



# The Power of Identity in Hybrid Peacebuilding: Buddhist Monks in Post-Conflict Cambodia

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## INTRODUCTION

Peacebuilding is a complex endeavour and relies on a multitude of actors and organisations coming together in an effort to build a sustainable peace that makes sense not only in international, regional, and local frameworks but also on the individual level. The actor- and relation-based approach to peacebuilding, with which this book deals, necessitates an analysis of ideas beyond conventional politics, namely that of identity politics (Öjendal et al. 2018). Assuming actors play a fundamental role in creating hybrid peacebuilding processes (Lutmar and Ockey 2018), it is important to further assess both the role of individual actors and their

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identity biases. Local actors are often granted natural authority within their environment (Gippert 2017). A monk, for instance, is well respected by members of his community. Whilst that may seem like a source of natural potency as a mid-space actor able to build bridges both vertically and horizontally, as detailed in Chapter 4, it is pivotal to acknowledge that this simultaneously predisposes the actor to belong to and represent an exclusive identity group (Peleg 2019).

The potential exclusivity of an actor's identity group highlights potential pitfalls from his or her background. If his or her identities adhere to hard lines, leaving little room for rapprochement to other identity groups, then internal belongingness transforms into an obstacle in hybrid peacebuilding. If the given 'other' or excluded group was part of the conflict that constitutes the subject of peacebuilding, such constructs may severely hinder mid-space actor's ability of fulfilling their role.

Buddhist monks in the Cambodian peacebuilding efforts in recent decades are cases in point (Kobayashi 2005). When monks in Cambodia mobilised society to overcome decades of domestic conflict (roughly 1970 to 1998), some scholars attributed their efforts to nationalist impulses (Lee 2018). Notwithstanding such instincts, the peacebuilding activities of monks must be understood in terms of identity: they helped construct—and legitimised (Lee 2020a)—new narratives of belongingness, which subsequently mobilised support for peacebuilding efforts (see also Ledgerwood 2012). These new narratives included notions commonly found in liberal peacebuilding, such as human rights and social justice. Monks were able to intertwine indigenous practices of religion with international discourses, a phenomenon explored by some scholars in hybrid peacebuilding theory (e.g., Mac Ginty 2010). In effect, monks became mid-space actors navigating local, national, and international spaces, becoming important actors in post-conflict Cambodia. How they connected across these different spaces was partly dependent on the identity frames they held and constructed. It is this topic that is explored in more depth in this chapter.

Much of the peacebuilding success of monks depends on their cultural and social legitimacy. In the language of hybrid peacebuilding, legitimacy depends not only on the faith of religious followers, but also the constant interaction between monks as peace activists and civil society groups within and outside Cambodia (Zanker 2017). This interaction resulted in an amalgamation of international norms and standards coupled with traditional concepts and practices (Richmond 2012). As mid-spaced

actors, however, monks also confront the country's repressive authoritarian regime (Kent and Chandler 2008), which at times constrain their capacities as bridge-builders. In this regard, one of the broader issues of hybrid peacebuilding has to do with the inability of monks to bridge gaps between grassroots actors and political and religious elites. Such failures to unify desperate groups of people highlight the myriad interests at stake in any peacebuilding process. In extreme cases, such a failure runs the risk of exacerbating localised conflict and turning religious actors into spoilers, as outlined in Chapter 4.

This chapter engages with identity politics as well as identity networks before placing such concepts into the hybrid peacebuilding context. The case study of Cambodian Buddhist monks is then examined by assessing successes and failures, leading to a discussion on mid-space actors as so-called 'spoilers' of peace processes before finally offering a conclusion.

## IDENTITY POLITICS

Identity constitutes a fundamental factor in creating group mentalities. Often identities are distinguished among "nations, races, ethnic groups, religious traditions, and ideologies" (Berreby 2008: 3). Those outside of one's group are 'othered,' which occurs both consciously and subconsciously. This process increases one's own belonging to a group and consolidates a margin of difference with one or more other groups. Identities help construct what could be considered 'In and Out' groups, and feelings of 'Us and Them.'

This type of cognitive inclusion and exclusion is critical in understanding the role identity plays in peacebuilding. Identity can create walls that actors must break down, overcome, or amend in efforts to achieve a positive peace with a former—or still current—so-called 'Out' group. Deep-rooted identity conflicts, such as during the Rwandan genocide (Caldwell 2014), conflict in Kashmir (Chowdhary 2015), or struggle for women's suffrage in various countries, can widen the gap between groups, sometimes resulting in horrific violence.

Power relations are intimately intertwined with identity. Korostelina (2013) for instance put forth that there exists a two-fold opposite relationship between social identity and power, both of which create a complex tangled process: national identity defines and is defined by power systems, leading to first, the embedment of power within identity concepts and second, the potential of defining power through the

lens of national identity. This insight is important as it highlights that power and power relations possess a place within national identity, thus affecting, shaping, and giving meaning to identity, which in turn may legitimise given power constructs and imbalances. An analysis of identity within the hybrid peacebuilding process thus goes beyond sole identity considerations and towards the concept of power relations.

In post conflict settings, identity conflicts can resurface during peacebuilding, potentially hindering or spoiling progress. Successful bridge-building between groups requires a careful understanding of identity and the power relations among social groups. Where identity can become an obstacle, it can also become a tool. Separate identities must not always clash; they can co-exist, they can intertwine, and they can encourage rapprochement with other groups (Jackson 1999). This is why nationality or ethnic background are often closely correlated to religious affiliation, gender identification, and political identity (Kulich et al. 2018).

Identity is not mutually exclusive; indeed, it is highly intersectional. The intersectionality of identity, further discussed in Chapter 3, allows different identities to co-exist and even mutually construct each other within the same space and even within the same actor (Collins 1998). This implies that identities overlap and layer; they do not necessarily cause identity clashes. This insight offers potential for fruitful co-operations amongst identities groups on a larger scale (McKeown 2013). Identity intersectionality holds the promise for an enhanced peacebuilding for actors from these separate yet mutually accepting groups, as these different groups may indeed, like identities, co-exist peacefully. Thus, identity can spoil bridge-building and meaningfully support it. How this works within the context of hybrid peacebuilding will be demonstrated below, followed by practical examples of prior cases where identity acted as both an obstacle and tool.

## IDENTITY IN HYBRID PEACEBUILDING

In hybrid peacebuilding, the relationships between different actors and institutions are of utmost importance in pursuing the goal of lasting peace (Dibley 2014). Mid-space actors must establish transformative relationships in order to commence bridge-building activities (Kagawa 2020), which means that ties across actors and institutions must be meaningfully strengthened to secure the onset and continuation of peacebuilding

efforts. Inherent to this are the different groups of actors and stakeholders, which congregate in numerous sub-groups, each with their own and overlapping identity and power relations.

Hybridity lies in this diversity. Hybridity encompasses varied groups of interest and background partaking in the peacebuilding process and working on a positive peace suitable for all participants and beyond (Bargués-Pedreny 2018). The hybridity of relationships explained in Chapter 3 assumes that varied groups exist and approach the tasks from multiple points of interest. Identities are also relationally constituted and thus are defined in relation to others (Kyriakidou and Èzbilgin 2006). This is supported by the theory of ‘negative identification,’ which outlines that identities are constructed against the backdrop of other identities, thus creating a process of othering but also allowing fluidity of the created and maintained identities (Oswald Spring et al. 2010). Given that identities are not fixed, the way in which different actors affect each other is difficult to predict within the identity networks. The function and behaviour of each actor thus depends directly on the environment in which it is required. The intersectionality of identities increases an actor’s fluidity in the peace process as more channels for interaction with diverging identity groups are available. This means that actors endowed with the task of building bridges within their community (and beyond) may fail to do so comprehensively because intersectional groups and sub-groups may not feel well represented by them. It is to this failure—what can be thought of as a ‘spoiler’ of peace—that we now turn in the next section.

## IDENTITY AS SPOILER

Although mid-space actors hold the potential for bridging divides in hybrid peacebuilding, they also hold the potential to be spoilers. One reason this can happen is because of identity. For instance, a mid-space actor may represent identity groups despised or anathema to the nascent norms being constructed within a post-conflict society. In this instance, the mid-space actor might spoil the peace process. In general, actor-based approaches to peacebuilding have the potential to spoil the process. Such approaches intrinsically encourage the categorisation and compartmentalisation of local actors by recognising diverging and potentially clashing identities, which brings the risk of instantiating false binaries and

enforcing a rigidity of the peace process that does not allow the accommodation of identity's natural fluidity, thereby risking the fluidity of the peacebuilding process itself.

Whilst it is necessary to analyse how identities operate within the framework of hybrid peacebuilding it is also pivotal to consider how peacebuilding can unintentionally entrench divisions between identities, which may obstruct progress. The binaries common to identity politics can be reinforced when different identity groups are asked to join the peacebuilding process, legitimising hard line identities (Uesugi 2020a). By establishing the necessity to involve diverging, separate identities, hybrid peacebuilding may indeed incentivise actors to solidify their identity along hard lines. The opportunity for inclusion in the peacebuilding process may thus directly intertwine with the fortification of actors' identities (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). It is therefore crucial to acknowledge these complex ways in which identities can both be informed by and inform the hybrid peacebuilding process. The case of Cambodia presented below demonstrates the fluidity and intersectionality of identity in efforts to build peace. The role of Buddhist monks demonstrates ways in which mid-space actors can be both bridge-builders and spoilers.

### MONKS AS BRIDGE-BUILDERS

Cambodia suffered decades of civil unrest (see Etcheson 2005). For our purposes here, the unrest began around 1970, when the royalist-backed government was ousted by a military regime friendly with Western powers fighting the communist government in neighbouring North Vietnam. Five years later, a communist regime came to power in Cambodia. Known as the Khmer Rouge (KR), this regime aimed to create an agrarian utopia and destroy modern society. Buddhism was banned and countless monks were either defrocked or killed. In 1979, after the KR was overthrown by a group of military defectors (with the support of Vietnam), a monastic community slowly returned to the country (Harris 2005). However, the civil in-fighting between different groups vying for power did not. Conflict among groups continued until 1998 when a single prime minister was finally elected. Although unrest can still be found today, many international organisations and countries perceive Cambodia to be stable. How this stability occurred is due to many factors. One such factor was the role monks played in building peace across antagonistic groups with divergent interests.

In Buddhist-majority Cambodia, monks possess an authority stemming from their ability to instantiate and mobilise a particular identity group as well as claiming representation of a higher religious authority. The social position of these monks as religious leaders thus constituted a rich potential source for influencing behaviour (Appleby 2008). The involvement of Buddhist monastic community (known as the *sangha*) in social issues has a long history dating back to colonial times in which they pursued goals against the French protectorate (Becker 1998), and in line with anti-imperialism against Thailand and Vietnam (Lee 2020a). Whilst their engagement in the Cambodian peacebuilding process following civil conflict does not mark the beginning of Buddhist involvement in social action, it does evidence a remarkable conscious resurgence necessitated by the severe suppression of the Buddhist tradition during the KR (1975–1979) and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea rule (1979–1991) (Öjendal and Lilja 2009). While the numbers of monks decreased drastically and their engagement ceased essentially in full, the significant influence connected to their professional and cultural importance endured (Yos Hut 1998).

For survivors of the KR regime, the “very sight of saffron-robed monks, white-dressed elders, and Cambodians gathered around an altar comfort[ed] them” (Mortland 2017: 172). The monks’ religious legitimacy, extensive cultural knowledge, and strong social network were meaningfully employed by those who partook in the reconciliation and peacebuilding process in Cambodia (Lee 2020a). With Cambodians accustomed to the leadership of monks, some *sangha* members began participating in bridge-building once again, especially between minority groups and the wider Cambodian public (Kawanami and Samuel 2013). Maha Ghosananda’s well-known peace march named *dharmayietra* (walking for teaching/truth) mobilised popular support not only domestically but also internationally. Importantly this ushered in the bridge-building process by monks in Cambodia on a larger scale. Ghosananda also established temples, organised readings and religious conferences, and attended United Nations delegations (Mahatthanadull 2013). Other marches such as the *sithiyietra* (march for peace) soon surfaced, with support from the Independent Monk Network for Social Justice (IMNSJ) and advanced the role of marches as public awareness campaigns (Lee 2018). The IMNSJ and organisations such as Buddhism for Peace evidence further initiatives by monks in creating positive peace in the country (Lee 2020a).

Alongside public events such as marches, Buddhist monks soon resumed charity programmes in support of their communities (Brehm 2021). Faith-based groups such as the Dhamma Dana Association distributed scholarships and study materials; others offered work opportunities, or sermons (Lee 2018). Some organisations provided aid for individuals with HIV/AIDS, drug users, and economically challenged women; aid that transcends identity groups revolving around ethno-religious lines (*ibid.*).

Significant horizontal bridging has been achieved as a result of monks' efforts, which were eased by the strong networks that monasteries enjoy within their social setting and communities (*ibid.*). Their continuous accompaniment through people's lives and traditions placed them in ideal situations to shape communities' outlook on the peacebuilding process (*ibid.*). Socially active monks used the concepts of 'Engaged Buddhism' to build and solidify bridges within their reach.

People reacting positively to the monks' efforts originated from group dynamics of identity. Concepts of respect, karma, and social responsibility encouraged Cambodians to allow monks' actions to take effect. Having said this, negative preconceptions and a severely fractured Buddhist tradition transformed this into a difficult task for Cambodia's surviving monks, of which there were few after the collapse of the KR regime.

Political and economic identities further aided monks in their task of bridge-building between "direct or indirect manifestations of a vertical gap in the society" (*ibid.*: 98). The negative perception of Cambodia's elite and their mistreatment of civil society unintentionally united mid- and lower-levels of society under an umbrella constructed on political-economic identity. The grouping-in of other identity categories such as religion and ethnicity not only highlights the intersectionality of identity but also demonstrates that monks were able to tap into many identity groups through the process of underlining a common identity, transforming so-called 'Out-groups' into a single 'In-group.'

When assessing Cambodian monks' involvement in the peacebuilding process it becomes evident that important successes have been achieved. In a post-conflict society faced with fractured identity notions, monks began bridging the gaps that separated people within their communities. Traces of identity structures and a deep-rooted respect towards monks enabled them to build bridges to those who agreed with these ideas. Their progress remains important in their communities as well as on the wider grassroots level when challenging the upper socio-political echelons.



Nevertheless, the same identity frames that enabled such success simultaneously obstructed the monks' progress in other ways—a paradox that will be discussed below.

### SHORTCOMINGS OF BRIDGE-BUILDERS

Whilst the work of monks was often positive, it remained extremely restrained in its reach. Only a small number of monks today survived the genocide, limiting their involvement in the post-conflict peacebuilding process. Endowed with importance in Cambodia's society, monks enjoyed significant success in places they could reach. Their engagement in the peacebuilding process and social action was not, however, universally approved. Some mainstream Buddhist orders, which nurture close relationships with political authorities, claimed that peacebuilding monks overstepped their purposes of non-violent and calm lives (Coward and Smith 2004). The monks' efforts at peacebuilding, in other words, were not normal *sangha* practice. This created a new chasm within the religious community, evidencing that their involvement did not only unite but also distance individuals and groups.

More importantly, however, the Buddhist monks' horizontal bridging simultaneously widened vertical gaps. Much of Cambodia's lay society negatively perceived the government. In this way, a political-economic identity took precedence over other identity groups, such as religion, ethnicity, or gender, creating a large coalition of diverse identities. Whilst this evidences the monks' ability to bridge horizontal gaps by transcending strict identity lines, it also demonstrates that vertical bridge-building between the government and civil society failed to a significant extent, consolidating or even widening such gaps. This is closely related to the nature of the conflict: distrust, anger, and distance to the government made sense in an environment that suffered from top-down violence exemplified by the KR and subsequent regimes. The activism responding to prior conflict can therefore be divisive in nature, especially considering the political backdrop in which it operates (*ibid.*).

The immense trauma and consequent negative identification of the official, top-level 'Out-group' made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for monks to fulfil their role in bridging not only horizontal but also vertical gaps. These vertical gaps, it should be noted, were not as extreme as in other neighbouring contexts. Monks in Myanmar, for instance, were given tacit consent of the government to use violence towards

certain ethnic groups, notably the Rohingyas (Selengut 2017). This led to the emergence of Buddhist religious extremism against minority groups, something similarly found in Sri Lanka. The widening of vertical gaps carried through by Cambodian monks can thus be considered relatively minor compared to other contexts.

Whilst government action lent itself to maintenance of the vertical gap, monks were also aware that they needed to actively challenge the government to achieve their aims (Lee 2018). These challenges were carried through by peaceful means which, coupled with the government's readiness to use force against monks (Keyes 2007), severely destabilised the government's accusation that monks were the source of disorder, thereby serving a blow to government legitimacy and obstructing the rebuilding of trust on behalf of citizens who perceived such violence as the worst action by political elite since the KR regime (Sreang 2008). Overall, Buddhist leaders' social engagement provoked harsh government crackdowns that not only delegitimised the top-level leadership but also clearly highlighted the vertical gaps that remained intact or un-addressed (Lee 2020b).

This lack of transformative relationships with the government prevented monks from becoming efficient vertical bridge-builders, pointing at the difficulty of overcoming frames of othering that were imposed on and by them during and post conflict. Although it is of fundamental value in hybrid peacebuilding to involve different groups' participation in the peace process, it is also necessary to acknowledge the potential over-burdening of one particular group. Consequently, a strong intertwined network of actors and institutions must be built in order to avoid the possibility of failure when important groups (Uesugi 2020b), such as the monks in this case, fall short of their duties to transform relationships and build large political coalitions united by a common identity.

In addition to political economic identities preventing sound transformative relationships between the government and monks, the ability to bridge gaps between other communities also evidenced serious shortcomings. As religious figures, monks naturally represent the Buddhist tradition. Yet, they also increasingly aligned themselves with strong nationalistic views. The exclusive nationalism supported by Buddhist leaders has the by-product of indirectly encouraging aggression toward non-Khmer individuals in Cambodia (Lee 2020a). Through their adherence to nationalism, monks automatically alienated various groups of

Cambodia's society, highlighting their likely inability to connect to these groups in a peaceful and meaningful way.

Buddhist monks in Cambodia face difficult identity groupings in their environment, critically impairing them as mid-space actors (Kent and Chandler 2008). The identities formed in the context of their environment constructed certain attitudes and prejudices that affected their behaviour, thereby preventing them from successfully bridge-building. Other challenges in organisational and policy-making fields further called for a widened network and cooperation with the monks in order to prevent failure (Appleby 2008). When assuming that mid-space actors' importance and unique qualities useful to the peacebuilding process arise out of their wide-spectrum network with society and their transformative bottom-up approach, one must also consider that these characteristics may be compromised from the beginning as their position means their inclusion in, or at least experience of, the conflict (Svensson and Lindgren 2013). Given the deep root of these inherent challenges, such issues must be addressed explicitly before and during the peace process. The circumvention of such challenges requires deconstructing these characteristics, predisposing the actors to some forms of exclusionary behaviour in order to usher in a fundamental understanding of one's own biases. Without such processes, as displayed in the case for these mid-space actors in Cambodia, memories and trauma from an identity-centred conflict complicate the prospects of peacebuilding whilst therefore also obstructing Buddhist monks' tasks (Charbonneau and Parent 2013).

## MONKS AS SPOILERS

Analysing how identity can both be useful and obstructive in bridging gaps raises the question whether the participation of mid-space actors placed in the settings of identity frameworks is a positive or negative qualifier. In conflicts that evidenced discord along clear identity lines, does belonging to one of the conflicting 'In-groups' benefit the peacebuilding process or hinder it? Participants in the process recognise the unique position that mid-space actors can fill, considering their natural inclusion in society; however, they also tend to ignore how identity can predispose these actors to pursue a certain kind of bridge-building and consequently type of peacebuilding. Such considerations are pondered when the mid-space group in question demonstrates hyper-evident ideologies which can

become problematic, as is done with rebel groups (Swain and Öjendal 2018). When the group is overtly peaceful, non-problematic, and in pursuit of a peacebuilding process favoured by other actors, no evident potential for spoiling the process is addressed explicitly. The identity frames that can turn bridge-builders into spoilers, however, are covert, complicated, and often difficult to trace clearly. It is thus important to acknowledge these mid-space actors' resistant positions within existing identity groupings in order to recognise the potential prejudices that they can add to the peacebuilding process.

That is not to say that certain mid-space actors such as monks should be excluded or restrained in the peacebuilding process. Rather, this serves to demonstrate two points: first, mid-space actors such as monks are positively supported by existing identity concepts which endow them with authority and agency, thereby allowing them to reach their communities on profound and meaningful levels through 'locally grounded legitimacy' (Uesugi 2020b); second, however, if these identity structures encompass othering of groups that should be included in and beneficiaries of the peacebuilding process, their role as bridge-builders may be obstructed, turning them into spoilers. Indeed, the violent Buddhist movement in Myanmar is case in point. Through their placement within the conflict, mid-space actors have the ability to identify clearly the existing conflicts which are pressing issues amongst identity groups; employing their authority to address these conflicts, however, can lead to at least two opposite outcomes: building bridges, or burning them. Due to the intrinsically deeply held character of identity, it is difficult to avoid such spoiling: according to one's own ideas and views, actions that alienate Others—such as the Cambodian government's stance towards monk's peacebuilding activism—likely makes sense.

Rather than abandoning such activities, however, it should be preceded or coupled with a critical understanding of one's standpoint. Despite potential efforts in enhancing mutual understanding, tolerance and coexistence, it remains considerably difficult to break free from concepts deeply rooted in one's identity as a kind of circular reasoning occurs. Yet, without recognising the roots of these oppositions, truly lasting peace that addresses misconceptions and underlying discord between identity groups in the post-conflict society can hardly be made (Richmond 2002). Whilst a positive peace may arise out of the peacebuilding process, division will still likely grow alongside the peace. At this stage, one must consider external actors' and scholars' projection of their ideas to a

foreign, unsuitable setting. Divisions, or in more positive terms diversity, are not necessarily bad. Indeed, they should be preserved where suitable. Addressing identity in the peacebuilding process is not to erase these distinctions but to use them efficiently in the pursuit of hybrid peacebuilding in practice.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter argues for the need to include identity frames within the study of hybrid peacebuilding from an analytical and practical standpoint. It has suggested that identities play a crucial role in bridging the gap between horizontal spaces for local peacebuilding initiatives and the vertical involvement in government-led peace agendas as identity formations of Buddhist monks have reflected in their agency as actors in the context of their ability to position themselves as bridge-builders in post-conflict Cambodia. As mentioned, this is concomitant to the relevance of identity frames as an important factor in the articulation of othering that also defines the politics of exclusion and inclusion within conflict and post-conflict societies.

Identities become a double-edged sword as a tool and obstacle in the success and failure of peacebuilding agendas. Although monks in Cambodia have been able to perform a wide-range of activities and tactics to horizontally intervene and contribute to peacebuilding processes, the vertical spaces for formal peace processes have not been readily open for them, which also leaves the question of whether it is possible for one group to bridge gaps at the horizontal and vertical levels. Nevertheless, the centrality of identity frames is still an important aspect of hybrid peacebuilding as it illuminates important aspects that must be considered in hybrid peacebuilding.

The interaction and cooperation of monks with local and international civil society groups begs the question of their role in mobilising popular support for peace processes. After all, religion is only one part of the political equation as such sectors as women's groups, trade unions, youth and student organisations, and business groups have to be behind the peace process as well (Laurent Baregu and Landsberg 2003). In fact, this raises some concerns regarding the relationship of the monks with such organisations and the degree of cooperation they can foster in order to bridge the gaps between the horizontal and vertical spaces for peacebuilding. In this regard, this issue turns to the possibility that the ability of the

monks to bridge the gaps between horizontal and vertical spaces is largely dependent on the manner they are able to take advantage of or create linkages with sectoral groups, which can help them achieve their goals in the peacebuilding process. Of course, this is an issue of the capacity of the monks to cooperate with other Out-groups. In this case, the success of Buddhist monks to fulfil their role as mid-space actors can be determined by their ability to converge these multiple interests and points of contention with the goal of intervening in the peace process.

The chapter's conceptualisation within the context of hybrid peacebuilding has acknowledged that identities could not and should not remain in neat categories given the ability of a single religious group to transgress across different spaces. The following chapter examines the Bangsamoro civil society's hybridisation that has emanated from the interaction and combination of local and international resources, which have provided an opportunity for non-state actors to support and intervene in the formal peace process. For future research, it would be valuable to compare and contrast the role of ethno-religious and other identity groups that operate in different contexts. In Asia, the violent conflict in Myanmar, for example, operates more closely along ethnic and religious divisions, which runs in contrast to the case used in this chapter. Although Cambodia is a relatively heterogeneous state, the political factions within the government run along ideological lines and are typically not based on racial or ethnic groups, which take into account as to why the mid-space role of the Buddhist monks has been largely undermined.

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