means of structuring the comparison of the projects, and to derive conceptual models of the problem situations. The projects all varied significantly in the extent to which they fulfilled all the requirements of the designed LISP process, but all of those that produced a LISP proforma demonstrated some improvement in the performance, effectiveness and legitimacy. Twenty-seven mechanisms drawn from what works in neighbourhood policing and from other public policy interventions have been shown to be at work in the LISP framework and six of which have been uniquely developed in this study, providing a most robust complex of key activities that make LISP projects successful in the appropriate contexts. This study has demonstrated that the 27 mechanisms satisfactorily map from the vulnerable locality contexts to the PEEL policing outcomes, therefore demonstrating that the LISP process is an effective new tool in neighbourhood policing for engaging with high risk vulnerable neighbourhoods in an effective, legitimate and confidence building manner.

CHAPTER. 8.   CONTRIBUTIONS & FUTURE WORK

The previous chapter provided a detailed Context-Mechanism-Outcome analysis of the key mechanisms at play within the projects, establishing that within the four most active mechanisms operating in the LISP Handbook, strong CMO configurations can readily be constructed between the context of a 'vulnerable locality', i.e. that it is an area of high deprivation, chronic levels of crime and a complex problem situation. This demonstrates that the mechanisms, drawn from 'what works' and 'what is promising' in policing and public policy intervention evidence is operational within the LISP Handbook as implemented. This concluding chapter returns to the research question, its contribution to theory and practice, the limitations of the study and advise researchers on future studies that can enhance the field.

The underlying theme of this PhD research is to understand how one might design and implement better social innovation interventions. Although the subject matter of the field work here is neighbourhood policing, the wider context of this work holds out the hope that any social or environmental problem could be subject to the processes and procedures described in the LISP Handbook and robust socially innovative interventions could be co-designed and co-implemented with the communities that are experiencing the problems. It is, of course, beyond the remit of this research to test the efficacy of the LISP Handbook outside the field of neighbourhood policing. That is a clear limitation of this research, and a topic for further research. This work provides a detailed empirically based demonstration of how the LISP Toolkit works, and why it works in specific contexts, following the protocols established by Soft Systems Methodology analyses. Having done so in a series of different contexts, albeit in one subject domain (of neighbourhood policing, and in Northamptonshire), the Context-Mechanism-Outcomes frame provides a robust evidential basis for the LISP Handbook in other contexts and subject domains because a significant proportion of the mechanisms tested were drawn from wider public policy interventions. In short, the research shows how the LISP Handbook implements the most effective mechanisms in public policy interventions.

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The research question for this investigation was 'By what mechanisms (why), and in what contexts (how) does LISP work as a socially innovative community engagement process in neighbourhood policing?

The secondary aims were to:

1. Investigate the background of development of the tool, working back into the theoretical antecedents of the work
2. Investigate the pilots of the Handbook that were developed, and thereby
3. Establish what mechanisms that contribute to what outcomes in which contexts?

8.1. BY WHAT MECHANISMS AND HOW?

Question: Does LISP work? Answer: Yes

Question: Ok. By what mechanisms does LISP work? Answer: by the interplay and triggering of the 27 mechanisms identified in this research, established from national research into 'what works and what is promising' evidence on neighbourhood policing and research into public health policy interventions.

Question: In what contexts does LISP work? Answer: LISP has been demonstrated to achieve stronger outcomes in contexts (different neighbourhoods) where there is chronic crime and/or deprivation is worse. Beyond reducing crime, different communities have different aspirations, and different ideas of how to keep crime low: those are Outcomes. But regardless of context or outcome there are five mechanisms that work quickly and easily, and five that are really difficult to implement. Those that are readily triggered are:

- *Highly connected individuals*
- *Attuned to community dynamics*
- *Tacit skills*
- *Demand effort from stakeholders*
- *Offer encouragement and feedback*
- *Build trust and resilience*

These will not take long to establish and will suggest that the social innovation LISP project is going well and there will be high confidence of success. The following mechanisms are much harder to implement:

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- *In-depth understanding of people, place and problems*
- *Sufficient 'dose' of intensive engagement with sufficient time*
- *Make accommodations for set-backs*
- *Explain the theory of change*
- *Share execution and control of the intervention*

Without clear and careful attention to ensuring that these mechanisms are in place and soundly implemented, not matter how desperate the context or how modest the outcomes, how engaged or enthusiastic the community or how modest the interventions that are designed, the LISP project will probably be deemed a failure.

The above italics represent a not-so fictional conversation between the author and a senior police officer implementing the roll-out of LISP projects in the future. The research has been designed and implemented to answer those questions. The investigation has identified 27 mechanisms, drawn from what works in neighbourhood policing literature and practice and from Pawson's wider research into what works in public policy interventions, and from 6 mechanisms that were identified specifically from within this research.

The additional insights developed in this research are that community engagement based social innovation requires a stable team, responsibilisation, a mix of contingent interventions, perspective taking, a sensitivity to hidden communities, and attention given to connecting communities together that hitherto are not.

The mechanisms are equally important, but they are not evenly triggered within a given context or for a given set of desired outcomes. As each case study was evaluated, and the connections between each context and outcome were made through the mechanisms, it was clear that some mechanisms were consistently more readily activated across most of the projects, regardless of the context or the outcome, and other mechanisms were much less readily activated. This was an unexpected insight and lent a great deal of additional resolution to the 27 mechanisms, breaking them down into categories of 'easy wins' and those that needed to be much more carefully considered in implementing any project.

8.2. ANTECEDENTS TO THE TOOLKIT

The first phase of the research was to investigate the background of the development of the Toolkit. The findings from the investigation into the antecedent literature of the LISP are that it is complex and sprawling, messy even. And herein lies the perennial challenge, exemplified by Ackhoff "Managers are not confronted with problems that are independent of each other, but with dynamic situations that consists of complex systems of changing problems that interact with each other. I call such situations messes. Problems are abstractions extracted from messes by analysis; they are to messes as atoms are to tables and charts … Managers do not solve problems, they manage messes." (1979, p99). Making sense of the messes of organisations and communities, and the intersections between organisations and communities, whether they are social enterprises or police forces, seems to be the common factor here. The other common factor seems to be the shift from the use of the term 'organisation' as a noun to a verb, from 'organisation' to 'organising'.

The earliest engagement of the researcher with the world of organisational change was an experience of organising without direct power (Bellman, 1992), a situation that both Saul Alinsky (1957) and Paolo Freire (1996) experienced, identified with and theorised about in the worlds of community development. The unconnected but associated world of Rogerian non-directive therapy that gave rise to Motivational Interviewing (Miller and Rollnick, 2012) as an approach that recognised the need for change but left to direction of the outcome open to the client or beneficiary is compelling in a new(ish) world of the social entrepreneur that is full of new and reinvented organisational forms and expectations that new products services and outcomes will be created by creative and powerful heroes (Leadbeater, 2007). Bellman's (1992) foundational insights into creating change when not in a position of authority provided a useful threefold framework of 'purpose, power and persuasion', which can be carried forward into the subsequent Pawson (2013) mechanisms to some limited extent, but do not take account of the different contexts within which the power and persuasion might have to be deployed or the different outcomes that might have to be achieved.

In the meantime, the public servant police officer is under increasing pressure to deliver a basket of measures and outcomes that look increasingly like the

interventions of the community worker and social entrepreneur, whilst little notice is taken of the existing assets, efficacy and resilience of the community. The research has demonstrated that these threads are drawn together, at least implicitly in the first drafts of the LISP Handbook creating a theoretical foundation that isn't immediately obvious in reading the LISP text, but is actually present.

This may lead to an assumption that the 'agent' is the key to the social innovation seen in the LISP projects reported here, i.e. that the PCSO, or other individuals, possessing or creating networks of high social capital to create the socially innovative interventions, but to leap to this sparse conclusion would be to render the 'wicked issue' of both social innovation, and neighbourhood policing, 'tame'. It would be an adequate observation, but does not account for the evidence, and is not the complete outcome of the 'context-mechanism-outcome' work in Chapter. 7. Most notably, it doesn't account for how the agents go about this creative process, or at least, not in a manner that allows for a consistent and repeatable framework to be parsed from the evidence. The current theoretical account of this process undertaken by the social innovation agent is that of 'bricolage' (discussed in 3.6.3). Although Di Domenico, Haugh and Tracey (2010) endow social bricolage with six features (making do, refusal to be constrained by limitations, social value creation, stakeholder participation, and persuasion of significant actors) at its core their theory is still informed by Derrida's original (1970) concept of 'freeplay' and therefore still reliant on the agents' skills and talents to make do, confidence to refuse to be constrained, and find and persuade significant actors. This research, however, using critical realism, allows social innovation to move beyond the special characteristics of the agent, or the serendipity of bricolage's 'freeplay', to construct and test a series of mechanisms (or processes) that any agent or group of agents may apply consistently and repeatably to create community-based social innovation. The findings summarised below encompass Di Domenico, Haugh and Tracey's (2010) six features of social bricolage, but resists the temptation to tame the wicked issue by oversimplifying the challenge of social change to six elements, but instead provide 27 verified mechanisms (parsed out to 5 straightforward and 5 more challenging) that work across hundreds of potential circumstances

8.3. THE FINDINGS

The **Contexts** were localities or neighbourhoods in which this research was conducted, and were identified according to three criteria indicating their 'vulnerability' to chronic crime, that experienced (C1) significant multiple deprivation, and (C2) long-term chronic crime patterns and (C3) complex, publicly contested crime types including anti-social behaviour and serious acquisitive crime.

For the different members of the community in each context, the desirable **Outcomes** of neighbourhood policing would be incredibly diverse, and impossible to track, so were instead limited to three identifiable Police outcomes; Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy, taken from the national Police inspection PEEL audits. Pawson's approach to outcomes is to derive them from 'regularities', patterns of behaviour that he identifies from the policy interventions he is studying. Each of the LISP pilots established (or were supposed to) their own expected outcomes for each project, identified at Step 7. Outcomes, for the police are more complex than merely reducing reported crime rates. Further, the desired outcomes of the residents and users of a given neighbourhood would equally be complex - perception and fear of crime is not connected directly to actual crime rates, so improved feelings of safety and confidence may be as important as actual crime rates. The effectiveness of a Police force is assessed in relation to how it carries out its responsibilities including cutting crime, protecting the vulnerable, tackling anti-social behaviour, and dealing with emergencies and other calls for service. Its efficiency is assessed in relation to how it provides value for money, and its legitimacy is assessed in relation to whether the force operates fairly, ethically and within the law. Police outcomes were thus expressed as (PO1) Performance, (PO2) Effectiveness or Efficiency and (PO3) improved Legitimacy.

The research then identified 27 **Mechanisms**, drawing on what is known and what is promising in neighbourhood policing research, and from Pawson's cross-sectoral policy intervention research and 6 insights drawn directly from the field work. Of the 27 mechanisms, the most active were where highly connected individuals (M7) are attuned to community dynamics (M9) are utilising tacit skills (M10) and demanding effort from stakeholders (M14) in an environment in which they have

deliberately built trust and resilience (M16). These were the most readily activated mechanisms in the case-studies, but not necessarily the most effective.

There are important caveats to some of these most readily activated mechanisms too. An in-depth understanding (M1) of a vulnerable locality (C1/3) will result in better performance (O2), if understanding gained is used focussed on identifying skills and assets to contribute to reduction in crime. It will only improve legitimacy and/or confidence in policing, if co-created with the stakeholders. Drawing on and utilising the skills and capabilities of the community stakeholders (Tacit Skills M10) would increase their assent towards interventions delivered by the police. Where those tacit skills are recognised, the stakeholders begin to appreciate the tacit skills that the police officers elicit.

There are a series of 'least active' mechanisms that represent those that have been the hardest to implement. Mechanism 1, the in-depth investigation into the problem, with the depth and breadth necessary was rarely done to the level necessary, and was only significantly improved when case study was prioritised at a more senior level. The 'dose' (M3) was also problematic, because project leaders were being constantly abstracted[128] for additional tasks, so it required a very determined and dedicated sergeant/inspector team to defend the use of the staff time on LISP activities. Ultimately, a perfectly implemented LISP project ought to trigger all of these mechanisms equally across the lifetime of an intensive engagement process, but this process of identifying the least and most engaged mechanisms allows a few of the 180-possible context-mechanism-outcome configurations to be narrowed down to investigating just a few.

The analysis demonstrates that within the four most active mechanisms operating in the LISP Handbook, strong CMO configurations can readily be constructed between the context of a 'vulnerable locality', i.e. that it is an area of high deprivation, chronic levels of crime and a complex problem situation.

For the practitioners undertaking the LISP activities, the question of power was framed in finding the 'highly connected, highly capable' people able to affect change in their localities. This summarises the notion of 'social capital' (Putnam, 1995 and specifically for community resilience; Poortinga, 2012) in particular the

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[128] Policing term for removed for other duties

role of bonding capital connecting different groups within a given locality together, and bridging capital being the ability of those groups to bridge to sources of power and resource outside their locality.

8.4.   CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY

Chapter Six, the Mode 2 Soft Systems analysis returns to a critical realist evaluation of the evidence presented in Chapter Five, specifically using Pawson and Tilley's (1997) context-mechanism-outcomes (CMO) chains method, to posit triggers that may have activated those CMO chains in the projects to account for their successes and failures. Developing CMO relationships across a range of pilot interventions helps to understand what makes the LISP Handbook work, and under what circumstances. During the development of the CMO configuration chains, the idea of a 'trigger' was developed to suggest that it is not just a one-off instant 'hair trigger' moment that fires a mechanism, like Pawson and Tilley's gun powder analogy (1997). But if the mechanisms have differently weighted 'triggers' (light or heavy), using the same weight of pressure on the trigger might mean that some mechanisms do not fire even when expected. Dalkin et al (2015) have most recently tackled this and suggested a graduation of outcomes rather a binary on-off switch. Whilst concurring that a sudden trigger is also not encountered in this study, the concept of a weighted trigger is a more nuanced approach. Different pressure is placed on the trigger according to the contexts, and according to the 'resources' and 'reasoning' (Dalkin et al, 2015, p4) appropriate to the situation.

This study is the first to apply Soft Systems Methodology to the field of social innovation. Applying Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) in the field of social innovation required making the case that SSM is based in and consistent with the epistemology and ontology of Critical Realism. This is a novel shift, but so too is introducing critical realism to the field of social innovation. This work specifically identifies that a common idea in contemporary social innovation theory is that of 'bricolage' (Section 3.6.3) but that it is generally understood as a random, eclectic and essentially mysterious craft, consonant with postmodern thought. This research, grounded in critical realism, that identifies mechanisms that drive social behaviours and regularities, shows that social innovation can actually be a process of consistent and repeatable activities. This is not to reject the concept of

bricolage, at least in the form identified by Di Domenico (2010) above, but rather to suggest that the improvisation is not wholly 'freeplay' as the theorists might suggest or wish for, and that bricolage is constrained and structured. The research does not suggest that social innovation must be constrained and structured, but that social innovation can be consistently and repeatably applied and yet create unique interventions, whilst yet activating and mobilising the same underpinning mechanisms. Sorting through the mess of bricolage seems to reveal a different set of layers (laminar layers as Bhaskar (1975) would describe them) that comprise the mechanisms that contribute to the social impact that social entrepreneurs are seeking to achieve.

8.5. CONTRIBUTION TO PRACTICE.

The research contributes to both the fields of social innovation and community policing. It has established an effective structured, consistent and repeatable approach to social innovation, demonstrating its effectiveness in the field of community policing. The 27 mechanisms, and the extent and difficulty with which they are triggered, in given contexts and with identified outcomes, provides a robust tool for first developing social innovation solutions that are sensitive to the unique contexts of place, people and processes. They are also a means of monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the proposed 'solutions and practices' through evaluating the extent to which the practitioners have implemented each of the key mechanisms. This will allow practitioners to ensure that their social innovation projects are carefully and fully implemented to give the best possible chance of achieving the planned social outcomes. It will also equip evaluators with a fair and robust approach to evaluating what social innovations work, and under what circumstances. It can also be used as a diagnostic tool to aid strategists in establishing what engagement strategies are needed in what contexts. The contribution to neighbourhood policing has been to establish what works and in what contexts, with respect to engaging with the communities, in particular neighbourhoods, to devise and implement locally identified and co-produced solutions and behaviours that change the dynamics of the social norms that arise from the people, places and processes to reduce the conditions that give rise to crime, whilst assuring the effectiveness and legitimacy of the uniformed police staff. Finally, the research has given rise to a training and

competency framework to identify and improve the skills of social innovation practitioners.

8.6. CONTRIBUTION TO POLICY

Innes et al (2020) suggest the death of neighbourhood policing. The loss of confidence in the neighbourhood policing model during the austerity period 2008-2020 has focused the cuts in policing resources on PCSOs and neighbourhood officers. But the Covid19 pandemic of 2020 further increased concerns that public agencies, charities and social enterprises were losing touch with the public (Marston et al 2020). New approaches and concerns about serious and violent crime amongst young people cited community and public engagement in crisis (Peten, 2019) In 2019, the College of Policing picked up on the crisis and promoted public health (i.e. preventative) approaches into policing (Christmas and Srivastava 2019). This promoted the use of realist epidemiological approaches to analysing the problems and a systems leadership approach to solutions development. Despite the apparent crisis in neighbourhood policing, place-based policy (Beer et al, 2020) is still a matter of significant debate. What is missing, however, is an evidence-based step-by-step process of consistent and repeatable problem analysis and community-based intervention development, implementation and impact evaluation. This research demonstrates what mechanisms underpin and make such a process work well. Police forces, community safety partnerships and associated community organisations could adopt this model of social innovation, learning from the analysis and the way in which the mechanisms are applied to ensure through implementation of the LISP process. Infrastructure organisations and community engagement professionals could adopt this framework as a competency framework, and the quality of community engagement projects could be measured against the 27 mechanisms.

8.7. STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Within the ethical approval of the research study, it was not possible to gather data from members of the public involved in the LISP pilots, interviews were only conducted with PCSOs and uniformed police officers. This made it impossible to adequately include the community voice in the research beyond that which was expressed through the rich pictures collected by the PCSOs themselves.

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Another limitation was the inability of any of the pilots to complete the LISP 8 step process within the pilot phase, due to operational limitations. Further work is needed to explore the CMO configurations in steps 7 and 8, and to test the evaluation of the interventions.

However, the strengths of this approach are that it resolves the problem of idiographic, story-driven case-based research which dominates much of social innovation work. This research could have been 8 separate unrelated and incomparable projects, but the rigour of the soft systems methodology allied to the context-mechanism-outcome chain analysis demonstrated that the seemingly unrelated projects are comparable and have deep structural similarities that supersede any a priori statistical demographic similarities that might be identified when trying to construct a counterfactual in a 'gold standard' randomised control trial. This opens the way up for social innovations from much more diverse backgrounds to be compared in a structured, coherent and consistent comparative process.

Indeed, other projects have been developed since this research, and the analytical frame created here has been used to analyse and guide the implementation of new LISP projects. Other research projects could be created to develop LISP pilots entirely created by members of the public to tackle crime issues, and differentiate their approach to that of the police led. Further work could be done on the extent to which, as hinted in Figure 9.16 in the Appendix, rich picturing can be used to explore not just two dimensional multiperspectival depictions of a given problem situation, but the laminar reality, exposing hidden social norms that structure and constraint freedom. After this research, work in Gloucestershire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and West Yorkshire has developed that has been led by Community Safety Partnerships, rather than the police force, although still directly involving police officers. A further step may involve no police officers at all. Further work will be pursued into areas outside of public safety, into post-conflict and environmental resilience.

Nonetheless, this study has demonstrated that the 27 mechanisms satisfactorily map from the vulnerable locality contexts to the PEEL policing outcomes, therefore LISP is an effective new tool in the neighbourhood policing Handbook for engaging

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with high risk vulnerable neighbourhoods in an effective, legitimate and confidence building manner

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CHAPTER. 9.   APPENDICES

9.1.   MODE 1 ANALYSIS PROJECT ONE ASIAN GOLD

This section utilises soft systems methodology to analyse the case study in a structured manner. All of the evidence provided in the thick description above is used as material to undertake an SSM Mode 1 Analysis of the problem situation. The Mode 2 analysis will be undertaken in Chapter. 6

Enter situation considered problematical

Section 5.3 above provides a thick description of the problem situation known by the police as the 'Asian Gold Burglaries' problem.

Express the problem situation

Rich Picture

Figure 9.1 PSCO developing a rich picture of the problem situation

The earliest rich pictures undertaken with the public involved in this pilot have already been presented in Chapter 5.3 but Figure 9. shows the PCSO working on their own rich picture of the problem situation. The picture shows the notes taken during the public meetings (on the right) and the generic properties in the centre with the common areas of vulnerability in and around the houses.

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CATWOE

Table 9.1 CATWOE statement

i.	Customers/Beneficiaries - Who are the beneficiaries of the highest-level process and how does the issue affect them?	In the first instance, the Police are the beneficiaries of the problem of interest, as they have chosen the problem as an ongoing concern. Other people who would benefit include the victims of the burglaries, the families and relatives of those concerned, and ultimately the community leaders
ii.	Actors - Who is involved in the situation, who will be involved in implementing solutions and what will impact their success?	Police, victims, families, community leaders, 'target-hardening' charities, local authority housing, environmental health
iii.	Transformation Process - What is the transformation that lies at the heart of the system - transforming grapes into wine, transforming unsold goods into sold goods, transforming a societal need into a societal need met?	The transformation process at work here is a change in the relationship between the community and police. The community have traditionally considered themselves disconnected from policing, hence their own attempts at a militia. The community were passive consumers of safe spaces, but when that is threatened as they are targeted as a coherent community, they become active citizens, but in need of direction.
iv.	World View - What is the big picture and what are the wider impacts of the issue?	The bigger picture- the outcome that all stakeholders would agree on would be to reduce the vulnerability of the citizens to this crime type.
v.	Owner - Who owns the process or situation being investigated and what role will they play in the solution?	Nobody owns the system of interest, except that the Police have power in the public realm, and the Council (and its

		agents) have responsibility for maintaining wellbeing in the public realm. The citizens are not in control of the problem, but their social connections are key to delivering a less vulnerable community
vi.	Environmental Constraints - What are the constraints and limitations that will impact the solution and its success?	The layout of the streets cannot be changed and there are no resources to create change at the start of the process of investigation. Privately owned houses may require target hardening, but can't afford it. Local authority has a duty to protect council tenants, but it is not clear what they should do beyond individualised responses

Formulate root definitions of relevant systems of purposeful activity

The residents of Dallington/St James, and the wider Asian community that might keep valuable costume jewellery cease being a target of crime through increased security of their buildings and improved cohesion between citizens, and with the Police.

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

Build conceptual models of the systems named in the root definitions

Figure 9.2 First 'Asian Gold' conceptual model

The first round of conceptual modelling illustrated in Figure 9.2 provides a mapping of the critical factors developed in the rich description in the previous section. The three main systems of interest are the householder and their interaction with the criminal, with the subsequent involvement of the Policing system. The gold exists in the houses, rather than in secure boxes in a bank because of the cultural/community system, and the particularly vulnerability of the houses at a specific time (around hajj) is represented by the religious system. The criminal system has very little overlap with the other systems. There is a question about the extent to which the perpetrators of the crimes are insiders, and have knowledge of the gold-storing practices and time-critical vulnerabilities of this specific community, but (uniquely in systems analysis terms) one critical stakeholder group (the criminals) are not involved in the systems thinking process[129].

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[129] Although in some cases, like anti-social behaviour, the perpetrators of the problem could be more readily involved in the systems analysis and problem-solving process.

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

Comparing models with real world situations

Figure 9.3 Second 'Asian Gold' conceptual model

The second iteration of modelling (Figure 9.3) filled in some missing details, specifically the involvement of the wider 'non-Asian' community (bottom-right hand of picture) who may also have been subjected to burglaries or other crime in the area, and the local authority and housing associations that own public housing in the area. Private owners are also connected to the neighbourhood watch schemes in the area (not covering the whole neighbourhood) indicating a level of bridging social capital in being able to secure the attention of the police.

This conceptual model begins to draw out of the detail, three core systems components: the neighbourhood streets that provide the physical context for the criminal behaviours, the point at which PCSO, citizen, criminal and victim are physically present. This environmental context is well rehearsed in Environmental Visual Audit activities in neighbourhood policing partnerships, but these often lack the direction and resources (i.e. are not considered important enough) for actions to be completed or a given environmental setting has not been considered to be vulnerable before (as is the case here). Factors that the PCSOs and citizens

identified are recorded here including street lighting, bushes, fences and alarms. It is more usual for PCSOs to advise on alarms, window and door security and other individualised target hardening techniques, but in this pilot (prompted by the LISP systems thinking) the PCSOs shifted from advising individuals to thinking of the problem as a system of problem situations suggesting that a communal experience may also be part of the problem. This prompted consideration of street lighting but also visibility between houses being limited by unkempt fences and hedges.

The second core system component centres around the NBA Bangladeshi Association. Whilst the NBA centre is not located in the centre of the neighbourhood at risk, key members of NBA did live in the neighbourhood. This required the PCSOs to think in terms of assets rather than deficits, and assets that are available to whole community rather than just the neighbourhood. The connection of the NBA community group, the imams from the mosque and friends & relatives became important as the PCSOs sought to communicate with the victims as a community of experience rather than individuals, representing bonding social capital. The observation by the PCSOs that this group of community members had little prior positive connection to the police, and yet were highly active in response to the crimes suggested that this group lacked 'bridging' social capital and that the police had discounted their substantial bonding social capital (through considering them to be a deficit, or merely victims, within the problem situation).

The third critical system component seems simple: to remove the gold from the houses so that the houses are not a target. This behaviour is tied up with a range of social and cultural practices including the Muslim community using specialist banking services, notions of personal wealth and status and a more general sense of not being a target for crime. Changing these dynamics to encourage the storage of gold jewellery elsewhere required the social capital of the community association and the mosques, as well as reaching across the diagram to the remote Police and Crime Commissioner's office to access funding for appropriate literature. This was brokered through the PCSOs and the sergeant, demonstrating the critical role of the police as bridging social capital, connecting the community to places of power and resource.

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

The green marks indicate suggestions at 'mechanisms', as the systems analysis considers 'what is going on here?' The connectivity between the police, citizens, victims and the wider community has been coded as **'improved resilience'**. This is probably not a mature code at this point- but the cohesion or connectivity across a community space that is usually a contested one is probably more important at this point. Removing the opportunity with respect to the presence of the gold in homes relates to situational crime theory (Clarke, 1995). Utilising social capital and accessing bridging capital draw directly from social capital theory (Bourdieu, 2018) and the manner in which they might lie latent in the case of the NBA community association's social capital (for the lack bridging capital) and be activated by capital bridges like the neighbourhood watch scheme but also, in this pilot, the PCSO and the NBA community association members.

Define changes which are both possible and feasible, and Take action to improve the problem situation

Figure 9.4 Third 'Asian Gold' conceptual model

The final iteration of the conceptual modelling of the 'Asian gold' problem situation (Figure 9.4) reduces the complexity of the second iteration, focussing on the three core system components but looking at the nature of the boundaries between the systems. Whilst doors and window security are the standard target-hardening

response, the PCSOs now access better visibility (separating 'visibility of policing' from their physical presence) by responsibilising (Foucault, 1977; Swyngedouw, 2005) the citizens into co-creating that visibility. This is achieved by recruiting and redirecting existing social capital through culturally appropriate communication and bridging that community capital to other capitals of power and resource, with the consequent increase in the legitimacy of the police.

MODE 1 ANAYSIS PROJECT TWO SPENCER HAVEN

Enter situation considered problematical

Section 5.4 above provides a thick description of the problem situation known by the police as the 'Spencer haven' problem.

Express the problem situation

Rich Picture

No rich pictures in the terms of Soft Systems Analysis were used in this pilot. The PCSO suggested that ""it was difficult to explain to a deaf person the purpose of a picture" (Vera 6:45) even though this would have been a very good opportunity to allow the residents to speak through rich pictures on their own terms. It is clear, however, from the spray diagrams (in Figure 5.24) that the PCSO had developed a rich picture in her head but was not comfortable with drawing that out.

CATWOE

Figure 9.5 CATWOE statement

| i. | Customers/Beneficiaries - Who are the beneficiaries of the highest-level process and how does the issue affect them? | In the first instance, the Police are the beneficiaries of the problem of interest, as they have chosen the problem as an ongoing concern. Other people who would benefit include the victims of the burglaries, specifically in this case the vulnerable residents of the Haven, and the houses around the boundary that are affected by the spate of burglaries. The council and community organisations like deaf connect have an interest because of the cost and distress caused by the burglaries |

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

ii.	Actors - Who is involved in the situation, who will be involved in implementing solutions and what will impact their success?	Police, victims (deaf, learning difficulties, elderly), families, community leaders, 'target-hardening' charities, local authority housing, environmental health/environmental wardens
iii.	Transformation Process - What is the transformation that lies at the heart of the system - transforming grapes into wine, transforming unsold goods into sold goods, transforming a societal need into a societal need met?	The transformation process at work here is the police developing a better understanding of the lived experienced of particularly vulnerable people with respect to burglaries, and modifying the way in which they communicate and receive information from the residents
iv.	World View - What is the big picture and what are the wider impacts of the issue?	There are other neighbourhoods populated with particularly vulnerable people in Northamptonshire, the police could adopt similar tactics. The wider picture is improving the way in which the police listens to hard-to-hear communities.
v.	Owner - Who owns the process or situation being investigated and what role will they play in the solution?	Nobody owns the system of interest, except that the Police have power in the public realm, and the Council (and its agents) have responsibility for maintaining wellbeing in the public realm. The citizens are not in control of the problem, but their social connections are key to delivering a less vulnerable community

vi.	Environmental Constraints - What are the constraints and limitations that will impact the solution and its success?	The layout of the streets cannot be changed and there are no resources to create change at the start of the process of investigation. The porosity of the boundary in terms of fences, gates and hedges present a weakness as well as an opportunity

Formulate root definitions of relevant systems of purposeful activity

The residents of Spencer Haven are confident that the Police take their specific needs seriously and modify their policing activity to take account of this lived experience.

Build conceptual models of the systems named in the root definitions

Figure 9.6 Conceptual model of Spencer Haven problem situation

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

In the centre of Figure 9.6 is the outline of the Spencer Haven neighbourhood, bounded by a very fast and busy road on the right side, and private houses above and below. The presenting problems related to the shape neighbourhood, the (purple) paths through the neighbourhood and the proximity to the private houses. Surrounding that, to the left is the person representing the residents, and the issues mentioned by the residents surround that person. On the right is represented the Police, also taking ideas and phrases from how the Police saw the problem. The gap between them conceptually is represented by the purple DISCONNECT word. On the side of the residents is the Residents' Association, which is connected to and supported by the other associations and charities involved with the residents. This has a formal connection to the Council, through their representation, but the Police are only informally connected to that residents' association. The highly connected and capable people in this analysis are the chair of the Association who is a former police officer, and the Councillor who can intercede with the Council services.

Figure 9.7 Conceptual model of solutions proposed in Spencer Haven case

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

Looking more closely at the solutions and interventions proposed, Figure 9.7 illustrates how the PCSO was considering all the key stakeholders, including the perpetrators of the crimes and developed a broad base of interventions to respond to the different facets of the problem situation. The purple boundaries indicate the interventions that had a common balance of effort or focus on a specific stakeholder.

9.3.   MODE 1 ANALYSIS PROJECT THREE HOLY SEPULCHRE

Enter situation considered problematical

Section 5.5 above provides a thick description of the problem situation located in the Holy Sepulchre area of Northampton, UK.

Express the problem situation

Rich Picture

Figure 9.8 PCSO Rich picture 1 (Sept 2013)

This picture (Figure 9.8) comes from a first round of investigations into the problem situation in Sept 2013. It demonstrates the conceptual boundary of the problem situation as understood by the police at the time in that there is no sense of the winder context- the town centre or the bus station providing flows of people and alcohol or drugs. The nearby Castle ward is shown as an influence by the marking of 'mosques' in the bottom left of the rich picture- but mostly in the context of a clash of worldview between Muslims and street drinkers. The 'centre' of the problem situation is clearly conceptualised as the church, surrounded by

the 'green area' in the centre of the picture, with some sense of the institutions that support the street drinking behaviour- the ex-servicemen's club and the HOPE centre. There are no people depicted in this picture, although the sense of conflict comes (surprisingly) in the red scribbles in the top left of the picture behind the HOPE homeless centre.

Figure 9.9 PCSO Rich Picture 2 (Sept 2013)

The second rich picture (Figure 9.9) from the same period shows a marked lack of spatial awareness, but a tighter focus on just the 'front' of the church in Sheep Street. People are depicted (top middle), with a dog, but connections are being made (by the blue arrows) between the mental health facility, the homeless shelter, the job agency and the pharmacy (at the centre of the blue arrows. The officer's implicit worldview (weltanschauung) is demonstrated by the 'broken window theory' remark, even though there are no broken windows in this location, as such, there is some visible neglect such as overgrown church yard (the responsibility of the Council). Some attempts at thinking through assets and solutions are emerging here as the job agencies, and "know, people skills" is

marked on the bottom right. Money and the nightclub seem to be important, but not connected to any other feature.

Figure 9.10 PCSO Rich Picture 3 (Sept 2013)

The third rich picture (Figure 9.10) is much more conceptual than the previous two, and centres the problem situation on the church (circled in red and marked 'no go area', but with bottles and people indicated) but with a significant influence from the Somali community centre (in reality, geographically situated to the south of the church). The run of shops along Sheep Street are reduced to (dislocated) shops- sex shop and chemist. Influence arrows are shown in blue –from the bus station to the Somali centre. The red lines show some of the weltanschauung of this officer, in the marking of the DPPO (preventing drinking in public) and the 'more police patrols' comment, but there is an idea to speak to the licensed premises about the supply of alcohol into the location.

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

CATWOE

Table 9.2 CATWOE statement

i.	Customers/Beneficiaries - Who are the beneficiaries of the highest-level process and how does the issue affect them?	In the first instance, the Police are the beneficiaries of the problem of interest, as they have chosen the location as an on-going concern. Other people who would benefit include the users of the church, the customers of the kindergarten in the church halls and others put off from using the church yard.
ii.	Actors - Who is involved in the situation, who will be involved in implementing solutions and what will impact their success?	Police, churchgoers, church hall users, manager of kindergarten, parents of kindergarten, office users on Sheep Street, homeless people and/or clients of OASIS centre, owners of shops and businesses in Sheep St.
iii.	Transformation Process - What is the transformation that lies at the heart of the system - transforming grapes into wine, transforming unsold goods into sold goods, transforming a societal need into a societal need met?	Fundamentally, the locality is a process for facilitating people's use of shops, roads, pavements, church green spaces, the church halls and the church for the benefit of the users. It's difficult to speak of a community here because very few of the Actors are in contact with each other. The whole location can be described as a liminal space[130] or contested spaces[131].
iv.	World View - What is the big picture and what are the wider impacts of the issue?	The bigger picture- the outcome that all stakeholders would agree on is going

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[130] liminal zones (Urry, 2003)

[131] As different stakeholders attempt to "put order on things" or in the words of (De Certeau, Jameson and Lovitt, 1980) "transform the uncertainties into readable spaces." For De Certeau acting "out of place" at the right time in public spaces are the most common ways how people embrace public spaces as their own and alter their use, meanings, and functions.

		about their daily life in a safe environment
v.	Owner - Who owns the process or situation being investigated and what role will they play in the solution?	Nobody owns the system of interest, except that the Police have power in the public realm, and the Council (and its agents) have responsibility for maintaining wellbeing in the public realm. Various private actors (shops, clubs, offices) and users of the streets (flowing through) have a vested interest in wellbeing in the public realm
vi.	Environmental Constraints - What are the constraints and limitations that will impact the solution and its success?	The layout of the streets cannot be changed and there are no resources to create change at the start of the process of investigation.

Formulate root definitions of relevant systems of purposeful activity

The users, residents and businesses in the system of interest go about their daily activities in a safe and unthreatened manner such that the churchgoers, and children and carers using the kindergarten and church halls, as well as pedestrians walking through are able to do so without undue[132] fear from other users including the users and clients of the homelessness centre.

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[132] This is, of course, all down to perception of fear, prior prejudices people hold regarding street dwellers and requires a sense that all users have a right to use the space (and govern the rules of the space) not just 'law abiding citizens'.

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

Build conceptual models of the systems named in the root definitions

Figure 9.11 First Conceptual model

Conceptual Model 1

The homeless people system

The Church attending system

The flow of people through the church yard system

The Policing System

The Kindergarten system

The business and office system

The first conceptual model (Figure 9.11) seeks to express the core systems operating within the overall system of interest. The oval Policing system encompasses all of the other components. At the centre is the church attending system comprising of those using the church yard for various activities at various times of day, adjacent to the main path through the church yard. This flow of people is facilitated by the path and open gates at either end of the church yard, and attached by the places of rest outside the church door, at the east end of the yard (a park bench) where primary conflict occurs between the church attending system, the kindergarten system and the flow of people through the yard.

Comparing models with real world situations

The second conceptual model (Figure 9.12) shows the result of comparing the first model to the real world, this incorporates two new systems linking the homeless centre to the church system: the rough sleeping system, and the associated (but not essentially linked) drug taking system, facilitated by the lack of pedestrian access to the back of the church. The zig-zags on the right of the picture depict the conflict that arises between the different expectations that the users of these areas outside the church, the church hall and the kindergarten have of what is appropriate behaviour. Whilst the path between the church and the church halls,

and up to the park bench look like they are private to the church, they are in fact public, with open gates at top and bottom of the path.

Figure 9.12 Second Conceptual Model

The complexity of drawing up a CATWOE statement like Table 9.2 illustrates the importance of Williams (2005[133]) pragmatic advice on undertaking soft systems analysis to "Run through process again using different CATWOE (e.g identify a different "owner")…". In reality, public safety situations like this have multiple owners. The process of thinking through the CATWOE structure with the homeless people as 'owners' (or at least significant stakeholders) identifies the links between the homeless centre, the church and the kindergarten, whereas in the original thinking by the PCSOs (see Figure 9.8 to Figure 9.10) the homeless people and the 'perpetrators' of the street drinking are not considered. The cognitive shift that occurs here is to think through the worldview of all the stakeholders, not just those 'holding the problem' like the Police, or the ones communicating the problem, like the church wardens.

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[133] https://mafiadoc.com/soft-systems-methodology_5a80c6591723dd44783128b5.html [Accessed 10/06/19]

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

Define changes which are both possible and feasible, and Take action to improve the problem situation

In the context of this analysis, change in the real case study is not possible, but at this point it is important to understand that difference between the proposed changes arising from the LISP pilot, and that which happened in real life. The solutions (an external garden for the kindergarten children to use and make the church yard look busy) were not completed. Although overgrowth was cut back and funding arranged by the kindergarten, the garden was not implemented. The primary causes of this were a) the shifting of the two PCSOs away from the LISP location[134] and b) the lack on ongoing understanding or strategic support from the senior leaders.

At the time of the pilot, the reaction of those involved was positive. Videos made for the training at the time provide a source of evidence for this.

The OASIS House manager demonstrates (at timestamp 0:39 into the film[135]) that she didn't know that there was a kindergarten in the church yard that were being affected by her 'customers' (homeless and alcoholic users of OASIS services), demonstrating the bonding social capital that was being developed by the PCSOs linking groups together. At 0:55 in the film the manager indicates that the customers were recruited into helping out, and that this was well received. External volunteers were recruited (Nationwide, at 1:11) removing needles and faeces as well as overgrown shrubbery on behalf of the Borough Council (1:22) and demonstrates a self-interest in ongoing involvement to maintain good relations with the neighbourhood and police even if they weren't aware of the kindergarten (2:05) and (at 2:25) the perception of the use of the space for drinking etc has improved.

The other key stakeholder, the owner of the Kindergarten whose staff frequent the back of the church buildings, and whose parents park up nearby to drop of their children, was very aware of the situation and responds positively to the new approach. She states (at timestamp 0:13) that the process was initiated by the PCSOs that the process started snowballing (at 0:40), but with the starting point

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[134] "I'm conscious, because of the [sigh] change in demographic of the police, because I have lost both of my, I've lost N[] she's on the town centre now and I've lost T[]" (Lines 12-14 Transcript of Kojak Sept 2015)
[135] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t8SzbTtDFLA&list=PLEgE1Ylw9u6pRwzN-M-TJVOS_smwvNvw3&index=2 [Accessed 17th Sept 2015]

being the 6-month dispersal order[136] (0:51). The PCSOs had said during the training events that their first meeting (in a town hall format) did start poorly with the stakeholders treating the meeting as a place to complain about the police, but they turned that around into a solutions-focussed event (much like the Asian Gold PCSO changing the nature of the conversation from problems to solutions.) At timestamp 1:16 the manager indicated a hidden stakeholder group, the parents whose children are attending the kindergarten, whose interests are being met by the LISP pilot, but whose perceptions might not be directly appreciated by any research. Self-interest for the kindergarten manager lies in improving the perceptions of those parents of the safety of the locality "it is quite scary for people" (at 1:34). At 2:00 the manager clearly states what success would look like for her- that the momentum is sustained going forward.

The manager is quite clear that there is a different strategy at work here "the last time there was a dispersal order, nobody came to see me at the nursery, it was nothing to do with us… and once it was done [i.e. the six months expired], that was it, we never saw anyone again" (at 2:54) and "you two [the PCSOs] are properly geared up for getting this sorted really… the way you two have got involved in it has got everyone else fired up about it" (at 3:37). This indicates that at the time of this interview, the process, although different, was still very much reliant on the personalities and leadership of the PCSOs. "Being involved yourselves, even when you are not working…a lot of that is what has got so many people involved" (at 4:25) indicates that the legitimacy of the officers is through their personal investment in the situation.

It wasn't entirely clear from the LISP documentation the extent to which the perpetrators of the ASB etc were involved in developing the solutions to the problems. The PCSOs had spent a lot of time engaging with street drinkers across town centre as part of their duties, but there is no evidence directly that their perspectives or experience was being taken into account in the LISP process. A serendipitous film taken by the author in preparation for the training of other PCSOs was captured in Sept 2013[137] and gives an insight into some of the

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[136] It is interesting to note that the press reported the dispersal order as aimed at youths rather than drinkers http://www.northamptonchron.co.uk/news/local/police-get-more-powers-to-move-youths-on-1-926345 [Accessed 17th Sept 2015[

[137]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mTOZ5ZkOwFc&index=4&list=PLEgE1Ylw9u6pRwzN-M-TJVOS_smwvNvw3&t=5s [Accessed 17th Sept 2015]

perspectives of the street drinkers. The park bench they are sitting on is in the Holy Sepulchre church yard within 100m of the kindergarten. They didn't want to be anonymous, but is pointed at the view they had of the church yard. This is "not an attractive" yard (0:13) but "on a mid-afternoon, you got nowhere to go, it's nice to sit in an open area, there's a bench, and it's nice to have a few beers without the police bothering ya" (0:15). "It's just a little place, no-one walking down here"…."you could sit in a park, but in a park there will a lot of kids around to see you drinking, it's not a good look" (0:40). This phrase 'it's not a good look' profoundly expresses the internal self-understanding of the street drinkers that what they do is not socially acceptable, and what they are seeking to do is keep out of harm's way "we are out the way a bit, we are not disrespecting any grave stones and so what" (0:49). The problem is, that when a few people do walk through, or when there are children in this district, their presence is even more keenly felt. When people are there, they think that they are being received politely "a lot of them [elderly people from the church] have walked past us and there's a smile on their face and [indistinct] politeness.. said hello back" (1:00).

When asked about the kindergarten, one of the informants didn't know there is a nursery in the area "I aint seen no kids here" (1:39) and their understanding of the use of the space was firmly as a graveyard "nah, kids shouldn't play in a graveyard …..not the best place to take your kids" (1:43). Finally, they indicate that the rules of the space are already marked out by the presence of the bench "there is a bench here….if there wasn't a bench here would you sit here?.. no..no….would have to bring a deckchair here wouldn't I!" (1:48). There is no children's playground, so their worldview excludes behaviours that wouldn't be a 'good look' for children, like drinking in front of them, but the presence of the bench indicates to them that the purpose of this area is to stop and relax, which for them involves cigarettes and alcohol. If the bench didn't invite such behaviour, they would be somewhere else. This is particularly important in the context of the OASIS house being a 'dry establishment'- no alcohol is allowed in the building or in its courts.

Ultimately, the PCSOs were deployed to other more pressing duties in early 2014. The community garden has not been completed. The PCSO involvement was withdrawn, according to 'Kojak', too early. They only just started to tackle the

issues, had only started on one issue and the intensive engagement had not achieved critical mass:

"the garden never got built…I think when the shift in emphasis there was a lack of momentum as well because I know that T and N got pulled to town centre and they got pulled more and more to spring boroughs because we were tackling other issues in spring boroughs" (lines 35-38 Transcript of Kojak Sept 2015).

The sergeant also confirmed the fresh approach taken by the PCSOs had an impact of the perception of policing:

> *"it [LISP] was new, it was fresh, and a bit of a surprise ….that we were actually asking for help not the other way round" "historically, most people look at the police as a service they go to help for, but this time we were going to them for assistance"* (lines 6-9 op cit.)

> *"the feedback I got thereafter was very positive, primarily from the lady from the playgroup [the kindergarten]… especially the old people visiting…the coffee morning… they said it was better, a lot better"* (lines 10-12 op cit.)

The loss of the stable team seemed to stem from a lack of understanding, as far as 'Kojak' was concerned, at the Inspector and Chief Inspector level as to the strategic utility of the LISP process. LISPs were treated as something to have been done, rather than established on the basis of risk (later to emerge as Priority Areas) and without clarity as to the resource implications of deciding to undertake a LISP:

> *" he's a very good manager, ok, and he'll say to me, ok, erm what LISPs have you got going? He'll come to me and ask me…… I don't know what S has on the town centre, but we have the holy sepulchre church, so what he tends to say, he'll say to S, your turn to do a LISP now, where are the LISPs in your area? He'll ask us those questions"* (Lines 72-75 op cit.)

Although this seems to be a positive response, two comments suggest that this was not a risk-based use of LISP- that the decision to LISP was placed with the sergeant (without an associated resourcing question) and 'it's your turn' suggests that LISPs were being encouraged to occur anywhere regardless of an appreciation of what was to be achieved. Losing PCSOs (one, to the regulars, would have been unplanned and the second one shifted to a location demanding more activity) underlines an activity-based style of management, rather than risk/harm-based analysis.

9.4. MODE 1 ANALYSIS PROJECT FOUR KETTERING

Enter situation considered problematical

Section 5.6 provides a thick description of the problem situation located in the All Saint's area of Kettering

Express the problem situation

Street drinking around the vicinity of All Saint's church, Kettering and two nearby off-license shops creating a disturbance, and alcohol-related crime.

Rich Picture

In noting the more widespread incidence of public drinking, the PCSO began theorising on the causes "Kettering has a high number of letting agencies so many residents have 6- month tenures before moving on. It is difficult to engage with these persons as they have no feelings of responsibility for the area long term" (Kettering LISP Proforma May 2013). 'Nikita' identified that the symptoms of the problem were street-drinking, but the underlying causes lay with the nature of the housing in the vicinity; short-term, and multiple occupancy. In considering what or who might be an asset to the community, Nikita ignored all the other shops and premises in the district (including a centre housing various community groups, and a religious community centre) but did identify a Polish language school in the immediate vicinity, staffed by a long-term immigrant, who had also experienced the negative effects of the behaviours.

This location was included in the considerations of the first experimental training course, and the first rich picture (Figure 9.13) shows the attempt of PCSO Nikita to explain her problem situation. The DPPO area and primary symptomatic location is in the top left-hand corner of the image, with the church, and the shops with the yard shown in green pen.

Figure 9.13 Rich picture developed during LISP pilot (Feb 2013)

The 'rich picture' developed by PCSO Nikita much later for the LISP proforma (Figure 9.14) is rather over structured, but does repeats the emerging sense of the problem being greater than the DPPO extension area (shown in pink), extending into the wider street environment, but with a narrower focus. Figure 9.13 shows a much wider area of concern, particularly as the PCSO was thinking about the implications of driving the street drinking away from the Rockingham Rd front by enforcement action, into the back streets behind the main shopping area. She included in her concerns a pocket play park (the circular area) which might then become a centre of attention. She also included in her consideration the nature of the streets (very little public space) and the concern that these houses of multiple occupancy may also be overcrowded, withall the rooms being used as bedrooms, and possibly occupants sharing beds on a shift basis. Her concerns are reflected in research undertaken in the UK (Spencer *et al.*, 2007; Wilkinson, 2014) on the experiences of east European migrants.

Figure 9.14 'Rich picture' developed by PCSO 'Nikita' (May 2013)

CATWOE

Table 9.3 CATWOE statement

i.	Customers/Beneficiaries - Who are the beneficiaries of the highest-level process and how does the issue affect them?	In the first instance, the Police are the beneficiaries of the problem of interest, as they have chosen the location as an on-going concern. Other people who would benefit include the users of the church, the nearby shops and restaurants

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

ii.	Actors - Who is involved in the situation, who will be involved in implementing solutions and what will impact their success?	Street-level: PCSOs, off-licenses, neighbouring businesses, All Saint's church volunteers District: landlords, employers, neighbourhood safety, night-time economy stakeholders, environmental health, Kettering Borough Council Housing and Licensing departments, parish council, All Saints Parish Council
iii.	Transformation Process - What is the transformation that lies at the heart of the system - transforming grapes into wine, transforming unsold goods into sold goods, transforming a societal need into a societal need met?	This street exists to serve customers flowing into and out of the town centre, with some local residential services. There is a national chain garage and superstore nearby which draws customer passing through. The immediate district is a short-term, let private landlords. Employers in the area benefit from the low rent, high turnover employee supply
iv.	World View - What is the big picture and what are the wider impacts of the issue?	There is a low-level community of street shops but no coherence in their interests. Hidden structures of rent, letting policy, transient labour and language barriers create low investment in care for the neighbourhood. Therefore the fear of crime is disproportionate to actual crime, and different in nature (Pain and Smith, 2008). There is no coherent community identity between long term residents, shop keepers and transient labour.
v.	Owner - Who owns the process or situation being investigated and what role will they play in the solution?	Nobody owns the system of interest, except that the Police have power in the public realm, and the Council (and its

		agents) have responsibility for maintaining wellbeing in the public realm. Various private actors (shops, clubs, offices) and users of the streets (flowing through) have a vested interest in wellbeing in the public realm
vi.	Environmental Constraints - What are the constraints and limitations that will impact the solution and its success?	The layout of the streets cannot be changed and there are no resources to create change at the start of the process of investigation.

Formulate root definitions of relevant systems of purposeful activity

The users, residents and businesses in the system of interest go about their daily activities in a safe and unthreatened manner such that the off-license customers, residents, churchgoers, and people using the church and church halls, as well as pedestrians walking through are able to do so without undue fear from other users.

Build conceptual models of the systems named in the root definitions

The first conceptual model developed for this pilot scheme (Figure 9.15) builds on the basic layout of those created by PCSO 'Nikita' and those who participated in her community engagement. The basic layout of the centre of the problem situation, the Rockingham Road street front is in the centre of the picture, with All Saint's Church to the right. The private yard is depicted above that street.

Surrounding this central area of concern are three key influences that don't appear in the built environment but are influencers to the environmental behaviour observed. Firstly, the nature of the housing behind the Rockingham Road front, small Victorian terraces, privately rented (often by the room) has a significant impact on the function of the two shops and the private yard as 'front room' social space for the transient migrant workers. The behaviours of the landlords in privileging short-term lets means that the residents are transient and are consumers of the public spaces rather than contributors to civic society.

The second influencer is the night-time economy in the nearby town centre. This is the focus of the supply of non-resident visitors to the location, as they return home but also to act outside the boundaries of the more constrained DPP area in

the town centre. Extending the DPP to this location served only to threaten to push the street drinking further into the residential area.

The third major influence picked up in the LISP pilot was the influence of the major employers. These are not located in the neighbourhood, but are part of the system of interest because their employment policies created the concentration of transient workers, facilitated by the landlord letting policies.

Figure 9.15 First Conceptual model of Kettering pilot April 2017

The constraints on those factors are the role of the Houses of Multiple Occupancy licensing and enforcement (for the landlords' letting practices), the Environmental Health and Alcohol licensing functions within the local authority (managing the licensing and behaviours of the off-licenses) and hiring policies & shift patterns of the employers under employment law.

Comparing models with real world situations

Figure 9.16 emerged as an attempt to express the different levels at which the problem situation was being experienced. This touches on the idea within Critical Realism (a summary is in the box below) that reality is stratified and laminar. In this case study it becomes clear when considering the system of interest for the PCSO being mediated entirely at the street (empirical) level, with the drinkers, the shop keepers, the parishioners etc contesting the meaning and purpose of the

liminal public space, but also that their behaviours and attitudes are being structured by the 'actual' level of stakeholders (family, customers, neighbourhood policing colleagues) and forces (profit and turnover, crime rates, community 'mission) that are not empirically evident, but have real effects on the behaviours of the actors.

Figure 9.16 A 'laminar' rich picture of Kettering LISP pilot April 2017

The 'Real' might be expressed by the laws, norms and scripts that further create the conditions in which the 'actual' and 'empirical' events occur. These can be abstracted to the insight in Figure 9.15 that the policies and decisions of the employers, landlord and nearby 'night-time economy' actors have a greater influence on the root causes of the problem situation than the immediate events at the 'empirical' level.

> Reality is a stratified (actually, nested) ontology of three levels:
>
> The **Empirical**, the level of sense data and information, arguably also the level of meaning, which is emergent from….
>
> The **Actual**, the level of events, which may or may not be experienced by us in the Empirical, emergent from…
>
> The **Real**, the level of 'generative mechanisms' or 'forces', 'fundamental laws', or tendencies etc. that might, or might not, produce events in the Actual

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

Define changes which are both possible and feasible, and Take action to improve the problem situation

In the context of this analysis, change in the real case study is not possible, but at this point it is important to understand that difference between the proposed changes arising from the LISP pilot, and that which happened in real life.

In the final LISP proforma produced in May 2014, the PCSO leading the LISP pilot was proposing the involvement of the local authority licensing team and more police patrolling, i.e. still a strongly police-led solution. Nevertheless, in red (the last update) PCSO Nikita was proposing to 'increase community engagement' and 'visits and presentations to employers'.

Police Officer 'Jon Snow' was interviewed in March 2015, sometime after the involvement of PCSO Nikita ceased. His reflection in taking over the neighbourhood was "I have to say, we still have that problem, albeit some of the work from the LISP did give us more of a mechanism to deal with it" (Jon Snow, 4:29). Nikita's fears of displacement were well founded as Jon Snow reports "what we've done is displaced it slightly….a couple of streets beyond which is what I am looking at" (Jon Snow, 5:30). This is important given that the crime reporting data reviewed in Section 5.6.2 doesn't support this perception. A wider context that must be noted is that this locality became the focus of a whole variety of interventions under the Policing Futures initiative within Northamptonshire Police in 2015. In this experimental programme, one PCSO was replaced by 6 police officers, and PCSOs redeployed to rural villages. There was also a focus on experimenting with harm/risk lead 'PredPol' predictive policing (Kutnowski, 2017) type strategies as well as capable guardianship despite the performance and ethical issues of using very small data sets to predict behaviour. There was also an attempt (the evaluation of which is not covered in this research) to introduced capable guardianship strategies even though Nikita had not yet recruited capable stakeholders who were (1) the willing to supervise, (2) able to detect potential offenders, and (3) willing to intervene when necessary (Reynald, 2010). Had the LISP activity not been abandoned in favour for these 'solutions' before the full LISP strategy been implemented, the subsequent interventions might have been more robustly implemented.

Nevertheless, the legacy of Nikita's analysis did survive her redeployment, because Jon Snow, who was entirely new to the neighbourhood, and had not been directly briefed by Nikita, did elicit similar systemic thinking "the area is very transient in nature, .. a hell of a lot of rental properties, and their short-term rents…what we find is..whenever we get a grip of the problem, it only takes a few months for the dynamics of that area to completely change <u>and all of a sudden your impact has gone.</u> The people you were impacting no longer live there" (Jon Snow, 7:12). Later on he says "we are working with letting agents, landlords, local authorities around that…it's very much in its infancy" (Jon Snow, 8:30) demonstrating the long steady and slow engagement required to make more than transient progress.

9.5. MODE 1 ANALYSIS PROJECT FIVE DAVENTRY SKATE PARK

A detailed and high-quality engagement with the stakeholders in the Daventry skate park meant that the LISP proforma was considered to be excellent on its own terms, despite the fact that no rich pictures were offered in the analysis. Post-hoc analysis of the Police UK crime data also indicates that this was actually a very low crime location in comparison to the nearby bus station and night-time economy area. The justification of the LISP was based on very short-term events involving ten incidents over a ten-day period. Looking at data from one year before the construction of the skate park in July 2013 (the point at which the LISP commenced), the bus station and nearby shops contributed approximately 10-20 crime reports a month, whereas the park itself contributed a maximum of 9 events in April and May 2014 (a year later), and about 3-4 events a month for the year before and year after its opening. It is possible that the locations of the crime events that were reported are no accurate, and that the number of young people attracted to the skate park results in greater crime in the wider area, but the statistics for the immediate locations do not change significantly throughout the introduction of the skate park and the commencement of the LISP. Indeed, the crimes reported in the nearby locations peak at the time during which community partners are implementing their 'solutions and practices' in April/May 2014.

The basis on which the LISP pilot was started was weak, especially if the criteria for starting a LISP project were a) vulnerability, b) crime rates and c) sufficiently complex problem. The town was not selected for its concern to the Police, and the

crime rates remained low compared to a more significant night-time economy nearby. Nevertheless, the expectation that crime and anti-social behaviour might increase rapidly by virtue of a new public youth attraction, closely located to shops, a bus station, and under the watchful eye of the nearby police station is well founded.

The interview with PCSO Rufus[138] reported undertaking a rich picturing event with the fifty seven young people (involved although these pictures were not included in the proforma) which then developed into a representative stakeholder working group. An environmental visual assessment (EVA) was also undertaken by a Crime Prevention Officer (no evidence of the involvement of the public or statutory agencies in this), whose recommendations were limited to visibility and CCTV coverage in the park. Nevertheless, this LISP is marked by the significant community involvement that was present throughout. The skate park itself was funded through community funding, so there would have already been a significant level of connectivity between members of the community and between the skateparking community (bonding social capital) and between the skateparkers and those tasked with planning and community services to get the park installed in the first place (bridging social capital). Community safety managers, youth group leaders, street pastors, a youth centre, the Princes Trust, the local Academy, local community trusts and a county-wide youth service were all mentioned in the LISP proforma. Interestingly, PCSO Rufus mentioned specifically in both the proforma and the interview that the youth service actively refused to engage, viewing the LISP initiative as a threat to their understanding of the 'needs' of the young people. Perhaps solving the problem would have affected their income negatively.

The interview reported that there was a strong sense in which the young people involved in the skate park were already acting as a core community working group with a significant list of actors will and capable of making change. 15 people from a range of community organisations were cited in the stakeholder group. The observations arising from the problem analysis stage were focussed on the liminality of the skate park, that it is open for large groups to congregate, not all of whom are interested or supportive of skating, and the effects this would have

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[138] pseudonym

on those using the park for other reasons. The vision was that the park would be managed by a youth forum, with a constitution and charitable status, even though some of them had been excluded from their school!

The proforma completes with offering five possible solutions to issues that might arise from the skate park, or because of the people using the site and 7 different ongoing practices to support these solutions (albeit mostly utilising statutory agencies). The measures of success were well shared across the different stakeholders – for example a Women's Aid group were able to contribute to greater safety for young women in the area.

9.6. MODE 1 ANALYSIS PROJECT SIX TOWCESTER RETAIL

The case arose as part of the pilot where existing work using the SARA model of problem solving had been occurring but where the team wanted to achieve something more than a 'quick fix'. The neighbourhood is a reasonably prosperous county town with a significant (100) small boutique businesses in a small town centre area. A LISP proforma was completed by PCSO Juliet[139], but the initial screening stages were not completed; there was no definitive crime pattern data (this was not a force Priority Area, so no central data analysis support was available), but the LISP proforma states that a spate of thefts over the summer of 2013 (only) initiated the LISP pilot. There had been an attempt to create a 'shop watch' before but it hadn't sustained. The reason for the LISP was to create something more sustained that could be taken on by someone else. The PCSO Juliet reported that the LISP prompted her to think about key stakeholders and recruiting the right people, scanning the locality and deliberate recruitment of people to share information around. She had a solution in mind already (sharing communication), so the problem analysis and solutions was rather perfunctory, but the steps of identifying 'highly connected and high capable' persons, connecting stakeholders together, deliberately identified gaps in representation, proactively seeking out shop keepers to connect the retail community together all demonstrate good practices. The use of rich pictures was focussed only on creating a mind-map identifying all the shops and not the range of problems within the neighbourhood. CCTV was proposed, but the LISP process avoided the need for

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[139] pseudonym

paying for CCTV in the town centre. Juliet broke the retail zone into two clusters with co-ordinators, so that she need only communicate directly (weekly) with two people but still get a message to the whole community.

New to area, a good plan to build up the relationships, using foot patrol time for this LISP work, this was supported by (both) sergeants (even though they didn't understand the details of the LISP process), latterly expecting her to sustain the LISP activity. Had encountered some resistance, because the initiative hadn't worked before, but she 'rolled with resistance' to sustain involvement during the set-up period, so that speaking in her interview 2 years later, she was still speaking positively of shop keepers reporting to her when shops were becoming vacant, and a significant qualitative reduction in crime and increase in confidence in the policing of the area. In particular, the respondents were more confident in reporting more of the individual crimes to sustain awareness of the incidences of crime- to the point that PCSO Juliet was proactively reporting on crime data to the retailers. She also made use of all the other LISP proformas that were being shared across the Police force IT systems, even sharing the struggles and failures in the process! The process brought together the retail community that didn't see themselves as a community, but it didn't extend to any residents, shoppers or even criminals involved in the problem situation.

9.7. MODE 1 ANALYSIS PROJECT SEVEN DAVENTRY NO LISP

PCSO Poirot[140] was designated to a neighbourhood known to him as 'the Grange and Southbrook' and associated wards in Daventry, a prosperous modern county town in Northamptonshire with low crime and 'very low' ASB rates. Poirot is a long serving PCSO, having been recruited nine years before the interview, and had 15 sergeants and 8 inspectors in that time i.e. with very little continuity. He participated in the second round of LISP training (based around the Holy Sepulchre case study), but scored himself with low scores in a cross-force internal survey of the implementation of LISP, but volunteered to be interviewed.

He spoke more about the challenges, pressure and stress that the PCSO in Case 5 experienced. He described LISP as 'getting them [the public] to take control' which isn't quite the ethos meant by understanding the self-interest of the

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[140] pseudonym

stakeholders to co-produce public safety. In concept the PCSO felt the process was good, but felt that PCSOs were expected to do all the 'donkey work' for other statutory agencies, missing the point about the range of stakeholders involved.

The PSCOs requested a 'shorter way of doing it', finding out who 'owns the area', photograph it all, list down the problems, go a see the 'person concerned' and tell them to 'deal with it'. He suggested that this would then be handed over to the sergeant and inspector, and they will 'enforce' it. He later suggested that if the 'community' took over the paperwork aspect (the LISP proforma) they could then get sergeants and inspectors to escalate their wishes to the correct authorities. He alluded to the CAF[141] form, 15 pages long, what's that got to do with us'?- but pointing to the extent of other workloads PCSOs are expected to deliver on within Policing, especially processes that PCSOs have little or no control over. He preferred to be out and about walking rather than writing up the intentions or results of his walking about.

The 'Grange' district of Daventry he worked on already had an active Neighbourhood Watch, with local councillor involvement, with 25 voluntary litter pickers (indicating an area of high social capital and significant pre-existing volunteerism. 'Jackie' also contacts the council to 'moan and whinge' until the Council services eventually give in to them, but there is a contradiction here between ensuring that the Council maintain their services, whilst the community reduce the need for council services by volunteering. He did want to spread these LISP-style activities to other wards to bring the different communities together. The PCSO was despondent about the possibility of making substantive progress using LISP processes.

He did allude to 'bringing back community spirit' where members of the community are looking out for each other. He suggested that all the elements of a LISP were already in place 'without the paperwork', or that (had a screening process been undertaken) the Grange wouldn't really be selected for a LISP. He said that he had been asked four times to undertake a LISP, even though he didn't think it was necessary and may even have raised awareness of a problem that in his mind didn't exist. Southbrook, mentioned only briefly, was reported as entirely

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[141] At a time when 'Early Help Assessments' had replaced CAF forms

different, and more problematic neighbourhood, and possibly quite high in the indices of multiple deprivation.

9.8. MODE 1 ANALYSIS PROJECT EIGHT WELLINGBOROUGH NO LISP

Wellingborough is a large deprived county town in Northamptonshire with significant crime problems, with Queensway and Hemingwell estates being of particular concern, but which was not identified as a force Priority Area. PCSO Marple is a police officer allocated to the centre of the town Safer Community Team (SCT) for six years, and for two years before that as a PCSO in the same location. During that time she was nominated as a 'problem solver' (with no additional training, especially not in LISP[142]), dealing with AO1s, long-term ASB and neighbour disputes, and that which comes from Joint Action Groups (JAGS), and tasked with the authority of a sergeant to task PCSOs to work on certain problems. She was not involved in the LISP training. When she was a PCSO there were three PCSOs and 3 constables allocated to every ward in the town. Since the austerity measures begun in 2010, this has been reduced to 4 officers for the whole of sector (town and rural), and all the ring fencing of PCSOs and officers to distinct areas was withdrawn and the remaining officers allocated across all the wards, with no-one having any particular responsibility for an area. The remaining 10 PCSOs are still allocated (larger) beats, but are also deployed across all other areas as well, on demand. She identified LISP as a measure to provide a more focussed effort in certain areas rather than the effort being spread thinly over the whole town, but also as 'dealing with all the stuff that nobody else has the time or inclination to deal with, a lot of the issues are things that have been going on for years'. Most of the PCSOs she would have been able to task to 'problem-solve' had been trained in LISP, but none of them had come forward with any LISP pilot.

They had considered motorcycle nuisance, but the 'community weren't prepared to do anything about'. It had been discussed with the research team at another meeting but concluded that it was too local and short term an issue to be a candidate for a LISP pilot. Instead, the inspector wasn't tasking anyone to use LISP techniques, but instead tasked Marple, as a 'problem solver', to tackle

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[142] But she noted that she wrote her dissertation on problem solving in community policing

shoplifting (i.e. one single crime type) in one branded national retail outlet, across the whole sector, based on a reactive response to a short-term spike in thefts. The logic is that, in looking at all the crime reports, 3 suspects could account for most of the thefts across the town, but individual reporting officers had not made the connections. She was only offered the time to undertake this analysis because she was on restricted duties at the time of the interview. Marple elicited some LISP style behaviours in suggesting that she would look closely at the layout of the stores involved in each of the villages in the sector, and ensure that they were more proactive in preventing the thefts- responsibilising the retail outlets themselves to co-produce the effects they are expecting. But she did note that she was repeating an activity that had happened two years previously.

An inspector on the sector had discussed with the research team the possibility of a broad range LISP on the Queensway and Hemingwell estates, but this also did not progress, despite the fact that these estates have high indices of multiple deprivation. Marple indicated that JAGS have been reduced to a tick in the box, and ineffective, although all three statutory agencies are already engaged in direct communications. It is no longer a joint action group, in that the original 10 stakeholder groups no longer attend. She also noted that the police take responsibility for a lot of things that are not relevant to policing or crime. Officer Marple opined that she didn't think LISP would work because the police don't have the relationship with the community now that they had 9 years ago when she was a PCSO, but when LISP was explained in more detail, became more enthusiastic. She suggested that locality teams were essential, but that they are only really fire-fighting rather than proactively resolving problems. She felt that there is still scope within the remaining officers and PSCOs to make a difference, but over 5 years the focus of management has resulted in a loss of community connectivity-members of the community just don't know who is responsible for their area- only one PCSO in Wellingborough has remained on the same beat, and senior officers are only tackling what is on the weekly task sheet rather than having a richer picture of how these crimes interact with all of the issues in any given locality.

In essence, this interview summarises all the of the conversations and formal interviews held with PCSOs, officers and senior leaders about the 'control group' in respect of the challenges that were occurring across the whole of the force at the time, and to which the LISP pilots were responding.

9.9. RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORMS

Review of Intensive Community Engagement through Locally Identified Solutions and Practices May 2015

Information Sheet

Thank you kindly for taking the time to participate in a focus group.

Northamptonshire Police, with the support of the University of Northampton, have been piloting a new way of working with communities in the county, called LISP, and we understand that you have been involved in a project that has been part of this pilot. We have been given your contact details by a PCSO or Police officer who has been in prior contact with you. We would like to learn what your opinions of the project are; how it was developed, how you were involved etc.

Your participation will remain confidential, as will all the information you share today, **except if someone else is in danger**

You are free to leave the group at any time, and there is no obligation to answer or discuss anything you are not comfortable doing so.

Nothing you tell the other members of the group (including the PCSOs) will be used for anything other than the report.

When the data is analysed your name will not be used and you will not be able to be identified from any of the data or quotes that may be used in the final report(s).

If you feel uncomfortable with any aspect of the research, please speak to the researcher.

You are entitled to withdraw your data up to two weeks after the date of your interview. If you want to withdraw your data from the research or you have any further questions, please email me: tim.curtis@northampton.ac.uk

Thank you for your time today

Tim Curtis

Participant Consent Form

NAME:

Please tick to confirm

I have been informed of the nature and purpose of this study. I have read the Information Sheet.	
I understand that I have the right to not answer any questions that I do not want to answer without giving a reason.	
I am fully aware of my right to stop participation at any point during the focus group, and to withdraw my data up to two weeks afterwards. I do not have to provide a reason for withdrawing and there would be no adverse consequences for me in doing this.	
I understand that the session will be audio recorded and transcribed, and pseudonyms {alternative names} will replace real names in the transcripts and the final report to protect my identity.	
I understand that the audio recording will be stored securely and deleted after the report has been written, and this should be no longer than 24 months after the initial session.	

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I understand that the anonymised {without your name} quotes from my interview might be used within the report. Anonymised data will be stored securely and may also be used in future publication.	
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about the interview and my involvement in this research.	
I understand that participation in this study is voluntary and I am do not have to take part.	
I give my authorised consent to participate in this study and I confirm that I am 18 years of age or over.	
I understand that confidentiality will be maintained, except if someone else is in danger	

Your Signature…………………………………………………………………….................

Signature of Researcher……………………………………………………Date………………….

My chosen PSEUDONYM is:

9.10. EXAMPLE LISP PROFORMA

from Kettering Project May 2013- incomplete and redacted

PCSO ████████

Title DPPO – All Saints, Kettering

START DATE   January 2011 (DPPO Extension) January 2013 – All Saints dedicated patrols

REASON FOR LISP

An increase in street drinking prompted an extension to the DPPO area in Kettering Town Centre after an LIP in 2011 for Princes Street / Crown Street was used to desist incidents of alcohol related ASB.

Crown Street compound is an off road "secure site" that is used as rear access to a number of shops, including Kettering Food and Wine Centre. Persons were purchasing alcohol through the rear doors, sold to by staff members, and then sitting in the area drinking through the night.

Princes Court had numerous complaints regarding noise / music nuisance as well as loud gatherings of people in the car park at the rear, mainly linked to a flat in the premises.

Reports of street drinkers outside two new off licence / shops on Rockingham Road, as well as behind the nearby church and on seats placed on a green area near to the shops and church grounds.

In conjunction with the extension to the DPPO came reports from a nearby block of flats Kings Walk, King Street (now within the extension area) of persons drinking outside the gates and in the car park underneath.

What prompted the AO1 to be raised?

> The DPPO was extended, and patrols increased. But the approach was not uniformed enough to create results – i.e. – Night Safe not being utilised, officers and PCS's not aware of the extent of the issues and related powers for dispersal etc.
>
> The A01 was activated early as a preventative measure through the I Predict Scheme as we were aware of previous seasonal increases in alcohol related incidents in the DPPO extension area.

How many crime incidents of what type precede this LISP?

****check FIS****

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

SCANNING

1.1 What's in the area?

What community assets/vulnerabilities are there?

The area has a large number of private rented properties. Kettering has a high number of letting agencies so many residents have 6 month tenures before moving on. It is difficult to engage with these persons as they have no feelings of responsibility for the area long term.

Information from EVA?

An EVA was only carried out in May 2013, which concentrated on a set of alley ways on All Saints that have been mentioned by residents as being used for groups of persons drinking. The persons stopped here have predominantly Eastern European.

Other LISPS nearby?

None.

1.2 Stakeholders

Who are directly involved in this issue?

The main shops that opened in 2011 are:

- ██████ Store *** Rockingham Road, Kettering

- ███████ Food and Wine Centre, *** Rockingham Road, Kettering

- █████████████ flats, King Street

Both shops sell predominately Eastern European food and drink to cater for the large Eastern European community living in All Saints. This therefore creates an ideal situation for them to socialise near to shops selling alcohol and also their

friends. This behaviour is in direct conflict with apparent acceptable social behaviour and current laws and perception of ASB.

Who else do you know in the locality?

██████ MD at ████████, Rockingham Road, Kettering. ██████ is a Polish national who has been living and working in the UK for 6 years. He teaches English classes a few times a week and has expressed interest in becoming involved to see what he can do to assist in any local problems as well as obviously gaining interest in PR for his English Classes. He has contacts within the community and may have ideas relating to potential groups or meetings in the future. I have requested a meeting with him Friday 31st May. Working on Rockingham Road he has experienced the drinking first hand.

████████ – Caretaker and wife at ████████ Kettering. ████████ is very proactive and ██████ is of Polish nationality and has offered translations / help in the past.

How are they connected together?

Both lots of flats are private rent / management companies. Many of the properties are let to Eastern Europeans, and many are regarded as HMO's as are a large percentage on the All Saints beat.

████████ Gate are a longer term issue with regards to 2 particular flats that the management company are trying to work with. Both are potentially HMO's both with separate private landlords which makes the process longer and more complicated.

Can they be connected together?

Both the shops opened at similar times in early 2011. Before they opened, there were no street drinking incidents reported for the area. Therefore I would suggest that they can indeed be linked together.

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1.3 Intensive Engagement

Problem RP

1.4 Working Group

Who in the stakeholder group are engaged and able to make changes?

Stakeholders mentioned in 1.2 are willing to assist individually but all have day jobs that ensure their commitment most of the time. I would suggest that they are only available for consultation and ideas.

The shops have been visited and advised re – sale of alcohol, licensing are aware and are also assisting on long term ideas. Obviously long term they would like to remain in the area because of business so it is in their interest to assist where possible. This may be linked into visits by licensing.

I have no stakeholders wiling to take part in a working group at the moment due to ongoing personal issues. At some point I will re evaluate this issue but for now it is purely a police based working group.

ANALYSIS

Narrative of observations on RP in 1.3

The main issue lies in front of the two shops on Rockingham Road. This is where most of the groups meet and buy the alcohol and consume it.

The secondary issue is in the ground of St Andrews Church. I believe that due to the open nature of the church grounds, and its proximity to the shops, that this is why the area is used. It is an area that cannot be seen form the road, and although is open for public access, is quite private and out of the way.

The tertiary issue is the bench on Eskdail Street. After a recent EVA I have requested this bench be moved away from the area, as with the bus bays on the opposite side of the road there is no productive reason for it to remain.

There are also sporadic issues within the flats on Kings Walk, although the A01 is no longer active.

Seasonally, groups of residents will gather and drink in the car parks and on the roof terraces (access for top floor flats) although this is private property and is actually to do with the insurance policies of the flats rather than a part of the DPPO. Some of the prolific offenders caught in the DPPO have lived in some of the flats or have associates who do.

Actions suggested by working group

- Increased patrols by officers and PCSO's of the DPPO area, included on Night Safe weekend patrols ONGOING

- Patrols by Street Pastors on Night Safe weekend patrols. ONGOING

- Engagement with shops regarding sale of alcohol to drunken persons – engagement around police contact numbers for when incidents occur, making the staff responsible for being more proactive. DONE

- - Initial engagement and education of persons caught in DPPO area has not yielded a reduction in self generated of police incidents. Prolific offenders are taking no notice. DONE.

- Use of Section 27 dispersals for persons caught drinking (enables officers to deal with prolific offenders by way of arrest and court summons) ONGOING

- DPPO signs have been translated into 6 languages explaining the alcohol free zone. We have also been equipped with translated cards including Polish Explanations of Stop Search and rules regarding the DPPO. DONE

- Activating an A01 and I Predict Scheme for the area. DONE

- New signage has been translated for the church grounds and given to Rev ██████. DONE

RESPONSES

3.1 Draw Solution RP

WHAT DOES SUCCESS LOOK LIKE?

Success would be (as indicated on original RP) for no hotspots to remain in the DPPO – although sporadic and seasonal issues could be expected from time to time.

The A01 would be closed long term.

We would experience a decrease in Licensing referrals for both shops on Rockingham Road.

3.2 Develop and secure agreement on interventions (S&P)

Solutions	One –off events, projects or facilities			
What	Why	With whom	How	By When

Processes of Social Innovation in Neighbourhood Policing

Practices	Ongoing behaviours or activities to sustain success			
What	Why	With whom	How	By When
Section 27 dispersals	To stop prolific offenders	PC's and PCSO's to patrol	Section 27 notices issued	Ongoing
60a Licensing forms	To make shop keepers responsible for behaviour caused by staff not following licensing law	PC's and Licensing	60a Submissions and Licensing visits	Ongoing
Night Safe patrols	To increase public confidence, visible presence to residents and shop staff, to deal with incidents.	PC's / PCSO's / Street Pastors	Visible foot and vehicle patrols of DPPO area.	Ongoing

ASSESSMENT

4.1 Evaluation

What factors will indicate ongoing success?

> **-** Decline in calls to the Police for the whole DPPO area.
>
> - Decrease in groups outside the shops and in the hotspot areas.
>
> - Positive feedback from local community and wardens / staff linked to the church.

4.2 Escalation

When, how or why should this LISP be escalated up the Police for action at a higher level?

The LISP for the DPPO has already needed to be escalated. Offenders were repeatedly ignoring officers and PCSO's advice regarding the no drinking area and were continuing to cause problems. The standard practice now for the area is the use of Section 27 dispersals to persons caught drinking alcohol. This has resulted in one arrest for breach of dispersal and subsequent bail conditions, which went to court.

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