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THE ORDERS OF NATURE AND GRACE:
THOMISTIC CONCEPTS IN THE MORAL THOUGHT OF FRANCISCUS JUNIUS
(1545–1602)

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor of Philosophy
aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magnificus
prof.dr. V. Subramaniam,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie
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ABSTRACT

The driving question of this project pertains to how Franciscus Junius (1545–1602) retained, refined, or rejected Thomas Aquinas’s (c. 1225–74) moral concepts. European scholars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have frequently expressed interests in the life and thought of Junius, particularly in his role as an irenic reformer of church and state. Unfortunately, however, only two monographic works were published on Junius’s theology in the twenty-first century to date, and the lacuna concerning the Thomistic substratum of Junius’s theology has only been filled by short essays. In such context, this extended, focused, and specialized study of Thomistic concepts in Junius’s thought will be the first English monograph on Junius’s theology in more than 40 years, and it will be the first monograph on Junius’s use of Thomistic moral concepts to date. Therefore, on a broad level, this project investigates the reception of Thomistic ideas in the early modern Reformed tradition. On a narrow level, this project contributes to a historical study of Junius’s moral theology itself.

To be specific, the term “moral” here refers to the ways in which Junius understood the order of human actions, rather than to the specific issues pertaining to good and bad actions, or virtues and vices. In this sense, the term is employed to capture the ways in which law, order, and action are intertwined in his thought, and thus the theme of law will be considered in relation to the order, structure, and pattern of human actions. To the main question, therefore, through six body chapters, the argument will be made that the Thomistic ideas in Junius’s moral thought were refined, revised, and reorganized according to the Reformed conceptions of nature and grace, which reflected distinct accounts of the orders of human action and divine action. As a result, it will be demonstrated that, in Junius’s moral thought, as it was in Aquinas’s, law was conceptually connected to *actio*, *revelatio*, *ordo*, *ratio*, and *relatio* in a realist framework, and all of these concepts in turn explained various layers of *perfectio*.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Paul Oscar Kristeller, an eminent scholar of Renaissance thought and culture, left an enduring insight that the intellectual achievements of Renaissance can be fully appreciated only when the achievements of both humanism and scholasticism are considered together. He warned against exaggerating the gulf between early modern humanists and scholastics by insisting that “all kinds of adjustments and combinations between humanism and scholasticism were possible and were successfully accomplished.”¹ Early modern scholastic theologians could, with the help of humanism, improve their Latin style, sharpen their understanding of original texts, and refine the questions they brought to the study of theology, yet still use scholastic patterns of argumentation in their works. In fact, in Kristeller’s judgment, the humanists did not—and certainly could not—replace the philosophical accomplishments of scholastics merely with their rhetorical excellence, and their reflections on philosophical topics, he commented, appear to be “rather superficial and inconclusive” compared to the ones produced by scholastic thinkers.² Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund’s recent argument carried this line of thought forward and highlighted the intersections between scholastic and humanistic traditions in the sixteenth century, with an argument that the intellectual milieu then was “neither exclusively humanist nor exclusively scholastic—it was both.”³ Brian Copenhaver contended even more strongly: “Where the humanist/scholastic construct prevails, no reliable story can be told about post-medieval philosophy.”⁴

1. Paul Oscar Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanistic Strains* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 116.

2. Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought*, 99.

3. Benjamin Hill and Henrick Lagerlund, “Introduction,” in *The Routledge Companion to Sixteenth Century Philosophy*, ed. Benjamin Hill and Henrick Lagerlund (New York: Routledge, 2017), 1.

4. Brian Copenhaver, “Philosophy as Descartes Found It: Humanists v. Scholastics?” in *The Routledge Companion to Sixteenth Century Philosophy*, 42.

It is no wonder then that Heiko A. Oberman portrayed Martin Luther (1483–1546) as a critical reformer, not a complete rejecter, of medieval scholasticism.⁵ Richard A. Muller hence accurately described early modern Protestant scholasticism as a “revised scholasticism” that is “a child of the Renaissance as well as a child of the Middle Ages.”⁶ One should not forget therefore that even at the Academy of Geneva, the academy founded by John Calvin (1509–64) in 1559, students studied not only Calvin’s *Institutio christianae religionis* and Antoine Rodolphe Chevalier’s (1507–72) *Rudimenta Hebraicae linguae*, but also Julius Pacius’s (1550–1635) *Institutiones logicae*, which was a condensed—and revised—version of Aristotle’s logic.⁷ Actually, Theodore Beza (1519–1605), another influential theologian at the Academy, envisioned the institution to be the “*respublica scholastica*, or the academic commonwealth.”⁸ Thus the theological education even at Calvin’s own institution included both philological and philosophical kinds of training, or both linguistic and logical instructions, and this testifies to one crucial historical fact that many modern Christians tend to undervalue: Reformed theologians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries developed their theology by using the tools of both Renaissance humanism and medieval scholasticism.⁹ In this regard, Muller made a perceptive remark when he asserted that both humanism and scholasticism

5. For example, Heiko A. Oberman, “Luther and the *Via Moderna*: The Philosophical Backdrop of the Reformation Breakthrough,” in *The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the New World*, ed. Donald Weinstein (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 21–43.

6. Richard A. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 1.36 & 63.

7. Antoine Rodolphe Chevalier’s *Rudimenta Hebraicae linguae* underwent several editions, beginning at least from 1560; Julius Pacius’s *Institutiones logicae* was published in 1615 in Franeker.

8. Richard A. Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 43.

9. For a helpful account of the historiographical shift in the field of Reformed orthodoxy, see Willem J. van Asselt, “Reformed Orthodoxy: A Short History of Research,” in *A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy*, ed. Herman Selderhuis (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013), 11–26. The “medieval” elements of sixteenth-century Reformed theology are well documented in, for example, David S. Sytsma, “Sixteenth-Century Reformed Reception of Aquinas,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas*, ed. Matthew Levering and Marcus Plested (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 121–43.

belong to “the historical Reformed tradition,” not to a mythical tradition created by modern scholars.¹⁰

This background must be considered in reading the works of Reformed scholastics, such as Franciscus Junius (1545–1602). Junius was a student of Calvin and Beza at the Academy of Geneva and later a professor of theology at the University of Heidelberg and the University of Leiden.¹¹ His reputation as a theologian was so great during and after his lifetime that a Dutch minister, Jacobus Verheiden (fl. 1590–1618), left this comment: “Though France hath abounded with many professors of the gospel, yet there are very few that have outstripped this worthy Junius.”¹² One interesting facet about Junius is that, despite his prior training in humanism in France, and despite his rigorous biblical education in Switzerland, he never shied away from using scholastic methods and concepts in his theological treatises. For example, he explained the mereological order of creation (i.e., how parts are ordered to the whole) in terms of a thing’s relation to itself and to others, by naming the former as “absolute” relation and the latter as “relative.”¹³ One implication of this view was that moral actions were viewed in terms of how an acting subject ought to act in relation to self and others—all motions in creation were understood to occur in the context of one part relating to (or being related to) another either by self or by others. In conjunction with this, Junius believed that these orientations of creatures are inherent in nature: “In fact,” he insisted, “nature itself constantly teaches that all parts of

10. Richard A. Muller, *After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 46.

11. For helpful biographical accounts of Junius’s life, see Willem J. van Asselt, “Introduction,” in Franciscus Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology: with the Life of Franciscus Junius*, trans. David C. Noe (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2014), xi–xxiii; Todd M. Rester and Andrew M. McGinnis, “Introduction,” in Franciscus Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, ed. Andrew M. McGinnis, trans. Todd M. Rester (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2015), xix–xxvi. See also Tobias Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602): Ein reformierter Theologe im Spannungsfeld zwischen späthumanistischer Irenik und reformierter Konfessionalisierung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 30–48.

12. Jacobus Verheiden, *The History of the Moderne Protestant Divines: Containing Their Parents, Countries, Education, Studies, Lives, and the Year of Our Lord in Which They Died*, trans. Donald Lupton (London: N. and John Okes, 1637), 178–79. It was originally published as *Praestantium aliquot theologorum qui Rom. Antichristum praecipue oppugnarunt effigies* (Hagae-Comitis: Nieulandius, 1602).

13. Franciscus Junius, *De theologia vera, in Opuscula theologica selecta*, ed. Abraham Kuyper (Amsterdam: Muller and Kruyt, 1882), thesis 6 (pp. 49–50). The translations of this text used in this dissertation will be from David C. Noe’s translation unless stated otherwise. See Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 104.

one body are ordered to the whole.”¹⁴ Thus, for Junius, the relational or mereological order of creation is neither arbitrary nor imposed, but is intrinsic and natural. Moreover, in this twofold mereological framework, God is a Being who is necessarily ordered to himself, yet is freely related to creatures; but creatures are those beings who are necessarily ordered to themselves and to others, including God, by the design of creation, or by the intent of their Creator.

Scholastic categories were used in Junius’s presentation of human perfection as well. Junius described two kinds of created perfection, which were distinguished into absolute and comparative kinds (just like he distinguished absolute and relative relations). The absolute perfection of a created thing referred to its state in which “nothing more may be desired that belongs to constituting the nature of a thing as just and full.”¹⁵ In other words, the absolute perfection here referred to the full possession of that which a thing desires, and this category was applied to saints in heaven because their knowledge and desire of God would be so full that nothing more could be added. The comparative perfection, on the other hand, was a state of a thing that “tends by certain degrees to that absolute perfection.”¹⁶ This kind of perfection was fitting for Christians on earth, Junius believed, as their mutable perfection is tethered to the perfection promised to them in heaven. So human perfection is human nature’s motional fullness (i.e., full actualization) and mereological completeness (i.e., complete union), as it can be grasped in Junius’s statement that “the rationale for one part of a thing separately established by itself is imperfect until it is called back to the rationale of the whole of which it is a part.”¹⁷

Accordingly, Junius’s construal of the perfection of human nature manifests various layers of natural, mereological, and teleological acts, which, not surprisingly, was how Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–74) formulated the concept—Aquinas for instance claimed that “a thing is

14. Franciscus Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, thesis 1 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 41. The translations of this text used in this dissertation will be from Todd M. Rester’s translation unless stated otherwise.

15. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 63.

16. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 63.

17. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 41.

perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.”¹⁸ Moreover, on the mereological dimension of creaturely perfection and the role of law in it, Aquinas asserted that “since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness.”¹⁹ These observations then raise a question worth asking: what was the nature of Junius’s appropriation of Thomistic concepts, especially on the theme of moral order? To be more specific, what Thomistic concepts did Junius refine, receive, or reject on the areas of law, order, and action?

1.2 Research Context

In 1976, John Patrick Donnelly argued that “Protestant scholasticism builds its theology on a substratum of philosophical ideas largely borrowed from Aristotle.”²⁰ In support of his thesis he brought to light the Aristotelian and Thomistic elements in the theology of Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562), and stated that “there is a strong scholastic substratum in his theology, that depends upon Saint Thomas more than upon any other medieval theologian.”²¹ Vermigli, of course, was not alone in this narrative; Donnelly argued that Girolamo Zanchi’s (1516–90) theology, especially his doctrine of God as expounded in *De natura Dei*, provides a case for a sophisticated appropriation of Aquinas in the Reformed tradition, and he concluded that Zanchi’s theology is “the best example of Calvinist Thomism.”²² Arvin Vos also wrote in 1985 against the common misconception regarding Thomism in the Reformed tradition with an argument that “most Protestants know little or nothing of Aquinas’s thought, and so they have

18. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981), Ia, q. 4, a. 1. All the translations of Aquinas’s *Summa theologica* used in this dissertation will be from this edition.

19. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 90, a. 2, co.

20. John Patrick Donnelly, “Calvinist Thomism,” *Viator* 7 (January 1976): 441.

21. Donnelly, “Calvinist Thomism,” 443.

22. Donnelly, “Calvinist Thomism,” 444.

no way to grasp its relevance for today.”²³ The proper response from Protestants should be, Vos asserted, to reclaim Aquinas as part of their own tradition, as it was so in the Reformation period.²⁴ Furthermore, following the historiographical trajectories initiated by Heiko A. Oberman and David C. Steinmetz, Richard A. Muller re-affirmed the lasting value of Donnelly’s contributions to Post-Reformation studies and acknowledged that Donnelly’s argument created an impetus for further research into the nature and impact of Thomism in Reformed scholastic theology.²⁵ Muller, however, went much further than Donnelly did, as he eventually showed not only the *presence* of Thomism in Reformed scholastic thought, but also its *prevalence*.²⁶

Thus directly pertinent to this project is the broad issue concerning the reception of Thomistic ideas in the Reformed scholastic tradition. On the one hand, Donnelly’s argument on the “Thomistic substratum” in the Reformed doctrine of God—and by extension in other doctrinal areas—received a favorable acceptance since its publication in 1976.²⁷ On the other

23. Arvin Vos, *Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought: A Critique of Protestant Views on the Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 1985), xiii.

24. Vos, *Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought*, 174.

25. Richard A. Muller, “Calvinist Thomism Revisited: William Ames (1576–1633) and the Divine Ideas,” in *From Rome to Zurich, Between Ignatius and Vermigli*, ed. Gary W. Jenkins, W.J.T. Kirby, and Kathleen M. Comerford (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 103.

26. His more recent works on this are Richard A. Muller, “Not Scotist: Understandings of Being, Univocity, and Analogy in Early-Modern Reformed Thought,” *Reformation & Renaissance Review*, vol. 14, no. 2 (August 2012): 127–50; idem, *Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017); idem, “Calvinist Thomism Revisited,” 103–20; idem, “Reading Aquinas from a Reformed Perspective: A Review Essay,” *Calvin Theological Journal*, vol. 53, no. 2 (2018): 255–88.

27. For example, see John Patrick Donnelly, *Calvinism and Scholasticism In Vermigli’s Doctrine of Man and Grace* (Leiden: Brill, 1976); idem, “Calvinist Thomism,” *Viator* 7 (January 1976): 441–55; idem, “Italian Influences on the Development of Calvinist Scholasticism,” *Sixteenth Century Journal*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1976): 81–101; Richard A. Muller, “Arminius and the Scholastic Tradition,” *Calvin Theological Journal* 24/2 (1989): 263–77; idem, *God, Creation and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1991); idem, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, vols. 3–4; Harm Goris, “Thomism in Zanchi’s Doctrine of God,” in *Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2001), 121–39; Sebastian Rehnman, *Divine Discourse: The Theological Methodology of John Owen* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2002), 25–45; Patrick J. O’Banion, “Jerome Zanchi, the Application of Theology, and the Rise of the English Practical Divinity Tradition,” *Renaissance and Reformation*, vol. 29, no. 2–3 (2005): 97–120; Stephen Hampton, *Anti-Arminians: The Anglican Reformed Tradition from Charles II to George I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 221–65; David Sytsma, “Harvest of Thomist Anthropology: John Weemse’s Reformed Portrait of the Image of God” (ThM Thesis, Calvin Theological Seminary, 2008), 144–54; idem, *Richard Baxter and the Mechanical Philosophers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); Kalvin S. Budiman, “A Protestant Doctrine of Nature and Grace as Illustrated by Jerome Zanchi’s

hand, scholars such as Antonie Vos, Andreas J. Beck, and J. Martin Bac have countered that view with a claim that the predominant and the matured philosophical model in Reformed scholastic theology was rather Scotistic than Thomistic.²⁸ In this scholarly context, with an awareness of various issues pertaining to this topic, the authors in *Aquinas Among the Protestants* conjointly acknowledged the prevalent influence of Aquinas's thought upon Reformed scholastic theology, and left this astute remark that, though the term "Thomism" may not be an adequate category to be applied to Reformed scholasticism due to its historical association with Dominicans, the Reformed scholastics did in fact regard Aquinas as a "significant representative of a broader tradition."²⁹ To date, nonetheless, the best treatment of this topic comes from *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas*.³⁰ Especially significant is the essay by David S. Sytsma, in which he excellently narrated the historical

Appropriation of Thomas Aquinas" (PhD Dissertation, Baylor University, 2011); Yoo Jeongmo, "John Edwards (1637–1716) on the Freedom of the Will: The Debate on the Relation Between Divine Necessity and Human Freedom in the Seventeenth Century and Early Eighteenth Century England" (PhD Dissertation, Calvin Theological Seminary, 2011); James E. Bruce, *Rights in the Law: The Importance of God's Free Choices in the Thought of Francis Turretin* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 33–40; Christopher Cleveland, *Thomism in John Owen* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013); Stefan Lindholm, "Jerome Zanchi's Use of Thomas Aquinas," in *Aquinas Among the Protestants*, ed. Manfred Svensson and David VanDrunen (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018); Jordan J. Baller, "In the Footsteps of the Thomists: an Analysis of Thomism in the Junius-Arminius Correspondence," in *Beyond Dordt and De Auxiliis: The Dynamics of Protestant and Catholic Soteriology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. Jordan Ballor, Matthew Gaetano, and David Sytsma (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2019), 127–47.

28. See Antonie Vos, "The Theoretical Centre and Structure of Scotus' *Lectura*: Philosophy in a New Key," in *Via Scoti: Methodologica Ad Mentem Joannis Duns Scoti*, ed. Leonardo Sileo (Rome: Antonianum, 1995), 455–73; idem, "Always on Time: The Immutability of God," in *Understanding the Attributes of God*, ed. Gijsbert van den Brink and Marcel Sarot (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1999), 65; idem, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006); idem, "Scotus' Significance for Western Philosophy and Theology," in *Lo scotismo nel Mezzogiorno d'Italia*, ed. Francesco Fiorentino (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2010), 173–209; idem, "The Systematic Place of Reformed Scholasticism: Reflections Concerning the Reception of Calvin's Thought," *Church History and Religious Culture*, vol. 92, no. 1/2 (2011): 29–42; Andreas J. Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676): Sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007); 344–58, 403–25; idem, "Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676): Basic Features of His Doctrine of God," in *Reformation and Scholasticism*, 205–26; idem, *Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) on God, Freedom, and Contingency: An Early Modern Reformed Voice* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2021); J. Martin Bac, *Perfect Will Theology: Divine Agency in Reformed Scholasticism as Against Suárez, Episcopius, Descartes, and Spinoza* (Leiden: Brill, 2010). It has to be noted that, at least in the 1980s, Vos did see Thomism as a dominant view of Reformed orthodoxy and saw it as a positive development. See Antonie Vos, "Thomas van Aquino en de gereformeerde theologie: Een theologie-historische impressie," in *Jaarboek 1982: Werkgroep Thomas van Aquino* (Utrecht, 1982), 114–19.
29. See the historiographical account provided in Manfred Svensson and David VanDrunen, "Introduction: The Reception, Critique, and Use of Aquinas in Protestant Thought," in *Aquinas Among the Protestants*, 1–23. The quotation is from page 12.
30. Matthew Levering and Marcus Plested, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

background to the Reformed acknowledgement of Aquinas as one of the *saniore scholastici* (sounder scholastics).³¹ According to Sytsma it was not merely Vermigli or Zanchi, but also Martin Bucer (1491–1551) and Johannes Oecolampadius (1482–1531), who distinguished Aquinas from the *sophistes* (often nominalist scholastics) and placed him among the best of the *saniore scholastici*, for the fact that many of Aquinas’s ideas were regarded as refinements or advancements of Augustinian trajectories.³²

To be specific here, the fundamental issue that generates diverse observations and interpretations regarding the Reformed reception of Aquinas does not actually pertain to the *presence* of Thomistic concepts in Reformed scholastic literature. It is overwhelmingly clear and irrefutably obvious that Reformed scholastics did appropriate Thomistic ideas in their works, and, in Carl R. Trueman’s terms, their positive use of Thomism is “undeniable.”³³ “From 1520 to 1600,” Sytsma argued, “there is no decade where Thomas is not cited and used positively by a Reformed theologian.”³⁴ Rather, the critical issue here pertains to the *purity* and *proportion* of Thomistic concepts in Reformed scholastic theology: as Heiko A. Oberman remarked, a textual reference in the sixteenth century did not necessarily indicate a conceptual dependence, and as Antonie Vos noted, Reformed theologians in the early modern world could be conceptually Scotist even when they explicitly cited Aquinas’s works.³⁵ The focus of this project, then, revolves around the extent to which the appropriated concepts can be designated

31. “In addition to reading and citing Aquinas and other medieval scholastics, Reformed theologians over the course of the sixteenth century began to evaluate medieval scholastics comparatively in terms of better and worse, earlier and later. The better scholastics were often labeled *saniore scholastici* or ‘sounder scholastics’. In contrast to the *saniore* were the *sophistes*, often identified with recent or contemporary scholastics, especially of the Sorbonne. This trend began with Martin Bucer in the 1530s and became commonplace among Reformed theologians by the end of the century. During this time, Thomas was consistently reputed to be among the *saniore scholastici*.” Sytsma, “Sixteenth-Century Reformed Reception of Aquinas,” 121–43.

32. Sytsma, “Sixteenth-Century Reformed Reception of Aquinas,” 123–33.

33. Carl R. Trueman, “The Reception of Thomas Aquinas in Seventeenth-Century Reformed Orthodoxy and Anglicanism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas*, 207.

34. Sytsma, “Sixteenth-Century Reformed Reception of Aquinas,” 137.

35. Heiko A. Oberman, *The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1992), 131. Antonie Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 7. See Muller’s response to this thesis in Richard A. Muller, “Not Scotist: Understandings of Being, Univocity, and Analogy in Early-Modern Reformed Thought,” 127–50; idem, *Divine Will and Human Choice*.

as “Thomistic,” and also the proportion of Aquinas’s influence in the system of Reformed scholastic thought—in short, both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. In this regard there is a limited account here about the extent to which Scotistic ideas were utilized and modified by Junius; determination of the issue would require a separate project. Therefore, on a macro-level, this project contributes to a narrow investigation into the reception of Aquinas’s thought in the early phase of Reformed orthodoxy, with a recognition that some answers to the two areas need to be supplied, and also with a recognition that the Thomism being considered here pertains particularly to the direct line of Calvin, as Junius himself was, as Muller stated, “one of Calvin’s most eminent students.”³⁶

On a micro-level, this project contributes to a historical study, or better, to a monographic treatment, of Junius’s theology itself. European scholars from the nineteenth century onwards had sustained interests in the life and thought of Junius, particularly in his role as an irenic reformer of church and state. For instance, in the Netherlands, Johannes Reitsma published his *Franciscus Junius: Een levensbeeld uit de eerste eeuw der kerkhervorming* in 1864 and provided a decent amount of information regarding Junius’s youth, academic training, and professional life as a preacher and professor.³⁷ Just about two decades later, in 1882, Alfred Davaine published *François du Jon (Junius): pasteur et professeur en théologie, 1545–1602, étude historique* for his bachelor’s program at the then newly established *Institut Protestant de Théologie* in France.³⁸ Wilhelm Geesink’s *Calvinisten in Holland: Franciscus Junius (1545–1602), Petrus Plancius (1552–1622), Cornelis Geselius (1583–1614), De doleerende Kerk van Rotterdam (1611–1618)* was published in 1887, and it provided similar

36. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 2.154. Interestingly, and quite convincingly, Sytsma argued that Martin Bucer, rather than Calvin himself, was a more influential appropriator of Aquinas’s thought in the early Reformation period. See Sytsma, “Sixteenth-Century Reformed Reception of Aquinas,” 138.

37. Johannes Reitsma, *Franciscus Junius: Een levensbeeld uit de eerste eeuw der kerkhervorming* (Groningen: J. B. Huber, 1864).

38. Alfred Davaine, *François du Jon (Junius): pasteur et professeur en théologie, 1545–1602, étude historique* (Paris: Imprimé Par Charles Noblet, 1882).

treatments of Junius's life and thought as done by Reitsma and Davaine.³⁹ A more thorough work on Junius's life was produced by Friedrich Wilhelm Cuno in 1891, in which Junius's doctrinal, exegetical, and philosophical writings were introduced and his views were contextualized against the background of, for example, Jacob Arminius (1560–1609) and Robert Bellarmine's (1542–1621) ideas.⁴⁰ Generally speaking, then, a number of European scholars in the latter half of the nineteenth century expressed their high regard for the ways in which Junius contributed to the Reformation in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, and despite their similar contents and focus, the published works in diverse ways renewed modern recognition and appreciation of Junius's theology.

After a rather long hiatus in scholarship, Wilhelm Holtmann published a dissertation in 1960 to briefly account for Junius's political and ecclesial thought as expressed in his *Eirenicum*.⁴¹ In 1977, Bernard Albert Venemans revisited Junius's irenic ecclesiology and published a short work titled *Franciscus Junius en zijn Eirenicum de pace ecclesiae catholicae*.⁴² While all these scholarly treatments of Junius were happening in Europe, Douglas Judisch published a three-volume doctoral dissertation in 1979 on the summary and translation of Junius's *Sacrorum parallelorum liber primus* at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland.⁴³ This work appears to be the first monographic treatment on Junius's theology in the English-speaking world, and its significance should be acknowledged in that regard. However, its flaws are created by its misguided approach to humanism and scholasticism—Judisch contended, for example, that Junius “did not practice the exaggerated form of Aristotelian exegesis associated

39. Wilhelm Geesink, *Calvinisten in Holland: Franciscus Junius (1545–1602), Petrus Plancius (1552–1622), Cornelis Geselius (1583–1614), De doleerende Kerk van Rotterdam (1611–1618)* (Rotterdam: Arnhem, 1887).

40. Friedrich Wilhelm Cuno, *Franciscus Junius der Ältere, Professor der Theologie und Pastor (1545–1662)* (Amsterdam, 1891).

41. Wilhelm Holtmann, *Die Pfälzische Irenik im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation* (Göttingen, 1960).

42. Bernard Albert Venemans, *Franciscus Junius en zijn Eirenicum de pace ecclesiae catholicae* (Leiden: Elve/Labor Vincit, 1977).

43. Douglas Judisch, “A Translation and Edition of the *Sacrorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius: A Study in Sixteenth Century Hermeneutics” (PhD Dissertation, University of St. Andrews, 1979), volumes 1, 2, 3.

with Scholasticism and the Age of Orthodoxy.”⁴⁴ Soon after this Christiaan de Jonge also published a monographic work on Junius with a title, *De irenische ecclesiologie van Franciscus Junius (1545–1602)*.⁴⁵ This work was written in part to revise Venemans’ arguments made in his work noted above; yet, as Karla Taylor critically noted, “its weakness is a failure to bring the extensive analysis of Junius’ theology to bear directly on his irenicism.”⁴⁶ Also in 2000, Gustav Adolf Benrath published a German account of Junius in his *Franciscus Junius (François du Jon): 1545–1602; Pfarrer in Schönau bei Heidelberg, Lambrecht und Otterberg, Professor der Theologie in Neustadt an der Haardt, in Heidelberg und in Leiden*, in which he narrated the professorial career of Junius in Germany and the Netherlands as documented in the aforementioned works.⁴⁷

The most impressive study of Junius’s life and theology to date, however, has been produced by Tobias Sarx in 2007.⁴⁸ In one sense this work surpasses all the existing works on Junius—not only because of its focus and scope, but also because of its assumption: Sarx, by echoing Muller’s arguments, did not hesitate to state that both humanistic and scholastic methods were coherently appropriated by Junius.⁴⁹ Considering the depth and scope of research presented in the work, it is very likely that it will continue to serve the growing Junius scholarship for many more years, despite the fact that it is written in German. Yet, if there is one key weakness in it, it should be the absence of *analyses* concerning the Thomistic ideas expressed in Junius’s oeuvre. Sarx excellently noted some key patristic and humanistic insights embedded in Junius’s theology, including Calvin’s, and he provided helpful accounts of the

44. Judisch, “A Translation and Edition of the *Sacorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius,” 1.146.

45. Christiaan de Jonge, *De irenische ecclesiologie van Franciscus Junius (1545–1602)* (Leiden: Brill, 1980).

46. Karla Taylor, “Review: *De irenische ecclesiologie van Franciscus Junius (1545–1602)* by Christiaan de Jonge,” *Renaissance Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 4 (1981): 579–81.

47. Gustav Adolf Benrath, *Franciscus Junius (François Du Jon): 1545–1602; Pfarrer in Schönau bei Heidelberg, Lambrecht und Otterberg, Professor der Theologie in Neustadt an der Haardt, in Heidelberg und in Leiden* (Speyer, 2000).

48. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*.

49. For instance, Sarx argued that Junius’s mature theology evinces “a clear development towards Thomistic-scholastic argumentation.” Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 159.

ways in which traces of Cyprian (c. 200–58), Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329–90), Ambrose (c. 340–97), Augustine (c. 354–430), Nicholas of Cusa (1401–64), and Michel de l’Hôpital’s (1507–73) ideas could be found in Junius’s writings.⁵⁰ With respect to the *scholastic* features in Junius’s theology, however, Sarx merely provided an *acknowledgment* of the presence of Thomistic ideas, yet he did not provide detailed *analyses* as to how Thomistic ideas were actually utilized and employed by Junius.⁵¹ Given this lacuna, then, it will be fair to say that Sarx’s work lacks certain criteria to be designated as a definitive study of Junius’s thought, despite the excellent introductory and interpretive remarks he provided after thorough, rigorous, and extensive research.

This lacuna concerning the Thomistic substratum of Junius’s theology has been filled by short, but perceptive, essays. Among them without doubt Muller’s works stand out, as he extensively unearthed the character and significance of Thomistic ideas in Junius’s theology over many years.⁵² More recently he compared the Thomistic ideas in Junius’s doctrine of predestination with the ones appropriated by Jacob Arminius (1559–1609), by noting that Junius’s appropriation of Thomistic concepts on predestination aligned more with the Dominican way, rather than the Jesuit way, which was Arminius’s adopted way of appropriation.⁵³ Muller, of course, was not the first one to notice Thomistic ideas in Junius’s theology—John Platt in 1982 published a monograph on early modern Dutch Reformed theology and in it he argued that, after examining Junius’s prolegomenal thought, “there is no escaping the strong Thomist cast of much of his thought” and that Junius’s doctrine of God

50. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 62–70, 72–81.

51. For instance, see Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 159.

52. The first volume of his *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, which was republished in 2003, includes extensive treatments of the scholastic roots in Junius’s prolegomenal ideas. Even Muller’s recent work on Scotism-Thomism involved a rigorous treatment of Junius’s philosophical concepts. See Muller, *Divine Will and Human Choice*, 214–20.

53. Richard A. Muller, “Arminius’s ‘Conference’ with Junius and the Protestant Reception of Molina’s Concordia,” in *Beyond Dordt and De Auxillis*, 103–26. His earlier work on this topic is Richard A. Muller, “Arminius and the Scholastic Tradition,” *Calvin Theological Journal*, vol. 24 (1989): 263–77.

manifests “[t]he twin influences of Calvinism and Thomism.”⁵⁴ Particularly noteworthy is his comment that Gerardus Joannes Vossius (1577–1649), a student and a son-in-law of Junius, wrote in a letter (dated September 1621) that Junius assiduously read scholastics, especially Aquinas.⁵⁵ In this regard, Platt made it evident that an investigation of the Thomistic influence in Junius’s thinking takes up an insight expressed in the early modern period itself, though the details of the investigation are yet to be told.

Also in 2015 Todd M. Rester published an introductory chapter in the English translation of Junius’s *De politiae Mosis observatione* and briefly introduced some ancient sources in Junius’s legal, moral, and political thought expressed in the treatise.⁵⁶ Perhaps the most helpful observation that Rester provided in the chapter was his claim that in Junius’s theology of law, the traces of Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and Beza’s legal ideas are clearly discernible, yet these different layers of influences ought not to be taken as surprising: Rester rightly claimed that, as an early modern theologian, Junius was “operating within a long tradition of Christian legal thought.”⁵⁷ In another essay Rester examined Junius’s hermeneutical ideas and concluded that, along with William Ames (1576–1633), Junius “maintained basic continuity with the Thomistic exegetical tradition on the nature of the literal

54. John Platt, *Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575–1650* (Leiden: Brill, 1982), 133 & 137. In a footnote on page 133, Platt referenced that Paul Althaus recognized Junius’s Thomistic epistemology in *Die Prinzipien der deutschen reformierten Dogmatik im Zeitalter der aristotelischen Scholastik*, which was published in 1914 (repr. 1967).

55. Platt, *Reformed Thought and Scholasticism*, 133n63.

56. Todd M. Rester, “Introduction,” in *The Mosaic Polity*, xxvi–xli. In 2017 W. Bradford Littlejohn also published a short chapter comparing Junius’s theology of law with Richard Hooker’s (1554–1600), by eventually arguing that both Junius and Hooker utilized Aquinas’s natural law theory and, therefore, leaned toward him for jurisprudential insights. See W. Bradford Littlejohn, “Cutting Through the Fog in the Channel: Hooker, Junius, and a Reformed Theology of Law,” in *Richard Hooker and Reformed Orthodoxy*, ed. W. Bradford Littlejohn and Scott N. Kindred-Barnes (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), 221–40. See also Rester’s doctoral dissertation, where he argued that Junius’s conception of God, moral law, and positive law all express a Thomistic approach. See Todd M. Rester, “*Theologia Viatorum*: Institutional Continuity and the Reception of a Theological Framework From Franciscus Junius’s *De Theologia Vera* to Bernhardinus De Moore’s ‘*Commentarius Perpetuus*’” (PhD Dissertation, Calvin Theological Seminary, 2016), 41.

57. Rester, “Introduction,” xli.

sense of Scripture, but in carrying Thomas' premises forward, they represent a trajectory of discontinuity and development."⁵⁸

Jordan J. Ballor's recent work also advanced the scholarly investigations on this topic. He helpfully distinguished that an argument that states one particular theologian or group's *positive* and *constructive* employment of Aquinas's ideas is different from designating Thomism as a *definitive* and *normative* framework in the whole Reformed tradition.⁵⁹ In light of the distinction, Ballor concluded that Junius presented a Thomistic construal of nature and grace "as one of a number of acceptable alternative forms of expression."⁶⁰ Because of the positive yet critical reception of Thomism by Junius, Ballor could find sufficient pieces of evidence to make a claim that "Junius thus stands as a figure whose proper understanding requires a revision of a standard Reformed anti-Thomist narrative."⁶¹

In 2019 Markus M. Totzeck published *Die politischen Gesetze des Mose* and noted Junius's unique contributions to the Reformed theology of the Mosaic law, and affirmed that the Thomistic legal concepts discoverable in Junius's theology are in fact "mixed" with humanist ideas.⁶² David S. Sytsma also presented a refreshing argument in the aforementioned essay on the reception of Aquinas in the early modern Reformed tradition. Whereas Willem J. van Asselt argued for the Scotistic influence behind Junius's archetypal and ectypal distinction,⁶³ Sytsma re-iterated and confirmed Donald Sinnema's older claim that the direct source behind the archetypal and ectypal distinction was likely Aquinas's ideas, rather than

58. Todd M. Rester, "Type, Anti-type, and the *Sensus Literalis*: Protestant Reformed Orthodox Approaches to Psalm 2," in *Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on the Maturation of a Theological Tradition*, ed. Jordan Ballor, David Sytsma, and Jason Zuidema (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013), 387–400. The quotation is from page 387.

59. Ballor, "In the Footsteps of the Thomists," 127–47.

60. Ballor, "In the Footsteps of the Thomists," 146.

61. Ballor, "In the Footsteps of the Thomists," 146.

62. Markus M. Totzeck, *Die politischen Gesetze des Mose: Entstehung und Einflüsse der politia-judaica-Literatur in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019), 339–84.

63. Willem J. van Asselt, "The Fundamental Meaning of Theology: Archetypal and Ectypal Theology in Seventeenth-Century Reformed Thought," *Westminster Theological Journal*, vol. 64 (2002): 319–35.

Scotus's.⁶⁴ Considering these discussions, then, it is accurate to state that scholars are continuing their examination of the scholastic background to Junius's theology, while at the same recognizing the dominant influence of Aquinas's ideas on Junius's thought.

Despite the growing interests in and discoveries of Junius's theology, unfortunately, there is still not a monographic treatment—that is, a lengthy, focused, and specialized study—of the undergirding Thomistic ideas in Junius's theology to date. This is why Ballor argued that the story of Thomism in Junius's theology is “a worthy topic of a much longer study.”⁶⁵ Therefore this dissertation is aimed to fill that specific lacuna and contribute to the growing Junius scholarship as a first monograph devoted to the very issue of Junius's reception and refinement of Aquinas's moral concepts, and also as a first monograph to be published in English after more than four decades. It will then achieve its aim by raising this central question: how did Junius retain, refine, or reject Aquinas's moral concepts? The term “moral” here refers broadly to the way Junius understood the order of human actions, rather than to the specific issues pertaining to good and bad actions, or virtues and vices. In this sense, the term is employed to capture the ways in which law, order, and action are intertwined in Junius's thought, and thus the theme of law will be considered in relation to the order, structure, and pattern of human actions. In fact, Aquinas himself acknowledged the subject of moral philosophy as the study of the order of human action⁶⁶ and reason as “the proper principle of

64. Sytsma, “Sixteenth-Century Reformed Reception of Aquinas,” 135. See also Donald Sinnema, “Reflections on the Nature and Method of Theology at the University of Leyden Before the Synod of Dort” (MPhil Thesis, Toronto, Institute for Christian Studies, 1975), 72–3.

65. Ballor, “In the Footsteps of the Thomists,” 128. Ballor also claimed this point in his essay, Jordan J. Ballor, “Deformation and Reformation: Thomas Aquinas and the Rise of Protestant Scholasticism,” in *Aquinas Among the Protestants*, 41–42.

66. “As the subject of natural philosophy is motion, or mobile being, so the subject of moral philosophy is human action ordered to an end, or even man, as he is an agent voluntarily acting for an end.” Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. C.I. Litzinger (Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books, 1993), 2.

human acts.”⁶⁷ Junius’s statement is also relevant here: “A human being is born for action, and the law is the arbiter of actions among human beings[.]”⁶⁸

To this question, therefore, this dissertation provides the main argument that the Thomistic ideas in Junius’s moral thought were refined, revised, and reorganized according to the Reformed conceptions of nature and grace, which reflected distinct accounts of the orders of human action and divine action. This means that, on the one hand, Junius’s appropriation of Aquinas’s moral ideas can never be characterized as “pure,” but only as “modified,” due to the critical fact that the construals of eternal law, natural law, divine law, human law, and the Mosaic law evident in Junius’s theology were revised according to Renaissance methods and Reformed theology. Yet, on the other hand, although Junius revised Aquinas’s nature and grace framework significantly through Reformed convictions, he nonetheless employed much of Aquinas’s concepts in his expositions of law, order, and action. The latter aspect speaks to the quantitative proportion of Aquinas’s ideas in Junius’s thought and will strengthen the claim that, despite Junius’s eclecticism, Aquinas’s ideas have a proportionately high embeddedness in Junius’s theology compared to other scholastic ideas.⁶⁹ In the end, this project will contribute to illuminating the catholicity, profundity, and diversity of Reformed scholastic theology, and will in turn provide informative materials to enrich the intersectional field of Reformed dogmatics and ethics.

67. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 100, a. 1, co.

68. “A human being is born for action, and the law [referring to the human law in context] is the arbiter of actions among human beings so that whatever action would not be done in whatever way, by whomever, or whenever it would seem right, but rather that this particular action would be done by this person, and in this way, place, and time, and another action would be done by another person, and so forth.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 16, p. 360; cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 78–79. Aquinas left a similar statement when he said that law “belong to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure.” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 90, a. 2, co.

69. The nature of “eclecticism” as applied to Reformed scholasticism is well documented in Richard A. Muller, “Reformation, Orthodoxy, ‘Christian Aristotelianism,’ and the Eclecticism of Early Modern Philosophy,” *Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, vol. 81, no. 3 (2001): 306–25; Aza Goudriaan, *Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625-1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus van Mastricht, and Anthonius Driessen* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2006), 1–28.

1.3 Methodology

In order to make sense of Junius's moral thought, it is inevitable that the broader intellectual climate of the sixteenth century is presented, such as medieval scholasticism, Renaissance humanism, as well as the broader Reformation context that grounded Junius's life in particular historical moments.⁷⁰ Still, the chief purpose of this present research is to expound the philosophical and theological concepts that firmly buttressed Junius's moral thought. In this regard this project neatly belongs to the discipline of *historical theology*, for the ultimate aim of this project is to unpack and analyze a historical person's *theological ideas*. This focus assumes that "[h]istorical theology is concerned to locate theologians and theologies within their particular contexts, and in this task history in the more general sense serves primarily to illumine theology, in much the same way that background studies illumine one's interpretation of any historical text."⁷¹ Then, to undertake a historical investigation into the theological mind of a pre-modern figure, the undergirding methodology in this dissertation follows the interpretive model, or specifically the diachronic, synchronic, and integral approach, laid out by James E. Bradley and Richard A. Muller.⁷² At the heart of this approach is the conviction that "the location of meaning lies in the interaction of ideas, in a particular period as understood by particular individuals, but always as contributory to the larger development."⁷³ This principle then shapes the overall project in this way: it will attempt to arrive at the objective truth about Junius's thought by way of analyzing the relationship between the interpretive

70. As Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark noted: "Historical theology is concerned to locate theologians and theologies within their particular contexts, and in this task history in the more general sense serves primarily to illumine theology, in much the same way that background studies illumine one's interpretation of any historical text." Therefore, "it would seem that a successful explanation of the history of theology must account not only for the 'one', i.e. that which unifies thinkers between epochs, but also for the 'many', i.e. the concrete particulars which distinguish theologians of one era from those in another." Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark, "Introduction," in *Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2006), xv & xvii.

71. Trueman and Clark, "Introduction," xv.

72. James E. Bradley and Richard A. Muller, *Church History: An Introduction to Research Methods and Resources* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2016).

73. Bradley and Muller, *Church History*, 32.

claims and the *texts* themselves, for “objectivity is not measured by a canon of absolute truth; it arises as a standard of the relationship between data and its interpretation.”⁷⁴

In other words, also by echoing the methodological insights so forcefully articulated by Quentin Skinner, the methodological stance of this research acknowledges this principle: “the appropriate methodology for the history of ideas must be concerned, first of all, to delineate the whole range of communications which could have been conventionally performed on the given occasion by the utterance of the given utterance, and, next, to trace the relations between the given utterance and the wider *linguistic* context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer [emphasis original].”⁷⁵ In short, the theological ideas presented in Junius’s treatises will be “firmly set within the time frame in which they were written—the time frame that determined the range of possible language used and fields of meanings and intentions which it was possible to express.”⁷⁶ The implication of this methodology is that all the arguments in this thesis project will be grounded in primary sources, specifically in his *De*

74. Bradley and Muller, *Church History*, 47. Norman F. Cantor and Richard I. Schneider’s point is also applicatory: “Understanding [of history] is achieved at the level at which the relationships between facts can be explained; thus understanding, while based on facts, is almost entirely inferential.” Norman F. Cantor and Richard I. Schneider, *How to Study History* (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1967), 28.

75. Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” *History and Theory*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1969): 48–49. Carl R. Trueman commented on this: “Basic to this is the idea that sentences are not simply grammatical and syntactical constructions which can be understood purely by judicious use of a dictionary and a grammar, but that they are in fact *historical acts* which both partake of the forms of their age and are intended to fulfil a particular purpose. As historical acts, such texts must be set, like any other historical act or event, in context before they can be properly understood, a move which involves placing them both in the broader contemporary scene and against the background of the tradition/culture/history from which they emerge. Only when both dimensions of the context are understood will the true meaning of the words or text emerge. That is the task of the history of ideas.” Carl R. Trueman, “Puritan Theology as Historical Event: A Linguistic Approach to the Ecumenical Context,” in *Reformation and Scholasticism*, 258. Selective but appreciative applications of Skinner’s principle are well narrated in Muller, “Reflections on Persistent Whiggism and Its Antidotes in the Study of Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-century Intellectual History,” in *Seeing Things Their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion*, ed. Alister Chapman, John Coffey, and Brad S. Gregory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 134–53; Willem J. van Asselt, “Scholasticism Revisited: Methodological Reflections on the Study of Seventeenth-Century Reformed Thought,” in *Seeing Things Their Way*, 154–74. For a more critical (but perceptive) evaluation of Skinner’s method, see Sarah Hutton, “Intellectual History and the History of Philosophy,” *History of European Ideas*, vol. 40, no. 7 (2014): 925–37.

76. Trueman, “Puritan Theology as Historical Event,” 258–59.

politiae Mosis observatione (1593) and *De theologia vera* (1594), although other primary sources will be used as supportive proofs.⁷⁷ This is due to the recognition that, though Junius expressed his moral and legal ideas most clearly in his *De politiae Mosis observatione*, his ideas need to be compared with his other expressions in order to evaluate his consistency.

Specifically on the methods of investigating an early modern theology itself, the methodological and interpretive principles that undergird this research are borrowed from and inspired by what Mickey L. Mattox called, “the Oberman School.”⁷⁸ Heiko A. Oberman, one of the most prominent scholars of the late medieval and Reformation intellectual history in the twentieth century, believed, quite adamantly, that historians must not impose pre-determined or anachronistic categories on the Reformers to make sense of their textual and conceptual meanings, but should first pivot on the “unresolved intellectual and theological problems of the late medieval period” and then examine the Reformers’ responses in the light.⁷⁹ This approach to Reformation studies was carried over to Post-Reformation scholarship especially by Muller.⁸⁰ Surely, Reformation was the era when the Reformers were not *renouncing* all the traditional doctrines and practices that they inherited from the medieval world, but were *reforming* some crucial ones in the light of the normative teachings of the Scripture.⁸¹ Their successors then inherited the re-formed body of theology and attempted to refine it to meet the needs of the new context, such as developing academic programs for Reformed theological

77. Two things need to be mentioned here. Firstly, the translations of the two texts used in this monograph will be from the English translations produced by David C. Noe and Todd M. Rester respectively, as noted above in the footnotes, unless stated otherwise. Secondly, the original texts of *De politiae Mosis observatione* (1593) and *De theologia vera* (1594) include some marginal notes that Kuyper’s edition left out, yet their omission is inconsequential since they are mostly references to thesis numbers or bible passages. In view of this, the texts from Kuyper’s edition will be used in all chapters.

78. Mickey L. Mattox, “Heiko Oberman,” in *Historians of the Christian Tradition: Their Methodology and Influence On Western Thought* (Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1995), 603–18.

79. Mattox, “Heiko Oberman,” 608. See also Heiko A. Oberman, *Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought* (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2002); idem, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism* (Durham: Labyrinth, 1983).

80. David C. Steinmetz was also a significant historian in this regard. See his pioneering work: David C. Steinmetz, *Luther and Staupitz: An Essay in the Intellectual Origins of the Protestant Reformation* (Durham: Labyrinth, 1980).

81. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.34.

education and defending their beliefs against polemical attacks, whether internally or externally caused.⁸²

With that in mind, at the most basic level, it is imperative to realize that “Reformed orthodoxy was a varied movement both intellectually and geographically or internationally.”⁸³ This is an important, though plain, historical point to note, for Junius, like many other examples, was a French-born Protestant who travelled widely in Europe, studying and serving in France, Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands. Such life by necessity emanated various cultural and intellectual varieties and, in order to situate his thought in a proper context, it is crucial to understand the roaming theological and philosophical problems that the European Reformed world generally faced in the day. Furthermore, since this is an analysis of a *scholastic* theologian, whose theological ideas were expressed and presented in the form of academic disputations rather than sermons, it is crucial to acknowledge here what Muller calls the “double continuity”: in the Reformed orthodox era there is a *theological* continuity with the Reformers that does not preclude a *methodological* continuity with the medieval academic practice.⁸⁴

One other methodological assumption should be mentioned here. Muller correctly noted that a potential danger of doing “reception history” is that one particular thinker’s thought can be regarded as the “prime mover” of a whole intellectual tradition.⁸⁵ In this approach, the modifications made in later generations may unjustly be categorized as deviant or abnormal, notwithstanding the fact that in reality ideas are always formed by multifaceted forces.⁸⁶

82. This is well documented in Muller’s *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.27–84.

83. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.28.

84. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.28. For competing theories on Protestant scholasticism, see “Introduction” in *Reformation and Scholasticism*, 28–34.

85. For example, Muller warned against regarding Calvin as “the prime mover” of Reformed tradition. Richard A. Muller, “Directions in the Study of Early Modern Reformed Thought,” *Perichoresis* 14, no. 3 (2016): 3–16.

86. Richard A. Muller, “The ‘Reception of Calvin’ in Later Reformed Theology: Concluding Thoughts,” *Church History and Religious Culture*, vol. 91, no. 1–2 (2011): 255–74.

Therefore the safe way to overcome this danger is first of all to acknowledge that in the early modern period the adoption of earlier constructions and patterns of thought by Reformed theologians happened in new contexts with new demands and, inevitably, demanded diverse ways of appropriations.⁸⁷ What this means is that, in Junius's particular context, Calvin was not the most dominant voice in the developing Reformed tradition—in fact, “several of the significant voices that influenced the Reformed were late medieval, with those of Aquinas, Bradwardine, and Scotus having a major impact.”⁸⁸ The scholastic concepts in this context then, even the Thomistic ones, ought to be acknowledged as “the property of a fairly wide community of theologians.”⁸⁹

Anthony N.S. Lane also provided similar—but more specific—interpretive principles when he laid out eleven theses concerning Calvin's use of the church fathers.⁹⁰ One of the helpful insights that Lane presented was that the use of earlier ideas by Reformers, such as Augustine's or Aquinas's, was often done for the purpose of *polemics* and *apologetics*: Reformers such as Calvin cited older works to criticize the Catholic authorities' mishandling of the tradition on the one hand, as well as to justify the catholicity of Protestant ideas on the other.⁹¹ This insight is particularly relevant to this project on Junius, as the Thomistic concepts that will be expounded throughout the chapters were used by him in a context where Reformed theologians were attempting to establish both the legitimacy and the catholicity of the Reformed tradition. Therefore, by assuming this methodological principle, the reception of Aquinas will be studied with a keen awareness of the fact that his thought had been appropriated, criticized, and modified in various ways prior to or during Junius's professional life as a Reformed university professor.

87. Muller, “The ‘Reception of Calvin’ in Later Reformed Theology: Concluding Thoughts,” 256.

88. Muller, “The ‘Reception of Calvin’ in Later Reformed Theology: Concluding Thoughts,” 259.

89. Muller, “The ‘Reception of Calvin’ in Later Reformed Theology: Concluding Thoughts,” 259.

90. Anthony N.S. Lane, *John Calvin: Student of the Church Fathers* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 1–13.

91. See especially thesis 2 in Lane, *John Calvin*, 3.

1.4 Order of Arguments

“A human being is born for action,” Junius remarked, “and the law is the arbiter of actions among human beings[.]”⁹² In one sense this whole dissertation is devoted to explicating the rich meaning of the statement, namely the interrelationship between law, order, and action in Junius’s thought. With this focus in mind the next chapter covers the basic structure of human action as conceived by Junius, with a view to supporting an argument that Junius adopted Thomistic ideas in framing the moral order in terms of rational motion, relation, and perfection. One of the purposes of covering these areas is to highlight that the way Junius united *ethica* to *theologia* was by expounding the mereological, teleological, and motional order between divine *ratio* and human *ratio*, and that law was closely surrounded by the notions of *actio*, *ordo*, *ratio*, *communicatio*, and *relatio*, which altogether explained the nature of *perfectio*. This chapter therefore makes explicit the discovery that Junius’s moral thought bears the character of Aquinas’s moral theology, in the way that Romano Cessario has described it: “Moral theology is more about completion than it is about choice.”⁹³

The third chapter covers the nature and role of eternal law in relation to human action, or better, in relation to moral action itself. In his explanation on eternal law Junius explicitly mentioned that he was echoing the voice of “the scholastics,” and this raises an obvious question: which scholastics? The scholastics in the Thomist, or in the Scotist, tradition? The answer should show some nuance and qualification, as Junius shows an eclectic utilization of philosophical concepts—the notions of analogy as well as accommodation, and the concepts of divine ideas as well as divine will, are all systematically intertwined in his moral thought. Therefore, this chapter will revolve around this question: which scholastic notions did Junius adopt in formulating the doctrine of eternal law? Upon considering the issues pertaining to the

92. “The law” here refers particularly to the human law. See Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 16 (p. 360); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 78–79.

93. Romanus Cessario, *Introduction to Moral Theology* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), xxi.

doctrine of God, all the arguments in the chapter will converge upon the main thesis, namely that, despite his eclecticism, Junius appropriated predominantly Thomistic ideas to systematize the nature and role of eternal law.⁹⁴ The discussion of the aforementioned areas will demonstrate how Junius related eternal reality to the temporal reality, or divine mind to the human mind, and these areas will be essential in explaining the function of other creaturely laws in subsequent chapters.

Following the treatment of eternal law in Junius's thought, the fourth chapter will examine the way Junius conceived natural law. As Jennifer Herdt put it well, "the magisterial wing of the Protestant Reformation continued to employ the natural law tradition as a *lingua franca* for ethical reflection, even as that tradition was reinterpreted in light of new understandings of the Fall and of justification."⁹⁵ It is therefore of paramount importance to consider the fact that, after dissociating from the Catholic Church and relativizing the juridical role of canon law, Protestant magistrates and theologians conjointly undertook the task of sifting through the inherited body of law on the one hand and establishing an acceptable theology of law on the other.⁹⁶ Therefore by situating Junius's natural law doctrine against that background, this chapter will provide an argument that Junius's doctrine of natural law demonstrates a modified appropriation of Thomistic ideas in four areas: natural law's inclinations, notions, participation, and limitations. Considerations of these four areas will shed light on how Junius construed the relationship between intellect and will, nature and grace, and divine reason and human reason, and all of these ideas will illumine the fact that, in Junius's ethical system, epistemological acts are inseparable from one's ontological condition.

94. Cf. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 3.66–68.

95. Jennifer A. Herdt, "Natural Law in Protestant Christianity," in *The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Ethics*, ed. Tom Angier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 155.

96. Herdt, "Natural Law in Protestant Christianity," 156.

The fifth chapter advances the discussion of nature and grace and covers the topic of divine law, understood as “the principle of divine communication with human beings.”⁹⁷ Divine law understood in this way refers fundamentally to the ordering of reason for heavenly and supernatural communication, and only secondarily to the distinct types of law revealed in the Mosaic covenant. This point is crucial to understanding Junius’s conception of supernatural grace, as he defined the substance of divine law as “that which has been inspired by God, infused in rational creatures, and informs them with common and individual notions beyond nature for the purpose of transmitting them to a supernatural end by a supernatural leading.”⁹⁸ Thus this chapter will examine the issue of how grace relates to nature and contend that Junius, while understanding the role of grace in terms of causal, dispositional, and spiritual acts, nonetheless modified Aquinas’s conception of supernatural communication on Christological, soteriological, and anthropological grounds. This is to say that Junius positively appropriated Aquinas’s framework in viewing the supernatural ordering of nature through the categories of infusion, disposition, and cognition, yet, as a Reformed theologian, those categories were used along with the assumptions of finite nature and sovereign grace. Furthermore, as this chapter broadly considers the relation between supernatural communication and perception, the “nature” in the chapter will include Christ’s human nature as well as the glorified nature of the heavenly saints, in order to describe more fully the pattern by which the order of grace interacts with the order of nature in Junius’s moral theology.

The next chapter will bring to light the ways in which Junius understood human law. In the preface of his *De politiae Mosis observatione*, Junius stated that political discipline is “the mistress of the just and honorable,” “the guardian of order,” and “the defender of the public and private rights of the common good.”⁹⁹ The order in view here, to be specific, is the order

97. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (p. 349); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 51.

98. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (p. 348); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 49.

99. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (p. 229); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 3.

“in human affairs [*in rebus humanis*]” or “in public affairs [*in rebus publicis*].”¹⁰⁰ This indicates that human law in Junius’s thought is from, by, and through humans—the principles as well as the applications of human laws are all worked out by humans themselves. This explains why, in Junius’s thought, the finality, legitimacy, boundary, and authority of human law were all explained in terms of *human reasoning*—a proper ordering of reason from principles, through conclusions, and to determinations is what secures human law to attain justice, legitimacy, and reasonableness. Then, by relating this topic of human law to the overall aim of the project, this chapter provides a thesis that in Junius’s understanding of human law the Thomistic *duplex ratio* has been recast in light of the Calvinistic *duplex regnum*.¹⁰¹ Upon analyzing the adjacent areas it will be made evident that Junius’s ideas on the finality, legitimacy, boundary, and authority of human law express both Thomistic and Calvinistic concepts on nature and grace, integrity and depravity, and creational and eschatological order, to the degree that he can be more adequately described as a “Thomistic Calvinist,” rather than as a “Calvinistic Thomist.”

The last chapter is on the Mosaic law. David C. Steinmetz and Richard A. Muller claimed that in the Reformation exegetical tradition “[t]he importance of the Old Testament for the church is predicated upon the continuity of the people of God in history, a continuity which persists in spite of discontinuity between Israel and the church.”¹⁰² This, moreover, has to be understood against the background that, even when the Reformers rejected the medieval *quadrige* method, they still retained the premodern hermeneutics of promise and fulfilment to interpret the substantial and typological elements that run through both testaments.¹⁰³ By

100. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, preface (p. 330); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 4–5.

101. To state briefly, the term *duplex ratio* here means the way Junius treated reason in terms of natural and supernatural kinds, which resembles Aquinas’s pattern of thought—whereas the term *duplex regnum* refers to the way Junius understood the distinct roles of church and state as two administrative bodies of God’s law, which is reflective of Calvin’s view of the twofold government.

102. Richard A. Muller, “Biblical Interpretation in the Era of the Reformation: The View of the Middle Ages,” in *Biblical Interpretation in the Era of the Reformation Essays Presented to David C. Steinmetz in Honor of His Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. Richard A. Muller and John L. Thompson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 7.

103. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 2.469–70.

acknowledging these contextual issues, then, this chapter will support the argument that Junius's understanding of the law of Moses expresses a modified reception of Aquinas's ideas in this significant way: the metaphysical as well as the historical account of the moral order prescribed in the Mosaic law were explained through a covenantal law-and-gospel framework. In short, Junius, in a Reformed way, delineated the Mosaic moral order in light of the triadic covenantal figures, namely Adam, Abraham, and Christ, to account for the process of perfection from the Old to the New. Once these topics are treated it will become clearer that, to Junius, the Reformed covenant ideas were that which moderated his reception of the traditional "scholastic" principles concerning the law of Moses, and in his account the integration of Thomistic and Reformed concepts was successfully accomplished.

CHAPTER 2

THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN ACTION

2.1 Introduction

Upon observing the controversies that surrounded Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444) and Niccolò Tignosi (1402–74) in Italy from their translations of Aristotle’s ethical works, David A. Lines commented that some of the issues in Renaissance ethics arose from the translation and transferability of Aristotle’s *eudaemonia* into Latin terms such as *felicitas* and *beatitudo*, and also from identifying the textual and conceptual relations between Aristotle’s ethical, political, and economic works.¹ As the eminent historian Paul Oskar Kristeller had remarked about the universal use of Aristotle’s works in the early modern period, the study of ethics in the sixteenth century revolved around the texts of Aristotle and the field was avidly studied by both humanists and scholastics, regardless of their regional, institutional, and theological differences.² The difference of approach between them, however, was that humanists tended to regard ethics not only in relation to economics and politics, but also to rhetoric, as it was typical of humanists to see rhetorical and verbal eloquence as a hallmark of a moral person.³ James Hankins also provided a similar conclusion that “[t]he humanists claimed that study of good letters made people better, more virtuous, wiser, and more eloquent.”⁴ Hence the moral goal of *studia humanitatis* was, according to both Lines and Hankins, was the perfection of moral and rhetorical powers through the study of language, poetry, history, and literature, and this was one of the differences that distinguished the humanist approach to ethics from the scholastic

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1. David A. Lines, “Humanistic and Scholastic Ethics,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 314–15.
 2. Paul Oscar Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanistic Strains* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 305. Cf. Richard A. Muller, “Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy, and the Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism,” *Trinity Journal*, vol. 19, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 81–96; idem, “Reformation, Orthodoxy, ‘Christian Aristotelianism,’ and the Eclecticism of Early Modern Philosophy,” *Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, vol. 81, no. 3 (2001): 306–25.
 3. Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought*, 305.
 4. James Hankins, “Humanism, Scholasticism, and Renaissance Philosophy,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy*, 32.

approach: humanists treated the discipline of moral philosophy predominantly in relation to *oratio*, whereas their scholastic counterparts were treating ethics primarily at the level of *ratio*.⁵

Of course, Renaissance humanists were not the first ones to embark on the project of weaving the textual and conceptual relationships of Aristotle's ethical, political, and economic works. Already during the thirteenth century Aquinas had provided volumes of commentaries on Aristotle's works, including his ethical and political treatises, and to this date they retain significant historical and theological values.⁶ However, as a theologian, his achievements have to be measured against his attempts at relating *ethica* to *theologia*; as Étienne Gilson emphatically remarked, Aquinas as a theologian considered all things "in their relation to God conceived as being both their origin and their end."⁷ It is unambiguously clear that in Aquinas's *Summa theologica* the discussion of law served the discussion of human action, and the discussion of human action was a sub-topic within divine government.⁸ More specifically, Aquinas's theory of law was formed as a detailed explanation of the ways in which human acts are ordered, and the theory of human actions, in turn, was formed as an explanation of the ways in which God governs the created world. He argued that "in [divine] government there are two things to be considered; the design of the government, which is providence itself; and the execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others."⁹ In this light human actions were framed as means of God's execution of his governing plans and thus, in Aquinas's thought, there is an intricate order between divine actions and human actions. Furthermore, the

5. Hankins, "Humanism, Scholasticism, and Renaissance Philosophy," 32. See also Muller, "Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy, and the Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism," 310.

6. For example, see Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. C.I. Litzinger (Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books, 1993); idem, *Commentary on Aristotle's Politics*, trans. Richard J. Regan (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007).

7. Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 9.

8. See the charts provided on page 503 in the first volume and pages 581 and 991 in the second volume of Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981). All the English translations of Aquinas's *Summa* will be from this edition.

9. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 103, a. 6.

specific focus of Aquinas's treatment of the moral order of human actions pertained to *actus humanus*, a human action in distinction from *actus hominis*, or an act of a human, though both were situated in the context of divine government.¹⁰

Aquinas's theological legacy continued well into the sixteenth century and, whether in appropriating or criticizing his ideas, many theologians in the century engaged deeply with his moral ideas.¹¹ Junius for instance defined law as "the ordering of reason [*rationis ordinatio*] to the common good established by the one who has care of the community."¹² This is almost completely identical to Aquinas's definition of law as "an ordinance of reason [*rationis ordinatio*] for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated."¹³ In fact, despite the differences in English translations, the only difference between the two in Latin is found in just one word: Junius substituted *promulgata* with *institutata*.¹⁴ This is far closer to the original terms of Aquinas than the definition given by, for example, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), who defined law as "a certain rule and measure, according to which one is induced to act or is restrained from acting."¹⁵ Moreover, even an influential "Calvinistic Thomist," Jerome Zanchi (1516–90), defined law somewhat

10. Aquinas makes the distinction between *action of a man* and *human action* in his *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 1, a. 1. For rather accessible, yet debated, treatments of these two kinds of actions in Aquinas's thought, see Ralph M. McInerney, *Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992); idem, *Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997).

11. On the legacy of Aquinas's ethical ideas in the sixteenth century, see the excellent essay by Benjamin Hill and Henrick Lagerlund, "Ethics," in *The Routledge Companion to Sixteenth Century Philosophy*, ed. Benjamin Hill and Henrick Lagerlund (New York: Routledge, 2017), 516–37.

12. Franciscus Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, ed. Abraham Kuyper (Amsterdam: Muller and Kruyt, 1882), thesis 1 (p. 344). The translations used in this chapter generally follow Todd M. Rester's translation, unless alternative wordings may deem more useful. See Franciscus Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, ed. Andrew M. McGinnis, trans. Todd M. Rester (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2015), 38.

13. Aquinas argued: "[Lex est] rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata." Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 90, a. 4.

14. Junius defined law in a manner that was almost verbatim identical: "Lex est rationis ordinatio ad commune bonum, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, instituta." Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (p. 344). W. Bradford Littlejohn also noted this difference in W. Bradford Littlejohn, "Cutting Through the Fog in the Channel: Hooker, Junius, and a Reformed Theology of Law," in *Richard Hooker and Reformed Orthodoxy*, ed. W. Bradford Littlejohn and Scott N. Kindred-Barnes (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), 221–40.

15. Frederick C. Copleston, *Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy*, volume 3, *A History of Philosophy*, reprinted ed. (London: Continuum, 2019), 381.

differently, as he stated that “the divine and eternal revelation of God’s will, through which he teaches what he wishes human beings to do and avoid, and by which he warns that it be done or avoided for his own glory and for the good of the human race both in private and most of all in public.”¹⁶

This then raises a question: how close were Junius’s thoughts to Aquinas’s on the relationship between law and order? In other words, did Junius merely reverberate Aquinas’s definition, or did he also situate law against the background of human action and divine action like Aquinas did? These questions are not insignificant because, as Heiko A. Oberman remarked, a textual reference in the sixteenth century did not necessarily indicate a conceptual dependence; and as Antonie Vos noted, a theologian could be conceptually Scotist despite his citation of Aquinas.¹⁷ By focusing on these questions, then, this chapter provides an argument that Junius indeed adopted Thomistic ideas in framing the moral order in terms of rational motion, relation, and perfection. To defend this thesis four areas will be considered: first, a brief historical background to Junius’s relation to humanism, scholasticism, and the discipline of ethics; secondly, the structure of reality in his thought; thirdly, the natural and supernatural order in relation to human action; lastly, the internal order between intellect and will. Upon considering these areas it will become clear that the way Junius united *ethica* to *theologia* was by expounding the mereological, teleological, and motional order between divine *ratio* and human *ratio*, and that law was surrounded by the notions of *actio*, *revelatio*, *ordo*, *ratio*, and *relatio*, which altogether explained the nature of *perfectio*.

16. Girolamo Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, trans. Jeffrey J. Veenstra (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2012), 6.

17. Heiko A. Oberman, *The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1992), 131. Antonie Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 7. See Muller’s response to this thesis in Richard A. Muller, “Not Scotist: Understandings of Being, Univocity, and Analogy in Early-Modern Reformed Thought,” *Reformation & Renaissance Review*, vol. 14, no. 2 (August 2012): 127–50; idem, *Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017).

2.2 Franciscus Junius in Context: Humanism, Scholasticism, and the Discipline of Ethics

In his *Vita nobilis et eruditi viri Francisci Junii*, Junius narrated that his grandfather, William, was Lord of Boffardiniere at Vayrac, and had served the King Louis XII (1462–1515), whom he called “the most Christian king of France.”¹⁸ William’s third son, Denys, was Junius’s father, and Denys studied law from three of the best-known institutions in France, that is in Bourges, Poitiers, and Toulouse.¹⁹ Under the tutelage of his father, Junius commenced learning from the age of five and, at the age of six, he “began to write and demonstrate to some important degree the natural bent of [his] gifts and disposition.”²⁰ When he started to attend grammar school, he received instructions from both school teachers and private tutors at home: at school, he studied under Johannes Popardinus, Johannes Morellus, and Henricus Pampulfurious; at home, under Petrus Galerandus and Petrus Barba.²¹ Because of his father’s occupation as a lawyer “there were constant matters of business” at home, and in that environment and under his father’s guidance Junius could “combine a knowledge of human affairs with [his] pursuit of learning.”²² Not only that, due to his father’s requests, Junius gave assistance to him “in hearing cases, copying out investigations, putting together capital charges, reviewing strategies from face to face, and studying the proper disposition both of all manner of cases and indeed of capital ones as well.”²³ He was very glad that his father approved of his abilities—and as his confidence grew, Junius said, he strove for “more responsibility.”²⁴

18. Franciscus Junius, *Vita nobilis et eruditi viri Francisci Junii s. theologiae doctoris, et in Academia Lugdunensi professoris dignissimi: ab ipso nuper conscripta*, ed. Paullus Merula (Lugduni Batavorum: Ex Officina Plantinianna, 1595). Its translation is from “The Life of Franciscus Junius” in Franciscus Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology: With the Life of Franciscus Junius*, trans. David C. Noe (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2014), 14. The translations of Junius’s *De theologia vera* will be from Noe’s translation in *A Treatise on True Theology* unless stated otherwise.

19. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 14.

20. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 18.

21. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 20.

22. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 21.

23. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 21.

24. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 21.

Through his father's influence Junius also learned about public matters in France; Denys used to explain to his son that "France had been filled with injustice; moreover, that it was not possible for those who desire to maintain law and equity with a clear conscience to achieve public offices in France."²⁵ Because of such pessimistic and distrustful convictions about their country, Junius was often told by his father to "flee as far as possible from such [public] offices" for the sake of "the sanctity of a clear conscience."²⁶ Instead, Junius was often advised to "acquire a legacy of knowledge," as such pathways would enable him to become "the most reliable and noble guide and mistress" of his life.²⁷ These discussions moved Junius very much; he recounted that he could "scarcely ever listen without tears to [his] father discussing these matters in grave tones."²⁸ Tobias Sarx's observation seems fitting, therefore, that through those conversations and experiences Junius must have "developed a sensitivity for law and order."²⁹ Moreover, due to the impact of these family conversations, Junius had the desire to study the humanities—and at the age of thirteen, he sensed a growing desire to study law, upon reading a chapter of the *Institutes of Justinian* translated by Hugo Donellus (1527–91).³⁰ Since then, for almost two years, he devoted himself to the study of law in Bourges under Donellus, Franciscus Duarenus (1509–59), Antonius Concius, Ludovicus Russardus, and other renowned scholars in the profession.³¹

25. Junius, "The Life of Franciscus Junius," 23.

26. Junius, "The Life of Franciscus Junius," 23.

27. Junius, "The Life of Franciscus Junius," 23.

28. Junius, "The Life of Franciscus Junius," 23.

29. "Da Junius in seiner Autobiographie sonst eher selbstkritisch und zurückhaltend über seine Person schreibt, darf man annehmen, dass die juristischen Tätigkeiten in dem kränklichen Jungen ein gutes Selbstvertrauen heranbildeten und in ihm den Wunsch nach gesellschaftlichem Aufstieg weckten. Auch eine Sensibilität für Recht und Ordnung, die ihn in seinem späteren akademischen Arbeiten maßgeblich beeinflusste, dürfte er durch das familiäre Erleben und durch die Arbeit bei seinem Vater bereits als Kind entwickelt haben." Tobias Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602): Ein reformierter Theologe im Spannungsfeld zwischen späthumanistischer Irenik und reformierter Konfessionalisierung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 30.

30. Junius, "The Life of Franciscus Junius," 25.

31. Junius, "The Life of Franciscus Junius," 25.

Sarx noted that, since 1529, a new approach to the study of law was introduced by Andreas Alciatus (1492–1550) in Bourges, by which he attempted to interpret Roman law not through the traditional scholastic methods but through the burgeoning philological insights gathered from the renewed study of classical literature.³² The result of the attempt was the reconstruction of the historical texts themselves as well as the refined interpretation of sources.³³ Along with such historical-critical methods to jurisprudence, Duarenus and Donellus provided a rule of organizing legal materials so that students may learn to relate, arrange, and systematize scattered pieces of evidence for informed judicial thinking.³⁴ This method provided the students, Sarx noted, with opportunities to discuss “the connection between law, politics, and morality”—the nature of justice, legislation, as well as the application of *aequitas* were all under discussion as they studied the subject.³⁵ The main texts were Plato’s *Politeia*, Aristotle’s ethical and political works, and various writings from Cicero.³⁶ It was from these professors and texts that Junius gained methodological as well as conceptual insights into the burgeoning field of humanistic jurisprudence.³⁷ Upon observing these educational issues Sarx remarked that, when Junius received his first legal training in Bourges, the academics in the field of law had “abandoned the scholastic method of science and had developed a new humanistic type.”³⁸

The crucial discovery during this phase in Bourges was Junius’s awareness of his educational deficiency in “refined arts, languages, and especially history.”³⁹ As these subjects

32. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 36.

33. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 36.

34. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 36.

35. “Neben dem pädagogischen Interesse hatte die systematische Hinwendung zu den Grundfragen des Rechts auch die Intention, die Verbindung von Recht, Politik und Moral zu erörtern: Das Wesen der Gerechtigkeit und die Natur menschlicher Gesetzgebung gerieten ins Blickfeld der humanistischen Juristen.” Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 36.

36. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 36.

37. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 36.

38. “In Bourges hatten sich die juristischen Lehrer von der scholastischen Wissenschaftsmethode verabschiedet und einen neuen humanistischen Typus entwickelt, mithilfe dessen man glaubte, die ungeheuren gesellschaftlichen Umwälzungen besser gestalten zu können.” Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 36.

39. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 25.

were directly relevant to the study of law, Junius was seeking ways to fill this deficiency, and an opportunity came for him to study at Lyon at the recommendation of Bartholemaeus Anulus (1510–61), then the presider of the gymnasium named Collège de la Trinité in Bourges.⁴⁰ In Lyon, Junius not only devoured books voraciously, but also found a mentor who instructed him in the method of learning, arranging, and organizing knowledge.⁴¹ Sarx noted that when Junius devoted himself to the *studia humanitatis* in Lyon, the so-called “undogmatic and cosmopolitan humanism” was prevalent, which invited various communities of learning to the study of humanities.⁴² The humanistic learning then included intensive philological training in Latin, Greek, and also Hebrew, and the textual resources were gathered from the classical period.⁴³ The study of morals, Sarx stated, revolved around robust attention to the questions of human being’s spiritual and moral constitution, yet it deflected from those metaphysical considerations typically raised by the scholastics.⁴⁴ The French humanists found useful sources of moral thinking primarily from the classical authors, rather than from the medieval ones, and thus the principles of moral life were gained from the classical philosophy, rather than the scholastic philosophy.⁴⁵ Another notable feature of the *studia humanitatis* prevalent in France, Sarx argued, was that the study of history became one of the focal points of intellectual training: following Cicero’s comment that history is *magistra vitae*, the humanists saw history as life’s teacher and saw it as an indispensable instrument in forming one’s moral life.⁴⁶ Sarx also pointed out that, by these renewed appropriations of philology and history, along with the

40. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 25–26.

41. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 26.

42. “In Lyon wurde ein undogmatischer Humanismus gelehrt, der nicht nur tolerante, sondern auch religionskritische Züge aufwies.” Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 36. See also “... in Lyon begegnete ihm ein undogmatischer und weltoffener Humanismus.” Idem, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 47.

43. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 40.

44. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 41.

45. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 41.

46. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 41. Cicero stated: “Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis, qua voce alia, nisi oratoris, immortalitati commendatur?” See Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Oratore, Books I–II*, trans. E.W. Sutton and Harris Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), II.36.

renewed appreciations of rhetoric over dialectic, the Renaissance humanism in France transformed the way moral formation was pursued, as it shifted the focus from *ratio* to *oratio*, or from *thought* to *tongue*.⁴⁷ Another important contextual factor is that, unlike the kind of humanism that had swept Italy, the humanism that infiltrated into countries such as the Low Countries, Germany, and France, had developed into a certain “Christian humanism,” due to the influence of figures such as Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536), Guillaume Budé (1467–1540), and Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples (1455–1536).⁴⁸

Yet, during his time at Lyon, Junius confessed that he underwent several “treacherous cliffs” that damaged his youth, namely the temptations from several women and the ungodliness resulting from a random conversation with a skeptic.⁴⁹ On top of this, there was much civil unrest in Lyon during his stay, which morphed into indiscriminate slaughters and riots, and which killed many Huguenots, including his counsellor Anulus.⁵⁰ The cause of the riots, he thought, was “disputes over religion,” and those unsettling—and uprooting—situations eventually made him move back to his home.⁵¹ He returned home not only with his belongings but also with his changed temperaments; he was seriously disintegrated by youthful boys and girls and his faith was almost shattered by a skeptical man he met randomly. Of course, he also witnessed the horrific acts of wickedness that filled the city of Lyon, and thus when Junius returned home, his father sensed ungodliness as well as directionlessness in Junius.⁵² Yet his father patiently taught him that “true piety cannot be forcibly introduced but must be gently instilled in minds. It cannot be completed but must be insinuated; not commanded but taught; coercion is not desired, but persuasion.”⁵³ In this context, Junius

47. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 42.

48. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 42–44.

49. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 28.

50. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 28–29.

51. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 31.

52. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 32–33.

53. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 33.

opened the first chapter of the gospel of John in the New Testament, and had a life-changing encounter with the magnificent divinity of God: “I read that part of the chapter ... [and] immediately I perceived that the divinity of the argument and the grandeur and authority of the writing surpassed by a great margin all streams of human eloquent. My body shuddered, my mind was dumbfounded, and throughout the whole day I was so overwhelmed that I seemed to myself unsure who I even was.”⁵⁴

His father noticed this godly change in him. “He congratulated himself as much on my return to piety as he had grieved over my departure and desertion to impiety.”⁵⁵ Following Junius’s indication to pursue some preparatory studies for theology, Denys recommended that he should go to either Paris or Geneva.⁵⁶ This, however, should not be interpreted as a recommendation to choose between Catholicism and Protestantism: during the sixteenth century John Calvin (1509–64) and the Reformed faith exerted a significant influence upon French Protestantism, and the first draft of their *Confessio Gallicana* (1559), it should not be forgotten, was prepared in Geneva.⁵⁷ In short, “[t]he Genevan influence on Reformed theology in France remained [strong] during the second half of the sixteenth century.”⁵⁸ Junius found each place appealing in distinct ways: Paris was a good place of choice as it provided “the path toward knowledge, reputation, and distinction,” and also “the men who were by far the most educated.”⁵⁹ However, though Geneva comparatively lacked the wealth of resources and reputable intellectuals, Junius left for Geneva with the hope of learning languages, as well as of avoiding civil unrest in France.⁶⁰

54. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 34.

55. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 34.

56. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 34.

57. Tobias Sarx, “Reformed Protestantism in France,” in *A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy*, ed. Herman Selderhuis (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013), 229. See also Glenn S. Sunshine, *Reforming French Protestantism: The Development of Huguenot Ecclesiastical Institutions, 1557–1572* (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2003), 3–5; 20–21; 25–30; Mark Greengrass, *The French Reformation* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991), 29–30.

58. Sarx, “Reformed Protestantism in France,” 232.

59. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 35.

60. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 35.

On March 17, 1562, Junius arrived in Geneva.⁶¹ During his early time in Geneva he could visit Wolfgang Musculus (1497–1563) and Wolfgang Haller (1525–1601) in Bern; Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562), Heinrich Bullinger (1504–75), and Rudolf Gwalther (1519–86) in Zurich; and Guillaume Farel (1489–1565) in Neuchâtel.⁶² Also, in Geneva, he studied Calvin’s *Institutio christianae religionis*, presumably the 1559 edition, and also Théodore Beza’s (1519–1605) *Confession de la foy chrestienne* “as a kind of index to Calvin’s works.”⁶³ To study Hebrew, Junius read Antoine Rudolphe Chevalier’s (1507–72) *Rudimenta Hebraicae linguae* when he was on his own, but he later received private tutoring under Philippe Birgan.⁶⁴ In Sarx’s own words, the period in Geneva for Junius was the period of “internalizing the principles of Reformed theology.”⁶⁵ Not everything was congenial to his study, however, as he went through severe poverty while he was in Geneva, and he even received the news that his father Denys was murdered by “the hatred of certain Papists.”⁶⁶ After his father’s death, he returned to his study with heavy heart, and he soon renewed his devotion to the “study of sacred literature and languages.”⁶⁷ During this time he spent time with Ludwig Enoch, whom Junius described as “a man outstanding for his piety and learning,” as Junius taught him Latin, Greek, and Hebrew almost every day.⁶⁸

These narratives of Junius’s early life do provide some helpful information about his exposure to humanist learning, as it is evident that he studied under some of the leading humanists—jurists and theologians—and that he loved studying languages, literature, as well as history. Yet, there is one interesting feature here. Junius’s *Vita* does not indicate any existent

61. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 36.

62. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 37.

63. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 37.

64. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 38. See also Douglas Judisch, “A Translation and Edition of the *Sacorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius: A Study in Sixteenth Century Hermeneutics” (PhD Dissertation, University of St. Andrews, 1978), 1:6.

65. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 47.

66. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 42.

67. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 44.

68. Junius, “The Life of Franciscus Junius,” 44.

or experiential tension between humanism and scholasticism. Though Sarx made a number of comments regarding tensions between humanism and scholasticism as background information, Junius himself actually never mentioned that Calvin's theological method was contrary to his own, as many modern scholars may expect, that the legal training he received in Bourges was inadequate to be used in the discipline of theology, or that his devotion to the study of letters deviated his attention from the study of philosophy. Despite the fact that Antoine de la Roche Chandieu (1534–91) had already established himself as a renowned theologian and pastor in the French Reformed church during the mid-sixteenth century as an Aristotelian thinker, and also the fact that his Aristotelianism was not wholly accepted by, for example, Pierre de La Ramée or Petrus Ramus (1515–72) in France, Junius never mentioned these issues.⁶⁹ Also, some of the Reformed theologians Junius met in Switzerland—for instance Musculus and Vermigli—had already incorporated scholastic methods and concepts in their theological teachings, yet Junius never mentioned them as odd, distinct, or contentious methods.⁷⁰ Junius never indicated scholasticism as a current that contradicted the method and spirit of humanism, and certainly never criticized Aristotle's philosophy. In short, there is complete absence about his philosophical learning, about his exposure to scholastic streams, and about his motive behind adopting scholastic methods and concepts in his theological works despite his avid love of humanism.

Such omission should be interpreted against the background of at least three factors. First, as both humanism and scholasticism were concurrent trends in the academic world in

69. Sarx, "Reformed Protestantism in France," 232. For Ramus's influence in early modern Europe, see Walter J. Ong, *Ramus: Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Howard Hotson, *Commonplace Learning: Ramism and Its German Ramifications, 1543-1630* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); idem, *The Reformation of Common Learning: Post-Ramist Method and the Reception of the New Philosophy, 1618–1670* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). On Antoine de la Roche Chandieu, see Donald Sinnema, "Antoine de Chandieu's Call for a Scholastic Reformed Theology (1580)," in *Later Calvinism: International Perspectives*, ed. W. Fred Graham (Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1994), 159–90; Theodore Van Raalte, *Antoine de Chandieu: The Silver Horn of Geneva's Reformed Triumvirate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

70. For instance, see Wolfgang Musculus, *Loci communes in usus sacrae theologiae candidatorum parati* (1560) and Peter Martyr Vermigli, *Loci communes* (1576).

early modern Europe, Junius did not have to undergo any struggle as to which intellectual and methodological tradition he should choose over against another.⁷¹ “During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,” Kristeller noted, “university instruction in the philosophical disciplines continued everywhere to be based on works of Aristotle” to the extent that “[t]he Renaissance is still in many respects an Aristotelian age which in part continued the trends of medieval Aristotelianism, and in part gave it a new direction under the influence of classical humanism and other different ideas.”⁷² With the universal appropriation of Aristotle’s works and ideas in Europe but particularly in France, humanism developed “within the limited area of rhetorical and philological studies.”⁷³ Humanism, he argued, centered on the fields of grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy, but it was scholasticism that flourished in the fields of logic and natural philosophy—therefore “the two traditions had their locus and center in two different sectors of learning[.]”⁷⁴ Thus even the criticisms that humanists leveled against scholastics were limited to several areas, Kristeller noted, which were against their Latin style, their ignorance of classical history and literature, and their preoccupation with supposedly vain questions.⁷⁵

In this academic environment, then, Junius certainly did not have to state his formal stance for or against scholasticism as a theologian, as “all kinds of adjustments and combinations between humanism and scholasticism were possible and were successfully accomplished.”⁷⁶ He could simply improve his Latin style, broaden his awareness of classical sources, and refine the questions he brought to the study of theology by adopting humanistic

71. By affirming Kristeller’s conclusions, Richard A. Muller argued that “humanism was not only a product of the intellectual culture of the Middle Ages, but also that it arose, not as a successor to scholasticism, but as a parallel development in the university faculties of the thirteenth century.” Richard A. Muller, *Calvin and the Reformed Tradition: On the Work of Christ and the Order of Salvation* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 20.

72. Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought*, 34 & 47

73. Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought*, 123.

74. Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought*, 113.

75. Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought*, 101.

76. Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought*, 116.

tools and still use scholastic patterns of argumentation. In fact, he was schooled at an academy where its leading theologian, Beza, had envisioned the institution to be the “*respublica scholastica*, or the academic commonwealth.”⁷⁷ Accordingly Junius’s omission of his encounter with scholastic currents in his *Vita* must be interpreted against the fact that there was simply no need for him to justify his appropriation of scholastic methods, as in the mid-sixteenth century there had been no apparent confusion and contradiction surrounding the usability of both humanism and scholasticism in Reformed academies: they both could “subsist together as aspects of the academic preparation of theologians.”⁷⁸ Thus, simply put, Reformed scholasticism is “a revised scholasticism” that is “a child of the Renaissance as well as a child of the Middle Ages.”⁷⁹

Secondly, as an extended point, Junius’s overt mentions of his exposure to the *studia humanitatis* do not indicate that his philosophical positions were drawn exclusively from Renaissance humanists. In fact, in Kristeller’s judgment, humanists did not—and certainly could not—replace the philosophical depth and rigor of scholastic thinkers merely with their rhetorical and philological excellence, and the humanist works on philosophical topics, he commented, appear to be “rather superficial and inconclusive” compared to the ones produced by their scholastic counterparts.⁸⁰ Also, as Richard A. Muller insisted, the scholastic works produced during the mid and late sixteenth century would typically include contents from the text of Scripture, the philosophy and theology of the church fathers as well as of the medieval scholastics, yet the contents and conclusions of theology would depend on “the choice of materials and the theological and philosophical proclivities of the individual author than with

77. Richard A. Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 43.

78. Muller, *Calvin and the Reformed Tradition*, 28.

79. Richard A. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academics, 2003). 1.36 & 63.

80. Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought*, 99.

the method itself.”⁸¹ What this entails is that Junius’s appropriations of humanism did not necessarily and exclusively align him to humanist philosophies, because humanism itself could not provide him with sufficient philosophical depth in logic and metaphysics.⁸² From this perspective, it can easily be affirmed that Junius’s reputation as a renowned Reformed theologian was not solely due to his “humanist” orientation as opposed to the “scholastic,” and his theology was presented by his careful attention to texts as well as his profound grasp of traditional concepts, which ranged from Greek to Latin, from ancient to medieval, traditions.⁸³ Therefore, Junius’s appropriations of humanistic and scholastic methods—despite his silence on the latter in his *Vita*—should be evaluated against the background of the early modern academic context, in which Reformed theologians labored to establish appropriate academic methods on the one hand and to develop their theological system for successive generations on the other.⁸⁴

Lastly, it has to be acknowledged that the discipline of ethics in early modern Reformed universities involved commentarial studies of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, which required both humanistic and scholastic methods of learning.⁸⁵ Manfred Svensson convincingly pointed

81. Muller, *Calvin and the Reformed Tradition*, 30.

82. Muller clearly argued that Renaissance humanistic methods did not necessarily produce covenantal hermeneutics and scholastic methods did not necessarily lead to metaphysical determinism. Muller, *Calvin and the Reformed Tradition*, 29.

83. See Donald Sinnema’s insightful article on the role Antoine de Chandieu played in bringing scholastic method into the growing Reformed tradition: Donald Sinnema, “Antoine de Chandieu’s Call for a Scholastic Reformed Theology (1580),” 159–90. Also helpful is Theodore G. Van Raalte, “Antoine de Chandieu (1534–1591): One of the Fathers of Reformed Scholasticism?” (PhD Dissertation, Calvin Theological Seminary, 2013); idem, *Antoine de Chandieu: The Silver Horn of Geneva’s Reformed Triumvirate*. Howard Hotson also provided an excellent account of the educational and intellectual background of Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588–1638). See Howard Hotson, *Johann Heinrich Alsted 1588-1638: Between Renaissance, Reformation, and Universal Reform* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).

84. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.60–63. See these two very helpful essays on the nature of Reformed scholasticism and the proper methodology required to study the field: Richard A. Muller, “Reflections on Persistent Whiggism and Its Antidotes in the Study of Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Intellectual History,” in *Seeing Things Their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion*, ed. Alister Chapman, John Coffey, and Brad S. Gregory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 134–53; Willem J. van Asselt, “Scholasticism Revisited: Methodological Reflections on the Study of Seventeenth-century Reformed Thought,” in *Seeing Their Way*, 154–74.

85. Kirk M. Summers argued that the concept of “ethics” as understood by Calvin and Beza was “a shorthand for Christian conduct to the glory of God or, conceived more abstractly, as the rationale for that conduct.” However, the term used in this dissertation is much broader than that, as it refers to the study of the order or

out that Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* was "the standard textbook for the teaching of ethics" in Protestant academic institutions and, as a fruit of their academic engagements, Protestants produced close to forty commentarial works on it between 1529 and 1682.⁸⁶ Studying ethics through Aristotle's text was a common practice pursued, for example, at the Genevan Academy, the University of Heidelberg, and the University of Leiden, and even earlier theologians from other universities—such as Vermigli and Andreas Hyperius (1511–64)—also published Reformed commentaries on it.⁸⁷ In fact, David S. Sytsma rightly argued that Calvin's conception of moral virtues was also formulated in engagement with Augustine and Aristotle's ideas, and Calvin "maintained a dual interest in Aristotelian and Augustinian eudaemonist virtue ethics."⁸⁸ Such commentarial practice continued throughout the sixteenth century and, in 1598, Rudolf Goclenius (1547–1628), a Reformed philosopher from Marburg, even combined Vermigli and Hyperius's commentaries together and published the package for more convenient Reformed education.⁸⁹ Although later thinkers such as Bartholomaeus Keckermann (c. 1572–1609) could write a mature work on the system of ethics itself, he too heavily used Aristotle in understanding, ordering, and defining ethics as an academic discipline.⁹⁰

structure of human actions. See Kirk M. Summers, *Morality After Calvin: Theodore Beza's Christian Censor and Reformed Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 10.

- 86 . Manfred Svensson, "Aristotelian Practical Philosophy from Melancthon to Eisenhart: Protestant Commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1529–1682," *Reformation & Renaissance Review*, vol. 21, no. 3 (2019): 218–38.
87. Donald Sinnema, "The Discipline of Ethics in Early Reformed Orthodoxy," *Calvin Theological Journal*, vol. 28 (1993): 14–15. See also Andreas Hyperius, *Ad X libros ethicorum scholia* (Marburg, 1553); Peter Martyr Vermigli, *In primum, secundum, et initium tertii libri ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum ... commentarius* (Zurich, 1563).
88. David S. Sytsma, "John Calvin and Virtue Ethics: Augustinian and Aristotelian Themes," *Journal of Religious Ethics*, vol. 48, no. 3 (2020): 519–56.
89. Sinnema, "The Discipline of Ethics in Early Reformed Orthodoxy," 15. Cf. Rudolf Goclenius, *Meditationes ethicae sive Aristotelis ethicorum Nikomacheion perspicua ac perquam erudita, cum moribus sacris, id Est, in sacra pagina descriptis, collata explicado per d. Petrum Märtyrem Vermilium ... et d. Andream Hyperium ... cum notis et lemmatibus logicis Rodolphi Goclenii* (Lieh, 1598).
90. Sinnema, "The Discipline of Ethics in Early Reformed Orthodoxy," 32. Cf. Bartholomaeus Keckermann, *Systema ethicae tribus libris adornatum et publicis praelectionibus traditum in gymnasio dantiscano* (Hanau, 1607).

The study of ethics in this context therefore demanded detailed attention to the classical text itself and also a sharp awareness of philosophical issues relevant to the order of human action, and these altogether demanded both philological and philosophical approaches to learning the subject.⁹¹ To repeat: in both Lutheran and Reformed universities in the sixteenth century, expositions on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* formed "the backbone of moral education."⁹² In this regard, it should not be surprising to discover Aristotelian concepts in Junius's moral theology, especially as Reformed theologians prior to Junius had already provided perceptive but critical observations on the usability of Aristotle's ethical thought. Moreover, as the successful embedding of Aristotle's ideas in Reformed moral thought was done after rigorous philological and philosophical engagements with his texts, it should not be surprising that Junius found Aquinas's ideas congenial to explicating the order of human action; because in Aquinas's thought he could discover a sophisticated integration of both Augustinian and Aristotelian concepts on law, order, and action, all from theological viewpoints.⁹³

2.3 The Structure of Created Reality: *Ratio, Ordo, Actio, Relatio, and Perfectio*

Having covered some contextual matters, the first sub-thesis to be stated here is that Junius employed a framework of seeing the perfection of the created order in terms of *ratio, revelatio, ordo, actio, and relatio*, in a way that is very similar to how Aquinas conceived it. Aquinas

91. Sinnema argued: "Following the pattern established by Melanchthon, Reformed universities or academies, from their beginnings, taught ethics as a separate philosophical discipline within the context of the Arts faculty, according to the medieval model. Here ethics was taught along with the other philosophical disciplines such as physics and logic, and like them its teaching was based on classical authors, usually Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Thus, early Reformed universities did not treat ethics as a theological discipline or directly base the teaching of ethics on Scripture." Sinnema, "The Discipline of Ethics in Early Reformed Orthodoxy," 14.

92. Svensson, "Aristotelian Practical Philosophy from Melanchthon to Eisenhart," 238.

93. The formation of the sixteenth century theologians' conception of human intellect, which had a fundamental significance in early modern theological ethics, was in most part a result of engaging with Aquinas's account of faculty psychology provided in the *Summa theologiae*. Cees Leijenhorst even argued: "For many authors in the sixteenth century, the starting point for thinking about the human intellect was the formidable *Summa Theologiae* by Thomas Aquinas." See Cees Leijenhorst, "The Nature of the Understanding: Intellect, Conception, and Concepts," in *The Routledge Companion to Sixteenth Century Philosophy*, 475–76.

believed that the created world is normed by the “unity of order.” “The very order of things created by God,” Aquinas argued, “shows the unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order, whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come from God, have relation of order to each other, and to God Himself.”⁹⁴ This indicates that the established pattern of relationship that created things have *ad extra* includes two directions: first, toward God, and secondly, toward other creatures. Furthermore, in discussing the names of God he acknowledged that “some have said that relation [inherent in creation] is not a reality, but only an idea.” “But,” he argued, “this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude.”⁹⁵ Here, he affirmed that the relations created things have toward things external to themselves are real because the relations are effects of the activities of nature, rather than of human notions, and consequently the relationships that arise from nature were framed as the intended results of divine construction, rather than human’s. He stated: “[T]he order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result of a succession of agents.”⁹⁶ In other words, a certain kind of magnetic relations that created things have toward each other and toward God are classified as notional insofar as they refer to God’s notions (i.e., divine ideas), but from the perspective of the human mind, they are really, extra-mentally, and mind-independently established in nature. Therefore, in this sense, Aquinas was surely a “realist.”⁹⁷

94. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 47, a. 3.

95. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 13, a. 7.

96. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 15, a. 2. See also: “Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him.” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 13, a. 7.

97. For a brief introduction to the difference between medieval realism and nominalism, see Alessandro D. Conti, “Realism,” in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 2.647–60.

Junius's idea of the structure of the created order evinces this Thomistic realism, notwithstanding the fact that it is less sophisticated than Aquinas's.⁹⁸ More specifically, Junius's statements concerning a twofold direction of created things attest to the fact that he adopted a Thomistic conception of a twofold mereological orientation in creation. For instance, in *De theologia vera*, Junius contended that there are two ends in theology: "the first and primary one that looks to God, and the other, secondary one that looks to us and the human race in its entirety."⁹⁹ Here, the primary end of theological knowledge is something that is not only external to humanity but also something that transcends it, and the secondary end is something that is internal to and imminent in humanity. In other places Junius distinguished relations in terms of a thing's relation to itself and to others, by naming the former as "absolute" relation and the latter "relative."¹⁰⁰ In conjunction with this, he believed that the relational orientation of things is established by nature: "In fact," he insisted, "nature itself constantly teaches that all parts of one body are ordered to the whole."¹⁰¹ As noted above already, Junius defined law as "the ordering of reason to the common good established by the one who has care of the community."¹⁰² The meaning of "ordering" according to Junius was "an act πρὸς τι," the term whose root can be traced back to Aristotle's πρὸς τι (meaning "toward something") in his *Categoriae* and *Metaphysica*.¹⁰³ The expression of πρὸς τι in Aristotle's philosophy was connected to his concept of "reciprocity of correlation," which referred to the proposition that

98. The general meaning of "realism" used throughout this chapter is the conviction that "the logical order and its rules of predication arose directly from the mind's encounter with the real order, the order of things." Muller, "Reformation, Orthodoxy, 'Christian Aristotelianism,' and the Eclecticism of Early Modern Philosophy," 318.

99. Franciscus Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 31 (p. 90); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 207.

100. For example, he stated: "[I]ndeed this archetypal theology seems to me once to have been called by the orthodox fathers exemplary. God has fashioned the second kind of theology on the model of the divine and immutable exemplar, proportionally to the creatures' capacity. More contemporary authorities have designated the former theology as in relation to itself, and the second one as relative." Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 6 (p. 50); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 104.

101. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (pp. 344–45); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 41.

102. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (pp. 344); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 38.

103. Aristotle, *Categories and Metaphysics* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

“[a]ll relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate.”¹⁰⁴ Thus, judging from Junius’s comments stated above and his correlation of an act of ordering with an act πρὸς τι, the order that law aims to achieve is neither arbitrary nor ungrounded, but is real and natural, in Junius’s thought. Moreover, in his understanding, law performs a relative act that relates human reason to something else, that is ultimately to God’s *ratio*, and penultimately to the forms of things, namely the created *ordo*.

These indicate a realist framework of mereological order, yet it has to be clearly stated here that, as a Christian, Junius related all natural, mereological, and causal orders to *God*. To begin with, Aquinas argued that “God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being.... Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government.”¹⁰⁵ He elaborated on this point by stating that:

Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a moveable thing, caused by the moving principle ... And every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments.¹⁰⁶

In this short paragraph, it is evident that mereology, agency, and causality were all intertwined in Aquinas’s conception of divine government. Even under the Divine governor, whose being is the primary cause of all moved and movable things and whose governance uses various creaturely means and actions, some things are governed “according to their nature.” Thus this “nature” is the subject of human action but also the object of divine action, as God “works in

104. Aristotle, *Categories*, 11. He also wrote: “We call *relatives* all such things as are said to be just what they are, *of* or *than* other things, or in some other way *in relation to* something else [italics retained from the translation].” Idem, *Categories*, 10.

105. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 103, a. 5.

106. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 103, a. 5, arg. 2.

them interiorly.”¹⁰⁷ In short, for Aquinas, the natural operation—and orientation—of created things does not obliterate the activity of God in them; rather, God governs them through establishing and preserving their causal relations to orient their “determinate forms” to himself, such that it can be manifest via human reason that the ultimate efficient cause and the ultimate final cause of all things may be found in God.¹⁰⁸ Aquinas thus concluded, “God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things.”¹⁰⁹

In a similar way to Aquinas, Junius used the categories of efficient and final causes to explain his definition of law and also his understanding of the created order. In *De politiae Mosis observatione* he stated that the efficient cause of law is the agent who is “established by the one who has care of the community,”¹¹⁰ while its final cause is “the common good.”¹¹¹ In *De theologia vera*, Junius gave a fuller explanation of causality with these remarks:

Although we have set out accurately in our definition, by the sure and accessible order of nature, all the causes that are necessary for a proper definition of our theology stated absolutely, nevertheless it was helpful for sound instruction to speak about the internal and essential causes of theology before dealing with those that are outside it or joined with it extrinsically. We call internal those causes that establish the essence of that item which is under discussion. Material and formal causes belong to this class in all instances. But external causes, whatever they may be, attach like something external to the item once it is established. They do this either for the generation of that thing, as an efficient cause, or for its function and completion, as a final cause.¹¹²

According to this fourfold causal scheme, formal and material causes were categorized as “internal and essential causes” as the form and matter of a created thing constitute its essence, while efficient and final causes were categorized as “external” causes that actualize the

107. Aquinas also argued that “Therefore [God] is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of the movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately.” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 105, a. 5.

108. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 44, a. 4.

109. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 44, a. 4.

110. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (pp. 344); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 40.

111. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (pp. 344); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 40.

112. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (p. 78); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 177.

generation, function, and completion of the thing. In short, the fourfold causal movements were to Junius the dimensions of the created reality that explain the generation, constitution, function, and completion of creation, which comprehensively explain a thing's existence from its origin toward its goal. These different layers of causal forces generate certain effects, either singular or manifold, as it is possible in a created realm that a singular and common effect can be generated even "when several causes are functioning in coordination."¹¹³

Yet, Junius was consistently emphatic that natural causes only generate natural effects, never supernatural effects—the supernatural effects would require supernatural causes, which is why Junius, like Aquinas, saw the necessity of grace in attaining the supernatural good.¹¹⁴ Junius also argued that "God Himself alone, not however any created thing, is the efficient cause of that disposition which we call theology."¹¹⁵ This had a direct implication on divine revelation: "because God alone is true light and subsists through *Himself* ... it would be absurd if anyone should believe that the light which arises from that One who is Himself very light should fall upon created things from some other source [emphasis retained from translation]."¹¹⁶ In other words, God is the one who knows himself in himself and who revealed his self-knowledge to creatures by himself, and therefore all the supernatural truths, ends, and goods originate from and terminate in God alone. These are not merely philosophical claims;

113. "Whenever causes of things that are effected are explained in order (and order must be observed among several things causing effects simultaneously), it is always necessary that the rationale for that cause which is the principal one be principally considered, as well as what are the causes, finally, that are contributing to one effect. But because it generally happens in the case of created things that, when several causes are functioning in coordination, there are singular causes (as they are called) and these function to the best of their ability in the common effect, then on the contrary those causes which alone are sufficient in and of themselves and productive of effects are called absolute." Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 29 (p. 86); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 197.

114. "Therefore although these divine things cannot be contained by us nor by nature and the entirety of nature, certainly the efficient cause of theology should be sought neither in man, nor in any created thing, nor even in this whole universe. For why seek for it in something of that kind where it neither is nor ever can be present by an internal force nor by some ability of that thing? Its genus is supernatural; therefore, it cannot proceed from a natural cause, nor even from nature itself." Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 29 (p. 86); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 196.

115. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 8 (pp. 53–54); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 114.

116. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 8 (pp. 53–54); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 114–15.

the critical thing to note here is that these comments about the origin and by extension the goal of created order were the fruits of Junius's contemplations, reflections, and explications of biblical passages, such as Romans 11:36: "For from Him and through and in Himself also are all things, the apostle says: to Him be glory forever. Amen (Rom. 11:36)."¹¹⁷

These considerations shed light on Junius's understanding of "perfection." At the outset, he conceived that God is perfect not merely because he has no limitations, but also because to him "nothing could be added": God is perfect because there cannot be any additions or changes in him.¹¹⁸ From this Junius went on to describe two kinds of created perfection, which were distinguished into absolute and comparative kinds. The absolute perfection of a created thing refers to its state in which "nothing more may be desired that belongs to constituting the nature of a thing as just and full."¹¹⁹ In short, the absolute perfection here is the full possession of that which a thing desires. The comparative perfection, on the other hand, is a state of a thing that "tends by certain degrees to that absolute perfection" according to "the order of nature."¹²⁰ Thus a thing's motional fullness (i.e., full actualization) goes in tandem with its mereological completeness (i.e., complete union), as it can be grasped in Junius's statement that "the rationale for one part of a thing separately established by itself is imperfect until it is called back to the rationale of the whole of which it is a part."¹²¹ In fact, in commenting on the perfection of archetypal theology, he asserted that perfection itself is that which is devoid of "all development or growth, and change."¹²²

Consequently Junius's construal of the perfection of created nature is aligned with the fullness of its natural and mereological acts, which, not surprisingly, was how Aquinas formulated the concept—Aquinas claimed long before Junius that "a thing is perfect in

117. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 8 (pp. 53–54); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 115.

118. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 63.

119. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 63.

120. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 63.

121. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (p. 344); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 41.

122. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (pp. 52–53); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 110.

proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.”¹²³ Moreover, on the mereological dimension of creaturely perfection and the role of law in such framework, Aquinas asserted that “since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness.”¹²⁴ In this light Michael Baur was correct in pointing out that “Aquinas’s account of law as an ordering of reason for the common good of a community depends on the mereology (i.e., his theory of parthood relations, including the relations of parts to parts and parts to wholes), and so a fuller exploration of his account of law might well begin with an examination of parts, wholes, and the common good in his thought.”¹²⁵ Even in Junius’s understanding, it is clear that there is a unity of order intrinsic to creation, the unity characterized by mereological relations, teleological orientations, and causal motions—not only to other creaturely things, but also to their creator, God himself. Therefore he argued that God is “the sole and perfect author and accomplisher” of human perfection and insisted, with a rhetorical force, “if perfection is not in God and from God, then we must confess that it exists nowhere.”¹²⁶

It is also imperative to recognize the fact that Junius’s conception of the perfection of human nature that occurs through actions and motions—whether by God’s or human’s—hinges on *truth*, understood in both ontological and epistemological senses. He mentioned that “the

123. As pointed out by David Svoboda, Aquinas’s mereology is inseparable from his views on potency and actuality, which together form the idea of *perfection*. See David Svoboda, “Aquinas on Real Relation,” *Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica*, vol. 6, no. 1 (2016): 152. See also idem, “Thomas Aquinas on Whole and Part,” *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review*, vol. 76, no. 2 (2012): 273–304; Desmond Paul Henry, *Medieval Mereology* (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 1991); Thomas M. Ward, “Relations Without Forms: Some Consequences of Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Relations,” *Vivarium*, no. 48 (2010): 279–301; Andrew Arlig, “Is There a Medieval Mereology?” in *Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500*, ed. Margaret Cameron and John Marenbon (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 160–90; idem, “Parts, Whole and Identity,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John Marenbon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

124. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 90, a. 2, co.

125. Michael Baur, “Law and Natural Law,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 238.

126. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 29 (p. 87); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 199.

old authors” were correct in declaring that *truth* (*veritas*) is convertible to *being* (*ens*): “whatever exists, by the very fact that it exists, is true”; and also, “whatever is true exists by the very fact that it is true.”¹²⁷ These two metaphysical propositions concerning existence, Junius argued, are so coherent and interlinked that they both need to be applied to all existing beings.¹²⁸ Nonetheless, Junius clarified that truth is distinguishable, as the truth existing *in intellectu* is truth insofar as it refers and signifies truth, whereas the truth existing *in res* is the actual thing existing objectively in the world.¹²⁹ He thus provided this succinct summary: “the underlying structure of the things which exist is twofold: for some exist *in re*, others *in intellectu*.”¹³⁰ In terms of the priority and hierarchy of significance, Junius believed that the truth *in res* is more important than the truth *in intellectu*, as “universals are more valuable than those that are singular, and forms that have been abstracted and purged from matter are more valuable than those things that are bound by matter.”¹³¹

Junius then applied these categories to the Being of God as Truth, and argued that “divine truth exists in two modalities”: first, infinitely in God’s *ratio*, and secondly, finitely by God’s *revelatio*.¹³² This means that, because whatever is of God and from God are “disposed toward God,” the order in creation is established toward that which is the transcendent and true,

127. “Sanctify them in your truth: your word is truth” (John 17:17). But because the term truth, which is popularly talked about in a careless fashion, is not really so much understood with the mind as it is bandied about in everyone’s mouth, we will now provide a clear statement of it in a few words. The older authors, therefore, declared very well that the truth is translated and likened to Being (as they call it), that is, with that which exists. For whatever exists, by the very fact that it exists, is true. And on the other hand, whatever is true exists by the very fact that it is true.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 25 (pp. 80–81); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 184.

128. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 25 (pp. 80–81); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 184. See also Richard A. Muller, s.v. “*veritas*,” *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally From Protestant Scholastic Theology*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), 389–90. Antonie Vos also argued that the convertibility of *ens* with oneness, truth, and goodness was also affirmed by Scotus. See Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus*, 291.

129. “... if we say that anything exists, we are contemplating it *in re*; but if we assert that it is true, we are contemplating that which exists *in intellectu*.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 25 (pp. 80–81); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 184.

130. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 25 (pp. 80–81); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 184.

131. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 25 (pp. 81–82); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 185.

132. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 25 (pp. 81–82); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 185.

God himself.¹³³ “[God] is the universal principle, pattern, and goal of all those things which have existed up to this point,” Junius argued, and “He is infinite in Himself and gives testimony in all things to His own infinite nature by the most complete demonstrations of His essence, His power, and His works both common and particular.”¹³⁴ Furthermore, Junius clearly believed that in God one finds not only the ultimate Truth or Being, but also the ultimate Good, as he saw God as “the principle of all that is good in the universe.”¹³⁵ Junius thus believed that *veritas* and *bonitas* are also convertible, and that is why moral perfection is profoundly related to epistemological actions in Junius’s thought—knowing truth is the good of human soul, and pursuing *veritas* as *bonitas* is the inbuilt structure of human nature. On the other hand, he insisted that divine truth possess three attributes: holiness, justice, and perfection.¹³⁶ The rationale is simple in that divine truth reflects God “who is Himself holiness, justice, and perfection.”¹³⁷ In addition to these, Junius argued that the way in which God delivers this good, or the truth, is by “λόγος προφορικός,” or what he termed “the enunciative discourse of God.”¹³⁸ Thus the moral life in Junius’s thought is executed in an intelligible world, conformed to an intelligible order, and guided by an intelligible discourse, the spiritual word of God.

Again, these remarks are well aligned with Aquinas’s account of the convertibility of truth with being, as he argued that “as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.”¹³⁹ Further, he argued that “truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth.”¹⁴⁰ The truth in God’s intellect (*in intellectu*) precedes the truth in

133. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 5 (p. 49); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 102.

134. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (pp. 74–75); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 170.

135. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 2 (p. 46); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 93.

136. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 26 (p. 82); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 187.

137. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 26 (p. 83); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 189.

138. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (p. 87); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 199. This idea of enunciation has been articulated by Aquinas as well, as he remarked that “enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech”: The truth of enunciation in God’s intellect is truth itself, whereas the truth in God’s speech is called “the enunciable truth.” See Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 16, a. 7, co.

139. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 16, a. 3, co.

140. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 16, a. 2, co.

reality (*in res*) in the ontological order, but the truth in reality (*in res*) precedes the human intellect (*in intellectu*) in the epistemological order: “since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect.”¹⁴¹ In short, “Truth is the equation of thought and thing.”¹⁴²

Another point to note here is that Aquinas affirmed that there is a fourfold relation between *ordo* and *ratio* in creation.¹⁴³ This deserves to be mentioned in full:

There is one order that reason does not establish but only beholds, such is the order of things in nature. There is a second order that reason establishes in its own act of consideration, for example, when it arranges its concepts among themselves, and the signs of concepts as well, because words express the meanings of the concepts. There is a third order that reason in deliberating establishes in the operation of the will. There is a fourth order that reason in planning establishes in the external things which it causes, such as a chest and a house.¹⁴⁴

To summarize, in Aquinas’s thought, human reason first recognizes or perceives the external order in nature; secondly, it arranges concepts as well as the signs of concepts about that very order internally in the mind; thirdly, it affects the operation of the will; lastly, it generates a formal cause in external things and brings about change in reality. This fourfold relationship between *ordo* and *ratio* are critical to understanding the operative relationship between things *in re* and things *in intellectu*, as in Aquinas’s thought the external *ordo* can be perceived and preserved by the proper operation of the internal *ratio*, the human reason.

141. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 16, a. 1, co. See also: “Now we have said (1) that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known.” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 16, a. 6, co.

142. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 16, a. 1, co.

143. Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, 1–2.

144. Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, 1–2.

In short, Aquinas believed that “[t]he mode of cognition in every cognitive being follows the mode of that being’s nature.”¹⁴⁵ At one level, this means that the state of nature determines the mode of cognition, as that which transcends nature cannot be known in the state of ungraced nature; thus “man must receive, over and above his natural knowledge, a knowledge surpassing his natural reason.”¹⁴⁶ At another level, because of the hylomorphic nature of the human mind, the mode of cognition for all human beings takes particular and sensible things as the starting point in the order of knowing: “primary things cannot be understood by anything anterior to them,” Aquinas argued, “but by something consequent, as causes are understood through their proper effects.”¹⁴⁷ These accounts of ontology and epistemology are surely contrary to the nominalist tradition,¹⁴⁸ and these distinctively Thomistic—not merely Aristotelian—accounts of the relationship between *ordo* and *ratio*, as well as the relationship between *veritas* and *bonitas*, were the philosophical underpinnings in Junius’s moral thought. Therefore these ideas reveal that the structure of reality in Junius’s thought is characterized by a web of casual, mereological, and motional interactions between divine *actio* and human *ratio* in a stable *ordo*.

2.4 Nature and Grace: The Principle, Power, and Pathway of Human Action

Another point to note is that Junius, in a Thomistic way, embraced the two-tier distinction of nature and grace as fundamental realities that determine the principle, power, and pathway of human action. The distinction between nature and grace is so pervasive in Junius’s theology that, without understanding their difference and interaction, the basic structure of human action

145. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles, Books III–IV*, trans. Laurence Shapcote (Green Bay, WI: The Aquinas Institute, 2018), 3, c. 152.

146. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 152.

147. Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, 4.

148. On the nominalist constructs of ontology and epistemology, see for example Heiko A. Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2000), 57–67.

in his thought cannot be adequately presented.¹⁴⁹ He insisted in *De theologia vera* that the efficient cause of natural theology is neither skill nor chance, but nature, which he regarded as “the principle and cause of motion.”¹⁵⁰ Human actions are performed as “[n]ature resolutely places this one end before itself; will selects it in a mutable fashion.”¹⁵¹ Junius also argued that, by virtue of God’s creative design, human nature always pursues its own good and avoids the contrary.¹⁵² Then he argued this: “the natural order of that seeking has been composed in such a way that individuals seek their own good as it is closest and the common good as highest (in which the common good of individuals consists).”¹⁵³ This implies that human nature has the natural orientation to value the primary and ultimate end higher than the secondary and penultimate ends; this axiological conviction is naturally knowable, in other words, that “the ends of things are more valuable in proportion to the value of the objects toward which, as toward a proper end, one properly aims—especially since the certainty of the end corresponds to its value.”¹⁵⁴

In light of this, Junius argued that the good that ultimately perfects a human person is twofold. First, the common good, by which he meant God’s glory.¹⁵⁵ Second, in this common good the individual good can be found, as human beings are “to be made glorious in the glory

149. At the very least, Junius argued that: “Thesis 14: The mode, moreover, of communicating this theology is twofold, by nature and by grace. The former happens as an internal principle of communication. The latter, by an external principle of the first one. Thus it happens that the one theology is termed natural and the other supernatural.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 14 (p. 63); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 141.

150. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 15 (pp. 64–65); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 146.

151. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 31 (p. 89); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 206.

152. “We see that our nature, therefore, is always carried to such a point that it seeks its own good and flees the opposite.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 20 (pp. 70–71); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 159.

153. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 210–11.

154. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 32 (p. 90); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 207.

155. “Thus also God in His account of saving grace has demonstrated by the light of theology the common good and the individual good as consisting in the common good. The common good is God’s glory. Truly in this common good, our individual good is located, namely that we are to be made glorious in the glory of God and are to perceive all good as both from His glory and to His glory. So as the glory of God remains steadfast in this age and the one to come, and as it is the perpetual font of the good that comes to all created things, so also we must establish that the effect of that always active, supernatural cause is always present in our souls; that cause is most free and never hindered, and it will never perish by anyone’s action.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 211.

of God and are to perceive all good as both from His glory and to His glory.”¹⁵⁶ In short, the individual good for human beings is glorification but the common good is God, the very glory itself.¹⁵⁷ God, however, does not come as *summum bonum* in a “naked mode,” since he is the ultimate good precisely as “Father.” It is because of this paternal conception and context of God’s relation with saints that he argued that eternal life is primarily the work of divine predestination but secondarily the work of divine adoption.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, precisely because God is Father and glorification is the consequence of adoption, Junius believed that “the proper pattern which befits His heirs” is righteousness: as God the Father is righteous their children will need to be formed in such a way that the attributes of glory and righteousness will be their proper features of existence—in other words, “[t]he proper pattern of heirs consists in true righteousness—a righteousness that love defines as a pure heart, a good conscience, and a faith unfeigned (1 Tim. 1:5).”¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, God distributes the “hereditary goods” to the saints, which are communicated not only in the future life but also in the present life, such that they can be “actually” righteous on earth even when they are not “fully” righteous.¹⁶⁰ These ideas about “glorifying” human nature in terms of making it “befitting” to heaven fits well with the notion that “it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature,”¹⁶¹ as Junius believed that God, in heaven, communicates to the saints the highest manner of their existence by conforming them to his own nature.¹⁶²

156. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 37 (p. 96); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 221.

157. “In this way, by striving toward the common good, that is, to God’s glory, we are led to the individual good, that is, our salvation. Why and how does this happen? Surely through the promises of grace and the revelation of theology.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 37 (p. 96); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 221.

158. Junius argued: “It is thus true that we are predestinated to life, but, accurately speaking, we are predestinated to adoption by the special grace of our heavenly Father.” See Jacob Arminius, *A Discussion on the Subject of Predestination, Between James Arminius, D.D., Minister at Amsterdam, and Franciscus Junius, D.D., Professor of Divinity at Leyden*, in *The Works of Arminius*, trans. James Nichols and W.R. Bagnall (Auburn and Buffalo, 1853), 3:13–14.

159. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 211–12.

160. “Truly those hereditary goods indeed exist in the life to come, but nevertheless they are actually communicated already in this present life and are perceived through faith until we attain full possession of them in the future life.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 212.

161. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 1, a. 1, co.

162. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 210–12.

This raises a question as to whether that heavenly righteousness is attainable by nature's power alone. At one level Junius shared Aquinas's view that grace was necessary even prior to the fall. Aquinas claimed that both in the state of integrity and depravity "human nature needs the help of God as First Mover."¹⁶³ In the prelapsarian state, he claimed, human nature could do "the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, as the good of infused virtue."¹⁶⁴ Upon rebellion, however, human being "falls short of what he could do by his nature," and thus "cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing."¹⁶⁵ Thus the corrupted nature requires a twofold function of supernatural grace—"in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious."¹⁶⁶ Junius similarly contended that "even in the actual unspoiled human nature, theology could not have been perfected according to the perfection of human nature taken in itself, but that theology was to be perfected by God's supernatural grace, or rather to be abolished, as it were, by a perfection that would enter into its place."¹⁶⁷ In short, "in man, even before the Fall, intellect could not raise itself by transcending the natural limits to supernatural knowledge, nor could the will apprehend those things, except supported and sustained by supernatural help."¹⁶⁸

Yet Adam was originally created in righteousness and holiness; Junius clearly claimed that Adam possessed the "innate rectitude," and law and obedience were required to conserve that righteousness already given to him.¹⁶⁹ He further claimed that "to this particular principle

163. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 109, a. 2, co.

164. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 109, a. 2, co.

165. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 109, a. 2, co.

166. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 109, a. 2, co.

167. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 17 (p. 68); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 154.

168. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio, ante & post lapsum*, thesis 33. Translations of Junius's *De libero hominis arbitrio* come from Willem J. van Asselt, J. Martin Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde, eds., *Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010), 10.

169. "Therefore, being bound to the conservation of this innate rectitude by no necessity except of law and obedience, he squandered it by his own inner principle and most freely, when by consuming the fruit of the forbidden tree he declined from the norm of life prescribed to him. So, by using it in a bad way, 'he ruined

of his nature was added (*superadditus*) a singular principle of grace for Adam, by which his intellectual will was acting, singularly moved, above its natural mode.”¹⁷⁰ Therefore the “norm of life” in the Garden was to be lived out by both natural and supernatural principles, yet once Adam disobeyed, “the image of God was totally obliterated and was followed and replaced by an incredible disorder and corruption of human nature.”¹⁷¹ Accordingly the moral consequence of the fall was, on the one hand, that “the natural gifts have been corrupted and the supernatural ones lost,”¹⁷² and on the other, that “all proper order and suitable relationship to one another” is distorted.¹⁷³ Therefore Junius argued that, for the fallen nature, the threefold act of supernatural grace became necessary in attaining the required righteousness: justification, sanctification, and conversion.¹⁷⁴

Elsewhere in *De theologia vera*, Junius distinguished two kinds of grace: natural and supernatural. This deserves a full reference:

Now in fact the shared principle of nature equally as of grace is God, the author of all good in the universe, whether that good exists according to nature or above it. But because it seemed gracious to the Lord at the very moment of creation to bestow on some of his own creatures a certain natural theology and to implant the principles of it in their understanding, then certainly if we should ignore this grace, although it is natural, we will be ungrateful to God. And yet it is fitting that we should remember that this grace, by the very fact that it is natural, is opposed to that grace of revelation from which our theology of revelation is named. From this shared principle that internal and unique principle that we call the image of God has been implanted by nature. Adam, formed according to that image in this life, by a proper and internal impulse looked to God as his pattern. God had implanted the shared principle of that impulse in Adam’s unique nature and in the shared nature of all human beings. It is

both himself and his choice’ (as we say with Augustine in his *Enchiridion ad Laurentium*, cap. 30).” Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 38; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 104.

170. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 34; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 103.

171. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 39; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 104.

172. “Moreover, what the orthodox fathers and the scholastics who followed their steps handed down very well was commonly known: namely that the natural gifts have been corrupted and the supernatural ones lost. So from this statement we establish that supernatural theology, which by the sin of man had been, as it were, rejected and most undeservedly spurned, retreated from here to the heavens; and natural theology, as all the other things which arise from nature, was corrupted.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 18 (p. 69); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 155.

173. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 18 (p. 69); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 156.

174. By “conversion” Junius meant “the action emanating from the new creature, both of the mind in acknowledging and of the will in embracing God in Christ.” While justification and sanctification are completely and exclusively God’s work, he argued that in conversion the regenerate people “cooperate with the Spirit as principal agent, and acted upon by the Spirit we start acting.” See Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, theses 53–56; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 106.

fitting, moreover, that the second mode of communicating theology always corresponds to this internal principle established in the nature of the human person (which we call natural grace). This mode the orthodox fathers called supernatural grace, because the natural principle was intact in us at that time, when it was attached to the supernatural and external principle. But when first it turned itself away from that principle, it was corrupted and most wretched. As a consequence of this, it happened that a duplex theology is established analogically: one of which is called natural and the other supernatural.¹⁷⁵

Here, Junius insisted that Adam received both kinds of grace—natural grace as an implantation of natural principles and supernatural grace as an infusion of extrinsic principles.¹⁷⁶ The key reason why supernatural grace was necessary even prior to the fall was simply that nature did not have the *power* to perceive divine truths in a full, complete sense. It is for that reason Junius contended that “by supernatural virtue” human beings may be “translated to that blessed condition through grace.”¹⁷⁷

Accordingly, the moral good or end of human action pertained to “true righteousness.”¹⁷⁸ Yet Junius was clear here: the progression from the partial possession all the way to the complete possession of righteousness is God’s work. “[T]here can be no saving means of offering and obtaining this cause other than the revelation of that divine wisdom, which is not the wisdom of this age, nor of the princes of this age who are perishing; rather, it is the wisdom of God in a mystery, that hidden wisdom which God had determined for our glory before all ages, and which no prince of this age recognized, but God alone revealed by His Spirit (1 Cor. 2:7–8).”¹⁷⁹ To Junius it is the divine wisdom that reveals and communicates the righteousness that is given to the “heirs of the coming heavenly Kingdom,” and thus the supernatural truths, goods, and ends are, again, convertible and interlocked in his moral

175. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 14 (pp. 63–64); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 142–43.

176. For example: “These principles, infused into us in this life by grace, are watered and grow by that same power, until by the glorious vision and communion of God, we acquire in the heavens all fullness. These are the principles or seeds, therefore, the argument of that theology which we call the theology of revelation.”

Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 13 (pp. 61–62); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 136.

177. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 17 (p. 68); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 154.

178. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 37 (pp. 95–96); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 220.

179. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (p. 92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 212.

thought.¹⁸⁰ Therefore in Junius's theology, God is the universal good, salvation is the particular good, and righteousness is the moral good of human action, and all of these goods can be gained through supernatural truths. In other words, there is a triadic relationship that heavenly righteousness has with communication, perception, and possession in Junius's account: human persons can possess the supernatural moral goods by perceiving and receiving what God has communicated through his word.

A few remarks need to be mentioned in relation to the new pathway or trajectory inaugurated by grace. Firstly, Junius stated that "God imitates the order of nature," by which he meant that supernatural grace uses the pattern and power of rational operation that is intrinsic to human nature for its perfection.¹⁸¹ He argued:

[J]ust as principles are present in our nature which, by the advance of time and development of reason, rise up to conclusions and determinations of proper knowledge according to the mode of human nature, so also in the work of grace, God imitates the order of nature as He begins from the principles of grace and that wisdom. These principles, infused into us in this life by grace, are watered and grow by that same power, until by the glorious vision and communion of God, we acquire in the heavens all fullness.¹⁸²

This implies that the pattern of natural reasoning has been established *prior to* the giving of supernatural grace, which means, at least in terms of logical order, the establishment of natural order preceded the establishment of supernatural order.¹⁸³ The mode of giving supernatural grace to nature is, Junius stated, *infusion*, a term that is strikingly redolent of Aquinas's conception of the mode of communicating grace.¹⁸⁴ Junius claimed that by infusing supernatural principles in nature, God, through "the process of a middle kind of reasoning" of human mind, would lead them to supernatural conclusions and determinations until "the glorious vision and communion of God."¹⁸⁵ Thus, as grace "imitates" or "corresponds to"

180. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (p. 92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 212.

181. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 13 (pp. 61–62); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 136.

182. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 13 (pp. 61–62); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 136.

183. This topic will be treated more fully in chapter 5.

184. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 13 (pp. 61–62); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 136.

185. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 13 (pp. 61–62); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 136.

nature, the way God supernaturally leads human reason toward its proper end does not abolish the established rational pattern, but precisely uses that pattern of ratiocination, to attain the “conclusions and determinations conducive to heavenly knowledge.”¹⁸⁶ Human reason understood in this way has the capacity of making compositions, divisions, conclusions, and determinations, and all these distinct acts form a proper reasoning process toward truth and all of them are used in divine government, whether for natural or supernatural ends.¹⁸⁷

Secondly, Junius shared the Thomistic maxim that “nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength.”¹⁸⁸ Junius believed that “everybody undergoes internal changes” and everyone is “subject to the laws of change.”¹⁸⁹ He also believed that, if the movements occurring inherently in nature persist, nature itself would be led toward its diminishment and dissolution; but by the movements occurring by supernatural grace it can be led toward its advancement and perfection.¹⁹⁰ In other terms, the two different trajectories or pathways of nature occur because of this very thing: the limitation of nature’s *power*. Nature cannot attain its ultimate perfection by its power alone because the human subject of action “in its own nature cannot contain something perfect or even perfectly in its actuation, or its potentiality, or in any disposition to potentiality.”¹⁹¹ This is consistent with Aquinas’s points that “man cannot attain to his last end by his own operation, which surpasses the faculty of his natural powers, unless his operation be enabled by the divine power to bring him to it.”¹⁹²

186. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (pp. 74–77); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 172.

187. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 8 (pp. 53–54); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 113.

188. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 109, a. 3, ad 2.

189. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 36 (pp. 94–95); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 218–19.

190. “As we must consider, moreover, the instance of an individual nature heading toward its own diminishment and dissolution, so in contrast we must contemplate the instance of a grace that increases in the servants of God and all the righteous and happily rises up to its own perfection: because the decrease of the former is the increase of the latter.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 37 (pp. 95–96); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 220.

191. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 34 (p. 93); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 215.

192. “Everything obtains its last end by its own operation. Now, an operation derives its efficacy from the operating principle: hence, by the action of the seed, something is produced in a definite species through the efficacy preexisting in the seed. Therefore, man cannot attain to his last end by his own operation, which surpasses the faculty of his natural powers, unless his operation be enabled by the divine power to bring him to it.” Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 147.

Junius also stated, similar to Aquinas’s point made in his *Summa*, that “if any of the truth about God is searched out through reason, it is known only by a few, and after a long time, and comes to man with an admixture of multiple errors.”¹⁹³ Thus Junius held the view that nature cannot, by its power alone, gain “the perfection that is added by grace,” for it has no power of inclination, relation, or disposition to the perfection that can only be accomplished by “heavenly grace.”¹⁹⁴ Junius was clear here—human nature has neither the active nor the passive potency to attain heavenly perfection by itself, and it completely lacks power to move itself toward that heavenward trajectory.¹⁹⁵ Nature possesses, in other words, neither the aptitude nor the ability to perceive, receive, and attain the order of grace that exceeds nature, and more importantly it does not possess the heavenly righteousness that is necessary for perfection.¹⁹⁶

To summarize these points then: Junius clearly believed that God uses the cognitive power of nature to lead humans toward a heavenward trajectory, but its power is insufficient to cause such a trajectorial change. Rather, it is the power coming directly from the Spirit of God that leads human nature toward God himself and it is only “the power and efficacy of grace” that enables and accomplishes its advancement toward perfection.¹⁹⁷ Junius asserted:

193. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 16 (pp. 66–67); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 150. This point closely resembles Aquinas’s comments in the very first part of his *Summa theologiae* that “it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors.” Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 1, a. 1.

194. “[W]e claim that this natural theology *is not even able, in and of itself, to contain the perfection that is added by grace*. That is, it possesses no inclination in and of itself by its nature or character, or ordered relation, or disposition (as they say) by which it might receive that perfection which is poured out by heavenly grace [emphasis from the translation].” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 19 (p. 70); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 157.

195. “Nevertheless, if you look to the enjoyment and perception of those heavenly and spiritual gifts that God communicates with men by His special revelation, then this theology possesses no potency that is passive *per se*, nor receptive, nor (as the scholastics call it) *obediential*; nor, finally, is there a disposition which natural theology shares with supernatural theology [emphasis from the translation].” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 19 (p. 70); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 157–8. The best treatment of how different kinds of potency relate to perfection in the Thomistic tradition is Lawrence Feingold’s work. See Lawrence Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters*, 2nd ed. (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2010).

196. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 16 (pp. 66–67); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 150–51.

197. “[T]he Spirit of God claims all the parts for itself entirely, so that it is with all justice called supernatural.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, theses 19 & 37 (pp. 70 & 96); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 158 & 220.

“Now of principles, and reasonings, and the conclusions that come from [supernatural grace], and of experience, and actions, and all judgments, of the whole of reason that extends to all things, this is the highest perfection: most perfectly adjudicating and most wisely arranging whatsoever things exist by intelligence, reason, and knowledge.”¹⁹⁸ It is because of this eschatological and moral conception of grace that Junius saw *supernaturalis theologia* not so much as *scientia* but as *sapientia*—“[I]t includes the intellection of first principles, the knowledge of conclusions and ends, and it is the most beneficial skill of our work, by which we strive toward God.”¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, it is also this conception of the power and efficacy of grace that his account should be distinguished from Aquinas’s—grace does not merely communicate the power of perfection to nature, but also leads the movements of nature toward its full actualization. He stated: “[God] claims its rising, progress, and completion entirely for Himself, so that each person who boasts may boast in the Lord (1 Cor. 1:31).”²⁰⁰ Thus, in this moral framework, the grace of the Triune God is clearly designated as the singular cause of both potency and actuality of moral perfection, and Junius had no room for the concept of merit that earns any part of that eschatological perfection by natural power alone.²⁰¹

In addition to these points, Junius believed that the rational ordering that grace commences and consummates pertains to “God,” such that human reason by grace can know God himself and God’s relation to creatures.²⁰² In explaining this Junius appealed to Augustine’s *frui* and *uti* distinction found in his *De doctrina christiana* and affirmed that supernatural wisdom reveals God as someone whom humans should enjoy (*frui*), but it also reveals created things as those that should be used with respect to God (*uti*).²⁰³ This means that understanding God’s nature and will, which Junius called the “twofold order” of supernatural

198. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 5 (pp. 48–49); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 101.

199. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 5 (p. 49); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 102.

200. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 10 (p. 55); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 118.

201. Junius, *De theologia vera*, theses 37 (p. 96); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 221.

202. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (pp. 78–79); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 178.

203. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (p. 79); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 179.

knowledge, involves knowing God's nature either in the unity of his essence or in the distinction of his persons, and also knowing God's will, which explains God's relation to all created things, to human beings, and to his church.²⁰⁴ This idea of truly, certainly, and clearly knowing God's relation to the world and vice-versa is something unavailable to an ungraced nature, notwithstanding its Godward-orientation. By the natural principles endowed in the mind the human subject can know that God is to be worshipped, as, by virtue of the image of God, there is "a shared intuition concerning God."²⁰⁵ Yet they do not inwardly testify to the fact that "God is in relationship with the human race from the beginning"—they, at best, enable an ungraced nature to perceive the effects of God's acts in creation, but never the intention and goal of the order between God and creation. This means that grace is necessary to know the full scope of the causal, mereological, motional, and teleological order between God and creation; only by grace can a human being truly know how the world is created by God and for God.²⁰⁶ Through grace one can perceive the truth that God is "the universal principle, pattern, and goal of all those things which have existed up to this point, or are at the present time, or ever shall be."²⁰⁷ Therefore, by infusing supernatural principles, God supernaturally leads human beings to their supernatural ends, and the power of such "leading" is from God alone—the ultimate *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* of human life is none other than God himself.²⁰⁸

The idea of *law* is thus to be contextualized against the backdrop of the relation that exists between God and creation. In the Scriptures, Junius insisted, three things are known by grace: first, creation's relation to God; secondly, God's work in creation; thirdly, the law that

204. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (p. 79); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 179.

205. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 16 (pp. 66–67); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 149.

206. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–50); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 49–54.

207. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (p. 75); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 170.

208. "The supernatural principle acting in us, together with its supernatural leading that moves us, is so effective that by its strength alone—not by any faculty of our nature—we may be transmitted to that supernatural end, no differently than a javelin is moved and transmitted to its proposed target by a javelin thrower." Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 349–50); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 53.

regulates the relations.²⁰⁹ More specifically, the Scriptural knowledge reveals that creation relates to God by necessity, but God relates to them by “the freedom of His own will.”²¹⁰ This point is seen in Aquinas’s *Summa* as well, as he also argued that “there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God.”²¹¹ Thus, such relations between God and creation can be observed by “the torch of divine theology,” for it teaches the diversity in created things along with their unity, as the diverse things are shown to be united toward God, their universal cause.²¹² In this broad framework Junius stated that “the moral precepts [in the Mosaic law] most perfectly taught the most perfect truth of morals that pursue the proper duties toward God and human beings.”²¹³ Junius here distinguished the order of morals and the order of faith as two distinguishable layers of supernatural order through which God-human relations ought to function. Thus the order that grace inaugurates in nature is for the “communion and possession of heavenly life,” which culminates in the “glorious vision and communion of God.”²¹⁴

In short, in Junius’s account, the mode of action is determined by the power of nature. For instance, human nature cannot exist in heaven unless its power befits the mode of existence required in heaven. It is critical therefore to bear in mind what Junius stated in his discussion of *ectypa theologia*, namely that “[a]s the righteous await this perfection, indeed, they grow up through their advances into the perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the full-grown Christ, and they rise up to the perfect vision of Him (Eph. 4:13).”²¹⁵ This means that Junius’s

209. “Now with regard to the second topic concerning those things that are ordered with respect to God, there are more or less three relevant considerations set forth in the sacred Scriptures. I mean, of course, (1) the nature of reality by which it is ordered with respect to God; (2) God’s work in them; and (3) the law that has been assigned to them by God.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (pp. 78–79); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 179.

210. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (pp. 78–79); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 180.

211. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 28, a. 1, ad 3.

212. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (pp. 78–79); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 180.

213. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 331–32); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 8.

214. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (p. 343); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 38. See also Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 136.

215. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 13 (pp. 62–63); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 138–9.

moral thought is presented with a profound consideration of the fact that a finite, mutable, and earthly human nature advances to its perfection in the context of various causal, mereological, and spiritual movements; yet the actual trajectorial transition to the pathway of perfection requires supernatural grace, because grace enables one to know God and his will, who is the “standard and most reliable end” of human action.²¹⁶

2.5 Intellect and Will: The Internal Order of Human Action

The third sub-thesis is that Junius’s conception of the internal order of human action, that is the order of interaction between intellect and will, is clearly aligned with an intellectualist, more specifically a Thomist, framework.²¹⁷ Here, it is worth stating again that Aquinas’s theory of law is formed as part of his explanation of *actus humanus*, a human action in distinction from *actus hominis* or an act of a human, and the theory of human action, as noted above, was placed in the context of divine government.²¹⁸ Against the background of this distinction, Aquinas asserted: “The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.”²¹⁹ This means that the government of human action occurs via two concurrent ways, the primary government done by God, and the secondary government done by human subjects.

First, in regard to God’s act upon human intellect, Aquinas claimed that:

[T]here is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the

216. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 27 (pp. 79–80); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 193.

217. It should be noted at the outset that recent historical discussions on the relationship between divine will and human choice demonstrated that, though voluntaristic emphases were certainly present, voluntarism as a consistent stream of thought was not a dominant feature of the Reformed tradition.

218. Aquinas makes the distinction between *action of a man* and *human action* in his *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 1, a. 1.

219. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 103, a. 5.

likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impress on him the likeness of the thing understood. Now God moves the created intellect in both ways.²²⁰

This indicates that, according to Aquinas, God has given two principles of intellectual operation in the human mind: first, the potency of understanding, and second, the actuality of understanding. The transition from potential to actual understanding occurs when God “impresses” on the person “the likeness of the thing understood,” and thus to Aquinas God moves or actualizes human intellect by providing certain conceptual content to it.

On the other hand, Aquinas offered two reasons as to how God is the ultimate governor of human will. Having defined will as “a rational appetite,”²²¹ he argued firstly that “the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone,” and secondly, that “the will is ordained to the universal good,” which referred to “God Himself, Who is the universal good.”²²² God, then, as the prime and universal mover of his creation, moves the human will by granting the intrinsic power to it *and* by shaping its directedness to the extrinsic good—God himself—because “without this universal motion, man cannot will anything.”²²³ According to Aquinas the will’s pursuit of and orientation toward the universal good is peculiar to rational creatures alone, as irrational animals are oriented only toward the particular goods according to their appetite.²²⁴ To move the *actus humanus*, therefore, human will must function in coordination with intellect, which grasps the universal end as the universal good.²²⁵ It is for

220. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 105, a. 3.

221. “The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i.1) that *the good is that which all desire* [italics original from the translation].” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 8, a. 1.

222. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 9, a. 6.

223. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 9, a. 6.

224. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 1, a. 2.

225. “[T]he object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end.” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 1, a. 3.

this reason that Aquinas stated, “[t]he movement of the will follows the movement of the intellect.”²²⁶

Upon establishing the point that it is ultimately God who governs human intellect and will, Aquinas provided two particularly relevant concepts to explicate the specific ways by which God governs rational creatures. The first is the idea of “command.” Aquinas argued that “command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the reason.”²²⁷ More elaborately speaking:

Now the reason can intimate or declare something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when one person says to another: *This is what you should do*. Sometimes, however, the reason intimates something to a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is said to someone: *Do this*.²²⁸

To Aquinas the acts of intimating or declaring are therefore rational acts that occur in the human mind, in indicative or imperative forms, and these rational acts are again linked to the divine acts of government.

The second concept is *law*. Law, in Aquinas’s framework, provides a specific content of commands, such that rational acts of intimation or declaration, the acts of providing obligatory indicatives and imperatives, may have the appropriate conceptual and cognizable content. To him “[i]t belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as stated above. Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.”²²⁹ Law is “something pertaining to reason” also because “it belongs to the reason to direct to an end, which is the first principle in all matters of action.”²³⁰ Furthermore, because law is something

226. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 10, a. 1. Tobias Hoffmann succinctly stated that according to Thomas “[e]very act of the will is informed by an act of the intellect, and the way in which one uses the intellect depends on the will. The activities of intellect and will penetrate each other, and ultimately it is the human person who moves him or herself to a choice by means of reason and will.” Tobias Hoffmann, “Intellectualism and Voluntarism,” in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, 1.416.

227. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 17, a. 1.

228. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 17, a. 1.

229. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 90, a. 1.

230. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 90, a. 1.

pertaining to reason and an end, “the law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness.”²³¹ In this sense, then, the universal end overlaps with the universal good, and thus human reason’s act of grasping the universal end is inseparably linked with the will’s act of pursuing the universal good. The law, therefore, is to be understood as an instrument of God’s government of human action, and through law God orients reasons of not merely individuals but also of particular communities toward a universal end, toward an immaterial good, by commanding or forbidding.

Tobias Hoffmann helpfully argued that for Aquinas “[r]eason moves the will by formal causality, ‘determining’ or ‘specifying’ the will’s act (desiring to study, choosing to take a walk) Conversely, the will moves reason by efficient causality to exercise its act (to think or not, to dwell on a consideration or not).”²³² In addition to this, Muller contended that “the question of the priority of one faculty over the other has to be determined not so much by the question of efficient as by the question of final causality.”²³³ This distinction is crucial not only in understanding why scholastics formulated in detail the roles of intellect and will in the order of action, but also in determining somebody as an “intellectualist” or a “voluntarist”: the categorization to a great degree hinges on whether “it is the intellect that apprehends the final vision of God as being and truth,” or whether it is the will that perfectly cleaves to “God as the highest good (*summum bonum*).”²³⁴ In other words, identifying the internal order between intellect and will was not merely an anthropological concern, but it involved theological (i.e.,

231. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 90, a. 2.

232. Hoffmann, “Intellectualism and Voluntarism,” 1416.

233. Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin*, 171.

234. Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin*, 162. For example, Thomas Williams argued that, for Aquinas, “the intellect is the *formal* cause of the will’s acts” but at the same time “the will moves the intellect as an *efficient* cause.” This is not entirely wrong; however, as Muller remarked, to determine Aquinas’s position the final cause of each move has to be examined as well. See Williams, “Human Freedom and Agency,” 203.

theology proper), soteriological, and eschatological concerns that involve profound causal considerations.²³⁵ Thus Calvin, even in attempting to avoid excessive speculations on this issue, still “held to a fundamentally Aristotelian faculty psychology, according to which the soul consists in the faculties of intellect and will and the ‘affections’ stand (ideally) in subordinate relation to the will.”²³⁶ The end result was what Muller called “a soteriological voluntarism” where the fundamental problem in sinful acts was postulated as acts of will and the solution to such acts was indicated as God’s grace.²³⁷ It is no surprise, then, that in Calvin’s thought the abstract issue of the relationship between intellect and will was “a necessary presupposition of major doctrinal formulations.”²³⁸

In his *De libero hominis arbitrio* Junius claimed that the faculties of intellect and will comprise “a singular principle” of human actions.²³⁹ It is by the operation of intellect and will that humans make free choices, and it is by their conjoined acts rational creatures freely move themselves.²⁴⁰ He provided a definition of free choice as “a natural potency of choosing or refusing good or evil by its own proper motion, without compulsion.”²⁴¹ Here, the natural power of choice is twofold, namely choosing or refusing; the object of volitional choice is also twofold, that which is good or evil. “The choice of the intellect,” Junius further argued, “is a

235. “In the medieval tradition, given this effective conjunction of intellect and will in the act of faith, the question of the priority of one faculty over the other has to be determined not so much by the question of efficient as by the question of final causality. Thus, in the intellectualist perspective of Thomas, although intellect and will conjoin in faith, it is ultimately the intellect made perfect in love, that rests upon God in the *visio Dei*. In the voluntarist perspective of Scotus, however, even though the intellect remains the subject of faith, the choice of the will is nobler—inasmuch as final blessedness is attained not in intellectual vision but in an act of will that identifies the highest good (*summum bonum*) as the proper and ultimate object of will (*summum volendum*).” Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin*, 171.

236. Muller, “Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy, and the Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism,” 93.

237. Calvin’s is “not a philosophical but a soteriological voluntarism that not only recognizes the necessity of grace to all good acts of the will but also recognizes that, in the soul’s present sinful condition, the will most certainly stands prior to the intellect.” Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin*, 166.

238. Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin*, 164.

239. “To both kind of creatures [angels and men] God has imparted the light of the intellect and the faculty of will, as a singular principle of their own actions in themselves, by which they are moved freely by themselves to their actions, and by means of a voluntary act.” Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 31; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 102

240. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 31. Cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 102.

241. Translation provided in Muller, *Divine Will and Human Choice*, 215. Cf. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 1.

mental act by which a mind-gifted nature distinguishes between intelligible objects and after deliberation judges which of those objects are true or false.”²⁴² On the other hand, the choice of the will “is likewise the act, by which the will either chooses, because it is good, or rejects, because it is bad, the things distinguished, judged and set before the will by the intellect.”²⁴³ What should be noticed in these remarks is that before the will performs the acts of election, it is the intellect that performs the acts of deliberation: the will without compulsion chooses or rejects that which is presented as true or false by the intellect.²⁴⁴ Thus by commenting on this line of reasoning, Muller argued that Junius’s view “comports with a Thomistic line of thought and rather pointedly counters a Scotist model.”²⁴⁵

Accordingly when Junius defined the eternal, natural, divine, and human laws as rational orderings, he was expressing Thomistic ideas.²⁴⁶ Like Aquinas Junius affirmed in *De theologia vera* the tight relation between God’s *reason* and human *reason* by arguing that God “endowed our minds with a divine reasoning process.”²⁴⁷ More specifically, Junius indicated a number of actions that reason can perform: reason deduces, compares, separates, joins, decides, forms, and orders all knowable things.²⁴⁸ In light of these capacities of reason, Junius insisted:

Therefore, let us call the matter of law *reason*, as the subject, and the whole work of reason is deposited in the distinction between the just and the unjust, which work intercedes between superiors that are in charge and inferiors beneath them. For even if the law, as it is an act, is properly attributed to the will (because acts are from the will), yet because an act here is ruled by reason which prevails over will, it is quite appropriate that this act is entirely attributed to reason as the master rather than to the will as its assistant. In fact, the form of that act is called an ordering because it is the

242. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 4; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 99

243. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 5; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 99.

244. Junius also argued in his thesis 3: “Although the term ‘choice’ is determined first of all by its forensic use (as we have said), later on they began to derive other uses from that use and began to apply it to all those things, which can relate to a deliberation or, especially, to an election based on a deliberation. With respect to the former it is usually ascribed to the intellect, but in regard to the latter it refers to the will.” Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 3; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 99.

245. Muller, *Divine Will and Human Choice*, 218.

246. See his definitions of the laws in Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, theses 1–7 (pp. 339–40); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 29–30.

247. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (pp. 75–76); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 172.

248. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 15 (pp. 64–65); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 146.

nature of all related things that the very relation intervening between two related terms should properly constitute the form of the thing enacted.²⁴⁹

In addition, by being consistent with the theses made in *De libero hominis arbitrio*, Junius posited also in *De politiae Mosis observatione* that reason “prevails over will” and is “the master” of will, and, as noted above, all of these points echo Aquinas’s argument, namely that “[t]he movement of the will follows the movement of the intellect.”²⁵⁰

There are also other points of similarities. Junius’s definition of eternal law highlights the fact that, similar to Aquinas’s, God is understood to be the universal and primary mover of human reason, and this God, just like in Aquinas’s thought, moves it through providing certain conceptual and cognizable content to it. Junius defined eternal law as “the immutable concept and form of reason existing before all time in God the founder of the universe.”²⁵¹ The crucial part here is that to Junius the eternal law is “pure, unadulterated act, just as God is a simple actuality on whom, as the universal principle, entirely all things depend.”²⁵² Here, the eternal law is identified as divine ideas, and divine ideas are framed as divine acts.²⁵³ Acts, moreover, are causes of movements, and therefore it is appropriate to claim that in Junius’s thought God’s eternal ideas *ad extra* were the causes of all movements in the world including the human intellect.²⁵⁴ This interpretation can be supported also by the fact that, to Junius, “[t]he natural law is that which is innate to creatures endowed with reason and informs them with common notions of nature, that is, with principles and conclusions adumbrating the eternal law by a certain participation.”²⁵⁵ In other words, God moves human actions not only by implanting a rational power and potency but also by implanting certain principles and conclusions that adumbrate the eternal law, and by comprehending such divinely-given, or naturally-built

249. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (pp. 344–45); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 40.

250. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 10, a. 1.

251. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 42.

252. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 42.

253. Next chapter on eternal law will treat this topic in depth.

254. Muller, *Divine Will and Human Choice*, 216–17.

255. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 44.

concepts of the eternal law, humans may govern themselves to a universal end, the common good. These points, then, indicate that for Junius, like it was for Aquinas, God's way of governing human action is by ordering human intellect toward an end, and this teleological ordering uses the conceptual content called "law." In this regard J. Martin Bac's statement that "Reformed scholasticism is Perfect Will theology" is inaccurate to describe the general outlook of Junius's theology; divine agency in Junius's thought ultimately centers on God's intellect, rather than God's will, despite the notion of divine communication being very significant.²⁵⁶

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter revolved around the specific theme of law and order in Junius's thought. The theme was contextualized by investigating three interconnected areas: first, the structure of created reality; second, the natural and supernatural order in relation to human action; third, the internal order between intellect and will. All of these areas were examined to situate Junius's conception of law in the orders of nature and grace, and between divine and human actions, with a view to supporting the thesis that Junius adopted a Thomistic framework in seeing the moral order in terms of rational motion, relation, and perfection. The obvious point of similarity between Aquinas and Junius is their definition of law itself: both thinkers defined law as the ordering of human reason toward the common good. As this definition indicates, law in their system of thought is closely associated with *ratio*, *ordo*, *actio*, and *relatio*, which altogether express an intellectualist strand of moral, mereological, and metaphysical thinking. Furthermore, in a way that is very similar to Aquinas's theology, Junius appropriated the two-tier distinction of nature and grace as fundamental realities that determined the principle, power, and pathway of human action. At the same time, it is Junius's conception of the power

256. J. Martin Bac, *Perfect Will Theology: Divine Agency in Reformed Scholasticism as Against Suárez, Episcopius, Descartes, and Spinoza* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 5. This issue of divine communication will be treated in detail in subsequent chapters.

and efficacy of grace that his account should be distinguished from Aquinas's—grace does not merely communicate the power of perfection to nature, but also leads the movements of nature toward its full actualization. Hence, in Junius's moral framework, the grace of the Triune God is clearly presented as the singular cause of both potency and actuality of moral perfection, and Junius had no room for the concept of individual merit in the order of eschatological perfection.²⁵⁷

One interesting feature of Junius's theory of law is that, quite dissimilar to Zanchi's, law is formulated fundamentally as a means of achieving motional and mereological order, rather than as a series of rules. Zanchi asserted that “[l]aw was established as the eternal will and rule for what must be done or avoided for God's glory and for the good of each individual privately and of the entire human race.”²⁵⁸ When Junius's conception of law is compared to such statement it becomes clear that Junius's was framed upon overtly Thomistic mereological, teleological, and motional principles, as law is systematically situated between natural and supernatural orders, and between divine and human actions. Junius's concern was to perceive and achieve the “proper order and suitable relationship to one another” until the attainment of the vision of God.²⁵⁹ In this sense, Junius's moral thought bears the character of Aquinas's moral theology, in the way that Romano Cessario has claimed: “Moral theology is more about completion than it is about choice.”²⁶⁰ Indeed Aquinas himself considered the subject of moral philosophy as the order and ordering of human action toward perfection by the coordinated actions of intellect and will, and Junius shared these ideas even as a Reformed theologian.²⁶¹

257. Junius, *De theologia vera*, theses 37 (p. 96); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 221.

258. Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, 6.

259. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 18 (p. 69); cf. Junius, *A Treatise On True Theology*, 156.

260. Romano Cessario, *Introduction to Moral Theology* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), xxi.

261. “As the subject of natural philosophy is motion, or mobile being, so the subject of moral philosophy is human action ordered to an end, or even man, as he is an agent voluntarily acting for an end.” Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, 2.

Therefore, the structure of human action in Junius's moral thought is reason's causal, mereological, and teleological movement toward both natural and supernatural *verum* and *bonum*, which shaped the proper ends of human action. In this sense truth was essential to a moral life—Junius believed that human action was properly ordered, arranged, and executed only when it is moved by and terminated at truth. In short, Junius defined human *ratio* as the principle of *actio*, subordinated human *ratio* to the divine *ratio*, and conformed human *ratio* to the created *ordo*. In so doing, Junius presented a system of moral thought that situated human *ethica* in the context of divine *politica*, *oeconomia*, and *rhetorica*, such that human perfection was formulated in the context of God's sovereign distribution of supernatural wisdom (*oeconomia*) through his word (*rhetorica*) until the saints arrive at his dwelling place, heavenly kingdom (*politica*). Consequently, there is a triadic relationship that heavenly righteousness has with communication, perception, and possession, as these three concepts explained the economy of moral goods; human persons can possess them by perceiving and receiving what God has communicated through his word. Moreover, what was fundamental to Junius's theory of law and moral order was the typical paralleling of *natura-potentia-opera* with *gratia-potentia-opera*, whereby human actions were construed as effects of the powers arising from either nature or grace and as instruments of divine government. The end result, to state this point again, was this: in Junius's moral thought, law was connected to *actio*, *revelatio*, *ordo*, *ratio*, and *relatio* in a realist and an intellectualist framework, and these altogether constituted different layers of *perfectio*.

CHAPTER 3

ETERNAL LAW: THE ETERNAL FOUNDATION OF MORAL ORDER

3.1 Introduction

The development of Reformed scholastic doctrine of God, in its initial phase, occurred in the context when “Roman Catholic theology, reinforced after the council of Trent by the growth of the Jesuit Society, tried to demonstrate the theological and philosophical failures of Reformed theology.”¹ As Reformed scholastics developed their answers to the questions raised by medieval scholastics and also to the criticisms leveled by Roman Catholic theologians, they faced the challenge of establishing a philosophically defensible account of “the ultimacy and independence of divine knowledge and an understanding of the freedom of God in creation.”² Richard A. Muller argued that the available metaphysical options for the Reformed scholastics then were primarily Thomist, Scotist, and Ockhamist models.³ In this milieu, the faculty of theology at the University of Leiden contributed in major ways to the development of the doctrine, and their contribution reached its high point in their publication of *Synopsis purioris theologiae* in 1625.⁴ Dolf te Velde noted that, notwithstanding the fact that the *Synopsis* itself was published after more than four decades of theological education in the Low Countries, the codifiers of the *Synopsis* “continued a line of teaching at Leiden which had already been established in the days of Franciscus Junius and Franciscus Gomarus.”⁵

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1. Dolf te Velde, *The Doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy, Karl Barth, and the Utrecht School: A Study in Method and Content* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 22
 2. Richard A. Muller, “Calvinist Thomism Revisited: William Ames (1576–1633) and the Divine Ideas,” in *From Rome to Zurich, Between Ignatius and Vermigli*, ed. Gary W. Jenkins, W.J.T. Kirby, and Kathleen M. Comerford (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 105.
 3. Muller, “Calvinist Thomism Revisited,” 105.
 4. Dolf te Velde, “Eloquent Silence: The Doctrine of God in the Synopsis of Purer Theology,” *Church History and Religious Culture*, no. 92 (2012): 581–608. See also *Disputatio VI–XI* in Roelf T. te Velde and Willem J. van Asselt, eds., *Synopsis Purioris Theologiae* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 1.150–283. On academic disputations in the early modern Netherlands, see Willem Otterspeer, *Groepsportret Met Dame*, 3 vols. (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2000), 1.91, 175, 236–38.
 5. Velde, “Eloquent Silence,” 581–82, 605.

While John Patrick Donnelly's argument concerning the "Thomistic substratum" in the Reformed doctrine of God received positive evaluations and gained wide acceptance since its publication in 1976,⁶ other scholars such as Antonie Vos, Andreas Beck, and J. Martin Bac provided an alternative view that the matured philosophical model in the Reformed scholastic doctrine of God was rather Scotistic.⁷ What has to be accounted in these differing interpretations, however, is that Junius shows a high level of awareness and appropriation of Thomistic concepts in his exposition of eternal law—in a very similar way to Aquinas who

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6. For example, see John Patrick Donnelly, *Calvinism and Scholasticism In Vermigli's Doctrine of Man and Grace* (Leiden: Brill, 1976); idem, "Calvinist Thomism," *Viator* 7 (January 1976): 441–55; idem, "Italian Influences on the Development of Calvinist Scholasticism," *Sixteenth Century Journal*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1976): 81–101; Richard A. Muller, "Arminius and the Scholastic Tradition," *Calvin Theological Journal* 24/2 (1989): 263–77; idem, *God, Creation and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1991); idem, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, vols. 3–4; Harm Goris, "Thomism in Zanchi's Doctrine of God," in *Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2001), 121–39; Sebastian Rehnman, *Divine Discourse: The Theological Methodology of John Owen* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2002), 25–45; Patrick J. O'Banion, "Jerome Zanchi, the Application of Theology, and the Rise of the English Practical Divinity Tradition," *Renaissance and Reformation*, vol. 29, no. 2–3 (2005): 97–120; Stephen Hampton, *Anti-Arminians: The Anglican Reformed Tradition from Charles II to George I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 221–65; David Sytsma, "Harvest of Thomist Anthropology: John Weemse's Reformed Portrait of the Image of God" (ThM Thesis, Calvin Theological Seminary, 2008), 144–54; idem, *Richard Baxter and the Mechanical Philosophers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); Kalvin S. Budiman, "A Protestant Doctrine of Nature and Grace as Illustrated by Jerome Zanchi's Appropriation of Thomas Aquinas" (PhD Dissertation, Baylor University, 2011); Yoo Jeongmo, "John Edwards (1637–1716) on the Freedom of the Will: The Debate on the Relation Between Divine Necessity and Human Freedom in the Seventeenth Century and Early Eighteenth Century England" (PhD Dissertation, Calvin Theological Seminary, 2011); James E. Bruce, *Rights in the Law: The Importance of God's Free Choices in the Thought of Francis Turretin* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 33–40; Christopher Cleveland, *Thomism in John Owen* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013); Stefan Lindholm, "Jerome Zanchi's Use of Thomas Aquinas," in *Aquinas Among the Protestants*, ed. Manfred Svensson and David VanDrunen (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018); Jordan J. Baller, "In the Footsteps of the Thomists: an Analysis of Thomism in the Junius-Arminius Correspondence," in *Beyond Dordt and De Auxiliis: The Dynamics of Protestant and Catholic Soteriology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. Jordan Ballor, Matthew Gaetano, and David Sytsma (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2019), 127–47.
7. See Antonie Vos, "The Theoretical Centre and Structure of Scotus' *Lectura*: Philosophy in a New Key," in *Via Scoti: methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti*, ed. Leonardo Sileo (Rome: Antonianum, 1995), 455–73; idem, "Always on Time: The Immutability of God," in *Understanding the Attributes of God*, ed. Gijsbert van den Brink and Marcel Sarot (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1999), 65; idem, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006); idem, "Scotus' Significance for Western Philosophy and Theology," in *Lo scotismo nel Mezzogiorno d'Italia*, ed. Francesco Fiorentino (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2010), 173–209; idem, "The Systematic Place of Reformed Scholasticism: Reflections Concerning the Reception of Calvin's Thought," *Church History and Religious Culture*, vol. 92, no. 1/2 (2011): 29–42; Andreas J. Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676): Sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 344–58, 403–25; idem, "Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676): Basic Features of His Doctrine of God," in *Reformation and Scholasticism*, 205–26; idem, *Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) on God, Freedom, and Contingency: An Early Modern Reformed Voice* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2021); J. Martin Bac, *Perfect Will Theology: Divine Agency in Reformed Scholasticism as Against Suárez, Episcopius, Descartes, and Spinoza* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

stated that “the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character of an eternal law,”⁸ Junius argued that eternal law is “the immutable concept and form of reason existing before all time in God the founder of the universe.”⁹ Besides, only upon establishing the tight connection between divine essence and divine idea did Junius posit the relation of eternal law to temporal laws by stating that eternal law can only be a cause, not an effect, of other laws: “This law is immutable, and accordingly (as we should say with the *scholastics*) it is never ruled by any other law.”¹⁰

Here, it is clear that the idea of immutability is at the root of his doctrine of eternal law and, as he explicitly affirmed, the systematic relation between the two is a conceptual inheritance he willingly received from “the scholastics.” Then a question arises: which scholastics? The scholastics in the Thomist, or in the Scotist, tradition? The answer should show some nuance and qualification, as Junius’s views on the eternal law and its relation to other mutable laws witness to an eclectic utilization of philosophical concepts—the notions of analogy as well as accommodation, the concepts of divine ideas as well as divine will, are all systematically intertwined in his moral thought. Accordingly, this chapter will revolve around this question: which scholastic notions did Junius adopt in formulating the doctrine of eternal law? Moreover, how did Junius revise, retain, or even reject the Thomistic line of thought on this matter? To provide an accurate account, and by acknowledging the fact that “the philosophical or metaphysical elements of [Reformed scholastic] doctrine of God evidence an eclectic approach to philosophy,” this chapter will cover three main areas that will explain the scholastic underpinnings of Junius’s doctrine of eternal law: first, the simplicity, actuality, and

8. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 91, a. 1. English translations of Aquinas’s *Summa* used in this chapter are taken from Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981).

9. Franciscus Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione* (1593), thesis 2. The Latin texts of all Junius’s original treatises used in this chapter are from *Opuscula theologica selecta*, ed. Abraham Kuyper (Amsterdam: Muller and Kruyt, 1882). The translations of Junius’s *De politiae Mosis observatione* used in this chapter are from Franciscus Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, ed. Andrew M. McGinnis, trans. Todd M. Rester (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2015).

10. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (pp. 345–46); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 43.

eternality of divine essence; second, the essentiality, universality, and exemplarity of divine ideas; and third, accommodation, adumbration, and analogy as modes of divine communication.¹¹ These considerations will converge upon the main thesis, namely that, despite his eclecticism, Junius appropriated predominantly Thomistic ideas to systematize the nature and role of eternal law.¹² This means that even when the Scotistic emphases can be detected, Junius's doctrine of the eternal law expresses a high level of embeddedness of Aquinas's concepts. Thus the discussion of the aforementioned areas will demonstrate how Junius related eternal reality to the temporal reality, or divine mind to the human mind, and these areas will be essential in explaining the function of other creaturely laws in subsequent chapters.

3.2 The Ontological Context of Eternal Law: Divine Simplicity, Actuality, and Eternality

The first sub-thesis of this chapter is that Junius, in a Thomistic fashion, grounded the immutability of the eternal law in the simplicity, actuality, and eternity of divine essence.¹³ He defined eternal law as God's "immutable concept and form of reason [*conceptum immutabilem formamque rationis*] existing before all time in God the founder of the universe."¹⁴ This means that, Junius clarified, eternal law is essentially God's "pure, unadulterated act, just as God is a simple actuality on whom, as the universal principle, entirely all things depend."¹⁵ In these statements at least three ontological notions—divine simplicity,

11. Richard A. Muller also argued that "This philosophy can be called 'Christian Aristotelianism' only with qualification: specifically, the Reformed thinkers of the era of orthodoxy engaged in an ongoing debate and dialogue with the older tradition, its late Renaissance manifestations, with various classical options—notably Platonism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism—that had been revived in the Renaissance, and with the newer forms of skepticism and deism born in the sixteenth century." Richard A. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 3.31.

12. In arguing this it has to be mentioned that Junius's strong emphasis on revelation and accommodation likely has Scotistic undertones. See Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 3.66–68.

13. Junius's more extensive treatments on the essence and attribute of God are contained in his *De essentia Dei et attributis illius* and *De attributis Dei*. See Junius, *Theses theologiae* in his *Opuscula theologica selecta*, 123–32.

14. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 42.

15. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 42.

actuality, and eternity—were referenced to support the immutable character of God’s concept. This line of thought is a clear appropriation of Aquinas’s construal of eternal law, as Aquinas also supported its immutability on the basis of the notion that God is a Being of pure actuality, simplicity, and eternity (or infinity).¹⁶ Thus to understand the Thomistic underpinnings in Junius’s definition of eternal law as well as his explanation, it is imperative to understand the ontological context and basis in which divine ideas are located.

First of all, in Junius’s thought, the eternal law is grounded in divine simplicity.¹⁷ In affirming this he legitimated a number of negations in regards to God’s essence:

In a similar way, that which from our perspective is a distinction, this neither exists in God nor does it cause any distinction. For how could some specifying characteristic be attributed to that most simple essence, one as removed as possible from every composition? This is so because distinction establishes a reason for its own appearance, as form does for its material. But God is so completely simple in His essence that not even by a plausible thought experiment can any composition be attributed to Him; not of material and form, not of parts, not of essence and being, nor of subject and accidents. Because whatever exists in God is God.¹⁸

Here, Junius affirmed that, on the one hand, God is the “most simple essence” and the “essence beyond essence.”¹⁹ On the other hand, he negated two interdependent propositions: in God there is no distinction and composition. There is no distinction and composition in God because God is not composed of matter and form; of parts and whole; of *essentia* and *esse*; and of subject and accidents.²⁰ These points are undeniable indicators of his use of scholastic concepts, in which both metaphysical and physical compositions of matter and form, essence

16. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 9, a. 1. See also Brian Leftow, “God’s Impassibility, Immutability, and Eternity,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 173–85.

17. For accessible surveys on the doctrine in medieval and Reformation traditions, see Jordan P. Barrett, *Divine Simplicity: A Biblical and Trinitarian Account* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), 71–92 & 93–132.

18. Franciscus Junius, *De theologia vera in Opuscula theologica selecta*, thesis 7. The translations of Junius’s *De theologia vera* used in this chapter are from Franciscus Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology: With the Life of Franciscus Junius*, trans. David C. Noe (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2014), 108.

19. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 6 (p. 50); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 105.

20. In Latin Junius stated that God is “non essentiae & esse.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, ch. 4 (pp. 51–52). On Aquinas’s distinctive take on *esse* and *essentia* and its reception in the Reformed tradition, see Richard A. Muller, “Reading Aquinas from a Reformed Perspective: A Review Essay,” *Calvin Theological Journal* 53, no. 2 (2018): 255–88.

and existence, genus and difference, and substance and accident were denied to exist in God.²¹ Using Étienne Gilson's words, this scholastic conception of God—more specifically the Thomistic conception of God—regards God as “*esse* itself, pure and simple, without any other qualification of nature or essence added in order to determine it.”²² What is equally notable in Junius's conception of divine being is that, just as there cannot be any real distinction in God between his essence and existence, there is no real distinction between his knowledge and his being. This is to say that, in Junius's theology, the knowledge that God has of himself in himself bears “an essential characteristic of the divine essence” and he located that divine self-knowledge in “the very essence of God, just as God is most simple in all respects, whose being and understanding and knowing is the same thing, although we distinguish these in our own minds according to reason.”²³ Similar to Aquinas who argued that “His existence is His act of understanding,” Junius argued that “[divine theology] exists with His essence simultaneously, indivisible and immutable. By the same evident reason, His eternal wisdom is devoid of parts, and succession, and of all motion.”²⁴

By commenting on the diachronic overview of *theology proper* in history, Muller argued that divine simplicity was the “governing concept” that determined the way in which theologians related divine attributes to divine essence, divine essence to divine persons, and divine being to creaturely beings.²⁵ Muller evaluated its role in the system of Christian theology

21. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 3, a. 7. Muller notes: “Indeed, the entire force of the Reformed scholastic argument is to deny in God *only* those distinctions that imply composition, namely, real distinctions, and, therefore, to point forward to the *proper* distinctions that do subsist among the attributes and between the attributes and the divine essence.” Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 3.278. Also: “‘real’ does not mean ‘genuine’ but rather ‘thingish’ or ‘substantial.’” Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 3.56.

22. Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 103. See also John P. Rosheger, “Augustine and Divine Simplicity,” *New Blackfriars*, vol. 77, no. 901 (February 1996): 72–83.

23. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (p. 52); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 110.

24. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 14, a. 5. See also Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (p. 52); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 110.

25. “Among the divine attributes one stands forth as a governing concept which determines the way in which theology discusses the attributes and their relation to the divine essence: the divine simplicity. Here we encounter the basic question of the difference between God and his creatures and of the relation of universals to God.” Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 3.38–61.

as being “normative,” as “[t]he doctrine of divine simplicity is among the normative assumptions of theology from the time of the church fathers, to the age of the great medieval scholastic systems, to the era of Reformation and post-Reformation theology, and indeed, on into the succeeding era of late orthodoxy and rationalism.”²⁶ Muller even argued that “Thomas Aquinas addressed the concept of divine simplicity as fundamental to the understanding of God, giving it more relative importance in his doctrine of the attributes than his predecessors had done and addressing the issue of distinctions in the Godhead other than the distinctions between the persons.”²⁷ Andreas J. Beck also noted by examining Gisbertus Voetius’s (1589–1676) doctrine of God that Voetius’s use of divine simplicity was twofold, the first one being negations of creaturely attributes in God, and the other being positive affirmations of God’s incommunicable attributes.²⁸ Junius (as a predecessor to Voetius) likewise regarded the concept of divine simplicity as fundamental to understanding who God is not—and in turn who God is—such that, despite the importance of natural, human, and divine laws in God’s economy in time, the eternal law that resides in the simple God could alone remain as an immutable, eternal, and perennial standard of moral order.²⁹

Secondly, Junius affirmed God’s pure actuality as the ground of the immutability of eternal law.³⁰ He did not elaborate much on the pure actuality of God in *De politiae Mosis*

26. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 3.39.

27. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 3.53. This is also evidenced by the fact that Aquinas discussed divine simplicity prior to any other divine attributes in *Summa theologiae*, Ia.

28. Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) on God, Freedom, and Contingency*, chapter 7, section 7.7.

29. D. Stephen Long argued that Aquinas’s doctrine of divine simplicity is more congenial to the God of the Bible (specifically of Jeremiah) than the Reformed scholastic expression of the doctrine, on the grounds that Aquinas used it to defend the Trinity of God whereas the Reformed scholastics used it to defend divine sovereignty. This juxtaposition between Aquinas’s and Reformed scholastics’ uses of divine simplicity is not entirely justifiable: as Junius showed, the affirmation of divine simplicity was connected primarily to explaining the relationship between divine essence and existence, and the use of divine simplicity in relation to divine sovereignty was accompanied by other associated concepts such as divine will and eternal exemplar. See D. Stephen Long, *The Perfectly Simple Triune God: Aquinas and His Legacy* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016); idem, “Thomas Aquinas’ Divine Simplicity as Biblical Hermeneutic,” *Modern Theology*, vol. 35, no. 3 (July 2019): 496–507.

30. For John Owen’s use of *actus purus* in his doctrine of God, see Cleveland, *Thomism in John Owen*, 27–68. For a thorough, yet contestable, account of Aquinas’s understanding of God and action, see David B. Burrell, *Aquinas: God and Action* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2016).

observatione; he merely stated that eternal law is a “pure, unadulterated act, just as God is a simple actuality on whom, as the universal principle, entirely all things depend.”³¹ God, in other words, is both unadulterated pure actuality (*purus putus actus*) and simple actuality (*απλή ἐνέργεια*),³² and these terms captured what was at the heart of divine immutability: God is full of actuality, devoid of passivity, and free from mutability.³³ Furthermore, the idea of divine simplicity together with his pure actuality conveyed that God cannot cause himself to act incessantly, because in such case there would be “a composition between a causing part and a caused part in God’s being,” and this contradicts both divine simplicity and pure actuality.³⁴ Pure actuality captured God’s independence on the one hand and creation’s dependence on the other; it strongly upheld that all acts in creation are from God and no acts from creation can produce motions in him.³⁵ Another point to note here is that “since God is pure act and does not have the transition from potency to act, the same hold for God’s knowledge: there is no transition from not knowing to knowing.”³⁶ As clearly indicated here, the very idea of God’s pure and simple actuality was fundamentally connected to and predominantly used for the explanation of divine essence and divine knowledge in Junius’s thought—his driving concern was to show how God’s pure actuality shed light on the nature and location of divine ideas, as it was typical of Aquinas in his *Summa*.³⁷

31. Junius, *De politicae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 42.

32. “Num vbi conceptum immutabilem formamque rationis legem aeternam appellamus, purum putum actum esse demonstramus: quemadmodum Deus *απλή ἐνέργεια* est, a quo tamquam vniuersali principio res omnes vniuersae pendent.” Junius, *De politicae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2.

33. “This view of God as fully actualized being lies at the heart of the scholastic exposition of the doctrine of divine immutability.” See Richard A. Muller, s.v. “*actus purus*,” *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally From Protestant Scholastic Theology*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), 11–12. Moreover, the terms “purest and simplest actuality” was also used by William Ames in his description of God as “most pure and utterly simple act.” See William Ames, *Medulla theologiae*, Liv.20: “Haec attributa in Deo sunt unus purissimus, & simplicissimus actus.” Cf. Muller, “Calvinist Thomism Revisited,” 109.

34. Velde, *The Doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy, Karl Barth, and the Utrecht School*, 150.

35. Velde, *The Doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy, Karl Barth, and the Utrecht School*, 151–52.

36. Velde, *The Doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy, Karl Barth, and the Utrecht School*, 179.

37. This conclusion, again, counters D. Stephen Long’s argument that the doctrine of divine simplicity in Reformed scholastic system functioned “first to explain God’s relation to creation rather than first refereeing to God’s essence in a speculative theology.” See Long, *The Perfectly Simple Triune God*, 119–70.

Thirdly, eternal law, as clearly indicated in its name, is rooted in the eternity of God. Muller noted that “[a]t the root of the Reformed orthodox argument for divine eternity lie the issues of change and succession and the relationship of unchanging God to things that change and succeed one another: the argument is couched precisely for the purpose of denying change and succession in God while at the same time insisting on a relationship between God and temporal creatures.”³⁸ Although it is obvious that a sophisticated construal of eternity is not a prominent feature in Junius’s exposition of eternal law, it is still easily noticeable that he consciously affirmed the “scholastic” expression of eternity:

[Divine wisdom] ceaselessly comprehends in one all divine and individual things by its peculiar and boundless insight, without parts of these things, without an order of the parts, without any motion and succession of times (to use an expression of the scholastics). It comprehends the whole at the same time, and wholly. For this reason, we proclaim that this wisdom is also divine, with its special and nonfigurative meaning, so that we may always, when this wisdom is discussed, raise our minds above all things that are human, temporary, and created.³⁹

In addition, Junius regarded archetypal theology or divine self-knowledge as eternal because “it is uncreated wisdom, essential, absolute, infinite, in all aspects of simultaneously present.”⁴⁰ In a typical scholastic fashion, therefore, and not far from the Boethian formula, eternity is marked by two fundamental characteristics in Junius’s thought: on the one hand, by motionlessness or immutability; on the other hand, by successionlessness or simultaneity.⁴¹ In short, Junius’s conception of divine eternity simply referred to God’s “everlasting nowness” outside of time,⁴² and on this point Scotus would agree: “Simultaneity is incompatible with time, successive as it is, and succession is incompatible with eternity.”⁴³

38. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 3.354.

39. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (p. 52); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 109.

40. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (p. 52); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 110.

41. Paul Helm denotes this kind of conception as “divine atemporality.” See Paul Helm, “Infinity and God’s Atemporality,” in *The Infinity of God: New Perspectives in Theology and Philosophy*, ed. Benedikt Paul Göcke and Christian Tapp (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2018), 276–95.

42. See how Reformed scholastics used Boethius’s “everlasting NOW” in Velde, *The Doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy, Karl Barth, and the Utrecht School*, 157.

43. Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus*, 499.

In speaking on the role of eternity in Aquinas's thought, Eleonore Stump commented that "Aquinas's understanding of God as eternal is foundational for very many of his theological views."⁴⁴ Despite much complexities surrounding Aquinas's philosophical concept of eternity, it is at least clear that to him eternity in the absolute sense was God's attribute alone: "Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability."⁴⁵ Aquinas also argued that "eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable—that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole."⁴⁶ Thus, seeing that Aquinas understood eternity in the light of interminability and simultaneity, and that he attributed eternity only to the simple God, Brian Davies's statement about Aquinas is fitting as a description of Junius's thought as well: "eternity," for Aquinas as well as Junius, "is bound up with immutability."⁴⁷ For these reasons Junius stated that eternal law is the "unmoved and constant rule" of moral order, and thus he rooted the immutability of eternal law in the completely simple, fully actualized, and everlastingly simultaneous nature of God's essence.⁴⁸

3.3 The Conceptual Nature of Eternal Law: Essentiality, Universality, and Exemplarity

In view of this, as a second sub-thesis, it should be stated that Junius understood eternal law as divine idea or reason.⁴⁹ Muller noted that early codifiers of Reformed theology such as Wolfgang Musculus (1497–1563), Andreas Hyperius (1511–64), Zacharias Ursinus (1534–83), and Lambert Daneau (c. 1530–95) did not produce sophisticated accounts of the ways in which divine ideas are related to God's *scientia* and *sapientia*. Later thinkers, however, such

44. Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 131.

45. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 10, a. 3.

46. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 10, a. 1.

47. Brian Davies, *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 110.

48. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 42.

49. Junius's use of divine ideas as exemplars can also be seen in his *Libri Geneseos analysis* (Geneva: Sanctandrea, 1594), 4.

as Amandus Polanus (1561–1610), William Ames (1576–1633), Petrus van Mastricht (1630–1706), and Stephen Charnock (1628–80), made notable contributions to the development of the doctrine, by treating various philosophical topics associated with divine essence, ideas, and acts.⁵⁰ The philosophical model used by Ames, for instance, showed “a fundamentally Thomistic approach,” as the way he related eternal exemplars to both divine ideas and divine essence evinced a Thomistic pattern of argumentation.⁵¹ Junius’s account of eternal law vis-à-vis eternal concept reveals the same Thomistic pattern: he argued that “[God’s] knowledge is infinite—infinately comprehending all things according to their essence, potency, actions, passions, and affections, and finally, all general and particular things, both universally and individually.”⁵² Furthermore, “this [eternal] rule exists through itself, and not by an alien gift, communication, or participation. This law is eternal and divine, and therefore the universal principle and exemplar of all other rules. This law is immutable, and accordingly (as we should say with the scholastics) it is never ruled by any other law.”⁵³

Consequently it has to be mentioned that, first of all, the divine mind shares the same attributes with the divine essence in Junius’s theology. Junius believed that divine knowledge is God’s *essential* knowledge as he knows everything through his essence. He stated that God’s archetypal knowledge shares “an essential characteristic of the divine essence or of deity” because “God is most simple in all respects, whose being and understanding and knowing is the same thing, although we distinguish these in our own minds according to reason.”⁵⁴ Furthermore, just as divine essence is characterized by, for example, immutability, simultaneity, and simplicity, divine knowledge is also characterized by the same

50. Muller, “Calvinist Thomism Revisited,” 106.

51. Muller, “Calvinist Thomism Revisited,” 117.

52. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (p. 366); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 94.

53. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 42. On medieval philosophical accounts of mental representations and concepts, see Gyula Klima, “Mental Representations and Concepts in Medieval Philosophy,” in *Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 323–37.

54. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (p. 52); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 110.

incommunicable or transcendent attributes.⁵⁵ Therefore Junius believed that divine knowledge “exists with His essence simultaneously, indivisible and immutable. By the same evident reason, His eternal wisdom is devoid of parts, and succession, and of all motion.”⁵⁶ This indicates his reception of one of the fundamental tenets in the scholastic expression of God: God’s eternal concept acts not discursively but simultaneously.⁵⁷ This, in turn, indicates that God’s eternal knowledge is characterized by synchronicity, simultaneity, and immutability in Junius’s thought, and this must be considered at the background whenever his views on contingency and causality of creation are examined.⁵⁸

Such way of paralleling divine being with divine knowing most certainly resembles Aquinas’s pattern of thought. In both *Summa contra Gentiles* and *Summa theologica* Aquinas clearly argued that “God knows Himself and all else by His own essence.”⁵⁹ In *Summa contra Gentiles* he expressly appealed to divine simplicity, eternity, immutability, and actuality to establish a point that divine intellection *is* divine existence:

If, however, God’s act of intelligence is His existence, His act of intelligence must be simple, eternal, unchangeable, existing only in act, and all those things which have been proved about the divine existence. Wherefore God is not in potentiality to intelligence, nor does He begin to understand a thing anew, nor is His act of intelligence subject to any change or composition whatsoever.⁶⁰

In addition, he also found simultaneity to be an attribute of divine knowledge:

Every intellect that understands one thing after another is at one time understanding potentially, and at another time actually: for while it understands the first thing actually, it understands the second potentially. But the divine intellect is never in potentiality,

55. As stated above: [Divine wisdom] ceaselessly comprehends in one all divine and individual things by its peculiar and boundless insight, without parts of these things, without an order of the parts, without any motion and succession of times (to use an expression of the scholastics). It comprehends the whole at the same time, and wholly. For this reason, we proclaim that this wisdom is also divine, with its special and nonfigurative meaning, so that we may always, when this wisdom is discussed, raise our minds above all things that are human, temporary, and created.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (p. 52); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 109.

56. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (p. 52); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 110.

57. See Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.229–38.

58. In regard to the notion of synchronicity vis-à-vis eternity in the Reformed orthodox theology, see Richard A. Muller, *Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), 203–10.

59. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 15, a. 1.

60. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles, Books I–II*, trans. Laurence Shapcote (Green Bay, WI: The Aquinas Institute, 2018), 1, c. 45.

but is always understanding actually. Therefore it understands things, not successively, but altogether simultaneously.⁶¹

For both Aquinas and Junius, therefore, the mode of God's being necessarily determines the mode of God's knowing, and in their systems the immutability of divine ideas was derived from the immutability of divine essence. "God is the similitude of all things according to His essence," Aquinas argued, and as such "an idea in God is identical with His essence."⁶²

In addition, in *De veritate*, Aquinas stated that "[s]peculative knowledge is that which considers the principles and causes of things, as well as their properties. But by ideas God knows all that can be known of things. Therefore, the divine ideas pertain not only to practical, but also to speculative knowledge."⁶³ If Junius's statement about God's essential knowledge is analyzed against the background of this speculative-practical distinction, then it becomes clear that Junius did not merely relate God's *practical reason* to divine ideas but also God's *theoretical reason* as well, because Junius presented God's knowledge as the cause of all ontological, epistemological, and moral principles. He argued:

To [divine mind] all things are most present, not from any principles, composition or division of the intellect, reasoning, conclusions, knowledge, judging, and sequence, but in the simplest way: by a simultaneous, unparalleled understanding of everything, and not in succession as happens with created things. It gives birth to these principles from itself. It is not born from them. This wisdom produces intellect, reason, conclusions, knowledge, and wisdom itself in others. It persists in itself immutable and without variation. Finally, this wisdom in other things outside itself, causing all variations in parts, order, and succession, is as it were the universal and unmoved principle of all principles, intellects, reasons, conclusions, and all types of knowledge. Wisdom is the mother of all wisdom.⁶⁴

Therefore Muller's thesis is illuminating here: "The central point, that God knows externals not on the basis of externals but in and through the divine essence, certainly derives from Aquinas."⁶⁵ It is against this essential background of divine ideas that Junius affixed divine

61. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 1, c. 55.

62. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 15, a. 1.

63. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 3, a. 3.

64. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (pp. 51–52); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 108–9.

65. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 3.239.

ratio to divine *actio*; as well captured by Gilson, “*Esse* itself, the God of St. Thomas, causes and knows the totality of *esse*.”⁶⁶

The second characteristic of divine idea is its universality. The topic of universals in scholastic philosophy is not only a complex but also a contentious field.⁶⁷ To cut through the complexities surrounding the debates on metaphysical universals, it has to be mentioned that divine idea is not only the universal principle of all *forms* but also the universal principle of all *rules* in Junius’s thought. Junius believed that “the underlying structure of the things which exist is twofold: for some exist *in re*, others *in intellectu*.”⁶⁸ In terms of the priority and hierarchy of significance, he believed that the truth *in res* is more important than the truth *in intellectu*, as “universals are more valuable than those that are singular, and forms that have been abstracted and purged from matter are more valuable than those things that are bound by matter.”⁶⁹ Quite clearly this axiological principle indicates a denial of a nominalist ontology and epistemology at least on two levels: Junius affirmed, first, the existence of extra-mental universals, and second, the possibility of abstracting universals from singulars.⁷⁰ These tenets are characteristic of the *via antiqua* in the early modern period because, in this framework, the universals are not determined by the choice of the human will, but by the choice of the divine will.⁷¹ Hence, it is worth remembering Heiko A. Oberman’s statement that this so-called

66. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 113. See also John F. Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 172–93.

67. Armand A. Maurer helpfully summarized the issue by stating that “The central problem concerning universals is whether they are real or simply conceptions of the mind.” See Armand A. Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy: A History of Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1962), 27. Also a good starting place to engage in this topic is Claude Panaccio, “Universals,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John Marenbon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 385–402.

68. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 25 (pp. 80–81); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 184.

69. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 25 (pp. 80–81); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 185.

70. See Heiko A. Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2000), 61.

71. See Heiko A. Oberman, “Luther and the *Via Moderna*: The Philosophical Backdrop of the Reformation Breakthrough,” in *The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the New World*, ed. Donald Weinstein (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 27.

“Anselmian confidence in the ability of human reason to unravel the divine mystery would have been inconceivable in the *via moderna*.”⁷²

Junius also argued that divine wisdom (*sapientia*) is uncreated, “for it does not have a principle in anything else, or any manner of a principle or creation; indeed, it does not even have any appearance of a principle. For it is itself the principle of principles, extending powerfully from one limit to the other, and suitably putting all things in their place.”⁷³

Elsewhere in *De politiae Mosis observatione* he made a distinction between two kinds of universal principles in divine wisdom:

Moreover, when we say that that form of reason has been conceived by God and in God for the common good, we manifestly distinguish the eternal law of God from the rest of the reason of the divine wisdom that acts and occupies itself with created things. For the reason of that divine wisdom, which is prominent in acting, moving, and sustaining created things, is occupied with all things all the time. But in this place is treated only that reason of the divine wisdom which he established for human beings endowed with reason for the perception of that wisdom, so that those things perceived would lead to a lawful obedience by doing lawful things and fleeing their contraries in the contemplation of the common good, in which contemplation are also located a personal (as we have previously touched upon) and particular good.⁷⁴

Here, he distinguished within divine wisdom two kinds of *ratio*—one that which is occupied with “acting, moving, and sustaining created things” that encompass “all things all the time,” and the other which is specifically occupied with the moral “ruling” of rational creatures toward the perception and contemplation of the good.⁷⁵ The latter is properly called the eternal law and is rightly captured by Romanus Cessario as “the ruling notion which governs the activity of created things.”⁷⁶ The universal operations of these two kinds of *ratio* were highlighted by the fact that divine ideas are the causative, productive, or generative source of all order, or

72. Oberman, “Luther and the *Via Moderna*,” 35.

73. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (p. 52); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 110.

74. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 42.

75. It should be noted that the metaphysical nature of eternal law is never detached from its moral aspect, as it can be seen in Junius’s understanding of theology as “the wisdom of true righteousness.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (p. 91); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 210.

76. Romanus Cessario, *Introduction to Moral Theology* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 52.

more specifically “the universal and unmoved principle of all principles, intellects, reasons, conclusions, and all types of knowledge.”⁷⁷ Thus, in Junius’s thought, eternal law is one part of the divine ideas that is “nothing other than the very wisdom of God that determines the rationale of what is lawful and unlawful in all things created according to his own image[.]”⁷⁸ Better put: eternal law is “a catholic rule [*regula catholica*]” of all things.⁷⁹ Seeing eternal law as such implies that contemplation of the created order itself—encompassing both natural and supernatural dimensions—constitutes an important facet of a wise life, as life is lived wisely when the order of creation is properly perceived and when one is drawn to God by “the contemplation, cognition, and admiration of that eternal law.”⁸⁰

These considerations need to be tethered to the third point, namely that in Junius’s thought eternal law is the eternal exemplar of all creaturely actualizations. Marie-Charles Perret has pointed out helpfully that “[w]hen philosophers speak of a thing’s exemplar, it is not a question of a certain member in a series; it is not merely the first such member, the ‘first edition,’ the prototype of which the other items are repetitions. For them it is a question of the original, the model itself and not the reproduction.”⁸¹ John L. Farthing therefore made an important point when he posited that the notion of exemplarity in scholastic thought meant “that model in imitation of which something else comes to be (or is made to be) what it is.”⁸² Exemplarity, in short, is inseparable from its relation to causes and effects of existent things,

77. “To [divine mind] all things are most present, not from any principles, composition or division of the intellect, reasoning, conclusions, knowledge, judging, and sequence, but in the simplest way: by a simultaneous, unparalleled understanding of everything, and not in succession as happens with created things. It gives birth to these principles from itself. It is not born from them. This wisdom produces intellect, reason, conclusions, knowledge, and wisdom itself in others. It persists in itself immutable and without variation. Finally, this wisdom in other things outside itself, causing all variations in parts, order, and succession, is as it were the universal and unmoved principle of all principles, intellects, reasons, conclusions, and all types of knowledge.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (p. 52); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 108–09.

78. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (pp. 345–46); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 43.

79. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 17 (p. 361); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 81.

80. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, theses 2 & 6 (pp. 345 & 349); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 42 & 50.

81. Marie-Charles Perret, “La notion d’exemplarité,” *Revue Thomiste*, vol. 41 (1936): 450. The translation is from John L. Farthing, “The Problem of Divine Exemplarity in St. Thomas,” *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review*, vol. 49, no. 2 (April 1985): 186.

82. Farthing, “The Problem of Divine Exemplarity in St. Thomas,” 187.

and it has “the characteristic of similitude or likeness (*similitudo*).”⁸³ It is not surprising then that Gregory T. Doolan discovered in Aquinas’s writings more than eight hundred occurrences of the word *exemplar* and other associated terms.⁸⁴ In Aquinas’s thought divine exemplars broadly served epistemological, ontological, and causal functions: first, they are the principles of knowing as they determined what and how much can be known by human creatures; second, they are the principles of being, because God, on the basis of them, made human creatures in his likeness; third, they are properly categorized as the formal causes of all things but are never detached from their efficient cause, as the exemplars in divine intellect have a certain priority in relation to the operation of the divine will.⁸⁵

In adopting the concept Junius argued that *form* has a twofold relation to God: first to the mind of God and second to the work he created.⁸⁶ The internal form of exemplar, Junius stated, is “eternal concept,” which is “of the divine will and grace contemplated in God Himself.”⁸⁷ The external form, on the other hand, is “the effect of that eternal concept” on things, whereby the reservoirs of the internal exemplar are stored and contained in the things

83. Gregory T. Doolan, *Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 2.

84. Doolan even argued: “To have a complete understanding of Thomas’s metaphysics, then, one must be familiar with his account of the divine ideas as exemplar causes.” Doolan, *Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes*, xiii–xiv.

85. Doolan, *Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes*, xv. See also Mark D. Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas,” *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 38 (1984): 17–32; Vivian Boland, *Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis* (Leiden & New York: Brill, 1996). John M. Rhiza also believed that eternal law is not only an exemplary cause, but also a final and efficient cause of creation. John M. Rziha, *Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 55. Eleanor Stump, however, is convinced that exemplars are to remain only as *formal* causes of things, not their efficient cause. See Stump, *Aquinas*, 180.

86. “Indeed, we explained the material cause of that wisdom sufficiently as a principle just a little bit before, when we related that those things with which theology deals are *divine*, or *things divine*. Therefore, a very serious topic remains concerning its form and manner. These two concepts in our definition we touched upon separately in a few words when we said that this theology was *fashioned from the archetypal one through the communication of grace*. For form, from whatever craftsman it arises, is properly constituted as twofold: The one exists in the mind of the craftsman, while the other is in his work. And thus inasmuch as internal and external action alike are contemplated in our affairs, so also is form twofold: internal and external.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 8 (p. 54); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 115.

87. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 8 (p. 54); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 115.

created.⁸⁸ These comments correspond to his understanding of truth, because to him the truth existing *in intellectu* is truth insofar as it refers and signifies truth internally in the mind, whereas the truth existing *in res* is the actual thing existing externally in the world. These considerations suggest that Junius was clearly a “realist” who believed, on the one hand, in the reliable and stable relation between what is in God’s reason (*in intellectu*) and what is in things (*in res*), and on the other, the priority of universals over singulars.⁸⁹

They also suggest that Junius regarded the eternal law as God’s knowledge of the created order that comes *posterior* to his gracious willing. In regard to the freedom of the divine will, Junius insisted that “God is uttermost free [*Deus esse liberrimus*]” and divine freedom “belongs to his main attributes, from which not even the least one (if we may say so) can be taken away, without abolishing immediately the whole concept of Deity.”⁹⁰ This divine freedom, he argued, can be divided into two: freedom in relation to the “apprehension of the will [*apprehensio*]” and in relation to “the execution of the things apprehended and commanded by the will [*executio*].”⁹¹ By the *freedom of apprehension* Junius meant the way in which God’s will relates to the objects of choice presented by the intellect, namely good and bad things.⁹² When the things are presented to the will as good by the intellect, the will has

88. “But the external one is the effect of that eternal concept (as we would put it) on other things, made in its own time. God fashions this wisdom in two ways, internally by His most wise counsel, and externally by His most powerful work. But because this form is twofold, it subsists in God as in a fountain but is diverted into other things as into lakes. From this, something else follows, namely that the twofold reason of this wisdom has always been correctly and suitably marked by learned men: The one, in an absolute sense or in the very font of wisdom, is that which the crowd of scholastics call theology in itself. The other, in a relative sense or as though resting in lakes and reservoirs of Himself, is that which they name relative theology.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 8 (p. 54); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 116.

89. See Alessandro D. Conti, “Realism,” in Robert Pasnau, ed., *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 2.647.

90. Franciscus Junius, “De libero hominis arbitrio, ante & post lapsum,” in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, thesis 25. The translations of the treatise used in this chapter are from Willem J. van Asselt, J. Martin Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde, eds., *Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010), 99–102.

91. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 25; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 101–02.

92. “[a] According to the first aspect of freedom (which we especially discuss in this *quaestio*), freedom is attributed to God, but not universally, if freedom is understood as freedom from necessity proper. The reason why will be clearly evident from the distinction of the special objects of free choice, namely good and bad (for indifferent things are no point of debate here).” Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 26; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 102.

“the freedom of contradiction or the freedom of contrariety” as God “can choose or not choose, if there was a singular object; and he can choose this or that, if there are more objects.”⁹³ When both good and bad things are presented to the will, however, God by necessity prefers the good to the bad, because “it is utterly repugnant to its nature to prefer the bad to the good.”⁹⁴ Yet, Junius endeavored to accentuate that God has no necessity to create in the first place and God is under no obligation to will one particular good over others. Therefore, even in willing what is good for creation, God still retains the freedom to “choose between different good things; but he is not necessitated to choose good things, only because they are good. He can decide not to choose a good thing.”⁹⁵

By the *freedom of execution* Junius meant that God is completely free to will what he deems right and good for creation, as there is nothing that coerces or forces him to execute what he apprehended: God is “only αὐτεξούσιος, most free from himself, in himself and by himself, having every right and power over everything he has created, and his will neither depends on nor is governed by any external cause, but everything depends on his will.”⁹⁶ This latter freedom of execution, Junius argued, is a “prototype [πρωτοτυπος]” of human freedom, as creatures, in a finite way, “reflect the image of their maker” by choosing things that are good and rejecting things that are bad, the objects of which are presented and discerned by the intellect.⁹⁷ These accounts of divine freedom indicate at least three important facets of the divine will: first, God’s will has the freedom of contradiction and contrariety in relation to the act of apprehension; second, God’s will has the freedom from coercion in relation to the act of execution; third, all creation is dependent on God’s will for everything it is and it does.⁹⁸

93. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 27; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 102.

94. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 27; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 102.

95. van Asselt et al, *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 119.

96. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 28; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 102.

97. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 5 & 29; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 99 & 102.

98. For a detailed treatment of Junius’s philosophical accounts of divine freedom, see Muller, *Divine Will and Human Choice*, 214–20.

These affirmations of divine will and freedom, however, should not necessarily make Junius a Scotist, because Junius's construal of the eternal law reflects not only the *contingency* of the created order but also the *consistency*, *coherency*, and *credibility* between who God is, what he knows, and what he willed: Junius's emphatic point was to spotlight the fact that "the *ad extra* revealed nature of God coordinates more directly with the *ad intra* hidden nature of the divine being."⁹⁹ As Muller demonstrated in his treatment of Ames's thought, locating divine ideas consequent to the divine will itself does not make one a Scotist, because even Ames—arguably echoing Aquinas—regarded "divine ideas, following the determination of divine will, as exemplars of actual things."¹⁰⁰ In other words, though it is the divine will that determined *that things are*, it determined it on the basis of the divine idea that apprehended *what they are*.¹⁰¹ Using Gilson's words:

Just as in God, His knowledge of the cause is not the cause of His knowledge of the effect, and yet He knows the effect in its cause, so His willing of the end is not the cause of His willing of the means, and yet He wills the means as ordered to their end. He wills, therefore, that *this* be because of *that*; but it is not because of *that* He wills *this*.¹⁰²

Considering these points Antonie Vos's argument that divine immutability can have its basis only in God's essential (or necessary) acts in a Thomistic framework would not be perfectly accurate, as Junius—following a Thomistic trajectory—understood divine immutability having its ground in a threefold source, namely in God's essence, knowledge, and will.¹⁰³ What is important on this matter, therefore, is the way in which Junius retained a "difference between

99. See Muller, *Divine Will and Human Choice*, 78, 83–138, 282. Doolan argued helpfully that even in Aquinas's thought, divine exemplars are contingent and consequent categories in relation to the divine will, and hence "Thomas rejects the theory of a necessary emanation." Doolan, *Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes*, 158.

100. Muller, "Calvinist Thomism Revisited," 116.

101. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 118.

102. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 118.

103. Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus*, 500; idem, "The Systematic Place of Reformed Scholasticism," 29–41. Muller pointed out that Vos assumed a particular reading of Aristotle, the view shared by Hintikka and Knuuttila. See Jaakko Hintikka, "Aristotle and the 'Master Argument' of Diodorus," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 1, no. 2 (April 1964): 101–114; idem, *Time & Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973); Simo Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism," in *Reforging the Great Chain of Being: Studies in the History of Modal Theories*, ed. Simo Knuuttila (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1981), 163–257.

the eternal and necessary dimension of God's act of knowing through his own essence, and the temporal and contingent nature of the things known by God."¹⁰⁴ In this regard Velde has painted a more nuanced picture, as he argued that "the conglomerate of Junius's formulations reveals a combination of Thomist and Scotist concepts employed to elucidate the relationship between God's knowledge and will and the relationship between God (in his knowing and willing) and the created world of contingency."¹⁰⁵

However, such eclecticism does not entail that there was a perfectly proportionate appropriation of Thomistic and Scotistic concepts. In other words, despite the fact that it is certainly possible to discover certain Scotistic concerns in Junius's formulation of eternal law, his thought is properly categorized as "Thomistic," given the higher proportion of Aquinas's ideas embedded in his thought. The key issue for Junius was to show how the divine will relates creatures not only to the divine will itself but also to the divine intellect, or to the eternal *form*: he understood eternal law as a kind of divine idea formed consequent to the divine will, but it is the rational, formal, and conceptual basis by which and from which all actualizations were made. He saw eternal law as both "the universal principle and exemplar of all other rules" and "that highest reason of divine wisdom which moves and directs all things to a just end."¹⁰⁶ In addition to linking divine *exemplar* with divine *ratio* he acknowledged in *De theologia vera* that "God has fashioned [*informata*] the second kind of theology [i.e., ectypal] on the model of the divine and immutable exemplar, proportionally to the creatures' capacity."¹⁰⁷ In this statement one can clearly read a structure that placed God's fashioning (or in-forming) of ectypal theology posterior to his modelling of the exemplar, and this implies that human reason is moved not merely by the act of divine will, but also by the act of divine intellect, which all together hints at Junius's appropriation of a Thomistic framework. Accordingly, in Junius's

104. Velde, "Eloquent Silence," 589.

105. Velde, "Eloquent Silence," 589.

106. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (pp. 345–46); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 41–43.

107. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 6 (p. 50); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 104.

thought, the eternal law *qua* exemplar was formulated as the eternal, rational, formal, and conceptual foundation of all motion, which regulates all human *ordo*, *ratio*, *actio*, and *relatio*.

Once again: by natural and supernatural laws human reason grasps not only the moral will of God but also his moral nature. In explaining the immutable and perennial ends of human laws, Junius stated that “it is necessary for the end of the law to be holy and just in itself.”¹⁰⁸ He then paired holiness with piety and justice with equity and argued that the ends that pertain to holiness and justice in human laws are only “a shadow of that eternal reason.”¹⁰⁹ As noted in the second chapter this is due to his belief that divine truth possess three attributes: holiness, justice, and perfection [*veritas est sancta, iusta, et perfecta*].¹¹⁰ The rationale was simple—divine truth reflects God “who is Himself holiness, justice, and perfection.”¹¹¹ This was why he believed that by perceiving the eternal law through natural and supernatural laws human beings would be led to “a lawful obedience by doing lawful things and fleeing their contraries in the contemplation of the common good, in which contemplation are also located a personal (as we have previously touched upon) and particular good.”¹¹²

Considering these points, then, at least these three provisional conclusions need to be drawn in regard to Junius’s theology of eternal law: first, eternal law fundamentally reveals the moral nature of God; second, it is formed consequent to God’s act of will; third, it is the eternal and causal basis of all created *ordo*, *ratio*, *actio*, and *relatio*. These views, undoubtedly, reflect Aquinas’s idea: “the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him.”¹¹³ Even Aquinas himself acknowledged here that eternal law pertained to the ordained will of God— as a result it needs to be affirmed here that, as it was for Aquinas, Junius aligned eternal law

108. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 17 (p. 361); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 81.

109. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 17 (p. 361); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 81.

110. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 26 (p. 82); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 187.

111. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 26 (p. 83); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 189.

112. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 42.

113. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 91, a. 1.

with the *potentia Dei ordinata* and *scientia Dei visionis*, because it is the conceptual basis of the power that God ordained to use for the government of creatures foreknown by him.¹¹⁴

3.4 The Modes of Divine Communication: Accommodation, Adumbration, and Analogy

The eternal law conceived as a conceptual content in God's reason requires a discussion of another area, that is the interconnected area of communication, cognition, and predication.¹¹⁵

Donald Sinnema claimed that the archetypal-ectypal distinction and also the supernatural-natural distinction in Junius's theology mainly express Thomistic constructs, while noting that Polanus himself actually referenced both Aquinas and Scotus as sources behind the distinctions.¹¹⁶ Muller, on the other hand, noted that the typical Reformed scholastic identification of archetypal theology with God's self-knowledge has Scotistic concerns at the background, as Scotus himself contrasted *theologia in se* with *theologia nostra* on the basis of God's and human's epistemological capacities respectively.¹¹⁷ Andreas J. Beck went further than Muller did—Beck, following and modifying Antonie Vos's line of thought, contended that Junius and Voetius both embraced a nuanced form of Scotistic univocity.¹¹⁸ These differing interpretations partly stem from the fact that in Reformed scholastic thought the category of archetype in relation to divine knowledge was significant not only because of its role in describing the nature of God's knowledge itself, but also because of its role with respect to divine revelation, as all ectypal forms of theological knowledge were understood as “similitude to the archetype.”¹¹⁹ Archetypal theology, using Polanus's words, was “exemplary

114. Muller, *Divine Will and Human Choice*, 274–82.

115. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.227.

116. Donald Sinnema, “Reflections on the Nature and Method of Theology at the University of Leyden Before the Synod of Dort” (MPhil Thesis, Toronto, Canada, Institute for Christian Studies, 1975), 72–78. Sinnema did in fact affirm both Thomistic and Scotistic influences in Junius's theology, but the Scotistic influences were exclusively tied to the issue of revelation.

117. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.227.

118. Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) on God, Freedom, and Contingency*, chapter 7, section 7.4.

119. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.230. See also Willem J. van Asselt, “The Fundamental Meaning of Theology: Archetypal and Ectypal Theology in Seventeenth-Century Reformed Thought,” *Westminster Theological Journal*, vol. 62 (2002): 319–35.

theology, to which as to an immutable, primary and premordial idea and exemplar, all created theology is conformed as likeness.”¹²⁰ Therefore it is crucial to note that Reformed scholastics such as Polanus regarded God as “the first, highest, and most perfect theologian”—God knows his own mind perfectly and hence he can communicate that divine knowledge in the most perfect way.¹²¹ In Junius’s thought, in a similar fashion, the notion of accommodation goes in tandem with the notion of archetype, as these two conjointly explained how divine exemplars can be known by human reason: God revealed the exemplars by accommodating, moderating, and tempering them to the capacities of human creatures.¹²²

Even with a few Scotistic adjustments, however, it should be pointed out (again) as a third sub-thesis that Junius predominantly appropriated Thomistic categories in establishing the relationship between eternal and ectypal laws, or specifically natural and supernatural laws. In other words, despite the Scotistic emphases on the finitude of human capacity, Junius mostly used Thomistic concepts to construe the relationship between divine communication and human cognition in terms of accommodation, adumbration, and analogy.¹²³ Junius defined God’s communicative act as a “προφορικός discourse” because it “flows from God Himself, and through a sort of effluence or procession from it (as we would say) produces its own effect

120. See Amandus Polanus, *Syntagma*, I.iii. Translation is from Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.231.

121. Polanus, *Syntagma*, I.iii. Cf. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.233.

122. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.236. Also, it is important to grasp this point in discussing divine accommodation: “God does not accommodate his truth to human sin—rather he communicates his truth to human ways of knowing. Thus, revelation itself, whether supernatural or natural, is suited to the present conditions of human knowing, just as vision is suited to the ultimate conditions of human knowing when we no longer see as ‘in a mirror darkly.’” Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.262.

123. This section provides a general treatment of the “communicative” part in Junius’s thesis that “from this unmoved and constant rule, which is of that essential, divine majesty, all other rules exist regulated (as we say) with regard to created things from this one through a certain communication and participation.” The latter part on participation will be covered in the next chapter. See Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 43. For helpful literature on Calvin’s use of accommodation, see Jon Balsarak, *Divinity Compromised: A Study of Divine Accommodation in the Thought of John Calvin* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006); Arnold Huijgen, *Divine Accommodation in John Calvin’s Theology: Analysis and Assessment* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011).

in those who hear.”¹²⁴ The προφορικός or enunciative discourse was understood by Junius as a method by which “a person communicates with others the concept of his own mind, or something that was engendered in his intellect, or what was perceived by reason externally.”¹²⁵ Through this method of discourse God communicates the “images [*imagines*]” or “traces [*vestigia*]” of his archetypal knowledge to rational creatures, and thus its category was deemed to have sufficient utility in capturing the incommunicable nature of God’s essential knowledge as well as the vestigial nature of human’s ectypal knowledge.¹²⁶

In fact Junius used various words to describe the nature of that discourse: it is an act of transmission (*transmissio*), impression (*impressio*), or even a certain kind of emanation (ἀπορροή), not in the sense of extending divine essence, but in the sense of communicating the radiance (ἀπαύγασμα) and the fragment (ἀποσπασμάτιον) of eternal wisdom.¹²⁷ It is also an act of stamping—Junius argued that in ectypal theology one finds “a kind of relief image stamped by the essential theology.”¹²⁸ In addition to these verbs that express different nuances of God’s communicative act, he also contended that God “tempered His revelations to our condition and accommodated Himself voluntarily to human reason and to the salvation of His own church.”¹²⁹ His use of the word “tempered [*contemperatum*]” was deliberate; he also used the same term elsewhere to state that God by his wisdom and goodness provided “a mode tempered to the small capacity of nature [*modum contemperatum modulo naturae*].”¹³⁰ This

124. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (p. 88); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 202. Also, thesis 30: “The instrumental cause of this wisdom is the λόγος προφορικός, or the enunciative discourse of God: it is spoken both spiritually, and when it is corporeal, then corporeally.” Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 200.

125. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (p. 88); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 201–02.

126. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (pp. 52–53); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 110–11.

127. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (pp. 52–53); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 111.

128. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 6 (p. 50); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 106. The term “stamp” was picked up from Hebrews 1:3 by Aquinas to indicate his belief that “humans are in the image of God not according to bodily attributes—since other animals also possess such attributes—but according to human possession of intelligence.” It seems that Junius’s use of “stamp” is well aligned with this view. See Matthew Levering, *Paul in the Summa Theologiae* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 7.

129. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 22 (pp. 73–74); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 165.

130. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (pp. 75–76); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 171.

voluntary act of tempering, at one level, means that God sufficiently revealed whatever human beings need to know, but at another level, it means that whatever was not necessary or useful, God “concealed” them.¹³¹ These verbs—transmitting, impressing, emanating, tempering, stamping, and concealing—are therefore at the background when Junius used the term “adumbrating” to describe the nature of divine accommodation, because Junius consistently used the verb to describe how eternal law was related to both natural and supernatural laws; he consistently argued that eternal law was “adumbrated in nature or expressed in his word.”¹³² Thus when Junius insisted that eternal law was adumbrated in nature and in Scripture, he meant that God transmitted, impressed, emanated, tempered, stamped, and concealed his eternal law by his act of accommodation.¹³³

He did not stop there; he used another verb to explain the nature of the enunciative communication of God’s eternal concept, and it was the word “circumvestion.” He argued that God circumvested “divine, spiritual, and heavenly matters in a human, corporal, and earthly fashion, so that nothing of those things which it was profitable for us to know would escape

131. “And this is also the reason why God established that communication of His wisdom in that very manner and mode, altogether accommodated to the capacity of men and His elect, and of His church. For in this way, He announced whatever things are needful to know. But whatever He saw either was not necessary or could not usefully be communicated with us, these things He very wisely concealed.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (pp. 75–76); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 171.

132. “Thesis 4: The natural law is that which is innate to creatures endowed with reason and informs them with common notions of nature, that is, with principles and conclusions adumbrating the eternal law by a certain participation.”; or “Thesis 13: Whatever by certain reason has been ordered for the common good by the one who has such authority, according to the form of that eternal reason, which God adumbrated in nature or expressed in his word, is immutable.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 & 13 (pp. 346 & 357); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 29 & 31. This twofold communication of eternal law is definitely different from the fourfold communication construed in the nominalist tradition, despite its affirmation of the relationship between eternal and natural laws. See Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology*, 105.

133. David S. Sytsma compellingly demonstrated the continuity of Calvin’s “accommodation” in the early Reformed scholastic thought in David S. Sytsma, “Calvin, Daneau, and ‘Physica Mosaica’: Neglected Continuities at the Origins of an Early Modern Tradition,” *Church History and Religious Culture*, vol. 95, no. 4 (2015): 457–76. See also Paul Helm, *John Calvin’s Ideas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 184–208.

us.”¹³⁴ The idea of “circumvesting [*circumvestiens*]”¹³⁵ divine, spiritual, and heavenly form in a human, corporal, and earthly form is essentially an analogical circumvestion, as he argued that “there is a kind of analogy of spiritual matters with those that are corporeal.”¹³⁶ Moreover, Junius insisted that the analogical and circumvestive discourse is an instrumental cause of divine communication, as God communicated his eternal law by using spiritual and corporeal realities, or internal and external realities, “for our instruction.”¹³⁷ To carefully delineate the analogical relationship between corporeal and spiritual realities Junius distinguished a *conjoined* instrument (*conjunctum instrumentum*) from a *separated* instrument (*separatum instrumentum*) in divine communication.¹³⁸ The conjoined instrument was that which was necessarily attached to the principal cause in completing an action, and a separate instrument was that which was not necessarily joined but additionally used by the principal cause.¹³⁹ For instance, Junius noted that, in the act of speaking, things such as tongue, palate, and teeth function as a conjoined physical instrument because of their attachment to the mouth of the speaking agent. The separated instrument, however, is the air that enables the vibration of vocal cords, which has a certain independence and extrinsicality from the agent himself.¹⁴⁰ Likewise, in spiritual actions, God’s analogical communication includes both his own speech as a conjoined instrument and the speeches of angelic or human creatures as separated ones.¹⁴¹

134. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (pp. 75–76); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 172. Noe used “enrobbed” to translate “circumvestiuit,” but to capture the original Latin term and the vestigial character of the verb, the word “circumvested” is used here.

135. “In modo vero illustrem gratiam suam effecit, quum res diuinas, spiritales, & caelestes, modo humano, corporeo, & terrestri circumvestiuit (vt ita dicamus) ne quid nos fugeret earum rerum quas nostra scire intersuit.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (p. 87).

136. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (p. 88); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 200.

137. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (p. 88); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 200.

138. “Now of the instruments that we typically use for completing actions, some are joined to a principal cause while others are separated, just as in acting the hand is a conjoined instrument while a cane is a separated one.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (p. 88); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 200.

139. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (p. 88); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 200.

140. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (p. 88); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 200.

141. “God makes use, moreover, of each mode in His own spiritual discourse analogically: either He only uses His own speech as an analogical instrument, or He will have willed to employ internally the speech of angels or of ourselves. Therefore this axiom stands firm: The instrumental cause of this wisdom is the discourse of God, just as the instrumental cause of wisdom in human affairs is the discourse of one man teaching and

Hence he argued that the enunciative discourse of God uses spiritual and corporeal realities in creation as instruments and that human beings perceive the content of such discourse in both corporeal and spiritual realities.¹⁴² Its implication then is this: despite the differences that exist between spiritual and corporeal realities, the principle of analogical equivocation enables the terms that properly belong to corporeal things to be applied to spiritual matters without ignoring their difference, dissonance, or dissimilarity.¹⁴³ In the words of Frederick C. Copleston, the notion of analogy is the “notion of simultaneous similarity and difference.”¹⁴⁴

What should be noted here is that the idea of enunciation has been articulated by Aquinas as well. He remarked that “enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech”: the truth of enunciation in God’s intellect is truth itself, whereas the truth in God’s speech is called “the enunciative truth.”¹⁴⁵ In addition to this, Aquinas argued that “words are signs of ideas, and the ideas the similitude of things.”¹⁴⁶ As words are functionally situated between ideas and things, he treated two extreme views concerning verbal predications of God. On the one hand, he rejected a univocal view by stating that “[u]nivocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner.”¹⁴⁷ On the other hand, he rejected a pure equivocality of predication, for it would entail that nothing about God can be truly known or demonstrated by

instructing another.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (p. 88); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 200–01.

142. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (pp. 88–89); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 202.

143. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 30 (p. 88); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 200.

144. Frederick C. Copleston, *Medieval Philosophy*, vol. 2, *A History of Philosophy*, reprinted ed. (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2019), 356.

145. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 16, a. 7, co.

146. “I answer that, since according to the Philosopher (*Peri Herm.* i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it.” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 13, a. 1, co.

147. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 13, a. 5.

human language.¹⁴⁸ Aquinas's middle way was analogous predication: "Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, that is, according to proportion."¹⁴⁹ This proportional understanding of analogy was understood as "a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation," because "in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing."¹⁵⁰

In addition, in his *Summa theologica*, Aquinas used the categories of separate instrument (*separatum instrumentum*) and conjoined instrument (*coniunctum instrumentum*) to convey the sacramental notion that God communicates grace through a twofold instrument: Christ's humanity as a conjoined instrument, and the sacrament as a separate instrument.¹⁵¹ This was a further elaboration of the point that, though the principal agent of salvific acts is Christ's divinity, "Christ's humanity is the instrument of the Godhead [*humanitas Christi est divinitatis instrumentum*]."¹⁵² What is interesting to note is that Junius applied these Christological distinctions to the area of *prolegomena* to provide an analogical way of interweaving corporeal things, spiritual things, and eternal law—the corporeal reality analogically communicates the spiritual reality, and the spiritual reality in turn analogically

148. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 13, a. 5.

149. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 13, a. 5. Of course, Aquinas was not the only one who used the concept of analogy in discussing predication; for instance, see Ockham, *Reportatio*, III, q. viii provided in William Ockham, *Philosophical Writings: A Selection*, trans. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1990), 106–13.

150. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 13, a. 5.

151. "I answer that, As stated above (Article 1) a sacrament in causing grace works after the manner of an instrument. Now an instrument is twofold. the one, separate, as a stick, for instance; the other, united, as a hand. Moreover, the separate instrument is moved by means of the united instrument, as a stick by the hand. Now the principal efficient cause of grace is God Himself, in comparison with Whom Christ's humanity is as a united instrument, whereas the sacrament is as a separate instrument. Consequently, the saving power must needs be derived by the sacraments from Christ's Godhead through His humanity." Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 62, a. 5, co.

152. "I answer that, There is a twofold efficient agency—namely, the principal and the instrumental. Now the principal efficient cause of man's salvation is God. But since Christ's humanity is the 'instrument of the Godhead,' as stated above (Question 43, Article 2), therefore all Christ's actions and sufferings operate instrumentally in virtue of His Godhead for the salvation of men. Consequently, then, Christ's Passion accomplishes man's salvation efficiently." Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 48, a. 6, co.

communicates the *imagines* of eternal law.¹⁵³ In this framework, therefore, the principle of analogy operates on two levels: first, between corporeal and spiritual realities, and second, between spiritual and eternal realities.

By examining Junius's posthumous work *Summa aliquot locorum communium ss. theologiae* Muller argued that Junius denied the univocal predication as a fitting way to speak about God, and that Junius assumed a Thomistic principle of analogy of proper proportionality.¹⁵⁴ Junius affirmed "three degrees (*gradus*) of the perception of God," Muller noted, "whether in nature or in Scripture."¹⁵⁵ The first degree is by way of negation, by which creaturely properties and attributes are negated to exist in God as God does not belong to creaturely *genus* and as God transcends creation.¹⁵⁶ The second degree, on the other, is by way of affirmation or perfection, by which creaturely properties and attributes are positively attributed to God but upon acknowledging God as the source and archetype of those properties and attributes.¹⁵⁷ This second way of predication gives support to "an analogy of proper proportionality," Muller reasoned, because this method sees God as the "principle analogate" of all creaturely perfections.¹⁵⁸ The third way is by way of "supereminence": this is the method by which the excellence of creaturely perfections was understood to exist primarily and—as Junius here peculiarly stated—"univocally" in God.¹⁵⁹ Also in *De theologia vera* Junius claimed, by explicitly following the scholastics, that "wisdom is predicated of God univocally but of ourselves equivocally," in order to mean that the archetypal wisdom belongs firstly, properly, and in the highest degree to God.¹⁶⁰ Muller described the meaning of this kind of

153. These ideas correspond to the interconnected relationship between intramental *res*, extramental *res*, and divine ideas.

154. Richard A. Muller, "Not Scotist: Understandings of Being, Univocity, and Analogy in Early-Modern Reformed Thought," *Reformation & Renaissance Review*, vol. 14, no. 2 (August, 2012): 139–40; idem, "Reading Aquinas from a Reformed Perspective: A Review Essay," 255–88.

155. Muller, "Not Scotist," 139.

156. Muller, "Not Scotist," 139.

157. Muller, "Not Scotist," 140.

158. Muller, "Not Scotist," 140.

159. Muller, "Not Scotist," 140.

160. See Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 7 (pp. 59–60); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 108.

“univocity” in this way: “a term can be predicated univocally of God when the term is understood by way of excellence or supereminence, to be essential and intrinsic to God in a way that it cannot be to creatures.”¹⁶¹ This “univocal” way of predicating creaturely attributes to God did not mean to Junius that the God-creation relation ought to be univocal, but that creaturely perfections are properly, originally, and in the highest degree God’s perfections; and therefore, despite the use of the term “univocal” here, Muller concluded that Junius most probably adopted “analogy of proportionality, considering the attribute to be essential and perfect in God, derived and imperfect in the creatures.”¹⁶²

Though Muller correctly observed that Junius adopted a Thomistic view of analogy as opposed to a Scotistic view of univocity, an argument can be made that Junius’s view is more appropriately designated as *analogy of attribution*, rather than *analogy of proportionality*.¹⁶³ To begin with, Junius conceived the relation between divine intellect and human intellect in terms of analogical relations, rather than univocal relations,¹⁶⁴ and this view was exhibited in the context of discussing analogy in more or less a semantic sense.¹⁶⁵ Unlike univocation, which he simply understood as an application of common names to different entities, Junius

161. Muller, “Not Scotist,” 140.

162. Muller, “Not Scotist,” 140.

163. Here “the analogy of attribution (or proportion)” refers to the concept that an analogical term (e.g., wise) first and foremost predicates the perfection in the primary analogate, namely God, and it attributes that perfection to secondary analogates, namely creatures. In this view, God’s perfections are intrinsic to himself but are extrinsically denominated, attributed, and predicated of creatures. On the other hand, “the analogy of proportionality” refers to the notion that perfections such as wisdom can be applied to both God and creatures insofar as both God and creatures share that perfection in proportionally differing degrees. This view, often described as the Cajetanian view, regards both analogates (God and creatures) share the perfection intrinsically but in a proportionally different way.

164. “[B]ecause this very name of law is customarily predicated of that highest reason of divine wisdom which moves and directs all things to a just end, in the same way also this definition of law must be commonly understood concerning that highest reason or ordering. Moreover, that law is spoken about analogically, and not, so to speak, ὁμογενῆς, that is, of one kind with our laws.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (p. 344); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 40.

165. “[T]he significance of this distinction [between archetypal and ectypal theologies] is so great that these very discrepant topics cannot be suitably enough differentiated with the same term, nor can these quite disparate ideas, which we designate with one word, be contained in one genus. Therefore, as those ideas which are explained under the designation theology differ in their whole genus according to the nature and their own quality, but fittingly share some qualities by a certain analogy, so also the consonance of the term, or equivocation (as it is commonly called) must be established.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 6 (pp. 49–50); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 103. Considering the relationship between *res* and *ratio*, however, the gap between semantic and ontological concentrations of analogy should not be too rigid.

distinguished equivocation into pure and analogical.¹⁶⁶ He defined, in attempting to speak “in the manner of the scholastics,” a pure equivocation as a relation of terms whose meanings are completely different to each other, and an analogical equivocation as “one in which, of those things which are said equivocally, the meaning is the same in one respect or relatively, and at the same time differs in another respect.”¹⁶⁷ Because of the fact that analogical equivocation captures both dissonance and consonance of terms, or both dissimilarity and similarity of meanings, he noted that it was the method scholastics used to explain “the terms for divine and human matters.”¹⁶⁸ Its suitability came from its recognition of the fact that God needs to be placed outside of creation as he is eternal, infinite, and divine—and thus he needs to be firmly located outside of all creaturely *genera* before establishing any meaningful connection between the two. Consequent to affirming the equivocation, however, a certain relationship must be established, as God through his communication truly enables rational creatures “to grasp things about God.”¹⁶⁹

He then used four technical Greek phrases to describe the nature of the analogy. First, he used the phrase “θεοπρεπῶς” or “*theoprepos*,” the concept of which was used also by later Reformed theologians such as John Owen (1616–83), Francis Turretin (1623–87), and Johannes Hoornbeeck (1617–66), to convey that eternal law should be understood in a manner that is appropriate or fitting to the transcendent God.¹⁷⁰ Secondly, Junius used the phrase “ἄφ’

166. The *locus classicus* of this issue is Aristotle’s statements in the beginning of his *Categories*. See Aristotle’s *Categories* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 3.

167. “[W]e call that a pure equivocation in which there is obviously and completely a differing meaning of those things which are said equivocally. For thus we may speak in the manner of the scholastics.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 6 (pp. 49–50); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 103.

168. Junius, *De theologia Vera*, thesis 6 (pp. 49–50); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 103.

169. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 41.

170. “Moreover, that law is spoken about analogically, and not, so to speak, ὁμογενῆς, that is, of one kind with our laws. Therefore, it is also necessary that this definition of the law, which we have asserted in this way, be received in such an analogical way that insofar as these things are said about God they are understood divinely [θεοπρεπῶς] and to the extent that we are able to grasp things about God. As they have been said about created things, however, they are understood properly.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (p. 344); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 40. See also Francis Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, ed. James T. Dennison, trans. George Musgrave Giger (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R, 1992), 1.206; John Owen, *Vindiciae Evangelicae; Or, the Mystery of the Gospel Vindicated and Socinianism Examined* (Dale Tuggy, 2009), ch.

ἐνὸς πρὸς ἕν” to express that his use of analogy was from the field of logic.¹⁷¹ In medieval scholastic thought this phrase was associated with the principle of “*ab uno*” and “*ad unum*” and it literally meant “from one toward one.”¹⁷² E.J. Ashworth noted that this so-called *proshen* equivocation was frequently used by medieval logicians in association with *analogia* and, when they appealed to analogy in discussing the nature of theological predication, they often meant an analogical form of equivocation, rather than something that is completely distinct from equivocation.¹⁷³ Ashworth further noted that she never encountered a medieval logician who used analogy in the sense of *analogy of proportionality* in their works, as all of them used analogy in the sense of *analogy of attribution* or *proportion*.¹⁷⁴ Gilson was of the same view: he argued that the notion of analogy in Aquinas’s thought was a distinct form of equivocation and, moreover, that it was the analogy of proportion.¹⁷⁵ Copleston also reckoned that in Aquinas’s thought “the analogy of proportionality presupposes analogy of proportion or attribution and that the latter is the more fundamental of the two kinds of analogy.”¹⁷⁶

Ashworth furthermore argued that even the fifteenth century Thomists such as Dominic of Flanders (1425–79), Paulus Soncinas (d. 1494), and Johannes Capreolus (c. 1380–1444) understood analogy as a way of attribution, but it was Tommaso de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534) who designated the principle of proportionality as the proper way to use *analogia*.¹⁷⁷ In fact

4; on Johannes Hoornbeeck’s use of *theoprepos* in interpreting Psalm 2:7 against Socinians, see Mark Jones, *Why Heaven Kissed the Earth: The Christology of the Puritan Reformed Orthodox Theologian, Thomas Goodwin (1600–1680)* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 152.

171. “Quapropter etiam in hac diuisione (quod genus Logici ἀφ’ ἐνὸς πρὸς ἕν appellarunt) tum τὸ φύσει πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, tum etiam τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον obseruatur.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis obseruatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 41.

172. E.J. Ashworth, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background,” *Vivarium*, vol. 33, no. 1 (1995): 57.

173. Ashworth, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being,” 55.

174. E.J. Ashworth, “Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) on Analogy and Equivocation,” in *Studies on the History of Logic: Proceedings of the III. Symposium on the History of Logic*, ed. Ignacio Angelelli and María Cerezo (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996), 122.

175. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 106.

176. Copleston, *Medieval Philosophy*, 356.

177. “Like Cajetan, Soto divided genuine analogy into the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proportionality. During the middle ages none of the logicians that I am acquainted with appealed to the analogy of proportionality in their logical works, and this is certainly true of the fifteenth-century Thomists Dominic of Flanders and Paulus Soncinas, as well as of the theologian Johannes Capreolus. Cajetan, however,

Cajetan in his *De nominum analogia* noted that Greek philosophers had used the expression “from one, in one and to one” to place an analogical predication “midway between equivocal and univocal terms.”¹⁷⁸ Upon distinguishing the differences between analogy of proportion and proportionality, he devoted the rest of his attention to the latter kind by treating the issues of metaphors, intentions, and denominations as the proper study of the term *analogia*.¹⁷⁹ Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) followed suit, and used the term *analogia* broadly as a reference to both analogy of attribution and of proportionality.¹⁸⁰ Given this background, then, Junius’s use of analogy as a *pros hen* equivocation indicates his appropriation of the older approach to analogy rather than the newer approach, although he did not explicitly use technical terms to designate one particular view as more fitting.

Thirdly, Junius used the phrases “τὸ φύσει πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον” and “τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον” to refer to two interrelated logical principles: “that which is by nature prior and that which is posterior” and “that which is greater and that which is lesser.”¹⁸¹ He used these phrases to insist that “the eternal law and its own nature is prior and by its own infinite virtue entirely surpasses every mode of natural and human law.”¹⁸² Ashworth argued that the first phrase was associated with analogy of attribution, because to medieval logicians “analogical terms were terms which signified their objects in a prior and a posterior way (*secundum prius et posterius*), and according to attribution (*secundum attributionem*), because of a relationship between the

not only used the analogy of proportionality but insisted on giving it a privileged position.” Ashworth, “Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) on Analogy and Equivocation,” 122. See also Ralph M. McInerney, *Aquinas and Analogy* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996); Joshua P. Hochschild, *The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). Ashworth made some perceptive—and critical—comments on McInerney’s treatment of Aquinas’s analogy in E.J. Ashworth, “Book Review: Aquinas and Analogy,” *Speculum*, vol. 74, no. 1 (January 1999): 215–17.

178. Its translation is available from Tommaso de Vio Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, trans. Edward A. Bushinski (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009), ch. 2, 19–20.

179. See especially Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, ch. 3, 23–30.

180. Ashworth, “Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) on Analogy and Equivocation,” 120–21.

181. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 41–42.

182. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 42.

principal significate and the secondary significate.”¹⁸³ Gilson also explained this form of analogy as a way of understanding that which is prior as the cause and that which is posterior as the effect: “Signs and effects of God, the perfections of things are not what God Himself is; but God Himself is in an infinitely higher mode, what things are.”¹⁸⁴

On top of that, the latter phrase of “τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον” or “that which is greater and that which is lesser” appears in Aquinas’s *Summa* when he used the phrase to explain the relationship between eternal law in itself and its effect:

A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (*de vera relig.* Xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.¹⁸⁵

Hence, judging from Junius’s use of these Greek phrases, it can be argued that Junius most likely understood analogy as a form of attribution rather than as a form of proportionality, though Muller was certainly correct to note the Thomistic underpinnings in Junius’s stance on theological predication.¹⁸⁶ Clearly these accounts counter the univocal view: unlike Scotus who contended that “God cannot be known naturally unless being is univocal to the created and uncreated,” Junius employed the categories of accommodation, adumbration, and analogy to achieve the knowability of divine essence—not as it is, but as it is captured and moderated through nature and Scripture.¹⁸⁷ In Junius’s thought, therefore, both the Calvinistic view of

183. Ashworth, “Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) on Analogy and Equivocation,” 120–21.

184. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 107.

185. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 91, a. 2.

186. Ashworth also argued that the notion of *analogia entis* as a metaphysical concept was foreign to Aristotle and Aquinas, because to them the issue of analogy pertained to language and logic; the ontological use of analogy was Scotus’s construction, rather than Aquinas’s. See E.J. Ashworth, “Analogy and Metaphor from Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus and Walter Burley,” in *Later Medieval Metaphysics: Ontology, Language, and Logic* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 223.

187. Cf. Muller, s.v. “univocatio,” *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 383. See also, Scotus, *De Metaphysica*, iii–v and *Cognitio Naturalis De Deo* in *Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings*, 4–12 & 19–30.

accommodation and the Thomistic view of analogy are coherently integrated, as God's analogical communication was presented as a form of God's accommodated communication and as theological predications were clearly presented as analogical and accommodated forms of speech.

3.5 Conclusion

In commenting on the eternal law, Aquinas noted Augustine's views on the relationship between eternal law and other laws:

Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb. i.6*) that knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us. I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (*de vera relig. Xxxi*). Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.¹⁸⁸

Judging Junius's views in the light of these comments, then, Junius's pattern of argumentation appears to be predominantly Thomistic: for instance, Junius, in a Thomistic fashion, grounded the immutability of eternal law in the simplicity, actuality, and eternity of divine essence; and second, he understood eternal law as divine idea or reason. Junius did not alter the ways in which eternal law relates to both the divine essence and the divine mind as far as Thomistic concepts are concerned, but he used various verbs such as transmitting, impressing, emanating, tempering, stamping, concealing, and circumvesting to capture different nuances and modes of divine communication. In this framework, to use Gilson's words, Junius eclectically presented God as both "the supreme Intelligent" and "the supreme Intelligible."¹⁸⁹

188. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 91, a. 2.

189. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 111.

Having covered these areas it will be worth raising this question: what function does eternal law have in Junius's moral thought? In his moral thought eternal law is the rational, formal, and immutable foundation of moral order. It is the *exemplar*, *ratio*, and *terminus* of all moral order, as it is the source and reference of moral righteousness. It is therefore helpful to be mindful of the fact that, as Muller argued, "in virtually all aspects of the doctrinal exposition, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Reformed writers evidence a significant interrelation, even interplay, between the doctrine of God and the other topics of their theology."¹⁹⁰ This is certainly true in the case of Junius's moral thought; God's immutable essence and ideas function as unalterable, archetypal, and purest bases of all kinds of laws promulgated in time, and his metaphysical notions of God preserved the partition between Creator and creation while protecting their connection by way of accommodation, adumbration, and analogy. The texts and interpretations provided thus far do not suggest that the scholastic concepts used in Junius's construal of eternal law are predominately Scotistic, as there is no indication that his primary concern was to engage with Scotistic concepts and concerns at the expense of Thomistic ones—the issues pertaining to the univocity of being, formal distinctions, and voluntaristic freedom did not occupy much space in Junius's moral thought and, as Muller stated, a strong accent on the contingency of creation "is not enough to identify a later theologian as 'Scotist.'"¹⁹¹

190. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 3.33.

191. Muller, *Divine Will and Human Choice*, 176.

CHAPTER 4

**NATURAL LAW:
THE NATURAL ORDERING OF MORAL ACTION**

4.1 Introduction

Against the conglomerate force of Barthianism, antinomianism, and biblicism, a minority group of scholars in the twentieth century—notably John T. McNeill—strenuously endeavored to substantiate the claim that “[t]here is no real discontinuity between the teaching of the Reformers and that of their predecessors with respect to natural law.”¹ By continuing and modifying this line of argument a number of important monographs were published in recent times, and they have considerably advanced scholarly investigations on the topic. For instance, the intersection between natural law and politics in early modern Europe was well documented in John Witte Jr.’s works.² Stephen J. Grabill, on the other hand, convincingly demonstrated how natural law was construed as a legitimate form of natural theology by various Reformed orthodox theologians, and his work contributed in significant ways to the solidification of the thesis that the natural law doctrine, “to a large degree, remained unbroken in the theology of the Protestant Reformers and their orthodox sixteenth and seventeenth-century successors.”³ David VanDrunen also provided scores of works to show how natural law was construed as a

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1. John T. McNeill, “Natural Law in the Teaching of the Reformers,” *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 26, no. 3 (1946): 168. See Josef Bohatec, *Calvin und das Recht* (Feudingingen in Westfalen: Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt G. m. b. H, 1934); Günter Gloede, *Theologia naturalis bei Calvin* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1935); John T. McNeil, “Natural Law in the Thought of Luther,” *Church History*, vol. 10 (1941): 211–27; T.H.L. Parker, *The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God: A Study in Calvin’s Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1959); John D. Eusden, “Natural Law and Covenant Theology in New England, 1620–1670,” *Natural Law Forum*, vol. 47 (1960): 1–30; Lee W. Gibbs, “Puritan Natural Law Theory in William Ames,” *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. 64, no. 1 (1971): 37–57; Paul Helm, “Calvin and Natural Law,” *Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology*, vol. 2 (1984): 5–22; Susan E. Schreiner, *The Theater of His Glory: Nature and the Natural Order in the Thought of John Calvin* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Publishing, 1991); Guenther Haas, *The Concept of Equity in Calvin’s Ethics* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997).
 2. John Witte Jr., *Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); idem, *The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); idem, “Law, Authority, and Liberty in Early Calvinism,” in *A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy*, ed. Herman Selderhuis (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013), 591–612.
 3. Stephen John Grabill, *Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2006), 2.

form of divine government in early modern Reformed tradition.⁴ Many other scholars also examined the Reformed approach to natural law, but they mostly concentrated on John Calvin's (1509–64) thought on the doctrine,⁵ though a few other broadly Reformed figures such as Peter

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4. David VanDrunen, "The Context of Natural Law: John Calvin's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms," *Journal of Church and State*, vol. 46, no. 3 (2004): 503–25; idem, "The Use of Natural Law in Early Calvinist Resistance Theory," *Journal of Law and Religion*, vol. 21, no. 1 (2005–06): 143–67; idem, "Medieval Natural Law and the Reformation: A Comparison of Aquinas and Calvin," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 80, no. 1 (2006): 77–98; idem, "Abraham Kuyper and the Reformed Natural Law and Two Kingdoms Traditions," *Calvin Theological Journal*, vol. 42, no. 2 (2007): 283–307; idem, *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social Thought* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2010); idem, "Presbyterians, Philosophy, Natural Theology, and Apologetics," in *The Oxford Handbook of Presbyterianism*, ed. Gary Scott Smit and P.C. Kemeny (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 457–73; idem, "Natural Law and Reformed Theology," in *Research Handbook in Natural Law Theory*, ed. Jonathan Crowe and Constance Y. Lee (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 204–22.
 5. David Little, "Calvin and the Prospects for a Christian Theory of Natural Law," ed. Gene Outka and Paul Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1968), 175–97; Raymond K. Anderson, *Love and Order: The Life-Structuring Dynamics of Grace and Virtue in Calvin's Ethical Thought* (Chambersburg, PA: Anderson, 1973); Allen Verhey, "Natural Law in Aquinas and Calvin," in *God and the Good: Essays in Honor of Henry Stob*, ed. Clifton Orlebeke and Lewis Smedes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), 80–92; August Lang, "The Reformation and Natural Law," in *Calvin and the Reformation*, ed. William Park Armstrong, trans. J. Gresham Machen (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1980), 56–98; William Klempa, "John Calvin on Natural Law," in *John Calvin and the Church: A Prism of Reform*, ed. Timothy George (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1990), 72–95; I. John Hesselink, *Calvin's Concept of the Law* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 1992); David C. Steinmetz, "Calvin and the Natural Knowledge of God," in *Calvin in Context*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 23–39; R.S. Clark, "Calvin and the Lex Naturalis," *Stulos*, vol. 6 (November 1998): 1–22; Irena Backus, "Calvin's Concept of Natural and Roman Laws," *Calvin Theological Journal*, vol. 38 (2003): 7–26; C. Scott Pryor, "God's Bridle: John Calvin's Application of Natural Law," *Journal of Law and Religion*, vol. 22, no. 1 (2006–07): 225–54; John Witte Jr., "Calvin the Lawyer," in *Tributes to John Calvin: A Celebration of His Quincentenary* (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 2010), 34–58; idem, "John Calvin," in *Great Christian Jurists in French History*, ed. Olivier Descampes and Rafael Domingo (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 117–33; Marta Garcio-Alonso, "Biblical Law as the Source of Morality in Calvin," *History of Political Thought*, vol. 32, no. 1 (2011): 1–19; Neil Arner, "Theological Voluntarism and the Natural Law: The Integrated Moral Theories of John Duns Scotus, John Calvin, and Samuel Pufendorf" (PhD Dissertation: Yale University, 2012); Guenther Haas, "Calvin, Natural Law, and the Two Kingdoms," in *Kingdom Apart: Engaging the Two Kingdoms Perspective*, ed. Ryan C. McIlhenny (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 2012), 33–63; Charles Raith II, "Calvin's Theological Appropriation of His Philosophical Sources: A Note on Natural Law and Institutes 2.2.22–23," *Calvin Theological Journal*, vol. 47, no. 1 (2012): 32–49; Jennifer A. Herdt, "Calvin's Legacy for Contemporary Reformed Natural Law," *Scottish Journal of Theology*, vol. 67, no. 4 (2014): 414–35; Constance Y. Lee, "Calvinist Natural Law and the Ultimate Good," *The Western Australian Jurist*, vol. 5 (2014): 153–75; idem, "The Spark That Still Shines: John Calvin on Conscience and Natural Law," *Oxford Journal of Law and Religion*, vol. 8, no. 3 (2019): 615–40; David S. Sytsma, "Calvin, Daneau, and 'Physica Mosaica': Neglected Continuities at the Origins of an Early Modern Tradition," *Church History and Religious Culture*, vol. 95, no. 4 (2015): 457–76; idem, "John Calvin and Virtue Ethics: Augustinian and Aristotelian Themes," *Journal of Religious Ethics*, vol. 48, no. 3 (2020): 519–56; Matthew J. Tuininga, "'Because of Your Hardness of Heart': Calvin and the Limits of Law," *Scottish Journal of Theology*, vol. 69, no. 3 (2016): 281–94; idem, *Calvin's Political Theology and the Public Engagement of the Church* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Denis Edwards, "John Calvin (1509–1564)," in *Christian Understandings of Creation: The Historical Trajectory* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), 171–90.

Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562)⁶ and Richard Hooker (1554–1600)⁷ have received sustained attention. The rest of the Reformed scholastic thinkers, however, have only received sporadic examinations, despite the sophisticated and matured accounts of natural law in their works.⁸

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6. Sebastian Rehnman, “Virtue and Grace,” *Studies in Christian Ethics*, vol. 25, no. 4 (2012): 472–93; idem, “Moral Philosophy and Moral Theology in Vermigli,” in *Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism*, 199–214; Eric M. Parker and Jordan J. Ballor, “‘Fides Mater Virtutum Est’: Peter Martyr Vermigli’s Disagreement with Thomas Aquinas on the ‘Form’ of the Virtues,” *Reformation & Renaissance Review*, vol. 15, no. 1 (2013): 54–67; W. Bradford Littlejohn and Jordan J. Ballor, “More Than a Swineherd’: Hooker, Vermigli, and an Aristotelian Defense of the Royal Supremacy,” *Reformation & Renaissance Review*, vol. 15, no. 1 (2013): 68–83; Gary Jenkins and Jordan J. Ballor, “Citizen Vermigli: The Political Animal in Vermigli’s Commonwealth,” *Reformation & Renaissance Review*, vol. 15, no. 1 (2013): 84–98; Mark J. Larson, “Peter Martyr Vermigli, Scholasticism, and Aquinas’ Justice of War Doctrine,” in *Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on the Maturation of a Theological Tradition*, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, David S. Sytsma, and Jason Zuidema (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 185–97.
7. Paul Surlis, “Natural Law in Richard Hooker (c. 1554–1600),” *Irish Theological Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 2 (June 1968): 173–91; J.P. Somerville, “Richard Hooker, Hadrian Saravia, and the Advent of the Divine Right of Kings,” *History of Political Thought*, vol. 4, no. 2 (1983): 229–45; W.J. Torrance Kirby, *Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy* (Leiden, New York: Brill, 1990); idem, “Richard Hooker’s Theory of Natural Law in the Context of Reformation Theology,” *Sixteenth Century Journal*, vol. 30 (1999): 681–703; idem, “Richard Hooker and Thomas Aquinas on Defining Law,” in *Aquinas Among the Protestants*, ed. Manfred Svensson and David VanDrunen (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018), 91–108; Daniel Westberg, “Thomistic Law and the Moral Theory of Richard Hooker,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, vol. 68 (1994): 203–14; Nigel Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology: A Study of Reason, Will, and Grace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); A.J. Joyce, *Richard Hooker and Anglican Moral Theology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); W. Bradford Littlejohn, *The Peril and Promise of Christian Liberty: Richard Hooker, the Puritans, and Protestant Political Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2017).
8. Peter A. Lillback, “Ursinus’ Development of the Covenant of Creation: A Debt to Melancthon or Calvin?,” *Westminster Theological Journal*, vol. 43, no. 2 (1981): 247–88; Donald Sinnema, “The Discipline of Ethics in Early Reformed Orthodoxy,” *Calvin Theological Journal*, vol. 28 (1993): 10–44; A. W. G. Raath, “Divine Law, Natural Law and Reason in Dutch Jurisprudence: The Rise of Moral Relativism in the Jurisprudence of the Dutch ‘Golden Age,’” *Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap*, vol. 41, no. 3/4 (2005): 1–31; Christofer Frey, “Natural Law and Commandments: Conditions for the Reception of the Decalogue since the Reformation,” in *The Decalogue in Jewish and Christian Tradition*, ed. Yair Hoffman and Henning Graf Reventlow (New York: T & T Clark, 2011), 118–31; Jordan J. Ballor, *Covenant, Causality, and Law: A Study in the Theology of Wolfgang Musculus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012); idem, “A Society of Mutual Aid: Natural Law and Subsidiarity in Early Modern Reformed Perspective,” in *Law and Religion: The Legal Teachings of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations*, ed. Jordan J. Ballor et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), 9–21; David S. Sytsma, “Sir Matthew Hale (1609–1676) and Natural Law in the Seventeenth Century,” *Journal of Markets and Morality*, vol. 17, no. 1 (2014): 205–56; Simon J. Burton, “Samuel Rutherford’s *Euthyphro* Dilemma: A Reformed Perspective on the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition,” in *Reformed Orthodoxy in Scotland: Essays on Scottish Theology 1560–1775*, ed. Aaron C. Denlinger (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 123–39; Robert von Friedeburg, “The Rise of Natural Law in the Early Modern Period,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Theology (1600–1800)*, ed. Ulrich L. Lehner, Richard A. Muller, and A.G. Roeber (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 624–41; Gijbert van den Brink and Aza Goudriaan, “The Image of God in Reformed Orthodoxy: Soundings in the Development of an Anthropological Key Concept,” *Perichoresis*, vol. 14, no. 3 (2016): 81–96; Kirk M. Summers, *Morality After Calvin: Theodore Beza’s Christian Censor and Reformed Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Knud Haakonssen, “Early Modern Natural Law Theories,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence*, ed. George Duke and Robert P. George (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 76–102; Mary-Anne Plaatjies van Huffel, “Natural Law in the Reformed Tradition,” in *Christianity and Natural Law: An Introduction*, ed. Norman Doe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 121–39; Richard A. Muller, “Was It Really Viral? Natural Theology in the Early Modern Reformed Tradition,” in *Crossing Traditions: Essays on the Reformation and Intellectual History in Honour of Irena Backus* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 507–31; Paul Helm, *Human Nature from Calvin to Edwards* (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2018);

There are at least three significant threads of arguments these studies have produced. The first one is the straightforward thesis that natural law as a doctrinal category was positively received by early modern Protestant theologians. As Jennifer Herdt put it well, “the magisterial wing of the Protestant Reformation continued to employ the natural law tradition as a lingua franca for ethical reflection, even as that tradition was reinterpreted in light of new understandings of the Fall and of justification.”⁹ It is therefore of paramount importance to consider the fact that, after dissociating from the Roman Catholic Church and relativizing the juridical role of canon law, Protestant magistrates and theologians conjointly undertook the task of sifting through the inherited body of law on the one hand and establishing an acceptable theology of law on the other.¹⁰ The doctrine of natural law, in this context, was positively received, refined, and retained by Protestant traditions. The second notable line of argument, which was made primarily by medieval historians and philosophers, is that natural law as an objective moral standard was a firmly established doctrine not only in the tradition of *via antiqua* but also in the tradition of *via moderna*, and accordingly all Thomist, Scotist, and Ockhamist traditions affirmed it.¹¹ The last area of significant achievement is the informed

Manfred Svensson, “Aristotelian Practical Philosophy from Melanchthon to Eisenhart: Protestant Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics 1529–1682,” *Reformation & Renaissance Review*, vol. 21, no. 3 (2019): 218–38; Jennifer A. Herdt, “Natural Law in Protestant Christianity,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Ethics*, ed. Tom Angier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 155–78; J.V. Fesko, *The Covenant of Works: The Origins, Development, and Reception of the Doctrine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020); Harrison Perkins, *Catholicity and the Covenant of Works: James Ussher and the Reformed Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

9. Herdt, “Natural Law in Protestant Christianity,” 155. Cf. Merio Scattola, “Natural Law Part II: The Protestant and Philosophy Traditions,” in *The Routledge Companion to Sixteenth Century Philosophy*, ed. Henrick Lagerlund and Benjamin Hill (New York: Routledge, 2017), 580–613.

10. Herdt, “Natural Law in Protestant Christianity,” 156.

11. See John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio III*, d. 37, q. un and William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta*, v, q. i. For secondary sources, see William J. Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” in *The Pursuit of Holiness*, ed. Charles Trinkhaus and Heiko A. Oberman (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 26–59; Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M., *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Heiko A. Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2000); Douglas C. Langston, *Conscience and Other Virtues: From Bonaventure to MacIntyre* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 53–61; Hannes Möhle, “Scotus’s Theory of Natural Law,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 312–31; Grabill, *Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics*, 54–69; VanDrunen, *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms*, 42–55.

acknowledgement that the Protestant—or more narrowly the Reformed—doctrine of natural law was tethered to various adjacent theological ideas, such as revelation, reason, virtue, salvation, covenant, and governance.¹²

By situating Junius’s natural law doctrine against these discoveries and issues, this chapter will proceed toward answering this question: what Thomistic concepts did Junius appropriate in his articulation of natural law? Also, given that his philosophy was eclectic, how did he retain, refine, or reject the inherited legacies of the doctrine? The main argument of this chapter, then, is that Junius’s doctrine of natural law demonstrates a modified appropriation of Thomistic ideas in four areas: natural law’s inclinations, notions, participation, and limitations. Considerations of these four areas will shed light on how Junius construed the relationship between intellect and will, nature and grace, and divine reason and human reason, and all of these ideas will be assumed in the treatments of other three laws, namely divine, human, and Mosaic laws.

4.2 Natural Law as Internal and Intrinsic Order of Human Action

As a preliminary note, five points need to be stated at the outset. First of all, Junius’s theology of law revolves around two architectonic principles. The first principle is rooted in divine ontology (*essentia Dei*), and the other is in divine economy or work (*opera Dei*). Using Junius’s own terms those principles can be categorized as archetypal and ectypal ones—his conception of law rests on the distinction between God’s being in eternity and God’s act in history, as law is “either eternal or informed and declared in time.”¹³ Furthermore, the purpose of bifurcating

12. Grabill calls this the “internal” context of the doctrine of natural law. Grabill, *Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics*, 18.

13. Franciscus Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, ed. Abraham Kuyper (Amsterdam: Muller and Kruyt, 1882), thesis 2 (p. 345). The translations of Junius’s *De Politiae Mosis Observatione* used in this chapter are from Franciscus Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, ed. Andrew M McGinnis, trans. Todd M. Rester (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2015). See page 41 of *The Mosaic Polity* for the cited quotation.

all laws into eternal and temporal categories was to clearly distinguish immutable laws from mutable ones; he claimed that “whoever establishes mutable or dead laws in the place of absolutely necessary ones steals the liberty of Christians, and whoever establishes deadly ones steals their life.”¹⁴ If pressed further, however, it can be discovered that both the law in eternity and the laws in time revolve around one fundamental concept in Junius’s theology, and it is the concept of *nature*. To him eternal law is rooted in divine nature and all the laws enacted in time are rooted in human nature—in addition to locating the eternal law in divine essence he argued that “law that is in time is either the natural law or that which advenes to nature.”¹⁵ Such a nature-centered theory of law is not surprising, however, if one recognizes the deeply embedded principle of *agere sequitur esse* in his thought.¹⁶

Secondly, crucial to Junius’s metaphysics of creation—thus of God’s economy—is the distinction between internal and external principles of things. He insisted that “entirely everything that exists among created things has either an internal principle from nature in them or one that advenes to them outwardly from some external principle acting on them and operating in them.”¹⁷ In scholastic philosophy the adjective “internal” was used to describe something that was “within a being or within a power,” and the term “external,” on the other hand, was used to describe something that originated from the outside of a thing’s being or power.¹⁸ The associated term “adventitious” similarly meant that something was acquired and added, thus not inherent, and it implied that the thing was added to “a being already complete

14. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 38 (p. 392); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 164.

15. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 3, (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 43.

16. Cf. Richard A. Muller, s.v. “*agere sequitur esse*,” *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally From Protestant Scholastic Theology*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), 19–20.

17. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 3 (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 43–44.

18. Bernard J. Wuellner, s.v., “extrinsic,” “internal,” and “intrinsic,” in *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy* (Fitzwilliam, New Hampshire: Loreto Publications, 2012), 45, 63, 64. See Aquinas’s use of these categories in his discussion of internal and external causes of sin. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 75–81. English translations of Aquinas’s *Summa* are taken from Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981).

in essence and in proper accidents.”¹⁹ In these scholastic ways Junius asserted that “[w]hatever the principle is, it is necessarily either innate or added and adventitious. No one is able to conceive of anything in human affairs beyond these two seats of principles.”²⁰ Therefore, Junius’s construal of natural law cannot be fully teased out without grasping this assumed framework of internality and externality, as it is the philosophical framework by which the locations, functions, and limitations of natural law were delineated.²¹

Thirdly, natural law is a rational and causal ordering according to Junius. Junius defined natural law in this way: “The natural law is that which is innate to creatures endowed with reason and informs them with common notions of nature, that is, with principles and conclusions adumbrating the eternal law by a certain participation.”²² Using a fourfold causal language, he explained that the material cause of natural law is “the lawful and unlawful thing that pertains to reason,” whereas its formal cause is the act of ordering.²³ The efficient cause is undoubtedly “God the author of nature,” while its final cause is the common good.²⁴ Elsewhere in his epistolary interaction with Jacob Arminius (1560–1609) Junius stated that, firstly, “all causes are either principles, or from principles,” and secondly, that “rational will, turning freely to good or evil, is the principle of moral actions.”²⁵ That rational will is the principle of moral actions was elaborated more in his *De libero hominis arbitrio*, in which Junius provided more straightforward statements about the order by which human nature performs intelligent and

19. Wuellner, s.v., “adventitious,” in *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*, 5.

20. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 3 (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 44.

21. Junius argued: “because the law is entirely present in created things according to the image of God, it is necessary that it is either innate or that it supervenes to this nature. In fact, beyond this distinction nothing can be devised or fashioned.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 3 (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 44.

22. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 44.

23. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 44.

24. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 44.

25. Jacob Arminius, *A Discussion on the Subject of Predestination, Between James Arminius, D.D., Minister at Amsterdam, and Franciscus Junius, D.D., Professor of Divinity at Leyden*, in *The Works of Arminius*, trans. James Nichols and W.R. Bagnall (Auburn and Buffalo, 1853), 3:58. For an excellent contextual treatment of the letters between Junius and Arminius, see Richard A. Muller, “Arminius’s ‘Conference’ with Junius and the Protestant Reception of Molina’s *Concordia*,” in *Beyond Dordt and De Auxiliis: The Dynamics of Protestant and Catholic Soteriology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, Matthew T. Gaetano, and David S. Sytsma (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2019), 103–26.

voluntary actions following the “judgment of the intellect.”²⁶ The created order of human action is such that the intellect would present the ends and objects of action to the will, and the will in turn would voluntarily choose certain actions to perform in view of the chosen ends and objects—hence acting intelligently and freely is the created pattern of human action, and it is the inherent order that is congruent to human nature.²⁷ Accordingly this so-called “intellective will” or “rational will” is moved by the prior movements of intellect and, because of the primary role that intellect occupies in the order of human action, Junius consistently concentrated his discussions on *notions*—what reason knows eventually impacts what the will chooses, and, therefore, it will in the end impact which actions can and will be performed by a human subject.²⁸ Considering these causal dimensions of natural law, then, Richard A. Muller was correct in pointing out that the concepts of nature and grace, which communicate the notions of internal and external revelation, describe “two types of theology and two kinds of casualty.”²⁹

As a fourth point, Junius considered the operation of natural law in two different contexts, that is in prelapsarian and postlapsarian conditions (*naturae integrae* and *naturae deprauatae*), as he believed that Scriptures provide a “twofold account of nature.”³⁰ The

26. Franciscus Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio, ante & post lapsum*, in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, thesis 32. The translations of the treatise are from Willem J. van Asselt, J. Martin Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde, eds., *Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010), 103.

27. “Furthermore, this principle in the creation being right, holy, not contaminated by any stain of inordinate desires, voluntary (ἀθαρπετος) followed the judgement of the intellect (which could not be deceived because of the innate light of truth), in such a way that under its guidance, both angels and mankind, in accordance with the order that is congruent to their nature and in an intelligent way, were willing the ends and the objects shown by reason, and performed them by acting: although the angels acted in a more excellent way than mankind, because of the excellence and simplicity of their nature.” Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 32; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 103.

28. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 34; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 103.

29. Richard A. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 1.282.

30. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4, (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 45. See also Franciscus Junius, *De theologia vera*, in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, chapter 10. The translations of Junius’s *De theologia vera* used in this chapter are from Franciscus Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology: With the Life of Franciscus Junius*, trans. David C. Noe (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Reformation Heritage Books, 2014), 151–58.

different ontological conditions of nature must be examined in order to make sense of the changes occurred in the natural law: “in the untainted nature the natural information and its common notions occurred in some other way” but in the depraved nature the occurrence of such notions “has been corrupted.”³¹ The ontological and epistemological changes are inseparably intertwined in Junius’s account because he regarded human nature as the subject that generates natural notions, human mind as their seat, and human reason as “nature’s workman” that advances nature from its imperfection to perfection.³² In this framework different states of human nature provide different contexts in which natural law operates; yet, notwithstanding the sophistications, all of Junius’s discussions on natural law revolve around this one overarching reality, and that is “the whole shared rationality of nature.”³³

Lastly, and as a fifth point, Junius believed that natural happiness is a *praestructa* and a *substructa* of supernatural happiness, by which he meant that the structure of nature precedes the structure of grace and the order of grace consummates the order of nature.³⁴ In short, “natural happiness would be the foundation and upon it the consummation would be in supernatural happiness.”³⁵ Junius—again in his interaction with Arminius—expressed his

31. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4, (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 45.

32. “Reason indeed is nature’s workman in the human being created in God’s image. By the cultivation of that reason, these principles had to advance from their shared character to individual works, from obscurity into light, from imperfection to a kind of perfection according to the capacity of their natural ability. Thus knowledge would be produced in the human mind from the seed of these principles and from the cultivation of reason.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 17 (pp. 67–68); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 153.

33. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 17 (pp. 67–68); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 152.

34. “[N]atural happiness is a previous preparation (*praestructa*), the other that it is a foundation (*substructa*) to the supernatural. It is prepared for and previous to it. Unless he had been already happy in nature, even if he had remained without falling, he would not have attained the other happiness, there must have been in him that natural happiness by which he could approach the supernatural. But when he should have, in fact, entered into that supernatural felicity, then natural happiness would be the foundation and upon it the consummation would be in supernatural happiness. If perfection is added to perfection, the less is not destroyed, but the increase is made upon the less, as fire is increased by fire, the vegetative faculty by the sentient, and both by the rational.” Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:149–50. Andreas J. Beck on the other hand claimed that Gisbertus Voetius rejected this kind of “two-level” structuring of nature and grace in terms of sub-structure and super-structure of human actions. However, Beck’s intention here is to point out that Voetius did not regard nature as an autonomous structure that operates without any divine actions, and, on this point, Junius would posit the same—in Junius’s thought human nature is never separated from divine actions. See Andreas J. Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) on God, Freedom, and Contingency: An Early Modern Reformed Voice* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2021), chapter 6, section 6.4.

35. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:140–50.

hylomorphic view of human nature by arguing that a human person possesses both material and spiritual natures “in one compound subject.”³⁶ Due to the possession of both material and spiritual qualities, moreover, the activity of human nature is related to a twofold reality: first, to the physical world, second, to the spiritual world.³⁷ By focusing on the spiritual activities of human nature Junius argued that Adam’s spiritual life consisted of both natural and supernatural modes.³⁸ “The end of our nature,” Junius argued, “so far as it is natural, is this, that it should approach very near to the Divine; so far as it is supernatural, it is that man may be united to God. To the former, Adam could attain by nature; to the latter, he could be exalted from the former, by grace.”³⁹

He used “natural” in the sense of being “common,” in contrast with what is “personal,” as Adam’s natural gifts and powers are shared commonly with all human beings, whereas his supernatural gifts and powers, on the other hand, were specially, personally, and individually provided by God.⁴⁰ Adam and Eve’s supernatural gifts were not meant to be transmitted to their heirs by virtue of natural procreation—they were meant to be personal and special gifts, and nothing other than God himself could grant them.⁴¹ One important point here is that the concept of “gift” served the concept of “act” in Junius’s thought, and both concepts, in turn, served to explicate the scope of “the image of God” as the fountain, principle, and form of human action.⁴² Thus, by using these distinctions and categories, Junius contended that the

36. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:104.

37. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:101.

38. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:170.

39. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:149–50.

40. “If, then, supernatural things are ordained on this principle, they cease to be supernatural, and become natural. Besides the relation of supernatural things is such that they are not natural, as they are not common; for those things which are common to all men belong to nature, but supernatural things are personal, and do not pass to ‘heirs.’ I acknowledge that Adam and Eve received supernatural gifts, but for themselves not for their heirs; nor could they transmit them to their heirs, except by a general arrangement or special grace.” Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:103.

41. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:103.

42. “The image of God is not said to be knowledge, but knowledge is said to be renewed in us after the image of God. What, then, is knowledge? An act of the image of God. What is the image of God? The fountain and principle of action, fashioning in a formal manner, the action, or the habit of that image.” Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:107.

goods and ends of human nature comprise of both natural and supernatural kinds, and the latter does not nullify but perfects the former.⁴³ In other words, because both nature and grace are the means of God’s providential ordering and God’s special way of governance, it has to be affirmed that “even though the terms *natural* and *supernatural* are used to indicate different orders of causality, those orders are necessarily interrelated.”⁴⁴

4.3 *Triplex Ordo Inclinationum*: The Basic Inclinations of Human Nature

In the light of these considerations, the first sub-thesis is that Junius’s formulation of the basic inclinations of human nature closely reflects Thomistic concepts, despite his use of a slightly different terminological phrase. To start with, Junius regarded that there are two parts to natural law: natural notions and natural inclinations. Before considering the nature of rational notions, however, some considerations must be given to Junius’s phrase, “the triple order of inclinations [*triplex ordo inclinationum*].”⁴⁵ He argued that, firstly, as with all other living things with substance, human nature is universally inclined toward seeking its own good—in other terms, toward self-conservation.⁴⁶ Secondly, as with all other animals, human nature is inclined not only to self-conservation but also to propagation, which extends into “the union of husband and wife, the education of children, and other similar things.”⁴⁷ Lastly, as rational creatures, whose activities “surpass other living beings,” human reason is naturally inclined “first to the knowledge or cognition of God and of all things and then to the establishing of life with nature as one’s guide in order to achieve the good.”⁴⁸

43. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:149–50. Also Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (p. 343); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 38: “grace perfects nature; grace does not, however, abolish it.”

44. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.283.

45. “Notiones vero ad finem illum pertinentes trium sunt generum, prout triplex est ordo inclinationum a natura in nobis dispositus.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347).

46. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 46.

47. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 46.

48. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 46.

Interestingly, the phrase *triplex ordo inclinationum* also appeared in Johann Heinrich Alsted's (1588–1638) *Encyclopaedia*. In chapter seven of the first volume Alsted cited almost verbatim Junius's exposition of the *triplex ordo inclinationum* and contended that, in human nature, there exists "*triplicia principia innata*."⁴⁹ This phrase manifests a slight modification of Aquinas's *ordo praeceptorum legis naturae* expressed in IaIIae q. 94 of his *Summa theologica*, wherein the order of natural inclinations was aligned with the order of natural notions.⁵⁰ Aquinas argued:

Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals," such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.⁵¹

Girolamo Zanchi (1516–90) also commented on this portion of Aquinas's *Summa* and argued that "natural law has three levels."⁵² The first level or trait is self-protection and is, he argued, "a natural reaction for all things."⁵³ The second is procreation and other related domestic impulses such as marriage and education of children.⁵⁴ The last and the most distinctively "human" trait of natural law, as noted in Aquinas's argument, is the knowledge and worship

49. "Principia ad finem pertinentia sunt trium generum, prout est triplex ordo inclinationum a natura in nobis dispositus." Then he concluded: "Hinc in homine existunt triplicia principia innata." See Alsted Heinrich, *Encyclopaedia septem tomis distincta* (Herbornae Nassoviorum, 1630), I.7.6.

50. "Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law." Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2.

51. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2.

52. Girolamo Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, trans. Jeffrey J. Veenstra (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian's Library Press, 2012), 10 & 19.

53. Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, 10.

54. Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, 10–11.

of God and the love of neighbors.⁵⁵ It is then expressly obvious that Zanchi, Junius, and Alsted all affirmed the triple inclinations or the “three structural tendencies” of human nature as expounded by Aquinas; all of them followed the Thomistic tradition in connecting the threefold inclination of human nature to its substantiality, animality, and rationality.⁵⁶

Furthermore, another Thomistic feature in Junius’s thought is his point regarding God’s addition and impression of “common notions of nature.” To this inbuilt *triplex ordo inclinationum*, he argued, God added common notions of nature and impressed a law, in order that human beings can adequately rationalize their actions according to the particular goods they are inclined to pursue. The common notions, in other words, are uniquely and exclusively provided to rational creatures to guide their inclinations and actions. Junius argued:

[I]n order that a person blinded by these inclinations is not carried too far away by them, God also added [*adiexit*] to these inclinations the common notions of nature and impressed [*impressit*] them on each human being to be a law naturally inclining a person to those things that are particular to a human being so that, as an individual substance, a human being would discern his own existence (so to speak) and, as an animal, would discern his own species, and in fact as a human being would be informed with reason concerning his own cognition and life.⁵⁷

His focus here was to highlight that, in the case of human beings, their natural inclinations operate with natural notions such that, unlike irrational animals, humans possess the natural ability and responsibility to consider, discover, and identify their own longings, dispositions, and goods. In other words, the notions provide the rationale of human actions and inclinations so that, through reason, human beings can rationalize the ends and means of their ordered life on earth. For this reason it is incorrect, as Michael Baur pointed out well in his treatment of Aquinas’s natural law, to say that the first two levels of inclinations are “pre-rational” and only the last inclination is “rational”—in Aquinas and Junius’s framework, natural notions are

55. Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, 11 & 19.

56. Cf. Romanus Cessario, *Introduction to Moral Theology* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013), 86.

57. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 46.

aligned with all three levels of inclinations.⁵⁸ Thus, using Aquinas’s own words, “it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason.”⁵⁹ The purpose of God’s additive work, then, was to enable human nature to discern his own existence (*de suo esse*), his own species (*de sua specie*), and his own cognition and life (*de sua cognitione & vita*), so that they can rationally and freely self-order their actions toward those particular things that are good for their substance.⁶⁰ It can therefore be contended that, though the idea of the threefold inclination itself has a long pedigree reaching back at least to Cicero (c. 102–43 BC), Junius’s understanding of *triplex ordo inclinationum* is more proximately rooted in Aquinas’s exposition of *ordo praeceptorum legis naturae*, which highlighted the inbuilt collaboration between natural notions and inclinations in the pursuit and performance of moral actions.⁶¹ On this point Matthew Levering’s remark then should explain Junius’ theology as well: “Natural inclinations and reason’s apprehension of the precepts of natural law belong to the same teleological ordering of the human being as created.”⁶²

4.4 Principia et Conclusiones: The Parts and Attributes of Common Notions

In conjunction with the point just made, the second sub-thesis is that Junius’s account of the parts and attributes of common notions closely reflects Aquinas’s concepts. In the first place the common notions of human nature occupy the central place in Junius’s account of moral order as those notions are the focal places toward which all the forces of eternal, divine, and human laws converge. Upon making the distinction between nature in integrity and in depravity, he considered two kinds (*genera*) of common notions that are provided to practical

58. Michael Baur, “Law and Natural Law,” in Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 248.

59. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 94, a. 4, co.

60. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 46.

61. Cicero, *On Duties*, ed. E.M. Atkins, trans. M.T. Griffin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1.11–12.

62. Matthew Levering, *Biblical Natural Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 140–41.

reason in both conditions. The first kind, he argued, is “the end to which we act by the natural law” and the second is “those things which pertain to the same end.”⁶³ He stated that the first kind is “the end of that practical reason, which has been placed in both the just and the unjust,” and the end in view here is “one’s own good, and for this reason it is the first and highest precept of the natural law.”⁶⁴ Seeking one’s own good, in other words, is the *primum & summum praeceptum* of the natural law, and this precept informs individuals that they should pursue the good (*bonum*) and avoid the evil (*malum*).⁶⁵ Under the second kind Junius placed all the particular and subordinate notions that pertain to it—he asserted that those “notions pertaining to that end are of three kinds, according to the triple order of inclinations placed in us by nature.”⁶⁶

All the common teleological notions that pertain to the threefold inclinations are further distinguished into two parts: *principia* and *conclusiones*.⁶⁷ Principles are those natural and teleological notions that are “known by themselves [*per se nota*], are immovable [*immota*], and (as the scholastics call them) are indemonstrable [*indemonstrabilia*],” which include the notions concerning the existence of God, the significance of human life, and the principle of justice.⁶⁸ In addition to these primary notions about *esse*, *vita*, and *iustitia*, Junius argued that

63. “Therefore, there are two kinds of common notions (which the ancient philosophers used to call *κοινὰς ἐννοίας* or *πρόληψις*): one, regarding the end to which we act by the natural law; the other, regarding those things which pertain to the same end.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 45.

64. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 45.

65. “Finis autem rationis illius practicae, in iusto & iniusto positae, proprius est bonum, ac proinde legis naturalis primum & summum praeceptum est, bonum, velut finem naturae, prosequendum & faciendum esse, auersandum malum.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (pp. 346–47).

66. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 45.

67. “Indeed, of these notions that we affirm as commonly endowed [*inditas*] to human nature, we state that there are only two parts, which we call common *principles* and common *conclusions*.” See also: “Those principles and conclusions certainly remain constantly, just as those things that we have placed in that highest definition also pertain to this natural law. Now the material is the lawful and unlawful thing that pertains to reason.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 44–46.

68. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 46. Also Junius wrote: “We call principles those things which are known *per se* by the light of nature, which are known immediately, and which are unmoved or immutable, such that from them at last definite knowledge arises.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 15 (pp. 64–65); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 146. See Muller’s treatment of the concept of *per se nota* in Aquinas and in the Reformed scholastic tradition, see Richard A. Muller,

there are also common conclusions in the human mind, which are “those things that natural reason, with the light of nature leading the way, constructs from the principles, such as, for example, that God must be worshipped, and that our life, our species, and the supports of justice must be cared for.”⁶⁹ This means that, human reason, from the natural principles, “compares the principles of nature with the truth of reality or separates them from one another. It joins causes with effects and from these forms conclusions. It decides which things are common and which unique. Finally, it so orders everything that it acquires knowledge of all those things which the reason of a person can trace down and follow.”⁷⁰ In this account one can find a typical scholastic principle of epistemological order, namely that the internal light of reason works in tandem with the external creation to form true and corresponding notions of reality.⁷¹

One crucial thing to note here is that common conclusions are the consequences of rational constructs and thus are properly categorized as “the work of nature.”⁷² This is why, while regarding both principles and conclusions as universal notions, Junius regarded conclusions as the unique notions of individuals—conclusions are gained by the individual and discursive work of ratiocination.⁷³ At the same time the conclusions of natural notions are distinct from the conclusions of conscience, as Junius used the term “a twofold sense [*duplex sensus homini*]” to argue that human nature internally produces a twofold testimony: first, common notions *in mente*, and second, individual notions *in conscientia*.⁷⁴ This distinction

“Reading Aquinas from a Reformed Perspective: A Review Essay,” *Calvin Theological Journal*, vol. 53, no. 2 (2018): 262–65.

69. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 46.

70. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 15 (pp. 64–65); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 146.

71. For a brief treatment of Junius’s theory of truth *in res* and *in mente*, see chapter 2.

72. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 46–47.

73. “[A]ll things in [Adam] were then intact and uncorrupted but restricted by the limits of nature, not stepping out beyond nature. Therefore these principles in him were shared. For if they had been unique to him, they would not have been principles, but conclusions and determinations of his reason working toward true and proper knowledge.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 17 (p. 67); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 152–53.

74. “[J]ust as a human being by nature is endowed with a twofold sense [*duplex sensus homini*]—commonly by the natural law, as (for example) ‘you shall not murder,’ and individually by the testimony of conscience, ‘but you have murdered,’ (for this witness, as Paul says, individually accuses or excuses someone)—so also it was necessary for God to employ a twofold testimony [*duplex testimonium*] so that he might inform us, first, of common notions in the mind [*in mente*]; second, of individual notions in the conscience [*in conscientia*], so

indicates that, in his thought, the individual conclusions of common notions are distinct not only from the common principles but also from the “individual notions in the conscience,” as common conclusions are not accusing or excusing notions, but teleological notions.⁷⁵ Aquinas in a similar manner argued that, while the principles of practical reason are “the same for all” and “equally known by all,” their conclusions are neither the same for all nor equally known by all.⁷⁶ This point was also affirmed by Zanchi who argued that “natural law is one and the same among all nations if we look at its presuppositions, not at its conclusions or applications.”⁷⁷ By appealing to Romans 1 Zanchi also made the comment that “with regard to the conclusions often derived from natural law, Scripture shows that they are sometimes blotted from human hearts when they are handed over to their sins,” yet “it is necessary that the first principles remain unchangeable.”⁷⁸ In all of these accounts of natural notions the discursive character of human reason was underscored, and this reflects Zanchi and Junius’s reception of a set of scholastic rules of logic, namely that human reason does not perceive both principles and conclusions “in one single intuition,” and that the cognition of principles does not immediately cause the cognition of conclusions.⁷⁹

that the use of the divine law would be effective with us from its especially common testimony of salvation, even by an individual witness and revelation of it whether applied ordinarily or extraordinarily.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–50); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 53.

75. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–50); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 53.

76. “[I]n speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all. It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all... But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all.” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 94, a. 4, co.

77. Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, 23.

78. Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, 24.

79. Cf. Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 117. Even William of Ockham (1285–1347) argued that the comprehensive, intuitive, and non-discursive knowledge of supernatural principles and conclusions is available only in the beatific vision. See William of Ockham, *Ordinatio* D.II, Q. ix; translations are from William Ockham, *Philosophical Writings: A Selection*, trans. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1990), 104.

At the same time Junius accentuated the universal nature of conclusions more emphatically than Aquinas did, as he repeatedly claimed that the two kinds of basic teleological notions in nature—again, in both states—are “the principles and the conclusions arising from those principles by ratiocination [*per ratiocinationem*].”⁸⁰ This consistent pairing of principles and conclusions in his discussion of common notions possibly reflects Scotus’s emphasis, as Scotus himself firmly affixed the latter by arguing that “nothing belongs to the natural law other than a principle or a demonstrated conclusion.”⁸¹ Whether Junius consciously adopted Scotus’s concerns or not, however, it is more important to note that in his thought conclusions are not only the natural effects of human reason but also the adumbrated effects of eternal reason: God, by communicating the adumbrated notions of principles and conclusions, orders human actions toward their proper ends and goods.⁸² They are, in other words, produced by “fixed processes, like rivulets from springs,” but they are nonetheless “the most slender traces of the true and living God.”⁸³

Strictly speaking, therefore, the notions that possess the attributes of *per se nota*, *immota*, and *indemonstrabilia* are strictly *principia* in Junius’s thought. At least on a terminological level Junius’s account clearly reflects the adjectives that Aquinas used to describe common principles: Aquinas used *per se nota*, *indemonstrabilia*, *universalia*, and *immobiles* as descriptions of natural *principia*.⁸⁴ In regards to those natural notions being *per se nota*, Aquinas claimed that “the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-evident principles [*principia per se nota*].”⁸⁵ “Any proposition,” he went further, “is said to be

80. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–50); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 52.

81. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, d. 17, q. un., 19. Translations are from *John Duns Scotus: Selected Writings on Ethics*, trans. Thomas Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 276–77.

82. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 44.

83. Junius, *De theologia vera*, theses 15 & 16 (pp. 64–66); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 146 & 149.

84. All of the terms appear in Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 94, except *immobiles*, which appears in q. 97.

85. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2.

self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject.”⁸⁶ In his judgment this was a re-iteration of Boethius’s (c.500–524/25) tenet that “certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all.”⁸⁷ Furthermore, Aquinas contended that the most basic proposition from which all speculative knowledge proceeds is the axiom, “the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time” and the basic proposition from which all practical knowledge proceeds is the axiom, “good is that which all things seek after.”⁸⁸ Thus, in Aquinas’s thought, the pursuit of *bonum* is the “*primum principium*” of practical reason and the “*primum praeceptum*” of natural law, yet those notions that bear the characteristics of *per se nota* and *indemonstrabilia* are strictly *principia*, rather than *conclusiones*.

Muller stated that the idea of *per se nota* in scholastic thought is “principial in the sense that it is immediately and intuitively known to be true and that it is so basic that it is a starting point of discourse.”⁸⁹ This is certainly a fitting description of Junius’s view, as he also saw common principles as a form of “κατάληψις” and “vocal notion [*notionis voce*]” that communicate the teleological message of God prior to any human act of communication, contemplation, and construction.⁹⁰ Hence the reason why Junius regarded the *principia* of common notions as *per se nota*, *immota*, and *indemonstrabilia* is because natural principles are the very first contents of God’s communicative message and the very first effects of God’s communicative act, and there is no other notion that antecedes them. They are, to use Ralph M. McInerny’s words, the “rockbottom principles embedded in the moral discourse of human beings.”⁹¹ Conclusions, on the other hand, can differ according to persons, as they are

86. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2.

87. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2.

88. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2, co.

89. Muller, “Reading Aquinas from a Reformed Perspective: A Review Essay,” 264.

90. David Noe’s translation reads *notionis voce* as “intuition.” Though it captures the meaning of the original term correctly, a more literal translation of Junius’ own words would be “notional voice” or “vocal notion.” See Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 16 (p. 66); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 148.

91. Ralph M. McInerny, “Ethics,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 209.

construed differently according to the works of individuals. Junius argued that even the pre-fall Adam had to grow in his reasoning from the shared, veiled, and imperfect principles in him; and his failure to obey God was fundamentally due to his misconstruction of conclusions, not due to God's miscommunication of principles.⁹²

In light of this background, then, it can be concluded that Junius attributed the characteristics of *per se nota*, *immota*, and *indemonstrabilia* to common notions, but specifically to common principles, as Aquinas did. That common principles are *immota* does not require much elaboration; it is a natural extension of the point that human actions cannot mute or alter the basic contents of God's communication. These arguments therefore strengthen the thesis that, just like Aquinas did, Junius correlated the order of natural inclinations with the order of natural notions, and all of these concepts were used to explain different layers of the inbuilt structure of human nature that God established for the proper progression and perfection of human life.

4.5 Adumbrative Participation: Eternal Law and Natural Law

At this juncture it is helpful to revisit Junius's definition of natural law: "The natural law is that which is innate to creatures endowed with reason and informs them with common notions of nature, that is, with principles and conclusions adumbrating the eternal law by a certain participation."⁹³ Aquinas similarly yet more succinctly defined natural law as "the rational creature's participation of the eternal law."⁹⁴ As noted by numerous scholars, the relation between eternal law and natural law is a prominent feature in Aquinas's moral thought.⁹⁵ John

92. Junius, *De theologia vera*, theses 17 (pp. 67–68); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 151–54.

93. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 44.

94. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 91, a. 2, co.

95. For example, see Louis-Bertrand Geiger, *La Participation Dans La Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1942); Cornelio Fabro, *Participation et Causalité Selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1961); idem, "The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation," *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 27 (1974): 449–87; Rudi A. te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1995); John F. Wippel, "Metaphysics," in *The Cambridge*

M. Rziha summarized that “the notion of participation illuminates many of Thomas’s brilliant principles, including the relation of creation to God, the unity amid diversity in creation because of its relation to God, and the analogy between creatures and God as effects made in the likeness of their cause.”⁹⁶ He also stated that “the notion of participation is at the foundation of all that Thomas has to say about the perfections of created reality.”⁹⁷ Therefore, Rziha argued, “an understanding of the Thomistic notion of participation allows one to grasp that all things are (that have *esse* in their own particular mode) in relation to God.”⁹⁸ This is virtually an echo of Rudi A. te Velde’s point that “[p]articipation is applied first and foremost to the being of creatures; it signifies the (causal) relation of origin between God and creatures, between the infinite Being itself and the many finite beings, each of which participates in being according to its essence.”⁹⁹

Aquinas himself stated that “the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law” and therefore “the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light.”¹⁰⁰ Because of the relation that natural law has with eternal law, he asserted that natural law “endures without change, owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author of nature.”¹⁰¹ Yet, human reason “cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine reason” but can only have an imperfect one, as reason can merely grasp “certain general principles.”¹⁰² It is important to note here that the

Companion to Aquinas, 93–99; idem, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000); John Rziha, *Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009); Daniel D. De Haan, “Aquinas on Actus Essendi and the Second Mode of Participation,” *The Thomist*, vol. 82 (2018): 573–609; Andrew Davison, *Participation in God: A Study in Christian Doctrine and Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

96. Rziha, *Perfecting Human Actions*, 27.

97. Rziha, *Perfecting Human Actions*, 27.

98. Rziha, *Perfecting Human Actions*, 27.

99. Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas*, 280.

100. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 91, a. 2. co.

101. See Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae q. 91, a. 2. co; cf. idem, IaIIae q. 97, a. 1, ad 1.

102. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae q. 91, a. 3, ad 1.

participation of natural law in the eternal law is established at the level of *cognition* in Aquinas's thought, and he clearly argued that by natural participation human reason grasps the principles of eternal law, not its particular applications and determinations.¹⁰³ Furthermore, he argued in *Summa contra Gentiles* that "the rational creature participates in divine providence not only in being governed, but also in governing," meaning that rational creatures alone participate in God's government in two ways, firstly in being governed by him vis-à-vis eternal reason, and secondly in governing other creatures as God's agents vis-à-vis natural reason.¹⁰⁴

Rziha commented that in this Thomistic framework "humans have a certain knowledge of the eternal law and are not only moved and governed by the eternal law but also govern themselves and others in accord with the eternal law. By knowing and agreeing with the *ratio* of the governor they participate at a higher level in the eternal law than creatures that are simply moved by that *ratio*."¹⁰⁵ Irena Backus also affirmed that in Aquinas's thought the way in which natural law participates in eternal law is *rational*, and even argued that "to Aquinas the term *natural law* applies in its strict sense not to the natural tendencies and inclinations of man on which his reason reflects but to the precepts that his reason enunciates as a result of this reflection."¹⁰⁶ Backus also contended that this Thomistic construal of participation is absent in Calvin's works; and as J. Todd Billings's and Charles Raith II's works on Calvin's doctrine of

103. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae q. 91, a. 3, ad 1.

104. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles, Books III-IV*, trans. Laurence Shapcote (Green Bay, WI: The Aquinas Institute, 2018), 3, c. 113.

105. Rziha, *Perfecting Human Actions*, 75. Also, he argued: "In summary, humans naturally participate in God both in terms of their first act (that of *esse*) and their secondary acts (operation). In reference to the first act, humans participate in God who is the efficient cause of their act of *esse*, the exemplary cause of their mode of *esse*, and the final cause of their being naturally ordered to their particular end. In reference to secondary actions, humans participate in God who is the efficient cause by giving them the power to act, the exemplary cause by giving the species of the acts, and the final cause in that all acts are ordered to an end. Because God moves humans to rational actions, they participate in God through their actions in two ways: first, as moved and governed by the eternal law, and second, by actually having a certain knowledge of the eternal law. In both cases, their mode of participation is limited by their natural form, which determines their potency to act." Rziha, *Perfecting Human Actions*, 78.

106. Backus, "Calvin's Concept of Natural and Roman Law," 11–12.

participation indicate, the category was primarily used in soteriological terms in Calvin's theology, rather than in natural terms.¹⁰⁷

Junius, however, shows some proximity to Aquinas's ideas on participation. Like Aquinas Junius understood human's natural participation in terms of sharing a special part in God's *ratio* and *actio*.¹⁰⁸ Yet, Junius reserved the term "participation" for the relationship that rational creatures have with God, and this indicates a limited but nonetheless a positive use of the concept.¹⁰⁹ He did clearly believe that all creatures are governed by God's *ratio* and that all things come into existence by God's *actio*, but he did not posit, as Étienne Gilson put it, that the "connection between creature and creator, as it results from creation, is called participation."¹¹⁰ As he articulated in his discussion of divine ideas the eternal law is not merely "that highest reason of divine wisdom which moves and directs all things to a just end,"¹¹¹ but is more specifically "the very wisdom of God that determines the rationale of what is lawful and unlawful in all things created according to his own image[.]"¹¹² Because of the moral and rational character of eternal law Junius used the concept of participation not to explain "the ordered diversity of creation by means of the degree of participation of each creature in God," but to rather explain the ordered participation of *rational* creatures, or *moral* actors, in God's

107. Backus, "Calvin's Concept of Natural and Roman Law," 12; J. Todd Billings, *Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Charles Raith II, *Aquinas and Calvin on Romans: God's Justification and Our Participation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

108. For a treatment of Aquinas's view of participation as cognitive acts, see Rziha, *Perfecting Human Actions*, 184–256.

109. At the most basic level, the term "participatio" does not appear in Junius's *De creatione mundi* and also in *De providentia Dei* in explaining the way in which creatures have *esse* in relation to God. For detailed accounts of Aquinas's reception and utilization of neoplatonic concepts, see W.J. Hankey, *God in Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); idem, "Dionysian Hierarchy in Thomas Aquinas: Tradition and Transformation," in *Denys l'Aréopagite et sa postérité en Orient et en Occident, Actes du colloque international Paris, 21–24 septembre 1994, édités Ysabel de Andia, Collection des études Augustiniennes, série Antiquité 151* (Paris: Institut d'études augustiniennes, 1997), 405–38.

110. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 373.

111. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (pp. 344–45); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 41.

112. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 2 (p. 345); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 43.

eternal law.¹¹³ Considering these points then the general purview of creatures' participation in God appears to be more refined and confined in Junius's thought, notwithstanding his explicit appropriation of the concept.¹¹⁴

Another notable difference is that Junius employed the term, *adumbratio*.¹¹⁵ He first of all distinguished the perfection that applies to eternal law (i.e., archetypal perfection), and the perfection that applies to natural law (i.e., ectypal perfection).¹¹⁶ Upon making the distinction, he argued that, in the state of prelapsarian nature (*naturae integrae*), the operation of natural law was "wholly and perfectly conformed to the eternal law according to the mode of nature, and it adumbrated that eternal law by a certain, perfect participation."¹¹⁷ The prelapsarian nature's perfect yet adumbrative participation in the eternal law was intended by God himself, as human nature was created to mirror God as "a shadow, not as the body and substance of it."¹¹⁸ On the other hand, though the depraved nature has become "imperfect" due to the fall, it still "adumbrated the eternal law by a certain participation."¹¹⁹ So in both conditions, whether perfect or imperfect, or uncorrupted and corrupted, Junius believed that natural law participates in God's eternal law in an adumbrative, or in a shadowy, way.¹²⁰

The theological meaning of adumbration can be illuminated by that, on the one hand, the word *adumbratio* is etymologically related to the term *umbra* (shadow), and, on the other, that the word *umbra* appears in the Latin Vulgate Bible in Hebrews 8:5 and Colossians 2:17 to

113. Cf. Rziha, *Perfecting Human Actions*, 29. See also John F. Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 155.

114. Romanus Cessario argued that the whole human nature, not merely reason, participates in the eternal law in Aquinas's thought: "The view that human nature shares or participates in the divine pattern of all that exists forms a central thesis of a realist anthropology." See Cessario, *Introduction to Moral Theology*, 77. Junius, however, did not endeavor to broaden the extent of participation beyond *ratio*, but Muller presented some examples of more broad accounts of participation in the Reformed scholastic literature. See Richard A. Muller, "Not Scotist: Understandings of Being, Univocity, and Analogy in Early-Modern Reformed Thought," *Reformation & Renaissance Review*, vol. 14, no. 2 (2012): 127–50.

115. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (pp. 346–8).

116. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 47.

117. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 47.

118. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 47.

119. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 47.

120. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 47.

refer to the truths that foreshadowed heaven and Christ in shadowy forms. Junius hence associated shadowiness with natural law and argued that “the natural law was a *shadow* of that eternal law according to the perfection of our nature [emphasis intended].”¹²¹ More specific accounts of such shadowiness comes from his *De theologia vera*, where he insisted that natural notions are common, obscure, and imperfect [*communes, obscuras, et imperfectas*] in relation to eternal ideas.¹²² The basis of the thought is Romans 1:19–21: by appealing to Paul’s writing Junius argued that human mind can truly see something about God, yet such notions are obscure and imperfect as they are neither clear nor complete.¹²³ Considering Junius’s earlier remarks regarding analogy and accommodation, it is clear that his idea of adumbrative participation implies that common notions do communicate something truly about divine ideas, yet they do so adumbratively, analogically, and imperfectly due to the aforesaid relationship between *exemplars* and *ectype*.¹²⁴ This adumbrative participation is how Junius conceived, to use Paul Helm’s words, the “religious epistemology.”¹²⁵ Therefore, as a third sub-thesis, it should be concluded that Junius provided a nuanced account of participation by viewing it as rational creatures’ participation in God’s communicative act, which expressly witnesses to a modified form of Thomism.¹²⁶

4.6 Necessity of Infusion and Determination: Limitations of Natural Law

Lastly, the fourth line of refined Thomistic trajectory discoverable in Junius’s natural law theory is natural law’s limitations. First of all, Junius argued that human reason has the capacity of making compositions, divisions, conclusions, and determinations, all of which formed a

121. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 347); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 47.

122. Noe translates them as “shared, veiled, and imperfect.” See Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 148.

123. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 16 (pp. 66–67); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 150.

124. See chapter 3 for a treatment of this issue.

125. Paul Helm, *John Calvin’s Ideas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 184.

126. Cf. Richard A. Muller, “Reformation, Orthodoxy, ‘Christian Aristotelianism,’ and the Eclecticism of Early Modern Philosophy,” *Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, vol. 81, no. 3 (2001): 323.

proper order of ratiocination.¹²⁷ These distinct acts of human reason provide a helpful background to Junius's claim that there are two kinds of limitations of natural law. Firstly, he mentioned that supernatural life and grace could not be gained merely through natural law, even in the state of integrity: "Indeed," he argued, "since no human being living according to [integrate] nature either would have known supernatural life and grace (which leads to life) by natural law, or would even gain it naturally, it was necessary that a law superior to nature be added by the grace of God."¹²⁸ Secondly, he claimed that by a mere grasp of natural notions human reason cannot come to adequate conclusions and determinations regarding particular matters of "this present life of ours."¹²⁹ As natural reason informs only the general and rudimentary principles of action, he insisted that "it was necessary that the other supplement of the natural law be applied according to which particulars and individual things are directed to the common law."¹³⁰ One important point to note here is that these two kinds of limitations of natural law, which necessitate the advent of two kinds of external laws, correlate with Junius's division of life into two ages, that is the present life and the future life.¹³¹

On the one hand, Junius made emphatic and repeated claims that human reason, even before the fall, "could not raise itself by transcending the natural limits to supernatural knowledge, nor could the will apprehend those things, except supported and sustained by supernatural help."¹³² The limitation toward supernature is intrinsic to nature, at the very least because common notions are *obscure* and *imperfect* notwithstanding the fact that they are

127. "[T]he genus is wisdom, in which at the same time we include all principles both natural and supernatural, the capacity of reasoning itself both in composing and dividing, and the conclusions and determinations that proceed from that process, as well as the knowledge of all the foregoing, and their use as moderated by judgment and proper regulation." Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 8 (p. 53); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 113.

128. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 348); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 48. It should be noted that the word "pure nature" used in Rester's translation is actually "integram naturam" in the original Latin.

129. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (pp. 347–48); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 48.

130. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 348); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 48.

131. "It was necessary to develop two approaches to the natural law so that it refers to the human race first according to this present life of ours, and then to that future one." Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 348); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 48.

132. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 33; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 103.

commonly *shared*. For example, that God is to be worshipped is a natural conclusion shared in all humanity in both uncorrupted and corrupted conditions. Yet in both conditions, it is still veiled “because the very thing which it points out to us it does not, nevertheless, show clearly. And last, it is imperfect, because it does not show Him fully.”¹³³ Natural law, in other words, truly communicates “the most slender traces of the true and living God,” yet it does not communicate how this God relates to human race.¹³⁴ More simply put nature alone does not produce sufficient conceptual materials for a clear and perfect knowledge of God’s being and work—without supernatural principles human nature even in the prelapsarian state would not know the proper ways of communion and relation with God.¹³⁵ This was an important point to accentuate because, as noted above, Junius believed that the proper order of human action occurs when the intellect apprehends the proper ends and objects of action and presents them to the will. If the intellect does not apprehend supernatural ends and goods in the first place, then, the will by necessity does not have the supernatural goal to aim in the order of execution.¹³⁶

What has to be clarified here is that Junius did *not* contend that human nature lacked holiness or uprightness before the fall. Rather, he argued that nature itself needed superior principles to know supernatural ends and goods. In fact, Junius unambiguously affirmed that Adam was originally created in righteousness, holiness, and truth; he made no mistake in affirming that Adam possessed the acts or habits of righteousness, holiness, and truth in his

133. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 16 (p. 66); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 149.

134. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 16 (p. 66); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 149.

135. “What then? Was knowledge of divine matters able to be perfected in the unspoiled man by these, so to speak, tools of nature? By no means. For reason itself could not but work from obscurity and imperfection, since it possessed the material for producing knowledge from no other source than these principles. This is because in these principles (as the more recent philosophers typically say) all things are present by their quality generally, which are comprehended by human reason and knowledge individually. From this it immediately follows that reason could not, even in the intact state of human nature, have ascended to a higher apex of human knowledge than it could build upon these principles and from them.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 17 (pp. 67–68); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 153–54.

136. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 32; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 103.

nature and that those habits of action were corrupted, not removed, by the fall.¹³⁷ In other words, the image of God, which Junius described as “the constitution of human nature,” is imparted to human beings precisely so that they can act in righteousness, holiness, and truth whether before or after the fall.¹³⁸ Humanity’s perfection was initially dependent upon reaching the apex (*ad fastigium*) of Adam’s condition through his own intellectual accomplishment and improvement, and it was to be done by using the inherent habits of righteousness, holiness, and truth.¹³⁹ Thus “the principle of happiness” was clearly provided to Adam, but “the final happiness” or “supernatural felicity” was not given “until he should fulfill his appointed course” for himself and his posterity.¹⁴⁰

For Junius maintaining the original righteousness of Adam was necessary in countering Arminius’s semi-Pelagian conception of human nature. Arminius believed that the material object of predestination was humanity *in puris naturalibus*, that is the humanity devoid of supernatural endowments, and hence the nature that God considered in the order of decree was both ungraced and unfallen.¹⁴¹ The critical point here is that, according to Arminius, pure nature was not only a hypothetical construct but also a historical reality, as Adam’s created

137. “The subject is man, who is the same person, whether as the old, or the new man. The principle is the image of God, which is the same, whether old or new, and purified from corruption. The acts or habits, inwrought by that principle, are righteousness, holiness, and truth. Righteousness, holiness, and truth are not the image, but pertain to the image. Let us return, if you please, to that principle, which the Fathers laid down “natural things are corrupt, supernatural things are removed.” You may certainly, hence, deduce with ease this conclusion;—righteousness, holiness and truth are not removed, therefore, they are not supernatural. Again, they have become corrupt, therefore, they are natural. If they had been removed, none of their elementary principles would exist in us by nature. But they do exist; therefore, they are by nature, and are themselves corrupt, and, with them, whatever originates in them. The same is the fact with the image of God. The image of God is not removed; it is not, therefore, supernatural; and, on the other hand, it has become corrupt; it is, therefore, natural.” Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:108–09.

138. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:108–09.

139. “The second consideration is that the means of that development which man would have accomplished from the principles when his nature was intact, until it was perfected by supernatural grace and he was conveyed to its apex, was not therefore removed. For since the nature of a person is composed in such a way that he indeed possesses these principles in himself, truly he would pursue their improvement through reasoning and study until he could arrive at real knowledge.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 17 (pp. 67–68); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 152.

140. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:153; idem, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 39; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 104.

141. Arminius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:36. On Arminius’s anthropology see Aza Goudriaan, “The Synod of Dordt on Arminian Anthropology,” in *Revisiting the Synod of Dordt (1618–1619)* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 81–106.

condition itself was devoid of supernatural grace.¹⁴² Though Junius conceded that, in the order of divine decree, God first contemplated nature and then grace,¹⁴³ he resolutely claimed against Arminius that in actual existence “[m]an was never without supernatural grace, either inherent or habitual.”¹⁴⁴ The supernatural gifts or principles were added to Adam’s nature at the very beginning of his existence such that the process of the addition was presented as analogous to the hylomorphic union: “as the soul was added to the body, so the supernatural endowments were added to the soul.”¹⁴⁵ Therefore, against the background of these conceptual issues, Junius argued that “to this particular principle of his nature was added (*superadditus*) a singular principle of grace for Adam, by which his intellectual will was acting, singularly moved, above its natural mode.”¹⁴⁶

The second limitation of natural law, or its inability to adequately dictate particular and individual conclusions of moral matters from natural principles, is overcome by the provision of a supplementary law called human law. Junius regarded the making of determinate conclusions as the terminal action in the order of moral reasoning:

This order of human judgments has been established by God and by nature, so that reason would draw out the principles from the intellect, from the principles it would connect conclusions, it would accommodate conclusions to particular things, and from the particular conditions it would make just and individual determinations for all people, universally, at every time, with respect to all things, and one would observe it subduing others with proper reasoning.¹⁴⁷

142. Arminius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:36 & 3:194. Unlike Arminius and other Jesuits, Domingo de Soto also saw pure nature as a conceptual construct, not a historical reality. See Domingo de Soto, *De natura et gratia* (Paris: Foucher, 1549), r7; Reinhard Hütter, *Dust Bound for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012), 120; Steven A. Long, *Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010); 21 & 61; Muller, s.v. “*status purorum naturalium*,” in *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 344; Jordan J. Ballor, “In the Footsteps of the Thomists’: an Analysis of Thomism in the Junius-Arminius Correspondence,” in *Beyond Dordt and De Auxillis*, 127–47.

143. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:103.

144. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:174–75.

145. “Which, then, is more probable, that the soul was, at the moment of its creation, endowed with supernatural gifts, or that they were superadded after its creation? I would rather affirm that, as the soul was added to the body, so the supernatural endowments were added to the soul.” Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:102.

146. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 34; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 103.

147. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 10 (p. 355); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 66.

In these remarks, there are three linkable rational acts that form a right pattern of moral reasoning: perception of moral principles, connection of moral conclusions, and determinations of legal judgments in the light of such conclusions.

Firstly, in Junius's thought, there are two kinds of principles in this chain of moral reasoning: natural or supernatural.¹⁴⁸ Secondly, from these principles, two kinds of conclusions are drawn: general and particular.¹⁴⁹ Thirdly, the act of determination is a terminal act of reason and it marks the completion of moral reasoning—determinations are “terminal orderings or dispositions (so to speak), beyond which one cannot proceed, because all knowledge, reason, and every act of reason terminates in particular and individual matters.”¹⁵⁰ For instance, drawing conclusions and determinations from a natural principle would follow this pattern:

[I]t is a general principle that a human being ought to love his neighbour, that is, another human being. It is a general conclusion that a neighbour must not be injured, and that whatever is owed to him must be paid to him and so forth. A particular or individual conclusion is that Peter, John, and Maevius must not be injured. From this the particular determinations arise that Peter, John, and Maevius must not be injured at all in this or that way, time, or place, and so forth.¹⁵¹

As implied in this paragraph, important in this pattern of reasoning is the consideration of contingency, as the purpose of moving all the way to determinations is to rightly govern actions that are contingent on particular persons, things, and circumstances.¹⁵²

These steps of moral reasoning resonate with Aquinas's idea, as he also contended that “something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: First, as a conclusion from

148 “Principles are either natural, existing from nature, or supernatural, existing from grace.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 99.

149. “There are two kinds of conclusions, which is easily understood from the preceding points. Some are general and others particular.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 99.

150. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 99.

151. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 99.

152. “And the reason why we call such determinations—the material of human laws—particular is because all those minute things pertaining to right action, according to any particular thing that can be contingent for persons, things, and circumstances, or can be observed in these things individually, are delimited in human laws. Who is ignorant of the fact that individual things are able to change in the greatest number of ways and continually without end?” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 99. Aquinas also argued that practical reason is occupied with contingent matters of human action. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 94, a. 4, co.

premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities.”¹⁵³ He asserted that deriving conclusions from the principles of natural law follows a method used in the “sciences,” whereas determining particulars from the conclusions follows a method used in the “arts.”¹⁵⁴ Though distinct in method, he made a point that “both modes of derivation are found in the human law.”¹⁵⁵ In a similar vein Junius contended that the making of human law was natural and necessary because “under such great imperfection and infirmity that the more we descend into individual things, the more fully we fall away from that natural law into base and unworthy failures.”¹⁵⁶ To prevent this from happening, he stated that “certain things were placed around us like fences and barriers as a human help so that we would not rashly wander from the natural law.”¹⁵⁷ The key here is that human law was presented not only as a natural product of human activities but also as a legitimate instrument of governing human reason: human law has a legitimate and justifiable authority to order human communities toward the common good, notwithstanding its status as “human.”¹⁵⁸

Consequently, Junius made it clear that without the “advent” of divine and human laws, natural law even in the state of uncorrupted nature could not have led humanity to a heavenly life and to a well-ordered life on earth; in the state of corrupted nature, its necessity is indubitably escalated. The solution that “advent” provides to the problem of limitation, therefore, is to supply right teleological notions and to guard a proper pattern of ratiocination so that the ends and goods of human nature could be rationally perceived for the performance of deliberate, voluntary, and right actions. Again, this pattern of argumentation is not too

153. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 95, a. 2, co.

154. “The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape.” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 95, a. 2, co.

155. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 95, a. 2, co.

156. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 348); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 48.

157. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 348); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 48.

158. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (pp. 350–51); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 54.

different from Aquinas's own formulation—Aquinas long before Junius provided an argument already that both divine and human laws are “added” to natural law “for the benefit of human life.”¹⁵⁹

Undoubtedly the limitations and restrictions of nature were intensified by the fall. Junius argued that when Adam fell by his disobedient actions, he “declined from the norm of life prescribed to him” by squandering “his own inner principle” that was added by God.¹⁶⁰ Then the consequence was this: “the image of God was totally obliterated and was followed and replaced by an incredible disorder and corruption of human nature.”¹⁶¹ On the one hand, the language of “total obliteration” here was not merely a hyperbolic rhetoric as Junius believed that the fall brought corruption upon “the whole of nature, so also all its principles, have been entirely corrupted in themselves.”¹⁶² On the other hand, the term “disorder” was frequently used to capture a key characteristic of the corrupted nature, because Junius regarded the inherent order of nature to have become most corrupted (*corruptissima*) and confused (*conturbatissima*) by the fall.¹⁶³ Therefore in relation to the heavenly life, “all proper order and suitable relationship to one another” was damaged to the degree that nature lost all the potency, actuality, and inclination toward supernatural ends and goods.¹⁶⁴ In relation to the earthly life, moreover, the problem was also heightened as the common notions were “compromised” and “confused” and there remains only “broken fragments.”¹⁶⁵ By expressing agreement to the teachings of the “*orthodoxi Patres & Scholastici*,” therefore, Junius insisted that the fall did not merely incur the *corruption* and *confusion* of natural gifts, but also the *dispossession*,

159. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 94, a. 5, co.

160. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 38; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 104.

161. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 39; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 104.

162. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 18 (pp. 68–69); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 155–56.

163. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 18 (p. 68).

164. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 18 (p. 69); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 156.

165. “Thesis 18: After this nature, however, was corrupted, those first principles yet remained in individuals. They were still shared, veiled, and imperfect. But now they were completely compromised in themselves and quite confused among themselves, as though mere broken fragments of our nature, because of our depravity.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 18 (p. 68); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 154.

abdication, repulsion, and retraction of supernatural gifts: supernatural wisdom was lost by man's own deliberate abdication and repulsion, and therefore the knowledge of divine matters was, so to speak, taken back to heaven (*abdicatam & repulsam indignissime peccato hominis, hinc se in coelos recepisse*).¹⁶⁶

The two words as noted above—*superior* and *supplementary*—were purposefully chosen by Junius to nuance different purposes and modes of divine provisions. The first limitation of natural law, or nature's inability to inform humans about supernatural life and grace, is overcome by the divine act of *infusion* that moves nature toward a superior reality.¹⁶⁷ He mentioned that “infusing [*infundi*] is nothing other than that which is dispensed into us from the heavenly principle [*superno principio*] that is above us all and above our nature.”¹⁶⁸ To attain its supernatural good, in short, nature must have new principles and power, and these must be provided directly by the Spirit.¹⁶⁹ The term was famously used by Aquinas; the word *infusion* was used to explain the instillation of supernatural and theological virtues that orient human nature toward that which transcends it.¹⁷⁰ Hence, “the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end.”¹⁷¹ Also important is his view of causality, as one of the assumed causal principles in Aquinas's moral thought was that “[e]ffects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles.”¹⁷² As supernatural happiness cannot result from natural causes, and as

166. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 18 (p. 69).

167. Muller noted that the distinction between natural and supernatural theology in Reformed scholastic theology affirmed two ways of knowing God, “the former being conceived according to the natural powers of acquisition belonging to the mind, the latter according to a graciously infused power bestowed on the mind by God.” Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.283.

168. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 5 (p. 348); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 48–49.

169. “[N]ature does not draw out a disposition except from a preexisting matter, but the Spirit of God works all things in all. And so with regard to natural theology, nature both applies understanding and takes the seeds of the principles for its disposition. But with regard to supernatural theology, the Spirit of God claims all the parts for itself entirely, so that it is with all justice called supernatural.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 19 (pp. 69–70); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 157–58.

170. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 62, a. 1.

171. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 62, a. 3.

172. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 63, a. 3. Cf. Francis Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, ed. James T. Dennison, trans. George Musgrave Giger (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R, 1992), 1.39.

supernatural conclusions cannot be deduced from natural principles, he argued that “the power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.”¹⁷³ The second limitation of natural law, on the other hand, is overcome by the human act of *determination* according to Junius, because by it human reason lawfully becomes the “principium,” “presider,” and “author” of intra-human matters.¹⁷⁴

One interesting feature in these accounts is that Junius did not use the word *superadditus* in both *De theologia vera* and *De politiae Mosis observatione*, though he used it in *De libero arbitrio*.¹⁷⁵ In *De theologia vera* he used the term *superventus* to argue that the perfection to which nature can be exalted is super-advented or super-vented by the grace of God.¹⁷⁶ Also in *De politiae Mosis observatione* he used *superueniens* to describe the mode by which God came down to add supernatural principles to human nature.¹⁷⁷ In both works, he did not use *superadditus* to communicate the mode of God’s additive work but consistently used *superventus*, and repeatedly highlighted that “from God the author and leader, who is the way, the truth, and the life, we have the law of that way, truth, and life.”¹⁷⁸ Despite his distinct terminological choice, however, the concept is very similar to Aquinas’s: supernatural principles are adventitious, external, and infused, and they are not commonly distributed to all rational creatures.¹⁷⁹ In fact, even Aquinas himself used *superventus* in his *De veritate*, when he insisted that “grace, coming down to nature, does not destroy but perfects it.”¹⁸⁰ Therefore

173. Aquinas, *Summa theologia*, IaIIae, q.6 3, a. 3.

174. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (p. 357); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 72.

175. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 34.

176. The thesis 19 reads: “Itaque haec Theologia nihil omnino ad perfectionem potest perducere, nec perducit vnquam: ac ne perfectionis quidem est per se ipsam capax, superuenientis a gratia.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 19 (p. 69).

177. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (p. 359); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 75.

178. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 4 (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 48.

179. Junius, in *The Works of Arminius*, 3:103.

180. “Gratia enim superveniens naturae non destruit eam.” Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae, De veritate*, q. 24, a. 8, 1. Nonetheless Aquinas more frequently used the word “superaddition” in other places, such as: *Summa theologia* Ia, q. 45, a. 5 ad 1; Ia, q. 95, a. 1, ad 4; IaIIae, q. 2 a. 5, ad 5; IaIIae, q. 62 a. 1 co; IaIIae,

Junius's choice of the word should not be seen as a deliberate rejection of Aquinas's assumptions and, by extension, his causal, teleological, and moral framework.¹⁸¹

By way of summarizing it will be helpful to reiterate the claim made above, namely that Junius construed the limitations and functions of natural law on the basis of the distinction between internality and externality. It was noted above that Junius argued, "entirely everything that exists among created things has either an internal principle from nature in them or one that advenes to them outwardly from some external principle acting on them and operating in them."¹⁸² He emphatically stated that "[w]hatever the principle is, it is necessarily either innate or added and adventitious. No one is able to conceive of anything in human affairs beyond these two seats of principles."¹⁸³ This internal or innate nature of law was tightly connected to the boundary of its power, as Junius shared the Thomistic maxim that "nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength"¹⁸⁴ Rziha noted the importance of this distinction between internal and external powers by arguing that "[t]he intrinsic powers give humans the ability to perform human actions. However, because of the limitations of the powers of the soul (both caused by its initial state of potency and its weakness), the intrinsic principles must be strengthened and assisted by extrinsic principles. These extrinsic principles direct and move the intrinsic principles to cause good actions that are in accord with their ultimate end."¹⁸⁵

Therefore this internal and external distinction served to highlight the boundary of human nature on the one hand and the necessity of God's additive work on the other. With all

q. 62, a. 3 ad 1; IaIIae, q. 63, a. 3 ad 3; IaIIae, q. 91, a. 4, ad 1; IaIIae, q. 93 a. 6 co; IaIIae, q. 94 a. 5 co; IaIIae, q. 106, a. 1 ad 2; IaIIae, q. 107, a. 2 co; IaIIae, q. 107 a. 4 co.

181. Muller helpfully noted that the Reformed doctrine of the covenant of works is a Protestant form of *donum superadditum* and at the root of the covenant idea was the Augustinian and Thomistic conception that "the *donum* was part of the original constitution of the human being and not a gift given on the basis of an initial probation—any more than grace, as provided to sinners after the Fall, is given on the basis of a human act." Richard A. Muller, *After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 184.

182. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 3 (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 43–44.

183. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 3 (p. 346); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 44.

184. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 109, a. 3, ad 2.

185. Rziha, *Perfecting Human Actions*, 97.

the arguments about how human nature is structured, Junius endeavored to insist that it is God who claims “its rising, progress, and completion entirely for Himself, so that each person who boasts may boast in the Lord (1 Cor. 1:31)” and that “natural theology *is not even able, in and of itself, to contain the perfection that is added by grace* [emphasis retained from the translation].”¹⁸⁶ This utter dependence on God’s work of infusion for the perception of supernatural truths and for the perfection of human nature is certainly consistent with the Augustinian emphasis on the so-called “monergistic” nature of salvation, in which human nature’s progression toward its perfection was construed as an effect of grace alone.¹⁸⁷ Hence, though the category of moral virtues was underdeveloped or, more precisely, unused in his treatment of natural law,¹⁸⁸ Junius’s account of the limitations of natural law reveals a significant level of reference to Aquinas’s concepts, and all these considerations support the claim that Aquinas was the most useful scholastic thinker to Junius on the topic of natural law.

4.7 Conclusion

Stephen J. Grabill, in commenting on Francis Turretin’s (1623–87) theology of natural law, argued that in Turretin’s thought there is “seamless integration of the doctrines of natural revelation, natural theology, and natural law.”¹⁸⁹ In Junius’s theology of natural law one can find the same pattern: he formulated his theology of natural law by situating it against the background of eternity and temporality, divine economy and human ontology, and natural revelation and natural theology. To him natural law is God’s communicative and legislative

186. Junius, *De theologia vera*, theses 10 & 19 (pp. 55 & 70); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 118 & 157.

187. On the Reformed scholastic constructions of grace in relation to salvation, see Richard A. Muller, *Grace and Freedom: William Perkins at the Early Modern Reformed Understanding of Free Choice and Divine Grace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). For Augustine’s own writings on this topic, see Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings*, trans. Peter King (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

188. On the theme of virtue in Calvin’s thought, for example, see David S. Sytsma, “John Calvin and Virtue Ethics: Augustinian and Aristotelian Themes,” *Journal of Religious Ethics*, vol. 48, no. 3 (2020): 519–56.

189. Grabill, *Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics*, 173.

act of ordering human creatures toward the proper ends of their actions, the ends of which were explained by the threefold inclinations of human nature. Moreover, in Junius's ethical system, the theological knowledge has the power to perfect human nature. To put it otherwise, epistemological acts are determined by one's ontological condition. The natural law in Junius's thought is fundamentally God's act of conceptual revelation and relation—God through natural law communicates basic moral truths to all human beings and in so doing he orders, relates, and arranges them toward the common good. Thus the value of Junius's natural law doctrine, as is often the case with many early modern natural law theories, is that the role of *truth* is central in ethics. To be moral is to know truth; to be a moral agent is to be a perceiver and a communicator of truth. The cognitive act of a moral agent is always a constitutive part of a moral action, and Junius, like Aquinas, saw ratiocination as key to the proper ordering of moral acts.

Junius's theology of natural law is built upon both medieval and Reformational insights and undoubtedly exhibited a "catholic" mind, though the proximate conceptual sources seem to come from Aquinas, more specifically his thought expressed in IaIIae q. 94 of his *Summa theologica*. With the medieval tradition, Junius believed that common notions are not only the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of human action but also the *terminus in quo*, the converging point in which and upon which all the eternal, divine, and human laws act. Muller was hence correct to note that Reformed scholastics viewed human nature as "an internal and immanent ground of communication of divine knowledge."¹⁹⁰ With the Reformed tradition, however, Junius accentuated that human nature was first created upright and moral order is utterly dependent on God's communicative act; God is the one who freely yet sovereignly communicates to human creatures the ends and goods of their nature. Therefore, in summary, the similarities between Aquinas and Junius on natural law are most manifestly discoverable

190. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.261.

in four areas—the inclinations, notions, participation, and limitations of natural law. These considerations provide an important background to his expositions of divine, human, and Mosaic laws and, more fundamentally, to his formulations of the relationship between earthly and heavenly goods. The next chapter on divine law will treat the crucial topic of supernatural ordering in Junius's thought.

CHAPTER 5

DIVINE LAW: THE SUPERNATURAL ORDERING OF MORAL ACTION

5.1 Introduction

Grace, the concept that frames all the supernatural dimensions of divine work, was not merely a single *locus* in Reformed scholastic theology. Reformation brought nuanced changes to the ways in which theologians related grace to all the major areas of *opera Dei*, such as predestination, creation, revelation, salvation, incarnation, and, of course, consummation, and these modifications had inevitable bearings on the relationship between revelation and reason, faith and works, and gospel and law.¹ More specifically, however, the topic of supernatural grace was the junction between divine revelation and redemption, or supernatural communication and communion, and it had a pivotal role in defining the meaning of, for example, *visio Dei*, *unio cum Christo*, and *ordo salutis*.² For instance, Richard A. Muller traced

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1. For example, see J. Mark Beach, *Christ and the Covenant: Francis Turretin's Federal Theology as a Defense of the Doctrine of Grace* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007); idem, "The Idea of a 'General Grace of God' in Some Sixteenth-Century Reformed Theologians Other Than Calvin," in *Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on the Maturation of a Theological Tradition*, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, David S. Sytsma, and Jason Zuidema (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013), 97–110.
 2. See Dennis J. Tambarillo, *Union with Christ: John Calvin and the Mysticism of St. Bernard* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1994); Julie Canlis, "Calvin, Osiander, and Participation in God," *International Journal of Systematic Theology*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2004): 169–84; Mark Garcia, "Imputation and Union with Christ: Calvin, Osiander, and the Contemporary Quest for a Reformed Model," *Westminster Theological Journal*, 68 (2006): 219–51; idem, *Life in Christ: Union with Christ and Twofold Grace in Calvin's Theology* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2008); idem, "Imputation as Attribution: Union with Christ, Reification and Justification as Declarative Word," *International Journal of Systematic Theology*, vol. 11, no. 4 (2009): 415–27; J. Todd Billings, *Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Randall Zachman, "Communio Cum Christo," in *The Calvin Handbook* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 365–71; Richard B. Gaffin, "Justification and Union with Christ," in *A Theological Guide to Calvin's Institutes: Essays and Analysis*, ed. David W. Hall and Peter A. Lillback (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2008), 248–69; idem, "Calvin's Soteriology: The Structure of the Application of Redemption in Book Three of the Institutes," *Ordained Servant*, vol. 18 (2008): 68–77; idem, "A Response to John Fesko's Review," *Ordained Servant*, vol. 18 (2008): 104–113; Charles Partee, *The Theology of John Calvin* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2008), 240–50; Cornelius P. Venema, "Union with Christ, the 'Twofold Grace of God,' and the 'Order of Salvation' in Calvin's Theology," in *Calvin for Today*, ed. Joel R. Beeke (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2009), 91–113; idem, "The *Duplex Gratia Dei* and the Organization of Calvin's *Institutes: Ordo Docendi or Ordo Salutis?*," in *Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism*, 123–34; Charles Raith II, *Aquinas and Calvin on Romans: God's Justification and Our Participation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Paul Wells, "Calvin and Union with Christ: The Heart of Christian Doctrine," in *Calvin: Theologian and Reformer*, ed. Joel R. Beeke and Garry J. Wells (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2010); 65–88; Richard A. Muller, *Calvin and the Reformed Tradition: On the Work of Christ and the Order of Salvation* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012); John V. Fesko, *Beyond Calvin: Union with Christ and Justification in Early Modern Reformed Theology (1517–*

the particular origin of the technical term *ordo salutis* to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries but also noted that the topic concerning how grace is secured for and communicated to sinners “*in Christo*” had received much attention even in the sixteenth century, as it was fundamentally an exegetical issue arising from, specifically, Romans 8:28–30.³ Muller even argued that “one might say that the phrase *ordo salutis* is found early on, development of discussion concerning the order of the application of Christ’s work to the elect came next, and the standardized use of the phrase as a technical term describing the application of Christ’s work came last—in fact, came after the seventeenth-century development of Reformed orthodoxy.”⁴ It is thus crucial to bear in mind that in this context, that is, in the process of refining the received doctrines of grace, there were cross-confessional connections and interactions among Protestants and Roman Catholics and these interactions involved “conflicting claims over the basically Augustinian inheritance.”⁵ As Anthony Milton has pointed out, it is worth remembering here that Protestants “did not read Catholic authors merely in order to refute them.”⁶

In considering the scope and direction of Junius’s discussion of divine law, it is imperative to consider the consistent, constant, and convergent interaction between supernatural revelation and redemption, or between supernatural communication and communion, in his thought. Junius, in his *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, defined divine law

1700) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012); idem, “Girolamo Zanchi on Union with Christ and the Final Judgment,” *Perichoresis*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2020): 41–56; Joshua Schendel, “The Reformed Orthodox and the Visio Dei,” *The Reformed Theological Review*, vol. 77, no. 1 (April 2018): 24–44; R. Scott Clark, “Law and Gospel in Early Reformed Orthodoxy: Hermeneutical Conservatism in Olevianus’ Commentary on Romans,” in *Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism*, 307–20.

3. Muller, *Calvin and the Reformed Tradition*, 163–67.

4. Muller, *Calvin and the Reformed Tradition*, 164.

5. See the essays in *Beyond Dordt and De Auxillis: The Dynamics of Protestant and Catholic Soteriology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, Matthew T. Gaetano, and David S. Sytsma (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2019). The quotation is from Jordan J. Ballor, Matthew T. Gaetano, and David S. Sytsma, “Introduction: Augustinian Soteriology in the Context of the *Congregatio De Auxillis* and the Synod of Dordt,” 1.

6. Anthony Milton, “A Qualified Intolerance: The Limits and Ambiguities of Early Stuart Anti-Catholicism,” in *Catholicism and Anti-Catholicism in Early Modern English Texts*, ed. Arthur F. Marotti (Basingstoke, 1999), 94.

as “that which has been inspired by God, infused in rational creatures, and informs them with common and individual notions beyond nature for the purpose of transmitting them to a supernatural end by a supernatural leading.”⁷ It has to be mentioned that Junius’s account of the order of grace in terms of inspiration, infusion, information, and transmission is replete with teleological, causal, and epistemological dimensions, and all of those dimensions were specific layers of divine providence or governance. In his disputation on the doctrine of providence, *De providentia Dei*, Junius argued that God’s providential work entails natural and supernatural acts, goals, and means, and in *De politiae Mosis observatione* he clearly stated that the whole reality of “human affairs” should be understood through internal and external principles that accompany natural and supernatural movements.⁸ Even in his correspondence with Jacob Arminius (1560–1609) on the doctrine of predestination, he stated that providence is threefold: “as in nature, the work of Providence is threefold, to sustain a thing as to its existence, to govern it as to its action, and to protect or preserve it as it may be liable to destruction, so also in the pious, the work of grace is threefold, for it is accustomed to sustain, and to govern, and to protect them.”⁹ In view of this, all the complex notions that buttressed Junius’s argument about the nature and role of divine law as defined above should be interpreted in the light of divine government, or in the light of God’s providential governance of human actions toward their supernatural perfection, and only against the backdrop of this

7. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, ed. Abraham Kuyper (Amsterdam: Muller and Kruyt, 1882), thesis 6 (p. 348). Unless stated, all the translations of this text used in this chapter are from Franciscus Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, ed. Andrew M. McGinnis, trans. Todd M. Rester (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2015). The citation is from Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 49.

8. “Hoc opus est mediatum vel immediatum. Immediatum est quod tum in natura vniuersi, tum in singulis partibus ipsius siue mediis seu causis secundis, & praetor, vel etiam vbi visum erit contra omnia media peragitur: quod opus non parum facit ad gloriam Dei illustrandam, eiusque potentiam manifestandam, vt quae nullis adstricta est mediis externis. Mediatum vero opus Dei vocamus, quod sit per varia media, nunc per naturam superiorem illam, nunc per hanc inferiorem, tam communem quam singularem, nunc denique per singulas naturae partes secundum naturam, & supra naturam ipsam, prout visum est maiestati eius.” Franciscus Junius, *De providentia Dei*, thesis 5, in *Opuscula theologica selecta* (pp. 158–59); idem, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 3; cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 43–44.

9. Jacob Arminius, *A Discussion on the Subject of Predestination, Between James Arminius, D.D., Minister at Amsterdam, and Franciscus Junius, D.D., Professor of Divinity at Leyden*, in *The Works of Arminius*, trans. James Nichols and W. R. Bagnall (Auburn and Buffalo: 1853), 3:174.

framework can the Godward and heavenward nature of supernatural ordering be properly understood.¹⁰

Another conceptual context to be considered here is that, for Junius, divine law is not primarily and exclusively associated with the laws of Moses. God's supernatural ordering of human reason was a necessity even before the promulgation of Mosaic law and, in fact, even before the fall. In his treatise called *De lege divina* Junius first explained divine law in terms of "heavenly revelation" before he explicated the moral, civil, and ceremonial laws of Moses, and also in *De politiae Mosis observatione* he treated divine law primarily as the divine rule of human reason for the provision of and the direction toward the supernatural good, and only secondarily as the revelation of moral, ceremonial, and judicial laws in the Old Covenant.¹¹ The Mosaic law is "a most certain symbol of that divine and supernatural law," but it is not the substance itself.¹² He thus argued: "For whatever has been announced or written by the authority of God [in the Mosaic law] is indeed of the divine law, but it must not be said to necessarily embrace the whole substance of the law or the divine law in general and universally."¹³ To put it otherwise, he distinguished the internal substance of divine law from its external expression by designating the former as "the principle of divine communication with human beings."¹⁴ Scripture, on the other hand, is the external and inspired instrument

10. Aquinas was also clear that the ultimate function of all laws enacted in history was God's government of rational creatures; with respect to the divine law, therefore, he argued that its chief purpose is to "lead men to God." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, trans. Laurence Shapcote (Green Bay, WI: The Aquinas Institute, 2018), 3, c. 115.

11. "[W]e are treating the divine law according to its substance and genus, and not according to any of its external forms by which it has either been announced in spoken word or expressed in writing. For whatever has been announced or written by the authority of God is indeed of the divine law, but it must not be said to necessarily embrace the whole substance of the law or the divine law in general and universally." Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (p. 348); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 49; "The latter [divine law] is a rule of human beings by a certain mode according to our little measure [*modulum nostrum*], to whom by a little measure God accommodated his revelations and communications." Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–49); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 50–51.

12. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 62.

13. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (p. 348); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 49.

14. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–49); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 51.

through which those supernatural *principia* and *axiomata* are communicated.¹⁵ The key here is that the distinction between the substance and the expression of divine law loosely corresponds to the distinctions between the internal and the external testimonies of the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit's internal and external call, as the point Junius intended to accentuate was that God's supernatural ordering entails both internal-spiritual and external-scriptural dimensions.¹⁶

With these broader conceptual factors in mind this chapter raises the question: how did Junius retain, refine, or reject the Thomistic conception of grace as it pertains to revelation and redemption? In other words, what were the Thomistic underpinnings in Junius's conception of the substance of divine law, and, how did he modify them? To that question, this chapter provides an argument that Junius, while understanding the role of grace in terms of causal, dispositional, and spiritual acts, nonetheless modified Aquinas's conception of supernatural communication on Christological, soteriological, and anthropological grounds. This is to say that Junius critically appropriated Aquinas's framework in viewing the supernatural ordering of nature through the categories of infusion, disposition, and cognition, yet he used those categories along with the assumptions of finite nature and sovereign grace. Due to the fact that supernatural ordering of reason occurs not only in ordinary human natures but also in Christ's human nature, this chapter will consider Junius's view of divine ordering vis-à-vis theologies of union, of vision, and of revelation, the latter of which will be concentrated on the effects of grace on the fallen nature. To put it slightly differently, as this chapter broadly considers the relation between divine communication and human perception, the "nature" in the chapter will include Christ's human nature as well as the glorified nature of the heavenly saints, in order to

15. See Richard A. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academics, 2003), 2.158.

16. See also Franciscus Junius, *De sacra scriptura, Theses elencticae de scriptura sacra, De auctoritate sacrae scripturae, De verbi Dei auctoritate & perfectione*, and *De vocatione hominum ad salutem*. Girolamo Zanchi (1516–90) made similar observations when he distinguished "the law of the Spirit" from both natural law and the Mosaic law. See Girolamo Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, trans. Jeffrey J. Veenstra (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2012), 75–78. Muller noted that the category of infused habit was associated with regeneration or calling by the Spirit. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.359.

describe more fully the pattern by which the order of grace interacts with the order of nature in Junius's moral theology. All of these considerations will demonstrate how human reason is ordered by grace toward its supernatural good and will be a helpful background to Junius's exposition of the ceremonial law of Moses in chapter seven.

5.2 The Order of Perfection: From Divine Communication to Human Cognition

The first point to note is that four key ideas shaped Junius's account of the substance of divine law: inspiration, infusion, disposition, and ratiocination. These four notions were the building blocks in Junius's construal of the relationship between natural law and divine law, and, despite the nuanced differences that will be unpacked below, the way in which those ideas are interlinked exhibits similarity to Aquinas's pattern of thinking on the matter. First of all Junius believed that God interacts with humanity "by means of word."¹⁷ By being consistent with this belief he argued that the theology of revelation (*theologia revelationis*) is communicated by a twofold mode, that is by nature and grace.¹⁸ The former is an internal principle of revelation and, the latter, an external principle.¹⁹ He also stated that "in every communication a twofold mode is observed: how the communication proceeds from an agent, and how it comes to others and is perceived by them."²⁰ Upon making these points he asserted that the twofold mode of communication between God and human creatures via grace is distinguished into inspiration

17. Franciscus Junius, *Theseon theologicarum de auctoritate scripturae sacrae locus primus* (1589), thesis 13. The translation of this text is available in *Ad Fontes: A Journal of Protestant Resourcement*, Issue 3.5 (2019): 12–16.

18. Thesis 14: "The mode, moreover, of communicating this theology is twofold, by nature and by grace. The former happens as an internal principle of communication. The latter, by an external principle of the first one. Thus it happens that the one theology is termed natural and the other supernatural." Franciscus Junius, *De theologia vera in Opuscula theologica selecta*, thesis 14. Unless stated otherwise, the translations of this text used in this chapter are from Franciscus Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology: With the Life of Franciscus Junius*, trans. David C. Noe (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2014). See page 87 for the reference.

19. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 14 (p. 42); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 87.

20. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–49); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 51.

and infusion.²¹ The first mode of supernatural communication is inspiration, for it captures the spiritual nature of God’s communicative act: “just as God is spirit, so also he acts and speaks in the spirit.”²² More elaborately, the principal efficient cause of supernatural communication is “God the Father in His Son through His own Spirit, that is, the one true and eternal God, even three persons in the unity of essence, working in common in this communication of grace.”²³

The second mode, on the other hand, is infusion, which describes the kind of action that happens in a communicative patient when God’s spiritual communication takes place in human nature. He contended that, as rational creatures are “constricted vessels,” they are “unfit to perceive the fullness of his revelation, and consequently we gain a fuller kindness from God by it because he infuses his law with the same spirit and gradually instills it in our spirits by his own power.”²⁴ In this pattern of thought “the *modus* of theology relates to the ability of each individual to comprehend and perceive knowledge of God as the object of a created intellect.”²⁵ It is vitally important to grasp here the monergistic nature of this spiritual work, as Junius claimed that “[t]he supernatural principle acting in us, together with its supernatural leading that moves us, is so effective that by its strength alone—not by any faculty of our nature—we may be transmitted to that supernatural end, no differently than a javelin is moved and transmitted to its proposed target by a javelin thrower.”²⁶ Upon contending that what is infused by grace is essentially *principia* and *conclusiones*, he again re-iterated that they are *adventitious*—Junius consistently denied that supernatural notions could be either implanted (*insita*) or acquired (*acquisita*), as they can only be infused by God directly (*infusa*).²⁷

21. “Principium his verbis expressimus, *quae inspirata a Deo: & infusa rationalibus creaturis.*” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–49); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 51.

22. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–49); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 51.

23. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 29 (p. 86); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 197–98.

24. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–49); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 51–52.

25. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.236.

26. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (p. 350); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 54.

27. “In the scholastic vocabulary, *habitus* indicates any spiritual capacity or disposition of the soul, whether of mind or of will, to be informed by things or beings external to it. These capacities or dispositions, moreover,

Muller noted that, from the medieval uses of *habitus*—that is *innata*, *acquisita*, *insita*, and *infusa*—only the *habitus infusa* was utilized in Reformed orthodox theology as a legitimate theological category applicable to a fallen nature, notwithstanding its association with a medieval account of substantial infusion.²⁸ Junius’s use of *habitus* in conjunction with *infusa* is a case in point: his account of infused habit is firmly dependent on the proposition that the ultimate cause of human nature’s supernatural orientation is wholly external, not internal. This is not a new tenet, of course, as Aquinas in *Summa contra Gentiles* already provided an argument that a thing can possess a higher operation of power via two ways: first, through an intensification of an existing power, or second, through an addition of a new power.²⁹ The topic of power or strength was therefore one of the central categories in Aquinas’s moral thought, because, as he expressed in his *Summa theologica*, the power of an agent explains the boundary, possibility, and trajectory of his actions—hence “nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength.”³⁰ Adjacent to this point was the contention that “the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower.”³¹ By understanding *habitus* in terms of a disposition and capacity of nature that shapes its operation and orientation, Aquinas then could argue that an additional disposition is necessary to gain the knowledge that transcends

can be classified both according to origin or cause and according to function or kind. Thus a disposition can be innate or inborn (*habitus insita*), belonging to the nature of the mind or will; acquired (*habitus acquisita*) by an activity of mind or will in relation to something external; or infused (*habitus infusa*) by the activity of some thing or power external to the mind or will.” Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.357.

28. “*Habitus innata* and *habitus acquisita* are ruled out immediately by the fall: faith is not something that we have by nature or can gain by effort. Remaining are the terms *habitus insita* and *habitus infusa*: *insita* tended to be used with reference to the result of immediate apprehension while *infusa* carried with it the taint of the medieval doctrine of grace. Since the former adjective does not apply to the doctrine of faith—insofar as it implies synergism—the latter alone remains applicable. Rather, however, than speak directly of a *habitus infusa*, the Protestant scholastics tend rather to speak of the divine act of infusing the habit in regeneration or in calling.” Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.358–59.
29. “Nothing can be raised to a higher operation except through its power being strengthened. Now a power may be increased in two ways. First, by a mere intensifying of the power: thus the active power of a hot subject is increased by the intensity of heat, so that it is capable of a more vehement action in the same species. Second, by the addition of a new form: thus the power of a diaphanous body is increased so that it can give light through its being made actually lightsome by receiving the form of light anew. This increase of power is necessary in order that there result an operation of another species.” Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 53.
30. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 109, a. 3, ad 2. English translations of Aquinas’ *Summa theologica* used in this chapter are taken from Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans., Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981).
31. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 12, a. 11 co.

its natural boundary.³²

Junius clearly appropriated this *gratia-potentia-opera* pattern of thought. Like Aquinas Junius also believed that only by God’s adventitious and additive work upon nature can human beings enjoy “the eternal, gracious, and glorious vision of God [*visio Dei aeterna, gratiosa, gloriosa*].”³³ He remarked that all types of ectypal theology are dispositional, as the Spirit changes the capacity and orientation of natural reason to receive supernatural truths.³⁴ Junius was clear therefore that even in the state of integrity human reason was never able to discover “the very author of his own good and the path to Him and the way to receive that good by the strength of his own nature,” and that, in the state of depravity, the blindness concerning the nature of and the pathway toward that good was greatly intensified.³⁵ This idea correlates with his belief that a personal subject “is twofold according to its capacity and condition: the one consists in nature and the other in grace.”³⁶ “The subject,” in its natural condition, “cannot contain something perfect or even perfectly in its actuation, or its potentiality, or in any disposition to potentiality.”³⁷ Natural gifts, in other words, “would never have carried man up to the pinnacle of salvation and heavenly glory unless the singular and supernatural grace of God were at work.”³⁸ When the subject is considered in the state of grace, however, it has the capacity to receive the “perfect gift and good donation [*donum perfectum & bonam donationem*]” from God.³⁹ In raising human creatures beyond nature to grace, God provides both heavenly truths and heavenward dispositions that will be perfected in actual heaven.⁴⁰ Conversely this means an unchanged or an uninfused nature cannot be suitable for heavenly

32. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 49, a. 4 co.

33. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 60); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 132.

34. “[Ectypal theology] is dispositional, for it can come near the entire subject through the grace of God and deviate from the same through an absence of that grace.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 10 (p. 55); idem, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 118.

35. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 19 (p. 71); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 160.

36. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 34 (pp. 93–94); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 215.

37. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 34 (pp. 93–94); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 215.

38. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (pp. 76–77); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 173.

39. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 34 (pp. 93–94); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 215.

40. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 34 (pp. 93–94); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 215.

perfection as it not only lacks the *active* potency to produce but also lacks the *passive* potency to receive divine gifts from heaven. When it comes to the matter or content of infusion, Junius believed that it is essentially *concepts* that order rational creatures “with common and individual notions beyond nature.”⁴¹

He then made a point that, by grace, God furnished human minds with “a divine reasoning process and made open a way to the conclusions and determinations that are conducive to heavenly knowledge.”⁴² In other terms, by following the arguments of the orthodox Fathers and the medieval grammarians (*orthodoxi Patres & Grammatici*), Junius asserted that the infused principles of heavenly knowledge would enable the recipient of that grace to possess the integrated knowledge of God in a nominative sense (*Deus*) and also in possessive, dative, accusative, and ablative senses (*Dei, Deo, ad Deum, a Deo*).⁴³ The knowledge of God as *Deus* is the knowledge of his nature—whether comprehended as one in essence or as three in person—which he, following Augustine, regarded as something rational creatures ought to enjoy (*frui*).⁴⁴ The knowledge of God as *Dei, Deo, ad Deum, and a Deo*, on the other hand, is the knowledge of his will—his will toward all created things but specifically to his church as a recipient of his grace (which corresponds to *uti*).⁴⁵ The reception and perception of the latter kind of supernatural knowledge includes the knowledge of *opera Dei*, which is either God’s work in creation or the creation’s work according to God.⁴⁶ These diverse understandings of God and his works, in short, constitute the wisdom of divine things (*divinarum rerum*) in Junius’s judgment.

These accounts clearly highlight that God alone is the *terminus a quo* of all supernatural gifts. Junius insisted that, firstly, God “joined together the gifts of grace with the individual

41. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–49); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 52.

42. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (pp. 76–77); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 172.

43. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (p. 78); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 177–78.

44. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (pp. 78–79); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 179.

45. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (pp. 78–79); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 179.

46. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (pp. 78–79); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 180.

goods of nature which correspond to them”; secondly, God “affixed the principles of grace to the principles placed in the understanding by nature”; and thirdly, God “built the additional portions of His own divine light.”⁴⁷ These nuanced modes of divine action, that is the act of joining, affixing, and building, are all responses to one reality, that is the ontological and epistemological *finitude* that rational beings possess by virtue of creation. Junius emphatically pointed out that:

[N]atural theology *is not even able, in and of itself, to contain the perfection that is added by grace*. That is, it possesses no inclination in and of itself by its nature or character, or ordered relation, or disposition (as they say) by which it might receive that perfection which is poured out by heavenly grace. In like manner, whatever it receives in nature and from nature according to the genus of its potency which they call passive, comes from the aptitude and disposition of our nature. Nevertheless, if you look to the enjoyment and perception of those heavenly and spiritual gifts that God communicates with men by His special revelation, then this theology possesses no potency that is passive *per se*, nor receptive, nor (as the scholastics call it) *obediential*; nor, finally, is there a disposition which natural theology shares with supernatural theology [italics retained from the translation].⁴⁸

As indicated here God’s infusion of supernatural gifts is precisely his adventitious work unto nature, and this adventitious and additive work of God is necessary due to the fact that human nature itself lacks fitting dispositions, powers, and strengths that enable the reception and cognition of heavenly knowledge. Furthermore, as the lack of such dispositions is a reality of a created nature, not necessarily of a corrupted nature, God’s supernatural gifts were requisites for Adam even in the state of integrity. Thus, for Junius, God’s infusion of divine law follows his creation of natural law, as God’s additive work presupposes a natural structure and a delineation of its boundary.⁴⁹

Here, it will be a mistake to omit the claim that Junius’s denial of all kinds of passive potency in relation to supernatural theology, including the receptive and the obediential, is of paramount importance in understanding the fundamental difference between himself and the

47. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (pp. 76–77); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 174–75.

48. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 19 (pp. 69–70); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 157–58.

49. See chapter 4 for more details.

Thomists in the Roman Catholic tradition. In his excellent work on this topic Lawrence Feingold noted that the concept of obediencial potency was utilized by Augustine in his *De Genesi ad Litteram* but underwent a significant development in the Thomist tradition, which eventually came to refer to a notion that “all creation has the innate capacity to *obey* the will of the Creator and to be caused to do whatever He wills.”⁵⁰ The important part here is that *an obediencial potency* is distinguishable from a *natural passive potency*, for the latter concept affirms “there is an innate inclination for its actualization.”⁵¹ This means that, if the natural desire to see the essence of God was categorized as a natural passive potency, then the supernatural vision of God would be an innate or intrinsic inclination and thus, consequently, would be reduced to a connatural end; if it is categorized as an obediencial potency, however, its supernaturality is retained for its affirmation that its potency can only be actualized by the direct power and work of God.⁵² Hence the key difference between the two kinds of passive potencies, according to Feingold, was that a natural passive potency can be actualized by secondary and creaturely causes, whereas an obediencial potency can be actualized only by the primary cause, God himself.⁵³

50. “Starting with the theologians of the thirteenth century, obediencial potency is used to indicate a capacity in the creature to receive a perfection directly from the power of God, working above the order of natural causes. It means that the specific nature of the creature and the natural laws that govern it do not bind the hands of the Creator, so to speak; they do not make Him incapable of intervening in His work beyond the limits of the natural order that He has established. Because of God’s sovereign power over created being, all creation has the innate capacity to *obey* the will of the Creator and to be caused to do whatever He wills.” Lawrence Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters*, 2nd ed. (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2010), 105.

51. Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters*, 101.

52. “This capacity to obey God above nature is used in contrast with *natural passive potency*, which is the capacity to receive a perfection through *connatural* active powers (agents), in accordance with the laws of nature. Thus natural passive potency and obediencial potency are two different kinds of passive potencies, corresponding to two different kinds of agents: natural and divine.” Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters*, 106.

53. “[T]he notion of obediencial potency is a simple concept. It is the creature’s passive receptivity to being moved *directly* by God. There are two types of passive potency: *natural passive potency* to be moved by secondary causes, and *obediencial potency* to be moved by the will of God above secondary causes.” Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters*, 107. Also: “In his response, St. Thomas notes that a given nature, considered as a passive principle, can be acted upon by different orders agents: both natural and supernatural. In this case, the Aristotelian principle of proportionality between passive and active potencies is to be applied as follows: the passive potencies are to be distinguished and classified according to the level of the active potencies to which they correspond. A passive potency will be *natural* if its *corresponding active power is natural*. If the corresponding active power is *supernatural*, acting above the

After examining the concept philosophically (and historically) Feingold concluded that some of the early modern Thomists—for instance John of Capréolus (c. 1380–1444), Thomas Cajetan (1469–1534), Sylvester of Ferrara (c. 1474–1528), and Domingo Báñez (1528–1604)—were “all in profound agreement with St. Augustine and St. Thomas” in affirming the legitimacy of the concept and therefore affirming the residency of obediential potency in human nature.⁵⁴ This pattern of thought is starkly contrasted with Duns Scotus’s (c. 1266–1308), in which, due to his views on the univocity of being and the relationship between philosophy and theology, the supernatural end of humanity was designated as knowable if human nature itself was perfectly known—in this sense, simply put, supernatural revelation is rendered unnecessary, and natural reason is rendered sufficient.⁵⁵ That Junius rejected these concepts—obediential and passive kinds of potency for supernatural perfection—is a testament to the fact that, as a Reformed theologian, he conceived grace as utterly gratuitous and free, and nature as utterly dependent and finite. Once again: “whatever [human nature] receives in nature and from nature according to the genus of its potency which they call passive, comes from the aptitude and disposition of our nature. Nevertheless ... [natural] theology possesses

power of any natural agent, *then the passive potency will not be classified as natural, but as obediential.*” Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters*, 152.

54. “It is clear that Thomists such as Capreolus, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, Banez [macron?], Scheeben, and so forth, are all in profound agreement with St. Augustine and St. Thomas in speaking of a unique or specific capacity of the spiritual creature for supernatural perfection, rooted in the fact that the spiritual creature is made in the image and likeness of God.” Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters*, 120.
55. “We have seen that in *Ordinatio* I, prol., Scotus expresses his views by means of a dialogue between the ‘theologians’ and the ‘philosophers.’ The ‘theologians’ argue that Revelation is necessary for us to know our supernatural end, because our natural acts and faculties are not proportioned to it and thus cannot inform us about it. Against this position, which is also that of St. Thomas in *ST I*, q. 1, a. 1 Scotus raises a very interesting objection that he puts in the mouth of the ‘philosophers.’ He reasons that the existence of a natural potency and a natural desire in man for the beatific vision implies that if one perfectly knew man’s nature, the existence of this natural potency or desire for the beatific vision could also be naturally known. Knowing the existence of this natural potency and desire, one would know the intrinsic possibility of the beatific vision to which the potency is ordered. Thus from natural knowledge of the creature, one could gain knowledge of the final end to which we are ordered by the grace of God. From this, the philosophers seek to show that Revelation is not strictly necessary.” Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters*, 57.

no potency that is passive *per se*, nor receptive, nor (as the scholastics call it) *obediential*; nor, finally, is there a disposition which natural theology shares with supernatural theology.”⁵⁶

Upon noting the necessity of inspired and infused notions, Junius claimed that God, through them, provides a twofold testimony of salvation to a fallen nature: first, common exhibition of the “proofs of heavenly grace [*documenta caelestis gratiae*],” and second, individual senses of “a true consciousness of the divine law [*vera legis diuinae conscientia*].”⁵⁷ God’s exhibition of the proofs of heavenly grace is a work in the human mind (*in mente*), the effects of which are redemptive and soteric in the case of a fallen nature, and God’s informing work of the divine law in the individual conscience (*in conscientia*) is God’s communicative act that assures one from the accusations of law.⁵⁸ God, in other words, presses the objective and common truths of salvation unto the human mind, and in so doing he also touches the subjective conscience and communicates assurance to free the recipients of that grace from sin and guilt. Thus through these communicative and cognitive acts, Junius believed, God leads rational creatures beyond nature to a supernatural end, and he highlighted repeatedly that both the provision of supernatural truths and the operation of heavenward dispositions are solely and exclusively God’s work.⁵⁹ Due to the communicative character of supernatural ordering,

56. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 19 (pp. 69–70); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 157–58.

57. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 349–50); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 53.

58. “[H]uman being by nature is endowed with a twofold sense [*duplex sensus homini*]—commonly by the natural law, as (for example) ‘you shall not murder,’ and individually by the testimony of conscience, ‘but you have murdered,’ (for this witness, as Paul says, individually accuses or excuses someone)—so also it was necessary for God to employ a twofold testimony [*duplex testimonium*] so that he might inform us, first, of common notions in the mind [*in mente*]; second, of individual notions in the conscience [*in conscientia*], so that the use of the divine law would be effective with us from its especially common testimony of salvation, even by an individual witness and revelation of it whether applied ordinarily or extraordinarily.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 349–50); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 53.

59. “And so we have established the mode of these actions in the best way and in agreement with the truth when we say that it is by these actions that creatures are transmitted to a supernatural end by a supernatural leading. For just as the acting principle in us for the information and cognition of divine things is supernatural, so also the supernatural principle by which we are led into obedience of those perceptions and notions must act in us. The supernatural principle acting in us, together with its supernatural leading that moves us, is so effective that by its strength alone—not by any faculty of our nature—we may be transmitted to that supernatural end, no differently than a javelin is moved and transmitted to its proposed target by a javelin thrower. Therefore, what we said in defining the divine law most certainly follows, namely, that its principle is supernatural and so is its substance, work, and action, and likewise its mode and end transcend nature.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 349–50); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 53–54.

therefore, human contemplation, cogitation, and ratiocination is required in the process of heavenward growth: by the rational work of contemplation the blindness of human mind is gradually overcome, as the benefits as well as the author of supernatural grace can be grasped more clearly.⁶⁰

Thus the ideas of inspiration, infusion, disposition, and ratiocination are intertwined in Junius's account of God's supernatural work, and all of these ideas underscore the discursive character of God's supernatural ordering.⁶¹ Even in relation to eternal law, he contended that divine law is "not the same as the eternal law, but is proximate [*proxima*] and most closely joined to it [*conjunctissima*]."⁶² In differentiating divine law from eternal law he did not intend to deny that eternal law is "divine." Rather, he believed that eternal law is "more divine than even the one that in this place we call divine."⁶³ The extent to which the word "divine" can be applied to eternal law is unbounded, as it is "divine in all modes," but the divinity applied to divine law is limited, contingent, and relative as it is "divine in principle and according to a certain mode only."⁶⁴ For these reasons Junius contended that the archetypal theology is "uncreated from eternity: it is essential or formal, one and the same as that of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit."⁶⁵ The ectypal theology, on the other hand, is "created and has a beginning in time."⁶⁶ The eternal law itself is God's uncreated, infinite, internal, and essential law that is "the rule of rules [*regula regularum*]," but the divine law is God's created, communicated, and adventitious rule that only came to exist in time for finite natures.⁶⁷ This is to say that the major differences between the two lie in the simultaneous character of eternal law on the one hand,

60. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 13 (p. 62); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 137.

61. The discursive nature of supernatural ordering here is contrasted with the non-discursive nature of divine reasoning itself, due to the finitude of creatures and the infinity of God. See Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.234–38.

62. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–49); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 49.

63. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–49); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 49.

64. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–49); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 50.

65. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (p. 58); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 126.

66. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (p. 58); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 126.

67. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 (pp. 348–49); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 50.

and the sequential and discursive character of divine law on the other. On this point, Aquinas's thought is clearly reflected: "there is such a discursive process in our intellect from something known to knowledge of something that we were not actually considering before. And these things cannot happen in the divine intellect."⁶⁸

As such the common good that human beings may attain through God's supernatural ordering is communicated by way of discourse. One fundamental point here is that the vision of the glory of God was revealed and refracted through Christ's human nature—it is by sharing the divine wisdom in Christ's human nature (*theologia unionis*) that human beings can gain their supernatural blessedness.⁶⁹ In fact, Junius clearly argued that the *theologia unionis* is "the common principle of the rest of theology, both that which is perceived by those blessed spirits in heaven, and here on earth by wretched men."⁷⁰ These examinations then support the thesis that, to Junius, the perfection of human nature occurs by divine communication and by human cognition, and hence the four categories of inspiration, infusion, disposition, and ratiocination were the key conceptual pillars that buttressed Junius's view of supernatural ordering. In Muller's words: these scholastic constructions retained "the substance of the Reformation's view of the sovereignty and transcendence of God and of the utterly necessary, gracious character of revelation."⁷¹

Before advancing into the next sub-section it has to be mentioned at the outset that the most puzzling part in Junius's account of grace may be his idea of *abolishment*. He argued very

68. Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium theologiae*, pt 1, c. 2. The translation is from Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium of Theology*, trans. Richard J. Regan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pt 1, a. 29.

69. "Thus also God in His account of saving grace has demonstrated by the light of theology the common good and the individual good as consisting in the common good. The common good is God's glory. Truly in this common good, our individual good is located, namely that we are to be made glorious in the glory of God and are to perceive all good as both from His glory and to His glory. So as the glory of God remains steadfast in this age and the one to come, and as it is the perpetual font of the good that comes to all created things, so also we must establish that the effect of that always active, supernatural cause is always present in our souls; that cause is most free and never hindered, and it will never perish by anyone's action." Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 211.

70. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 59); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 129.

71. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.237.

clearly in *De theologia vera* that grace *abolishes* nature in both prelapsarian and postlapsarian conditions:

[R]eason could not, even in the intact state of human nature, have ascended to a higher apex of human knowledge than it could build upon these [natural] principles and from them. Now that these ideas have been established, we correctly conclude that even in the actual unspoiled human nature, theology could not have been perfected according to the perfection of human nature taken in itself, but that theology was to be perfected by God's supernatural grace, or rather to be abolished [*quasi abolendam*], as it were, by a perfection that would enter into its place. As a result, man would continue on after he was enriched by supernatural theology, and by supernatural virtue he would be translated to that blessed condition through grace. To the living hope of this grace we have been given new birth by the Lord (1 Peter 1:3). Nor is there any reason why someone should be surprised that we say natural theology was to be abolished by the supernatural. For so the apostle teaches us to say when he proclaims about this theology of ours and about the one that is to come in the heavens: "For we know in part," he says, "and we prophesy in part. But when perfection shall have come, then what is 'in part' will be abolished, etc." (1 Cor. 13:9). This replacement is not only of a different form, but also of a different and most perfect genus. It will swallow up [*quasi absorptura*], so to speak, this form of our theology and carry it into its perfection.⁷²

Despite his statement here about grace abolishing or replacing even the uncorrupted nature, in the introductory section of his *De politiae Mosis observatione* Junius stated that "grace perfects nature; grace does not, however, abolish it [*gratia naturam perficit, non autem abolet*]."⁷³ These remarks seem to contradict each other; grace is said to abolish nature in *De theologia vera* and not to abolish it in *De politiae Mosis observatione*. Then, how should these seemingly contradictory statements be understood? Did Junius really contradict himself, or did he intend to convey two distinct meanings? The simple answer is the latter: there is at least a twofold use of the word "abolishment" in Junius's account of grace.

Firstly, Junius meant that grace abolishes nature insofar as it introduces and infuses new dispositions into human nature that the "new nature" will be vastly different from the "old nature." This use of "abolishment" should be interpreted in the light of Junius's citation of 1 Peter 1:3 and 1 Corinthians 13:9 where, in the Latin Vulgate, the word *regeneravit* appears for

72. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 17 (p. 68); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 154.

73. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (p. 343); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 38.

the Greek word ἀναγεννήσας in 1 Peter 1:3 and the word *evacuabuntur* appears for the Greek word καταργηθήσεται in 1 Corinthians 13:8–10.⁷⁴ In other words, the term abolishment is used in the etymological context of regeneration and evacuation, which conveyed the idea of enlivening, emptying, and vivifying the old with a new life. Hence in Junius’s thought grace does abolish nature to the degree that the graced nature is posited as dramatically different from the ungraced nature, as grace infuses new principles, powers, and pathways of action that can never be acquired by nature alone.

Secondly, grace does *not* abolish nature in the sense that the provision of divine law does not eliminate the necessity of human law. Junius argued that:

[T]o the extent that we may be Christians, we do not cease being humans, but we are Christian human beings [*homines Christiani sumus*]. So also we must state that therefore we are bound by Christian laws, not that we are consequently released from human ones. For grace perfects nature; grace does not, however, abolish it [*nam gratia naturam perficit, non autem abolet*]. And therefore with respect to the laws by which nature itself is sustained and renewed, grace restores those that have been lost, renews those that have been corrupted, and teaches those that are unknown.⁷⁵

Here, his intention was to point out that, as grace does not nullify but renews the operation of natural law, grace does not invalidate the use of human law. Then Junius’s comment here would make sense: grace neither nullifies nor negates the use of adventitious laws, as both divine and human laws are added for the purpose of ordering human nature—the rational movement from principles to conclusions is preserved even after the conferral of grace and, therefore, the ordering of human reason via human laws still remains obligatory, especially as human law is charged with making determinations.⁷⁶ For these reasons, it can be affirmed that Junius did not contradict himself but rather used the term “abolishment” in two different senses to highlight,

74. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 17 (p. 68); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 154.

75. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (p. 343); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 38.

76. For example, thesis 7: “The human law is that which humans, proceeding by reason, produce from the preceding laws, accommodated first to common just, honest, useful, and necessary conclusions, then to particular determinations for the condition of persons for whose good it is produced, the things or matters concerning which it is produced, and for the circumstances which occur to them.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (p. 350); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 54.

on the one hand, the dramatic difference between the ungraced and the graced nature, and on the other, the continual necessity of human law even for those who received grace. Grace indeed is “above (*supra*) and not against (*contra*) nature: truth does not contradict truth.”⁷⁷

5.3 The Distributor of the Supernatural Good: Christ and the Grace of Union

The second sub-thesis is that Junius, while utilizing the categories of causation, disposition, and motion, modified Aquinas’s views on how Christ’s human nature knows divine things.⁷⁸ In other words, one of the key differences between the two thinkers lies in the fact that Junius denied the existence of infused knowledge in Christ, while Aquinas clearly affirmed that “we must admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge, inasmuch as the Word of God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is personally united to Him, intelligible species of all things to which the possible intellect is in potentiality.”⁷⁹ Muller was correct to note that, though the sophisticated discussion of Christ’s theological knowledge entered into Reformed orthodoxy through Junius’s *De theologia vera*, the topic itself was treated even before the Council of Chalcedon (AD 451) by church fathers.⁸⁰ “The tendency of Western Christology following Augustine,” Muller noted, “was to deny a communication of divine attributes to Christ’s human nature and to assume the finitude of his human knowledge.”⁸¹ Following this trajectory the Reformed denied both the Thomistic Christology that enabled a certain form of infinite theology in Christ’s humanity and also the Lutheran Christology that enabled a communication of divine attributes to the humanity of Christ.⁸²

77. Franciscus Gomarus, *Disputationes*, l.xliii, cited in Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.257.

78. Stefan Lindholm provided a historical-philosophical treatment of how Aristotelian concepts were used in Zanchi’s Christology. See Stefan Lindholm, *Jerome Zanchi (1516–90) and the Analysis of Reformed Scholastic Christology* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016).

79. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IIIa, q. 9, a. 3, co.

80. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.248. Earlier discussions of this topic are present, for example, in Zacharias Ursinus, *Tractationes Theologicae* (Neustadt, 1589).

81. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.248.

82. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.248. Richard A. Muller, s.v. “*communicatio idiomatum*,” in *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology*, 2nd ed. (Baker Academic: Grand Rapids, 2017), 69–71.

According to Junius Christ's theological knowledge in his humanity is fundamentally "a certain copy and, rather, shadowy image of the formal, divine, and essential theological image" and "the model of the divine and immutable exemplar."⁸³ It is not an *exemplar* itself, but an *ectype*, copy, image, shadow, or model of the eternal ideas of God, which does not share any archetypal attributes. The other key difference is that, because of the common sharing of human nature, Junius saw the incarnate Christ as a centrifugal point from which the supernatural good is communicated to those in grace and glory, and a centripetal point to which they come to attain their supernatural good. He stated that Christ "received this theology from the Father for our sakes, and we received it from Him," and it is through the conduit of Christ's theology of union that human creatures participate in God's economy of supernatural ordering.⁸⁴

Junius defined *theologia unionis* as "the whole wisdom of divine matters, communicated to Christ as God-man, that is, as the Word made flesh, according to His humanity."⁸⁵ To unpack this he made a point that the efficient cause of this theology is divine communication, and the agent of this communication is the triune God.⁸⁶ Thus the supernatural wisdom that Christ possesses in his humanity is attained "through the grace of union [*per unionis gratiam*]" that occurs in the unity of divine *suppositum*, namely the "person of Christ."⁸⁷ Junius clearly stated that such union does not confuse Christ's divinity with his humanity; the person of the Word "does not bring about either a confusion or a transfusion of the properties that pertain to the one nature or the other," such that "the substance of the divine person does not take away the truth of the human mind in our Savior... [and] does not remove

83. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 6 (p. 50); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 104.

84. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (pp. 57–58); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 124.

85. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (p. 56); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 121.

86. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (pp. 57–58); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 125.

87. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (pp. 57–58); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 125–26.

that knowledge which is a property of His humanity.”⁸⁸ Consequently, he continued, “both types of knowledge come together in the unity of the subject, and each preserves its own truth in the same Christ.”⁸⁹

At least his point about the existence of a twofold knowledge in the person of Christ does not counter Aquinas’s view. Aquinas—following the Chalcedonian formula—also argued that “the union of the two natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the properties of both natures remained unconfused.”⁹⁰ The person of Christ, moreover, is “a hypostasis or suppositum of a rational nature.”⁹¹ In addition, the phrase “grace of union” as used by Junius also appears in Aquinas’s *Summa theologiae*, where he, in commenting on Augustine’s argument in *De Trinitate* I.13, used the same phrase “the grace of union [*gratia unionis*]” to refer to that Christological principle by which the ability to comprehend divine essence can be ascribed to the “Son of Man.”⁹² Hence by virtue of the grace of union, Aquinas claimed, “[i]n Christ’s soul there was a twofold knowledge”—one according to his divinity and the other according to his humanity.⁹³ Aquinas even explained this twofold knowledge in Christ by distinguishing his human knowledge of vision (*per scientiam visionis*) and his divine simple intelligence (*per simplicem intelligentiam*), to indicate that by the former Christ knows

88. “Non enim personalis unio aut confusionem efficit, aut transfusionem proprietatum ad hanc aut illam Naturam pertinentium.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11.

89. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (p. 57); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 123.

90. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (pp. 57–58); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 126. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IIIa, q. 10, a. 1, co. Corey L. Barnes provided a helpful account of how Aristotle’s ideas were used in Aquinas’s Christology in Corey L. Barnes, “Aristotle in the Summa Theologiae’s Christology,” in *Aristotle in Aquinas’s Theology*, ed. Gilles Emery, OP and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 186–294. For a detailed philosophical treatment of the hypostatic union in the thoughts of Aquinas and Scotus, see Richard Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Cross’s recent publication on *communicatio idiomatum* is also helpful: Richard Cross, *Communicatio Idiomatum: Reformation Christological Debates* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

91. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans*, ed. J. Mortesen and E. Alarcon, trans. F.R. Larcher, OP (Green Bay, WI: The Aquinas Institute, 2012), c.1, l.2, 36.

92. “This saying of Augustine is to be understood of the grace of union [*gratia unionis*], by reason of which all that is said of the Son of God in His Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of the identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His soul, but in His Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son of Man is the Creator.” Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IIIa, q. 10, a. 1, ad 3.

93. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IIIa, q. 11, a. 5, ad 1.

all things that are consequent to God's volition, but by the latter he even knows all things antecedent to God's volition, including all possibilities.⁹⁴

Upon affirming the union of two natures in the person of Christ, the task then was to explain the difference between the two natures. Junius argued that the supernatural wisdom that Christ's human soul possesses cannot be categorized as archetypal due to the finitude of his human nature.⁹⁵ This finitude of Christ's human nature is "certainly no more able to contain in itself the divine knowledge than divine being. The human nature is contained, moreover, by the divine being, but its being does not contain the infinite because it is narrow in itself, nor is the proportion of the finite to the infinite able to be given."⁹⁶ The finitude of Christ's human knowledge means that he could not know things simultaneously whole at once (*non tota simul*), but it underwent alteration and succession.⁹⁷ Again, this rested on Junius's understanding of God's nature as existing in eternity and infinity, and of human nature as existing in time and finitude.⁹⁸

Yet Junius argued that "the dispositional theology of Christ, which we name the theology of union, is also enduring and complete in its quasi-infinite perfection [*perfectione quasi infinita*]."⁹⁹ He elaborated that:

[I]n Christ our Redeemer the mode of communicating theological wisdom is twofold: One is divine, according to His deity. The other is quasi-divine according to His humanity [*quasi diuinus secundum humanitatem eius*]. This quasi-divine mode, moreover, is on the one hand divine in its own eternal foundation and remaining eternal in the unity of his person. And on the other hand it is quasi-divine or very close to the divine, according to its own manner. For both had to exist simultaneously in Christ our

94. "God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is said to know by knowledge of vision, but also whatever He Himself can do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in I, 14, 9. Therefore the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ." Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 10, a. 2, ad 2.

95. "Ergo diuinam illam scientiam atque archetypam natura humana non capit in sese." Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11.

96. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (pp. 56–57); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 122.

97. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (p. 59); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 126–27.

98. See chapter 3 for details.

99. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 13 (p. 61); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 135.

Mediator, so that by this arrangement He could reconcile and unite divine with things human, reconcile God to men, and lead men to God.¹⁰⁰

Here, the rationale behind designating Christ’s knowledge as “quasi-divine” or “as-it-were-divine” came from the fact that Christ’s human nature was directly and proximately united to the eternal principle itself (*in aeterno principio suo*). The result of such union was that Christ’s divine knowledge—which was “expressive of His own eternal radiance [ἀπαύγασμα]”—was “present in Christ’s human nature most fully and perfectly.”¹⁰¹ This view is not too distant from Aquinas’s own view either, as he also argued that “the soul of Christ, since it is united to the Word in person, is more closely joined to the Word of God than any other creature” for it sees the “First Truth [*prima veritas*],” the essence of God.¹⁰² The description of God as the *prima veritas* was retained in Reformed scholastic discourse as well, as Franciscus Gomarus (1563–1641), for example, also identified God as “the first truth [*prima veritas*] and the highest good [*summum bonum*].”¹⁰³ Thus by the contents and dispositions of his “quasi-divine” knowledge, Junius argued that Christ could “reconcile and unite divine with things human, reconcile God to men, and lead men to God.”¹⁰⁴

Despite these similar considerations of Christ’s two natures, however, Junius, unlike Aquinas, clearly delimited the extent and scope of Christ’s knowledge on the grounds of the finiteness of his human nature. Aquinas argued that the divine knowledge Christ possessed in his human soul was an infused, acquired, and beatific knowledge (*scientia infusa, acquisita, et beata*), as the divine Person infused or imprinted “the intelligible species of all things” unto his

100. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (p. 59); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 126.

101. “Scientia diuina est in Christo incommunicabilis; sed sui tamen “ἀπαύγασμα” communicatiua. Quod ἀπαύγασμα siue resplendentia inest naturae humanae Christi plenissime & perfectissime.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (pp. 56–57); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 123.

102. “Now the soul of Christ, since it is united to the Word in person, is more closely joined to the Word of God than any other creature. Hence it more fully receives the light in which God is seen by the Word Himself than any other creature. And therefore more perfectly than the rest of creatures it sees the First Truth itself, which is the Essence of God; hence it is written (John 1:14): ‘And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father [*quasi unigeniti a patre*],’ ‘full’ not only of ‘grace’ but also of ‘truth.’ Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 10, a. 4, co.

103. Gomarus, *Disputationes*, I.xviii–xix, in Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.241.

104. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (p. 59); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 126.

human intellect to actualize his intellectual power.¹⁰⁵ “Both the infused knowledge and the beatific knowledge of Christ’s soul were the effects of an agent of infinite power,” Aquinas claimed, “which could produce the whole at once [*simul totum*]; and thus in neither knowledge did Christ advance; since from the beginning He had them perfectly.”¹⁰⁶ By the word “infusion” Aquinas conveyed the notion of God’s direct “impression” of divine truths unto Christ’s human nature,¹⁰⁷ and with this he accentuated that the divine truths in Christ’s humanity are conceived neither by angelic mediation nor by rational abstraction of principles from phantasms.¹⁰⁸ The acquired knowledge of Christ, on the other hand, is not about divine things but about earthly things, and it could *not* produce “the whole at once [*non simul totum*],” as it could only be gained successively through experience.¹⁰⁹ Christ’s infused and beatific knowledge, therefore, is marked by *simul totum* according to Aquinas, whereas Christ’s acquired knowledge, however, is marked by *non simul totum*, as it underwent alternations and successions. Accordingly Aquinas argued that “besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in Christ, there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge, whereby He knows things in their proper nature by intelligible species proportioned to the human mind.”¹¹⁰

The idea of infusion in relation to Christ’s knowledge is absent in Junius’s discussion of *theologia unionis*.¹¹¹ The most plausible theological explanation about its omission would be his intention to preserve the finitude of Christ’s theological wisdom in his humanity and to

105. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 9, a. 3, co.

106. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 12, a. 2, ad 1.

107. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 12, a. 4, co.

108. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 9, a. 4, co.

109. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 12, a. 2, ad 1.

110. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 9, a. 3, co.

111. However, it later appears in Francis Turretin’s account: “[W]e acknowledge a twofold knowledge of Christ’s human nature while on earth—infused and acquired or experimental. He received the infused by the grace of the Holy Spirit sanctifying his gifts (referred to in Is. 11:1, 2). The acquired is the actual knowledge which Christ gained both by ratiocination, by drawing conclusions from the principles of infused knowledge, and by his own experience (Heb. 4:15; 5:8).” Francis Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, ed. James T. Dennison, trans. George Musgrave Giger (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R, 1994), 2.349.

move away from, as was typical of the Reformed, the medieval construct of Christ's human knowledge as possessing infinite qualities either by infusion or beatific vision.¹¹² Junius clearly defined *theologia unionis* as a dispositional and finite theology, which indicates his concern to highlight that all the types of ectypal theology are only capable of finite perception—Christ's material conditions, most importantly, indicate his incapacity to rise above his ontological and epistemological finitude.¹¹³ Junius's delimitation of the extent to which Christ's humanity knows of divine things coincides with his comments above that in Christ, divine wisdom is not present simultaneously whole at once (*non tota simul*), but it is marked by mutability.¹¹⁴ His use of *non tota simul* in discussing Christ's theological knowledge indicates his awareness of its associated concepts, and his attribution of *non tota simul* to Christ's ectypal theology supports the contention that he did not adopt Aquinas's view regarding the simultaneous nature of Christ's human knowledge.

In all of these things, Junius's main concern is clear: despite the quasi-divine condition of Christ's human nature, his cognition of divine wisdom is nonetheless finite and limited, and it was by properly keeping the boundary of Christ's ectypal theology Junius could avoid the "ontological concurrence" between Christ's two natures.¹¹⁵ Muller was in this regard correct to observe that Junius's doctrine of *theologia unionis* witnesses to a sophisticated appropriation of the Reformed principle of *finitum non capax infiniti* that rested on two interrelated principles: "no proportion can be given or made between the finite and the infinite (*finiti ad infinitum dari proportio non potest*) and there can be no confusion of natures or transfusion of properties in the hypostatic union."¹¹⁶ Therefore, through and through Junius was consistent

112. "[T]he Reformed distance themselves from those medieval scholastics who identified the theology of Christ in his human nature with the beatific vision." Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.253.

113. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (pp. 76–77); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 173.

114. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 11 (p. 59); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 127.

115. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (p. 75); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 171.

116. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.250. See also Heiko A. Oberman, "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism," *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. 53, no. 1 (1960): 57–60.

with his argument that “the whole of theology is marked off by two modes: for one must be called infinite, and the other finite.”¹¹⁷ According to Junius the established order of grace is such that God be comprehended first by Christ, in whom there is “the highest and unparalleled pinnacle of wisdom,” and then by saints on earth and in heaven, unto whom Christ distributes his own divine wisdom.¹¹⁸ In this sense “the christological emphasis implied in the *theologia unionis* is carried forth soteriologically and eschatologically in the insistence of the Reformed upon mediation in and by Christ as the sole ground of man’s union and fellowship with God.”¹¹⁹

5.4 The Finality of Supernatural Ordering: *Visio Dei* and the Grace of Perfection

The third sub-thesis is that Junius’s concept of the *visio Dei* differs from Aquinas’s in that Junius considered the act of beatific vision in hypostatical terms (*hypostatikōs*), rather than in essential terms (*ousiōdōs*).¹²⁰ It has been noted correctly that Reformed scholastics treated the *visio Dei* in three principal places: first, in *prolegomena*; second, in the doctrine of God’s attributes; and third, in eschatology.¹²¹ Aquinas’s assertion here displays how the epistemological, ontological, and eschatological areas can be interconnected in the theme of *visio Dei*: “Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence.”¹²² First of all, underneath this contention are Aquinas’s assumptions about the principles of causation and cognition; he asserted that “there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause,” and as such “for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach

117. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 14 (p. 63); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 141. Muller notes: “This limitation of *theologia unionis* as finite knowledge and, therefore, as a form, albeit exalted, of ectypal theology, rests upon two basic principles: no proportion can be given or made between the finite and the infinite (*finiti ad infinitum dari proportio non potest*) and there can be no confusion of natures or transfusion of properties in the hypostatic union. Both of these principles can be stated in terms of the frequently cited Reformed maxim *finitum non capax infiniti* (‘the finite is not capable of the infinite’).” Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.250.

118. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (p. 75); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 170–71.

119. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.254.

120. These terms are borrowed from Turretin who used them to distinguish how God is perceived by the saints in the vision of God. Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, 3.610.

121. Schendel, “The Reformed Orthodox and the *Visio Dei*,” 24–44.

122. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 3, a. 8, co; idem, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 12, a. 1, co.

the very Essence of the First Cause.”¹²³ On the other hand, the very Divine Essence itself is the Happiness itself—Aquinas argued that “[b]y the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law [is] given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law.”¹²⁴ This view goes in tandem with his other remarks that “man’s happiness is twofold,” namely natural and supernatural,¹²⁵ and that supernatural happiness is distinguished into two aspects, firstly the external and uncreated Happiness itself, namely God, and secondly, the internal and created happiness in man, namely the enjoyment of the supernatural good.¹²⁶ Aquinas could then argue that the way humans gain happiness is by participation into the eternal law, because, ultimately speaking, “God is happiness by His Essence.”¹²⁷ In the light of these considerations, he made a claim that “if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void. Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.”¹²⁸

Junius, however, did not arrive at exactly the same conclusion, despite his utilization of similar Aristotelian causal and epistemological categories. For one thing, Junius was convinced that “the ectypal theology of union in Christ our Savior is the common principle of the rest of theology, both that which is perceived by those blessed spirits in heaven, and here on earth by wretched men.”¹²⁹ “That archetypal is the matrix [*matrix*] of them all,” he elaborated, “but the ectypal in Christ is the mother [*mater*] of the remaining types of theology. The archetypal is the fount of them all, but the ectypal is, as it were, the common reservoir or

123. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 3, a. 8, co; idem, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 12, a. 1, co.

124. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 91, a. 4, ad 1.

125. “Now man’s happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (Question 5, Article 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Peter 1:4) that by Christ we are made ‘partakers of the Divine nature.’” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 62, a. 1, co.

126. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 3, a. 1, co.

127. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 3 a. 1, ad 1.

128. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 12, a. 1, co.

129. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 59); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 129.

storage vessel.”¹³⁰ By applying the patristic and scholastic metaphor of “motherhood” to the theology of Christ,¹³¹ Junius accentuated that the theologies of vision (*theologia visionis*) and of revelation (*theologia revelationis*) do not receive their supernatural truths directly from the fount, the archetypal theology, but indirectly and mediately through the reservoir, the ectypal theology in Christ.¹³² In this way the two forms of ectypal theology are markedly different from *theologia unionis*—only the human nature of Christ can grasp the divine truths immediately through the “grace of union.” In line with such points, then, he defined the theology of vision as “the wisdom of divine matters [*sapientia rerum divinarum*] communicated in the Spirit of God according to the measure of Christ with those who dwell in heaven; according to this theology they enjoy the eternal, gracious, and glorious vision of God for His glory.”¹³³

One common ground between Aquinas and Junius is that the theology of vision necessitates an infusion of habit. “[T]his theology [of vision],” Junius noted, “is light: intellectual, [permanent], and perfect, communicated through the mode of an infused [habit].”¹³⁴ He argued that the condition of the perfected human nature is *iustorum*, *consecratorum*, and *evectorum*, and these attributes are attainable by receiving new dispositions and powers through the divine work of infusion.¹³⁵ Further, the new dispositions and powers are necessary for God’s children as they need to be capable of existing in their special *circumstance*, which he referred to as heaven. Thus he claimed that “heaven is the

130. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 59); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 129.

131. See Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.258.

132. “From the divine fullness of this saving vessel, created things draw in two ways: One group of them by sight in God’s presence, the other by revelation, though they are of course absent and on pilgrimage away from the Lord (2 Cor. 5:6–7). From these two modalities the two other *genera* of ectypal theology have proceeded: One of these the orthodox fathers called the theology of the blessed, the other, that of pilgrims.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 59); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 129.

133. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 60); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 132.

134. The original Latin says “permanens” here, but Noe’s translation used “enduring.” Also, the original Latin says “per modum infusi habitus communicatum,” but Noe’s translation used “infused condition.” The translations of “permanens” and “infusi habitus” into “permanent” and “infused habit” as used above capture the original terms more clearly. See Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 60); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 131.

135. “Quapropter etiam Apostolus ad Hebraeos spiritus iustorum τετελειωμένων appellavit, id est, consecratorum, vt vulgo exponitur, siue (quod fortasse magis conuenerit) ad perfectionem euectorum beneficio Dei.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12.

dwelling place of God our Father and the inheritance of His sons” and that heavenly home is the circumstantial context in which the *visio Dei* occurs.¹³⁶ Due to the closest proximity to the presence of God in heaven, the blessed saints can enjoy the knowledge of and the inheritance from God more excellently than other human beings on earth.¹³⁷ Thus, the changed dispositions of the blessed are simply the consequences of God’s work of infusion, and only by those changed conditions can the blessed become capable of beholding God in close proximity.

Aquinas was also of the view that a new disposition is necessary in attaining the beatific vision because “it is impossible to see the divine substance unless the divine substance itself become the form by which the intellect understands.”¹³⁸ In order for a created intellect to perceive the divine essence, he argued that “the created intellect needs to be raised for that purpose by some sublime disposition.”¹³⁹ The reason has been consistent in Aquinas’s argument: “Whatever exceeds the limits of a nature cannot be acquired by that nature except through the agency of another.”¹⁴⁰ In short, “[a] finite power cannot in its operation rise to the level of an infinite object.”¹⁴¹ Hence, at least on this point, Junius echoed Aquinas’s pattern of using a dispositional category in contending for the necessity of infusion in the perfection of ordinary human nature.

However, there seems to be a notable difference in the way they understood the object and mode of *visio Dei*. Firstly, Aquinas believed that the intellect of the blessed see God’s substance immediately: “then shall we see God face to face, because we shall see him immediately.”¹⁴² Secondly, he also argued that, since God knows in his essence all things at

136. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 60); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 132.

137. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 60); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 132.

138. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 52.

139. “Nothing can receive a higher form unless it be disposed thereto through its capacity being raised, because every act is in its proper power. Now the divine essence is a higher form than any created intellect. Therefore, in order that the divine essence become the intelligible species to a created intellect, which is requisite in order that the divine substance can be seen, the created intellect needs to be raised for that purpose by some sublime disposition.” Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 53.

140. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 52.

141. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 55.

142. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 51.

once, the blessed also know, in seeing God's essence, everything all at once (*simul*).¹⁴³ Thirdly, he stated that participation of a created intellect into the divine essence is necessary in the *visio Dei*.¹⁴⁴ These construals of immediacy, simultaneity, and participation were not echoed by Junius—considering his broader theological viewpoints, the immediate and direct perception of God's substance is never possible, even in the heavenly circumstance where God's presence is sensed in proximity.¹⁴⁵ The reasons are deeply Christological: “[The theology of vision] takes the principle of its origin and of its whole nature from Christ our Savior.”¹⁴⁶ It is also clear that even by this theology of vision the created reason cannot perceive all things at once (*non simul totam*), and this is due to the fact that, though the vision of God occurs in the context of heaven and in the soul of the perfected natures, it nonetheless requires “relating, arranging, and applying of heavenly things to God, as its own principle and most absolute pattern.”¹⁴⁷

Furthermore, as the mode by which the glorified human reason sees God is mediated through the human nature of Christ, the perfection of human nature in the eschatological state is achieved by its participation in Christ's incarnate human nature, rather than in God's eternal and incommunicable nature. “The definition of *theologia beatorum* points to the view that the relationship between God and the redeemed must always rest upon the work of Christ and his

143. “But because we have shown that the created intellect which sees the divine substance sees in it all the species of things, and since whatever is seen in it all the species of things, and since whatever is seen in one species must be seen at once and by one vision (because vision must correspond to the principle of vision), it follows that the intellect which sees the divine substance sees all not successively [*non successive*], but at once [*simul*].” Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 60.

144. “Now the divine essence is the proper intelligible form of the divine intellect, and is proportionate to it: for these three (understanding, medium of understanding, and object understood) are one in God. Therefore, that same essence cannot become the intelligible form of a created intellect, except through the created intellect participating in some divine likeness. Therefore, this participation in a divine likeness is necessary in order that the divine substance be seen.” Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 53.

145. Andreas J. Beck argued that Gisbertus Voetius, in utilizing the classical concept of *theologia visionis*, did not posit an intellectualist—or a Thomist—model but rather a volitional model. See his arguments in Andreas J. Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) on God, Freedom, and Contingency: An Early Modern Reformed Voice* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2021), chapter 5, section 5.2.

146. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 60); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 131.

147. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (pp. 60–61); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 133.

continuing mediation, even in eternity.”¹⁴⁸ In other words, the object of theological knowledge (*objectum theologiae*) firmly remains “not as God *in se* but rather God as he is revealed and covenanted in Christ.”¹⁴⁹ Junius clearly believed that “those heavenly creatures behold their own Creator as He is, by the vision that has been communicated with them from Christ’s fullness.”¹⁵⁰ In short, then, Junius presented a modified account of Aquinas’s *visio Dei* that anchored itself in the Reformed doctrines of *unio cum Christo* on the one hand and *imago Dei* on the other, in which God is never perceived and pursued as a “*Deus nudus*” by human nature.¹⁵¹ Therefore the key distinctive in Junius’s account of the supernatural end, good, and act of the blessed in heaven is the Christological context of *visio Dei*: “The theology of the blessed or the exalted theology is the wisdom of divine matters communicated in the Spirit of God according to the measure of Christ with those who dwell in heaven; according to this theology they enjoy the eternal, gracious, and glorious vision of God for His glory.”¹⁵² It is only in this condition, moreover, that human nature would necessarily, exclusively, freely, and eternally choose that which is good for its nature.¹⁵³

5.5 *Duplex Iustitia*: Righteousness, Faith, and the Grace of Redemption

The fourth and last sub-thesis is that Junius’s construal of the relationship between supernatural revelation, righteousness, and faith is different from Aquinas’s. The starting point of this

148. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.260. See also Richard A. Muller, “Christ in the Eschaton: Calvin and Moltmann on the Duration of the *Munus Regium*,” *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. 74, no. 1 (1981): 31–59.

149. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.255.

150. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 59); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 130–31.

151. Cf. Willem J. van Asselt, “The Fundamental Meaning of Theology: Archetypal and Ectypal Theology in Seventeenth-Century Reformed Thought,” in *Westminster Theological Journal*, vol. 64 (2002): 334.

152. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (pp. 60–61); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 132.

153. Thesis 58: “In the state of glory, however, our condition will be most simple and therefore our will most free, but it will be disposed to that which is good only and this necessarily and eternally, although not coerced. For then our old man will be totally abolished, and being made like the angels, 1 Cor. 15:49, we shall perfectly bear the image of that heavenly man Christ, whom with the Father and the Holy Spirit be the honor and the glory, for ever and ever. Amen.” Franciscus Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio, ante & post lapsum*, in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, thesis 58. The translations of the treatise are from Willem J. van Asselt, J. Martin Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde, eds., *Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010), 107.

discussion ought to be the relationship between grace and glory, or the theology of revelation and vision. Junius argued that the infused principles of grace, which he described as the “seeds [semina]” of glory, are nurtured and directed by God himself “until the glorious vision and communion of God.”¹⁵⁴ This means that, according to Junius, grace is the commencement of glory, and glory is the consummation of grace.¹⁵⁵ The difference between those in glory and those in grace here corresponds to the difference between the blessed in heaven and the pilgrims on earth, and there is an unbreakable continuity between what Junius called “antecedent grace” and “consequent glory.”¹⁵⁶ Thus he connected these infused and seminal gifts to the “theology of revelation [theologia revelationis],” which is a much dimmer mode of communing with God than what is available in the theology of vision.¹⁵⁷ He then stated that this theology of revelation is “inspired by God and entrusted to His servants through the word pronounced in Christ and sealed both in the Old and New Testaments through the prophets, apostles, and evangelists.”¹⁵⁸ In addition to identifying the material source of this revelatory wisdom, Junius identified its desired effects, as he believed that the effects of supernatural wisdom correlate with its attributes: because supernatural, heavenly, and saving truths in essence are “holy, just, and perfect,” the recipients of that grace will be guided toward holiness, justice, and perfection in all things.¹⁵⁹ It is against this background that Junius claimed that there is the “salvific conformation [salutaris conformatio]” of the graced nature to God’s holy, just, and perfect

154. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 13 (pp. 61–62); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 136. Augustine also used this term “semina” in *De Genesi ad Litteram*, 6.18.11

155. “Neither grace nor glory, in the decree, is twofold, but both are one in substance, in fact, and in relation, but different in degrees in relation to their object.” Junius, *A Discussion on the Subject of Predestination*, 3:253–54.

156. Junius, *A Discussion on the Subject of Predestination*, 3:254.

157. “We call this theology supernatural because of its origin, and a theology of revelation from its gracious mode of communication.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 20 (p. 71); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 160.

158. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 23 (p. 77); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 175.

159. “We have thus set forth these effects when we say in addition that this doctrine has been given and shaped by God, so that we may be guided as perfectly as possible toward holiness in ourselves, justice toward everyone else, and perfection in all things.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 26 (pp. 83–84); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 190.

nature.¹⁶⁰

Junius also insisted that, since the fall, “it was necessary that inspired theology come to man’s aid.”¹⁶¹ The purpose of this heavenward and inspired theology is, on the one hand, to provide “a clear hope and apprehension of the good,” which is granted only, again, by the condescension of God.¹⁶² On the other hand, this supernatural good was to be gained through the means of supernatural truth, which is “the gift of thought by which we learn to think upon God.”¹⁶³ More specifically, however, the salvific, supernatural, and sacred knowledge through which God perfects sinful reason includes the notion of “the righteous judgment of God [τὸ δίκαιωμα τοῦ θεοῦ]” as propounded by the apostle Paul in Romans 1:32.¹⁶⁴ This comment needs to be understood in the light of the distinction Junius made between two kinds of laws of nature—one is the law of nature (*ius naturae*), and the other is the law of morals (*ius morum*).¹⁶⁵ By the former law humans can make judgments about the world according to the universal laws of nature, but by the latter law humans do not only judge but also are judged as good and bad, according to their virtues and vices.¹⁶⁶ God’s righteous judgment, then, is based on the works measured against the moral law of nature. It is the sacred theology of revelation, thus, that “explains most perfectly this law of morals,” and through this knowledge human reason can perceive God not only as the judge but also as the “author and guide” of salvation.¹⁶⁷ As to how God leads them to this common, yet supernatural, good, Junius’s answer is clear: through “the promises of grace and the revelation of theology.”¹⁶⁸ He stated that “the grace of

160. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 26 (pp. 83–84); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 190.

161. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 20 (p. 71); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 160.

162. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 20 (p. 71); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 160.

163. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 20 (p. 71); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 160.

164. “But because all the praise of virtue rests in action, as Cicero used to say, that indeed is alone true praise which does not proceed from men deceived in their judgment and unreliable in their zeal, but from God Himself. Furthermore, the most obvious *locus* of material where sacred theology customarily consists is that which Paul several times called ‘the righteous judgment of God’ (Rom. 1:32).” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (pp. 79–80); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 181.

165. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (pp. 79–80); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 181.

166. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (pp. 79–80); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 181.

167. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 24 (pp. 79–80); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 181–82.

168. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 211.

God and the promises of grace are the only reason why we should be led to both of these goods.”¹⁶⁹

His rationale was based on 2 Timothy 4:8 where Paul concluded that the “crown of righteousness” was laid up for him and others who loved God. Here in Paul’s words Junius found that “two effects would come from these divine promises. One of these is that God Himself graciously forms us in the proper pattern which befits His heirs. The second is that He distributes the goods that belong to heirs.”¹⁷⁰ In other words, the proper pattern of life that befits the elect, and that which they are promised to receive as inheritance, are the gifts of righteousness: “The proper pattern of heirs consists in true righteousness—a righteousness that love defines as a pure heart, a good conscience, and a faith unfeigned.”¹⁷¹ God is the author who grants such righteousness and also the guide who leads them toward it; God is the Father who not only promises but also gives the “hereditary goods” to his children.¹⁷² His presentation of the supernatural good in a hereditary and familial framework is expressed also in his discussion of predestination with Arminius, where Junius stated on the basis of Ephesians 1:5 that “we are predestinated to life, but, accurately speaking, we are predestinated to adoption by the special grace of our heavenly Father.”¹⁷³ The role of *theologia revelationis*, then, is to communicate the heavenly truths that can be grasped by faith, and through them God performs his “fatherly” acts for the people of faith: God “begets righteousness in us as heirs of the coming heavenly kingdom, teaches the righteous the promises of every good thing, and displays to the faith of those heirs all the goods of inheritance and eternal salvation for God’s glory.”¹⁷⁴ It is

169. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 211.

170. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 211–12.

171. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 211–12.

172. “Truly those hereditary goods indeed exist in the life to come, but nevertheless they are actually communicated already in this present life and are perceived through faith until we attain full possession of them in the future life. God is the author [*effector*] of each: both of piety in us His heirs and of the inheritance in heaven for the sake of those who will be the heirs of His salvation. I add that He is also the author of the timely aids which are needed for obtaining this inheritance, so long as we are heading on this journey toward the Lord.” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 212.

173. Junius, *A Discussion on the Subject of Predestination*, 3:14.

174. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 212.

against the background of these concepts that Junius asserted, “[t]he secondary or subordinate end of our theology is the present and future good of the elect. For promises for this life and the one to come have been made with reference to their righteousness. This theology, moreover, is the wisdom of true piety [*pietatis verae sapientia*].”¹⁷⁵

In *De libero hominis arbitrio* Junius provided more elaborate accounts of the relationship between righteousness and redemptive grace. He insisted that “[t]he state of corruption is followed by the state of regeneration in the work of which *three* degrees of divine grace are to be observed.”¹⁷⁶ These three degrees of God’s supernatural work, Junius clarified, operate simultaneously with respect to time, but operate sequentially with respect to “the order of cause and effect.”¹⁷⁷ Then he argued that the first kind of God’s gracious work in a corrupted nature revolves around *vivification*: “The *first* degree is the one by which God out of mere pleasure in Christ vivifies us, who are dead in sins, by adopting us as his sons while by nature we were sons of wrath according to Eph. 2:3; and, thereafter, he vivifies us by inserting us into his communion, so that we are made participants of his death and resurrection, from Whom as our head the spiritual life floats down in us.”¹⁷⁸ Here, the vivification and adoption in Christ are all intertwined in the first degree of God’s supernatural work, as the corrupted nature is dead, rebellious, and excluded with respect to the communion with God.

The second degree, on the other hand, “is the one in which God equips us with the qualities necessary to establish rightly this way of life, while we begin to live again by the power of this adoption and the communion with Christ.”¹⁷⁹ This second kind of work is precisely about the provision of righteousness. Junius argued that God provides his adopted

175. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 210. The last phrase *pietatis verae sapientia* is translated as wisdom of true righteousness in Noe’s translation.

176. “The state of corruption is followed by the state of regeneration in the work of which *three* degrees of divine grace are to be observed. Although operating at the same time, some are yet prior to others and some are later than others, regarding the order of cause and effect.” Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 50; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 106.

177. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 50; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 106.

178. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 51; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 106.

179. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 52; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 106.

children with “a twofold righteousness [*duplex iustitia*]: an imputed righteousness common to all the elect, which is usually called justification before God; and an inherent and personal righteousness which is usually called sanctification.”¹⁸⁰ Then the third and last degree of God’s supernatural work pertains to *the fruits of the Spirit*: “The third degree of divine grace in the work of our regeneration is our conversion to God, or the action emanating from the new creature, both of the mind in acknowledging and of the will in embracing God in Christ. Everywhere in Holy Scripture this newness of life (Rom. 6:4 and Gal. 5:21) is called the fruits of the Spirit.”¹⁸¹

In expanding these points, Junius argued that the grace of justification refers to “the grace according to which God regards us not in our own person but in the person of Christ, and makes his perfect righteousness, although it exists outside us, by imputation our righteousness, and incites the experience of it in our minds by faith.”¹⁸² In *De iustificatione hominis coram Deo* he also made a point that righteousness is freely given, bestowed, and imputed by God himself, on the basis of the sacrificial ransom offered by Christ the Son of God.¹⁸³ It is very clear in these statements that Junius categorically rejected the Tridentine expression of the doctrine but received and recounted a Reformed doctrine of justification, where justification was not only connected to the instrument of faith, but also to the imputation of Christ’s righteousness.¹⁸⁴ Following this work of justification, Junius stated, the Holy Spirit works in

180. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 52; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 106. To see how “*duplex iustitia*” was variously used in the context of the Reformation, see Anthony N.S. Lane, *The Regensburg Article 5 on Justification: Inconsistent Patchwork or Substance of True Doctrine?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 89–146.

181. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 55; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 106.

182. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 53; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 106.

183. “Veruntamen ita gratuita est haec iustificatio, vt etiam iustitiae diuinae non repugnet; atque cum gratis ex gratia, data, donata, imputata, dicitur, non *meritum* illud sufficientissimum & ἀντίλυτρον filij Dei voluntarie persolutum, *iudicio Dei* satisfaciens pro nobis, ac *vitam aeternam* promerens, excluditur, sed nostra opera & inerita, quae nulla praecesserunt aut futura sunt.” Franciscus Junius, *De iustificatione hominis coram Deo*, thesis 7.

184. For helpful treatments of justification in the Reformation context, see Heiko A. Oberman, “‘Iustitia Christi’ and ‘Iustitia Dei’: Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification,” *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. 59, no. 1 (1966): 1–26; idem, *The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought* (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992), 104–25; idem, *Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought* (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2002), 121–204; Alister

the saints to create three effects that gradually transform them into the image of God: heavenly light in the obscure mind, rectitude in the perverted will, and holiness in all affections.¹⁸⁵ Junius also stated that “carnal man does not contribute anything to his spiritual regeneration”¹⁸⁶—yet, when it comes to bearing the fruits of the Spirit, the saints concurrently “cooperate with the Spirit as principal agent” while at the same time being “acted upon by the Spirit.”¹⁸⁷ Consequent to making these propositions, however, he remarked that the holiness, renewal, and purity of the saints in this world remain “only rudimentary,” and that the regenerated will operates by two principles, namely by the Spirit as well as by the flesh.¹⁸⁸ Thus, the moral dispositions of a regenerated person tend partly to the good, and partly to the bad, due to the

E. McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification—The Beginnings to the Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Robert Preus, *Justification and Rome* (St. Louis: Concordia Academic Press, 1997); Anthony N.S. Lane, *Justification by Faith in Catholic-Protestant Dialogue: An Evangelical Assessment* (New York: T&T Clark, 2002); Craig B. Carpenter, “A Question of Union with Christ? Calvin and Trent on Justification,” *Westminster Theological Journal*, vol. 64 (2002): 363–86; Miyon Chung, “Faith, Merit, and Justification: Luther’s Exodus from Ockhamism *En Route* to Reformation,” *Torch Trinity Journal*, vol. 6 (2003): 210–40; John V. Fesko, “Calvin on Justification and Recent Misinterpretations of His View,” *Mid-America Journal of Theology*, vol. 16 (2005): 81–114; idem, “Reformed Orthodoxy on Imputation, Active and Passive Justification,” *Perichoresis*, vol. 14, no. 3 (2016): 61–80; R. Scott Clark, “*Iustitia Imputata Christi*: Alien or Proper to Luther’s Doctrine of Justification?,” *Concordia Theological Quarterly*, vol. 70, no. 3/4 (2006): 269–310; Karla Wübbenhorst, “Calvin’s Doctrine of Justification: Variations on a Lutheran Theme,” in *Justification in Perspective: Historical Developments and Contemporary Challenges*, ed. Bruce McCormack (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 99–118; Heber Campos, “Johannes Piscator (1546–1625) and the Consequent Development of the Doctrine of the Imputation of Christ’s Active Obedience” (PhD Dissertation, Calvin Theological Seminary, 2009); Johann Heinz, *Justification and Merit: Luther vs. Catholicism* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2012); Carl R. Trueman, “*Simul Peccator et Justus*: Martin Luther and Justification,” in *Justification in Perspective*, 73–97; idem, “Justification,” in *T&T Clark Companion to Reformation Theology*, ed. David M. Whitford (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 57–71; Jonathan A. Linebaugh, “The Christo-Centrism of Faith in Christ: Martin Luther’s Reading of Galatians 2:16, 19–20,” *New Testament Studies*, vol. 59 (2013): 534–44; Michael Horton, *Justification*, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018).

185. “The grace of sanctification is an internal operation of the Holy Spirit by which man, being already implanted in the communion with Christ through the mercy of God and clothed with his most absolute righteousness (which alone can exist before the tribunal of a supreme judge) is gradually transformed into that image of God that was lost through the first sin, while the Spirit himself (who is said by the apostle to be given as an earnest of our inheritance, Eph. 1:14) creates a new and heavenly light in his previously obscure mind, rectitude in the will that was perverse and hostile to God, and further a true holiness in all affections.” Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 54; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 106.

186. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 56; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 106.

187. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 56; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 106.

188. “Nevertheless, as long as we are dwelling in this world, the holiness of this renewal is only rudimentary, and even in the best ones there always remain remnants of a certain impurity, inasmuch as man is on this world both old and new. Hence, it occurs that in this state the freedom of the will is of a certain extent: partly to the good, partly to the bad, in as much as the will is driven by these two principles: flesh and Spirit which are conflicting each other (the Spirit, however, being superior). Indeed, the will is driven in a free way by both principles, although in a necessary way according to the third sort of necessity.” Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 57; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 107.

two driving forces of action occurring in the regenerated, yet unconsummated, nature.¹⁸⁹

These accounts of supernatural grace are clearly different from Aquinas's own views. At the least, Aquinas also cited Ephesians 1:5 in his *Summa theologica* in making the claim that predestination is toward adoption.¹⁹⁰ Also in his commentary on Romans he stated that "we are predestined to adoptive sonship, which is a participation and image of natural sonship."¹⁹¹ Moreover, he highlighted the primacy of divine act in the process of divine adoption:

Now a man's inheritance is that which makes him rich. Wherefore, inasmuch as God, of His goodness, admits men to the inheritance of beatitude, He is said to adopt them. Moreover Divine exceeds human adoption, forasmuch as God, by bestowing His grace, makes man whom He adopts worthy to receive the heavenly inheritance; whereas man does not make him worthy whom he adopts; but rather in adopting him he chooses one who is already worthy.¹⁹²

Aquinas was clear here that God adopts certain human creatures in order to communicate the "abundance of his perfection," specifically the "likeness of natural sonship" of Christ.¹⁹³ God adopts, in other words, unworthy human creatures to become worthy by virtue of his fatherly acts, and for that reason God's will is the sole rationale behind their adoption. He thus argued: "when we say to God, 'Our Father,' we address the whole Trinity"—adoption is the work of the Triune God and, hence, it is rightly attributed to "the Father as its author; to the Son, as its exemplar; to the Holy Ghost, as imprinting on us the likeness of this exemplar."¹⁹⁴

189. Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 57; cf. *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 107.

190. "On the contrary, It is written (Ephesians 1:5) that "He hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children of God." But the predestination of God is not ineffectual. Therefore God does adopt some as His sons." Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 23, a. 1, s. c.

191. Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans*, c.1, l.3, 48.

192. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 23, a. 1, co.

193. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 23, a. 1, ad 2.

194. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIIa, q. 23, a. 2, s. c. & IIIa, q. 23, a. 2, ad 3.

Notwithstanding his explicit denial of human merit playing a contributing role in predestination,¹⁹⁵ Aquinas clearly insisted, however, “to believe is meritorious.”¹⁹⁶ Aquinas argued that four things are necessary in the justification of the ungodly: “the infusion of grace, the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the movement of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins.”¹⁹⁷ The reason why these four are necessary, in Aquinas’s judgment, is that the order of movement itself requires a threefold step: “first, the motion of the mover; secondly, the movement of the moved; thirdly, the consummation of the movement, or the attainment of the end.”¹⁹⁸ In this case the infusion of grace corresponds to the first step; the movements of the free-will toward God and sin, to the second step; and the remission of sins to the last step, as forgiveness is the end of justification.¹⁹⁹ In conjunction with these arguments, he asserted that the act of believing is an act of the intellect, but this intellectual act requires to be perfected by the volitional movement of “assenting” to the truths presented.²⁰⁰ Thus Aquinas argued: “the act of faith can be meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to the use, but also as to the assent.”²⁰¹ Therefore Eleonore Stump summarized Aquinas well when she stated that “for Aquinas the process of justification is the process by which a person is gradually changed from being a sinner to being righteous, although the end of the process, the complete removal of all sin from the person justified, does not occur in this life.”²⁰² Michael Horton’s summary is also perceptive: in a medieval—and Thomistic—account of justification,

195. For example: “Therefore, just as the man Christ was not predestined to be the natural Son of God because of any antecedent merits, but solely from grace, so we are predestined to be adopted sons of God solely from grace and not from our merits.” Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans*, c.1, 1.3, 48.

196. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 9, s. c. For a helpful summary of the literature on Aquinas’s theory of merit, see the first chapter in Joseph Warwykow, *God’s Grace and Human Action: ‘Merit’ in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).

197. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 113, a. 6, co.

198. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 113, a. 6, co.

199. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 113, a. 6, co.

200. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 2, co.

201. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 10, co.

202. Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 376.

“[r]emissio (forgiveness) now became the *terminus ad quem* (goal) of the process of justification rather than its *terminus a quo* (source) [italics original].”²⁰³

Expressed in a syllogistic form, Aquinas insisted that, as a premise, “our actions are meritorious insofar as they proceed from the free-will moved with grace by God.”²⁰⁴ Secondly, as a middle term, “the act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God.”²⁰⁵ Then, as a conclusion, “the act of faith can be meritorious.”²⁰⁶ Along with these notions of merit Aquinas also argued that “neither nature nor faith can, without charity, produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity, the act of faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of nature, and a natural act of the free-will.”²⁰⁷ This is due to the fact that he related faith to the intellect and charity to the will: “Now the act of faith is to believe... which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the will’s command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the intellect, i.e. to the true.”²⁰⁸ “Consequently,” he argued, “if the act of faith is to be perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the intellect.”²⁰⁹ Considering these expressions of grace then Alastair McGrath and Simon Francis Gaine’s assessments seem correct: Aquinas in sophisticated ways applied the Aristotelian notions of motion (*motus*) to the issue of grace, and as a result grace for Aquinas

203. Horton, *Justification*, 1.100.

204. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 9, co.

205. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 9, co.

206. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 9, co.

207. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 9, ad 1.

208. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 4, a. 1, co.

209. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 4, a. 2, co. He also made the same point in *Summa Contra Gentiles*: “The mode of cognition in every cognitive being follows the mode of that being’s nature. Hence the mode of cognition differs in the angel, man, and dumb animals according to the diversity of their several natures, as we have shown. Now, that man may attain to his last end, he received a perfection in addition to and surpassing his nature, namely grace, as we have proved. Consequently, man must receive, over and above his natural knowledge, a knowledge surpassing his natural reason. This is the knowledge of faith, which is of things unseen by natural reason.” Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 152.

is fundamentally the divine provision of new principles, powers, and pathways of human motion toward its perfection, with merits playing a central role in the process.²¹⁰

Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562) also utilized the concept of motion in explaining the role of faith in justification. Yet, he clearly defined that motion in terms of *confidence*: “Those who are the pure professors of the Gospel, therefore, rightly affirm that ‘to believe’ has a very strong connection with the act or motion of confidence, hope, and similar affections, but most of all with the sincere and firm confidence that faith always brings along with it.”²¹¹ Further, he even asserted that “[t]he faith that does not bring along with it trust, and other holy motions of the mind, draws men into desperation.”²¹² In Junius’s thought, similarly, faith is framed not as an antecedent or a consequent motion to the will, but as a deliberate act of the will itself. He elaborated the nature of faith’s fiducial act in this way:

Faith is that by which we grasp Christ with our will and most reverent zeal, and through which we are carried to Him by every impulse. Knowledge is that by which Christ offers Himself to us so to be seen, and dwells internally in our minds. The unity of these gifts among us all, however many of us are Christians, is the nearest and closest goal toward which we must strive in this life, so that through knowledge we may perceive Christ; and so that by faith, that most holy impulse, we may be moved, carried, and hurried off toward Him; so that the famous saying of Christ might prove true of us, that ‘the kingdom of heaven suffers violence, and the violent forcefully take it’ (Matt. 11:12).²¹³

Also in his *De fide iustificante* he clearly argued that saving faith is knowledge (*notitia*), assent (*assensus*), and firm trust and apprehension (*certa fiducia & apprehensio*) concerning the saving promise of Christ.²¹⁴

210. Simon Francis Gaine, OP, “Aristotle’s Philosophy in Aquinas’s Theology of Grace in the *Summa Theologiae*,” in *Aristotle in Aquinas’s Theology*, ed. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2018), 94–120; McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, 44. See also Matthew Levering, “Grace,” in Matthew Levering, *Paul in the Summa Theologiae* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 153–85; Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering, *Knowing the Love of Christ: An Introduction to the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 61–75.

211. Peter Martyr Vermigli, *Locus on Justification*, 2, in Peter Martyr Vermigli, *Predestination and Justification: Two Theological Loci*, ed. and trans. Frank A. James III (Moscow, ID: The Davenant Institute, 2018), 89.

212. Vermigli, *Locus on Justification*, 94.

213. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 39 (pp. 100–01); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 233.

214. “Fides adulatorum non tatum notitia est & assensus doctrinae nobis per Prophetas & Apostolos traditae: sed etiam certa firmaque fiducia & apprehensio, quae gratuita in Christo promissionis veritate fundata, per

These understandings of faith and its relation to saving revelation, righteousness, and Christ are no doubt shaped by the Reformed thought. John Calvin (1509–64), for instance, emphatically argued throughout his *Institutes* that “by faith we grasp Christ’s righteousness, by which alone we are reconciled to God.”²¹⁵ Furthermore, he argued that “God begins his good work in us, therefore, by arousing love and desire and zeal for righteousness in our hearts; or to speak more correctly, by bending, forming, and directing, our hearts to righteousness.”²¹⁶ Heiko A. Oberman provided a penetrating insight on this topic that Calvin, by appropriating the Scotistic emphasis on *potentia Dei ordinata*, heavily accentuated God’s commitment to his saving revelation and redemption through his *promissio*.²¹⁷ Muller also pressed the point that Calvin’s conception of faith should never be detached from its fiducial aspect, as Calvin’s view of faith is adequately termed as “soteriological voluntarism,” since faith to him was “a matter of intellect and will in conjunction—with the highest part, not merely the instrumental part, of faith belonging to the will.”²¹⁸

In line with these points, Junius believed that the gift of righteousness is commenced in grace and received by faith, but is consummated in glory. As noted above the hereditary goods of righteousness as well as the fatherly presence of God are truly granted to believers on earth through faith, but they will only be perfected in heaven.²¹⁹ “Truly those hereditary goods

Spiritus Sanctum reuelatur in mentibus nostris & in cordibus obsignatur.” Franciscus Junius, *De fide iustificante*, thesis 3.

215. “Why, then, are we justified by faith? Because by faith we grasp Christ’s righteousness, by which alone we are reconciled to God.” John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (The Westminster Press, 1960), 3.16.1.

216. Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.3.6.

217. Oberman, *The Dawn of the Reformation*, 255.

218. Richard A. Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002), 171.

219. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 13 (p. 62); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 137; idem, “Even so, this very theology, in whatever way it exists in each subject, is not more theology in one subject than in another, but is only counted greater or lesser in proportion to the capacities of the individuals. Just as, for example, we say that a short oak tree is not ‘less of an oak’ but a ‘lesser oak’ than another that is tall, so it is permissible somehow or other to define theology in the subject according to its essence, apart from a comparison with this distinguishing imperfection. For Christ also taught us that faith, which has a necessary connection with this theology, is not more or less a faith but is greater or lesser according to the capacity of the subjects, when He said to His apostles, ‘If you should have faith the size of a grain of mustard, you will

indeed exist in the life to come, but nevertheless they are actually communicated already in this present life and are perceived through faith until we attain full possession of them in the future life.”²²⁰ This consistency between the life in the present age and the life in the age to come, or the continuation of the same life in both stages, is achieved not by human’s meritorious actions, but by God’s sovereign acts of revelation and redemption, which were provided in the context of adoption. He thus argued that no human merit contributes to justification and thereby clearly distanced himself not only from Aquinas himself but also from the nominalist tradition that embraced the late medieval maxim, *Facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*.²²¹ Hence, despite the common appeal to adoption as a contextual category for the moral government of a graced nature, the idea of merit is completely non-operative in Junius’s account of God’s supernatural ordering of fallen nature, and in this regard Junius distanced himself sharply from the medieval scholastics. Only through faith, Junius would assert, can a fallen nature receive the imputed righteousness of Christ and the inherent righteousness from God.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter treated Junius’s formulations of the nature and role of God’s supernatural work. To answer the question concerning how Junius refined, retained, or rejected Aquinas’s notion of grace in relation to revelation and redemption, this chapter provided an argument that Junius, while understanding the role of grace in terms of causal, dispositional, and spiritual acts,

say to this mountain, ‘be moved from here to there,’ and it will move away, etc.’ (Matt. 17:20).” Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 34 (pp. 92–93); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 213–14.

220. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 33 (pp. 91–92); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 212.

221. “Iustificatio est actio, qua Deus hominem ex impio iustum facit, secundum beneplacitum voluntatis suae, & sine villo merito ipsius ad salutem.” Franciscus Junius, *De iustificazione fidei, Theses inavgvrales* (1584), thesis 1. See also Leif Grane, *Contra Gabrielem: Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Gabriel Biel in der Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam 1517* (Gyldendal, 1962); idem, *Modus Loquendi Theologicus: Luthers Kampf um die Erneuerung der Theologie (1515–1518)* (Leiden: Brill, 1975); Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology*, 132–34; John V. Fesko, “Arminius on *Facientibus Quod In Se Est* And Likely Medieval Sources,” in *Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism*, 347–60; Muller, s.v. “*facere quod in se est*,” in *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 118.

nonetheless modified Aquinas's conception of supernatural communication on Christological, soteriological, and anthropological grounds. This means that Junius critically appropriated Aquinas's framework of viewing the supernatural ordering of nature through the categories of infusion, disposition, and cognition, yet, as a Reformed theologian, he modified these concepts to suit the assumptions of *finitum non capax infiniti* and sovereign grace.²²² To support the thesis it was first of all pointed out that four key ideas were interwoven in Junius's account of the substance of divine law: inspiration, infusion, disposition, and ratiocination. What this highlighted was that the supernatural ordering of nature occurs not by an elevation of existing potencies but by an addition of new ones: without the added and infused gift of supernatural notions, Junius believed, no human person can ever attain "the eternal, gracious, and glorious vision of God."²²³

Besides noting the dispositional character of God's supernatural work, it also demonstrated that Junius's account of the divine ordering of human creatures was strongly discursive—grace does not disrupt but renews the discursive operation of human reason. To explain this more concretely the second sub-thesis stated that Junius, while utilizing the typical Aristotelian categories of causation, disposition, and motion, modified Aquinas's views on how Christ's human nature knows divine things. In short, Junius, unlike Aquinas, clearly delimited the extent and scope of Christ's knowledge on the grounds of the finiteness of Christ's human nature. In assuming this thesis and also by highlighting the significance of Christ's eternal mediation, the third sub-thesis was an assertion that Junius's concept of the *visio Dei* differs from Aquinas's in this crucial way: Junius considered the act of beatific vision in hypostatical terms, rather than in essential terms, because the *visio Dei* was eternally mediated through the incarnate Christ. The fourth and last sub-thesis, which covered the issues pertaining to the

222. "On the Reformed side of Protestantism, the ontological and epistemological premise of the prolegomena would be *finitum non capax infiniti*." Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1.109.

223. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 12 (p. 60); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 132.

redemption of fallen sinners, was simply that Junius sharply distanced himself from the Thomistic construals of saving revelation, righteousness, and faith. What this section demonstrated was that, in Junius's thought, the role of grace is much more widened in the post-fall world: grace regenerates the dead faculties of nature, remits the sins of nature, restores the lost gifts of nature, renews the corrupted parts of nature, and raises the power of nature beyond its limits.²²⁴ Junius's account of redemption was therefore rigorously contextualized by other notions such as revelation and consummation, and they altogether explained the nature of the sacred communion with God.

What is interesting in his account of divine law is that, time after time, he expressed his agreement to the "*orthodoxi Patres & Scholastici*" on the points he expounded—the result was that Junius presented an eclectic mix of Augustinian-Thomistic-Calvinistic concepts in his exposition of God's supernatural ordering of human nature. One of the fundamental patristic and scholastic insights that Junius appropriated was the twofold causal principle, namely that the effects of natural power will only generate two kinds of effects: those that are "equivalent to the power of an efficient cause" or those that are "lesser and not at all equal to an efficient cause."²²⁵ By using this twofold causal principle Junius emphatically and consistently asserted that, due to the finitude of nature's power, any perception or acquisition of the supreme good will not be possible; nature alone cannot generate effects that are superior to it. It is by engaging with these causal and motional principles that Junius formed his theology of grace, the substance of which was God's supernatural ordering of human reason, under the broader theme

224. Junius stated that "grace restores those that have been lost, renews those that have been corrupted, and teaches those that are unknown." Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (p. 343); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 38; Also "Therefore, also, He ordains and bestows upon them the grace of remission and renewal, as its antecedent mode, and the grace of that celestial glory, as its consequent mode." Junius, *A Discussion on the Subject of Predestination*, 3:254.

225. "[T]he mode of whatever things a foreign power effects is twofold: the one is equivalent to the power of an efficient cause in the same way that a person is generated by a person. The other is lesser and not at all equal to an efficient cause, as happens in a great many objects. For neither do the works of craftsmen equal their creators, nor do their external works prove equal to the internal patterns that are fashioned by the craftsman's desire and plan in his mind." Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 22 (p. 73); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 165.

of divine law.

Yet, Junius's theology of the substance of divine law cannot be fully understood without understanding his "Reformed" convictions. Even when he followed Aquinas's pattern of infusion-disposition-cognition in discussing the relationship between nature and grace, he nonetheless used them under the guiding principles of divine sovereignty, human depravity, as well as other epistemological concepts. As such Junius's account of grace is profoundly shaped by his Reformed assumptions: grace was consistently presented with the accompanying principles pertaining to *finitum non capax infiniti*. In addition, Junius allowed no room for the role of individual merit in the order of grace and perfection—it is God's sovereign and unbroken work of initiating, preserving, and leading that perfects nature through grace. In this regard, Junius's theology of grace hinges on all the revised—and reformed—doctrines of faith, Christ, Scripture, and glorification that had profound epistemological implications. The result was that the Thomistic construction of nature and grace was successfully refined by various Christological, soteriological, and epistemological principles, which altogether supported—not weakened—the Reformed doctrines of justification, sanctification, and glorification. Therefore, it is true that, as Willem J. van Asselt noted, Junius's account of supernatural ordering via *theologia unionis, visionis, and revelationis* manifests a modified scholastic trajectory with "a strong teleological and eschatological orientation of Reformed theology."²²⁶

226. van Asselt, "The Fundamental Meaning of Theology," 333.

CHAPTER 6

HUMAN LAW: THE HUMAN ORDERING OF MORAL ACTION

6.1 Introduction

“The Protestant Reformation,” John Witte Jr. claimed, was fundamentally about “a fight for freedom”—freedom from Rome’s unbiblical constraint and control of human conscience.¹ The secure acquisition, protection, and transmission of this freedom meant that Protestants had to estrange from the Catholic *Church* and also to establish Protestant *states*, and in this tumultuous context Martin Luther’s (1483–1546) and John Calvin’s (1509–64) doctrine of the two kingdoms exerted a remarkable degree of influence.² Calvin for instance quickly became the

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1. “The Protestant Reformation was, at its core, a fight for freedom—freedom of the individual conscience from intrusive canon laws and clerical controls, freedom of political officials from ecclesiastical power and privilege, freedom of the local clergy from central papal rule and oppressive princely controls.” John Witte Jr., *The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 77.
 2. Some notable scholarly treatments of Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine are: John T. McNeill, “Natural Law in the Thought of Luther,” *Church History*, vol. 10 (1941): 211–27; Heinrich Bornkamm, *Luther’s Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms*, trans. Karl H. Hertz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966); Ernst Wolf, “The Law of Nature in Thomas Aquinas and Luther,” in *Faith & Action: Basic Problems in Christian Ethics: A Selection of Contemporary Discussions*, ed. H.H. Schrey (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1970); W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, *The Political Thought of Martin Luther* (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1984); Bernhard Lohse, *Martin Luther’s Theology: Its Historical and Systematic Development*, ed. and trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999); William Lazareth, *Christians in Society: Luther, the Bible, and Social Ethics* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001); John Witte Jr., *Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); David M. Whitford, “*Cura Religionis* or Two Kingdoms: The Late Luther on Religion and the State in the Lectures on Genesis,” *Church History*, vol. 73, no. 1 (2004): 41–62; Antti Raunio, “Divine and Natural Law in Luther and Melancthon,” in *Lutheran Reformation and the Law*, ed. Virpi Mäkinen (Leiden: Brill, 2006). Scholarly materials on Calvin’s political theology are also vast, but these resources are particularly important: Josef Bohatec, *Calvin und das Recht* (Feudingen in Westfalen: Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt G. m. b. H, 1934); George L. Hunt and John T. McNeill, eds., *Calvinism and Political Order* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965); Brandt B. Boeke, “Calvin’s Doctrine of Civil Government,” *Studia Biblica et Theologica*, vol. 11 (1981): 57–79; Harro Höpfl, *The Christian Polity of John Calvin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Mary Jane Potter, “The ‘Whole Office of the Law’ in the Theology of John Calvin,” *Journal of Law and Religion*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1985): 117–39; Ronald S. Wallace, *Calvin, Geneva and the Reformation: A Study of Calvin as Social Reformer, Churchman, Pastor and Theologian* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1988); I. John Hesselink, *Calvin’s Concept of the Law* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 1992); William G. Naphy, *Calvin and the Consolidation of the Genevan Reformation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994); John Witte Jr., “Moderate Religious Liberty in the Theology of John Calvin,” *Calvin Theological Journal*, vol. 31 (1996): 359–403; idem, *The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism*; idem, “A Demonstrative Theory of Natural Law: Johannes Althusius and the Rise of Calvinist Jurisprudence,” *Ecclesiastical Law Society*, vol. 11 (2009): 248–65; Dale K. Kley, *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560–1791* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Guenther Haas, *The Concept of Equity in Calvin’s Ethics* (Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997); Irena Backus, “Calvin’s Concept of Natural and Roman Laws,” *Calvin Theological Journal*, vol. 38 (2003): 7–26; Volker Heise, *Der calvinistische Einfluss auf das humanistische Rechtsdenken: Exemplarisch dargestellt an den Commentarii de*

dominant theological leader in France even when the writings of Guillaume Farel (1489–1565), Pierre Viret (1511–71), and Heinrich Bullinger (1504–75) were available, and, since the opening of the Academy of Geneva in 1559, he trained many young men from Scotland, England, France, the Low Countries, Hungary, and even Poland for the cause of the Reformation.³ In fact, Calvin’s doctrine “was not simply a political theory of institutions, but a theological framework designed to distinguish the realms not only of church and state, but also of soul and body, spirit and flesh, inner life and outer life, conscience and reason, redemption and creation.”⁴ His ideas were distinct from both what later became known as Erastianism and asceticism, as he presented a so-called “two-track system of morality” whereby church and state were assigned with two distinct authorities to contribute cooperatively but differently to the rule of human morals.⁵ The Reformed ministers in the Dutch Republic endeavored to implement this rather “Calvinistic model” for their young nation.⁶ It is in these times that Junius ascended as a “transitional figure,” who played a pivotal role in developing the Reformed doctrine of twofold government to define, delineate, and defend the political and ecclesiastical powers more robustly.⁷

iure civili von Hugo Donellus (1527–1591) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004); Edward Dommen and James D. Bratt, eds., *John Calvin Rediscovered: The Impact of His Social and Economic Thought* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007); Christoph Strohm, *Calvinismus und Recht* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008); David VanDrunen, *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social Thought* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2010), 55–118; Matthew J. Tuininga, *Calvin’s Political Theology and the Public Engagement of the Church* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

3. Bruce Gordon, *Calvin* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 304; Diarmaid MacCulloch, *The Reformation: A History* (New York: Penguin USA, 2005), 247. For a recent scholarship on the Reformation in Geneva, see Jon Balsarak, ed., *A Companion to the Reformation in Geneva* (Leiden: Brill, 2021).

4. Witte, *The Reformation of Rights*, 44.

5. Witte, *The Reformation of Rights*, 77–78.

6. Phillip Benedict, *Christ’s Church Purely Reformed: A Social History of Calvinism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 173–201. Pierrick Hildebrand recently argued that the difference between the “Genevan” and the “Zurich” models of state-church relationship did not arise from different biblical theology, as both Bullinger and Calvin believed in the fundamental role of natural law and held to similar covenantal frameworks. The origin of a distinctively Calvinistic model should be sought, Hildebrand argued, from local or historical circumstances of Calvin’s life. See Pierrick Hildebrand, “Civil Order and Covenant: Heinrich Bullinger and John Calvin Compared,” in *Calvinus Frater in Domino: Papers of the Twelfth International Congress on Calvin Research*, ed. Arnold Huijgen and Karin Maag (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020), 233–42.

7. Jonathon D. Beeke made a claim that Junius likely begun formulating his understanding of the topic since the beginning of his tenure at the university of Heidelberg in 1585, and his thoughts were expressed well in

In the preface of his *De politiae Mosis observatione*, Junius stated that political discipline is “the mistress of the just and honorable,” “the guardian of order,” and “the defender of the public and private rights of the common good.”⁸ The order in view here, to be specific, is the order “in human affairs [*in rebus humanis*]” or “in public affairs [*in rebus publicis*].”⁹ In explaining the nature of human law in relation to this intra-human order Junius distinguished, just as he distinguished the “substance” of divine law from its expressed form, its internal and external parts. He argued that, though the efficient cause of human laws is ultimately one, two distinguishable causal forces are concurrently operative and conjointly intertwined in them. First, there is certain reason (*ratio certa*), which he regarded as the constant and immutable principle, and second, there are accompanying instruments that are easily moveable and variable.¹⁰ These two categories—certain reason and instruments—correspond to what Junius called the “internal” and “external” forms of human law; the internal part was identified as human law’s essential principle, and the external as its accidental properties.¹¹

In light of the distinction Junius defined the internal and essential form of human law as “that which humans, proceeding by reason, produce from the preceding laws, accommodated first to common just, honest, useful, and necessary conclusions, then to particular determinations for the condition of persons for whose good it is produced, the things or matters

Sacrorum Parallelorum Libri Tres (1588), *Defensio Catholicae Doctrinae* (1591), and *Animadversiones in Roberti Bellarmini* (1600). See also Jonathon D. Beeke, *Duplex Regnum Christi: Christ’s Twofold Kingdom in Reformed Theology* (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 119–49. For Dutch Reformation, see Benedict, *Christ’s Church Purely Reformed*, 173–201; Alastair Duke, *Reformation and Revolt in the Low Countries* (London: Hambledon, 1990); Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990); Andrew Pettegree, *Emden and the Dutch Revolt: Exile and the Development of Reformed Protestantism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Christine Kooi, *Liberty and Religion: Church and State in Leiden’s Reformation, 1572–1620* (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Martin van Gelderen, *The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555–1590* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Carter Lindberg, *The European Reformations*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 282–92.

8. Franciscus Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, ed. Abraham Kuyper (Amsterdam: Muller and Kruyt, 1882), preface (p. 229). The translations of this text used in this chapter, unless stated otherwise, will be from Franciscus Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, ed. Andrew M. McGinnis, trans. Todd M. Rester (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2015). The quotations are found in Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 3.

9. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (p. 330); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 4–5.

10. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (p. 357); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 72.

11. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (p. 358); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 73.

concerning which it is produced, and for the circumstances which occur to them.”¹² This clearly highlights that human law in Junius’s thought is from, by, and through humans—the principles as well as the applications of human laws are all worked out by humans themselves. His concentration on human reason here is not only consistent with his overall approach but also necessary, since reason, in his thought, is the means through which human beings govern their actions.¹³ Then, by relating this topic of human law to the overall aim of the project, this chapter proceeds toward answering this question: how did Junius refine, receive, or reject Aquinas’s views on human law? To the question this chapter provides an argument that in Junius’s understanding of human law the Thomistic *duplex ratio* has been recast in light of the Calvinistic *duplex regnum*.

The term *duplex ratio* here refers to the way Junius divided reason into natural and supernatural kinds, which resembles Aquinas’s pattern of thought; the term *duplex regnum*, on the other hand, refers to the way Junius conceived of the institutional governance of human morals, which reflects Calvin’s view of the church-and-state relationship. In order to defend the claim, Junius’s arguments on four areas will be analyzed: first, the immutable parts of human law; second, its mutable parts; third, the order of legal reasoning; and fourth, the difference between politicians and theologians. Upon analyzing these areas it will be manifest that his ideas on the finality, legitimacy, boundary, and authority of human law express both Thomistic and Calvinistic concepts on nature and grace, integrity and depravity, and creational and eschatological order, to the degree that he can be more adequately described as a “Thomistic Calvinist” who integrated Aquinas’s idea of twofold order with Calvin’s idea of twofold government in a coherent way.

12. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (p. 350); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 54.

13. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (p. 350); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 54.

6.2 The Immutable Parts of Human Law: *Terminus A Quo, In Quo, Ad Quem*

The first sub-thesis is that Junius was much more emphatic than Aquinas on his contention that the bases of human law ought to come from both natural and divine laws. Just to put things in context, it is worth noting that John Finnis claimed that, by appropriating the “reasonableness” of moral law in Aquinas’s concepts, the moral norm that undergirds human or positive laws is discoverable “independently of any knowledge of or belief in God’s existence, purposes or self-disclosure (revelation).”¹⁴ By and with philosophical explorations, he believed, people can arrive at the justifiable bases of human laws, and they can do so as long as they rightly use their “natural reason.”¹⁵ Speaking of Calvin’s view of natural law Irena Backus also made a claim that, in Calvin’s theology, “natural law can, without recourse to the Bible, bring about legislations that are in accord with the second table of the Decalogue.”¹⁶ David VanDrunen in a similar fashion emphasized that Calvin “does not necessarily need recourse to Scripture in order to support the magistrate’s interest in things such as idolatry and blasphemy.”¹⁷ Matthew Tuininga expressed a similar view: “Calvin’s position on the care of religion [*cura religionis*] was determined more by his judgments about natural law (i.e., political philosophy) than it was by his exegesis of scripture (i.e., political theology).”¹⁸

However, it ought to be noted that, in Junius’s theology, like it was in Calvin’s, the necessity of Scriptural considerations of the moral law is repeatedly highlighted. Junius defined the essence of human law as the immutable truths of both natural and supernatural laws such that natural law, without its explanation and reflection through the Scriptural teachings, did not become its sole ground. In other words, the moral conclusions derived from pagan sources alone are insufficient and, in many cases, inadequate, as they can only convey the laws of a

14. John Finnis, “Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence*, ed. G. Duke and R. George (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 22.

15. Finnis, “Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence,” 22.

16. Backus, “Calvin’s Concept of Natural and Roman Law,” 15.

17. VanDrunen, *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms*, 88.

18. Tuininga, *Calvin’s Political Theology and the Public Engagement of the Church*, 321.

corrupted nature, and at best only a fragment of the laws of an uncorrupted one.¹⁹ First of all Junius argued that “there is a rationale of all human laws so that they have their own immutable part and a mutable part; the former always obligates, whereas the latter obligates according to the persons, matters, and circumstances of those who live under them.”²⁰ To distinguish the immutable from the mutable, he explained human law in terms of its efficient, final, formal, and material causes.²¹ The efficient cause of human law is twofold: certain reason as the underlying basis of all human laws, and legislators as makers of human laws.²² Though legislators can and do change, Junius noted, certain reason as the “principium,” “presider,” and “author” of all human laws remains immutable; it alone is the proper efficient cause and it alone is unsusceptible to “instability and mutation.”²³ Its final cause is the common good, the immutable goal of all kinds of laws: all human legislation is to be done for the good of the communities it serves. The formal cause of human law, on the other hand, is “the form of that eternal reason, which God adumbrated in nature or expressed in his word.”²⁴ In addition to the

19. The previous two chapters provide a helpful background to how the Scriptural account of natural law is the account of a prelapsarian nature in Junius’s theology.

20. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 19 (p. 363); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 87.

21. “And so whatever is immutable in the law is thus defined according to its causes, such that with respect to its efficient cause it is spoken of as ordered by certain reason by him who has authority; with respect to the final cause, ordered for the common good; with respect to the formal cause, ordered according to the form of that eternal reason, which God adumbrated in nature or expressed in his word. Concerning the material cause there is no question, because there is no human thing that human laws are unable to provide for. And therefore nothing relevant to the topic prevents us from defining it.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (p. 357); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 71–72.

22. “Consequently, in the efficient cause of human laws two kinds of causes concur, which in every argument must be most prudently distinguished. One is unstable and varies to the greatest degree, which the logicians call instrumental—for example, legislators, or those to whom authority belongs, who construct and produce laws.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (p. 357); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 72.

23. “The other is most constant, as the unique and unmoved principium of all laws, and moves all legislators to the institution of those things, and thus in itself is truly the efficient cause, which we call certain reason. For reason is the principium of all laws, and statutes of human beings that do not have reason as presider and prince of the laws must not be considered laws, unless perhaps, as in things, so also in their names, an unworthy catachresis is employed. But although the mode of this reason, which we desire to preside over the laws being produced, is in itself certainly and absolutely most perfect, yet in individual human beings it is the most uncertain. Therefore, with respect to activity, when we call it certain reason we distinguish that reason as presider and author of the laws from the uncertainty of human reason. For when we call something certain it is a stranger to our doubt and to instability and mutation. That reason—that prince and arbiter of human laws—which is entirely beyond all doubt and all the variances of change must be distinguished from uncertain reason (as it is present in human beings concretely) and must be placed above uncertain reason as if it were at the pinnacle of human society.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (p. 357); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 72.

24. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (p. 357); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 72.

formal cause, its material cause is human beings, the legislators and beneficiaries of human law.²⁵

For Junius distinguishing the immutable parts from the mutable ones is of crucial significance because it is a necessary process in, on the one hand, defining the authority of human law, and, on the other, demarcating its boundary. Then to establish its authority and boundary in a proper manner Junius took pains to present various methods of “circumscription.”²⁶ The first method of circumscribing human law pertained to the principles of human law, by which he meant that human law ought to be produced by “proceeding from the common principle of the laws, which we call reason.”²⁷ The ultimate rule of human law is eternal law, but its proximate rule is twofold: “one innate, which we call natural law; the other inspired, which we call divine law.”²⁸ According to Junius, therefore, this twofold source or reason was the “birthplace of the human laws,” due to its status as eternal law’s accommodated revelations and human law’s proper origin and basis.²⁹ If human law is not based on the twofold source, he believed, it is fundamentally “degenerate, unworthy of the name of law.”³⁰

The second method of circumscription pertains to the action of human law. The chief work that human legislators ought to pursue, again, is twofold: firstly, to derive pure conclusions from the “innate” and “inspired” principles, and secondly, to apply them to particular situations by translating them into concrete legal determinations.³¹ Here again, the primary action required in the order of legislation was presented as ratiocination—conclusions

25. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (p. 357); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 72.

26. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (p. 350); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 54.

27. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (pp. 350–51); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 55.

28. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (pp. 350–51); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 55.

29. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (pp. 350–51); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 55.

30. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (pp. 350–51); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 55.

31. “Furthermore, there are two kinds of actions or works of that law, which we have expressed in our definition by these words: accommodated first to common just, honest, useful, and necessary conclusions, then to particular determinations. Implications ought to be drawn either from innate principles, which are taught by natural law, or from inspired principles, which are taught by divine law. From those two sources these two kinds of actions entirely proceed and flow, namely, pure conclusions and determinations that agree with those conclusions.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (pp. 350–51); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 55.

ought to be inferred properly and purely from moral principles before they are translated into particular applications.³² The key work required in the process of application is determination, because determinations are “that part of human law that circumscribes any of those natural conclusions with specific (as we call it) boundaries, not by the authority of nature, but rather by the judgment of the wisest persons, by the common law of nature specifically accommodated to the mode of individual things.”³³ Accordingly Junius believed that drawing conclusions from moral principles and applying them to particular situations—that is, ratiocination and determination—ought to be the two main tasks of all human legislators.

Lastly, the third method of circumscribing pertains to the mode of human law, which was fundamentally about “a just proportion.”³⁴ This was further distinguished into three: firstly, human laws ought to have a just proportion to their primary objects, namely human persons; secondly, to their secondary objects, such as “things, matters, and deeds” that are to be ordered to human persons as means; thirdly, to their tertiary objects, the accidental circumstances that surround both primary and secondary objects.³⁵ All of these distinctions reveal one of Junius’s teleological beliefs, namely that the means and mode of action should be fitting to its end. This principle was clearly articulated by Aquinas already: “Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be determined proportionately to that end.”³⁶ Also, considering the fact that, in an Aristotelian tradition, proportion is understood as “a relation of one quantity to another,” Junius’s point here can be seen as an argument that the quantitative elements of human law ought to be preoccupied primarily with human persons.³⁷ Hence in this

32. “Implications ought to be drawn either from innate principles, which are taught by natural law, or from inspired principles, which are taught by divine law. From those two sources these two kinds of actions entirely proceed and flow, namely, pure conclusions and determinations that agree with those conclusions.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (pp. 350–51); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 55.

33. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (pp. 351–52); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 56–57.

34. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (pp. 351–52); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 57.

35. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (pp. 351–52); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 57.

36. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 95, a. 3, co. English translations of Aquinas’s *Summa* used in this chapter are taken from Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans., Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981).

37. See Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, book five, lecture 5, 939.

way Junius could identify that the common good in view was primarily the good for human persons, though the maintenance of those secondary and tertiary goods was still important, as they serve, shape, and sustain the human life in various ways.

Another way to discern the immutable parts of human law is to consider its three immutable *termini*: the origin, object, and goal of human law, or its *terminus a quo*, *terminus in quo*, and *terminus ad quem*.³⁸ In regard to the origin or the *terminus a quo* of human law, Junius claimed that eternal law is “a catholic rule [*regula catholica*]” and “the highest principle and chief rule of principles” because it “pertains to all things universally and without exception.”³⁹ As Edward J. Damich has helpfully noted, the fundamental purpose of human law in a Thomistic paradigm is to make individual determinations in the light of God’s immutable law, and for such reason establishing its relation to eternal law is of crucial importance in the whole moral system.⁴⁰ Yet, as Junius accentuated in his discussion of revelation, this ultimate, highest, and chief principle is not approached directly, but mediately through natural and divine laws. Natural law is one of the proximate principles of human law because it provides the moral norms of nature, and divine law, as an added law to nature, is another proximate principle as it provides the moral norms of grace in “the word of God.”⁴¹ Therefore, while the ultimate principle (*principium*) of human law is one as all laws are based in the eternal law, its rationale (*ratio*) is properly conceived as threefold according to Junius: the eternal, natural, and divine laws.⁴² Natural and divine laws are, in essence, revelations of

38. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 18 (pp. 362–63); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 85. Richard A. Muller, s.v. “*terminus*,” in *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology*, 2nd ed. (Baker Academic: Grand Rapids, 2017), 355.

39. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 & 17 (pp. 359 & 62); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 75 & 81.

40. Edward J. Damich, “The Essence of Law According to Thomas Aquinas,” *The American Journal of Jurisprudence*, vol. 75 (1985): 89–90.

41. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (p. 359); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 75.

42. “Moreover, there is one principle and one mode of this essential form in the thing, but the rationale is threefold. For three things concur in circumscribing this form: first, that eternal reason, which is also immutable, that exists in God as the founder of the universe; second, the natural law, by which God adumbrated in nature his own eternal reason; and, lastly, the divine law that he expressed in his word.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (pp. 357–58); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 73.

eternal reason, and human laws ought to be formulated according to their principles in order to maintain its conformity to the eternal reason, the highest and ultimate regulator of moral order.⁴³

Aquinas, at first glance, appears to have believed that only natural law is the *terminus a quo* of human law. He only mentioned natural law as “the first rule of reason” in legal reasoning and as a result “every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature.”⁴⁴ This is because natural reason, by virtue of its participation in the eternal law, remains immutable and universal.⁴⁵ However, he argued elsewhere that unjust laws are those laws that oppose both “human good” and “the Divine good” as their end, and unjust laws were presented as those that contradict both natural and divine laws as to their form—and he even argued that those unjust laws “must nowise be observed, because, as stated in Acts 5:29, ‘we ought to obey God rather than man.’”⁴⁶ Also Girolamo Zanchi (1516–90), who, in the words of John Patrick Donnelly, represented the best example of Reformed Thomism,⁴⁷ argued that “all political laws have their origin, as far as their essence is concerned, in natural law.”⁴⁸ Yet, he also asserted that “right and just laws are those conceived by those who have authority, are derived from natural or divine law, and exist for the good and well-being of the State or the church.”⁴⁹ Unjust laws, therefore, are those that are “contrary to the glory of God

43. By acknowledging his agreement to the orthodox fathers Junius stated that “eternal reason is the moderator and arbiter of human laws, which indeed nature and Scripture teach.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (p. 334); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 15.

44. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 95, a. 2, co.

45. “Reply to Objection 1. The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above (Question 91, Article 2), and therefore endures without change, owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover the natural law contains certain universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain particular precepts, according to various emergencies.” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 97, a. 1, ad 1.

46. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 96, a. 4, co.

47. John Patrick Donnelly, “Calvinist Thomism,” *Viator* 7 (January 1976): 444.

48. Girolamo Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, trans. Jeffrey J. Veenstra (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2012), 29.

49. Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, 27.

and divine law” and, just like Aquinas pointed out, they do not have a perpetual authority as “God does not bind our conscience to unjust laws.”⁵⁰

If Junius’s thought on this matter is compared to Aquinas and Zanchi’s, then, it is noticeable that Junius was much clearer in locating the basis of human law in the moral conclusions of both natural and divine laws, as both sources provide the most basic yet the most constant moral principles of human action—one concerning natural ends, the other concerning supernatural ends.⁵¹ Thus to Junius, the rationale contained in both natural and divine laws was the standard by which good laws can be distinguished from evil laws; evil laws are those that are unfounded in the eternal, divine, and natural laws, and good laws are those that are founded in them.⁵² On this point Aquinas also believed that, as long as the rationale and the end of human law accord with reason, the law can be good—otherwise, it is evil in species.⁵³ Therefore, the efficient, material, formal, and final causes of human law are explicitly stated along the lines of the threefold rationale according to Junius, whereas such a threefold structure was less clearly stated in the writings of, for example, Aquinas and Zanchi.

In addition to identifying the *terminus a quo* of human law as God’s eternal reason reflected in natural and divine laws, Junius saw the outward action of human beings as its *terminus in quo*. The concept of object (or *objectum*) in Aquinas’s philosophy referred to “what the action relates to,” and it determined the specific relation and direction that human action

50. Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, 32.

51. “These three things, as principles of human law, are in a certain sense one principle because eternal reason is one, which both produces the natural law and infuses the divine law. For that natural law is, as it were, a trace of the divine, and this image of it has been impressed by the power of God. From these three principles, that internal form, which constitutes the proper and immutable essence of human laws, has been placed upon human laws and the polity of Moses.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (pp. 357–58); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 73. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 95, a. 2, co. & q. 96, a. 4, co.

52. “When, however, on the contrary by a single lack of matters pertaining to the good, a vice occurs in the matters, and evils result, we have most rightly stated that those laws and actions that lack even one of those moments are evil and vicious.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 18 (pp. 362–63); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 85.

53. Joseph Pilsner, *The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 69.

has with its target.⁵⁴ “A human being is born for action,” Junius remarked, “and the law is the arbiter of actions among human beings[.]”⁵⁵ An important point to note here is that he did not explicitly align the object of human law with the increase of human virtue. Rather, he argued that the two specific objects of human law pertain to external actions: first, just actions [*iusta*], and second, legitimate actions [*legitima*].⁵⁶ Junius argued:

In fact, we call these matters or objects just and legitimate because each is necessary in all the objects of our actions. On the one hand, the objects must be just, that is, extending from the nature of the right, the fair, and the good to those actions according to the nature of that eternal, natural, and divine law. On the other hand, they must also be legitimate, that is, they must have their limit in human law and must be sanctioned by the human order. For unless this would obtain, it is inevitable that in place of the order that is most necessary in human society, a horrible upheaval of all things occurs.⁵⁷

This can be evaluated against the backdrop of Aquinas’s view, in which human law was explicitly articulated not only as a rule of human actions but also of human virtues—as action is understood to be a result of “interior habit or disposition,” Aquinas argued that “[t]he purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually.”⁵⁸ He even argued that “[t]he intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest.”⁵⁹

The Dominican Thomists Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546) and Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) also expressly contended that the proper function of human law is to increase human virtues, as it promotes the virtue of obedience and service in a communal life.⁶⁰ On this

54. Pilsner, *The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas*, 70–141.

55. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 16 (pp. 360–61); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 79.

56. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 16 (p. 360); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 79. Tobias Sarx made a point that according to Junius ecclesiastical ministers address the inner part of human being by way of persuasion, whereas the political authorities regulate external and outward actions by means of coercion. Tobias Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602): Ein reformierter Theologe im Spannungsfeld zwischen späthumanistischer Irenik und reformierter Konfessionalisierung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 95.

57. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 16 (p. 360–61); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 79.

58. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 96, a. 2, co. & q. 96, a. 2, ad 2.

59. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 122, a. 1, ad 1 & IaIIae q. 95, a. 1, co.

60. Annabel Brett, “Later Scholastic Philosophy of Law,” in *A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics*, ed. Fred D. Miller Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi (New York: Springer, 2015), 358; idem, *Changes of the State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), 145. Cf. Francisco de Vitoria, *Commentario al Tratado de La Ley*, q. 92, a.1, pp. 20–21; Domingo de Soto, *De Iustitia et Iure*, Lib. I, q. 2, a. 1.

point Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562) appears to have shared some agreement: “A magistrate is a person elected by God so that laws and peace may be protected, evil may be repressed by means of penalties and the sword, and virtue may be promoted by every means.”⁶¹ The increase of virtue, in other words, was part of the overt object of political government and the intent of human law according to Aquinas, Vitoria, Soto, and even Vermigli, yet with Zanchi a different emphasis is noted—he argued that political laws “prohibit only external crimes and command only external duties. Consequently, they do not punish the desire of sin but the sinful external action itself.”⁶² Even some of the Jesuit thinkers in the sixteenth century such as Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) and Gabriel Vázquez (c. 1549–1604) posited that the focus of civil law ought to be external actions, not internal ones, based on their understanding of the limitations of human law.⁶³ Junius, perhaps by adopting the emphases presented by Zanchi and many others, did not designate the increase of inward virtue as an object of human law, but rather presented outward actions as the objects of political government and the focus of human law, though justice in his system cannot be completely detached from moral virtues.⁶⁴

In regard to the end of human law or its *terminus ad quem*, Junius argued that “[w]hatever tends toward a holy and just end [*ad sanctum iustumque finem*] according to the same eternal reason, as a universal rule, has thus been ordered in its end in human law immutably.”⁶⁵ In other words, the immutable *telos* of human law is twofold, distinguished into that which is directed to holiness and piety on the one hand [*ad pietatem*] and that which is toward the truth of justice, equity, and goodness on the other [*ad iuris & aequi boni*]

61. Peter Martyr Vermigli, “The Civil Magistrate,” in *The Peter Martyr Reader*, ed. John Patrick Donnelly, Frank A. James III, and Joseph C. McLelland (Missouri: Truman State University Press, 1999), 223.

62. Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, 40.

63. Brett, *Changes of the State*, 147.

64. In fact, Aquinas himself claimed that “*lex humana non potuit cohibere et ordinare sufficienter interiores actus* (human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts).” In this regard Zanchi and others seem to follow a tradition already found in Aquinas. See Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 91, a. 4, co.

65. In other words, “If the end of human laws are constituted in this way, they must be spoken of as immutable according to their end.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 17 (p. 361); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 81.

veritatem].⁶⁶ In Aquinas's thought the *terminus ad quem* determines the species or form of human action, as it delineates, defines, and specifies one particular *motus* from another.⁶⁷ Moreover, in his moral concept "piety" is associated with worship, but by worship here he broadly included revering God, parents, and one's country; piety is thus what he called the "second part of justice" with the "chief part of justice" being specifically the "acts of religion" toward God alone.⁶⁸ According to Calvin, however, piety is much more closely connected to the first table of the law and distinguished more clearly from justice that is required in the second table of the law: "in the First Table, God instructs us in piety and the proper duties of religion, by which we are to worship his majesty. The Second Table prescribes how in accordance with the fear of his name we ought to conduct ourselves in human society."⁶⁹ Like Calvin here, Junius distinguished piety and holiness more clearly from justice and goodness, and aligned the former with the requirements of the first table and the latter, the second table.⁷⁰ Furthermore, given Junius's understanding of the *terminus ad quem* as "the end in which the intention of the received law or human agent is terminated," the aim of human law is fulfilled when the external actions of human recipients, subjects, and observers of the law are directed to piety and justice.⁷¹ Yet, the distinction does not necessitate their separation—he believed

66. "Moreover, it is necessary in its mode that it has been established according to eternal reason. And so the end is holy, pertaining to piety; it is just, pertaining to the truth of justice and equity." Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 17 (p. 361); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 81.

67. See for example Pilsner, *The Specifications of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas*, 47–69.

68. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 101, a. 1, co & IIaIIae, q. 122, a. 1, co.

69. John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (The Westminster Press, 1960), 2.8.11. Though Calvin did not mention "justice" in the quotation, he clearly said elsewhere that justice is the requirement in the second table of the law. Cf. *Institutes*, 4.20.9.

70. "God has so divided his law into two parts, which contain the whole of righteousness, as to assign the first part to those duties of religion which particularly concern the worship of his majesty; the second, to the duties of love that have to do with men." Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.8.11. Junius acknowledged that the examples of the ways in which the principles of the first and second tables of the Decalogue were applied to God's people were provided in the laws of Moses. "Therefore, the examples that follow, concerning piety, have been comprehended in the first table of the law .. Moreover, the next example, concerning the duty toward one's neighbor, is commanded in the second table of the law." Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (pp. 359–60); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 76–77.

71. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 18 (pp. 362–63); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 85.

that the immutable truths from both the first and the second tables of the law must shape the goal of human law, because both tables convey the most constant truths of moral order.⁷²

Junius was consistent in his argument that the immutable parts of human law, or its origin, object, and goal, are drawn from both natural and divine laws, which ultimately reveal the reason of the eternal law. Eternal reason itself is the ultimate and highest regulative principle of human law, the most authoritative regulator of human action. Therefore, to the question as to how eternal, natural, and divine laws ought to shape the content and the direction of human law, his answer would be that the conclusions drawn from the principles of natural and divine laws ought to be presupposed in them, and human law in turn ought to apply those immutable conclusions to particular people, things, and circumstances by a proper reasoning process.⁷³ In other words, the conclusions of natural law apart from any Scriptural reflections are not the sole standard for human law according to Junius, though they constitute an essential part. The moral truths revealed in the divine law—broadly the word of God—ought to be consulted in the process of legislation and, without it, the human law loses its full obligatory force.

6.3 The Mutable Parts of Human Law: Causes and Conditions of Change

The second sub-thesis is that, on the issue of mutable parts of human law, there appears to be no notable difference between Junius and Aquinas. It will be helpful to revisit the claim that Aquinas conceived of an “agent” as one who orders parts to the whole.⁷⁴ He claimed that “the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle

72. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, theses 15–17 (pp. 359–62); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 76–84.

73. “When, however, on the contrary by a single lack of matters pertaining to the good, a vice occurs in the matters, and evils result, we have most rightly stated that those laws and actions that lack even one of those moments are evil and vicious. But why? Because human laws properly speaking are made from conclusions, not from principles.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 18 (pp. 362–63); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 85.

74. Brett has provided an excellent account of the role of human agency in the neo-Thomistic tradition. See Brett, *Changes of the State*, 37–61.

of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action.”⁷⁵ Furthermore, in Aquinas’s thought, there are at least two kinds of agents, the primary agent being God and the secondary agents being rational creatures, and the use of secondary agents on God’s part does not eliminate the magnitude of divine power—“God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.”⁷⁶ In fact, affirming God’s use of secondary agents in his government is theologically significant, as Aquinas noted in the following paragraph:

Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is the immediate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.⁷⁷

One key argument provided here is that denying God’s use of creaturely agents in the execution of divine plan is essentially a denial of *active potency* in creation, as denying their generative and productive role is a tacit acknowledgement that *passive potency* is the only kind of power residing in created natures. Since it is evident, according to Aquinas, that active powers are “seen to exist in things,” it follows that creaturely natures have both active and passive potencies, and consequently a twofold instrumentality must be affirmed in divine government. Therefore in Aquinas’s thought the act of ordering parts to a whole, individuals to a community,

75. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 105, a. 5.

76. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 105, a. 5, ad 1.

77. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Ia, q. 105, a. 5, co.

or particular goods to the universal good, is inseparably associated with “agency,” and secondary agents are conceived as dependent causal actors that have the legitimate power and authority to order human actions toward proper ends.⁷⁸

Junius had a similar view of the causal and mereological function of agency. First of all, Junius believed that in the created world a singular effect is often a result of multiple efficient causes “functioning in coordination,” and he distinguished “absolute” or “primary” causes from “subordinate” or “supporting” causes to explain the structure of coordinated causation in creation.⁷⁹ Junius believed that God is the primary, absolute, efficient cause of all things but he acknowledged that God employs certain subordinate causes to “accomplish His will.”⁸⁰ Then, *who* is the legitimate secondary agent that can possess the power and authority to order fellow human beings toward God’s will? Junius’s answer is clear: he saw him as one who is “established by the one who has care of the community.”⁸¹ Against the background of such causal and teleological conceptions of human agents, the nature of mutable parts in human laws can be understood more clearly:

We have said previously that there is a rationale of all human laws so that they have their own immutable part and a mutable part; the former always obligates, whereas the latter obligates according to the persons, matters, and circumstances of those who live under them. We have taught that a part is immutable, which in its principle, object, and end is conformed to the eternal reason, which God adumbrated in nature or expressed in his word. Therefore, it follows that if in human laws there is something beyond this, which, as it were, clothes those three things that constitute the essence of a just law, then that is mutable and does not have the perpetual rationale and authority of a just law.⁸²

Here, Junius argued that those things added to the immutable, enduring, and universal parts of human law do not have the “perpetual rationale and authority of a just law,” as those additional

78. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 93, a. 3, co.

79. Franciscus Junius, *De theologia vera* in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, thesis 29 (pp. 86–87). The translations of this text used in this chapter are from Franciscus Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology: With the Life of Franciscus Junius*, trans. David C. Noe (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2014), 197.

80. Junius, *De theologia vera*, thesis 29 (pp. 86–87); cf. Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology*, 197.

81. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 1 (pp. 344–45); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 40.

82. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 19 (pp. 363–64); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 87–88.

things contain in them the variability of persons, circumstances, and things themselves.⁸³ In short, these “additional,” “circumstantial,” and “conditional” aspects of human law are, fundamentally, associated with mutability, change, and alteration in Junius’s thought—or what constitutes those mutable parts are, first, the mutable condition of human reason itself, and second, the mutable conditions of the things legislated.⁸⁴ This twofold distinction reflects a Thomistic pattern of thinking and argumentation, as Aquinas also claimed that human laws ought to change because, firstly, “it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect,” and secondly, “the law can be rightly changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom different things are expedient according to the difference of his condition.”⁸⁵

In a similar manner, the changes in legislators occur in two ways in Junius’s thought—their reason either “rises up to the better or it falls off to the worse.”⁸⁶ It rises up to the better “if the reason of that person advances according to right reason agreeable to the principles of the eternal, human, and divine law.”⁸⁷ This positive dimension of the mutability of human law means that, when the legislator enacts a new law that conforms more closely to the immutable *termini*, then laws can advance toward the better. However, this does not mean that human law can be changed at any time; even when the principles of human law are conformed more closely to the immutable conclusions of natural and divine laws, the new law should not be enacted unless there is a clear perception of the utility of such change. He remarked:

I acknowledge that certainly it can sometimes happen that a fair law succeeds a fair law, and it can happen that both laws equally depend on a just equity. Nevertheless, this does not follow when no evident utility exists for withdrawing the former law from the received and customary right. I say that it does not follow that the former law with its

83. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 19 (pp. 363–64); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 88.

84. Thesis 19: “The remaining matters in human laws are mutable and have an entwined condition of change arising from two causes. That is, both the reason of the one commanding the laws sometimes changes, and so does the mode of those things governed by the laws.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 19 (pp. 341–42); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 32.

85. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 97, a. 1, co.

86. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (pp. 364–65); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 90.

87. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (pp. 364–65); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 90.

reason has changed. For although the new law is in itself equal with the old one, yet to the public, for whose sake the laws are produced, the reason of both of these laws cannot be the same because a change of this sort is rash, and not equitable, if there is no evident utility in it that will add to the public good.⁸⁸

Thus, Junius noted, even when the principles of new laws are closer to the conclusions of natural and divine laws, the timing and mode of such change should not be hasty as such action “inflicts a loss on the public, diminishes that obliging and binding force of laws, and makes a mockery of their authority.”⁸⁹ This view is aligned with Aquinas’s point as well: he also cautioned against making hasty legal changes as “when a law is changed, the binding power of the law is diminished, in so far as custom is abolished”; therefore “human law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal.”⁹⁰

On the other hand, the reason of the legislator falls off to the worse “if it is contrary to that common reason and lacks agreement with those immutable principles.”⁹¹ A deficient agreement of human law to its immutable principles can happen in three ways: firstly, by failing to conform human laws to its proper *terminus a quo*, the eternal law; secondly, by failing to have a proper object of human law, human action as its *terminus in quo*; thirdly, by failing to serve the common good, the *terminus ad quem* of human law.⁹² When legislators fail to meet these conditions by the changes they introduce, then laws become worse than before. Hence, when the reason of the legislator turns further away from the common reason and the immutable *termini*, he causes damage to both himself and to the public: “He injures himself because he neglects reason, for which a legislator and leader ought to have greater care and concern because he has more authority. Furthermore, he injures the public because it is for the

88. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (pp. 364–65); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 91.

89. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (pp. 364–65); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 92.

90. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 97, a. 2, co.

91. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (pp. 364–65); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 90.

92. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (pp. 365–66); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 92.

sake of the public and according to the public good that he has been equipped with reason and authority, which it is most shameful to abuse.”⁹³

Junius also noted that the mutability inherent in the things legislated demands legal changes. He argued that “the mode of those matters governed by the laws is always mutable, and is changed the greatest amount, and therefore laws that regulate these matters may be changed for the common good, and quite frequently it is necessary to change them.”⁹⁴ This simply means that when the condition of the things governed changes, the laws that govern them must adapt to their changes in order to serve them appropriately. That is why he believed that a mere ordering of human law to the immutable, universal, and perpetual truths does not serve the common good:

[A]nyone who thinks that mutable matters must be administered and cared for by an immutable reasoning and method is someone who would condemn the prudence of parents in ruling their children in the home, the practical knowledge of the plowman in cultivating his crops in the field, and the expertise of sailors in heeding the wind on the sea. But while such a person thinks he preserves a constant and perpetual reasoning, by not reasoning he will ruin the very matters about which reason reasons.⁹⁵

Therefore, in Junius’s view, prudential legal judgments must include, on the one hand, perceptions of perpetual moral principles, and on the other hand, considerations of circumstantial factors.⁹⁶ In alternative terms political reasoning requires both the general wisdom that perceives the order of human existence, and the particular wisdom that applies the perceived wisdom to practical matters according to their particular modes of existence.⁹⁷ Justice in this framework is achieved when the immutable and the mutable parts of human law are rightly distinguished, proportionately treated, and prudentially administered by human

93. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (pp. 364–65); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 91.

94. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 19 (pp. 341–42); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 32.

95. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (pp. 366–67); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 95.

96. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (pp. 366–67); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 95.

97. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (pp. 366–67); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 95.

law.⁹⁸ To govern human matters justly and prudently, therefore, Junius believed it was necessary that those two kinds of wisdom “concur in everything that is done.”⁹⁹

6.4 The Proper Order of Legal Reasoning: From Principles to Determinations

The third sub-thesis, which is an iteration and elaboration of the points assumed above, is that Junius closely adopted Aquinas’s pattern of legal reasoning.¹⁰⁰ It needs to be stated here that a refined Christology, despite the crucial importance of *duplex regnum Christi*, was not the only intellectual apparatus that Reformed thinkers utilized in solving the problems associated with human law.¹⁰¹ The reasons are, as Annabel Brett helpfully noted, the scholastic philosophy of law in the sixteenth century “was not an isolated theoretical subject, but part of a practical moral theology for the entirety of life within a Christian commonwealth, including the treacherous question of political obligation.”¹⁰² At the center of this scholastic endeavor was Aquinas’s concept of law, as both Dominicans and Jesuits conjointly re-appropriated his legal thought to overcome the challenges that beset the European soil in the wake of the Reformation.¹⁰³ On the other hand, the humanist contribution was as significant—Eric Nelson has convincingly shown that the development of early modern political thought occurred concurrently with the humanist movements that attracted various scholars to engage with the Hebraic ideas.¹⁰⁴ Nelson thus argued that Junius, who began his academic career as an Old

98. A helpful piece on this is Christopher A. Franks, “Aristotelian Doctrines in Aquinas’s Treatment of Justice,” in Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering, eds., *Aristotle in Aquinas’s Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 139–66.

99. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (pp. 366–67); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 95.

100. For a helpful account of Aquinas’s pattern of legal reasoning, see Raymond Bardley, “The Relation Between Natural Law and Human Law in Thomas Aquinas,” *The Catholic Lawyer*, vol. 21, no. 1 (1975): 42–55.

101. Some good scholarly works on the intersection between Christology and government in Calvin’s thought are David Willis, *Calvin’s Catholic Christology: The Function of the So-Called Extra Calvinisticum in Calvin’s Theology* (Leiden: Brill, 1966); John Bolt, “Church and World: A Trinitarian Perspective,” *Calvin Theological Journal*, vol. 18, no. 1 (1983): 5–31; Byung-ho Moon, *Christ the Mediator of the Law: Calvin’s Christological Understanding of the Law as the Rule of Living and Life-Giving* (Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster, 2006); Beeke, *Duplex Regnum Christi*.

102. Brett, “Later Scholastic Philosophy of Law,” 340.

103. Brett, “Later Scholastic Philosophy of Law,” 340. Cf. *idem*, *Changes of the State*, 11.

104. Eric Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 3. Similar accounts of political Hebraism can be seen in

Testament professor, was a participant in the so-called “Political Hebraism” movement and adopted the method of “comparative constitutional analysis” where the rationale embedded in human political laws was compared against the background of the rationale of the Mosaic laws.¹⁰⁵ His description seems justified: Junius explicitly argued that the judicial laws of Moses are far more excellent than other civil laws in authority, arrangement, and application because the author and judge who produced them “is not a human being, but the wisest, most just, and purest God of the very universe and of everything dwelling in the universe.”¹⁰⁶

Having assumed the complex scholastic and humanistic confluences in early modern legal thought, the first point to note here is that Junius and Aquinas both regarded the problem of sin in terms of spiritual disorder. Aquinas believed that, before the fall of Adam, human souls could rationally control the lower powers of the whole being because “the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul.”¹⁰⁷ Yet, after “a wounding of nature” through Adam’s fall, “all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order.”¹⁰⁸ He then identified four kinds of wounds: first, the wound of ignorance; second, the wound of malice; third, the wound of weakness; fourth, the wound of concupiscence.¹⁰⁹ These four wounds are spiritual consequences of the fall of Adam, and, because of them, “the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous.”¹¹⁰ All of these four wounds are in essence

Kalman Neuman, “The Literature of the *Respublica Judaica*: Descriptions of the Ancient Israelite Polity in the Antiquarian Writing of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2002); Gordon Schochet, Fania Oz-Salzberger, and Meirav Jones, eds., *Political Hebraism: Judaic Sources in Early Modern Political Thought* (Jerusalem: Shalem Press, 2008); Graham Hammill, *The Mosaic Constitution: Political Theology and Imagination from Machiavelli to Milton* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Richard J. Ross, “Distinguishing Eternal From Transient Law: Natural Law and the Judicial Laws of Moses,” *Past & Present*, no. 217 (2012), 79–115; Markus M. Totzeck, *Die politischen Gesetze des Mose: Entstehung und Einflüsse der politia-judaica-Literatur in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019).

105. Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic*, 72–73.

106. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 330–331); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 6–7. Again, this does not mean that the Mosaic civil laws were to be applied to all human societies without any alteration.

107. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 85, a. 5, co.

108. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 85, a. 3, co.

109. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 85, a. 3, co.

110. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 85, a. 3, co.

habitual changes in the soul, as Aquinas believed that “original sin is a habit” in the sense of “an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice.”¹¹¹

Notwithstanding the fact that Junius accounted for the reality of depravity more firmly in legal reasoning, which most likely echoes Calvin’s convictions on human nature’s utter perversion and vitiation,¹¹² he nonetheless approached the problem of sin in terms of the soul’s dispositional and operational disorder like Aquinas did. First of all, with respect to the act of perception of moral principles, Junius argued that the fallen intellect neither perceives moral principles clearly nor disentangles them properly, such that the fallen will eventually draws “obscure, muddy, imperfect, impure, and vicious judgments” from “a muddy fount.”¹¹³ The second and sequential act—connection of moral conclusions—becomes also problematic as that which draws conclusions from principles is a very “weak, imperfect, disturbed, and depraved reason.”¹¹⁴ Moreover, because this depraved soul is affected “by every influence, by innumerable ways, objects, and occasions,” reason is digressed by misleading desires.¹¹⁵ Thirdly, Junius argued that “even if the reason may in a certain way provide just conclusions from indubitable principles, the particular matters themselves—about which we must make our judgement through our own conclusions from the principles—are so obscure to us because of our infirmity, the nature of the matters themselves, and their innumerable number.”¹¹⁶ In other

111. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 82, a. 1, s. c & IaIIae, q. 82, a. 1, co.

112. Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.1.8–11. See also Matthew J. Tuininga, “‘Because of Your Hardness of Heart’: Calvin and the Limits of Law,” *Scottish Journal of Theology*, vol. 69, no. 3 (2016): 281–94.

113. “But in all these things, at each point, our judgment falls apart. For in the first place the intellect does not have those common principles made clear and disentangled as would be necessary for rightly making a judgment about such great matters, and the will is not serviceable for exciting and cultivating the intellect as it should, from which it happens that obscure, muddy, imperfect, impure, and vicious judgments are drawn from a muddy fount.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 10 (pp. 355–56); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 66–67.

114. “Second, indeed it is a weak, imperfect, disturbed, and depraved reason that has the power to make conclusions from whatever sort of principles are derived from our intellect. It is either impeded by its own darkness, or it is obscured and directed by individual desires, to which the will is carried away by every influence, by innumerable ways, objects, and occasions.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 10 (pp. 355–56); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 67.

115. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 10 (pp. 355–56); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 67.

116. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 10 (pp. 355–56); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 67.

words, the disorderly consequences that depravity brought upon the process of legislation are, first, human reason's obscure comprehension of universal principles as well as particular circumstances, and second, the digressing nature of circumstances towards imperfection and disorder.¹¹⁷ Against this background, the necessity of careful, analytic, and proper legal reasoning is emphasized because, by using a proper method, both the immutable and mutable parts can be distinguished and joined properly in all human laws, despite the disorderly operation of reason in the corrupted nature.

The second and the most similar aspect between the two thinkers pertains to the actual method of legal reasoning. With respect to the method, Aquinas argued that "something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: First, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities."¹¹⁸ He argued that deriving conclusions from the principles of natural law follows a method used in the "sciences," whereas determining particulars from the conclusions follows a method used in the "arts."¹¹⁹ Though distinct in method, he argued that "both modes of derivation are found in the human law."¹²⁰ In a similar vein Junius stated that there is a proper pattern of legal reasoning, which is constituted by three linkable acts: firstly, the immutable moral principles must be perceived; secondly, necessary conclusions should be deduced from them; lastly, those conclusions should be accommodated and applied to particular situations to determine which judicial action are necessary.¹²¹

117. "For not only do the matters themselves vary by nature, but even some conditions in themselves advance moment by moment to other conditions, which no creature—not even the most sharp-sighted and clearly Lyncean, or even heavenly one—could perfectly recognise unless equipped beyond its nature by the gracious strength of God. And yet without this knowledge of matters and particular conditions, what creature is able to make a certain and tested judgment?" Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 10 (pp. 355–56); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 67.

118. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 95, a. 2, co.

119. "The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape." Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 95, a. 2, co.

120. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 95, a. 2, co.

121. "This order of human judgments has been established by God and by nature, so that reason would draw out the principles from the intellect, from the principles it would connect conclusions, it would accommodate conclusions to particular things, and from the particular conditions it would make just and individual determinations for all people, universally, at every time, with respect to all things, and one would observe it

Firstly, Junius's identification of the essential form of human law as the conclusions drawn from the principles of natural and divine laws correlates with his argument that human law must serve eternal, natural, and divine laws. In other words, human laws must be formed "according to the image, according to the form, of that eternal law and this natural law and divine law."¹²² He stated:

[W]e do not say that the form of either that eternal reason, natural reason, or divine law is in human laws, but we affirm only that the human laws are according to the form of these things, that is, the mode of human law is formed and fashioned by the former laws. Therefore, the essential form of human laws is nothing other than the analogy and proper suitability [*analogia & conuenientia*] of those human laws with that eternal, natural, and divine law according to the mode of those three. For human laws are their servants. And this definition is gathered from its causes—that part of those causes that in human laws we call immutable.¹²³

Junius's point here was, on the one hand, to clarify that the essence of human law is not univocal to the essence of eternal, natural, and divine laws, yet, on the other, to establish that it nonetheless has to be connected to them in an analogical, proportionate, and symmetrical way.¹²⁴ The latter point is also resonant of Aquinas's view, since Aquinas contended that the nature of such derivation is analogical as human law is not univocally related to the truths of natural law, and as the force of natural law is contained in the human law according to the proportion of participation and derivation.¹²⁵

Secondly, Junius believed that, in order to form human laws according to the forms of natural and divine laws, it is crucial to draw pure conclusions from pure principles.¹²⁶ This is

subduing others with proper reasoning." Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 10 (p. 355); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 66.

122. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (pp. 357–58); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 73–74.

123. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 13 (p. 358); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 74.

124. The word "proper suitability" in the above quote can also be translated as "conformity" or "symmetry."

125. "When a thing is derived by one thing from another, as from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in both: thus when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct from the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same specifically. But when a thing is derived from one thing from another, according to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from the healthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as applied to urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the body of an animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It is in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the order of one to the other." Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 20, a. 3, ad 3.

126. "... because conclusions proceed from those principles according to reason—in which process of drawing conclusions the feeble reason of human beings generally fails—and because things that are of themselves in

to say that the derived conclusions ought to be “just, honest, useful, and necessary.”¹²⁷ He also believed that the examples of pure inference were contained in the common law (*ius commune*) but most perfectly in the judicial laws of Moses, because “there is absolutely nothing from Moses, and not even in the political and judicial laws, except what has been produced purely from its principles and from God its author.”¹²⁸ For example, the laws expressed in the Pentateuch “have their origin and foundation from the eternal, natural, and divine law, according to which by necessity such conclusions are made purely.”¹²⁹ In the case of laws concerning God, Junius believed that “the eternal and immutable principle according to the eternal, natural, and divine law is that God must be worshiped, and it is necessary to attribute divine worship to him alone.”¹³⁰ From this principle, two pure conclusions can be drawn: “First, neither a teaching nor a teacher that calls a person away from the true God and his worship may be heard. Second, they must not be heard who by nefarious craft would renounce God, attribute divine things or benefits (which certainly are nothing but divine) to another, and desire communications and revelations from demons.”¹³¹

In the case of laws toward one’s neighbors, he appealed to Deuteronomy 22:5 and 22:8 to make a point that “a twofold principle according to the form of eternal reason pertains to the institution of these laws: First, no one must be injured. Second, everyone must live uprightly.”¹³² From them, furthermore, at least two conclusions could be deduced: on the one hand, “nothing that could injure anyone may be built”; on the other, “the uprightness of nature according to someone’s natural reason must be lived out with utmost diligence in both the

principle pure become impure in their action, therefore it was necessary to add a limit to that rational act, namely, that it is inferred purely.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (p. 359); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 76.

127. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (pp. 350–51); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 56.

128. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (p. 359); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 76.

129. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (pp. 359–60); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 76–77.

130. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (pp. 359–60); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 77.

131. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (pp. 359–60); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 77.

132. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (pp. 359–60); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 78.

whole manner of life and in the very particulars of life.”¹³³ Thus, moral conclusions ought to be derived from both natural and divine laws—and from both tables of the law—and as a result human law ought to be concerned with piety and justice, or with religion and society, albeit in an external way.

Thirdly, the act of determination is a terminal act in the order of legal reasoning. Determinations are “terminal orderings or dispositions (so to speak), beyond which one cannot proceed, because all knowledge, reason, and every act of reason terminates in particular and individual matters.”¹³⁴ In this act of determination two concepts come to the fore, and they are contingency and analogy. On the one hand, the idea of contingency is important as the purpose of determination is to rightly govern those matters that are contingent to particular persons, things, and circumstances.¹³⁵ In other words, “the substance of these mutable laws is in the determinations, which are called particulars.”¹³⁶ On the other hand, Junius argued that “there is a twofold foundation of the common law and the law: one proximate and always necessary, which we call common reason [*ratio communis*]; the other, indeed, more remote, but yet most closely and necessarily joined to common reason, which we call analogy [*analogia*].”¹³⁷ This means that there ought to be an underlying common reason in all intra-human legal cases, but in some cases that rationale is less apparent; and in such cases, their justness ought to be measured against other similar cases that express the common reason more clearly.¹³⁸

133. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (pp. 359–60); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 78.

134. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 99.

135. “And the reason why we call such determinations—the material of human laws—particular is because all those minute things pertaining to right action, according to any particular thing that can be contingent for persons, things, and circumstances, or can be observed in these things individually, are delimited in human laws. Who is ignorant of the fact that individual things are able to change in the greatest number of ways and continually without end?” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 99.

136. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 98.

137. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 29 (p. 373); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 114.

138. “For there are some foundations of things stipulated by right [*ius*] and law that are so firm and so powerfully supported by common reason that no good person could doubt the truth and necessity of its right. There are others, however, that are not foundations in and of themselves, but that have the function [*ratio*] of a foundation from a similarity, because in similar cases the foundations of the right are apparent, which is defined in the laws.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 29 (p. 373); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 114.

This method is what Junius called “the analogical interpretation” of human law.¹³⁹ According to this method the rightness, justness, and fairness of human law is evaluated not only against the universal moral truths, but also against other similar cases, in order that both the immutable and the mutable parts could be holistically considered in the judicial process.¹⁴⁰ “For since the condition of all persons, things, and circumstances may change both in themselves and among themselves, equity demanded that those individual things for nature and for the public order ought to be suitably provided for by human law.”¹⁴¹ Hence he argued that “one of these must always be preserved: either the laws themselves, if a right has been expressed in them by right and proper reason; or an analogy of them, if no expressed right exists regarding these matters that can be judged by a comparison of similar things.”¹⁴² It is for this reason that Junius saw the need to preserve the examples of civil law found in the law of Moses—the underlying reason in the Mosaic civil laws as well as the used method of legal reasoning in them should be studied by all societies so that their own human laws could be measured against the similar cases expressed in the Mosaic law.¹⁴³ It is in this regard, interestingly, the difference between Junius’s and Aquinas’s methods of legal reasoning becomes most apparent: in Junius’s framework there is no role that canon law plays in legal reasoning and pursuing detailed analyses of the ways in which the Mosaic law captured the moral law is of the highest importance in the jurisprudential process.¹⁴⁴

139. Helpful resources on analogical reasoning in the common law tradition are John H. Farrar, “Reasoning by Analogy in the Law,” *Bond Law Review*, vol. 9, no. 2 (1997): 149–75; Grant Lamond, “Analogical Reasoning in the Common Law,” *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, vol. 34, no. 3 (2014): 567–88; Lloyd L. Weinreb, *Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

140. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 29 (p. 373); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 114.

141. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 7 (p. 351–52); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 57.

142. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 29 (pp. 373–74); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 115.

143. “... for this reason those laws that are in Moses simply by common law, and that proceed from common reason and obligate in the same way, must be altogether observed.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 29 (pp. 373–74); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 115.

144. For example, Anthony J. Lisska argued: “Roman law, and its ecclesiastical expression found in canon law, exerted a significant influence on Aquinas’ treatment of legal matters.” See Anthony J. Lisska, “The Philosophy of Law of Thomas Aquinas,” in *A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics*, 306.

This does not mean, however, that all the punishments recorded in the judicial law of Moses should be applied directly to all people in all places.¹⁴⁵ Junius was firm in his belief that “the scholastics once rightly said that the judicial commands of Moses are dead and the ceremonial ones are deadly.”¹⁴⁶ To solve the difficulty of just, legitimate, and proportionate punishment Junius distinguished two ways by which one can be guilty: first, by violating the common reason and common law, and secondly, by violating particular civil laws.¹⁴⁷ For instance, when circumstances are so complex that a simple determination of punishment cannot be made, judges should examine and weigh those circumstances to see, by way of analogical reasoning, both universal and particular factors that “aggravate or alleviate the mode of that crime.”¹⁴⁸ Therefore “judgments are made about crimes in a civil order in accordance with common reason through either a simple determination or an analogical one.”¹⁴⁹ This also explains why Junius believed that human legislators ought to perceive, presuppose, and protect the principles of both natural and divine law: understanding the moral law only through pagan sources and examples is insufficient, as the most perfect examples of civil laws are contained not in them, but in the Mosaic law, because they perfectly expressed the ways in which universal reason was applied to particular contexts and contingencies of people.¹⁵⁰ In this regard, the Mosaic civil law was believed to convey the perfect examples of legal reasoning, as its ultimate reasoner is God, who cannot make errors in principles, conclusions, and determinations.¹⁵¹

145. VanDrunen’s comment is helpful: “For Reformed orthodoxy, as for the Reformation and medieval traditions of the past, civil magistrates ought not impose the Mosaic civil law *as such* upon contemporary societies. Yet at times they will implement Mosaic civil laws, not because they are Mosaic laws but because they are particular applications of the natural law still appropriate under present circumstances.” VanDrunen, *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms*, 171.

146. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 31 (p. 377); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 125.

147. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 30 (pp. 374–75); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 117.

148. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 30 (pp. 376–77); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 122.

149. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 30 (pp. 376–77); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 120.

150. Next chapter will treat this issue more thoroughly.

151. “Now, although we have decided to speak not about the whole law, but only about that part of it that relies on human and public judgments, in any event in this subject the judicial and public laws of Moses must be distinguished from others because God is most certainly their author, who neither in principles, nor in any

6.5 *Duplex Ratio, Duplex Administratio*: Twofold Reason and Institutional Governance

The fourth sub-thesis is that Junius, while associating the works of nature and grace with the works of state and church, did not follow Aquinas in designating the supremacy of ecclesiastical powers over the political ones. Aquinas for example claimed in his *De regno* that monarchy is the most optimal form of political government, with the philosophical explanation that “a united force is more efficacious in producing its effect than a force which is scattered or divided.”¹⁵² This does not mean, however, that political monarchs ought to possess the supreme authority over all matters. Aquinas clearly stated that political monarchs are not authorized to lead their subjects to supernatural and heavenly ends, because their supernatural felicity is attained not by the human power but by the divine power, which is exercised through the ministry of the church.¹⁵³ It is because of the distinction between intermediate and ultimate ends, and because of the supremacy of supernatural goods over natural goods, that Aquinas argued for the ultimate authority of the Roman Pope over all human governors: “Thus, in order that spiritual things might be distinguished from earthly things, the ministry of this kingdom has been entrusted not to earthly kings but to priests, and most of all to the chief priest, the successor of St. Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff. To him all the kings of the Christians are to be subject as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself.”¹⁵⁴ In a similar manner he also made an argument in *Summa theologica* that, in the Old Testament writings, “a king is placed

conclusions, nor in the knowledge of individual things and conditions, nor in the case of determinations, nor in any other thing is able to err or to be led astray.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 11 (p. 356); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 68.

152. “virtus unita magis est efficax ad effectum inducendum, quam dispersa vel divisa” and “Quod autem regnum sit optimum regimen, ostensum est prius.” Thomas Aquinas, *De regno*, bk 1, c. 4. The translations of this text are by Gerald B. Phelan, published through the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949. Cf. Paul E. Sigmund, “Law and Politics,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 219–20.

153. For example: “gratia Dei, vita aeterna, perducere ad illum finem non humani erit, sed divini regiminis.” Aquinas, *De regno*, bk 1, c. 15.

154. “Huius ergo regni ministerium, ut a terrenis essent spiritualia distincta, non terrenis regibus sed sacerdotibus est commissum, et praecipue summo sacerdoti, successori Petri, Christi vicario, Romano pontifici, cui omnes reges populi Christiani oportet esse subditos, sicut ipsi domino Iesu Christo. Sic enim ei, ad quem finis ultimi cura pertinet, subdi debent illi, ad quos pertinet cura antecedentium finium, et eius imperio dirigi.” Aquinas, *De regno*, bk 1, c. 15.

over his people in temporal matters: hence it is especially commanded that the king should be instructed by the priests about things pertaining to the law of God.”¹⁵⁵

Though Junius never shared Aquinas’s convictions concerning papal supremacy, he nonetheless utilized many of Aquinas’s distinctions in delineating the roles of church and state. In the preface of *De politiae Mosis observatione*, the text of which was produced during a period where there was an “almost concentric overlap between a rising republic and a rising national church” in the young Dutch Republic,¹⁵⁶ Junius argued that it is proper for both theologians and politicians to possess “the heart of a human being.”¹⁵⁷ It means that, with respect to nature, both officers must “perceive those common notions,” as the basic moral truths are universally, commonly, and invariably shared with all human beings by virtue of “communion of nature.”¹⁵⁸ With respect to grace, magistrates assist the church in encouraging their citizens “to the gate of eternal salvation,” and ministers offer the heavenly good “through the support of human society and the influence of a good magistrate.”¹⁵⁹ However, despite the fact that the ordering of human reason is a common task for both theologians and politicians, Junius clearly argued that the former uses moral notions for “the sacred order” and the latter for “the political order.”¹⁶⁰ He further insisted that these distinct kinds of orders ought to shape the purposes of two distinct administrative bodies: the political body administering “in matters of earthly and temporal affairs [*in rebus terrenis & temporalibus*],” and the ecclesiastical body

155. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIaIIae, q. 16, a. 2, ad 3.

156. Todd M. Rester and Andrew M. McGinnis, “Introduction,” in Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, xxvi.

157. “It is proper for each of us to have the heart of a human being, not the hide of an elephant, so that we may perceive those common notions, and not be stupefied as senseless persons. If a theologian is ignorant of these principles, how can he teach the conclusions drawn from them? These principles, by communion of nature, are common to all human beings.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 336–37); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 22.

158. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 336–37); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 22.

159. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 336–37); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 22–25. For an account of how Bullinger, for example, connected *cura religionis* with royal supremacy, see W.J. Torrance Kirby, “‘Cura Religionis’: The Prophetic Office and the Civil Magistrate,” in idem, *The Zurich Connection and Tudor Political Theology* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 25–57; for how Richard Hooker and Peter Martyr Vermigli used the concept, see W. Bradford Littlejohn, “‘More Than a Swineherd’: Hooker, Vermigli, and an Aristotelian Defense of the Royal Supremacy,” *Reformation & Renaissance Review*, vol. 15, no. 1 (2013): 68–83.

160. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 336–37); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 22–23.

administering “in heavenly and eternal matters pertaining to God [*in rebus caelestibus & aeternis secundum Deum*].”¹⁶¹ In other words, “[t]he magistrate rules in this life; the minister directs through this life to the next.”¹⁶²

In Junius’s thought these distinct offices should adopt two distinct methods of government. Firstly, he argued, politicians should use the principles contained in the political science, but theologians ought to use the principles contained in the sacred or theological science. He stated:

The magistrates construct general and specific conclusions from the natural principles in the political science, and appoint individual determinations adapted to human society and order, according to the reason of the eternal law that has been sketched in the nature of a human being. Theologians and servants of God build general and specific conclusions upon the natural principles in the divinely inspired science, and abstaining from individual determinations accommodated to human society and order (which are a different kind of approach and investigation), they cultivate the communion of saints, and the conscience of whoever is in this communion, by spiritual determinations according to the rationale of the eternal law in the word of God and informed by the Holy Scripture.¹⁶³

Here, Junius clearly assigned the magistrates with the responsibility to make political determinations from the natural law, and the ministers with the responsibility to make spiritual determinations from the Holy Scripture. At first glance this seems to contradict what has been covered above, namely that both natural and divine laws ought to be the *terminus a quo* of human law. This seeming tension or contradiction can be solved if this point is assumed at the background: as noted above Junius believed that the account of the moral law revealed in the Scripture is an account of the restored and integrate nature, such that, by understanding nature

161. “What we have said regarding the nature and method of each administration has most especially proved that the two administrations have goals that could not be more different from each other. For the goal that has been set forth for the magistrate is that he ought to look after human society and the common good with respect to a person in their earthly and temporal affairs. However, the goal set forth for a theologian is that he ought to care for the society of the pious, which we have called the communion of saints, and for their salvation, in heavenly and eternal matters pertaining to God. According to each of these goals, from the beginning there was for each of these administrations a distinct nature and reason that God most wisely established.” Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 336–38); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 24–25.

162. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 337–38); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 25.

163. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 336–37); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 23.

through Scripture, one can ground the human laws in the laws of an integrate nature, rather than a corrupted one. This was, in his judgment, the teaching of the church fathers: “if the magistrates decreed an ordinance that was contrary to right reason, which God has revealed in nature and Scripture, the fathers either took care that it was corrected with calm and modest warnings, or patiently endured it—so that they would not disturb the whole common good for the sake of one good thing.”¹⁶⁴ Therefore, both offices and institutions are working under the power and authority of the eternal law, as natural and Scriptural truths are revelations of God’s immutable moral order.

Secondly, to achieve the intended goals, he argued that “[t]he magistrate establishes the strength of his rule and authority by force,” whereas “[t]he theologian affirms the strength of his rule and authority by teaching,” and claimed that “the application of force in sacred and divine things belongs to God alone.”¹⁶⁵ Accordingly, he argued that “if a magistrate neglects his own method, it sinks the society of human beings, but if a theologian or minister of Christ assumes a method that is not his own, he is either a wicked servant or a thief in the flock of the Lord and a tyrant[.]”¹⁶⁶ This view, of course, has implications on the issue of authority. The force of determinations made by magistrates, politicians, and lawyers pertains to all people under their rule, but the force of determinations made by ministers, theologians, and clergymen only pertain to those under God’s church.¹⁶⁷ These clear delineations of distinct tasks, goals, and boundaries of respective offices are, in Junius’s thought, reflections of the moral order established by God himself, as “from the beginning there was for each of these administrations a distinct nature and reason that God most wisely established.”¹⁶⁸ Hence, Junius’s division of

164. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 333–34); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 15.

165. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 336–37); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 24. Cf. Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.11.8 & 16.

166. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 336–37); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 24. In this view, a tyrannical governance is a real danger not only in the political leadership, but also in the ecclesiastical leadership.

167. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 336–37); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 24.

168. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 336–37); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 25.

the responsibilities of magistrates and ministers ought to be understood against the backdrop of his conception of the difference between natural and supernatural laws, *res humanae* and *res aeternae*, or political and ecclesiastical administrations, that are grounded in his understanding of nature and grace, or of natural and supernatural orders.¹⁶⁹

In analyzing this topic, as Tobias Sarx pointed out, Calvin's theology ought to be understood in the background.¹⁷⁰ Calvin for instance argued in his *Institutes* that God governs spiritual and inner morals through ecclesiastical jurisdictions and temporal and outward morals through political jurisdictions.¹⁷¹ The former is for the eschatological good, but the latter is for "the public good" on earth.¹⁷² With regard to the mode of execution, spiritual government is administered by the power of the keys—which is essentially God's Word as "Christ has not given this power actually to men, but to his Word"¹⁷³—whereas political government is done by the power of the sword, by which magistrates act as "ordained protectors and vindicators of public innocence, modesty, decency, and tranquility... for the common safety and peace of all."¹⁷⁴ Upon acknowledging these differences he argued that "Christ's spiritual kingdom and the civil jurisdiction are things completely distinct" and that, in unambiguous terms, "[t]here are in man, so to speak, two worlds, over which different kings and different laws have authority."¹⁷⁵

169. Sarx argued that the "*res humanae*" in view here was governed by the second table of the law, and that Junius did not consider the secular ruler to be responsible for legislating the first table of the law. See Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d.Ä. (1545–1602)*, 84–90.

170. Sarx claimed that Junius largely formulated a reformed ecclesiology based on the *Institutes* of Calvin. He also noted, however, that Junius's understanding of church discipline is different from both the Zurich and the Genevan practice, as he understood it as an internal ecclesiastical matter in which the secular authorities have no part. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d.Ä. (1545–1602)*, 91–94.

171. Calvin, *Institutes*, 3.19.15.

172. Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20.2. Also: "Magistrates may learn from this the nature of their calling. They are not to rule on their own account, but for the public good. Nor do they have unbridled power, but power that is restricted to the welfare of their subjects. In short, they are responsible to God and to men in the exercise of their rule. Since they have been chosen by God and do His business, they are answerable to Him." John Calvin, *The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Romans and to the Thessalonians*, trans. John Owen (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 1995), 282.

173. Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.11.1.

174. Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20.9.

175. Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20.1 & 3.19.15.

This does not mean, nevertheless, that civil government ought to be separated from the Christian religion.¹⁷⁶ First of all, according to Calvin, the activities of the civil government ought to pertain to *both tables of the law*: not even a pagan thinker, Calvin asserted, “discussed the office of magistrates, the making of laws, and public welfare, without beginning at religion and divine worship. And thus all have confessed that no government can be happily established unless piety is the first concern; and that those laws are preposterous which neglect God’s right and provide only for men.”¹⁷⁷ It is for this reason he regarded those governors as foolish “who would neglect the concern for God and would give attention only to rendering justice among men.”¹⁷⁸ Secondly, Calvin was clear that both political and ecclesiastical governments pertain to human *conscience*. He defined conscience as “a sense of divine judgment” or “a certain mean between God and man,” whereby one is excused from or accused of sins before the ultimate “Judge’s tribunal.”¹⁷⁹ To keep this “inward integrity of heart,” Calvin argued that by spiritual government “the conscience is instructed in piety and in reverencing God” and by political government both “the duties of humanity and citizenship” as well as “the outward worship of God” are maintained.¹⁸⁰ As a result, he claimed, “consciences are also bound by civil laws.”¹⁸¹ Lastly, Calvin also believed that both forms of government pertain to *righteousness*. He argued that civil government is charged with the task of administering “civil righteousness” to promote social reconciliation and tranquility on the one hand and to repress social wickedness and depravity on the other.¹⁸² Ecclesiastical government, however, has the

176. In fact, their complete separation would be impossible in the context of *res publica christiana* or *corpus christianum*.

177. Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20.9. Calvin’s engagement with classical thinkers is well narrated in Charles Partee, *Calvin and Classical Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 1977).

178. Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20.9.

179. Calvin, *Institutes*, 3.19.15.

180. Calvin, *Institutes*, 3.19.15.

181. Calvin, *Institutes*, 3.19.15.

182. Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20.2. Calvin also stated in his commentary on Romans 13: “A second part of the function of magistrates is their duty to repress by force the insolent behaviour of the wicked, who do not willingly allow themselves to be governed by laws, and to inflict punishment on their offences as God’s judgment requires. Paul explicitly declares that magistrates are armed with the sword not just for empty show, but in

duty to administer the saving and eschatological righteousness of Christ by the ministry of the gospel.¹⁸³

Just as Calvin's main concern revolved around distinguishing the roles of the church and state in matters of moral governance, Junius was also emphatic that—notwithstanding the common task—the two administrative bodies ought to be “secluded and divided [*secluditur disterminatúrque*]” in order that both politicians and theologians may avoid becoming “like circus trick riders in a four-horse chariot.”¹⁸⁴ “If any theologian labours concerning the matters relating to the ordering of human society, he wastes himself and does the most serious injury to the God who calls him, to the church for whose sake he has been called, and to her calling, by being a busybody and meddling in others' business, which is insatiable ambition.”¹⁸⁵ Hence Junius's formulation of the difference between ecclesiastical and political governments ought to be understood in the light of the twofold distinction of order, administration, and authority, which supported neither royal nor ecclesiastical supremacy, but their distinct operation.¹⁸⁶

Junius's conception of the distinct goals of the two administrative bodies therefore reflects the confluence of both Aquinas's and Calvin's ideas—to put it differently, Junius's view of the twofold government does not designate one particular body's supremacy over the other, but demarcates their particular boundaries according to the orders of nature and grace. Junius deemed that part of the church's ministry is to instruct Christians in matters of morals

order to smite evildoers.” Calvin, *The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Romans and to the Thessalonians*, 282–83.

183. “[Paul] therefore contends that there is nothing more notable or glorious in the church than the ministry of the gospel, since it is the administration of the Spirit and of righteousness and of eternal life [II Cor.4:6; 3:9].” Calvin, *Institute*, 4.4.3.

184. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, preface (p. 336); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 23. On the interplay between church and state in Calvin's Geneva, see Scott M. Manetsch, *Calvin's Company of Pastors: Pastoral Care and the Emerging Reformed Church, 1536–1609* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

185. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, preface (p. 335); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 20.

186. In this way, Junius's Thomistic-Calvinistic conception of *duplex regnum* is distinguishable from Richard Hooker's, as Junius did not support the view that “the royal supremacy in ecclesiastical government is a fitting way for Christian magistrates.” See Littlejohn, “‘More than a swineherd’: Hooker, Vermigli, and an Aristotelian defence of the royal supremacy,” 68–83.

so that they can be moral citizens in the newly established state.¹⁸⁷ The state's work, on the other hand, is to enable Christians to gather in church to attain their eschatological good through the gospel—the state ought to use its power to secure the *possibility of true worship* in churches, but the *actuality of true worship* can only be done through the ministry of the church.¹⁸⁸ To use technical terms, the state shares a certain “*ius circa sacra*,” but not the “*ius in sacra*,” as the power to make determinations of sacred things is assigned to and resident in the church, rather than the state.¹⁸⁹ This is why Junius endeavored to defend the thesis that there is a *duplex ratio*, or a twofold rationale, of moral government: “One is the civil one, which looks at the administration of human affairs. The other is the church, for the care of the holy things.”¹⁹⁰ Therefore in Junius's thought the administrative roles of church and state are clearly delineated and demarcated according to the truths of natural and divine laws, and in this way the common good for humanity was—at least in theory—never separated from the eternal law, the immutable rule of rules.

6.6 Conclusion

Aquinas argued that “the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts.”¹⁹¹ As reason is the rule and measure of human acts, human law pertains to human reason: Aquinas regarded the immutable bases of human law as the common and universal truths of reason, which are known and knowable through natural law. Against

187. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d.Ä. (1545–1602)*, 121.

188. Sarx noted that while Junius believed the state can secure “the possibility of religious assembly,” the church has the ability to gather them and influence them. Moreover, while the state should permit people to worship God, it should never enact punishments or excommunications for impure worship, as it is the church's responsibility. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d.Ä. (1545–1602)*, 91–95.

189. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d.Ä. (1545–1602)*, 92–93. For a short monographic treatment of the *ius in sacra* and *ius circa sacra*, see Johannes Heckel, *Cura religionis, ius in sacra, ius circa sacra*, 2nd edition. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962). It has to be mentioned here that, despite the difference between *ius in sacra* and *ius circa sacra*, the Genevan magistrates did possess a certain power in regard to the *ius in sacra*, as they appointed their pastors and elders.

190. Cited from Junius's *Eirenicum* in Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d.Ä. (1545–1602)*, 121.

191. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 90, a. 1, co.

this background, this chapter attempted to provide a justifiable answer to the question as to how Junius refined, received, or rejected Aquinas's views on human law. After analyzing four areas of human law in his thought, the thesis can be re-affirmed: in Junius's presentation of human law the Thomistic *duplex ratio* has been recast in the light of the Calvinistic *duplex regnum*. In other words, the revised accounts of nature and grace as demonstrated in previous chapters shaped Junius's understanding of the nature and role of human law, as well as the nature and role of administrative bodies, namely church and state. In Junius's thought the immutable parts of human law are essentially the determinations of divine reason and the mutable parts, on the other hand, are the determinations of human reason. This means that Junius's ideas on the finality, legitimacy, boundary, and authority of human law express an integration of both Thomistic and Calvinistic concepts on nature and grace, integrity and depravity, and creational and eschatological order, which were formulated along the lines of twofold order, twofold source, and twofold administration. All of these subtle distinctions, however, were nuanced descriptions of the work pertaining to *reason*, as Junius, like Aquinas, believed that reason is the principle of human actions.¹⁹²

It was noted by scholars that Calvin's doctrine of the two kingdoms was a refined appropriation of medieval concepts of spiritual and temporal jurisdiction, tailored by and toward the Protestant theologies of Christ, church, and law.¹⁹³ Even in the post-Reformation context, there was still "an enormous struggle to come to grips with the variegated medieval traditions and test them against established Reformed principles."¹⁹⁴ Against this background, following VanDrunen's way of description, Junius's theory of human law can be described as

192. "To both kind of creatures [angels and men] God has imparted the light of the intellect and the faculty of will, as a singular principle of their own actions in themselves, by which they are moved freely by themselves to their actions, and by means of a voluntary act." Franciscus Junius, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, thesis 31; cf. Willem J. van Asselt, J. Martin Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde, eds., *Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI.: Baker Academic, 2010), 102.

193. For example, see Tuininga, *Calvin's Political Theology and the Public Engagement of the Church*, 23.

194. Jordan J. Ballor, "A Society of Mutual Aid: Natural Law and Subsidiarity in Early Modern Reformed Perspective," in *Law and Religion: The Legal Teachings of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations*, ed. Jordan J. Ballor et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 14.

“a mostly Calvin-like two kingdoms theology intersected by an Aquinas-like twofold reason theory.”¹⁹⁵ Despite the various political persecutions occurred in Europe, Junius retained the Genevan model of *duplex regnum* between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities to the extent that, using Jordan J. Ballor’s words, one can find in Junius’s theology “a coordinated relationship between the civil and the ecclesiastical realms.”¹⁹⁶ Therefore, Junius’s theory of human law, despite the tumultuous context in which it was formed and expressed, still witnesses to “the broadly catholic, universal, or at least trans-confessional, even ecumenical, character of theology, law, and ethic in the Reformation and post-Reformation eras.”¹⁹⁷

195. VanDrunen described that Calvin held to “a mostly Luther-like two kingdoms theology intersected by a Gelasius-like two swords theory.” VanDrunen, *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms*, 93.

196. Ballor, “A Society of Mutual Aid,” 13.

197. Ballor, “A Society of Mutual Aid,” 9.

CHAPTER 7

THE MOSAIC LAW: PERFECT EXAMPLES OF NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL ORDERS

7.1 Introduction

Broadly considered, Junius understood the law of Moses as a reference to the Pentateuchal scriptures—the Mosaic law in this broad sense referred to “those five books that were written down by Moses at the command of God and deposited in the sanctuary by those who serve the church and most conscientiously maintain it.”¹ Since the five books of Moses contain diverse things, however, he believed that there should be another sense, a narrower one, which regarded the Mosaic law as “those things that pertain to that moral ordering of reason [*pertinent ad rationis ordinationem moralem illam*].”² This means that the Mosaic law, when considered strictly by Junius, referred to the sum of all legal principles, conclusions, and determinations contained in the Pentateuchal writings, which had the aim of ordering and governing Israel’s moral actions. Against the backdrop of that narrow definition, Junius argued that in the Mosaic law there are perfect examples of eternal, natural, divine, and human law.³ He used the phrase *exemplum perfectum* to describe what is *in* the Mosaic law, namely its “form and mode.”⁴ The form of the Mosaic law, on the one hand, is the *example* of eternal, natural, divine, and human law, and its mode, on the other, is *perfect*.⁵ He was clear nonetheless that the perfect character of the examples contained in the law of Moses was still creaturely; the perfection of the forms in the Mosaic law referred to a created, communicated, and comparative fullness that a mutable thing could possess in relation to a different thing or mode.⁶ These qualifications of creaturely

1. Franciscus Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, ed. Abraham Kuyper (Amsterdam: Muller and Kruyt, 1882), thesis 8 (p. 352). Unless stated otherwise, the translations used in this chapter are from Franciscus Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, trans. Todd M. Rester (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2015), 59.

2. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (p. 352); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 59.

3. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 352–53); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 60.

4. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 352–53); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 60.

5. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 62–63.

6. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 63.

perfection are not insignificant points to note as they captured the successive, mutable, and temporal aspects of the Mosaic law—by echoing a scholastic thought, he argued that “perfection of mutable things is successive.”⁷

He also stated that “the scholastics once rightly said that the judicial commands of Moses are dead and the ceremonial ones are deadly.”⁸ This is the principle affirmed by, for example, Aquinas, who argued that:

The judicial precepts did not bind forever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only ‘dead,’ but also deadly to those who observe them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly.⁹

To grasp the meaning of Aquinas’s concept presented here, various scholars in recent decades debated as to whether in Aquinas’s theology the redemptive economy revealed in the New Testaments “supersedes,” “revokes,” or “fulfills” the economy in the Old, and also whether the views articulated in his *Summa theologiae* consistently reflect the views presented in his biblical commentaries.¹⁰ These areas of enquiry were especially provoked by Michael

7. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 63.

8. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 31 (p. 377); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 125.

9. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 104, a. 3, co. The translations of this text used in this chapter come from Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981).

10. For example, Matthew A. Tapie argued that “[a] comparison of Aquinas’s thought on the ceremonial law after Christ in the commentaries with his teaching in the *Summa theologiae* reveals a tension in his thought on the ceremonial law.” Matthew A. Tapie, *Aquinas on Israel and the Church: The Question of Supersessionism in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2014), 156. See also Marie-Dominique Chenu, OP, “The Old Testament in Twelfth-Century Theology,” in *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West*, ed. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 146–61; Beryl Smalley, “William of Auvergne, John of La Rochelle and St. Thomas Aquinas on the Old Law,” in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies*, ed. Armand A. Maurer, vol. 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 11–71; Douglas Kries, “Thomas Aquinas and the Politics of Moses,” *Review of Politics*, vol. 52 (1990): 84–104; Marcel Dubois, “Thomas Aquinas on the Place of the Jews in the Divine Plan,” in *The New Testament and Christian-Jewish Dialogue: Studies in Honor of David Flusser* (Jerusalem, Israel: Ecumenical Theological Research Fraternity in Israel, 1990), 241–66; John Y.B. Hood, *Aquinas and the Jews* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); Jean-Pierre Torrell, “Ecclesia Iudaeorum—Quelques jugements positifs de Saint Thomas d’Aquin à l’égard des Juifs et du Judaïsme,” in *Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Age*, ed. B. Carlos Bazán et al. (Ottawa: Société internationale pour l’étude de la philosophie médiévale, 1995), 1732–41; Pamela M. Hall, “The Old Law and the New Law (Ia IIae Qq. 98–108),” in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 194–206; Matthew Levering, *Christ’s Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation According to Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, IN:

Wyschogrod's criticism in 1987 that Aquinas's threefold treatment of the Mosaic law—as moral, ceremonial, and judicial laws—was overly systematic and eventually created tensions between the moral and the ceremonial laws to the effect that, illegitimately, made the observance of ceremonial laws sinful for Christian believers.¹¹ That he chose to criticize Aquinas is not surprising; Aquinas did indeed elaborate on the Mosaic law, to use Jean-Pierre Torrell's words, “in minute detail.”¹² Not only that, his treatment of the ceremonial laws of Moses constitutes one of the longest sections in his *Summa*—fittingly as a *magister in sacra pagina*, he provided meticulous accounts of the relations between the Old and the New Laws, between types and substance, and between Christ and Church, in his oeuvre.¹³

Although their issues with Aquinas were driven by rather modern problems concerning Catholic-Jewish relations, the questions regarding the interrelation of the Old and the New Testaments were undoubtedly fundamental to the early modern Christianity, including the Reformation tradition. David C. Steinmetz and Richard A. Muller claimed that in the Reformation exegetical tradition “[t]he importance of the Old Testament for the church is predicated upon the continuity of the people of God in history, a continuity which persists in spite of discontinuity between Israel and the church.”¹⁴ This, moreover, has to be understood

University of Notre Dame Press, 2002); idem, “Ordering Wisdom: Aquinas, the Old Testament, and Sacra Doctrina,” in *Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life*, ed. Reinhard Hüter and Matthew Levering (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 80–91; idem, *Paul in the Summa Theologiae* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 109–52; idem, “Aristotle and the Mosaic Law,” in *Aristotle in Aquinas's Theology*, ed. Gilles Emery, OP (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 70–93; Holly Taylor Coolman, “Romans 9–11: Rereading Aquinas on the Jews,” in *Reading Romans with St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 101–12.

11. Michael Wyschogrod, “A Jewish Reading of Thomas Aquinas on the Old Law,” in *Understanding the Scriptures*, ed. Clemens Thoma and Michael Wyschogrod (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 125–38.
12. Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Aquinas's Summa: Background, Structure, and Reception*, trans. Benedict M. Guevin, O.S.B. (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 34.
13. Tapie, *Aquinas on Israel and the Church*, 165–66; Marie-Dominique Chenu, OP, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*, trans. A.-M. Landry, OP and D. Huges, OP (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1964), 242–45.
14. Richard A. Muller, “Biblical Interpretation in the Era of the Reformation: The View of the Middle Ages,” in *Biblical Interpretation in the Era of the Reformation Essays Presented to David C. Steinmetz in Honor of His Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. Richard A. Muller and John L. Thompson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 7; David C. Steinmetz, “The Superiority of Pre-Critical Exegesis,” *Theology Today*, vol. 37 (1980–81): 27–38. See also Richard A. Muller, “The Hermeneutic of Promise and Fulfillment in Calvin's Exegesis of the Old Testament Prophecies of the Kingdom,” in *The Bible in the Sixteenth Century*, ed. David C. Steinmetz (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990), 68–82; David C. Steinmetz, “Divided by a Common

against the background that, even when the Reformers rejected the medieval *quadrige* method, they still retained the premodern hermeneutics of promise and fulfillment to interpret the substantial and typological elements that run through both testaments.¹⁵ To go back even further, early modern Protestants “shared with medieval theologians a high regard for the hermeneutics of Augustine’s *De doctrina christiana*, and valued doctrinal and exegetical tradition as a source of precedent subordinate to the norm of Scripture.”¹⁶ Aquinas in this context was widely recognized in the Reformed tradition as one of the “*saniores scholastici*,” who sanely assisted them in the understanding of biblical doctrines and guided them toward the Augustinian trajectories.¹⁷ The reason for such recognition is not surprising: as Stephen J. Casselli pointed out, what Aquinas integrated was the various methods and strands of biblical interpretation that incorporated not only Platonic dualism but also Aristotelian hylomorphism, and not only the *natura-and-gratia* framework but also the *res-and-signa* framework, which eventually provided “a detailed analysis of both the literal-historical and spiritual-typological meaning” of the law.¹⁸

By acknowledging these contextual issues, then, this chapter proceeds toward answering this question: how did Junius retain, refine, or reject Thomistic ideas in his exposition of the moral order revealed in the Mosaic law? This question is particularly worthwhile as Douglas Judisch, writing in 1978, argued that Junius “did not practice the

Past: The Reshaping of the Christian Exegetical Tradition in the Sixteenth Century,” *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, vol. 27 (1997): 245–64; John L. Thompson, “Calvin’s Exegetical Legacy: His Reception and Transmission of Text and Tradition,” in *The Legacy of John Calvin*, ed. D.L. Foxgrover (Grand Rapids, MI: CRC Product Services, 2000), 31–56.

15. Richard A. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academics, 2003), 2.469–70.

16. David S. Sytsma, “Thomas Aquinas and Reformed Biblical Interpretation: The Contribution of William Whitaker,” in *Aquinas Among the Protestants*, ed. Manfred Svensson and David VanDrunen (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), 67.

17. Sytsma, “Thomas Aquinas and Reformed Biblical Interpretation,” 67; idem, “Sixteenth-Century Reformed Reception of Aquinas,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 121–43.

18. Stephen J. Casselli, “The Threefold Division of Law in the Thought of Aquinas,” *Westminster Theological Journal*, vol. 61, no. 2 (1999): 205.

exaggerated form of Aristotelian exegesis associated with Scholasticism and the Age of Orthodoxy.”¹⁹ More specifically, he contrasted Junius with Aquinas and asserted that Junius did not follow the Augustinian-Thomistic sign theory but followed John Calvin (1509–64), his teacher, in using the *mentem scriptoris* (the mind of the Scripture) as the ground of hermeneutical meanings.²⁰ On the other hand Todd M. Rester provided an argument that, along with William Ames (1576–1633), Junius “maintained basic continuity with the Thomistic exegetical tradition on the nature of the literal sense of Scripture, but in carrying Thomas’ premises forward, they represent a trajectory of discontinuity and development.”²¹ Junius’s adoption of Aquinas’s hermeneutical ideas does not stop here—as Markus M. Totzeck’s recent publication showed, Aquinas’s systematic division of the Mosaic law into moral, judicial, and ceremonial kinds was an original contribution made from his biblical and theological reasoning, and his threefold conception of the law of Moses eventually became a “common sense” in the Christian tradition, including the Reformed tradition.²²

Thus, it is worth revisiting the question as to whether Junius merely used the humanistic and philological tools in interpreting the moral order in the Old Testament at the expense of the scholastic and philosophical tools. To put it differently, whether he was merely Calvinistic at the expense of being Thomistic. To answer the question, therefore, this chapter provides an argument that Junius’s understanding of the law of Moses expresses a modified reception of

19. Douglas Judisch, “A Translation and Edition of the *Sacorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius: A Study in Sixteenth Century Hermeneutics” (PhD Dissertation, University of St. Andrews, 1979), 1.146.

20. Judisch, “A Translation and Edition of the *Sacorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius,” 1.182–83. Benjamin R. Merkle’s recent work provides an updated account of Junius’s hermeneutical principles. See Benjamin R. Merkle, *Defending the Trinity in the Reformed Palatinate: The Elohistae* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 149–52.

21. Todd Rester, “Type, Anti-type, and the *Sensus Literalis*: Protestant Reformed Orthodox Approaches to Psalm 2,” in *Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on the Maturation of a Theological Tradition*, ed. Jordan Ballor, David Sytsma, and Jason Zuidema (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013), 387.

22. “In den allermeisten Fällen wird die Dreiteilung ohne Verweise (auf Thomas) übernommen, was bereits auf einen Commonsense hindeutet.” Markus M. Totzeck, *Die politischen Gesetze des Mose: Entstehung und Einflüsse der politia-judaica-Literatur in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019), 39. Totzeck also provided a helpful treatment on Junius’s use of the threefold distinction on pages 346–57.

Aquinas's ideas in this significant way: the metaphysical as well as the historical account of the moral order prescribed in the Mosaic law were explained through a covenantal law-and-gospel framework.²³ In short, Junius, in a Reformed way, delineated the Mosaic moral order in light of the triadic covenantal figures, namely Adam, Abraham, and Christ, to account for the process of perfection from the Old to the New. To unpack the main thesis four areas will be treated—the moral law itself, the nature of determinations, and the judicial and ceremonial laws respectively. Once these topics are treated it will become clearer that, to Junius, the biblical covenant was that which moderated his reception of the traditional “scholastic” principles concerning the law of Moses, and in his account the integration of Thomistic and Calvinistic concepts was successfully accomplished.

23. Junius's more thorough treatments of biblical covenants are in *De evangelio, De foederibus et testamentis diuinis*, and *De veteri et novo Dei foedere* in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, ed. Abraham Kuyper (Amsterdam: Muller and Kruyt, 1882), 181–91. To cut through the complex arguments concerning Calvin's covenant theology and its relation to successive generations, this chapter will assume Richard A. Muller's argument that the identification of the moral law in the Mosaic law (or old covenant) with the prelapsarian natural law (or covenant of works) was already achieved by earlier Reformers and, in fact, by Calvin himself. See Richard A. Muller, *Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 96–97. See also Robert Letham, “The *Foedus Operum*: Some Factors Accounting for Its Development,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, vol. 14, no. 4 (1983): 462–63; Richard A. Muller, *After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 182; Brian J. Lee, *Johannes Cocceius and the Exegetical Roots of Federal Theology: Reformation Developments in the Interpretation of Hebrews 7–10* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009); J.V. Fesko, “Calvin and Witsius on the Mosaic Covenant,” in *The Law Is Not of Faith: Essays on Works and Grace in the Mosaic Covenant* (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 2009), 25–43; idem, *The Covenant of Works: The Origins, Development, and Reception of the Doctrine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020); Aaron C. Denlinger, *Omnes in Adam ex pacto Dei: Ambrogio Catarino's Doctrine of Covenantal Solidarity and Its Influence on Post-Reformation Reformed Theologians* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010); Andrew A. Woolsey, *Unity and Continuity in Covenantal Thought: A Study in the Reformed Tradition to the Westminster Assembly* (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2012); Jordan J. Ballor, *Covenant, Causality, and Law: A Study in the Theology of Wolfgang Musculus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012); R. Scott Clark, “Christ and Covenant: Federal Theology in Orthodoxy,” in *A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy*, ed. Herman Selderhuis (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013), 403–28; Harrison Perkins, *Catholicity and the Covenant of Works: James Ussher and the Reformed Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020); Douglas F. Kelly, “Covenant in Medieval Theology,” in *Covenant Theology: Biblical, Theological, and Historical Perspectives*, ed. Guy Prentiss Waters, J. Nicholas Reid, and John R. Muether (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2020), 311–25; Howard Griffith, “Covenant in Reformation Theology,” in *Covenant Theology*, 327–50; Blair D. Smith, “Post-Reformation Developments,” in *Covenant Theology*, 351–77; Bruce P. Bagus, “Covenant Theology in the Dutch Reformed Tradition,” in *Covenant Theology*, 379–400.

7.2 The Immutable Substance of the Mosaic Law: The Moral Law of Nature and Grace

The first sub-thesis is that Junius's conception of the moral law as an example of eternal, natural, and divine law indicates that the substance of the Mosaic law in his thought was constituted by both nature and grace, and contextualized in a covenantal framework. In other words, the moral law revealed in the Mosaic writings was regarded as a sum total of both natural and supernatural principles, or better, a sum total of supernaturally revealed principles of the natural law. The reason must be clear: Junius believed that through the sacred Scripture one can perceive the natural law in its original form, as grace does not conceal but reveals the order of nature.²⁴ The moral law understood in this way has a strong connection with *foedus operum*, which has its historical roots in Augustine's interpretation of Genesis 2–3 presented in *De Genesi ad litteram*.²⁵ Furthermore, this also corresponds to Junius's prolegomenal thought—just as his conception of *theologia vera* was inclusive of both *theologia naturalis* and *theologia revelata*, the immutable moral law of human nature was to him illumined by both *theologia naturalis* and *theologia revelata*.²⁶ Douglas Kries attempted to drive home a similar point regarding Aquinas when he asserted that Aquinas understood the Mosaic law as part of God's supernatural revelation while at the same time affirming the knowability of its substance through reason.²⁷

24. Cf. Tobias Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602): Ein reformierter Theologe im Spannungsfeld zwischen späthumanistischer Irenik und reformierter Konfessionalisierung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 213 & 269–70.

25. Muller writes: “Many of the Reformed follow the traditional Augustinian interpretation of Genesis 2–3 as found in Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* and identify the tree of life (*arbor vitae*) and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (*arbor scientiae boni et mali*) as sacramental signs of the grace available, on condition of obedience, to the first pair under the covenant of works.” Richard A. Muller, s.v. “*foedus operum*,” in *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology*, 2nd ed. (Baker Academic: Grand Rapids, 2017), 131.

26. In early modern Reformed theology, and especially in Junius's theology, “[t]he division between natural and revealed or supernatural theology argued under this rubric of *duplex cognitio Dei* places both *theologia naturalis* and *theologia revelata* squarely within the categories of *theologia vera* and, subordinate to that, *theologia ectypa* and *theologia viatorum*.” Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 2.294.

27. Kries, “Thomas Aquinas and the Politics of Moses,” 88.

Aquinas argued that it is imperative to distinguish “three kinds of precept in the Old Law; viz. ‘moral’ precepts, which are dictated by the natural law; ‘ceremonial’ precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship; and ‘judicial’ precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be maintained among men.”²⁸ In commenting on Romans 7:12 he claimed that the distinction of the Old Law into ceremonial, judicial, and moral laws is taught by Paul himself when he described the law as holy, righteous, and good.²⁹ Thus the moral precepts, for Aquinas, were “the precepts of the natural law,” which were distinguishable from the precepts of the ceremonial and judicial laws in the Old Law.³⁰ In other terms the moral law referred to the *dictate* of natural law; the ceremonial and judicial laws, the *determinations* of natural law. The moral precepts, on the one hand, had the function of ordering interior acts of the human soul, while other laws had the function of regulating external acts that served the proper operation of interior acts.³¹ The moral precepts—lastly—were distinct from the ceremonial and judicial ones as they directly pertained to “human morals,” which referred to the rational principles of human actions.³²

Understanding the purpose of the moral law requires grasping the twofold order prescribed in it: Aquinas argued that “the precepts of the first table, which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue.”³³ This means that in Aquinas’s thought the twofold moral order prescribed, protected, and presupposed in the Decalogue regulates relationships to “the head of

28. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 4, co.

29. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans*, ed. J. Mortesen and E. Alarcon, trans. F.R. Larcher, OP (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute, 2012), C.7, l.2, n.551.

30. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 98, a. 5, co.

31. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 3, co.

32. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 100, a. 1, co.

33. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 100, a. 8, co.

the community” and also to the “fellows and partners in the community.”³⁴ As one’s relation to the head of his community has primacy over his relation to other fellow members and partners, he argued that the laws concerning God preceded the laws concerning neighbors in the Decalogue.³⁵ What was common in both tables of the law, however, was the regulation of actions in deed, word, or thought.³⁶ This threefold domain of moral action pertained to all the Decalogical commandments in Aquinas’s thought, as, for example, the command not to kill was understood not only as a prohibition of deeds, but also as prohibitions of verbal and conceptual acts; the first four commands in relation to God, likewise, entailed prohibitions against making images of God by deed, profaning the name of the Lord in word, and revering other things more than God in thought.³⁷ In this light, he argued that “it is more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by thought.”³⁸

Like Aquinas here Junius was emphatic that in the law of Moses three things should be distinguished: moral, judicial, and ceremonial laws.³⁹ The importance of properly distinguishing them lied in the fact that “moral laws, in the case of piety or looking to God, are embellished with ceremonies, but in the case of our common duty toward one another, the moral laws are embellished with judicial or political rites.”⁴⁰ It was by recognizing the complex relation that each law had with another in the Mosaic covenant that he argued, “the majority of [Mosaic] commandments have a certain composite rationale from the moral, judicial, and ceremonial law, generally speaking, and are not of only one kind.”⁴¹ This means that “many ceremonial laws occur among the judicial laws of Moses” to the degree that “the judicial laws

34. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 100, a. 5, co.

35. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 100, a. 5, co.

36. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 100, a. 5, co.

37. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 100, a. 5, co.

38. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 100, a. 6, co.

39. “And so in this mixed kind of Mosaic laws that we call judicial or political, three parts must be distinguished—the moral, political, and ceremonial—and the law of these must be discerned individually.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (p. 382); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 140.

40. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 35 (p. 381); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 137.

41. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 35 (p. 381); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 137.

cannot be easily explained without an exposition of the ceremonial laws.”⁴² It is because of the composite nature of the Mosaic commandments, in other words, that they need to be distinguished properly. Then the consequence of distinguishing them was this affirmation: “what is moral remains, what is judicial is absolutely changed according to the circumstances, and what is ceremonial universally perishes.”⁴³ He expressly followed the “fathers” and “scholastics” on this issue, whose view was “thoroughly” pleasing to him: “The judicial commands that Moses handed down are dead, that is, no longer living in such a way as to obligate; but the ceremonial commands are deadly, that is, they cannot live any longer or be observed among the living without those who observe them becoming liable to death, just as Jerome and Augustine have said in their letters.”⁴⁴

Another reason that necessitated a proper distinction of the three came from the fact that there were two extreme groups who mistreated the validity of the Mosaic law. On the one hand, Junius was cognizant of a group of people who reasoned that “since the whole rationale of the law is divine, each and every member of that law is catholic, that is, every law applies universally and commonly to all persons, matters, times, places, and other circumstances as if only that which is of a general character exists in the law.”⁴⁵ On the other hand, there were others who concluded that “all things of that legal system without exception and indiscriminately were particular and now have entirely ceased, and so the authority of the whole law has ceased.”⁴⁶ These two extremes, in Junius’s view, were seriously mistaken, as the former group “lost the truth of the gospel” by demanding obedience to the whole of Mosaic law and the second “destroyed the authority of the divine law” by severing obedience to the

42. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 31 (pp. 378–79); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 130.

43. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (p. 342); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 35.

44. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 31 (p. 378); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 129. Aquinas also dealt with Augustine and Jerome’s points in his *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 5, co. See also Augustine, *Letters 1–99*, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2001), 148–52, 280–96, 314–34.

45. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 331–32); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 9.

46. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 331–32); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 9.

substance of the Mosaic law.⁴⁷ As confusion on the Mosaic law eventually creates distortions of the gospel and the law, Junius took pains to provide a suitable account by which the immutable and mutable parts, or the universals and particulars, could be rightly distinguished.

Thus analyzing Junius's formulation of the Mosaic law demands careful attention to the precise relationship between eternal, natural, and divine laws on the one hand and moral, judicial, and ceremonial laws on the other. On this very issue Junius's conviction was that the substance of the Mosaic law was an *example* of eternal, natural, and divine laws. He defined an example in this way: "Things that have been made according to the form and mode of one or more patterns are said to be examples."⁴⁸ The immutable part of the Mosaic law was an example of the eternal law because "God himself is the very eternal law and universal principle of all sacred laws, which either are from nature or grace, or are sanctioned by human beings according to the order of nature and of grace itself."⁴⁹ Eternal law was to Junius the ultimate principle of the Mosaic law as moral, ceremonial, and judicial laws had as their foundation God's thoughts concerning natural and supernatural realities.⁵⁰ Moreover, Junius conceived that the Mosaic law also contained the expressions of natural law, because in the writings of Moses one finds "the common notions of nature endowed by the natural law."⁵¹ He argued that "the principles and conclusions of the natural law, that is, those common notions of nature, are perfectly expressed in the law of Moses."⁵²

What is significant to note here is that the common notions—the principles and conclusions that natural reason generates—revealed in the Mosaic law are the notions revealed in the *uncorrupted* nature. It is significant to note this because Junius clearly contended that

47. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 332–33); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 10.

48. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (p. 352); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 60.

49. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 11 (p. 356); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 68.

50. Aquinas, though, did not explicitly ground the Mosaic law in the eternal law. He clearly identified God as the ultimate *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* of the Mosaic law as he believed that "[t]he Old Law was given by the good God," yet he did not explicitly connect the link between the eternal law and the Mosaic law. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 98, a. 2, co. & q. 99, a. 3, co.

51. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (p. 352); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 60.

52. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (p. 352); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 60.

the Mosaic law retained the purity of the uncorrupted natural law “by the highest perfection” and liberated it from further corruption. He argued:

These common notions not only exist in the corrupted nature of man, but also existed in the [nature of integrity]. For in our corrupted nature there are the same common notions that previously existed in the [uncorrupted] one, but just as that very nature has been corrupted by the deed of our first parents, in whom was the principle of our nature, so also the notions and principles of this nature, as well as its conclusions, received the defect of corruption and depravity. All these principles, which now in us have the highest degree of depravity and were once pure in our first parents according to the perfection of our nature by the faculty of that law which we call natural (as the apostle teaches in Romans 2)—these principles, I say, are liberated from corruption in the law of Moses by the highest perfection, and they are restored [to the integrate condition] against all the impiety and unrighteousness of human beings who suppress the truth in a lie.⁵³

Hence, through the declaration of the Mosaic law, God restored the common notions of an uncorrupted nature “against all the impiety and unrighteousness of human beings who suppress the truth in a lie.” It is in this sense that Junius, as a Reformed thinker, understood the Mosaic covenant in relation to *foedus operum*.⁵⁴

Junius supported such conclusions with Christ’s teaching in Matthew 5 where Christ was “an interpreter and witness” to the perfection of the natural law in the law of Moses.⁵⁵ Also in his *Sacrorum parallelorum liber primus*, where he compared the parallel teachings in the Old and the New Testaments, he stated that the law as taught by Christ in Matthew 5 is an uncorrupted, restored, and pure form of the moral law.⁵⁶ For example, Junius noted that vengeance was often thought to be an inherent principle of natural law by some philosophers, including Aristotle. However, Junius argued, vengeance is strictly a work of a *corrupted* nature,

53. The translation above used “restored to the integrate condition” in place of Rester’s phrase, which is rendered “restored to the pure nature,” due to the absence of “natura” in the original text. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 352–53); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 60–61.

54. Robert Letham claimed: “Gomarus’ compatriot, Franciscus Junius, also in 1594, defined the order of creation as covenantal and considered the moral law of Sinai to be identical to the natural law at creation, calling Sinai a *foedus operum*, and thus implying very strongly that he approved of Gomarus’ sentiments.” See Letham, “The *Foedus Operum*: Some Factors Accounting for Its Development,” 459.

55. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 352–53); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 61.

56. Franciscus Junius, *Parallel XV*, in *Sacrorum parallelorum liber primus*, comparing Exodus 20 and Matthew 5; translation is available in Judisch, “A Translation and Edition of the *Sacorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius: A Study in Sixteenth Century Hermeneutics,” 2.96.

not an *uncorrupted* one—human nature is so corrupted that vengeance seems to be its ordinary and necessary outworking, but it is in fact not part of the most basic principles of natural reason.⁵⁷ The principle of justice derived from the law of uncorrupted nature states that “vengeance is adverse to the law of nature because it is a common principle of the natural law that we ought not to do evil to anyone” but the corrupted nature may contradict it due to its disorder and wickedness.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the principle from an uncorrupted reason demands a conclusion that “evil should not be done even to the one who has committed the offense, so that neither the person wrongfully charging us, nor the one ruined through our own particular vengeance would be driven into further evil.”⁵⁹ “Thus,” Junius concluded, “God preferred to call back our corrupted nature from that miserable and ruined corruption to its integrity by the law of Moses and to revive the pre-established example of natural law.”⁶⁰

It is worth noting here that these statements by Junius are much clearer expositions of the relationship between natural law and the Mosaic law than the account given by Aquinas, for, though Aquinas saw the overlapping content between the moral law and the natural law, he did not clearly identify which condition of human nature the Mosaic law specifically restored.⁶¹ Moreover, unlike Junius, Aquinas justified the legitimacy of retaliation on the basis of Matthew 5, as long as it was done “out of love of justice” rather than “out of revengeful spite.”⁶² Considering these points Muller’s argument can be confirmed again: even without the explicit use of *foedus operum*, Calvin and his many successors—including Junius—identified

57. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 352–53); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 61.

58. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 352–53); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 61.

59. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 352–53); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 61.

60. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 62.

61. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q.100.

62. “Reply to Objection 4. The reason why the ceremonial precepts of the Law are not mentioned in Matthew 5 is because, as stated above (ad 1), their observance was abolished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial precepts He mentioned that of retaliation: so that what He said about it should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept, He taught that the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be sought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out of revengeful spite, which He forbade, admonishing man to be ready to suffer yet greater insults; and this remains still in the New Law.” Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 107, a. 2, ad 4.

the content of the moral law revealed in the Mosaic covenant with the content of the natural law revealed in the Adamic covenant.⁶³

Junius also believed that there is a perfect instantiation of the divine law in the law of Moses.⁶⁴ As noted in chapter five the fundamental content and concept of divine law in Junius's thought was the supernatural ordering of reason. Here again in his treatment of the Mosaic law he asserted that "whereas the divine law is supernatural and proceeds from God, the law of Moses is that very law that God allotted to his church for those times, so that he might set forth supernatural proofs of grace, first by clear commands and then by types and ceremonies."⁶⁵ This is to say that "[f]rom the beginning God graciously communicated the law of Moses to his church as a most certain symbol of that divine and supernatural law, and God gave supernatural testimony to it in many ways and at many times."⁶⁶ This also means that through the Mosaic law God oriented his "infantile church" toward the "contemplation, cognition, and admiration of that eternal law," and as such the divine law, which is expressed through the ceremonial law, can also be called the source of the "ecclesiastical law."⁶⁷ It is within this typical and imperfect stage of "the church" that Junius understood Moses to be "a most pure legislator and faithful servant in the whole house of God."⁶⁸ Aquinas's thought was not too different: Aquinas also stated that "the Divine law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another."⁶⁹ The chief aim of the divine law, in other words, was to establish an orderly communion between God and humans, and it was done through ordering human's internal and external acts, the former of which were faith, hope, and love, and the latter of which were regulated by

63. Muller, *After Calvin*, 181–82.

64. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 62.

65. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 62.

66. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (pp. 353–54); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 62.

67. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 6 & 31 (pp. 349 & 377); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 50 & 126.

68. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 30 (p. 374); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 116.

69. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 3, co.

ceremonial acts.⁷⁰ Though Israel’s external regulations of worship were done away with in the New Law, Aquinas nonetheless believed that “the Old Law was given by the same God, from Whom came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ.”⁷¹

As briefly stated above, the reason why moral law has an immutable and universal authority upon human beings in Junius’s thought comes from the fact that both natural and divine laws, which express the moral law, were authored by God himself. Junius believed that natural and divine laws derived their names from their *authors*—nature is the author of natural law and God is the author of divine law.⁷² Although both laws were from God, he noted, natural law referred to nature as its source because most people perceived it to be the foundation of human actions, the standard of goodness and evil, though believers by the work of the Holy Spirit could perceive that God is actually their ultimate author.⁷³ He also raised rhetorical questions here to emphasize this point:

Since these things are so, we have most truly established that neither law may be assailed by anyone without the most shameful injury against God, nature, all things, and, therefore, oneself. For how does the one who opposes God’s law not cause injury to God when God is the one universal source of nature and of all things in nature, and the common and particular source of grace in his church? In fact, would not a person injure his own nature when he attempts to uproot the law given by nature and impressed in the minds of all? Could one be pronounced just among any human beings when he has afflicted God and nature itself with the most atrocious affront by violating those sacred and inviolable laws? Finally, could it be supposed that a person would ever be just toward himself when he would deprive himself both of his own source—in whom he lives, moves, and even exists—and all things, as if he could blot out the outlines that are most evidently drawn and exposted in the natural and divine law?⁷⁴

If these are true, he noted, then “no one can doubt that the law of Moses exists by the same authority, as it delivers the natural and divine law by renewing the ancient principles, restoring what has been lost, communicating what is unknown, and revealing divine things in a human

70. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 3, co.

71. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 98, a. 3, co.

72. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 9 (pp. 354–55); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 65.

73. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 9 (pp. 354–55); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 65.

74. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 9 (pp. 354–55); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 65.

way.”⁷⁵ In short: the Mosaic law revealed, renewed, restored, and revived the moral law that was operative in the pre-fall nature and which is normative even in the post-fall nature.

In summary, Junius’s point was that “the Mosaic law delivered the principles of each of [eternal, natural, divine, and human] laws perfectly by the thing itself or by its own example and it lacks every imperfection, seeing that the perfect wisdom of God ordained it so that it would convey God’s adolescent church to the perfection of the gospel.”⁷⁶ In a more elaborate manner, he argued that in the Mosaic law one discovers:

[t]he highest principle and chief rule of principles, which we call the eternal law; the innate principle and rule that is naturally formed in us according to the pattern of the eternal law, which we call the natural law; and, finally, a principle added to us by grace, which we call the word of God or the divine law, by which God graciously accommodated the proofs of that eternal law to our capacity.⁷⁷

Thus, Junius saw the immutable substance of the Mosaic law to be a sum total of moral principles and conclusions drawn from natural and divine laws, which in distinct ways adumbrated the eternal law of God. Even Christians, in other words, are bound by the same moral law, as it is the very means through which they are ordered toward the proper ends of moral actions.⁷⁸ The substance of the Mosaic law then binds all people of God regardless of their circumstances, and on this point Junius surely echoed Aquinas: the very substance of the Mosaic law is the moral law that is immutable, universal, and common. Yet, on the very content of the moral law contained in the law of Moses, Junius was clear that it renewed, restored, revived, and revealed the principles of both natural and supernatural order, which were “embellished” in judicial and ceremonial laws respectively.

75. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 10 (p. 355); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 66.

76. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (p. 354); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 64.

77. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (p. 359); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 75.

78. Junius however distinguished different administrations of the law for God’s church: “The former time was the childhood, but this one is the adulthood of the church. If you would altogether desire one and the same administration for both times, that would be madness, not wisdom.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (p. 383); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 141.

Hence, while the Mosaic law truly communicated the moral truths that enabled Israel to participate in an orderly life with God and with others, it was not the fully developed, or the completely matured, means of moral ordering. Junius made an emphatic point that “the Mosaic law delivered the principles of each of [eternal, natural, divine, and human laws] perfectly by the thing itself or by its own example,” but its purpose was to “convey God’s adolescent church to the perfection of the gospel.”⁷⁹ The *gospel*, here, referred to a new historical administration of grace, as it meant “the fullness of times.”⁸⁰ In this sense, “the law of Moses according to its principles contains the same perfection that we believe is contained in the gospel, but yet in an inferior mode of perfection, because it was given as a tutor of minors [*paedagogus minorum*], as it were, so that they might rise to a more perfect teaching.”⁸¹ In short, Junius argued that both law and gospel, understood in historical, successive, and covenantal senses, shared the same function of ordering human actions toward their natural and supernatural ends.⁸² It is this covenantal conception of the moral law that made Junius’s account different from Aquinas’s: the New Covenant, as it will be demonstrated below, was interpreted as the gospel, not as the New Law.

7.3 The Mutable Parts of the Mosaic Law: Determinations

The second sub-thesis is that Junius, like Aquinas, defined the mutable parts of the Mosaic law as the determinations of natural law, yet he treated them, far more rigorously than Aquinas did, in the light of the covenantal context of Israel.⁸³ As stated before Junius argued that “there is a

79. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (p. 354); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 64.

80. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (p. 354); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 63.

81. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 8 (p. 354); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 64.

82. For a helpful account of how the historical law and gospel distinction was utilized by the Reformed theologians in the seventeenth century, see Mark Jones, “The ‘Old’ Covenant,” in *Drawn into Controversie: Reformed Theological Diversity and Debates within Seventeenth-Century British Puritanism*, ed. Michael A. G. Haykin and Mark Jones (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 183–203.

83. This does not mean that Aquinas did not attend to the idea of “covenant”—in his commentaries on Jeremiah, the term “*foedus*” appears at least 10 times; on Isaiah, 8 times; on Romans, 5 times; on Hebrews, 5 times; and even in his *Summa theologica* the term appears 13 times. Yet most of the appearances are due to biblical quotations that include the term rather than his own explanations. Junius, however, employs the concept firmly

rationale of all human laws so that they have their own immutable part and a mutable part; the former always obligates, whereas the latter obligates according to the persons, matters, and circumstances of those who live under them.”⁸⁴ This distinction also applies to the Mosaic law since Junius saw determinations in the Mosaic law as being mutable and hence not authoritative in the age of the gospel. Determinations are those that proceeded from common principles and conclusions, and therefore “whatever resides in those particular determinations, to which one proceeds from the immovable principles and general conclusions (and so forth), is mutable.”⁸⁵ Junius also argued that determinations ought to be related to the immutable parts in a certain way: “the law of Moses proceeds to those determinations from unmoved principles and general conclusions according to the mode and condition of those matters that are under the regulation of the law.”⁸⁶ This means that the proper method of distinguishing the immutable from the mutable parts should consider two *termini*: “The first and highest terminus of this relation,” Junius argued, “is designated by the phrase from the unmoved principles and common conclusions, but the final terminus is designated by the phrase specific determinations.”⁸⁷ He continued with this remark and made a point that “[b]etween these two termini a mode of relation intervenes because from the highest terminus to the final one the law of Moses proceeds according to the mode and condition of those matters that are under the regulation of the law.”⁸⁸ Thus, the proper way to discern how the immutable and mutable parts were conjoined in the Mosaic law is to recognize, first of all, the universal moral truths, and secondly, the particular laws that were made by the act of accommodation and determination.

as a contextual factor in God’s interaction with his people. For a helpful background to the early uses of covenant in relation to moral law, see Fesko, *The Covenant of Works*, 11–31.

84. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 19 (p. 363); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 87.

85. Thesis 22 reads: “Those specific determinations in the law of Moses are mutable, to which one proceeds from unmoved principles and common conclusions according to the mode and condition of those matters subject to the regulation of the laws.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (pp. 367–68); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 98.

86. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (pp. 367–68); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 98.

87. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 100.

88. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 100.

It is fair to say that these points are refinements of a Thomistic paradigm. Aquinas likewise argued that “the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined both by human law and by Divine law.”⁸⁹ Simply put, determination was for him “an application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way.”⁹⁰ For example, justice as the substance of the moral law did not change, yet as to how that very justice was to be upheld or applied in Israel’s situations required wise judgments on particular, individual, and circumstantial aspects.⁹¹ For this reason he argued that “the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is directed to God, just as the judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor.”⁹² His distinction between the dictates of natural law and its determinations also correlates with his distinction between moral and legal duties. He stated that “a duty is twofold: one according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty.”⁹³ The moral duty that arises from the dictates of reason is further distinguished into necessary and useful acts, the former of which was called “precepts” and the latter, “commandments.”⁹⁴ The legal duty, on the other hand, is a kind of duty created by determinations, which was distinguished into ceremonial and judicial precepts.⁹⁵ The precepts contained in the ceremonial and judicial laws can be called precepts because they were necessary, but as they were not dictated directly by nature, their binding force was limited and therefore mutable. Aquinas argued:

[T]he ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the

89. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 3, co.

90. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 4, ad. 2

91. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q.100, a. 8, arg. 3.

92. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 101, a. 1, co.

93. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 5, co.

94. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 5, co.

95. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 5, co.

judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in Galatians 3:24.⁹⁶

These points are generally appropriated by Junius; yet he regarded both ceremonial and judicial laws as *examples* of the natural, divine, and human laws, not merely as determinations, which indicates his distinct understanding of their relevance in the aftermath of their termination.⁹⁷

Junius thought it was important to distinguish, within the universal moral truths revealed in the Mosaic law, different kinds of principles and conclusions. He argued that both principles and conclusions are distinguished into two kinds, as there are natural and supernatural principles on the one hand and general and particular conclusions on the other.⁹⁸

An example where these distinct categories are expressed comes from the command to love neighbors. He noted:

[I]t is a general principle that a human being ought to love his neighbor, that is, another human being. It is a general conclusion that a neighbor must not be injured, and that whatever is owed to him must be paid to him, and so forth. A particular or individual conclusion is that Peter, John, and Maevius must not be injured. From this the particular determinations arise that Peter, John, and Maevius must not be injured at all in this or that way, time, or place, and so forth.⁹⁹

Here, the general principle of charity proceeds to the general conclusion regarding justice and protection, which then provides foundational materials for contingent conclusions and determinations. In the process of ratiocination, then, the key principle was that the contingent, circumstantial, and contextual factors ought to be taken as premises.¹⁰⁰

The material contents of determinations expressed in the Mosaic law were contingently shaped by three things according to Junius: persons, matters, and circumstances.¹⁰¹ The mode or condition of each of those three things, moreover, was further distinguished into general and

96. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 104, a. 3, co.

97. "God gave an example of human affairs in [Mosaic] judicial and political laws, and an example of divine things in the ceremonial laws." Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (p. 332); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 11.

98. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 99.

99. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 99.

100. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 22 (p. 368); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 99.

101. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 23 (p. 369); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 100 & 102.

particular conditions.¹⁰² The general condition of the aforementioned objects—persons, matters, and circumstances—was “whatever is from nature and resides in the thing itself absolutely,” whereas “the particular is that which is added to nature in some way and which is considered relatively, in that which the law regulates.”¹⁰³ For example, the *persons* whom the Mosaic law attempted to regulate should be understood first according to their universal condition, which is their human condition shared by virtue of common nature. On the other hand, their condition should also be considered particularly, as they were called into “the covenant, promises, truth, order, and signs of grace.”¹⁰⁴ Through the first condition Israel was seen as human beings, but through the second condition they were seen as Jews under God’s special covenant. Their universal condition was founded upon their common nature, but their particular condition was founded upon the “increase of saving grace to which God calls his church, first from the Jews prior to the advent of Christ, then from Christians in our age, from which the gospel of Christ was promulgated prior to his advent.”¹⁰⁵ Consequently, the Mosaic determinations pertained not only to Israel’s universal condition as human beings, but also to their particular condition, as Israel was God’s covenanted people established by God’s special promises and for God’s special grace.¹⁰⁶

The same principle applied to *things*. Junius argued that “[t]here is a universal mode of things as they exist in common and are employed in the use of human beings, but there is a particular mode of things as they are additionally employed according to God’s institution for a particular use or signification of the covenant, its promises, truth, order, and for those who have been covenanted.”¹⁰⁷ This is to say that all the things that are under the regulation of Mosaic law had both universal and particular conditions, because by the former they were seen

102. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 24 (pp. 369–70); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 103–104.

103. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 24 (pp. 369–70); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 104.

104. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 25 (p. 370); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 104.

105. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 25 (pp. 370–71); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 104–105.

106. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 25 (p. 371); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 107.

107. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 26 (p. 371); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 107.

as having natural functions but by the latter they were seen as having supernatural functions that signified and expressed God's special covenant.¹⁰⁸ An example of this is the land of Canaan—the promised land of Canaan had a natural condition, which required the ordinary work of cultivation to gather fruits, yet it had a supernatural condition according to grace, by which it functioned as “a present token of the divine covenant, promises, truth, and order” through which and in which Israel could participate in the special life with God.¹⁰⁹

The third point to note is *circumstances*. As with the former two, the circumstances in which Israel lived involved two conditions, both general and particular.¹¹⁰ By “circumstances” he meant “whatever surrounds and, as it were, clothes those persons and things about which the law commands, by either a perpetual necessity, such as time or place, or a perpetual vicissitude, which usually arises from a person's will or from chance, as generally happens in actions or deeds, causes, modes, and instruments, for the condition of these circumstances is always in flux.”¹¹¹ In other words, “[j]ust as persons or things are employed in works of nature or grace, so also circumstances must be understood either commonly according to nature and their real condition or particularly according to grace and the institution of grace.”¹¹² In a Thomistic framework, as Joseph Pilsner showed, *circumstantia* referred to an accidental feature of human action and, though they did not sufficiently determine the ends of actions, “circumstances would have an influence over the determination of the mean.”¹¹³ Junius in a similar way regarded *circumstances* as key to explaining the *occasions* for which certain words or actions were performed, and occasions in turn were believed to provide necessary information in regard to their *purpose*.¹¹⁴ Calvin expressed a similar view: “in each

108. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 26 (pp. 371–72); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 107–108.

109. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 26 (pp. 371–72); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 108.

110. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 27 (p. 372); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 109.

111. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 27 (p. 372); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 109.

112. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 27 (p. 372); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 109–110.

113. Joseph Pilsner, *The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 174 & 183.

114. Judisch, “A Translation and Edition of the *Sacrorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius,” 1.196.

commandment we must investigate what it is concerned with; then we must seek out its purpose, until we find what the Lawgiver testifies there to be pleasing or displeasing to himself.”¹¹⁵

Arising from these conditions of persons, things, and circumstances are *actions*, which are also distinguished by Junius into general and particular ones.¹¹⁶ The general duty demanded from Israel as human beings pertained to their social order, but their particular duty—“the duty God established by grace in the nation of the Jews”—pertained to their participation in the covenant life.¹¹⁷ Hence, those particular duties commanded in the determinations of the Mosaic law were mutable, as what God intended for them in their covenantal circumstances were “temporary proofs of grace.”¹¹⁸ It is within these categories that God’s commands, prohibitions, rewards as well as punishments in the Mosaic law were to be interpreted.¹¹⁹ To Junius the moral order prescribed in the Mosaic law had to be analyzed against the background of the covenantal context of Israel, as it was the key to delineating universality and particularity, substance and circumstances, or immutability and mutability. In Aquinas’s account, however, the subtleties of the covenantal context of Israel were not teased out rigorously, notwithstanding his acknowledgment of the typological nature of Mosaic determinations in relation to the New Law.¹²⁰

As judicial and ceremonial laws were seen as determinations of the moral law and also as examples of the divine legal reasoning, Junius could argue that they were intended to be mutable from the very beginning. The reason, again, was that those laws were servants of the

115. John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (The Westminster Press, 1960), 2.8.8.

116. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 27 (p. 372); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 110.

117. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 27 (p. 372); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 110.

118. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 28 (p. 373); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 111.

119. Broadly considered, in the law of Moses “good things are commanded and bad things are forbidden, persons are rewarded for good deeds and punished for evil deeds.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 23 (p. 369); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 102.

120. As noted above, Aquinas did recognize the crucial role that the Old Law and the New Law framework plays in delineating the substantials from the circumstantial, yet Junius witnesses to a far more developed account of the covenantal nature of the Mosaic law.

moral law—the judicial laws served Israel to maintain their social order and decency according to the moral law of God and so did the ceremonial ones, as they served them to maintain the purity of their worship of God and piety according to the supernatural notions in the moral law.¹²¹ In other terms, the moral precepts in the law of Moses were derived from common reason—which was the “substructure” of Mosaic law¹²²—and they were distinguished into two kinds: “the proper duties toward God and human beings.”¹²³ First, he argued, “the ceremonial precepts taught the most perfect truth of faith by which human beings from this depraved world strive for God”; secondly, “the judicial precepts taught the most perfect truth of order pertaining to the cultivation of morals and faith within that republic that God instituted.”¹²⁴ Accordingly, the two kinds of moral precepts that undergirded both ceremonial and judicial laws pertained to the truth of *faith* and the truth of *order*, which comprehensively covered the twofold order of the world—one in relation to God, and the other in relation to human beings. Moral law, in other words, was an unchangeable rationale that underlay both judicial and ceremonial commands in the law of Moses, but their circumstantial, accidental, or external parts were “destined to change”—they were provided for “a mutable republic, by reason of mutable things, persons, and circumstances, and in a mutable way.”¹²⁵ On this issue therefore Sarx made an apt remark when he claimed that, according to Junius, the Old Testament writings can be used in the areas of politics, religion, piety, and morality, as long as they are lifted out of their specific contexts, conditions, and circumstances.¹²⁶

121. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 31 (p. 377); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 125–26.

122. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 31 (pp. 378–79); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 130.

123. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 331–32); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 8.

124. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 331–32); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 8.

125. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 31 (p. 378); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 128.

126. “Die alttestamentlichen Schriften können bei der Frage nach einem Maßstab für Politik, Religion, Frömmigkeit und Moral herangezogen werden, jedoch nur, wenn man sie aus ihrem spezifischen Kontext heraushebt und aktualisiert.” Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 196.

7.4 Determinations for the Truth of Order: Significance of the Judicial Laws of Moses

The third sub-thesis is that, while Junius understood the nature of the judicial laws of Moses as determinations like Aquinas did, he saw them also as perfect examples of legal reasoning.¹²⁷ Junius was conscious of the fact that early Christians did not endeavor to investigate the connection between the judicial law of Moses and the civil law. He provided at least two interrelated reasons: on the one hand the “common society” then was so ruled by pagan emperors, kings, and authorities that Christians were not permitted to intervene in the administration of political justice.¹²⁸ On the other hand, the early church faced severe persecutions to the extent that Christians did not share the pressing concern to consider “the question of the use and authority of the judicial laws of Moses” in the political life, as their immediate need was to sustain the existence of church herself.¹²⁹ Nonetheless, Junius firmly believed that the judicial law of Moses had a universal and perennial relevance to both church and state—but not as a law that demands ongoing obligation, but as a law that demands ongoing examination, as it collectively revealed a perfect example of moral ratiocination in regard to political matters.¹³⁰ In this regard Junius echoed Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) who argued in his *Loci praecipui theologici* (1559) that “[b]ecause the Mosaic political structure is the highest ideal and best form of civil order in this corrupt state of our human nature, it is useful for wise rulers to study this form of government.”¹³¹

127. For a recent account of how Calvin, for example, interpreted the Mosaic law in relation to politics, see Barbara Pitkin, “Calvin and Politics According to the Mosaic Harmony (1563 | 1564): Text, Paratext, and Context,” in *Calvin Frater in Domino*, ed. Arnold Huijgen and Karin Maag (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020), 37–56.

128. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (p. 333); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 13

129. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (p. 333); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 13.

130. Kries made a point that “the judicial precepts [expounded by Aquinas] constitute the master exemplar of political wisdom to which all human political thinkers, including Christian political thinkers, must aspire.” The key here is that, though his point is valid, it nonetheless is *his* evaluative comment, not a point that Aquinas himself explicitly made. Junius, however, made this comment by himself. See Kries, “Thomas Aquinas and the Politics of Moses,” 102.

131. “Because the Mosaic political structure is the highest ideal and best form of civil order in this corrupt state of our human nature, it is useful for wise rulers to study this form of government. The laws of the Gentiles were less stringent in two areas, in the matter of punishing blasphemies and in controlling our vagrant lusts. The law of God established serious penalties against the worship of idols, blasphemies, ungodly teachers, and likewise against our erring desires. Therefore the will of God in regard to these sins must be studied by prudent

Junius insisted that the substance of judicial laws (i.e., moral law) did not change but the circumstances in which they were operative underwent various changes “according to time, place, persons, deeds, modes, causes, and supports—in the past, the present, or the future—as well as in public and private matters.”¹³² It is “for this reason all the judicial commands of Moses could expire,” Junius remarked, and as such “now the thing itself is dead, extinct, and eliminated from common use.”¹³³ Then, why is it important to consider the connection between the judicial laws of Moses and the normative political order? Junius was of the view that, compared with other civil laws, even the *Corpus iuris civilis* which he believed achieved “the greatest agreement with the divine laws of Moses,” the judicial commands in the Mosaic law still “rank far higher than all the rest in their authority, arrangement, and application.”¹³⁴

The judicial laws of Moses are far more excellent than other civil laws in authority because the author and judge who produced them “is not a human being, but the wisest, most just, and purest God of the very universe and of everything dwelling in the universe.”¹³⁵ This divine author produced the judicial laws for his church under Moses, and this author was unable to make errors in principles, conclusions, and determinations.¹³⁶ This is not an insignificant point as this contrast between divine and human authors served to highlight that the legal judgments contained in the judicial laws of Moses were made by a perfect process of ratiocination, as it was determined by God’s reason; in other civil laws, however, such perfection cannot be found.¹³⁷ The authors of other civil laws, however great they may have

rulers in the divine law itself.” Philip Melancthon, *Loci Praecipui Theologici 1559*, trans. J.A.O. Preus, 2nd ed. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2011), 228.

132. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (pp. 382–83); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 140–41.

133. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 31 (pp. 378–79); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 130.

134. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (p. 330); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 6.

135. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 330–31); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 6–7.

136. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 11 (p. 356); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 68.

137. For example, Junius made these comments on human judgments: “Concerning the human law and the judicial commands of Moses, opinions vary because the laws have been tempered with human judgments, and human judgments cannot construct either conclusions from common principles or individual determinations from particular conditions that are entirely just for all people at all times and for all circumstances, or that are able to judge others constructing them.” Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 10 (p. 340); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 30.

been, were fallen, depraved, and “endowed with but a slender shade of wisdom,” and hence could only produce “imperfect” and “insufficient” laws.¹³⁸ The judicial laws of Moses are also more excellent than other political laws in their arrangement and application—they were arranged for and applied to Israel by God himself who perfectly knew their conditions, circumstances, and contexts.¹³⁹ Therefore, the judicial determinations in the law of Moses have an ongoing value even after the advent of Christ as they are examples of a perfect pattern of legal reasoning and determination, despite their legal force having been expired.

An important point here is that, when Junius argued that the moral law undergirded the judicial laws, he meant that the principles and conclusions of both natural and divine laws were contained in them; in other words, natural law in the corrupted form was not the background to the judicial laws. For example, Junius acknowledged that the principles of the first table of the Decalogue, which pertained to the matters of piety, were contained and clothed in the judicial laws—he believed that the passages such as Deuteronomy 13 and Exodus 22 revealed that the judicial laws contained determinations concerning worship, which expressed the undergirding principles of the first table of the Decalogue.¹⁴⁰ Hence Junius argued:

These political laws have their origin and foundation from the eternal, natural, and divine law, according to which by necessity such conclusions are made purely. These conclusions obtain their immutable certainty from the force of the principles from which they proceed. For the eternal and immutable principle according to the eternal, natural, and divine law is that God must be worshiped, and it is necessary to attribute divine worship to him alone.¹⁴¹

From these principles, Junius argued that at least two conclusions could be made: “First, neither a teaching nor a teacher that calls a person away from the true God and his worship may be heard. Second, they must not be heard who by nefarious craft would renounce God, attribute divine things or benefits (which certainly are nothing but divine) to another, and desire

138. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 330–31); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 7.

139. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, preface (pp. 330–31); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 7.

140. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (pp. 359–60); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 76–77.

141. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (pp. 359–60); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 76–77.

communications and revelations from demons.”¹⁴² These conclusions were, in his judgment, “as necessary as the principles themselves,” because there were purely derived from the principles.¹⁴³

Thus these points support the claim that in Junius’s thought the judicial laws of Moses (which contained both commandments and punishments) did not merely prescribe that *a god should be worshipped*, but specifically that *the true God of Israel should be worshipped*, and in this way the truths of both natural and divine laws were prescribed by the judicial law. In short, “whatever Moses commanded in the law was most certainly purely established by eternal reason—with natural reason witnessing in the things of nature, and divine reason witnessing in the things of grace.”¹⁴⁴ On this point there seems to be no substantial difference with Girolamo Zanchi (1516–90) who stated that God appointed magistrates in the Mosaic order to be “guardians of his people not only according to the second table but also the first, that is, in religious matters[.]”¹⁴⁵

Aquinas asserted that “[t]hose judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state.”¹⁴⁶ “But,” he continued, “after the coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also.”¹⁴⁷ These remarks highlight that the judicial laws of Moses, according to Aquinas, were provided in order to orient the people toward justice and equity, which were demanded by the natural law, but he believed that *nature* was not the only reference point—it was also *grace*, or *Christ*, to which they pointed. Aquinas argued that the entire state of Israel,

142. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (pp. 359–60); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 77.

143. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 15 (pp. 359–60); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 77.

144. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (p. 365); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 92.

145. Girolamo Zanchi, *On the Law in General*, trans. Jeffrey J. Veenstra (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2012), 91–92.

146. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 104, a. 3, ad 3.

147. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 104, a. 3, ad 3.

for whose order the judicial laws were given, was “prophetic and figurative” of Christ.¹⁴⁸ He believed that “[a] precept may be figurative in two ways.”¹⁴⁹ The first way in which a precept may be figurative is when the precept itself is intended to be a foreshadow of something *supernatural*. “In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for the very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and the mystery of Christ.”¹⁵⁰ The second way, however, is when a precept foreshadowed something *natural*: “In this way the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity.”¹⁵¹

In this sense the purpose of the judicial laws was not merely to order Israel’s society according to the principles of nature, but also to order the whole of Israel to become the very context in which Christ would be born: the Old Law, of which the judicial laws were a part, “disposed men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ’s coming.”¹⁵² Because Israel was “a child,” and because Israel was “under a pedagogue,” the judicial laws provided the legal means of providing “temporal rewards or punishments” through which they could learn to desire spiritual things and to see spiritual realities.¹⁵³ Aquinas argued:

The judicial precepts did not bind forever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only ‘dead,’ but also deadly to those who observe them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly.¹⁵⁴

148. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 104, a. 2, ad 2.

149. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 104, a. 2, co.

150. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 104, a. 2, co.

151. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 104, a. 2, co.

152. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 6, co.

153. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 99, a. 6, co. & IaIIae q. 99, a. 6, ad 2.

154. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 104, a. 3, co.

This reveals that, in Aquinas's thought, there was a threefold intention in the judicial laws of Moses: first, to order Israel toward God, secondly, to order them toward each other, and thirdly, to order them toward Christ, the mediator between God and man. In Junius's thought, however, the Christological end of the judicial law was not explicitly expressed, as his main focus was to claim that the judicial commandments in the Mosaic law provided abundant examples and cases where *the process of divine reasoning* could be studied. He was emphatic that in the law God's eternal, natural, and divine laws were captured, and these distinct laws could be discerned by studying how the immutable laws were accommodated to the mutable circumstances of Israel by God himself.¹⁵⁵ In other words, Junius believed that the judicial laws of Moses have an ongoing value, though they lost their ongoing force after the first coming of Christ, because they contained the perfect example of pure, right, and just legal reasoning done by none other than God himself, the perfect legal reasoner.

7.5 Determinations for the Truth of Faith: Significance of the Ceremonial Laws of Moses

The fourth sub-thesis is that one key difference between Junius and Aquinas on the ceremonial law was the role that divine covenants played in renewing, restoring and revealing the supernatural order of God's people. Junius argued that "the entire rationale and observance of [ceremonial laws] in the church has passed away, just as the sun usually dispels shadows by its arrival."¹⁵⁶ The reason was that they were intended to foreshadow "the Christ who would come

155. "The eternal law is like a source and is the pattern and original form of human laws. The matter in these things is occupied with what the laws govern, and in these the legislators cannot properly provide for the common good unless they know the things that the laws govern and especially any changes and local variations. In both cases, it is necessary that human beings advance and study, no matter what laws are produced, but with God all things are known and ascertained according to his unsearchable wisdom and infinite knowledge. For God himself is that eternal, right, and immutable reason from whom the communication of all natural reason, as well as all supernatural and divine reason, flows forth to created things as if from a spring." Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 20 (p. 366); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 94.

156. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 31 (pp. 378–79); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 129.

and his benefits” through types and ceremonies, after whose coming lost their binding force.¹⁵⁷ In this regard Douglas Judisch was correct in claiming that “Junius regards Christ as being just as central to the Old Testament as to the New—not just for the Christian looking back, but in a very direct way for the Old Testament people of God themselves.”¹⁵⁸ Junius also argued that, just as all other laws had both substantial and accidental aspects, ceremonial laws should also be considered either in substance or in circumstance.¹⁵⁹ The ceremonial laws considered in their substance were the principle, object, or end of divine grace clothed in types and ceremonies; the circumstantial parts were those things that were added to them.¹⁶⁰ Thus, Junius simply noted, “whatever is ceremonial must be called ceremonial either essentially or accidentally.”¹⁶¹ Without utilizing the distinction between substance and accidents, or internal and external elements of the ceremonial laws, he was convinced that “one could not easily understand the rationale of the ceremonies.”¹⁶²

The substantial and circumstantial aspects of the ceremonial law were distinguished according to their *termini* by Junius. He regarded that their substantial aspects had supernatural grace as their *terminus a quo* (foundation) and *terminus ad quem* (end), and the covenanted Israel as their *terminus in quo* (object).¹⁶³ If a law either has one or all of these *termini* as its rationale with a type or ceremony, then Junius saw it as a ceremonial law.¹⁶⁴ He called a type “the express image of true things in figurative things, but we call a ceremony the express image

157. “All these things possess a particular law and contain a figurative ceremony of the coming grace in Christ, as the whole rationale of that particular law is explained from the figure of type. Moreover, when ceremonies foreshadow the Christ who would come and his benefits, they plainly will at some point cease to exist.” Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 31 (p. 386); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 148.

158. Judisch, “A Translation and Edition of the *Sacrorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius,” 1.134.

159. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 32 (p. 379); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 130–31.

160. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 32 (p. 379); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 130.

161. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 32 (p. 379); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 130.

162. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 32 (p. 379); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 130–31.

163. Junius noted that “a law is ceremonially established either in its principle and origin, that is, in its foundations; in the object to which the enactment pertains; or in the end toward which the enactment aims.” Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 32 (p. 379); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 131.

164. “If one of these modes, or these three simultaneously, should contain a type or ceremony, then that law has been enacted ceremonially.” Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 32 (p. 379); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 131.

of holy, spiritual, and divine actions in actions, the enactment of which was sanctified by God.”¹⁶⁵ The crucial point to note here is that in Junius’s thought ceremonial laws fundamentally expressed *divine* actions in the commands that required *human* actions, as what God demanded from Israel were eventually performed by God himself in Christ Jesus. In short, the Jews in the Old Covenant had to see divine truths as well as divine actions foreshadowed in the ceremonial laws so that they could perceive through the carnal and typal shadows the divine accomplishment and application of moral righteousness.¹⁶⁶

Thus, with respect to the foundation of ceremonial law, Junius stated that through ceremonies God intended Israel to understand the ultimate source of their lives and possessions: “God wanted to show by a ceremonial observance that he is the owner of the land and that the land or region belongs to him, and not to any other, by the highest right of ownership.”¹⁶⁷ In regard to the object or the thing that which ceremonial law regulated, he held that it was the redemptive-historically progressing Israel who needed “a complement to the mystery of our redemption and the promulgation of the gospel.”¹⁶⁸ In regard to their end, he argued that “not only all those other ceremonies, but also those things that especially pertained to prefiguring Christ, his person, actions, duties, and benefits in the future, were established as ceremonial in their end.”¹⁶⁹ For example, God’s command to sanctify the firstborn in Exodus 13:3 entailed all of the three *termini*:

[T]here was a common end that pertained to the order of the ancient church, namely, that the firstborn who were sanctified to God were to oversee the worship of God in each family and minister to the Lord. That duty that belonged to the firstborn endured until the Levites took their place by the specific institution of God, as stipulated by the law in Numbers 3. But that more proper end endured until the advent of Christ: the firstborn were sanctified to the Lord so that in every family there was a type of Christ, and they foreshadowed our Lord, the firstborn among many brothers, by this divine

165. “Typum appellamus, expressam rebus figuratiuis rerum verarum imaginem: Cerimoniam vero, expressam actionibus, quas institutum Dei sanctificauerit, sanctarum actionum, spiritualiumque & diuinarum imaginem.”

Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 32 (p. 379); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 131.

166. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (p. 383); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 141.

167. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 33 (pp. 379–80); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 132.

168. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 33 (pp. 379–80); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 132.

169. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 33 (p. 380); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 134.

sanctification. And so this is certainly enough concerning the things that were established ceremonially, which can be worthily called ceremonial laws according to their essence or species.¹⁷⁰

Hence, the rationale of the ceremonial law was explained fundamentally in terms of God's supernatural communication concerning salvation in Christ, which showed forth both divine truths and actions that would find their fulfillment in Christ in the age of the gospel.¹⁷¹

The circumstances of the ceremonial law, on the other hand, were distinguished into two: they were either extrinsically or intrinsically attached to the foreshadowing of grace in Christ.¹⁷² Extrinsic circumstances were those added things, such as carnal and typl things, that symbolically, visibly, and sensibly clothed God's grace in Christ.¹⁷³ Intrinsic circumstances, furthermore, were those that "constitute the species of those very things that are treated, according to which our affairs or actions are called either good or evil."¹⁷⁴ The extrinsic circumstances, in other words, referred to those distinctive typl materials in the Old Covenant, whereas the intrinsic circumstances meant those distinctive historical circumstances of Israel, whose moral order was determined differently when, for example, the temple came to fulfill the role of tabernacles in the age of Davidic kingdom. In this sense, the binding force of the ceremonial commands regarding tabernacles had been abrogated even before the advent of Christ.¹⁷⁵ Therefore these two kinds of circumstances were attached to "the mystery of our

170. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 33 (p. 380); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 134.

171. According to Judisch Junius believed that "[t]he nature of Christ as God and man and his offices as prophet, priest, and king were common knowledge in the Old Testament church, according to the Heidelberg scholar." Judisch, "A Translation and Edition of the *Sacrorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius," 1.136.

172. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 34 (p. 380); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 135.

173. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 34 (p. 381); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 135.

174. For example, "There is a time in which a good thing or a neutral or indifferent thing is rendered evil because it is unseasonable. There is a place in which a good or indifferent thing is rendered evil because it is out of place. Similarly there is a mode and there are instruments by which good or indifferent things become evil because neither the mode nor the supports are proper. And so on this occasion circumstances are said to constitute the species of the actions." Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 34 (p. 381); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 135.

175. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 33 (pp. 379–80); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 132–33.

redemption and the promulgation of the gospel,” and they revealed “either a record of past things, a demonstration of present things, or a presignification of future things.”¹⁷⁶

Junius also noted that there are certain things that Christians—in the New Covenant—have in common with the ancient Jews under Moses: “such as the glory of God, a common salvation, the communion of human society in the nature of things and in the church of God.”¹⁷⁷ However, the very commands that oriented Israel toward those ends were established consequent to their entrance into the covenantal relationship with God, and as such the types and ceremonies used for the “sacramental relation or arrangement” of God through Moses had ceased after the coming of Christ.¹⁷⁸ The greatest difference between the commands given to the Jews and to Christians in regard to worship, for example, was that “all those carnal and typical things have been removed and consummated in the truth that was foreshadowed in those instruments and observations.”¹⁷⁹ Junius therefore believed in a twofold end of ceremonial laws, one vertical regarding the worship of God and the other horizontal pertaining to the prefiguration of future truth, whether Christological or eschatological: “all ceremonies pertained to these two things: either to signifying the truth—chiefly a future one—or to establishing worship according to that reason by which God commanded that he be worshipped and that he had outlined for his worshipers in that republic and in his church.”¹⁸⁰

These points support the claim that Junius’s conception of the mutable parts of the ceremonial law was shaped by a covenantal hermeneutic. Junius conceived that the particular circumstance that gave rise to the enactment of both ceremonial and judicial laws was God’s covenant with the nation of Israel, which entailed a hermeneutical paradigm of promise and

176. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (p. 385); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 146.

177. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (pp. 383–84); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 142.

178. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (p. 383); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 141. For a helpful treatment of the relation between sacramental and ecclesiological connections in Aquinas’s thought, see Hans Boersma, “Ressourcement of Mystery: The Ecclesiology of Thomas Aquinas and the Letter to the Romans,” in *Reading Romans with St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 52–74.

179. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (pp. 383–84); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 142.

180. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (pp. 383–84); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 143.

fulfillment. The way Junius conceived the specific condition and circumstance of Israel deserves to be mentioned in full:

The first is the covenant by which God took the nation of the Jews for himself by saying, ‘I will be your God, and you will be my people.’ The second consists of the promises in Christ added to the covenant. For since the Jews were not able [to] stand in the covenant, God added promises to the covenant by which he himself graciously testified that, however much the people of the Jews fail and transgress, nevertheless he will be most steadfast in fulfilling the faith and truth of the covenant on account of his beloved Son. The third is truth, or a particular fulfillment and guarantee of the things that God declared to the Jewish nation in the covenant and promises. For since the rationale of the covenant and promises made to the Jews was twofold—one temporal, the other eternal—doubtless already in his time and order God offered the truth of temporal things to all the Jews, but the faithful ones gained the truth of spiritual things in its own way, just as it is said that Abraham saw the day of the Lord and rejoiced concerning it (John 8[:56]). The fourth is the public order that God ordained to be observed both in political things and in the church of the Jews for as long as they were nourished in the truth of the covenant and promises, according to the rationale of those times, and were stirred up to the expectation of a future, fuller good. The last thing consists of the signs that God added to all the preceding things so that the nation, assured in the expectation of the divine promises and truth, would rest in that faith. For that faith was sealed by proofs of the signs commanded by the Lord.¹⁸¹

Here, it is clear that Junius understood the role of the accidental parts in the Mosaic law as protection and progression of God’s covenant promises on the one hand and Israel’s orderly life in the covenant on the other, through which they could not only participate in the eternal realities but also anticipate their historical fulfillment in Christ. Hence, through such mutable laws, the church under Moses could be “nourished in the truth of the covenant and promises.”

What is also noticeable is Junius’s appeal to the Abrahamic promise as the undergirding historical cause of Israel’s circumstance: “God took the nation of the Jews for himself by saying, ‘I will be your God, and you will be my people.’” He also appealed to Abraham as the one who saw “the day of the Lord” through faith, which highlights that Junius saw Abraham and Israel as co-heirs of Christ and redemptive blessings as God’s chosen people.¹⁸² This understanding of the Abrahamic covenant was one of the reasons why Junius concluded that

181. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 25 (pp. 370–71); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 106–7.

182. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 25 (pp. 370–71); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 106–7.

the New Testament is, in its substance, the same testament concerning the Abrahamic promise as the Old Testament, and both the Old and the New Testaments constitute one Christian Scripture.¹⁸³ Calvin's view was similar—"Moses was not made a lawgiver to wipe out the blessing promised to the race of Abraham. Rather, we see him repeatedly reminding the Jews of that freely given covenant made with their fathers of which they were the heirs."¹⁸⁴

It is remarkable that in Aquinas's *Summa theologica* "the number of articles on the old Law exceeds the number of articles on eternal law, natural law, human law, and New Law combined."¹⁸⁵ Speaking specifically on the relationship between the Old and the New Laws, Matthew Levering argued that, just as grace does not destroy nature but perfect it, Aquinas regarded the New Law as a perfection of the Old Law, rather than its destruction.¹⁸⁶ It is true that Aquinas stated that "our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by them."¹⁸⁷ With all the moral, ceremonial, and judicial laws operating at various levels to order internal and external acts of God's people, Aquinas could see that the Mosaic law led Israel to Christ in two ways: first, by *witnessing* to Christ, and secondly, by *wiring* Israel's dispositions toward him.¹⁸⁸ Yet he expressly followed Dionysius in understanding three distinct states and circumstances of the blessed people—"the first was

183. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 196–99.

184. Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.7.1.

185. Tapie, *Aquinas on Israel and the Church*, 165.

186. "Aquinas begins his analysis of the Old Law by asking whether, in a technical sense, the Old Law was 'good.' Something is good if it leads the person to the end of human being, namely, the perfection fitting to human nature. This perfection, as we have seen, is a supernatural one; still, it should be noted that in the state of supernatural perfection, human nature will not lack its 'natural' perfection, since, as Aquinas says elsewhere, grace does not destroy nature but perfects and elevates it. On this basis, the Old Law is indeed good, since it leads Israel toward the supernatural perfection that God has ordained for human beings." Levering, *Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple*, 21.

187. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 103, a. 4, co.

188. "I answer that, The Old Law was given by the good God, Who is the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to Christ in two ways. First by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He Himself says (Luke 24:44): 'All things must needs be fulfilled, which are written in the law . . . and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning Me': and (John 5:46): 'If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also; for he wrote of Me.' Secondly, as a kind of disposition, since by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship, it enclosed [concludebat] them in the worship of one God, by Whom the human race was to be saved through Christ." Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 98, a. 2, co.

under the Old Law; the second is that of the New Law; the third will take place not in this life, but in heaven.”¹⁸⁹ The first state or circumstance was “figurative and imperfect” in relation to the New Law, and the second state of the New Law is also figurative and imperfect compared to the future state of glory.¹⁹⁰ The difference between being in the state of the Old Law and of the New Law is that in the latter the substance of the Mosaic law—moral law—is interiorized, instilled, and inscribed by the Holy Spirit on account of the coming of Christ.¹⁹¹ “Christ,” Aquinas noted, “fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and in His doctrine.”¹⁹² In his works, he fulfilled the legal requirements by being made under the law, and in his doctrine, he fulfilled them by teaching and prescribing “the true sense of the Law.”¹⁹³

Yet, in his commentary on Romans, Aquinas indicated a twofold meaning of the term “fulfillment” in relation to the Old Covenant.¹⁹⁴ The first sense is applied to Christ, the Head of the church and the promised Seed, who came to fulfill what was demanded in the Old Law—in this sense Christ fulfilled the demands of the law as a proper heir who would inherit the promised heritage through obedience.¹⁹⁵ In the second sense, however, the fulfillment is applied to believers, the body of Christ and the adopted heirs, who would inherit the promised

189. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 106, a. 4, ad 1.

190. “But as the first state is figurative and imperfect in comparison with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state figurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly state, with the advent of which the present state will be done away as expressed in that very passage (1 Corinthians 13:12): ‘We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face.’” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 106, a. 4, ad 1.

191. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 106, a. 1, co.

192. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 107, a. 2, co.

193. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 107, a. 2, co.

194. Levering writes: “When the Messiah fulfills the divine law, therefore, the community of Israel will also be brought to fulfillment in the person of the Messiah... The Messiah, as the true ruler of Israel, fulfills the law not as an isolated individual but rather as the embodiment of the community.” Levering, *Christ’s Fulfillment of the Temple and Torah*, 117; idem, “The Mosaic Law,” in *Paul in the Summa Theologiae*, 115: “God’s grace enables us to fulfil God’s law, and so the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is conferred by Christ Jesus, perfects and fulfils the Mosaic law. The important point is that the Mosaic law, although imperfect, is not opposed to the perfect ‘law’ that is the grace of the Holy Spirit. Rather, both are good, and the perfect ‘law’ enables us in Christ to fulfill the imperfect law.”

195. “But this seed is principally understood as Christ: *now the promises were made to Abraham and to his seed. It does not say, ‘and to seeds,’ referring to many, but referring to one* (Gal 3:16), because in the one in whom it is to be fulfilled it is shown that he would be heir of the world: *ask of me and I will make the nations your heritage* (Ps 2:8). Secondly, it is fulfilled in those who through Christ’s grace are spiritually the seed of Abraham: *the children of the promise are accounted for the seed* (Rom 9:8). Through Christ they inherit the world, inasmuch as all things are for the glory of the elect: *all are yours and you are Christ’s* (1 Cor 3:22).” Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans*, c.4, l.2, n.352.

blessings through Christ.¹⁹⁶ The crucial factor to note here is what the latter sense captured: the adopted heirs of God’s supernatural blessings do not receive them *exclusively* through Christ, but *conjointly* with Christ, as co-inheritors in the eternal house of God.¹⁹⁷ In other words Aquinas believed that the Old Covenant people participated in what Levering called the “figurative drama”¹⁹⁸ in which God’s dramatic acts and stories of redemption were manifested through figures, types, and shadows—“In Christ,” furthermore, “the Mosaic Law (and the covenant with Israel) is not revoked. Instead, the Mosaic Law is brought to its proper ‘end’—Christ—in whom all people (Jews and Gentiles) now may perfectly fulfill the law.”¹⁹⁹

Against the backdrop of the twofold sense of the term “fulfillment,” the fundamental difference between the Old and the New Covenants in Aquinas’s theology can be stated along the lines of the *mode* of revelation and the *power* of observance in relation to law, as the history of revelation moved from the external mode to the internal mode. “Thus, therefore, although God speaks in the New and the Old Testaments, he speaks more perfectly in the New, because in the Old he speaks in the minds of men, but in the New through the Son’s Incarnation.”²⁰⁰ Aquinas’s rationale is also captured well in this remark:

The things of God are not to be revealed to man except in proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of downfall, were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honor of God.²⁰¹

As God revealed his mysteries in a figural mode that befitted the capacity of Israel, the change in the mode of revelation in the New Law occurred upon considering the capacity of those “cultured” people. Moreover, as the external acts of worship underwent radical changes from

196. Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans*, c.4, l.2, n.352.

197. Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans*, c.4, l.2, n.352.

198. Levering, *Christ’s Fulfilment of the Temple and Torah*, 24.

199. Levering, *Christ’s Fulfilment of the Temple and Torah*, 29.

200. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Hebrews*, trans. F.R. Larcher, OP (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute, 2012), C.1, L.1, n.15.

201. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 101, a. 2, ad 1.

the Old to the New, the internal acts also underwent changes, as the last and the greatest theological virtue, love, is inscribed in the heart to complete the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love.²⁰² Hence, Aquinas understood the New Law as the “law of love” or the “law of charity,” which was a chief means of achieving the internal worship of God and a virtue that disposed one toward a supernatural happiness.²⁰³

These points coincide with Aquinas’s other argument that ceremonial precepts had literal and figural senses.²⁰⁴ The literal sense was the Divine worship, and the figural sense was the prefiguration of Christ.²⁰⁵ The literal purpose of enacting ceremonial laws was to obligate Israel to observe what was necessary for divine worship (vertical orientation, one might say), but the figural purpose (horizontal orientation) was to foreshadow Christ in allegorical, moral, and anagogical senses.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, divine worship is distinguished into internal and external worship, the former of which “consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and affections,” and the latter of which consists in the body being “ordained to the internal worship” as well as in the figures foreshadowing Christ.²⁰⁷ The correspondence between internal and external worship with literal and figural senses of the ceremonial law is of paramount importance in understanding Aquinas’s conception of the antitypal reality of the

202. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 107 a. 1 ad 2.

203. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 107, a. 1, ad 2; cf. idem, IaIIae, q. 62, a. 3, co.

204. “On the contrary, Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written (1 Corinthians 10:11) that ‘all (these things) happened to them in figure.’ Now in the stories of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, there is the literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal, besides their figurative causes.” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 102, a. 2, s. c.

205. “Now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold: for they were ordained to the Divine worship, for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the words of the prophets regarded the time being in such a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as Jerome says on Hosea 1:3. Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways. First, in respect of the Divine worship which was to be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are literal: whether they refer to the shunning of idolatry; or recall certain Divine benefits; or remind men of the Divine excellence; or point out the disposition of mind which was then required in those who worshipped God. Secondly, their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are figurative and mystical: whether they be taken from Christ Himself and the Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of the Christian people, which pertains to the moral sense; or to the state of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ, which refers to the anagogical sense.” Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 102, a. 2, co.

206. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 102, a. 2, co.

207. Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IaIIae, q. 101, a. 2, co.

Mosaic law, as it is interpreted as the new administration of *law*, or the inward love of charity.²⁰⁸

In Junius's thought, however, a clear notion of God fulfilling his own covenant promises by Christ is recognizable. "God added promises to the covenant by which he himself graciously testified that, however much the people of the Jews fail and transgress, nevertheless he will be most steadfast in fulfilling the faith and truth of the covenant on account of his beloved Son."²⁰⁹ In this regard Judisch was correct in summarizing that, in Junius's thought, "all the major events in the life of the coming Christ were already known to the Old Testament church."²¹⁰ Junius did not regard the antitypal fulfillment of the Mosaic Law merely in terms of Christ's clearer revelation and communication of the principles of *human actions*, but fundamentally in terms of his completion of the promised *divine actions* foreshadowed in ceremonies and types—Christ is the substance of supernatural grace, the reality of the shadows, because he performed those divine actions foreshadowed in the Mosaic precepts for God's church.²¹¹ In commenting on the fulfillment of the prophecy in Isaiah 53 Junius stated that "the main point of that passage in Isaiah is that Jesus Christ is going to join many co-heirs to himself by accomplishing our redemption through death on the cross and blotting our sins through his intervention."²¹² The reason, at the foundational level, is because Christ is the one "in whom the fulfillment of all the promises of God has been placed."²¹³ Also crucial is the notion that,

208. Levering comments: "To proclaim the good news of the radical *communio* of charity gained by Christ's passion, a visible community is needed that embodies the spiritual unity of the Mystical Body. Such a community, foreshadowed by Israel, is the Church, constituted by faith and the sacraments of faith. This community of proclamation and worship, ordained to the beatific vision, shares in Christ's fulfillment of the Torah and thereby, as Christ's Mystical Body, fulfills Israel's Temple." Levering, *Christ's Fulfilment of the Temple and Torah*, 125.

209. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 25 (pp. 370–71); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 106.

210. Judisch, "A Translation and Edition of the *Sacrorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius," 1.136.

211. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (pp. 386–87); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 149.

212. Junius, *Parallel LIII*; the translation of this text is available in Judisch, "A Translation and Edition of the *Sacrorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius," 2.190.

213. Junius, *Parallel II*, comparing 1 Chronicles 3 and Matthew 1; translation is available in Judisch, "A Translation and Edition of the *Sacrorum Parallelorum Liber Primus* of Franciscus Junius," 2.4.

upon fulfillment, “Christ supplied the fulfillment of them to his church.”²¹⁴ The two key words here are *fulfillment* and *supplication*—the gospel in regard to the moral law is the provision of moral righteousness, not the precepts of righteousness, in Christ. This is why Junius understood εὐαγγέλιον to be “δύναμις Θεοῦ ἐστὶν εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι”—the gospel is the power of God unto salvation to everyone who believes, rather than the power of man unto salvation who co-fulfills what is demanded by the law.²¹⁵

It is against this theological background that Junius, in his *De libertate christiana*, defined Christian liberty as “a gratuitous, spiritual liberation of the truly faithful.”²¹⁶ By spiritual liberty he meant “bringing man’s conscience peace, as the conscience knows and feels that it has been brought into grace with God thanks to the merit of Christ.”²¹⁷ Hence such liberty is gained only because of Christ’s deliverance from “the law’s curse, the slavery imposed by sin, and the yoke of legal ceremonies and of matters undecided in themselves [*adiaphora*].”²¹⁸ The end result, according to Junius, is this: those set free by Christ and the Holy Spirit “begin to serve God in holiness and righteousness on their own accord.”²¹⁹ In other words, Junius

214. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 38 (pp. 390–91); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 159.

215. Franciscus Junius, “De evangelio,” from *Opuscula theologica selecta*, 181.

216. “Christian liberty is a gratuitous, spiritual liberation of the truly faithful. Thanks to this liberation, the faithful are set free because of Christ from the law’s curse, the slavery imposed by sin, and the yoke of legal ceremonies and of matters indifferent in themselves, and they are bestowed the Holy Spirit. As a result, they begin serving God in holiness and righteousness on their own accord, for their own salvation, to edify the brethren, and for the glory of God.” Franciscus Junius, *De libertate christiana*, in *Opuscula theologica selecta*, thesis 1 (p. 223). Translation is from Ryan Hurd, “‘Christian Liberty’ by Franciscus Junius,” in *Modern Reformation*, vol. 30, no. 2 (2021): 14.

217. “We call this liberation not bodily, but “spiritual” (which is just as different from bodily liberation as slavery is). The point is for us to know that it is different from political or civil liberty, as well as the spurious liberty of other schools of thought. This is because spiritual liberty has to do with bringing man’s conscience peace, as the conscience knows and feels that it has been brought into grace with God thanks to the merit of Christ. Notwithstanding, this spiritual liberty can coincide with external liberty or slavery. The faithful, being given external liberty, can have internal liberty as well; and they can meet with and retain internal liberty, despite having been pressed into external slavery (1 Cor. 7:21–22). Augustine has said it well: A good man, if he serves, is free; a bad, if he reigns, is a slave—not just to one man, but what is more serious: to as many masters as his vices.” Junius, *De libertate christiana*, thesis 2 (pp. 223–24); cf. Hurd, “‘Christian Liberty’ by Franciscus Junius,” 14–15.

218. “Christian liberty has three parts: liberation from the law’s curse, the slavery imposed by sin, and the yoke of legal ceremonies and of matters undecided in themselves.” Junius, *De libertate christiana*, thesis 5 (p. 224); Hurd, “‘Christian Liberty’ by Franciscus Junius,” 16.

219. “The formal cause is the Holy Spirit’s sanctification and testimony. By this, the Spirit seals within the hearts of the truly faithful a certain persuasion and full assurance of their adoption unto sons of God from being sons of the devil, and thereby also their immunity from their former slavery (Rom. 8:13–15; 2 Cor. 1:22; Gal. 4:6–

believed that the moral order symbolically revealed and temporally regulated through the ceremonial laws was the prefiguration of divine actions of salvation to be fulfilled in Christ, which were to be perceived and received by faith in the Old Covenant. Therefore one key difference between Junius and Aquinas on the nature of ceremonial law was the role that divine covenants played in renewing, restoring and revealing the supernatural order of God's people in Christ. It is by framing the moral law in covenantal concepts that Junius appropriated both the threefold division of the Mosaic law and the threefold use of the moral law as a Reformed thinker. The consequence of the change was that law and gospel were differentiated not only in terms of redemptive history, but also in terms of moral righteousness—again, law is the precepts of righteousness, whereas gospel is the provision of righteousness in Christ Jesus. This is clearly distinguishable from Aquinas's thought where, to use Kries's succinct words, "the New Law simply reaffirms the general moral precepts of Moses, such as the decalogue and the charity precepts[.]"²²⁰

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the underlying Thomistic ideas in Junius's exposition of the Mosaic law—its substance, accident, as well as its fulfillment. By examining Junius's formulations of the substance and shadows of the Mosaic law, it was argued that Junius's understanding of the law of Moses expressed a modified version of Aquinas's theology in this significant way: the metaphysical as well as the historical account of the moral order prescribed in the Mosaic law were explained through the Adamic, Abrahamic, and Christological realities in Junius's thought. One of the central tenets in Junius's treatment of this issue was the claim that God's

7; Eph. 4:30). The proximate end is that they begin to serve God in holiness and righteousness on their own accord. For they are free with a servant liberty, who serve him with a free servitude. The intermediate end is the salvation of those using this liberty, and the edification of the weaker brethren (1 Cor. 9:19–23). The remote end is the glory of God (1 Cor. 10:31)." Junius, *De libertate christiana*, thesis 4 (p. 224); Hurd, "'Christian Liberty' by Franciscus Junius," 15–16.

220. Kries, "Thomas Aquinas and the Politics of Moses," 85–86.

people under Moses and under Christ constitute the one and the same “church,” the difference of which was marked by different administrations and contexts rather than different substance, as “[t]he former time was the childhood, but this one [of the New] is the adulthood of the church.”²²¹ The acknowledgement of the church’s substantial connection and teleological progression in the Old and the New Covenants was strongly affirmed by Aquinas as well, who, by using Moses and Aristotle, provided a sophisticated account of the perfection of *populus Dei* in different circumstances.²²² What was different and distinct in Junius’s treatment of this issue, however, ultimately pertains to the law-and-gospel paradigm: to Junius law in the moral sense refers to the precepts of righteousness, whereas gospel refers to the provision of righteousness in Christ Jesus; in the covenantal sense, law refers to the Old Covenant, and gospel to the New Covenant. For Aquinas, however, to use Holly Taylor Coolman’s words, “publication of the Gospel—and the accompanying shift in practice of the Divine Law—is at least effectively synonymous with the promulgation of the new Law.”²²³ These differences had ramifications on the way in which “fulfillment” was conceptualized in Junius’s thought, as it singularly referred to the divine completion, acquisition, and supplication of moral righteousness through Christ Jesus.

These points were significant to Junius not only because they shape one’s understanding of the life in Christ, but also of the liberty in him, as both are the realities in the age of the gospel:

[W]hoever establishes mutable or dead laws in the place of absolutely necessary ones steals the liberty of Christians, and whoever establishes deadly ones steals their life. And so, may Christ our Lord and Saviour guard this liberty and life in the truth, which he acquired and gave by the eternal communication of his Spirit. Amen.²²⁴

221. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 36 (p. 383); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 141. Cf. Fesko, “Calvin and Witsius on the Mosaic Covenant,” 28–30.

222. Hans Boersma and Holly Taylor Coolman helpfully noted these themes in *Reading Romans with St. Thomas Aquinas*, 52–74, 101–12.

223. Coolman, “Romans 9–11: Rereading Aquinas on the Jews,” 110.

224. Junius, *De polittiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 38 (p. 392); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 164.

Hence the chief intention in Junius's exposition of the Mosaic law in his *De politiae Mosis observatione* was to provide a way to discern what was "ethical" and what was "typical," or what was "immutable" and what was "mutable," in order that the ethical requirements in the Mosaic law may continue to regulate the moral actions of Christians even in the age of the gospel and also that the typical elements may be understood as the sacred witnesses of God's actions to be fulfilled by Christ's actions. Again, he did so by using covenantal categories, specifically the covenant realities revealed in Adam, Abraham, and Christ, and in so doing he successfully retained and refined this scholastic maxim: "the judicial commands of Moses are dead and the ceremonial ones are deadly."²²⁵

It is therefore true that, as Sarx remarked, the category of *foedus* was the conceptual means through which Junius connected nature and grace, or creation and new-creation;²²⁶ yet, contrary to Judisch's claim, they were connected not only by using humanistic tools but also by adopting scholastic tools, such as the scholastic method of ratiocination. Accordingly Junius retained Aquinas's threefold division of the Mosaic law as moral, judicial, and ceremonial kinds, yet he refined them in these ways: Junius presented the moral law as a revelation of an uncorrupted natural law, the judicial law as a manifestation of God's perfect legal reasoning, and the ceremonial law as a prefiguration of divine actions to be fulfilled by Christ, and by Christ alone. There are no surprising factors here, of course—as a Reformed theologian Junius saw the flow of redemptive history as a covenantal pathway that moved from *promissio*, through *foedus*, to *testamentum*, which regulated the moral order of God's people in different circumstances.²²⁷ Hence Bruce P. Baugus was correct to state that Junius with his "humanist commitment to *ad fontes* scholarship with scholastic rigor" understood the concept of *foedus* in the light of the biblical terms בְּרִית (*berith*) and διαθήκη (*diatheke*) and utilized it in his

225. Junius, *De politiae Mosis observatione*, thesis 31 (p. 377); cf. Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, 125.

226. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 271–75.

227. Sarx, *Franciscus Junius d. Ä. (1545–1602)*, 196.

exposition of law and gospel.²²⁸ In this regard, Reformed covenantal concepts occupy a prominent place in Junius's thought, as they governed his reception and appropriation of medieval scholastic ideas, including Aquinas's.

228. Baugus, "Covenant Theology in the Dutch Reformed Tradition," 384–86.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

8.1 Summary of Arguments

The main question that drove this project pertained to how Junius's theology refined, retained, or rejected Aquinas's moral concepts.¹ To the question, through six main body chapters, the argument has been made that the Thomistic ideas in Junius's moral thought were refined, revised, and reorganized according to the Reformed conceptions of nature and grace, which reflected distinct accounts of the orders of human action and divine action. Following the introductory chapter the second chapter treated the basic structure of human action as conceived by Junius, and in it three areas were examined: firstly, the structure of reality in his thought; secondly, the natural and supernatural order in relation to human action; lastly, the internal order between intellect and will. Examinations of these areas made it evident that Junius adopted Thomistic ideas in framing the moral order in terms of rational motion, relation, and perfection. Hence the structure of human action in Junius's moral thought is reason's causal, mereological, and teleological movement toward both natural and supernatural *verum* and *bonum*, which determined the proper ends of human action. In this sense truth was essential to a moral life—Junius believed that human action could be properly ordered, arranged, and executed only when it is moved by and terminated at truth. In other words, Junius defined human *ratio* as the principle of *actio*, subordinated human *ratio* to the divine *actio*, and conformed human *ratio* to the created *ordo*. In so doing, Junius presented a system of moral thought that situated human *ethica* in the context of divine *politica*, *oeconomia*, and *rhetorica*, such that human perfection was formulated in the context of God's sovereign distribution of supernatural wisdom and blessings (*oeconomia*) through his word (*rhetorica*) until the saints

1. As noted in the introduction, considerations of the extent to which Scotistic ideas were utilized and modified by Junius require a separate research project, and the present dissertation was specifically focused on Aquinas's influences on Junius.

arrive at his dwelling place, heavenly kingdom (*politica*). The end result was that, in Junius's moral thought, law was conceptually connected to *actio*, *revelatio*, *ordo*, *ratio*, and *relatio* in a realist and an intellectualist framework, which altogether explained various layers of *perfectio*.

The third chapter covered the nature and role of eternal law in relation to human action, or better, in relation to moral action itself. In his section on eternal law Junius explicitly mentioned that he was echoing the voice of "the scholastics," and this raised an obvious question: which scholastics? The scholastics in the Thomistic, the Scotistic, or any other tradition? Judging from Junius's views on the being of God, it was clear that Junius's pattern of argumentation was predominantly Thomistic: for instance, Junius, in a Thomistic fashion, grounded the immutability of eternal law in the simplicity, actuality, and eternity of divine essence; and second, he understood eternal law as divine concept, idea, or reason. Junius did not alter the ways in which eternal law relates to both divine essence and divine mind as far as Thomistic concepts are concerned, but he used various verbs such as transmitting, impressing, emanating, tempering, stamping, concealing, and circumvesting to capture different nuances and modes of divine communication. Moreover, this chapter provided analyses concerning what function eternal law played in Junius's theology of law, and the provided answer was that in his moral thought eternal law was the rational, formal, and immutable foundation of moral order. It was the *exemplar*, *ratio*, and *terminus* of all moral order, as it is the archetypal source and reference of moral righteousness.

The fourth chapter was on natural law. Junius, like Aquinas, formulated his theology of natural law by situating it against the background of eternity and temporality, divine economy and human ontology, and natural revelation and natural theology. To him natural law is God's communicative and legislative act of ordering human creatures toward the proper ends of their actions, the ends of which were explained by the threefold inclinations of human nature. Moreover, in Junius's ethical system, the activities of reason cannot be understood

independently from the condition of nature. Better put, epistemological acts are always considered in relation to one's ontological conditions. Natural law in Junius's thought is fundamentally God's act of conceptual revelation and relation—God through natural law communicates basic moral truths to all human beings and in so doing he orders, relates, and arranges them toward the common good. Therefore the value of Junius's natural law doctrine, as is often the case with many early modern natural law theories, is that the role of *truth* is central in ethics. To be moral is to know truth; to be a moral agent is to be a perceiver and communicator of truth. The cognitive act of a moral agent is always a constitutive part of a moral action, and Junius, like Aquinas, saw proper ratiocination as key to the order of moral actions. In summary, it was argued that the similarities between Aquinas and Junius on natural law are most manifestly discoverable in four areas—the inclinations, notions, participation, and limitations of natural law. These considerations provided an important background to his expositions of divine, human, and Mosaic laws and, more fundamentally, to his formulations of the relationship between nature and grace.

The fifth chapter examined Junius's conception of divine law, understood as the regulative principle of supernatural communication between God and human beings. To answer the question concerning how Junius refined, retained, or rejected Aquinas's notion of grace in relation to revelation and redemption, this chapter provided an argument that Junius, while understanding the role of grace in terms of causal, dispositional, and spiritual acts, nonetheless modified Aquinas's conception of supernatural communication on Christological, soteriological, and anthropological grounds. This means that Junius critically appropriated Aquinas's framework in viewing the supernatural ordering of nature through the categories of infusion, disposition, and cognition, yet, as a Reformed theologian, he modified these concepts to suit the assumptions of *finitum non capax infiniti* and sovereign grace. To support the thesis it was first of all pointed out that four key ideas were interwoven in Junius's account of the

substance of divine law: inspiration, infusion, disposition, and ratiocination. One of the fundamental patristic and scholastic insights that Junius appropriated here was the twofold causal principle, namely that the effects of natural power will only generate two kinds of effects: those that are “equivalent to the power of an efficient cause” or those that are “lesser and not at all equal to an efficient cause.”² By using these causal notions Junius emphatically and consistently asserted that, due to the finitude of nature’s power, perception or acquisition of the supernatural good will not be possible by an ungraced or an unglorified nature. Yet, Junius’s theology of the substance of divine law cannot be fully understood without understanding his “Reformed” convictions, as even when he followed Aquinas’s pattern of infusion-disposition-cognition in discussing the relationship between nature and grace, he nonetheless used them under the guiding principles of divine sovereignty, human depravity, as well as other revised epistemological concepts. In this regard, Junius’s theology of grace hinges on all the revised—and reformed—doctrines of faith, Christ, Scripture, and glorification that had profound epistemological implications.

Upon considering the issues of nature and grace in Junius’s thought, the sixth chapter covered how Junius conceived the nature and role of human law. Aquinas argued that “the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts.”³ As reason is the rule and measure of human acts, human law pertains to human reason: Aquinas regarded the immutable bases of human law as the common and universal truths of reason, which are known and knowable through natural law. Against this background, this chapter attempted to provide a justifiable answer to the question as to how Junius refined, received, or rejected Aquinas’s views on human law. The answer was that in Junius’s understanding of human law the Thomistic *duplex ratio* has been recast in light of the Calvinistic *duplex regnum*. In other

2. Franciscus Junius, *The Life of Franciscus Junius* in Franciscus Junius, *A Treatise on True Theology: With the Life of Franciscus Junius*, trans. David C. Noe (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2014), 165.
 3. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981), IaIIae, q. 90, a. 1, co.

words, the revised accounts of nature and grace as demonstrated in previous chapters shaped Junius's understanding of the role of human law, as well as the roles of church and state, in a way that reflects both Thomistic and Calvinistic trajectories: Junius divided reason into natural and supernatural kinds, which resembles Aquinas's pattern of thought, and he affixed them to the institutional governance of human morals, which reflects Calvin's view of the church-and-state relationship. Junius identified the purposes of two administrative bodies (i.e., state and church) with the contents of twofold reason (i.e., natural and supernatural notions) to the extent that their institutional purposes, authorities, and powers were clearly distinguished according to the twofold rationale. Junius did not, unlike Aquinas, regard the superiority of the ecclesiastical administration over the political, but instead, like Calvin, saw them as distinct and distant. This means that Junius's ideas on the finality, legitimacy, boundary, and authority of human law express an integration of both Thomistic and Calvinistic concepts on nature and grace, integrity and depravity, and creational and eschatological order, which were formulated along the lines of the twofold order, twofold source, and twofold administration. All of these subtle distinctions, however, were nuanced descriptions of the work pertaining to reason, as Junius, like Aquinas, believed that reason is the principle of human actions.

The last chapter, which presupposed all of these prior discussions on eternal, natural, divine, and human laws, examined the underlying Thomistic ideas in Junius's exposition of the Mosaic law. By examining Junius's formulations of the substance of the Mosaic law, it was argued that Junius's understanding of the law of Moses expressed a modified version of Aquinas's theology in this significant way: the metaphysical as well as the historical account of the moral order prescribed in the Mosaic law were explained through the Adamic, Abrahamic, and Christological realities in Junius's thought. The acknowledgement of the church's substantial connection and teleological progression in the Old and the New Covenants was strongly affirmed by Aquinas, who, by using Moses and Aristotle, provided a sophisticated

account of the perfection of *populus Dei* in different circumstances. What was different and distinct in Junius's treatment of this issue, however, ultimately pertained to the law-and-gospel paradigm: to him law in the moral sense refers to the precepts of righteousness, whereas gospel refers to the provision of righteousness in Christ Jesus; in the covenantal sense, law refers to the Old Covenant, and gospel to the New Covenant. Accordingly, Junius retained Aquinas's threefold division of the Mosaic law—moral, judicial, and ceremonial kinds—while at the same time refining them in these subtle ways: Junius presented the moral law as a revelation of an uncorrupted natural law, the judicial law as a manifestation of God's perfect legal reasoning, and the ceremonial law as a prefiguration of divine actions to be fulfilled by Christ, and by Christ alone. Again, he did so by using covenantal categories, specifically the covenant realities revealed in Adam, Abraham, and Christ, and consequently he successfully retained and refined this scholastic maxim: "the judicial commands of Moses are dead and the ceremonial ones are deadly."⁴

8.2 Evaluations of Junius's Moral Theology

All of the arguments mentioned above provide sufficient materials for at least two evaluative comments about Junius's moral theology. First of all, in Junius's framework of moral theology, doctrinal truths are postulated as theological predications about divine actions—in short, theological truths are fundamentally determined by God's words about God's works. In his mind there is no separation between truth and action, as doctrines are fundamentally true predications about divine actions, and, more fundamentally, as they are means of divine actions. Thus all the creational, providential, soteriological, and eschatological actions by God are captured and confessed as doctrines—creation, justification, and glorifications are all about true predications about divine actions. This is a distinct character that Junius manifests as a

4. Franciscus Junius, *The Mosaic Polity*, trans. Todd M. Rester (Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2015), 125.

Thomistic thinker, for whom the being of God—not only the work of God—was designated as pure act, *actus purus*. Junius inherited this tradition of thought and, as a result, truths were understood as reason's ordered perceptions, predications, and pronouncements about divine actions. Hence, according to Junius, theological knowledge bears not merely a rational character, but profoundly a moral one, as the causes, contents, and consequences of theological knowledge all revolve around moral righteousness. Theology, he would argue, is ultimately the wisdom of true piety. It is in this sense the impact of Aquinas's concepts is perhaps most manifest, as both thinkers regarded moral theology as a theology that provides a true account of the ways in which *ratio*, *revelatio*, *ordo*, and *actio* interrelate on the theme of righteousness.

Secondly, Junius's appropriation of Thomistic ideas in his moral thinking was sharply refined through Reformation ideas. The uniqueness of Junius's moral thought compared to Aquinas's—and by extension to the Roman Catholic appropriations of Aquinas—boils down to a mature development of Reformed prolegomenal, anthropological, Christological, and soteriological convictions. In other words, there is little difference between Aquinas and Junius on the way they viewed God's ontology in eternity, but significant differences can be seen in the way they viewed God's economy (or work) in time. The reason, in a nutshell, is because they conceived the relationship between nature and grace differently. Therefore the most significant—and the irreconcilable—differences between Junius's and Aquinas's conceptions of human action come from their understandings of nature and grace, despite their employment of similar concepts and patterns of arguments in their expositions of law, order, and action.

Because of this, the overall Thomistic concepts in Junius's moral thought cannot be designated as pure, but mixed, as they are modified by the distinctive theological convictions of the Reformed tradition; the story of Junius's reception, retention, and refinement of Thomistic ideas can only be adequately told if it is presented as a modified Thomism. Nonetheless, considering the proportion of Aquinas's ideas embedded in his theology, it is

appropriate to designate Junius as a Thomist in the Reformed tradition, who fortified the moral bedrock of Reformed theology by using a wide range of Thomistic concepts. In this regard, to everyone who aspires to be Thomistic with their broader Reformed convictions, Junius provides an exemplary model of such system, outlook, and vision. His theology has the power to attract many students even today as he perceptively systematized, established, and preserved the catholicity of Reformed theology that was passed onto him after barely fifty years of the Reformation.⁵ Furthermore, due to the intimate connection between divine actions and human actions in his theology, Junius's Reformed dogmatics can teach contemporary theologians a great deal about Reformed ethics.

5. Muller writes: "In no small measure, we have the nearly two hundred years of scholastic orthodoxy to thank for the preservation of the barely fifty years of theological achievement that was the Reformation. Without the establishment and successful defense of this confessional orthodoxy in the Reformed churches, the reform efforts of Bucer, Zwingli, Calvin, Bullinger, and their contemporaries would probably have registered in the pages of Western history as an evanescent movement long ago vanished from the face of the earth rather than as the foundation of an institutional form of Christianity." Richard A. Muller, *After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 46.

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