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Oligarchical Populism; The Analysis of President Joko Widodo's Political Communication

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Abstract. There are two perspectives toward the appearance of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) to a national political field. The first impression represents optimism towards political decentralization in Indonesia is by addressing Jokowi as a populist figure who can be a politician from a regional area to a capital city. Then, the second impression represents the oligarchy thesis, which is called the rise of Jokowi to a national political landscape because of oligarchies firmly rooted in Indonesia. This study aims to analyze Jokowi's political communication through populism and oligarchy framework, and the domination of both. This study uses the transformative critical paradigm with the critical discourse analysis (CDA) Teun. A van Dijk's model as method. The communication of Jokowi's politics related to corruption eradication, investment escalation, and freedom of expression are analyzed critically by using that method. The result reveals that Jokowi is under two political concepts which contrast to one another, namely populism and oligarchy. These concepts make Jokowi a weak figure who fights the oligarchy's will. Consequently, Jokowi is not sincerely fighting the KPK's weakening strategy, inconsistency in developing investment, and the non-sense statement about freedom of expression. In this case, Jokowi (a populist) is being in the oligarchs' co-optation or 'oligarchical populism'.

Keywords. oligarchy, populism, political communication, oligarchical populism, Joko Widodo

1. Introduction

There are two perspectives from researchers and scholars' parties related to the appearance of Joko Widodo, who is familiarly known as Jokowi, who joins the national political field. The first common impression of the Jokowi's appearance as a part of democratization through centered and region decentralization through a direct head regional election system. This view is correlated with Mieznar (2015), Hamid (2014), and Mas'udi (2017 and 2019). The Jokowi's success of becoming a Major of Solo for two terms through the populist approach is considered a trigger for him to join the national political field until he finally becomes the number one person in Indonesia.

The second view sees the appearance of Jokowi as part of the oligarchic intervention in political practice in Indonesia. This view considers that Jokowi's rise to the national political stage through the Regional Head Election (Pilkada) for the Jakarta Capital Special Region (DKI Jakarta) in 2012 and then the 2014 Presidential Election (Pilpres) because of oligarchs'

contribution (Winters, 2013; Tapsell, 2015; Hadiz and Robison, 2013; Fukuoka and Djani, 2016).

The appearance of Jokowi becomes a new political phenomenon in Indonesia. Jokowi successfully has a remarkable speed of his rise in his political career even though he comes from a non-elite group. He became a city mayor of Solo for two terms (2005-2010 and 2010-2012), winning DKI Jakarta regional head election in 2012, shortly after that winning a presidential election in 2014, then winning again as a president for the second term in 2019. Jokowi is not like any other politicians with backgrounds from the central elite, whether it is an elite party or other power elites. Jokowi is also not a member of rich group. Jokowi gives a big hope for the emergence of a new era in democracy reformation in Indonesia. It is because the previous presidents come from an established elite group. However, shortly after he led, Jokowi shows that he is involved in oligarchy co-optation, making him join a national political field (Muhtadi, 2015, p. 350).

1.1 Jokowi as a Populist

There is no definitive conception of populism yet. Some researchers who focused on populism studies still have different understanding related to the definition of populism. These differences cannot be separated from the approach in understanding populism as a political phenomenon. Mudde (2017, p. 47) and Hawkins (2019) view populism as a set of ideas that positioned society in two opposing groups: pure people versus the corrupt elite. Even though populism seems like an ideology, it differs from other political ideologies, such as liberalism, capitalism, or socialism. Populism is perceived as a thin-centered ideology. Therefore, it always adjoins other ideologies in its practice.

Different from Muffitt (2016), who perceives populism as a political style. Populism is defined as a repertoire that shows people versus elites attraction, bad attitude and critical performance, destruction, or threat (Moffit, 2016, p. 53). On the other hand, Barr (2019, p. 44) and Weyland (2017, p. 80) understand populism as a political strategy through a personalistic leader and mobilized masses. This political strategy approach is too broad in understanding populism. As a result, every politician can be categorized as a populist even through that kind of understanding.

Despite the differences in populism as a political phenomenon, some researchers have categorized Jokowi as a populist, such as Mietzner (2015), Hadiz and Robison (2017), Hamid (2014), and other researchers who implicitly has categorized Jokowi as a populist, like Mas'udi (2017).

Several researchers have written various reasons why they called Jokowi a populist. First, Jokowi is not a part of the central elite group while running for a DKI Jakarta governor election in 2012 and becoming a presidential candidate in 2014 and 2019. Thus, Jokowi is seen as a transformative figure because he is not a part of the established elite group. It is supported by the fact that the elites strongly controlled previous political power (whether political elites or oligarchy).

In terms of power, Jokowi comes from nothing. Jokowi was born in 1961 in Solo, Central Java. A small town that is generally called Surakarta. Jokowi is not a son of a bureaucrat, military man, or someone who has political power. Jokowi was born to a carpenter who is economically a middle-class group. Even more, Jokowi once felt his house evicted when he was a kid (Mietzner, 2015, p. 24).

After graduating from UGM in 1985, Jokowi worked in the country's forestry company in Aceh. Not so long after that, he went back to Solo and created the furniture business. His

business was growing fast and passed through the European export market in the early '90s. Becoming a furniture entrepreneur is Jokowi's track record before entering politics.

Jokowi entered politics for the first time when he ran on Solo regional head election together with F.X. Hadi Rudyatmoko in 2005. This pair was nominated by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), a place where Jokowi has his cadre until now. Jokowi's candidacy takes advantage of central and regional decentralization. The 2005 Regional Head Election (Pilkada) was the first direct election to be held.

Jokowi's political career continued in his second term as a town major of Solo in 2010. Jokowi was winning again with the most significant votes, and he got more than 90% votes. Mas'udi (2017, p. 15) assumes the votes in his second term show that he succeed build political legitimacy by answering the public expectations through transparent government management and meeting people's basic needs primarily because a vacuum of political legitimacy occurred in Solo due to the failure of government management just before Jokowi's winning.

Success in building political legitimacy in Solo made Jokowi's political career rise to the central government level by becoming the Governor of the Capital Region of Jakarta, which became a national politics' barometer in 2012. Then, he won the Presidential Election in 2014 and 2019.

The rise of Jokowi's political career to the central government level brought a new phenomenon in the practice of politics in Indonesia because the succession of national politics usually comes from the established elite group, whether they are political elite, military group, or other power elite, such as oligarchy. Jokowi has changed that dominance and made his self-image known as a populist. It is because he comes from the common ordinary people, not from the elite group (Hamid, 2014 p. 94).

Second, Jokowi's appearance becomes a criticism of previous government condition, which was considered to have failed to meet public expectations. Jokowi appears to offer a solution to the dissatisfaction. Mas'udi (2017) mentioned that there had been a legitimacy vacuum in the previous government, so that Jokowi was present to fill that void. This legitimacy vacuum has been seen since Jokowi became a candidate for Mayor of Solo in 2005. At that time, the leadership in Solo was being delegitimized and provoked dissatisfaction in society. Jokowi is here to fill that legitimacy by offering programs that can restore people's satisfaction with government management.

Likewise, when he ran for the 2012 DKI Jakarta governor election. Jokowi also offered practical steps for the dissatisfaction that the society had felt due to the previous government's failure. Therefore, Jokowi who is not part of Jakarta's elite group is considered an alternative leader candidate for the capital. The elite group in Jakarta is already associated with the problem; therefore, people set high expectations on Jokowi to solve the problem (Hamid, 2014, p. 94-96).

The same thing happened when he ran for president in 2014. His presence was also a critique of public dissatisfaction with the previous leadership, namely President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who led Indonesia for two terms before Jokowi (Mietzner, 2014, p. 113). Although SBY's leadership for two terms did not bring any setbacks, his second leadership term has provoked much dissatisfaction in society. This is because SBY prioritized political stability to maintain the status quo rather than creating policy transformations.

Third, Jokowi's populism is established on a crisis of trust in the political elite and corruption. Before Jokowi's appearance into the national political landscape, the institutionalized political elite in political parties created distrust in society. Many people were disappointed with the performance of political parties which institutionally function as their representatives. Political elites are even associated with corruption (Hamid, 2014, p. 96). The

second term of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's leadership as president was also associated with the same value. Various corruption scandals that befell the cadres party have caused disappointment and even distrust in the society (Mietzner, 2014, p. 113).

Fourth, as Mietzner (2015) described, Jokowi presents a new style of populism, namely as a technocratic populist. The pragmatism that exists in Jokowi has presented a political style that is oriented towards the efficiency of practical problem-solving rather than mere demagoguery. Jokowi also often makes sudden work visits (*blusukan*) to illustrate that he prioritizes actual work activity rather than becoming a loudly empty vessel. This model effectively convinces society because the previous leader was described as someone who only good at talking rather than improving performance. This makes it possible for Jokowi to identify himself as part of the people without openly confronting the elite, even the oligarchs. Jokowi can also bring out the sense of ordinary people in himself without attacking the wealthy elite. (Mietzner, 2015, p. 3).

1.2 Jokowi as a Part of Oligarchy

Winters (2013) build a concept about oligarchy through a power resource theory. Power resource theory believes that all societies have the power hierarchy, starting from tiny ones or almost no power until the most significant power. Winters (2013) divides power resource theory from the biggest to the smallest in five categories: power in formal politics, power due to official positions (inside or outside the government), coercive power, mass mobilization power, and material power. Material power which is distributed exclusively and concentrated to a few people, is the oligarchy basis. Meanwhile, the other four powers are categorized as elite (Winters, 2013, h. 3).

Material power is a versatile power and can be used to trigger other categories of resource power. Material power can be political power, law, mobilization, or even encourage coercive power. Even so, there will be difficulties in examining the influence of the oligarchy on other powers. Because oligarchic actors can be passive and even stay away from the political process, however, their material wealth works for certain political practices to defend themselves (Winters, 2013, p. 4). For example, an oligarchic actor may provide funds for the political elite's interests, while the oligarch stays silent and even stays away as if he is not in the political arena.

In Indonesia, the appearance of oligarchy began to be seen since the New Order era under the control of President Soeharto. This is in line with capitalism's growth, which is centered on the expansion of personal wealth (Hadiz and Robison, 2013, p. 37). In this context, Hadiz and Robison (2013) conceptualize oligarchy based on the theoretical framework of the political-economic structure, which perceives oligarchy as a system of power relations that concentrates on wealth and defense authority (Hadiz and Robison, 2013, p. 37-38).

This oligarchic practice continued even though the New Order had fallen in 1998. The transition to the reform era marked by the fall of the New Order era only made the oligarchs adapt to the current democratic system. The oligarchs only need to rearrange how they maintain their material wealth from relying on Suharto as the controller of the New Order or sultanistic oligarchy towards control of political electoral. It is adjusting to the current political system (Hadiz and Robison, 2013; Winters, 2013; Fukuoka, 2013).

The collapse of the new order is also referred to as the collapse desired by a group of oligarchs who no longer feel comfortable with Suharto's leadership. The Cendana family, which represents the Suharto family, is considered a threat to oligarchs defending their wealth. Especially when Suharto prepared his son in political succession to take his place (Winters, 2013, p. 7-8).

Likewise, the appearance of Jokowi is phenomenal because of his populist figure. Jokowi is also part of the way the oligarchy remains in power during political dynamics changing. Jokowi, who comes from outside the elite group with high electability, becomes a way for the oligarchs to stay in power. Fukuoka and Djani (2016) understand the Jokowi phenomenon as a new way for oligarchs to adapt to keep political domination practices in maintaining their wealth. The appearance of Jokowi has changed the power structure, which has made the political clientelistic pattern no longer effective. Thus, Jokowi was co-opted by the oligarchs as a new way to maintain political dominance in the post-clientelist phase. Such as the adaptation of the oligarchy from sultanism in the New Order era to an electoral oligarchy when it entered the reformation period (Winters, 2013, p. 5).

The first oligarchs who saw the potential in Jokowi were Prabowo Subianto and his younger brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo. The two brothers played the decisive role behind Jokowi's appearance in the national political landscape. Prabowo and Hashim are two brothers who control the source of material wealth, and therefore, both are part of the oligarchic group in Indonesia (Winters, 2013, p. 18).

Prabowo fought for Jokowi so that he could run for the Jakarta Special Capital Region election in 2012. Prabowo, the General Chair of the Gerindra Party, lobbied Megawati Soekarnoputri directly, the General Chair of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) as the party for Jokowi's cadre. Through Jokowi, Prabowo had ambitions to win the DKI Jakarta Pilkada as electoral domination in preparing the presidential nomination that he had planned in the 2014 Presidential Election. As the nation's capital, Jakarta is a barometer of national politics. Prabowo paired Jokowi with Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (a.k.a Ahok), who at that time was a cadre of the Gerindra Party. Prabowo took a big part in winning Jokowi as Governor of DKI Jakarta (Winters, 2013, p. 14). This was because only oligarchs with their wealth can make Jokowi a potential candidate (Winters, 2013, p. 14; Tapsell, 2015, p. 36).

Earlier before the presidential election in 2014, Jokowi and Prabowo's relationship changed. Jokowi, with high electability value, is running as a presidential candidate, leaving his position as Governor of DKI Jakarta. Meanwhile, Prabowo remains with his plan to run as a presidential candidate. Prabowo and Jokowi, who supported each other in the DKI Jakarta Regional Head Election, finally split. Both are running as presidential candidates in the 2014 presidential election head-to-head. Even so, breaking up a partnership with Prabowo does not necessarily make Jokowi free from the oligarchic group. Jokowi moved from one oligarchic group to another. Jusuf Kalla, who was his representative at the time, was also an oligarch.

Based on Tapsell's records (2015), at least four oligarch media were directly affiliated with Jokowi's candidacy for president in the 2014 presidential election. They were Surya Paloh, who is the owner of Metro TV and the General Chair of the National Democratic Party (NasDem); Dahlan Iskan, who at that time was the owner of the Jawa Pos Group; James Riady, owner of BeritaSatu, Jakarta Globe, and Lippo Group; and Sofyan Wanandi who is a wealthy businessman who still has relation to The Jakarta Post, an Indonesian daily newspaper published in English (Tapsell, 2015, p. 47).

Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, a retired Indonesian National Armed Forces, chose to leave the Golkar Party to support Jokowi, who was paired with Jusuf Kalla. Golkar, at that time, was in the supporting coalition group of Prabowo, who was paired with Hatta Rajasa. Luhut is also an oligarch by controlling the mining business through his business group, Toba Sejahtera Group. Then, Luhut occupied various ministerial positions and heads of institutions and dominantly appeared in the government cabinet formed by Jokowi.

In the second term, more and more oligarchs supported Jokowi. The Mining Advocacy Network noted that the 2019 presidential election marked Jokowi's second term as a president

as a competition between oligarchs. In the 2019 presidential election, Jokowi is still head-to-head with Prabowo. There were 11 mining and energy oligarchs behind Jokowi, who is paired with Ma'ruf Amin. Those were more than amount of eight mining and energy oligarchs on Prabowo's side (who was paired with Sandiaga Uno).

The mining and energy oligarchy behind Jokowi in the 2019 presidential election is Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, who has supported Jokowi since the first term. Luhut then filled the position as a Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, a position that was prone to conflicts of interest with his business. In addition, there is Fachrur Razi, a retired Army General who served as Minister of Religion before being replaced by Yaqut Cholil Qoumas. There is Surya Paloh who has been a supporter of Jokowi since the first term through his NasDem Party. Wahyu Sakti Trenggono who currently serves as the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. Harry Tanoesoedibjo, Chairman of the Perindo Party who placed his daughter, Angela Tanoesoedibjo as Deputy Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy. Previously, in the presidential election 2014, Harry Tanoesoedibjo was a supporter of Prabowo.

In addition, there is Jusuf Kalla, who previously served as Jokowi's vice president in the first term. Aburizal Bakrie, a senior politician of the Golkar Party. In the presidential election of 2014, Aburizal supported Prabowo. Then there are also Oesman Sapta Oedang, Andi Syamsudin Arsyad and Suaidi Marasabessy and Jusuf Hamka who are the mining and energy entrepreneurs behind Jokowi's victory.

Meanwhile, the mining and energy oligarchs in the Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno side are Prabowo and Sandiaga themselves. Both are known for having several companies engaged in mining and energy. Furthermore, there is Hasyim Djojohadikusumo, Prabowo's younger brother. Hutomo Mandala Putra is also known as Tommy Suharto, son of former President Suharto, who led during the New Order era. Sudirman Said served as a Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources at the beginning of Jokowi's leadership in the first term. Ferry Mursyidan Baldan also served as Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning at the beginning of Jokowi's first leadership term. Zulkifli Hasan, Chairman of the National Mandate Party (PAN) and Maher Al-Gadrie.

The oligarchy in Jokowi's second government increased with the joining of Prabowo and Sandiaga into the cabinet. Prabowo served as a Minister of Defense, and Sandiaga Uno served as Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, replacing Wishnutama.

1.3 Political Communication

According to McNair (2011, p. 4), political communication is communication about politics with a specific intention or purpose. This definition includes all forms of communication carried out by politicians and other political actors to achieve specific goals, communications directed to political actors by non-politicians, and communications related to the activities of political actors, including media coverage. This definition divides political communication into three elements, namely political organization, media, and society. Three of which are connected to each other in the form of communication.

Perloff (2014) defines political communication as the process of using language and symbols by leaders, the media, or citizens that give an intentional or unintentional effect on individual political cognition, attitudes, or behavior or on public policy. This definition has five basic assumptions about political communication. First, it is political communication as a process. Second, political communication focused on the use of words and symbols. Third, there are three main actors in political communication, namely the elite, the media, and the public. Fourth, the effects of political communication can be intentional or unintentional. Fifth, the political communication effect occurred at various levels (Perloff, 2014, p. 30-33).

2. Methodology

This study uses a transformative critical paradigm to criticize Jokowi's political communication and reveal the oligarchic domination behind it. Neuman (2014, p. 110-111) perceives that research with a critical paradigm or what he calls critical social science aims to criticize and or even change social relations by revealing the power domination that causes inequality. Creswell (2014, p. 12) mentions that the research with a critical paradigm or what he calls a transformative worldview has an action agenda to reform social order. Therefore, critical paradigm research which activist-oriented is based on political morals.

Meanwhile, the analytical method used in this research is the critical discourse analysis (CDA) in the Teun A. Van Dijk model. Jokowi's political communication text related to the dynamics that emerged as a result of the revision of Law number 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK Law), the creation of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation and freedom of expression were critically analyzed by using van Dijk's CDA model. CDA on Van Dijk model pays attention to social cognition in understanding discourse and its relation to social practice. Social cognition is seen as a part that can explain the relationship between text and complex contexts (Dijk, 2015).

3. Results and discussion

Jokowi's political communication as the country's leader shows an inner turmoil within himself between the influence of populism in him and the oligarchy's interests. Such as Jokowi's political communication regarding the revision of Law number 30 of 2002 to Law number 19 of 2019 concerning on Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK Law) which led to the weakening of the KPK's performance as an institution that eradicates corruption, Jokowi's political communication regarding the formation of the Law of Omnibus Law number 11 of 2020 on Job Creation which is considered full of oligarchic interests and Jokowi's political communication related to freedom of speech as a representation of a democratic country.

3.1 Revision of the KPK Law and Jokowi's Weak Figure

In the field of corruption eradication, Jokowi has shown disappointing political communication. Appearing as a clean figure because he comes from a non-elite group that has been associated with corruption, Jokowi, in his leadership, has actually weakened the efforts to eradicate corruption through the revision of Law No. 30 of 2002 on Corruption Eradication Commission or known as the KPK Law. Nevertheless, the revision of the law is not necessarily Jokowi's will. Jokowi's political communications during the revision controversy show that he is in a battle between following the will of the public as part of his populist figure or following the will of a handful of elites, including the oligarchs who want the law revised.

Jokowi was more lenient and considering issuing a Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) when massive demonstrations and resistance to the revision of the law occurred. Previously, Jokowi was said to have refused to issue a Perppu to thwart the revision of the KPK Law, which had already been passed by the House of Representatives (DPR) in a hurry. Jokowi's statement regarding his consideration of issuing a Perppu following the people's demands was conveyed after he met some community leaders, ranging from academics to humanists, at the Merdeka Palace on Thursday, September 26, 2019 (Syambudi, 2019).

However, Jokowi never realized the plan he had considered. Jokowi decided not to issue a Perppu and allowed the KPK Law to be revised. Jokowi follows the will of a few people around him rather than following the will of the people who are delivered through massive rejections and demonstrations (Hakim and Galih, 2019).

There are 26 points in the revision of the law that could weaken the authority of the KPK as an institution that focuses on dealing with corruption cases. Among them is the weakening of the institutional independence of the KPK because it places the KPK as an institution under the executive family. KPK employees have the status of State Civil Apparatus (ASN), which can put the employee's independence at risk in practice because they are related to appointments, shifts, and mutations when carrying out their duties. In addition, the existence of a Supervisory Board that has technical authority is considered to interfere with the performance of investigators. The Supervisory Board must approve wiretapping, rummage, and confiscation in the handling of cases. This causes the flow of case handling to take so much time. In this context, the arrest operation (OTT) against corrupt officials using wiretapping will be difficult to carry out. The existence of the authority to issue a Notice of Termination of Investigation (SP3) which creates a loophole to manipulate the case. Previously, the SP3 mechanism at the KPK could be pursued by pretrial (Ramadhan and Meiliana, 2019).

The concern over the weakening of the KPK through the revision of the law was proved. The KPK leadership has issued SP3 for the first time in history to the corruption case of Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance (BLBI) with the conglomerate as a suspect named Sjamsul Nursalim and his wife Itjih Sjamsul Nursalim. Previously, Sjamsul was suspected of causing state money loss of Rp 4.58 trillion in that case. The case also dragged the name of Megawati Soekarnoputri while still serving as a president (Idris, 2021).

The KPK leaders will also fire 51 of the 75 KPK employees who do not pass the National Insight Test (TWK) for State Civil Apparatus (ASN) recruitment. This decision is contrary to Jokowi's will that the test results are not used as a basis for dismissal. The test results provoked controversy because the 75 KPK employees who did not pass the TWK were devoted investigators who have a high commitment to eradicate corruption. The test material also provoked controversy and was purposively created to eliminate employees who have a high commitment to eradicating corruption. In this case, Jokowi shows again that he has no power over the co-optation of the oligarchs.

3.2 Jokowi's Job Creation Law and Inconsistency

Early in his candidacy as a president for the first term, Jokowi showed reluctance to accept foreign investment. This strengthens his position as a populist who shows a nationalist attitude by prioritizing domestic investment. Jokowi showed a very contrasting attitude when he entered his second term. In his presidential speech after the inauguration ceremony as a president for the second term on October 20, 2019, Jokowi expressed his desire to enact the Omnibus Law to simplify regulations that will attract much investment in practice, especially foreign investment.

It did not take long for Jokowi's wish to come true. The House of Representatives (DPR) passed the law on October 5, 2020, before Jokowi had completed one year of leadership in his second term. In the process, the law received a rejection, especially from the workers, because many clauses in the draft law cut down workers' rights. Many university students from various cities demonstrated against that law. The two largest religious community organizations in Indonesia, namely Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah also joined their rejection movement. The Omnibus law, which covers many laws, only cares about investors and ignores the rights of ordinary people (Hamdi and Wibowo, 2020).

However, Jokowi did not budge on the rejection from several groups. Unlike Jokowi's attitude at the beginning of becoming a presidential candidate, he has a big ambition to bring in as much foreign investment as possible in his second term. Jokowi even formed the Ministry of Investment with Bahlil Lahadalia as the minister, who formerly served as a Head of the

Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM). Based on the data from the Ministry of Investment or BKPM, investment realization in the first quarter of the January to March 2021 period was IDR 219.7 trillion. It consists of Domestic Investment (PMDN) of IDR 108.0 trillion and Foreign Investment (PMA) of 111.7 trillion. This achievement increased by 4.3 percent compared to the achievement in the first quarter of 2020 and increased by 2.4 percent compared to the achievement in the previous quarter.

It is very normal to associate Omnibus Law with oligarchic interest. Many of the law regulators have business backgrounds, both from the executive and the legislature. Based on the investigation by Tempo and Auriga Nusantara, 262 or 45 percent of 575 members of the People's Representative Council have business backgrounds. They are affiliated with more than a thousand companies, starting from ownership sharing, commissioner positions, directors in the broadcasting sector, general trading, and extractive industries. From that number, 57 were from the PDI-P, 48 from the Golkar Party, 41 from the Gerindra Party, 21 from the NasDem Party, 26 from the PKB, 23 from the Democratic Party, 22 from the PKS, 18 from PAN, and 6 from PPP. Around 147 people are from petahana, while the rest 115 people is a new legislative member. PDI Perjuangan, Golkar, Gerindra, NasDem, PKB, PAN and PPP are parties that supported Omnibus Law and Job Creation Law. The only parties that refused Omnibus Law are Demokrat and PKS.

3.3 Jokowi's Non-Sense Statement and Freedom of Speech

Jokowi's statement provoked controversy when he asked the public to be more active in expressing criticism. This statement contradicts the current situation. Jokowi delivered this statement while delivering a speech in the Annual Report of the Republic of Indonesia Ombudsman on February 8, 2021. Jokowi asked people to be more active in conveying criticism, input, and potential maladministration related to public services.

Jokowi made this statement at a time when the level of freedom of speech in Indonesia was declining. Since 2017, Freedom House, a non-profit organization based in Washington DC, the United States, has categorized Indonesia as a partially free country with a score of 65. Indonesia's score continues to decline in 2018 to 64, 2019 to 62, 2020 to 61, and 2021 to 59. As a result, Indonesia is still a partially free country until now. Civil liberties contributed to the decline in Indonesia's score as a democracy. Other than that, corruption cases are still rampant and systemic, discriminating, practicing violence, and participating in politics.

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 2020 report indicates the same thing. Indonesia's democracy index is low. Indonesia is ranked 64th globally with a score of 6.30. From the five civil liberty categories, political culture and civil liberties have the lowest score. With this score, democracy in Indonesia is considered as a flawed democracy.

The Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SafeNet) report shows that freedom of expression in the digital space is still becoming the primary concern. In 2018, there were 25 cases of criminalization of internet users due to their expression on the internet. In 2019 it decreased to 24 cases. In 2020 it jumped to 84 cases. The sentence report is related to the Electronic Information and Transactions Act Law (UU ITE). Clause 28 paragraph 2 on hate speech, Clause 27 paragraph 3 on defamation, and Clause 28 paragraph 1 on consumer hoaxes are the most widely used law clauses. The clause is considered ambiguous and is widely used by various parties to criminalize people.

The Freedom House report also shows that freedom in the digital space in Indonesia has decreased from year to year. In 2016 the score for Indonesia was 56, in 2017 it was 53, in 2018 it was 54, in 2019 it was 51, and in 2020 it was 49, which was the lowest point ever. One of the

causes of the decreased freedom in the digital space is the violation of user rights because of the ITE Law.

After the public widely discussed the ITE Law because it became a criminalization tool in the digital space, Jokowi expressed his desire to revise the law if it is not implemented with the principle of justice. Jokowi is aware that there are ambiguous clauses that are often used to criminalize. However, the relevant ministries under Jokowi are not serious in implementing Jokowi's directives regarding the revision of the ITE Law. If it is not revised, Jokowi's statement as head of state will be meaningless.

Regardless of that issue, the condition of press freedom in Indonesia is getting better from year to year. Based on the world press freedom index issued by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) on the rsf.org page, press freedom in Indonesia is getting better even though its ranking is still far below. In 2019 Indonesia was ranked 124th out of 180 countries with a score of 36.77. In 2020, Indonesia was ranked 119th with a score of 36.82. In 2021 Indonesia will be in 113th place with a score of 37.40.

3.4 Oligarchical Populism

The description above shows that Jokowi is in two opposing political concepts. On the one hand, Jokowi seeks to maintain his character as a populist who is oriented to the people's will in his political concept. On the other hand, Jokowi is powerless to repress the oligarchs' will as his political backers. In populism concept, oligarchy is part of what is identified as a common enemy by the society or 'pure people.' In Jokowi's case, the people and the oligarchs should be in opposite positions and facing each other. On the contrary, they merge and complement each other. In fact, based on Tapsell's (2015) writings, oligarchs play a significant role in building and strengthening Jokowi's image as a populist.

In this context, Jokowi has shown the merging of oligarchs and populism or 'oligarchical populism.' The authors in this journal offer the term 'oligarchical populism' to describe the unification of oligarchy and populism within Jokowi. The two supposedly opposite concepts complement each other, which dominate each other in practice.

4. Conclusion

Even though an oligarchy co-opts Jokowi, he does not necessarily abandon his populist figure in leading the country. Based on political communication related to three aspects of government, which are the policy on the revision of the KPK Law, the establishment of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, and freedom of expression, Jokowi tries to show himself as a populist who follows the will of the people based on political morals.

This action causes the political communication of Jokowi to contradict the current conditions, as in his hesitation in responding to the efforts to weaken the KPK, his contrasting will in increasing the arrival of foreign investment, and the non-sense statement about freedom of expression. Jokowi's political communication is like a pseudo-reality that shows he is still a populist who supports the ordinary people's will to cover up the oligarchic agendas behind him.

Authors' contributions

This article is written by three authors. Andi, S.I.Kom, contributed to preparing the entire manuscript, Anang Sujoko, S.Sos., M.Si., D.COMM, and Wawan Sobari, S.IP., MA., Ph.D. contributed in guiding the entire manuscript preparation. All authors have read and agree to the result.

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Abbreviations

1. CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis
2. Pilkada: Pemilihan Kepala Daerah - Regional Head Election
3. DKI Jakarta: Daerah Ibu Kota Khusus Jakarta – Jakarta Capital Special Region
4. TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia - National Armed Forces
5. Jatam: Jaringan Advokasi Tambang - The Mining Advocacy Network
6. UU: Undang-Undang – Law
7. KPK: Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi - Corruption Eradication Commission
8. Perppu: Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang - Government Regulation in Lieu of Law
9. UU ITE: Undang-Undang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik - Electronic Information and Transactions Act Law
10. DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat - the House of Representatives
11. ASN: Aparatur Sipil Negara - State Civil Apparatus
12. OTT: Operasi Tangkap Tangan - Hand Arrest Operations
13. SP3: Surat Pemberitahuan Penghentian Penyidikan - Notice of Termination of Investigation
14. BLBI: Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia - Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance
15. TWK: Tes Wawasan Kebangsaan - the National Insight Test
16. BKPM: Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal - the Investment Coordinating Board
17. PDI-P: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan - Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
18. Golkar: Partai Golongan Karya – Functional Groups Party
19. Gerindra: Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya – Great Indonesia Movement Party
20. NasDem: Partai Nasional Demokrat – National Democratic Party
21. PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa – National Awakening Party
22. Democrat: Partai Demokrat – Democratic Party
23. PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – Prosperous Justice Party
24. PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional – National Mandate Party
25. PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – United Development Party
26. Perindo: Partai Persatuan Indonesia – Indonesian Unity Party