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The role of the party platform in the American political system

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The Role of the Party Platform in the

American Political System.

(by

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B.A., M.A.)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Identification of the Problem Area

The role of the party platform in the political pro-
cess is an area of political science that has been studied
neither very extensively nor very seriously. As V. O. Key
points out:

> Platforms are electioneering documents, not blue-
> prints for action. They may indicate the general
> direction of movement sought by the dominant ele-
> ments of the party, but from both practical and
> theoretical necessities, they leave wide latitude
> for discretion once the election is won.[1]

The vague, ambiguous and rhetorical characteristics of the

platform are explained by the fundamental nature of the

American party system which, for several reasons, is not

conducive to party programmes pledging specific courses

of action if the party is elected. Firstly, to win an

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[1] V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups
(5th. ed.; New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 421.

election under a competitive, two-party system in a highly
pluralistic society, a party must be able to form coali-
tions between diverse groups encompassing a wide spectrum
of interests. Therefore the party should produce a pro-
gramme that does not alienate more prospective voters
than it attracts.[2]

Secondly, the Administration wants flexibility of
action once the election is won. This is facilitated by
a dedication in the platform to broad principles without
a commitment to specific policies. Thirdly, there is no
guarantee a party programme could be implemented, due to
the separation of powers between the Executive and the
Legislature. There are few binding links between the Pres-
ident and his party-in-Congress which would encourage a
common party programme to be carried out by party support
from both branches of government.

Finally, although the President or the leading can-
didate for the nomination is usually influential in

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[2]Voting studies have shown that to win an election, a
party must formulate the issues in such a way as to stimu-
late the turnout of the peripheral voter. Therefore, a
party programme--and by extension, a party platform--should
capture the support and interest of the weakly-identified
or independent voter. Angus Campbell, et al. The American
Voter (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1964), and Angus Campbell,
et al. Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley
and Sons, 1967).

drafting the platform, it is not designed to reflect the views of one candidate but, rather, must be acceptable to all possible candidates that might become the nominee of the party. Extending this point, the platform should be acceptable to all factions in the party. Unity behind the platform is symbolic of unity within the party and of a willingness to put political differences aside for the purpose of winning the Presidency. Deep rifts between factions in the platform committee and the Nominating Convention represent, in most cases, corresponding divisions within party identifiers in the electorate.

Although these factors obviously contribute to making the party platform a "spineless" document, it remains "a statement of principles, resolutions, and policies on public questions which the National Convention draws up and adopts, and promises to be carried out when and if the party wins the election."[3] This paper is an attempt to synthesize the two viewpoints and discover to what extent concrete proposals found in the platform are carried forward in legislative proposals in subsequent sessions of Congress, and whether they are eventually passed into law.

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[3]Edith Vorees, Political Parties in the United States (New York: Pangant Press Inc., 1960), p. 55.

In other words, the research will examine the promises made in the platform and discover whether or not action is taken upon them.

As a framework for the analysis, David Easton's systems model of the political process will be used. This model views the political system as a set of interacting variables, through which the resources of a society are allocated in a binding fashion.[4] That is, the main concern of political activity is to make decisions upon how the scarce resources of society are allocated, and to make those decisions effective throughout society. The wants of society are input into the political system and by interaction with other variables in the system, decisions are made and outputs generated. These outputs re-enter the social system and generate new demands: thus the system is self-perpetuating.

Using this framework, the party platform can be viewed as a collection of demands and issues which certain sectors of society want to see implemented by the political system. The paper will trace the process by which the decision-makers in the system convert these inputs into

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[4]David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 478-479.

acceptable outputs. The importance of this question can
be related to the importance of demand satisfaction to the
political process. If the party platform is considered an
indicator of the major demands of a large section of
society, then it is certainly relevant to examine the ex-
tent to which they are enacted by the political system
and, further, to examine this transition from demand to
output.

This paper provides a "new approach" to the analysis
of party platforms in that the methodology attempts to
apply scientific criteria and quantitative method to an
area of political science previously analysed by observa-
tional and historical data. The study will test general-
izations about the party platform and provide backing or
refutation for hypotheses already advanced on the nature
of the party platform. In essence, the study is an attempt
to disregard political science "folklore" concerning the
party platform and examine whether or not action is taken
on proposals in subsequent years and to what extent that
action is effective. The focus is unique in applying a
general systems research design to the analysis of an em-
pirical problem. As such, this paper is one of the few
attempts to utilize a general systems model for middle-

range research.

Hypotheses

The intent of the research is to identify the extent
and source of support given to platform demands by the
political system. If a platform demand is to become an
output, it must be debated by an individual, or groups of
individuals, who possess the authority to make, or to con-
tribute to, a binding decision. This decision-making pro-
cess has two main aspects: initiation of debate and making
the authoritative decision. Effective support must be
mobilized at both stages if a demand is to be implemented.
In the case of platform proposals, debate is mainly ini-
tiated by the Administration through its legislative pro-
gramme, or by Congress. By voting on legislative pro-
posals, Congress plays a large role in making the authori-
tative decision, but, under certain circumstances, the
Executive may also perform this function. The President
can always interfere with implementation by using the
veto power.

Two main questions can be formulated to operation-
alize the decision-making process with regard to demands
articulated in the party platform.

1. To what extent does the President or Congress attempt
   to initiate action on proposals embodied in the plat-
   form?

2. Where are the key areas of support necessary to the
   passage of Presidential requests based on platform
   proposals and to what extent does party unity affect
   the mobilization of support process?

   By focussing upon these two questions, the paper will
describe the flow of platform demands through the political
system, and identify the sources of support necessary to
the successful passage of a proposal.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Definition of Systems Theory

The term "systems" implies a focus on the inter-relation of activities within the broad context of a specified environment. Systems theory is concerned with how inter-related variables maintain themselves under the impact of environmental disturbances, or in terms of political systems: "how do any and all political systems manage to persist in a world of both stability and change?"[1] So systems theory focuses upon the process of maintenance and adaptation; or, more broadly, how the system functions within a changing environment.

The political system can be distinguished from the social system by two means. Firstly in terms of the units of the political system. That is, the elements of which a system is composed. In the case of the political system,

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[1]David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 17.

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the units are political actions. Secondly, it can be dis-
tinguished by the existence of boundaries which are defined
by all those actions which are more or less directly related
to the making of binding decisions for society.[2] From this
discussion it emerges that systems conceptualization pre-
sents a dynamic model of a political system as a goal-
setting, self-transforming and creatively adaptive system.[3]
Its activities are well summarized by H. V. Wiseman:

> Any political system involves political structure,
> political roles performed by actors or agents, pat-
> terns of collectivities, and a political process.
> This is, basically, a continuous series of patterns
> of interaction between political actors, in which
> leaders secure the support they need, and get their
> followers to accept restrictions, while followers
> procure direction and decisions, and give the nec-
> essary support. All this operates in a political
> culture, which involves the question of legitimacy
> and values.[4]

David Easton's Systems Model

David Easton defines the political system as "the
most inclusive system of behaviour in a society for the

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[2]David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Poli-
tical Systems," World Politics, 9 (April, 1957), p. 385.

[3]David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 132.

[4]Herbert Wiseman, Political Systems: Some Sociologi-
cal Approaches (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 98.

authoritative allocation of values", an allocation being
authoritative when the persons oriented to it consider
themselves bound.[5] He focuses upon the process of decision-
making as this takes place within the political system and
upon how political decisions produce reactions within the
environment which produce further demands for action. The
model argues that it is useful to interpret political life
as a complex set of processes through which certain kinds
of inputs are converted into the type of output that can be
called authoritative policies, decisions and implementing
action.[6] This is an input-output model of the political
system. In its essentials it is quite simple and can be
represented diagrammatically as in Figure 1. Through the
input channel the wants of the members of society are
articulated and introduced into the political mechanism
for satisfaction. Support for these demands is also input
into the system. Outputs are, characteristically, important
consequences for society, namely authoritative decisions.
Without inputs the system can do no work; without outputs
the work done cannot be identified.

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[5]Easton, *Framework for Political Analysis*, p. 56.

[6]Easton, *Systems Analysis*, p. 17.

Figure 1: EASTON'S BASIC MODEL OF THE POLITICAL
            SYSTEM
Source: David Easton, A Framework for Political
          Analysis (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1965),
          p. 112.

So Easton argues that it is necessary to identify the

inputs and the forces that shape and change them, to trace

the process through which they are transformed into outputs

(conversion process), to describe the general conditions

under which such processes can be maintained, and to es-

tablish the relationship between inputs and succeeding out-

puts of the system.[7] Further, and here a dynamic element

is introduced, by modifying the environment, political

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[7]Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political
Systems," p. 386.

outputs thereby influence the next round of effects that move from the environment back to the political system: a continuous feedback loop is established.[8]

Therefore, systems analysis encourages an interpretation of political life as a dynamic system of behaviour, both as an interacting set and as a body of activities which, in their totality, are able to do work by converting inputs into outputs.[9] Since this research project focuses upon the flow of demands through the system, this aspect of Easton's model needs further discussion.

Demand Flow Patterns

The inputs of a system--demands and supports--can be viewed as the raw materials from which the outputs are manufactured and are indicators that sum up most of the important effects that cross the boundary between the environment and the political system.[10] The conversion process takes these inputs and translates them, via the supportive mechanism, into outputs. However, before a demand becomes a demand it appears in the form of a social

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[8]Easton, Framework for Political Analysis, p. 111.

[9]Easton, Systems Analysis, p. 471.

[10]Easton, Framework for Political Analysis, p. 113.

want, preference, hope, expectation or desire. Only at
the time when social wants or hopes are voiced as proposals
for decision and action on the part of the authorities do
they become demands.[11] Why should these demands lead to
political activities? Firstly, because all the demands
made cannot be fully satisfied, some mode of selection and
rejection is essential; and, secondly, because the satis-
faction of some demands requires a special organized effort
by "society", eg. a demand for better education requires
action by the political authorities if it is to be satis-
fied.[12] Demands will pass into the political process via
certain established channels and it is at this point that
an initial selection process occurs. Gatekeepers exist to
perform this function; for instance, the platform committee
operates as a gatekeeper when processing demands to be in-
cluded in the party platform.[13]

The flow of demand patterns is put in diagram form
by David Easton: Figure 2 is an elaboration of the basic
input-output model. The wants of society--expectations,

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[11]Ibid., p. 122.

[12]Wiseman, Political Analysis, p. 121.

[13]Easton, Systems Analysis, p. 136.

public opinion, motivations, ideology, interests, prefer-
ences--are formulated as articulated demands. These de-
mands cross the boundary threshold between the environment
and the political system and enter the political system.
The boundary threshold is shown as a broad band, indefi-
nite as to limits, indicating that it matters little
whether the conversion of wants is interpreted as taking
place in the environment or in the political system. As
the figure shows, certain established patterns exist in
the conversion process, *i.e.* channels S, T, U, V, W,
whereby demands enter and are processed by the political
system.

1. Channel S: A demand enters the system and withers
   almost immediately; it is voiced but does not persist.
   This is the most frequent possibility.

2. Channel T: A demand is voiced and moves immediately
   to the output stage. This is most likely to occur
   when the demand is the result of a sudden event and
   achieves near consensus in the polity as to its nec-
   essity.

3. Channel U: This demand has been voiced but at some
   stage it is modified or combined with other demands of
   a like character. Combination usually occurs when more

ENVIRONMENT

ENVIRONMENT

Expectations

Public Opinion

Motivations

Ideology

Preferences

Interests

boundary
threshold

POLITICAL SYSTEM

FEEDBACK

O U T P U T S

I N P U T S

W A N T S

D_1 D_2 D_3 D_4 D_5 D_6 D_7 D_8 D_n

S T U V W

ΔR ΔR

$\Diamond I$ $\Diamond I$

Figure 2: TYPES OF DEMAND FLOW PATTERNS

Source: Easton, *Systems Analysis*, p. 74.

EXPLANATION OF FIGURE 2

⟶ D_1 to D_n: represents the points of entry and
inflow of demands. They indicate that varying wants have
been voiced as demands. The letters **D** and their subscripts
identify different demands.

⟹ S to W: represents flow channels and patterns.
The solid arrows represent the channels along which de-
mands flow, and the broken arrows suggest the disappear-
ance of the demands. The letters identify the five basic
types of flow patterns that demands may take.

△ R: Reduction and combination points. Once a demand
is part of the political process, it may be modified or
combined with others, thereby reducing the total number of
demands in the system.

◇ I: Conversion to issues. At some stage demands are
transformed into issues; from these a selection is ulti-
mately made for conversion to outputs.

▷ O_{a-n}: Demands in their original or processed form are
turned into decisions and associated actions. The sub-
scripts identify different outputs. ∿⟶ represents the
flow of outputs into the environment.

demands enter the system than could possibly be pro-
cessed and there is need for them to be modified in
content and reduced in number. Such demands may be
unsuccessful and linger for some time but also may be
ultimately successful and become outputs.

4. Channel V: The demand bypasses the reduction and com-
bination stage. Once it is put into the system it is
immediately transformed into an issue and it is either
accepted or rejected.

5. Channel W: Demands are modified as in Channel U, and
either fail to move to the next processing stage or,
if they continue, are converted into issues. Once
again, after having been fought out as an issue in the
system, the demand may die or it may finally reach the
output stage.[14]

The above flow channels are summarized by Figure 2.
Through the use of this diagram it is possible to identify
the progress of each demand as it enters and passes through
the political system. The model could be constructed in
the form of a pyramid; large numbers of demands are
gradually reduced to a few, but, in the process of re-
duction, these few may incorporate some or all of the

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[14] Easton, Systems Analysis, pp. 76-77.

content of many of the demands that had been eliminated as independent units.[15] The function of reduction is performed by gatekeepers; it is by the action or lack of action taken by individuals at key positions in the political system that demands are either promoted or rejected. As demands move closer to the output point, although they probably become smaller in number, they will at the same time be more comprehensive in scope.[16]

The Function of Issues

An important aspect of the research design is the transition from demands to issues, as shown by channels V and W. At any one time in most systems there are a large number of demands that reflect problems requiring attention; thus there must be some way for politically relevant members of society to discriminate and select among these problems. This is the fundamental task of issue formulation.[17] Issues are matters of dispute formulated as realistic alternative policies from which a

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[15]Ibid., p. 136.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., p. 140.

binding decision can be made. Easton distinguishes two

major kinds of issues. Firstly, decisional issues which

involve substantive content of possible alternatives for

decision and action; and, secondly, orientation decisions

which relate to differences in attitude toward the possi-

ble alternatives. An orientation decision might focus

upon differences in the qualities of a contender for

office.[18] This paper is mainly concerned with decisions

of the former type. So issues can be viewed as those

demands that become a matter of contention because they

are being considered as the basis for implementation in

the immediate future.[19] The main problem is how issues

can be distinguished empirically from demands. David

Easton suggests that:

> The primary index of the issue status of a demand
> depends upon the degree of involvement of the re-
> levant members of the system in its discussion and
> the extent to which the matter is being considered
> for possible authoritative action.[20]

As Easton points out, the distinction between demands and

issues is often very narrow. The vagueness of the defini-

tion makes it extremely difficult to operationalize.

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[18]Ibid., p. 142.

[19]Ibid., p. 143.

[20]Ibid.

However, the overall scheme provides a very percep-
tive analysis of how the process of conversion from want
to demand to issue can be conceived. The next section of
the paper will apply this model to the present research.

Research Design

The research design uses David Easton's model to
trace the progress of party platform demands through the
political system. The model, as shown in Figure 3, iden-
tifies the input, output, conversion and feedback stages.
The party platform can be viewed as a mechanism for demand
and issue entry into the political system, the Nominating
Convention being identified as a boundary threshold. The
resolutions committee is an initial gatekeeper of the
system and performs the function of reducing and combining
demands into a coherent platform. The platform itself is
a mixture of demands and issues since not all proposals
have the same degree of policy content. Some are already
formulated in alternative policy terms and can thus be
classed as issues; others are more vague and can only be
considered articulated demands.

Once input into the political system, platform de-
mands may be converted into outputs via several possible

flow channels. Figure 3 illustrates three possible patterns. Flow patterns one and two show the demands and issues of the platform being acted upon by the Administration. By incorporation into an Administration programme, the proposals either directly exit the system as Executive Orders (pattern one), or they are sent to Congress as part of a legislative programme. Clearly, Administration proposals to Congress are formulated in alternative policy terms and can be classed as issues. Congress can either pass the proposed legislation (pattern two), or reject the demand.

Flow pattern three shows Congress taking the initial action but, again, the proposal may be either passed or rejected. Before becoming an authoritative decision, the proposals passed by Congress must be signed by the President, who may block implementation. Otherwise they will become law, and thus outputs of the system. Both outputs and rejected demands have a feedback effect upon new demands and supports arising in the system.

This model illustrates possible channels through which a platform demand may flow if it is to be converted into an output of the system. In essence, the research will test which of these flow patterns is generally

Figure 3: ADAPTATION OF EASTON'S MODEL OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, USING THE PARTY PLATFORM AS AN INPUT

followed by platform demands.

To operationalize this model, specific questions need
to be asked which will quantify the treatment of platform
proposals by the political system.

1. Does the President incorporate platform planks in his
   legislative programme?

2. Does Congress initiate any action on platform proposals?

3. Does Congress support the platform legislation proposed
   by the Administration, and, if so, to what extent is
   this support mainly from the President's party?

4. When Congress is controlled by the non-Presidential
   party does it attempt to introduce proposals based on
   its own party platform?

5. Does the President use the veto power to prevent Con-
   gressional legislation which contradicts platform pro-
   posals?

By investigating these questions, the progress of
platform proposals through the political system can be
measured, and an indication of key support areas for plat-
form enactment determined. The basic methodological pro-
blem was to operationalize the systems model so that the
input, conversion and output stages could be quantified
and the process traced in an empirical fashion.

Input Process

The input data for this paper were the party plat-
forms of the victorious Presidential party for the years
1952, 1956, 1960 and 1964. In other words the input data
were the 1952 Republican party platform, 1956 Republican
platform, 1960 Democratic platform and 1964 Democratic
platform. These platforms were selected for several rea-
sons. Firstly, because the data were more readily acces-
sible. Secondly, because there is a continuing factor,
tracing the process of platform enaction for 1952 to
1967. A third reason is that these platforms provide a
good distribution of situations. There are two Republican
Presidencies, two Democratic Presidencies; one case, that
of 1956, shows a Republican President and a Democratic
Congress. The other cases show the party controlling
Congress also having an incumbent President. So, although
the platforms do not represent a random sample of party
platforms, in this particular research such a problem
does not seem very important.

The first problem was to organize the raw data, pro-
vided by these documents, for empirical research. This
was done on two levels, on an area level and in terms of

specificity of content. On an area level the platforms
were broken down into seven broad categories:

Agriculture

Economic Policy

Foreign Policy

Government Affairs

National Defence

Natural Resources

Welfare

Each proposal was then placed in one of the seven categor-
ies. This was done for reasons of organizational clarity
and to investigate whether any distinct disparities exist
between the various categories. An initial problem arose
in systematically deciding whether a proposal merited in-
clusion. The criterion used was a pledge by the party to
act in a certain fashion or to adhere to certain standards
and principles if elected.

A further refinement was introduced by classifying
the platform proposals in terms of the specificity of con-
tent. A scale of specificity was developed which involved
placing each proposal in one of the three following classi-
fications.

"A" Proposal: Very specific. A reference to proposed

legislative action. The key question to be asked in clas-
sifying a platform proposal, "A", is whether or not it has
already been framed in legislative terms or in such a man-
ner that rapid, effective action is feasible. Some examples
are: 1952 platform: "Restoration to the States of rights
to all lands and resources beneath the offshore waters."[21]
1956 platform: "Oppose the seating of Communist China in
the United Nations."[22]
1960 platform: "All firms to have access at reasonable
rates to patented inventions resulting from Government-
financed research and development contracts."[23]
1964 platform: "Fair Labour Standards Act must be extended
to all workers employed in industries affecting interstate
commerce."[24]

"B" Proposal: Reasonably specific. A declaration to act
in a definite fashion without actual reference to proposed

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[21]Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, National
Party Platforms, 1940-1964 (3rd. ed.; Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1966), p. 502.

[22]Ibid., p. 557.

[23]Ibid., p. 587.

[24]Ibid., p. 646.

legislation. This type of proposal indicates a positive approach to a problem and a direction in which the party wishes to move if elected, but does not propose any concrete action. Some examples are:

1952 platform: "co-ordination of intelligence services for protecting security."[25]

1956 platform: "continue and expand the school milk and lunch programs."[26]

1960 platform: "give small business a more equitable share of government contracts."[27]

1964 platform: "raise the minimum wage level and extend coverage."[28]

"C" Proposal: General reference. Approval of a general course of action or the affirmation of the desirability of a goal. This type of proposal is vague in nature; it is declamatory and has little specific policy content. Some examples are:

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[25]Ibid., p. 500.

[26]Ibid., p. 552.

[27]Ibid., p. 587.

[28]Ibid., p. 646.

1952 platform: "Combat inflation by encouraging full production of goods and food, and not through a program of restriction."[29]

1956 platform: "Give full support to farmer-owned and farmer operated co-operatives."[30]

1960 platform: "Eliminate the slums within ten years."[31]

1964 platform: "Protect the consumer where necessary."[32]

This scale of specificity was necessary for two reasons. Firstly, because of the nature of the party platform. As is evident upon first glance, proposals in a party platform are not homogeneous. As the examples show, they vary from vague principles to declarations of an intention to change a specific law in existence or to introduce some new legislation. This can be viewed on a continuum, ranging from a very vague form of "C" proposal to a highly specific "A" proposal; the categories do not have rigidly fixed dividing lines and classifications are sometimes somewhat arbitrary. This classification scheme is relevant to the research since the wording

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[29] Ibid., pp. 500-501.

[30] Ibid., p. 552.

[31] Ibid., p. 593.

[32] Ibid., p. 647.

of a proposal in the platform may relate to the extent of Administration action or the level of effective output.

The second reason why this scale is necessary lies in the type of research design used. David Easton's model distinguishes between demands and supports on the one hand and issues on the other. When the members of a political system are prepared to deal with demands as significant items for discussion they can be classed as issues, so "A" proposals could be termed issues. "C" proposals remain in the form of demands as they have yet to be formulated in specific terms. "B" proposals are, perhaps, in the transitional stage since they possess direction but are not formulated in alternative policy terms.

Essential though this scale of specificity is to the research design, it has the basic disadvantage that it is difficult to preserve rigorous objectivity when classifying proposals. Many proposals are on the borderline between classifications and it has proved a great problem to maintain consistent classifications, both within each classification and when considering the intent of the research design. Two measures were taken to ensure a minimum degree of consistency: continuous rechecking of classifications, and classification by other students.

Conversion Process

The next stage, the conversion process, traces the passage of platform demands through the political system. This was operationalized by considering each proposal and seeking to discover the action taken upon it by either the Administration or Congress. If the action was taken by the President, then the degree of supportive behaviour by his party in Congress was also sought. The data source was the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, years 1953, 1954, 1957, 1958, 1961, 1962, 1965, 1966. In tracing the fate of platform proposals this research has only considered the first two years of a Presidential term, since it would be difficult to relate action taken after two years to a party platform written at convention time.

The first step was to discover whether any action had been taken on a proposal. Action can be taken in three ways.

1. President: action was deemed as taken by the President or his Administration if any evidence of such was found in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac.[33] A problem

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[33]The Congressional Quarterly Almanac uses the State of the Union Address, Presidential messages to Congress and letters to Congressional leaders to determine Presidential proposals.

with a numerical score for Presidential action on plat-
form proposals is that the President may ask Congress
for some measures that he would not wish to see passed.
Also it is impossible to know which proposals the Ad-
ministration actively pursued in Congress and those
which were allowed quietly to disappear.[34]

2. Congress: No distinction was made between the house
   or the party of origin of the proposal, this simply
   indicates whether the bill originates in Congress.

3. "E" proposal: This is a proposal that is the continu-
   ation of an existing policy. For instance a declara-
   tion found in the 1964 Democratic platform to "pre-
   serve the wilderness of the United States through the
   1964 Wilderness Act"[35] would be classed as the con-
   tinuance of existing policies. In this case, legis-
   lation would be inappropriate since no overt action
   needs to be taken to fulfill the platform pledge.
   Rather, such a proposal pledges the continuance of
   a present policy and can thus be considered as an

---

[34]These are the same problems encountered by David
Truman on page 329 of his study on legislative voting be-
haviour, The Congressional Party (New York: John Wiley,
1959).

[35]Porter and Johnson, Party Platforms, p. 647.

indirect and passive form of action by the Administration.

Therefore the total action taken = action by the Administration + action taken by Congress + "E" proposals.

The second step is to investigate the support found in Congress for the Administration's proposals, once presented. Different methods are used to estimate this support.

1. The basic figure compiled is that indicating "supportive Congressional action," i.e. the number of proposals of the President to which Congress gave supportive action. This is an overall indication of the success of the Administration programme.[36]

2. Two indices were constructed to measure the degree of support received by the President from his own party and the opposing party in Congress. The relative-support and effective-support indices are based on Congressional roll-call figures given in the

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[36]The terms Administration and President are used interchangeably in this paper. For the purposes of the study it was assumed that Presidential and Administration proposals could be classed as part of the same Administration programme and so it was not useful to distinguish between them.

Congressional Quarterly Almanac.[37]

The relative-support index shows the support given the President as related to the number of Congressmen voting, eg. Poverty programme bill. Vote in the House was

245 - 158. (R: 24 - 110; D: 221 - 48). This gives

a relative-support index for the Democratic Party of

$$\frac{221}{269} \times 100 = 82$$

The effective-support index shows the support given to the President as related to the possible total support a party could give.

eg. Poverty programme bill. Effective-support index

for Democratic Party is

$$\frac{221}{294} \times 100 = 75$$

for the Republican Party

$$\frac{24}{141} \times 100 = 17$$

The difference between the two indices rests on the basis for assessing party strength in Congress, whether this is actual party strength at the time of voting, or potential party strength. It is apparent that relative-support is likely to be higher than effective-support in

---

[37]The source for the idea of using relative and effective support indices was Volume XII (1956) of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac.

all cases since full participation in roll-call votes
is rare.

The relative and effective support indices were
developed to measure the extent of support for the
Administration from the government and non-government
parties in Congress. To clarify these terms, the
government party is the party of the President whether
it is the majority or minority party in Congress. The
non-government party is the party that does not control
the Presidency.

In order to assess the degree of partisan conflict
generated by the Administration's legislative requests to
Congress, a differential index of support was devised.
This is a somewhat unsophisticated method of measuring
the difference in voting behaviour between the government
and non-government parties. The differential index of
support represents the index of support--either relative
or effective--of the government party minus the appropriate
index of support of the non-government party. Relative and
effective support indices were calculated for each platform
by averaging the indices of the component proposals. Thus
differential indices of support were calculated for each
platform rather than for each proposal.

An example will make the procedure more explicit. In
the 1952 platform, the relative-support index for the gov-
ernment party was 91%. This means that on roll-call votes
based on party platform proposals, Eisenhower Administra-
tion requests received support from 91% of the Republican
party Congressmen voting. Eisenhower was similarly sup-
ported by 78% of the Democratic Congressmen. So, for the
1952 platform:

> Government Party R.S. = 91%; R.S. Non-government
>
> party = 78%
>
> Differential index score = 91 - 78
>
> $$= + 13$$

By constructing index scores for each platform examined,
the degree of conflict between the parties is measured.

Output Process

The final step in tracing the progress of platform
proposals through the political system is to measure the
output of the system. This was done by measuring the
total effective action taken on the proposals. This
score includes all proposals acted upon in a favourable
fashion by the system: legislation, constitutional
amendments, Executive Orders, and "E" proposals.

An Overview of the Processing of Platform Demands

This study, by means of the tools outlined above, intends to measure the extent of support and source of support for platform proposals as they are processed by the system. A broad overview of this process can be obtained by applying Easton's Demand Flow Pattern Chart, as described on page 15.

Expectations, public opinion, motivations, ideology, interests and preferences of society form wants which are translated into demands and input into the political system via the boundary threshold. The Nominating Convention can be seen as a possible channel by which these wants are formulated in terms acceptable to the system. These demands, however, come from different stages of the flow of demands. In some cases, the demands are new, as yet unprocessed by the system; in other cases they may have developed into issues, either by reduction and combination (Channel W), or by immediate transformation into issues (Channel V). The party platform contains demands at various stages of the conversion process; in most cases it is likely that they will come from a point in the flow pattern W.

Some demands are simply at the entry into the politi-
cal system stage--these are not necessarily new demands,
they may be demands that are re-occurring as a result of
feedback from former rejection or partial enactment; others
have reached the reduction and combination stage; others
have already developed into issues. For present purposes,
"C" proposals will be interpreted as raw demands, "B" pro-
posals as demands in process of reduction, and "A" propos-
als as issues. This classification is not absolute; it is
an attempt to relate the research design to Easton's demand
flow pattern analysis.

The chart also shows that at each stage the demand or
issue can be either accepted by the system or fade away,
dependent upon how the gatekeepers--the President and his
Administration, Congressional Committees, Congress--react
to the platform proposals. If the demands are successful
at each stage they will eventually become outputs and once
more enter and react upon the environment.

The various indices developed in this paper are de-
signed to measure the extent of demand flow in the politi-
cal system. Theoretically, it should be possible to
determine how the wants of society are transformed into
demands and become part of the party platform; then to

examine whether these demands are reduced and combined, how far they are then put in issue terms and whether they become outputs. For instance, in the cases of "B" and "C" proposals, very often one piece of legislation will cover several demands and thus a reduction process has been put into effect. However, this paper does not attempt to quantify all the aspects of the process but focuses upon the extent to which the demands incorporated in party platforms become outputs and where the significant areas of support for those demands are found.

The Implications of Using Systems Theory for This Study

By using systems theory the research can concentrate upon the role of one specific aspect of the system and how it functions, without becoming involved with how it ought to function, given a particular institutional structure. The systems model considers a governmental institution as one variable among others that can either allow or reject the passage of demands through the actions of the individuals who compose the institution. For instance, Congress can be viewed as a gatekeeper that regulates the flow of demands into the system but it is the individual Congressmen who allow or reject the passage of demands. The focus

is upon observing the way in which the political system
operates; that is, upon what actually happens to demands
as they pass from the input through the conversion to the
output stages.

So, the study is based upon an empirical observation
of the conversion process. The method used involves the
quantification of demands at each crucial stage of their
flow through the political system. Easton's model is
theoretically capable of operationalization, which means
that one could measure the total volume of demands, trace
the progress of demands through the conversion process,
numerically determine the output and identify the feed-
back effective upon new demands arising in the system.
Obviously the model is predicated upon an acceptance of
the decision-making process as crucial to political
activity; or, in Easton's terms, that the authoritative
allocation of values is the main business of politics.[38]

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[38]Most behavioral political scientists accept that
the decision-making process is central to the system, and,
certainly, traditional political science is also concerned
with decision-making. The difference lies in the angle
from which the process is viewed. The institutional focus
is upon the institutions involved in the making of deci-
sions--Congress, the President, the Bureaucracy--and how
they operate, whereas the behavioralist would focus on the
roles played by influential individuals in those institu-
tions, and how they, as actors in the political system,
make decisions.

Operationalization of the systems model could only
be done with extreme difficulty because of the nature of
the available information. For example, how could one
trace all the informal activities that are involved in the
decision-making process? However, it is possible to focus
upon one aspect of the system, in this case the role played
by the party platform, and quantify the variables involved.
This study is not considering either the means by which
the hopes, expectations, and desires of the population be-
come demands, or the formulation of the platform at the
Nominating Convention. It accepts the document as a state-
ment of demands and issues which are endorsed by a poli-
tical party as representing its policy intentions if
elected to office.

No _a priori_ relationship exists between a demand's
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the platform and subse-
quent enaction by the political system. The demands of
the party platform merely state objectives of the party
and are made in other contexts by other groups. Further,
although groups do participate in the activities of the
platform committee at the Convention, their primary focus
for pressure is likely to be on other actors in the system,
nearer to the actual decision-making process, _eg_. members

of Congress or the Administration. Clearly, whether or not demands are effective depends on the total range and degree of support from the political system, not inclusion in a party manifesto.

Although the paper does not specifically deal with the process of constructing a platform, the findings of the research certainly reflect upon whether the platform represents the major demands of the polity at the time of the convention. If the research shows that the demands articulated in the party platform are subsequently formulated in issue terms, debated by the political system and converted into authoritative decisions, these demands must represent the expressed wants of important groups in society. Therefore, although the platform is not likely to be the only channel used by pressure groups to input demands into the political system, it may be a statement of demands and issues that does, indeed, have a real basis of support in the environment.

If it were apparent that no platform demands were enacted, two possible conclusions could be drawn. Either the platform does not represent societal demands and other channels are being used for demand input, or demands in general are not being satisfied by the political system.

The second alternative indicates deficiencies in the decision-making process, and suggests that the political system is operating under conditions of stress.

By applying Easton's framework and terminology to the action taken by the political system on four party platforms the analysis provides snapshot glances of the system as it functions at different periods of time. The strength of the approach lies in the use of scientific criteria to investigate a problem in political science, thus achieving an objective assessment of its role. As David Easton argues:

> Behavioral research in politics represents a commitment to the broad and essential requirement of scientific knowledge: the search for criteria that within the scientific framework will permit the investigator to test for the relevance of empirical data and at the same time will offer hope of providing a richer understanding of the phenomena central to his interest.[39]

Of course, many problems arise in achieving the goal of a scientifically valid methodology. In this particular paper the main problems were to devise a research design that reflected the goals of the study, and to maintain objectivity in applying the research tools to the data. Neither of these problems has been completely overcome,

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[39]Easton, Framework for Political Analysis, p. 133.

partly because of the inherent limitations of the study and partly because more sophisticated techniques that might have solved problems of inconsistency could not be used.

Despite these limitations, the systems model does provide a new and valuable framework for the analysis of the party platform. This framework allows the researcher to focus upon the basic question posited by any party platform: to what extent are platform pledges carried out after the election? Both the extent of, and the source of support for a successful platform are clearly illustrated by using a systems model as a basis for the research.

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS

This paper empirically analyses the way the political

system processes the demands and issues incorporated in the

party platforms of the winning Presidential candidates,

between 1952 and 1964. To attain this goal, Easton's sys-

tems model was operationalized by developing indices to

quantify the various stages of the flow of platform demands

through the political system toward the eventual goal of

authoritative decision. For the purposes of the research

design, each end of the conversion process can be viewed

as a fixed quantity, an initial input--the 1952 Republican

platform, the 1956 Republican platform, the 1960 Democratic

platform and the 1964 Democratic platform; and an eventual

output level--the number of platform proposals that are

legitimized by the system. The indices developed in the

paper trace the dynamic process by which the inputs become

outputs, rather than trace the process by which wants be-

come inputs or the effect of outputs on the environment.

Thus the conversion process of David Easton's model is the

central focus for this research design.

The Party Platform as an Input into the Political System

In order to measure the conversion process, the party platforms were broken down analytically into proposals. Each proposal was assigned an area classification and a specificity level. In this manner an unsophisticated form of content analysis was performed, on the basis of which some interesting observations on the nature of the party platform can be made.

The simplest classification procedure counts the number of policy proposals made by the parties in each platform examined.

PLATFORM	NUMBER OF PROPOSALS
1952 Republican	95
1956 Republican	126
1960 Democratic	161
1964 Democratic	77

The variation between platforms is wide, ranging from 77 proposals in the 1964 Democratic platform to 161 in the 1960 Democratic platform. This suggests that the policy content of a platform must depend upon the unique features of each political situation in which the document is written.

A further consideration is how far the platform pro-
motes specific proposals as opposed to vague generaliza-
tions about policy. The analysis indicates that a plat-
form does not deal with very specific policy ideas.
Table 1 illustrates that only twenty-two percent of all
the platform proposals examined could be considered
specific policy proposals. The largest group of proposals
was concerned with statements about the direction the
party might take if elected, _i.e._ "B" proposals. Investi-
gating further, the analysis showed that the platform is
least specific when dealing with National Security and
Foreign Policy proposals, and most specific in the area
of domestic policy. Table 1 also suggests that the party
platforms are similarly structured with equivalent propor-
tions of "A", "B", and "C" proposals.

A final point concerning the structure of the docu-
ment is illustrated by Table 2 which shows the composition
of the party platform by area classification. The platform
typically concentrates upon domestic issues--Economic Policy
and Welfare--with least emphasis on National Security
matters.

So, a superficial content analysis suggests that
the party platform is a vague document that concentrates

TABLE 1

COMPOSITION OF PARTY PLATFORMS BY SPECIFICITY

(As percentages of number of proposals in each platform)

	N=	"A" proposals	"B" proposals	"C" proposals	TOTAL
1952	95	20%	44%	36%	100%
1956	126	23	35	42	100
1960	161	26	45	29	100
1964	77	20	49	31	100
MEAN		22	43	35	100

TABLE 2

COMPOSITION OF PARTY PLATFORM BY AREA

(Number of proposals in each area classification as percentages of the total number of proposals in the platform)

	N=	AG.[a]	EP.[b]	FP.[c]	GOV.[d]	NS.[e]	NR.[f]	WEL.[g]	TOTAL
1952	95	18%	14%	21%	21%	3%	16%	16%	100%
1956	126	14	27	11	11	8	15	14	100
1960	161	9	19	15	16	5	12	24	100
1964	77	6	22	14	9	10	17	22	100
MEAN		12	20	14	14	6	15	19	100

[a]Agricultural proposals
[b]Economic Policy proposals
[c]Foreign Policy proposals
[d]Government Affairs proposals
[e]National Security proposals
[f]Natural Resources proposals
[g]Welfare proposals

upon domestic issues.[1]

However, there are limitations to this conclusion.
To an extent, the decision as to what constitutes a pro-
posal was arbitrary. The methodology section indicated
that a proposal is defined as a pledge to act upon a
certain problem if the party is elected to office. In
some cases, statements of intent were so vague that they
could hardly be considered possible courses of action.
However, to draw a line between which statements to in-
clude, and which to omit was subjective since the re-
searcher made a personal decision and was capable of in-
consistency. This limitation of the research design
should be kept in mind throughout the paper although it
could be eliminated by using a more systematic tool,
such as a computer, to decide upon both policy inclusion
and area classification.

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[1]Many political scientists observing the structure
of the party platform have concluded that it is a basically
nebulous and unspecific document. For instance, V. O. Key
argues that "no tightly reasoned or succinct manifesto of
party doctrine emerges from the convention. The platform
tends to be wordy and be cast in the rhetoric of political
declamation." Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th.
ed.; New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 460.

Another limitation is that the emphasis given by the parties to each proposal is not accounted for by the classification scheme which encompasses neither the wording of the proposal nor the amount of space devoted to each proposal. The specificity classification does assess the policy content of a proposal but it does not indicate the emotional emphasis placed on an issue.

Conversion Process

If the demands articulated in the party platform are to become authoritative decisions, they must pass through a conversion process. In order to determine how this process functioned, the paper examined the roles of various political actors as they impinged upon the decision-making process, either promoting or disregarding the party platform demands. This decision-making process basically involves two stages: party platform proposals must be put forward for debate by the political system and, secondly, a binding or legitimizing decision must be made.

Table 3 illustrates both the overall level of initiation of debate on the party platform proposals and the origin of this type of action. From this table several

observations can be made. The initial total action taken

by the political system averages at 64% of the relevant

platform proposals. This suggests that the platform of

the victorious party in the Presidential election re-

presents a collection of demands and issues that are

largely acted upon subsequent to the election. Looking

at the table from a different viewpoint, the gatekeepers

at this stage of the system--the Administration and Con-

gress--rejected, or delayed action upon, 48%, 30%, 37%

and 25% of the demands channelled into the system via

the 1952 Republican, 1956 Republican, 1960 Democratic

and 1964 Democratic party platforms.

The Administration initiates action on a much higher

proportion of platform demands than does Congress. Over

the four periods, the Administration initiated debate on

about 50% of all platform proposals as compared to 5%

initiated by Congress. There is also the possibility

that the platform may advocate policies already being

implemented. In such a case the proposal was classified

as an "E" type proposal and in the four platforms an

average of 9% was devoted to pledging the continuation

of existing proposals. An examination of Table 3 shows

that very little of the 1952 and 1960 platforms of the

TABLE 3

INITIAL ACTION TAKEN ON PLATFORM PROPOSALS

(As percentages of total number of Platform Proposals)

	N=	ADMIN.[a]	CONGRESS	"E" PROP.[b]	INITIAL TOTAL ACTION
1952	95	38%	8%	4%	52%
1956	126	51	2	17	70
1960	161	57	1	2	63
1964	77	54	8	11	75
MEAN		50	5	9	64

[a]Administration direct proposals to Congress
[b]proposals based on existing legislation or policies

winning party advocated "E" type proposals and that for
the equivalent 1956 and 1964 platforms the percentages
were much higher. Now in 1956 and 1964 the Republican
and Democratic platforms, respectively, were written
under the influence of incumbent Presidents. So, the
conclusion can be made that a platform is more likely
to advocate existing programmes when it is written by
the party of an incumbent President than if the party
is seeking the Presidency.

Having determined that the Administration acts upon
approximately one-half of the total number of platform
proposals, the next question to be asked is whether
certain types of proposals are favoured, either because
of the substantive area they cover or the specificity of
their content.

Table 4 suggests that the Administration does not
concentrate its attention on particular policy areas.
The range of action over the four periods is from 36%
on Natural Resource proposals to 68% on National Secu-
rity proposals, with the other area categories staggered
evenly between these scores. Further, the variance
within each column is high, indicating that no pattern

can be established over time.

Analyzing the extent of Administration action on proposals at each level of specificity, Table 5 shows that, although the data do not reveal a clear trend, there is a tendency for the Administration to act more frequently on "A" and "B" proposals than on "C" proposals. Again the problem with discerning a pattern in the data is that the variance within the columns is high.

On the basis of the above discussion, it appears that about two-thirds of the platform proposals are sufficiently important to merit further debate by the political system; that the Administration is the prime actor in this process and that the Administration is more likely to act upon more specifically defined proposals without showing any bias towards substantive policy areas.

Although the research showed that a majority of platform proposals are acted upon, what if these proposals are not of equal importance? What if the crucial questions are not acted upon? The research design does not take into account the relative importance of demands

TABLE 4

EXTENT OF ADMINISTRATION ACTION IN
EACH AREA CLASSIFICATION

(As percentages of Platform Proposals in each area)

	AG.[a]	EP.[b]	FP.[c]	GOV.[d]	NS.[e]	NR.[f]	WEL.[g]
1952	32%	31%	50%	31%	66%	35%	50%
1956	47	53	64	57	80	22	47
1960	50	52	44	53	62	58	74
1964	100	52	45	28	62	38	70
MEAN	57	47	51	42	68	36	60

[a]Agriculture proposals
[b]Economic Policy proposals
[c]Foreign Policy proposals
[d]Government Affairs proposals
[e]National Security proposals
[f]Natural Resources proposals
[g]Welfare proposals

TABLE 5

EXTENT OF ADMINISTRATION ACTION AT EACH
LEVEL OF SPECIFICITY

(As percentages of Platform Proposals at each level
of specificity)

	"A" proposals	"B" proposals	"C" proposals
1952	55%	42%	28%
1956	76	40	46
1960	69	63	38
1964	47	66	42
MEAN	62	53	39

and gives each demand equal weight, although a pledge to expand the Peace Corps may not be of the same importance as the pledge to end a major war. Further, it is likely that if the political system were continually frustrating demands of the first type, problems of stress would not arise to the same degree as in the case of the second type of demands.

Grave though this problem is, it was not possible to operationalize the concept of "importance" in any systematic fashion: the element of subjectivity would have been too high. However the overall impression of the researcher was that demands are not systematically acted upon according to their importance.

Once the Administration (or, in some cases, Congress) has initiated debate on a demand or issue articulated in the party platform, a decision must be made on whether that measure should become authoritative. This can be done directly by the Administration through an Executive Order, but, usually, Administration proposals must pass Congress if they are to become binding decisions. Therefore the Administration needs the support of Congress if platform-based proposals are to be

successful. The data gathered in this research suggest
that this support is generally present. Congress sup-
ported the Administration on 72% (1952, Republican plat-
form), 70% (1956, Republican platform), 65% (1960, Demo-
cratic platform), and 86% (1964, Democratic platform)
of its legislative proposals based on demands articu-
lated in the party platforms. So the Administration
received favourable treatment from Congress when acting
upon such proposals.

Analyzing this support level further, Table 6 con-
siders the support given the Administration by Congress
in each area category. The table suggests that the sub-
stantive policy area of the proposal affects the degree
of support found in Congress. Agriculture and National
Security proposals received preferential treatment—at
the 97% implementation level—whereas Government Affairs
proposals were acted upon favourably in only 41% of the
cases examined.

Since it can be assumed that when proposals reach
Congress they are formulated in issue terms, the degree of
specificity of the proposal is not very relevant to Con-
gressional action; all proposals are, by then, at the "A"
level. Therefore no attempt has been made to correlate

TABLE 6

LEVELS OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE AREA CATEGORIES

(As percentages of the number of platform proposals acted upon by the Administration in each area)

	AG.[a]	EP.[b]	FP.[c]	GOV.[d]	NS.[e]	NR.[f]	WEL.[g]
1952	100%	75%	56%	33%	100%	75%	71%
1956	100	50	78	50	88	75	75
1960	86	50	91	29	100	64	71
1964	100	77	100	50	100	80	91
MEAN	97	63	81	41	97	74	77

[a] Agricultural proposals
[b] Economic Policy proposals
[c] Foreign Policy proposals
[d] Government Affairs proposals
[e] National Security proposals
[f] Natural Resource proposals
[g] Welfare proposals

TABLE 7

EXTENT OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS

YEAR	ADMIN. PROP. SUBMITTED	ACTION BY CONGRESS	APPROX. SCORE
1954	232	150	64.7%
1955	207	90	46.3
1956	225	103	45.7
1957	206	76	36.9
1958	234	110	47.0
1959	228	93	40.8
1960	183	56	30.6
1961	355	172	48.4
1962	298	132	44.4
1963	401	109	27.2

Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
Jan. 24, 1964, p. 181, as cited by Nelson
Polsby, Congress and the Presidency (New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 101.

Congressional action on Administration proposals and the way in which the proposal is formulated in the party programme.

The main finding of this interaction process is that the extent of disagreement between the President and Congress on platform articulated proposals is not as great as might be expected. For instance Table 7 reproduces a table compiled by the Congressional Quarterly Weekly showing conflict between the President and Congress from 1954 to 1963. There is a clear difference between these lower figures and those cited on page 58 of this paper. However, the research showed that, through the process of reduction and combination, one Administration proposal could satisfy more than one demand, if the demands were not very specific. Also a platform demand was deemed satisfied if increased appropriations were allocated to that area. Such a type of demand satisfaction would not be reflected in the figures of the Congressional Quarterly table which deals only with legislative proposals, as such.

This discussion on Congressional decision-making on proposals articulated in the platform of the victorious Presidential party has only related to the support given by Congress as a body. In order to further analyse the

process, the research design investigated the level of support given by the Democratic and Republican parties to the President. Indices of effective and relative support were developed to measure the degree of support from the government and non-government parties. In all cases the government party refers to the party of the incumbent President. The purpose of using these indices was to test whether the Administration received equivalent levels of support from each party in Congress or whether the level of support from the government party was significantly higher. The research has already indicated that Congress supported the Administration on 73% of platform articulated proposals, the present question is whether that support was generally bi-partisan or whether partisan factors were operating when Congressional votes were counted?

The extent of conflict between the parties on such proposals was operationalized by devising a differential index of support based on the government and non-government parties roll-call behaviour.[2] By using this tool, table 8 was constructed to show the extent of partisan

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[2]For a discussion of the differential index of support and how it was constructed, see above, pp. 32-35.

TABLE 8

SUMMARY DIFFERENTIAL INDICES OF SUPPORT
FOR EACH PLATFORM

(Index of support for the government party minus the
index of support for the non-government party)

	HOUSE		SENATE	
PLATFORM	RS.[a]	ES.[b]	RS.[a]	ES.[b]
1952	+13	+16	+26	+24
1956	0	+2	+5	+4
1960	+33	+30	+30	+26
1964	+27	+27	+23	+18

[a] Relative-support differential index
[b] Effective-support differential index

conflict on each platform. It illustrates that, with the exception of the 1956 platform, there are considerable differences between the levels of support given the Administration by the government party and those given by the non-government party. The data suggest that partisan factors do operate when Congressmen vote on Administration proposals articulated in the party platforms.[3] To be more specific, when the party of the Administration also has a majority in Congress the government party gives the Administration significantly greater support than does the minority party.

The second Eisenhower Administration provided an exception to the pattern of partisan voting. As Table 8 illustrates, Congress did not exhibit partisan voting behaviour when voting on Administration proposals based on

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[3]The conclusion that partisan voting behaviour is evident on platform proposals is supported by the work done on Congressional roll-call analysis by David Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1959), Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), and Duncan MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958). These studies conclude that the great majority of Congressmen are susceptible to the pressures of the party when voting and that non-partisan voting behaviour can, in most cases, be attributed to constituency pressures.

the 1956 platform. Rather the level of government party

support was lower than in other sessions and the level of

non-government party support higher. This suggests that

the Republican Administration's proposals were of a fairly

uncontroversial nature and that the Democratic leadership

was able, in most cases, to obtain a bill acceptable to

their political viewpoint.[4]

Since Eisenhower was in the White House because he

was not strongly identified with his party and because he

was able to gain the support of independent and weakly

identified Democratic voters, it seems logical that his

legislative programme would arouse neither great support

from the more strongly identified Republican membership

in Congress, nor much opposition from the Democratic party.

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[4]This analysis of Congressional action on platform
proposals, 1957-1958, can be related to V. O. Key's find-
ings on the problems of the Eisenhower Administration in
1955. Key in Parties, Politics and Pressure Groups, p. 648,
shows that although Republican members of the House gave
consistent support to orthodox Republican domestic policies,
Eisenhower found consistent opposition on foreign policy
issues. Using figures for the 1955 Congress from the Con-
gressional Quarterly Almanac, he found that 40% of the Re-
publican House members opposed the Administration foreign
policy position at least 40% of the times they voted, where-
as about 40% of Democrats supported the Administration on
at least 80% of their votes. In this present research, the
support index differentials indicate that in the Eisenhower
Administrations the level of Republican support for Presi-
dential proposals was low and Democratic support relatively
high, especially in the foreign policy area. See above,p.66.

TABLE 9

DIFFERENTIAL INDICES OF SUPPORT FOR AREA CATEGORIES

POLICY AREA	PLAT-FORM	HOUSE		SENATE	
		RS^a	ES^b	RS^a	ES^b
AGRIGULTURE	1952	+48	+43	+49	+39
	1956	+1	-3	0	-11
	1960	+48	_42	+43	+41
	1964	+41	÷39	+13	+3
ECONOMIC POLICY		+18	+8	+34	+40
		+10	+6	+1	+2
		+10	+15	+34	+33
		+13	+9	+22	+19
FOREIGN POLICY		-16	-13	-25	-27
		-8	-6	+9	+9
		+28	+26	+13	+10
		+35	+31	+5	+3
GOVERNMENT		+20	+38	+24	+16
		+37	+32	+29	+24
		-10	-13	+7	+9
		+2	+1	+27	+28
NATIONAL SECURITY		0	+3	voice vote	
		-3	-2	+3	+2
		+5	+1	+2	+1
		+3	-1	-3	-16
NATURAL RESOURCES		+20	+43	+37	+33
		-7	-7	-1	-5
		+44	+42	voice vote	
		voice vote		0	-15
WELFARE		+3	+2	voice vote	
		voice vote		-9	-10
		+54	+51	+51	+44
		+44	+42	+44	+41

[a]Relative Support differential index
[b]Effective Support differential index
[c]Each cell entry represents the index of support from the government party minus the index of support from the non-government party.

Further, when the Democrats gained control of Congress,
their leadership, together with the Republican leader-
ship, attended the Executive-Congressional meetings in
the White House.[5]

In conclusion, partisan factors do operate upon Con-
gressional voting patterns on Administration proposals
when the majority party is that of the incumbent President.

A more detailed analysis of voting behaviour is pro-
vided by Table 9 which illustrates partisan differences in
the indices of support for each area category. Although
the trends were not consistent, the data show that the
level of partisan split is higher in the areas of Agri-
culture and Welfare. If a contentious area is defined
as an area with a +30 score on the differential index of
support when the relative and effective scores are aver-
aged, the following trends appear.

	House	Senate
1952	Agriculture	Agriculture
	Natural Resources	Natural Resources
	Government	Economic Policy
1956	Government	

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[5]Charles Jones, The Republican Party in American
Politics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), pp. 125-136.

	House	Senate
1960	Agriculture Welfare Natural Resources	Agriculture Welfare Economic Policy
1964	Agriculture Foreign Policy Welfare	Welfare

Similarly, if a least contentious issue is defined as a

differential average score of less than +5 but greater

than -5, a table of consensus can be constructed.

	House	Senate
1952	National Security Welfare	
1956	Agriculture	Economic Policy National Security Natural Resources
1960	National Security	National Security
1964	Government National Security	Foreign Policy

As the tabulations above show, areas of conflict

shift over time as Administrations and the electorate

focus upon particular areas for policy interest. For in-

stance, in the 1950's the Republican Administration's

attitude toward governmental affairs provoked conflict

between Democrats and Republicans in the House--this

probably centered around internal security matters. In

the 1960's, Democratic Administration proposals on Welfare

matters provoked a similar conflict. Agriculture was the

policy area generating consistent partisan voting patterns;

perhaps this is because Republican and Democratic policy

has traditionally been opposed on farm matters.[6] The

least contentious area or the area that generated the

greatest agreement between the parties was National Secu-

rity: over the period, 1952-1967, Congress rarely disagreed

over these issues.

So National Security proposals generate the highest

level of agreement between the parties and Agricultural

proposals the highest degree of partisan voting behaviour.

These findings can be related to an earlier conclusion

that Congress, as a body, passes more Administration

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[6]An interesting explanation of this partisan voting
behaviour in Congress on agricultural issues can be found
in "The Political Impasse in Farm Support Legislation,"
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 71 (April, 1962), pp. 952-978. The
authors argue that the differences in voting behaviour re-
flect the different interests of the farming constituents,
that Southern (Democratic) crop interests conflict with
Midwestern (Republican) interests because their products
compete. So the nature of crop interests within each
party probably determines the party's agricultural policy.
David Mayhew in Party Loyalty among Congressmen (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960), agreed that the impressive
unity within the Democratic party on farm policy was based
on the party embracing programmes favoured by its farmers.
But he observed less unity among Republicans due to a split
between farm and non-farm Republican blocs; the split be-
ing caused by the party following policies unfavourable to
its farming constituents.

requests in the areas of Agriculture and National Security

than any other policy areas. This suggests that the passage

of demands may be aided by either a fundamental consensus

between the parties on the proposals or a strong conflict

of attitudes that would stimulate party loyalty.

This analysis of partisan voting behaviour is based

upon the effective and relative support indices outlined

in the methodology chapter. These indices assess the de-

gree of Congressional support given the Administration on

roll-call votes in Congress. However, do the roll-call

votes reflect the true levels of support given to the

Administration by the parties in Congress? Firstly, the

model does not identify the key areas of support necessary

to the passage of a bill through Congress. Only the formal

aspects of the process are measured, i.e., the number of

proposals backed by the Administration, the number of

Administration proposals supported by Congress and the

final roll-call vote. In some cases, the crucial vote may

have been an earlier vote on a section of the bill, or an

Amendment, or in the Committee; the roll-call vote may be

simply a formality. Further, the Administration may be on

the record as supporting a bill but it may not be actively

promoting its passage through Congress. The point is that

the informal support given to the various proposals is not measured and this factor is crucial to the success of a platform demand.

Secondly, the amending process can considerably change the original bill suggested by the Administration. The extent of this process is not reflected in the figures shown in the tables and, so, an apparently high level of support for the President could conceal a realistically lower level. The data compiled show only that a Congress-man of the President's party is significantly more likely to vote in favour of an Administration bill--embodying a platform proposal--than a Congressman of the non-Presi-dential party.

The reasons for this partisan vote may not, however, be related to party loyalty. For instance, Lewis Froman argues that the difference between Democratic and Republi-can voting patterns reflects differences in the kinds of constituencies from which Democrats and Republicans come. He argues that the voting patterns of Representatives reflects the conservative or liberal nature of their constituencies.[7] However, many studies have suggested

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[7]Lewis Froman, "Inter-Party Constituency Differences and Congressional Voting Behaviour," American Political Science Review, LVII (March, 1963); pp. 57-61.

that a Congressman prefers to vote with the party than
against it, unless he feels that constituency needs are
contravened. In a study based on extensive interviewing
of Congressmen about their attitudes towards being a
Congressman, Charles Clapp found that:

> Congressmen in terms of philosophical outlook
> and commitment are usually disposed to support
> the party position, and there is no need to
> bring pressure on the faithful. When they do
> part company, the cause may be attributable
> to a desire to adhere to what they believe is
> district sentiment.[8]

The difference between the two analyses of roll-call
behaviour outlined above is a question of emphasis. Both
approaches accept that a Congressman votes with his party
in most cases; disagreement centres upon whether his party
loyalty is the result of the ideological orientation of
the voters in the constituency or a conscious decision on
his part. This present research provides no evidence on
the motivations of Congressmen and will simply interpret
the data on their face value. In other words, that a
Congressman of the Administration's party is more likely
to vote for an Administration supported proposal than a
Congressman of the non-Presidential party.

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[8]Charles Clapp, The Congressman (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1963), p. 313.

In summary, the conversion process whereby demands articulated in the party platform are converted into outputs has suggested several interesting regularities in behaviour. Debate on the platform proposals is mainly initiated by the Administration. Congress will support the Administration programme in most cases, especially if the proposals are in the areas of Agriculture and National Security. In voting on platform articulated proposals, Congress votes along party lines if the majority party is of the same party as the President. If not, roll-call support is bi-partisan.

Extent of Implementation of Platform Proposals

From the interaction within the political system, an implementation level for the demands input via the party platform is determined. The output of the system was measured by determining the number of platform-articulated proposals that are effectively acted upon. Effective action could be taken either by Congressional means--by passing legislation or a constitutional amendment--or by Executive means--an Executive Order or by virtue of being an "E" proposal. The main point is that the output of the system determines the final disposition of demands input

through the party platform.

The legislative output of the system is illustrated
by Table 10. Since most debate initiation is stimulated
by the Administration, legislative output is considered
the result of a Congressional response to Administration
proposals.[9] An analysis of Table 10 suggests that the
crucial factor determining the level of legislative out-
put is the extent of Congressional supportive behaviour.
Over the four periods examined, the platform demands re-
sulted in some form of legislative expression in approxi-
mately 40% of the cases. The 1952 platform was implemented
to a slightly lesser degree due to a low level of debate
initiation from the Administration. On the other hand, the
1964 platform received a higher level of implementation---
56% of the 1964 platform was passed into law. Although the
Administration of President Johnson did not act more fre-
quently on proposals, it was more successful in achieving
Congressional approval and, consequently, had a higher
legislative output rate. The approval level for this
particular platform can be explained by the fact that

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[9]Congress initiated debate on between 1% of the total
number of platform proposals in 1960 and 8% in 1964 and
1952, see above, p. 52.

TABLE 10

EXTENT OF LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT FOR PLATFORM DEMANDS

PLATFORM	ADMIN. PROP.[a] (% of total prop. acted upon by the Administration)	CONGRESS. ACCEPT.[b] (% of Admin. legis. requests passed by Congress)	LEGISL. OUTPUT[c] (% of total platform porposals passed by the system)
1952	38%	72%	34%
1956	51	70	37
1960	57	65	37
1964	54	86	56
MEAN	50	73	41

[a]Administration legislative requests.
[b]Congressional acceptance.
[c]Legislative output.

Johnson had a much larger majority in Congress than either Kennedy or Eisenhower, making defeat less likely. Also, Johnson came to the Presidency after a long and highly influential career as Majority Leader in the Senate. His high level of success with Congress could be partly attributed to his past experience and personal influence.

Thus far, the output of the system has been discussed in terms of legislative output. A more complete assessment of the effectiveness of platform articulated demands is given by the effective action figure which includes all types of authoritative decisions made by the system. The effective action data show the percent of platform proposals which are passed by the system and which re-enter the environment as binding decisions. The level of effective action taken on the 1952 Republican platform was 41%; on the 1956 Republican platform, 54%; on the 1960 Democratic platform, 44%; and the 1964 Democratic platform, 66%. Thus the range of effective implementation of platform articulated demands is approximately from 40% to 65%.

Analyzing these data in greater depth, Table 11 shows the level of effective action related to the area of origin of the proposal. This table indicates that the

TABLE 11

EFFECTIVE ACTION TAKEN BY THE SYSTEM IN AREA CATEGORIES

(As percentage of total platform proposals in each area)

PLATFORM	AG.[a]	EP.[b]	FP.[c]	GOV.[d]	NS.[e]	NR.[f]	WEL.[g]
1952	33%	23%	38%	21%	66%	29%	93%
1956	71	33	57	57	80	44	71
1960	50	39	40	19	100	42	55
1964	100	60	45	14	75	92	76
MEAN	63	39	45	28	80	52	74

[a] Agricultural proposals
[b] Economic Policy proposals
[c] Foreign Policy proposals
[d] Government Affairs proposals
[e] National Security proposals
[f] Natural Resources proposals
[g] Welfare proposals

TABLE 12

**EFFECTIVE ACTION TAKEN BY THE SYSTEM
BY DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY**

(As percentages of total platform proposals
in each classification)

PLATFORM	"A" proposals	"B" proposals	"C" proposals
1952	50%	45%	31%
1956	48	56	56
1960	43	53	32
1964	47	74	63
MEAN	47	57	46

effective action taken on platform proposals is loosely related to the policy area of origin. National Security and Welfare proposals received the highest enaction levels, with Governmental Affairs and Economic Policy gaining the lowest levels. However, the variance between each group suggests that no consistent pattern is being observed.

A further question is whether a relationship exists between the terms in which the proposals are written in the platform and consequent enaction by the system. Table 12 suggests that such a relationship cannot be upheld. This is somewhat surprising as it might be expected that the more specific, issue-oriented, platform planks would be more likely to be enacted. There are two possible explanations for this apparent failure. The first is methodological. A large problem in the research was encountered when assessing whether a specific piece of legislation reflects the platform proposal. In the case of an "A" proposal it was reasonably simple to decide whether or not it had been implemented. The "B" proposal, because it is directional rather than specific, is capable of satisfaction by more than one possible course of action. Therefore it may be more likely to find some kind of legislative expression and thus rate

highly in terms of implementation. The "C" proposal, since this is only a general statement, is hard to satisfy in legislative terms. Secondly, the platform itself may not truly reflect the issue status of the "demand" since a party may avoid concrete proposals rather than risk alienating prospective voters or creating dissent in the party.

This chapter has described the flow of platform demands and issues through the political system; it has indicated both the extent of, and source of, support for platform articulated proposals. The concluding chapter will summarize the findings of the analysis and suggest tentative hypotheses concerning the consequences of platform implementation for the political system.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Flow Pattern of Platform Proposals Through the Political System

The analysis suggests a well-defined flow path for platform proposals through the political system. In essence, the research has tested the possible flow patterns suggested by Figure 3, and the conclusion can be made that the actual pattern is much like Figure 4.

The platform was seen to consist of both demands and issues. About 50% of platform proposals were acted upon by the system after the Presidential election. This action was mainly taken by the Administration, which tended to act more often on proposals already formulated in issue terms than on vaguer demands. The Administration placed these proposals before Congress for debate as part of a legislative programme. Congress acted favourably upon two-thirds to three-quarters of such proposals. A significant pattern of partisan voting was observed on roll-call votes, especially on Agricultural proposals.

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
FIGURE 4

OBSERVED FLOW PATTERN OF PLATFORM DEMANDS

National Security proposals aroused little disagreement between the parties. Since Congress, as a body, tended to favour proposals in the policy areas of Agriculture and National Security, it was concluded that platform demands were most likely to be successful if dealing with either highly contentious or highly consensual topics.

The overall level of implementation for platform articulated demands ranged between 40% and 65% of the platform. This gives a rough measure of the degree to which the demands of society, as represented by the platform, are satisfied--in some fashion--by the political system, and re-enter the environment as binding decisions. No general level of implementation seems to be indicated by the data.

The general conclusion can be made that the flow of platform demands through the political system does follow a definite pattern. The observed flow was through the Administration to Congress to legislative output; this pattern corresponds to a general trend of legislative initiation which is increasingly coming from the Administrative branch rather than Congress. The research suggests that the party platform is a document based on the policy ideas of an aspiring or incumbent President and,

as such, reflects the intentions of the prospective Administration.

Although the research design did not specifically investigate the extent of any feedback effect from outputs re-entering the environment, certain observations can be made on the feedback process. For instance, it is quite clear that many demands are enduring and are consistently part of many platforms, both Democratic and Republican. This is true mainly for the "B" and "C" category proposals and can be explained by the basic consensus found in the American electorate about general propositions such as "corruption in government is wrong and something must be done about it." Most demands, as opposed to issues, are of a general nature; they indicate a problem in society and are likely to be shared by a large section of the population. An example would be that most people agree that taxes should be lowered, or that America should be adequately defended. Conflict arises when these general demands are discussed in policy terms, i.e. are converted into issues.

In most cases, a general or directional demand--a "B" or "C" proposal--can be satisfied by several courses of action. However, in taking that action, some sections

of the population may be alienated or partially satisfied, since their demand may not have been converted into an acceptable output. Thus the same general demands may appear in consecutive platforms, even if some action was taken by the Administration and, also, the same demand can be part of opposing party platforms. Although these aspects of the feedback effect were not specifically researched, it was apparent from the regular appearance of certain demands in both party platforms and from analysing the platform proposals in classifications of specificity, that a feedback effect was likely to occur.

Consequences of Platform Enaction for the Political System

Thus far, this paper has described, by quantitative method, the process by which party platform proposals are transformed into outputs. The next question to be asked is whether this process can be related to other elements in the political system?

The Significance of the Overall Level of Enaction of Party Platform Proposals for the Political System

In some respects, the party platform can be considered an indicator of the major demands of the polity at

a particular time. Thus the degree to which action is taken on that document should give a broad indication of the extent of demand satisfaction in society. Granted that the nature of the platform is extremely general and un-specific, the Administration does take action upon a majority of the proposals embodied therein. This does not imply that because the proposals were included in the party platform they would necessarily be acted upon. Rather, it implies that the platform reflects the major issues and demands of the day and that the Administration's legislative programme is consistent with the platform. This is not so unexpected when the process of platform-drafting is considered.

Although the dominant faction at the convention de-termines the content of the platform, a prospective can-didate is likely to be concerned with unifying the party—and the electorate—behind his leadership. Therefore, he will generally seek a platform which compromises between a moderate viewpoint that will attract a maximum number of voters, and traditional party policies that are likely to appeal to strong party identifiers. The process of drafting an acceptable party platform may be comparable to the process of constructing a national legislative

programme. If a platform reflects the major views of the

prospective Administration, then the actions taken by

that Administration are likely to be consistent with

platform promises. The 50% of platform proposals not

acted upon by the Administration probably advocate the

more dogmatic aspects of traditional party policy which

would be rejected in the process of compromise necessary

to constructing a national legislative programme.

The next question to be asked is whether the level

of platform enaction affects the behaviour of the electo-

rate? Many studies have shown that the electorate is not

aware of the extent to which the Administration might

attempt to implement election promises.[1] There is no

evidence that the average voter is even aware of the con-

tent of the party platform and still less that his voting

behaviour is affected by how far it may or may not be

[1]Angus Campbell, et al., in The American Voter (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1964), showed that one voter in three failed to hold an opinion and know what the government was doing on public policy matters. Further, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes in their article, "Constituency Influence in Congress," in Angus Campbell, et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 361-372, argued that constituents are not aware of the actions taken by their Congressmen when voting on roll-call votes in Congress. Thus the electorate cannot be considered to be aware of the action taken by their representatives on policy matters.

enacted. However, the political system functions because demands are not allowed to backlog to the extent that a stressful situation might develop. Although the elector- ate is not aware of the extent to which platform demands are implemented, this knowledge may not be necessary if a reasonable percentage of such demands are regularly enacted. Therefore, if the platform can be accepted as a gauge of public demands, or at least demands from the influential sectors of society, the implementation levels found in this research indicate a steady flow of demands passing through the political system and re-entering the environment as authoritative outputs. Thus, if the satis- faction of demands is an indication of stability, this political system is clearly stable.

Programmatic Aspects of the Party Platform

One question raised by the research is whether the party platform can, in any sense, be looked upon as a party programme, unifying Congress and the President in the common pursuit of party policy. The view of most commentators is expressed succinctly by Nelson Polsby:

> A Presidential platform is an unusual document.
> It is written at the national party convention,
> and its avowed purpose is to appeal to voters

and groups of voters who will be electing a President. They need not promise only those policies which are likely to be enacted. They need not reflect the actual relative strength of demands made on the political system once the election is over. They need not even reflect the priorities of the man who is elected President. And they certainly are not intended to reflect the goals or priorities of all the persons who are elected to Congress.[2]

The findings of this research would not substantiate these conclusions entirely. There is no question, of course, of postulating a tightly-knit executive programme that is almost automatically accepted by the legislature as in Great Britain or West Germany.[3] However, the findings do suggest that in the majority of cases examined, Congress will take favourable action on Administration proposals,[4] and, further, a significant partisan voting pattern emerges from an analysis of roll-call votes.

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[2]Nelson Polsby, Congress and the Presidency (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 100.

[3]British political parties exhibit a high degree of cohesion in voting on government bills in the House of Commons. A similar feature can be observed in the West German Bundestag where the two major parties, the CDU and the SPD, in the period 1949-1961, showed 95% or higher unity on recorded votes. Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German Political System (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966) p. 357.

[4]Congress acted favourably on 73% of Administration proposals based on the party platforms, see above, p. 58.

In basing an analysis of partisan support in Congress on roll-call voting, two problems are raised. Firstly, a roll-call vote shows only the positions a Congressman wishes to take in public, it might not reflect his true attitude toward a bill or the extent to which he feels obligated to vote for the party. Secondly, although a high percentage of the bills might be passed by Congress, this does not necessarily imply a relationship between the Administration backing the bill and a Congressman of the Administration's party voting for the bill.

To help elucidate these problems, other studies of Congressional voting patterns are relevant. David Truman, in what is generally considered the authoritative study on the subject, The Congressional Party, found that: "despite differences between the parties, a clear tendency toward partisanship in both House and Senate distinguished most members of the majority party from most of those in the minority."[5] Truman used an Administration support index to identify whether cleavages exist and found that

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[5]David Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: John Wiley and Sons), p. 280.

"blocs in the Democratic structure in the House and Senate were composed of men who supported the Administration position on these votes more frequently than did the members of the corresponding Republican blocs."[6] His findings were strengthened by less precise evidence supplied by the leaders and informed staff in both House and Senate who stated that most members of Congress disliked being on record in opposition to the leadership and to the majority of the party.[7] This provides support for the data used in this paper and suggests that the known policy preferences of the Administration do have an effect on voting in Congress, and that Congressmen feel an obligation to support the party, if this does not conflict with constituency pressures.[8]

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[6]Ibid., p. 283.

[7]Ibid., p. 285.

[8]This conclusion is also supported by Julius Turner, in Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), p. 168, "the great majority of Congressmen yield to the pressures from their constituencies and especially to the pressures of party in casting their vote." Also, Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 121-123, showed that the "average Senator voted with the party about 75% or 80% of the time on party-line roll-calls. He concluded that although party discipline is weak, party identification is strong and this is the basis of partisan voting in the Senate."

Now Truman argues that the linkage between party-in-Congress and the Administration is provided by the leadership in Congress, and that support for the President is a pivotal element in the roles of the principal elective leaders of the President's Congressional party.[9] Could this finding of Truman's which, admittedly, is based only on the eighty-first Congress, be related to this present research into legislative behaviour on Administration party platform proposals? One possible hypothesis is that the party platform is the product of the opinions of "influentials" in the party at the Convention, based primarily on the President's or leading contender's

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[9]David Truman, The Congressional Party, p. 285. A similar argument is put forward by Lewis Froman and Randall Ripley in "Conditions for Party Leadership: the Case of the House Democrats," American Political Science Review (March, 1965), p. 53, "it is a rare occasion when the Speaker, Majority Leader and Whip are not 100% behind a Presidential programme." Also, Randall Ripley, "The Party Whip Organization in the House of Representatives," American Political Science Review (September, 1964), p. 575, "the whip organization is an important institutional device for helping the House leadership perform a mediating role between the President and the rank and file Democratic membership." And George Galloway, "Leadership in the House of Representatives," Western Political Quarterly (June, 1959), p. 433, "the Majority leader's task is to steer his party in the House toward the formulation and adoption of policies and strategies designed to carry out the Administration's legislative programme where the House and Presidency are controlled by the same political party."

viewpoint, but encompassing the opinions of the Congression-
al leaders. For instance, a regular feature of Congres-
sional-Executive relationships is the meeting of the Presi-
dent and the "Big Four" or "Big Six" of the Congressional
parties.[10] From meetings such as these the President must
gain an impression of what is politically feasible for
legislative implementation, and thus, how far a platform
would be capable of enaction. George Galloway goes so
far as to suggest that these meetings are the American
counterpart of the "hyphen that joins, the buckle that
fastens, the executive to the legislature."[11]

This suggests that, at least in the case of an in-
cumbent Administration, policies put forward in the plat-
form are likely to be acceptable not only to the Adminis-
tration but also to Congressional leaders. In the case
where the platform committee is not dominated by an in-
cumbent President, the leaders of Congress are fairly
likely to have access to the main contender for office
or to the platform committee members. Little evidence

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[10]Truman, The Congressional Party, p. 285.

[11]Galloway, "Leadership in the House of Representa-
tives," p. 435.

can be offered in support of this hypothesis, but it would

be possible to discover how many Congressmen were on the

platform committee and, if so, whether they represented

the leadership wing of the Congressional party. Lack of

substantiation does not mean that the hypothesis that a

fundamental consensus exists between the incumbent Presi-

dent and the Congressional leadership about the main plat-

form proposals must be rejected. Rather, it must be

offered as a tentative explanation of the relatively high

level of Congressional support for Administration pro-

posals based on platform planks.

The hypothesis is, of course, dependent upon an

acceptance of Truman's suggested "alliance" between

Presidential action in Congress and Congressional leader-

ship. Further, the high level of overall support found

by this research suggests that the Congressional leader-

ship of the government party is successful in mobilizing

support for the Administration proposals. Most studies

on the influence of Congressional leadership on party

membership voting conclude that this is usually a very

indirect form of influence. The leadership has very few

direct means of putting pressure on party members to

co-operate with the Administration, but indirect means

such as committee assignments, aid on members bills,
personal favours have a limited usefulness. The general
conclusion is that the key determinants of a leader's
position are his own personality and persuasiveness.[12]

The original question posed in this section was
whether the party platform can be regarded as program-
matic. The general conclusion must be in the negative,
since there is no evidence that either the President or
the Congress feels bound to enact such proposals. How-
ever, the data gathered in the research suggest that,
partly because of the vague, generalistic nature of
the document, and partly because the platform does repre-
sent broad policy goals, the Administration usually acts
upon about half of the proposals. Further, Congress will
support such action in most cases; this support being
based on an alliance between the President, the Congres-
sional leadership in the President's party and the
majority party in Congress.

Concluding Remarks

The main task of this study has been to describe the
process by which the political system converts demands,

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[12]Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World, p. 126.

articulated in the party platform, into outputs. This was done by using quantitative methods to determine the actual flow patterns of the conversion process. Consequently, if another individual were to repeat the study—using the same research design and data—an identical flow pattern should emerge. On the basis of these findings, tentative conclusions were drawn on the reasons for the observed flow pattern and its relationship to the maintenance of the political system.

Since the study is basically heuristic, no final conclusions are appropriate. Some difficulties with the systems model have been illustrated by the problems encountered, especially that of measuring the informal aspects of the system. However, applying the systems model to an analysis of the party platform has, also, illustrated the strengths of systems theory. The research has shown that the platform does represent the demands of society and that, to a degree, these demands are converted into legal decisions. In other words, the research has objectively assessed the effectiveness of the party platform as an input channel for the demands of society, and has indicated the sources of support for these demands as they flow through the political

system. To this extent it can be considered worth-

while.

APPENDIX

Tables 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, show the detailed
progress through the political system of demands articu-
lated in the 1952 Republican, 1956 Republican, 1960 Demo-
cratic and 1964 Democratic party platforms. An explana-
tion of those tables is provided below:

Input Stage

1. No. of proposals: shows the number of proposals found
   in platform, the number of proposals found in each area
   category of each platform and the number of proposals
   at each level of specificity.

2. % of total: Percentage of proposals found in each
   classification ("A", "B", "C"), as related to the
   total number of proposals in the area of each platform
   and the platform as a whole.

Conversion Stage

3. Admin. action: the figure in parentheses is the number
   of proposals acted upon by the Administration in each
   group. The figure outside the parentheses is the per-
   cent of the total number of proposals in each section
   that the raw score represents. eg. 1964 platform, the

Administration acted upon 12 proposals in the Welfare

policy area. The total number of proposals in the

platform concerning Welfare was 17. Thus the relevant

percentage is

$$\frac{12}{17} \quad X \quad 100 \quad = \quad 70\%$$

4. Figures for Congressional action and "E" proposals

are calculated in the same manner.

5. Total action = Administration action + Congressional

action + Existing or "E" proposals.

6. Supportive Congressional Action: the figure inside

the parentheses is the number of proposals receiving

favourable action from Congress. The figure outside

the parentheses shows the percentage of the total

number of proposals initiated by the Administration

that receive favourable action from Congress.

Output Stage

7. Legislation: shows the number of proposals gaining

legislative enaction and the percentage of initial

platform proposals the raw score represents.

8. Effective Action: includes legislation, Executive

Orders, Constitutional Amendments, and "E" proposals.

Again, figures are given in both raw scores and per-
centages.

Table 13 is a summary table that gives the flow of
demands for each party platform examined. Tables 14, 15,
16 and 17 give a more detailed analysis that encompasses
the flow of demands within each area category. Both
types of tables shows enaction figures at the three levels
of specificity.

Table 18 shows the conversion process in greater
detail. The indices of support for each year and each
area classification are given. The relative-support (RS)
and effective-support (ES) indices are estimates of the
support given to the Administration by the parties in
Congress-the government party and the non-government
party. Table 18 thus shows the support level given to
the President by his party in Congress and by the non-
presidential party. It also shows the overall level of
support given to the Administration by Congress as a
whole.

TABLE 13: SUMMARY TABLES FOR FLOW OF PLATFORM DEMANDS THROUGH THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

	INPUT		CONVERSION PROCESS					OUTPUT	
			INITIAL ACTION			TOTAL ACTION	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
	No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"E" proposals				
1952 SUMMARY TABLE									
TOTAL	95	100	38(36)	8(7)	4(4)	52(47)	72(26)	34(31)	41(37)
"A"	19	20	55(10)	11(2)	5(1)	72(13)	70(7)	39(7)	50(9)
"B"	42	44	42(17)	10(4)	2(1)	55(22)	82(14)	45(18)	45(18)
"C"	34	36	28(9)	3(1)	1(2)	38(12)	55(9)	19(6)	31(10)
1956 SUMMARY TABLE									
TOTAL	124	100	51(63)	2(3)	17(21)	70(87)	70(44)	37(46)	54(67)
"A"	29	23	76(22)	0	10(3)	86(25)	50(11)	40(11)	48(14)
"B"	43	35	40(17)	2(1)	26(11)	67(29)	71(12)	30(13)	56(24)
"C"	52	42	46(24)	10(2)	13(7)	63(33)	87(21)	42(22)	56(29)

SUMMARY TABLES FOR FLOW OF PLATFORM DEMANDS THROUGH THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, contd.

	INPUT		CONVERSION PROCESS					OUTPUT	
			INITIAL ACTION			TOTAL ACTION	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
	No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"E" proposals				

1960 SUMMARY TABLE

	No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"E" proposals	TOTAL ACTION	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
TOTAL	161	100	57(92)	1(2)	50(8)	63(102)	65(60)	37(59)	44(71)
"A"	42	26	69(29)	0	2(1)	71(30)	58(17)	36(15)	43(18)
"B"	72	45	63(45)	3(2)	7(5)	72(52)	67(30)	43(31)	53(38)
"C"	47	29	38(18)	0	4(2)	42(20)	72(13)	28(13)	32(15)

1964 SUMMARY TABLE

	No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"E" proposals	TOTAL ACTION	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
TOTAL	77	100	54(42)	8(7)	11(9)	75(58)	86(36)	53(41)	66(50)
"A"	15	20	47(7)	13(2)	13(2)	73(11)	71(5)	33(5)	47(7)
"B"	38	49	66(25)	8(3)	8(3)	82(31)	88(22)	66(25)	74(28)
"C"	24	31	42(10)	8(2)	17(4)	67(16)	90(9)	46(11)	63(15)

TABLE 14: SUMMARY DATA FOR 1952 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

	INPUT		CONVERSION PROCESS					OUTPUT	
	No. of proposals	% of total	INITIAL ACTION			TOTAL ACTION	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
			ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"E" proposals				
AGRICULTURE									
TOTAL	16	100	31(5)	0	0	31(5)	100(5)	32(5)	32(5)
"A"	2	13	50(1)	0	0	50(1)	100(1)	50(1)	50(1)
"B"	9	56	33(3)	0	0	33(3)	100(3)	33(3)	33(3)
"C"	5	31	20(1)	0	0	20(1)	100(1)	20(1)	20(1)
ECONOMIC POLICY									
TOTAL	13	100	31(4)	0	0	31(4)	75(3)	23(3)	23(3)
"A"	3	23	66(2)	0	0	66(2)	100(2)	66(2)	66(2)
"B"	6	46	33(2)	0	0	33(2)	50(1)	17(1)	17(1)
"C"	4	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1952 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, contd.

| | INPUT | | CONVERSION PROCESS | | | | | OUTPUT | |
| | | | INITIAL ACTION | | "E" | TOTAL | Supportive | | |
	No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS proposals	proposals ACTION	TOTAL ACTION	Congress. action	LEGIS- LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
FOREIGN POLICY									
TOTAL	16	100	50(8)	0	6(1)	56(9)	50(4)	25(4)	38(6)
"A"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
"B"	7	44	86(6)	0	0	86(6)	66(4)	57(4)	57(4)
"C"	9	56	22(2)	0	11(1)	33(3)	0	0	22(2)
GOVERNMENT									
TOTAL	19	100	31(6)	14(2)	7(1)	47(9)	33(2)	16(3)	21(4)
"A"	6	26	50(3)	20(1)	0	66(4)	33(1)	17(1)	17(1)
"B"	9	47	11(1)	0	14(1)	22(2)	100(1)	11(1)	11(1)
"C"	4	21	50(2)	50(1)	0	75(3)	0	1(25)	50(2)

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1952 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, contd.

| | INPUT | | CONVERSION PROCESS | | | | | OUTPUT | |
	No. of proposals	% of total	INITIAL ACTION ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"E" proposals	TOTAL ACTION	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATIVE	EFFECTIVE ACTION
NATIONAL SECURITY									
TOTAL	3	100	66(2)	0	0	66(2)	100(2)	66(2)	66(2)
"A"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
"B"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
"C"	3	100	66(2)	0	0	66(2)	100(2)	66(2)	66(2)
NATURAL RESOURCES									
TOTAL	14	100	35(4)	1(1)	0	36(5)	75(3)	29(4)	29(4)
"A"	4	28	50(2)	0	0	50(2)	50(1)	25(1)	25(1)
"B"	5	36	49(2)	20(1)	0	60(3)	100(2)	60(3)	60(3)
"C"	5	36	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1952 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, contd.

	INPUT		CONVERSION PROCESS					OUTPUT	
	No. of proposals	% of total	INITIAL ACTION			TOTAL ACTION	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
			ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"B" proposals				
WELFARE									
TOTAL	14	100	50(7)	29(4)	14(2)	93(13)	100(7)	71(10)	93(13)
"A"	4	29	50(2)	25(1)	25(1)	100(4)	100(2)	50(2)	100(4)
"B"	6	43	50(3)	50(3)	0	100(6)	100(3)	100(6)	100(6)
"C"	4	29	50(2)	0	25(1)	75(3)	100(2)	50(2)	75(3)

TABLE 15: SUMMARY DATA FOR 1956 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

INPUT		CONVERSION PROCESS					OUTPUT	
		INITIAL ACTION		"E"	TOTAL	Supportive	LEGIS-	EFFECTIVE
No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS	proposals	ACTION	Congress. action	LATION	ACTION
AGRICULTURE								
TOTAL 17	100	47(8)	0	24(4)	71(12)	100(8)	47(8)	71(12)
"A" 6	35	66(4)	0	17(1)	83(5)	100(4)	66(4)	83(5)
"B" 5	30	40(2)	0	20(1)	60(3)	100(2)	40(2)	60(3)
"C" 6	35	33(2)	0	33(2)	66(4)	100(2)	33(2)	66(4)
ECONOMIC POLICY								
TOTAL 34	100	53(18)	3(1)	6(2)	71(21)	50(9)	26(9)	33(11)
"A" 7	21	86(6)	0	0	86(6)	33(2)	29(2)	29(2)
"B" 17	50	47(8)	0	12(2)	59(10)	50(4)	24(4)	35(6)
"C" 10	29	40(4)	10(1)	0	50(5)	75(3)	30(3)	30(3)

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1956 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, contd.

INPUT		CONVERSION PROCESS					OUTPUT	
		INITIAL ACTION		"B"	TOTAL	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATIVE	EFFECTIVE ACTION
No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS	proposals	ACTION			
FOREIGN POLICY								
TOTAL 14	100	64(9)	0	7(1)	71(10)	78(7)	50(7)	57(8)
"A" 2	14	100(6)	0	0	100(2)	0	0	0
"B" 2	14	50(1)	0	0	50(1)	100(1)	50(1)	50(1)
"C" 10	72	60(6)	10(1)	70(7)	100(6)	60(6)	60(6)	70(7)
GOVERNMENT								
TOTAL 14	100	57(8)	0	29(4)	86(12)	50(4)	29(4)	57(8)
"A" 6	42	100(6)	0	0	100(6)	33(2)	33(2)	33(2)
"B" 4	29	50(2)	0	50(2)	100(4)	100(2)	50(2)	100(4)
"C" 4	29	0	0	50(2)	50(2)	0	0	50(2)

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1956 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, contd.

INPUT		CONVERSION PROCESS					OUTPUT	
		INITIAL ACTION			TOTAL ACTION	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"E" proposals				
NATIONAL SECURITY								
TOTAL 10	100	80(8)	0	10(1)	90(9)	88(7)	70(7)	80(8)
"A" 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
"B" 1	10	100(1)	0	0	100(1)	100(1)	100(1)	100(1)
"C" 9	90	78(7)	0	11(1)	89(8)	86(6)	66(6)	78(7)
NATURAL RESOURCES								
TOTAL 18	100	22(4)	11(2)	17(3)	50(9)	75(3)	28(5)	44(8)
"A" 4	22	25(1)	0	50(2)	75(3)	100(1)	25(1)	75(3)
"B" 4	22	0	25(1)	25(1)	50(2)	0	25(1)	50(2)
"C" 10	56	30(3)	10(1)	0	40(4)	66)2(	30(3)	30(3)

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1956 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, contd.

| | INPUT | | CONVERSION PROCESS | | | | | OUTPUT | |
| | | | INITIAL ACTION | | | | Supportive | | |
	No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS proposals	"E" proposals ACTION	TOTAL ACTION	Congress. Action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
WELFARE									
TOTAL	17	100	47(8)	0	35(6)	82(14)	75(6)	35(6)	71(12)
"A"	4	23	75(3)	0	0	75(3)	66(2)	50(2)	50(2)
"B"	10	59	30(3)	0	50(5)	80(8)	66(2)	20(2)	70(7)
"C"	3	18	66(2)	0	33(1)	100(3)	100(2)	66(2)	100(3)

TABLE 16: SUMMARY DATA FOR 1960 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

INPUT		CONVERSION PROCESS					OUTPUT	
		INITIAL ACTION		"E"	TOTAL	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS	proposals	ACTION			
AGRICULTURE								
TOTAL 14	100	50(7)	0	7(1)	57(8)	86(6)	43(6)	50(7)
"A" 2	14	100(2)	0	0	100(2)	50(1)	50(1)	50(1)
"B" 9	64	56(5)	0	11(1)	66(6)	100(5)	56(5)	66(6)
"C" 3	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ECONOMIC POLICY								
TOTAL 31	100	52(16)	6(2)	3(1)	61(19)	50(8)	32(10)	39(12)
"A" 7	23	71(5)	0	0	71(5)	60(3)	43(3)	43(3)
"B" 17	54	53(9)	12(2)	6(1)	71(12)	44(4)	35(6)	47(8)
"C" 7	23	29(2)	0	0	29(2)	50(1)	14(1)	14(1)

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1960 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, contd.

	INPUT		CONVERSION PROCESS					OUTPUT	
	No. of proposals	% of total	INITIAL ACTION			TOTAL ACTION	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
			ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"B" proposals				
FOREIGN POLICY									
TOTAL	25	100	44(11)	0	0	44(11)	91(10)	36(9)	40(10)
"A"	7	28	57(4)	0	0	57(4)	75(3)	29(2)	43(3)
"B"	10	40	60(6)	0	0	60(6)	100(6)	60(6)	60(6)
"C"	8	32	13(1)	0	0	13(1)	100(1)	13(1)	13(1)
GOVERNMENT									
TOTAL	26	100	53(14)	0	4(1)	57(15)	29(4)	8(2)	19(5)
"A"	9	34	77(7)	0	11(1)	88(8)	14(1)	0	22(2)
"B"	8	30	75(6)	0	0	75(6)	50(3)	25(2)	37(3)
"C"	9	35	11(1)	0	0	11(1)	0	0	0

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1960 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, contd.

| | INPUT | | CONVERSION PROCESS | | | | | OUTPUT | |
| | No. of proposals | % of total | INITIAL ACTION | | "E" proposals | TOTAL ACTION | Supportive Congress. action | LEGIS-LATION | EFFECTIVE ACTION |
			ADMIN.	CONGRESS					
NATIONAL SECURITY									
TOTAL	8	100	62(5)	0	38(3)	100(8)	100(5)	62(5)	100(8)
"A"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
"B"	3	38	33(1)	0	66(2)	100(3)	100(1)	33(1)	100(3)
"C"	5	62	80(4)	0	20(1)	100(5)	100(4)	80(4)	100(5)
NATURAL RESOURCES									
TOTAL	19	100	58(11)	0	5(1)	63(12)	64(7)	37(7)	42(8)
"A"	4	21	50(2)	0	0	80(2)	100(2)	50(2)	50(2)
"B"	8	42	50(4)	0	0	50(4)	50(2)	25(2)	25(2)
"C"	7	37	71(5)	0	14(1)	86(6)	60(3)	42(3)	57(4)

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1960 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, contd.

	INPUT		CONVERSION PROCESS					OUTPUT	
	No. of proposals	% of total	INITIAL ACTION				Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
			ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"E" proposals	TOTAL ACTION			
WELFARE									
TOTAL	38	100	74(28)	0	3(1)	76(29)	71(20)	53(20)	55(21)
"A"	13	34	69(9)	0	0	69(9)	78(7)	54(7)	54(7)
"B"	17	45	82(14)	0	6(1)	88(15)	64(9)	53(9)	59(10)
"C"	8	21	63(5)	0	0	63(5)	80(4)	50(4)	50(4)

TABLE 17: SUMMARY DATA FOR 1964 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

| | INPUT | | CONVERSION PROCESS | | | | | OUTPUT | |
| | | | INITIAL ACTION | | "E" | TOTAL | Supportive | LEGIS- | EFFECTIVE |
	No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS	proposals	ACTION	Congress. action	LATION	ACTION
AGRICULTURE									
TOTAL	4	100	100(4)	0	0	100(4)	100(4)	100(4)	100(4)
"A"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
"B"	4	100	100(4)	0	0	100(4)	100(4)	100(4)	100(4)
"C"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ECONOMIC POLICY									
TOTAL	17	100	52(9)	11(2)	11(2)	74(13)	77(6)	46(7)	60(9)
"A"	4	24	50(2)	25(1)	0	75(3)	50(1)	25(1)	25(1)
"B"	8	47	75(6)	0	12(1)	88(7)	66(4)	50(4)	63(5)
"C"	5	29	20(1)	20(1)	20(1)	60(3)	100(1)	40(2)	60(3)

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1964 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, contd.

| | INPUT | | CONVERSION PROCESS | | | | | OUTPUT | |
| | | | INITIAL ACTION | | | | Supportive | | |
	No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"E" proposals	TOTAL ACTION	Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
FOREIGN POLICY									
TOTAL	11	100	45(5)	0	0	45(5)	100(5)	45(5)	45(5)
"A"	2	18	50(1)	0	0	50(1)	100(1)	50(1)	50(1)
"B"	6	55	50(3)	0	0	50(3)	100(3)	50(3)	50(3)
"C"	3	27	33(1)	0	0	33(1)	100(1)	33(1)	33(1)
GOVERNMENT									
TOTAL	7	100	28(2)	14(1)	0	42(3)	50(1)	14(1)	14(1)
"A"	4	57	25(1)	25(1)	0	50(2)	0	0	0
"B"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
"C"	3	33	33(1)	0	0	33(1)	100(1)	33(1)	33(1)

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1964 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, contd.

| | INPUT | | CONVERSION PROCESS | | | | | OUTPUT | |
| | No. of proposals | % of total | INITIAL ACTION | | | TOTAL ACTION | Supportive Congress. action | LEGIS-LATION | EFFECTIVE ACTION |
			ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"E" proposals				
NATIONAL SECURITY									
TOTAL	8	100	62(5)	0	12(1)	75(6)	100(5)	62(5)	75(6)
"A"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
"B"	5	62	80(4)	0	0	80(4)	100(4)	80(4)	87(4)
"C"	3	37	33(1)	0	33(1)	66(2)	100(1)	33(1)	66(2)
NATURAL RESOURCES									
TOTAL	13	100	38(5)	15(2)	46(6)	100(13)	80(4)	46(6)	92(12)
"A"	3	23	33(1)	0	66(2)	100(3)	100(1)	33(1)	100(3)
"B"	5	38	20(1)	40(2)	40(2)	100(5)	100(1)	40(3)	100(5)
"C"	5	38	60(3)	0	40(2)	100(5)	66(2)	40(2)	80(4)

SUMMARY DATA FOR 1964 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, contd.

INPUT		CONVERSION PROCESS					OUTPUT	
		INITIAL ACTION			TOTAL ACTION	Supportive Congress. action	LEGIS-LATION	EFFECTIVE ACTION
No. of proposals	% of total	ADMIN.	CONGRESS	"E" proposals				
WELFARE								
TOTAL 17	100	70(12)	16(2)	0	86(14)	91(11)	76(13)	76(13)
"A" 2	12	100(2)	0	0	100(2)	100(2)	100(2)	100(2)
"B" 10	59	70(7)	10(1)	0	80(8)	86(6)	70(7)	70(7)
"C" 5	29	60(3)	20(1)	0	80(4)	60(3)	80(4)	80(4)

TABLE 18: INDICES OF SUPPORT IN CONVERSION PROCESS FOR EACH PLATFORM

	ADMIN. propos.	INDICES OF SUPPORT IN CONVERSION PROCESS								Supportive Congressional Action	
		GOVERNMENT PARTY				NON-GOVERNMENT PARTY					
		HOUSE		SENATE		HOUSE		SENATE			
		RS	ES	RS	ES	RS	ES	RS	ES		
1952	36	91	81	72	62	78	65	46	38	72	(26)
1956	63	78	72	90	74	78	70	85	70	70	(44)
1960	92	87	77	85	75	54	47	55	49	65	(60)
1964	43	87	81	86	73	60	54	63	55	86	(36)
1952											
AG.	5	95	87	97	79	47	44	48	40	100	(5)
E.P.	4	89	85	90	80	71	67	56	40	75	(3)
F.P.	8	69	62	65	60	85	75	90	87	50	(4)
GOV.	6	95	80	92	75	75	58	68	59	33	(2)
N.SEC.	2	100	89	voice vote		100	86	voice vote		100	(2)
N.RES.	4	92	86	75	69	72	43	38	36	75	(3)
WEL.	7	98	84	voice vote		95	82	voice vote		100	(7)

INDICES OF SUPPORT, contd.

	ADMIN. propos.	GOVERNMENT PARTY				NON-GOVERNMENT PARTY				Supportive Congressional Action
		HOUSE		SENATE		HOUSE		SENATE		
		RS	ES	RS	ES	RS	ES	RS	ES	
1956										
AG.	8	100	74	100	76	99	77	100	85	100(8)
E.P.	18	99	94	99	93	89	88	100	91	50(9)
F.P.	9	64	61	79	66	72	67	70	57	78(7)
GOV.	8	85	75	91	80	48	43	62	56	50(4)
N.SEC.	8	87	80	94	74	90	82	91	72	88(7)
N.RES.	4	92	83	99	82	99	90	100	87	75(3)
WEL.	8	voice vote		80	63	voice vote		89	73	75(6)
1960										
AG.	7	81	72	73	69	33	30	30	28	86(6)
E.P.	16	88	79	80	74	78	64	46	41	50(8)
F.P.	11	86	76	88	75	58	50	75	65	91(10)
GOV.	14	84	67	82	69	94	80	75	58	29(4)
N.SEC.	5	95	87	95	82	90	86	93	81	100(5)

INDICES OF SUPPORT, contd.

ADMIN.	propos.	GOVERNMENT PARTY				NON-GOVERNMENT PARTY				Supportive Congressional Action
		HOUSE		SENATE		HOUSE		SENATE		
		RS	ES	RS	ES	RS	ES	RS	ES	
1960, contd.										
N.RES.	11	91	87	voice vote		47	45	voice vote		64(7)
WEL.	28	87	81	84	75	33	30	33	31	71(20
1964										
AG.	4	86	79	85	72	45	40	72	69	100(4)
E.P.	9	91	81	85	70	78	72	63	51	77(7)
F.P.	5	75	69	78	69	40	38	73	66	100(5)
GOV.	2	84	67	86	76	82	66	59	48	50(1)
N.SEC.	5	100	92	97	77	97	93	100	93	100(5)
N.RES.	5	voice vote		100	75	voice vote		100	90	80(4)
WEL.	12	84	78	85	75	40	36	41	34	91(11)

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