Abstract

Globalization has typically been regarded as challenging representative democracy at the state level. This chapter outlines four of these challenges—that of democratic externalities, of transnational global processes and supranational organizations, of cosmopolitan norms, and of effective and justified representation at the global level. It then explores three solutions that have been put forward to meet them: scaling up to a supra-national regional or even a global democracy for certain issues; creating a trans-national network of democratic bodies that address different issues and functions; or having inter-national associations of representative states under the equal control of their elected representatives. Whilst the first and second solutions are shown to create problems of both representation surpluses and deficits—some groups get over-represented and other groups under-represented, it is argued that the third solution can avoid both these difficulties and that it addresses the challenges more directly.

Chapter 34

Globalization and Representative Democracy

Normative Challenges

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Within the contemporary world the basic unit of representative democracy remains the territorial state. As a result, individuals obtain political representation on the basis of a right to citizenship of, although not necessarily current residence within, a particular territorial constituency that coincides with the borders of the state (Moore 2015). They thereby gain a say in the policies, laws and the resulting bundles of rights provided within that state and are represented as members of it in international negotiations and when travelling and working abroad. However, this territorial, state-based model of political representation has come under increasing criticism on both empirical and related normative grounds. The prime—if not the sole—sources of such criticisms have been respectively the alleged empirical insufficiency of a state-based system of political representation in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world (Held 1995), where many issues require international coordination, and the supposed normative inadequacy of the available justifications for either excluding individuals from citizenship—and hence representation—within a given state, or limiting political representation to such a system (Pogge 1992). Indeed, both empirical and normative critics point to the proliferation of international organizations, particularly the EU, and the growth of international law, to contend that these developments are already taking political

representation beyond the state and, in some instances, even the territorial model, and necessarily and rightly so (Archibugi et al. 2012).

This chapter will briefly outline four main challenges that globalization poses to political representation, discuss the normative criteria we might employ to assess any response to them, and then explore three solutions that have been put forward to meet them: scaling up to a supra-national regional or even a global democracy for certain issues (Archibugi 2008; Cabrera 2018); creating a trans-national network of democratic bodies that address different issues and functions (Pogge 1992; Bohman 2007); or having inter-national associations of representative states under the equal control of their elected representatives (Christiano 2015; Bellamy 2019). I shall argue that the first and second solutions create problems of both representation surpluses and deficits—some groups get over-represented and other groups under-represented (Bellamy and Kröger 2013). By contrast, I shall contend that the third proposed solution can avoid both these difficulties and that it addresses the challenges more directly. Nevertheless, it requires all state governments to be representative of their peoples by virtue of being elected through an effective form of representative democracy—a requirement many states currently fail to meet. Whilst sometimes criticized for offering an apologia for an unjust status quo, a fairer criticism of this solution might be to acknowledge that in this and some other respects it proves as utopian as the other two. All the same, I shall suggest it offers a more realistic utopia (Rawls 1999: 6), and on these grounds is to be preferred.

Four Challenges to State-Based Representative Democracy

Globalization challenges the state-based model of territorial representation in three fairly straightforward ways, whilst raising a fourth set of challenges for any solution to the problems it raises.

The first challenge arises from the ways the democratic decisions of one state can frame and even undermine the democratic decisions of another state within an interconnected world. This challenge involves a clash between the different territorial constituencies of representation. For example, if the citizens of state A elect representatives with a mandate to increase carbon taxes and raise corporate taxation, those policies may both lead to, and be undermined by, the representatives of state B wooing voters with promises of reduced taxes by seeking to free ride on the one and gain a competitive advantage with the other by lowering both. In this case, the policy choices of the citizens in state A produce positive externalities for state B that increase the attractiveness to state B's citizens of a set of diametrically opposed policies—perhaps increasing the electoral chances of more neo-liberal parties that otherwise would have been unlikely to be so successful. Meanwhile, these policies produce in their turn negative externalities for the citizens of state A that undermine the expected benefits of their original policy choice. As a result, many citizens in each of these states may feel that their interests ought to have been represented in the other state's decisions. Let's call this the challenge of democratic 'externalities'.

The second, and related, challenge stems from the global processes and actors operating transnationally, across states, that cannot be controlled by any individual state, although they may have a considerable impact on domestic social and economic well-being and political decision-making. Global environmental forces, financial markets, migration and trade flows; multinational corporations; and international crime and terrorist groups can only be adequately regulated, and the global pathologies—such as global warming—to which they give rise can only be tackled, through international agreements and organizations. A dual

challenge results from this circumstance associated with the power and influence of processes and organizations that are trans-territorial, and so cross territorial constituencies, on the one hand, and that give rise to organizations that are extra- or supra-territorial, on the other hand. The concern here is that both elements—global processes and actors, and international agreements and organizations—may lead to representatives of particular state-based constituencies responding to pressures or constituencies that lie outside the territory of the state rather than to the views and preferences of those who elected them, the overwhelming majority of whom are resident within the state. For example, they may feel bound to satisfy global markets or make concessions to the governments of other states in international negotiations, and so adopt policies that lack a mandate from their voters—or even contradict their electoral mandate. They may portray such decisions as responsible and in the best interests of those they have been elected to serve, but they may be perceived nonetheless as undermining democratic responsiveness towards those they represent. Let's call this the trans- and supra-national challenge.

These first two challenges relate to the issues of who is appropriately included or excluded from representation within a given democratic or other decisional process, and the difficulties posed by globalization of encompassing the appropriate group within a system of political representation based on the territory of a given state. On the one hand, the decisions of representatives responding to those within a given state may have oppressive or dominating effects for those outside its territory who are excluded from representation in the appropriate decision-making. On the other hand, if these same representatives include the preferences of these or other excluded parties in their decisions or are influenced by them in other ways, then their electorate may feel under-represented in their turn and likewise subject to domination or oppression. Of course, sometimes it may be right to exclude certain persons or preferences from the collective decision-making process. All existing democratic systems

have age limits excluding young children from the electorate and most distinguish certain purely local from national decisions. Similarly, many have formal constitutional rules that render it unlawful even to advocate certain kinds of discriminatory policies. Nonetheless, globalization increases the scope of who and what ought to be considered in even state-based decision-making, and the difficulties confronting purely state-based determinations of who and what these should be. Meanwhile different criteria for inclusion—such as the all-affected principle, on the one hand, or the all subject to coercion principle, on the other—will produce different views on the justification of excluding some or any individuals (Bauböck 2018).

Both these practical challenges can be seen as reflecting a third challenge stemming from a more general, normative, cosmopolitan critique of state-based political representation. From a cosmopolitan perspective, all individuals—regardless of the state into which they are born or happen to reside—should be treated as moral equals. Some cosmopolitans contend that we should regard citizenship of a wealthy and well-ordered state as an arbitrary privilege, one that often results from a history of oppression and domination of other states, not least through colonization (Carens 1987). As a result, they advocate a policy of open—or at least more open—borders, a proposal with potentially major implications for citizenship policies in a period of almost unprecedented global migration. Other cosmopolitans go further and argue for a global form of democracy in which the territories of the entire globe are represented on an equal basis (Archibugi 2008). Let's call this the cosmopolitan challenge.

The three challenges explored so far lead in their turn to the fourth challenge, which concerns how far, and in what ways, a political arrangement able to meet these three challenges can represent citizens in a sufficiently meaningful way that can avoid the prospect of oppression or domination. For example, if we conclude that global problems require a form of global democratic decision-making, then how adequate can the representation of such a diverse and vast number of people be, supposing that an effective representative assembly

could only be so big (Miller 2010)? Will the representative mechanisms we associate with state-based systems of representative democracy be plausible? For instance, will suitable transnational political parties be able to develop (Christiano 2011)? A key issue here concerns the linked problems of a representation surplus and a representation deficit. On the one hand, global democracy risks over-representing groups with only a marginal stake in certain decisions. On the other hand, it may make majority tyranny more likely by increasing the possibility of certain minorities—be they dispersed or territorially concentrated—getting under-represented. Let's call this the global representation challenge. The next section explores the criteria we might employ to assess whether this challenge has been met.

The Criteria for Democratic Representation

A number of different criteria can be used to assess any system of political representation. Broadly speaking, these criteria may be divided into output and input considerations (Scharpf 1999: 6–13). Output criteria assess a political system by its likelihood to promote certain kinds of decisions, such as those likely to be in the public interest or promotive of a given conception of social justice. However, given that people hold differing understandings of these outputs, such criteria are hard to operationalize. Indeed, though democracy may possess some epistemic qualities, it is generally seen as a fair mechanism for deciding between different reasonable views of the public interest and social justice rather than as a means for reaching the 'best' or the 'right' view. By contrast, input criteria concern the attributes of the process of decision-making itself, such as the fairness of the way power is distributed and the degree to which those subject to it can be regarded as free from domination. In what follows, I shall mainly be concerned with these input considerations, or what has been termed 'political justice' (Macdonald and Ronzoni 2012).

Democracy has been defended in such input terms as offering a 'content independent' form of legitimacy (Christiano 2015: 983). That is, in circumstances of reasonable disagreement about which collective policy a group of people should pursue (Rawls 1993: 54–8), then a democratic system of one person one vote and majority rule provides a fair process that (1) treats all equally, regardless of their status; (2) is impartial between the views they hold, treating them all the same; and (3) is neutral as to the eventual outcome, having no bias to any particular view other than it is the option those concerned most favour (May 1952). Most democratic systems treat some outputs from even fair democratic processes as inconsistent with political justice—for example, decisions that removed basic civil and political rights from certain groups of citizens on arbitrary discriminatory grounds, such as gender or skin colour. However, such constitutional side constraints apart, within the domain for which democratic decision-making is deemed appropriate the complex democratic systems employed by existing democratic states seek to preserve the three above-mentioned features, adapting them to the problem of addressing a huge number of decisions amongst a vast number of people by introducing some form of representation.

In theory, such a majoritarian system can be regarded as offering the fairest system for collective decision-making, offering each person the best chance of living under decisions they agree with. In reality, though, that will only be the case so long as the political community is not divided in ways that create consistent majorities and minorities. If there are segmental divisions based on socio-economic interests and/or culture, most commonly reflecting ethnicity, religion, or language, then a significant minority may find itself regularly on the losing side. In such circumstances, democracy may no longer appeal to such groups as a fair way for settling disagreements (Dahl 1989: 160ff). To avoid this possibility, many state-based democratic systems depart in various ways from strict majority rule. These departures typically involve special representation rights, such as a proportional say in the

executive, to guarantee that minorities have at least some influence in collective decisions; self-government rights, involving a considerable devolution of powers to territorial units in which the national minority is a majority; and special rights, protecting certain liberties for specific minority groups, such as language rights (Kymlicka 1995; Lijphart 1977). Meanwhile, even when these minority-protecting measures are in place, there may be demands—as in Catalonia, Quebec, and Scotland—for secession and the formation of a distinct political community on the part of the minority.

Democracy is only likely to prove legitimate for all concerned, therefore, when there is a sufficient degree of convergence on interests and culture for there to be cross-cutting rather than segmental cleavages amongst the demos. Given that these conditions prove hard to meet within many existing state-based democratic systems, one can imagine that they will prove even harder to achieve within a global representative system. In particular, they have an impact on two criteria that we might wish to employ for such a system—first the criteria for inclusion in such a process, and second the criteria regarding how those included are represented. I shall explore each in turn.

With regard to democratic inclusion, three criteria figure prominently in the literature: the all-affected principle (Goodin 2007); the all subjected to coercion principle (Stilz 2011); and the stakeholder principle (Bauböck 2018). The first principle suggests that anyone who is affected by a decision, such as the citizens in state A who are affected by the negative externalities of the decisions of the citizens of state B in the example given above, should be included in the initial decision-making process. The second principle has a more limited application. It suggests that the morally relevant feature for inclusion is being coercively subjected to obeying democratic decisions. That would suggest that only citizens of state B in this example should be included. However, it could justify inclusion within supranational decision-making if the rules of such bodies could be coercively imposed on citizens of the

states subjected to them, as is the case with the EU (see Chapters 32 and 33 in this *Handbook*). Finally, the third principle suggests that those included should have an equal stake in the totality of collective decisions over time, if not every single one, with their rights and liberties inherently linked to the decisions and functioning of the polity. This principle has been seen as favouring the territorial state model, given that the prime feature favouring this model consists in its offering a suitable context for applying common rules and policies that can provide equal freedoms and opportunities to all individuals, regardless of who they may be, simply on the grounds that they live in geographical proximity to each other and are engaged in a scheme of social cooperation on which the well-being of each, to some significant degree, depends.

Two aspects of the stakeholder account could be said to favour it over the others, at least from a democratic point of view (Bauböck 2018). One aspect is that the first and second principles are both concerned with the impact of outputs, while the third is concerned primarily with the input dimension. Arguably, a discussion of who is entitled to make a decision in the first place has a logical priority over a consideration of the effects of these decisions. That does not mean that the impact of outputs should not be considered, but an appropriate consideration may not be to give all those affected or coerced by a decision a say in its formulation. For example, it may suffice and be more suitable to offer non-citizens who are affected or subjected to certain decisions similar protections for their rights to citizens and a comparable means of redress or contestation through domestic or international courts. I shall return to this issue below.

The second aspect favouring the stakeholder account is that the all-affected and the all-subjected principles risk being too inclusive. The all-affected principle suggests that in a globally interconnected world all individuals worldwide might need to be involved in collective decision-making to ensure all those potentially affected were included (Goodin

2007). The all-subjected-to-coercion principle seems narrower. However, it suggests that anyone on the territory of a coercive political authority, including tourists or short-term residents—are entitled to the same rights as citizens of the polity in question (Stilz 2011). Both these views risk undermining part of the basic case for deciding collective policies by a democratic vote: namely, that if we accept that no individual's well-being is more important than that of another individual, and that individuals are the best judges of their self-interest, then amongst a group of individuals whose well-being is equally tied up in a range of collective decisions, each of these individuals should have an equal say to ensure their well-being is taken equally into account. However, if—as the all-affected and the all-subjected principles allow—individuals with less than an equal stake in the short- and long-term implications of any collective decision gain an equal say, then that would be unfair. It would lead ineluctably to a problem of the tyranny of the majority by over-representing those with less than an equal stake in many decisions (Christiano 2006). Most domestic systems recognize this second aspect by devolving certain decisions to a more local level. The needs of rural and urban areas may diverge in some respects; for example, making it appropriate for certain services to be organized locally and placed under the equal influence and control of those who use them regularly. Likewise, a global democratic system would require considerable devolution of democratic authority, in all likelihood to something like the level of current states and their regions.

So far I have only considered the need for a demos to have an equal stake in a shared set of collective decisions. However, I also noted that a shared culture can be as important (Miller 2009). For example, a shared language and media facilitates the ability of a demos to deliberate effectively together on matters of common concern. Otherwise, a danger exists that different perspectives may develop along linguistic lines. Likewise, certain shared values—not least of toleration—facilitate the ability to compromise and avoid stigmatizing certain

beliefs. For example, differences may exist regarding the acceptability of the state supporting particular religious attitudes and practices. As I remarked, these considerations can also lead to demands for devolving power and effectively creating multiple demoi within a polity. Of course, local government is usually framed by central government, but in many societies with deep socio-economic and/or cultural divisions the degree of devolution can be very considerable. That suggests that any global system of democracy would face a problem of deciding (a) which decisions could be justifiably decided at the global level, giving all individuals an equal say—these may turn out to be minimal, and (b) how to avoid a tyranny of the majority. As we shall see in the next section below, the solution to both may be to have decisions made by a consociation of states—making global democracy more like international democracy.

These points lead to the second set of criteria to be discussed—those determining who is represented and how. Most accounts settle on the need for representatives to be able to credibly 'stand for' those they represent, with some relating this to the degree to which they can also 'stand as' them (Pitkin 1967). With regard to the first criterion, for a system of representation to be democratically justified it must preserve a rough equality of influence and control amongst those citizens who possess an equality of stake in the relevant decisions. One way this is achieved is through an appropriate mechanism of authorization and accountability between representatives and those they represent, which seeks to ensure that representatives 'stand for' the represented in the sense of adequately reflecting their interests as they themselves see them. Such a mechanism allows for representatives to act in part as delegates, possessing a mandate from their voters, and in part as trustees, able to act for the interests of their voters even without explicit directions, yet subject to sanction should they fail to do one or the other—at least in the eyes of those they represent.

How well these mechanisms operate in domestic democracies has been a matter of some dispute. The issue I wish to raise here, though, is that these problems will be compounded within any form of global democracy. The reason is simple—size matters (Dahl and Tufte 1973). The larger the number of people being represented, the weaker this representation will be. Yet how many representatives could a global parliament include and still be manageable? Assuming a world population of around 7 billion, then a global parliament of 1000 representatives would mean each would represent around 7 million people—more than the entire populations of many existing states. If the earlier challenge of any form of global democracy was that of over-inclusiveness and a representative surplus, this issue poses the challenge of a representation deficit due to global constituencies being too large. The interests of 7 million people will be fairly diverse—how could any representative coherently and consistently 'stand for' them all?

Matters become worse once one factors in the increasing demand that representatives not merely 'stand for' but also can 'stand as' those they represent—that they share certain common qualities of class, ethnicity, or gender with the represented, or that these qualities are at least present within the parliament as a whole. Cosmopolitan democrats tend to be somewhat dismissive of the validity of this criterion. They regard it as potentially arbitrary and discriminatory and involving a failure to treat individuals as equals. However, others contend that if all interests are to be given an adequate hearing—especially those of groups that have been traditionally ignored or discriminated against—then they need to be present in the representative body (Phillips 1998 and Chapter 8 in this *Handbook*). A degree of identification between the represented and their representatives can also strengthen the legitimacy of the latter in the eyes of the former. It is important that citizens feel that politicians share the same social and political concerns as they do, and are similarly impacted by their decisions. If the political class are all white wealthy males from the developed world,

then—even if all are conscientious and well motived—the worry will be that they are partial to their own experiences and interests, perhaps without realizing it, and neglect, or fail to appreciate fully, the concerns of women, individuals of colour, and the peoples of the developing world.

This section has raised four problems confronting any global political system: first, the need to avoid over-inclusion when tackling exclusion from decisions, and the importance of decision makers having an equal stake in collective issues and a shared political culture; second, the related need to avoid both a representation deficit and a representation surplus; third, the constraints posed by size on the degree to which representatives can 'stand for' the represented; and fourth, the problems posed by diversity on how far they can 'stand as' those they represent. Taken together these four problems create a global representation challenge to the prospects for a global democratic order.

One can summarize the argument so far as follows: a representative democracy must operate as a system of public equality to be legitimate (Christiano 2008). Those involved must have a roughly equal share in the public matters to be decided and they must conceive of themselves as a public, among whom collective decisions can be appropriately made. Part of such a conception depends on their sharing sufficient common interests and political values for their disagreements to be cross-cutting. That is, there will not be significant groups that are consistently in a minority through having different interests and/or values to the majority within the society. Citizens may disagree as to the best way to promote some of their common interests, which partly reflect their different ideological, cultural, or ethical perspectives, but they will feel that whatever their differences they will be roughly equally impacted by the totality of the collective decisions they take, and that they more or less agree on how decisions should be taken and what kinds of collective decisions might be impermissible. In cases where regional economic differences and/or culture—be it language,

religion, or nationality, lead groups to believe they do not share either common interests or values or both, so that there will be consistent disagreements between these groups, then the four problems noted above will arise. The standard response to these problems has been for the different groups to demand greater representation and protection of group interests and values either through self-government rights and the devolution of ever more collective decisions to the group level or/and special representation rights that give them a secure say in collective decisions. Where these prove, or are perceived as being, insufficient, then—as with the independence movements in Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia—some groups will seek to secede and form a political community in their own right. In other words, even within state-based representative democracies, the four problems can promote a demand to shift democratic authority downwards. Of course, in the process the first three challenges posed by globalization to representative democracy are likely to be exacerbated. However, it also creates a dilemma, given that shifts of democratic authority upwards are likely to exacerbate in their turn the problems associated with the fourth, global representation, challenge.

Meeting the Four Challenges: Three Models of Representative Democracy Beyond the State

This section explores supra-, trans- and inter-national models of democracy beyond the state. As we shall see, the first two fare reasonably well with regard to the externality, the trans- and supra-national, and the cosmopolitan challenges, but—for the reasons hinted at above—have difficulties in adequately responding to the global representation challenge (for an overview, see Table 34.1).

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Supranational Democracy

By supranational democracy, I mean a form of democratic representation that operates in an analogous way to a domestic state-based system of representative democracy, but includes representatives from more than one state in a shared legislature that makes common laws over a circumscribed range of global issues that cover all the participating states. This model assumes some form of world government, with existing states nested within a global federal structure (Held 1995; Archibugi 2008; Cabrera 2018). The constituencies of such a supranational body need not coincide with those of the borders of states, and might encompass more than one state. However, many schemes for supranational democracy base constituencies around states, at least to some degree.

Supranational democracy offers a fairly straightforward way of tackling the problems of exclusion that arise from the democratic externalities and trans- and supra-national challenges. Scaling-up ultimate democratic decision-making to the global level renders representation in decision-making more inclusive in the sense of including all those affected by decisions worldwide. Moreover, most advocates of such a scheme do so by explicitly embracing cosmopolitan principles, thereby aspiring to address that challenge. The key issue, therefore, is whether it can meet these three challenges while satisfying the global representation challenge. To achieve the latter, it must avoid producing either a representation surplus or deficit at the same time as managing to provide adequate mechanisms to ensure representatives can credibly stand both for, and as, those they putatively represent.

The most common examples of such a scheme take the UN as their starting point, being the nearest we have to an organization involving representatives from all the world's states. However, cosmopolitans seek to shift political representation from states to individuals. For example, Archibugi and Held (1995) propose that a new assembly that is directly elected by a global demos should sit alongside the current general assembly of state representatives and

provide a means for overriding state-based negotiations. However, there are numerous practical difficulties with this proposal (Miller 2010). First, not all states are democracies, so it can be doubted that free and fair elections to a global assembly would be possible in all countries. If representatives from non-democracies were included, then their credentials to stand for, or as, those they represented could be questioned. If they were excluded, however, that would infringe the cosmopolitan challenge and create a representation deficit.

Second, there is the aforementioned constituency problem. Assuming, as per the previous section, that a global assembly of a workable size of a 1000 representatives would mean roughly one representative per 7 million people, that would leave many existing national peoples, such as the Norwegians, Icelanders, or New Zealanders, without a representative. Meanwhile, large current state peoples, such as the Chinese or citizens of the United States, would be represented by a comparatively large number of delegates (roughly 194 and 46 respectively). I remarked above how the application of a strict cosmopolitan principle might thereby produce a representation deficit, increasing the likelihood of intense and isolated consistent minorities. Some global democrats address this problem by adopting a similar solution to that employed for the EU's European Parliament (EP). They recommend a system that guarantees all existing states at least one delegate combined with something like the EP scheme of degressive proportionality. Yet, this solution may not only not be sufficient to avoid the problem of the tyranny of the majority, given that large states might still be able to outvote smaller states—unless they adopted something like the EU practice of Qualified Majority Vote as well—but also falls short of addressing the cosmopolitan challenge. Moreover, there will be the problem of a representative surplus on issues where individuals in different parts of the globe may not have equal stakes.

Third, this leads to the question of which issues such a global assembly could justifiably address. As I observed above, democracy assumes common interests and a shared political

culture, including language—an issue that is generally supposed to be overcome with the global spread of English. Habermas (2006: 143) has suggested that a global consensus might be found on preventing wars of aggression and crimes against humanity. Yet, if these are the only issues for a global democracy to consider, then it suggests there would not be so much to deliberate about—especially if, as I suggested, such an assembly could only be truly global once all peoples had embraced democracy and, hence, some respect for basic rights. Indeed, one might consider a consensus on such issues as morally obligated, and democracy as a collective decision-process, inappropriate.

However, once one moves to areas where reasonable disagreement might be expected and acceptable, the legitimacy of such an assembly becomes decidedly weaker. Not only will it be hard to ensure all those involved share a public interest and public sphere, but also it is doubtful their diverse interests and identities can attain adequate representation. Even if they did, to what extent could an individual voter claim to be influencing any collective decision? That is not simply an issue of the immense size of the electorate. Even in national elections, the weight of any single vote is vanishingly small. However, within a democratic context structured around a limited number of different perspectives on common interests, the choices facing the electorate will be relatively clear. For example, they can choose to vote for a party of the right or the left, or for the Protestant or the Catholic party, and so on. But within a global democracy, there may be little overlap between how each constituency sees the world. Even if similar cleavages operate in different constituencies, which may be true of some but not all, they are unlikely to all be moving in the same direction at the same time. In addition, there are almost no global transnational social movements, let alone political parties. If, as occurs in European Parliament elections (Hix and Marsh 2011), individuals therefore simply vote on the basis of domestic allegiances and issues, these may have no relevance at all for how they might meaningfully vote at the global level. Moreover, shifts of

opinion in any given constituency are unlikely to reflect or influence shifts of opinion globally. The most probable outcome will be some form of global grand coalition of parties that remains relatively stable over time, with elections having minimal effects on its composition. The result is likely to be a general disaffection with democracy and in all probability a very low turnout.

Transnational Democracy

Schemes for transnational democracy seek to democratize the particular organizations that exist, or might come to exist, to regulate processes that operate across the borders of existing states (Bohman 2007; Pogge 1992). As a result, they lack the global scope and inclusiveness of supranational schemes. Instead, they adopt a more piecemeal approach, although the proponents of such schemes differ as to whether they supplement or are destined to supplant existing national and supranational forms of democracy. Advocates of this approach have offered a variety of normative accounts of democracy: deliberative, republican, and liberal. However, they all share the shortcomings criticized below.

The transnational organizations focused on by this approach are fairly heterogeneous in character, ranging from transnational regulatory bodies operating in specific functional areas, be they state-sponsored bodies such as the Universal Postal Union or non-state organizations such as FIFA, the international federation of football associations; to charities that operate on a global basis, such as Oxfam; to transnational civil society groups such as Human Rights Watch or Green Peace; and social movements, such as Occupy (Hurrell 2007, chapter 4). I will treat state-sponsored international agreements and organizations, which are sometimes included under this heading, as a separate category and discuss them in the subsection that follows. Most of these non-state organizations do not produce legally binding and enforceable rules, but through lobbying and the exertion of moral pressure can nonetheless

incentivize agreement amongst relevant parties concerning matters such as the use of child labour, global poverty, or environmental policies to protect endangered species. As such, this scheme involves global governance rather than global government. The claim is that such transnational organizations and movements reflect a transformation of the nature of political community away from the state-based model of a single sovereign authority operating over a given territory towards a post-sovereign model of multiple transnational demoi that cut across current state boundaries and can exercise democratic control over specific functions and processes. The assumption is that any given individual is likely to belong to a number of these demoi, depending on the activities in which they are engaged.

The transnational approach sees transnational organizations as potentially an alternative to supranational and international ways of handling the complex patterns of global interdependence, which many regard as eroding national forms of state-based representative democracy over time. Supporters of this view regard such transnational arrangements as a way of overcoming the challenge of democratic externalities in ways consistent with cosmopolitan norms while avoiding the transnational and supranational challenge by remaining close enough to the relevant demoi with a stake in a particular organization for representation of their interests and values to be justified and effective. Yet, it is unclear that they can satisfactorily address the problem of over inclusiveness which we have seen bedevils supranational schemes without becoming in their turn over exclusive, thereby replacing a representation surplus with a representative deficit. Their dispersal of sovereign authority is also liable to generate its own version of the challenge of democratic externalities. However, attempts to address these issues end up moving towards a supranational approach, with all the attendant problems analysed above.

Following Grant and Keohane (2005), I shall draw a distinction between internal and external accountability. Internal accountability refers to the accountability of those running

these organizations to the sponsors, members, and volunteers who sustain these various transnational bodies. External accountability relates to the accountability of these organizations to those affected by, or with a stake in, their decisions. By contrast to democratic systems within states, these two groups are unlikely to coincide either in membership or their priorities. As a result, the organization may have to be accountable to two distinct demoi. Moreover, there may be difficulties in identifying either of them, and of appropriately weighting the influence of both of these demoi relative to each other and of the different individuals within each of them.

Very few transnational civil society organizations have formal mechanisms of internal accountability. Exit and loyalty rather than voice tend to be the main channels of influence. Moreover, these channels operate in rather uneven ways, with a single large donor often having considerably more influence than even a large number of volunteers or small donors. Of course, that might be appropriate—the interest of small donors, say, may be marginal and passing. However, it remains unclear how, and under which principle, such a diverse group of supporters could be coherently represented.

The same difficulties apply to external accountability. By and large, transnational organizations have made representative claims on behalf of those they seek to serve, occasionally backed by various forms of consultation. How such mechanisms of influence and control could be formalized proves problematic. If we adopt the all-affected principle, then that potentially includes everyone and so slides towards supranationalism. Terry Macdonald (2008) has attempted to counter such a slippage by distinguishing primary from secondary stakeholders in a decision, with only the first, whose 'autonomy-constraining interests' are at stake, being entitled to a right to participate in decision-making. Yet, again this can be quite a widespread group, and how to weigh its components and to involve them is unclear. For example, it could include both those directly affected by a decision to support

cause A, and those indirectly affected because, as a result, support was not given to causes B, C, and D. Meanwhile, there is a general problem of the externalities of any decision. If all decisions are treated as discreet, then the democratic externalities challenge risks becoming greater under this scheme than with state-based democracy. Potentially, something like the World Social Forum provides a venue where organizations could collectively consider such mutual knock-on effects. But once again this proposal starts to shade into some form of supranational democracy.

These criticisms do not deny that such organizations can and do play an important supplementary role in giving voice to otherwise marginalized groups. However, they do illustrate how at some point a formal and more comprehensive set of representative channels is needed if different interests and views are to be treated equitably. In this regard, the transnational scheme fairs worse in meeting all four challenges than the international scheme it seeks to supplant.

International Democracy

Proponents of supra- and trans-national democracy have a tendency to stigmatize state-based forms of international democracy as anachronistic hangovers from a 'Westphalian' era of sovereign states that has lost its relevance in a globalizing world (Held 1995; Buchanan 2000). However, one can see the very arrangements they favour, such as the supranational mechanisms of the UN and the EU, or more partial, transnational organizations such as the WTO, as the responses states have made to the global challenges. Rather than considering these mechanisms as transitions to super-state or post-state and sovereignty forms of global democracy and governance, they may be more appropriately viewed as devices that sovereign states have adopted to retain their relevance and democratic capacity in an interconnected world (Christiano 2012; Bellamy 2019).

From this perspective, supra- and trans-national organizations are essentially voluntary associations of states, that derive their legitimacy from state consent and their democratic credentials through being subject to a two-level game that I have called elsewhere a form of 'republican intergovernmentalism' (Bellamy 2019). According to this arrangement, democratic legitimacy is provided by two levels of representation: First, at the domestic level, the states themselves must have working systems of democratic representation in place, which place governments under the equal influence and control of those they represent; Second, when making collective decisions at the international level, governments must show each other equal concern and respect as representatives of their respective peoples, and acknowledge that their decisions must be mutually acceptable to them (Bellamy and Weale 2015).

Five objections might be raised to this account. First, it might be objected that this arrangement does not meet the cosmopolitan challenge because state peoples rather than individuals are represented in international agreements. However, any system of democratic representation works through constituencies. As we saw, supra-national and trans-national schemes find it difficult to define constituencies with sufficient coherence for representatives to either stand for their interests, or credibly stand as them, through identifying with their experiences and attitudes. By contrast, inter-national democracy operates through established constituencies and forms of representation. Moreover, individuals are equally represented within them, so at the constituency level the cosmopolitan norm is satisfied.

Second, though, it might still be maintained that governments tend to be allowed a high degree of discretion in foreign affairs, which rarely figure prominently in domestic elections and where parliamentary oversight can be limited. Admittedly, that has been true in the past. However, such issues have gained in electoral salience as the awareness of citizens of the global challenges to domestic representative systems has grown. Issues such as the Iraq war

and the impact of the financial crisis have led citizens to take a greater interest in their government's international policy and enhanced the oversight exercised by legislatures—witness the increasingly vocal opposition to the lack of transparency of the negotiations leading to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the likely difficulties in getting it ratified by either all twenty-seven EU parliaments or both houses of Congress in the USA.

Third, it could be countered that supranational parliaments and forms of democratic representation are already developing, most notably the European Parliament, and that these offer a more coherent way of meeting the supra- and trans-national challenges. However, many commentators have remarked how the EP suffers from the very drawbacks with such schemes that were discussed above. Despite the EP's powers having steadily grown over the past thirty years, that same period has seen a steady decline in voter turnout and support. The exception to increased apathy on the part of the European electorate has been the sharp increase in support for Eurosceptical parties opposed to further political integration and demanding the repatriation of important state powers. By contrast, post the Lisbon Treaty, there has been ever more involvement of national parliaments in EU decision-making, and cooperation between them (Bellamy 2019: chapter 4). All EU states have set up EU parliamentary committees and employ them to influence and control the positions of government ministers in EU negotiations. They also exercise a check on how far EU policies meet the proportionality and subsidiarity requirements, while interparliamentary bodies have some oversight responsibilities with regard to the EU's foreign and financial policies. Indeed, other international bodies exist where control is exercised not by a supranational parliament or even only by governments but also by an assembly of national parliaments—notably, the Council of Europe and its most powerful organ the European Court of Human Rights.

Fourth, a worry might be raised that wealthier and more powerful states will be able to dominate small states, and that the normative ideal of the two-level game will, in reality, be at best a fiction that serves to justify the hegemony of the key international players. As a result, the challenge of democratic externalities will not be met. I concede there may be some truth in this objection. However, normative ideals can have an impact on the reality by providing criteria that can be used to criticize current practice and motivate its reform. Moreover, small states have become increasingly adept at cooperating and within multilateral international forums can collectively have an impact that moves international negotiations in the direction of republican intergovernmentalism.

Finally, this arrangement might be thought to allow too much scope for states to block cooperative arrangements they regard as potentially damaging their interests. Again, this may mean that the challenge of democratic externalities might go unaddressed and that global public goods and bads, such as climate change, are not adequately tackled. That would be true if the only solution compatible with a two-level game involved consensus among the parties on each and every issue. However, given that states are likely to be repeat players in multiple agreements, incentives exist on their part to seek agreements over a broad package of issues, promoting compromise and a degree of give and take. Moreover, part of such a compromise could and should be to allow certain states to opt out of certain agreements. After all, given the socio-economic and cultural heterogeneity of states across the globe, it would be both inefficient and inequitable to take a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to all global issues. Even the comparatively homogeneous EU allows for a degree of differentiation as to the timing and form of common policies its members adopt, and even permits complete opt-outs in certain areas (Bellamy 2019: chapter 6). Indeed, given that not all states will have an equal stake in every global decision, such opt-outs will often be democratically legitimate and even necessary to avoid what above I called a representation surplus. Meanwhile, the need for

even the most powerful states to ally or cooperate with other states for defence and trade makes them sensitive to moral and economic pressures to adopt and abide by commonly accepted *jus cogens* norms and to address, to some degree, pressing global issues such as poverty and climate change.

Conclusion

Within an interconnected world, state-based democratic representation risks being undermined by externalities stemming from the decisions made by other states, on the one side, and being unable to adequately control transnational processes and organizations or tackle global problems, on the other. To many scholars and practitioners, the most direct way of dealing with these global challenges has seemed to be either to scale up democratic authority to the supranational level or to disperse this authority transnationally across current state borders. However, these proposed solutions create in their turn representation surpluses and deficits, and fail to offer appropriate ways for representatives to either stand for, or as, those they represent, or to be influenced by, or held accountable to, the represented. By contrast, I have suggested that, through state-based international arrangements, democratic states have managed to address many of these challenges in ways that can satisfy cosmopolitan norms. While much can be done to improve and extend such arrangements, they have the advantage of building on the already existing and comparatively effective and equitable systems of state-based democratic representation. To address the global challenges these face by greatly diminishing their importance, or even doing away with them altogether, risks throwing the baby away with the bathwater.

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Table 34.1 Dimensions of Global Representation

Type of Global Challenge	*Type of Global Representation*		
	Supra-national	**Trans-national**	**Inter-national**
Democratic Externalities	Meets this well, through inclusiveness	Meets some but may create others	Meets well through mutual agreements between states
Supra- and Trans-national	Addresses supra- and trans-	Addresses only trans-	Can grasp elements of both through formation of comprehensive

			international organizations such as the EU
Cosmopolitan	Prima facie, although may have difficulties treating all individuals equally	Prima facie, although may have difficulties treating all individuals equally	Compatible with setting up bodies such as ECHR to secure basic human rights
Global Representation	Risks representation deficit and surplus	Risks representation deficit and surplus	Can represent the peoples of representative/ democratic states