Did the ACA's "Guaranteed Issue" Provision Cause Adverse Selection into Nongroup Insurance? Analysis using a Copula-Based Hurdle Model

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Abstract

Prior to the ACA, insurance companies could charge higher premiums – or outright deny coverage – to people with preexisting health problems. But the ACA's "guaranteed issue" provision forbids such price discrimination and denials of coverage. This paper seeks to determine whether, after implementation of the ACA, nongroup private insurance plans have experienced adverse selection. Our empirical approach employs a copula-based hurdle regression model, with dependence modeled as a function of dimensions along which adverse selection might occur. Our main finding is that, after implementation of the ACA, nongroup insurance enrollees with preexisting health problems do not appear to exhibit adverse selection. This finding suggests that the ACA's mandate that everyone acquire coverage might have attracted enough healthy enrollees to offset any adverse selection.

JEL Classification: I13; C31

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1 Introduction

This paper seeks to determine whether, after implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), nongroup private insurance plans, whether obtained through the exchanges or elsewhere, have experienced adverse selection along dimensions that insurance companies are now prohibited from using for premium adjustments, particularly preexisting conditions. We introduce a novel empirical approach, based on copula functions, that allows for an investigation of selection effects along multiple dimensions. Our main finding is that, after implementation of the ACA, we *do not* detect evidence of adverse selection into nongroup insurance.

The ACA, passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by President Obama in 2010, placed strict limitations on the types of information that private insurance companies may use to set insurance premiums. In effect, those so-called "community rating" restrictions permit insurance companies to adjust premiums along only the following dimensions: age, location, smoking status, and single/family. Insurance companies may not adjust premiums along other dimensions that might correlate with medical risk, such as gender, race, and preexisting health conditions.

The most noteworthy aspect of community rating, from an actuarial perspective, concerns preexisting health conditions. Prior to the ACA, insurance companies in most states could charge higher premiums – including prices near infinity, effectively denying coverage – to people with preexisting health problems. But the ACA's "guaranteed issue" provision, as it is known, forbids such price discrimination with respect to preexisting health problems. This detail of the ACA has raised concerns about **a certain type of** adverse selection, in which people with preexisting health problems might be most likely to obtain coverage. Such adverse selection would result in a sicker pool of enrollees, eventually requiring higher premiums to cover medical risks.

To reduce the possibility of adverse selection, the ACA includes what has become its most famous, and hotly debated, provision: A mandate that everyone must acquire health insurance.

For people without access to employer-based group coverage, the ACA established state- and federally-operated marketplaces, often called "exchanges," from which people can shop for ACA-compliant plans offered by private insurance companies that participate in the exchanges. Yet despite the mandate, concerns about adverse selection remain, in part because, for many people, penalties for noncompliance fall below prices of insurance through the exchanges.

Simple calculations of mean health care spending, including those reported in this paper, show far larger spending among subjects covered by nongroup insurance, relative to those lacking insurance. But, although striking, those differences in means do not, by themselves, point to the sort of adverse selection that might destabilize nongroup insurance markets. First, some of those differences owe to socioeconomic traits – for example, insured subjects tend to be older than their uninsured counterparts. Second, some of those differences stem from moral hazard, in that insurance lowers the point-of-service cost of obtaining health care, leading to increased spending. But so long as insurance companies can accurately price policies with respect to socioeconomic traits and moral hazard, neither of those first two explanations represents a threat to market stability.

However, the third possible explanation for those differences – adverse selection – is the one that could potentially destabilize nongroup insurance markets. If, for example, subjects with preexisting conditions seek nongroup plans, and if insurance companies no longer may price plans to reflect those medical risks, then premiums for everyone would have to increase, potentially driving out healthier enrollees, and thus destabilizing the nongroup insurance market.

Because the ACA still is a relatively new law, not many studies have investigated this topic. Among the few, Sacks (2018), in a mostly descriptive piece, argues that "it does not appear that large numbers of healthy people are exiting the Marketplaces." By contrast, Panhans (2017) reaches the opposite conclusion using exogenous premium variations in Colorado. **A handful of studies examine the three "insurance for insurers" mechanisms – referred to as risk adjustment, risk corridors, and reinsurance – designed to serve as a last line of defense**

for insurers in the event of adverse selection (Layton, McGuire, and Sinaiko, 2016; Geruso, Layton, and Prinz, 2017). Diamond, Dickstein, McQuade, Persson (2018), while not explicitly a study of adverse selection, investigates the related issue of whether exchange enrollees drop coverage soon after enrolling.

A related strand of literature investigates the Massachusetts health insurance reform, which was enacted in 2006 and served as the template for the ACA. That literature appears to point toward *favorable* selection following the Massachusetts reform, which speaks to the effectiveness of the law's insurance mandate at drawing healthier individuals into the risk pool (Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski, 2015).

The literature on asymmetric information offers several methods to test for adverse selection, but some of them are poorly suited for the topic considered here. For example, one approach is to estimate a regression of medical spending on insurance, and then sequentially add categories of control variables to determine how those controls alter the link between insurance and medical spending (Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2008). While simple, such an exercise depends crucially on the sequence in which those controls are added, with different sequences potentially yielding conflicting findings (Gelbach, 2016).

Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) propose a method for testing for adverse selection, but their approach works best for contracts, like annuities, where moral hazard is expected to be relatively absent. Such is not the case for health insurance contracts. Moreover, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) present a method for isolating adverse selection, but their approach requires information on insurance companies' assessments of individuals' medical risks *as well as* individuals' subjective self-assessments of their own risks. Such information is rarely available for general categories of health care spending.

Instead, we adopt an alternative method that draws inspiration from seminal work on contract theory by Chiappori and Salanié (2000). First, we jointly model nongroup insurance enrollment

and medical spending using a bivariate copula. The control variables in the two marginals include only those dimensions along which the ACA permits premium adjustments. By the logic of Chiappori and Salanié, the dependence parameter from that copula blends the direct effect of insurance on spending and any possible selection effect. We then give the dependence parameter a regression structure based on characteristics that insurance companies are *not* permitted to use in setting premiums. The coefficients attached to those characteristics in the dependence parameter inform upon selection effects along those dimensions. Not only does this approach allow us to detect the possible presence of adverse selection, but it also explicitly handles the commonly-noted, but seldomly-addressed, concern that selection effects, if present, likely occur along multiple dimensions, with potentially different magnitudes and directions (de Meza and Webb, 2001). To that end, our proposed method can be viewed as an extension of the simple test proposed by Chiappori and Salanié (2000).[1]

Our main finding is that, after implementation of the ACA, nongroup insurance enrollees with preexisting health problems do *not* appear to exhibit adverse selection. In fact, we find some evidence, albeit only marginally significant, of *favorable* selection with respect to preexisting conditions. Therefore, despite that the law is still relatively young, and the political climate regarding its support remains somewhat in flux, we conclude that fears of adverse selection seem to have been misplaced.

2 Data

Data used in this study come from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), collected and published by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, a unit of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The MEPS provides nationally-representative, micro-level information on medical spending, insurance status, and health conditions. We focus on the 2015 and 2016

[1] Computationally, we implement our approach by building upon the already-available `R` (R Core Team, 2021) package `GJRM` (Marra and Radice, 2021).

waves of the survey, because those are the most recent waves publicly available at the time of this writing, and also because most of the ACA statutes relevant to this study were fully active by 2015.

To isolate the nongroup private insurance market of interest, the estimation sample focuses on non-elderly adults (18-64) who were never enrolled in Medicaid or Medicare, the two main publicly-operated insurance options in the U.S. The sample also eliminates subjects enrolled in group-based insurance, either through an employer or some other organization, because selection effects for group-based coverage tend to be dominated by selection into employment. Furthermore, even before the ACA, group-based plans rarely engaged in the sorts of denials of coverage central to this study. The final estimation sample includes $n = 6,014$ unique persons.

The main measure of medical spending is the sum of expenses – both out-of-pocket and insurer-reimbursed – for all office-based services during the calendar year. (Almost all non-emergency care in the U.S. requires some form of office-based contact with the medical system, so office-based services provide a broad gauge of medical usage.) The main measure of private insurance coverage is a simple binary indicator for whether the person ever had private nongroup insurance during the calendar year. Based on that measure, approximately 26 percent of the estimation sample had nongroup insurance, while 74 percent lacked any form of coverage, which speaks to the challenges the ACA has confronted in extending coverage to this historically hard-to-insure population.

Table 1 reveals that enrollees of nongroup insurance spend more than their uninsured counterparts. Some of those differences in spending owe to socioeconomic traits; for example, insured subjects tend to be older, which might explain part of their higher spending. Some of those differences might reflect moral hazard, in that insurance lowers the costs of obtaining care, thus leading to higher overall spending. But a third possibility, and the main threat to market stability, is that relatively unhealthy subjects might select themselves into coverage, a phenomenon known as "adverse selection."

Table 1 also attempts to shed light on the awkward distributional shape of annual office-based spending (hereafter referred to as "spending"). First, a relatively large proportion of subjects report zero spending, especially among those lacking insurance. Second, among subjects with positive spending, the distribution shows high skewness, as evidenced by the difference between means and medians. Those distributional quirks are what our copula-based hurdle model, discussed below, seeks to address.

Tables 2 and 3 report sample means for spending and nongroup coverage, partitioned by socioeconomic characteristics that insurers may (Table 2) and may not (Table 3) use for premium adjustments. Although not a formal test for adverse selection, Table 2 suggests adverse selection with respect to age, in the sense that older subjects spend more and have higher rates of nongroup coverage. Similar patterns emerge for married individuals and non-smokers. (Note that, for confidentiality concerns, the MEPS does not release publicly-available measures of location finer than the four broad census regions.) Table 3 suggests adverse selection among females, nonblacks/nonHispanics, and those with chronic conditions.

Most striking, and perhaps least surprising, is that spending appears to increase with chronic health conditions, which are typically long-lasting ailments that require ongoing medical treatment. (To calculate that measure, we sum binary measures for whether the subject has ever received a diagnosis of: a physical limitation, high blood pressure, heart disease, heart attack, stroke, high cholesterol, cancer, diabetes, arthritis, and asthma.)

3 Methodology

This section describes the adopted model (specifically, the main building blocks that make it up), parameter estimation and inference.

3.1 The model

Consider two random variables (Y_{1i}, Y_{2i}), for $i = 1, \ldots, n$, where $Y_{1i} \in \{0, 1\}$, $Y_{2i} \in \{0, \infty\}$, and n represents the sample size. Variable Y_{1i} indicates whether the person has nongroup insurance, whereas Y_{2i} denotes medical spending. Using a parametric copula $C : (0, 1)^2 \to (0, 1)$ the joint cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the two variables could be expressed as (e.g., Sklar, 1973; Marra and Radice, 2017; Radice, Marra and Wojtys, 2016)

$$F(y_{1i}, y_{2i}) = C(F_1(y_{1i}), F_2(y_{2i}); \theta_i), \tag{1}$$

where $F_1(y_{1i})$ and $F_2(y_{2i})$ are cdfs of the marginals of Y_{1i} and Y_{2i}, taking values in $(0, 1)$, and the association parameter θ_i describes the dependence between Y_{i1} and Y_{i2} after covariate effects at the marginal level are taken into account. Note that, as it will be made clear in the next sections, the marginal cdfs depend on distributional parameters which are in turn linked to covariates and coefficients; however, to avoid cluttering the notation we have suppressed this dependence in the notation.

Because we limit the covariates in the marginals to characteristics insurance companies may use to adjust premiums – age, location, smoking status, and single/family – remaining traits, such as preexisting conditions, become absorbed into the dependence term. Consequently, as explained by Chiappori and Salanié (2000), that dependence term, which appears to be positive in our data, blends together two economic phenomena: (1) the effect of insurance on spending, sometimes called "moral hazard," and (2) the indirect effect of unobserved (to the insurance company) attributes that simultaneously correlate with both insurance enrollment and medical spending. Health economists refer to that indirect effect as "adverse selection" if it makes the dependence term more positive. It is adverse selection that represents the primary threat to the stability of nongroup insurance markets. Being a scalar-valued parameter, the dependence parameter does not allow us to untangle moral hazard and adverse selection, nor is that the explicit goal of this paper.

However, extending the approach of Chiappori and Salanié (2000), we can specify the dependence term as a function of unobserved (to the insurance company) attributes, in order to determine how those attributes contribute to adverse selection. **To see that logic, note that, as it is commonly defined, moral hazard is purely a consequence of insurance lowering the point-of-service price of medical services; it has nothing to do with person-specific attributes that might induce adverse selection (Chassagnon and Chiappori, 1997). The reason for that separability is that moral hazard-related actions induced by an insurance contract do not depend upon a person's "riskiness," but rather on its partial derivative – that is, the extent to which riskiness changes after accepting an insurance contract. And partial derivatives, implicitly, impose a ceteris paribus assumption on other arguments.** Therefore, if, say, preexisting conditions cause the dependence term to increase, implying simultaneous increases in the probability of insurance enrollment *and* medical spending, then such a finding would offer evidence of adverse selection with respect to preexisting conditions.

Four configurations of outcomes are possible: $y_{1i} = 0, y_{2i} = 0$ (denoted by $(y_{1i}^0; y_{2i}^0)$ in what follows), $y_{1i} = 0, y_{2i} > 0$ $(y_{1i}^0; y_{2i}^+)$, $y_{1i} = 1, y_{2i} = 0$ $(y_{1i}^1; y_{2i}^0)$ and $y_{1i} = 1, y_{2i} > 0$ $(y_{1i}^1; y_{2i}^+)$, and each maps to a data distribution given by a product of a bivariate hurdle probability and a density for the positive outcomes. The joint probability mass function for the hurdle part can be described as

$$\begin{aligned}
F^h(y_{1i}^1, y_{2i}^+) &= C^h(F_1^h(y_{1i}^1), F_2^h(y_{2i}^+); \theta_i^h) \\
F^h(y_{1i}^0, y_{2i}^0) &= 1 - F_1^h(y_{1i}^1) - F_2^h(y_{2i}^+) + C^h(F^h(y_{1i}^1), F^h(y_{2i}^+); \theta_i^h) \\
F^h(y_{1i}^0, y_{2i}^+) &= F_2^h(y_{2i}^+) - C^h(F_1^h(y_{1i}^1), F_2^h(y_{2i}^+); \theta_i^h) \\
F^h(y_{1i}^1, y_{2i}^0) &= F_1^h(y_{1i}^1) - C^h(F_1^h(y_{1i}^1), F_2^h(y_{2i}^+); \theta_i^h)
\end{aligned} \quad . \tag{2}$$

The term F^h is the joint probability mass function defined for the pair of binary random variables in the hurdle part, and F_1^h and F_2^h are the cdfs for the two binary outcomes, nongroup insurance and positive medical spending. The function C^h, joining the marginals, is a parametric copula

with dependence parameter θ_i^h.

For subjects with positive spending, the second part of the hurdle model examines the relationship between nongroup insurance and the amount of medical expenses given positive spending. Thus, the second part of the hurdle setup involves mixed data, with both binary and continuous responses. The joint probability density function (pdf) has the following copula representation

$$\begin{aligned} f^c(y_{1i}, y_{2i}|y_{2i} > 0) = h^c\left(F_1^c(y_{1i}|y_{2i} > 0), F_2^c(y_{2i}|y_{2i} > 0); \theta_i^c\right)^{y_{1i}} \\ \times \left(1 - h^c\left(F_1^c(y_{1i}|y_{2i} > 0), F_2^c(y_{2i}|y_{2i} > 0); \theta_i^c\right)\right)^{1-y_{1i}} f_2^c(y_{2i}|y_{2i} > 0), \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where f^c is the joint pdf defined for the pair of mixed outcomes given positive spending; f_2^c and F_2^c denote the density and distribution functions of the positive health care expenditure respectively, and F_1^c represents the cdf of $y_{i1}|y_{i2} > 0$. Assuming that $C^c(\cdot, \cdot; \theta_i^c)$ is a copula that joins the marginals, $h^c(\cdot, \cdot; \theta_i^c)$ is then defined as

$$h^c\left(F_1^c(y_{1i}|y_{2i} > 0), F_2^c(y_{2i}|y_{2i} > 0); \theta_i^c\right) = \left(\frac{\partial C^c\left(F_1^c(y_{1i}|y_{2i} > 0), F_2^c(y_{2i}|y_{2i} > 0); \theta_i^c\right)}{\partial F_2^c(y_{2i}|y_{2i} > 0)}\right)$$

where θ_i^c is the dependence parameter that is associated with copula C^c.

[Maybe a few sentences here addressing Referee 1's 2nd comment from a statistical perspective? And then that discussion could segue naturally into the next paragraph?]

Two-part hurdle models require that the mechanism that governs whether Y_{2i} is positive must remain separate from the process that determines the magnitude of Y_{2i} when it is positive. The appropriateness of that separation is especially important in the present context, where we attempt to link both parts to insurance status. To be sure, such a decoupling is not valid in all settings, especially in classic Heckman-style selection problems where the selection process correlates with magnitude, even after accounting for covariates. But two-part hurdle specifications have become a methodological cornerstone for medical spending, due to the "principal-agent" setup of the U.S. health care system, where patients (principals) typically initiate contact with physicians (agents), but then physicians determine appropriate levels of care (Zweifel, 1981; Deb and Trivedi, 2002). Manning et al. (1987, p. 109), in their seminal study of the RAND Experiment, crystallize this

view by observing that "...the decision to receive some care is largely the consumer's, while the physician influences the decision about level of care." Thus, we follow conventions established in the health economics literature and assume the validity of such a decoupling.

3.1.1 Specification of marginal distributions and copula

We use probit formulations for the marginal distributions for the bivariate hurdle part of the model, as alternative setups (logit and cloglog links) appeared to offer little improvement to fit. That is, we specify $F_1^h(y_{1i}^1) = \Phi(\eta_{1i})$ and $F_2^h(y_{2i}^+) = \Phi(\eta_{2i})$, where Φ is the cdf of a standard normal distribution. Similarly, the marginal distribution for y_{1i} in the bivariate model with binary and continuous responses is modeled with a probit, $F_1^c(y_{1i}^1) = \Phi(\eta_{3i})$. The predictors $\eta_{vi} \in \mathbb{R}$, for $v = 1, 2, 3, ...$, contain covariate and coefficients and are defined in generic terms in the next section.

To accommodate the highly-skewed shape of positive expenditures, we explored several distributions, including log-normal, gamma, Dagum, Weibull, inverse Gaussian, with the Dagum appearing to offer the best fit, according to Akaike information criterion (AIC) values and residual diagnostics. The Dagum pdf is

$$f_2^c(y_{2i}|y_{2i} > 0) = \frac{a_i p_i}{y_{2i}} \left[\frac{\left(\frac{y_{2i}}{b_i}\right)^{a_i p_i}}{\left\{\left(\frac{y_{2i}}{b_i}\right)^{a_i} + 1\right\}^{p_i+1}} \right],$$

where $y_{2i} > 0$ and $b_i > 0, a_i > 0, p_i > 0$ are the related distributional parameters. The corresponding cdf is

$$F_2^c(y_{2i}|y_{2i} > 0) = \left\{ 1 + \left(\frac{y_{2i}}{b_i}\right)^{-a_i} \right\}^{-p_i}.$$

Note that, for the Dagum distribution, the expectation and variance of Y_{2i} are given by non-linear combinations of b_i, a_i, p_i (see, e.g., Table 2 in Marra and Radice, 2017). Also, these parameters are specified as $b_i = \exp(\eta_{4i})$, $a_i = \exp(\eta_{5i})$ and $p_i = \exp(\eta_{6i})$ which allow us to link these coefficients to regression effects. (The use of the inverse link function $\exp(\cdot)$ ensures that the parameters are always estimated as positive values.)

Our main focus is in the dependence parameters, θ_i^h and θ_i^c, which, as noted, combine the effect of insurance on spending and selection effects. But then, by specifying those dependence terms as regression functions of traits that insurance companies may *not* use to adjust premiums, coefficients attached to those traits inform upon whether selection effects exist with respect to those traits. Thus, we specify the dependence terms as functions of predictors: $\theta_i^h = m^h(\eta_{7i})$ and $\theta_i^c = m^c(\eta_{8i})$, where m^h and m^c are one-to-one transformations which ensure that the dependence parameters lie in their ranges (see Table 1 in Marra and Radice (2017) for the list of transformations; the table also shows the relation between θ and the Kendall's τ coefficient, which is a measure of association that lies in the customary range $[-1, 1]$). The copulae considered here include the Clayton, Frank, Gaussian, Gumbel and Joe, as well as 180 degree rotations of the Clayton, Gumbel, and Joe copulas. Note that, as pointed out for instance by Genest and Neslehova (2007), the result of Sklar (1973) for C^h and C^c can only guarantee that the copula is unique over the range of the outcomes. In a regression context, however, this potential issue is less likely to be a concern mainly because regression structures in the marginals generate additional variation in the outcomes and thus more completely cover the outcome domains (e.g., Joe, 2014; Nikoloulopoulos and Karlis, 2010; Trivedi and Zimmer, 2017).

The reader is referred to the help file of `GJRM` (Marra and Radice, 2021) for the full list of implemented marginal distributions and copulae.

3.1.2 Predictor specification

This section provides some details on the construction of the model's additive predictors. For the sake of simplicity a generic η_i is considered. Recall that the main advantages of using additive predictors are that various types of covariate effects can be dealt with, and that such effects can be flexibly determined without making strong parametric a priori assumptions regarding their forms (Wood, 2017).

We proceed by defining η_i as a function of an intercept and smooth functions of sub-vectors of

a generic covariate vector called $\mathbf{z}_i$. That is,

$$\eta_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_k(\mathbf{z}_{ki}),\ i = 1, \ldots, n, \tag{4}$$

where $\beta_0 \in \mathbb{R}$ is an overall intercept, $\mathbf{z}_{ki}$ denotes the k^{th} sub-vector of the complete covariate vector $\mathbf{z}_i$ (containing, e.g., binary, categorical, continuous, and spatial variables) and the K functions $s_k(\mathbf{z}_{ki})$ represent generic effects which are chosen according to the type of covariate(s) considered. Each $s_k(\mathbf{z}_{ki})$ can be approximated as a linear combination of J_k basis functions $b_{kj_k}(\mathbf{z}_{ki})$ and regression coefficients $\beta_{kj_k} \in \mathbb{R}$, i.e. (Wood, 2017)

$$\sum_{j_k=1}^{J_k} \beta_{kj_k} b_{kj_k}(\mathbf{z}_{ki}). \tag{5}$$

This formulation implies that the vector of evaluations $\{s_k(\mathbf{z}_{k1}), \ldots, s_k(\mathbf{z}_{kn})\}^\mathsf{T}$ can be written as $\mathbf{Z}_k\boldsymbol{\beta}_k$ with $\boldsymbol{\beta}_k = (\beta_{k1}, \ldots, \beta_{kJ_k})^\mathsf{T}$ and design matrix $Z_k[i, j_k] = b_{kj_k}(\mathbf{z}_{ki})$. This allows the predictor in equation (4) to be written as

$$\boldsymbol{\eta} = \beta_0\mathbf{1}_n + \mathbf{Z}_1\boldsymbol{\beta}_1 + \ldots + \mathbf{Z}_K\boldsymbol{\beta}_K, \tag{6}$$

where $\mathbf{1}_n$ is an n-dimensional vector made up of ones. Equation (6) can also be written in a more compact way as $\boldsymbol{\eta} = \mathbf{Z}\boldsymbol{\beta}$, where $\mathbf{Z} = (\mathbf{1}_n, \mathbf{Z}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{Z}_K)$ and $\boldsymbol{\beta} = (\beta_0, \boldsymbol{\beta}_1^\mathsf{T}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{\beta}_K^\mathsf{T})^\mathsf{T}$.

Each $\boldsymbol{\beta}_k$ has an associated quadratic penalty $\lambda_k\boldsymbol{\beta}_k^\mathsf{T}\mathbf{D}_k\boldsymbol{\beta}_k$ whose role is to enforce specific properties on the k^{th} function, such as smoothness. Note that $\mathbf{D}_k$ only depends on the choice of basis functions, but not on $\boldsymbol{\beta}_k$. Smoothing parameter $\lambda_k \in [0, \infty)$ controls the trade-off between fit and smoothness, and plays a crucial role in determining the shape of $\hat{s}_k(\mathbf{z}_{ki})$. The overall penalty can be defined as $\boldsymbol{\beta}^\mathsf{T}\mathbf{D}_{\boldsymbol{\lambda}}\boldsymbol{\beta}$, where $\mathbf{D}_{\boldsymbol{\lambda}} = \text{diag}(0, \lambda_1\mathbf{D}_1, \ldots, \lambda_K\mathbf{D}_K)$. Finally, the smooth functions are subject to centering (identifiability) constraints.

For parametric, linear effects, equation (5) becomes $\mathbf{z}_{ki}^\mathsf{T}\boldsymbol{\beta}_k$, and the design matrix is obtained by stacking all covariate vectors $\mathbf{z}_{ki}$ into $\mathbf{Z}_k$. No penalty is typically assigned to linear effects ($\mathbf{D}_k = \mathbf{0}$). This would be the case for binary and categorical variables.

For continuous variables the smooth functions are represented using the regression spline approach. Specifically, for each continuous variable z_{ki}, $s_k(z_{ki})$ is approximated by $\sum_{j_k=1}^{J_k} \beta_{kj_k} b_{kj_k}(z_{ki})$, where the $b_{kj_k}(z_{ki})$ are known spline basis functions. The design matrix $\mathbf{Z}_k$ comprises the basis function evaluations for each i, and hence describe J_k curves which have potentially varying degrees of complexity. We employ low rank thin plate regression splines which are numerically stable and have convenient mathematical properties, although other spline definitions and corresponding penalties are supported in our implementation. To enforce smoothness, a conventional integrated square second derivative spline penalty is typically employed (this is also the default option in the software). That is, $\mathbf{D}_k = \int \mathbf{d}_k(z_k)\mathbf{d}_k(z_k)^\mathsf{T} dz_k$, where the j_k^{th} element of $\mathbf{d}_k(z_k)$ is given by $\partial^2 b_{kj_k}(z_k)/\partial z_k^2$ and integration is over the range of z_k. The formulae used to compute the basis functions and penalties for many spline definitions are provided by Wood (2017) who also discusses their theoretical properties. This specification allows us to avoid arbitrary modeling decisions, such as choosing the appropriate degree of a polynomial or specifying cut-points, which could induce misspecification bias.

Other specifications can be employed. These include varying coefficient smooths obtained by multiplying one or more smooth components by some covariate(s), smooth functions of two or more continuous covariates, random and Markov random field smoothers.

3.2 Some estimation and inferential details

Let us define the overall quantities $\boldsymbol{\delta}^\mathsf{T} = (\boldsymbol{\beta}_1^\mathsf{T}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{\beta}_8^\mathsf{T})$ and $\mathbf{S}_{\boldsymbol{\lambda}} = \text{diag}(\boldsymbol{\lambda}_1\mathbf{S}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_8\mathbf{S}_8)$, where $\boldsymbol{\lambda}_v^\mathsf{T} = (\lambda_{vk_v}, \ldots, \lambda_{vK_v})$ for $v = 1, \ldots, 8$. Parameter vectors $\boldsymbol{\beta}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{\beta}_8$ and their corresponding penalty matrices and smoothing parameter vectors are associated with $\eta_{1i} \ldots, \eta_{8i}$, respectively. Recall from Section 3.1.1 that in our model eight parameters can potentially be specified as functions of additive predictors, hence the notation adopted here. However, if the user wishes to employ, for instance, a two-parameter distribution instead of the Dagum then there would be seven parameters and the notation would be adapted accordingly. Using equations (2) and (3), assuming that a random

sample $(y_{1i}; y_{2i}; \mathbf{z}_i)$, $i = 1, \ldots, n$ is available, the log-likelihood function can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}\ell(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = &\sum_{y_{1i}^0 \ \& \ y_{2i}^0} \log\left(F^h(y_{1i}^0, y_{2i}^0)\right) + \sum_{y_{1i}^0 \ \& \ y_{2i}^+} \log\left(F^h(y_{1i}^0, y_{2i}^+)\right) \\ &+ \sum_{y_{1i}^1 \ \& \ y_{2i}^0} \log\left(F^h(y_{1i}^1, y_{2i}^0)\right) + \sum_{y_{1i}^1 \ \& \ y_{2i}^+} \log\left(F^h(y_{1i}^1, y_{2i}^+)\right) \\ &+ \sum_{y_{2i}^+} \log\left(f^c(y_{1i}, y_{2i} | y_{2i} > 0)\right).\end{aligned}$$

Because of the flexible predictors employed here, the use of a classic (unpenalized) optimization algorithm is likely to result in component estimates that are too rough to produce practically useful results (e.g., Wood, 2017). Therefore, we maximize $\ell_p(\boldsymbol{\delta}) = \ell(\boldsymbol{\delta}) - \frac{1}{2}\boldsymbol{\delta}^\mathsf{T}\mathbf{S}_{\boldsymbol{\lambda}}\boldsymbol{\delta}$. The above log-likelihood structure suggests that parameter estimation can be carried using two separate bivariate copula models, one for the hurdle part and the other for the continuous part. Facilities to achieve this using `GJRM` are already available and are based on the works by Radice, Marra and Wojtys (2016) and Klein et al. (2019) to which we refer the reader for further details.

'Confidence' intervals for any linear and nonlinear function of $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ are obtained from a Bayesian point of view, by recalling that the penalty term associated with the smooth functions of covariates represents the prior belief that these functions are likely to be smoother rather than wiggly. This implies setting an improper multivariate Normal prior on $\boldsymbol{\delta}$, which then leads to the posterior distribution $\boldsymbol{\delta} \dot{\sim} \mathcal{N}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\delta}}, -\hat{\boldsymbol{\mathcal{H}}}_p^{-1})$, where $\boldsymbol{\mathcal{H}}_p$ is the model's penalized Hessian. The rationale for using this result post-estimation is provided, for instance, in Marra and Radice (2017). They also show that using the above posterior distribution yields confidence intervals with better frequentist properties than those obtained using a frequentist approach itself. Other advantages of using the Bayesian result are that the distribution of nonlinear functions of $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ can easily be obtained by posterior simulation and that the resulting distribution need not be symmetric.

4 Empirical results

This section breaks the results down separately for each part of the hurdle specification. We label the part that models whether spending is positive as "Part 1" and the part that models the

magnitude of positive spending as "Part 2."

4.1 Part 1

The first part of the hurdle specification jointly models the probability of nongroup insurance and the probability of positive spending. Each of those marginal probabilities relies on a probit setup, as alternative link function choices offered little improvement to fit.

For the copula linking those two probabilities, Table 4 shows AIC values for several choices of copulas, each with different dependence patterns. The Rotated Gumbel copula appears to offer the best fit, although other copulas with similar shapes, such as the Clayton and Rotated Joe, perform similarly. Those copulas all show asymmetric dependence, with dependence strongest in the lower tail, suggesting that subjects with small probabilities of having insurance also tend to have small probabilities of positive spending, but that that correlation becomes weaker for larger probabilities. (Note that, because evidence overwhelmingly suggested positive dependence, we did not consider rotations of the Clayton, Joe, and Gumbel copulas designed to accommodate negative associations.)

Having settled upon probit marginals glued together via a Rotated Gumbel copula, Table 5 presents parameter estimates **(i.e., regression coefficients with associated standard errors)**, while limiting the covariates to traits that insurance companies may use to adjust premiums. Age and being married appear to positively correlate with insurance enrollment and positive medical spending. Likewise, subjects residing in the Midwest or West appear more likely to have insurance and positive expenses, relative to their counterparts residing in the (relatively poorer) South. Meanwhile, smokers are less likely to have insurance and medical expenses, suggesting that smoking status picks up some unobserved traits that tend to correlate with smoking.

The main focus of this study, appearing near the bottom of the Table 5, is the dependence parameter, which is positive and precisely estimated. As noted above, that positive dependence term combines the effect of insurance on spending and the indirect effect of unobserved (to the

insurance company) attributes that simultaneously correlate with both insurance enrollment and medical spending.

Table 6 attempts to determine whether adverse selection actually exists with respect to those unobserved (to the insurance company) attributes. Our approach involves specifying the dependence term as a function of those attributes. The main results of interest, shown in the right-hand panel of Table 6, fail to find evidence of selection with respect to gender, race (black), and BMI. However, the coefficient attached to ethnicity (Hispanic) is negative and precisely estimated, suggesting favorable selection along that dimension.

Focusing on the all-important number of chronic conditions, the statistically insignificant coefficient suggests that subjects with preexisting health problems *do not* appear to adversely select into nongroup insurance. In fact, lack of statistical significance notwithstanding, the negative coefficient suggests that subjects with preexisting health problems might positively select *out of* insurance. Although somewhat counterintuitive, many widely-cited studies have reported similar findings in other types of insurance markets (Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006; Pauly, 2005; Cameron & Trivedi, 2013).

One explanation for lack of adverse selection is that risk aversion, as opposed to unobserved health problems, might represent the primary driver of insurance demand. To explore that possibility we added to the dependence parameter a binary measure of whether the person disagrees "strongly" or "somewhat" that he or she likes to take risks. We omitted this measure from our baseline models, due to the variable's highly subjective nature. Nonetheless, the coefficient of that variable failed to achieve statistical significance in the dependence parameter, casting doubt on whether risk aversion explains the lack of adverse selection.

Another explanation, and the one that seems to corroborate evidence from the Massachusetts health insurance reform (Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski, 2015), is that the ACA's mandate, despite its relatively toothless penalties, might have drawn enough healthy enrollees into nongroup

risk pools to offset adverse selection. This conjecture is impossible to verify without detailed panel data on pre- and post-reform enrollees, but it seems the most likely explanation for the evident lack of adverse selection.

Of course, using linear combinations of control variables might hide nonlinear relationships, especially for nonbinary variables. To explore that possibility, for "Age" in the two marginals and "Number of chronic conditions" in the dependence term, we replaced the covariate/slope terms with smooth spline functions, as described in Section 3.1.2. Figure 1 shows graphs of those splines, with 95% percent confidence bands. (All other coefficients were very similar to those reported in Table 6.) The left-hand panel of Figure 1 shows that subjects between about 25 and 45 years of age have lower probabilities of nongroup insurance enrollment, while subjects above 45 have higher probabilities. The second panel shows that the probability of positive medical spending increases in an (approximately) linear fashion with age. The right-hand panel shows the negative, but insignificant, link between chronic conditions and the dependence term. The confidence band appears to fan out as chronic conditions increase, largely because only 2 percent of subjects in the estimation sample report more than 4 chronic conditions. Nevertheless, the figure indicates that chronic conditions never appear to contribute *positively* to the dependence term, offering no evidence of adverse selection along that dimension.

4.2 Part 2

The second part focuses on subjects with positive spending. Mirroring the model selection process for the first part, we first choose appropriate marginals based on separate estimation of each marginal, before turning to the copula. We again opt for a probit specification for the probability of insurance enrollment. For positive spending, we attempted several distributions including the lognormal, Weibull, gamma and Dagum, all of which allow for the highly skewed shape of positive spending. The Dagum appeared to offer the best fit, according to AIC calculations and the residual plots reported in Figure 2. Note that only parameter b (see Section 3.1.1) was specified as function

of η since including predictors in the other parameters did not lead to improvements to fit. As for the copula, Table 7 shows that AHM offers the best fit.

Having settled upon probit/Dagum marginals and the AHM copula, Table 8 presents estimates. Coefficients of control variables produce similar signs to those reported in Part 1. **[I'll add a few sentences about the marriage coefficients here.]** Shown near the bottom of the table, the dependence term, though smaller in magnitude than in Part 1, is positive and precisely estimated. Again, that positive number combines the effect of insurance on spending with possible selection effects.

Table 9 specifies the dependence term as a function of controls to determine the extent, if any, to which those attributes contribute to adverse selection among positive spenders. In contrast to Part 1, the coefficient of female is positive, indicating that positive-spending females might adversely select into nongroup insurance, relative to their male counterparts. Meanwhile, the coefficient of BMI suggests (marginally significant) favorable selection along that dimension. Most importantly, the coefficient attached to chronic conditions is indistinguishable from zero, which, similar to Part 1, indicates a lack of adverse selection with respect to that all-important dimension.

Figure 3 shows spline estimates for age and chronic conditions. The patterns are somewhat similar to those observed in Part 1, although less precisely estimated, perhaps due to the smaller sample size compared to Part 1. Again, most importantly, the link between chronic conditions and dependence never appears to be significantly positive.

Finally, recognizing that some health conditions might require more medical attention than others, we return to our baseline specifications, for both Parts 1 and 2, and replace the chronic conditions variable with separate indicators for specific conditions. Reporting only the coefficient estimates from the dependence parameter, Table 10 produces the same conclusion: chronic conditions do not appear to contribute to adverse selection. The lone exception is asthma in Part 1 of the model, although

considering that Table 10 contains nearly 20 coefficients for health conditions, a Type I error would not be surprising at conventional levels of statistical significance.

5 Partial Effects of Insurance on Spending

Our copula-based setup allows us to recover a partial effect of insurance on spending, with particular focus on how chronic conditions alter that relationship. We focus on Part 1, because the coefficient of chronic conditions in Part 2 is nearly zero.

Therefore, using the converged parameter estimates from Part 1, we calculate

$$\Pr(y_{i2} > 0 \mid y_{i1} = 1) - \Pr(y_{i2} > 0 \mid y_{i1} = 0),$$

which would be equivalent to $\Pr(y_{2i} = 1|y_{1i} = 1) - \Pr(y_{2i} = 1|y_{1i} = 0)$, where

$$\Pr(y_{2i} = 1|y_{1i} = 1) = \frac{C\left(\Phi(\eta_{1i}), \Phi(\eta_{2i}); \theta_i\right)}{\Phi(\eta_{1i})},$$

and

$$\Pr(y_{2i} = 1|y_{1i} = 0) = \frac{\Phi(\eta_{2i}^{(y_{1i}=0)}) - C\left(\Phi(\eta_{1i}), \Phi(\eta_{2i}); \theta_i\right)}{1 - \Phi(\eta_{1i})}.$$

In other words, this provides the difference in the probability of positive spending between a person with and without nongroup insurance.

Figure 4 shows partial effects for one observation in our data; we choose a person with attributes relatively close to sample medians. That person has zero chronic conditions, but we recoded that variable several times to see how chronic conditions alter the partial effect. For zero chronic conditions, nongroup insurance correlates with an increase of 0.296 in the probability of positive spending, and that estimate differs statistically from zero. We stress that that number does *not* provide the *causal* effect of insurance on positive spending, because residual selection effects might remain. But it *does* remove selection effects stemming from variables that appear in our model: age, married, smokes, region, gender, race, ethnicity, BMI, and chronic conditions.

As the number of chronic conditions increases, the partial effect hardly budges from 0.296, indicating a lack of selection with respect to preexisting health problems. The main message from Figure 4, and indeed the main punchline of this paper, is that we fail to uncover evidence of adverse selection with respect to preexisting health problems.

6 Conclusion

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) forbids insurance companies from adjusting premiums with respect to certain attributes that are widely believed to correlate with medical risk, a restriction known as "community rating." The most important of those attributes is preexisting health problems. This feature of the ACA, although seemingly popular with American voters, has raised concerns about adverse selection, in which people with health problems might be disproportionately likely to comply with the ACA's mandate that everyone have insurance coverage, resulting in a relatively sicker risk pool.

Focusing on the market for nongroup insurance, this paper explores whether, after implementation of the ACA, enrollees really do exhibit adverse selection with respect to attributes that insurance companies must ignore. We adopt a copula-based hurdle model with the dependence parameter specified as a function of those attributes, which allows us to determine the existence (and direction) of selection patterns stemming from those attributes. Because our approach focuses on dependence between nongroup insurance enrollment and medical spending after conditioning on certain covariates, our method can be viewed as an extension of Chiappori and Salanié (2000). Our main finding is that nongroup insurance enrollees do not appear to exhibit adverse selection, particularly with respect to preexisting health problems. In fact, the first part of our hurdle specification finds some evidence of favorable selection with respect to preexisting conditions, although that result fails to achieve statistical significance at conventional levels.

Overall, we conclude that, at least so far, fears of community rating/guaranteed issue causing

adverse selection seem to have been misplaced. The most likely explanation is that the ACA's mandate, despite its relatively small penalties for noncompliance, might have attracted enough healthy enrollees to offset any adverse selection. We stress, however, that the ACA is still relatively young, and political support for the law seems to whipsaw with respect to whichever party has political power. Furthermore, our findings apply just to nongroup private insurance markets. The ACA also introduced sweeping changes to public insurance arrangements, but investigating those likely requires a separate study.

Statistically, the copula-based hurdle model that we employ should prove useful for any outcome variable that has high probability mass at zero and a long upper tail, and where the underlying mechanism that determines whether the variable is positive can be decoupled from the process that determines its magnitude if positive. Medical spending is one such example, but other variables with similar distributional shapes, such as household income or charitable contributions, might also apply. Moreover, whether used in a hurdle context or not, the copula approach, via its estimable dependence parameter, should offer researchers the ability to uncover otherwise difficult-to-detect details related to selection and endogeneity.

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Table 1: Summary statistics for office-based spending (n = 6,014)

	Nongroup insurance n = 1,553	No insurance n = 4,461
Any spending?	0.64	0.33
Spending among positive spenders		
mean	1,087	343
median	179	0

Table 2: Sample means of spending and nongroup coverage partitioned by traits insurers may use to adjust premiums

	Spending	Nongroup coverage
age < 40	294	0.19
age ≥ 40	793	0.33
married = 0	371	0.21
married = 1	778	0.33
smokes = 0	571	0.26
smokes = 1	321	0.22
Northeast	523	0.21
Midwest	465	0.32
West	483	0.30
South	582	0.23

Table 3: Sample means of spending and nongroup coverage partitioned by traits insurers may not use to adjust premiums

	Spending	Nongroup coverage
female = 0	333	0.23
female = 1	754	0.29
black = 0	545	0.26
black = 1	482	0.23
Hispanic = 0	811	0.39
Hispanic = 1	255	0.12
BMI 1st quartile	582	0.30
BMI 2nd quartile	452	0.26
BMI 3rd quartile	449	0.24
BMI 4th quartile	654	0.22
chronic conditions = 0	241	0.22
chronic conditions = 1	789	0.30
chronic conditions = 2	728	0.35
chronic conditions ≥ 3	1554	0.34

Table 4: AIC values for PART 1 copula model (margins are Bernoulli with probit links)

Copula	AIC
Gaussian	13,974
Clayton	13,971
Rotated Clayton (180 degrees)	14,001
Joe	14,004
Rotated Joe (180 degrees)	13,974
Gumbel	13,982
Rotated Gumbel (180 degrees)	**13,971**
Frank	13,982
AHM	13,972
FGM	13,990
Student-t (with df = 3)	13,972
Plackett	13,979

Table 5: Rotated Gumbel copula model estimates of Part 1 (regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses)

	Nongroup insurance	Any spending
Age	0.016^{**}	0.024^{**}
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married	0.246^{**}	0.160^{**}
	(0.038)	(0.036)
Smokes	-0.110^{**}	-0.197^{**}
	(0.052)	(0.048)
Northeast	-0.060	0.010
	(0.061)	(0.056)
Midwest	0.247^{**}	0.202^{**}
	(0.051)	(0.049)
West	0.202^{**}	0.100^{**}
	(0.044)	(0.041)
South (omitted)	–	–
	–	–
Constant	-1.484^{**}	-1.270^{**}
	(0.062)	(0.058)
Dependence τ (95% interval)	0.23 (0.21, 0.26)	

* p < .10; ** p < .05

Table 6: Rotated Gumbel copula model estimates of Part 1 (regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses). Here the dependence parameter is expressed as a function of covariates

	Nongroup insurance	Any spending		Dependence
Age	0.016^{**}	0.024^{**}	Female	-0.028
	(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.155)
Married	0.245^{**}	0.155^{**}	Black	0.036
	(0.038)	(0.036)		(0.204)
Smokes	-0.100^{*}	-0.188^{**}	Hispanic	-0.502^{**}
	(0.052)	(0.048)		(0.199)
Northeast	-0.058	0.008	BMI	0.003
	(0.061)	(0.056)		(0.015)
Midwest	0.248^{**}	0.198^{**}	Number of chronic conditions	-0.096
	(0.051)	(0.049)		(0.076)
West	0.204^{**}	0.086^{**}		
	(0.044)	(0.042)		
South (omitted)	–	–		
	–	–		
Constant	-1.489^{**}	-1.286^{**}	Constant	1.056^{**}
	(0.062)	(0.059)		(0.391)

* p < .10; ** p < .05

Figure 1. Part 1: Estimated smooth effects of age on nongroup insurance and positive spending, and of number of chronic conditions on the dependence parameter on the scale of the predictor, and associated 95% point-wise intervals. The jittered rug plot, at the bottom of the graph, shows the covariate values.



Table 7: AIC values for Part 2 copula model (margins are Bernoulli with probit link for insurance, and Dagum for spending)

Copula	AIC
Gaussian	41331.9
Clayton	41338.1
Rotated Clayton (180 degrees)	41350.7
Joe	41357.6
Rotated Joe (180 degrees)	41340.4
Gumbel	41341.8
Rotated Gumbel (180 degrees)	41330.9
Frank	41329.2
AHM	**41328.7**
FGM	41328.9
Student-t (with df = 3)	41336.6
Plackett	41329.5

Figure 2. Histogram and normal Q-Q plot of randomised normalized quantile residuals (Dunn & Smyth, 1996) for the Dagum marginal modeling positive spending.



Table 8: AMH copula estimates of Part 2 (regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses)

	Nongroup insurance	Positive spending
Age	0.013^{**}	0.018^{**}
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Married	0.023	0.018
	(0.053)	(0.057)
Smokes	-0.068	-0.172^{**}
	(0.079)	(0.084)
Northeast	-0.042	0.071
	(0.088)	(0.094)
Midwest	0.299^{**}	-0.025
	(0.072)	(0.079)
West	0.195^{**}	0.106
	(0.063)	(0.068)
South (omitted)	–	–
	–	–
Constant	-0.918^{**}	4.326^{**}
	(0.097)	(0.169)
a (95% interval)	–	1.07 (1.01,1.12)
p (95% interval)		1.81 (1.52, 2.20)
Dependence τ (95% interval)	0.15 (0.12, 0.18)	

* p < .10; ** p < .05

Figure 3. Part 2: Estimated smooth effects of age on nongroup insurance and positive values of spending, and of number of chronic conditions on the dependence parameter on the scale of the predictor, and associated 95% point-wise intervals. The jittered rug plot, at the bottom of the graph, shows the covariate values.



Table 9: AMH copula estimates of Part 2 (regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses). Here the dependence parameter is expressed as a function of covariates

	Nongroup insurance	Positive spending		Dependence
Age	0.013^{**}	0.018^{**}	Female	0.344^{**}
	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.165)
Married	0.020	0.020	Black	-0.017
	(0.053)	(0.057)		(0.250)
Smokes	-0.064	-0.174^{**}	Hispanic	0.152
	(0.079)	(0.084)		(0.203)
Northeast	-0.060	0.066	BMI	-0.027^{*}
	(0.088)	(0.094)		(0.014)
Midwest	0.296^{**}	-0.025	Number of chronic conditions	0.004
	(0.072)	(0.076)		(0.063)
West	0.183^{**}	0.105		
	(0.064)	(0.068)		
South (omitted)	–	–		
	–	–		
Constant	-0.925^{**}	4.331^{**}	Constant	1.200^{**}
	(0.097)	(0.170)		(0.395)
a (95% interval)	–	1.07 (1.01,1.13)		
p (95% interval)		1.81 (1.50, 2.20)		

* p < .10; ** p < .05

Figure 4. Partial effect of insurance on the probability of positive spending (with 95% confidence band)



Table 10: AMH copula estimates of dependence, with specific chronic conditions (regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses)

	Any spending	Positive spending
	Dependence	Dependence
Female	−0.098	0.405**
	(0.158)	(0.181)
Black	0.071	−0.085
	(0.207)	(0.277)
Hispanic	−0.402**	0.071
	(0.205)	(0.212)
BMI	0.005	−0.028*
	(0.013)	(0.015)
Physical limitation	−0.253	−0.059
	(0.419)	(0.420)
High blood pressure	−0.037	0.159
	(0.206)	(0.192)
Heart disease	−0.818	0.533
	(1.439)	(0.798)
Had a stroke	−1.235	−0.475
	(1.363)	(0.572)
High cholesterol	−0.138	−0.222
	(0.230)	(0.196)
Cancer	0.324	0.097
	(0.341)	(0.491)
Diabetes	−0.848	0.415
	(0.558)	(0.318)
Arthritis	0.220	−0.129
	(0.253)	(0.221)
Asthma	0.540**	0.007
	(0.245)	(0.280)
Constant	1.150**	1.225**
	(0.353)	(0.416)

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$